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**INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS**

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**HEARINGS**

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER  
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS**

OF THE

**COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS**

SECOND SESSION

ON

**THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS**

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**PART 6**

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**JANUARY 24, 25, 26, AND 30, 1952**

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Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



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# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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## RESOLUTION

Whereas testimony of John Carter Vincent was received in executive sessions of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on each of 3 days, January 24, 25, and 26, 1952; after which Mr. Vincent testified in public session on 4 days, January 30, 31, and February 1 and 2, 1952; and

Whereas repetition in public session of all of the testimony given in executive session was deemed undesirable, from the standpoint of efficiency and economy; and, therefore, substantial areas of the testimony given in executive session were not again traversed in the public sessions which followed; and

Whereas before the decision was made not to repeat all of the executive testimony at the public sessions, the question of making the executive testimony public was discussed with the witness and his counsel; and

Whereas the witness, John Carter Vincent, and his counsel after having opportunity to read the record of the aforesaid 3 days of executive sessions, stated on the record, during one of the subsequent public sessions, that they had no objection to the public disclosure of the testimony taken in executive session; and

Whereas the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary deems the release of such executive testimony to be in the public interest: Therefore be it

*Resolved by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary*, That the testimony of John Carter Vincent taken at the executive sessions of the subcommittee on January 24, 25, and 26, 1952, be released from the injunction of executive secrecy, and be printed and made public together with the public hearings held on January 30 and 31 and February 1 and 2, 1952.

PAT McCARRAN.  
JAMES O. EASTLAND.  
HERBERT R. O'CONOR.  
WILLIS SMITH.  
HOMER FERGUSON.  
W. E. JENNER.  
ARTHUR V. WATKINS.

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THURSDAY, JANUARY 24, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
Washington, D. C.

EXECUTIVE SESSION—CONFIDENTIAL

The subcommittee met, at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Connor, Smith, and Ferguson.

Present also: Senators Magnuson and Hendrickson; J. G. Sourwine, counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent is the witness, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

**TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY  
WALTER STERLING SURREY, COUNSEL**

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please proceed, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, newspaper stories which preceded your return to this country indicated, quoting friends of yours, that your primary desire when you got back here was a full hearing which would give you an opportunity to clear your name in the public eye. Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you appear here today because you want to be here and you want to testify and cooperate with the committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I do. I have confirmed that in letters to the committee, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. The committee will shortly give you an opportunity to make such statement as you want to volunteer. I would like to ask at the outset, so that the record may show: when you were subpoenaed to this hearing, were you requested to bring certain documents?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have those documents with you?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You referred the letter of request to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have here a letter from the State Department of which a copy has been sent to you?

Mr. VINCENT. I have a copy, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, it is respectfully suggested that for the purpose of saving time today the traverse of this State Department letter be saved and we will put the letter into the record of the public hearing and then go into detail as to the documents.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. The gist of the letter is that the State Department has already furnished documents such as press releases and has declined to provide the others on the ground that to do so would inhibit free and frank expressions by Foreign Service officers.

Mr. VINCENT. May I say that I do have copies of those documents which the State Department sent. They had an extra copy made for me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have, sir, any of the documents which the State Department did not include?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. They mention several which they say their files do not contain. Do you have any of those?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it that the State Department says, you mentioned there once, as to letters that they are not sending on here?

Mr. SOURWINE. I will read an excerpt from the State Department's letter, sir:

With respect to the remainder of the requests it is noted that they call for a large number of internal documents of the Department of State. In many cases these are reports from the field. It is the view of the Department that preserving the integrity of the reporting by departmental officers is a matter of principle of the highest importance. It is equally important to protect the integrity of the internal memoranda in which views are exchanged in the formation of policy. The release of these documents would undoubtedly inhibit the free and frank expression of views by the officers of the Department. For these reasons, the request for these internal papers presents such serious questions of policy and principle that it has been felt necessary to refer the matter to the White House for reply.

Your request for the loyalty file on Mr. Vincent has also been referred to the White House as required by the Presidential directive of March 13, 1948.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the White House refuse?

Mr. SOURWINE. We have no word from the White House. This letter is dated January 22 and was delivered this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether the State Department also has ever considered the fact that, if these are held forever secret, you lose something, in that a man can falsely report and he is never called to task for it. It appears to me that that is a big thing in this question of reports.

The CHAIRMAN. I think right off the bat it puts this witness in a light that perhaps he should not be in, because it can be assumed that there is something there which may not be there at all, that they do not want to disclose with reference to this witness.

To my way of thinking that is a very unfortunate situation. What is more, their excuse for not giving us that seems to me the most flimsy in the world.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand, the witness has not claimed that these ought to be secret?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might say, on the contrary, it is the State Department's statement, in the letter, that Mr. Vincent has requested the Department to cooperate in making the documents available.

Senator FERGUSON. So he wants these delivered?

Mr. SOURWINE. The situation was that the committee wrote separate letters to Mr. Vincent and to the State Department asking for the documents in each of these 32 categories. Mr. Vincent referred his letter to the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter we will have to deal with at a later time. I think the State Department has forgotten the principal point of this matter, that national defense, the internal security of this country, means more than anything internal in the State Department. If this country is to be protected and secured internally everything in every Department should be made available if necessary so that security may be obtained.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you feel now, Mr. Vincent, because of the writing of this letter that you cannot disclose to this committee the



contents of reports and so forth that you may have made to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as my memory would enable me to recall actions of mine, but I do not think I could disclose the contents of reports, sir, as an employee of the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. It leaves you in the position that you really cannot testify on these matters?

Mr. VINCENT. Insofar as it is necessary to have those documents; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I know, but the contents of the documents?

Mr. VINCENT. I see what you mean.

Mr. SOURWINE. There are four documents mentioned here which the Department says do not appear in its records, thereby implying that they are personal to Mr. Vincent. I would like to ask about those four. One is referred to as a statement criticizing the statement of six members of the House Military Affairs Committee regarding Soviet intentions in the Far East. Do you recall such a statement, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir. I went over that and we looked over the statement of the six members but we found nothing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never made a statement?

Mr. VINCENT. I never made a statement to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. The text of a speech made at a conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Hot Springs, Va.?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of making a speech there. I took part in panel discussions but nothing in the way of a formal speech.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is nothing in your files such as a copy of a speech?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. A statement of November 4, 1946, concerning General MacArthur. Did you make a statement on or about that date?

Mr. VINCENT. What date?

Mr. SOURWINE. November 4, 1946.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of making such a statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. The text of an address delivered by you at Cornell University, January 21, 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. That was made from notes, Mr. Sourwine, and I may say that it followed very closely a speech that I had made at Wellesly College which has been published in a little book by Rutgers Press, but the other speech made at Cornell was made from notes which I do not have but which may be in Tangiers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that speech reported?

Mr. VINCENT. No; it was not reported to the press. It was a closed—not a closed—but not a meeting for the public.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I am jumping toward a conclusion for the purpose of saving time. Are you in your own opinion an expert on the Far East and far eastern affairs?

Mr. VINCENT. I should say, I am.

Mr. SOURWINE. You spent a substantial part—

Mr. VINCENT. As regards different areas, my primary activity has been as you know China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You spent a good deal of your life in China and in dealing with Far Eastern affairs?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the purposes of this hearing is the committee satisfied with that brief qualification of Mr. Vincent?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I think it might be appropriate at this time to let you make any voluntary statement that you came here to make.

Mr. VINCENT. Thank you, sir. I would like to read this statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long is it, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. It will take me exactly 5 minutes, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought if it were long we could get copies.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, I have no extra copies of it except for this one. May I proceed?

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:

I have requested an opportunity to meet with you for two reasons. First, to repudiate under oath certain irresponsible but very grave allegations made against me before this committee: and secondly, to give the committee whatever assistance I may in the conduct of its investigation.

On August 23, 1951, before this subcommittee, Mr. Morris asked a witness, Louis Budenz, the following question:

Mr. Budenz, was John Carter Vincent a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Budenz replied:

From official reports I have received, he was.

Insofar as the printed record shows, Mr. Budenz did not produce or describe the "official reports" to which he referred.

Later Mr. Morris again inquired:

Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that it was an official Communist Party secret shared by few people that at that time John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party?

"Yes, sir," replied Mr. Budenz.

Mr. Budenz also testified that I was described "as being in line with the Communist viewpoint, seeing eye to eye with it." When questioned as to his source, he answered:

That was stated by Communist officials in the Politburo at that time, by Mr. Browder and Mr. Jack Stachel.

I have never met either Browder or Stachel, but it is pertinent to recall that Mr. Browder testified before the Tydings committee that he knew of no connection that I had with the Communist Party either directly or indirectly.

On October 5, 1951, Mr. Budenz again appeared before the subcommittee.

Mr. Morris asked:

Mr. Budenz, have you identified John Carter Vincent to be a member of the Communist Party before this committee?

Mr. Budenz replied:

Yes, sir, from official communications.

Later, during this same hearing, Mr. Morris said that—

Mr. Budenz reported to me, as a naval intelligence officer, the fact that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party, and I made a report on that fact.

Gentlemen, anyone, including Budenz, who before this subcommittee or anywhere else, testifies that I was at any time a member of the Communist Party is bearing false witness; he is, to put it bluntly, lying. I do not pretend to know what motives guide Mr. Budenz. In my own case, his motives seem to be clearly malicious. He has endeavored before this subcommittee to support his allegations by strained suggestions and devious insinuation.

Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am not a Communist and have never been a member of the Communist Party. I have never sympathized with the aims of communism. On the contrary, I have worked loyally throughout the 27 years of my foreign service career in the interest of our own Government and people. I am strongly attached to the principle of representative democracy and to our system of free enterprise. These being the facts, the members of the committee will appreciate, I am sure, how disagreeable it is for me to find it necessary to affirm my devotion to our democratic institutions because of unfounded allegations made by Budenz or anyone else.

We cannot dismiss the Budenz testimony as a "mistake." Any attempt through malicious testimony to cause the American people to lose confidence in their officials, or in each other, is in itself subversive to the interests and security of our country. When, as in my case, the official represents his country abroad, the effect may be doubly harmful.

I am in full accord with the objectives of this subcommittee. The internal security of the United States, now probably more than ever before in our history, is vitally important to all of us. Our American way of life is threatened from within as well as from without. But we cannot, as I wrote you, Mr. Chairman, on November 9, defend democracy with perfidy or defeat communism with lies. And I wish to state, not as an official of our Government who has been falsely accused, but as a citizen who is deeply concerned for the welfare and security of his country, that irresponsible testimony such as Mr. Budenz is wont to give, might have its use in a totalitarian state but has no place in our American democracy.

Mr. Budenz has made other allegations concerning me which are equally untrue though less material. Other witnesses have appeared before your committee and made statements concerning me which are factually incorrect. Mr. Eugene Dooman's testimony concerning the formulation of a postwar surrender policy for Japan is most inaccurate; in fact, some of the policies which Mr. Dooman charges that I formulated were actually formulated under his chairmanship of the committee dealing with the problem, or by Governmental agencies in which I had no responsibility. Admiral Cook's testimony about my attitude toward making available certain ammunition to the Nationalist Government of China is in error. I wish to assure you that I am prepared to discuss and correct all such testimony and discuss any other issues which this committee may wish to consider.



But, gentlemen, my main purpose in seeking an opportunity to come before you has been accomplished. At the subcommittee hearings of October 5, 1951, Senator Smith is reported as saying:

Mr. Vincent should come here and challenge Mr. Budenz' statement and say "I am not a Communist." That draws the issue.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I now solemnly repeat: I am not and never have been a member of the Communist Party. I so draw the issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say to you, Mr. Vincent, that it is not alone membership in the Communist Party that constitutes a threat to the internal security of this country; it is sympathy with the Communist movement that raises one of the gravest threats that we have.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, I think I said in here that I had no sympathy with the aims of the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, that raises a question, if I might ask. Membership in the Communist Party is pretty difficult to determine, is it not? You have had experience with Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I would not say that I had enough experience with the Communist Party to know whether membership is difficult or not to determine.

Senator FERGUSON. To prove?

Mr. VINCENT. To prove whether one is or is not. I suppose one could prove very easily that one was a member of the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. You think it is easy for a person to prove—

Mr. VINCENT. One could prove it I suppose by producing a Communist Party card.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you not realize that many members do not carry a card, never have a card?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not true?

Mr. VINCENT. That is true as far as I know.

Senator FERGUSON. You are now saying in this testimony that you are not a card-carrying member and you have never been a member in any form, directly or indirectly, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct, sir, and that I have had no sympathy with the aims of the Communist Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, as an expert on the Far East do you recognize that communism is one of the major problems in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly do, Mr. Sourwine, and have recognized it for some time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever seen or read the Communist Manifesto, by Marx and Engels?

Mr. VINCENT. I have seen it but have not read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever seen or read State and Revolution, by Lenin?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever seen or read Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, by Lenin?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know about it?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't ever heard of that last one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see or read Foundations of Leninism, by Stalin?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall having heard of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see or read Problems of Leninism, by Stalin?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of it?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see or read History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, authorized by the Central Committee of the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see or read Program of the Communist International and Its Constitution, third American edition?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Any edition?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see or read The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, a resolution of the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, I haven't. My reading of Communist documents has not been broad.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you be able to characterize those documents as a group at all? Do you know what they represent?

Mr. VINCENT. I should say from the titles, and I can only speak from the titles, that they represented the Communist point of view on various and sundry subjects, as you mentioned.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would be all you know about them?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be all I know about them and I would gather that from the titles.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I have here a list of names of a number of individuals.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to simplify the questioning. The first question we want to ask is, Did you or do you know the individual named?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Second, Did you know, under any other name, an individual whom you now know or believe to be the person referred to?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Third, if so, what were your associations with the individual? Fourth, did you know at any time that the individual was connected with the Communist movement? If so, in what way, to your knowledge, was the individual connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You understand that is the information we want about each one of these persons?

Mr. VINCENT. And you will ask the questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. If agreeable with you I will simply read the names and it is intended to cover the first two questions: Did you or do you know the individual named? Did you know, under any other name, an individual whom you now know or believe to be the person referred to?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you say "No" when I read the name you are answering "No" to both the questions?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you say "Yes" we will go into it. A "No" answer is a denial that you ever knew the individual or that you ever knew an individual whom you now believe to be the person referred to.

Solomon Adler?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were your associations with Mr. Adler?

Mr. VINCENT. I have a piece here on Solomon Adler because I anticipated that, if you let me. I don't like to be inaccurate as to dates because there are many people.

The CHAIRMAN. What are you reading from?

Mr. VINCENT. These are notes, Mr. Chairman, that I made in anticipation because I haven't too good a memory for dates and people that I have known in the dim, distant past.

The CHAIRMAN. Are those notes made by yourself?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Were they all made by you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. I had assistance in getting the facts together.

The CHAIRMAN. You had assistance in getting the facts together?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, from Mr. Surrey.

The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you that assistance?

Mr. VINCENT. People in the State Department who would look up and find out as to when and where I had met somebody if I did not recall the circumstances. You see, many of these concern places and people whose service has not exactly coincided with mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you now here testifying as to Mr. Adler and the others on the basis of your own recollection, as refreshed?

Mr. VINCENT. As refreshed.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not simply telling the committee this is what somebody in the State Department says is the facts?

Mr. VINCENT: No (reading): I first met Mr. Adler in Chungking and that was in 1942, early 1942. It may have been late 1941. He came out as an assistant to Dr. Manuel Fox, who died some months later, in the matter of administering our interest in the Chinese currency stabilization loan, I think, of about half a billion dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. Under what department or authority did he come out?

Mr. VINCENT (reading): He came out under the authority of the Treasury Department, Mr. Chairman. I at that time was counselor of our Embassy in Chungking. In the course of the natural business between the Embassy and these people with the Treasury Department I did see Mr. Adler from time to time during that year and a half.

I was transferred back to Washington and did not see Mr. Adler

again until sometime in 1945. I think he made a trip home. I saw him once or twice then on business connected with China.

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1945 or 1946, I wouldn't be sure (reading): He at that time had become Treasury attaché. I then went to Bern as Minister. I did not see Mr. Adler again and have not seen him since that time. At Bern I remember receiving a letter from him in which, and I do not recall the exact contents, he asked me to give some estimate of his work at Chungking when he was associated there with me.

I did and replied that he had been, as far as I knew, a conscientious and hard-working Government employee and that I had no reason whatsoever to question his loyalty. I assumed from the character of his request that at that time, although I cannot testify to this, he was being examined by the Treasury Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that was when?

Mr. VINCENT. That was in either late 1948 or early 1949.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Mr. Adler is now?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not. I have heard from someone that he is teaching school somewhere, but I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. That I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall who introduced you to Mr. Adler?

Mr. VINCENT. I should say that Dr. Manuel Fox introduced him because he came after Fox.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you ever heard of him before that?

Mr. VINCENT. I had not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have told the committee your full associations with him?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time that Mr. Adler was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have reason to believe that he was?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now know or have any reason to believe that he is or ever was in the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Adler in Bern asked you to make some kind of a statement as to his loyalty; is that true?

Mr. VINCENT. As to his work at Chungking.

The CHAIRMAN. And at that time did he give you a reason for his request or why he was seeking such a statement from you?

Mr. VINCENT. He did, sir. He indicated that the Treasury Department wanted a statement from me on his work because he was—here I must testify completely from memory—that investigation was being made into his work while he was in Chungking.

Senator FERGUSON. Loyalty? Work?

Mr. VINCENT. His work. I would not say the letter said "loyalty"; but I do not deny it might have.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, you were familiar with the loyalty program?

Mr. VINCENT. Not at that time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever heard of it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I heard of it but had no familiarity.



Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that different departments were making inquiry about the loyalty of their members?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. This indicated to you then that this was a loyalty investigation?

Mr. VINCENT. It indicated to me that there might have been a loyalty investigation into Mr. Adler, but my testimony on him was solely as to his work and my estimate of his work in Chungking.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not put in the reply that you believed him to be loyal? Did you not cover the question of loyalty?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I would have to have a copy of the letter which I don't have to be able to answer that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think they would have been able to judge his work on other questions? They would have been able to determine what he had accomplished and so forth as far as being a representative of the Treasury?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I will say this: That I would have, and may have been perfectly free to say that I had no reason while Mr. Adler was working in Chungking to question his loyalty.

The CHAIRMAN. Right there, Senator, may I interrupt you? I am called away and I believe we might suspend for a few minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. Let the record show that the committee will recess until 3 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 3 p. m. of the same day.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator SMITH. We will come to order.

Mr. Sourwine?

#### TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY WALTER STERLING SURREY, COUNSEL—Resumed

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, we were discussing various names. I assume that the witness does remember the questions but it has been some time; this is an unusually long recess. The mention of the name is intended to ask these two questions: Did you or do you know the individual named and did you know under any other name an individual whom you now know or believe to be the person referred to?

I believe we had completed the discussion of Mr. Solomon Adler?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is Robert W. Barnett?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were your associations with Mr. Barnett?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my recollection (reading): Mr. Barnett came to China, Chungking, in 1942 with the OSS I believe on a very short mission. It's the first time I ever saw Bob Barnett. Then later, back in the Department of State after the war was over he came into the State Department to do some kind of economic work. He was never to my knowledge—I was in the Far Eastern Division and my associations with him were not close, primarily because our jobs were of a different character. He was an economist and still is in the State Department.

I saw him here some days ago in the State Department, but as I say he was a man that I met casually from time to time and may have been on committees where I served, but I didn't know him very well ever.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is not a social acquaintance of yours?

Mr. VINCENT. Never. I don't know his wife, I don't think.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time that Mr. Barnett was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did I ask you that question with regard to Mr. Adler?

Mr. VINCENT. You did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at any time know that Mr. Adler was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is Joseph Barnes.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first hear Mr. Adler's name connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I never have heard his name connected with the Communist Party, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. You are not acquainted with the testimony taken by this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I am not.

Senator SMITH. Where is Mr. Barnett? Is he here now?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Was not his father a missionary to China?

Mr. VINCENT. I think he was. Most of those boys were sons of missionaries to China.

Senator SMITH. I used to know his father years ago.

Mr. VINCENT. It is surprising how many of them are sons of missionaries and some day somebody can write a book on the influence of the sons of missionaries in the Far East.

Senator SMITH. This is a man who used to go to student conventions down in South Carolina during the summer?

Mr. SOURWINE. Joseph Barnes?

Mr. VINCENT. Joseph Barnes. Let me see. I have never had much association with Mr. Barnes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know him?

Mr. VINCENT. I know him. I just want to see the dates.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is Mr. Barnes?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Barnes, when I knew him, was a newspaperman. Yes; here I have a note jotted down (reading): I met Mr. Barnes first in 1942 when he came to China with Wendell Willkie. Subsequently on my return to Washington I probably saw Mr. Barnes once or twice. I met him socially in New York, I think, on one occasion. I have forgotten what the occasion was.

I have never met Mrs. Barnes, and we were not close associates.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was the last time you saw him, do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. The last time I saw him, my guess would be, was in 1946, but it might turn out to be 1947. It was at some time when I was in New York making a speech and there was a dinner afterward and he was present after the dinner.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever been in his home?

Mr. VINCENT. Never.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he married?

Mr. VINCENT. I am told he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Adler is married?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Adler is married, or was married the last time I met him, because he told me he had a new wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you ever met his wife?

Mr. VINCENT. No; but I think I met her when he came back here.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was the last time he visited Washington?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection would be that he was here some time before I departed for China and after the war closed, which would be in 1946, more likely than not, if that is when he married. I don't know when he married, but at the time I learned he was married was the last time.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was the occasion when he told you he had a new wife?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I think I either had lunch with him or saw him at the Cosmos Club, because I have a recollection of seeing his wife and was introduced to her as the new wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember who else was present on that occasion?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say offhand that it was just the three of us, although my wife may have been present. It was one of these downtown lunches.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give the party or did he?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I did. I think I did because I don't think he is a member of the Cosmos Club. I may have told him to meet me at the Cosmos Club.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is Mr. Barnett married?

Mr. VINCENT. I think he is, but I don't know his wife, at least I don't recall his wife, although I may have met her.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, when you said you met Mr. Barnes at a dinner in New York, under what auspices was that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know. I think he came in after dinner some time.

Mr. MORRIS. You said you were the speaker?

Mr. VINCENT. No, no, it was at a time when I was in New York making a speech and stayed on in New York. I was never given a dinner.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was the speech given?

Mr. VINCENT. It may have been my speech before the National Trade Council or it may have been the speech I made before the foreign affairs group.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Foreign Policy Association?

Mr. VINCENT. I made one. I was up there three or four times during the year. If I could recall I would tell you which one. I didn't usually go up to New York except to go up there to make a speech. I couldn't afford going up there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any correspondence with Mr. Barnes?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time that Mr. Barnes was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is Dr. Norman Bethune, B-e-t-h-u-n-e.

Mr. VINCENT. I can't, Mr. Sourwine, recall knowing Mr. Bethune, yet the name rings a mild bell somewhere. If you could possibly aid my memory in what connection I may have known him I might be able to contribute something.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry, I could not, naturally, make a suggestion in that regard.

Mr. VINCENT. Then my testimony is that I don't recall Mr. Bethune and yet there were so many people in and out of Chungking and in and out of my office that Bethune was somebody that I might have known.

Mr. MANDEL. Could I refresh your memory?

Mr. VINCENT. You could.

Mr. MANDEL. He was the head of a hospital in China. He is engaged in medical relief in China.

Mr. VINCENT. Chong Chow? There was a hospital that I was in myself in 1937. In Peking? There was the Peking Medical Society Hospital, a Rockefeller hospital, but I don't recall any association with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is T. A. Bisson, B-i-s-s-o-n.

Mr. VINCENT. I have a note here on Bisson, I think, if I may refer to it as to when I met him. The note here, well, could I say I have a recollection of meeting Bisson on several occasions? The one that is the most prominent in my memory, the others have faded away, is the IPR conference in Hot Springs in 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was Mr. Bisson?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Bisson at that time was connected with the IPR in some capacity and wrote for the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. What has been your association with Mr. Bisson?

Mr. VINCENT. Very slight indeed, as I have put here. As I say (reading): I may have met him on half a dozen occasions. These people came into the office on one matter or another. I don't know a Mrs. Bisson, I don't know where he lives.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you say you don't know Mrs. Bisson or a Mrs. Bisson?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know a Mrs. Bisson.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he married?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you corresponded with him?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. At any time?

Mr. VINCENT. There may have been an exchange of letters during 1944 or 1945 during that period when I was connected with the IPR, but as I say I don't recall any correspondence or the nature of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you have not corresponded with him at any other time?

Mr. VINCENT. No. He may have written me a letter while I was in China and I didn't know him. He may have written while I was consul in Dairen.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you know him?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't say that I did. But people would write you letters wanting to know what is going on in Mukden or Dairen.



Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where you met Mr. Bisson, first met him?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it you don't recall how you met him?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Bisson didn't make much of an impression on me, but I do know he was at the Hot Springs conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the last time you saw him?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't want to testify that was the last time, that was the last time according to my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not make any appointment with him for a meeting at any subsequent time?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall. I never sought him out.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you met he sought you out?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be my testimony based on my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or a chance meeting?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is Earl Browder?

Mr. VINCENT. I have never met to my knowledge Earl Browder.

Mr. SOURWINE. I forgot to ask the standard question, sir, with regard to Mr. Bisson. Did you know at any time that Mr. Bisson was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is Evans F. Carlson, C-a-r-l-s-o-n.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall ever meeting Evans Carlson at all. I have heard of him and understand he wrote a book, which I never read, but I never met him to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. We come now to the first of what will, before we are through, be many Chinese names. I do not speak the language, and I must apologize for what will undoubtedly be improper pronunciation in many cases.

Mr. VINCENT. May I apologize, too, that there are going to be many of these names that will be Chus or Yus or Yings and Yangs who just not through a lack of desire to be helpful but that I won't be able to place unless you can place them for me.

Mr. SOURWINE. The first name I have here is with my inadequate pronunciation, I will spell it—C-h-e-n H-a-n-s-e-n-g.

Mr. VINCENT. Chen Han-seng. I don't recall meeting Chen Han-seng. I knew him by repute in China, a professor there, but I don't recall my meeting with him. I want to continue that testimony. You meet many Chinese and I want to be quite frank with you that Chen Han-seng may have been in a meeting at Chungking or when I was in Kunming or he may have come here to the State Department with other Chinese but I don't recall meeting him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he was a professor?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought he was down in Kunming.

Mr. SOURWINE. About what time was that?

Mr. VINCENT. It would be the time when I was in China, which would be the last time, 1941 to 1943.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about the present connections of Chen Han-seng?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time that he was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name I have here is Ch'ao Ting Chi, C-h-'a-o T-i-n-g C-h-i. Or perhaps the Chi should come first?

Mr. VINCENT. Chi. I have met Chi (reading) : I met him in Chung-king when he was acting as assistant to Dr. H. H. Kung, K-u-n-g, when he was assistant to Dr. Kung and also was connected with the Stabilization Board. I saw him from time to time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met him before that?

Mr. VINCENT. I had not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall who introduced you to him?

Mr. VINCENT. My thought would be that the logical person would have been either Dr. Kung or Manuel Fox, who was head of the Stabilization Board.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether it was the logical person who did introduce you?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not remember whether it was the logical person.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know, in other words, who did introduce you?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I met him frequently on social occasions in the house of General Chiang Kai-shek because he was also a man who was there at any social functions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you meet him socially elsewhere?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall. Probably in Chinese homes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you yourself have any personal social intercourse with him?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he in your home or you in his?

Mr. VINCENT. He may have been in Dr. Gauss' home. We invited Chinese over to have lunch once a week and he may have been one of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any correspondence with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any correspondence with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall when or approximately when is the last time you saw him?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that I haven't seen him since I left China, but if he came to the States and was around at large functions such as they have in New York, Dr. Chi may have been there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he a doctor?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I think we called him Dr. Chi because he is a professor.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he a Ph. D?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know. I fell into the "Doctor" because he was a professor.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall when you last heard about him from anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you heard anything from him in the last 2 or 3 years?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I haven't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know and do now know that at any time Dr. Chi was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not. Judging by the closeness he had with Chiang Kai-shek and H. H. Kung I would certainly have thought he was the opposite.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would be surprised to know that he was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. The association that I had with him was in Chungking where he was almost a habitue of Chiang Kai-shek and Kung's home.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read any of the hearings of this subcommittee?

Mr. VINCENT. I have read those that were particularly pertaining to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you find out which were the ones particularly pertaining to you?

Mr. VINCENT. By going through and picking up my name; that on August 3 Mr. Bunde testified about me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who would tell you that?

Mr. VINCENT. Who would tell me? The books are up in the State Department, the three books that are now——

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought that in going through the books you had checked the subject index and read the pages where your name appeared?

Mr. VINCENT. I did in the first and in the second.

Senator FERGUSON. Has the State Department anyone working on these records?

Mr. VINCENT. What records?

Senator FERGUSON. Our hearing.

Mr. VINCENT. The books are all down there in the legal adviser's office and I have access to these books.

Senator FERGUSON. But is there any particular person working on it down there that helps you?

Mr. VINCENT. Several people who helped me, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is assigned to the task for instance?

Mr. VINCENT. There is no particular person assigned to the task. It is a matter where if we are trying to recollect a situation or something.

Senator FERGUSON. I meant for instance you say that in the legal department. Is there anyone there that reads them daily and digests them and gets in touch——

Mr. VINCENT. With me?

Senator FERGUSON. Or with somebody?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or with whoever is mentioned?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know of anybody like that?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. The gentleman with you is your counsel?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Private personal counsel?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Not from the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, do you want the committee to understand that you have, with respect to the first two volumes, read those portions and only those portions which were listed in the index as pertaining to you and that with respect to the third volume you have read some portions pertaining to you and that you have not read the fourth or subsequent volumes yet?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I would want the committee to know that I read, I believe, the volume of August 23. Is that not the date? I ran through, I believe, the index afterward of that one. How thoroughly I ran through the index of the next two volumes as they came out printed, I wouldn't know.

I read pretty thoroughly the volume of Admiral Cooke and the volume in which Mr. Budenz made his second appearance. There are many of the volumes that I have not gone through.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how many volumes there are as of now that have been released?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid I don't, Mr. Sourwine. I would guess about 12, but that may be wrong.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you reading them in manuscript form?

Mr. VINCENT. If you mean by manuscript form——

Mr. SOURWINE. Typescript.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not reading the printed record? It's typescript, in the form of duplication.

Mr. VINCENT. Typescript, but I had already read the August 23 one, but when the typed one came out I probably referred to the typed one because the typed one has some of the exhibits in it, I believe.

Mr. SOURWINE. I should point out that if you are reading them in the—that is, the 8-by-11 or 8-by-11½ size sheet, there is no index in those, so I have been talking about something that is nonexistent. When I was talking about the index I was talking about the printed volumes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I am aware that the printed volumes have an index where my name occurs.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you have not had occasion, or for some other reason, you have not read those through?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not read those through. I have no doubt the first volume, which I think carries the Budenz testimony, I again went through it to the extent of trying to see what exhibits were put in.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you read the original through? You are not saying that you read all of the originals through or all of the original through?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I do not recall seeing any mention in any of the volumes I read of Dr. Chi.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I meant. There is mention of him in those hearings.

Mr. VINCENT. If I saw it, it didn't ring a bell.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name I have here is spelled Chou En-lai, C-h-o-u E-n-l-a-i.

Mr. VINCENT. It is pronounced Chou En-lai, the present Premier of Communist China.



Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know him?

Mr. VINCENT. I did know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us to what extent and what was the nature of your association?

Mr. VINCENT. If I may check here because I would like to refer to these notes on him. Yes, here I have jotted down these things as exactly as I can (reading): As consul of the American Embassy I met Chou En-lai in Chungking several times. He was the representative in Chungking of the Chinese Communists, who had their seat of government at Yen-an. He had an official position recognized by Chiang Kai-shek, and it may have been a reception at Chiang's where I first met Chou.

I recall also meeting him at a luncheon in the home of an American manager of the British-American Tobacco Co. Also I met him when he made a courtesy call on Ambassador Gauss soon after Gauss' arrival and my own in the summer of 1941.

The last time I saw him was before my departure for the United States in May 1943. He called at the Embassy as I was leaving to meet George Atcheson, who was taking my place as chargé at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see you are using your notes for that?

Mr. VINCENT. Other things reminded me of that. I got the date for that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you attempted in those notes to set down, and have you attempted here in telling us about it to tell us about, all of the instances and occasions when you met Chou En-lai?

Mr. VINCENT. I have named so far all of the instances that I can recall of meeting Chou En-lai. I have another note here that (reading) my few conversations with Chou concerned conditions in the areas of North China occupied by the Communists. That would have been a logical topic of conversation, in particular, the conduct of military operations against the Japanese.

The information obtained by me and by other officers of the embassy was of considerable value to us in evaluating conditions in an area to which we had no access whatsoever at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Would he go out into the field himself?

Mr. VINCENT. Chou?

Senator FERGUSON. Would he?

Mr. VINCENT. He could have gone to Yen-an from time to time. Whether he did pass backward and forward I don't know, I would think he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether you ever had any private conferences with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I never had a private conference with him in the sense of the two of us getting together. He was at the luncheon I speak of. He came and told me goodbye when I was leaving. He met Atcheson. I recall it was made the subject of a memorandum, what he was describing as conditions, and I believe it must have certainly been submitted to the Department after my departure because I would have been home.

Senator FERGUSON. That would have been one of the papers sent by you, an appraisal of the Communists after you conferred with him?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have been a paper sent by me. To the extent

it would have been a factual report, it would have been what he had to say. I was more of a reporter than I was an appraiser.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have a conference with him at which you were the highest-ranking State Department official present?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, Mr. Sourwine, I wouldn't call them conferences, but I was probably the highest-ranking State Department official when the British-American Tobacco man gave his luncheon, which was the first time I recall meeting him.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was not referring to that kind of conference.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that the conference when he came over and called to say good-by, that Acheson was senior to me. We were both the same grade, but he had assumed charge of the Embassy.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was not Dean Acheson but another?

Mr. VINCENT. George Acheson, now dead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever participate in a conference with Chou at his headquarters or at his office?

Mr. VINCENT. I never was in his office that I can recall at all. I never made a call on him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever participate in a conference with him at his home?

Mr. VINCENT. I may have been in his home one time when he was there, but I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever participate in a conference with him away from American official premises and not in connection with some social gathering?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, Mr. Sourwine. I can give an all-embracing answer, I never had a secretive conference with Chou. That wasn't your question, but I can assure you I didn't have that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever correspond with him?

Mr. VINCENT. Never.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you answered fully in your opinion the question of whether you know that at any time he was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I know he was connected with the Communist movement.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you have known that since you first met him?

Mr. VINCENT. When I met him he was a known Communist representative.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his official title, if you have it?

Mr. VINCENT. That I don't recall, Senator, but it was something of the order of Representative of the District Government of Northern Shensi, and the Chinese were careful not to use the word Communist too much.

You see, the theory was maintained always, even the theory, that there was an official connection between Chungking and Yen-an during those years.

Senator FERGUSON. Even the Communists let that be believed?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. As a matter of fact, the Communist Army was described under the same general designation as other armies in China, I have forgotten, something like the Eighth Route Armies or Sixth Route Army. The Chinese Armies were given the designation "Route Army."

Senator FERGUSON. The Communists wouldn't say "Communist Army," they would refer to it as the Eighth Route?

Mr. VINCENT. They would refer to it as the Eighth Route Army or the Shensi Border Army or some title of that kind. No, officially it was not called the Communist Army.

Senator FERGUSON. Was their government called the Chinese Government?

Mr. VINCENT. No, it was called, I think—you are speaking now of what, the Chinese?

Senator FERGUSON. Chou's Government.

Mr. VINCENT. I think the Chinese would have referred to it as Shensi. Shensi is the province where the Yen'an Government was located. We called it the Chinese Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not deceived from the fact that it was the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not, I can recall.

Senator FERGUSON. So he was known to be a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. They were not, as I say, I recall quite distinctly myself that they were not agrarian democrats.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you refer to them as agrarian farmers?

Mr. VINCENT. I never did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. We will go on to the next name here, sir.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Sourwine, may I ask one question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. MANDEL. Would you describe the nature of the luncheon with the British-American Tobacco official?

Mr. VINCENT. I can describe it only that there were probably half a dozen people there and the only person I can remember is the host himself and the fact that Chou was there, which made quite an impression on me. The host was Dick Smith, Richard Smith, manager for the British-American Tobacco Co.

Mr. MANDEL. Is it not rather curious that you should be invited together with Chou En-lai? What was the purpose of it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know. Smith spoke Chinese. I didn't speak Chinese well. Chou speaks some English, and he was up there on business, just that kind of luncheon. I would like to be able to tell you that it had some special significance, but it didn't have any special significance to my mind.

I had, as I say, met Chou at a reception of Chiang Kai-shek before this luncheon, and he had made a courtesy call on Mr. Gauss.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that luncheon at the home of the host?

Mr. VINCENT. At the home of Mr. Smith.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that all, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name I have here would be, I imagine, Chu Teh, C-h-u T-e-h.

Mr. VINCENT. It's Chu Teh. I know he was head of the Chinese Communist Army. He never came to Chungking to my knowledge, and I was never in Yen'an.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is O. Edmund Clubb. I have these alphabetically, which accounts for the intermixture.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I put it down so I could be sure and tell you where Clubb's service and mine were together.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might say that we deliberately put these alphabetically so there would be no possible parallelism.

Mr. VINCENT. Mine are not in alphabetical order (reading): I find that I first met Edmund Clubb when he was assigned for language study in Peking in 1929. I was a student of Chinese there from 1928 to 1930, and our duties overlapped for about 9 months.

Our paths have crossed from time to time during the next 10 years, but we did not have service together again until 1941. In 1941 I stopped in Shanghai briefly on the way to Chungking as a consul and was later assigned to Chungking. I wanted to make a note that he was in Shanghai for those few months I was there.

I was a consul and Mr. Clubb came to Chungking after the people were let out of Shanghai by the Japanese, and he was assigned by the secretary to the Embassy in Chungking in 1942. I recall that his job at that time, which he was briefly there, was looking after our relations with the OWI activities.

Subsequently he was assigned to Tihwa in Sinkiang. Mr. Clubb served briefly with me in the Department during the period of 1943-44 before he was assigned to Vladivostok. I believe he was home on leave once before I left for Switzerland in 1947 and I no doubt saw him when he was about the Department.

That is a record of any associations I have had. I may add there that I have had associations with these younger officers from time to time. My association with Clubb probably has been less than with any others through no design of my own, but we just haven't been together in places and socially we never have been close.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it that with regard to what you have just testified to, it was more from notes than from memory. You are stating facts that you would not be expected to remember, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. For instance, if I did not have these notes, if I had not looked up Clubb's history, I would have forgotten that Clubb was there when I went to Shanghai.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you testified to is merely what the records of the State Department show?

Mr. VINCENT. And what his duties were. His duties in Chungking were with OWI.

Senator FERGUSON. Where would you find this kind of information in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I found this in the record of Edmund Clubb's biographic career.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the Official Register of the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. As to when he was at a certain place?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But that would not tell you that you met him at this spot and at this luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. No, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall the last time you talked with Mr. Clubb?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, Mr. Sourwine, but I would imagine it was when he was home on leave in between his coming from China and going to Vladivostok.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is he now?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know he is here in the city.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you seen him since you got back?



Mr. VINCENT. I haven't seen him since I got back.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember corresponding with him?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I do not remember corresponding with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk over the subject of communism with Clubb?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't believe I ever did talk over the subject of communism with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you feel that you have a real knowledge of communism?

Mr. VINCENT. I have a real knowledge of communism in the sense that I have seen it operate in China. As I indicated this morning, I am not a student of communism.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice you haven't read even the manifesto?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. How can a man be a Foreign Service officer these days and not know about communism?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, that is a very difficult question, but I have to answer the question that I am not.

Senator FERGUSON. I am wondering how a man could be a Foreign Service officer and not understand communism.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I just have to reply that it's part of my education that has been limited. While I was in the State Department I was busy and haven't had an interest.

Senator FERGUSON. But I am talking as part of your work. How can a man really do the job as a Foreign Service officer in the State Department and not know communism, not know what it is?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean not be a student of it?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right, know what its aims are and what it is doing and everything.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say, Senator, that, without having read these books that were listed this morning, that just by watching it in China I had a pretty clear idea of what its aims were.

Senator FERGUSON. What books have you read on communism or Marxism?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I don't recall of any that I have read. I probably have read one, but I can't recall one.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it is possible that some of your acts, some of your statements, may be in line with this philosophy and you not know it?

Mr. VINCENT. Some of my acts?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. If you have not been a student of it, could it be that you may be paralleling it in some lines and not know it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is certainly a possibility. As I say, I have to testify that I have not made myself a student of communism, and I have not read to any extent at all Communist books.

Senator FERGUSON. So your knowledge of communism is based on how the Communists acted in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. To follow Senator Ferguson's thoughts, have you read the two publications of the House Un-American Activities Committee on communism?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read the American Bar Association brief on communism?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know they had a brief on communism?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name I have here is Frank V. Coe, C-o-e.

Mr. VINCENT. Frank V. Coe, I recall, was in the Foreign Economic Administration.

Mr. SOURWINE. I beg your pardon; I forgot to ask you the question whether you knew at any time that Mr. Clubb was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now go ahead with Mr. Coe.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Coe, I recall, was an officer of some sort in the Foreign Economic Administration during the—well, how long he was there I don't know, but I was there from October until January—that is, October 1943 into January of 1944 when he was over in the Economic Cooperation Administration under Mr. Crowley. There is where I first met him, and as far as I can recall it's the last I met him until he, I believe, was a delegate at the IRP conference.

I could tell quickly whether or not he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which IPR conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Hot Springs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the only one you ever attended?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the only one I ever attended.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you yield for a moment?

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Senator would pardon me for just a moment?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the end of your association with Coe?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the end of my association with Coe.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You were asked a question by me about the Communists, and you indicated that you had knowledge of what they were, what they stood for and did in China, and then you were asked the question about Mr. Clubb, I think it was, as to whether or not you knew he was a Communist or sympathetic to the Communists, and your answer was "No."

Would you state for the record what were the principles of the Communists in China at the time you knew them and if they changed? Tell us what the change was.

Mr. VINCENT. The principles of the Communists as I first knew them in China, and that would have to be dated 1941, the announced ones were the unification of China and resistance to Japan. I am speaking now of what were their announced objectives.

At that time when I was there——

Senator FERGUSON. You mean unification because China was separated?

Mr. VINCENT. Separated because Manchuria was in the hands of the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean unification under Chinese Communist domination, do you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I was coming to that. They were not announcing they wanted unification under Communist domination. It became

apparent, as you went along and became more conscious of what they were doing in China, that their objective was not simply the creation, as they professed, of a unified democratic China, but it was a China which insofar as they could bring it about would be controlled by them.

In other words, it was a matter of wanting power. It was not so clear at that time how they meant to get the power.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was true; and their desire and objective was clear even as early as 1940 to you, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1940 I would have not reached that conclusion so quickly, because in 1940 the unity between the Generalissimo and the Communists had not broken down. You may recall, Mr. Sourwine, from 1937 to 1940 there was a fairly close military cooperation between the two, and it looked like the objective was as stated for the two to work together for defeating the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want the committee to understand that you, despite all your prior years in China and your familiarity with what was going on out there, did not until 1940 know the true nature and objectives of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. The true nature of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. SOURWINE. The true nature of the objectives of the Chinese Communists.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't want the committee to get that impression. I realize that a Communist Party was out to seize power. I saw it in 1930—not 1930—in 1926 when the wrangle came up between the two, and they tried there at Hankow and Canton to seize power.

Chiang Kai-shek eventually triumphed in 1927 over the Communists, and you had the other thing. There was clear evidence of what they wanted. I was speaking, when I said the other, the obvious thing when you were out in 1941 there was a certain unity in trying to defeat the enemy.

Mr. SOURWINE. That unity, that rapprochement, was a partial victory and a step toward total victory?

Mr. VINCENT. That was my interpretation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that not recognized by you and other well-informed persons?

Mr. VINCENT. That the Communists, if the opportunity presented, would seize power.

Mr. SOURWINE. That that was their objective?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. There was one other thing along that same line. They had two known things in mind, and that was, you say, in uniting of China, which would be getting back from Japan Manchuria, and the defeat of the Japanese?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was really one; defeat of the Japanese would have accomplished both of them?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How was that made known? Was that a published fact, or was that said in their open speeches?

Mr. VINCENT. On the contrary, their open speeches, as I can recall them, it was always based upon the desire for national unity in order to defeat the Japanese at that time. The Communists themselves, insofar as I can recall, never made an open declaration of a desire to achieve full power in China.



Senator FERGUSON. Not full power, but to have the land, not indicating who was to control it; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first come to the conclusion that the Communists of China were part and parcel of the Communists of Russia?

Mr. VINCENT. I should say that I never came to a definite conclusion, and I will frankly admit that there were many of us who hoped they never would for a long time. But it became, I believe, clearer toward the end of 1942 and 1943.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Mao's position in the Chinese Army?

Mr. VINCENT. Mao was always the head of the government.

Senator FERGUSON. Head of the Communist Government?

Mr. VINCENT. Up in Yenan where they had their seat; Mao Tse-tung.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you not known that he had been a Russian Communist, had been to Moscow?

Mr. VINCENT. He had been to Moscow, but Chiang Kai-shek had been to Moscow. I am not saying that Mao Tse-tung was not a Communist. I knew he was a Communist from the way he acted and talked. He never made any bones about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they talk about Russia?

Mr. VINCENT. In those days?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, but I never had any conversation with Mao.

Senator FERGUSON. You have never seen Mao?

Mr. VINCENT. I have never seen Mao.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any doubt back at the earliest time that there were Communists trying to dominate in China; that they were the regular Communists with headquarters in Moscow.

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I would not be able to answer that question fairly in saying that—did I ever have any doubt that they were Communists and had their headquarters in Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not say that you had?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't say that I had knowledge that they were regular Communists with headquarters in Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that now?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly take it for granted. I don't know it as a positive fact. I think they take their direction from Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you come to that conclusion that they were Communists and that they had their headquarters in Russia and were part of the regular Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say I came to that definite conclusion sometime during the period of General Marshall's mission to China in 1946; that I was also convinced that it was a Communist movement which wanted to achieve power in China, but it was only after the war that it became clear to my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time of the Marshall mission, what brought you to the conclusion that they were then under Russia?

Mr. VINCENT. Because it seemed to me that the difficulties which General Marshall was having with his mission out there clearly indicated that the Communists were getting support from just not themselves; that they were, if you want to put it, being guided by Moscow.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did the Communists do to make General Marshall's mission difficult?

Mr. VINCENT. By holding out for terms. You may recall—I may have to be a little lengthy there, and I am speaking purely from memory. You will recall that General Marshall went out in early 1946. There was at that time called by the Chinese, you remember, a constitutional convention or a people's political council, I think it was, as a preliminary thing to which the Communists were to send delegates.

When General Marshall arrived, I think that thing was about to be convoked or had been; and he had a certain degree of success, you may recall, in the first 3 months in bringing about a truce which was, I know as a matter of fact, one of the main objectives of General Marshall to try to stop civil war.

I mention civil war because in my mind, correctly or incorrectly, the worst that could happen in China in those days was the all-out civil war. As the negotiations went on after the spring, it became more and more apparent from General Marshall's telegrams back—we sent very few to him because he was in charge; it was his own show—that the Communists were making it more and more difficult in trying to get not a majority position in this so-called constitutional government but a position of greater influence than they were warranted in having, plus the fact that there was a certain amount of anti-Marshall propaganda that came out from time to time from the Communists that seemed to be inspired from elsewhere, it appeared to me.

I make that statement from memory because I do recall at one time Marshall complaining.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did the propaganda come from?

Mr. VINCENT. From the Communists in China. One or another would make a statement or speech throwing, or casting, some doubt on the sincerity of General Marshall in trying to undertake his mission to bring about peace.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think that was inspired by Russia?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought so; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What made you think that?

Mr. VINCENT. Because it seemed to have the flavor of propaganda that was coming out of a place not Chinese. That is hard to explain, but at the initial stages, in the initial stages, the Communists had seemed from Marshall's report to be quite agreeable to calling off war and of sitting down and talking things over with the Generalissimo, which is just what the Generalissimo wanted.

But in the spring it seemed to me that situation changed. Now I have purely a surmise, Senator. You recall I think it was in March that Mr. Byrnes—Secretary Byrnes, Jimmy Byrnes—was at a foreign ministers' conference in London; and at that conference, I think it was, it was the first time that the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Minister of Russia—mind you, the war was only over 4 months, 6 months—really got to calling each other names.

It was a very uncongenial conference. I have, as I say, in trying to piece these matters together, thought that at that moment the chances of success of Marshall's mission were certainly lessened tremendously because of the animosity that was developing between us and the Russians.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then you felt that Russia was in complete charge at that time of China's policy—that is, the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. That is I think difficult: saying Russia was in complete charge. I think at that time Russian influence on what Chinese Communists did or did not do increased.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your position in China when Marshall came out?

Mr. VINCENT. I was back here in the States, Mr. Senator, I was back in the Department of State.

Senator FERGUSON. You were back in the Department of State?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the memorandum as to what his mission was?

Mr. VINCENT. I was, sir. You mean the one that had been called the directive?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Were you familiar with that?

Mr. VINCENT. I was familiar with that.

Senator FERGUSON. Who drafted it?

Mr. VINCENT. It was drafted, I believe, in the War Department. If you wish I have dates and I can read a 2-page memo I have to be sure that I know what the sequence was.

Senator FERGUSON. What about that mission? When did it first come to your attention?

Mr. VINCENT. When did what come to my attention?

Senator FERGUSON. The Marshall mission.

Mr. VINCENT. The Marshall mission came to my attention for the first time when as you recall at the end of November General Hurley resigned, and the next day the President appointed or requested Marshall to go to China.

Senator FERGUSON. All right; now when did Hurley resign?

Mr. VINCENT. As far as I can recall Hurley resigned on November 26.

Senator FERGUSON. November 26?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I have that here. I don't want to tell you the twenty-sixth when it really was the twenty-seventh. Yes, on November 27 the President asked General Marshall to undertake a mission for him. General Hurley had submitted his resignation as Ambassador the day before.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. On the twenty-sixth he resigned, and on the twenty-seventh the President asked General Marshall to go?

Mr. VINCENT. Undertake a mission, not as an Ambassador.

Senator FERGUSON. No. When did you first hear about the directive?

Mr. VINCENT. I first heard about the directive in the sense that it came over from the War Department. I was asked on the 28th of November to draw together quickly something on the basis of which Byrnes could talk to General Marshall about what was his general idea of his mission.

Senator FERGUSON. You were asked to draw up a memorandum for Byrnes so that Byrnes could have a conversation with Marshall as to his mission on the twenty-eighth?

Mr. VINCENT. As to what were the Department's general ideas on the thing. It was not a directive.



Senator FERGUSON. It was getting in line for a directive?

Mr. VINCENT. Marshall had to have something as a background.

Senator FERGUSON. So the next day after his naming Marshall—was that a public naming on the twenty-seventh?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was public?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. George Marshall was then testifying before a joint committee here in the Senate?

Mr. VINCENT. On Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. He was then under cross-examination.

Mr. VINCENT. I remember that.

Senator FERGUSON. He was named and indicated that he had to leave immediately for China; is that not true?

Mr. VINCENT. He left on the fifteenth of December, I think; that is true. Up until the day almost that he left I am told he was with the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Did you draw a memorandum as to what a directive should contain?

Mr. VINCENT. Not as to what the directive should contain because I want to be exact. I have it here.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, if you want to.

Mr. VINCENT. I would like to as a matter of history. The following is my recollection of the development of the directive to General Marshall.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will pardon the interruption, did your counsel assist you in that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, this is from my own memory in getting dates. You will find at times I couldn't even get a date.

In the autumn of 1945 we in the Department were becoming increasingly concerned over developments in China. It looked as though China were heading rapidly toward a general civil war. There was much press and public criticism over the stationing of our marines in North China. Disarmament and repatriation of Japanese soldiers in China was moving slowly.

We had flown three or four of Chiang Kai-shek's divisions from South and Central China to North China, mostly to the Peking-Tientsin area. The objective of this move was to place Chiang's troops in the position to take the surrender of Japanese troops. But there was strong indication that the Nationalist Army was finding it difficult if not impossible to gain control of rural areas held by Communists.

Our marines had to be used directly in effecting surrender of Japanese troops.

I have that as a background [reading]:

In late October or early November I was asked to prepare a memorandum regarding the situation and what we could do about it. This I did, setting forth four alternative procedures which may be briefly described as follows:

- (a) All-out support for the government of Chiang Kai-shek;
- (b) Normal diplomatic relations with the National Government while refraining from taking any part in internal affairs;

(c) Assistance to the Chinese Government in bringing about a settlement with non-Kuomintang groups including the Communists in order to avoid general civil war (at this time discussions were under way among the various Chinese political groups with that idea in mind, but they were making little headway);

(d) An international conference of interested powers to seek a solution.

Senator FERGUSON. Those are the four?

Mr. VINCENT. Those are the four. That was a memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a memorandum that you had prepared?

Mr. VINCENT. That is a memorandum that I had prepared.

Senator FERGUSON. That was while Hurley was still in China?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make a recommendation on any of those?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I have never seen that memorandum. I did it over a week end and haven't seen it since that day.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how long it was before the 28th?

Mr. VINCENT. That would have been done the latter part of October or the early part of November, probably the latter part of October, so probably it would be a month before Hurley resigned.

Senator FERGUSON. Now on the 20th did you prepare a new memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. This memorandum was submitted to the Secretary of State, to the White House, and to the War Department. Procedure (c) was chosen as furnishing the most practical approach to the existing problem.

Senator FERGUSON. Was (c) the one?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; (c) was the one chosen to assist the Chinese Government and avoid civil war. In other words, to bring about a settlement with the non-Kuomintang groups, including the Communists, in order to avoid civil war.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, in your memorandum in the last part of October did you recommend a taking of the Communists into the Chiang Kai-shek government?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; these were four alternative procedures that I set forth as clearly as I could, and I was never consulted at any time as to the selection of (c).

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn that they had chosen (c)? Your (c) is so indefinite I would not know how a man would take that and say that it was a consolidation of the two governments.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I am trying to do this from memory because I haven't seen that document since I wrote it 5 years ago, but that was the general tenor of it, assistance to the Chinese Government in bringing about a settlement with non-Kuomintang groups, including the Communists, in order to avoid civil war.

It was not a new idea. It was an idea that General Hurley had pursued during his Ambassadorship of trying to bring about some kind of settlement during the war for military cooperation.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 28th what did you do?

Mr. VINCENT. I had better read here.



General Hurley had submitted his resignation as Ambassador the day before. On November 28 I was asked to prepare something to indicate to General Marshall our line of thinking in the Department. That was the first time that I realized—

Senator FERGUSON. When did you prepare that?

Mr. VINCENT. That was when it was indicated to me that that was going to be prepared along the lines of my point (c). This I did in the form of a rough outline of possible courses of action. This memorandum was, I believe, handed to General Marshall on November 28 or 29 by Mr. Byrnes.

Senator FERGUSON. So you did not take long to draw that up?

Mr. VINCENT. No; it was a rough memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you recommend?

Mr. VINCENT. In my memorandum I suggested assistance to Chiang in recovering Manchuria and steps to assist the Chinese in bringing about a military truce and a settlement of political difficulties through a general political conference.

I also stated that political peace in China was impossible as long as there existed autonomous armies such as the Communists had, and suggested that all armies be united and organized under the National Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you recommend the taking of the Communists into the Government?

Mr. VINCENT. The Communists were included in my statement here, "a settlement of political difficulties through a general political conference."

Now whether that would have resulted in the Communists coming into the Government or not I wouldn't know, but it was in my mind, I can assure you that.

Senator FERGUSON. It was?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you recommend in this memorandum the taking of the Communists into the Nationalists?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that I recommended specifically, but when I said taking other political parties in I had the Communists in mind.

Senator FERGUSON. You had the Communists in mind. Did you not indicate that the Communists if they went in wanted such power that they would in effect take it over?

Mr. VINCENT. That brings up a question of tactics which I would be glad to explain. We were, as I say, terribly concerned over the results of an outbreak of general civil war in China. I was particularly. I had been in China and had seen the effects of civil war on the country.

Senator FERGUSON. But coming back, I understood you to tell me before that you knew that if you took the Communists in that they wanted a greater power than they were entitled to, indicated to you that Russia was in command?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that is what I was coming to, Senator, was in my conception that you had a better chance of taking the Communists in in more ways than one by bringing them into a government

on a minority basis, not against the wishes of Chiang Kai-shek's government, but they themselves were at that time negotiating.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, you told me in the meeting in London it was clear to you then that they wanted a domination. Prior to that, were you not also of the opinion that if you ever took the Communists in they would dominate the Government?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have been willing to say that the Communists would try to dominate the Government, but I still believed that you could have taken them in, not forced them on Chiang, but Chiang could have taken them in in more ways than one on a minority basis.

There were at the time Communists in the Italian and French Governments who were eliminated. But I was trying to avoid what I thought honestly was the worst possible disaster that could come to Chiang, which was the outbreak of general civil war.

Senator FERGUSON. Could that be any worse as far as America was concerned than to have the Communists take over the government and not have a civil war?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, my concept was that the Communists would come into the Government on a minority basis and that we could, through support of the Chiang Kai-shek government, and I think you will find this philosophy stated in my memorandum, that with help from us we could eventually strengthen the Chinese Government enough to eliminate the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. To kick them out?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I stated that in so many words.

Senator FERGUSON. In this memorandum of the 28th did you state that?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, but I did in the subsequent memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after that?

Mr. VINCENT. I should say some time in the spring or summer of 1946.

Senator FERGUSON. When did this memorandum come over, back from the Army?

Mr. VINCENT. The memorandum came back from the Army—this memorandum, as far as I can recall, was handed by Mr. Byrnes to General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 28th or 29th?

Mr. VINCENT. On the 28th or 29th. Subsequent to that, some time in the following week, a memorandum came back from the War Department which General Marshall either drafted or had drafted. This statement then came back. Mine had been entitled "Rough Outline."

This one came back as Statement of Policy Toward China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Beyond the change in titles what difference was there?

Mr. VINCENT. There was a vast difference. It was a memorandum, as I have said here, and some of the phraseology and thought in my memorandum was there, but it was in composition and character a much bigger paper. Mine ran to two pages, I think, and this one ran to probably six, and mine was not a directive.

I didn't realize that Marshall was going to want a directive. This was jotting down the ideas that I thought were important.

Senator FERGUSON. Then Marshall drafted his own directive?

Mr. VINCENT. Marshall drafted or had drafted. I would doubt that General Marshall, as busy as he was with the committee, had drafted it.

Senator FERGUSON. Somebody in his Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Somebody at the War Department, if he did not himself, drafted this long statement.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel that if it had been drafted in the State Department that you would have been part of it?

Mr. VINCENT. If it had been drafted in the State Department, as Director of the Far Eastern Office I would certainly have had something to do with it.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you called in conference at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I want to finish this (reading): That memorandum came back to the State Department sometime during the first week of——

Senator FERGUSON. December?

Mr. VINCENT. December [reading]: There were some changes and I can't recall them, but they were not changes of any great merit. This was already Marshall's idea. Some additions were made for clarification and then it was sent back again to the War Department during the first week of December.

Then the next thing, and the last thing I had anything to do with it, was on December 9, as I think both General Marshall and Mr. Acheson testified. There was a meeting in Byrnes' office to go over the final draft of this statement of policy toward China, which has been called the Marshall directive, and it was agreed upon by Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any changes made at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. At that meeting I don't recall any other drafting.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you present?

Mr. VINCENT. I was present, Mr. Acheson, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Hull, and General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it appears that here when there was a grave diplomatic move to be made that the Army dictated that move. It was their directive?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say that the Army dictated that move, but I am sure that General Marshall, who then considered himself as a civilian, had a great deal to do, not with the drafting, but with the general ideas.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he know about the situation in China? Here was a memorandum drafted in the War Department, you assumed in your answer, and said it was Marshall that directed it. What did he know about the conditions in China?

Mr. VINCENT. He probably had kept up with them as well as any intelligent man would, but he had in the War Department, I am quite sure, officers who had just come back from service in China.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who they were?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you feel that you had a grasp of the situation in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Both politically and militarily?

Mr. VINCENT. Insofar as I could trust the information that was coming to me. I hadn't been in China for some time.



Senator FERGUSON. For how long?

Mr. VINCENT. I hadn't been there since 1943.

Senator FERGUSON. You left there in 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. I left there in 1943, and this was in 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Who in the State Department knew more about conditions in China at that time, at the time of the drafting of this document, than you?

Mr. VINCENT. That is a difficult question, Senator, to say. Let me think of the people who might have known more of conditions than I. We all read the same papers and had the same information.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you the top man?

Mr. VINCENT. I was the Director of the Far Eastern Office.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So it would be natural that they would come to you as the man who had the most knowledge and the best insight into the whole problem; is that not right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you sanction and agree that the Marshall directive as drafted by the War Department was the way to solve this problem?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were consulted?

Mr. VINCENT. I was consulted, the memorandum, as I say, came back, and we saw the full draft. There were some minor changes made in it, but I want to say that I was fully in support of the objectives of what General Marshall was going to try to do.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you were?

Mr. VINCENT. I was.

Senator FERGUSON. You say the objectives, did you believe in the method that was laid down to do it, of taking them in?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What made you believe that if you ever took them in you could get them out?

Mr. VINCENT. What made me believe that was the fact that they were going to come in on a minority basis; that was clear all the time. The Chiang Kai-shek government was to be strengthened, not publicly, through assistance, and that there would be positions where, as I have stated before, and I have this on record some place or another, that the idea was to take them in in more ways than one.

Let me make this clear about Marshall's mission. One of the main things was the stopping of the civil war. As I say, I don't know that I was right or wrong in that, but I dreaded the idea of China being embroiled in the civil war immediately after the war.

Senator FERGUSON. But did you argue the point that you always had to keep Chiang Kai-shek's government in the forefront with aid and support?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In such a way that this other would always be a minority?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir, so much to the point that I said it to a member of the Chinese Embassy here in this city.

Senator FERGUSON. No, no, but did you say it to Marshall?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.



Senator FERGUSON. So he understood how you felt about it, that if they did not dominate the situation they would lose this thing, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. That the Chinese had to dominate.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, the Nationalist Government?

Mr. VINCENT. And in the last analysis that is what—I am working from memory here now—what in the last analysis broke it down was the excessive demands of the Communists as to representation in a new government.

Senator FERGUSON. Well now, you did not know anything about the strategy in the military situation over there?

Mr. VINCENT. In what military situation, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. In China?

Mr. VINCENT. I mean in the military situation, the war was over.

Senator FERGUSON. Between the Nationalists and the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. We knew that, as I have testified here, that in north China Chiang was having a terrible time taking over those areas from the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Then did you not know that if you stopped that, that you might give the Communists a great edge over Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. If you stopped this war?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Marshall tell you that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he know anything about the conditions there?

Mr. VINCENT. He found out very quickly, and an indication of that is that General Marshall immediately set about organizing these truce teams to stop the fighting; that was his own idea.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out about giving aid. What did you know about that?

Mr. VINCENT. That was not taken into consideration that you were actually aiding the Communists by preventing a civil war.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever consulted after the final draft of the Marshall document?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Acheson present at the final draft?

Mr. VINCENT. I had already taken off for Moscow with Mr. Byrnes. The final draft, when it was adopted in the White House and handed to General Marshall, if that is what you mean, that was on the 14th.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Dean Acheson in the Department with you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he consent to this draft?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Byrnes consent to it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir, on the 9th, and a day later he was over to the White House, took it over to the President and the President approved it. It was approved by General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any argument at all to the effect that once you put the Communists into this Government there was a probability that it would be the government of the future?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, no argument that I heard of because it was based probably mostly on the hope that this plan would succeed in subordinating the Communists in the Government rather than making a trial of arms and civil war.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but you do not solve problems by hopes, do you?

Mr. VINCENT. I know you don't, but I will say that was the estimate you had to operate on.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew the military upper hand was in the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. The upper hand insofar as Chiang holding central and south China?

Senator FERGUSON. The upper hand was held by the Communists in north China?

Mr. VINCENT. We had assistance. We helped Chiang in taking over Tientsin and Peking by flying his divisions over there.

Senator FERGUSON. After Marshall left here with the directive you did not know whether or not the State Department was consulted?

Mr. VINCENT. Consulted in what manner?

Senator FERGUSON. As they were going along?

Mr. VINCENT. On the general operation of his mission? No. General Marshall, under the directive, had, I should say, a free hand.

Senator FERGUSON. And exercised it?

Mr. VINCENT. And exercised it.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did you stay in Russia? Did you go over with Byrnes?

Mr. VINCENT. I went over with Byrnes in December for that short conference at Christmas time with the Russians and came back.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a very short time?

Mr. VINCENT. Half a month.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Marshall consult the State Department at all?

Mr. VINCENT. After he went to China?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. That I do not recall. My general impression is that we did not have telegrams from him asking for advice. He kept us very well informed in telegrams of about once every 10 days or 2 weeks.

Senator FERGUSON. But not asking for advice, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. When did he come back?

Mr. VINCENT. He came home in March, and there were conferences that he had with Byrnes, but they were not in the sense of conferences having to do with what he could do.

Senator FERGUSON. Telling you what he had done? When did he make the statement to the effect, "Plague on both your houses"?

Mr. VINCENT. He made that, I should say, in the first week of January 1947, after he came home.

Senator FERGUSON. After he finally came home?

Mr. VINCENT. After he finally came home. Whether he had assumed the secretary of state ship by that time or not I don't recall, but it was all in that week.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you leave this China desk or the Far East desk?

Mr. VINCENT. I left the Far East desk July of 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. So you were in all the time?

Mr. VINCENT. All the time the mission was out there and after Marshall came back.

Senator FERGUSON. And there was no advice sought from your desk on the situation?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. VINCENT. When I make a positive statement like that there may have been questions as to this, that, or the other.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do not recall any of them?

Mr. VINCENT. On the over-all policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask a series of questions?

Senator FERGUSON. You go right ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since this subject has been opened up I would like to ask a series of questions. Going back, sir, you said you had prepared a memorandum on the situation?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was prior to the directive, it was not a directive, it was what you got together hurriedly, as you say?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to distinguish between that one I made at the end of October and the one I made at the end of November.

Mr. SOURWINE. The rough draft for the use of Mr. Byrnes?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was sent over to the State Department and subsequently a draft came back which was a much longer draft, in pages about a 2 to 6 ratio?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say so.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want you to tell the committee what, if anything, there was in the Marshall draft—that is, the one that came from the War Department—that was at variance with any of the concepts or suggestions that were in your rough memorandum.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think there were any.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was merely an expansion then?

Mr. VINCENT. The Marshall draft came back incorporating this idea of trying to seek a truce; that was one of the ideas. It had more ideas than mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. But there was no variance?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say there were some changes by way of clarification before it went back to the War Department the second time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you participate in making any of those changes?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew then that there were changes, but they were not of any consequence?

Mr. VINCENT. They were not of any consequence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then the final draft came back?

Mr. VINCENT. The War Department got it, and they brought it over to this meeting of December 9.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had they again made further changes?

Mr. VINCENT. I think they did.



Mr. SOURWINE. Were they of any consequence?

Mr. VINCENT. None.

Mr. SOURWINE. You sat in on the conference approving the final draft?

Mr. VINCENT. Approving the final draft insofar as Byrnes and General Marshall were concerned. The President finally approved it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had three cracks at it? First, you prepared the rough draft memorandum; and, after that had been expanded but without in any way changing your concepts or suggestions, you had a chance to make further suggestions and did make or approve some; and then you were present and concurred in the final approval?

Mr. VINCENT. My concurrence was not necessary in the final approval when General Marshall and Mr. Byrnes were there.

Senator FERGUSON. Not to interfere with your line of thought, I just wanted to know when George Marshall left the War Department.

Mr. VINCENT. Let me see. That is a question that I will just have to guess on here. My recollection is that he left almost immediately after the war was over with Japan. At least he hadn't been out more than 2 or 3 months when he was asked to come back.

Senator FERGUSON. But he was not in the Government at the time the President asked him to come back?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for the fact that the War Department, of all departments, was drafting a diplomatic document and implementing and saying how it should be implemented? You did not have any implementation in it at all. How do you account for the War Department, of all departments, drafting a diplomatic document and handling its implementation?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, there were many people over in the War Department who had a great familiarity with the situation. There was still in China—our own forces which had not been deactivated. I want to be fair to the Army. There were many people over in the Pentagon Building who had a very up-to-date and clear idea of the situation in China, which even still was military in the sense of the surrender of the Japanese troops.

I don't know how many there were, but it was something over a million.

Senator FERGUSON. But there was that great diplomatic problem of the negotiation between the Communists and the non-Communists. You had had an Ambassador, you had had a Department of State staff there, and you were head of the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Here was the Army drawing the directive and the implementation of a directive, taken out of your hands really; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I hate to testify that it was taken out of my hands, because they did send it back and give us a crack at it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not taken very far out of your hands when you had initiated the policy, and had one chance to correct it, and saw it at the finish?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. Not just I, but Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Acheson.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was speaking specifically of you because it was from you virtually alone that the initial rough draft came?



Mr. VINCENT. Yes. As I testified, I had no argument with the document as it came over.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you confer with any of these Army people?

Mr. VINCENT. No. While it was being drafted?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you did not confer with them?

Mr. VINCENT. No; except on the 9th when General Marshall came over.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made a very interesting statement, sir, in the course of your discourse with Senator Ferguson and in response to his questions you said, speaking, I presume, of yourself and others, "We all read the same papers, we all had the same information."

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What papers and what information are you talking about?

Mr. VINCENT. I am speaking of information coming in from reports. I think we will have to go back and remember what Senator Ferguson's question was. Who did I consider the best-informed person on the Far East? When I say "we all," I have in mind my own Deputy Director, who is Mr. Penfield.

Anything of importance was read by Mr. Acheson; and the Chief of the China Division, who was Mr. Drumright at that time, would read them. These were not immature people, I mean. Everybody in the State Department had access to them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that include reports from Mr. John Stewart Service?

Mr. VINCENT. That would include whatever reports came in. John Stewart Service during this time was not in China; he had already been sent to Tokyo.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was not thinking of a particular period.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would include such reports as were coming back. In other words, would it be correct to say that the thinking not only of yourself, ex officio, so to speak, but of the others around you in the State Department was conditioned by the reports that came in that you all saw?

You all depended primarily on the reports you saw from the field; therefore, you and the others around you could be expected to have substantially the same views about the matters which you were considering?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; and we also saw reports from General Wedemeyer. His reports were made available to us, too. I will say that in an operation of that kind we didn't depend entirely on reports from the field for making up our minds on things. It was a case of bringing our experience to bear and using the reports to reach a decision.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the reports or memoranda were in the Department, would they also circulate the same way so that they would all see them?

Mr. VINCENT. They would in the Far Eastern Office. Any person with sufficient rank to merit having it. For instance, General Marshall's reports back were seen only by General Carter, who was in the

State Department as his assistant; myself; Dean Acheson; and the Secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, to turn to another point, you have three times used the phrase, "take the Communists in in more ways than one." I got the feeling that you perhaps had used that phrase yourself at an earlier time either in arguments or something you had written.

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall where you used it?

Mr. VINCENT. I used it, and I have to—before I left China in 1942.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a phrase you have used often?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I know it was a concept I had that the best way to take the Communists in—and it is based on the knowledge of fighting and civil war—was to take them in.

Mr. SOURWINE. We were discussing your use of the phrase "take the Communists in in more ways than one."

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You intended, did you, by the use of that phrase on various occasions, as you have here, to suggest that there was some advantage to the Nationalist Government, some disadvantage to the Communist Government, in bringing the Communist Government into a coalition government?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, through the avoidance of civil war and the other component part of this, which was the dissolution of a Communist army and integration into a national army.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to examine that a little bit. You spoke of your first point there, the avoidance of a civil war?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is actually merely a matter of inducement; that is a club because a civil war would not have been a direct disadvantage to the Chinese Communists, would it?

Mr. VINCENT. A civil war?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. A civil war, I believe, would have been a direct advantage to the Communists; it would have stirred up more trouble in China. I couldn't foresee any conclusive—

Mr. SOURWINE. It was an alternative, was it not, civil war or bring them into the Government?

Mr. VINCENT. It was an alternative to bring them into the Government and dissolve this army; they were supposed to dovetail.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you think the Communists would give up their power in the north to any government that they did not control or expect to control?

Mr. VINCENT. I did assume that they would if given a part in government. They had said they would and joined in conferences to that effect.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you believe them?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I hoped they would. Yes; I will say that I believed that General Marshall going out there could bring about this kind of a solution. I don't believe I could have, but I thought General Marshall could.

Mr. SOURWINE. In view of what you have testified to today with regard to your knowledge, going back a long way, as to the nature of the Chinese Communists and their objectives, you never did believe,

did you, that the Communists would give up their power in the north to a government that they did not control or expect to control?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. And give up that advantage that you said they had?

Mr. VINCENT. The advantage militarily?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. It was an advantage of creating or continuing to create disorder in the country.

Mr. SOURWINE. You thought really that you would be putting something over on the Chinese Communists by bringing them into a coalition government?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time you felt that they had the upper hand in north China?

Mr. VINCENT. In the rural districts, Senator, and they had had this kind of advantage even over the Japanese. We watched this, and it was tremendously difficult to deal with the guerrilla operation that they carried on.

Senator FERGUSON. And they would give that up?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And become a minority in a government and give that up?

Mr. SOURWINE. In justice to yourself, sir, is it possible that you would like to amend that, that you thought that would be so if the Nationalist Government retained the upper hand in the coalition?

Mr. VINCENT. That was implicit in all of the negotiations that they had had with the Communists and the minor parties. It was on that point, as I say, that I believed the negotiations finally broke down.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Nationalist Government was not to have the upper hand, then bringing the Communists into a coalition government would not be putting anything over on the Communists, would it?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you state that again, please?

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Nationalist Government was not to have the upper hand in the coalition, bringing the Communists into the coalition government would certainly not be putting anything over on the Communists, would it?

Mr. VINCENT. It would not.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would not be taking them in in any sense except by bringing them into the Government?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; and the point was always that the National Government was the National Government of Chiang Kai-shek, which was to be organized under a constitutional form and in which there would be some minor—I think the highest figure ever used was that the Communists would have 7 or 8, and I am just calling on memory now, out of a possible 21 in a provisional government.

Mr. SOURWINE. But, regardless of the form of the government or mere matters of form, it was absolutely essential that the Nationalist Government retain control of the coalition; otherwise the Communists by getting the coalition won a great victory?

Mr. VINCENT. That is true, sir, and General Marshall never thought in any other terms.



Mr. SOURWINE. Would you, sir, point out what there is in the Marshall directive or in any official statement of the State Department at or about that time which says or implies that it is important or essential that Chiang retain control of the coalition government?

Mr. VINCENT. There is a paragraph in the Marshall directive which, I recall, says just exactly that, that we continue to recognize and support the National Government of China, which is the Government of Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator FERGUSON. Get us that, please.

Mr. VINCENT. We don't have the Marshall directive here. Is there a copy of the famous book, the White Paper, here? I am sure it is in there, and I can produce it tomorrow if necessary.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you say "the famous book, the White Paper"?

Mr. VINCENT. Because it has been referred to, and I had a part in it, and it has become rather famous, in my opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. I refer to that particular language. Do you believe that that particular language clearly expresses the view that in any coalition government Chiang would have to control and the Communists would have to have a minority interest?

Mr. VINCENT. I believe it does, and added to—

Mr. SOURWINE. Actually, if there was a coalition government and it was called the Nationalist Government of China, even though the Communists took over that government and maintained control of that government, it would still come within the phrase which you have cited?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't believe so, but we are both—at least I would have said it was the Nationalist Government of China under Chiang Kai-shek. I will go on to say from my memory of General Marshall's telegram back that it was very clear that at no time did he ever conceive of the Communists getting a majority control of the Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you talked about the Nationalist Government of China you meant the Chiang Kai-shek government?

Mr. VINCENT. The Kuomintang government, whether Chiang Kai-shek—

Mr. SOURWINE. Kuomintang government would have been whatever Government was controlled by the Kuomintang regardless of who composed the Kuomintang and whether or not Chiang still had a part in it?

Mr. VINCENT. It would.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that all that that part of the directive said was that the United States Government should continue to support the National Chinese Government without regard to whether Chiang was in it or not?

Mr. VINCENT. Support the National Government. It was Chiang Kai-shek's party. The Kuomintang was Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was at that time.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your conception that the directive was making it clear that we were to maintain it as Chiang's Government?

Mr. VINCENT. To maintain it as a Kuomintang government under Chiang.



Senator FERGUSON. We were to maintain it as a Kuomintang government under Chiang. In other words, we were to continue to maintain Chiang as over that particular government?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, we were supporting Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. We were supporting Chiang.

Mr. SOURWINE. And we were continuing—

Mr. VINCENT. If Chiang Kai-shek had resigned as head of the Kuomintang and somebody else had taken over that position as head of the Kuomintang, Dr. Kung or T. V. Soong, it wouldn't have meant that we wouldn't support that government.

Mr. SOURWINE. No. Suppose that Chou En-lai had taken over instead of Mr. Soong, would it have meant that we would not support that?

Mr. VINCENT. We certainly would not have to do that because Chou En-lai couldn't have taken over a Government of the Kuomintang, could he?

Mr. SOURWINE. Assume that the Government was taken over by some Communist as the result of bringing into the Kuomintang of a majority of Communists or pro-Communist elements. If it were still in the form of the Kuomintang government and still called the Nationalist Government of China, would not the United States have felt itself committed to cooperate and to support that government under the Marshall directive?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think so, it would change its entire character.

Mr. SOURWINE. It certainly would have. Are you saying that it was your conception, that it was the conception of the State Department, that it was the conception of General Marshall, that it was intended to continue to support in power Chiang Kai-shek as the head of the Chinese National Government?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what we were committed to do?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what we were committed to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. We were going to assist in the attaining of that objective by bringing the Communists into the coalition government?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And we were going to take the whole Army?

Mr. VINCENT. We were going to amalgamate the Army and call it the National Chinese Army.


Mr. SOURWINE. And you thought it was a feasible program?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought it was a feasible program.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, that perhaps is a good note on which to recess.

Senator FERGUSON. I think so. We will resume tomorrow morning at nine o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 9 a. m., Friday, January 25, 1952.)



# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER  
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

## EXECUTIVE SESSION—CONFIDENTIAL

The subcommittee met at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Vincent, you have been previously sworn.

## TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY WALTER STERLING SURREY, COUNSEL—Resumed

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe I asked you about Frank V. Coe.

Mr. VINCENT. You had.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is Lauchlin Currie.

Mr. VINCENT. May I consult my book here?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT (reading): I first met Dr. Currie in 1936 or 1937 when he was an officer with the Federal Reserve Board. I saw him occasionally during the next 2 years prior to my departure for Geneva in 1939. Upon my return from Switzerland late in 1940 en route to China I saw Dr. Currie several times. He was then an administrative assistant to President Roosevelt. He was interested in China officially and he was a White House representative. We had several discussions on the matter of financial aid to the Chinese Government. The currency stabilization loan at that time either had just been passed or was being passed.

In 1942 President Roosevelt sent Dr. Currie to China to see Chiang Kai-shek and consult the Chinese Government officials on matters of common interest regarding the war. I saw him several times there. I gathered his conversations were largely on financial and economic matters. I did not participate in the conversations with Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you attend any conferences with Currie and any Chinese?

Mr. VINCENT. No (reading): When I returned to Washington in 1943 I was loaned by the State Department for several months to the newly-established Foreign Economic Administration.

Mr. SOURWINE. You got back when, December 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. No, June, and had a vacation, a couple of months in the far eastern office and went over there for a matter of 4 months. (reading): Dr. Currie was Deputy Administrator of the FEA. I saw him directly during this period. After I returned to State in February of 1944, I had little occasion for contact with Dr. Currie.

In 1945 he left the Government and went into business in New York. The last time I saw him was in New York in 1949 when I had lunch with him and Mrs. Currie at the Metropolitan Club. I was home for a brief period of consultation in Washington at that time. I have not seen him since this meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall how you met or who introduced you?

Mr. VINCENT. He was up in New Hampshire where he had a little farm. I was with Mr. Grew. He had a farm and had loaned his farm to my wife and children. They had one at Hancock.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have covered fully your associations with him?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I can recall them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he had any connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think he did. I never connected him in my own mind with the Institute. He wasn't at the one meeting I went to at Hot Springs that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever consult with him and with persons known to you to be members of the Institute?

Mr. VINCENT. With him at the same time as other members?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall any such consultation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall ever being asked by the IPR, or someone representing it, to talk with Mr. Currie?

Mr. VINCENT. About any specific subject?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall any.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at any time know or have reason to believe that Mr. Currie was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name here is John P. Davies.

Mr. VINCENT (reading). I first met Davies when he was a language student in Peking. I was consul in Dairen. That was in 1932 or 1933. Our paths no doubt crossed from time to time during the next 10 years, but we did not serve together.

In 1942 Mr. Davies was assigned to China while I was counselor of the Embassy. His job was, he said, a sort of political adviser to General Stilwell. He was not directly connected with the Embassy. I saw him from time to time during this period.

Also after I returned to Washington, Mr. Davies would come in to see me when he was on home leave or on assignment by General Stilwell to Washington I would see him. In December 1945, I again saw Mr. Davies in Moscow when he was Secretary of the Embassy



there. We were having the Moscow conference of the foreign secretaries. I saw him last in Washington in 1949 briefly when I came home on consultation. I have not seen him since.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time if Mr. Davies had any connection with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Eugene Dennis?

Mr. VINCENT. Eugene Dennis, I do not know him, and I have not followed matters well enough to know who he is; but I know who he is now. He was Secretary of the Communist Party, but I don't know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Laurence Duggan?

Mr. VINCENT (reading). Laurence Duggan was in the State Department at the same time I was in 1936 to 1939. I don't recall any contact with him. I was junior to him. He was concerned with Latin-American affairs and I was assistant desk officer in the far eastern office. I can recall no association with him, other than I might have met him at some meetings that did take place in the Department or something where I would see him casually in the hall. He was not a person with whom I had any reason to have official contact, and I had no social contact with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time that Mr. Duggan was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. John K. Emmerson.

Mr. VINCENT (reading). He is a junior officer in the State Department who had specialized, I believe, in Japanese affairs rather than Chinese. I cannot recall when I first met Emmerson. He served in the far eastern office sometime during the period 1944 to 1945, maybe somewhat earlier than that.

He was in China, I think, just at the end of my term of duty. I can recall no specific meeting with him. I have seen him since I came back this time. He is now an officer there in the State Department.

I have seen him once or twice casually, but I had not anticipated his name, so I have not got the State Department register to see about him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any reason to believe he was connected with the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wilma Fairbank.

Mr. VINCENT (reading). She is the wife of John K. Fairbank. I first met her—I may say I met her because he was in China, but I think I first met her at the IPR conference where she was either on the secretariat or a delegate. From that time on we saw her from time to time. My wife was a good friend of hers while they were stationed here. We visited them once before he went off to Switzerland in 1946 or 1947, I should say, and the last time I saw them was when I was passing through Cambridge. I had come back from visiting my son at Exeter. We visited the Fairbanks in Cambridge then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know or have any reason to believe that she was in any way connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Miriam S. Farley.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no clear recollection of having met Miriam Farley, but I probably did see her at the IPR conference. I wouldn't know her now if I saw her.

Mr. SOURWINE. What position did she hold with IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I think she was a member of the secretariat. I no doubt met her in that capacity.

As I say, if I saw her I don't believe I would know her. She may have written at some time or called. It is purely a name to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time or have reason to believe that she was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Frederick V. Field?

Mr. VINCENT (reading). Frederick V. Field I met casually and briefly at a large cocktail party at the IPR conference. That is the only time I have a distinct recollection of having met him. I do recall there was a preparatory meeting of the American delegation that went to the IPR conference. He may have been there. If he was, it made no impression on my mind.

I never had any vis-à-vis conversations with him or any contact with him other than through that conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you asked to assist in any way when Mr. Field was trying to get a commission in the Army?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know he tried to get a commission?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time or have reason to believe that Mr. Field was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. At the time I knew him I had no reason to believe he was connected with the Communist Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Julian R. Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT (reading). Friedman was a young fellow assigned to the Far Eastern Division and assigned to my office in the China Division in 1944. I had nothing to do with his assignment either to the division or to my division. He worked there in the division for a matter of, I should say, a year. He was then particularly interested in the field of labor and had, I think, come to that division from the Labor Division, as it was called, in the State Department, primarily because he had indicated an interest in the Far East and China, and had hoped to get an assignment as a labor attaché as soon as the war was over, attaché to China.

He got the assignment in the fall, I think, of 1945, at the end of the war. I don't recall having seen him since then. The last recollection I have of him was his sending me a notice he had gotten married when I was in Switzerland. His duties in the China Division were those of a junior officer who was a leg man. He went to the IPR conference as a member of the secretariat and he was also out in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference.

Senator FERGUSON. How would a man like that get to the United Nations Conference and the IPR conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Take the second one. I don't know how he got there. I know there was a notice that went around that they needed

young people on the secretariat at San Francisco. He, being an energetic young man, probably went down and applied for a job on the secretariat. I did not recommend him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they not look into these people to see whether or not they had Communist leanings? Did they not in the State Department have any idea that there might be disloyalty?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't say as to that. I had no suspicions of Friedman.

Senator FERGUSON. Or anybody else?

Mr. VINCENT. He was a very active young man probably with free ideas. I disagreed with him, but I did not suspect him of having Communist leanings.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it ever enter your mind while in the service during these days we are talking about that the Russians might be trying to penetrate our Foreign Service and our diplomatic service?

Mr. VINCENT. No evidence of it ever came to my attention.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not conscious of it?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not look into that question at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. It never entered your mind, in fact?

Mr. VINCENT. Do you say "it never entered my mind"? I can vouch that it never entered my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall of any instance you may have thought well, now, this person or that person may be working for the Kremlin, for the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. It never entered your mind?

Mr. VINCENT. But there were several divisions in the State Department that were supposed to look into that.

Senator FERGUSON. But in the Far East situation nothing ever entered your mind that there could be an influence of the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. Within the Foreign Service?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Even as far as Friedman was concerned?

Mr. VINCENT. I never suspected Friedman at any time or any of my associates there in the Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you at the United Nations?

Mr. VINCENT. I was part time.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Friedman do out there?

Mr. VINCENT. He was working down on the secretariat and keeping contact with the various labor organizations represented out there.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that not have been a good place to put a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. To have contact with the labor unions there?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. It probably would.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it not have been a good place to put a Communist in relation to the work of our delegation?

Mr. VINCENT. I should say it would have been a very good thing for the Communists to try to plant people there.



Senator FERGUSON. You never thought about it at that time, never thought about questioning any of these people?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or to look into the records or anything of that kind?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I may say again we had security divisions that were supposed to look into these people.

Senator FERGUSON. When were you first questioned on security?

Mr. VINCENT. Myself you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know I was ever questioned as to security; never in my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. I just wondered whether they questioned everybody.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you sure that you have not understated Mr. Friedman's importance in any way? Was he in any sense more than a fetcher and carrier?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know that is all he was. I can't recall the particular assignments he had. He sat in a far corner of the room. I had a big office there. He looked over the papers that came in with regard to labor conditions. I can recall of no major assignment Friedman had.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he work directly under you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, in the China Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. You supervised his work?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any official in the echelon between you and him, or did you supervise his work directly?

Mr. VINCENT. I had an Assistant Chief of the China Division who probably exercised supervision over him as well as I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he actually exercise supervision over him?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't say to what extent.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was the Assistant Chief?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Paul Meyer. I would have to consult the register, but the period in there is somewhat vague.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Friedman was never given any real responsibility?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. He never substituted for you or acted as your deputy in any matter?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Meyer act as your deputy?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, occasionally. I think what you have in mind is some area committee that Mr. Dooman has mentioned where he went in. He was not my deputy or representative. He was simply there. I went sometimes myself to this area committee. Mr. Dooman has testified on that, but not in the capacity as my deputy. He had started going to those meetings when he was still in the Labor Division and continued to go. I attended them very seldom.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are referring to the meetings of the Far Eastern Committee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. No, he never went to the SWNCC committees. There was a rather vague committee called the Area Committee that various



divisions would sit in on and discuss problems in a general way. He attended those from time to time so I am now told or gather from the testimony. I would not recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. But he never did attend the meetings of the Far Eastern Committee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nor ever had any authority to represent you there?

Mr. VINCENT. In the SWNCC meetings?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no record of his ever going to the SWNCC meetings. I think he had left the Department for China before I ever became connected with SWNCC.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did he leave?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall the date. I would have to have the register, but my recollection is the early autumn as soon as the war was over.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know or have any reason to believe that Mr. Friedman was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know or have any reason so to believe?

Mr. VINCENT. I have seen nothing that would indicate it.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is Mark J. Gayn.

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know him and I have never met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know who he is?

Mr. VINCENT. He was with Amerasia. The name clicks in that way that he was connected with Amerasia, but I never met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether that name sticks in your memory because associates or persons might have mentioned him to you, or did you read it in the newspapers?

Mr. VINCENT. I read it in the newspapers. I am trying to remember; that is where he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mark Ginsbourg.

Mr. VINCENT. No, I have no recollection of a Mark Ginsbourg.

Mr. SOURWINE. Louis Gibarti?

Mr. VINCENT. No recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Harold Glasser?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes [reading]: He was with the Treasury Department. I met him, I should say, once or twice on Treasury business that had to do with State. He was at the UNNRA conference, if I recall correctly, at Atlantic City. That was in 1944. I had very little contact with Glasser.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall where you first met him?

Mr. VINCENT. My estimate would be it was at the conference at Atlantic City, but it may have been earlier.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your association with him was very slender after that?

Mr. VINCENT. Very.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not on a friendly social basis?

Mr. VINCENT. I never saw him socially that I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know or have any reason to believe he was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think I stated this before but I will ask again that question. I mean no implication that these people were, or are, Communists.

Mr. VINCENT. I was hoping my answer was also that I did not then, but in most of these cases and in all of them I had no idea then or now.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think the question is quite broad enough to cover that. It is so intended. I asked it specifically, notwithstanding, in the one case of Mr. Friedman, the discussion which had gone on which might have left an implication that you have some such feeling.

Mr. VINCENT. I would like to say that being out of the country since 1947 almost continually, things may have happened here that I should have been aware of that I am not. Four years' absence means I have not followed it. Somebody may have admitted he was one and I wouldn't know it.

Mr. SOURWINE. The committee will not hold you responsible for knowing who is and who is not a Communist in every instance. We are trying to find out what you do know.

Grace Maul Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know Grace Maul Granich. I know that she is the wife of Max Granich who was out in Shanghai. I never knew her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Max Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. I never knew Max Granich except by name.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know him to be a Communist, by name?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And in any way connected with the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. We have reports. The Chinese gave reports that they thought he was connected with the Communist Party. Mr. Gauss, the consul general at that time in Shanghai, asked the Chinese to produce evidence. The Chinese were unable to produce it, but that did not destroy the suspicion that they were connected with the Communist Party. They were certainly left wing.

Senator FERGUSON. Were any of these other people you may have mentioned you did not know to be Communist left-wingers?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I have gone through so far.

Senator FERGUSON. Even Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. Friedman I would have called a New Dealer of an extreme sort.

Senator FERGUSON. But not a left-winger?

Mr. VINCENT. You have to define that. I have described him as a young New Dealer.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not unusual to find those people?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. In the Foreign Service?

Mr. VINCENT. In the Foreign Service. You have the whole political pattern from one extreme to the other in the Foreign Service.

Mr. SOURWINE. Michael Greenberg?

Mr. VINCENT. Michael Greenberg, I think, was at one time an assistant to Lauchlin Currie when Lauchlin Currie was a Special Assistant to the President in the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Lauchlin Currie to be a New Dealer?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly have associated Lauchlin Currie with the New Deal.

Senator FERGUSON. And Michael Greenberg?

Mr. VINCENT. I know nothing about his political views, but I would have thought if he was working for Currie he would have been.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say either one of those were left-wingers?

Mr. VINCENT. Not from my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any association with Greenberg?

Mr. VINCENT. None other than the fact that he was an assistant to Currie at a time when Currie was handling far-eastern affairs. They had a little office. From time to time I would see him. I don't recall having any discussions with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say from what you knew about him or even reports from the Chinese Government that he was in any way connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I never saw any reports from the Chinese Government on Michael Greenberg.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you on any of these other people, other than the ones you have mentioned, Granich, Max Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. I mentioned him, but I would not say I saw any report on him.

Senator FERGUSON. Or any others?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did on Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he not operating some kind of a paper?

Mr. VINCENT. He was operating something called the Voice of China, which was highly propagandistic in character, as a magazine, in Shanghai.

Senator FERGUSON. What language?

Mr. VINCENT. In English. I had no first-hand knowledge of that in the sense he was operating in Shanghai and I was in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Joseph Gregg?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of ever meeting anyone by that name. The name doesn't ring any bell.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't know anybody by that name who might have been known by some other name?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Alger Hiss?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I might like to refer to these papers [reading]:

My first recollection of meeting Alger Hiss was in 1940 when he had become assistant or special assistant to Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, who at that time was political adviser for the Far East. I may have met him in the halls or elsewhere before that because he was working for Mr. Sayre, but I have no recollection of that. I am giving my first meeting where I recollect.

I was home en route to China and he was assistant to Mr. Hornbeck. I went to China and did not see him again until I came back in 1943. I had occasional meetings with him. All business with Hornbeck had to pass through Mr. Hiss. When Dr. Hornbeck left the



far eastern office some time in the spring of 1944, Mr. Hiss became, as far as I can recall, interested in the work preparatory to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference which was the prelude to the United Nations Conference. I saw him, frankly, not at all then.

Senator FERGUSON. How much did you see him then?

Mr. VINCENT. Not at all. I don't recall seeing him; I may have seen him in the halls, but I had no business with him. Once he left I had no business with him.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were in the Far East you had quite a bit of dealing with him?

Mr. VINCENT. He was in Washington and I was in the Far East. Therefore, he presumably saw the reports I wrote in, but I never saw him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever talk with you about a report?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know on any occasion he wrote you directly about a report you had made, not agreeing with it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall ever having any correspondence with Alger Hiss about any reports I made or he made.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever have any correspondence or cablegrams or any communication with Hornbeck about these?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean when I was in China and Hornbeck was here? I would not have been able to tell about telegrams coming out from Hornbeck, because they would have been signed by the Secretary, and I have no recollection of personal correspondence between myself and Hornbeck about myself or about official matters.

The Senator had asked me whether I had any correspondence while in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. About his reports, Mr. Sourwine. He has testified the fact that Hiss was assistant to Hornbeck and therefore matters would be through Hiss to Hornbeck, the reports.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I had not finished with this paper. I said that [reading] he left far eastern affairs and went with some group that was preparing for Dumbarton Oaks and later I saw him only as he was Secretary General of the Conference in San Francisco and was very busy. I had no contact other than to know he was there.

After that he came back to the Department and was made, in the autumn of 1945, I believe, the chief or the director of the newly created United Nations office. In that capacity he attended staff meetings which I also attended where we were discussing matters where we would cut across them on United Nations affairs, far eastern affairs, European affairs. I saw him in that capacity for just a year before he resigned and went with the Carnegie Institute. I have not seen him since.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet with Mr. Hiss outside the State Department, or otherwise than on official duties?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of it. I believe that no doubt we attended dinner parties where he was present. I may have gone to a cocktail party at his house, but I had no intimate, outside-of-office associations with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time Mr. Hiss was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or have any reason to believe it?



Mr. VINCENT. I had no reason to suspect him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since you have stipulated your answers bring it down to the present time, do you have any reason now to believe that Mr. Hiss was ever connected in any way with the Communist party?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you believe he was?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't say I believe he was, but I have reason to suspect that he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a belief in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether Mr. Hiss was a Communist or was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say he was at one time in his life.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name here I will ask you to pronounce. It is Ho Chi Minh.

Mr. MANDEL. May I refresh your memory? He is the leader of the forces in Indochina.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. No, I never had any contact with him. I certainly knew him by reputation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any reason to know or believe that he is in any way connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say most definitely I think he is connected with the Communist Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Philip Jaffe?

Mr. VINCENT. I never knew Mr. Jaffe, never met him knowingly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever had any communication with him?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever send him any messages or receive any from him?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I don't think there was correspondence between him and me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you talk with him over the telephone?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before you answer further, who was Mr. Jaffe?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Jaffe was, as I recall it, connected with the Amerasia magazine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that before having read it in the papers, or otherwise?

Mr. VINCENT. From the papers. I don't think I knew Jaffe was on Amerasia until the case broke.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know the Amerasia magazine?

Mr. VINCENT. Very slightly. I remember seeing it from time to time. I read it from time to time.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you a subscriber of it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the State Department get you a copy?

Mr. VINCENT. It would come into the State Department, or people would bring it. I can't say whether the State Department subscribed to it or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever get any idea it was a left-wing magazine?

Mr. VINCENT. I had no thought at the time I was reading it. I don't recall reading it. I remember the first issue. I thought it was a rather good magazine. Dr. Hornbeck contributed an article to it, but I didn't follow the magazine.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever contribute to it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever asked to contribute?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I can do Owen Lattimore [reading]: I first met Lattimore probably in 1930 when he was in Peking. At that time I believe he was connected with some scholarship that he had; whether it was the Crane Foundation or something else. Our paths from then on might have crossed. I have no recollection. I was not an intimate friend of his.

My recollection of meeting him was when he came to China in 1941 in the late autumn or early spring as the President had sent him out to be a special—I don't know his title, but he was supposed to be an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking. I did not see him very often at that time primarily because he was connected with Chiang Kai-shek and I believe Lattimore himself thought that too close an association with the Embassy would probably not be conducive to his good relations with the Generalissimo. He would think he was reporting backwards and forwards.

I did not know his work. I would see him in Chungking from time to time. He left Chungking before I did.

When I came back here, I found that Lattimore had become, I think, Deputy Director of OWI for the Pacific, for matters in connection with the Pacific area under Elmer Davis. We no doubt had contact, although it was not close, because he was busy. I was busy, and the liaison between the State Department and its various divisions and OWI was carried on by an office especially designated for that purpose. I recall Mr. Merrill Meyers was our liaison with OWI. He would keep them currently informed and point out what they were doing in the way of their programs.

My next association with Lattimore was on the trip to China with Mr. Wallace. He, as you know, was a member of that group. I saw him, of course, there, when we were in a plane for 50 days, with great frequency. I would say in passing that in Siberia and Central Asia Lattimore interested himself primarily in visiting museums, educational institutions, whereas I stayed more closely with Wallace in visiting agricultural places, industrial things, and attending social affairs in the evening that were usually given for us.

We returned from that trip, and I think soon thereafter Lattimore resigned. I don't know at what time he went back to his work at Johns Hopkins. I can't recall. I wasn't keeping in close enough touch to remember when he quit OWI. It is in his own record.

I saw him from time to time. We knew his wife, Mrs. Lattimore. I remember visiting them once in Towson, Md., and Baltimore.

The question has arisen, and we might as well deal with it now, of the matter of a proposal that he become a consultant in the State Department. I would just as soon make that statement now. In the early spring of 1945 Mr. Lattimore had a form made out, and I don't know what the form of employment was, for consultant in

the State Department on a per diem basis. I thought it was a good idea. We needed somebody who as a tactical expert would give us information or prepare background data on those borders and areas of Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia.

He had written a book called the Inner Asian Frontiers of China, I think is the name of it, and was in my estimation the foremost expert on that area in the States. We had at that time Dr. Kennedy, the late Dr. Kennedy, of Yale, who was furnishing in the far eastern office similar information and background work done for Indonesia, and I think also other Southeast Asian areas.

So I recommended, if you want to call it "recommended," Mr. Lattimore be taken on in this job. The recommendation was approved by my chief, who was then Mr. Ballentine. Mr. Grew, however, told me he did not think it was a good idea to hire a man who was engaged in publicity to the degree that Lattimore was at that time. He was contributing to magazines and other things. There the matter was dropped. I did not know—

Senator FERGUSON. Was that the only reason he assigned?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the only reason he assigned to me.

Senator FERGUSON. I would think that was the kind of man you wanted.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Grew put it on the basis of "who was engaged in publicity." I think Lattimore was writing articles for maybe the Baltimore Sun or something else, contributing once or twice a week. He was certainly a contributor to magazines.

Subsequently I have learned through seeing Mr. Dooman's testimony that he took it up with Mr. Grew and had it stopped. But Mr. Grew did not tell me that then.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any reason to believe he should not have come with the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; as a matter of fact, I thought as a man to work on a tactical subject he was ideally suited, and those areas were little known to us.

Senator FERGUSON. What would he have received in compensation?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know what the per diem was. I know it probably ran—I just don't know what it was. I knew Dr. Kennedy was getting a per diem.

Senator FERGUSON. How much; \$50?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not as high as \$50. The financial side of it would not have been an inducement for anybody to come down.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it Mr. Lattimore's idea, or someone else's, that he apply for this position with the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. It was the result of discussions between Mr. Lattimore and myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it your suggestion?

Mr. VINCENT. That I would not recall, whether I suggested it or he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ask him if he would accept one of these jobs that had no financial inducement?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say the financial inducement was not a consideration. We discussed the matter of needing a better source of information on these areas which were certainly going to come up in any subsequent negotiations of a peace treaty. I may add this: That at the time we discussed that, neither I nor he, or anybody else, any-



body else on my level in the State Department, knew that the Yalta agreement was going on and you might say certain disposition was being made there, particularly with regard to Outer Mongolia. That did not become known to me until June 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall where this conference with Mr. Lattimore took place at which you asked him if he would accept a job with the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not. I don't recall whether I asked him or whether he indicated it was a job he thought should be done.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understand you to testify——

Mr. VINCENT. It came out in a conversation with him. I am perfectly willing to say I may have asked him to accept the job and he may have accepted the job and I said "Yes, it is a good idea." Who produced the idea I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this in your office?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall, or whether it was on the week end in Towson. We went up Saturday night and came back Sunday.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that week end before or after this occasion? Can you definitely place it?

Mr. VINCENT. I can.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it only the one week end?

Mr. VINCENT. With Lattimore, that is the only week end I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not in the habit of interchanging visits with him or you and your wife with him and his wife?

Mr. VINCENT. No. He could not have spent a week end with us because we did not have any place to put him up. He was down in Washington and would probably call up and say, "I am here. Won't you have lunch with me?" My relations with Lattimore were of that sort.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are or were quite friendly over a long period of time?

Mr. VINCENT. He would certainly let me know. Over the period I would say of 1941 on down——

Mr. SOURWINE. You first knew him as early as 1930?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would not say you have been unfriendly since then?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have been friendly since then?

Mr. VINCENT. There was a whole gap of 10 years when I saw him. When we were associated it was after he had an official position in Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. We don't have to see a man every day to be good friends, do we?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore is your good friend?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you undoubtedly saw him on enough occasions outside the office so that you would not be able to pinpoint any particular one or necessarily remember the sequence of all of them?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Mr. Lattimore was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No.



Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know him to be a left-winger?

Mr. VINCENT. Again I would say I felt Lattimore was a person of New Deal complexion. He was a man with liberal ideas rather than a left-winger.

Senator FERGUSON. That brings up the definition of liberal. What is a liberal in your opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator—

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you said he was a man with liberal ideas.

Mr. VINCENT. I confess I don't have any definition ready for a liberal.

Senator FERGUSON. I claim to be a liberal and my views are entirely opposite to that of Lattimore. I want to know what your definition of a liberal is.

Mr. VINCENT. I suppose the best way to put it would be if a person is looking for means and ways of improving and changing conditions as they exist where he finds them unsatisfactory that he is liberal in his views, because he is not tied to any preconceived ideas as to exactly how our democratic things work. That would be the best definition I can give. Maybe I am getting confused with a humanitarian.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say a man who works to relieve people from activities of Government was a liberal?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't quite understand what you mean by the activities of Government.

Senator FERGUSON. The Government dictating the policies and doing things for everybody.

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly say a person could be a liberal and still resent that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think a liberal would be the man who would want the Government to do things?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not Owen Lattimore that kind of a man?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall. He was a person who believed in the Government. You have got to define what you mean by the Government doing things.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us not talk about Mr. Lattimore in the past tense. I think he is still very much alive and you have not ceased to know him or associate with him.

Mr. VINCENT. I have not seen him since 1947. I would rather not try to discuss Mr. Lattimore as a liberal.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he not the kind of man that wanted the Government to do everything?

Mr. VINCENT. You are getting me into an area now—

Senator FERGUSON. You said he was a liberal. You class New Dealers as liberals. You said he was a New Dealer and a liberal. You used the term, not me.

I want to know what it is now. Here is a man that you describe as a liberal. What was he?

Mr. VINCENT. I described it here as a man who was not tied to a preconceived idea of how things should be done but was looking for ways to improve Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you call communism liberalism?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you call Marxism liberalism?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you call socialism liberalism?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you call New Dealers liberals?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the difference between New Dealers and socialism?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think the New Dealer ever—I should not get into this because I am not a political philosopher. The New Dealer, to my mind, never, as I saw it, wanted to bring about Government ownership. There may have been cases where the New Deal did in a broad sense. I know there was TVA. Government ownership of the means of production I do not think was ever the program of the New Deal.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you a New Dealer?

Mr. VINCENT. I would describe myself as being in favor of some of the New Deal's policies.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the policies you were in favor of? What were they?

Mr. VINCENT. Such things as banking and insurance. I was not mixed up in the New Deal at all. I was opposed, for instance, to the Supreme Court, if you want to call that New Deal.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean packing the Supreme Court?

Mr. VINCENT. That was one thing. I would not know. You would have to name what measures.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not the idea of packing the Supreme Court to give the Government power over people?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't like the means at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not that the idea?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know the objective at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that was a liberal movement to pack the Supreme Court?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, and I was opposed to it.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give us any more information as to what Lattimore was?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was a New Dealer and a liberal?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that Lattimore himself would call himself a New Dealer. I find myself in a disagreeable position because our conversation was about China and not about internal politics.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you describe him as a humanitarian?

Mr. VINCENT. I would think so. There again I don't want to be put in the position of having to describe a humanitarian.

Mr. MANDEL. Would you estimate precisely and briefly the authority of Owen Lattimore in the field of far-eastern affairs according to your own personal opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. As an authority?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I think he has been a very serious student of Far Eastern affairs. I have not any exact recollection now just what the thesis is in his book, the last book he wrote on the Far East. I found myself in agreement with some of his ideas in that book and in disagreement with others. That would not mean I didn't think he was an authoritative writer on the Far East, but some of his ideas I have found to be not in agreement with mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you intending to hedge on Lattimore? Did not you call him earlier the outstanding authority on the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. On these inner areas. I thought we were covering a much broader subject. I did. I would get around to that.

That was his principal field of claiming to be an expert. As to the Far East, he certainly has already lived there all his life, and I have looked at him as a man having a certain knowledge about the Far East.

Mr. MANDEL. You read all his books?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I have glanced through and read the Inner Asian Frontiers and that other book I am trying to recall. I do not recall reading anything else.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read Solution in Asia?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what I am talking about. I know certain parts of that I was not too much impressed with. There were others I thought were sound. I would have to have the book to know what I was talking about.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to ask some question about Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have an additional line of questioning about him.

Senator FERGUSON. I will come back to that, then.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will ask one question out of order.

Do you know what a Communist means when he refers to someone as a liberal?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name here is Duncan Chapin Lee.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall meeting him. He may have been a person who came into my office or may have been in the Far East at one time. I don't recall him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Michael Lee?

Mr. VINCENT. If that is the man I think it is [reading] down in FEA at one time when I was there for a short time, I saw him in and out of FEA during that period in 1943 through January of 1944 when I was there. I don't recall seeing him since.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well did you know him?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know him well at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not. I heard at one time he went to the Department of Commerce after I left Washington, or even before, maybe.

Mr. SOURWINE. How about Li Shao Chi?

Mr. VINCENT. Li Shao Chi—I don't recall meeting anybody by that name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the name mean anything to you?

Mr. VINCENT. No. There are many Li's whose last names I would not have known.

Mr. MANDEL. Could I come back to Michael Lee for a moment? Michael Lee was in charge of far-eastern shipments in the Department of Commerce. Wouldn't it be logical to believe he was in touch with the State Department on matters pertaining to the Far East and in touch with you?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think while I was there—he may have been in touch with the State Department, but while I was there I was not in



touch with him. I don't think he was in charge of that operation while I was in Washington. I left in early 1947 or the middle of 1947. I can't quite place Michael Lee as of the time he went into Commerce.

Mr. SOURWINE. Raymond Ludden?

Mr. VINCENT. He is a young Foreign Service officer. I think I have him just for dates here in my book [reading]: He was a junior officer whom I may have met from time to time, but my first association with him which I recall was when he was assigned to China in 1943 somewhat before my departure for America.

I met him casually since then. He was assigned to China at Kunming. I recall in 1950 I had met him in Brussels when he was there with Mr. Bob Murphy as Ambassador and had dinner at Mr. Murphy's with him. He is back in America now and I saw him once in the State Department since he has been back. He is not one of the junior officers I have known as well as some of the others like Davies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember reading any of his reports?

Mr. VINCENT. He made reports from time to time from Kunming which I no doubt read. They don't stick in my memory, though.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will ask this question and go back on it: Did you know or did you ever have any reason to believe that Mr. Ludden was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know or did you ever have any reason to believe that Michael Lee was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did I ask you that question about Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I believe you did. I am sure you did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Selden Menefee?

Mr. VINCENT. That name recalls something if you will give me a minute. I have not thought of the name in years. Can I put it in the form of a question? Was he connected with radio broadcasting? I am trying to place him as a young man.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is.

Mr. VINCENT. He was a young man who used to come in and assist during a period when we were using these broadcasts on various and sundry subjects in the State Department. If I am not mistaken, he was working with Fischer of NBC, and arranged the broadcast which General Hildring and someone else and I gave on Korea and on Japan.

I think there was a series of about four. To what extent Menefee each time was engaged in this—I would say that he came in and tried to piece these things together because they were prearranged debates on Far Eastern policy. He would get my ideas, Hildring's ideas, and patch them together, and he was an arranger of radio programs.

Mr. SOURWINE. He wrote the scripts?

Mr. VINCENT. He wrote some of them. I wrote most of mine, but he would fit it in. If you mean he arranged the scripts, he may have written some of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. In a sense of writing the script, the man who writes it is the man who puts down the words in the order in which they were said. Did you write the script or prepare a memorandum of the ideas you wished to express?



Mr. VINCENT. Menefee would come in and interview me, get that, and take out of it what I said and rearrange it to make it in the form of a conversation among the three of us.

Mr. SOURWINE. Inserting questions by others or responses by them to questions by you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that script then submitted to you for approval before you went on the air with it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it submitted also for the approval of the other participants?

Mr. VINCENT. I assume it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. As far as you know was the procedure the same in the case of the others that Mr. Menefee would interview them and then write the script?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not suggest what the others on the program should say?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know, but I don't recall in these meetings we ever met together to arrange a program.

Mr. SOURWINE. You met for the first time at the radio station?

Mr. VINCENT. In the case of Hildring we were meeting in the State Department, but insofar as the program was concerned—

Mr. SOURWINE. You would see the whole script in advance for approval?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make any suggestions in any of those scripts for changes in what any of the others said?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make suggestions for changes with regard to your own, or did Mr. Menefee do a good job of putting on paper what you had told him?

Mr. VINCENT. I no doubt made changes in the way he had put it down as to what I said.

Mr. SOURWINE. So the scripts when they went on the air were made up of your language and not his?

Mr. VINCENT. Insofar as I recall they were.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know or have any reason to believe Mr. Menefee was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. William Mandel.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't—the first name?

Mr. MANDEL. He is an expert on the Soviet Far East, a writer, a lecturer.

Mr. VINCENT. He wrote a book which I think had to do with the Soviet, with Siberia, the Soviet eastern Siberia area. I never met him, and I don't know whether I read the book or not. I can't recall. That is the man. Thank you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mao Tse-tung?

Mr. VINCENT. General Hurley used to call him "Mouse Tung." No; I never met him.

Mr. MANDEL. Have you read any of his works?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have reason to believe that he is connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is that connection?

Mr. VINCENT. He is now president of the Communist regime, if that is the title they use. He may be chairman of the board or chairman of the party as well.

Mr. SOURWINE. In China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he an active Communist at the time you were in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him as such then?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew him as such.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet him?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Kate Mitchell?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I never met Kate Mitchell to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know who she was?

Mr. VINCENT. She also I think was connected with the Amerasia matter, wasn't she?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that only from reading about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. V. E. Motylev? But, before you go to that name, do you know or did you have any reason to believe Kate Mitchell was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. V. E. Motylev?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I have no recollection of meeting anybody by that name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who he is?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Constantine Oumansky?

Mr. VINCENT. He was a Soviet, either chargé or ambassador, for a period. I never met him other than I think I attended the Soviet big to-do and this annual celebration where I shook his hand one time. Otherwise I had no contact with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no conferences with him on any other occasions?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or participated in conferences that he was participating in?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. J. Peters?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

You don't want me to recall when I might have met him? The name means nothing. If I met him, it made no impression.

Mr. SOURWINE. When I name one of these names—it will do no harm to refresh your recollection—I am asking two questions: Did you or do you know the individual named? Did you know by any other name an individual whom you now know or believe to be the person referred to?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I didn't know him.

I may say we skipped that other one frequently: Did I know anybody by any other name? That is understood, is it not?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is understood in each case.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say I don't know anybody that I might have known under some other name at other times other than somebody who might have gotten married.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mildred Price?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I ever met Mildred Price.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who she is?

Mr. VINCENT. May I look here? I went through some of those names.

Mr. MANDEL. May I refresh Mr. Vincent's memory?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I wish you would.

Mr. MANDEL. She was executive secretary of the China Aid Council.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I ever met her. If she had turned up at the IPR conference, I don't know. She may have been at a function, but I never had any contact that made any impression on my memory of her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Ludwig Rajchman?

Mr. VINCENT. Ludwig Rajchman was a man out in China and associated with Mr. T. V. Soong. I think I met him here in Washington once or twice at social functions. I don't recall ever having any conferences with him on any business. He was a name well known to me in China because he was in Nanking but never when I was stationed there. He came out with the League of Nations in the first instance, or maybe not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that he was ever connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Vladimir Rogoff?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall having a luncheon at the Cosmos Club in January 1944 with Rogoff and some other people. At the present time my recollection is that Bill Johnstone, of George Washington University, was there. Rogoff had some connection with Tass News Agency, I believe, and had been recently in China. I don't recall who arranged the luncheon. I did not. It could not have been Rogoff, because it was at the Cosmos Club. It was probably Johnstone. I never met him before or since.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you a member of the Cosmos Club?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

The conversation was of a general character, and it did not make such impression on me as to recall now what it was about.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that a long luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. It lasted longer than a luncheon would normally last. We had that little room, I think, in the Cosmos Club where you don't sit completely apart but have a little room there, and we probably stayed on, instead of 1 hour, 2 hours.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall who else was there?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall other than Bill Johnstone was there. I remember talking with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Lattimore there?

Mr. VINCENT. If he was, I don't recall it. Maybe the testimony of these hearings has indicated who it was, but I don't recall who else was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought perhaps from your consultation of your notes, which you told us were prepared by people who had access to the hearings, that the notes covered what had been said in the hearings about that particular conference.

Mr. VINCENT. I have made no record here of who else was there. I remember Johnstone. I do recall other people were there, but I don't recall the names.

Mr. SOURWINE. These notes are intended to cover instances which have been made mention of in our hearings? That is, concerning you?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. That is the reason some of them I have and some I have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. We will come back to that last conference later, Mr. Chairman.

Vladimir Romm?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall. Could I ask my other question as to how I may have met him? I just don't recall him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me go back to Rogoff. Did you know or have reason to believe that he was connected in any way with the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly have thought he was connected with the Communist Party, since he was a Tass correspondent.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean a Tass correspondent has to be a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't say he has to, but I would say I assume he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he has to be?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Andrew Roth?

Mr. MANDEL. You skipped Romm.

Mr. VINCENT. I said I didn't know him. Mr. Mandel had something to offer there?

Mr. MANDEL. He was the Tass correspondent sometime prior to Rogoff and was purged subsequently in Russia. He was Tass correspondent in Washington for a number of years.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall ever meeting him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Andrew Roth?

Mr. VINCENT (reading): Andrew Roth was a young man who was in the Navy who first came to my attention when the Amerasia case broke. I don't think I knew of him before that time. I don't think I ever met Roth more than two or three times in my life, never had any business dealings with him, but know the name, and met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met him before the Amerasia case broke?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall meeting him before that. He may have come into the office on one thing or another. He was particularly interested in Japan. He may have been in, but it made no impression on me. He was a man who would go around. I never had any what you would say business dealings with him that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe Mr. Roth was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. MANDEL. Have you read his book Dilemma in Japan?



Mr. VINCENT. No; I have not. His very recent book?

Mr. MANDEL. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Laurence Salisbury?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes [reading]: Laurence Salisbury is or was a Foreign Service officer whom I met from time to time as our paths crossed as Foreign Service officers. The first time I recall serving with Salisbury was in Nanking, China. No; he was not there. He was in Peking but came to Nanking frequently. We had a double Embassy office there. He was in Peking, and I was in Nanking. He would come down to Nanking.

I had met him before, but that was casually. When I came back to the Department in 1943, Salisbury was in the Far Eastern Office. I suppose he was handling Japanese affairs because that was his specialty. He had studied Japanese.

I will go back and say he was with the Lytton Commission that came to Manchuria in 1936. I met him there. I never saw the Lytton Commission, but I saw him. I think that would be the first time I met him.

In 1944 Salisbury became, in the reorganization, Chief of the Southeast Asian Office of the State Department. He resigned some months after that. My recollection would be either in the summer or autumn of 1944 Salisbury retired; and now he is living, so far as I know, in retirement in Connecticut. I have not seen him for many years. I have not seen him since I went to Switzerland, and I don't recall seeing him since he retired.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever correspond with him?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall. There might have been correspondence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know or have reason to believe he was in any way connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. John Stewart Service?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I have something on him [reading]: Service was a junior secretary. I was going to precede it with the fact that, Service being in the Foreign Service, I no doubt run across him in the State Department, but I am limiting myself to periods when we served together. He may have been in Shanghai for that brief 2 months I spent there, but I don't recall. I do know he came to Chungking and worked when I was there as consul under Mr. Gauss. He was one of the secretaries, the second or third.

For a while during this period he lived with Mr. Gauss and me for a short time. He was an active and intelligent young officer. I do not recall the exact date of his assignment. In 1943 Service went to General Stilwell's headquarters on loan as a sort of political adviser in the same way that Davies was lent. I don't know whether you are familiar with that arrangement, but there were about five or six of these young officers who were attached to Stilwell's headquarters to assist him in any way they could. I probably should not emphasize the word "political," although that was what they were called.

My next contact with him was in 1944 when he came home on a short vacation, and that was purely seeing him in the Department. In 1945 he was in Washington again. He was assigned at that time to the Office of the Director General of the Foreign Service doing

some kind of administrative work. It was this time that the Amerasia case broke. I never discussed the case with Service, nor did I have anything to do with the Amerasia case. I did, along with some other friends, make a small contribution to assist him in the business of obtaining legal counsel at that time. I believe he repaid me.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us how that was brought about. Did he solicit you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I have forgotten who did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did somebody?

Mr. VINCENT. Somebody must have started the idea of trying to get him some money. I remember Mr. Gauss was one of them that contributed. I was one, and I wouldn't know who else.

Senator FERGUSON. How much did you contribute?

Mr. VINCENT. I have forgotten, but it was not more than \$50, and it may have been \$40 or something like that. I think Service repaid it.

Mr. MANDEL. Was it an interdepartment project, or did Mortimer Graves—

Mr. VINCENT. He was another contributor.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he solicit you?

Mr. VINCENT. He may have. He may have been the person who conceived the idea of getting money for Service, although I wasn't one who would have to be prodded or solicited on the thing if I thought he needed any money.

Senator FERGUSON. What was he being accused of?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time I think the accusation was espionage.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean as a Foreign Service officer you would not need to know any of the facts but that a fellow employee in the Department was accused of espionage and that you would contribute to his defense?

Mr. VINCENT. I contributed toward helping him get a lawyer for his defense. That is exactly the case. He was not guilty.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait a minute. Did you know anything about the facts?

Mr. VINCENT. Only what I read in the papers. I had no consultation with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Why would you in your position contribute to a man when you didn't know whether he was guilty or not?

Mr. VINCENT. Because of a matter of friendship.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you contribute to a man who was guilty if the facts showed he was guilty?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you contribute any to the Hiss defense?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you asked to?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To any other defense?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You said you made a contribution of \$50, I think.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I said \$40 or \$50.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it paid back?

Mr. VINCENT. I could not recall, but I think Service paid it back.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the occasion for Service paying it back?

Mr. VINCENT. He did not have any money at the time. He later got money to pay it back. I am testifying that I think he paid it back.

Senator FERGUSON. This is the only time in your life, is it, that you ever contributed to a fund for a man's defense?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't know any more about it than you are telling us now?

Mr. VINCENT. Any more about what?

Senator FERGUSON. The contribution.

Mr. VINCENT. All I know is what I am telling you.

Senator FERGUSON. You certainly are not clear on what you did, when you got it back, what the facts are. You do not know who solicited you? You mean to tell us this is the only occasion and your memory is no better on this than you are giving us?

Mr. VINCENT. My memory is no better than I am giving you here.

Senator FERGUSON. Think a minute about this fund. Who solicited you?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Mandel——

Senator FERGUSON. He is not trying to——

Mr. VINCENT. I know he is not. I don't recall who solicited me. If he said Mortimer Graves solicited me, he may have.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk to Graves about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Graves say about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Graves had been in touch with Service and said he needed money.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ask you for a certain amount?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ask him what the facts were?

Mr. VINCENT. Of the case?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not care whether he was guilty or not? You were going to contribute?

Mr. VINCENT. I was going to contribute to a man who was in trouble who had been a friend of mine, who lived with me in Chungking just as the Ambassador did the same thing. If he had been proved guilty, but he had no money to even hire counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. It is not a question of that. I wanted to know whether or not you asked anything about the facts before you contributed. You were a United States official, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. He was then being accused of betraying the very Government that was hiring you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you made no inquiry as to his guilt or innocence?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you contributed?

Mr. VINCENT. Before I contributed to his defense, to hiring a lawyer for his defense.



Senator FERGUSON. You knew who the lawyer was?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the occasion for you being repaid?

Mr. VINCENT. I have said I don't recall whether I was.

Senator FERGUSON. Why?

Mr. VINCENT. If I was, I don't recall whether he did or not. I think he did. Probably he simply repaid the money when he was able. He was home on leave and had no money.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't even recall whether you were repaid this money, you say?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall whether I was paid it. My impression was he did repay it.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall the facts of the repayment?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you really think that is possible, that a man who once in his life makes a contribution cannot recall whether or not it was repaid to him?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my testimony, sir, that I do not recall whether Service repaid it. My impression is he did.

Senator FERGUSON. He did.

Mr. VINCENT. He did.

Senator FERGUSON. Where, here?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Your memory is blotted out as to where he may have repaid it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; if he repaid it. I never asked him to repay it.

Senator FERGUSON. When you made the donation or gave the money, was it understood it would be repaid?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot give us any more light?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not contributed with the idea it would be repaid.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all you know about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know or have any reason to believe that Mr. Service was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a minute. If he took papers and gave them to the Communist movement, and that is what you were paying the money for, to get him a lawyer, to defend him on that, do you want your answer to stand to that last question?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. As to whether or not you knew or had any knowledge?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you read the question again, please?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. The fact that the United States Government was accusing him, did that not raise any suspicion in your mind at all? It is your Government and mine.

Mr. VINCENT. Just a minute. At that time it was not even established, as I recall, that Amerasia itself was connected with the Communist movement.

Senator FERGUSON. No, but the fact that he was being accused of espionage, it had to be connected with some other government. You



are a Foreign Service officer, an employee of the United States. Here was the United States Government accusing a newspaper or a magazine of espionage, and Mr. Service, another Foreign Service officer, was accused in the same conspiracy. You knew that the espionage was with Russia did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew there could be espionage. I knew of none.

Senator FERGUSON. But if it was true it would be with Russia? That was the claim?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not make any inquiry about what Service was charged with?

Mr. VINCENT. Except I saw it in the newspapers.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it not tell you?

Mr. VINCENT. It told the case.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that bring anything to your mind at all that Service may have had some connection with the Soviet?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Service in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I have just testified to that.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew him well?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

(Off the record discussion followed.)

Mr. MANDEL. Did you know he lived with Solomon Adler?

Mr. VINCENT. In China?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. If he lived with him, it was after I left Chungking. I think he was living with Mr. Gauss and myself up to the time we left.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, as a Government employee, if a man did get papers from the State Department that would get into the hands, or that he knew might get into the hands, of the Soviet Government, you would then say that if you had that knowledge that he was in some way connected with the Communists, but in this case you made no inquiry from the State Department itself whether or not Mr. Service could have taken those papers out?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You now know that the Loyalty Board has found that he did take the papers?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. And he did give them to Amerasia?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that lead you to believe on this question that he had any connection with the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. This recent thing?

Senator FERGUSON. This question is not only past, it is present.

Mr. VINCENT. If it is present, then certainly this last finding of the committee would indicate that he had this connection.

Mr. SOURWINE. With the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. Not with the Communist movement. I still do not think he thought he was having a connection with the Communist movement.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you say that when the facts are that he gave it, the information, to aid the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't believe, sir, that Service knew when he gave those papers he was giving them aid, but I have not read his testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you made inquiry?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not read the hearings of the Review Board that came out. I am here simply stating that I do not believe that Service at the time he did that felt that he was aiding the Communist Party,

Senator FERGUSON. The way you have acted in this case, with your donation and everything, you would say that it would be very difficult for the State Department itself to get the facts so that it would ever be convincing that a man had any connection with the Communist Party; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. You would have to restate that.

Senator FERGUSON. I will strike that out.

You won't now believe and you have not gone into the facts to ascertain whether or not a fellow officer had any connection with the Communist Party; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. You are speaking of Service?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You cannot believe that Service——

Mr. VINCENT. I find it extremely difficult to believe that Service purposely did this in order to aid the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to ask this question: You would be one of the people that the Government might want to get evidence from as to whether or not Service was connected with the Communists and took these papers out and gave them to Jaffe or Amerasia; is that not true?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you learned anything about the facts or were consulted, you made a donation to his defense?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator——

Senator FERGUSON. How would you ever be a witness in that kind of a case?

Mr. VINCENT. When you have a friend such as he was who was in trouble, I don't know that you would prejudice the case or your own attitude toward it by contributing something for him to hire legal defense when he did not have the money to do so.

Senator FERGUSON. I believe firmly in the idea that a man is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but you were a fellow employee in the very Department where these papers were taken from. They were far-eastern papers and they were given to an agent of the Communists and that was the charge by your Government for which you were working. I cannot understand why you would not make some inquiry about that before you would take such a definite stand as to make a donation. I really cannot.

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I am sorry I can't——

Senator FERGUSON. You made no inquiry. If you had made an inquiry and convinced yourself that he was right, then I can see why you would have donated all the money. You would have gone and testified for him.

But you were connected with the very Department that these papers came from.

Mr. VINCENT. I can only say this: That you have got to put this on the basis that he was my friend and innocent until he was proved guilty.

Senator FERGUSON. But the facts now prove that the Loyalty Board found that he did take the papers out.

Mr. VINCENT. The grand jury acquitted him at the time on the charge that was made against him insofar as——

Senator FERGUSON. Before you gave the money they had not acquitted him.

Mr. VINCENT. No, but they did afterward.

Senator FERGUSON. But you made no inquiry.

Mr. VINCENT. There was an agency in the State Department handling the whole matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you inquire from them?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did anybody inquire from you about the facts?

Mr. VINCENT. No, not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did anybody ask whether or not you knew any papers were taken out?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact, he was under you, was he not?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How was he connected with you?

Mr. VINCENT. He was in the administrative section under the Director General of Foreign Service. He had been assigned to that division.

Senator FERGUSON. He had far eastern duties?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think so. He was purely in an administrative job in Selden Chapin's office.

Senator FERGUSON. How would he get his hands on the papers from the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know. Most of the papers he had were his own memoranda and notes that he kept with them.

Senator FERGUSON. From the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that the custom when you make a report to keep a copy?

Mr. VINCENT. It never has been my custom.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. A new name, Agnes Smedley?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall ever meeting Agnes Smedley.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who she was?

Mr. VINCENT. Wasn't she a missionary? In China?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any reason to know or believe that she was ever connected in any way with the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Richard Sorge?

Mr. VINCENT. No. Mr. Mandel, does that—the name does not mean anything to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any reason to know or believe that Mr. Sorge was ever connected with the Communist Party or with Communist activities?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I don't know him, and I therefore don't know who he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is not one of the people you have read about in the papers?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Gunther Stein?

Mr. VINCENT. He was in Chungking at one time or another during the period I was there—as a newspaper man, as I recall it. I didn't see much of him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall where you first met him?

Mr. VINCENT. In Chungking, at what they called the press hostel there, where the newspaper people stay. I think he was again at the IPR conference, although I have no recollection of meeting him there. I just reviewed who was there and noticed he was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him socially at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever correspond with him?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know or have any reason to believe he was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. MANDEL. May I ask one question? Have you read his books and articles?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. William T. Stone?

Mr. VINCENT. He was in the State Department under William, now Senator, Benton at the time I was stationed in the State Department. I think that was his position there. I saw him from time to time on official business. I don't know that I ever saw him socially out. He was an acquaintance, you might call it, a friend in the State Department, a fellow officer.

But my associations with him were not such as to make any meeting with him stand out.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know or have any reason to believe he was in any way connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I know who she was, but I don't have any recollection of ever meeting her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was she?

Mr. VINCENT. She was a woman we all suspected of being a Communist out in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that?

Mr. VINCENT. It was while I was in Washington. I could not recall any date of when people are suspected of being a Communist. She may have declared herself to be a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you say, "we all suspected her of being a Communist out in China," you mean those in the State Department here suspected that she was in China as a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know her in China?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.



Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know her here at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No. She may have been at one time or another at a social function or a cocktail party. She was around. She was an American citizen, but I have no recollection of ever meeting her.

Mr. SOURWINE. On what basis was she suspected of being a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say. I have no exact knowledge as to on what basis she was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say, "we all thought she was"?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no exact knowledge as to why.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was "we all" the whole State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. The people in the Far Eastern office who thought that Anna Louise Strong was generally considered to be, if not a Communist, very much in sympathy with them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know on what basis?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I suppose it was her associates out in China. I don't know right to this day whether she ever went up to Yenan or ever had any contacts.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know her associates and who they were in China?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I have no clear recollection of Anna Louise Strong's activities. I can tell you that it was the general impression she was either a Communist or a sympathizer.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you have no facts, it must have been the case someone told you that she was suspected of being a Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. I would not remember anybody telling me. It was just a general impression that one got of Anna Louise Strong. If you asked me the question, Do I recall anybody telling me she was a Communist—

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know with whom she associated?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to find out how you got your general impression. It was the process of osmosis in the Far Eastern division?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall. There were no doubt instances of somebody saying that she has an association with this or that person, but I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think it was a matter of inferences which you drew from specific information that at one time you had?

Mr. VINCENT. That at one time may have come to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Laurence Todd?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I don't recall knowing Laurence Todd.

Mr. SOURWINE. Here is another Chinese name, Tung Pi-wu?

Mr. VINCENT. Oh, yes. He was the Chinese Communist that Chiang Kai-shek sent to San Francisco for the United Nations Conference, and I recall meeting him out there along with the other Chinese delegates. I don't recall having any close association with him and wouldn't know him if I saw him now, but he was a member of the Chinese delegation to the U. N. I think I met him with others of the general delegation because my job was to keep in contact with the delegates from China and from other countries.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met him before that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Julian Wadleigh?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall him or ever having met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who he is?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Paul Walsh?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I don't recall him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Harry Dexter White?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes [reading]: He was, as you know, in the Treasury Department. My first distinct recollection of meeting him was when I came back from Geneva in 1945, and again it was the discussion of the Chinese stabilization loan. I may have met him before then, but I had no business with him. I may have met him at a luncheon but was not socially acquainted. I don't think I ever met his wife, never was in his home.

But we did have discussions then. After I came back from China, there was from time to time matters concerning China of a financial character which we went over. I remember one conference in Secretary Morgenthau's office which was concerned with assistance to China of one form or another. Outside of that I think the last time I ever saw him—maybe I saw him later—was at the Bretton Woods Conference when I went there just for one day to discuss a matter of paying for an airfield with the Chinese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know or have reason to believe that he was in any way connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now I have a much shorter list of names. Some of them are names we have mentioned. The question is, What position did you take in reference to the loyalty status of this individual in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. What position did I take?

Mr. SOURWINE. If you took any position at any time with reference to the loyalty of the person named, please say so. If you did take a position, please explain fully what the circumstances were.

Alger Hiss?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Cora DuBois?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. John K. Emmerson?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Robert W. Barnett?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Julian R. Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. John P. Davies?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wilma Fairbank?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Laurence Salisbury?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. John Stewart Service?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Raymond Ludden?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. William T. Stone?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. By your answers do you mean you never at any time were asked regarding the loyalty of any of those persons questioned in that connection?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I was never questioned.

Senator FERGUSON. You never expressed an opinion in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You said you were never questioned.

Were you ever questioned?

Mr. VINCENT. I was never questioned as to the status of their loyalty.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to their loyalty?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You were never questioned in the Service loyalty hearings?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You would recall that?

Mr. VINCENT. That I certainly would.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not serve with Service and Davies in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Nobody ever asked you a question about them?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you were never approached by the FBI with regard to the loyalty of any of these persons?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Really, I cannot understand this.

Mr. SOURWINE. They must have gone around Mr. Vincent, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Here you were, a fellow working out in the Far East with these people. It is notorious now that they have had charges before the Department as well as before the Loyalty Board. You have never been consulted about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Throughout this whole period of these loyalty hearings I have been in Switzerland, and no one ever approached me with regard to any one of them.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not have a case before the Loyalty Board?

Mr. VINCENT. My case before the Loyalty Board?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have a case before the Loyalty Board?

Mr. VINCENT. Mine is finished now.

Senator FERGUSON. You did have one?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. No one asked you any questions about these other people?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Or about any person in the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. In connection with their loyalty?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall anybody approaching me, in Switzerland, since I have come back, or before, regarding the loyalty status of anyone.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew at the time of Service's arrest there was a Loyalty Board?

Mr. VINCENT. Was there one in 1945?

Senator FERGUSON. Was there not?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Not in the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No; not that I recall. I think the Loyalty Board system came into existence after 1945.

Mr. MANDEL. There was a Security Board in the Department, was there not?

Mr. VINCENT. There was a Security Office or Division there.

Mr. SOURWINE. This question and your answer to it included even the Security Office or officer of the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have concluded that list of names. Do you have any names in your memoranda that we have not asked you about?

Mr. VINCENT. I will check on it. I went through some of these.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to give you an opportunity to get them in, and this is a good time for it.

Mr. VINCENT. Let me ask you, because I notice that T. A. Bisson was mentioned in connection with me. Did you ask me about Bisson?

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe so.

Mr. VINCENT. I know, because you asked something about it yesterday.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Bisson was on this list of names?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether you ever asked me whether I had any acquaintance with Mr. Edward C. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. No.

Mr. VINCENT. I have him here [reading]: My acquaintance with him has been slight and brief. My first recollection of meeting him was in 1943 when I returned from Chungking. He came into the office and wanted to talk about China. That was when I attended the Hot Springs conference of the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Please go through your notes now. Are there any others?

Mr. VINCENT. You asked me about Wilma Fairbank. Did you ask about her husband?

Mr. SOURWINE. John? No.

Mr. VINCENT (reading). I met Dr. Fairbank when he was in China in 1942. I believe he was with OSS and later with OWI. We saw each other in Chungking socially and on official business.

Later in Washington I believe he was with OWI. I saw him from time to time.

As I testified, my wife was a good friend of his wife. We visited Dr. Fairbank at Harvard when he passed through Cambridge last year. I made that testimony also.

Senator FERGUSON. You never knew he had any connection with the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Or you had no reason to believe that he did?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know him to be a left-winger?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. A New Dealer?

Mr. VINCENT. I suppose he was sympathetic with the New Deal. I don't know. I never discussed it.



I have made notes here if you want them on where and when I have met Dr. Jessup. You have not asked me about him.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wish you would go through your notes and pick up any names you have not been asked about.

Mr. VINCENT (reading). My first recollection of meeting Dr. Jessup was at the Hot Springs conference of the IPR in 1945, or perhaps at a preliminary conference of the American delegation to that conference in the autumn of 1944. It is quite possible I met Dr. Jessup from time to time after that, either in Washington or New York, but I do not recall the occasions.

I last saw Dr. Jessup in Paris in May 1951, when he was attending the conference there on the agenda of the foreign ministers.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one question on Fairbank. Did you ever know him to be pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know Owen Lattimore to be pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How many of these people outside of Mao Tse-tung and the ones you said you knew to be Communists did you know to be pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not have called any of them pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Even Julian Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think he was pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. None of them were pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Did you mention Dr. Johnstone? We have mentioned him from time to time here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Whom do you mean?

Mr. VINCENT. William Johnstone of George Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned him.

Mr. VINCENT. I have just a brief note on him [reading]: I knew him as dean of George Washington University and as head of the Washington office of the IPR for a while.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of what is he a doctor?

Mr. VINCENT. He is just a Ph. D., I suppose.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is is a young man?

Mr. VINCENT. Forty-five, I should say.

Senator FERGUSON. It has become the habit that you call almost everyone doctor in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I don't think so. He is not in the State Department. He was dean of George Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean IPR and people connected with that. You have named some of the others doctor.

Mr. VINCENT. Dr. Chi. He has his doctor's degree from one of the Peking universities. At least he was called doctor there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Johnstone, dean did you say?

Mr. VINCENT. At George Washington University, sir. Whether he is there now, I do not know, because I haven't seen him for years. He was at the IPR conference at Hot Springs.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he was also at this luncheon at the Cosmos Club?

Mr. VINCENT. He was also at the luncheon at the Cosmos Club.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact, you think he was the man that invited you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I haven't seen him since those days. I have here another Chinese whose name has been mentioned in connection also with Chou En Lai, Lin Piao.

I might say, since we are mentioning that, do you want me to say also that I had never reason to believe that Dr. Johnstone was connected with the Communist Party or a pro-Communist?

Mr. SOURWINE. If that is the fact, I wish you would.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, suppose I put it this way: If they are Communists I will say I knew them to be Communists, and the ones I have here, I do know to be Communists [reading]:

He was in Chungking during the winter, Gen. Lin Piao, incidentally, he was in Chungking during the winter of 1942-43 while I was there. He was there at the invitation of Chiang Kai-shek to discuss measures of military cooperation in fighting the Japanese.

I have no clear recollection of meeting him, but it was quite possible I did. Perhaps at a reception at Chiang Kai-shek's, or perhaps at some other function.

I do not recall any conversations with him.

I do recall a report made by one of our young officers on the conversation with Lin Piao, the primary object of which was to get information regarding the military situation in Communist areas. I didn't speak Chinese well enough to talk with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know a man by the name of Asiaticus?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think so. Could I look at it?

No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you pronounce that?

Mr. MANDEL. Asiaticus.

Mr. VINCENT. It isn't anybody's name.

Mr. MANDEL. Also known as Hans Moeller or Heinz Moeller.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Heinz Moeller?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Han Seng?

Mr. VINCENT. No; that is a name that has something in my mind, but I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. That name was on the list, and Mr. Vincent was asked about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Chi?

Mr. VINCENT. He is the man I was asked about; he was Dr. Chi, if he is a doctor.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you say about a person who would write this language:

I think you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the Chinese section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspect, but can be depended upon to do it with the right touch.

What would that convey to you?

Mr. VINCENT. That, I think, is a part of that letter that was read into the record, wasn't it? The whole letter?

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with the letter?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What does that convey to you?

Mr. VINCENT. Taken out of context, it would certainly convey to me, and I don't recall the whole letter——

Senator FERGUSON. There is the paragraph. That is not taking it out of context.

Mr. VINCENT. But my recollection is, Senator, that there was some other paragraph in it that indicated that the intent of it was entirely different. But if you asked me, I think that that would indicate that the people, taking that out of context, that the people writing it had some—I don't know what you call it—ideas in mind, which were somewhat “subterfugeous.”

Senator FERGUSON. What?

Mr. VINCENT. I mean that they were trying to get across something. Would you read that again?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the Chinese section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I would say that I have no opinion on that, without seeing the whole letter, Senator, because I don't know quite what he means by the radical aspects of it, or the right touch.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you think a person was pro-Communist that would write that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. A person that would bring out the radical, would do it with the right touch?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I wouldn't necessarily call him pro-Communist. I already testified that I didn't have knowledge that Chi was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that some of these persons he was talking about were Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes?

Mr. VINCENT. I have already testified that I don't know Chi was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Or that Han-seng was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I didn't know Chen Han-seng, and I think I testified that I knew of him only as a professor.

Is that the whole letter?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I have the whole letter. That is all, go ahead.

Mr. VINCENT. The name occurred somewhere of James S. Allen, and I simply say I haven't any knowledge of ever having met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who he was?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your notes do not indicate it?

Mr. VINCENT. No. To the best of my knowledge I have never met James Allen and don't have any recollection of who he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. VINCENT. I have the name here of Hilda Austern and I say she, I have learned, was Mr. Carter's secretary. I may have met her in Hot Springs conference. I have no recollection of her or any meeting.

I have testified on Edmund Clubb, haven't we?

We have testified on Ludden.

Did you ask me about a man named Little?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. I have him here for some reason, and have said I haven't any recollection of having met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not ask you.

Mr. VINCENT. And Ford. I don't recall why I have it here.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is Little's name?

Mr. VINCENT. Ballard.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you do not know anything about him except that you have a note on him that you don't know him, and never did?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know him, and never did.

You asked me about Earl Browder, didn't you?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir. What was the name after Mr. Little?

Mr. VINCENT. Anne Ford.

Mr. SOURWINE. A woman?

Mr. VINCENT. A woman, I suppose.

Mr. SOURWINE. A-n-n?

Mr. VINCENT. A-n-n-e.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was she?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Except that you have a note that you know nothing about her?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Somewhere the name cropped up.

Mr. SURREY. I think the name was in the committee hearings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are those notes in your handwriting?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you do not know in what connection the name Anne Ford came to you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I have no idea. But I believe it was a name that came up in these hearings.

You have asked me about Robert Barnett.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Evans Carlson.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I think you asked me about a fellow named Abraham Chapman.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. You didn't?

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was he?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know him, and I don't know why he was mentioned.

Mr. SURREY. That was another name that came up in the hearing.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all. That concludes your recounting of the names in your list that we did not ask you about?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know, sir, whether Mr. Owen Lattimore was ever called in to advise the Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he ever came in to advise the Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not.



Mr. SOURWINE. Might he have come in to advise the Secretary without your knowledge?

Mr. VINCENT. He could have easily come in to the Secretary without my knowledge. Are you speaking of the current Secretary, or at any time?

Mr. SOURWINE. Ex officio, or any time.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever advise you?

Mr. VINCENT. When you say advise me, he came into my office when he was OWI Director of Pacific Affairs.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he advise with you?

Mr. VINCENT. He advised with me on the program of the OWI in China.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he advised the Secretary of State on the same thing?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever ask him to advise you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever ask his advice about anything?

Mr. VINCENT. Probably on far eastern matters, on China matters; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You considered him as an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. On these areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he had been available to you, you would have asked him; wouldn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would.

Mr. SOURWINE. You probably would have taken it?

Mr. VINCENT. That would depend on the character of the advice.

Mr. SOURWINE. Expert advice?

Mr. VINCENT. Expert advice on these Inner Asian frontiers, yes; I would have taken the advice.

Mr. SOURWINE. His advice would have weighed most heavily in your mind on any far eastern matters, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly have paid attention to it.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, when the occasion presented itself, as often as you had opportunity, you did discuss with him matters about which you could use or needed such expert advice?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, have you completed a full discussion of any efforts that you ever made to assist in securing an appointment for Mr. Lattimore to a job in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe you stated that Mr. Ballantine approved that appointment?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection. I haven't seen it, but it would normally go through with him, and I am sure it did go through him. He was the director of the Far Eastern Office at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that involve any recommendation by you for appointment of Mr. Lattimore in any capacity or to perform any work or duties in or with the China subdivision of the Far Eastern section?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the general idea, that he would come in for a day or so a week and prepare background material, as Dr. Kennedy was doing, on these Inner Asia areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is where he was to work as a consultant?

Mr. VINCENT. When he came from Baltimore; yes, sir. In the Far Eastern office. But he probably would have worked in the China division, where the Inner Asian frontiers were in my division at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Lattimore the fact that his application had been rejected after the rejection had taken place?

Mr. VINCENT. I probably did. He probably wanted to know why and I told him why.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, you told him what had been told you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I told him he couldn't have it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any present recollection of that conversation or conference?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have my mind refreshed, because I don't think I knew at the time; but I am talking about the president of Johns Hopkins.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to distinguish in your testimony between what might have happened and what you remember happened.

I wish, if it meets the Chairman's pleasure, that the witness would endeavor not to say "this might have happened" or "that might have happened," unless he remembers that it did happen, or he has some reason to believe that it did happen. That is, please do not use that phrase as pure speculation, as a hypothesis without any basis.

Mr. VINCENT. All right; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That should make the record clear.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that Lattimore received an appointment and served as adviser to Mr. Pauley in connection with his so-called repatriation mission to Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that at a time when you were head of the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What, if anything, did you have to do with Mr. Lattimore's appointment as adviser to Pauley?

Mr. VINCENT. Nothing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recommend it?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you approve it?

Mr. VINCENT. That was not for my approval.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know about it at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who did recommend him?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how it came about?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or whether Lattimore asked for it, or initiated it?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss it with Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. That I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you talk with Lattimore about it after he left the university for the Pauley mission?

Mr. VINCENT. I probably did.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did you discuss with Lattimore the Pauley report after he got back?

Mr. VINCENT. I probably did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no independent recollection of it in either case?

Mr. VINCENT. No; after Lattimore got back, I do recall that Lattimore came in and I was obviously anxious to find out what the conditions were out there, and we had a discussion about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not discuss the Pauley report as such?

Mr. VINCENT. No doubt, but I don't recall discussing the Pauley report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore had a hand in writing that report; did he not?

Mr. VINCENT. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. And when talking about it, did you not discuss his handiwork, as one expert to another, discuss his craftsmanship in that report?

Mr. VINCENT. I probably did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no recollection?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of the discussion itself.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no recollection of the discussion having taken place?

Mr. VINCENT. No, but as I say no doubt one took place. I am trying to make a distinction between what you asked me now, if I have a recollection of, you might say, a discussion at a particular time. But I would say that it no doubt took place.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that the record will not carry implications that are not testified, do you even know whether Mr. Lattimore had anything to do with the Pauley report?

Mr. VINCENT. I have already testified that he certainly must have had something to do with it. He went with Mr. Pauley; he was with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. He could have been with him without having anything to do with the report; could he not? That could have been one of those things that could have been.

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say to what extent he participated in drafting the report, but I say I assume that he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to find out whether you discussed it, or whether it was another thing that might have happened.

Mr. VINCENT. It might have happened.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not recall discussing it with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that we discussed drafting the report.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was a good friend of yours?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he did participate, he had a hand in the drafting; but you have no memory of discussing that job?

Mr. VINCENT. No memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. Even saying "That was a fine job"?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't recall saying it was a fine job.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you read the report?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't—I don't recall reading it; but I certainly must have read the Pauley report in the office.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not so clear on the answer that you gave that the Secretary of State would not hire Lattimore in the Department.

Why did he say he would not hire him?

Mr. VINCENT. It wasn't the Secretary at that time, Senator. It was Mr. Grew who was Under Secretary. Mr. Grew told me that he could not approve the job for him because he was engaged in publicity to the extent that he thought it would be unwise to have a man in the State Department who was doing that publicity. He was writing for a couple of newspapers or so, and he was contributing articles.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, to be afraid that he would leak things out in these articles?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, he wasn't going to give up his articles, and that therefore it was a situation that——

Senator FERGUSON. That could be the reason; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That could be the reason. I don't know that he would have.

Senator FERGUSON. But that was Grew's attitude in saying "Now, this man is writing for these articles, and so forth, and we cannot have him here because he will get information that he may use in the articles"; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Lattimore ever delivered a lecture to personnel of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any occasion of his delivering a lecture to the personnel.

Mr. SOURWINE. Suppose we say the word "lecture" is broad enough to include talks, briefings, informative addresses.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; as I say, it is quite possible he did, but I don't recall the occasion of Mr. Lattimore delivering an address.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you recall the occasion of his having delivered more than one? Or how many?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have anything to do with arranging or approving any such lecture or lectures?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall approving a lecture.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever instruct any of your subordinates to attend such a lecture?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Roswell Hartsen Whitson?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who he was?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Whitson is a man who is alleged to have made a written report to the State Department stating that General MacArthur could not be trusted for either ability or knowledge of affairs in the Far East. Did you ever see or hear of such a report?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there had been such a report officially transmitted through channels to the State Department, you would have seen it, if it had come in during the period you were head of the Far Eastern division; would you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Not necessarily.



Do you mean General MacArthur was writing to him?

Mr. SOURWINE. This was supposed to be a report by Mr. Whitson.

Mr. VINCENT. You don't know the period of that?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am attempting to ascertain whether you can give us the date.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know the name, and I have no recollection of such a report.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would be a fairly sure thing, then, that you never recommended Mr. Whitson for employment?

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly would be, if I don't know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or for promotion?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is Kim Koo-sek?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, he is a Korean. That I can tell from the name. But I don't know him, Kim Koo-sek. He had something to do with the general political situation, either in Korea or when there were a bunch of Koreans up in Yenan.

But I can't place Kim Koo-sek at this moment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet him?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend him for employment?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend him for a promotion?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend him to replace Syngman Rhee on any mission or trip?

Mr. VINCENT. No, not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know, or have you any reason to believe, that Kim Koo-sek is or was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No; was he?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not know, or did you not know, that he was a Moscow-trained Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I would have to go back over the whole record. I may at one time have known him, but you are asking me now what I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am making an effort not to be argumentative in any of these questions. We simply want to ask them and get your answer.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. When did leave the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. In the middle of 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know of an order going out, or instructions, to General Hodge to advise the Koreans that they had to take Communists into their Government?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know anything about that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't remember any order telling that.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever consulted about that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You see, it happened in China. You said the instructions that went out for Marshall were that he was to take them in and consolidate, and so forth. Did you know the same thing that happened in there?

Mr. VINCENT. Let me go back. No instructions went out to Marshall to take the Communists into the Government. It was his own directive.

Senator FERGUSON. It was his directive, you said, to take them in?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know whether a directive to General Hodge, or any other public official in Korea, to take them in in Korea was made?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the International Assets Commission?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean the International Assets Commission in Switzerland? It is not called that there, I don't think.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is it called?

Mr. VINCENT. It has no name, as I recollect. But I have a paper on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there an organization which comes to your mind when I say "What is the International Assets Commission"?

Mr. VINCENT. There is.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is that organization?

Mr. VINCENT. It is not an organization; but it is a committee in Bern made up of the representatives of the four legations there. I have it right here, and I can give you a statement on that [reading]:

After the Japanese surrender the Japanese Government, pursuant to SCAP directive, instructed its missions in neutral countries to turn over all Japanese state property to the custody of the neutral governments for eventual transfer to representatives of the Allied Powers.

In February of 1946 the Swiss Government transferred the Japanese Legation and Archives in Bern and all Japanese state funds in Switzerland to the custody of the United States, British, and Chinese Legations in Bern.

Sometime later, when Switzerland accorded recognition to the U. S. S. R., and the U. S. S. R. established a legation in Bern, the Russians were admitted into this group on their insistence. This is all something that happened before I went to Switzerland.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were the French a part of that group?

Mr. VINCENT. The French were not.

Mr. SOURWINE. But the Chinese were?

Mr. VINCENT. They were.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the Nationalist Chinese?

Mr. VINCENT. That was [reading]:

By agreement, the British assumed the duties of day-to-day administration of the assets. I might define them a little more clearly. It was not just the Japanese Legation, but there was a certain amount of money in the bank that the Japanese had there.

Whenever any relatively important operation was to be carried out, such as major repairs to the Japanese Legation, it was accomplished after agreement by all four legations on the steps to be taken. This was sort of a rent contract. The Chinese were paying for the Legation.

The various legations were represented in these affairs by first or second secretaries. I never attended one. The meetings of these representatives were informal and, in general, when action was taken, it was taken by unanimous agreement.

There were never any formal rules laid down for these proceedings. It was no doubt tacitly assumed by all representatives that each legation had the power of veto.

This matter, however, was never put to test until the arrival in Bern of the diplomatic mission of the Chinese Peoples Republic.

Following the departure of the Japanese diplomats from Bern, their premises were rented by the Chinese Nationalist Government for its Legation.

The Chinese Nationalist mission left Bern in February of 1950, shortly after the recognition by the Swiss Government of the Chinese Communists. The Chinese Communists, however, did not send a mission to Bern until December of 1950.

At this time, the former Japanese Legation premises were vacant, although efforts had been made to rent them after the departure of the Chinese Nationalists.

Our Legation learned informally from the Swiss Foreign Office through the British Legation, as administrator of the property, that the Chinese Communists were interested in renting the property. The British were not enthusiastic about the prospect of renting the property to them, but the British were being pressed by the Swiss Foreign Office, which was under a duty to use its best efforts to find space for the Chinese mission.

The British had recognized Communist China a year or so before.

Our Legation reported the matter to the Department of State before the question was raised in a meeting of the interested powers in Bern. We stated that normally we would maintain a united front with the British on these things, but that there might be objections in this case. We requested the Department's instructions.

We were informed that the Department definitely opposed the renting of the former Japanese Legation to Chinese Communists.

About a month later, our Legation received a letter from the British Legation enclosing a note from the Swiss Foreign Office requesting an agreement to rent the Japanese Legation to the Chinese Communists. The British were told that we were opposed to this.

At the same time, the Chief of the Foreign Office—that is what we would call the Secretary of State—interceded in an interview with me. He called me to his office. I told him that we were opposed to renting the building to the Chinese Communists.

In view, however, of the fact that the Chief of the Swiss Foreign Office had made a personal approach on this matter, I told him that I would send his request to the Department of State. This was done, and the Department replied that they were opposed to renting the Legation to the Communists and would interpose a veto if necessary.

Another question arose after this. The British Foreign Office authorized the British Legation to treat the Chinese Communist representatives as entitled to have a voice in the administration of the Japanese state property in Switzerland. One was the Legation, it was state property, and there was also money in the bank which we didn't do much about. It was just there.

I reported this to the Department, and adding that unless instructed to the contrary, I intended to inform the British that the United State could not approve of such action. That ended the matter,



and since that time the administration of Japanese assets in Switzerland have been carried on with the participation of only the United States, British, and Soviet Legations.

The former Japanese Legation, the last time I heard of it, had no tenant.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not at any time a member of the organization?

Mr. VINCENT. As Minister I was head of the Legation and the secretary who attended these meetings was sent by me. I never attended a meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then there never were any Chinese assets turned over or former Japanese assets turned over to the Chinese Communist Government as a result of any action taken by that organization?

Mr. VINCENT. No; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nor any such turning over in which you concurred?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

And before I left Bern, the Chinese Communist group has found some other place to live, as I gather. I may add in that connection, to show my relation, I was the only person who gave a farewell reception for the Chinese Nationalist Minister, Dr. Wu.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was in what year?

Mr. VINCENT. That was 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not mean in regard to Mr. Wu.

Mr. VINCENT. I mean in regard to all this thing coming up here. It was late 1950 and 1951.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am jumping around here a bit, necessarily. I have some matters that I have no date on. I cannot put them in chronologically.

What, if anything, do you know about a plan or plans, or concerted movements, to remove various officers from positions in the Department of State connected with far-eastern affairs?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, now, that brings up two questions. I mean, two people. I have seen Mr. Dooman's testimony, and I would be glad to explain that. I am thinking now of Mr. Dooman's testimony that I was at least a part in the removal of Mr. Dooman, Mr. Ballantine, and Mr. Grew.

Nothing could be further from the truth. I was in Potsdam with Mr. Dooman during July, at the Potsdam Conference. He and I were rather close together. Such a scheme as removing anybody was never mentioned to me and between us. He and I traveled back together to London to attend a short UNRRA conference as far-eastern people. We both came home, sometime in the middle of August.

I saw him one day coming into the Department with a suitcase, and I remember saying to him, "I thought you were going in the other direction."

With that, he passed on by. I asked for, and got permission, to take leave in New Hampshire. I went up there to a place, up around Hancock and some other little place, and only 3 days after I had been there—and I say this as indicating how ignorant I was of how developments were—and having spent money to get up there, I had a telephone call from Mr. Ballantine to come back; that I was wanted in Washington.



He did not explain what it was. When I came back he told me, and later Acheson told me, that they wanted me to be Director of the Far Eastern Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when that was?

Mr. VINCENT. That was in the latter part of August. It wasn't early September, because I was back here by the end of August.

I had, as I say, only 2 days' leave up there. I was ignorant as anybody could have been of what the plans were for my future. I was at that time Chief of the China Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. You got back here?

Mr. VINCENT. And in August, when I got back from Potsdam, I took off, I should say, within a few days because I had already gotten permission to be away for a short vacation with my wife in New Hampshire. I didn't see Acheson except a short time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were called back from that vacation and stepped into Mr. Dooman's shoes, so to speak?

Mr. VINCENT. I took over Mr. Dooman's job at the end of August, as Chairman of the FESWNCC, and on the 19th or 20th of September, I took over Mr. Ballantine's job, and he was made special assistant to the Secretary.

Mr. Dooman resigned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has there ever been any controversy anywhere about those dates?

Mr. VINCENT. About those particular dates?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, when you took over from Mr. Dooman, either at SWNCC or head of the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Not as far as I am concerned. But I know that the record shows that I attended the first SWNCC meeting, subcommittee of the SWNCC on, I think September 1.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in that position as head of the Far Eastern Committee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. In that position, I was ex officio head of the FESWNCC Committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to repeat that question about controversy, because it could be that you misunderstood it.

To your knowledge, has any controversy arisen about those dates, when you took over from Mr. Dooman, either as head of the FESWNCC Committee, or as head of the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not call it a controversy. I know what you are referring to because at one time, in a situation which I think that you know about, I had thought that my position and duties as head of SWNCC were coincidental of my becoming head of the Far Eastern Office. I later checked the record and found that I became head of SWNCC earlier than I became head of the Far Eastern Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you testify before the Loyalty Board, as you have testified here, with regard to those dates?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified before the Loyalty Board that I did not recall becoming head of SWNCC until I became director.

I subsequently checked on the record and corrected that testimony, which is now that I chairmanned the meeting on the first.

Mr. SOURWINE. The correct date now on all records is as you have given it here?

Mr. VINCENT. There was never any formal appointment. But I found that I did attend as chairman a meeting on the first of September.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know of any plan or plans or movement with regard to the removal of Mr. Dooman or getting rid of Mr. Dooman?

Mr. VINCENT. No, and I had nothing to do with it.

I would like to put this on the record, that I considered myself a friend of Eugene Dooman. We were very close at Potsdam. I suppose we spent more time together than any other two people, because we didn't have much to do. We were not called on to attend the conference or anything else.

I never realized that Mr. Dooman had resentment against me. I may be naive.

Senator FERGUSON. There is a question I would like to ask.

You brought up this morning in your testimony about your loyalty board. What were the charges against you at the loyalty hearing?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I am not at liberty, I am told, to reveal the charges against me.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean you are forbidden by the Secretary of State; is that it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think that the revelation of the thing is in order at all. I have to say that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you say you are forbidden.

Mr. VINCENT. You see, there has not been any decision in the case yet.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but you know what you are charged with.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, but I am not at liberty to reveal anything about the Loyalty Board hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking about the hearings.

You did reveal here something about the testimony.

Mr. VINCENT. The charge is a part of the hearings. I did that simply to correct a misapprehension.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you understand that you are not allowed to disclose what you are charged with?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. Who told you that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know who told me that, but I don't think it is in order to disclose them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you consulted counsel about that, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. SURREY. I consulted the Loyalty Board, and we were advised that we were not to reveal, not in connection with this hearing, not to reveal anything connected with the Board hearings except on their approval, and they included "or anything on the record of the Board hearings."

Mr. SOURWINE. The Chairman has asked a specific question. The witness has stated in several different terms what appears to be his intention not to answer. I think it is understood, or should be clear, that that is, in fact, a refusal to answer the question, a respectful and polite refusal, but a refusal to answer the question.

I am trying to find out on what basis that refusal is made, and I am asking the witness, if you do not mind, whether the witness has consulted counsel in connection with his refusal.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. On what basis do you base that refusal?

Mr. VINCENT. I base it on the fact that any proceedings of the Loyalty Board or the charges are not a basis for this discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, your refusal is a challenge to the right of this committee to ask the question?

Mr. VINCENT. You are using legal language.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are an extremely intelligent man, sir, and I am sure I am not using language beyond your comprehension when I say you are basing it as a challenge to the authority of this committee, rather than claiming the privilege. You know what I mean by challenge to the authority of this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I know that I am not at liberty to reveal hearings before the Loyalty Review Board, of which the charges are a part.

Mr. SOURWINE. You feel that this committee does not have the right to compel you to answer the question?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know about the jurisdiction of the committee to compel me to answer the question, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are refusing to answer, and you do not mean to be contemptuous of the committee, I am sure.

Mr. VINCENT. Certainly I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the committee has the power to require you to answer that question, and you refuse, you are being contemptuous of the committee. You would realize that, would you not?

Mr. VINCENT. You have turned that around there where I can't answer.

All I know is that I have to go back to my original statement that, from my understanding of the statement, I am not at liberty to reveal the hearings before the Board, which would include, to my mind, the charges themselves.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you intending to claim your privilege under the fifth amendment, your privilege against self-incrimination?

I am not trying to trap you, sir. If you intend to claim that privilege, you have to so state. Otherwise, it is not a claim of that privilege. I am not urging you to claim that privilege. Your counsel is there, and I suggest you consult with him and then advise the committee on what basis you are refusing to answer the question. Take as long as you want.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your answer?

Mr. VINCENT. (after conferring with counsel). My answer is I don't want to claim immunity under the fifth amendment and that as far as I know the documents which brought the charges against me would come under a category the same as the State Department documents, and that I will ask permission to reveal to the committee, if they want, the charges that were brought against me.

I have no desire, particularly, to hide them myself.



MR. SOURWINE. Did you receive a specification of charges in writing?

MR. VINCENT. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. Were they marked as classified when you received them?

MR. VINCENT. That I don't recall, sir. I don't recall whether it was confidential, but I imagine it was.

MR. SOURWINE. If you do not recall that it was classified, how can you claim that it was classified?

MR. VINCENT. I think it was classified, then.

MR. SOURWINE. How was it classified?

MR. VINCENT. Confidential.

MR. SOURWINE. Is it your contention that this committee, in executive session, has no right to question you about matters which are classified as confidential?

MR. VINCENT. I should not say that; no.

MR. SOURWINE. Are you contending that you are refusing to answer this question because the matter was classified or confidential?

MR. VINCENT. I am refusing because of my original statement, that I didn't think I was at liberty to reveal them. I have no objection myself to revealing them to this committee, and we have gone over them here quite extensively, what the charges were.

I think they extend in large measure from the same things we have gone over here.

If I just consulted my own self, and I have not a clear knowledge of this Loyalty Board business, I would not have the slightest objection to telling you what the general charges were.

But I would like to clarify it with the State Department.

MR. SOURWINE. We have arrived at a situation, by the asking of the question, and the witness' reluctance to answer it, which challenges the jurisdiction of the committee. I feel it is my duty to make a full record on it here for whatever consideration the committee might want to give to it later.

I want to give the witness every opportunity to consult with counsel and place his refusal, if he persists, on whatever basis he wishes.

As it stands now, I would say it appears that the basis of the refusal is simply that the witness does not want to answer. If there is another basis, if you have received orders or instructions not to answer such questions, or questions of this particular class, I wish you would tell the committee so.

MR. VINCENT. Well, I can find out from the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not the question.

Have you been instructed not to answer that question?

MR. VINCENT. It is my impression, as I go back again, that anything connected with my Loyalty Board hearing are not for—

Senator FERGUSON. Who told you that?

MR. VINCENT. The legal adviser in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is that?

MR. VINCENT. Mr. Fisher.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Fisher told you that you were not to answer any question relating to anything that concerned the Loyalty Board hearings?

MR. VINCENT. That the Loyalty Board hearings were not to be released.



Mr. SOURWINE. When did you discuss with Mr. Fisher your appearance before this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I discussed it with him from time to time during the last month, I suppose.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ask his advice, or did he give it unasked?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall the definite advice. Are you speaking of the specific question?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am speaking about advice in connection with your appearance before this committee. Did you ask his advice, or did he volunteer?

Mr. VINCENT. That I don't recall. But I recall the letter which the State Department wrote that the loyalty trial, of which I considered the charges to be a part, is one that only the President can release.

Mr. SOURWINE. What letter do you refer to?

Mr. VINCENT. I refer to the letter which the committee received from the State Department just the day before yesterday, or whenever it was, the letter from the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. The State Department has refused the committee certain files, but we are not asking you for any files. We are asking you for a matter that is within your knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Not what is in the file—what is in your knowledge.

Mr. VINCENT. But I simply am at a loss to know whether the charges are a part of the loyalty file. If they are a part of the loyalty file—

Senator FERGUSON. We are not asking for the files.

Mr. SOURWINE. You will have another opportunity to testify before us, sir, and I will simply ask this: At the present time, for the record, do you want your respectful refusal to answer that question to stand?

Mr. VINCENT. I want at least an opportunity to review the thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not going to answer the question now, are you? I am trying to give you every possible opportunity.

Mr. SURREY. May I consult with him a minute?

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course.

Mr. VINCENT (after conferring with counsel). I would not want to put a respectful refusal, but to have an opportunity to find out whether the Presidential order with regard to releasing loyalty files includes those charges.

Senator FERGUSON. Includes your knowledge?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; includes my knowledge of the thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not the custodian of any loyalty files, are you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You see, we cannot tell now, but you may have avoided many answers here on the grounds that there is something in the loyalty proceedings about it.

Mr. VINCENT. I have not, sir. I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. But I say you could under this arrangement.

Mr. SOURWINE. This particular question, however, at this time, the witness respectfully refuses to answer. I do not mean to put words in your mouth, but is that the way you want the record to stand?

Mr. VINCENT. May I consult counsel, because I don't know whether that is considered to be contempt of the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will put it another way: The question has been asked; will you now answer it? Will you say "Yes" or "No"? Will you answer the question?

Mr. VINCENT. My counsel has now told me, and which clarifies matters considerably, that, if you wish, I will be glad to tell you the three or four questions.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was the question. The question itself is much less material than the refusal to answer.

Mr. VINCENT. It was divided into three questions, three statements: One, that I was pro-Communist, according to reports that had been received, I assume, through the FBI investigation.

The second one was that I was a member of the Communist Party. There was no indication in these letters as to what that springs from, but I assume it comes from testimony of Mr. Budenz.

The third one was association with people about whom the Department had derogatory information. I can't recall the names, but I am sure that every one of them has been gone over here.

There was Lattimore, Currie—I would have to get the list there. But, as I say, there were five or six names. Those are the three charges that I had to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of anybody else besides Lattimore and Currie?

Mr. VINCENT. I could look at the letter. I think every one of them would come to me.

Senator FERGUSON. They have been covered here, anyway?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Adler—I am guessing now. Let me look at this. There were Adler, Currie, Field, Strong—Anna Louise Strong—

Senator FERGUSON. I do not think you put Lattimore in that last answer.

Mr. VINCENT. Lattimore was one of them; Adler was one of them; Field was one of them; Rogoff may have been one of them; I don't know, but I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified, sir, with regard to many of those persons.

Mr. VINCENT. I can assure you that if I got the letter that I have testified to with regard every one of them, because it is a limited number of eight. With the number we have gone over here, I am quite sure we covered those eight.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was phrasing the question a little bit differently. You have testified with regard to a number of those persons that you do not know or have any reason to believe that they were in any way connected with the Communist activities or the Communist movement.

Now, you want that question to stand as of the present time, in view of the fact that some of these names are names which have been included as Communist or pro-Communists in charges against you?

Mr. VINCENT. They were not called Communists or pro-Communists, but about whom the Department—I recall the phrase—"had derogatory information."

I gave the same testimony with regard to them that I have given here.

Mr. SOURWINE. I just wanted to be sure that you did not want to make any change in your testimony in that regard.

Senator FERGUSON. And you know of no derogatory information as far as these men are concerned?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I know of none now. But what information the Department had——

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking you what they had, but to your knowledge.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Well, Senator, let me correct that in connection with Anna Louise Strong. She was one covered. I said that I never knew her.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have made clear testimony in that regard.

Mr. VINCENT. But the Senator asked me if I myself had any knowledge of derogatory information.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think he meant with respect to those that you have so testified to today.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you did not know her?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you say, when you did associate with Field, you did not know anything derogatory about him?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And the same way with any of them? You did not know of anything derogatory when you were associated with them; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you complete your answer to the question whether you knew of any plan or concerted movement for the removal or displacement of Mr. Dooman?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew of no plan or concerted plan. I thought I had finished that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was not sure. It was some time ago. Therefore, obviously, you could not have taken any part in such a plan?

Mr. VINCENT. I took no part in such a plan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know of any such plan or movement with regard to Mr. Ballantine?

Mr. VINCENT. None.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to Mr. Grew?

Mr. VINCENT. None.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to Mr. Hornbeck?

Mr. VINCENT. With regard to Mr. Hornbeck, there was no plan or concerted plan to remove Dr. Hornbeck. I will give you that story, if you wish to have it, about the misunderstanding on Dr. Hornbeck.

Dr. Hornbeck himself has thought—I don't think he does now—that there was a concerted plan to get rid of him.

In 1943, when the Department was undergoing a reorganization—1944, please—there was a general feeling that Dr. Hornbeck, who had been in the Department as chief of things for 15 years, had, you might say, been under a considerable strain. That was my feeling, anyway.

But I was assigned to FEA and knew nothing about it except that I saw him when I came back after having been closely associated with him for about 4 years, from 1936 to 1939, very closely associated with him, because he and I were both very much in favor of giving things to China during that period of our time of helping Chiang Kai-shek out against the others.

Dr. Hornbeck was to become Director of the newly formed far-eastern office—at that time he was political adviser—he was to become Director of the newly formed far-eastern office. He did become Director of that.

There were two officers in the State Department who did not want to serve under Dr. Hornbeck. They indicated that to the Secretary of State or to the chief of personnel, I don't know which.

I did not participate in that. I did write a letter to the chief of personnel telling the chief of personnel that I did not want to take a job which would have been Chief of the China Division which a friend of mine had, for reasons that I had to respect—had known him for so many years—did not want to take it. In other words, I did not want to replace him.

No attention was paid to my letter and I did become Chief of the China Division in January or February. Dr. Hornbeck did become Director of the Far Eastern Office and remained there until May when he was made a Special Assistant to the Secretary and sent out as Ambassador to The Hague.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who were the two employees who declined to serve under Dr. Hornbeck?

Mr. VINCENT. One of them is Mr. Salisbury, whom we have now already mentioned. The other was Mr. Stanton, who is now Ambassador to Siam.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were there any others?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what was the basis for the friction in connection with these two gentlemen?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no certain knowledge of it, because I don't know what they put into their memorandum to them.

But my recollection is that it was based on the fact that Dr. Hornbeck was under a strain; that Dr. Hornbeck, as Director of the Office, was an excellent man for political thinking, but as an administrator, I think that these two fellows did not want to work under him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it was more personal than a matter of policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I am quite sure that it was more personal than a matter of policy, and I might add that all three of us worked under Dr. Hornbeck.

Salisbury subsequently retired. Stanton continued on as a special assistant in the Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Personal frictions can arise in any office, even in the State Department.

Mr. VINCENT. They arise far too often in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. That Department is not exempt from office politics, I take it?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid it was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, has it been reported to you at any time that your name has been mentioned in connection with the disappearance of three CIA agents in Bulgaria?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever been questioned about that matter?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever had any connection with the editorial board of Amerasia magazine?



Mr. VINCENT. No, none whatsoever.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any connection with the magazine itself?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you play any part at all in the Amerasia case, so-called?

Mr. VINCENT. Not at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you defend any of the individuals involved?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you did contribute to the defense of Mr. Service, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, when you say "defend," I didn't appear in any defense of any one of them. I contributed \$50 to a friend who didn't have any money in order for him to hire counsel.

Mr. SOURWINE. Words can have many connotations. I do not mean to fence with you. But we will have fewer semantic difficulties if you will accept my words in the broadest sense. If it seems to you they should be narrowed, go ahead and narrow them down.

I meant, by defense, did you speak in his behalf; did you take up the cudgel for him? Anything that might be constituted as defensive?

Mr. VINCENT. I might say that I kept myself completely apart from the trial of him, other than contributing \$50 to assist him in hiring counsel.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know now the story of the Amerasia case? Do you know what the facts were in that case?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall them from memory; no. I would have to see.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever write for publication under a pen name or a pseudonym?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were in China, did you know Edgar Snow?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is he?

Mr. VINCENT. He was a writer. Do you want me to comment?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him only as a writer?

Mr. VINCENT. I only knew him as a writer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not know him as a person?

Mr. VINCENT. I met him first in Mukden, during the Japanese trouble of 1931. He came up to cover that and I met him.

As far as I know, I didn't meet him again until he came to Chungking—well, I would say in Mukden I have forgotten what press agency he was with. When he came to Chungking, in 1942 or 1943, he was then, I think, associated with the Saturday Evening Post.

He was in Europe at one time, getting a story, and came in to see me at Bern. I saw him again at a large cocktail party in New York last autumn.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever correspond with him?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say he was a friend of yours?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. A personal friend?

Mr. VINCENT. Personal friend, but not a close one, very personal friend. We have never had any business dealings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read any of his books?

Mr. VINCENT. I read *The Red Star Over China*.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you think of it?

Mr. VINCENT. At the time?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I thought it was a fairly good presentation of the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you still think so?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't reread it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you think it was biased in any way?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say he took a sympathetic point of view toward the regime there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Toward the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge, or any basis for belief, that he was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you think he was a pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not his book indicate that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say. I think it was biased from a factual point of view, from presenting the Communist point of the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. He was writing about the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. But he was biased on the facts, you said.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the facts. No, I said it presented them in, what shall you say, a favorable light.

Mr. SOURWINE. And not completely an objective report, perhaps?

Mr. VINCENT. I would want to read it again and see if it was an objective report. It gave the Chinese Communist side of the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you mean to imply that it was unduly favorable or unjustifiably favorable to the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it your impression that it was not unduly favorable to the Communists or unjustifiably favorable to them?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to read the book again, but you asked for my impression. I again state that it was stating the case of the Chinese Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it purport to be a statement of the case of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. It purported to be, as I understood it, a case of what was the situation with regard to the Chinese Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. It reported to be a factual and objective statement, did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It did.

Mr. SOURWINE. It did not purport to be a brief for the Chinese Communists, or a statement of their side of the case?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. But was it, in fact, a statement of their side of the case?

Mr. VINCENT. To my recollection it was a statement of their side of the case, because it was the first book given about it, because he had been to Yenan, and I suppose he was giving factual statements of the situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Without regard to his mind, but considering it as a book, with regard to what you know and knew about the Far East, was it factual or was it pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have thought it was factual at the time, but I had no way to check the facts.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see.

Mr. MANDEL. I just wanted to know whether Mr. Vincent knew Mrs. Snow.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I may have met her sometime, but I wouldn't have known her at all. She may have been to cocktail parties. I don't know Mrs. Snow in the sense that I would know her if I saw her. There is a new Mrs. Snow that I met in New York.

Mr. SOURWINE. He has two wives; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I met his new wife in New York at this cocktail party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the name Nym Wales mean anything?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the name she went under.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was his first or second wife?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the old one. I don't know the name of his new wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew she used that name?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read any of the works of the Chinese Communist leaders, their writings?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read any of the published works of Israel Epstein?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I never read that. I don't recall the book. It was a book he wrote, and I did not read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read any of the published works of Owen Lattimore, other than the two mentioned here?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any of them. I recall reading his column from time to time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether you read the published works of any other IPR writers?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall from the testimony given here that I am supposed to have reviewed or read a book of Rosinger's.

I have no recollection of reading that book, but it is quite possible I had, that these books came into the office and if that is the book that I have in mind, which I reviewed, I have no recollection of the book, but some review that he had.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the IPR in the habit of sending you books to review or read?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think they came from the IPR. They came from the individuals. I am quite sure David Rowe sent me his on China and the Powers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall whether I read the manuscript or the other. John Fairbank—I have a copy of his book. That came out after I left the States. I read it, though.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe you testified that you do not know Agnes Smedley?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Never met her?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read any of her books?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, or do you, know Harry B. Price?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have a note here on Harry B. Price.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have been through that list and you gave us the names of everybody you had a note on that we had not asked you about, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I have a note on one of the Prices. There are two Prices. Yes, I have one here on Harry B. Price, which is in the back thing, which simply says that [reading] Mr. Price was, I recall, with the China Defense Supplies during the war. I have no doubt met him from time to time, but I do not recall the specific occasions of our meetings. That is all I have on Mr. Price.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether he ever worked for the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall his ever working for the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know where he did work?

Mr. VINCENT. I said here that he did work for China Defense Supplies, but I have forgotten since that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you if you knew Mildred Price?

Mr. VINCENT. I think you did, and I said I didn't know. Is Mildred Price his wife?

Mr. SOURWINE. I was going to ask you.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mrs. Price, his wife?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't recall ever having met her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you would not know anything of her associations, if you do not know her; would you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mrs. Price, Elizabeth Rugh?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Elizabeth Rugh?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether she was ever employed by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know if she is employed there now?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any hand in getting her employed there?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Our information, Mr. Chairman, is that Elizabeth Rugh is currently employed by the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p. m., same day).

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.



TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY  
WALTER STERLING SURREY, COUNSEL—Resumed

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, before we resume the questioning of the witness I have here a letter addressed by the witness to the Chairman in response to the request that he bring with him certain documents. In that connection a letter from the State Department has been discussed at these hearings.

I would respectfully suggest that an order be entered that this letter may be placed in the record at the same point where the State letter which was discussed is inserted, if counsel has no objection.

Mr. SURREY. No objection.

The CHAIRMAN. It is over the signature of the witness?

Mr. SOURWINE. It is over the signature of the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be done.

(The document referred to appears hereafter, at p. 2092.)

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Sourwine, does that include our request?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, it does not. Would the Chairman deem it desirable that our letter of request be placed at the same point in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. The State Department letter is also to be placed in the record at that point.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be well to do so.

(The document referred to appears hereafter, at p. 2092.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, have you ever read the book *Inter-Asian Frontiers of China*?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who wrote that book?

Mr. VINCENT. Owen Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever asked to review that book for the publication *Pacific Affairs*?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever review any book for *Pacific Affairs*?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what the publication *Pacific Affairs* was?

Mr. VINCENT. *Pacific Affairs* I think was a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations; was it not?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is your memory?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was the editor of that publication?

Mr. VINCENT. The only time that I knew exactly who was the editor was Salisbury, I think it was, who was the editor at one time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Owen Lattimore ever the editor of that publication?

Mr. VINCENT. I believe at a very early date he must have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have known it at the time if he had been?

Mr. VINCENT. I believe I would have. I would not have known his exact position. That is the reason I am trying to refresh my memory, but it seems to me that some time in the thirties he was the editor of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think he was editor of Pacific Affairs at the time he wrote *Inter-Asian Frontiers of China*?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't say with exactness because I have forgotten when.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would have been in 1940.

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I don't know when he wrote *Inter-Asian Frontiers of China*.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would have been in 1940. I believe it was 1940.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know when he began or when he ceased being editor of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that book in your opinion a good objective analysis of the subject with which it dealt?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought it was, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You so regarded it at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And still so regard it?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall now the exact nature of the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now I believe that you may have covered some of these questions in previous testimony. I ask that you forgive any repetition, but I want to set them in here all together.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first meet Mr. Laughlin Currie?

Mr. VINCENT. I first met Laughlin Currie as I have testified either in 1936 or 1937. I have forgotten the year.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he in Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. That is not where I met him, but he was in Chungking in 1942 when I was counselor of the Embassy there.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew him there?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were given leave to handle work in the Office of the Director of Foreign Economic Administration, or assigned to that Administration—which was the case?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I was assigned or detailed. I was still paid by the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that time did Mr. Currie have anything to do with that assignment or detail?

Mr. VINCENT. I think he asked me whether I would come over; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was at that time in what position with the FEA?

Mr. VINCENT. He was just organizing it or helping organize it under Crowley, and he was one of the deputies or the deputy of FEA.

Mr. SOURWINE. FEA had just been created?

Mr. VINCENT. FEA had just been created in that autumn. BEW had gone out of business.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well did you know Mr. Currie at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew him, I should say, well, not very well, but well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Socially as well as professionally?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; my wife was a friend of his wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you, prior to that time, ever consulted Mr. Currie with regard to matters of policy?

Mr. VINCENT. On the Far East?

Mr. SOURWINE. On anything.

Mr. VINCENT. I had, I suppose, on the Far East, but he was in Chungking and he, no doubt, from time to time would ask me about the situation in Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did your consultations with him on matters of policy limit themselves to far-eastern matters?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; except for FEA where I was in there for a short period.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that time he was in a sense your superior?

Mr. VINCENT. He was my superior.

Mr. SOURWINE. Subsequent to that detail and after you had returned to the Department, did you continue to consult Mr. Currie with regard to matters of policy from time to time?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you intending to testify that after you returned to the Department from FEA you did not thereafter consult with Mr. Currie concerning any matters of policy?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall that he ever contacted you thereafter—that is, after you got back from FEA, with regard to matters of policy?

Mr. VINCENT. He might have, but I don't recall the instances.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now I believe you already testified with regard to your knowledge or acquaintanceship with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified who they were?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you restate that for the record at this point?

Mr. VINCENT. Chou En-lai at that time was the representative of the so-called Communist government.

Mr. SOURWINE. At what time?

Mr. VINCENT. At the time that I had any association with him in Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. About 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. About 1942 over to the middle of 1943. He was the representative, officially recognized, in Chungking of what we called the Yen-an Government or the Communist government.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now Lin Piao?

Mr. VINCENT. Lin Piao was a general, as I recollect, who had come down to Chungking also at the end of 1942 at the request of Chiang Kai-shek to discuss matters of interest in trying to get the two armies together to fight the Japanese. I don't know the nature of the discussions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you testified about whether you ever met them?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet them?

Mr. VINCENT. I did meet both of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell the committee where and when?

Mr. VINCENT. May I refer to this just exactly the same as I did before [reading]:

As counselor of the Embassy at Chungking I met Chou En-lai several times. He was the representative in Chungking of the Chinese

Communists at Yen-an. He had an official position recognized by Chiang Kai-shek and it may have been at Chiang's where I first met Chou En-lai. I also recall meeting him at a luncheon in the home of an American manager of the British-American Tobacco Co.

Also I met him when he made a courtesy call on Ambassador Gauss. The last time I saw him was just before my departure for the United States in May 1943. He called at the Embassy to meet George Atcheson, who was taking my place.

My few conversations with Chou concerned conditions in North China, areas occupied by the Communists, and in particular the conduct of military operations against the Japanese. The information obtained by me and by other officers of the Embassy was of considerable value to us.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any conferences with Mr. Chou En-lai?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified that I never had any conferences with Chou En-lai other than these conversations I have just mentioned here. I did recall I think in the testimony this morning, or was it yesterday afternoon, that there may have been a luncheon party that I attended given by the Chinese, whether it was at a house I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever consult with or meet with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao together?

Mr. VINCENT. No; although let me say it would have been quite natural for them to be together. I don't recall the occasion of ever meeting Lin Piao. I might have met him at Chiang's or elsewhere. Whereas, I have a distinct recollection of the places where I met Chou I have no recollection of occasions when I met Lin Piao.

Mr. SOURWINE. The occasions when you met Chou were either social or as you have testified to?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you and Mr. John Stewart Service ever have a conversation with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall. I will amend that, Service may have been present at this luncheon I mentioned at the British-American Tobacco Co.'s place.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. I was unable to recall it yesterday, and I can't recall it today, but I would say at the end of 1942 or early 1943.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been later, as late as July of 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. It could have been.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that?

Mr. VINCENT. Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been as late at August 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. I say it could have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been as late as September 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. It could have been as late as November or December of 1942 because I was still there. Are you speaking now of the luncheon?

Mr. SOURWINE. The luncheon.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that it was before then, but I say I have no recollection—that it was before the autumn of 1942.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been on November 20, 1942?



Mr. VINCENT. One of these occasions might have been in November, but I would not say this luncheon.

Mr. SOURWINE. One of what occasions?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it was in the autumn.

The CHAIRMAN. What occasion? You say "one of those occasions."

Mr. VINCENT. I have named those occasions when he called on Mr. Gauss.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am inquiring now about an occasion, if there was one, when you and Mr. John Stewart Service had a conference with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao.

Mr. VINCENT. A conference with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao? I said I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think you said such conference could only have occurred if you had met them all together at a luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. I say it might have occurred at the luncheon. Lin Piao was not at the British-American Tobacco Co. luncheon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you could not have had a conference with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao at that luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. No. Lin Piao did not arrive in Chungking until the autumn of 1942. If I had a conference with him, it was not in connection with the British-American Tobacco Co. luncheon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you and John Stewart Service have a conference or conversation with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao on or about November 20, 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. It could possibly be so. I have no recollection of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where would you have had such a conference?

Mr. VINCENT. That may have been the reference I have had here to having a luncheon at Chou En-lai's.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you stated that Lin Piao was not at the luncheon, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I have stated that Lin Piao was not at the luncheon given by the British-American Tobacco Co.

Mr. SOURWINE. What luncheon did you mean?

Mr. VINCENT. The luncheon given by the Chinese, which may have been Chou En-lai. It was an invitation to a Chinese lunch.

Mr. SOURWINE. You and Mr. Service?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that Service was there, but he could have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I am endeavoring to find out is whether there was a meeting of that nature at which yourself and Mr. Service and Chou En-lai and Lin Piao were present at which time they, meaning Chou and Lin, made certain suggestions to you with regard to American policy. Was there such a conference?

Mr. VINCENT. And I am trying to be helpful, and I cannot recall the conference; but, as I say, a conference of that kind could be not a conference but a meeting, which, as I say, I do not recollect the meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then if there was such a conference or conversation, you would be unable at this time to testify concerning any suggestions that may have been made; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly would not be able to testify as to suggestions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any memory of any suggestions made to you and Mr. Service by Chou and/or Lin about American policy?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I have testified already that from my recollection our conversations were on the matter of conditions in Yenan and fighting of Japanese and the whole military situation in north China as they knew it.

Mr. SOURWINE. If such suggestions had been made at such a conference, would you have felt that you should transmit a memorandum concerning them to the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say—

The CHAIRMAN. Even though these conversations may have been at a social gathering such as a luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; where we thought there was sufficient amount of importance to a conversation at a social gathering, we made a memorandum.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel that you would have transmitted them if there had been such conversations, such recommendations?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say "Yes," that we probably would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel that so strongly that you would be willing to say that if you made no such report to the State Department there was no such conversation and there was no such suggestion?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I would not be willing to say. In other words, if the conversations were not of such importance that I considered them so that I would not have burdened the Department with the report. But, if I considered them of sufficient importance to have the Department have the information, then I would have reported, or it would have been reported, as you stated here; Service may have done it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have called to your attention the report made by Mr. Service under date of January 23, 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. In that report it is stated, and I read from page 792 of our hearings, part 3:

The Communists themselves, Chou En-lai and Lin Piao, in a conversation with John Carter Vincent and the undersigned about November 20, 1942, considered that foreign influence, obviously American, with the Kuomintang, is the only force that may be able to improve the situation. They admit the difficulty of successful foreign suggestions regarding China's internal affairs no matter how tactfully made, but they believe that the reflection of a better-informed foreign opinion, official and public, would have some effect on the more farsighted elements of the leadership in the Kuomintang, such as the generalissimo.

Then it continues. Does that refresh your recollection at all?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid it doesn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember having heard such views expressed by Chou or Lin?

Mr. VINCENT. No. But I say I have simply forgotten the occasion. I am not denying the occasion, because Service was an exact reporter.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not remember it. You say he was an exact reporter?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought he was an exact reporter at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me get that answer. You thought what?

Mr. VINCENT. I was saying that in connection with this instance I think he was an exact reporter there of a conversation of that kind.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next paragraph of the report reads as follows:

The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem. One would be the emphasizing in our dealings with the Chinese Government and in our propa-

ganda to China of the political nature of the world conflict, democracy against fascism. This would include constant reiteration of American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China. It should imply to the Kuomintang our knowledge of and concern over the situation in China. Another suggestion is some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist army as a participant in the war against fascism. The United States might intervene to the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support be given by the Central Government to the Eighteenth Group Army. The Communists hope this might include a specification that the Communist army receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China. Another way of making our interest in the situation known to the Kuomintang would be to send American representatives to visit the Communist area. I have not heard this proposed by the Communists themselves, but there is no doubt that they would welcome such action.

Your memory remains unrefreshed?

Mr. VINCENT. My memory remains unrefreshed, but that was a question that was discussed continually in Chungking at the time and subsequently by Mr. Hurley and all of us as trying to get a more effective cooperation. Chiang Kai-shek himself had Lin down to do that in fighting the Japs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this an accurate statement of what the Communist objectives and desires were?

Mr. VINCENT. If you would read it again? I don't want to be caught up on anything, but I think it probably was the Communist desire to get American assistance, if that was one of the points.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will read it rapidly, if I may. Please listen with the idea that I want you to tell us whether this, which is in Mr. Service's report, is a fair and accurate statement of the Communist desires, Communist objectives at the time:

The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem. One would be the emphasizing in our dealings with the Chinese Government and in our propaganda to China of the political nature of the world conflict, democracy against fascism. This would include constant reiteration of American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China. It should imply to the Kuomintang our knowledge of and concern over the situation in China. Another suggestion is some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist army as a participant in the war against fascism. The United States might intervene to the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support be given by the Central Government to the Eighteenth Group Army. The Communists hope this might include a specification that the Communist army receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China. Another way of making our interest in the situation known to the Kuomintang would be to send American representatives to visit the Communist area. I have not heard this proposed by the Communists themselves, but there is no doubt that they would welcome such action.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that that was a fairly accurate statement of what the Communist Government at that time wanted.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those were, as Mr. Service has reported, the recommendations of Chou and Lin with regard to American policy. Now, to what extent were those suggestions followed; do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, let me see. Taking the last one, there was an American military mission sent to Yen-an in 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. You favored that, and, as a matter of fact, urged it at the time, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. The President favored it; Mr. Wallace favored it; and the military. As a matter of fact, it was initiated by the military in Chungking, our own American military, of trying to get some intelligence group up into that area. The objective was to get



intelligence for our own Air Force, which were flying bombing missions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us not lose sight of the fact that I am trying to find out, with regard to the specific recommendations of the Communists, which ones we followed.

Mr. VINCENT. There never was, to my knowledge, any arms or ammunition supplied to the Communists by us that I know of. There may have been some supplied in a manner through OSS or something, but I don't recall it. Isn't that one of the points, too?

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us take it seriatim. In our dealings with the Chinese Government was it emphasized, and in our propaganda to China was it emphasized, that this was, this Chinese situation, part of a world conflict of a political nature?

Mr. VINCENT. Was it emphasized?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Did I emphasize it, or was that realized?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that become a part of American policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did those in power in the State Department, in positions of influence in the State Department both here and in China, emphasize, in dealings with the Chinese Government and in propaganda to China, the political nature of the conflict?

Mr. VINCENT. They did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there repeated reiteration of "American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy" in China?

Mr. VINCENT. There was.

Mr. SOURWINE. That statement is necessarily in derogation of any claims to democracy of the then-existing Government, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That was not in derogation. It was that the Chinese should have a constitutional government, which they themselves spoke of more often than we did.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you say that you hope a country will someday have all of this development of genuine democracy, you are saying it is something that an existing government does not have?

Mr. VINCENT. The existing Government made no pretension to having a democracy; it was a one-party tutelage under the Kuomintang.

Mr. SOURWINE. The conclusion seems so clear.

Mr. VINCENT. I was thinking of representative democracy, and they certainly did not have that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there ever a specification that the Communist armies receive an apportioned share of American supplies sent to China?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that ever recommended?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot testify to that. I don't know whether General Stilwell did or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anything to do with such a recommendation?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever assent to such a recommendation?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not Mr. Wallace make such a recommendation in his Kunming cable?



Mr. VINCENT. I don't know. I do not think so. That a proportionate amount of supplies be sent to the Communists? No; he did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read Mr. Wallace's testimony before this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you might be asked this question again, sir, and I suggest you read this testimony between now and the time you come back in public session.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not want to belabor that point, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That testimony of Mr. Wallace's can be made available to the witness.

Mr. VINCENT. Your question was whether Mr. Wallace in his Kunming cable recommended, and I do not recall that it did. I haven't read his testimony before this committee completely. I have looked at it, but looked at it where it concerned me personally.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have stated earlier, Mr. Chairman, it is not the endeavor here, the objective here, to become argumentative. We are trying to traverse the area.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the record and the chairman's information at this point, the witness has already testified that he has access to the hearings of this committee—that they are available at some place in the State Department. Incidentally, they are available down there in manuscript form, are they not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And Mr. Wallace's testimony is available?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Wallace's testimony is available.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first come into contact with Mr. Henry Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I have that here; and, if you like, for precision I would like to read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. We would be glad, of course, Mr. Chairman, to supply any copies of printed record that the witness may wish.

Mr. SURREY. We appreciate that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, the witness desires to add a parenthetical clause to his testimony of a moment ago.

Mr. VINCENT. I am referring to this because it is primarily a statement of my early association with General Wedemeyer.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that raised?

Mr. SOURWINE. As I understand it, the point the witness wants to make, and correct me if I am incorrect, he wants no inference by his answer with regard to Mr. Wallace's recommendations in the Kunming cable, he wants no inference that the question of aid to the Chinese Communists did not come up later. I think he wants to expand on that.

Mr. VINCENT (reading): In the late autumn or probably winter of 1944, in December, it was generally understood in the State Department—I was in the State Department then—that there was possibly going to be an American landing on the north coast of China. That area was largely occupied by Chinese Communist guerrillas.

It became apparent to us, and by "us" I include Mr. Grew, who himself at the time was anxious that any forces that could aid us in

fighting the Japanese should be utilized, and this would. Also, we assumed it would save American lives if we would utilize the Communists.

I went to call on General Wedemeyer in March of 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

Mr. VINCENT. Here in Washington, sir [reading]: He was home on leave. It was my first meeting with General Wedemeyer. I brought the problem to his attention, making it clear to him that it was after all a military problem to be decided by military officers, but that in the State Department we had felt that if we could get some arms to these people it would be of assistance.

General Wedemeyer and I discussed the matter, and he said that he would go back and look into it. He said, and I agreed with him, that he did not believe in just arming the Communists, nor did I. Nothing was done about it, and I subsequently learned that it was about that time that any idea of landing on the Chinese coast had been abandoned for the general landing that was going to be made in October in the southern island of Japan.

I just wanted to add that to it, that that is my recollection of it when getting arms to the Communists did arise and not during the Wallace mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is your answer to the question as to whether the question of the extension of a portion of our aid, military and otherwise, to the Chinese Communists was raised?

Mr. VINCENT. What is my answer?

Mr. SOURWINE. To the question as to whether that question was raised?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not raised to my knowledge during the Wallace mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it raised at all? We had a statement that there had been a recommendation with regard to policy by the Communist leaders and that that was one of the things that the Communist leaders urged that we do. Now I am asking whether by anyone in the Department, in a position of authority or responsibility, that was subsequently urged—that is, the extension of aid to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Not outside the context of what I have mentioned here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not outside of your discussion with General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not otherwise recommended by you, or, to your knowledge, by anyone in the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first come into contact with Mr. Henry Wallace?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment there. There is perhaps something that I have not connected up in my mind. My recollection is that the witness testified that he was in the State Department at that time and that it was discussed in the State Department. If I misquote him I want to be corrected. And that following the discussion between himself and some other member of the State Department—

Mr. VINCENT. No, I mentioned Mr. Grew. Mr. Grew was Under Secretary and it didn't result from the discussion, it was his attitude.

The CHAIRMAN. A discussion as to arming the Reds. You called on General Wedemeyer, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then there was a discussion in the State Department on the question of arming the Reds?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. VINCENT. For the specific purpose that I have mentioned, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As I understand it, it is your testimony that that was the only time when there was such a discussion?

Mr. VINCENT. As far as I can recall, of getting arms to the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first come into contact with Mr. Henry Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I first came into contact with Mr. Henry Wallace in 1944 just prior to the mission. I went out with him in May 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know him in 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1943 I had not met Mr. Wallace; no. May I, just to keep my memory fresher, describe what I have here [reading]:

In the spring of 1944, probably April, I met Mr. Wallace at his request. I had never met him previously. I was then Chief of the China Division in the State Department. I had spent 2 years, 1942-43, in Chungking and was on good terms with the Chinese officials there. No one in the Department at that time had had similar experience.

Mr. Wallace told me of his plan to visit China at the President's suggestion. He wanted information regarding China. He also talked with Mr. Ballantine, Deputy Director of the Foreign Office, and I believe Mr. Grew, the Director. Subsequently, Mr. Wallace asked Secretary Hull to allow me to accompany him on the mission. Mr. Hull agreed and instructed me to make the trip.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me get that straight. Mr. Wallace talked with you about his trip before there was any request that you accompany him?

Mr. VINCENT. As far as I can recall it was first going over conditions in China. The President had just asked him to go, according to his statements to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he and you talk about the possibility that you might go with him?

Mr. VINCENT. We possibly did; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who broached that possibility first, you or he?

Mr. VINCENT. He did. I was just about to say that I had no desire to go to China again. I had been away from my family 2½ years and I may admit that I didn't like flying for 51 days, so I had no desire to make that trip. But I considered it my duty to make it on the basis of what I have just said, that it was a logical selection for me to go if someone was going, that it be a man who had been in China the previous 2 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. When were you assigned to work in the office of FEA?

Mr. VINCENT. In either September or October.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of 1943?



Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was the Director of FEA at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Crowley.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Wallace had left when the BEW had ceased to exist?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I recollect the BEW had ceased. I think he left before the BEW ceased to exist.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Board of Economic Warfare became the Office of Economic Warfare as part of the Office of Emergency Management and Mr. Wallace went out at that time, July 15. That is the record I have. Does that accord with your recollection?

Mr. VINCENT. I had just gotten back.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was subsequent, September 25, 1943, that what was then the Office of Economic Warfare of the Office of Emergency Management became the FEA?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who initiated the request for your assignment to FEA?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Currie, I testified this morning.

Mr. SOURWINE. He initiated it himself?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. who?

Mr. VINCENT. Currie, Laughlin Currie.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall a series of meetings organized or arranged by Laughlin Currie in 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us about those?

Mr. VINCENT. Why, I never did quite know what the purport was, but apparently, before he went with FEA, as a Presidential assistant he had been given general, some general, job in connection with Far Eastern affairs. He had made a trip to China and interested himself very much in China.

When I got back from China in 1943, the summer, I found that these meetings went on from time to time. I don't know to what extent, what their regular frequency was. I recall attending one or two in Currie's office. There would be an OWI person present, probably a military man, people interested in China who were there to sit and discuss problems in Currie's office which he had in the State Department at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a case of Mr. Currie calling together people who were in various departments of Government who were functionally concerned with China?

Mr. VINCENT. That was my understanding of the meeting. As I say, it went out of business more or less when he went over to FEA, and he went over to FEA the next month after I got back.

Mr. SOURWINE. How often did such meetings occur?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I couldn't say because I don't think I attended more than two or three, and whether it was a weekly or monthly or semimonthly thing I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Who were the attendants at these meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, as I say, it was people interested in China from various departments of Government. My recollection is vague on that because I didn't attend many meetings, but I would say that there would be an OWI man and an officer from the War Department particularly interested in China.



Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember who was present at any of the meetings you attended?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did your deputy attend any of those meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't have a deputy at that time because I was just back and was assistant, or had the title of assistant, in the Far Eastern Office and didn't have a deputy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Friedman in the office at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not think so. He was not; he did not come in until 1944 as far as my office was concerned. He may have been in the Labor Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything more about the purport of those meetings than you have testified to?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever prepare any memorandum or instructions in connection with any of those meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you became Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs August 21, 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. That will come from the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. That date is taken from the State Department register. I am in a chronological portion of the inquiry.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you stated that you did know Mr. Lawrence K. Rosinger?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe you stated that you read his book, *War-time Politics in China*; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the title. I recall a book which he wrote which covered the period from, I would say, 1923 up to the beginning of the war, if that is *Wartime Politics in China*, which was supposed to cover that period.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the only book of Mr. Rosinger's you ever read?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the only book of Mr. Rosinger's that I have read.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you come to read that one?

Mr. VINCENT. It was either furnished me or, as somebody has testified, I was furnished a manuscript. I wouldn't want to say I didn't. I know I have read the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the risk of repetition will you testify how well you knew Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know Mr. Rosinger well. Mr. Rosinger was a casual acquaintance whom I had met at one time or another; I didn't even know what he did at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. What was his official position at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall, Senator, that he even had an official position. If he did it escaped my attention.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at that time that he was connected with the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I would assume I did know that he was connected with the IPR and was writing, contributing articles, I think, to the IPR publication. I don't recall reading them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that something that we could eliminate assumption on, and find out whether you remember that you did know, or you do not remember whether you knew?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, because my recollection is that Mr. Rosinger was at the Hot Springs conference in 1945 as a member of the American delegation.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are now talking about November 1943.

Mr. VINCENT. We are?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at that time know that he was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no exact knowledge that I did know at that time he was connected with the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. The IPR had no evil connotation for you at that time, did it?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to be perfectly clear with you as to whether Mr. Rosinger was connected with the IPR in November 1943. I couldn't give you exact testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever attend meetings or conferences at which Mr. Rosinger was present?

Mr. VINCENT. I attended a conference, as I have just testified, in Hot Springs in 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than the conference at Hot Springs?

Mr. VINCENT. He was probably at a preparatory conference for the American delegation before he went down to the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember that he was?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, but again I assume he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever attend any other conference or meeting at which he was present?

Mr. VINCENT. I may have, but I do not recall them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You recall no such other meeting or conference?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that mean it is your testimony that you never attended any meetings of the Institute of Pacific Relations or any functions under the sponsorship of that organization at which Mr. Rosinger was present except the Hot Springs conference and possibly a meeting of a delegation in advance of that conference?

Mr. VINCENT. It would not because I think there has been testimony here that I attended a conference of the IPR in 1938.

Mr. SOURWINE. At which Mr. Rosinger was present?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know whether he was present, but I have no recollection that he was present. My testimony is that I would not recall if he was there. I thought you were limiting it to these two cases of the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, but at which Mr. Rosinger was present.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you attend any other meetings or functions of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I may have attended this one in 1938, it would have been natural for me to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Then let us close that incident. Let us see if we can get at it. The only time that you remember meeting with Mr. Rosinger was at the Hot Springs meeting and another meeting at some other place?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Two meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. That is, the only ones I recall. I have testified, I think, before that Mr. Rosinger was a person who may have come to my office, and I may have met socially elsewhere, but I am testifying to where I know I met him.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew, however, that he was writing for the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you first meet Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I cannot recall how I first met Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could he have been introduced to you by the Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. I would consider it most unlikely that Mr. Hull introduced me to Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could he have been introduced to you by Mr. E. C. Carter?

Mr. VINCENT. He could, although I never met Mr. Carter until 1943.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you really have no recollection at all about your first meeting with Mr. Rosinger; you might have known him always?

Mr. VINCENT. I might. I would like to just say that during this period there were so many people that came into my office, people interested in the Far East, people who came to the Far East when I was in Chungking, that I don't want the inference that I would be able to tell you every time I met Mr. Rosinger. Mr. Rosinger, and I don't want to be immodest, probably has a better recollection of when I met him than I have of when I met him, and that would apply to a great many of these other people.

If I could recall the occasions that I met Mr. Rosinger or any of these other people I would be glad to do so because it is in no sense trying to avoid indicating when or when I did not meet them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now you have stated, have you, that you read his book, *Wartime Politics in China*?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Try very hard to recall whether you read it in book form or in manuscript form.

Mr. VINCENT. I have said that I cannot recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether you did have the manuscript at one time?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I did have the manuscript at one time and I don't recall whether I read it or not in manuscript, but it would have been perfectly natural for me to have it in manuscript, I think, and look it over. I had just come back from China. I think the book was published in 1943, was it not?

Mr. SOURWINE. Why would it have been natural for you to have the book in manuscript?

Mr. VINCENT. Because as a person just back from China frequently people would come to me with articles and books on China. Here was a man writing me to see whether there was factual data that was incorrect. I had been in China for the previous 15 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in the habit of going over manuscripts for people that you did not know?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not in the habit of it; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have many people bring you book manuscripts to go over and correct?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I did, but there were occasional ones. I testified this morning that I think David Rowe sent me one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anybody bring you a book manuscript for correction outside of the IPR or the channels of IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I think Mr. David Rowe sent me his China Among the Powers.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean that he had no connection with the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I knew of at that time. Did he?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you for your testimony.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I cannot testify to the ultimate fact of what you knew, only you can do that.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that it has been stated that Mr. Rosinger's manuscript on Wartime Politics in China was sent to you for criticism by an official of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I have seen that testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the truth?

Mr. VINCENT. That—I have no distinct recollection of it, but it may have been the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you doubt that?

Mr. VINCENT. I have read the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you doubt that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't doubt it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why do you suggest that it may have been brought to you by Mr. Rosinger himself?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't suggest.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry, I misunderstood.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall Mr. Rosinger bringing it in himself.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said people were frequently bringing such things in to you, and I thought you meant the authors were bringing them in.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Rosinger himself did not bring it in to you?

Mr. VINCENT. I say, I don't recall whether Mr. Rosinger brought it himself or whether it was sent through the mails or whether somebody else brought it.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment there. You left the impression with the chairman that Mr. Rosinger brought it in because you said many people came to your office; that you had been in the Orient for 15 years and that many people came to your office and discussed matters with you and left manuscript with you or otherwise.

I took it from that that you regarded Rosinger as one of many who left his manuscript with you.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. When I say "many" I say people would come in to discuss conditions in the Far East. As I say, the only manuscript, the only other manuscript, that I can recall is China Among the Powers. How I came into physical possession of the manuscript—I have already testified that I have no clear memory of how I got the manuscript.

The whole case is something I would like to be clear on, but the only thing I can say is that I have a knowledge of the book, knew the book,



and whether I read it in manuscript or not and how I got it is a matter I would like to be clear on, but I can't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that the record of this committee includes a letter to you from Mr. T. A. Bisson of the Institute of Pacific Relations asking you to return the manuscript?

The CHAIRMAN. Asking what?

Mr. SOURWINE. Asking the witness to return this manuscript of Mr. Rosinger's book, *Wartime Politics in China*.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I had read that, and I had no recollection of that incident at all when I read it in the thing. That is the reason I would say that I assumed that the thing had come to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think that you did return the manuscript at Mr. Bisson's request?

Mr. VINCENT. Did I?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; did you?

Mr. VINCENT. I say I did. I would have no reason for keeping it.

Mr. SURREY. You mean Mr. Bisson's request?

Mr. SOURWINE. I intended to say, and I hope that the record will read, that I asked if you think you did return the manuscript of Mr. Rosinger's book at Mr. Bisson's request.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were with the Board of Economic Warfare on detail—let me ask this foundation question first.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever assigned or detailed to work with the Board of Economic Warfare?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anything to do with the meetings of the so-called Interdepartmental Regional Committee?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir. May I amend that previous statement? When you say "any connection with the Board of Economic Warfare," I was while we were waiting to get somebody to China, I acted on the BEW in addition to my duties as counselor before we procured somebody for BEW.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what the Interdepartmental Regional Committee was?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall, no sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You wouldn't be able to tell us what if anything that committee or such a committee had to do with the Board of Economic Warfare, or vice versa?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. MANDEL. Could I have one question?

Mr. SOURWINE. By all means break in any time you want.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Rosinger was a delegate to the conference, an IPR conference, at New Delhi, India, in 1949?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MANDEL. Did that conference or his attendance at the conference have any direct or indirect approval of the State Department or support from the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Mandel, I couldn't say, give any answer to that, because I was in Bern, Switzerland, and completely out of the picture at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified I believe that you knew Vladimir Rogoff?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; on one occasion.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the risk of repetition, where did you meet him?

Mr. VINCENT. I met him at the Cosmos Club in January 1944, I think I have testified, at a luncheon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that on January 20?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know the exact date, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you testify that was a luncheon to which you were invited by Mr. Bill Johnstone?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I think Bill Johnstone was the host at the luncheon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. William L. Holland at that luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mr. Holland?

Mr. VINCENT. I know Mr. Holland.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Owen Lattimore at that luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. I think this morning I said I did not recall. I have seen the manuscript as you call it, but made no note of who was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was C. F. Remer at that luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. He might easily have been, he was interested in the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mr. Remer?

Mr. VINCENT. I have met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is he?

Mr. VINCENT. He was at one time with the OSS. I don't recall when I first met Remer.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was his position there in January of 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that that was the period, but here I can't be exact, when he had come over to the State Department and had some position in the economic work as a man studying capital investment or investment of one sort or another.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. William Lockwood at this luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall Lockwood, sir, but I, as I say—

Mr. SOURWINE. What can you tell us about the luncheon? What was its purpose? What was discussed?

Mr. VINCENT. The purpose of the luncheon insofar as I knew was to find out from Rogoff what he knew about China. That was my recollection of it, that Rogoff had come back from China as a Tass correspondent, and these people wanted to find out from him what he, a Tass agent, had to say about China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were seeking information that would be useful to you?

Mr. VINCENT. I was seeking information that would have been useful to me; that would have been something that I would have gone to in the normal course of my duties to find out what was going on in China from his angle.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether you were invited to that luncheon by a telephone call?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I can't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been a telephone call from someone in the IPR office speaking on behalf of Mr. Johnstone?

Mr. VINCENT. It could easily have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember anything more than you have told us about what took place at the luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember anything about anything that Mr. Rogoff said?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not. Unfortunately, I do not recall any details.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make any memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. To my knowledge I did not make any memorandum?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mrs. E. C. Carter?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think I have ever met Mrs. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who she is?

Mr. VINCENT. I would amend that to say that if she was at the IPR conference in 1945 and I may have met her at some social gathering. No; I don't know. You mean, who she is other than the wife of Mr. E. C. Carter?

Mr. SOURWINE. The wife.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about her connection, if any, with the China Aid Council?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any connection with the China Aid Council?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not recall having personally known Mrs. E. C. Carter?

Mr. VINCENT. In any relationship; if she was at the IPR conference I would probably have met her at a social gathering there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever correspond?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever ask her to send your regards to Madam Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Madam Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have asked mutual friends to tender regards?

Mr. VINCENT. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you did not regard Mrs. Carter as such a mutual friend?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not regard Mrs. Carter as a mutual friend.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say that you never made such a request to her—that is, to convey your regards to Madame Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. VINCENT. I can say that I have no recollection of asking Mrs. Carter to convey my regards.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had done so you would probably have remembered; would you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that I would, if somebody came in casually and said, "I am going to China and seeing Madame Sun Yat-sen." I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not constantly sending your regards to Madame Sun Yet-sen?

Mr. VINCENT. No, Mr. Sourwine, but I don't know what the period was.

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1944, about June?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, something that happened 7 years ago, whether I sent my regards to Madame Sun Yat-sen or not through Mrs. Carter I don't want to say because I don't remember.

Mr. MANDEL. Would you regard Madam Sun Yat-sen as pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would regard her as pro-Communist. I haven't seen her since 1943.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether she is a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know. She was in Peking and I would assume she is with the party.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no more information than that answer implies?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do anything to prepare or condition Mr. Wallace for his mission to China?

Mr. VINCENT. As I have already testified, he and I met on two or three occasions prior to our departure in May, and I no doubt brought him up to date on conditions in China. There were not memoranda made of that, and I don't recall the exact nature.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not supply him with certain material in advance of the trip?

Mr. VINCENT. I suppose I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether you did?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't remember whether I did or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet with him prior to that trip?

The CHAIRMAN. That is rather perplexing, Mr. Vincent. This is a very important occasion that you were going on for you to say that you don't remember whether or not you supplied material to Mr. Wallace.

Mr. VINCENT. But, Mr. Chairman, I thought I had just testified that I probably did, but I don't remember the nature of what I may have supplied him.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the way I caught it.

Mr. VINCENT. Whether I did it orally or in writing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You testified that you did meet with him and did have oral discussions?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, and they may have resulted in preparing him with written material on China.

Mr. SOURWINE. The purpose of the discussions was to help prepare him or condition him for the trip, but whether there was any writing you do not know?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the occasions when you met with Mr. Wallace to discuss his forthcoming trip to China, did any of those meetings take place outside the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. In his office. In the building here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did any of those meetings take place anywhere else?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did the first meeting take place; here in his office?

Mr. VINCENT. Not the first meeting. I recall it was in the office in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he come up there?



Mr. VINCENT. He came up there and I said, "I am coming up to see you," and he said, "No. I am coming up to the State Department." He didn't come to my office, he came to the little office occupied by Currie.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you went over and met him there?

Mr. VINCENT. I went over and met him there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Currie have anything to do with arranging that first conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I would assume that he did. Wallace has testified that Mr. Currie had a great deal to do with arranging the mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you from the basis of your recollection.

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection is that Mr. Wallace called me for a meeting and that Mr. Wallace then said he would come to the Department and meet me there. What part Currie had I don't know; that was the first time I recalled meeting the Vice President of the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the first mention that was made to you of such a meeting, when he called you about it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't think so, but I don't recall any other mention. I don't know when that meeting took place.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you think there was mention before Mr. Wallace called you of the possibility of your meeting with him?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know who that was mentioned by?

Mr. VINCENT. I think probably that Currie himself told me that the President had proposed to Wallace to go to China and that Wallace wanted to meet me and talk about China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, sir, consult with Owen Lattimore to make any preliminary arrangements for the Wallace trip?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no distinct recollection of a consultation between Lattimore and myself on making the arrangements, but I would certainly expect that they would have taken place with him and possibly with John Hazard, who also made the trip.

The CHAIRMAN. Who?

Mr. VINCENT. John Hazard, who was another member of the party, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss the forthcoming trip with Mr. Lattimore at any time before his appointment was announced?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I have no distinct recollection of discussing it, but as I say it would stand to reason that I did. It was not announced until just before we left, so there would have been considerable discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that you did discuss it with Mr. Lattimore for some time before you left on the trip?

Mr. VINCENT. I am quite sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that discussion?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it in Baltimore?

Mr. VINCENT. He may have been at one of the meetings that I went down to in Mr. Wallace's office.

The CHAIRMAN. He was not connected with the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. He was connected with the Office of War Information at that time, he was Deputy Director.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss it—that is, the forthcoming trip, with Mr. Lattimore before you discussed it with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall having any discussion with him before I discussed it with Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say you did not discuss it with Mr. Lattimore before you discussed it with Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I would consider it most unlikely that I would discuss it with Mr. Lattimore before I discussed it with Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why?

Mr. VINCENT. Because my recollection of my first meeting with Mr. Wallace was for the very purpose of discussing his trip to China and whether I would go.

Mr. SOURWINE. But that was not the first you had heard about this mission?

Mr. VINCENT. I had heard about it before that from Currie.

Mr. SOURWINE. I attimore was your good friend and Mr. Wallace you had never seen before?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why is it unlikely that you would have discussed it with Mr. Lattimore before you discussed it with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. Because I didn't think at that time there was any certainty that I was going.

Mr. SOURWINE. As long as we have gotten into the matter of probabilities, why do you consider it improbable that you would have discussed it with Mr. Lattimore before you discussed it with Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. Because my recollection of the meeting with Wallace is that that was the first time there was any definite idea that I was going.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't say that——

Mr. VINCENT. I will amend that to say that it is probable that I did meet with Lattimore before.

Mr. SOURWINE. It's not what I want, it's what you want to testify to?

Mr. VINCENT. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. If I express incredulity it is only for the purposes of straightening out the record.

Mr. VINCENT. I appreciate that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you present at all the talks between Mr. Wallace and Gen. Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. VINCENT. All except the first one and the last one going over in the car to the airport. I think that is considered as one of the conversations.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you learn about what took place at the two talks at which you were not present?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Wallace told me after the first one and Mr. Wallace told me as soon as we got into the airplane of the second one that I hadn't taken part in.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he give you written memoranda of those talks?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection is that he gave me no written memoranda of the first one; of the second one he had scribbled some notes which he gave me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he supplement those notes with an oral recounting of what had taken place?

Mr. VINCENT. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make written memoranda with regard to the talks at which you were present?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; at Mr. Wallace's request.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; I do not mean to suggest for a moment that there is anything improper about that.

Mr. VINCENT. They are all in the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was some written memorandum with regard to each of the talks, except for the first one, then, in your possession before you started back for America?

Mr. VINCENT. They were in my possession at Kunming where I transcribed them into the notes as you now know them in the White Book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wait a minute; that was done at Kunming?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your notes of the conversations?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; let me say that what I had was—I am not a stenographer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes?

Mr. VINCENT. What I had was rough notes taken at the conferences.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes?

Mr. VINCENT. Immediately we got to Kunming I sat down and using my memory and these notes and names, expanded them into what were the reports of each meeting, with Mr. Wallace present at Kunming to aid me.

Mr. SOURWINE. What became of those reports, or what ultimately became reports? Did you actually send those from Kunming?

Mr. VINCENT. We brought those home with us.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not change them or expand them after you left Kunming?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As prepared at Kunming is the way they were submitted?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you do with your original memoranda, the rough memoranda? Were they discarded?

Mr. VINCENT. They were discarded. They were written in a little book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you say they were destroyed?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you consciously destroy them?

Mr. VINCENT. I might have destroyed it because I don't possess it now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you not have consciously and deliberately destroyed it, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would.

The CHAIRMAN. What he means by that last answer is that he consciously destroyed the original notes that he made at the respective conferences; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct. I have no recollection of the physical process of destroying them, but I don't have them.

The CHAIRMAN. You said you did destroy them? It is a very positive statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you have just thrown them in the wastebasket somewhere?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I could have thrown them in the wastebasket.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hand them to somebody and say, "Take care of these"? Could you have left them in the bureau drawer? Could you have left them in a trunk? Could you have left them in the pocket of an old coat? In a duffle bag? Or on the airplane? Are any of those things possibilities?

Mr. VINCENT. All of those things are possibilities because as I say I don't have a distinct recollection of taking those notes and in any manner destroying them.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not want to embarrass you, Mr. Vincent, but how long had you been in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I had been in the State Department for 20 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those were notes of a very highly restricted conference; were they not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those notes were classified material?

Mr. VINCENT. They were. They weren't at that moment but should have been classified.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you not have felt that it was your absolute obligation to either guard those most carefully or personally destroy them?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had let them out of your possession, would you not have classified them very highly?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have, but I am not a classifier. I don't know whether I would have put "confidential" on them, but I would have indicated.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would have classified those notes as only confidential?

Mr. VINCENT. I am only using the word in its general sense.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would not have classified them as secret?

Mr. VINCENT. I use the word simply to indicate. Whether I would have classified them confidential or secret—

Mr. SOURWINE. There is a lot of difference between secret and confidential, is there not?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have considered them secret.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or perhaps even top secret?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or perhaps even "eyes only"? No, it would not be a message, so it would not be that. All right, sir, you have no memory of precisely what you did with them?

Mr. VINCENT. Precisely?

The CHAIRMAN. To straighten this thing out, he said he destroyed them.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understand that the witness says he has no memory as to what he did with them.

The CHAIRMAN. Then he says he has no memory of what he did with them. He says positively that he destroyed them.



Mr. SOURWINE. I thought he said any number of things was possible. The CHAIRMAN. After that he said any number of things was possible.

Mr. VINCENT. The Senator is right, but as I say, under further questioning I have no memory of any physical disposition that I made of those things.

Mr. SOURWINE. In any event at Chungking they became the basis for the reports on the talks?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your memoranda on the talks which are now part of the White Paper?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there anywhere at any time in any written memorandum or oral statement to you from Mr. Wallace any reference to a request by Chiang Kai-shek for the assignment of General Wedemeyer as the representative of President Roosevelt?

Mr. VINCENT. My only recollection in connection with that is that after we reached Kunming the name of General Wedemeyer was suggested as a good man to take the place of general over-all command of the troops of American forces in China and the statement was made that when General Wedemeyer made a trip to China at some time earlier the Generalissimo had been well impressed by him.

Mr. SOURWINE. That statement was made when?

Mr. VINCENT. That doesn't answer your question. I am telling you all I know about the relationship of Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. That statement was made when?

Mr. VINCENT. That was made when we were in Kunming in June, 1944 after we had left Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it was made by whom?

Mr. VINCENT. It was made to me by either Alsop or Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know which?

Mr. VINCENT. No. My recollection is that T. V. Soong, who was also at one time on the plane with us, may have made the statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. As far as you know was that the first mention of that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I do not recall it ever coming up in the conversation at Chungking, the name Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then it was not included in any of the oral or written reports that Mr. Wallace gave you about his conferences with the Generalissimo?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Owen Lattimore have anything to do with the transmission to you of any report or memorandum concerning any conversation of General Chiang with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that he had anything to do with it. He was present at several of the meetings with Chiang.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with him what took place at any of those meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. I say, he was at three or four of them, and I may have discussed them with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not think you ever discussed with him——

Mr. VINCENT. A meeting at which he was not present.

Mr. SOURWINE. A meeting where he was present or was not present?

Mr. VINCENT. I did have discussion on the plane but not after the meeting that we left Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, after the meeting had taken place, did you not on some occasions discuss the meeting with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. But I have no distinct recollection of any of those occasions where I would have discussed with him. It was a natural thing to have discussed it with him, he was a member of the party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever give you a memorandum of his recollection of what took place?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Whatever discussions you had with him were prior to the time you prepared your memoranda, which was at another place?

Mr. VINCENT. Which was at Kunming.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I recall no assistance that he gave me because these were supposed to be factual memoranda insofar as I could reconstruct them from my notes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, sir, while you were with Mr. Wallace on this mission did you feel it was your duty to make available to the Vice President your 20 years or so of experience in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I did so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make that experience available to him to the best of your ability?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my ability I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you take advantage of every opportunity to make that experience available to him?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him any unasked advice?

Mr. VINCENT. That is difficult to say, but I imagine I did give him unasked advice.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom are you referring now?

Mr. SOURWINE. The Vice President when he was on his mission to China. You were there as a matter of fact for the purpose of proffering advice when it was needed? You were his adviser, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. That was my purpose.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your usefulness would have been severely restricted if you had only spoken when you were spoken to?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not feel that you were in that position?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did speak out whenever you felt that you had information to give him that would be of value?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or advice that would be to his interest or to the interest of the mission?

Mr. VINCENT. Aid his mission.

The CHAIRMAN. At all of the meetings that the Vice President was present in Asia was Mr. Lattimore present also?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Lattimore was present at—there were probably five meetings, and Mr. Lattimore was present at two or three of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember the places where he was present?

Mr. VINCENT. The meetings, all of them, except the first one and the last one, which I did not attend, took place in Chiang Kai-shek's home out in the hills.

The CHAIRMAN. Lattimore was there?

Mr. VINCENT. Lattimore was there.

The CHAIRMAN. Who else was in your party besides Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. John Hazard.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he there?

Mr. VINCENT. He was not there because he was a Russian expert.

The CHAIRMAN. He was what?

Mr. VINCENT. He was the Russian expert who went along with Wallace.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was an expert, he was not himself a Russian?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he attend any of the talks with Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refresh myself from the talks to see. He may have come into one of them. He was not consciously present, he certainly took no part in them that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who initiated with Mr. Currie the request for your assignment to go with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. Who initiated with Mr. Currie?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. The request?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. It might have been Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. It might have been Mr. Wallace in discussion with Currie; that would have been my impression.

Mr. SOURWINE. It might have been somebody else?

Mr. VINCENT. It might have been somebody else, but I would say that Currie, who knew Wallace—either way.

Mr. SOURWINE. If it was between them, for all you know Mr. Currie may have initiated?

Mr. VINCENT. He may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or the President? Or somebody else?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. At least you did not? When you first learned of it, it came from Mr. Currie; and who initiated it, you do not know, it might have been himself?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It might have been spontaneous?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why Mr. Hull sent you with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. My only knowledge as to why Mr. Hull sent me with Mr. Wallace was to make available to Mr. Wallace the experience that I had had recently in Kunming and over a period of 20 years in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear any other reason given as to why Mr. Hull sent you to Mr. Wallace, with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I think, and here I am having to call very largely on my memory, there was a small conversation between Mr.



Hull and myself just before I went out at which Mr. Hull very briefly said, "Vincent, you are going." He said that he hoped Mr. Wallace would not make any promises to the Chinese that we couldn't live up to.

Mr. Wallace had just come back from a trip the year previous to South America. There had been some feeling that Wallace had been expansive in his promises of aid there and Mr. Hull was himself a little concerned about whether Mr. Wallace was going to overdo it.

The CHAIRMAN. That wish was expressed by Mr. Hull to you?

Mr. VINCENT. That idea was expressed by him to me, as I recall it. As I say, there I am drawing on a memory that isn't too good on a situation long ago. I do remember seeing Mr. Hull, and that is my recollection. There may have been something else said.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you were afraid that Mr. Wallace might make elaborate promises to the Chinese authorities?

Mr. VINCENT. I was aware of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you were specifically charged by the Secretary with doing what you could to avoid that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Hull tell you he had picked you to accompany Mr. Wallace in order to hold him down?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any such language as that, but—

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it your understanding that you were to serve as a restraining influence over him in the event he endeavored to make unjudicious or injudicious commitments to the Chinese Government?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be what I would gather from this conversation I vaguely remember. I may say, in adding there, that I did not find it necessary to hold him down. He didn't become expansive in China so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he make any commitments to Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. None other than saying, as I think was reported in one of these conversations, that we would do our best to aid and support them in their conduct. But so far as a specific promise to Chiang, which we had to live up to, I don't recall any.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it only to Chiang that Mr. Hull was afraid Mr. Wallace might make injudicious or elaborate promises?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; so far as I know he had in mind the National Government of China under Chiang and not any other group.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had no thought of any promises or commitments that might be made elsewhere?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would General Chennault have been either desirable or acceptable as the President's personal representative to Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that General Chennault would have been most acceptable to the Generalissimo as his adviser.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would he have been either desirable or acceptable to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony would be that he would be desirable and acceptable. I had a great admiration for him myself. I don't know to what extent the State Department knew him as a man that might have been acceptable or desirable or fit for that job, but to my own estimate he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would he have been desirable or acceptable to the War Department in that job?



Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you express any view in that connection, that is, with regard to his desirability or acceptability on behalf of anyone to Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. When we were in Kunming, after we left Chungking, I recall suggesting that General Chennault might be the man he wanted for the job of being adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. It was hardly the matter of adviser. It was taking over the general control of the American Armed Forces in China and maintaining close contact with the Generalissimo, so that we had a coordinated military effort.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was far more than adviser, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. It was more than adviser, and at that time I think the title of Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo was being used.

I do know, as a matter of fact, that Wedemeyer did, when he took over the job, have the title of Chief of Staff. He was also Commander, but he had the title of Chief of Staff. I am getting into military things now.

Mr. SOURWINE. But that was not proposed by either you or Mr. Wallace at that time, was it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, not at that time, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Senator O'Connor, we are discussing at the moment the Wallace mission to China.

"Would General Chennault have been either desirable or acceptable as the President's personal emissary to Chiang" was the subject, and the witness has testified that in his opinion he would have been acceptable and desirable to Chiang, that he would have been acceptable to the State Department. He does not know whether he would have been acceptable to the War Department.

Did you testify, sir, that it was your suggestion to Mr. Wallace at Kunming that perhaps General Chennault was the man to be recommended for the job of the President's personal emissary to Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I recommended Chennault as the man to take over the control of the forces in China, which carried with it also this idea of being the adviser to Chiang.

Mr. SOURWINE. In that connection, did you recommend the replacement of Stilwell by Chennault?

Mr. VINCENT. In that connection, the recommendation was one which was not entirely one, in its inception, of getting Stilwell out of the command. It was possibly leaving Stilwell in the over-all command militarily in the whole China-Burma theater area.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you recommend the removal of Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. Let me please continue here. It was thought possible at that time to make the recommendation that Chennault would take over the China thing and be on his own as the political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, commanding troops there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it that you were trying to accomplish the removal of General Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. What we were trying to do was accomplish the removal of General Stilwell from the position he occupied in China as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "we," you mean you and Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the general idea here, and I think it is stated here in the cable.

Mr. SOURWINE. But I am asking for your memory of the purpose.

Mr. VINCENT. The purpose was to replace Stilwell in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your recommendation was that Chennault was the man for that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did Mr. Wallace say about that recommendation?

Mr. VINCENT. Of Chennault? I do not know what he said, but it became clear in the conversations that General Chennault himself did not feel that he wished to take the job.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, how did that become clear? Did Mr. Alsop make that clear?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether it was Alsop, sir, or, since we were living in General Chennault's house, whether he made it clear to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't discuss this Kunming cable with Chennault, did you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nor did Mr. Wallace, so far as you know?

Mr. VINCENT. Not so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you did discuss it with Mr. Alsop?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. Alsop was on General Chennault's staff?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You certainly didn't know that General Chennault was unwilling to take that assignment, or you shouldn't have made the suggestion; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That's right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then the word that General Chennault was unwilling to take that assignment must have come either from Mr. Wallace or Mr. Alsop. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. It probably came from Mr. Alsop.

Mr. SOURWINE. It must have come from either Mr. Wallace or Mr. Alsop? There were only the three of you there, and it wasn't you, so it was either Mr. Wallace or Mr. Alsop?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So, on that basis, what is your memory as to who made the statement?

Mr. VINCENT. My present memory would be that Alsop made the statement.

Mr. MANDEL. Could I ask a couple of questions there?

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. MANDEL. Did Mr. Wallace or any of his group of advisers consult with any of the Chinese Communist leaders in reference to the matter of the replacement of Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not that I recall. I don't think that Mr. Wallace or any of his advisers saw the Chinese Communists during this mission out there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that all you had?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who first suggested General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified before that I can't recall whether it was T. V. Soong or whether it was Alsop.

Mr. SOURWINE. No; I mean at the conference with Mr. Wallace.

Mr. VINCENT. At the conference with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. At which, of course, T. V. Soong was not present. I would say it was probably Alsop, although it may have been as a result of a conversation that Mr. Wallace had had coming down on the plane with T. V. Soong. It could easily be Mr. Wallace recalling.

Mr. SOURWINE. The objective was to secure the removal of Stilwell; you recommended Chennault as the man to replace him; and either Alsop or Wallace suggested Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. There may have been something previously placed in the mind by somebody.

Mr. SOURWINE. You wouldn't know who placed the suggestion in Mr. Alsop's mind?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your comment when General Wedemeyer's name was suggested?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't recall my exact comment.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the nature of it?

Mr. VINCENT. The nature of my comment, if it was any comment at all, was that we needed a man, and I knew General Wedemeyer by reputation, and he would make a good man. But I had no way of knowing it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you think he was a better man for the job than Chennault?

Mr. VINCENT. I made no comparison in my mind as to his being a better or a worse man than Chennault.

Mr. SOURWINE. Having recommended Chennault, did you thereafter assert entirely in the suggestion of Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were in China with Mr. Wallace, did you have a conference with General Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any knowledge of a conference between General Stilwell and Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it, then, that your answer would be "No" to the question, Did you and Mr. Lattimore have a conference with General Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. The answer is "No." General Stilwell, insofar as I can recall, remained in north Burma or India and did not come to Kunming, and none of us went in the opposite direction, as I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are stating this definitely now? This is a matter of memory and not a matter of what might have happened? You are stating that you did not have a conference with General Stilwell and that you and Owen Lattimore did not have a conference with General Stilwell in June of 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. We did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. If Mr. Service or anyone else reported the results of such a conference, how would you characterize the report?



Mr. VINCENT. If Mr. Service or anyone else said that I had a conference with General Stilwell during this trip, I would have to characterize it as a complete misstatement of fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, were you in China with Mr. Wallace on or about June 20, 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. I was, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you and Mr. Wallace arrived in Chungking, did the two of you go to visit Mme. Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not identify her as a Communist at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now?

Mr. VINCENT. I gather that she is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now identify her as having been a Communist at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I testified earlier that she was probably pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you square that with your recent testimony that neither Mr. Wallace nor either of his advisers consulted with Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it would square on the basis that I had no knowledge that she was a Communist, but we thought she had Communist leanings at that time. She certainly was sympathetic. And he called on her, Mr. Wallace called on her, as the widow of Sun Yat-sen.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say she certainly was sympathetic. You mean at that time she was sympathetic to the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. That was my understanding.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew that at the time, didn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. May I interrupt there to ask, Upon what would you base your statement of belief that she was favorable? From any expressions on her part?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I would see her from time to time. She was living with either Chiang Kai-shek or with the Kungs—I forget—one or the other. And it was a matter that we had social gatherings together, and Mme. Sun Yat-sen always took the more extreme view with regard to assisting the Communists in getting on with the war against the Japanese and things like that. We did not have many political conversations. I am giving an impression based upon the fact that as you will recall Mme. Chiang Kai-shek also in 1926 or 1927 disassociated herself, when Chiang Kai-shek broke with the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are talking about 1944.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. But, as I say, I am giving you the reasons that I have the impression that she was sympathetic toward the Communists, and it goes back as far as 1926.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just expand a little bit on the point you are trying to make when you talk about Mme. Chiang Kai-shek in 1927. Why did you drag her in at this point? What is the point you are trying to make?

Mr. VINCENT. No; Mme. Sun Yat-sen. Did I say "Mme. Chiang Kai-shek"? Will you correct that?

I know she wasn't pro-Communist in 1927.



Mr. SOURWINE. I didn't know anything except what you said. I had to go by that.

Mr. VINCENT. But you can have a slip in names.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; but you can recognize it was rather startling testimony at the moment.

Mr. VINCENT. I am referring to Mme. Sun Yat-sen.

Senator O'CONNOR. You will have the opportunity to clear that up if there was any slip of the tongue.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was well known to you in 1944 that Mme. Sun Yat-sen was definitely pro-Communist, and that was known to you and, I presume, to Mr. Wallace when you went to visit her?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you went to visit her on or about the morning of June 21, 1944. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. It would be that date. We were there between the 21st and 24th.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who went with you? Do you remember?

Mr. VINCENT. There was one other Chinese present, and I do not recall his name. It may have been her own brother, Sun Fo.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there a Caucasian present?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I can recall. I think it was Mr. Wallace and myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Acheson, from the Embassy, accompany you on the visit to Mme. Sun Yat-Sen?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think he did, sir; but he may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Isn't it a fact that he went with you to Mme. Sun's residence and was asked to retire during the actual conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of such an incident at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, what can you tell us about the meeting, or the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I can say that it was a conversation of a very general character, and I don't recall any of it. It was more or less, as I have stated, a courtesy call on the part of Wallace to call on the widow of Dr. Sun Yat-sen as far as I had any knowledge of its objective.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no memory that Mr. Acheson was present at the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no memory of that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say he was not present?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I would not say he was not present. As I say, the only people I recall being there were Wallace, myself, Mme. Sun Yat-sen, and one Chinese, maybe Sun Fo.

Mr. SOURWINE. For how long did you talk together?

Mr. VINCENT. I would estimate it was anywhere from 20 minutes to a half an hour.

Mr. SOURWINE. No longer than half an hour?

Mr. VINCENT. That was my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mme. Sun request Mr. Wallace and America to help the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that she did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say that she didn't?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say that she did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there was in existence a report of that conference that said that she did, would you challenge it?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever report on that conference to anyone?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall a report on that conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you report to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall reporting to the State Department. But I may have after we got back. I did not report from Chungking on it. It may have been that Atcheson, who was present, reported on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you don't know whether he was present or not, do you?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I don't know whether he was present, but one could easily have gone back and told Atcheson what the conference was about, and he might have reported on it.

Senator O'CONOR. Specifically, Mr. Vincent, what was taken up with her directly?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I don't recall what was taken up, as I say. It was a mission to go over there to call on the widow of Sun Yat-sen, and as far as the conversation was concerned, to my recollection, it was a general conversation. If there exists, as you say, reports here that she asked Wallace to help the Chinese Communists, I have just said that I would not deny that she did. But I don't recall it.

Senator O'CONOR. Have you any recollection, though, of any specific matter which was taken up or about which you and Mr. Wallace went to see her?

Mr. VINCENT. Unfortunately, I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she indicate that she regarded the Chinese Communists as the oppressed?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall that she did, but, as I say, I have indicated already that I can't recall the specific character of the conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, even so, I hope I don't insult you by asking specific questions, because the question itself might refresh your memory.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I am glad you are.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was well known as her view at the time, was it not, that the Chinese Communists were the oppressed?

Mr. VINCENT. She never, to my knowledge, told me that she thought the Chinese Communists were the oppressed. Madame Chiang's principal line——

Mr. SOURWINE. Madame Sun, you mean?

Mr. VINCENT. Madame Sun's. Most of the time, was for bringing about a greater degree of unity, political and military, among the Chinese, among which, of course, she included the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she express, on the occasion of the meeting of yourself and Mr. Wallace with her, any views in regard to broadening the political power of the Communists in China and permitting them to participate in the government?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that she certainly would have. I don't, as I say, recall the nature of it, but it would have been a very logical thing to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall the nature of the meeting?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall anything about the dwelling in which it took place?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you recall anything about the room in which it took place? Was it a room with small windows?

Mr. VINCENT. It probably did have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she seated or standing during the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I would think that she was seated, and that it was in Sun Fo's home.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she behind a desk, or in a chair, or on a divan?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall whether she was on a chair or on a divan.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am just trying to recall it for you.

Mr. VINCENT. I know, but the position of Madame Sun Yat-Sen at this meeting I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you don't recall your own position, what you sat on?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly remember it if I stood the whole time, but I must have sat.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you have to do with the preparation of Mr. Wallace's report to the President on his China mission?

Mr. VINCENT. We are speaking now of the telegram from Kunming?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am talking about his report, if there is a distinction. Was that telegram from Kunming a report?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to make a distinction between what was a telegram from Chungking on or about—

Mr. SOURWINE. From Kunming, you mean?

Mr. VINCENT. I mean from Kunming. On or about June the 26th, and a report which Mr. Wallace made to the President after he returned here from his mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he make two reports, then, one in the form of a cable from Kunming and one in the form of a written report after he came back?

Mr. VINCENT. He has so stated, that he made one after he came back. I don't know of my own knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to know on the basis of your own knowledge.

Mr. VINCENT. I had no knowledge at the time that he made a report on the mission to the President in writing or orally, although he said he was going to see the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the submission of any report or memoranda by Mr. Wallace to the President other than the Kunming cable?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Wallace ever ask you for suggestions with regard to any such report, oral or written?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with him the subject of such a report?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who typed his report to the President?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see a rough draft of such a report, or of memoranda prepared for such a report?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever submit any suggested language, orally or in writing, for possible inclusion in such a report?



Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. So far as you know, did Owen Lattimore ever submit any suggested language for possible inclusion?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge on that subject.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, you were, as you have testified, present with Mr. Wallace, as an adviser, as his chief adviser. You were the man who knew China.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wouldn't it have been in your contemplation the most important thing about his whole mission, to make a report to the President?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have certainly thought it was, and he told me he was going over to see the President and talk to him, but I was not present at the conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you account for the fact that throughout the whole mission you never discussed with him or touched on in your conversations with him the possibility of a report to the President?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, he told me he was going over to see the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was after you got back. I am saying, all the way along, all the way on the trip, the airplane trip, and across the country, and until you got back, you never touched upon the question, with him, of a report to the President?

Mr. VINCENT. We touched upon the matter of his going in to see the President and talk to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that? Was it before you got back to Washington?

Mr. VINCENT. On the plane from time to time he would tell me he was going in to see the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you never talked about what he would say?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nor did he, or whether he would file a written report or an oral report?

Mr. VINCENT. He never told me he was going to file a written report.

Mr. SOURWINE. But when you talked about it, you never talked about whether he was going to file a written report or an oral report?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you find yourself in entire accord with Mr. Wallace in his verbal expressions concerning what he had found out?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean his verbal expressions after he came back here, or during the trip?

Senator O'CONOR. No, en route, during the trip back.

Mr. VINCENT. One doesn't always find oneself in entire accord with anyone, and I would say there probably were differences of opinion. I don't recall them.

Senator O'CONOR. Were there any marked differences?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall any marked differences, Senator.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would have thought the question of a report to the Chief Executive would have been uppermost both in your mind and in Mr. Wallace's. How do you account for the fact that it wasn't?

Mr. VINCENT. I can account for it as far as I can. I myself told you, and I have said before, I didn't ever know he made a written report to the President until here within the last few months.



Mr. SOURWINE. No; that doesn't account for anything. Excuse me. I interrupted you.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I was about to say we had sent in a telegram, which was two or three pages long, from Kunming, to bring to the President's attention the situation as it was seen by Mr. Wallace in China. There was also the transcript of the notes which I had made in the conversations with Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those had already been transmitted to the State Department; hadn't they?

Mr. VINCENT. The notes were brought home by me and typed after they got back to the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought you said they were prepared at Kunming.

Mr. VINCENT. They were prepared at Kunming, but brought home by me.

Mr. SOURWINE. They weren't typed at Kunming?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether they were in longhand or whether they were typed at Kunming, I don't recall, but my recollection would be that they were in long hand.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought you testified that they were unchanged from the time you prepared them at Kunming until you submitted them.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I mean unchanged in form, because they were retyped here in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. But unchanged in context?

Mr. VINCENT. Unchanged in context. I simply came in, just to keep the record completely straight, and then there was a digest made of them, which reduced them down from 20 pages to 3, in the State Department, for Mr. Hull's attention, and I have no certain knowledge whether they ever went over and were read by the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are back to the question of how you account for the fact that you and Mr. Wallace didn't even discuss this subject of a possible report to the President. Have you said all you want to on that subject?

Mr. VINCENT. I have. I was just saying it is possible that he considered—he always told me he was going in to see the President; and that was his affair.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he say, "that is my affair"?

Mr. VINCENT. No, he didn't say "that is my affair." He simply didn't take me into his confidence about going to the President at any time, once we arrived back in this city.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you never broached the subject?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had known that he had no thought of making a report to the President, would it have concerned you at all?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; it would have concerned me. But he had told me he was going to see the President and talk over the mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it didn't concern you whether he would make an oral or a written report?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no interest in ascertaining which he was going to do?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you subsequently inquire?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with anyone the question of whether he would make a written or an oral report to the President, or any such report that was to be made?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall no conversation. And I want to reemphasize that from a certain point of view the telegram from Kunming, which was our last stop, might have been considered as my last participation in the thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you so consider it?

Mr. VINCENT. I did so consider it, once we got back to Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, on the plane, on the way back, did Mr. Wallace do any typing?

Mr. VINCENT. He presumably did. He kept a typewriter with him, or we had a stenographer, an Army officer, a young fellow in the Army.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the plane?

Mr. VINCENT. On the plane.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Wallace dictate to him on the way back?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he had a typewriter?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, whether Mr. Wallace had a typewriter, I don't recall. I don't know whether Mr. Wallace can type.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean the young Army officer. Well, you never saw Mr. Wallace typing, then, or you would know whether he could type. But you never saw him typing on the plane?

Mr. VINCENT. I never saw him typing; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. What kind of a plane was this?

Mr. VINCENT. A DC-4, four motor.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it all compartmented up, or one large compartment?

Mr. VINCENT. There was a compartment forward, with a bed here, and a bed there, and aft it was all one compartment.

Mr. SOURWINE. So if Mr. Wallace had been typing on the plane, you would have seen him?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The conclusion, then, is inescapable that he didn't do any typing on the plane.

Mr. VINCENT. He certainly made notes, but he didn't do any typing. I would say here that quite apart from the question of any report to the President, Mr. Wallace was getting ready at that time for a speech which he was scheduled to make immediately on his return at Seattle. And I was busy with that, contributing whatever little share I had in it, and Wallace was busy writing his report—I mean, writing this speech which he subsequently gave in Seattle about the 10th of July.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the way back, then, you were working on the Seattle speech?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Together?

Mr. VINCENT. All of us were working on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. The young Army officer, the stenographer, too?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You wouldn't have had much time to work on a report on the plane, then, would you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or Mr. Wallace or Mr. Service or any other representative of the American Government get an expression of views from any Chinese Communist source on General Stilwell's removal?

Mr. VINCENT. None to me. When you name other people——

Mr. SOURWINE. To your knowledge, did you or Mr. Wallace or Mr. Service or any other representative of the American Government get an expression of views from any Chinese Government source on the removal of General Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. I can state that I got none. I can state that as a positive fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you a little more than that. I am asking you whether to your knowledge anyone else did.

Mr. VINCENT. To my knowledge, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you send in separate reports to the State Department or to the President while you were in China with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You sent no reports to the Department from China?

Mr. VINCENT. No. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. And when you got back, did you submit any reports other than your memoranda of the conversations?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the only report I submitted that I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you submit any oral reports to your superiors in the Department after you got back?

Mr. VINCENT. I undoubtedly talked the mission over with Mr. Grew and with Mr. Ballantine. Both were my immediate chiefs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you express——

Mr. VINCENT. Just a moment. I went in with Mr. Wallace when he called on Mr. Stettinius, who was Under Secretary then, and just as a junior person present listened to that conversation. I don't recall what it was, but it was mostly just how the trip came out.

We also went with him when he called on Secretary Hull, just to report that he was back and on the mission. That was a very brief conversation, which developed nothing beyond what we had already reported.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at any time express any dissatisfaction with or disapproval of any of the views Mr. Wallace had expressed?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Sergei Goglidze—G-o-g-l-i-d-z-e?

Mr. VINCENT. The Russian? The man of the toast?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. If I have mispronounced it, correct me.

Mr. VINCENT. The man that gave the toast; yes sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Identify him, will you? Who was he?

Mr. VINCENT. He was the Russian official who was sent to join the Wallace party when we arrived in eastern Siberia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he sent to join the party, or was he there when you got there?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether he met us when we first came down on Russian soil; I don't recall. There was a Russian Army officer who met us when we came down, but whether Goglidze met us a day or so later, I don't recall. But he was with us most of the time we were in eastern Siberia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he a commander in that area?

Mr. VINCENT. No; he was a political man in what they called the Department of Maritime Provinces.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he hold army rank?

Mr. VINCENT. If he did, I knew nothing of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he a Georgian?

Mr. VINCENT. He was a Georgian, so he told me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he a friend of Stalin?

Mr. VINCENT. So he himself stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you first meet him?

Mr. VINCENT. I met him when he came aboard the train or met him at their various hostels we stayed at along the way. But I would presumably have met him the first night, because everybody sat down in these hostels together.

Mr. SOURWINE. We keep getting presumably mixed with recollection. I know it is very difficult. But do you recall when you first met?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall who introduced you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that he introduced himself, because we had nobody on the plane to introduce him to us, because none of us on the same plane had ever met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore didn't introduce him to you?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I remember; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned a toast. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. And I don't remember the occasion, but, as I say, I seem to think that it was when we were about to leave Siberia.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was at a dinner, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. It was at a dinner. And it was, I think, about the time we were leaving. I would not have recalled that toast, if I may say, had not Mr. Wallace made a record of it. It made no impression on me at the time, either mental or otherwise, and I made no note of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you speak Russian?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were all of the toasts at this dinner translated?

Mr. VINCENT. Goglidze, I think, could speak a little English, and it may have been that in this case he tried to speak a little English.

Mr. SOURWINE. This toast was in English?

Mr. VINCENT. That I don't recall. But he could speak a little English, and I couldn't speak a word of Russian, and I know from time to time he and Mr. Wallace were talking.

Mr. SOURWINE. He praised you rather highly in the toast, didn't he?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether you would call it praise or not. There were those overstatements. I saw no significance in it, even though Mr. Wallace's book writer did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it is possible that you might be more familiar with such things than Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. What things, sir?

Mr. SOURWINE. Such encomiums.



Mr. VINCENT. I would say it is the nature of toast-makers to always overstate the case; but in this particular instance my recollection is that he said I had great responsibility with respect to China. Now, the factual thing is that I was the chief of the China Division in the State Department. Therefore I did have some responsibility with regard to China. So it reduces itself down to analysis of what he meant by "great," and I can't put it—

Mr. SOURWINE. What he said was, "For China's future," wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't got the toast here.

Mr. SOURWINE. "To Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future."?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think he was talking about your duties and responsibilities in the American State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I think he was; yes. I don't want to deny—but all of the implications that this toast had any ulterior significance or anything else were completely wrong.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember it as ever having been given?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't even remember the toast and would not have remembered had not Mr. Wallace made a record of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you remember it after you read his record of it?

Mr. VINCENT. I still don't remember. I don't remember the occasion. I know that toasts were made, but this particular toast—I rely completely on Mr. Wallace's book for knowing that a toast was made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever take part in the drafting or preparation of a message to Chiang Kai-shek for the signature of President Roosevelt?

Mr. VINCENT. In the fall of 1944, there was a telegram that went out to Chiang Kai-shek. Now, this is a matter of State Department archives, and I do recall the occasion, that I took part in the drafting of a telegram. Now, whether that is still classified material, I don't know, but I judge there is no harm in my saying here—I don't recall the exact contents of the telegram, but there was a telegram. Since you remind me of it, about the President participating in signing it, there was a message that went out in the fall to Gauss, which, my recollection is—that is the reason I remember it, because it was one of the few telegrams that went out. It was signed by Hull, incidentally. It said the President and I were authorizing Gauss, in response to a telegram he had sent, to go over and speak very frankly to the Generalissimo about the urgent need of trying to bring about a greater amount of unity in the military command in China. Now, without consulting that telegram, which has now been drafted 7 years ago, I am trying to give you as best I can recall that that was the general nature of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understand.

Mr. VINCENT. There was also an idea that Mr. Gauss, the Ambassador at that time, who had very much on his mind, was trying to bring about some kind of military council, which would have the same objective as I have just mentioned, which would have in mind having a more effective prosecution of the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. What part did you take in drafting that telegram?

Mr. VINCENT. That I could not say, what part. I was one of the drafters.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you prepare a draft?

Mr. VINCENT. I prepared a draft.

Mr. SOURWINE. How close was your draft to the final draft?

Mr. VINCENT. That I wouldn't have any recollection of, how close the final draft was to my draft.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see the final draft before it went out?

Mr. VINCENT. I did. I myself, as I recall it, took it down to Mr. Hull.

Mr. SOURWINE. The final draft came to you for at least review before it went out, and you took it to Mr. Hull?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he sent it?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Hull took it over to the President, as I recall, and the President approved it, and Mr. Hull took it back and sent it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't see it after it came back from the White House?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. MANDEL. Could I add a question on the Wallace mission for a moment?

Senator O'CONNOR. Go ahead, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. Would you definitely say that at the session with Mme. Sun Yat-sen and Sun Fo, no mention was made of the Stilwell matter?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say definitely there was no mention made of the Stilwell matter, insofar as I can recall, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. What attitude or responsibility would you take for the book of Wallace, Soviet Asia Mission?

Mr. VINCENT. None, Mr. Mandel. I was only sent a copy of it after Mr. Wallace finished it. I didn't know who wrote it. I didn't know until I saw this testimony that someone else wrote it for him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read it?

Mr. VINCENT. I never read it. I have glanced through the pictures. I am ashamed to admit I never read through the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who initiated the contents of the draft which you prepared of this telegram that you prepared? Were they your own thoughts?

Mr. VINCENT. We haven't got the telegram here. We are speaking of a document I haven't seen. But I was in full accord; that is, the initiation of the telegram was in response to a telegram from Ambassador Gauss, who was pointing out that there was an urgent need for a greater degree of unity of command.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I mean is, can you recall whether having Ambassador Gauss' telegram it occurred to you it was desirable to respond to it, and perhaps in a certain way, or whether the request came down to you from a higher echelon to prepare a draft of response to this message from Gauss?

Mr. VINCENT. Now, I am just reconstructing purely from logic, knowing how things were handled in the Far Eastern Office at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. First, do you remember?

Mr. VINCENT. Do I remember that I drafted the first draft?

Mr. SOURWINE. No; do you remember which of the two theories of initiation was correct?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that the theory of an initiation in the Far Eastern Office is the one that is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, in your office?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, it wasn't my office then. In 1944, it was Grew's and Mr. Ballantine's.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean a higher echelon than you at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Proceed.

Mr. VINCENT. I was about to say that if the thing worked as it logically would in those things, it resulted from a conference between Ballantine, Stanton, and myself. I think Stanton was in the Department at that time, but a telegram of that kind would have been of general discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would have called a conference on Gauss' message, and a reply would come out of that conference?

Mr. VINCENT. And somebody would have assumed the duty of drafting the telegram, and it quite probably would have been me. I don't think it would have been Ballantine, because he did not do much drafting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell the committee what part, if any, you had in the drafting or preparation or submission of the message under date of July 14, 1944, the text of which appears on page 560 of the State Department white paper?

Mr. VINCENT. Have we got the white book?

Mr. SOURWINE. Have we the white paper here? I will defer that question until we get it here. I am sorry I asked it without the volume. I thought we had one here.

Did you have anything to do with the preparation or transmission of a message to Chungking on or about July 25, 1944, quoting or paraphrasing Amerasia magazine?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of any such telegram. I could not say; as being in the Far Eastern Office at that time. If such a telegram existed, I did not have a part in drafting it, but you ring no bell in my memory there.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no memory of preparing it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no memory of approving it or of having seen it?

Mr. VINCENT. None at all. But I cannot say that such a telegram did not go out.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wish you would try to search your memory on that point. We will ask you about it again later. It is possible that if you think about it something might come back to you about it.

Mr. SURREY. What is the date, again?

Mr. SOURWINE. July 25, 1944.

Mr. SURREY. On Amerasia?

Mr. SOURWINE. A message paraphrasing or quoting from Amerasia. If there is anything you can do to refresh your memory on that, we would like to have you do it.

Senator O'CONOR. Before going off that point, and returning again to the consideration of the part played by the several individuals, and specifically on the return journey on the plane, either in connection with the preparation of the Seattle speech or the prospective



report or anything of that kind, what part did Professor Lattimore take in it?

Mr. VINCENT. I am speaking now without exact memory of the thing. Professor Lattimore probably gave him information about central Asia, where he had taken notes. We had visited Tashkent and other places in central Asia. He probably gave him the benefit of the notes he had taken in Siberia. I had taken none there.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you say "he," you mean Professor Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That he gave to Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I have no exact memory or knowledge of it, but that would be my recollection of how the thing came together. It is a speech which I haven't read in a long time, but it had a great deal of emphasis on the commercial relations between the Pacific area, China, Siberia, and others, and our own west coast. It was a speech given in Seattle, and it was given with that general idea in mind, of envisaging the great opening up of trade relations across the Pacific. It was a political speech, I should say, though it didn't take up politics.

Senator O'CONOR. Are we to understand that much of the factual information or the detailed information upon which the speech was based was furnished by Professor Lattimore from the notes that he had made?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say, Senator, that the Vice President, himself, so far as Siberia was concerned, supplied most of his own information, because he had also taken very copious notes on agricultural development, on the whole industrial development of Siberia. He was very industrious in taking those notes. I had taken none. Therefore, I am assuming he did most of his own work but was assisted in that part of it by Lattimore and Hazard, who were people who did take notes on the trip.

Mr. SOURWINE. Apart from the Vice President's notes, are you clear that there had been a substantial quantity of notes taken by Professor Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified earlier that Professor Lattimore didn't go with us on many of these missions. He went to educational places, museums, when we would take off elsewhere. I would say the major portion—

Mr. SOURWINE. In those instances, though, when he went alone, I have no doubt that on the return his information that he had gathered on his exclusive mission, so to speak, was accepted; because that is what he went for.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I interrupted you in what you started to say.

Mr. VINCENT. I started to say that I omitted Mr. Hazard, too, because Mr. Hazard spoke in Russian, too, and he was at Mr. Wallace's side on the Siberian trip, and it was a matter of all of us getting together and trying to throw together a speech. My contribution was what I could recall of trade relations with China. It was not one taking up policy, had nothing to do with these other matters we have just gone into, but the possible trade relations between the west coast and Asia.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have been asked to inquire: What was the date of that message to Ambassador Gauss, the "President and I" message?



Mr. VINCENT. I thought you gave the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Hull's message to Gauss said, "The President and I."

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection. But I thought you gave the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. No; I didn't give the date. And do you know just what the date was? You said the fall of 1944.

Mr. VINCENT. That is as near as I can identify it. And Mr. Gauss himself retired around the 1st of November, so it couldn't have been later than that. And I was out of the Department on leave during most of that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't think it was in the summer?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think it was in the summer. I would identify it as best I could as in September, but I am not sure, and I don't know where I could check to find out.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you know about a struggle over policy within the State Department on the question of whether there should be a hard peace or a soft peace with Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. That brings up presumably testimony by Mr. Dooman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, my question was only: What do you know? The question doesn't necessarily bring up any testimony by anybody.

Mr. VINCENT. Then I would say that in my position at that time, as chief of the China office, I had no direct knowledge of a struggle going on in the State Department over a hard peace or a soft peace with Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. You played no part in any difference of opinion over that matter of policy?

Mr. VINCENT. Not over that matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you an advocate of a hard peace, so-called, with Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I would probably have been called an advocate of a firm peace with Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. I am sorry. I didn't mean to be at all harsh a moment ago.

Mr. VINCENT. My advocacy was not one that would be heard in any committee meetings or anything else.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sure the committee would be glad to have you volunteer any comments you want to make with regard to Mr. Dooman's testimony. I didn't mean to foreclose you on that.

Mr. VINCENT. This morning I think I testified with regard to my relations with Mr. Dooman that I had nothing to do with getting him out of the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. I only jumped a little bit when you said that that brings up the Dooman testimony.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. Well, I have traced that to Dooman in my own mind and in recollection of his testimony, but I have no exact recollection of what Dooman said about a hard peace or a soft peace. I do remember it was discussed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall what he said a "hard peace" means?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that your advocacy of a firm peace was in line with what he called a hard peace? Or did you mean to make a distinction between hard peace and firm peace?

Mr. VINCENT. I probably meant to make a distinction between a hard peace, which some people wanted for Japan—I have even heard the statement used, and I don't recall where it was, at the end of the war, and as a matter of fact, feeling was running very high, that the thing to do was to "let Japan stew in its own juice," after the war was over. That seemed to me a very short-sighted view.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were the principal points in the firm peace that you would like to have seen, that you wanted?

Mr. VINCENT. Disarmament of Japan; breaking up of the large cartels, called the Zaibatsu, would be another one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, now, this Zaibatsu, is that a word that is translated "large cartels," or is it more broad and more inclusive?

Mr. VINCENT. It is more inclusive. It is a matter of the interrelation, however, of the large families, such as the Mitsubishi, the Mitsui, and so on. I am not, I may say, an expert on all of the internal matters in Japan, because I have never lived there in my life.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you spoke of the breaking up of that class, did you mean to include only the breaking up of the large families, such as the Mitsubishi, or did you mean the manufacturing and mercantile class, the business class generally?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not mean to include those. I meant the large families, which it seemed to us had almost a virtual monopoly of a certain type of Japanese economic activity; to what extent they were also the controlling element in manufacturing in Japan, I really don't know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in favor of the breaking up, removing from power or authority, of all those having anything to do with controlling large business interests, banks, and industrial concerns in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you oppose it?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not in a position to oppose it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You took no position on that point?

Mr. VINCENT. Because those were all matters that took place before I came into it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you favored breaking up the Zaibatsu. In favoring that, you said that you did not favor breaking up all these groups

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, when you vocally espoused the breaking up of the Zaibatsu, did you make the distinction that you didn't include all these groups in it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; to use a word Mr. Dooman used, I certainly was not in favor of an atomization of Japanese industry.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you favor the deposing of the Emperor?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir. Let me continue, there. I expressed it that, as one who had considerable feeling about the war with Japan, I would have hoped, as I say, that the Japanese might have established a republican form of government. But in a speech I made and in other things, I was not in favor of deposing the Emperor against the wishes of the Japanese and trying him as a war criminal.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might say for the record that I now have the White Paper, and I ask you if this message, beginning on page 563, is the one that we talked about as Secretary Hull's cable to Gauss.

Mr. VINCENT. As far as I can remember, this is the telegram we have spoken of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, will you turn back to page 560? That is the one I asked you about at the time when I didn't have this volume before us. I will ask the question again.

What part, if any, did you have in the drafting or preparation or submission of that message under date of July 14, 1944, which appears to have been signed by President Roosevelt?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you give me a chance to read this?

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course.

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge and belief, as I say, I either drafted this or had a part in drafting it. It is one of those kinds of messages, where a request would come from the White House or from Wallace, which I do not recall, and I was told to draft the message.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember any more about it than that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any more about it than that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember anything about the documents that that message itself refers to?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't.

Do you mean where it says, "The Vice President handed me your telegram of July 8"?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that. "And in reply to a letter to you of June 27. \* \* \*"

Mr. SOURWINE. Those are the two documents then. You must have had those.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any letters that Mr. Wallace wrote the Generalissimo, which is apparently what this was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You must have had those documents, in order to prepare a draft of this. Correct?

Mr. VINCENT. But as I have told you, I do not recall those two messages. I am not giving that testimony because they have not been found, but—

Mr. SOURWINE. It should be obvious that you must have had them in order to prepare the draft, is that right? That draft couldn't have been prepared without it.

Mr. VINCENT. No, unless Mr. Wallace simply told me that he had received a letter and had replied to Chiang Kai-shek. But that seems wholly improbable.

Mr. SOURWINE. The draftsman would almost have to see the letter. You don't know what happened to them?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. May I have that volume?

Were you ever a member of the board of trustees of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. May I here refresh my memory, if this is going to be about the IPR?

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course. Were you a member of that board in 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Insofar as being a member of the board and being on a letterhead. I do not recall ever attending any board meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what other years you were a member of that board?



Mr. VINCENT. I was never a member of that board except during the year 1945. It may have gone over into 1946, before I was apparently not reselected, but I had nothing to do with my selection on it or nothing to do with my selection off it.

Senator O'CONOR. Were you consulted before your name was added?

Mr. VINCENT. I was consulted. A letter or telegram, as I recall, came, and I asked Mr. Grew if it would be all right to be on that board.

Senator O'CONOR. From whom did the letter come?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall. It may have come from the secretary or from E. C. Carter or a man named Dennett. Dennett, at that time, I think, was secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you contribute to the American Council of the IPR during 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you contribute during any other year?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you given to understand that even though you were a member of the board of trustees you were not expected to contribute?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that I was told that I was not expected to contribute. I did not contribute, and I have no recollection of anybody asking me to contribute.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that you were the only member of the board of trustees of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1945 who was listed as a complimentary member.

Mr. VINCENT. I knew it after reading the testimony here, but I was not aware then. I was aware that I had not contributed anything to it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why it was that you were listed as a complimentary member?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir. I know why I didn't contribute; as I didn't have any funds to contribute.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a nominee on the 1945 IPR ballot for board of trustees?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean to carry over into 1946? I was on in 1945, in the best of my recollection. But you mean a nominee of 1945 to become one for 1946?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, the ballot that elected the trustees for 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. I presumably was. I don't know how they elect their trustees, so you are giving me new information.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't recall having seen the ballot?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know, then, whether it is true that your name was one of six on that ballot under the subheading "Washington" with the instruction "vote for 6"?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. What duties did you perform as a member of the board of trustees?

Mr. VINCENT. None whatsoever, as I recall. Outside of it it was a duty I performed in the American delegation; but I was never called upon to perform any duties as a trustee.

Mr. SOURWINE. What other official positions did you ever hold as a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?



Mr. VINCENT. None that I recall, except on the American delegation to IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. If that is official. Did you ever hear that the Institute of Pacific Relations was controlled by a Communist group or groups?

Mr. VINCENT. Not during that period.

Senator O'CONNOR. Did you see evidences of it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you still affiliated with the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you attend a conference of the IPR in 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you invited to attend that conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a member of the American delegation?

Mr. VINCENT. As a member of the American delegation, and was sent by the State Department, under State Department instructions.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you went as an official representative of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No; but I asked whether I could go, and, as I say, I was not under instruction to go as an official.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you were sent by the State Department. Do you mean the State Department paid your expenses?

Mr. VINCENT. They didn't pay my expenses.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your expenses were not paid by IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how it was that you were invited to attend that conference as a member of the American delegation?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no memory of the background. I was Chief of the China Division in the State Department at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Philip C. Jessup had recommended you for an inclusion in the American delegation to this conference?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember his mentioning it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. No one else told you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any recollection of making a speech in the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I took part in the panel discussions in a rather desultory way, but I made no speeches.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified here with regard to your acquaintanceship with Julian Friedman.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Friedman the question of what material might be given or shown to Andrew Roth?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not have any recollection of any such discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you testified that Mr. Friedman occupied a desk in your office. Was that a large office, physically speaking?

Mr. VINCENT. That was an office about two-thirds the size of this, in old State. He sat down in one corner. I sat down in the other corner. The situation changed as soon as we got new quarters.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were those opposite corners?

Mr. VINCENT. Opposite corners.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or corners along the same wall?

Mr. VINCENT. Along the same line. But that was for a short period, and when I came back from the IPR, which had nothing to do with the IPR, new quarters had been given us in the north side of the building, where I had a private office of my own.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he sit in an outer office there?

Mr. VINCENT. There he sat in another office. I don't know where he sat then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it an office connecting with yours?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where you were both in the same office, was there a door between you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean the door of entry to the room was not between you?

Mr. VINCENT. The door of entry to the room? You came into the room at the side, and I moved forward to my desk, which was up in the corner by the window. He went back across to the rear end of the room, to his desk.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, the door was in the wall opposite the wall along which your two desks were situated?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that a person coming in the door could look in one direction toward your desk and in the other toward his. They were corners opposite the door?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. But as I say, I am not making a factual thing about it. We have gone into the details of that office so much. As I say, a month later we did get a new set-up, where we had to put in partitions, and so forth.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you only occupied office space with Mr. Friedman for 1 month?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have forgotten how long it was, during the fall of '44. But in the spring of '45, we moved out of this big room.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is this 1 month period? One month from what?

Mr. VINCENT. From the return from the IPR conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see.

Mr. VINCENT. It was over about the middle of June.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Friedman occupied office space with you for some time before that?

Mr. VINCENT. In the autumn of '44; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before that, who else occupied space with you?

Mr. VINCENT. No one. Because we didn't have that office. When we moved into that office, that was another move. I moved three times, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you moved into that office, he moved with you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you have anything to do with the appointment of Mr. Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. I had nothing to do with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or his assignment or detail in your office?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you describe for this committee his full duties while he was occupying office space with you?

Mr. VINCENT. I think this morning I went into that. He was a sort of an odd-job man, but he took a particular interest in whatever matters came into the Division on labor problems. He was trying his best to equip himself to go to China as a labor attaché, which he eventually did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was material coming to your desk routed across his?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was material leaving your desk routed across his desk?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. Unless it was a matter that particularly concerned him. But there was no automatic routing to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. It didn't go to him unless you so marked it? Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that that would be correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anything ever come to your desk from his?

Mr. VINCENT. Let me say here that routing of stuff that came into the China Division was not done by me. It was done by an administrative officer, or the assistant chief; I don't recall which.

Mr. SOURWINE. The routing of material that left your desk was done by you, was it?

Mr. VINCENT. The routing from my desk was sent off by me; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Material leaving your desk never went to his unless you so directed?

Mr. VINCENT. Unless I so directed, insofar as I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you normally so direct?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not normally so direct.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that he was not generally familiar with what came on and went off your desk?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say he was generally familiar.

He certainly was not familiar with memoranda and things that I might write to my superiors, because he had no part in that.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was not a party to the routine of your office, and of your job?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was not in any sense your understudy or your deputy or your assistant?

Mr. VINCENT. He was not my deputy or my assistant. He was just a man who had been assigned to my Division, and physically occupied that space, because he were so crowded.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever investigate his loyalty record?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever call for his file, his security file?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. VINCENT. As I said, I think, this morning or yesterday, last I heard of him he was in London. He sent me a notice that he was going to get married, and that is the last I ever heard of him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you hear from him since he got back to the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. Since he got back here? No; I haven't heard from him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't hear that he was out in the University of California?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. I should rephrase that. Do you know he is out in the University of California?

Mr. VINCENT. The first I heard he was back in the United States was when I heard he was going to appear before this committee. The last I had heard from him, he was at the London School of Economics in London.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why was he dropped from the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I had already left Washington. I do not know why he was dropped.

The CHAIRMAN. We will pause there. The committee will recess until tomorrow at 10.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p. m., Friday, January 25, 1952, the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m., Saturday, January 26, 1952.)



# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

SATURDAY, JANUARY 26, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

## EXECUTIVE SESSION

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order. Mr. Vincent, you have been previously sworn. You may proceed.

## TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY WALTER STERLING SURREY, COUNSEL—Resumed

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I am informed that I failed to ask a pertinent question yesterday. I cannot understand how it happened. I am told that in the discussion of the trip with Mr. Wallace, when Mr. Hazard was mentioned, I did not ask you to characterize Mr. Hazard as pro-Communist or anti-Communist, as the case might be, or neutral, if that was the fact. Would you express an opinion on that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would express an opinion, yes, that I have no knowledge at all that he was pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what his views were with regard to communism?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see any evidences during the trip that he was pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, you know I spoke to you the other day about your knowledge of communism. Do you think that at that time you were competent to tell whether a person was pro-Communist or not?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that I would be able to tell if he gave very clear evidence of it. But I would not call myself an expert on being able to detect whether a person was pro-Communist or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Having in mind what I call the "cagey" letter, and you know the letter—

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The way that Mr. Lattimore indicated that certain things were to be done, in other words, you were to do things but you were to make it appear that that just was not your purpose, and that was not what you were doing, do you not think at times it is a little difficult to tell when a person is advocating the Communist line?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly agree with that, sir, that it would be difficult for me to detect.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am getting at. Some of these people that we are going over here, if you had close contact with them, I wonder whether you were able to judge whether or not they were pro-Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. I have said, sir, that I would not call myself a person competent to judge, except on the most obvious evidence, whether a person was pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Back in those days, did you appreciate the fraud and deceit with which communism worked?

Mr. VINCENT. Not in the degree I do now. I was anti-Communist in the sense I did not like Communists, but I certainly was not aware, as I am today, of the manner in which they worked. I certainly was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with their technique of penetration?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I just wondered about your knowledge, what it was with respect to communism in those days.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, what was SWNCC? The initials are S-W-N-C-C; right?

Mr. VINCENT. SWNCC was the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the purpose of that committee?

Mr. VINCENT. The purpose of the committee was to examine various and sundry problems that came up that cut across the lines of State, War, and Navy at that time, to formulate papers to go for general approval by the three Secretaries.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a high level policy committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I would call it so; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your connection with SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. My connection with SWNCC began at the end of August 1945, when I assumed the chairmanship for the first time, on September 1, of the FE, what we called Far East subcommittee of SWNCC.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had not been represented at all, or a member, or an attendant, at the committee meetings before that time?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have no recollection of having attended a meeting before that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Subsequent to that time, were you ever represented on SWNCC by anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of being represented, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Julian Friedman ever represent you on SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of, sir.

Mr. SURREY. Do you mean SWNCC or the subcommittee of SWNCC?

Senator FERGUSON. What does the witness mean, that is more important.

Mr. VINCENT. I think Mr. Sourwine is always speaking, with reference to me, as being a member or represented on the Far East Subcommittee. But I was never a member of the top level SWNCC. That was composed of the Assistant Secretaries of State, War and Navy.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never attended a meeting of that?

Mr. VINCENT. I attended meetings of that from time to time, when invited, after I became the chairman of the Far East Subcommittee.

Mr. SOURWINE. But not before that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Not before that time to my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Either on SWNCC itself or on the Far East Subcommittee, were you ever represented by anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. Sir?

Mr. SOURWINE. Either on SWNCC itself or the Far East Subcommittee, were you ever represented by anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. By whom were you represented?

Mr. VINCENT. Very shortly after I became chairman, my duties elsewhere became so pressing that at one time or another Penfield, who was my deputy, represented me; also Mr. Hugh Borton.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you spell Penfield, one "n" or two?

Mr. VINCENT. P-e-n-f-i-e-l-d.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember his first name?

Mr. VINCENT. James K. Penfield. I think that at other times Mr. Hugh Borton, the Chief of the Japan Division, would represent me. There may have been others, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would Mr. Friedman have been one of those others at any time?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, that Mr. Friedman has ever been a representative of me on the F. E. SWNCC, or attended the SWNCC meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him authority to do so, or to represent himself, at either one of those organizations' meetings, as representing you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever report to you concerning what went on at meetings of the Far East Area Subcommittee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. I think there that you are confusing two things unintentionally. It is that there was an area committee which was not, to my knowledge, a committee of SWNCC. It was an area committee which had been formed on a different basis in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was that a committee of?

Mr. VINCENT. What?

Mr. SOURWINE. What was it a committee of?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a committee of representatives, also, who gathered, I think, from other departments. But it was mostly State people who came from different divisions to discuss area problems that cut across divisional and office lines.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it also a high level policy committee?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my recollection; it wasn't. I didn't attend it more than once or twice. That doesn't keep it from being high level.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the difference?

Mr. VINCENT. Of the two?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I must say that my memory on just exactly what the area committee did other than just discuss interdivisional problems, I don't know what its origin was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say it was an interdepartmental committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether any other departmental—I mean, outside of the departments. It may have been intra.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you sure that it had nothing to do with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection was that it was not related to it.

Mr. SOURWINE. What became of the recommendations, if any, of the area committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I suppose that they were sent to the chiefs of whatever divisions or offices were interested in the particular problem discussed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see any such recommendations?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the recommendations of the area committee. I am speaking of the area committee now.

Mr. SOURWINE. You brought this subject up when I was discussing Julian Friedman and asked about him. Am I to understand that you want the committee to understand that Mr. Friedman represented you on the area committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say that he represented me on the area committee. I think my former testimony was that my recollection had been that he attended at the area committee meetings while he was still with the Division of Labor or the Labor Division of the State Department, and that he continued to attend them after he was assigned to the Far Eastern Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say that he did not attend in your stead, or as your deputy?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be my statement, sir. I don't ever recall instructing him to attend them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Friedman ever report to you concerning what went on at meetings of the area committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that he probably did, but I have no recollection of his reports on those meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Orally, or in writing?

Mr. VINCENT. Orally, as far as I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give to another person or persons information that Mr. Friedman had given you about what took place in those meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I did not reveal information that took place in those meetings. I make that as a general statement because I just testified that I do not recall the information.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was not anything in that question about revealing it outside, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. No.



Mr. SOURWINE. The question simply was did you ever give to any other person or persons information which Mr. Friedman had given you about what took place in meetings of that committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought the implication was the other. But I would certainly, if I thought it was important enough, discussed it with Mr. Grew or Mr. Ballantine, who were my chiefs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Again you are in the realm of speculation.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no specific memory as to what happened in regards to the discussions of this area committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether you discussed it with any other person, or, if so, with whom?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I may add there that my recollection is that Mr. Stanton, who was also a person of my same rank, attended those area meetings far more often than I did, as a man to speak for China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give information about the Far East Subcommittee of the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee to The Nation, or representatives of that publication?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give to The Nation, or representatives of that publication, information about the so-called area committee?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the phrase Far East Area Subcommittee of SWNCC a misnomer?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection would be that the name of the committee was the Far East Subcommittee of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee.

Senator FERGUSON. The way that Mr. Sourwine put it would not mislead anyone? It would be the same thing?

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, if I may interpose before the witness answers, it might mislead someone if there was a Far East area subcommittee somewhere else, and I understand there was.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think it was called the subcommittee. It was the Far East Area Committee. But there I am speaking only from memory. What the exact title was I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. But the Far East Area Committee had nothing to do with SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Far East Area Subcommittee was the one which you became the active head of on the 1st of September?

Mr. VINCENT. I became the ex officio head of it.

Senator FERGUSON. It is clear now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give information about either of the two committees we are discussing, the Far East Subcommittee of SWNCC or the Far East Area Committee, to the New Republic?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To PM?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To Amerasia?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear reports that information from SWNCC or the Far East Subcommittee thereof was leaking out?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't hear it at the time. I have since seen from testimony here in the hearing room, that it did leak out.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not hear about it at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I have no recollection of hearing about it at the time. But my testimony is that I do now know that Mr. Dooman has testified that it did leak out.

Mr. SOURWINE. But knowing nothing about it at the time, you did nothing about it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I may express my disappointment that Mr. Dooman didn't come to me at that time, according to his testimony, and say something to me about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Is the first that you ever heard of that in the testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I can recall, sir, I never heard of any accusation that it was leaking.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think you would recall an important matter like that?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I would; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you could say that was the first, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give or arrange a luncheon for members of the IPR at the Blair Lee House?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall arranging any luncheon. I don't recall it; no. I don't recall ever giving a luncheon at the Blair Lee House, but I may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember discussing such a luncheon with Mr. Raymond Dennett, secretary of IPR, in January 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. About January 1945, which would have been before or after the IPR conference at Hot Springs. The Hot Springs conference took place—I am trying to remember whether—

Mr. SOURWINE. I give you that date to refresh your memory. The question is whether you ever discussed such a luncheon with Mr. Dennett.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of discussing it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember receiving a letter from him under date of December 19, 1944, with regard to that matter?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not remember receiving it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was such a luncheon actually held?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to recall the two or three occasions that I was in the Blair Lee House. I am coming to this because I do believe a luncheon was held in the Blair Lee House. Whether I gave the luncheon or not, and who was present, I am trying to recall—whether it was specifically a luncheon for IPR people or whether it was a luncheon at which there were IPR people. There was a luncheon or dinner about the same time, along at that time, for the Vice President of the Philippines. I can recall that one.

I can't testify with any clarity whether I believed that a luncheon was held there and whether it was specifically to entertain IPR people or not. I can't say.

Mr. SOURWINE. You recall no further details?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall no details, except that there was a luncheon at the Blair Lee House in which I participated. Whether I gave it or not, whether I got the permission of the State Department to use the Blair Lee House, I don't recall.

Anything given in the Blair Lee House was always an arrangement by the State Department, and it was given under the State Department auspices and was paid for by the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that if there was such a luncheon or dinner, the most that could be said on your participation would be that you arranged it? You would not have given it, really, because the State Department would have been giving it?

Mr. VINCENT. The State Department. But somebody had to be host; but I don't recall being host. I may have arranged it, but I don't think I was host.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, sir, in 1945 express the view that Chiang Kai-shek must be gotten rid of?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you concur in that view?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever informed that you were being investigated or had been investigated by the State Department Security Division or security officers with respect to your connection with the Amerasia case?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I was never informed that I was being investigated by them in connection with the Amerasia case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether, in fact, you were so investigated?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, as a matter of fact, whether I ever was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever told that you were suspected of responsibility for leaks in the State Department in connection with the Amerasia case?

Mr. VINCENT. No one ever told me that I was suspected of being responsible for them; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That includes down to the present time; does it?

Mr. VINCENT. I seem to have read somewhere that my name had been mentioned in connection with the possible leaks of the Amerasia case, but nobody told me at the time and nobody told me directly since.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "read it," do you mean in the newspaper?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether I read it in the newspapers or in hearings of the committee, or one place or the other, I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it would be one of those two places?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see Andrew Roth in your suite of offices at the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I think he was in there; yes, sir. I don't know when, but some time.

Mr. SOURWIN. How often?

Mr. VINCENT. Not often. As a matter of fact, I don't even recall the instances when I saw him. But I know that I have seen Andrew Roth in the State Department and in the Far Eastern Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. More than once?

Mr. VINCENT. Probably more than once.

Mr. SOURWINE. More than twice?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't think so. I mean, I would say several times, but my testimony would be—



Senator FERGUSON. What was his position when he was in the office?

Mr. VINCENT. I think he was a young naval officer at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. What duties would bring him into that office?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall what brought him in. I think he was a friend of Friedman's.

Senator FERGUSON. If he was a young naval officer, had he any duties in the Navy that would bring him in there for information?

Mr. VINCENT. He had no duties in connection with my Far Eastern Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Friedman introduce him to you?

Mr. VINCENT. He did; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your office?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, in my direct office or in some office of his where I ran into him.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was this office?

Mr. VINCENT. In the old State Building, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Roth ever visit you in China?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Miss Rose Yardumian, of the Institute of Pacific Relations, ever arrange an appointment with you for Mr. Raymond Dennett, of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no distinct recollection of her arranging it, but I had meetings with Mr. Ray Dennett, of IPR, and I believe that Miss Yardumian was the person who arranged those, because she was in charge of some office of the secretaries here in Washington, over on Madison Place.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether she arranged an appointment for Mr. Dennett with you within the week immediately following February 5, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no distinct recollection of that. That might have been the time, but, as I say, you pin it down to that point and I don't recall whether I saw Mr. Dennett through arrangements with her at that time or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Miss Yardumian other than as a voice over the telephone?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; because I think she was down at the IPR conference in Hot Springs. I think I have seen her. I don't think I would recognize her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you meet her at any other time?

Mr. VINCENT. I think there was a meeting up in the American headquarters of the IPR when she was secretary there, and I probably met her there.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would have been after the Hot Springs conference?

Mr. VINCENT. It may have been before or it may have been after. I believe there was a preparatory meeting of the American delegation, of which she probably acted as secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you meet her after the Hot Springs conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall meeting her after the Hot Springs conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not meet her socially?



Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall meeting her socially.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever an officer of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I was a trustee during the year 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were then a State employee?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever get consent to be a trustee?

Mr. VINCENT. I took the matter up with Mr. Grew, yes, sir, who was then my chief, and he said it was agreeable with him.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the IPR as far as you knew?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; or at any time.

Mr. VINCENT. It was a research organization in which there was a tremendous number of academic people, and was not connected with the Far East, as far as I knew. I had no great familiarity with it.

Senator FERGUSON. You were trustee?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I never attended a trustees' meeting, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never attended a trustees' meeting?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What were they trying to do; just get names?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be my assumption. General Marshall was a trustee at one time. Henry Grady was a trustee.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate, as being a trustee, that you had something to do with the policy.

Mr. VINCENT. It would indicate it, but I didn't; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you know how many trustees they had on the basis of your connection, that like you were just figureheads, letterheads of it? Letterheads would be better than figureheads.

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I don't think I can say how many they had on that basis. I would have to see a list of them.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you think George Marshall was one?

Mr. VINCENT. I would think George Marshall never took any part at all in the policy of the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought it was a research agency; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Doing research in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Doing research in the Pacific area and handling publications.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think it had an influence?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought it had an influence in the matter of investigating into the problems of the Far East; yes. Its publications came out and people read them.

Senator FERGUSON. You think it is well now for a man to serve as a trustee as a letterhead?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not; no sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You would say now, if you were asked, you would not go on?

Mr. VINCENT. If I were asked, I would say I would not go on as a trustee of the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. Because it might leave a wrong impression that the State Department was interested in the particular policies that they were carrying out; is that not right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Gen. George Marshall when he was a trustee?

Mr. VINCENT. He was a trustee in 1949, I notice. That would have been while he was Secretary of State.

Senator FERGUSON. He would have been Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. When did George Marshall become Secretary? No; he was not. He had ceased to be Secretary of State at the beginning of 1949. He retired.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, he is an ex-Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; he had retired. He was head of the Red Cross.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But when you were trustee, you were then on the desk for the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it would give prestige to a publication to read that one of the trustees for that publication was a member of the State Department desk of the Far East, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; just as it gave prestige—I mean, Dr. Hornbeck, who had been my predecessor, had been a trustee. Henry Luce was a trustee at the same time I was. Henry Grady was a trustee.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think, looking back as an officer in the State Department, that communism would want to penetrate the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I would assume that, with the objectives of communism, they would try to penetrate most anything they could, and that the IPR would be one of the organizations they might try to penetrate.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know a more fertile field for penetration than the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I wouldn't want to put the comparison on that there might be more fertile fields. It would be a fertile field.

Senator FERGUSON. What would be a more fertile field? Would there be any publications of the State Department that would be more fertile than the IPR's?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't get that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any publications of the State Department that would be more fertile than the IPR publications?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know of any State Department publications.

Senator FERGUSON. Do they not have publications? They are spending thousands of dollars every year on publications.

Mr. VINCENT. You mean the bulletin from the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I should say that if Communists could infiltrate and influence the publications of the State Department, that would be more effective.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that would be more effective than the IPR books?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you think that the IPR would probably come next?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I would say if the Communists could infiltrate the Luce publications, it would be more influential than infiltrating the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean by that Life and Time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And Fortune?

MR. VINCENT. Yes. They are far more widely read. I find it difficult to make these comparisons.

MR. SOURWINE. Life, Time, and Fortune never have been regarded as the expression of the views and opinions and knowledge of experts on the Far East, have they?

MR. VINCENT. We are limiting ourselves to the Far East?

SENATOR FERGUSON. Yes.

MR. VINCENT. If we limit ourselves to the Far East, the answer to the question would be "Yes." I know of nothing that limited itself to the Far East.

MR. SOURWINE. Life and Time and Fortune have never been considered technical publications in any field, have they?

MR. VINCENT. No.

MR. SOURWINE. And many of the publications of the IPR were so considered, were they not, by you and others in the State Department, as authoritative, expert publications in the field?

MR. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

SENATOR FERGUSON. And you would not say that you and George Marshall would go on those as letterhead trustees, on Life and Time and Fortune?

MR. VINCENT. No, sir.

SENATOR FERGUSON. And they were not considered as expert opinions?

MR. VINCENT. No, sir.

SENATOR FERGUSON. But this IPR was considered so, was it not?

MR. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Did it have an influence in the State Department?

MR. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge. Obviously, people read the articles that were in there, and if there were facts or opinions in there—

MR. SOURWINE. If the chairman will permit, that is a question which calls for such a broad conclusion; if I might ask one or two questions sort of underlying that, it would be better.

You have just stated that you read Red Star Over Asia by Mr. Snow.

MR. VINCENT. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. And at the time you believed it to be a factual and objective treatment of the subject?

MR. VINCENT. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. And you read Mr. Lattimore's books, or some of them?

MR. VINCENT. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. And you considered them highly expert?

SENATOR FERGUSON. I do not think you answered that last question. I think you mumbled the answer.

MR. VINCENT. We were making a distinction between inner-Asian frontiers of China, which I did think was an expert piece of factual work.

MR. SOURWINE. I believe you testified, did you not, that you would give great weight to any views that Mr. Lattimore expressed about the Far East?

MR. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not willing to say that he was the outstanding expert outside of that one area, but you said in the entire Far East you would give great weight to his views?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact, you thought so much of him that you wanted to hire him, but in the context of an expert of these inner-Asian frontiers.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, these publications of the IPR were then, were they not, considered as the opinions of experts on the field?

Mr. VINCENT. And they were, as I say.

Mr. SOURWINE. And they were rather widely read by people who were in positions of authority dealing with those matters? Now on the other hand, you have not read, although you considered communism one of the important problems in the east, you had not read any of the basic Communist documents, so that your ideas about communism and its influence and its objectives, so far as you got them from books, were gathered at least in part from IPR publications? Is that not correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they widely read in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I couldn't say whether they were widely read. It was generally read, I suppose, in the far-eastern office when there was an article that was of particular interest to us.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, they covered just the Far East, did they not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of a more influential publication than the IPR is on the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it aimed to influence public opinion as well as State Department opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that any magazine published, of that kind, was aimed to influence the readers, and the readers were the public.

Senator FERGUSON. And the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. And the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think they would have wasted all their efforts just on the public, Joe Doaks, reading it? They, in fact, distributed them free to you people, did they not, in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether a copy came to us free or whether it was subscribed to—

Senator FERGUSON. Well, either one. But do you not think that all of these publications on the Far East came to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I am quite sure they did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and they would be distributed among the members of the Far East Division. Is that not correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. This was not just to influence the opinion of Joe Doaks in Detroit?



MR. VINCENT. Well, I would not say that they particularly slanted themselves toward the State Department. But they certainly would have figured that the State Department would have read their publications.

Senator FERGUSON. And be influenced by them. That was part of the policy, was it not?

MR. VINCENT. Well, the policy of any publication is to influence its readers. I can't say for IPR whether it aimed particularly and especially at influencing the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not true that one of the things that made you feel that Owen Lattimore was an expert on certain parts of the Far East was what he said in publications of the IPR?

MR. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact, you got more knowledge from those publications than any other way about Mr. Owen Lattimore?

MR. VINCENT. During the period that Owen Lattimore was editor of the Pacific Relations, I don't recall having a great deal of contact with the magazine itself. I was speaking of the period when I was back here, and at that time when I knew him—well, I had hardly known him intimately before, but when I knew him here on an official basis as head of OWI he was at that time not editor.

MR. SOURWINE. You mean of Pacific Affairs?

MR. VINCENT. Pacific Affairs.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not get your knowledge about his expertness in the Far East from the OWI work, did you?

MR. VINCENT. No, sir; I got it partially from that, in conversations with him, when we were discussing far-eastern policy as the OWI was supposed to carry it out.

Senator FERGUSON. And the reading of these books, is that not right?

MR. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever come to the conclusion that Frederick Vanderbilt Field knew anything about the Far East?

MR. VINCENT. No, sir; I never had any conversation with Frederick Vanderbilt Field about the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever read any publication in the IPR written by Field?

MR. VINCENT. I have no recollection of ever having read an article by Field in the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know the IPR was using aliases to write articles?

MR. VINCENT. I never knew that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you believe that the people writing those articles were the real people that signed them?

MR. VINCENT. If I read an article signed by somebody, I assumed so, unless it was an obvious pseudonym. I was not, I may say, a regular reader of Pacific Affairs at the time. I am just saying not as a factual statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but these books came out. Is that not true?

MR. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you say now about a publication like the IPR writing either articles or books under fictitious names?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't like it in the IPR or in any magazine, to have fictitious names.

Senator FERGUSON. Clearly fictitious. If they were marked Mr. X, or something like that.

Mr. VINCENT. I wasn't thinking of Mr. X. You mean clearly fictitious to mislead the reader?

Senator FERGUSON. No; I mean clearly fictitious not to mislead the reader. Say Mr. X writes this. You would think that they should not use another name indicating another writer was writing it.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say they certainly should not.

Senator FERGUSON. Or a fictitious name.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were any of these names out of the "cagey" letter? For instance, the "Asiaticus." Was that a fictitious name?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that it was fictitious.

Senator FERGUSON. Were the other two fictitious?

Mr. VINCENT. I have forgotten the other names.

Senator FERGUSON. One was Chi.

Mr. VINCENT. No; they were not fictitious names.

Senator FERGUSON. What is Chi now?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know. I have had no contact with Dr. Chi since I was in Chungking. I haven't seen him in this country.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what he is now, what his position is?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Has he any position with the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at Yalta?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever write a memorandum about the Yalta Conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; not before the Yalta Conference. Are you making your question clear? Did I write a memorandum about the Yalta Conference?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. That is the question. I asked that after you had testified that you were not at Yalta.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us about that memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. May I read these notes?

Mr. SOURWINE. I would rather have you answer the question.

Mr. VINCENT. You say did I ever write a memorandum. I am now going to describe the memorandum I wrote. I made no contribution to Yalta. I did not know the conference was going on until after it was over, and I knew nothing about the contents of the agreement on China until after several months, I should say, in June 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me see, you were then on the Far East desk?

Mr. VINCENT. I was Chief of the China Division, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, of the Far East Office.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And was there anybody higher except the Secretary of State? Who was your next one?

Mr. VINCENT. The Deputy Director for the Far East Office, and after him the Director.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was that?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time in 1944 it would have been Ballantine as Director of the Far Eastern Office, and Stanton was Deputy Director.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was Deputy Director?

Mr. VINCENT. Stanton.

Senator FERGUSON. He was over you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; he was over me.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were never consulted or knew that they were going to deal with the China situation at Yalta?

Mr. VINCENT. Never, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for not being consulted?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I would say the secrecy with which the whole Yalta Conference was conducted.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Ballantine considered a Far Eastern expert?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had he served as much as you had in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. More, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He had served more?

Mr. VINCENT. He was an older man.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Stanton an expert in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know whether either one of those were consulted?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know that they were consulted. But I don't believe they were, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn about the Yalta agreements?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, in June or just before the Potsdam conference.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you get knowledge of it?

Mr. VINCENT. Just before we went to Potsdam, I have forgotten now who told me, we were told before we went to Potsdam about the Yalta Agreement. I was on the delegation to Potsdam, with Mr. Byrnes.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know who told you about the Yalta agreements?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I can't recall. It may have been someone in the delegation. It may have been, as I say, Mr. Bohlen, Charles Bohlen. It may have been someone else.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you then learn about what we had done, as far as Yalta was concerned, about China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. And it was my first knowledge of it, and it came to me as a great shock.

Senator FERGUSON. It was a shock?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you feel that Yalta was a mistake?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I considered that the word "shock" indicated a mistake rather than you were delighted. It was a shock rather than being delighted?

Mr. VINCENT. Without being there, I don't know what all of the considerations were that caused them to have Yalta. But just seeing the bare agreement was a shock to me.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore you thought it was a grave mistake?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I didn't pretend to know what my superiors had in their minds in reaching that conclusion, whether it was a good bargain or a bad bargain.

Senator FERGUSON. No; but to you it was a shock and a mistake; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

May I go on? I am getting to this memorandum, if that is all right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead. I am hopeful we can get along and get through by noon.

Mr. VINCENT. This is just this page.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good, sir.

Mr. VINCENT (reading). Some factual papers were prepared in the Far East Area Committee for use at Potsdam. They were not, to my knowledge, used. As far as I know, any discussions of far eastern policy at Potsdam were purely incidental to the main consideration of matters concerning Europe.

While at Potsdam, we received the State Department report on the conversation which Dr. T. V. Soong had had just prior to Potsdam with Stalin and Molotov, in regard to the Sino-Soviet treaty.

I addressed several memoranda to Mr. Dunn, now American Ambassador in Italy, and at that time Assistant Secretary of State, who was assisting Mr. Byrnes at Potsdam and the President. I expressed my concern over the character of the discussions that had taken place at Moscow. The Yalta Agreement, insofar as it concerned China, had shocked me. I considered it retrogressive and a threat to our interests and security in the Far East.

I felt that it was inconsistent with China's sovereignty. However, it was an agreement between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin and, therefore, from my point of view, a part of policy.

But I was alarmed to find that the Russians were going even beyond the agreement in their demands. I suggested that Soong be asked to come to Moscow where he could have our support in talking with Stalin. The suggestion was not acted upon, I suppose for the reason that it was not on the agenda of the Potsdam Conference, and they were busy with other matters.

That is the statement.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that you thought the Yalta Agreement should be changed, and you might do something about it at Potsdam?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I considered that the Russians were overreaching themselves, even considering that the Yalta Agreement, in my mind, was no contribution to peace and security in the Far East, but even so within the framework of the Yalta Agreement, from the reports that we got. The Russian demands and requests of Soong, to my mind, went beyond even Yalta.



Mr. SOURWINE. Were you present at any conference or conferences between Gen. Patrick Hurley and General Wedemeyer in 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I had a conference with General Wedemeyer in 1945, and in which General Hurley was not present. I do not recall any conference between Hurley and Wedemeyer and myself, but it is probably simply a faulty memory because it could have easily happened during that time.

They were both home, back from China, in March and April 1945, and it would have been most natural if the three of us had met. I don't recall the occasion. The one I recall, sir, is the conversation with General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you prepare a memorandum with respect to a conference with General Hurley and General Wedemeyer, or with General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I prepared a memorandum with respect to a conference I had in the Pentagon Building with General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the only memorandum of a conference with General Wedemeyer that you prepared?

Mr. VINCENT. It is the only one that I recall, sir. Are you interested in the conference I had with Wedemeyer? I think I covered it yesterday. Yes, I think we discussed Wedemeyer yesterday, and it has to do—yes, as I testified—it has to do with the matter of the landings on the China coast which never took place.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is any more comprehensive memorandum of that conference in existence than the one you prepared?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you furnish this committee with a copy of the memorandum you prepared?

Mr. VINCENT. It is a part of the State Department documents, and I would have to refer your request to the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a copy of it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss that conference or your memorandum on it with Mr. Andrew Roth?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you furnish him with a copy of your memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who got copies of your memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that the copies, if there were copies, were given to no one. They were kept in the State Department. I may have shown one to Hurley, and no doubt did.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not circulated?

Mr. VINCENT. Not out of the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who in the office would have received copies of it?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Ballantine, Mr. Grew.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Stanton would have received it. Would he receive a copy or not? He would have received it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. If the Secretary was there at the time he would have probably seen it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give any IPR authors access to State Department information?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Specifically did you ever give such access to Andrew Roth?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To Mark Gayn?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To T. A. Bisson?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know anything about a draft of a proposed policy to be followed by the United States in the event Japan surrendered?

Mr. VINCENT. A policy that would have been drafted where, in the State Department?

Mr. SOURWINE. I would rather read the question back, because I cannot testify to where such a thing was drafted, if it existed. I want to find out whether it was drafted, if we can, from you. Do you know, or did you know, anything about a draft of a proposed policy to be followed by the United States in the event Japan surrendered?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I did. It is the SWNCC papers that were drafted and called the Post Surrender Policy for Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you speaking now of a draft that was submitted to and considered by the Policy Committee of the State Department on or about May 24, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I am not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about a draft of a proposed policy to be followed by the United States in the event Japan surrendered, having been submitted to, and considered by, the Policy Committee of the State Department on or about May 24, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge of that, sir. I may add that at that time I had no direct or, as I can recall, indirect relation to policy regarding Japan. I was Chief of the China Office and didn't have any responsibility nor any connection with Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there was such a draft, you might not have known about it?

Mr. VINCENT. I might not have known about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss the question of such a draft, or of any proposed policy with regard to the possible Japanese surrender, with anyone, at any time, between May 24, 1945, and July 29, 1945, approximately a 2 months' period in there?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall discussing it with anybody.

Mr. SOURWINE. And during that time you did not know of any paper or memorandum on the subject of a proposed policy in the event of the surrender of Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I found out about it—I think we may refer there to the Potsdam declaration. I only heard about it after I went to Potsdam, with regard to the terms of surrender which was issued from Potsdam. Prior to going to Potsdam, I had no knowledge of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what view General Marshall took with regard to any proposed policy to be followed by the United States in

the event Japan surrendered, at about this time, that is, late May, early June and July of 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. He was Chief of Staff then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what view Owen Lattimore took?

Mr. VINCENT. On the surrender of Japan, I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss that matter with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first learn that Mr. Lattimore went to see the President about this proposed policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I never knew, to my recollection I never knew, that he went to see the President about the proposed plan.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not read that in our hearings?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with anyone in the IPR the question of a proposed policy to be followed by the United States in the event Japan surrendered?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of discussing it with anyone in the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you present at the Potsdam Conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What agreements with respect to China were made at that Conference?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I know of, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were any secret agreements entered into by or on behalf of the United States at Potsdam?

Mr. VINCENT. With respect to China?

Mr. SOURWINE. Were any secret agreements entered into by or on behalf of the United States at Potsdam?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I know of, but I would not have been in a position to know then because I was there purely——

Mr. SOURWINE. Were any secret agreements entered into concerning China?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I know of, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of a letter by Mr. John M. Patterson, Acting Division Chief of the Department of Public Liaison of the Department of State, addressed to the American-China Policy Association, in which it was stated that no secret agreements concerning China were concluded at the Potsdam Conference?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, I have no recollection of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Letters prepared by the Public Liaison Division would not necessarily be checked with you even though they dealt with the subject under your jurisdiction?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, they would not.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I find out whether your answer includes in the term "agreements" an understanding between governments?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, it does, sir. You mean the previous question there?

Senator FERGUSON. It would include the word "understandings"?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Mr. Theodore White?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.



Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify him, please?

Mr. VINCENT. As a newspaperman, who visited China from time to time, while I was out there as counsel of our Embassy. My recollection is that Theodore White at that time was writing for the Luce publications.

Mr. SOURWINE. What time was this?

Mr. VINCENT. This would be from 1941 until the spring of 1943. He was there after the war broke out, as I recall it, which would be 1942.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him personally?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew him personally.

Mr. SOURWINE. A friend of yours?

Mr. VINCENT. A friend of mine, not a close friend, but a friend of mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he or was he connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall the connection of White with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with him or with anyone else the question of Mr. White's discharge by Mr. Henry Luce?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't think I discussed it with anyone.

Mr. SOURWINE. He never talked with you about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever write to you about it?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no record of his writing to me about it at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you remember that he ever did?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't remember that he ever did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say that he did not?

Mr. VINCENT. Drawing on my memory, I can say that I don't recall that he did, but I can't say that he didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he send any message to you about it through someone else?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any message.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you never discussed his discharge with anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever urge or recommend that T. V. Soong and Foreign Minister Wang Shi-shueh, or either of them, go to Moscow?

Mr. VINCENT. There is a record in the State Department that in the spring of 1945 the matter was discussed with Hurley, who was then in China, that Soong had planned to go to Moscow to discuss matters with Stalin, a matter of an agreement. I just try to draw on my memory, but I have no clear recollection of the incident, nor do I know whether he ever went, nor do I recall any part I had in it other than the telegrams coming in, and a telegram would presumably have gone back to Mr. Hurley who reported Soong's intention, as I recall it, to go.

I don't recall that Soong did go to Moscow until after he found out about the Yalta agreement, which he was told of, it seems to me, sometime in May 1945.

Is that responsive to your question, sir?

Mr. SOURWINE. Partially, sir. Now, how about the question of whether you ever urged or recommended that Soong and Wang Shi-shueh—



Mr. VINCENT. Well, there was a man named Wang Shi-shueh who was, I think, either Acting or Foreign Minister at that time, and he did go to Moscow at the time the Sino-Soviet treaty was discussed.

Mr. SOURWINE. How would you spell that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would spell it W-a-n-g S-h-i-s-h-u-e-h.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it be H-s-u-e-h?

Mr. VINCENT. It could be, because the Chinese words vary. But I think that is the man we have in mind, because I think at that moment he was Foreign Minister of China or Acting Foreign Minister.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is described as Foreign Minister, so that is the man. May we call them Soong and Wang?

Mr. VINCENT. And I have no clear recollection of having urged that Soong and Wang go to Moscow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or recommending them?

Mr. VINCENT. Or recommending them. My only recollection, as I say, is a report from Chungking to the Department that Soong had discussed the matter with Ambassador Hurley, and Hurley reported on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they in fact go to Moscow?

Mr. VINCENT. They did, in fact, go to Moscow in early July to discuss the Sino-Soviet treaty. Whether they went prior to this—

Mr. SOURWINE. After they got to Moscow, were additional demands made upon them by the Russians?

Mr. VINCENT. I have just testified with regard to my attitude toward the Yalta agreements, and it was my impression that the Russians went beyond my interpretation at least of the Yalta agreement in making their demands. Both the length of the leases and the joint agreement on the railways, of what they demanded of half of the port facilities at Dairen, I recall, and the extent of the naval report agreement all seemed to be excessive.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your answer is, then, that the Russians did make additional demands upon Soong and Wang?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be a matter of interpretation.

Senator FERGUSON. That was your interpretation?

Mr. VINCENT. My interpretation; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Chinese Government appeal to Ambassador Hurley to mediate?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall if they did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never learned that they had made that request?

Mr. VINCENT. That they had Hurley to mediate between the Russians and the Chinese?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear that they asked Ambassador Hurley for any assistance at all in connection with their conference?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't recall their asking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of any instructions sent by the Department to Mr. Hurley in that connection?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, now, there are two matters here, Mr. Sourwine: One is when Soong and Wang Shi-shueh went over to Moscow as a result of having been informed of the Yalta agreement, and one of the conditions in the Yalta agreement was that the Russians and the Chinese would negotiate a treaty. My recollection is that prior to that, and even prior to Soong having any knowledge, insofar as I

knew, of the Yalta agreement, there was also a plan in Chungking reported to us in the Department by Ambassador Hurley that they had intentions of going.

If they had any knowledge of the Yalta agreement at that time, I didn't know that they had it, and I had no knowledge of the Yalta agreement.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I was attempting to reach——

Mr. VINCENT. So, my first testimony was with regard to a reported intention of T. V. Soong to go to Moscow at a time when, as I say, I didn't know about the Yalta agreement, and I don't believe he did. I don't think he went to Moscow, but I can't recall. He went to Moscow later when he found out about the Yalta agreement.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I was attempting to reach with my question was this: Whether you knew or were aware of any instructions from the Department to Mr. Hurley in connection with his assistance to the Chinese delegation in their negotiations with Moscow, or in connection with his response to a request that he mediate or assist at that time.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I recall, and I recall it not too distinctly, a telegram from Hurley giving what was a proposed agenda that Soong had proposed to take up with Stalin if he went to Moscow at this time, prior to the knowledge of the Yalta agreement.

I recollect, too, that there was a telegram that went back telling Hurley that we appreciated getting that telegram and the information on it. I don't recall the rest of the telegram. It might have had in the telegram a suggestion by Hurley that he mediate or go along with Soong. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. It might have had that in it?

Mr. VINCENT. It might have had something in it, and the telegram that went back which may have been sent by me or anybody else, may have suggested. I would have to refresh my memory from the State Department, which I would be glad to do. It may have told him that we didn't want him to be in the position of mediator between Russian and Chinese Governments.

Senator FERGUSON. I am wondering whether your telegram did not say that, to tell him to stay out of it.

Mr. VINCENT. I would like to see the telegram before I testify here.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean it may have said either, for all you know, it could have approved his mediation or it could have prohibited it?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection, without referring to it now, would be that it did not approve any mediation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You started out by saying that it might include approval.

Senator FERGUSON. You said it might. Now which did it?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I haven't got the telegram here, and I haven't see it for some time.

Senator FERGUSON. But is that not a very important matter, and would you not remember a thing like that?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection is, and I don't know whether I drafted it or not, that Ambassador Hurley was told that we didn't wish him to mediate between the Russians and the Chinese.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you use the words "it might have been"; do you mean it is theoretically possible, or do you mean there is some likelihood?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I mean this: From the best that I can recall, the attitude in the State Department at that time was not to mediate between the Russians and the Chinese in coming to an agreement. Therefore, it could have been put in a telegram quite easily. I have asked that I would like to refresh my memory with the telegram.

Mr. SOURWINE. A moment ago, when you used the phrase "it might have been", as referring to words of approval of such mediation, were you discussing that as a possibility or as a probability, or as a likelihood, or were you discussing it merely as something which theoretically could have happened, all other considerations aside?

Mr. VINCENT. I was discussing it as something that would have been a logical position to take in the State Department at that time, that it was not desirable to mediate between the Russians and the Chinese.

Mr. SOURWINE. You remember saying that this message in response to Hurley's telegram might have approved his mediation, might have told him to go on with it?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall making that testimony, Mr. Sourwine. If I did, it is incorrect, because I said it approved the idea of discussing the matter with Soong, and expressed appreciation, if I can recall it at all, of getting these five points. But so far as I can recall, it did not approve the idea of mediating.

Mr. SOURWINE. All that concerned me was the semantics problem. We have a record here which is full of your saying "this might have been" or "that might have been." I wanted to find out clearly whether, when you used that phrase, you meant something which in your opinion was likely, something which in your opinion was logical under the circumstances.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what you have meant here when you used that phrase?

Mr. VINCENT. That it was logical?

Mr. SOURWINE. When you say "it might have happened," did you mean that to you it seemed logical under the circumstances?

Mr. VINCENT. That Hurley would have been advised not to mediate.

Mr. SOURWINE. At any time when you used that phrase, you used it to mean something that to you was logical?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And something that you did not know did not occur?

Mr. VINCENT. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see the text of a cable to Ambassador Hurley in August of 1945, signed by Grew, conveying the idea or instruction that Hurley was not to advise, mediate, or otherwise assist in Chinese-Russian negotiations?

Mr. VINCENT. In August 1945? I do not recall any such telegram.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall such a cable at any time prior to August 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I just recalled this cable that we are speaking of here, the exchange of cables which took place in the spring.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that signed by Grew?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't know whether it was signed Grew or not without seeing the telegram, Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Byrnes was Secre-



tary of State at that time, and if Byrnes was there it would have been signed by Byrnes. If Mr. Grew was acting, it would have been signed by Grew.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation or approval of that cable?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I have said that I don't recall the telegram, and therefore I can't say whether I had anything to do with the preparation of it. I just don't recall those circumstances. I do the earlier one, but I don't recall this one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether it was composed by Under Secretary Grew?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would be unable to testify further with regard to it unless we can get the document?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have an opportunity or means for refreshing your memory by access to the document, other than through this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I could ask the State Department if they would let me see the telegram, if you will give me the date of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. All I can ask you about is a cable on or before August of 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. That could easily have been the telegram we have been discussing, if it is on or before August. It could be the one of the spring we have just discussed.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there was one in the spring and there was none later, that is what this committee would like to establish. If there was a telegram in the spring and a reiteration of the policy later in response to a specific request from Hurley, that is what the committee would like to establish.

Have you any thought of what the fact might be in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. My thought would be that when you are speaking of this telegram, we are speaking of the same telegram, just on a knowledge that by the 8th or the 10th of August the Sino-Soviet agreement or treaty had already been signed, or maybe the 15th of August. But the first half of August the Sino-Soviet treaty was signed, and there would be no need for mediation then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your best recollection is that there was only one such cablegram?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that was in the spring of 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you advised about sending that cable?

Mr. VINCENT. The one I have testified to originally?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I knew about that exchange.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you advise against mediation or Hurley having anything to do with it?

Mr. VINCENT. I presumably would have advised against mediation. I have no distinct recollection of whether I advised or not, but I knew it was the policy in the State Department at that time not to interfere in these negotiations.

Senator FERGUSON. Why?



Mr. VINCENT. We thought it was better for the Russians and the Chinese to work out their own arrangement. I had no knowledge at that time——

Senator FERGUSON. You said you were violently opposed to what happened to China. Notwithstanding that, you were against any change?

Mr. VINCENT. At the moment of this telegram, Senator, I had no knowledge of the Yalta agreement. I didn't have any knowledge of the Yalta agreement until June or early July, just before Potsdam. There were presumably other officers in the State Department who did know about the Yalta agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the message in May had nothing to do with the Yalta agreement?

Mr. VINCENT. If it was in May—it would be earlier than that, I think, because I think Soong himself was already advised. This was early in spring, or May.

But to answer your question, it is that the message at that time had nothing to do with the Yalta agreement. It was a plan of Soong's, as I recall it, to go to Moscow to discuss with them, at a time when I was ignorant, and I believe Soong was ignorant, of the existence of the Yalta agreement.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to mediation: would such a question of policy, established at that time, with regard to mediation, necessarily have controlled at a conference subsequent and after it had been made necessary by the Yalta agreement?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think it would, sir. You mean after the Yalta agreement?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. We had ourselves so completely, you might say, laid down a line for China to follow that it would have, to my mind, altered the situation completely.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it did, in fact, control, and that policy was adhered to and persisted in, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Susumu Okano?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess, and convene again at 1 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 11:15 a. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 1 p. m. of the same day.)

#### AFTER RECESS

Senator FERGUSON. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, the last question asked before the recess was whether you knew Susumu Okano, and you replied "No."

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who he is or was?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Susumu Okano is a Japanese Communist leader.

Did you, Mr. Vincent, know that Susumu Okano had been flown from China to Japan after the conclusion of hostilities in the Japanese war?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall having knowledge of that; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you have to do with the preparation or approval of a paper entitled "The United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan"?

Mr. VINCENT. May I refer to these notes?

Mr. SOURWINE. Surely.

Mr. VINCENT. Thank you, sir [reading]:

Mr. Dooman, before this committee in September, discussed the policy entitled "The United States Post Surrender Policy for Japan." He said that this paper was adopted by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on August 29, 1945, but that the paper had been reported reopened prior to its release on the 22d of September by the White House.

Actually, the records show that the paper was reviewed by the Far East Subcommittee of SWNCC, of which Mr. Dooman was chairman, not by SWNCC itself, on August 29, and the paper was not finally adopted by the top-level over-all SWNCC committee until August 31, 1945.

Both Mr. Dooman and I attended this meeting on August 31, although it was Mr. James Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State, who officially represented the State Department.

Mr. Dooman has placed particular significance on the fact that he had retired as chairman of the Far East Committee and had been replaced as chairman by me prior to September 6, when the paper was approved by the President.

His principal charge was that I had primary responsibility for this paper and that certain important changes were made in it following its approval during the last days of his tenure as chairman of the Far East Committee.

In connection with these statements, Mr. Dooman had read into the record several paragraphs taken from this document which he said subsequently were used as the basis of work undertaken to destroy and eliminate the capitalist class in Japan.

When asked by Senator Eastland whether this was the work of John Carter Vincent, Mr. Dooman replied that I was chairman of the Far East Subcommittee at the time, and the implication clearly was that I had instigated the changes in this important document that would pave the way for communism in Japan.

First, I wish to inform the committee that the paragraphs which Mr. Dooman read into the record as changes were not written by me.

Secondly, I am prepared to testify here on the basis of an examination of the record that the language which Mr. Dooman implied had been changed following his resignation as chairman of the subcommittee was not changed, but, in fact, appeared in the document when it was before the subcommittee under his chairmanship on August 29, and again when it was approved at a meeting of SWNCC which he attended on August 31.

Finally, I would like to show that the paragraph read by Mr. Dooman, far from being intended to destroy capitalism in Japan, was an expression of general policy to foster the peaceful and democratic development of Japan's postwar economy.

Here is the language from the document entitled, "United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan," which Mr. Dooman read into the record as changes made in the paper after its adoption in the last days of August 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have that document?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SURREY. We have the document that was released on September 22.

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade \* \* \* To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

"(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for place of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic efforts solely toward peaceful ends; and

"(b) To favor the program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry."

I should like to refer to a photostatic copy of the press release of United States Post Surrender Policy for Japan, dated September 22, 1945. Beginning at the bottom of page 4, under the heading of "Promotion of democratic forces," the first sentence reads:

Encouragement shall be given and favor shown to the development of organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis.

Immediately following this sentence appears the first sentence quoted by Mr. Dooman:

Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade.

Following this sentence there appears another important sentence which Mr. Dooman did not see fit to use in this quotation. I shall quote it here because I believe that the entire substance of the paragraph which he has quoted relates very closely to this sentence. The sentence reads:

Those forms of economic activity, organization and leadership shall be favored that are deemed likely to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the Japanese people, and to make it difficult to command or direct economic activities in support of military ends.

The remainder of the language quoted by Mr. Dooman then follows.

I do not place special significance on the fact that Mr. Dooman did not quote in full from the document, but I think it is important that the committee have the full text. What is of utmost importance for this committee to know is that this very language which Mr. Dooman alleged was changed, in fact appeared in this document as early as mid-August 1945, and remained unchanged when released by the White House September 22, 1945.

I have reviewed the changes made in the document. The changes made in the document subsequent to its approval on August 29 by the subcommittee, chairmaned by Mr. Dooman, were:

1. In the first paragraph headed "Purpose of this document" minor changes were made by the subcommittee after I became chairman, but these changes were made at the request of the SWNCC committee at the meeting at which Mr. Dooman and I were both present, that is the meeting on August 31.

For example, the original document contained the clause, "Following Presidential approval", and the revision made by the committee, of which I was chairman, read: "It has been approved by the President."



In the first document it is not specifically stated that distribution should include General MacArthur in Japan. The revision made by the subcommittee, of which I was chairman, made clear that the document had been distributed to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to appropriate United States departments and agencies for their guidance.

I think that the committee will agree that these modifications in no way changed the basic meaning of the document.

The second modification concerns military training in the Japanese school system. The record shows that the change was offered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at a meeting attended by Mr. Dooman. The change itself merely makes clear that the paragraph refers to career military and naval officers and not to all Japanese who had served in such capacity.

The record also shows that Mr. Dooman attended the meeting at which this change was made.

The next modification concerns the section dealing with "Encouragement of desire for individual liberties and democratic processes."

In the first paragraph an additional sentence was added, which reads as follows:

At the same time it should be made plain to the Japanese that ultranationalistic and militaristic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of religion.

In the second paragraph the words "other United Nations" was changed to read "other democracies."

Mr. Dooman attended the meeting at which these minor changes were made.

The final modification had to do with exports from Japan and according to the minutes of the meeting was intended to strengthen the hands of the occupying authority in the control of exports. The suggestion for this modification had been originally made at a meeting of the subcommittee, but was not acted upon at that time because it was deemed appropriated for this to be taken up at the top SWNCC level.

This change, which was in line with current policy at the time, can hardly be interpreted as seeking to destroy capitalism in Japan.

Without wishing to burden this committee with further analysis of these documents, I would like to point out that the only changes made following its adoption on August 31 at a meeting of SWNCC, attended by Mr. Dooman and me, were very minor modifications in the first paragraph and the modifications in the paragraph on reparations.

I submit again for the consideration of this committee that these changes were important, but they were not changes which carry the implication read into them by Mr. Dooman.

The records prove beyond any question that the language which Mr. Dooman asserted was an example of changes made actually appeared in the document prepared by the subcommittee when he was chairman and were approved by the higher level SWNCC at a meeting which he attended.

Insofar as the document itself is concerned, I should like to emphasize that it was a broad, general document, which in no way spelled out specific measures. General MacArthur himself urged its publication.



In line with a policy of promoting a strong middle class in Japan, our Government then proposed that it be the policy of the Supreme Commander in Japan to suppress the activities of those who in the words of the document "do not direct future Japanese economic efforts solely toward peaceful ends."

I do not believe that anyone familiar with the prewar economic structure of Japan would quarrel with that statement. I think that the results of the program carried out by General MacArthur under this policy statement bear out the wisdom of our initial approach to the problem.

The second policy given General MacArthur in this section was one of breaking up the large family combines and cartels which for so long had dominated Japanese life. It was these groups primarily who had succeeded in making Japan a war-making aggressor in the thirties.

Without the support of these combines the Japanese militarists would not have been able to conquer half of Asia and bring about Pearl Harbor.

The program developed under this second policy was largely implemented by the Japanese themselves, with the approval of General MacArthur. To a degree it paralleled our own antitrust program in this country; in some cases I understand it went further.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, it went a good deal further, did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Than our own antitrust program?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say in its application to Japan it did go further.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want the committee to understand that you think there is a parallel between the program in Japan toward the elimination of the Zaibatsu and our own antitrust program in the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. Not exactly parallel.

Mr. SOURWINE. How much is it paralleled?

Mr. VINCENT. Parallel to the extent of where there was interlocking directorates on banks, shipping companies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Parallel to the extent only, is it not true, that they both dealt with the industrial class, really?

Mr. VINCENT. With industrial combines, I would say.

Mr. SOURWINE. They both dealt with industrial combines, but they did not have the same objective, did they?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And they were not carried out in the same way?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you familiar with our own antitrust laws?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I am not familiar with our antitrust laws, particularly.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you state that they were in effect parallel to our own antitrust program?

Mr. VINCENT. I state just as a layman who understood that the antitrust laws are to prevent large combines from controlling large areas of the banking and industrial life of our country, and my own understanding that that is what the Zaibatsu and Mitsui combines in Japan did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that they put into effect an order that no rice paddies could be owned by one individual of greater than  $2\frac{1}{2}$  acres?

Mr. VINCENT. Of that land program, I know. I am not familiar with the details of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that kind of thing is in compliance with this program?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not think it was in compliance with this. It was not in connection with this program. I have a paper on that here, if you would let me present it, on land reform.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the education of Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. The educational system?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know, as a matter of fact, that we placed in the schools the Communists of Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I have never heard that, sir.

Mr. FERGUSON. You have never heard that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you heard now that the real Communist menace in Japan is in two places, the labor unions and the educational system of Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I had not heard that. I do not deny it, but I have been out of the country for a long time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who had charge of the taking over of the schools and changing of the teachers and so forth?

Mr. VINCENT. Under General MacArthur?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that a State Department function?

Mr. VINCENT. No; it was not. It was a function under General MacArthur.

Senator FERGUSON. Military function?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a function in the educational program of SCAP, was it not?

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you.

Mr. VINCENT. That would be my answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is the author of this document?

Mr. VINCENT. Of this document here?

Mr. FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir. It was virtually in its form there before I ever became a part of SWNCC. It was drawn up in large measure at the time when Mr. Dooman was chairman of the SWNCC.

Senator FERGUSON. Who drew it up? The State Department, the Army, or who?

Mr. VINCENT. It was drawn up by F. E. SWNCC, which means that State, War, and Navy, in the SWNCC committee collaborated in drawing it up.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you consider this a military document?

Mr. VINCENT. I consider it a SWNCC document.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not a Government policy program, and not military?

Mr. VINCENT. It is a Government policy program, coming out of the SWNCC committee, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think military men would be competent to draft such a political document?

Mr. VINCENT. I think we had quite a few military men.

Senator FERGUSON. Many of these men even take pride in the fact that they have never voted in an election. Do you say that men who are not allowed to take any part in our civilian government are competent to lay out a program for the future of the Nation?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall any of their names, Senator, but I do know quite a few competent military men.

Senator FERGUSON. Are they not all barred from taking any part in political activities, and so forth?

Mr. VINCENT. But they were assigned to this committee by the Assistant Secretary of Navy who was the top SWNCC man.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question.

Mr. VINCENT. Aren't they barred from taking any part in political activities?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; by their own regulation.

Mr. VINCENT. Barred, I would not say. I don't know that a military man can't vote. They can vote, I know, but he certainly could not run for political office and would not be expected to take part in political activities in this country.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not that a State Department function to lay out the future of Japan's political life?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the very purpose for which the SWNCC thing was created, to get State, War, and Navy joint action on matters of this kind.

I was not there when SWNCC was created, but that was my impression of the objective of the creating of the SWNCC committee, was for State, Navy, and War to cooperate.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this document intact when you first came in contact with it?

Mr. VINCENT. It was intact when I first came in contact with the exception of a few minor changes which I just said were put in it to make it clearer.

Senator FERGUSON. Who in the State Department was in higher position than you who had control of this document?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Dooman was higher than I was and was chairman of the SWNCC committee at the time this document was drawn up.

Senator FERGUSON. So it was either your responsibility or Dooman's to approve this?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, it would have had to have been approved by the top SWNCC, I have to refer to that, which was made up of the Assistant Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of War, and the Assistant Secretary of Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. They did not make any changes in it, though?

Mr. VINCENT. They made no changes insofar as I know, but I was not in SWNCC in the month in August, and I believe July, when this was being discussed.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in when it was issued?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you feel you were responsible for this document?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say I would have approved that document.



Senator FERGUSON. There is nothing in this that you disapprove of?

Mr. VINCENT. There is nothing in that that I disapprove of.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. May this be offered for the record?

(The document identified by Mr. Vincent, entitled "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," was marked "Exhibit No. 376A" and is as follows:)

[Immediate release, September 22, 1945]

The following is a statement of general initial policy relating to Japan after surrender prepared jointly by the Department of State, the War Department, and the Navy Department and approved by the President on Sept. 6. The document in substance was sent to General MacArthur by radio on Aug. 29 and, after approval by the President, by messenger on Sept. 6. The text follows:

No. 273.

## UNITED STATES INITIAL POST-SURRENDER POLICY FOR JAPAN

### PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT

This document is a statement of general initial policy relating to Japan after surrender. It has been approved by the President and distributed to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to appropriate U. S. departments and agencies for their guidance. It does not deal with all matters relating to the occupation of Japan requiring policy determinations. Such matters as are not included or are not fully covered herein have been or will be dealt with separately.

### PART I—ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES

The ultimated objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, to which policies in the initial period must conform, are:

(a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world.

(b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.

These objectives will be achieved by the following principal means:

(a) Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor outlying islands as may be determined, in accordance with the Cairo Declaration and other agreements to which the United States is or may be a party.

(b) Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political, economic, and social life. Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed.

(c) The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly, speech, and the press. They shall also be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations.

(d) The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity to develop for themselves an economy which will permit the peacetime requirements of the population to be met.

### PART II—ALLIED AUTHORITY

#### 1. MILITARY OCCUPATION

There will be a military occupation of the Japanese home islands to carry into effect the surrender terms and further the achievement of the ultimate objectives stated above. The occupation shall have the character of an operation in behalf of the principal allied powers acting in the interests of the United Nations at war with Japan. For that reason, participation of the forces of



other nations that have taken a leading part in the war against Japan will be welcomed and expected. The occupation forces will be under the command of a Supreme Commander designated by the United States.

Although every effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan which will satisfy the principal Allied powers, in the event of any differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United States will govern.

## 2. RELATIONSHIP TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the Supreme Commander, who will possess all powers necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan.

In view of the present character of Japanese society and the desire of the United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources, the Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives. The Japanese Government will be permitted, under his instructions, to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration. This policy, however, will be subject to the right and duty of the Supreme Commander to require changes in governmental machinery or personnel or to act directly if the Emperor or other Japanese authority does not satisfactorily meet the requirements of the Supreme Commander in effectuating the surrender terms. This policy, moreover, does not commit the Supreme Commander to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority in opposition to evolutionary changes looking toward the attainment of United States objectives. The policy is to use the existing form of Government in Japan, not to support it. Changes in the form of Government initiated by the Japanese people or government in the direction of modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies are to be permitted and favored. In the event that the effectuation of such changes involves the use of force by the Japanese people or government against persons opposed thereto, the Supreme Commander should intervene only where necessary to ensure the security of his forces and the attainment of all other objectives of the occupation.

## 3. PUBLICITY AS TO POLICIES

The Japanese people, and the world at large, shall be kept fully informed of the objectives and policies of the occupation, and of progress made in their fulfillment.

## PART III— POLITICAL

### 1. DISARMAMENT AND DEMILITARIZATION

Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with determination. Every effort shall be made to bring home to the Japanese people the part played by the military and naval leaders, and those who collaborated with them, in bringing about the existing and future distress of the people.

Japan is not to have an army, navy, air force, secret police organization, or any civil aviation. Japan's ground, air, and naval forces shall be disarmed and disbanded and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the General Staff, and all secret police organizations shall be dissolved. Military and naval matériel, military and naval vessels and military and naval installations, and military, naval, and civilian aircraft shall be surrendered and shall be disposed of as required by the Supreme Commander.

High officials of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and General Staff, other high military and naval officials of the Japanese Government, leaders of ultra-nationalist and militarist organizations and other important exponents of militarism and aggression will be taken into custody and held for future disposition. Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility. Ultra-nationalistic or militaristic social, political, professional and commercial societies and institutions will be dissolved and prohibited.

Militarism and ultranationalism, in doctrine and practice, including paramilitary training, shall be eliminated from the educational system. Former career military and naval officers, both commissioned and noncommissioned, and all other exponents of militarism and ultranationalism shall be excluded from supervisory and teaching positions.

## 2. WAR CRIMINALS

Persons charged by the Supreme Commander or appropriate United Nations agencies with being war criminals, including those charged with having visited cruelties upon United Nations prisoners or other nationals, shall be arrested, tried, and, if convicted, punished. Those wanted by another of the United Nations for offenses against its nationals, shall, if not wanted for trial or as witnesses or otherwise by the Supreme Commander, be turned over to the custody of such other nation.

## 3. ENCOURAGEMENT OF DESIRE FOR INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES

Freedom of religious worship shall be proclaimed promptly on occupation. At the same time it should be made plain to the Japanese that ultranationalistic and militaristic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of religion.

The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity and encouraged to become familiar with the history, institutions, culture, and the accomplishments of the United States and the other democracies. Association of personnel of the occupation forces with the Japanese population should be controlled, only to the extent necessary, to further the policies and objectives of the occupation.

Democratic political parties, with rights of assembly and public discussion, shall be encouraged, subject to the necessity for maintaining the security of the occupying forces.

Laws, decrees, and regulations which establish discriminations on ground of race, nationality, creed, or political opinion shall be abrogated; those which conflict with the objectives and policies outlined in this document shall be repealed, suspended, or amended as required; and agencies charged specifically with their enforcement shall be abolished or appropriately modified. Persons unjustly confined by Japanese authority on political grounds shall be released. The judicial, legal and police systems shall be reformed as soon as practicable to conform to the policies set forth in Articles 1 and 3 of this Part III and thereafter shall be progressively influenced, to protect individual liberties and civil rights.

## PART IV—ECONOMIC

### 1. ECONOMIC DEMILITARIZATION

The existing economic basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed and not be permitted to revive.

Therefore, a program will be enforced containing the following elements, among others; the immediate cessation and future prohibition of production of all goods designed for the equipment, maintenance, or use of any military force or establishment; the imposition of a ban upon any specialized facilities for the production or repair of implements of war, including naval vessels and all forms of aircraft; the institution of a system of inspection and control over selected elements in Japanese economic activity to prevent concealed or disguised military preparation; the elimination in Japan of those selected industries or branches of production whose chief value to Japan is in preparing for war; the prohibition of specialized research and instruction directed to the development of war-making power; and the limitation of the size and character of Japan's heavy industries to its future peaceful requirements, and restriction of Japanese merchant shipping to the extent required to accomplish the objectives of demilitarization.

The eventual disposition of those existing production facilities within Japan which are to be eliminated in accord with this program, as between conversion to other uses, transfer abroad, and scrapping will be determined after inventory. Pending decision, facilities readily convertible for civilian production should not be destroyed, except in emergency situations.

## 2. PROMOTION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES

Encouragement shall be given and favor shown to the development of organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis. Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade.

Those forms of economic activity, organization, and leadership shall be favored that are deemed likely to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the Japanese people, and to make it difficult to command or direct economic activity in support of military ends.

To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends; and

(b) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry.

## 3. RESUMPTION OF PEACEFUL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

The policies of Japan have brought down upon the people great economic destruction and confronted them with the prospect of economic difficulty and suffering. The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behavior, and the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage. It can be repaired only if the Japanese people renounce all military aims and apply themselves diligently and with single purpose to the ways of peaceful living. It will be necessary for them to undertake physical reconstruction, deeply to reform the nature and direction of their economic activities and institutions, and to find useful employment for their people along lines adapted to and devoted to peace. The Allies have no intention of imposing conditions which would prevent the accomplishment of these tasks in due time.

Japan will be expected to provide goods and services to meet the needs of the occupying forces to the extent that this can be effected without causing starvation, widespread disease, and acute physical distress.

The Japanese authorities will be expected, and if necessary directed, to maintain, develop, and enforce programs that serve the following purposes:

(a) To avoid acute economic distress.

(b) To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies.

(c) To meet the requirements for reparations deliveries agreed upon by the Allied Governments.

(d) To facilitate the restoration of Japanese economy so that the reasonable peaceful requirements of the population can be satisfied.

In this connection, the Japanese authorities on their own responsibility shall be permitted to establish and administer controls over economic activities, including essential national public services, finance, banking, and production and distribution of essential commodities, subject to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander in order to assure their conformity with the objectives of the occupation.

## 4. REPARATIONS AND RESTITUTION

*Reparations*

Reparations for Japanese aggression shall be made:

(a) Through the transfer—as may be determined by the appropriate Allied authorities—of Japanese property located outside of the territories to be retained by Japan.

(b) Through the transfer of such goods or existing capital equipment and facilities as are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese economy or the supplying of the occupying forces. Exports other than those directed to be shipped on reparation account or as restitution may be made only to those recipients who agree to provide necessary imports in exchange or agree to pay for such exports in foreign exchange. No form of reparation shall be exacted which will interfere with or prejudice the program for Japan's demilitarization.

*Restitution*

Full and prompt restitution will be required of all identifiable looted property.



## 5. FISCAL, MONETARY, AND BANKING POLICIES

The Japanese authorities will remain responsible for the management and direction of the domestic fiscal, monetary, and credit policies subject to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander.

## 6. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCIAL RELATIONS

Japan shall be permitted eventually to resume normal trade relations with the rest of the world. During occupation and under suitable controls, Japan will be permitted to purchase from foreign countries raw materials and other goods that it may need for peaceful purposes, and to export goods to pay for approved imports.

Control is to be maintained over all imports and exports of goods, and foreign exchange and financial transactions. Both the policies followed in the exercise of these controls and their actual administration shall be subject to the approval and supervision of the Supreme Commander in order to make sure that they are not contrary to the policies of the occupying authorities, and in particular that all foreign purchasing power that Japan may acquire is utilized only for essential needs.

## 7. JAPANESE PROPERTY LOCATED ABROAD

Existing Japanese external assets and existing Japanese assets located in territories detached from Japan under the terms of surrender, including assets owned in whole or part by the Imperial Household and Government, shall be revealed to the occupying authorities and held for disposition according to the decision of the Allied authorities.

## 8. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY FOR FOREIGN ENTERPRISE WITHIN JAPAN

The Japanese authorities shall not give, or permit any Japanese business organization to give, exclusive or preferential opportunity or terms to the enterprise of any foreign country, or cede to such enterprise control of any important branch of economic activity.

## 9. IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD PROPERTY

Imperial Household property shall not be exempted from any action necessary to carry out the objectives of the occupation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before we go further with that statement of yours, let me ask this question:

Mr. VINCENT. I am through with it—it is just 10 more lines.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, get your 10 lines in and then I will go back to the point I want to make.

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

I would like to make it clear that this broad directive had my concurrence in September 1945. It had the approval of Secretary Stimson. It had the approval of Secretary Forrester, and the approval of the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes. It had the approval of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee, and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It had the approval of the President.

Although I have not had the opportunity to follow events in Japan closely since 1945 when I went to Bern, I am sure there has been general approval in this country of the occupation under General MacArthur.

To imply that this general policy statement under which General MacArthur carried out the occupation, was a document that was calculated to promote the destruction of the Japanese capitalist class seems to me childish. I think that the facts completely refute Mr. Dooman's references.

At this point, I would like to emphasize particularly that my testimony today on the Japanese directive is offered here for the purpose of setting the facts straight and correcting the statements made by Mr. Dooman. Accordingly, I have pointed out that I was not the author of the changes under discussion, but I do not wish to disassociate myself from the document.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that statement your own?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.



Mr. SOURWINE. Was that statement wholly prepared by you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Now, because you raised the subject, I had assistance in getting the information together, because I was not familiar with that whole document after 5 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. But the language is yours, the content is yours?

Mr. VINCENT. In large part.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is not prepared from somebody's outline and suggestions? It is the argument that you yourself want to make?

Mr. VINCENT. It is the argument I am making.

Mr. SOURWINE. Because you raised the question of parallelism between the activity in the elimination of the Zaibatsu, and our own antitrust program, I would like to ask you this: Do you know of any elements of confiscation in the antitrust program in the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. Of confiscation of property?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any element of confiscation in what was regarded the Zaibatsu in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall no element of confiscation except as the testimony of Dooman, of the capital levy or of everything over a thousand, but the combines were broken up.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that the capital levy of everything over a thousand was confiscatory?

I am not asking whether it was justified as a confiscatory measure, but was it confiscatory?

Mr. VINCENT. Everything over a thousand?

Mr. SOURWINE. It was confiscatory?

Mr. VINCENT. In a sense; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you had one element, that of confiscation, which was present over there which was not present in our own antitrust program?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of anything arbitrary in our antitrust program in the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there anything arbitrary in this program in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. It was arbitrary, as a military program would be.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that is another difference?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any element of proscription in our antitrust program in the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you define "proscription"?

Mr. SOURWINE. Prohibiting people from engaging in any particular activities.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was such an element in the program in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. The people who might endanger the——

Mr. SOURWINE. There was a class of people, a substantial number of persons who were proscribed?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there anything in the nature of attainder in our antitrust program in the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. What is attainder? I don't think there is; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Attainder would be the placing of burdens upon those who come after the original wrongdoer.

Mr. SURREY, would you like to try a better explanation?

Mr. SURREY. That is good enough.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not trying to give a technical, but an untechnical definition. What is your answer?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there attainder, in that sense, in the program in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was not?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of.

State that again, will you please, because you were talking to Mr. Surrey and I didn't get what you said.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me start over again without the use of that technical phrase.

In our antitrust program in the United States, do you know of anything which prohibits a man from engaging in lawful business because he may have been convicted in a prior antitrust action, or once had an antitrust case against him?

Mr. VINCENT. I am not familiar with our antitrust laws, but I wouldn't think there would be.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there anything of that nature in the Japanese program?

Mr. VINCENT. There was.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that would be another difference, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, on the basis of those differences, sir, would you like in any way to revise your suggestion of parallelism between this program against the Zaibutsu and the antitrust program in the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. I would, to this extent, to point out that I used the term in a general character without any specific knowledge of the antitrust program in this country. I had just the general objective of a layman's idea of breaking up large trusts which were inimical.

Mr. SOURWINE. Merely for the purpose of argument?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that your own conception to use that argument as parallel?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I would have thought that combines here and the Zaibutsu both might have a strangling effect on business.

Mr. SOURWINE. As you testified before, the Zaibutsu is a broader term than merely combines?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It includes the capitalist class, the industrialist class?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, but it generally referred to the large combines, the Mitsubishi and others.

Mr. SOURWINE. They have constantly been brought up in connection with it, and it certainly had an impact upon them, but it was not exclusively an impact on them, was it?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. It has a much broader impact?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what has happened to the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't followed it, sir. I haven't followed specifically what has come out of this, because I left the country in 1947 and only came back a few months ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether any of those who were of the Japanese capitalist class before the war are still so engaged in industry in Japan today?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir, whether they are still engaged in industry.

Mr. SOURWINE. There could not be very many of them, under the program which was undertaken, could there?

Mr. VINCENT. My impression was that many of them had returned to industry.

Mr. SOURWINE. The whole purpose of the program was to eliminate them from influence and power, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It was to break up the large combines.

Mr. SOURWINE. You took all property away from a man over 100,000, did you not? That was true, was it not? That was the confiscation feature we have just been talking about?

Senator FERGUSON. \$100,000.

Mr. VINCENT. 100,000 yen.

Senator FERGUSON. How many dollars was that?

Mr. VINCENT. The official rate was 15 to 1. Probably the rate at the time was anywhere from 50 to 70 to 1.

I am not saying the effect was the same, but to be precise my recollection of this, then, was that the 100,000 yen was left intact and there was a graduated scale up to a million or more, at 25 percent of the first 10,000, or 10 percent of the first 10,000, but it was a graduated scale.

Mr. SOURWINE. The whole operating effect and intent of that program was to eliminate anybody as a large industrialist, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It would seem to be, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Because he could not continue to be one after you took his property away?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Furthermore, the man who had been the head of a business was proscribed, he was kept from continuing that business, or from returning in that field, was he not?

Mr. VINCENT. That would have been an after effect of it, that I could not testify on, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made mention toward the end of your statement about the Japanese capitalist class. Would you go back and read it again, that sentence where you mentioned the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. Toward the end, sir?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, in what you described as the last 10 lines.

Mr. VINCENT. This is the only reference I see:

To imply that this general policy statement under which General MacArthur carried out the occupation was a document that was calculated to promote the destruction of the Japanese capitalist class is not correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you please tell us what it was calculated to do, if it was not calculated to promote the destruction of the capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean by confiscating?

I cannot testify to that, the program which has been spoken of here as taking everything over 100 million or taxing it was put into effect as strenuously as we have been led to believe here.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this 100,000,000, or is it 100,000?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection, it is 100,000; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the first place, what do you mean by "calculated"? Do you mean "designed for" or "adopted to the purpose of"?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not believe it was designed for the destruction.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean "calculated" in the sense of "designed for"?

Mr. VINCENT. Not "designed for." That was not the intention.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean it was not intended?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not mean to say that it was not adopted for that purpose? Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you admit that this whole program was well adapted to the destruction of the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. It could have been used to destroy the capitalist class if the program of taking everything over 100 million yen applied to property, capital, and everything else.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us leave the "ifs" out.

Mr. VINCENT. My understanding of this program, which I say I did not have anything to do with formulating, was to stop currency inflation, and my impression, if I must give the impression I have, was that this was directed primarily against currency inflation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are familiar with this program, are you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are familiar with this document?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have reviewed it recently?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, are you contending that that program as it was laid down and recommended was not well adapted to the elimination of the Japanese capitalist class, or are you willing to admit that that program was in fact well adapted to the elimination of the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. It could have been adapted to the elimination of the capitalist class.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean it could have been used for the elimination of them?

Mr. VINCENT. I hate to use "if," but my understanding is that it was a plan for currency, to stop currency inflation, and the 100 million was money that people had, rather than property.

Mr. SOURWINE. This program could have been used to eliminate the Japanese capitalist class, will you admit that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you have said, then, and that coincides with what you did say, that when you used the word "calculated," you meant intended or designed for, and what you are contending, then, is that



this program was not intended or designed for that purpose of eliminating the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. What I have said here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. You are saying that this program was not intended or designed for eliminating the capitalist class in Japan.

Mr. VINCENT. That was not my idea.

Mr. SURREY. By "this program," you mean this document?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right, the program espoused in this document.

Mr. VINCENT. The program espoused? This document is not specific. The program grew out of a later mission that went out in the fall of 1945 or the early spring.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Now, do you think that the people who formulated this program, this document, were aware that that program was well adapted for the purpose of eliminating the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. The people who made this document?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not think they thought they were going to eliminate the Japanese capitalist class in drawing up this document here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think they knew that it could be used for the elimination of the Japanese capitalist class? In other words, that it was well adapted for that purpose?

Mr. VINCENT. I could not testify what was in their minds, whether they knew, or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were at least informed as much about this matter as you were, were they not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have said you know it could have been used for that purpose.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, but it was not used.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not suppose they knew it could have been used for this purpose?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify as to whether they knew it would be used for the purpose.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think it is possible that this program was put on paper this way; that this document was prepared and promulgated, without a realization on the part of those who had a part in this that this could be used for the elimination of the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, you are asking me that and I would say that I do not believe any man who participated in the preparation of this document intended that it was to be used to eliminate the Japanese capitalist class.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time you approved that, did you know it could have been used for the elimination of the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. That has been an afterthought?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there at any time in connection with that document any representation going along with it, in the way of memorandum or otherwise, cautioning that this program was one which

could be used to eliminate the Japanese capitalist class, or disavowing an intent that it should be so used?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I recall, but I was not there in the preparation of the document, except its final adoption.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has it been used for the elimination of the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean that opinion in the sense that there is always a capitalist class in any country, and, therefore, we still have one in Japan, or are you referring specifically to those who composed the capitalist class in Japan prior to the end of the war?

Mr. VINCENT. I am referring to that class which this document refers to here.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a class?

Mr. VINCENT. Of those whose economic activities were inimical to peace. I think there is a statement in there.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a different category, if you please.

Senator FERGUSON. You might say that all capitalists were inimical to peace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Communists hold that all capitalists are inimical to peace, do they not?

Mr. VINCENT. What?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do not Communists hold that all capitalist classes are inimical to peace?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So without getting into the semantics of where a capitalist class stands, what is your answer to the question?

Mr. VINCENT. Without getting into the semantics of where the capitalist class stands, what is my answer to your question?

I would like to have the question again.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean that opinion in the sense that there is always a capitalist class in any country, and, therefore, we still have one in Japan, or are you referring specifically to those who composed the capitalist class in Japan prior to the end of the war?

Mr. VINCENT. My answer would be that I had reference to the people who composed the capitalist class before the end of the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you are saying that the group of people who composed the capitalist class before the war have not been destroyed as the capitalist class of Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, and I do not know what you mean by "destroyed." The combines, they are probably destroyed, but as a class, I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do the same people who controlled the industry and capital of Japan, before the war, control it still?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir. They certainly do not control it in the same extent, but whether they are in business, or not, I could not say so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you do not care?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not want to say I don't care. If you mean somebody who was in Mitsubishi before the war is still back in business in Japan, and I would care or not——

Mr. SOURWINE. Perhaps I should not have asked the question that way.

Is it your testimony, sir, that you have no knowledge as to the extent to which the capitalist class of Japan, as it existed before the end of the war, has been eliminated as such?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we pass that point, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who was Yoshio Shiga?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who was Kyuichi Tokuda?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the name. I don't know who he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it refresh your memory if I said that they were Japanese Communists, Japanese Communist leaders?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the names of them as Japanese Communist leaders.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read a report about Shiga and Tokuda being released from jail and returned to their homes at the conclusion of the war?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or of that having been done by United States personnel in a United States car?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall a report made by Gen. John S. Hodge, then commanding general in Korea, relating to the situation in Korea, the report being made to SCAP in Tokyo late in 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall the report to SCAP in late 1945, that General Hodge made.

Mr. SOURWINE. To the best of your knowledge, you have not seen such a report?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge, I have not seen such a report.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there had been such a report, and it had borne the endorsement by John S. Service, would you have been likely to remember that fact?

Mr. VINCENT. I would, I suppose. I couldn't tell you without seeing the report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember having seen a report bearing the endorsement by Mr. Service?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall a request from General Hodge, directly or indirectly, that Syngman Rhee be flown out from Washington?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall the incident.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of any State Department objection to a request, by General Hodge or anyone else, that Syngman Rhee be flown out from Washington?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know the circumstances under which Mr. Rhee, in the fall or later of 1945, was flown out to Korea?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make a recommendation for someone to go to Korea instead of Mr. Rhee?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make a recommendation that Kim Koo-sek be sent to Korea?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall Kim Koo-sek or the recommendation I made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now perhaps we had better clear this point up because a question has been presented here. Is the statement by President Truman on United States policy toward China, under date of December 15, 1945, the same statement that has been referred to throughout these sessions with you as the Marshall directive?

Mr. VINCENT. I have referred to that, yes, sir; as the Marshall directive. It is carelessly referred to as that, but it is the one that is generally spoken of as the directive, as it was generally understood at that time. It was the same statement made public on December 15, to which I testified yesterday or before, in the preparation thereof.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say it was made public on the 15th?

Mr. VINCENT. The President made it public.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was dated December 15, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; and I think it was made public the same day, sir. I was in Moscow at the time, but I think it was made public the same day.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether that directive, or any draft of that directive, was at any time submitted to Mr. Ben Cohen?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To Mr. Dean Acheson?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; it was submitted to Mr. Dean Acheson. We went over it at that conference on December 9.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before that, do you know whether it was submitted to Mr. Acheson?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no positive knowledge that it was, but I would assume that it passed through his hands.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether Mr. Cohen ever saw it?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well did you know Joseph Gregg?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that I knew Joseph Gregg, sir. The name doesn't make any response at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Joseph Gregg was ever in your home?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall Mr. Joseph Gregg. I don't recall his ever being in my home.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see a security file or investigation file on Mr. Gregg?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him any information of a confidential or a security nature?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him any information with the knowledge or expectation or with reason to believe it would be passed on, directly or indirectly, to the Soviet Government, or an agent thereof?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or to the Communist Party of the United States, or any foreign nation?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.



Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about an effort or movement to force Patrick J. Hurley out of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I know of no such movement. I would want to review the matter, as a matter of dates, but I know of no movement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know the name of Guesev, G-u-e-s-e-v, or Gussev, G-u-s-s-e-v?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know a man connected with the Russian Embassy whose name was similar to Gussev, or who used the name of Gussev or some similar name, as an alias?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the Far East Commission?

Mr. VINCENT. The Far East Commission was a Commission of 11 nations first formed in the fall of 1945. But as the Far East Advisory Commission at the Moscow conference in December 1945, there was an agreement reached there with the British and the Russians, and endorsed by the Chinese and the other nations, for the establishment of a Far East Commission. It was established in the spring or earlier, 1945, under the chairmanship of Gen. Frank McCoy, and functioned in a manner that was to more or less supervise or go into the matter of the control—not control, because the word “control” was never used—of relationships between the various governments and SCAP.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have a few questions here, a series of questions.

I suspect it is possible you may have a prepared statement on the subject.

After you have answered these questions, if there is any further statement that you would like to make, I shall be glad to have you make it on the record.

Mr. VINCENT. I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember a paper known as Far East Commission 230, FEC-230?

Mr. VINCENT. I do, sir, and I have a paper on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that paper submitted to the Far East Commission for consideration?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it ever adopted by the Far East Commission?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who submitted that paper?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the paper that grew out of the trip of Mr. Edwards to Japan in the fall of 1945, and was acted upon in the SWNCC Committee some time after his return.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who prepared that paper?

Mr. VINCENT. Members of the SWNCC Committee, so far as I know. I would like to refer to the statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. I shall be glad to have you refer to it, but just at the moment—

Mr. SURREY. For the purpose of answering the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; I understand.

Mr. VINCENT. I have here the mission went out in 1945. I testified it went out in autumn. It went out in 1946.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are referring now to the State Department document known as FEC-230?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the one I am referring to here, and I have here the statement [reading]: "The recommendations of this mission became the basis of a paper prepared by the working group of the Far East Subcommittee of SWNCC."

Mr. SOURWINE. But it was not prepared by the Far East Commission, then?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did it ever get the name "Far East Commission 230"?

Mr. VINCENT. It was submitted over there as such a document and numbered as such, but never adopted by the Far East Commission.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was submitted to the Far East Commission for consideration, then, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. A moment ago I asked you whether it was, and you said "No".

Mr. VINCENT. I said the Edwards report.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you if this paper, FEC-230, was submitted to the Far East Commission for consideration, and I understood you to say "No."

Mr. VINCENT. I am sorry; but it is a fact that I did know it was never approved by the Far East Commission.

Mr. SOURWINE. I had two separate questions. It was submitted?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it was never adopted by them?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who submitted it?

Mr. VINCENT. The SWNCC Committee, I imagine it submitted it, after the working committee had prepared it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was prepared by the working committee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was prepared by that working committee. Do you mean the Far East Subcommittee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. A working committee of the Far East Committee; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that be under your control?

Mr. VINCENT. I was chairman of the FE Committee, and it would be under my general control, but this particular working committee was under my control in an ex officio way.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you approve the document before submission to the Far East Commission?

Mr. VINCENT. I may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. How could it have been submitted to the Far East Commission without your approval?

Mr. VINCENT. It had to be submitted through SWNCC and top SWNCC would have been the one that submitted it.

Mr. SOURWINE. They did not go around you?

Mr. VINCENT. No. The FE Subcommittee of SWNCC would have taken it up with SWNCC.

Mr. SOURWINE. You headed that subcommittee?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would have had to approve it before it got to SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. On that basis, did you approve it?

Mr. VINCENT. I did approve it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was submitted by SWNCC to the Far East Commission; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. By SWNCC to the Far East Commission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that mean it was approved by SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. I have forgotten what the exact formula was, whether it was submitted to FE, whether it was submitted to FEC by SWNCC purely for consideration, or whether it went over with an approval of SWNCC. I can't testify as to whether it was sent over to them for their consideration, but without any advance approval by SWNCC or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you testify in any event it was ordered transmitted to FEC by SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, who were the members of the working group who prepared that?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who any of them were?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall a one of them; no sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how many of them there were?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many were there on the Far East Committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I could find out.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how many men there were on the Far East Committee who might have worked on it?

Mr. VINCENT. There would have been economists, and I can't tell what the number would have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you can find out, try to do so before we come in on public session.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how that paper reached Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. The paper reached Japan by being sent out informally to SCAP.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who sent it out?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not?

Mr. VINCENT. It was usually sent out by the War Department—the War Department, usually—but the communications between SCAP and Washington were almost always through the War Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. So far as you know, it was sent by the War Department, and not by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know, it was sent out by the War Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say it was not sent out by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say it was not, because my memory is not exact enough to know, but there was no implication there that the State Department did not know it was being sent out. I am just speaking of a channel of communication.

Senator FERGUSON. You are speaking of the means of communication?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the channel of communication.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not an official publication by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Although it had been transmitted officially from the SWNCC committee to FEC?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It had not been ordered by FEC to be disseminated or transmitted to SCAP, had it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anyone who sent this paper, or a copy of it, to Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know anyone who sent it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anyone in Japan to whom a copy of this was transmitted?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, other than to SCAP.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anyone who gave this paper, or a copy of it, to anyone to be taken or transmitted to Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would a document of that nature have required your endorsement as Chief of the Office of Far East Affairs if it was to be issued or circulated as a State Department document?

Mr. VINCENT. No; it would not have required my endorsement. An economic paper of that kind might have had my endorsement. It might not have required my endorsement. It could have been the endorsement of the Assistant Secretary of State, the endorsement of Will Clayton.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it have required your approval?

Mr. VINCENT. It would not have required my approval. It would have been normal to have my approval.

Mr. SOURWINE. If such a paper were to be distributed through State Department channels would it have been normal to have cleared that circulation or distribution with you?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have been normal, except where it might have been an economic paper—that had to be through Mr. Will Clayton; it might equally have not been sent through me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether this paper was circulated or distributed by or within the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say.

Mr. SOURWINE. If it was so circulated, what would be your opinion as to whether you knew of and approved of that circulation at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. Of circulation in the State Department?

Mr. SOURWINE. In or by the State Department.

Mr. VINCENT. What do you mean by "circulation"?

Mr. SOURWINE. I use "circulation" in the technical sense of copies prepared, a notation at the bottom, usually at the lower left-hand corner, as to whom it is circulated to.

Mr. VINCENT. I would not have thought, and I am speaking here purely from memory, that the paper was in a form to be circulated through the State Department.



Mr. SOURWINE. Such circulation might have a half-dozen names, or 20. It might have distribution symbols. You are familiar with all the possibilities there?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have marked papers for distribution?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is quite a wide range. You can put a couple of initials, or a half-dozen initials, which mean it will go to several hundred places.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, it normally would have been your function to mark for distribution such a paper, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Not a paper coming out like that, on economics. It probably would have gone to a division there which was handling Japan and Korean affairs at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether you did mark this paper for distribution?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say whether I did or did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is the same paper, is it, that was subsequently printed by Mr. James Lee Kuffman, a New York lawyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge of that. I have read in the hearings that the testimony has been to the effect that he did print it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a copy of this document, FEC-230, the document about which we are talking?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that document instruct General MacArthur to "effect wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade"?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to see the document, Mr. Sourwine, to be able to testify exactly to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you have anything that you want to contribute voluntarily in addition to the answers that you have given to the questions asked?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It has been said, Mr. Vincent, that you have been falsely charged with being one of those who was deluded by the belief that the Chinese Communists were just agrarian reformers. Do you want to comment on that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would like to comment on that, sir.

Since I returned to America here, I have gone through some papers and find that it is on record that I have stated that the Chinese Communists were real Communists, and they were not agrarian democrats, and I have made that statement many times; but I have one factual statement to that effect but I never was deluded into thinking that they were agrarian reformers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever believe that the Chinese Communists were just agrarian reformers?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall at any time that I thought the leaders of the Chinese Communists were agrarian reformers.

The fact that they used agrarian reform as one of their methods of popularizing themselves is a distinct matter from whether they were Communists, and I would have called them Communists, utilizing agrarian reform as a tool.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have never yourself believed, have you, nor attempted to spread the doctrine, that the Communists were just agrarian reformers?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did I interrupt you? Did you want to read a statement?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, sir, in a speech before the Foreign Policy Association Forum in New York City, on October 20, state that?—

at the throat of Chinese difficulties is the need for certain economic reforms, particularly in the agrarian field, and in the field of taxation.

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to see that speech. That is a Foreign Policy Association speech and I would have to see whether that is an exact quotation, but I may say that I felt very much that the Nationalist Government of China could have strengthened its position tremendously by taking some reforms in the agrarian field.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember making this statement in that same speech?—

Much is written about the industrialization of China, but without reforms, one of the primary objectives which would be to increase the individual incomes of the Chinese farmers, and without an expanded transportation and a sound currency, industrial development would be meaningless to the Chinese people.

Mr. VINCENT. I do recall—I assume you have the exact words.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is substantially the view you had?

Mr. VINCENT. That is substantially the view. I would like to expand on that in two sentences.

Mr. SOURWINE. You shall have that privilege.

Mr. VINCENT. My idea at the time was that you had to have a public in China to absorb the product of industry. There was a strong feeling at the time that when the war was over—these were discussions concerning postwar economic developments—that the Chinese should go about increasing the purchasing power of the mass of people which were the farmers, as a corollary, to go with industrial development, rather than have industrial development come ahead of that and simply have the products coming out of Chinese factories that were exported, rather than to be bought by the Chinese people. That was my philosophy behind that.

Mr. SOURWINE. The philosophy, in other words, of creating the market first before you produce the goods?

Mr. VINCENT. Create it simultaneously, anyway. I am not an economist, but that seemed to be sound common sense in China at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have a slightly different theory in this country, do we not?

Mr. VINCENT. That production creates the market?

Mr. SOURWINE. Is not our industrial advancement built rather largely on the principle of make all you can as good as you can, and then go out and sell it?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, we have not been faced with the same situation as there is in China, with a buying public that did not have 2 pennies to rub together.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was a diversion, I admit, and we got a little bit away from the scene of this conference.

Did you on or about February 23, 1946, write a letter under that date to Mr. Edward C. Carter, executive vice chairman of the American Council of the IPR, advising him you did not feel you could accept nomination for a second term as a member of the board of trustees of the American Council?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I did not accept it, but I do not recall writing him the letter I wouldn't accept it. If you would ask me to rely on my memory as such, I would have said that I simply did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will tell you now that we have such a letter from the files of the IPR. I do not have it now, but at the public hearing we will produce it, and you will have an opportunity to look at it, and I will ask you the question again with the letter in your hands.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your reason for not wanting to continue? Did you state it in your letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I say I do not recall the letter, Senator, so I don't know what my reason was at the time. I have an idea that a part of it was that I just didn't have time to bother with anything connected with the IPR because I was awfully busy.

Mr. FERGUSON. Was it because of any communistic tendency on the part of IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No; it was not based on any suspicion I had then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the newspaperman who telephoned you on September 2, 1946, on behalf of the New York Herald Tribune, to ask you what you thought of the statement that had just been issued by General MacArthur personally known to you?

Mr. VINCENT. He was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was that newspaperman?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a man named Metcalf. I had not met him often, but I knew who he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did this newspaperman subsequently apologize to you and acknowledge to you that the story he had written was untrue?

Mr. VINCENT. He did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Arthur C. Bunce?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall him. Could I ask where I would have known him? If you will give me a minute, I will try to think.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Bunce was an economic adviser.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; to Korea.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know him but you now know who he was?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; and I met him once or twice in my office before he went out to take up his duties in Korea.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember an article or dispatch transmitted from Mr. Bunce criticizing both the military government and the United States policy in Korea?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether a copy of such an article or dispatch was requested by Mr. Philip E. Lilienthal?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who Mr. Lilienthal was?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he connected with the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, but I am not saying he was not. I don't know of his connection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was a copy of such a report from Mr. Bunce requested by anyone else connected with IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you furnish a copy of that report pursuant to any such request?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in the habit of furnishing information to Lilienthal?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or anyone else in the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have already testified that Mr. Penfield, who was your deputy for a period——

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether he had any connection with the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I know of no connection that Penfield ever had with the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember a statement issued by General MacArthur on or before September 11, 1946, in the nature of a warning with respect to the danger of communism in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall the statement. That couldn't be the same statement that you have just referred to here, of Metcalf printing an incorrect article?

Mr. SOURWINE. It could be; the times are very close together. I would not be surprised if that was the article.

Mr. VINCENT. I am assuming you recall the circumstances, or should I recall them, of the Metcalf article?

He called me on the telephone and asked had I read a statement by General MacArthur.

My recollection was that it was about Labor Day that I was working, around Labor Day, the early part of September.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. I told him I had not read it and then he went on to talk about Japan policy, not about the statement, and asked me whether there had been any change in our policy toward the Far East, toward Japan, and I told him I knew of no changes that had been made. That may be the statement of General MacArthur's.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who recommended your appointment as head of the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Director of Far Eastern Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. I beg your pardon.

Mr. VINCENT. I was not correcting you—I was just thinking.

The first person to mention my appointment to me of Director was Mr. Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State. I was appointed by Mr. Byrnes and I had already known Mr. Byrnes——

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that Mr. Acheson recommended your appointment to that post?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not positive knowledge that he recommended my appointment to that post.



Mr. SOURWINE. At the time he mentioned it to you, was it already a fait accompli?

Mr. VINCENT. That brings up the testimony I gave yesterday of being out of the city off on vacation, when I was called back suddenly, and it was a fait accompli, because I was called back from this and told I was going to be—I was not then Director, and I was not immediately made Director of the Far East Office; I was not made Director until the 19th of December—but Mr. Acheson told me that was the reason he was calling me back, to get myself ready to be Director.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was before Mr. Byrnes had actually made the appointment?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, was not your appointment as head of the Far Eastern Division one of Mr. Acheson's first acts after he became Under Secretary?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have a hard time testifying to that, but it was very early after he became Under Secretary of State, but whether it was one of his first acts, I wouldn't say.

Senator JENNER. What year was that?

Mr. VINCENT. That was in 1945. I became Director in September 1945. Have you got 1946?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry. Your testimony is unquestionably correct on that point. I did not mean to challenge it, but I was trying to think of when Mr. Acheson was appointed. His appointment had been less than a month before that time, had it not? He was appointed toward the end of August?

Mr. VINCENT. He was appointed, I should say, around the middle of August.

Mr. SOURWINE. Around the middle of August and you were called back from your vacation before the end of August?

Mr. VINCENT. The circumstances were, you may recall, that Acheson had tendered his resignation as Assistant Secretary of State, and when Mr. Byrnes got back from Potsdam, he called him back and told him he was going to be Under Secretary of State, or asked him to be Under Secretary of State.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, moving up to the fall of 1946, did you at that time draft or assist in drafting a statement designed to be issued in case General Marshall should admit failure of his efforts to end the civil war in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't quite get the connotation of failure, but I am fully aware of the circumstances we are talking about, that in the late autumn of 1946 it became more and more apparent to all of us that General Marshall's mission was not going to succeed. So where the instructions came from, whether it came from Mr. Byrnes, whether it came from the White House or where, or whether General Marshall asked us to prepare something of the sort, there was a document which eventually became public on December 18, which was a general review, economic, military, and otherwise, of our relations with China during and since the war, and of developments there.

Senator JENNER. May I ask a question right there?

Having missed his previous testimony with reference to Marshall's mission to China, has that been gone into?

Mr. SOURWINE. Very thoroughly.

Senator JENNER. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will summarize it for the Senator.

The gist of the witness' testimony in that regard, as he himself assented to a summary of it here, was that he had three cracks at it. He prepared an original rough draft. After certain changes had been made in that rough draft over at the War Department, it came back for his perusal, the second time; and then, before ultimate final approval he saw it again.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator JENNER. Did Marshall see it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

May I straighten out one thing? I prepared, not a rough draft of the directive but a rough draft of what were the problems, and of the manner in which I thought they should be attacked in China.

It was handed to General Marshall. It was not in the form he wanted it, and then a statement of China policy was drafted under General Marshall's direction.

Senator FERGUSON. In the War Department?

Mr. VINCENT. In the War Department. And this other draft, although it had some of the phraseology and the thought of my much shorter rough draft, is in itself a completely different document in intent, as well as in language.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said your document was about two pages, and the one that came back is about six?

Mr. VINCENT. We have it there.

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, do you have your document?

Mr. VINCENT. It is in the files of the State Department. I shall be glad to try to procure it for you.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am surprised at the addition now to your statement: "It was much different in intent."

Mr. VINCENT. I said "content."

Mr. SOURWINE. Since I understood your statement to be initially that what did come back from the War Department contained a number of the phrases or phraseology and ideas that were in yours, and contained nothing at odds with or in derogation of what was originally proposed.

Mr. VINCENT. What I meant by "intent" I had not intended when I wrote a rough draft to draft something called a directive.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is understood.

Mr. VINCENT. I was writing something for Mr. Byrnes to talk with Mr. Marshall about. I did not conceive it in the terms of a directive, and if we could produce it you could easily see it had no relationship to being a directive.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not recognize the child when he came back?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I was able to recognize some phraseology.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know, sir, who did take part in originating the idea of that draft?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know. As I say, I have just testified that there was a general feeling, and I know that the White House shared that feeling that we must be prepared to issue something for General Marshall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anyone who took part in drafting that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that the boys in the Far Eastern Office, under me, that they consulted—you can look at the content, they must have consulted the War Department people and the economic people, and it was a composite document of some five or six pages which was preparatory.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you take any part in the preparation of that?

Mr. VINCENT. I no doubt did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not remember?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not remember what I may have contributed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it in a sense your responsibility, since it was being done under you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say I had the principal responsibility to see that it was done.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you then instrumental in presenting that draft to Secretary Byrnes?

Mr. VINCENT. I no doubt was. I don't remember the physical process of presenting it to Mr. Byrnes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The routine procedure would have been for you to transmit it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. It would have gone down under my initials.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that draft statement recommend withdrawal of all aid to the Nationalist Government of China?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I haven't reread it for some time. I am testifying from memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it contain any recommendation of that nature?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall it did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that draft statement approved?

Mr. VINCENT. It was approved and issued as a press release on December 18.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose that draft?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of. I know that it was sent out to General Marshall and he approved it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there a draft in October which was disapproved, or which the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember making more than one address at Cornell University?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. The only address you made there was on or about January 21, 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to check the date. I have never been to Cornell but once, and the address we spoke of yesterday.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether, in the course of that address, you stated that it would be advantageous for our defense to throw our weight on the side of the status quo in China?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall making any such statement as that, throw our weight on the side of the status quo——

Mr. SOURWINE. In China.

Mr. VINCENT. In January——

Mr. SOURWINE. 1947.

Mr. VINCENT. In January 1947? No; I don't recall making such a statement. You would have to define the status quo. The status



quo was that Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government was in control of the country politically.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall in that address saying, or that you said, anything about throwing our weight or influence on the side of the status quo?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it have been possible that in that address you said that it would not be advantageous to our defense to throw our weight or influence on the side of the status quo in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I made that statement either. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you be surprised to learn that you had made that statement?

Mr. VINCENT. I would be surprised to learn that I made the statement that we should not throw our weight behind the status quo because the status quo was that Chiang Kai-shek was in control of the Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you made a statement at that time that it would not be advantageous for us to throw our weight or influence on the side of the status quo, that was a statement against Chiang Kai-shek, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember participating in the briefing of General Wedemeyer and his staff before they left for the Far East in July 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; there was a meeting of a few of us which General Wedemeyer himself had requested. It was not in the sense of any exhaustive briefing.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long did it take?

Mr. VINCENT. Not more than 20 minutes or a half hour.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where was it held?

Mr. VINCENT. In my office in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. You not only participated, then, but you were one of the chief participants in that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not call myself the chief participator, except it was called to my office. I was packing my suitcase to go to Switzerland. I don't recall. A naval officer was there who was going to accompany General Wedemeyer. Mr. Sprouse, chosen by the State Department was there. Some Army officer was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they merely drop into your office to get any suggestions you might have?

Mr. VINCENT. No. General Wedemeyer himself suggested that they meet in my office, just to go over the general—there was a discussion among them more than any briefing by anybody like myself, as to what they were supposed to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would have been the customary thing, with anybody undertaking a mission, to get an expression of views, from the head of the Far Eastern Division; would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. But General Wedemeyer had his discussions before that with General Marshall, and his relation with General Marshall was one that he hardly required briefing from me at any high level. I remember at the meeting that General Wedemeyer asked me: "Is there any intention here that I shall have any responsibility to try to carry on the objective of the Marshall mission?"



I said, "None whatsoever," that that is, so far as I am concerned, a "dead duck."

He was going out on a fact-finding mission and not any mission to get together with the Nationalists and Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. The directive, as such, was it a "dead duck" in 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. The directive to General Marshall?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. General Marshall having come back and given up the mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. As we pointed out, that was a public statement by the President of the United States.

Mr. VINCENT. The directive to General Marshall?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. It was not withdrawn or renounced?

Mr. VINCENT. Insofar as General Marshall's attempts to implement that statement of policy, he was back here and he had made his statement of January 7.

Mr. SOURWINE. But the policy had not been recanted?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not telling General Wedemeyer that the policy, as such, was a "dead duck"; you were simply telling him that, in your opinion, he had no duties with respect to affirmatively seeking to implement that policy?

Mr. VINCENT. Exactly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, at the time of that briefing or conversation with General Wedemeyer and others, emphasize the necessity for introducing a liberal element into the Chinese Government?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you mean by "liberal element"?

Mr. VINCENT. I meant exactly the same thing that General Marshall had meant when he finally left China, which was that it would be a very good idea to have a liberal business, broad-minded group in there. As you know, at that time there was considerable criticism of some of the old-line Kuomintang officials, who were retarding progress.

General Marshall and I thought K. P. Chiang and John Chiang and some of the more broader-minded Chinese should come into the Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you consider the Chinese Communists as among the "liberals" who should be introduced?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that when a Communist says "liberal" he means Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know it now? I am not stating it. I am asking you if you know that is true.

Mr. VINCENT. As a matter of exact knowledge, I do not know when a Communist says a person is "liberal" it means that he is a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or a pro-Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who initiated your appointment as Minister to Switzerland?

Mr. VINCENT. The first discussion I had about it was with Mr. Acheson—I had to leave the Department at the end of 4 years—some time in the late spring.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean the selection of Switzerland. Do you know whose thought that was, Mr. Acheson's or yours?

Mr. VINCENT. It was Mr. Acheson's.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Acheson's?

Mr. VINCENT. I can recall that exactly. He said, "Where would you like to go?"

I said, "I would like to go anywhere, from New Zealand to Norway, provided I can take my family with me," because I had been absent from them 2½ years during the war. I meant to eliminate the Far East, from which families were barred.

He said: "How would you like to go to Switzerland?" I said I would be delighted.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who initiated the statement on China policy made by President Truman on December 15, 1949?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, that is the same thing that is mistakenly referred to as the directive.

It was a published statement, but General Marshall considered that a directive.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have been asked to ask you this question:

Sir, do you own a home in Sarasota, Fla.?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you buying a home there?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you plan to live there?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Maybe the Florida Chamber of Commerce has an interest in you.

Mr. VINCENT. I find that is the most curious question that has been asked here. I am not indicating here that I would not like to have a home there.

Mr. SOURWINE. When were you transferred to Tangiers?

Mr. VINCENT. I was transferred to Tangiers—I went to Tangiers in June 1951, just this past year. The actual transfer order came—there was 3 months' difference between the time I got my order to go. I had to stay in Switzerland to finish the matter of the German assets. The transfer to Tangiers came to me sometime in February, and I went to Tangiers in early June.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why you were transferred?

Mr. VINCENT. I was transferred because I had already been in Switzerland 3½ or 4 years. Mr. Patterson had been assigned to Switzerland as Minister. Therefore, it was necessary to find a place for me to go, and Tangiers was chosen.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has anyone in the State Department ever expressed an opinion to you as to why Tangiers was chosen as the next position?

Mr. VINCENT. They have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before you were transferred to Tangiers, had you any expectation of being transferred to some other post?

Mr. VINCENT. There was talk of going to Costa Rica, as Ambassador.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had expected to leave Switzerland, in any event; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I had already indicated I would like to leave when my children were leaving, at the end of 4 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever receive from Secretary Acheson any communication with regard to your appointment to Tangiers?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have never had any communication with Mr. Acheson regarding my appointment to Tangiers, unless the travel order may have been signed by him, which I doubt.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever informed that you had been suspected of or charged with revealing to Russia, to the Communists, the identities of American agents in Eastern Europe?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I never have been. I never have and I never have been informed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever propose or recommend the inclusion of Chinese Communists, or their representatives, in the Economic Commission in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; Chinese Communists or Japanese Communists?

Mr. SOURWINE. Chinese Communists or their representatives, in the Economic Commission.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or Japanese Communists or their representatives?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know any of those, either. I was trying to think—What was the Economic Commission for Japan?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mr. John McJennett?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; he works in the legal adviser's office in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he a personal friend of yours?

Mr. VINCENT. I just met him since I came back from Tangiers this time for the first time, but I would call him a personal friend.

Mr. SOURWINE. What part, if any, did he play in the release of your letter of November 9th, to Senator McCarran?

Mr. VINCENT. I understand he telephoned the release was going to be made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you understand that from what I told you or did you have any prior understanding?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew that he was going to let Senator McCarran's office know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ask him to do so?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I asked him to do so, or we agreed it was to be done. I was perfectly agreeable for it to be done.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you specify whom he was to call?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or that he was to get the message to Senator McCarran, or something of that sort?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that the message was to be gotten to Senator McCarran's office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at the time that Senator McCarran was ill and in the hospital in Nevada?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. McJennett had called on a Saturday afternoon, to the Judiciary Committee here, and had spoken with Mr. Mandel, rather than calling Senator McCarran's office?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know who Mr. McJennett called.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your request to him was simply what?

Mr. VINCENT. To let Senator McCarran's office know that this was to be issued on the following Monday. November 9th was the date of the letter, and this took place some 10 days later, which would make it the 20th.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think it was the 17th.

Mr. VINCENT. Saturday was the 17th.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your letter to Senator McCarran was addressed to him where?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall the envelope. I know it was delivered to the Senator's office.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was addressed to him?

Mr. VINCENT. It was delivered to him here by hand; and, therefore, it must have been addressed here.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. And you knew at the time that he was in Nevada?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. There were two copies delivered, one for him and one for whoever was in charge of the office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Knowing that the letter was delivered here on the 9th—if that was the case; certainly not earlier than the 9th, because it was dated the 9th—yet as early as the 16th you were already pressing for a reply, although you knew he had gone to the hospital in Nevada?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were making a point of it and suggested that the Department make it a point on his failure to reply by the 16th?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not suggesting that the Department make a point of his not replying. I myself, maybe naively, would have thought that his office itself would have made a reply on his behalf. That is my own feeling: That the letter would be sent out to him, but the staff here would be in a position to make a reply.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry that things are not run up here as perhaps they are in the State Department, but up here there is nobody who can answer for a Senator on a matter where the Senator has to make a decision, at least until he has made the decision.

Mr. VINCENT. I am simply giving you my belief that I would have thought it could have been answered.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see the State Department release on that letter before it was issued?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not see the actual release, I do not believe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss it with Mr. McJennett?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not prepare that release?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ask that it be prepared?

Mr. VINCENT. I asked that it be prepared.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now have any feeling that Senator McCarran was dilatory or discourteous?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not have any feeling that he was dilatory in replying to that letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions of this witness. We hope to be able to have him back here in public session on Wednesday of next week, if that might be the order, subject to a possible contingency that we cannot now foresee.



Mr. VINCENT. Did you say 10 or 10:30 on Wednesday?

Mr. SOURWINE. That would be subject to the Chair. I would think we should start at 10 o'clock and try to get through if we can.

Senator JENNER (presiding). If there is no objection, that will be the order.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, there is also this matter which has been discussed with the witness, and counsel.

This examination has taken much longer than any of us anticipated. We have been at it 3 days and the record is quite large.

Among other things there was a long list of names about which Mr. Vincent was asked, and each one of which required substantial comment.

The thought has been advanced that a great deal of time could be saved all around if, prior to going into the public session on Wednesday, it might be the order of the committee that the executive record be opened.

That would permit us to refer to specific portions of it, to place matter in the record. It would give the witness an opportunity, which he desires, to make the most public possible denial of these charges that have been made against him and, at the same time, it would give us some hope of getting through in a day or so.

It is my understanding that the witness and counsel have no objection to that, if they can be allowed to see the record; and while they recognize they have no right to control the committee in that regard, they would like to have an opportunity, if there is any portion of the executive record they would not like to make public, to make expression to the committee before it is ordered to be made public.

Senator JENNER. That is a reasonable request, and we will make that an order.

Mr. SOURWINE. We will have this record back here on Monday.

I regret that there was a resolution of the committee, with regard to these records, and I cannot send it out.

Mr. SURREY. Is it all right for someone to be here in my behalf?

Mr. SOURWINE. Anyone by authority of your firm may have access to it here.

Mr. VINCENT. Do you know whether a meeting is scheduled in here Monday morning?

Mr. SOURWINE. The full committee is meeting here Monday, but we will give you a desk in one of these other rooms and do what we can to make you comfortable.

If this committee may stand in recess, with the assent of the witness, he may return at the public session at 10 o'clock on next Wednesday morning.

Senator JENNER. That is agreeable.

(Whereupon, the executive session was concluded at 2:40 p. m.)



# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF  
THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY  
LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m. pursuant to recess, Senator Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, O'Connor, Ferguson, and Jenner.

Also present: Senators George, Hayden, Hendrickson, Millikin, and McCarthy.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research for the subcommittee.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want the witness sworn?

Mr. SOURWINE. The witness has been sworn, sir, in executive session. If the record may show that, I don't think another swearing would be essential.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe the witness had better be sworn again. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. VINCENT. I do, sir.

## TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY AND HOWARD REA

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I believe the record should show that the unanimous consent of the Senate was granted yesterday to the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate meeting while the Senate is in session this afternoon, that is, Wednesday, today, and during the remainder of this week. As the chairman knows, that consent was granted at the chairman's request.

Mr. Vincent, you are here today at your own request for the purpose primarily of denying any and all charges that may have been brought against you in connection with communism, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It will be the purpose of the committee to give you the fullest possible opportunity to make your denial in this regard as complete and comprehensive and explicit as you may wish.

Mr. VINCENT. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To that end a series of questions will now be put to you which are not intended as either argumentative or repetitive. They merely cover different facets of the issue. Do you understand that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any objection to that procedure?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the conclusion of this opening series of questions, if you have anything you want to add in the way of a prepared statement, or an impromptu statement, you will be given an opportunity to read it into the record or make it.

Mr. VINCENT. At the conclusion?

Mr. SOURWINE. I have a few questions; not the conclusion of the hearing, but of this series of questions.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party of the United States or a member of the Communist Party of any other country?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever been under Communist discipline?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever knowingly assisted the Communist Party of any country or any person or persons known to you to be Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever been asked to do so?

Mr. VINCENT. I never have been asked to do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever received any orders or instructions or suggestions, directly or indirectly, from any Communist or pro-Communist source?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever made any suggestions to a Communist or pro-Communist source?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever conferred with Communists or persons known to you to be pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever been asked, or invited, or urged, to join the Communist Party of any country?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you been in contact with any members of the Communist Party of the United States or of any other country?

Mr. VINCENT. I have in my official duties from time to time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than—

Mr. VINCENT. Officials of other countries, not members of the American Communist Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your answer is that you have not been in contact with any members of the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever received any advice, or directives, on policy, from any Communist or pro-Communist source?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not, sir.



Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever received any money, reward, emolument, decoration, or praise from any Communist government or its representative at any time?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever visited any Communist country?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I visited Siberia.

Mr. SOURWINE. On more than one occasion?

Mr. VINCENT. Siberia once, and I was on the conference with Mr. Byrnes in Moscow in 1945, December.

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than those two occasions?

Mr. VINCENT. I was trying to recall whether recently in Europe. No; I never visited any of the Communist countries in Europe.

Mr. SOURWINE. On August 30, 1948, Mr. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of State, testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities that there was a group in the State Department opposed to the idea that the Russians were not going to be sympathetic or cooperative and that they indicated a very aggressive policy, and that this group, Mr. Acheson's group, as he described it, with Mr. Hiss as his principal assistant in the matter, won out in the State Department. Would you consider yourself a part of the group there referred to?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever attended any discussions, group meetings, or social gatherings with Communists or pro-Communists, either in the United States or in any other country?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever consciously conformed your actions or your expression of opinion with any Communist policy or Communist directive?

Mr. VINCENT. Not consciously, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever express publicly or privately sympathy for Communist aims and ideology?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of ever doing so, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that cover the question of expression of sympathy for Communist aims or ideology in China or in Asia, generally?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your answer is no in that regard also?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the assignment or transfer to China, or to Japan, of any person whom you knew or had reason to believe was Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the transfer to the Far East of Mr. John S. Service?

Mr. VINCENT. I had nothing to do with Mr. John S. Service's transfers in any way, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the return to the Far East of Mr. John S. Service?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the assignment of Miriam Farley to the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the assignment of T. A. Bisson to the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a part of any Communist organization, apparatus, or network?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever under Communist discipline?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever agree to accept Communist discipline?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you have a statement that you want to make, sir, now is a good time to do it.

Mr. VINCENT. Thank you.

Senator EASTLAND. I would like to ask just one question.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. He asked you if you had approved the transfer of Mr. T. A. Bisson, Mr. John S. Service, and other people to the Far East. Your answer was that you had nothing to do with that. Do you know who did?

Mr. VINCENT. In the case of Mr. T. A. Bisson, I don't know of his ever having been transferred to the Far East in any official capacity, so my answer would be that I wouldn't know that anybody had transferred him to the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you stressing the word "transfer"?

Mr. VINCENT. Or the assignment.

Mr. SOURWINE. I intended the question to include assignment also. May I ask that question again with regard to Mr. Bisson: Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the assignment of Mr. Bisson to the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever advise, recommend or approve the assignment of Miriam Farley to the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. The answer again is no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever advise, recommend or approve the assignment of Mr. John S. Service to the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Now, Senator——

The CHAIRMAN. What is the answer to that?

Mr. VINCENT. To the last one?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, do you know who did?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I would say it was the Personnel Division of the Department of State in the case of Service's assignments.

Senator EASTLAND. What individual down there was behind this assignment to the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Let's go back. Are we speaking of the recent period of history?

Senator EASTLAND. We are speaking of the period he spoke of in those questions.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I think, covers the whole period.

Senator EASTLAND. That is what I want you to cover.

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot recall, Senator, who were the heads of the Personnel Division in the State Department at the time that Mr.

Service was assigned at one time or another, but his most recent assignment to the Far East was when he went out to General MacArthur, which I recall, and that was just an assignment by the Personnel Division, and at that time I would say that a man named Pen Davis was Chief of Personnel.

Senator EASTLAND. Are you saying that Mr. Davis was responsible for Mr. Service's assignment? Is that what you are saying?

Mr. VINCENT. I am saying so far as I know the Chief of Personnel technically was the responsible man for the assignment of personnel to the field.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the way it is carried out in the State Department, that the Chief of Personnel makes the assignments to the major places?

Mr. VINCENT. The Chief of Personnel, acting under the Administrative Assistant Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was the Administrative Assistant Secretary during this time?

Mr. VINCENT. That would have been in 1945. I should think it would have been Mr. Donald Russell, the Assistant Secretary to Mr. James Byrnes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Mr. Service was being assigned to the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean in this particular assignment?

Mr. MORRIS. 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I knew that he was being assigned to General MacArthur's headquarters.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you participate in any discussions concerning that transfer?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall any, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Had you known at that time that Mr. Service had gotten into difficulties in the Amerasia case?

Mr. VINCENT. I had known that; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator?

Senator EASTLAND. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. It had been the purpose to go into some of these matters more fully at a later time, I might say, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. That is all right. I will wait.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand the witness has a statement, and you say this is the proper time for him to make it?

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe so, sir, since I understand it has to do with subject matter of the series of questions just asked and answered.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. You may proceed.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I have requested an opportunity to meet with you for two reasons. First, to repudiate under oath certain irresponsible but very grave allegations made against me before this committee, and secondly, to give the committee whatever other assistance I may in the conduct of its investigation.

On August 23, 1951, before this subcommittee, Mr. Morris asked a witness, Louis Budenz, the following question:

Mr. Budenz, was John Carter Vincent a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Budenz replied:

From official reports I have received, he was.

Insofar as the printed record shows, Mr. Budenz did not produce or describe the "official reports" to which he referred.

Later Mr. Morris again inquired:

Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that it was an official Communist Party secret shared by few people that at that time John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party?

"Yes, sir," replied Mr. Budenz.

Mr. Budenz also testified that I was described "as being in line with the Communist viewpoint, seeing eye to eye with it." When questioned as to his source, he answered:

That was stated by Communist officials in the Politburo at that time, by Mr. Browder and Mr. Jack Stachel.

I have never met either Browder or Stachel, but it is pertinent to recall that Mr. Browder testified before the Tydings committee that he knew of no connection that I had with the Communist Party either directly or indirectly.

On October 5, 1951, Mr. Budenz again appeared before this committee. Mr. Morris asked:

Mr. Budenz, have you identified John Carter Vincent to be a member of the Communist Party before this committee?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; from official communications.

Later, during the same hearing, Mr. Morris said that:

Mr. Budenz reported to me, as a Naval Intelligence officer, the fact that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party, and I made a report on that fact.

Gentlemen, anyone, including Budenz, who before this subcommittee or anywhere else, testifies that I was at any time a member of the Communist Party is bearing false witness; he is, to put it bluntly, lying. I do not pretend to know what motives guide Mr. Budenz. In my own case, his motives seem to be clearly malicious. He has endeavored before this subcommittee to support his allegations by strained suggestion and devious insinuation.

Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am not a Communist and have never been a member of the Communist Party. I have never sympathized with the aims of communism. On the contrary, I have worked loyally throughout the 27 years of my Foreign Service career in the interest of our own Government and people. I am strongly attached to the principle of representative democracy and to our system of free enterprise. These being the facts, the members of the committee will appreciate, I am sure, how disagreeable it is for me to find it necessary to affirm my devotion to our democratic institutions because of unfounded allegations made by Budenz or anyone else.

We cannot dismiss the Budenz testimony as a mistake. Any attempt through malicious testimony to cause the American people to lose confidence in their officials or in each other is in itself subversive to the interests and security of our country. When, as in my case, the official represents his country abroad, the effect may be doubly harmful.

I am in full accord with the objectives of this subcommittee. The internal security of the United States, now probably more than at any



other time in our history, is vitally important to all of us. Our American way of life is threatened from within as well as from without. But we cannot, as I wrote you, Mr. Chairman, on November 9, defend democracy with perfidy or defeat communism with lies. And I wish to state, not as an official of our Government who has been falsely accused, but as a citizen who is deeply concerned for the welfare and security of his country, that irresponsible testimony, such as Mr. Budenz is wont to give, might have its use in a totalitarian state but has no place in our American democracy.

Mr. Budenz has made other allegations concerning me which are equally untrue though less material. Other witnesses have appeared before your committee and made statements concerning me which are factually incorrect. Mr. Eugene Dooman's testimony concerning the formulation of a postwar surrender policy for Japan is most inaccurate. In fact, some of the policies which Mr. Dooman charges that I formulated were actually formulated under his chairmanship of the committee dealing with the problem or by governmental agencies in which I had no responsibility. Admiral Cooke's testimony about my attitude toward making available certain ammunition to the Nationalist Government of China is in error. I wish to assure you that I am prepared to discuss and correct all such testimony and discuss any other issues which this committee may wish to consider.

But, gentlemen, my main purpose in seeking this opportunity to come before you has been accomplished. At the subcommittee hearings of October 5, 1951, Senator Smith is reported as saying:

Mr. Vincent should come here and challenge Mr. Budenz' statement and say "I am not a Communist." That draws the issue.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I now solemnly repeat: I am not and never have been a Communist. I so draw the issue.

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Sourwine, here is a letter which I wrote to the Honorable John Peurifoy, at that time Under Secretary of State, and which was submitted to the committee by the State Department which I would like an opportunity to read. It will take an additional 3 minutes. Mr. Chairman, may I?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. What date is that?

Mr. VINCENT. This is March 7, 1950. It is addressed to John Peurifoy.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it pertinent to this issue?

Mr. VINCENT. It is pertinent to this issue, sir.

You will note that the date is about the time of the hearings in the Tydings committee and I wrote him when I was Minister at Bern.

Mr. SOURWINE. This document, Mr. Chairman, is one of several documents which the State Department furnished in response to the committee's request for a much longer list. We will go into that a little later. It might be well at this time to point out that this is the only one of the documents furnished by the State Department which had not theretofore been made public.

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

DEAR JACK: I am sorry about all of the trouble that is being raised for you as a result of charges made against the Department. You and the Secretary have my full confidence and support, if needed.

A friend has sent me a copy of the Congressional Record of February 20. I gather that I have been "identified" in the press as Senator McCarthy's case

No. 2. I am, in fact, one of our "foreign ministers" although the job is hardly what I would call "high brass." Also, I did misplace a piece of clothing one time in 1946. But I must profess myself amazed that the incident became a matter of record, if in fact it has as Senator McCarthy's story would seem to imply. It was not my piece of clothing. It was a raincoat which some visitor left behind in the Far Eastern Office, of which I was Director at the time, and which hung there for weeks. One rainy day, having no coat with me, I put this raincoat on to go to lunch. Returning, I stopped at the Department washroom and forgot to take the raincoat when I left. Some days later, I recalled the oversight and called the building guard office, where I learned that the coat had been found and turned over to the Department's Security or Control Office. I have forgotten with whom I spoke in that office, but he informed me that there was a piece of paper in the inside breast pocket containing writing in what looked like Russian. I explained the history of the coat and asked whether the writing gave a clue to ownership. He did not know, but subsequent examination showed the writing, as I recall it, to be a practice or exercise in Russian word endings or suffixes, presumably the work of someone studying Russian. The coat was returned to the Far Eastern Office. When we moved from Old State to New State in 1947, I appropriated the coat and still have it. That is the history of the "clothing." I shall be glad to return the raincoat to the real owner, should his memory as to where he left it be revived by Senator McCarthy's story.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you say you did with the coat? Will you kindly go back just a little way when you moved from the old State Department to the new?

Mr. VINCENT. When we moved from Old State over to New State in 1947 I appropriated the coat and still have it, no one having called for it in a matter of a year.

May I continue?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, surely.

Mr. VINCENT (continuing):

As to the main portion of the Senator's statement I must profess complete ignorance. I have never acted directly or indirectly to provide espionage agents of Russia, or any other country, with information in the State Department or from any other governmental source. Therefore, the Senator's story, if it is intended to apply to me, is simply not true. Furthermore, I do not believe there were people in the Far Eastern Office capable of such action. No case of the kind ever came or was brought to my attention.

So much for that. I do not know whether the Department has a "case history" on me, but I would like to take this opportunity to let you have briefly a few facts concerning me which may be unknown to you, and to state that there are no other facts pertinent to the situation which is troubling Senator McCarthy.

As to family, just in case the question should arise: My mother died when I was a child. My father died in 1938. He was a real-estate agent and an active member of the Baptist Church. My stepmother is 76; lives in Macon, Ga.; and is as active in the Baptist Church as her age (76) will permit. My brother is a banker in Spartanburg, S. C. My sister is married to Rear Adm. Allan E. Smith, United States Navy, who recently rescued the U. S. S. *Missouri*. I have various and sundry cousins with whom I have virtually lost contact, but I have never heard anything derogatory regarding them. I have two nephews who served in the Armed Forces during the late war.

My wife has two brothers, John and Fred Slagle. They are in the insurance business, one at Chicago and the other at Kansas City. Both, as I understand it, are respected and sturdy Republicans. My wife's parents have been dead for many years. So much for family.

As for myself: I have never joined any political organization, "front" or otherwise. For 1 year, I think it was 1945, I was made an honorary or noncontributing member of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Service abroad has made it impracticable to join a political party. I am a Jeffersonian Democrat, a Lincolnian Republican, and an admirer since youth of Woodrow Wilson. I am a member of the Cosmos Club, Washington, the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity, and the Baptist Church.

I have never knowingly associated with American Communists or Communist sympathizers. I say "American," because my official duties have from time to time caused me to be in contact with foreign Communists. Chou En-lai, for instance (the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist regime.) I met in the house of Chiang Kai-shek. He was head of a liaison mission to the Chungking Government during the war. Here and in Washington, before my assignment here, and at other posts abroad, I have met foreign Communists at official or social functions. Our relationships have been perfunctory, except where official business had to be transacted.

In 1944, I accompanied Vice President Henry Wallace on a mission to China. I went under instructions from the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. The purpose in sending me was to make available to the Vice President my experience in China, extending back over 20 years.

As you know, my association with Far Eastern affairs has been a subject of intermittent press criticism. This was especially true while I was Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (September 1945 to August 1947). During that time I served under Mr. James Byrnes and General Marshall, as Secretary of State. My job was to implement the Government's policies, and to make them. It is immaterial that I found myself in accord with those policies. Had I not, I would have still attempted to carry them out or asked to be removed from a position where it was incumbent upon me to do so.

Any American, in public or private life, has a right to criticize our policies toward China and in the Far East and elsewhere. He does not have the right to impugn, simply on the basis of disagreeing with the policies themselves, the motives or character of those who are charged with the duty of implementing them. I have taken the oath of allegiance and loyalty to my country many times during my 25 years of service. The last time was in 1947, as United States Minister to Switzerland, after the Senate had confirmed my appointment. One is free to question my ability; but they cannot, in truth, question my loyalty. My record of public service is clear and so is my conscience.

I regret very much the circumstances that have caused me to feel it necessary to make this protest of innocence and loyalty but it is my belief that you and, if you approve, the public, have a right to expect a statement from me.

With best regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, when was that letter written?

Mr. VINCENT. That letter was written on March 7, 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. How was it transmitted?

Mr. VINCENT. It was transmitted in the normal mail.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it requested by one of your superiors?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it indicated to you that you should write such a letter?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was your own desire to write such a letter?

Mr. VINCENT. Voluntarily submitted by me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that seem to you to indicate that you had heard certain charges had been made against you?

Mr. VINCENT. I had read some of the testimony that was being made in Congress in the press, press reports.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was solely on the basis of the testimony in Congress and statements in the press that you wrote this letter?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This letter was written before or after the Budenz testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. This letter was written before the Budenz testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. This letter was written in 1950, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VINCENT. March 7, 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Budenz, I might say that there may be occasions when counsel or members of the committee—



Mr. VINCENT. Did you say "Mr. Budenz"?

Mr. SOURWINE. I beg your pardon, sir. If I did it was a slip of the tongue.

Mr. Vincent, there may be occasions when counsel or members of the committee may not feel that they agree wholly with your answer to some question, but we will not always on that occasion challenge you then and there with regard to it. I don't want the next few questions to be taken as an indication of policy as to how the hearing will be conducted, but some matters have been brought up that perhaps should be gone into right now.

You mentioned the fact in that letter to Mr. Peurifoy that you were a noncontributing member to the IPR. That makes it obvious that as early as 1950 you knew that you were a noncontributing member, does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall discussing that question in executive session here earlier?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall the exact discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall having been asked if you knew that you were a noncontributing member?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us now when you first came to know that you were a noncontributing member?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew that I was a noncontributing member because I never contributed so far as I could recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that you were the only noncontributing member of the board of trustees?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were a member of the board of trustees of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew that?

Mr. VINCENT. I was notified of that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned the matter of a coat.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you been asked any questions about that coat in this committee in executive session?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are volunteering that here?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your intent to testify with regard to the coat in question that you had left it somewhere?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And where did you leave it?

Mr. VINCENT. As I said in this letter, I left it in a washroom in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long after that did you remember that you had left it in the washroom?

Mr. VINCENT. It must have been a matter of a week, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who did you call?

Mr. VINCENT. I called the police guard that was in charge in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you say to them?



Mr. VINCENT. I said, "Have you found a raincoat," and tried to describe it.

Mr. SOURWINE. What kind of a description did you give them with regard to the coat?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't have a very clear idea because I had just taken the coat out that one time, but it was one of these ordinary brown-colored raincoats.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all you were able to tell them?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it the custom of the guards in the guardroom at the State Department when a person is attempting to identify lost or stolen property over the telephone to help them out by telling them what is in the pockets?

Mr. VINCENT. No; and he did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you know about the Russian papers in the pockets?

Mr. VINCENT. You may recall, as I say, that the police guard said he had turned it over to the security officer in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the security officer volunteer to you what was in the pockets?

Mr. VINCENT. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made no statement to him?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made no statement to the guard that you called first with regard to what was in the pockets of the coat?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not. I did not know that there was anything in the pockets.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were asked several questions here, Mr. Vincent, and I bring this up not for the purpose of quibbling with you but for the purpose of impressing upon you the desire of the committee—and I am sure it will be your own desire—to testify quite factually and give no wrong impressions with regard to anything. You were asked a number of fairly broad questions at the outset of the hearing. You were asked, for instance, if you had ever received any orders or instructions or suggestions directly or indirectly from any Communist or pro-Communist source.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have received suggestions from many people, have you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't doubt that I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have received suggestions through the reading of many books and other writings, have you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you in a position to state categorically that none of the people from whom you received suggestions and none of the writings that you read in that connection were either Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, in the absence of being able to recall exactly what I have read, but it would be a very broad statement to say that I have never received any suggestions from anything I have read, and I have read not consciously, if I have ever read what you call pro-Communist literature.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was whether you are in a position to state categorically that no person who has ever given you a suggestion was Communist or pro-Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot state categorically.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think that is obvious. Your answer to this question was a little bit too broad, then, was it not? The committee is not trying to trap you, Mr. Vincent. If a question is asked that it too broad, narrow it down. We will go into it and straighten out all the semantic difficulties and be sure that we understand your testimony and that you understand the questions.

As a matter of fact, you have through the years received suggestions from members of the IPR, have you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Through their writings and through conversations with them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Right. Are you in a position to state categorically that none of those members of the IPR were Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I could not state categorically that they are not pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is your opinion as to whether the IPR was Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not consider the IPR Communist or pro-Communist at the time I had any association with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is your present opinion, if it has changed in any way?

Mr. VINCENT. From the testimony I have heard and seen here, I would say that it certainly had a pro-Communist slant at times.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you know now that the IPR had a pro-Communist slant at times, and you know now that at times you received suggestions from IPR personnel and IPR writings?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall direct suggestions from them, but I have testified that in reading their writings and in conversations with them there is no doubt that there were suggestions.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't mean to labor—

Mr. VINCENT. I don't quite get what you mean by suggestions, whether you mean by suggestions that they came to me suggesting or whether I read or in conversation with them myself drew inferences from what they were saying.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe you stated that both had occurred.

Mr. VINCENT. I think we understand each other, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were asked the question have you ever been in contact with any members of the Communist Party of the United States.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The most that a man could say to that would be, not knowingly, isn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated categorically that you had not been.

Mr. VINCENT. Didn't I add to the best of my knowledge and belief?

Mr. SOURWINE. You were asked if you had ever received advice on policy from any Communist or pro-Communist source. You have received advice on policy from people connected with the IPR, have you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Now you are bringing the word "advice" in rather than suggestions; that I could not say that I have received advice from members of the IPR or from the IPR itself?

Mr. SOURWINE. Persons connected with the IPR, was the question.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't doubt that from time to time in conversing with those people that they have attempted to give advice on matters of policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. You were asked if you had ever received any praise from any Communist government or its representative at any time.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said "No."

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember Sergei Goglidze?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. We will go into that more fully later, but Mr. Goglidze did praise you, did he not?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say in connection with that toast he might have considered that praise.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is an incident in the record of a statement by Mr. Sergei Goglidze which highly praised Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Vincent.

Mr. Goglidze was at that time a representative of the Communist government, was he not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you answered that question categorically, then, your answer was a little too broad, at least, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not thinking in terms of that toast as praise.

Mr. SOURWINE. I won't reiterate on all of these questions, but you were asked whether you had attended any social gatherings with Communists or pro-Communists in the United States or any other country and you said "No." You did attend at least one, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Then I didn't understand the question, because I have attended social gatherings. I have attended receptions at the—

Mr. SOURWINE. Any time you don't understand the question please ask to have it repeated because your answers are going to be binding upon you, sir, and if the question is too broad we want you to narrow it down. If you don't understand it make sure you do. If you don't understand the meaning of a word, let's be sure that the understanding is there. For instance, in the executive sessions we had the understanding—and I would like to have it here—that if you use the phrase "it might have been," you mean it in the sense of something which you feel was logical under all the facts known to you and which you did not know did not happen, is that clear?

Mr. VINCENT. That is clear; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You will not use the phrase "it might have been" merely in the sense of a hypothesis, the truth of which you have no knowledge or belief with regard to?

Mr. VINCENT. I will try not to, if it confuses you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very well. If it strikes counsel that you are so using it we will certainly bring it up and straighten it out.

Mr. Chairman, I apologize for these digressions, but it is going to be a long hearing and I think perhaps that foundation will be helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the executive sessions—as the chairman knows, there were 3 days of executive sessions—a number of questions were asked which were necessarily tedious. Mr. Vincent and counsel have stated, and I ask them to reaffirm it here—that they have no objection to having those hearings or any part of them made public if the committee so rules. The committee of course has the right to remove the executive injunction from those at its option but I thought the record should show that Mr. Vincent and counsel have voiced no objection after having read the testimony.

You were asked, sir, were you not, at the executive sessions with regard to what position you took in reference to the loyalty status of certain named individuals in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to go through that list again. The question with respect to each name is this: What position, if any, did you take in reference to the loyalty status of this particular individual in the State Department?

That is a fairly inclusive question. Take your time in answering. Alger Hiss.

Mr. VINCENT. I recall taking no position on the loyalty status of Hiss.

Mr. SOURWINE. Cora DuBois.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of taking any.

Mr. SOURWINE. John K. Emmerson.

Senator EASTLAND. Give him time to answer the question.

Mr. VINCENT. John K. Emmerson. I have no recollection of taking any position on the loyalty status of Emmerson.

Mr. SOURWINE. Robert W. Barnett.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I have not; not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Julian R. Friedman.

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge have I taken a position.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you ever hear of any charges against Mr. Friedman, any suspicion about him, any suggestions that he ought to be investigated or checked?

Mr. VINCENT. I may have, but I took no position on Friedman. No inquiry was ever made of me as to the loyalty status of Friedman that I recollect.

The CHAIRMAN. Let him finish his answer.

Mr. VINCENT. That I recollect. I don't recall ever being questioned regarding the loyalty or taking a position on the loyalty of Friedman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't anyone ever come to you with allegations against Mr. Friedman, with the statement or urging that they should be investigated?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall anything coming to me, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. John P. Davies.

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wilma Fairbank.

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. John Stewart Service?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.



The CHAIRMAN. Get this all clear. You are going back to your original question that he had taken no position and expressed nothing with reference to each one of these.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct.

That brings up, before I go through with the rest of these names, your answer to Senator Eastland's question with regard to Mr. Service. As a matter of fact, do you know who made the telephone call to Mr. Service in California to tell him to go back to China, that he was going to work with General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you make that telephone call?

Mr. VINCENT. It could be logical that I did, but you are asking me if I recall, and I don't recall telephoning him to go on back to China.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understand that you stated categorically in response to several questions along that line that you had nothing whatsoever to do with Mr. Service's assignment or reassignment or instructions to return to China.

Mr. VINCENT. That was my testimony, sir, and based on my memory I have no recollection of having anything to do with Service's returning to China. He was already assigned to China in 1944. It was a mere matter of his returning, was it not?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember the occasion on which Mr. Service, then in California, was instructed to return to China and told that he was going to be attached to General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that, sir. I knew he was going to be attached, but I don't recall this particular occasion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that he had been back to the United States and did return to China and was thereafter attached to General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. He had been attached previously to General Stilwell.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any circumstances at all about his return to China and his attachment to General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid I do not, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Service himself had made a statement with regard to that?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read the hearings of the State Department employee loyalty investigation before a subcommittee of the Senate on Foreign Relations of the Eighty-first Congress?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have here a copy of those hearings. They contain a paragraph which I shall ask the permission of the Chair to read. It is on page 1998 of the printed hearings, part 2, appendix.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, if it is pertinent to the matter we are discussing.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a transcript of an oral statement made by Mr. Service before the Department of State Loyalty Board.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a statement made under oath?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir. Referring to the telephone call we have just been discussing, which told Mr. Service that he was to go back to

China, the chairman said, "Who in the State Department made that telephone call?" Answer, "Mr. John Carter Vincent."

Do you have anything you want to add at this time to the statement you have made in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't have anything to add, sir. I simply do not recall telephoning Service. I recall that Service went back, but the fact that I made the telephone call has completely slipped my memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is and was a friend of yours?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. I don't even recall that there was an issue as to whether he was to go back.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is Laurence Salisbury.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, Mr. Sourwine, you had better connect up there again.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question asked with regard to this name, as in the case of each of the other names, is, What position did you take in reference to the loyalty status of this individual in the State Department, Laurence Salisbury?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall taking no position with reference to his loyalty.

Mr. SOURWINE. Raymond Ludden.

Mr. VINCENT. I took no position that I recall in connection with the loyalty status of Ludden.

Mr. SOURWINE. William T. Stone.

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is a point, sir, that perhaps should be cleared up. Newspaper accounts have differed with respect to your comment on the testimony of Louis Budenz. Many newspapers and all of the national wire services have referred to the fact that you called Mr. Budenz' testimony false. Certain other publications, including the New York Compass and the Daily Worker, have specifically used the word "perjury." You have made a statement here today which dealt with the matter. Would you tell the committee whether you wish to be understood as declaring Mr. Budenz' testimony to be in error because of faulty memory or improper recollection or hallucinations or the drawing of unjustifiable conclusions or any similar noncriminal reason or whether you wish to charge Mr. Budenz specifically with willful perjury?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not wish to charge Mr. Budenz with willful perjury.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were subpoenaed to attend this hearing were you requested to bring with you certain documents?

Mr. VINCENT. I was, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you bring them?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give the committee an explanation for not bringing them?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was that explanation?

Mr. VINCENT. I said I requested the State Department permission to bring them and the State Department said they could not release the papers.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the record on that with reference to the State Department, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, the letter of the chairman to the State Department requesting 32 categories of documents is already referred to in the record, together with the State Department's reply.

The CHAIRMAN. In the record in executive session?

Mr. SOURWINE. In the record in executive session. It will be the recommendation of the staff that that record be opened up as a public record and be made a part of the printed record of the examination of Mr. Vincent. With that in mind we are not immediately prepared to put that letter in the record again. The State Department took the position that most of the documents could not be turned over and they were therefore refused on the grounds that to turn them over would hamper the free flow and interchange of information at various levels in the State Department.

There is here, Mr. Chairman, a list of the 32 documents which were requested of the State Department, and if desired it can go in the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it should go in the record at this time. I think the answer of the State Department should follow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good, sir. Will you order that it be laid in at the proper place in the record? The question I was asking Mr. Vincent was his own answer with regard to these documents because the request was made separately to him and to the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. He seemed to be inclined—at least he had no objection to bringing the instruments requested, but the State Department refused to permit him to bring them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that substantially your statement?

Mr. VINCENT. That is substantially correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You felt you had no authority to bring any of those documents without the State Department's authorization?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct. I had no possession of them.

(The documents referred were marked "Exhibits No. 376 and No. 377," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 376

JANUARY 2, 1952.

HON. DEAN ACHESON,  
*Secretary of State*  
*State Department, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Due to unforeseen circumstances, the appearance of John Carter Vincent before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee will have to be postponed from January 11, 1952, to January 24 or 25.

In the interests of full justice to Mr. Vincent and in order to safeguard against any possible misinterpretation of his position or that of the Department of State, we are asking him to bring with him the enclosed documents. It would undoubtedly expedite matters if the State Department made all the necessary arrangements for obtaining these documents from its files for use at this bearing.

It would further expedite the situation if the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee were given access to the loyalty file of Mr. Vincent.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

JOHN CARTER VINCENT—DOCUMENTS REQUESTED

1. Correspondence with United States Embassy staff in Chungking from July 1 to December 30, 1945.
2. Copy of statement issued criticizing statement of six members of the House Military Affairs Committee regarding Soviet intentions in the Far East—



House Members' statement published September 10, 1946—Vincent statement subsequent.

3. Drafts of all statements prepared by Vincent for General Marshall.
4. Draft of statement for Secretary Byrnes in the fall of 1946 recommending withdrawal of all aid to the Nationalist Government of China.
5. Copy of speech delivered before the Far East luncheon of the National Foreign Trade Council on November 11, 1946, stating that it is unsound to invest capital in countries with corrupt regimes.
6. Drafts of all memos prepared for Henry A. Wallace, or correspondence with him.
7. Copies of all recommendations made to Yalta and Potsdam Conferences.
8. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with Julian R. Friedman, Harry B. Price, Philip Jaffe.
9. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with Alger Hiss, Hugh DeLacy, Frederick V. Field.
10. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with John P. Davies, Raymond Ludden, John S. Service, T. A. Bisson, Edward C. Carter, Miriam Farley, John K. Fairbank.
11. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with Patrick J. Hurley.
12. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with Owen Lattimore, Lauchlin Currie, Solomon Adler.
13. Draft presented to Secretary of State in the fall of 1946 used as a basis for the President's statement of December 18, 1946.
14. Letter of Vincent to John E. Peurifoy dated March 7, 1950, from American Legation at Bern.
15. Copy of speech made at IPR (Institute of Pacific Relations) conference at Hot Springs, Va., in 1945.
16. Memorandum prepared for Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the late autumn of 1945, later submitted to the Secretary of State and the White House.
17. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer and Gen. Joseph Stilwell.
18. Drafts of all memos on Japanese Peace Treaty and surrender conditions.
19. Recommendations on the supply of arms to the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists; also all estimates and recommendations regarding the Chinese Communists.
20. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with John N. Hazard, Joseph Barnes, Vladimir Rogoff.
21. Full statement published in the New York Herald Tribune September 4, 1946, attacking MacArthur for violation of State Department directives re "building a bridge of friendship to the Soviet Union."
22. Statement authorized by Vincent in the latter part of 1946 re American naval vessel being summarily ordered out of Dairen by Soviet commander in violation of Yalta Pact and Sino-Soviet Pact of 1945.
23. Copy of address at Cornell University January 21, 1947, indirectly attacking Chinese Nationalist Government.
24. All documents in connection with Vincent's change from Minister to Switzerland to the position of diplomatic agent and consul general at Tangier.
25. A full record of votes by Vincent before the International Assets Commission which voted on the question of turning over the assets of the Chinese Nationalist Government to the Chinese Communists.
26. Copies of all cables sent by Vincent to the State Department in June 1943.
27. Broadcast speech contained in State Department Bulletin October 7, 1945, page 538.
28. Vincent recommendations regarding the setting up of the Korean government.
29. Memorandum prepared by Vincent about March or April 1945, regarding conferences with Generals Hurley and Wedemeyer held in Washington.
30. Vincent report of conversation with Chou-En-lai and Lin Piao on November 20, 1942, and any other conversations with Communist leaders in China. (See p. 3, Subject: Kuomintang-Communist situation—probably Service document.)
31. All memoranda furnished by Mr. Vincent to Mr. Wallace in connection with the latter's mission to China in 1944 and in connection with subsequent reports on the mission.
32. All memoranda furnished by Mr. Vincent to President Truman relative to the latter's statement on China policy made December 15, 1949.



EXHIBIT No. 377

JANUARY 22, 1952.

The Honorable PAT McCARRAN,  
*United States Senate.*

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: This is in reply to your letter of January 2, 1952, requesting that the Department of State transmit to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee 32 categories of documents from its files relating to Mr. John Carter Vincent and to the policy of the Department of State with respect to the Far East.

Mr. Vincent has referred to us your letter to him dated January 2, 1952, in which you also requested the same 32 categories of documents, and has requested the Department to cooperate to the fullest extent practicable in making the documents available.

The Department is happy to cooperate to the fullest extent that its regulations and policies permit.

There is transmitted herewith a copy of the speech delivered by Mr. Vincent before the National Foreign Trade Council on November 12, 1946, summary notes of conversations between Vice President Wallace and President Chiang Kai-shek prepared by Mr. Vincent, a copy of a letter from Mr. Vincent to Mr. John E. Peurifoy, dated March 7, 1950, a press release issued by the Department of State January 6, 1947, on the status and control of the port of Dairen, and a press release of October 5, 1945, on a radio forum concerning our occupation policy for Japan. There is also enclosed a paraphrase of the telegrams sent by Vice President Wallace to President Roosevelt as a result of Vice President Wallace's mission to the Far East, a mission on which he was accompanied by Mr. Vincent. These telegrams deal with both General Stilwell and General Wedemeyer.

The records of the Department do not disclose any statement criticizing the statement of six members of the House Military Affairs Committee regarding Soviet intentions in the Far East, the text of any speech made at the conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Hot Springs, Va. in January 1945, any statement of November 4, 1946, concerning General MacArthur, or the text of an address delivered by Mr. Vincent at Cornell on January 21, 1947.

With respect to the remainder of the requests, it is noted that they call for a large number of internal documents of the Department of State. In many cases these are reports from the field. It is the view of the Department that preserving the integrity of the reporting by departmental officers is a matter of principle of the highest importance. It is equally important to protect the integrity of internal memoranda in which views are exchanged in the formation of policy. The release of these documents would undoubtedly inhibit the free and frank expression of views by the officers of the Department. For these reasons, the request for these internal papers presents such serious questions of policy and principle that it has been felt necessary to refer the matter to the White House for reply.

Your request for the loyalty file on Mr. Vincent has also been referred to the White House as required by the Presidential directive of March 13, 1948.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE,  
*Deputy Under Secretary*  
(For the Secretary of State).

Enclosures: As stated above.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, you were qualified as an expert on the Far East by more than 20 years of training and experience, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct, with the modification that my training and experience have been primarily in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You testified, I believe, that you considered yourself an expert on the Far East, particularly with regard to China?

Mr. VINCENT. Particularly with regard to China, because I have not had actual physical service outside of China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the committee satisfied with this qualification of Mr. Vincent or does it desire further questions asked? We will go more into his experience as the examination progresses.

Did you or do you know Mortimer Graves?

Mr. VINCENT. I met him here in Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify Mortimer Graves?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I first met Mortimer Graves when I came back from China in 1943. I don't believe I met him before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is or was Mortimer Graves?

Mr. VINCENT. Mortimer Graves was a member of something called the Learned Societies. I don't recall the exact title he had here. He was working at the time I met him in connection with some kind of study of languages for the Government, I believe. I am testifying here completely from memory because Mr. Mortimer Graves was not a close friend of mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you continued the acquaintanceship since 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. I saw him probably from time to time between 1943 and 1945. I don't recall seeing him subsequent to 1945 or 1946.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you carry on a correspondence with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of a correspondence with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Edwin M. Martin?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify him?

Mr. VINCENT. He is an economist in the State Department whom I met first, I would say, when I came back from China, either in 1943 or 1944, some time during the period of my service in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he ever Chief, Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs for the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my recollection that was his title. He was in it, whether he was chief or not I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that?

Mr. VINCENT. That would have been—I am now testifying purely from memory—in 1945, I should think.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at that time Chief of the Far Eastern Division, Director?

Mr. VINCENT. I became Director of the Far Eastern Office in September 1945. Prior to that I had been Chief of the China Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs under the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a separate division?

Mr. VINCENT. Under Mr. Will Clayton.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Martin, then, at the time you were Director of the Far Eastern Division, was on a level with you in the State Department echelon?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't give exact testimony to that because he didn't have the title of Director, so I doubt whether he would be technically considered on the same echelon. He would have been considered the same echelon when I was Chief of the China Division, but he would not have been——

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he then your subordinate?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he in any sense your protégé?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I would not say so. Mr. Edwin Martin was never a protégé of mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he work under you?

Mr. VINCENT. He worked with me from time to time, but he did not work under me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever seek your advice or counsel with regard to his work?

Mr. VINCENT. I should think he would have.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did very frequently?

Mr. VINCENT. It would be logical for him. I don't recall. We will use your word logical. It certainly would have been logical for him in the economics office, and there were always committee meetings and consultations.

The CHAIRMAN. Does your memory serve you that he did or that he did not?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have thought that he would have sought my advice.

The CHAIRMAN. You say it is logical. What is your memory?

Mr. VINCENT. I say I have no distinct recollection of his seeking my advice, sir, but it would have been logical for him to do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, he conferred with you with considerable frequency, didn't he?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; but I was saying I was not able to recall specific instances.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you do know that he did confer with you frequently?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you know that Mr. Martin was a speaker much sought after by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge on that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never knew that he made speeches for the Institute or at their request?

Mr. VINCENT. Edwin Martin? I have no recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was Mr. Martin's position with regard to General MacArthur and his activities?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall his attitude on General MacArthur and his activities.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know him to or hear him express himself with regard to General MacArthur's staff?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't have any recollection of Martin discussing General MacArthur's staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say it was not common knowledge in the State Department what attitude and opinion Mr. Martin held with regard to General MacArthur's staff?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say it was common opinion because it certainly wasn't common to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say it was not common knowledge in the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Martin ever express himself to you or in your hearing with regard to officials in Korea who are opposed or were opposed then to the left-wing element?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of his making such a statement, sir.



Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever express himself with regard to the Korean Commission?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall his expressing himself to me. To what Korean Commission would that be, sir? I am trying to get that precisely. I have no recollection of his making any comments to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Having raised the question, let's get it precise. How many Korean Commissions were there?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to get myself what is the Korean Commission at this time. I have been out of this country for 6 years. I was trying to remember what was the Korean Commission. If you have data——

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't place the Korean Commission?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't at this moment place the Korean Commission.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is possible that counsel has used a misnomer. Do you know whether he ever characterized the Korean Commission or any agency that he referred to as the Korean Commission as right-wing reactionaries?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall his making such a statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. There has been some discussion with regard to Mr. John Stewart Service. To be sure your testimony is complete on that point, will you identify him and tell the committee when and where you met him?

Mr. VINCENT. May I refer to these notes I have here just so it is in accord with the facts and the dates?

Mr. SOURWINE. Are those the same notes you had at the executive session?

Mr. VINCENT. The same notes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you augmented them in any regard?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no names in there now that you didn't have in the original notes?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you have, then, already commented to the committee in the executive session on each of the names that you have in that notebook, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; as far as I recall. I haven't added any names to it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is understood, Mr. Chairman—it was understood in the executive session and I will ask Mr. Vincent to agree to this—that when he uses this notebook it is for the purpose of refreshing his recollection. He is not reading the notebook and saying this is what the notebook says. He is saying this is my testimony, having been refreshed from notes which I have myself made.

The CHAIRMAN. These notes are of his own making?

Mr. SOURWINE. They are of your own making? That is your testimony, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; and in looking up to find out what times or places Service may have served.

The CHAIRMAN. How did it come about that you prepared these notes preliminary to the executive session?

Mr. VINCENT. Because I went through some of the hearings of the committee and people who may have been mentioned in connection with me, I anticipated that there probably would be a request for testimony, and my purpose was solely to have as nearly exact informa-



tion as I could get as to what my associations were with these various people.

The CHAIRMAN. In making the notes did you confer with others or did you confer with records?

Mr. VINCENT. I conferred with records.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vincent brought out in the executive session that the State Department has in its library a complete file of the hearings of this committee in the manuscript form, that is, a file purchased from the reporter. He didn't have to wait until the printed record came out. The State Department purchased that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. VINCENT. Do you want me to give this data?

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let's have the question, please.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question is to identify Mr. John Stewart Service and tell the committee when and where you first met him.

Mr. VINCENT (reading). Service was a junior secretary at our Embassy in Chungking when I was counselor under Ambassador Gauss from May 1941 to May 1943. For a while during this period he lived in the house with Ambassador Gauss and me. He was an active and intelligent young officer. I do not recall the exact nature of his assignments. In 1943, Service was lent to General Stilwell's headquarters as a sort of political adviser. Several other junior officers were similarly assigned.

My next contact with Service was in 1944 when he came home on a short vacation. In 1945 he was in Washington again. He was assigned to the Office of the Director General of the Foreign Service doing some kind of administrative work. It was at this time that the Amerasia case broke. I never discussed the case with Service, nor did I have anything to do with the Amerasia case, but I did, along with other friends, make a small contribution to help him hire legal counsel. I believe he repaid me.

After the grand jury dismissed the case against Service, he was assigned to General MacArthur's headquarters, and I do not believe I saw him again before my departure for Switzerland in 1947. When I came home in 1949 for 10 days' consultation, Service was in Washington and we and other friends had lunch together.

Since my return to Washington I have seen Service once in the halls of the State Department. We chatted briefly. I have not seen him since.

I do not mean to imply by the foregoing that I have avoided Service. It was simply a matter of no time for social meeting and we both had other business.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you intend that statement, Mr. Vincent, to be a full and complete disclosure to the committee of your association with Mr. Service?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. I could add to it that without doubt I may have seen Service at other places prior to 1942, but—he may have been in Shanghai at the time I was there. Or our paths may have crossed elsewhere.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well do you know him?

Mr. VINCENT. Quite well.

Mr. SOURWINE. You still know him quite well?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend him for employment?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of recommending him. He was already employed when I met him. You mean as to assignment? He was employed when I met him first. He was already employed with the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your answer is that you never recommended him for employment?

Mr. VINCENT. Employment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend him for assignment to any particular post?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall ever recommending him for assignment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend him for promotion?

Mr. VINCENT. Let me see. No, I have no recollection of recommending him for promotion.

The CHAIRMAN. Who effected or brought about his being lent to General Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, I would say General Stilwell did himself. I think General Stilwell made a request of the State Department to assign to him certain officers in 1942.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Stilwell select or name the officers that he wanted?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say whether General Stilwell actually selected them or not.

The CHAIRMAN. He was at that time housed with you and someone else?

Mr. VINCENT. Ambassador Gauss. Ambassador Gauss and I during my period in Chungking lived together, and some time during that period a short time Service was also there.

The CHAIRMAN. It was during that period that he was lent to General Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. He was lent to General Stilwell, and I think in that period he then moved out and another young secretary moved in with Ambassador Gauss and myself.

The CHAIRMAN. His being lent to General Stilwell must have come from some State Department authority?

Mr. VINCENT. The State Department would have had to approve his being loaned to him. He still continued to be on the State Department payroll and continued to have the title, I think, of third or second secretary with the Embassy. But his work was with General Stilwell.

The CHAIRMAN. You had nothing to do with his going with General Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir. General Stilwell I think chose his own people. Service was already in China and was known to Stilwell.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever arrange for Mr. Service to make a talk for the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall that he made a talk before the IPR, and I don't recall any recollection of my arranging for him making a talk.

The CHAIRMAN. That wasn't the question. What is that question again?

Mr. VINCENT. The question is did I ever arrange for him to talk, and I said that I had no recollection of making arrangements for his talking or of his talking before the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Following Mr. Service's return to Washington in 1944 did someone in the IPR ask you whether it would be possible to have Mr. Service come over and give an informal off-the-record talk to some of the IPR people in their Washington office?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of such an instance, but again I will say that it would be logical for somebody to ask me whether a returning officer could come over and make a talk. I say I have no memory of the incident.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you arrange talks for the IPR so frequently that they didn't make any mental impression on you, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not. I don't recall ever making arrangements for talks with the IPR, even this one that you mention here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Service has himself stated that the circumstances were substantially as indicated in my question, that is that someone in the IPR asked if it would be possible for him to come over and make a talk and cleared it with you?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of that incident. It would be logical for them to call me.

Senator EASTLAND. I would like to get the information connected with his joining IPR. Who sponsored him? Would you ask him those questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir; I have a series of questions on it. I will be glad to ask them now if the Senator wishes.

Senator EASTLAND. No. Go ahead, that is all right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who would have arranged for Mr. Service to make a talk before the IPR, if it was to be arranged from a State Department source? Who had the authority?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say who would have the authority.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had it, didn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. If I had the authority—I would not have thought it would take authority for him to make an off-the-record talk.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not know whether you had that authority or not?

Mr. VINCENT. To allow him? He was not under my control.

Mr. SOURWINE. A moment ago you said it would have been logical for him to come to you. Why would it have been logical for him to come to you?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have been logical because I was Chief of the China Division at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. You were his superior, too.

Mr. VINCENT. You have there to go into the whole matter of the arrangements in the State Department. I was a senior officer, but not in any sense his superior in the sense that I gave him instructions what to do or not to do, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. Why?

Mr. VINCENT. Because he was working at that time under General Stilwell, loaned by the State Department to General Stilwell, and was home, as I gather it, on leave.

The CHAIRMAN. That isn't the time referred to in the question.

Mr. VINCENT. What is the time?

The CHAIRMAN. Back to the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Following Mr. Service's return to Washington in 1944.

Mr. VINCENT. At that time he was assigned to General Stilwell.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there was a man in a lower echelon from the State Department who desired a clearance at a higher level with regard to making a speech outside the Department and he did come to you, would you have had authority to express an opinion as to whether he could or could not properly make that speech?

Mr. VINCENT. That is a difficult question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have hesitated to express an opinion in such a case?

Mr. VINCENT. I would probably have told—as I said, I am testifying—I probably would have told him I saw no objection to his going over and making a talk before them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you would have told him that as a matter of course, without investigating the circumstances, or going into where he was going to make the speech or who the people were?

Mr. VINCENT. No. If he told me where he was going or if he just told me the IPR, I would have had no objection at the time to his going before the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give Mr. Service any papers to be taken or delivered to anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of ever giving Service papers to be delivered elsewhere.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give Mr. Service any papers to be given to Mr. Jaffe?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did any of your associates or subordinates do so?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think they did, but I have no exact knowledge on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you instruct anyone directly or indirectly to give Mr. Service any papers to take to Mr. Jaffe?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Where did he get those papers? Did they come from your department?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time, at the time of the Amerasia case, he was working down in the administrative office. How he ever got those papers—

Senator EASTLAND. Was he in your department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, he was not in my Division. He was working in the Administrative Division of the State Department in 1945. He was not in the Far Eastern Office at that time.

Senator EASTLAND. Those papers were under your charge, were they not?

Mr. VINCENT. They were not. They were under my charge in the sense that I was Chief of the China Division.

Senator EASTLAND. That is what I mean. They were under your charge. Did he have access to them?

Mr. VINCENT. He probably did. As a China service man and officer in the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. They were reports on conditions in China, weren't they, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the nature of these. I haven't read the Service testimony and I don't recall the nature of the documents.



But it is correct to say that they were in the charge of the Far Eastern Office, and I was the Chief of the China Division.

Senator EASTLAND. They were under you.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you say he had access to those papers?

Mr. VINCENT. He could have come up and seen papers because he was a member——

The CHAIRMAN. Let's get your statement there. The question of the Senator is did he have access? You can answer that "yes" or "no."

Senator EASTLAND. Of course, he can answer it "yes" or "no."

Mr. VINCENT. I have answered that he would have had access to the papers up in the Far Eastern Office.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator EASTLAND. Who sponsored you for membership in the IPR, Mr. Vincent.

Mr. VINCENT. I have learned lately that it was Dr. Philip Jessup. I did not know it at the time or didn't recall that I was sponsored by anyone. But I have seen somewhere——

Senator EASTLAND. Didn't you attempt to find out who sponsored you for membership when they asked you to join?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not.

Senator EASTLAND. How long were you a member before you were put on the board of trustees?

Mr. VINCENT. I wasn't a member before I was put on the board of trustees.

Senator EASTLAND. When you became a member you were put on the board of trustees?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. How were you notified of membership?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of a letter being served, but I imagine I was notified that I had been made a trustee.

Senator EASTLAND. By whom? Who notified you?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Jessup?

Mr. VINCENT. I have seen somewhere that Mr. Jessup was the one who recommended me.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Mr. Lattimore have anything to do with it?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Senator EASTLAND. You were a friend of Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I was a friend of Mr. Lattimore.

Senator EASTLAND. You are a friend of his now?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. In fact, when you were in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department you were friendly with Mr. Lattimore, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. How long were you a member of IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Just that 1 year—1945.

Senator EASTLAND. Why did you quit?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I was just not rechosen as a trustee or a member.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, didn't you decline to serve for a second term?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection on that, but my point is that I didn't become a member again and I presume I did decline.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a little different from not being chosen again, isn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember why you declined?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall. You have said that you could refresh my memory on that, I think, in executive hearing.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Mr. Lattimore discuss with you our China policies?

Mr. VINCENT. He did from time to time, Senator, when he was Deputy Director of the OWI, the Office of War Information. During what period that was I don't know.

Senator EASTLAND. Did he advise with you about our policies in China and Asia at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. He almost had to, if I may add. He almost had to as Deputy of OWI. There were conferences all the time because they had to keep in touch with us in the State Department on what was the general line.

Senator EASTLAND. That is what I asked you. What you are saying is that he was attempting to find out what your policies were. Did he advise you what those policies should be?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall his advising me as to what our policies should be. He advised with us as to what policies were, and then through the mechanism of the OWI they were trying to work out their matter of bringing information to the Far East during that period of 1944, I think it was, that he was Deputy Director of OWI.

The CHAIRMAN. The policy was made in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; not in OWI.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in OWI, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, weren't you considered by the IPR as a "trusted" member of the IPR, and I use that word in quotes?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge that they considered me a trusted member of the IPR. I never had had any association with the IPR to any extent prior to my choice or election as a trustee. I had known the IPR members, but I had not followed the affairs of the IPR with any closeness.

The CHAIRMAN. As the picture stands now, as I view it—and I wish you would correct me if I am wrong—that you became a member, and when you became a member you became a trustee?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Immediately on your being selected?

Mr. VINCENT. I was never a member other than the period when I was a trustee.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Then you failed to be a member and was no longer on the board of trustees, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. And I may add there that the board of trustees, if it met, I never met with it during the time I was a trustee. I didn't participate in whatever deliberations there were expected of trustees. I don't know what deliberations were expected of trustees.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know Freddie Field?

Mr. VINCENT. I met him once or twice.

Senator EASTLAND. Where?

MR. VINCENT. I met him for the first time, I think, at an IPR conference at Hot Springs in January 1945, at a social gathering. I may have met him at a meeting here in Washington of the American delegation. I was on the American delegation to the IPR conference in Hot Springs in 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Sourwine.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, do you recall having seen a report on the subject of The Need of an American Policy Toward the Problems Created by the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, a report indicating that the Communists are about one-fifth of the population and that they were going to have a definite influence on the future of China?

MR. VINCENT. Will you state your question again, sir? Do I recall seeing such a document?

MR. SOURWINE. Yes.

MR. VINCENT. I do not recall seeing such a document.

MR. SOURWINE. Do you know that that was one of the so-called Amerasia papers?

MR. VINCENT. I do not know to this day that that is one of the Amerasia papers; no sir.

MR. SOURWINE. Do you recall having seen a document, a report on the subject The Growth of the New Fourth Army, an Example of the Popular Democratic Appeal of the Chinese Communists, indicating that the popular support of the Chinese Communists shows their policies and methods are democratic?

MR. VINCENT. I do not recall such a document.

MR. SOURWINE. Do you recall having seen a document entitled The Views of Mao Tse-tung, America and China, dated in March of 1945?

MR. VINCENT. My answer again is I do not recall the document. My testimony is that I do not recall the document. If I saw the document, it was one of many that passed across my desk as Chief of the China Division, but I have no present recollection of those documents.

MR. SOURWINE. Do you know that all three of those documents I mentioned were among the so-called Amerasia papers?

MR. VINCENT. No.

MR. SOURWINE. Do you have any information or knowledge as to how any of those documents could have gotten into the possession of Amerasia?

MR. VINCENT. I do not, except that the testimony is that Service was the man who brought them there, so the testimony is.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, did you ever give confidential and specific advice to the Institute of Pacific Relations in connection with the advisability of their publishing a controversial report on the Chinese situation written by Maxwell Stewart?

MR. VINCENT. Mr. Morris, I have no recollection of giving such advice on the report. I don't even recall the report. I do not recall ever having any confidential conversations with regard to such report.

MR. MORRIS. I see.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Service, did you ever hear——

MR. VINCENT. Mr. Vincent, please.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, did you ever hear the view expressed that the Chinese Communists had a non-Russian orientation?

Mr. VINCENT. I have heard that view expressed, yes, because in China frequently we would use the term "Chinese Chinese Communists" and "Russian Chinese Communists." I don't recall any particular Chinese called by one or the other of those names, but there was an impression that some of the Communists in Yenan were more Russian in their viewpoint than some of the others.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. John Paton Davies, Jr., ever espouse the view that the Chinese Communists had a non-Russian orientation?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall his expressing such a view, but I do recall that Davies was one of them also who referred to what you would call Chinese Communists and Russian Chinese Communists. I wouldn't be surprised if he wasn't the one that created that idea.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever express or approve the view that the Chinese Communists had a non-Russian orientation?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall expressing such a view, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. What were your views?

Mr. VINCENT. My views were that some of the Chinese Communists were not as closely allied to the Russians as some of the others.

Senator EASTLAND. What about the leadership?

Mr. VINCENT. The leadership of Mao Tse-tung we considered to be out-and-out Communist, and some of the people under him. I recall, I think it was Chu Teh, the head of the army, was not considered to be as much of a pro-Russian Communist, but there was never any question but what they were Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. They were not agricultural reformers?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear or see the view expressed that the Chinese Communists were pursuing a policy of self-limitation so far as the postwar period was concerned?

Mr. VINCENT. Of self-limitation? No; I don't recall such a report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. John Paton Davies ever expressed that view?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know as a matter of fact whether he ever expressed that view.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see a memorandum in which he expressed that view?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall seeing the memorandum.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what is meant by that phrase, that the Chinese Communists were pursuing a policy of self-limitation?

Mr. VINCENT. I must confess I don't know what he meant unless he meant that in the postwar period they were not going to try to take over the power.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what it was used to mean, isn't it, that the program of the Reds after the war was to make sure for communism the areas they had already taken over, but that they did not contemplate further expansion?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wasn't that a view held by Mr. Davies, among others?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know that that was a view held by Mr. Davies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that that was a view held by anybody?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall anyone expressing that view to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Ambassador Gauss agree with that view?



Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't know whether Ambassador Gauss agreed with that view or not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you agree with it?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you attach a memorandum to a report by Mr. Service expressing that viewpoint, stating therein or indicating in it agreement with Mr. Service's views in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall such an incident.

Mr. SOURWINE. Speaking of Mr. Service, you stated here a moment ago that Mr. Service was and is your good friend, and yet you stated you had never discussed with him the matter of the Amerasia case. How do you account for the fact that in the case of a good friend of yours, who had serious accusations made against him, you never so much as slapped him on the back and said, "I am for you, old boy" or "I don't believe it," or give any other expression about him?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any—

Senator EASTLAND. He put up money for him, did he not?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't. As a matter of fact, during that period—we are speaking of the period when he was under charge, before he went before the grand jury—

Mr. SOURWINE. You said "never." You said you never discussed with him the question of the Amerasia case.

Mr. VINCENT. I will have to correct that to say that after the grand jury released him, then I am quite sure that he or I discussed the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you never discussed it with him during the time that he was under suspicion, so to speak?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall discussing it with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that because you were cautious?

Mr. VINCENT. It was because I thought that he should keep away and not discuss it with anyone, just go and get a lawyer. As I say, he may have popped into the State Department one time or another but I have no recollection of discussing the case with him while it was pending.

Mr. SOURWINE. It wasn't because he kept away. It was because you thought he should stay away?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't know that I thought he should stay away, but I thought he should consult counsel and handle the case that way rather than consult people in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you as a matter of fact avoid him?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not avoid him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever send word to him or notification that you didn't want to see him or it would be better if he didn't see you?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall telling him not to come to see me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have?

Mr. VINCENT. I just simply say I don't recall it, but I don't think that the issue arose of telling him not to come.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did hold the view that he shouldn't be seen around the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I did hold that view while the case was pending. Whether he came around the State Department I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, did you ever try to get Owen Lattimore appointed to a job in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified on that, sir, and I would be glad to do so again.

Mr. SOURWINE. Please.

Mr. VINCENT. In the early spring of 1945 the question arose of getting someone in the State Department—as I have testified before, whether it was Mr. Lattimore who first suggested it or myself—to come in on a consultancy basis and furnish background technical information on the border areas of China, meaning by that Mongolia, Sinkiang, and possibly Manchuria. Mr. Lattimore had written a book called *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the book [indicating]?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let the record show that counsel is showing the witness a book.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that is the book.

I considered Mr. Lattimore an expert on this.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you read this book?

Mr. VINCENT. I had read the book, not carefully, but I had gone through the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. You read it carefully enough to satisfy yourself that he was an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; and I had also discussed the area with Mr. Lattimore when we traveled through a large portion of it during the trip with Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. How carefully do you have to read a book to satisfy yourself that the writer is an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't answer that, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you don't have to read it very carefully to reach that conclusion?

Mr. VINCENT. In connection with Mr. Lattimore, having already talked to him in China and seen him in action and seen what he did know about Sinkiang and what he did know about Outer Mongolia.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are the one who brought up the book. If you mean you knew he was an expert before you read the book, that is one thing. If you concluded he was an expert from reading the book, that is another thing. I am trying to find out what the fact is.

Mr. VINCENT. The fact is, I concluded he was an expert from the reading of the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before that you didn't know he was an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't know he was an expert on that. I knew he traveled in those areas. I knew he had been in Mongolia.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you say you didn't read the book very carefully.

Mr. VINCENT. I read the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said, "I didn't read it very carefully."

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nevertheless, from your reading of the book you concluded he was an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, on page 101 of this book there is a paragraph which I ask—

The CHAIRMAN. What book are you referring to?

Mr. SOURWINE. This is the book I showed the witness and identified by him as *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, by Owen Lattimore.

Senator EASTLAND. Let him finish his answer about Lattimore's job in the State Department. Had you finished that?

Mr. VINCENT. I hadn't finished that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I beg the Senator's pardon.

Mr. VINCENT. At that time in the State Department we also had in the Far Eastern Office the late Dr. Kennedy of Yale, who was performing similar services with regard to Indonesia and some of the southeast Asian areas. The way the system operated these people would come down 1 or 2 days a week on a per diem basis and prepare background material that might be needed.

Senator EASTLAND. And advise you about what our policy should be there?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not conceived as a policy job particularly, Senator, although that certainly would come out.

The CHAIRMAN. It was partly a policy job, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. There was prepared a form in the State Department which was to authorize the per diem employment of Mr. Lattimore.

Senator EASTLAND. What were you going to pay him?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I don't know; what the prevailing—

Senator EASTLAND. You have read Mr. Lattimore's books, have you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. You knew him, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. You knew Lattimore intimately, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. You knew Lattimore had always followed the Communist line, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Haven't you studied Mr. Lattimore's books?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say I have studied Mr. Lattimore's books.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would not say you have studied them?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, and I don't know that I would say that he has followed the Communist line. I have no feeling that Mr. Lattimore has followed a Communist line.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read enough of Mr. Lattimore's books to satisfy yourself with regard to a conclusion as to whether he is merely liberal or pro-Communist?

Senator EASTLAND. Or worse.

Mr. VINCENT. I think I testified that I have read through this book and I have seen *Solution in Asia*, and I have not drawn the conclusion that Mr. Lattimore was Communist or pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have drawn no conclusion at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you state you had studied Mr. Lattimore's books and from your study you had concluded he was merely a liberal?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what I stated here to the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Here in this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. Didn't I state that here?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you. Don't you remember where you stated it?

Mr. VINCENT. I stated here in this committee what my recollection is. I haven't the testimony before me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you just state you had not studied Mr. Lattimore's books, that you would not say you had studied his books?

Mr. VINCENT. I am using the word "studied." I haven't studied them. I have read this book.

Senator EASTLAND. You knew Mr. Lattimore's views. You knew his views on problems in Asia, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. More or less; yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. You discussed them with him?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. I don't know whether he answered that question or not. You discussed them with him. You have a habit of grunting at it, and I take it the reporter is getting your answers.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I have discussed it.

Senator EASTLAND. You have been intimately associated with him?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Can you tell us, knowing his view, knowing his writings, that he was not attempting to promote the Communist line in Asia?

Mr. VINCENT. That—I was never conscious that Mr. Lattimore in his discussions with me was trying to promote the Communist line in Russia.

Senator EASTLAND. In Asia?

Mr. VINCENT. In Asia.

Senator EASTLAND. You didn't get that idea from his books?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not get that idea from his books.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, earlier today you acknowledged that the Institute of Pacific Relations was pro-Communist in its orientation.

Mr. VINCENT. I said that at the time I was with it I was not conscious of that, but from these committee hearings and others there are certainly people in it now who at that time I had no suspicion were pro-Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, was not Mr. Lattimore one of the leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations at the time.

Mr. VINCENT. At what time?

Mr. MORRIS. At the time you now realize it was pro-Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. MORRIS. He was not one of the leaders?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that he was one of the leaders now but at the time I knew the IPR and at the time I knew Lattimore, I never thought the IPR was pro-Communist or that Lattimore was.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; but you have admitted, Mr. Vincent, that you have changed your mind about the pro-Communist slant of IPR, have you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Exactly right.

Mr. MORRIS. You have now decided from the additional evidence that has been brought to your attention that the IPR was at some time in the past pro-Communist in its orientation?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Inasmuch as Owen Lattimore was the leader of the Institute of Pacific Relations at the time that you had dealings with the Institute of Pacific Relations do you also consider that he too was pro-Communist in his orientation?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think Mr. Lattimore is pro-Communist in his orientation.



Mr. MORRIS. So you make a distinction between Mr. Lattimore and the other leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that your position?

Mr. VINCENT. I was thinking more in terms of some of the people who were associated.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Do you make a distinction between Mr. Lattimore and other people in IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You see, Mr. Vincent, Mr. Dennett, who was the Secretary of IPR during the war years, has testified that the two leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations, No. 1 and No. 2 leaders of the IPR, were Philip Jessup and Owen Lattimore.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I think in reverse order, Owen Lattimore and Philip Jessup. I am wondering to what extent you consider, now that you recognize the IPR was pro-Communist, that the same label was attached to the two leaders of the IPR.

(No response.)

Senator EASTLAND. Who were the pro-Communists in the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I am trying to recall now. It is just a matter of referring to the testimony before this committee. I have no distinct recollection of how I came about the conclusion that there were pro-Communists in it.

Senator EASTLAND. You reach the conclusion now, you say, that it was pro-Communist. Who were those pro-Communists who fixed their policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid I would have to refer to the membership, and I am not trying to be evasive.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course you would have to refer to the membership. Who were they?

Mr. VINCENT. I say I have no distinct recollection of the membership now.

Senator EASTLAND. Was Mr. Jessup pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Jessup is not pro-Communist.

Senator EASTLAND. You said Mr. Lattimore was not pro-Communist. Was Mr. Carter pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not believe he was.

Mr. MORRIS. They were the three outstanding leaders of the IPR, were they not?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, Field was certainly a leader.

Mr. MORRIS. He was also one of the leaders of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Field fix the IPR policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether Field fixed the IPR policy or not.

Senator EASTLAND. You don't think he did, do you? Now do you think Jessup fixed the policy of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think Field had any influence on Jessup.

Senator EASTLAND. Would he control Lattimore's policies in IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't think he would, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. How could he fix the policies of IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No; you asked me, I thought, whether I could recollect any of them in the IPR who were pro-Communist, and I would say that Mr. Field was pro-Communist.

Senator EASTLAND. I want you to tell us frankly, and you can do it, who the pro-Communists were who fixed those policies. You say that you are now convinced it is a pro-Communist organization. Who were those pro-Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I have tried to think of names, and I have thought of Field, and I can't think of any others.

Senator EASTLAND. Here is an organization in which you say that Dr. Jessup would fix the policy, that Mr. Carter would fix the policy, and that Lattimore would fix its policy. Then you say Field, the only pro-Communist, couldn't fix their policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't said that Field could not fix their policies. I have no exact knowledge as to how the policies of the IPR were fixed.

Senator EASTLAND. You said Field couldn't fix Jessup's policy.

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say that Field would fix Jessup's policy, but to what extent he would fix IPR policies I don't know because I don't know how the IPR adopted policies.

Senator EASTLAND. It is bound to be Jessup's policies when he is one of the leaders in it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, if you say on the over-all basis that the Institute of Pacific Relations was pro-Communist, then you are saying either the leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations are pro-Communists or they are influenced by Communists; are you not, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you repeat that question?

Mr. MORRIS. I am submitting to you, Mr. Vincent—if the chairman thinks it is appropriate, I think Mr. Vincent should have an opportunity of clearing up any possible ambiguity that may reside in the record. If, Mr. Vincent, you say that the Institute of Pacific Relations as a whole was pro-Communist at that time—

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think my testimony was, and if it is that the Institute of Pacific Relations as a whole was pro-Communist—

Mr. MORRIS. Exactly what was your testimony, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony I thought was—but the chairman has reminded me that it was not—that there were pro-Communist elements in the IPR.

Senator EASTLAND. That was not what you said.

The CHAIRMAN. That wasn't your testimony at all. Your testimony was, in direct answer to Mr. Sourwine, that the Institute of Pacific Relations was pro-Communist, that you had come to that conclusion.

Mr. VINCENT. Well—

The CHAIRMAN. The leaders of IPR have been referred to here. Where was the policy fixed, if not in the leadership?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, my testimony is that there were pro-Communist elements in the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to change your testimony now from what you gave this morning?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly change it and say that it was my intent then to indicate that because of testimony I had read before this committee I have become conscious that there were pro-Communist elements in the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it because of the mention of these names that you wish to change it?

Mr. VINCENT. It is not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you want to change it from what you gave this morning?

Mr. VINCENT. Because it would be a more exact statement of what my feeling is about the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The major question we started out with was whether you ever tried to get Owen Lattimore appointed to a job in the State Department.

Mr. VINCENT. We haven't finished that yet.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes or no, did you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. VINCENT. Did you want me to finish with that?

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. VINCENT. I think when we broke off that testimony I was speaking of a form that had to be submitted for Lattimore to become employed. I have no exact recollection, but it is quite possible that I myself was one who signed the slip to go down for the employment. It was approved by the then Director of the Far Eastern Office, Mr. Ballentine. It went to Mr. Grew. Some time later Mr. Grew called me down and told me that he did not think Lattimore should be brought into the State Department because he was engaging in publicity at the time; I think he was writing for a newspaper. There the matter closed as far as I was concerned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had Mr. Lattimore applied to you for a job?

Mr. VINCENT. As I have testified, I don't know whether Mr. Lattimore applied or whether Mr. Lattimore suggested it and I went ahead and had the form filled out.

Mr. SOURWINE. In any event, it originated with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You weren't drafting him into State Department service.

Mr. VINCENT. I was not drafting him into the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were carrying out his wish to come in, whether it was in his formal application or his suggestion to you and then you filling out the form?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did what you could to make it easy up to the point of getting it up to your superior?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I thought that it was something that was needed in the Far Eastern Office at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have stated, have you not, that you thought then and think now that he was and is one of the outstanding experts in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time when this recommendation for Mr. Owen Lattimore's employment was under consideration you stated Mr. Ballentine was head of the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Office, but that is all right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss the matter of Mr. Lattimore's appointment with Mr. Ballentine?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of any discussion with him. The form would have had to go through him as Director of the Far Eastern Office, and in that way I may have mentioned it.

Mr. SOURWINE. But he didn't discuss it with you at all?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall discussing with Mr. Ballentine, Mr. Lattimore, but I am saying it would have been logical for there to have been a discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. It must have gone up to him with your favorable recommendation, didn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that Mr. Lattimore subsequently received an appointment and served as adviser to Mr. Pauley in connection with his mission to Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I do, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that at a time when you were head of the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. I was trying to place the dates. I was either still Chief of the China Division or I had become Director of the Far Eastern Office. The probability is that I was head of the Far Eastern Office because I think the Pauley mission went out to Japan and Korea and Manchuria in the latter part of 1945, and I became Director of the Far Eastern Office in September 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. What, if anything, did you have to do with Mr. Lattimore's appointment as adviser to Mr. Pauley?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall no connection that I had with his appointment to Mr. Pauley.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recommend him?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I recommended him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you approve it?

Mr. VINCENT. The mission was drawn up, I think, under the White House auspices, and I don't believe I had anything to do with his appointment or the appointment of anybody on the Pauley Mission. Senator EASTLAND. Do you know who did?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you discuss that matter with Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. VINCENT. I may have but I have no recollection of discussing it with Lauchlin Currie. At that time he was in FEA.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was Lauchlin Currie at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I have forgotten exactly when Lauchlin Currie quit the Government and went to New York in business, but it must have been some time right after the conclusion of the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I ask a question: During Lauchlin Currie's work at the White House did you consult him on matters?

Mr. VINCENT. I probably did, Senator. I have no recollection. We held these meetings—

Senator FERGUSON. That is pretty indefinite, "probably."

Mr. VINCENT. Let's put it this way: I was back here, I came back here in June 1943, and by September Currie had gone over as Deputy Director of the Foreign Economic Administration, FEA, under Crowley. So my period—

Senator FERGUSON. Then when did he go back to the White House?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think he ever went back to the White House.



I think when FEA was dissolved he went out into business. Went to New York. I think he went directly from FEA to New York.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you consult with him while you were in Washington?

Mr. VINCENT. From time to time; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. On what matters?

Mr. VINCENT. On far eastern matters, China.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. He was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you consult with him if he was not an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. Because some time during the period 1940 or 1941 he had apparently been designated by the President as a Presidential man to handle far eastern affairs. He had come to China in 1942 at the request of the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that the only reason why you consulted him, because you thought he was close to the President?

Mr. VINCENT. No. He himself had a position which was well-known in the State Department as a man in the White House who was handling far eastern matters, particularly China matters, from the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell us anything you consulted him on?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall any specific instance of consulting him on matters.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss with Mr. Lattimore the matter of his appointment as adviser to Mr. Pauley?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall discussing it with him. As I say, I might easily have, but I do not recall discussing the matter. The Pauley Mission, as I said, from what I can recall, was something that was organized and put forward without any consultation as far as I can recall, with me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know about Mr. Lattimore's appointment as adviser to Mr. Pauley at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I knew he was going out with Mr. Pauley.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, was the Pauley Mission under the State Department payroll?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know who paid the Pauley Mission.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine, would it be appropriate to ask a question at that time?

Mr. SOURWINE. Any time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, I think in fairness to the record and in fairness to you, in connection with the question I asked you a while ago with reference to whether or not you had been consulted by the Institute of Pacific Relations with respect to the advisability of publishing a controversial manuscript or pamphlet by Maxwell Stewart, you stated that it was your recollection that you could not recall being consulted by people in the Institute about the advisability of publishing that. That is your testimony, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my testimony. I have no recollection of any instance of being consulted on a publication. I don't know that I have ever met Maxwell Stewart.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read at this time for us exhibit No. 176, which does appear in the record. As you know, Mr. Vincent, there is a conflict between that and your testimony at this time.

Mr. MANDEL. I read exhibit No. 176, which is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 4, 1944, marked "W. L. H." presumably William L. Holland—

Mr. SOURWINE. Which appears at what point in our record?

Mr. MANDEL. It appears on page 629 of part 2. From M. S. F., presumably Miriam S. Farley, "copy to H. M.," presumably Harriet Moore.

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China.

The Ms. has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among others. Vincent said (in confidence) and with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommending rather extensive rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on point of detail. I am now editing the Ms. in the light of suggestions from Fairbank, Vincent, and others. I have also to consider the author, who is not in favor of toning it down any more. Nevertheless, I am making some changes along lines recommended by Fairbank, though not, likely, enough to satisfy him completely. My position is that I am willing, in fact, anxious, to go to any lengths to avoid offending Chinese sensibilities, provided this does not destroy the pamphlet's value for American readers. Our purpose in issuing it is to provide information for Americans, not to influence Chinese national policy. It would be useless for this purpose if it were written so subtly that ordinary Americans would not get anything out of it.

Personally I doubt that the China Council will leave the IPR because of this or anything else in similar vein. They have more to lose than the IPR by such action, though naturally they will use threats for what they are worth. I am inclined to agree with Max that they respect us more if we don't knuckle under to them.

The American Council is, of course, prepared to take full responsibility for this pamphlet, and will quite understand if the Secretariat wishes to disown it. Nevertheless, we should welcome yours views. Perhaps I have assumed too much from the meagerness of your comments on the original Ms.; if so, please let me know. I shall be glad to show you the revised Ms. if you care to see it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, do you know now that Maxwell Stewart is or was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever suspect that he was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't even recall ever meeting him, sir, and I have heard nothing about Maxwell Stewart, whether he is a Communist or not.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean in view of the letter that has just been read, Mr. Vincent, can you recall reading that particular pamphlet?

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony, without having had my memory refreshed, is that I would not have recalled that particular instance of reading that particular pamphlet.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you now recall?

Mr. VINCENT. I actually now do not recall the instance, but I see they have used my name, but I do not recall the instance even now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you willing to accept that letter as expressing a fact, to wit, that you did read the manuscript and did express the opinion which is there attributed to you?

Mr. VINCENT. I am not willing to testify on the basis of that letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. I said do you accept it as a fact.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not accept it as a fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you challenge it as a fact?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't challenge it either, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't contend that you did not read the manuscript?

Mr. VINCENT. Even the reading of the thing here does not refresh my memory as to an instance of that kind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you contend that you did not express an opinion with regard to the manuscript as outlined in that letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not contend that I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You might have?

Mr. VINCENT. I might have.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know Agnes Smedley?

Mr. VINCENT. I never met her.

Senator EASTLAND. Have you ever talked with her?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any IPR writings or publications that were submitted to you prior to publication?

Mr. VINCENT. IPR publications?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall any.

Senator FERGUSON. None whatever?

Mr. VINCENT. None whatever that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that the testimony from the witness yesterday, Larry Rosinger, indicates that they did submit documents, papers, and writing to members of the State Department for criticism prior to publication?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't read his testimony and didn't hear his testimony yesterday. That is what Rosinger said yesterday?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall on any occasion seeing an IPR document, while you were trustee of the IPR, prior to its publication?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall any.

Senator FERGUSON. None whatever?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Does this refresh your memory at all?

Mr. VINCENT. This doesn't refresh my memory at all. There has been testimony that Mr. Rosinger submitted a manuscript to me, but that was not an IPR document, I believe. That was a book.

Senator FERGUSON. It was published by IPR, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know who published it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that document?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall the document. I presumably sometime saw the Rosinger book, but I do not recall the instance. It is in the record apparently that it was sent to me and he had to ask for it back.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any recollection at all of this document that they are now talking about, this manuscript?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. That Max Stewart manuscript?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't the slightest recollection of it?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't the slightest recollection of what these peo-



ple are talking about that manuscript, of its being changed here and being modified.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Owen Lattimore ever delivered a lecture to personnel of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he delivered more than one such lecture?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall any time that Mr. Lattimore delivered lectures to the State Department. It is logical that he may have, but I do not recall Mr. Lattimore making lectures to the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge as to how many times he delivered lectures to personnel of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anything to do with arranging or approving any such lectures?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of arranging or approving lectures for Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had arranged it or approved it you would remember it, wouldn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that answer?

Mr. VINCENT. I say I would not necessarily remember that I had. We are dealing with a period back 7 years ago. I say that I would not now want to say that I would naturally remember arranging for a lecture for Mr. Lattimore to speak before Foreign Service people or in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever instruct any of your subordinates to attend a lecture by Mr. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of instructing my subordinates to attend a lecture by Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to deny that you ever did instruct them?

Mr. VINCENT. I mean to say just what I said, that I have no recollection of ever instructing my subordinates to attend a lecture.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had instructed them to attend a lecture by Owen Lattimore, would you remember it?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say this again as I said to the other question, that in the first place I would not have instructed them to attend a lecture but I—

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you testify that you did not?

Mr. VINCENT. But I could have suggested that somebody attend a lecture by Mr. Lattimore but I have no recollection of having done so.

Mr. SOURWINE. A suggestion by you as head of the Division to a subordinate would have been tantamount to a command, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would State Department personnel have felt completely free to disregard such a suggestion?

Mr. VINCENT. They certainly would. In other words, I wouldn't have instructed and I would not have said—I might have suggested that they attend, but I don't even recall either instructing or suggesting that they go to—

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to deny that you did instruct or suggest that they attend such a lecture?



Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I mean to say that I have no recollection of having instructed anyone or suggested that they attend a lecture.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a common thing for you to instruct or suggest your subordinates to attend a function of that nature?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. If it was an uncommon thing, don't you think if you had done it you would remember it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't think I would remember an instance of that kind of telling somebody I thought it was a good idea, if it occurred.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which of Mr. Lattimore's books have you read?

Mr. VINCENT. I said that I had read the Inner Asian Frontiers and that I had read solution in Asia, at one time or another.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that is all?

Mr. VINCENT. That is all I can recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You certainly did not make a study of Mr. Lattimore's books at any time, then, did you?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I would not say that I had made a study of his books; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would not be able to say that you could form a conclusion on the basis of a study of Mr. Lattimore's books, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I said that I formed a conclusion on the basis of the knowledge of this book here; that he was, in addition to what else I knew, a man who knew the subject of the inner Asian frontiers of China.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was whether you feel it would be right and proper for you to state that on the basis of a study of Mr. Lattimore's books you had formed any conclusion at all with regard to his writings.

Mr. VINCENT. Formed any conclusion of any kind?

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you made a study of Mr. Lattimore's books?

Mr. VINCENT. I said I have not made a study of Lattimore's books.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you have not made a study of Mr. Lattimore's books, would it be proper for you to state that on the basis of a study of Mr. Lattimore's books you had reached thus and thus a conclusion?

Mr. VINCENT. It could not be made. If I haven't made a study of them I couldn't reach a conclusion on the basis of a study.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you have made such a statement you were wrong; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. If I have made such a statement?

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you say now, if you have said that on the basis of a study of Mr. Lattimore's books you reached certain conclusions about his writings, that was a statement which was not true? Will you say that now?

Mr. VINCENT. It was certainly a statement which was not factually correct as far as I can figure. It may have been an opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the difference between not being factually correct and not being true?

Mr. VINCENT. There is no difference.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I inquire? Did you ever have anyone in the State Department make a survey of Mr. Lattimore's writings prior to the time that you recommended him as a consultant?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. So without an examination of his writings and without causing an examination to be made for your advice, you still recommended him as an adviser to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that a customary thing?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't say it was customary. I will say here that my knowledge of Mr. Lattimore is derived from having seen him from time to time when he was director of OWI and when he went on the Wallace mission, as much as on his books.

Senator FERGUSON. But without examining what he had written you recommended him; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I read two of his books.

The CHAIRMAN. He testified he read them. Let us straighten it out with the Chair a little bit. I understood that you had read the book that is referred to here, by Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you recommend him for a place in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that enter into your recommendation?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You believed because of that book that he should be recommended?

Mr. VINCENT. Because of that book and because of the knowledge I had of Mr. Lattimore that he would be an excellent technical expert to come into the State Department to assist us on these areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you testify, sir, that before you read this book you didn't consider him an expert, that it was on the basis of this book that you concluded he was an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't believe I testified to that, and if I did I was incorrect because I knew already that Lattimore had traveled extensively through—

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean before you read this book you had your mind all made up that Lattimore was an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. You are using the word "expert" there. I knew Lattimore was well informed with regard to those areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any opinion as to whether he was an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. You would have to define an expert.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have been talking about that word "expert" for quite a while now. What definition did you intend it to have when you were using it?

Mr. VINCENT. I considered him an expert. If a man wrote a book like that on those areas, I considered him an expert on those areas. Prior to that time I also had an opinion on him because I knew he was making travels through those areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now wish to testify that before you read this book you knew him to be an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. On those areas?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say I—there again you are getting into the matter of definition of an expert. I knew he was a man familiar with those areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let's define "expert" and then we will use it with your definition. What do you mean expert?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that an expert is—a man who could write as exhaustive a book as that became an expert on those areas, but prior to that I had no knowledge he was an expert.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the exhaustiveness of the book the mark of an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. Not necessarily.

Mr. SOURWINE. What precisely do you mean, since you have raised the point of definition?

Mr. VINCENT. Because he was a man who had had extensive travels in those areas and so far as I knew was a man who knew more about those areas than anyone at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is an expert a man who, as you say, knows the subject thoroughly, is preeminent in the field, and writes well and factually about it? Will you accept that definition?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no objection to that definition.

Mr. SOURWINE. Using that definition of expert, did you consider Mr. Lattimore to be an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. I considered Mr. Lattimore to be an expert on those areas; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you consider him to be an expert on those areas before you read this book, meaning the book *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not have thought him an expert. He was a man well informed on the areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you didn't consider him an expert until you read this book?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, the thought of considering him an expert or not an expert would never have come to my mind until you make this statement here, but a man who writes a book of this kind I would consider an expert.

Mr. SOURWINE. You brought up the question of the book and said that after reading that book you were sure he was an expert; didn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. I said he was an expert.

Senator FERGUSON. If he wasn't an expert, why did you want him as a consultant?

Mr. VINCENT. I am not saying he was not an expert. The point I am getting at here is there is a differentiation trying to be made between before and after he made the book as to whether he is an expert. I don't know quite—

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to know whether the book is what made up your mind that he was an expert.

Mr. VINCENT. It was.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is now your testimony that it was your reading of this book that convinced you that Mr. Lattimore was an expert.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; on those areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not convinced before reading this book?

Mr. VINCENT. The matter of not being convinced whether he was an expert had not arisen. I knew he was a man well informed on the area. I knew he traveled in the area.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all you knew about him before you read the book.



Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I read a brief paragraph from page 101 from this book that I want to ask the witness about:

Actually a return to the past was inhibited by the new forces that had penetrated both Mongolia and China. Instead, Outer Mongolia was first made a victim of Tsarist Russian imperialism and then set free by the nonexploitative policy of the Soviet Union toward the Mongol Peoples Republic, the granting of loans without interest, economic aid, technical help, and the creation of an army trained and equipped by the Soviet Union but not officered by the Soviet Union or under its orders.

Do you consider that an informed and factual statement, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is page 101.

The CHAIRMAN. The answer is, "I do not"?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let's go over to page 202. That is twice as many.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you leave that, on the basis of that statement did you want the man who wrote that as a consultant in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, at the time I wanted him as a consultant in the State Department I had read this book several years before, I had no recollection of that particular paragraph.

Senator FERGUSON. Now what would you say after its being read to you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say after having that read to me, that he could not serve well as a consultant if he took that attitude toward Outer Mongolia being now free.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a strongly pro-Communist statement, that paragraph I read, isn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So you would not recommend him today after hearing that statement in the book?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not.

Mr. SOURWINE. It may be redundant but I would like to read one more paragraph.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I just didn't want to leave that paragraph without following it up.

Mr. SOURWINE. From page 202:

Again, since these changes are visibly progressive, since they have been expedited by active Soviet policy, since the Soviet Union has not taken advantage of its power to fasten an "imperial" control on the Province—

referring to the Province of Sinkiang.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

And since the Soviet Union has not taken advantage of its power to fasten "imperial" control on the Province, and since Soviet trade remains important in keeping up the progress that has been begun, the total result has not been to fasten Soviet control on the Province but to set up in the Province itself a drift toward the Soviet Union. This, which I have elsewhere described as the phenomenon of "negative accretion" results in a wide expansion of the influence of the Soviet Union beyond its own borders, not by a process of acquisition and control but by the action of the peoples who come within reach of Soviet policy. Finding that they are not subordinated either economically or politically to the Soviet Union but are helped to help themselves these peoples continue of their own accord to seek a closer association.

Is that a fair and factual and objective statement, Mr. Vincent?



Mr. VINCENT. I would not call that a fair and factual statement on the situation there, but I was not familiar with the situation in Sinkiang at that time. I did know that the Russians had moved in. That is the reason I gave the positive answer on the other one, that the Russians had moved into Outer Mongolia. In Sinkiang they had not come in to the same extent.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the Senate is in session. The Chair would like to be on the floor.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you let me have one question before you adjourn.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe that that fairly represents the attitude of the Soviet Union toward Mongolia or the Province there?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Hearing that read, would you now recommend the author of that paragraph as a consultant?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we will resume this afternoon. I don't know that the present chairman can preside this afternoon. Senator, Ferguson, how are you fixed for this afternoon?

Senator FERGUSON. If the time was about 2 o'clock.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like very much to go all afternoon and possibly have an evening session. It is going much slower than anticipated, and we have a short time schedule.

Senator FERGUSON. I could make it about 2 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. If you will do that I will appreciate it.

Senator FERGUSON. With the right to close to go over on any vote.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon the committee was recessed until 2 p. m. the same day.)

#### AFTER RECESS

Senator FERGUSON (presiding). The committee will come to order. Mr. Sourwine, I have several questions I would like to ask.

You are familiar with the last two quotations read from this book that you had read?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not familiar with those quotations—

Senator FERGUSON. I mean you are now familiar with them?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you or would you not say that the writer of those quotations was pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. Taken in the way they were read, Mr. Senator, I wouldn't; no.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not describe them as pro-Communist. I would like to refresh my memory on the whole book to see how.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about the quotations.

Mr. VINCENT. Take, for instance, the one on the Province of Sinkiang. So far as I know, it may have been quite a factual statement of the situation there at the time, because I was not familiar with conditions in Outer Mongolia or Sinkiang at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your reason for answering the questions, then that I gave to you as to whether or not you would

have recommended him for the position as being consultant, that you would not after hearing these read?

Mr. VINCENT. After hearing the first one read, I thought there was an attitude there regarding the area—not an attitude but a description there that I would have thought now would not be one which would not have accurately recognized the real dangers in there of a Communist control of Outer Mongolia.

Senator FERGUSON. Then would it not be pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not describe it particularly as pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not at this morning's session admit that that was a definitely pro-Communist statement, that paragraph, sir?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recollect saying that in so many words; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you did admit it this morning, did you mean to, or was it a slip of the tongue?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that this morning showed a misconception of the dangers of communism in that area.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not remember, sir, what you testified to this morning?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't remember the exact words that I testified to this morning. If they would read them back——

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that either one of these statements was anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say they were anti-Communist; no.

Senator FERGUSON. They do not represent the facts? That is, in your opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I did not know what the factual situation was in Sinkiang, therefore, whether this does represent the facts at that time I do not know. The conditions—I am talking about the conditions.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you tell us, then, that if you had known of these two statements you would not have recommended him as a consultant?

Mr. VINCENT. I spoke of that as regards to the first statement. I thought it showed a misconception. The first one was on Outer Mongolia. I would have to have it read back to me.

There were certain statements there which I thought showed a misconception of the real situation in Outer Mongolia at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you wish it read or simply pointed out to the witness?

Senator FERGUSON. Just let the witness see it.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is the paragraph, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. I think you must have read more than this, did you not, Mr. Sourwine? That is, more than that paragraph that you have marked here?

Mr. SOURWINE. I read that paragraph this morning from page 101.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. Is that the only one you read?

Mr. SOURWINE. Since there is a question about what I read, you had better let me read it again, sir, or perhaps if you would read that marked paragraph, the one that you expressed doubt if I read any more, the record will show what you are talking about and what I was reading this morning.

Mr. VINCENT (reading) :

Actually, a return to the past was inhibited by the new forces that had penetrated both Mongolia and China. Instead, Outer Mongolia was first a victim of Czarist Russian imperialism and then set free by the nonexploitive policy of the Soviet Union toward the Mongol People's Republic. The granting of loans without interest and economic aid, technical help and the creation of an army trained and equipped by the Soviet Union, but not officered by the Soviet Union, or under its order.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the paragraph where you expressed doubt?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the paragraph as I read it aloud here that Outer Mongolia was first a victim of the—"Outer Mongolia was first a victim of Czarist Russian imperialism and then set free," that is the phrase in there that would have given me the idea that there was not a complete understanding of the policy there or the policy of the Soviet Union. But I would not necessarily—and I do not say that a person could be in error making a statement that because of that it was pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar at that time with the policies of communism?

Mr. VINCENT. As familiar, probably, as just the ordinary man in the street was. But I was not a student of the policies of communism; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you were representing the United States on the desk of the far eastern or the China desk and you want to tell us now, this committee, that you were no more familiar with the principles of communism than the average man on the street. Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Are you speaking of the time this book was written or 1945?

Senator FERGUSON. No; in 1945 when you recommended him to be an adviser to the State Department.

Mr. VINCENT. I thought you were speaking about the time I read this book. In 1945 I had just been in China and I had a fairly clear idea of what the policies were of communism in that area. I have testified heretofore that I was not familiar.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you read the book?

Mr. VINCENT. I read the book sometime early in the 1940's. I don't know when.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, you, I think, stated that the reason for recommending him as an expert was your reading of the book?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. That was one of the reasons I gave, as reading the book, otherwise it was my general knowledge of the man.

Senator FERGUSON. You had it clearly in mind at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not have the book clearly in mind at that time. It was just my impression of the book which I had read 4 or 5 years before, but I say I would not have recalled at the time I recommended Mr. Lattimore for the job these particular paragraphs in that book, and I didn't reread the book.

Senator FERGUSON. Knowing what you know about communism as of today, would you or would you not say that that or was not a pro-Communist statement?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say it was a statement which showed a lack of knowledge of what the Communists were up to.

Senator FERGUSON. A lack of knowledge of what the Communists were up to?

Mr. VINCENT. That seems to me to be the principal thing you can keep out of that, a lack of understanding at that time of what was the real intent and the real danger of communism.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that Mr. Lattimore at that time, at the time he wrote the book, did not know what the Communists were up to?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I cannot testify as to what Mr. Lattimore thought.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought he was an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought he was an expert.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you think an expert would know as of the time he wrote that book what the Communists were up to?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that he was an expert on those areas, but I don't know that I would call him——

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about what the Communists were up to in that area.

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say that Mr. Lattimore was an expert on communism. I just don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not say he was an expert on communism, is that your answer?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say because I just don't know. I say I couldn't say whether he was an expert on communism or not, because I just don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know at the time you read that book what was going on in this territory that this statement was written about?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were you working at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I was working at that time in Geneva, Switzerland, as consul there.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you a far-eastern expert then?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You were?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How long had you been in the Far East, dealing with the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Prior to 1940? I had been in the Far East and dealing with the Far East for the previous 12 or 15 years.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to 1940?

Mr. VINCENT. Prior to 1940.

Senator FERGUSON. And as such an expert, did you try to find out what the Communists really were doing and had in mind in relation to this territory that is written about?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not?

Mr. VINCENT. I had no knowledge of what was going on in Mongolia.



Senator FERGUSON. Did you try to find out, as an expert? That is part of the Far East, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. You are assigned to various and sundry tasks, and my task never carried me into a place where I would be expected to find out, if I could find out, what was going on in Mongolia.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think today you know what communism really is in the world?

Mr. VINCENT. I believe I do, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you acquire your knowledge of knowing what communism was?

Mr. VINCENT. I became fully conscious of it when the war was going on and at the conclusion of the war. I would say before this time I wasn't aware of the real menace of communism.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not conscious of the real menace until after the war was over?

Mr. VINCENT. I was conscious that the Communist ideology was a menace, but I am talking about the machine as we have now seen the expansive power and aggressiveness of the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. You may take the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you. The Chair may desire to have placed in the record at this time a reply from Mr. Carlisle Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary of State, to a request transmitted to the State Department for certain documents in connection with or relating to Mr. Vincent.

Mr. Humelsine sends with his letter a photostat of a letter to the Secretary of State from the President. The Chair might wish those read.

Senator FERGUSON. You may read them into the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is in response to Senator McCarran's letter to Mr. Acheson, which is already referred to in the record, requesting these 32 categories of information.

It will be recalled that the State Department, over Mr. Humelsine's signature, had earlier sent a few of them and said that the request was being referred to the White House. I believe this would be a good place in the record to insert the chairman's request and that earlier reply.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be inserted. The documents supplied by the Department will be printed in the appendix.

(The documents referred to appear in the appendix, beginning at p. 2286.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Humelsine now says in his letter of January 30, 1952:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I am enclosing for your information a photostatic copy of a letter to the Secretary from the President in regard to your letter of January 2, in which you requested certain departmental files relating to Mr. John Carter Vincent.

If I may be of any further assistance to you in this matter, please do not hesitate to call on me.

The photostat letter is dated January 24, and reads:

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have given very careful consideration to Mr. Humelsine's memorandum of January 22, relating to Senator McCarran's request for the loyalty file of John Carter Vincent, and for certain other papers and reports from the internal files of the State Department. It is understood that the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee desires these documents for the protection of Mr. Vincent against misinterpretations of his position, and that Mr. Vincent for

the same reason has urged compliance with this request. While it is earnestly desired to accommodate Mr. Vincent and the subcommittee to the maximum extent possible, the paramount consideration in ruling upon this matter must be the protection of the interests of the United States.

The surrender to a legislative investigating committee of this type of report and other documents from the confidential files of the State Department would create a serious danger of intimidation and demoralization of Foreign Service personnel. It is of overriding importance to our national security, internal as well as external, that officers of the Foreign Service are free to present their reports and express their views as to problems of international relations, without fear or favor, completely and honestly, as they see them at the time, and not in anticipation of the possible reaction of some future investigating committee which might hold opposing views. Accordingly, it is considered that it would be clearly contrary to the public interest to furnish these documents.

The release of individual loyalty files to congressional committees has consistently been denied under terms of my directive of March 13, 1948, as contrary to the public interest in that it would involve the disclosure of confidential information and sources of information and would tend to undermine the integrity of the loyalty program. The request for Mr. Vincent's loyalty file should be denied.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

Is it desired for insertion?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; it will be inserted. The reporter will compare this actual letter and enclosure with your reading of them, to be sure they appear accurately in the record.

I want to ask you another question.

You have heard the President's letter read. Do you think that that keeps you from testifying in relation to the matters that were asked for?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not?

Mr. VINCENT. Except where there may be confidential documents that I couldn't reveal the subject matter of.

Senator FERGUSON. Are there any of them that you cannot reveal the contents of?

Mr. VINCENT. I should say there would be quite a few of them, sir. I should say there would be quite a few of them that were confidential, that were still classified documents, as you call them.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that recently the State Department released an opinion of the Appeal Board, of the Loyalty Appeal Board?

Mr. VINCENT. In the case of Service, I think that was it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I have seen that in the paper. I didn't see the opinion, but I know they released it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that that places you now in the position as indicating that if yours is not released, the matters that are asked for, there where it was felt that they were favorable to the State Department they were released and now they do not release yours.

Mr. VINCENT. Would you state that question again?

Senator FERGUSON. I say do you not think it puts you in an unfavorable light for the President to deny those documents to this Committee when, in the Service case, the State Department itself released the opinion of the Loyalty Board?

Mr. VINCENT. After the loyalty case had been closed?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did you see that report?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. That opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not read it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that they did not release, however, the men's names who signed it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I did not know what they did not release. I am not familiar with the document. As I told you, I know it was released, but I did not read the document that was released in the case of Service.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no reasons to keep or suppress the evidence asked for, have you?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no reason to suppress it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it would embarrass you or any other foreign officer in the future if that was released to this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. It might conceivably embarrass somebody.

Senator EASTLAND. How could it?

Mr. VINCENT. Because there might be other names, there might be situations which are still current in the documents, Senator, that might be embarrassing to the Government. The President here has given his reasons.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the President saw the documents before he wrote the letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether he saw them or not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might point out, Mr. Chairman, that the State Department has possibly foreseen a question as to whether the President did, in fact, send them this letter, because they sent us not just a copy of it but a photostatic copy of the President's letter to the Department.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not questioning the President's signature at all. I do not mean that; but it is as to whether or not the President saw the documents, not the letter. You may have misunderstood.

Mr. SOURWINE. I beg your pardon.

Mr. VINCENT. No, my answer was "No."

Senator FERGUSON. Are there any other questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. May I proceed?

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. We were discussing Mr. Lattimore. Have you read his book *Solution in Asia*?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I think I read a copy of it when it first came out.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know about when that was?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that it came out in the spring of 1945; is that correct?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct.

Mr. Chairman, it is copyrighted 1944, 1945, and it is marked "Published February 1945, reprinted February 1945."

Did that book in any way change your opinion of Mr. Lattimore as an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that Mr. Lattimore was an expert, in my opinion, on the inner Asian frontiers. I would not want to say that this book here changed my ideas by reading the book, because I have no clear recollection of the book.



Mr. SOURWINE. So, at that time you got just the general impression? You did read it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read it carefully?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not read it carefully.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read it as carefully as you read Inner Asian Frontiers of China?

Mr. VINCENT. About the same way as that.

Mr. SOURWINE. And I want to know, did that reading in any way affect that opinion, the opinion you then held of Mr. Lattimore as an expert in certain fields?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall it affecting my opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it, then, that you did not recognize any of the passages in this book which you chanced to read as pro-Communist? They did not so affect you?

Mr. VINCENT. They did not so affect me at that time, sir, or I have no recollection of their affecting me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember reading this passage, from the bottom of page 16 of this volume and running over to the top of page 17:

In the whole record of our protests to Japan, Britain and America never once contested Japan's right to make demands on China. We only protested that privileges acquired by Japan should not exclude us.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it read, does it have any connotation in your mind as pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I read from page 23, this sentence:

For well over a hundred years we have taken for granted the ascendancy of capitalist thought as the civilized mode of thought.

Do you remember reading that?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't remember reading that.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the following paragraph:

Capitalist ascendancy of this kind is no longer unchallenged. Marxist thought is now as fluently and as cogently expressed in such Asiatic languages as Buryat-Mongol, Kazakh, Uzbek, and Tajik as it is in Russian or Ukrainian, because Marxist thought has rooted itself as firmly in the minds of these people as it has in the minds of the Russians and Ukrainians. In most territories adjoining the Soviet frontier, Marxist thought cannot be dismissed as merely "subversive propaganda." It is no longer subversive but competitive.

Do you remember reading that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't remember reading that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind as pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say, as you have read it there—I would have to read it more carefully—as you have read it there, it would seem to me that it was a fair analysis of what he observed in the area. It is an observation.

Mr. SOURWINE. It impressed you as a fair, factual analysis?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I didn't say that. I said it impressed me as to what he observed in the area. In other words, he had just been to Asia, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. It impressed you as an expression of opinion?



Mr. VINCENT. It impressed me as an expression of his opinion, and the best of his judgment, as to what was the situation there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Even with that in mind, does it, in your mind, have any connotation of whether it is pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from page 24:

The prestige of Soviet industrial production has increased with every victory won by weapons made in Soviet factories, and this prestige extends to the system of production as well as to the things produced. Along the inland frontiers of Asia we may expect to see Soviet engineers increasingly consulted where formerly the only engineers consulted were European or American. If we are politically intelligent we may expect the Soviet engineers to be consulted on the organization and management of production, as well as the design of machines and the lay-out of factories. We may count on seeing, over wide areas, the partial acceptance of Marxist ideas and the adoption of one or another part of the Soviet system.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind as pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from the bottom of page 67, and over to the top of page 68:

Into this complicated situation there intruded the influence of the Russian revolution, the effects of which were felt all over Asia. We in America have never yet properly grasped the character of that influence. Wherever we see Russian influence we still tend to look for Russian agitators, upsetting the minds of people who would not make trouble if they were not stirred up by troublemakers. We cannot understand either the Asia of yesterday or the Asia of today and tomorrow if we resort to such absurd simplifications.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind as pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It appears to me as just an opinion of Mr. Lattimore's on the situation as he observed it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it have any connotation as either pro-Communist or anti-Communist to you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 69:

One of the most powerful, brutal, and insensitive of the master people, the Russians had overthrown its own masters, had summoned all other peoples to do the same, and was now held at bay by the remaining master peoples. In this observation of big, simple ideas, the people of Asia saw, or hoped that they saw, a community of interest between themselves and the Russians.

Do you remember reading that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it read, sir, does it have, in your mind, any connotation of either pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not have a pro-Communist connotation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anti?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading on page 73:

China, struggling to throw off the economic control of the great capitalist countries, had a natural community of interests with Russia politically and economically blockaded by the same countries.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it read, does it have in your mind any connotation of either pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from page 74:

With the advantage of hindsight, we can see that the Russian policy was reasonable and realistic, since the powers which were trying to hamstring the Chinese revolution were also the powers which were trying to wreck the Russian revolution.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, sir, does it have in your mind any connotation of either pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not call it pro-Communist or anti.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from page 99:

During this period, the Communists pressed and propagandized for a negotiated end to the civil war and a full stand against Japan at the earliest possible moment rather than the last possible moment. By so doing they invested themselves with a new political character. They ceased to be merely a policy which opposed the policy of the Government, and became a party with a policy alternative to that of the Government. Furthermore, although they remained a one doctrine party and could not yet broaden out into a coalition, they became potentially the focus of a new coalition because a number of movements outside of Communist territory and not in the least Communist in character began to urge the national government to accede to the policy advocated by the Communists.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have, in your mind, either a pro-Communist or anti-Communist connotation?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say it is a factual statement?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that, as well as I can recall it, it seemed to describe the situation that was present at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it has any bias in it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think that is a biased statement, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, do you realize that this statement says, in essence, that the Nationalist Government of China was opposed to fighting a war against Japan, to making a stand against Japan.

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't recall you reading that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You realize that this statement says that it was the Communist government and not the Nationalist Government that was making a stand and wanted to make a stand against Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. It does?

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you if you realized it?

Mr. VINCENT. From my recollection of the situation in China at that time, I was not in China, that could be a conclusion that one could reach, that Mr. Lattimore could reach.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you realize that this paragraph was stating that conclusion, was advancing that theory, that thesis?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I did, that the Communists themselves were urging greater resistance to Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me read that paragraph again.

Senator EASTLAND. Was that true, did you observe it in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not in China at the time, sir. But I think the reports back from China generally gave that impression, the factual reports back, that the Communists were through their organizations urging resistance to Japan. Chiang Kai-shek at that time made a visit, if I recall, in 1936, and was arrested, held in house arrest, for a short time, and because at that time some of his armies in the south and the Communists were urging greater resistance to Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you place this in 1936, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I placed it in 1936 because I have a clear recollection of General Chiang Kai-shek's arrest at Ceylon. I don't place this in 1936. I was just simply saying, referring to an incident at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Was not Senator Eastland's question addressed to the period of this presentation?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't get when this period was, but I gathered that this is describing the situation in China around 1936 or 1937.

Mr. SOURWINE. You recognize it as a description of the situation in China in 1936?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what I would have thought that was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are thinking about the situation in China in 1936 being in such close terms as this that you recognize that area of time by what was said here?

Mr. VINCENT. That was my general impression.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from page 110:

The coalition trend of the Communists has put them in a strong position to make a bid for wider allegiances when on the heels of the Japanese their columns marched parallel with those of the National Government into recovered territory.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind of being pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from page 121:

The Communists have survived and have even expanded the territory they control \* \* \*.

Mr. Chairman, my reference is wrong. I am beginning on page 120 and carrying over to page 121:

\* \* \* The Communists have survived and have even expanded the territory they control not because they subdued the people by armed force but because the people support them. Basic economic conditions as to food and clothing are better in Communist-controlled China than in Kuomintang-controlled China. The incident of conscription and taxation is more equally distributed in Communist-controlled territory than in Kuomintang-controlled territory. Many progressive, educated, middle-class Chinese have somehow got through the blockade into Communist territory, but not many have fled from that territory. The political structure under the Communists is more nearly democratic than it is under the Kuomintang. It is a fact that governing committees and representative committees are elected and that the Communists limit themselves to one-third of the representation; whereas, in Kuomintang territory it is increasingly difficult to hold a public position without joining the Kuomintang and accepting its discipline.

Do you remember reading that passage?



Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind of being pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say it is a factual statement?

Mr. VINCENT. Insofar as I can recall, it was a statement that described the situation there. I was never in that area. Other people, I don't recall who, newspaper people, were there who came back with similar stories.

Mr. SOURWINE. So far as you know, you believed it when you read it, and you are willing to believe it now?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time, it was fairly as accurate a statement as one could get out, with the knowledge you had of the place.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from the bottom of page 121 and over to the top of page 122:

Representatives of the minor parties which have no armed forces and no rights are inclined to believe that it is only because the Communists have armed forces that people in the Communist area have political rights and liberties. They assume that if the Communists lose control of their armed forces the people would lose their political freedom. They therefore support as openly as it is possible for them to do so demands for freedom to organize political bodies and the right to elect members of political bodies with real functions and authority, and do not demand that the Communists should first submit to military control. Pending the development of a larger body of knowledge about the Communist area, certain tentative conclusions can be drawn. The Communists have done well enough in the territory they control to stand comparison with the Kuomintang. There is a case for negotiating a political compromise with the Communists before pressing the question of military control.

Do you recall having read that passage?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Having heard it read, sir, does it have in your mind any connotation as being either pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it impress you as a factual statement?

Mr. VINCENT. It impresses me as a report on conditions in China at that time, one man's report, and his opinion which could have been held by him and other people.

Mr. SOURWINE. The passage I have just read, and immediately preceding, do they strike you as being unrealistic?

Mr. VINCENT. I think now that you use that word "unrealistic"—I think you would have to read them again, sir, for me to say whether I would describe them as unrealistic, because of the many statements there.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are an expert on China?

Mr. VINCENT. But I don't recall from the reading of those two passages, and applying the one idea "unrealistic."

Mr. SOURWINE. I will read the one before last, and you listen:

The Communists have survived and have even expanded the territory they control, not because they subdued the people by armed force, but because the people will support them. Basic economic conditions as to food and clothing are better in Communist-controlled China than in Kuomintang-controlled China. The incidence of conscription and taxation is more equally distributed in Communist-controlled territory than in Kuomintang-controlled territory. Many progressive, educated, middle-class Chinese have somehow gotten through the blockade into Communist territory, but not many have fled from that territory. The political structure under the Communists is more nearly democratic than it is under the Kuomintang. It is a fact that governing committees and representa-



tive committees are elected and that the Communists limit themselves to one-third of the representation; whereas, in Kuomintang-controlled territory it is increasingly difficult to hold a public position without joining the Kuomintang and accepting its discipline.

Do you find anything that strikes you as unrealistic in that passage?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I would say that that passage there, without being able to check the facts because I was never in the area, seems in some measure to be unrealistic.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, did any of these statements influence you in determining your foreign policy?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They did not?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I have said I don't recall that. Most of this was information that he has written here, and was already more or less available, in different form, to us in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that what influenced you to act? You say it was already available in the State Department, that which was read.

Did that influence you in acting, that information?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have influenced me, but one way or the other I didn't accept it. I don't accept it all.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you accept any of it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, as reports from China on a situation there in North China. But you would have to say in what way, I am afraid, that it influenced me to act. I can't now say how my actions might have been influenced.

Senator FERGUSON. I will read a statement:

During the 15 years of its existence, the Communist Party of China has grown up into a powerful revolutionary party, steeled in the fire of its Chinese revolution in one of the best sections of the Comintern, and has succeeded in establishing Soviet districts in the armed forces of the revolution, the Red Army, which is displaying miracles of heroism, and which the seven campaigns of the enemy have not succeeded in breaking.

Would you say that statement was or was not pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't say that statement was pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. You would say?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not say. Do you know who wrote that statement?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know who wrote that statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say it was anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say it was anti-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Georgi Dimitrov?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear of him?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that he was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You have never heard of him?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, there are so many Russian officials. I mean, Dimitrov may have been a Russian official, but I don't recall him now.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from the bottom of page—

Senator FERGUSON. Just a minute. Did you know that he was head of the Communist Internationale?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't, no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from the bottom of page 129, and continuing to the top of the next page:

As industrialization passed from experiment and many local mistakes and failures to general and increasing success and prosperity, Russia began to acquire a reputation for stability, reinforced later by her firm handling of Japan, and especially her decisive repulse of Japanese incursions against her frontiers.

Do you remember reading that passage?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, sir, does it have in your mind any connotation of either pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 134:

In Asia, the Soviet Union has a major power of attraction, backed by a history of development and a body of precedents.

Do you recall reading that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind as being pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 135:

There then began the process of reintegration into a federative Soviet Union. This was not done all at once or by degree. From 1918 to 1924 there was a complicated grouping and regrouping. The Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic was, from the beginning, the major unit. Other Republics split off from it, but made agreements of various kinds with it and with each other. After a number of preliminary steps, not all of them simultaneous, the main Russian Republic combined with about six other Republics to form the Soviet Union, whose first constitution was approved in 1924.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connection in your mind as being pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is primarily historical, is it? That is, in your opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. Not having any familiarity with the history of the time, that is what it sounds like to me, as an account of what actually happened. But I couldn't check into whether it is an account.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you do not have sufficient familiarity of the history of Russia at that period to know whether this is a factual account?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are willing to accept it as a factual account because he wrote it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I am not willing to accept it because I have not—

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore is an expert, in your opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; but Mr. Lattimore could be easily wrong on his facts. I have no reason to accept that as being facts.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think he is the kind of an expert that could be wrong in his facts in a book that he has written?

Mr. VINCENT. I think any expert could be wrong.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you think Lattimore is the type that could be wrong in what he has written in this book?

Mr. VINCENT. He could be wrong, but I have no reason to challenge it.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand you have read this book that is now being quoted to you prior to your recommendation that he be hired in the State Department as a consultant to you?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator Ferguson, I have no recollection as to what time I read this book. I think we said it was published in February. I have already testified that I do not know what exact time was the recommending of Mr. Lattimore, so I couldn't testify as to whether I had read this book before or after that.

Senator JENNER. Mr. Chairman, is the witness trying to say to this committee that he does not know what is pro-Communist and what is anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, no, I am not trying to say that. I am being asked here to identify these as anti- or pro-Communist, and most of them seem to be the opinions of a man with regard to a situation at that time in China.

Senator JENNER. I know, but Senator Ferguson just read you a passage from the Secretary General of the Communist International, and you did not recognize it as pro-Communistic.

Mr. VINCENT. No, I thought that was a statement of the describing of a situation.

Senator JENNER. Mr. Vincent, you are the head of the Far Eastern Division of our Government, in the State Department. How long has that been?

Mr. VINCENT. I was from 1945 to 1947.

Senator JENNER. 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. Late 1945 until the middle of 1947.

Senator JENNER. Then would you think this would be a fair statement of the appraisal of the Far Eastern Division: That they did not know what was pro-Communist down there and what was anti-Communist during that period of time?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I would not; no.

Senator JENNER. Would you think this would be a fair statement of the Far Eastern Division of our State Department: That up until the Korean war, and that includes the time you were head of the Far Eastern Division—

Mr. VINCENT. No; I was already in Switzerland.

Senator JENNER. But 1945-47, from that time on up into the Korean war, would you say that the pro-Communist influence in the State Department of our Government was predominant?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not, sir.

Senator JENNER. Are you acquainted with John Foster Dulles?

Mr. VINCENT. I am.

Senator JENNER. Are you well acquainted?

Mr. VINCENT. I have never met John Foster Dulles.

Senator JENNER. If John Foster Dulles made that statement, would it have any effect upon your thinking?

Mr. VINCENT. It would not, sir, because when I was in the State Department I did not myself detect any procommunism in the State Department.



Senator JENNER. Do you know what is procommunism? In these readings you say you do not think they are procommunistic and yet history has proven that they are procommunistic.

Mr. VINCENT. They are, to my mind, Mr. Lattimore's opinion of a situation as he thought. I wouldn't want to describe this as pro-Communist or anti-Communist. Almost every one of those is one man's opinion of a situation that existed at that time.

Senator JENNER. Mr. Chairman, my point is, if the witness does not know what is procommunistic and anticommunistic——

Mr. SOURWINE. If it might be suggested to the Senator, the record will speak for itself on such a question. All the committee can attempt to do is to find out what the witness' opinions are.

Senator EASTLAND (presiding). Mr. Vincent, how long were you at the head of the far-eastern desk in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. From September 1945 until July 1947.

Senator EASTLAND. What was the American policy toward China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, that would take a long time, but the American policy toward China at that time was primarily expressed in the mission of General Marshall to China, which that directive describes.

Senator EASTLAND. You can just explain it now in a few words.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. One of the principal preoccupations at that time, or let us say when I walked into the office, the war was over—that was September of 1945—was the imminent danger of civil war breaking out again in China. Another preoccupation at that time——

Senator EASTLAND. Was there not a question of who would win that war, if civil war did break out in China?

Mr. VINCENT. There certainly was a question.

Senator EASTLAND. Who did you want to win that war?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly wanted Chiang Kai-shek to win the war if it broke out, and for the Communists to be defeated.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead.

Mr. VINCENT. But there was a serious doubt in many people's minds, not my own, but people in the State Department and in the Pentagon Building, that the outbreak of civil war, after the Chinese had already been undergoing 8 years of war, would make conditions in China even worse than they were at the end of the war, and would be conducive, even, to the future spread of turmoil from which the Communists themselves could take advantage. It was far from clear to anyone at the time that the National Government of China was going to be able to completely militarily defeat the Chinese Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. Why?

Mr. VINCENT. On the basis of the historical analogy, the Japanese had been trying to defeat the Chinese Communists for the previous 7 years.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know that Russia was arming and equipping Chinese Communists at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. The only knowledge we had at that time of the Chinese Communists getting anything from the Russians was what they were able to pick up from Japanese arms in Manchuria.

Senator EASTLAND. That was considerable.

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say whether it was considerable or not, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. You knew in reality that hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers had surrendered to the Russians, and that their



equipment was being turned over to the Chinese Communists. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator EASTLAND. So the cure for that situation was to take those Communists into the government and form a united front between Chiang and the Communists, was that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I think, Senator, that is an oversimplification of it. The idea then was, and the Chinese themselves, the National Government was holding conferences trying to bring about a peaceful solution of their difficulties.

Senator EASTLAND. I know, but those conferences, what you were doing was telling Chiang to take Communists into his government. Is that true or is it false?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think that General Marshall ever told the Chinese Government to take the Communists into the government. They were already discussing the matter of some kind of peaceful solution of a political difficulty. There had been a political conference at which the Communists were already present and discussing things when General Marshall went to China.

Senator EASTLAND. You say our Government did not pressure Chiang to take Communists into the Government of China?

Mr. VINCENT. I am not saying—the word “pressure” I think is an incorrect one. I don't know to what extent General Marshall used his influence, but that was one of the things in his directive, which was to go out and assist the Chinese.

Senator EASTLAND. You agreed with that policy, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. That Communists should have been taken into the Government of China?

Mr. VINCENT. I made the statement several times that it seemed that that was a less violent way than to go ahead and carry on civil war. But I made the statement many times that the idea was to take them in in more ways than one, as Mr. Sourwine will recall, on a minority basis.

Senator EASTLAND. And it has always wound up one way: That is a Communist stepping-stone to take a country over. That was an identical system that Communists used all over Europe. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I have already testified here, and I was at that time not an authority on Europe, but in that particular time the French had Communists in the government, the Italians had Communists, and were able to eliminate them.

Senator EASTLAND. I understand, but that was a common front in the satellite states. It wound up that they became nothing but satellite states of Moscow. Why is it that you had adopted that Communist tactic and was pressuring it on Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. VINCENT. As I said before, it was the understanding not of myself but of a policy adopted by the entire administration that, taking the Chinese Communists into the government on a minority basis, for the time being, was a better solution and gave a better chance of putting them in a subordinate position than carrying on civil war.

Senator EASTLAND. In other words, it would permit them to take over China without a big war. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, that was not in anybody's mind, that it was going to permit them to take over China.

Senator EASTLAND. You have testified that you knew, and that the State Department knew, that the Chinese Communists were being equipped by the Russians with captured Japanese equipment.

It appears to me that this would call for equipment from this country. Did we attempt to equip the Nationalist forces of China?

Mr. VINCENT. We did, during that period. In the fall of 1945 we had already equipped, I think it was, 39 divisions of Chinese troops. We flew Chinese troops from south China to north China to help take over the areas there.

Senator EASTLAND. But were we giving them the arms and equipment, now, to win the war and to match what Russia was giving the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. We had given and were giving during that period, turning over arms to the Chinese.

Mr. MORRIS. Not after the decision was made that there should be a coalition government.

Mr. VINCENT. After General Marshall went out, I do not know the degree to which arms were still turned over to the Chinese. But at that time the Chinese had received arms from us, with the possible exception of those troops that we transported to Manchuria. They were also armed by us.

Senator EASTLAND. Did we furnish them equipment to meet the aggression caused by Russian equipment given to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, we had virtually equipped the Chinese Army during the war, and were still equipping them when the war ended in 1945.

Senator EASTLAND. When did we stop equipping them?

Mr. VINCENT. When General Marshall went out for a short period.

Senator EASTLAND. When was that?

Mr. VINCENT. That was in January 1946.

Senator EASTLAND. And that caused the fall of China, did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Chiang Kai-shek was never short of arms during that period. He was well equipped. We carried his troops to Manchuria and north China, and they were also equipped. I think people much better than I on it have said that Chiang Kai-shek's troops were always sufficiently equipped.

Senator EASTLAND. We stopped giving them war equipment in 1946. When did we resume?

Mr. VINCENT. We resumed in 1947 at a time when, I would say, the military position of Chiang Kai-shek was stronger than it had ever been before, when he was in north Manchuria and elsewhere in north China.

Senator EASTLAND. What did he get, what was the equipment he got?

Mr. VINCENT. Specifically I can't recall. I remember that arms were turned over to him from certain ammunition dumps in China. I know that air equipment was given to him, transport planes, during 1947.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not know whether it was an appreciable amount, enough to offer serious opposition, do you?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it was an amount sufficient to offer opposition, which is what he had done and was doing at that time. I left the

Department in July of 1947 and don't know how the thing developed after that.

Senator JENNER. During that crucial period, was there not a 15-month period there when we withheld aid from Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. During the period 1946, military aid as such—it was the policy of the Government not to give military aid. General Marshall was out there trying to carry out a mission to assist the Chinese in settling their differences without civil war.

Senator JENNER. What were the Chinese Communists doing during that 15-month period? Were they demobilizing?

Mr. VINCENT. The Chinese Communists during the latter part of that period, Senator Jenner, were actually being defeated by the Chiang Kai-shek forces. As I have just said, the Chinese Government forces expanded their area of control considerably during the period 1946 through to 1947 in the summer. They controlled a larger area of China at that time than they had at any time previously.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from page 144:

Soviet policy in outer Mongolia cannot be fairly called Red imperialism. It certainly establishes a standard with which other nations must compete, if they wish to practice a policy of attraction in Asia. Russo-Mongol relations in Asia, like Russo-Czechoslovak relations in Europe deserve careful and respectful study.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind as being either pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think the reference to the careful and respectful study which Russo-Czechoslovak relations in Europe deserve is a realistic one?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know about the word "respectful," but I would certainly say that one should very carefully study the relations between any country and the Soviet Union.

Senator EASTLAND. Well, now, do any of these passages, do you think they connote that they are pro-Communist, any of the passages he has read?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Taking them altogether, do they raise any question in your mind?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it is an attempt on the part, and these are read out of context, an attempt on the part of Lattimore, as it seems to me, to analyze the situation from which he might arrive at a completely—

Senator EASTLAND. Of course, Lattimore is your close friend, and you do not want to say that you think he is a Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. You were his protégé, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I was not a protégé.

Senator EASTLAND. Did he recommend you for appointment to the Far Eastern desk?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; never.

Senator EASTLAND. Who did?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I just simply came up to it as a matter of promotion in the State Department. I mean, I was head of the China



division. Then I was appointed Director of the Far Eastern Office in 1945. So far as I know, Mr. Acheson was the first one to tell me that I was going to be Director of the Far Eastern Office. Mr. James Byrnes appointed me the Director of the Far Eastern Office, and I knew Mr. Byrnes. So I couldn't say that Mr. Acheson recommended to Mr. Byrnes, or Mr. Byrnes himself—

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not say it was one of Mr. Acheson's first acts after he became Under Secretary?

Mr. VINCENT. I did. I testified that I was called back from leave.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from page 187:

As a matter of political prophecy, I agree that the Japanese people are likely to overturn the throne unless we prevent them. As a matter of political principle, I think we should make the worst possible mistake in trying to use for our own purposes either the present Emperor or a successor nominated by us.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind as being pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it strike you as realistic and factual?

Mr. VINCENT. It is an expression of an opinion, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now I have one more I would like to read, Mr. Chairman, from page 139:

The fact that the Soviet Union always stands for democracy is not to be overlooked. It stands for democracy because it stands for all the other things. Here in America we are in the habit of taking a narrow view of foreign claimants to the status of democracy. If China or Russia or some other alien people does not measure up to the standards of the particular American modification of Anglo-Saxon democracy, we say that it is not democratic. We are going to find ourselves boxing with shadows instead of maneuvering in politics if we stick to this habit. The fact is that for most of the people in the world today what constitutes democracy in theory is more or less irrelevant. What moves people to act, to try to line up with one party or country and not with another is the difference between what is more democratic and less democratic in practice.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind as being pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that that was a misconception of communism.

Senator EASTLAND. Answer his question. He asked you whether it was pro or anti.

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I would say that that, to my mind, is a pure misconception of communism, to describe it as democracy.

May I continue, sir? But to say that it therefore constitutes a pro-Communist statement in the mind of Mr. Lattimore, or that other, it is just simply a misconception of what is communism.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think a man who wrote that and meant it is an expert on communism in the Far East or anywhere else?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it could have been written by Mr. Lattimore with the knowledge that it was not the exact truth?

Mr. VINCENT. That I cannot testify.



Senator EASTLAND. Do you think the man who wrote that and knew it, should be an American adviser on far eastern affairs in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't get your question.

Senator EASTLAND. I said, do you think that a man who wrote that and meant it should be an adviser to our State Department on China policy?

Mr. VINCENT. Taking these things out of context, they would seem to leave the impression that he should not.

Senator EASTLAND. Then why did you want to employ him?

Mr. VINCENT. I wanted to employ him, as I testified before, Mr. Chairman, because he was an expert on these fringe areas in China. He was the only person that I knew, or who was known in the State Department, who was familiar with conditions in Outer Mongolia in Sinkiang and these other things.

We took it for granted that he was a technical expert and he was coming in to do a technical job.

Senator EASTLAND. I think you also said it would be broader than that.

Mr. VINCENT. He was coming in on a per diem basis.

Senator EASTLAND. And adviser, too. He was going to advise you on policy.

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, that was the purpose of his coming in.

Senator EASTLAND. Policy adviser?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I would give you the answer, then, that Mr. Kennedy who was preparing papers and doing things with regard to Indonesia, and what not, never, to my knowledge, never assumed to advise policy. He gave factual reports on what he knew of conditions in those areas, and that was what was anticipated that Mr. Lattimore could do with regard to these other areas.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course, the facts that he alleges to give are colored, or tainted, from the Communist point of view, the policy that emerges must be a pro-Communist policy, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. If, as you say, they are tainted. But I have not, myself, felt that his facts were tainted. He was trying, in his opinion, to give a factual picture of the situation there.

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever take Mr. Lattimore to see the President on the question of declaring the Japanese Emperor to be a war criminal?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that he ever went to see the President about that question?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not have any recollection of Mr. Lattimore going to see the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Lattimore the fact that he had gone or what took place?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of discussing with him a visit to the President. He was a good friend—I don't know whether the testimony is pertinent, but I knew that he was a friend of the President, the President himself—

Mr. SOURWINE. Which President are you talking about?

Mr. VINCENT. I am talking about President Roosevelt now.

Mr. SOURWINE. The President himself had what?

Mr. VINCENT. The President himself, according to Mr. Wallace, had himself suggested that Mr. Lattimore come on the mission with us to China in 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about any testimony in which Mr. Currie had suggested it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not know of any testimony there may be. I know only Mr. Wallace's statement that the President had several times suggested that Mr. Lattimore come on the trip with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I give you this, which is the biographic register of the Department of State, with the thought that it may be useful to you.

As we go through here I will ask you questions about where you were, and what your assignments were. I understand that volume gives dates, but not dates of arrival. From that, or what memoranda you have, it might help you to refresh your recollection.

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking about me now?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. When I ask you about a biographical fact, I give you that to assist you, if you need it. But I would like to have you give us the facts as you know them rather than say "this is what I read somewhere."

How old are you, sir?

Mr. VINCENT. Fifty-one.

Mr. SOURWINE. And where were you born?

Mr. VINCENT. I was born in Seneca, Kans.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your early education?

Mr. VINCENT. My early education was in Macon, Ga.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did you go to secondary school?

Mr. VINCENT. Macon, Ga.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you go to college?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What degrees?

Mr. VINCENT. A. B.

Mr. SOURWINE. From where?

Mr. VINCENT. From Mercer University, Macon, Ga.

Mr. SOURWINE. When?

Mr. VINCENT. From 1919 to 1923. I graduated in 1923.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hold any jobs after graduation before you were appointed to Changsha?

Mr. VINCENT. I worked with my father for a year in the real-estate business.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you were appointed a clerk in the American Consulate in Changsha on April 4, 1924?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you went out to the Orient soon after?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you married at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Owen Lattimore in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge that he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first meet him?

Mr. VINCENT. I met him some time in 1929 or 1930 in Peking.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not meet him any earlier?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that he was in business with Arnold & Co., Ltd., at Tientsin and Peking from 1922 to 1926?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know at the time. I have later heard that he was in business.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know now?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I knew he was in business with someone and I assumed it was Arnold & Co.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have occasion, between 1922 and 1926, to visit Tientsin or Peking?

Mr. VINCENT. I never visited Tientsin until 1928.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were appointed foreign-service officer, unclassified, vice consul of career, and vice consul at Changsha on May 12, 1925?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was John Stewart Service in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know he was a draftsman in China in 1925 and 1926?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't referred to his record, so I wouldn't know. I didn't know him. I knew he was the son of a missionary or the son of a YMCA man, and therefore he might be in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know him in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't know him at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your paths may have crossed, but nothing that you remember?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were appointed vice consul at Swatow temporarily on May 28, 1927?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; I was appointed, but never went to Swatow.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never spent any time there?

Mr. VINCENT. No; by that time they canceled the vice consul.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were appointed to Foreign Service School October 10, 1927?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you return to this country for that purpose?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I came not for that purpose; no. I came home on leave, and after coming home, I was given an appointment to the school.

Mr. SOURWINE. By that time had you met Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I had not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you meet him while you were here in the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were appointed vice consul at Hankow on February 4, 1928?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And language officer at Peking on October 1, 1928?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Foreign Service officer, class 8, and appointed consul December 19, 1929?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was John Paton Davies, Jr., in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know he was at Yenching University, Peking, 1929 and 1930?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know it, sir, and I did not know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Lattimore in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. He was in China at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was doing research in Manchuria under the Social Science Research Council, was he not?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not know the exact organization, but I understood he was doing research work.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met him that early?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say I met him some time in 1929.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not remember where?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or the circumstances?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or who introduced you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I may add that I have very little recollection of my early meetings with Mr. Lattimore. It was social until 1940.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were in China, did you know Edgar Snow?

Mr. VINCENT. I first met Edgar Snow when he visited Manchuria, during the time the Japanese were taking over Manchuria. I forgot what newspaper he was with, but I saw him there with other newspaper people.

Mr. SOURWINE. What year would that be?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be either late 1931 or 1932.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well did you know him?

Mr. VINCENT. Not well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you form a friendship then?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know John K. Fairbank in 1930?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I had not met him at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you meet him?

Mr. VINCENT. My first recollection of meeting Fairbank is when he was assigned to Chungking, in 1942, I think it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were appointed consul at Tsinan August 7, 1930?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Owen Lattimore in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I presume he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I already said I met him in Peking, but I never saw him in Tsinan. I assumed he continued on in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were appointed consul at Mukden January 28, 1931?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And foreign Service officer, class 7, July 1, 1931?

Mr. VINCENT. You are losing the place here, but assume that is factually correct here; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Consul at Nanking June 23, 1932?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Raymond Paul Ludden in China at that time?



Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall. I hadn't met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first meet Mr. Ludden?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection of our first meeting, or our paths may have crossed, was somewhere when he was a junior officer when he came to China in 1942, I believe, and was assigned as secretary of the embassy and as consul in Kunming.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. John Paton Davies, Jr., in China at that time; that is, 1932?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to turn over here to see whether Davies at that time had begun his language work in Peiping. I don't think he had, sir; therefore, I don't know where he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Owen Lattimore in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. That was in 1932?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. I can't give any exact statement on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he not in Peiping under the Harvard Yen-ching Institute?

Mr. VINCENT. That I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or had he come under the Guggenheim Memorial Foundation at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking information about him that I really don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated that you had not met Mr. Ludden in China at that time, in 1932?

Mr. VINCENT. Had not met Mr. who?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Ludden, Raymond Paul Ludden.

Mr. VINCENT. No, I had not; not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at Yen-an in 1932?

Mr. VINCENT. I was in Yen-an from the fall of—was I in Yen-an in 1932? No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you leave? You were appointed consul at Tsinan August 7, 1930.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. And I left there in April 1931.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did you go, do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I went to Mukden.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Ludden was appointed vice consul at Tsinan in December 1932?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't have any distinct recollection of it, but if it is in the biographical—do you want me to refer to see?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, I just want to know if you knew it.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. These dates, I might say, for the benefit of the chairman, are dates which I myself have copied out of the State Department Register. I do not vouch for their absolute accuracy, and I am simply using them to find out from the witness what the connection was, if any, with these people.

You were named consul at Dairen September 13, 1932?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long were you at Dairen?

Mr. VINCENT. I was in Dairen for 2½ years, approximately.

Mr. SOURWINE. 1932 to 1934, approximately?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I did not leave. You see, that is where you get these dates. I did not leave November 30, 1934, which would indicate when I left for Nanking. I left in either January or February 1935.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you after that, at any time, stationed at Dairen?

Mr. VINCENT. After?

Mr. SOURWINE. After 1935, after you left to go to Nanking?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were consul at Dairen; were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I was consul at Dairen.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were consul at Dairen, were you married?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When had you married in the interim?

Mr. VINCENT. I married in Tsinan just before I left for Mukden.

Mr. SOURWINE. While at Dairen was your wife living with you at that post?

Mr. VINCENT. She was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who else was a part of your household?

Mr. VINCENT. My children and the Chinese servants. My child, I should say, and the Chinese living in the house, and a Chinese servant out behind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did your wife have a companion living with you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, no companion lived in the house with us.

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1933, was John Stewart Service in China? Do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refer to this book to see.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met him at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall having met him at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Raymond Paul Ludden?

Mr. VINCENT. I had not met him at that time, as far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know this Mr. Service had been appointed clerk in the American Consul in Yunnanfu in 1933?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refer to this to know, but I have no knowledge of Mr. Service's appointments.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no connection with the consulate at Yunnanfu?

Mr. VINCENT. Did you say Yunnanfu or Tsinan?

Mr. SOURWINE. Y-u-n-n-a-n-f-u.

Mr. VINCENT. That is the other name for the city we have been calling Kunming around here. That name was changed to Kunming some time during the last 5 or 6 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then, in 1933, Service was at Kunming, and Davies was at Kunming, later going to Peiping. Did you know that at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't know it at the time. I know at some time in there Davies was appointed a language student at Peiping.

Mr. SOURWINE. In August of 1933. Is that about when you first met him?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that is when I first met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Owen Lattimore was in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know Lattimore was in China at that time. I may have seen him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any contact with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall contact with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that he was doing work with the Guggenheim Foundation?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no familiarity with that.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was in Peiping?

Mr. VINCENT. As I said, sometime in there he started becoming a writer for the Pacific Affairs. I don't know the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named secretary of the diplomatic service and consul at Nanking, November 7, 1934?

Mr. VINCENT. I was named such.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was John Stewart Service in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. That I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was vice consul at Yunnanfu or, as you say, Kunming?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Raymond Paul Ludden was at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know where he was at that time, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Owen Lattimore was?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that not the year that he did field work in Mongolia?

Mr. VINCENT. It may have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named second secretary at Nanking on November 30, 1934?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Second secretary to the Department, September 11, 1935?

Mr. VINCENT. I am just trying to be exact here. To the Department on September 11, 1935, is what I have here. But not as a second secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Foreign Service officer, class 6, October 1, 1935?

Mr. VINCENT. October 1, 1935; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were stationed at Nanking at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I was stationed—

Mr. SOURWINE. You had come to Nanking?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to figure when I left Nanking, but I don't know exactly when I left Nanking.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had been named second secretary at Nanking November 30, 1934?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, these dates here—I mean, I was named second secretary whether that date is correct or not. I might say, from my own, that I left Nanking on transfer back to Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were detailed for special study at the Georgetown University February 12, 1937?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where John Stewart Service was then?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall where he was, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Ludden was then?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Davies?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know that Mr. Service was at Peiping and Mr. Ludden and Davies at Mukden?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not. I didn't recall it.



Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Mr. John Kenneth Emmerson was at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I would say he must have been in Japan, if he joined the service.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met him yet?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long were you at Georgetown?

Mr. VINCENT. During two sessions, I think; that is, 2 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you study there?

Mr. VINCENT. I studied Latin-American history under Mr. Culbertson at one time, and I studied a course called geopolitics under a Hungarian professor whose name I have forgotten. There may have been another course, but I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever study the Russian language?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you speak Russian?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who Max Granich is?

Mr. VINCENT. I do know who he is; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is he?

Mr. VINCENT. He is an American that went out to Shanghai in 1935, I think, with his wife, and published a magazine called the Voice of China there for a period.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that he was Mike Gold's brother?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who Mike Gold is?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid I don't, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mandel has been sworn previously for the duration of these hearings for the purpose of giving expert testimony.

Is it proper if I direct a question to him without reswearing him?

Senator JENNER (presiding). You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell the committee, of your own knowledge, who Mike Gold is?

Mr. MANDEL. Mike Gold has been for a number of years a regular Communist writer for the official organ of the Communist Party, the Daily Worker, and his name appears there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Max Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know him?

Mr. VINCENT. I never met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know Mike Gold?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know Max Granich's wife?

Mr. VINCENT. Never knew Max Granich's wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she the former Grace Maul?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify as to whether she was or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you know of Mr. Granich's connection with the Voice of China?

Mr. VINCENT. I know that in 1935 he was editor and, I suppose, owner of the Voice of China.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was managing editor; was he not?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't define it as managing editor—whether he was owner, editor.



Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know he had been managing editor of China Today?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that publication, China Today?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that it was the official organ of the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that the American Friends of the Chinese People is a Communist-front organization?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge of the fact that Grace Maul was a contributor of articles to the Party Organizer issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge that that was the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that brought to your attention at any time?

Mr. VINCENT. It may have been in some of the documents which I read over before I went down on the Granich case, before the un-American Activities Committee, but I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at any time check, or cause to be checked, by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the records of either Max Granich or his wife?

Mr. VINCENT. I myself? No; I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see an FBI report or other security report on either one of those persons?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall seeing one, but there may have been one in a large file I read in the State Department.

You realize, when I am giving this testimony, that I was in Washington when the Granichs were in Shanghai.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Did you ever ask for an FBI report or other security file on either Max Granich or his wife, Grace Maul Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall asking for that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you think you asked for one?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall asking for one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell the committee, please, about your activities, if any, as a State Department official, in connection with the message to the American consular general in Shanghai which has been referred to occasionally, at least, as a reprimand, for harassing the activities of Granich?

Give us the correct version of that, please.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I can give you the story of that.

Sometime in 1935 Granich arrived in Shanghai, but I don't know at what time. I don't recall from memory what time he was there, he and his wife.

They applied for registration at the consular general for a publishing company which was to publish cultural matters and things in regard to China. I do not recall the name of what they called the publishing company. I recall the name of the Voice of China, which was the magazine.

Mr. Gauss, after seeing one or two publications, realized that it was engaging in what he called radical propaganda, directed against stirring the Chinese up against the Japanese. I am testifying here from memory, from what I can remember from these documents I

have seen. Otherwise, I would not have had this memory of that particular instance.

Mr. Gauss canceled the registration of this firm which was publishing the Voice of China. Registration, I may say here, is an act which is done in China where a company will come in and register simply to have its name in the consulate in case of difficulties. It is not obligatory to register, nor is a lack of registration a particular handicap to the company, although some of them think it is, like the Standard Oil Co. would register.

He canceled that because he did not think that the magazine was carrying the kind of material which Granich had originally indicated to him it was going to carry.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that why he said he canceled it?

Mr. VINCENT. Why Mr. Gauss said he canceled it? Because he thought it was not doing what Mr. Granich had originally held out that he was there to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the only reason he gave?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the only reason I know he gave at the time.

The Chinese then complained to Mr. Gauss, the Chinese police, that Mr. Granich was—I have forgotten now, whether they said pro-Communist, Communist, or a member of the Comintern.

Mr. Gauss wrote back, and I am recollecting these things from this file, and asked the police for any information that they may have to support this evidence that he was a member of the Comintern.

The Chinese police did not furnish him with this information. The next thing that happened in this case was that Granich came in and told Mr. Gauss, or somebody in Mr. Gauss's office, that some of his magazines had been seized out of a book store.

Mr. Gauss told him that he should take whatever recourse that he should in getting these magazines back.

The next time I have any recollection now of the case really coming up was when we were notified by Mr. Gauss that Granich had had—I forget now how many copies, probably 1,000 or 2,000 copies of his magazine seized by the Chinese from the Chinese post office.

Mr. Gauss informed us in the Department—this was in 1930, by then, I believe—Mr. Gauss then informed us that he had not taken any action in this case to get the man to recover his goods.

At this time, the case was referred down to what we call the Legal Division to get an opinion on whether Granich's property under the extraterritorial treaty should be given protection.

The Legal Division of the State Department ruled that, irrespective of the character of the magazine, since Granich was an American and since this was American property, at least a gesture should be made to assist him in recovering the magazines.

That was put in the form of a dispatch. Mr. Gauss was told that, whereas Granich deserved no diplomatic protection, the State Department was in sympathy with his general attitude toward Granich, but from a purely legal point of view Mr. Granich had a right to what we would call his treaty rights under the extraterritorial treaty, to expect the consulate to make some effort to recover the magazines.

Mr. Gauss, I think, has already testified that he did not consider that a reprimand.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say he was told that the State Department was in sympathy with his viewpoint?

Mr. VINCENT. That the State Department was in sympathy with his general attitude on Granich, but on this legal point, for fear of establishing a precedent, for fear of, in those days, admitting to the Chinese that they had a right to seize American property, no matter whether it was property which we had no sympathy with ourselves, it was property.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see the police memorandum; that is, the memorandum prepared by the Shanghai police dated January 12, 1937, covering the activities of Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. I presumably did when I read that file. I have no distinct recollection of the police memorandum. But I think the Chinese police themselves recited the matter as to his Communist affiliations. That is my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not Mr. Gauss accuse him of any Communist affiliations?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall Mr. Gauss accusing him of Communist affiliations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not Mr. Gauss forward the Shanghai police file?

Mr. VINCENT. I believe he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. For what purpose?

Mr. VINCENT. For informing the Department as to the man, I suppose.

Mr. SOURWINE. He wanted you to read it and know what was in it? And it contained allegations with regard to communism?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you say Mr. Gauss did not make any allegations?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Gauss, the only thing I recollect in this big file was his statement that whereas he realized that the man was carrying on activities of a radical character, which would have stirred up the Chinese people, that he was being critical of the Nanking Government, the Chinese Government, that he had had no positive evidence that he was a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you prepare or approve the instructions sent by pouch under date of July 12, and signed by Sumner Welles, regarding the disposition of that Eastern Publishing Co. matter, that being the name of Granich's firm?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I was the final drafter on that thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you prepare the telegram of May 13 to the United States consular general at Shanghai, that is, to Gauss, asking an explanatory statement as to why the consular general declined to intercede on behalf of Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. There I cannot, from memory, say that I did. I know that I was in the final drafting, not final, but I was the one that put together the ideas in the dispatch.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you prepare a memorandum of June 12, 1936, stating that the Voice of China, upon examination, did not show that it was carrying out Communist propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that based on a study which you yourself had made of the magazine?

Mr. VINCENT. Somebody in the office, it may have been myself, had looked at the magazine, and Mr. Gauss himself had also reported that the magazine did not carry Communist propaganda.



Mr. SOURWINE. You were not reporting Mr. Gauss' conclusion, were you, in this memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. That I cannot say at the time, or whether I was reporting his conclusions, because I recall that memorandum was a summary of the case up to the time, and whether I was reporting information which I myself arrived at or whether I was reporting that as simply what Mr. Gauss had done. I think you will find that the date of that, as I just arrived back from Washington, I was just given the job of reviewing the Granich case when it came up. •

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not in that memorandum state it as your opinion that an examination of the magazine Voice of China did not show it was carrying out Communist propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did state that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As your opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. Not as my opinion. This was a summary, if I recall that memorandum correctly. It started out and gave a complete review of the case of the Voice. Whether I was summarizing there an opinion of Mr. Gauss, or whether I was stating an opinion of my own, or examination of the magazine, I cannot state.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know what you were purporting to state in the memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. I know in the memorandum I was purporting to review for superior officers the present status of the case, based upon what I had there.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were trying to give them facts, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I was trying to give them the facts at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what you would try to give your superior officers, the facts?

Mr. VINCENT. A factual summary of the Granich case in order for them to reach a decision; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. All the facts that they would need to reach an intelligent decision?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were then giving them the fact that the Voice of China did not appear to be carrying propaganda; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I was giving them that either as a fact taken from Mr. Gauss' report or from reading it there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether you ever examined a copy of the Voice of China?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of having examined a copy.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had examined it, do you think you would have been competent to state whether it was carrying out Communist propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. That would depend entirely on the magazine at the time. I can't say whether I would have been competent to judge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Upon what basis or in what frame of reference would you decide that anything was or was not Communist propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. In this particular case, I would decide it was or was not, because Mr. Gauss himself had reported that an examination of the magazine showed it was not Communist.



Mr. SOURWINE. You mean that Mr. Gauss' expression of opinion in that regard would have been conclusive with you?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Without an examination of the document?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. That explains, then, how you could reach such a conclusion in this case.

Generally, do you feel that you yourself are competent, from examination, to determine whether something is Communist or non-Communist, pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly, as I testified before—I am not an expert on communism. I would have to probably have the thing to see what magazine you had, to see whether I could determine whether it was Communist or anti-Communist. I am no expert.

Mr. SOURWINE. What frame of reference do you have to determine whether anything is Communist or non-Communist, pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I will have to answer there, sir, that I have no frame of reference, particularly, on which I would decide it. I mean, if this magazine had carried on at that time propaganda in favor of the Chinese Communists, then I would have thought it was pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. How would you recognize propaganda in favor of the Chinese Communists? Did you know what the propaganda line was?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then how would you recognize propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. I am simply stating that if the magazine had come out speaking favorably of the Chinese Communists in China, then I would have certainly known it was pro-Communist. But I am not testifying that I would have been able to adopt a subtle line of approach.

Mr. MORRIS. On that last point, may I ask a question, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Surely.

Mr. MORRIS. I think the last thing you said, Mr. Vincent, was that you set up the standard that if something spoke favorably of the Chinese Communists therefore it was pro-Communist in its orientation.

Mr. Vincent, is that a fair appraisal of your testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. I said if the Voice of China had come out with propaganda for the Chinese Communists, then I would call it a Communist magazine.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had recognized something in that magazine as Communist propaganda you would have said it was pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you might not have recognized it because you didn't know what the Communist line was?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, I would like to read just one paragraph from a volume here, Wartime China, by Maxwell Stewart:

As China is not like any other country, so Chinese communism has no parallel elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other countries, and you can also find resemblances to the grass roots populace movements that have figured in American history. Because there is no other effective opposition in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many progres-

sive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx or Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Communists as agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices.

Would you call that pro-Communist propaganda according to your definition?

Mr. VINCENT. I would call it a misconception of Communists in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Would that conform to the definition you just gave of the standard of recognizing pro-Communist writing?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that that is Mr.—what's his name?

Mr. MORRIS. Maxwell Stewart.

Mr. VINCENT. Maxwell Stewart's interpretation of what the Communists were up to in China.

Mr. MORRIS. You would not, employing your standard, call that procommunism?

Mr. VINCENT. Insofar as it is just his analysis of it, it is an incorrect analysis, whether or not you want to call it incorrect or his opinion, as to the Chinese Communists in China.

Mr. MORRIS. You recognize that is the pamphlet, Mr. Vincent, about which we had evidence this morning which you said you were not able to deny?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Which reads:

The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent, among others. Vincent said (in confidence), and with a certain emphasis that he thought it good and well worth publishing.

You recognize that that is the same publication?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not until you tell me now, because I testified this morning that I had no recollection of this particular incident and when you read this I do not recall that as the memorandum which these people say I read.

Mr. MORRIS. Yet this morning you did not deny it?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not deny that I had read this.

Mr. SOURWINE. With whom, sir, did you discuss this matter of the Voice of China, Max Granich's publication?

Mr. VINCENT. I discussed it with the legal adviser, one person in the legal adviser's office, Mr. Francis Xavier Ward, who was a good friend of mine there and who was in charge of far eastern matters in the legal adviser's office. It was discussed also with my chiefs at the time and went out under their initials. The chiefs at the time if I may recall from memory, were Mr.—let me see. This was in 1936. Maxwell Hamilton would have been Deputy Director and Dr. Stanley Hornbeck would have been Director. If my recollection is correct both of them initialed that before it was sent out under the signature, I think, from my recollection of the document, under the signature of Sumner Welles.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss that matter with anyone outside of the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall discussing it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss it with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not recall discussing it with Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the decision with regard to the memorandum which you prepared on the nature of the magazine wholly your own decision?

Mr. VINCENT. On the nature of the magazine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, that it was non-Communist, that it did not appear to be putting out Communist propaganda.

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified already, I think, sir, that my conclusion as to the nature of the magazine was derived from Mr. Gauss' own statement on the magazine, which was that it was carrying out radical propaganda—

Mr. SOURWINE. Perhaps it is a quibble, but what I am trying to get at is this: Let me see if I can get more apt language: Whether the decision to characterize it as non-Communist, on whatever basis you chose to make that decision, was your own decision, or were you instructed in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. I have already testified, sir, that this memorandum I wrote here was a summation or summary of the case for my superior officers and was based upon the report of Mr. Gauss.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not instructed, then?

Mr. VINCENT. Nobody instructed me to include a statement in my memorandum, although if I had left it out I would have felt that I was lacking in my duty because that was a part of the record which I was summarizing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were, about June 1, 1937, made Foreign Service officer, class 5; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I assume so, sir. May I refer to this again?

Mr. SOURWINE. Surely.

Mr. VINCENT. Where are we down to?

Mr. SOURWINE. 1937.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1938 where were you?

Mr. VINCENT. I was still in the Department of State.

Mr. SOURWINE. You remained there through 1938, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you attend a discussion conference of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, in Washington, on or about December 9 and 10, 1938?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified in executive session on that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. That I have no recollection of that meeting, but that it is quite possible I did attend.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know how you attended that conference or what was the subject of the conference or what part, if any, you took in it?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid that I don't recall that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know the names of anyone else in the Department who attended the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not. I know that—I think Dr. Hornbeck might have attended it. Dr. Hornbeck was a trustee of the organization about that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't mean to be unduly repetitious, but you remember you were asked to try to scrape your memory on this one. Do you remember whether Mr. Alger Hiss was in attendance?



Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether Mr. James Penfield attended?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether Owen Lattimore was there?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether Mr. and/or Mrs. Steve Raushenbush was there?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall. I simply don't recall the occasion. I think I have testified that as far as being attending there, I would have considered it part of my job to keep up——

Mr. SOURWINE. You know the record shows you did attend?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You simply have no memory of having attended?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named consul at Geneva February 1, 1939?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Messrs. Service, Ludden, Davies, and Emmerson were at that time? Was Mr. Service at Shanghai?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I do not recall. If you want me to refer to this, or if you have already done that I will take your word.

Mr. SOURWINE. My notes here indicated that Mr. Service was at Shanghai, Mr. Ludden was at Peking, Mr. Davies was at Hankow, and Mr. Emmerson was at Osaki, first at Taiheku temporarily and then at Osaki, Japan.

Mr. VINCENT. If you have referred to this I don't think I should take the committee's time——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have connections with any of those gentlemen at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you notify any of them when you were leaving for Geneva——

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And give them your new address?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think that it would have been in the Gazette, but I may have. I certainly would not have notified Emmerson because I don't know him. I don't think I knew Ludden, so I wouldn't have notified him. I don't think at that time I knew Service so I hardly would have notified him. I had met Davies, according to my recollection, at that time, but it is highly improbable I would have taken the trouble to notify him I was going to Geneva.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named Foreign Service officer class 4 November 16, 1939, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't find that one. I will take your word for it. I don't see why we should take the time for it. I was named class 4 at some time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Class 4. Do you remember going——

Mr. VINCENT. Class 4; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember going to Geneva in the spring of 1940?

Mr. VINCENT. I do, sir.



Mr. SOURWINE. When did you get back?

Mr. VINCENT. Get back where?

Mr. SOURWINE. From Geneva.

Mr. VINCENT. I think I got back from Geneva in the latter part of November 1940, yes, 1940.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't go over for just a short trip and then come right back and go over again?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What time did you leave to go over there, do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I took a sailing in May.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had left the country by the 1st of June?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I was already in Switzerland by the 1st of June.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you got back did you get in touch with Mr. Owen Lattimore immediately after you got back?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of getting in touch with Mr. Lattimore when I got back. I may testify there that our relations were not one where I would have felt it incumbent upon me to get in touch with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. How soon after you got back was the first time that you saw Mr. Lattimore?

I will rephrase the question. It is not very well stated. How soon after you got back did you see Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection, I would say, of seeing him at all. I came here to Washington for I think a week or 10 days' consultation. I went from here to Chicago and spent Christmas with my wife and family. I went from there out to the west coast to spend time with my brother-in-law, Admiral Smith, and sailed for Shanghai in January some time, or maybe early February.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were in Washington did you speak to Mr. Lattimore by telephone?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't have any recollection of speaking to Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no recollection of speaking with him in person during that period?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were away did you write to him?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of corresponding with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. After you got back did you write to him?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall writing to Mr. Lattimore; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you receive any letters from him?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in the habit of keeping in touch with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. Not at that time; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why Mr. Lattimore should feel that you would get in touch with him as soon as you got back?

Mr. VINCENT. Not unless at that time he was being considered by the President, which eventually came through, for appointment as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek and that may be the reason that he may have seen me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, can you identify that as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one paragraph from this letter and ask that the whole letter be made a part of the record at this point.

Senator JENNER. It may go in.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 378" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 378

Cable: Pacaf, Baltimore

Telephone: UNIVERSITY 0100, Ext. 43

#### PACIFIC AFFAIRS

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JUNE 7, 1940.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,

*Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street,  
New York City.*

DEAR CARTER: I have now looked up the book on "The Geology of China" by J. S. Lee. It turns out to be a textbook, and as such is hardly suitable for review in Pacific Affairs, crowded as we are. Nor do I think you really need it for the International Secretariat library, unless for the rather artificial point of having such a book by a Chinese author. You already have Cressey's "Geographic Foundations," which will give you all the references that you could get from the book by Lee.

I have not yet been able to read Buell's "Isolated America," and hardly think that I am the one to do the suggested review. There are a number of other books, on subjects that I know more about, which I ought to review first, and Pacific Affairs ought not to be overloaded with my reviews. On the other hand, I should think that you yourself are just the man who ought to review this book. You have the particular link with the Far East, and you have a broader outlook than most of us who have specialized on the Far East, through constantly being in touch with international organizations.

I am sorry that Gauss would not take on the review of "Inner Asian Frontiers of China." I am pretty sure that John Carter Vincent is not back from Geneva, or we should have heard. Moreover, as a member of the State Department, he would probably have to pussyfoot in commenting on political parts of the book.

The trouble is that the best of the "specialists" available in America—Wittfogel, Wang Yu-Chaun, Feng Chia-sheng, Bishop, Creel—have all been so heavily quoted and directly acknowledged that they can hardly review the book in a publication which is edited by the author of the book. That is why Gauss would have been good, if he had not been so confoundedly modest. He is a man of great general knowledge, and an acute comparative knowledge of theory.

Do you know what I think would be an excellent idea, if you could persuade him to do it? Get Field to write the review. It's a little bit in the family, of course, but Field has the qualifications. He is not himself a specialist on ancient history, of course, but why should he be? There are other things in the book. And Field is interested in, and knows a lot about, theories of historical origins, the interaction of society and environment, and so on.

I'll also scratch the part of my head where the bald spot is rapidly spreading, and let you know if I can excavate by this method any further bright ideas, if Field should prove to be obstinate.

Yours very sincerely,

[s] Owen Lattimore  
OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a letter on the lettehead of Pacific Affairs. It is dated at 300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., June 7, 1940, and is addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, Institute of Pacific Relations. The third paragraph reads as follows:

I am sorry that Gauss would not take on the review of Inner Asian Frontiers of China. I am pretty sure that John Carter Vincent is not back from Geneva or we should have heard. Moreover, as a member of the State Department, he would probably have to pussyfoot in commenting on political parts of the book.

Would you say, Mr. Vincent, that Mr. Lattimore's apparent expectation that you would get in touch with him as soon as you got back from Geneva was completely unfounded?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say so. It was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were friends, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. We were friends, but as I say at that time not, or we never have been close friends. At that time I would not have looked up Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think this might indicate that he was keeping tabs on where you were and was going to look you up as soon as you got back?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly draw that inference from the letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he in fact look you up when you got back?

Mr. VINCENT. As I said, I do not recall seeing Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what Mr. Lattimore meant when he said here, "as a member of the State Department, he," referring to you, sir, "would probably have to pussyfoot in commenting on political parts of the book," referring by "book" to "Inner Asian Frontiers of China"?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not. I don't know what was in his mind that I would have to pussyfoot in commenting or what his idea was for me to review his book. I never reviewed the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that his book?

Mr. VINCENT. Inner Asian Frontiers of China?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never did review the book. Were you ever asked to review it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall ever being asked to review it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in a position at that time, that is, in 1940, where you could have written a completely frank review about a book no matter what your views on it were for publication?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean for publication?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I would have to refer to the State Department, and I myself would naturally have not wanted to appear in public press in reviewing a book about the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anything you had written in the way of a review of a book would have had to accord with State Department policy or at least not be violently at odds therewith; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, but I would say according to personal policy and other things I wouldn't have gone into the business of publicly reviewing books.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read the book Inner Asian Frontiers of China?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named consul at Shanghai August 10, 1940?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. You ought to correct your records there. I left very much later.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to find out approximately when you got to Shanghai.

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't leave Geneva, for instance, until November, although this shows I was appointed consul in Shanghai. I came home and, as I said, did not leave the United States for Shanghai until the latter part of January or early February, and more likely February. Then I would have arrived in Shanghai late in February or early March.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of 1941?

Mr. VINCENT. Of 1941.

Mr. SOURWINE. You remained at Shanghai until you were appointed first secretary at Nanking in June; is that right, temporarily?

Mr. VINCENT. No. That is purely a technicality there. Nanking was occupied by the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never changed your duty station?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I stayed in Shanghai but the appointment to Nanking, may I explain there just for your record, the appointment to Nanking was a technicality because theoretically the Chinese Government was still supposed to be at Nanking, but when you were appointed to Nanking you went to Chungking where the government was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you leave Shanghai and go to Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. I left Shanghai and went to Chungking, my recollection is, in May, but this doesn't show it here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was John Stewart Service in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to turn to this. Whether John Service was in Shanghai during those few months I was there I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wasn't he third secretary at Nanking prior to about April, and named vice consul at Shanghai in April?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refer to this, sir. My first distinct recollection of Service is when he was in Chungking at the same time I was counselor there with Mr. Gauss.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember having met him earlier at Shanghai?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall exactly but I think he was in Shanghai at that time and I would have met him if he was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Mr. Raymond Paul Ludden was at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I can look it up for you, sir, but I don't recall. Do you want me to look it up?

Mr. SOURWINE. The note I have here is that he was vice consul at Canton. Would you have had contact with him if he was there?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I have never visited Canton in my life.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know from memory where Mr. John Paton Davies was at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.



Mr. SOURWINE. If he was still at Hankow, as seems to be indicated, would you have had contact with him there?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named first secretary at technically Nanking but actually Chungking June 3, 1941?

Mr. VINCENT. That must be the date; yes. Then I would like to correct that testimony. I wasn't named until June. I probably didn't leave Shanghai until June.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that about the time you first met Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I didn't meet Lauchlin Currie there. He came up later to Chungking. I didn't meet him in Shanghai. I have testified that I first met Mr. Currie up in New Hampshire when he had a little farm there and we had been loaned a little house at Hancock by Mr. Grew. That was 1936 or 1937. I have testified to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see him in Chungking in 1941 or 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't see him in 1941, as I recollect, but did see him in 1942. I think the 1941 visit was made prior to my arrival in Chungking but I couldn't testify exactly to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well did you know him in Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew him fairly well in Chungking. He was there. I had met him before. I saw him from time to time. I think I have testified before that I was not taken with him on conferences because he stayed with the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were given leave to handle work in the office of the Director of the Foreign Economic Administration did Mr. Currie have anything to do with that assignment?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. He asked me to come over there for a while.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was then in what position?

Mr. VINCENT. He was Deputy Director of the FEA, Foreign Economic Administration.

Mr. SOURWINE. You covered here the question, either in the executive session or here today, the question of your social intercourse with Mr. Currie and of consulting him on matters of policy and so forth?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated, I believe, that you had visited him on a number of occasions, both at his office and at his home; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I saw him from time to time, not frequently but from time to time socially when we were in the FEA. I saw him from time to time during the short period I was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember if you went to see Mr. Currie soon after your return from Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say from memory whether I saw him soon after I came back from Chungking or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you receive an invitation from him to come see him shortly after you got back from Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. I have used the phrase before: it would have been logical that I would have seen him but I have no recollection of meeting him at that time. As I testified before he was a White House man who was handling China affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where was Mr. Lattimore at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. This would be now in 1943, I gather.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek in 1941-42, wasn't he?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. He left China sometime in 1942. It may have been early 1943.

Mr. SOURWINE. And became Deputy Director of OWI in early 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't the exact information on that. He became the Deputy Director sometime.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was then in charge of Pacific operations for OWI?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether it was late 1942 or early 1943 I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any contact with him while he was in that job?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that contact——

Mr. VINCENT. Not frequently, but I would see him from time to time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have a telephone contact with him from time to time?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of it, but it would be logical that I would have.

Mr. SOURWINE. And correspondence passed between you?

Mr. VINCENT. Correspondence of an official nature. I don't recall any personal.

Mr. SOURWINE. Solely official?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know. There may have been correspondence. I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that in November 1941 Mr. Lattimore had sent a message to Lauchlin Currie at the White House indicating a violent adverse reaction by Chiang Kai-shek to the proposed modus vivendi for Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you read that again, because I want to be sure of this one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me start over again. Do you know what I refer to when I speak of a proposed modus vivendi for Japan, circa 1941?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I think I do, but I know it from——

Mr. SOURWINE. You know what I am referring to?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I do; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that in November 1941 Mr. Lattimore had sent a message to Lauchlin Currie at the White House indicating a violent adverse reaction by Chiang Kai-shek to that proposed modus vivendi for Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know he had sent one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Mr. Lattimore had urged that the President be told about Chiang's adverse reaction?

(Senator Ferguson took the chair.)

Mr. VINCENT. If we are speaking of that situation I don't know that it had to be urged. The answer to that is that I do not recall. But Mr. Gauss and I informed the White House, the State Department, of the very strong adverse reaction to the modus vivendi on the part of either Chiang Kai-shek or the foreign secretary at that time, Quotai Chi.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at the time that Mr. Lattimore had sent or intended to send such a message?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss it with him at any time?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of discussing it with Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since you say that you and Ambassador Gauss had sent such a message, will you tell us what was the proposed *modus vivendi* and why it was opposed by Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no exact memory on that *modus vivendi*, and I would have to go back into documents to see, but I can tell you why Chiang Kai-shek, I can tell you enough to know why Chiang Kai-shek had a violent reaction to it, because this proposed *modus vivendi*, which I don't know whether it ever was a proposal, had something to do with advising the Chinese and the Japanese to give up their war status; it had something to do with our calling off the oil embargo on Japan, provided Japan would agree not to move any farther south in French Indochina and eventually get out of French Indochina.

As I say, without being able to refer to that specific *modus vivendi*, I know that his reaction was violent and that Mr. Gauss reported it. I say Mr. Gauss and I because I was present when the Generalissimo or the Foreign Secretary—I forget which—had this. It was brought to their attention not by Mr. Gauss and myself, mind you. It was brought to their attention by their own Ambassador here in Washington, and one or the other of them called Mr. Gauss and me in to give their violent reaction to this proposed *modus vivendi*.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did inform the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. We did inform the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. What if anything do you know about the origin of that proposed *modus vivendi*?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid that I don't know anything about the origin of the proposed *modus vivendi*. It came out, I believe, of talks that Mr. Hull was having with Nomura at the time, but from here I am speaking from memory. I was in Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named Foreign Service officer, class 3, February 1, 1942.

Mr. VINCENT. I assume that you are correct because you copied it from out of here. Class 3, February 1, 1942; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And consul of Embassy, actually at Chungking, March 17, 1942.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. John Stewart Service was third secretary at Chungking from about July 1942. Did you know him there?

Mr. VINCENT. I did know him there, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Raymond Paul Ludden was second secretary at Chungking from about July 31, 1942, and later division consul at Kunming October 1942. Did you know him there?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. John Patton Davies was consular officer at Kunming, for duty as second secretary, temporarily, at Kunming, beginning at the end of April 1942. Did you know him there?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met John K. Emmerson?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not believe I had yet met Emmerson, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named Counselor of Embassy at Chungking July 1, 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought we read that first. That is changing the order to Chungking, yes.



Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify for the committee Chou En-lai and Lin Pao?

Mr. VINCENT. Chou En-lai is the present member and Foreign Secretary of the Kuomintang regime in China. He was the representative of the Communist group in Yen-an stationed at Chungking. It was a position of, I suppose, liaison character. I never knew how it was described, but he was there in a capacity recognized by the Chinese Government. As I have testified before, I met him at Chiang Kai-shek's. I am describing their character. Lin Pao to the best of my recollection was a general who came to Chungking in the fall, I believe, of 1942 to discuss with Chiang Kai-shek the possibilities of settling their differences and having a better coordinated military campaign against the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet those gentlemen?

Mr. VINCENT. As I have testified in executive session, yes, I have met En-lai when he paid a courtesy call on Mr. Gauss, the Ambassador. As I say, I met him at a reception at Chiang Kai-shek's. I had a lunch with him and the head of the British-American Tobacco Co. at Nan-king. I testified also that I met him somewhere at some time at a Chinese residence.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you keep your voice up a little.

Mr. VINCENT. Excuse me, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Specifically, did you testify concerning whether you ever met them together and had a conference with them together?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not specifically testify to that because I had no recollection of meeting the two of them together.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you testify as to whether you and Mr. John Stewart Service together had a conversation with Chou En-lai and Lin Pao in November 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not testify that I recalled such a meeting. I notice now that Mr. Service has himself, in a memorandum which he wrote, said that he and I did meet them, under what circumstances I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were asked to check up on that, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I saw it on the page that you mentioned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you refreshed your memory in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid after even reading the memorandum here, I don't recall the circumstances of that meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no memory of that meeting?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of that meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. The paragraph you are talking about appears on page 792, part 3, exhibit No. 249 of the hearings of this committee. Mr. John Stewart Service in that report stated:

The Communists themselves (Chou En-lai and Lin Pao in a conversation with John Carter Vincent and the undersigned about November 20, 1942) consider that foreign influence (obviously American) with the Kuomintang is the only force that may be able to improve the situation. They admit the difficulty of successful foreign suggestions regarding China's internal affairs no matter how tactfully made. But they believe that the reflection of a better informed foreign opinion, official and public, would have some effect on the more far-sighted elements of leadership in the Kuomintang, such as the Generalissimo.

The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem—

and so on.

Are you sure you have no memory of any such meeting at all?



Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't have. As I say, that meeting, which I gather here he reported on 2 months later, I just don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you two had had a meeting like that it would have been in line with your official duty, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. And there would have been an obligation to report upon it?

Mr. VINCENT. I have searched through the files of the State Department and can't find that I ever reported on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would there have been an obligation on you to report on it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, there wouldn't have been an obligation to report on it if I did not consider it of sufficient importance to report on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. If it took place as Mr. Service had described it, it would have been of sufficient importance to report on, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have seemed to me to be, but I cannot find any report I made on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. In that event would it have been your duty to report or would the joint duty of yourself and Mr. Service have been discharged by his report?

Mr. VINCENT. The joint duty would have been discharged by Mr. Service's reporting on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Whether you knew about it or not?

Mr. VINCENT. He would have had to report on it, and at that time—here you have to get into the matter of assignments again.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Whether or not he was at that time, and I think he had become, adviser to Stilwell or not, I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he was adviser to Stilwell and was making his report to Stilwell that wouldn't have discharged your duty of reporting, would it?

Mr. VINCENT. He would have made a copy of the report to Stilwell, presumably, available to the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would he have made a copy available to you?

Mr. VINCENT. Not necessarily.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you knew that he was reporting it to Stilwell and a copy to the State Department you would have had no obligation to report, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have had no obligation to report, but as I say, whether he reported through the Embassy or whether he reported through Stilwell, I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have read this account. Do you have any opinion as to whether it happened as Mr. Service reported it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not have, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doesn't the mere fact that Mr. Service reported it at least lead you to the prima facie supposition that it happened?

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly does. You asked me whether I had a memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do have an opinion whether it happened?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I have an opinion, but I don't recall the instance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it happened as Mr. Service reported?

Mr. VINCENT. I am inclined to think it did happen as Mr. Service reported it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no reason to doubt Mr. Service's accuracy or veracity?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I would say one thing on the question of my recollection of it, that Mr. Lin Pao or Gen. Lin Pao spoke only Chinese and Mr. Service spoke Chinese well, whether the conversation which I say is one that I cannot recall whether it was in Chinese which I did not myself understand well. I just give that as a circumstance in this meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading further from this report:

The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem. One would be the emphasizing in our dealings with the Chinese Government, and in our propaganda to China, of the political nature of the world conflict; democracy against fascism. This would include constant reiteration of the American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China. It should imply to the Kuomintang our knowledge of and concern over the situation in China.

Was that suggestion carried out in American policy?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was American policy such as to be in accordance with the expression contained in that suggestion, whether wittingly or otherwise?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say it was, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, wasn't there a great deal of stressing by the State Department of the "political nature of the world conflict," and a good deal of reiteration, almost constant reiteration, of the American hope of "seeing the development of genuine democracy in China"?

Mr. VINCENT. Of genuine democracy in China, yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then there was, as a matter of American policy, precisely what the Communists here suggested as one of their approaches, was there not?

Mr. VINCENT. Let me read again [referring to document]. Well, yes. When you say that you get on to the matter of democracy in China—

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't want to get on to the question of democracy in China, please. I only want to get on to the question of what the State Department was stressing in its propaganda.

Mr. VINCENT. Let's take first the word "propaganda." The State Department, I don't think, had any propaganda at that time, but if you are speaking of what was the policy which Mr. Gauss and I were supposed to carry out, it was to try to get the Communists and Kuomintang to settle their differences so they would both fight the others.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't believe there will be any difference here if we will get our words together so they mean the same thing. I mean no evil inference when I use the word "propaganda." I mean propaganda as an expression of opinion which it is desired that others shall hear and react to. In that regard the State Department engages in propaganda every day, isn't that true? On the basis of that kind of definition.

Mr. VINCENT. On that definition.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the basis of that kind of definition of propaganda what Mr. Service says Chou En-lai and Lin Pao were suggesting here was actually a particular type of propaganda, was it not? They were suggesting that the State Department reiterate the American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Whether they meant by democracy what we mean, or whether they meant by democracy what the State Department would mean, or what Soviet Russia would mean, is not the question. They were asking for a specific phrase to become a part of State Department propaganda, were they not?

Mr. VINCENT. According to this, they were.

Mr. SOURWINE. That phrase did become a part of the State Department propaganda, did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I again object to the word "propaganda."

Mr. SOURWINE. We have defined "propaganda" in a manner acceptable to both of us, and I use it in that sense.

Mr. VINCENT. It was the policy of the Embassy to try to bring about as much as we could an improvement in the Chinese Government. Whether we were stressing at that time democracy I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. The State Department at Washington did reiterate on numerous occasions the American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China; didn't they?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You wrote memoranda with that phrase or substantially that phrase in it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. For signature by the Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those memoranda were so signed?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Others in the State Department used the same phrase?

Mr. VINCENT. Genuine democracy in China; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. An expression, a reiteration of the American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to pin this down to a particular period of 1942, and I do not know that it was being reiterated at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was being done all the way through; it was still being done in 1945 and 1946; wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very strongly in 1945 and 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. By which time you had a strong hand in the matter?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Isn't it conceivable to you that that phrase may have had in China the impact which the Communists, Lin Pao and Chou En-lai, desired, whatever it may have meant to the people who heard it used back home?

Mr. VINCENT. The impact that Chou En-lai and Lin Pao desired?

Mr. SOURWINE. I will simplify that question:

Mr. VINCENT. I wish you would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Obviously if Lin and Chou desired that this particular phrase be reiterated by the State Department, they had a reason for that; didn't they?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That reason must have been the impact that they felt it would have in China; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. They felt that the use of that phrase by the State Department would have an impact in China which would be helpful to them; isn't that right?

Mr. VINCENT. To broaden the Government—

Mr. SOURWINE. Can't you conceive that when the phrase was used by the State Department it did have an impact in China?

Mr. VINCENT. It never had much impact in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is your opinion? When the State Department used that phrase and reiterated it they were not at any time careful to include a parenthetical statement, "We do not mean by this phrase what Lin Pao and Chou En-lai might like to think we mean," did they?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. They simply used the phrase and let it go out over the wires.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What kind of an impact do you think that had in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I have just said it had very little impact at this particular period because the Chinese Government did not bring it about.

Senator FERGUSON. It was a criticism of the then government.

Mr. VINCENT. It was what we considered a constructive criticism of the then existing Kuomintang government, which was a one-party government.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say it had no impact at what time? You mean in 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. 1942 up to the time I left it had produced no results that I knew of.

Mr. SOURWINE. It had no impact in 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. It had an impact in 1945, bringing about the Marshall mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. It had an impact in 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1946 it didn't have any results.

Mr. SOURWINE. It had had its result by that time, had it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It didn't even have a result by that time because even then it didn't result in anything other than a falling out among the various parties, but it did eventually bring about a constitutional regime.

Mr. SOURWINE. Its impact had certainly been felt by 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next paragraph [reading]:

Another suggestion is some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist Army as a participant in the war against fascism. The United States might intervene to the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support be given by the Central Government to the Eighteenth Group Army. The Communists hope this might include a specification that the Communist armies receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China.

Let's take the first sentence of that:

some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist Army as a participant in the war against fascism.

Did you ever advocate that?

Mr. VINCENT. I never did advocate participation of the Chinese Communist Army in the war with Japan other than that what they were doing, except as all of us wished that the Kuomintang and the



Communists could bring about some kind of coordinated military effort. In that context, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, sir, ever advocate some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist army as participant in the war against Fascists?

Mr. VINCENT. Some kind, we certainly did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course you did.

Mr. VINCENT. We advocated that Chinese Communist army be brought into some kind of coordinated position with the Kuomintang.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course, and that was the State Department position, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let's take the second sentence:

The United States might intervene to the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support be given by the Central Government to the Eighteenth Group Army.

Did the United States ever intervene to that end?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that we ever intervened to that end.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the United States ever ask that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the United States ever ask that support be given by the Central Government to the Eighteenth Group Army?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall its ever taking that up with Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any expressions by the State Department, official or semiofficial, in favor of that?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall now; yes, they were in favor, as I have said before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Certainly.

Mr. VINCENT. They were in favor of these people settling their differences and fighting on a united front against the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. They did express themselves in favor of that. Certainly they did.

Mr. VINCENT. I am confining that now to their intervening with Chiang Kai-shek to get him to do it. I don't recall any official intervention on the part of Mr. Gauss to get them to do it.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SOURWINE. The next sentence:

The Communists hope this might include a specification that the Communist armies receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China.

Did you ever recommend anything along that line?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have already testified, sir, that I don't recall ever recommending that they get a proportionate share. May I clarify that. To what extent Chiang Kai-shek would have given them their proportionate share had they settled their differences and had they fought under one command, I don't know, but I never recommended that they get an independent—

Mr. SOURWINE. You concurred in Mr. Wallace's recommendation in that regard, didn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. We discussed that in executive session.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you to read Mr. Wallace's testimony, you remember.

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't find anything in Mr. Wallace's testimony about his saying that they were getting a proportionate share. Is it in the testimony there? I glanced through it hurriedly but I don't recall it. You recall at the meeting here you said it was in his telegram from Kuomintang and I couldn't find it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it still your statement, having read that, and having read Mr. Wallace's testimony, that in your opinion there was nothing in there which involved giving a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China to the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. After we talked about that in the testimony, I say that I glanced through it hurriedly and I left here and I did not see anything in there where he said that.

Mr. SOURWINE. The record speaks for itself; so I don't mean to argue with you about the record. I didn't want you to make a record of a statement in conflict or in apparent conflict with the record without having the chance to look at it. That is why I asked you the other day to look at the record.

Mr. VINCENT. I glanced through it—I won't say I read the whole thing—and did not find any such statement.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

Another way of making our interest in the situation known to the Kuomintang would be to send American representatives to visit the Communist area.

Was that ever proposed or urged by anybody?

Mr. VINCENT. That was proposed and urged by the Vice President at the request of the President when Mr. Wallace made his mission during 1944. That was the first I heard of it. The American Army authorities were the ones who were anxious that they get some kind of observer group up there.

Mr. SOURWINE. You can't say for sure that that was the first you ever heard of it, can you, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't say for sure, but I have no recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have admitted that probably you heard it first from Chou En-lai and Lin Pao in 1942 as reported by Mr. Service.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, but I don't think that Mr. Service—is he now still saying that this is what?

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't know what Mr. Service is saying now, but this is his report of January 23, 1943, to what occurred in 1942, and you have stated you think it probably did occur that way.

Mr. VINCENT. You have said that Mr. Chou En-lai and Lin Pao suggested that, but the next sentence says, "I have not heard this sponsored by the Communists themselves." I am not here now trying to dispute the testimony, but it seems to me that Mr. Service is implying that this is something he was suggesting.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think that is entirely his suggestion?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say so from a reading of the context of this.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it a suggestion in which you concurred?

Mr. VINCENT. I later concurred in it, but as I say I had no recollection of this memorandum here, but the sending of a military mission to Yenai to find out what conditions were was in people's minds from time to time and I am not myself denying here that the suggestion may not have been made.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was strongly urged upon Chiang during Mr. Wallace's visit, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is quite right.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you yourself brought it up at least three times and shifted the conversation to that subject.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And were extremely anxious that he should make a decision to permit that mission to go, holding all other matters in abeyance.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I was no more anxious for it than the American Army was at the time, which wanted to get intelligence out of Yenan, the Communist area.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir.

I am through with that phase.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess until tomorrow morning at 9:30.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m. the committee was recessed until 9:30 a. m., Thursday, January 31, 1952.)





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