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INTEREST

Of these United Provinces.

BEING
A Defence of the

Zeelanders Choice.

Wherein is shewne,

- I. That we ought unanimously to defend our selves.
- II. That if we cannot, it is better to be under England than France, in regard of Religion, Liberty, Estates, and Trade.
- III. That we are not yet come to that extremity, but we may remaine a Republick. And that our Compliance with England is the onely meanes for this.

TOGETHER WITH

Severall Remarkes upon the present, and
Conjectures on the future State of Affaires in Europe,
especially as relating to this Republick.

By a well wisher to the Reformed Religion, and
the wellfare of these Countries.



M I D D E L B U R G,
Printed by *Thomas Berry*, according to the Dutch Copie
Printed at *Amsterdam*. ANNO 1673.

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The first part of the document
 discusses the general principles
 of the system and its
 objectives. It is intended to
 provide a clear understanding
 of the scope and purpose of
 the project. The following
 sections will describe the
 methodology and the results
 of the study.



The second part of the document
 describes the methodology used
 in the study. It includes
 details of the data collection
 process and the statistical
 analysis performed. The
 results of the study are
 presented in the following
 sections.

A Summary of the ensuing Treatise.



THE PREFACE. Wherein, the occasion and reason of this Worke. The Authors fears ballanced with others hopes. The necessity of unanimity for, and duty of self defence.

SECTION I.

The rise and State of that great Question, (viz.) whether upon supposal of inability to defend our selves, it is our INTEREST to be under England or France, and the Zeelanders choice of the former.

2. Arguments to prove this choice to be agreeable to our true Interest. The first whereof is from our Religious concernments. Wherein is shewen how great a support Religion is to a State; and how greatly it concerns us to secure our Religion.

3. The plea of France's granting us the liberty of our Religion, considered.

4. Objections from the danger of losing our Religion under England, from the Kings being a Papist, designing to set up Popery; the increase, countenance, and tolleration of Papists, as also from his joyning with France against us, and Church Government by Bishops, all answered.

5. A 2. Argument taken from Liberty. Wherein the different Kinds and degrees of Liberty, under all sorts of Government, are declared; and the probability of enjoying greater freedom under England than France, argued.

6. The 3. Argument is the preservation of our Estates; in regard of Soldiers violence, Governors impositions, Publick Debts by obligation, and Revenues of the Romish Church.

7. The 4. Argument from Trade. This (viz. Merchandise and Navigation) our chief secular Interest. And friendship with England to secure the same. England and we Competitors herein, what implied thereby in point of Interest, and Inference. The probability of getting more, as also enjoying the same with greater Peace under France, with other Arguments, largely debated; and the contrary winced under Engla.

Several other Arguments and inducements to incline us rather for England, briefly mentioned. With an inference from the whole preceding discourse, that the friendship of England is to be preferred before that of France.

9. That we are not yet come to that extremity, but we may still remain a Republick; in regard of our own strength, and our Neighbors Interest, Englands especially; that they had better lose Scotland or Ireland then let the French have these Provinces. This War a Game at Hazard. Being engaged will go through, and Parliament probably assist therein.

10. Compliance with England; the only means of the Commonwealths continuation.

11. Conjecture of future affairs. The motions of the ensuing Summer likely to be quick and great. As to this Republick, probably England may get a bridle to curb us, France the saddle to ride us, Colen a Supernumerary girth, Munster a bos off the crupper. Our condition deplored and consolated. A necessary caution for England, another for the Orange Family. The Authors fears of what will at last befall us. The Spanish Netherlands a dying. The friendship of England and France sick at heart, and cannot live long. That of Spain and England sound at heart, and will recover, &c.

12. France's Ambition. Growing greatness. The causes thereof. We and England in the fault. The Common Intrest of Europe to oppose France particularly declared of the Empire, Spain, England, Denmark, and this Republick and Hans Towns. Tea of Sweden, Savoy, and Switzerland. The ballance of Europe to be held even, and by whom.

13. The Conclusion of the whole Discourse.

To the Impartial Reader.



Although in so small a Tractate, it may be thought needless to give an account of the occasion thereof; yet I think my self obliged for your further satisfaction, to do it briefly. The Author having been lately in *Holland*, found what the *Zeelanders* had done in the late Revolutions, misunderstood by some, and variously censured by others; and therefore thought it worthy his pains, fairly and modestly to vindicate the same. And the rather, because he foresees various pretexts will be deduced thence, and divers interpretations be made thereof, which the Author hopes by his declaring the true intent and meaning, to free it from. That so all those, whose Curiosity or Interest leads them to inquire, might be acquainted with the true Grounds and Reasons thereof; and that neither the propensity of some to the *French*, nor the prejudice and passion of others against the *English*, might make us run blindfold upon our ruine; but that we may discern our true *Interest*, and pursue it as occasion shall require. For as all affection to that which is not our real Interest, so all aversion from that which is, is madness and folly, which clouds Reason, precipitates Counsels, runs us upon extreams, and drives us into inevitable destruction, many times before we are aware.

I know some will be apt to say, What need of this now? The Storm is over, and the supposition of inability to defend our selves out of doors. If I thought so, I assure you I should neither trouble my self, nor others any further. But whether it be my love to the Countrey, and desire of the welfare thereof; or my jealousy over the Factions of the Rulers, and tumultuousness of the people therein; or my comparing and estimating our own strength, fidelity, and courage, with our Enemies; or my observing, that our former Military Discipline (which made us renowned, and our Countrey accounted the School of War) is in a great measure, if not utterly decayed and lost; or my hearing how old Officers, and Foreign Forces have been slighted; and such preferred, as are unexperienced for conduct, and untried for courage; or the difference I have observed in the valour of a poor and rich people; Poverty always stirring up and whetting Valour, out of hopes to better their condition; whereas riches makes men fearful of losing what they have, and so falling into a worse. As may be observed not only in different people, as between the Northern and Southern Nations; but also in the same, yea in our selves. For when poor in our Wars with *Spain*, we made good the old Character which Tacitus gives us, *Omnium harum gentium virtute præcipui Batavi, &c.* Of

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all the *German* Nations, or People, the *Batavians*, were chief for valour; but now that we are grown rich, we are afraid to adventure either our Person or Estates, and readier to open our Gates, than shut them against our Enemies. Or whether it be my melancholly temper only; or my fears and cowardise, if you please to call it so; or my fancy from my observation, that the third War (as this is with *England*) hath ever proved fatal to the one side, as is apparent by many Examples; or whatever other cause it is, I must profess freely, That I am of another sentiment, this War having so black a visage to mine appearance, that I fear we are rather in the midit of a tempestuous Sea of Troubles, than discovering of Land, much less a safe Harbour of Rest.

I am not ignorant upon how many Pins men hang their Hopes. Some upon the advancement of his Highness the Prince of *Orange*, hope all will be redrest, and well at home; and that his relation to the Crown of *England*, and the Elector of *Brandenburgh*, will capacitate him to remedy all abroad. Others, upon conjectures of his marrying with the Duke of *York's* Daughter, or some nearly related to the Crown of *England* or *France*; which hath been an usual way, I confess, especially amongst absolute Princes, of accommodating differences. Some upon our sufficient numbers of Men and Monies to defend our selves. Other some upon the assistance of the *Emperour*, and the *German* Princes, *Brandenburgh* especially. And others upon their opinion, That now the Pensionary *de Wit*, and his Party are broken, so that *England* can confide more in our friendship, that the King will break with *France*, and afford his Nephew and these *Netherlands* assistance; especially because they judge, that it is the interest of *England* and *Germany*, as well as *Spain*, not to see us fall into the *French* hands, for fear they have only *Polyphemus* his courtesie, to be last devoured. But yet all these grounds, and divers others, which are variously discoursed of, prevail not so far with me, as that my hopes can ballance my fears.

For although I grant the strength of the remaining Provinces to be considerable both by Sea and Land; and the greatest foundation to build our hopes upon, next under God Almightyes Protection; yet if we duly consider the state and condition we are in, there is not that just ground of confidence, which may free us from fears; as many are apt to imagine. He is very short-sighted, that observes not, 1. That there are two different Parties amongst us, and that a Commonwealth, much less then a Kingdom divided, cannot stand. 2. That we might do much more than we do, or (for any thing I yet see) will or shall do for our own defence. 3. That we are destitute of Succours from abroad for the present, except from *Spain*; which we may happily pay dear enough for, if we should be drawn into a League Offensive and Defensive with them in a long and tedious War. And 4. That we are full of tumults and distractions at home, which is to me a greater presage of approaching ruine, than all our Enemies weapons of War; and makes me fear, that as tumults was the occasion

of our rising, so they will be of our ruin. And that Priols observation of *Hist. Gs.*
two only Nations that have stood firm by defection; the *Helvetians* at the
rise, and the *Hollanders* at the fall of the *Rhine*; those founding and defend-
ing their Liberty by the Mountains, their Poverty, and Equality; these by
the Waters, their Riches, and the States with a Captain General; may
shortly be contradicted in the latter, if we be not more unanimous, and
perhaps ere long in the former also. *l. 2.*

I grant likewise, That it is very considerable to have so wise a Conductor
as the Prince of *Orange* is for his years, and one of such near Relation to
two such great Potentates as his Uncles of *England* and *Brandenburg*. But
yet if we rightly consider, we cannot but conclude. 1. That it must be
Power as well as Policy that can relieve us; and that in the Affairs of the
World, Interest is preferred above all Relations; the whole world turning
upon the Hinge of Self-interest; and all Princes, States, Families, and Persons
eagerly pursuing that which they apprehend their Interest although often
mistaking it, and oftner the means to obtain it, no wonder if they miss
thereof. 2. And that his Civil Dignities come rather to him by Popular
Tumults than Regular Proceedings: which is found an easie way to rise by,
but a hard way to stand by, yea, Morally impossible, if not backed by Power.
For as it is with sick Persons, so with sick States, if all things be not quickly
redressed that is grievous to them, they presently cry, *Turn me again*; and
think they have power to undo, that which they themselves have formerly
done. It being a true Character which *Livy* gives the Common People,
Plebs aut humiliter servit, aut superbe dominatur. 3. And that though the *Lib. 24.*
de Wirs be dead, their party lives; and if things succeed not well under his
Highness, will have no small advantage, not only from the horrid Murder of
those two Pillars of their party; but from the declining of Affairs to cry
him down with the People, and make him an *Insignificant Cypher of State*.
4. And lastly, there are so many Papists, and other Sects of Religion and
Malecontents, who watch for opportunities to fly-blow the Common people,
and set them upon Sedition; that I much question, whether that fresh gale
of Affection to the Prince, which hath blown so briskly through all these
remaining Provinces, will last long. For if they see that his Highness cannot
make Peace, as they expected; and they feel more miserable effects of a stub-
born and cruel War, and be forced to greater Taxes (the Common People
being always covetous, whatever the cause or necessity be) and find their
Trade still obstructed, and Land drowned, to the impoverishing both of
Citie and Countrey: I fear we shall find the People so restless and unquiet,
that they will neither know what to do themselves, nor be willing to be
guided by their Governours that do; but when Extremities press upon us,
bring all into Confusion, and consequently Ruine.

For besides the Jealousies which many have of his Highness, which *Benti-
voglio* long since foresaw and foretold, That these Jealousies betwixt the
State, and the Stadholder, would become the cause of our Ruine; the needy
multitude

multitude, (which are always enemies to good Order and Government) when distressed ; will seek occasion to prey upon the richer, whom they constantly envy. And the middle sort, which are the true Basis of a State, whose principal aim is Liberty and Plenty, when they see these indangered, grow jealous of their Governours (upon whom all misfortunes are constantly laid) and seek to pull them down and set up themselves one after another, to the ruine of all. For the pomp of Government so dazles the eyes of those that know not the weight of it, that when there is any seeming access thereto, all are apt to contend for it, and every one to think himself as capable as his neighbour, and vie with one another without end : till they that were formerly good Passengers, now turning Pilots in a Storm ; through their continual contentions and unskilfulness, shipwreck the Commonwealth, whilst they sincerely desire and endeavour to save it. I shall therefore conclude, that although we have a good *Head*, yet except the members be at unity, and unanimously resolved to give assistance to their Head and Governours ; it is in vain to think, we can be secured from such potent Enemies, (except any be so mad as to expect miracles) or that the Princes name or weighing of his Flag upon our Towers can defend us.

For his Marrying his Highness the Duke of *York's* Daughter, we may speak of it here, and those in *England* of the King of *Sweden*, and both be mistaken. I can see little certainty thereof, and therefore can say less therein ; but this I can say, that if a Relation would effect our desires, there is that which is very near already ; yea which many perhaps will think too near, if it conduce no more to the procuring our Peace.

For our assistance from the *Empeour* and *German Princes*, which is so much talkt of, the *Brandenburghs* especially ; If I were assured they designed to serve us, and not themselves of us, I should have more hopes than I have. I know the *Germans* are a great and warlike-Nation, and that none almost have warred with them, that have not repented it. And when we see them war with *France*, though they directly assist us not further, such a diversion to our enemy will be a considerable advantage to us. But at present, we see no more of their intentions, than to defend themselves. The *Empeour* is not only continually kept waking by the *Turk* ; but at present diverted also by the distractions of *Hungary*. And the fears of *Poland*, will necessitate *Brandenburgh* to have an eye to *Prussia*. The Princes of the Empire are many, and divided, (several of them declaring for *France*, others wavering and waiting opportunity to close with the prevailing side) which makes their Counsels slow, and more subject to be discovered, the raising men and bringing them together more difficult, the commanding of them more lyable to discord (which hath often proved fatal in their Armies) and the providing for them very uncertain. And I might add hereunto (for it is well known) that some of the *German Princes* have so run out their revenues ; that though they have men far more than their proportion,

yet

yet have not money to pay the half of their rate. So that it is well, if what was said of old of the *Brittains*, prove not true of the *Germans*, *Dum singuli pugniant, omnes vincuntur.* *Tacitus in vita Agri- cola.*

As for the Interest of *England*, which we think should incline them to hinder rather than further *France's* growing greatness, and consequently to Peace with us: I shall only say this, That as we allow all men liberty to judge of their own Interests, so must we much more to Kings and Rulers. And it is but reasonable to think, that they understand their own Interest better than we, that are strangers to their designs; except we think of our selves as the *Persians*, who say that they have two eyes, and others but one. I may think, that the same Reason of State should prevail now, that did formerly with the *English*, in the first War, *To humble us, but not ruine us*; and shall make it apparent, that they cannot rationally have a thought of our ruine, without thinking to follow after; yet circumstances are so different, and the passions of men so various, that I am not certain to what extent and degree of Humiliation they measure their Interest, or how far *England* is engaged with *France* for effecting of this. We may think, and the *English* Nation may be jealous (as I know they are) that *France* will couzen them at last, and serve them now as *Comines* tells us they have formerly, *When usually they beat the French in their Wars; but then what they had got by their Swords, they lost by their Treaties*, (even as *Bodin* tells us the *French* were served by the *Spaniards*;) but if they will adventure that, who can hinder them? *L. 3. c. 3. &*
l. 4. c. 9.
Bodin de
Rep. l. 5.
c. 1.

Should I speak my private apprehension, 'tis briefly this. *England* hath been long jealous of the growing greatness of this State by Sea, and find it an error of Policy in former Governors, to suffer us to arrive at this height of contesting with them. From whence they have met with several inconveniences in regard of Trade, and also been put to vast expences to maintain constantly a Fleet to cope with us. These things they would willingly ease themselves of, which they know cannot be done, but by the Sword. The first War which was occasionally begun, was no time to effect their designs, in regard the Kingdom was harrassed and exhausted by a long Civil War; and *Oliver* the Protector's chief design was to settle himself, and therefore made Peace. The second War advantaged them nothing; for the *French* countenancing us (though secretly in League with them before the War was ended) they were not able to effect what they designed, having lost their opportunity which they had after the first battel in their hands: That being often verified of the *English*, which was said of *Hannibal*, (by whom matters not, for the Learned Historians *Livie* and *Plutarch* differ therein,) *Vincere scis Hannibal, victoria mi nescis*. A Peace is concluded at *Breda*, but the War had a sting in the tail of it, the work at *Charlam*, *Manet alta mente repostum*, and makes them more eagerly wait for an opportunity both to revenge themselves, and pursue their former designs. And now *France* taking occasion to quarrel with us, they take the opportunity to oppress us and bring us under; that they may free themselves from those present inconveniences

Lib. 1.

Hist. lib 5.
c. 6.

in Trade and Expences, and will see how they can make it with *France* for the future. They know well, that if we be broken, there is no Nation else is able to match them at Sea, and being in an Island, fear not invasion by Land-Forces. I might parallel this with the *Peloponesian War*, the cause whereof was the *Athenians* growing greatness, and particularly in Power at Sea; upon whom therefore the *Lacedemonians* made War, as *Thucydides* tells us, who hath accurately writ the History thereof. And yet though Interest be the moving cause of most Wars, whatever the pretext be, (for *Polybius* hath long since taught us to distinguish these two by sundry Examples) yet I am far from asserting it alone a justifiable cause of any War. If any desire satisfaction what is, I refer them to *Grotius de Jure Belli & Pac. lib. 2. cap. 1. & seqq.* for my design permits me not such a digression. These thoughts of the present Interest of *England*, leads me to conclude.

1. That in their League with *France* they have made provision for these; so that if the *French* prevail, they shall have such Maritime places, as may be a real security to them in these particulars. 2. That they will never suffer *France* (if they can possibly hinder it) to have all these Maritime Provinces entirely. For if our might alone be such an eye-fore to them, how much more if it should be joyned with that of *France*. 3. That they will not desist, till they have tried their utmost, to obtain those ends which they account their Interest; having now the advantage of Alliance with *France*; their joyn't Power and Prevalency, and our present Weakness and Distractions. So that I cannot flatter my self so much as to hope, That either the Princes Relation to his Majesty can procure, or Money purchase our Peace with them, so long as they see any probability of effecting their designs.

But if any hath more certain grounds of hope, which are not yet discovered to the World, he needs not lose his time in perusing this Treatise. It is but my losing a few spare hours in composing, and the Printer a small sum in publishing this amongst those many Pamphlets, which daily fly abroad, through all corners of the Countrey. For I profess this once for all, That I pretend not to know (or if I did should I discover) any Intrigues or Mysteries of State; nor desire to pry into the *Arcana imperii*, but let them silently rest in the bosom of those who sit at the Helm of Government; or to make any unworthy reflections upon any, Friends or Enemies, *French* or *English*. But only as one standing upon lower ground, to take the height of the Tower of Interest, which is gazed upon by all, but through passion and prejudice rightly measured by few. Whether I have mistaken it with the multitude, time will discover; and let others judge by the following Discourse; which I foresee will meet with as many Censures, as I have Hairs on my Head, though I value them all less than the least of them; my Conscience bearing me witness, that I have published the same, with a sincere affection to the Reformed Religion, and welfare of these Countreys.

Nov. 30. 1672.

J. H.

Sect.

Se&t. I. *The rise and state of the Question, viz. Whether upon supposal of inability to defend our selves, it is our Interest to be under England or France, and the Zeelanders choice of the former.*

HE is a Stranger to us, and our Affairs, who knows not, That the late Revolutions among us, and particularly at *Utrecht's* betaking themselves to the *French* for protection, were attended both with great consternation, and various deliberations, as is usual in such disasters. When therefore misery and destruction was approaching as a violent torrent, that beats down all before it; Self-preservation being the fundamental Law of Nature; every Province, City, and almost Village, began to consider what they should do to preserve themselves from being drowned in the overflowing deluge.

Some were of opinion, That the remaining Provinces were of sufficient strength to defend themselves, and therefore look'd no further. Others were of a contrary judgment; and therefore thought it better, upon reasonable terms, to put our selves under a Forreign Power, as *Utrecht* had done, then to be conquered by the Sword. And herein also mens judgments were divided, some thinking it better to be under the *French*, others to be under the *English*. Those of *Holland* (as was commonly reported) were more inclinable to the former, in regard of their near approach to them in *Utrecht*; and especially out of an opinion which many have entertained, That the Interest of *Holland* being principally that of Trade by Sea, was more compete with that of *France*, than *England*. Infomuch, that many believe, if the advice of Monsieur *Pomponne* of the Kings sending *Charte Blanche* had been followed, the Cities of *Holland* had at that time several of them imitated the example of *Utrecht*; those of *Zeeland* were generally inclined to the *English*. But as opinions are usually both bred and brought up by Passions; so here it is manifest, That the excessive hopes of the former, made them for absolute defence; and the excessive fears of the latter, for absolute resignation. In such cases there are two wayes have always been found safest and best for accommodation, *viz.* A due examination of the grounds of those Passions, and a just temperament or comprehension of the diversity of opinions: which here so happily fell out, That it was resolved upon and declared by many in *Zeeland*, first, *That they would use their best endeavours to defend themselves*; and secondly, *If they found themselves unable, they would then resign to the English*. Hereby shewing, That they neither did through vain fears, wholly despond of their own strength; nor through flattering hopes, were wholly fearless of their Enemies. They would try and use the best means they could, to stand of themselves according to their hopes; and yet also provide against the worst of their fears, which was their fall by absolute Conquest.

For the manner of doing this, I shall neither accuse, nor defend it; though the Magistrate led not the Van of Consent, according to his place and dignity, yet he followed close in the Rear. And though it was done hastily, yet why may not a hasty Pen, sometimes be as happy as *Apollo's* his Pencil, which in Passion being thrown on the Picture, better portrayed the Horses foaming, than all his premeditated Counsel and Art.

It is enough to me, and to my purpose, that what was done is agreeable to the true Interest of the Countrey; which I hope to make apparent in the following Discourſe. But before I do that, give me leave to premise a few things, which tend to the clearing of the Matters in question.

1. That we only suppose this inability for the present, to satisfy the curiosity of the World, which never think their *Telescope* long enough, to see to the utmost end of Interest. For we shall afterwards make it apparent, that we neither are as yet come to that extremity (through Gods mercy) nor need to fear we shall be reduced to it, if we be not wanting to our selves.

2. It is above all to be understood, that this resolution is absolute for Self-defence, and conditional only for Resignation. It is an approved Maxim which every wise man lives by, *Alterius ne sis, si tuus esse possis*, which holds good in Societies, whether lesser of Families, or greater of Cities, and Provinces, as well as private persons. If any can be free, it is folly to think they will be subject to another.

3. This resolution being conditional, upon the supposal of evident inability to defend our selves, it is not to be imagined, that it should take place upon every Danger or Alarm of War, especially so long as *Holland* and *Freeſland* are able to defend themselves: States as well as Persons, may be our Enemies, or assistance may be afforded us from our Friends; the Scene of War may change, the Water and Weather may be our Walls of defence, Difficulties, Dissentions, and Distractions, may befall our Enemies: One thing or other may fall out so far to our advantage, that we may retrench our selves in safety, though we should not recover our former Greatness.

4. Nor can it be reasonably thought, that any will give themselves over to another, so as to part with their Religious and Civil Interests, and be in no better a capacity than a conquered people; who though they are not made absolute slaves, yet are usually fore oppressed by the Conqueror. But only to part with their *Supremacy*, and the Appendixes thereunto, under which they may live as free Protestant Subjects.

If any object this is not practicable, in regard of the Treaty betwixt the two Crowns of *England* and *France*.

Answer. 1. Who knows that, except a few of their Cabinet Council? 2. This supposes that they have divided the Lions Skin before he be slain; which to me is very doubtful. For although two such mighty Potentates, might upon rational grounds think themselves able to master this Commonwealth, before they began the War; yet so many are the

unexpected accidents, and the events of War so doubtful, that few have been known to divide the spoil, before they had won the battel, or the Country before they had triumphed in the War: lest they being frustrated of their hoped success, should become a scorn and contempt to the world. We have sufficient reason to think, that neither *England* will permit *France*, nor *France* *England*, to have these Countreys entirely; and can we then think that they would agree upon this beforehand? if others will guess, I have the same liberty; whereby I think that when time (which is the revealer of secrets) brings the Treaty to light; it will appear that the *French* should hold us in by Land, and the *English* by Sea, till they had brought us to their own terms; of *France* keeping such places above as may be thought most conducible to the enlarging his Conquests and keeping us under, and *England* by Sea, as may secure his desired Trade, and Naval expences; and that neither of them should have these Maritime Provinces entirely (for that was for the one to make the other his Master, and absolute Sovereign at Sea, by such an accession of strength) nor yet divided; for that would be a continual bone of contention betwixt them. 3. Those that suppose this repetition, generally say, that *Zeeland* is to be *English*; and if so, the objection is answered. For if each must conquer their part by their own Arms, as many imagine, who can think that any will be at the expence of so much blood and treasure, besides the hazard of success, for that which they can have upon honourable terms?

Or if they proceed joyntly with their Arms, to obtain their designs, we cannot think the one will obstruct the other, in that which is agreed upon by them both. And this way I suppose they take; because in a joynt War the success is common to both, and the advantage redounds to each according to their former accord; and was it otherwise here, *England* attacking us only by Sea, might get nothing by Land, and *France* all; which I cannot imagine to be so agreed upon, whatsoever the issue may be. For I cannot think the *English* such fools, to fight only for blows, and to set up the *French* to their own destruction.

But let their own agreement be what it will for the places they conquer, yet it cannot bind or determine us, how to dispose of our selves before we are conquered. All free States, and Cities, may upon what conditions they please, yeild the Sovereignty over them, and their own subjection to whom they please. And although such proffers have sometimes been refused, in regard of Wars and other evil consequences which might attend them; yet here the acceptance is not to be doubted of, seeing this is the *Helena* for which they fight.

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c. 2. f. 8.

If any shall ask how this is to be effected.

I answer, *Non est deliberandum de modo, priusquam constat de re.* If any grant that it is to be done, it is as much as I undertake. If God in his all-wise and righteous Providence, suffers us to be brought so low, that we cannot longer withstand our enemies: let those in supreme Authority take

care for the manner of performance, as to the time in which, treating whereby, and conditions whereupon they will yield the *Supremacy and Government*. It being my work only to shew, that it is our Interest in such a case to make choice of *England* rather than *France*, or any other Potentate whatsoever.

Se^ct. 2. *Arguments to prove the Hypothesis, the first whereof is from our Religious Concernments; wherein is shewn how great a support Religion is to a State, and how greatly it concerns us to secure our Religion.*

HAVING now truly related Matter of Fact, and clearly stated the Question, I shall proceed to prove the same, *viz. That in case of inability to defend our selves, it is our Interest to be under the English rather than the French.*

First in regard of Religion. Which as it is of chiefest concernment, so deserves to have the precedence of all other considerations. The very Heathens accounted this their chief Interest, and therefore above all to be secured and defended. The *Romans* saying was *Pro aris & focis*, therein giving Religion the preference of all their civil concernments. And if we Christians do not, the more is our sin, and the greater our shame. It is so well known how the Heathens of old, and Turks of later times have valued their several false Religions; how their first Founders, Legislators, and Magistrates have made Religion, both the Basis upon which they found their Kingdoms and Commonwealths, and the chief Pillar to support them; and how zealous the common people have been for their Superstitions: that I cannot but wonder that *Christians* should be such *Gallios* for the true Religion and Gospel of Christ, and fear that *Turks* and *Heathens* will rise up in judgment against us, and condemn us for our indifferency herein. But if examples would either sway us, or shame us, I need not go so far for them, our own Ancestors are abundantly sufficient. I am sure (if the History of former times deceive me not) Religion was the chief inducement to them, to begin that hazardous War with *Spain*: And had such an impression upon them, that they freely ventured their lives and estates for this especially; although I know there were many other grievances insisted on, to justify that War. Had they thought that their Posterity should have made so light of Religion and Liberty, which cost them so dear (as we may see in those places ever, who have so lightly parted with both in a greater measure,) I perswade my self they would never have commenced such a War; but the sincerer part of them would have fled with their Families abroad, rather than have endured those miseries at home. Could they now stand up out of their Graves, how would they condemn this unfaithful generation! And how will our Children have occasion to curse us, for betraying the trust reposed in us by our Ancestors, and

and selling the precious Truths of Religion at so cheap a rate, which they bought so dear.

If the true Religion which we profess, be not the Polar Star, by which those that sit at the Helm, steer the Ship of the Commonwealth; what can we expect, except we be Atheists, and shut out God and his safeguard, but to suffer shipwrack? Nay, if this be not the Pearl of price to us all, which we prefer above all worldly pebbles, it will be no wonder, if our enemies spoil us both of this and them. If any be of another judgment, and prefer the *Reason of State* above Religion (although in this case they are conjoined, as I shall shew hereafter) I wish such would observe from *Lewis* the 11. who first opened the Pack of fraudulent policies to the Princes of *Europe*; what dismal ends have befallen him, and the Atheistical Politicians since, those of *Italy* especially; and what disappointments their designs have met withall, and see if they have any reason to tread in their steps. I am jealous (I confess) that the Atheism and Irreligion of the present Age is great, which makes me larger herein than otherwise I should be: yet I hope not so great amongst us, That we should prefer Popish Superstition before the true Reformed Religion, *Belial* before *Christ*: If so, we are fitter to be our Enemies Asses, to be laden with their Trumperies, and last at their pleasure, than to be dealt withall by Arguments to convince our Conscience.

If we duly consider that true Religion is, 1. The fountain of all true Piety and Vertue here, and of eternal Felicity hereafter. 2. That which rightly teaches every one their duty, not only in reference to their particular practice, but publick concerns, Magistrates how to govern, and People how to obey. 3. That which furnishes us with the strongest Arguments for mutual affection and assistance to one another, courage in dangers, hope in extremities, patience in adversity, and perseverance in our duty. And 4. That which only can assure a People of Gods favour, and being propitious to them; and the contempt thereof on the contrary, of his displeasure and malediction: We must needs conclude, That the Magistrate in the first place as God's Vicegerent in Government, and all others in their several stations, ought to endeavour above all things, by all lawful means to preserve, defend, and secure the same; as they tender the honour of God, the welfare of his Church, the prosperity of the Commonwealth, and their own and Posterities temporal and eternal happiness. I shall not need to enlarge these things, in regard they are so well known, and approvedly verified by so many Examples, out of Sacred and profane Histories: and none that I know have ever had the impudence to deny them in *Thesi*, though they dispute in *Hypothesi*, which is the true Religion. Even *Machiavel*, as wicked as his Writings are in many things, yet asserts (as a Politician) that true Religion must above all things be regarded by those that desire to preserve themselves, and that there is no *certius indicium de recip. ruina*, than the contrary of Religion.

Sever. in
Lewis 11.
Bussares.
Hist. Brim.
1. 17. sed 9.
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Comin. 1. 6.
c. 7. p. 12.
Anti-Ma-
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c. 12.

And for fuller conviction let me add, that 'tis not only acknowledged truth, but that which all Ages of the World have experienced, *That Religion is the greatest bond and tye of humane society*, and therefore must needs be the main pillar of support to a State, and the best walls of defence to a people. Hoping therefore what is said in the general to be sufficient, I shall now descend to particulars briefly.

And herein it is well known, that the *English* and we (I speak of the generality of both Nations, Rulers and People) symbolize; being both of the Reformed Religion. Whereas the *French* are for the greatest part Papists, to be sure in all power whether Civil or Military : it being the practise now of *France*, to imploy none but such in the management of Affairs; so that if we be either Governed or Garrisoned by the *French*, we cannot expect to be so by any, but Papists and professed Enemies of our Religion.

But something here will be pleaded for the *French*, and something also objected against the *English*.

SECT. 3. *The plea of France's granting the liberty of our Religion considered.*

First, for the *French* it may be argued, that the King will grant us the liberty of our Religion.

To which I reply by way of concession, that I verily believe he will; but desire it may be further considered.

1. If he grants this liberty according to the custom of *France*, it will be only to those of the Reformed Religion. Now besides these, there are many others amongst us, Jews, Lutherans, Anabaptists, &c. The Commonwealth consisting both of several sorts of People, and several sorts of Religions: and what shall become of those, which the Commonwealth tolerates, though not of the professed Religion of the Land?

2. But let it be further supposed, that provision be made for the liberty of those also that dissent from the Reformed Religion, or for all, and that by Articles, Edicts, or whatsoever way you please: yet we know how slightly these are usually observed, by those that have the execution of them, and how little Governors and Soldiers regard these. For they well know, that most cannot, many dare not, others will not complain of them, and if any do, it will be a wearisom work, and the remedy many times worse than the disease. So that a patient suffering is the only solace to the sufferer and oppressed.

3. I might add, that it is a Maxim with many Papists (although not all I confess *) *That no faith is to be kept with hereticks*. Now all Papists accounting us such, if those that Govern be of that persuasion; how little account will they make of what conditions soever are made with us; but as

* Melancthus de fide hereticis ser. 2. c. 1. c. 2. c. 3. c. 4. c. 5. c. 6. c. 7. c. 8. c. 9. c. 10. c. 11. c. 12. c. 13. c. 14. c. 15. c. 16. c. 17. c. 18. c. 19. c. 20. c. 21. c. 22. c. 23. c. 24. c. 25. c. 26. c. 27. c. 28. c. 29. c. 30. c. 31. c. 32. c. 33. c. 34. c. 35. c. 36. c. 37. c. 38. c. 39. c. 40. c. 41. c. 42. c. 43. c. 44. c. 45. c. 46. c. 47. c. 48. c. 49. c. 50. c. 51. c. 52. c. 53. c. 54. c. 55. c. 56. c. 57. c. 58. c. 59. c. 60. c. 61. c. 62. c. 63. c. 64. c. 65. c. 66. c. 67. c. 68. c. 69. c. 70. c. 71. c. 72. c. 73. c. 74. c. 75. c. 76. c. 77. c. 78. c. 79. c. 80. c. 81. c. 82. c. 83. c. 84. c. 85. c. 86. c. 87. c. 88. c. 89. c. 90. c. 91. c. 92. c. 93. c. 94. c. 95. c. 96. c. 97. c. 98. c. 99. c. 100. c. 101. c. 102. c. 103. c. 104. c. 105. c. 106. c. 107. c. 108. c. 109. c. 110. c. 111. c. 112. c. 113. c. 114. c. 115. c. 116. c. 117. c. 118. c. 119. c. 120. c. 121. c. 122. c. 123. c. 124. c. 125. c. 126. c. 127. c. 128. c. 129. c. 130. c. 131. c. 132. c. 133. c. 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occasion serves, if they dare not openly break, yet will they secretly evade all such as serve for our support, and think they do God good service. As also their tenet of the Popes power of dispensation with all oaths, Articles, Promises and Obligations though never so solemn and sacred: or if you please (for it is all one) a power to abrogate Gods Laws, null all the faith and bonds of mankind, subvert all humane Society, and in short *ex injuria facere justitiam*, as the *Canonists* tell us. Now suppose we have Governours that measure consciences by ells rather than by inches; who matter no more engagements dispensed with by his Holiness, than we do our Almanacks out of date: I should be glad to be informed what we could do in the case, more then cry and complain to God Almighty. For I doubt they will seldom do that, which *Maximilian* the first did frequently, *Deus eterne, nisi vigilares, quam male esse mundo, quem regimus nos ego miser venator, & ebrius ille ac sceleratus Julius!* Nay if Governours think themselves obliged in conscience and honour to keep conditions; yet it is well known how generally they are influenced by their Clergy: so that in all dubious cases, and the application of general rules to particular practises; it cannot be expected but Judgment should be given on the Papists side, and that the *Grandees* of the Church should bear them out in it, and *Jesuites* and other *Zelots* applaud their practises.

4. The Papists must have publick places for their Worship, not only in all Cities but Villages, as we may see in the Articles propounded by the *French*. Now there being by far too few Churches or places for publick Worship, in most of our populous and enlarged Cities already: it will not be possible for a great part of our Religion, to enjoy the publick Ordinances of God; but many will run into profane courses, most grow ignorant and careless what Religion they are of, and their posterity absolute *Papists*. By which means the number of the Reformed decreasing and Papists increasing; where at first there was but only one Church for Popery, they shall then take more, and so continue to enlarge themselves and straiten us. Nor let any judge these, as only jealousies and fears. For if they begin already to inroach (as it is credibly reported from several places they command) and break Articles herein, when not only the Commands of Superiors, but common Policy requires a most Religious observance thereof; what shall we think they will do hereafter? If they will not now out of hopes to win those to them, which yet stand out: much less will they, when there is no more hope of gaining thereby.

5. When Popery is the Religion of our Governours; who have the disposal of preferments and profits, to allure men to their Religion: We shall find by woful experience, what by education, converse, marriages, dignities and other worldly advantages; many of the ignorant and looser sort of Protestants, will change their profession (I say not Religion, for that such never had) and turn Papists. Who is such a stranger in the World as knows not, that by such artifices they have more weakened the Protestants,

testants in *France*, than by all their wars and contests with them. In so much that of late years, some of the wise men of the Reformed Religion there, have been so fearful of its being utterly supplanted; that they have required their Children by their last Will and Testament, to leave that Kingdom, and settled themselves in these Countries.

6. Let the best be supposed that any rational man can imagine, yet will it be bad enough. For if the Papists have the Civil Power to back them, although the wiser and better sort, it is not to be doubted, will be civil; yet the ruder sort will be intollerably insolent. And this begins to appear in some places already, where the Popish Inhabitants are more insufferably insulting, spiteful, and injurious to the *French* themselves. And if they do this so early while things are doubtful, and the issue of the War dubious; what may we expect when they are in their high Meridian of success and glory?

7. And lastly, If any one think that these are only needless fears and groundless surmises, I shall desire them to peruse the *French* Embassadors Speech to the Emperors Council, where he will find this Argument of Religion insisted on to divert the Emperor from our Assistance (which is well retorted by the ingenious Answer thereof.) And inform themselves how fast the Jesuits and other Zealots for the Romish Religion, fall off from the House of *Austria* and *Spain*, to *France*; in regard of their inability to carry on their designs of the Universal Popish Monarchy, and the hopes they have of *France's* Potency to effect it. And then let them judge, if there be not sufficient ground, for all that I have said, and much more that might be said upon this Subject.

Sect. 4. *Objections from the danger of losing our Religion under England; from the Kings being a Papist, designing to set up Popery; the increase, countenance, and tolleration of Papists, as also from his joyning with France against us, and Church Government by Bishops, all answered.*

BUT now on the other hand it is by some objected against *England*.
I. That the King is a Papist in heart, and designs to set up the Popish Religion.

First, what the King is in his heart, and what he designs, is only known to God Almighty, who is the searcher of hearts. That he is a professing Protestant, is well known. And although I will not swear for him nor any man alive, that he will not change his Religion; yet to me it seems very improbable, upon the following grounds.

I. He that would not in his Minority, when under his Mothers education in *France*, but followed his Fathers instructions, of *being obedient to her* in all things, excepting the matter of her Religion; I cannot think will now in his maturity.

2. His

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2. His withstanding so many temptations wherewith He was environed so long a time together, during those many Years of His Exile; wherein neither the friendship of Papists, nor unkindness and hard measure He met withall from Protestants, could move Him; makes me think Him much more immoveable, now He is free from those. Who that knows those times, knows not what designs the Papists had upon Him? What Persuasions and Arguments they used both by word and writing? What Promises they made Him of assistance to recover His Kingdoms? What Arguments of Interest they prest Him with, which are usually more prevalent with Princes; than the intrinick Arguments of Religion? And if He stood unshaken in all those boysterous blasts, shall we think He will fall in a calm?

Militaire's
Victory of
the Truth,
and Br.
Branholls
Answer.

3. His rescuing His youngest Brother the *Duke of Gloucester* out of His Mothers hands, when her designs appeared for perverting him in his Religion; is an evident proof of the reality of His Profession. If any one say it was His Interest for regaining His Kingdoms, I say,

4. And is it not His interest also for keeping them? Did He gain them so quickly? or are His Three Kingdoms so little worth, that He should easily hazard them? Kings are wiser than to venture their Crowns upon every idle Priests prattles. If there were any stronger Arguments now than formerly, either for the Popish Religion, or from His Interest, we had some reason to be jealous that He might change.

But 5. It is apparently against His Interest, not only in regard of the danger He might incur of losing His Crowns, but the great loss which would inevitably accrue to Him by this change.

The danger we cannot imagine to be small, if we rightly consider those Kingdoms. I have had an account (having been a little curious in those enquiries) of 1100000 of His Subjects, that by interest and inclination were carried counter to the Court. Under these five Heads. 1. The Purchasers of *Crown* and *Church-lands* that are now restored, and they outed. 2. Souldiers and Seamen, that had fought against Him by Sea and Land. 3. Magistrates and Ministers, that were removed, and turned out of their places. 4. Commonwealths men, that were Anti-monarchical in their judgments. 5. Fanaticks, properly so called, as Anabaptists, Fifth-Monarchy-Men, Quakers, &c. And though I could perhaps give as good a guess as another, at the rest of the substantial Protestants that are of the Episcopal persuasion, yet that needs not now. These you must think, however divided in their Interests, Judgments, and Affections; and many of them, no doubt, very Loyal to His Majesty; yet without all doubt would join against Popery, and never willingly submit themselves to that yoke of bondage. Nay, some perhaps would be glad of such an Argument, and Plea to the People, and the Demagogues gain thereby no small number of Profelytes to their Party, if His Majesty was once a declared Papist.

And as His danger, you see, is great, so His loss I am sure could not be small.

saill. 1. Of his *Honour*, not only in changing that Religion he hath now so long profess'd, and blurring the fair copy which his Father hath set him; but in admitting the Popes Supremacy: which hath been so injurious to the dignities of Emperors, Kings, and Princes; that their complaints how they have been plagued by the Popes are infinite. 2. Of his profit and revenues, in regard that the *Peter-pence* or Tenths of Livings, and other Contributions paid formerly to the Pope, are by Law annexed to the Crown, and paid accordingly to the King. 3. Of his Subjects affections, wherein his safety especially consists. For a Prince that hath the hearts of his people, hath their purses and persons at his service; and reigns more happily by their love, than all his own power, though never so great. If we therefore consider his education in, and his long profession of the Protestant Religion, his Honour and Interest engaging him to persevere therein: I should think no man need fear his changing it for the Popish, the sopperie sw hereof he hath so fully both seen and known.

I might add to these, that which further satisfies me, that having been at *Bruxels*, *Colen*, and most of the places, where his Majesty during his exile did reside; I can say *bona fide* that in all the variety of companies and converse I was ever in, I never heard any probable grounds, from any one intelligent person, that toucht, much less stain'd his Majesties reputation in this particular. But I will not impose this upon others, though it moves me to say the more, because I am not willing to annex my name to what I have written. Not that I am ashamed to own what I conceive to be the real truth, which I have published in this Treatise to the world, and can make good much more largely: but because I know who I am, and that my name can add no estimation to this political discourse; but rather perhaps prejudice some who know me not, and are used to judge of writings by their Authors; whereas those that will impartially search after truth, must have regard to *things*, not *persons*, and to what is written, and not the writers thereof.

As for his setting up Popery, I neither think that he will, for the foregoing Reasons; nor if he would, that he can, for these following especially.

1. The Protestant Religion is settled in all his Kingdoms by their fundamental Laws, which the King cannot repeal. It is true he hath the executive power of the Laws, and so can suspend the execution of penalties; but cannot rescind any one Law, much less make new ones, without the consent of Parliament in his respective Kingdoms. And absolute Sovereignty is not there in use. For power paramount to all Laws, carries too great a Top-sail for an *English* Bottom; wherein the Subjects Liberties are shipt, as well as *Caesar* and his fortunes.

2. The Lands and Revenues formerly supporting the Romish Religion, which are many and great, are in the possession of the Nobility and Gentry for the most part; and have been bought by them of the Crown at the dispo-

dissolution of Abbies, Monasteries, &c. And the Purchases confirmed by Law. And can we think that they will ever be induced to part with them again? or Enact any such Laws shall tend to their own ruine, and the utter undoing of their Families? If there was so much danger and difficulty to wrest them out of the Hands of the poor Votaries (as the Histories of those times tell us) What will there be to recover them from the powerful Nobility and Gentry? who legally possessing them, will doubtless defend them, so that none shall deprive them thereof, that have not better courage, and sharper Swords than they.

3. The great disparity in the number of Protestants and Papists. There being not one Family of a hundred in *England* and *Scotland* Popish, and in many and great Parishes not a Papist. Now what greater madness can we imagine, than that his Majesty should adventure to rely upon the Papists alone, against all the Protestants of three Nations. Though their numbers are greater then formerly, yet are they comparatively small (as we have said) to those that profess the Reformed Religion. So that it can never enter into my brain, that such folly should enter into any Princes breast, much less one who hath suffered so much by the former Divisions of His Kingdoms.

4. The vast difference between a People enlightned by the Gospel, and well-grounded in their Religion, and an ignorant and unprincipled People. For the generality of the common People brought up in ignorance (as they usually are under Popery) are more subject to receive impressions from their Teachers, and so by degrees change their Profession. Whereas those that are assured from the Word of God, That they are in the right, will by no means be induced to the same. And usually the more force is used, the more obstinate they are. For a settled Conscience despises danger, and defies all the Terrors and Torments that their cruellst adversaries can invent. If in lesser differences of Church-government, the King hath found it so difficult, That after all the Coercive Laws, and other means He hath used, He tells the World, *'Tis evident by the sad experience of twelve years, that there is very little fruit of all those forcible courses;* What shall we think he is likely to gain in the greater and essential differences of Religion should he attempt any change therein? Surely not much from the pious and sober party of Protestants, for I neither matter nor mention the ruder sort, and ignorant Rabble. Nay, universal experience hath taught the World, that where any kind of Religion is powerful, all force against it is weak and contemptible: and much more against the true reformed Religion, as that wise and excellent Historian *Thuanus*, shews in the *Preface* to his History. which is one of those three admirable Dedications to the Crown of *France* that are worthy to be read by all the Kings and Princes of *Europe*.

I might add to these, the *genius* of the *English* Nation, which I know to be zealous in what way of Religion soever they take, as hath been observ'd by several Authois. In times of Popery so addicted thereto, that they had

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given most of their means to the Church, if the Statute of *Mortmain* had not prohibited them. In the times of Libertinism when a Republick, the *Pbanatics* were so intoxicated, That it was not enough for them to push down the Pope, but they would break off all Government, for being his Hous, and make every thing Antichristian that was not to their humor. When the King return'd, and *Episcopacy* with Him, that Party would not abate the Three controverted Ceremonies (as a wise and moderate Bishop both foretold and lamented) for the universal Peace of the Three Kingdoms. Nay, the very common Rabb'e would overflow both in Drink and Devotion; kneel at a Piller, and reel at a Post. Though I know there are as pious, sober, and serious Christians of several Perswasions, (*Episcopal, Prebyterial* and *Independent*) as any are in the Christian world; but I say this, to shew, that what way soever they take, they are not easily diverted.

But as groundless jealousie is both uncharitableness and folly; so where there is just ground, not to be jealous, is stupidity. It may therefore not be amiss for our further satisfaction, to enquire into these Objectors grounds, and they are these: 1. The encrease of Papists, at Court especially. 2. The King's countenancing and entrusting them with power. 3. His tolerating their Religion. 4. Joyning with *France* against us.

For the first and second I can say little of mine own knowledge, it being many years since I saw either *England* or *France*. But I shall take reports upon the Publick-faith of *England* and *Holland* for this once, though it be none of the best security. 1. Therefore that Papists encrease through the Queens Court, the extraordinary Correspondence with *France*, the Dissensions of the *Protestants*, the Atheism and Irreligion of the Age, and other wayes and means which might be mentioned, is not to be wondred at; but rather that there are no more. Although I am well assured, that their number is comparatively small, and their interest in *England* and *Scotland* inconsiderable to effect any change. And were they more, this will not infer the King is one.

2. And much less his countenancing and intrusting them. For who ever concluded that the French Kings for their kindness to Protestants (who have served them most faithfully heretofore in their Wars) were Protestants? or the States Papists, for employing the *French* and others in their Armies? A Papist may be a loyal Subject, a wise Statesman, a fit Ambassador, a good Souldier, and merit his Prince's favour, though of a different Religion.

3. Nor will the King's indulgence of liberty to those of that Religion, conclude more against our Assertion, than for the *States of Hollands* being of all the Religions they tolerate, or for *Amsterdams* being *Jews*. There may be Reasons of State sometimes to connive, and sometimes to tolerate that, which we neither approve, nor would willingly allow; even as *Moses* did divorce to the *Jews*. Or, there may be Articles, Promises, and other Engagements upon us, whereby we are forced to do that which we would not, if free: as *Joshua* to the *Gibeonites*; and our Ancestors

to Papists, Anabaptists, &c. who assisted them in the defence of the Country against Spain.

There are two things do Wonders in the World, and are the ordinary pretexts and best apologies for the greatest exorbitances, viz. *danger and necessity*. And yet where these are real and not feigned, they are considered both by God and good men. Nature dictates, That we should hazard the Hand, rather than the Head; and lose a Part, rather then venture the Whole. I have for above 20 years observed, both where I have lived and where I have travelled; that *Moderation* is rather a speculative notion, than matter of practice: like a vertuous and beautiful poor Lady, that all will commend, but none will marry. Parties that are under, call for it eagerly; but when they are upmost, neglect it shamefully. Seeing then the passions of men, and iniquities of the Age are so great, that I expect nothing in Religion, but either an *Inquisition* or *Toleration*; I am more for the latter, and would rather reside at *Amsterdam* or *Constantinople*, than at *Rome* or *Madrid*.

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But to come closer to the particular case. If his Majesty therefore had no obligation upon him to do this, or were it a liberty to Papists only, or a liberty for their Worship in Publick, I should grant the objection was very weighty; but it is the quite contrary. For he tells the World he was obliged in point of gratitude to the Papists for their Service to his Father; and to the Presbyterians (who had been so instrumental in his Restauration) in point of promise also several wayes made to them both before, and after his return to his Crown; several times declaring, That He would grant indulgence to them, and others of Tender Consciences. And we know that if His Majesty had follow'd His own inclinations, they had been better performed. And now that he gives a concession of liberty, it is neither solely nor principally to those of the Romish Religion, but to all others as well as they, and that with this manifest difference, that it is to the *Protestants publickly* and to *Papists in their private houses only*, and this revocable at pleasure. Although some wise men are of opinion, That the King and Rulers will not only find such ease and safety therein, but such eminent advantages many wayes, and the People generally such content, That it will scarce be Revoked.

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4. His joining with *France* against us, is matter of *Interest*, and not *Religion*. And if we judge impartially will no more conclude him a Papist, than the *Emperor & King of Spain* Protestants, because they join with us. Herein let us eye and own the Providence of God, who changes times and seasons, and makes Friends become Enemies. and Enemies Friends. Would not this have been thought incredible to our Ancestors, that *France* and *England* who raised us, should endeavour our Ruine? And that *Spain* and *Austria* who sought our destruction, should ever seek our preservation? And all this out of *Interest* (as I shall shew hereafter); those formerly to ballance *Spain's*, & these now *France's* greatness; and neither Religion nor Affection. For whosoever thinks that *Spain* and *Austria* have any kindness

for us more than themselves, hath a Faith larger than my Fancy.

There is another Objection against our closing with *England* for Religious sake, from their *Episcopal Church-Government*; which if it were not mentioned by some to the prejudice of my Assertion, I should have passed over as inconsiderable. For,

1. This is only an accidental difference in the same Religion, and not a different kind of Religion, as Popery is. And a difference in the external form of Government only, not in the substantials and virals of Religion. For we both agree in the same Confession of Faith, and in all the essentials of the Reformed Religion.

2. A very great part of the King of *England's* Subjects are *Presbyterians*, as is well known.

3. Although Episcopacy be the Church-government, settled by Law in the three Kingdoms, yet his Majesty indulges publick liberty to Presbyterians, and other Non-conformists. So that we need not doubt but He will much more to us, that Church-government which is settled amongst us.

4. *New-England*, and several other Plantations belonging to his Majesty of *Great Britain*, have alwayes enjoyed, and still do, their own Church-Government freely; and therefore we need not fear that ours should be denied us.

5. Although the Church-government of these Provinces be Presbyterian, yet as to its vital Power and Administration in several places, it hath for sundry years last past rather been *Erastian*. The Magistrates frequently assuming that power here, which the Bishops do there. Inso-much that I question whether the Presbyterians may have more hopes that their Discipline should be raised, than fears that it should be ruined under *England*. What crying up the Magistrates power *circa sacra*, and what decrying the Ministers' both by word and writing. *Antistius* tells us in the frontispiece of his Book, That whatever right divine or humane is attributed to the Ministers, or they assume to themselves; is either falsely and impiously ascribed to them, or is only from the Rulers of the Republick, or City where they are settled. What applauding of *Hobbs's Leviathan*, now translated into *Latin* and *Dutch*. What frequent interposing in Ecclesiastical-Affairs, and how miserably the honest Minister in the *Hague* was handled, may be seen in *Aitzma*. Many were afraid of a storm falling upon the Ministers, if our Enemies had not fallen upon us. What crossing the Churches in the Election of their Pastors, and exercise of their Government hath been at *Rotterdam*, and other places, is too well known; and being Reformed, I wish what's past, might be buried in oblivion. And thus I have vindicated my first Argument from Religion, and shall endeavour to compensate my prolixity herein, with more brevity in the rest. Concluding, That if we cannot defend the true Reformed Religion we profess, nor will not secure it the best we can, we may call our Countrey *Ichabod*, for the glory is departed from these *Netherlands*.

Grolle,
contra A-
pollodizum
1646.
Lucii An-
tistii de
Jure Ec-
clesiasticor.
l. 1665.
Politick
discourse
l. 4. over
Kerkelike
Saaken.

SECT. 5. *The second Argument taken from Liberty. Wherein the different kinds, and degrees of Liberty, under all sorts of Government, are declared; and the probability of our enjoying greater Freedom under England, than France, argued.*

IT will further appear our Interest to be under *England*, rather than *France*, in regard of our *Liberty*. Which next to true Religion and Life, is the greatest blessing bestowed on Mankind. Now for our clearer proceeding herein, we must 1. Shew what kind of *Liberty* is here meant. 2. Wherein it consists, and the measures thereof. 3. Accommodate these to the matter in hand.

For the first. We mean not here *Personal Liberty*; either morally considered in opposition to *coaction*; or *civilly*, either in opposition to *Confinement*, as we usually take it: or to slavery, as the *Civilians*. 2. Nor *Civil Liberty*, as opposed to *Monarchy*; as the *Greek* and *Latin* Historians frequently; with which *Tacitus* begins his *Annals*, *Urbeni Romam a principio Reges habuere, libertatem et consulatum L. Brutus instituit*. For I well know, That to whomsoever we submit, this *Liberty* is lost. Much less, 3. For *Licentiousness*. For Subjection to Laws and Government, is so far from being inconsistent with *Liberty*, that it is the only means of its preservation. For without this, What are Kingdoms and States, but great *butcheries of men, and publick robberies of propriety*, where the strongest Arm, and longest Sword sweeps away all? So boundless is mans villany, and his lusts so ragingly restless: that we have no other choice left us, but either be subject to Law, or Slaves to Licentiousness. As *Tully* says well, *Legum idcirco omnes servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus*. But 4. That *publick Liberty* which a People have under their Government (of what kind soever it is) as it is taken in opposition to *publick oppression*. Which is of divers sorts, and different degrees, in regard of our Persons, Priviledges, and Proprieties. When a People are neither oppressed by *Usurpation*, without colour of Law; nor by *Extortion*, under pretext thereof. Which is an invaluable mercy to those that enjoy it: though rightly valued by few, except those that want it. And hath been so highly praised by all sorts of Writers, that it is better to be silent, than brief in its commendations.

Now secondly, Wherein this consists, and how to measure the same, is harder to discover and determine, in regard she can meet with no guides that have gone this way. For the *Civil Law*, which is copious concerning all other Dominions, is silent in this of *Sovereignty*; and being calculated for the Meridian of *Monarchs*, leaves them free to make their Subjects so, more or less at their pleasure. *Historians* only relate what Freedom such and such people had under such & such Rulers: and the Writers of Policy, and particular Republicks, compare the peoples Liberty under the several forms of Government, and commend this or that State for the same. And these are all the helps we have: which are in the next degree to nothing.

We

We will therefore pass them all by, and freely follow our own judgment, in shewing jointly both the nature of Liberty, and the measures thereof. But we must necessarily here premise :

Politie. l.
6. c. 2.
V. Arni-
sans de
rep. l. 2. c. 7.
f. 2. n. 75.

1. That though all ought to pay the homage of Subjection to that lawful Government under which they live; yet none ought so to be wedded to any Form, as to think the Subjects of all others not free. Which *Aristotle* long since observed to be the vulgar error in *Democracy*. For though it well becomes a vertuous Wife, to esteem her own Husband the best Head she can have, and accordingly to be guided by him: yet if she will censure all other Wives for meer Slaves, all her Neighbours round about her will ring her a peal of indignation.

2. That the best way to judg of Peoples liberty, is by considering it in reference to Sovereignty. For all Subjection and Government being Relatives, and Subjects liberty consisting in such a manner of subjection to the Supreme Powers, as is free and not slavish; the one is easily known by the other. So that if we duly consider Supremacy, we may discern, whether the Subjects be free or no by the manner, and the degrees of their freedom by the measure of their subjection.

3. That we must distinguish between *actual liberty*, or freedom from oppression; and *legal liberty* by constitution. For freedom may be considered, either in regard of moral Power or Government, which is the exercise thereof; and that both severally, and jointly. For a people free by Law, may be oppressed by their Rulers; and a people not legally free, may be actually so by their Governors grace. So that *actual liberty* alone, is only under absolute Powers, *legal* under limited and mixed, and both under Governments which proceed regularly, in the Sphere of Power wherein they are placed, and are not Planetary in their motions. Having premised these things, we shall now proceed to lay down certain Rules, whereby every vulgar capacity may judge of the nature of Liberty, and the degrees thereof, under any kind of Sovereignty whatsoever. Whether it reside in a Single Person, or in a Plurality; either absolute, or limited, in regard of its measure; or for the manner, simple or mixed, either of two or three Estates, equally or unequally, and from whatever priority or predominant part denominated, Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy, according to the constitution of every Nation.

And the general Rule is this, *The greater power in the Sovereignty, the lesser liberty in the Subjects; and the less power in the Sovereignty, the more liberty in the Subjects.* It is not my present work to determine, whether of these is better for the whole. The Politicians pens have sufficiently ventilated that question, usually ascribing more strength and stability to the former, and more common prosperity to the latter; though often concluding, either through favour, or fear, and flattery, that that Government under which they live, deserves above all to wear the garland. I shall therefore only say this, That seeing Extreams are always dangerous, a golden

mean is that, which makes a Golden Age both to Sovereigns and Subjects.

Now although I judge this Rule alone sufficient for our present purpose, yet in regard some perhaps may be pleased with so large a prospect, as the liberty of all Nations in all Ages of the World, we shall take a fuller view thereof; and the rather, because it will be of use to us hereafter, not only in this, but in the following Sections. And for this end will begin at the bottom, that so ascending by degrees, we may behold both it and them the better.

1. A People under *absolute power* are not truly and legally free, but only permissively and precariously. Because their liberty is not from Law, but only founded in their Governours favour. So that they are liable to all oppression, although they are sometimes as actually free, and little oppressed, as those that live under other Governments.

And this liberty, as to the certainty thereof, is more or less, according to the degrees of absolute Power. Where the Rulers Will, is the Peoples Law; freedom is an *Embryo* rather than formed: when they make Laws whereby Subjects are at more certainty, it then becomes a *Fœtus*: and when they oblige themselves to rule by those Laws, the *Child* is born, and may cry out of violence and oppression. This *liberty*, how small soever, and uncertain of life, hath yet many Witnesses to avouch its name, which we find also registred in Antiquity. So that whosoever denies the same, must call all those *slaves*, who lived under the *Eastern* and *Roman* Empires of old, and the *Turks* and *Persians* at this day.

2. Under *limited power*, the People have a legal liberty, which is greater or less, according to the Laws, Constitutions or Contracts, whereby the power is limited. Whether originally and antecedently; or by after-condescend, betwixt those in Supremacy and them in subjection, is not much material. This liberty being supported by Law, not voluntarily made by the Governours themselves, and alterable at their pleasure (as in absolute Power) but necessarily condescended to by them that will govern, makes the subjection of a People tolerable. And if the Fathers in power please to foster them, they want not for necessaries, though they abound not in superfluities. But I confess if this freedom meet with a churlish stepfather, & hath neither guardian nor friends to maintain its right, then it's forced to keep private at home, and dare scarce appear in publick, which makes their present condition miserable. For liberty once lamed by power, is not unlike to a labouring-man that hath his leg broken, who till it be sound, is thereby confined to his own Cottage, or crawls but abroad to beg with his crutches.

3. Those that live under a *mixed power*, have more or less liberty, according to the temperament thereof.

If mixt of *Monarchy* and *Aristocracy* only, the common Peoples liberty is according to their Laws. And is more secured by this composition, than in a simple Government, though limited; because one is a check to the
exorbia-

exorbitancy of the other. For though every mixt power be limited, yet every limited power is not mixt. In this Government, though the Nobility should as Cedars, shelter the under-shrubs from the storms of the Superior order; yet both History and Experience shew us that oftentimes (I say not alwayes) the Peers care not to be their Princes Vassals, that so the rest of the People may be theirs.

If mixed, so that the common People have a share in the supream Power, they are *absolutely free*; and their liberty is more or less, according as their share is. Whether it be mixed of all the three kinds of Government, *viz.* Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, or onely of the two latter; for I never read or heard of a State compounded of the two Extreame.

Now the Supream Power consists especially (I say not only) 1. In Enacting, Interpreting, and Repealing of Laws. 2. In Eleſting and Appointing subordinate Magistrates and Ministers of State for Government. 3. In judging and determining all Crimes and Controversies amongst their Subjects ultimately without Appeal. 4. In levying Taxes to defray Publick Expences. 5. In the power of Arms for defence of the Whole. 6. In making War and Peace with others. So then as a people partake in these, their freedom is accordingly to be counted of. And here liberty is come to Maturity; and if she be modest and keep within her bounds, and fall not into wanton licentiousness, ravishes the eyes of all Spectators, filling their mouths with her praises and their minds with admiration.

But it is high time that we hasten to the third particular proposed, which is the accommodation of these to the subject matter we have in hand. First then it is well known, that there is a very vast difference in the liberty of the Subjects of these two Crowns. The common people under the King of *England*, have 1. A part in the legislative Power, which is the chief Authority in all Governments. For the Commons make a third State in all the three Kingdoms, and have their Representatives freely chosen by themselves in all Parliaments, which are the true Conservatories of publick Liberty, and particular propriety. Whereas the common people in *France* either never had this priviledge; or if they had, have long since lost it.

Franco-gallia. c. 10, 11, 15. De republ. l. 2. c. 6. f. 6.

That they had it formerly, *Hottoman* endeavours to prove, which *Arniseus* denies (and answers his Reasons) nor that only, but all mixture in the *French* Monarchy either with Princes of the Blood, Peers, or any other State whatsoever. But whatever was the Government under the two first Lines of the Kings of *France*, it is generally agreed, That in the beginning of the third under *Hugh Capet* (who canton'd out *France* about the year 990) the peoples liberty was devoured by the Dukes and Earls of the Provinces, and the Monarchy almost turned into a Toparchy, by reason of their hereditary Right. Which the after Kings soon perceiving to be too great a ballance to the Crown, broke down by degrees, and so became the only *Atlas's* that have ever since sustained that Government. For the Assembly of the three Estates, which were the only bulwark of the

public liberty, that was left undemolished by despotical Powers; if they ever had any share in the Legislative, lost it long before *Capet's* time (for from *Charles the Great*, the King's Edicts have pass for Laws) and being discontinued in their Wars with *England*, and their remaining power (whatever it was) broke down by the policy of *Lewis the Eleventh*, they were finally laid aside by *Lewis the last*. And although *Philip the Fourth* fixed that Court of Judicature at *Paris*, that was formerly ambulatory, and usually accompanied the Kings Court, which became a patern to the rest of their Provincial Parliaments; yet both that and these have only the name and shadow, not the nature and power of the Parliaments under the Crown of *England*. The Members being neither chosen by the people, nor representing them; but Lawyers, that usually either purchase these places of the Crown, or pay an annual pension for the same. having no Legislative power, nor indeed any other but derivative from the King, and alterable at his pleasure. They tell the Academy of *Paris*, *Se à Rege jussos promulgare leges, quos ipsi visum fuerit ferre. Apud illum auctoritatem esse, &c.* But these things are so well known, That I will not stand to alledge Authorities to prove them; although, if it were necessary, I could bring as many as would fill the page even to ostentation. But let us briefly run over the rest. Those two under the Crown of *England*, have the election of Magistrates generally in Corporations, & some under Officers in the Country, which cannot be removed without due process of Law.

3. Have a share in the Jud cature, by the Juries (in *England*) for matter of Fact, together with the King's Judges for matter of Law, and their last appeal to Parliaments. 4. The original power of raising Taxes. For the Proposal and Grant must come from the Commons, and the other two States only consent. 5. The liberty of bearing Arms. Whereas in *France*, all Promotions, Governments, Judicatures and Taxes, are in the King's power, who permits not the vulgar use of Arms, or a standing *Milizia* in His Kingdom; but only such as are in his pay, and thereby entirely at his devotion: so that there is no Commonalty that lives more happily than that of *England*, nor none more miserably than the *poor Peasantry* of *France*.

Guaguin.
in Ludov.
12.

2. Hence we may infer a fair probability of enjoying more liberty under the Crown of *England*, than *France*. I know our freedom will not necessarily follow from the premises; for that which is *legal*, will depend upon such conditions as shall be either previously agreed upon, or after consented unto: yet I leave every one to judge, which is likeliest to grant us the best; not only for our Religion, but liberty in our Persons, Priviledges and Estates; as also whose Government is most likely to defend the same, and make us thereby also *actually free*.

If it be argued, That the *French King* may give us more liberty than his other Subjects, and the *King of England* less. The Reply is easie, That we reason not from the power of either, or what they can and may do, but what in all appearance they will do. Although those that hold it for a

fundamental in the *French* Government, That whatever is conquered by them, or acquired, must be incorporated with the Kingdom of *France*; and that this is as indispensable for the Body Politick, as the *Salic Law* is for the Head; scruple much, whether the King *de jure*, can make us freer than the rest of His Subjects. But we neither desire to dispute the Prerogative of Princes, much less of such a Mighty Monarch; nor indeed are we of their opinion herein, and therefore take it for granted, That He, as well as the *King of England*, may grant us as full and ample liberty, as He shall think it fit in his Royal Pleasure. We only profess our Fears, what He will do, and such as are rational and becoming Men; not groundless Fancies, or frivolous Reports, which are the usual *Bug-bears*, that afright only fearful Women and Children.

1. We cannot flatter our selves into hopes, That our condition should be better than either of those two Kings (which soever we submit unto) natural Subjects. If it be equal, it is well; and all that we can rationally expect. And therefore we judge, That *England* will easier be induced to this, which is ordinary unto that Government; than *France*, to indulge us of extraordinary favour, unless we had merited such a priviledg, as to be made an exception from the general Rule. And that Governors under them will willingly and readily maintain, that which they are accustomed unto; but very hardly such Immunities, as transcend the bounds which are set to others.

2. The many examples we have before us, of such Countrys as *France* hath gained, keeps our Fears continually waking. For by whatever Title they have been acquired, we find them all generally in the same condition. Whether by right of Donation, as *Dauphiny* and *Provence*; or Purchase, as *Berry*, *Montpelier*, &c. or Marriage, as *Bourbon*, *Champagne*, *Languedock*, *Bretaigny*, &c. or by Conquest and powerful Seizure, as *Normandy*, *Aquitane*, *Poitou*, *Arjou*, and whatsoever held on *England* by *Charles* the Seventh, and *Burgundy* with those that depended thereon, by his Son *Lewis* the Eleventh; all these being incorporated with *France* (whatever their former Immunities were, and whatever lesser they still enjoy) are all equally subject to all Laws, Governments and Impositions from the Crown, without dispute and contradiction. And can we then be such fools as to think, that though we come under *France*, yet we shall be free? But now on the contrary we know, That whatsoever accession hath been made to the Crown of *England*, either by Marriage, as *Scotland*, or Conquest, as *Ireland*, that they have all their Laws, Priviledges, Governments and Immunities remaining entirely, as inviolable from the Crown, and unalterable without their own consent. Nor do they only enjoy these, but make Laws for supporting them, according to their particular interests; yea, cross and opposte to the other, which yet are ratified by His Majesty, or at least by His Royal Authority and Pleasure.

3. If any have neither list nor leisure, to look into the Histories of former times; the present Age will furnish them sufficiently, with examples

both foreign and domestick. Let them enquire of *Lorraine* and *Flanders*, how they fare with their new Masters. Or let them but pass into the adjacent Provinces, and inform themselves of the *French* Government: and then they may see, as in a Glass, the face of their own future condition. And if any be resolutely blind, that they will not see; except they be deaf also, or stop their ears, they may hear enough (if the tenth part of Reports be but true) to warn them sufficiently to look to themselves. But if they remain so incredulous, that all the Beacons that are fired about them, makes them not fear; and that they will believe nothing, which they themselves do not feel: I wish that experience (which wise Men call *the Mistress of Fools*) convince them not of their folly, when it is too late; and their condition become so miserable, that it's fitter to be drawn covered with a sorrowful veil, by some *Timantes*'s Pencil, than to be lively set forth in its sad Colours, or described by the Pen of an impartial Historian. For my part, I profess That none honours the worth and gallantry of the *French* Nation more than myself, yet I would loth come under its power: for the reason which the Fox gives the Lyon in the Fable,

— *Quia me vestigia terrent, Omnia te adversum spectantia, nulla retrorsum.* Horat. Epist. lib. I.

4. We think we have reason to be afraid not only for our persons, and purses; but even for our lives, and all those things which may make us miserable; not only in regard of the *French*, but our selves. For we know that a People accustomed to liberty, who have had enough given them, and taken much more, when once they come to be restrained, and strictly held in by the Reigns of Government, are very apt to break out into Mutinies and Mischiefs; and like wild Colts in their first managing, rush desperately into ruine, that they may throw their Riders. Yea, when Conquerors think they have so harnessed the Multitude, that they dare not but draw their triumphant Chariots; and doubt not but they themselves sit so fast, that they may drive them out of breath, and so tame them at their pleasure: they usually *Phaeton*-like, set all on fire; and if they escape the popular fury by running away in the smoke, meet with his fate, to be struck with the Tunderbolt of their Sovereigns Justice. Innumerable are the examples for the confirmation of this; but we will confine our selves to our own Country, and content our selves with two only. When *Philip* the 4th had beat the *Flemmings*, united *Flanders* to *France*, and set Governours over them; who erected Citadels in their several Towns, garrisoned their Cities to keep them in awe, and arbitrarily charged them with great Contributions; the People that were used to Freedom, would not be brought into this yoke of bondage; but desperately revolt, massacre the *French*, and involve all in confusion and misery. Nor is this all; for (though the baser sort begin, yet great men usually end such quarrels) a War followed, which cost both *France* and *Flanders* dear, in the vast expence both of Blood and Treasure. And when Duke *d'Alva* attempted the like upon our Ancestors in these *Provinces*, who were a free People, and not used to

Horat. Epist. lib. I. ep. I.

Serres in Phil. 4.

such severity; how did the sparks of mutiny in the beginning break out into great flames at last, which set the whole Country on fire? No Pen is able to express the miseries of those Times, nor Tragedy represent the things that were perpetrated. How were most mens hearts filled with *fear*, many with *horror*, and some with *despair*, to see their Country become an *Aceldama*; and so many thousands forced through a *Red Sea of Blood*, to find their passage to the Land of *Canaan*! I conclude therefore, That if they who enjoyed less liberty than we, could so little endure Servitude, we shall be much less able to endure it, who have enjoyed far more freedom than they. So that we may easily foresee, without any Prophetick Spirit, what a *flood of Calamities* is likely to break in upon us, when ever any shall break down the *banks of our liberty*.

SECT. 6. *The third Argument which preponderates for England, is the preservation of our Estates: in regard of Souldiers violence, Governours Impositions, Publick Debts by Obligation, and Revenues of the Romish Church.*

WE proceed now to shew, That it is better to be under *England* in regard of our *Estates*. Both in respect of *getting* them (as I shall shew in the following Section) and the *keeping* those we have gotten already, or by the blessing of *God* may get hereafter. And to this I give the precedency, because the enjoyment of Riches is the end for which, and *Trade* only the means by which we labour to obtain them. Now if it can be made apparent, That we can neither get, nor keep such *estates* under *France*, as we can under *England*: there are none so regardless herein (what ever they are of *Religion* and *Liberty*) but will easily grant the truth of our *Conclusion*.

1. Then let us consider, That except we can keep that which is our own; we are never the better for it, but a great deal the worse. Had we a grant of *Mida's* wish, that all we touched, should be turned into *Gold*; or were we insured, that all our *Adventures*, should bring us Returns as rich as the *East-India* Companies; What should it profit us, if we could not keep them? Nay, Were we not a great deal worse than without them? What toyle and anxiety is there in getting! What fears and troubles are there in keeping! and what sorrow and vexation in the parting with Riches! Not that I think any civil Authority will ever take away our *Estates*, except we forfeit them through misdemeanors; but when the *Sword* brings such a *Commission*, I would gladly know who dare deny it? And whether the poor man then, that hath all his money in his Purse-pocket, be not both safer in his Person, and more secure of his Estate, than the rich Merchant, whose *bags* and *warehouses* are filled with his wealth? *Crasus* was rich even to a Proverb, yet shewing to *Solon* all his Treasures, *Solon* told him, *That if any came wish better Iron than he wore, they would be master of all that Gold.*

Now

Now in regard of plundering, depredations, and all inanner of violence by Souldiers, both to our Persons and Estates, I think we are far more secure from the *English*, than *French*. And for this I shall appeal to the *common experience* of all ages and places where their Armies have come, which bear witness to the great exorbitances of the latter more than the other; in the violation both of Womens Chastity, and Mens Estates, and frequent desolations by Fire and Sword. Yea, I will make their own Historian *Comines* judge of the Controversie, who having shewn how unjustly great Ones govern, and the innocent people are oppress'd both by them and the Souldiers, whose flagitious Lives, petulent Carriage, and violent Rapines are intolerable, professes that he mentions these things for *France's* sake, which of all the Principalities he had known, was most afflicted with them. Whereas on the contrary, he says, *England* excell'd them all, in these three particulars; *Respect to the Common-good; the Peoples freedom from Injury; and the little spoil their Souldiers and Armies made in their Wars*: the last whereof he repeats, and enlarges a little after in the same Chapter.

Lib. 5. c. 18.
Polisse.

2. But we will suppose the best in all *uncertainties*, and therefore hope we shall escape all plundering and violence from Souldiers in a time of confusion, and make no doubt thereof in a settled condition. But yet we know we shall not escape paying such Taxes, as indeed justly deter us, both in regard of their *greatness*, and also the *arbitrariness* of their imposition. In both which, we know no People in *Europe* more miserable than *France*; nor none happier in the contrary, than the Subjects of the Crown of *England*. Which partly occasioned that known saying of the Emperor *Maximilian* the First, That he was *Rex Regum*; the King of *Spain*, *Rex Hominum*; the King of *France*, *Rex Asinorum*; and the King of *England*, *Rex Diabolorum*. For he could have nothing but what the *German* Princes consented to; *Spain*, only what the Laws allowed him; *France*, all that he pleased; and *England*, nothing that pleased nor the People.

As touching their *greatness*, i. I willingly grant that Subjects must afford their Sovereigns assistance; and in times of extremity and utmost dangers, it is hard to determine how far their Power may not lawfully be extended. Secondly, I know the *grandeur* of the *French* Court is great, which is lately shewn us in our own Language. That their *Armies* are often numerous, and some alwayes necessary, both for the defence of the Government from its domestick Enemies, and of the Frontiers from foreign, in the adjacent Countries. And that these require vast Sums to support them. Yet notwithstanding, thirdly, *Moderation* ought to be used, so that the common People may enjoy the fruit of their labours. But to shew how far the Government of *France* hath been from this, would be an endless work. We should but tire our selves to read what their own Historians have related; and be weary with the rehearsal of the many Tumults and Rebellions that have arisen from their *Gabels*. It would fill any one with sorrow to hear of the great *complaints* and *out-cries* that the People have made in former

Weegsch.
al. 3 c. 3.
+ 5.

Ages, and fright us to hear those of the present; which yet their Governours are so used to, that they count them but the old *sa sa* of *France*, and oppression the sin of the old World. What remorse of Conscience several of their Kings have had for their Extortion, is well known to those that have read their Histories. Some in their life-time, as *Charles* the Eighth; some at their death, as *Philip* the Fourth, who remitted the Taxes he had unjustly required, and commanded his Sons to ease the People. But above all, *Lewis* the Eleventh, who resolved to reform, but it was too late; and therefore charged the *Dauphine* against that Oppression he had practised. And indeed it was highly necessary; for he had reduced the Common-
 People to such poverty, that many of the Farmers were forced, with halters about their necks to draw their own Ploughs; except they would steal, and once for all stretch both themselves and Ropes on the Gallows. But I should not once mention any of these things, if I thought it not better for us, both to know and believe them before-hand, than experience them afterwards to our cost. For I fear if we come once under the *French*, there will be no end of paying Contributions, until we be brought into the condition of the *Andrians* of old, who, when *Themistocles* demanded Money, telling them he had brought two Goddesses to require it, *Perswasion* and *Power*; answered, That they had two great Goddesses also, who taught them to deny it, which were *Poverty* and *Impossibility*. And then the *Hollanders* may do that living, which *Saladinus* the Emperor of *Asia* did dying, shew their Winding sheets, and say, *These are all the rich Hollanders have left*.

Plut. in
 vita The-
 mistoccl. ex
 Herodot.

Procopius
 de ed. C.
 lib. 6.

But should we part with some of our estates, though it were a good share, so we were sure to enjoy the rest, it was less matter: but when we are always obnoxious to an Arbitrary Power, still to be squeezed like Sponges at the pleasure of others, we can scarce call any thing our own, and are rather *Procuratores* than *Domini divitiarum*. I know well that some of the *French* Kings have, like good Shepherds, fleeced, not feed their Flocks (according to *Tiberius* his saying, *Boni Pastoris est pecus tondere, non deglubere*) especially *Lewis* the Twelfth: who therefore (as the Jesuite well observes) had no Rebellion in all his Reign, which is a rare blessing (as he sayes) and extraordinary in that Realm. And the great wisdom and generosity of his present Majesty, puts me out of all doubt of his *clemency*; but a good, a great, a wise *Solomon*, may have a *Rehoboam* to his Son and Successor, whose little finger may be heavier than his Fathers loyns. By which example in Sacred History, we are shewn, that whatever Prince will force his Subjects to open their Puries to his pleasure, shall quickly find their Hearts shut; and though for the present they may supplicate, and outwardly seem to adore him (as the *Indians* their Deities *ne nocent*) yet they hate him worse than the *Devil* himself, and upon the first occasion tumultuously cry, *Every man to your Tent*; whence open Divisions, lawless Rapines, bloody Wars, and all the miserable effects that follow them, break in upon a Nation beyond count. But let us be frank in conceding (as it becomes us when we speak

Sueton. in
 vita Tib.
 Baisfore
 hist. Franc.
 lib. 15.

of Kings) that there shall never arise a *Rehobaim* out of *Lewis's* race; yea, that this is as impossible, as for a Vulture to rise out of the Phœnix ashes; yet we know the best of Kings may have bad Governors under them; and that they must often, both see with other eyes, & hear with other ears than their own. Yea, let us suppose, That we shall never pay more Tribute to the fair *Lilies of France*, than we have done to the *Belgick Lyon*; except that of respect, which we acknowledge His due: yet there still remains a vast difference betwixt a *legal* and a *permissive exemption*, and of the same payments made by *publick consent*, and those that are commanded by absolute *power*; though not in regard of the money, yet in regard both of the Authority that requires it, which if absolute and arbitrary, is alterable, although it should not be altered; and the different impressions which they make, and effects that follow in the minds and affections of men. For when a People know the necessities of State, and freely vote their own Contributions, they account themselves free and uninjured, though the Taxations be never so great (according to the Rule, that *violenti non fit injuria*;) and look upon them as a gift, rather than a debt, and therefore pay them willingly, and generously bear their parting with their share. Whereas on the contrary, when they are ignorant of the grounds of such impositions, they are always jealous, that they are not so great as is pretended; and when they have no suffrage therein, look upon themselves as wronged and oppressed; and though they pay them, yet it is with reluctance; and because they must and cannot withstand it, their minds are dejected, and their spirit and courage strangely depressed, as I could shew by many examples. The difference of these two Authorities, and their various and different effects, is well observed by two Noble Lords, *Bacon* of *Verulam*, and *Comines* of *Argenton*; both of them famous for their wisdom, one in the Theory, and the other in the Practice thereof; so that if the former had the latter's *Prudence*, and the latter the former's *Learning*, no Age could have paralleld them. That of publick consent the Learned *Bacon* observes, doth not so dispirit a People, and diminish their *Martial courage*, and instances in these very *Provinces*, shewing how cheerfully they have born the great burthen of *Exoise*, because it came from themselves, & their own Authority. And that of Arbitrary power, is shewn of *France*, by that great Statesman *Comines*, Counsellour to *Lewis* the Eleventh; whose History is so much esteemed by the *French* (as *Bussieres* the *Jesuit* tells us), that they neither envy the *Greeks* their *Thucidydes*, nor the *Romans* their *Livy* or *Tacitus*. Wherein he so frequently inveighs against these impositions, and complains of the Peoples miseries thereby; so freely exposulates with the *Kings* and *Governors*, and is so honest an *Advocate* for their Subjects; that I with all *Princes* would make this excellent Historian, as familiar to them, as did *Charles* the Fifth, that great and wise *Emperor*. In the 18 *Chap.* l. 5. he saith, That neither the King of *France*, nor any other, hath power to exact of their Subjects without their own consent;

Essay (or
Sermo fide-
lis) 29.

Hist. Fran.
l. 13.

Fr. Esolin.
de rep. l. 6.
c. 2.

except

except they will tyrannically use their power contrary to all right both Divine and Humane. And *Chapter 7. l. 6.* That *Charles* the Seventh, who in the *English* wars had introduced this impèrious way of taxing the people without the consent of the *States*, had burthened both His own Conscience, and the successive *Kings* with great guilt, and most cruelly wounded the *Kingdom*, of which it was like a long time to bleed. Nor doth he only thus declaim against the unlawfulness thereof, but also shews how ungrateful it is to the People, as well as injurious. And on the contrary, how readily & unanimously, without tumult or contradiction, even in the Kingdoms greatest poverty, the *States* consented, and People paid to *Charles* the Eighth. But if Princes will forget the good advice this *Historian* there gives them, yet I wish they would remember at least old *Pythagoras's* Symbol, *Sudorem ferro abstergere, tetrum facinus*. Which *Plutarch* (as a Learned man tells us) expounds, *That none should take away that with the Sword, which others have earned with the sweat of their brows*. If they will only use their own absolute power, yet let it be so tempered with equity and moderation; that the crys of the Poor, and the curses of the People, may never bring Gods vengeance upon them. But if we should speak the sense of our Souls, we must needs (alas!) say, That moderation is so rare a Jewel in the Crown of absolute Monarchs, and the Governors under them so used to Hunt, and Hawk at all Game to enrich themselves: that though we may all hope to escape, yet we have more reason to fear, that if the fate of the other Provinces befall us, we shall all (as the Beasts said in the Fable) *meet at last at the Furriers shop*. If any can flatter themselves with fancies, That our *Commonwealth* shall under *France*, become like *Plato's Republick*, wherein violence and oppression shall not be known: and that their Governors, will be like those in *Utopia*, Fathers to our Fortunes, as much as their own. I must confess that I am not so *Mercurially* made, and do no more expect to see the World so happy, than to see the great *Platonick year*. But on the contrary, That great Impositions will be added, to the great Excise that is upon us already; whereby the number of the *Poor* will certainly encrease, and the *Provisions* for them daily decrease. Yea, it is well, if maintaining the *Land* against the *Water*, be not neglected, and so our *Eden* be laid waste: and that our rich and pompous Cities return not in time to their old condition, of poor and despicable Fishers Villages. However, seeing the blessing of *Judah* and *Issachar*, can never befall the same People, as *Bacon* observes in the mentioned place, if we and our Estates shall come under Arbitrary Power, then let us deface the *Lyon Rampant*, that was the Arms of generous *Judah*, which our Ancestors and we have hitherto born: and set up *sluggish Issachar's* of an *Ass couchant* between two *burdens*, that is to say, the *Popes trumperies*, & *France's tribute*.

3. There is another consideration which is of great importance to the Inhabitants of these Countries, and that is concerning their *Debts*. For mentioning Estates, we mean not only that in our own, but also that in other

Gyrald.
Symb.
Pythagor.

Other mens hands. As for *Private debts*, we know they must needs be very many and great in places of such Merchandise, seeing the greatest part of trade is all over, and here especially, driven upon credit. Now how these will be gotten, if bad times come on, so that many remove, and more be impoverished; I leave those to consider, whose concernment it is. Concerning *Publick debts*, (which are yet more desperate, whatever change happens) they are such as are contracted, either for *Service* to the Commonwealth, and *Commodities* delivered for publick uses, or for *Moneys* upon obligation; all which ways many thousands are greatly concerned, especially the last. There being very many, who have lent, some a good part, and others the greatest part of their Estates, upon the *publick faith* of the *Land*, *Cities* and *Lombards* of these Provinces. So that if this *publick faith* prove *faithless* like the *Punick* of old, a great number of Families, and (which is most deplorable) Widows and Orphans, (who being incapable to employ their Estates thus intrusted them (will be wholly ruined and undone. Herein I think all that have any sense of justice and equity, will conclude with me.

1. That it is very unreasonable and unjust, that if the present Government cannot discharge these debts, or a change happen; that those who have credited the Republick, should sit down with all the loss, and others not bear their proportion. 2. That seeing they were lent to the Publick, and Obligation accordingly given, and that for publick uses, and so employed, (or if other ways converted, yet without the Creditors fault :) it is all the reason in the world, that the Publick should faithfully pay the same. 3. That if the Republick stand, care ought to be taken to satisfy these Creditors: and that if a change of Government happen, the people remaining the same, are both in Law and equity liable to pay these debts. For though it is a great question how far Subjects are obliged to pay their Sovereigns, yet it was never questioned by any, but that such as are made for the Publick by the peoples tacit, and much more express consent, must be paid by the people, whatever change be made in the Government: Whether from a Monarchy to a Republick, as the Commonwealth of *Athens* paid the 100 Talents which their 30 Tyrants had borrowed of the *Lacedemonians*; and these very Provinces, that which the King of *Spain* was indebted to the people: Or from a Republick to a Monarchy; *Non desinit debere pecuniam populus rege sibi imposto, quam liber debebat; est enim idem populus, & dominium retinet eorum que populi fuerant; imo & imperium in se retinet, quanquam jam non exercendum à corpore sed à capite, &c.* *Grotius de jure belli & pacis*, l. 2. c. 9. Sect. 8. See also *Arnifaus de rep. lib. 1. c. 5. Sect. 4.* *Quatenus acta Reip. obligent civitatem*, and the *Civilians de rebus creditis*, *Digest. lib. 11. tit. 1. l. 27.*

All the difficulty therefore will be if a change come, how the payment of these just debts may be procured. And here we need no other *Counsellors* advice, than our own reason, which will inform us, that the freer any people are

Demosthen. adv. Leptin. V. Dissquisit. politic. 53.

and the more they participate of power, the more probable it is, and also the more facile for them to obtain their rights. Now that we are likely to have more freedom under *England* than *France*, I have shew'd sufficiently in the former Section. Yea common experience as well as reason hath learnt the world this lesson; that when inferiors can only pray and petition, they may daily get fair promises, and perhaps be sprinkled with some *Court-holy-water*; but performances and payments are still the work of to morrow, and continually kept as *reserves* in the rear. Nor can they bring more arguments for their expedition, than Superiors have excuses for their delaying: and if at last their patience be worn as thread-bare as their clothes with attendance; so that they become importune in requesting; then *Grande'es* grow deaf in hearing, and resolutely peremptory in denying: whence both sides frequently fall to irregular proceedings; the one for recovering, and the other for defrauding them of their rights. Whereas those that can, not only request; but also legally require, that justice be done; have ground to hope, that when the touchiness of times is over, and the boisterous passions of great ones are laid; some happy conjuncture of affairs may prove a prosperous gale to bring them at last, their hazardous adventures home in safety.

4. And lastly, (that I may draw this Arrow to the head) I shall desire that we may consider a little of the Lands and Revenues, formerly belonging to the *Romish Church*. Which to defend our selves in our Wars with *Spain*, were sold to several, and are since parcelled out into many more hands. Now the very mentioning of this I should think sufficient, the difference between *France* and *England* herein, being so well known. Do we hear what the former hath already done, in all those places subject to him, and how they have set up all the *Romish* rable; and can we think that they will not in time recover (whatever promises they pass for the present) that which not only they themselves, but all of their Religion account their right? Can we imagine that their *Bishops*, *Abbots*, *Priors*, and other Superior Orders, will live like *Parochials* or *Mendicant Friars*? Who is so ignorant as knows not, that where ever the *old Gentleman of Rome* comes to rule, he brings with him many attendants to bear up his train; and that their pomp must be supported, though many *Gentlemen* thereby be ruined? Whereas on the contrary, *England* is by them, in the same condemnation with our selves; neither permitting his headship and dominion over them, nor his members and followers any demains among them. So that we may safely conclude, that all those that possess such Estates, as the Church of *Rome* doth challenge; can neither rationally hope to keep them under *France*, nor fear to lose them under *England*.

Sec^t. 7. *The fourth Argument from Trade. This (viz. Merchandise and Navigation) our chief secular interest: and friendship with England to secure the same. England and we Corrivals herein, the probability of getting more, as also enjoying the same with greater Peace under France, with other Arguments: largely debated, and the contrary evinced under England.*

WE are now come to the *Acropolis* of the cause; *Trade* being the great *Tower of Strength*, to which the Adversaries of our opinion, having deserted the former outworks, usually fly unto our refuge. We shall therefore pursue them; but orderly, first making our *approaches* by degrees; and then raising such Batteries, and planting such *Reasons*, as are forcible, either to beat this down, or at least to make such breaches therein, as shall render it untenable for their defence; and so compel the most pertinacious of our enemies, either to submit, or fall before us.

But before we begin this work, we must acquaint you, that when we mention *Trade*, we mean not every particular kind of negotiation, wherein the several sorts of Artificers and Shop-keepers are employed: to speak of which would be both an endless, and a bootless work. Herein perhaps some might fare better with the *French*, the *Mercers* & *Taylor*s especially; for the *a la mode Mounseurs* when they have money, affect to change their fashion as often as the *Moon* doth her face; and to wear as many ribbands on their breeches, as ordinary Pedlers bear on their backs; as if all the fortunes of *France* hung at their ends, and all their own happiness followed their heels. And happily *Butchers* and *Cooks* would fare better with the *English* for a piece of good *Beef* or a *Shoulder of Mutton*. And we might instance in many others with merriment; but we have no mind to be pleasant upon so serious a Subject. In short therefore, we mean *Maritime Trade* (as our Adversaries do) this being the great *Diana* of the *Netherlands*, which brings them in their *Silver Shrines*.

1. Then we shall lay this down as a fundamental and undoubted *Maxim*, (which all I think will take for granted) that *Trade by Sea is the great secular Interest of these Provinces, the Maritime especially, by which they most flourish, and without which they cannot subsist*. Let *Amsterdam* and the other *Cities* be as rich, or richer than they are imagined, yet will they in few years, if their *Trade* be obstructed, become as poor as their Neighbours at *Gant* or *Antwerp*. For who will build at such excessive charges (where the foundation sometimes is half to the superstructure) or pay such rents for their habitation, and live in such expensive places, if there be not freedom of *Trade*? But those that can, will remove; some hither and some thither, as their interest and affection shall incline them, rather than spend their *Capitals* here. If ever Merchants were, or are in any place of the world, the *vena porta* (as *Bacon* styles them) of any publick body, it is certainly the

Belgick. If they freight not their Ships, whereby the Marriners may be employed; if they furnish not the Tradefmen shops, whereby they may follow their Vocations; if they lade not the poor mens backs, whereby their families may fill their bellies; finally if they distribute not their Merchandise through the various Seas and Rivers of the *Universe*, we may linger a while, but it is as impossible we should live long, as for a body deprived of food, whose parts languish for want of nourishment, which should be brought them in the veins, by the bloods regular *circulation*.

2. Merchandise being our chief concernment, it will necessarily follow that that Nation that can most obstruct the same, can do us much injury. Now that *England* can do this more than *France*, or any other whatsoever, I think none will deny; if any do, there is enough said hereafter, that will make it sufficiently apparent.

3. Of all our neighbouring Nations, *England* being most potent by Sea, and *France* by Land, it will clearly follow, that a Peace with these two above all others, is our great concernment: with the former for getting, and with the later for keeping and enjoying our Estates. But if we cannot have this from them both, which of them is to be preferred comes next in consideration.

4. This Common wealth consisting of *Maritime* and *Inland Provinces*, the former being by far the most considerable, the friendship of *England* is more to be valued than that of *France*. And this the wisest men that this *Republick* ever had, formerly never doubted of. Prince *William* the First Founder of this Common-wealth, laid down these three principal maxims of State, which were approved by all, as sound and rational beyond contradiction. 1. *To do justice to Strangers*. For great Nations may be upheld by Power, but small Territories must be maintained by Justice. 2. *To hold a fair correspondence with France*. For *Spain* being then the grand *Monarchy* of *Europe*, and our dreadful enemy; the assistance of *France* was greatly necessary for our supportation. 3. *To preserve an inviolable peace with England*. In regard that this is absolutely requisite for our freedom of Commerce by Sea, & the *English* were our friends in affection as well as interest, whereas the *French* only upon the later account. For the greatest obstacle that stood in the way of *France's* greatness, was the *Spanish* power in these *Netherlands*; which being once broke down, they well knew they could dilate their Empire at their pleasure, as we see it now to our sorrow. It is true of later times, the *Lovesteiners* to free themselves from the Headship of the *Orange* family; which sought (as they imagined) either an absoluteness, or at least to infringe the liberty of the Common-wealth, have been rather inclined to *France* than *England*: but they were not so blinded with passion, but that having a Peace with *Spain* & being sensible of *France's* prevalency, and raising their Fortunes upon the *Spanish* ruines, it was their Interest to comply with *England* rather than *France*. Which plainly appears, in that no sooner was those unhappy differences between us and *England* com-

composed at *Breda*, but immediately the *Tripple Alliance* was designed and concluded upon by that great States-man *de Witt* the head of their party, and Sir *William Temple*, on purpose to put boundaries to the boundless ambition of the *French Nation*.

5. To the reason of State already mentioned, together with the judgment of our greatest *Politicians* both in former and later times, let me add; that Terrestrial war hath always been accounted more eligible than a Naval; yea by some our absolute interest, as the *Duke of Rhoan* observes. In so much that *Zealand* never to this day consented unto, but absolutely protested against these *Provinces* making Peace with *Spain*. And here it is observable, how our Adversaries prevaricate; in granting this assertion, and yet preferring *France*. I foresee their evasion, of conceding a Land war with a lesser Potentate, and denying it with *France*. But this is both easily obviated and outed; for as I am well assured, that if *England* had not assaulted us by Sea, *France* had never done it by Land; so I have reason to believe, that if he had, we should have found him sufficient work. If we had the Sea free for our inferior *Provinces*, the charges of a Land-war the far superior were easily born. And we should not want men enough for our money, to fight for them with *France*, or any other whatsoever, so long as we should think them worth the fighting for. Nor let any wonder that I insert such a conditional; for I shall afterwards make it appear how the Common-wealth may be well secured, though these *Provinces* should be let go or lost. And as for the inferior they are so situated in the water, and thereby so inaccessible; that we need not fear what all the force of *France* can do, if we be resolved to defend them. It being therefore apparant that Traffick is our principal concernment, and *England* of all others most able to obstruct it; we may conclude in point of interest, as Prince *Maurice* (I have heard) used to say, that *were the English Devils, we must have peace with them.*

These being the *Approaches*, (which I think) no fallies of our Adversaries can prevent; we shall now, being got nearer them, take a better view of their strength. Were we free and had our choice, whether we should war with *France* or *England*, you see our interest should carry us against *France*. But the case (alas!) is far otherwise with us, for they both make war upon us: by what error of policy one of them, which could best, was not taken off and diverted, if it had been possible; or whether it was impossible, and so no error or omission in us, is not now our enquiry. But seeing they both threaten us with destruction, upon supposition that we are unable any longer to resist them both, whether of them we should choose to be under in regard of our *Trade*.

This then being the Question; our Adversaries give their suffrage for *France*; and think themselves impregnable in this point of interest. Let us therefore impartially represent the strength of their reasons, and weigh them duly in the true balance of interest, and then we shall find them, you shall see, not only many gains, but ounces too light.

1. It is better for us; say they, to be under *France*, because *England* and we are Competitors for Trade.

2. It is very true, *England* and these Countries by their situation, genius, and interest are set for Trade: and this naturally begets an enmity between us, and a vying with one another for the same. But this was always, and will be so whilst men are men: and what will follow hence? Surely one of these things; either that we must willingly yield to them, or they to us, which is madness to imagine; or that we must fight with them for the whole, which if they mean of our selves, is the next degree to dotage; seeing we are about matches, and Peace in their Trade is always the interest of a Trading People; if they mean joyntly with *France*, we shall speak to that in the following Argument, and shew what a hazard even that will be, and much more singly: or that we must compound with them for our share, and so each Nation may have, what Gods blessing may give, and their own industry may procure them. And this in my opinion will have the vote, not only of all the Cowards, but all the wise men of both Nations. But because this Argument is much insisted on, both in former times, and this juncture of affairs; we will more particularly consider the same, in reference to this Commonwealth as to *England* absolutely without respect to *France*. And thereby we shall see what corrivals in Trade imlicie in point of Interest, whether the power be about equal, (as we shall he suppose *England* and this Common wealth) or unequal, and in point of inference. Now in regard of Interest, we shall find in my judgment, that 'tis clearly this for us as equal in power.

1. That we must vigorously defend our Trade, as that on which our temporal welfare depends.

2. That we must for this purpose maintain a Naval power, equal at least to theirs. That so we may hold them up to the just and due terms, and bounds of Commerce of Navigation.

3. That for this end the league of the Maritime Provinces be kept inviolable. If the band of the bunch of Arrows be either cut or broken, so that they fall out of the Lions paw; he will soon have his skin pull'd over his ears. So that to make several Common-wealths of them, is but to make them so many morsels, to be the easier devoured by their enemies. And therefore I wonder at the Author of the *Interest of Holland* herein, who, c. 41, 42, &c. asserts the power of that Province sufficient by Sea, and joyntly with *Utrecht* by Land, to wage War with all other Potentates. Seeing these Maritime Provinces entirely considered, are but the match at Sea for *England*. And the reasons that he gives, c. 37. are now refuted by experience. I acknowledge it also an error in policie, for *Zealand* to break this bond of Amity, if possibly they can help it. But if their Enemies sword cuts this asunder, what shall they do? And this is the case only that I defend.

4. That we should rather yield to them in *Punctilioes* of honour; that being

being a *Crown*, this only a Common-wealth. Such I mean as the *Flag*; although I reckon not that any dishonour to us, seeing they have not only always challenged it, but our Ancestors also given it: and other Nations as well as we, pay the same acknowledgment to that *Crown*. The first time that we have ever refused it, was in the time of King *James*; the circumstances whereof Sir *Anthony Welden* in his *Court* relates, and the effects both their and our Historians. It is not my design to speak of this particular, which would swell to a discourse larger than this whole Treatise; but only instance therein, as a known example; concluding that if they will War for it, it is our wisdom to yield it, and except we were far stronger than they, folly to fight for it.

5. Rather to dissemble lesser injuries than seek to revenge them. Which holds in all equalities of power whatsoever.

6. But if they will unjustly inroach upon us to ruine our Commerce, then to War with them. For 1. Our Traffick being our subsistence, who ever would spoil us thereof, necessitates us to defend it, and gives us a just cause of contest. 2. We being a match for them in power, may in point of wisdom as well as justice, try it out with them, and leave the issue to Gods Providence; Wars being the last appeal to Heaven, when justice cannot be had on earth. 3. If success attends our Armies, we secure our selves at least, if we better not our condition; and if the contrary, we do but drown and die a little the sooner. A destructive Peace and unsuccessful War are both fatal in the issue; the former being a *Chronical*, the later an *acute* disease of State. It is not so material, whether by a lingering Consumption of Peace, or by the Hectick Fever of War, the gray hairs of Government, be brought with sorrow to the grave.

7. Yet if we can enjoy the freedom of Commerce, and fruit of our labours, upon reasonable terms; it is better to sit down contented with our share, than to War for the whole. For 1. What wise man ever doubted, but that Peace is the interest of a rich and trading People; if it can be had upon tolerable conditions. 2. Is not a competent certainty preferable to a greater good that is wholly hazardous and uncertain? for how often doth that happen to men, which did to the greedy and covetous dog in the Fable; who let go that he had, to catch at the shadow thereof in the water, and so lost all!

I know some that have more of *Mars* than *Mercury's* temper, are all for fighting, and therefore I shall desire them calmly to consider, these few particulars following:

1. What either we or *England* have gotten by our former Wars, when matcht in power. I partly know what it hath cost us both, in treasure and blood: and can demonstrate, that if either hath gotten, 'tis *England*, though not to countervail the cost. Let's but reckon (as we must if we go rightly to work) the *lucrum cessans*, and *damnum emergens*, or the profit that ceases, and loss that accrues, and what we have got, we may put in our eye, and not see much the worse.

But if any one say who can reckon that, or how?

I shall freely acknowledg that to pounds and persons we cannot, nor no man alive; yet in the general we may, so far as to make a judgment. I have done it for my own satisfaction, and shall tell you how; that so those that are curious may satisfie themselves therein, and not take it upon my credit. By the publick Customs, the Number of Ships, the Capital where-with Trade is driven, and by the riches of the Merchants. Of these, the two former are more easie and certain, wherein *England* hath encreas'd: the two latter more conjectural, wherein this Republick hath the superiority. But hath not gotten it by the Wars, but arises from several other causes, (which I could mention) and especially from these two following, which I think will satisfie any intelligent man. As to the Capital, ours comes to be greater, in regard that as the Merchants grow rich in *England*, they buy Land, and breed up their sons to be Country Gentlemen; whereas we, especially in *Holland*, continue the stock and our Children in the Trade. Land being here at 35 and 40 years purchase, and in *England* at 15 or 20 ordinarily. And that the Merchants here should be richer than there, is no wonder to me; who know so well the frugality of the one, and the prodigality of the other.

2. Let it be consider'd how difficult and hazardous it is for equal powers, to destroy one another; and therefore how little likelihood there is, of any thing to be gotten by contesting. Nay there are several circumstances in our situations, employments, and people, that render absolute conquest almost impossible. We may like Cocks fight, and breath, and fight again, and crow over one another for some victories, but far from a conquest. And this we might both have seen long since in the glass of policy: which clearly shews, that such equal powers fighting for profit, is but like *Nero's* fishing with a golden hook, wherein more is adventured, than ever is likely to be gotten. We have had a Comick-tragedy, and a Tragick comedy of two Wars, and *England* the contrary; wherein our enemies indeed have been pleasant spectators, and satisfied their envious eyes, but what have either of us got, but blows? Passion and prejudice are so prevalent in the World, and so blind the eyes of men, that often they will not see the truth, till dear bought experience makes them even to feel it. And this we now both see, and therefore *England* takes this opportunity of breaking down the equality of power, and bringing us lower, that so we may truckle under them, and they be at rest in the bed of security.

3. Those that are so much for *Mars*, might do well to consider, the advantages and disadvantages of both Nations, for carrying on, and subsisting under long Wars. In some things we may happily have the advantage as in bearing the Charges, number of Shipping, Caping by Letters of Marque, &c. And in others *England*, for they have a great and rich Inland Country, an Island that cannot be easily diverted by a Land-war, so that us the *Duke of Rhoan* saith right, *l'Angleterre est un grand animal, qui ne peut*

iamais

jamaïs mourir, s'il ne se tue lui mesme. We subsist wholly on Trade, all things from abroad, they have sufficiency of necessaries from their own growth at home. When Trade stands still, they have cloaths for the back, and meat for the belly, better cheap for the poorer people: here not only such accomodations are far dearer than there, which can well be born when Trade flourisheth; but when that is stopt, & it can worst be endured, then are they dearest of all. Our Seamen which come most from the Northern Quarters about the *Baltick* Sea, to serve us in Navigation, when they see no hopes of gain, but only venturing their lives for the pay of the Wars, will remove and serve other Nations: whereas the King of *England* hath three Kingdoms to press out for his assistance, according to the custom of the Crown there, which is not practised, nor indeed practicable in this Free State. And although at the first such as are prest be averse to the Wars; yet we find and feel by experience, that, what through the Officers and other Gentlemens caressing and encouraging them, what through company and conversing with others before-hand, this restiness is worn off by degrees; and through the principles of self-defence, and some sparks of the honour of their Countrey, they fight well enough, whatever the cause or the quarrel be.

4. I wish both Nations would well consider, whether whilst we two are so eagerly contesting for Trade, others may not carry it away. I have reasonably considered what Nation can bid the fairest for this, in regard of their *Situation, Havens, Geniis, &c.* The advantages of the *Mediterranean* and *Baltick* Seas, and let my thoughts stretch themselves as far as both the *Indies*: have observed the *French* Fleet, the darling of the King and Kingdom; their hopes with the grounds of them, and the probable success thereof, as also the communication of *Spain* with *America*; and find no one Nation alone capacitated to carry away our Commerce; but several to have greater shares than they have at present. Yea, to speak my mind freely, I have had far further contemplations, and of a far different kind from these upon this Subject, in respect to future times. And indeed such as have often made me both very sorrowful to see the Christian world so mad and quarrelsome about their Commerce, & very fearful that God would either blast it to us, by taking it away and giving it to *Turks* and *Heathens*; or not bless us with it, giving us herein our hearts desire in his wrath, and them the Gospel in exchange thereof. As I clearly see he hath done to the *Jews*, the generallest and greatest Merchants of the World: and as I think he threatens us Christians in several places of *holy Scripture*, if they be duly considered. But because I love not dogmatizing, or to be positive in things I am not so fully satisfied in; I shall at present say no more of this, but leave it to every good Christians consideration.

Having thus declared what Corrivallship implies as to equal powers, we shall now see it in unequal. And here *Interest* shews us,

That if we decline and become inferior in strength, if they were so inju-
rious

rious to us; that we had a just cause of War, yet we must not adventure it at fighting, but use policie to procure a Peace. And in my opinion this Piety and Wisdom is taught us by our Saviour Christ in the Gospel; for where Souldiers are alike, and no advantage of ground, &c. what is it but tempting of God, & meer folly for *ten thousand to encounter twenty thousand?* Yea, though the disparity was not so great; Wars beeing always hazardous to the weaker side, though they often be victorious: it being frequently found (as *Pyrrhus* said of his warring with the *Romans*) that their very Victories do undo them. In such cases, old mens heads are better helps than young mens hands. To shew the refuges of weaker powers when threatened with Wars, would be a large discourse. I shall therefore only hint some few generals, of many which I have observed. 1. To gain all time possible. 2. Therein to break down the stronger designs, and weaken them at home as much as may be. 3. To raise them up enemies abroad by making them jealous of their power. 4. By alliance with others to balance their might. 5. To prepare for a divertive rather than a direct War. 6. By proposal of Marriages, &c. to make up the breach. 7. By procuring forein Potentates mediation, and appealing to their Arbitration. 8. To make the best Peace they can, when best provided with power for War. For otherwise nothing is to be expected, but either an unsafe, or a short Peace, little better than a Truce, or Holy-day of War.

*Best is that Peace, whose Articles are made
Under a Shield, and written with a Blade.*

Now all these have many particulars contained in them. For Example in the first to gain time, by sending Embassadors, and so still that as one is returning another may be sent; whereby a fair pretence of ignorance of transactions may be pleaded; and time spun out in further debates. By conceding one thing after another by degrees, still reserving the principal point of Interest entire, &c. And so of the rest within the bounds of honest Policie. The reason of the case is so clear, that were it not for mens passions, inferiors in power would not be so ready to fight. For let them either be beaten or beat, it will at last redound to their own destruction. If the former, why should they spend their blood and treasure to make themselves more miserable? and if the later, they do but enrage their enemies the more, who being more powerful, will not fear two or three Battels to end the War, and come to a Peace to their great dishonor. So that we may lay down this as a general rule for the weaker side, *That self-defence must be first for preparation, but last for execution.* Of all the Princes of *Europe* in our age, the Duke of *Lorraine* hath been the cunningest gamester, but the foulest player with stronger powers. But oh, how is he caught in his own craftiness! Although I confess I could not see him and his Court (as I have done since this disaster) without great commiseration; to think that one of the ancientest Familie, and greatliest allyed of all *Europe*, should fall into that condition. Of the former age the *Veronians*, who
being

being oppress'd by their Neighbours the *Venetians*, that were more powerful, would notwithstanding needs War with them; wherein though they were often victorious, yet it proved their ruine at last, for which they are stigmatized for Fools to all succeeding Generations. And many other examples might be produced, but I think them needless in so plain a case.

An thus you see what our being competitors for Trade implies as to Interest in regard of War and Peace. Which I have been the larger upon, because I know what work fools make wise men in both Nations. I have many times been put to it for patience, and sometimes into a Paroxysm of passion, to hear the senseless clamours of men. We are Competitors for Trade! It is our Interest! Our Interest! Down with the *Dutch*! Down with the *English*! Let us but consider who these are, and we shall find them, Men that have a pound of passion, for one ounce of reason. Men that never saw, or at least not well observed both Nations. Men that never bestowed one calm hour to balance their powers. For wise men that know both well, were but grieved to hear, or pleasantly merry with such madness. I publickly decry'd such folly in the first Wars, and had severely chastis'd such fools in the second, if I had not been several ways hindred. Let me say it freely (I think I have some reason, for I believe there are few men that have better view'd both Nations with their eye, to that end which I have had, nor balanced their power with greater accuracy) that if either the King of Great *Britain*, or the States or both require it: I am ready to demonstrate, that for these 20 or 30 years last past, there was nothing of advantage rationally to be expected on either side, that can countervail a War: nor as both might manage their power, likely to be, so long as both continued in that condition, for in powers about equal, all the difference is in the management thereof. And because I see what work is made in the world, if I live to see the balance come so even again, (though I think I never shall) I do here engage for the publick peace of Protestants, and good of both Nations, to satisfy all rational men herein, I hope even to curiosity; And shall, if God spares me life and health, defend the same, against all the State-tinkers of both Nations; although I well know, they have great store of small Tools, with which they make a ratling in their Budgets.

Let us now proceed to such inferences as our Adversaries make from this competition in Trade.

Some argue thus, the *English* minding Trade more than the *French*, they may come and live among us, and carry away our Commerce.

In my apprehension, there's more fear of their Souldiers coming hither than their Merchants. But suppose more Merchants did come, would that be any worse for us? I have heard several of the greatest Merchants of both Nations say, the more in a place and better, though I confess it is not so for Shopkeepers. But for this they may rest secure, those that know the cheapness of living in *England*, in comparison of these Countries, will

abundantly satisfie them that fear this : Yea, I shall shew hereafter that the *English* would have more reason to fear, that we should come thither, and deprive them of their Trades. Yet to say the truth, I see not that either need fear, were we under the *English*, that either Nation should suffer hereby; seeing all have had freedom that will to remove formerly, and that hath made so small an alteration as to the balance of Trade, that it is inconsiderable. For if I make my calculation right, there is not much difference, of the *English* here, and the *Dutch* in *England*.

Others argue we are Corrivals for Trade, that is the Mistress we both Court, and therefore one must Marry it.

But this is but a toyish Sophism, when men will compare Commerce to a Mistress, that one only can Marry. For 1. The World is wide enough, and the Sea large enough for both Nations to exercise their skill and industry. 2. If we think to betroth all Trade, and ingross it to our selves alone; other Nations will come in and forbid the Banes, as well as *England*, as I shall shew hereafter. 3. If we two could so happily agree, and so settle Commerce as it might perhaps be settled; we might bid fair for carrying it, or at least for retaining it betwixt us. And so far as my short sight can reach, this seems to me the mark aimed at on both sides, by those who have the direction of affairs, which I do not despair to see effected.

Seeing then we are in as much danger, that I say not more, to lose that part of Trade we have, as to gain more by our contesting: I hope all rational men will grant it our Interest, that *England* and we so compound for it, that each of us may have what *Gods* blessing, and justice, and equity gives to eithers industry. And this I am sure was the wisdom of former times. I have shewn it already in part on our side, and could much more largely both for Us and the *English*. In Queen *Elizabeths* time we were not grown up to our present greatness. In King *Jame's* time, who all the World knows was no Martial man, but in his temper as well as motto truly pacifick, the Cautionary Towns that *England* possess in these Countries, were A. 1616. ransomed, and we grew up to that greatness of being an equal match for them in power at Sea. And this the *English* account the great error of Political Interest; although they must needs acknowledg it but fair and honest dealing, King *Charles* the First, that Prince of blessed and immortal memory, seeing how we grew up, not only kept a fair correspondency with us, but having experience how cross Parliaments were to the Court, so that no War could be carried on, did by a fair correspondence keep friendship with us; and not only so, but married his eldest Daughter to the *Prince of Orange* for this reason of State amongst others. For being jealous of this Common-wealth's favouring that party in his Kingdoms, which was then called by the Court *Puritans*, and seeing the growing greatness of this State by Sea, did for these two reasons of State, engage the Prince and this Common-wealth by that Marriage. And this was also the reason of State in *Oliver's* time when Peace was made, that we must
accord

accord for a mutual Trade. How it hath been since we all know, and therefore I need not mention it. And this is the first weapon our enemies use, which you see if we measure rightly, is too short to touch, much less mortally to wound, the truth of that cause which we maintain.

Yet we must do our Adversaries right: the wiser sort of them upon the supposai of equal powers, (as we have formerly been, and which is that I have hitherto spoken of) are for peace, and judg it the Interest of both Nations; but they think our coming under *France* will render *England* so unequal and inferior a match for us, that we cannot in all humane appearance, miss of marrying our beloved Lady *Trade*, and clearly carrying her from our Corrivall. And I confess ingeniously if there be any thing of moment to be said for *France*, 'tis this.

2. Therefore our Adversaries are for *France*, because thereby we should be able to beat *England* out of their Trade, and so become masters of the whole, or the greatest part at least of the Sea-negotiation.

Now because they so much triumph in this, though before the victory; we will examine it thoroughly, and see what probability there is of obtaining the greatest part of Trade by this means.

1. We grant that *England* and this *Republick* being about an equal match at Sea, the accession of *France* would clearly make us an over-match for *England*, if all was true which they suppose.

2. But therein is their mistake, that they take these two things for granted, which are both false. First that these Maritime Provinces should entirely become *French*. And secondly, that all other Nations will stand neutral, so that we shall have no more to do, but *France* and we entirely to deal with *England* alone.

Now how far this is from truth, we shall make abundantly apparent, and by balancing of powers how little probability there is, of these their designs becoming practicable, and such as will effect their desires.

1. Hereby they suppose a War, and such a long and tedious one, as perhaps we may not live to see ended. For we cannot rationally imagine the *English* such tame animals, that they will easily part with their Trade: but must suppose they will set all at stake, before that jewel of the Land be lost. Now let us but calmly consider, how destructive such a War will be to our Trade, and what advantages they have above us of subsisting under a long War, some of which we have before mentioned; and I do believe no wise man will think this our Interest, except there was a greater likelihood of a sudden subduing them, than is rationally to be expected, as we shall presently make apparent. Now on the contrary, if we come under *England*, there is no fear of a War with *France* at Sea, that Kingdom being so much inferior in Maritime power to either of us, and much more to both. And should we have a Land-war with *France*, yet that is more eligible for us than one by Sea, in the opinion of all wise men, as we have formerly shewn, and shall have occasion hereafter more fully.

2. A War with *England* being supposed, as it must, (for we must either say we can and will have the Trade alone, or the greatest part thereof *invisis Anglis*, or we say nothing to the purpose) the readiest way to see what probability there is for conquering them, and consequently carrying the Trade; will be first by balancing of powers, and then by some other Considerations. The former of these we shall do with respect to *Zealand*, and then with respect to other Nations.

For the first it must be considered that *Zealand* hath expressly declared *That they will not come under France, but that if they cannot defend themselves, they will then submit to England.* It is true (as I have said) it is the interest of these maritime Provinces to keep their League; but if their enemies Sword cuts it asunder, and they will not venture the loss of their Religion and Liberty under *France*, who shall hinder them? They are free surely to dispose of themselves as well as *Utrecht*, or the other Provinces. For in coordinate Powers, when their confederacy is broken, either by themselves or their enemies; each are at liberty, and in their former freedom, to dispose of themselves, as they shall think fit. And though *Friesland* hath not declared, so that if they should come to the utmost extremity, we know not but they might happily incline to *England* also; yet because that is uncertain, we will be liberal in granting our Adversaries even that which they cannot prove, and take to our selves only that we can, and so proceed upon infallible grounds.

Nor let any one here stop me, and say that in taking it for granted that *Zealand* will be *English*, I may be mistaken, for they may beat off their enemies and defend themselves. I grant it, although by the way let me say it, I see but little likelihood of that; for of above 100 Companies they pay, there is as yet not one in their principallest Islands (though how it comes so, becomes not me to enquire) but the thing is to me matter of admiration. But I will shew you how I reason; not from the War, that *England* will conquer *Zealand*, nor from the Agreement betwixt the two Crowns, which yet is generally said brings us under that: but upon supposal that we are tired out with the War, and come to treat with our enemies (for I hope no man is so mad, as to think these Provinces will as *Utrecht*, call them in, and after make what terms we can get, but treat with them with our weapons in our hands, *Zealand*s not only *Declaration*, but *Inclination* carries them for *England*. So that which way soever we take conquest by our enemies, their disposing of us, or our own disposal of our selves, *Zealand* is still *English*. So that upon the supposition of inability to defend our selves, we are morally certain, that *Zealand* will fall to *England*: and our Adversaries uncertain, that *Holland* and *Friesland* will choose *France*. But we will grant them all they can reasonably desire, *viz.* that these two Provinces make such a choice, and thereupon proceed to the balancing of Powers.

Now in Naval strength, *Zealand* hath the proportion of a sixth part in
this

this Republick; there being five Admiralties, wherein *Amsterdam* hath a double rate, we will suppose any number for a Fleet greater or less to be set out by them. For Example, the States equip a Fleet of 72 Sail herein.

The Admiralty of	}	<i>Rotterdam</i> and the <i>Mase</i> is	12
		<i>Amsterdam</i>	24
		<i>North-Holland</i>	12
		<i>Zealand</i>	12
		<i>Frieslvd</i>	12

72

Yea in the last War I find in the List A. 1666. (which by the way, I wonder any Admiralties should publish, and perceive there is none now) that *Zealand*, was a greater share than *Friesland* both in Ships and Men.

Zealand 15 Ships. 676 Canon. 2268 Seamen. 807 Soldiers.

Friesland 11 ——— 638 ——— 2748 ——— 260 ———

Although I know in the *quot.*s or Tax to the publick, *Friesland* is more: but that is because of their greater share in the Land, which is a certain Revenue, and Trade only a Contingencie. In strength then at Sea we see, that *Zealand* at least ballances *Friesland* if not more should that Province prove *French*, and this is sufficient for my present purpose.

Now let us look abroad, and we shall as clearly find, that *Spain* comes into the *English* Scale. For which way soever *France* takes, *Spain* must take the contrary. Nay in this case *Spain* is as much concerned as *England*. For if *France* have these Provinces entirely, how shall they alone be able to bring home their *American* Treasure? They know to their sorrow, what they have formerly lost by the *Dutch* taking their Plate-fleets; and what an extraordinary charge & hazard they had to defend them. And shall we not then think, that they will rather venture to the utmost with the *English*; than let us intercept their Treasure, and after some years be master of their Mines? It is true, if I was led as the world is usually, to judge by news, which hath been for some months, that *Spain* and *England* were breaking, all this was frivolous; but I make my measures from reasons of State, which tells me, that they will not, because they must not, and they must not, because it is their mutual Interest, and it is their Interest, because otherwise they cannot ballance *France*, but will both in time be ruined. So then you see clearly, that upon supposition that *Holland* be *French*, it will be *England* and *Spain* against *France* and *Holland*, and so we are again ballanced.

We are thus far upon sure grounds, we shall now proceed to that which is not much less certain, if we rightly consider. And that is, that *Denmark* in all probability will become also our Enemies, if we take *France* so far for our Friends, as to make him our Master. Let us but well observe a few fundamental *Maximes of State*, which every nation according to their Interest frame for their Government, and it will much help us to make a
rights:

right judgment in all such cases. Now this is one of that Kingdoms, *Not to suffer any one to be absolute Sovereign of Trade and Navigation, if they can possibly prevent it.* For the Revenues of that Crown mostly consisting of Toll in the *Sound*; we cannot imagine the *Danes* such dullards, but they know who ever is so, will soon open that passage, and make it as free as the water it self between the *North and Baltrick Seas*. And then the King may sit in's house at *Gluckstadt*, and take toll of Boats that pass in the *Elve*, instead of *Copenhagen*, and his Castle of *Croneburgh*, where now he takes toll of all Ships in the *Sound*.

I foresee it will be said, that *Sweden* will ballance *Denmark*, if that should be so. But see then what work this *Trade* will make in the world. And this is wholly uncertain: nay, Interest will rather incline to the contrary. For though *Sweden* be none of the richest in Trade, yet have they their share to lose as well as the rest. And the Revenues of that Crown consisting much in Copper, (which hath occasioned their Armies spoiling all the Mines of that Metal in *Germany*, and wheresoever they could, on purpose to enhance their own) they know very well that pains might have been spared, if Commerce should have an absolute Monarch; and that, with all the *Chymistry* that they can use, they shall not be able to extract Silver and Gold out of that Metal, when one only Chapman comes to the market. Besides their *Bremish* and other Territories on this side the *Baltick*, will soon lie a bleeding they know, if *France's* Sword comes to wound the Roman Eagle, and his Race. It may be some may say, the *Dane* dares not for fear of losing that we are indebted to him. But who knows not, that it is better to lose a part, than the whole. And if blows be a way of paying of debts, we may happily have *Portugal* so to pay us.

3. Having thus ballanced the apparent strength of both sides, we shall proceed to some other considerations, concerning the same. For it is not enough to consider power absolutely, but also the management thereof; for less powers well managed, are usually prevalent above greater. And herein are many things, which in my judgment, were we an over-match for them, which you see is not so, would render our ruining their Naval power, and consequently their Traffick impracticable. As 1. supposing we are under *France*, shall their whole Fleet constantly be here, and leave the *French* Coast naked, or shall they from thence come to joyn with us for our Sea expeditions? If the former, *France* is subject continually to be molested and diverted from *England*; and if the later to be intercepted by reason of their situation. 2. Who shall have the direction of Naval affairs, is to me very considerable. Whether the *French* alone, or conjointly with the *Dutch*; for that the later only should be instructed, is not to be imagined. The former way is liable to miscarry through unskillfulness, the later through jealousies and dissentions. 3. Where shall Marriners be had for our Fleets? Shall the *French* press here as in their own Kingdom? If so, I foresee, we shall soon lose our Seamen. Or shall they only use

Volunteers? Then the number will be small, because the *French* pay is not great. I might mention other particulars, as the *French* and *Dutch* Officers discord. The manner of Payments, and from whence, &c. But these are enow to shew us, that which way soever we look, there's nothing but difficulty and danger stares us in the face.

4. But we have yet that which is more momentous, and that is, the situation of *Great Britain*. For could we knock their men in the head, as easily as our *Borinne's* their Eggs; and sink their Ships as if they were shells; yet we cannot possibly remove the Island. Which is, 1. Not only nigh unto us, but over against us, so that we cannot look out, but we are upon them. 2. So situated, that should we bear them and their Associates, (which is not easie in equal powers) they can still manage a War destructive against us. And what good will it do any but the envious, to ruine others, if they be ruined themselves? For with a few Ships in the Chanel, wherein they have Harbours all along, to go in and out at pleasure; they will force us continually to sail with great Convoys, or we shall be forced to fall into their hands. And the like may be said of the Northern passage by the *Orcades*, where a few Ships will obstruct our Trade. Now how great a prejudice this is to Traffick, I leave all knowing men to judge. For by this means no single Ships, nor small numbers can sail. Restraint will be laid upon going out but in great Fleets, and with sufficient Convoys. Many will be necessitated to lie idle, and at great expences to wait for their Company, whilst they could sometimes have performed their voyage. And Merchants lose particular designs, which are usually the greatest profit, to such as are able rightly to manage them. 3. In storms and tempests we shall be frequently forced into their Harbours, and so fall as a prey into their mouths.

5. *Britain* and *Ireland* being *Islands*, are not easily invaded, and so diverted by a Land War, but that they may solely attend to a Maritime, when they are once engaged therein. Whereas *France* being on the Continent, is subject to invasion from *Spain* on several sides. Which was one reason, why our Ancestors preferred the guardianship of *England*, before that of *France*.

6. *Tangier* in the mouth of the *Streights*, will be no small prejudice to our *Mediterranean* Trade. Which if the mould or harbour can be made firm, will prove of great concernment to the *English* Crown, and a strong curb to all their Enemies Traffick. And here I might adde, *Cadiz*, and all the Coast of *Spain*; for if we be *French*, no wise man (I think) will doubt, but we shall have *Spain* our Enemies again.

And these things I think are abundantly sufficient to dismount our Adversaries confidence, of carrying away the Trade from *England*, if we should come under the Power of *France*.

3. Another grand Argument against us is, that we are more likely to enjoy Peace under *France* than *England*.

Peace (I confess) is an invaluable blessing. How many and great miseries doth it free us from! Bloodshed, violence to our Persons, and Estates, inquietness, and almost all manner of troubles. How many and great mercies doth Peace bring along with it! It is both the Mother that bears, and the Nurse that brings up all our temporal Blessings. It gives us mercies, the freedom of enjoying them, and sweetens their enjoyment. It contains liberty, plenty, equity, tranquility, pleasure and safety. So that he was a mad man that should not chuse Peace. But I fear our coming under *France*, is neither the way to procure Peace, nor the means to preserve it. And that we by so doing, shall but have *Ixions* fate in the Fable, embrace a cloudy and tempestuous War, instead of the fair and beloved *Juno* of Peace.

1. Let it be considered; that if we have Peace by Land, we have War by Sea: which is to leap out of the frying-pan into the fire. It is an old and a good political axiom, *Ex duobus malis minus est eligendum*; Theological it was never, for in Divinity, *Nullum malum est eligendum*. Now if we rightly measure our Interest, we shall find a Land War much more eligible for us upon many accounts, which I need not here to mention, they being easily imagined by all wise men. For should it be granted, that for the present the two Crowns accord and we have Peace: it will either be such a one as will ruine us, or cannot be lasting to be sure; but in a very few years will necessarily come to the ballance I have mentioned of *Spain* and *England* against *France* and *Holland*.

2. Let us therefore examine their grounds; that so we may see before us, and not run our selves blindfold into destruction. Which so far as I can, discern are these four. *The Power and Prevalency of his Arms. His Treasure to maintain them. His Neerness to us. And his Allies.*

First for the *Power and Prevalency of his Arms*. 1. It is true his numbers are great, both in Arms and in the Kingdom of *France*. The great advantages he hath, by the largeness, compactness, situation, and soil of his Dominions; the infinite number of Nobility and Gentry for Cavalry, and the populousness of his Cities and Provinces for Infantry, which capacitate him above all the Princes of *Europe*, to enlarge his Empire; I well know, and willingly grant.

But what relates to the Kingdom of *France* concerns not us *Netherlanders* in this case farther than as to his Arms and Power to defend us. Now in my reason the greater power in the *Sovereign*, the less liberty in the *Subject*, as we have already shewn. So that the more numerous his Armies, and so much the worse. Doth not *France* groan under this burden, and shall we desire to do so, or help to ease them by bearing part thereof on our backs? If we be so kind, I dare engage we may have it all, and a thousand thanks from the Kingdom. Which is so wearied with it, that above one half of them (if my intelligence greatly deceive me not) would rejoyce to see it lessened, though it were with some loss to the honor of the Nation. But because I write not to be known, but to better the world, and with

my bucket of water to help to quench the **Flames**, that threaten destruction to the Protestant Interest; I shall desire all intelligent persons to enquire of those that understand *France*, or have come lately thence; and then let them consider if their condition be desirable. If a numerous Army lies quartered upon us, shall we not both be kept under by them, and eaten up of them? And although they be paid in the Kings name, yet must not we find a share of the Money? I never yet read or heard of any wise people, that desired their Prince so potent, for fear he should oppress them. A due Mediocrity hath always been counted best. Let any one read the *Greek* and *Roman* Historians, or any others that are wisely writ: and he shall find, if he duly observe, that the *Princes Potency hath always been the Peoples Jealousie*.

2. It is also true, that he hath been successful in his Arms against us, beyond most mens imaginations, and perhaps even his own hopes and expectations. But if all things be rightly considered, it is no such wonder as the world makes it. Our Wars by Sea; our intestine Divisions; the cowardise of some; the corruption of many; and our multiplicity of Garrisons, whereby our Forces were so parcell'd, that fighting severally they were easily vanquished; together with several other causes which concurr'd under the hand of *Divine Justice*, makes it no wonderment to wise and considerate men. Nor is it any new thing in the world, but that which hath befallen most of the Nations in *Europe*, as all their Histories abundantly witness.

3. Nor will this evince our defence. For it hath often been experimented, that those that have won much in a little time, have lost it again in less. How did the same *French* Nation under *Charles* the 8. over-run most part of *Italy* in a little time, and quickly lost it, as the many Historians of both Nations relate! And in our days, how did the *Swede* like lightning pass through *Poland*, which was quickly extinct and came to nothing! And so may this (if it please God, and we manage our work wisely) like a Thunder-clap and sudden flash of *Lightning*, afright and astonish us, more than hurt us, as I shall shew hereafter.

4. If *France* goes on, the world grows so jealous of their greatness, that they may possible have work enough; when their hand is against every one, and every one against them; and then where shall be our peace and defence? It is known by all that know former times, how in the *Roman* Monarchy when they were distressed at home, they still called their Forces from abroad, and left their conquered Provinces to shift for themselves, as I might instance in *Spain*, *France*, *England*, and many others both Eastern and Western. And indeed it alway is thus; so that should *France* be fallen into by *Spain*, or *England*, or the *Empire*, or *Italy*, or other several of these joyntly, or should they fall into Civil Wars, which are more frequent there than any, yea I think I may say all the Kingdoms in *Europe*; in what condition should we then be? Truly I will tell you, I think fighting

with the *French*, and more eager to be rid of them, than many are now to receive them. If any one say, but would you have us entertain the *English*? I say no, but preserve our own freedom by complying with them as I shall shew hereafter.

5. If we will espouse all the quarrels of *France* we may possibly have more than enow, and such as may prove our ruine, rather than safety and security. Our Marriners have their Wars by Sea, our Citizens & Souldiers by Land. Our Merchants Trade to pay their money, and all to raise *France* to the Universal *Monarchy*, to the ruine of the Reformed Religion, and also the greatest part of Christendom. And though now his friends be many, yet if he once comes to receive a check, his enemies will be more.

6. I see no need we have to fear all his power and prevalencie, if we will do our duty, and quit our selves as men for our Country. And if we do, upon our friendship with the Crown of *England*, we may have Souldiers enow out of those three Kingdoms, which are as good Infantry surely as *French*, by their own *Historians* Confession, and it is Foot we want (if any) for the defence of our Garrisons. And besides that they are not so likely to be remanded, as those of *France*, those Kingdoms being Islands, less liable to invasion, and less likely to be engaged in Forein, or to be involved in Domestick Wars.

Secondly, for his treasure it cannot be denied to be very great. But this is rather against, than for our Adversaries. For, *the richer the Sovereign, the poorer the Subject*. And I never knew any people yet, that desired to have their Prince so rich, especially when it comes out of their own pockets. I will not meddle with the dispute of the *Greeks Ostracisme*, nor that of Politicians, whether poverty or riches in the Sovereign be better for the subject. A due mean wise men have always accounted best. When neither the Prince may be jealous of his people for their *Riches*, nor they of him for his *Treasures*; but that they may mutually depend on each other, for the good of the whole. For as it is difficult to determine, what the Magistrate may not demand, in case of necessity; so it is easie to conclude, that he ought not to impoverish his people when there is none, and make himself rich by their ruines. That being tollerable, but this intollerable oppression.

Nor is it imaginable, that he will make *France* poor, to make us rich. Nor is it credible that if they remain poor, we shall remain rich. For in all Princes there remain some jealousies of a conquered people, that they may, upon some revolution of affairs or other, revolt. And therefore it is their usual practice, by all ways possible to drain them, and draw their Riches home; as the *Romans* into *Italy*, and other Conquerors their own Kingdoms; either by bringing it into their own Treasuries, or Native Subjects purses, or rather both, that so they may command it upon all occasions.

Thirdly, for their nearness unto us, we know it too well. And if the
subdued

subdued Provinces remain in their hands, shall find what it is to have such neighbours. But otherwise *England* is nearer us than *France*, and can easier come to our assistance. For the *French* have not only a long march, but through part of the Empire, which is their enemy, and so liable to obstruction. As to the Prince of *Liege* (or Archbishop of *Colen*) *Duke of Newburgh* and others that have permitted this passage, they may pay dear enough for it hereafter, as their subjects are paying for it at present, even to the *French* themselves. Who are so weary of their Company, that I perswade my self, they will be the first that will endeavour, to drive them out, when they shall find an opportunity.

But we are not afraid of all our Adversaries weapons, and therefore will enforce their Argument, by supposing all they can desire; That *France* will keep these conquered Provinces, and in all probability make new acquets, by subduing of the *Spanish Netherlands*. So that if we be not subject to him, we shall never be at quiet, but they will continually be as Thorns in our sides.

1. And vvhy may vve not as vvell suppose, that if vve be under him, vve shall never be at rest for others? For no Potentate in Christendom hath more jealous eyes upon him, nor likelier to be continually imployed in Wars. Now vvhat vvill changing help us, if vve better not our condition? For we may easily foresee, that if vve come under *France*, vve shall have *England* and *Spain* against us by Sea (as vve have said) and the *German*s and *Spanish* Provinces by Land, and so shall be in the same condition, though not by the same enemies, that vve are now; ground like Corn betwixt the Mill-stones. Yea it is more than probable, that knowing the ticklish condition and mutinous temper of the *French* Nation, he vvill bring his Wars into these Countries and their confines, and so vve shall again become the Cock-pit of War for all *Europe*.

2. I doubt not but he vvill attacque the *Spanish* Provinces and seek to connect them vvith his conquests, and then incorporate all vvith *France*. But it is certain vvhat time this may require before they be all under his power. We know not the Articles between the two Crowns, nor are vve sure that *England* and *Augria* vvill see this vvork. Many things may fall out, vvich no mans eye can foresee. The King of *France* is mortal and may die, and the *Dauphin* young and so incapable to carry on such mighty designs. Or he may meet vvith a check in his enterprises, and be stopt in his further progress of glory. *France* is harrast, and vveary of Wars, may fall to their former mutinies. The King of *Spain* may grow more potent. *England*, *Sweden*, and the *Cantons of Switzerland* may think themselves concerned, as vvell as the *Empire* and *Spain*, to stop the growing greatness of *France*. The *Spanish* may divert him in *Catalonia* and else-where. Sicknes and mortality may seize upon his Armies. Factions in his court, discontents in the Country, tumults in his Kingdom, and many other Accidents may happen, to call him off us, or at least necessitate him to give us reasonable

reasonable conditions, and confine him to his own Kingdom. So that 'tis madness to avoid a present mischief, to run our selves upon certain ruine.

3. If we had the friendship of *England*, we might soon be in a capacity to defend our selves against *France*, and need not fear the power of their Arms. I do not say that we alone are able to recover at present what we have lost, without the assistance of others: But that these remaining Provinces are able to defend themselves, and either let go the other, or in time possibly regain them, as we shall shew hereafter.

Fourthly, For his *Allies*, they need not fright us. For all friendship of the World, and especially publick, proves often times like winter brooks, which run freely when we have least need of them, but fail us in drought when we want their Water. If the fortunes of *France* should once decline, we should see those that now adore them, readily renounce this their idolatry, and not only confess their former fault, but help to turn the *Wheel* about, and bring them under whom they now exalt.

And thus we see what small grounds there are of enjoying such great Peace under *France*, as our Adversaries flatter themselves withal, and would perswade the World of; which will never find credit with wise men, who are used to judg by Reasons of State, and not by the vain arguments of fancy.

4. The fourth Argument for *France* is, their having the *upper Provinces* already, which are of such concernment to the *Nether*, that they affirm we cannot want them, and therefore we must call in *France* that he may have them all, that so they may be joynd under one *Head*.

We cannot want them say they. 1. For our *Security*, and 2. for our *Commerce*.

Let us therefore examine these things, and having so done, we shall give a release to your patience in this great Argument of our Adversaries concerning *Trade*.

First that we cannot want them for our *Security*, is apparantly false. Nay upon a *Politick account* we had better part with them, though not in point of *Honour* and *Religion*.

1. They were a continual charge to those inferior *Provinces*, which yet was willingly born, in regard of their being an out Sconse to us, which many supposed sufficiently strong for our defence. Which yet others have always doubted of, and now we find they had sufficient reason. Seeing then some of them willingly deserted us, and others slightly defended themselves, and us consequently, and thus laid us open to the invasion of our enemies: if we let them go, and they suffer thereby, they may thank themselves, and we must otherwise secure our Country.

2. I wonder men should think they can secure us, when we see the contrary by our experience. Nay indeed this was the great mistake that had like to have ruined us all. For we relying on them, was unprepared for our own defence, whereby the whole was greatly endangered. Yea so greatly,

greatly, that if the *French* had fallen into *Holland*, when they came to *Utrecht*, I tremble to think what work they might have made, amongst us.

3. It was apparent that the boundaries of the Common-wealth was too great, and our Garrisons too many to defend against such powerful Armies. Which at the same time are not only Masters of the Field, but able to assault what places they please. This War being far different from our former with *Spain* (or less Potentates) wherein we had an Army to ballance theirs, for relief of such Garrisons as were at any time attackt by them. And this the *Author of the Interest of Holland*, hath long since well observed, and experience now shews us. Wherein I dare be his second, against any combatants that dare encounter him.

4. Let any man but recount our Garrisons with their greatness, and compute what number of men is requisite for their defence, and he will soon see, whether I have not clear reason on my side. I shall not now stand to do that, though if any be obstinate, I can do it sufficiently to convince him: that though the *States* in times of Peace maintain 60000, and in this War above 100000 men by Land; yet were they not half enow to defend all our Garrisons, and keep an Army in the Field to relieve them. And therefore I never expected any better success of the War, than now we see; though my judgment was entertained by many with merriment, and of others with fears it might prove Prophetical. For we must either have dismantled most of the weakest, and supplied a few of most consequence for a long resistance; or it was never likely it should be otherwise than it is; it being always found true by experience, that *multiplicity of weak powers prove none against the strong*, for, *dum singuli pugnant, universi vincuntur*. And therefore we see our enemies had the wisdom to wave *Maastricht*, that was provided with men to give them work; and fell upon such places, as they either knew their money had, or their Swords could most easily conquer.

5. Many of our outmost Garrisons lying in a champaign Country, cannot be relieved without a powerful Army of Cavalry. And these Countries are very uncapable many ways both for keeping and marching great numbers of Horse. In these lower Provinces Land being so dear, and more profitable for Cows than Horses; and so many great Rivers, which cannot be past with Bridges, except we make them of Boats continually, is sufficient demonstration that they cannot be here. And in the upper Provinces there is no forage for such a body of Horse, as we must have if we will relieve our outmost Garrisons. And this those that know them know: Let us from *Bergen op Zoom* pass along the Coast of *Brabant* by *Breda* and our other Garrisons even as far as *Maastricht*, and from thence back to the *Buss* which is the greatest part of the open Country we have (for *Gelderland*, *Utrecht* and *Overysel* are full of Rivers) and we shall find that which belongs to us, inconsiderable for this purpose; the greatest part of that Country being heath and barren ground.

I know well that most of the Cities lie upon Rivers, but I know also and so do all of ordinary understanding, that a Fort on either side commands them, and so bars our passage by water to them.

But let us instance in one for all. I wish mine adversaries would shew us any way to relieve *Maestrecht* if it should be assaulted and distressed by the *French*. I mean that it is practicable, for we are not now discoursing of *Mathematical powers*, which demonstrate motions as swift as the Sun's, and the plucking up Oaks with a single hair, and such like curiosities that can never be done; but of *Martial powers*, which are not for speculative notions, but practical performances.

6. Let us but consider who hath paid those great Armies we have constantly kept, and must pay many more both Foot and Horse (which are much more chargeable) that we must keep, if we will defend these out-Provinces against powerful enemies; and we shall soon see that we must pay very dear for their uncertain and weak defence of us. For this purpose I shall satisfy the curious with inserting the proportion of Taxes which each Province pays to the Publick for the Armies and other expenses; whereby it will appear that the *quota* of these superior Provinces, *Gelderland*, *Over-Iffel*, and *Utrecht* (which the *French* now possess) is very inconsiderable, wherein also they have often been behind, and will be much less now able to pay it, being so much impoverished.

<i>Gelderland</i>	5	12	3
<i>Utrecht</i>	5	16	7 and one third.
<i>Over-Iffel</i>	3	11	5
<i>Holland</i>	58	6	2 and a quarter.
<i>Zealand</i>	9	3	8
<i>Friesland</i>	11	13	2 and a third.
<i>Groning</i>	5	16	7 and one third.

7. If they be regained, we must pay for it, they being now under our enemies. And what an infinite of blood and treasure will that cost, if our enemy will not quit them on reasonable terms in treaty, I leave any man to judge.

8. If we rightly consider, great Territories are for Kings, small only fit for Common-wealths. This we may observe in the Histories of former times, in the *Grecian* Republicks and their neighbour Kingdoms. For the *Roman* was mixt of *Monarchy* and *Aristocracie*, by their great power of their *Consuls* ruling as Monarchs by their turns, and especially in dangers by *Dictators*. Yea our own experience hath shown us this in the neighbouring Kingdoms. But what shall I say, many men are like the Judges Statues at *Thebes*, have their eyes blinded and hands lamed, though not for Justice but for Judgment, they can neither see nor feel before them. In 59 being then in *England*, in some Gentlemens Company, where there were some zealous Republicans, and I from History and observation shewing

shewing them, that in great Dominions, especially where there are many Nobility, a Common-wealth could never stand long; that if there, it must be from the City of *London*, managing it as *Rome* had done, and not as they went to work, and several other things, shewing the impracticableness of their notions, (which I have reason to remember, for I was complained of to *Lambert*, & was in danger of being called before the *Council of State*) In the year 60. some of them took me for half a Prophet, and so perhaps may some hereafter, for what I shall now say: *That if we affect great Territories by Land, we shall lose all.* It is our Sea affairs, that we are set for by our Country, made for by our genius, and fit for, especially, by our imployment. And we may as well think to turn our Rivers, as change these things, nay, indeed, if we could, it would quickly turn to our destruction: Traffick by Sea, as I formerly have shown, being our chief secular interest.

But I foresee what will here be said, that a weak defence is better than none, and how all these *Inferior Provinces* be otherwise secured.

And it is very true indeed, *better a weak wall, than none at all.* And if we could not build a stronger, and at less charges, and with far less cost for reparation and defence against the violent storms of our enemies (for none can secure us against Heaven) we should be ashamed to have thrown down the old, which (in my judgment) is by the former Considerations levelled with the ground. For as it is folly, to pull down before we consider how to build better, so we must take heed that therein we commit not those errors which many wise men (though that was none of their wisdom) have frequently (as I have often observed) fallen into in their building. *To bestow as much in piecing and patching an old house, as would build a new one far stronger and better: and when they have built either old or new, so find several inconveniences therein, which a provident fore-sight might have prevented.* As the ingenious Mathematician *Dr. Wren* hath demonstrated (as I mean) in *England*, that they had better build *S. Pauls* in *London* anew, than repair the old. So I think I am able to demonstrate, that we had better make a new defence for these inferior Provinces, than that of the superior. But it must be well considered of, lest we find inconveniences therein afterwards. And as in *Architecture* I pleasantly play with dice and cards alone (which others do in company) making my walls of the former, and floors and covering of the latter, to see the conveniences and inconveniences therein, better than in plain figures; and especially to demonstrate the same to others that will advise with me therein, and are no Mathematicians: so here I must confess I have seriously pulled down and set up several defences for us which are too long to relate. But I will briefly touch of some things, which are sufficient (I think) to silence mine Adversaries.

There are 5 or 6 ways of Natural Fortification & defence of a Country.

Seas for Islands, which are the best. For though they are hereby incapacitated to enlarge their Empire abroad, being by Sea as it were confined to home; yet have they great advantages thereby, not only of

Maritime Negotiation, but also security from Invasion. So that they are at small charges for maintaining Armies; which those that live on Continents, must constantly do for their defence: otherwise the door stands open for the first that comes to enter in and take possession.

Great Mountains that are unpassable for Armies, or such passes as the famous *Thermopyles*, which are easily defended, and these are next to Seas the best defence.

Vast Wilderesses where Armies can have no Provision to march, but what they carry along with them, as in *Africa*.

Peninsular Countries, which are easily retrencht within lines of security, as the famous Wall in the North of *England*, first made by *Agricola*, *Nero's* General there, repaired by *Hadrian*, and after by *Severus* against the *Picts*, the ruines whereof are still apparent. And *Scotland* often also against *England* hath thus retrencht themselves, even in our days with great safety against the *English* Army; which if they had had the wisdom to have kept within, they had saved themselves and the Kingdom: but their adventurous-folly in forsaking them, was dearly paid for by the loss of both.

Great Rivers which cannot easily be past. As *Euphrates* in the *East*, and the *Rhine* in the *West*, defended those Nations beyond them, from the great power of the *Romans*.

And lastly inundations by Water, marsh and boggy grounds, &c.

I might be large in examples of all these in several Kingdoms of the World; and also in the wonderful Providence of God, who hereby sets bounds and limits to the mighty *Nimrod*s of the World, saying unto them by the voice of Nature as to the great Seas and Waters, *hitherto shall ye go and no further*: but I will confine my self to our own Country.

Now these Provinces if we consider them aright, are naturally fortified most of these ways. Not by Mountains, for we live in a level Country; nor by Defarts and barren Wilderesses, for we have a fruitful Land, like *Canaan* flowing with milk and hony. But all the other ways we are defensible; so that if we can but defend our selves by Sea, and keep that for our Commerce; we need not fear all our Enemies by Land. We have the Sea to guard us below, mighty Rivers not only within, but on both sides these Provinces to defend us; we are either Islands as *Zealand*; or peninsular as *Friesland* and *Groenigen* together, and *Holland* and *Utrecht*, by reason of the Sea and great Rivers that almost surround them. And let it come to the utmost extremity, we can by water drown our Enemies, and save our selves in our Cities. So that they that talk of conquering us, must either be fools, or ignorant of the Country; and those that fear to be Conquered, pusillanimous and frighted with vain bravadoes.

But we will be a little more particular, in running over briefly several Provinces.

Zealand consisting wholly of Islands, is thereby well fortified, and the Inhabi-

Inhabitantss so used to the Water, that they are not easily mastered therein *Friesland* and *Gronningen* together, are alin ost surrounded with the *North* and *South Seas*, together with the River *Emm*; and scarce accessible by Land in regard of marish or boggy grounds, if *Coverden* and some other strong places on the passes be kept.

Holland will prove the greatest difficulty, and of most consequence; that Province being the Head and Heart of this Republick. For this end I must suppose that we must have part of the Province of *Utrecht*, which we must either regain by Treaty, or by strength let it cost what it will, both for our Communicarion, and future safety. And then we have these two again almost environed with the *North* and *South Seas* and several branches of the *Rhine* and *Mees*. Only one neck of ground between the *Leck* and *South Seas* of 5 or 6 miles, where a River might be cut to carry water from the former, as something higher, into the latter; from between *Viana* and *Twael*, from whence downwards the River is deep, and hath the Tyde flowing up by *Hauten*, *Heer*, *Melis waert*, *Melaeten*, and so along the low Grounds to *Pjenborch* in the River *Eem* to the *South Sea*. Which will make the whole adjacent Country being low, stagnate with water, and so defend these two Provinces from the Enemies incursions. And the rest are done to our hands, by the several foldings of the Arms of those two great Rivers, the *Rhine* and the *Mase*, whose several denominations I need not mention nor the places where; these being sufficiently known to those that know these Countries.

But oh *Utrecht*! *Utrecht*! I foresee there will so much depend upon that one City, that I fear the greatest Affairs of *Europe* will hang and turn upon that single hinge. I know we flatter our selves they will part with it, and I wish we may not be deceived; but I fear far other things, not so much from what I have said, as from other Reasons of State. But if any will ask what those are: I say *Ho-la*, I am so far from publishing them, that if the shirt on my back knew the thoughts of my heart herein, it should be my first work to burn it.

But our Adversaries will fight it out to the stump; both of their strength and weapons. They say the *French* in the superior Provinces hath the command of our Rivers, and so will be able to ruine our Trade.

Truly I am tired with this long discourse of Trade, and therefore for a divertisment I will tell you a short and pleasant story. Upon a time King *James* of Great Britain was angry with the City of *London*, and sent for some of the Aldermen and Common Council, whom he first chid, and then threatned that He would take away their *Charters*, spoil them of their Priviledges, and ruine the City, that he would. And old Fox that stood behind, perceiving the King in a passion, and the rest of the *Ruffs* in a silent fright, pretended deafness; and industriously that his Majesty might observe him, required first of one, and then of another, *Is't hat says his Majesty? what? Doth he say he will turn the River of Thames?*

Theames? The King perceiving it, would needs know what he said, and being told, burst out into a laughter, & swore in his Scottish dialect he was *afause loune*, and packt them away. So let me merrily ask mine Adversaries one after another. What? will the King of *France* turn the *Rhine*? will he turn the *Maes*? Will he cut off the Arms of those mighty Rivers? Or will he Rivuletise them into more hundred furrows than *Historinns* tells us *Cyrus* did *Gyades* when the went to take *Babylan*? Will he chastise the South Sea, and fetter it, as *Xerxes* did the *Hellepont*, making *Harderwick* and *Hoor* as *Sessus* and *Abydus* of old, now the strong Castles the *Turks* have made in the *Dardaanelis*? Let the old rich Merchants that have more money to lose than I, fear that, I do not. And except he can, so long as we keep the mouth of the Rivers where they exonerate themselves into the Sea; let the *French* keep them above, and see what they can make of them.

But to be serious. I had thought our Trading had been in Ships at Sea especially, and not with Boats in Rivers. And that it is these inferior Provinces, and our Sea Traffick that *France* aims at; though in regard of our Naval strength, he comes down upon us by Land; thinking that way to carry the Country. For his stopping the Boats passing up and down the *Rhine* and *Maes*, there is no fear if we rightly consider, that that will ruine the *French* themselves more than us. In regard we can subsist without this, and they cannot. We have Corn in abundance from *Dantzick* and other places, with which we supply others in want: but they must have theirs from above, by these Rivers. How can we think that he should stop the Commerce betwixt *Germany* and these Countries by the *Rhine*; and they not stop his Provisions at *Collen* and other places? Or that he intercept the Traffick by the *Maes*; and *Leige*, or at least *Namurs* under the *Spanis*, should not prohibit his supplies from *France*? There are two ways of dealing with Enemies. If small to beat them, if great to pine them. They dare not but leave a considerable Army in those Provinces, for fear of the former; and they must be supplied from abroad, for fear of the latter. Now if they be not from us beneath, they must be by these from above; for these Provinces alone are not able to provide for them; and why then should we trouble our selves with such fantastical Fears? Were it not that I thought things sufficient, and that I have been already so prolix in this Argument; I would shew at large that those above depend on us for our Money and Commodities, more than we on them for theirs. But to do this satisfactorily, would be a large discourse, and therefore I dismiss it, at least for the present.

Our Adversaries having thus spent their Cannon upon us ineffectually, will needs try a volly of small shot: That we must have these our Provinces, for the quartering our Army, that so our Cities may be free from their disturbance in Trade.

But this reaches us not. For we have out Garrisons enough upon the Confines of these inferiour Provinces, as *Sluys*, *Bergen*, *op Zoom*, *Breda*,
Buffs.

Buffs, &c. well known, that are of less Trade, and capable to quarter 100000 men if need was, as I can easily make apparent. Nor do I imagine Soldiers prejudicial to any trading City, if they be not too numerous; but rather helpful, by the Excise they pay, the work when off the watch they cheaply perform, the spending their money with the poorer sort, and several other ways which might be mentioned.

And thus you see in point of profit, or worldly Interest, that we can want the superiour Provinces, (excepting the City of *Utrecht*, and a little of the Circumjacent Country) yea had better quit them upon several accounts; and though our boundaries be less, yet if we be more compact and stronger, that will abundantly compensate our greatness: besides the vast expence which is spared thereby, not only of Blood, but treasure, in maintaining constantly so great an Army as we must, if we will recover and defend them. The only advantage that I can foresee by them is, to have bad Neighbours further off: but whether that will Countervail the cost, may be a question to others, but it is none to me.

But if we value our honour at so high a rate, and will pay so dear for it, that if the *French* will not part with them upon fair terms, we will wage war for them; I heartily wish we never repent it. For I have observed that *Common-wealths are fitter for self defence, and Kingdoms for conquests*. Which is shadowed out by the *Venetian* Statue, holding a Shield in the right hand: that some unskilful Travellers condemn, as an error in the Statuary. Whose yet ambitious swerving from this *Common-wealths* maxim, cost them very dear: and seeing it is the nearest parallel to our case, I know, I shall briefly relate it, because I think it may be useful for us. The *Venetians* having long warred with the *Genovese* at Sea, afterwards cast an ambitious eye on the Continent of *Italy*, and by one means or other (too long to relate) became Masters of many considerable places. This made them envied by their neighbouring Monarchs, who entred at *Cambray* A. 1508 into a league to war with them. *Maximilian* the Emperor, first of that name, recovered *Padua*, *Vincentia*, *Verona*, &c. belonging to the Empire, the Pope *Ravenna*; *Cernia*, *Arminum* and *Faventia*: *Lewis* the 12. then posselt of *Millain* in right thereof, *Bergamum*, *Crema*, *Cremona* and *Brixia*: *Ferdinand* the King of *Spain* in right of *Naples*, *Manfredonia*, *Trano*, *Barlet* and *Monopoli*, all of them Havens on the *Adriatick*; the Duke of *Ferrara*, *Rovigo*: and the Duke of *Mantua*, *Asula*: in so much that the *Venetians* were forced to betake themselves to the *Islands* and *Marishes* of their City. And yet in a short time by compliance with the *Pope* they broke confederacy, and by on means or other regained the rest, except those belonging to the Realm of *Naples*. The question is debated in the Senate, *whether they should war for these or no?* And wisely concluded in the negative, *That although they were commodious Havens for them, yet better to part with them, than war with such a potent Prince as Spain*. And let me say it freely to our selves, that had we served God, followed our Trade, and kept our selves

more off the Stage of *Honour*, as our Ancestors did : We had less occasioned our Neighbours envy, and not being reduced to those Straites we are in.

But if our Senators be of *Nassau's* judgment, and would have this foil for our *Martial valour*, and this exercise to rub of the rust, our Arms have contracted by their long rest. If our Cavalry are ambitious to have the Trumpet of Fame sound their praises, and the Infantry to have their Marches beaten, through succeeding Ages and Generations. I wish that the echo of Fame may follow them, with a clearer sound than the hoarse clamour of the People; and hope that the imbellick Bores that are ready to start at the Report of a Gun, and stoop at the whistling of a Bullet, may by having dangers familiarized to them, become (as the Fox did with the Lion) undaunted at last, and under their brave General and Commanders regain our reputation : And shall heartily pray both for our Senators prosperity, and Souldiers success.

The only consideration that sways with me for contesting for them, if we cannot have them otherwise, is that of *Religion*. If therefore this policy, I have pleaded should prove Apocryphal; and that our League and Alliance with them, obliges us for their recovery; or that the Rules of Christian Charity require us, to adventure our own loss for their safety : God forbid, that I, or any man else should be against it; and I hope there are none so degenerate, but will contribute their best assistance both in purse and person to so good a work. If the *Turks* will redeem the caged Birds to set them at liberty, let us much more willingly our Christian Brethren, and so committing our cause to God, pass thorow the *Temple of Virtue*, that we may happily come to that of *Honour*.

Having thus shewn the impregnableness of the truth of our cause, against the assaults of its Adversaries; and sought it out with them, in their representing the *Advantages of being under France, and disadvantages of being under England*, and our Replying: It comes now to our turn to be *Assailants* wherein we hope to obtain an absolute conquest, by shewing them the quite contrary.

Now herein we might be very large, if we would argue from all the *suasory* and *dissuasory* topics; as the *Honesty* of being under *England* rather than *France* for the common Interest of the Protestant Religion; the *Honorableness* thereof for the common good of Christendom, whose Interest it is to oppose the greatness of *France*, as we shall shew hereafter : the *Equity* of this for assisting our *Allies* against *France* : the *possibility* or practicableness of this only, now that his *Highness* is both *General* and *Stadt-holder* : and also from the contrary of these if we seek to come under *France*. But we shall only insist upon that *Utility*, because that is most perswasive, and that with respect to our selves only, the most part of men being so selfish; that they prefer their *particular* before the *publick good*.

The disadvantages of being under France, and advantages of being under England.

1. Our being under *France* brings us infallibly into a War with *England* and *Spain*; in some short time at least, if not presently, as we have already shown. Now how destructive such a War is to our Maritime Negotiation, I leave all wise men to judge, and Merchants especially who have the experience thereof.

Whereas on the contrary our being under *England*, gives us *Peace* and freedom of Trade by *Sea*; at least inconsiderable disturbance in comparison; yea very probably by *Land* also, in regard we can spoil *France's* Trade, disturb his Coasts, divert his designs, and balance his power. For *France* cannot fight with all *Europe*. If we be under *England*, we have *Spain*, the Empire, &c. with us; and if *France* will fight, we need not fear him. But if that which is said be not sufficient (as I suppose it is) I am ready to make it apparent, that a Land-war is more eligible for this Republick, than one by *Sea* with such potent enemies, and take the utmost interruption *France* can make of our Sea-traffic into the balance.

2. If we come under *France*, we shall either do it *entirely*, or *impartially*.

If the former, we are ruined in a great measure in our Commerce; for supposing that the *Spanish Netherlands* shall fall under *France* also, as in all probability they will, and that speedily, as even our Adversaries themselves take it for granted; the *Scheld* will be open and free; and so *Antwerp*, *Bruxels*, *Mechlyn*, *Loven Lier*, and the other Cities of *Brabant*, by this means recover part of their former Commerce; which now we deprive them by *Wysing* and *Rammekens* below, and *Lillo* above on that River: and *Ghent*, *Cortrick*, *Riissel*, and other Cities of *Flanders* apart, by the former River being free, and by opening the other passage to them, which is now obstructed at the *Sas van Ghent*.

Now of how great consequence this is to us, especially in regard of *Amsterdam*, which bears now a double proportion in the Admiralties, and almost half of the burden of the Taxes of *England*, which is almost the half of the whole Republick, I leave any one to judge, and especially those that know the principles of interest for that great and flourishing City. I could be very large upon this, in shewing how the fall of *Antwerp* was the rise of *Amsterdam*; how this City prevailed that the other should not be taken by the Arms of this Republick as also what some say it cost them to prevent it; that this was a great inducement to the States, not to enlarge the Republick on the side of *Flanders* and *Brabant*; and what a great motive it was to make peace with *Spain*, that so they might prevent so potent a Prince as *France*, from coming so nigh them upon that quarter, and doing it by power; and how *Holland* gave security for maintaining the peace, when *Zealand* protested against the same: But these are so well known in *Holland*, and the objections against it so answered, that I need not launch into this *Ocean*. Now who is so purblind but he may

forles.

foresee, that if we come under *France*, the *Flemish* Merchants, especially *Papists*, will return and carry their Trade to *Antwerp*, and many *French* also settle themselves there, the River being much better, the City fit for traffick every way, and having the *Popish* Religion publickly profest, so that it will soon contest with *Amsterdam* for Trade, and carry it ere long; and then *Amsterdam* may say of *Antwerp*, as the Ice of the Water, *Mater me genuit, mater mox gignitur ex me*. For we must think those Cities, and particularly *Antwerp*, are nearer the confines of *France* than *Holland*; and will be more confided in, being *Papists*; so that they will become both the care and Crown of that King and Kingdom, for their Trade in these Northern parts of the World. Yea let me say it, for I know it to be true, this is that the Trading *Flemmings* long for, seek for, and should above all things be glad to see: so that instead of hindring, they shall help, all they dare, *Frances* conquest for this their Interest.

And if some of these Provinces only come under *France*, and other some under *England*; what a miserable condition shall we be in; by having two such potent Princes continually contending in the midst of us, so that by such strong fits of Cholick in our bowels, and Convulsions in the whole body, our disease must needs become mortal, and our wounds incurable. Let us suppose that which is likeliest, both by the best intelligence, inclination of the people (as we have said formerly) and interest as we shall shew hereafter, that *Zealand* become *English*, and *Holland* should chuse *France*; and consider the situation of *Zealand*, near the Sea, and almost right over the River of *Thames*, and both between *France* and *Holland*, and betwixt *Holland* and the Chanel; the Harbours of *Vlissing* and *Ter Vere*; into which, the latter especially, all Winter long, notwithstanding the Ice, is safe arrival; their genius as well as commodiousness to Cape: and then judge in what a perillous condition the Trade of *Holland* will be under *France*, and what miserable work will be made amongst us. Or let it be supposed that there is friendship between *France* and *England*, in the enjoying their several shares (for we will grant all possibilities, and much more probabilities, our Adversaries cannot reasonably desire) and how will our mutual Traffick be spoiled, by the Impositions of both Crowns upon commodities; if we should but pay to the one in *Holland* and the other in mutual traffick be spoiled, by the impositions of both Crows upon *Zealand*, as undoubtedly we must. For it is a certain truth, that multiplicity of impositions, especially when great, spoils Merchandize. And will it not be in *Englands* power to open the River, and make it free to *Antwerp*, &c. as we have said? and in that case, where will the vast Commerce of *Holland* then be?

Whereas on the contrary were we either of these ways under *England*, we exclude *France* and *Flanders*, and preserve our Trade to our selves.

If we be entirely under *England*; we may save the *Spanish* Netherlands whose Governours are contented with that Commerce they have, rather than lose all; we may preserve our selves from the *French* neighbour-

bourhood, and thereby also our Trade from them both.

Or if we but part so, we preserve the friendship of these Provinces, the Trade betwixt us : secure our Interest both at home and abroad, and command the Commerce of *Europe* at our pleasure.

3. If we come under *France*, we have not only *Spain* our Enemy by Sea and Land (as we have shewn) but the loss of our *Spanish Trade*, and the hazarding of our whole *Levant Traffick* : and if we rightly calculate, that amounts to no small part of our Commerce ; the *Spanish Southerlands*, *Spain*, and their Dominions in *Italy*, taking off much of our *East India* and *Western Wares*. For as *Muscovy*, and other *Northern Nations*, consume much of our *Pepper*, and some hotter Spices ; so the *Northern* and *Eastern*, in the *Mediterranean*, much of our other Commodities. Now with what security can we either carry them through the Sea, or bring our *Silks*, *Camels hair*, and other the richest Commodities we have, from *Aleppo*, *Egypt*, and our other *Factories* for the *Turkie Trade*, and maintain our Traffick with *Venice*, *Legorn*, and other places in *Italy* : seeing the *Spaniards*, besides the Ports of *Spain*, have so many *Havens*, and some *Islands* in the *Adriatick*, *Sicilia*, *Sardinia*, *Majorca*, and *Minorca* in the *Midland Sea*, and *Cadiz* so commodiously situated at the mouth of the *Streights*; some of which have been famous in all Ages for the archest *Pirates* in the whole world. Betwixt these therefore, and the *Turks*, we are certain of nothing but of bad *Trading*, and they good *Caping*. So that I may conclude with the *Poetical Proverb*, that he that desires to flee from *England*, and fall under *France* for Traffick, *Incidit in Scyllam, Cupiens vitare Charybain*.

Whereas on the contrary, if we come under *England*, we certainly secure our Commerce with *Spain*, and all the *Territories* belonging to that *Crown* : And not only so, but against the *Turkish Pirates* which infest those Seas, which would be of no small advantage to us. For besides that *England* is at peace with some of those places on the *African Coast*, and is in friendship with the *Turkish Empire* ; how easie a thing was it for us joyntly, to bring the rest to our own terms ? Yea, so to subdue them all, and keep them under, that they should never be able to disturb us, no nor *Christianity* more by their *Caping* ? And how generous a design this is, and how destructive to that Great and Common Enemy of all *Christians*, I leave all wise men and well-wishers to *Christianity* to consider and judge.

4. Our *East India Trade*, the richest Jewel of this Republick, which hath occasioned us so much envy, and caused so many quarrels and contests, if we come under *France*, will run a great *Risko* to be ruined. Hath not this been their great design of late years ? Have they not for this end erected a *Company*, and now got footing there ; and follow it further, even in this last year, as we hear, with their greatest endeavours ? Nay, is not this the principal motive which induces them to make this War ? I know we need not fear them there, nor all *Europe*, if we have peace here, and can send them supplies : We are also advanced in that *Negotiation* ;

so strong in Forts, Shipping and Souldiers; our men so accustomed to the heat of those Countries; our Mariners to those Coasts, and Merchants to the Languages and Trade of those parts: But if we come under *France*, will not *England* and *Spain* seek continually to intercept our supplies thither, and our returns from thence? Will not this put us to vast charges of Convoys to defend our Ships going and coming in security? Will not some through storms, and other accidents, when separated, unavoidably fall into their hands, as we have often experienced? And will they not always be in one hazard or other from them for safety? Yea, let us suppose that all stands well there, and none of our Ships miscarry through our Enemies, but safely arrive both there and here, where shall we vent those Commodities from thence at the prices they now yield us, when we have such Enemies at home, and such dangers in carrying them abroad, as we have formerly shown? Nay, can we rationally think otherwise, than that the Kingdom of *France* will have share with us there, and the Crown the greatest profit here? So that our *East India Actions*, as high as they are now, may in a little time come as low as those of the *West India Company*, which was once thought equal with the other, and are now next to nothing: and then many of us, who have most of our estates adventured in the *East Indies Trade*, may lose that we have left, as we have formerly lost by the *West Indies*, and no remedy but patience, for we must sit down in a sorrowful silence. Herein I have reason to speak feelingly of my fears, being so concern'd according to the proportion of my small estate; how much, matters none but my self; but were it ten times more, I must tell you, that though the *Actions* at this present are considerably above three hundred, I shall the first day I see we come under *France* sell mine willingly, for two, rather than keep them, and render many thanks to the Buyer into the Bargain.

Whereas, on the other hand, if we come under *England*, they have formerly had, and still have a considerable share in the *East India Trade*. Their *Company* and ours accord well, and frequently accommodate each others correspondence. His Majesty in the former War, in his Declaration, and the Papers past between the *States General*; & his Envoy Sir *George Downing*, insists upon *Poleron*, one of the *Banda Islands*, satisfaction for injuries past, with deduction of what we had suffered, & Regulation of Trade for the future; & his Majesty in his Declaration of this present War only mentions the last, *The Regulation of Trade in the East Indies*. Now I persuade my self, that neither the *States* nor *East India Company* will stick upon these. For *Poleron*, if they have it, it can now neither be any great profit to them, nor prejudice us: For a just accounting with them, what just man can be against it? or against a due and equal Regulation of Trade? that so all occasions of Contests between the two Nations may be cut off, and wholly prevented for the future. It is true, that reaches not the supposal of our being under them, but only standing upon equal terms

with.

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with them for Trade : and therefore we will come close up to the supposition in hand.

And herein we shall proceed with such frankness, that we shall grant more than our Adversaries can reasonably be jealous of; and that is, that the *English* should have half of that Trade with us; and yet shew that it is better for us, then to take in *France*. For 1. The *English* have a considerable part already, and *France* but an inconsiderable: so that we must, in to the former. Our first Capital of the *East India Company*, is 64 Tun of all probability, part with much more to the latter, and need part with less Gold, and the *English* 40. It is true we have Traded both longer and more, and so have a greater improvement: Suppose 70 Tun of Gold there, which ordinarily is reckoned about three times in the value, when returned hither; and suppose as much or more here in Goods or Money, which vastly exceeds the *English*: yet it must be considered, that we are at greater expences there several ways than they; that we have money at interest, though inconsiderable to what formerly, having paid off the last year above 50, some say 60 Tun of Gold. I must here ingeniously confess, that I have but the formentioned calculations from the curiosity of discourse, and the credit of others; not upon the authentick Authority of the Books of both Companies; which I have not leisure now, nor indeed pleasure to enquire into; and yet, I think, I am near the truth, having had these things from very good hands. I will therefore proceed, and here we are certain, that besides a great sum of money our Company hath lent the States to carry on this War, which I reckon as an Honorable Gift, we are like to part with a far greater to purchase, our peace. And though our *Actions* be far more worth than theirs: For example, a capital *Action* that gives right to a suffrage, in the Election of the Directors of that Trade being originally 100 l. *Vlaminsh*, (or 600 *Gilders*) is now in these bad times worth above 300 l. *Vlaminsh*, (or 1800 *G.*) and in times of peace 400 l. *Vl.* (or 2400 *G.*) and sometimes 500 l. *Vl.* (or 3000 *G.*) and with them not worth two, nor twelve: Yet this arises not so much from the great Emolument that the Participants here receive more than there, as from the plenty of money here, which several have, and know not how otherwise to improve the small Interest (usually under 4 *per Cento* to those of good credit) and the dearness of Land; all which are contrary in *England*. So that I leave it to any competent and impartial man to judge, (should it be so, which yet, I think, none need to fear) whether it is better for us to supply the *English* with a less part, or the *French* with a greater of that our Trade. For I dare say, that if *England* hath a fourth of ours, *France* hath not an eighth part thereof.

2. How easie is it for us and *England* to beat *France* out of the *East-India Traffick*, if we have Wars, or if the *French* seek to incroach upon us?

3. Under *England* we keep our own *Chambers of Trade*; whereby thousands of Families subsist in our *Cities*. All manner of Trades for Shipping

and Navigation, Carpenters, Smiths, Sail-makers, &c. All manner of Tradesmen for Victuals, Bakers, Brewers, Butchers, &c. by their labours at least: All manner of Shop keepers for selling them Provisions that are sent, and buy Commodities that return: Besides the poorer sort, as Boats-folk, Labourers, &c. which are exceeding many that wholly depend on the Company for their livelihood: Whereas if we come under *France*, and the *Spanish Provinces* also, as we may reasonably suppose, a great share will be removed to *Antwerp*, there being so large and magnificent an *East-India* house, and that being nearer *France* by far, whereby our Trade being taken from us, our Cities will be impoverished beyond imagination.

4. The Impositions of the Crown of *England* is with consent of the People in Parliament; the Rates both inward and outward being set by Law; and so would be here with consent of the States; Those of *France* arbitrary, and inahnsible at pleasure. And how great an alteration *Customs* make in *Commerce*, I leave all knowing Merchants to judge.

I foresee it would be said, that were we under *France*, we should beat *England* out of the *East India* Trade, and so have it wholly to our selves.

If they would make either the Antecedent or Consequent good, the Argument deserved consideration; but I know they cannot, for they are both impracticable.

First, We cannot beat them out there, till we have conquered them here: for how shall we in Wars with them spare Ships, Souldiers, &c. to do that? Now what probability there is of conquering them, is formerly declared. The *English* are reasonably fortified and provided, and will doubtless be better if they see danger approaching: And not onely so, but being in good Amity (as I have heard) with those Nations where they reside, they would never suffer our enmity to prevail so far against them; nor those Nations with whom they Trade: For knowing how low one Chapman makes the Market, they will assist the weaker, rather than lose their advantages by them.

Nor if we should conquer them there, will all the spoils fall to our selves; as some may possibly think, whose hopes are Postilion to the Sun, and therefore fancy things beyond the Moon, and bring such Booties from East to West upon the wings of their windy imaginations. For instead of hoping to have half, we have reason to fear, should it be so, that *France* will have all parts of the *Prey*.

5. If we be under *France*, what shall become of our *Fishery* upon the Coast of *England*, and those multitudes of Families which depend thereon? I might be large herein from mine own Observations, having had the humour or curiosity (call it what you please) to view all the Rivers, Harbours and almost Creeks, on both the opposite Coasts, from *Thames* to *Tinmouth*, and from the *Elve* to *Oostend*; and particularly *Yarmouth* and *Flambrough-Head*, as the greatest Promontaries of *England*, and whereabouts there is the best Fishing: But I will only speak to those things which concern the

the present Argument. A diligent person calculated in the Year 62 the dependants on the *Fishing Trade*, (I mean not Fishers only, but also all employed about their Shipping, Nets, Cask, Salt, &c. with their Attendants at Sea) and reckoned them above 400000. Yea, some have made their number far greater, particularly that Learaed, Wise and valiant Knight, Sir *Walter Rawleigh* (whom I parallel with Sir *Philip Sidney*) in his information of King *James*, reckons our Vessels that Fish on the Coasts of *Great Britain* 3000. and every 20 Busses to maintain 8000, which will amount to 120000. But this is incredible: He must either be mistaken in number of Ships, or the proportion he allots them, or both: For upon diligent enquiry I cannot find half that number, either of Ships or Men, in some years last past. If he mean of the three several seasons of Fishing, in *Autumn* for Herrings, *Spring* for Cod-fish, and *Summer* for Salmon, we shall not contest with him, nor concerning the numbers he says attend them, viz. 9000 other Vessels, and 150000 Men. It is sufficient for my present purpose, that I shew that our Fishery is very considerable, and the Friendship of *England*, for the same, of far more consequence to us, than that of *France*.

Guicciardine, a very diligent Writer, A. D. 1587. reckons the *Herring-Busses* that Fish on the *Brittish* Coasts at least 700, and some said many more: and though he include *Flanders*, yet not the other Fisheries, as *Rawleigh* doth, and doubtless of all the Maritime Provinces of this Republick; which the Author of the *Interest of Holland*, c. 5. erroneously appropriates to that Province alone, through inadvertency, that Forreigners frequently call all these United Provinces *Hollanders*, that being the principal: and all the *Spanish*, yea formerly all the 17, by the name of *Vlamens*: And not only so, but tells us the *Fishery* is increased since a third part, which I cannot credit; not only in regard that the *English*, but *French* and *Flemish*, whom we used to supply, for the greatest part, now fish themselves. Yea, I rather think, that since our Merchandise hath so much increased, our Fishery hath decreased.

*Descript.
generalis:
Belgii.*

And what considerable profit redounds to us thereby, appears by the computation which *Guicciardine* makes very particularly, that those 700 Busses take annually 49000 Last of Herring, which he reckons at 10l. VI. or 60 Guildens the Last; which amounts yearly, together with the other Fisheries to the following sums.

	I. Vlam.		Sterl.
Herrings	490000	or	294000
Cod-fish	166666 $\frac{2}{3}$	or	100000
Salmon	66666 $\frac{2}{3}$	or	40000

The usual reckoning of Salt-Fish that is yearly taken, and either spent or sold by the *Hollanders*, if you will believe the *Interest of Holland*, c. 55 is 300000 Last. So that the Families that are maintained, the money that is gotten, and food that is eaten from Fishing, is almost incredible.

Now that it will be in *Englands* power, and not in *Frances* to spoil us of this *Fishery*, or at least the greatest part thereof, I think no rational man will deny that considers the only fishing for *Herring* in these parts, or perhaps in the whole world, is upon the *British* Coast, and most also for Cod-fish Northward of *Scotland*, and on the *Dagger sands*, and other places where they can easily interrupt us. Those therefore that are so forward for *France*, might do well to consider, what they will do with all these Families, or how they shall be maintained when they are deprived of their Trades.

Other Arguments which might here be added, I shall not now bring into open view, but keep them as a Reserve, in case our Adversaries should rally, and make Head against us, having sufficiently routed them (we think) by these five, wherewith we have already fought them.

But yet there remain some advantages under *England*, which we cannot expect under *France*; some of them more general for the Republick, and othersome more particular for Provinces and Persons: In the handling whereof, we shall desire to use, now that we are got within our Enemy, the short and pungeut Dagger of *Demosthenes*, rather than *Cicero's* Long sworded Eloquence.

Advantages under England, not to be expected under France.

1. By being under *England*, we retain and increase our Friendship with the *Empire*, *German Princes*, and *Free Cities*; which are not jealous of *Englands* affecting the *Imperial Crown*, as they are of *France*: and therefore will not prejudice us under the former, as they will certainly in a little time under the latter. Nay, I doubt not but were we under *England*, they would take courage, and generally appear against *France*: So that we should hereby greatly promote the Common Interest of *Europe*.

2. Under *England* we might have the Freedom of the *West India* Trade, which would be of great profit to us many ways. Now how great a share *England* hath in the *West Indies*, and how small and inconsiderable *France*, is well known: These having only the Island *Terre Neuf* for fishing, and some of the most Northerly Continent unpeopled, not cultivated, and unprofitable, as may be seen in *de Laet*, by those that know it not; part of *St. Christophers*, and some other places of small concernment, in comparison to what the *English* profitably possess.

3. By being under *England*, we might share at least with the *English* those Plantations we have in the *W. Indies*: *Holland* in their *New Netherland*, and *Zealand* in *Surinam*, &c. Which would be of eminent advantage for Colonies, either there, or to be sent thither, besides the profit we might have from those Plantations; as *Zealand* (or some at least therein) even in these first years, and beginning thereof, have pretty well experienced, and know how greatly it is further improveable. Now what a singular benefit it is for a full and populous Commonwealth, now and then, like the sedulous Bees,

to cast a swarm of their poorest and most laborious people, is apparent from the Histories of all Ages. And though I confess the *Dutch* are not so good Planters as the *English*, being more used to the Water, and the other to Land: yet in regard all those *Plantations* are upon the Sea Coasts and Rivers, the *Dutch* might be used for building of Ships or Boats Houses, &c. and especially for Fishing, carrying and recarrying goods by Water on the Rivers, and to and from the Ships, and in Navigation; and the *English* for planting and working in the ground; and so in mine opinion, would make an excellent temperament, and very profitable for both Nations.

4. Expences might be saved in several Convoys, and particularly of the *East India* Companies. I know very well they will have them return round about, on the back of *Ireland*, lest they should touch at any of these Northern places, especially in the Channel, and so Trade; and will send out Ships with fresh men, and take out the Mariners that return, to prevent their Trading for themselves: but yet the extraordinary charges of four Men of War might be spared. Nay, the *States General* bring in these to be deducted in the Account with *England*, as the occasion thereof, in their *List of Damages, Article the 5. before the last War, A. D. 1664.*

5. Such as are rich, and weary of Trade, or love their ease, honour, or pleasure; may, if we were under *England*, more easily remove thither, and be made *Liege* Subjects, and *Denizens* of *England*, by the *Crown*, or be *Naturalized* by the *Parliament*; and so buy, possess, and inherit Lands and Revenues at half the price here, and live upon their Rents as Country Gentlemen, in a cheap and pleasant Land, enjoying as great Civil Liberty as any where in Christendom; and also the freedom of their Religion: Or let out their money not only at far greater interest, but also upon *Hypothec* or real Security: I have often thought this 20 years, whether it might not be better for *England* to give this Liberty by Law to Strangers, especially those of the Reformed Religion, and of these Countries; and of which side the interest lay betwixt us for this: Now that *England* hath so many and great Plantations in the *West Indies* for their poorer people; now that Money is so plentiful; now that this Commonwealth was so increased upon them; now that the number of Merchants is every where so multiplied; and now that Trade is beaten so low, almost in all the known parts of the World: But this would be both a large and unnecessary digression, and I am very sensible that I have been already too long in this Argument: Yet industriously, I confess, because I foresee, that many will diligently peruse this, who perhaps will negligently pass by the rest; and mine Opposites so much glorying herein, I thought best to give them full measure, and rather abound to Curiosity, than be deficient in satisfying the least Nicety; *Trade being the Crown of that Kingdom, and this Commonwealth.*

Se^t. 8. Several other Arguments and Inducements to incline us rather for England, briefly mentioned: With an Inference from the whole preceding Discourse, that the Friendship of England is to be preferred before that of France.

Al though what is said of *Religion, Liberty, Estates, and Trade* be sufficient to prove this Hypothetical Problem; yet I shall give, as over-measure, some other inducements for *England*, briefly.

1. The different humour and Genious of the *French* and *Dutch*; which is well known to those that know them both, to be far greater than between us and the *English*: Which makes not only a strangeness, but alienation of affection; begets a disgust, and nauseating of each other; brings forth many contests and quarrels; and nourishes a continual discontent, uneasiness and inquietness of life.

2. The affection which the generality of the *English* and *Dutch* Nation have for each other: So that if the Controversies of late years, and at this present between us, had been or were referred to the Body of the People in both Nations (although I well know what both their *Representatives* have done) I dare say, upon reasonable satisfaction for the inutual miscarriages, which cannot but sometimes happen towards each other, there never had been, nor would be War betwixt us more; and that his *Majesty*, and the *Prince of Orange*, would have more *Voluntiers* in one day to fight the *French*, than they have in twenty to fight each other.

3. The way of *France* is only *Gentry* and *Paisantry*, the former Lording it over the latter, which have always lived more miserably than any common people in *Europe*. In *Cesars* time there was *nihil plebe contemptius*, as he tells us, and hath continued so, as *Bodin* acknowledges, & is so at this day we all know. Whereas in *England* and these *Countries*, there is a middle sort of people that live freely and independently on their own Lands and Farms, that will never endure the insolency of such Lords, much less to be their Slaves, and least of all be ruined by them.

4. Now that the *Prince of Orange* is advanced, and his Party upmost, so that the Crown of *England* may confide more in our friendship, it is not to be doubted, but through his *Highness* Interest in his Uncles, we shall better accord hereafter, when these unhappy differences are once ended.

And thus I have done with this great *Question* of the times; sufficiently, I think, to satisfie any rational man; though nothing is sufficient, nor will satisfie, I know, such as are either so resolutely prejudiced against the *English*, or Princes Interest, that if they can but ruine them, they matter not though they ruine both themselves & the Nation; are so partially passionate for the *French*, that they desire them, though it be to their own destruction; for all the Arguments in the World will never prevail against passion and prejudice: It is only experience that can convince such of their error, and make them, with *Damocles*, when the drawn Sword is over them, desire

to depart, finding they were deceived in their opinion of Happiness.

I shall therefore conclude with a brief Reflection upon some of these Arguments, and the Corollary which naturally flows from them.

That seeing *England* and *We* are of the same Religion; Both free people and affectionated to each other; Both Imbarqued in the same Interest of Trade, though in different bottoms; It not only becomes us, but is our mutual concernment, that we take heed we dash not one another to peices, but fairly and Christianly comply with each other, for the safe-guard of our Religion, preservation of the protestant Interest, our own and others also Liberties, and the just and equitable course of Commerce; that so each Nation may happily enjoy their *Religion, Liberty, Estates and Trade*, with Gods Blessing on them all.

Sect. 9. *That we are not yet come to that Extremity, but we may still remain a Republick: in regard of our own Strength, and our Neighbours Interest, Englands especially: That they had better lose Scotland or Ireland, than let the French have these Provinces. This War a Game at Hazard. Being engaged will go through, and Parliament probably assist therein.*

WWE have hitherto discoursed upon the supposal of *inability to defend our selves*; because it becomes wise men always to suppose the worst condition that may probably befall them, with the consequences thereof, and accordingly to make provision, and in regard of the endless curiosity of mens minds, which are always restless under *miserie*s, and still inquisitive after *futuritie*s. We shall now proceed to shew, that we are not yet (through Gods Mercy towards us) come to the extremity supposed, nor reduced to those straits, that we are necessitated to take either *French* or *English* for our Masters, but that we may still remain a Republick, if we be not wanting to our selves, or through passion or precipitancy betray our own Interest, and cast our selves into irrecoverable destruction. And this we shall make apparent, by shewing there is no sufficient ground for us to despair, if we either consider *our own Strength*, or *our Neighbours Interest*. Let us therefore observe the good rule in policy which the Poet gives,

*Senec. Thyest. Nemo confidat nimium secundis,
Nemo desperet meliora lapsis.*

First, Let's take a view of *our own Strength*, and see what grounds of encouragement that will yield us. Which though sufficiently known to many, yet not so well to the Multitude. Now the Strength of a Nation consists especially in these things following, which I shall briefly recite, and accommodate to our own *Country*.

1. The great strength of a people consists in the *situation of their Country*.

Now concerning this both in the general, and this Land in particular, I have already spoken sufficiently for my purpose; and shewn that all these Maritime Provinces, are either Islands or Peninsular, and very defensible thereby; and also upon extremity liable to inundation, either from the Sea, or Rivers that surround them, or both.

2. In the Artificial Fortification of particular places; *Cities, Castles, Forts, Passes, &c.* And herein these Countries may contend with any Nation whatsoever, Kingdom, or Common-wealth, that is of no greater circumference. For the number of their Cities, and their regular Fortification, Art herein vying with Nature, is not to be parallel'd in the world. I need not descend to particulars, Those that desire satisfaction herein, may consult *Guiccardine's* description of these Netherlands.

3. In means of defence. As Shipping for those Nations or Cities that lie upon the Sea, or great Navigable Rivers, and Lakes, as these Provinces do, to defend their Coasts from invasion. And herein we are rather redundant than defective; the Number of Shipping in *Holland* alone, being usually accounted 20000. And Warlike provision of Arms and Ammunition. Wherein also we abound: these Countries ever since they were a Common-wealth, having been the greatest Magazine of warlike provisions, as is well known, of any in the world.

4. In men; in regard of their Number, Courage, Skill, and Unanimity.

As to our Numbers, they are abundantly sufficient for our defence. The *Interest of Holland*, cap.8. from particulars, reckons the summe of that Province alone 2400000. But if there be so many in them all, it is enough. Just how many is impossible to say, or near how many in such a multitude is very difficult to guess, and harder with us than any other people, I think in the world; in regard of the uncertainty of Seamen, the Number of Strangers and Travellers in peaceable times, and the diversity of Religions, Jews, Papists, Anabaptists, &c. which Baptise not their Children with us. But I know the number of our men must needs be great; by the great Number of our Cities, these several Provinces being as it were nothing but Nests of Cities, so many being no where to be found in so small a circumference in any parts of the habitable world; by their largeness and multitude of houses, which imply the inhabitants to be many; by the greatness of their Trade, which is the lure that draws multitudes to them; and by the known Christnings and Burials of those only of the Reformed Religion.

And to our courage, which at present suffers an Eclipse, there is more to be said then the world is aware of. And indeed I wonder none of our History Professors, have given other Nations some satisfaction herein. I have not been without some thoughts of doing it my self, having been a diligent observer how things have gone, but I want Authentick materials for such a work. I could produce very many and very honourable testimonies,

monies both ancient and modern of their Valour, out of such Writers as give the Characters of Nations, Republicks, Geographers, and especially Historians, *Dion, Caesar, Tacitus, Suetonius, Florus, Orosius*, &c. of old, the famous *Italians, Guiccardine, Bemivoglio*, and *Strada*, with *Spanish, French, English*, and the Neighbouring Nations, even so many, and such as are sufficient either to shame, or to inflame the veriest cowards, one should think, of the world into courage. But this would be too large to insert here, and may possibly be done in another dress hereafter. Nor is the success of *France* against us such a wonder, as many make it, as I have formerly shewn. I will at present onely add, that which is proper for this place, and that is, that the *French* Armies were not onely so numerous, but also trained up in the School of *Mars*, and ours for the most part raw and unexperienced in War. As the Fox in the Fable, the first time he saw the Lion and heard him roar, trembled; the second time was less afraid, and the third grown wholly fearless of him: So it is with men, by being accustomed to Dangers, either at Sea or Land, they converse with them familiarly, and account them nothing at last. And therefore wise Commanders have always endeavoured to unlearn their Souldiers fear, by shewing them their Enemies at Walls, Trenches, Passes, Rivers, or other Places, where they could not be come upon by them, and so harden and flesh them by degrees, before they have adventured to fight them against old and experienced Enemies. And I doubt not, but through Gods blessing, in a little time, if the Wars continue, our Belgick Lion will not be found such a tame Lamb, and so easily torn in pieces, as our Enemies may hope, and others possibly may imagine.

As for our Skill superadded to Courage, there is no want, for the manner of Defence we are to make. For besides our able Commanders and Souldiers to defend the Posts, and Passes abroad, all our Cities abound with Seamen, and such as are skill'd to traverse their Ordnance, and desperate for Sallies, if need should require.

Our Unanimity, I confess, is that I most fear: and that when our Cities are threatned with danger, the Citizens should grow mutinous, and fall together by the ears, and so let in their Enemies to put the fray. And yet I have reason to think they will grow wiser, by their hearing and knowing how their Friends are used by their Enemies.

5. In money and food to maintain their men. And in neither of these, through Gods mercy, is there any want amongst us: If we will lay out our selves, as we ought, for the publick. *Aitfin's Liwe*, reckons the Publick incomes of *Holland* alone, A. 1643. at eleven Millions of our money, which is eleven hundred thousand pounds Sterling: we calling every ten thousand pound Sterling a tun of gold, and every hundred thousand a Million, *i. e.* of *Gilders*. And besides the publick incomes of every Province, every City hath their peculiar, which in some is very considerable. But if our Common Treasuries are exhausted in several places, it is no wonder: Yet if we

consider the Riches of particular persons, we have enough to hold out the War, to weary our Enemies out at the last, as much as they do us at the present. I will not now stand to shew the calculation of this, though if necessary, I think I can do it satisfactorily, comprehending the disadvantages our Enemies are under. But the late Project printed so often, of the *Capitals* of this Countrey, for raising and maintaining so numerous an Army, though the manner prescribed prove not practicable, hath in part spared my pains herein.

And for food, our Cities are generally so well furnished, that if our Enemies steal not supplies from us, it is well; we need neither seek to them, nor fight with them for supplying our selves. We have Bread-Corn, Fish and Oil, Butter and Cheefe in abundance. And if our Liquorish Dames want their Delicacies a while, no great matter: they will value peace, and pay their Souldiers the better.

Now what can be added for the sufficient defence of any Nation, to the particulars mentioned, I cannot imagine; and if my enumeration be insufficient, I wish any wise man would shew wherein, and then I shall thank them. And therefore let us take courage to our selves, and not be frightened with vain fears, or scared with any vaunting Bravadoes; like that great *Rhodomontado* of the Grand *Turk*, who when he heard of the long War such a Great Prince as *Spain* made about this small Countrey; said, *That before he would have kept such a pottering about a few petty Provinces, he would have taken them, and hurled them into the Sea at once*: Though his Successor kept no small pottering about the single City of *Candia* many years together; to which some of our Cities, all things considered, seem not much inferiour for strength: although I well know what a difference there is betwixt the Defence of one City alone without a Countrey, and many at once contained therein.

But though this *internal strength* be so considerable, and with us of greatest consequence; yet this is not all; we have also an *external and accidental strength*, by the Interest of our Neighbours. For this end it must be well considered, that some Countries and Cities, of small Strength comparatively in Themselves, are yet very strong by their situation among, and well secured by the Interest of other circumjacent Princes and States: who will not suffer, if they can possibly prevent it, accession of strength to one another, lest their own Scale in the Ballance of Powers should become light, and soon born down. What is it but this, under the Shadow of the Almightyes Protection, that secures the smaller Republicks in *Italy*, and the *Empire*? What *Geneva*, *Stratsburg*, *Colen*, *Hamburg*, and the rest of the Free Cities, and *Hans Towns*, but this? GOD governing the World usually, as both *Comines* and *Cardan* well observe, by the passions of men; in the ballancing of Powers; that when any one will break out into Rage and Wars, others will oppose them with the like fury, and so keep the World a little quiet; otherwise the great *Nimrods*, and Hunters after Dominion

minion would soon, if let alone, destroy and devour all before them.

Now if we look about us, and see amongst whom our Land lies, and well consider their interest; this will be very apparent in our selves, notwithstanding this War that is made against us, that we are not devoted by any to destruction, but only the *French*, as I shall shew hereafter.

For *Spain* our next Neighbours on one hand in the rest of the Provinces, they know this so well, and are so sensible of their Interest herein, that they not onely assist us what they can, but I dare say, were it not for *England*, would rather break with *France*, than see us endangered. But those two Crowns, as I have already hinted, and shall more fully shew hereafter, must not, and therefore will not break.

For the Empire above us, they also are frighted with our fears; and if the Princes thereof had money to their might, would willingly, I doubt not, assist the *Emperour*; lest the *Lilies of France* should mount above the *Roman Eagle*. In the year 1584. when the States, upon the death of Prince *William*, were a looking towards *France* for Protection, the Princes of the Empire sent *Malroy* to admonish them, *ut à consilio Gallici patrocinii implorandi desisterent, alioque fore, ut Germani Principes tantum domui Austriacæ & origine & fœdere artium adeo cum imperio vinculis conjunctæ factam injuriam non negligant*, as *Thuanus* tells us, l. 80. And if they were then jealous of *France*, what shall we think they are now? And if then zealous for the Concernments of *Spain*, shall we think they will now be wholly negligent both of theirs and their own?

And *France* to be sure will never see us entirely *English*: for so he knows he should never be able to ballance *Englands* power at Sea; which he doubts both hopes and aims at, by the Accession of Strength from these *Netherlands*.

Nor *England* suffer us, if they can hinder it, to be wholly *French*; for this they know would clearly tend in a little time to their destruction. This very Reason of State moved *Q. Elizabeth* at first to support us against *Spain*, rather than to have us fall into the Arms of *France*, by their becoming our Protectors. Which that wise Historian *Thuanus* faithfully relates in several places. A. 1575. She told *Gampaniach*,--*Ne molestè ferat Philippus, si ipsa securitatis suæ causa Hollandiæ & Zelandiæ patrocinium suscipiat, antequam Galli perpetui Anglorum hostes eis potiantur*. L. 60. A. 1576. *Elisabetha verita ne aliorum ope destituti Belgæ ex desperatione fœdus nobiscum jecerent, seque & res suas Francis committerent, eos pecunia adjuvit, &c.* L. 26. A. 1577. She excuses her defence of us to *Philip* the II. with this very Reason, *Ne Belgæ ex desperatione pernicio sum non solum sibi, sed vicinis, concilium caperent, externi Principis patrocinio salute commissâ*. Meaning the *French*, L. 64. And A. 1584. shews the emulation between the *French* and *English* herein. *Ipsi sibi invicem suspecti erant. Nam Rex veterem hostem Belgii accessione Galliæ imminentem reformidabat, & Angli nosros Belgi-potentes mirus æquos fœderi, quod Angliæ cum Burgundica domo intercedit, atque adeo commercio futuros verebantur*. L. 80. And

is angry with the Ministers of State in *France*, for neglecting this singular occasion, of enlarging their Empire by taking these Provinces into the *French* Protection. And to say the truth, this was the greatest error in Policy by way of omission, and that of *Charles* the 8. concerning the Kingdom of *Naples* of Commission, that I think the Crown of *France* was ever guilty of. And indeed there were many of the *English* Nation, that judged it one of the greatest oversights that that wise Princess ever made, not to take into her hands, as she was offered, the absolute protection of these Provinces. But that is not so clear to me, nor will be so I think to others, who rightly consider the circumstances of those times; for we must not judge by the following, wherein this Common-wealth grew up beyond all expectation, under such Wars, as many feared would have been our destruction. But yet though she refused for several reasons both of Conscience and State (mentioned by *Comden* in her *Annals*, A. D. 1575.) yet it plainly appears by the forementioned places in *Thuanus*, that rather than the *French* should, she would have done it. And could she have foreseen, what we have known, I am apt to think she would have ventured it; although I must tell you it would have been a great venture: *Spain* being both so potent at that time, and spiteful against her, as was quickly after perceived by the *Spanish Armado* in 88. and besides the enmity of *Spain*, she had thereby incur'd the envy of *France* infallibly, and was uncertain not only of success in the War, but of what support of men, and money especially the *Dutch* should be able to contribute for the carrying on the War, which was easily foreseen would be long and bloody.

Nor can any one think, that *England* is not sensible, of the danger they are in, if we be under *France*, that either considers the Reasons of State, or observed that which was obvious to every eye: and that is how the *English* was startled at the progress of *France*. What posting was made too and again? Was not the *Lord Vicount of Halifax* halted over, when they feared their approach to *Utrecht*? And hearing it was over, was not his *Grace the Duke of Buckingham*, the *Lord Arlington*, with several other Commissioners, posted after? At which time having the honour to wait on my *Lord of Halifax*, and telling him the Town talk of the *Duke of Buckingham*, &c. coming through the Fleet, and being gone to the *Hague*; he could scarce credit it, having not had the least notice thereof; they coming away in such haste, for fear the *French* should over-run all.

And no wonder, if we consider the consequences thereof for *England*, which are so great, that they had better lose either *Scotland* or *Ireland*. And if any *English* think I overlash, I shall desire them first carefully to compute these several particulars, and then censure.

1. The loss that the King will have in his Customs, and the Kingdome in their Trade; which neither of those Nations can compensate.

2. The constant charges of maintaining a Navy, which that Kingdome must be at to maintain their Traffick, far greater than will secure them against either of those Kingdoms.

3. The

3. The great Injuries they are always liable unto, from such potent Enemies by Sea as the *French* and *Dutch* conjoynd: more than from the other by Sea and Land.

4. The Wars that are likely to fall upon them in a few years both by Sea and perhaps Land also? which would prove far heavier than either of those Kingdoms can make with them.

5. The hazard they run of being baffled and beat out of their Trade by such a War. It is true, this is not so easie as many of the *Dutch* imagine, as I have already proved? nor yet so difficult, much less impossible, as perhaps some of the *English* may fancy.

I shall not now stand to draw these out of their close order into an open, yet if any of the *English* think me weak in this, I have a Reserve, which, I think, will sufficiently secure me from being routed.

It will be said to me, Why then should *England* commence this War?

Truly let me say it freely, for I know it, that the Scale of War very hardly cast that of Peace, and the difference was so small, that it came upon two or three grains onely. I have weighed this as exactly as I possibly could: first distinguishing Pretexes from real Causes, and then distinctly considering these one by one. There were these five variously discoursed of. His Majesties designing to introduce the Popish Religion? To alter the Government of those Kingdoms? To revenge Himself upon us? To advance the *Prince of Orange*? And the Interest of the Kingdom of *England*.

For the two first which made the loudest noise in some mens months, I soon found them frivolous? and only calumnies cast out by his enemies at home and abroad, to make the King odious, and his people jealous. As to that of changing Religion, I have formerly shewn, and I thing sufficiently, that he neither will, nor can if he would effect it.

As for the 2d I considered the Kings years, as being past any such youthful and vain ambition? his being destitute of a Child that can challenge the Crown? his former miseries and sufferings by War; and his wisdom too great, to set upon a design so wholly impracticable, especially in *England* and *Scotland*. For by the constitution of his Kingdoms, though he have the *Militia* for the execution of the Laws? Authority without Power being a vain scare-crow, and insufficient to suppress the audacious exorbitances of the multitude: yet the People have the Purse to ballance that Power, and whence then would he pay his Armies? Nor let any one stop me with saying, the Long Parliament contended with his Father for the *Militia*? for that was onely temporary, they challenging it onely for that time of the danger they apprehended in the Kingdom, and not as thier constant right, and not belonging to the Crown, as may be seen by those who will rightly read their Declarations which they published to the World concerning that War, Collected and Printed together by *Husbands* at London, 1642. And besides this, a Parliament in being though not sitting, which hath some

some kind of radical Power; though not to be exerted, but when legally congregated. But suppose them dissolved, it being in the Kings Power to do it at his pleasure; yet hath he not the City of *London* on his back, and both Kingdoms about him to oppose him; especially considering that the Jealousie of Popery would be taken into the quarrel. And what Ministers of State durst suggest such Designs? they know well the Maxim of the *Commons* and their practice (as the great means of preserving their Freedom) is to *ruine such as would infringe their Liberty*. And that they are so jealous of, and zealous for their Rights herein, that some of them still have the Courage and Resolution to venture their own Heads to break the Necks of such Men and such Designs as would prejudice their Priviledges. I have observed in the Histories of former times, and in my own time also, that there were seldom any of the Noblest Stags of State, how much soever imparked in the Kings Favour, and how strongly soever impaled with Power; but if the *Commons* of *England* singled him out, and set upon him, though he might hold them at an abay for some time, yet they still hunted him down at last. And for the King to think of making himself absolute, and govern only by an Army, (like the *French Kings*) by an Army of *Frenchmen*, is so ridiculous that I thought it not worthy of consideration. Can any man in his wits imagine his Majesty of *England* so senseless, as to give his Crowns and Kingdoms to the *French King*? For that is all one with this in effect.

As for that of *Revenge*, either for *Chattam*, or the affronts mentioned in his Declaration of this War, or both: I considered his *Temper*, which hath so much *Clemency*, that it rather inclines him to *Lenity* than *Cruelty* and *Revenge*. As is abundantly apparent, not only by passing, but even forcing (as I know he did, against some addicted to the latter extrem) the *Act of Indempnity* or *Oblivion*, for those many and great Injuries he had suffered from his Subjects. And his Government since, in conniving at the violation of such Laws as are thought severe in matters of Religion, and indulging Liberty therein: which hath made some that have sufficiently heretofore cried up Parliaments, now run into the other extrem, and cry them down as fast; and instead of the Parliaments formerly, now magnifie the Kings Favour and Clemency. And yet Kings and Princes are men, and men subject to like Passions with others, liable to suggestions from those about them, and tender of their Honour as the Apple of their Eye. And therefore I will grant this might come in consideration, but not so much, I dare say, as alone to make a War.

For the *Prince of Orange*, there was not only near Relation and Affection, but Interest also to be considered. For the *Lovesteyns* Party having been so cross to *England* upon his Account, and the correspondent friendship between us so uncertain without his Headship; I verily believe that if what is now done therein had been done timoussly, it had wholly prevented this Unhappy War. Yea, besides the extraordinary Affection which
the

the people have for the Prince, our very Bores had this Policy, and were more than ordinary zealous for his promotion, as the best means to procure their peace.

As to the further interest of the Kingdom of *England*, in regard of their Trade, and Naval expences, I have expressed my thoughts before in the *Preface*.

It is true, this War was always intricate, and hath proved a Game at Hazard for *England*, beyond not only theirs, I believe, but all the worlds expectation. But yet if it be still notwithstanding cautiously played, as they may, and so far as I can possibly discern, mean to play it; they can many ways come to save their stakes, at the least, if not to win more than we imagine by the War: and was far fairer at first than *France* for winning by the game in all humane appearance, as I could manifest by many Arguments. But because that concerns them two only, and us not at all further than our sufferings, I shall wave them (at least for the present) and proceed. For I will not hearken to the curious enquiries of those who would here be asking, how I think *England* will play their game? for that let them look to it whom it concerns on all sides, and doubtless they will; for me to express my private thoughts, might do more hurt than good, which is the only thing I aim at: and what I think the Issue will be, I shall declare hereafter in my *Conjectures*.

But here it will be asked, seeing it is *Englands* interest that we fall not into the hands of *France*, and that the Prince is now promoted, will they not make peace with us this Winter?

I must needs say, I fear they will not, except we should give them such terms, as I see we shall not; we thinking our condition far better, and they think it far worse, that really it is. For the cause of this, as of most Wars, is complex, as I have shewn; so that though two of those I assigned may be past, yet the 3d of the Kingdoms interest, is not. They are already too far engaged in the War, and with *France*. The Kings Honour is at the stake, and the Kingdoms expectation of another Issue than the last War. And besides all these, how can any wise man imagine, now that they are engaged with *France*, and have an advantage against us, as well as a Hazard from *France*; that if they know how to secure themselves against the latter (as I suppose they do) they will let go the former? For we must needs think they will be at a certainty on one side or the other; and not part with *France's* friendship, till they be sure of our satisfaction. What it is they demand, or how rightly, is not now our design to discourse, but only matter of Interest all along. And yet I can easily foresee that the danger of our becoming *French*, will be a singular advantage to us, as an inducement to them, for a more easie compliance with us. But at present I see no probability of Peace, but that they will go through with the War: or continue it so long, till they have tried their utmost to obtain their ends.

I know there are many wise men amongst us, that think the King can-

not carry on this War: as there was that thought he could not begin it. The former they find themselves deceived in, and will be so in the latter also. I have discoursed this with several in Government, who argue that the King hath not mony of himself to go through with this War, and that he will not convene the Parliament, or if he do, they will not supply him. I grant the first, but deny the others. For if we rightly consider their designe, the Parliament must meet, and the representation that will be made thereof, and the constitution of the Parliament, they will grant him supplies; though perhaps not with that facility, that they did it within the former War. And therefore let us neither flatter nor deceive our selves with vain hopes herein; but rather seek timely to accommodate differences, before their preparations in the Spring; for I fear the longer we delay, the worse it will be with us.

SECT. 10. *Compliance with England the only means of the Commonwealths continuation.*

HAVING thus declared the condition that we are in, and that there is no probability of peace; we come now to shew the consequences thereof, and what is to be done by us, to preserve our selves from ruine and destruction. And here to my understanding one of these three things must necessarily follow: That we must either continue the War against them both, or comply with them both; or with one of them alone if possible we can. We shall first declare our thoughts concerning these briefly, and then shew with which we both may and must comply.

1. Then whether we should continue the War against them both. And herein would we do, as we might and should; it may be this were better, than to comply with either of them, especially if they will impose upon us unreasonable conditions, and much better than to comply with them both. We have strength enough, through Gods blessing, to withstand them (as I have already manifested) if we have but courage, and unanimity? and the former of these will be got by degrees, as I have said, and our own interest, and preservation should perswade us into the latter. But truly let me say it freely, I see such a weariness in many of the War; such an unwillingness to lay out our selves, as our Ancestors did formerly, for the good of the publick; such a selfish temper, every one seeking to preserve his particular interest, and neglecting the good of the Community; and such a loathness to adventure our lives and estates in a War; that I see little probability of preserving our selves, and much less of prevalency against our Enemies. So that if this War continue, I fear these provinces will become a prey to them both. For though neither *France* will suffer *England*, nor *England* *France* to have them all, as I have shewn? yet they will part and share them betwixt them, except we prevent it by a compliance

pliance. And what a miserable condition we shall then be in, even worse than if we were under either of them, I have formerly declared. Seeing then we are so degenerate, and become like *Iffachar*, which his Father stiles a *Strong Ass*, and says of him, that *He saw that rest was good, and the land that it was pleasant; and bowed his shoulder to bear, and became a servant unto it* bute: we must either take courage and be unanimous, valiantly fighting it out with our enemies; or for the present be contented with this character and condition. Will we then fight for our *Religion, Liberty, Country, Families, Estates, Trades?* or will we not? If the former, let me encourage all in the words of *Joab* that great General and brave Souldier, wherewith he encouraged the *Israelites*, when he had his enemies before and behind him, *Be of good courage, and let us play the men for our people and for the Cities of our God: and the Lord do that which seemeth him good.* But if the rest be so good, and the Land so pleasant to us, that we will rather bow our shoulders, and become servants, than shew our faces in the field to fight with our enemies; let us see what *Master* we should chuse, and agree with him upon the best terms we can.

Gen. 49.
14. 15.

2 Sam. 10
12.

2. Therefore, shall we comply with both our enemies? surely if reason, and what we can give, will satisfie them; every wise man will say *Yes*, that we may enjoy the many blessings God hath given us in peace. But if they will have such *Cities*, such *vast sums of money*, and such *Conditions*, as we cannot give them, except we be ruined thereby; who will not say, *No*. We must therefore consider if there be no other way practicable, to save ourselves, from the devouring Sword of our Enemies.

3. There is no way therefore left us, but to comply with one of our Enemies, if we can possibly, that so we may ballance the others power, and either compel him to a Peace, or be enabled to continue the War. If any one know any other way, I heartily wish he would shew it, as I think he is bound to do one way or other; for every one ought to contribute his best assistance, even by the principles of self-preservation. And *Solomon* tells us, *There was a poor wise man, who by his wisdom delivered the City, though no man remembered him*, and infers thence, that *wisdom is better than strength, though the poor mans wisdom is despised, and his words are not heard.* Yet surely notwithstanding that poor man did but his duty; though he was but poorly requited for his pains.

Eccles. 9.
15, 16.

But I believe most will grant the way is good, but impracticable, in regard of the League betwixt the two Crowns, and that they will not treat asunder, &c. Well then, let us proceed to consider these things a little, and see whether we cannot level these mountains of difficulties that are before us, and make our way become plain and passable.

1. With which of these our Euemies we should chuse to comply, I think I have made sufficiently apparent; in shewing it our *Interest*, rather to be under *England* than *France*, and to have peace and correspondent friendship for our *Sea-traffic*, with the former rather than with the latter, if we

cannot have it from them both. And I am sure this was the wisdom of our Ancestors, who in their low condition A.D. 1575. deliberating into whose Protection they should give themselves over, first declared the Empire, and the competition coming between the Crowns of *England & France*, prefer'd the former upon many and weighty considerations, related by their Historians, and very many of our own, which are so well known I need not mention them; and *Boxhornius* the Author of the *Disquisitiones Politicæ*. The *Civil Wars* of France, the inveterate feud betwixt French and Dutch, those especially that live upon the Confines of both Countries; the hard yolk of the French Government; the levity of that Nation; its liableness to be invaded by the Spanish; the incommodiousness of their Ports for our Ships and Navigation; made them averse to France. And on the contrary, The Reformed Religion of the English, their greater likeness with us in geniom and language, the nearness of the Country, the multitude of their Ports, their commodiousness for our Commerce, the multiplicity of the English Manufactures and Commodities, the Country not easily invaded; strong and potent by Sea and Land; not frequently imbroiled in Civil Wars; a free People; the Government temperate, and not burthensome with Exactions; and the Interest of the English Nation, which if these Countries were conquered, would scarce be able to resist the Conqueror; clearly inclined them for England. You see then that Reasons of State direct us to the same choice, which our Ancestors heretofore wisely made.

2. Seeing then we must chuse *England*, not only for the Common Interest of the Protestant Religion, but for our own greatest, both religious and civil concernments. We shall now remove those obstructions that seem to block up our way to Compliance.

It is objected that the two Crowns are in a League, that neither will treat without the other, and how can we then comply with *England* alone?

I confess if all Statesmen were *Aristides's*, the Argument might be strong. For he having heard by command of the *Athenian Senate*, *Themistocles's*, design of burning their enemies Fleet, made report, that it was very profitable, but no ways honest, upon which it was rejected. Or if they were all *Stoicks*, and held that honesty, equity, and utility were all one, and with good old *Socrates*, cursed those that first separated these, as learned men tell us. But we see it is far otherwise now in the World; and that the *Peripateticks* doctrine that *honestum* and *utile* are really distinguished, is every where prevalent, and no where more, than amongst *Politicians*; which hath occasioned that known saying, that all States are *Atheists*. I do not approve any, and much less so high uncharitableness; but this I will say, that as the world goes now, all States must be considered as *Gamesters*. And what if I should say, that neither of the Courts are so strait laced in their Consciences, but were they assured from us of such conditions as they require, they would let the other go and get theirs as they could? Nay, what if I should say, there may be none iniquity in this? If I should, I think I can prove it, for if in mutual covenants, either side do that, which is a breach; it is folly to

ambden
nnales
Elizabetha
1575.
buanus
b. 60.
asus 20.

Plutarch.
in vita
Aristid.

Plutarch.
lib. 4.
Sympos.
Cicer. 3.
Offic. & 1.
de Leg.

to think that the innocent should be bound, and the peccant party free; which they may know, though others do not, as it is clear in the strongest covenant, that is in the World, I mean that of Wedlock. I do not say that this is so betwixt them, but I say it may be so though we do not know it, so that either of them in such case, may conclude with us. And I am sure it is no dishonesty on our part.

But it will here be said, they will not.

Do not tell me that, I know they either of them will. And if any one asks me, how? and if I be of their Cabinet Council? I shall only smile, perceiving they do not know me. I am far from that, or having ever to do with Kings or States in that kind, or pragmatically trinketing with State affairs, it being a Rule which I live by, *never to ask great men mercy*. Common favour and justice I desire of men, but mercy only of my God. And yet I know this very well, and I will tell you how, and that is from their *Interest*; which is the Compass, by which all States-men steer their course, and may be discerned by a skilful passenger, although he sit not at the helm. If any man be so ignorant of the affairs of the World, as to think that States-men trouble their heads with the *School-mens quiddities*, and *heccities*, or their Consciences with *Casuistical niceties*, as a late *German Divine* that puts the case, whether we should pray *Vader Onse*, or *Onse Vader*, and learnedly concludes that custom must carry it; let him enjoy his opinion, it is very charitable, and can do no hurt. But yet I may say, that for above 20. years I have observed, that the custome of the World carries it with them, and have known few, I had almost said none, of the strictest Sect of the *Pharisees*; though I have some, and my charity obliges me to hope there are many, that seriously mind the *weightier things of the Law, Justice, Righteousness, Temperance, and the World to come*.

Now that this is the Interest of both the Kings, rather to deal with us apart, than jointly, as well as ours, I could many ways make apparent. But seeing it is our Interest to chuse *England*, we shall prove only that it is theirs to comply with us; omitting that of *France*, as superfluous to our purpose.

1. They know they cannot wholly conquer us themselves. Not only in regard of our own strength, of which I haven spoken before, but the *French*, which are in the Country already, and if they were not, would never permit it, as I have formerly shown sufficiently. Nay, I dare say, they never designed any such thing, because they know it is impracticable: that being always true of the *Greeks*, *αδυνατα ε βυλευσα*. or things impossible come not into consideration. I doubt not but they both intend and hope to have their share, what ever it is that is agreed upon between the two Crowns, in case of Conquest; but that they should have the whole, could never so much as be dreamt of by them.

2. They know also that it is their Interest, never to suffer *France* to have all, no nor any of these Maritime Provinces. If he have some of the superior,

perior, that is the utmost their interest can permit. Nay indeed he is nearer these inferiour, than that will allow, if they could help it, but that's now past. What disadvantage it will be to the *English*, to let *France* have footing upon our Coasts, and so come to cope with them at Sea, I have formerly shewn: and I know they are very sensible of it; and therefore may well infer a willingness on their parts to a compliance.

3. The *Prince of Orange* his Interest being also theirs, cannot but sway something with them. For if it had been Gods will those Kingdoms had continued in Peace, and the Succession of the Royal Reign uninterrupted there, and the *Orange* Family continued alive and in power here, I perswade my self we should never have Warred with one another; so I doubt not, if it please God to preserve his Highness, that they may confide more in our friendship than they could formerly, he will be a happy Instrument of a better understanding between the Nations, when these unhappy quarrels come oncè to be compos'd; because this is their Interest as well as ours, and it is Interest that rules and reigns in the World.

And thus I have shewn you that we *may*, I shall now shew briefly that we *must* comply with them, or without a Miracle of Mercy we are ruined.

I. Because if the War continues, and we be too weak to make strong resistance, so that our Enemies prevail, they will share the Country betwixt them, and then we fall into the worst condition that can possibly befall us. It is true, I fore-see that several particular Persons may save themselves and their Estates by Friends on the one side or the other; but I speak of the community; and it is well if the hopes many have of that, make them not more negligent for this. There are two famous Republicks in *Ialy*, *Venice*, and *Genoa*; and what is the cause of the formers flourishing so much more than the latter, which was anciently both their better and their Master? but this, that the *Venetians* are more intent upon the Publick, and the *Genoese* upon their private Concernments, whereby they become obnoxious not only to many Factions among themselves, but also to oppressions from their Neighbours. I could say more herein of our selves, than I shall at present, in regard it might create more jealousies (which are already too many) of those that are, or at least have been in Government amongst us. But though I will accuse none, yet I must needs say, that I ascribe a great part of our present miseries to this *Genoan* practice; and heartily wish this prove not fatal to us at last.

2. Because if we be not senseless we may clearly see, that *France's* design is absolutely to conquer us: whereas *England* seeks only (to use their expression) their own security. And therefore in my Logick the inference is plain, that we had better part with something, than lose all, as we are like to do, if we come not to a compliance with *England*. To make these apparent to any wise man, would be the lighting a Torch to the Sun. Although I know the quite contrary is cast out among us by the Friends of *France*; who would perswade us; that the *French* seek only to humble us,

us, and the *English* to conquer us. But we know the minding of Men is but shooting at random, and that he that means to come near the Truth, must have his Eye upon the *Mark of Interest*, which cannot lye, as men do frequently for it. If any be so foolish as to be enchanted with such *Sirens Songs* as are daily sung amongst us, and have more regard to publick news than the Interest of Nations; they may go on, I cannot hinder them: but let me tell them, that I fear they will find at last the Poets Fiction a real Truth; and if they steer their own course, meet with the Seamens fate in the Fable, be sung asleep for a time, that so they may be afterwards with greater facility drowned and devoured.

3. Because there is no other way or humane means left us (so far as I can discern) of the Commonwealths continuation. And this is the Conclusion that follows clearly from the Premises. For if we be unable to withstand them both, or satisfy them both, we must either break their Confederacy, and have the help of one of them; or the Republick will be ruined.

It will be here demanded, seeing it is both *Englands* Interest, and our own to accord, why we do not then come to a Compliance?

I will tell you why. Because we judge our Condition better, and they judge it worse than really it is; and therefore stand upon greater terms than we will give them. We think things will go better with us in time, and they think they will grow worse. We flatter our selves with vain hopes, and rely upon *Brandenburghs* Assistance, *Spains* breaking with our Enemies, the *Parliament of Englands* not supplying that King to carry on the War, and the like, when they know the quite contrary in all humane appearance. Or perhaps we are afraid to irritate *France*, if we should make overtures to *England*; and *England* will not give such an umbrage of Jealousie to *France*, as to tamper with us, except they be first assured from us of satisfaction. But cannot the effecting this be put into the hands of his *Highness*, and a few others, as it was lately, to be privately transacted by them? Here then it is that the Shoe pinches, We are a Popular State, the People still think, till an Enemy comes, they can defend themselves, and therefore our Governours dare not adventure to tender *England* such satisfaction as (for ought I see) they will have, lest they either should not be able to perform it, or if they do should lose themselves with the People. And therefore I foresee the War will be continued till we be reduced to that condition that we shall be necessitated to give them both their Demands by Publick Transaction, or at least that way break with one of them. And on this Foundation I shall now proceed to guess at that which I think is most likely to befall us.

SECT. II. *Conjectures of future Affairs.* The motions of the ensuing Summer likely to be quick and great. As to this Republick, probably England may get a Bridle to curb us, France the Saddle to ride w, Colen a supernumerary Girth, Munster a Boss of the Crupper. Our Condition deplorred and consolated. A caution for England and the Orange-Family. The Authors Fears of what will at last befall us. The Spanish Netherlands a dying. The Friendship of England and France sick at heart, and cannot live long. That of Spain and England sound at heart, and will recover.

ALTHOUGH I have sometimes spent almost whole nights at gazing on the Stars, and could perhaps erect an Astrological Scheme as well as another; yet I never used that way, nor never shall, for guessing at *Futures*; because I know it is vain to think we can spell Gods Providence, by their mystical Hieroglyphick. Yet let me say it without vanity, I do believe I have made as many conjectures concerning Kingdoms, States and particular places, as any man of my quality in *Europe*: not by any Enthusiastick Spirit of Prophecy, or by Astrology from the Stars; but reasons of State, their Interest, and the fundamental Maxims of their Government; sometimes out of curiosity only, and sometimes for other ends, but such as are honest I assure you, for none are either better or worse by it but only my Brothers and my self. The reason why I adventure to do this publicly now, is that I may awaken us out of our security, and that we may look about us, and see if possibly we can prevent those things which it is very probable are coming upon us. Onely I desire to do it modestly, as it becomes every Christian; and neither on the one hand to pretend to that certainty as if we were of Gods Council, nor on the other hand to fall under *Christs* rebuke for *not discerning the Signs of the times*, which are both theological and political, but I am now only treating of the latter, and to that I shall confine my discourse.

Now that we may be quickned to defend our selves, comply with *England*, and free the *Spanish Netherlands* from their fears, and our selves from the Neighbourhood of the *French* there, (this being one Reason of State why we formerly made Peace with *Spain*, lest we should be in continual danger of annoyance from *France*) and also render their maintaining their Conquests among us more difficult, by their being kept unconnected with that Kingdom: I shall now proceed to the *Conjectures* I have made, not with an Astrological Confidence, but a Christian allowance of divine Providence, which strangely alters times and seasons, pulls down one and sets up another, confounds the Wisdom of the Wise, brings to nought the counsels of *Achitophels*, and turns the great Designs and Preparations for War, into a happy compliance and peace as he pleases, and all in infinite Wisdom, though we cannot discern it, the knowledge of Gods
provi-

Provide even when past or present, and much more for future, being to *David*, & therefore far more to us. *Too wonderful for us, so high that we cannot* Psal. 139.
attain unto it; and so deep in the great waters, that the footsteps thereof are not
to be traced and known. So that we may well say, as of old, *Dei sapientia,* Psal. 77.
& hominum stultitia regunt mundum. First then, if we awake out of our secu-
rity, and look up in the morning of the year, we must needs conclude of *foul*
weather the ensuing Summer; *the Skie is so red*, that we may easily perceive it
portends blood; and the lowest Region *is so lowering*, that we may easily *discern*
that a tempestuous storm is a gathering; except we be so befotied, as the
foolish *Jews* of old, with security, *that we cannot discern, as Christ tells them,*
the signs of the times, Can all *Europe* almost be Arming, and we asleep in
the Bed of Security, dreaming of Peace? Besides the incredible preparations
of *France*; is not *England*, *Swedeland*, and all our Neighbours almost up
and at work; and can we think they would be at that Cost, for a Comedy of
Peace? have we not all the reason in the world, to think it will be to us, a
Tragedy of War? Let others enjoy their opinion, and not take the Alarm,
till they see *Hambul ad portus*; for my part I must needs profess, I cannot,
from what I observe, but conclude, that the affairs of the ensuing Summer, are
like to be great, and the motions thereof quick, and such as will highly con-
cern us in these Countreys.

As to this Republick, which hath at this time these four declared Enemies,
England, *France*, *Colen*, and *Munster*; I shall briefly speak my thoughts,
with reference to them all.

England probably will get a *bridle* over us. I have shewn in the *Preface*,
what they account the *Interest* of the Kingdom: We see notwithstanding the
Prince of Orange his Promotion, they still pursue the War; and must we not then conclude,
that they seek something further? Whether they will by Sea attacque our Coasts, or by
marching their Army about over Land, is not for me to determine; much less
what particular places below they may fall upon, or what success they may have.
Yet I conclude they will have some bank or other upon our Naval power,
one way or other, before they make Peace with us; otherwise they will continue
the War the following Summer, to try their utmost, to get that which we will
not give them.

France that is already got into the Saddle, will there sit and ride us,
though we flatter our selves, we shall by one means or other shake him
out of it, and off our backs. Truly I cannot but wonder often times, to
hear what vain hopes men express; and there's no contradicting them;
(although sometimes I cannot contain my self from smiling, or shaking
my head) that *France* must be content with one or two of our Cities which
we can best spare, and with a confidence almost as large, as if they were
ready to run away, or resolved to march out and quit those Cities they
have, at our pleasure. As if the *French* were such fools, to be at that
vast Expence, great Pains, even the King himself personally, and have
such

such advantage upon us, and quit the lame for a thing of nothing? For my part, I am afraid they will rather get more, then lose that they have gotten already. And I know, their design is, to get all at last. It is true, if we comply with *England*, and so strengthen our selves by them and *Spain*, we may thereby hope either to obtain better conditions by Treaty, or compell them thereunto by Force. But I am speaking of the state of the War, as now it stands.

Colen, that pretends to some of those Cities which we held about the *Rhyne*, that are now in the power and possession of the *French*, may possibly for his pains, and permission of their passage, &c. get some *supernumerary girth*, one place or other that may be of no great concernment to *France*, either for their designs upon us, or the Empire, and must be contented therewith. And perhaps for some time his Counsellors may have their Pensions continued from *France*.

Munster, that is mercenary and fights for Money, will get a bos off the crupper, ; *French Lewis's* made and minted of *Dutch Ducats*. For elective *Princes*, as *Bishops*, that are only for life, seek more to enrich themselves, then to enlarge their Territories, as those do that are hereditary.

And this is likely, so far as I can see, to prove our condition; except *Σεδ, ἀπὸ μηχανῆς* appear in the Tragedy, or God Almighty by some wonderful providence, make a change in the Scene of this War. Which, I confess, is very deplorable, which way soever we look; and we are not so sensible of it now, as we shall be hereafter. I had thought here to have sit down a little with a lamentation, but I have been so large already, that I shall wholly wave it for the present.

And yet it is a bad wind that blows no good, we may make this advantage of our miseries, so long as we remain amidst our Enemies, when a Peace is once concluded; that we may hold them both fair to us, and so secure our selves a little more in quiet, then we perhaps think, by being ready to close with either, to the great prejudice of the other.

And therefore let me freely insert this important and necessary Caution for *England*, That they take heed they do not over-do their work; and so far irritate this Republick, that out of a present prejudice and passion, and also desperation of their future quietness from them, they call in the *French*, to be revenged of them, though it be to their own ruine.

I know many are jealous, that this whole War is only to make the *Prince of Orange* a *Monarch*, and the two Crowns will have no more to do with the States; although I profess, I am far from thinking, that those two Kings and Kingdoms would be at all this expence of blood and treasure for that end only; and do believe that if that would set us in our former condition, it would soone be assented unto; not only by the multitude, but the wisest men amongst us; who know the extraordinary abilities and great capacities of his Highness. Therefore let me say it freely without offence, either of Him or his Enemies, that I perceive many lay this for a

fundam-

fundamental Maxim, *Better a Prince that hath power to defend us, than one whom we must only defend.* And except my eye-sight fail me, some are fast at work in preparing materials to build thereon. A word is enough to the wise, and therefore I will say no more.

Nay, I will not dissemble my further fears, That if *France* keeps those places on the South Sea, and should get others lower, either in *Holland* or *Friesland*, as may capacitate him to incommode their Trade, though we should have peace for some time with him, we shall fall into his hands at last. For the *French* are already so near us on every side, that they hover over us, as a Hawk over the prey, watching only an opportunity, how they may grasp us in their talons.

If any shall here ask me, Why may we not then, as well now become *French*?

I also shall ask such one Question, which when they satisfy me in, I also shall them. You know certainly you must dye at last, (whereas here is only uncertain fears) and yet when you are sick, why do you take Physick, and use means for recovery? Is it not because you desire to live as long as you can? Do you not account him a mad man, that will cast away his life, although he must lose it at the last? And rightly, because who knows what God may do, and whether he may not recover him, though the disease be desperate?

Having spoke our thoughts concerning these united, we shall now speak of the *Spanish* Provinces. I have as much smattering skill in Physick, I confess, as would serve me to make *Charon* a freight of old Wives; yet I am far from being arrived at the confidence, which I have observed in *Urinal Doctors*. And yet for once, I will adventure to try the little skill I have, with those *State-Mountebancks*, that are so secure concerning the *Spanish* *Neiberlands*. For my part, I have shak't their water again and again, and can find nothing but symptoms of death. I shall only promise, that I shall not with an Empirical confidence tell you the time: Kingdoms and States, as well as private persons, sometimes languish out, rather than live their last, but that they are so sick, that I see no hopes of their Recovery if this War continues. And I will tell you my fears for the ensuing Summer.

1. The incredible preparations that *France* makes this Winter, both of Men and Money, as if they would set all at stake for carrying on the following Summers Wars.

2. The Empire's Army is over-matched with *Turen's*. They know, that we are not in a capacity to recover the Cities we have lost, and that they cannot conquer those that remain; so that their Armies cannot be designed either for strengthening their own Garrisons, or forcing of ours. Except they will spend a Summers Expedition upon some inconsiderable out-Garrisons, which I cannot imagine.

3. I have looked round about in *Europe*, where this storm should fall,

and can see no place it hovers over, except those Provinces, and our selves.

4. I consider the eminent advantage *France* hath at present by their Friendship with *England*; which I fear he will take.

5. Although I do not think *France* will prevail by all his endeavours with *England* to break with *Spain*; yet I think *England* will either be employed in doing their own work, or not so quickly break with *France*, to stop his carreer in over-running those *Neitherlands*.

6. We shall either have the Wars continue, or a Peace. If the former as they are, though *England* helps not therein, (for they profess in the Declaration to maintain the Treaty at *Aken*) yea, though they would hinder it, yet I do not see how they can practically; if they have not prevented it beforehand by their Treaty; nor we to be sure the Wars continuing. If a Peace be concluded, we shall be forced to forsake them; this being the main ground of the quarrel. For if we would have helped *France* to have ruined them, we might have been quiet for some time at least: but because we had rather quench, then set our neighbours house on fire, lest ours follow it in the flames, *France* hath fallen upon us, and shall we not then think that he will cudgel us into such conditions? It is true indeed, if *England* and we come to understand one another, and our joynt interest better, we may succour them for some time: but that's not my supposal, of the Wars continuing as they are, which in that case implies a strange complication of diseases, which to me, who knows not their Treaty, seems incurable.

7. And where else they should have assistance to save them, if *France* will fall upon them, I see not. For the Empire cannot, it is well if they can save themselves. *Spain* is at a great distance; May make perhaps some diversion in *Catalonia*, or some small from *Millan*, &c. But what's that to save those Provinces?

8. We must therefore consider if they stand on their own leggs, so as to withstand their Enemies power, and not to be thrown down thereby. And here we shall find the number of *Spanish* inconsiderable; the *Dutch* very wavering and uncertain: Some Popish Zealots thinking *France* can best carry on their designs; others betwixt hopes and fears, wishing they might see an issue, and others plainly despairing of resistance, desiring they were over. Their Cities great and untenable, several of them requiring almost as many to man them well, as they have *Spanish* in the Countrey. If they can make good *Bruxels*, *Antwerp*, *Namur*, and *Ostend*, for some time, to see if the affairs of *Europe* may not alter, it is all I expect. But what shall become of the whole Countrey, and the rest of the Cities, *Bruges*, *Mechlin*, *Gant*, *Lovain*, &c. Some of them as large as most Cities in *Europe*. Three Noblemen, *An. 1427*. (as *Guicciardine* tells us) with great charges, had five of the greatest Cities on this side the *Alpes* measured, and found but 18 Rods or Perches difference. Of which *Lovain* and *Gant*, the greatest: *Paris* (within the Walls) and *Liege* alike; *Colen* the least. But neglecting to mention the just measure, *Guicciardine* tells us they

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Lovani.

are 6 *Italian* miles within, and above 8 without the walls. And though this be enough, yet I must needs think them more. For having had the curiosity to measure one of them for all, I found it upon a warm walking within the Walls, three full hours by my Watch. And besides this, *Paris* and *Liege* are most populous, *Colen* next, but these of the *Netherlands* least: so that I leave any rational man to judge what number of men they require to maintain them, For I will not now stand to make that calculation. Now if he takes these two great Cities, he is in the heart of *Brabant* and *Flanders*, so that all the rest will fall of themselves. I conclude therefore, that except the Treaty between *France* and *England* secure them, which is unknown to me; or that God in his all-wise Providence, make some wonderful change in the Scene of affairs in *Europe*, the *Spanish Netherlands* are lost. Having therefore tolled their passing Bell, we will leave them to Gods mercy, and the King of *France's* clemency, and hast us out of them to *France* and *England*.

And here many perhaps will think me little better than mad, to cross the current opinion of Christendom; when I say that the *Friendship of France and England*, is sick at heart, and cannot live long; and the contrary of that between *England* and *Spain*. But I matter not that, other men have their way of making their measures, and I have mine. And indeed I thought to have communicated it, but this working having already exceeded my intentions, and that would be a great digression, I would only tell you my grounds or reasons for the present, why I think so, and may happily make a particular discourse of the other hereafter.

How *France* and *England* came to be so great Friends as to agree to commence, and carry on a War thus far against us, is not now mine enquiry; but to shew there is no such ground to despair of compliance with *England*, notwithstanding their present League with *France*, is my design. And for this end I shall first shew that though this Friendship is fair outwardly, each for their own ends; yet that it is not so cordial and firm, as many amongst us fear it is. And to say the truth, the consideration hereof, was the first dawning of hopes I had, for the Protestant Interest, and the good of these Countreies. Now although I could mention some more private expostulations, and perhaps, some of their Articles, although I could by no means, ever procure from either side, the knowledge of them all: yet I think it not fit to mention these, but such things only as are publick, and others as well as my self may know, if they use their eyesight, and observation.

Let us then omitting all secrets and Mysteries of State, which yet are the best grounds to make a judgment, when certainly known; we will only mention such things as are publickly apparent, but being not considered in subordination to Reasons of State, were unuseful to the most, for the end I have observed them.

When all *Europe* stood in doubt what *England* would do, and all men on their

their tiptoes with expectation; to see whether War or Peace, betwixt that Kingdom and these Countries: upon the *Smyrna's* Fleet return, the doubts of many were then decided. The Saturday morning early after the fight, the *Fiscale* sent his Footman to tell me they had fought, with some generals thereof, and that the Fleet was before the Land: I must confess, I stood amazed at *Holmes's* furious folly, who had orders only to bring them up, not to commence a War, the Declaration thereof being not published; although to those that would not submit to such orders, it was all one effect, though not in formalities, which are the greatest plea that I know of, that the *English* have for that Action. Upon this I began to consider the Reasons of State as to *England*, both domestick and foreign; For I reasoned thus, if this Friendship be so firm, that *England* will go through with *France* in all their great designs, I must make other measures then I had formerly done. But still finding all Reasons of State against this, and those jealousies of changing *Religion* and the *Government* in those Kingdoms frivolous, (as I have demonstrated) I found also thereby stronger grounds of hope for the Protestant Religion and common Intrest of *Europe*; and that it was only a temporary Friendship, out of some particular peake, or design against these Provinces, which would have an end when satisfaction therein was given to that Crown. Whilst I am busie in balancing all the Reasons of State for those Kingdoms, and likewise for their Intrest abroad as comprehensively as I could, the Protestants intrest, the Triple Alliance, the greatness of *France*, the danger of *England*, &c comes the *English* Declaration of War to mine hands, but without a particular date, contrary to practise, but wisely to colour what *Holms* had done. Which having diligently perused, what I desired first to see, I found last to my great satisfaction, and that is that they would support the peace made at *Aix la Chappelle*, (or *Aken*) and notwithstanding the prosecution of the War, will maintain the true intent & scope of the said Treaty & that in all their Alliances which they have or shall make in the progress of this War, they have & will take care, to preserve the ends thereof inviolable, unless provoked to the contrary. Whereby I was fully confirmed in my former opinion, so that I will now proceed to relate such things which have publickly past in the management of this War, that are sufficient I think to induce those that are unprejudiced, though perhaps not to convince the obstinate, to be of the same opinion with my self, and that the Friendship of *England* and *France* is not so firm as they have feared. Promising that though all States, as Gamesters, must and will be cautious in their playing their parts, yet there appeared still more than ordinary jealousies of each others Friendship all along, in the management of this War,

1. It is observable that though *France* is the Principal in the War, yet they were so diffident of *England*, that they would have them first to begin it, that so they might see them certainly Engaged against us,

2. When they are both Engaged, they trust not one another, without great

great *Hoftages* as it were on both fides; the *French* Squadron of Ships with the *English*, and the *Duke of Monmouth* with the body of an Army with the *French*.

3. That body of the *English*, which doubtlefs fhould have remained together under their own general Officers, conjoynd with the *French* Army, we know was not trusted by the *French* fo to do, but were mingled here and there, under the principal command of the *French* Generals.

4. The Fleet wherein the *English* had the principal fhare of power and command, only faced ours at firft in point of Honour; yet attacked them not, though they had the wind, whereby they might eafily have done it at their pleaſure, and alfo to their advantage, but ſtood over again to the *English* Coaft. Which fools thought was want of Valour, but wife men will judge it reaſon of State, that they might ſtay and obſerve what ſucceſs the *French* had by Land. And had we not fallen upon them, for Reaſons of State in thoſe circumſtances and Government of theſe Provinces that are well known, I think they would have done as little as they could for *France*, to have fought us to this day.

5. After that fight, though they knew ſeveral of their Ships were laid up, and ſome thouſands of men called out of the Fleet, yet notwithstanding all the Summer after for many weeks, they attempted nothing againſt us with their Fleet. Intending doubtlefs to do their own work, as they then ſay *France* did theirs.

6. How the *English* were ſtartled, at the *French*'s coming to *Ulrecht* was very apparent, which we have formerly mentioned.

7. Why might not *England*, as well as the reſt of the World, think that *Weſel*, *Rijnberg*, *Skenker*, *Sconſe*, and the reſt of our ſtrong out-Garrifons might give the *French* ſufficient work? And the *French* on the contrary, who had laid their trains before hand, know that when they came to fire them, there was no fear they would miſs, and they ſhould fail of having thoſe places? Yea why may they not deſign by this means to break both our powers ſo by Sea, that they may riſe up to contend with either of us? I am ſure theſe things are very uſual with Princes and States, and examples of this kind are infinite. Why may we not then think that *England* might hereby deſign to break *France*'s power by Land, and *France* *Englands* power, and ours alſo by Sea? How often theſe two Crowns have played ſuch like games with one another formerly; when *England* had footing in *France*, is apparent from the Hiſtories of both Nations. But we will ſpeak of that which more nearly concerns our ſelves, and within our own knowledge. In our firſt War with *England*, I obſerved, what influence *Don Alonzo*, the Reſident for *Spain* at *London*, had, to foment thoſe jealousies that that Common-wealth had of this, that it was the Kings-
cauſe, which this Republick by means of the *Orange* Family had eſpouſed, and what aſſiſtance *Spain*, (which firſt publickly acknowledged that Common-wealth) would afford them, &c. And when we were both engaged

gaged, how the *Spanish* drew their Forces towards our Frontiers, as if they also would fall upon us, and when we declined, withdrew them again, to encourage us both to continue the War. And in our second War, if *France* had not a great hand both in contriving and continuing it, wise men are much deceived, and the *French* misrepresented to the World. By what inducements they persuaded both sides to a willingness to that War, I list not to mention, nor is there much necessity thereof, they being so well known to several of both Nations. What a hand they had in its continuation, we may easily perceive, if we recollect but what passed therein. When the *English* in the first Battle had beaten us, *France* being only a *Spectator* to ballance *England*, becomes our Second; and *Monsieur*, the Kings only Brother, and his Lady, *Englands* only Sister, were not permitted to use any publick expressions of joy by Bonfires, or otherwise for their Brother the *Duke of Yorks* Victory over *Opdan*. Their Fleet under *de Duke of Beaufort* shall come to our assistance, which occasioned the dividing the *Englishs*, by which means, and *Monks* precipitancy (who would needs fight contrary to the advice of the chief and best Commanders in the Fleet, as *Ascough* told us in the *Hague*) the *English* are beaten by us. And to Buoy up *England* again, a private League is made between the two Crowns, as I have formerly declared from an Honourable Author. So that these tricks of State are usual, though not discerned by every eye; nor dare I censure them always for sinful, except I see manifestly foul play, because I know not the Reasons of State, which are the Grounds of their proceedings.

Having thus shewn, and I think sufficiently, that the Friendship of England and France is sick at heart; I shall now proceed to shew, that it cannot live long, but if France goes one, will and must dye quickly.

1. *Englands* Interest will persuade them to this, which they cannot but discern clearly prompts them to put a stop to *France's* Progress. If any think that they are so blinded with Passion, that to be revenged of us, they will ruine themselves: I am not of their opinion, for many Reasons, which I think I am clear in; although I shall not mention them now, but only appeal to the issue, whether they or I be in the dark and deceived.

2. The many tricks that *France* plays them, some whereof I have hinted, and several others might be mentioned, that I know they have attempted, but been disappointed in, cannot but alienate the *English* from them.

3. A Treaty being the game (as I have said) we shall play it, (which the sooner and better for us) I foresee plainly, that such Cards will be played, as will make it apparent, that the pack was neither fairly shuffled, nor delt, and that the *French* mean to play at *la bete* with us both; and if we continue to play, shall come to *losing loadam* at last: So that though the *French* have more of *Clubs* and *Spades* in their hands, by which they hope to win the *Diamonds*, we shall have more of the *Hearts* between us, and so perhaps save some of our stock at the stake.

4. If *England* come to receive satisfaction, the spirit of the Nation will turn

turn the scales. For suppose that should be now, that *Comines* tels us was heretofore, (which yet is sooner said than proved) yet we must needs think that if *France* deals unfairly with them; they will not only have a fair occasion to desert them, but the King and his Court; the Parliament and People will be more irritated against them, then they are now against us, (as is usual in such cases) and be readier to rejoyn with us and fall upon them, then they were to joyn with them against us, for the conversation both of their Religious and Civil Concernments,

5. The Necessity of keeping up ballance between *France* and *Spain*, will necessitate *England* to break with *France*, or at least hold them to keep more within their bounds, as we shall more fully shew hereafter.

6. Nay, the very defence of these Countries, which we think they seek to ruine, will cause them either to bring *France* to a peace with us, or themselves to help to defend us against them. For they will never suffer *France* to have them all; no, nor the greatest part of the maritime Provinces, nor the strongest, as *Holland*, if they can possibly hinder it, though they may permit them some part of the Superior, for having themselves a share of the Inferior, as I have formerly shewn. So that our Interest is so far *Englands*, and is the greatest security we have, next to Gods protection, and our own strength, that we shall not be wholly over-run and brought under the *French*. Yea, this is so highly their concernment, that I perswade my self, if all the strength of the 3 Kingdoms under the Crown of *England*, and all the Power of *Spain* with them, can hinder it, *France* shall never gain them; or if he do, never quietly possess them.

And these things I think are sufficient, to free us from our foolish fears of *England*; and to perswade us to a compliance with them, seeing we are both so greatly concerned to comply.

We shall now proceed to shew the quite contrary of the Friendship between *Spain* and *England*, that it is found at heart, and will recover. Wherein we need not be so large, because that which shews that the friendship of *France* and *England* must dye, proves that of *England* and *Spain* will live.

That this Friendship is found on the side of *Spain*, none questions; this being the great motive, (though not the only I confess) that hath kept them from breaking with *France*.

And that it is also so on the side of *England*, I think is as clear to those that consider.

1. Their declared intention of maintaining the Treaty at *Aix la Chapelle* (or *Aken*) in their Declaration of this War.
2. Although a provisional clause, unless provoked to the contrary, in the close thereof, gives them a latitude of breaking with *Spain*; yet notwithstanding they have been provoked several wayes by them, as all know that have observed the War, yet they will not break with them we see; which is a clear demonstration their Friendship is firmer than we imagine.
3. The importunities of *France*, which we know have been great, that

England would engage with them against *Spain* also, hitherto we see, have prevailed nothing herein.

4. The assurance we know *England* hath given the Court of *Spain*, both there and at *Bruxels*, concerning the *Spanish Netherlands*, makes us not doubt of their intentions, although we do of *France's*, by reason both of their preparations and opportunities, as we have formerly shewn. But if *France* should fall upon them, as we have reason to fear; that will prove both our Assertions the stronger, making the Friendship of *England* and *France* dye immediately, and that of *Spain* and *England* quickly recover. And if this save not those Provinces for the present, there's nothing (so far as I see) under Heaven that can, as I have formerly said.

We perceive then the pulse of this Friendship beats both strong and orderly enough, to secure us from all fears of its dying, lets visit the patient once more and we shall find no further need of such *Physicians* advise, as the Author of *la France Politique*, in his *Avis important à l'Angleterre*, pag. 471. and that the distemper was only a fit or two of an Ague the last Spring, and therefore so far from being dangerous, that it may prove rather Physical according to the Proverb, *An Ague in the Spring, is physick for a King*. And that the body Politick of *Spain* in their Friendship with *England* is recovering, as well as the King of *Spain* personally is recovered.

1. If we consider the Common interest of *Europe*, wherein the *English* not only are, but also profess themselves concerned. And for this I need not an other proof, but the *Triple Alliance*, and the *Declaration of this War*, both which whosoever reads, must needs acknowledge this for truth.

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1668.

2. The great interest of Trade which the *English* have in the *Spanish Dominions*. The very effects the Merchants had standing out there, were computed at the beginning of this War, at sixteen Millions. And can we think the King will easily forgo his Customs, and the Kingdom their Commerce with those Dominions? Which in my calculation, is equal with that they have with all *Europe* besides.

3. We know that they have lately made a peace in the *West Indies*, and how peremptory they are in the observance thereof; so that the Governor of *Jamaica* upon complaints of him, was sent prisoner to *London*, clapt up in the *Tower*, &c. And shall we think then, that they will break into War at home?

4. *England* cannot but be sensible of the greatness of *France*, and cannot be so senseless, but they must needs think, that it is their concernment that he grow not so great, that he become their Master also at last? And the whole World knows that *Spain* not only hath been now for many years the ballance for them, but still must be so upon the Continent, or none: The Princes of the Empire being now so divided between the *Imperial* and *French Crown*. What wise man therefore can think now that *Spain* declines, but that the *Empire* and *England* are highly concerned to support them? And shall we think then that instead of this, either should help forwards their downfall? For my part, were there no other reason of state, but

but this, I should not fear *Englands* breaking with *Spain*, and especially now that they see what progress *France* hath made amongst us.

5. This hath been a Fundamental Maxim in the Government of *England*, to keep the ballance even betwixt the two Crowns of *Spain* and *France*, ever since *Lewis* the Eleventh's time, who seized on *Burgundy*, which was formerly the usual Confederate with *England* against *France*. In place whereof *Austria* first, and after *Spain* obtaining the rest of the Provinces that were under *Charles*, last Duke of *Burgundy*, by Marriage of his Daughter; *England* after still had an eye to them in reference to *France*. And when the Civil Wars in these Provinces broke out, and *England* was jealous of *France's* being our Protector: *Q. Elizabeth* would not permit it, still having respect to the *House of Burgundy*, as *Thuanus* and *Cambden* in the forecited places shew.

And thus you have my Conjectures, with such Reasons of State whereon they are grounded as are publick, and may therefore be published: I having industriously declined, all reflections on private Transactions, Treaties, and Articles whatsoever, that so no side may have any just occasion of being offended with my writing.

Sec^t. 12. *France's Ambition. Growing greatness. The causes thereof: we and England in the fault. The Common Interest of Europe to oppose France particularly declared of the Empire, Spain, England, Denmark, and this Republick and Hans Towns. Yea, of Sweden, Savoy, and Switzerland. The ballance of Europe to be kept even, and by whom.*

TO those that know the World, the ambition of *France* cannot be unknown. Lets but look a little about us, and we shall see the *French Interest* is every where driven on. To set this forth in its right colours, would require Volums rather than Pages. We shall therefore do as the Painter, that instead of drawing the Giant at length, drew only his Thumb; or as Geographers that set forth great Countreys in small Maps. And for this we shall not look far backwards to former times, but only our own, since *France* recovered of those strong Convulsions, by the Civil Wars and Dissentions in *Mazarines* time, in the Minority of his present Majesty; and we shall find sufficient, to awaken the most part of Princes and States in *Europe*, to look to themselves. The Invalion of the *Spanish Netherlands*; the taking the *French Comce* (though after restored to the *Spanish*) and *Lorraine*, which they still keep; the engaging a strong party of the *Electors*, and Princes of the *Empire* for their interest; the work they have made in *Poland* and *Hungary*, that that Crown might be at their disposal, and this diverted; their taking the *Swede* off their Triple Alliance; and obliging him to give the Emperor work in *Germany*; and *Brandenberg* in *Prussia*, with a great sum of Money, some say and Print also 60 Tun of Gold, or 600000*l.* Sterling;

ling; the endeavours they have used with *Portugal* in *Spain* a diversion; though that Kingdom is not in a capacity to serve their designs; the work also they have made in *Italy*; their interesting themselves in all Treaties almost in *Europe*; the Penfions they allow to Ministers of State in most Princes Courts, and many other ways they take to enlarge their Empire. Those that are desirous to see their designs, may consult the late Author of *La France Politiue, au ses desseins executez & à executer*. And especially the ingenious discourse of the *Baron of Isola*, in's *Boucliera' Estate & de Justice* Article 67 where he shews *France's* aspiring to the *Universal Monarchy*, and by what Maxims and means, they advance apace towards it; and as their ambition is great, so their pretensions are boundless. Who knows not how they pretend, not only to the *Spanish Netherlands*, but the whole *Empire*? *Des justes pretensions du Roy sur l' Empire, par le Sieur Aubery Advocat au Parlement, & aux conseils du Roy*. Printed at *Paris* 1667. And there are *Aubery's*, or at least *Advocates* enow in *Paris*, to draw up pretensions to the Crown of *England*; and so of one Kingdom and State after another, according as their Swords shall be able to pursue them.

And indeed such is the growing greatness of that Kingdom, that it is become formidable to all *Europe*. I need not insist on this, the World is sufficiently sensible of it; but it may be worth our pains to enquire into the causes thereof.

France formerly had several boundaries to their Ambition, which by degrees they have broken down. Several *Dukes*, on the one side that of *Normandy*, and the *English* after who for 400 years together, laid dominati sunt in *Gallia*; till *Charles* the 7. his time; and that of *Bretaigne*, till *Charles* the 8 gained it to the Crown of *France*, by the marriage of *Ann*, Daughter of *Francis* the 2. the last Duke thereof; and on the other side the *Dukes* of *Burgundy*, till *Lewis* the 11. who after the death of *Charles* the last Duke slain at the Battle of *Nancey*, seized thereon, and united it to the Crown of *France*. These three Potentates kept the French Kings continually under, by their confederations and Wars against that Kingdome. Which Bands, they having once broke, they became at liberty to get more elbow-room in the World; and become the largest, compactest, and strongest Kingdom of *Europe*, were it not that their own intestine Divisions, and frequent Civil Wars hath often weakned them.

After *France* had arrived at this greatness, the following Kings *Charles* the 8th. *Lewis* the 12. and *Francis* the first, fruitlessly spent the Kingdoms strength in their Wars in *Italy*, till *Francis* and *Charles* the 5. became competitors for the *Empire*, and *Spain* and *France*, a fit match for each other in power. Since which time such mighty contests have been betwixt those two Kingdoms, as have filled all *Europe* with terror and amazement, and all *Historians* with their Actions. But how *France* hath so far prevailed, as we see at present, is partly by our own, and partly by the *English* fault; we by Commission, and they by Omission, as we shall (with what brevity

vity we can) make apparent, in regard it may be useful to us both.

During the Reign of *Charles* the 5. and *Francis* aforesaid, the Reformation of Religion began, which occasioned great alterations to the Kingdom of *France*, and to the King of *Spain* in these *Low Countries*. Wherein the Crown of *Spain* continued to prosecute their interest, in breaking down the power of *France* by all means possible, and especially by joyning with the *Guision Faction*, which stiled themselves the *Holy League*, under pretence of opposing the *Protestants*. Those great contests which the several factions in *France* clothed with the glorious mantle of *Religion*, are well known to those that are conversant in their Histories, and are particularly declared by many; but best in my judgment, on the *Protestants* side by *Beza*, the Author (though not named) of those 14 Books, he stiles *Commentariorum de statu Religionis & Reip. in Regno Gallia. sub Henrico. 2. Franciso 2. Carolo 9. & Henrico 3.* And on the *Papists* by *D. Ila* in his excellent History of the *Civil Wars of France*. In which Contests, in the Reigns of the four forementioned Kings, the Successors of *Francis* the 1, and in the times of *Henry* the 4. who succeeded them; the *Protestants* (called there *Hugonots*) got into their Possession, above 300 Garrisons and Forts in that Kingdom.

On the other hand *France* was not asleep, or wanting to prosecute their interest, in fomenting, promoting, and carrying on those divisions in these *Low Countries*; to break down the power of *Spain*, into whose hands they had fallen by marriage, (as we have said) and to remove the obstacle, which these Provinces constantly were, to their advancing their designs. For which end they continually assisted us, and whilst they pretended to fight our Battels, at our charges, they really fought their own. And lest the House of *Austria* so nearly allied to *Spain*, should afford them further assistance, they engage *Sweden* to invade the *Empire*, and give the *Emperor* work at home, allowing A. D. 1631. *Gustavus Adolphus* 300000 Franks for leying an Army, and a Million yearly for paying them, (evray Frank being two Shillings sterling) as in the years 1625. and 1635. they fathering all the *Empire* did on *Spain*, engaged us also in more firm and constant Leagues against them. This being the true State of those times between those 10 Crowns, we therein thus doubly miscarried, and erred both in our Civil and Religious Intrest.

First, in that we thought we could never bring *Spain* low enough, nor assist *France* sufficiently against them. In this blind zeal we went a great deal too far, though nothing the length that *France* desired: For had we listened to their suggestions, we had to this day continued our Wars with *Spain*, and so have done their work for them. What Arts *France* used to dissuade us from peace with *Spain*, may be seen in their Historian Priol, as well as our own, concerning the Treaty of *Munster*. But the States seeing the successes of *France*, of whose greatness they now at last, and indeed too late, became jealous; to which they were the more awakened, by the *French* approaches towards us in *Flanders*, and taking of *Dunkirk*, it being

D: Robus
Gallicus,
L. 10.

being their own Proverb *Aye le Francois pour ton Amy, non pas pour ton voisin*: they resolve to take the opportunity which was put into their hands by *Spain*; who despairing of peace with *France*, fought no hing more then to take off their confederates, the *Swede*, and these united *Provinces* especially, by concluding a Peace with us, and procuring one also between the *Empire* and *Sweden*. For knowing their own weakness, and great work on their hands, by the revolt of *Portugal*, Rebellion in *Catalonia*, the doubtful condition of *Naples*, the frequent losses they had received, and their want of Men and Money to War every where; they offered us equal conditions; and we privately without the knowledge either of the *French Plenipotentiaries*, or the Mediators (*Chigie* from the Pope, and *Cortaren* from the State of *Venice*) accept them at last, and a Peace is made betwixt us at *Munster*, January 33. 1648. and quickly after between the *Empire* and *Sweden* at *Osnaberg* August the 6. in the same year. By which means *Spain* was freed from our Wars, had opportunity of prosecuting theirs against *Portuga*, and of creating *France* trouble at home, by joyning with the *Condean* Faction, in the greatness of *Mazarine*, and the minority of his present Majesty. This Peace so stuck on the Cardinals stomach, that neither He nor that Kingdom have ever digested it: but because we would not War for them any longer, resolved they would War against us at last: though if we had not done that too long, they had never done this so successfuly.

Secondly, we help forward *France*'s greatness and our own destruction, by helping to destroy the Protestant Interest in that Kingdom. For as *France* had the power of *Spain* to keep them in on every side, so they had also a curb of the Protestants at home, to check them in their exorbitant designs. Who from the beginning of the Reformation under *Francis* the first, *Henry* the 2d. and *Francis* the 2d. had grown to that strength and greatness, that they grew formidable to the Crown of *France*. And notwithstanding the Massacre of *Merindel* and *Chubries*, A. D. 1545. and the several civil Wars that was made against them, (by *Charles* the 9. and 3 by *Henry* the 3d.) the great Massacre at *Paris* 1572. Yet God so blest them and multiplied them, that in the year 1560. there was reckoned above 1250 Churches of them, and by their several capitulations with the two fore-mentioned Kings at the end of their Civil Wars, and the Connivance of *Henry* the 2. formerly Head of their Party, they got 300. at least Garrisons and Forts for their defence, which he used to call, *The Commonwealth of Rochel*, that and *Montauban* being their principal places of strength. From whom they obtained several immunities, but especially that of the liberty of their Religion; which he confirmed to them by the ratification of the several concessions of his Predecessors in the *Edict of Nantz*, 1598. passed in the Parliament at *Paris*, February the 25 in the following year. Although the promulgation thereof, out of respect to *Cardinal Medices* was defer'd, till *March* the 2. 1599. Which he then veh-

vehemently prest, beginning his speech with a strange prodigie that had fallen out betwixt himself and the Duke of *Guise* 26 years before, who being about to play at Tables in the presence of many Nobles, there appeared drops of blood, which though once and again wiped off, yet new still were perceived, and none knew whence, there being not any in the Room that bled; which he then declared for a sad omen of much blood that should be shed betwixt them two, which having accordingly happened to his great grief, he desired to take away all further occasions of their Civil Wars by publishing that Edict, &c. which may be seen in *Tbuanus*. This *Lib.* 122. great King by name and merit, having fought 140 batels and skirmishes with his own hands, beleagured 300 Cities and Forts, was so soone slain by the Dagger of that Rascally villian *Ravillac*, in the midst of his greatest Glory and delights, but his Son and Successor *Lewis* the 13. confirms the same, May the 22. 1610. wherein he acknowledges, that *Experience* having taught the Kings his Predecessors that the fury and violence of Arms had not only been unprofitable to draw their subjects to the Roman Church, but was rather hurtful; which made them have recourse by more happy Counsel, to mildness, granting them the exercise of the reformed Religion they professed: in whose imitation his father (*Henry* the 4.) had made the edict of *Nantes*, & reconciled all his loving subjects: the observance whereof had settled & assured quiet amongst them, which had ever since continued without interruption. And declares that though that edict be perpetual & irrevocable, & by that means hath no need to be confirmed by any new declarations, yet to the end his subjects may be assured of his love & intention to have the said Edict inviolably kept (being made for the good & quiet of his subjects) therefore it is ordained by him with the advice of the Queen Regent, Princes of the blood, &c. that the same be kept inviolably; and those that shall infringe it, severely punished, as troubleers of the publick peace of the Kingdom, &c. Yet notwithstanding all this, the King being provoked by the same, is induced, much against his inclination, to War against them whom he declared Rebels 1621. and took many of their Cautionary Towns from them, yet this was at last composed, and they reserved *Rochel* and several other places still for their defence. But afterwards, at the instigation of *Cardinal Richelieu*, (not out of any zeal for his Religion, being called the *Hugonot* Cardinal, but of Policy to free *France* from their fears of the Protestant party at home) with much regret the King makes War against them again, 1625. and sent to the States for twenty Sail of Men of War according to the late Treaty, which was assented unto, though with great reluctance, and as they were sent under Admiral *Hauthain*; which were especially instrumental of ruining the Protestants power at Sea, and of *Rochel* afterwards, and consequently all the power that party had left under the Duke of *Roban*, with near 50 places for their Protection: All their Cautionary Towns being dismantled and they having no other shelter, but the shadow of the Almighty, and their Kings clemency left them to flie unto for their defence. So that as I wish we had otherwise employed our power, so I pray

*Imperium
militarem
cap. 2.* (as *Schookius* in our first War with *England*, *Deum rogo, filiis & nepotibus non impiet, quae a parentibus facta fuerunt*) that God may not lay this sin to our charge. The Protestants having thus made their last Will and Testament, whereby the Crown became sole Heir and Executor of all they had, *Lewis* the last, thereby became the great Monarch since *Charles the Great*: his predecessors having reduced the many Provinces dismembred from *France* by *Hugh Capet* into one intire body; and he all the parts thereof to the entire subjection of the Crown; and that Kingdome at liberty to look abroad, and carry on their designs where they please, having for this end gained; Keys to their neighbour Kingdoms, *Pignerol* to enter *Italy*; *Brijack*, *Germany*, and *Perpignan Spair*.

We have seen how we have gone against our interest in overdoing our work; lets now see how *England* have been no less guilty, in not doing their duty; wherein they have not only been greatly wanting to themselves, but more to the Protestant interest in *Europe*.

The Protestants in *France* having by *Arms, Treaties, Concessions, and Confirmations* of several Kings, obtained that strength which we have declared: There could be nothing more clearly the interest of all those of the Reformed Religion, and especially their Neighbours then to support them in their just Rights; which Queen *Elizabeth* and her Council so well understood, that though she had assisted these Provinces both with money and men considerably, whereby she had drawn upon her a War with *Spain*, which was very costly to her, and also occasioned the Rebellion in *Ireland*; which to reduce, stood Her and her Kingdome of *England* in 4 years time no less, if we take *Morisons* accompt, then 1198000 L. Sterling: yet she neglects not to supply *Henry of Navar* against the *Guisian* League and Faction for the support of the Protestants, with 101560 Franks for the Baron of *Donna* to raise an Army in *Germany*, A. D. 1587. for his service: and 71165 besides 20000 the spent in sending 4000 men under the conduct and command of the *Lord Willoughby*, A. 1589, and 33333 to levy an Army under the Prince of *Anhalt*, for the Service, and as much money she lent *Navar* himself, the following year, 1590. and continually upon all occasions supported him and the interest of the Reformed Religion in those Kingdoms, so that she was publickly prayed for by the *Hugonots* as their *Protectors*.

*Compendi
Annals
1590,*

Lib 29. No sooner was this great Princess dead, whose glory yet will never dye, being accounted by her very Enemies the *Guisians*, the most glorious that ever swayed Scepter, *gloriosissima, & omnium quae unquam Sceptrum gestarunt, felicissima femina*, as *Thuanus* tells us, adding many great Elogiums of her, and concluding *none ever was or will be like her of that Sex*: and *King James* called in, to succeed in that Crown: but the *French*, though they had under hand opposed the conjunction of those two Kingdomes all they could, having still made use of *Scotland* formerly in their Wars with *England* for a diversion to them, by setting them upon entering that King-
dom

dom at the back doore betwixt them; and as loath allso that such an accession of power should accrew to their old enemies the *English*; yet now they are the first that come with a splendid Embassage, to welcome him to his new Crownes. This King, if he had had as much of the Lions courage, as he had of the Foxes cunning and King-craft, as he called it; how happy had it been both for his own Family and his Kingdoms! But as he was the occasion of the sad Disasters that happened to both, as is shewn, not only by the Historians, but particular Authors in the *English* Tongue, so I shall now briefly shew how he occasioned many and great irreparable losses to the *Protestant* Interest abroad, especially by his pusillanimity.

*R. B. Corb.
W. Owen,
Osborn,
&c.*

How he perswaded this Republick to a 12 years Truce with *Spaine*, and how prejudiciall it was to these Provinces, is well knowne. How earnestly he was prest to assist his Son the *Palsgrave*, both by Forreign Princes abroad, and his Parliaments at home, I need not mention: nor how he spent more in Embassies, their Trains and Treaties, then would have done his Work with Men of Armes and Trains of Artillery. I shall only speak of that relating to the *French Protestants*, as the proper subject of my Discourse.

When *Lewis* the 13 set upon reducing the Cautionary Towns which the *Protestants* had in his Kingdom, by the grants of several Kings (as we have said) and the distressed sought to the Crown of *England* for Relief: *K. James*, according to his usual custom, only employes Embassadors, the Lord *Herbert* once and again; whom the *French* delayed with words, till they had done their Work. For knowing King *James's* temper too well, *Luynes* the High Constable of *France*, being appointed to give *Herbert* Audience, first sets a Gentleman of the Reformed Religion behind the Hangings, that being an Ear-witness of what past, might relate to the Reformists, what small grounds of hope they had, of having Succors from the Crown of *England*; and then instead of hearkning to his Embassage; in a most insolent manner affronted both his Master and himself with Menaces: which when he could not brook, but roundly replied, *His Majesty then knew what he had to do*, and offered the Constable, who was cholericke thereat, the satisfaction of his Sword; the *French* Embassador misrepresents what past to *K. James*, and procures *Herbert* to be called home, and the *Earl of Carlile* is sent in his place, to as little purpose as before. Nor was this the worst, for the *Duke of Guise* obtained 8 *English* Sayl of Men of War to joyn with him against the *Rabblers*, and them of the Religion, to distress them by Sea, as the Count of *Soissons* did by Land, (for which the *Duke of Buckingham* was after questioned in Parliament) and thus the greatest part of the *Protestants* Power was broke down, and had been wholly; but that the *French* had not then time; by reason of the *Spanish* work in the *Valtolime*; so that a Peace was skind over for a small time, till they had leasure to open the Wound again, and make the poor Patients bleed their last. These things caused great complaints of *England* every where amongst them of the Reformed Religion, and occasioned *Deodate's* saying, *That King*

*Howels
Hist. of
Lewis 13.
A. 1621.*

James's sins of omission, were greater than all his Predecessors sins of Commission.

Though the Pacification was published at *Montpellier*, yet *Richelieu* being made *Minister of State* and chief Director of affaires in *France*, A. 1624; he made it his first worke to go on with the designe of destroying the Protestants power in that Kingdome; and though the King was against it at first, yet the Cardinal carried it on at last, so that afterwards he said, *He had taken Rochel in spite of three Kings*, meaning his own, *England & Spain*. For the accomplishing this work, the Eagle-eyed *Richelieu* foreseeing that *England* and these *States* might stand in his way and obstruct him, he resolves to charme us both to a compliance. For which end *France* makes a stricter league with these *United Provinces*, affords us 1600000 franks yearly for the two next following, to be repaid the two next years after our peace with *Spain*, agrees for Ships for their service, &c. And for *England*, though they knew *K. James* would not disturb their designs, yet not knowing what the *Prince of Wales* might do, there were means used to ingage him, by a Match with *Henrette* the only Daughter then unmarried of *Henry* the 4. *K. James* who was desirous to match his only Son considerably, had for 9 or 10 years been Courting of *Spain* to this purpose, that so with one he might have the *Palatinate* restored to the *Palsgrave*; and the *Prince of Wales*, having past through *France* incognito into *Spain*, to make love personally to the *Infanta*, and see with his own eyes if fame belied not her beauty; and being there still delayed, but not denied (the *Spanish* desiring to see all the Daughters of *France* first matcht, to prevent an alliance betwixt *England* and that Kingdome) and the business of the *Palatinate* still kept in suspense; he is commanded home by his Father *K. James*. But having seen the Lady *Henrette* at a maske, in his passage through *France*, under the notion of an *English* Gentleman, and being taken with her beauty, more then the *Infanta's*; overtures are made of a Marriage with her, and though some in the *French Council*, were rather for her matching to *Lorraine*. (that so those Territories might be gained to *France*, which had been long troublesome to them) yet this reason of State, of obliging him not to interrupt their design of ruining the Protestants, and prevent his marrying with *Spain* prevailed, and in nine months time a Match is concluded.

Richelieu thinking *France* secure of these two they most feared; fall to work to reduce the *Hugonots* Cautionary Towns. Upon which *Soubze* and *Blankart* goe for *England* to implore *K. Charles* (his Father *K. James* being then dead) his assistance. This good King thinks himself obliged in Conscience and Honour, notwithstanding his Marriage with the King of *France's* Sister, to support them. And indeed so he was, for the Ambassadors and Agents of the Crown of *England*, had become *Caution* to those of the Religion, for the King of *France's* performance with them. He therefore sends 150 sayle of Ships and an Army of 10000 men, under the Command of the *Duke of Buckingham*, to take of that odium which was upon him in *England*, for what was formerly done under *K. James*. Who published

blished a *Manifesto* in the K. of *Englands* name, July the 21 1627. declaring that though there were other grounds sufficient for the War, as the abuse of the *English* Merchants, their ships and goods seized on, and the extraordinary equipping for Sea in *France*; yet that the sole cause of the War, was the *Crown of France's* not performing of Articles with those of the Reformed Religion. This expedition, and the causes of its miscarriage, is writ by a learned Pen *, and well known from the modern Histories of both Kingdoms. The *French* and *English* both proceed, the former in carrying on, the latter to prevent if possible, their designs. From which end K. *Charles* sent the Earle of *Denbigh* with another Fleet, which was able to effect nothing; and the Earle of *Linzey* with the last (*Buckingham* being assassinated by *Felton* the day before he was to embark) But before *Linzey* came, such stupendious works were raised (of which *Bertius* hath writ a particular Book) and so pallifadoed, that the Cardinal sent to the *English Admiral*, that he should have a passport with six of his ablest Commanders, to come ashore and veiw the works, and if they thought *Rochel* relievable, he would raise the siege, without fighting a stroak. The *English* thus coming too late, lost *Rochel*, upon which followed the Duke of *Rohan* and the rest of the Reformists compliance, the dismantling of their remaining Garisons (above 40, whereof *Mantuban* was the last) and a peace with *England* and those of the Reformed Religion in *France*.

* *Expeditio in Ream Insulam*,
 Authore
Edovardo Herbert Barone de Cherbury.

Since which time what mighty designs have been contrived, and carried on by the two Cardinals, *Richelieu* and *Mazarine*, for that Kingdom abroad, whose plots they are still pursuing, is not unknown to those that are curiously inquisitive. How the former wrought the revolt of *Portugal*, the Rebellion in *Catalonia*, the carrying on the Wars in these Countries, to bring downe *Spain*; set on foot and fomented the distractions of Great *Britaigne*, first by the *Scots*, and afterwards by other means, to give *England* worke at home: tamper'd with *Wallesteyne* for betraying the Imperiall Army, for whose death he most passionately wept, failing thereby of his hopes of *France's* speedy coming to the *Empire*: engaged *Sweden* to serve their ends in *Germany*; tooke *Pignerol* to keep *Italy* in aw: *Lorraine* is taken; the *Dukes of Savoy, Mantua, and Modena* are wholly at *France's* service: and the Princes Electors, especially the Ecclesiasticall, rather courting the favour of that Crown, then the Imperiall. This was the true State of *France*, at the death of *Richelieu* in 42, and the King his Master, who quickly followed him, May 14 1643, the same day of the year his father died, and wherein he was Crowned. Which I have bene the larger in, first because tis for the most part the same now, and in severall things greater than then, especially by their alliance with *England*, and success against these and the *Spanish* *Netherlands*: and 2. that it might appeare, how far they have overgrowne *Spain* in power, that so the world may be awakend, and see to lop off their superfluous bowes, least they grow in time like *Nebuchadnezzars* tree, so great that they overshadow us all.

For *Mazarine* succeeding *Richelieu* as Minister of State, who was his onely Scholar that proved his parallel; to which two Clergy-men let me say it, for it is a truth, (though I know the Laity may stomach it) *France owes their present greatness*; the first 5 years after till 48, that tumultuous Nation was never wifelier governed in the non-age of their Sovereign: and though in the next lustre, or 5 years following till 53, they had some Aguish fits that shaked them in their Civil Wars; yet they soon recovered thereof, and have ever since grown stronger and stronger. So that it was high time for the Neighbour Nations no longer to dance after the Fidle of *France*. And the States saw this, and therefore made Peace, as I have said; But *England* herein offended again, and prevaricated in the common Interest of *Europe*. Let me shew how briefly, because it may satisfie perhaps the curiosity of some that have wondered at it, as much as my self, in regard they have been ignorant of the true Grounds thereof.

When *Cromwel* the *Hanibal* of the *English Commonwealth*, and Immortal Enemy and Terror to *Rome*; came to have the power of those three Kingdoms in his Hands; he saw it necessary to engage those Nations, and employ his Armies in a Forreign War; for without an Army he could not maintain the Power he had got, and without employing them, he could not quietly enjoy it, (Armies being like raised Spirits, they must be employed, or else they fall foul upon him that raised them); And besides this necessity of Interest; his own inclination strongly carried him, and perhaps some extravagant hopes, to pull down the *Pope*; for he once said to *Lambert*, *Were I as young as you, I should not doubt to knock at the Gates of Rome before I died*. *Spain* and *France* both courted him, knowing what Mettal his Sword was made of, and his *Iron-sides* wore; of which competition he made his advantage, obtaining such Conditions of *France*, as were a wonder to all that understood the Maxims of their Government. That which most inclined him to the *French*, was that he juged *Spain* and *Austria* the two strongest Horns of *Antichrist*, whose fall was come as one of his Prophets (whom I could name) inspired him, and that *France* might be brought to renounce *Rome*; intending withal to get such places in *Flanders*, and over against the Coast of *England*, that he might keep the *Dutch* in aw, and with a few of his Ships command a Toll for the Passage in the Channel, as the *Dane* did in the *Sound*. A League therefore is made with *France*, *March* 23. 1657. for a year, and renewed the next, by *Lockart* his Ambassador, who for his Parts and Sagacity was so acceptable to *Mazarine*, that he had more Access to him, and Business with him, than all the Ambassadors at *Paris* besides. These two *Cromwel*, and the *Cardinal*, the stronglier to carry on their designs, take in the King of *Sweden* for a third into their Confederacy, (*Christina* having resigned that Crown, and wandring about like a blazing Comet) and these three leagued together made the *Triumvirate* of those times.

Sweden was to pluck the Plumes of the *Roman-Eagle*, when he had clipt the Wings of his Neighbours, that they might not fly upon the Prey he left behind.

behind. Wherein *Oliver* so concerned himself, that when the *Dane* had got the *Dutch* for his second, he sent *Moumague* to bouy up *Swedens* sinking interest in the *Sound*; and they were so near an engagement, that they had certainly fought, had not the *English* espied an Advice-Yacht coming towards them, which bringing them newes of the *Protectors* death, they hoyft up sailes, and returned home.

France was to pull downe *Spaine* by Land, with his own forces, and such as the Protector could spare. Which *Lockart* the Embassador there commanded. Who having beene more used to fight in the field, then play the pioneers with their spades, were not so much esteemed at first by the *French*: till the fight with *Don John of Austria's* Army which came to relieve *Dunkirke*, wherein they behaved themselves with that gallantry, that *Don John* cryed out he was beat by raging wild beasts rather then men; and that great Soldier the *Prince of Conde* hath often said since, that he never saw the like action, as was that day performed by the *English*. Shortly after *Dunkirk* yeilded, and was put into the *English* hands.

The Protector was to bring down *Spaine* by Sea, which he said he would do, or he and his should live on bread and water. Intending also to carry on the designe, which *Sidney*, *Rawleigh* and several of the wisest men of those times under *Q. Elizabeth* prest, and that was to beat the *Spanish* out of the *Indies*; but as she had too many irons in the fire to carry on that work, so how he miscarried in it, is sufficiently known. And indeed he had broke *Spaines* Naval power much more then he did, although he did a great deale at *Tenerif*, and elsew here, had it not been for a small accident that happen'd, which was this. *Admiral Blake*; who still principled his seamen in those Confusions and frequent Revolutions of Governement, that the Fleet served no Parties nor Persons, but the *English* Nation; having brought some of his great ships before *Tunis*, batterd down the Castle and compell'd them to his termes; for which extraordinary service he expected the reward of gratitude at least: Instead thereof, by his next Advice from *England* he hath a pardon sent him; for endangering the Fleet in such an attempt without order, &c. Which so stuck on the stomack of that stout and sturdy *Stoick*, that afterwards the *Spanish* Fleet coming on the Main Ocean off *Cadiz*; He reading his Commission, and finding it only for fighting them in the *Mediterranean*, would not fall on them; though the Commanders sollicited him, promised to answer it for him, &c. only was willing to fight if the *Spaniards* begun; but though the *English* provoked them to it, and affronted them all they could, yet the wary *Spaniard* was wiser than to engage, and so saved themselves; at which *Oliver* stormed not a little, but *Blake* cared not much, the Admiral hereby crying quits with the General.

Thus you see what great things a little blind Zeal may do. And indeed it is not so much to be admired at in him, he having had such an embusiastical heat, as all know, that knew him well; nor can we wonder so much, if his Head sometimes run round, who was so continually wrapt up in
such

such whirlpools of affairs, as he was perpetually plunged in: though to miscarry in so great a concernment for the Protestant Interest, was a capital crime in him above all others; who designing to pull down the Pope, * by bringing down Spain, set up France to ruine the Protestants throughout Christendom. Thus *Ludit in humanis divina potentia rebus.*

But these three lived not long to go on with these designs, and indeed it was well for the world they did not. *Oliver* went first, at which *Mazarine*, was secretly glad, saying, when the news was brought him as he was at play, *there's then a fortunate fool gone.* But this was but to trample upon a dead Lion, whom he so ridiculously feared before, that his greatest Confidants made themselves privately merry therewith. Knowing how uncivily for this, he put the King of *England* out of *France*; and the Duke of *Yorke* also notwithstanding his Service, and the Cavalries acclamations of *vive's* to him, and Curses of the Cardinal: Yea how after his death he feared his shadow, for in the *Isle of Fesant* 59 at the interview of the two Kings and their Courts, where the Marriage was made, and Peace concluded betwixt them, (which *Mazarine* had reserved for his own Glory) and the King of great *Britain* being there received by *Lewis de Haro* at first with the height of a *Spanish* complement in the depth of the mire, and treated after with all civility: yet the Cardinal, though courted by the Duke of *Ormond*, durst not speak with him, for fear of *Lokart* that was present at the Treaty. But though the crafty Cardinal was no Coward, yet thus fearful, and timorously was he cautious for Him, whom I know he hated above all mortals, and that Common-wealth above all People in the world; as I can many wayes make apparent, if it was of any importance to the publick.

But to be brief, *Olivers* other two consorts followed after him quickly, and these three Conquerors, being cut off by death, who kept all Christendom in aw whilst they lived, the world had a little quiet, till *France* got a Horseback again in *Flanders*.

But betwixt and that time was that great change in *England* by the wonderful providence of God in the restoration of his Majesty, by which means the *French* got *Dunkirk* again into their hands, and were thereby capacitated, the better to carry on their work against these Countries, at which the *French* made themselves merry, and some say abusively, by having *Dunkirk* drawn with a purse hanging over it: The *English* stormed, and some swore *Oliver would have sold his great Nose, rather then Dunkirk.* Yea this still sticks on many of their stomachs; I remember at my last being in *England* in 66 and seeing *Clarendon House*; and wondring a little why it was situated so near the Road, which made it both unfree, and molested with dust; and critising upon some other things, the Oratory especially, that the Chancelor that was the eldest Son of the Church of *England*, should make his Chappel, as a wag writ of *Emanuel Colledge's*, so awry: *Just North and South, yea verily: when I came above on the Leads I was so pleased with* the

* *Grotius*
de jure
bel. &
pac. l. 2.
c. 22. vo-
luntatem
implendi
vaticinis,
sine Dei,
mandato,
non esse
causam
belli.

the pleasantness of the prospect, that I thought for that it might compare with any House I had seen, knowing no place in *England*, except above *Greenwich*, that I thought comparable to it: upon which the Domestick had the confidence, perceiving me a stranger, to tell me I could not thence see *Dunkirke*; for the Commonalty had Christened it, and made *Dunkirke* the Godfather, calling the House after its name. But though I confess it was against the Common Interest of *Europe*, that it should fall to the *French* again; yet whether it was against the Interest of the King of *England*, and that Kingdom, is not so clear to me. I will only say this, that I know a Person hath weighed that so well, that I shall carry this challenge for him; That if any Gentleman, *English* or *French*, pleases fairly to state this Question *in-hypothesis*, according to the circumstances of those times, let him take which side thereof he pleases, and use what weapons he will (and I think that's very fair) and he shall not want an *Antagonist* that shall fight him fairly, whether he pleases to appear in *Roman bus*, or in his half-shirt made of his own Mothers Language, upon the publick Theater of the World. And truly his designe is so honest, I dare be his Compurgater, and being a little acquainted with it, I shall tell you briefly: It is to let men see, how hard it is sometimes to discern on which side the true interest of State lies, (there being so many circumstances considerable, which often, in the Scale of Policy, weigh heavier then that which bystanders think the maine) and thereby also to check the sawciness of every Stopkeeper, who like the little *Spanish Dons*; will be censuring Princes Counsels, and condemning Ministers of State, though they are ignorant of the grounds of their Actions, and much more of that which is true Policy.

Having thus shewn the true State of *France*, and its continual growing greatness down to the times of his present Majesty, who hath not only got *Dunkirke*, regained *Lorraine*, conquered a great part of *Flanders* from the *Spanish*, but three Provinces also entirely from the States: It will clearly follow to be the common Interest of *Europe* to oppose *France* in their future progress, except they mean to follow our fate.

I had thought to have been larger herein then I shall, in regard my pains is herein in part prevented, by the Authour of *La France Politique*, from page 470 to 525, or the end: And having been so long already, I may happily hereafter discourse this more largely in another Language. I shall therefore be brief in that which remains.

The *Emperor*, though greatly concerned, (the *French* being not only nigh them, but among them, and having got such places of the *Rbyne*, capacitated to pass over all at their pleasure) yet seem asleep, and are therefore to be roused, and if no words will do it, yet let the alarmes of War raise them, and the strength of their enemies make them combine, lest fighting singly, they be all foiled. I shall not stand to particularize, but surely the *Duke of Newburgh* and *Prince of Liege* that have been most guilty in letting

ting the *French* have passage through, and quarter in their Countries; will have the first cause to repent, except they mean to sell them to the Crown of *France*; which yet may happily beat them down in price, now they are so impoverish'd by them. For though *Gulick*, belonging to *Newburg* be strong, the Castle especially, (which was the Pattern to that of *Antwerp*) yet it is on dry ground, easily approachable, and in a Champion Countrey, and not relievable from a siege. And if that small City once be taken, all that pleasant Corn Country may cry out,

*Impius hæc tam culta novalia miles habebet,
Barbarus hæc segetes!*

And though *Liege* (or *Luyke*) be great and populous, and the desperate People in all times that I know in *Europe*; yet *vana est sine viribus ira*, the City hath such Hills overhanging it, that it is neither strong by its situation, nor can hope of relief if they should be distressed, except it be by a confederacy from others; and if this single City be lost, all their Country will be so quickly.

Yea, not onely those on this side the *Rhine*, but even all the rest will quickly find, that if the Wings of the *Roman Eagle* be clipt, and prove too short to shadow her young Ones, they will soon become a prey to the Power of *France*, and will be thrown out of their Nests as spurious, if they cannot stedfastly behold the Rising Sun, and will not receive their warmth from his Beams.

Spain is sensible enough of their Concernments, knowing that not onely their *Netherlands*, but their *Indies* and *Italy* lie at the Stake: for if *France* be Master of all these *Provinces*, they will soon be so of the *Indies* also; and the *Dutch* fetch thence the *Spanish Gold* for the *French Crown*; and the *Lillies of France*, be the Royal Flower in all their Gardens both in *Italy* and *Sicilia*.

England; though now their Confederate, cannot but know what danger they are in for their Trade; which is the best Jewel in that Crown, and the greatest Darling of that Kingdom. And therefore it is high time surely, that the Sovereign straiten not his interest at home, by espousing any particular Party; nor the Subjects' quarrel about Ceremonies, when the substance of Religion is so endangered; that so they may timously look abroad, before it be too late and all be lost; and his Majesty in due time retire from *France*, and make himself and Successors (as is much desired) the Head of all the Protestant Party in *Europe*.

Denmark surely knows; that if the *Empire* fall they cannot stand: but must lose both their Toll in the *Sound*, and what by Land the *French* pleases: This *Republick*, of all others, is most immediately concerned, for he is blind that sees not, what ever some may flatter themselves, that the *French* intend nothing less than reducing of us to their Obedience.

And when this is done, and they advance upwards in the *Empire*; what are *Strasbourg*, *Colen*, *Aken*, *Breme*, *Hamburg*, and the rest of the *Hanse Towns*,

Townes, and free Cities, but as so many morsels, easily eaten up and devoured;

Yea their constant friends and Allies may look to themselves,

Sweden how they will save their *Bishoprick of Breme*, *Pomeran*, and what lies on this side the *Baltick*; and how they will sell their *Copper*, which is the Staple commodity of their own Countrey. And in stead of the *French Crownes*, which is now their usual money amongst them; when that Kingdome hath no more need of their service; they may carry their own *Copper* coyn on their backs to pay a collation, or laden a horse when they travel, to pay for 2 or 3 good nights lodging.

Savoy knows he is at *France's* mercy, and therefore dances after their pipe, endeavouring to save himself by his devotion. But they may remember the Lamb in the Fable, who when the Wolf above quareld him, because he troubled the water; answered that could not be so, in regard it descended to him, not from him; the Wolf then said, he had reviled him 6 months before, to which the Lamb replying, he was not then born. But thy Father then did fish He, and that's cause enough for the son suffering.

For *Switzerland*, though their mountains and Poverty may secure perhaps their Countrey: yet what shall secure their liberty, which consists in an equality amongst them? or what shall secure the Religion of the *Protestant Cantons*? Or the good pay which the *Papish* have long had, for their service in the Wars of *France*? They must then be content with what they can get, or be turned to graze on their own mountains.

And thus you see what necessity there is that the *French* be kept within bounds, and consequently that the ballance of *Europe*, be both brought and held in a greater equality. For intrests changing continually with the revolution of times; and Kingdoms and Commonwealths, Cities and places, having their youth strength and old age, as well as particular persons: If lesser Powers combine not together, they singly become like the smaller fishes, easily swallowed up and devoured by the greater. Thus the league between the King of *Naples*, Duke of *Millain* and *Florence* A. D. 1480. Lib. 1. secured *Italy* against the power of the *Venetians*; and the Confederacy of the *Italians* at *Venice* in 95. preserved them from being all ruined by the *French* under *Charles* the 8. who had in a small time conquered several, and got the Kingdome of *Naples* he came for: as that wise Historian *Guicciardine* Lib. 2. shews, in his excellent Historie of the Wars of *Italie*.

Not let any think to obstruct my passage with saying, that Wars to bring down the growing greatness of others are unlawful.

For though very many both *Lawyers* and *Historians* are of the opinion they are, as may be seen in *Gentilis* and some *Divines* also, yet the whole Collidge of *Sorbon* gave their determination for this and the Learned *Bacon* saies plainly that the contrary opinion is next to be received, and many other modern Authors concur herein, besides the many Precedents of States that have made preventive Wars, as the *Lacedemonians* against the

De jure
belli &
pac. l. 2.
c. 1. ff. 17.
& c. c. 22. ff.
5.

Athenians of old, and many especially of later times; and the Arguments for it are not contemptible: yet notwithstanding I am rather of *Grotius's* opinion, that neither our own fears and jealousies, nor the growing greatness of others, are sufficient causes of warring against them.

But indeed neither of these is the cause we plead, but the following, which we will maintain *jure gentium* or by the law of Nations to be just and equitable.

1. Let any Kingdome or Common-wealth grow as great, as they can by Gods blessing; yet so long as they keep themselves, within the bounds of justice and equity with others; there is no just cause of breaking down their power by War. For jealousy that we may thereby suffer, is no sufficient ground for us to fight them. It being with publick as well as private safety, as Physicians say it is with our health, considerably well, but never absolute and perfect. And therefore against such force as we may fear, we must trust the Providence of God, and use lawful means cautiously to prevent dangers; our Saviour having taught all Christians to use *the wisdom of the Serpent with the innocencie of the Dove*, and cursed be they that separates what Christ hath joyned together.

2. When Neighbor Nations see the growing power of any, whence they have just cause of jealousy: they ought to combine together, that so they may prevent the dangers they fear. And if any of the Confederates be unjustly invaded, they have all a just cause of war against the Aggressor. As the *Italians* being jealous of the *Venetians* Power, leagued themselves for their own defence, so that though the Republick of *Venice* was too strong for any of them singly, yet being far too weak for them all, was kept within bounds, and they thereby wisely secured themselves.

3. When any Potentate that is stronger than his Neighbors aggresses any of them, the rest ought to confederate; and if his cause be just compel him to accept of due satisfaction, and if he will not, his cause then becoming unjust, and much more if it was so originally, to make war against him. As the *Italians* did against the *French*, when they under *Charles* the 8 were invaded. And the *Triple Alliance* of late, when the same nation had taken the *Country of Burgundie*, commonly called the *French Comté*, and invaded *Flanders*, both which belong to the Crown of *Spain*. Thus our Neighbors also should now alie with us, in point of honest interest; that so we may reduce *France* to keep within bounds, lest we should be ruined by them.

I shall make these things plain by familiar example. The ballancing of Nations is like to that of boats: they that by an even poize might all sit safe in a boat on a rough Sea, by the rising up of some are all in danger to be drowned. In such case therefore the company perceiving a quarrel likely to arise amongst some of them, must either agree before hand to keep them quiet; or if the contest come suddenly, afterwards resolve together, to compel those that are injurious to keep their place; and if they will not, throw them

Guicciardino's
Hist. of
Ital. l. 1.

them over-board. And this ballancing of powers, I shall defend by the Fundamental Law of Nature *self-preservation*, and from the Law of Nations, as well as from the word of God, and back the same by many approved examples; if any one hath a mind to contest with me herein.

Lets see a little *how*, and *by whom*, stronger powers must be ballanced, and I shall give a release to your patience.

1. By the Confederacy of weaker Nations that are their Neighbors, and are in danger thereby of being overcome, as we have already shewen.

2. Or by a Neutral Nation that reserve themselves free, to league with the weaker, when they see them injured by the stronger powers. And this was the Ancient policy of *England*, since *France* and *Spain* became the two great balances in *Europe* Which (as I have said) begun to be so under *Charles* the 5. and *Francis* the first, whom *Henry* the 8 of *England* still kept even, as the many Histories of those times shew, as well as other writers of State affairs, engraving this motto upon his Gold, *Cui adhaereo, praest.* From this maxim of State *Q. Elizabeth*, also his Daughter, first assisted *Henry* the 4. which *Mornay* strongly pleaded to *Walsingham*; and after when *France* was grown great, assisted these Provinces, lest they should fall into the hands of *France*; as we have before shewen out of the best Historians of those times, *Thuanus* and *Camden*, the latter whereof after his declaring this reason of State in the place forementioned A. 1575, afterwards shews how this noble Heroine sate as the honourable Arbitrix, (holding the ballance in her hands) between *Spain*, *France*, and these *Low-Countries*.

Memoires de Ribier
T. 1. l. 2.
p. 347.
Memoires de du Plessis.
Memoires du duc de Sully, T. 2.
c. 4. p. 14.
Ambassades du Cardinal
Offat. part. 1. p. 180.
Annales Eliz.
A. 1557.

SECT. 13. *The Conclusion of the whole Discourse*

I Have now done, and it is high time, having been much larger than I intended at first; although not so large by far, as I found, being once entered upon the Argument, I might be. And yet, I hope, it will not be tedious to the Reader. In regard of the novelty of the matter, which though daily discours'd of by many yet never writ of by any. And in regard of the usefulness thereof. For though old men are to dote upon the brats of their brain, as well as their body: Yet, if I be not deceived, this Discourse, may through Gods blessing, prove instrumental in begetting a better understanding between both Nations, for which end I have published it in both Languages) by shewing them their concernments, it being the *Chariot of Interest* which all Princes and States *Jehu-like* furiously drive; and also serve to clear up some State Controversies, that are not easily discerned by vulgar eyes, to discover the former and present state of affairs amongst us, and most parts of *Europe*, and give a prospect through this intricate, dark, and cloudy War, with what hopes we may have concerning its issue: and besides these things I think the clearness of stile, which I have used to deliver my mind in, may make it less nauseous to some, who are apt to mind the swadling cloths more than the Child.

I know mediation betwixt men in passion is a very thankless office; and that the freedom; I have used, will both please and displease many sorts of men on all sides; but yet when mens passions are allayed, I do not doubt but they will think better of the honest designs of the Author. And yet I have endeavoured to give as little offence as I could possibly to any; but if any notwithstanding count me their enemy, because I tell them the truth, I cannot help it; for I never accounted them worthy to write, that are byast with fear, or favour and flattery. Yea, I perswade my self, that there is not any ingenious man, or brave Gentleman even of the *French* Nation, whose designs I chiefly oppose; but they will acknowledge it lawful for an enemy to fight them with a pen as well as a pike, and that I am a very civil Adversary, having both fairly fought them, and with their own weapons, having made use of their Authors, and not ours, throughout my discourse.

I shall not now throw down the gantlet and make a challenge, yet if any undertake to refute me concerning the interest of these Countries, which I think worthy asserting, I shall not fail to do it. As for my *Conjectures*, I both account and call them *probable*, and therefore being not positive and dogmatical in them, I leave them with their Reasons to the Reader to judge. But if some passionate person thinks with railing at the *French*, *English*; or the Author hereof, and carping at some particulars to refute me; I shall tell them before hand I was never bred, to give any one ill language, and shall only answer them with silence and contempt. Or if any well meaning scholar that has read perhaps honest *Keckermans*, or some others learned *Systema Politicum*; I shall only smile in my sleeve, having always accounted Book policy alone, mere pedantry; and although no man values learning more than my self, yet he must know men as well as books, and the world well, that will write of these things. Yet if any will bring Reasons of State, and clearly delivered, as I think I have done and fairly ventilate my opinion, I shall promise him as fair an Answer, for truth never feared a fair trial.

POSTSCRIPT.

IT is necessary that I tell you, this work hath been long in the birth. I had drawn up my thoughts on this subject the last year, and sent my Papers into Holland to print; but my honest friends unacquainted with the Artifice of Government, to nourish hopes in the greatest dangers (Hope being the miserable mans God, as well as the presumptuous mans Devil) sent me word, of nothing but peace, yet kept my Papers through curiosity, till I was forced to send my servant for them. And having got them, and contracted with a Printer here, He was called out for a Soldier, and go he must, and therefore the work must stand. In the mean time two sorts of Papers came to my hands, The Appeal; which being his designs, in reference to England, be different from mine, yet in reference to France, being much the same, I let pass for the present; and the Chancellor of Englands speech, with his *Defenda est Carliago*, which whilst my Printer after his return home is printing off this, I examined, according to the Rules of Christian Charity, Common Equity, and State Policy; but that being too large, I reserve it for an Appendix. In the mean time, though it be late before this comes forth (the Month of April 7.) yet I hope better late than never; and though no Printer will undertake it, because it is Paradoxical to the common opinion of Peace, yet I have put it into the publick Treasury for good, at my own charge in both Languages; and though it cost me 100 l. and none consider me, or to use Solomons phrase, Remember that poor man, in any kind, not so much as enquire after him, or return him thanks; yet it shall not repent me for the good of both Nations, for which I intend it, and to whom I wish a happy peace, and all prosperity.

FINIS

