



By Professor Paul S. Reinsch

INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL CUR-
RENTS IN THE FAR EAST
WORLD POLITICS
COLONIAL GOVERNMENT
COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION
AMERICAN LEGISLATURES AND LEGIS-
LATIVE METHODS
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL UNIONS
READINGS ON AMERICAN FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
READINGS ON AMERICAN STATE GOV-
ERNMENT
ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN COLONIES

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BY

PAUL S. REINSCH



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To A. M. R.
Quorum pars magna fuisti



PREFACE

As long as a hundred years ago a great philosopher said, "Indian wisdom is streaming back to Europe and will bring about a fundamental change in our knowledge and thought." But it is only the events of the more recent past — the rise of Japan, the great Chinese transformation, the nationalist movement throughout the Orient — that have made us more generally conscious of the fact that the separate existence of the East and the West has come to an end, and that, in profoundly influencing each other, they will both contribute their share in developing the all-human civilization of the future. There have been great crises in past history, but none comparable to the drama which is now being enacted in the Far East, upon the outcome of which depends the welfare not only of a country or section but of all mankind. In order that the issues now pending may be solved in a proper way, a sympathetic mutual understanding between different races or civilizations is indispensable.

In the essays contained in this volume no attempt has been made to lay down hard-and-fast conclusions, nor to make any political prophecies; they are merely thoughts and notes of one who has watched from day to day with the deepest interest the marvelous unfolding of a new

life throughout the East. In forming for himself a picture of what is going on in the intellectual life of the Far East, the author has made constant use of the Oriental periodical press and contemporary literature, but he has also been assisted by numerous correspondents, who have kept him supplied with translations, with significant accounts of contemporary ideas and happenings, and with commentaries. All this has been most helpful in gaining a composite view of contemporary Oriental thought. The author, therefore, desires to express his acknowledgments to his friends and correspondents in the Far East, many of them former students of his; but especially to Mr. Horatio B. Hawkins of Soochow; Mr. Tsai Chu-tung and Mr. Chang Lauchi, of Shanghai; Mr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, of Hangchow; Mr. Motosada Zumoto, Dr. Toyokichi Iyenaga, Mr. Masao Matsuoka, Mr. R. G. Konno, Mr. Kazuo Ebina, Mr. Basanta Kumar Roy, and Mr. H. C. Das. These gentlemen are, of course, in no sense and in no instance responsible for the judgments expressed in these essays. The author also desires to acknowledge the kindness of the editors of the *Atlantic Monthly* and the *North American Review* for allowing him to use parts of his articles which first appeared in their pages.

PAUL S. REINSCH.

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INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL CURRENTS IN THE FAR EAST

CHAPTER I

ASIATIC UNITY

To personify a nation and to invest it with certain definite attributes has always been an attractive shortcut to knowledge, and a convenient basis for sweeping judgments. It is not surprising that this method should have been applied with even greater boldness to a whole continent, for the infinite variety of Oriental life makes patient inquiry exceedingly perplexing. Such aphorisms as "The East is the East" afford a welcome solution, but, it must be confessed, not one which will long satisfy the inquiring mind, nor afford a reliable guidance in political action. It may therefore be worth while to make some search whether amid all this diversity of social phenomena there may actually be discovered a bond of unity. Are there elements in Oriental life universal and powerful enough to constitute a living unity of sentiment for the surging multitudes of the Orient? What thoughts can they summon up which will stir in them such feelings as overcome us when we see the luminous masterpieces of the Greek chisel, or the soaring arches

and pinnacles of Bourges; when we think of the civic wisdom of Rome, the blossoming of Christian ideals of the middle ages? What names are there to compel homage and undying admiration as the great ruler after whom all emperors are named, what philosophers to compare with the two Hellenic master spirits in whom all our thoughts and systems have their source, what representatives of an Oriental world-literature as universal as the divine bard, or the exiled Ghibelline of Florence?

Whether such a unity of thought and sentiment, such a common tradition of powerful personality exists in the Orient, appears at first sight very doubtful, indeed. We must constantly be on our guard against misleading similarities and antitheses. Truth resides neither in "Yes" nor "No," neither in difference nor in identity, but in the shade or manner, the subtle relations of thought which lead one race or generation to emphasize classic form, while another dwells on inner force or romantic charm, both believing after all the same religion of beauty. Thus the analogies between Christianity and Buddhism are many, and Confucius solved moral problems in a manner not unlike other great moral teachers, so that his wisdom often appears trite to those who are looking for the strange and unaccustomed.

Indeed, it may be said that whatever has been thought has, at some time or other, been thought in Asia. But though the periphery and the contents of two

theories may be almost identical, their import may nevertheless be immeasurably diverse, according to the *nuance* of emphasis imparted by the psychological background of primal motives and beliefs. Thus the theories of the advocate of Stuart absolutism and of the sentimental herald of the Revolution are almost identical in their component elements, when statically compared; yet how vastly different in import and result, through distribution of emphasis and grouping of their various concepts. Even thus it is with Gotama, Kapila, and Confucius: we should probably get closer to a real understanding of Asiatic unity and of the relations of East and West, if instead of enumerating and counterbalancing qualities and characteristics, and setting up a fixed standard called Oriental, we should rather try to seize the subtle and Protean temper animating Oriental races; and instead of dilating upon the whole complex of their beliefs and institutions, attempt to appreciate the shades and gradations of meaning, and to understand the temperamental background of Oriental life and thought. We may then perhaps find less Orientalism in Schopenhauer, as we have enough of pessimism in the West to supply sundry philosophers; nor shall we probably be confident enough to strike a balance between East and West that will settle categorically all questions of superiority and power of triumphant control. No glittering aphorisms will reward us; nor sensational thrills and excitements. These joys we must forego, if we desire to

approach the Orient in the spirit typified by a Humboldt rather than in the excited fancy of the exorcist of war clouds and many-colored perils.

The Orient has always had a dangerous fascination for the West; it has filled the Western mind with vague longings, fantastic imaginings, and lurid forebodings. As fair Italy with Circean charm enticed the rough riders of the Alemannian forests, even so the Orient has always cast a powerful spell over the nations of the West. Her deep philosophy, her venerable history, command their wonder and respect; her potential energy and wealth arouse their cupidity. The Russian mind has been especially prone to such entrancing dreams. "The grand and mysterious Orient — it is ours, it is through us that its destiny is to be realized"; thus ran their thought; yet they were destined in unforeseen ways to prove the mysterious power which they had hoped to bind to their will and make the instrument of a boundless ambition. Such vague aspirations make the romance of history, but they also make the heart-rending misery of suffering millions.

Two utterances by prominent British statesmen have of late caused a great wave of discussion in the intellectual world of the East, particularly in India. On account of their deep effect — due to very different causes — they deserve our attention, and may reveal to us some interesting views of the temper of the Oriental mind. When Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, fond of imperial display

and realizing the importance of an impressive ceremonial, was always ready to take advantage of occasions of public moment. It being a part of his official life to personify both the grandeur and the wisdom of the British *raj*, he was not satisfied with the mere outward pomp and trappings of royal splendor, but also addressed himself to the intelligence of his subjects in dignified discourses. But the homily which, shortly before his resignation, he delivered at the Convocation of the University of Calcutta seems to have gone far towards destroying whatever assuaging effect his former diplomatic utterances had exerted. Speaking before a select body of the intellectual aristocracy of India, he pronounced his views on some aspects of Oriental character. Though he directed his remarks to the graduating students, his words were taken by his hearers, and by those to whom they were reëchoed through the Indian press, as a reproof deliberately offered to the moral character of India.

The words which thus stirred up the resentment of a whole nation, and which are even now remembered throughout Asia, would not at first sight strike us as extravagant, accustomed as we are to the most fanciful generalizations about Oriental races. But their solemn recital in the face of a representative Indian audience, on an occasion generally consecrated to soothing commonplaces, is an instance of the traditional defectiveness of the British sense of humor. Such sen-

tences as the following aroused the storm which has not yet subsided: "The highest ideal of truth is to a large extent a Western conception. . . . Truth took a higher place in the moral codes of the West long before it had been similarly honored in the East, where craftiness and diplomatic wile have always been held in repute. We may prove it by the common innuendo that lurks in the words 'Oriental diplomacy' by which is meant something rather tortuous and hypersubtle." Lord Curzon then explained that the most ordinary forms which falsehood takes in Indian life are exaggeration, flattery, and vilification.

The retorts to this salutatory address were legion, and ran through the whole gamut of feeling, from bitter recrimination to dignified regret at the Viceroy's total misunderstanding of native life and ideals. There was no scarcity of material for retort, when the records of the British conquest in India were raked up. Lord Lytton's definition of a diplomat, and such well-known epithets as *perfidie Albion*, not to speak of more pointed and personal charges, were cited to neutralize the innuendo; while a strange light was cast upon Western veracity by recounting the methods of American fraud concerns. Comparisons between the Greek and the Indian epic readily revealed the unfoundedness of Lord Curzon's allusion to the historic development of the sense of truthfulness; Greek practice, too, was very unfavorably contrasted with that of Asiatic nations like Persia. General

surprise was expressed at the rash generalizations of the Viceroy: "The idea of summing up a whole continent in a single phrase can occur only to the very ignorant or the very confident." Lord Curzon had "given rein to the ignorant conceit of pigment and power," and had "emulated Elijah in berating a whole nation." Sarcastic references to Western forms of speech became very common in India, such as, "a new liquor-shop, — they call it a saloon in the more truthful phraseology of the civilized West."

The occurrence, however, stirred up feelings deeper than a mere passing resentment and irritation. It led to an earnest self-analysis, and an accounting was taken of the Indian intellectual temper in its relation to the European rulers. While the most serious-minded among the educated Hindus freely admitted that the strictures of Lord Curzon were not entirely unfounded, they with bitterness of heart advanced the charge that if the character and the national self-respect of the Indian people had been impaired, such was the inevitable result of unfreedom and political subjection. "The greatest evil," they said, "that has been wrought by the political dominion of England over India is the loss of our old Oriental dignity and reserve — that nobility of knowing reticence." Despotism and lying go together, as the national spirit is debased by subjection, and the individual who is oppressed will, like the boy, look upon a falsehood as an abomination before the Lord, but a very

present help in trouble. That the head of the alien government should charge a nation with weaknesses which might largely be attributed to its position of dependence, was, in the eyes of these critics, to add insult to an injury for which his own people were responsible.

But aside from a certain degeneracy imposed by unkind conditions, the full tragedy of which they keenly felt, the leaders of Indian thought would not admit that veracity and honesty are held in less esteem in the Orient than among European peoples. They pointed out, however, a highly important difference in valuations, the spirit of which Lord Curzon had failed to mention or to perceive. While freely admitting the greater exactness of the Western mind in observation and statement, they attributed this not to superior honesty but to a keener perception of the utility of accurate thought. Veracity is a social and commercial commodity in England and America, in many cases scarcely involving any moral valuations at all. If, on the other hand, the Oriental is prone to exaggeration, this is not due to a deliberate desire to deceive and to impart false impressions. His temper being emotional and idealistic, he makes known his impressions in a language, not mathematically precise and coldly accurate, but designed to awaken the same emotions of surprise, wonder, admiration, or fear, which he himself experienced. He is not dishonest, though his statements lack accuracy. In the words of an Indian writer, "It will not do to exaggerate the heating power

of the sun, if you want to roast your beef by his rays. When, however, you do not desire to install the luminary of day as your chef, but to contemplate his majesty and glory, to meditate on the promise of his morning rays, and read the message of his dying splendors, then the play of the poetic imagination becomes an essential condition." Educated Hindus were inclined to doubt whether the standard of utility is higher than the emotional and spiritual standard of the Indian mind.

In considering the question of the valuations of the ideal of truth, I need not repeat Max Müller's brilliant vindication of the essential truthfulness of Oriental races, nor should we perhaps be ready to follow him in every detail of his apologetics. But we shall find that most fundamental honesty which requires that our actions should correspond to our profession and our beliefs, in as high regard among the Oriental peoples as with those of the West. The ideals of their beliefs may be less elevated than our own, but at any rate there is also less variance between actions and belief among Confucians, Shintoists, and Buddhists than among the majority of good Christian people. Moreover, a more honest attitude towards the problems of life than that which characterizes the thought of Buddha and Confucius can hardly be imagined; the relations of life are clearly seen, social duties are faithfully met, and no facile optimism is allowed to gloss over life's tragedies. Buddha faced unflinchingly the misery of existence, and without ap-

pealing for salvation to a future state, worked with a will to discover the path by which men can gain peace and an ennobled life here below. Such a system, if not true, is certainly at least honest.

Nothing has set up a more impassable barrier between the peoples of the East and the West than the profound discrepancy between Christian profession and practice. The deceitful selfishness, the rapacity and bloodshed, with which Christian nations have established their power in the Orient, the viciousness of the earlier adventurers and traders, have thoroughly alienated sympathy and destroyed confidence. When, after the revolting record of the Chinese War, the Western nations offer themselves as moral exhorters, the cultured Oriental is tempted to smile at the incongruity. But the disillusionment which is thus created has its tragic side, too. How pathetic is the blighted hope and utter despair of an ardent convert like Nilakantha Goreh whose high expectations of Christian life are disappointed! After cutting loose from his earlier beliefs, and thereby bringing deep sorrow on all his beloved ones,¹ this young Indian scholar came to England to live in that atmosphere of love and purity whose ideal simplicity had attracted his soul after he had fought his way through all the systems of Indian philosophy. But after six weeks in London, he came to his Oxford mentor with the sorrowful words, "If what I

¹ His father took the vow of eternal silence, so as not to have to pronounce the curse against his son.

have seen in London is Christianity, I am no longer a Christian." His noble and brilliant intellect was ultimately wrecked through his great disillusionment. So it is possible that under the law of compensation we may have lost somewhat in honesty of life while we have gained in exactness of statement and thought.

Though the appreciation of scientific exactness has of late increased very much in the Orient, yet Oriental thinkers are not ready to give it quite an absolutely leading importance among their ideals. It is in this connection that the other utterance I have mentioned — a recent address of Mr. Balfour as president of the British Association of Science — created a powerful impression in the Orient. He discussed the electrical theory of matter, the latest result of the advances of physical science, according to which the world is motion or energy, expressed in terms of electric monads. Under recent discoveries the supposed solidity of matter has melted away; with proper light we may now look through the heart of oak, nor will the massive fortress wall resist these penetrating rays. The solid mountains and ancient strata of our earth are themselves but imprisoned energy, and all our perceptions are the result of winged motion. After dwelling on the marvelous vistas thus disclosed, the philosophical statesman said, "It may seem singular that down to five years ago, our race has, without exception, lived and died in a world of illusions, and that these illusions have not been about things

remote or abstract, things transcendental or divine, but about what men see and handle, about those 'plain matters of fact' among which common sense moves with its most confident step and most self-satisfied smile." Thus our sensual sight and touch have been deceived, and it is only through the inspired vision, the penetrating imagination, of great scientific seers, that the truth of the real constitution of the universe is beginning to dawn upon our intelligence. Mr. Balfour further notes that through evolution our senses have not been prepared for the vision of the inner and absolute truth of things. The common sense of humanity lives in persistent illusion; "matter of fact" means deception. The needs of self and race preservation lead to all the falsehoods and deceits involved in the shrewdness of competitive life, the illusions of sexual selection, and the master fallacy of vulgar patriotism.

When Western thinkers express and suggest such thoughts as these they awaken a strange echo in the philosophy of the East in both Hindu and Buddhist lands; — the vanity and illusoriness of sensual existence, the veil of Maya cast over us which produces the delusion of the ego, of finite personality; and the Buddhist belief that the desire for individual existence is the root of all suffering, that true happiness comes alone from the perception of the transitoriness of all things and from the gradual conquest of the error of self. As the implications of these views have been fully realized in the East,

the attitude of the Oriental mind towards the practical, scientific knowledge, which we value so highly, has differed greatly from our own. The usefulness of science for increasing the comforts of life is indeed admitted, and use will be made of its guidance for practical purposes; but to the Oriental, soul life will always be more important than bodily existence. Buddhism, in the words of one of its adherents, finds its goal rather in the delights of a deep appreciation of the realities of existence, in the exercise of the higher mental faculties, in a life transfused with everyday beauty, than in the possession of innumerable means of advancing wealth and commerce, of gratifying sense, of promoting merely bodily comfort.

As the Oriental strives to overcome the fetters and limitations of personal existence, so his mind yearns rather towards the vast mysteries that surround life on all sides; it loves to dwell on the problems of infinitude and of the ultimate springs of human action, rather than to confine itself within the narrow limits of detailed scientific investigation. Notwithstanding the sane and positivist teachings of Buddha and Confucius, their insistence on the duties of present life, their refusal to pass in thought beyond the awful gates of life and death, the yearning of the Oriental mind had been towards the mysterious. From the Tantra devils of Thibet, through the awe-struck philosophies of Hinduism, to the subtle imaginings of ghostly Japan, this tendency to contem-

plate the mysterious, the grand, the far-away in time and space, is powerfully present. Day with its solar splendor, with its clear and bright illumination, reveals the form and color of things near by, of household, meadow, and forest; yet this very brightness and effulgence is a heavy curtain that conceals from our sight the universe, the myriads of worlds which the clearness of night will unveil. Compared to these, our empires are but fragments of dust. Even so the clear light of experimental science to the Oriental seems but a shred of that veil of Maya which hides the real, the universal, the absolute, from our sight.

The reason for this peculiar Asiatic bent toward the mystic, as compared with the white-light intelligence of Europe, may perhaps be found in the constant presence of overawing natural phenomena. Europe, with its narrow valleys, its rivers across which any strong-limbed man may swim, its equable temperature, its normal succession of seasons, is indeed the place where human intelligence could learn to respect itself, and man conceive the thought of measuring his powers with those of nature. But stand before the heaven-conquering walls of the Himalayas, gaze across the continents of sand in Asiatic deserts, shifted again and again by storm so as to sweep away or create anew veritable mountain ranges; contemplate the torrents, which without warning bring destruction to thousands, and the inundations in which hosts lose home and life; think of earthquakes, typhoons, tidal

waves, and the black scourge of famine and pestilence as constantly impending; and then apostrophize man and his intelligence as the master of it all; and you will find few believers among the cowed sufferers from the imperious caprice of nature.

Overawed by such forces, surrounded by a nature bountiful and caressing at one moment, bitterly cruel and destructive the next, the Orient could not avoid a temper of mind which looks on human contrivance as weak, on human existence as valueless, and sees real force and permanent sway only in the vast, mysterious powers of earth and sky. Personality, a mere plaything of the grim and irresponsible, cannot have any importance in itself; and the best solution is that all this terror-inspiring existence is but a phantasmagoria, an illusion, a procession of incongruous dream states. And yet it is an emanation of the universal force. The impersonality of the Orient has for its counterpart an intensive appreciation of the universal force whatever it may be called. For as the individual counts as nothing in the philosophy of the Brahman and the Buddhist, in the polity of China and Japan, it is the realization of the universal spirit or force, in some form or other, that constitutes the chief yearning of the Asiatic mind. The Hindu spiritualizes and personifies nature in his crowded pantheon, and sees in all phenomena the expression of one mysterious will; Buddha, admitting neither spirit human nor divine, yet finds peace and happiness in the

elevation of the individual mind to the plane of universal thought, to the contemplation of universal law. In China and Japan the universal is worshiped in the form of ancestral achievement, in that strange identification of ancestral spirits with the soul of the country; so that, in the minds of the people, sacred Fuji and the groves and rivers and seas of Japan are united with the qualities of that silent but ever-present choir of ghosts from which Japan draws her inspiration and strength.

From our one-sided point of view, we would say that humanity in the Orient, overpowered by destiny in the shape of natural catastrophe, famine, pestilence, and war, has not yet found itself. It has never enjoyed the shelter of the Greek city in which Western humanity first became conscious of its powers and its individuality. For though the great master Gotama had a clear vision of human spiritual development, his simple and austere faith has been overlaid by the powerful impulse of Asiatic nature, with a rank growth of animism and mysticism. And though Confucius, too, clung to the practical, his very authority in the course of time deadened individual striving and advance. Oriental humanity has indeed found itself in the nation of Japan, — in that brave race which, drawing courage and poetry from the very terrors of the grave, with all the deep suggestiveness of Asiatic insight, has still the iron grip of self-control and the clear vision of the practical.

\ The Orient shuns limitations. Indeed, if we may be

permitted to generalize, one of the chief differences between Oriental and Western civilization lies in the fact that the former has never strictly and consistently limited the field of its consciousness and of its endeavors, but has allowed all the sensations and passions of past and present, of the indefinite and the infinite, to crowd in upon it, so that the sense of individual form in thought and life has not been developed. While in the West, expressing itself in the idea of classicism, and in the concrete imaginings of the Greeks, there has been a steady effort to confine human thought and sentiment within certain lines, to dwell on certain aspects of life which seemed to be most closely connected with human personality as a dominant factor; excluding the fierce and untoward moods of nature, and suppressing certain weird and uncanny tendencies of thought as abnormal and in fact insane. But such classic limitations of individuality are not of the spirit of the Orient. Rather than limit the individual formally and thus allow the development of characteristic individualism, it would identify him with the social body, and his soul with the world-soul. Thus also, while most punctilious of social forms, and bowing to a superrefined social etiquette, it does not countenance the tyranny of shifting fashions, or the conventional respectability founded on a certain exclusiveness of the individual.

In India, it is considered meritorious for the householder and father to leave behind him the confining relations of

family life and to become a hermit or monk. The man who leaves his home and family, dresses himself in rags, and ravages his body with hardships and ill-usage, may become an honored teacher, the intellectual and spiritual guide to many. Men love to cast off the shackles of respectability and take to the highways and the woods; and they gain merit by so doing. They are the religious, the philosophers, the inspiration of the multitudes. To the people they appear to realize various immunities. In India, hermits come year after year from the mountains to visit valley towns, showing no signs of aging as far back as old men can remember. This same longing for the unlimited, the unrestrained, together with the influence of terrific natural phenomena in Asia, lies at the bottom of the uncanny horror and mystery of Asiatic life. In the delicate ghost stories of Japan this feeling has assumed a graceful and poetic aspect, the æsthetic possibilities of awe and terror have been realized to the full. But in India where coarse magic flourishes and preys on a superstitious multitude, the awfulness of the abysses of human consciousness may be divined.

The Greek portrayal of death has in this respect sounded the keynote of our civilization. The terror, the heart-rending ugliness of dissolution, the hopeless void, are not in the remotest way suggested; the gentleness of grief, the sweetness of consolation, the companionship of loved ones are represented; while death himself is a friendly genius summoning to rest. And so in our history

we early outgrew ancestor worship, and resolutely turning our back on the past with all its degrading memories and bestial struggles, we faced the morning of hope, the promise of a sunny day. Deep in the night of subconsciousness there is still a dark and unclean deposit of wilder ages, of sordid life, cruelty, ignoble conquest, and harsh passions. In the elemental fury of war, these lower instincts awaken, and men whom we love as friends and brothers may be dragged down to the level of a bestial age. But the total effect of our civilization and training is to draw our consciousness away from such impulses, to concentrate our vision upon our present ideals. For how could we preserve a sense of individuality and spirituality, were we to be dragged back constantly into the terrors and passions of primitive ages.

Much of the subtle charm of Japanese life and poetry comes from the ever imminent sense of an abysmal void which threatens to swallow up her flowery meadows and her silent temple groves. May the earthquake never come that will again bring uppermost the dead past in Japan. The Orient, through constant musing on the mysterious and hidden, may have fortified itself against the coarser aspects of the primitive in man; but its development, yes, its very existence, has been jeopardized by this lack of limitation. Japan, it is true, has transfused these elements into a marvelous poetry of life, and China practices Confucian self-control; but all Oriental peoples are ruled by these weird forces.

While the psychological unity of the Oriental nations has not been so clearly and definitely worked out as it has been in the West, notwithstanding all minor national idiosyncrasies, still the Orient has also had its share of international unifying influences. The sacred places in India where the great teacher lived have for two thousand years attracted pilgrims from all parts of the Buddhist world; and earnest students have sought deeper wisdom by communing with the monks of famous monasteries in Burmah and Ceylon. Ever since the embassy of Emperor Ming-ti sought for the new gospel in the year 61, and the sage Fa-hien undertook his great journey, India has thus been visited by seekers after new light. Also the apostles of India's missionary religion, in its first age of flourishing enthusiasm, spread the teaching of Gotama to all the lands of southern and eastern Asia, even from Palestine, where they implanted the germs of the Western monastic system, to the far islands of the rising sun. Thus Buddhism became the greatest unifying force in eastern Asia, and no mind nor personality commands a wider and more sincere homage than he who found the light and pointed the way, the great teacher "who never spake but good and wise words, he who was the light of the world." So it is that also in more recent epochs down to our own day, his thought and life have been and are the chief centre of the common feelings and enthusiasms of Asia.

The great age of illumination under the Sung dynasty

in China saw the beginning of the attempts to merge and fuse Taoist, Buddhist, and Confucian thought, in Neo-Confucianism, called by Okakura "a brilliant effort to mirror the whole of Asiatic consciousness." It was Buddhist monks and missionaries who acted as messengers between China and Japan in that great formative period of a thousand years, in which all the currents of Indian and Chinese civilization made their impress upon Japanese national character. Then, under the Tokugawa régime the independent spirits of Japan trained themselves for the demands of an exacting epoch in the thought of Wang-yang-ming, or Oyomei, which, informed with the noblest ideals and the deepest insight of Buddhism, joins to these a zest in active life, an ardent desire to participate in the surging development in which the universe and human destiny are unfolding themselves. In this school, which combines a truly poetic sentiment for the pathos of fading beauty and fleeting fragrance, for the ghostliness of an existence made up of countless vibrations of past joy and suffering, with the courageous desire to see clearly and act with energy; to share to the full in this great battle we call life, — in this school were trained the statesmen and warriors of Satsuma and Choshu who have led Japan to greatness in peace and glory in war.

The unity of Asiatic civilization has found an actual embodiment in the spirit of Japan. There it is not the product of political reasoning, nor the discovery of philo-

sophical abstraction. All the phenomena of the overpowering natural world of Asia are epitomized in the islands of the morning sun, where nature is as luxuriant and as forbidding, as caressing and as severe, as fertile and as destructive, as in all that cyclorama of storm, earthquake, typhoon, flood, and mountain vastness which we call Asia. Even thus has Japan in the course of her historic development received by gradual accretion the fruit of all Asiatic thought and endeavor. Nor have these waves from the mainland washed her shores in vain; her national life has not been the prey of capricious conquerors — imposing for a brief time a sway that would leave no permanent trace on the national life. Her mind and character have received and accepted these continental influences, as the needs of her own developing life have called for them; they have not been adopted perforce or by caprice, but have exerted a moulding influence and have been assimilated into a consistent, deep, and powerful national character. A psychological unity has thus been created — an actual expression of the flesh and blood of life — in touch with the national ideals and ambitions of a most truly patriotic race.

This is a far different matter from the mere intellectual recognition of certain common beliefs, ideals, and institutions throughout the Orient. On such a perception of unity at most a certain intellectual sympathy could be founded. But in Japan the Oriental spirit has become flesh — it has ceased to be a bloodless generalization,

and it now confronts the world in the shape of a nation conscious of the complicated and representative character of its psychology, and ardently enthusiastic over the loftiness of its mission. We know Japanese patriotism as national, inspired by loyalty to the Mikado and by love for the land of Fujiyama; we are also learning to know it as Asiatic — deeply stirred by the exalting purpose of aiding that Asiatic thought-life which has made Japan to come to its own and preserve its dignity and independence through all the ages. Must we view with apprehension such a broadening of Japanese patriotism? Not if Japan herself remains true to the essential ideals of Eastern civilization.

It is said that Asia is pessimistic. Yet her pessimism is not the sodden gloom of despair, whose terrifying scowl we encounter in European realistic art, and which is the bitter fruit of perverted modes of living. The pessimism of Asia, which makes the charm of her poetry from Firdusi to the writers of the delicate Japanese *Hai-kai*, is rather a soothing, quieting, æsthetic influence, like the feeling of sadness that touches the heart at the sight of great beauty, and which perhaps is due to the memory of all the yearnings and renunciations in the experience of a long chain of lives. The pessimism of the Orient is tragic, rather than cynical, and Japan at the present time gives proof of the fact that the spirit of tragedy belongs to strong nations.

As tragedy was the art of the Greeks before Pericles

and of the Elizabethan English, so modern Japan draws strength from that deep undercurrent of tragic feeling in her nature. The attitude of the Japanese mind is further apparent from its conception of suicide; the hara-kiri is not a cowardly escape from the burdens of life, it is rather a supreme effort to concentrate all the powers of personality towards the righting of a wrong, or the achievement of a high purpose, which no other sacrifice would attain. Nor is Buddhism itself in any sense nihilistic, as is so often supposed. The goal of Nirvana is not a negative — self-annihilation — but a positive ideal, “life made glorious by self-conquest and exalted by boundless love and wisdom.” The preponderance of ill is admitted, but there is no utter despair of redemption from care and suffering: the diligent development of right thought, the acquisition of that high training which enables the mind to extricate itself from vulgar error and to share the serene peace of impersonal vision — that is the way of salvation. Such tendencies of mind as these cannot indeed be branded as dangerous by simply stamping them with the mark “pessimism.”

It is said that the Orient is despotic. And yet nowhere are governmental functions more circumscribed than in countries like China. Oriental despotism does not mean constant governmental interference. The despot is, indeed, irresistible when he does act; but he will not choose to act contrary to the general customs of the realm, because these customs are sacred, and on their sacredness

his own customary authority depends. It is the people who through continued action make the customs, and they are little interfered with in the management of their affairs. Even when China had no parliament, its social organization was thoroughly democratic. Nor is the Orient subject to the tyranny of a vast industrial mechanism, impersonal and inexorable. Its industries are carried on in the family home, and form part of the family life; the joy of work has not departed, for the workman does not toil in a dreary prison-house, and the soul has not been taken out of his work. As the object of his labor grows under his hand, he rejoices in the perfection of form, and to the satisfaction of the artisan is added the delight of the artist. Thus it is that in the Orient art with all the joy of beauty that it brings has not gone out of the life of the people, has not become an exclusive and artificial language understood only by the few, a minister to luxury and indolent ease. It has retained its true function of pervading all human life with a subtle aroma of refinement and joy.

In ideals such as these it would be difficult to discover the rampant and infuriate dragon of the yellow peril imagination. Indeed, the temper of Oriental civilization is preëminently peaceful. China has imparted her civilization to all the peoples of the Far East, but she has never attempted to impose her rule upon them by conquest; and of Buddhism alone of all great religions can it be said that it never carried on a propaganda with the

sword. The great peoples of the plains of India and China have been too peaceful to resist invasions, but they have been strong and patient enough to subdue the victors to their own civilization. The conquering hordes of Asia have come not from the civilized plains, but from the rude and inhospitable mountain haunts of Turkestan and Mongolia. At their hands peaceful Asia has suffered even more than turbulent Europe, and Japan alone has never been forced to bow before a victorious foe.

If the Orient is allowed more fully to realize these inherent tendencies of its spirit, and to develop along its own natural lines, in a life of peace and artistic industry, true humanity should rejoice, for its purposes would be accomplished. The unity of all human life, the brotherhood of man, is the essential doctrine of the most potent religion of the East. Only if diverted from these ideals by continued injustice and aggression, by a rude attempt to subject these ancient societies to an alien law of life, could the spirit of the Orient be led to assume a threatening and destructive attitude.

It is but a short time since the broader and more representative minds among the Asiatic races have begun to realize the unity of Asiatic civilization. The endless variety in speech and custom, the difference in character and temper between the Chinese and the Hindu, the opposite political destiny that has made one nation subject to foreigners while it has led another into an honored position among the independent Powers — all

these differences can no longer obscure the deep unity of customs and of ideals that pervades the entire Orient. This unified character of Oriental life, in its essence so totally different from Western civilization, frequently expresses itself on the surface in customs and institutions which seem to us bizarre and even barbarous, and which invite the active reformer from the West to sweep them away and put in their place a more enlightened system. But whoever considers carefully the conditions of the Orient may arrive at a very different conclusion, and may see even in these apparently backward institutions the marks of a broad and noble ideal of life. The vastness of Oriental populations, the long duration of their institutions, create a feeling of permanence and peace. The frequency of natural catastrophes, the overpowering aspect of mountains, torrents, and typhoons, have given the Orientals an entirely deferential attitude towards nature, which they have not tried to conquer or subdue. Busied rather with the causes of things and with the general laws of existence, they turned to religion and philosophy, and gave but little attention to practical facts, to scientific control of the forces of nature, and to the betterment of social conditions. The pessimistic tinge of Oriental thought is due to this feeling of helplessness, which causes the world and existence to appear as a great procession of shadows, full of suffering and evil. But in all this impermanence, in the multitude of fleeting and ephemeral individual existences, the Oriental mind sees

the manifestation of an omnipresent force — eternal change, symbolized by the figure of the dragon. The deepest feeling in Oriental thought is the poetry of vanishing life. The withered rose, whose fragrance has delighted us for a day, is but the symbol of the maiden's beauty and the grace and activity of the young warrior, who also fade and fall after a brief span, their places taken by a new array of budding spirits.

The intellectual bond which unites the Orient, and best interprets its deepest soul, is Buddhism. Resting upon the same philosophical foundation as Brahmanism, it really constitutes the missionary principle of the great Indian religion, through which the Farther Indies, China, and even the distant islands of Japan, were brought into touch with the original seat of Oriental thought and culture. The poetry of Oriental thought finds its most potent expression in the philosophy of eternal change and final annihilation of all sensible existence, taught by Gotama. This Asiatic religion of poetic insight is the expression of that higher ideal to which all the activities and ideals of Oriental life are tributary — search for the universal principle, together with endless variety in individual existence. Thus the rural locality is the real centre of Asiatic life. There is nothing like the European centralization of authority and culture. Local self-government, with little interference by the central authorities, the preservation of immemorial customs, not reduced to set form nor modified by conscious legis-

lation, such is the framework of Oriental polity. In China, the village governs itself, while the Imperial Government fills the function of a counselor and defender. Industry is similarly decentralized; it is carried on in the homes of the artisans, where labor is not a curse, but a natural activity and manifestation of daily life, graced by the artistic character which pervades all Oriental handicraft. High respect is everywhere paid to intellectual forces, not only in the lands of the Brahman and mandarin, but in the more militant Japan. Practical religion is made up partly of an idealization and worship of the all-encompassing forces of nature, partly of a feeling of loyalty to the spirits of the ancestors, whose thoughts and work are embodied in the life and spirit of the nation to-day.

Of this vast and ancient civilization, Japanese life is the flower and concentrated essence. The foundation stock of the Japanese nation was animated by the nomad instincts of western Asia, by the fierce courage of marauding tribes. The original basis of their national life is a worship of the past and of nature. Their temples commemorate the lives of heroes, but their festal days are not the anniversaries of battles; they mark the birth of flowers. In April, the multitudes begin their fond pilgrimages to see the blossoming cherry trees, languid summer brings the nymph-like lotus, and late in fall the gorgeous chrysanthemum draws its crowds of worshipers from village and town. These earlier romantic and war-

like instincts have been sobered and steadied by the social morality of Confucius, bestowed upon Japan by the Chinese nation, that great civilizer of northern Asia. This system is often characterized as a congeries of mere platitudes; yet it has constituted an invaluable training in the simple and homely duties of neighborly life and in practical morality, a training necessary to the Orientals, who are so idealistic, and so prone to overlook the near for the distant and mysterious. Coming last among all these influences, the poetical religion of Buddhism found the Japanese soul an especially responsive medium. The fleeting shadows of existence, lovely in their rapid succession and tragic death, the mystery of the soul, in which the memories of the past existence are reëchoing — these were the forms of thought evoked by the great Asiatic religion in Japan. The flower of all these civilizing influences — Japanese art — was acquired from, and based upon, continental forms, and even now it best shows the historical development of the latter. Indeed, the genesis and progress of Oriental art can be studied in its completeness only in Japan, where the treasures of the past have not been at the mercy of succeeding waves of ruthless conquerors. But the Asiatic modes of art assumed an added refinement and poetical delicacy when they reached the Island Kingdom. The lovely background of a sweet nature, an inanimate world that is a melodious orchestra to the poetical drama of human existence, the spirit shadowings of former lives, the

high heroism, the ready self-sacrifice of unselfish men and women, the delicate respect paid to the weak and old, the worship of heroic virtue, gave Japanese art a multitude of subjects in which to realize its most perfect expression.

In its passage to Japan, Buddhism underwent a great temperamental change, — its pessimism was softened and received a delicate artistic tinge. The insight into the deep mysteries of life which it affords has, with the Japanese, strengthened serious purpose and transfused the soul with pulsations of heroism. The tragic mood is the mood of greatness. Greek power and intellectual predominance declined with the tragedy, and our own England never furnished a higher revelation of spirited and energetic national life than when Shakespeare conjured up the tempests of the soul. Thus the undercurrent of Buddhist tragedy in Japanese life has not resulted in a debilitating pessimism, but constitutes a tonic inspiration to great deeds and to disdain for the petty and mean incidents of a mere bourgeois existence. While in southern Asia vast populations have settled down to dreamy inactivity, thereto encouraged by the Buddhist belief in the nothingness of all existence, the spirit of Japan created a different interpretation of this deepest of Asiatic religions. Like her great English counterpart, Japan has assimilative talent of the highest order. The intensity of her national life has enabled her to mould all the influences to which she has been subjected into a harmonious

organic whole. This is chiefly due to the training she has always given herself in loyalty and social cohesion. These qualities have been put to a most decisive test in the last twenty-five years. While an unprecedented social change was going on, and while the entire mechanism of Western industrial life was being rapidly adopted, the leaders in this movement were animated with the desire not to copy Western civilization, but to assimilate those methods which would render them able to defend their own civilization against oppression or usurpation by the better armed nations of the world. No other hypothesis is possible, because it is unthinkable that a nation should give up its essential customs and beliefs, and still retain a unified and energetic national life. Thus, while the Japanese have learned our methods and have successfully analyzed our system, they have remained loyal to the spirit of their own historic past. As the Western nations are becoming aware of this permanence of Asiatic ideals, they are beginning to be apprehensive of the motives of the new Power which has thus risen, and which must be counted with in any policy that would affect the destiny of the Orient.

More even than the ancient Greeks, the Japanese worship their native country. Wherever nature has created a beautiful landscape, a temple is erected, to which the people take frequent pilgrimages; and in their mind the country, with its noble forests and mountains, its peaceful lakes, its delicate, silvery atmosphere, has become

the chief object of worship, towards which they feel a loyalty and attachment unequalled anywhere else in the world. But though the æsthetic element is so prominent in the feelings of the Japanese, though the soldiers pick flowers and write graceful poetry in their moments of leisure, they also fight with the fury of berserkers when they feel the home of their national life in any way endangered. It is then that the individual passes beyond himself, and, animated by a sacred frenzy, in which the whole complex race and ancestor experience suddenly flashes up into consciousness, his moral nature expands, and he is armed with the spiritual strength of numberless generations. The courage of the Japanese has no trace of fatalism, nor has it the stolid, dogged fearlessness of the barbarian; its irresistible *élan* is akin to the ardor of genius.

When Japan was fighting for her life against a European autocracy, it was a perfectly natural and honorable ambition to arouse the peoples of Asia to a feeling of the value of their civilization and of the solidarity of their interests. We naturally ask ourselves the question whether, considering the character of this civilization, we have reason to fear its purposes. Yet, as represented by the great nations that are its true exponents, its first characteristic is peacefulness. China has given her civilization to the nations that surround her on all sides, without any desire to conquer them or to exploit their wealth. The soldier is distinctly subordinate to the man

of peace in her national ideals. India herself, while torn by the most terrible internal dissensions, had essentially a policy and philosophy of peace; her woes, like those which have periodically overtaken China, being due to the lack of effective resistance which invited the foreign invader and conqueror. Japan, with all the warlike spirit in her blood, has still set the ideals of peace above those of war, as is seen in her national festivals, and in the temper of her artistic and social life. The civilizations of the Orient are essentially sedentary. They cling to the soil of their birth with many tenacious roots. The sacredness of the fatherland, the worship of the ancestors, the reverence of their tombs, are all forces of strong attachment. When we consider such fundamental ideas and customs of Asiatic civilization, we cannot escape the conclusion that, should Asia be allowed to develop along natural lines, she could never become a menace to our civilization.

As a matter of fact, no more fantastic idea has ever played a part in serious politics than that of the military "yellow peril." We need not consider the natural barriers erected against such an invasion, nor the fact that in the methods of modern warfare the defensive is relatively far stronger than the attack; but there is in present Oriental conditions and ideas not a vestige that can justly be used as a basis for alarmist prophecies. Neither China, India, nor Japan has ever engaged in offensive warfare of conquest; even the last great war was practi-

cally forced upon Japan by the Russian advance. India and China have themselves suffered at the hands of the Asiatic hordes, at the memory of which the nations of Europe are still trembling; and it is one of the glories of Japan to have successfully repelled these invaders, who again and again overran the rich countries of the Continent. There is no irrepressible conflict between Oriental and Western civilization. On the contrary, they are complementary to each other, not necessarily competitive. During the last century our own civilization, torn by internal conflicts and troubled by uncertainties, has sought for broader views in Oriental thought; Japanese art has shown our artists a new way of beauty, in which, by painting light in all its splendid manifestations, enchanting vistas of artistic possibilities have been opened up. The monistic thought of Oriental philosophy has been more and more approached and assimilated by our scientific system. Only narrow-mindedness can see in this civilization a danger which we must subdue; only ignorance can consider it as worthless and vicious.

! Thus far the ideas of Asiatic unity have been vague and conflicting; the Orient has not possessed that definite stock of common concepts and ideals which constitute the psychological unity of Europe. And hence, also, the conventional and vulgar antithesis of Orient and the West, with its sharp delineation of contrasts, has been altogether misleading. As the perception of a certain unity

of Oriental development becomes clearer, and as the historic sense is strengthened through the rise of a strong political entity in Japan, we may look for powerful conscious efforts to realize an Oriental unity of spirit and civilization. But when we examine the chief elements upon which such a unity would have to be founded, were it to take as its basis the historic facts of Asiatic life, we can, after all, find in them no strident conflict with our ideals. Marked differences, indeed, exist in customs, traditions, and social policies, but the underlying unity of the consciousness of mankind manifests itself in no less striking a manner.

Nothing, indeed, vouches so much for the ultimate unity of the human race as the fact that the most characteristic expressions of Asiatic thought are not utterly alien to us, but on the contrary powerfully touch the most secret heartstrings and appeal to our deepest emotions. This is, of course, not surprising when we go back to the Aryan background of Indian civilization. The images and ideas of the Vedic age find a ready response in our poetic experience; Indra, Varuna, and the Goddess of Dawn appear familiar figures. What could be more deeply touching than the solemn words of the Vedic funeral rite: "Go thou, deceased, to this earth which is a mother, and spacious and kind. May her touch be soft like that of wool or a young woman, and may she protect thee from the depths of destruction. Rise above him, O Earth! do not press painfully on him; give

him good things, give him consolation. As a mother covers her child with her cloth, do thou cover him."

But even the expressions of later ages and of more distant races do not leave us untouched, — especially the deep poetry of natural beauty and of intimate soul-life inspired by Buddhism. The Japanese Chomei, whose fame rests chiefly on the description of his tiny cabin in the mountain forest, gives us glimpses of nature that are amazing when we remember the blindness of European literature to natural beauty until some one hundred years ago. "Here in spring there may be seen the rippling blossoms of the wisteria, shedding a fragrance towards the west. In summer the *hototogisu* is heard, who by his reiterated cry invites to a tryst with him on that rugged path which leads to Hades. In autumn the song of the cicada fills the ears, sounding like a wail over the vanities of this earthly existence. In winter the snow excites in me a compassionate emotion. As it grows deeper and deeper, and then by degrees melts away again, it is an apt symbol of the obstruction of sin. When on a calm night the moon shines in at my window, I think with yearning of the men of old. The fireflies in the clumps of herbage represent to me the fisherman's cresets on the isle of Magi no Shima; the rain at daybreak sounds to me like leaves when fluttered by a stormy gust of wind. When I hear the copper pheasant with his cry of *horo, horo*, I wonder whether it is the spirit of my father or my mother. When the stag from the mountain-top

approaches without shyness, I realize how far I am separated from the world." Nor is Chinese literature less responsive to the beauty of the external world, and although it may not contain quite such delicate spiritual overtones, it sees in the play and the varying moods of nature but an emblem of the vicissitudes of human life.¹ Thus Ou-yang Hsiu writes, about the year 1050: "The sun's rays peeping at dawn through the trees, by and by to be obscured behind gathering clouds, leaving naught but gloom around, give to this spot the alternations of morning and night. The wild flowers exhaling their perfume from the darkness of some shady dell, the luxuriant foliage of the dense forest of beautiful trees, the clear frosty wind, and the naked boulders of the lessening torrent, — these are the indications of spring, summer, autumn, and winter." And speaking of the sad hour of autumnal death: "Still, what is this to plants and trees, which fade away in their due season? . . . But stay, there is man, man the divinest of all things. A hundred cares wreck his heart, countless anxieties trace their wrinkles on his brow, until his inmost self is bowed beneath the burden of life. And swifter still he hurries to decay when vainly striving to attain the unattainable, or grieving over his ignorance of that which can never be known."

¹ Eckermann reports the following conversation with Goethe concerning a Chinese novel which the poet had read: Eckermann said, "It must have appeared very curious and strange"; to which Goethe replied, "Not so much as one would suppose. The people

But even the favorite words of Buddhist devotion, uttered to-day by hundreds of thousands as they place their gifts of fresh flowers before the image of the Great Teacher, — a meditation rather than a prayer, for there are no gods to invoke in pure Buddhism, — even this has not an utterly alien sound to us, “These flowers I offer in memory of Him, the Lord, the Holy One, the Supremely Enlightened Buddha, even as the Enlightened Ones in ages past, the Saints and Holy of all times have offered. Now are these flowers fair of form, glorious in color, sweet of scent. Yet soon will all have passed away — withered their fair form, faded the bright hues, and foul the flowers’ scent! Thus even is it with all com-

think, act, and feel almost entirely as we do, and very soon we become familiar with their point of view; although with them everything is clearer, calmer, and more moral. In their arrangements everything is sensible, *bourgeois*, without great passion or poetical inspiration, and so is very similar to my *Hermann and Dorothea*, as well as to the English novels of Richardson. There is, however, a difference, in that with them external nature is always seen by the side of the human figures. We hear the goldfishes splash in the ponds. The birds in the trees are singing all the time, the day is ever serene and sunny, the night clear. There is much talk of the moon, but it does not change the landscape: its light seems to be thought of as bright as the day itself. The interior of houses is neat and graceful as their pictures. There are innumerable legends which accompany the stories and are used almost after the manner of a proverb. So we hear of the maiden who was so graceful and so light on her feet that she could balance herself on a flower; or of a young man who was so straightforward and good that when he was only thirty years of age the Emperor spoke to him. So there are volumes of legends which deal with what is moral and proper. It is through this strict moderation in everything that the Chinese Empire has been able to maintain itself for thousands of years.”

ponent things: Impermanent, and full of Sorrow and Unreal. — Realizing this, may we attain unto that peace which is beyond all life!"

The Orient, indeed, has unity; it has common ideals and sentiments; but these are not things apart; they belong to the general life of humanity.

CHAPTER II

ENERGISM IN THE ORIENT

THE ethical conceptions of Oriental peoples are as manifold as their conditions of life; and yet, in the common thought of the Western world, the ethical temper of the East is quite different from that of our civilization. When standards of conduct are discussed between different nations, it is difficult to avoid misunderstanding, because each nation or race, having its own social conventions, which to it have become second nature, sees in the conventions of other peoples compromises with truth if not a complete departure therefrom. Thus when the East and the West mutually compare their moral beliefs and modes of action, there is apt to be revealed a lack of sympathetic insight. Yet the ethical thought of India, traced to its simple Aryan sources, inculcates the same cardinal virtues which are contained also in our Western codes. Purity, benevolence, and truthfulness are as important there as in our morality. Quite contrary to the common belief in the West, the appreciation of veracity is just as constantly and urgently held up as a fundamental virtue as in our own ethical literature. Nor are the knightly virtues of courage and firmness neglected in these earlier Indian models of conduct.

But as Indian civilization developed in complexity, through modifications introduced by conquest and through the growth of the caste system, moral doctrine lost its primitive simplicity. It was divided into parts, many secondary elements were added, and there was a new distribution of emphasis. In the final result the doctrine of renunciation overshadows everything else. Indian ethical sentiment of later ages favors the abdication of life, inaction, and the uncomplaining acceptance of the evils of existence. It is a creed of inactivity, contemplation, quietism, and self-suppression. The repeated conquests of India, the overpowering forces of nature, the absence of national self-consciousness, have all helped to emphasize these characteristics. They are present, not only in Hinduism, but in other forms of belief, like Buddhism and Jainism, that have originated in India. But our own generation is witnessing in India a great stirring of social life, the awakening of new national forces. The ancient texts are read from a new point of view and in a different temper, and it is discovered that the morality of non-action and submission is only one part of a complex system; that there are other more active and more manly virtues inculcated as well. It is these latter that now receive the emphasis. The achievements of nationalism in Japan are having their effect; and though Japan may lately have alienated sympathy through her forward policy in Manchuria, the energy revealed in her national life remains a model to the rest of Asia.

The searchings of the national spirit in Indian tradition have brought out the fact that Hindu morality, side by side with *mukti*, *bairagnya*, or renunciation, contains the ideal of action in *dharma*. While the former has for centuries been emphasized through the repression which history has imposed on India, the more vigorous forces of life have not been extinguished and will now seek new expression with the help of the principle of *dharma* which is embodied in *Karma Yoga*. This does not mean that the national ideal of renunciation as the highest quality and virtue is to be abandoned. On the contrary, the low valuation of the material universe and the proud belief in the conquering force of spirituality which it contains will remain the essential part of the Indian conception of human destiny and action. But it is also recognized that this idea of renunciation has been falsely understood and grievously misinterpreted in the past; that it has been a cloak for laziness and torpidity, under which it has been attempted to make the most pitiful weakness appear as strength. To the Indian mind at present, renunciation in its true sense appeals only as a higher form of *dharma*. Before one may reject, one ought to understand; before renouncing, one ought to have experienced; before yielding to the greater, one ought to have mastered the lesser. Thus renunciation, to be more than weakness and self-deception, presupposes a mastery of the world of fact and action, and it requires the power to rise superior to ordinary struggles and ambitions.

Through mental energy and understanding of the world only can such mastery be acquired. Renunciation must be strength, not weakness. In the words of Vivekananda, *mukti* is far superior to *dharma*, but *dharma* must be finished first of all. This eloquent writer and preacher, whose thought is one of the most important influences in the awakening of Indian life, has expressed this transition in ethical temper with great effectiveness. In his view, that society is the greatest where the highest truths become practical or embodied in action. Like the Chinese Wang Yang Ming, he was, therefore, a pragmatist before William James. He strives for power and energy; and prays, "Thou Mother of Strength, take away my unmanliness and make me man."

Of all the religious books in India, that which is at present most frequently appealed to and most diligently studied, the *Bhagavad Gita*, is eloquent in inculcating the morality of action together with the ideal of renunciation. The *Gita* says, "Be more manly; destroy your enemies and enjoy the world. It is for heroes only to enjoy the world. Rise and obtain name and fame by conquering your enemies." As has often been pointed out by Orientals, the Christian nations, in active life, far from following the injunctions of their Master as to forbearance and gentleness, seem to be guided rather by the principles of the *Gita*. Whereas the Hindus on their part had for a while forgotten these stirring injunctions and had lost themselves entirely in a weak interpretation of

the doctrine of *mukti*, without remembering that renunciation cannot begin before power has fully proved and asserted itself.

The *Bhagavad Gita* enshrines caste morality. The position of each man in life indicates those virtues in which he must strive to excel. "Better is one's *dharma*, though destitute of merits, than the well-executed *dharma* of another. He who doeth the *karma* laid down by his own nature incurreth no sin." It is the same idea of the relativity of virtues to the position of a man that we find in Plato's *Republic*. The special virtues required of the three classic castes of Brahmans, warriors, and landholders, are dwelt on in great detail; all other classes are assigned acts in the nature of service, with a corresponding lowliness and humility of conduct. Vivekananda complains that the august virtues of the higher castes are no longer practiced, but that the whole nation has adopted servile ways, singing everywhere without end in weak abandonment, "As the water on the lotus leaf is thin and trembling, so unsteady is the life of man." The heroic, both in action and in renunciation, has become rare. Nietzsche would say that the Indian nation has adopted slave habits and has forgotten its master morality. The *Gita* itself says, "Then I shall destroy all caste distinctions and thus ruin all these people"; and Vivekananda exclaims, "Buddha ruined us as Christ ruined the Romans," laying India's downfall to the abandonment of the heroic caste virtues. It is remarkable that

a man like Vivekananda, who fought against the artificial restrictions of the caste system, should yet see in this relativity of moral precepts, including the prescription of heroic virtues for the higher classes, the saving principle. But he evidently despairs of raising the vast masses of the Indian population to the plane of energism in morality; he feels that if the leaders of social life in India were inspired by these ideals, it would be sufficient. While abandoning the external accessories of caste, advancing Indian thought is, therefore, inclined to retain some of its essentials. I shall refer again later to this very important fact, which involves a question as to whether a unified morality is possible for the entire human race in the Orient or whether we must accept the principle of relative duties and virtues.

Thus Hinduism is becoming aggressive in the sense of seeing greater virtue in action and being inspired with ideals of positive achievement and progress.¹ In speaking for this ideal in her brilliant little pamphlet on "Aggressive Hinduism," Sister Nivedita shows her grasp of the essentials that make up Western national energism. She knows what the historic sense has done for the West, and demands that the "history of India,

¹ Mr. S. Nihal Singh, in his essay on "The Spirit of Maya leaving Hindustan," in *Glimpses of the Orient To-day* (1910), says, "To-day a different philosophy is moving India's masses. It concerns itself with Here and Now, and relegates the Hereafter to the background. It develops material life along with the advancement of the spirit."

which has yet to be written for the first time, should be humanized, emotionalized, made the trumpet voice and evangel of the races that inhabit India." She also says that Indian life must seek expression in nationalism, must make itself strongly national before it can take its part in the full life of the world. Many Hindus are inclined to believe that political salvation is to be found in the idea of a world state, but in the view of this eloquent writer "only the tree that is firm rooted in its own soil can offer us a perfect crown of leaf and blossom."

However, the writers and thinkers of new India agree that above all they must cherish that national ideal which expresses itself in spirituality. In intellectual and spiritual force they see the highest energy, and so renunciation, truly interpreted, is, after all, the highest virtue. "Concentration, calmness, and inactivity are the result of centralization of great powers — calmness is the mother of tremendous energy," these words of Vivekananda express that valuation which sets intellectual activity high above all mechanical contrivance, which appreciates that, by the side of the thought-energy of the human mind, everything else is insignificant. This is the greatest paradox in philosophy, that the West, where man first became conscious of his powers, where he learned to master the forces of nature before which the Oriental peoples bowed down in awe, should invariably have to yield to the Orient in fully appreciating the intense power of that very human mind and its activity.

It is here that Hinduism and Buddhism converge. In both, spiritual force is most highly valued, most intensely striven after. But as the Buddhist belief swept away the whole fabric of caste distinction and assumed a position of utter unworldliness, it has always seemed to be the religion of renunciation carried to its greatest possible extreme. The concept of unending change is the essence of Buddhism as it is the essence of all Oriental thought and poetry; this proves how true, after all, an expression of the real spirit of the Orient is to be found in Buddhism. Where nothing is stable, where all life flows past the beholder like a stream, where all things of beauty fade and all things of force decay, there everything invites to that quiet abdication which always has a pessimistic tinge. Now the West has arrived at a similar position in its interpretation of the universe. Both the principle of evolution and the electric theory of matter are not only consonant with Buddhism, but are to a certain extent anticipated by its thought. A realization of this truth will make it plain that in its real and deeper meaning, Buddhism is neither nihilistic nor pessimistic; that it is a superficial view to think that Buddhism erects self-annihilation into an ideal, sees no value in action, and preaches the prone acceptance of all evil as inevitable. If this were true, Buddhism could never have been a religion of salvation to millions, it would have ceased to exist long ago. It is also a significant fact that the great energist philosopher, Schopenhauer, stands in the closest

relationship to Buddhism. He is for this condemned by his dissident pupil Nietzsche; but if this brilliant aphorist had lived to see the present development of energism in the Orient, he might have looked even upon Buddhism from a different point of view.

As a matter of fact, while Buddhism is a quietist, renouncing, contemplative religion, it after all has its deepest meaning and most striking significance as an appreciation of the energy of the human mind. Nirvana is the ultimate achievement of the complete self-possession and mastery of mind, gained through the application of the most concentrated energy in mental processes through generations. It is significant that it is this side of Buddhism, the side of intellectual energism, which is at the present time most insistently dwelt upon by its ablest devotees, to the confounding of the notion that Buddhism is enervating and reduces to a lower level of life. While these energistic implications have always been present in Buddhism, it is only now that they are being fully appreciated in the Oriental world of thought.

The Chinese are far less inclined to abstract speculation and philosophical ideals than are the peoples of southern Asia. They follow a common-sense morality which is practical in its categorical precepts and judgments. But the traditional temper of the Chinese is also eminently pacific and quietist. The great strength of the Chinese lies in peaceful resistance; without meeting force by force, they negate the effects of conquest and oppression

in a manner that elicited the deep admiration of Tolstoi. He held up the Chinese as a model to his fellow Russians, and called attention to the quiet patience of this vast mass of humanity, to their manner of following the rule, "Resist not evil," in not opposing to injustice harsh and rebellious measures, but in following the quiet and natural remedy of non-action. The Chinese philosopher whose thought has been most potent in giving form to the quietist ideals of this vast population is Lao-Tze. Often called the Epicurus of China, he does indeed resemble the Greek philosopher in the manner in which he values reason above all things. In his view, compared with reason as working itself out in things and men, self-conscious human energy is of no avail. The sage must accept the course of nature and adapt himself to it by the use and development of his individual reason: "Reason always practices non-assertion, and yet there is nothing that remains undone." While Lao-Tze's ideal of non-assertiveness does not mean inactivity, but the desire to allow things to develop naturally and not to force their growth in an artificial way, such has not been the popular understanding of his thought. The merely passive elements in his philosophy have been unduly emphasized. Virtue and strength have thus been turned into weakness, and at present many Chinese hold Taoism responsible for that inadequacy of national organization and action through which China has suffered numberless disadvantages and humiliations.

To-day we are witnessing the awakening of this vast people to new energies and to a more active conduct of affairs. Peaceful China, the land of non-assertion, is fast becoming military. The ideal of national energy, efficiency, and strength expresses itself [in all public utterances. Great sacrifices are made for military preparation, and throughout the provinces even the children in the schools are put into uniforms and trained in soldierly fashion. The old contempt in which the profession of warriors was held in this most rational of countries has passed away, as fresh energies are beginning to stir.¹

The literary evangel of this new national faith is found in the writings of Wang Yang Ming, the Chinese soldier-philosopher, whose value for present-day needs the Japanese were the first to discover. During the last decade he has become the most widely read author of China. His general philosophy is alluded to elsewhere in this book; here we are concerned with him only as a votary of energism. Wang Yang Ming's practical ethics hinge upon the theory that thought and knowledge are of little value unless translated into action. Adequacy in action is, therefore, a test to be applied to ideas of conduct and

¹ The extent of the change which has come over Chinese feeling in matters of national strength, is witnessed by the edict on military reform, issued in April, 1911. It opens with the sentence, "We are of the opinion that militarism is the first thing necessary to the upbuilding and preservation of a nation," and goes on to recite the deeds of valor and military exploits performed by the Manchu dynasty.

of philosophy. Himself a man of affairs as well as a writer, he could express these thoughts in language pulsating with life and stimulating to deeds of valor. Among all native writers he has contributed the most characteristic element in the present state of Chinese public feeling. This zeal for action expresses itself also in the prevalence of revolutionary sentiments and desires, which go far beyond anything the old philosopher would probably sanction. The idea that evils are to be borne, or at most resisted quietly, has largely passed away, and in its place there has arisen the belief that only through positive heroic action can the troublesome problems of national life be solved. The words of Wang Yang Ming are like a trumpet call to modern China.

Japan is the true apostle of energism in the Orient, representing this temper not only in her present life but also in her traditional practices.¹ She is the one Oriental

¹ In 1910 a leading Japanese review took a vote among prominent men on the question of who are the greatest moral heroes of the world. It is interesting to note that Hideyoshi and Napoleon tied for first place; after them followed Bismarck, Washington, Iyeyasu, and then Luther, Shokatsu Komei, and Lincoln; Cæsar and Gladstone came at the end among the first ten. This will indicate the importance given to military achievement in Japan. In commenting upon this matter, Doctor Inouye Tetsujiro said that there are only four men who are entitled to be called *seijin*, or great moral heroes: Christ, Socrates, Confucius, and Buddha. All other heroes are of coarser fibre. Both of these classes of heroes are judged by character as a standard, their work must be an outgrowth of their character; both display great strength of will. But the truly great heroes are spiritual in influence, while the others are material. The teachings of the greatest heroes have been turned

nation in which military feudalism developed in a manner almost entirely parallel to that of Europe. The militant side of feudalism still constituted the essence of her action and ideals as she emerged into the fullness of modern life. The priest and the philosopher never gained the ascendancy in Japan which they had in the Chinese and Indian systems. Though Japan has accepted and is harboring both Buddhism and Confucianism, she has fused them with her own peculiar forms of thought into a distinctive national unity. Undaunted by the contradictions between these different systems, she has adapted them to her eminently positivist temper, and has moulded ideas of conduct in which the development and expression of human energy hold the central place. From the militant ages she has taken over her gentlemanly code, *bushido*, the Way of the Warrior, which inculcates loyalty, generosity, bravery, and other virtues that Plato and the Hindu classics demand of the governing castes. Here the code of the select has not been swamped, as in India, in the resigned and servile misery of the masses. New Japan has, indeed, attempted to extend the sway of traditional moral precepts to all classes of the population, but the problem has not by any means been solved as yet, and it is apparent that a code made for knights in a militant age does not meet all the moral difficulties of a modern industrial society.

into weakness by degenerate followers. Therefore, in our age of relentless competition, the military and virile virtues of ordinary heroes are necessary. — *Japan Mail*.

The ethics of Japan are notable, in that suicide itself is not viewed as resignation, but as the highest and most emphatic expression of personality. Under the code of *bushido*, the feudal knight or dependent felt his duty of loyalty most intensely; should his superior pursue a course of action that seemed ill-advised and dangerous, respectful representations might be made; but if no heed were given to such quiet and polite suggestions, the loyal retainer still had the recourse of taking his own life in order to awaken the conscience and good sense of his master. In this most powerful appeal, life itself, with all its energy, was consumed. These tendencies still hold sway in modern Japan; suicide is not merely, or principally, a means of escaping from a situation grown unbearable, but it is often the most intense self-assertion, either as a protest against some great evil, or an appeal intended to move men to needed action.

This brief review of the contemporary thought of the Eastern world will show how far these ancient nations have gone in turning to a philosophy of action and energy. The manifestations of this spirit will indeed differ in many ways from similar tendencies in the West, because of certain fundamental distinctions that separate external development. Western individualism, with all it implies and involves, is still foreign to the Orient. When we inquire for the root and source of this prominence of the individual personality, of this freedom of development, we have to go to the classicism of Greece

and Rome. The classic spirit is the spirit of self-limitation, it implies the power and will to control both our view of things and our expression, restraining them within a definite orbit and excluding all that is merely curious, or horrible, or insane. Thus liberty is born of self-restraint. As a result of this mutual limitation, individuals become conscious of their differences of character and of that subtle complex which we call personality. At first sight it is strange that it has been exactly this individualistic West that has striven to apply its moral principles to all alike, in other words, that has transfused ethics with democracy. Yet when we remember that personality is the result of self-restraint, this will seem less paradoxical.

In all these matters important differences exist between East and West. We have already seen that as the demand for energetic manifestations of human character and action arises in the Orient, it is prone to appeal to caste instinct and to invoke those codes of behavior which rest upon social selection. This is the deepest problem involved in the present Oriental transition: can a common morality of mankind, applicable to all human beings, enjoin those qualities of character which are demanded by energist ideals? Are we to have democracy or aristocracy in the realm of morals? Of the three principal countries of Asia, China is most truly the home of democracy. While democracy was not formally recognized as a method of government, the temper of Chinese

affairs was such that whatever concerned a community was not settled without its consent; though there also existed a certain social hierarchy. These democratic sentiments prevail even more fully in the present national transition, when the effort is being made to mould the forms of the state in accordance with popular ideals, to go beyond the superficial parliamentarism of Japan and to give the vast empire a system of truly representative institutions. It is therefore not surprising that those manifestations of energism which we note in contemporary China assume a thoroughly popular character. Participated in by the masses of Chinese humanity, this tendency will produce movements responsive to ideals that are not exclusive.

It will be of the greatest interest to watch the unfolding of the contrast between aristocratic and democratic forms of morality in the Far East. In India and Japan the question is, Can the energism which the national life requires be developed without recourse to the historic codes of the warrior castes? And if these codes are necessary, is there any way in which the master morality, which they contain, can be transfused into more general social precepts? China, on the other hand, is confronted with the question whether, without the leadership which is so strongly developed in Japan and which is striving for ascendancy in India, the national regeneration can be carried through successfully. If it should become clear that this could not be done, then there may gradually

emerge in the morality of China more aristocratic conceptions. Who would have suspected, a decade or so ago, that the great problem of slave and master morality would so soon be fought out on the vast theatre of Asiatic civilizations? Here it is really to be decided whether the world is to have a human, a universal, code of ethics.

It is perhaps true that the thinking men of the Orient, as they compare their own civilization with that of Europe, feel keenly the lack of individualism with its resultant personal energy. Touched with the fire of active ambition, they are seized with the Renaissance spirit. They desire that human personality should be given full freedom of growth and action. Instinctively they suspect that such a development cannot be hoped for if there is only a mass movement; they therefore turn to those aristocratic codes which the past has born, and hope to get from them that invigoration of human personality which national life requires. If the Orient is to travel the road of democracy in the Western sense, it would seem that it could be reached only through the development of individualism, which is often anti-democratic in tendency.

The new temper of the East involves a radical change of attitude toward physical nature; patient submission to nature's force and caprice is giving way to a desire for mastery. Altogether the most important intellectual change which the Orient is undergoing is the acquisition of that idea of the rule of natural law which

was first developed in the West. Up to very recent time the mystic element has been strongest in Oriental life. The Oriental would rather imagine and interpret than understand; he does not long to lift the veil of mystery that shrouds religion and authority. Carrying out the idea of Dostojevski's words, "Russia cannot be understood, she must be believed in," the Orientals are ready to believe in anything that surrounds itself with splendor and the emblems of authority. Moreover, every aspect of life is viewed as an expression of mystic spiritual forces. Spirits are everywhere; the poorest Hindu peasant constantly feels their immanence; in the beliefs of Chinese folklore, air and soil are peopled with genii. The Japanese build delicate temples in woodland glades; no human being ever enters them; but many gaze reverently through the latticed windows into the twilight silence within, where abide divinities and ghosts of noble men. The highest and purest expression of this belief is found in the hero-worship among Oriental nations, especially among the people of India and Japan. The great man, the noble character, is held to be a direct impersonation of the divine spirit; and to worship him appears a most natural thought. Thus the Oriental feels himself surrounded on all sides by spiritual forces, by whose influences his everyday life is moulded and his destiny controlled.

The one important conception which the popular Oriental mind lacks is that these mysterious and all-

powerful manifestations are themselves governed by a fixed norm. The reign of natural law is not a current thought among the Oriental masses, who still live under a tyranny of capricious spirits. The idea of gradual, orderly development according to a universal rule, — the cosmos of the physical world, — though comprised in their philosophical system, is not familiar to larger numbers as it is in the West. This attitude of the Oriental mind toward natural phenomena is due to two causes: in the first place, nature in her manifestations is so overpowering as to awe and suppress the spirit of man, and to prevent his conceiving himself as the central figure, as the ruler and director of all this energy; on the other hand, the philosophical mind of the Orient is so much taken up with the things of the spirit that, while it does construct and develop comprehensive systems of cosmogeny and evolution, it does not study natural phenomena in detail and by the experimental method. The development of energism which we have been tracing, however, involves a profound change in the attitude of the Oriental mind toward natural phenomena. The field in which human talent and energy has so triumphantly manifested itself in the West will not remain closed to Oriental experience. Already the Japanese are taking a high position in the physical sciences, and in India the pressure is enormous to pass from the narrow tutelage of the classics, as taught under the British system, to the splendid vistas of modern scientific achieve-

ments. The highest ambitions, the profoundest sentiments of the Orient are bound up with the desire, now suddenly revealed, to rival the West in scientific mastery, and so the spirit twilight will soon disappear. In a measure, the Orient may repeat the experience of the ancient pagan world, as set forth by Shelley when he speaks of "the hills, and seas and streams, dispeopled of their dreams."

But if the Orient is to adopt the philosophy of energism and active life, it does not, after all, follow that it will change its most underlying and essential ideals. It has often been said that if the Japanese have made themselves strong by the adoption of Western methods and processes, they have done so in order to be able the more effectively to protect the treasures of their own ideals and civilization. "Make yourself strong so that you may retain the right to be yourself," that seems to be the temper, not only of Japan, but also of China and India; and the self of the Orient is now, and intends to remain, highly spiritual. Mastery over external nature, indeed, attracts as part of the régime of energetic activity, but to the Orient the spirit of man, the mysteries of his psychology, the grandeur of the limitless vistas of development of which the human soul is capable and the heights to which it may attain, are more fascinating than any of the phenomena of external physical nature. It is to Orientals a source of great inspiration and enthusiasm to think that they are called to give to the world, and to

perpetuate in it, this noble spirituality. They have come to recognize the merits of the West, its high individual development, its energetic activity, its clean and successful methods, its complex system of machinery; but they also well understand that the human spirit does not always come to its own with all this efficiency and outward success, that machinery kills souls, that mechanism destroys human feeling. When they see the West striving to introduce mechanical ideas into the most sublime realms of thought, standardizing everything upon the basis of computed units of efficiency, they feel that the Orient still has a message that will be heard. It is from materialism that they hope to bring liberation. The manner is not yet clearly seen; but as the West glories in its efficiency, so does the East draw comfort and confidence from the thought that its spirituality is to be the salvation of the world. This destiny it can fulfill only if its newly aroused energies are directed to the achievement of aims that have a spiritual meaning and value.

CHAPTER III

INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA

THE historic traditions of the eastern half of Asia are eminently favorable to the recognition of leadership based upon intellectual power. Both China and India, as well as the small countries lying between them, have given intellectual qualities a unique preëminence in their social and political systems. The wisdom of the mandarin or the Brahman, rather than the haughty dominance of a feudal *noblesse*, the prowess of a general, or the popularity of a politician, has been, in theory at least, the quality upon which these Oriental nations have based their reliance in matters of state life. It is this conception of the sovereignty of mind which Plato interpreted and applied to Greek affairs in the *Republic*. In view of such social ideals, it is natural to expect that the men of mind and learning should in these countries be identified in a direct manner with the strivings of social consciousness, that they should be *par excellence* the representative men of their countries.

In India, however, the more recent developments of social and political life have by no means been favorable to the complete and normal evolution of an intellectual leadership in direct touch and harmony with other social

forces. A blighting dualism has been introduced into Indian life — superimposed upon that complex and intricate web of racial traits, religious beliefs, and social observances, that tapis of variegated and irregular design, which has come from the loom of Indian history. Every conquest, indeed, will produce a more or less permanent dualism. In measure as the social consciousness of victor and conquered have reached clearness of expression, this antagonism will be more pronounced. There may, indeed, be a gradual approach and amalgamation as in the case of Rome and Gaul, or of the Alexandrine conquest of Asia Minor; but on the other hand, the tendencies of the two civilizations may be so dissimilar that a continuing and apparently irreconcilable disparity results, as in Russian Poland and Finland, in Crete, or in the Mohammedan colonies of France. Such a permanent dualism leads to a situation that may, from the point of view of normal political conditions, be called unnatural, as it stands in the way of that spontaneous development of a unified national energy which is the law of normal life in society.

The Mohammedan conquest had already introduced a dualism of this nature into India. On nearly every point of social and religious belief the Islamite conquerors stood, and continued to stand, apart from the life of the Hindus. Certain adjustments, indeed, were made in the course of time. The democratic religion of Islam exercised a great attraction upon the masses, so

that to-day one fourth of the inhabitants of India are among the followers of the Prophet. Moreover, religions have a way of accommodating themselves one to another in the Orient, where purely religious discord — aside from social and political interests — is well-nigh unthinkable. The Oriental mind, cosmopolitan in these matters, instinctively seizes the elements of unity found in all religious belief. From the Hindu point of view Islamite monotheism could be interpreted as a more intensive form of worship concentrated upon one particular divinity, in itself not alien to Hindu ideas. Thus the contrasts between these forces were less marked than from a purely theoretical point of view we should be led to assume.

Yet, on the other hand, the age of Mogul rule brought no true amalgamation of national life, no growth of a feeling of unity and common purposes among the intellectual leaders of India. The stagnation of the Hindu intellect continued and grew more hopelessly film-covered as time went on. The patronage secured for literature at the courts of various Indian rulers kept alive literary activities, but did not produce a strong expression of national life. At the courts using the Persian language there was, to be sure, a faint after-glow of the glories of Persian poetry; but the Hindu dialects had even less to show during these centuries of regression. Classic studies according to the old form were preserved, but as for any manifestations of original genius, it was an age of intel-

lectual decadence. The pundits of Benares and like centres of Sanskrit learning continued to expound the sacred texts; the Yogi philosophers, and other less coherent devotees of mystic thought, were, as of yore, deeply absorbed in esoteric meditations; the court poets sang the glories of the dawn, or in more amorous moods celebrated the soft, silken eyelashes, the lily-white hands of the odalisques. But the spirit of Kalidasa was no longer abroad in the land, the strength and beauty of poetic thought had become a classic legacy.

It was into this stagnant civilization — full of varied and multi-colored life, indeed, in its more detailed aspects, but torpid as a national whole — into this abode of departed greatness, into this jungle of castes, this tangled wilderness of religious beliefs, from rude fetich-worship to all the subtle shadings of deistic speculation, it was into this *world* called India, that the barbarians of the West, led by commercial impulse, urged on by jealousies, brought new discord and an even deeper dualism of life. In certain moods we might almost regard it as a fantasy of Providence that it should have designated, from among all the Western races, the one inherently least ideological — least *spirituel* — to guide the destinies of this Mother of beliefs, thoughts, and imaginings. It may perhaps be said that an erudite and imaginative nation would have been too much appalled by the task before it; with the impulse to study and understand the infinite complexity and the strident dishar-

monies of Indian life, it might not have combined the cool power of will necessary to rule with a firm hand over all this agitated world. The English have relied but little on science or imagination; instinct has been their guide — and thus, after they had “blundered into all the best places of the earth,” they maintained themselves by everywhere remaining themselves, and allowing subject peoples to do likewise. Nor was the directness of their aim obscured or their purpose deflected by deep pondering on the civilizations with which they have to deal. Thus, while the French were making an ardent propaganda for Gallic civilization, and while the Germans were exploring out-of-the-way corners with infinite zeal and illuminating results, or were marveling at the profundity of Indian thought, the English drank toddy and ruled the world. Whenever they did allow theoretical considerations to prevail, curious consequences followed, due, according to hostile critics, to a deeply Machiavellian manipulation of causes and effects; while others attributed such results to the bland, uncalculating liberality of the English rulers. However that may be, such occasional instances of theoretical policies did have their tangible results; “free trade” in India meant a clear road for British merchants, and certain liberal institutions set the Indian religious factions by the ears.¹ But there were few instances of such attempts at “assim-

¹ Mr. Theodore Morison, in his *Imperial Rule in India*, has pointed out strikingly the perverse effects of liberal institutions in India.

ilation." The English knew, or guessed, that they had no predecessors or prototypes in their work; so they followed no models. The Romans had a different world to conquer and to rule, a world of racially related peoples; they, too, remained themselves, but they emulated the Creator in making other peoples after their own image. The English have felt the difference in their position and have not tried to Anglicize the subject populations.

It is, however, curious to note that, in so far as the policy of assimilation has been used at all in India, it has caused the dualism which inevitably results from conquests to become far more emphatic and permanent. The self-contained, reserved character of the English has tended to accentuate the caste superiority of the conquerors. But it is not only the implied antagonism of this new superimposed caste to all the native growths of social organization that stands as a conspicuous result of the Indian conquest. No, there has been in addition brought into native life a dualism of culture which, reaching far deeper than any earlier schism, has severed the intellectual element of the nation from the historic traditions of Indian development. Thus contemporary intellectual life in India has become incongruous and full of conflicting tendencies — lacking that strong unifying influence, that dominant impulse, which free nations draw from the living consciousness of past ideals and achievements.

When, a hundred years ago, the English first seriously faced the problem of their relation to the native culture of India, they were inclined to follow the simple policy of *laissez faire*. Active propaganda of Western ideas was avoided and Indian culture was mildly encouraged, as it had been encouraged by the Mogul and native rulers whom the British succeeded. But the rationalistic side of Liberalism, so effectively represented by Lord Macaulay in his famous report, tended to give prominence to the ideal of introducing the Hindu mind, caught in the meshes of hampering superstition, to the bright light of Western science and philosophy. This view gradually gained many adherents among those in authority. Thus it came about that the non-assimilating English did actually introduce into India a system of education based entirely upon their own ideas and experience, a system which in the event served to impede the spontaneous development of native culture and to substitute in its place an artificial exotic growth.

It has now become a matter of common knowledge and opinion that the Indian system of education is too exclusively literary and too superficial to make for training in efficiency. The instruction of the students in the middle and higher schools consists of English grammar, composition and literature, mathematics, philosophy (logic and metaphysics), and general history, to which are added on a second plane, Sanskrit, Latin, or some modern Indian language, and an elementary smattering

of "natural history." The system is purely a product of *a priori* reasoning, without regard to the historic background of Indian culture, nor to the economic and social needs of the Indian population. The fact that educational affairs were given this turn is due in a large measure to the intellectual temper of a time when the historical school had not yet done its work and when the all-importance of scientific training was not as yet understood. But its retention in the face of results disastrous to Indian culture may be explained partly by the fact that literary education, requiring neither laboratories nor even large libraries, is cheap, and therefore adapted to an excessively poor country like India. That the English harbored a sinister purpose to destroy native culture, and impede the development of national life in this manner, is a charge based on reflex reasoning rather than on a frank inquiry into motives. But, though adapted to a poor country, the system was evidently apt to make the country poorer still by stunting intellectual growth. This tendency is now so fully realized by the leaders of India, as well as by the Government, that efforts are being made to improve training in the direction of really scientific training and mental power. But in our present study of the contemporary Indian intellect we are concerned rather with the results produced by this system, during its existence of three quarters of a century, than with the effects which may be expected from changes suggested and partially introduced in recent years.

In the leading European countries, as well as in Japan, there has been an uninterrupted development of national culture, disturbed at times, retarded, warped by external factors, yet in the main a continuous growth. There has at least been no violent break in traditions, from the Nibelungenlied to Hauptmann, from Beowulf to Tennyson, yes, even from Tacitus to Renan, from Aristotle to Lord Kelvin. The literature, science, philosophy, ethics, of to-day are intimately connected with our past traditions, out of which they have been gradually developed. Nor has there ever been a long period of decadence and stagnation; for as the Roman world fell into decay, the vigorous Germanic nations were giving themselves their first schooling in a more progressive civilization. In this the circumstances of the Orient, especially of India, have differed widely from our own. There the great things lie in the past, and, for centuries prior to the coming of the British, the national mind, despairing of any higher destiny, or flatly contented, turned its eyes to the past for all guidance and inspiration. It was an era of intellectual languor, satisfied that the best had been said and the greatest achieved, — not of resolute striving for still higher advance. Then suddenly this connection with the past was severed, and the Indian intellect was invaded by the conflicting notions and ideas of European literary culture, imparted in a superficial manner.

It is a fact that the intense curiosity aroused among us by the Orient was in a measure reciprocated with regard

to Western learning by a large part of the Indian cultured world, even in the first era of more intimate contact. The Indians were lukewarm in the support of their own traditional culture, and their youth crowded the opening portals of Western learning. Was it a true hunger for mental sustenance, was it idle curiosity, greed for novelty, which affects even the staid and stoic East? or was it even less dignified — connected with the quest for clerical employment?

Enthusiasm for the learning of the conquerors is indeed a frequent phenomenon: as the East Indians were eager to learn English, so are the Filipinos; so the negroes of North America and of the West Indies yearn for a literary education. Undoubtedly motives of a mixed nature are active in this matter; chief among them, however, being a desire for intellectual equality with the ruling race. In India, where the educational system was made the gateway to preferment in the native civil service, narrowly utilitarian methods and practices soon began to dominate. It is depressing to consider the effects produced when a purely cultural factor — literary or artistic — is turned into an instrument for obtaining an extraneous advantage, when it is associated with a utility foreign to itself. In India, education came to be regarded, not as a development and an unfolding of the mind, an adaptation to social environment and a fitting for social service, but as a condition to being employed by the Government and earning a clerk's salary.

The passing of certain examinations, which are the portal to official employment, is the end-all and be-all of this education. The energy of students and teachers is bent on these tests, and their successful accomplishment is the sole criterion of educational methods. Unfortunately the Government has afforded additional encouragement to a tendency, already too strong, by basing the ratio of grants-in-aid upon the success of the students in a given institution in passing examinations. The result is a superficial, narrow, one-sided training, in which the memory is almost exclusively relied upon. It is a text-book education, a continued cramming process. But even the official standard text-books contain too much material for the thrifty-minded students; the contents are condensed and the abstracts or keys are memorized, together with the notes on lectures, which latter adhere closely to the subject-programme set for the examinations. The feats of memory performed at examinations are indeed notable, but usually they are mechanical and utterly apart from independent reasoning and judgment. Translations are learned "in blocks," and it has often happened that students will begin a required translation before the point assigned, and with momentum thus gained run on beyond the end, writing out a complete *bloc* as memorized. Historical facts and names will be remembered, not by their logical connections, but through some artificial device with the aid of numbers, assonances, or fortuitous associations. As a result there

is a total lack of grasp; the essential is not distinguished from the incidental; there is no scientific analysis and coördination.

No system could have been more successfully devised for the intellectual emasculation of a race than this "introduction of the Eastern mind to the treasures of our literature and philosophy." Instead of training the power of observation in the bracing discipline of science, developing reason and judgment through social and historical investigation, and using literary studies for the nourishment of the critical and constructive faculties, Indian education has been made up mainly of learning by rote parts of an alien literature and half-understood summaries and abstracts. On account of the utilitarian character of the system, there has not even been an adequate or fruitful study of the classical and vernacular literature of India itself.

In brief, the net result achieved thus far, while the above methods were in use, has been to exaggerate certain native defects of the Indian intellect. Through pursuing dialectic and literary studies for ages, the Indian mind has become remarkably subtle, but also unused to direct observation, untrained in independent judgment, fond of wordy discussions, volatile, and unpractical.

But it is not only the mental constitution of the Indian people which has suffered through this superficial method of education. The development of character itself has been affected, as young men have not received, together

with their intellectual discipline, the needful training of their moral nature; the education they received has been disconnected from the ethical impulses native and natural to the Indian mind, and has not provided the youth of India with definite moral aims. Thus by one of those strange paradoxes of which history is so fond, this system, introduced to liberate the Indian mind from the superstitions of a backward learning, has had the result of enslaving rather than setting free, of weakening rather than building up, the intellectual forces of India. At present its defenders and friends are few, but the effects produced will not soon be obliterated, though coming generations be better trained.

Looking now at the present situation of Indian intellectual life, without further emphasis upon the harm directly caused by an unfortunate system, we note as one of its most striking, yet natural, indirect results, an unusual dissociation of the educated from the masses of the people. The educated world is of course everywhere in danger of losing its contact with the broader currents of human life and experience; but in India, where the learned class has been reared upon an alien culture, this detachment is especially noticeable. The intellectual leaders are not fully understood by their own people; in other words, those whose intellectual powers entitle them to leadership have received from their education little assistance toward making such leadership effective. The intimate ideas, images, and notions that appeal to the

Indian masses are derived from the Vedas, the Puranas, Kalidasa, not from Burke, Hume, and J. S. Mill. The subject-matter of Indian education is alien, and not of such a nature as to give the minds trained in it that acknowledged and almost irresistible power, born of a mastery of the cultural environment, which a thoroughly adequate training would bestow. An Indian orator, who wishes to appeal to the masses, must unlearn his alien ideas and steep himself again in the native lore. We know the high motives which led to the establishment of Western learning in India; yet if a follower of Machiavellian statecraft had created the Indian Government, he could not have devised a shrewder means of sterilizing natural leadership than by making intellectual culture *alien* and *literary*.

It may here be noted that the actual influence of the educated natives has often been overestimated by the European observer. Their command of the English language enables them to make themselves heard in the world. But, on the other hand, their alien training prevents them from being always the effective interpreters of what the three hundred millions of the Indian masses feel. It is this fact which makes it so difficult for an outsider to form an accurate judgment on Indian political conditions. He may listen to the sober and optimistic reports of the Government, or to the contemptuous prejudices of the resident commercial Europeans and their press, or to the strident manifestos and denunciations of the educated

natives. Yet, how is he to form a correct view of the needs and feelings of the silent millions untouched by European culture, patient of conquerors, plodding and poor, but apt to move suddenly with the massive impact of a landslide or the tumultuous sweep of a typhoon? During the last few years, it is true, a great advance has been made in unifying the thoughts and sentiments of all classes in India, and in making the leadership of the intellectual and educated more effective. But all the relations of public and social life in India still suffer from the dualism which has been pointed out.

But while the education in English has raised a wall between the learned and the masses, it has, on the other hand, exercised a unifying effect by giving India a common language; a language, it is true, which is used as their mother tongue by less than one thousandth of the Indian population, and of which only a slightly larger portion of the natives have a good speaking knowledge; yet throughout the length and breadth of India, the educated classes can now be appealed to in this common vernacular. There has grown up an English native press, comprising some excellent, and numerous indifferent, periodicals and journals: and more than a thousand books are annually published in that language in India. It is the language of the lecture platform, and of the learned and political societies. The speeches in the Indian National Congress, in the general educational and social-reform congresses, are delivered not in Hindi or

Bengali or Tamil, but in English. That the growth of a feeling of national unity among the Indian people has been helped by this fact goes without saying; yet the influence is not deep nor far-reaching enough to afford a basis for a true national regeneration; for that purpose a native vernacular would be needed.

There is no likelihood that English will become the language of the masses in India, or of any very considerable portion of the population. Nevertheless its status as a literary language of the educated is not without its importance. For one thing, it keeps these classes in touch with European public opinion, and while it arouses in them political aspirations, it also makes them feel wherein their own culture and civilization are defective. Thus it is the native leaders of opinion who are most strenuous in their advocacy of a reform in education, in their demand for scientific training.

English is the language of conscious reasoning, of reflected thought, in India. Though creative literary expression has been attempted in English by Indian writers, they have achieved only a moderate amount of success. They have not come within measurable distance of the creation of a true Anglo-Indian literature, which would express and interpret the inner movement of Indian life, the deeper emotions and yearnings of the Indian soul. The delightful poems of Toru Dutt, Ramakrishna's *Tales of Ind*, Romesh C. Dutt's *Slave Girl of Agra*, and the English verse of M. Ghose, who competed

with Alfred Austin for the poet-laureateship, are, after all, exotics. It is but natural that English has not become the language of the heart — of fireside tales and love-songs; still, as an instrument of exposition, argumentation, and description, it is being employed with great aptitude by numerous Indian writers, some of whom occasionally attain the level of the ablest English expository essayists.

Though the critical doorkeepers of even the better Indian reviews do not always succeed in shutting out articles of diffuse content and apprentice-like workmanship, a faithful reader of such periodicals as the *Hindustan Review*, the *Indian Magazine*, the *Indian World*, the *Modern Review*, *East and West*, will again and again be rewarded by some article of admirable clearness or true literary charm. This frequent mastery of a strong and nervous English style, which exacts an unflinching homage from those newly acquainted with Indian writing, is the one redeeming result of the educational system, as well as a proof of the adaptiveness of the Indian mind. The style of some of these writers would indeed satisfy the most exacting taste. Their diction is lucid and agreeable, their suggestions are subtle, their grasp of general ideas is impressive, their information wide and varied. They, however, often lack a sense of humor and a just appreciation of literary values, — which occasionally robs their writings of effectiveness to us.

For the more luxuriant growths of Indo-English style

one has to go to the newspapers. Even in these the writers often manifest a surprising mastery of English, but it is here that the *babuism* flourishes, — an exotic English phrasing colored by Hindu modes of thought and expression. Delicious specimens of inverted idiom abound; we are remorselessly dashed from the heights of sentiment by the blow of a flat anticlimax or again made to ascend into the clouds from the level of commonplace discussions; strident invective is found side by side with inflated grandiloquence.¹ Yet withal, the discussion of political, cultural, and literary matters is carried on in

¹ It is not surprising that the English of Indian writers should occasionally have quaint or comical turns. The manner in which native writers are most apt to offend is in a flattening-out at the ends of their sentences, as when an obituary notice of a prominent man says that "His death has made this part of the world dark, as it were." They seem to be especially fond of such gentle phrases as "a pretty pass" or "quite a pity." Another shading occurs in the following: "Mr. Madan Mohan stands like Eiffel's Tower when he addresses his fellow congressmen. He stands, slanting forward, admirably preserving his centre of gravity." Again, a writer will pass with surprising abruptness from an account of very ordinary affairs to outbursts of poetical or romantic imagination, as in this description of the habits of Rash Behasi Ghose, taken from a serious bibliographical essay: "He goes to bed very late, and prolongs his studies to the small hours of the morning. As a necessary consequence, he is seldom up before nine, and he has never witnessed one of the most glorious scenes of nature: the mellow sun suffusing the eastern sky and the crimson rays of its blood-red orb bursting forth in all their glory at early dawn." Often, in his desire to produce a strong impression, the writer will steal from Peter to pay Paul, as in the following: "The speeches of Keshub Chunder Sen, Surendranath Bannerjee, and Lalmohan Ghose . . . compared with those of Sir Ph. M. Mehta, pale into insignificance and flatten down to the tawdriest of affairs."

these journals effectively and upon a high plane. Though this press, of course, speaks to the educated Hindu, rather than to the Indian masses, no student of the Indian world can afford to neglect it. Among the best known of the English papers edited by natives of India are the *Nation*, moderate in its views; the *Indian Mirror*, originally edited by Keshub Chunder Sen; the *Bengali*, a large and well-written metropolitan newspaper; and the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*; all of Calcutta. The latter paper was originally published in the Bengali dialect; but when the Vernacular Press Act was passed, it changed its language to English in order to avoid the restrictions imposed by that law. Other papers of prominence are the *Hindu* and the *Indian People*, of Madras; the *Tribune* and the *Panjabi*, published in the Panjab. A regular reader of such a paper will be supplied with abundant and accurate information concerning domestic and international politics and events of public interest the world over; he will be able to follow in detail the discussions in the Indian legislative councils and in such gatherings as the National Congress; and he will find intelligent and incisive commentaries upon public affairs. Matters of literary and intellectual interest are given special attention in these sheets. The Indian press described above must be distinguished from those papers which appeal especially to the British residents in India, and are edited distinctly from their point of view.¹ It is not surprising

¹ Leading publications of this class are the *Englishman* and the

that these two sections of the Indo-English press are quite generally engaged in bitter recrimination; and it must be confessed that an example of due moderation is not always given by the British section.¹

Journalism in the vernacular languages of India has not, as yet, been raised to an independent and dignified position. The Indian reading public is reached more effectively by the papers written in English; and altogether it is small compared with the total population. Consequently, the circulation of the journals written in the dialects is limited, and beggarly salaries are paid to editors and writers. The gross annual income of even a good monthly will usually not exceed the sum once paid to Mr. Gladstone for a single article. Journalism, therefore, does not afford a secure livelihood, and newspaper writing is usually pursued as an avocation by teachers and lawyers. But as every copy that is printed is read by, or to, many besides the original purchaser, the vernacular press does after a fashion reach people. It is, therefore, the favorite and most convenient vehicle of expression to those who are carrying on political agitation. These men are not always particular in the allegations which they make against the Government; *Statesman*, of Calcutta; the *Madras Mail* and the *Times of India*; the *Civil and Military Gazette*, of the Panjab; the *Pioneer*, of Allahabad; and the *Bombay Gazette*.

¹ Thus, recently, the *Pioneer* wrote about "descending into Bengal with fire and sword, and shooting and harrying remorselessly; and it evoked the "tiger qualities of the imperial race," which are not dead, but merely sleep."

and though the latter looks upon freedom of the press as a safety-valve, the present exacerbation of political unrest has again brought to the fore the demand for a more rigorous supervision of vernacular newspapers.¹

The chief centres from which the intellectual life of India radiates are the three great presidency towns with their universities and learned societies, to which must be added scholarly Allahabad and lordly Lahore; Poona and Benares, the noted seats of Sanskrit learning; and the Moslem metropolises, Delhi and Hyderabad. Among learned societies, first rank is taken by the Asiatic Society in Bombay and Bengal, in the work of which native scholars take a large and increasing part; and by the Bengal Academy (*Sahitya Parishad*). The latter was founded through the initiative of Romesh C. Dutt, in 1893; it has given much encouragement to the revival of Bengali literature, and its six hundred members include the leaders in the intellectual life of Bengal. Literary societies abound also in the *mofussil* towns of India, where they foster the flame of learning or at least keep alive intellectual activity and curiosity. But the most prominent platform for the exercise of leadership is

¹ Among the monthly reviews printed in the Indian languages there are some publications of considerable importance to the student of modern India, such as the *Bharati*, the *Sahitya*, the *Nabya Varat*, which is of an especially high literary grade, the *Salai-Am*, and the *Prabasi*. The editor of the latter also publishes the *Modern Review*, and it is, indeed, very common for modern Hindus to undertake extensive intellectual and literary activities in several languages.

afforded by the National Congress, a body composed of delegates from all parts of India, which meets for a short period every year for the discussion of political problems. It is here that national ideals are elaborated, and that leading men, by the force of their personalities or example, mould the public opinion of India. Such organizations as the Indian Conference, the Indian Social Conference, and the Mohammedan Educational Conference also afford abundant opportunity for the exchange of views among educated men of India.¹ At these meetings the leaders of native opinion attempt to arrive at a programme of concerted action and to work out clear conceptions of what is desirable and of what may be achieved. Frequently their efforts, however, resolve themselves in oratorical appeals directed against the proud parapets of British overlordship.

The means of expression at the command of the Indian educated world are peculiar, in that they consist of a foreign language in which higher education is carried on, and in vernaculars which have but a short and meagre literary history. The older languages in which the treas-

¹ The variety of the intellectual interests of India is illustrated by the following list of congresses held in 1910 in Allahabad and Nagpur: The Indian National Congress, the Indian Industrial Conference, the Indian Social Conference, the Temperance Conference, the Industrial and Agricultural Exhibition, the Common Script Conference, the All-India Moslem League, the Mohammedan Educational Conference, the Convention of Religions, the Theistic Conference, the Indian Ladies' Conference, the Kshatrya Conference, and the Hindu-Moslem Conference.

ures of Indian thought and expression repose, are still widely studied, and even employed as a medium for writing. Every year over five hundred Sanskrit books are published in India. Yet, however valuable as a language of classical scholarship, Sanskrit cannot be revived as a vernacular and adapted to the present literary needs of India.

History seems to point to Hindustani as the coming language of India, if, indeed, a common vernacular is finally to be adopted. This language is among the most lavishly endowed in existence. As English rests upon the solid substructure of a sturdy Saxon speech, and has been enriched through Norman French with the treasures of the Latin language, so Hindustani is an idiom based upon Hindi, the popular tongue of Upper India, a vernacular derived from Sanskrit, to which has been added the wealth of Persian and Arabic diction. Both Hindi, in which the Sanskrit element predominates, and Urdu, rich in Persian ingredients, have a noteworthy literature; they tend to converge in modern Hindustani,¹ in which all this rich inheritance of speech — such is the hope of the lovers of this language — is to be preserved in a tongue subtle and strong, direct, delicate, and expressive, capable of supplying the literary needs of a

¹ The terms Urdu and Hindustani are often used interchangeably; Hindustani is a dialect of Western Hindi, to which a Persian and Arabic vocabulary has been added; thus it is known as Urdu. Originating in the region around Delhi, it became the camp language used throughout India under the Mohammedans.

great nation. A society has recently been formed at Benares (*Nagri-Pracharini Sabha*) for the purpose of fostering the historic study of Hindi, and of bringing to light earlier manuscripts of literary value.

The conscious effort to develop the literary possibilities of the vernacular languages is of recent origin. It is to a large extent due to the quickening of the Indian intelligence which followed upon the first contact with Western reform ideas in the earlier half of the past century. Of this movement the *Brahmo-Somaj* was the centre. The men whose mental horizon had been widened by the new ideas, sought for a medium to communicate the thought that was burning within them to larger circles of their fellow men. The vernaculars — thus far used chiefly for oral communication — had been employed to a certain extent in poetic expression, but not in serious discussion in written prose. Rammohun Roy, while acting as an advocate of Western learning and institutions, at the same time did pioneer service in making of Bengali a literary language. He took the initiative in creating a vernacular press in India. The impulse given by him was quickened by the great scholars Ishwar Ch. Vidyasagar and A. K. Dutt, who are generally considered as the real founders of Bengali prose.

Modern vernacular literature thus bears a strong imprint of Western, especially English, models and ideas; it is a reflex result of English education. The

dialects of Bengali, Marathi, Gujarati, Urdu, and Hindi, have especially shared in this development. The best known novelist of modern India, Bankim Chandra Chatterji, as well as the poet Rabindranath Tagore, and the dramatist Dinabandhu, used Bengali; Tulsi Das, whose works have passed through hundreds of editions, wrote in Hindi; while the Urdu side of Hindustani boasts as leaders of its literary expression writers like Mir Taqi and Ghalib, and the court poets Munshi Ameer Ahmed *Ameer* and Nawab Mirza Khan *Dagh*, in whom lived the traditions of Persian song. Dinabandhu's tragedy, *Nil Darpan*, a counterpiece to Dekker's Javan story, *Max Havelaar*, is strongly influenced by Western literary forms, though its subject-matter is Indian — the woes and sufferings of peasant existence. The romances of Bankim were inspired by Sir Walter Scott, though the materials from which they are wrought are Indian thought, tradition, and social convention. Such books as *Durgesh Nandini*, *Kapâla Kundalâ*, *Chandra Shekar*, and *The Poison Tree*, afford an interesting survey of Indian life, traditions, and social ideals. From the point of view of art, their style is so simple and their thought so naïve as to give them an almost archaic flavor.

It is quite noteworthy that the awakening of Indian nationalism has been accompanied by a development of the drama. The desire for a more active life, for a more positive and energetic temper, has expressed itself in a

drama that, while still incomplete and halting in technique, is yet alive with new ideals. Thus the stage bids fair to play an important part in the working-out of those motives and forms of thought which go to make up the new Indian life. Rabindranath Tagore, the Bengali poet, has tried his hand also as a dramatist, producing *Raja o Rani* and *Garai Galad*; other Bengali writers have even more extensively sought literary expression in dramatic form. Thus, Girish Chandra Ghose has produced numerous dramas, among them *Nala Damanti* and *Buddha Dele*, while Amritalal Bose follows closely behind with his *Adarska Bandhu* (Ideal Friend) and *Bejoy Basanta*. Ghose was a disciple of Ramakrishna; the master, recognizing the literary gifts of his young follower, would not allow him to renounce the world, but bade him use his gifts for the delight and improvement of his country. In other dialects, too, there has been a dramatic revival. In Gujarati, Dahyabhai Dhal Sha produced a number of plays which gave new standing to the drama in this language; the author exercised a great influence upon public opinion in favor of social reforms, which he makes appear, not only desirable, but necessary. Marathi drama was revolutionized by Kirlosker, who infused a spirit of healthy action into the dramas of Maharashtra.

Bankim's books, *Ananda Math* and *Devi Chau Dhurani*, have become factors in the present unrest in India. The former, the story of a conspiracy to drive out the

early English conquerors, contains the original of the national hymn, *Bande Mataram*. The romantic view of Indian history contained in these books has had a powerful influence in arousing the national spirit of India. The relation is not unlike that of early nineteenth-century romanticism to the development of German national life. So strong are the feelings that have been stirred up by these books that the Government has been on the verge of forbidding their further publication as seditious, though they were written forty years ago. Most recently, the production of *Nil Darpan* has actually been interdicted. No more effective means of arousing Indian patriotism could be imagined than such official embargoes on cherished works of literature.

Among the activities which radiate from the centres of Indian intellectual life, scientific research is the most slender and fitful. The apparatus of scientific scholarship is almost entirely lacking. The present resources of India are so poor that it has not been possible to establish well-furnished laboratories or even libraries. There is scarcely a high school in the larger cities of the United States which has not a better scientific equipment than can be found at any Indian institution of learning, with one or two exceptions. In all Bengal there are only two or three professors who have been encouraged and placed in a position to do research-work. While in Japan many hundreds of students engage in advanced research, Bengal cannot muster more than

a score. Recently a wealthy Parsee, Mr. Tata, following in the footsteps of our own Carnegie, gave some million rupees for the foundation of a scientific institute in Bombay. On a smaller scale, a number of technical schools and scientific institutes have been founded, among them the memorial to Sir Amar Singh, established last year by his brother the Maharajah of Kashmir, at Srinagar. Thus what formerly would have been the occasion for the erection of some merely ostentatious monument, is now transformed into an aid toward higher national efficiency. The Society for the Advancement of Scientific and Industrial Education of Indians has been founded for the purpose of supplying the deficiencies in the older method of education. Its efforts up to the present have been directed chiefly to making it possible for promising students to go to Europe, America, and Japan in order to acquire a scientific or industrial education. Thus from various sources exertions are made to supply India with those elements of intellectual life which, up to the present, have been too inadequately developed. The matter of technical education has frequently been brought up of late in the Legislative Council of the Indian Empire. The native members of this body bring forward the subject and introduce resolutions calling upon the Government to establish polytechnical colleges in India. They charge the Government with expending the revenues of India for military purposes, while leaving the industrial

education of the people uncared for. The Government will then point to the beginnings which have been made in many provinces in giving systematic instruction in industrial work, engineering, and mining. The official members take the position that, on account of the limited resources of India, only slow progress can be made in this direction. In the end, the resolution is voted down against a minority of almost all the native members.

Native educational reformers in general are fully alive to the need of India for scientific research and training. Thus the Mohammedan college at Aligarh (Koil) combines a thorough scientific education with the study of the Islamite culture. Projects which have from time to time been made for the creation of a national Hindu university, in every case include provisions for advanced courses in the natural sciences. The Government, too, is beginning to give heed to these demands. It has established a few research scholarships, and seems inclined to give a more scientific turn to education. Yet many Anglo-Indians harbor a strong sentiment against letting the natives share in the scientific command over the forces of nature.¹ Thus the principal achievement of

¹ A striking example of such dogged illiberality is found in the memorandum of a former Surveyor-General of India, in which he says: "It is suicidal for Europeans to admit that natives can do anything better than themselves. . . . In my own surveying-parties I never permitted a native to touch a theodolite or make an original computation, on the principle that the triangulation or scientific work was the prerogative of the highly paid European."

Western civilization, the mastery over nature, the very thing which the natives would most readily acknowledge as superior and strive to emulate, is not adequately imparted to them. A government which annually spends about one thousand millions of rupees has found itself too poor to expend anything for scientific education. To such strange use has the rationalistic liberalism of Bentham and Mill been put in India.

While it is the genius of India to be imaginative and philosophical, the Hindus are by no means lacking in capacity for accurate scientific work. That they are thus gifted has been abundantly proven by the achievements of such men as the renowned physicist, Doctor J. C. Bose, who is by many considered to be the first inventor of wireless telegraphy; and of P. C. Roy and Gazzar, both noted chemists. The latter possesses one of the best equipped private laboratories in chemistry, which he has allowed the University of Bombay to use in the teaching of advanced courses. Indians have often carried off the highest honors in the English universities. R. P. Paranjape was senior wrangler in mathematics at Cambridge; D. N. Mullick won a similar distinction, while H. N. De carried off first honors in classics at Oxford. The latter is the Mezzofanti of India, enjoying the mastery of twenty different languages. Paranjape is now president of Ferguson College, where he gives his services for seventy-five rupees a month in order to help Indian education. Unselfish action of this

kind among men of the very highest intellectual ability is not uncommon in India; as an offset to her many woes she may count the unusual devotion of the ablest among her sons. But while scientific capacity is undoubtedly present among the Indians, favorable conditions for its development have not yet been created. Moreover, all the past training of Indian thinkers is calculated to make them averse to narrower specialization. One man now living has attempted the mastery of Sanskrit literature, geology, mathematics, astrology, and other branches more. The self-limitation which is necessary for the soundest scientific training, Indian scholars do not seem ready to impose upon themselves. A great deal of national and individual self-discipline will have to be exerted before India can hope to win a prominent place in scientific thought.

The scientific investigation of historic facts, so closely allied to the method of the natural sciences, has also received little encouragement in India. The Oriental mind is not predisposed to historic studies. True, the past appears all-important, but it is a static past, the age of some great reformer or religious leader, the past as enshrined in the sacred books. Or again, it is the past as idealized in the romantic fiction of a Bankim. As a development of which the present is the natural outcome, and through which alone it can be understood, history has lacked votaries in the East, although the evolutionary conception is clearly enough contained in

Buddhist thought. Historic consciousness is one of the most striking characteristics of Western civilization, more especially of Western nationalism.

Among Oriental peoples, it is Japan alone, with its nationalistic spirit, that has anything approaching the Western historical conception. Moreover, special difficulties and discouragements confront the student of Indian history. The documentary records are unreliable and fragmentary. The continuous series of chronicles, charters, and law-books, which give a solid foundation to Western historic scholarship, as well as the cultural background provided by the Greek and Roman historians, are lacking in India. A satisfactory tracing in detail of the movements of Indian history is thus rendered almost impossible. There is a great uncertainty about dates and localities, and, although antiquarian details may be agreeable to some minds, there is no powerful fascination in investigations and controversies confined to such matters, with only a remote chance of satisfactory determination.

The deep interest of the more recent development of India has indeed inspired the labors of such men as Romesh C. Dutt (*Economic History of India*), and Pramatha N. Bose (*Hindu Civilization during British Rule*); moreover, with the awakening of a sense of Indian nationality, historic research is being enlivened and roused to greater effort. Special periods and regions are being made the subject of scientific historical inves-

tigation. Thus the period of the Mohammedan Empire has been dealt with by Jadanath Sarcar, and Rajwade has conducted deep researches in Maratha history. Dinesh Chandra Sen has furnished a good account of Bengali literature. In all this little enough encouragement has come from the schools. History is taught in a cut-and-dried fashion, from outlines and manuals which are mechanically memorized, though only half-understood. In some of the universities it is even possible to take honors in historic studies without having received any university training in Indian history at all.

One of the most notable signs of the influence of Western modes of thought in India is the preëminence which many Hindu thinkers and historic students give to economic data. Not only do they recognize the basic importance of economic factors in social development, but they also see in an understanding of economic laws the key to a better counseling in the affairs of their own country. R. C. Dutt and P. N. Bose, the historians already cited, have given serious attention to the successive economic transformations of India. A mind which busied itself especially with economic and social conditions was that of Mahadeo S. Ranade, a justice of the Bombay High Court, who died in 1904. Deep and comprehensive study had assured him a clear grasp of the various fields of social and economic activity, through which he was enabled to deal effectively with Indian economic problems. Another contemporary writer who

owes his distinction primarily to economic studies is Mr. Subramania Iyer, of Madras.

Critical students of economics might find fault with the writings of the Indian economists as being colored by a poignant sense of the unfavorable position into which India has been brought through British dominance. The question whether or not India is to-day poorer than under the Mongols will generally be approached with a certain tinge of bitterness against the English, with a desire to hold the latter responsible for some things which have been inevitable. As the British *raj* is justified by its defenders chiefly on account of the economic benefits conveyed through it to the Indian population, e.g., through irrigation, railways, and other public works; the discussion of economic history itself is always prone, in India, to assume a political coloring. It is in this field where data are so confused and incomplete, where chains of remote causation have to be dealt with, that there is especial need of the careful, broad-based inductions of a purely scientific method. Some of the government universities have recently incorporated, as a separate subject for study and examination, "The Progress of India under British Rule." Since the avowed purpose of such a course is to counteract native discontent, and its very title embodies a conclusion, we can hardly look to it for any special value in training the native mind to an accurate observation and analysis of economic life.

More has been accomplished on the side of literary history and criticism. The most original and powerful of Indian scholars, Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar and Rajendra Lal Mitra, gave their chief attention to such studies. These men exemplify in their intellectual life the best results of the contact between East and West. With their intelligence quickened and their mind enriched by Western learning, they remained true to their native culture, which they studied from a new point of view. The name, Vidyasagar, — Ocean of Learning, a *nom de guerre*, or might we say *nom de savoir*, like the titles bestowed on great mediæval teachers, — was conferred on its holder by his *alma mater*. With a head resembling that of Esopus as pictured by the Greek sculptor, this Indian scholar, versed in all the classic lore of his country, was no less deeply interested in the broad currents of humanity than was the Greek fabulist, nor was he entirely without the other's sense of humor. He found time to become a leader in social-reform movements and to do for the Bengali dialect what Luther had done for his Saxon tongue. Rajendra Lal Mitra, a man of superb bearing, a sinewy and erect body crowned with a leonine head, a man moreover of proud, unbending spirit, was perhaps the greatest Indian scholar and critic of the nineteenth century, — from our point of view at least.

The præminence of Sanskrit and Pali historical investigation seems to be returning from Europe to India

herself. Benares and Poona are the centres of this scholarship, and among its principal representatives in recent years are Bhandarkar, Yatabhuson, the Aptés of Bombay, Shanker Pandurang, Satis Chandra, Haroprasad Sastri, Ganganatha Jha, and Rao Bahadur C. V. Vaidya. B. G. Tilak, a man of the widest interests, a scholar and political agitator, has also produced some interesting studies on Sanskrit literature. He has just written a book, the *Gita Rahasya*, in which he deals with the Hindu philosophy of active life, and compares it in detail with Western transcendentalism, especially with the thought of Kant. Yatabhuson also has been attracted by the comparative method and has given us a study of Vedanta in its relation to modern thought. Text criticism, translations, commentaries, and lexicographic works are now being produced in large quantities and with great success by scholars, who are assisted by the efforts of the Asiatic Societies of Calcutta and Bombay and other learned bodies. Scientific work in connection with the vernaculars is also being pursued by many native scholars. Thus, at the instance of the Bengal Academy, there has just been produced a code of rules for the transliteration of Arabic and Persian words into Bengali. Buddhist learning has its principal centre in Rangoon, where a group of eminent writers ably represent the latest tendencies in Buddhist thought, writing both in the classic languages and in English.



Among the intellectual leaders of New India none have attracted more attention with us in the West than the religious and social reformers. Not only are the expressions of religious sentiment in the Orient in themselves deeply significant to us, but in this case our interest has been intensified because we have believed that we were witnessing an essential modification of Oriental thought consequent upon the contact with Western Christianity. That the *Brahmo-Somaj* movement was actually inspired by, and received its guiding impulse from, contact with the scientific West, is of course evident; but it is a more doubtful question how far the monotheism of Christianity exerted a distinctive and definite influence, although the Indian rationalist movement is full of assonances to Christian thought in its Unitarian form. The three sects into which the *Brahmo-Somaj* is now divided, together have less than five thousand members. They are indeed congregations of highly intellectual and *spirituel* people, to be compared with bodies like the old Positivist Society of London. But the movement has nothing of the passionate sweep of a religious reformation. Though its ideas have exerted a great influence upon the thoughtful men of India, yet on the vast surface of the sea of the Indian masses they have produced but a slight ripple. Their real importance must be sought in a powerful liberalizing impetus given to Indian thought.

Many religious minds in India seem to find the ration-

alist movement of the *Brahmo* lacking in spiritual content. It would be more correct to say that the intellectual or critical element has been over-emphasized. The leaders of the movement were certainly full of the spirit of devotion, but their eclectic method in dealing with the foundations of belief deprived their system of that inner strength, mixed with dross and weakness though it be, which can be found only in a more spontaneous religious growth. They neglected the subconscious forces of human psychology. Yet they were truly representative of the intellectual temper of the educated classes of India, which is thoroughly rationalistic. This, however, is but another aspect of the disassociation from the feelings and impulses of the masses which we have already noted. Yet, when all these reservations have been made, and notwithstanding the small number of actual devotees, it must be admitted that the movement of the *Brahmo* has exercised a deep and an abiding influence on Indian civilization. It has aroused spiritual life, and has made men aware of the opportunities for higher development which the modern world holds. Its influence in reviving the vitality of Bengali literature and of Sanskrit study must also not be overlooked. Brahmoism accepts the personality of Christ as a guiding force in life, but it is far from accepting the Christian dogma in its completeness. Thus it had an influence in stopping the spreading of dogmatic Christianity among the educated classes of India, while, on the other hand, its own

expansion was impeded by the foreign elements which it had taken up into its thought.

The three sects into which the *Brahmo Somaj* is divided might be called the conservative, the radical, and the moderate. The *Adi Somaj* is the most orthodox faction. In it the caste instinct is to some extent preserved, and among its members the Brahmans keep the sacred traditions. The principal leader of this wing was Maharsi Debendranath Tagore, the father of the noted Bengali writer. The most liberal sect is the *Sadharan Somaj*, which seeks truth wherever it may be found, and at its services reads from all the bibles of the world, including in that term the works of great thinkers like Kant and Emerson. Its present leader, Sivanath Shastri, is a noted Sanskrit scholar. The *Nava Bidhan*, or new dispensation, was founded by Keshup Chandra Sen, who is still idolized by the members of this sect. His action in allowing his daughter to be married as a child, according to the orthodox Hindu fashion, led to the split by which the sect was produced. In its temper and tendencies it stands between the other two, attempting especially to mediate between Eastern and Western civilization.¹

The *Arya Somaj*, founded by Dayanand Saraswati, a man educated in the Hindu traditions, is closer to the heart of the people. This movement clings to the Vedas

¹ Among those members of the sect who are best known in the West is Mazoomdar, the author of *The Oriental Christ*.

as inspired, although it has departed from many of the former grotesque interpretations and is reading the classics in a straightforward and simple manner. It is militant, even pugnacious in its attitude toward Islam and other non-Hindu forms of belief.

More representative of the older religious spirit of India are the followers of Ramakrishna, among whom the recently deceased Vivekananda was the most engaging figure. He received an English education, and had early in life been attracted by Brahmoism, though he became estranged from that movement through what he called its lack in spiritual depth. In these men the older traditions of Indian religious life were dominant. They withdrew from the world for meditation, they clung to the Vedas as revealed, they rested satisfied with the old philosophy of India. But they saw it with new eyes, they called for a stronger expression of personality, a more active devotion; to use a current word, they were more pragmatic than the older religious teachers of India had been. In this practical tendency the contact with Western civilization made itself felt rather than in the philosophic form of their thought. In the words of Vivekananda, "The best guide in life is strength. In religion, as in everything else, discard everything that weakens you, have nothing to do with it. All mystery-mongering weakens the human brain." Language such as this, which might have proceeded from so radical an energist as Nietzsche, shows how little

the vulgar wonders of "theosophy" have in common with the truly important philosophical and religious movements in India. Theosophy, far from discovering for us the light of Asia, deals preferably with half-understood mystic elements, which the leaders of Indian thought look upon as remnants of a darker age now happily outgrown, and never in accord with the true light of Asian thought.

Religious beliefs are in India so closely bound up with social observances and institutions that the one cannot be modified without directly involving the other. As the organization of the family and of the castes rests upon religious authority, any change in the customs of marriage, family property, and inheritance, inevitably conflicts with some accepted socio-religious dogma, toward maintaining which intact all the conservative forces of society cooperate. The liberalizing of religious belief, and the unfettering of social action, are therefore in India usually two aspects of the same movement: to rationalize religion and to secure a more enduring existence for widows have been purposes constantly allied in practice. Without exception, all religious reformers have been propagandists of social freedom as well — though differing in degree as to the amount of social liberty to be striven for. Vivekananda and his associates, dwelling on the spiritual side of religion, and conservatives in temper, do not expect much from mechanical reform. But Vivekananda himself speci-

fically insisted upon freedom of travel and of diet, and condemned the spirit of all trammeling conventions. Ambitious proposals for new institutional forms of society he encountered with less assurance. The work of the *Somajes* tends toward social reform in a preëminent degree. Even the conservative *Arya Somaj* favors the remarriage of widows and similar reforms of family law. The *Brahmos* wage direct war against the entire caste-system, and it is they who form the real centre for social-reform agitation.

But there are also secular organizations which pursue this same object. The Indian Social Reform Conference, which was founded by Ranade in 1887 and which has since met annually, has carried on a systematic agitation against enforced widowhood, early marriage, the prohibition of foreign travel, and various harassing incidents of the caste system. Among the leaders of social reform must also be mentioned the scholar Vidyasagar, who wrote a book on widow-marriage, showing its permissibility according to the sacred books; Ananda Mohun Bose; and the Parsis Jijibhai and Malabari. The latter, a Gujarati poet and lecturer, spent heroic efforts in securing the passage of the Age of Consent Act of 1891, and in preparing the way for its acceptance by the Indian people. His enlightened independence earned him the bitter hostility of the conservatives. In a country where a departure from social customs often entails the most cruel consequences, such as the severance of

family ties, causing bitter pain to friends and dear ones, where social ostracism threatens the non-conformer, reform is not the mild and smiling goddess which is worshiped in the West, but rather a stern taskmaster, who demands the cruelest sacrifices in an austere alternative between conflicting duties. Under such conditions the activities of the reformer exact qualities of mind and character akin to heroism, which can be inspired only by an intense courage of conviction.

Problems of social life are everywhere interrelated with matters of politics, but in India this connection is especially close; the various fields of human activity have in that country not yet been differentiated as they have been in the West, and the master fact — an alien political dominance — gives a peculiar coloring to all national problems. In recent years political questions have more and more overshadowed all other considerations, and the leaders of native thought have entirely concentrated their attention on political action. In religious and social reform they encounter the sullen indifference of the uneducated masses. They well-nigh despair of accomplishing a regeneration of India in that direction. The social reformers are virtually still occupying the same position as that held by Rammohun Roy seventy-five years ago; they have indeed made progress in securing adherents as well as practical results, but they have not as yet reached the masses of India directly. One of the chief effects of literary education in

India is the development of a spirit of skepticism, a questioning of authority. This questioning was at first directed against the authority of native custom and religion. At present it is directed more and more against the authority of the Anglo-Indian Government. It is not strange that the Indian youth should apply Edmund Burke's invectives against tyranny to political conditions in India; they are less prone, however, to emulate his sage conservatism.

It would be misleading to attribute the present "unrest" in India to a superficial stirring up of the people by irresponsible agitators. On the contrary, the whole impact of the strain of the attempted adjustment between the old and the new, the East and the West, has now become concentrated upon political relations, and all the latent dissatisfaction of a vast society, poor and dependent, is seeking a vent in political agitation. No police action, no methods of repression, can solve this difficulty; the danger of a catastrophe can be avoided only by far-seeing and statesmanlike action which will create a satisfactory basis for permanent relations of confidence and mutual respect, combining the maintenance of British authority with proper concessions to the dignity of Indian national life.

As yet the depths of native life have not been stirred, but signs are plentiful that the patient masses may before long be drawn into the political whirlpool. The intellectual leaders of India have gradually come to the

conclusion that their leadership is exposed to sterility on account of the lack of a broad, popular following. They may write and talk to their hearts' content, but their hearers will be only themselves — already persuaded to satiety. Real power over the destinies of their country is denied them by the organization into which Indian political life has been cast through the conquest. They have therefore concluded that all other considerations must be postponed in favor of a crusade for more power in the hands of the native leaders. They are willing to "let up" in their attacks upon native abuse in order to secure the encouraging support and solid backing of their less enlightened fellow subjects. Thus the ardor for social reform wanes, while political excitement is fanned to a white heat.

In a country where the opportunities for exercising a direct influence upon the political destinies of the people are so limited, it is natural that extra-governmental centres and organizations should be created for the discussion and agitation of national policies. Of this nature are the National Congress and the various provincial assemblies, as well as minor clubs and meetings. The entire literary and social life of India has in fact taken on a political tinge. Whenever Indians meet in larger or smaller numbers for the discussion of religion, industry, social reform, or education, they invariably discuss political matters. Thus the platform of such congresses has afforded a great opportunity for achieving a certain

amount of national prominence. It is unfortunate for India that this kind of leadership is generally without any regular connection with actual public affairs, that it is not tested in practical administration, as is the political leadership in most other countries. Yet the men who have thus obtained prominence are in many respects worthy of the confidence which has been reposed in them. Their chief weakness has been their national love of generalization, accentuated by lack of training in the responsible conduct of public affairs. The process of meeting year after year to pass the same resolutions and to express the same sentiments, would have cooled the ardor of a less idealistic race; but the leaders of India, undaunted by the present barrenness of their labors, have confidently looked to a more propitious future when the seed they have been sowing shall have grown into fruit. In the words of Ghokale, "It is for us to serve our country with our failures, it will be for future generations to serve her with their successes."

Yet at present a more impatient mood has seized the Indian world. The British system, with all the fair viceregal promises, has appeared to the natives more and more unyielding and supercilious. So there has arisen a group of violent agitators not satisfied with the methods of intellectual propaganda to which such men as Mehta and Ghokale have adhered. These newer men lack all steadying training, they base their action on abstract opinions without regard to the intricate and

delicately adjusted facts upon which the Indian system rests, and their agitation is considered even by Indians as endangering the normal evolution of Indian political life. And yet the existence of such radical and unscrupulous agitators is a direct result of the fruitlessness of the conservative reform movement. The leaders of Indian thought have come to feel keenly their lack of the power of positive action; they know that so long as the people remain inert, their congresses may go on meeting year after year, passing the same insistent resolutions, without having as much effect on the government of India as the articles in an English provincial paper. The popular support so essential to a political movement, and through which alone they could bring pressure to bear upon the Indian Government, seems denied them so long as they confine their efforts to congressional discussions, to lectures before educated audiences, and to social reform. The masses care not for social reform, nor for political disquisitions. Agitators are needed to stir them up; and we may well imagine that the arguments used by such persons will be made more directly *ad hominem* than those contained in Mill on *Representative Government*.

It is a great misfortune to India that her true leaders are unable to reach the masses with the ideals by which they themselves are inspired, while irresponsible agitators are appealing to motives which in turn may arouse forces beyond the control both of the leaders themselves

and of the Government. That this system should result in a feeling on the part of Anglo-Indians which at times approaches panic, is very easily explainable. The materials dealt with, while ordinarily dormant, are nevertheless extremely explosive.

As the relations of the intellectual *élite* to the conduct of public affairs are, in the nature of things, a matter of subtle influence and delicate adjustment, it would anywhere be difficult to follow Plato's suggestion and cast them into fixed institutional forms. It is indeed of rare occurrence in Western countries that men, recognized as leaders in the world of thought and culture, are also prominently active in governmental affairs. The literary men of first-rate importance, who, during the past two centuries have busied themselves with political administration, beyond the general interest of citizenship, can be counted on the fingers of one hand; and of these, Goethe administered a large federal estate rather than a national government, while Björnson was drawn into political strife by a crisis of profound importance to his country. So distinct is, at ordinary times, the official sphere from the leadership in culture that it attracted much comment, as a thing unusual, when an American ambassador at Berlin maintained intimate social relations with men of learning and science. To note these instances is, of course, no more than to illustrate the trite fact that specialization, in modern life, has a tendency to separate the various classes and bodies

of men who occupy positions of leadership. It is not that the intellectual element has abandoned politics, but that those who devote themselves to politics are in professional matters more or less segregated from other leading men, as these again form several groups and classes. Strange to say, the country where such a segregation is least apparent, where general intellectual and political leadership are most closely identified, is that most practical, unimaginative commonwealth of England.

In the greatest dependency of Britain, however, the relations of intellectual leadership to politics are given a unique turn, through the fact that here an intellectual aristocracy of ancient pedigree finds itself stripped of influence in its own home and sees the seats of power occupied by forceful aliens who care little for the things of the spirit. Accordingly, in no country of the world are the educated classes so universally occupied with political matters as in India at the present time. It would be difficult to mention a single Indian contemporary of great prominence who does not, as writer or editor or congress speaker or agitator, take part in politics. This condition is not the result of a powerful original interest in matters of state, but it is caused by the abnormal conditions in which the country finds itself; just as the political interest of Plato or Dante or Milton or Renan was the result of critical conditions in the affairs of the societies in which they lived.

Little opportunity is afforded the natives of India to exercise leadership through direct possession of political power. The native states are still administered by men of Indian descent, but they contain few positions of great importance, and the problems dealt with are rather of local interest. Yet in such positions some men have earned national fame as successful administrators and wise rulers. Such statesmen were hailed as proving the capacity of Indians to govern themselves, and their pre-eminence was a solace to their countrymen in British India who are excluded from high political dignities. Among the most notable of these Indian prime ministers were Sir Salar Jung, who traced his descent back to Arab origin, and that Sir T. Madhavao, of Baroda, who was in his youth a brilliant student of physics and mathematics, devoting himself to positive, rather than to literary and metaphysical learning. We might note here in parenthesis that many among the prominent leaders of modern India have in a similar manner emphasized the positive or scientific side in their studies, as in the case of Dadabhai Naoroji, Mehta, and P. N. Bose.

A career affording greater prominence though less direct power than these local premierships, is open to a few distinguished Indians, through membership in Parliament and in the Supreme Legislative Council of India. Membership in the British Parliament has been bestowed upon native Indians only in very exceptional

cases; that it should have been done at all by a British electorate is a striking proof of the liberal temper of English politics. This distinction, when conferred upon an Indian, gives him a recognized position of political leadership in his own country. For a long time Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, who sat in Parliament from 1892 to 1895, was looked up to by educated Indians throughout the Empire as their most dignified representative. This "grand old man of India" is of Parsee descent, and has enjoyed a career of great political prominence. For a time he was Diwan of Baroda, and thereupon a member of the Bombay Legislative Council. The unifying influence of the British *raj* is shown by the fact that some of the most prominent political leaders of India have come from the Parsee community of Bombay — in numbers as insignificant as it is notable for ability in affairs and for progressive ideas. The importance of Mr. Naoroji in India itself was almost outshone by Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, also a Parsee, who for forty years past has been active as a political leader, lecturer, and legislator. Notwithstanding his conservative and pro-British attitude, this man has preserved his ascendancy and his influence over the public opinion of India. Other Parsees of high reputation are the philanthropists, Sir J. Jijibhai and Behramji Malabari, whose work has already been referred to.

The Hindu part of the Indian population finds its most prominent political representatives in such men as

Gopal Krishna Gokhale, W. C. Bonnerjee, and Lalmo-hun Ghose. The latter, who died in 1909, was a man of the highest ability, amounting to genius, to which was added a great personal charm. He was a leader of the legal profession, and as a public speaker was compared with Chatham for the sustained brilliance of his oratory, nor was he lacking in a sense of humor. Mr. Gokhale, a native of Bombay, was in his youth influenced by the temper of the Parsee leaders, as well as by the economic studies of Ranade. He became Mehta's successor in the Imperial Council, where he made a reputation as a dignified and forceful speaker, and won special renown by the clearness of his expression. He possesses a mastery of financial questions, and his judgment on financial matters has repeatedly been accepted by the Government in modifying its original proposals. Another valuable member of the Supreme Legislative Council is Dr. Rash Behari Ghose, who is looked upon as the leader of the Calcutta Bar. A career of less prominence is afforded by the provincial legislative councils and by the municipal magistracies; but even here reputations may be won, as in the case of Nalin Behari Sircar, who was held to be Bengal's greatest citizen because of his public-mindedness and his efficient service to his people in less exalted positions.

The councils of which we have spoken, however, on account of their purely advisory powers, do not afford a completely satisfactory field of activity for the leading

men of India. In the administrative branches of the Government the boundaries set to their ambitions are very narrow indeed; it is only in the judicial service that a fair chance for distinction is accorded to natives.¹ We therefore find that native talent often turns in this direction; and some careers of undoubted usefulness have been achieved. Among the names which immediately suggest themselves are Chief Justice Romesh C. Mitter, K. T. Telang, O. C. Mookerji, Subramanya Iyer, on the Hindu side; and among the Mohammedans, Ameer Ali and Syed Mahmud. These men are all notable for their general culture. Justice Syed Mahmud had a fondness for quoting Urdu and Persian poetry in his decisions, calling upon the graceful muse to soften the decrees of stern justice, without detriment to the quality of his law. Both he and Mr. Justice Ameer Ali were trained in England. The latter has achieved great distinction as a legal and historical writer. His occasional essays in English reviews have been justly admired for their clearness of diction; yet his command of a fine and expressive English style is equaled by other Indian literary men.

The present situation in India illustrates some of the unfortunate results of the political dependence of a civilized people. Not only politically, but also in economic matters, India is kept in a state of dependence

¹ In 1903, out of 1307 positions in the higher Indian civil service which pay over one thousand rupees (\$330) a month, only ninety-four were held by Indian natives. The latter are entirely excluded from higher military command.

on the metropole. But the most hopeless feature of the situation is that the men who would naturally be leaders in government and enterprise, find themselves excluded from opportunities for exercising legitimate power in their own country. Such a decapitation of an entire people is a great sacrifice to impose, even in return for the blessings of peace and an efficient policing of the country. The continuance of this policy would mean either the total destruction and degradation of Indian national life, or the end of the British *raj*. The policy of exclusiveness exercises an unfavorable influence on the civil service itself, in that, while a lower type of intelligence — a merely clerical faculty — is encouraged among the native officials, yet these inferior men, being of the soil and knowing local conditions, will necessarily have a great influence in fixing the character of the entire service and the quality of its work. The encouragement of higher types of ability through a greater liberality in official appointments would thus vitalize the service and strengthen its contact with the real forces of Indian life. Yet from the point of view of national destiny, the above considerations are of less importance than the tendency which is thus described by Mr. Ghokale: "A kind of dwarfing or stunting of the Indian race is going on under the present system. We must live all our life in an atmosphere of inferiority, and the tallest among us must bend in order that the exigencies of the system be satisfied."

CHAPTER IV

INTELLECTUAL TENDENCIES IN THE CHINESE REFORM MOVEMENT

To understand the intellectual temper of the great movement that is now going on in the Chinese Empire, it is necessary to form a clear conception, both of the elements in Chinese traditions and native thought which are being applied especially to the present situation, as also of the manner in which Western civilization is being understood by Chinese minds. From the transition which China is now undergoing she will undoubtedly emerge with deep and far-reaching modifications in her traditional system; but it also seems certain that the essentials of her civilization will remain Chinese, that she will retain whatever is strong and valid in her culture, adopting only such institutions and methods of the West as may be truly helpful to her national life.

The ideas developed in Chinese history and philosophy distinctly favor the view that government ought to be the rational expression of the common weal enforced in accordance with the dictates of the popular conscience. In the earliest Chinese traditions, preserved for us in the historic book of Confucius, supplemented by other sources, there is drawn a picture of royal govern-

ment essentially aristocratic in character. Throughout the two thousand years from 2500 B.C. onward, which are recorded in these annals, there is a uniform insistence on certain ideals of government. While the Emperor is looked upon as the representative of divine authority, it is made plain that he endangers his power and the continuance of his rule by falling into vices and disregarding the duties of his office. He governs, not as a personal despot, but in accordance with the advice of princes and other leaders who surround him, and especially of the Prime Minister, who is selected by reason of unusual efficiency and high political virtue. The Emperor must practice self-control and not pursue a personal policy; in order to discover the right way, he will always welcome the advice and assistance of great scholars. Should an emperor entirely fall from grace, so that his conduct would leave no hope for ultimate improvement, a revolutionary act would justly supersede him and put in his place a worthier man of tested strength and character.

Thus it is written of one of these rulers, set up as a model to all successors, "that he listened to reproof, did not ignore advice, and was altogether in accord with the leaders of the people." It was common to assemble the princes and leaders of the Empire for consultation after the manner of the imperial diets of Charlemagne; the earliest assembly recorded was that called by Yu at the Hill of Mao, south of the Yang-tze, which thereafter was known as the "Hill of General Investigation,"

a name that suggests the "grand inquest" which was the origin of Parliament in England. The system developed in these centuries recalls the first beginnings of modern democracy as conceived by the early French writer, Languet; in his view, too, the people should not act as a mass, but as organized bodies represented through their magistrates, leaders, and princes.

The welfare of the people is throughout laid down as the main aim and purpose of government, and upon the manner in which a ruler can hold public confidence and find a place in the hearts of the people depends the permanence and usefulness of his rule. An early emperor was reproved in these terms: "The people have withdrawn their favor and Heaven has turned itself away because of your transgressions." In the general conduct of life democratic ideals are inculcated, — the avoidance of all ostentation, luxury, and display. Thus one ruler is admonished "not to set a value on rare things nor to belittle such as are useful, for thus you will prosper the people." One of the emperors sought everywhere for learned and accomplished scholars to instruct and to direct his people; he sought for them also that they might afterward give aid to his immediate successors. Another said, "It is not so much that I fear the scholars of my country will be left waiting outside my gates, as that they may pass me by." The respect for intellectual eminence, the desire to accept rational advice, and to weigh courses of action in the light of wisdom, therefore,

go back to the very beginnings of Chinese history, over four thousand years ago. When the leader of the first recorded revolution (B.C. 1776) began his movement and assembled his troops, he addressed them in the following words: "This thing that I am about to do is not of my choice. It is the decree of Heaven on account of Hia's transgressions. Think not that I have no pity for you, that I willingly sacrifice your peaceful arts of husbandry to bring about the conquest of Hia. I have heard your words of complaint, but as I fear the supreme ruler, I dare not refrain from this work. If I do not resist this evil, how can I look for Heaven's support?" The ideal of royalty is summed up in the words, "He who subdues others is a lord, but he who conquers himself is a king."¹

The models of conduct, held up in the historical work of Confucius for the guidance of Chinese rulers, recall, to a certain extent, the ideals inculcated in books for the instruction of princes, which were so common during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe. But it is, on the whole, a more vigorous, sane, and generous ideal that is contained in these old Chinese works; it is broad and practical in its care for the public welfare, wise in its reliance upon tried and trusted counselors, humane and full of the spirit of severe self-control. A return to these early ideals of national government is urged by modern Chinese like Wang Chi and Tang Hsi, who are

¹ The wording of passages from the *Shu King* in the above is taken from Mr. W. Gorn Old's translation.

leaders in a movement that calls for a renaissance of the system of the Chow Dynasty, under which Confucius lived and the ideals of which he embodied in his writings.

In other works of Confucius the same ideals of government are further developed and emphasized. It is said directly that "he who gains the hearts of the people, secures the throne; and he who loses their hearts, loses also the throne." The revolution against tyranny, already referred to, which ended the Hia Dynasty, is justified upon the maxim that "the people's hearts and Heaven's decree are the same." In Chinese thought, therefore, the principle that the voice of the people is the voice of God has been familiar from time immemorial. The book of Mencius also most clearly sets forth these ideas, holding that the only true foundation of government is in the hearts of the people. Among the most characteristic expressions are the following: "Heaven sees according as my people see; Heaven hears according as my people hear." "He caused him to preside over the conduct of affairs, and affairs were well administered so that the people reposed under him; thus the people accepted him. Heaven and the people gave empire to him." Kingly rule rests on humane ideals: "He who subdues men by force is a tyrant; he who subdues them by benevolence is a king." Though popular in spirit, in their mode of action government and society were aristocratic. Mencius sets forth in terms

which recall the Indian *Bhagavad Gita*, that different demands are made on different men according to their endowments and capabilities: "Those who labor with their minds rule, and those who labor with their bodies are ruled." It has been said that the Chinese ideal of government is one of benevolent despotism tempered by revolution. It would be juster to say that it is a benevolent absolutism tempered by constant regard for the traditions of the Empire, for local custom, and for the sentiments of the people.¹

While the attitude of Chinese rulers and of the governing class has been influenced constantly by the ideals set forth by Confucius, the masses of the people have been followers of Lao-Tze in name, though with much perversion of that philosopher's original thought. The social ideals of Confucius have indeed given stability and prosperity to the Chinese Empire for thousands of years. They are a form of stoicism seeking satisfaction in the sense of accomplished duty and in self-centred

¹ The fundamental doctrines of Chinese political tradition have been thus summarized by an older writer: "First, that the nation must be governed by moral agency in preference to physical force; second, that the services of the wisest and ablest men in the nation are indispensable to its good government; third, that the people have the right to depose a sovereign who, either from active wickedness or vicious indolence, gives cause to an oppressive and tyrannical rule. These doctrines are accompanied by an institution, namely, the system of public service competitive examinations." Meadows, *The Chinese and Their Rebellions*. 1856. For more complete extracts from the Chinese classics, see Reinsch, *The Rise of Chinese Nationalism—Documents and Readings*. 1911.

character. Yet this self-sufficiency has been carried to an extreme by Confucian scholars and public men. Great intellectual pride sought expression in these ideals, and rendered them more and more formal so that their temper departed gradually but decisively from the modest and sincere attitude of Confucius himself. Simplicity became simplicism under which, as a well-understood and accepted convention, Chinese officialdom, with all its corrupt and devious ways, flourished for centuries. These doctrines, so simple and flexible in their origin, became, in the course of centuries, hard-and-fast limitations upon national development. Modern China appeals from the more recent to the more ancient Confucianism. But while Confucius's teaching was corrupted in the direction of exclusiveness and artificiality, the Taoism of Lao-Tze was more sadly perverted to the nursing of an inert superstition, so that modern Chinese writers see in Taoist doctrines the chief cause of China's weakness and decay. Lao-Tze himself sought in Reason the essence of life and guidance in human affairs. He discouraged, above all, the assertiveness by which any individual would attempt to magnify his importance and to interfere with the normal, quiet, and rational development of things. This he applied to the conduct of private as well as of public affairs. In all pursuits he expects more from quietly waiting upon reason than from trying to force matters by artificial contrivance. "If princes and kings could keep to reason, the ten thous-

and things would of themselves be reformed." "When one desires to take in hand the Empire and make it, I see him not succeed. The Empire is a divine vessel which cannot be made. One who tries to make it, mars it." Nor does he encourage great striving among the people; he would rather keep them in quiet satisfaction. "Not exalting worth, keeps people from rivalry. Not prizing what is difficult to obtain, keeps people from committing theft. Not contemplating what kindles desire, keeps the heart unconfused. The holy man when he governs, suppresses the people's passions, but fills their souls. Always he keeps the people unsophisticated and without desire. When he acts with non-assertion, there is nothing ungoverned." "The ancients, who were well versed in reason, did not thereby enlighten the people; they intended to make them simple-hearted. If people are difficult to govern, it is because they are too smart. To govern with designing cleverness is the country's curse." But while Lao-Tze discourages the arousing of ambitions in the people, he too has a popular conception of government: "The nobles come from the commoners as their root, and the highest rest upon the lowly as their foundation." The general ideals of conduct are expressed by the sage in the following terms: "The holy man knows himself, but does not display himself. He holds himself dear, but does not honor himself." "To be taciturn is the natural way. A hurricane does not outlast the morning. A cloudburst does not

outlast the day. Even heaven and earth cannot be unremitting, will not man be much less so?" "A good man acts resolutely and then stops. He ventures not to take by force; he is resolute but not boastful; resolute but not haughty; resolute but not arrogant; resolute because he cannot avoid it; resolute but not violent."

All the pacific elements of Chinese life find in Lao-Tze their strongest expression: "He who with reason assists the master of mankind will not with arms conquer the Empire. Where armies are quartered, briars and thorns grow. Even beautiful arms are unblessed among tools, and people had better shun them. Therefore, he who has reason does not rely upon them. Arms are unblessed among tools and not the superior man's implements. Only when it is unavoidable he uses them. Peace and quietude he holds high. He conquers but rejoices not. Rejoicing at a conquest means to enjoy the slaughter of men." This is the foundation of the philosopher's most notable doctrine of the ultimate victory of the weak over the strong, a doctrine which has had strange illustration and verification in Chinese history. "The weak conquer the strong, the tender conquer the rigid." "The compassionate will, in time of attack, be victorious, and in defense, firm." "Thus, if matched armies encounter one another, the tenderer one is sure to conquer." "He who excels as a warrior is not warlike. He who excels as a fighter is not wrathful. He who excels in conquering the enemy does not strive. He who

excels in employing men is lowly.”¹ In every respect Lao-Tze puts forward the ideal of quiet strength, rather than of blustering activity and self-assertion. This philosophy gives expression to those elements in Chinese popular character which have made it possible for that huge empire to exist in rarely broken peace for thousands of years; which have also caused the gradual assimilation of the conquerors who from time to time attempted to influence the destiny of China. If Confucianism is the philosophy of the Chinese higher ranks, Taoism is the religion of the masses, industrious, frugal, and patient to inertness. But to the party of national advance at the present this quietism seems evil and dangerous. While expressing some fundamental qualities of Chinese character, the doctrines of the sage have indeed also been perverted in a notable manner. Human indolence, inertness, and weakness have sought consolation in them disregarding all the deep strength which underlies these teachings; while the sublime doctrine of Reason as the all-powerful force, has been used in a manner almost unbelievable to support the most degraded and irrational practices connected with sorcery, incantations, and amulets. It is against these parodies of the teachings of the sage that modern China is protesting.

The political ideals and practices of the Chow period have been further set forth in the *Chow-Li*, the cere-

¹ Doctor Paul Carus's translation of the *Tao Teh-king* has been followed in the above extracts.

monial institutions of the Chow Dynasty (1122-255 B.C.). This ancient book contains a detailed account of the entire imperial administration in all its parts, giving the functions and duties of a veritable army of officials. The historic character of this work has not been entirely defined. By many it is believed, like the *Republic* or the *Laws* of Plato, to be merely an effort to construct an ideal system of administration. But leaving aside the question as to how far the institutions described were actually put in force, the book may safely be taken as indicating the political ideals of the time, ideals which would undoubtedly, in many cases, rest upon practice. The promulgation of laws is described in the following manner: "On the appointed day the sovereign addresses the officials present in the audience hall and proclaims the law to be in force in the kingdom; the chief elders of groups of six towns and their next subordinates receive the law in turn through the grand astrologer. A full audience must be given by the sovereign to these important chiefs for the purpose of repeating the law before enforcing it in the townships." It is further provided that the opinion of the people must be considered, especially on such important questions as dangers threatening the nation, migration within the country, and the election of a sovereign in case of a failure of succession. Many means are provided by which the people may express their opinion before ministers or the king. Debating platforms are main-

tained and information is gathered from the town chambers. In this manner, in both legislation and in the control of finance, there was a certain participation of the popular elements. Official ordinances of the various ministers of state were publicly posted in prominent places before going into effect; and they would be withdrawn if decidedly disapproved by the people. Budgetary forecasts of income and expenditure were also submitted by the proper officials. Every three years a general examination of the morality and skill of the people was held as a basis for promoting in rank those who were notable for merit. The various towns also elected men to act as their representatives in managing their local affairs. The institutions thus outlined might be described as a limited monarchy with responsible officials acting in consonance with an active public opinion. The *Chow-Li* is at present specially appealed to by those whose political aims take the tendency of reviving the ancient institutions and popular liberties in China. Considering its age, the book is entirely unique on account of its comprehensiveness in the allotment of political functions to a large number of officials and in the balance which it establishes between the different component parts of the state.

It is, of course, impossible in this place to review the entire development of Chinese thought and institutional practice. We can consider only those elements which are becoming salient features in present political dis-

cussions and tendencies. In passing, we ought, however, to glance at the views of the famous social reformer, Wang An-shih, who was prime minister for some years after A.D. 1068. He proposed and partially introduced an extensive system of reform which recalls modern socialistic ideas. In order to eliminate oppression of the poor by the rich, the Government was to purchase the entire surplus of production and distribute it virtually at cost. Taxes were to be paid the state in the products of agriculture and industry, and poor men were to be enabled to obtain land through government advances. Public works, heretofore constructed by forced labor, were to be paid for out of the proceeds of an income tax; in the levy of this impost great difficulties were, however, encountered in ascertaining the actual income of the subjects. Altogether, though given a fair trial, the system did not succeed in China and was soon abandoned. Henceforth similar ideas and institutions were looked upon by Chinese literary and public men as ill-conceived. It is indeed strange and paradoxical that in a country where the isolated individual means so little, where the community is everything, a socialistic experiment should, after all, have been so complete a failure. However, China is strongly a *laissez-faire* country, although it is not the individual, but the family, clan, and township, that are individualistic and resist augmentations of public authority.

A political writer whose views are also entering into

the composition of present Chinese political thought is Wong Li-chow, who wrote at the time of the decline of the Ming Dynasty, about 1625 A.D. His work shows how far Chinese kingship had departed, in the course of centuries, from the earlier ideals, and it is now used by the adherents of reform to point the moral of institutional decay and to argue for a return to the purer and saner practices of earlier ages. According to Wong Li-chow, the earlier kings were men who, at the cost to themselves of great pains and much exertion, undertook the work of advancing public good in the midst of a general selfishness. These heroic leaders toiled immeasurably more than the rest of the community. Accordingly there were many men who refused to take up the burden of kingship, others voluntarily abdicated, while still others performed their duties reluctantly. In later days, however, the idea of kingship has changed. Kings now believe that they have a right to claim for themselves all that is good and to put all burdens upon others. What the king desired in his selfishness, he compelled others to recognize as existing of right. So he finally came to regard the state as his property, descendable to his heirs; while in the earlier days the state was principal and the king subordinate, the latter devoting his whole life to labor for the public good. At present every true principle has been reversed; in fact, kings have gone so far as to use their exalted office merely to provide gratification for their low desires. Thus it has come

about that the people are sacrificed for one man's satisfaction; and they, therefore, hate the king to the last extreme, regarding him as the common enemy. Neo-Confucianism has supported this supreme development of absolute power in maintaining the theory of the king's divine right and denouncing the dethronement of even the worst tyrants. This is certainly a perversion, for why should one man or family be privileged to the detriment of an entire people? Great dangers arise from such ideas and practices, for, if the whole country is regarded as one man's property, others are made covetous to acquire it. Thus many ambitious persons arise who aspire to its possession; one king can never stand against all these, no matter how strong and clever he may be. Sooner or later his descendants must pay for his misdeeds with their very bodies, so it may come about that to be born into the royal family may seem a disaster. The selfishness of kings has unsettled all government. When the duties of a king were defined and well known, the people yielded the kingship to a chosen leader. Now, however, anybody may aspire to be a king.

Wong Li-chow especially bewailed the abolition of the premiership. The Neo-Confucianists, who exaggerated royal power, were opposed to the king's sharing his authority with a responsible prime minister. Formerly the kings were only the first of officers, but in later days they became so vain through flattery that they considered it beneath themselves to be ranked

together with other public servants. So the important position of premier was abolished. Under the old régime there was mutual respect and confidence between king and officers, and the sovereign showed special regard for the ability and importance of the prime minister. Little by little, however, the king came to believe that the officers were created exclusively to serve him, rather than to assist him in serving the state. Thus the original idea of public service was lost, and officialdom as well as royalty suffers in consequence. A very serious result, too, is that in case the heir is a minor there occurs an interregnum in which the Government is rarely in efficient hands. In ancient time the kingship was virtually elective, open only to those who were most notable for character and ability. At a later period the evils of hereditary kingship were still somewhat counterbalanced and a shadow of the ancient principle of an elective royal head was preserved in the premiership. Now even this has been abolished and there is nothing to take its place. The grand councilors are only the private secretaries of the monarch; they entirely follow the wishes of the court, and have not the personal importance and responsibility of a great public official. As a matter of fact, the retainers and attendants of the court, men without public character and responsibility, have under this system come to exercise the ministerial power. The supreme influence in government must rest somewhere, and it is but natural for the court attendants to step

into the place left open through the abolition of the prime-ministership, and to exercise the powers of punishing, pardoning, appointing, and administering public affairs. The grand council is itself dependent upon the good will of these underlings. Thus the corruption of the entire administrative system is due to this change. It is only when the Emperor is surrounded by great and responsible personalities, men of influence and power, that he can be induced to follow the exalted example of the ancient rulers.¹

The writings of Wong Li-chow are read at present with great interest, not only because they set forth the ancient ideals of public life, but because the evils they describe notoriously abound in the circles that are powerful in the Empire. But from the depressing diagnosis of Wong Li-chow and the pessimistic inactivity of later Taoism, the Chinese have turned with joy and hope to the pages of Wang Yang-ming, a great writer who flourished under the Ming Dynasty. He was a philosopher who embodied his theories in his character and tested them by action, when, as a general, he commanded the imperial forces in putting down rebellion, and when, as an administrator, he governed the people. His philosophy is informed by the practical knowledge acquired in a long, active life. This philosopher of action had fallen

¹ The translation of the writings of Wong Li-chow, Wang Yang-ming, and Tan Sze-tong, upon which summaries in this chapter are based, was made for the author by Mr. Tsai Chu-tung.

into relative oblivion in China, when, a century ago, the Japanese rediscovered him and found in his pages the inspiration that carried them far on the way to new national life and strength. His works were at that time, and have been since, read even more intently in Japan than those of Confucius himself, and among his latter-day followers Admiral Togo is cited as a most ardent devotee. His ré-*vival* in China is even more recent, falling within the last decade; but the Chinese found in him what they needed most, inspiration to an active life and to what would be, compared to their former passive attitude, aggressive firmness. His works are no longer studied only by the learned, but they are being multiplied in thousands on thousands of copies and spread broadcast over the land, so that every schoolboy is becoming familiar with the old Ming general and philosopher. A certain insight into his ideas is essential to an understanding of the present temper of the Chinese people. Wang Yang-ming has suddenly become a modern author in China. We shall, therefore, go a little more fully into the theories of this writer than has so far been done in any Western language.

The thought of Wang Yang-ming contains two cardinal principles, — one, the theory that knowledge and practice must not be divorced, the other, that every man with his individual mind should strive to investigate the principles of things in themselves. His practical philosophy is, therefore, a combination of what later became

known in the West as Positivism and Pragmatism. In these practical implications of the philosopher's doctrine lies the secret of his great importance to the present age, when a philosophy of action is called for, and when the Far East is becoming wearied of the crushing weight of authority. Wang Yang-ming stands for individuality in reasoning, for the application of an individual criterion to the phenomena of life. Each mind is to work out its problems on the basis of its own nature; trueness to life and to one's self is what he insists upon. But the knowledge thus acquired must be subjected to the test of action; only thus can it be proven to have more than a subjective validity. The life of contemplation must be supplemented by the life of action. It is this call to action that is so stirring to the contemporary Oriental world.

In considering the philosophical doctrine of Wang Yang-ming in its entirety, we shall, however, be impressed with his moderation. The principle of individualism, which we have seen to be inherent in his practical philosophy, he modifies by insisting upon the need of general human sympathy. In many ways his philosophy is representative rather than original. He is representative of his own times, and was moreover especially influenced by certain philosophers of the Sung Dynasty, such as Chang Ye-chuan and Loo Hsiang-shan, adopting from them the ideas concerning the individuality of every man's own nature and mind. Details in his thought

will recall, not only other Chinese philosophers, but also Western thinkers like Plato, Descartes, and Hegel. Nevertheless Wang Yang-ming's philosophy is of undoubted originality in its point of view and in the specific and harmonious character which the philosopher has given his thought. His treatment is profound and his individual arguments are most effective.

Mind, according to Wang Yang-ming, is the sole universal and rational principle which is actualized in the multiplicity of individual forces and existences in the material world. As the latter is simply an external manifestation or product of reason, so the relation of mind to matter is described by Wang Yang-ming as that of root to efflorescence, of unity to multiplicity, and of reality to phenomenon. In this sense he interprets the ancient saying that "Man is the heart of the universe," a different phase of Descartes's thought, "*Cogito ergo sum.*" But in virtue of the principle of vitality, mind is itself pluralized. In the midst of a plurality of visible existences, our mind may easily lose its former identity and is therefore liable to corruption. The means to avoid this, Wang Yang-ming works out in his practical philosophy. Reason he also calls the absolute principle, and he holds that reason alone exists, anticipating Hegel's similar theory stated in the reverse, that whatever is, is reasonable. Viewed from its actualization, reason is called Nature; from its ever unceasing changes, it is called Fate or Destiny; from its character as design or

order (cosmos), it is called God; from its conscious individuality, it is called Mind. All these are but different denominations for one and the same reality. Mind is thus noble of origin and connected in its most intimate being with the divine, rational, all-seeing, all-knowing. Knowledge is its innate attribute and its very essence, as it involves the grasp within it of all existence. Moreover, all the virtues, such as uprightness, temperance, and justice, are but different phases of the activity of mind in its relation with that of other individuals. Just as the same man may be father in respect to one and son in respect to another person and yet retain his identity, so virtues, with all their varied demands on character, are but the expression of the relation of an unchanging mind to others. Self-centred mind is, therefore, the sole criterion of everything in the universe. As long as mind is in its original uncorrupted state, we can and should reject whatever is not consistent with it, even when it is maintained by Confucius, and accept whatever is consistent with it, although it may come from the lowliest of human creatures. Never before was the independence of individual mind from authority, in all its decisions and judgments, so strongly asserted in Chinese literature.

As mind dwells in a sensuous body, and is, therefore, subject to be influenced by impressions and desires, it is constantly in danger of allowing its identity to be swallowed up. Moreover, the continuous effort to maintain one's individuality in the face of antagonistic and oppos-

ing elements, tends to obscure and destroy the feeling of spiritual unity among different individuals. When this feeling of homogeneity has been weakened, the unity of mind is split up by individual desires and loses its force; therefore, the way to preserve one's mind in its original quality and brightness is to retain the feeling of identity of all mind, by cultivating sympathy and compassion with others. The ideal man in the true sense of the word is he who is conscious of the essential identity of his mind with reason and, therefore, with the external world, including all sentient or insentient beings. Such a man makes no distinction between you and me, between his own body and that of his neighbor, but looks upon them all alike as the expression of the same inherent force and eternal principle. Sympathy is, therefore, innate in mind and is an essential quality of it. If no obstacle is placed in the way of the activity of the mind, sympathy is ever present; but when we forget all others in the pursuance of our own selfish interests, we limit our mind and exclude ourselves from reason by restricting our fellow-feeling. But even in such cases the original mind still remains active, and on some occasions flashes its intelligence upon us, giving us an opportunity to reclaim our true self. It will be seen that Wang Yang-ming's insistence upon the free action of mind in the individual is limited by the conception, common throughout the Orient, that all existence is identical, and that there is, therefore, no real distinction between indiv-

iduals. Their suffering, as their joy, is common, and to cut one's self off from this unity in isolation and in the pursuit of self-seeking aims is to suffer a loss of the true quality of mind or reason. In the Indian epic, the sage persuades the opposing armies to abstain from warfare by proving to them their identity with each other; this same idea inspires the Chinese general and man of action, though he is the greatest Oriental individualist.

The belief in the common bond of humanity moderates also Wang Yang-ming's philosophy of action, which is developed in the following terms: The mind is in direct possession of true knowledge, which cannot be separated from action, but is constantly striving to express itself in deeds. "Knowing is the motive of acting; and action, the realization of knowing. Knowledge is the beginning of action, and acting is the completion of knowing." Though a man may say that he knows the duty to be obedient to his father and faithful to his friend; yet, unless he can translate into action what he thinks and what he knows, he cannot be said truly to possess that knowledge. To say that we know a thing without having tested it by action or being ready to test it in that manner is self-deceit, and such self-deceit is a betrayal of our humanity. It is this part of Wang Yang-ming's philosophy that has sounded a trumpet call to action; its stirring impulse is being felt by all the Far Eastern nations. Quietism, renunciation, and other inert modes of thought and temper are abandoned in

favor of a more active and aggressive conduct of life. It is certainly a remarkable instance of common impulses moving the entire civilized world, when such theories of the actualization of thought are acclaimed in the Orient at the same time when the philosophical and ethical thinkers of the West are being attracted by Pragmatism.

The high favor which Wang Yang-ming's writings are enjoying with the Chinese public at the present time is due in part also to his belief in equality among men. He arrives at this position from the point of view of rationalism. As we have seen, he considers mind as the same in all human beings, obstructed in some by vice and lack of firm endeavor, in others revealing itself in greater purity and strength; but in all equal as to its essential qualities. All differences in human minds are artificial and the result of long-continued diversity of training. It is this belief in the fundamental equality of men that attracts to Wang Yang-ming those who are striving for democracy. The intellectualism of Confucius is very aristocratic in the tendencies it has developed in Chinese life. Like Buddha and like Christ, Wang Yang-ming believes in equality; but his Chinese followers point out that his theory does not rest upon mystic elements, such as the universal fatherhood of God in Christianity, but is a purely rational doctrine derived from the character of the human mind itself.

The tendencies of modern Chinese thought are concretely illustrated in the career of a man, who, called to

high office at a critical time, sealed his beliefs with his own life-blood. Of the six martyrs who laid down their lives on the scaffold after the *coup d'état* in 1908, Tan Sze-tong is the most conspicuous, both in character and in learning. He sprang from an ancient and illustrious clan in Hunan. His father, who had held important positions of honor and trust, including the governorship of Hupeh, was a man of strict integrity, but of conservative views. Tan Sze-tong's early life was far from happy, for his mother died when he was a small boy, and he was left dependent upon a stepmother, who had no love or consideration for him. But the bitterness of these years, which might have made other men spiritless, became a blessing in his case. He emerged from it a hardy, thoughtful, and strong-willed youth. In his later days he told Liang Chi-chao that, had he not been left under the harsh rule of his stepmother, he could never have understood the depth of misery to which humanity is subjected. Tan Sze-tong used his time to such advantage that at the age of twenty he was well versed in ancient philosophy and the classics, and had won distinction in his province as a forceful and deep writer. He was fond of athletic exercise, worshiped chivalry, and was skillful in sword-fight.

Tan Sze-tong prepared himself to understand the world he lived in by making extensive travels throughout China proper, Chinese Turkestan, and Formosa, carefully studying the local conditions in all the places

he visited. At the close of the Chino-Japanese War he had come fully to realize the weakness of his country and the necessity of reform. Entering upon leadership in many directions, he established educational associations in his native province and founded normal schools and a military academy. He inspired the local government with new life, urged the importance of opening mines and building the Canton-Hankow Railway, and established a steamship service on the local rivers. He gave frequent public lectures, and at regular intervals discussed political and economic questions with the scholars of the capital of Hunan. Hearing that Kang Yu-wei had formed a "self-help league" in Peking and Shanghai, he went to the latter town for an interview with the leader. After a long conversation, Tan Sze-tong declared himself to be Kang's disciple and pledged himself to support his master's policy. In 1908, when the Emperor was collecting his reform cabinet, Tan was summoned to Peking; and after a brief audience, he was appointed to the Grand Council, together with Lin Yo, Yang Yu, and Lu Kang-te, the other men who were destined to be martyrs in the *coup d'état*. With his supporters in the Council, Kang Yu-wei hurried to put into execution his long-cherished reform schemes, persuading the Emperor to issue the well-known edicts. But the opposition to these innovations was so strong that the reformers feared the Empress would be carried back to power unless they succeeded in forcing her into absolute

seclusion. They counted on Yuan Shih-kai to assist with his troops, and Tan communicated to him the secret policy they were pursuing. The outcome was disaster to the reformers, as Yuan cast his lot with the partisans of the Empress Dowager.

This fatal reverse was borne by the reformers in a dignified spirit, and Tan Sze-tong exhibited in these dark days the noblest side of his character. During the last critical time, when it was known that the Empress Dowager had reassumed power, some distinguished Japanese scholars advised Tan to escape to Japan with them. To this invitation he replied in the following words: "We need men to perpetuate our policy; we also need men to die for the purpose of showing our appreciation of what the Emperor has done. Liang Chi-chao is now in the Japanese Legation, and will thus be able to preserve our policy, so I shall take upon myself the other duty — that of dying; moreover, martyrdom must always precede revolution. The weakness of China is due to the fact that there have been no martyrs for the cause of freedom and reform. Shall I not be the first martyr?" We here encounter an expression of that deep faith in the value of sacrifice which is so common in contemporary China. Tan waited for his arrest in his room for two days. Both in prison and on the execution ground he maintained his usual calmness and was most cheerful, as if he were going to his reward.

Tan Sze-tong's philosophy is a combination of Con-

fucianism, Christian ideals, and Buddhism, with, however, particular preference for the latter. He wrote quite extensively, but his thought is best expounded in a little volume styled *Benevolence*. He agrees with the three great religions named above in the conception that benevolence, sympathy, and love are the foundation of all virtue in social relations. In its practical application, this benevolence calls for the abolition of all artificial arrangements restricting free intercourse, mutual service, and helpfulness among men.

Our writer first applies these general principles to the field of commerce, and pronounces himself most strongly in favor of free trade among nations. The advantages which commerce gives to the seller and the buyer are equal in quantity and quality, though different in form. Thus, when Western nations ask for world-wide trade, they confer a benefit on all mankind. Their commerce benefits the Chinese as well as themselves; though the balance of trade should be against China, it is still to her advantage to keep up the trade, for in that case the Westerners would supply economic wants which must be satisfied and would receive in return only money, which, by itself, cannot appease hunger nor quench thirst. It may be argued that the purchasing power of a country is destroyed after the exhaustion of its money supply. This theory may be true with regard to countries that have no mines, but it cannot be applied to China whose mineral resources are beyond estimation.

Why should not China let her people open all her mines for the benefit of herself and of the world at large? It is only the foolish and the drones that ascribe the poverty of China to her intercourse with the outer world.

There are two aspects or phases of the policy which should be adopted to regulate the relations of China to foreign countries. The first is to foster industry, to encourage business, to stimulate manufactures, and to open the country to the outer world. Under this policy China shall be able to give something to the rest of mankind in return for what it receives. There will then be an equal distribution of wealth throughout the world and we shall at no time find ourselves in want. The second policy is for the Chinese to concentrate upon uplifting and helping themselves; though it may seem less noble than the first one, this should not be considered as a narrow, selfish course of action, for self-help is only another form of benefiting others. Whoever helps himself, relieves his former benefactors from taking care of him, and thus enables them to direct into new channels the energies hitherto spent to help him. A man lives in the world for others, as well as for himself. Even so, if a nation should daily receive benefit from the outside without thinking of making any return and should remain in a position of idleness and poverty, it is unpardonably guilty of violating a fundamental principle of natural law: namely, the reciprocity of services. In this case the outer world would be justified in extinguish-

ing the existence of such a country. So benevolence means free intercourse between all peoples in all things. China has a duty to mankind which she must perform sooner or later. She must strengthen and reform her organization so as to be able to do her part in the work of the world.

In the second part of *Benevolence*, Tan Sze-tong attacks absolute monarchy most relentlessly, reflecting the social contract theory of Rousseau and the ideas of independent public action developed by Wang Yang-ming and Wang Li-chow. As the form of absolutism which exists in China to-day was established as the result of indifferentism on the part of the people in matters of politics and their generally peaceful and non-assertive nature, he looks for the salvation of China in the revival of the ancient spirit of chivalry. As the love of country increases, the pliant attachment to absolute rule will pass away. He holds the Government responsible for the humiliations and indignities which the outer world has inflicted on China. Then follows a very complex passage in which the author's pride in the great potentialities of his country and his sense of justice and love of freedom form a singular combination. China is weak, indeed, but he feels that it is a good thing for the world that she is weak while still governed under absolutist principles. He says, "It is fortunate for humanity that the Chinese soldiers did not and could not fight. If the Chinese army were as strong as the German, and the

Chinese navy as efficient as the English, woe were to the world! The white race, the black, and the brown must then be doomed. A government which considers it right to oppress its own people could not tolerate any other nations. For this reason it is not too much to say that God has willed that the outer world should slight, harass, and insult us, and overthrow us altogether; nor is it an irony to assert that, in causing us to appear weak and miserable to the world, God is only doing the best He can for our own good; He confers upon us a benefit under the guise of misfortune. Unfortunately for China, as well as for the rest of the world, the Chinese are now crying for vengeance. Such an attitude shows our failure in justly measuring ourselves and can result only in hindrance to our natural growth."

In the remaining pages of this little work, Tan compares the relative merits and the possible effects of the three religions, Christianity, Confucianism, and Buddhism. While recognizing the merit of each and seeing that they all aim at the same object, — namely, universal salvation, — he regards Buddhism as the best in theory and easiest of application. He says that Buddhism not only levels to the ground all forms of casual inequality, but also leaves a man free from the restraint of the artificial conception of Heaven and Hell, which is characteristic of Christianity. The superiority of Buddhism he ascribes to the condition of the time when it originated. The thought of this man, truly Oriental in

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elements and form, nevertheless yields a result which, together with his action during his life and the temper of his martyrdom, gives us an insight into the complexity of the present Chinese intellectual temper, and indicates the many points which, with all differences, it has in common with our own ideas. Tan Sze-tong is an energist like Wang Yang-ming, but his desire for strength and efficiency is moderated by a deep sense of justice and the belief in sympathy and benevolence. These men, who are trying to build up and rejuvenate the forces of the most ancient empire, are not animated by the unbridled ambition of a Napoleon; they would not follow Nietzsche in his extreme views; but their thought, with all its longing for energy and strength, carries in it the feeling of a deep human sympathy.

Another writer whose ideas are important in the composition of contemporary intellectual life in China is Chang Pin-lin, who is reputed the leader of Chinese philosophical revolutionists. He is editor of *The People*, the principal organ of the revolutionary party, and has written extensively both in the form of editorials and books. The complete system of philosophy is set forth in a book called *Chin* (reconstruction). It is interesting to note the attitude of this thinker towards Confucius. While he gives Confucianism credit for its undoubted merits, he asserts that this system is not in itself a sufficient safeguard against political corruption and moral perversion. Indeed, Confucius set himself against the

manner in which the aristocrats of his time monopolized the whole power of government and attempted to train his disciples in political action. He even succeeded in reducing the power of the privileged class and in securing some political rights to the common people, but he was too peaceful and timid a man to enter upon a movement for the entire overthrow of oligarchic power. So he turned out advisers, but not masters; he manufactured servants, but not men. The result of his teaching in China has been to spread the belief that a man's ability to render service to mankind is completely dependent upon his success in securing a position under a prince. "Office fever" and "money disease" are the fatal evils with which the Chinese body-politic has long been infested; and they are not discouraged by Confucianism.

Chang Pin-lin is convinced that the chief need of China in the present crisis is strong religious feeling; and it is in Buddhism that he sees those elements which are most in harmony with the aspirations of an Oriental democracy. He admires especially the social ideals of Buddhism, its belief in absolute equality among men based upon the essential being of human nature, the exalted spirit of independence which it imparts, as well as its teachings on service and sacrifice. The identification of mind with Buddha he considers of especial value, because it exalts and dignifies each individual as having within himself the highest principle of thought and life. This view recalls the ideas of Wang-Yang ming, and it

is, of course, also related to Stoic thought and to modern rationalism. It is interesting to see how Chang reconciles the spirit of nationalism with the universal love and brotherhood of the Buddhist ideal. He interprets nationalism as a desire of the people to free themselves from all oppression that violates human nature, retards progress, and creates artificial inequalities. In his view, nationalism must pursue universal moral aims in order to justify itself. This shows that Chang Pin-lin is essentially a humanitarian who looks upon national organization as only a means toward a higher and more comprehensive purpose.

In looking back over the elements which Chinese literature and traditions supply in the present critical times, we see in them a wealth of materials from which many tendencies of thought and action might draw inspiration. Yet the temper of China at present is such that all these older traditions and philosophies will be read from the point of view of extensive popular rights in the government of the Empire. As Neo-Confucianism interpreted the classics so as to favor the growth of absolute power, this new revival of Chinese nationalism will seek in them strong and decided support for popular rights. The idea of a kingship of limited authority, based upon public service and surrounded by responsible and capable ministers, is in accord with modern demands. The Emperor is still the Son of Heaven, but that title indicates high duties, rather than exclusive

and invidious privileges. The Government must exert its powers, not for the gathering of means for the satisfaction of the selfish desires of officials and rulers, but for the development of the country and the welfare of the people at large. Before arriving at important decisions, it will allow itself to be guided by public opinion expressed now more perfectly in institutions of a parliamentary character. Such, in outline, are the political ideals of the present which seek and find support in the older traditions of the Chinese Empire. But they also rest upon a continued popular practice, as will be brought out in the chapter on the constitutional movement. Revolution in China has always been looked upon as an entirely legal procedure; in almost the same way as it was viewed by Locke, who saw in it the enforcement of a higher law through joint action and common consent.

Adherence to the ancient ideals of Chinese polity is interpreted in many different ways by the various groups into which Chinese men of thought and action are divided. All but the crassest reactionaries are ready to reject the narrow formulæ of Neo-Confucianism and go back to the original fountain-head in the writings of the sage. The hard crust of artificial interpretation is thus broken, and thought is brought into more direct relation to the needs of life, viewed from many different angles. The Constitutional Reform Party values the teachings of Confucius for the moral ideals they contain, rather than for the specific forms of government therein de-

scribed. While human nature is ever the same, subject to the same moral duties and practical requirements, the conditions of life are always changing and to them the forms and practices of government have to be adjusted. Thus, while the men who hold this opinion retain the monarchical principle so strongly established in Confucianism, they insist upon the creation of a real parliament with more than advisory powers, which would reconcile the existence of imperial office with popular rights. Confucian standards are thus not slavishly followed, but applied with a great sense of freedom to the present conditions of Chinese public life. It is but natural that the interpretation given to the ideas of the sage, as well as the apportionment of emphasis, should be governed by the dominating desire for effective popular institutions. While adhering to Chinese traditions and desiring their permanence, the moderate reform party is, therefore, open to be influenced by Western ideas and is ready to accept from the West such methods as will be helpful in Chinese development. Incidentally the classic movement of to-day stands for a much broader interpretation of the inherited teachings. The Confucian revival is accompanied by an inquiring disposition, by a search for truth, and is far from accepting uncritically the orthodox interpretations and commentaries of the past. The leaders of the movement seek to apply Confucian thought in the light of their own experience and with reference to the present needs of China.

There is another movement which is far more conservative without therefore being unintelligent. Ku Hung-ming, in a brilliant book just published, calls this tendency the "Chinese Oxford Movement," in analogy to the opposition which Newman led against the new theology. Chang Chih-tung was the man who most prominently represented this tendency in public life. Himself one of the select experts in the Chinese classics, he was, indeed, willing to accept Western industrial processes, but stood for the maintenance of Confucian ethical and political ideals. Ku Hung-ming, who sings his praises, nevertheless brings out the fact that the great viceroy really favored a double morality, that of Confucianism for the Chinese as individuals, but for the nation, the adoption of the new learning and methods of modern Europe with their intensely competitive temper. The movement here described has its stronghold among the Hanlin scholars, who, as an imperial academy, exercise the conscious guardianship of Chinese culture. Their feelings against Western civilization are quite intense. They abhor its materialistic tendencies, the vulgarizing and cheapening effects of some of its methods. According to Ku Hung-ming, the moral basis for the anti-foreign spirit of the true Chinese *literati* is that they view foreign civilization as hideous, vulgar, and demoralizing. Their interpretation of Confucianism is, therefore, not such as to encourage the wholesale adoption of institutions modeled upon Western experience. They

admit that China is in need of a movement to restore the purity of her moral constitution, but they are not so favorable to extending the idea of popular consent so as to shift the centre of governmental authority from the imperial administration to an elective parliament. They might accept many of the things proposed by the Constitutional Reform Party, but their whole point of view is different and their aims are focused upon the maintenance of Confucian civilization in its purity, of whose dynamic possibilities they have a high conception, as witness the words of Ku Hung-ming: "Confucianism, with its way of the superior man, little as the Englishman suspects, will one day change the social order and break up the civilization of Europe."

The political and social movements of modern China are not accompanied by any parallel developments in religious feeling. The official world sees in Confucianism a sufficient moral and religious code for the education of Chinese youth and does not show any special interest in any other forms of belief. But the injunctions of Confucius constitute, after all, to follow Ku Hung-ming, "the way of the superior man," a kind of Stoic's faith, although they have also influenced the masses of the population. The latter, however, find less sober and sapient beliefs attractive, and have turned to Buddhism, Taoism, and Mohammedanism. The restriction of the authority of the Dalai Lama of Thibet — which meant the downfall of the independent political power of

Buddhism—led to a certain weakening of its influence among the higher classes in China, with whom, indeed, it had never been very strong. But, on the other hand, the decline of the superstitious hierarchy of Thibet is looked upon by many as a blessing, as it allows the purer forms of that faith to assert themselves and to develop in China. That a new era has begun for Buddhism, not only in southern Asia, but also in China and Japan, is apparent. The higher elements of Buddhist philosophy are so fully in accord with the demands of Western science, while yet so completely expressive of Oriental ideals and modes of thought, that throughout the East men feel a pride in calling their own a system so notable. The Buddhist revival is now only in its first stages, and it is too early for us to be able to form a conception as to its ultimate bearing. It is, however, significant that among the most prominent apostles of the nationalistic movement in China, there are a number who accept Buddhism and express great confidence in its future. Such are, for instance, Chang Pin-lin, Liang Chi-chao, and Wong Chi, as well as Tan Sze-tong, among the martyrs of 1898. These men and their associates have attempted to bring Chinese Buddhism back to the older, purer form of worship and thought. Just as Confucianism is to be purified of unnecessary and extraneous elements imposed upon it through the interpretation of centuries, so Buddhism is to be freed from superstitious and unscientific accessories.

Of all Chinese religions, Taoism has fewest friends among the progressives. This system of beliefs and practices has departed so far from the rational standards of its founder that it is utterly incompatible with scientific knowledge, unless indeed it might be able to undergo a marvelous regeneration. The growing nationalism of China demands that Taoism should render itself more pure and efficient, and turn its back upon those practices which are irrational and superstitious. It has been said that in China, Buddhism has taken from Taoism whatever was good originally in that faith and has given it in return its own evils and weaknesses, together with its monastic organization. Between popular practice in Buddhism and Taoism there is indeed little to choose; but it is in the return to the great traditions and pure sources of the South-Asiatic faith that the nationalists see hope and helpfulness.

The Chinese, and more general Asiatic, elements which we have here reviewed are now confronted by Western civilization. Thus we are led to inquire in what manner and to what extent the influence of the West has become active in China. In general it is undoubtedly true that the Chinese intellectuals maintain a similar position toward Western thought to that held by the Hindus. Looking upon their own philosophy as all-sufficient for high cultural purposes, they are yet willing to acknowledge that for practical ends, and especially for the needs of national defense, Western science may

furnish much of value. It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish between the West as consisting of complex institutions, methods, and processes, dominated by the principles of exact science, and the West as a system of beliefs, conceived as an attitude of mind. The former is quite generally accepted; the latter rejected. The immense technical mastery of the West is admitted. Its moral grandeur, the sincerity of its rules of conduct, the validity of its philosophical ideals, are doubted. There is in all Oriental countries an advance guard of thinkers and investigators who are intimately familiar with Western philosophy, but even among these the majority acknowledge its value only as a variant expression of the concepts and ideals contained in Oriental thought. On the other hand, there are also those who draw from this concord the conclusion that the concepts and beliefs of all humanity are fundamentally harmonious, that races differ only in details of custom and method.

At first sight it would certainly seem that of all Asiatics the Chinese are, through their traditions and training, best prepared to enter into the scientific positivism which is now dominant in the West. They certainly have been trained to take rational views of conduct and of human relations; and while natural science had not been developed under the old régime, human activities had been subjected to study and analysis. The Chinese mind was trained in the rigorous school of classicism. Although there was a vast amount of work for the mem-

ory to do in the learning of commentaries on the classics, we must not forget the refinement of mental processes and powers implied in the critical study of literary masterpieces and in literary construction. With minds thus prepared, the Chinese enter upon the study of Western science fitted with many intellectual qualities that favor rapid progress. The fields of thought and action in which the defects of the old training are perhaps most evident are those which relate to economic and social affairs. In these it is more difficult to banish the old superficial, unscientific methods of reasoning than it would be in engineering or physics. Consequently we note that even the more capable public men in China often lack a grasp of economic and financial principles, and are at times satisfied with the most puerile notions of economic organization. This defect has stood in the way of a readier solution of such pressing problems as those regarding the currency and taxation.

In rendering Western works accessible, writers like Yen Fu, — the translator of Huxley, Spencer, Adam Smith, and Montesquieu, — Liang Chi-chao, Wong-Chi, and Wu Kuang-hien have done a great service. These men were confronted by enormous difficulties because it was necessary for them to create a new scientific vocabulary in the Chinese language, but they and their assistants have succeeded within the last decade in supplying China with a good, workable library that affords a key to the scientific achievements of the West.

Credit is also due Sin Chin-nan, a fellow provincial of Yen Fu, for his admirable rendering into Chinese of the novels of Scott, Dickens, Dumas, Hugo, and other Western writers.

As strong nationalism is always associated with the historical way of seeing things, whether it be in Greece or in Britain, in Chile or Japan, conversely, a non-national civilization is always unhistoric. This was eminently true of China; though she had annals in plenty, they were dry and unprofitable catalogues of deeds and happenings, unilluminated by any sense of national development. But with the dawn of a new era, writers began to view history as a necessary element in national self-consciousness. Liang Chi-chao, the most important literary exponent of nationalism, has directed his attention to historical work; and Chinese history is now beginning to be studied by others in a critical and scientific manner. Moreover, national history has become one of the principal subjects of instruction in the schools.

In order to get a bird's-eye view of the intellectual activities of the present, it may be well to glance at the different intellectual interests, even those not so directly connected with political reform. The principal centres of literary life lie in the middle and southern parts of China, in cities like Canton, Shanghai, Kwangchow, Wuchang, and Changsha. The Japanese Yokohama has also been a centre of literary influence, being the residence of leaders in opinion, who, temporarily exiled by

their own or governmental action, continued to influence their country from a distance; this city has, therefore, been called the Geneva of contemporary Chinese literature.

Among the political writers of the nationalistic movement, Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chao undoubtedly hold the primacy. Kang Yu-wei, the leader of the extreme party of reform, published political memorials and manuals, as well as an account of his travels. Liang Chi-chao is the most voluminous writer of the group. He is a journalist, a historian, a delineator of character, and a critic of political action. In a sense he may be called the Fukuzawa of China, seeking as an effective teacher to introduce the public mind to the thought of the great world. A follower of Kang Yu-wei, he has gradually outgrown his master's programme, though denounced by the radicals as being too moderate in his political demands. At first he was quite antidynastic, and had to live for a while, an exile, in Japan. More recently he has confined his efforts to preaching the doctrines of constitutional government and representative institutions. The editor of the *National Civilization Magazine*, Wong-Chi, also deserves a prominent place among those who are endeavoring to teach the Chinese people. He has given special attention to history and biography and attempts in this way to awaken a more positive national self-consciousness.

The growth of journalism in China has been one of the

chief agencies of political agitation and reform. The more radical journals naturally sought the protection of the treaty ports and of the foreign mail systems. But in most parts of China, daily and weekly journals, as well as monthly reviews, have suddenly become an almost indispensable means of information and of moulding public opinion. Hence the tone of the contemporary Chinese press is exceedingly serious. Questions of political and cultural life are discussed with intensity of feeling and a desire to get at the truth. The nationalistic movement has used the press as the strongest instrument of its propaganda; political views were developed in the editorial columns, official action reported and criticized in the accounts of current news; a strong effort was made to inspire the public with a more intense interest in national regeneration by going into foreign affairs and reporting events, public action, and progress in other countries. The cartoon also came into use, and everything connected with the Government was graphically pictured, very often with merciless satire. These pictures exercised a great influence in arousing public opinion by spreading progressive ideas in such a manner that they could be understood even by those who could not easily read a political discussion. Shanghai became the chief seat of newspaper enterprise, both on account of its central position, as also of the fact that editors there enjoy the sanctuary of the foreign settlement, and thus feel free more candidly to express their ideas on

official malpractices or needed reforms. Thence the papers found their way to the interior, where they were studied in shops and yamens, even within the walls of the forbidden cities themselves.

Innumerable periodical publications sprang up, and it would be impossible to give a complete account of these enterprises here. Among those which have achieved most prominence are the *Western Times (Shi-pao)*, published under Japanese protection and representing the views of Liang Chi-chao and Kang Yu-wei. It was for a time the very gospel of the progressive movement in China. The opinions of the literary class may be found in the *Shanghai Journal (Shang Pao)*. Originally conservative, this paper has modified its tone as the *literati* have gradually become more favorable to reform. It gives special attention to educational affairs and is strongly nationalistic in tone, at times even anti-dynastic, and openly hostile to all extension of foreign influence. The party of progressive reform students used the *Universal Gazette (Shung-yai-jih-pao)* as its organ of expression, until it was bought over by the Shanghai taotai. Among other journals recently organized we may mention the *South China Journal*, the *National Herald*, the *Sin Wan Pao*, *The People*, and *Heavenly Warning*. Second in importance as a newspaper centre is the city of Canton. Its journals, conforming to the general temper of the southern province, are almost all liberal and progressive in their policy. A very strong

influence is exercised also by the fortnightly and monthly magazines, such as the *National Civilization Magazine*, of which Wong Chih is the editor, and which aims to develop national sentiment by arousing an intelligent interest in Chinese history and biography, in addition to contemporary affairs. Others are the *National Spirit Magazine*, the *New Citizen's Magazine*, the *Foreign Review*, and the *People's Organ*, the latter controlled by radical revolutionary tendencies.

Educational and other associations, such as the Society for the Preparation of Citizenship, have also done important work in rendering accessible to wider circles the information necessary for active and efficient participation in public affairs. This association was founded by Chang Su-oom, a wealthy resident of Shanghai, immediately after the Throne had promised the grant of constitutional government. Though its membership is professedly open to all, its active members come mostly from the ranks of rich merchants and of literary men. It has received official patronage and financial support, which, together with the contributions of the members, enable it to distribute many treatises on constitutional government and local administration. Having secured the coöperation of the Chinese chambers of commerce at home and abroad, the association undertook the task of preparing a code of Chinese commercial law. It has also taken an active part in the propaganda for parliamentary institutions.

While reviewing agencies for the diffusion of learning and information, mention should be made of the publishing houses which now flourish in China. Most prominent among them is the Commercial Press of Shanghai, which has published a large number of foreign and Chinese treatises; its output of schoolbooks is specially notable. Several important geographical and biographical writers are connected with this house, and a staff of translators is kept busy providing materials from foreign languages. The era of public libraries has not yet commenced in China. The library of the great Hanlin Academy at Peking is open only to officers and high *literati*. A few of the political and cultural associations have, however, established libraries, some of which are open to the public.

Interest in literary work for its own sake has very much declined in China at the present day. It is difficult to find a man of letters writing for purely literary purposes. With the coming of the new learning, there has been a marked decline in the traditional spirit of literary culture, and very few men at present follow learning for its own sake. Men of literary talent are, indeed, to be found in official life, in educational work, and the public enterprises of the gentry; but even in these activities the proportion of scholars is lower than under the old régime. The present age in China is becoming too journalistic. There has been a strong reaction from the earlier over-emphasis on form or style,

and much of the present output of printed matter is written in a way which older men think worthy of contempt. Elegance of style is abandoned in the cultivation of other qualities, substantial or superficial, which are demanded by writing articles on modern affairs. Some encouragement in the way of maintaining higher literary standards has, however, come through the issuing of popular reprints of many classics which were hitherto not easily accessible.

The definitive effect of the new movement on literary standards and production has therefore not yet declared itself. There has, however, been a great deal of indiscriminate borrowing from all kinds of sources. The fondness for literature inspired by the old traditions of China has not abated, but it cannot be said that any distinct tendencies of modern literature have emerged. European letters have thus far had but a superficial influence in China. It is always interesting to note what books will be first translated. Chinese editors and translators have judged that the following would best respond to the curiosity and intellectual wants of their public: Harriet Beecher Stowe, Rider Haggard, Dumas, Hugo, Scott, Bulwer-Lytton, Conan Doyle, Jules Verne, Gaboriau, and Zola. That being so, we must needs submit to having our literary tastes and standards judged for a while according to the impression made by these writers. It seems to be quite generally true that the books first translated are tales of adventure or the artificial

products of romanticism. It is only slowly that Oriental readers learn to care for or come to understand a Thackeray or an Anatole France.

The contemporary drama of China is not without interest. Departing for some length from the traditional classic standards, although retaining the methods of the Chinese stage, dramatic authors and actors of the present try to influence thought by portraying scenes that have a distinct political or social significance, teaching by example and holding up the mirror to the life of the present. Liang Chi-chao attempted to familiarize the popular mind with ideas of political change by dramatizing the reconstruction of Italy, bringing forward Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Cavour as characters on the stage. Many contemporary plays are founded on actual occurrences, which are dramatized immediately after the event. The Chinese theatre evidently feels a call to interpret actualities and to give expression to public opinion. Though the plays deal with contemporary events, they retain the traditional forms of the Chinese stage, with no cutting in length, so that usually several evenings are taken up with the performance of a single drama. The plays are full of action, but are generally quite devoid of plot; interesting current events are picked up and dramatized with readiness and skill. As these plays are important documents for the understanding of the present momentous period in Chinese history, when the popular intelligence is arousing itself

to far-reaching action, it may be appropriate to glance for a moment at one of these performances.

Nearly everything with which the Chinese mind is at present busy is touched upon in the action of one evening; the drilling of troops and the exhibition of their discipline, the feeling against the use of opium, the movement for the abolition of footbinding among women, all come in for treatment. Educational reform is dealt with directly or referred to incidentally in connection with the irrational worship of josses and unnecessary offerings to idols; the implication being that the money thus spent should be invested rather in educational institutions. But it is the political situation of China which is given most attention. The abuses current in Chinese administration are satirized without mercy; official incapacity and corruption are exposed. The privileges of the foreign residents in the extra-territorial concessions of the treaty ports, which are most distasteful to patriotic Chinamen, also come in for condemnation. Opportunity for enthusiasm is given by frequent allusions to reform and especially to the creation of a national parliament. The audience enters fully into the spirit of the play and expresses its concurrent sentiments through frequent and loud applause. Thus it will voice its approval when a thief is sentenced to receive only fifty blows, while a seller of opium is given double that penalty, or when representatives of the Chinese Government refuse to be held responsible for damages caused by disorder within

the foreign concession limits. The strange mixture of ancient and modern elements, of political discussion and commonplace occurrences, will be illustrated by the following brief outline of an ordinary play recently performed.¹

The play opens in Canton with Wong, the hero, bidding farewell to his guardian grandmother at the time of his departure for Shanghai to seek his fortune in commerce. Great filial piety is expressed in the respectful obeisance to the spirits of the ancestors and to their living representative. The grandmother's careful advice and sorrowful leave-taking are interrupted by the steamer's whistle, which calls for the hurried departure of Wong. In the next scene appears Ye, a compradore of the Netherlands Bank, who is reflecting in soliloquy upon the sad condition of China, nationally and locally. Conceiving himself powerless to remedy national affairs, he resolves at least to better the local situation by founding a Chinese volunteer company, an idea which is heartily seconded by his fellow merchants. The scene changes to a grocery in Shanghai. A family argument is in progress. The proprietor is remonstrating with his wife regarding her large and profitless expenditure for idol worship. He receives much applause from the audience for his arguments against idolatry and small feet, but his wife, conservative as her sex in general, is

¹ A report of this play was communicated to the author by Mr. Horatio B. Hawkins, of Soochow.

less affected thereby. Wong has meanwhile obtained a clerkship in a large export firm and has become prominent as corporal in the volunteer company. While on the way to drill he meets the grocer's wife and her servant; they are being menaced by some ruffians who had mocked their ceremonies and attempted to steal their religious offerings. The rascals are put to flight by the heroic Wong, who, after the departure of the women, puts his squad through a number of drill manoeuvres. The grocer's wife, having returned home, relates her misadventures to her husband, who now takes an even more decided attitude of skepticism. This is followed by a night scene in the same house, where the men of evil, who had discovered the abode of the woman, attempt to scale the wall in order to loot the premises. The women awaken and call their lord and master, who, when he sees the danger, cries loudly for assistance from the very gods whom he had scoffed. He disappears under the furniture and directs the maid to look for help. At this critical moment Wong appears on the scene and begins to knock down the burglars one by one; he, however, gets into a terrible struggle with the head ruffian, who draws his knife and inflicts many wounds, from which the hero expires. Then follows a court scene, preceded by a soliloquy of the magistrate, who moralizes upon the political situation in China and bewails the general corruption and inefficiency. The murderer is thereupon brought to trial and punished. The play,

extremely naïve in its story and incidents, was, nevertheless, in detail true to life and in every way realistic. It dealt with actual personages, some of them in the audience, and with living facts; actors who had assisted in the work of authorship took part in the presentation.

As this account of an evening's entertainment incidentally shows, the public conscience of China has of late become distinctly political, and national thought expresses itself chiefly in the form of political reasoning. Literary criticism and construction, philosophical writing, and even to some extent the consideration of social problems and institutions, are rather in the background when compared with political thought. The nation is intensely conscious of the need of giving political form to its institutions and ideas, to the end that the Chinese people may stand forth as one of the great personalities in the world to whom the future belongs.

It is natural under such circumstances that the most radical views should attract attention out of proportion to their real intrinsic value. Though they may not be followed by great numbers, they are talked about most. In studying the contemporary revolutionary literature of such countries as Russia, Persia, and China, it is interesting to see how books, which with us had done their work a hundred years ago, and which are now resting as pensioned veterans on our library shelves, assume again in these distant regions the character of potent revolutionary forces. Their thoughts, which we coolly

study and analyze as historical data, inflame the youth of China to heroic sacrifice and rash action in behalf of ideals which to them are blushing with the glory of the morning. So our now rather sedate friends, Rousseau and Tom Paine, experience a new birth and enter again upon a state of militancy. In all such great movements there is a time when Rousseau is taken as the source of inspiration and guidance; by his side, however, Napoleon also is often worshiped, as the embodiment of national force. The portraits and busts of these two men are common in the Orient, and Rousseau's ideals are much valued. The form which is assumed by the political tendency that disengages itself from these enthusiasms is one of thoroughgoing resistance to all established authority. There must be a clean sweep before institutions and actions can be established upon a proper basis, — that is the belief of the revolutionaries; and when the new government is to be constructed, it must rest upon universal suffrage and be republican in form. The chief agitator in this revolutionary propaganda is Doctor Sun Yat-sen, who has organized a secret society, *Ka Ming-tang*. The protagonists manipulate the movement from Japan and other neutral neighboring countries. As the society is secret in its organization and work, it is, of course, impossible to get accurate data about its strength. The claims which it puts forward as to the number of its followers are, however, generally regarded as exaggerated, and it is also felt that the

organization, should a critical struggle come, could not hold together its many divergent branches.

A number of local outbreaks have been organized in recent years to further revolutionary principles. Such uprisings attract the lawless elements, just as the early Taiping movement did. When a local revolt of this kind is started, there is considerable disorder, some fighting and assassination; but the chief sufferers are the common people of the affected district, who are treated with little regard by either side. After a certain amount of panic, the officials conquer and some executions take place. Meanwhile the instigators of the uprisings, at a safe distance, intrigue and manipulate in order to start similar trouble in some other quarter of the Empire. The natural consequence of such outbreaks is to strengthen the reaction and to bring about for a time rule by fire and sword. Revolutionary writings, full of immature theories and perverted statements, circulate widely among the student class. They have a great influence upon the young and inexperienced, and often alienate from the true interests of the country energies needed for carrying on its work and assuring its salvation.

While dwelling on the evils of revolutionist propaganda in China, we ought, however, not to overlook the fact that the revolutionary leaders are apparently gaining wisdom with experience. Their propaganda assumes gradually a more constructive, republican character; and their opposition is now directed chiefly against the

permanence of the Manchu Dynasty. Leaders of the movement have recently been in the United States, there gathering funds among Chinese residents. They are attempting an organization which will include many men in higher walks of life; young sympathizers are to be assisted to gain official position, so as to be able to dispose of influences favorable to the movement. This would indicate that the leaders aim at bringing about the changes they desire by more pacific means.

Among the students who have gone to Japan, there have been many who have used the knowledge acquired there in an attempt to assist in the upbuilding of education and industry at home; but there are others who have fallen under the influence of radical theories. Spending little time in serious study and being satisfied with a mere smattering of facts, many of these youths readily fall victims to agitators, who promise them abundant scope for action, resulting in glory to themselves, in excitement, and in great political upheavals. The temper of these young men is well illustrated by a recent conversation with a returned student, who spoke about Chinese history and compared it with that of Europe. He pointed out that Europe had been awakened to her present strength and efficiency through the French Revolution and many years of bloody struggles. Since then her progress in civilization has been very rapid. China, on the contrary, cultivated peace, and for ages has been stagnant and unprogressive. The Europeans

fought for their rights and founded the constitution of their country with their blood. The first remedy prescribed for China, therefore, is to rise in revolt against the present government; only by such means can true liberty be obtained.

¶ This view of the French Revolution and of revolutionary movements in general has gained a remarkable hold on the minds of the young and energetic, not only in China, but also in other countries, which are in a state of transition, like Persia, Turkey, and Russia. National advance is interpreted as the direct result of forcible action and bloodshed, and it is entirely overlooked that the modern progress of Europe rests upon the peaceful development and quiet labor of centuries; that it is the result of that combination of tendencies and structural factors which we call "Western civilization"; and that the bloody movements, while indeed outbursts of great energy, were useful only in that they removed obstacles, but were not in themselves the source of sustained strength and progress. This theory of the beneficence of revolutions, originating from a superficial reading of history, has, nevertheless, taken a deep hold in China, not only among students but among other classes. It has been condensed into a proverb, "Blood must flow before any improvement can come." This notion has already been, in individual cases, the cause of heroic though needless sacrifice; the end of its influence is not yet seen, and should affairs become more critical,

it may move large masses to rash action. A comical and almost pathetic incidental effect has been witnessed in cases where individuals, feeling the injustice of things, have petitioned for redress or improvement and, though stopping short of the Japanese *hara-kiri*, have chopped off one of their limbs, or at least a finger or a toe, in order that such bloodshed might help to effect their purpose. It is notable that such immolation always makes a strong impression, not only upon the populace but even upon officials, who feel that there is a determined energy back of it. So the sentiment that "blood must flow before things can be better" has become a very active and widespread superstition.

That the young men who are actuated and influenced by these views of revolution are often inspired with truly noble ideals and have a certain amount of wisdom, was exemplified by the advice given by a young noble to Viceroy Tuan Fang. This student, educated in Japan, himself the son of a high official, had been imprisoned on account of implication in the revolutionary movement in the province of Anhui. He wrote a letter to the Viceroy, in which occurs the following passage: "In our radical movement we simply do our duty, in urging the Government to decree a constitution for the welfare of the people. Our country would then not meet with the fate of India or Korea. If this great object can be obtained, we shall be happy even though our bodies be torn to pieces. The purpose of my action here has now

been totally destroyed, and I am willing to be punished according to the law of the country; but before my death, permit me to say a few words of advice to His Excellency Tuan. Our campaigns have already spread to every part of the Empire and our followers number thousands. These people have no fear of death; should one be executed to-day, ten would rise to-morrow. I hope His Excellency will show more mercy to the followers after punishing one or two of our leaders; otherwise, the tide of revolution will rise so high as to sweep everything before it. Our country is now in a very dangerous situation, the Powers are watching her as their prey. Thus while the brothers of the family are fighting against each other, burglars break into the house and take away their property." This youth, willing to struggle and to suffer, was, after all, only fighting against intolerable evils and was not aiming merely to overthrow and destroy. The presence of this constructive insight will save many of the younger men from interpreting revolutionary ideas in a purely negative and oppositional sense.

Before 1906, every reformer was *prima facie* a revolutionary, although there were many who in fact simply believed in moderate reform. The Government up to that time frowned upon any views that would indicate a desire for modifying things, but since then a great change has come about. In the edicts of 1906 and 1907, the Government gave way to what had finally impressed

it as a fundamental popular demand, and decreed the gradual establishment of administrative reforms and representative institutions. The controlling classes of Chinese non-official society had also come to a clear intelligence that the nation needed a more efficient political organization. The reform movement was, therefore, taken up by the *literati* and the gentry in general, who now began to form an actively progressive element in the Chinese Empire. This development put the avowed revolutionists outside the pale; they were deprived of the monopoly of progressive ideas and charged with the odium of counseling irregular and dangerous methods. The opinion of the progressive Chinese was influenced less by Rousseau's theorism than by the knowledge of the actual needs of China gained through experience in affairs, and by a desire to utilize foreign models in accordance with the well-ascertained demands of the situation. The gentry and the possessing classes quite universally adopted these views, and began to urge upon the Government a more positive policy than the officials had thus far been ready to adopt. So the moderate progressive party continued, in a modified and somewhat less rancorous form, the attacks upon official incompetence, which had been begun by the radicals. But while the beginnings of parliamentary institutions have been founded and the first meetings of deliberative bodies have been held, the progressive elements have thus far neither evolved a perfected party

organization nor has definite leadership developed. The first session of the National Assembly, indeed, gave opportunity for the display of oratorical talent, but so far no men have emerged as acknowledged leaders of the progressive movement. In all parts of Chinese affairs, governmental as well as popular at the present time, there is a lack of men whose personality and power command that absolute respect and exercise that moral authority which ought to be associated with political leadership.

Through the development of a moderate progressive tendency, the revolutionary and radical movements have been driven underground even more than before. They now operate almost entirely with those subterranean and circuitous methods to which the Chinese have long been familiar in various branches of social life. No one who knows the situation in China will flatter himself that the danger of fundamental upheavals is entirely past. The Government lives under the odium of defeat and insuccess. Every measure taken against popular movements, no matter how necessary it may be in fact, adds to the bitterness and to the estrangement between dynasty and people. The Government's adoption of progressive ideas was undoubtedly opportunist, and the progressive party in China believes that the effective establishment of the various reforms that are planned can be brought about only by means of the action of representative institutions; so there is constant

friction, even between the Government and those classes which are most disposed to uphold law and order. The appeal to the classics, which is so universal at the present time, is, as we have seen, favorable to the ideals of government by moral agencies and with the enlistment of the services of the wisest and ablest men of the nation, rather than to a further emphasizing of loyalty toward the sovereign. Nor can the Manchu Dynasty, being foreign, ever count on that long inherited and instinctive loyalty which the Japanese feel toward the house that has headed the nation ever since the dawn of history. The absence of a national dynasty in China is the most important individual factor in the present political situation. To make up for this weakness, the Government, in supporting the dynasty, must seek to give full effect to the demands formulated by the select representatives of the entire Chinese people. For this reason it is confidently expected by the Chinese progressives that the powers of the new parliament will be more substantial than those of the Japanese Diet.

China is experiencing at the present time a great movement of thought and spiritual energy, complex in its ramifications and including a great diversity of psychological elements. The overpowering tradition of the past takes on a new form and meaning when brought into contact with the needs of the living present. The diverse tendencies of the re-adaptation of these Oriental ideals to new forces, the substitution and application

of European experience, and the influence of European social and political ideals; — upon all these matters the Chinese mind is working, utilizing the classic training of the past in the attempt to bring harmony into so many conflicting elements of thought and action. Occasionally also original ideas arise out of this tumult of intellectual forces. Yet beneath it all there lie as a dark mass the instincts and customs of the millions of Chinese people, who think and reason little, but whose impulses must be counted on as ultimately decisive in a great crisis. The polished rationalism of the Confucian scholars, the ardent debates about the old and new, the influence of European thought and example, are all but on the surface of the vast deep. This sea of humanity is still moved by other forces; how the people will act as the crisis develops the Chinese leaders themselves are not able to forecast. The Chinese people are extraordinarily industrious, frugal, and patient; they have only little breadth of horizon, and cling most tenaciously to the customs of their little sphere; but when at times their long-suffering comes to an end, they are moved by tempestuous furies that defy all rational control. They stop short of nothing until, in their rage and defiance, they hurl themselves against a wall of rock. It is such elemental outbursts that the leaders and friends of China fear most, during these years of national preparation when irretrievable injury might be done. To comprehend the psychic situation created in China by the

momentous changes of the present is impossible. All we can hope to do is to see manifestations here and there which may give us an inkling as to the tendency of evolution and then to watch the gradual or perhaps rapid unfolding of new national forces.

The proximate cause of the restlessness of this vast society and of the desire of its thinking classes to carry out radical changes lies in the repeated shocks received by China from the impact of foreign nations culminating in the humiliation following the Boxer outbreak and in the occupation of Manchuria. The success of Japan had a profound influence. By comparison it made China conscious of her own weakness, and it caused her thinking people to look upon the methods adopted by Japan as necessary also to Chinese regeneration. Together with this, there has come the sudden transformation of Chinese life by the introduction on a vast scale of railways, telegraphic communication, and modern industrial methods in general. Never before has so vast a population been so shaken to the very roots of its being by actual and impending changes.

It is not surprising that there should be a scarcity of leaders at this juncture. The forces involved are so overpowering, the masses concerned so vast, that it is too much to demand of any individual person that he should be able to represent all these tendencies and impulses. Indeed, men have come forward who have been leaders in a limited sense — men who have expressed the

feelings and desires of the multitudes; or those who, as government officials, have acted in accordance with the demands of the modern spirit and so have become prominent; or again, men who, through writing and speaking, have made themselves the mouthpiece of the learned and the gentry. There have been agitators like Sun and like Kang Yu-wei; there have been transmitters of thought from the outside world to the Chinese mind; and there have been official reformers like Yuan and Chang. But there has been a lack in consistency and permanence of leadership; nor has it been comprehensive enough to be truly national. This is what China needs most at the present time: no more of impersonal reasoning, of suggested reforms, of agitation, but the great personality whose character will command respect and whose capability will comprise the needs and aspirations of a vast nation.

There are European practices and modes of thought which have already made so profound an impression upon China that they may be considered henceforth as part of her being. First of all, there is the idea of national organization and efficiency. The Chinese have learned that civilization is not only a matter of individual virtue and excellence, but that it must also express itself in such an organization of national life as will make it possible for all the forces therein contained to act smoothly, and, when need be, to concentrate their efforts at any given point. With the commonwealth idea, there comes the

feeling of national patriotism, to take the place of the narrow localism and clannishness that have so far split up the force of China into small fragments. There is also a strong impulse toward parliamentary and representative government as the best method for focusing the forces of public opinion and bringing them to bear upon national affairs. These liberal ideals are now almost universally accepted by all who are not benighted reactionaries. The revolutionary party, as we have seen goes farther; they accept the "egalitarianism" of Rousseau and pronounce war on everything that is not radically democratic. A superficial reading of history makes them exaggerate the beneficence of bloodshed and of violent agitation.

The social and political ideals of the West have also exercised a certain influence. The honesty and efficiency which, on the whole, are maintained in the public service of Western nations, has strongly impressed the Chinese. While they cling to the more formal Confucian morality with its five standard social relations, the feeling of a broader moral responsibility resting upon the brotherhood of man is also influencing contemporary thought and action. There is a tendency to become more individualistic, to give the individual greater latitude of action, and to exact from him a more general moral responsibility. This has already begun to have a liberating influence on women, in allowing them at times to widen the sphere of their interests and activi-

ties. Moreover, some cruel practices and vices which had been tolerated before are now vigorously combated. The strength of moral enthusiasm shows itself in the battle against the evil of opium-smoking; women are being relieved of the tyranny of the small-feet custom; greater naturalness is becoming an ideal, and ancient peculiarities of dress are being abandoned, although the individuality of the national costume of China is happily being maintained.

In this rebirth that China is undergoing we meet the same ardor and energy of youth which characterized the European Renaissance. China, indeed, is weighed down by a feeling of humiliation and suffering, and is vexed by great unsolved problems, so that she cannot experience to the full the joyousness of such a movement. Nevertheless it is the force of youth that is manifesting itself; and as a matter of fact, the young and vigorous are now most active in China, while the older, whose strength lies more in experience, are resigning leadership into youthful hands. This is remarkable in a country in which age has always been given so great an importance and so many privileges. The youthful strength and naturalness which characterize the movement, very often, however, tend to take the form of resistance to all restraint. The so-called naturalism of Japan has its counterpart in China; as a matter of fact, "naturalistic" modes of thought have been directly imported into China by returned students; but even with-

out this direct connection, the phenomenon would undoubtedly have occurred. Naturalism, that desire to let all force work itself out, may take varied forms; but it is the general experience that its main tendencies are toward a harsh materialism. It is here that the greatest moral danger of modern China lies.

In its present need the nation goes back to the traditions of the past for guidance, and indeed it finds there wisdom and nobility of mind; but whether the ideals of Confucianism are sufficient to exercise a compelling force over the new generation still remains to be seen. Nor have any of the more distinctly religious beliefs current in China furnished a trusty basis for moral constancy and strength. In an age so intensely competitive as our own and in a country where the rigors of competition, inter- and intra-national, cannot be softened; where fierce struggles are still to be fought; where, from the depth of despondency and discouragement, the only thing that seems to offer security for the future is organized physical force, the possession of means, and the use of material instruments, — under such conditions, it is not surprising that multitudes turn to the naturalism of material forces and agencies, desiring the things that are demonstrably strong if they are high-minded, and losing themselves in material satisfactions if they are of coarser fibre. The ideals which might help the Chinese people to escape these dangers cannot be created out of hand, nor can they be adopted from abroad. The

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national spirit, indeed, contains elements high and noble enough for moral guidance in the future, but they must be conscientiously developed through a devoted spirit among leaders and followers. And while they may be improved and strengthened by the good qualities contained in other civilizations, it is the Chinese themselves who, from the character of their national genius, will have to solve this supreme problem. Christianity, too, has a message for modern China. Many of the new impulses which are stirring Chinese life find nourishment in Christian ideals of sympathy, humanity, and devotion. But in applying these motives, the special needs of China and the moral character of her people should control the forms of teaching so as to give them their full effect. Recently, at an informal meeting of Chinese Christians, a symposium took place concerning the prospects of Christianity in the Empire.¹ These men represented different groups and widely different interests and localities; yet they all were agreed that if Christianity is to succeed in China, it must become less foreign and more Chinese; that stress must be laid on essentials of faith rather than on formalism of creed; that there must be a certain liberality which will not consider sinful the ceremonies of respect for ancestors, for the Emperor, for Confucius, and for the dead, but will tolerate these as national observances; and that Christian thought should be presented so as to appeal

¹ Communicated by Mr. H. B. Hawkins.

to all classes, not only to the people, but to their leaders as well.

At a time when such radical changes are taking place, when so many conflicting forces are bearing in upon the mind of China, there is a great danger that the guiding star of national destiny, in moral impulse, may be lost sight of. China cannot, indeed, make herself over into an efficient nation unless she is willing to learn from other peoples the ways in which they excel and to consider the moral elements of their success; but she must also be true to the best in her own civilization — its reasonableness, its calm and peaceable view of life, its respect for the things of the spirit. Turning her back upon abuses current in the past, she will make herself strong by becoming different, without ceasing to be essentially herself.

CHAPTER V

THE NEW EDUCATION IN CHINA

THE present tendency of affairs in China seems to indicate that our generation is to witness a repetition of the marvel of the Japanese Restoration and that a movement will take place in China which in rapidity and thoroughness may even excel that remarkable transformation. In a country in which the stability of social and political institutions has become a religion, where all the details of a complex system of social polity have lasted in their present composition for upward of two thousand years, such a sudden movement, full of surprising interest in itself, is fraught with imminent dangers to the millions of this colossal empire. The unfolding of dynamic forces, acting upon such a vast basis and with such an intricate background of civilization, has never been witnessed before in the remembered history of our world. In the conflicting currents and counter-currents of this sweeping stream, it is difficult to fix upon the dominant forces and fully to understand their action. Personal ambitions and intrigues, enthusiastic demands for reform, unselfish sacrifice and martyrdom, cynical calculation, are intermixed and intertwined so as to give every movement and every act an aspect of duplicity and to

make it utterly impossible to fathom their tendencies; and yet nothing can be more certain than that we have to do with an overpowering impulse of a strong nation to free itself from the tyrannies of custom and of human device and to emerge into the broad stream of modern life. This impulse has long been present among the younger and more vigorous minds of China, but it took the bitter experience of the Chino-Japanese War and of the reprisals consequent upon the Boxer outbreak to bring the country as a whole to the realization that a great change was absolutely demanded if fatal disaster were to be averted. At present the nation has become thoroughly aroused, and no action seems too radical to enlist a following even among the most responsible parts of the population.

The unifying element in this great movement is the system of education. In India, as we have seen, education has been a bond of national union only in a very superficial way. In the original Indian civilization, it was a perquisite of a caste, and under the English régime it has served rather to dissociate the educated people from the feelings of the multitude than to bind the whole nation together in an active spirit of unity. China presents a different complexion. Education there has always been a unifying element. The basis of the selection of leaders from the masses of the population, — it has always been looked upon with the greatest respect by the people. Through its uniform character derived

from the overshadowing importance of the Chinese classics, it has set its stamp upon the entire Chinese nation; the effect thus produced indeed betokens in a most striking manner the influence of psychological factors in the assimilation of tribes which in their physical environments and original traits were very different from one another. The old system of education has also been a most conservative force through the respect for authority which it has instilled in the people; it has been given undivided and constant support by the intellectual classes, who are directly interested in maintaining its standards. The abolition of this notable system, which has been the centre of Chinese polity for thousands of years, is therefore not a matter merely of pedagogy. On the contrary, it involves a thoroughgoing transformation of Chinese modes of thought and action.

In the old Chinese system of education we encounter a purely literary ideal. Founded mainly upon ethical precept, it entirely lacked the scientific or critical point of view; and even history was studied only for the purpose of acquiring apt illustrations and striking instances for the embellishment of a literary essay. The most serious and responsible of the sciences thus became a mere matter of ornament. Mathematics was looked down upon as the affair of shopkeepers, the instrument for computing petty gains. The ideas of natural science contained in the traditional lore of China are most grotesque, reminding us of the crude notions current in our own

mediæval period, though in some cases strangely yielding a result that coincides with common sense. The chief weakness and defect of the traditional modes of thought was the inclination to classify and systematize on the basis of superficial characteristics and false analogies, without going to the bottom of things by research and experiment. Thus a fanciful set of analogies — comparing each of the five elements to an organ in the human body, the stomach, liver, heart, and so on — forms the basis of Chinese physiology and medical science; also the heads of plants are thought to be suitable for diseases of the upper parts of the body. Such superficial theories, once stated and accepted as authority, would then be forever slavishly repeated, and human ingenuity would exhaust itself in discovering new fantastic applications of those basic ideas. Nor did Chinese literary expression, upon which the system of education laid most weight, in itself follow any positive aim, such as accurate description or concise argumentation. Its values are purely conventional and it constitutes an intricate world by itself. When we remember that Chinese literature lacks the values of the spoken word, that it is entirely a matter of writing, we shall be in a position better to appreciate the character of this training. While there are thirty thousand word-signs, there are only about five hundred root syllables. Thus a single syllable will usually stand for at least thirty or forty different meanings, each of which, however, has its own word-sign.

Spoken Chinese is totally unlike the classic language. In conversation or formal address, the speaker makes himself understood by using innumerable modifying syllables to explain words which otherwise would be too ambiguous to yield any meaning. Written language follows a different method; the collocation of word-signs, which appeals to the eye alone, is relied upon to indicate shades of expression. Thus, when read aloud, literature is either unintelligible, or appears full of trite and worn sentiments and expressions; but the printed or written page is pictorial and symbolic in the extreme. The suggestiveness of the written language is without limit; as every idea and image has its own special word-sign, there is a great wealth and variety of expressions. But it is not only in the use of rare and *précieuse* forms that a delicate literary sense is sought, but rather in the artistic grouping and arrangement of word-signs, by which, through a certain mutual reflection, they gain in suggestiveness and color. So the writer may revel in the most intimate allusions and complex sentiments. This brings about a certain esotericism; everything contained in such compositions few of the readers will understand, but through the ages a hidden thought will appeal to this or that kindred spirit and light up a happy smile of recognition. The study of such a literature presents an aspect and holds possibilities which are not equaled by any other classical language. Its conventionality, indeed, is restricting and its literary canons draw narrow boundaries

to individual expression; and yet, withal, the possibilities for delicate shading and subtle suggestiveness are infinite. We may well believe that the soberly printed page of even the most poetical of Western writers appears barren to a Chinese literary scholar, accustomed to the subtle allusions lurking in every group and clustering about every line of his pictorial writings.

The type of mind developed by exclusive attention to such a literature is complex and subtle. The bland and trite moralism of the educated Chinaman is a result of the conventionality of the notions inculcated in the classical literature. But when it comes to deal with the details of expression, the Chinese mind develops a remarkable delicacy and subtlety which is transmitted to all its operations. The educated Chinaman has eyes trained quickly to perceive the unobvious meaning in things. His mind is less well adapted for seeing the broad essential forces that dominate action in nature and the human world. However, though trained primarily in other matters, the Chinese mind has nevertheless become accustomed to rigorous concentration to such an extent that it may readily be turned into an admirable instrument for the investigation and fathoming of the problems of modern scientific thought. Yet what a task ahead before this can be accomplished. From lifeless chronicles to history, from artificial deductions to direct observation of natural forces, from a confining formalism to the expression of individual experience and char-

acter, from fanciful analogy to positive proof, — in making this transition Chinese methods of thought must indeed radically transform themselves.

While the Chinese mind has been held in the prison of childish theories, the character of the Chinese is not such that it is ever satisfied with purely theoretical pursuits. Common sense, shrewdness, a practical eye for business, and withal a great power of self-control, are among their most striking characteristics. The latter, indeed, is not to be attributed to stolidity. The Chinese are originally and fundamentally excitable and prone to violent outbursts of passion. As that notable lady, Doctor King Ya-mei, has justly remarked, "The Chinese, excitable by temperament, have chosen a high standard of self-control as an ideal. The very power of their passion has caused the Chinese to raise such formidable barriers of custom in self-defense." This same common sense is now beginning to exert itself in matters of intellectual life, and as the Japanese have come to believe in practical science, have indeed become masters of scientific inquiry and management, no less will the Chinese surprise the world in this matter. Their psychology is predisposed to this development, which has been retarded by anterior conditions. They have none of the volatile, dreamy characteristics of the Hindus. To cite again the words of Doctor King, "It devolves on China, which is neither mystic nor warrior, with its great body of skillful farmers

artisans, merchants, unpicturesque and often as uninteresting as their British congeners, to solve the practical problems of Asiatic life.”¹

But though from the point of view of Chinese psychology, the present evolution seems purely normal, viewed in its relations to social and political institutions, it is nothing short of a revolution. In the past, the entire fabric of Chinese society has rested upon classical authority. Intellectual life was circumscribed by the belief that everything worth knowing has been reasoned out and settled by the ancients. Social custom was determined by the precepts of the sages, and political preferment came to those who had best mastered the classical lore. There had been created, in Chinese education, a unifying psychological force, which in itself was the bond that held the Empire together by assimilating the various elements in its population. In the conduct and destiny of the Chinese nation, educational matters therefore had an importance far transcending the life of the schools. Accordingly, a change of system is by no means a matter of pure pedagogics, but it involves such fundamental permutations of social and political conduct, that among all the changes progressing and impending in the Middle Kingdom, this reform of education is the most significant and far-reaching.

Those who knew China best were most apprehensive as to the difficulties which would attend any attempt to

¹ *The World's Chinese Students' Journal*, vol. 1. p. 41. ✓

dislodge a system so long established, and so intimately connected with the power of officialdom. As late as 1898, the events of that turbulent epoch seemed to render hopeless any attempt at reform from within. The repeated humiliation of Chinese pride during the last decade has, however, brought about most suddenly a sweeping movement of change, supported by the common feeling among all thinking Chinamen that only a thorough renaissance of national life can save the country from continued inroads and humiliations. Nor can China take her time. She must become strong in a hurry. So, with all the retarding weight of tradition, with popular distrust and impatience, with official intrigues and counter-intrigues, with diplomatic embarrassment, the Chinese are still forging ahead in the work of reconstruction. Even the distant spectator cannot but be filled with concern when he realizes the risks to which the Chinese people are now subject. They are seeking a forward way, a road out of the stagnation into which their national life has fallen; but whether they will be able to accomplish this escape from the fetters of tradition without bloody sacrifice, is a question the answer to which the future still holds.

Changes in the educational system of China have been attempted before; notably in 1898; but the conservatism of the official classes has always succeeded in defeating any plan of thoroughgoing reform. After the Boxer troubles, however, even they could no longer escape the

conclusion that changes were necessary, if China were to resist the inroads of foreign powers. A commission, appointed in 1904 to study the educational situation, submitted a complete plan for a national public-school system. Receiving the sanction of the Imperial Government, this plan became the authorized programme for educational changes throughout the Empire. In September, 1905, an edict was issued which abolished the customs of two thousand years. The old literary examinations, by which men had obtained the right to official appointments, were entirely discontinued, and there were substituted for them examinations in which subjects of modern learning were given a prominent place. In December, 1905, the importance of educational matters was further recognized by the creation of a National Board of Education, charged with the duty of superintending the enforcement of the imperial decrees on educational matters.

The two essential elements in the Chinese reform are the creation of a *public-school system*, and the introduction of *Western subjects of study*. Under the old régime schools were almost entirely supported by private enterprise. Neighborhood school associations provided for elementary teaching, while in the larger towns educational bodies or officials backed the higher schools. The ambitious plan worked out and submitted by Chang Chih-tung, Chang Pao-hsi, and their associates, provides for a complete system of educational institutions

modeled upon those of Japan, which, in turn, were inspired chiefly by the educational practice of the United States and Germany. There is to be a kindergarten, followed by a lower and an upper primary school, with courses occupying five and four years respectively, in which the subjects taught are reading, classics, history, mathematics, geography, elementary science, music, and gymnastics. It is the purpose of the law that every larger village shall have its primary school, and that there shall be at least one of these institutions for every four hundred families. Every district town is to have a higher primary school. The next grade in the educational system is the middle school, which would correspond roughly to the American high school or academy. There is to be at least one in each prefecture. In addition to a more advanced pursuit of the studies mentioned above, the study of foreign languages also is required in these institutions. Each provincial capital is to be supplied with a college, while the coping-stone of the whole system is the University of Peking, with which universities in other important centres may be associated. The University of Peking is supplied with eight faculties and forty-six departments. Admission from lower schools to those of a higher grade will be obtained on the basis of strict examinations.

In addition to the schools enumerated, there have also been established a large number of agricultural and technical institutions of various grades, from the farming

school, to which graduates of the primary school are admitted, to the technical colleges, which require a much longer preparation on the part of the students. There are also normal schools, and special schools for law and political science. The latter are intended especially for the supplementary training of government officials. The National Board dealing with educational matters exercises a general supervision, but as the actual administration of schools is in the hands of local officials, it does not exert much positive control, nor does it originate educational policies. The scope of its functions may be implied from the bureaus into which it is divided namely, professional status, general affairs, secondary studies, technology, editing, investigation, and councilors. The Board is assisted by over one hundred and eighty attachés, representing the learning of the Chinese classics, as well as that of Japan and of the West. Among them are a number of prominent specialists. The bureau of editing requires the largest staff, as it is intrusted with the work of translating and publishing foreign works suitable for purposes of instruction, as well as with the direct preparation of Chinese text-books.

The imperial decree enjoins upon all viceroys, governors, and prefects the utmost diligence in the rapid building-up of the educational system in all its parts. Its realization of course still depends upon the individual initiative and energy of governors and local officials. On account of the varying local conditions, considerable

latitude must be allowed to these men — a broad discretion as to the specific methods which will be most conducive towards the realization of the general scheme. H. E. Yuan Shi-kai has given evidence of his serious purpose, in an ordinance issued in 1907 with respect to education. He makes very specific numerical requirements as to schools. In each provincial capital there are to be at least one hundred Primary schools with five thousand pupils. In each district there shall be forty such schools, with at least two thousand pupils, and in each village at least one with an attendance of forty. The viceroy contemplates the requirement of compulsory education for a period of at least two years for all children. Together with H. E. Tuan Fang and old Chang Chih-tung he memorialized the Throne to make primary education compulsory throughout the Empire. The plan outlined above, as may be imagined, looms much larger on paper than in actual execution, and there is a long distance which still must be traveled before the system of Chinese education will really become general and serviceable to all parts of the population.

When the Chinese Government had issued its radical decrees on education, the spirit of the past seems to have loomed up before it in a threatening manner. To appease the national ancestors, almost divine honors were bestowed upon the great teacher Confucius. It was also decided that a Confucian University would be established at the birthplace of the sage, in the province of

Shantung. Here the classic learning is to be preserved in all its purity. The present representative of the family of Confucius, the "Holy Duke" Yen, a descendant of the great teacher in the seventy-sixth generation, presented himself before the Empress and Emperor to render thanks for the great distinction bestowed upon his family. Being evidently touched with modern views, he proposed that, while the place of honor should be given to Confucian studies, the new university should also not neglect such branches as political and social science, foreign languages, and other Western studies. This testimony to the importance of Western science coming from such a source, had a great influence upon the conservatives of China. Having become interested in education, Duke Yen Sheng memorialized the Throne concerning four points: first, the character and behavior of students shall be carefully looked after; second, the color of the cloth used for drill shall be made uniform; third, teachers shall be selected from amongst persons who are of serious character; fourth, teachers shall be over forty years of age. By imperial order, the Board of Education has transmitted these views to all provincial authorities. With such wisdom to guide them, how can the Chinese go astray?

One of the greatest difficulties occasioned by the new system of education lies in the heavy expense which it entails. Buildings have to be secured and furnished, teaching materials and text-books provided, and teach-

ers of sufficient acquirements employed. The old-style teacher of the Chinese village school was satisfied with a paltry income, — some thirty or forty dollars, silver, a year, — supplemented as it was by kindly attentions from the neighbors. Men who are to teach the new branches expect a much larger salary; in fact, they demand many times as much as the old reading masters. The financing of the new system has consequently been a matter of extreme difficulty. In many localities, the question of securing a building equipment was solved by turning ancient Buddhist temples and monasteries into schools, and using pious funds for the purchase of maps, books, chairs, and desks. The Buddhist monks were not always willing benefactors of the public; in fact, they began to make frequent use of the subterfuge of transferring their property to Japanese Buddhists, in order to obtain diplomatic protection. The threatened increase of Japanese influence led the Government to abandon the further conversion of Buddhist temples, except in cases where some sort of agreement could be arrived at with the bonzes.

Private munificence has been strongly appealed to by the officials. A person endowing a certain number of schools will be given the title of a Chairman of the Gentry; especially generous gifts are acknowledged by the Emperor in person. The public system has, of course, not superseded the system of private schools. The latter flourish and increase in number by the side of those

established by authority of the Government. It has also been proposed that the moneys heretofore spent in processions, in certain commemorative exercises and comedies, be applied to the more useful purpose of furthering the educational cause. The main source of funds for educational purposes should, of course, be general taxation. But on account of the inflexibility of the Chinese revenue system, local officials often find it difficult to raise the additional income required to meet the new expenses. Some special sources have from time to time been utilized, such as the sale of public property, or the indemnity funds remitted by the United States.

The financial administration of the schools has not escaped suspicion; in fact, it has incurred much criticism on the part of the public press. Such statements as the following (from the *Shen-Chow-Jih-Pao*, or *National Herald*) are often encountered: "When we first heard of the new schools, we believed that they embodied a healthy desire and honest wish to benefit the educational system. It was indeed a matter of remark that the notables and literati, who had hitherto considered the old schools as unexcelled, had over night become enthusiastic supporters of the new system. The cause of their sudden change appears more clearly at present. A look at the modern schools shows that they were founded chiefly through a desire for gain. The notables have become school managers. The funds intrusted to them they misappropriate. For teachers, pupils, and objects

of instruction they care not. In their hearts they are still followers of the old system."

While this view is undoubtedly too cynical, it nevertheless indicates the difficulties in the road to reform, so long as official misuse of funds is not checked by an adequate system of accounting. The educational system itself suffers most from the scarcity of properly qualified teachers. The schoolmaster of the old type could at least scan the lines of the classics, but those who pretend a knowledge of modern branches have often acquired only a most superficial smattering from some Japanese instructor, who himself may have dipped from second-hand sources. In many localities, the entire spirit of the schools leaves much to be desired. The teachers themselves are prone to strike if their pay is not sufficient. Disputes between pupils and teachers are common. Should an unpopular teacher not be dismissed, a boycott is organized by the pupils, and they often go to the length of leaving the school in a body. Frequently they seem to carry their point to the extent that, in some localities, all discipline has been subverted; and students have gone so far as to dictate to the teachers what they want to be taught. The teachers sometimes have much to suffer from an obstinate insistence on the part of the students to do things in their own way. A custom once established will be adhered to with a stubbornness which can be described only as "pig-headedness."

News items like the following are common in the Chin-

ese journals: "*Yangchow*, 14th June, 1907. There are troubles in the middle school at Yangchow, caused by disagreement as to the amount of the teachers' pay. The teachers have all resigned"; or, "*Hankow*, 13th May, 1907. Owing to a conflict between teachers and students in the middle school of Lin-hai-hsien, the latter have left the school." Under all these circumstances, it is not surprising that the attitude of the man in the street toward the schools is not always enthusiastic. The schoolboys parading about in their new uniforms are apt to be arrogant, and offend the susceptibilities of the people they meet. The new taxes imposed by the mandarins are burdensome to many. A system which seems to be utilizing the contributions of all for the benefit of a comparatively small number is easily made the object of popular opposition, especially when feelings have been embittered through petty bickerings. So, in some localities the buildings occupied by the new schools have been torn down, and public violence has been aroused by any effort to develop the new system. But these are only difficulties and troubles which could naturally be foreseen when a reform of such reach and importance was undertaken.

In the majority of Chinese towns, however, the public feeling is of a quite different kind. Great things are expected of the new education. A hopeful and strong national spirit has arisen from the many ills that threaten China. The new system is certainly given an eager

reception by the young students themselves; it is so superior to the old in interest and in freedom from tedious tasks of memory work. They are especially fond of their uniforms, which mark them as young soldiers in the national army. Though the system was introduced at first against the will of the *literati*, they did not seriously oppose it, but soon came to acknowledge that the new education is necessary to China. It was supposed that there would be bitter opposition on the part of the teachers of the old school, who would be in danger of losing their livelihood. The result happily does not bear out these anticipations. Such subjects as Chinese literature, natural history, and philosophy, still offer a large field of activity to the old type of teachers, provided that they have put themselves in touch with modern ideas on their subjects through reading a few Western treatises. The zeal of the older teachers in trying to catch up with the foreign-trained men is at times almost pathetic. In most towns a "teachers' discussion class" has been organized. These classes were established by the initiative of the teachers themselves, in order that they might acquire the knowledge necessary for elementary instruction in the new branches. With great eagerness these men, varying in age from thirty to fifty-five years, will follow the instruction given by some youngster in the early twenties who has been fortunate enough to have had a course in Japan or the West. While the necessary superficiality of such a system must be deplored, the mere fact of this in-

struction being so eagerly sought by the teachers is the best proof that the old order, recognizing its inevitable fate, has abandoned the hope of regaining its former supremacy and is hurrying to adapt itself to the new conditions.

This enthusiasm also finds expression in great individual sacrifices, and even in martyrdom. Private gifts are made in large numbers, even without the solicitation of officials or the hope of rewards. Within the last few years, it has frequently happened that some person desirous of founding a school, and lacking the means to do so, has in truly Oriental fashion appealed to his or her townsmen by committing suicide, after writing out a touching request for aid in the new cause. A Tartar lady at Hankow who had founded a school for girls was unable to secure sufficient money for carrying on the work of the institution. In order to secure her object, she determined to commit suicide. In her farewell letter, she stated that she felt the need of the school so much that she would sacrifice her own life and thus impress the need upon those who were able to give money. Her act had the result desired, as after her death money came flowing in from many sources. In most cases, fortunately, the appeals for assistance are successful without going to such extremes. Thus, the wife of a district magistrate in Honan having decided to establish a school for girls, wrote a circular setting forth that a girl, if uneducated, brings six kinds of injury to herself and three kinds to her rela-

tives. The subtlety of her arguments fascinated the city folk, and sufficient funds for her purpose were soon provided.

The introduction of female education, which militates against the most deep-seated prejudices of the Chinese race, has called for greater personal sacrifices than any other part of educational reform. Some powerful patrons have indeed arisen. H. E. Tuan Fang urged the importance of this reform upon the Empress herself, with the result that, before her death, the great lady established a school for female education in the capital. Educated women are making a strong plea for the education of their sisters. Doctor King Ya-mei, herself educated in the West, points out that those who lament the superficial nature of the present reforms forget that "half the nation, whose special function it is to put into practice the ideas governing the world in which she lives, has not yet been touched; that the strong impressions of childhood are the lasting ones, and that man is but an embodiment of the ideas of the mother." But in the case of female education, it is not primarily the provision of funds that causes difficulties. The desire of women to share in the advantages of education is of itself looked upon by the majority of the Chinese as scandalous and not at all to be encouraged. Many heartrending tragedies have been brought about by insoluble conflicts of duty toward the old and the new. A short time ago, in an interior village in Kiang Su, a woman, ambitious to become educated,

killed herself after bad treatment from her husband's relatives. Her farewell letter was everywhere copied by the Chinese press. It has become a national document, and almost a charter of the new movement. In it occur the following sentences: "I am about to die to-day because my husband's parents, having found great fault with me for having unbound my feet, and declaring that I have been diffusing such an evil influence as to have injured the reputations of my ancestors, have determined to put me to death. Maintaining that they will be severely censured by their relatives, once I enter a school and receive instruction, they have been trying hard to deprive me of life, in order, as they say, to stop beforehand all the troubles that I may cause. At first they intended to starve me, but now they compel me to commit suicide by taking poison. I do not fear death at all, but how can I part from my children who are so young? Indeed, there should be no sympathy for me, but the mere thought of the destruction of my ideals and of my young children, who will without doubt be compelled to live in the old way, makes my heart almost break."

The blood of such martyrs is beginning to make its impression upon the Chinese people, and is turning them to favor more liberal popular customs. A nation in which a spirit of such ruthless self-sacrifice is still so common may bring forth things that will astonish the world. It has been said that "China contains materials for a revolution, if she should start one, to which the horrors of

the French Revolution would be a mere squib"; but if turned into different channels, this spirit of self-sacrifice may, as it did in the case of Japan, bring about a quick regeneration of national life and national prestige, through the establishment of new institutions, that correspond to the currents of life thus striving to assert themselves.

The external organization of the Chinese educational system, important as it is, is but half the battle. In the struggle for a national renaissance, these forms will be of small advantage, if the true spirit of modern scientific study is lacking. There is indeed a great amount of curiosity among the Chinese, such as inspired the Japanese when they were first confronted with Western civilization in all its prowess and varied interest. The youth of China are most eager to learn, but the direction given to their efforts has not always been judicious. The movement is too tremendous in scope to have reached perfection in detail. Many of the students see in Western learning an open sesame to wealth, a smooth highway to position and honors. Indeed, in the first educational edict, the Government was careful to caution teachers and students not to look on education as the pathway to honor, rank, and preferment, but rather as a means of bringing strength to their country. But the idea which this edict gives of the spirit of the new education is itself very vague. It states the objects to be, "loyalty to the Confucian spirit, public-mindedness, bravery, and

truth." Such general ideals are compatible with many different interpretations, and thus the all-important question will be, To whom will fall the privilege of guiding China in the paths of the new learning? The prestige acquired by Japan through her successes in the last war gave her people for a time a decided ascendancy of intellectual leadership in China. As a Hindu writer has expressed it: "Since Japan inflicted upon Russia a signal defeat, the entire Orient is pulsating with a new life. All Asia seems to be vibrant to follow in the wake of Japan."

While the war was in progress, Buddhist monks from Japan were carrying on a propaganda for a revival of their religion in China, and Japanese teachers poured into the provinces of the Empire in great numbers. Though there were among them many of insufficient training, they still acted as a vanguard of progress and education, and were eagerly received by the progressive young China. Thousands of Chinese students, moreover, went to Japan for study. The movement was fostered on the part of Japan by such associations as the *Toa Dobunkai* ("Society of the countries having the same script"), who favored a strong educational propaganda. But in the end, the military success of Japan in Manchuria was somewhat too great not to fill the Chinese themselves with misgivings as to their own political safety. These fears have been accentuated through the manner in which the Japanese have maintained their foothold in Manchuria, through the treaties between

Japan and various European powers by which they mutually guarantee their interests, and through the action of Japan in the Tatsu Maru incident. A certain conflict of interests could not be concealed, and the nationalist feeling of China was directed against any further expansion of Japanese influence in that empire. China is at present not turning to any particular nation for guidance, but is seeking, as did Japan thirty years ago, to learn the best methods wherever they may be found.

The Chinese Government has for some time been actively encouraging young men to study abroad and to get from travel, observation, and systematic study at foreign universities that knowledge of the processes and methods of Western civilization which now seems essential to a further development of Chinese national life. In former years those who went abroad usually went upon their own impulse, or if they were sent by authority, they were expected to prepare themselves for a certain definite task. No special favor was shown those who had a foreign education. On the contrary, they were treated rather with jealousy and suspicion. Now all this is changed, and the Government itself has set a premium on foreign learning. When the old-style examinations were abolished, the Government introduced a special metropolitan examination in which the students trained abroad were to be tested for official positions. In the summer of 1906 the first group of students was thus examined at Peking. The occasion excited deep interest in

China and abroad, and it seemed a test, not only for the candidates presenting themselves, but for the examiners and the Chinese Government, with respect to the ability of the latter to select men frankly and equitably on the basis of proficiency and scientific training. To conduct an examination of this kind, with no precedents to guide and with candidates trained in various systems of education, was indeed no small task. The chief official in charge was H. E. Tang Shao-yi, but the actual work of examining the aspirants fell to the noted scholar, Yen-fu. In determining upon the standing of the candidates, the examiners took into account the diplomas presented, the linguistic ability of the students, and their knowledge of their respective specialties. In order not to give the students educated in Japan a special advantage, it was left optional with the candidates in what language they were to write their examination papers. A general essay was required on one of the following topics: "The Practicability of enforcing Compulsory Education in China at present," "The Means of improving Chinese Agriculture," "How the Law against Chinese Immigration may be modified on the Basis of the Chino-American Treaty," etc. On the basis of this test, the examiners awarded the doctorate to nine candidates, eight of whom had been trained in the United States. The master's degree was awarded to twenty-three, nearly all of whom had attended Japanese institutions. Ten candidates were rejected. Some of the men admitted to the doctorate

were so ignorant of Chinese writing that they could not even decipher the decree in which their honor was granted. The Government therefore decided that in future examinations the composition of an essay in Chinese will be required in order to oblige the students to give due attention to their own national literature and language. In 1907, Grand Secretary Chang Chih-tung himself supervised the metropolitan examination, being assisted by a few of the successful graduates of the previous year. It was reported that "His Excellency was sympathetic on this occasion, and that, therefore, the examination was marked by the success of many Japanese returned students." This report indicates the current belief that success in these great examinations, to a certain extent, depends upon the mood of the examiners; and, indeed, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to invent a method of conducting this test which would be mathematically accurate in its results. At this second examination the candidates were required to write a Chinese essay, in which enterprise many proved sad failures. In the subsequent year an American graduate again carried off first honors, while the larger number of those rejected as failures had studied in Japan. In 1910 the number of candidates had risen to over six hundred. This body of highly trained young men, the cream of the intellectual youth of China, are reported to have presented a very inspiring sight to the older men. Nearly all of them showed that they had not only devoted their

time to the study of books, but had received athletic training in the gymnasium, in sports, and outdoor games. On this occasion the students from Japan were so successful that it was charged that the examining board had not been entirely impartial, — another indication of how difficult it is to satisfy the public that the mode of selection is absolutely fair to all.

On account of the difficulty of settling upon a definite and permanent policy of examination, the whole system has been condemned by many, together with the preference which is given to the government schools in the matter of selecting men for the lower degrees. A great many people hark back with regret to the immemorial method. It is claimed for the old training that it constituted a true and thorough education of the faculties of the mind, and as well that it gave to the students refinement and distinction. But what is urged specially against the new examinations is that a student may prepare for them by cramming, that a superficial knowledge of facts and principles memorized in view of the occasion may carry him through; or at least assist materially toward his success. Such methods were impossible under the old system, which tested, as it were, the candidate's entire literary personality, his ability, his taste, and that immersion in literary ideas which can come only after a long training. So there is a great deal of mutual recrimination. The adherents of the classics are picturesquely described as "fossils rotting in the odor of a putrid

past"; while the supporters of modern science are castigated as being hysterical and throwing to the winds the wholesome restraints of Confucian wisdom.

But the old system has irrevocably passed away. Never again will proficiency in composing the eight-legged essay lead to distinction and official power in China. The need of a mastery of scientific processes of thought and action has been too clearly seen and too profoundly felt to allow such a revival; but undoubtedly the tendency will grow stronger to keep training on a national basis by drawing from the traditional learning of China those elements which are of permanent value and insisting upon their acquisition by the youth of the land.

For the purpose of admission to office, the foreign mission schools are not recognized. In the words of the edict, "In order to safeguard the educational interests of China, graduates of foreign schools in China are not to be admitted to the examinations." When the excellent work is remembered which these schools have done in many parts of China, this decree will appear illiberal. The Government, however, feels that every means must be taken to preserve the national character of the movement, and not to allow it to fall under the control of foreign educators. There is also a certain amount of competition between the schools established by the Government and those independently founded by the gentry of different localities. It is only the government schools whose students are directly admitted to public examina-

tions, and in the law for election of provincial assemblies, training in these same schools is given as one of the qualifications for suffrage. The law states, "or its equivalent," but of course the burden of proof would be on those coming from other than government schools to prove that the equivalent exists. The fact that training in the schools of the Government is thus given a special place in the political life of the state has led to the popular belief that those who pass through this course will surely be provided with public office; the Government thus finds itself swamped with large numbers of expectant officials. Undoubtedly a different system will have to be worked out. The authorities of the central and provincial governments may continue to examine the students who have absorbed their training, in order to bestow upon them the literary degrees; but by the side of this it will be necessary to establish distinct civil service examinations in order to test men effectively as to their preparation and capability for undertaking some one of the different lines of governmental work.

The government students who are sent to the Western countries and to Japan receive a liberal expense allowance and remain under the guidance and guardianship of the Chinese embassies. At times the ministries at home may even specifically direct their studies. Thus in 1907, the Ministry of Justice cabled to eighteen students, ordering them to make special preparatory studies so as to be able to assist in the codification of Chinese

law. The students who are selected to go to the United States on the income of the returned indemnity fund are selected in an annual examination held in Peking. At the first of these, fifteen hundred candidates presented themselves, out of whom fifty were selected. Large numbers of Chinese students also go to foreign countries on their own account. The majority of these attend Japanese institutions, on account of the proximity and inexpensiveness of the latter. Immediately after the Russian war, there were as many as fifteen thousand Chinese in Japanese universities. The number has now receded to about eight thousand. Much criticism has been aroused by the behavior of the Japanese students after their return to China. Many of these young men have attempted to cast off all restraint, moral, social, and political. The sudden transference of a young Chinaman, brought up in a life of strict regularity, to an atmosphere of entire freedom, is accompanied with danger to his character. To judge from all the accounts of student life in Tokyo, the freedom enjoyed by the Japanese students was turned into licence and licentiousness by many of the young men from China. So, instead of becoming a source of strength, of character building, instead of imparting to the students the morale needed by men starting upon careers of constructive work and struggle, Tokyo proved an enervating Capua to many of them, stealing away their spirit and leaving them uncertain of purpose and helmless. For these undesirable

results, however, the Japanese system of education can by no means be held responsible. The cause must be sought rather in the general conditions of Tokyo student life, in the uprooting of old customs and inherited ideas, in a hasty struggle for everything new, and in the general immaturity of the Chinese students. How inadequate are our common notions of Chinese slavery to custom and of the stolidity of Chinese character. Custom, indeed, is strong, but it restrains in ordinary circumstances an almost equally strong impulse to high-wrought and passionate action. Let once this control be removed, and the individualistic tendency of China apparently knows no bounds. Moreover, while the regularly established Japanese institutions of learning performed a great service to Chinese students, many of the latter unfortunately fell into the hands of educational adventurers, who made a business of rapidly furnishing a makeshift education (the *soku sei* method) and sent their victims back to China with graduation certificates and with a feeling of great personal consequence, but without any vestige of serious training.

The belief, so common among returned Japanese students, in the efficacy of revolutionary movements and their great admiration for the French Revolution, is a notable consequence of these superficial methods of study. Such results of Japanese education have rendered the Government less prone to encourage student migration to that country. In some provinces, Japanese

students have even been made the objects of indiscriminating and fanatical persecution on the part of the officials. The mere word "Japanese student" has become a term of reproach in the ears of the officials. It is perhaps well that the institutions of Japan should be purged of this irresponsible element. Then only will they be able to fulfill their mission of interpreting Western scientific civilization to the majority of Chinese foreign students, who, in the nature of things, will always seek instruction in Japan. A stricter control over the Chinese students is now exercised through the minister residing at Tokyo, in which effort the Governments of both countries cooperate. So the ill report of the "Japanese student" will be a passing phase.

The political propaganda which is carried on by Chinese students, both at home and abroad, is a most interesting phase of the present situation. They are intensely nationalistic and desire to make their influence felt, either by appealing directly to the Government or by working upon public opinion. It is a very common thing for officials at Peking, or for provincial governments, to be flooded with telegraphic messages and cablegrams by students, whenever any action is planned that does not appeal to their sense of fitness. This has taken place especially whenever it was believed that the Government was on the point of granting a foreign concession or taking up a foreign loan. The venerable Chang Chih-tung, when at the head of the educational board, admin-

istered a fatherly rebuke to the youthful politicians in a decree, in which he advised students to apply themselves to their studies in order to gain a certain mastery of their subject before undertaking to counsel the Government on how to manage the country. But the practice has not fallen into disuse and seems to be as popular as ever. During the queue-cutting propaganda, the students in a great many governmental schools had their appendages removed as a sign of independence and progressive spirit. In Tientsin and other places the use of military force had to be threatened to awe school children, mere boys and girls, who were proceeding to go on a strike in order to force the publication of an edict announcing the immediate assembling of a national parliament. When the Russo-Chinese question was in an acute stage, early in 1911, twelve hundred Chinese students assembled in a Tokyo restaurant for the purpose of discussing the situation. After much heated oratory had been discharged, the students decided that their Government had been culpable in its weakness and that their country had been humiliated. They resolved to form a society for the purpose of urging a strong foreign policy and agreed to subscribe ten yen each toward the first expenses. Telegrams were to be sent to all the local assemblies in China. Eight hundred of the students — those who received their education at government expense — then went to the Chinese minister and demanded money from the funds held on their account. After futile efforts to placate them,

the minister finally paid over the money, out of which the expense of sending the telegrams was defrayed. Such happenings illustrate vividly the independent spirit and the interest in public affairs which animate the youth of China.

A great technical difficulty which confronts the workers in the cause of education and scientific reform lies in the character of Chinese literary expression. The classical written language which has been taught in the school from time immemorial is less of a living vernacular in China than Latin is with us. The spoken language is divided into numerous dialects, with extreme varieties of expression and of pronunciation. According to the educational decree of the Government, an effort is to be made to give all instruction in the public schools in the so-called Mandarin dialect, that is, the dialect spoken in most of the interior provinces of China. If in this manner the adoption of a universal spoken language could be brought about, the new educational system will have subserved a very important purpose towards the creation of political unity. But another serious difficulty lies in the translation of scientific terms. The Chinese literary language, being concise in the extreme and subject to much misunderstanding in its spoken form, is as yet an imperfect vehicle for the purpose of imparting accurate scientific ideas, though its potential efficiency is great. Doctor Yen Fu has performed a heroic intellectual task by creating for himself an entire code of philo-

sophical expressions in his translations of Spencer and Huxley. But so far there is little uniformity in such usage; every writer does as best he can, and much confusion and uncertainty of thought results. In order to avoid misunderstanding, Chinese writers often add the foreign term to the expression into which they have translated it in their works. But the genius of the Chinese language is opposed to the introduction of foreign words, and a way must be found, even at the cost of immense intellectual labor, of developing a concise and accurate technical vocabulary in the various sciences.

In providing educational materials, the Japanese and the Germans have been most active. Tons of school-books, histories, geographies, and scientific apparatus have been prepared by the Japanese for the Chinese market. The German Government recently fitted out a traveling exhibition of school supplies, such as maps, models, chairs, and scientific instruments, which was sent through the provinces of China, and which everywhere excited the interest of persons engaged in education. It is hardly necessary to say anything about the importance, to any nation, of leadership in the matter of Chinese scientific training. No civilizing aim of wider bearing can be subserved at the present time by any country than to attract Chinese students and to give them a thorough training in scientific methods of investigation; nor will the country that accomplishes this task lack a liberal recompense

in the way of cultural and ethical influence of a thoroughly legitimate kind.

When we consider the entire educational movement in contemporary China, we are forced to admit that, with all the daring innovations that have been made, the great battle is yet to come. The first enthusiasm must be turned into the sustained energy of daily effort on the part of millions of students and hundreds of thousands of instructors. The substitution of the attitude of scientific work for the old literary amateurism cannot be the matter of a few years. For a long time China will have to suffer from the ravages of pseudo-science. A distinctive and promising feature of the "Young China" spirit is the emphasis of scientific and historical training. But while the prime desideratum ought to be rigid training in scientific methods of observation, yet, in the selection of courses, the cultural subjects should not be entirely neglected in favor of the branches which, on the surface are more practical. One of the greatest friends of Chinese education, Mr. Tong Kai-son, has expressed regret that so many of the men going to the West are intent upon technical subjects alone. There is so great a need in China for transmitters of modern culture, for true national teachers who have mastered the philosophy and history of the West, and who can combat the superficial conclusions of immature minds. The attitude of the Government itself is more favorable to purely technical studies, like engineering, physical science, and jurispru-

ence. So it may be that the larger number of students who are sent abroad through government assistance will continue to devote themselves to those subjects, and that the more general cultural branches will be pursued more generally by those who provide their own means and who, therefore, in many instances, will not get farther than Japan. This would seem to indicate that in the general interpretation of cultural and philosophical ideas, Japan will continue to hold a prominent position in the Orient. ,

CHAPTER VI

A PARLIAMENT FOR CHINA

THOUGH history repeats itself, it does so only in the great outlines of events. There is no iteration of concrete facts, and as the pageant of history passes, we behold an unending variety of incident. Thus, while the events which have happened in the political world of China during the last three years may be expressed in the general form of ideas with which we are abundantly familiar, such as political agitation and constitutional reform, the actual facts of the situation in China in detail are unprecedented. They constitute an entirely novel eventuality in the history of the world.

The change which China is undergoing at present may be expressed by saying that Chinese society is becoming political. Hitherto it has lived from generation to generation by custom, with no consciousness of political aims or purposes; nor has the Government itself been influenced in its action by definite policies. Secure in its authority, it has selected its servants on the basis of examination tests, reënforced by such favor as promising candidates might be able to obtain through *douceurs* of various kinds. Now, all of a sudden, the political impulse is strongly awakening in the breast of the Chinese

people. They see before them the nations which are consciously guiding their policy from the point of view of national life and national interests. It will no longer do to drift, to let customs take care of themselves, to deal with foreign nations from day to day in compromises, which never go to the root of a policy, but simply gloss over the difficulties of the moment. The intellectual and responsible among the Chinese people are feeling a deep need for a conscious expression of national policy, and for the use of careful reason and long-headed foresight, as well as calm firmness, in the management of their national affairs.

The impulse came from without. Chinese self-complacency suffered a rude shock in the Japanese war of 1894. On account of the lack of centralization and of a common patriotism, this shock would probably have remained without a deep influence upon Chinese life had it not been followed by other and more serious catastrophes. It was, however, the signal for inroads upon China by all sorts of political and economic influences from without. The division of China impended. The masses of the people, at first vaguely restless, were soon deeply moved by fears and passions akin to panic, unrestrained, yes, even assisted, by high officials who were themselves not clear in their political aims. So they rushed headlong into new trouble by attacking the foreigners and their legations. Again China was to receive a poignant impression of her own weakness. This warning was

accentuated when Russia made herself at home in Manchuria, and refused to listen to Chinese demands. The militant and political genius of Japan evinced itself; by contrast with Japanese victories and diplomatic successes, the Chinese at last came to perceive the depth of inefficiency to which their national life had sunk. Most touchingly this feeling expressed itself in the formation of "national humiliation societies." Hundreds of thousands became members, and women gave up the wearing of rings or other ornaments, with the exception of one upon which were engraved the words "national humiliation." Thus was China shocked into a feeling of her own weakness, and of the dangers that beset her on account of the absence of a strong national political spirit.

The question was how to escape from this humiliating condition. That some change was necessary was recognized even by the most conservative, but the remedies suggested went all the way to the revolutionary proposal of the establishment of a republic. The Government was fully impressed with the seriousness of the situation. It tried to find its path to a policy of national reform. It abolished the artificial system of education under which the officials of China had hitherto been trained, established public schools, and provided for instruction in science, law, history, and politics. It sent study-commissions to foreign countries to gather accurate information suitable to Chinese conditions, from all the countries of the world. The reports of these embassies were

published in large editions, and were eagerly read by the educated throughout China, forming a basis for political information.

The task of reform before the Government was, indeed, an appalling one. To transform the easy-going system of administration, under which the Empire had lived for centuries in time of peace and in the absence of all foreign competition, into a centralized, modern engine of national action, is in itself an undertaking that calls for the greatest originality and statesmanship. But the educated people of China were not satisfied to have the Government concern itself with the administration alone. They instinctively centred all their demands about the cry for a national parliament. How could the nation be one before there had been created an organ to express its national public opinion? It was argued that, as all efficient countries are provided with parliaments, as Japan had strengthened herself by creating such an institution, the establishment of a national assembly must be the first step of actual reform. Thus reasoned reformers of all degrees of radicalism.

The Government recognized the justice of these demands. It understood that in the great movement for public efficiency which it had undertaken, it ought to be able to rely upon the coöperation of the Chinese people and of the natural leaders of Chinese society. What better institution could be conceived for gathering up all this powerful social support than a deliberative assembly?

But the Government was as yet by no means decided as to the character and form which should be given to this institution. By the highly important decree of September 1, 1906, it, however, put itself on record as favoring a constitution and the participation of the people in matters of government.

The last five years have been full of nervous action and reaction. Attempts to arrive at clear ideas with respect to great questions of policy have been interrupted again and again by personal controversy, court intrigues, and the panicky fear of revolutionary movements. The forces which the Government has to deal with are complex in the extreme. The imperial clan itself, being non-Chinese, must avoid the appearance of following a mere family or clan policy. The privileged position occupied by Manchu officials had long been irksome to the influential Chinese. The mitigation of these jealousies, the unification of these two elements in the official world, or at all events the adjustment of their mutual claims, was therefore one of the first problems to be faced. The Empress Dowager always had reason to fear that the great national renaissance in China might take an anti-dynastic direction. The efforts of high Manchu officials to avoid such a result led them, in 1900, to make common cause with the Boxers. From the point of view of the imperial house, it is a most serious question how far the nationalist enthusiasm and propaganda can be harmonized with continuance of Manchu domination. That

the true solution lies in the absorption of the Manchus by the mass of the Chinese people, and in the suppression of artificial privileges, is recognized by the Government, many of whose recent measures have been based upon such a policy.

The Government, acting through its high Chinese and Manchu officials, has to deal, further, with all the interests, desires, and tendencies among the four hundred million people of the eighteen provinces and of the dependencies. That the desire for a unified national life and for an effective expression thereof has become so strong that resistance to it would invite revolution, is fully recognized; but, as elsewhere, the people is composed of many elements, discordant and confused in their aims and ideas. The masses of the people, the peasants, tradesmen, and coolie laborers, have not as yet come into political consciousness. They are simple-minded, easily guided this way or that by their leaders, but also apt to run into sudden frenzies of anger or panic, which, when once unloosened, have all the force of an earthquake or typhoon. The intellectual class, on the other hand, composed of men of education and of commercial and industrial importance, is, as that class usually has been, desirous of placing the institutions of the country upon a basis less broad than that of a pure democracy. Only the most radical reformers clamor for universal suffrage. The middle class is merely demanding parliamentary institutions through which the intel-

lect of the nation may manifest itself in politics. On account of the constitution of Chinese society, the influence of these men on their own neighborhoods is greater even than that of the middle class in other countries. It is they who do the political thinking, and whose ideas are willingly followed and supported by the less educated. If the Government could appeal directly to the masses of the people, it might ignore the middle class; but it is impossible to organize the Chinese state on an efficient basis, to concentrate all the vast human energy which it contains, without taking into account the desires of these natural leaders in the various communities.

The Government has definitely embarked upon the policy of parliamentary institutions. Foreign as this conception is to the inherent character of Oriental authority, the exigencies of political life have prevailed, and the counselors of the Empire have placed the institution of a parliament among the leading reforms which are to give China a new vitality. By imperial edict in September, 1907, it was decreed that the constitutional government of the state should rest upon the principle of mutual counsel. Two houses of parliament are held to be the proper foundation of government; and, though the time is not yet ripe for the creation of both, as a basis for the future institution the decree provided for the summoning of a national consultative assembly to be known as the "Tsecheng Yuan," which signifies, "Council of Advice." This body was to be composed of delegates

nominated partly by the Government itself, partly selected by the provincial assemblies. The Manchu prince, Pulun, and a high Chinese official were appointed respectively president and vice-president. The constitution, rules, and regulations of this body were to be worked out before the time of its meeting. Though no definite expression was made on this point, the functions of the national assembly were probably conceived as similar to those of the advisory councils of the Indian Government, to whom legislative and administrative measures are submitted for advice, but whose determinations do not of themselves have the force of law. By another edict there were established in the various provinces bodies similar to the national assembly which were to deal with all proposals for provincial legislation. According to the first form of the edict, these were to be appointed by the provincial governors from among notables and heavy taxpayers of the provinces. They, too, were to act only in an advisory capacity. A certain portion of the membership of the national assembly was to be selected from these provincial bodies.

The reception given to these edicts among the intelligent people of China was far from enthusiastic. They expected a more definite enunciation of the policy of the Government as to the organization and the powers of the national assembly, and, before all, they insisted upon the right of electing representatives instead of having them appointed. They were glad enough to see provin-

cial councils established; but the organ most necessary in their opinion for the upbuilding of Chinese national life is a sovereign parliament representing the entire people of the Chinese provinces. They did not, indeed, urge universal suffrage, and a taxpaying or educational qualification for electors would have been perfectly acceptable; but upon election they did insist, claiming that councils composed of appointed officials would not represent public opinion, but would constitute merely glorified debating societies. The more truculent among the editors charged the Government with evasion and disingenuousness, in that, after having promised a constitution, it was now trying to put off the people with a deceptive appearance of parliamentary institutions. They expressed distrust of mandarins, and charged that the whole reform movement was being turned into a means for personal advantage and into degrading intrigues. The Government, being aggrieved by such a lack of confidence, in December, 1907, issued a decree counseling conservatism; it urged that the people should participate in public affairs, not as mobs and in a disorderly fashion, but with respect for law and in that regular and organized manner which characterizes the use of parliamentary institutions in Europe.

In the year when the establishment of these representative bodies was decreed, the Government had also created a council known as "Hsien-cheng Pien-chakuan," or the "Commission for the Study of Constitu-

tional Government." The work assigned to this body was the investigation of political conditions and needs in the provincial and national life of China, and the study of foreign institutions which might be, in whole or in part, applicable to these needs. The council is, in a way, a constitutional convention, which, on the basis of its findings of fact, works out projects for fundamental laws which are then submitted to the Throne and to the Great Council for their sanction. Its character, to a certain extent, combines the functions of a commission of inquiry with those of a legislative body. The department is made up of high Manchu and Chinese officials whom the Government has long known and trusted. At one time, indeed, in the spring of 1908, when the criticisms which we have noted were current, an appointment was made which indicated the desire of the Government to accord representation also to the more advanced views among the reformers. The appointment was that of Yang Tau, a man who had lived abroad as a student and a follower of Kang Yeu-wei, the original reform leader of China. While still loyal to the dynasty, he represents advanced views on institutional reform. His firm attitude in this matter was preserved by him in his official position. Shortly after his appointment, he delivered an address of five hours before the commission, in the course of which he declared that he had come up to the capital, not for office nor for honor, but for the settlement of this life-and-death question for China. If

he could not assist the Government in forming the parliament, he would rather leave and help the people in various provinces to obtain it, regardless of whatever danger he might himself incur. While he has remained firm in his unqualified belief that the national parliament is the indispensable condition of all other reforms, he has become one of the strongest defenders of the administrative policy of the Government.

The Commission of Constitutional Study set to work with energy on the problem of how to transform the antiquated machinery of the Chinese Government into an efficient organization in which all the various factors would coöperate harmoniously. In May, 1908, a vote was taken in the council as to how soon a constitution should be granted. Yang Tau and three others voted for the shortest period — two years. Seven counselors favored a period of five years, eight a period of seven years, twelve a period of ten years, and one believed it wise to defer the grant of parliamentary institutions for twenty years. It is interesting to note that the members who voted for the shortest period had been educated according to the old school, or in Japanese institutions, while those who had an American or a European education generally voted for a longer term, in most cases for that of ten years.

As was to be foreseen, the Government sided with the more conservative view, and in its edict of August 27, 1908, it decreed that during the next nine years reforms

should be undertaken step by step which would prepare for the granting of a constitution by the year 1917. The edict proceeds: "The Constitutional Laws will then be definitely decided upon by us, and the date for the opening of the parliament will also be announced by that time." A detailed scheme for the reforms referred to in the decree had been worked out by the Commission of Constitutional Study, and was promulgated at the same time. It indicates, with considerable definiteness, the parts of the reform which are to be accomplished every year. Thus the work was to begin, in the first year, with the promulgation of regulations concerning local self-government in cities, towns, and districts, and of regulations for a census; the Ministry of Finance was to reform methods of taxation and accounting; citizens' readers on government were to be published; codes of civil, commercial, and criminal law were to be edited.

The work of administrative reform was to go on gradually, until, during the last of the nine years, there are to be promulgated the Constitution itself, the laws of the imperial household, and the rules and regulations of the parliament and of elections. There is likewise to be created a special council of imperial advisers, probably suggested by the Japanese Privy Council (composed of the *Genro*), and a national budget is to be prepared. It was therefore expected that when parliament should come into being, the new administrative machinery would already be in running order, and the Government would

have the political situation well in hand. In the preparation of the various measures of reform, the administrative departments cooperate with the Commission of Constitutional Study. The latter body thus has acted as the central organ for a great amount of legislative activity of a constitutive character. When the parliament at last assembles, most of the important questions of organization will already have been settled. Throughout the preparatory era, special attention is to be given to public education, to the end that, by 1917, one half of the male population of China shall be able to read and write. The Government has always insisted that representative institutions should not be granted before the people had acquired sufficient knowledge to understand their nature and to use them properly. Education is evidently looked upon as a conservative, as well as enlightening, influence.

The decree of 1907 with respect to the Commission of Constitutional Study was followed, within a month, by an edict establishing in the various provinces advisory bodies, which were to deal with all proposals for provincial legislation. These bodies were to be appointed, by the provincial governors, from among the notables and heavy taxpayers of the provinces. It was also indicated that the members of the national council might be selected from these provincial bodies. The policy of this edict was reaffirmed and made more definite by an edict issued in July, 1908, which also introduced the

elective principle. The decree runs in part as follows: "The consultative council is an institution in which public opinion will be ascertained, and from which the members of the central council may be recruited. Let our people point out clearly through the councils what are the evils that should be abolished in their respective provinces and what are the reforms that they desire. But let them also remember the duty which they owe to the court and to the country. Violent discussion should be prevented, lest the order and safety of society might be disturbed."

The plan worked out by the Commission of Constitutional Study determines with considerable detail the qualifications which must be possessed by members of the provincial council — such as official and scholastic status, property, etc. The councils will be consultative merely, and will be largely under the influence of the provincial officials. The electorate is limited to those who possess the qualification of experience in public office, a high-school degree, or the ownership of property worth five thousand dollars silver. Of great interest is the article which declares that men shall be disqualified from voting "who are perverse and misguided in behavior, who decide matters with unreasoning impulse, and who judge of men with partiality"; moreover, those are excluded, "who in business are not just and honorable, who have been accused and not yet cleared, who use opium, who have heart disease, who belong to a

family of sullied reputation, or who do not know the language." These provisions are still governed by the Confucian ideal of the close connection between government and morality: the virtuous and those of unblemished reputation alone are to take part in public affairs. The political experience of the West has led us to separate political from ethical considerations, and has proved that provisions like these cannot be justly administered in a modern state.

The first provincial elections took place in the spring of 1909; they did not, of course, elicit so much popular interest as would have been shown in case a national parliament were to be chosen. But the very fact that the principle of elective representation has thus been introduced into Chinese political life in a quiet and orderly manner is of supreme importance. Similarly quiet and unpretending was the actual commencement of parliamentary institutions in China. Without blare of trumpets or august ceremony, the legislative councils or assemblies began their functions in the fall of 1909 in every one of the great provinces of China. These groups of representative men, elected according to the rules determined by the Central Government, came together in an unostentatious manner and settled down to the discussion of the common public affairs of their respective provinces. They cautiously felt their way, conscious of the great experiment China had undertaken; and yet, by national temper and individual training, prepared to

deal with matters affecting the public interest with practical common sense. Rather than rushing immediately into legislative activity, these first assemblies were satisfied carefully to survey the field and to study the question of accommodating to one another the various institutions and methods newly created. They, however, took occasion frequently to indicate their belief in their own powers held in reserve.

When, in the subsequent year, the second sessions of the assemblies came on, these bodies were already surer of their ground, so that in many cases they undertook constructive plans of legislation and worked out a definite policy in administrative matters. In several cases conflicts occurred between the local viceroy or governor, and the assembly; as in Kwangsi and Honan, where difficulties arose concerning government loans. The gentry of the provinces are, in general, opposed to having the Central Government take up foreign loans for internal improvements, because, on the one hand, they lack confidence in the technical efficiency of the metropolitan authorities and their representatives, while, on the other, they fear an undue growth of foreign influence. They, therefore, advocate a policy which would attempt to raise at least the larger portion, if not the entirety, of the loans in the different provinces themselves, leaving the enterprise chiefly under provincial control. Thus the question of foreign relations enters strongly even into the politics of the provincial assem-

blies. In Kiangsu, trouble arose about opium, in the suppression of which the governor did not seem energetic and efficient enough; in Yunnan it was because an attempt was made to increase the amount of the salt tax. Whenever a local legislature got into difficulty with its governor, it appealed to the national assembly at Peking for moral support, which was never wanting, as the central body always sided with the local assemblies in such controversies. It is interesting to note in this connection that the right and practice of petition is of real importance in contemporary China. With us, this ancient privilege has rather degenerated in efficiency; through indiscriminate use, it has become dulled and blunted; but in China the traditions of the censorate give special dignity to any form of memorializing public authorities. The provincial assemblies not only receive petitions, but actually read them and pay attention to them. So the petition has become one of the methods through which public opinion strives to express itself in China.

On the whole, the action of the provincial assemblies has by no means been entirely oppositional. They have been animated with a desire to do constructive work; they assist the officials and stimulate them to greater activity. Thus, for instance, the great success which opium suppression has had in Szechuan is, in great part, credited to the manner in which the assembly used all its influence to assist in the carrying-out of measures of restraint. Not only did it act as a body, but the indiv-

idual members used their personal influence with their constituents in order to bring about universal public coöperation in this matter. Wise governors are glad to utilize this new instrumentality for effecting the purposes of administration; they strive to remain on good and trustful terms with the assembly and to invite its coöperation in important matters. There has also been formed an Association of the Assemblies, to which each provincial body sends several delegates. In the meetings of this society questions are discussed upon which a nation-wide interchange of opinion and experience seems profitable. Thus there has already come about a systematic attempt to introduce uniformity into the action of the provincial assemblies in so far as the diverse local conditions may permit.

Of great interest is the manner in which public opinion in many provinces has attempted to control legislative action. Of special significance in this connection are the occurrences in Kwantung during 1910 and 1911. The public of this province, dissatisfied with the action of members of the assembly, actually forced their resignation, introducing in this way a sort of official recall. The trouble arose in connection with gambling, which vice had assumed such serious proportions in Canton and other centres that, to conscientious men, it seemed in its evil effects second only to opium-smoking. The Government had pursued a policy of toleration, licensing public gaming-houses, and employing the proceeds from

fees in the policing of the coast region. With the general moral awakening in China, public sentiment began strongly to condemn the continuance of this vicious system. Members of the Kwantung provincial assembly were, therefore, prevailed upon to introduce a bill to do away with the licensing of such resorts and to prohibit public gambling. Certain powerful financial interests, alarmed at this, and fearing that such a reform might have a bad effect upon business, began to use every conceivable means to influence members of the assembly against the measure. After a tempestuous debate lasting for four days, the bill was rejected. But immediately a great public outcry arose; it was openly charged that thirty-six of the members of the assembly who voted against the bill had been illegally influenced. All through the province a strong demand was voiced that these men should resign, being unworthy of future confidence. Those assemblymen who had favored the passage of the bill themselves threatened to leave office, declaring that they could not longer respect, or work with, the others. The manifestations of public feeling became so strong that the thirty-six suspects were actually forced out and a new election was ordered. The matter also resulted in a change in the person occupying the viceregal office. In the place of an official who had only mildly favored the passage of the bill, there was appointed a vigorous and energetic man who promised to support the measure and to aid in making it possible for the Government to

get along without this particular source of income. The reconstructed assembly, early in 1911, enacted a law under which all public gambling is forbidden in the province of Kwantung. In coöperation with the viceroy, it also devised means for raising money by new taxes so as to supply the deficit created by the suppression of gambling licenses. In this episode the province proved that in cases of great moral importance, the demands of public opinion will be carried out even at the cost of reconstituting a legislative body.

The opening of the first session of the preliminary national assembly at Peking was fixed by the Government to take place on October 3, 1910. This event was looked forward to with the greatest expectation. For the first time, at least for thousands of years, representative men of the entire Chinese people were to meet together to discuss national affairs in public. It was the most striking manifestation of that national unity which the Chinese are now striving to attain. On the day appointed, the assembly was opened by the Prince Regent with a dignified and sympathetic speech, in which he dwelt on the need of a frank understanding and coöperation between the Government and the people. The assembly was composed of 202 members, the majority (102) of whom were appointed by the Government from among men of official rank, while the remainder had been chosen by the provincial assemblies. There were imperial

princes, dukes and noblemen, Manchu and Chinese officials, side by side with men who had won prominence in the constitutional movement in their respective provinces. The body followed the rules of procedure laid down for it by official edicts, which were based upon general parliamentary practice. It used the committee system for the preparation of projects. In plenary session, men spoke either from their seats, or, in the case of more formal addresses, from a tribune, and what they said was taken down by stenographers. The side galleries and balconies were filled with spectators, members of the official world and of the diplomatic corps, army officers, and others who had gained the favor of admittance.

As the summoning of this body marked a radical departure in the political practices of China which had existed for thousands of years, it may be interesting to follow the action of the assembly a little more in detail. The first subject of discussion was a controversy between the governor of Kiangsu and the local assembly on the question of opium restriction. Kiangsu is a province which has profoundly suffered from the ravages of opium-smoking; the representatives in the assembly had charged the governor with not strictly and faithfully enforcing the regulations for the suppression of the traffic. The national assembly took the same attitude and was practically unanimous in its condemnation of the governor. In the discussions on this matter, some of the imperial princes participated, exhibiting a desire to win

the sympathy and confidence of the popular representatives. The assembly then took up the burning question of accelerating the creation of the national parliament. There had been a great amount of agitation throughout China in favor of the immediate convocation of a national parliament with full powers. The Government had argued that a change so important would have to be more gradually approached; that the administrative system of the Empire needed to be remodeled; and, above all, that general education and intelligence in political matters would have to be much more fully developed. The Government, therefore, insisted that the date of 1917 was as early as it was desirable to enter upon this important change; but the classes that control public opinion continued to urge an earlier date. At first sight this impatience is rather difficult to understand; it is, however, in accordance with the general characteristics of the Chinese, who, when they have once made up their minds that a thing is just, will insist upon immediate action. They were inclined to treat the Government as withholding rights to which the Chinese people were entitled, and the argument that these rights should only gradually be established was compared in the press with the reasoning of the thief cited by Mencius, who, when caught in systematic stealing from a neighbor, was ready to promise that he would take a little less every year until he had accustomed himself to the new situation. But there is another reason for this impatience in

the deep lack of confidence which the people feel in the ability of the Government to protect China against exploitation by foreign powers. As things have been going, the Chinese feel that every year, yes, every month, precious advantages may be lost to the nation through official incompetence; and they cling with an ardent hope to the belief that once a national parliament is established, public affairs will be conducted in a more efficient manner. It is this fear of successful foreign aggression that is one of the main causes for resisting the postponement of parliamentary institutions until 1917. The matter was eloquently argued in the assembly on the ground that the Government was not justified in withholding from the people this right. As there were in the Government a great many persons who themselves felt that the sooner the new institutions were definitely established, the better for the successful conduct of affairs, the Government was prevailed upon to yield, and the summoning of a national parliament of two houses was fixed for the year 1913. Even this did not satisfy the radicals, who opposed any delay at all; but the Government did not yield further, and by edict it directed that those outsiders who were still carrying on an agitation in Peking should be ordered to leave and let the matter rest.

This success of the Tsecheng Yuan made it ambitious to gain greater recognition for itself. Continuing to take up individual cases where controversies had happened between governors and provincial assemblies, it always

took the side of the latter and tried to obtain the condemnation of the respective governors. Thus, in the province of Honan the governor had neglected to consult the assembly with respect to a provincial loan; the national assembly accordingly called for punitive action by the Government. The edict which was issued in response to this resolution stated that, while the governor had been negligent in omitting a step in the procedure, the policy of the loan was in accordance with the plans of the Central Government and that therefore no change would be made, although in the future governors would be directed to consult the local assembly in such cases. This response was entirely unsatisfactory to the popular party; they refused to be mollified by fair-spoken promises and insisted that this particular governor should have been punished; after a long debate, the conclusion resulted that the Great Council was responsible for this leniency and should be called to account. A vote was passed censuring the Great Council and summoning its members before the assembly to explain their non-action. When they refused to respond, the assembly went a step farther by demanding that they should be dismissed, and that a responsible cabinet should be appointed in their place.

It is certainly a significant fact that an assembly composed with such conservative means should have immediately developed so strong an attitude of opposition. It virtually declared itself the sovereign represent-

ative of the people, after the fashion of the French Constituent Assembly; and insisted not only that it should be consulted in all important matters of legislation, but that the high officials of state should be held responsible for carrying out its determinations. This attitude affords an insight into the independent spirit which animates the Chinese public. The members who represented the provincial assemblies argued the popular view of institutions with such ability and emphasis that they carried with them a great many of the official delegates. Of course, the Government itself was anxious to meet the nation halfway and to avoid an open rupture. But when, step by step, the assembly attempted to establish itself as the centre of authority; when the popular representatives drew a distinction between the power of making laws and that of issuing mere administrative ordinances, claiming the former function as belonging to their body; when they held that from the provision that their advice must be sought it followed that their advice must be taken; the Government finally took a decided position against such extreme claims. When the members of the Great Council had offered their resignations, the Prince Regent refused to accept them. In doing so he issued an edict in which he asserted that the conduct of public business, and especially the making of appointments, belongs to the functions of the Government and is not for the assembly, "nor others." The last phrase was most offensive to the assembly. Great excitement pre-

vailed and many speeches were made advising immediate adjournment, since all effective power had been denied; but finally Yi Chung-kwei said, "No, we shall not go away, for then we should shirk our duty like the Council. We stay here." A new address to the Prince Regent was adopted, asking for a responsible cabinet. The Government did not unequivocally yield to this demand, although an edict was issued charging the Commission of Constitutional Study to make preparatory arrangements for the earlier summoning of parliament as agreed upon, and also for the institution of a cabinet. The question of the relation of this new cabinet to parliament was not at the time determined. After this action, the government supporters in the assembly took a stronger position and no further resolutions were adopted on these fundamental public policies.

The assembly spent some time in discussing the abolition of the queue. An impassioned debate took place in which Prince Tsai Yunnan spoke in favor of the change. Many comical incidents occurred. An old official from the financial department was very much agitated about the matter. In great excitement, he cried, "Cut off your queues! Cut off your queues! I shall not do it. If you insist, I shall not stay here, but go away." But then, probably realizing that he would not find much comfort in leaving China, he cried to Prince Pulun in a tearful voice, "Mr. President, this cannot be; cannot you help us?" To which the Prince coldly remarked, "I have

nothing to do with it at all." A vote was passed calling for the abolition of the queue in the army, among Peking officials, among students and teachers; which was frantically applauded in the galleries. The Government did not carry out this resolution. It even issued an edict against a change of national dress, saying, however, nothing about the queue. Thereafter the young patriots all over China, young and old, but mostly the former engaged in queue-cutting ceremonies. It now became a visible mark of progressive spirit to be rid of the obsolete appendage. Some patriotic souls had the idea of devoting the proceeds from the sale of the hair to paying off the national indebtedness.

The national assembly also devoted itself to a discussion of the budget, which had been worked out and submitted by the Government. The estimates indicated a probable deficit of 80,000,000 taels. Confronted by this situation, the assembly had two alternatives: the reduction of expenses and the levying of new taxes. Had the assembly been ready at this time to elaborate and adopt a permanent fiscal policy, it would have been necessary to provide for largely increased revenue. But as the Government had not yet unequivocally pronounced itself on the latitude of power it was willing to accord the national parliament, the assembly steered clear of all measures which would have made the Government more independent financially and which would also not have contributed to the popularity of the assembly among

taxpayers. It, therefore, confined its work to cutting budget estimates, especially through a reduction in official salaries. Now, it is well known that the scale of salaries is not such that they can be further reduced without interfering with the efficiency of the service. When officials are absolutely underpaid, they will seek outside sources of income. The only way in which the Chinese administration can be freed from corruption and incompetence is to place salaries on an adequate basis. The cuts in the estimates which were made led to a veritable reign of terror in official Peking. General Yin Chang the War Minister, reduced the number of employees in his office by several hundred, and in other ministries, too, a great many unnecessary positions were discontinued. But with all this, the fundamental question of giving the Chinese Government more adequate resources was not advanced. It will have to be faced in the immediate future. The Government needs Parliament because it needs money, and a parliament must be strong enough to take upon its shoulders, together with legislative power, the burden and odium of increasing the customary taxes of the whole country. The chances are, however, that the Government will not be able to obtain a substantial increase in revenue before it has accorded to the national representation genuine powers of initiative and control.

On January 11, the first session of the Chinese Assembly was adjourned by official edict. It had been a stormy

period, and now opinion was divided as to the success of the experiment. The constructive programme which the assembly had at first proposed to itself, including administrative and educational reform, advance in railways, communication, and other developmental matters, had not been elaborated. The assembly had spent its time in seeking to gain political authority and in criticizing the Government. But while these results seem disappointing, on the other hand, the assembly had conducted its proceedings with dignity,¹ and there had been developed a certain public leadership. The most important result of this first assembly was the unmistakable clearness with which it was demonstrated that really effective parliamentary institutions alone would satisfy the Chinese public. From a political point of view, therefore, the assembly was most interesting. It could perhaps hardly be expected that it should immediately make itself very useful in the matter of administrative reform; though in its future work it will be judged by detailed results rather than by general claims and professions.

¹ The manner in which Prince Pulun, as president, conducted the proceedings of the assembly is one of the most notable features of this great experiment. That a Manchu prince, totally unaccustomed, of course, to the methods of parliamentary bodies, should be able to enforce parliamentary law in the clearest fashion, and that he should always act as a strictly impartial moderator, holding the balance equally between contending factions, is indicative not only of quick intelligence but of high and unusual qualities of character. While this statesmanlike conduct may not have earned the Prince official favor, it certainly has gained for his judicial temperament wide admiration in China and elsewhere.

It is characteristic for the situation in China that, immediately after the adjournment of the assembly, intrigues began among high officials with a view to securing positions in the cabinet to be created. The discussion as to how soon it was to be organized and what its powers were to be was dominated by personal considerations. Thus, the opponents of Prince Ching, hoping he would not be appointed Prime Minister, favored the early establishment of the new organization which would displace the Great Council. An unfortunate tendency was present in the effort to bring forward for this most important position superannuated princes who had been holding various sinecures, such as the headship of the Imperial Clan Court or of the College of Astronomy. Unless China can place her biggest and most experienced men in the premiership, her national woes will continue and augment. The creation of a cabinet ought to be a decided departure from the old system in which such a thing as united and centralized authority was unknown. Not only did each department constitute a college of officials in which there was no definite leadership nor responsibility, but the departments in their relations to one another were similarly disorganized. The creation of a cabinet under the responsible headship of a prime minister would therefore be a radical and beneficent change, especially if it were to be accompanied by placing each department under a minister with full authority. A beginning in this direction was made in 1911, when the

Department of War was freed from the collegiate régime and placed under the control of one supreme official. The edict of May, 1911, by which a cabinet is created, was, however, in most respects disappointing. The organization which it provides for is altogether too cumbersome and complicated, and not sufficiently removed from the old Chinese idea of government by equipoise through colleges of officials. Moreover, the question of the relation of the cabinet to the National Parliament is left unsolved by this edict.

In order to advance the cause of parliamentary institutions in China, there have been formed a number of political associations. Such are the Association for Preparing Constitutional Citizenship, the Association for the Study of the Constitution, the Constitutional Discussion Society, etc. The expression of public opinion in China has been facilitated through these associations. They started a movement as a result of which sixteen of the provinces sent representatives to Peking during the summer of 1908, for the purpose of presenting memorials to the Throne favoring the establishment of a national parliament. These associations devote themselves to the discussion of public policies, both foreign and domestic. Political problems are considered, and proposals are worked out for legislative action. This activity is merely one of the indications of the aptitude of the Chinese people for public discussion. They have,

indeed, in the past not been without training for this purpose; and in creating a national assembly and provincial councils, the Government is not building in the air.

Though in theory the Chinese Government is absolute, its representatives and agents have never been able to disregard the public opinion of the community in which they were working. It is practically impossible to impose any new tax without conciliating the opinion of the leading men of the neighborhood. Should any official neglect to put himself in touch with these forces, his decrees would be disregarded. The Chinese have always been accustomed to take communal action. Rather than pay a tax to which they had not consented, they would close their business houses and engage in a boycott or strike, until their grievances had been listened to, and the matter in controversy had been adjusted in accordance with their own sense of equity. The Chinese people are grouped in various guilds and associations. The affairs of these bodies are managed by discussion in the meetings of the guild officials and members. The demand for a national assembly is therefore the natural outgrowth of a practice which is deeply ingrained in Chinese social life. The political associations which have been mentioned would readily grow into political groups and parties, were a parliament once established. It is of course a question how far party action could be made a valuable and potent political force in China. Bitter

struggles may be expected before the true functions of political parties have been determined, and permanent groupings established. The experience of Japan teaches us how difficult it is to adapt party action to a system of highly centralized authority.

When the people of a Chinese neighborhood resist the imposition of a new tax until certain grievances have been adjusted, they are exercising the essential function of parliamentary government. The powers of the "Mother of Parliaments" grew up in this manner, and the financial functions of parliamentary assemblies are always the centre of their action. It is here that the whole question of Chinese parliamentarism hinges. In order to carry through the vast reforms planned in the administration, in the school system, in the construction of railways and roads, in the maintenance of a modern army and navy, the Chinese Government needs money in quantities that increase in a geometrical progression. The burdens of a foreign debt imposed upon China in 1894 and 1900 must also be considered. Altogether it is plain that, even with effective fiscal reforms, the present sources of public income in China are inadequate. Compared with the taxes in such countries as Japan, India, or the Philippines, those levied in China are very moderate indeed. Sir Robert Hart expressed his belief that it need not cause any particular difficulty to increase the income of the Chinese Government tenfold. But no matter how rapidly the Chinese people may be

developing a strong and devoted patriotism, they will continue to resist as much as ever the arbitrary imposition of new taxes. In order to provide itself with the necessary funds, the Chinese Government must reconcile the opinion of the nation to its policies. If this is to be done through the multitude of local officials distributed over the Empire, the results will be inadequate, and official action will be constantly embarrassed by great friction and outbreaks of violence. Altogether the simplest and safest method of dealing with the nation in this matter would be through a body of representatives. As the kings of England commanded the knights of the shires to come together for the purpose of adjusting taxation, so the Chinese Government could well afford to command the provinces and prefectures to send their representatives, in order that mutual arrangements might be made for adequately supplying the ever-increasing financial needs of the Empire.

But the causes which make the creation of a parliament necessary in China are more deep-seated even than financial needs. In order to understand the present political problems of China, we ought always to remember that hitherto the functions of government have covered only a small part of social and economic life. If we should conceive of the governmental powers exercised in Western countries in their greatest completeness as covering the area of a large circle, we should find that only a minute part of these functions, covering a small

segment of the circle, is exercised in China by governmental agencies. Another portion of what with us is public business has, in China, been in the hands of the people themselves and has been managed almost without governmental interference. But these two areas, taken together, would occupy only a small portion of the circle of the total functions exercised by Western public administrations. Thus in such circle we should have two small segments assigned respectively to the Chinese Government and to the people, besides a large area unallotted to either. The situation will appear clear if we look for a minute at the ordinary activities of the Chinese Government before the beginnings of reform. Its chief functions were taxation, the collecting and disbursement of revenues, the making of official appointments, and the selection of candidates for office through public examination. Beyond these, the Government was supposed to provide for the defense of the country, which was done in a most haphazard way; it enforced the criminal law, and gave a great deal of attention to ceremonial rites. On the other hand, the people managed for themselves, with very little governmental interference, all business connected with their local affairs; roads and other means of communication as far as maintained at all were kept up in this way, and education was provided entirely by private enterprise. Controversies that would in other countries fall under the purview of the civil law were settled mostly by private arbitration

and through the guild courts. The currency was issued largely by private bankers.

Between these two areas of public functions, exercised either by the Government, on the one hand, and through joint effort of the people, on the other, there lies an extensive field not occupied by either. Within the latter there would be found such important functions as preventative or protective policing, creation and maintenance of many classes of public works, and, in general, nearly all those developmental and inspectional functions, of which the business of a modern state is largely composed. When the Chinese began to see the need of greater public activity, there forthwith began a sharp competition between the Government and the people for control over these new fields. It was felt by all that the developmental functions which had hitherto been neglected or only partially exercised would have to be put into use in order to strengthen the nation. From our point of view it would, of course, be perfectly natural for the Government to expand its sphere of activity and directly to undertake these new duties and powers. But the Chinese public has a deep-seated suspicion of official methods. While the sway of mandarins has been tolerated as an unavoidable evil, every one has sought to keep his affairs as free as possible from official interference. Now, when the Government desires to build railways and roads, to establish educational institutions, and in general to undertake that multitude of adminis-

trative functions to which we are accustomed in our countries, the Chinese public struggles for its traditional independence; and in order to protect itself, it undertakes by private initiative the performance of such work as is plainly necessary. Thus, by the side of government schools, educational institutions of the gentry are still being maintained and developed in every province and locality. When the Government attempts to build a railway, the merchants refuse to furnish it the necessary funds; when it attempts to take up foreign loans, they resist such a policy, and offer to finance and manage the railway themselves. So the circle of governmental functions and the circle of popular action are both expanding and taking up some of the hitherto unassigned work of administration. Many public associations have been formed for this purpose, societies for self-government and for the development of citizenship. While the creation of municipal assemblies or councils has been favored by imperial edict, these bodies also represent an almost spontaneous action of the public in an attempt to manage its affairs in its own way, without any special reference to officials. These councils, or assemblies, are large. The number of sixty members is not unusual; they are, indeed, veritable parliaments on a small scale. The assemblies take up questions of public improvement, such as road-making, street-lighting, and water-supply, as well as more effective police service. They conduct independent investigations and formulate plans

of action, which would be carried through without the assistance of officials, if necessary. However, very often this initiative gives a stimulus to the local officialdom; they extend their activity and try to improve their methods for fear of having the assembly encroach upon their powers. In the suppression of recent mutinies near Canton, the self-government association of the region was far more efficient than the officials of the Government, a fact which was acknowledged by the viceroy. This particular society has also done most valuable work in organizing a relief service for the care of sufferers from floods and famines. As the public assumes the attitude that it will itself exercise these public functions if they are not properly fulfilled by the officials, it is plain that the assemblies, municipal and provincial, which represent such constituencies, will not be satisfied with a merely passive and advisory rôle. The same is true of the National Parliament, which is certain to be animated by exactly the same spirit. The public will not allow the official world to extend its field of activity in these many new directions without itself having a share therein, either through immediate participation or through parliamentary representation. The latter method, therefore, is the only way in which the Chinese Empire, as a state or public organization, can get thorough control of those fields of administration which have hitherto been neglected.

But this extension of the functions of government

brings with it another competition. As the people have hitherto been comparatively free from governmental interference, so have the provinces largely been left to manage their own affairs, though under the direction of a governor or viceroy and of other officials sent from Peking. The demand made by the metropolitan authorities upon the provincial officials was that they should somehow or other see to it that affairs ran along smoothly in their districts, that the taxes were paid and the revenues forwarded with reasonable promptness. The details of government were left to the local authorities, and there was no such thing as a centralized administrative control. Now when the National Government, in order to strengthen the Empire, is taking up the new functions which we have spoken of, it at the same time begins to tighten its control over the provinces, while the latter resist this centralizing tendency. These Chinese provinces, vast nations in themselves, could never be reduced to the level of mere administrative circumscriptions like the Japanese *fu* or the French *préfecture*. It is, therefore, one of the major problems in Chinese legislation to-day how to adjust the relations of the provinces to the strong central authority which is being created. So far very little headway has been made in working out a definite and harmonious system of relations between the provinces and the metropolitan Government. The authorities at Peking are attempting to get control of all branches of administrative activity and are issuing

multitudinous edicts on these matters to provincial officials. Now the legal power to do this indeed exists, but the enforcement of such decrees is another matter. It depends entirely upon the temper of the local society how far a governor may be able to carry out the demands made upon him by Peking.

A far more thorough analysis of federal organization than has hitherto been made will be necessary in China, because here the powers in question are just beginning to be exercised and it is more difficult to find a historical basis for their distribution than it was in the United States, Germany, Australia, or India. Yet, the experience of these countries has much to teach the Chinese at this juncture. The assignment of attributions either to central or provincial authorities ought to be determined in relation to the vast size of China and the varied conditions in its several regions. The powers should be placed where they could be most effectively exercised, and only those should be united in the Central Government in which a unified system for the whole nation is possible and desirable. Precedents are indeed abundant in the systems already mentioned, but their application depends upon special conditions in China. The German Constitution has many admirers among Chinese officials. What makes it appropriate and renders it acceptable to the governmental party is the prominence it accords to the imperial office, as well as the fact that the federal relation is effectively elaborated, and that the popular

element in the state is reconciled with the demands of a powerful central administration. Among the constitutions of modern civilized states, that of Japan has most of suggestiveness for the Chinese legislators. The dignity and importance of the imperial office is there maintained. The Japanese Diet is given a great latitude of discussion and coöperation, but the real power of government is in the hands of the Council of the Elder Statesmen. The Diet, indeed, has the sole right of authorizing new levies of taxation; but while at times the Government has been seriously embarrassed by the lack of funds, in the long run it has been able to obtain a vast increase of revenues. The Japanese Diet has on the whole assisted in binding the nation loyally to the Government, and it has certainly brought about a stronger national feeling. But it is already clear that Chinese legislative assemblies will demand more extensive powers than are exercised by the Diet of Japan. The independent action and self-help to which Chinese society has been for ages accustomed, stands in the way of the complete absorption of administrative authority by the Government itself. Moreover, the ruling family of China, being foreign in origin and having of late suffered many reverses, cannot count on that instinctive loyalty and ready submission which is the corner-stone of authority in Japan.

There is one other reason operative in China which favors the growth of strong parliamentary institutions.

The traditions of the Government are not those of leadership, of a strong, active policy, but they are expressed rather in a seeking for an equipoise of forces. In his attempt to keep a province at peace, a governor would strive to balance conflicting influences against one another; and likewise, from the point of view of the metropolitan officials, success would consist in the ability to take advantage of rivalry and jealousies and to match against one another forces whose joint action might become dangerous. This principle has also been the chief guidance of the Chinese in foreign affairs, so that Chinese diplomacy has usually aimed at nothing higher than to play off one nation against another. It is even probable that one of the elements which determined the Government to establish deliberative assemblies was the hope that new elements would thus be introduced which could be utilized as counters in this old game of balancing forces. But it is plain that what China needs most particularly at the present time is leadership strong enough to batter down these ancient contrivances, and, arising superior to them, to pursue an active and positive policy of organizing Chinese public life on a higher plane of efficiency. The public seems to recognize the need, and for this reason, too, the parliaments are so insistent in claiming for themselves an authority which will transcend and outweigh the artifices of official intrigue. It remains, of course, to be seen whether they will be able to free themselves from these insidious habits and tenden-

cies in Chinese public life. The Government itself has apparently also come to the conclusion that leadership and concentrated responsibility are necessary in public administration. They are now taking steps to abolish the old system of compensated balance in official organization, and, as we have seen, a cabinet headed by a prime minister has been established.

One of the special problems much discussed in China relates to the best basis upon which the representation in a national parliament may be founded. We have already seen that the introduction of universal suffrage is not contemplated at present. The Government originally favored councils appointed from among representative men, somewhat after the manner in which the councils of the Indian Government are made up. The idea of representation of interests has also been strongly put forward by Chinese publicists. The Government ordered a careful study to be made of the Austrian system, under which special representation in the Reichsrath is accorded to urban and rural communes, to industrial and commercial associations, and to universities. For a while it seemed that some such plan of interest representation would be adopted in working out the details of the Chinese Constitution. This would have taken account of communal feeling existing in such districts as the *fu* and the *hsien*, the professional cohesion among learned men, as well as the associative relations of the guilds and industrial companies. This method was

ultimately not adopted in the electoral law for the provincial assemblies, which has, as already stated, an official, educational, and property qualification. In practice, however, this arrangement works out so as to produce a representation of interests, rather than of numbers; and as the members of the national assembly are elected largely from among members of the provincial bodies, the same principle obtains throughout. But as the intelligence of the great mass of the people increases, the movement for manhood suffrage will undoubtedly gain in strength. At the present time scholastic education does not reach the masses, nor do they as yet manifest a decided interest in public affairs.

So far as the general policy of the Chinese Government at the present time may be determined, stripped of temporary vacillations and of the merely hortatory elements so common in Chinese documents it may be expressed in the following rough outline. Governmental authority must be maintained, but the officials must govern in accord with public opinion, though not in detail dependent upon it. The character and morale of official methods must be improved. The tests for appointment to office must be based upon modern science and practical efficiency, while the character and personality of the candidate too must be taken into account in making selections. Salaries will be increased in order that the officers of the Government may not depend upon illegal fees and exactions. The general efficiency

of the system is to be improved through the enforcement of stricter responsibility, and through scientific accounting. In all this work the people should assist the Government and give it their confidence. Such representation as will be accorded them ought to strengthen the state by enlisting popular sympathy and coöperation. But a constitution cannot be imported from without; it must build upon the living forces in the nation and utilize them for the general ends of the state. The Government, therefore, must be allowed to take time to feel its way, in order that the institutions, once introduced, may actually fit into the political and social life of China.

The Chinese Government would, of course, be reluctant to give up the substance of power to a representative assembly. This fact is made the basis of the argument advanced by the ultra-revolutionary forces that China can be endowed with true national institutions only through a revolution in which the dynasty would be utterly overthrown and a purely elective government established. But it would seem that in the Chinese situation at the present time, Burke is rather a safer guide than Rousseau. The Government would, indeed, defeat its own purposes, and might bring on even sadder catastrophes than China has already suffered, if it should attempt to dam up the great forces of public opinion that are now seeking to express themselves. A national parliament must be created; and it must, moreover, be

a body truly representative of the intelligence and energy of the nation. We ought, of course, not to expect too much of such an institution, as parliaments are not ideal in any part of the world. But when public opinion has thus been enlisted, there will have been created an inquest of the nation, through which the Government may readily ascertain the feeling of its subjects throughout the Empire. New imposts of taxation will be given authority by acceptance through representatives, and the financial administration of the Empire will benefit through parliamentary control.

But all this is only a beginning. An institution like a parliament brings with it new difficulties, party controversies, the introduction into political life of personal ambitions, although on a far higher plane than that of court intrigue. So the difficulties of China will not vanish by the creation of this organ. China will, indeed, have endowed herself with an instrument that may be used toward bettering her general condition. But the real work of reform must be done in the administration. There the confidence of the people must be won. The corrupt methods which have obtained in the past must give way to strict accountability, and to the maintenance of just and legal charges. The great public works which the Government is undertaking call for unusual capacity and devotion in the public service. Should there be over-centralization, the development of the provinces would suffer; and yet these great units will

have to submit to a more direct, centralized control than they have felt in the past, in order that the nation may act as one body and bring to bear its concentrated energies. Thus it is clear that, with the achievement of parliamentary institutions, the real work of China will have just begun. But if these institutions can be so adjusted that they will constitute the expression of a true union between the Government and the people, the solution of the other difficulties and problems will have been rendered far easier than it would have been in the hands of an administration working at cross-purposes with an independent public opinion.

CHAPTER VII

INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN JAPAN ¹

THE intellectual life of less self-conscious ages than ours has had no independent existence. Men have sought some other primary purpose, and given to philosophy, to poetry, to story-telling, only that time and attention which they could spare from more strenuous, or at least outwardly more energetic, pursuits. The minnesinger or troubadour played on his viol and poetized when he was not wielding the sword. When men first began to devote themselves entirely to the joys of the spirit, their fate is that of Rutebœuf, — grinding poverty, and the gray misery of an outcast's life; unless perchance they may come to enjoy the patronage of some Mæcenas. From these humiliations, they cannot, with Doctor Johnson, proudly declare themselves independent, until another age has dawned, an age in which the things of the mind are valued in and for themselves.

Japan is but now emerging from a state of culture which it shared with mediæval Europe throughout a remarkable parallelism of historic development. In

¹ In connection with this chapter the author desires to call attention to the excellent literary summaries published in the *Japan Mail*, of which he has been a constant reader and which give an admirable current account of Japanese literary activities.

Japan, as in Europe, it was the priest who philosophized, though his first duty was to pray; it was the samurai, the warrior, who developed poetry in the moments of relaxation from the severities of military discipline and warlike combat. Yet, though intellectual life under these conditions can develop only as it connects itself in an ancillary way with the two great interests of war and religion, nevertheless the clear purpose and well-defined ideals that are apt to animate an age of action are favorable to the creation of literary masterpieces, so that there may be a literature though there are no literary men. But even in Dante, the temper of priest and warrior is predominant.

In old Japan, art and philosophy were hieratic, or courtly and precious. Under the Tokugawa régime a new era dawned with the popularizing of literature through Bakin, and the picturing of the humbler phases of life in the Ukiyoye. Then with the Restoration a flood of new experiences and emotions burst upon the Japanese, carrying them along toward a more varied and specialized civilization. Yet the substructure of Japanese society is so firm that the earlier influences and ideas are still powerful, and we cannot understand the intellectual struggles and triumphs of modern Japan unless we often revert to the literary activities of the priests and the samurai, or rather of those among them who had a feeling for the things of the mind.

With the new era has come a reign of general educa-

tion. Illiteracy has almost disappeared, and a large reading public has come into being. We cannot, indeed, expect the same taste and discrimination that characterized the courtly circles of the earlier age, but there is a broader field in which intellectual life — of higher or lower aspirations — may flourish. Old class distinctions and trade-groupings have broken down, and the simple activities of the earlier societies have multiplied and have become specialized in the endless complexity of modern life. Thus there has come about an opportunity for men to devote themselves more exclusively to science, literature, or philosophy. In dignity and independence their position is not equal to that which *savants* have obtained in Western countries, but something has been achieved in that direction. The limitations inherited from the earlier society still condition these activities, but they are emerging constantly into greater prominence and repute.

Whoever desires to grasp the essential currents of Japanese thought, and picture to himself the modern development of Japanese psychology, is beset with innumerable difficulties, which all, however, contribute to the deep interest of the problem. The adjustment of an old culture, itself highly refined and complex, to entirely new conditions; trying demands upon faculties which had not been cultivated before; the adoption of new processes and modes of thought, and their amalgamation with those elements which had been retained

from the past — these are the main requirements imposed upon Japan by her new situation. Of transcendent interest to the student of psychology is the rapid development of faculties such as the mathematical, which in the feudal society were considered unworthy of cultivation, being looked down upon as mercenary and plebeian.

Nor is the Japanese mind perplexed only by the difficulty of choosing between the old and the new. Added to this great problem of policy and conduct, is one common to the entire civilized world to-day, but which under Japanese conditions assumes a peculiarly troublesome aspect. It concerns the relation of the demands of material development and technical perfection to those deeper elements of culture — the art of literary and pictorial expression, the emotional life of poetry, and all that mankind yearns after when its highways have been constructed and its harvests garnered. The necessities of national self-defense and maintenance have in Japan emphasized everything that makes for material strength and have put on the defensive, even more than in Western countries, those pursuits and enthusiasms whose value transcends mathematical demonstration.

The student of Japanese psychology will also note many other interesting likenesses to other civilizations. Though in character and temperament the Japanese have much in common with the French, yet in their intellectual and scientific culture, they have followed rather the English and the Germans. During the pre-

sent era, the star of the French has not been in the ascendant; they are not preëminently a successful race. And disregarding to a certain extent intellectual sympathies, Japan has turned to those who, under present conditions, stand for demonstrable success and positive achievement.

Before entering upon a survey of the intellectual life of Japan, it is necessary that we should divest ourselves entirely of the superficial theory, so frequently put forward, that there is an impassable gulf between the psychology of the East and that of the West. If such a view is to be held at all, we ought to accept it only after it has been forced upon us unavoidably as the result of long observation and comparison in many fields of intellectual life. Nothing is easier than to enunciate a startling, absolute theory and then to give a few examples, which to the superficial view bear out the aphorism. No matter how different from our own may be the Japanese mental attitude and manner of expression, it is not necessary to accept such a transcendental explanation when we still have the effects of social structure and physical environment to take into account as determining factors. Were we to enter upon this matter at this place, it would be easy to make a *prima facie* case for the identity of psychological organization and intellectual activity among Japanese and Europeans; but this is not our purpose. We would rather look at life as it presents itself and, above all, endeavor to appreci-

ate the multitude of shades that distinguish apparently similar relations and phenomena. Thus, shunning generalization of a sweeping kind, we shall pass in review certain types of Japanese intellectual experience, and attempt to gather by accretion a composite view of the operation of intellectual forces in the Japan of to-day.

The type of priest who is also a philosopher and man of learning is still found in Japan, though modernized and adapted to new conditions. Let us look for a moment at the career of Count Kozui Otani, by inheritance Lord Abbot of the Nishi Hongwanji, the great western monastery of the Shin sect of Buddhism. This young man, destined for the most influential position in the Buddhist Church in Japan, prepared himself for his duties and responsibilities by a long period of study abroad. He spent four years in Europe examining the relations of religion to political life, looking into the details of the government of the Established Church in England and Germany, as well as into the religious difficulties of France. Nor was he without the companionship of numerous other Buddhist students, men of high rank who were following learning with a similar purpose and from a similar point of view in the great centres of European education.¹

¹ His brother, Sompō Otani, was studying at Cambridge; Tesshin Watanabe and S. Fujii were observing ecclesiastical government in England; S. Sonada was at Berlin following the university courses on comparative religion; while another member of the group, K. Honda, was far away in Sumatra, investigating the condition of his co-religionaries in that island.

After completing his European studies, Count Otani went to India, where he carried on researches in the early history of Buddha and his religion. He gathered many inscriptions and other historical data, proceeding in the collection and criticism of historical material according to approved scientific methods. The death of the reigning Lord Abbot called him back to Japan in 1903. Here an abundance of work lay ready to his hand. Buddhist missionaries were sent to the United States and to China, and the Buddhist societies in California were given assistance and encouragement. When the great war came, a service of chaplains for the army had to be organized. The patriotic outburst of the war aroused in Buddhist endeavor new vigor and enthusiasm. Especially in the field of China was missionary work taken up with redoubled energy. Fertile in resources, an active and efficient organizer, the Lord Abbot has been the soul of the great Buddhist expansion of these recent years. Meanwhile, he leads the simplest of lives, ascetic in his conduct, living without ostentation or a large household, but full of energy and enthusiasm in his action.

The sermons of another Buddhist ecclesiastic, Sōyen Shaku, Lord Abbot of the great Kamakura monastery, which were delivered to audiences in the United States, also give us an insight into the intellectual awakening among the higher Buddhist clergy. Not only are internal questions of belief and ethical principle dealt with

in a broad and modern spirit, but these sermons also contain highly significant discussions of the relation of Buddhism to Oriental and Western culture. There is a great deal of preaching in Japan, and many books of sermons are published. These discourses are less formal than with us, they contain little of purely doctrinal matter, but discuss ethical teaching in its relation to life, and are enlivened with many anecdotes and quaint applications of folk-wisdom.

In its first effects, the Restoration in Japan was not favorable to religious fervor. The revival of Shintō proceeded from purely political motives and did not imply a strengthening of religious sentiment except as it expressed itself in loyalty to the throne and to national traditions. Whatever religious zeal was aroused by this feeling was turned into channels of state action. The attitude of mind of the leaders in this great transformation was purely secular. They judged of religions by their fruits, that is, by the ethical impulse they imparted. Nor were they inclined to view with enthusiasm the achievements of the older forms of religion in the matter of ethical culture.

Kunitake Kume has described for us, with a touch of humor, the experience of a group of representative Japanese in 1872. In that year Prince Iwakura went to America and Europe at the head of a mission of which such prominent men as Kido, Okubo, and Itō were members. Kume, who accompanied the mission in the capac-

ity of an expert on Chinese and literary subjects, was detailed, with another member, to make an investigation of the state of religion in the West. In their zeal to begin work, they early on the voyage accosted a Roman Catholic priest, and questioned him about Western religion. They got an account of the Ten Commandments and of the Trinity; but soon the tables were turned, and they were themselves questioned on the religion of Japan. The answers which they gave did not satisfy either themselves or their hearers. So a council of war was held in the smoking-room that night. What attitude should the mission take when questioned about Japanese religion? It was first suggested that they might claim Buddhism as the religion of Japan, but it had to be confessed that there was no one in the mission who knew enough of Buddhism to give a trustworthy account of it, especially on doctrinal matters. Confucianism might be professed, but this would not help matters, as Occidentals look upon the doctrines of the great sage as merely a politico-ethical system. Shintō was ruled out, as it was then too little known in the West, and also because a religion which lacks sacred books, and one whose observances are so archaic, might not particularly impress the Western mind. There remained no alternative but to confess that Japan had no religion — an unfortunate situation, because heathen are considered but little better than wild beasts in the West.

This dilemma did not, however, prove fatal to the

mission, for they were not questioned as to their religion during all the remainder of their trip. On their part they had the amusement of wondering at the strangeness of Western ceremonies and at the piety of their host, when Sir Harry Parkes took them to a service of the Established Church in England. In relating this experience, Kume dwells upon the change which has come over the educated Japanese in the matter of religion. In the earlier part of the Meiji era most men of education shunned religion as unworthy of a rational mind and corrupting in its practices. Now they no longer denounce and repudiate religion, but admitting the importance of religious sentiment, direct their shafts of satire against beliefs and practices that seem superstitious.

On the other hand, it is apparent that the educated classes of Japan are not entirely free from what may be truly called superstition, — from the personal belief that man is surrounded by beneficent as well as by evil spirits or influences, which may be propitiated by befitting observances. Fanciful suppositions of occult influences by which the course of human destiny is determined, are common in Japan. During the Russian War, carloads of ikons were shipped to the frontier by the Orthodox believers; but the Japanese, also, did not disdain to court the favor of mystic powers by wearing amulets, and observing special rites.

It is difficult to draw the line between superstition and

higher forms of religion, and the ceremonies observed by such great leaders as Togo and Kodama undoubtedly bear witness to the awakening of religious feeling under the spur of the tremendous struggle for national life. But other practices common among the people are plainly superstitious — certain sounds are believed to forbode ill, there are lucky and unlucky ways of beginning an undertaking. Wonder-working priests have a great many adherents, even among the educated and the wealthy; nor have the superstitious practices of such sects as the Jisshūkyō, whose activities are devoted mainly to exorcism and divination, abated with the progress of enlightenment.

The fading of the first flush of rationalism which dominated the beginning of the Meiji era, has thus resulted not only in a revival of religious sentiment, but also in a recrudescence of superstitious feelings and observances. In the masses of the people, rationalism had made little headway, and the grosser superstitions current among them have never been energetically combated by the priests, who profit by popular ignorance in these matters. There is, however, in Japanese superstition much that is poetical, much that has a deep meaning, approaching to a profound wisdom in matters of human destiny, as is well known to those who have read Hearn's marvelous studies in the borderland of psychic mystery.

The evolution of religious sentiment in Japan is

closely related with the development of political and social life. During the earlier period of Meiji, positivist tendencies based upon European thought as represented by Spencer and Haeckel were most prominent. For a while it seemed as if religious feeling was largely disappearing from among the educated people of Japan. Then came a revival of nationalism, inspired on the one hand by romanticist views of Japanese history and traditions, on the other, by the growing ambition of political power. In the *Nippon Shugi* movement, romanticists like Takayama played a prominent part. This writer was strongly influenced by the thought of Nietzsche, whom he introduced to Japanese readers. He sought in the traditions of his country for the materials toward building up a strong national feeling. Nichiren, the patriotic monk, was his chief admiration. Thus the nationalistic renaissance led to a revival of religious feeling among classes that had formerly seemed very cool toward religion, and efforts were made to infuse new life and enthusiasm into the national forms of worship. Mystic tendencies were also strengthened at this time; many prophets arose, and spirit-seeing became a common experience. Incidentally Christianity in Japan was also favored through this accentuation of religious sentiment; although at the same time the demand grew that the Christian religion in Japan must assume a national character. As already pointed out, the Russian War gave further impetus to these tendencies and the

pendulum swung very far in the direction of religiosity. The movement had now, however, reached a climax; the intellectual temper reasserted itself, and Japan became less inclined to religious fervor. The rationalist materialism of the earlier era was not, indeed, rehabilitated, but a similar tendency gained control in the movement called naturalism, which, on the basis of French and Russian realism, favors a high degree of intellectual emancipation and a study of human life in all its phases.

Religious life is not stationary in Japan, or in other Oriental countries. Sects are still being thrown off by the main stocks of religion; new tendencies are being developed in individual groups. Such a new creed is *Shingaku*, which attempts to represent in itself the best elements of Shintō, Confucianism, and the Buddhist faith. There are two recent Shintō sects, the *Remmon Kyokai* and the *Tenri Kyokai*, which seem to many to be but baneful and superstitious corruptions of Shintō. *Tenri Kyokai* (the teaching of heavenly bliss) has a strange similarity to the Christian Science movement in America, especially in the matter of healing disease through prayer. The sect was founded by a woman, Omiki, who exercised a great personal ascendancy over her followers. Its doctrines are simple and lack scientific logic, which does not interfere with their effectiveness among the people. The ethical beliefs of the sect have a tinge of individualism as well as of communism, incul-

cating the sacredness of labor, coöperation in the activities of life, and mutual assistance in misfortune. It calls for fellowship between husbands and wives, and would give Japanese women a more independent position. But the sect appeals most to the Japanese masses by associating religion with health and material welfare. It preaches cheerfulness, and aims to uplift the masses to a more joyous condition of life. Its faith-healing practice, resting on optimistic views of psychic power, attracts many votaries. Though it teaches kindly morals, its ethical standards are not exacting, and it calls for no self-sacrifice other than that which is involved in fellowship and coöperation. The sect believes in one chief god or supreme ruler, and is true to its Shintō derivation in being extremely nationalistic in its enthusiasm. Its joyousness often takes a luxuriant form, such as hilarious dancing and wild orgies, — frowned upon by the police authorities. For this reason, the Government at first refused to recognize the sect as an authorized religious body. But the growth of the Tenrikyō in numbers and influence was such that the State was forced to take official cognizance of it. In the few decades of its existence, this sect has grown so as to comprise at the present time over four million adherents, and many thousand preachers.

Japanese Buddhism is remarkable for the great number of sects into which the believers are divided. Every conceivable tendency of thought is represented by a

different grouping. Of late there has, moreover, been great activity in the formation of Buddhist societies among the educated people. Among organizations recently formed, the Great Japan Young Men's Buddhist Association, which works among the students of the different Tokio universities, is perhaps the most important. Many of its older members have attained high position in the social and political world, and the society therefore enjoys a considerable influence among the intellectual classes. It includes among its members adherents of all the different sects of Buddhism.

Other associations are formed for special purposes, such as the scientific study of Buddhism, the commemoration of important personalities, or the development of the tenets of particular sects. The great commercial house of Mitsui and Company has been instrumental in organizing a Buddhist society of nearly one thousand members — officials, statesmen, newspaper editors, and well-known business men. This society devotes itself especially to meditation and to the study of *Hekigan-roku*, one of the most popular books of the Zen sect. Recently a young Buddhist priest has established a dormitory where he brings under his educational and religious influence a great number of young men. These are some of the centres of activity through which Buddhism is regaining in part the influence which it formerly exercised among the intellectual classes of Japan.

We may note in passing that the situation is not en-

tirely unfavorable to the further development of Christianity in Japan. The rationalistic apathy of the first part of the Meiji era was the most unpropitious soil for religious growth. Rationalism is indeed still strong, and therefore rationalistic forms of Protestantism, especially Unitarianism, have exercised a definite influence among thinking men of Japan. Some scholars even believe in the possibility of a Japanese religion constructed upon a rational basis, with an eclectic use of the best elements in other religions. Of this opinion is Doctor Tetsujirō Inouye, whose writings are quite representative of the thought of educated Japanese. Doctor Inouye's point of view is, however, essentially secular. He values religions according to their ethical contents and the moral influence which they exert. Neither Buddhism nor Christianity, considered as forms of supernatural belief, inspires him with enthusiasm. The mixture of doctrines in Buddhism brings about a distracting confusion, and as for moral influence, "the majority of Buddhist priests are so bad that if there was such a place as hell they ought to be the first to go there." Christian teaching, on the other hand, to his mind, lacks many of the character-forming elements in which Confucianism is rich. In common with many Japanese Christians, he believes that the future growth and influence of Christianity in Japan depends upon the manner in which it shall be able to solve the ethical questions that perplex Japan, and to adapt itself to Japanese character and social conditions.

The search for ethical standards to be applied in national life has strengthened the hold which Confucianism has upon the Japanese. The ethical elements contained in Bushidō, the warrior's code which has of late received so much applause in Europe and America, are drawn mainly from Confucian thought; therefore the success of Japan in the recent war again redounds to the prestige of the Chinese sage, as it encourages in general a return to Oriental origins. Thus it happens that we witnessed, a year or two ago, the revival in Japan of the custom of publicly paying honor to the memory of Confucius. This ceremony in honor of Confucius had been allowed to lapse at the time of the Restoration, when Japan was bent upon the revival of Shintō and was in other respects looking to Europe for light and guidance. But now the commemorative festival is again observed — a spontaneous homage to a great Oriental sage and hero. Moreover, Confucian thought has been made the basis of the practical work of several ethical societies, as notably of the association which, under the guidance of such men as Baron Shibusawa and Mr. Yano Tsuneta, is attempting to develop higher standards of morality in the Japanese business world.

In the matter of ethical ideals and common morality, Japan is passing through a critical era. The code of Bushidō, which produced the moral excellences of the feudal age, deals in the main only with the reciprocal

duties of feudal vassal and superior. It has no teachings for the relations of man to man in a more democratic state of society, especially in a society of competition where men meet face to face in the strenuous and grim struggle for a livelihood. Despite itself, Japanese society is becoming individualistic. The harsh compulsion of the competitive system, ambitious striving after success, or mere grasping for the necessaries of life, has brought into play motives which were dormant in the older era of group association. The word "success" is used as frequently in Japan as in the rest of the world, and seems to exercise the same kind of charm.

With the older restraints removed, and with a universal worship of getting ahead, there remains no ethical check upon selfish and ruthless action in the scramble for livelihood, wealth, and power. The virtues of liberality, generosity, and self-control, inculcated by the code of Bushidō, have not as yet been transferred to the ordinary relations between men. Even the greatest admirer of Bushidō would not claim that this code answers the moral needs of Japan to-day. The inspiring devotion and self-sacrifice of the Japanese soldier have not been given their counterpart in the virtues of everyday life. The principle of the limitation of moral force seems to be borne out by Japanese experience. The potentialities of Japan are exhausted in the heroic virtues of war and the traditional loyalty and piety toward superiors and parents. A new distribution of moral energies,

in accord with the new structure of society, is a task that will require the patient effort of generations.

In the field of ethical speculation, men's minds are confused by the impact of system upon system, and sect upon sect. Christian ethics is a matter of ideal to which, even in Christian societies, conduct conforms only in part; it is an aspiration which presupposes all that is contained in Western civilization. Its full bearing and influence cannot, therefore, be appreciated by an alien society. The greatness of Buddhism lies in the realm of psychology and in the refinement of mental powers and processes, through freeing the mind from the limitations of individual existence. On the side of popular morals, its teachings are subject to a great many conflicting interpretations. The ethics of Confucius does not deal with the relations of man to man, but with certain enumerated social relations, leaving the men who may not be thus bound together confronted with each other in the struggle of competition without any adequate ethical guidance.

Whatever instruction the masses of the Japanese people receive in ethical subjects is based upon the imperial edict of 1890 on education. With great wisdom the Japanese Government resolved to place public education on a secular footing; and in following the precedent set by America, it avoided the endless struggles which the introduction of religious teaching would inevitably have brought about. But it was felt that some

ethical guidance should be afforded the young. The highest authority in the realm, therefore, addressed the nation on this matter in the edict which has become the Magna Charta of Japanese education.

The principles which this edict lays down as fundamental in ethical culture are grouped about the duties of loyalty to the sovereign, and piety toward parents and other superiors. A second edict was issued in 1908, which instills the virtues of frugality, frankness, and simplicity of life. The moral problems resulting from the victories over Russia offered the occasion for issuing this edict; but its purpose may also have been to supply guidance in the more ordinary and less heroic virtues, of which Japan has been in special need in times that require patient dutifulness in everyday relations. The reception accorded this ethical exhortation was rather cool, and some critical minds ventured to suggest that such preaching on the part of the Government was not complimentary to the intelligence and self-reliance of the nation.

The complaint is often heard that while the edict might be made the basis of broad instruction, the official interpretation has been such as to confine emphasis entirely to the ideas of loyalty and filial piety (*chu ko*). Should any teacher attempt a broader treatment, or should he even suggest that the imperial edict ought to be supplemented by further instruction in order to fulfill its purpose, he might be accused of want of respect to

the Emperor, and his position would be endangered. The Japanese school system exercises the most painstaking care with respect to the observance of loyalty to the Emperor. The loyalty which the Bushidō code inculcated is at the present time focused entirely upon the head of the state. The Emperor's photograph hangs in every schoolroom in the Empire. The attitude of students and teachers toward this picture is one of veneration, sometimes almost of fearsome awe. It is certainly not in accord with the wishes of His Majesty that his picture should become a source of apprehension to his subjects, and yet such has been the result, in many cases, of official practice. Persons have lost their lives in trying to rescue the photograph from fire, and school principals have committed suicide because the imperial picture had been destroyed or removed.

A peculiar situation has thus been brought about. In the schools from which religious instruction is excluded, there has grown up a political cult, which claims the entire force of the religious sentiments of the pupils in deep reverence, and the unquestioned acceptance of mythical explanations of national origins. The moral capital accumulated during the feudal era has been invested almost entirely in loyalty to the Emperor. By the side of this cult, no other religious feelings are encouraged in the schools; any ethical ideas that do not directly contribute to its strength are frowned upon by the authorities. A certain kind of official guardianship

over morals is also illustrated by an order issued by the Tokio police to troops of itinerant story-tellers, to the effect that only such stories are to be related as teach loyalty to superiors and filial piety. It is not difficult to imagine how readily these disreputable vagabonds will satisfy ethical requirements by allowing their hero-villains to utter a few pious sentiments — an ethical legerdemain which is, as we know, also practiced with us in higher circles of dramatic “art.”

While speaking of ethical motives in Japanese life, we ought not to overlook the fact that ethical conflicts form the deepest interest in Japanese drama and literature. The Japanese distinguish between *giri*, which is reason, principle, duty, and *ninjo*, human affections. When these two are in conflict, the knightly code of Japan demands an absolute sacrifice of all human feeling. The moral grandeur of suppressing the strongest passions and affections of the heart and obeying without a murmur the dictates of duty, will always move the Japanese, to the point of causing them to shed tears, even when the conflict is presented only in poetry or on the stage. This great ethical force, though focused upon loyalty to a superior, might in time come to form a strong substructure for broader moral sentiments and enthusiasms. The problem of developing it in such a manner as to comprise the social relations between man and man, and to bring these powerful ideas of duty and justice to bear upon the ordinary affairs of life, is what

Japan has set herself to solve, as a result of the social transformations during the Meiji era.

The official interpretation, together with the notion of the sacredness of the imperial rescript, has led to imparting a tone of artificiality to ethical teaching, which has weakened the spontaneous growth of ethical thought and impulse among the Japanese people. The Department of Education has at times used its power of supervision over higher instruction in a surprising manner. A few years ago it withdrew the license under which graduates of the Tetsu-Gakkan College were allowed to teach in secondary schools. This action was taken because the college used Muirhead's *Ethics*, which sets forth the theory that man's actions are either good or evil according to the motives of the person acting; and because the teacher in charge of the course had expressed his view that it was not necessary to guard the passage in the text-book from misinterpretation. The action of the Department called forth a resolution of the Ethical Society (*Teiyu Rinrikai*) to the effect that Muirhead's teaching on motives is not in any way dangerous from an ethical point of view.

A great variety of opinions has been expressed concerning the philosophical endowment of the Japanese. According to Aston, the Japanese are scarcely capable of high intellectual achievement, yet others have credited them with special capacity for metaphysics. Baron Suyematsu, in a recent lecture on Japanese character,

admits that the Japanese are not gifted with high imagination. He contrasts them with the Hindus, who are easily carried into superexalted fantasies; the Japanese have no cosmologies, no philosophical rhapsodies, such as the Hindus have developed. They are moral positivists. Hearn, too, speaks of the Japanese as likely to produce great haters of ideologies, and it is patent that they have not produced a distinctive system of philosophy. Nevertheless they have always shown much interest in philosophical discussion. During the Tokugawa régime, when Neo-Confucian philosophers like Shushi and Oyomei were introduced into Japan, they indeed dominated Japanese thought for a while, but their conceptions were also further developed and were given a new interpretation by Japanese thinkers. The *Kogaku-ha* (back to antiquity) school purified Confucian doctrine by rejecting Buddhist and Taoist admixtures which had come in during the Sung Dynasty. The members of this school have also pointed out the essential positivism of Confucian doctrine, which brings it into accord with the development of Western philosophy during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Modern Japanese students generally show great ease in acquiring the abstractions of Western philosophy, nor is the Japanese language, with its Chinese elements, devoid of philosophical expressions or unadapted to the development of abstract thought.

In matters of philosophy, Japanese scholars have of

late been engaged in studying foreign systems and making selections therefrom, rather than in building up an indigenous philosophy based entirely upon Japanese thought.¹ As a result of these eclectic methods every tendency of European philosophical thought, from the transcendentalism of Kant and Hegel to the positivism of Comte, is at present represented among Japanese scholars. The evolutionary philosophy of Huxley and Spencer still counts many adherents in Japan, the most noted among whom is Baron Hiroyuki Kato. He had originally written a book on man's rights and his place in creation, which was somewhat Rousseauic in tendency. But when the modern views of evolution became known to him, he himself pronounced judgment upon his first book and burned it at the stake. He now applies the doctrine of the survival of the fittest in a most radical manner to all departments of life and thought. Doctor Tetsujiro Inouye is more of an idealist. According to his view, evolution, having to do with mere phenomena, cannot supply us with an ethical standard. For this we must investigate the real being that lies beyond phenomena. Other idealists get their inspiration from

¹ The University of Tokyo has been much attacked because of its failure to take the lead in philosophical construction and in providing the Japanese nation with an original system of philosophy. A facetious critic describes the philosophical faculty as a telephone exchange which transmits messages from Western scholars to Japanese students. Yet this is nothing but the charge of unoriginality that has so often been made against *Philosophie-professoren* in Germany as elsewhere.

Spinoza, Hegel and Greene. Berkeley, Locke, Lotze, Schopenhauer, and Hartmann all have received a hearing and have influenced the ideas of Japanese thinkers.

Such philosophical individualism, which makes the mind of man the centre of the universe and gives it a selective and creative autonomy, is hardly in accord with the traditions of Oriental thought. Still less so would seem to be the aristocratic individualism of Ibsen and of Nietzsche. Yet this unique German thinker and literary artist has extended his sway even to the distant realms of Asia. This is indeed not to be wondered at. Nietzsche's aphoristic style, his assurance, his proneness to the enunciation of startling ideas, gives him a special hold upon young minds impatient to get at results. He seems to proffer in a sentence the knowledge which it would otherwise take months to acquire. His complete detachment, the manner in which he leads men upon mountain tops and shows them views never seen before, gives to his readers a sense of superiority which is especially fascinating to the young the world over. Moreover, there are a great many assonances between Nietzsche and the code of Bushidō, although he sees ethical relations from an entirely different angle. As a result, the German Zarathustra has become one of the most potent intellectual influences in contemporary Japan. Even more modern than Nietzsche, pragmatism is gaining votaries among Japanese students and scholars. There is, indeed, a good deal of pragmatism in the

teachings of Oyomei, whose ideas formed the chief intellectual influence in preparing the ground for the Restoration. The subjective nature of truth also is not an entirely new idea to the Orientals. It is the name and the grouping of concepts in pragmatism which attracts rather than any originality in philosophical contents.

It would be interesting to inquire into the relation of social experience to philosophical reasoning. Abstract thought presupposes opportunities for social generalization and for taking a detached view of life. A feudal society, free from self-consciousness, exuberant with the joy of living and the prowess of deeds, could not be expected to evolve philosophic theory, however artistic and refined it might be. But when a society begins consciously to compare itself with others and to see within itself contrasts and competition between groups, it may develop a philosophy if it has cultivated intellectual independence. Thus the present philosophical uncertainty and confusion in Japan may be the first stage of original creation. Indeed, some scholars like Doctor Ryukichi Endo are already consciously endeavoring to elaborate a new system of ethics based upon Japanese foundations.

We have already noted the influence of the imperial rescript of 1890 upon ethical education. The rescript, among other things, emphasizes the everlasting character of the Empire and describes the imperial throne as coeval with heaven and earth. In Japanese legendary lore the creation of the world and the foundation of the

Empire are closely connected. The almost religious sentiment of loyalty to the Imperial House, which is the corner-stone of the Japanese political edifice, draws its inspiration from the belief in the divine descent and heaven-ordained reign of the Emperor. Thus the mythical past has been made, as it were, a part of the Japanese Constitution and political system. To subject any of these traditions to scrutiny by the methods of historical science would be looked upon as unorthodox and dangerous to the stability of the Japanese Government. Accordingly Japanese historians generally have been cautious and careful to steer clear of such discussions, or have accepted the legends without comment; and historical scholarship in Japan has been obliged to impose upon itself certain limitations. Now, it is perhaps true that popular beliefs entertained about so remote a period, on which accurate historical knowledge after all is unattainable, may be left to flourish without entirely depriving scientific history of its proper field of operation. Nietzsche, in his brilliant early essay upon the uses of history, tries to protect the legendary beliefs of society against destruction by historical criticism; in his opinion critical research implies an analysis and dissection which destroy vitality and which should, therefore, not be applied to ideas that are essential to life. Japanese historical scholars may find some consolation in this point of view, when they are called upon to exercise self-denial. If the limitations referred only to the period of

earliest origins, they might not be so irksome and dangerous; but there is a strong impulse in Japan to read all history from the viewpoint of political exigency. So the dismissal from the University of Tokyo of Doctor Kume Kunitake for holding unorthodox views of early history, and attempting to exercise a higher criticism in respect of the ancient myths, was a distinct discouragement to historical scholarship in Japan. The manner in which historical questions are apt to cause political excitement in Japan is illustrated by the acrid controversy concerning the legitimacy of the northern and southern courts in mediæval Japan, which divided public men in 1910 and came near to causing cabinet resignations. Not long ago a prominent scholar, Doctor N. Ariga, made a plea before the Asiatic Association (*Toa Kyokai*) in behalf of the cultivation of Japanese archæology. He believes that the field of historical study has been limited too narrowly and that the early history of Japan should be studied according to scientific standards. It is his opinion that questions of ethnology and origins should be investigated, such as the problem as to where the plain of Takama-ga-hara, whence the founders of Japan are said to have come, was located. But though he advises the scientific study of imperial archives, of traditions and customs, yet Doctor Ariga is careful to express no dissent from such current traditions as the view that the world was created by Izanagi and Izanami. The Imperial University has, indeed, fostered historical studies,

with the result that there has been created a committee for the compilation of materials for the history of Japan, which has already published a number of historical documents, diaries, and other materials relating to the mediæval and modern era. But there does not exist as yet a complete scientific history of Japan, nor has there been made anything but a beginning in the study of special periods.¹

The temper of modern Japan may not be entirely favorable to intensive historical studies. There is so much to achieve in the present, there are so many problems looming in the future, that no time or energy is left for delving into the past. The highest appreciation of the value of historic consciousness to national life is not found in Japan, and national history seems so self-evident and natural as to excite no more interest and require no more thought than is bestowed by an active man on pondering the course of his own personal development. The Japanese are prone to confound history with reminiscence and autobiography, which engage men only after the more active life is past.² The histor-

¹ Thus Mr. Natsume Soseki says, "To us the past is as if it had never existed, so intent are we on the future." This noted writer, though speaking with admiration of his teacher, Mr. Murdoch, confesses that he has never read the latter's work on Japanese history.

² Full credit must, however, be given for what has been achieved by such scholars as Tsuboi, Shiratori, Hoshino, Mikami, Ukita, Hagino, and by Asakawa and Yamagata (collaborator of Mr. Murdoch), writing in English.

ical sense, indeed, is not entirely wanting in the Japanese people; however, it has so far been developed, not on its scientific or critical side, but in connection with romantic traditions in plays and stories. This romantic historical sentiment is a strong ally of the national spirit. It gives the people that consciousness of past life and achievement, of historic purpose, which constitutes national personality and character. The experience of modern Germany has been repeated in Japan, and the glories of a mediæval state, living again in romantic imagination, have become a strong factor in nationalism. But modern civilization demands a deepening of the historical sense on the critical side.

In dealing with intellectual and particularly with literary life, it is important to give some attention to the mode of expression, which, in the case of the Japanese language, is peculiarly complex and variegated.¹ In the literary medium of Japan there is a great distinction between classical Japanese and the colloquial style. The classical Japanese is further differentiated according to the extent to which it employs Chinese terms or follows Chinese precedent in diction and construction. The

¹ A report of a recent law examination for judgeships gives some idea of the great variety of styles in popular use. Some of the men adopted a rather cursory lecture note phrasing, others followed the ancient classical Japanese, and still others imitated the pure Chinese style. Many used a mixture of formal writing and colloquial expression. In Chinese there are also a number of distinct styles adaptable to legal use and inherited from various periods of the past.

Chinese style is used wherever dignity and precision are required, as, for instance, in imperial rescripts, official ordinances, formal addresses, and weighty treatises. Formerly Chinese was looked upon, much as was Latin in Europe, as a social shibboleth and as the distinguishing mark of an educated man. Chinese learning in the past, in Japan as in China itself, over-emphasized the importance of words. Words became of greater consequence than the things and ideas they stood for; and a discussion in which the origin of word-signs was explained was held to be satisfactory from a philosophical point of view, even though no contribution whatever had been made to a clearer understanding of the ideas involved. Colloquial Japanese is diffuse and full of circumlocutions. The absence of tenses and personal pronouns, as well as the tendency to mass qualifying words, render this style far from adequate for the expression of exact scientific reasoning. In this respect, Chinese ideographs have fulfilled a useful function, as new scientific conceptions can readily be expressed by the use of Chinese words; thus the Japanese language is being supplied with a concise, technical vocabulary. A great difficulty has arisen, however, as writers have adopted different ideographs to express the same scientific notion: confusion results and again much energy is wasted in fruitless controversies concerning nomenclature. Accordingly the opinion is gaining strength that it would after all be better to form such designations out of purely Japanese

linguistic materials. When a scientific term dealing with things to be seen or otherwise perceived by the senses is required, there is no difficulty in supplying an adequate word by the use of Chinese roots. It is different, however, when a writer has to find an equivalent for some word to which cling historical traditions or which has particular social and political implications. The translation of a word like "bourgeoisie" or "Third Estate" would be far from easy, as no simple term could carry within it all the concepts that have become concentrated in such an expression; in such cases, too, the use of Japanese descriptive words might be more satisfactory.

There is at present going on a very interesting amalgamation of the colloquial with the classical style. The semi-colloquial written style, which combines the characteristics of the classical diction and the spoken language, has been in use for some time and is known as *gembun itchi*. Ephemeral literature is already largely composed in the latter style, while more formal writing still follow the classical precedents. In recent discussions of this matter, opinion seems to incline toward the belief that, as the semi-colloquial is being used more and more by cultivated and well-read men like Koyo Ozaki, and is, therefore, on the way to become more refined and to develop its inherent power, this more natural mode of expression is certain to triumph as the chief literary medium.¹ Within the last decade, it has made remark-

¹ Rohan Koda, the noted novelist, uses mainly the literary language and quite logically confines the colloquial to the dialogue.

able progress and already most articles and periodicals are composed in *gembun itchi*, which is now also called *kogo-tai*, or conversational style. Moreover it has been adopted as the medium for literary expression by the schools, so that the entire younger generation is becoming accustomed to its use. It has the disadvantage of being more discursive than the classical style, but is less stilted and more pliable and expressive of the actual sentiments of both writers and people. Consequently it is also far more readily understood by the reading public. Some writers have favored the return to the *gembun itchi* style used during the later Ashikaga period, in the sixteenth century. This style is especially clear and forcible. It is composed mostly of Japanese words and makes small use of Chinese ideographs. Altogether a good deal of attention has been given to questions of language in recent years, with the result that Japan is being provided with a literary medium which has close relations with everyday speech.

The improvement in the literary character of colloquial Japanese has had an important influence on oratory, or it might be more correct to say that *gembun.itchi* and oratory have developed side by side. As long as only the stilted classical style had any recognized standing, it was manifestly impossible to develop a dignified and at the same time effective manner of public speaking. Elocution would, under such conditions, either be too ornate to be intelligible or too informal to be impressive.

Between these two alternatives, Japanese oratory found no place to grow, until literary quality had been given to the colloquial parlance. Then only did it become possible to develop a style of public address which could, on the one hand, give dignified expression to matters of weight, and, on the other, was not so far removed from the ordinary language of men as to become unintelligible, or at least devoid of all capacity to move the heart as well as to inform the understanding.

It is interesting to notice the influence of foreign languages in Japan. The study of two foreign languages is required in the higher schools. This is a university entrance requirement to which there has been considerable opposition on the part of the public and the middle schools. The testimony is almost universal that the language acquirements of high-school students are very meagre and that they are able to get only a smattering during their courses. But it is also urged that there is a far larger demand for men who have a good reading knowledge of some Western languages in order to be able to interpret Western thought in Japan, rather than for men who may excel in carrying on a conversation. It is natural, therefore, that reading and translation should be emphasized in the high-school courses. By a strange transfer of method, many Japanese teachers have fallen into a way of having the English translated literally into Japanese, reproducing all the words of the original, no matter how unimportant they may be in Japanese.

This is the method followed in the translation of Chinese books, but what is perfectly natural in the one case produces ludicrous results in the other. Half-educated Japanese are ever ready to parade their faulty English in print; they seem to underestimate the difficulties of a foreign language; and when they have only a smattering, will write newspaper notices and even articles without having them revised by some one who really knows the language. Every traveler in Japan brings back specimens of such diction, which, in our country, have been so deliciously imitated by "Hashimura Togo." It admits of no doubt, however, that the study of foreign idioms has exercised an important influence upon Japanese intellectual life. The structure of European languages is logical and strict; the use of personal pronouns, tenses, and numbers gives the Japanese student training in consistent thought and makes him conscious of the logic of expression in a manner not to be derived from the mere study of his own language. Many of the authors who have a good knowledge of English have cultivated in their Japanese writings a marked directness of expression and closeness of reasoning. Thus, for instance, the prose of Soseki Natsume or of Koyo Ozaki in many ways indicates the influence of English diction; they also often use English ideas as the basis for new Chinese or Japanese compounds; in this way not only does their style become concise and clear, but it is constantly enriched even by a stream of new expressions, which add

to the charm of novelty the advantage of expressiveness.

The Japanese have often been described as prosaic and lacking in imagination. In making an inquiry as to how far they really possess this divine faculty, it is necessary that we should distinguish between the different modes in which imagination manifests itself. The constructive imagination which bodies forth before the mental vision new and original combinations of ideas wrought into organic unity, appears not only in literature, philosophy, and the fine arts, but it also guides and inspires the scientific discoverer, the constructor of cities, and the general who directs a battle or plans a campaign. The Japanese may not equal the Greeks and other more modern Western nations in the power to summon philosophical and poetical visions, but they have certainly exhibited the highest type of constructive imagination in other directions. In the Russian War they showed a grasp of detail and a power of combining and planning which proved able to cope with the greatest strategical and tactical problems that have ever confronted man. The extent of the battle line, the variety and novelty of the means of destruction, the new conditions and unaccustomed uses of each military factor — all these were wrought by the strategic imagination of a Kodama into a force of irresistible impetus. Such a vast complex of military details had never before been carried in a human mind. Nor could the generals survey the scene from

a high eminence; at the staff headquarters they received intelligence from all parts of the battle-field by telephone and their orders flashed to the regiments and corps by electricity. Modern war, therefore, requires in its generals the power of imagination in a far higher measure than did all former situations of military leadership. In the organizations of the banking and credit system of Japan, her statesmen and financiers have shown a similar grasp and command of intangible forces. Nor is the transformation of feudal loyalty and traditional authority into modern political power a lesser achievement. Indeed the Japanese have abundantly demonstrated their powers of ideal construction. It would even seem that their imagination at times runs riot and pictures forth achievements that are not in accord with the normal laws of human activity. Their mercurial character renders them visionary. They may see their nation as the Lohengrin of Asia, some bold individual may undertake to create a new religion, or again publicists will agitate a diplomatic policy that rests on airy nothing. Yet this characteristic bears witness to the presence of a power of imagination which needs only sobering down by scientific training to make it effective in durable construction. As the Japanese learn to understand more and more the reign of law in nature and in human affairs, the waywardness of their visionary nature will be disciplined to more substantial uses. Hearn, who observed in the Japanese a certain incapacity for abstract reason-

ing, looked forward to the day when they will produce "Napoleons of the practical applications of science."

In the field of fancy, the Japanese are among the first. Their imaginative life is Ariel-like. It is a spirit-world full of the unaccountable moods of ghosts and fairies, yet with a charm and sweet reasonableness all its own. What more awesome feat of the imagination than the belief that myriads of ancestral ghosts are upholding the national life and fighting its battles; that the departed witness the actions of to-day, glory in our triumphs, are saddened by our defeats! No metaphor here, no poetical fancy merely, but a deep conviction of spirit-life, on the strength of which statesmen may build policies and risk the fortune of unequal war. And in its lighter moods, how fanciful is this same spirit-world, how full of delicate suggestion and imagery all that is related to it! Mirrors are spirit-haunts. Who could ever forget the pathetic story, told by Hearn, of the little maiden who held gentle converse with the reflection in her silver mirror, in the belief that it was the face of her departed mother? When shrines are erected to the greater among spirits, it is not necessary to fill them with images and altars. The spiritual pervasion is sufficient; and to those who look in through the latticed sides, the vacant space within is filled with a presence, all the more impressive as no trappings distract the thought from the deep emotion of spiritual contact. All nature is alive with the essence of past generations. The spirits of the drowned move with

the waters forever, and there are lord-spirits of mountain, river, and of the soil. The soil of Japan is thus sacred in a sense most real and deeply felt by the people.

In its lighter moods, fancy is present everywhere — in the turn of expression, in the interpretation of feeling, in the description of common things. The Japanese are quick to discover the romantic in the ordinary, to catch unobvious analogies; they see existence with the eyes of humor and fancy. *Oni*, the goblins, and *sennin*, the fairies, give their names to plants and insects. A snowy landscape is spoken of as “a silver world.” As in their paintings and color prints, the Japanese interpret the beauty of snow in an unrivaled manner, so also have they expressed its poetry in spoken words, as in the stanza written by a woman poet back in the eleventh century: —

“To my lover
I thought to show them,
The sweet plum blossoms.
Now snow is falling fast,
Blossoms and snow are one.”

A like mood is portrayed in the following poem, translated by Sir Edwin Arnold: —

“She hid his coat;
She plucked his sleeve.
‘To-day you cannot go;
To-day at least you will not leave
The heart that loves you so.’
The window (*mado*) she undid
And back the panel (*shoji*) slid,
And clinging, cried, ‘Dear Lord, perceive,
The whole white world is snow.’”

Traditionally, poetic expression in Japan has been confined to the light lyrical touches of the *tanka* and *haikai*. These graceful and delicate sketches give mere suggestions to the mind, which imagination will expand into a more complete picture.

“Morning glories hold
Bucket at well.
I beg for water.”

This may suggest a garden well overgrown with flowers in such profusion that water cannot be drawn without tearing away some of the blossoms. So the considerate maiden must go to the neighbors to ask for water. Such poetry does not stifle the imagination; it is a stimulus at the touch of which a fertile native fancy unfolds its powers. No two men would translate these little Japanese poems alike, because each would receive from them a different imaginative impulse; but all would equally delight in the subtly sweet music of the verse.

Epic and narrative poetry, with the exception of ballads, did not exist in Japan, nor any poetry of extensive form, except the solemn and august hymns chanted in Buddhist and Shintō worship. Some of these are deeply effective in their stately cadence and the images shadowed forth in their language. But poetry in Japan has never risen to that height and that importance as an element in civilization which the Western Muse achieved through Homer, Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, and Goethe.

Of late, in the whirl of modern change, Japanese literary men have had little time to dream new visions of poetic beauty. Still some efforts have been made to develop poetic expression. In 1882, three authors published jointly a book on the "Poetry of the New Form" (*Shin-taishi Shu*), in an attempt to break down the strict formal requirements of older Japanese poetry, and to introduce a greater freedom of movement and diversity of character. Many experiments have been made. Some writers have produced longer poems, divided into stanzas. Others have experimented with rhyme, but it is so unadapted to Japanese diction that the syllabic cadence had ultimately to be retained. All the innovators favor the free use of Chinese words, which is not admissible under the traditional rules of poetry in Japan. The Japanese seem to have the same feeling toward Chinese words that we hold toward Latin derivatives. These appeal to the intellect and, naturally, well express logical operations; but of the feelings of the heart we do not like to speak in other than the words that have for ages been the mother-tongue.

Among the poets who have won special renown in breaking away from the older forms of Japanese versification, and following original methods of poetic diction, are Toson Shimazaki, the novelist, and Bansui Doi. In their poems they have allowed themselves a great latitude of expression, using many Chinese elements and modeling the products of their mind upon European art.

The traditional forms of Japanese prosody have also been developed in new directions. Thus the melody of the *haikai* has been infused with fresh grace by Shiki Masaoka. Greater flexibility and range of subject-matter has been imparted to the *uta*, a form of verse which is appropriate to the expression of elevated thought and dignified images. The *uta* has been used with great art by the Emperor himself; his productions are delicate and thoughtful, and they have been accorded far more than a mere *succès d'estime*. There is also a woman poet, Akirako Yosano, who possesses a veritable genius for this kind of poetic expression. Kainan Mori, a professor at the University of Tokyo, who was a close friend and confidant of Prince Ito during the latter half of that statesman's career, has the reputation of being the greatest expert in Chinese poetry.

It is in connection with the drama that the power of Japanese imagination especially reveals itself. In our Western opera we let fancy rule and do not strive to reconcile the behavior of the beings on the stage with logical thought. But for a pure dreamland of historical romance and fairy frolic, we must go to the Japanese theatre. The older drama of Japan was poetical in concept and form. It still survives in the *No* plays, which are performed privately at court festivals and other pretentious entertainments. It is here that the splendor of feudal Japan unfolds itself in all its gorgeousness, as

Heredia has pictured it for us in his brilliant sonnet.¹ The resplendent procession moves across the stage to the sound of Old-World music, and to the accompaniment of classical dancing. Here all the traditions of mediæval art are still alive. But the diction of the drama is in classical style so remote from the present vernacular that not even educated Japanese can follow the language of the play. It is scarcely more intelligible to the audience than is the Greek of Æschylus to an American play-goer.

The more popular drama has hitherto occupied but a modest position. Play-acting was formerly looked down upon by people of social standing; actors were despised as outcasts, and ordinary plays were considered amusing only to the rabble. Yet gradually the drama was developed into an acknowledged institution in national life. It is in a sense an outgrowth and vulgarization of the *No* drama, and its material is chiefly historical; the stirring life of old feudal Japan — of the Daimios, the Samurai, and their attendants — in all its brilliant coloring is unfurled before the large audiences of the popular theatre.

¹ "Swords at his sides comes he,
 Deep scarlet in dark armor; and with
 Great Blazons on his shoulders, feared in war.
 Like huge crustacean, shining black and red,
 Lacquer, silk, and bronze from feet to head.
 Glittering and brilliant is this loved one.
 He sees her — smiles beneath his bearded masque,
 And as he hastens, glitter in the sun
 The gold antennæ trembling on his casque."

Turning aside from the cares of business, the din of machinery, and the street turmoil of modern Japan, the people here enter the portals of the romantic past and steep themselves in the traditional ideals and aspirations of their race. Modern life impresses both playwright and theatre-goer as essentially unromantic; accordingly the art of the Japanese theatre has not yet become realistic in structure and ideas: it still aims at edification rather than illusion. Nevertheless, in the portrayal of nature the most realistic effects are achieved. The waterfalls and snowstorms of the Japanese stage, produced though they are by the simplest means, would be the despair of the Western stage manager. There is thus a strange combination of realistic detail with a dramatic structure that makes great demands upon the imagination. The theatres harbor large audiences, being often provided with seats for as many as four thousand people. As a play lasts for at least ten hours, people make themselves thoroughly at home in their boxes, order food or eat that which they have brought with them, and even change the outer layers of their clothing. The acting itself does not aim at realism; and as the plays are accompanied with music, the actors are obliged to raise their voices to a shrill, unnatural pitch. Until very recently women actresses did not appear before men; actors took women's parts, but their imitations were far from realistic.¹

¹ Although these actors are much admired by women, and imitated not a little in their manner of address and outward appearance.

It is said that in the women's special theatres, where only women act, men's parts are quite admirably presented. Geisha appear in all the plays, but their performances are limited to incidental dancing. The furnishings of a theatre recall, in their simplicity, the days of Shakespeare. Footlights are often provided by a row of men who hold up paper lanterns on fish-poles.

In addition to the historical plays, which are most popular, there are also performed fairy plays in which fire-spitting dragons, talking animals, and bold robber chiefs disport themselves somewhat after the fashion of the spectacular light opera in the West. Another variety of plays, called *Oiyemono*, deal with the affairs of some illustrious family and usually portray troubles between several of its members; or again the plots centre around geisha love, the only form of the romantic passion which received representation on the old Japanese stage. The ideas which are held in the Orient concerning the relations between the sexes are so different from our own that the *leit-motif* of neither our novel nor our drama could be appreciated by the Japanese. This partly accounts for the difficulty of introducing the Western drama into Japan.¹

¹ A Japanese, after seeing *Julius Cæsar* performed in London, wrote as follows: "Portia spoke to Brutus in far too familiar a manner, actually putting her face near that of her husband's and placing her arms around him — liberties that no Japanese wife would dream of taking with her lord. The Japanese wife who saw this performed would at once say, 'This is too geisha-like.'" An unconscious self-criticism of Japanese social life!

That the national drama of Japan will develop along new lines is certain. Much that amused in the old theatre is already becoming wearisome, and there is a strong demand for a drama that will really hold the mirror up to Japanese life. As the diction of the traditional plays is not at all intelligible and action reduces itself to pantomime, the demand is becoming strong that the language of the stage should correspond to the spoken idiom. Dramas have been composed in accordance with these ideas by prominent writers such as Tsuboüchi, Yamazaki, and Sano. Tsuboüchi's plays (for instance, *Maki-nô-kata*) are melodramatic, but contain forcible scenes and are notably free from the mannerisms and extravagances of the older drama. Some use has recently been made of novels as the basis for plays, but the dramatic sense of the Japanese is too keen to submit to such a practice. They demand truly dramatic situations, and the story of a novel, developed through dialogue, is not sufficient to satisfy them. As the life of modern Japan comes upon the stage, its dramatic features will claim attention, rather than the psychological analysis contained in the dialogues of a novel.

The Japanese national theatre has maintained itself and has, indeed, developed considerably during the Meiji era. Some actors, like Danjuro, have achieved national reputation, and have been given social honors which formerly would not have been accorded to any professional players. Recently the daughters of Danjuro were

even advised by a prime minister himself to go upon the stage; and, entirely contrary to Japanese traditions, a dramatic school for women has been founded at Tokyo. The graduates of it are to replace the actors who have hitherto taken female parts. In order to place the drama on a high social footing, only women of education who come from good families are admitted to this school. The actors, Kawakami and Madame Sada Yacco, have been of late the most ardent supporters of improvement in the Japanese theatre, as well as the strongest exponents of Western dramatic art, both in its classic and realistic form. Their exertions have met with great applause; and through encouragement of wealthy citizens of Tokyo, they have been enabled to build a new playhouse, sumptuous in its appointments and fashioned upon European models. The only Japanese feature preserved in the architecture of this house is the flower path (*hanamichi*), the elevated passageway by which actors pass from the rear of the auditorium to the stage in full view of the audience. The principal aim in founding this new Imperial Theatre (*Teikoku-za*) was to have a dignified house, where, in addition to the plays of Japan, the European drama might be presented. A new channel is thus opened through which the art of the West may exercise an influence upon that of Japan. But the success of the experiment is still problematical, as it depends upon the attitude which will be assumed by the intelligent public and literary men who have thus far

not been particularly inclined to admire the Western drama.

The literary history of the Meiji era may be divided into two completed periods and a third which has just begun, being in its development parallel to the evolution of social and ethical thought which has already been alluded to. The first was the period of the adoption of European models, which lasted for twenty years, until about 1888. At that time there took place a sudden reaction against everything Western, a reaction which, in the political world, led to a number of assassinations and attacks upon statesmen. The second period, an era of the militant nationalism, lasted for about fifteen years, and in a sense it has not yet passed. Since the time of the transition from century to century, national thought has been controlled by a tendency called *Nippon Shugi*, or Japonicism. This is a modification of the radical form of nationalism, inasmuch as it does not oppose entirely the adoption of foreign institutions, methods, and ideas, but insists upon giving them the specific imprint of Japanese nationality. Thus if European Christianity, European jurisprudence, European literary methods, are to be tolerated at all, there must be infused into them the essential characteristics of Japanese civilization. During the last decade a great many new influences have manifested themselves, which have led to an individualization of thought. Realism and naturalism in art have given an overpowering impulse to individualist tenden-

cies. The present era in Japan is one of universal search and questioning; no theory is without its votaries, no new conception but is voiced with acclaim by ever hopeful seekers after light. All this has had a decidedly unsettling effect, but the need for positive beliefs and for constructive action is strongly felt, and men are earnestly casting about for adequate ideals and principles.

In fiction, the differences in method which characterize European literary work are found also in Japan. *The Essence of Fiction*, a little work published by Doctor Tsuboüchi in 1885, had a profound influence in making writing more natural and observation more direct. Among realist writers, the lead is attributed to Koyo Ozaki, a man of wide culture and great literary power, while Hasagawa, who died in 1909, stood for naturalism, the later development of the realistic tendencies. On the other hand, Rohan Koda represents the idealists. His work is largely in the realm of historical romance, as, for instance, *Hige-Otoko*, a story of the civil wars of the eighteenth century. He is a master of the classical style, which he interweaves with colloquial forms. His descriptions are poetical, but the movement of his stories is slow and his discussions drag somewhat. Another idealist, Fumio Yano, gained surprising success, especially with his story, *Keikoku Bidan*, which dealt with life in Thebes at the time of Epaminondas. This historical novel sold in such quantities as to enable the author to buy himself a house and to take a trip to

Europe, — a return most unusual in the annals of Japanese literature. Doctor Yuzo Tsuboüchi, who in his *Essence of Fiction* denounced the artificial style and morality of Bakin, has himself produced a number of novels which contain graphic sketches, though they are not notable from the point of view of plot or portrayal of character. We could hardly expect vivid or searching delineations of special types from Japanese novelists, who are just beginning to train themselves in the careful observation of individual traits. The manner of psychological analysis, which with us is illustrated by George Meredith and Henry James, is being cultivated by a school of writers who are known by the name of *Futaba-Kai*. The principal among these is Soseki Natsume (Kinnosuke). Mr. Natsume is a thorough student of English literature and has, also, a good command of Chinese. This training has enabled him to enrich the Japanese language with many concepts and terms dealing with social and individual psychology. Another important element in his training as a writer is his practice in the composition of *haikai*, which has given marked terseness and nervousness to his style. Like the writings of his American compeer, the novels of Natsume are caviar to many. His disquisitions on mental philosophy are understood with difficulty by the ordinary reader, who prefers small talk and easy gossip to a psychological criticism of the follies and weaknesses of mankind. Natsume has special regard for the fiction of English-speak-

ing nations, and less sympathy for the productions of France and Russia. But while not a follower of the naturalist school and its Russian models, he is far from being an active opponent, but says good-naturedly that he writes only for indolent people who do not care for violent shocks. The romanticist tendency was most strongly represented by Takayama, who has already been mentioned as the leader of the Japonicist movement. A young woman, Ichyo Higuchi, who died in 1898 at the age of twenty-five, won wide reputation through her romances, which are still very popular among Japanese readers. Her works are chiefly love-stories which are developed in a setting of Tokyo city life.

The school which is at the present time clearly in the ascendent is that known as naturalism. It draws its inspiration chiefly from Russian and French writers.¹ Kunikida introduced through translations the novels of Turgenieff, Dostoievski, and Gorki into Japan; Flaubert and Maupassant are also prominent among the models of this school. Perhaps the most noted author of this group is Hasagawa, who died in 1909. He also translated Russian books, but is of greater importance through the manner in which he introduced the colloquial *gembun itchi* into literature.

It is natural that these writers should have attempted to elevate the colloquial dialect to literary uses; but

¹ There is even published a magazine, *The Russia Bungaku*, which is devoted entirely to Russian literature.

Hasagawa first showed the way in which this could be done in an effective and dignified manner. It is already apparent that the study of the great European models of realism has had an intensely stimulating effect upon literary effort in Japan. There is among literary men a distinct revulsion against purpose novels and other productions of the conventional type. They have begun to see in the accurate portrayal of the life about them in all its moods and phases the true field of literary art. Advance has also been made in improving the structure and movement of novels; they have gained in complexity, but also in directness. It is not only in the production of longer novels that the present *littérateurs* excel, but they, in many cases, rival the European models in a masterly treatment of short-story themes. At the present time the fiction writers of Japan who may be considered men of achievement, or at least of high promise, are numbered by scores. It would be difficult to make a selection that would be just to all; suffice it, therefore, to indicate a few who, in addition to the writers already mentioned, have gained special prominence. Work of deep psychological insight has been produced by Toson Shimazaki, who, in books like *Ie*, practices a most delicate analysis of mental states. Mori Ogwai, in *Seinen* ("Young Men"), and Homei Iwano, in *Horo* ("The Surging Wave"), have recently furnished notable contributions to literary expression. The last-named author is perhaps the most Zolaesque of the Japanese novelists,

and, indeed, he almost outdoes the French master in the brutal directness of his realistic descriptions. Kwatai Tayama excels in short stories in which he deals with complex phases of character and striking situations in contemporary social life. The atmosphere of these literary works is usually sad even to pessimism; they present rather sombre views of human destiny. But occasionally an author like Kafu Nagai comes forward with a more brilliantly colored picture of contemporary life, instinct with the wondrous animation of Oriental imagery. With all this activity, performances may be expected of Japanese fiction which will soon arrest the attention of our own literary world. The keenness of vision and sureness of touch and the remarkable power of selection, which constitute the supreme merits of Japanese pictorial art, are now being manifested also in literary expression. All these writers take their subjects exclusively from Japanese life, which they seek to portray with all its local color, drawing away from the established Tokyo characteristics and other conventional methods in fiction. The romantic hero of the earlier novels finds no admission to these pages, which deal rather with gloomy, tired, and despondent individuals, and touch preferably upon the serious problems of life. These writers do not aim at a high finish in style according to the older standards; but the earlier stylists certainly seem shallow in the substance of their work in comparison with these vigorous book-wrights.

Mr. Rohan Koda has recently pronounced himself upon current tendencies in Japanese fiction. He deprecates the loose methods of modern writers who, instead of polishing their style and putting a deep meaning into their language, write in a superficial manner so as to be intelligible at a glance. He believes that the lovers of really good literature have become less numerous. He is especially out of sympathy with the tendency to portray the deformed and abnormal. As the ordinary phenomena of social life are not interesting enough to some novelists, they exploit the things which cause surprise or disgust. Answering these strictures of Koda, another writer admits that modern novels deal mostly with men or women who are in some way unbalanced — at least, nervous and hysterical; yet he takes comfort in the thought that the writers of these stories may be about to fathom the deeper problems of human nature and that the study of the abnormal may yield important results. He adds: "We who belong to a new era should go wherever men go and see all that can be seen." Many of the better class of novelists look upon themselves as public educators, and attempt to inculcate ideals of devotion and duty by the examples which they depict in their novels. Yet there is also a large class of popular fiction which for its interest relies entirely upon illicit and vulgar relations.

As already indicated, the indirect influence of foreign literature and languages has been very potent in Japan.

Foreign models have been consciously imitated, although — as in the case of the drama — there is always a barrier to the full appreciation of Western art in fiction in the different attitude of the two civilizations towards the problem of sex and of character development. The triumphs and defeats of a Becky Sharp, the simple life of Silas Marner, the tragedy of Tess, all these are so deeply founded in our social experience, that they bear but little meaning to the Japanese. It is, therefore, natural that when drawing upon Western literature in translation, they should choose stories of adventure, even cheap detective yarns, in preference to those writings which we consider masterpieces. It is amusing to reflect that the first English novel which had the honor of being translated into Japanese was Lord Lytton's *Ernest Maltravers*, than which a weaker, more inane or more artificial specimen of novel writing could scarcely be found among books of standing in English. Yet it is on the basis of this that many Japanese formed their opinion of Western fiction. It is, however, just to say that there are also very discriminating readers in Japan whose valuation of our literary work does not differ materially from our own standards. Among writers whose books have found special favor are not only Rider Haggard, Jules Verne, Anthony Hope, Conan Doyle, and Max O'Rell, for the lighter class, but also Dumas, Cervantes, Zola, Hugo, and Goethe. The genius of the latter is valued far more highly than that of Schiller, and in general it

may be said that what has been called the silver-lined school, including poets like Schiller and Longfellow, is not much regarded in Japan. Both Scott and Shelley are popular poets, but Byron especially enjoys a strong vogue among young men. Among English novelists, none is more widely read in Japan than Dickens.

It is interesting to note the connection of authorship with local influence. Thus far the influence of the national capital has been all-important in Japanese literature. The life of Tokyo has a *milieu* all its own. During the Tokugawa Shogunate, it was the centre of feudal life, where congregated the daimios with their retainers. A type of character was developed which differs even more from that of the Japanese in general than metropolitan character is ordinarily distinguished from the national life about it. The Tokyo townsmen, the Edokko, are popularly described as persons boastful in speech, presumptuous and quarrelsome in behavior, and improvident in the expenditure of money. These characteristics of the Edokko are explained as an imitation of the manners of the professional warrior class of feudal days, among whom swashbucklers were not uncommon. These military men insisted upon cringing servility on the part of the lower orders. They hardened themselves by partaking of unsavory dishes, such as chopped salted worms, centipede soup, and pickled frogs. In summer, they would sit in heated rooms, while in winter they exposed themselves to cold. They affected shortness of

speech, abbreviating words and speaking in curt phrases resembling the *Schneidigkeit* of German officers. The lower orders, forced into a position of crouching obsequiousness, were nevertheless eager to pick up the manner of the superior beings. Native critics of Tokyo life further portray the populace as superficial, devoted to a shallow optimism, prone to conceal its real feeling, given to fickleness and levity, and deficient in stability of purpose.

Exaggerated though these characteristics undoubtedly are by novelists, for literary effect, their portrayal yet gives the dominant note to recent Japanese fiction. In Tokyo, light literature finds its source and centre. The scenes of novels are laid there and the language employed is the Tokyo colloquial. But it cannot be said that there has been produced a literature with an effective grasp of a local situation, even for the life of Tokyo. The great importance of the capital is the result of the centralizing tendency through which all Japanese life has been unified and brought under one system. Uniformity of education and the imitation of foreign models have to a large extent neutralized local influence. The novels are all cast in one mould; local differences and the perception of individual traits are overridden by general ideas. The burden of the classicism of a past, when men were not free to write as they pleased but were obliged to follow models in a servile manner, also still weighs upon Japanese literary life. Yet Yanagawa feels encouraged

to speak of the "new and strong freshness which fills the air of our literary world." Most recently, through the efforts and observations of the naturalist school, Tokyo is coming to be ousted from the position of dominance which it has occupied, for writers are beginning to study their local environment and to give their novels more individual character.

It is notable, in view of what has been said above concerning literary expression, that the Japanese nevertheless seem to have a delicate sense for the effects produced upon human character by different localities. One writer says that in Tokyo it is easy to distinguish between men who dwell on the hills and those who live below amid the bustle and turmoil of the streets: "Though we may meet such persons only casually, we shall know from their behavior and their language where they come from." This is borne out by our recollection of the strife which arose between Confucian scholars who dwelt in the lower part of the town (*Shita-Machi*) and those who lived on the heights (*Yama-no-te*). It has also been observed that the books composed in the North of Japan are more gloomy and serious than those written by Southerners.

In the essay the favorite form is biographical. The careers of prominent men — writers, politicians, leaders in industrial life — are a never-failing subject of interest; foreign notabilities, too, are included in the repertoire — from monarchs and presidents to criminals and

revolutionaries. The men who attain the greatest reputation, and who are most worshiped by the public, and especially by the young, are, next to successful generals, the leaders in state affairs. Parliamentary life, though as yet only superficial in its political influence, has nevertheless made a striking impression upon the imagination of young men. A method by which magazine editors have of late been trying to interest their readers and increase their circulation is in each issue to dissect some prominent literary man. Concerning the victim chosen for such distinction, other *littérateurs* are interviewed; and their opinions on his work and personality, the quality of his style, the points of strength and weakness in his methods, are published at length. This process of being laid upon the operating-table is by no means grateful to men of sensitive, retiring dispositions; but there is no help for it, they have to pay the price of notability. On the other hand, there is thus brought before the public much that is of real interest. While it is unusual for prominent men of affairs to write for Japanese magazines, a very common way of bringing their thought before the public is to have them interviewed. From the standpoint of the subject of the sketch, there is an advantage in that the editor alone is responsible for the exact expressions used, a specific statement to that effect being usually made. The Japanese statesman is, therefore, under no obligations to disavow any of the ideas in an interview which he may find inconvenient.

Among recent essayists, none has won greater consideration than Shuntei Toyabe. This notable writer, who died in 1908, made his style especially powerful through an intimate knowledge of Chinese, which enabled him to use old idioms and classical allusions in such a way as to express modern thought in an original and striking manner. In his biographical essays, which were written with a masterly hand, he always took pains to give his subject a historical and literary setting. In the characters which he studied and portrayed, he saw preferably the nobler side of human nature, although he also knew how to deal critically with the current action of public men. Thus he exercised a great influence upon public opinion, and it would have been possible for him to become a powerful factor in practical politics had he so desired. As an analyst of human qualities, he may be compared to Macaulay, even in the brilliance of his style. It is interesting to hear Toyabe say, "The four men whom I most admire are Chow Kung, Shakespeare, Emerson, and Carlyle." The deep meaning of Chow, the superhuman talent for character analysis displayed by Shakespeare, and the insight which distinguish Carlyle and Emerson were what attracted him to these men. Another essayist of great reputation is Shiga, a man trained in the Sapporo Agricultural College. Rather than seek inspiration in Western literature, as so many other Japanese have done, Shiga has nourished his spirit through the intimate study of Chinese poetry. His best-known

writings are essays on Japanese scenery and stories of his travels.

Among all forms of literary expression, the newspaper press has received the greatest impetus through the changes introduced during the Meiji era. The Japanese are, in general, not a bookish people. There is a common feeling that a wise man need not read, and there is little real taste for literature among the masses of the population. Books do not play the prominent part in Japan that is accorded them in the life of the West; but on the other hand, cheap, light fiction and newspapers are read a great deal, and the public is large, as nearly all Japanese have a reading knowledge. Thus the press has become a great power in Japan, both for good and for evil. And this, even in its infancy, for it is almost a creation of the Meiji era, though even under the Shogunate news sheets (*Yomiuri*) were given out. These, published as occasion demanded, were printed from blocks, although moveable letters had been in use for some centuries,¹ and were hawked about the streets after any event had occurred of sufficient note to warrant publication. A description of the deeds of the Forty-seven Ronin was circulated about the streets of Tokyo within a few hours after their death. Sometimes the imagination

¹ The scene in a modern Chinese or Japanese printing-office is very lively. As a paper has to use at the very least ten thousand different characters, the work of the printer's "devil" calls for great agility, as he runs back and forth from the type cases to furnish the characters required by the head compositor.

was drawn on and events were reported before they had happened.

Since the Restoration, journals have been established in increasing numbers until they now form a cardinal element in Japanese civilization. Among the papers which are noted for their influence and the excellence of their subject-matter are the *Asahi*, the *Jiji*, the *Nichi-Nichi*, the *Hochi*, and the *Kokumin*. These journals compare favorably with the press of other nations, although in general their foreign news service is rather meagre, since regular correspondents are maintained only in China and in two or three of the most important Western capitals. Formerly there existed a great many publications of doubtful respectability which were taken up largely with personal notes and scandal. The number of these absolutely "yellow" journals has been greatly reduced of late through the centralization of the newspaper business. The sole object of this class of papers was to make a sensation, and they were exceedingly unscrupulous in the manner in which they dealt with private character. As a result, while they were read eagerly for the spicy information which they contained, they were not taken seriously by the public. When they undertook to deal with important matters, no attention was given to them, so that even a splendid "scoop" was not believed and received no credit. In the last few years the press of Japan has undergone a radical transformation. The smaller papers have been absorbed; and the

large metropolitan journals now print special editions for the different localities. Thus the *Kokumin* prints about twenty editions daily, most of which are local papers having one page devoted to the affairs of the town for which they are issued. Only a few large independent local papers are left in Japan, among them the *Asahi* and *Mainichi* of Osaka. As already indicated, the centralization has also, to a large extent, wiped out the irresponsible "yellow" press. But, on the other hand, "yellow" press methods have been extensively adopted by almost all the newspapers, so that the social news presented is usually of a sensational character. This amalgamation of conservative and "yellow" journalism has a very important bearing in the matter of language. Formerly the better newspapers attempted to follow the classical literary style. As this was not readily understood by uneducated people, the small sheets which catered to the wants of the masses, and which were written in a colloquial style, were read by the multitudes. The recent development of *gembun itchi* as a literary mode of expression has enabled the standard newspapers to adapt themselves more completely to the needs of the general public. It was inevitable that there should be a certain letting-down of standards. News items had to be admitted which suited the small-minded and whose presence cannot be looked upon as an educational influence. But in general, the serious press of Japan occupies a position of real influence, through the moulding of

an intelligent and responsible public opinion. Editorial writers, while poorly paid,¹ are respected, and repeatedly men have, through their work in the sanctum, prepared themselves for performing the duties of high public office.

A situation has been established in Japan which makes the growth of a class of independent literary men possible. The development of a large reading public which includes men of all degrees of culture and a variety of tastes, calls for special professional training on the part of writers. The returns, while still modest, are yet in many cases sufficient to enable a successful literary man to support himself with his pen. A poor man will naturally seek to connect himself with some journal or magazine so as to have steady occupation. Those who have gained more literary fame may be able to put forth individual works at a considerable profit. Some novels sell in tens of thousands, whereas thirty years ago no book would be issued in more than a few hundred copies. While the results of the literary democratization of Japan may not be altogether encouraging, since an impetus has been given to certain contaminating influences and enterprises, yet in all this activity there is enough of sound literary development to be full of promise for the

¹ Some of the larger papers have indeed begun to pay handsome salaries to their editors and attract men of the highest ability. Thus, Mr. Natsume, who was a lecturer on English literature at the University of Tokyo, left his position to become a contributor to the Asahi.

future. In former years the writer who was not a priest or a Samurai poet was looked upon as a man without a calling, and his life was indeed precarious and generally sad. Even now Japan has not, indeed, as yet passed beyond the period of Grub Street literary life. A great many writers of ability are forced to struggle with poverty and to live, however much they may dislike it, a Bohemian life. As late as 1909 a prominent literary man, Bizan Kawakami, committed suicide because of poverty. Another martyr was Ryokuwu Saito, who also died a short time ago. His novels, well designed and carefully written, are conceived in the spirit of realism; by temper he was a satirist, and his observations on character are keen and cutting. In his personal fortune, Saito was most unhappy. His bad health was made more unbearable by his poverty. Though he was punctilious in social observances, he was perforce ultra-Bohemian in his private life. Being improvident as well as poor, he resembled the eighteenth century poets whose struggles and sufferings Johnson has described for us. With the exception of rare intervals of revelry, he usually had to buy his food from stands on the streets or even to go hungry. He shunned society, and would not allow even his friends to know where he lived, mailing letters from offices distant from his place of residence, in order to keep from them a knowledge of his abject poverty.

There are other authors in Japan who, while living a life of great simplicity, are surely enjoying the fullest

happiness. Such was Fukuzawa. Adventurous in his youth in the pursuit of knowledge, he braved poverty and danger in order to master whatever was accessible of Western learning. When the new era dawned, the mastery he had acquired enabled him to become a great teacher of his nation; yet so narrow was the conservatism of the many that he was constantly in danger of violence at the hands of reactionaries. Meanwhile he worked on with might and main writing his books on European civilization, and through the columns of the *Jiji* bringing the light of Western thought to the people of Japan. Together with Fukuchi he became the founder of the modern Japanese press. His books had an enormous circulation. The *Gakumon-no-susume* is reported to have sold seven hundred thousand copies within five or six years of its publication, and altogether millions of volumes of Fukuzawa's works were circulated. The income from these writings was invested in a great school, *Keio Gijuku*, where he gathered about him hundreds of promising men who carried his ideas to the ends of the country. The welding of a nation, the breaking-down of the distinctions between warriors and peasants, is the work which he promoted. No writer of Japan has wielded a greater influence. The man's great simplicity and his notable geniality of manner won the hearts of his students and enlisted their undying friendship. Very fond of traveling, he took numerous trips in company with members of his family and friends, sometimes

going with a party of twenty or more. On these trips he was satisfied to travel most modestly and to live on the ordinary fare at the inns. He was a good traveling companion, and, though always the leader, placed absolutely no restraint upon those with him, allowing his companions to arrange their life according to their own convenience. A tremendous walker, he even in his old age took trips in the mountains on which younger men could scarcely follow him.

A man of interesting personality is Doctor Nitobe, also a scholar whose intellectual development has been greatly influenced by Western knowledge; in fact his intellectual culture, aside from Japanese civilization, comes almost entirely from the West. His most famous book is the little volume in praise of *Bushido* in which he gives an admirable analysis of that ethical code. Doctor Nitobe has a directness of manner, a candidness of speech, which in the eyes of the Japanese make him resemble a foreigner. While in general the Japanese are uncommunicative and even secretive, suppressing their individual thoughts and emotions, Doctor Nitobe speaks out and makes known exactly what he thinks and feels. He has given special attention to technical training, being a graduate of the Sapporo Agricultural School, professor of agricultural economics at the Imperial University, and late director of the First Higher School at Tokyo. He professes Christianity, but believes that the Japanese Church should do its own thinking. Aside

from his renown as a writer and teacher, Doctor Nitobe is also widely known and in great demand as a speaker at public meetings, rivaling Count Okuma in popularity. Another type of Japanese intellect appears in Doctor Jiro Kitao, who died in 1907. A very precocious child, he had mastered at the age of ten the Chinese classics and was able to write Chinese poetry. His prodigious memory was especially noteworthy. At the age of sixteen he went to Germany, where he stayed for thirteen years, studying under Helmholtz and other men of science. He later had a controversy with the great German physicist, because of Kitao's claim that he was himself the original inventor of the leucoscope. After he returned to Japan, Kitao became a professor at the Imperial University and at the College of Agriculture. He always retained great interest in German literature, studying Goethe and even writing a voluminous German novel, *Waldnymphé*. His scientific works on metallurgy and subsoil moisture were also published chiefly in German. When he first returned to Japan, he had forgotten his mother tongue to such an extent that it was difficult for him to deliver his lectures. He soon recovered his mastery, however, and his wonderful memory made it possible for him to use the most difficult Chinese idioms, with which he often astonished his students. He had also given much attention to Greek literature, and was a lover of music. Though married and having a pleasant family life, he was a recluse, living day and night with his

books. He seldom retired before two o'clock and frequently studied through the night. When he had worked for a long time over some difficult matter and finally a solution flashed upon him, he would shout *banzai* so loudly that every one in the house would be aware of his triumph. In his zeal for knowledge, he neglected his bodily welfare; his nerves became overwrought and toward the close of his life, he at times went into a state of ecstasy.

Country life has a great attraction for Japanese authors, and many of them feel a yearning for the soil. Thus, Kenjiro Tokutomi has become a veritable Tolstoy, living on the farm and tilling the soil with his own hands. He says, "For a man like me to be living the life of a peasant may seem a profitless undertaking, but I know nothing comparable to what I feel when I tread the ground barefoot. Here it is that a man gets strength. It seems to me that those who are nearest the earth are nearest to heaven." He enjoys the quiet, simple life, the hard work of the field, the sound sleep with which it is rewarded, all of which refresh his spirits wearied with the toils and distractions of modern city existence. Years ago Tokutomi visited Tolstoy at Yasnaya Polyana. He conceived a great admiration for the master, whom he has since followed in his ethical and political doctrines. During and after the anarchist trial of 1910, Tokutomi severely criticized the Government for its action. Significant of the divergences of individual development in

modern Japan is the wide difference between the attitude and views of this writer and those of his brother, Yichiro the renowned editor of the metropolitan journal *Kokumin*, who is one of the foremost moulders of political opinion in Japan.

It may also be interesting to glance at the life of a publisher, Hanshichi Yoshikawa, who died recently. He began life as an apprentice boy in a rice shop. As rice merchants resorted to underhanded means of making gains, he left his master and engaged under a confectioner. Finding the eating of sweetmeats bad for his stomach, he went on to a second-hand store, but there he soon discovered that his master's profit came from selling counterfeit articles, to which practices he refused to lend his assistance. He therefore determined to seek employment in a bookshop, considering that book dealers trade for the benefit of their fellow men rather than for personal gain. He began by hawking books about Osaka and Yeddo. After he had established a shop of his own, he opened a reading-room, where, for one sen per hour, students were able to consult the best authors. Gradually he won the confidence of teachers and the public and was intrusted with the publication of many important books, building up in this way a large and profitable trade. After his death his name was commemorated by his descendants through the republication of a valuable dictionary.

The types of experience above portrayed are taken

from a great mass of material, and the selection does not in all cases imply exceptional prominence of the particular man in the intellectual life of Japan, but is intended to illustrate the various phases of literary activity as well as the conditions under which men work. The position of literary men in Japan differs in many essential respects from that which is accorded writers of prominence in the Western world. The individuality of literary fame and literary personality in its various aspects have not been developed in the Orient to nearly the same extent as in the West. The great books to which men return again and again for guidance and inspiration were written thousands of years ago, and the men who earned fame thereafter won their laurels usually by writing commentaries upon the classic texts. No merit attached to originality. Moreover, most writings were anonymous; especially if they were original was it advisable that the author should not make his personality too prominent. While learning has always been respected, authorship has never commanded the consideration in Japan and other Oriental countries that it has enjoyed in the West from the Greeks down to the present. Japan is, indeed, a country where hero worship is highly developed, but no literary man has gained the Olympian position which Dante, Shakespeare, and Goethe hold in the West; nor even that which is accorded to lesser men of genius with us. However, the modern development of Japanese literature, joined with the growth of individ-

ualism, will undoubtedly tend to give greater personal prominence to writers.

While old class distinctions have nearly disappeared in Japan, newer social and professional contrasts have grown up which are quite as marked. The different professions have very few interests in common. Thus, one may almost speak of a class of public men, a class of literary men, and a class of merchants, each living in its own world and having little contact with or interest in any of the others. It is not uncommon for a public official of high rank to show complete ignorance of what the literary men of Japan are doing. The latter, on their side, live in the world of imagination, and unless they are essayists like Toyabe, concern themselves but little in current affairs. The literary statesmanship of the West, of which Guizot, Gladstone, Balfour, and Roosevelt are ready examples, is unknown in Japan, and statesmen will not even write their memoirs. There are, of course, some exceptions to this. Thus, while Count Okuma is not distinctly a literary man, his relations with the world of letters are intimate. Another exception lies in the connection between editorial work and political life, which has already been pointed out; an editor and publicist will necessarily interest himself in the political affairs of his country.

Any consideration of the intellectual life of Japan would manifestly be incomplete were we not to include some reference to educational methods and results.

While this is not the place to put forward a systematic account of Japanese educational institutions, we may at least endeavor to scan some of their general characteristics as they appear in the contemporary literature of Japan and in the qualities of the young men who have recently received their training. Superadded to the problems with which our Western institutions are struggling, there exist in Japan the difficulties created by the adoption of many aspects of an alien culture. The curriculum of the schools is, therefore, overloaded with subjects, and such demands have to be made upon the assimilating capacity of the students that it is small wonder if their training in independent reasoning is often defective, and their intellectual culture superficial rather than intensive in quality. As, in addition to their own language and the exceedingly difficult Chinese, the Japanese high-school pupils have to study two foreign languages, it could hardly be expected that they should acquire more than a reading knowledge of the latter.

The University of Tokyo is distinctly an official institution. Not only are its funds provided by the State, but the members of its faculties assist the Government as counselors in the administration of public affairs. On the other hand, the Government, through the Department of Education, exercises a rather strict control over the university, which has often proven irksome to scholars. The relations of official administrative departments to institutions of learning are nowhere free from

difficulty, but official domination seems to have been especially obtrusive in Japan. Hearn, in his *Letters*, notes the presence of a great over-shadowing control and of many intercrossing influences. It seemed to him that the power within the university was little more than nominal, "that there was something nameless and invisible without, something much stronger than the director or heads of colleges — a political influence, perhaps; certainly, a social influence. It seems to overawe the institution and its activities." Doctor Inouye, in complaining of this situation and in demanding greater independence, bewails the fact that learning in Japan has not yet reached the dignified position which it occupies in the West. Of late, indeed, there has been a tendency to allow the university greater freedom from official control. The direct connection of the university with the Government, however, also has its compensations, as it gives to university men in return a considerable influence in public affairs. Some of the departments of the Government are entirely administered by university graduates. The introduction by Prince Ito of the merit system in appointments has, of course, been a great help to graduates of the institution which was in a position to give the most adequate training.

Among the university courses, the technical subjects, such as law, medicine, and engineering, attract most students. The fact that letters and philosophy have fewer votaries is, of course, largely due to the fact that stu-

ents are anxious to prepare in a subject which promises them a life career. But aside from this, the definite conclusions of technical knowledge seem to be more attractive to the Japanese mind than the imponderable and spiritual considerations dealt with in literary and philosophical thought. The two great private institutions of Keio and Waseda, the former founded by Fukuzawa, the latter by Count Okuma, efficiently supplement the work of the imperial universities, including, moreover, the lower stages of the educational process. Both of these universities have turned out a great number of independent and original writers and thinkers. As they have no connection with official life, they are inclined to greater independence in their treatment of public affairs. Waseda publishes an excellent literary journal, *Waseda Bungaku*, the critical standards of which are upon a European plane.

There have been a number of great educators who have left their personal impression strongly upon Japanese thought. In the first rank must be placed Fukuzawa who was a thorough believer in the adoption of Western processes and methods and who looked especially to America for helpful models. French ideas of government and social polity were represented by Tokusuke Nakae, who has been called the Rousseau of Japan because of his able interpretation of the views of that writer. Among those who were guided by the more conservative ideas of the English, a prominent influence was exercised by

Keiu Nakamura. Doctor Hiroyuki Kato, of the Imperial University, used his great intellectual powers to spread German thought, and it is due largely to his leadership that German ideas have obtained so strong a hold in the Japanese universities. No account of educational influences would be complete without acknowledging the work performed by the men who, coming from the West as professors, teachers, and missionaries, brought directly, in their learning and character, the models which the Japanese at that time were eager to imitate.¹

The students in higher educational institutions of the Government are selected from a large number of applicants. In a recent year there were nineteen thousand graduates of middle schools who desired higher educational advantages. Of these, only three thousand could be admitted to the universities. Though the Government was for a while disinclined to increase the facilities for higher education, because there is already a severe competition among university graduates for positions guaranteeing a livelihood, yet at last it has been decided to create two other universities, so that a somewhat larger number of students might be accommodated.

The competition among students is relentless, and it is but little relieved by friendly encouragement. In the

¹ Among those whose influence was most powerful are Doctor Verbeck, Doctor Brown, of Yokohama; Captain Janes, of Kumamoto; and Mr. Clark, of Sapporo. They impressed their personality upon a large number of students who perpetuated the ideas of their teachers in their own action in important national affairs.

middle schools the pupils work themselves to death in order to be able to pass the entrance examinations to the higher institutions; but once admitted there, other and still more severe tests of various kinds await them before they can hope to achieve a position for themselves in the world. They are, indeed, in need of a stoic temper, and many young men of more delicate fibre break down under this strain. Hearn, in his *Letters*, mentions many cases. "Some have gone mad," he says; "numbers have died; numbers have had to give up; the strain is too great because the hardship is too great." In most cases students are obliged, on account of their lack of means, to do a great deal towards earning their own living and to practice all kinds of economies. It is a splendid characteristic of the young men of Japan to whatever class of society they may belong, that they are willing to make great sacrifices of this kind in order to achieve their aims of self-improvement. We need only think of the numerous cases where Japanese of the highest endowment, men who later won great fame and reputation, earned their livelihood while studying in America, by performing menial work of all kinds.

At times veritable epidemics of suicide have broken out among the students, although other classes of the population are also not free from such attacks. As we have seen, suicide is not absolutely frowned upon in Japanese philosophy, and Doctor Kato himself has defended the self-destruction of soldiers who have been

defeated in battle. At the conclusion of the last war there was a great deal of personal despair. After the tremendous strain of action and sacrifice, the achievement of the struggle and the glory of victory, there came a disheartening disillusionment when the nation had to take up its everyday life with the enormous burden of taxation on its shoulders, and with the feeling that the concrete advantages gained through the war were inconsiderable. The competition of individualistic society has in it something terrible to the people of Japan, who still remember the easy-going, friendly ways of the feudal age, when every one was sure of his living and when the population did not yet press so seriously upon the means of subsistence. In the rush of modern life, with its harsh rivalries and discords, many natures are bewildered; not knowing how to maintain themselves, they finally capitulate. For a while, almost every week suicides were committed at the Kegon Waterfall, near Tokyo. A young student of philosophy, who killed himself there by leaping into the cataract, left the following words written upon a tree nearby: "Alas, how distant all things seem! How vast are the limits of the great universe! The petty being called man has at all times tried to comprehend this immensity in vain. Of what value is philosophy? The real state of the universe remains incomprehensible. Out of regret for this, in the anguish of my soul, I have at length resolved to die, and presently I shall discover that the depths of woe and the very high-

est bliss may blend with each other." The police found it necessary, whenever a student proceeded alone to the neighborhood of the falls, to have him shadowed by a guard, and steps were taken to prevent inns of the neighborhood from giving accommodations to unaccompanied students. The priests of the shrine situated near the cataract posted up a placard in which they said that "to throw away precious lives is to defile the sacred mountain; it is an act of irreverence towards the gods, of disloyalty to the sovereign, and of disobedience to the parents."

It is not surprising that in an age of great intellectual stress, of doubt and confusion, when Japanese minds are tortured by uncertainty, a great many matter-of-fact natures should seek refuge in a materialistic philosophy of life. The tendency of thought at present most popular among Japanese students is that which is called naturalism, as it draws its inspiration from the literary movement of that name. The books of Gorky, Turgeneff, and Maupassant are the gospel of this faith. It seeks intellectual satisfaction in denying the validity of anything that cannot be demonstrated; and demands for its votaries the privilege of seeing and experiencing all phases of life. On the side of conduct it therefore tends strongly toward the repudiation of all moral restraints, and sees veracity and worth only in "life living itself out." This tendency is not confined to Japan. Throughout the Orient there is current among the younger men

a materialistic temper which does not bode well for the future of civilization, unless the youthful energy which it represents can overcome the deadening and barbarizing influence of materialism and draw new inspiration from old ideals, remaining true to the old Oriental faith in the validity and power of spiritual forces.

The present review of intellectual forces and tendencies in Japan can make no claim to completeness; thus, for instance, the achievements in the physical and technical sciences have only briefly been referred to. It has been my purpose to give an impression of the variety of intellectual interests in Japan and of the temper with which the things of the spirit are viewed at the present time. In the future, the Japanese mind will undoubtedly still further excel in many directions, but the greatest development may be expected in those activities for which racial and social experience has best prepared the intellect. A strong but selective realism in literature, delicate word-painting, the successful search for mastery over the forces of nature, a grasp of social and political relationships — these are among the things we may expect from the Japan of the future. At present all is still in the turmoil and uncertainty of a titanic struggle of opposing forces from which only gradually there is emerging the mind and spirit of modern Japan.

NOTE TO CHAPTER VII

LEADERS IN SCIENTIFIC WORK

Astronomy:

Terao, Hirayama.

Botany:

Matsumura, Miyoshi, Miyabe, Ikeno.

Chemistry:

Sakurai, Ikeda, Osaka, Shimose, Nagai, Takamine, Matsui, Haga, Kuhara.

Geology:

Koto, Yokayama, Jimbo.

History:

Japanese history: Shigeno (died 1911), Hoshino, Kume, Mikami, Hagino, Uchida, Yamaji.

Asiatic history: Shiratori, Naito, Tsuboi.

Western history: Tsuboi, Gempachi, Mitsukuri (brother of Baron Kikuchi), Ukita.

International law:

Ariga, Takahashi, Terao, Tachi, Yamada.

Law:

Tomii, Nobushige Hozumi (elder, philosophy of law), Yatsuka Hozumi (younger, constitutional law), Miyazaki, Ume (died 1910), Okada.

Mathematics:

Baron Kikuchi, Fujisawa, Takaki, Sakai.

Medicine:

Miyake, Aoyama, Osawa, Kure, Koganei, Ogata, Miura, Kitasato, Sato.

Philosophy:

Baron Kato, Tetsujiro Inouye, Yujiro, Miyake, Kuwaki.

Ethics: R. Nakajima.

Psychology: Matora, M. Matsumoto.

Æsthetics: Otsuka, Okakura.

Philosophy of religion and Hindu philosophy: Takakusu, Anesaki, B. Matsumoto.

Physics:

Yamakawa, Tanakadate, Nagaoka, Tsuruda, Muraoka, Omori (seismology), Honda, Mizuno.

Political economy:

Kanai, Viscount Tajiri, Baron Soeda, Amano.

Sociology:

Takebe, Endo.

Zoölogy:

Kakichi Mitsukuri (brother of Baron Kikuchi), Iijima, Watase, Ishikawa, Oka, Goto, Kishigami.

Novelists:

Yuzo Tsubouchi (Shoyo), dramatist.

Rintaro Mori (Ogwai), introducer of German literature.

Futabatei Hasegawa, introducer of Russian literature.

Rohan Koda, romanticist.

Koyo Ozaki, realist.

Doppo Kunikida, naturalist, translator of Russian novels.

Kafu Nagai, introducer of French models.

Soseki Natsume, psychological novelist.

Critics:

Rinjiro Takayama.

Takitaro Shimamura.

Iichiro Tokutomi, editor, publicist.

Poets:

Shiki Masaoka, *Haikai* expert.

Toson Shimazaki, *Shintaishi* expert (also novelist).

Bansui Doi, *Shintaishi* expert.

Mrs. Akirako Yosano, *Uta* expert.¹

Kainan Mori, expert in Chinese poetry.

CHAPTER VIII

POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN

IN the study of the relations and the mutual influence between the East and the West, the actual workings of institutions adopted by Oriental nations are worthy of special attention. Influence may be exerted by one civilization upon another in various ways; there may be a more or less gradual modification of customs and manners affecting dress and the general mode of life, such as we see among the wealthy Chinese at Singapore, who furnish their houses in European style and are fond of displaying fine horses and carriages; or economic life may be developed by the adoption of new industrial processes and methods of organization; again, changes in the legal system may be modeled upon individual laws evolved in the experience of another civilization. But the boldest and most radical form of imitation is seen in the copying of complex institutions in their entirety, such as the organization of an educational system, or, most striking instance of all, the parliamentary form of government. When an institution like the latter is bodily transplanted, the process is likely to expose the limitations of the influence which can thus be exercised by

one civilization on another. It is therefore with special intentness that we approach the study of the parliamentary system in Japan, knowing that the experience in government gained in this new field will yield valuable material for the scientific study of politics in general, and for an understanding of Oriental modes of thought and action. We shall therefore attempt to point out the principal phases in the development of modern Japanese politics and to indicate the present status of the enterprise of organizing Japanese political life upon a Western basis.

The use of party organization in its modern sense originated in Count Itagaki's agitation for a parliament in the late seventies. The movement was taken up from another point of view by Count Okuma. About these two men devoted followers grouped themselves; and though the personal element was thus predominant from the start, it was the aim of these leaders to create actual and efficient political parties. The parties which they originated never had much opportunity for constructive action, being confined almost always to the opposition. Indeed, constructive government, as we shall see, has not been carried on upon the principle of party action in Japan. In addition to these original parties, other groups were from time to time formed, whose cohesion was usually slight and of short duration. Such were Count Ito's original Constitutional-Imperial Party, the National Unionist Party founded by Saigo and Marquis

Yamagata, the Teiseito, the Yukokai, the Seiko Club, and the Daido Club. A more important political organization was formed by Marquis Ito in 1900, the Seiyukai. The two original parties, organized in 1880 and 1881 respectively, were at first composed entirely of personal followers of the two prominent reformers; being without much opportunity for the exercise of real political power, they were marked by a distinctly theoretical character. Count Itagaki's Liberal Party drew its inspiration chiefly from Rousseau and other French theorists, and only to a lesser extent from the English Liberals. Its watchwords were "freedom, equality, and constitutional government," it believed in a broad basis for the suffrage, and in a legislature composed of one chamber, directly representative of the people. Count Okuma's Progressive Party was influenced rather by the English Liberal and Utilitarian school, as well as by English and American political experience. It emphasized internal reform and local self-government, and favored a bicameral parliament and the gradual extension of the suffrage.

During the ten years which elapsed between the definite promise of a parliament and its actual installation in 1891, these parties could of course carry on only a theoretical propaganda looking to future action. When the time for the first election came, they made a vigorous canvass, with the result that, taken together, they controlled a majority of the first House of Representatives.

The Government had adopted a rather neutral and almost disdainful attitude, in not making any direct, concerted efforts during the election; with the result that it found itself from the start without a majority in the lower chamber. As a matter of fact the powers which had been apportioned to the lower house in Count Ito's Constitution were by no means controlling, and the Government undoubtedly felt that its action could not be seriously embarrassed unless opposition should be very obstinate and long-continued. In the Japanese system, the Chamber is checked in its action by the House of Peers, the majority of whose members are noblemen, the rest being nominees of the Government. The financial powers of the Diet are confined to the voting of new taxes and of the budget prepared by the Ministry of Finance. Should any budget not meet with the approval of the Diet, the preceding estimates will remain in force for another fiscal year. The Emperor, through the Government, exercises the power of fixing the salaries of public officials, and the size and organization of the military and naval forces.

While it might, therefore, well have seemed to the elder statesmen that a body of such limited powers could be easily handled, the troubles which began as soon as the Diet opened indicated that the intractableness of the Chamber would probably be proportioned to its lack of real power. The candidates who had sought election to the House in the opposition parties were frequently

men who had been disappointed in their political ambitions by the close corporation of Satcho leaders¹ who were in control of the Government. Young men, excluded from every prospect of political advancement by the policy of confining lucrative appointments to the members of the clans to which these leaders belonged, were violent in their attacks upon such favoritism. The Chamber exhausted itself and the Government in bitter party attacks; it became impossible to advance any legislation, and the first Diet was dissolved after an existence of a little over a year.

A turbulent campaign followed. Forcible and insinuating arguments were put forward in appeals to every kind of human motive, high or low. Candidates even went so far as to enlist the services of *soshi*, or professional ruffians, for the purpose of intimidating their opponents. The Government, through an ordinance for preserving the peace, subjected the liberty of meeting and of speech to the strictest regulation. The newly elected Chamber was, however, in no way more manageable than the first. Its continued refusal to vote the necessary funds caused the Emperor to have recourse to his power over the civil service. In a rescript he called upon all public employees to give one tenth of their annual salaries for the purpose of assisting the State in the creation of an adequate armament. Other sessions and elections followed in quick succession until the wave of

¹ Members of the two leading clans, Satsuma and Choshu.

patriotic feeling engendered by the Chino-Japanese war caused a temporary armistice in party struggles.

But the controversy between Opposition and Government was taken up with redoubled energy, when the modification of the Treaty of Shimonoseki became known, through which Port Arthur was taken from Japan. The most violent scenes were witnessed in the Diet. The Premier, Marquis Ito, was in imminent danger of assassination by men of the people whose mind had become inflamed by the bitterness of the conflict. As the parliamentary opposition threatened to thwart every effort at new financial legislation, the Government finally saw itself forced to seek reconciliation with some of the opposition leaders. Count Itagaki was therefore invited to join the Ito Cabinet. With the aid of his influence the budget was doubled and over one hundred and twenty important, much-needed laws were passed through the lower house. As a price for his support, Itagaki had insisted upon the acceptance of laws guaranteeing the liberty of the press and asserting the responsibility of Ministers to the Diet. The latter principle was the centre of the political battles of those years, as in fact it still remains. The opposition parties claimed that constitutional government is unthinkable without responsibility of the Cabinet to the Parliament and the people. The Government, however, insisted that the ministers, being the servants of the Emperor, are responsible solely to him; and while of course it also recog-

nized their responsibility to the nation as a whole, it would not admit the right and power of the lower house to turn them out of office through a vote of lack of confidence. With respect to the above proposals of legislation a very shrewd use was made of the House of Peers. This conservative body readily adopted all the measures welcome to the Government, but rejected the two bills especially advocated by the Liberal Party. The defection of support in the House of Representatives which resulted upon this action, brought about the resignation of Marquis Ito and the formation of a new cabinet. His place was taken by Count Matsukata, another of the *Genro*, or elder statesmen, who associated with himself Count Okuma, the leader of the Progressive Party. Through a lavish use of the patronage this cabinet was enabled to hold office for sixteen months.

But this method of using one or the other of the opposition leaders soon proved a temporary makeshift. The Government was unable to satisfy the demands of the personal following of its new associates, while the limited recognition of opposition leaders only whetted the appetite of others and gave greater vigor to their attacks upon the Government. For these reasons, after Marquis Ito had again held office for a few months, he determined upon a bold stroke. He resigned and advised the Emperor to appoint a party cabinet composed of the leaders of the opposition, in order that they might try their mettle in actual administration. A combination

was accordingly formed between the two opposition parties, which entered upon official power under the name of Kensei-to. Great was the rejoicing among enthusiasts for parliamentary government, for the struggle for party recognition and ministerial responsibility seemed to have come to a successful ending. But signs of serious disagreement between the two sections were not slow in revealing themselves. On important matters of policy, such as the purchase of railways and the extent of the armament, the leaders were by no means at one. But this divergence was not so fatal to the success of the new cabinet as was the "office-hunting fever" which had seized upon the minor politicians so long excluded from the spoils. Notwithstanding numerous removals, it was impossible to satisfy a tithe of the applicants, and the various factions soon became openly hostile in this struggle over the distribution of offices. The embarrassments of the Cabinet were increased by the forced resignation of Mr. Ozaki who, in a public address, had been indiscreet enough to admit the possibility of Japan being a republic in a thousand years. Four short months sufficed to prove the impossibility of coöperation and to justify the shrewdness of Marquis Ito's counsel. Their opponents now being thoroughly discredited, the elder statesmen could form a cabinet composed entirely of their associates and followers. Marquis Yamagata became Prime Minister, and his principal colleagues were Counts Matsukata and Saigo, Viscounts Katsura and Aoki, and

Admiral Yamamoto. This cabinet, was, however, not free from the necessity of conciliating members of the Diet through an extensive use of public patronage and through other more or less corrupting influences, which earned for its head the sobriquet of "the modern Walpole." Among the measures of the Government at this time was a law raising the salary of members of the Diet from eight hundred to two thousand yen — an increase not out of proportion to the advancing cost of living, which was, however, looked upon as somewhat of a *douceur*.

The year 1900 brought an exceedingly important advance in the development of Japanese parties. Marquis Ito had come to realize that the Government could not go on in the old way, neglecting legitimate party organization and confining its efforts to sporadic alliances which tended to corrupt public action. He now himself descended into the political arena, and with a loud flourish of trumpets announced the formation of an ideal political party, summoning all good men to rally to his banner. The new party was given the name Seiyukai (friends of the Constitution). It comprised the majority of the old Liberal Party, — which was dissolved at the same time, Count Itagaki having retired from political life, — as well as a number of deputies who had formerly been without party affiliations. While Marquis Ito had come to the conclusion that public opinion should be organized so as to become responsible and to be of assist-

ance in the conduct of public affairs, he by no means intended through the movement thus inaugurated to bring about actual party government and ministerial responsibility. This is apparent from a speech which he delivered at the time of the foundation of the Seiyukai. In this address he stated that the appointment or dismissal of cabinet ministers appertains to the prerogatives of the Sovereign, who therefore has complete freedom to select his advisers as he may deem proper, from statesmen within or outside of the organized parties. Moreover, Marquis Ito asserted that when once ministers had taken office, it was not permissible for their political associates to interfere with the discharge of official duties, from the point of view of party advantage or party control. He declared this to be the fundamental principle of Japanese statesmanship. A correct interpretation of Marquis Ito's action in forming a party must take into account this declaration, which is borne out by his subsequent action. The "old statesman" had not been converted to the Liberal principle of cabinet responsibility; but he had come to see that the almost anarchical state of public opinion was detrimental, and that the party system must be reorganized from the point of view of the Government itself. In his opinion the party was not to be an instrument for the control of the Government, but rather a means through which the Government might exercise a steady influence over public opinion. Agreement of opinion upon general principles

was what he relied on among the members of his new party, — rather than the impulse to set up party control. The declaration of party principles which he caused to be issued on this occasion is therefore composed of rather vague generalizations with regard to properly conducting the affairs of state, advancing the prosperity of the country, and securing the harmonious working of administrative machinery.

As a result of this work in political organization, Marquis Ito was in October, 1900, again intrusted with the duty of forming a cabinet. Notwithstanding the platonic character of his partisanship, the House of Peers showed itself so much opposed to the very idea of party that it threatened to kill all legislation attempted by the Seiyukai; Marquis Ito had to seek aid by securing an imperial rescript which put the peers in a more conciliatory frame of mind. The cabinet was a strong one, including such names as Kato, Suyematsu, Watanabe, Kodama, Kaneko, and Hayashi. But latent internal dissensions soon developed into serious obstacles. Viscount Watanabe, Minister of Finance, disagreed with the Premier on the matter of financial legislation, being himself in favor of strict retrenchment. The Ito Cabinet, therefore, came to an early end, in 1901. It was succeeded by a cabinet under the influence of the most conservative elements, especially of Marquis Yamagata. Count Katsura was made Prime Minister and all his associates were peers.

With both the Seiyukai and the Progressive Party usually in opposition, a temporary alliance having been effected through circumstances, the Cabinet could not secure sufficient support in the House of Representatives. The sessions of the latter were short and stormy, and both in 1902 and 1903 the Chamber refused to vote the budget prepared by the Ministry. The latter was therefore forced to continue its financial administration under the budget for 1902, which had been fixed by a preceding Diet. While thus attempting to cut off the Government from supplies, the opposition engaged in the most irrational criticism of the supposed dilatoriness of the Ministry in foreign affairs; though refusing to vote the budget, they demanded a strong foreign policy, even to war with Russia, if that should prove necessary. This inconsistent attitude illustrates the irresponsibility of Japanese parties; their aim at the time seemed to be rather to embarrass the Cabinet than to pursue a complete and consistent policy. Marquis Ito, leader of the Seiyukai, threw his influence in favor of the Government, but in 1903 he apparently realized the impossibility of controlling his followers and giving adequate support to the Cabinet; he accordingly resigned the formal leadership and became President of the Privy Council, while the former president, Marquis Saiyonji, a member of the Kyoto court nobility, took his place as leader of the Seiyukai.

The parliamentary opposition to the Government cul-

minated in 1903 in a session which lasted only two days. The session of the Diet is customarily opened by an address from the throne, to which a formal answer is made by each house. This answer, in the lower house, is usually prepared by the Speaker in consultation with some of the leaders. When on December 10, 1903, the imperial address had been read, the Speaker of the time, Mr. Kono, drew from his pocket, and proceeded to read, an answer which he himself had prepared. The members did not realize the personal and irregular nature of this act, and although the answer contained a strong condemnation of the Government, amounting to a vote of lack of confidence, it was passed by the combined votes of the Seiyukai and the Progressive Party. The action of the Speaker was irregular in several respects. To make the answer to the address of the Sovereign the vehicle of political opinions was unprecedented, as it is a principle of Japanese decorum that the Sovereign is to be left entirely out of the political disputes of the day. Moreover, the Speaker had thus far not used his office as an instrument of party action, he had rather confined himself to the functions of an impartial moderator. The present Speaker, through his coup, put the opposition parties in an uncomfortable position. They had voted upon what they had distinctly heard, and they could therefore not without embarrassment reconsider the vote. A hasty vote of this kind, however, would not tend to increase their influence with the country, and would of course lead

to an immediate dissolution of the Chamber, which was, in fact, announced on the next day.

The opening of hostilities against Russia had the natural effect of ending all party opposition for the time. The Peace of Portsmouth, being at first unpopular, caused a renewal of attacks on the Cabinet, which weakened as the complex character of the situation became better known. In January, 1906, it was considered advisable to have the Katsura Ministry, which had enjoyed the longest tenure since the creation of the Diet, withdraw in favor of a cabinet a little more representative of the parties in parliament. The formation of this cabinet was intrusted to Marquis Saionji. This act was hailed as a victory of the Seiyukai and of the principle of party government — an unwarranted opinion, as it was distinctly understood at the time that Marquis Saionji had been invited as an individual statesman, not as a party leader, and that he would carry on the policies of his predecessors. It was expected that he would be able to count on the support of the Seiyukai, to which was added that of the Daido Club, an informal organization of pro-government representatives, under the virtual control of Count Katsura. The influence of the Yamagata element was indicated by the admission of three associates of Count Katsura to the new ministry, while General Teruchi continued as Minister of War. This cabinet, which was hailed as a party ministry, while it made certain concessions to the composition of parties in the lower house,

was still primarily based upon the non-partisan principle of government. It differs from the Katsura Cabinet in being more representative, but it could not be said to be responsible to the larger party in the Diet nor identified with it in leadership and principles. The opposition was, after 1906, made up of the Progressive Party, the Seiko Club, and independent members. The Saionji Ministry had the promise of fair sailing. It had reconciled the principal party in the House, as well as the conservatives and peers, who look to Marquis Yamagata for leadership. But its path after all proved to be not free from difficulties. The conservatives continued to look with suspicion upon the party connections of ministers and they were evidently resolved to avoid any action which might countenance the principle of party power.

The political changes in the last three years have involved some significant developments. A general parliamentary election was held in May, 1908. In the campaign the Seiyukai made every effort to overcome the general unpopularity incurred through the Government's policy in maintaining the high war taxes. The party was successful, and for the first time in the history of the Japanese Diet a single party had the absolute majority in the House. But though the presence of a compact body of one hundred and ninety-two members would seem to give assurance of continued political power, within a few weeks after the election the Seiyukai Cabinet resigned. As a reason for this surprising step the

Prime Minister assigned personal ill health; a deeper cause, however, must be sought in the opposition to the principle of party government which was still strongly held by the House of Peers. The Cabinet, having to deal with extremely difficult problems of finance and administration, could not hope to succeed if its action were blocked at every point by the upper house. A new cabinet was formed by Marquis Katsura, whose relation with Prince Yamagata and with the House of Peers gave him a strong hold on all the branches of government. He was, however, confronted by a situation in the lower house which made a certain amount of compromise inevitable; so, while not formally recognizing the Seiyukai as part of the Government, the new Premier sought to cultivate close relationships with it and to win its support for his measures. An alliance was thus begun, which gradually gained in strength and which constitutes the most significant feature of the present situation.

Several minor parties had come into existence at this time. The Yushinkai, or Reform Party, was composed of men who directed their efforts against corrupt methods in party politics and who opposed the continuance of war taxation. They counted forty-five members in the new Diet. Representatives of the industrial and commercial classes, who now, on account of the new basis of taxation, are more strongly represented in parliament than in former years, organized the Boshin Club, which is usually spoken of in English as the "Commercial Club."

This faction comprised forty-two members. The old Progressive Party had a strength of sixty-six.

The policy of friendly neutrality, assumed by the Seiyukai continued throughout the session which ended in March, 1910. This attitude of the controlling party allowed the Government to carry its budget and other administration measures without difficulty. The somewhat irresolute and ambiguous position of the leading party, however, led to a great deal of unrest and shifting among the other groups, who seemed to feel that the Seiyukai had no distinct policy and could, therefore, successfully be broken up, if a strong, united party were formed in opposition to it. Finally, in March, 1910, a new party was organized bearing the name of "Constitutional Nationalists" and uniting under its control ninety-two members of the Diet. The core of this organization consists of the old Progressives, who came over almost in a body; other elements are drawn from the Yushinkai and the Commercial Club. At the time when this combination was being organized, the Daido Club expanded by incorporating a majority of the commercial members, together with some independents; it is now known as the Chuo, or Central Club.

When the Diet opened again in December, 1910, the Seiyukai still had two hundred and five members, an absolute majority of thirty-six. Yet there was considerable unrest within the party itself, and it was beginning to be attacked, not only from without, but from within.

In order to avoid having the whole parliamentary situation thrown into confusion, Marquis Katsura now came out openly and invited the Seiyukai to a more definite alliance. At the formal banquet at which this new alliance between government and party was announced and received its sanction, Marquis Katsura expressed his admiration for the moderation and the resolute attitude of the Seiyukai and his appreciation of their valuable aid in the past. "In a time calling earnestly for administrative reform and for measures calculated to maintain the peace of the East, there should be complete unanimity in striving for the nation's benefit." His sentiments were reciprocated in the speech of Marquis Saionji, who expressed the hope that by coöperation between his party and the Government the final success of constitutional institutions might be achieved. The interpretation given to this action in contemporary discussion was agreed in acknowledging the significance of the change of attitude in Marquis Katsura and his group, who had hitherto strenuously opposed the idea of party government. But while some publicists viewed the action as dictated merely by the necessities of the moment, others saw in it a step as important as that taken by Marquis Ito, when, in 1900, he descended into the field of party politics and organized the Seiyukai. The action of Marquis Katsura seemed to indicate that the attitude of the House of Peers and of the elder statesmen had become more favorable to the idea of party control;

at last they appeared to have recognized that legislative anarchy could be avoided only by encouraging the growth of permanent, responsible party groupings. The restrained and helpful attitude of the Seiyukai, even when it represented the Cabinet, had gained the respect of the upper house. It would undoubtedly be premature to see in this step the definitive establishment of government by party, centred in the lower house. The focus of government is still the administration controlled by the Privy Council. But the leaders in Japanese government are evidently willing to give more heed to matured public opinion expressing itself in organized parties within the Diet. No immediate cabinet changes followed upon the announcement of the new alliance, although early in March, 1911, the Cabinet, as well as the Seiyukai, were greatly agitated by a controversy concerning school-readers. It throws light upon the political sentiments of Japan to know that a statement contained in a school-book, concerning the legitimacy of the northern and southern courts in Japan six hundred years ago, could for a while become the most momentous political question by which even portfolios in the Cabinet were endangered.

During the entire period of government under the Constitution, the opposition parties have made it a practice to urge and press the Government to pursue a strong foreign policy. In appealing to the patriotism of the nation, they attempted to gain a double advantage, on the

one hand, embarrassing the Government in the conduct of affairs, on the other, standing before the people as the watchful guardians of national rights. But such a position assumed by parties in opposition, who are avowedly struggling for the principle of ministerial responsibility, carries with it manifest dangers to the accomplishment of their main purpose. If the people are encouraged to demand what is called a strong foreign policy, if their attention is concentrated on foreign affairs, the field wherein party influence may normally and consistently be exercised is of necessity neglected. A warlike policy always strengthens the executive at the expense of the legislative branch, because it demands secret counsel and quick action. The English parties, which have been the model for party life in Japan as well as elsewhere, have generally abstained from carrying the political struggle into the domain of foreign affairs. Unless parties can find a sufficient basis for action in domestic matters, they may be said to have confessed a failure to realize the possibilities and limitations of party action.

During the difficulties occasioned by the San Francisco school situation, the Progressive Party assumed the position that the Japanese Government was dilatory in safeguarding the interests of the Japanese abroad. The standing committee of this party has repeatedly issued manifestoes criticizing the Cabinet for its supposed lack of vigor. This attitude was imposed upon the party by its more extreme wing led by Mr. Oishi; the moderate

section seemed to realize the danger of introducing party criticism into the domain of foreign affairs during such a delicate situation. The responsibility for this action of the Progressives must, however, also be shared by Count Okuma, who took a very strong position in this matter, though he was more logical than his followers in facing the consequences of an assertive foreign policy upon national finance. His views were reflected in the *Hochi Shimbun*, the leading Progressive journal, which, however, took an unduly alarmist view of the situation. The Daido Club played a somewhat temporizing part in this matter. Its manifestoes dealt in general phrases counseling patience, but in the same breath criticizing the dilatory policy of the Government. It is interesting to note that, even during the recesses of the Diet, parties continue to act formally on political matters through their general committees, which meet at Tokyo for discussion and issue manifestoes as occasion demands.

The Progressive, now transformed into the Constitutional Nationalist Party, has, of all political organizations in Japan, shown most permanence and cohesion. This has been due to the genial leadership and powerful personality of Count Okuma. Although in office for less than two years during his whole parliamentary career, he succeeded in inspiring his followers with such personal devotion that they continued their exertions in political life in the face of great discouragements and without hope of immediate reward. But dissensions

which had arisen in the party took on a somewhat serious aspect at the beginning of 1907. They were largely personal in nature, being occasioned by the ambitions of two younger leaders, Messrs. Oishi and Inukai; but questions of decentralization, of military policy, and of financial retrenchment were also involved. It was finally decided in the council of the party that Count Okuma should resign from the party leadership, and action in that sense was taken. The Count looked upon the matter in a most impartial and modest way, and declared it desirable that a more active and vigorous propaganda should be carried on under the direction of younger men. He assured his followers that, while formally retiring, he would always continue heart and soul in the work of the Progressive Party.

The retirement of Count Okuma was cited as a further proof of the hopeless outlook of party government in Japan. Many of his followers had undoubtedly become impatient with long waiting, and pinned their hope to a change in leadership, though it is difficult to see how another leader can succeed in doing more for them than Count Okuma accomplished. A man of great political insight and experience, he always strove to give dignity and responsibility to the action of his party. It seemed to him worth while that there should be a centre for progressive opinion, even if the succession to actual political power should be indefinitely delayed. As a statesman he always showed a strong grasp of political problems in

their organic relations. He was, therefore, never a radical like Itagaki, nor did he ever push a single policy without considering its relation to other branches of political life. His resignation was avowedly brought about because he insisted that it was not advisable to favor great increase in the armament without thoroughly reconstructing the financial system of the country. Like his great rival, Prince Ito, he has served his country by bringing it to a consciousness of what is meant by public policy. He will for a long time remain a living force, and if Japan is to hold the place she has gained and harmoniously to develop her national life, his counsels will have to be taken into account by the nation and its leaders.

The great statesman who, throughout the last three decades up to the time of his death, exercised altogether the most constant and pervading influence in the government of the Japanese nation and in its political life, was also one of those men whose characters profoundly impress the imagination of their contemporaries. It will be interesting to see how Prince Ito was judged by his most prominent rival and competitor for ascendancy over Japanese public opinion. Count Okuma has written of him as follows: ¹ —

“As a politician Prince Ito was certainly a very great man, and to me it always appeared that his greatness was attributable to two mental qualities that he possessed. One was the most remarkable versatility, the

¹ Translated in the *Japan Weekly Mail*.

other was a conciliatory spirit. Successful statesmanship depends on a minute knowledge of all that affects the people governed, of all that might render any proposed policy a success or a failure; armaments, diplomacy, finance, education, religion, popular feelings, customs, — a statesman should study them all. And this the late Prince did. His minute acquaintance with the details of so many different subjects rendered him in most cases a safe guide. Statesmen like Prince Ito are very rare in this country to-day. We have a good many brilliant politicians in our midst, but their range of vision is very limited; they do not take in the whole field; they are mere specialists and they lack common sense. Prince Ito's conciliatory spirit was one of the most useful as well as the most beautiful traits of his character. Numerous indeed are the conflicting elements in politics. The men out of power are always attempting to pick holes in the policy of those who hold the reins of government. Those in power are too often anxious to escape responsibility and to put the blame of their maladministration on others. Then there is the element of personal ambition which is never absent from politics and which often helps on good government, because, in order to shine, men have to avoid making mistakes. With all the influences that tend to divide politicians, the presence of a man like the late Prince Ito to smooth over differences, to pour oil on the troubled waters, contributed greatly to that peaceful coöperation for the attainment of great ends

which has so often been witnessed in this country during the past few decades. Though Prince Ito when in power had sufficient personal ambition to make him try his best to make a success of his administration, his devotion to the state was such that he was always ready to give place to others when circumstances seemed to indicate that this was the wisest course to follow.”¹

¹ A most interesting comparison of the characters of Ito and Okuma has been made by Mr. Setsurei Miyake (translated in the *Japan Weekly Mail*). “Both these statesmen have labored hard to plant constitutional government in the country. Which of the principles for which they contended will win, it is perhaps too early to determine. But a comparison of the two men may prove of interest. In physical strength and health they were about the same. They often drank sake together, and Count Okuma on these occasions was able to stand more liquor than the Prince. In activity and in spirit they were alike. They both possessed an enormous amount of practical wisdom, and the capacity of each for imbibing new knowledge was about equal. The Prince often went abroad, but Count Okuma has remained at home. The Prince was a great reader of Chinese and English original work but the Count’s clear ideas on numbers of subjects have all been acquired by studying translations. At the age of seventy, the Prince was a match in argument for men in their prime, and the Count is still this, though over seventy. Their minds taken as a whole were much alike, and which was the stronger of the two it is difficult to determine. In the practical uses to which he put his knowledge, the Count went beyond the Prince, but the Prince was more wary and laid his plans in such a way that his opponents could not take him at a disadvantage. They both understood learned subjects as well as men who are known as scholars, but neither of them had the ways of academicians. In analytic power the minds of both were deficient, it was in perceptive power that they so excelled. In moral character they resembled each other more than most people suppose. In money matters the Count has been considered to be a hoarder, a man who liked

It is apparent that the party system has not fully been tried as yet in Japan, as parties have not been called upon to carry out a constructive policy for any length of time. Constructive political action has been in the hands of the elder statesmen of the Government. This situation of itself has tended to render party action irresponsible, and to reduce party principles to mere generalities. The latter result has also been favored by the desire on the part of opposition parties to ally themselves with other factions for the purpose of securing greater influence. A policy specific in detail would stand in the way

money for its own sake, and the Prince's indifference to money has been paraded before the public as though it were a virtue. This kind of criticism is all very shallow. The Count has undoubtedly accumulated money from time to time, but it has been with the object of spending it on good causes. Want of sufficient means has been and probably is to-day the one cause of his inactivity in certain directions. Additions to his income have always meant the development of new enterprises with Count Okuma. If he saves, he saves to spend. Turning to Prince Ito, if he was, as people represent, indifferent to money, it was because he could afford to be indifferent to it, knowing where to go for as much as he required. In any enterprises that he wished to carry out, he never wanted for money. To say that he was not avaricious simply means that he had no desire to lay up large sums of money for himself or even for his family. But the same thing can be said of Count Okuma. As regards the conduct of the two statesmen, one has to remember the characteristics of the age in which they were brought up and the habits of the men with whom they associated throughout their lives. In whatever dissipation the late Prince indulged, it never interfered with the arduous duties he performed. The hours he spent in sleep were few, and though constantly in the company of women, he never allowed them to occupy time that was not his own to give."

of such alliances, and has therefore generally been avoided. The persistent prosecution of certain definite political ends expressed in specific principles has not characterized Japanese parties. They have rather been personal followings of important leaders, like Count Itagaki or Count Okuma, or they have been brought together temporarily by the hunger for political spoils. Much inconsistency is also found; prominent men change their affiliations in an unexplained manner, and leaders are deserted without much consideration.

But we must look at the institutions through and in which parties are active in order to understand their limitations. The Diet itself is an institution superficially grafted upon the Japanese body politic. Its tenure has been most uncertain. Counting the general election of 1908, there have taken place nine elections in eighteen years, only two of which were regular elections following the expiration of the full term of four years. Many of the sessions of the Diet have lasted for only a few weeks or even days. The conditions of the franchise are such that only sixteen out of every thousand inhabitants are entitled to vote, the entire electorate numbering 757,000. The financial powers of the Diet are very circumscribed. In the most recent sessions there has been little debate upon the budget. Thus, the budget of 1906, carrying appropriations of 600,000,000 yen, was voted after a discussion of three hours. As a matter of fact, the real work of the House is done in its committees. The Budget

Commission, composed of sixty members representing all factions, carefully goes over the financial legislation and discusses it with members of the Ministry of Finance. When the balance of parties is favorable, the action of the Commission practically disposes of the matter.

During the first years of its existence the House of Representatives promised to become a great forum for debate. Brilliant speakers like Takanashi Tetsushiro, Inouye Kakugoro, Osake Yukio, and Shimada Saburo, won national prominence by their oratorical talents. But when the real impotence of the House became apparent, a blight fell upon oratorical effort and the rostrum was more and more deserted. Matters were settled in the committees and in the lobbies, and every other kind of influence seemed to be more powerful than rational persuasion. Charges of corruption are very frequent. They have at times been admitted by individual members with cynical effrontery, and Count Okuma has repeatedly bewailed the corruption in the constituencies, which recalls the Walpolian era in England. Notwithstanding such discouraging conditions, a certain advance seems to have been made through the education of public opinion in matters of government; but this advance is beset on all sides by dangers created through misunderstanding and hostile feeling.

The House of Representatives is, however, not alone to be considered. It is associated with the House of Peers,

a thoroughly conservative force. The majority of the nobility itself are strongly adverse to party government, nor is a different opinion held by the imperial nominees and the great taxpayers, who make up the rest of the upper chamber. Being more closely in touch with the Government, the House of Peers has more real power by far than the House of Representatives.

We must also consider the other elements of the Constitution in order to appreciate the full bearings of the party idea upon general political life in Japan. The apex and centre of the Japanese Government is the Throne, about which are grouped all the hierarchies of officialdom. The Constitution has embodied and made permanent the old Shintō belief in the heavenly descent and personal divinity of the Mikado. The character of this portion of Japanese constitutional law is indicated by the following passage from Marquis Ito's *Commentaries on the Japanese Constitution*: "The Sacred Throne was established at the time the heavens and the earth became separated. The Emperor is Heaven-descended, divine, and sacred. He is preëminent above all his subjects. He must be revered, and is inviolable. He has indeed, to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no power to hold him accountable to it. Not only shall there be no irreverence for the Emperor's person, but also shall he not be made a topic for derogatory comment nor one of discussion." As long as the conception embodied in this extract is still a living force in Japanese politics,

the centre of gravity will not be shifted from the Government to the popular representation in the Diet.

The Throne is surrounded and supported by the *Genro*, or elder statesmen. For forty years (since the restoration of the Emperor) this group of leaders, constantly dwindling but essentially permanent in personnel and ideas, has supported the burden of responsibility. It is they who have piloted the Japanese state and people in their perilous passage from the old to the new civilization. They have combined great foresight in matters of international development and foreign intercourse with constructive talent which has enabled them at the proper time to create the means and measures for domestic progress. All this they did under the weight of constant popular opposition and misunderstanding. Steadied by the traditions of Japanese civilization and by their personal allegiance to the Throne, loyal to one another, they quietly and firmly carried out a consistent policy leading to a more efficient organization of the Japanese state.

Their cohesion is explained by the fact that they belonged to the clans who had originally supported the imperial restoration. Even now, when only four or five of the original *Genro* survive, they, as well as nearly all their important followers, are taken from a small number of clans. Thus, Choshu has furnished Ito, Yamagata, Inouye, Katsura, Hayashi, and numerous other leaders. The two principal representatives of Satsuma are Mar-

quis Oyama and Count Matsukata. Hizen, with Count Okuma, and Tosa, with Count Itagaki, have furnished the brains and impulse of the opposition. Added to the principle of clan allegiance is that of personal leadership. All of these men, Yamagata, Ito, Okuma, and others, have a large personal following, attracted by their personal qualities. They begin the recruiting of a following in good season, among the promising students of the Japanese universities. Count Okuma has long been the patron, and has now become the President, of Waseda University; and similarly the ultra-conservative Marquis Yamagata looks after the education of young men through whom he hopes to secure the future advance of his policies.

The institution through which the *Genro* or elder statesmen have chiefly exercised their influence is the Privy Council. Throughout the warlike period of the last decade this body has stood above the Cabinet, and, as the direct adviser of the Emperor, has been the real guardian of the destinies of Japan. Its most influential members were Ito, Yamagata, and Matsukata. The prominence of Field Marshal Marquis Yamagata, who is also the leading member of the supreme military council, indicates the importance of the army organization in the Japanese state. Indeed, economic and political life must subordinate itself to the efficiency of the military machine. As already indicated, these leaders have not at all times been able to count on the united support of the

Japanese nation. Very bitter attacks have from time to time been made upon them, and they have frequently been in personal danger on account of the traditional popular feeling among the Japanese that it is a worthy act to put out of the way a man who is unjust or tyrannical, provided the assailant is ready to expiate his deed with his own life. Most of the prominent Japanese statesmen have at one time or another been threatened by the hand of the assassin. Okubo was killed by a reactionary, and Viscount Mori fell at the hands of an enraged Shintō follower, in 1889. Count Itagaki was stabbed by a young Hotspur, and Count Okuma had his leg taken off in a bomb attack when, in 1888, he was negotiating the treaties for the abolition of extraterritoriality. Toru Hoshi was killed for attempting to introduce methods resembling those of American party organization and bossdom in Tokyo. Other prominent victims of this practice were Yokoi, Omura, and Hirose. Such attacks, as well as occasional riotous outbursts, are a constant warning to the men in power that public opinion cannot be ignored. It would indeed seem an inevitable conclusion that it would be far better to foster the action of public opinion through regular and responsible organizations than to risk such destructive outbursts of lawlessness.

It will be seen that the problem of organizing public opinion so as to make it truly helpful to the government of the state is still far from its solution in Japan. The

Japanese state is, in fact, remarkable chiefly on account of the effective organization of authority. As in Russia, though with a great difference, public action rests on the principle of authority rather than on popular consent. Authority itself is supported by the traditions of the Empire, by the military organization, made constantly more effective on account of the foreign relations of Japan, by clan cohesion, which itself is the principle of authority working on a smaller area, and finally by the wisdom and experience of the representatives of authority and their notable success in augmenting the power of the state. The other principle which ought to be present in a modern popular state, that of consent, has no corresponding organization or support. The creation of a parliament, indeed, raised hopes of popular control; but while parliamentarism has been disappointing in all parts of the world, it has been especially ineffectual in Japan. Japan lacks the strong and independent spirit of a middle class which might make the Diet the centre and organ of its influence. The parliamentarians, having been confined to the barren task of opposition, lack experience in practical administration and constructive activity. Their inexperience often leads them to demand the unattainable, and impairs their influence and weight with the nation as a whole. The international relations in which Japan has found herself, necessitating a strong armament and repeated wars, have also been extremely unfavorable to the development of popular rights. It

is therefore both illogical and impolitic for the opposition to favor an aggressive foreign policy and to urge the Government on to warlike demonstrations. A national party system can develop only in an era of peace and domestic progress.

Opinions may differ as to whether the absence of a strong parliament is a source of strength or weakness to the Japanese state as a whole. Foreign relations can at present be handled with great secrecy and expedition, and it cannot be denied that the country has been rapidly advancing in general prosperity. But it remains very doubtful whether the principle of authority alone can ever be a safe basis for state life. In Japan it threatens to become excessively developed. The Japanese state is, in fact, not only military and bureaucratic, but also monopolistic. Railways, manufacturing and distributing agencies, and financial institutions are directly owned, or at least controlled, by the Government. A formidable machine is thus being created, at the risk, it is to be feared, of impeding spontaneous national development. It is here that the value of a well-organized public opinion is to be sought. Responsible and truly influential, it would keep the Government in touch with the vital forces of the nation, so that there might be avoided the building up of a lifeless mechanism, temporarily efficient, but in the long run bound to become a disastrous impediment to the freedom and progress of the people.

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
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