INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

TESTIMONY OF GEN. JAMES A. VAN FLEET

SEPTEMBER 29, 1954

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INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1954

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p. m., pursuant to call, in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Jenner and Johnston.

Also present: Alva C. Carpenter, chief counsel; Dr. Edna Fluegel, professional staff member.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Last night in Hawthorne, Nev., the Honorable Pat McCarran died. He was a casualty, a grievous casualty, in this world war in which free men and women fight to defend their bodies and their souls against the bloody-fanged barbarians of the Communist jungle.

What he stood for and what he feared is demonstrated in a passage from testimony taken a few weeks ago:

Senator MCCARRAN. General, looking back over our history, do you remember the expression "Give me liberty or give me death"?

The WITNESS. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCARRAN. Do you remember the expression "54–40 or fight"?

The WITNESS. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCARRAN. Do you find that prevalent today, that spirit that made those enunciations?

The WITNESS. It certainly has not been prevalent, Senator McCarran, since World War II was over.

When word came to us that Senator McCarran had died, our first thought was to postpone this hearing out of respect to the Senator's memory. But then we had a second thought.

Pat McCarran founded this subcommittee. He wrote the law out of which it was created. He fixed the standards by which it operates. He molded it into a deadly piece of artillery in the anti-Communist war.

And he did one other thing. He made our enemies for us. They are the kind of enemies we are proud to have. They are the kind of enemies we vow to keep. If the day ever comes when the enemies of Pat McCarran cease to be the enemies of this subcommittee, and every last member of its staff, then we will know we have failed the man who died last night.

So it was, as we thought about these things, that we put aside all notion of postponing this hearing. We knew that Pat McCarran

would not want it that way. He was particularly interested in these hearings on Korea.

Just recently he made a trip for this committee to Florida and interviewed a very important witness, General Stratemeyer. Let the record show this hearing of the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Senate of the United States is held in honor of the subcommittee's founder, the honorable Pat McCarran, of Nevada.

Before proceeding with the witness, I have one other short statement that I think the American people should know about. John W. Powell, editor of Communist China's propaganda magazine, China Review, appeared before this subcommittee on Monday of this week and invoked the fifth amendment against self-incrimination, again and again, when asked questions which touched on his Communist affiliations. We also had here American officers and soldiers who had spent as much as 2½ years in Communist prison camps in Asia and were forced to read the issues of this once American magazine and repeat the lies it peddled before they could get any food or medical care. If they did not cooperate, they were severely punished. We learned of at least one death as a result. One of our witnesses, Carroll Wright, Jr., a former lieutenant in the Army, said that Powell was a murderer, responsible for the deaths of many American fighting men.

I was shocked beyond words to learn that this renegade American was permitted to hold a press conference yesterday in the National Press Club of Washington.

It is reasonable to assume that John W. Powell is in this country to soften up the American people, as he tried to soften up our fighting men, so we will agree to trade with the Soviet bloc, and keep quiet if Red China is admitted to the United Nations.

Mr. Powell probably intends to use the prestige of the National Press Club in Washington to get a background for his propaganda when he goes to other cities.

We sentence a Corporal Dickenson, of Crackers Gap, to 10 years in prison, and give a dishonorable discharge to Colonel Fleming, although these men withstood most of the horrors of imprisonment in Communist prison camps, while we let a renegade American, who indirectly helped to torture them, travel freely about this country, to spread the poison of confusion and defeatism.

It is time to end this folly. Yesterday I asked the Attorney General of the United States to press a treason charge against Mr. Powell. He is an American citizen. He has adhered to our enemies in wartime and given them substantial aid and comfort, as the testimony came from the lips of the former soldiers and officers who were taken prisoners in that war. I am submitting the testimony of these hearings to the Department of Justice, and I hope for quick action.

General Van Fleet, will you be sworn to testify. Do you swear that the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General VAN FLEET. I do.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. JAMES A. VAN FLEET, UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED

The CHAIRMAN. General, let me say it is a pleasure and a privilege to meet here with you today. I know I speak for all my absent colleagues and, indeed, for all America, in paying tribute to you. Your record is brilliant; your courage extraordinary; your forthrightness, phenomenal—and most refreshing.

It is good in these days of whining and of breast-beating, of buck-passing and of expediency, to hear from an American leader who believes in America and in its future. Yours is not the blind faith of the ill-informed, nor the courage of the untried. You have met the Communist enemy in Greece and, again, in Korea—and to the extent that you were free to act it is the enemy who has good reason to regret the encounter. You, yourself, have never wavered in your will to win and in your conviction that "there is no substitute for victory."

But victory in Korea was denied to you—not by your fighting generalship and not by your valiant men—but by an unidentified "they." Whatever the motivation of "they" it is now fairly clear that the announced reasons were preposterous and the results disastrous. As you know, this subcommittee is not concerned with either foreign policy or with military policy, per se.

The internal security of this great country is our concern, however, and there are many facets of both foreign and of military policy that raise the question, "Why?"—why were the experts, the policy-makers, the men who so arrogantly discounted the judgment of our field and theater commanders; why were these men so uniformly and consistently wrong when great masses of our citizens who make no claim to expertness were right?

Why was there so much conflict in testimony in the MacArthur hearings? Why are so many crucial questions still unanswered? What secret commitments were made? Who made them? America? A caucus of diplomats? The U. N.? They told us we must limit our action; we must appease to preserve allied unity and to avoid world war III. They told us Korea was the wrong war. They told us time was on our side. Was it? What has happened to the unity for which we repudiated our great traditions? Can anyone contemplating the world abroad maintain that "they" were right?

And now, as you observe:

> * * * We have at home other curious, perhaps well-intentioned, defeatists who would have us believe that our time to win has already passed. When I listen to their speeches and read their articles—exaggerating the enemy's present strength, playing down the importance of the Pacific and of Asia, I wonder if they are not, consciously or unconsciously, waging psychological warfare against us—destroying our will to win, minimizing our strength, softening us up to accept unnecessary defeat.

Can you identify any of these individuals? Do you believe that stupidity alone motivates them?

I note that you use the expression "consciously or unconsciously." What difference does it make whether serving the enemy has been conscious or unconscious if American security is thereby jeopardized? And so, General Van Fleet, some of our questions today will cover these borderline areas of policy in the hope that your answers may serve to pinpoint areas of decision where the mystery of "why" may

lead to further identification of the mysterious "they," and to an exploration of the extent to which the subversion of our policy may have been a factor.

This we do know. The "neutralization" of Formosa freed the Chinese Communists armies to move north to the Yalu. Limitations unprecedented in our military history were imposed on our commanders. We have isolated and are studying a whole series of peculiar episodes in the conduct of that war. We have noted that some of the same American officials who, for one reason or another, were architects of earlier disaster, were in policymaking positions during the Korean war. As I said to the Senate on August 13, 1954:

> We have learned what hidden Communists did to our foreign policy agencies. That has been documented. We have not spelled out what they did to our military agencies.
>
> No Senator would want to sit down at a chess game with the Soviet chess team, if he thought his American partner was a secret Communist, planning how to throw the game to the Soviet players without being detected. Mr. President, you and I do not want to draft American youth, to engage in any military contest with the Soviet forces, if somewhere, high up on our side, someone is secretly planning how to throw the contest to the Soviet side, without doing anything tangible enough to be found out.

You may proceed, Mr. Carpenter, with the questioning.

Mr. CARPENTER. Will you please give us your full name, your address, and occupation?

General VAN FLEET. James A. Van Fleet, general, United States Army, retired. Home address, Lake Alfred, Fla.

Mr. CARPENTER. Will you give us an outline of your military career, please?

General VAN FLEET. I entered West Point in 1911 from Florida, graduated in the class of 1915, was assigned to the Infantry. I went overseas in World War I in command of a machinegun company; promoted, commanded a machinegun battalion in the closing months of World War I.

Between the wars I had various commands from battalion to regiment, lots of civilian duty with ROTC's and Organized Reserves.

In the beginning of World War II, I was with the 29th Infantry Regiment at the Infantry School, Fort Benning. That was a demonstration regiment, the only war-strength regiment we had in the United States Army.

There I was promoted to full colonel and took command of the Eighth Infantry Regiment which I had for 3 years and commanded as an assault regiment in the invasion of France. I spent 10 months of combat in Europe during World War II as regimental, division, and corps commander. My corps was one selected to be moved to the Pacific and was on its way there when VJ–Day was declared. So I stayed in this country then and subsequently commanded the Second Corps area with headquarters at Governors Island and later I was Deputy Army Commander of the First Army there.

Then I was sent to Germany for a few weeks and then selected by General Marshall and sent to Greece. Following 29 months in Greece I returned to command the Second Army with headquarters at Fort Meade and I was there 8 months before being sent to Korea to command the Eighth Army.

I retired from active duty on March 31, 1953.

Mr. CARPENTER. Thus, you have been in the service of your country since your very early days, is that right, General?

General VAN FLEET. That is correct.

Mr. CARPENTER. What was your assignment in Greece?

General VAN FLEET. I was the director of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group to Greece.

Mr. CARPENTER. What political briefing did you receive before accepting that assignment?

General VAN FLEET. I was in Germany at the time and was asked to come to Washington and here report to General Marshall who was then Secretary of State. While here I received some briefings, both political and military.

Mr. CARPENTER. And for how long a period, General?

General VAN FLEET. Just a few days. It was expected that I would be here longer, but that was rather amusing, General Marshall asked the Pentagon representative how long I would be here and he said about a month. The general asked again to have it repeated. Then he said, "Well, did you arrange an armistice with the guerrillas?" That comment seemed to speed up my departure from Washington because a day or two after that I was on my way. The briefings were very few.

Mr. CARPENTER. Because of the situation in Greece, it was most urgent that you get there as quickly as possible, is that right?

General VAN FLEET. General Marshall thought so, and that proved correct.

Mr. CARPENTER. General Van Fleet, have you ever wondered whether the whole Greek episode that you went through and the Berlin airlift were diversions to keep us concentrated in Europe while the debacle developed in the Far East?

General VAN FLEET. What is the first part of the question?

Mr. CARPENTER. From your experience in Greece, have you ever wondered whether the whole Greek episode and the Berlin airlift were diversions to keep us concentrated in Europe while the debacle developed in the Far East?

General VAN FLEET. Gradually, I came to that conclusion. I would not say I was of that opinion when I first went to Greece, but that evolved and I so believe today.

Mr. CARPENTER. You believe that today?

General VAN FLEET. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you believe that today? Will you briefly state it?

General VAN FLEET. Mr. Chairman, a lot of events point to it. I might go back with a few views I have.

I believe our Government and especially the military was oriented to Europe rather than to Asia. For generations we have had very close ties with Europe while the reverse holds for Asia. Asia is very difficult country. There is no luxury out there to enjoy like there is in Paris or London or other capitals. So for a hundred years we have been a European nation in our views.

The Pentagon was filled with many high-ranking officers who had experience in Europe, and their thinking was Europe—in fact, Western Europe. While in Greece, when I fully understood the whole picture of the importance of the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean, I advocated greater strength, military strength, in that area.

I was told repeatedly that the high command was not interested in that, that Russia would have no interest at all to the south, that the whole threat was against Western Europe. Nothing we could do in the Balkans or the eastern Mediterranean would prevent Russia from driving west. So I ceased sending in such recommendations.

But in the latter part of my tour there it so happened that General Gruenther took up the war plans position in the Department of the Army. I got a message from him asking for more information on such plans. So then I began to send in volumes of information on the importance the Balkans and other areas in the eastern Mediterranean would play by providing a threat that would point north to the underbelly of Russia, should Russia advance west.

So it was rather late in my tour in Greece before even the eastern Mediterranean got much attention from the Western European advocates.

So I have often wondered as we go farther east to take in the Middle East and then the Near East and finally the Far East, why those areas receive even less consideration in the world picture of a threat from Russia.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, up until that time we had a European complex and could not see anything but Europe?

General VAN FLEET. I believe that to be correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And only a certain segment of that, of Western Europe?

General VAN FLEET. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSTON. General, in other words, we did not consider the Far East very much at that time; is that true?

General VAN FLEET. I do not know how we considered the Far East at that time, Senator, since I was in Greece. I myself had little knowledge of the Far East. I do not know the thinking that actually went on, but I do know they did not give the eastern Mediterranean much consideration other than the Truman doctrine assistance which was to help a nation maintain its freedom. It first applied to Greece and Turkey in 1947.

Mr. CARPENTER. What were the Russians seeing at that time when we were seeing only Western Europe?

General VAN FLEET. I think that is clearly outlined in the statements of the Soviet leaders. All their written statements of world conquest, corroborated by their deeds, suggest that they were oriented to capture Asia before Europe.

Mr. CARPENTER. In Greece did you observe any American involvement on the Communist side?

General VAN FLEET. I was familiar with some difficulties which the chief of the mission, who was then former Governor Griswold of Nebraska, later Senator, had with one of our American correspondents. They seemed to have been at cross-purpose and a lot of charges and countercharges were being aired in the press. I thought it played into the hands of the enemy.

Mr. CARPENTER. Can you tell us a little more about who were involved, General, other than Governor Griswold?

General VAN FLEET. Former Governor Griswold was chief of the economic mission. There was no Ambassador there at the time, so he was the senior American present and in command of all our American missions, the Embassy, the economic and military groups.

Mr. Homer Bigart was one of the American correspondents in Greece at the time, and Mr. Bigart seemed to sympathize greatly with the Communist cause in Greece, the guerrilla cause, perhaps thinking they were the underdog or were helping the underdog. Actually they were the dirty dog rather than the underdog; but perhaps his views were honest.

The CHAIRMAN. Were his views in line with our foreign policy at that time?

General VAN FLEET. I would say "No." It was a very harmful criticism which he made of our efforts in Greece. Then he finally entered the guerrilla territory through Yugoslavia and spent some time with the Communist guerrillas in northern Greece, and eventually came through the lines and surrendered to an American advisory group with a Greek national unit. I thought the whole episode was wrong.

Senator JOHNSTON. Was he ever tried?

General VAN FLEET. No, he was not. He wrote quite a story about his experiences.

Senator JOHNSTON. Who had the authority to try him at that time?

General VAN FLEET. I do not suppose anybody had unless it would be this committee, with new legislation.

Senator JOHNSTON. No one in Greece in command had a right to try him?

General VAN FLEET. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, this committee has no right of trial.

General VAN FLEET. You mentioned earlier this other gentleman—a Mr. Powell—who was playing with the enemy, too.

Mr. CARPENTER. Bigart later covered the Korean war, did he not?

General VAN FLEET. Yes, he did; or part of it.

Senator JOHNSTON. Where is he now?

General VAN FLEET. I do not know. He is a very able fellow. I would say he is a good American all right, but he goes to extremes to get the enemy's point of view.

Mr. CARPENTER. What about the efficiency of the United Nations in Greece, General?

General VAN FLEET. The United Nations set up a United Nations special committee on the Balkans to observe border troubles. The Soviet bloc of nations boycotted that mission, so it was made up of only friendly allies. They were there to observe troubles along the Bulgarian, Yugoslavian, and Albanian borders. I do not believe there is any other United Nations mission there.

The CHAIRMAN. What about UNSCOB?

General VAN FLEET. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. How did it operate?

General VAN FLEET. They were fairly effective as regards our side of the border. They never crossed over into the enemy's territory or into the guerrilla territory.

The CHAIRMAN. They gave you good cooperation?

General VAN FLEET. Yes. In fact, it was my organization which gave them support in the form of logistics.

Mr. CARPENTER. What conclusions did you reach in regard to Communist political strategy and tactics?

General VAN FLEET. That takes us into the whole subject of guerrilla warfare, which is an unorthodox, unconventional type of warfare where it is a hit-and-run process. Never fight or give battle and work on the civilians as much as on the government forces.

When you combine communism with guerrilla warfare, it becomes doubly bad because you get all kinds of lies. It gets out of the realm of the partisan or patriotic movement for the good of their side of a civil war. It gets into international communism which prospers by lies and murders to make the underprivileged believe they can have more under a Communist regime. It is very appealing to people who are unemployed or who are suffering for want of food or shelter. Those lies appeal very much. That, I would say, is the first step in getting a convert to communism. It is only later, as they find it does not work that way, that they have eventually lost their souls.

Mr. CARPENTER. Was any attempt made by American officials to force a coalition government on Greece?

General VAN FLEET. That was our whole policy in the State Department, to have a government that would represent all elements. It was a coalition government always that was set up; all parties being represented in the government. That was what we advocated as a policy for Greece.

Mr. CARPENTER. Does that include Communists?

General VAN FLEET. That would include Communists or leftwingers or collaborators—any and all parties.

The CHAIRMAN. General, in order to make that policy successful, didn't we as a Government threaten to withhold aid if they did not take the Communists into their Government?

General VAN FLEET. Mr. Chairman, I do believe that threat was used on many occasions. I remember one particular occasion I might relate.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would, General.

General VAN FLEET. There was a Greek election in which the leftwing got a substantial vote, I would say about 14 percent of the vote, which is a good vote, because there are so many parties. But His Majesty did not wish to appoint the leader of that party as the Prime Minister because it was a leftist party headed by General Plastiris.

Our ambassador there, Mr. Henry Grady, insisted that Plastiris be named Prime Minister and head up a new government. There was quite an impassé for some time. Other solutions were tried to form a government. I won't say tried, were proposed, before His Majesty saw that he would have to, in conformity with American wishes, name General Plastiris as Prime Minister to head up a new government. When he did so, the American Ambassador attended a big party given by Plastiris and publicly announced that now Greece would get the money for the hydroelectric projects.

Mr. CARPENTER. What later developed in that situation that you recall?

General VAN FLEET. General Plastiris' government was not very successful, was not in power long, had much opposition. The rightists and conservative parties would not go along on many issues. About that time Gen. Alexander Papagos, who was then the general in command of the Greek forces under me, retired. His Majesty had previously appointed him to the rank of field marshal. Field Marshal

Papagos entered politics, organized the Greek Rally Party in the hopes that he would get a majority of the vote, but he actually got less than 50 percent. Without a majority he would not take part in the government.

At a second general election he received a majority of the vote of the people, which did away with all the coalition governments of the many past years. With a majority Papagos could name the ministers and be backed by Parliament and thus have a permanent government, one which Greece enjoys today.

The CHAIRMAN. When our Government insisted upon the Communists being taken into the Government of Greece and finally the Communists did take over, this Plastiris did take over for a short time and had an unsuccessful government, would you tell us what the Communists did? Did they make growth in the communities?

General VAN FLEET. Yes, Mr. Chairman. During the short while that General Plastiris headed up the Government, more of the fellow travelers got into office by appointment. I would not say General Plastiris always had knowledge that they were Communists or fellow travelers. General Plastiris was an ignorant person and was easily influenced. He was under the control of the leftists. He would appoint a friend of a friend who would be recommended. In that way the Communists were gradually getting back into power. There was a Communist mayor appointed in a little town which is the capital of a province in northwest Greece near the Albanian border Those trends were quite widespread and became very alarming to the conservative element of the Government and to the Greek Army itself. They were shocked to see these people gradually getting back into power. Based upon such evidence, I sent a message to Washington advising them of the conditions. I believe it was about the last message I sent from Athens before I came home in July 1950.

The CHAIRMAN. Did it change our policy?

General VAN FLEET. Well, I think it did because it was shortly after that that the Plastiris government fell and Marshal Papagos became the prime minister.

I will not say my message did it, Mr. Chairman. I think the Greek Army and conservative elements were aroused to the danger and took action.

Senator JOHNSTON. You were not in Greece any time Peurifoy was there?

General VAN FLEET. No, sir. He followed.

Mr. CARPENTER. When you returned from Greece, General, what was your assignment?

General VAN FLEET. I was placed in command of the Second Army in the continental United States. Headquarters were at Fort Meade.

Mr. CARPENTER. What were your views on the military situation at the Pentagon meeting in early December 1950?

General VAN FLEET. I attended an Army commanders' conference in the Pentagon about December 1 to 3 of 1950. It was a regularly scheduled Army commanders' conference such as were held a few years back. Of course, the Korean war was discussed very fully at that conference. The Chinese Reds had entered the war in November; that is, just a few weeks prior. The American Army was withdrawing from North Korea. The situation looked very bad. That was the subject of much discussion at that Army commanders' conference.

Mr. CARPENTER. What were the views expressed there?

General VAN FLEET. The need of more personnel, personnel questions, how serious they were, how serious the shortage of equipment was, the condition of some of our units in Korea which had been overrun.

It was indeed quite a gloomy picture that was painted of our position in Korea.

Mr. CARPENTER. Who painted gloomy pictures, General?

General VAN FLEEET. It was expressed by many people. I think the one I remember most was General Haislip. I remember speaking out that I thought the picture was not so bad, that there were great opportunities there.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you alone in those views?

General VAN FLEET. No. I think there were several other generals present who agreed with me. However, I believe we were in the minority. I was reminded that the 2d Infantry Division had lost all its equipment in the action at Kunari Pass. Only about half of the personnel had managed to get back. The division therefore would be out of action for an extended period of time, if ever it could be put back into fighting condition.

I said, I believe they will bounce back rapidly. Their morale will remain high if we can get them the equipment. They will be ready to fight in short order.

The CHAIRMAN. Wasn't this conference held shortly after the President of the United States announced that General MacArthur would be authorized to use the atomic bomb wherever needed?

General VAN FLEET. I do not recall, sir. I do not remember that incident.

Mr. CARPENTER. When were you first placed on a standby basis for Korea?

General VAN FLEET. Early January 1951.

Mr. CARPENTER. Who placed you on that standby basis?

General VAN FLEET. The Chief of Staff, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, told me in the event of replacement for General Ridgway I would be next and that I must keep it quiet and only three other people would know about it.

Mr. CARPENTER. When did he tell you this, on what occasion, General?

General VAN FLEET. It was at the funeral of Gen. Walton H. Walker at Arlington.

Mr. CARPENTER. Do you remember the exact date?

General VAN FLEET. I think it was January 3.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you briefed during the period you were on a standby basis?

General VAN FLEET. No, I did not get any special briefings. I followed the war closer than ever, of course, to keep posted.

Mr. CARPENTER. You say you were on a 10-day leave in Florida when on April 11, 1951, General Collins phoned and ordered you to Korea. When did that leave start?

General VAN FLEET. I went on a 10-day leave from Fort Meade on April 8 to my place in Florida. It was the night of April 10–11 that I received a telephone call from General Collins reminding me of

the conversation he had had with me in early January and that I would be going at once and to hurry back to Washington. We did not mention Korea or the assignment to the Eighth Army. It merely referred to the prior conversation in January.

Mr. CARPENTER. Had you any inkling of the impending relief of General MacArthur?

General VAN FLEET. That had been discussed in the newspapers for the past 2 or 3 days; that is, prior to April 10. So as I remember, that had already occurred.

The CHAIRMAN. All you knew was what you had read in the newspapers, the rumors?

General VAN FLEET. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you expect that General MacArthur's relief would lead to your sudden departure to Korea?

General VAN FLEET. No. It did not occur to me because I was to be General Ridgway's replacement, and I thought someone else would replace General MacArthur rather than General Ridgway.

Mr. CARPENTER. What was your view concerning the MacArthur proposals in 1950?

General VAN FLEET. Those proposals I remember were to use the atomic weapons and bomb enemy targets in north China and Manchuria.

Mr. CARPENTER. I do not believe it was to use the atomic bomb. It was hot pursuit, to bomb the enemy sanctuaries in Manchuria and to drive through to the Yalu River?

General VAN FLEET. Of course, I was very much in accord with such views.

Mr. CARPENTER. How about his subsequent views?

General VAN FLEET. I have always subscribed to such action then and since.

The CHAIRMAN. And now, General?

General VAN FLEET. And now; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever discuss these proposals with any of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General VAN FLEET. I am sure I have. We had many visitors from Washington to Korea, and the discussions would be rather general and complete. I am sure that question came up. I am sure my views were still in line. I cannot recall any specific conversation with the Army Chief of Staff—Army, Navy, or Air Force—on that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. The high officials you did visit with, what were their views? You told them your views; what were their views?

General VAN FLEET. I am unable to say, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not recall?

General VAN FLEET. No, sir; I do not. I do remember General Clark's views were very much for it, but I do not have any recollection of specific views on that subject by the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who came to Korea.

I would believe they would all be for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the policy change? Were you allowed the right of hot pursuit? Were you allowed to bomb sanctuaries? Did our Government's policy change?

General VAN FLEET. At times we were in hot pursuit and other times we were stopped.

The CHAIRMAN. Were your planes given the right of hot pursuit to cross the Yalu sanctuaries?

General VAN FLEET. No, never.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the basic policy did not change?

General VAN FLEET. I do not think it did. As far as crossing the Yalu, never was it granted. It was never done.

The CHAIRMAN. General, have you ever heard of a war in all of history, especially American history, where the fighting was to be confined to the territory of our friends?

General VAN FLEET. No; it is most unusual.

Mr. CARPENTER. Prior to your assignment in April 1951, General, had you ever been in the Far East?

General VAN FLEET. No, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Was Korea the wrong war in the wrong place and at the wrong time?

General VAN FLEET. Well, certainly not. I have often made a statement that it was the right war at the right place and the right time against the right enemy and with the right allies, thinking of the Koreans as a very worthy, friendly ally in whose country to fight.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, would you say that General Bradley's judgment was based on the theory of the paramount importance of Western Europe, particularly the Ruhr?

General VAN FLEET. I agree with that statement.

Mr. CARPENTER. Can you comment on that a little?

General VAN FLEET. I believe General Bradley and General Collins, especially those two of the Joint Chiefs, were oriented entirely to Western Europe and that they could not see a deployment of American strength in the far Pacific. They, I am sure, helped in the estimate of the situation that Russia would strike in Europe and not in Asia. That estimate of enemy's intentions, in my opinion, was one of the greatest errors we have ever made in sizing up our enemy's intentions.

The CHAIRMAN. What would happen to a field commander who made that kind of a mistake?

General VAN FLEET. He would be relieved, of course.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, would bombing the supply lines of Manchuria have contributed to victory?

General VAN FLEET. Certainly.

Mr. CARPENTER. Could we have won the war in Korea?

General VAN FLEET. Certainly. Let me say that everybody in the Eighth Army, to include our United Nations allies and the Koreans, believed in victory and believed they could achieve victory. I still believe that we could have achieved victory in Korea.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, have you ever wondered why we adopted what you describe as a weak policy, one that gave the enemy the initiative and produced the present chaos?

General VAN FLEET. Why we adopted that policy?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes.

General VAN FLEET. I have always blamed that on the United Nations. I have no real evidence to point to, but the war in Korea was a United Nations action. By resolution they named the United States as the executive agent to prosecute the war. We named the commander.

We set up in Washington a little group of nations or representatives of the nations who had forces in Korea. They were informed from time to time of the progress of the war. There had to be some machinery for advising our friendly allies what their forces were doing in Korea. They were briefed one or two or more times a week here in Washington.

I believe on major issues they would be consulted perhaps in advance. Especially would Great Britain be consulted. They may have helped us in some of our decisions. They may have guided us, influenced us to go easy with a weaker policy, to stop at the 38th, or to work for an armistice. I surmise that. I do not have the evidence that would make it conclusive.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, you state that the aim of the Communists in Asia clearly is to bring all Asia into the Communist fold as part of a grand design for a Communist world. This is their announced objective, is it not?

General VAN FLEET. That is their announced objective, and their deeds are in line with it.

Senator JOHNSTON. Summing up your statement, I believe you would say this was a war fought by the military but guided by the State Department; is that right?

General VAN FLEET. That is correct. The policy was set by the State Department. I would assume they would consult certain allies, that the miiltary would be consulted. But I believe our military was very much oriented to Europe. They went along very readily with a weak policy.

Senator JOHNSTON. I agree with you thoroughly, and I think I expressed my feelings in the matter in October 1950, in Los Angeles in a speech that I made there. I came out with it in a vigorous speech.

The CHAIRMAN. General, let me ask at this point: Would you want to fight another war with American boys under those conditions?

General VAN FLEET. Of course, I have seen so much destruction and horror of war, Mr. Chairman, that I think to fight in any war is a terrible thought. But under justified reasons and to preserve our freedom, I believe I would be ready to go to war again and that in any future war, with the same conditions, we would have different decisions. So my answer would be "Yes"; we would never do it again like we did in Korea.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

General VAN FLEET. I might say just a word more, using the map, about this being the right war and the right place.

The CHAIRMAN. You may go to the map, and there is a microphone, General, that you may speak into.

General VAN FLEET. On the map you have Red China and Korea. For the Red Chinese to maintain an effort in Korea they had a single rail line along the coast through North China, running up into Manchuria, and then south across the border; at which time they came under the fire of our Air Force for 200 miles thereafter south to the battle lines, across the middle of the peninsula. That is a long supply line, a very difficult supply line. And for the Chinese to assemble and to move and support in action an army of nearly a million men halfway down this peninsula, the last 200 miles under attack, is a tremendous undertaking; which places them at a great disadvantage.

In addition, supplies from Russia, which were considerable, had to come a long distance across Siberia, by rail line, into Vladivostok and then along a much longer rail line along the Korean coast, which was under the constant fire of our Navy and air. They were paying a very heavy price to maintain a war at a point of great disadvantage to them.

The reverse of that is true of the American forces. We were supplied by water, and some air, through Japan, to Korea. We had command of the water and the air. We had, and still have, unexcelled bases in Japan and Korea for redeployment. And to maintain an expeditionary force overseas and sustain it in battle, you must have large bases.

There are only two places in the world where such conditions exist outside of the United States. One is England and the other is Japan. We had a base here, Japan, fully at our disposal, to do as we pleased about it; unexcelled harbors and repair facilities and fields.

We had the tremendous skill of the Japanese industrial nation, employed as civilians, to help us prosecute that war. It could not possibly be made or altered any better. We had the flank protected by our Navy, and all this base here to destroy a Red Chinese Army far from home, well out on the limb, and in great difficulty all the time—a beautiful opportunity for victory.

Look at other places around the world anywhere; you cannot find it any better.

That is why I say this was the right place and at the right time, with the wonderful nation of the Koreans, the right ally. And against this new enemy, Red China, far from home.

The CHAIRMAN. General, have you ever wondered why the experts, who must have known what you pointed out, were so blind?

General VAN FLEET. I can't figure that out, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JOHNSTON. Why did we have a divided peace, under those circumstances?

General VAN FLEET. I should conclude this by saying that we left an armistice line 1 day's march from the capital city of Seoul, generally through there, but an impossible line from a military point of view or from a political point of view. Everyone in the city of Seoul lives in fear of the enemy 1 day's march away. How can you expect any private capital to invest and rehabilitate that city?

In addition, economically it is the wrong line. Here is South Korea with 21 million people, an agricultural country. North Korea, originally with 8 million, is the industrial part of the nation. It has minerals, hydroelectric power, coal.

Of course, of the original 8 million in North Korea, about 4 million are now refugees in South Korea; among them large numbers of Christians, whom our missionaries converted during the past 60 years, principally in the town of Pinyang. It is these Christians from the north more than any other element of the Korean race who are the strong advocates of President Syngman Rhee's going north, to liberate their homes and such relatives as may be left.

I have often advised our high command that, if we must confine the war to Korea south of the Yalu, to at least stop it at the narrow waist, which would be a shorter line, easier to defend, could be defended by the Koreans themselves, and would give them much needed territory and many cultural centers, which play a very big part in the

history of the culture of that race, such as the ancient capital of Kaesong, not far from Seoul.

It was this narrow line I advocated that we seize, by many, many different plans for operations which were submitted throughout the time I was in Korea; all of which were, of course, turned down.

Mr. CARPENTER. General Van Fleet, you say that native troops are cheaper and they make it difficult for the Communists to charge imperialism. Were there reasons for limiting the ROK training program?

General VAN FLEET. I do not believe there was any political reason for limiting the size of the Korean forces. I think it was mostly economic and perhaps some person's military views that they were not good soldiers.

Mr. CARPENTER. What is your opinion as to their ability as soldiers?

General VAN FLEET. They are among our finest soldiers in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we made another mistake on that calculation, did we not, General?

General VAN FLEET. I would say we did, for a long while after I arrived there.

I judge that this way: In the early days of the war, the Korean Army, as such, was quickly overrun. They had a force of only 96,000 at the time of the attack. During the days of the Pusan perimeter, under General Walker, the Koreans were impressed into the army from fields, from cities, given a few hours of instruction on how to load and shoot a gun, and found themselves in the front line. So they gave all they could in the way of spirit and bravery, but they were not a trained and equipped army as we know one. And it was not until months later that the time and circumstances permitted training of Koreans.

Shortly after I arrived in April, 1951, I observed that the Korean was a very hardy individual, was used to austere existence, could endure hardships, suffering; that he was intelligent, he learned fast, was very obedient, and that he respected age and orders of his elders, would do exactly as told, and go forward on orders and die, if necessary.

So, having those wonderful qualifications, I knew we could make good soldiers of them if only we gave them equipment, weapons, and training.

I advocated a large program of training and activation of additional divisions from almost the time I arrived.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were there limitations on the number of ROK troops you could train, General?

General VAN FLEET. Yes. There was a ceiling on the number. That ceiling was controlled partly by money, partly by a belief that it would be enough to take care of the situation the high command had in mind. But within that ceiling we had great numbers of ineffectives. We had 50,000 or more in the hospitals, who were counted against the ceiling strength of the army. I took every means possible to get them discharged so as to replace them with able-bodied soldiers.

There is no Veterans' Administration in Korea; there is no one to take care of discharged veterans, and it was a very difficult process.

We finally adopted a system, which was proposed by President Rhee, that the men in the training camps would be called civilians; which I accepted. We did not swear them in until they were trained. We have a similar category in this country, like CMTC, ROTC, even a CCC. So I called them civilians and that gave me quite a few more soldiers for the fighting units.

Officially that was not supported, but Washington let me get by with it. In fact, Mrs. Rosenberg,[2] when she came over was smiling about it and thought it a pretty smart system.

That limitation was gradually lifted so that the ceiling strength of the Korean Army gradually crept up to take care of each specific case and I could get another few soldiers added to the army.

I advocated, of course, more divisions; but additional divisions were not authorized until December 1 of 1952.

Mr. CARPENTER. You certainly needed additional manpower, did you not, General?

General VAN FLEET. We felt that the Korean could do about as much as an American boy and would replace Americans if we had enough of them.

The CHAIRMAN. General, did you ever stop to wonder why the most powerful, the richest Nation in the world, engaged in a war that we were supposed to win, would put a limitation ceiling upon the troops of a country that our boys were defending, fighting for?

General VAN FLEET. It seemed absurd since a war that they were willing to fight—as a matter of fact, President Rhee, bless him, would often inspect with me new arrivals of American units, and with tears in his eyes would say, "General, I don't like to see your little American boys come over here so far from home and fight in this country for us; we have lots of manpower; we will do the fighting. Just give us the weapons and the training."

Repeatedly he would ask me to present that to my Government as a plea to them.

The CHAIRMAN. And you did?

General VAN FLEET. I did.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your answer; a limitation?

General VAN FLEET. Always a limitation.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Carpenter.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, you frequently state that the cease-fire in Korea freed Communist power for further marauding. Is it not likewise true that the neutralization of Formosa the second day of the Korean war freed the Chinese Communists for action in Korea?

General VAN FLEET. Yes, it would certainly help them; give them a feeling of security that they could go north free from a threat in the south.

Mr. CARPENTER. Does that make sense, from a military point of view?

General VAN FLEET. No.

That is the unfortunate part about the whole Far East situation. There are so many fronts, to win on any one you need to put pressure on all.

Mr. CARPENTER. Do you believe that the Chinese Communists would have crossed the Yalu without assurance that our military action would be limited?

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[2] Mrs. Anna M. Rosenberg, Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1951–53.

General VAN FLEET. No; he would not have entered Korea if he did not feel safe from attack in north China and Manchuria.

Mr. CARPENTER. He felt pretty secure, did he not?

General VAN FLEET. I am sure he must have, or he would have been foolish to have entered Korea.

Mr. CARPENTER. Have you ever speculated as to the source of this assurance?

General VAN FLEET. I have no evidence on where he would be assured.

The CHAIRMAN. General, we are looking for the "theys."

General VAN FLEET. I merely have a guess that he would get it through some embassy source in Peiping.

Mr. CARPENTER. At Wake Island, General MacArthur is reported to have said he doubted that Red China would enter the war in view of our overwhelming sea and airpower and atomic potential. If any participant in that conference had already committed this country to limit our retaliation, not to employ these normal military measures, should our military commander not have been informed?

General VAN FLEET. I think he should have been informed; yes, if there were such a promise to Red China.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think there was such a promise; or they would not have come in?

General VAN FLEET. My own conviction is that there must have been information to the enemy that we would not attack his home bases.

Mr. CARPENTER. You may recall that subsequently General MacArthur was blamed for miscalculating Chinese intentions, that is, the Chinese Reds. Actually, his judgment was based on the normal military assumption that he would be allowed to use all of his weapons, was it not?

General VAN FLEET. I agree.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to introduce as an exhibit, General MacArthur's letter to Senator Byrd on the 19th of April 1953. I would like to enter it into the record and have it made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 492" and appears below:)

EXHIBIT No. 492

GENERAL MACARTHUR'S LETTER

APRIL 19, 1953.

DEAR SENATOR BYRD: Thank you for your note of the 13th inquiring as to my views with reference to certain testimony before the Senate subcommittee investigating the shortage of ammunition in Korea. For the sake of historical accuracy, I am very glad to give you my comments on the points you have raised.

I was never consulted directly or indirectly with reference to the supply program under discussion. Its scope and volume, its appropriations and production schedules were prepared solely by Washington authorities, the function of my command being limited entirely to routine reporting of my needs and necessities. Under such circumstances, the labored effort made by the former Secretary of the Army to create without the slightest foundation of realism some sort of relationship between me and the ammunition shortage in Korea during the last 2 years since I left there, is completely fantastic.

Nor would it be any more logical to attribute the failure to set up an adequate program for United States security to optimistic views, if and wherever held, of an early end to the Korean war during the early months of the conflict.

As a matter of fact, no such optimism existed, either at the front or elsewhere, during those early months when our beleaguered and heavily outnumbered forces, with their backs to the sea, clung desperately to the Pusan beachhead perimeter. The only predictions from Washington at that time warned of impending military disaster. Then, too, our ammunition was critically short. As I recall, General Walker [then commander of the Eighth Army] at one stage was down to five rounds per gun. His heroically successful efforts under unparalleled shortages of all sorts constituted an amazing military exploit.

Disaster was avoided by the Inchon operation—an enveloping movement designed to destroy the enemy's supply network—which was only grudgingly approved on my desperate insistence over the most serious professional doubts from higher authority. The North Korean Army, with its supplies cut off, disintegrated and was practically destroyed, and by the latter part of October the capital of Pyongyang was captured. These events completely transformed the situation from pessimism to optimism.

This was the golden moment to translate military victory to a politically advantageous peace. Success in war involves political as well as military considerations. For the sacrifice leading to a military victory would be pointless if not translated promptly to the political advantage of peace. But what happened was just to the contrary. The inertia of our diplomacy failed utterly to utilize the victory of Inchon and subsequent destruction of the North Korean armies as the basis for swift and dynamic political action to restore peace and unity to Korea. This was one of the great contributing causes to the subsequent new war into which we were later plunged by Red China. At this time a new war with this much more formidable foe was not foreseen. Neither the State Department through its diplomatic listening posts abroad, nor the Central Intelligence Agency to whom a field commander must look for guidance as to a nation's intention to move from peace to war, found any evidence of intent by the Peiping Government to intervene with major forces until the moment they actually struck.

My own military estimate was that our largely unopposed air forces, with their atomic potential, capable of destroying at will bases of attack and lines of supply north as well as south of the Yalu River, no Chinese military commander would dare hazard the commitment of large forces upon the Korean Peninsula. The risk of their utter destruction through lack of supply would be too great. But by one process or another it was conjectured by, or conveyed to, the Red Chinese that even though they entered the fray in large force it would be under the sanctuary of being relieved from any destructive action of our military forces within their own areas. Such a limitation upon the utilization of available military force to repel an enemy attack has no precedent either in our own history or, so far as I know, in the history of the world.

The results were disastrous beyond imagination and are still incalculable. When the Chinese Communists actually struck without warning, and my order to destroy the bridges at their points of entry over the Yalu into Korea was immediately countermanded from Washington, I realized for the first time the extraordinary decision which had been made to deny me the use of my full military power to safeguard the lives of my soldiers and insure the safety of the Army. To me it clearly foreshadowed the tragic situation which has since developed and left me with a sense of shock I had never before experienced in a long life crammed with explosive reactions and momentous hazards.

Hoping this basic decision might still be changed, I made recommendations including, among others, air bombardment of military installations north of the Yalu which were being actively employed against us, naval blockade of the coast of China to cut off enemy supplies, and the utilization of Nationalist China troops available on Formosa. These recommendations were actually approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 12, 1951, but somewhere between the offices of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the President, those recommendations were pigeonholed, and we took the course leading to the present stalemate of positional warfare, by all odds the most costly and least productive method of waging war.

The overriding deficiency incident to our conduct of the war in Korea was not in the shortage of ammunition or other materiel, but in the lack of the will for victory, which has profoundly influenced both our strategic concepts in the field and our supporting action at home. This lack undoubtedly must bear responsibility for the extraordinary failure to anticipate and provide the means by which victory might have been made possible. This led us into the fatal error of becoming bogged down in positional warfare on terrain which with the abandonment of a war of maneuver necessitated a tremendously increased expenditure of ammunition to protect our lines from enemy infiltration or collapse.

Underlying the whole problem of ammunition and supply has always been the indeterminate question as to whether or not the Soviet contemplates world military conquest. If it does, the time and place will be at its initiative and could not fail to be influenced by the fact that in the atomic area the lead of the United States is being diminished with the passage of time. So, likewise, is the great industrial potential of the United States as compared with the Communist world. In short, it has always been my own belief that any action we might take to resolve the Far Eastern problem now would not in itself be a controlling factor in the precipitation of a world conflict.

It is quite probable that the Soviet masses are just as eager for peace as are our own people. They probably suffer the delusion that there are aggressive intentions against them on the part of the capitalistic world and that they would welcome an imaginative approach which would allay this false impression. The Soviet is not blind to the dangers which actually confront it in the Far East in the present situation.

We still possess the potential to destroy Red China's flimsy industrial base and sever her tenuous supply lines from the Soviet. This would deny her the resource to support modern war and sustain large military forces in the field. This in turn would greatly weaken the Communist Government of China and threaten the Soviet's present hold on Asia. A warning of action of this sort provides the leverage to induce the Soviet to bring the Korean struggle to an end without further bloodshed. It would dread risking the eventuality of a Red China debacle, and such a hazard might well settle the Korean war and all other pending global issues on equitable terms just as soon as it realizes we have the will and the means to bring them to a prompt and definite determination. Such an end would justify the sacrifice of our countrymen we have asked to die in that far-off land, would rejoice the Korean people whose nation we are pledged to redeem, would validate the principle of collective security upon which rests our present foreign policy, and would insure us the respect and faith of the peoples of Asia now and for all time.

Again, Senator, let me thank you for the sense of fair play and the courtesy which have prompted you to write me as you have. I appreciate such action more than I can say.

With best wishes and warm regards.

Most faithfully,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

Mr. CARPENTER. At this time I would like to read about two paragraphs.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. CARPENTER. General MacArthur wrote:

My own military estimate was that, with our largely unopposed air forces, with their atomic potential, capable of destroying at will bases of attack and lines of supply north as well as south of the Yalu River, no Chinese military commander would dare hazard the commitment of large forces upon the Korean Peninsula. The risk of their utter destruction through lack of supply would be too great.

But by one process or another it was conjectured by, or conveyed to, the Red Chinese that even though they entered the fray in large force it would be under the sanctuary of being relieved from any destructive action of our military forces within their own areas. Such a limitation upon the utilization of available military force to repel an enemy attack has no precedent either in our own history or, so far as I know, in the history of the world.

The results were disastrous beyond imagination and are still incalculable. When the Chinese Communists actually struck without warning, and my order to destroy the bridges at their points of entry over the Yalu into Korea was immediately countermanded from Washington, I realized for the first time the extraordinary decision which had been made to deny me the use of my full military power to safeguard the lives of my soldiers and insure the safety of the Army.

To me it clearly foreshadowed the tragic situation which has since developed and left me with a sense of shock I had never before experienced in a long life crammed with explosive reactions and momentous hazards.

That letter is signed by Douglas MacArthur.

Mr. CARPENTER. General Van Fleet, in Reader's Digest, February 1954, you state:

When the Korean war began, Chiang offered us his army. Had we accepted, we might not have needed to bring a single American ground division from the States.

Why did we not accept?

General VAN FLEET. I never have understood why we did not use Chiang Kai-shek's divisions. Looking on it today, it was a terrible mistake, because it would have given them a wonderful training, a battle test, to develop Chiang's army and to know which of his generals are good in combat and what the Nationalist troops can really do. Even today we do not know that answer.

Mr. CARPENTER. You say that later you wanted to use Chiang's troops, three divisions at a time, to rotate and get battle experience. You say you believed many more Chinese Communist troops would have come over to our side since no loss of face would have been involved if they joined other Chinese. This is logical.

Why did not the high policy experts comprehend it?

General VAN FLEET. I am unable to answer the question.

Mr. CARPENTER. You have given that some thought, have you, General?

General VAN FLEET. Yes, sir.

I was influenced in my views largely by conferences I had with Chinese officials in Korea, especially their Ambassador from Formosa, who often stated to me their wish to bring Chinese divisions there and face Chinese Communists that speak in the same language; they would get wholesale desertions by the simple expedient of offering them better food and still a military home.

Mr. CARPENTER. You state that you still believe that Chiang, if his landing were facilitated, would attract many to switch sides, and that a change in China is fundamental to peace and security in the Far East.

Again, why did we not do it?

General VAN FLEET. I am unable to answer the question.

The CHAIRMAN. General, right there at that point, let me ask: There appears in our press daily the situation in Quemoy. Is Quemoy important to the United States?

General VAN FLEET. Senator, I would say it is vitally important. I visited Quemoy during my recent visit to the Far East, inspected the Chinese positions along the beach facing the mainland. I think it is important because a defeat there would mean a further retreat of American policy and prestige. I do not believe we can afford to have any further loss of prestige in the Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. Are we replacing the ammunition that is being expended there by the Nationalists?

General VAN FLEET. I am sure we are.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think we give the Nationalists as much aid as the Communists give the Reds?

General VAN FLEET. No; I do not. We may in dollars, but not in kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Which is the more important?

General VAN FLEET. To actually receive the article that you use and the food you eat is more important.

The CHAIRMAN. The newspapers recently said, General, that Koreans had, a week or two ago, only about a 2-day supply of ammunition. Do you know whether there is any basis of fact in that statement?

General VAN FLEET. These are the Koreans?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General VAN FLEET. I am sure there are ample supplies in the Far East and also in Korea. But, of course, they are in American hands, and perhaps the 2 days that you speak of represents the amount in Korean possession.

The CHAIRMAN. General, let me ask you, as a military man, a question, because I am not a military man.

Suppose that story is true, that as far as the South Koreans are concerned, they only have 2 days' ammunition, but as far as the Americans are concerned, there is ample ammunition. Now let us assume the Communists decide to strike; what would happen to the American boys? Could they get the supplies and ammunition to the South Koreans and deploy it in time to be effective to save American boys' lives?

General VAN FLEET. The supply services would operate, I am sure, effectively so as to replenish the supplies.

The CHAIRMAN. In 2 days' time?

General VAN FLEET. As long as we are in command and have sufficient troops there, especially service troops, to supply them.

The CHAIRMAN. And you assume we have sufficient troops there to do this job?

General VAN FLEET. I must assume we have. I do not believe we would create such a critical situation.

However, that situation you speak of would create quite a fear in the minds of the Korean troops and their fear would be quite justified. It hurts their morale.

The CHAIRMAN. If that be true, General, what could be the purpose of our command withholding the necessary supplies from South Koreans to defend that which our boys fought and died for only a few months ago: if that be true? I do not know that it is.

General VAN FLEET. That raises quite an issue, Senator, in that it proves that we are not willing to trust a worthy ally, or that we do not trust him. I think that is a mistake. We should have complete confidence. We should treat all our allies as partners and equals, and when we do not, we do not have the willing cooperation in return.

The CHAIRMAN. General, this committee is not a military committee, as I said, or a foreign relations committee, but we are interested in that "they" that caused this war to be limited, caused this war to be lost. "They" would not let the fundamental principles of military policy be adhered to. "They" would not permit the use of the Nationalist Chinese troops or Korean troops, who could have fought just as well as American boys, as you say.

It is the same situation today that we are interested in. They are still controlling the 2 days' supply of ammunition in the hands of the South Koreans. And for what purpose?

Go ahead, Mr. Carpenter.

Mr. CARPENTER. General Van Fleet, since your return to the United States, do you get the impression that the American people want peace at any price?

General VAN FLEET. No, they do not.

Mr. CARPENTER. In your recent article in U. S. News & World Report, written in the fall of 1953 and released for publication September 17, 1954, you make a series of statements, on which the following questions are based.

You point out that the small nations in Asia will be forced to make their peace with China, that fifth columns will flourish, and that neutralist countries like India will not be able to afford to remain neutral, that once the raw materials and manpower of this vast region come under the dominance of the Communists our position will be frightful indeed. All this is logical and clear.

Why, then, have we followed and do we continue to follow a policy leading to these results?

General VAN FLEET. Do you want me to try to answer that?

Mr. CARPENTER. Just your impression.

General VAN FLEET. Of course, in southeast Asia the policy there has been pretty much set by Great Britain and France. We were helping France, which, in turn, was handling the Indochina war.

I think it is traditional with the United States not to interfere with decisions which belong to a sovereign nation.

The CHAIRMAN. But we did in Greece, did we not, General? We did influence it.

General VAN FLEET. We had endeavored to influence it through diplomatic channels, yes; sometimes by the dollar.

My formula for making a country feel safe and resist Communist aggression is to strengthen it in all fields, political, economic, military; of which the military field very often is the dominant factor. When you build a native army the people feel a strength; they can see the soldiers and feel strong and become confident that they are safe.

That, in turn, will make the leaders bold, and they will say "No" to all kinds of pressures, Communist pressures, or cold pressures, propaganda, the agents. They will become so bold as to arrest these agents; they will outlaw the Communist Party. They will stamp out the beginning of a Communist takeover.

When you do that in the early stages in any country, do it in time, you have a strong, stout-hearted nation who loves its freedom and is willing to die for it. When a people do not feel they can win, then they must accommodate themselves to the enemy position, and they go over to the enemy side.

You must remember that they are living with that danger close to them, around them all the time. It is so much easier, under those conditions, to accommodate yourself to the winning side.

We have not done this in southeast Asia in sufficient time or quantity to make those countries feel that they are going to win. To size the situation up today, communism is going to win.

Senator JOHNSTON. Are we not also holding back our friendly nations in Europe? What about Western Germany? What about her army? I think you could give her a little more rights and give her an army at the present time.

General VAN FLEET. Senator Johnston, the best allies we have in the world are those who have outlawed the Communist Party. You can name them: Greece, Turkey, Spain, Iran, Pakistan, the Philippines, Korea, Formosa. Some of our weakest allies are those who encourage communism.

I use the word "encourage" in that they do not stamp it out.

That is France, Italy, even England, Japan.

I was disappointed in Japan to find that the Communist Party there has gotten control of the labor unions. They are in the newspaper field; they are in the teaching professions. And when

I pointed that out to one of their ministers, his reply was, "Well, General, we have your country to thank for that."

That is more of our policy of including all parties in a coalition government.

Now we get by with the Communist Party in this country because we are so strong and powerful and very much an enlightened people, and with superior communication means, that the Communists cannot get far. But those conditions do not exist in other countries, weak countries, illiterate countries, where as much as 80 percent of the people are illiterate. And communism can thrive. So, giving it a legal position, they are there with full rights to take advantage of the freedom to destroy those freedoms, and they make great headway.

I have always said that the reason to outlaw the Communist Party in the United States, as you have done, the greatest reason for that was to set the right example to our smaller allies; not so much that America needs it, but we need to show the right example to those weak nations whom we are trying to help.

The first thing in helping another nation is to see that they get rid of the enemy, which is our No. 1 enemy in the world today: communism; not a political party, but a conspiracy.

Mr. CARPENTER. You state that United Nations public opinion seems to feel it gains an immense superiority by letting them call the shots. It is they, never we, who will decide whether the next "limited" war will be fought, as now, on the Korean, Formosa, and Indochinese sector, or on some more distant spot.

You also state the United Nations apparently feels that the standard military maneuver of vigorously pursuing a beaten army before it can reform is unworthy of our ideals. You say that you feel this policy "politically impossible" and wrong, and that the entire armistice episode was a profound mistake.

Why, then, did we pursue this policy?

General VAN FLEET. We were misinformed and guessed wrong on Russia—I say the greatest blunder that we have ever made in estimating the intentions of an enemy.

Mr. CARPENTER. You say that the United Nations policymakers lost their nerve in dealing with Red China; that having condemned the small aggressor, North Korea, and also having condemned Red China as an aggressor, members of the United Nations now deal with China as a neutral; are asked to arbitrate what was once a crusade to defend freedom against aggression as though it was only a neighborhood brawl. During the course of the MacArthur hearings it became clear that from the legal point of view the United Nations had vested in the United States full charge of the Korean war.

Who are the United Nations' policymakers? Is it the whole United Nations? Is it the United Nations' countries with forces in Korea? Or is it American policymakers using these as a blind and a disguise for pursuing so fatal a policy?

No official body of the United Nations, as far as the record has been disclosed, ever forbade bombing in Manchuria, reconnaissance, blockade of the China coast, or any other measure.

Do you know the existence of such a body?

General VAN FLEET. I assume the United Nations' policymakers are the whole body, of which the Communist bloc are members.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to introduce as an exhibit a summary of the information of this subject contained in a book, In the Cause of Peace, by Trygve Lie, former United Nations Secretary-General, and I would like to introduce it into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 493" and appears below.)

EXHIBIT No. 493

LIE, TRYGVE. IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE. MACMILLAN, 1954

The command situation is described in some detail on pages 333–335, 336–340, 343–346. On pages 333–334, Mr. Lie mentions a draft resolution circulated July 3, 1950, to the United States, British, and French delegations and to the then president of the Security Council, Arne Sunde, of Norway. While requesting the United States to assume direction of the armed forces, it would have established a committee on coordination of assistance for Korea (Australia, France, India, New Zealand, Norway, United Kingdom, and United States), possibly others members who furnished assistance. Mr. Lie says the United States mission and the Pentagon opposed this committee on coordination and the resolution adopted placed full power in the United States alone. In succeeding pages Mr. Lie makes it clear that the unified command was the United States—and he deplores its solo role.

On page 343, Mr. Lie states in one paragraph that no military secrets came to the U. N. Department of Security Council Affairs. In the next paragraph he publishes an intelligence estimate of August 29, 1950, sent in from Korea by the U. N. representative.

Mr. CARPENTER. I would like to make a comment on it:

If Mr. Lie's version is correct, full authority to act in Korea rested with United States officials, and any restraints imposed by allied governments were accepted voluntarily.

I would also like to enter into the record and have made a part of the record at this time some items from volume 5 of the MacArthur hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 494" and appears below.)

EXHIBIT No. 494

Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, First Session, to Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his Assignments in that Area, Part 5—Appendix and Index:[1]

Page 3382:

"The Aide-memoire of the Chinese Nationalist Government offering Chinese troops was addressed to *the United States Government*. The offer was considered by the *United States Government* and the answer was made by the United States State Department."

Pages 3372–3373:

"G. THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, JULY 7, 1950

"The Security Council, having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, having recommended that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

[1] Emphasis supplied by the subcommittee.

"(1) *Welcomes* the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;

"(2) *Notes* that members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;

"(3) *Recommends* that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a *unified command under the United States;*

"(4) *Requests* the *United States* to designate the commander of such forces;

"(5) *Authorizes* the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

"(6) *Requests* the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the unified command.

"*Voting for the resolution:* United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Cuba, Ecuador, and Norway. *Abstention:* Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia. *Absent;* Soviet Union."

"H. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, JULY 8, 1950

"The Security Council of the United Nations in its resolution of July 7, 1950, has recommended that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27, make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States.

"The Security Council resolution also requests that the United States designate the commander of such forces, and authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against the North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.

"I am responding to the recommendation of the Security Council and have designated Gen. Douglas MacArthur as the commanding general of the military forces which the members of the United Nations place under the unified command of the United States pursuant to the United Nations' assistance to the Republic of Korea in repelling the unprovoked armed attack against it.

"I am directing General MacArthur, pursuant to the Security Council resolution, to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against the North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating."

Page 3382:

"K. GENERAL ORDER NO. 1, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, TOKYO, JULY 25, 1950 [FROM UNITED NATIONS RELEASE, JULY 25, 1950]

"1. In response to the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations of July 7, 1950, the President of the United States has designated the undersigned Commander in Chief of the Military Forces assisting the Republic of Korea. Pursuant thereto, there is established this date the United Nations Command, with General Headquarters in Tokyo, Japan.

"2. The undersigned assumes command.

"DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,
"General of the Army, United States Army,
"Commander in Chief."

Mr. CARPENTER. And I would add this comment on the document:

Throughout the hearings repeated questioning failed to develop a clear picture as to the "chain of command" beyond the President of the United States. The role of the United Nations in the actual direction of the Korean war has never been clarified.

General Van Fleet, you state that the free world situation is now worse than it was in June 1950, that Red China is stronger, both militarily and psychologically, and that our allies are more intent on appeasement.

Do you believe, then, that time is not on our side?

General VAN FLEET. Time is not on our side.

Mr. CARPENTER. You say time is not on our side?

General VAN FLEET. I do.

Mr. CARPENTER. The excuse given by our policymakers in the spring of 1951 was that the MacArthur proposals would bring Russia into the fight and would jeopardize the free world alliance. Do you believe that Russia would have entered the war in any event?

General VAN FLEET. I do not believe so.

Mr. CARPENTER. Do you believe the free world alliance is stronger because we renounced victory?

General VAN FLEET. No. We are weaker.

Mr. CARPENTER. In other words, did we sacrifice victory for something we actually lost by that appeasement?

General VAN FLEET. We did.

Mr. CARPENTER. You state that—

yet we have at home other curious, perhaps well-intentioned, defeatists who would have us believe that our time to win has already passed. When I listen to their speeches and read their articles—exaggerating the enemy's present strength, playing down the importance of the Pacific and of Asia—I wonder if they are not, consciously or unconsciously, waging psychological warfare against us, destroying our will to win, minimizing our strength, softening us up to accept unnecessary defeat.

I note that you use the expression "consciously or unconsciously." Do you believe that stupidity alone motivates them?

General VAN FLEET. Stupidity and ignorance and lack of experience.

Mr. CARPENTER. Do you believe that, when events have demonstrated policymakers to have been fatally wrong, they should be dismissed?

General VAN FLEET. They certainly should be relieved.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you know that many policymakers who were fatally wrong on China were again in positions making Korean war policy?

General VAN FLEET. Surely. Many may be still in power. I don't know who. I am unable to recall many names. Surely the high command had continuous service through China and Korea.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, what difference does it make in the life and death of a nation whether this serving the enemy has been conscious or unconscious?

General VAN FLEET. I will have to ask you to repeat the question. I am sorry.

Mr. CARPENTER. What difference does it make in the life and death of a nation whether serving the enemy has been conscious or unconscious?

General VAN FLEET. It makes no difference; the same result.

Mr. CARPENTER. You state that—

had not the people, the press, and the Congress spoken up clearly and firmly in the past, Formosa would have been surrendered as an appeasement to Red China, and even the Korean Republic might have been thrown in to seal the bargain. Such protests have blocked the attempt of the Chinese Reds to shoot their way into the United Nations.

Do you believe that this danger has passed?

General VAN FLEET. I do not. I believe that we should speak out more than ever.

Mr. CARPENTER. How do you feel about the responsibility of military officers to speak up when the best interests of the country are jeopardized?

General VAN FLEET. I believe they do speak up through their commanders. In that way their voice can be heard.

Mr. CARPENTER. Is it not a fact, General, that had not General MacArthur and others spoken out of turn on the subject of Formosa and recognition of Red China, both of those disasters would have probably been consummated?

General VAN FLEET. That is correct.

Mr. CARPENTER. You say that in our obligations to the United Nations you see nothing that compelled us to surrender the initiative in war to the Communists. You referred to distant political committees in command in our battlelines which forced the military to abandon all the lessons of American military history.

You say that the United Nations diplomats considered it bad taste to be reminded that the United Nations once branded Red China as an aggressor and shifted to the concept of the Chinese as volunteers and that this constituted a low in political morality, both for the world and for the United States.

What United Nations diplomats, do you believe?

General VAN FLEET. I believe all of them who agreed to the armistice and called Red China troops volunteers; who denounced them as aggressors, but in recent months, in fact, in recent years, they do not talk about them as aggressors.

Mr. CARPENTER. The United Nations has never repealed its condemnation of China as an aggressor. Do you know from where the orders came which limited your efforts?

General VAN FLEET. Yes. It came from the Far East Command, my immediate superior.

Mr. CARPENTER. From where did the Far East Command get their orders?

General VAN FLEET. From the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. CARPENTER. You state that the United Nations should not be relied upon as an instrument for collective security. You go on to point out that Russia and her European satellites are members while many others proudly proclaim neutrality in the fight for freedom. You further state that while some members of the United Nations participated in the effort, their participation was very limited, and that—

the price we paid for them was the loss of decisive military command.

You say that—

they controlled not only overall strategy, but small-scale tactical moves, and even the choice of bombing targets within Korea.

You also refer to a caucus of diplomats.

What this committee would like to know is what the joint committee investigating General MacArthur's relief continually asked and never clearly ascertained. Who were these diplomats?

General VAN FLEET. The caucus referred to in that article included the representatives of the 16 countries who had fighting forces in Korea. They were kept advised of the progress of the war and I assume were consulted from time to time on major operations and policy in the conduct of the war.

They subscribed to the wish for an armistice, helped achieve it.

During that time, our operations were extremely limited, so that no operation could take place other than patrol action of sufficient nature to keep the Eighth Army from being surprised. That patrol action could not be more than one platoon in size.

Senator JOHNSTON. That is true with the Allied forces, but it was not true with the other side; is not that true? They could go ahead and fight?

General VAN FLEET. They felt confident that we would not strike them. Therefore they could seize the initiative in assembling forces and piles of ammunition at critical points and then break out with a perfectly furious attack to take a limited objective of considerable tactical value to them.

Having the initiative was a big advantage. We could counter that offensive and regain the position; which we usually did.

The CHAIRMAN. But again you were limited?

General VAN FLEET. Very much so. We could not go beyond that objective, even when the enemy was completely defeated.

The CHAIRMAN. That order to you came to the Far East Command?

General VAN FLEET. Yes; presumably, on directions from Washington.

There were many wonderful opportunities where we could have advanced great distances following up one of those Communist attacks, in which he threw everything he had on a rather wide front. His effort was destroyed usually by our air and artillery, counteroffensive; by counteroffensive, by fire rather than by manpower. And having destroyed his troops and the supplies he had in that area, we were quite free then to go considerable distances; but there were no orders to do so.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, I note that you state "If we must again send our sons abroad to fight for freedom, I hope they go unshackled; that no appeaser's chains bind their arms behind their backs."

You then proceed to recommend regional pacts as more effective because they represent a greater common interest.

Will you expand on this?

General VAN FLEET. Of course, in battle, as in any business, you must have a single head to make decisions. You must have fixed responsibility and unity of command. And where it is American effort, we should have American decision and freedom of action and not have to account for it to a United Nations.

That is what I mean, that, in future warfare, we should have a free hand to do as the United States decides to do on the battlefield.

We may have had the legal authority to do that, as Mr. Trygve Lie has pointed out; but I do not believe that we had always the moral right to do it without consulting them. And I subscribe to the point of view that our State Department would consult these other allies, and especially Great Britain, which had a full division in Korea.

The very fact is that we did weaken our command structure to do as they would have us do and not as I would want and the genius of America would have us do.

Senator JOHNSTON. Do you know whether or not our Chiefs of Staff at any time took the matter up with United Nations to free your hands and let you fight like you ought to have been able to fight in the field of battle?

General VAN FLEET. I do not know that, but I feel confident they did not. It was a little bit beyond what they normally do, in my opinion.

I must say, Senator, that when I speak of the governments of our allies I wish to cast no reflection whatsoever on their troops. Their

troops were magnificent. We had a great team in the Eighth Army; and they were very proud of being a part of that Eighth Army, and we were very happy and glad and fortunate to have them part of us.

The CHAIRMAN. And they wanted to win?

General VAN FLEET. It was a great professional gathering of good fighters in Korea——

The CHAIRMAN. Who wanted to win, General?

General VAN FLEET. Who wanted to win.

I say that for the British Commonwealth as strongly as I would for the American commanders and other U. N. commanders.

The CHAIRMAN. But that does not apply to the diplomats?

General VAN FLEET. No, sir; not in all cases. Some governments; yes.

This was what I called a caucus of 16. No doubt there were many of the 16 who wanted to win that war as badly as we did.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, in the light of your experience in dealing with the Communists and your experience in fighting the U. N. war, do you favor severance of diplomatic relations with Russia?

General VAN FLEET. I believe our relations with Russia are not getting us anything at this time, and I believe it would be a good move, short of war. I would favor a break with Russia as a major dramatic step in an effort to prevent world war III.

I believe it would create a situation in Russia that their people would want to know why we did sever relations. It might give us an opportunity to tell the Russian people that the reason is their own leaders, who are misguiding them and leading them into war.

Mr. CARPENTER. How about the satellite countries?

General VAN FLEET. The same thing.

Mr. CARPENTER. Do you consider the regional organization of the Pacific, excluding South Korea, Nationalist China, and Japan, feasible?

General VAN FLEET. I would favor two regional alliances in the Pacific: The one which has been created, SEATO, and another one for East Asia.

Mr. CARPENTER. Do you favor continuance of the U. N.?

General VAN FLEET. Yes; I do. I think the U. N. has served a good purpose. It means well. I look on it as a constructive force for what good it hopes to accomplish. Some things it has accomplished.

I think it has served a good purpose in showing up Russia for what she is. We did not fully understand Russia at the beginning of the United Nations. Some of us may have, but our population, as a whole, did not. I think they do understand Russia today and know their methods and denounce them.

I think the U. N. has served a good purpose just to acquaint the American people with the kind of Communist bloc we are faced with.

The CHAIRMAN. But you would not want to fight another war under their system?

General VAN FLEET. I do not see how you can fight a war under United Nations, but you can under smaller groupings.

The CHAIRMAN. General, let me ask you this: Suppose Red China was admitted to the United Nations; what would you do?

General VAN FLEET. I would advocate that the United States resign and that the United Nations be moved out of this country. Let it take

its turn for the next 10 years in Moscow. The U. N. has given them a wonderful opportunity to broadcast their propaganda throughout the United States. I think it is high time that some of the United States propaganda, which is the truth rather than lies, be broadcast inside Russia.

Senator JOHNSTON. Along that same line, do you not believe it would be nice to meet in Russia and meet in other nations and find out what is going on there? They are allowed to come over here.

General VAN FLEET. I think the Iron Curtain should work both ways, not a one-way route.

Senator JOHNSTON. Do you think they would let us come over there?

General VAN FLEET. No; they would not, sir.

Senator JOHNSTON. That might be a good way to get around it.

General VAN FLEET. We find ourselves fighting with an honorable set of rules, and they are not abiding by the rules.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, what was your recent mission to Korea?

General VAN FLEET. I was asked to conduct a survey of the military forces of the Far East and to include the military assistance programs which we have for those countries, including in that survey many other factors in other fields—economic and political.

Mr. CARPENTER. And you will submit a report on that later, I presume?

General VAN FLEET. I hope to submit it tomorrow.

Mr. CARPENTER. Of course, what this committee is wondering is: Will your report be suppressed? Shall Congress and the American people hear about it years later and wait until a further catastrophe and only after some congressional committee has managed to obtain and disclose portions of it will it be made public, General?

General VAN FLEET. My report is confidential and submitted to the President. I have no say-so on that, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any further questions, Senator Johnston?

Senator JOHNSTON. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. General Van Fleet, I want to thank you on behalf of every member of this committee for your forthright statements made here today. I think you have contributed a great deal of information both to this committee and to the American people. We are still in the search of the "they" that tied your hands, that prevented us from winning a war; that caused us to fight a war limited to the land and the territory of our friends.

Your contribution here has been beneficial and we certainly thank you from the bottom of our hearts.

General VAN FLEET. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We stand adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 4:20 p. m. the hearing was recessed to reconvene subject to call of the Chair.)

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INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. EDWARD M. ALMOND (Retired)

NOVEMBER 23, 1954

PART 25

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INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1954

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3 p. m., in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Robert C. Hendrickson, presiding.

Present: Senators Hendrickson and Welker.

Also present: Alva Carpenter, chief counsel and executive director of the Internal Security Subcommittee; J. Sourwine, counsel of the Judiciary Committee and associate counsel, Internal Security Subcommittee; and Dr. Edna R. Fluegel, professional staff member.

Senator HENDRICKSON. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Internal Security will now be in order. The witness this afternoon is General Almond.

General, we greet you and we are grateful for your presence. General Almond, in meeting here with you today, we are conscious of the fact that you have served your country long and well, with courage, with devotion, with brilliance, and with honor.

Your career was a varied one, rich in combat experience, in advanced training, in staff work, and in accumulated experiences. You fought in World War I and served in the occupation thereafter. You were in military intelligence work in the midthirties. In World War II you liberated Genoa and worked with and observed the Italian partisans. As Chief of Staff of the Far East Command in Tokyo in the postwar years, you were in an exceptionally advantageous position to observe the march of events in the Far East and the rising power of Soviet Russia and of Communist China in that crucial area. As chief of staff in Tokyo, and as commander of the X Corps in Korea, you can speak with unique authority on some of the events of the first year of the Korean war.

Your published statements and your testimony before Preparedness Subcommittee No. 2 of the Senate Committee on Armed Services indicate grave distress at some of the events of that war.

On February 13, 1953, in an interview in U. S. News & World Report, you stated, in part:

I had no confidence in the armistice talks then, and I don't now * * * to harangue and delay and allow your opponent to become stronger so that he can fight you harder later on is unpardonable, in my humble opinion as a soldier * * *. My philosophy is to engage the chosen enemy to defeat him in battle * * *. My belief is that when we engage an enemy, we ought to defeat that enemy * * *. I also think that where we have an enemy who is inclined

to become stronger and stronger, we have to seek a solution, and it has to be either a different approach by force or an effective political arrangement on a national policy basis.

General, this subcommittee is not concerned with either foreign or with military policy per se. We are concerned, however, as I know you are concerned, with the national security and the tranquility of this great country of ours. We believe, as I know you believe, as millions of Americans believe, that there have been and still are hostile forces working tirelessly to corrupt, to misdirect and to destroy us from within.

We believe that the most skillful, and the most menacing, of these forces are engaged in trying to subvert our political and military policy. This would be a logical deduction even though it were based on no tangible evidence, but solely on the nature of the enemy and on his announced purpose. This subcommittee has tried to approach each of its investigations judiciously, seeking out the truth, searching for the pattern of subversion. Some of its investigations have been initiated by the American people, through letters, through group petitions, through information collected and sent to the subcommittee. Other investigations have developed as events clarified previously assembled facts, and added new urgency to the pursuit of unexplored items. Our interest in past events has been and is directed to the present danger and the future.

The series of hearings, of which this meeting today is a part, was initiated last August with the appearance before the subcommittee of General Mark Clark. The late Senator McCarran met with General George Stratemeyer in Florida. More recently, we have questioned General James Van Fleet.

In each instance, information was gleaned that helped clarify the still-confused, partly-undisclosed story of the Korean war. In each instance, it was discovered that these great generals shared our uneasiness and had asked themselves some of the questions the American people are asking: "Why? And who? And when? And how will it end?"

Today, General Almond, we are asking you to share with us your knowledge, your observations, and your judgment in the interest of the internal security of this great Nation you have served so long and so valiantly.

Now, General, you were sworn in executive session this morning, but I think it would be good form to have you sworn again in public hearing.

General, do you solemnly swear that the evidence you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General ALMOND. I do.

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD M. ALMOND, LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U. S. ARMY, RETIRED

Senator HENDRICKSON. Thank you. Now, would you state your full name and your address and something of your career for the record, General?

General ALMOND. My name is Edward Mallory Almond. I was born in Luray, Va., on December 12, 1892. I attended school there

and in Culpeper, Va., from which I graduated, as a high-school senior. I then went to Virginia Military Institute, from which I graduated as a bachelor of science in electrical engineering in 1915. In 1916 I entered the Army as a second lieutenant in what was known as the first provisional class, at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., and for 3 months underwent a training course similar to the officer training courses that followed in World War I. I then became a second lieutenant on the Mexican border with the 4th Infantry and later on commanded a company in that regiment and the 58th Infantry. We were moved from the border at Brownsville, Tex., to Gettysburg, Pa., and there the United States 4th Division was formed, and I became a part of the 4th Division, first as a company commander and later as a battalion commander of the 12th Machinegun Battalion. In that capacity I went to Europe with the 4th Division in the First World War. I participated with that division in all the major engagements from May of 1918 until the armistice on November 11, 1918.

I then participated in the army of occupation on the Rhine for about 8 months. Upon my return to the United States I became an officer in charge of civilian instruction at a military school in an ROTC capacity, Reserve Officer Training Corps. From there I went to Fort Benning, Ga., to the Infantry School, and took a course for commanders and later stayed at the Infantry School as an instructor in the Department of Tactics for 4 years. At the same time, General Marshall was the assistant commandant at the Infantry School. Following that tour of 4 years, and in 1928, I was detailed to attend the General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, which I did for 2 years.

Following that service, I went to the Philippine Islands and became a battalion commander of Philippine Scouts and served at Fort William McKinley, very close to Manila. Following that tour, I came back to the United States as a student at the Army War College, then at Fort McNair in Washington, D. C.

Following that tour, I was detailed to the War Department General Staff where I served for 4 years in the Department of Intelligence. From there I went to the Air Corps Tactical School as a ground officer for a year's training in the employment of aviation, combat aviation. Following that I went to the Naval War College at Newport, R. I., where I spent a year, trying to learn something about the problems and activities of the Navy.

I went from that assignment back to the War Department and the Department of Intelligence, where I spent the next 6 months. And from there, I was assigned as the Operations Officer of the Sixth Army Corps in Providence, R. I. As training officer of the Sixth Army Corps in 1941 I participated in the maneuvers that we had in the Carolinas in those days, which was just before our entry into the war, World War II.

I then became chief of staff of the Sixth Army Corps, shortly after the Japanese action against Pearl Harbor, and from that assignment I was promoted to the rank of brigadier general, assigned to the 93d Division, stationed at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. I served in that capacity for 5 months when I was promoted to major general and given command and the task of organizing the 92d Division, with headquarters at Fort McClellan, Ala.

From that assignment in Alabama, I went back to the desert with this division, the 92d, and trained there for more than a year. Fol-

lowing that training, in August of 1944, I was sent to the Italian theater, where I participated in all of our operations until the end of the war in 1945, under the command of the Fifth Army, mostly, Gen. Mark Clark and later Gen. Lucian Truscott.

Following the termination of the war in Europe, I was assigned to command the 2nd United States Infantry Division for the purpose of redeploying that division in Japan and finishing the military operations over there, in conjunction with all the other troops that were so designated. Before I could take command of that division, the war ended, as we all know.

We know of the signing of the terms of agreement aboard the Battleship *Missouri*.

I commanded the 2d Division at Camp Swift in Austin, Tex., and at Camp Lewis, Wash., for the next 8 months, when in June 1946 I was transferred to Tokyo as one of 12 general officers of the Army; and there I was given an assignment in General MacArthur's headquarters, first as his personnel officer, G–1, where I remained for 5 months, starting in June 1946, until November or early December 1946. I then became the Deputy Chief of Staff, Far East Command, for the Army portion of General MacArthur's responsibilities.

He was both Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Commander of the Army Forces in the Japanese area and the Philippine area.

In 1949, February, I became Chief of Staff under General MacArthur, and, as such, remained until the 12th of September 1950, when I became commander of the X Corps, and participated in the Inchon landing, and other operations in Korea, terminating on July 15, 1951. At that time, I returned to the United States and became commandant of the Army War College at Carlisle, Pa., where I remained until I was retired on the 31st of January 1953.

I now am retired and live in Anniston, Ala.

Senator HENDRICKSON. Mr. Carpenter, you may proceed to develop the testimony of the witness.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, I would like to go back to the period of 1934–38. I believe at that time you were in the Latin-American section of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff; is that correct?

General ALMOND. That is correct.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, while you were in that section, did you have cause to wonder about Communist infiltration in our Government or possible Communist subversion of our policy?

General ALMOND. I most certainly did.

Mr. CARPENTER. Would you tell us about that, please?

General ALMOND. When I became a part of the G–2 Division of the General Staff in June of 1934.

Senator WELKER. May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman?

Senator HENDRICKSON. The Senator from Idaho.

Senator WELKER. Will you define for the record, please, what you mean by G–2? I know and I want the record to so show.

General ALMOND. Yes, sir. The intelligence functions of most staffs, starting with the Department of the Army, or the War Department then, are placed in what they call G–2, the Department of Intelligence. It is a General Staff section.

Senator WELKER. Thank you, General. I am sorry for the interruption.

General ALMOND. When I joined that section in June of 1934, I was told that the Department of the Army was in a complete state of confusion because of a recent order, I will say in the last 3 or 4 months prior to that time, emanating from some very high authority, that investigators representing the Nye committee were authorized to go through the files of the Department of the Army or the War Department, and to see any file we had. The thing that concerned those responsible for their files was what would be the result of general investigations of the most secret files we had, and would the information in those files, secured for the investigation, be held within the proper limits.

That caused a lot of consternation among those officers responsible for the files, which were prepared in some cases in all confidence, which involved the relationship between the Latin-American countries and our own country, with which we were trying, as far as possible, to build the highest types of friendship. To throw discussions and our interest in their discussions and interests open to unknown grabbing or misuse or misappropriation was something that we could not see the end of.

Therefore, at that time we were very much disturbed by what we though was at least pinkish intrusion in the most secret files in our establishment.

Mr. CARPENTER. Now, I would like to take you to 1938–44, General. I believe you have testified that you graduated from the Air Force Tactical School and also from the Naval War College. Yet you were stationed in the United States until 1944 before you were sent to Italy. You also had experience in the Far East. Was that not a rather peculiar assignment, to wait so long before sending you to a theater of action?

General ALMOND. Well, it was to me, and I would have had a great desire for other assignments. But those were my orders and those were the orders that I carried out to the best of my ability. I could have thought of many jobs I would have rather participated in as an Army officer. If you read my record of that time, you will see why.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, you were stationed in the Mediterranean theater of occupation. What unit did you command there, and where?

General ALMOND. Well, I joined General Clark's Fifth Army in August of 1944. I was then in command of the 92d Infantry Division. That division deployed from Arizona to the western coast of Italy about the time that, or just after, our forces entered Rome. The Fifth Army entered Rome on the 6th of June, and then moved from that general area up to the Arno River, which empties into the Mediterranean about where Leghorn is, from the direction of Florence. That was the line at the time my division began to participate in the war in Italy, which ended the following May 5, I believe.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you liberate one of the areas in Italy?

General ALMOND. Yes; I did.

Mr. CARPENTER. What area was that, please?

General ALMOND. That is the area extending along the Ligurian coast, the western portion of Italy, from the general location of where

the Tower of Pisa is, to the French border in the Alps, and to Torino at the head of the Po Valley, across the Apennines, and facing the Alps.

Mr. CARPENTER. In your particular area, did you have any contact with the so-called partisans in that area?

General ALMOND. Yes; very specifically.

Mr. CARPENTER. What were their nationalities?

General ALMOND. They were basically and in the mass Italians. They were people who had been under the oppression of the Fascists, who had endured the oppression of Mussolini for the past 20 years, and who were glad the yoke was removed.

But there were also other elements. Yugoslavs, some Russians, I found out later, or Soviets, Rumanians. It was the general run of the miscellaneous type of Balkan and Mediterranean bordering countries.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you have any experiences that made you question the Russian postwar intentions?

General ALMOND. Made me question what?

Mr. CARPENTER. The Russians' postwar intentions.

General ALMOND. Yes; I was very much disturbed on several occasions. Our relations, as I said, with the Partisans for probably 8 months were very close, and we relied upon them to do things beyond the front line of our own forces, which we could not do for ourselves, being in uniform. We had the opportunity of sending patrols by small boat, including Partisans, which were then on our side, around through the Mediterranean, landing behind the enemy, staying there for several weeks and coming back and reporting on the area to which they were designated to go. That was very helpful to us.

But, when the war ended, I found that these same Partisans that we used so usefully were the rank and file of the Partisan movement, but they were, as far as I knew, in my area, in the vicinity of Genoa, and Turin, Ventemilia, Savona, and many other of those Mediterranean ports and towns, that they were readily under the direction of a Soviet comrade known as Mira, and Comrade Mira was the fellow that I held responsible for the atrocities that happened in my area, and with which I had much to do to try to suppress, both as to kangaroo courts, and murders as a result of these courts; on some occasions we found as many as 20 bodies, 10 to 20 bodies every morning lying on the beach in the harbor of Genoa. We found out who was behind that. We began to deal with these groups that were holding these kangaroo courts. All during this period, I will say, for a month following the war, my contacts with Comrade Mira were frequent, always on a high plane, if I could keep it that way, but always trying to hold him responsible for the things that I have just recounted.

Finally, at one of these conferences participated in by some 20 or 30 partisan chieftains—always Mira was the leader and the most dominant character present—on one of these occasions he was absent. I said "Where is Comrade Mira?" They said "He has gone back to Rumania. Things are too peaceful here for him."

Mr. CARPENTER. Now, General, I would like to take you to the period of 1946 to July of 1951, and in your various capacities in the Far East. To what extent were you able to follow the developments over there

in such areas as China, Korea, Formosa, and other territories contiguous thereto?

Senator HENDRICKSON. Counsel, before we get to the Far East, may I pursue one question as a result of a statement that the general made?

General, you said you thought it was peculiar that you were held here in the United States until 1944, with the rich experience and background you had. What did you think was responsible for holding you here when your experience would have been of such great value elsewhere?

General ALMOND. Well, Mr. Chairman, possibly you misunderstood what I said. I did not think that I was held here because my experience would have been more useful elsewhere. I said I might have desired to have more pleasant assignments than I had. I felt at the time that, if I received the assignments I did receive, that it was my duty, not only my duty but I should readily and happily accept such assignments and did.

Senator HENDRICKSON. I see.

General ALMOND. I have no quarrel with what my assignments were, except I could have thought of some that would have been more pleasant.

Senator HENDRICKSON. I thank you, General.

Counsel, you may proceed.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, I would like to go back and clear up one more point. Were you familiar with a man by the name of Tinio?

General ALMOND. Yes, sir.

Tinio was a nomad from a Turkishtanian area. I could not even locate it myself, if I tried. He had a partisan band and to look at them you would immediately decide they were cutthroat pirates. This band was a band of his own. He was a nomad. He came to Italy and joined with one of my regiments. He became a very reliable patrol leader. He many times and on more than one occasion occupied a section of the front in the Appenines, virtually unoccupied by regular military personnel, between my right flank and the left flank of the Brazilian Division which was just beyond me or east of me, in the winter of 1945. He did such good work that he was known throughout my division. I think we gave him a certificate of accomplishment or something, just to be grateful about it.

But one day soon after the war ended in Italy, in 1945, I was queried from General McNarney's headquarters, which he very properly did, because he had the request from a Soviet mission that had come to Italy. Apparently, they heard about this Tinio. The specific query of me was: "Was there a Turkishtanian by the name of Tinio with a band or group operating in my sector?" I said "Yes, there was one, but where he is now, I don't know." They said, "Is he in your area now?"

On investigation, I found he was still over there with the 370th Infantry, his friends. I got in touch with the colonel of that regiment. He said that he would and did talk to Tinio. He immediately discovered that he, Tinio, was very much alarmed, that the Soviets had queried about him. What he had done in his own country, I didn't inquire of him. I have no knowledge. He was a good fighter and on our side. But he was disturbed that the Russians wanted to know where he and his men were.

I also attribute it to the fact that he was not a convert of the Communists or Soviets and they were after him. I was ordered eventually to turn Tinio over to the Russians for transportation back to Russia. I did that with the complete conviction, based on the things I had gotten from Tinio and from those with whom he associated, that it meant his certain destruction, and that of his band.

Senator WELKER. May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman?

Senator HENDRICKSON. The Senator from Idaho.

Senator WELKER. Are you at liberty to tell who ordered you to return this gentleman to the Russians?

General ALMOND. Well, as I recall, that was a routine understanding. Russia at that time had been our ally, and was then, presumably. As soon as the war was over, I think it was their practice to send their delegations into every area. I suppose Britain and France. They certainly came to Italy. I suppose to all of Europe. That was to find out what nationals they could claim title to within the bounds of what they said was Soviet Russia so that these people might be returned to their native land. I believe that that was the general policy that we followed, and I think that our being ordered to turn that particular band over to that group was a matter of routine.

Senator WELKER. Granted that it was a matter of routine, can you give the committee the name of the superior officer who ordered you to return them to Russia?

General ALMOND. No; I could not. But I might find that out. I know who the commander was. General McNarney was the commander. He was the Deputy Commander of the Allied, AFHQ, Allied Forces in Italy. It was a joint command. General McNarney was our American commander. He had many people under him and many bureaus. So I think a policy that had been decided would be something that would be transmitted to his headquarters and his staff would carry it out.

Senator WELKER. And he was bound to do that because of the policy followed?

General ALMOND. I think so.

Senator WELKER. There is nothing derogatory to General McNarney?

General ALMOND. No; not at all.

Senator WELKER. Thank you, General.

Mr. CARPENTER. Now, General, during your various assignments in Tokyo, to what extent were you able to follow the developments in such areas as China, Korea, Formosa, and those various countries in that locale of the world?

General ALMOND. Of course, our headquarters in Tokyo was very intimately connected with what went on in the Philippines, in Okinawa, in Japan, in Guam, Saipan, Tinian, and so on, which was within General MacArthur's definite jurisdiction. And in Korea, at the time, because our General Hodge in the early time had the 24th Corps there, in South Korea. We knew what was going on in those areas. We had no jurisdiction over China, Formosa, southeastern Asia, and, of course, Manchuria and North Korea, because we could not get in there. We had as intimate knowledge as might be possible, I would say, in the contacts of our people who went to China, went to Formosa, went to Honk Kong, Indochina, Korea, as travelers. We

had contacts with those people who lived in those countries, either by assignment or who were natives who came to Japan.

For example, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, the High Commissioner of southeast Asia, all the time I was over there, made a visit to Japan and many other functionaries did. People came from India. In connection with all of those visits and our visits to them, when one of our officers would go to that area, and when he came back he was supposed to make a report on what he found out that was unusual. Those were unofficial contacts in the areas not under General MacArthur's command from which we gleaned much information.

But there was no organized system or intelligence service that we could rely upon except through our missions and embassies in the State Department.

Mr. CARPENTER. I believe one of the visitors that you had there was Mr. Philip Jessup from the United States; is that true?

General ALMOND. That is right.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you talk with him while he was there?

General ALMOND. Yes; I talked with Mr. Jessup several times.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did he try to sell you on his theories regarding Formosa?

General ALMOND. No. He was very pleasant to me, and I to him, I hope. I saw him on his way in to have conferences with General MacArthur and on his way out. I met him at a number of parties. But I never discussed with Mr. Jessup the policy of the United States.

Mr. CARPENTER. Do you know whether he tried to sell his views on Formosa to General MacArthur?

General ALMOND. Well, from the general discussion that General MacArthur had with me, after these conferences, I gathered that Mr. Jessup was probing General MacArthur to find out how determined General MacArthur was in his views on Formosa, and General MacArthur's views on Formosa have been plentifully and completely discussed, I think, since that time.

Senator WELKER. And probably at that time, too, General.

General ALMOND. I have no doubt of that. But I have no direct knowledge of his discussions with General MacArthur except the general atmosphere of our discussions afterward.

Senator WELKER. Knowing General MacArthur, I doubt very much that you would say that he did not make his position very clear to Mr. Jessup.

General ALMOND. I tried to convey that.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, were the forces in Japan, United States forces in Japan, strengthened in view of the Communist conquest of the China mainland, and of the discovery that Russia had the atomic bomb?

General ALMOND. Well, from the time of my knowledge of the occupation, in June of 1946, until some time in 1948, the Eighth Army was always below strength. It was most difficult, for, first, General Eichelberger, who was the commander at first, and General Walker, who succeeded to that command, to carry out his occupation functions, and at the same time to maintain a semblance of a military command which might be called upon at any instant to do something in a military way, which had nothing to do with occupational functions, but might be required to suppress disorder, because his strength, the strength of the Army in the period I am talking about got as low

as 60 percent, as I recall it; 60 percent, I mean, of the peacetime strength of military organizations, not 60 percent of the wartime strength. There is a difference and it is a considerable difference. But during those lean years, our strength got so low that most of our men in some way or other were involved in occupational duties which gave us just the merest skeleton of a military command. We brought that to the attention of the Pentagon repeatedly. I made a trip myself in October of 1946, sent by General MacArthur, to call attention to the very thing that I am talking about.

We monthly and perhaps in some cases daily, for periods, called attention to the reduced strength of our command. I do not think that was anybody's fault particularly; I just think our Army was in a pretty low state of personnel following the demobilization after the war. I believe the Pentagon was trying to build up our strength as rapidly as possible and we just had to bear our share. But that did not make it any easier on us.

About the middle of 1948 or the spring of 1948, replacements began to arrive, and I would say when the operations in Korea began, General Walker's army was pretty well up to its peacetime organization. But peacetime organization meant a battalion of infantry with only 3 companies instead of 4. It meant a regiment of infantry with only 2 battalions instead of 3. It meant a tank battalion with only 1 company instead of 3. It meant an artillery battalion with 1 battery instead of 3 in it. That was the condition of the Eighth Army when we were faced with throwing our troops into Korea.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, did you have any inkling of the change in British policy in 1949 and 1950?

General ALMOND. Yes; I did.

Mr. CARPENTER. Would you tell us something about that?

General ALMOND. In August of 1949, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, the High Commissioner for southeast Asia, with residence in Singapore, arrived in Tokyo for a friendly visit. Everybody had a friendly visit. Several days after that Mr. MacDonald expressed the desire to talk to the principal staff officers of our headquarters. We had many sections. I think we had 32 sections in that headquarters, 10 or 15 SCAP and 10 or 15 FEC, covering every activity of occupation in the military forces.

General MacArthur agreed. He said, "Have Mr. MacDonald say anything he wants. We will be glad to hear his viewpoints." I was Chief of Staff then, and I had at least the heads of every section and many other officers and others of our staff who I thought would benefit by hearing a foreign viewpoint, although for some of the SCAP people the British Commonwealth was a participant in the occupation activities, the SCAP activities. Mr. MacDonald came to our briefing room. He addressed us for 40 or 50 minutes, and then we had a question period of some half hour afterward, trying to adjust our views and ask questions and understand his points.

The theme of Mr. MacDonald's discussion with us—there wasn't any secret about it, he talked to everybody about it, all over Tokyo—was that the basis of a rehabilitated far eastern area was India; that India, being economically depressed, to say the least, overpopulated, poorly irrigated, and somewhat irritated, if helped economically, would be a stabilizing factor in Asia, and especially so since their

religion, the religion of the Indians, was the antithesis of the Communists, who I am sure have no religion.

So it was a question of Mohammedanism, and so on, against zeroism, and if we thought well of it, we might bend our efforts to a rehabilitation of India in opposition to the Communist threat.

That was in August of 1949. In December of 1949, as I recall, Red China was recognized by the British Government.

Senator WELKER. Mr. Chairman, may I have a question?

Senator HENDRICKSON. The Senator from Idaho, Mr. Welker.

Senator WELKER. General, based upon your experience as Chief of Staff with General MacArthur, can you tell the committee whether or not General MacArthur was ever asked for his opinion on the whole Far Eastern situation before the Korean war?

General ALMOND. Yes; he was, yes.

Senator WELKER. Can you tell us more about that?

General ALMOND. Well, we were always being asked for views on various things. We were asked for views on the economic situation in Japan, and what the Communist threats to the Japanese were, and various other things. So that was just, I suppose, a regular routine question. But it must have had more than an ordinary importance. A short communication came to us which asked for General MacArthur's estimate of China, the situation in China, and the countries contiguous to China.

Before I took this communication in to General MacArthur to discuss it with him, I had the operations officer get a map and just count what the countries contiguous to China are. As I recall it, there were 14. India, Manchuria, Indochina, and various others. That looked like to me, on the face of it, an impossible task for the reason that General MacArthur had already arrived at when I got into his office. He read this Pentagon request again with me. The point was having no means of collecting the information in those countries, General MacArthur was loath to give an estimate without facts upon which to base it.

Senator WELKER. As a matter of fact, he planned a trip, did he not, to visit Formosa on July 1, shortly before the Korean outbreak?

General ALMOND. That was a little bit later. If I may just finish this one thing——

Senator WELKER. Very well.

General ALMOND. Our reply to that telegram, radio, was essentially that: When the Far Eastern Commander is given the intelligence agencies under his control to visit China and the countries contiguous to it, and the facts are collected, "I will be in a position to render the estimate that you request."

We never heard any more from that request. Later on we did go to Formosa. We planned a trip to Formosa because, I presume—I am not sure, I couldn't be certain about it—after Mr. Jessup's trip, Formosa began to be a pretty hot potato. After that, General MacArthur, being asked to give an estimate of Formosa, decided himself to go to Formosa. He made this decision and notified the Pentagon that he proposed to do this. He didn't ask permission. He was given a mission and he decided to do it himself. We had planned that trip, as I recall it, for the 1st of July, the 1st to the 4th. This was early in June that he made the plans.

On the 25th of June the invasion of Korea began, and that temporarily suspended that Formosan trip. We did make the trip, General MacArthur, General Stratemeyer, Admiral Joy, the naval commander, General Willoughby, General Marquat, the economic adviser, and myself, and others. We did go to Formosa, as I recall, on the 25th of July.

Senator WELKER. As I understand, that trip, though, was postponed by the outbreak of the Korean war?

General ALMOND. That is correct, sir.

Senator WELKER. And is it a fact, General, that this trip, when made, stirred up a hornet's nest, even though it was fully authorized and was undertaken to comply with the Pentagon request and inquiry?

General ALMOND. That is my recollection; yes, sir. The people back here weren't any too happy, but General MacArthur is a man who, when he is responsible for a task, doesn't have to ask anybody how to perform it.

Senator WELKER. General, may I ask you this very simple question: Why were the people back here very upset? Can you give us your observations on that?

General ALMOND. No, sir; I wouldn't know.

Senator WELKER. You have a pretty good idea, don't you?

General ALMOND. Many things happened back here that I didn't understand, and I would hesitate to try to assign reasons for them.

Senator WELKER. But in the back of your mind you have a pretty good idea, don't you?

General ALMOND. Well, I believe I do really recall the statement being made that we had a mission down there, a State Department mission, which was capable of furnishing General MacArthur the information that he would need in order to make that estimate.

Senator WELKER. A State Department mission?

General ALMOND. That is right.

Senator WELKER. To take the place of one of the greatest field commanders, one of the greatest generals in the history of the Republic? In other words, your impression was that the State Department was calling the signals at that time?

General ALMOND. Yes; I have that distinct impression on that and many other instances.

Senator WELKER. Now, if counsel will allow me to interrogate.

Senator HENDRICKSON. The Senator may proceed.

Senator WELKER. Shortly thereafter Secretary of Defense Johnson and General Bradley came to Tokyo. Is that correct?

General ALMOND. That is right; about the 20th of June.

Senator WELKER. A few days before the Korean outbreak, but the trouble was brewing. Is that correct?

General ALMOND. That is correct, sir.

Senator WELKER. Did you get any impression or intelligence from those officers to the effect that trouble was brewing in Korea?

General ALMOND. No, sir. We did not. I don't think they knew it, and I don't think we knew it.

Senator WELKER. Well, did General MacArthur enlighten them on anything along that line?

General ALMOND. It was along intelligence lines that he did. It was the practice of our headquarters, and at General MacArthur's direc-

tion, that everybody who came to his headquarters had the privilege, and we would suggest if they didn't ask it, of being briefed on the situation in the Far East as we knew it, Mr. Johnson, General Bradley, and all the others. I am sure General Bradley was present. I remember Mr. Johnson being present because we had many discussions about various things all through the staff. The staff was all present.

A briefer for military intelligence at our headquarters described the intelligence situation in North and South Korea. The operations officer, who was then General Wright, as I recall it, described the strength of the North Korean forces and the South Korean forces, in ground forces, in weapons, in naval units, and in police. The ostensible size of the two forces was about 105,000 ground forces for the North Koreans, and about 100,000 for the South Koreans. Each side had about 50,000, of what they called, organized national police. That, roughly, gave 150,000 but not all combat units. And then the few planes that each side was known to have, and the few ships were almost enumerated by name.

Mr. Johnson got that, and General Bradley got that. We knew the potentialities of both sides but not their intentions.

Senator WELKER. General, will you describe to the committee, sir, the opening days of the Korean war as viewed from your position as the Chief of Staff, including the first inspection trip, and the telecon?

General ALMOND. Well, I recall right off the bat that those were very hectic days. They were particularly a jolt to me because, on Sunday morning, which was the 25th of June, having had a week of General Bradley and Mr. Johnson visiting to our area, we were concerned with almost a 20-hour schedule to see that they got to the right places, that they had the right conferences, to do the preparing for these conferences where it was our function.

In general, we had been pretty busy. So on that particular morning, I went down to my office with the idea of shuffling a few papers on Sunday and going home at least by 2 o'clock in the afternoon. I had been in my office only some 20 minutes when the first telegram came from Korea, from our little communication detachment we had over there with Ambassador Muccio's diplomatic group. That said that a border incident happened on the Ongjin Peninsula, which is at the mouth of the Han River, in western Korea. In about 30 minutes we got another such message. In the next 2 hours or two hours and a half we had 5 messages that stretched all the way across the 38th parallel, roughly. From the first one we were concerned, but we thought perhaps it had been a border raid. But when we got them scattered all across the front, we knew that something unusual was bound to happen and was happening. We transmitted each one of those, as I recall it, as rapidly as possible to the Pentagon to show that something was brewing. That has all been established, I am sure.

The next day—after the 25th of June—or the next 2 days, here in America, realization having taken place also of something unusual, we were directed to send a group to Korea as General MacArthur's reconnaissance party to determine just what was going on. We sent Major General Church of our staff and 14 officers from our headquarters by plane, destination Seoul. They landed at Suwon, Korea. The condition of the Korean Army had deteriorated so in that period of 2 days

that Major General Church never got to Seoul. On June 29, General MacArthur and a small staff flew to Korea. We found Major General Church on the 29th, 2 days later, there at Suwon.

We had continued to observe the deteriorating situation on June 25, 26, 27, and 28. General MacArthur got query after query, wanting to know just what was happening. So, again, as he went to Formosa later on, he decided to go to Korea. He took the key members of his staff. I, as chief of staff, was a member of it. We flew to Suwon airport and landed at almost the instant that two YAK North Korean planes dropped a bomb on the end of the runway. We sent our plane back to Pusan after we landed. It was to come back and pick up the group at 4 o'clock that afternoon, which it did.

At 20 minutes to 4, as we were coming down the road from the direction of Seoul, where we had been the latter part of the day, two YAK's came over again and dropped two more bombs on the end of the runway, which delayed General MacArthur's plane coming in to pick him up to take him back to Tokyo. His purpose in going to Korea was to have first-hand information, not only of what the Korean Army was doing, but what the President of the Nation thought about it, what our own United States Ambassador thought, what the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army was thinking about doing in the face of all this debacle that was happening.

We arrived, I would say, at 10:30 in the morning. We went to a little schoolhouse where General MacArthur found General Church and his 14 officers from Tokyo, our officers. They had had 2 days to sense throughout the southern part of Korea what was going on.

There we met with Mr. Rhee, the President of the Republic; Mr. Muccio, our Ambassador in Korea; the Chief of Staff of the South Korean Army, and a lot of lesser lights.

General MacArthur began his query by asking General Church to have his officers, or himself, give the situation as he understood it. To make a long story as short as possible, General Church gave us the current situation on June 29 with the assistance of some of his officers who had been out and who had more intimate information than he had received in the last few hours. General Church said, "This morning we knew of 8,000 men in hand in the Korean Army, 8,000 out of 100,000." He said, "As far as we can tell, they are straggling all over South Korea, coming down all the roads, and even across the mountains. They all have their rifles and ammunition, but apparently nobody is fighting." He said, "I have just received a report that we now have in groups standing along the road 8,000 more, and I hope to have 8,000 more tonight, all stragglers."

That made 24,000, if he got them, out of 100,000 supposedly combat forces. That just gives you an example of how deteriorated that situation had gotten. That had a considerable bearing on our deployment into Korea within the course of the next week.

General MacArthur then asked Mr. Rhee what his concept of the condition was, and Mr. Rhee gave a very brief statement. To be a little facetious, it amounted to about the statement that "We are in a hell of a fix."

Senator WELKER. And he was in a hell of a fix.

General ALMOND. Undoubtedly. And we recognized it and so did he. General MacArthur then asked the chief of staff of the Korean

Army what his plan was in the emergency. His reply was that he was going to mobilize 2 million youths in South Korea and repel the invasion, which had already happened. That was a little impractical. Mr. Muccio then gave his impression and he gave a very sound one. I have the highest respect for Mr. Muccio. I never saw him before, and I haven't seen him since, except during the Korean war, but he had real courage in the interpretations that he gave us and his attitude toward repelling the invasion. General MacArthur then said, "Well, I have heard a good deal theoretically, and now I want to go and see these troops that are straggling down the road."

We got three old, broken down cars and got them there at Suwon, 30 miles out of Seoul, the capital. We drove to the south bank of the Han River, where we could see the enemy firing from Seoul to targets on the south bank. We were within probably a hundred yards of where some of these mortar shells were falling. It was safe enough, so we had no worry. Going up that road from Suwon for a distance of 30 miles, we passed many trucks, many stragglers, many men in groups, all smiling, all with rifles, all with bandoliers of ammunition around them, all saluting, showing that they were disciplined—they recognized that some dignitary was coming along. We had some MP's with us, some Korean MP's, and some policemen clearing the road. They all smiled. General MacArthur made the remark. He said, "It is a strange thing to me that all these men have their rifles and ammunition, they all know how to salute, they all seem to be more or less happy, but I haven't seen a wounded man yet." That indicated that nobody was fighting, that they had lost their leadership, and that is what happened. The best men in the world can't fight without coordination and determination.

Some fight better than others individually as guerrillas. But anyhow, that gave him the idea of just how bad the situation was. We then returned to Suwon and took off, as I told you, between YAK bombings, and went back to Tokyo. I think that night we began a series of telecon conferences with our Government here, in the Pentagon, which enabled General MacArthur to personally, from personal observation, interpret how bad the situation was.

It was during that period just before and during this trip to Korea that it became known to us, much to our surprise, I will say, and much to General MacArthur's surprise, that this country was going to participate in armed action in Korea. None of our plans had involved this, had included this. Our plan and our mission was to evacuate our diplomatic and military training personnel (KMAG) from Seoul in case of adversity. We had done that by June 28. But in these telecons, it developed that it had been decided by the United Nations to intervene in Korea in some way. The first manner was by the way of supply. When we learned that we were to supply the Korean armed forces, the question went back "Where do we land these supplies and how?"

As I recall it, it was stated that we would put these in at Pusan, the southern port. The reply that went back from our headquarters was to the effect that Pusan might not exist in our hands any too long, and perhaps not more than a day or two longer. "How would we land the supplies then?" The directive then came back. It must be remembered that in the meantime we had received the instructions that

the United States Air Force and the United States Navy would assist the South Koreans in opposing the NK forces and in restoring order.

We knew from our trip to Korea on June 29 that the South Koreans had lost their capacity to restore order anywhere for the reasons that I have just recounted. Our rejoinder to that concept of "restoring order" was that this could be looked upon with little confidence. Whereupon, we were directed to place defense forces to protect the port of Pusan in Korea to the extent of one regiment of infantry so that supplies to the ROK government could be sent by us from Japan.

The rejoinder that the Pentagon received from that statement was that "that is totally inadequate." That reply by General MacArthur caused a suspension of conversation over the telecon, to be resumed 30 minutes later.

In 30 minutes the telecon was resumed, whereupon General MacArthur was authorized to use the forces necessary in his opinion to protect the port of Pusan. The question then came, "Do you require any further instructions?" The answer was "No." That terminated the telecon and General MacArthur immediately ordered three divisions under General Walker, the bulk of the Eighth Army, to Korea, because he knew the situation was so bad that nothing short of a fundamentally sound military movement would salvage it. I don't think you have to have me to testify that even that wasn't enough for the next 3 months. The immediate action that was taken was barely enough to drag along so that General Walker could maintain the semblance of a continuous line in the defense of Pusan, called the Pusan perimeter.

Senator WELKER. Now, General, I am sure you are familiar with an article appearing in the Saturday Evening Post on August 22, 1953, written by General Bradley, which stated, and I quote:

> By some miracle our forces held in Pusan and the "brilliant Inchon operation" carried our forces northward faster than the Communists anticipated.

Just how miraculous was that initial period?

General ALMOND. That article that you refer to, Senator, is the one entitled "A Soldier's Farewell"?

Senator WELKER. That is it, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record excerpts from A Soldier's Farewell by General of the Army Omar Bradley, which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post on August 22, 1953.

Senator HENDRICKSON. Without objection, the statement will appear in the record at this point in the general's remarks.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 495," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 495

[Source: The Saturday Evening Post, August 22, 1953]

A SOLDIER'S FAREWELL

By General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as told to Beverly Smith

* * * * * * *

The quality of the Communist North Korean Army which made the original attack indicated that Soviet leadership had spent at least 2 years in secretly training and equipping it. Thus they had plenty of time to think out their plans, which doubtless envisaged a series of possibilities—somewhat as follows:

First possibility: The powerful North Korean Army routs the lightly armed South Koreans and grabs the whole peninsula within 2 or 3 weeks—before the

U. N. or the United States can decide whether to intervene. This would wreck the prestige of the U. N. and prove to all wavering nations that America would not fight to protect her allies. Southeast Asian countries would then be ripe for one-by-one plucking.

Second possibility: The United States and the U. N. intervene, but, not realizing the power of the Communist drive, are promptly and humiliatingly kicked out of South Korea. From the Communist viewpoint, this possibility would have been in someways preferable to the first in its demonstration of Communist power and American-allied weakness.

Third possibility: The United States and the U. N. intervene and by some miracle manage to hold. In that case, they might eventually drive the North Koreans back north of the 38th parallel. In this event, an enormous army of Chinese Communist "volunteers," secretly readied in advance, would strike south from Manchuria, overwhelm the battle-tired allied troops and drive them into the sea. This came close to fruition in the winter of 1950–51, but our lines held.

Fourth possibility: The tired allies somehow manage to check the Chinese hordes. In this case the Communists had to think of the possibility that the Americans, enraged and impetuous, would make war on Communist China, attacking her ports and cities by sea and air, and eventually bogging down in an all-out Asiatic war. During the process, America's strategic Air Force could be heavily depleted by operational losses and MIG attacks. Then the Communist leaders would really have America over the barrel. They could start their world war or seize all of Europe, without any very effective counteraction available.

To the materialistic mind it would seem that such a plan could hardly fail. If any one of the possibilities came to pass, it would be a great success. And yet, as we now can see, each one of the possibilities—if this is the way they figured it out—successively broke down against the courage and calm spirit of America and the free world.

The United States and the U. N. acted with unprecedented speed in coming to the aid of the South Koreans; the lines at Pusan held firm; General MacArthur's brilliant Inchon operation carried the line northward faster than the Communists anticipated; the Communist Chinese armies, rushed into the conflict sooner than they had forecast under the third possibility, struck with less power than they could have mustered a few weeks later. The allies lost heavily, were driven far southward, but recovered their balance and moved again toward the 38th parallel.

At this point there arose an honest difference of opinion between the Joint Chiefs and their deeply respected brother-in-arms, General MacArthur. The MacArthur controversy was broad and many faceted, and I wish here to touch briefly only on its military aspect. General MacArthur wanted to carry the attack directly against Communist China or parts thereof, and he believed this attack would have decisive results. It was a soldierly desire. Any one of the Joint Chiefs, if he had been in local command in the Far East, might have urged a similar course. But the duty of the Joint Chiefs as a group was to consider the world military picture as a whole, and the fourth possibility (above) was a real one in our minds. Our overriding concern must be the safety of the United States—no less. The action urged by General MacArthur, we felt, would hazard this safety without promising any certain or proportionate gain. We may have been wrong. As of today, I still believe that we were right, because at that particular time we did not have the necessary armed might to risk such a course of action, as well as the safety of Europe.

General ALMOND. I have read that. I have a transcript of part of it here, and I have written a comment on it which I would like to read.

Senator WELKER. Very well, sir.

General ALMOND. My remark is that: "Our lines held in spite of the restrictions and limitations imposed by our own Government, and our casualty rates were enormous." That is the first comment I have on that.

The second one is General Bradley sets up the same "strawman" as he has done on every other opportunity. That is, "Communists might attack us after we weaken our strategic Air Force." That is a quote. He never seems to consider what we might gain by a strong reaction to

Red Chinese aggression. Any military commander knows the tremendous risks the Chinese were taking by operating hundreds of miles away from their bases of supply. This comment applies to the situation after the Chinese had attacked. And so does General Bradley's article written after the Chinese attack?

Senator WELKER. General, may I interrupt you? Would you repeat, please, your first comment on the question that I asked you?

General ALMOND. I would be glad to, yes, sir. You were speaking about "our lines held." Of course they held. American lines always will hold unless they are too much restricted in what the command away from the front imposes.

My comment, though, is that our lines held in spite of the restrictions and limitations imposed by our own Government, and our casualty rates were enormous. There isn't any doubt about that.

Just take the record of the 24th Division, starting with General Dean's battalion at Osan on July 4, 1950, when he lost the whole thing, being overrun by NK forces. But that wasn't "the line" that General Bradley was talking about, as I assumed. He talks about this line in the winter of 1950–51, "but our lines held."

I was saying in the second comment, General Bradley sets up the same strawman as he has done on every other opportunity. "The Communists might attack us after we weaken our strategic Air Force." He never seems to consider what we might gain by a strong reaction to Chinese Red aggression. My own comment is that "any military commander knows the tremendous risks that the Chinese were taking by operating hundreds of miles away from their bases of supply. What if we had defeated the Chinese? Why does he not consider this eventuality in his analysis? General Bradley was oriented toward Europe and nothing could budge him from it."

Senator WELKER. Would you repeat that, please?

General ALMOND. I say General Bradley's analysis of the world situation was oriented toward Europe, he says so himself, and nothing could budge him from it. He could not visualize the effect on Russia or China in the logical supposition that we might win. As a matter of fact, the entire Saturday Evening Post article by General Bradley in my opinion was "an apology" for being wrong. In his estimate of what we should have done in the Far East, General MacArthur's wisdom and vision will endure as long as time runs. I doubt that many in the next generation will recall this apology entitled "A Soldier's Farewell."

Senator WELKER. Now, General, based upon your distinguished service to your country, do you feel that few, if any, commanders could have handled the Inchon operation as it was handled?

General ALMOND. Do I think that any field commander——

Senator WELKER. Few, if any, great field commanders or generals, such as General MacArthur, could have handled the Inchon operation as it was handled.

General ALMOND. Well, I think General MacArthur is a master at that kind of operation. He told me when we were formulating this operation that this was the 11th amphibious operation that he had engaged in since he left Australia, fighting back up the axis. He said, incidentally, if I may continue, "this is the largest force that I have ever had, and I have the greatest hopes for it."

Senator WELKER. When did the planning of the Inchon operation commence?

General ALMOND. When?

Senator WELKER. Yes.

General ALMOND. It was always in General MacArthur's mind from the time that he realized how hard pressed General Walker was going to be. Knowing the capacity of the troops that he would be likely to get, he knew some master stroke had to be conceived and executed in order to give the relief to those hard-pressed forces that we first sent straight into the face of the enemy. He at one time, before the Inchon landing was ever conceived in its eventual guise, considered sending the 1st Cavalry Division over on the west flank of Korea to help General Walker by an amphibious envelopment. He once considered sending the 1st Cavalry Division in at Inchon, but the condition with which General Walker was faced grew worse so rapidly that before we could load the 1st Cavalry Division, we had to send it in to General Walker's area landing it at Pohang-Dong to block the enemy which was upon General Walker, and we couldn't trifle with any wide envelopments. That is why the 1st Cavalry Division went in on the east coast of Korea and joined up and very soon took its position in front of Tague. Later on, always having it in the back of his mind I would say, General MacArthur racked his brain and the brains of all the staff as well, to find out how we could assemble a force sufficiently large to make a strategic effort to relieve the enemy pressure upon the front that General Walker was having so much difficulty defending north and west of Pusan. He didn't have the troops required. He was constantly rushing one unit from one side to the other, like a fire brigade putting out a fire. He would grab the 24th Division and put it in a gap and pull it out 3 days later to give it some rest, when another gap would occur in some other place, and he was then forced to put this unit back in the line again. He had tremendous trials and tribulations. The forces with which he had to contend and those of the enemy are shown on this map (see p. 2111, exhibit 498–A).

General MacArthur then began to search for more troops than the Department of the Army thought were available to him at the time. Almost as if by a miracle, those troops were made available, to a large degree, by General Shepherd, now Commandant of the Marine Corps, then Fleet Marine Commander on Admiral Radford's staff in the Pacific Naval Forces who was making a visit to General MacArthur's headquarters.

In conversation, General Shepherd said, "Why don't you use some marines?" General MacArthur's reply was, "Well, I will use the Marines if you can get them for me." He also said, "If you will give me the Marines you will solve a lot of my problems."

From that conversation developed the essence of the Inchon landing.

We knew that if we could get a division of marines, that we would have that much to go on, and we were willing to try to get other troops from the Department of the Army. We then also decided to build up the 7th Division then in Japan with replacements, a part of which General Walker needed very badly, but we were trying to make this coup at Inchon which we thought would be most beneficial; and I think it proved so.

With those tangible assets and the promise of a marine division, General MacArthur directed me, as Chief of Staff, to have a plan prepared for a landing on one flank or the other of Korea with the objective as Seoul.

We studied this problem for a little while and we came up with Inchon as the selected point. The details are of no matter here. But the Inchon landing was planned and executed in 23 days from the time we got the word "go" until we landed there, only 18 miles west of Seoul on the 15th of September, 1950 (see pp. 2112, 2113, exhibits 498–B and 498–C).

Senator WELKER. Now, will you tell me, General, what sort of support or cooperation did you receive from Washington.

General ALMOND. Well, Washington, of course, was very interested in these plans. They had already told us that troops were extremely limited. That is why we asked for the Marines.

They even brought to our attention how strenuously General Walker needed what we were trying to divert to this flank operation. I am sure General Walker was conscious of that. We certainly were. We never thought for a minute that he did not need them.

But General MacArthur's solution was that "if we could strike in the rear, at the heart of the enemy's communications, it would do more good than any other way." Events proved him right.

As these plans developed, General Collins and others came over to Tokyo and discussed them with us. It advanced from one stage to another, and finally we sent an officer back to the Pentagon with our completed plan, which was presented before the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and approved by them. Thus began the movement toward Inchon.

Senator WELKER. General, if the whole operation from July through September was so miraculous was not the calculated risk of these who launched us into that action a very great one indeed?

General ALMOND. The calculated risk was recognized as being not hazardous but problematical. General MacArthur had at many times so assured everyone, and had so assured Admiral Sherman, who was concerned with the technical side of this operation. It is one thing to order a thing, and another thing to carry it out. You appreciate that fully, I know.

The technique of utilizing the Marines with many types of special equipment, with amtracks, landing boats, cranes, air support from carriers, and submarines and mines and so forth, were all technicalities.

I would not say we were plagued with them, but we were abundantly confronted with them and repeatedly confronted with them as being reasons for not attempting the Inchon landing.

General MacArthur thought the risk was worth the result, and I think the result proved that he was correct.

Senator WELKER. Now, General, considering the unrestrained criticism, the Veterans of Foreign Wars episode, and the failure of normal moral support and protection by the Pentagon from ill-informed press criticism, and attack by our own allies, have you ever wondered whether we were meant to win or whether there were commitments made at that time?

Senator HENDRICKSON. Commitments not to win?

Senator WELKER. Yes; in the words of General Van Fleet, who appeared before this committee. Commitments made that we were not to win at that time.

General ALMOND. Senator, I have no way of knowing what commitments were made. I can only answer to that to say that the things as they happened looked very strange insofar as the assurance with which the enemy appeared to operate. I think it would have been a very hazardous thing for the Chinese to enter North Korea in the abundant numbers in which they did if they had thought that their bases of rice or ammunition or any other base would be subject to attack.

Is that what you mean?

Senator WELKER. That is it. Thank you very much.

Now, Counsel, I am sorry I interrupted.

Mr. CARPENTER. I would like to retrace this inquiry for a moment, General. I do not believe we had finished the period of 1949–50 (British policy changes).

General ALMOND. I was up to December 1949, of the British policy.

Mr. CARPENTER. I would like for you to finish that at this time, please.

General ALMOND. I was saying that in December, after Malcolm MacDonald had given us the basis of anti-Communist action in the southeast Asia area and in Asia proper, in December, the British recognized the Red Chinese Government as being the de jure government of China.

It was explained to me very carefully once by the British Ambassador in Tokyo that there was a difference between the de jure and de facto status of the recognition—an explanation which he volunteered and I did not seek.

The following spring, in 1950, all British heads of mission throughout Asia and southeast Asia were assembled in Singapore to meet with Mr. MacDonald, and there they had a 2- or 3-day discussion. I am sure, from the rumors I heard in Tokyo when those from our area returned, that they must have been receiving a reorientation of policy because the British Ambassador in Tokyo in his conversation with me, and there was nothing secret about it—he was very frank about it—assured me that the United States Consul General Angus Ward incident, which had happened in December 1949 in Mukden, was very unfortunate in that, had it not happened, our Government as well as his own would have recognized Red China.

I was astounded as far as our Government was concerned, and I told the Ambassador so. I said in reply, "I have no idea what course your Government will take. I do not believe that my Government intends to recognize Red China. If it does, that fact has not been communicated to me either formally or informally."

Therefore, that seemed to me a very distinct reversal of policy as to how we could combat communism in Asia.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, I believe General MacArthur has indicated that the neutralization of Formosa was a tipoff to the Chinese Reds that they would enjoy unprecedented sanctuary and that the Chinese Reds must have known our efforts would be limited before they crossed the Yalu. Do you agree?

General ALMOND. Well, I can only judge by what I saw on the 25th of July when General MacArthur and his staff, of which I was one, went to Formosa. I saw the face of the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang and his Chief of Staff and other Chinese staff officers; the consternation with which they accepted the ruling that

Formosa or an invasion of the Chinese coast was forbidden to them. When we got down there their whole theme was "How much can you help us to get back to China?"

To answer the second part of your question, I am sure that if I were a military commander of a squad, or up to the size of a field army, if I thought that I could block any particular section of my problem out, it would make it easier for me to operate on the balance of my front. Therefore, the neutralization of Formosa, in my opinion, was a facility which the Chinese took advantage of in order to concentrate all of their troops, their worthwhile troops, in the north—having no concern about the south.

It may not have been contemplated that way when the decision was made, but contemplations, in my opinion, ought to be tempered by the probable result.

Mr. CARPENTER. To a military commander that was very obvious, was it not?

General ALMOND. Very, to me.

Mr. CARPENTER. General MacArthur has also stated that his orders to bomb the Yalu bridges were countermanded within a matter of hours. From your extensive experience, would you say this was extraordinary promptness on the part of the Pentagon?

General ALMOND. Yes, I think that was pretty prompt.

Mr. CARPENTER. Does it suggest a decision based on commitments which may have been taken earlier in anticipation of such an eventuality?

General ALMOND. Not necessarily. That prohibition might have been issued in following out or carrying out a policy within which it would fall. Therefore, if the policy was well established, it might have been very easy to answer yes or no. If it was indicated that the policy would cover it, that is. On the other hand, a complicated problem, even though in conformity with the policy, might require much longer to reply to or evaluate.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, I believe you are familiar with General MacArthur's remarks that appeared in the New York Times on Sunday, February 1, 1953.

At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce these excerpts into the record.

Senator WELKER (presiding). It will be so ordered, and will be made a part of the record at this point.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 496" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 496

[Source: The New York Times, February 1, 1953]

TEXT OF MACARTHUR REMARKS

Here is the text of the statement by General MacArthur, as released by his aides last night:

"That reported decision of the administration to revoke the order to the 7th Fleet requiring it to protect the Red Chinese mainland against combat operations by the free Chinese forces on Formosa will correct one of the strangest anomalies known to military history. This order, issued in June 1950, proved to be a fundamental error which has contaminated the entire far eastern situation.

"Its restriction upon the activity of the free Chinese forces gave public notice that the Chinese Reds were to enjoy unprecedented sanctuary in the struggle for Asia between the forces of communism and those of the free world. It was undoubtedly this decision, with its implications, which emboldened the Chinese

Communist forces to intervene in increasing strength in Indochina, in Korea, in Tibet, and along the entire periphery of their aggressive advance in Asia.

IMMUNITY HELD FACTOR

"Actually it was this protection which permitted the transfer of the very Communist armies assigned to the coastal defense of central China for the attack upon our forces in Korea. Indeed, the concept of such sanctuary immunity unquestionably predominantly influenced Red China to enter the Korean conflict after the North Korean armies had been destroyed. For, in the absence of assurance that his bases of attack and lines of supply to his rear would be safe, no military commander lacking both naval force and air cover would have committed large forces across the Yalu River.

"As a matter of historical record, when he did so, I immediately ordered the destruction by air bombardment of the bridges across the Yalu which would have imperiled his entire force. Within a matter of hours my order was countermanded and these bridges, augmented and increased, have since borne millions of marching feet and hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies and munitions to sustain the enemy's operations against our hard-pressed forces. It has been stated that the purpose of the order to the 7th Fleet was to prevent the spread of the war, but the result has been just the opposite.

"It laid the basis for altering the localized character of the Korean conflict and set the stage for further involvements just as appeasement and indecisiveness have always done. The modification of the 7th Fleet's orders should be supported by all loyal Americans irrespective of party. It certainly is time for this change."

General ALMOND. I think I have commented on that, have I not? I just said my comment on that was, after reading this, I accompanied General MacArthur to Formosa on the 25th of July, a month after this order of June 1950. I saw the consternation that was on the Generalissimo's face, and all of his associates.

I wholly agree with General MacArthur's statement that this neutralization of Formosa was a clear signal to the Reds to move north, which they did. I have no way of knowing whether it was premeditated or not.

Mr. CARPENTER. At this time I would like to introduce into the record excerpts from an article in the U. S. News & World Report entitled "Bradley Defends World Policy of the United States," dated March 28, 1952.

Senator WELKER. It will be so ordered, and introduced into the record and made a part of the record at this point in the proceedings.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 497" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 497

[Source: U. S. News & World Report, March 28, 1952]

(Foregoing are excerpts of address by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Junior Chamber of Commerce of Pasadena, Calif., on March 20.)

BRADLEY DEFENDS WORLD POLICY OF UNITED STATES

STRATEGY IN KOREA—USE OF AIRPOWER—TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS

* * * * * * *

The top-priority problem on our military docket—the war in Korea—has been tough from the very beginning. Despite the military odds against us, no decision, at the time it was taken, had such complete support from the American people as our decision to oppose the outright aggression in Korea. But militarily, it has been an uphill fight all the way.

We have a long and successful history of tackling every problem directly. We pitch in, appropriate enough money, build enough equipment or weapons, and slug it out for enough rounds to win a decision. We usually start our military

operations when we have built up our strength and are ready to launch an offensive.

But in Korea we were in the scrap before we were militarily ready. We started with less than an Infantry battalion when the South Koreans had their backs to the wall. We opened up on the defensive.

When we have to fight, we Americans like to fight on a big scale, with plenty of elbow room. However, because we did not want to enlarge the war unnecessarily by bombing in Manchuria, we have tried to fight the war in a limited area.

The decision not to extend the bombing to Manchuria and China was taken after long and careful thought. It was felt that the results would not be decisive; that such bombing might incite hostile bombing behind our lines, or might bring on a general war.

It has given some a feeling of frustration that we have withheld part of our airpower. Americans felt like a fighter who doesn't really have enough room to swing. We have withheld what Americans consider our "Sunday punch"—the atomic bomb—because strategic bombing to be effective must be aimed at the source of supply. And we all know that the main source of Communist supply is not in China.

There is no guaranty that airpower in any of its dimensions would be decisive. An air attack by the United Nations on China might possibly trade the small deadlock in Korea for larger stalemate in China.

Even with our war limited to Korea, we proved to the enemy that his aggression was not successful. So they offered to sit down and talk truce.

Truce negotiations have now dragged on for over 8 months. This is not the fault of the United Nations or the United States.

We could have secured an armistice by agreeing to all Communist demands. This would have sacrificed all that we had gained, and would have proved that the Communists can succeed by aggression.

The negotiators for the United Nations are working hard to settle the last three major points. Of the original problems on the agreed agenda, there remains our disagreement with the Communists on the rehabilitation of some of their North Korean airfields and the exchange of prisoners of war. In addition, there is the recent introduction of the Soviet Union as a possible member of the neutral truce inspection team.

* * * * * * *

No summary of the military outlook would be complete without facing the inevitable question: If the Soviet Union and her satellites really have the intention of conquering the free world, why haven't they attacked before this?

They have attacked and are attacking every day—by any means they consider advantageous. In the cold war, they have taken advantage of our free press, free speech, and free economy. They have used our freedoms, and our support of freedoms, as modes of attack. Every medium has been used to spread the Communist line.

The Communist directors have used the technique of war by satellite in Korea. If it is allowed to become a successful method, they may be encouraged to try some more of it.

They have not started an all-out war. Maybe it is because of our atomic stockpile, and our airpower, and because they have watched the rehabilitation of the peoples in Western Europe.

We don't know what the Soviet imperialists intend to do. But from a military viewpoint, I believe that if we continue to work for collective-security arrangements that help our allies to help themselves, we will continue to deter the aggressive designs of the enemy.

I believe that the actions we have taken so far will continue to have the support of the American people. The moves we have made are morally right, politically and economically feasible, and spiritually well founded .

The citizens of the free world have criticized themselves for a lack of positive military policy. We have accused ourselves of failing to act, and allowing ourselves only to react to the aggressor's moves.

The situation is different today. We have positive programs for security. We have a sound military policy that has taken the initiative for peace as a deterrent to war.

Mr. CARPENTER. General Almond, are you familiar with this article, and could you comment on it?

General ALMOND. I read that over. We have to remember that this was March 28, 1952, 8 months after I left the Korean front. But the significant part of those remarks, as they struck me, was his statement, the first paragraph of the excerpt, maintaining that the American people were solidly behind our decision to oppose the outright aggression in Korea.

My comment on that is if this was so why did our administration insist that it was a police action when it could have stated the seriousness of it and mobilized sufficient forces? For one, I don't appreciate the Korean war, having fought in it, being termed a "fracas," as was done by General Collins, then Chief of Staff, United States Army, in the Senate hearings in May 1951. It was a great deal more than a fracas, as it has been termed by witnesses that have appeared before congressional committees who have talked about the "fracas occurring in Korea" and the great problem in Europe.

The problem wasn't in Europe then, in an actual way. The problem was in Korea where we had a quarter of a million men engaged. And with the result that we now know of, 142,000 casualties and some $20 billion. That didn't start as a fracas; it didn't start as a police action, from the 29th of June, 4 days after it started when General MacArthur saw the condition of that South Korean army. It was never a police action to us. That is my comment.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, when you testified before the subcommittee of the Committee of the Senate on Armed Services in April 1953, you stated, on page 33:

> I became conscious of what we call the sitdown war about the 1st of May, before the Chinese attack on the 16th of May 1951.

Were our forces north or south of the 38th parallel at that time?

General ALMOND. Were they?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes.

General ALMOND. They were south of the 38th parallel, I believe.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, do you have a map? Could you identify on the map and go into detail so that we can see it, these various locations? That was never well reported in this country, General. I believe it needs clarification by one who was there.

General ALMOND. The Chinese made three distinctly large attacks in Korea, in my opinion. The first one was in early December against the Eighth Army and against the X Corps at the Chosin Reservoir in 1950. That attack—on this other map (see p. 2114, exhibit 498–D) eventually resulted in the Eighth Army withdrawing as far south as Seoul.

When this first attack occurred the X Corps was over here [indicating], from Wonsan and Hamhung and on up toward the Chosin Reservoir. The Eighth Army was in this vicinity [indicating]. (See p. 2115, exhibit 498–E.)

Mr. CARPENTER. Would you identify that?

General ALMOND. This vicinity is south of the crossings of the Yalu River at Antung, Sinanju, Sinuiju, and south of Manpojin on the Yalu River, where we found so many Commies had crossed unknown to our own forces, even unknown to our Air Force reconnaissance. But that concentration of some 8 or 10 or more divisions against the X Corps initially was done at night very surreptitiously, and the Eighth Army was also suddenly confronted with great masses of Chinese against the South Koreans on its right flank with a strong attack.

That attack resulted in the Eighth Army's right flank, where the South Koreans were, being crushed. It caused a readjustment of Eighth Army forces to the extent that they withdrew in the face of superhuman odds; you might say, in numbers up to 20–to–1 odds; gradually down into the vicinity of Seoul along and south of the 38th parallel. That was the first attack. (See p. 2116, exhibit 498–F.)

The second atack occurred on the 22d of April 1951, and this attack was on the front of the I Corps and in the vicinity of Uijongbu and some 20 miles north of Seoul. That attack involved about 38 Chinese divisions; 24 of these were badly handled, and the Chinese withdrew from the 22d of April to about the 30th. (See p. 2117, exhibit 498–G.)

On the 8th of May 1951 General Marshall testified before a committee of Congress that the Chinese were so badly handled in that attack of the 22d that forces of the CCF probably wouldn't be employed again in an important attack for months.

In exactly 8 days from the time he made that statement the Chinese moved, as this map indicates (see p. 2118, exhibit 498–H), five army corps across the front, from the front of the I Corps, where I am pointing to, to the front of the X Corps, north of Hongchon, where I am pointing to now, and which corps I commanded at the time; 175,000 Chinamen attacked the 2d Infantry Division here north of Hangye, with the idea of destroying that division, also about here [indicating] (see p. 2119, exhibit 498–I), splitting the ROK Army on the right of the 2d Division from here to here [indicating] away from the Eighth Army, driving a wedge through there and blocking off the Eighth Army from its base at Pusan.

That attack materialized on the 16th of May. (See p. 2119, exhibit 498–I.)

This chart shows the extension from this line [indicating] to this position [indicating], that it went to. In that effort the X Corps, composed of 3 American divisions and 4 ROK divisons, sustained 14,000 casualties, 7,000 Americans and about 7,000 ROK's.

For 6 days while this battle was going on day and night, after the second day, we withdrew each night to a new line and bent with the wind or the breeze of the enemy attack.

If you ever read The Three Bamboos, an intriguing Japanese story, that is what the Three Bamboos, three powerful Japanese brothers, did. They accepted every situation in the best possible shape, readjusted to meet the next situation, and that is what we did. But we also captured many prisoners during that battle.

When my intelligence officer indicated to me that this great force of 175,000 men which had turned our flank virtually enveloping the X Corps and which was coming down like this [indicating] and strung out in this direction [indicating] (see p. 2119, exhibit 498–I), when they had consumed most of their rations and a great part of their ammunition—well, that is when we struck back at them. It has always been my concept of battle that "if our force is tired the enemy might be tired as well." With that philosophy and the pretty certain knowledge that his supplies were running low, if not exhausted, and with General Van Fleet's full cooperation and understanding—he being present on the battlefield or always nearby—it seemed time to go to a counter-offensive.

General Van Fleet and myself discussed this at great length. Most of the reserves were either in the line or just behind it, including his own.

I asked him to give me the 187th Airborne Regiment, a fine outfit, with close to 5,000 men in that regiment, his last resource, including the supporting artillery.

On the 22d we started the attack. We drove across the enemy's rear on an axis of attack from Hongchon to this point called Inje, and in the next 2 or 3 days this complete enemy force, down here (see p. 2120, exhibit 498–J), reversed itself and started hiking for the rear. They lost every piece of transportation that they had in this area. We captured groups of pack mules and pack animals which they should have been able to get out except that the horses and mules were poor and the supplies were exhausted.

With this result, by the 1st of June we had regained much of this territory that we had lost in December and January 1950–51, and some more besides.

About that time, I will say between the 1st of June and the 1st of July, when we were readjusting this line, a thing happened to me that I have never experienced before. By private conversaton with my commander, the Eighth Army commander, General Van Fleet, I was told to halt my troops on that line and advance no further and only take action in an aggressive way that would either straighten out and stabilize that line or protect the lines of my men. In other words, it was decided somewhere above General Van Fleet's head, and where I do not know—I complied with the orders—that when we had defeated this huge force that General Marshall didn't think could be employed, but it showed that the Chinese not only had 36 divisions over here, 12 of which could be deployed, and were according to my map (see p. 2118, exhibit 498–H), but they had more, and did employ them to the extent of 137,000 Chinamen and 37,000 or 38,000 North Koreans against this one sector [indicating] (see p. 2119, exhibit 498–I)—that when they did that they were using the cream of their army, and when we defeated that cream I think we were entitled to capitalize on it.

In defense of this line I had told my men—I not only told them but I landed in a helicopter along their line in every battalion, 11 battalions across this front, with the X Corps—I told them that they would stay in their established positions until somebody in authority ordered them to leave, which they did.

I have no hesitation in the interest of my country in ordering men to battle if I think that it is worth while and that something useful, as this line which we had built to defend as here shown, will result from it.

I have a great resentment when I find that 7,000 of my own men and 7,000 of my allies, the Koreans, including a French battalion and a Dutch battalion—with four nations being involved—in finding that I am not permitted or I am prevented from obtaining recompense for those losses when the mission of any battlefield commander is to win in the field and not be denied a victory for his forces.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to introduce the maps that General Almond has used in describing the situation as he found it.

Senator WELKER. Very well, they and other maps as required will be so introduced and made a part of the record.

(The maps were marked "Exhibits Nos. 498–A, 498–B, 498–C, 498–D, 498–E, 498–F, 498–G, 498–H, 498–I, 498–J, 498–K, 498–L, 498–M," and appear on pp. 2111–2123, inclusive.)

Senator WELKER. When Secretary of State Acheson testified on the investigation of the military situation in the Far East, in the first week of June 1951, he stated that "area" should be defined as the territory of the Republic of South Korea, and the settlement of the war as the 38th parallel would constitute victory.

When were you informed that the 38th parallel would constitute victory?

General ALMOND. I was never informed of that fact or decision. I was only informed that my troops, which I considered victorious and which were prepared to destroy the enemy—this means the X Corps—acting in conjunction with the rest of the Eighth Army, and with the help of the Air Force and Navy in Korean areas, that could have been easily done; the only knowledge I had of that statement by Mr. Acheson is the fact that we were ordered not to advance farther than that line as a matter of procedure on the battlefield.

Senator WELKER. According to the records of the 1951 hearings, the 38th parallel was first crossed by advancing U. N. forces about the middle of October 1950. American casualties up to October 13, 1950, were 26,083, of whom 4,036 were dead, 4,336 were missing and the rest were wounded. Were you then advised that the military job in Korea was accomplished?

General ALMOND. I was not, and I have the distinct concept from no less than General MacArthur, whose subordinate I was, and operating under his instructions—and I believe General Walker had the same concept—that we were there, we had just about defeated the North Korean Army, and we were going to finish it up and that we were going to clear up northern Korea and do what the United Nations had intended, so they say, to reunite Korea as a free, democratic republic as quickly as possible. We were in the process of doing that.

Senator WELKER. When was the mission changed, General?

General ALMOND. Never, as far as I know.

Senator WELKER. And you have already testified that we did not defeat the North Koreans? Is that correct?

General ALMOND. That we did.

Senator WELKER. You did?

General ALMOND. We did defeat the North Koreans.

Senator WELKER. But you were not permitted to go ahead and completely obliterate them as army men should?

General ALMOND. My move in northeast Korea, when some of my troops reached Hyesanjin on the Yalu, what we did prior to that time is well illustrated by a map that I also have. (See p. 2121, exhibit 498–K.)

I am speaking of the X Corps now because that is what I commanded.

The area to the left of the pointer was the Eighth Army area. This over here in northeastern Korea [indicating] is the area for which I was responsible. In connection with the defeat of the North Korean forces, our forces arrived on the Yalu here at Hyesanjin, on 21 November, up here at Chongjin, about this distance, 60 miles from Vladivostok.

In this area south of that line and on down to the 38th parallel, as we advanced we established civil government in every town and vil-

lage and hamlet. The fact that we established these contacts and gave assistance to these people was one of the reasons, I believe, that confidence in our forces over here and under General Walker was built up. Wherever we went we were trying to do something worth while for the people who lived there.

We furnished their medical supplies, clothing, shelter, gasoline and oil for their fishing boats, and gasoline for their transportation to haul the lumber for the mountain people, the people in the mountains, to exchange with people on the coast, lumber for rice.

Where we came out of this northeast area from Hungnam (see p. 2116, exhibit 498-F) to rejoin the Eighth Army here [indicating] the fact that we brought 100,000 refugees hanging on our LST's—as a matter of fact, one LST had 10,000 people on it, believe it or not. We even had a baby born, moving the mother from the gangplank up to the top of the LST. That is how distraught they were. They were all kinds of people in all kinds of conditions. But 100,000 refugees came out of this area where we had befriended them, and they are now on Kojedo and other places in South Korea. I know that. I get letters from them even to this day.

Senator WELKER. General, you have stated to the committee that we defeated the North Koreans. Did we defeat the Chinese Communists?

General ALMOND. Not at all; no, sir.

Senator WELKER. Do they now occupy more territory than they did in November of 1950?

General ALMOND. Decidedly. When they first attacked the front of the Eighth Army they were pretty well up above Pyongyang. Now they are pretty well below it.

Senator WELKER. I will ask you if it is not a fact that the Communist Chinese are a greater power today than they were then.

General ALMOND. I think decidedly so, sir. I think they have learned a lot from us in military operations that they will never forget. They have a finer army. I wouldn't hesitate to say that they have a fine army.

Senator WELKER. And now, in concluding this part of my questions, I will ask if it is not a fact that in your appearance before the Armed Services Subcommittee in April of 1953 you testified, at page 53 of those hearings, that you never had any confidence in the truce talks because they simply gave the Chinese Communists time to build up. The same judgment applies to a protracted armistice as well, does it not?

General ALMOND. Yes, sir. In my opinion. If anyone has any confidence in the commitments of the Communists in any direction I don't know who he is, and I will be glad to have anybody explain his fundamental reasons for carrying out any commitment at any time anywhere.

Senator WELKER. Reverting to late October and November of 1950, were you familiar with the special report which General MacArthur submitted to the U. N. on November 5, 1950?

General ALMOND. What did that have reference to? The indication of the Chinese entry into the war? Is that what it was?

Mr. CARPENTER. November 5, 1950, a special report of General MacArthur to the Security Council of the United Nations. I believe you have it, General.

At this time I would like to introduce this into the record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WELKER. It may be so introduced and made a part of the record.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 499" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 499

(Source: Military Situation in the Far East, hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., to conduct an inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area, part 5, August 17, 1951.)

[From Department of State Bulletin, November 27, 1950]

SPECIAL REPORT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, UNITED NATIONS, NOVEMBER 5, 1950

I herewith submit a special report of the United Nations Command operations in Korea which I believe should be brought to the attention of the United Nations.

The United Nations Forces in Korea are continuing their drive to the north and their efforts to destroy further the effectiveness of the enemy as a fighting force are proving successful. However, presently in certain areas of Korea, the United Nations Forces are meeting a new foe. It is apparent to our fighting forces, and our intelligence agencies have confirmed the fact, that the United Nations are presently in hostile contact with Chinese Communist military units deployed for action against the forces of the United Command.

Hereafter, in summary form, are confirmed intelligence reports substantiating the fact that forces other than Korean are resisting our efforts to carry out the resolutions of the United Nations:

A. August 22: Approximately 50 bursts heavy antiaircraft fire from Manchurian side of Yalu River against RB–29 flying at 7,000 feet over Korea in the vicinity of the Sui-Ho Reservoir; damage, none; time 1600K; weather 10 miles visibility, high broken clouds.

B. August 24: Approximately 40 bursts heavy anti-aircraft fire from Manchurian side of Yalu River against RB–29 flying at 10,000 feet over Korea in the vicinity of Sinuiju; damage, none; time 1500K; weather, 20 miles visibility.

C. October 15: Antiaircraft fire from the Manchurian side of Yalu River against a flight of 4 F–51's flying near the Sinuiju airfield on the Korean side of the river; damage, 1 aircraft total loss; time, 1445I; weather, overcast at 8,000 feet; 8 to 10 miles visibility.

D. October 16: The 370th Regiment of the 124th Division of the Chinese Communist 42d Army, consisting of approximately 2,500 troops, crossed the Yalu River (Korean border) at Wan Po Jin, and proceeded to the area of Chosen and Fusen Dams in North Korea where they came in contact with U. N. forces approximately 40 miles north of Hamhung.

E. October 17: Approximately 15 bursts heavy antiaircraft fire from Manchurian side of Yalu River against RB–29 flying at 10,000 feet over Korea in the vicinity of Sinuiju; damage, none; time 1200I; weather, 8 miles visibility, low clouds 2,300 feet.

F. October 20: A Chinese Communist task force known as the 56th unit, consisting of approximately 5,000 troops, crossed the Yalu River (Korean border) at Antung and deployed to positions in Korea south of the Sui-Ho Dam. A captured Chinese Communist soldier of this task force states that his group was organized out of the regular Chinese Communist 40th Army stationed at Antung, Manchuria.

G. November 1: A flight of F–51's was attacked early in the afternoon by 6 to 9 jet aircraft which flew across the Yalu River into Manchuria. No damage was done to United States aircraft. A red star was observed on the top of the right wing on one of the jet aircraft.

H. November 1: Antiaircraft fire from the Manchurian side of the Yalu River directed against a flight of 13 F–80 aircraft was observed in the vicinity of Sinuiju at 1345 hours. This resulted in the total loss of one U. N. aircraft.

I. October 30: Interrogation of 19 Chinese prisoners of war identified two additional regiments of 124 CCF Division, the 371 and the 372 in the vicinity of Changjin.

J. November 2: Interrogation of prisoners of war indicates the 54 CCF unit in Korea. This unit is reported to have same organization as 55 and 56 units, but to be drawn from the 112, 113, and 114 divisions of the 38 CC Army.

K. November 3: Further interrogation of Chinese prisoners of war indicates 56 CCF unit organized from elements of 118, 119, and 120 CCF Divisions of the 40 CCF Army.

L. November 4: As of this date, a total of 35 CCF prisoners had been taken in Korea.

The continued employment of Chinese Communist forces in Korea and the hostile attitude assumed by such forces, either inside or outside Korea, are matters which it is incumbent upon me to bring at once to the attention of the U. N.

General ALMOND. I have this comment on it.

Part of my forces captured some Chinese prisoners, I think about the 26th of October. We found out that these Chinese had crossed the Yalu River on the 16th and made contact with the 23d ROK Regiment, a part of my force, on the 26th. I interviewed those prisoners and reported the identification to GHQ in Tokyo. I flew to the 1st ROK Corps operating under my command, the X Corps, and interviewed these prisoners.

The radio that I sent to General MacArthur is a matter of record. It is somewhere in the records of the Department of the Army at the Pentagon.

This statement that we refer to, it seems to me, should have alerted the United States Government by means of a realistic evaluation that a new war was in the making in Korea and that we must defeat this new aggressor.

I think, instead of alerting us to a new evaluation, it struck terror to "the thinking in Washington" at the time.

Senator WELKER. Would you describe to the committee, please, the meetings that you attended and the thinking of the top command in Tokyo and Korea in the interval between this report and full-scale entry of the Chinese Communists?

General ALMOND. Would you repeat that, please?

Senator WELKER. What did you think about it?

General ALMOND. Between what periods?

Senator WELKER. The time General MacArthur made his report to the United Nations. How did your men out there, trying to win a victory, think about it? What was the thinking of you who were there trying to protect not only your country but those precious American boys that you commanded?

General ALMOND. I think it was that everything possible should be done to assist us who were trying to carry out the mission to which we had been assigned. I don't believe I was, as a corps commander, as conscious as perhaps General MacArthur's headquarters was, that we weren't receiving that assistance. But I have learned it later, and I think very deeply on it now.

Mr. CARPENTER. Does that complete your answer?

General ALMOND. Yes.

Mr. CARPENTER. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record the statement of the President, President Truman, on November 16, 1950, which appeared in the New York Times of November 17, 1950.

General Almond, I believe you have a copy of that. Could you comment on that, please?

May this go into the record?

Senator WELKER. It is so ordered.

(The document was marked "Exhibit 500" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 500

(Source: Military Situation in the Far East, hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., to conduct an inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area, pt. 5, Aug 17, 1951.)

[From New York Times, November 17, 1950]

STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT (TRUMAN), NOVEMBER 16, 1950

The Security Council has before it a resolution concerning the grave situation caused by the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. This resolution, introduced by the representatives of Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States, reaffirms that it is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate, to protect fully legitimate Korean and Chinese interests in the frontier zone, and to withdraw the United Nations forces from Korea as soon as stability has been restored and a unified, independent and democratic government established throughout Korea.

This resolution further calls upon all states and authorities to withdraw immediately from Korea all individuals or units which are assisting the North Korean forces. I am sure that all members of the Security Council genuinely interested in restoring peace in the Far East will not only support this resolution but also use their influence to obtain compliance with it.

United Nations forces now are being attacked from the safety of a privileged sanctuary. Planes operating from bases in China cross over into Korea to attack United Nations ground and air forces and then flee back across the border. Chinese Communist and North Korean Communist forces are being reinforced, supplied and equipped from bases behind the safety of the Sino-Korean border.

The pretext which the Chinese Communist advance for taking offensive action against United Nations forces in Korea from behind the protection afforded by the Sino-Korean border is their professed belief that these forces intend to carry hostilities across the frontier into Chinese territory.

The resolutions and every other action taken by the United Nations demonstrate beyond any doubt that no such intention has ever been entertained. On the contrary, it has been repeatedly stated that it is the intention of the United Nations to localize the conflict and to withdraw its forces from Korea as soon as the situation permits.

Speaking for the United States Government and people, I can give assurance that we support and are acting within the limits of United Nations policy in Korea, and that we have never at any time entertained any intention to carry hostilities into China.

So far as the United States is concerned, I wish to state unequivocally that because of our deep devotion to the cause of world peace and our long-standing friendship for the people of China we will take every honorable step to prevent any extension of the hostilities in the Far East.

If the Chinese Communist authorities or people believe otherwise, it can only be because they are being deceived by those whose advantage it is to prolong and extend hostilities in the Far East against the interests of all Far Eastern people.

Let it be understood, however, that a desire for peace, in order to be effective, must be shared by all concerned. If the Chinese Communists share the desire of the United Nations for peace and security in the Far East they will not take upon themselves the responsibility for obstructing the objectives of the United Nations in Korea.

General ALMOND. My statement on this is, first, that this statement reiterates the mission of General MacArthur in Korea, when the President said "It is the policy of the U. N. to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate."

The other quote is "To withdraw our forces from Korea as soon as a unified, independent and democratic government is established throughout Korea."

This whole statement gives every assurance of fair intentions toward the Chinese Reds, without a single warning of the consequences to the Chinese if they continue to pursue their invasion, which they did.

This announcement must have been the strong endorsement of someone in the light of what occurred on November 24, 7 days later, and our denial to General MacArthur when he desired to protect his front from Chinese knifing attacks by using his Air Force against Red bases in Manchuria.

The line that held, according to General Bradley's A Soldier's Farewell, was the line on which so many of our men died without benefit of our own and immediately available supporting weapons. Fear of the mob or of your own armed opponent never saved a conflict in battle of my knowledge.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to introduce into the record, and have made a part of the record, an address delivered on November 17, 1950, by Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the convention of the Associated Press Managing Editors Association at the Biltmore Hotel, Atlanta, Ga.

Senator WELKER. It will be so introduced and made a part of the record.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 501" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 501

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION,
Washington 25, D. C., November 17, 1950.

ADDRESS BY GENERAL OF THE ARMY OMAR N. BRADLEY, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, BEFORE THE CONVENTION OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS MANAGING EDITORS ASSOCIATION AT THE BILTMORE HOTEL, ATLANTA, GA.

The military problems of the United States have rarely been as difficult as they are today.

We are participating in active military operations in Korea. We face an aggressive power in Europe which might be capable of overrunning the land mass of that continent. And in the United States, we are forced to contemplate that war, if it comes, may mean the atomic bombing of our cities and homes.

With our own military forces already committed at many points around the globe to the protection of free peoples, and the threats to freedom constantly increasing, where is the American citizen to turn for a sound solution—and eventually for lasting peace?

Could we turn to appeasement and acquiescence? In Europe and in Korea, the American people have rejected a course of appeasement and acquiescence. For we seek the liberty, and the advantages of a free system founded upon the dignity and the worth of the individual, as it is stated in the measured phrases of the Declaration of Independence. Appeasement would either put an end to the freedoms we seek, or it would lead to war.

Could we then contemplate preventive war? No, the American people have rejected any idea of preventive war, for we seek peace. The American people would like to see order emerge from this chaos, and security arise from this present insecurity. We strive for the political and economic rehabilitation of those countries already ravaged by attack. Preventive war is not a means to these ends—and does not offer a solution.

What about a return to isolation? This, too, the American people have rejected. For we know that we need other free nations, and they need us. We seek a complete freedom of ideas in a world that welcomes new ideas. We have rejected the course of isolation, for if American citizens withdraw from world political decisions, from world commerce, and from world leadership, we would see the collapse of the United Nations, a reduction of economic wealth and well-being, and eventually a return to chaos and insecurity in the free world of today.

The only course left open to us is the best one—and the one that gives the greatest promise. It more nearly suits our ideals and fundamental purposes.

We must continue the fight for freedom and against aggression. We must seek every means possible to avoid war, and to prolong peace. The doors of negotiation must always remain open.

We must continue to help rebuild the economic, moral, and military strength of our friends. Wherever and whenever possible, we must enlarge and improve the capabilities for self-help and mutual aid among free nations.

In this course of action lies our chance for success—and for peace. Unswervingly we can uphold the fundamental purposes of the American people which have not changed in 175 years.

Almost two centuries ago, our forefathers mutually pledged, in support of the Declaration of Independence, and with a firm reliance on Divine Providence, their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor.

What better could we Americans do today?

Accomplished in the talents of science, we have created the atom bomb. Today, we would gladly trade it for a genuine course of righteousness in the world.

Acknowledged victors in the art of war, we would prefer the benefits of lasting international agreement and tranquillity. Today, we would trade all military power for a century of peace.

But no easy trades are on the open market. We must earn the world righteousness we seek, and the peace we so earnestly desire.

Evidently our labors have just begun.

Unfortunately, the means open to Communist aggression are unlimited, for they can try any method, and will sacrifice any civilized advancement to their slavery and its wicked ends.

The means open to freemen are limited to the worthy ones—limited to methods that the overwhelming majority of civilized men can recognize unmistakably as honorable methods to achieve freedom and peace.

We may ask ourselves honestly: what means are these?

First, we can build a strong and wholesome nation, to act as a pivotal center for freedom. This calls for preservation of our ideals, and our way of life. It calls for protection of every freedom we respect.

We must maintain and enlarge the industry and productivity that we have developed. At the same time, wherever it serves freedom's interest, we must share the benefits.

Next, we must exercise all the means of diplomacy, all the skills of negotiation, to enlarge the opportunities for freedom throughout the world.

In short, we can and must win the cold wars, as well as the hot ones. So long as we create the political, economic, religious, and moral strength with which to face the threats of international communism, we are on the road to success.

At the same time, we must build the enduring military strength which can preserve and protect the United States, and freedom, so that we insure the security of this pivotal Nation. This means a rapid rebuilding and enlargement of our own Armed Forces, as well as continued support to the reconstruction of the military strength of friendly nations.

It is the reconstruction of this essential military strength that concerns Americans today, next month, and for years to come. None of it is easily done, and none of it comes without community and individual sacrifice.

In broadest outline, the principles of our military security, like the principles of our democracy, have not changed in 175 years. Our military objectives are three: to create the power to prevent disaster in the event we are attacked; to have in hand the immediate capability of quick and strong retaliation to the attacker; and finally, to have a base upon which to build an overwhelming force with which we can take up the offensive, and overpower the aggressor.

Any provision short of this would invite disaster.

It is a bruising and shocking fact that when we Americans were committed in Korea, we were left without an adequate margin of military strength with which to face an enemy at any other specific point. Certainly, we were left without the strength to meet a general attack. In the military sense, the free world was left without adequate reserves except for the atomic bomb.

We cannot continue this unnecessary jeopardy to our own security. As a first step, we must build the forces—our own, and our allies—in Western Europe, as well as in the United States—which can prevent disaster, and afford effective retaliation.

For our share, we need a greater degree of readiness. It calls for more people in active military service than at any time in our peacetime history.

Some people seem to believe that when the Korean war is brought to a successful conclusion, our defenses can once more be partially demobilized. Nothing would put us in greater danger.

So we are going to propose Armed Forces which will solve the threefold military problem as well as we possibly can. The number of combat air groups which the Joint Chiefs of Staff propose for the remainder of this fiscal year will be larger than the Air Forces that exist today.

Since the Navy is sharing with the United Kingdom, and to some degree France, the naval responsibility for the North Atlantic Ocean, its buildup is internationally important. For not only American citizens but citizens of the whole North Atlantic Treaty Organization are depending on the United States Navy. Fortunately, we will be able to program the necessary ships, including an adequate naval air arm for this task.

As part of the Navy, we are scheduling two full-strength divisions of Marines for the Fleet Marine Force and its naval role. It is unnecessary to point out that we are also counting on these two Marine divisions to serve as a supplement to the ground army whenever such action is necessary.

Our defense obviously calls for a larger Army than we have ever had before. But this week the Joint Chiefs of Staff are face to face with a difficult problem. If we establish the number of divisions and separate regimental combat teams that we need as a bare minimum, our manpower total for Army, Navy, and Air Force comes face to face with manpower shortages. They are not real shortages in the sense that in case of war we could not meet the demands. After all, in 1945 we had 89 divisions and a great Air Force and a great Navy.

But in peacetime, we will have to maintain, for many years to come, large forces which may cut into the manpower available for industry and production. Obviously, we must strike a sound balance between these demands. If our requirements for immediately available forces exceed those we can properly maintain on continuous active duty, then maybe we should restudy our entire system of reserves so that we can have more trained units immediately available in case we are attacked.

For example, instead of maintaining all National Guard divisions at 100 percent officer strength and approximately 50 percent enlisted strength—with many of these soldiers serving recruit enlistments—perhaps we should maintain some of them at 100 percent officer strength and 85 to 90 percent enlisted strength, with every soldier in these divisions having had the benefit of a couple of years of active service. If this were the case, then some National Guard divisions could be available for combat almost immediately.

Similarly, some of our Reserve units should be brought up to this standard. In addition to their officer personnel, their enlisted men should have all had at least 2 years' training, and the units should have annual training periods to keep them up to date.

There was a time when commanders of United States forces could look across both oceans and could plan on fielding their first divisions in 6 months to a year. That is no longer the case, for the manifest intent of Communist aggression as shown in Korea has shortened the readiness time for American forces.

Somehow we must modify our Reserve and National Guard system—ground, air and navy—to meet this new requirement. However, until such time that units of the civilian components are in this improved state of readiness, the American manpower resources may have to be severely taxed to create the active forces we need.

While we are building up our own forces, our friends in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are planning with us, and with our help, an increase in the military capabilities of their countries. We are working toward an improvement in command structure and strategic guidance that will enable our combined forces to defend the North Atlantic Community, and to retaliate if any part of it is attacked.

Our strategic concept of mutual defense was fashioned a year ago. In the spring we settled upon the balanced collective force principle as the most economic and effective means to military strength in the heart of Europe. Last month in Washington we were able to sit down at the conference table with 11 other nations and work out the military commitments and the timetable for the creation of these forces which will lead us steadily to an adequate defense in Western Europe.

The key area of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the land mass of Western Europe, and its sea approaches. Although the pivotal strength now lies in the United States—and it must be protected at all costs—any tide of aggression on the European continent must be met and contained.

In order to improve the military structure for the defense of Europe we have been considering an integrated force, a Supreme Headquarters and a Supreme Commander to plan and operate the defense of this area in time of peace.

However, the Defense Ministers in conference were given a most difficult problem by the North Atlantic Council. The Council had directed "The Defense Committee in the light of the information available at the time of its meeting, to make specific recommendations regarding the method by which, from the technical point of view, Germany could make its most useful contribution to the successful implementation of the plan * * *" All 12 nations had agreed that a contribution from Western Germany was essential to the adequate defense of the enlarged area extending "as far east as possible."

For 5 years we have struggled to unify Germany and to help Germans toward democracy, to peace, and to permanent freedom. To further such efforts, we must grant these people an opportunity to defend themselves in the event that the Western Powers are attacked.

It is unthinkable that Frenchmen, Englishmen, and Americans should combine with other European nations to defend the line of the Elbe, without allowing all of those people being defended, including the Germans, to participate in that defense.

On the other hand, the reestablishment of German armed forces is fearsome for a Frenchman to anticipate. Three times in the last century France has been invaded by the Germans from the north. However, it is just as difficult for a Dane, or a Norwegian, or a Belgian, or a family in the Netherlands to contemplate the reestablishment of a German military menace. They, too, have felt the bit of the Wehrmacht sword.

And the world will not quickly forget the British as they staved off the air blitz of 1940.

But these nations now weigh the greater threat advisedly. With the establishment of adequate safequards—including no German general staff, no German war machine—these nations are willing to devise a scheme of defense for Western Europe as far east as possible, with the production, resources and manpower of Germany being permitted to make an adequate contribution to the mutual defense.

The enlargement of our defensive zone does not bring the Germans into the pact completely forgiven and with a free hand. In my mind, it enlarges their opportunity to prove the German people are bent upon a continuing course of international cooperation with freedom-loving people, in the hope of preventing war, in the purpose of deterring aggression, and if necessary, with the capability of helping defend their homeland.

Our international problem is political and military. On the political side we must achieve a measure of German participation which is acceptable to the German people and their democratic progress. It must be acceptable and tolerable to the French people—and the Danes, and the Norwegians, and the Belgians, and the Dutch—while the memory of invasion still burns in their minds.

From a military standpoint, we must establish a defense of Western Europe which is militarily sound, and includes the participation of the total resources, productivity and manpower of combined free peoples of Western Europe—including the Germans.

This month the Military Committee is working on a militarily acceptable solution. Simultaneously, the Council Deputies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are working on a politically acceptable solution to the German participation problem.

Very shortly these two committees will meet and combine their efforts in a report to the Defense Committee, which we hope will be acceptable to all 12 nations, and to the German people.

I hope that we find a speedy solution to this difficult problem. There is urgency in our desire to get on with the establishment of an integrated force for the defense of Europe. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that a resurgent Western Europe is one of the great hopes for the defense of freedom, and the improvement of our chances for peace. As soon as the problem of German participation is solved, then we can proceed with our plan for an integrated defense force for Western Europe.

If we are able to provide adequate military support for the protection and preservation of freedom-loving nations, freemen need not fear communism. We have, in the free world and especially in America, the undeniable power of a better idea. Our societies hold the individual and his freedom as an end in itself. This appeal to mankind is the most contagious and compelling idea in all history.

Any group of men, or any creed which holds to despotic slavery of one man in bondage to another must create a curtain of ignorance between the enslaved and the free people. We must try to pierce that curtain with enlightenment and hope. It is our purpose to provide that ray of hope as frequently and as constantly as possible.

It is our purpose—now, and for the succeeding years—to create the strength that will protect the pivotal core of freedom, the United States, and contribute to the protection through self-help and mutual aid of all those people who struggle with us for the spread of freedom.

It is within our power—but the time is short. We have set out upon the long, hard road. We must steadfastly continue the march toward freedom and peace.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, I believe you are familiar with the address, and you have studied it. Could you give us your comments on the statements contained therein?

General ALMOND. My first comment is that the purposes enunciated in this address are high purposes with which we all agree. The generalities are intriguing. I think, referring to the specific thing I have reference to, that was the first part of it where it was said—

the only course left open to us is the best one, the one that gives the greater promise. It more nearly suits our ideas. We must continue to fight for freedom and against aggression—

and so on. I agree with that. We must continue to fight it.

The second is:

Any provision short of this will invite disaster. It is a bruising and shocking fact—

says General Bradley—

that when we Americans were committed to Korea we were left without an adequate margin of military strength with which to face an enemy at any other specific point. Certainly we were left without the strength to meet a general attack. In the military sense, the free world was left without adequate reserves except for the atom bomb.

This is a statement which proves to me, at least, that Washington operated from fear of the unknown.

It is true that our ready-to-move units were few, but our reserve potential was enormous. Where were the 8 million men discharged from a victorious army only 5 years before? One of the things that General MacArthur asked for early in the Korean war was that sufficient men of our Organized Reserves be called at once to give our units in Korea added strength. This was not done because, I believe, we were still trying to pan off on the public a serious military operation as a "police action."

The Navy began mobilizing its reserve ships. Why did not the Army do likewise?

When General MacArthur saw that the reserves were not going to be called he asked for Marine reinforcements. I have described to you how General Shepherd offered these Marines to him, and finally we got them.

That is the comment I have on that.

Senator WELKER. General, may I ask you this question: If you had been an enemy weighing the risks of intervention would you not have found the insurance that the United States was "caught short and un-

prepared and lacking the strength to meet a general attack" definitely enticing? Is it customary to make such information available? Was such a revelation, preoccupation with European defense, and such a detailed account of weakness, well calculated to discourage the Chinese Communist intervention?

General ALMOND. I certainly do think the enemy would be highly gratified, and I think it is a much worse offense to make such "disarming" statements to the enemy than the offense for which General MacArthur was relieved.

Senator WELKER. Once the Chinese Communists intervened General MacArthur issued the following special communique on November 28, 1950, which I would like at this time to have introduced into the record, a copy from the New York Times of November 29, 1950.

General ALMOND. The 28th, isn't it?

Mr. CARPENTER. It is November 28, but it is in the New York Times of the 29th.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 502" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 502

(Source: Military Situation in the Far East, hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., to conduct an inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of The Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area, pt. 5, August 17, 1951.)

[From New York Times, November 29, 1950]

SPECIAL COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY GENERAL MACARTHUR

NOVEMBER 28, 1950

Enemy reactions developed in the course of our assault operations of the past 4 days disclose that a major segment of the Chinese continental armed forces in army, corps and divisional organization of an aggregate strength of over 200,000 men is now arrayed against the United Nations forces in North Korea.

There exists the obvious intent and preparation for support of these forces by heavy reinforcements now concentrated within the privileged sanctuary north of the international boundary and constantly moving forward.

Consequently, we face an entirely new war. This has shattered the high hopes we entertained that the intervention of the Chinese was only of a token nature on a volunteer and individual basis as publicly announced, and that therefore the war in Korea could be brought to a rapid close by our movement to the international boundary and the prompt withdrawal thereafter of United Nations forces, leaving Korean problems for settlement by the Koreans themselves.

It now appears to have been the enemy's intent, in breaking off contact with our forces some 2 weeks ago, to secure the time necessary surreptitiously to build up for a later surprise assault upon our lines in overwhelming force, taking advantage of the freezing of all rivers and roadbeds which would have materially reduced the effectiveness of our air interdiction and permitted a greatly accelerated forward movement of enemy reinforcements and supplies. This plan has been disrupted by our own offensive action, which forced upon the enemy a premature engagement.

General MacArthur later issued this additional paragraph to the communique:

This situation, repugnant as it may be, poses issues beyond the authority of the United Nations Military Council—issues which must find their solution within the councils of the United Nations and chancelleries of the world.

General ALMOND. Basically, in this he said, "Consequently we face an entirely new war. This has shattered the high hopes we entertained, that the intervention of the Chinese was only a token force or volunteer force," and so on.

My comment on that is this statement was the plain truth, which should have sobered the approach to the problem stated in the statement made by the President on the 17th of November. It took only 10 days to prove that the U. N. attitude must be reexamined and some more effective steps than pleading with the enemy must be forthcoming.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, was a new directive to cover the new war received?

General ALMOND. Was the what, sir?

Mr. CARPENTER. Was a new directive issued at that time to cover this new war?

General ALMOND. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you familiar with the Joint Chiefs of Staff paper of January 12, 1951?

General ALMOND. No, sir; I never heard of it until I read the proceedings of the MacArthur inquiry.

Mr. CARPENTER. In the President's message to Congress on December 1, 1950, he stated that General MacArthur's report to the U. N. on November 5 had proof of Chinese participation. The President also referred to possible "dreadful consequences" to the Chinese Communists, and warned they "must bear the responsibility for those acts."

Were any new orders issued to implement this statement?

General ALMOND. Not that I am familiar with. I was pretty much concerned with my own command around the Chosin Reservoir on December 1. But in reading that statement since I have become aware of it I have this to say: First, the statement "I am today transmitting to Congress a request for additional funds." I say that is 5 months too late. I believe if the American people were fully aware of what we had done in Korea and were behind it, as General Bradley said, then was the time to say "This is going to be a costly effort. Americans, do you desire to support it or not? If you are behind it, support it and don't beat around the bush continually and 5 months later ask for funds to sustain it."

Up to this time, the time that the President asked for these funds, Korean support in arms, tanks, and other equipment, as I understand it, had been coming from MDAP stores, then coming off the assembly lines. They were intended for our allies—maybe very properly. We certainly needed them in Korea. Very properly we should have diverted them to Korea. That is where the war was. It was not in Iran or Turkey or some other place that these stores were intended for. Our men needed what we got, and more in many cases, much more.

In itself, a misuse of our strength to support our democratic allies elsewhere is this: This action furthered the President's scheme, as I said, to label Korea as a police action, up to this 5-month delay that I am talking about, and not to ask Congress for funds for use in Korea. This wild scheme thus exploded in the face of the Washington planners.

Many people have testified that even their budgetary planning for the next year—it is in all the papers, it is in all the testimony—in planning that budget they say "When we put in our estimate we will say it was not recognized that a war existed in Korea."

I think the President and everybody below him ought to measure up and shoulder up to the fact that we did have a war there and we didn't have "a fracas."

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to put in the President's Message to Congress, December 1, 1950, from House Document 726, 81st Congress, as well as the communique of December 8.

Senator WELKER. Without objection, it is so ordered as a part of the record.

(The documents were marked as "Exhibits Nos. 503 and 504" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 503

(Source: Military Situation in the Far East, hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session, to conduct an inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area, part 5, August 17, 1951.)

[From House Document No. 726, 81st Congress]

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, DECEMBER 1, 1950

To the Congress of the United States:

I am today transmitting to the Congress a request for additional funds to strengthen our defenses. The gravity of the world situation requires that these funds be made available with the utmost speed.

United States troops are now fighting as part of the United Nations command in Korea. They are fighting for freedom and against tyranny—for law and order and against brutal aggression. The attack of the North Korean Communists on their peaceful fellow countrymen in June was in defiance of the United Nations and was an attack upon the security of peaceful nations everywhere. Their action, if unchecked, would have blasted all hope of a just and lasting peace—for if open aggression had been unopposed in Korea, it would have been an invitation to aggression elsewhere.

In that crisis, the United Nations acted, and the United States strongly supported that action—for the people of this country knew that our own freedom was as much at stake as the freedom of the Korean people. We knew that the issue was nothing less than the survival of freedom everywhere. If freemen did not stand together against aggression, there could be no hope for peace. This was essentially a moral decision. We did not hesitate, even though we knew we would have to operate at the end of lengthy supply lines, and would initially be faced with overwhelming odds.

There were serious reverses at first, but the courage and skill of our men, and those of other free nations, working together under brilliant leadership, drove the aggressors back.

It soon became evident that North Koreans alone could not have prepared the kind of well-organized, well-armed attack which was launched against the Republic of Korea. As Ambassador Austin proved in the Security Council of the United Nations, the aggressors were armed with Soviet Russian weapons. From the early days of the attack, it became clear that the North Korean forces were being supplemented and armed from across the frontier. Men and equipment were coming out of those dark places which lie behind the Iron Curtain.

As the United Nations forces continued to defeat the aggressors and continued to advance in their mission of liberation, Chinese Communist participation in the aggression became more blatant. General MacArthur, as commander of the United Nations forces, reported to the United Nations Security Council on November 5 the proof of this participation.

Despite this outside Communist aid, United Nations troops were well on the way to success in their mission of restoring peace and independence in Korea when the Chinese Communists a few days ago sent their troops into action on a large scale on the side of the aggressor.

The present aggression is thus revealed as a long-calculated move to defy the United Nations and to destroy the Republic of Korea which was giving a demonstration to the peoples of Asia of the advantages of life in an independent, national, non Communist state.

The present attack on the United Nations forces by the Chinese Communists is a new act of aggression—equally as naked, deliberate, and unprovoked as the earlier aggression of the North Korean Communists. Cutting through the fog of Communist propaganda, this fact stands unmistakably clear: The Chinese Communists, without a shadow of justification, crossed the border of a neighboring country and attacked United Nations troops who were on a mission to restore peace under the direction of the organization representing mankind's best hope for freedom and justice.

The Chinese Communists have acted presumably with full knowledge of the dreadful consequences their action may bring on them. The Chinese people have been engaged in fighting within their own country for years, and in the process their lands and factories have been laid waste and their young men killed. Nothing but further misery can come to the Chinese people from the reckless course of aggression into which they have been led by the Communists.

The United Nations resolutions, the statements of responsible officials in every free country, the actions of the United Nations command in Korea, all have proved beyond any possible misunderstanding that the United Nations action in Korea presented no threat to legitimate Chinese interests. The United States especially has a long history of friendship for the Chinese people and support for Chinese independence. There is no conceivable justification for the attack of the Chinese Communists upon the United Nations forces.

The only explanation is that these Chinese have been misled or forced into their reckless attack—an act which can only bring tragedy to themselves—to further the imperialist designs of the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists have acted, and they must bear the responsibility for those acts.

EXHIBIT No. 504

(Source: Military Situation in the Far East, hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., to conduct an inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area, pt. 5, August 17, 1951.)

[From Department of State Bulletin, December 18, 1950]

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMUNIQUE OF DECEMBER 8, 1950, REGARDING HIS CONFERENCES WITH PRIME MINISTER ATTLEE

Since Prime Minister Attlee arrived in Washington on December 4, six meetings between the President and Mr. Attlee have been held. Among those who participated as advisers to the President were the Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder, the Secretary of Defense Gen. George C. Marshall, the Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman, the Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, W. Averell Harriman, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, W. Stuart Symington, and Ambassador-designate Walter S. Gifford. Mr. Attlee's advisers included the British Ambassador, Sir Oliver S. Franks, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, Sir Roger Makins, and R. H. Scott of the Foreign Office, and Sir Edwin Plowden, Chief of the Economic Planning Staff.

At the conclusion of their conferences, the President and the Prime Minister issued the following joint statement:

"We have reviewed together the outstanding problems facing our two countries in international affairs. The objectives of our two nations in foreign policy are the same: to maintain world peace and respect for the rights and interests of all peoples, to promote strength and confidence among the freedom-loving countries of the world, to eliminate the causes of fear, want, and discontent, and to advance the democratic way of life.

"We first reviewed the changed aspect of world affairs arising from the massive intervention of Chinese Communists in Korea. We have discussed the problems of the Far East and the situation as it now presents itself in Europe. We have surveyed the economic problems and the defense programs of our respective countries, and particularly the existing and threatened shortages of raw materials. We have considered the arrangements for the defense of the Atlantic community, and our future course in the United Nations.

"The unity of objectives of our two countries underlay all the discussions. There is no difference between us as to the nature of the threat which our countries face or the basic policies which must be pursued to overcome it. We recognize that many of the problems which we have discussed can only be decided through the procedures of the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

"The peoples of the United States and the United Kingdom will act together with resolution and unity to meet the challenge to peace which recent weeks have made clear to all.

"The situation in Korea is one of great gravity and far-reaching consequences. By the end of October, the forces of the United Nations had all but completed the mission set for them by the United Nations 'to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.' A free and unified Korea—the objective which the United Nations has long sought—was well on the way to being realized. At that point Chinese Communist forces entered Korea in large numbers, and on November 27 launched a large-scale attack on the United Nations troops. The United Nations forces have the advantage of superior airpower and naval support, but on the ground they are confronted by a heavy numerical superiority.

"The United Nations forces were sent into Korea on the authority and at the recommendation of the United Nations. The United Nations has not changed the mission which it has entrusted to them and the forces of our two countries will continue to discharge their responsibilities.

"We were in complete agreement that there can be no thought of appeasement or of rewarding aggression, whether in the Far East or elsewhere. Lasting peace and the future of the United Nations as an instrument for world peace depend upon strong support for resistance against aggression.

"For our part we are ready, as we have always been, to seek an end to the hostilities by means of negotiation. The same principles of international conduct should be applied to this situation as are applied, in accordance with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to any threat to world peace. Every effort must be made to achieve the purposes of the United Nations in Korea by peaceful means and to find a solution of the Korean problem on the basis of a free and independent Korea. We are confident that the great majority of the United Nations takes the same view. If the Chinese on their side display any evidence of a similar attitude, we are hopeful that the cause of peace can be upheld. If they do not, then it will be for the peoples of the world, acting through the United Nations, to decide how the principles of the Charter can best be maintained. For our part, we declare in advance our firm resolve to uphold them.

"We considered two questions regarding China which are already before the United Nations. On the question of the Chinese seat in the United Nations, the two Governments differ. The United Kingdom has recognized the Central People's Government and considers that its representatives should occupy China's seat in the United Nations. The United States has opposed and continues to oppose the seating of the Chinese Communist representatives in the United Nations. We have discussed our difference of view on this point and are determined to prevent it from interfering with our united effort in support of our common objectives.

"On the question of Formosa, we have noted that both Chinese claimants have insisted upon the validity of the Cairo Declaration and have expressed reluctance to have the matter considered by the United Nations. We agree that the issues should be settled by peaceful means and in such a way as to safeguard the interests of the people of Formosa and the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific, and that consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute to these ends."

* * * * * * *

The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation.

Senator WELKER. General, did you know, for example, that as early as October of 1950 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was writing about the defense of South Korea and telling the world that "Korea is not an area of first-class strategic value."

If, as an enemy commander, you had heard that address with the assurances it contains as to what we would regard as local wars, in which we would limit our efforts, would it not have affected your strategy?

General ALMOND. If I were the enemy?

Senator WELKER. Yes.

General ALMOND. Yes, sir, it certainly would have affected it.

Senator WELKER. As a matter of fact, it would make you quite happy, would it not?

General ALMOND. Very, sir.

Senator WELKER. You could not have lost, in other words?

General ALMOND. Is that the Reader's Digest?

Senator WELKER. Yes. At this time I introduce into the record, this Reader's Digest article of October 1950.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 505" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 505

[Source: The Reader's Digest, October 1950]

GENERAL OMAR N. BRADLEY,

UNITED STATES MILITARY POLICY: 1950

Our foreign policy and our military policy in 1950 call for the defense of Western Europe from the start, not for a liberation of our friends after they have been overrun and their homes occupied.

Korea is a deeply significant step of United States military policy. The American people have made a great decision in Asia, and should know, from the military viewpoint, how this decision was reached.

For months many had contended that we must somewhere draw the line against Communist aggression in Asia. However, it was recognized that American military capabilities should not be unduly weakened by involvement in areas of secondary importance and of negligible strategic value.

Korea is not an area of first-class strategic value. In an all-out world war it would be extremely difficult to hold. But in Korea we were bound by an international commitment made at Cairo in 1943 and by the action of the United Nations in supervising the setting up of the Republic of South Korea. The Communist aggression could not be condoned. Any action of the United States would be in accordance with the U. N. Charter. And if the defense of South Korea was risking all-out war, the choice was not ours, for the Communists had thrown down the gauntlet. President Truman's decision to defend South Korea was made upon the unanimous recommendation of his advisers, and with the full concurrence of Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and myself and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

When the President made his historic Korean announcement of June 27, he also mentioned the Philippines, Formosa, and Indochina.

The Philippines are strategically essential to us. Together with Japan, while we occupy it, and with Okinawa, they constitute our front defense line in the Pacific. Additionally, we are bound to the Philippines by a treaty of mutual assistance. We have air and naval bases in the Philippines. We are now strengthening our support there.

Formosa presents itself now in a new aspect. I have always felt that in a world war Formosa should not be in unfriendly hands. I have also thought, however, that Formosa was not of sufficient strategic value to justify our occupying it at the risk of provoking a war.

Today, because of the Communist temper revealed by the aggression in Korea, we think our fleet should patrol the waters between Formosa and Communist China, and it does. We feel that Formosa should be neutralized until its status is determined by a Japanese peace treaty or by the United Nations.

In Indochina the French are using a large proportion of their regular troops, plus considerable native forces, against the Communists. The French have not asked for American troops. We are sending them some military equipment.

There are numerous other areas of potential local wars in Asia. Among them are Siam, Burma, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. In fact, the whole vast semicircle of Asia from the China Sea to the Mediterranean Sea can be regarded as a range of volcanoes that can erupt into local wars at any moment if the Communists so choose. Two principles should guide us in our attitude toward all such locals wars:

1. We will recommend aid only to those peoples who are willing to fight Communist aggression.

2. We will refuse absolutely to allow local wars to divert us unduly from our central task. They must not be allowed to consume so much of our manpower and resources as to destroy our strength and imperil our victory in a world war.

No enemy is likely to overcome us unless he first possesses Western Europe, which is still the strategic pivot of the world. Let us thereupon discuss the defense of the United States, which is our primary aim, and then the defense of Western Europe, which forwards that aim.

General ALMOND. My comment on that is, where it says that Korea is not an area of first-class strategic value—of course, everybody is entitled to his own opinion—I say it just so happens that for the brand of Communist expansion with which we are confronted, Korea is a first-class strategic area of value in which to contest such expansion. Nowhere in the world could we have found a better area except for the individual hard fighting in which to oppose Chinese hordes of men. I am talking about the isolation of the area. Nowhere could we have found a better area in which to oppose these Chinese. Nowhere could we have found a battleground where the base facilities for supply, air and naval support are better present than Korea with the areas of Japan, the Philippines, and Formosa virtually secure from Chinese or Soviet attack, except air attack on Japan from Soviet Asia. There are many places closer than Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, but what I say is the areas in which this is so isolated, where they could not get to us except on the Korean Peninsula.

This statement shows that the Washington concept excluded what might happen in Asia.

There is another comment that I have. Today, because the Communist temper is revealed by the aggression in Korea, we think our fleet should patrol the waters between Formosa and Communist China. I say General MacArthur's statement, New York Times, February 1, 1953, on the result of the utilization of Korea, is important. Events now past have proven that General MacArthur was right and General Bradley was wrong. I need add nothing to this series of facts. Their noise is deafening to those who listen. The opportunity to deal a death blow to expanding communism presented itself in Korea. But I don't believe General Bradley ever could see it.

He could never see that victory in our grasp in Korea would be the one beacon to anticommunism throughout the world. We are exactly where we started in 1950, on the 38th parallel.

Senator WELKER. I am not a military man, General, but I would like to ask you this: As a matter of fact, had you been permitted to win the war in Korea, in that event you would have saved Indochina also; is that a correct assumption?

General ALMOND. I think so, sir; decidedly. I think the failure to win has given the Chinese Communists great incentive to proceed farther than they ever hoped to proceed at this time.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to introduce an excerpt from a speech delivered before the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, Chicago, Ill., on April 17, 1951,

by Omar N. Bradley, General of the Army, entitled "Korea, the Key to Success or Failure."

Senator WELKER. It will be so admitted.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 506" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 506

[Source: Vital Speeches of the Day]

OUR WORLDWIDE STRATEGY—KOREA, THE KEY TO SUCCESS OR FAILURE

By Omar N. Bradley, General of the Army

(Delivered before the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, Chicago, Ill., April 17, 1951)

It is hard to realize that our relatively small-scale military operations in Korea hold the key to the success or failure of our worldwide strategy.

In the hands of our United Nations' soldiers, sailors, and airmen, fighting the unwarranted attacks of twice as many North Korean and Chinese Communist aggressors, rests the possibility for peace. Success in Korea may prevent a new incident, and may prevent World War III. Failure in Korea will only invite another aggression.

When our forces were in the throes of withdrawal last December, many people who saw no point to further struggle, were recommending that we give up the fight. Nothing could have been more disastrous for the South Koreans, the United States, the United Nations, and the ultimate chances for peace in this world.

As much as I hate war, if we had abandoned Korea under any less circumstances than being driven out, we would have dealt a tragic blow to the hopes of freemen everywhere for peace.

Adding up the military pros and cons of the situation, there is no early end in sight to the Korean war under present conditions. As far as we can see now there is nothing transitory, nothing temporary about the Communists' determination to drive us out of Korea, and, if possible, to destroy our forces completely. We may strive for peace, and a cessation of hostilities, but while so doing we must continue to fight.

POLICY OBJECTIVES

Foreign policy is the expression of a nation's instinct for survival. Military policy comprises the practices of a people in the organization of their military resources for defense.

There is little immediate danger of this country being overrun; but our way of life, our freedom, and our Nation have the best chances for survival by keeping peace in the world.

This is the overriding consideration of our national foreign and military policies. Any recommended course of action which would enlarge the present war is contrary to our best intrests, and by jeopardizing world peace, ultimately would threaten our security.

In Korea our foreign policy and our military policy are united in three basic objectives:

First, to protect and maintain our form of government and our way of life against any challenge. On this point we recognize no limitation of expenditures or of exertion.

Second, to seek peace by every means at our command. We will not provoke a war against anyone. And we will not wage a so-called preventive war even against an archenemy, for this certainly destroys peace. But there is one price we will not pay—appeasement.

Third, to assure peace, not only for ourselves, but for all others. For this reason we support the United Nations, realizing that world peace is an integral part of American security.

I would like to emphasize that our military action in Korea is closely related to our North Atlantic Treaty efforts in Europe.

The same guiding principles govern our actions there. We joined in the North Atlantic Treaty as a collective defense effort for mutual security. In collective action, we multiply our defensive strength. Bound together in a pact, the individual nations gain strength from their close ties, and individually, are more secure.

Not only are we trying to contain communism, but we hope to deter all forms of aggression in order to bring peace to the world.

Through our efforts in connection with the North Atlantic Treaty, and our even more positive action in Korea, we have drawn the line—giving unmistakable evidence that appeasement of communism is not part of American policy.

In Korea, communism went, without warning, one step further than it had ever gone before, and for the first time resorted to open and organized armed aggression to gain its oppressive end, shedding even its pretense of peaceful intention.

THREE PEACE FACTORS

The United Nations had to take some quick, positive action. The decision to support the Republic of Korea, first with air and sea power, and then with ground forces, was heralded in this country as a sound decision, and given wholehearted support. Like every other international political decision from time immemorial, there had to be some authority behind it to make it stick, and the task of establishing that authority was assigned to the Armed Forces.

As we proceed wih the assigned military task in Korea, your military advisers and planners are keeping these three important factors in mind:

Because we are intent upon preventing world war III, we are not making moves that might lead to an enlargement of the present conflict, whenever it is militarily practicable; furthermore, because we seek peace and an end of this war in Korea, our Government is cautious in every decision that might prolong this conflict. I might add that it has been difficult for the men in the field to refrain from attacking the airbases in Manchuria. However, Communist air intervention has not been a factor in the ground action to date. Neither has it been any serious threat to our Air Force.

And, third, every decision we have recommended has supported United Nations unity in the conduct of war. With these principles in mind, we of the United Nations are now doing an outstanding military job.

Conjecture in military affairs is always risky and often unwarranted, but I would like to give my personal opinion as to some of the accomplishments of the Korean decision that may have escaped public attention. I doubt that even those who supported this move at the time realized how much more was being gained toward world peace.

I believe that our positive action in support of the United Nations resolution was unexpected by the Kremlin-dominated Communists. I think we scored an advantage, and disarranged their plans for Asia.

I think our positive action in support of the United Nations slowed down the plans for world domination, not only in Asia, but in other areas in the world.

The Communist action in Korea indicated to me that the people in the Kremlin are willing to risk world war III. I believe the United Nations action in Korea gave them pause for thought.

I would also estimate that our action in Korea may have prevented, at least temporarily, Chinese Communist aggression toward Indochina. It may have saved Thailand. It may have preserved Formosa. At least it gained time in all of these areas.

There was no doubt in the minds of free men that we had to draw a line somewhere. Appeasement would have forfeited our chance to stop communism, and encourage them to continue picking off helpless nations one by one. Eventually the international situation would have become intolerable as the Red-dominated areas covered more and more space on the map.

Today, we are carrying out the military operations to enforce this political decision.

As we carry out these actions, even though it would possibly result for a time in a military stalemate, we have already achieved an international victory.

As long as we are able to confine the battles to Korea and continue to destroy the Communist aggressors, we are making progress toward our international objective of preventing world war III. As long as we are keeping Communist forces occupied and off balance and keeping the war confined to Korea, we are minimizing their chances for world domination.

We are going to be faced with some difficult decisions in Korea in the next few months.

To solve them, we must realize that Korea is not a brief, acute attack of a new disease; it is a symptom of a chronic ailment which must be cured.

In outlining my thoughts on this matter, I have no intention of entering the foreign policy field or even urging a particular policy in the conduct of foreign affairs. Conduct of foreign affairs is a civilian responsibility. But a soldier

can often see strategic perils that the layman might overlook. However, it is fundamental that our foreign policy must be based upon our military capabilities to back it up.

We cannot take the chance of trying to anticipate immediate Communist intentions. We can only determine their capabilities, and prepare to meet them. Otherwise we would be in a guessing game without a referee. We would be playing Russian roulette with a gun at our heads.

IMPATIENCE NO SOLUTION

Fundamentally we Americans are apt to become impatient with a situation that has no foreseeable conclusion. We all would like to know when the war in Korea will be over.

I wish that I might tell you; my job would be less difficult If I knew.

If we examine the Communist capabilities in Korea, we find indications that the Chinese Communists are building up for another drive. We must prepare to meet it. There is no assurance that even when this attack is dispelled that the war will be over.

In the case of Korea, those who despair of an early solution are apt to become frustrated and discouraged. There have been recurring and louder whispers in favor of forcing a showdown and delivering an ultimatum to those who encourage such "local wars" and who continue to obstruct sincere efforts for peaceful negotiation.

Any such direct, unilateral solution to the problem would be militarily infeasible.

I wonder if these responsible citizens have pondered the conditions of such an act. Any ultimatum must state clearly the irreducible minimum of what we would regard as satisfactory and it ordinarily, if not always, implies a threat to use force if the demands are not met. These dissatisfied and impatient strategists—and they are not representing the views of responsible Air Force officials—suggest the threat of bombardment as part of the ultimatum.

Our policy is to avoid war, and to promote peace.

Our best chance for the survival of our way of life, and our freedom is to continue cooperation in mutual security efforts, and to continue negotiation in this worldwide conflict as long as possible. An ultimatum would either commit us to a so-called preventive war, or gain for us only a temporary respite from war until the enemy feels that conditions for his victory were more favorable.

Enlarging the battle to a full-scale war is never an economical or morally acceptable solution to a limited conflict. If at all possible, Korea should be settled on the present battleground.

ROLE OF DIPLOMACY

The confinement or extension of the area of combat is in the realm of diplomacy and international politics.

However, the military consideration is an intrinsic part of this problem. Our armed force will continue to carry out the tasks assigned to them until conditions permit a political decision to be reached.

I have mentioned the complexity of the United Nations problems only to encourage us in a steadfast course of patience and preparedness.

The United Nations forces in Korea have done a magnificent job and have exhibited a cooperative spirit that is more effective than anyone could have previously imagined.

The Air Force and the Navy have performed wonders in supporting the ground forces in Korea. They have exercised ingenuity and imagination in carrying out missions that could not have been anticipated. The Marines have performed heroically side by side with our soldiers.

I am especially proud of the United States Army.

The soldiers entered the war in platoon strength, building up to a force of six divisions which have fought through fierce summer heat and bitter winter, usually against great odds, and with platoons and companies, battalions, and regiments which were for a long time under strength.

The American people can be very proud of their Armed Forces and of the spirit which these men have shown.

If we here at home can only measure up to their standards of sacrifice and devotion—to their achievements in patience and courage—there is every reason to believe that the war in Korea can ultimately be concluded on honorable terms, contributing to a hoped-for permanent peace in our times.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, will you comment on this statement? I believe you have it.

General ALMOND. General Bradley, after having said previously that Korea was not a first-class strategic area, said on the 17th of April, 6 days after he recommended General MacArthur's relief to President Truman:

> It is hard to realize that our relatively small-scale operations in Korea hold the key to the success or failure of our worldwide strategy.

If that doesn't constitute strategic importance, I don't know what does. He had learned the error of his thoughts in October, and from the great strategist, General MacArthur, whom he had agreed should be relieved of his command.

Another comment goes on:

> Furthermore, because we seek peace and an end of this war in Korea, our Government is cautious in every decision * * *
>
> And, third, every decision we have recommended has supported United Nations unit in the conduct of war. With these principles in mind, we of the United Nations are now doing an outstanding military job.

He said these three factors that I cited in talking about worldwide strategy show how far the JCS could go, under General Bradley's guidance, to avoid conclusive victory in the Korean war by force of arms. He said we were not making use of the Air Force to attack Manchuria. He failed to mention the bridges which, if destroyed, would leave a million Chinese Communist forces stranded in Korea. He said the U. N. is now doing an outstanding military job when, as a matter of fact, on the 17th of April, we were clinging to our lines like drowning men to a sinking raft, awaiting a huge Chinese attack that came on the 22d of April, 5 days after he made this statement, and it came again on the 16th of May, as I have described on my map, 1 month later only 8 days after General Marshall had testified that "the CCF could not attack in strength for months to come."

Either General Bradley did not know the situation, or he was careless in his interpretation of the real facts in order to suit the trepidations and fears of our American people, who should have been given the true picture.

One more comment. The role of diplomacy. When you are in battle and war, I say these are just words for public consumption and all of these actions at the present cost of more than $20 billions to the Treasury, and 142,000 American casualties, and we are now just where we were then, on the 38th parallel.

Senator WELKER. You might add the enemy is stronger now than he was at that time. You have taught him to fight. Is that a correct assumption?

General ALMOND. In my opinion; yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Could we have won the war in Korea in November and December of 1950 had reinforcements been sent and had authorizations for bombing across the Yalu been granted?

General ALMOND. Well, in my opinion; yes. I don't know whether the reinforcements were available in the degree that we would have needed them. I believe, as many of the people that I discussed it with, as the situation developed, as more force was brought in by the Chinese, we might have had to expend more force, but we had the opportunity by the use of all our facilities—air, navy, and ground, with a little more ground effort and the intensification of air and navy, especially

planes—to destroy the bases which were sustaining this great force, and that, in my opinion, constituted the potentiality to win, but the thing that frustrated that was the fear of something that we in the Far East did not think was likely to happen, has not happened yet, and I do not think it is going to happen until the Soviet decides in his own mind that he is ready to accomplish something by force, which he is now accomplishing by threat.

Senator WELKER. I shall never forget the testimony given by that great military leader, Gen. Mark Clark, before this same committee a few months ago when he testified that he saw with his own eyes the buildup of thousands of MIG airplanes across the Yalu River and at the same time antiaircraft from the enemy shooting down our boys flying, but we were not permitted to do anything. That, to me, as a nonmilitary man, seems certainly the answer to the question I propounded to you, which comes to a later date, not 1950. Certainly we had the military force at that time to have destroyed those thousands of MIG planes sitting there in wide open daylight ready as sitting ducks. I think he called them. Could we have won the war in 1951 with, for example, the casualties we subsequently had during the protracted armistice negotiations?

General ALMOND. I think so. I have shown on one of these maps that we lost 14,000 ROK's and Americans, Frenchmen, and Dutchmen, in defending for 6 days. We had the opportunity with a reasonable estimate of casualties to return to the offensive, certainly with a few more troops than we had, if the go sign had been given. They could have been secured. Our failure to do that at, I would say, a cost of 25,000 or 30,000 casualties at the most, has now cost us 52,000 since that stabilization took place. We had lost 52,000 casualties from the time I left Korea on the 15th of July, after this battle, until the time the armistice was negotiated.

Senator WELKER. I think you have already testified to this, but do you believe an all-out effort to win in Korea would have led to World War III as propagandized all over the country?

General ALMOND. I have no such idea, sir.

Senator WELKER. Do you believe with me, a nonmilitary man, that if Russia wanted to move in Western Europe she could move in 2 weeks and take it?

General ALMOND. I don't know the facts on that, Senator. I could not answer that, sir. She could move, but whether she could take it or not, I haven't the slightest idea. I don't believe she could, though.

Mr. CARPENTER. At this time, I would like to introduce into the record, an excerpt from a statement of Gen. Claire Chennault, which was sent to Senator Russell on June 20, 1951.

Senator WELKER. It will be so entered as part of the record at this time.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 507" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 507

(Source: Military Situation in the Far East, hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., to conduct an inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area, pt. 5, August 17, 1951, p. 3348.)

STATEMENT OF C. L. CHENNAULT, MAJOR GENERAL (RETIRED) UNITED STATES ARMY, SENT TO SENATOR RUSSELL ON JUNE 20, 1951

* * * * * * *

As a matter of fact, available evidence reveals that Stalin is opposed to open warfare as a means for spreading communism. He has indicated on numerous occasions that he prefers infiltration and overthrow from within. Stalin is opposed to war because he has learned from experience that it is destructive and that the outcome of war is not always certain. He was forced into World War II by Hitler's treacherous attack, and he kept out of the war with Japan until he was certain that Japan could not win. He refused to use Russian soldiers in Greece though there is no doubt that he wanted a Communist satellite on the Mediterranean Sea. All of the evidence indicates that Stalin will refrain from open war unless Russian territory is invaded or until the time arrives when he is convinced that his retention of power depends upon war.

Then what are his intentions with regard to the conflict between the United Nations and the combined Chinese-Korean Communist forces? Why are there repeated reports of an increase in Russian troops, airplanes and submarines in eastern Siberia? It is these reports that have frightened us into maintaining the present limitations upon our military action against the Chinese Communists and which caused the summary removal of General MacArthur. It is curious that such precise reports of Russian troop movements and dispositions "leak out" from Siberia but the vast buildup of Chinese troops and supplies on the Korean border last October was concealed from the American Army in Korea, from Tokyo and from Washington. Can it be possible that the Siberian intelligence leaks are intentional? Has Washington suddenly opened a pipeline under the Siberian Iron Curtain or is it only a blow hole which spouts nothing but that which the Russians pump into it?

Mr. CARPENTER. General, would you comment on this statement?

General ALMOND. My comment on that is most military evaluations and certainly most of our own responsible commanders think, and I concur, that the Soviet will never start a war until he is ready and at a place of his own choosing; that he has no intention of open warfare involving Soviet forces, ground, air, or naval, so long as he continues to win diplomatic victory by conference and armed conflict by satellites.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I have a copy of a telegram sent to certain embassies in regard to hot pursuit, dated November 13, 1950, and I will ask that it be introduced and made a part of the record.

Senator WELKER. It will be so introduced and made a part of the record.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 508" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 508

(Source: Military Situation in the Far East, hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session, to conduct an inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area, pt. 3, June 1–13, 1951, p. 1928.)

TELEGRAM SENT TO CERTAIN EMBASSIES IN REGARD TO HOT PURSUIT, NOVEMBER 13, 1950

Please discuss with Foreign Minister at earliest possible moment grave problem confronting U. N. forces in Korea in use by enemy of Manchuria as privileged sanctuary for forces which are in fact attacking U. N. forces in Korea itself. See excerpt from Austin's statement to U. N. Security Council on November 10.

This problem arises in two respects. First, ground forces can move into Korea and supply themselves from bases and lines of communication which are largely sheltered by immunity of Manchuria. Secondly, enemy aircraft (nationality not always known) operate from Manchurian fields, dash into Korea air space to

strike U. N. air and ground forces and then fly to safety behind Manchurian border a very few minutes away.

U. N. commander has strictest orders about violations Manchurian territory in addition to orders to use extreme care in operations near the frontier itself to insure that hostilities are restricted to Korea. This determination to play according to the rules imposes most serious handicap in face of an enemy which is willing not only to break the rules themselves but to exploit proper conduct U. N. forces.

United States Government is determined to do everything possible to localize conflict in Korea. This is illustrated by rigorous instructions to commanders as well as by efforts made to adjust accidental intrusions into Chinese territory by offering compensations for damages, et cetera. It is obvious, however, that the abuse of Manchuria by the enemy could easily impose an intolerable burden upon U. N. forces operating lawfully and properly on U. N. missions in Korea.

Therefore United States Government wishes to inform government to which you are accredited that it may become necessary at an early date to permit U. N. aircraft to defend themselves in the air space over the Yalu River to the extent of permitting hot pursuit of attacking enemy aircraft up to 2 or 3 minutes' flying time into Manchuria airspace.

It is contemplated that U. N. aircraft would limit themselves to repelling enemy aircraft engaged in offensive missions into Korea.

We believe this would be a minimum reaction to extreme provocation, would not itself affect adversely the attitude of the enemy toward Korean operations, would serve as a warning, and would add greatly to the morale of U. N. pilots who are now prevented from taking minimum defense measures and for whom in case of bomber pilots it is impossible under existing conditions to provide adequate air cover.

For your information we are not asking the concurrence of Government because we believe the highly limited application of hot-pursuit doctrine in this situation would turn upon military necessity and elementary principles of self-defense, but we think it important that Government be notified of the problem. Please telegraph any reactions NIACT.

ACHESON.

(NOTE.—Hot pursuit approved by Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense, State, President. Telegram taken up with six nations only. "Hot pursuit" not granted.)

Mr. CARPENTER. General Almond, can you comment on this telegram?

General ALMOND. Because certain interests prevailed upon certain entities to disagree with our idea of hot pursuit, which I think our own country was favorable to, I say we confirmed the absurdity of the reaction to this statement of our intention, best described in the eyes of a commander:

The absurdity is magnified by our United States acceptance of the policy "hot pursuit denied."

I don't agree with it at all.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, if the enemy received information to the effect that this proposal approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense, State, and the President, was protested by the six countries to which it was addressed and that the proposal was thereupon discarded, would it not have constituted pretty definite assurance that the United States would not take stronger measures?

General ALMOND. Would not take stronger measures?

Mr. CARPENTER. That is right.

General ALMOND. I think so.

Mr. CARPENTER. Since this matter of "hot pursuit" was rejected after General MacArthur had notified the U. N. that the Chinese Communists had intervened as identifiable military units, it was a strong indication, was it not, that normal military measures to counter such intervention would be disallowed?

General ALMOND. I think so.

Senator WELKER. General, would you care to fight another war under the same inhibitions, with the same back seat drivers, and with the same channels of information open to the enemy as you had to fight in Korea?

General ALMOND. I will always contribute as much as I am capable of as a soldier of this Nation. I would deplore being sent on a mission which was foredoomed or developed into foredooming where my mission originated to gain a decision and I was in any way hampered. We have a philosophy in the Army, and all military services, that sums up what I mean: It is bad enough to have to fight the enemy; it is terrible to have to fight both the enemy and those that you are supposed to have support from.

Senator WELKER. General, do you believe that the United States should recognize Communist China?

General ALMOND. Decidedly not, sir.

Senator WELKER. Do you care to comment on the U. N. and on Soviet membership in the U. N. while aiding Communist China, which was declared by the U. N. to be an aggressor?

General ALMOND. I have great hopes for the U. N.

Senator WELKER. So do all of us, but what kind of a U. N.? Will you tell us what you mean?

General ALMOND. I have not seen the materialization of any of those hopes. I think the U. N. provides a listening post in the midst of our country, which has been utilized to the fullest. I would like to see the U. N. hold sessions for the next 2 or 5 years—this is a private opinion, and as an American voter now, and retired also, I think I can express it—I would like to see the U. N. take up its headquarters in Moscow and give our men an oportunity to put their ears to the Russian ground as the Russians have put their ears to ours.

Senator WELKER. In other words, you agree with General Mark Clark that the U. N. is now and has been a nest and a haven for spies, saboteurs, and people who can come over here and get vital information that might seriously affect the future of our Republic?

General ALMOND. I have no doubt of it, sir.

Senator WELKER. This is a question I wanted to propound to you: In the last session of the Congress, the late and great Senator Pat McCarran, of Nevada, and Senator Jenner, the chairman of this committee, introduced a resolution asking that we sever diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. I will ask you, General, if you care to give us your opinion as to whether or not we should go along and have relations with them, or should we sever our relations?

General ALMOND. My opinion isn't worth very much, Senator.

Senator WELKER. Yes, it is. It may not be worth a lot to a lot of people, but it is worth a lot to the American people who are listening and who will read your profound testimony, sir.

General ALMOND. I think we have done and said so many things to counter the Russians to which they pay no attention. I think they have shot down so many planes that we should have resented it as a national insult. I think they have subjected us to many indignities that no nation should accord another, and I think although there are sufficient grounds to separate our diplomatic relations or to rupture them, as a guide if they wanted to do business with us they should be reasonable, according to our standards of conduct, and honesty, and sense of cooperation in all these matters. I think they disregard with

impunity the statements we make. I don't believe they care, thinking that it will amount to nothing, whether we accept even their excuses if they choose to give them or not.

I think it might be a good idea to jolt their complacency and see what happens then. I don't think it could get any worse.

Senator WELKER. General, I am thinking now of the Russian people, the slave laborers, the people who are denied their freedom, not only in Russia, but those in the satellite states under the control of Russia. Would it not have a tremendous effect upon those people to know that we were stopping the coddling and the kissing of Russia and that we were cutting off our relations with them, to give them an inspiration, a desire, to seek freedom and help, and in the end that they could help us?

General ALMOND. I think so, sir. How deep down into the mass of those people the information would go, I do not know. I do not know how they allow their people to even become informed, but if they happened to be informed, I think it would certainly be a salutary influence.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, in the light of subsequent developments, have you ever wondered why the political decisions that hamstrung the prosecution of the Korean war so consistently served the enemy?

General ALMOND. Yes, I have often wondered why we do the things we do.

Mr. CARPENTER. At this time I would like to introduce into the record excerpts from a statement made by General MacArthur as printed in the U. S. News & World Report of March 28, 1952, and ask that it be made a part of the record.

Senator WELKER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 509" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 509

[Source: U. S. News & World Report, March 28, 1952]

(Excerpts from General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's address, joint session of the Mississippi Legislature at Jackson, Miss., on March 22.)

MACARTHUR ATTACKS WORLD POLICY OF UNITED STATES

THREAT TO ALL ASIA—YALU AS DEFENSE KEY—"BETRAYAL" OF CHINA

Possibly in Asia, where the record is more fully developed and events themselves have more plainly written the judgment, has the irresponsibility of our national policy been most pronounced. There our betrayal of China will ever stand as a black mark upon our escutcheon. But the tragedy of Korea comes closer to the hearts of the American people. For there thousands of our beloved dead give mute evidence to the tragic failure of American leadership.

There, in the aftermath of victory in World War II, we first undertook the protection of the Korean people and the welding of their segments into a consolidated and free nation. Later, we repudiated that purpose and practically invited the aggression which ensued by withdrawing our forces, enunciating the policy that the defense and consolidation of Korea was no longer within our sphere of political and military interest, and simultaneously withholding the arms needed adequately to prepare the South Korean defense force. Yet, still later after its southern half had been brought under attack from the north, we reassumed its defense and consolidation.

We defeated the Northern Korean armies. But in the wake of the commitment of Communist China against us, we again repudiated our purpose to weld all of Korea into a free nation and denied our own beleaguered forces the orthodox military means which offered promise of early victory. We had them fight to a stalemated position on the peninsula and left them there to die in a deadlocked struggle of position and attrition, while we entered into so-called cease-fire negotiations universally interpreted as our suing for peace.

These negotiations have been under way for 8 months, the only noticeable result being that the enemy has gained time to bring up artillery, air and mechanical transport and to perfect his antiaircraft defenses and communications, all to gain strength where once his weakness was most pronounced. And the high and noble purpose which introduced us into the Korean conflict is now no nearer fruition than when our Nation was first committed to the task. At that time, it was our stated intent to punish the aggressor, but through our strange and unprecedented war policies, we have inflicted the punishment, not upon the aggressor, but upon our own forces and upon the Korean nation.

We have permitted the enemy with impunity to prepare his blows against us from behind arbitrary and unreasonable sanctuary. We have protected him by holding inviolate his own soil, his warmaking facilities, and his own nearby bases of attack.

We have protected him by preventing, with our own naval forces, any hostile movement against his flank by our faithful ally garrisoned on Formosa. And this despite the fact that such a movement would have relieved the pressure upon our own Army fighting in Korea and thereby saved countless American lives.

And, while we afforded him this measure of protection and the time and battle training to permit him to build and perfect his military strength to challenge our mastery of the air, we enforced upon the Korean people the dreadful tragedy involved in the exclusive use of their soil as the sole battleground. As a consequence, death has come to hundreds of thousands of defenseless Korean civilians and a nation brought under our sacred protection has been devastated and gutted.

As long as history is written, the shame of this will be recorded, but its more immediate consequences will be found in the loss of the faith of Asia in our Nation's pledged word and the consequent undermining of the foundations to the future peace of the world. For our failure to sustain our solemn commitments in Korea will probably mean the ultimate loss of all of continental Asia to international communism. It might well mean foreclosure upon the chances the Chinese may have had to throw off the chains of Red tyranny and oppression.

It perhaps will even mean the ultimate fulfillment of the Russian dream of centuries to secure warm-water outlets to the south as a means of gaining a military posture of global omnipotence, with the hope of ultimate domination over the seaborne commerce of the world. Beyond Asia, Africa would then be exposed to Communist hordes dominating the Indian Ocean area, and Europe would come under a real threat of invasion.

I repeat here what I said many months ago—the first line of freedom's defense is not the Elbe, not the Rhine, but it is in Korea on the Yalu. Prejudiced and willful voices scoffed at this warning, but there is where the Communists elected to challenge our spiritual and military strength and there is where we have failed adequately to meet that challenge, even though we had the military resource and means at our command.

Our failure has been of the spirit, not of the arms—a bankruptcy of leadership in our American tradition. Yet this failure has furnished the Soviet the passkey to world conquest. Small wonder that such weakness and vacillation should cause us loss of faith and respect abroad. Not since the early days of the Republic has our Nation been so reduced in the universal esteem. Never have we as a people been held in such doubt by others.

Mr. CARPENTER. Could you comment on this statement made by General MacArthur?

General ALMOND. Yes; I will comment, and I will contribute a two-line poem I wrote about it. I say this is a masterful statement of our failure to obtain by victory on the battlefield what has been unobtainable by any other means and my poetic contribution is:

"Of all the freedoms which we hold dear
The one we should cherish is the freedom from fear."

Fear of what might happen if we lead from strength is robbing the free world of its success in opposing ever-expanding communism.

Senator WELKER. General, I have one concluding question.

One of my friends of the press informed me a moment ago that a number of our American boys have been sentenced to from 4 years to

life imprisonment behind the Iron Curtain of the Communists in Red China. I take it that statement would merely add to your testimony about the shooting down of the planes. Yet, certain of our diplomatic officers, more skilled no doubt than the now acting chairman, continually ask for peaceful coexistence with people of that type. Do you think that will work?

General ALMOND. I don't know anything about coexistence except in my own family life.

Senator WELKER. You know we have not had very much luck in peaceful coexistence since this thing started, do you not?

General ALMOND. Maybe I am mistaken, and very probably I am, but I do not have any faith in the kind of coexistence you speak of. I know what Mr. Churchill says about it, and I know what other people say about it, but coexistence with the Soviet philosophy is just hard for me to digest. I cannot well conceive of it.

Senator WELKER. Do you have any further questions?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes. General Almond, much criticism has been directed toward the separation of the X Corps from the Eighth Army in late November 1950. Could you describe the strategy and the reasons for that separation?

General ALMOND. Yes; I will be glad to do so.

Mr. CARPENTER. What would be your reply to this criticism?

General ALMOND. My reply to the criticism of separation of the X Corps from the Eighth Army is that the people who criticize it do not appreciate the very basis of such separation.

At the time this separation was made—we have to remember that for the preceding 3 months, because the capture of Seoul was exactly 3 months after the North Korean invasion, the 25th of September—the railroads had been completely interrupted from Pusan, by our own Air Force, the base from which the Eighth Army had to get all of its supplies. General Walker was confronted with a serious guerrilla problem back in this area. He left his IX Corps under General Coulter back there to clear that up. He moved his I Corps and other troops up into this Seoul area.

Mr. CARPENTER. Will you please explain that?

General ALMOND. This area [indicating] is the area of Seoul (see p. 2122, exhibit 498–L). With General Walker's operation coming up from the south and the Inchon landing coming in from the west, there was a merging of these two forces. The problem was to clear up North Korea, and North Korea goes from the 38th parallel close to Vladivostok here and to the Yalu River over on the other side. General Walker's main problem was to attack and crush the remaining North Korean force, which was greatly decimated, but there were pockets of appreciable resistance.

The first thing that was thought necessary was to capture Pyongyang, the capital of the North Koreans, but the question of supply was a very vital one. General Walker had come all the way from Pusan to Seoul, some 300 miles. He had come by "combat parties" and "attack groups" and by marching the main forces of his army, and truck transportation alone supplied his men. One of the great assets of the Inchon-Seoul area was to gain another port at Inchon through which our supplies could come. The capacity of a port determines what you can do with it. As for the capacity, during the Inchon landing, of the port of Inchon, we tried to put our Liberty ships in to un-

load them. There is a tremendous tide there, which was one of the problems in our landing there. Only 4 hours a day can you unload a ship. If you don't get that ship in in 2 hours and get it out in 2 more, you will find it lying on its side when the tide goes down. Thirty-one feet is the range of the tide. So, the greatest capacity that we could expect from Inchon was 6,000 tons a day using LST and lighter service to do it.

Six thousand tons was not a beginning for General Walker's force and for the X Corps. The X Corps alone had 80,000 troops. General Walker had something close to 200,000 besides the ROK troops. The ROK's had to be fed like anybody else, although they ate a different ration. So the question was: Can you get the supplies to this great force?

Therefore, one of the motivating factors in General MacArthur's mind was to take the X Corps, an amphibiously proven force, and not some other corps, because the others had not had that experience of landing and getting in and out of boats, and so on, to take that corps, reload it again, and bring it around here to Wonsan (see p. 2115, exhibit 498–E), and put it in opposite to what was the main objective of General Walker, Pyongyang, move it across here, and assist him from the east by a movement westward from Wonsan.

Mr. CARPENTER. Would you identify that on the map?

General ALMOND. Wonsan is where the X Corps landed. Pyongyang was the objective of General Walker. The X Corps was to come in here at Wonsan and join with General Walker when it was my understanding, as the commander of this force, that all the troops would merge and come under the command of General Walker.

In the meantime, as this movement progressed, and in fact before it culminated, about the 12th or 14th, the ROK's I Corps, which was coming up the coast by marching, did make this much and were in control of Wonsan. About that time, General Walker pushed his forces north from Seoul and took control of Pyongyang. That made the original concept of this movement useless, so General MacArthur then, on the 27th of October, I believe, issued a new order in which he reoriented the mission of the Eighth Army to drive on to the Yalu and the mission of the X Corps, not to come across the Taebek Mountain Range here and further complicate the supply situation, but to turn and go up in this direction and clear up this area, as I have shown you on another map (see p. 2123, exhibit 498–M).

Mr. CARPENTER. Will you identify that?

General ALMOND. That area extends from the 39th parallel, I believe it was, north, east of the Taebek Mountain Range, and all the way up to Chongjin, which is 60 miles from Vladivostok. So that was the mission of these two forces. Here was the mountain range between us, just like the Appalachian chain, except worse, with no roads between them, so that was the condition in which we found our troops of the Eighth Army and the X Corps when this surreptitious move of the Chinese crossing into North Korea occurred.

It is very well to say what you ought to have done beforehand. It is a different matter to readjust yourself when a new element is introduced in a military situation, especially one, as General MacArthur has testified, which was a new element in the war, an element that required a new study, a new approach.

It has been discussed many times and one of the Senators on the investigating committee, when General MacArthur, General Marshall, General Bradley, and General Collins testified tried to make the point of the fallibility of General MacArthur's concept by the losses he had suffered because he did not join these forces soon enough. He said that "it is 300 miles from here to here [indicating] across North Korea and it is only 160 miles here across Korea near the 38th parallel."

We were not there. We were here. We were trying to go clear up north of the 38th parallel when a new element was introduced. Therefore, he claimed that because there were losses here in North Korea, and there were some losses here, of course, those losses should be charged to General MacArthur's lack of judgment. Therefore, if he had lack of judgment in this case, then in his recommendations to the JCS later, in such latter case his judgment should be questioned, in any other case, namely, a blockade and bombing of these supply bases along the Yalu River and these enemy air bases.

I contest that very definitely. I have told you why these forces were separated like this, and I tell you now that the fact that General MacArthur thought this corps would be a threat in this direction from the flood of the CCF invasion, even after these forces developed, that thought was a sound one, for this reason: When we first met the Chinese at the Chosin Reservoir, we met one division on about the 26th of October, in the beginning the elements of one regiment. As days went on, for the next 10 or 15 days, those divisions grew into 2.

As soon as the Chinese found a force on their flank, they not only sent 2 divisions, but it ended up by their sending 8 more, so that what had been a nominal threat to their advance against the Eighth Army was now a serious threat to them, so serious that instead of sending 1 division over here to Hungnam, which our prisoner interrogations said was the purpose, they diverted 10 divisions. The CCF main army didn't outflank General Walker. General Walker's right flank was composed of the III Korean Corps. They never came through the gap west of the X Corps. They came through the collapsed III ROK Corps of the Korean Army, the ROK Army. When they struck the X Corps, they came frontally and around the X Corps flank. When they struck the Eighth Army, they came through this collapsed Eighth Army flank where the ROK's were. They continued on through here, but as that penetration widened, then we had to readjust the situation.

General MacArthur asked me, on the 11th of December, at an airfield at Hungnam whether I though we ought to withdraw this force here. It is no secret now. I said, "General MacArthur, to leave this force here would be a great threat to any further aggression of this big force unless the augmentation of the Eigthth Army caused by the force against them required immediate assistance. If it does, that is the primary thing and I think the X Corps should be pulled out and pulled around here because there are no troops anywhere else so close to assist them."

I do not think I made the decision—I just contributed to it—with respect to this movement which took place in 14 days from the 10th of December to the 24th, in which we moved from here by our own choice (see p. 2116, exhibit 498–F).

Mr. CARPENTER. From where?

General ALMOND. From Hungnam, where I am pointing, over 100,000 of our own troops, and ROK's, and over 100,000 refugees in a number of ships so finely provided by the Navy, and bringing all of our own fighting equipment, 325,000 tons of combat equipment, in such a manner that, in a week, from the 24th to the 1st of January, New Year's Day 1951, this X Corps force had been moved to Ulsan and Pusan and disembarked. It had moved to a place east of Taegue, which is Knanju, an ancient capital of Korea. It then moved its command group and a 1 division force to the second most important rail center of Korea, Wonju. So this force was withdrawn from its committed area in 14 days, when the last elements came out, and it was redeployed in the south and became the defensive force on the east central front on the Eighth Army front, and was operating there on the 2d of January. It was done because the Eighth Army needed more troops in the face of this great threat and there were no troops to come from anywhere else.

On 11 December General MacArthur had said, "How long could you stay here in the Hungnam area if we decided to leave you here?"

I had said, "As long as you desire."

Why? Because we had sufficient troops to guard that port.

We had the entire Navy in the Far East within gun fire of the enemy threat. We had a supply line that was only 8 miles long from the water. Therefore, we were safe, but we did and ought to have contributed to a withdrawing force of the Eighth Army down here. We did do that, but had other troops been available to send in there and support General Walker, what could be a happier situation now with the Communists down here on the 38th parallel and us with a good, strong force sitting there at Hungnam. I think it would have been ideal, but we could not take that liberty with a force that needed the reinforcement of a force the size of the X Corps, and that is why it came about. So I want to disabuse anybody's mind of the gap the Chinese came through and of the illogic of employing the X Corps separately from the Eighth Army. It was basically and initially a question of supplies, as I have tried to explain.

It was then modified by the change in the situation in which we were picking up the remnants of the North Korean Army north of the 38th parallel.

A new situation later still was introduced which required a new estimate. That new estimate was made in some form, I am sure. In what form, I am not aware of, but that explains the situation as it applied to us there in Korea.

I gave a lecture to the Army War College, of which I was president, 6 months after I came back from Korea, and the true situation is a matter of record everywhere in the military service that I know about.

Senator WELKER. Are there any further questions, Counsel?

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Sourwine has a few questions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions, the answers to which with the questions may take as much as 15 minutes, if you can allow the time, to wind up some loose ends in the testimony that has already been given.

Senator WELKER. I should say for the record that Mr. Sourwine was the counsel for Senator McCarran who passed away on the 28th of September.

You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. Sourwine. General, do you remember testifying very early in your appearance here respecting a state of confusion in the War Department because of a certain investigation?

General Almond. Today?

Mr. Sourwine. Yes.

General Almond. I am not clear on what you mean.

Mr. Sourwine. I ask you if you remember testifying at the outset of your testimony here respecting a state of confusion in the Department, meaning the War Department, because of a certain investigation?

General Almond. You are talking about General MacArthur's investigation?

Mr. Sourwine. No, sir. I am just asking you if you remember testifying about the War Department being in a state of confusion because of a congressional investigation.

Mr. Carpenter. That was back in 1934, I believe, and 1938.

General Almond. Yes. I thought you were talking about Korea.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember your testimony?

General Almond. Yes, I remember that. I took part in it.

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, sir. How did you know that the Department was in a state of confusion, General?

General Almond. I was in the Latin American section. I had two research clerks. These women were people who had been in the War Department 20 years. They were high type, intelligent, research people. I would say their morale, as far as their job was concerned, was about 10 miles below sea level, if you could go that far. They thought that all the integrity of our Intelligence Service was at stake where we had sent a military attaché, for example. Our representatives gain the confidence of a military man in, we will say, Chile, or Brazil, or Argentina, or Uruguay, or Paraguay, or some other place, Cuba, Central America, or Panama. Our people in the War Department thought that to throw these files open to just any kind of riffraff utilization either for publication or criticism would seriously disturb our effectiveness presently and perhaps forever.

Mr. Sourwine. General, was riffraff seeking the files at that time?

General Almond. Well, these research clerks thought so.

Mr. Sourwine. You spoke earlier of holding the investigation within proper limits. What did you mean by that? What limits?

General Almond. I think Congress, and I think this committee, has certainly a complete right to know what is going on in our country, and if I thought that that investigation would be reposed only in this committee or the committee that was representative of our people, that would be all right with me, but if I thought that by giving a confidential document, or allowing it to become known to them, and I would see it in a book on the 10-cent counter in the near future in order to make this fellow some money, I would be seriously concerned about it.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you believe that the legislative branch has the right to subpena documents from the executive branch of the Government?

General Almond. You are asking a question that I am not a legal authority on. I just say that I believe that our Congress has an equal right with other branches of the Government to know what is good for our people.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it makes any difference whether the documents sought are Army documents or from some other department?

General ALMOND. No, I wouldn't say so. I don't think the Army has any special privilege.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, while you were personnel officer for General MacArthur, did you have a free hand subject to General MacArthur's orders, or were there any influences or pressures from the outside on you in the performance of your duties?

General ALMOND. When I was the personnel officer?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

General ALMOND. No, when I was the personnel officer I had many occasions to seek personnel and I tried to, but I had short success on most of the cases.

I have spoken of how we did receive replacements in the Eighth Army in the middle of 1948, I believe, and those are my chief concerns. I don't have anything in mind that interfered with my work. I was in military operations. I was concerned with personnel, and promotions, and pay, and things of that kind, and the morale of our troops. I tried to carry on those duties and I didn't have anybody interfering with them to any degree.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was no civilian interference that you recall?

General ALMOND. No. We had many civilians working with us. We had about 3,000 in Tokyo.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, skipping to another topic, you remember you discussed the partisans and you spoke of finding out later that the partisans, included some Russians. What did you mean by "finding out later"? Later than what?

General ALMOND. My contact with the partisans began in September and October of 1944. My division intelligence officer, my G–2, would come to me directly and say, "Now, if it is all right we will use a partisan man to make this reconnaissance instead of our own soldier. They are dressed like Italians. They speak Italian. They are Italians. They are more successful." At that time, I took a partisan for an Italian patriot who was seeking some sort of contentment after his experience with Mussolini, and when the war was over and I became an area commander in a military occupied area, then I began to realize that the people who were directing a lot of these partisan efforts or were gaining control of them were Soviets.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you, General.

General, were you in Tokyo when certain Japanese Communists were liberated from prison and ridden through the streets of Tokyo in American automobiles?

General ALMOND. No. I came to Tokyo 9 months after the occupation began.

Mr. SOURWINE. You remember your discussion of the visit of Malcolm MacDonald?

General ALMOND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the policy of Great Britain in and prior to August 1949, when Mr. MacDonald arrived?

General ALMOND. With respect to what? General policy?

Mr. SOURWINE. With respect to communism, sir, specifically.

General ALMOND. I thought that they were as much interested in frustrating communistic tendencies in Japan and elsewhere as we were, and they may still be, but they just don't show it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a fair statement to say that General MacArthur proposed carrying the attack directly against Communist China?

General ALMOND. Is it correct?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

General ALMOND. No. It is correct to say that General MacArthur said we should do everything to eject Communist interference from Korea, which we were trying to do. So many people have tried to trip him up and trip up other people that he recommended the introduction of ground troops into China. It is absurd to observe the efforts of those who are always trying to catch somebody off base, but I don't think they have succeeded.

Mr. SOURWINE. He never did, as a matter of fact, recommend carrying the attack directly against Communist China, did he?

General ALMOND. No. He only intended to do that against Communist China which would prevent their interfering in Korea as they were doing.

Senator WELKER. May I interrupt, Counsel?

As a matter of fact, no military commander, whether it be Bonaparte or whether it be any other great leader has ever been successful in a land war against the Asiatics, and certainly the Russians are. Am I correct on that?

General ALMOND. Not even Genghis Khan.

Senator WELKER. That is right.

General ALMOND. He endured for 150 years, but that is all.

Senator WELKER. And that commander out of bounds over in the hotel in New York would never be so naive as to even suggest such a matter.

General ALMOND. He said the man that conceived that ought to have his head examined. I remember that expression. He told me that many times.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember the use of the phrase, "the calculated risk was recognized as being not hazardous, but problematical"?

General ALMOND. What was the risk?

Mr. SOURWINE. I was going to try to find out what the specific calculated risk was that you had in mind. I doubt if the record is clear.

General ALMOND. I think the calculated risk I must have had in mind was the calculated risk of doing more than we were doing in Korea to win the war and I think the calculation was that based upon the knowledge of these people that we had been fighting by a commander who knew their characteristics and what to expect of them, that his judgment that a little more force in certain directions certainly was more valuable than somebody sitting back eight or ten thousand miles, each one of whom have admitted that they had never been to the theater of operations prior to their visits to the Eighth Army or the X Corps after the operation began. General MacArthur spent more than 25 years in the Far East. He knows more about Asiatic tendencies and philosophies than anybody I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, you will recall that counsel asked you whether you saw any evidence of a commitment guiding the orders that came from Washington, and I believe you said you did not, but suggested that those orders indicated possibly a firm policy, which would account for the speed with which General MacArthur got back an answer. Do you recall that colloquy?

General ALMOND. Yes, I remember it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wanted to ask you, if we had a firm policy, wouldn't that mean commitment to that policy?

General ALMOND. I would say so; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And would it not be reasonable to assume that our allies at least were advised of what our policy was?

General ALMOND. I am certain of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. So, actually, that would imply a certain measure of commitment, would it not?

General ALMOND. Yes, but, as I recall "hot pursuit," as I recall "hot pursuit" in the testimony that has appeared publicly, the Secretary of State was directed to contact our allies and get their reaction, and Trygve Lie says in his book that the United States being the executive agent of the United Nations was not required to have a referendum on all these things, although I can see the logic of keeping friendly with all of our allies in discussing these problems with them, but certainly when you think of the contribution in force, 90 percent American and Korean, or 95 percent, and 5 percent others, no corporation that I know of settles its issues on any basis except a 51 percent stock vote.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, you remember the discussion of Korea not being strategically important. Do you think that there is a difference in that regard whether you look at it from the standpoint of a solely defensive war, or whether you look at it from the standpoint of a war in which we might take the offensive? In other words, is it possible that the view that Korea has no strategic importance might be argued by a man who is considering only defending against the capture of Korea, but might not well be defended by a man who is considering Korea as a base for operations in a war which he hopes to win?

General ALMOND. I don't know. I can't answer that question. I think Korea is of strategic importance. I think this war has shown it. Somebody else, in his view may think it is not important. You always write down a number of reasons why you think things, and I think if you want to make a point you can usually write down about 10 things that will support your thesis. Whether somebody else agrees with it or not is another matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, you said it is terrible to have to fight both the enemy and those you——

General ALMOND. I said, "being hampered." You are in a bad fix if you have to contend with the enemy and those who are supposed to support you.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said those who you are supposed to have support from. I wondered who you had to fight that you were supposed to have support from.

General ALMOND. Not me. I had in mind General MacArthur.

Mr. SOURWINE. The "you" is plural.

With whom did you and General MacArthur have to contend that you were supposed to have support from?

General ALMOND. I believe General MacArthur had that to contend with when he asked for the authority for "hot pursuit." That is an example.

Mr. SOURWINE. Any other instances?

General ALMOND. I don't know. There are a number, I guess. I don't know what they would be. I just know there was constant caution of everything we did.

For example, everybody became alarmed with this diagram we have here, after it had happened, became alarmed at what was going to happen to the X Corps. Messages were sent to General MacArthur that "You better be careful. You might lose some forces."

Senator WELKER. Who sent the messages?

General ALMOND. I think they came from the Pentagon. I think that is General Bradley's testimony, and I believe General Marshall's testimony, and General Collins' certainly, that they were concerned at the time, and some Senator asked General Bradley, "Would you have done it differently?"

General Bradley was very magnanimous when he said, "General MacArthur was on the grounds. He might have had his own reasons. He [Bradley] might have done it differently, but whether my plan would have been better than his, I can't answer," so I think he had the right solution there. General MacArthur had reasons which I have tried to explain, the fact that all these Commies came in, but as far as danger to the X Corps or danger to the Eighth Army, when you are attacked by a greatly superior force, what do you do? You get the heck out of there as soon as possible and readjust your lines in accordance with the new development. You just don't run away. Nobody ran away over there. They readjusted themselves to the new situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, how many opportunities did our side have to win the war in Korea?

General ALMOND. I think we had one with additional force. If we could have reinforced General Walker and left the X Corps up where it was on the flank, that is one. I think we had an opportunity, a very definite one, even without General MacArthur's request to use the naval blockade, air action, and possibly a few more troops on the ground, whatever was demanded which he thought would win it, but even without that, I say that in the month of June, had we taken advantage of the defeat that I am satisfied involved as many as 50 divisions of the Chinese, we had an opportunity then to win it even without General MacArthur's stipulation of blockade.

Senator WELKER. June of what year, General?

General ALMOND. 1951.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your answer is, then, we had two opportunities to win the war?

General ALMOND. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your opinion, sir, were the same factors responsible in both instances for the fact that we did not take advantage of the opportunity?

General ALMOND. I don't know. I couldn't answer that. I just know that in one case, in November and December, when we were badly off, had we had reinforcements it would have helped that situation. I am not sure that the Chinese weren't greatly surprised at their success in November and December, and I believe they were so surprised they were unable to take advantage of it because when they captured

Seoul around the first part of 1951, they had battalions down as far as Suwon. When they took Seoul, they had battalions down as far as there. The Eighth Army was still in sort of a rocky condition, although the X Corps had come down and reinforced this Eighth Army. They, the Chinese, made no attempt to go farther south at that time, but they did later in April and May.

If they had had all that success, they should have pushed their efforts then as much as we should have pushed them later on in June and July 1951.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WELKER. Are there any more questions, Counsel?

Mr. CARPENTER. No more, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WELKER. General Almond, it has been the acting chairman's great honor to have been here and listened to you and to other great military men, including General Van Fleet, Gen. Mark Clark, General Stratemeyer, General Wedemeyer, and others. We have omitted to say that General Walker gave his life in the defense of his country and men.

On behalf of Chairman Jenner, the chairman of the full committee, over which I am now acting chairman, I want to thank you profoundly, and I know this: that your profound testimony today will have an impact on red-blooded Americans all over this land who either have given or are ready to give their only sons that this Republic might live.

It is a great pleasure and an honor to have such a distinguished man before us. We expect to continue on with other great military leaders of our forces. I thank you profoundly. You have done something, and I hope that by virtue of your testimony, the American people will once again arise and have that strength, that great ability, and that will to win that you and the other great generals have evidenced before this committee.

Thank you so profoundly.

Also, before we close, I would like the record to show that the distinguished general who has favored us today by his testimony lost a son and a son-in-law in defense of our country in World War II.

Thank you again.

General ALMOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It is a pleasure to be here.

(Whereupon, at 6:05 p. m., the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

(For acceptance of exhibits which appear on the following pages, see pp. 2073–2074.)

EXHIBIT 498-A



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

TESTIMONY OF ADM. CHARLES TURNER JOY

DECEMBER 29, 1954

PART 26

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

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INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1954

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
San Diego, Calif.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a. m., in room 359, Civic Center, San Diego, Calif., Senator William E. Jenner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Jenner.

Also present: Alva C. Carpenter, chief counsel to the subcommittee; and Dr. Edna R. Fluegel, professional staff member.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Admiral Joy, I am afraid this is not at all original, but it is a relief, after all the cartoons, to find that the floor-length beard you were supposed to have acquired during the protracted Korean truce negotiation is nonexistent.

It is indeed a privilege and a pleasure, Admiral, to meet here with you today. Your career has spanned tumultuous decades of our history. The very place names that occur in your biography, covering as they do both oceans and three great wars, arouse pride and hope in the hearts of all Americans.

You were with the U. S. S. *Pennsylvania* in World War I and shared in the exultation of victory as you escorted President Wilson to Paris for the Peace Conference. You were in the Pacific at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster, but you were also there, fighting back to victory, from Bougainville to the Aleutians, from Saipan to Leyte, to Manila, to Iwo Jima and Okinawa. You knew the Pacific when American prestige and power were paramount and when, under the beneficent influence of this power, the Pacific had assumed, indeed, the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake.

You returned in 1949 when storm signals were up. Again you met disaster and again you fought back. Once again you shared in victory at Inchon and once again you met disaster and fought back, until you were stopped on orders from Washington.

Even then, at Kaesong and at Panmunjom—where, as you say, "The field of combat was a long, narrow, green-baize-covered table. The weapons were words"—you fought within the limits prescribed by Washington.

And, from this varied experience, even from the last bitter ordeal, you have gleaned the information and the wisdom which we are here today to ask you to share with this subcommittee and, through it, the American people.

In 1952, Collier's, August 23, page 31, you stated:

It has been said that in war there is no substitute for victory. It can also be said that in debating with the Communists there is no substitute for the imperative logic of military pressure * * *. In the end, might is essential to right, not because you or I would have it that way, but because, unless we have armed might and unless we are willing to use that armed might in dealing with the Communists, we cannot win our point and, in fact, we may not survive to argue our point.

That was 1952.

Again, in 1953, Newsweek, May 4, page 38, you stated:

Of course, by far the best way to negotiate with the Communists in a military situation is to apply sufficient military power to give emphasis and meaning to your arguments.

And what of 1954? And the future?

Four months ago, Senator McCarran, of Nevada, whose death on September 28, deprived this country of a great patriot and wise leader, addressed the following words to Gen. George E. Stratemeyer:

And, General, what of today? What of tomorrow? Where are the missionaries and traders, the soldiers and statesmen who gave to the Pacific "the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake," a "vast moat to protect us?" You know the answer. Not only in the Pacific but throughout the world events confirmed that "the Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You cannot appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe." But we continue to appease, and to lose.

Is it any wonder, then, that throughout the length and breadth of this land the questions are asked "why?" and "how?" and "who?" and "where will it end?" Is it any wonder that, in these days of peril, we are turning to men like yourself, men who should have been consulted and were not, men whose patriotism is tried and tested, men who, denied victory, have considered and analyzed and thought deeply over the events and the reasons for that denial? * * * For victory, we substituted disaster. It is to explore some of the reasons for that disaster and, by exposure, to arouse the American people to their jeopardy, that we meet here this morning.

This hearing is a continuation of that effort. Indeed, Admiral Joy, nothing but the urgency of the matter and its import for the future would warrant this subcommittee intruding on your well-earned retirement in this jewel (La Jolla) of the Pacific. Yet, here in San Diego, where so much history was made, you know well the dangers that beset this country for which you fought all over the world with such brilliance and such gallantry.

I repeat, Admiral Joy, it is a great privilege as well as a pleasure to meet here with you today.

Admiral Joy, you were sworn yesterday in executive session. It is our custom to again swear you in open session. Will you stand and be sworn to testify. Do you swear that the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Admiral Joy. I do.

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES TURNER JOY, ADMIRAL, UNITED STATES NAVY (RETIRED), LA JOLLA, CALIF.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state for our record your full name?

Admiral JOY. My name is Charles Turner Joy.

The CHAIRMAN. Where do you reside?

Admiral JOY. I reside in La Jolla, Calif.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you give us a brief biography?

Admiral JOY. Yes, sir. I was born on the 17th of February 1895, in St. Louis, Mo., and appointed to the Naval Academy from the 22d Illinois District in 1912. Following graduation from the Academy in 1916, I served on the battleship *Pennsylvania* until January 1921 when I was ordered to a postgraduate course of instruction in ordnance engineering at Annapolis. Upon completion of this course of instruction, which included a college year at the University of Michigan from which I received a master of science degree, I joined the staff of the Commander, Yangtze Patrol Force, in 1923, as aide and flag lieutenant.

From then on, my tours of duty included routine assignments ashore and afloat, such as duty with the Bureau of Ordnance, assistant gunnery officer, U. S. S. *California*, ordnance officer at the Navy Mine Depot, Yorktown; commander of the destroyer *Litchfield;* staff of command, destroyers, battle force; head of Department of Ordnance and Gunnery, Naval Academy; executive officer, U. S. S. *Indianapolis;* and then, in late 1940, operations officer on the staff of Vice Adm. Wilson Brown, who was commander, Scouting Force. I was with Admiral Brown when World War II broke out and his force, with the carrier *Lexington* as flagship, participated in the Battle of Bougainville, and the raid on Salamau and Lae, in February and March 1942. During this period, I was promoted to captain.

From September 1942, until June of 1943, I commanded the heavy cruiser *Louisville* which took part in the operations in the Aleutians and off Guadalcanal.

In August 1943 I became head of the Pacific Plans Division, at the headquarters of commander in chief, serving in that capacity until May of 1944 when I was promoted to rear admiral and ordered as commander, Cruiser Division Six. Operations of Cruiser Division Six included all engagements of the Central Pacific from Saipan to Okinawa.

In June 1943 I was ordered to activate and train an amphibious group for the invasion of Japan. I was in Coronado, Calif., undertaking this task when the war ended. Then, I was ordered back to the Far East as commander, Yangtze Patrol Force, with the mission of clearing the Yangtze of mines, entering Shanghai, and assisting the Chinese in the rehabilitation of that port.

In January of 1946 I was ordered to Hong Kong as commander, Task Force 74, remaining there until April 1946, when I returned to the United States to become commander of the Naval Proving Ground, Dahlgren, Va.

In August 1949 I was ordered as commander, Naval Forces, Far East, with the rank of vice admiral. As such, I commanded, under General MacArthur, the naval forces assisting in the occupation of Japan. Later, when the Korean war broke out, I commanded the United Nations Naval Forces engaged in the war.

Shortly after July 1, 1951, I was designated by General Ridgway to be senior United Nations Command delegate at the Korean Armistice Conference, which assignment was in addition to my regular duty as commander, Naval Forces, Far East.

I returned to the United States in June of 1952 to become Superintendent of the Naval Academy. I was retired on July 1 of this year at my own request, because of physical disability. On retirement, I was advanced to the rank of admiral on the basis of combat awards.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carpenter, you may proceed with the questioning of Admiral Joy.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, for the purpose of the committee, we will begin with your career from about 1940. You were in the Pearl Harbor vicinity on December 7, 1941; is that correct?

Admiral JOY. That is correct.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, the Pearl Harbor attack has recently been the subject of much discussion. Have you an opinion on that Pearl Harbor attack, how it happened?

Admiral JOY. No; I think it is all in the record. I have always felt that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were made scapegoats, but outside of that I have no comment.

Mr. CARPENTER. What was the nature of your assignment, Admiral, from 1943 until 1944?

Admiral JOY. My assignment was as head of the Pacific Plans Division in the headquarters of commander in chief, in Washington. I have no real comments on that tour of duty. I was too busily engaged in work connected with the tactical problems of the Navy in the Pacific. That was my main job.

Mr. CARPENTER. Then from April of 1944 to June of 1945 you were again back in the Pacific; is that right?

Admiral JOY. That is correct.

Mr. CARPENTER. At that time, Admiral, did you believe it necessary to make concessions to insure Soviet participation in the Pacific war in 1945?

Admiral JOY. No; I did not. The war was already won when the Soviets entered.

Mr. CARPENTER. What contributions did the Soviet Union make?

Admiral JOY. Negligible, if any.

Mr. CARPENTER. I would now like to take you to the period of June 1945 to August 1945. What were your duties during that period, Admiral?

Admiral JOY. I was in California training an amphibious group for the landings in Japan.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you believe that such landings would be necessary?

Admiral JOY. At the time I did.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you informed of the Japanese attempt to surrender?

Admiral JOY. Not from official sources. I gleaned such from the newspaper.

Mr. CARPENTER. Now, I believe you testified that you led the Yangtze Patrol Force in September of 1945 to January 1946; is that correct?

Admiral JOY. That is correct.

Mr. CARPENTER. What was the position of the United States in the Pacific in September of 1945?

Admiral JOY. Well, I would say we were all-powerful. We could have shaped the course of the Pacific.

Mr. CARPENTER. What was your impression of the China situation during the period September 1945 to April 1946?

Admiral JOY. My impression was confused, to say the least, though I believed with timely and effectual help from the United States, the Communist menace which then had not reached grave proportions, could be defeated. I certainly never expected to be back in the Pacific 4 years later fighting communism.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, were you familiar with the Marshall mission to China?

Admiral JOY. Only in a general way. I knew that his mission was, in effect, to attempt to establish a coalition government. I was in Shanghai when he arrived. I witnessed his welcome, which was one of the most enthusiastic welcomes I have ever seen. All of Shanghai turned out. When General Marshall came from the airport into Shanghai, the streets were lined by Chinese with American flags. I have never seen such a friendly welcome or anything like it.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you encounter the agrarian line with respect to the Chinese Communists?

Admiral JOY. Yes, I did; among the Chinese intelligentsia, and British and French.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were American——

The CHAIRMAN. And Americans?

Admiral JOY. There weren't any Americans in Shanghai. You will recall the Americans got out of Shanghai before the war started. There were practically none.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were the Americans popular in China in 1945?

Admiral JOY. They certainly were. When we entered Shanghai, the welcome was really marvelous. I have never seen anything like it. The Chinese nearly killed us with kindness.

Mr. CARPENTER. Then, American criticism of Chiang at this time carried weight and helped to undermine the regime; is that right? Would you say that?

Admiral JOY. Well, I don't know, really. You say whether it would undermine the regime. But I know at the time, the British and the—not the British, but the foreigners, I will put it that way—were very critical of the Kuomintang government. They thought it was corrupt. They felt that the agrarian reformers couldn't be any worse.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, what were your hopes and expectations for the Pacific in April 1946?

Admiral JOY. I would say that my hopes were that the Kuomintang government would be able to withstand the encroachments of the Communists.

Mr. CARPENTER. At that time, you didn't expect to go back there fighting 4 years later?

Admiral JOY. No, I did not.

Mr. CARPENTER. Now, I would like to take you to the period of 1946 to 1949, when you were in Dahlgren, Va. Did you follow the developments affecting the Pacific during this period, Admiral?

Admiral JOY. Only in a general way, through the newspapers.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you concerned about our apparent absorption in Europe?

Admiral JOY. Not particularly, as I remember, although I did notice a gradual deterioration of our position in the Pacific.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, do you believe that the No. 1 objective of the Communists during this period was expansion in the Far East?

Admiral JOY. I certainly do now.

Mr. CARPENTER. Now, I would like to go to the period of August 1949, to June of 1950, when you were commander of United States naval forces in the Far East. Admiral, were you briefed on the international political aspects before your departure?

Admiral JOY. No. I was thoroughly briefed on the conditions in Japan, and the missions of the occupation, and so on.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, what was our policy at that time in regard to Formosa, Korea, Indochina?

Admiral JOY. Well, I would say it was a laissez faire policy, because there seemed to be no noticeable firm policy. I did definitely gain the impression, however, that Korea was considered outside of the United States sphere of interest, and of no particular concern to us.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, was the conquest of China and the announcement of Soviet atomic progress reflected in any change in policy affecting your assignment?

Admiral JOY. No.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you informed of the results of the reconsideration of our policy in the State Department meeting in the fall of 1949?

Admiral JOY. No; I was not.

Mr. CARPENTER. Was Philip Jessup in Tokyo during the period you were stationed there?

Admiral JOY. Yes.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you talk with him?

Admiral JOY. Yes.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did he attempt to ascertain your views on Formosa?

Admiral JOY. He did. It was my distinct impression that Jessup attempted to persuade me that Formosa was of no importance strategically to the defense of the Pacific.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, did you see Special Guidance——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, counsel. And what was your opinion at that time of Formosa?

Admiral JOY. I think all of us out there shared General MacArthur's views, that it was a very important bastion in the island chain of defense.

The CHAIRMAN. And in your conversation then with Philip Jessup, did you insist that it was of strategic importance to the defense of the United States?

Admiral JOY. I tried to, but what impression I made I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Anyhow, you brought your views out in this conversation?

Admiral JOY. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; proceed.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, did you see Special Guidance Paper No. 28 of December 23, 1949?

Admiral JOY. I never saw this special paper until Dr. Fluegel sent it to me recently.

Mr. CARPENTER. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record and have made a part of the record Special Guidance Paper No. 28, dated December 23, 1949, issued by the Department of State, entitled "Policy Information Paper—Formosa."

The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record and become a part of the official record.

(The document referred to follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 534

[Source: Military Situation in the Far East, hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., to conduct an inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area, pt. 3, June 1, 2, 4-9, 11-13, 1951, pp. 1667-1669]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PUBLIC AFFAIRS AREA—POLICY ADVISORY STAFF

(Special guidance No. 28, December 23, 1949)

POLICY INFORMATION PAPER—FORMOSA

I. PROBLEM

To formulate information policy which will minimize damage to United States prestige and others' morale by the possible fall of Formosa to the Chinese Communist forces.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Comment on Formosa is on the increase as the Communist advances on the Chinese mainland leave the island as the last substantial part of China under Nationalist control. Attention is focused by three principal elements:

1. Communists, worldwide, who charge the United States with conspiring to build the island into a fortress to be taken over by the United States (if it does not already control it), thereby trying to brand the United States with the mark of aggressive imperialism, and also hoping to get us involved in a risky and unpromising venture;

2. Pro-Nationalists (principally in the United States) who consider Formosa a redoubt in which the government could survive, and who tend to create an impression the United States is delinquent if it fails to "save Formosa";

3. Groups in the United States who are inclined to be critical of the United States for failure to act to prevent loss of the island to the Communists, largely because of mistaken popular conception of its strategic importance to United States defense in the Pacific.

B. Loss of the island is widely anticipated, and the manner in which civil and military conditions there have deteriorated under the Nationalists adds weight to the expectation. Its fall would threaten:

1. Loss of United States prestige at home and abroad to the extent we have become committed in the public mind to hold it;

2. Damage to the morale of other nations, particularly in the Far East, which are disturbed by the Communist gains and fear its possible further advances.

C. Formosa, politically, geographically, and strategically, is part of China in no way especially distinguished or important. Although ruled by the Japanese (as "Taiwan") for 50 years, historically it has been Chinese. Politically and militarily it is a strictly Chinese responsibility.

It is true that the technical status of the island remains to be determined by the Japanese peace settlement, but the Cairo agreement and Potsdam Declaration and the surrender terms of September 2, 1945, looked to its return to China, and the United States facilitated its takeover by Chinese troops shortly after VJ-day.

Even the small United States military advisory group sent there at Chinese Government request was completely withdrawn a year ago. Merely a handful of military attaché personnel with diplomatic status remains. The United States never has had military bases there, and never has sought any special concessions there.

ECA work done on the island, particularly through the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, has been of purely economic and technical nature for assistance in improvement of conditions, and no quid pro quo has been sought.

D. United States public opinion has concerned itself primarily with the question of the island's strategic importance; there has been insistent demand from a few sources for military action by the United States, but it has not assumed significant proportions. Rather, public opinion obviously is divided and uncertain, and there is no apparent consensus for a particular course of active intervention.

III. TREATMENT

A. If rising public interest warrants it, gradually increasing attention may be paid Formosa, to establish, publicly, the facts indicated below. Overseas use should be made of unofficial materials in public analysis and comment appearing both at home and abroad, as well as official statements as they may appear. Label conflicting public statements properly as "individual expressions of opinion," as "unofficial," etc.

B. All material should be used best to counter the false impressions that—

1. Formosa's retention would save the Chinese Government;

2. The United States has a special interest in or "designs on" the island or any military bases on Formosa;

3. Its loss would seriously damage the interests of either the United States or of other countries opposing communism;

4. The United States is responsible for or committed in any way to act to save Formosa.

C. Without evidencing undue preoccupation with the subject, emphasize as appropriate any of the following main points:

1. Formosa is exclusively the responsibility of the Chinese Government:

(*a*) Historically and geographically a part of China;

(*b*) The National Government has run the island's affairs since the takeover and is responsible for present conditions there;

(*c*) The United States has assumed no responsibilities or obligations, actual or moral.

2. Formosa has no special military significance:

(*a*) It is only approximately 100 miles off the China coast;

(*b*) Other potential objects of Communist aggression are closer to points on the Chinese mainland than to Formosa;

(*c*) China has never been a seapower and the island is of no special strategic advantage to the Chinese Communist armed forces.

3. Economic assistance in Formosa has been for economic and social purposes, has been consistent with demonstrated United States concern for the welfare of the Chinese generally, and has involved no thought of special concessions for the United States.

4. In areas of insistent demand for United States action, particularly in the United States itself, we should occasionally make clear that seeking United States bases on Formosa, sending in troops, supplying arms, dispatching naval units, or taking any similar action would—

(*a*) Accomplish no material good for China or its Nationalist regime;

(*b*) Involve the United States in a long-term venture producing at best a new area or bristling stalemate, and at worst possible involvement in open warfare;

(*c*) Subject the United States to a violent propaganda barrage and to reaction against our "militarism, imperialism, and interference" even from friendly peoples, and particularly from Chinese, who would be turned against us anew;

(*d*) Eminently suit purposes of the U. S. S. R., which would like to see us "substantiate" its propaganda, dissipate our energies, and weaken effectiveness of our policies generally by such action.

5. In reflecting United States unofficial demands for action of various kinds in Formosa, avoid giving them prominence unwarranted by their limited (usually individual) source, and make clear that the total of such demands evidences concern and frustration in some quarters but does not add up to a consensus on any particular position different from that officially taken.

D. Avoid—
1. Speculation which would show undue concern with whether Nationalists can hold the island or when Communists may take it;
2. References which would indicate important strategic significance, or that the island is a political entity;
3. In output to China, any emphasis on bad conditions in Formosa under the Nationalists, although to other areas reference can be made among reasons why Nationalists are vulnerable there as elsewhere;
4. Statements that Formosa's final status still is to be determined by the Japanese Peace Treaty;
5. Name "Taiwan"; use "Formosa."

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, did you take part in any of the discussions with Secretary Johnson and General Bradley in Tokyo directly prior to the Korean war?

Admiral JOY. No; I did not.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you familiar with the memorandum on Formosa which General MacArthur gave to Secretary Johnson at that time?

Admiral JOY. No; I did not see it.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you know General MacArthur's views?

Admiral JOY. Yes; I am very familiar with them.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you concur in General MacArthur's views on Formosa?

Admiral JOY. I did.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did they differ from the views presented in the State Department paper of December 1949?

Admiral JOY. Decidedly.

Mr. CARPENTER. Do you believe the Chinese Communists may have planned to launch an attack on Formosa shortly after the North Korean attack?

Admiral JOY. Strong concentrations of junks and craft of all types opposite Formosa indicated they may have planned an attack, though I believe they were waiting to see our reaction to the invasion of South Korea. The positive and expeditious action on the part of the United Nations and the United States with regard to Korea, as well as the decision to defend Formosa, undoubtedly dissuaded them from making the attempt, if such was the original intention. This resulted in their moving their Third and Fourth Armies, which were opposite Formosa, to Manchuria later on.

Mr. CARPENTER. Now, I would like to go to the period of June 1950 to July of 1951. Admiral, if you would, please, I would like to have you summarize the developments during the first week of the Korean war, that is, from a naval point of view.

Admiral JOY. From a naval point of view, developments during the first week of the Korean war were hectic, to say the least, because the war came as a complete surprise to all of us in the Far East. But it did not take us long to realize that Korea was being plunged into a real war, and not a border fracas in force, as was first suspected. Orders from Washington came thick and fast, and in our first telecon with the Pentagon the Seventh Fleet, then in the Philippine waters, was placed under my operational control through the commander in chief of the Far East, General MacArthur. Orders to evacuate American nationals from Korea followed, and then to blockade the coast of Korea, south of the 38th parallel.

On June 27 the Formosa neutralization order to the Seventh Fleet came through. On June 30 restrictions on the 38th parallel were

lifted and authority given to blockade the entire Korean Peninsula and to attack military targets above the parallel.

When the 24th Division was deployed to Korea, our orders also included support of the Eighth Army.

Fortunately, a major portion of the British Pacific Fleet, which was in Japanese waters when the war broke out, reported for duty under my command during these first few days. Their help was timely and effective.

Besides blockade and escort missions, naval action during the first week included the destruction of practically the entire North Korean Navy, a squadron of motor torpedo boats, by the United States cruiser *Juneau* and two Royal Navy ships. Bombardment and interdiction missions of enemy troops were also undertaken in our efforts to slow down the invading North Koreans. I think that is about all.

Mr. CARPENTER. Do you recall any comments of General MacArthur as to the need for ground troops if we planned to stay in Korea?

Admiral JOY. Well, at the first telecon, General MacArthur was authorized to send a regiment, as I remember, to Korea. General MacArthur, who had visited Korea to find out what the situation was, knew that the situation was bad, and said that that was not enough. The Pentagon, as I remember, took time out for about 30 minutes, and then came back and authorized him to use whatever troops he thought necessary.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you believe that the neutralization of Formosa was essential at that time?

Admiral JOY. I certainly didn't believe it was essential after the Chinese moved all their armies up to Korea.

The CHAIRMAN. But the order remained in effect?

Admiral JOY. The order remained in effect all the time.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, was consideration given to changing the Seventh Fleet orders when it was reported that Chinese forces opposite Formosa were moving to Manchuria?

Admiral JOY. There was no change in orders from Washington; no.

Mr. CARPENTER. And no consideration was given at all?

Admiral JOY. Well, there was no consideration by Washington that I know of. At least, I never heard of it.

Mr. CARPENTER. And your opinion was not asked?

Admiral JOY. It wasn't asked.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, I believe you are familiar with the Inchon operation.

Admiral JOY. Yes; quite a bit.

Mr. CARPENTER. Could you comment on that, please?

Admiral JOY. The Inchon operation was a brilliant tactical maneuver, conceived by General MacArthur, to bring an early end to the Korean war. The general felt that with this bold stroke, followed by the capture of Seoul, the entire southern peninsula would be sealed off, thereby resulting in the rapid deterioration of the North Korean armies, which had the Eighth Army penned up in the Pusan perimeter. He was supremely confident of success. The assault on Inchon by the X Corps was a Navy-Marine Corps operation, both in planning and execution. Subject to the overall command of commander, naval forces, Far East, who, in turn, was responsible to the commander in chief of the Far East, the commander, Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral

Struble, commanded all naval forces afloat that were engaged in the operation.

Rear Adm. J. H. Doyle, the amphibious commander, who was responsible to Adm. E. M. Struble, was in command of the actual attack phase of the operation. Command of the X Corps comprising two regiments of the 1st Marine Division, under Major General Smith, with the 7th Infantry Division in reserve, devolved upon the X Corps commander, Major General Almond, after the beachhead was secure.

The landing caught the enemy flatfooted, no doubt because, as General MacArthur had said beforehand, he did not expect anyone would attempt such a difficult operation. These difficulties included such natural hazards as tides of 30 feet, lack of suitable landing beaches, narrow and restricted waters leading to the city, and the fortified island of Walmi-do, which controlled the harbor. As someone had said previously, "one can search the world over and not find a worse site for an amphibious operation than Inchon."

The entire operation was as successful as General MacArthur had predicted. With the fall of Inchon and the subsequent capture of Seoul by the X Corps, practically all North Korean resistance in the southern part of the peninsula collapsed. In ending my comments, I should like to quote the message that General MacArthur sent to the commander, Seventh Fleet, after the Inchon beachhead had been secured.

Said he, "The star of the Navy and Marine Corps never shone brighter."

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, will you comment on the events of November of 1950 in Korea?

Admiral JOY. The events of November 1950 indicated to all of us in the Far East that a new and different war had begun. We knew that Chinese forces had crossed the Yalu, but I, for one, had no idea they had crossed in such large numbers. In anticipation of an early end to the war, and at the request of commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, we had, for example, returned some elements of the Seventh Fleet to the United States for overhaul. These were recalled to the Far East as soon as the seriousness of the situation was realized.

When the Eighth Army developed the strength of the Chinese by attacking on November 27, and then fell back in the face of vastly superior numbers, the Navy's primary task became the evacuation of Eighth Army forces from Chinnampo, Inchon, and later the X Corps from Hungnam. This last operation was completed on December 24.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you favor General MacArthur's proposal at that time for reinforcements and otherwise?

Admiral JOY. I certainly did.

The CHAIRMAN. What would have happened, in your opinion, Admiral, if General MacArthur had received the reinforcements that he begged for?

Admiral JOY. He continually begged for reinforcements, Senator, in the early days, as well as after the Chinese attack. But he was, in general, told that they were not available. I believe that had he received ample reinforcements at the beginning of the Korean war, the Japanese might not have dared to attack.

Mr. CARPENTER. You said "Japanese." You meant the Chinese?

Admiral JOY. Chinese.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they notify General MacArthur as to why reinforcements were not available, where they were?

Admiral JOY. They said at one conference that I attended, where the Joint Chiefs of Staff were also present, the tenor of the remarks by the Army Chief of Staff was to the effect that they did not have any trained or available forces, in the United States, and that their commitments in Europe were such that they could not withdraw any troops from Europe.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, were you satisfied with the economic measures taken to restrict supplies to the Chinese Communists after the Chinese attack?

Admiral JOY. No; I was not. From reports of our Navy reconnaissance planes, which flew daily missions over the Yellow Sea, and the Formosa Straits, we knew that many ships of foreign registry, such as British, Panamanian, Greek, and Norwegian, were visiting Chinese ports. For example, during the 6 weeks ending May 9, 1951, there were 204 visits, of which 76 were British ships. During the 6 weeks ending May 16 of the same year there were 219 ships.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, were you acquainted with the JCS paper of January 12, 1951?

Admiral JOY. Only when I read it in the minutes of the MacArthur hearings.

Mr. CARPENTER. Was it not at this time that General MacArthur described the response to the Korean war in terms of a fire department, and using only part of it? Could you tell us something about that story, Admiral?

Admiral JOY. Yes. It was a very dramatic and interesting conference. This took place, as I remember, on January 14, 1951. The Air Chief of Staff, General Vandenberg, and the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, were present. General MacArthur addressed his remarks almost entirely to the Army Chief of Staff, and this was the tenor of them. I wish I could be as dramatic as he was, but anyway, according to General MacArthur, as he told the Army Chief of Staff, the Armed Forces of the United States were like an excellent fire department in a big city, divided into 3 elements; 1 in the poorer section of the city, 1 in the industrial section, and 1 in the residential section. Said General MacArthur, "If a fire starts in the poorer section of the city, would you wait until it became a serious conflagration endangering the rest of your city before using the other two elements, or would you use those other two elements of your fire department and try to put the fire out before it spreads?" Well, of course, the implication was, "Why not use the forces we have, the troops"—he was particularly concerned about ground forces—"in the United States and in Europe to put the fire out in Korea before it spreads to other parts of the world?" It was a very forceful and rather elementary plea.

The CHAIRMAN. What reply did he get to that request?

Admiral JOY. The reply was to the effect, as I think I told you, that they did not have the trained troops in the United States and they had too many commitments in Europe to bring any to Korea.

The CHAIRMAN. They were still looking upon the Korean war as a police action?

Admiral JOY. Well, I don't know; I think the Army Chief of Staff was realizing at that time—that was when the Chinese attack was on—that it was a pretty serious war.

The CHAIRMAN. Not serious enough to take their eyes off Europe and put them on Korea? Would that be a fair analysis of it?

Admiral JOY. Of course, we all felt that they should take the troops from Europe to put the fire out and then send them back.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, what was our mission in Korea?

Admiral JOY. Do you mean the mission of the United Nations command?

Mr. CARPENTER. That is right; yes.

Admiral JOY. The mission, as I understood it, was to repel aggression and to restore international peace and security in Korea.

Mr. CARPENTER. Was that just South Korea or all Korea?

Admiral JOY. As I understood it, it was the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. CARPENTER. Was it ever changed?

Admiral JOY. In January of 1951, as I remember, the mission to repel aggression was not changed, but the emphasis shifted and the primary mission became the preservation of the United Nations forces and the security of Japan.

Mr. CARPENTER. Was there a written directive on that, Admiral?

Admiral JOY. I never saw it.

Mr. CARPENTER. Was Korea the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time?

Admiral JOY. Quite the contrary. It was a war of deep significance in a battle area which held many advantages for the United Nations forces. Furthermore, it was very timely from the standpoint of resisting Communist aggression. With the excellent bases in Japan, with the capabilities of flying carrier-based planes over the entire peninsula, and with a coastline that lent itself admirably to bombardment missions in support of the Army, the Navy could not have fought in a more favorable distant area from the United States.

Mr. CARPENTER. Was time on our side?

Admiral JOY. Well, I would say from the standpoint of developments to date, I believe that time was on the Communist side.

Mr. CARPENTER. And I think you have already testified that it was a war and not a skirmish or a police action?

Admiral JOY. Decidedly.

Mr. CARPENTER. Now, I would like to take you, Admiral, to the period of July 8, 1951, to May of 1952. I believe at that time you were senior U. N. delegate to the truce talks in Korea?

Admiral JOY. That is right.

Mr. CARPENTER. In the U. S. News & World Report, May 22, 1953, there are excerpts from a speech you delivered at Winston-Salem on May 15, 1953. In that address, you stated that when Jacob Malik proposed truce talks on June 24, 1951, Communist forces had suffered 200,000 casualties in the fighting in May and needed a cease fire. Do you agree, then, with General Van Fleet and with General Almond that our forces had scored a victory and were on the offensive when the truce was proposed?

Admiral JOY. Yes; but not a decisive victory, in my opinion. The Communists still had considerable potential strength left. There is no doubt, however, that the United Nations command was on the offensive and that the Communists were badly hurt.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to introduce into the record an excerpt from an address delivered by Admiral Joy on May 15, 1953, at Winston-Salem, N. C., reprinted in the U. S. News & World Report of May 1953, and I ask that it be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The excerpt referred to appears below, where it was read into the record by Mr. Carpenter.)

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, will you elaborate on that statement, and trace the events leading up to this decision?

Admiral JOY. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. That is the statement at Winston-Salem, and tracing the events leading up to this decision.

Admiral JOY. I think the events you mean are the decisions on the demarcation line, aren't they?

Mr. CARPENTER. That was the 30-day limit.

Admiral JOY. Well, you haven't brought that out yet.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, were the truce negotiations directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by the State Department?

Admiral JOY. All directives connected with negotiations emanated from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When I returned to the States, in June of 1952, I heard on good authority that these directives were drafted by a high-powered group from State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, you say presumably the decision was to give the Communists an incentive to show good faith. Why should anyone have presumed this?

Admiral JOY. I said presumably because it was the only logical explanation for a serious mistake. Are you talking about this demarcation line?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes.

Admiral JOY. Do you want to make that a little clearer?

Mr. CARPENTER. Can you elaborate a little more on your statement——

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring back to the Winston-Salem statement?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes.

Admiral JOY. Do you want to read that?

The CHAIRMAN. We will read it into the record.

Read it into the record, Mr. Carpenter.

Mr. CARPENTER (reading):

The Communists wanted to fix the then-existing battleline as the final demarcation line between both sides. Their strategy was obvious. If the line were fixed once and for all, there would be no reason for the Eighth Army to push them farther north because we would have to give them back the territory we had gained when and if an armistice was signed. In short, the Communists wanted a de facto cease fire then and there as a relief from the Eighth Army's pressure. But we insisted that the demarcation line be the battleline as of the time of the signing of the armistice. We realized, if the line were fixed permanently before completion of the negotiations, the Communists could stall to their hearts' content over the remaining items of the agenda. General Ridgway and the delegation felt very strongly that this was the situation calling for more steel and less silk. We felt certain the Communists would eventually give in on this point, thus assuring us of the retention of the negotiating initiative and of continuing pressure by the Eighth Army.

However, orders came through to agree to the then existing battleline as a provisional demarcation line with a 30-day time limit. This was done in a plenary session on November 27. Presumably the decision had been made on the basis that it would serve as an incentive for the Communists to show good faith by speeding up agreement on honorable and equitable terms. Instead of showing good faith they dragged their feet at every opportunity and used the 30 days of grace to dig in and stabilize their battleline.

In retrospect, I believe this was the turning point of the armistice conference, and a principal reason progress slowed to a snail's pace from then on. In demonstrating our own good faith we lost the initiative, never to regain it. We were no longer negotiating from a position of strength but from a position of military stalemate. And slowly before our eyes that which we wanted most to avoid began to happen—the balance of military advantages began to shift in favor of the enemy. The end of the 30-day time limit was just another date on the calendar. No one wanted to launch another ground offensive because the psychological handicap would be too large to overcome. The impetus was gone. And if the U. N. did launch an offensive it would be with the foreknowledge that the price would be extremely high because of the time the enemy had been given to prepare.

Rather late, and yet comparatively early, in our efforts to end the war, we had to learn that in negotiating with the Communists there is no substitute for the imperative logic of military pressure. In other words, we learned that progress in negotiating with them is in direct proportion to the degree of military pressure applied.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, will you elaborate on that statement and trace the events leading up to this decision?

Admiral JOY. Yes. In early November 1951 the United Nations Command delegation informed the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, General Ridgway, who, in turn, advised Washington that the Communist delegation had proposed fixing definitely the then existing battleline as the final demarcation line for the armistice.

The proposal was rejected by the United Nations Command delegation on the ground that the establishment of a demilitarized zone, based on the current line of contact, would constitute an immediate cease-fire on the basis of agreement on one item only of the agenda. Thus, the Communists would be insured against effects of future military operations while other agenda items were being discussed.

Washington expressed concern over the Communist proposal because it would curtail U. N. C.—that is, United Nations Command—ground advances beyond the current line of contact. This was considered unacceptable unless other agenda items were agreed upon shortly thereafter.

General Ridgway's comments were requested on a time limit for agreement on other agenda items, preferably a definite period in which major operations, ground operations, were not contemplated.

Washington told General Ridgway that early agreement on principle concerning the line of demarcation was important, and expressed concern that the Communists having made concessions on the location of the line might stiffen their resistance and revert to the 38th parallel.

A day or so after the Communists submitted their proposal, I, as senior delegate, pointed out to General Ridgway that the Communist insistence on having the current line of contact fixed as the final line was based on the belief that once the line was determined, the United Nations command would not want to engage in ground operations which would necessitate excessive casualties.

I also pointed out that they might expect to delay indefinitely on other agenda items or lull the United Nations command into a de

facto cease fire to increase their bargaining power in remaining negotions because of less United Nations command military pressure.

Another day or so later, Washington directed the commander in chief of the United Nations command to press for early settlement of this item of the agenda, on the basis of present line of contact, giving Communists to understand that the agreement only held good for a definite period during which the other three agenda items must be disposed of. A period of 1 month was suggested, after which the agreement was no longer to be valid.

Washington also did not consider that an agreement on this basis would imply a cease fire.

General Ridgway strongly requested reconsideration of Washington's instructions. He pointed out that in every case where the United Nations Command delegation had been allowed to stand pat, forcibly, on their proposals, the Communists had eventually agreed. He believed that continued patience and resistance would gain us this extremely important point. He also said that it was the concern of everyone in the United Nations command that Communist insistence on their proposal was based on the belief that once a demarcation line had been agreed to by the United Nations command we would be in no position to continue aggressive ground activities, which would mean excessive casualties, thereby giving the enemy the benefit of an effective ground cease fire without an actual armistice.

He mentioned what the senior delegate had said earlier with regard to stalling on other agenda items, and increasing their bargaining power because of less military pressure. In his opinion, premature acceptance of the present line of contact *under any conditions* would delay consummation of an acceptable armistice.

He went on to say Washington's course of action would increase Communist intransigence and debilitate our further position and that he was convinced that more steel and less silk would give us our objectives.

The directed course of action, according to him, would lead to sacrifice of our basic principles and would repudiate the cause for which many gallant lives had been lost. He argued standing firm, pointing that we stood at a crucial point. He went on to say that in his opinion, Communist military forces in Korea were badly hurt as a result of the United Nations command military operations and desired the earliest suspension of hostilities.

Washington replied by saying that the advantages of the early armistice outweighed the disadvantages present in giving a time limit on the current line of contact. Early action was directed to effect a settlement based on the current line of contact, which settlement would hold good for 30 days.

On November 17, the United Nations command delegation submitted to the enemy this proposal providing a 30-day period of grace. It was accepted by them with obvious relief.

The CHAIRMAN. That directive, of course, you later found out was not necessarily prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but by the State Department?

Admiral JOY. I do not know, Senator, who drafted it. I have said that, when I returned to the States, I heard on good authority that it was a high-powered group of JCS and State which drafted messages like that.

The CHAIRMAN. You say presumably the decision was to give the Communists an incentive to show good faith. How long had you been negotiating with the Communists at this time?

Admiral JOY. From July to November.

The CHAIRMAN. Why should anyone have presumed that this would make them have a show of good faith?

Admiral JOY. Well, as I said——

The CHAIRMAN. Had they shown any good faith up to date?

Admiral JOY. Very little, if any. I said presumably because it was the only logical explanation for a serious mistake.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was a serious mistake, Admiral?

Admiral JOY. In my opinion, it was a very serious mistake.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Carpenter.

Admiral JOY. I also have an article which appeared in the New York Times at that time which mentions that, mentions the question of good faith. That was the Times' summary of why it was given.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the article—I am asking from memory—is that the article which referred to the British position, the British attitude?

Admiral JOY. No. I think the British attitude had a great deal to do with that decision, because I have a clipping here from the New York Times which is entitled "British Perturbed by Korean Impasse"—dated November 17—"Disquiet Mounts Over Delay on Cease Fire—Sincerity of United States Questioned in Press." It goes on to say—well, it ends up here with a very amusing paragraph; at least, it was to me:

> The last thing with which to oppose Communist combination of rigidity and skill in negotiation is a combination of rigidity and clumsiness, and it looks very much as if the tactics of General Ridgway's negotiators have been pedestrian, if not flatfooted.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us the importance of that, Admiral.

Admiral JOY. I thought I had.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you threw away your bargaining rights?

Admiral JOY. The decision on the demarcation line gave the Communists a chance to dig in and a 30-day period of grace to rehabilitate their lines and their forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. CARPENTER. Isn't it elementary in any negotiations with the Communists that you need to retain the potential of pressure?

Admiral JOY. It certainly is elementary that you need to retain the potential of pressure.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, let me get this point straight in my mind and for the record. This decision to give the 30-day period of grace in your estimation was a fatal decision?

Admiral JOY. It was a serious mistake.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was the turning point of the armistice negotiations?

Admiral JOY. In my opinion, it was.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, in Collier's, August 1952, you state:

> A military armistice is a military problem requiring a military solution. It is not a general peace treaty.

Doesn't a prolonged armistice tend to be just that?

Admiral JOY. Well, I would say that a prolonged armistice is essentially a stagnant armistice, always unstable and subject to renewed fighting at a moment's notice. A peace treaty by its very nature is far more stable.

Mr. CARPENTER. You state that from the beginning, at Kaesong, the time and talents of many people were diverted from solutions by force of arms to solutions by negotiation. You also state Kaesong was accepted in the interest of avoiding delay though its disadvantages were recognized.

Why were we so anxious when the Communists were on the defensive, when they needed the armistice?

Admiral JOY. I can only quote what General Ridgway had said in his message to Gen. Kim-Il Sung, the Korean commander, and Gen. Peng Teh Huai, the Chinese commander, on July 13, 1951.

This was a message sent after the negotiations were suspended a few days, because the Communists would not allow some of our correspondents and newspaper people in Kaesong. General Ridgway suspended the negotiations.

He said here in a paragraph:

> In the interest of expediting the end of bloodshed and to demonstrate good faith under which the United Nations command was proceeding, I accepted Kaesong as a site for our discussions, and in so doing I expected that the conditions referred to above, vital to the success of any discussion, would be afforded at Kaesong.

Of course, you must remember, Kaesong then was in more or less of a no man's land, although the Communists really controlled the town. We had proposed beforehand that the *Jutlandia* be used as the site of the armistice conference, the *Jutlandia* being a Danish hospital ship. The Communists would have none of it. They came back with a proposal of Kaesong. General Ridgway felt that we should go ahead and accept Kaesong.

I am sure he wouldn't agree to meet in Kaesong if we had to do it all over again.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, in Collier's magazine of August 23, 1952, you observed that while the 38th parallel represented the approximate ground strength, the U. N. dominated the air and sea picture in North Korea; in other words, the military advantage was ours in the summer of 1951. Is that correct?

Admiral JOY. That is correct.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did the ultimate armistice represent this advantage or did the Communists achieve at the conference table that which they failed to achieve on the battlefield?

Admiral JOY. I would rather answer that as two questions. The first question would be: Did the ultimate armistice represent this advantage?

No, I would say not. Because the Communists had no comparable seapower nor did they control the air. They did not have these advantages to give up, although the Communists always contended the sum total of these advantages was represented in the position of the battleline.

With regard to the second question: Did the Communists achieve at the conference table what they had failed to achieve on the battlefield? I would say that the Communists came to the conference table on July 10, 1951, because they were on the verge of decisive defeat.

The armistice negotiations gave them an opportunity to repair their shattered war machine. Consequently, from that standpoint, you might say they accomplished at the conference table what they were unable to achieve on the battlefield. On the other hand, they failed at the conference table to accomplish what they had sought when they attacked South Korea, namely, to take over the entire peninsula.

The CHAIRMAN. You state that Nam Il—

had apparently taken for granted our acceptance of the 38th parallel, since there had been many public statements in high places to drive the enemy across the 38th parallel would represent a victory for the United Nations command.

Admiral JOY. He evidently had, and Malik had, because you will remember in Malik's proposal over the radio, on June 24, 1951, his suggestion was that we stop fighting, that we get together and stop fighting, and withdraw from the 38th parallel. Those statements were all made before we entered the conference. Our instructions from Washington were definitely to disregard those statements and to press for the battleline.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it normal to announce the acceptance of less than your position justifies?

Admiral JOY. No, of course not. But I don't think Washington accepted less, judging from our instructions.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you been informed at any previous time during the fighting that the 38th parallel would constitute victory?

Admiral JOY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, in the same issue of Collier's, you describe a p'an endorsed by General Van Fleet to exert pressure and present the Communists with a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. You state that General Ridgway was interested, but that—

in view of the approaching Japanese Peace Treaty Conference at San Francisco, he felt that the time had not arrived for drastic action.

Were these matters connected?

Admiral JOY. It should be remembered that at the time the Japanese Peace Treaty came up for signing at San Francisco, many people thought the Soviet Union's policy with regard to Korea and Japan were closely interrelated. As I remember it at the time, General Ridgway thought it best to wait and see what happened at San Francisco before doing anything that might upset the applecart. Many people even thought the Soviet Union would inject the Korean armistice into the peace treaty conference, and demand that it should be settled elsewhere than in the tent at Panmunjom.

Mr. CARPENTER. This was a military armistice you were negotiating, wasn't it, Admiral?

Admiral JOY. That is correct. A military armistice is a military problem, requiring a military solution. It is not a general peace treaty as some people tend to believe.

The CHAIRMAN. Did political considerations enter into the directives from Washington?

Admiral JOY. I would say that they did. An armistice agreement is simply an agreement between two opposing commanders to stop the fighting. It is not concerned, nor should it be, with political questions.

Mr. CARPENTER. In General Clark's book, From the Danube to the Yalu, he mentions his concurrence in your recommendation to suspend

the negotiations unilaterally, which you made shortly before you left Korea. He also said that this recommendation was disapproved by Washington.

What were your reasons for making this recommendation, and can you throw any light on why it was disapproved?

Admiral Joy. About May 10, 1952, I pointed out to General Clark that the Communists evidently intended to use further delegation meetings as a propaganda vehicle and for the present had not the slightest intention of accepting the United Nations Command final package proposal. If you will remember, that package proposal was introduced by the senior delegate on April 28, in the form of a final armistice agreement, in which we conceded on the question of the rehabilitation of airfields, compromised on the composition—or offered a compromise solution—on the neutral nations supervisory commission and stood pat on the principle of voluntary repatriation.

I am simply bringing that out because I don't think many people in the room realize what was in that proposal.

To continue, I said to General Clark that the issue must be squarely faced and that time for decisive action was at hand. By continuing it as at present, we were exhibiting weakness when strength was imperative. I pointed out that inasmuch as the President and other high U. N. officials had made statements backing up the finality of our package proposal, the United Nations Command delegation should be given authority to announce the unilateral suspension of the conference until the Communists were ready to accept our final solution of April 28 without substantive change. I also said that my recommendation to suspend the negotiations had the unanimous approval of the entire delegation.

General Clark strongly concurred in our recommendation and recommended to Washington that he be authorized to give us the authority to suspend the negotiations.

About that time there occurred the Koje-Do prison camp riots, with the capture of the United Nations Command camp commander by the Communist prisoners, and the incredible statement by the relief camp commander who, in order to effect his predecessor's release, assured the Communist prisoners that in the future they would not be treated inhumanely nor subjected to forcible screening.

Our recommendation was turned down by Washington for the following three reasons, as I recollect: (1) Confusion existed in domestic circles because of the Koje-Do riots; (2) the disadvantages of unilateral suspension were overriding in terms of continuing international and domestic support for the United Nations Command, and (3) suspension by the United Nations Command would require the Communists to initiate subsequent meetings and thereby render it more difficult for them to concede to our terms. Washington also told us to intensify negotiating pressure at the meetings and put the Communists on the defensive in order to maintain worldwide support of the United Nations Command position.

In other words, as the delegation looked at it, our primary task from the Washington viewpoint became the defense of our position in the eyes of the free world. Our negotiatory position apparently was a matter of secondary consideration.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, had your recommendation been followed, is it your opinion that we would have achieved an armistice sooner than July of 1953?

Admiral JOY. The answer to your question, I believe, is simply a question of arithmetic. General Harrison, my successor, was finally given authority to suspend unilaterally the negotiations, which he did in early October of 1952, 5 months later. Consequently, I have always believed we would have achieved an armistice 5 months earlier had the delegation's recommendation of May been approved at that time.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would like to introduce into the record, and ask that it be made a part of the record, an article entitled "A Deadly Game of Tit-for-Tat," by Vice Adm. Charles Turner Joy, appearing in Collier's August 23, 1952.

The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The document referred to follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 535

[Source: Pt. 2, A Deadly Game of Tit-for-Tat, by Vice Adm. Charles Turner Joy, United States Navy, Collier's, August 23, 1952, p. 31 (excerpt)]

From a negotiating standpoint we had worked up a good head of steam. We were no longer trying to catch up. We were ahead. The feeling around camp was positive and optimistic. But the feeling was short-lived.

The Red negotiators wanted to fix the then current battleline as the demarcation line once and for all; achieving, in effect, a de facto cease fire. We insisted that the demarcation line be identical with the line of ground contact as of the date of the signing of the armistice agreement. Our reason was obvious. With a de facto cease fire the Communists could stall to their heart's content over the remaining items of the agenda. With a de facto cease fire they would have what they wanted—respite from our military pressure. We would then have no reason for taking more ground and destroying more of their forces—and they, consequently, would have no incentive for coming to terms. General Ridgway and the delegation felt strongly that this was a situation calling for "more steel and less silk." We felt certain that the Communists would eventually give in on the point and that we would, as a consequence, retain the negotiating initiative and reap the benefits of the Eighth Army's continuing pressure.

However, the question had another side. Our mere presence at the conference table represented a commitment in the eyes of the world to seek a solution through negotiation where a final solution had not been arrived at through force of arms. Once committed, no amount of late apprehension could negate our early obligation to proceed in the good faith we had professed; no amount of trepidation could remove our obligation to assume good faith on the part of the enemy until he had proved his own bad faith—and no amount of after thought could alter the fact that compromise is the essence of negotiation.

If there had been indications that the enemy was disposed to stall, there also had been indications that he really wanted an armistice. He had agreed to a new conference site and he had given up on the 38th parallel, both of which were very difficult decisions for him to make. Some felt that if the enemy were worried about a northward movement of the demarcation line, the 30-day time limit would actually serve as an incentive. Our choice lay between action based on well-founded fear and action based on well-established obligation. The decision was made to respect our obligation and give the enemy the benefit of the doubt.

Agreement on a provisional demarcation line with a 30-day time limit was ratified in a plenary session on November 27. The Communists had their de facto cease fire. Would they accept it as an opportunity to demonstrate good faith by speeding agreement on an honorable and stable armistice, or would they seize on it as an opportunity to stall while they rebuilt their war machine? We did not have to wait long for our answer.

As I write this the Communists are still stalling. In demonstrating our own good faith we lost the initiative, never fully to regain it. We gradually found

ourselves no longer negotiating from strength, but from a position of military stalemate. We had lost the full use of our best argument, the magnificent Eighth Army. Technically the way was clear for a renewal of full-scale hostilities, but practically the way was barred.

The Communists would not resume an all-out offensive because they already had the cease-fire they wanted, and we would not because the psychological handicap would be too large to overcome. Who wanted the honor of being the last man to die in a war that might end at any time, and who wanted the responsibility for ordering that last man to die? Expiration of the 30-day time limit was just another date on the calendar. We lost our head of steam and were dead in the water, drifting with the tide. The situation we desired most to avoid slowly began to develop before our eyes—the balance of military advantages began to shift in favor of the enemy.

If the object of a story is to point a moral, my story could very well end here. It has been said that in war there is no substitute for victory. It can also be said that in debating with the Communists there is no substitute for the imperative logic of military pressure.

Debating with the Communists is not as simple as starting from a valid premise and proceeding by cogent logic to a sound conclusion. The Communist way is to start from a false or irrelevant premise and proceed by invective and bombast to a shameless demand described as a "just and reasonable proposal." The relation between premise and conclusion is seldom clear and the road between the two is traveled with untroubled lack of logic. History is rewritten to support the claim of the moment and most claims are uncomplicated by moral considerations. The end is mother of the means. Proof is by assertion, and rebuttal is by vilification. Repetition is the alchemy by which fiction becomes fact and fact becomes fiction. The machinery of debate is used to destroy the purpose of debate, just as democratic institutions are used by the Communists to destroy democracy. While you can expect to accomplish very little positive good through debate you can be certain of unlimited opportunity to foul your own anchor, to become buried under your own patience or to become impaled on your lack of it. Patience and logic are essential, but they can never be decisive. In the end, might is essential to right, not because you or I would have it that way, but because, unless we have armed might and unless we are willing to use that armed might in dealing with the Communists, we cannot win our point and, in fact, we may not survive to argue our point.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, in your Collier's article, you dwell on the Communists' "malevolently whimsical" nomination of the U. S. S. R. as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which their delegation proposed on February 16, 1952.

Why did this become a major issue which was still unresolved when you presented your final package solution in the form of an armistice document on April 28?

Admiral JOY. Around the middle of February 1951, the Communists nominated Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union as member nations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and then formally proposed that both sides agree simultaneously to the neutral nations nominated by both sides. You know, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was the organization set up to make the behind the lines inspections at the ports of entry.

We had nominated Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland a month earlier. The UNC delegates stated they were authorized to accept the nomination of Poland and Czechoslovakia, but the Soviet Union was not acceptable. The Communists in reply said they could not understand why the United Nations Command should reject any nation nominated by their side. The United Nations Command answered that it should be obvious why the Soviet Union was not acceptable and our reasons for nonacceptance would be presented at the next meeting.

The delegation also called attention to the principle which had previously been agreed upon by both delegations and which stated

both sides agreed to invite neutral nations acceptable to both sides which have not participated in the Korean war.

General Ridgway concurred in our rejection of the Soviet Union as one of the neutral nations for the reason that the country was not neutral. When he informed Washington of his action, we were astonished at the reply he received.

This reply concurred in our rejection of the Soviet Union but considered it inadvisable to give reasons for rejection because it would be difficult to substantiate proof of Soviet participation in the war. We were also directed by Washington that either no reason be given or the Communists told it was our view that members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission should be selected from nations not in close proximity to Korea.

Washington then went on to say that a rejection of the Soviet Union should be treated as a matter of fact without undue emphasis. We were further cautioned not to give the Communists the impression that the United Nations Command position was unalterable.

After being ridiculed and challenged by the Communists for our failure to give good reasons why we did not consider the Soviet Union a neutral in the war, I pointed out to General Ridgway that the restrictions imposed on the United Nations Command delegation had resulted in arrogant propaganda statements from the enemy, praising the Soviet Union's neutral attitude in the Korean war. I went on to show how embarrassing this was to us because of our lack of authority to refute such assertions.

I also recommended that we be allowed to make a statement to the Communists essentially as follows: During their meetings, the Security Council of the U. N. gave many reasons why the Soviet Union was not considered as a neutral in the war. These reasons are well known to the world. If you doubt this, we suggest you inform yourselves by obtaining copies of these meetings. The basic fact is, however, both sides have agreed to invite only neutral nations acceptable to both sides who have had no part in the Korean war. Since the Soviet Union does not qualify under these agreed criteria, your nomination of the Soviet Union is formally rejected.

Although General Ridgway strongly recommended to Washington that the delegation be permitted to give this statement to the Communists, this authority was refused. Finally, around the end of February, I pointed out to General Ridgway that the question of the Soviet Union as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was rapidly becoming a major issue, and that we should be given authority to say to the Communists that our refusal to accept the Soviet Union was final and irrevocable, and no longer subject to discussion. Washington gave this authority, but no authority to amplify the basis for the United Nations Command rejection of the Soviet Union.

In short, we were never permitted by Washington to give full justification as to why the U. S. S. R. was not a neutral nation in the war. To me, this was incomprehensible, except when viewed in the light of reluctance on the part of Washington and probably elsewhere to offend the Soviet Union.

Later, about the middle of March, General Ridgway recommended to Washington that the United States Government publicly announce

without delay and with concurrent announcement by as many of its U. N. allies as practical the decision to reject unequivocably the Soviet Union as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

He also pointed out that the removal of the U. S. S. R. as an issue in the negotiations was a prerequisite to the remaining two unsolved questions, i. e., rehabilitation of our airfields and the voluntary repatriation of the prisoners of war. Nothing ever came of this recommendation.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, in discussing the POW question in Collier's of August 30, 1952, you state:

> In short order the opposing delegations were bound and tied in a statistical, administrative, legal, moral, and political Gordian knot. The fact of military stalemate precluded cutting the knot; it had to be untied through negotiations.

General MacArthur had constantly warned against a military stalemate, had he not?

Admiral JOY. That is correct.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, have you any comment on our present plight that we apparently accepted an armistice without the return of all American prisoners of war?

Admiral JOY. By present plight, I presume you mean the predicament we are in with regard to our men who are being held in Red China, allegedly as spies?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes.

Admiral JOY. In answering your question, I should like to read to you paragraphs 51–A and 51–B of article III, arrangements relating to prisoners of war in the signed armistice agreement.

> 51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this armistice agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of the armistice agreement: A. Within 60 days after this armistice agreement becomes effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the armistice agreement, exchange the total number by nationalities of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters prepared by nationality, to include name, rank, if any, and internment, or military serial number. Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the annex hereto.

Obviously, then, the Communists in holding our men have broken this agreement which clearly provides for the return of all prisoners of war, either directly to the United Nations Command or to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at Panmunjom. In short, the United Nations Command did not accept an armistice which failed to provide for the return of all American prisoners of war.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you frequently point out that an armistice is a technical state of war.

Admiral JOY. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Then advocates of military pressure to insure good faith are not in fact advocating preventive war, are they?

Admiral JOY. No; I would say not.

The CHAIRMAN. Blockade is a normal military pressure, is it not?

Admiral JOY. Yes, in a state of war; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And since an armistice is a technical state of war, a blockade would be perfectly proper and legal; correct?

Admiral JOY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. In addition to that, Admiral, does not the United Nations Charter itself provide for a blockade under similar circumstances?

Admiral JOY. That is correct. I have the article right here.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you state that for our record?

Admiral JOY. Article 42 of the United Nations Charter says that the Security Council, and I quote:

may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of the members of the United Nations.

I just want to say that the U. N. Charter containing this provision was approved by the United States Senate 89 to 2 on July 28, 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. If the prisoners are not returned now, would you favor a blockade?

Admiral JOY. I certainly think it should be seriously considered.

The CHAIRMAN. You frequently refer to the Communists giving us lessons in the desirability of decisively defeating the Communists before entering negotiations with them.

Do you believe, then, that in war, there is no substitute for victory?

Admiral JOY. Yes; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Did we defeat the North Koreans?

Admiral JOY. Yes; decisively.

The CHAIRMAN. Could we have defeated the Chinese Communists in Korea?

Admiral JOY. Well, I believe the United Nations Command could have defeated the Communists, or at least caused them to withdraw from the Korean peninsula, had not the commander in chief of the Far East been restricted in the use of his forces, and had an effective U. N. blockade of Red China been established as soon as the Chinese entered the war.

Some Army commanders I have talked to also believed we would have required more ground troops in reserve to accomplish this. I know General Ridgway was also concerned about the paucity of reserve units for a sustained offensive. In view of article 42 of the United Nations Charter, I can see no valid reason why a naval blockade should not have been established.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, this committee has had before it on this series of hearings on this phase of our work, General Clark, General Van Fleet, General Almond, General Stratemeyer and others. I have asked them this question, and I want to ask it of you.

Would you ever again want to fight a war under the wraps and restrictions placed upon you by the United Nations?

Admiral JOY. I certainly wouldn't want to fight another war under those restrictions; no.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, a war that we could have won, but were prevented from doing so?

Admiral JOY. I believe we could have decisively defeated the Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Carpenter.

Mr. CARPENTER. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record a statement made to the U. N. correspondents at Munsan-ni by Vice Adm. Turner Joy, dated November 11, 1951.

The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The document referred to follows:)

[EXHIBIT No. 536]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND (ADV)

PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE, APO 500

11 NOVEMBER 1951
8:00 A. M.

(Following is the text of a statement made to U. N. correspondents at Munsan-ni at 8 a. m. today by Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, U. S. Navy, senior U. N. C. delegate at the military armistice conference in Korea.)

The U. N. C. basic concept of a military armistice is of long standing and is crystal clear.

Our firm objectives of last July when we entered into negotiations at Kaesong, continue to be our unswerving objectives today.

As military men, we are attempting to negotiate a full-fledged military armistice, based on military realities. We want an armistice agreement that will stick and we want terms that will discourage if not prevent a resumption of hostilities.

Specifically, the goals the U. N. C. delegation are striving for are:

1. The establishment of a demilitarized zone that will reflect the military situation as it exists on the day the armistice agreement is signed.

2. Completely adequate security for U. N. C. combat forces and U. N. C. rear areas during the suspension of hostilities. This requirement calls for militarily sound defensible main positions to discourage attack and minimize the effects of any surprise attack. In addition we need adequate room for our outposts ahead of our main positions to insure early warning of attack.

3. We require concrete arrangements that will prevent a buildup of military forces beyond the level existing at the time the armistice is placed in effect. This includes a proviso against the rehabilitation and refurbishment of existing forces whose combat effectiveness has been significantly reduced as the result of combat.

4. We are especially concerned with quick and satisfactory arrangements relating to prisoners of war. Prompt and expeditious recovery of the thousands of United Nations Command men in enemy hands is a primary aim.

We intend to press vigorously for a full military armistice. Anything less would be totally unacceptable.

We entered into negotiations last July at Kaesong with the fervent hope that a realistic military armistice and cease-fire could be achieved quickly. Our hopes dimmed as the Communists maintained an adamant stand on the 38th as a demarcation line and basis for a demilitarized zone. When the Communists summarily suspended the meetings of the delegations on August 22 serious doubts were raised that they did not share our desire for an early armistice.

Our hopes were revived when, after 2 months of suspension, the talks were resumed on October 25. We immediately proposed a realistic solution to an all too realistic problem. We suggested tentative establishment of a demilitarized zone related directly to the existing line of battle contact but adjustable to any subsequent military action prior to the actual signing of the armistice agreement.

But as the resumed subdelegation talks continue it becomes increasingly apparent that what the enemy wants in effect is a finalized demilitarized zone determined now.

He wants all of the advantages of a de facto cease-fire so that he can prolong the armistice negotiations without cost to himself. He wants immediate relief from our inexorable military pressure—the pressure which would be an "incentive" to arrive quickly at agreement on other items.

Our proposal of yesterday on item 2 is honest and realistic and in accordance with United Nations Command objectives.

We proposed that a demarcation line and demilitarized zone be located on the actual line of ground contact at the time of the signing of the armistice. We suggested that only minor, local, and mutually desired adjustments be made to the zone or line. In effect we said to the Communists, "the military situation existing at the time of the armistice will be the controlling factor on the location of the boundary." We must retain this flexibility of military action, without which any immediate solution to other agenda items is problematical.

We shall continue to use every weapon at our command, be it at the conference table or on the battlefield, to achieve a complete military armistice at the earliest possible time.

But we will not compromise our principles. We will not endanger the security of our forces in the field. We will not jeopardize early recovery of our prisoners of war.

Mr. CARPENTER. I would also like to introduce into the record an article from Time magazine of April 28, 1952, entitled "Strategy, the Reason."

The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The document referred to follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 537

STRATEGY

The reason

Why has no truce agreement been reached in Korea? Beneath the weird and interminable welter of words at Panmunjom, the reason is plain even to the newest soldier on the front.

When the truce talks got underway last July, the U. N. knew what brought the Reds to the conference table: they were suffering heavy losses on the battlefield and they faced the prospect of defeat. U. N. spokesmen said insistently that only by continued pressure could the Reds be brought to sign an armistice. But U. N. strategists lost sight of that fact.

Last summer the Communists set out to test U. N. determination by breaking off the talks for 2 months. The result was to bring Matt Ridgway's army down on them with almost as much weight as before, and the Reds came meekly back to the table and gave up their demand for a truce line on the 38th parallel. Washington might have learned a lesson. Instead, it all but stopped the pressure. U. N. settled down to a wait-and-see campaign. Casualties fell off, but over the past 10 weeks the United States has still suffered a weekly average loss of sixty-plus killed, one-hundred-and-forty-plus wounded. The cost of the war went on at roughly $5 billion a year.

Since the lull on the battlefield, the Red negotiators have been wholly intractable. The U. N. has no policy except to try to wear down the Reds at the conference table. In the game of waiting, the U. N. is up against the champs. Once, the U. N. had the advantage in Korea; now it has got into a contest in which the advantage is with the enemy.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, would the military pressure required—that is, in order to defeat the Communists in Korea—would that have started world war III?

Admiral JOY. I do not believe so. I do not think that the Soviet Union was ready for a war.

Mr. CARPENTER. As long as she was not ready, she would not have gotten into the war?

Admiral JOY. The Soviet Union will never start a war except at the time and place of their own choosing. I don't think they were ready for it then.

Mr. CARPENTER. When you secured concessions in negotiations was it as a result of proof of our good faith or of pressure?

Admiral JOY. As I have said publicly a number of times, the only way to negotiate with the Communists is through patience and un-

mistakable firmness, backed up by military power and a willingness to use that power. Nothing else makes sense to the Communist mind. They are not impressed by logic nor are they remotely concerned with morality. Their guiding precept is that the end justifies the means.

Mr. CARPENTER. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record an article published in the U. S. News and World Report of January 11, 1952, and ask that it be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The document referred to follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 538

HOW TO DEAL WITH COMMUNISTS

Out of the prolonged negotiations with Communists in Korea are emerging lessons which United States negotiators feel are vitally important for the American people to learn and take to heart.

These military officers have been trying earnestly for 6 months to do business with the Communists. They have negotiated under the pressure of war with men being killed on both sides day by day as the talks went on. The same frustrations, delays, harassments that confronted diplomats in past negotiations with the Communists were met by military men seeking to deal when time meant lives.

To these men, the lessons for the American people are simple and basic—to be misunderstood or overlooked only at great peril for the future.

The basic conclusion is this: Communist leaders, fundamentally, are convinced that the United States is afraid to risk major war, and can be bluffed and forced to make sacrifices if treated rough. The Communist assumption is that capitalist countries are decadent and prefer their comforts to a prolonged shooting war. Communists assumed that when they went into Korea. They assume it now. They will keep on assuming it, in the opinion of negotiators, in Asia and elsewhere until convinced by something besides words that the West is willing to fight and to kick the pants off Communist forces every time that aggression is tried.

This leads to the question of whether further wars can be avoided by a display of firmness.

The answer, as the negotiators see it, is this: If the Communists are convinced that the West really will fight, then there will be no fight. The Communist technique, set down in black and white and followed consistently, is to strike at weak points, not to attack when it is known that there will be military opposition. If Americans are ready and willing to go to war, in other words, there will be no war. But the burden of proof is on the United States and the West—it has to demonstrate beyond a shadow of a doubt that it will fight before Communists will be convinced. Words and threats will not do.

How to convince them that America means business, then, becomes the big problem. The conclusions of the United States in that regard point to these answers:

What do the Communists respect?

Not a threat, not an ultimatum as such, not a bribe, not a promise of future action, not a compromise, certainly not payment of blackmail in any form. They seem to respect only power than can and will be used to back up a United States position. It must be power in being and in place, where it can be seen and believed unquestionably.

But can you really deal with Communists, short of war?

The negotiators believe it can be done, within limits. But you need infinite patience, you must be firm at all times, you must be coldly logical, and you have to have the military strength actually to enforce every position you take—and to make it perfectly clear that you would just as soon use it for that purpose.

Just how to go about dealing with the Communists is becoming clear, too. The way to operate, as the negotiators see it now, is as if you were a calm, mature teacher who is dealing with a clever juvenile delinquent.

Basically, in other words, the men who have been negotiating with Communists in Korea have come to believe the only way to deal with Communists anywhere is to "speak softly and carry a big stick." There must be no compromise of principles. There can be no give and take, only a demonstration of power or the lack of it.

What the West really is up against is shown, in turn, by these further lessons from Korea:

Why not use Yankee "horse trading" methods with the Communists?

They won't work, say the negotiators. If you give an inch, the Communists will take a mile. Any concession, it appears, is taken as a sign of weakness and the Communists then will increase their demands instead of lowering them.

Can you believe anything they say?

Not as a rule. The men who have been dealing with Communists for 6 months conclude that their word is good only if signed to an agreement that the West can enforce. Each agreement was reached only because it could be enforced and, as long as we are willing to enforce it, their word will be kept.

How about using their methods ourselves?

That wouldn't work, the American officers conclude. Communists operate on a set formula that has been used by Russia for years, one based on deceit and understood by them better than by us. They are masters at using the "big lie" technique to sidetrack the real issues, to confuse and camouflage the point at hand, to get their opponents angry and off guard. No westerner could compete with them on that basis.

Then is there any real way to deal with them by negotiations?

Yes; if you can back it up. It's a matter of repetition. It is very important to make our position perfectly clear by repeating it over and over again, and in different words so that there can be no misunderstanding or suspicion of a loophole. The Communists, who are geniuses at twisting words around, are highly suspicious of any single statement. Several papers, each saying the same thing in different words, should be presented to back up each point. Even after an agreement is reached, the Communists will search for loopholes and give the agreement different meaning if the idea is not made completely clear by other statements saying the same thing.

Can you get an agreement on anything in a hurry this way?

No; it always takes time at best. Time means nothing to the Communists, the negotiators say, and they will haggle indefinitely until they are absolutely certain that the opposition won't weaken and maybe concede something else. In the past, they have come out on top of conference after conference largely because of their willingness just to sit and wait. It takes no intelligence, but a good deal of patience. Others get impatient, under pressure from home to get results in a hurry, and the Communists know this and take advantage of it.

Just how do you go about getting any agreement then?

Well, take the case of the agreement reached on the so-called truce line in Korea. That took months of negotiating. It was done, in essence, by demonstrating to the Communists that if they didn't accept the present battleline, United Nations forces then would push further north and take more Communist-held ground. Further delay, in other words, would cost the Communist something.

The Communists, in that case, finally offered a compromise when they were convinced they could not get the 38th parallel as a truce line. Then they offered a better compromise, and finally agreed to the present line. They still bring the matter up constantly. But they respect the United Nations Army's ability to hold that line, and so the agreement will stand unless they think they can talk us out of it later. It was a matter of carefully demonstrated firmness coupled with active pressure.

Do all Communist negotiators have to clear every agreement with Moscow?

Probably. There is some leeway and not every point is cleared. But all major positions and agreements appear to be sent to and finally decided by an office of the Politburo somewhere—either in Moscow or perhaps a branch office in Peiping or elsewhere. Nothing important is left up to the local commander in any dealings with the West.

What is the Communist formula for dealing with the West?

The pattern invariably followed is something like this: Communists will propose or agree to settlement talks only when on the defensive; they were in Korea last summer. Then, by negotiating, they will try to relieve the pressure on themselves, or gain a breathing spell, or even get a major concession. They will make a proposal and proceed to disagree violently with any change, as a means of testing how firm the position of the West is. They often will make wild statements that are obviously untrue just to confuse the basic issue and upset the Western negotiators. If any concessions are made by the West at this stage, then there is no chance of compromise. It becomes possible to deal later if the West takes steps which will put the Communists further on the defensive, if actual pressure is applied so that it is obviously to the Communist advantage to settle quickly. Words themselves mean nothing. Time means nothing. Only action, and power that can and will be applied, is meaningful.

In the case of Korea, wasn't United Nations power clearly demonstrated in the Communists' high casualty rate?

Yes, but the pressure exerted by casualties is always less on the Communists than it would seem to the western mind. Human life means little to them. Purges all over the Communist world show that. It shows up, too, in other ways. For example, if Americans knew that there was a spy in a unit of 50 men, they would go to a lot of trouble to ferret him out, try him, then either jail him or deport him. The Communists would simply shoot all 50 men in the unit, thus getting rid of the spy with a minimum of trouble. Loss of life even in their own armies apparently becomes a problem only in logistics and replacement.

Looking back, was there a more effective way of trying to get a settlement in Korea?

The negotiators believe so. To get results, the United Nations just had to resume a full-scale land offensive at any time. Tell the Communists you don't care when they come to an agreement, but in the meantime you are going to drive further north every day and move the truce line with you. Then do it. That's the kind of incentive, the officers believe, that gets results in a hurry. The cost of such an offensive would be high in United Nations casualties, so land drives have been limited since the beginning of talks with the Communists.

These, in brief, are the lessons coming out of the latest attempt to deal with Communists around a conference table. The negotiators feel that they must be learned and used skillfully in years ahead if a full-scale war with the Communist world is to be avoided.

Mr. CARPENTER. I would also like to ask that the last statement of Admiral Joy to Communist negotiators, Panmunjom, May 22, 1952, be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record and become a part of the record.

(The document referred to follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 539

LAST STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOY TO COMMUNIST NEGOTIATORS, PANMUNJOM, MAY 22, 1952

At the very first plenary session of our two delegations, on the 10th of July of last year, I said: "The success or failure of the negotiations begun here today depends directly upon the good faith of the delegations present." These words constituted both a promise and a warning—a promise of good faith by our side and a warning that we would expect good faith from your side. Today at the 65th plenary session, my opening remarks on the subject of good faith are more than ever pertinent.

It has become increasingly clear through these long drawn out conferences that any hope that your side would bring good faith to these meetings was forlorn indeed. From the very start, you have cavilled over procedural details; you have manufactured spurious issues and placed them in controversy for bargaining purposes; you have denied the existence of agreements made between us when you found the fulfillment thereof not to your liking; you have made false charges based on crimes invented for your purposes and you have indulged in abuse and invective when all other tactics proved ineffective. Through a constant succes-

sion of delays, fraudulent arguments, and artificial attitudes you have obstructed the attainment of an armistice which easily lay within our grasp had there been equal honesty on both sides of this conference table. Nowhere in the record is there a single action of your side which indicates a real and sincere desire to attain the objective for which these conferences were designed. Instead you have increasingly presented evidence before the world that you did not enter these negotiations with sincerity and high purpose, but rather that you entered into them to gain time to repair your shattered forces and to try to accomplish at the conference table what your armies could not accomplish in the field. It is an enormous misfortune that you are constitutionally incapable of understanding the fair and dignified attitude of the UNC. Apparently you cannot comprehend that strong and proud and free nations can make costly sacrifices for principles because they are strong; can be dignified in the face of abuse and deceit because they are proud, and can speak honestly because they are free and do not fear the truth. Instead you impute to the UNC the same suspicion, greed, and deviousness which are your stock in trade. You search every word for a hidden meaning and every agreement for a hidden trap. It would be charitable for me to say that you do these things by instinct, but you are people of intelligence and it is probably truer to say that you do these things with purpose and design.

From the very first the UNC has had but one objective in Korea: To bring an end to the Korean war so that a permanent and enduring peace might be established as quickly as possible. This has been the precise objective of the UNC delegation in these negotiations. This is what we meant by good faith on our part. You have but to examine the record to see the many evidences of our restraint, our constructive suggestions, our willingness to conciliate and compromise, and our patience. There is very little evidence of similar contributions by your side. As an answer to the question: "Which side has brought good faith to these meetings?" Nothing could be more impressive than a comparison of the actions of the two delegations during our 10 months of these conferences. They are as different as day and night. No amount of propaganda however oft repeated can hide your ignoble record. That these meetings have continued this long and that we have, after a fashion, resolved our differences to the point where only one major issue remains is testimony to the patience and dedication of the UNC.

Now our negotiations have come to the point where the POW issue stands as a formidable barrier to the accomplishment of an armistice. Casting aside any pretense of humanity, you have made the demand that the UNC must return to your side all POW's in its custody, driving them at the point of a bayonet, if necessary. You even have the colossal impertinence to document your position by referring to the Geneva Convention. What could be more ironic than your attempt to found your inhuman proposition upon an international agreement whose purpose is to defend and protect the unfortunate victims of war. These are strange words for you to employ. You who have denied the International Red Cross access to your POW camps, who have refused to furnish lists of POW's to the POW Bureau, and who cannot even account for over 50,000 UNC soldiers whom you officially boasted as having in your custody before the Korean war was 9 months old. After months of conciliation, of meeting you more than halfway on issue after issue, the UNC has told you with all firmness and finality that it will not recede from its position with respect to POW's. On the 28th of April we offered you an equitable and specific solution to the issues remaining before us. We told you then, and we tell you now, that we firmly adhere to the principles of humanity and the preservation of the rights of the individual. These are values which we will not barter, for they are one and the same with the principles which motivated the UNC to oppose you on the battlefield. No amount of argument and invective will move us. If you harbor the slightest desire to restore peace and to end the misery and suffering of millions of innocent people, you must bring to the solution of this issue the good faith which, as I said at our first meeting, would directly determine the success or failure of our negotiations. The decision is in your hands.

After 10 months and 12 days I feel that there is nothing more for me to do. There is nothing left to negotiate. I now turn over the unenviable job of further dealings with you to Maj. Gen. William K. Harrison, who succeeds me as senior delegate of the UNC delegation. May God be with him.

Mr. CARPENTER. Shortly before you left Korea in June 1952 you presented the Communists with our final and irrevocable offer. How did this differ from the armistice achieved later, a year later?

Admiral Joy. It was essentially the same, except for a few minor changes, and the addition of a few supplementary paragraphs covering the details of the screening and disposition of prisoners of war not desiring repatriation.

Mr. Carpenter. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record, and ask that it may become a part of the record, the extract from Admiral Joy's farewell to the Naval Forces, Far East, June 1952.

The Chairman. It may go into the record, and will become a part of the record.

(The document referred to follows:)

Exhibit No. 540

Extract From Admiral Joy's Farewell to the Naval Forces, Far East, June 1952

During the last 10 months of my tour in the Far East I was fortunate or unfortunate enough to face our common enemy across the conference table. If there are still those in the free world who believe that the enemy can be moved by logic, or that he is susceptible to moral appeal, or that he is willing to act in good faith, those remaining few should immediately disabuse themselves of that notion. Our one serious mistake during the negotiations was in assuming, or even hoping, that the enemy was capable of acting in good faith. Future textbooks can set down the maxim that the speed with which agreement is reached with the Communists varies directly as the military pressure applied; and that the worth of any agreement is in proportion to the military pressure you are able and willing to apply to enforce it.

As for the future, it should be clear that there is nothing inevitable about the onward and upward progress of the United States or the United Nations. In fact, there is nothing inevitable about our survival. History is littered with the graves of civilizations that assumed all is well. All is not well. We will survive and progress to the extent that we are aware of the nature of the enemy who threatens us and to the extent that we stay strong enough to meet him in the arena of his choosing.

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, why, then, do you believe that the negotiations were protracted for another year?

Admiral Joy. I have no—protracted from the time we suspended the negotiations?

The Chairman. Protracted from your final one.

Admiral Joy. Yes. Well, of course, it was entirely up to the Communists. We had made our final offer, and there was no backing down on it by the United Nations Command or our Government, or the United Nations. This final offer, to me, has always represented the difference between the free world and the Communist world.

It was very, very difficult for them to accept anything like that final offer for the simple reason that the principle of voluntary repatriation is a principle of this country that the rights of man come before the rights of the state. In the Communist countries, as you know, the rights of the state come before the rights of man. Therefore, there was a fundamental difference in this final proposal between what the Communists believe and what we believe. To accept that meant a great deal to them. Of course, I have no way of knowing why they held off so long and finally came back to the conference table. I can only guess they were using that period, trying to decide whether or not it was to their interest to back down on the prisoner issue and agree to an armistice on United Nations terms for the exchange of prisoners. Probably they realized it was better to forego for the time

being their original intention of attempting to take over all of the Korean Peninsula, and concentrate instead on a more vulnerable area such as Indochina.

Mr. CARPENTER. May I ask you this, Admiral: Did leaks of information handicap your efforts at the armistice negotiations?

Admiral JOY. Yes, decidedly.

Mr. CARPENTER. Would you comment on that, please?

Admiral JOY. We were very embarrassed at the time by the leaks that appeared in periodicals and newspapers in the States, because, as you know, the Communists can read just as well as we can, and they had access to all of that information.

For example, here is an article which is headlined: The Steps Washington Is Planning To Achieve a Truce in Korea. It was incorrect in several details but at the same time when the Communists read something like that, they just sit back and wait, and since time means nothing to them, they continue to wait and see whether such information is correct or not.

For example, here is one:

A decision has been made to abandon opposition to the Soviet Union serving as one of the neutral powers supervising the armistice.

Possibly, that is the reason they stood pat on the neutral nations. I don't know.

Here is another one:

The U. N. seen ready to yield on issue of airfield ban.

And there were others. As I have often said, when you negotiate with Communists, it is like playing poker: You can't have a mirror behind your back.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, Admiral, some of these releases that you referred to came out with the position that our Government was going to take even before you received it officially?

Admiral JOY. I wouldn't say before we received it officially.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you were ready to use it in your negotiations?

Admiral JOY. Before we were ready to use it; yes.

For example, when we made our proposal for a 30-day time limit on the demarcation line, 2 days before we made it we had received it from Washington. Two days before we made it, one of the correspondents came up to me at Panmunjom and said that his head office had heard we were going to give the Communists a time limit, and was that correct? Of course, they had contacts with the Communist correspondents and that all gets in to the Communists. Well, I think that is about enough.

The CHAIRMAN. Someplace along the line, there were some damaging leaks.

Admiral JOY. We always felt they were unnecessary leaks.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, other than the intransigence of the Communists, what was the greatest handicap under which you conducted the negotiations?

Admiral JOY. I would say that the greatest handicap under which we negotiated was the apparent reluctance or inability, in a number of instances, of Washington to give us firm and minimum positions which would be supported by national policy. In other words, positions

which we could carry through to the breaking point of the negotiations if necessary.

As General Ridgway said on one occasion, to introduce and argue vigorously for a basic principle only to be later required to give up that position is detrimental to the overall success of the negotiation. The final position to be supported by national policy should be known to the United Nations Command delegation prior to opening discussion on any general agenda item. In that connection, I would like to read you a telegram I received gratuitously from one of my senior staff officers only yesterday. He is a brilliant and able officer now stationed in Washington.

In view of the forthcoming interrogation, as your ex-staffer, I wish to offer the following comments. At no time were we able to confront our opponents with a forceful alternative to accept our proposals. We knew and they knew there was no steel in the UNC's final positions. There was no point at which our side could resume the military argument powerfully if the discussions failed to make progress. Our lack of determination, revealed to our opponents by acts of recession directed from above us, utterly denied our cause. The only effective combination in negotiating with such enemies is the combination of reasonable proposals, linked with forcible alternatives. Our enemies can be brought to accept reasonable propositions only if these are posed in combination with an alternative of imposing force. This essential was never allowed to us. End of comment. Use this if you like.

Well, this indicates how other members of my staff felt.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, do you have any comment on SEATO?

Admiral JOY. Well, as a layman, pure and simple, I think it is a step in the right direction, though I should like to have seen all anti-Communist countries in the Far East included in the organization, such countries as Japan.

Mr. CARPENTER. What about Indochina?

Admiral JOY. Well, again speaking as a layman, I deplore the fact that the French apparently found it necessary from the standpoint of their national interest to come to an appeasement agreement with the Vietminh. In my opinion, their action in so doing presages the Communist ultimate conquest of the rest of Indochina, probably Thailand and the Malay Peninsula, and Indonesia.

The CHAIRMAN. Should we recognize Communist China?

Admiral JOY. Decidedly no.

The CHAIRMAN. Reverting to the armistice negotiations: Do you feel the real source of our directives was the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the State Department?

Admiral JOY. Well, as I say, I have no means of knowing, Senator. I told you what I heard on good authority when I got back, that it was a combination of a group of State and JCS. That is about all I can say about it.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, political considerations injected themselves into the military considerations?

Admiral JOY. There were undoubtedly political considerations; yes.

Mr. CARPENTER. Admiral, do you believe that the American people wanted then or want now peace at any price?

Admiral JOY. I don't believe the American people have ever wanted peace at any price, when they became aware of the principles and the issues involved.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything further?

Mr. CARPENTER. Nothing further, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. In conclusion, Admiral, I want to thank you for sharing with us some of your hard-earned knowledge. I understand that you went to Kaesong in full and radiant health and that you finished your tour of negotiating with the Communists with your health seriously impaired. I felt at the time, and I feel strongly now, that the Nation owes you and our other fighting military officers an apology for subjecting you to the sheer indignity of having to negotiate with those unprincipled barbarians. I understand, also, the reticence acquired in a lifetime of dedicated military service and appreciate how difficult this session has been for you. I sincerely believe your appearance has been in the public interest and deeply appreciate your cooperation.

The committee will stand adjourned.

Admiral JOY. Thank you, Senator. It has been an honor to appear before your distinguished committee.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded at 11:40 a. m.)

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INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

[Activities of United States Citizens in Red China]

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

DECEMBER 13, 1954

PART 27

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Statement of Senator Herman Welker, acting chairman, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee 2240

INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

MONDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1954

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
San Francisco, Calif.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a. m., in the auditorium of the Department of Health Building, 101 Grove Street, San Francisco, Calif., Hon. Herman Welker presiding.

Present: Senator Welker.

Also present: Alva C. Carpenter, counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director; and Robert McManus and Louis R. Colombo, professional staff members.

Senator WELKER. The meeting will come to order.

The hearing today concerns the activities of American citizens in behalf of Communist China. This hearing is a continuation of hearings held in Washington, D. C., on September 27 and September 28. We heard a number of witnesses, some prisoners of war who had suffered incredible tortures in Communist Chinese prison camps. A central figure in the hearings held in Washington, D. C., was John W. Powell, former editor of the China Monthly Review, published in Communist China. Former prisoners of war described how the China Monthly Review was used for indoctrinating Americans in Communist prison camps. Failure to accept such indoctrination resulted in penalties ranging all the way from beating, solitary confinement, and starvation to the withholding of medical treatment, food, and in many cases, in death.

John W. Powell, we hope, will be our first witness today. I might say that he has been roaming the country of the United States of America, free to continue what the committee feels is the vicious propaganda that he started in Communist China.

We shall today hear from additional prisoners of war, not used in Washington, D. C., who were subjected to this indoctrination. We shall hear from Sylvia Powell, who will be identified at a later time. We shall hear from the widow of one American Army officer who died in the cruel hands of his Chinese Communist captors in a Korean prison camp. This lady will tell you under oath of her dealings with John W. Powell, who the committee feels is certainly living high and mighty in the city of San Francisco, Calif.

Mr. Carpenter, the chief counsel of the subcommittee, will call the first witness.

Mr. CARPENTER. John W. Powell, please.

Senator WELKER. Is John W. Powell in the hearing room at this time?

Does anyone in the hearing room know of the whereabouts of Mr. Powell, John W. Powell?

If not, Mr. Counsel, will you call your next witness?

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Sylvia Powell.

Senator WELKER. Will you stand and be sworn, please. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. POWELL. I do.

TESTIMONY OF SYLVIA CAMPBELL POWELL, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. (ACCOMPANIED BY ATTORNEY DORIS BRIN WALKER)

Senator WELKER. Will you state your name, please?

Mrs. POWELL. Sylvia Campbell Powell.

Senator WELKER. Where do you reside?

Mrs. POWELL. 1015 Carolina Street, San Francisco.

Senator WELKER. In San Francisco, Calif.?

Mrs. POWELL. Yes.

Senator WELKER. Are you a married woman?

Mrs. POWELL. I am married.

Senator WELKER. And do you have issue of that marriage, children?

Mrs. POWELL. I have two children.

Senator WELKER. Their ages, I think, are 5 and 9.

Mrs. POWELL. Five and three.

Senator WELKER. Five and three, I beg your pardon.

Where were you born, Mrs. Powell?

Mrs. POWELL. I was born in Pendleton, Oreg.

Senator WELKER. Now you may proceed, counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. When were you born, Mrs. Powell?

Mrs. POWELL. November 15, 1920.

Mr. CARPENTER. Will you tell the committee your educational background, please?

Mrs. POWELL. I was educated in the public schools of Portland, Oreg., and Milwaukie, Oreg.

Mr. CARPENTER. What year or years?

Mrs. POWELL. During the thirties, I assume.

Mr. CARPENTER. What college did you attend?

Mrs. POWELL. I attended Reed College in Portland, Oreg.

Mr. CARPENTER. When did you graduate?

Mrs. POWELL. I graduated in 1943.

Mr. CARPENTER. With what degree?

Mrs. POWELL. With a B. A. degree.

Mr. CARPENTER. After leaving college, did you go to work?

Mrs. POWELL. I worked for 1 year for the International Wood Workers of America, in Portland, Oreg.

Mr. CARPENTER. From there where did you go?

Mrs. POWELL. To Washington, D. C.

Mr. CARPENTER. For whom did you work in Washington, D. C.?

Mrs. POWELL. For the National Planning Board for a few months; for the Labor Research Bureau of the Midwest for a few months.

Mr. CARPENTER. Then where did you go?

Mrs. POWELL. Then I worked in Washington, D. C., for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

Mr. CARPENTER. What year was that?

Mrs. POWELL. 1945.

Mr. CARPENTER. How long did you work for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in Washington, D. C.?

Mrs. POWELL. For just a few months.

Senator WELKER. Counsel, may I interrupt you?

Would counsel for the witness please identify herself? Give your name and address, please.

Mrs. WALKER. My name is Doris Brin Walker, attorney at law, 345 Franklin Street, San Francisco.

Senator WELKER. You are admitted to practice law in the State of California?

Mrs. WALKER. I am.

Senator WELKER. Any other jurisdiction?

Mrs. WALKER. I am admitted to practice before the Federal district court.

Senator WELKER. How long have you been so admitted to practice law?

Mrs. WALKER. Although I am not a witness, Senator, I will answer the question.

Senator WELKER. If you do not care to identify yourself, all right. We will strike the question.

Mrs. WALKER. I was admitted on December——

Senator WELKER. All right. We will not have you say if you do not want to.

Mr. CARPENTER. How long did you work for UNRRA in Washington, D. C.?

Mrs. POWELL. For just a few months.

Mr. CARPENTER. Then where did you go?

Mrs. POWELL. I went to China for UNRRA.

Mr. CARPENTER. Where were you stationed in China?

Mrs. POWELL. I was stationed in Shanghai.

Mr. CARPENTER. Who was your immediate superior in UNRRA in Shanghai?

Mrs. POWELL. I had several jobs in UNRRA. I was the administrative assistant to the administrative officer of UNRRA. I was in the public-relations office of UNRRA. I was secretary to the head of CNRRA,[1] which is the Chinese counterpart of UNRRA.

Mr. CARPENTER. Was that an organ of the Chinese Government, CNRRA?

Mrs. POWELL. I would assume that the funds would have come from the Chinese Nationalist Government, but I was an employee of UNRRA.

Mr. CARPENTER. Who was your immediate superior while you were with CNRRA?

Mrs. POWELL. I was secretary to John Ting-Fu, T. F. John.[2]

Mr. CARPENTER. How long did you work for CNRRA?

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[1] China National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

[2] Ting-fu Tsiang, former CNRRA official, is now permanent representative of Nationalist China to the U. N.

Mrs. POWELL. For just a short while, perhaps several weeks.

Mr. CARPENTER. Where did you go from CNRRA?

Mrs. POWELL. Gentlemen, I would like very much, in view of the fact that I have an honorable Senator here——

Senator WELKER. Will you answer the question, please?

Mrs. POWELL. I would like to answer the question, Senator.

Senator WELKER. Please answer the question and then, if you desire to explain, I will be happy to have you explain.

Mrs. POWELL. I would like the opportunity of telling you, Senator, and you gentlemen, of the experiences I have had in China because I think that they have given me some insight there. I must say, Senator, that in view of the way this hearing has been presented, the publicity that has preceded the hearing, the threats that have been given to other people who have appeared before hearings by this same subcommittee, I feel that I cannot answer your questions on the ground of the first amendment, which gives me freedom of association.

I also take my constitutional privilege under the fifth amendment for fear that anything I might say might be used in future criminal trials against me.

Senator WELKER. In other words, you take as your objection the first and fifth amendments of the Constitution of the United States?

Mrs. POWELL. I am using my constitutional privileges; that is correct.

Senator WELKER. The first and fifth amendments?

Mrs. POWELL. Both the first and the fifth amendments.

Senator WELKER. I will advise you and your counselor that the committee recognizes the fifth amendment only. We do not recognize the first amendment. Your refusal to answer under the fifth amendment will be recognized.

Proceed, counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you on the editorial staff of the China Review—the China Weekly Review, and later the China Monthly Review, published in Shanghai, China?

Mrs. POWELL. Gentlemen, I think we are in the realm of freedom of the press, which I feel I have the right, under the first amendment, to refuse to answer this question. Since you have ruled you do not recognize that, I will take my constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment.

Senator WELKER. Madam witness, now you feel we are invading the freedom of the press to ask you a very simple question, whether or not you are a writer or assistant editor or any part of the press, not only of our great Nation but any other country, whether it be Communist or anti-Communist? Is that your objection, that we are now invading the freedom of the press by asking you now whether or not you were assistant editor of any publication? We are not asking you, Madam, what you wrote or anything of that sort at this time.

Mrs. POWELL. May I consult?

Senator WELKER. Yes, you may consult with your counsel.

(Witness consulting with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. Senator, I will stand on my previous answer.

Senator WELKER. What is that again?

Mrs. POWELL. That I take my privilege under the first amendment and my constitutional privilege under the fifth amendment.

Senator WELKER. Now, Counselor, I hope that you are advising the client because we all want to save time. We have a number of witnesses. We are not going to recognize the first amendment. I so advise you, when she desires, to take the fifth amendment. Let us limit it to that, please. If you want it so, I will stipulate that she includes, in her refusal to answer, the first and fifth amendments of the Constitution, with the further stipulation that the committee recognizes only the fifth amendment.

Mrs. WALKER. The question of the application of the first amendment to various witnesses is presently before the United States Supreme Court, Senator.

Senator WELKER. I did not ask you for any legal opinion, Counselor; I was merely trying to expedite the hearing. You know our rulings. We have never recognized the first amendment. We do recognize the fifth amendment. It will save time if you do not put the objection upon the grounds of the first amendment. I could not be any fairer than that because I am stipulating that the objection go into the record, but we do not recognize it. Do you understand, Counselor?

Mrs. WALKER. I wish to cooperate with you in every way, Senator, in expediting the hearing.

Senator WELKER. I am sure you do.

Mrs. WALKER. But I feel in advising my client I must advise her completely and not partially.

Senator WELKER. Let me say to you that you are here as a guest of the committee. You are not to advise your client until she seeks advice from you. We shall be happy to permit her to ask your advice at any time. We are glad to have you here, Mrs. Walker.

We will proceed, Counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. You were sometimes known as Sylvia Campbell; is that right?

Mrs. POWELL. That is my maiden name, Sylvia Campbell.

Mr. CARPENTER. Have you done any writing under the name of Sylvia Campbell?

Mrs. POWELL. Gentlemen, I again use the first amendment and my constitutional privilege under the fifth amendment.

Senator WELKER. May I interrupt you, Counselor, again?

In my statement made heretofore I probably did not make myself as clear as I should have that this committee does not recognize the first amendment as a basis for refusing to answer. Naturally, all Americans recognize the first amendment and all the amendments to our great Constitution. Once again let me say that the committee does not recognize the first amendment as a basis for refusing to answer any question propounded to you.

You may proceed, Counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to introduce into the record, to be made a part of the record, the flyleaf of a magazine I hold in my hand entitled "China Monthly Review." May it go into the record and be made a part of the record?

Senator WELKER. It is dated January 19, 1953. It may be made a part of the record.

(The material referred to above was marked "Exhibit No. 510" and appears on following page.)

EXHIBIT NO. 510

China Monthly Review

(J. B. Powell, Editor & Publisher 1918-1947)

Volume 124 — Number 1

Editor:
JOHN W. POWELL

Associate Editor:
JULIAN SCHUMAN

Business Manager:
CHEN PANG-CHENG

Contributing Editors:

SHIRLEY BARTON
WILLIAM BERGES
SYLVIA CAMPBELL
BETTY C. CHANG
CHANG SHU-CHI
SOPHIA CHANG
CHEN FU-SHENG
HUGH DEANE
ALUN FALCONER
HO TUN-SUN
HSU CHIEN
H. C. HUANG
KAO FAN
T. P. KING
DUNCAN C. LEE
MARK M. LU
C. Y. W. MENG
MARGARET TURNER
P. T. WANG
WANG TSUNG-YEN
ROSE YARDUMIAN

密勒氏評論報

January 1953

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Cable Address "Reviewing" Shanghai
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Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Powell, I have here a copy of the China Monthly Review of January 1953. I notice under the name of "Contributing editors" the name Sylvia Campbell. Is that your name and were you in that position with the China Monthly Review of January 1953?

Mrs. POWELL. Gentlemen, I use my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. May we stipulate, Counsel, that she means by that the fifth amendment.

Now, with the ordinary stipulation, if she wants the first amendment it will be not recognized as a basis for not answering the question.

Mrs. WALKER. Senator, I believe that the witness' assertion of her rights under the first amendment will not consume a great deal of time, and it will help to keep the record straight on her assertion of her right not to answer on both grounds. I believe that the ground of the first amendment is a proper ground, particularly in the fields into which you are now inquiring; that is, a publication, and that the witness should preserve her right not to answer on the ground of the first amendment, freedom of speech, as well as on the ground of the fifth amendment, her fear that her answer might be used against her.

I do not believe that it will consume an unreasonable amount of time if she merely states both grounds.

Senator WELKER. We are happy to cooperate with you in any way that we can.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to introduce into the record the flyleaf of the China Monthly Review for June of 1953 and have it made a part of the record.

Senator WELKER. It will be so ordered.

(The material referred to above was marked "Exhibit No. 511" and appears on following page.)

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Powell, I notice here in the magazine entitled "China Monthly Review," published in June 1953, associate editor, along with Julian Schuman, the name of Sylvia Campbell. I will ask you if you are the same person whose name appears on this fly cover of the China Monthly Review.

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I again use the first amendment, freedom of the press, and my constitutional right under the fifth amendment.

Senator WELKER. May I interrupt you, counsel?

Have you ever heard of the China Monthly Review?

Mrs. POWELL. May I consult with my counsel?

Senator WELKER. You may.

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I use the same grounds, freedom of the press, of the first amendment, and constitutional privilege of the fifth amendment.

Senator WELKER. I take it you would take the same objection if I asked you if while you lived in China you had ever seen the China Monthly Review or the China Weekly Review?

Mrs. POWELL. I stand on my answer.

Senator WELKER. Proceed, counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. How long were you in Shanghai, Mrs. Powell?

Mrs. POWELL. I was in Shanghai from 1945 to July 1953.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you travel extensively while you were in China?

Mrs. POWELL. I traveled some while I was in China.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you travel to any foreign countries while you were in Shanghai?

Mrs. POWELL. May I consult?

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

EXHIBIT No. 511



China Monthly Review

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MARK M. LU
C. Y. W. MENG
MARGARET TURNER
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WANG TSUNG-YEN
YANG LI-HSIN
ROSE YARDUMIAN

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Mrs. POWELL. I assert my privilege under the fifth amendment that I am afraid my answer might be used against me in some future trial.

Senator WELKER. We will recognize that.

Proceed, counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you travel to Soviet Russia while you were in Shanghai?

Mrs. POWELL. Gentlemen, I would like to say that if Americans had traveled to Soviet Russia——

Senator WELKER. Just a moment. I will ask you, counselor, to be helpful. Please respond to the question.

Mrs. POWELL. May I add that we had correspondents in the Soviet Union, and I am sure there would have been something in the papers to the effect.

Senator WELKER. Just a moment. You said "we" had correspondents.

Now, counselor, may I admonish you not to be touching the witness, please. I want no more of that activity because you know I admonished you in private hearing that you are here as a guest of the committee. Please do not touch the witness or ask her to look your way until she asks for your help.

Now, Mrs. Powell, you stated a moment ago you had correspondents in other countries. What do you mean by that?

Mrs. POWELL. I mean the United Press, Associated Press, and correspondents—Associated Press and correspondents of others.

I would like to finish my statement. I am sorry, Senator, but it makes me very confused when you keep interrupting.

Senator WELKER. I am sorry I am interrupting. I should be more humble. I traveled a long way. I know you are tired; so am I. If I interrupt you at any time, I am sorry. I merely have a job to do for the American people. You are here as a witness. We want to protect you in every way possible.

Now, if you desire to, go ahead and tell me about the correspondents you have. I want to interrogate you further on that score.

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. I decline to answer the question on my travels on the ground of my constitutional privilege. I mean the fifth amendment.

Senator WELKER. The fifth amendment, if you told the committee the truth, might tend to incriminate you or cause you to bear witness against yourself?

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I feel that anything I may say may be used as evidence against me at some future trial.

Senator WELKER. You fear that?

Mrs. POWELL. I do fear prosecution, although I am innocent. I have committed no crime, Senator. Innocent people have been prosecuted before this, and in this hearing I fear prosecution.

Senator WELKER. You do?

Mrs. POWELL. Indeed, I do.

Senator WELKER. Have you heard of the Internal Security Committee, of which I have the honor to be the acting chairman, prosecuting any innocent people? It is not our duty, Madam, to prosecute innocent people.

Mrs. POWELL. Senator, there are innocent people who have been prosecuted and who have been committed to jail. I am sorry; I will therefore not answer the questions that might tend——

Senator WELKER. I take it you do not believe very much in the American system of jurisprudence and justice?

Mrs. POWELL. I decline to give my opinion, sir.

Senator WELKER. You decline to state your opinion? Why, on the fifth amendment?

Mrs. POWELL. This is an opinion question, I believe, sir.

Senator WELKER. All right. You will answer it whether it calls for an opinion or not. I hereby direct you to answer it, Madam.

Mrs. POWELL. May I consult?

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. Gentlemen, there have been innocent people convicted, as history books will show, and as our press will show, and because of the threats that have been made in prior hearings of this committee, and because of the atmosphere in which this committee is being conducted, I must take my privilege under the fifth amendment.

Senator WELKER. And I take it, too, that if I may make this observation without rancor or bitterness, that answer must strike in their very hearts the brave American soldiers who suffered atrocities in Communist China with a great deal of honor. I am sorry that I had to make that statement, but that is your statement.

You may proceed, counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. What is your husband's name, Mrs. Powell?

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I would like to say that I love my husband, I am proud of my husband; but in view of the threats that have been made in prior hearings of this sort, in view of the manner and the way this hearing is being conducted, I regret very much that I cannot give you my husband's name. I would be most proud to be able to admit his name. I must take my privilege because I fear that this could be used against me in some future prosecution.

Senator WELKER. Under the fifth amendment, if you told the name of your husband, that you might be prosecuted and bear witness against yourself?

Mrs. POWELL. I fear that—excuse me.

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. I have stated my answer, sir. I will stand on that.

Senator WELKER. When did you last hear from your husband?

Mrs. POWELL. I take my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Do you live with your husband at this time?

Mrs. POWELL. I take my constitutional privilege under the fifth amendment.

Senator WELKER. Did you confer with your husband this morning?

Mrs. POWELL. I take my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. That is the fifth amendment now, that if you answered truthfully it might tend to incriminate you or you would have to bear witness against yourself?

Mrs. POWELL. I am taking it for fear that anything I should say to this could be used against me at some future criminal trial .

Senator WELKER. Did you confer with your husband last night?

Mrs. POWELL. I take my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Did you confer with your husband 2 days ago?

Mrs. POWELL. I take my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Do you know the United States marshal of this moment?

Mrs. POWELL. I take my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Do you know the United States marshal of this district has tried to subpena your husband since last Monday? Do you know that as a fact?

Mrs. POWELL. May I consult?

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. The same answer.

Senator WELKER. The fifth amendment?

Mrs. POWELL. My constitutional privilege under the fifth amendment.

Senator WELKER. Has your husband ever talked to you about the open letter that I wrote the people of this area, the people of California, published by, I think, most of the papers here and given on radio and television asking that he come before the committee?

Mrs. POWELL. Senator, I must take my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Are you familiar with the fact that the letter that I used in begging his appearance before this committee was also sent to your residence by special delivery?

Mrs. POWELL. I take my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Have you ever received a letter from Senator Welker, the acting chairman of this subcommittee?

Mrs. POWELL. My constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Proceed, counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Powell, when and where were you married?

Mrs. POWELL. Gentlemen, this covers an area which I feel I cannot discuss. I therefore use my constitutional privilege.

Mr. CARPENTER. You feel you cannot tell this committee when and where you were married?

Mrs. POWELL. May I consult?

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. I stand on my previous answer.

Senator WELKER. Madam, may I ask you this: Have you ever read the official transcript of the hearings of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee held in Washington, D. C., on September 27, 1954, when Mr. John W. Powell was a witness before that committee?

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. That is the fifth amendment. We will stipulate that.

Mrs. Powell, were you familiar with the fact that Chairman Jenner, the Senator from Indiana, advised John W. Powell, as appears on page 1904 of the printed record of said hearing, "Mr. Powell, you are not excused, but you will stand aside at this time from the witness stand. You will be recalled later." Are you familiar with that? Are you familiar with that order given by the chairman of this committee?

Mrs. POWELL. My constitutional privilege.

Mr. CARPENTER. When did you return to the United States, Mrs. Powell?

Mrs. POWELL. I returned in August 1953.

Mr. CARPENTER. From Shanghai?

Mrs. POWELL. From Shanghai.

Mr. CARPENTER. What type of passport did you use when you left Shanghai?

Mrs. POWELL. An American passport.

Mr. CARPENTER. From Shanghai?

Mrs. POWELL. Excuse me.

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I am afraid you do not understand. All I needed to leave Shanghai was a British visa to Hong Kong.

Mr. CARPENTER. So you had a British visa to Hong Kong. From Hong Kong did you travel on an American visa?

Mrs. POWELL. On an American passport.

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes; a visa or American passport. And you arrived here when?

Mrs. POWELL. August 1953.

Mr. CARPENTER. Have you been employed since your return to the United States?

Mrs. POWELL. Gentlemen, I am very sorry that you ask me this question. As I stated in the closed hearing, I feel your committee knows that I was employed; that your committee was aware of where I was employed since my subpena was served at my job. My employers would appreciate it greatly, as the Senator agreed with me—it is a very worthy, worthwhile organization, and it would be a great regret to have its name shamed. It would also, as I am sure you realize, jeopardize my job. I therefore beg you not to press me to give the name of my present employer.

Senator WELKER. I would like to say that I reiterate the fact, the questions and answers that we had in private session a few moments ago, to the effect that the work on which your employer is engaged is, indeed, a meritorious and a great one. By a like token, I feel that these boys who gave their lives and their limbs and suffering, many thousands of them, were engaged also in quite a meritorious, fine function on behalf of their country.

Now I am directing you, madam, to answer the question of counsel.

Mrs. POWELL. I work for the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis.

Senator WELKER. Here in San Francisco?

Mrs. POWELL. Yes.

Mr. CARPENTER. How long have you worked there?

Mrs. POWELL. Since February 1954.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Powell, are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party of the United States?

Mrs. POWELL. I take my constitutional privilege.

Mr. CARPENTER. Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party of China?

Mrs. POWELL. But I am American.

Mr. CARPENTER. I still ask you, were you a member of the Communist Party of China?

Mrs. POWELL. Gentlemen, I take my constitutional privilege.

Mr. CARPENTER. Are you a member of the Communist Party at the present time?

Mrs. POWELL. I take my constitutional privilege.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you a member of the Communist Party when you were a student at Reed College?

Mrs. POWELL. I take my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. How old were you when you attended Reed College?

Mrs. POWELL. I was 17 when I first went there.

Senator WELKER. As a resident?

Mrs. POWELL. Yes.

Senator WELKER. And if you told the committee the truth, you feel that your answer might tend to incriminate you?

Mrs. POWELL. I fear that my answer could be used against me at some future trial. I therefore am using my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Were you a member of the Communist Party when you did the work for the labor organizations about which you testified heretofore?

Mrs. POWELL. I take my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Were you a member of the Communist Party when you were employed at Milwaukie, Oreg.?

Mrs. POWELL. I take my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Were you a member of the Communist Party when you did your work in Washington, D. C.?

Mrs. POWELL. Senator, I refuse; the same answer.

Senator WELKER. Mrs. Powell, I would like to say that certainly we are Americans, too, and if anything is more meritorious than the work you are doing in the National Federation for Infantile Paralysis, it would be hard for me to describe one more meritorious work than that. I hope that anything that has been said here—I hope and pray that the citizenry of this great State, those who contribute to that great cause, will not fail to contribute by virtue of your answer, and answers to the questions propounded to you.

Mrs. Powell, I am again directing your attention to page 1,881 of the official hearings held by the chairman of this committee, Senator Jenner, in Washington, D. C., on September 27, 1954, when John W. Powell, editor and publisher of the China Monthly Review, was on the stand. I will ask you this: whether or not you were informed that Mr. Powell, under oath, informed the committee that:

> My wife is available. If you gentlemen have questions about my wife, she will be more than pleased to come here and give you her views on any variety of subjects.

Are you familiar with that?

Mrs. POWELL. My constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Would it make any difference if we asked you to come to Washington, D. C., and testify? Would you change your answers?

Mrs. POWELL. My constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Very well.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you serve as secretary to Madam Sun Yat-Sen in the China Welfare Fund in China, in Communist China?

Mrs. POWELL. Gentlemen, as I said, I would be most glad, under other circumstances, to tell you of my experience in China. I would certainly be proud to say that I knew Madam Sun Yat-Sen, whom I believe is one of the great women in the world today. In view of the atmosphere that is conducted in this hearing, in view of the threats that have been made to these other witnesses, I greatly regret that I cannot answer this question any more.

Senator WELKER. Counselor, may I take over?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes.

Senator WELKER. I regret very much to hear statements made about this committee. We have always taken pride in trying to defend those who are honest and fair with us. I hope that at the

end of this interrogation you will give us the benefit of the doubt and say that at least we tried to be honest and fair.

Never in my service upon this committee have we attempted to embarrass or to abuse. I hope and pray that if I do that today, or if my counselor does that today, you will call it to my attention. We are, in fact, seeking only to work for the American people that we represent. We are the only way of their having a voice in the Halls of the Congress of the United States.

Now you have praised Madam Sun Yat-Sen. I will ask our research director, Mr. Ben Mandel, for the record and, for the people here, to give his findings and observations with respect to this lady that you say is such a wonderful person.

Mr. MANDEL. The record on Madam Sun Yat-Sen is quite elaborate, but I will confine myself to reading a short dispatch from the New York Times of August 20, 1954, page 2, an AP dispatch from London, which reads as follows:

> Madam Sun Yat-Sen, sister-in-law of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, has been elected deputy to Red China's National Congress, the Peiping radio said today. Madam Sun Yat-Sen, widow of the famed Kuomintang, revolutionary leader, is a supporter of the Chinese Communists and has served as a senior member of the Peiping government since 1949.

Senator WELKER. Now, in view of that statement made by our research director, I assume you still want your answer to stand, that she is a very famous woman and you would like to tell all about her if you were not afraid of the committee?

Mrs. WALKER. Is that a question, Senator?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. Gentlemen, I have answered that question.

Senator WELKER. Mrs. Powell, have you ever been in the service of a foreign Communist government?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. I use my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Mrs. Powell, I am going to approach the witness stand now. Would you be so kind as to give me an example of your handwriting, please?

Mrs. POWELL. May I consult with my counsel?

Senator WELKER. Certainly.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. I decline to do so, sir, on the grounds of the fifth amendment.

Senator WELKER. If you did so, that it might tend to incriminate you?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I would like to say I am innocent of any crime, but I am afraid if I do this, it might be used against me.

Senator WELKER. I may answer that by saying that if you are innocent of any crime and your able counselor cannot take care of you, I will volunteer my services to help you. [Applause.]

I would please like to ask the audience to refrain from any clapping, cheering, whether or not it be for or against any witness who might be on the witness stand. I can say to you all that this is not pleasant for the witness; it certainly is not pleasant for the chairman or the staff. I know that you fine people here will abide by that admonition.

Now directing your attention, Mrs. Powell, to a document marked "Exhibit A" for identification only, I ask you to look at the signature, "Sylvia Campbell Powell," in the lower righthand corner and ask you whether or not that is your signature.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. Senator, I decline to answer.

Senator WELKER. On the ground that if you answer the question it might tend to incriminate you?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. The ground is that my answer might be used against me in some future trial.

Senator WELKER. Do you actually feel that if you told the truth as to a signature, wherein you swore to the truth, that it might tend to incriminate you?

Mrs. POWELL. Senator, I repeat, I am innocent; but in this hearing and with the threats that have been made in previous hearings, I must stand on my answer.

Senator WELKER. I never knew that I was such a vicious person or the committee that I have had the honor to serve on for all these years.

Did you ever live at 410 Embankment Building, Shanghai, China?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. I decline to answer under my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Would you like to tell the committee where you resided on the 31st day of October 1949?

Mrs. POWELL. Senator, I use my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. I will ask you if it is not a fact that on exhibit A you did swear under oath to your God, and I quote:

I have not been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state, taken oath or made an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; entered or served in the armed forces of a foreign state, accepted or performed the duties of any office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof; voted in a political election in a foreign state or participated in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory; made a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state; been convicted by court-martial of deserting the military or naval service of the United States in time of war, or of committing any act of treason against or of attempting by force to overthrow, or of bearing arms against the United States.

If any of the above-mentioned acts or conditions are applicable to the applicant's case, or to the case of any other person included in this application, a supplementary statement under oath should be attached and made a part hereof.

Did you so swear before one Allan A. Turner, vice consul of the United States of America, on the 31st of October 1949? You may look at the exhibit.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. I decline to answer.

Senator WELKER. Exhibit A will be introduced in whole in the body of the record at this part of the testimony.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 512" and appears on following pages.)

EXHIBIT NO. 512

Passport No. 560
Issued on Nov. 8, 1946

APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT OR EXTENSION OF { PASSPORT / CERTIFICATE OF IDENTITY AND REGISTRATION }
(To be filled out in duplicate)

I, Sylvia Campbell Powell (Name) request that my {Passport / Certificate of Identity and Registration

be amended to include my wife, ... (Name in full) who was born at ....

on .... (Date), to whom I was married on .... (Date of marriage) at ....
and whose photographic likeness is attached.
My wife's maiden name was ....

and she { was not previously married. / was previously married on .... }

She was formerly married to .... (Full name of former husband)

on .... (Date) at .... (City, State)

who was born at .... (City, State, or country) and the marriage was terminated by { death / divorce / annulment }

Her present address is .... (City) .... (State)

My wife's last American passport was obtained from ....

and is submitted herewith for cancellation ....

I request that my (Passport) be amended to include my minor children, whose photographic likeness is attached.

John Sellett Powell (Name in full), born at Shanghai, China (Place and State or country) on June 12, 1943

has never resided in the United States from .... to ....

and is now residing at 410 Embankment Bldg. Shanghai

.... (Name in full) born at .... (Place and State or country) on .... (Date)

resided in the United States from .... to ....

and is now residing at ....
(Attach here sheet giving information, as above, as any additional children to be included in passport)

I have not been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state; taken an oath or made an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; entered, or served in, the armed forces of a foreign state; accepted, or performed the duties of, any office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof; voted in a political election in a foreign state or participated in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory; made a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state; been convicted by court martial of deserting the military or naval service of the United States in time of war or of committing any act of treason against or of attempting by force to overthrow, or of bearing arms against the United States.

If any of the above-mentioned acts or conditions are applicable to the applicant's case, or to the case of any person included in this application, a supplementary statement under oath should be attached and made a part hereof.



Sylvia Campbell Powell
(Signature of applicant)
410 Embankment Bldg., Shanghai
(Foreign address)

American consular service at Shanghai

I certify that the person to whom the above passport was issued appeared before me in person and signed and swore to the above application on the 31st day of Oct., 1946.

Allen [illegible]
(Signature)
Vice Consul of the United States of America
(Title)

NOTE.—To be sworn to at offices of Consular Officers. ....

Applications may be accepted by mail if they have been sworn to before an officer authorized to administer oaths for general purposes. ....

F. [illegible] 12/13/50 [illegible]

EXHIBIT No. 512 A

APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT OR EXTENSION OF { passport / certificate of identity and registration } —Continued.

I request that my { passport / certificate of identity and registration } be—

(a) Extended for _____ months.

(b) Amended to include my (wife) (husband) _____

(minor children) _____

who (is) (are) (not to accompany me) (to apply for separate passport) (residing abroad).

(c) Amended to give description of present bearer (if other than original applicant):

_____
(Name of bearer)

Height _____ Eyes _____ Hair _____

Place of birth _____

Date of birth _____

(d) Amended to read in married name _____

_____

I was married on _____ at _____

to _____

who is { an American citizen. / a citizen of _____ }

MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE seen by _____
(Not to be filled in by applicant)

(e) Amended to read _____

_____

_____

CERTIFICATE OF ACTION TAKEN

American Consular Service at Shanghai

I hereby certify that the above { passport / certificate of identity and registration } was on Oct. 31, 1949
(Date)

[X] Amended as requested.

[ ] Extended for _____
(Insert length of period)

[ ] Referred to the Department for consideration and decision.

Authority _____
(If including authorized by letter, instruction, or telegram)

Documentary evidence submitted Report of birth executed at this office Jul[illegible]

_____
(Brief description)

(Seal) (No fee)

_____
(Signature of American Consul)

_____
(Title of the Consul of the United States of America)

INSTRUCTIONS

In cases where specific authorization by the Department is required, a notation of the action taken, upon the receipt of a reply from the Department, should be transmitted to the Department on a third copy of this form.

[illegible]

EXHIBIT No. 512 B

[redacted]

APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL OF PASSPORT

CAUTION.—Extension of expressly limited passports must be applied for on Form 219

In conformity with the rules and regulations prescribed by the President and the Secretary of State pursuant to law, I, the undersigned, hereby apply for a renewal of the period of validity of my passport, the number and date of which appear herein.

RENEWAL SERIES No. 473
Passport No. 560
Passport Serial No. FS 61462
Issued on November 8, 1946 at [illegible]
(Date)

I, Sylvia Campbell Powell, a {naturalized / native} American citizen, do hereby apply for the renewal of my passport. I was {naturalized / married} on December 27, 1947
(To be filled in by women only)

My husband is a {naturalized / native} American citizen
[redacted]
(Name of country)

My legal residence is Milwaukie, Oregon.
(Street address) (City) (State)

I represent the China Welfare Fund
(Name of person or organization)

The part in this block is to be filled in by all persons who have acquired citizen[illegible] naturalization.

Since my present passport was issued, I have resided outside the United States at the following places for the periods stated:

[illegible] from [illegible] to [illegible]

[illegible] from [illegible] to [illegible]

[illegible] from [illegible] to [illegible]

The purposes of my visits to the foregoing countries were:

(Give reason or reasons for stay in each country named)

Sylvia Campbell Powell
(Signature of applicant)

410 Embankment Building, Chex[illegible]
(Present address)

I certify that the person to whom the above passport was issued appeared before me in person on and signed the above application on the Sixth day of November

[signature]
American Vice Consul
(Title)

Fee $5.00

[illegible]
(Issuing office)

[illegible]

EXHIBIT No. 512 C

CERTIFICATE OF ACTION TAKEN

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the above passport was on .... (Date)

renewed for .... months.
renewed for two years.
referred to the Department for consideration and decision together with a Form 213.
taken up.

.... (Signature)

[SEAL] .... (Title)

Notarial Service No. ....

After application has been submitted to Department and information in reply received.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the above passport was on .... (Date)

renewed for .... months.
renewed for two years.
refused renewal and passport taken up.

Authority ....

.... (Signature)

[SEAL] .... (Title)

Notarial Service No. ....

In duplicate, but when the application is to be referred to the Department for consideration, it should be ... After the Department's decision is reported to the consular office, the triplicate copy should be filed ... with the ... and forwarded to the Department, the duplicate copy on file in the office being amended accordingly.

EXHIBIT NO. 512 D

Passport No. 560
Issued on Nov 8, 1946
At Shanghai

and
APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT OR EXTENSION OF { PASSPORT CERTIFICATE OF IDENTITY AND REGISTRATION
(To be filled out in duplicate)*

I, Sylvia Campbell (Name) request that my {Passport / Certificate of Identity and Registration

be amended to include my wife, //// (Name in full), who was born at ______ (Place and State or country)

on ______ (Date), to whom I was married on ______ (Date of marriage) at ______ (City, State or country)

and whose photographic likeness is attached.

My wife's maiden name was ______

and she { was not previously married. / was previously married on ______ (Important: Date of each previous marriage must be given)

She was formerly married to ______ (Full name of former husband)

on ______ (Date) at ______ (City, State, or country)

who was born at ______ (City, State, or country) and the marriage was terminated by { death / divorce } (Cross out one) on ______ (Date)

Her present address is ______ (City) ______ (State)

My wife's last American passport was obtained from ______ (Insert Washington, or location of office abroad) on ______ (Date)

and is submitted herewith for cancellation ______ (Give disposition of passport if it cannot be submitted)

I request that my { Passport / Certificate of Identity and Registration } be amended to include my minor children, as follows, whose photographic likeness is attached.

______ (Name in full) born at ______ (Place and State or country) on ______ (Date)

resided in the United States from ______ to ______

and is now residing at ______

______ (Name in full) born at ______ (Place and State or country) on ______

resided in the United States from ______ to ______

and is now residing at ______
(Attach here sheet giving information, as above, on any additional children to be included in passport)

I { have / have not } been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state; taken an oath or made an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; entered, or served in, the armed forces of a foreign state; accepted or performed the duties of, any office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof; voted in a political election in a foreign state or participated in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory; made a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state; been convicted by court martial of deserting the military or naval service of the United States in time of war, or committing any act of treason against or of attempting by force to overthrow, or of bearing arms against the United States.

If any of the above-mentioned acts or conditions are applicable to the applicant's case, or to the case of any other person included in this application, a supplementary statement under oath should be attached and made a part hereof.

Sylvia Campbell Powell
(Signature of applicant)
410 Embankment Bldg, Shanghai
(Present address)

A duplicate of the photograph to be affixed to the passport should be pasted here.

American consular service at Shanghai

I CERTIFY that the person to whom the above passport was issued appeared before me in person and signed and swore to the above application on the Eigth day of November, 1946

[signature]
(Signature)
American Vice Consul.
(Title)

NOTE.—To be sworn to at an American Consular Office; ... Consular Officers.
Applications may be accepted by mail if there have been ... before a local officer authorized to administer oaths for general purposes ... the foreign official should fill out, sign, and affix his seal to the ...

130-POWELL, SYLVIA CAMPBELL

AK-OX

EXHIBIT No. 512 E

APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT, EXTENSION OR [illegible] PASSPORT CERTIFICATE OF IDENTITY AND REGISTRATION —Continued.

I request that my {passport / certificate of identity and registration} be—

(a) Extended for [illegible] months

(b) Amended to include my (wife) (husband) ---

(minor children) ---

who is) (are) (not to accompany me) (to apply for separate passport) (residing abroad).

(c) Amended to give description of present bearer (if other than original applicant):

(Name of bearer)

Height ---, Eyes ---, Hair ---

Place of birth ---

Date of birth ---

(d) Amended to read in married name Sylvia Hunter Campbell Powell

I was married on December 27, 1947 at Shanghai, China,

to John William Powell

who is {an American citizen.}

MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE seen by Francis T. McCoy, American Vice Consul.
(Not to be filled in by applicant)

(e) Amended to read ---

CERTIFICATE OF ACTION TAKEN

American Consular Service at Shanghai, China.

I hereby certify that the above {passport / certificate of identity and registration} was on ~~date~~ November 8, 1948
(Date)

[X] Amended as requested.

[X] Extended for Two years. Valid to November 8, ~~1948~~ 1950
(Insert length of period)

[ ] Referred to the Department for consideration and decision.

Authority ---
(If specially authorized by letter, instruction, or telegram)

Documentary evidence submitted Marriage Certificate issued 27 December 1
Henry D Jones, Pastor, Presbyterian Church, USA, seen and retur
(Give description)

[illegible] (NO FEE)

Francis T McCoy
(Signature of American Consul)

INSTRUCTIONS

*In cases where specific authorization by the Department is required, a notation of the action taken upon the request should be transmitted to the Department on a third copy of this form.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—18848-1

EXHIBIT NO. 512 F

Budget Bureau No. 47-R017. Approved until changed.

Application for Passport

(Indicate plainly which is desired)

FORM FOR NATIVE CITIZENS

APPROVED
Date Nov. 8, 1946
Expires
Vice Consul
Place Shanghai, China

PASSPORT ISSUED
Date NOV. 8, 1946
No. (550473-61463
Expires NOV. 8, 1947
Place Shanghai, China

I, Sylvia Campbell (Name in full), a Native citizen of the United States, do hereby apply to the Department of State for a passport. I solemnly swear that I was born at Pendleton (City or town) Oregon (State or country), on November 15, 1920 (Date); that I am now residing at Hamilton House, Room ... (Give present address); that I resided continuously in the United States from 1920 to 1945 at Portland, Oregon; ... (City and State)

and that I have resided outside the United States as follows:

(State name of, and period of residence in, each foreign country)

China, from December 29, 1945 to present

(Name of countries), from ... to ...

My legal residence is at Route 17, 668, Milwaukee, Wis.

and I intend to return to the United States to reside permanently within indefinite

I was {never married / ~~married~~} to ...

who was born at ... ; who ...

and who is now residing at ...

My father, John Washburn Campbell (Name in full), was born at Medical Lake (City or town), Wash., on Oct. 19, 1862 and is now ~~residing at~~ deceased.

My mother, Alice Taylor (Maiden name), was born at Steubenville (City or town), Ohio, on Oct. 25, 1882, and is now residing at Route 17, 668, Milwaukee, Wis.

(IF EITHER PARENT WAS BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, FILL IN THIS PORTION)

My father emigrated to the United States on or about ..., resided in the United States from ... to ..., at ..., and was naturalized as a citizen of the United States before the ... (Name of court) Court of ... at ... (City and State) on ... (Month) ... (Day) ... (Year)

My mother emigrated to the United States on or about ..., resided in the United States from ... to ..., at ..., and was naturalized as a citizen of the United States before the ... (Name of court) Court of ... at ... (City and State) on ... (Month) ... (Day) ... (Year)

I request the inclusion of my wife ... (Name in full)

She acquired citizenship through ...

I request the inclusion of my minor children as follows:

... (Name in full), born at ... (Place and State or country) on ... (Date)

..., born at ... on ...

..., born at ... on ...

I {~~have~~ / have not} been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state; taken an oath or made an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; entered, or served in, the armed forces of a foreign state; accepted, or performed the duties of, any office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof; voted in a political election in a foreign state or participated in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory; made a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state; been convicted by court martial of deserting the military or naval service of the United States in time of war, or of committing any act of treason against, or of attempting by force to overthrow, or of bearing arms against the United States.

If any of the above mentioned acts or conditions are applicable to the applicant's case, a supplementary statement under oath should be attached and made a part hereof.

* A woman applicant who has been married more than once should give name and place of birth of each husband, date of each marriage, and date of termination of each marriage through death or divorce. This and any other information necessary to clarify the citizenship status of the applicant should be set forth in a separate affidavit which will be considered a part of this application.

EXHIBIT No. 512 G

I solemnly swear that the statements made on pages 1 and 2 are true, and that the photograph attached is a likeness of me.

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

Further, I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion: So help me God.

Fee for passport, $9.00.
Fee for administering oath and preparing passport application, $1.00.
Fee for registration.
No. 14214

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of November 1946

Vice Consul of the United States at Shanghai, China

DESCRIPTION OF APPLICANT

Height 5 feet 6 inches
Hair Brown Eyes Blue
Distinguishing marks or features None
Place of birth Pendleton, Oregon
Date of birth November 13, 1923
Occupation Administrative Assistant – China Relief

EVIDENCE OF CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTIFYING DOCUMENTS

Passport No. Special 5267 (R 3597) issued on October 24, 1945 by Department of State, Washington, D. C.

to applicant, SUBMITTED.

State disposition of passport Forwarded to the Department for cancellation.

Other evidence of citizenship and identifying documents submitted, as specified below: (Indicate whether sent to the Department, retained)

Previously registered at this office dated February 20, 1946.

The following should be given if this application is for a PASSPORT:

Countries to be visited: China
Purpose of visit:
Port of departure:
Date of departure:
Name of ship:
Is the ship of an American line? ("Yes" or "No")

REFERENCES

(Name) (Address)

AFFIDAVIT OF IDENTIFYING WITNESS

I, the undersigned, solemnly swear that I am a citizen of the United States; that I reside at the address written below my signature hereto affixed; that I know the applicant who executed the affidavit hereinbefore set forth to be the person he represents himself to be, and that he is a citizen of the United States; that the statements made in the applicant's affidavit are true to the best of my knowledge and belief; further, I solemnly swear that I have known the applicant personally for ____ years.

(Signature of witness)
(Residence address of witness)

[SEAL]

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ____ day of ____ 19__.

If no American citizen is available, an alien known to the consular officer may execute the affidavit.

Consul of the United States of America at

CONSULATE GENERAL SHANGHAI NOV 26 1946

The applicant requests that the following person be notified in the event of his death or disability:

Mrs. Alice T. Campbell (Name), Route 17, 668, Milwaukee, Wis. (Address)

Additional data: Location of real and personal property, nature and place of investments, location of will, et cetera. (It is entirely optional with the applicant to give this information.)

Registration approved / disapproved by the Department.

Certificate of Identity and Registration
Card of Identity and Registration

EXHIBIT No. 512 II

ENDORSEMENT ON PASSPORT

Nov. 8, 1946

THIS PASSPORT EXPIRES

Nov. 8, 1947

IS NOT VALID FOR TRAVEL IN ANY COUNTRY EXCEPT

CHINA

Mr. CARPENTER. At the same time, Senator, I would like the covering letter from the Department of State referring to that document to be included with it.

Senator WELKER. Very well. We will mark that "Exhibit B" for identification.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 513" and appears below.)

EXHIBIT No. 513

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 11, 1954.

In reply refer to
F130–Powell, John William

Hon. WILLIAM E. JENNER,
Chairman, Internal Security Committee,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR JENNER: In reply to your letter dated August 10, 1954, I am enclosing photostats of the passport applications of Mr. John William Powell [1] and his wife, Mrs. Sylvia Campbell Powell, together with photostats of the applications for renewal and amendment of their passports.

It will be noted that Mr. Powell's passport No. 796, which was issued to him on February 28, 1950, by the consulate general at Shanghai, China, was amended by the consulate general at Hong Kong on August 6, 1953, to include the names of his wife, Sylvia Campbell Powell, and his minor sons, John Sellett Powell and Thomas Sargent Powell. His passport was then renewed to expire on September 6, 1953, and was validated for travel to the United States only. Mr. Powell submitted to the consulate general at Hong Kong Mrs. Powell's passport No. 560, which was issued to her on November 8, 1946, by the consulate general at Shanghai, China, and which definitely expired on November 7, 1950. The passport was issued to her in her maiden name of Sylvia Campbell and had been amended to read in her married name; had been renewed to be valid until November 7, 1950; and had been amended to include the name of her minor son, John Sellett Powell.

Sincerely yours,

R. B. SHIPLEY,
Director, Passport Office.

Enclosures: Copy of this letter, photostats.

Senator WELKER. I shall hand this to counsel. It is merely hearsay; it is from the Department of State. It is with respect to exhibit A for identification, and I want to be fair with you on that [handing document to Mrs. Walker].

This letter, without reading it for the record, has been introduced at this portion of the testimony and marked "Exhibit B" for identification and put into the body of the record.

Proceed, counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Powell, did you know a Gerald Tannebaum?

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I am not going to answer any names about any people which I feel could be used in later proceedings against me. I refuse to answer this question on my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Counsel, may I ask a question?

In order to be sure that there is no mistaken identity, certainly not to embarrass your young sons, I wonder if you would be kind enough to state to the committee the names of your sons.

(Witness confers with her counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I do not see what the opinions of my sons or why——

Senator WELKER. I did not ask about their opinions.

[1] Mr. Powell's passport is reproduced at pp. 1870–1879 of pt. 23 of the subcommittee's inquiry into interlocking subversion in Government departments, wherein Mr. Powell testified.

Mrs. POWELL. I would not like to see them entered into this sort of hearing. I do not understand why you are asking this question.

Senator WELKER. I am sure I do not want to embarrass you. I thought I qualified my statement. If you are the great American you say you are, I am certain that your sons will be proud and not embarrassed.

Now, would you care to give us the names of your children, because certainly this committee does not want to have the wrong Mrs. Powell before it.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. Senator, as I stated at the closed hearing, my sons are 5 years old and 3 years old. I would prefer that publicity relating to this hearing would not affect either of them. Therefore, I hope you will not press this question.

Senator WELKER. I hope and pray that any publicity given to you will not reflect back upon those two fine sons. No one loves his children any better than the acting chairman.

Your declination to give us the names leads me to read a portion of exhibit B from R. B. Shipley, Director, Passport Office, of the Department of State, Washington, D. C., dated August 11, 1954, addressed to our chairman, Senator Jenner, of Indiana, second paragraph, and I quote:

> It will be noted that Mr. Powell's passport No. 796 which was issued to him on February 28, 1950, by the Consulate General at Shanghai, China, was amended by the consulate general at Hong Kong on August 6, 1953, to include the names of his wife, Sylvia Campbell Powell, and his minor sons, John Sellett Powell and Thomas Sargent Powell. His passport was then renewed to expire on September 6, 1953, and was validated for travel to the United States only. Mr. Powell submitted to the consulate general at Hong Kong Mrs. Powell's passport No. 560 which was issued to her on November 8, 1946, by the consulate general at Shanghai, China, and which definitely expired on November 7, 1950. The passport was issued to her in her maiden name of Sylvia Campbell and had been amended to read in her married name; had been renewed to be valid until November 7, 1950; and had been amended to include the name of her minor son, John Sellett Powell.
>
> Sincerely yours,
>
> R. B. SHIPLEY,
> *Director, Passport Office.*

Do you have any comment to make on that?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. I have no comment to make.

Senator WELKER. Will you say to the committee that the names of the minors there were not the names of your children and the children of John W. Powell?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. I decline to answer.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Powell, were you a contributor to the China Monthly and/or the China Weekly Review during the period when the Communists were in power in Shanghai?

Mrs. POWELL. Gentlemen, I use my privilege of the first amendment in this case as well as my constitutional privilege.

Mr. CARPENTER. Is it a fact that you were contributing editor during the Korean war to the China Monthly Review?

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, the same answer.

Mr. CARPENTER. Is it not a fact that you actively assisted in editing that magazine, along with your husband, John W. Powell?

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, the same answer.

Mr. CARPENTER. And is it not a fact, Mrs. Powell, that that magazine was used for propaganda purposes to propagandize American POW's against the United States and in behalf of Communist China?

Senator WELKER. You mean what by POW's?

Mr. CARPENTER. Prisoners of war.

Mrs. POWELL. The same answer.

Senator WELKER. May I ask a question, Counselor?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Mrs. Powell, did you ever write to any of the loved ones of prisoners of war on stationery of the China Monthly Review in which one John W. Powell was named as editor and publisher? Did you ever write to any of those great suffering Americans?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. I use the first amendment and I use the fifth amendment, my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Now I must advance to the witness chair again so that I can show you something. No, I think the record is very clear that the first amendment is not accepted by the committee as a basis for refusal to answer questions propounded to you.

Will you mark this as exhibit C for identification, Mr. Reporter.

Mrs. Powell, I will ask you if it is not a fact that on November 27, 1952, on the stationery of the China Monthly Review you did airmail the following letter to Mr. and Mrs. William D. Scott, 4 Auburn Street, Wakefield, Mass.

Before reading the letter let me say that up in the left-hand corner the name of John W. Powell appears as editor and publisher. The address on the right-hand corner is 160 Venan Road East, Shanghai (O); telephone 14772. Then there is some Chinese language that I do not have the ability to interpret.

Now I will read exhibit C to you.

DEAR MR. AND MRS. SCOTT: I am sorry not to have answered your letter of October 10 sooner. My husband has been traveling around China and I have been doing double duty at the office.

Your son's name was broadcast over Radio Peking on June 24, 1951. He, along with several hundred other American prisoners of war, had signed a statement addressed to the American people, which described an incident on April 22, 1951, when their camp was rocketed and strafed by four United States Mustang fighter planes, causing the death of 16 prisoners of war and wounding 16 others. This statement and the list of signatories appeared in the New China Daily News Release, and we sent this material on to the National Guardian, which also published them.

We can certainly understand your great concern for your son's welfare and would like to help you in whatever way we can. It is our feeling that when there is a cease-fire in Korea all information about prisoners of war and boys listed as missing in action can be clarified.

As you know, the only issue preventing a cease-fire is the question of the exchange of prisoners of war. I am certain that if the American prisoners of war had any say on this issue—and who has more right than they?—it would have been settled long before this and all the prisoners from both sides would now be back with their families.

Radio Peking is still broadcasting messages of prisoners of war and we shall certainly keep on the lookout for your son's name. If you feel we can be of any further help, please feel free to write us again. We would be glad to send a letter on to the China Peace Committee for you to be forwarded from there.

Very sincerely,

(Signed) "Sylvia Powell," and in typed letters, "Mrs. John W. Powell," which appears to me to be the same name as that of John W. Powell listed as the editor and publisher of the China Monthly Review.

Now will you look at that and say whether or not that is your signature and whether or not you sent that letter to Mrs. and Mr. William B. Scott?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. Senator, I use the first amendment and my constitutional privilege under the fifth amendment in declining to answer.

Senator WELKER. My, that Constitution is a wonderful thing, is it not?

Now this letter will be made a part of the record at this point of our proceeding.

(The letter referred to as exhibit C for identification was marked "Exhibit No. 514" and appears below.)

EXHIBIT No. 514

Cable Address:
"REVIEWING SHANGHAI"

JOHN W. POWELL
Editor and Publisher

China monthly Review

Address:
160 YENAN ROAD E.
SHANGHAI (0)
TEL. 14772

上海延安东路一六〇號

November 27, 1952

AIRMAIL

Mr. and Mrs. William D. Scott
4 Auburn Street
Wakefield, Mass.

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Scott:

I am sorry not to have answered your letter of October 10th sooner. My husband has been travelling around China and I have been doing double duty at the office.

Your son's name was broadcast over Radio Peking on June 24, 1951. He, along with several hundred other American Prisoners of war, had signed a statement addressed to the American people, which described an incident on April 22, 1951, when their camp was rocketted and strafed by four US Mustang fighter planes, causing the death of 16 Prisoners of War and wounding 16 others. This statement and the list of signatories appeared in the New China Daily News Release, and we sent this material on to the National Guardian, which also published them.

We can certainly understand your great concern for your son's welfare and would like to help you in whatever way we can. It is our feeling that when there is a cease-fire in Korea, all information about Prisoners of War and boys listed as missing in action can be clarified.

As you know, the only issue preventing a cease-fire is the question of the exchange of prisoners of war. I am certain that if the American Prisoners of War had any say on this issue -- and who has more right than they? -- it would have been settled long before this and all the prisoners from both sides would now be back with their families.

Radio Peking is still broadcasting messages of Prisoners of War and we shall certainly keep on the look-out for your son's name. If you feel we can be of any further help, please feel free to write us again. We would be glad to send a letter on to the China Peace Committee for you to be forwarded from there.

Very sincerely,

Sylvia Powell
(Mrs.) John W. Powell)

Senator WELKER. You may proceed, Counsel.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Senator WELKER. Once again let me rule on the first amendment, as I have ruled here all morning, that the first amendment is not recognized by this committee as a basis for refusal to answer the question. Your fifth amendment objection will be recognized.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Powell, did you attend the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference in October 1952 with your husband John W. Powell?

Mrs. POWELL. I use my constitutional privilege.

Mr. CARPENTER. In connection with this conference, did you write an article recounting your visit to Communist China?

Mrs. POWELL. I use, on advice of counsel, the first amendment; and I use my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. May I interrupt?

As your able counselor well knows, the privilege of the fifth amendment is a right granted to you and not to your counsel. She has no right whatsoever to advise you to take the fifth amendment. You, my friend, must take that right yourself.

Am I correct on that, Counselor?

Mrs. WALKER. I understood the witness to say that she continued to use the first amendment on my advice that it was available to her. She also inserted the fifth amendment in her right.

Senator WELKER. Let me say that the privileges granted by both of those amendments—the first and fifth amendments—are personal privileges and you have no right to advise. I want to repeat this so that the record is straight for your benefit as well.

Mrs. WALKER. I merely advised her that, in my opinion, if she chose to use the first amendment, it was a proper ground.

Senator WELKER. Very well. Reasonable minds might differ on that.

A moment ago you were interrogated about the National Guardian. I will ask you whether or not you have any information as to whether or not the China Monthly Review, whose editor was one John W. Powell—whether or not they have as an advertisement in the newspaper, in the China Monthly Review the following:

National Guardian—an American weekly that covers United States and world events from a progressive point of view. Order through the China Monthly Review. Seventy-five thousand yen a year postage included.

Did you ever know that the National Guardian was advertised in the China Monthly Review in the month of May 1953?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I use the first amendment and my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. Are you familiar with one Cedric Belfrage, a New York writer?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Senator WELKER. He was editor of the National Guardian and has been ordered deported as a Red, according to a news release of the New York Times dated December 11, 1954; on page 6 thereof.

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I use my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. I want this news release, as heretofore related, marked "Exhibit D" and made a part of the record at this point of the proceeding.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 515" and appears below.)

EXHIBIT No. 515

EDITOR IS ORDERED DEPORTED AS RED—BELFRAGE LINKED TO COMMUNIST ACTIVITY—BRITISH SUBJECT TO APPEAL RULING

WASHINGTON, December 10 (AP).—The Justice Department said today that an Immigration Service inquiry officer had ordered Cedric H. Belfrage, a New York writer, deported "on grounds of Communist Party membership."

Mr. Belfrage, identified as the editor of the National Guardian, has 10 days to appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. He was arrested May 15, 1953, and has been free on $5,000 bond.

The inquiry officer, the Department said, decided after a hearing in New York that Mr. Belfrage, a British subject, had been a member of the Communist Party at the time of and since his latest entry into this country.

Mr. Belfrage, born in London November 8, 1904, entered the United States at San Ysidro, Calif., in 1937. His latest reentry was as a returning resident at Rouses Point, N. Y., October 28, 1945.

The Department said that after World War II Mr. Belfrage had been active as a writer in Hollywood and had been listed as a research director of the Peoples Institute of Applied Religion. The organization, the Department said, is on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations.

ORDER TO BE APPEALED

Mr. Belfrage said yesterday that he would appeal the deportation order and would carry on the fight as long as the National Guardian, a news weekly, had the resources.

"The fight to protect the right of any publication to criticize the Government in any way it sees fit—for that is the essence of this fight as we see it—is an enormously costly one, but our many friends and readers are back of us," he declared.

The editor said he had been confined to Ellis Island for 4 weeks in 1953 on request of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican of Wisconsin, as an "imminent danger to the United States." Mr. Belfrage commented that although he had "continued in circulation for 1½ years" since his release on bail from Ellis Island, "the Government of the United States still stands."

He charged that he had been ordered deported now because his "politics were wrong 17 years ago." The order was issued under the Walter-McCarran law which the National Guardian will continue to fight until "it goes to the ashcan where it belongs," Mr. Belfrage asserted.

The McCarran-Walter Act, passed by Congress over President Truman's veto in 1950 and amended in 1951 and 1952, provides for the deportation of aliens who have belonged to totalitarian organizations.

Senator WELKER. Proceed, Counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Powell, while you were in Shanghai, did you contribute any articles to American newspapers?

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I use the first amendment and my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. The fifth amendment will be recognized as the basis for not answering the question, not the first.

Mr. CARPENTER. I have here a photostatic copy of the editorial page of the Oregon Daily Journal, Portland, Oreg., dated Monday, February 13, 1950. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have our investigator, Mr. McManus, read an article from this page and describe the article.

Senator WELKER. Very well.

I think you had better ask her whether or not she wrote it.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Powell, did you write an article entitled "Today's Guest Editorial—Red Shanghai, by Sylvia Campbell Powell"?

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I feel this is an abridgment of my right under the first amendment. I also use my constitutional privilege.

Mr. CARPENTER. At this point I would like to ask Mr. McManus to read the statement.

Senator WELKER. The committee will accept your refusal to answer questions claiming the fifth amendment, but not the first.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Senator WELKER. Proceed, Mr. McManus.

Mr. MCMANUS. This is a photostat of the editorial page of the Oregon Daily Journal, Portland, Oreg., Monday, February 13, 1950, An editorial note preceding the article referred to reads:

The following letter is from Mrs. Powell, wife of John Powell, editor of the China Weekly Review; daughter of Mrs. John Campbell of Milwaukee; a graduate of Reed College. It was written about 2 months ago and gives her personal reactions to the Red army regime in Shanghai. It is a surprising report.

The "guest editorial" is as follows:

I wrote you how much Bill and I were looking forward to witnessing the great changes that were bound to take place here in Shanghai. We haven't been the least bit disappointed. It has been amazing and if I hadn't seen for myself, I never would have believed it.

We had heard a lot about the wonders of the Red army, and now we have seen for ourselves. They are truly Spartans and devoted to the cause of building up China. Right now those stationed in this city are out in the countryside helping the peasants build dikes and harvest the crops. But what has impressed us most is the new spirit. This whole summer has been filled with parades and the parade to end all parades was held the first of October to celebrate the founding of the new government and International Peace Day.

An estimated 1 million people marched for 12 hours past our window, shouting slogans, singing songs, dancing the new folk dances—floats, torches, the new flags. It was terrific. And the real cross section of Shanghai—bankers, professors, doctors, small shopkeepers, thousands of students, but mainly workers. When we remembered that human lives in China have had little value, it was especially impressive to see that now all these people were realizing their potentialities. I wanted to cry, it was so wonderful.

Another thing we find most exciting is the constant meetings and the quickened interest of everyone to learn the new ideas and to participate in the production program. Every banker, student, worker—nearly everyone—attends some kind of a study meeting. They are so eager to know.

Of course, everything hasn't been sugar and honey. All during the summer several times a week 2 or 3—sometimes more—Kuomintang bombers came over the city. Though they caused little damage, still it was far from pleasant. Naturally, we weren't too happy to hear the Voice of America say last week that America is "selling" another 11 bombers to the KMT. The KMT blockade of this port has been another headache. It's not only made it more difficult for the new government, but foreign and Chinese businessmen have had to take it on the chin since Shanghai depends on trade to keep going. Though our State Department has said that it does not recognize this "illegal" blockade, still it is American Government supplies of oil and other fuels that make it possible. You can see why we're not too happy about the way things are going at home.

Just this week the two Chinese airways have deserted the KMT and come over to the new government, which is very good news indeed. Our friend Chennault is having a field day for he now has a monopoly flying the bigwigs from Chungking to Taiwan. It's bound to add more gold bars to his collection. Another unpleasantness has been the several incidents between foreigners and the new government. We feel that the primary cause has been the attitude on the part of some foreigners that Shanghai is their city. They forget that these aren't the "good old extra-territoriality days." For the rest of us who are willing to respect the laws and the Chinese people, there's nothing to worry about.

On the contrary, there is much to learn. It's a fascinating experience and we can't leave just yet.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Powell, did you ever participate in any parades in Shanghai?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. I use my constitutional privilege.

Mr. CARPENTER. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record, to be made a part of the record, as exhibit E for identification this article entitled "Today's Guest Editorial—Red Shanghai, by Sylvia Campbell Powell," which appears on the editorial page of the Oregon Daily Journal.

Senator WELKER. It will be so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 516" and appears below.)

EXHIBIT No. 516

TODAY'S GUEST EDITORIAL

Red Shanghai

By SYLVIA CAMPBELL POWELL

(The following letter is from Mrs. Powell, wife of John Powell, editor of the China Weekly Review, daughter of Mrs. John Campbell of Milwaukie and graduate of Reed college. It was written about two months ago and gives her personal reactions to the Red army regime in Shanghai. It is a surprising report.)

I wrote you how much Bill and I were looking forward to witnessing the great changes that were bound to take place here in Shanghai. We haven't been the least bit disappointed. It has been amazing and if I hadn't seen for myself, I never would have believed it.

We had heard a lot about the wonders of the Red army, and now we have seen for ourselves. They are truly Spartans and devoted to the cause of building up China. Right now those stationed in this city are out in the countryside helping the peasants build dikes and harvest the crops. But what has impressed us most is the new spirit. This whole summer has been filled with parades and the parade to end all parades was held the first of October to celebrate the founding of the new government and International Peace day.

An estimated 1 million people marched for 12 hours past our window, shouting slogans, singing songs, dancing the new folk dances—floats, torches, the new flags. It was terrific. And the real cross-section of Shanghai—bankers, professors, doctors, small shopkeepers, thousands of students, but mainly workers. When we remembered that human lives in China have had little value, it was especially impressive to see that now all these people were realizing their potentialities. I wanted to cry, it was so wonderful.

Another thing we find most exciting is the constant meetings and the quickened interest of everyone to learn the new ideas and to participate in the production program. Every banker, student, worker—nearly everyone—attends some kind of a study meeting. They are so eager to know.

Of course, everything hasn't been sugar and honey. All during the summer several times a week two or three—sometimes more—Kuomintang bombers came over the city. Though they caused little damage, still it was far from pleasant. Naturally, we weren't too happy to hear the Voice of America say last week that America is "selling" another 11 bombers to the KMT. The KMT blockade of this port has been another headache. It's not only made it more difficult for the new government, but foreign and Chinese businessmen have had to take it on the chin since Shanghai depends on trade to keep going. Though our state department has said that it does not recognize this "illegal" blockade, still it is American government supplies of oil and other fuels that make it possible. You can see why we're not too happy about the way things are going at home.

Just this week the two Chinese airways have deserted the KMT and come over to the new government, which is very good news indeed. Our friend Chennault is having a field day for he now has a monopoly flying the bigwigs from Chungking to Taiwan. It's bound to add many more gold bars to his collection. Another unpleasantness has been the several incidents between foreigners and the new government. We feel that the primary cause has been the attitude on the part of some foreigners that Shanghai is their city. They forget that these aren't the "good old extraterritoriality days." For the rest of us who are willing to respect the laws and the Chinese people, there's nothing to worry about.

On the contrary, there is much to learn. It's a fascinating experience and we can't leave just yet.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Powell, where you were in Shanghai, did you ever travel into North Korea?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. I decline to answer.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Powell, during the Korean war, while you and John W. Powell were publishing and editing the China Weekly and later the China Monthly Review, is it not a fact that you supported many editorials in that paper accusing the United States troops of using germ warfare against the North Koreans and the Communist forces of China?

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I use my privilege under the fifth amendment, which provides freedom of the press. I decline to answer on my constitutional privilege.

Senator WELKER. I ask you this question: Do you use the fifth amendment as to whether or not you have ever been in North Korea?

I will ask you whether or not you ever interviewed any American prisoners of war who were found in Shanghai?

Mrs. POWELL. The first amendment and the fifth amendment.

Senator WELKER. Or China or Korea; did you ever interview any American prisoners of war in either place?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I stand on my answer.

Senator WELKER. Let me say, for the—I do not know how many times I have so ruled—that we accept your refusal under the fifth amendment to answer, but not under the first amendment.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Powell, I believe at one time you were employed by the United States Government; is that right?

Mrs. POWELL. Between my junior and senior years in college I did work for a very few months for the United States Government.

Mr. CARPENTER. Was that as a junior clerk-stenographer in the Office for Emergency Management, San Francisco, Calif.

Mrs. POWELL. I imagine that is what it was called. I do not remember the name.

Mr. CARPENTER. And were you in a CAF–2 classification, paying $1,440 per annum? Is that right? Later you were promoted to assistant clerk-stenographer, CAF–3, at $1,620 per annum; is that correct?

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I do not remember exactly.

Mr. CARPENTER. And that was in the year 1942, specifically May 1, 1942, to September 29, 1942? Were those the dates?

Mrs. POWELL. Sir; I am sorry; I do not remember that long ago exactly.

Mr. CARPENTER. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record a statement from the United States Civil Service concerning Sylvia Campbell, dated August 11, 1954, which shows that during that period, May 1, 1942, to September 29, 1942, she was employed as a junior clerk-stenographer in the Office of Emergency Management.

Senator WELKER. It will be so marked as an exhibit and made a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit No. 517" and appears on the following page.)

EXHIBIT No. 517

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Washington 25, D. C., August 25, 1954.

Mr. BENJAMIN MANDEL,
Research Director Internal Security Subcommittee,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR MR. MANDEL: In accordance with the request in your letter of August 2, 1954, I am forwarding herewith a history of the Federal service of Sylvia Campbell (dob 11/15/20), as shown in our service record file.

No application papers are available for Miss Campbell.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN W. MACY, Jr., *Executive Director.*

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
SERVICE RECORD DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DSC:IPW
August 11, 1954

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL SERVICE

Notice to individuals - This record should be preserved - Additional copies of service histories can not be furnished due to limited personnel in the Commission. This record may be presented to appointing officers for their inspection.

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH
Sylvia Campbell	11-15-20

Authority for original appointment (Examination from which appointed or other authority--Executive Order, Law, or other exemption)

EFFECTIVE DATE	NATURE OF ACTION	POSITION, GRADE, SALARY, ETC.
5-1-42	War Service Appointment	Jr. Clerk-Stenographer CAF-2 $1440 per annum OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT San Francisco California
9-29-42	Resignation w/o Prejudice	Assistant Clerk-Stenographer CAF-3 $1620 per annum

_____ Chief,
Correspondence Section

The above transcript of service history does not include all salary changes, intra-agency transfers within an organizational unit not involving changes from one official headquarters or duty station to another, and promotions or demotions, since Federal agencies are not required to report all such actions to the Commission.

USCSC--WASHINGTON D C

DS 80-11b
JANUARY 1954

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Powell, did anyone later give you access to the State Department files on the so-called Formosa incident?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. I decline to answer.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you take information from that file or any other information from United States Government sources, put it in an envelope and take it to a luncheon that you attended in Shanghai?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. I decline to answer.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you ever know a Joe Neeley?

Mrs. POWELL. I decline to answer.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you ever know a William H. Hinton?

Mrs. POWELL. I decline to answer.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you ever have any connection with either Soviet or Communist military intelligence? I mean Red China by that.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. Are we being serious, gentlemen? Are you accusing me of something?

Mr. CARPENTER. We are not accusing you of anything. I am asking you a question.

Mrs. POWELL. Well, this is a very, very serious charge, gentlemen. I never heard of such a gentleman.

Senator WELKER. Will you please answer the question?

Mrs. POWELL. It seems to me if you——

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Senator WELKER. We are merely seeking the truth, Mrs. Powell.

Mrs. POWELL. Well, the way this atmosphere is, I decline to answer.

Senator WELKER. Mrs. Powell, in conclusion of your testimony, I might say that we can interrogate you at length on other phases, but I do not desire to pursue the testimony further.

I want to say this to you and to the country: that our committee believes in repentance. Certainly people have made mistakes. Many times we have had before us people who have made mistakes with respect to defections from the greatest country on the face of the earth, the United States of America. When I knew they were truly repentant and I knew that they wanted to come back to America and help us in the cause of freedom, and wanted to say, "I am sorry; I made a mistake," it has been my great happiness to send them home with our warmest congratulations.

Would you say now that you have anything that you have been sorry for or that you had made a mistake?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mrs. POWELL. Sir, I have never done anything that I have repented, or I have never done anything that I would apologize or be sorry for.

Senator WELKER. I think that ends your testimony. You are excused. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Madam Counselor. You have been very kind.

The next witness. Is John W. Powell in the room?

Mrs. Powell, I will inform you that you are now relieved of the subpena.

Mr. Bell, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BELL. I do.

TESTIMONY OF FRANK O. BELL, VALLEJO, CALIF.

Senator WELKER. State your name for the record.

Mr. BELL. My name is Frank O. Bell.

Senator WELKER. And you reside in San Francisco?

Mr. BELL. I reside in Vallejo, Calif.

Senator WELKER. And do you have an official position?

Mr. BELL. United States marshal, in the northern district of California.

Senator WELKER. You may proceed.

Mr. CARPENTER. Have you had occasion in the past week to serve a summons, a series of summons that were issued by Senator William E. Jenner, of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee?

Mr. BELL. I have.

Mr. CARPENTER. And, in particular, did you receive a summons for a John W. Powell?

Mr. BELL. I did.

Mr. CARPENTER. Will you please tell the committee the efforts you have made to serve the subpena on John W. Powell and whether or not the same has been served?

Mr. BELL. I received on December 6 a summons from the Jenner committee. I immediately proceeded to serve the summons by deputies, which I have in my office. In fact, there was more than one deputy endeavoring to make the service.

We could not locate Mr. John W. Powell. However, we did serve Mrs. Powell on the 8th and asked Mrs. Powell if she knew the whereabouts of her husband. She declined to give us an answer to his whereabouts.

As we have various information available to us, there were numerous addresses which we went to to find out if he could be located in those places.

I am sorry to say that we could not locate his whereabouts, or we have no trace of them at this time.

Senator WELKER. May I interrupt you, Counselor?

Where did you serve Mrs. Powell with her subpena, at 1015 Carolina Street?

Mr. BELL. No; 609 Sutter.

Senator WELKER. Is that a place of business?

Mr. BELL. I believe Mrs. Powell gave the name of the National Infantile Paralysis Office, 609.

Senator WELKER. Do you know, Mr. Marshal, where Mrs. Powell resides in the city of San Francisco?

Mr. BELL. I believe she resides at 1015 Carolina Street, which is the address which we have as her residence.

Senator WELKER. Did you serve John W. Powell in September or August of this year?

Mr. BELL. I believe we did.

Senator WELKER. Where did you serve him?

Mr. BELL. I cannot say at this time.

Senator WELKER. Will you check that up and report back to the committee?

Mr. BELL. I will be glad to.[1]

Senator WELKER. Very well, sir. You may step down.

Mr. CARPENTER. Senator, at this time I would like to place into the record a copy of the release of last Friday, December 10, 1954, which you released to the press, and a letter wherein you called on Mr. John W. Powell, 1015 Carolina Street, San Francisco, Calif., to appear before the committee. I would like to have the letter placed in the record at this time.

Before entering the letter into the record I would like to read it.

For release after 5 p. m., Friday, December 10, 1954, from the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

Senator Herman Welker (Republican, Idaho), today asked the cooperation of the press and radio in locating John W. Powell, resident of San Francisco, and former editor of the China Review, an English-language magazine published in China. Senator Welker explained that he made the request in his capacity as acting chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. The subcommittee will hold a public hearing next Monday in the Health Auditorium of the Civic Center. Powell's presence is desired as a witness at that hearing, but efforts to subpena him during the past 5 days have been unavailing.

Senator Welker has written an open letter to Powell, which the Senator has asked the press and radio to publicize as widely as possible. Senator Welker's letter dated December 10, 1954, and addressed to Powell at the address he gave the subcommittee as his home, follows:

Mr. JOHN W. POWELL,
1015 Carolina Street, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR MR. POWELL: This morning's edition of the People's World contains an article which appears under your signature. In an editorial attached to that article, the People's World, which has frequently been described as the official organ of the Communist Party on the west coast, declared:

"Bill Powell, son of J. B. Powell, famed United States editor and foreign correspondent, spent 15 years in China, the last 8, from 1945 to 1953, as editor of the English-language China Monthly Review. In September he was subjected to an inquisition by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. This is the statement he prepared for the committee, but was not permitted to present."

Let me remind you of the facts in this case set forth in volume 23 of the subcommittee's record of hearings on Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments.

As this record shows, you appeared before us on September 27, 1954. At that time you invoked the fifth amendment against self-incrimination in answer to 40 questions put to you by the subcommittee (pp. 1848–1904). You used the fifth amendment when asked if you were a member of the Communist Party of the United States (p. 1863). You used the fifth amendment when asked if you were a member of the Communist Party of China (p. 1864). You used the fifth amendment when asked if you knew Owen Lattimore (p. 1868). You used the fifth amendment when you were asked to identify your own signature on a document in which you had pledged to support and defend the Constitution of the United States (p. 1872).

During the course of the hearing you asked permission to read a statement prepared by you. In reply to your request, Chairman Jenner informed you of our rule that statements must be filed by witnesses, one day in advance of their appearance before us (p. 1950). At the conclusion of your testimony, Senator Jenner said this:

"The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Powell, you are not excused, but you will stand aside at this time from the witness stand. You will be recalled later."

For the past 5 days, extraordinary efforts have been made to subpena you to appear at a public hearing at 9 a. m., at the Health Auditorium of the Civic Center, Monday, December 13, 1954. You have been unavailable to accept the subpena. This is to inform you that your presence is required at this hearing.

[1] The subpena bears a record of service upon John W. Powell, August 11, 1954, at Kadimah Temple, Los Angeles, Calif., and is attested by W. S. Sweeney, deputy United States marshal.

When you appear, you may put your previously submitted statement into the record in accordance with the rules of the subcommittee. If you have any additional statements at that time, they must be delivered to us at least 24 hours before the hearing.

Very sincerely,

HERMAN WELKER.

Senator WELKER. That will be made a part of the record.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 518" and appears below.)

EXHIBIT No. 518

For release after 5 p. m., Friday, December 10, 1954, from the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee

Senator Herman Welker (R. Idaho) today asked the cooperation of the press and radio in locating John W. Powell, resident of San Francisco, and former editor of the China Review, an English language magazine published in China. Senator Welker explained that he made the request in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. The Subcommittee will hold a public hearing next Monday in the Health Auditorium of the Civic Center. Powell's presence is desired as witness at that hearing, but efforts to subpoena him during the past five days have been unavailing.

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1015 Carolina Street, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR MR. POWELL: This morning's edition of the People's World contains an article which appears under your signature. In an editorial attached to that article, the *People's World* which has frequently been described as the official organ of the Communist Party on the West Coast, declared:

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When you appear, you may put your previously submitted statement into the record in accordance with the rules of the Subcommittee. If you have any additional statements at that time, they must be delivered to us at least twenty-four hours before the hearing.

As acting chairman of the subcommittee, I should like to say that Mr. Powell has not favored us by appearing here. I should like to interrogate him at length with respect to his activities in China and with respect to the statement which he prepared and submitted to the subcommittee in violation of our rule, on September 27, 1954, in Washington, D. C.

At this time the subcommittee will suspend until 1 o'clock. I regret very much that we do not give much time for the lunch hour. We have a large number of witnesses, prisoners of war and other witnesses, and it will take a great deal of the subcommittee's time.

We will convene again at 1 p. m., sharp.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p. m., a recess was taken until 1 p. m., of the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

Senator WELKER. The meeting will come to order.

Counsel, you may proceed.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to place into the record certain subpenas that the deputy marshal has testified about, those that he served and those he did not serve. At this time I want to place into the record the subpena issued to Sylvia Powell in San Francisco, to be made a part of the record.

Senator WELKER. It is so ordered.

Mr. CARPENTER. Also a subpena issued to John W. Powell, in San Francisco.

Also a subpena issued to Mrs. Isobel Milton Cerney, 2465 Alpine Road, Menlo Park, Calif. She has been served. However, she is in the hospital, and, under doctor's orders, is not able to attend the meeting here this afternoon.[1]

Also a subpena issued to Edwin H. Cerney, 2465 Alpine Road, Menlo Park, Calif. The deputy marshal states that he is unable to serve this witness.

Also a subpena was issued to Paul F. Schnur, Jr., of 1250 James Street, San Francisco, Calif. Mr. Bell remarked that he had exhausted all efforts to locate Mr. Schnur in San Francisco.

Senator WELKER. They will be made a part of the record at this point as exhibit 519.

(The documents referred to were read in substance by Counsel Carpenter and were filed for the record.)

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[1] The following letter regarding Mrs. Cerney was delivered to Counsel Carpenter upon his arrival in San Francisco:

SEQUOIA HOSPITAL DISTRICT,
Redwood City, Calif., December 7, 1954.

Hon. WILLIAM E. JENNER,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Health Auditorium, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR SIR: Mrs. Isobel Milton Cerney, 2465 Alpine Road, Menlo Park, Calif., was served with papers commanding her to appear before the Internal Security Committee on Monday, December 13, at 9 a. m.

This letter will certify that Mrs. Cerney is a patient in Sequoia Hospital and her condition is such that it is not anticipated that she will be released on the date she is requested to appear.

Very truly yours,

MAX E. GERFEN, F. A. C. H. A.,
Administrator.

Senator WELKER. Counsel, you may proceed.
Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Gill.
Senator WELKER. Mrs. Gill, will you be sworn?
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mrs. GILL. I do.

TESTIMONY OF DOLORES HOLMES GILL, KANSAS CITY, MO.

Senator WELKER. Will you state your name to the committee, please?
Mrs. GILL. Dolores Holmes Gill.
Senator WELKER. Where do you reside?
Mrs. GILL. Kansas City, Mo.
Senator WELKER. Kansas City, Mo.?
Mrs. GILL. That is correct.
Senator WELKER. And your address there, please?
Mrs. GILL. 7418 Jefferson.
Senator WELKER. Proceed, Counsel.
Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Gill, what is your marital status?
Mrs. GILL. I am a widow.
Mr. CARPENTER. Who was your husband?
Mrs. GILL. 2d Lt. Charles L. Gill.
Mr. CARPENTER. Did he serve in the Armed Forces of the United States?
Mrs. GILL. Yes, sir; he did.
Mr. CARPENTER. Where did he serve?
Mrs. GILL. He served in the Korean theater.
Mr. CARPENTER. Was he taken prisoner while in the Korean war?
Mrs. GILL. Yes, sir.
It was the Saturday after Thanksgiving in 1950, we received word that he was reported missing in action as of November 2, 1950. Until that time, of course—well, my last letter from him was written October 30, 1950. So there was a period of almost a month where we heard nothing.
Mr. CARPENTER. Your last letter from him was October 30, 1950?
Mrs. GILL. October 30, 1950.
Mr. CARPENTER. That was prior to his becoming a prisoner of war?
Mrs. GILL. That is correct.
Mr. CARPENTER. Did you ever receive any letters from him while he was a prisoner of war?
Mrs. GILL. My first letter from him while he was a prisoner was received February 27, 1951. At that time a copy of the letter—his copy to me was received by me.
But before that time, on January 9, 1951, a member of the Kansas City Star staff—that is our local newspaper—phoned me and told me that they had received an Associated Press dispatch which had come over Peiping radio, that he was supposed to have read this letter to me, in which he said he was alive and had been wounded.
Mr. CARPENTER. Did you receive any other information from him in regard to that same letter?
Mrs. GILL. In that letter he stated that he had been wounded in both legs and one arm, he was being taken care of, they were receiving food

and cigarettes. And then he asked me to contact the mother of a Sergeant Harvey, who was with my husband at the time they were captured.

Mr. CARPENTER. And did you receive later mail from him, or information?

Mrs. GILL. No. That was the only letter I received.

Mr. CARPENTER. You say you first received the notice over the radio?

Mrs. GILL. That is correct.

Now, of course, I didn't get the broadcast, but it was picked up on an Associated Press dispatch out of London.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you ever receive any information from any other source relative to your husband?

Mrs. GILL. After that Associated Press dispatch was released, then I began to receive letters from various parts of the country, in fact, various parts of the world. Now, in that, several of the letters had enclosed a clipping reprinting his letter to me, and this reprint I found out was from this China Weekly News.

Mr. CARPENTER. The China Weekly News, or the China——

Mrs. GILL. At the time, if you will notice—well, in some of the letters that I had to present, part of those mentioned the China Weekly Review and part of them mentioned the China Monthly Review. But all of them mentioned the fact that John W. Powell was the editor.

Now, when I received—or when the reporter had called me from the Star staff, of course I was upset. But I was so thrilled to hear something, just anything. Then after these letters were received, relayed from Mr. Powell, I told this same man on the Star staff——

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you receive mail from Mr. Powell?

Mrs. GILL. He wrote to me, yes. And he sent a copy of this article that had appeared in his paper.

He stated that, as a fellow Missourian, he felt like it was his duty to give me this information.

Mr. CARPENTER. When was that letter sent to you by Mr. Powell?

Mrs. GILL. That I don't know. I think it was just about a month after that radio release.

Mr. CARPENTER. What did that letter state as to the treatment your husband was receiving?

Mrs. GILL. Don't mention that——

Senator WELKER. We will suspend for just a moment.

Mrs. GILL. In that letter he mentioned that I was not to pay any attention to these "fabricated atrocity stories," that there was nothing to them; that, as far as he knew, the men were being taken care of.

Of course, at the same time we were still getting our newspaper releases from our own press saying that the men were not being taken care of.

Senator WELKER. Will you repeat that last answer to me, Mr. Reporter?

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Senator WELKER. As a matter of fact, Mrs. Gill, is it not true that he did not say that was as far as he knew, but he said, "From our own personal observation of the action of the Chinese People's Government here in Shanghai, we know it is the policy to treat all prisoners—captured Kuomintang soldiers as well as criminals—with the greatest leniency and fairness in order to win over their support"? Is that a truthful statement?

Mrs. GILL. That sounds like a direct quote.

Senator WELKER. That was included in the letter that we will introduce.

Mrs. GILL. It sounds like it is a definite part of that first letter I received from him.

Senator WELKER. Counsel, if you will let me interrupt further——

Mrs. Gill, you are a resident of the State of Missouri?

Mrs. GILL. That is correct.

Senator WELKER. And Mr. Powell at one time was a student at the University of Missouri; is that correct?

Mrs. GILL. That is the way I understand it.

Of course, my understanding was derived from this member of the Star staff in Kansas City, and at the time I received this letter from Mr. Powell I called him, not knowing what to do with it. I was glad to hear the news, and still—well, people in my place in life just don't receive foreign mail, they certainly don't receive letters like that from anyone. And when I contacted this member of the Star staff I asked him about Mr. Powell, what he knew about him.

Apparently he has known the family over a period of years, both as a newspaperman and, from what I gather, that he was an acquaintance of the family.

And then he told me that Mr. Powell had been known as a fellow-traveler for years before that. So, of course, that answered all my questions.

Senator WELKER. As a matter of fact, in the letter you received from Mr. Powell, which contained the only letter you received from your loved one, Mr. Powell stated in effect—and we will have the letter read in a moment—that, as a fellow Missourian he wanted to write to you; is that not correct?

Mrs. GILL. That is correct.

Senator WELKER. Proceed counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you ever receive any information or propaganda from the National Guardian magazine?

Mrs. GILL. Yes.

Now, after that letter was received, my husband's letter was picked up and it was carried through the Daily Worker, it was carried through the National Guardian. It was reprinted in that.

And then, at the same time, Cedric Belfrage sent me a note enclosed with a copy of the paper and said that they were reprinting this letter from my husband and that they hoped that I would be pleased when I received the news. And his note was very short.

Mr. CARPENTER. All this information and propaganda was to the effect that your husband was being well cared for and in good health; is that correct?

Mrs. GILL. This letter was reprinted in these papers.

Now, the letter itself was reprinted by—what is it, the Chinese Soldier, or the Chinese News Correspondent, somewhere in Korea. I believe that was the byline on the articles.

I am afraid I forgot the question. About the various papers it was carried in; is that correct?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes.

Mrs. GILL. When this letter was reprinted, of course, there was always a paragraph or two of how grateful I should be that I received word about my husband, that I should be grateful to know

that he was alive when there were so many Korean, so many Chinese women who had no news at all.

Mr. CARPENTER. As a matter of fact, Mrs. Gill, at that time, what was your husband's condition?

Mrs. GILL. At the time, from the information I have received since then, he was dying of malnutrition.

Mr. CARPENTER. And your husband did die from malnutrition?

Mrs. GILL. That was the official release; yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. May I take over, Counsel?

Mr. CARPENTER. You may.

Senator WELKER. Mrs. Gill, John W. Powell, editor and publisher of the China Monthly Review, sent you a letter headed "China Monthly Review," cable address; Reviewing Shanghai; John W. Powell, editor and publisher, dated January 10, 1951; address, 160 Yenan Road, Shanghai; telephone, 14772; addressed to Mrs. Charles L. Gill, 7418 Jefferson Street, Kansas City 5, Missouri, in which he included these words:

DEAR MRS. GILL: Perhaps you have already received the original copy of your husband's letter to you, but as a fellow Missourian I wanted to make sure that you saw it and in good time. We know from the clippings and magazines we receive from home that there has been little, if any, news on the American POW's except for fabricated atrocity stories, and we felt the enclosed clippings from the local papers here might give you some reassurance.

From our own personal observation of the action of the Chinese People's Government here in Shanghai, we know it is the policy to treat all prisoners—captured Kuomintang soldiers as well as criminals—with the greatest leniency and fairness in order to win over their support, and we are sure this is the same policy being carried out by the Chinese volunteers in Korea. This accounts for the numerous statements of gratitude and expressions of good will by the American POW's which appear in our local newspapers almost daily.

In addition, there have been several demonstration groups of American and British POW's demanding the end of the "dirty war," for after they have seen the hatred of the Korean people against the Syngman Rhee government and the help being given by the Americans for that hated clique, they cannot help but feel this has all been one tragic mistake. We imagine many people in America must feel the same way, also.

We should have sent the enclosed clippings of a letter to Mrs. Foss before, but we did not think of it at the time. Perhaps you would be kind enough to send it on to her. If you would like us to send any further clippings about the POW's or the news on Korea that appears in our local press, please feel free to write us.

Very sincerely.

It is signed John W. Powell and typed John W. Powell.

In that letter is contained the clipping that I referred to.

Now, Mrs. Gill, this is an hour of sorrow and tragedy to you, of course, and our hearts go out to you. But let me ask, have you been informed since that time that when this letter was written to you by a man who posed as a fellow Missourian, your husband was, in fact, dying—dying of malnutrition and the disgraceful way he was treated by the enemy?

Mrs. GILL. Well, of course, until July 13, 1953—it's funny how you remember those dates, but they are all so important—I was just living for just any information at all, just to know he was still alive. And then we received word from the Government that he had died of malnutrition and dysentery.

At the time, they thought that he had died in April of 1953, and since that time, after the last group of men were released a year ago, in September, I talked to one of the men who buried him. He said that he had died the end of June (1951), he was buried then.

Senator WELKER. Now, Mrs. Gill, it is a fact, is it not, that in our Washington hearing on September 27, 1954, and since you have been here in San Francisco, you have talked with great men of the medical profession who were prisoners of war, too, who were trying to save their comrades, and they have told you under oath that they knew at the time this infamous letter was written that your husband was dying?

Mrs. GILL. That is correct.

Senator WELKER. Proceed, Counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mrs. Gill, you said you received propaganda material from all over the world. Can you name some of the things that you received in the various parts of the world which were sent?

Mrs. GILL. Really that letter amazed me, a letter like that, when he had just talked about our plans for the future, told me he hoped his allotment would come through all right. Then he mentioned he was alive and he was being taken care of but that he had been wounded.

That letter was reprinted in German; it was reprinted in the Scottish Daily Worker. Now, I have previously submitted those letters.[1]

And then it was reprinted in the National Guardian.

At no time was his name released on the official prisoners' list, although I think it was in the April issue of the National Guardian that there was a list in which his name was released as a prisoner of the Chinese people, volunteers. Actually, that is the way it was listed.

Now, since that time, of course, I have received other letters, and there were a few letters that I chose to submit now, not to involve the people. I don't know a thing about their sympathies, of course, but they were people who gave you the impression in their letters that tney were just a part of the common people; they could just be any American citizen. And still they all had access to this paper printed by John Powell.

Myself, I wouldn't know where to buy a copy of it; I don't know whether anyone would. Still these people had access to it.

Some of the other letters I had previously submitted were from people who had access to the Daily Worker, to the National Guardian, in which this letter was reprinted. They all enclosed the article to me.

And then, since the hearing, I received one more paper since that last hearing, and it was sent from Canada.

But on that—and it surprised me because I personally was not interested in any man's religion, but I would like to read to you what it says here.

Now, this paper, I don't know whether any of you have ever seen it before, or not; I certainly have never seen or heard of it. But at the top, typewritten, it says: "The Jew, John W. Powell, is not here."

I didn't know we were trying any religion. To me, I thought it was a man that we were talking about. He was fighting against the American people; he was fighting against his own—I guess you would call them brother citizens.

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[1] See pp. 1824 ff. of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee's hearing, September 27, 1954, on interlocking subversion in Government departments.

Well, he wasn't doing anything at all to help these prisoners of war but in truth was writing about—well, we mentioned those "fabricated atrocity stories." These men can prove they weren't fabricated. Any of them you talk to, they will bear scars the rest of their lives for what they went through.

And when I received this letter, I don't know. I don't know any of the people mentioned in this paper in fact were Jewish. I wasn't paying any attention to them; they carried high positions.

And this is my country. I am an American citizen and I won't give up my American citizenship or do anything to jeopardize it for anything in this world.

Senator WELKER. Of course, you are not interested, Mrs. Gill, in the race, color, or creed, other than the fact that they are great Americans. And you realize that we have in every race great Americans, people who are fighting the infamous Communist conspiracy.

But these people took away your loved one in trying to destroy this country of ours. You know that to be a fact and that is your testimony, and you want to swear before your God to that effect.

Mrs. GILL. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Thank you.

Mrs. GILL. Some of these other letters that I had brought with me, they were letters from people who had read this letter reprinted in some of the various papers, like he said. They actually—I couldn't swear that they were Communists or even fellow travelers, but it was the idea that they had access to the publications, or the fact that they were interested in having access to the publications.

I just don't understand it at all. To me, as an American citizen, I see that we have too much to lose when our Government is threatened by a foreign power.

Senator WELKER. Mrs. Gill, the last letter that you received from your husband was sent to you by a so-called fellow Missourian, Mr. John W. Powell, and reads as follows:

HI GAL: Well I never thought I would find myself in the fix I'm in now. You most likely by now have the telegram that says I'm missing in action. I'm a POW but I'm all right. I have a bullet in each leg and one in the arm but they are taking care of them for me. Please don't worry; they aren't bad to us at all; they give us food and cigarettes and they say we shall not be harmed.

I don't know if this will get to you or not so I shall just pray that it will get through. Tell the family I'm all right and not to worry. I'm not dead but could have been very easy. It's a long story about how and where but I'll tell you about it when I see you as I'm sure I will. Darling, I miss you very much and wish to God that this all ends and we can start our life again. Do me a favor. A master sergeant, Harvey, carried me out of the ambush we were in. Please write to his folks for me and tell them he's all right and not hurt; we will come home together. His address is Mr. and Mrs. A. A. Harvey, Box 34, Franklin, Mo., telephone 1F 42.

This is all the paper I have so I will have to stop. I love you, darling, and miss you so much. I believe the Government will send all of my pay and I may be a first lieutenant now so you'll be all right.

Goodby for now.

Love always,

CHUCK.

That was the last and only letter sent to you by your loved one, was it not?

Mrs. GILL. That is right.

Senator WELKER. In Washington, D. C., when you appeared before Senator Jenner and this committee, did you hear the testimony of Mr. Powell when Senator Jenner and our counsel interrogated him with respect to whether or not he wrote the letter?

Mrs. GILL. Yes, sir. I remember very well when he said about the signature. He said, "It looks like it."

Senator WELKER. He would not admit it was his signature?

Mrs. GILL. No, he wouldn't admit it was his signature, and he wouldn't admit it was his stationery.

Senator WELKER. Is it a fair or truthful statement, Mrs. Gill, that while you were there on the witness stand, one of the most tremendous jobs you have ever had in your life, that Mr. Powell laughed at you and sneered at you?

Mrs. GILL. Some of the officers that were with me—of course, it was the first time any of us had ever seen him, and they turned around and watched him. And he sat back there and grinned. It may have been a joke to him, but it hasn't been to me.

Actually, what has happened to me is no different from what has happened to so many others, but it still hurts.

Senator WELKER. And yet he lives here in the great State of California, as I said this morning, high and mighty, enjoying the wonderful things that the most wonderful country in the world could give to a human being. I am referring to Mr. Powell.

Mrs. GILL. Of course, one thing that impressed me most at that other hearing was the fact that he said, when he was asked the question why did he return to the United States, he said that he returned because it was home to him.

Of course, I am like everyone else; my home I try to protect, I certainly don't try to ruin it.

Senator WELKER. It is a fact, and you know it of your own knowledge, do you not, that Mr. Powell gave a press conference, if you please, at the National Press Club in the Nation's Capital, Washington, D. C., after he had testified before our committee?

Mrs. GILL. Yes; he did.

Senator WELKER. And after he had taken the fifth amendment some 50 times, I think.

Mrs. GILL. At that time he did the same thing his wife did this morning. He refused to acknowledge the fact that he was married to her, on the grounds of the fifth amendment. This morning she refused to acknowledge him, on the grounds of the fifth amendment. She said she loved her husband, she honored him. I love mine, too; but I am not ashamed of him. And I am not ashamed to admit that I was married to him.

Senator WELKER. You have never taken the fifth amendment to tell the American people that you gave the most precious thing in your life to your country?

Mrs. GILL. As an American citizen, I don't see I have any constitutional right to deny answering any question like some of those she was asked this morning.

Senator WELKER. Mrs. Gill, do you remember the interrogation by the chairman of our committee, Senator Jenner, of Indiana, when Mr. Powell stated as follows?

This appears at page 1902 of the official hearing record:

Mr. POWELL. I don't think you have a right to inquire into phrases.

Senator Jenner, the chairman:

This is your letter, your signature. What did you mean by writing this lady this kind of a letter?

Mr. POWELL. I think in——

The CHAIRMAN. You are an American citizen. You are under oath here. Don't sit there and tell me what I have a right to do. Why did you write this lady this kind of a letter?

Mr. POWELL. Would you like me to answer?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I would.

Mr. POWELL. If you give me a chance, I will be more than glad to answer.

The CHAIRMAN. You have the chance.

Mr. POWELL. I think this invades what I have written. I don't think you have a position to question me on this. The letter is there. You can read it. You have read it here. I think to be cross-examined in this place by you on various points in the letter—I think I am covered by the first amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. You must have a motive for writing this kind of a letter. What was your motive?

Mr. POWELL. I decline to answer under the provisions of the first amendment regarding my freedom of expression.

Did you hear that?

Mrs. GILL. Yes, sir. I was present during all of that.

Senator WELKER. Did you see that printed in the Missouri press?

Mrs. GILL. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. But did you see the full hearing, or the import of it, the whole printed hearing?

Mrs. GILL. No. No, sir; I didn't.

Of course, it was amazing to me, the fact that in a courtroom, where, if you are telling the truth, there is no question that can be the wrong question. And yet he refused to answer every question that was put to him on the grounds of the fifth amendment. Still he could go and have a news conference, where he felt that he would have the full value of all the publicity received, and there he would answer the same questions.

To me, you can always give your name and your family, tell your wife's name, tell where you are employed, where you were at a certain time, without actually incriminating yourself.

But then, there again, I don't have anything to hide. My life has been the same for years. I never change. People like that, I guess he has been involved in so many things that he can't afford to answer one question truthfully, because if he does they could find another question to ask him where he hesitates to answer it.

Senator WELKER. Mrs. Gill, as a matter of fact, you know that the press conference he gave at the National Press Club, that huge edifice there, dedicated to those who write the news for America, you know that he was not under oath, and you know that he took off and he made a long and lengthy statement. But he was not under oath at that time, and here the acting chairman has begged the news people, the radio, every means of communication, to have him brought before me; he is not quite so brave in the area in which he lives, where, as I say—and I repeat—he enjoys the life of the high and mighty.

I am embarrassed that I have not had the chance to cross-examine the gentleman upon the press release that he gave when he was so brave, but yet not so brave when under oath before our committee. I hope that in the months and years to follow I will have a chance to see Mr. Powell again. I hope that I will have a chance to meet him in friendly interrogation, in honest and fair interrogation, so

that we can find the facts and not publicize, while not under oath, but explain to the American people the thing that brought you and thousands and thousands of others scars on your hearts, that you will never get over.

You may proceed, counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. Do you have any other information for the committee, Mrs. Gill?

Senator WELKER. I want to say to you that I feel sorry for Mrs. Powell. I feel sorry for any person that gets involved as they did. I cannot help but believe that the spirit of repentance and love may come forth from seeing the great American that you are.

Proceed, counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you have any other information, Mrs. Gill, that would be helpful to the committee?

Mrs. GILL. None other than these letters that I mentioned before, those that mentioned reading the article, in which I felt people actually said nothing. In the letters that I submitted at previous hearings, those letters used phrases like, well, like "minions of Wall Street"—phrases of that order, that are printed or reprinted by someone who has definitely Communist sympathies.

That is the amazing thing that I see from so many of these letters that I received, that these people, they don't write like educated people, they don't talk like educated people, and yet they are able to write a full letter in nothing but three-letter words, except when it comes to using those expressions like "fabricated atrocity stories" and "minions of Wall Street." They might not spell the words right, but they can use them. People don't pick up those words out of papers.

Mr. CARPENTER. All written along the same line?

Mrs. GILL. That is right. That is what amazed me about it.

Of course, I had a lot of time to sit down and think over all of this when it first happened.

I was upset; I still am. But when I had a chance to reread the letters, then it was amazing to me just how much alike they were. And yet from the different sections of the country they come, and from different sections of the world. But the same idea was carried through in all of them.

Mr. CARPENTER. You believe that it was a concentrated, worldwide conspiracy, so to speak?

Mrs. GILL. I would rather think that than to think it was an original idea by each one of these writers. I know that there is no idea that is completely original. I think you are taught that in school, that whatever you think has been thought before you. But when people from all over the world start writing the same type of letter almost word for word, I would hesitate to think that that much of it was original.

Senator WELKER. Did you tell the committee that you had letters written in German and other foreign languages, such as Russian, Czechoslovakian? If you did, tell us again. I perhaps missed that.

Mrs. GILL. You weren't present, of course, at that other hearing, I am sorry.

Senator WELKER. I studied the hearings quite closely.

Mrs. GILL. At that hearing, when I presented those letters, I had some propaganda pamphlets that were sent to me, where they, oh,

were supposed to be stories or articles, statements of men who were prisoners of war.

Of course, it was the same old thing. They were supposed to be true statements and yet none of those were signed. They were signed: "A sergeant in the Second Division," or "Second lieutenant in the First Cavalry"; something like that; no names on them.

Senator WELKER. Mrs. Gill, I hate to bore you with interrogating you with respect to your testimony given before the committee in Washington, D. C., before Senator Jenner, the chairman, but in the city of San Francisco I was admitted to the practice of law before the supreme court of this great State. I want the people of this State to know the facts. I know some of them have not received the facts.

I know this is hard upon you, but in order that the people do receive the facts I must go ahead with respect to Senator Jenner's interrogation of Powell in Washington, D. C., on September 27.

Directing your attention to page 1902 of the hearings, Senator Jenner said:

You must have a motive for writing this kind of a letter. What was your motive?

Mr. POWELL. I decline to answer under the provisions of the first amendment regarding my freedom of expression.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course we do not recognize that, and you know that, Mr. Powell.

Mr. POWELL. In that event, I will decline under the constitutional privilege of the fifth amendment.

From the official transcript, in other words, Mr. Powell said that if he gave a truthful answer as to the reasons for writing you that letter it might tend to incriminate him.

Now pursuing the transcript further:

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Powell——

Then he starts quoting from the letter of Mr. Powell, including the letter from your husband, and his letter, that is, Mr. Powell's, had this to say:

From our own personal observation of the action of the Chinese People's Government here in Shanghai, we know it is the policy to treat all prisoners captured, Kuomintang soldiers, as well as criminals, with the greatest leniency and fairness in order to win over their support. We are sure this is the same policy being carried out by the Chinese volunteers in Korea. This accounts for the numerous statements of gratitude and good will of American POW's which appear in our local papers almost daily.

Then Senator Jenner continued:

What was your reason for writing that?

Mr. POWELL. I think the letter as a whole speaks; it is there, but as I say, with all due respect, I don't think you have the right to cross-examine me on phrases in this letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Powell, you have reporters gathering news. You heard the major testify just a while ago. You know how they secured their demonstrations, how they got the smiles on the faces of American prisoners. You know how they were treated. As a news gathering agency, you had every reason to know how they were treated. Why did you write this to this woman, who is now a widow as the result of the atrocities of the Communists?

Mr. POWELL. I can't answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. You said from personal observation.

Mr. POWELL. I said from personal observation of what I had seen of the treatment of Chinese POW's, Senator.

Before counsel proceeds, I want to ask you a few questions.

How old are you?

Mrs. GILL. Twenty-six years old.

Senator WELKER. When did you meet Chuck?

Mrs. GILL. Well, I had known him for 2 years before we were married in June of 1950.

Senator WELKER. Did he live in the same hometown with you?

Mrs. GILL. Yes, sir. We were both from Kansas City. Previously he had lived in Minnesota.

Senator WELKER. Did you go to school together?

Mrs. GILL. No; we did not. We were introduced by mutual friends.

Senator WELKER. He was a dedicated soldier; he loved the military?

Mrs. GILL. Yes, sir; he did. He had entered the service in August of 1949. At that time the newspapers were carrying articles to the effect that they expected that all men from 18 up would be drafted in September of 1949, and he thought rather than go in and take what was given to him he would go and enlist. He enlisted and went to Signal Corps School. Then later he applied, I guess, for a transfer to Fort Knox, and then after that he applied for officers candidate training. He was sent to Fort Riley for that.

After he was graduated from Fort Riley in February of 1950, he was sent back to Fort Knox. Then at the time we were married, he had overseas orders to serve in Japan. Then the day that he was to leave, we took him down to the plane. Of course, when we came back and read the papers—that was June 25—we knew then that the Korean war had broken out.

Senator WELKER. What was Chuck's age?

Mrs. GILL. At that time we were both 21. Our birthdays are in October.

Senator WELKER. In other words, you were just starting out your life together?

Mrs. GILL. That is right.

Senator WELKER. I am sorry, Mrs. Gill, that you have had to appear here. I know that your heart is heavy and will always be heavy. On behalf of Chairman Jenner's entire committee and the entire staff, we say, God bless you and may He give to you comfort in the years ahead. Thank you very much.

Mrs. GILL. Thank you very much. Really, I was glad to testify. It is just the idea that we have got to fight for our country if we expect to keep it the way it is. It is not the party in power that counts, it is the idea, the freedoms that we have now, the freedoms that we have to maintain. After all, we want our freedoms. Our families have fought for them for years before. It is so important that we keep this Government so that it allows a religious freedom. And we have the educational freedom. I was educated in public schools. I went to the State university, and, of course, when I left school in 1950 at the completion of my junior year—after we heard about my husband, I went on and got my degree, bachelor of arts degree in sociology.

It just seems like—on so many of these hearings it seems like they are trying to ridicule the law. The law of this country is not anything to ridicule. It is so important to all of us, it protects all of us. We find that out. It protected Mrs. Powell this morning, it protected her counsel. I do not have a counsel; I have to think for myself. I have nothing to hide, and as far as I am concerned, any time that I am

asked to testify I am going to be there. If I am not asked, I will request the opportunity.

Senator WELKER. That leads me to one of my concluding questions.

This morning I asked Mrs. Powell a question that she did not desire me to ask because it affected a great organization—one that we are all dedicated to. As I said before, I hope her employment here in San Francisco will not hurt that great organization that has done so much for human beings and mankind.

Would you mind telling the committee whether or not you do anything for good organizations, just about as good as the organization she works for here in San Francisco?

Mrs. GILL. Right now my job—I work 6 days a week. I do not have time for volunteer work. Before this job I had—well, it was immediately after we had heard about my husband—I volunteered to the Red Cross. Then I did office work. I had not been there too long before I started doing social work. Then they put me on the staff as a paid worker. At the time I was receiving no allotment, so I had to work for a living. It was either that or have my parents support me, which I did not think was fair to them.

Senator WELKER. But when you could, you dedicated your time, your work, your labors, and your efforts to the Red Cross?

Mrs. GILL. Yes; I did.

Now, that was something that I wanted to tell you about. In one of these letters that I have brought with me today, one of the women mentions having contact with the Red Cross, and they told her where sho could write to obtain a propaganda leaflet giving a letter that was supposedly written by her son. Now, the same time she wrote to me and gave me this information, I was working at the Red Cross. I had contacted the national office, I had contacted my superiors there in the Kansas City chapter office, and at that time there was no official information released by the Red Cross, by any other organization, or even by the United States Government. So where she got the information, I do not know. I would hesitate to think that any organization gave it to her when even the Government did not know about it.

In fact, my letter from my husband was the first time that any information was received at all on how to contact these men. After that letter had come through—I showed it to you—I had sent it in to the Government and they had seen that stamp on it. I will not say that that address, just on the basis of that letter, was the reason why the United States Government accepted it; but that letter was the rubber stamp telling that you could direct 1 letter a month to—now, I do not have that letter with me, but it said you could direct 1 letter to the member in 1 month, giving the name and rank, giving the Chinese volunteers' address, in care of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers for Peace, Peiping, China.

Senator WELKER. At this time I am ordering the letters that you have there at your left hand introduced into the record and made a part of the record. I will not permit the other publication there at the right of you to be put in, because we never engage in those things that might offend loyal Americans of any race, color, or creed.

(The documents referred to above were marked "Exhibit No. 520," and appear on following pages.)

EXHIBIT No. 520

THOSE REDS

Wherever you go, whatever you see or read, it's "those darned old reds." Who are they anyway, those wild-eyed, twist-brained, ungodly, trouble-making reds? Are they really the ones responsible for our wars, strikes & national strife/ deterioration of home & morality? The Czar could not kill Communism. Hitler failed & all the Truman-Marshall Plan money to China failed to stop communism. It must be a dread disease people catch when they get hungry. We think our government had better not go too far giving money to other countries or the American people might go Communist, instead of building homes for vets & everybody and stopping poverty or the constant fear of poverty with all its horrors here in the richest, most productive & scientific nation on earth. STARVE THE WARS. FEED AMERICA. Let's BUILD HOMES.

WAR 2 VETERANS & SEAMEN'S LEAGUE,
MOLINE LOCAL 802.[1]

MARCH 5, 1951.

MRS. CHARLES L. GILL,
7418 Jefferson Street, Kansas City 5, Mo.

DEAR MRS. GILL: While reading a recent issue of the newspaper Shanghai News I came across a letter addressed to you by your husband. It seems he is a prisoner of war and had asked the correspondent of the paper to forward his letter to you in some way.

Because I know how relieved and happy you will be to hear that your husband is safe and sound I am taking the privilege copying his letter to you. Here it is:

"Hi, gal: Well I never thought I would find myself in the fix I'm in now. You most likely by now have the telegram that says I'm missing in action. I'm a POW, but I'm all right. I have a bullet in each leg and one in the arm, but they are taking care of them for me. Please don't worry, they aren't bad to us at all; they give us food and cigarettes, and they say we shall not be harmed.

"I don't know if this will get to you or not, so I shall pray that it will get through. Tell the family I'm all right and not to worry. I'm not dead but could have been very easy. It's a long story, but I'll tell you about it when I see you, as I'm sure I will. Darling, I miss you very much and wish to God that this ends and we can start our life again. Do me a favor, a Master Sgt. Harvest (sic) carried me out of ambush we were in, please write his folks and tell them he's all right and not hurt. His address is: Mr. and Mrs. A. A. Harvey, Box 34, Franklin, Missouri. Telephone I. F. 42.

"This is all the paper I have, so I will have to stop. I love you, darling, and miss you very much. I believe the government will send all my pay and I may be a First Lieutenant now so you'll be all right. Goodbye for now.

"Love always,

"CHUCK."

I hope the above letter will set your mind at ease, Mrs. Gill, and, like your husband, I hope a peaceful settlement of the war in Korea will be made so that all our boys can come home.

Very truly yours,

NATHANIEL LOW.

11554 HUSTON STREET,
North Hollywood, Calif.

HOTEL WYNDHAM,
52 WEST 58TH STREET,
New York 19, N. Y., January 19, 1951.

DEAR MRS. GILL: Today I received a letter from a friend of mine in Shanghai with a newspaper clipping (North China Daily News, published in Shanghai) which I am enclosing.

Maybe you have already received the good news about your husband. If not, you will be glad to learn that he is alive, although a prisoner.

Would you be so kind as to get in touch with Mrs. A. A. Harvey, in Franklin, Missouri, and inform her about the fate of her husband?

Yours very truly,

JOSEPH G. PREUSS.

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[1] A postal card postmarked St. Paul, Minn., May 24, 1951.

U. S. PRISONER OF WAR WRITES TO FAMILY

(Special correspondent with Chinese people's volunteers)

KOREA, January 8 (Hsinhua).—Today, I came across a wounded war prisoner, now nearly recovered, who asked me to try to get a letter to his folks in America. He was very worried because he was known to have been wounded and in a tight spot and felt sure that he would be reported dead. Here are relevant parts of his letter, addressed to Mrs. Charles L. Gill of 7418 Jefferson Street, Kansas City 5, Mo.:

"Hi gal. Well I never thought I would find myself in the fix I'm in now. You most likely by now have the telegram that says I'm missing in action. I'm a POW but I'm all right. I have a bullet in each leg and one in the arm but they are taking care of them for me. Please don't worry, they aren't bad to us at all, they give us food and cigarettes and they say we shall not be harmed.

"I don't know if this will get to you or not so I shall just pray that it will get through. Tell the family I'm all right and not to worry. I'm not dead but could have been very easy. It's a long story about how and where but I'll tell you about it when I see you as I'm sure I will. Darling, I miss you very much and wish to God that this all ends and we can start our life again. Do me a favor, a master sergeant, Harvey, carried me out of the ambush we were in, please write to his folks for me and tell them he's all right and not hurt—we will come home together. His address is: Mr. and Mrs. A. A. Harvey, Box 34, Franklin, Mo., telephone 1F 42.

"This is all the paper I have so I will have to stop. I love you, darling, and miss you so much. I believe the Government will send all of my pay and I may be a first lieutenant now so you'll be all right. Goodbye for now. Love always—Chuck."

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115 ANTHONY STREET,
Santa Cruz, Calif., February 24, 1954.

MRS. CHARLES L. GILL,
7418 Jefferson Street, Kansas City 5, Mo.

DEAR MRS. GILL: I enclose a clipping from the North China Daily News of 10th January which I received today. I sincerely hope that you have had news of your husband before this but if not, no doubt the news in the clipping will be more than welcome.

Yours sincerely,

PAUL KOMOR.

BEARDSTOWN, ILL., *September 20, 1951.*

MRS. CHARLES L. GILL,
Kansas City, Mo.:

Today I received several leaflets of (Red propaganda) from my 23-year-old son who is serving with the 3rd Inf. Div. in Korea. These leaflets have been dropped to U. N. soldiers trying to induce them to surrender. One of these leaflets contained several letters supposedly written by some of our soldiers who were POW's to their families in America informing them of the wonderful treatment they were receiving in the prisoner of war camp. One of these letters was written to you by your husband, Charles L. Gill. I could not resist the temptation of trying to find if there was such a person at the address mentioned and if the soldier mentioned really was a prisoner and had contacted you. My motive is not entirely seltish as I have friends whose son has been missing since June 11 and thought I may be able to uncover something to give them hope for they have had no word from him.

Then, too, I thought if you hadn't heard from your husband this might give you fresh hope that at least he is among the living.

If there is a you and you have a loved one missing in this terrible heartbreaking war my sincerest sympathies are yours.

If you would like to see the leaflet I have mentioned please write me and I will send it to you if you will return it to me. I am writing to several others regarding the same paper and as I have only the one copy I wouldn't want to lose it as we are keeping everything our son sends us for him if God is kind enough to send him back to us.

Sincerely yours,

MRS. JAMES B. WARDEN.

ROUTE 2, BEARDSTOWN, ILL.

BREVARD, N. C., *March 5, 1952.*

DEAR MRS. GILL: I have a son that is a prisoner in Korea and has been for 15 months now. I was told by the Red Cross to write for a book that has a lot of prisoners' names and pictures and also their home address. I have received the book and your husband has written a statement that is in the book. I feel like you would be glad to know what he writes. Therefore I am writing you a copy.

"HI, GAL: Well, I never thought I would find myself in the fix I'm in now. You most likely by now have the telegram that says I am missing in action. I am a POW, but I am all right. I have a bullet in each leg and one in the arm, but they are taking care of them for me. Please don't worry, they aren't bad to us at all. They give us food and cigarettes and they say we shall not be harmed. Tell the family I am all right and not to worry. I'm not dead, but could have been very easy. It's a long story about how and where, but I'll tell you about it when I see you as I am sure I will. Darling, I miss you very much and wish to God that this all ends and we can start our life again. Do me a favor. A Master Sergeant Harvest carried me out of ambush we were in. Please write to his folks for me and tell them he is all right and not hurt. We will come home together. His address is Mr. and Mrs. A. A. Harvey, Box 34, Franklin, Mo., telephone L. F. 42.

"This is all the paper I have so I will have to stop. I love you, darling, and miss you so much. I believe the Government will send all of my pay and I may be a first lieutenant now, so you'll be all right. Goodby for now.

"Love always,

"CHUCK."

Mrs. Gill, I do hope you have received a letter from your husband by now. I have received two letters from my son. He writes like they were all getting good treatment, and oh how I pray for all of them and pray they will soon be home again. If you would like to send a picture of your husband I will check it with the pictures in the book I have and see if it is there. I will return the picture if you send one.

May God bless and comfort you.

Please write me. I would like to hear from you. I am trying to write to all the mothers and wives that have an address in the book.

Yours truly,

MRS. FRANK M. GARREN.

BOX 22, BREVARD, N. C.

Mrs. GILL. Really, on this paper, like I said, it mentioned people that I had never even questioned their religion. Now here it said that Gen. Mark Clark is supposed to be Jewish. I do not know whether he is or not. Personally, I am not interested. As long as he is capable of serving as a general in the Army, I do not care what church he belongs to. I do not think I am so terribly different from any other American.

Senator WELKER. I might say to you and for the records that that great senior general officer, Mark Clark, has given me the great honor of presiding at his hearing when he unburdened his heart to the American people. No finer man ever lived, no greater soldier, dedicated to human freedom, like you are.

I say in closing again, Mrs. Gill, that you have suffered for freedom-loving people all over the world. They will gain new luster by your life and by your testimony. Thank you very much.

Mrs. GILL. Thank you.

Senator WELKER. The committee will now call Mr. McManus.

Mr. McManus, do you solemnly swear the testimony you shall give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MCMANUS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT McMANUS, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER, INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Senator WELKER. Will you state your name for the record?

Mr. MCMANUS. Robert McManus.

Senator WELKER. And you are connected with the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate?

Mr. MCMANUS. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. What is your capacity?

Mr. MCMANUS. My title is staff member.

Senator WELKER. You may proceed, counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. McManus, did you attend a press conference at the National Press Club in Washington, D. C., on September 28, 1954?

Mr. MCMANUS. Yes; I did.

Mr. CARPENTER. Who conducted that press conference?

Mr. MCMANUS. Mr. John W. Powell.

Mr. CARPENTER. You did this in connection with your duties as a member of the staff?

Mr. MCMANUS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. What was the nature of that press conference? Will you please tell us, for the record?

Mr. MCMANUS. This press conference was held subsequent to Mr. Powell's appearance on the stand before the subcommittee, the day following his appearance, and was apparently intended to get his side of the argument circulated without the necessity for making any statements under oath. I took some notes at that press conference, which I have here, and I can give you an outline of what was said.

In discussing the testimony of the POW's who told of the mistreatment that they received in camps, he attempted to explain that by stating that while it may have seemed very rough to them, the real problem was that life was pretty rough in China anyway because apparently their experience was the way everyone in China lived. He said that when the Koreans were handling the prisoners it was much worse; things got a little better when the Chinese took over. I remember that particularly because of what was said by the witnesses in testimony before that.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did he say at the time where he received this information, how he received it?

Mr. MCMANUS. No; he did not say that he had ever made any first-hand investigation in the course of his journalistic activity.

He was asked about the charges printed in the China Monthly Review regarding germ warfare allegedly practiced by Americans. He spent a good deal of time failing to answer that one. He said it was a very serious question, he would like to give it a lot of thought. He said the Chinese began to produce evidence and there was testimony from an enormous number of villages; and if it was a hoax, that they certainly had an awful lot of people involved in this hoax. That is a direct quotation.

He was asked if he had seen any of the evidence, and he said, "I didn't see any."

It will be recalled that when he was asked whether or not he was a Communist——

Senator WELKER. Pardon me, Mr. McManus. You were with our committee when we investigated this germ-warfare allegation. Do you know it to be a fact that it was a hoax all the way and Red Communist propaganda of the most vile form? You were with me when we intercepted the first English version of the germ-warfare motion-picture film that came to our country. You know, as all people will know who have seen that thing, that it was nothing but an infamous lie made out of whole cloth. You know that; do you not?

Mr. MCMANUS. I think there is every evidence to support that statement; yes, sir. It has been investigated.

Senator WELKER. We will go into that with some boys who know all about it later on.

Mr. MCMANUS. He was asked directly whether or not he was a Communist, which he had refused to answer on the witness stand. He said, "I am not a Communist, not now, and never have been."

Again he was questioned on germ warfare. He said, "I have a feeling of doubt. Something must have happened there. Something sure in heck must have happened up there." These are direct quotes again. "I find it difficult to think it was American policy. Maybe somebody in Korea did something."

Mr. CARPENTER. What did he say about Mrs. Gill? What did he say as to the letter to Mrs. Gill?

Mr. MCMANUS. He was not asked to explain it. He said that he had never been in Moscow. That was another question that he refused to answer under questioning. He was asked about the testimony that the China Review was taken into the camp in truckloads. He said, "I would take exception to that statement about truckloads."

Again he came back to the question about the germ warfare. He said he had seen pictures and he had no reason to believe the pictures were faked.

Excuse me. In connection with the letter of Mrs. Gill, the only thing he said about that was, "We wrote a lot of letters."

He declared that his paper was not considered pro-Communist by the Communists in China. Then he made a good many statements about how much better off everybody was in Communist China than they had been before, but I did not bother to take notes on that.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. McManus, in connection with your duties on the staff of this committee, did you visit Boston, Mass., and vicinity?

Mr. MCMANUS. I did.

Mr. CARPENTER. In connection with prisoners of war?

Mr. MCMANUS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Can you state what you found there in the vicinity of Boston?

Mr. MCMANUS. I made visits to William D. Scott and John Mahoney, in Wakefield, Mass., and also other persons in the Boston area. Mr. Scott is the father of a POW who was missing in action and may be dead. He has never received final word. Mr. Scott told me this story: On about September 7, 1951, Mr. Scott received a postcard from a Mrs. Floyd Wells or Wills—it was not clear; you could not decipher the "e" or the "i"—of Steubenville, Ohio, informing him that his son's name had been listed in a group of POW's whose names

were printed in the August issue of the National Guardian. Scott did not know at that time what the National Guardian was.

I am reading from the notes I made. He telephoned Mrs. Wells for more information and reached her at 2 o'clock in the morning. She told him about the Guardian and in the course of conversation said, "They told me to get in touch with you." It was not clear to him what she meant by "they."

As a result, Scott became a subscriber to the Guardian and in a while began to receive propaganda from all over the world, including Czechoslovakia, just as in the case of Mrs. Gill. He also received hundreds of letters from other parents and relatives of POW's from all over the United States.

Among other things, apparently this device of working on the relatives of prisoners is also a means of trying to drum up subscriptions and circulation for Communist publications. I suppose there is a slimier way to develop circulation, but if there is I have never heard of it.

Here is the card that he received from the Weekly Guardian Associates; that is, the National Guardian. Apparently they used the same mailing machine as something called the Blue Heron Press.

This is addressed to William D. Scott, 4 Auburn Street, Wakefield, Mass. It is on one of those—apparently the result of an addressograph job. Above the name are the numbers 9564–53–S.

Here is a solicitation from the Blue Heron Press asking Mr. Scott to buy Howard Fast's, The Passion of Sacco and Vanzetti. It has the same addressograph plate, 9564–53–S.

He also received subscriptions, solicitations, from the New World Review, of which the editor is Jessica Smith. Our record shows, I think, Mr. Chairman, that Jessica Smith is the widow of Hal Ware.

Senator WELKER. Tell us about Mr. Ware.

Mr. MCMANUS. He dug the first tunnel under the United States Government. He was an agent. He was a young American farmer.

Senator WELKER. As a matter of fact, he was taught by Mother Bloor, the founder of communism in America. As a matter of fact, he was a head man in the Ware cell that Whittaker Chambers and Alger Hiss were involved in; is that correct?

Mr. MCMANUS. Yes. He was an agent of Lenin from the very beginning of the revolution. Lenin brought him to the U. S. S. R. His mother, Mother Bloor, tells Hal Ware's story in her own biography.

Senator WELKER. Will you tell us about Howard Fast? Do you suppose he was an American, a dedicated man to save the country, or did he write propaganda?

Mr. MCMANUS. I can see Mr. Mandel getting ready to answer that one, sir.

Senator WELKER. All right, I will direct my question to Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. The record of congressional hearings shows that Howard Fast is a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MCMANUS. Jessica Smith, to return to her, invoked the fifth amendment a good many times, it is my recollection. I mean she is an oldtime party wheelhorse.

Senator WELKER. Leaving what you have to say with respect to this press conference, do you remember at the hearing held in Washington, D. C., before Chairman Jenner, September 27, 1954, page 1896,

when the chairman was interrogating Mr. Powell with respect to the advertising contained in the China Weekly and Monthly Review?

Mr. Carpenter, our counsel, first asked the question:

You carried some advertising in your China Weekly and Monthly Review, did you not, Mr. Powell, American advertising?

Mr. POWELL. I think the same answer.

The CHAIRMAN. You claim your privilege under the fifth amendment to that question?

Mr. POWELL. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. The same record, Mr. Reporter.

Mr. CARPENTER. You had considerable advertising in your newspaper prior to the taking over of Shanghai by the Communists, didn't you?

Mr. POWELL. The same answer.

Meaning the fifth amendment.

Mr. CARPENTER. You only had two advertisers, when you closed, I believe.

Mr. POWELL. The same answer.

Meaning the fifth amendment.

On page 1897, Mr. Carpenter, our counsel, asked Mr. Powell:

Who paid for the copies of your China Weekly and Monthly Review that were sent to the POW camps in Korea?

The answer from Mr. Powell:

That is an implication; isn't it? Is that a straight question?

The CHAIRMAN. It is a question.

Mr. POWELL. In that form, I would decline. I would take my privilege.

Then, of course—to shorten this matter, because we must hurry along—he was asked whether or not he knew Mr. Randall Gould in Shanghai. Mr. Gould had sent to the committee a letter informing the committee that Mr. Powell, if I recall correctly, was strictly on the left. I am being very, very charitable on the statement.

Mr. MCMANUS. I have two other things that I would just like to bring up.

Among other things that the Scotts got, and according to what they told me, and what other people got, were books like this. Here is one book, We Can Be Friends, written by Carl Marzani.

Senator WELKER. Can you tell us about that gentleman—if I may say gentleman—where he is holding forth now?

Mr. MCMANUS. When he appeared before us he was doing propaganda work for the United Electrical Workers, to my recollection. He had been reposing a little while before that in jail, Senator.

Senator WELKER. For what reason?

Mr. MCMANUS. I would rather not give the exact reason because there was a dispute as to what he had been convicted of. Whether it was perjury or—I know there was a legal argument as to why he had gone to jail.

Senator WELKER. Did it involve falsifying a public record? He certainly was not convicted for being a red-blooded American, was he?

Mr. MCMANUS. No. He had been a former employee of the OSS and the State Department.

Here is one other thing. There is an organization in Boston known as the American Prisoners of War, Inc., and I have a letter from the commander of that outfit, Mr. Vincent A. Harrold, in which he says:

I am enclosing names and addresses of relatives of POW's who have been subjected to the Communist propaganda apparatus and have received letters from the editors of the China Review and the National Guardian, et cetera.

In other words, it is very obvious that this was a general practice. The kind of thing that happened to Mrs. Gill has been happening to many other people all around the country.

Senator WELKER. I will order that that letter be incorporated in the record as our next exhibit at this point of the remarks of the witness.

You may step down.

(The document referred to above was marked as "Exhibit No. 520" and appears below:)

EXHIBIT No. 520

AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR, INC.,
Boston 34, Mass., November 19, 1954.

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
United States Senate, Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

(Attention of Mr. Robert C. McManus.)

DEAR MR. MCMANUS: In reply to your request of November 4th, I am submitting the names and addresses of five ex-POW's of the Communists who will testify from firsthand knowledge how they were forced under threat of severe physical punishment to study the China Review and other English-language Communist periodicals while prisoners.

I am also enclosing names and addresses of relatives of POW's who have been subjected to the Communist propaganda apparatus and have received letters from the editors of the China Review and The National Guardian, etc. I will be willing to testify myself regarding this subject, relating the experiences of our organization in attempting to be of service to the relatives of captured American GI's and attempts by Communists to first infiltrate, then intimidate this organization of prison camp veterans.

My office telephone number is LI-2-4310 and I can be reached there between 9 a. m. and 5 p. m. My home number is AL-4-2951 and I can be contacted there after 5 p. m.

I sincerely hope the committee will decide to hold hearings in Boston as we feel much valuable information can be obtained here.

Please be assured of our complete cooperation in the event we can be of further service to you and the committee.

Many more witnesses can be made available if you so desire.

Sincerely yours,

VINCENT A. HARROLD, *Commander.*

(Enclosure referred to in above letter:)

M. Sgt. John J. O'Keefe RA31432135, 12 Birch Hill Avenue, Wakefield, Mass.
M. Sgt. George J. Matta, 66 Market Street, Brockton, Mass.
George A. Vitale, 38 Pleasant Street, Stoneham, Mass.
Joseph Dicato, 195 Bradford Street, Everett, Mass.
Guy T. Vadala, 195 Bradford Street, Everett, Mass.
William D. Scott, 4 Auburn Street, Wakefield, Mass. Father of Army Sgt. Gerald F. Scott who died in Communist captivity.
Mrs. Bessie McDonough, 256 Elm Street, New London, Conn. Mother of Air Force Major Charles E. McDonough who died in Communist captivity.
Mrs. Dorothy Kennealy, 325 East 8th Street, South Boston, Mass. Wife of Pfc. James R. Kennealy who died in Communist captivity.
Mrs. Ernest Graveline, 22 Warren Avenue, Pawtucket, R. I. Mother of Capt. Ernest Graveline, Army Medical Corp., who died in Communist captivity.
Mrs. Mae Pratt, 38 Pleasant Avenue, Stoneham, Mass. Mother of George A. Vitale, released POW. Mrs. Pratt was the victim of an extortion attempt while her son was held by the Communists.

Mr. CARPENTER. Colonel Wolfe, please.

Senator WELKER. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Colonel WOLFE. I do, sir.

TESTIMONY OF CLAUDIUS O. WOLFE, COLONEL, UNITED STATES ARMY

Senator WELKER. State your name.

Colonel WOLFE. Claudius O. Wolfe, colonel, United States Army.

Senator WELKER. Where is your residence, Colonel?

Colonel WOLFE. At the present time I am on active duty, Headquarters, San Francisco Port of Embarkation, Fort Mason, Calif.

Senator WELKER. What has been your duty since the so-called armistice in Panmunjom?

Colonel WOLFE. For the period from August 1952 to November 1953, I was charged with responsibility for investigating and documenting war crimes perpetrated by Communist forces against United Nations forces in Korea. I was personally in Korea during that time. The actual investigations were carried on by teams of military personnel in the field. Documentation was done in the War Crimes Division of my office under the supervision of Lt. Col. Jack Todd at Headquarters, Korean Communication Zone, Taeju, Korea. I believe Colonel Todd appeared before your committee in Washington.

Senator WELKER. Yes.

Proceed, Counsel.

Mr. CARPENTER. You have a prepared statement, have you, Colonel?

Colonel WOLFE. Do you desire me to present that?

Senator WELKER. I think that will expedite things because we are running short of time.

Colonel WOLFE. We have here a number of exhibits. However, as a preface to those, I would like to explain briefly what they are and how we arrived at those.

In order to get the background of these investigations, attention is invited to the following facts which I am sure all of us are familiar with. The North Korean forces launched an unprovoked attack upon the Republic of Korea at 0400 on June 25, 1950. On June 29, the President of the United States authorized General MacArthur to use armed forces in Korea. And on July 7 the Security Council authorized a unified command in Korea and requested the United States to designate the commander in chief of the United Nations forces in Korea. Despite a valiant defense, by August 1950 the United Nations forces had been pushed back to the Pusan perimeter.

It soon became apparent that the aggressors in such barbaric attack did not intend to be bound by the rules of humane warfare, and reports were received at GHQ, United Nations, describing barbaric and unspeakable atrocities being committed by the North Korean People's army. September 1950 saw the United Nations counteroffensive get underway with the landing at Inchon, Korea, and the attack of the enemy was turned into a rout. In the wake of this action, there was exhibited a sordid and unbelievable picture of bestial war crimes committed against South Korean civilian and military prisoners of war by the retreating Communists.

When it became apparent that atrocities were being committed in Korea on a large and increasing scale, General MacArthur set up the machinery for the investigation and accumulation of evidence for the cases of atrocities and other crimes committed by Communist aggressors in violation of the laws and customs of war in connection with and arising from the Korean conflict. Statements of victims and eye-

witnesses were taken. Photographs of the site and bodies of atrocity victims were taken. Proof that would meet the test of judicial courts was accumulated. The facts thus gathered without doubt established the commission of unspeakable atrocities.

The counteroffensive of the United Nations forces carried them to the Yalu River by November of 1950. However, at this point Chinese Communist forces crossed into North Korea and without justification joined in combat with the United Nations forces and in support of the North Korean Communists. The United Nations forces were pushed back to the 38th parallel. During all of this period evidence of the perpetration of atrocities by the Communists was accumulating.

Armistice talks began in 1951. In April 1953 these talks resulted in an agreement to exchange sick and wounded prisoners of war in an operation known as Little Switch. Approximately 169 United States prisoners were returned by the Communists. Many voluntary statements were made by these persons indicating brutal and harsh treatment. As a result of such statements, a total of 201 new cases of atrocities against U. N. Command were opened.

Ultimately an armistice agreement was entered into, effective on the 27th day of July 1953, which established the present demilitarized zone in Korea. Under the terms of this agreement, all remaining prisoners of war who desired to be repatriated were to be returned within 60 days. This was known as Operation Big Switch. In this operation approximately 3,339 American prisoners of war were returned, a number woefully less than that which we had every reason to believe would be returned.

Evidence gathered from these returned POW's not only corroborated previously reported atrocities but added many new atrocity cases not theretofore uncovered. In the latter part of 1953 a fully documented report of atrocities committed by Communists in Korea was published by the Department of the Army. Information pertaining to atrocities was presented to the United Nations General Assembly at a later date and the action there taken is a matter of public record for the world to see.

The statements of victims and witnesses show a remarkable unanimity as to mistreatment by Communist captors of U. N. military personnel. There were practically no American prisoners of war except those captured toward the end of hostilities who were not victims of cruel and inhuman treatment while they were prisoners.

It must be remembered that prisoners of war, under the accepted rules of land warfare and the principles of the Geneva Convention occupy an honorable status and are entitled to treatment in accordance therewith. They are not felons who are to be held in penal servitude. Yet the Communists apparently treated them as such. Of course, where it served their immediate purpose they would treat them well—for propaganda purposes.

Likewise, when it became apparent the Communists might not win or that the prisoners might be returned as a result of an armistice, treatment would improve. However, in the beginning when the Communists felt the surge of victory and when the Chinese intervened and the United Nations forces suffered temporary reverses, it is my opinion that there was a considered command policy to exterminate prisoners or to subject them to humiliating and inhuman treatment.

The Panmunjom peace talks showed the necessity of having living prisoners as a bargaining point. This was the turning point in mistreatment. Had this not occurred, I am convinced that there would have been no effort to spare or save these men, and that they would have been permitted to die of malnutrition and lack of medical care and exposure to the elements.

Now, with that background in mind, we have a series of pictures which have been selected to depict certain atrocities committed.

Senator WELKER. Colonel, may I digress? These are different pictures than were used in our hearing in Washington; are they?

Colonel WOLFE. That is correct. These were not introduced in the previous hearing in Washington.

Senator WELKER. Are you ready now to take a ruler or something to go up and explain them?

Colonel WOLFE. They are marked 1 (A), 2 (B), 3 (C). If they were marked also 4 and 5, I could explain each one of them.

(The photographs were marked "Exhibits 521 A to E" and appear on pages facing the text.)

Senator WELKER. Very well.

Will you tell the committee what picture No. 1 presents?

Colonel WOLFE. Yes, sir. Pictures Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were taken at what is known as the Hill 303 massacre. In order to understand that, let me give you just a few words of what that was.

On the morning of August 15, 1950, a mortar platoon of the 5th Cavalry Regiment was overrun by Communists. The prisoners' hands were tied with wire or their own shoelaces. For 2 days they were held, and then suddenly on the afternoon of August 17, 1950, their captors opened fire on them without warning.

Senator WELKER. May I interrupt? Were their hands tied behind their backs?

Colonel WOLFE. Yes, sir. You can see in those three photographs that we have there, each of those are bound with either wire, shoelaces, or other means behind their backs. They were prisoners of war at the time. They were not in combat.

Senator WELKER. And they (the Communists) violated every rule of the Geneva Conference?

Colonel WOLFE. That is correct.

Senator WELKER. In the treatment of prisoners?

Colonel WOLFE. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. In fact, they violated every rule of humanity?

Colonel WOLFE. That is correct, sir.

Senator WELKER. Proceed, sir.

Colonel WOLFE. Thirty-four American soldiers were slaughtered and their bodies were left on the scene. There were four survivors. These were rescued by a U. N. patrol later in the day. The patrol recovered the bodies, took photographs, and captured two of the enemy. Statements were voluntarily given by Communist soldiers, admitting participation in the crime.

That documentary evidence is a matter of evidence and is retained in the files of the Department of the Army.

Now, photo No. 1 shows a chaplain saying the last rites over the bodies of atrocity victims, certain ones of them, in this Hill 303 massacre, shortly after the advancing American forces found these bodies.

EXHIBIT No. 521A

Picture No. 1.

Picture No. 2 shows hands tied with his own shoelaces at the execution site; the body of a murdered American soldier lying on the ground with his hands tied behind him. The soldier was separated from the others, who were found in the same condition in another ravine a short distance away.

Senator WELKER. How was the soldier in picture No. 2 killed?

Colonel WOLFE. By rifle fire.

Senator WELKER. In the back or front?

Colonel WOLFE. That I cannot tell from the picture. They were fired at from whatever position they were in when the Communists suddenly opened fire. Some of them were probably facing the Communists, others were probably marching with their backs down the road.

Senator WELKER. Very well. Proceed.

Colonel WOLFE. This picture was made on the 18th of August 1950.

By the way, all these pictures are authentic United States pictures. You can verify them by the photographer who took them. They are the official photographs of the Department of the Army.

EXHIBIT No. 521B

Picture No. 2.

EXHIBIT No. 521C

Picture No. 3.

Photo No. 3, showing two American soldiers face down, having been excuted in that position, were also victims of the Hill 303 massacre. The picture shows them as they were left by their captors. The bodies of American soldiers shot by Communist-led North Koreans were found in this ditch. This is just simply a small group of that whole group. This was also on the 18th of August, 1950.

Picture No. 4, which is not marked—we will call the next two 4 (D) and 5 (E).

Senator WELKER. Very well.

Colonel WOLFE. This (D) is the scene from what is known as the Taejon Massacre. Taejon is about the center of South Korea at the present time. It is midway between Pusan and Seoul on the main military railroad that runs north and south through Korea.

EXHIBIT No. 521D

Picture No. 4.

A little background of that: This is one of the most sordid and bestial crimes that the North Korean Communists committed during the summer of 1950. The Communists captured the city of Taejon. Both civilian and military prisoners were put in the city prison and within the confines of the Catholic mission, the two of them adjoining each other. While being held they were beaten and tortured. Favorite pastimes were the twisting of prisoners' fingers, kicking and beating them without provocation.

When recapture of Taejon by the United Nations forces became evident in late September 1950, the Communists decided to liquidate all prisoners. Commencing September 23, groups numbering from 100 to 200 were bound and transported to previously selected sites, placed in open trenches dug for this purpose, and summarily shot. Many skulls were found crushed. The bodies were covered lightly with dirt. When the trenches were filled by the bodies, others were slain in the churchyard and basement of the Catholic mission. Many bodies were thrown in a well until it was completely stuffed with people—a civilian, 1 ROK soldier, and 2 Americans.

Thousands of bodies were recovered by the liberating United Nations forces who occupied the site shortly thereafter.

Now, this fourth picture shows the mutilated body of a United States soldier tortured and killed by the fleeing Communist-led North Korean forces, recovered from a crude grave in Taejon on September 30, 1950. This is only one of the remains of 42 American military victims of this massacre.

If you will examine the picture carefully, you will note the total lack of medical attention given this soldier prior to his murder. You can see the stub of his left leg there, to which no medical treatment whatsoever had been rendered. You will see that he not only has been shot, but he has either been bayoneted or bamboo spears had pierced his body, both undoubtedly prior to the time of his death.

The last picture (E) we have is one of sordid bestiality that is hard to believe. It is taken from what is known as the Suchon Tunnel Massacre. When the fall of the North Korean capital of Pyongyang to United Nations forces seemed imminent in October of 1950, all POW's were entrained by the Communists for movement forward. The men were herded into open gondolas, packed to overflowing, and forced to ride unprotected in the raw October weather.

EXHIBIT No. 521E

Picture No. 5.

Those of you who have been in Korea at that time of the year know actually how severe the winters are. Pneumonia and exposure then started taking its daily toll from the weakened survivors. After they had suffered such inhuman treatment for a period of 9 days, their train arrived at a railroad tunnel approximately 4½ miles northwest of Suchon and remained inside the mountain all day to avoid U. N. air activity.

During the early afternoon of October 20, the starving men were promised their first meal in several days.

An American major, together with a group of selected prisoners, purportedly as a detail, were taken supposedly to a nearby village to prepare food. Instead, they were shot. Hours later the men remaining in the tunnel were informed that food had been prepared and that they were to be conducted to a Korean house to eat; but due to the limited space, they must go in small units alternately.

The first group of 30 men were removed from the tunnel, escorted down the tracks, and told to hide in an erosion ditch until food was brought to them. As soon as they had relaxed on the ground the guards opened point blank fire, in cold blood, with Russian-made burp guns and rifles. Those living through the initial massacre and those still showing signs of life were dispatched by shooting or bludgeoning. Some of the victims survived by feigning death.

Remaining groups were treated in a like manner. U. N. forces overran this Suchon area the following day, recovering the bodies of 68 murdered Americans, and in addition, discovering 7 more inside the tunnel who had apparently died of malnutrition.

At least 138 American soldiers lost their lives in this crime. Pictures of the crime, statements of survivors, and statements of even enemy soldiers corroborated the occurrence of this atrocity.

This last photograph, which we will call No. 5 (E), shows the remains of 1 of these 68 American prisoners of war who were slain in a group while prisoners of war in this Suchon tunnel. As stated above, 138 said prisoners lost their lives in the movement and the murder.

Are there any questions?

Senator WELKER. Yes.

Colonel, there is no question about the validity of the profound investigation made by your organization and the Army; is that a fact?

Colonel WOLFE. As to the existence of these atrocities?

Senator WELKER. Yes.

Colonel WOLFE. There is none whatsoever, and I believe the evidence will stand up in any court of law.

Senator WELKER. I am convinced of that. I heard you testify at one time in Washington in Senator Potter's atrocity hearings. I remember that so well. I am sorry that we cannot go on and on with the many cases that we have. Those were taken up at other hearings. We must hurry on. I want to ask you a couple of questions.

The fact of the matter is that these atrocities occurred during the summer of 1950; yet Mr. Powell's letter discounting any information about atrocities was dated January 10, 1951. That is a fact, is it not?

Colonel WOLFE. That is correct, sir.

Senator WELKER. Furthermore, in September of 1951, in this tirade of attacking this country of which he poses to be a citizen, he charged the American troops with the barbarism and criminal action. Directing your attention further to another one of his tirades, in the China Monthly Review—which is what I am referring to—in December 1951, page 275, he had an article attacking Col. James Hanley, United States Army, judge advocate in Korea, who formally charged the Chinese volunteers with massacring 2,643 U. N. prisoners of war during the "past year." Do you remember that?

Colonel WOLFE. I do, sir.

Senator WELKER. Then again on December 5, 1951, on pages 276 and 277 of the China Monthly Review, he had an article containing photographs showing the kind treatment accorded American prisoners in North Korea and the cruel treatment accorded to Communists by the United States. Do you remember that?

Colonel WOLFE. I do, sir.

Senator WELKER. Colonel, you heard the testimony this morning in which our committee was accused of using some pretty bad methods. Could you in the remotest part of your imagination compare any methods that our committee has used with the terror of the methods used by the Communists in destroying precious American boys that could be your boy or the boy of any American in this land?

Colonel WOLFE. I could not only not conceive such thing, but know it to be utterly false. This committee is giving to each and every person his right to be heard, which is more than the Communists ever gave these boys.

Senator WELKER. Thank you, Colonel.

I shall interrogate our doctor about the matter of the five precious boys whose hands were wired behind their backs and shot. I shall interrogate later about the 36 Americans whose hands were wired behind their backs, facing a slit trench, and shot in the back. I will go into that more fully.

Colonel, it has been an honor and pleasure to have had you here. I know that Senator Jenner, the entire committee, and the staff appreciate your great work. I hope and pray that complacency of the American people will not remain as it is and that Americans once again will rise up to the days when Patrick Henry said, "Give me liberty or give me death," and Nathan Hale said, "I only regret that I have but one life to give for my country."

I am sure you will agree with me that in this dark hour of our history we wonder what has happened to that spirit of patriotism.

Colonel WOLFE. I certainly do agree with you.

Senator WELKER. Thank you, Colonel.

Mr. CARPENTER. Major Daltry.

Senator WELKER. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you shall give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Major DALTRY. I do.

TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND DALTRY, MAJOR, UNITED STATES ARMY

Senator WELKER. You are Major Raymond Daltry, are you?

Major DALTRY. I am.

Senator WELKER. United States Army?

Major DALTRY. I am, sir.

Senator WELKER. How long have you been in the armed services?

Major DALTRY. Twelve and a half years.

Senator WELKER. I notice upon your left breast the decorations that all Americans are proud of.

I shall now ask you to go ahead, because of the shortness of the time. I commend you, sir.

Where are you stationed?

Major DALTRY. Sixty-fifth Infantry Regiment, Fort Ord, Calif.

Senator WELKER. Did you take part in the Korean war, or peace action?

Major DALTRY. I did, sir.

Senator WELKER. When did you go to Korea?

Major DALTRY. In January of 1950, sir.

Senator WELKER. With what outfit?

Major DALTRY. I was over there with the United States military advisory group to the Republic of Korea.

Senator WELKER. Now, in your own words, can you tell us your experiences there?

Major DALTRY. I was with the Koreans as a military adviser——

Senator WELKER. The South Koreans or the North Koreans?

Major DALTRY. The South Koreans during the 6 months of the conflict. I was captured by the Communist Chinese forces on the 1st day of January 1951. I was captured at approximately the 38th parallel. After being captured, we moved back and forth in that general area for about 5 days and then started moving north. When I was captured I was alone, the only American captured at the time. Later I was joined by other Americans, until we had a group of 14.

We started to move north, and moved most of the month of January, moving at night, until we arrived at a temporary camp called the Bean camp. Upon arriving there we joined a group of Americans that they had there. We stayed in that camp approximately 10 days and then moved north again to camp No. 5, Pyongtong. The distance that we moved was approximately 400 miles.

Senator WELKER. Approximately 400 miles in how many days?

Major DALTRY. Not counting the times that we stopped, it would be a movement of about 30 days. Some nights we would move 20 miles, other nights we might move 5.

Senator WELKER. Were you fed well during that march?

Major DALTRY. Three meals at that time I had rice. The other meals were either corn or millet. Millet is a cereal. The average amount was about 8 ounces of watery soup twice a day.

Senator WELKER. Being a military man used to the profession of arms and making long marches, was that food sufficient to sustain you men in that march? I mean physically.

Major DALTRY. Physically, no. Quite a few men never arrived at camp 5. They became sick or too weak to move. They were left by the side of the road.

Senator WELKER. What happened when they were left by the side of the road?

Major DALTRY. I do not know. I have never seen any of the men who were left there.

Senator WELKER. Have you heard from any of them?

Major DALTRY. I never heard from any of the men who were left there.

Senator WELKER. Now proceed, Major.

Major DALTRY. After arriving at camp No. 5, I was placed into an officer's camp there. An indoctrination period had started before I arrived.

After arriving there I was there approximately a week and we had a class. This class was held outside. The weather at that time was approximately freezing weather, and the clothing we had was

the clothing that we had when we were captured—if we had that much clothing left, if it had not worn out.

This indoctrination was on trying to prove to us that the South Koreans had started the aggression, that the United States was backing the aggression, and that we were the aggressors in Korea.

Toward the end of March, the indoctrination period increased until it lasted 6 to 8 hours a day, still with the main theme of trying to prove that we were the aggressors in Korea and that we were war criminals because of the fact that we were members of the armed services.

Senator WELKER. Now will you tell, for the purpose of the record, sir, what you mean by "indoctrination"?

Major DALTRY. Indoctrination was given by fanatical English-speaking Chinese who were making statements against our Government and making statements that we had started the Korean conflict and using different publications, such as the Shanghai News, the China Monthly Review, or the China Weekly Review, and Peoples China.

The method of indoctrination was that they would hold lectures. Most of them were held outside at this time. Then if they were not holding a lecture, they would give us these publications with certain articles marked in red. They would mark them with a red crayon or a red pencil. They would insist that we read these articles, and after reading the articles insist that we would express our opinion on these articles.

Senator WELKER. What happened to those of you who did not express a favorable opinion on the article?

Major DALTRY. If you did not express the opinion that they thought you should, they figured that you would need more indoctrination. Therefore, you would be removed from the compound, taken to a separate room or area, and there would be relays of these interpreters or English-speaking Chinese who would repeat over and over the expressions or the orientation that they wanted you to have. They would keep this up until such time as you agreed with them.

Senator WELKER. What did they call those of you who did not indoctrinate properly?

Major DALTRY. We were reactionaries, or we had a hostile attitude.

Senator WELKER. What did they call those of our Armed Forces who did cooperate with them?

Major DALTRY. I do not know whether they called them progressive or not. Sometimes we did.

Senator WELKER. Now, you did see copies of the China Monthly Review and the China Weekly Review?

Major DALTRY. I did.

Senator WELKER. What was it used for, again?

Major DALTRY. It was used as a publication where certain articles of that magazine were marked. They would be given one to a squad, a squad composed of anywhere from 10 to 12 men, and we had to read—either each one of us had to read it individually, or, two, it had to be read out loud and then a discussion would have to be held on that material.

Senator WELKER. Major, I meant at the outset to ask you your hometown. Where did you come from?

Major DALTRY. At the present time, I have a home in Florida.

Senator WELKER. What town in Florida?

Major DALTRY. Bradenton; I am buying a home there.

Senator WELKER. Where were you born, Major?

Major DALTRY. I was born in Philadelphia, Pa.

Senator WELKER. Very well. Now you may proceed.

Major DALTRY. This indoctrination period of 6 to 8 hours a day continued from March 1951 up until approximately April of 1952. We continued at camp 5 until October, when the officers were moved from camp 5 to camp 2.

It was a very extensive indoctrination and very thorough. They used all these publications, insisting that you read them, insisting that you would discuss them, and insisting that you would give an opinion.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you say an opinion?

Major DALTRY. An opinion.

Mr. CARPENTER. But it was an opinion they wanted, not what you thought; is that correct?

Major DALTRY. That is correct; it was an opinion that they wanted.

Senator WELKER. Now tell the committee, please, what happened to you men who did not give the opinion that they wanted.

Major DALTRY. Men who did not give the right opinion, as I said, were taken out and given extensive indoctrination until they would repeat the words that they wanted to hear.

Senator WELKER. Supposing the intensive indoctrination did not work? Then what happened?

Major DALTRY. One of their favorite forms of punishment was standing at attention. That does not sound like much——

Senator WELKER. How long would you stand at attention?

Major DALTRY. It would vary from 2 to 12 hours, standing on ice without the proper clothing, such as wearing a pair of shorts; maybe 20° below zero, something of that nature. That would be part of the punishment.

Senator WELKER. Many feet were frozen, many people died as a result of that?

Major DALTRY. Many people's feet were frozen, and many people died.

Another method was that you were taken away and placed in solitary. Solitary does not sound like much, either, unless you figure it might be a 4 by 6 hole with a wooden top over it, without the proper clothing, no heat, improper food.

Senator WELKER. You mean a hole in the ground?

Major DALTRY. I mean a hole in the ground.

Senator WELKER. Bitterly cold?

Major DALTRY. Bitterly cold.

Senator WELKER. How long would they remain there?

Major DALTRY. Until they gave the proper opinion.

Senator WELKER. And that could last until what?

Major DALTRY. It could last until death, it could last until up in the months.

Senator WELKER. Can you describe for us any of the persons, our brave men, who came out of the hole after being forced to give the proper phrases and statements desired by the Communists? Were they changed men?

Major DALTRY. Some of them were.

Senator WELKER. As a matter of fact, Major—I have not interviewed you before this moment. As a matter of fact, they were insane men; is that a fact?

Major DALTRY. It was. Quite a few of them.

Senator WELKER. They had a wild, staring glare in their eyes, as would any person suffering like they did?

Major DALTRY. They did. And they had to be with us for quite a while before they recovered enough to recover their sanity.

Some had a phobia that they wished to talk because they had been so long silent; that any time they had the opportunity they would just talk, just to hear a voice or to hear somebody's voice, because they had so long been in solitary.

Senator WELKER. Now proceed, Major.

Major DALTRY. This indoctrination continued on after we reached camp 2 until April, I think, of 1952. In April of 1952 the indoctrination seemed to slow down. In other words, we did not hold formal classes in which it was required that everyone would attend.

Senator WELKER. Why did it slow down?

Major DALTRY. In my personal opinion, it was because of the fact that the publications were starting to scream that the Americans were using forced screening and forced indoctrination of the Korean and Chinese prisoners. So therefore they stopped it so they could say, "See, we do not do that to our prisoners."

Once in a while, approximately once a week, they would have a group of maybe 10 or 12 persons, take them from the compound over to one of the Chinese-occupied houses, and have a publication—maybe the Shanghai News or the China Monthly Review or the Peoples China, with articles on germ warfare. These articles then they would make us read. One of the group would have to read them out loud, and then they would ask, "Are there any questions or any discussion on this article?" Most of the time we would not say anything, and they would say, "That is all," and return us to the compound, taking another group, repeating the same procedure.

Also, in the library of the camp, which they set up, which was supposed to be the reading matter for the camp, they had all the magazines, China Monthly Review, the Peoples China, Shanghai News, Daily Worker, the Peoples World, and other publications of that nature, plus books, novels which followed or brought out the "decadent capitalistic system." Those were the only books and the only reading matter allowed in the camp. That was one way that they continued their indoctrination without holding a formal class.

Senator WELKER. I take it you did not have any articles by General Wedemeyer or General Van Fleet or Gen. Mark Clark or any persons like that?

Major DALTRY. We had no articles from any of those persons.

Senator WELKER. As a matter of fact, you received only the Communist propaganda?

Major DALTRY. That is correct.

Senator WELKER. And the China Weekly Review and the China Monthly Review, in your opinion, would you say it was a Communist publication?

Major DALTRY. In my opinion, I would say it is.

Senator WELKER. There is not any question about that?

Major DALTRY. There is no question in my mind, sir.

Senator WELKER. You saw it, you had to read it. Being the great soldier you are and having reached a majority in the profession of arms, you certainly would know something that was Communist or something that was for America, would you not?

Major DALTRY. I would.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you see one article in the China Monthly or Weekly Review that was favorable to the United States? Did you see one?

Major DALTRY. No, I did not. I have not seen any favorable to the United States in that magazine.

Mr. CARPENTER. And did you look through it quite carefully?

Major DALTRY. I did look through it quite carefully.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you know who the editor was of the China Weekly, and, later, the Monthly Review?

Major DALTRY. A man by the name of Powell.

Mr. CARPENTER. What was his full name?

Major DALTRY. I believe it was John Powell.

Senator WELKER. Major, may I ask you this: How much did you weigh when you were captured by the Communists?

Major DALTRY. About 150 pounds.

Senator WELKER. After going through your indoctrination, when you were released can you tell us how much you weighed?

Major DALTRY. At August or September 1951, I weighed between ninety and a hundred pounds; and upon my release I weighed 117 pounds.

Senator WELKER. As a matter of fact, prior to your release, the Communists tried to build you up and fed you up, did they not?

Major DALTRY. I would say that was what they were trying to do, yes.

Senator WELKER. Certainly. You got more food then. And you know, as a matter of fact, they did it to try to impress complacent Americans who thought they were so good to you people who were serving there; is that correct?

Major DALTRY. That is a correct statement.

Senator WELKER. Very well. Now will you proceed, Major?

Major DALTRY. After the formal indoctrination or the formal classes of indoctrination, the normal day, they allowed us more or less to fulfill our own wishes or do what we pleased within the camp, as long as there was no organization. In other words, we could have a softball game provided we made our own softball equipment.

Senator WELKER. And provided they could photograph it and use it for propagandizing the freedom-loving peoples of the world; is that a correct statement?

Major DALTRY. That is correct.

Senator WELKER. Major, I would like to ask you this question: Based upon your experience, your hardships, your dedication to your country in your great profession, what would you think about the recognition of Red China in the United Nations?

Be frank; come on.

Major DALTRY. This is my own personal statement and my own personal opinion. I would hate to see Red China made a member of the United Nations because of the fact that if you did, you would have 1 man speaking for 600 million people and they would have no voice in the decisions that would be made affecting their country.

Senator WELKER. And it could also result in nest and haven of spies and saboteurs and espionage agents within our country; is that correct?

Major DALTRY. That is correct.

Senator WELKER. Now will you proceed with anything else you desire to tell us, Major?

Major DALTRY. We received news. They would broadcast over their loudspeaker news which they wished us to hear concerning the negotiations, which was to the effect that if the negotiations were broken off they would let us know, making sure to tell us that it was the American side which had broken off the negotiations. They would make sure that we were able to read or able to hear the replies to all the discussions at Panmunjom made by Nam Il, and never gave us the opportunity to see the original discussion or the original remarks, but only the replies they would make.

Senator WELKER. Major, you fought in World War II?

Major DALTRY. I did, sir.

Senator WELKER. In what theater?

Major DALTRY. Pacific theater.

Senator WELKER. In your experience as an officer of the United States Army, have you ever had such a difficult war to fight as in Korea, keeping in mind the bitter cold, the lack of equipment, and things of that nature?

Major DALTRY. That is a hard question to answer.

Senator WELKER. I realize that all wars are hell. I think someone made that statement many years ago.

Major DALTRY. The difficulty is of the two extremes. One was the extreme heat, because I was around the Equator most of the time, and in Korea it was extreme cold. It was below zero most of the time.

Senator WELKER. And high and difficult mountains?

Major DALTRY. That is right.

Well, in the Pacific it was difficult mountains down there, too. The islands are full of mountains.

Senator WELKER. The colonel here is nodding his head because he was one of the great officers in that theater, as you well may know.

Major DALTRY. I will say one was as difficult as the other. The Korean war was as difficult as the war I was in in the South Pacific.

Senator WELKER. Major, you were captured before the breakthrough, were you not?

Major DALTRY. No. I was captured January 1, 1951.

Senator WELKER. When did the Red Chinese come across the bridges?

Major DALTRY. In November of 1950.

Senator WELKER. Did you have any experience there? Did you know the suffering that took place, the bitterly cold battles?

Major DALTRY. No. I was not up in that area at the time they came through.

Senator WELKER. Of course, it was so cold that the blood given by loyal Americans to save our boys had been frozen and could not be used. Furthermore, when brave Americans went out and tried to pick up a wounded comrade, they were shot at with every kind of armament by the Red Chinese and others.

Major DALTRY. I had that information; yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. And you further realize that our command was accused of bombing the bridges of the Yalu to keep these people from crossing in hordes?

Major DALTRY. I had heard that.

Senator WELKER. They called it the people's army, but I ask you if it is not a fact that you knew they carried arms manufactured by the Soviets.

Major DALTRY. Yes.

Senator WELKER. And further across the Yalu, you were informed and you knew that the lights were on for the buildup of thousands of MIG airplanes manufactured in Russia— they were the sitting ducks, and you people were not permitted to retaliate although from across the Yalu, in Manchuria, antiaircraft fire was shooting down our own fliers? You heard that?

Major DALTRY. I heard that.

Senator WELKER. It is a pretty tragic day for men who have dedicated their lives to your profession when you hear that; is it not? We hope and pray that it will never happen again.

I am sorry for the interruption. You may proceed, sir.

Major DALTRY. I believe that covers the period of time that I was in capitivity, as far as an overall statement goes. If you have any definite questions to ask, I will try to answer them.

Mr. CARPENTER. Major, were the prisoner-of-war camps marked according to the Geneva Convention so that they would be safe from bombing attack?

Major DALTRY. I never saw the prisoner-of-war camps marked up to 1953. In other words, to my knowledge, there was no marking of those camps until 1953.

Mr. CARPENTER. Of your own knowledge, did the Communist forces have ammunition dumps and personnel of their forces in the prison compound or adjacent thereto?

Major DALTRY. To my knowledge, which I have heard. I personally never saw a dump, but I do know there seemed to be quite a bit of activity from vehicles and things of that nature around the camp.

Mr. CARPENTER. Major, you are familiar with the expression, "Giving aid and comfort to the enemy"; are you?

Major DALTRY. I am.

Mr. CARPENTER. Will you tell this committee, after reading the material of the China Weekly Review and later the Monthly Review, do you believe that a man who would publish material like that and force it onto the American soldiers to read and give the indoctrination that you have testified to here, would you believe that a man in that capacity would be giving aid and comfort to the enemy?

Major DALTRY. In my opinion, any man who published material of that nature, whether it was given to American soldiers or whether it was given to Americans, or whether it was given to any race that believes in the things we believe in, would be giving aid and comfort to the enemy, because of the fact that he is publishing and encouraging the communistic line which they believe in.

Senator WELKER. What do you think about the fact that a man who should publish such material now enjoys a haven in the best country in all the world?

Major DALTRY. I think he should figure himself very lucky that he is able to be here.

Senator WELKER. I can quite well assure you, sir, that if he came to my home State of Idaho he would consider himself very lucky, indeed.

That is all, Major. Thank you.

Mr. CARPENTER. Major Anderson, please.

Senator WELKER. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Major ANDERSON. I do.

TESTIMONY OF CLARENCE L. ANDERSON, MAJOR, MEDICAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

Senator WELKER. Will you give the committee your name, please?

Major ANDERSON. Clarence L. Anderson.

Senator WELKER. And your profession?

Major ANDERSON. Physician, major, Medical Corps, United States Army.

Senator WELKER. I notice upon your left breast tributes given to you by a grateful country. The committee commends you, sir.

I will ask you this question: Were you ever a prisoner of war in Korea?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. When were you taken prisoner of war?

Major ANDERSON. On the 3d of November 1950.

Senator WELKER. Will you describe for the record, please, how you were captured?

Major ANDERSON. I was serving as a battalion surgeon for one of the battalions of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, and we were surrounded and overcome by tremendous numbers of Chinese whom I had not previously seen before.

Senator WELKER. Where were you taken after your capture?

Major ANDERSON. We were taken deep into North Korea to Pyongtong, which later became camp No. 5, first; then a few days later, about 6 or 8 miles south of Pyongtong to a small valley community.

Senator WELKER. Were you permitted to practice your profession in attempting to save the lives of your comrades in arms?

Major ANDERSON. For the first month and a few days after capture; no. Then I was allowed to practice in the sick call, and later in their so-called hospital compound for the next about 7 months of captivity.

On the 10th of May 1951, I was taken back to the prison compound.

Senator WELKER. What sort of instruments and medical facilities were given to you to help you in your profession of medicine?

Major ANDERSON. As far as medications are concerned, compared to the number of sick whom it was necessary to treat, virtually no medication. There were occasional shipments of small quantities of sulfanilamide and prontosil, both antiquated sulfa drugs which are no longer used for those purposes in this country.

Senator WELKER. As I did in the case of the major who preceded you, I meant to ask where is your home State?

Major ANDERSON. Iowa.

Senator WELKER. What city, please?

Major ANDERSON. Creston.

Senator WELKER. Major, do you subscribe to the general statements of Major Daltry regarding the treatment of prisoners of war?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Are you as familiar, perhaps, as Major Daltry, and will you agree with him and so testify to your God that he is correct?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Do you believe that the treatment of American prisoners, as described by Major Daltry, was unusual or isolated?

Major ANDERSON. No, sir. So far as we could determine, the group of five medical officers who returned from Korean prison camps, so as far as we could determine, this was a general overall plan of indoctrination.

Senator WELKER. In other words, a matter of official policy of the Communists?

Major ANDERSON. It seems so; yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Have you reached any conclusion as to the technique used in the indoctrination program?

Major ANDERSON. Yes; I have.

Senator WELKER. Would you be so kind as to tell the committee that?

Major ANDERSON. I believe that Communist indoctrination, as it was applied to the prisoners of war in Korea, is a general plan of Communist indoctrination, applying to our group, to the fringe Communist subject nations, and elsewhere.

This has been stated by some of the English-language Korean periodicals which I came in contact with. It is based essentially on the Pavlov condition reflex theory. If I may, I will give you a very brief background on that theory.

In the original experiments, experimental animals were subjected to certain basic stimuli. The one picked out was the taking in of food; the seeing, the smelling, and the taking in of food. The parotid gland, one of the salivary glands, was intubated so that the quantity of flow from this gland could be measured.

Under experimental conditions, then, the animal was allowed to see, smell, and taste the food and the quantity of salivary flow from this parotid gland was measured; then a period of conditioning, during which time, let us say, a bell would be rung at the same time that the animal was allowed to see, smell, and take in food.

After a period of time of the conditioning interval, the animal would respond to the bell alone in the same way that he had responded to the food previously.

Now, to make it more applicable to human experimentation, as it was used in our prisoner group, deconditioning can also be carried out in which, if the condition stimulus which produces salivation, the bell, for instance, is rung and at the same time a painful stimulus—any sort of an electrical stimulus—is used, then the animal will more or less forget his previous conditioning; so that this condition reflex is no longer in existence, he has been deconditioned.

Now, to apply this principle to the indoctrination of the prisoners of war in Korea, it is my feeling that every day of captivity from day one of the prisoners' existence as prisoners to the time of their release

was a part of a planned indoctrination program which was based on this Pavlov conditioning system.

Senator WELKER. May I interrupt, Major?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Did not, in some of your temporary practice of medicine in the city of San Francisco, you discuss this matter before the American Medical Association?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. And has it successfully, or has it been remotely contradicted?

Major ANDERSON. No, sir; I do not think it has been contradicted at all.

Senator WELKER. Tell me this: Of the many sick patients that you treated, what effect did the propaganda statements, literature contained in the China Weekly Review, the China Monthly Review, the Daily Worker, the Peoples World, and all the other publications have upon those weakened soldiers?

Major ANDERSON. Your question is what effect?

Senator WELKER. Yes.

Major ANDERSON. I probably am stating a minority opinion. I am stating my own opinion here. I think that this propaganda material and this general indoctrination program had a tremendous effect on all the prisoners. I think that it was effective not in making Communists or Progressives out of them but in neutralizing them as an effective counterpropaganda group.

Senator WELKER. Now, may I refer you specifically to November of 1951, to an issue of the China Monthly Review, and call your attention to the article regarding a prisoner-of-war hospital, on page 253. Will you read this article aloud and make whatever comment you desire concerning it, sir?

Major ANDERSON. This article, appearing in the November 1951 issue of the China Monthly Review, on page 253, signed by an American prisoner of war in POW camp No. 5 in Korea, is entitled "What Makes Up a POW Hospital?" I will read the article; it is brief:

> Here in the hospital one finds a very pleasant and cheerful atmosphere which to a great extent is due to the personnel and staff of the establishment. Basically our conditions are due to several important factors and these we shall deal with here individually.
>
> First let us take up the care given by the doctors. Not one dissenting voice will be heard in regard to this matter. All the doctors have more than once proven how competent and efficient they are.

May I intersperse with appropriate comments?

Senator WELKER. Certainly, at any time.

Major ANDERSON. In my experience I have seen a fair number of the so-called Chinese doctors who practiced on our prisoners in Korea. For the most part, these men did not have any formal medical training. Some of them had formal medical training which would be similar to that which is given a nurse's aide in this country.

Senator WELKER. Do you think a nurse's aide would do a little surgery and insert a chicken liver in the body of a human being?

Major ANDERSON. I certainly hope not.

Senator WELKER. You are familiar with that, are you not?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Will you tell us about that?

Major ANDERSON. This particular man had that treatment. A subcutaneous transplant of a small bit of chicken liver about the size of a quarter, which had been previously incubated in a weak penicillin solution, was made; a slit being made between certain ribs and the chicken liver placed under the skin and the skin sewed back together.

I was able to talk with a good number of these people, and remarkably enough none of them died, which was a source of great interest to me. It seems that those people who had been given the chicken-liver-tissue transplant were, prior to and at the same time they were given this operation, put on a relatively high-calory, high-protein, high-vitamin, and a relatively attractive diet. These men all survived, as any other prisoner would have survived had he been given this particular diet.

In all cases, the chicken liver either liquefied and erupted as pus or developed as a hard, calcified nodule. In no case was the chicken-liver transplant effective in medical treatment.

This is a pretty thoroughly disproven form of medical treatment.

Senator WELKER. Now you may proceed, Major.

Major ANDERSON. All right, sir.

I mentioned about the qualifications of the Chinese doctors.

Along with these two qualities so important in a doctor's makeup must be added devotion to duty. These men are devoted to the task of saving human life. I have seen them toil from sunup until late at night fighting for a man's life.

Senator WELKER. Have you seen them doing that?

Major ANDERSON. No; I do not think I can say that.

Senator WELKER. That was the propaganda contained in the China Monthly Review?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

These men were politically oriented. They spent a vast majority of their evening hours attending little political-study sessions. Therefore, I think that that statement is incorrect.

One of the finest tributes one can offer is to say that these men would make ideal "country doctors." I'm sure everyone will understand this term of praise.

Second in importance is the nursing care received here. From the date of my entrance the caliber of the nursing has been of the highest. Since the arrival of the Chinese Red Cross it has become even better.

Senator WELKER. What do you have to say about that?

Major ANDERSON. As nurses at this hospital during the time I was there, we had some local Korean farm girls, some of whom tried to do the best they could, many of whom were very sadistic in handling the wounds of the men, for instance.

Senator WELKER. Now just describe for the committee what you mean by the word "sadistic."

Major ANDERSON. As an example, I remember one—well, I remember several cases, one man who had a severe wound of his arm and whose bandage had been draining a good deal and was stuck to the wounded area. In taking this bandage off for purposes of redressing the arm, this Korean nurse would very carefully pick off little bits at a time and laugh while the man screamed in pain. This is a very painful way to take off such a dressing. It should be soaked. Again, water was available for that purpose but was never used.

Senator WELKER. Incidentally, I would like to ask you this question: Were you permitted to use the old country variety of practice of medicine, like hotpacks or something of that nature?

Major ANDERSON. No, sir; for the most part we were not. The hot water that was available to us for the most part had to be taken from the total quantity of hot water which was available to the men for drinking; that is, boiled water. We felt very strongly that all of the drinking water was contaminated and that we must first provide them with sufficient boiled water for drinking. No additional supply was allowed us for either cleansing the wounds, using hotpacks, or sterilizing, boiling the clothes which had been contaminated.

Senator WELKER. Now, continue in that discourse on those learned country doctors.

Major ANDERSON. All right, sir. This is on the nurses:

It is extremely difficult to look after people you cannot speak to, but these girls have tried diligently to minister to the sick. Now it is the rainy season and one can truly appreciate the problems encountered by the nurses as they rush through the rain and the mud to treat the sick.

Thirdly, I'd like to speak of living conditions. Originally the rooms here were dark, dreary, and crowded. Today they are cleaned regularly, the crowded condition has been relieved—

I might add by the simple expedient of most of the sick men dying off—

and windows have been installed to permit more light and provide better ventilation. All in all, our living conditions have been improved by better than 100 percent.

Finally, but certainly not of the least importance, is the matter of food. Our food definitely has improved tremendously. Men who are unable to take regular food are given special rations and the sickest are now segregated and receive special supplemental feedings.

The "special rations" referred to is a mixture of white rice and water into a sort of "gooish" soup and with no additional seasoning or flavoring of any sort.

Senator WELKER. Major, may I interrupt you at this point?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. I want to make a statement before I leave, and I am going to continue to go on with the remaining witnesses here. It will be a statement by Senator Herman Welker, acting chairman, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR HERMAN WELKER, ACTING CHAIRMAN, SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE, MADE IN SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., DECEMBER 13, 1954

Senator WELKER. On September 27, 1954, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee heard the testimony of Mr. John W. Powell. In addition, it heard the testimony of Mrs. Dolores Gill, the widow of an American officer who died in a Chinese Communist prison camp, plus a number of prisoners of war who had suffered incredible torture in these camps.

Today we have an additional number of prisoners of war as witnesses. Supplementing this, the staff of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee has analyzed with care the China Weekly—later Monthly—Review, of which John W. Powell was the responsible editor. From the evidence thus obtained we have established that—

(1) John W. Powell was the responsible editor of the China Monthly Review, which was used for indoctrination purposes and compulsory reading by the Chinese Communist armies among American prisoners of war. Failure to comply with Communist indoctrination orders resulted in severe punishment, torture, and deprivation of food and medical supplies for American prisoners of war, resulting, in some cases, in death.

(2) His magazine printed false and glowing descriptions of conditions within Chinese Communist prison camps in Korea, which were circulated both to GI's in Korea and to their relatives in the United States. These articles could be intended only to encourage defection and desertions among American troops and the encouragement of such action by their loved ones in the United States.

(3) His magazine consistently supported the policies and activities of the Chinese Communist government and opposed those of the American Goverment during the entire period of the Korean war. Articles to this effect were circulated to GI's in Korea and to their relatives in the United States.

(4) His magazine carried accounts alleging American atrocities and bombing of Korean civilians and American prisoners of war.

(5) His magazine attacked so-called American intervention in Korea, demanded the withdrawal of American troops, and praised the Chinese Communist "volunteers."

(6) His magazine carried clumsily concocted tales to the effect that the United States was engaged in germ warfare in Korea.

(7) His magazine attacked American civil and military leaders during the Korean war, including President Truman and General MacArthur, while praising the Chinese Communist leaders.

(8) His magazine carried articles featuring American losses and defeats in the military field.

(9) The China Monthly Review, edited by John W. Powell, was regularly used as a medium for the circulation of official statements of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Communist government.

(10) The contents of Powell's magazine and the conditions under which it was published in Communist China indicate strongly that the publication was controlled and supported by the Chinese Communist government.

(11) His magazine cooperated with Chinese Communist police authorities against American personnel in trumped-up charges: witness the cases of William Olive and Angus Ward, both United States State Department employees.

(12) John W. Powell established communication with relatives of American prisoners of war and circulated his magazine within the United States in furtherance of the above objectives.

(13) His magazine promoted Communist front organizations operating both on an international scale and within the United States as part of the vast international Communist apparatus.

(14) His publication supported Communist leaders on trial in the United States under the Smith Act and the defendants in the Rosenberg atomic espionage case.

(15) His magazine supported the Communist contention against the American policy of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war in Korea.

(16) His magazine featured statements against the American Government carrying the names of American prisoners of war as signators. Testimony disclosed that these names were, in many cases, obtained under duress or that they were false.

(17) The China Review published from time to time, and caused to be reprinted within the United States in a pro-Communist publication, lists of American prisoners of war obtained from Communist sources and independently of the American Government. In some cases, the information circulated was definitely false. The publication of these lists through nongovernmental channels tended to cast doubt upon the reliability of American Government channels. It could be interpreted as a move to encourage relatives of American POW's to consult publications filled with Communist propaganda for news in regard to their loved ones—a dastardly plot indeed.

(18) Powell circulated his magazine in the United States despite rulings by United States post-office authorities as to its nonmailability.

(19) He refused to say under oath whether his sworn statements as to his Communist affiliations in the passport application and in his application for Government employment were true or false.

(20) He is presently lecturing in the United States in support of the Communist government in China although not registered as a foreign agent.

The case of John W. Powell was called to the attention of the Department of Justice on October 1, 1954, and the Department still has the case under consideration.

That an American should be allowed to engage in such activities as those of John W. Powell, so detrimental to the welfare of his countrymen and his country itself, without any punishment, is an insult to the prisoners of war who faced the tortures of the Chinese Communist prison camps in Korea.

And I may say it is an insult to freedom-loving Americans all over our land and to freedom-loving people all over the world.

It is, in a sense, an encouragement to other conspirators to act likewise without fear of punishment. If this is an expression of our desire for coexistence, then God help America. I believe I am expressing the sentiments of every member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, of every POW who suffered in Korea, and of the great mass of the people of the United States when I say that conduct such as has been established in the case of John W. Powell should be subject to most severe penalties.

Unless the Department of Justice can deal adequately with this man under existing legislation, then the Congress should take the necessary legislative steps to assure that such conduct as his will be subject in future to the heavy sanctions it merits.

Furthermore, I might say to you, for the record, that if such conduct is condoned in this country of ours, people like John W. Powell and others, who are lecturing throughout the United States and taking the fifth amendment, if you please, when asked what organization they are lecturing for—then it is a dark, a sad day for our Republic and freedom-loving people everywhere.

I am sorry for the interruption, Major. Will you continue, sir?

Major ANDERSON. Just the concluding statements in this printed statement:

These four factors are basically what makes up life in a hospital. Of course, medical supply is of great importance, and I can assure you that medical facilities used for us here are excellent. Penicillin and streptomycin are not mere words, they are articles which are used.

All of this serves to make up a very efficient hospital with an equally capable staff of doctors and nurses. Here a man is given every chance in the world to live so that when the all-important peace comes he will be safely sent on his way home.

Now, there were many, many statements which came out as a result of hospital treatment by the Chinese. These statements were, for the most part, solicited statements by the Chinese.

Generally speaking, it was not necessary for them to point a gun at the man and say "we demand that you write a statement that is flattering to us," because this was a man who had seen death for a long, long time, and he realized that he was completely at the mercy of these people who were asking him for a flattering statement. He realized that they could very quickly cut him off from food and medications and shelter, and he had seen that done to other prisoners.

Therefore, many men wrote statements which I consider were under marked duress.

Senator WELKER. Now, Major, in conclusion, with respect to that aspect of your testimony, it is your opinion that that article written in the China Monthly Review was nothing but pure and simple Communist propaganda?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. And not based upon truth and fact?

Major ANDERSON. Right.

Senator WELKER. Major, did any of the camps in which you were imprisoned contain markings to show aviators that they were prisoner of war camps?

Major ANDERSON. I saw no markings, no such markings, until I believe sometime in the fall of 1952. After that time my camp was marked.

Senator WELKER. Can you tell us why it was marked then, while they were doing Little Switch and Big Switch?

Major ANDERSON. Actually, this was preparatory to the big discussion of the POW question, and they were repairing their bridges at that time. They were trying to make everything look very good.

There was also at that time considerable discussion at the Panmunjom conference concerning the exchange of Red Cross personnel to go up and investigate these camps.

Senator WELKER. I have already interrogated you with respect to your medical ideas. I will ask you this further question: Did you ever have any reason to think that the poor quality of your medical equipment and supplies caused an epidemic?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

May I give you a specific example?

Senator WELKER. I want that; yes, sir.

Major ANDERSON. Sometime during the summer of 1951—I can't give you the exact date—the Chinese came up to the company, of which I was a member, in Camp 5 and said they were going to give immunizations. They brought with them one syringe, two needles, and they had a bit of alcohol; and in switching from one patient to the next they used the same two needles for our group of approximately 120 men, and just rubbed the needle off with an alcohol sponge.

There were five doctors in this particular camp at this time. All of us pointed out to these men that there were cases in our company of hepatitis, that is, infectious yellow jaundice.

We pointed out that by means of unclean needles this condition could be spread and that it could become quite dangerous, that although it is usually a relatively benign disease; well, out of a thousand people who get it, 3 or 4 die.

The Chinese refused to listen to us on this, insisted on giving the immunizations in that particular manner, and within 6 weeks I think 90 percent of our group had hepatitis.

Senator WELKER. Now, Major, can you give me some observations with respect to the sanitation of these so-called wonderful hospitals, as printed in the China Monthly Review?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

In general, water, and particularly hot or boiled water, was at a marked premium in these hospital compounds. The men who were captured, generally speaking, were captured just before the winter had set in and were not in clothing at the time of capture which sufficiently would carry them through the North Korean winter.

Of course, during the time of the final combat, their capture and their subsequent marches in captivity, some of this clothing had deteriorated.

During this crucial time—I am speaking specifically now of the early months of 1951, it is the most critical time in our POW lives; during this crucial time there was a tremendously high death rate. We repeatedly asked that we be allowed to take clothing from the men who had died and redistribute it to the living, that it could no longer do the dead men any good. This was denied us. The clothing was collected and put aside. We were allowed no contact with the clothing whatever.

The men who had dysentery and whose clothes had become soiled were not allowed to boil these clothes or were not given sufficient water to wash these clothes. Lice were our closest associates, and all of us had many, many body lice.

A very simple way to get rid of body lice is to boil the clothes that the individual has. The louse lives on the clothes and lays eggs on the clothes. We asked for this; it was denied us.

Senator WELKER. I am going to try to cut things short here because I have to leave and the committee has to finish with some other witnesses.

Did you ever see any evidence of germ warfare practiced on Korea, North Korea, by the United States Government?

Major ANDERSON. No, sir.

Senator WELKER. That was another bit of vicious, false, lying propaganda.

Major ANDERSON. Yes.

Senator WELKER. I want to ask you this: Do you recall when some 36 precious American boys lined up facing a trench and were shot with "burp" guns? Some of them dead in this ditch? Do you recall that?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Did you interview one survivor of that infamous act?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir. I happened to be passing through Japan on my way to Korea at the time and was stationed for a few days in one of the station hospitals in Japan.

The one, or one of the survivors of this particular massacre came under my care for a brief period of time at that time.

Senator WELKER. He had been shot 2 or 3 times in the back?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir. He had been shot.

He was a man who had crawled over and rubbed his head and face in the blood of one of his comrades.

Senator WELKER. I want to go into that.

They did not kill them all when they shot them in the back, so that some of them were still alive?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. The American that you interviewed, the soldier, did he not reach over and take blood from his dead comrades, smear it all over his face and his body, notwithstanding the fact that the brutal Communists came up there, battered him in the head with the butt end of a rifle?

Major ANDERSON. Yes; that is the story he told me.

Senator WELKER. He took it without moving, and he came out and told you and others about that terrible atrocity?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir; that is true.

Senator WELKER. Were you acquainted with a great man, a great soldier, who gave his life to his country, by the name of 2d Lt. Charles L. Gill?

Major ANDERSON. Yes: I was.

Senator WELKER. I refer to page 1823 in the record of our hearings in Washington, D. C., and ask you to read aloud the letter written by John W. Powell on January 10, 1951.

Major ANDERSON (reading):

DEAR MRS. GILL: Perhaps you have already received the original copy of your husband's letter to you, but as a fellow Missourian I wanted to make sure that you saw it and in good time. We know from the clippings and magazines we receive from home that there has been little, if any, news on the American POW's except for fabricated atrocity stories, and we felt the enclosed clippings from the local papers here might give you some reassurance

From our own personal observation of the action of the Chinese People's Government here in Shanghai, we know it is the policy to treat all prisoners—captured Kuomintang soldiers as well as criminals—with the greatest leniency and fairness in order to win over their support, and we are sure this is the same policy being carried out by the Chinese volunteers in Korea. This accounts for the numerous statements of gratitude and expressions of good will by the American POW's which appear in our local newspapers almost daily.

In addition, there have been several demonstration groups of American and British POW's demanding the end of the "dirty war" for after they have seen the hatred of the Korean people against the Syngman Rhee government and the help being given by the Americans for that hated clique, they cannot help but feel this has all been one tragic mistake. We imagine many people in America must feel the same way, also.

We should have sent the enclosed clippings of a letter to Mrs. Foss before, but we did not think of it at the time. Perhaps you would be kind enough to send it on to her. If you would like us to send any further clippings about the POW's or the news on Korea that appears in our local press, please feel free to write us.

Very sincerely yours,

JOHN W. POWELL.

Senator WELKER. What is the date of that letter, Major?

Major ANDERSON. January 10, 1951.

Senator WELKER. Now I will ask you: Where was Lieutenant Gill on January 10, 1951?

Major ANDERSON. Lieutenant Gill was in a small valley camp named Sombokol, about 6 or 8 miles south of Pyontong.

Senator WELKER. What was his physical condition at that time?

Major ANDERSON. This was a little over 2 months after Lieutenant Gill had been captured. He was a sick man. I can describe his condition more closely to you, if you would like.

Senator WELKER. I want you to describe it as you can do it, as a professional man.

Major ANDERSON. All right, sir.

The clothing which he had worn during his period of captivity consisted of a coverall, fatigue coverall, and boots. That was the clothing in which he was captured and the clothing that he wore throughout that winter.

He was allowed to eat either cracked corn or millet, about a handful per day of the dry grain. It was mixed in a soupy concoction.

Senator WELKER. He was starving to death: was he not?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, starving to death; yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. This character named Powell had the temerity to write that letter?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

This man, on January 10, 1951, was starving and was sick.

Senator WELKER. And tell me about his sickness, sir.

Major ANDERSON. He had the same condition which eventually caused his death, a diarrhea or dysentery, which was probably based on a vitamin-deficiency disease.

Senator WELKER. You were not able to get any medicine to help Lieutenant Gill?

Major ANDERSON. No, sir. The medicine which he needed was food and clothing.

Senator WELKER. But you did not have any trouble getting the China Monthly Review?

Major ANDERSON. No, sir.

Senator WELKER. That came in by the bundle?

Major ANDERSON. That is right.

Senator WELKER. Major, in conclusion: On the basis of your personal knowledge, do you believe that John W. Powell gave aid and comfort to the enemy of the United States at the time of war in Korea?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Let me make this observation, sir. I am not under oath, but I cannot conceive of more aid and comfort to an enemy that a human being could give. Do you agree with me on that?

Major ANDERSON. I agree.

Senator WELKER. You were there, you suffered, you know far more than I do.

Major ANDERSON. May I give one brief instance of this?

Senator WELKER. I would like to have it, Major.

Major ANDERSON. There was an editorial in the China Weekly Review, at that time, some time in July 1950, which stated in essence that the South Koreans invaded the North Koreans and so forth. This particular editorial was quoted to me in its entirety, or in its parts, by virtually every English-speaking Chinese that I talked to. This

was quoted. This man was a maker of propaganda. He just didn't go along with it; he made it, he manufactured the stuff.

Senator WELKER. In conclusion, I would not presume that I had the ability to match the intelligence of this man, who I think was a traitor to his country. And I say that in view of the testimony given here.

But I hope and pray that God will give me strength that I have a chance to meet him—to meet him in a hearing room before Americans, that we might discuss his statements and discuss the fact of why he was so high and mighty that he could hold a press conference in the National Press Club in Washington, D. C. As a United States Senator, I have only been there once. I am not hurt about that.

But I want the people of California, I beg the people of California, my adopted State—a State that I love—I want the Americans every place to stand up and demand that Mr. Powell come forth and see the Internal Security Subcommittee, that we might find out the facts and the truth. If he is right—and I hope and pray that he is right, I am convinced he is not—if he is right, he will vindicate himself in the minds of millions of proud Americans. But as this record stands today, it is a record of infamy, it is a record of disgrace in the history of our country. And he ought not to be permitted to lecture to Americans. He ought not be permitted to hide out when we have used every effort at our command to have him come forth and tell us the truth. That is all we are seeking.

Major, you are a fine man; you are a credit to our country. May God bless you and yours. You are excused.

Major ANDERSON. Thank you, sir.

Senator WELKER. Lt. Col. Carl Aubrey.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Colonel AUBREY. I do.

Senator WELKER. You may proceed, counsel.

TESTIMONY OF CARL L. AUBREY, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Mr. CARPENTER. Will you please state your name?

Colonel AUBREY. Carl L. Aubrey.

Mr. CARPENTER. Your rank?

Colonel AUBREY. Lieutenant colonel in the United States Air Force.

Mr. CARPENTER. How long have you been in the Armed Forces, Colonel?

Colonel AUBREY. About 13 years.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you in the Korean war?

Colonel AUBREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. And for some time you were a prisoner of war in Korea?

Colonel AUBREY. Yes, sir. I was shot down the 12th of March 1951.

Mr. CARPENTER. And you were a prisoner of war then for how long?

Colonel AUBREY. Approximately 30 months.

Mr. CARPENTER. Colonel, you have listened to the testimony of your fellow officers here, and do you believe that the treatment of American prisoners, as described by them, was unusual or isolated?

Colonel AUBREY. No, sir. The statements that they have made were common to the prisoners of war that I associated with and that I saw.

Mr. CARPENTER. On the basis of your observation, did you believe that the treatment was a matter of official policy?

Colonel AUBREY. I am convinced of it in my own mind, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. In the course of your imprisonment, was an attempt made to indoctrinate you and your fellow prisoners to the effect that the United Nations Forces were engaged in germ warfare?

Colonel AUBREY. Yes, sir. There is no question that an attempt was made on the part of the Chinese to indoctrinate the prisoners of war that our forces were engaged in germ warfare.

It was done in many instances, but in one particular instance that I recall, a building was set up with large training aids throughout the building, and we as prisoners of war were forced to march through this building. It consisted of displays, enlargements of verbatim statements, so-called, made by other American Air Force officers. It consisted of statements, or enlargements of photostated pages of the China Monthly and Weekly Review. It consisted of photographs of things that were supposed to have been bombs that were dropped by our forces.

As I say, we were forced to go through this building, the entire camp was forced to.

Mr. CARPENTER. Colonel, by the way, where is your home?

Colonel AUBREY. My home is in Santa Ana, Calif.

Mr. CARPENTER. You are a Californian?

Colonel AUBREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. And you have been in the service 15 years?

Colonel AUBREY. About 13 years.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you and your fellow prisoners ordered to sign a so-called peace petition?

Colonel AUBREY. Yes, sir. We were ordered to do so. However, the officers compound of which I was a member, and what we termed the "first three graders" compound refused to sign this peace petition.

May I digress just a moment and give a little bit of the story about that?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes. Go ahead.

Colonel AUBREY. It concerned a feast that they were planning. By a feast I mean they were to receive meat for the first time in almost 8 months, and other choice bits of food. They required, however, that we sign this petition in order to obtain this feast. And when we refused they told us the feast was off.

We commented that that was only to get us to sign the petition, and stuck by those grounds. As punishment, the officers compound and the "first three graders" compound was forced on that afternoon to go on a very extensive work detail, which consisted of 2 trips of almost 5 miles each way up into the mountains, to gather wood for fire-burning purposes, for a fire.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you observe resistance by the POW's to the indoctrinating program?

Colonel AUBREY. At this particular camp and at all of the camps that I was in, our statements were—actually, we were forced to read these articles. If we refused to read them, they were read to us. However, our answers to those statements were rather strong, in four-letter Anglo-Saxon words.

The treatment which was afforded us consisted pretty much the same as has already been described here this afternoon. People were thrown in the hole, beaten, or other such treatment, for that sort of resistance.

Mr. CARPENTER. Do you recall an instance of someone being forced to stand on a cake of ice; can you tell us about that incident?

Colonel AUBREY. Yes, sir.

During one of their harrangues, which was, as I recall, from the China Monthly Review, read to us by one of the Chinese, an officer got up to open a window to let in some fresh air. For this, or, at least, that was the stated reason for the punishment, he was stood on a block of ice for almost 3 hours, at attention. His hands and feet were both severely frostbitten.

Senator WELKER. How was he dressed?

Colonel AUBREY. How was he dressed, sir?

Senator WELKER. Yes.

Colonel AUBREY. He was dressed in very thin soled tennis shoes, in the uniform of the day, padded clothes.

Mr. CARPENTER. Colonel, did any of the camps in which you were imprisoned contain markings to show aviators that they were actually POW camps?

Colonel AUBREY. There were no markings on the camps until about January of 1952. There were no markings prior to that time.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you at any camp which was bombed as a result of this failure to mark them?

Colonel AUBREY. I would hesitate to say that the bombing was as a result of the failure to mark the camp. It was more likely a bombing as a result of supplies and trucks that were passing through the village at the time. However, I was in such a camp; yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Was any punishment meted out to the injured after this raid because they had previously resisted political indoctrination?

Colonel AUBREY. Yes, sir. There were several officers injured. The bombs, in addition to down the road, went through our compound. Several of the people of the compound were injured. They were refused medical treatment by the Chinese even to such simple things as bandages.

When queried by the senior officer, who was injured, as to why they could not have some medical attention, the answer that I was told by this individual was they could not have any medical attention because their political ideology was not of the proper kind.

Mr. CARPENTER. Do you believe that some of the prisoners of war died as a result of not getting the proper medication?

Colonel AUBREY. It is my opinion that two of them died for that reason.

Mr. CARPENTER. In the camps where you were stationed, did you see copies of this China Weekly, and later Monthly Review?

Colonel AUBREY. Yes, sir. In addition to other publications, such as the Peoples World and the New York and London Daily Workers.

Senator WELKER. As a matter of fact, they shipped it in by large quantities, the China Monthly Review?

Colonel AUBREY. That is correct, sir.

Senator WELKER. These trucks that were so-called bombed by our Air Force, when they were passing you, they were not giving you food, they were not giving you medical supplies; they were taking arms, ammunition to their soldiers. Is that correct, sir?

Colonel AUBREY. That is correct.

Mr. CARPENTER. Colonel, I would like to ask you: You are familiar with the phrase "giving aid and comfort to the enemy," are you not?

Colonel AUBREY. I am, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. At least on the experience in the indoctrination they forced on you through the China Monthly Review, and later the Weekly Review, do you believe the editor of that paper, who wrote those articles which were later transferred to the prisoner-of-war camps; do you believe that man gave aid and comfort to the enemy?

Colonel AUBREY. In my opinion, he did. He made Benedict Arnold seem like an amateur.

Mr. CARPENTER. I do not know how I could improve on that.

Thank you, Colonel, for your great contribution to America. We are proud of you. On behalf of the chairman, Senator Jenner, and all the members of the subcommittee and the staff, we appreciate your coming before us to help us try in a feeble way to alert America as of days of old. Thank you very much.

Maj. Robert Burns.

Senator WELKER. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Major BURNS. I do, sir.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. BURNS, MAJOR, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Senator WELKER. What is your name?

Major BURNS. Robert J. Burns, major, United States Air Force.

Senator WELKER. I notice that you are a pilot.

Major BURNS. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Did you ever drop any germs on the Communists?

Major BURNS. No, sir.

Senator WELKER. And you know, as a matter of fact, that that was one of the greatest bits of vicious propaganda ever perpetrated upon freedom-loving people?

Major BURNS. Very definitely, sir.

Senator WELKER. Where were you born? What is your State?

Major BURNS. I was born in Ohio, sir.

Senator WELKER. How long have you been in the Air Force?

Major BURNS. Thirteen years, sir.

Senator WELKER. Were you a prisoner of war?

Major BURNS. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. How long?

Major BURNS. Shot down February 28, 1952, repatriated on September 5, 1953.

Senator WELKER. Now, Major, you heard the testimony heretofore given by these officers and men. Do you believe the treatment of the American prisoners, as described by all of these officers, was unusual or isolated; or was it general?

Major BURNS. Some phases of it I am acquainted with. However, my case is a little different than theirs in that I was never in a POW camp. The entire date of my confinement period was spent in solitary with a few isolated days, at which time I was kept with Chinese prisoners.

Now, I don't mean by that, Kuomintang personnel, but their own people who I believe most of them were fanatical, and, well, homosexuals. They were the most filthy individuals that I ever had the misfortune of running across, and at one time I was confined with a shackled madman and kept in a cave. I spent 3 days and 4 nights in that place with this individual.

Senator WELKER. You say you were in solitary?

Major BURNS. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Tell the committee what that was, sir.

Major BURNS. Well, sir, it is just exactly what the word implies. You are denied complete freedom.

Senator WELKER. There are many people in our country, unfortunately, who might think that is a nightclub.

Major BURNS. No, sir. I was going to go ahead and give a little explanation here about being denied complete freedom.

In the earlier days of my capture, up until the latter part of May of 1952, I was kept in a hole—actually, this is a hole of a little different type that I am going to tell you about later—actually, just a cave inside of a mountainside. I was up in there—well, the only time that I would have any contact would be when the English-speaking Chinese officers would come up to tell me how the American forces were utilizing bacteriological warfare, bombing indiscriminately the Korean cities, and the overall atrocities or alleged atrocities committed by our Armed Forces.

I was not permitted to associate with nor even see American prisoners, or any other U. N. prisoners all through this period.

Then later on, after moving toward the rear lines, which is up toward the Pyoktong area along the Yalu River, I was then quartered in grain rooms in Korean adobe huts, without heat, required to stay inside at all times, the only time being permitted outside would be to go to the latrine, which was an outdoor affair.

Then I would be required to return to the confines of this room, which was nothing but just a mud floor, four walls, and no window, and a door which was covered with parchment paper.

Senator WELKER. How many beds did it have, Major?

Major BURNS. There was no bed, sir.

Senator WELKER. You slept on the floor?

Major BURNS. Right, sir.

Senator WELKER. Was that cold; bitterly cold?

Major BURNS. Very definitely, sir.

Senator WELKER. Why were you put in solitary; because they tried to indoctrinate you?

Major BURNS. Very definitely, sir.

Senator WELKER. Were you familiar with the China Monthly Review and China Weekly Review?

Major BURNS. In the early stages; no, sir. I wasn't given any publications up until the time of reaching the Yalu River area, which was the later part of May, early June. I believe I could safely say in June that I really received the first publication of the China Monthly Review for indoctrination periods.

Mr. CARPENTER. What period?

Major BURNS. 1952, sir.

Senator WELKER. Did you ever receive any news of any kind about the outside world from your Chinese captors?

Major BURNS. No, sir. I was deprived of news throughout the entirety of my stay in North Korea. One time—I can't say that exactly—I received news. However, I received it from another POW who was apparently kept in the same condition, under the same conditions as I; only he was quartered a ways down the street, I would say about 150 yards from the Korean home or adobe hut that I was in.

Senator WELKER. Did you make any use of that news?

Major BURNS. Very definitely, sir.

Senator WELKER. What did you do with it?

Major BURNS. I used it as bait by asking leading questions to the interrogators. I had one in particular who was, well, let us say he was as "lousy" as they would come, and he took every advantage of the opportunity to degrade you to the state of that of an animal or lower.

I asked him questions regarding this information; in other words, who the President of the United States was. I knew that we had the election, but I didn't know who was running for the election on either ticket, nor who was elected. He declined to give me this information. However, I had already received this information from another POW through a note-passing system which we devised ourselves, in that we both had to use the same latrine and we just took the gamble.

However, another high-ranking officer came in one day making his normal routine inspection, so to speak, and finding out the progress, if any, that I was making. I inquired of him the same type of information and he, of course, declined to give me these data, and I told him "It makes little or no difference whether you give me it or not"; that this other one, his comrade had already given the information, that it was already verified. From this time on, I had never seen or heard of that man again.

So they moved me around several times during my period. So I thought, well, I had better use that way. I had another "stinker" in another camp in the area. So it worked very effectively again. So even though the information was old, it was still effective, so I continued using it.

Senator WELKER. Major, did you ever have reason to believe that you were being indoctrinated by the Russians?

Major BURNS. Very definitely, sir; yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Do you want to comment on that briefly?

Major BURNS. Well, sir, in this one area, while I was south of Pyoktong, in a little farm area south of the city, I was approached one day. I was actually peeking through the holes in the paper there. You always watch in the event that somebody might come by, an American you might be able to yell to or at least just get a word to one of the fellows, you know, that might be passing through there.

I saw these 4 approaching, and I recognized the 2 as being, 1 of them, the commander of the camp, and the other, the former interrogator who had been working on me. And in this company were these two other people who I found later to be Russian. They stood outside of the door and would speak to the commander, who stood in the door. He would talk to the interrogator who was in the room with me, and it was just a relay. The commander could talk Russian, he would talk Chinese to the interrogator, who would talk English to me; and we just kept our channel of relaying going.

The primary concern and the information that they desired was our aircraft control and warning system, our radar sites, locations, methods of control of our bombers on bombing runs.

In other words, I can't go any further because of the security classification.

Senator WELKER. Very well.

Now, Major, on the basis of your personal knowledge and on the basis of the sworn testimony that you have heard here today by those of you who gave the best years of your lives for your country—and very sorry years they were—do you feel that John W. Powell and all like him, including Mrs. Powell, gave aid and comfort to the enemy of the United States in time of war?

Major BURNS. Well, sir; I am going to express my own personal opinion, and it is certainly not the Air Force.

Senator WELKER. All right, you can open up the throttle.

Major BURNS. I very, very definitely would accuse them of being one of the most effective means and operated one of the most effective news media for spreading these filthy lies and propaganda not only to their own people but to some of the boys in the camp who possibly were not quite as well educated as the others and were taken in by some of their vile propaganda; and then, further, to the low-grade Korean personnel who never had an opportunity of study or receiving any other type of indoctrination; of corrupting their minds to the point that they made them definitely a hostile enemy of the United States.

Senator WELKER. Do you agree with the acting chairman, Major, that because these people disseminated this vicious Communist propaganda, all of you and hundreds and thousands of others were sent through all the hardships and suffering that you have related, and they have related; will you agree with me that we of America should go back to that good, old-fashioned form of Americanism, and invite them; yes, send them back to live with those filthy Communists who desire to destroy all that is good in this world?

Major BURNS. They have chosen for themselves. I think they should have no choice now. They have to go.

Senator WELKER. They have no choice, but they seem to be, as I say, in the words of airmen, living in the high and mighty, some sneaking—sneaking like coyotes—out through the countryside, when the officials of our country and our committee have tried so hard to get them here for only the truth, not to smear and seduce and abuse. But the record that they have made will stand forever unless they come forth and tell us the truth.

And as I said this morning, I think you heard me, that if they are truly repentant they can make up for the sins they have done to our country. We will be the first to help them to regain their status as proud Americans if they ask forgiveness for their sins.

Thank you, Major. We are very honored to have had you before us.

Capt. Paul O'Dowd.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Captain O'Dowd. I do.

Senator Welker. Proceed, counsel.

TESTIMONY OF PAUL T. O'DOWD, JR., CAPTAIN, ARTILLERY, UNITED STATES ARMY

Mr. Carpenter. Will you please state your name and rank, Captain?

Captain O'Dowd. Paul T. O'Dowd, Jr., captain, Artillery, United States Army.

Mr. Carpenter. How long have you been in the Armed Forces?

Captain O'Dowd. Over 8 years, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Where is your home now?

Captain O'Dowd. San Francisco, Calif., sir.

Mr. Carpenter. You are a native Californian?

Captain O'Dowd. Yes, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. During your military service, did you have occasion to serve in the Korean war?

Captain O'Dowd. Yes, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. Were you captured as a prisoner of war during that period?

Captain O'Dowd. Yes, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. When were you captured?

Captain O'Dowd. On Lincoln's Birthday, in 1951, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. What unit were you with at that time?

Captain O'Dowd. I was a member of the 15th Field Artillery, 2d Infantry Division, doing liaison work with the 8th ROK Division.

Mr. Carpenter. How long were you a prisoner of war?

Captain O'Dowd. Until September 6, 1953, sir.

Mr. Carpenter. That would be approximately how many months?

Captain O'Dowd. About 31 months.

Mr. Carpenter. Captain, you have listened here to the testimony of your comrades. I would like to ask you if you believed that the treatment of American prisoners, as described by them, was unusual or isolated?

Captain O'Dowd. No, sir. I think most every American prisoner at some time or other went through the process described by Major Daltry.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you believe, on the basis of your observation, that the treatment was a matter of official policy?

Captain O'Dowd. Yes, sir; definitely.

Mr. Carpenter. Captain, did you have occasion to see this so-called Chinese Monthly Review in your prisoner of war camp?

Captain O'Dowd. Yes, sir. That was the first propaganda I was ever exposed to.

Mr. Carpenter. Can you elaborate on that and tell us something about it?

Captain O'Dowd. Yes, sir.

After capture, we marched north. I was captured deep in South Korea. We marched to within 40 miles of Pyongyang. As most of the marches were, it was rather a death march. We started out with about 380 men and arrived with 120.

The camp was a deserted mining camp located about 40 miles southeast of Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, and it was there we ran into our first English-speaking Chinese political commissars. The only propaganda they had at that time was the China Monthly Review. It was required reading. At least portions of it were required reading by every prisoner, and editorial comment was required after reading it.

The policy of the Chinese at the camp at that time was very strict. Such minor infractions of the rules as leaving the room were punishable by death, and they enforced their indoctrination through this infamous publication to a point where every prisoner was—I say 100 percent of the prisoners were forced to read and to write their "cognitions" of it, what was read.

Mr. Carpenter. And did that "cognition" of it have to follow a certain line?

Captain O'Dowd. Initially they asked for our opinions, and they said they wanted our real opinions. But it became quite obvious, after several men were severely tortured and beaten, that what they really were wanting was an echo of the Communist Party line that was put out in the China Monthly Review.

Mr. Carpenter. Did any of the camps in which you were imprisoned contain markings to show aviators that they were actually POW camps?

Captain O'Dowd. Initially, no. And as a result of their not marking camps, I was in two camps that were severely worked over by our Air Force. Both camps, in both occasions, were used for the storage of ammunition and fuel or as a stopover point for Chinese troops moving to the front lines. Although we begged the Chinese camp commanders to allow us to mark with the available brush and material around the camp, we were always told that we had no right to live so long as Chinese soldiers were dying in the front lines.

The camps were eventually marked. The last camp which I was at was a penal camp at the north end, east of camp No. 5, and it did not become marked until late in the last year of the war.

Mr. Carpenter. Is it true, Captain, that you were in a hospital during an air raid?

Captain O'Dowd. Not during an air raid; no, sir. I was 5 months in the hospital that Dr. Anderson described in his testimony. In fact, I arrived at that hospital the day that Dr. Anderson left the hospital, the 10th day of May 1951, and I was there until about the middle of October 1951.

Mr. Carpenter. Captain, I would like to call your attention to an article in the issue of October 1951 China Monthly Review. Did you know any of the individuals whose letters were quoted in this article? If you will refer to the article, please?

Captain O'Dowd. Yes, sir. I recall the article, having been forced to read it while I was a prisoner. There was a particular officer here which I knew. He was a patient at the hospital. He died lying next to me in the hospital at the time this particular letter was published.

Mr. Carpenter. What is the nature of that letter, Captain, so we can get it in the record?

Captain O'Dowd. It is apparently not a letter, but a broadcast to the brother of a major of the United States Army, to his brother and sister in Arlington, Va., in which he told them to write his father and tell him not to worry because he was safe, and that he was a prisoner of war.

At the time this particular publication came out that man had been dead for several months.

Mr. Carpenter. I would like to call your attention, Captain, to another article in the Review of August 1951. It is entitled "New List of American POW's." If you will read the introductory paragraph——

Captain O'Dowd (reading):

The following names of American POW's are additions to the lists published in the May, June, and July issues of the Review. These names have been compiled from the files of the New China News Agency (Hsinhua) and do not constitute an official list, being only the names of POW's who have broadcast statements over the Peking radio or who have asked Chinese correspondents in Korea to publish their names so that their families may learn that they are prisoners.

That is signed by the editor, Powell.

Mr. Carpenter. Signed by Mr. Powell?

Captain O'Dowd. It is signed, "Editor," and that refers to Powell.

Mr. Carpenter. Do you have a knowledge of the status of any of the men listed there at the time this article was published?

Captain O'Dowd. Many of these people I knew while I was prisoner. Many are since dead. But at the time this particular issue was published, a lieutenant, an officer of the United States Army, was listed here who had been dead for over 4 months.

Mr. Carpenter. Captain, were you ever subjected to medical experimentation while you were captured?

Captain O'Dowd. Yes, sir. I was one of the forty-odd prisoners that Dr. Anderson referred to as having received the chicken liver treatment.

Mr. Carpenter. Will you tell us something about that, please, Captain?

Captain O'Dowd. Well, prior actually to the operation, I spent roughly 3½ months in this Korean hospital. The death rate was tremendous in the hospital. We had men who died lying next to us for 3 or 4 days before their bodies could be removed. Even in the heat of summer—and Korea is quite warm in the summer—there were men who having defecated were unable to move. The gentle Korean nurses came in and threw shovels of dirt over them. An average of 10 percent of the people living in the room I was in died daily during the first 2 months there.

It was merely in addition to what Dr. Anderson has already said Living conditions were extremely hard. In this particular hospital the patients eventually started to recuperate. The medicine needed

was, as the doctor said, it was clothing and food. Eventually our death rate cut down to somewhere between 2 to 3 a day. The hospital had about 125 men and 50 patients at all times.

Late in July or early August, a team of so-called Chinese doctors arrived at the hospital. They brought with them the first medical instruments that I had seen in Korea. They quartered themselves outside of the hospital, and after a few days of walking around and looking us over they declared the hospital to be closed to all incoming patients. A large percentage of the patients living in the hospital were discharged.

I would say 43 to 44 of us who were the healthiest at that time—and I would say my body weight at that time was 115, 120 pounds—we were selected to receive this so-called cure-all.

Senator WELKER. What is your normal weight, Captain?

Captain O'DOWD. I was captured in Korea weighing about 170, 172 pounds. My lowest point was the 10th of May, at which I weighed somewhere in the vicinity of 84 or 85 pounds.

Senator WELKER. Eighty-four or eighty-five pounds from 170?

Captain O'DOWD. Yes. When I was repatriated, I weighed 137 pounds.

The hospital was closed and there were about 40 of us selected. We were told we were going to receive a new Russian cure-all that was known as the nicotinic acid treatment.

For a good number of days following that we had no indoctrination, we were allowed to do as we pleased. There was a lot of boiled water given us, and eventually the ration was improved to a point where it was quite palatable and apparently more than sufficient to retain our body weight because the average prisoner did put on weight. It was bloated, but it was weight.

The experiment started with injections. We were given 1 cubic centimeter of a solution which they manufactured in the hospital in the arm per day for the first 10 days. Then it built up to where we were receiving 10 cc's of this solution in the arm daily.

Now, the injections themselves caused considerable pain, and apparently some very excruciating pain to some of the patients. They would scream, and it was very difficult to keep them from thrashing and hurting themselves.

The solutions were made in our presence. Goats' eyes, chicken livers, lungs of pigs and pig livers, human afterbirth on one occasion; anything which apparently had some vitamin B content. The material was chopped finely and put into water, and not brought to a boil, but brought to just below the boiling point, and then filtered out through cotton until it had no large particles in suspension. Then it was shot in our arms.

This went on for about 2 weeks. Apparently the new Chinese doctors felt that what they had given us had not accomplished what they were looking for, and they told us then that we were going to be operated upon with this new Russian operation called the tissue treatment. Of course, there was quite a protest to it. Most of us by that time were quite willing to leave the better rations or anything to get out of the control of these people and get back in the camp.

We made a demonstration to prevent the operation. It was finally put down by the Chinese coming in and cutting off all rations. We

received nothing to eat. They told us that we would starve to death or that we would submit; that they could wait, there was no rush.

Eventually the operation took place, about 10 men a day for 4 days. The procedure was to strip the upper part of the body. They painted one side or the other up to the armpit with iodine, and 1 cubic centimeter of novocaine was injected into the tissue above the rib. They made an incision about 2 inches long, probed and formed pockets under the skin next to the bone, between the flesh—actually between the bone and ribs—and inserted 2 pieces of prepared chicken liver; that is, a full chicken liver which has been cut in half, one-half being put in the back, one in the front, and then it was sewed up again. We were bandaged with Korean homespun. In fact, there was no bandage as we think of it, no gauze; it was just a piece of very coarse Korean homemade material. It was wrapped around us, and we were told to hang on to it to keep it from falling off. As the doctor explained, the material either rotted out or was eventually absorbed by the body.

Mr. CARPENTER. Do you want to show us the scar, Captain? I would like it for the record.

(A photograph of the scar was marked "Exhibit 522" and appears below.)

EXHIBIT No. 522

Senator WELKER. Thank you very much, Captain.

Mr. CARPENTER. Captain, I would like to return to this indoctrination program. How many hours a day were you required to study and receive this indoctrination?

Captain O'DOWD. It depended greatly on the conditions outside the camp. I refer to the military condition in Korea. I would say a bare minimum of 6 hours a day and sometimes as long as 12 hours

a day, including singing which would require revolutionary songs and other material which we were forced to absorb in some way.

Mr. CARPENTER. So it averaged 6 to 12 hours a day?

Captain O'DOWD. I would say 8 hours a day would be a good average.

Senator WELKER. Did you sing Russian Communist songs?

Captain O'DOWD. Some Chinese songs, revolutionary songs. One was Dung Fung-ho and Sung-li-di-chi-chi-wa-la-la-li-bi-oo. There were a good number of revolutionary songs of various types that were forced upon the prisoners to learn to sing.

Senator WELKER. Captain, I want to make this observation: that time is of the essence at this hearing, and you have worked hard. I must leave for the East tonight and must go to other places.

I know it to be a fact that we have thousands of enlisted men who went through just as much as you did; do you?

Captain O'DOWD. In many cases, more, sir.

Senator WELKER. In many cases more?

Captain O'DOWD. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. And if it were possible, we would have those brave men here, too; I wish it were possible.

Thank you, Captain, very much.

Senator WELKER. Maj. Paul Bach, please.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you shall give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Major BACH. I do.

TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE B. BACH, JR., MAJOR, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Senator WELKER. State your name, please.

Major BACH. My name is Lawrence B. Bach, Jr.; major, United States Air Force.

Senator WELKER. Where is your home, sir?

Major BACH. Grand Forks, N. Dak., sir.

Senator WELKER. You are a major airman, I see.

Major BACH. That is correct, sir; major in the United States Air Force.

Senator WELKER. And you, like the others here, were a prisoner of war of the Red Chinese and the North Koreans?

Major BACH. That is correct, sir.

Senator WELKER. Have you prepared a list in the English-language publications which were used in the indoctrination of prisoners?

Major BACH. I have a short list here, sir; yes.

Senator WELKER. Would you mind giving them to the committee, please? Just read them.

Major BACH. The Great Conspiracy; the author is unknown to me.

High Treason.

Daily Workers from New York, Chicago, and London.

The Peoples Daily World from San Francisco.

The National Guardian.

The History of the Communist Party of the United States. I believe that is by William Z. Foster.

Senator WELKER. And he was what, do you know?

Major BACH. I believe the official title of William Z. Foster was chairman of the Communist Party of the United States.

History of the Americas.

Thunder Out of China.

China Shakes the World.

The Last Days of Sevastopol, and several books by Howard Fast.

Freedom Ruled.

The Vanishing American.

Citizen Tom Paine, and Peekskill, USA.

Then a monthly publication known as Masses and Main Stream.

Political Affairs—again a monthly magazine, I believe.

The very insidious book by Annabelle Carr, called the Truth About America's Diplomacy.

Bases and Empire, by George Merian, referred to by the prisoners as "Bases and Umpires."

Another piece of insidious material, American Imperialism, by Victor Perlo.

Prosco's publication from India.

Several Soviet periodicals that the spellings I am not quite sure of. One was A Cmeha, I believe.

Another publication, I believe the English translation is the Crocodile; an English-language publication including Soviet Russia Today.

I believe there was one, the Soviet Union.

Most of these books were evidently from the Soviet Union, were produced by the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow.

There was a real gem called the Short Course on the History of the Communist Party, which was produced again by the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow.

There was a book on the Soviet Constitution and High Treason by Albert Kahn.

Senator WELKER. How about the China Weekly Review and China Monthly Review?

Major BACH. Very definitely, sir; yes.

Senator WELKER. Just as infamous as the others?

Major BACH. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Major, was there any resistance to this attempt at indoctrination by any of the American prisoners? If so, will you describe it?

Major BACH. Yes, sir. You might say there was a continued resistance to this type of propaganda and indoctrination attempted by the Communists from its very inception some time in the very first days of February 1951 until so-called forced indoctrination ceased in March of 1952. There was a very definite attempt on the part of the vast majority of the prisoners to refuse to submit to indoctrination by the Communists using this material.

Senator WELKER. Do you recall any of your colleagues who lost their lives as a result of resistance?

Major BACH. I do remember of one case that I believe has appeared before this committee in testimony before.

Senator WELKER. Major Hume?

Major BACH. That is correct, sir.

Senator WELKER. Briefly, will you tell us for the record here?

Major BACH. If I remember correctly, the story on that was that one of the so-called study classes was in progress. The subject that was up for discussion at the time was a speech, I believe, made by one of the senior political men in China. I believe it was Ku-Moe Joe,[1] if the pronunciation is correct. He was the same thing as the State Department man there. This article appeared in the Monthly Review, I believe, in the form of a supplement.

Senator WELKER. Chinese Monthly Review?

Major BACH. That is correct, sir.

Senator WELKER. And edited by Mr. Powell?

Major BACH. By Mr. John Powell.

Senator WELKER. What happened to him?

Major BACH. During the subject of discussion of this speech, this major made the statement that he did not believe the speech was worth the paper it was printed on and that this paper was not any good, either.

Senator WELKER. In other words, he did a 180° turn?

Major BACH. You might term it that, yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Proceed, sir.

Major BACH. Unfortunately, he made the statement before a very vile personality who was there at the time, a Chinese Communist who was present and monitoring this so-called discussion group. He was taken from the compound and punished by being given a term of solitary confinement.

Senator WELKER. Do you have any knowledge of where American soldiers were forced to write letters home falsely, stating the conditions in the camp, saying that they were satisfactory?

Major BACH. I know of no cases where they were forced to write letters home. I do know of many cases where they were informed that their letters would not go home unless these letters did contain statements that they were being treated well and that they were being taken care of.

Senator WELKER. Major, because of the shortness of time, I want to commend you again; to say that we have another officer here of the Air Force. He is one of the last that we have today. He was shot down, and bailed out, after he had made a bombing run. He suffered and he witnessed the false propaganda, as you have.

I would like to make that statement on the part of the chairman because we simply cannot take the time to call Capt. Ellis Burton, who was stationed at Andrews Airbase, some 20 miles out of Washington. He is a very great soldier like you are.

You are excused, and thank you so kindly.

Now I would like to call Colonel Kopischkie.

Colonel, do you solemnly swear the testimony you give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. I do.

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[1] Kuo Mo-jo is a Chinese Communist writer who attended some "peace" conferences as leader of delegations, and whose Report on Cultural and Educational Work in China was offered for sale by the China Review in December 1950.

TESTIMONY OF CARL E. KOPISCHKIE, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, UNITED STATES ARMY

Senator WELKER. Give your name for the record, please.

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Carl E. Kopischkie.

Senator WELKER. Colonel, where is your home?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Chippewa Falls, Wis.

Senator WELKER. You are a colonel in the profession of the Army?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Lieutenant colonel in the United States Army, sir.

Senator WELKER. How long have you been so engaged?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. I have been in the service 13½ years now, sir.

Senator WELKER. Were you captured as a prisoner of war? If so, when and at what time?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Yes, sir. I was a member of the 38th Field Battalion, Artillery, 2d Division, and was captured on the 1st of December 1950, and released on the 6th of September 1953.

Senator WELKER. Colonel, I would like to ask you this in the interest of saving time, because you know of the dilemma I am in—I really must leave for a plane right away.

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Do you feel and do you testify that the previous stories of witnesses parallel your own experience?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. They are true.

Senator WELKER. Do you believe that such treatment of prisoners of war was isolated, or general?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. No, sir. The treatment of prisoners of war at the time of my capture was general.

Senator WELKER. Do you believe it was a matter of official Communist policy?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Yes, sir; I believe it was.

Senator WELKER. Can you tell us about how prisoners of war were worked in the camps?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Yes, sir. At first we were mainly engaged in going out and cutting our own wood with the crudest equipment that could possibly be found, something that we would not think of using in the United States. We would cut our own wood and carry it back; prepared our own meals. In addition to that, we carried water, sometimes great distances, depending upon the distance the camp was from the nearest stream or well. Later on we were mainly utilized in making long trips up to the reservoir, where the barges were brought in from China, unloading rations, wood, sometimes carrying them back.

Senator WELKER. Now let me ask you a question. Those barges unloaded tons, may I say, of Communist propaganda to be used upon you and your fellow men-in-arms; is that correct?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Yes, sir. They brought in a great deal.

Senator WELKER. When they did not have room to bring in medical equipment, medicine, or things that might give you some comfort, like food?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Yes, sir.

I have an incident in mind, if the Senator would like to hear about it. One of the first temporary camps I was at was in Death Valley, which we named for a mining camp in North Korea.

Senator WELKER. Why did you call it Death Valley?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Because of the high death rate among the prisoners at that particular temporary camp. Another reason was for the small amount of each day during the wintertime that light actually fell within the camp area.

We were housed a great number to a room; many sick, many already died, and they were dying in addition. After being there a couple of weeks, an English newspaper correspondent by the name of Shapiro—the first white man other than among ourselves that we saw——

Senator WELKER. Communist to the *n*th degree?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Yes, sir.

He spent a few days at this camp, and during that time he took time out to talk to the ones that were physically able to be moved from their rooms up to a schoolhouse approximately a quarter mile distant from our camp. There the question was put to him: Why wasn't food and medical supplies being brought to this camp?

The statement made by him was that our Air Force was bombing the supply route and they could not be brought in; incidental to the fact that at the same time Communist propaganda was coming in, including older issues of the China Weekly Review and newer issues of the China Monthly Review.

Senator WELKER. Published by John W. Powell, the editor?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Now, Colonel, let me ask you this question: When you were captured, how much did you weigh?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. I weighed a little less at that time, sir, than my normal weight. I weighed approximately 210 pounds. At the lowest point of my captivity, as far as weight is concerned, I can only estimate. I would consider that I weighed between 140 and 150 pounds.

Senator WELKER. Did you have any experience in forced marches?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Yes, sir. From the point of capture just south of Cudare, North Korea, we were marched to Death Valley by a circuitous route in which I would estimate we covered approximately 250 miles.

Senator WELKER. How many days was that?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. I was captured on the 1st of December, and we arrived at Death Valley Christmas Day 1950; 25 days.

Senator WELKER. Colonel, did you have any experience of a bombing incident at camp No. 2 on the 13th day of October 1951?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Yes, sir. The incident that the Senator refers to was also propagandized in the December issue of the China Monthly Review, of which John W. Powell was the editor. This bombing raid was made on camp No. 3, known as Chongsong, North Korea. Past this camp quite frequently were going both Korean and Chinese troops. In addition, a great number of supply trucks were going past this camp. At night normally there would be a light in the headquarters of our particular area in the camp, and also quite a number of lights in a minor Korean headquarters a short distance away.

A bombing incident occurred sometime early in the night of October 13, 1951. One bombing run was made. Bomb drops, the majority of them, landed within our compound or very close to it. Approximately 7 officers were wounded that night, 2 of them critically. They

were taken to a Chinese-Korean so-called hospital some distance from our particular compound and refused medical treatment because of their political beliefs and noncooperation with the Chinese previous to that.

One of the lieutenants died that night. The next morning his body was stripped of all clothing over most parts and his wounds revealed so that the public—by "public" I mean the Korean villagers—were required to march by and view the wounds as well as a number of the companies. Later on some of the companies were required to march through our compound to view the damage that was done.

It appeared in this article in the December issue of the China Monthly Review that some of the statements were made by those people that had witnessed both the body and the compound that was bombed. The picture of the naked dead lieutenant appears on page 315 of this December issue 1951, of the China Monthly Review.

Senator WELKER. That is edited by the gentleman who classes himself an American, giving lectures all over the United States, wherever he might be, and gives press releases in the National Press Club in Washington, D. C. He did that?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. Have you seen the pictures of the atrocities wherein some of our precious American soldiers were stuck in the back with bamboo sticks so that they might suffer and die gradually?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Yes, sir; I have seen those photographs.

Senator WELKER. Rather terrible; was it not?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. They certainly are.

Senator WELKER. And that was published in the China Monthly Review?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Yes, sir. I believe that practically anything that John W. Powell thought would be of value to the Communist cause was published in the China Monthly, and previous to that the Weekly Review.

Senator WELKER. Do you have a photograph of the dead lieutenant in the China Monthly Review appearing before you?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator WELKER. I would like that to be made a part of the record, if possible.

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 523" and appears on following page.)

Senator WELKER. Colonel, I would like you, in concluding this hearing, to make any sort of statement you would desire to make to the people of the State of California.

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Senator, after listening to the statements made by a number of the other ex-prisoners of war, I would like to reiterate their feelings or make a statement entirely on my own, my own opinion. I firmly believe that John W. Powell and others like him, working for that same cause, aided, abetted, and gave comfort to the enemy, thus committing an act or acts of treason against the United States of America.

Senator WELKER. Colonel, I want to say this in your behalf and in behalf of the other fine officers who protect us and our children, our heritage, that we might live. It has been my unique honor to have had some great, fine witnesses before me, in an attempt, a hard at-

tempt, to protect the internal security of the Government of the United States.

EXHIBIT No. 523



It has been a tiresome task to me today, but yet, in my heart, I say that I have never had before me such precious, fine witnesses as I had today. I commend you on behalf of Chairman Jenner, the chairman of the committee of which I am now the acting chairman; and every member of the committee, both Democrat and Republican; every member of the staff who has worked so hard that we might, in a small way, bring these atrocities, these dark days, to the attention of the American people.

I hope God will give you comfort in the years to come, that you may have some happiness for the days and the years that you suffered in these camps. And that applies to all of the others.

I hope that I will see you again. I know that the Army of the United States has precious leadership when it has such great men as have appeared before this committee today.

Thank you.

Are there any further questions?

Colonel KOPISCHKIE. Thank you, sir.

Senator WELKER. Counsel has called to my attention one thing. I would like to read into the record a statement.

In view of the fact that a number of local newspapers in various parts of the country have selected the names of American soldiers which have appeared as attached to statements or broadcasts emanating from Communist sources in Korea and published in hearings by the Internal Security Subcommittee, we feel that, in all fairness, we must make appropriate comment.

Testimony of former prisoners of war in Korea showed that the names of POW's attached to written statements or broadcasts were obtained as a result of intensive indoctrination under conditions of duress. This process is described in a statement by medical officers who were prisoners of war of the Communists in Korea, which state-

ment was incorporated into our hearings. This statement declared in part, as follows:

STEPS IN INDOCTRINATION

The first necessary step was to break down the moral resistance to an alien ideology. This was accomplished by keeping the prisoners cold, hungry, and in a state of disorganized confusion until each person realized that resistance meant starvation and death. It was emphasized repeatedly that the prisoners were no longer members of the armed forces of their nation, and all attempts to maintain a military organization were harshly punished. The planners of this indoctrination program did not condone the shooting of large numbers of prisoners. Instead, they resorted to starvation and exposure to cold.

After a few months of this treatment the resistance of the survivors had softened. The second phase of indoctrination consisted of an intensive formal study program. For a period of approximately 1 year, most of the waking hours of the prisoners were spent in some form of supervised study. Food was gradually improved, and more clothing was issued. It was made painfully clear to each prisoner that living conditions would be improved only so long as there was no resistance to the study or propaganda program.

The subcommittee made no effort to pass judgment upon individual POW's who, under the conditions described, signed statements or made broadcasts. Nor are we in any position to vouch for the accuracy of such statements as carried by the China Monthly Review or similar publications.

Mr. CARPENTER. Senator, since the name of Angus Ward's case was mentioned here, I would like to have inserted into the record and be made a part of the record certain articles that appeared in the New York Times.

One was Sunday, October 30, 1949, and captioned "Mukden Reds Seize U. S. Consular Head, Charging Assault."

The article dated November 1, 1949, says, "Chinese Reds Keep 5 U. S. Aides in Jail."

The article dated November 6, 1949, "U. S. Demands Red China Free 5 Held at Mukden."

Another article dated November 11, 1949: "Chinese Reds Ignore U. S. Plea on Consuls."

Another article dated November 17, 1949: "Acheson Protests Chungking Attack on American Ship."

Another article dated November 21, 1949, captioned, "Ward Case Action by U. S. Due Today."

Another article of November 22, 1949, headed, "Test of U. S. Note to 30 Nations Urging Ward Case Action."

Another article dated November 22, 1949, headed, "U. S. Bids 30 Nations Protest to Peiping on Arrest of Ward."

The last one, dated November 24, 1949, headed, "Communists Release Ward, Order Him To Leave China."

These are all from the New York Times.

Senator WELKER. They will be ordered incorporated into the record at this point.

(The articles referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 524 to 532" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 524

[From the New York Times, Sunday, October 30, 1949]

MUKDEN REDS SEIZE UNITED STATES CONSULAR HEAD, CHARGING ASSAULT—BEATING CHINESE EX-EMPLOYEE IS ALLEGED BY PEIPING—FOUR CONSULATE AIDES ALSO HELD—STATUS IS NOW UNCERTAIN—STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN THINKS TOP AMERICAN MAY HAVE BEEN RELEASED

(By Walter H. Waggoner)

WASHINGTON, October 29.—The State Department learned by telegram from Mukden, Manchuria, today that Angus Ward, United States Consul General there, had been arrested by Chinese Communist authorities on charges of beating a former Chinese employee.

The official message supported reports received earlier in San Francisco from the Chinese Communist radio in Peiping. These reports said that Mr. Ward and other members of the Consulate General at Mukden would answer to a people's court.

There were indications, however, that Mr. Ward might have been freed, according to a high State Department official. The Mukden telegram, he explained, had stated that Mr. Ward had been jailed for "2 or 3 days," and the possible inference, he went on, was that the Consul General was now at liberty.

REMINDER SENT TO PEIPING

Meanwhile, officials said, the State Department had sent instructions to the United States Consulate in Peiping to remind the Chinese Communist authorities there of their earlier assurances that Mr. Ward would be allowed to embark for the United States.

The Chinese Communists took Mukden a year ago, and the following May the State Department instructed Mr. Ward to close his office. His departure has been continually thwarted, however, by his inability to obtain transportation out of Mukden.

Mr. Ward is charged by the Communist authorities with beating a former Chinese employee on October 10. Four other members of his staff, two of them United States citizens, were arrested along with him, according to the reports. One of the Americans is said to be Ralph C. Rehber, of Rochester, N. Y.; the other was named as Shiro Yatsumi, who is of Japanese descent.

Officials here, who have already protested Mr. Ward's arrest through instructions to American representatives at Peiping, described the charges against the consul general as being of "the flimsiest sort." They said that he had been virtually a prisoner of the Chinese Communists since May, under what amounted to house arrest, and that guards would have been in a position to prevent the alleged beating.

The telegram was not signed by the consul general, but "for" him, by a member of his staff.

The department first heard of Mr. Ward's arrest from the Peiping broadcast, it was said, but later received the confirming telegram from the consulate in Mukden.

They described it as the second in a series of planned attacks against the United States diplomatic mission in Mukden. The first had been a charge by the Chinese Communists last June that the consulate had been operating "a big American spy ring," which the Communists had allegedly "broken." The situation was at that time called by a spokesman for the United States Embassy, then at Nanking, "too fantastic for comment." Mr. Ward was able to send only a Chinese-language report to the Embassy, saying he was having difficulty finding responsible Communist officials with whom to communicate.

At the end of June, Mr. Ward reported he had made contact with a Communist representative and that conversations for the departure of the consulate staff were underway.

COMMUNIST VERSION BROADCAST

WASHINGTON, October 29 (AP).—The Communist radio pictured the Mukden population aroused by the accounts of a "savage and brutal act perpetrated by American imperialists."

The Communist account said that on September 27 Mr. Ward told an employee, Chi Yu-heng, to do some work he couldn't do, and thereupon ridiculed the workman. Finally he discharged the Chinese and refused to grant him severance pay in addition to wages, it was related.

Mr. Chi came back October 10 to demand the extra money and was beaten in the consulate, together with his brother, the Communists said. The Communist radio's description of the injuries mentioned only bruises and a small cut but it described Mr. Chi as bleeding profusely when the police found him.

EXHIBIT No. 525

[From the New York Times, Tuesday, November 1, 1949]

CHINESE REDS KEEP 5 UNITED STATES AIDES IN JAIL—CALL MUKDEN CONSUL, 4 OF STAFF "OVERBEARING" AS THEY AWAIT TRIAL ON ASSAULT CHARGES

HONG KONG, October 31.—The Communist radio said today that Angus Ward, United States Consul in Mukden, was being held in jail with four consular employees pending trial before a Communist people's court on charges of beating a Chinese employee.

The Peiping broadcast cleared up an impression that Mr. Ward had been released after being held for several days for investigation of a beating the Communists said Mr. Ward had administered to Chi Yu-heng, a servant in the consulate.

The Communists said Mr. Ward and the other employees, two of them Americans, "put on an overbearing air and refused to admit what they had done" when summoned to the Public Security Bureau after the alleged assault, and that they were being detained.

The broadcast said the incident had caused widespread indignation throughout Manchuria and that letters demanding trial of the culprits were pouring into the Mukden newspaper, the Northeast Daily News. It also reported Chinese employees of the consulate had struck until justice has been meted out.

Mr. Ward has been under virtual house arrest since the Communist capture of Mukden a year ago.

Edmund O. Clubb, United States Consul General in Peiping has made repeated efforts to arrange for Mr. Ward's departure from Mukden. The State Department said Mr. Clubb had been asked to remind the Communists of their earlier assurances that Mr. Ward would be allowed to embark for the United States.

STATE DEPARTMENT SKEPTICAL

WASHINGTON, October 31.—The State Department, still without direct word of the incident, commented today it was hard to understand the charges on which Consul General Ward and four of his staff had been arrested. The consulate was said to have been under Communist guard for the past year.

An official said Mr. Clubb had been asked to go to the "highest Chinese Communist authorities" for a report.

Michael J. McDermott, chief press officer of the State Department, said:

"It is difficult to understand how this incident could have occurred, since Mr. Ward and the entire consul general staff have been under strong guard ever since the Communists seized the city last November. Communist guards have been on duty both inside and outside the two residential compounds and the consul general's office. Consul General Clubb at Peiping has not yet reported on his efforts to take up the matter with the highest Chinese Communists authorities in Peiping."

EXHIBIT No. 526

[From the New York Times, Sunday, November 6, 1949]

UNITED STATES DEMANDS RED CHINA FREE FIVE HELD AT MUKDEN

WASHINGTON, November 5.—The United States has demanded that the highest Chinese Communist authorities help free five arrested members of the United States consulate in Mukden, it was disclosed today.

State Department officials said that O. Edmund Clubb, United States consul general in Peiping, had made the representations to Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist regime.

Mr. Clubb, in a letter left for Mr. Chou on Thursday, asked that the arrested men be freed and the entire consulate staff be allowed to leave China, as the Communists had promised on July 24.

EXHIBIT No. 527

[From the New York Times, Friday, November 11, 1949]

CHINESE REDS IGNORE UNITED STATES PLEA ON CONSULS

WASHINGTON, November 10.—The State Department said today that it had received no reply to its November 3 request to the Chinese Communist authorities for the release of Angus Ward, United States consul general in Mukden, and four members of his staff who were arrested October 24.

A lengthy note was sent to Gen. Chou En-lai, foreign affairs chief for the Chinese Communists, by O. Edmund Clubb, United States consul general in Peiping, a week ago today, and a spokesman for the State Department reported this noon that, "as far as we know," Mr. Ward and his staff members are still being held.

Mr. Clubb's letter followed fruitless efforts to see General Chou and other high officials of the Chinese Communists responsible for the detention of the consul general and four Embassy employees, the State Department said.

The latest message from Mukden, dated November 5 and received here yesterday, indicated that all requests to see any of the prisoners had been denied, but that specific appeals for packages of food and clothing had been permitted to go through to the four members of Mr. Ward's staff.

Mr. Ward, however, has been prevented from sending out his version of the arrest. Several telegrams that the Mukden consular staff have tried to send to this country have been returned as "unsuitable for transmission."

EXHIBIT No. 528

[From the New York Times, Thursday, November 17, 1949]

ACHESON PROTESTS CHUNGKING ATTACK ON AMERICAN SHIP—COMPLAINT TO NATIONALISTS HITS ENDANGERING OF UNITED STATES LIVES IN BLOCKADE SHELLING—NO RED RECOGNITION NOW—ARRESTS CITED BY SECRETARY—BOMB THREAT TO VESSELS IN FORMOSA STRAIT REPORTED

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, November 16.—Secretary of State Dean Acheson protested to the Chinese Nationalist Government at Chungking today for endangering American lives in the shelling of the United States merchant vessel, Flying Cloud.

At the same time, Mr. Acheson told his news conference that the United States would not even consider the possibility of recognizing the Chinese Communists until they let United States officials out of jail in Mukden.

The Secretary of State said he had not received an official report of the shelling incident in which Chinese Nationalist warships near Shanghai had ordered the *Flying Cloud* to halt, and then fired on her when she had refused to do so.

He added, however, that he had read Walter Sullivan's first-hand account of the incident in this morning's New York Times, and had complained to the Chungking Government on the basis of that account.

HUMANITARIAN ASPECT CITED

The United States protest dealt purely with the humanitarian aspects of the incident and not with the Nationalists' legal position under a blockade that is not recognized by the United States Government. Mr. Acheson said these questions would be studied after an official report had been received.

[An Associated Press dispatch from Tokyo said the Chinese Nationalist Government was reported to have issued a warning that its air force would bomb foreign shipping in the Strait of Formosa.]

Although the Secretary in his first news conference after returning from Europe took a sharp line on the *Flying Cloud* incident, he was even more pointed in his remarks on the refusal of the Chinese Communists to release Angus Ward, United States consul general, and four of his colleagues in Mukden, Manchuria. They were arrested last month on charges of having beaten a Chinese worker.

There is now some reason for relieving that Mao Tze-tung, head of the Chinese regime in Peiping, is not in complete charge of the Communist authorities in Manchuria, where Mr. Ward and his associates are under arrest, and that additional efforts will now be made to have the Soviet Union intercede with Li Li-san, the Communist leader in Manchuria.

The case of Mr. Ward and his four associates in Mukden—Ralph Rehberg, clerk; Shiro Tatham, mechanic, and Franco Cicogna and Alfred Kristan, non-American employees of the consulate—is now understood to be affecting not only the relations between the United States and the Chinese Communists but the relations between the Communists and other governments as well.

MATTER OF PRIMARY CONCERN

The detention of the consul general, Mr. Acheson said, was without any warrant whatsoever and is regarded here as a serious matter of primary concern to the United States Government. Mr. Ward is a 56-year-old Foreign Service officer with long experience in both China and the Soviet Union.

He was arrested on October 24 and is being held pending a hearing before a "People's Court" on charges of having assaulted a Chinese employee after a dispute over wages. These charges have been characterized in official quarters here as "fantastic" and "absurd."

The United States has received no reply to its protests over the matter. The United States consul at the headquarters of the Communist regime in Peiping, O. Edmund Clubb, addressed a letter to the Communist "Premier," Chou En-lai, on November 3, asking for the release of the Americans, but no answer to this letter has been received.

Mr. Acheson said today that the Russians had not been requested to intercede in the case. On the basis of the evidence that the Chinese Communists in the south are not in control of the situation in Mukden, however, the State Department is now considering a new approach to the Communist authorities in Manchuria, who are apparently under the direction of the Moscow-trained Li Li-san, and in closer contact with Soviet officials.

SOVIET TO ACT IN KOREAN CASE

Secretary Acheson told his press conference that the Russians had agreed to take up with the North Korean Communist regime the release of two Economic Cooperation Administration officials, Alfred P. Meschter and Albert Willis, who have been detained there since September 22.

Moscow at first did not respond to United States requests for aid in getting the two American ECA officials out of Communist-dominated North Korea, but on the basis of their agreement to do so, received today, there is renewed hope at the State Department that this approach may open up new possibilities in the Ward case.

Meanwhile, the question of recognizing the Chinese Communists is being held up, not only here but in other capitals as well. Mr. Acheson said that he had discussed the recognition question with Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin of Britain and Foreign Minister Robert Schuman of France, but that he had not requested Mr. Bevin to delay recognition.

Despite this statement, however, it is noted here that the British seem somewhat less eager to hurry recognition of the Communists than they were a couple of weeks ago. They are known to have been doing some informal diplomatic exploring to see whether early recognition might have any effect in preserving British interests in Hong Kong. They are also known to have been talking not many days ago about recognizing the Communists after the close of the current meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

Now, however, although the diplomatic representatives of the British Commonwealth recently met and decided to recommend recognition, the new line is that Britain probably will not recognize the Communists until after another meeting of British officials in the Far East early in the new year.

Mr. Acheson did not speak about the shelling of the American merchantman near Shanghai with quite the same acidity as he did in discussing the Ward

case, but he did make clear that the United States Government took a dim view of the *Flying Cloud* incident.

When asked for comment on the shelling of the American ship, he said that he had not yet received any official report on it but had read the very full account of it from Mr. Sullivan, the New York Times correspondent, who was aboard the *Flying Cloud*.

The Secretary of State said that his protest to the Chinese Nationalists would not go into the question of the legality of the blockade proclaimed by the Chungking government. Other questions, he said, would arise after an official report had been received, but meanwhile, knowing "Mr. Sullivan's high qualities," he had no doubt that the Times' story was accurate.

The Secretary expressed the hope that Ambassador Philip C. Jessup would soon go to the Far East in order to review United States Government policy in that region. A definite decision on this mission, he added, would probably be made within the next few days after consultations with President Truman.

EXHIBIT NO. 529

[From the New York Times, Monday, November 21, 1949]

WARD CASE ACTION BY UNITED STATES DUE TODAY—PLEAS TO SOVIET, BRITISH, AND FRENCH AND MOVE IN U. N. UNDER CONSIDERATION

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, November 20.—The United States is expected to decide tomorrow on various courses of action designed to persuade the Chinese Communists to release Angus I. Ward, the United States consul general under arrest in Mukden, Manchuria.

Action under consideration at the State Department over the weekend was known to include the following:

1. New instructions to the United States consul general at Chinese Communist headquarters in Peiping to make another effort to see Premier Chou En-lai, who is charged with the conduct of foreign affairs in the regime of Mao Tze-tung.

2. An appeal to the British and French Governments to have their representatives in Mukden intercede with Chinese officials there for the release of Mr. Ward, who was arrested on October 24 on charges of having assaulted a Chinese employee of the United States consulate.

3. A simultaneous appeal to the Soviet Government to use its good offices on behalf of Mr. Ward's release.

4. An elaboration of the case before the United Nations General Assembly, now meeting in New York.

It is hoped here that by direct negotiations with the Communist regime in Peiping and indirect appeals through the Russians, British, and French in Mukden, Mr. Ward will be released.

RECOGNITION BAN

If these negotiations do not achieve their objectives, however, some officials in the State Department believe that the United States should urge the United Nations General Assembly to adopt a resolution recommending that recognition of the Chinese Communist regime should be withheld by all member states of the United Nations until the Chinese Communists demonstrated in the Ward case that they were prepared to meet their international obligations to officials of foreign governments.

The feeling in official quarters here is that, even if the United States did not ask United Nations members to refrain from sending ambassadors to the Chinese Communist regime, an appeal could be made to the United Nations on the ground that the Chinese Communists were violating human rights supported by United Nations members.

Plans for Ambassador Philip C. Jessup to go to the Far East for a review of United States policy in that region are now virtually completed, but he apparently has no intention of going into Communist-held China.

He plans to sail with his wife and secretary for the Far East between December 15 and 20 if his obligations at the United Nations will allow him to sail that early.

STUDIES COMPLETED

Ambassador Jessup has completed his preliminary studies of Far Eastern policy. He has reviewed all present aspects of United States policy in that region not only with Government officials but with a number of prominent private citizens, who have special knowledge of the far eastern question.

These included former Secretary of State George C. Marshall, John K. Fairbank, of the committee on international and regional studies at Harvard University; Bernard Brodie, department of international relations, Yale University; Owen Lattimore, director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University. Harold Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota, and now president of the University of Pennsylvania, gave his views on the far eastern question to Ambassador Jessup last month.

EXHIBIT No. 530

[From the New York Times, Tuesday, November 22, 1949]

TEXT OF UNITED STATES NOTE TO 30 NATIONS URGING WARD CASE ACTION

WASHINGTON, November 21.—The text of the State Department announcement on Secretary of State Dean Acheson's message to 30 foreign governments on the Angus Ward case follows:

The following is the text of a personal message from Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the foreign ministers of all countries which have either diplomatic or consular representatives in China. The United States chiefs of mission at the posts listed below were instructed on the night of November 18 to deliver the messages to the respective foreign ministers urgently:

Ankara (Turkey), Athens (Greece), Bangkok (Siam), Berne (Switzerland), Brussels (Belgium), Bucharest (Rumania), Cairo (Egypt), Canberra (Australia), Caracas (Venezuela), Copenhagen (Denmark), Habana (Cuba), the Hague (the Netherlands), Lima (Peru), Lisbon (Spain), London (England), Manila (the Philippines), Mexico City (Mexico), Moscow (Russia), New Delhi (India), Oslo (Norway), Ottawa (Canada), Panama City (Panama), Paris (France), Prague (Czechoslovakia), Rangoon (Burma), Rome (Italy), Sofia (Bulgaria), Stockholm (Sweden), Vienna (Austria), and Warsaw (Poland).

CONCERTED ACTION

"I would like to emphasize the importance of concerted action by those governments which respect international law to protest the treatment being accorded United States consular personnel in Mukden, China.

"Since late November 1948 the United States consular staff and their families have been detained under house arrest inside the consular compounds. All communication between the staff and the United States Government have been strictly controlled by the local authorities, and there was one period of almost 7 months when no communication of any kind was possible.

"At the present time communication is permitted only at the will of the local authorities and it is not possible for the consular staff to report their situation in an effective manner.

"Because of this treatment it was impossible for the consulate to perform any of its functions, and on May 19, 1949, the United States consul general at Peiping under instructions from the United States Government, notified the appropriate authorities there that the consulate was being closed and asked that arrangements be made for the safe exit of the consular personnel and their families.

"On June 21, 1949, the Communist authorities at Mukden notified the consul general that he and his staff would be permitted to depart and that transportation facilities would be made available.

NO REPORT PERMITTED

"These assurances have not been honored. On October 25 the Chinese Communist press and radio announced that Counsel General Angus Ward and four members of his staff had been arrested on October 24, 1949. So far as is known they have been in prison since that time.

"The local authorities at Mukden have not permitted the consular staff to make a report concerning the facts in the case. So far as this Government has been able to determine, the consular staff has not been permitted to get in touch with Mr. Ward or the four members of his staff and has not been informed of the date of any hearing which may be held or permitted to make arrangements to protect Mr. Ward's interest at such hearings.

"This Government has not been informed in any way, except by press and radio reports, of the reasons for the arrest of Mr. Ward and the four members of his staff. The efforts of the United States consul general at Peiping to determine the facts in the case and secure the release of Mr. Ward and the others have been completely ignored.

"The treatment accorded to Mr. Ward and to the American consular staff in Mukden is in direct violation of the basic concepts of international relations which have been developed throughout the centuries. As such, it is of direct and immediate concern to all countries interested in diplomatic intercourse, particularly to those with missions or consulates in China.

"I ask you, as a matter of urgency, to express to the highest Chinese authorities in Peiping through such channels as may be available to you the concern which your government undoubtedly feels over the treatment of the American consular staff in Mukden who have been arbitrarily deprived of their freedom for one year.

"I am sending a similar communication to the foreign ministers of other countries which have representatives in China.

"The international practice of civilized countries for many years has recognized that consuls should be accorded all the privileges necessary for the proper conduct of their duties. Although consuls do not have diplomatic immunity, it has been the universal practice, because of the public and official character of their duties, to permit them and their staff freedom of movement, and in the event that any criminal charge is made, to permit them to remain at liberty on proper arrangements for bail, with unlimited freedom to communicate with their governments with respect to official business."

EXHIBIT No. 531

[From the New York Times, Tuesday, November 22, 1949]

UNITED STATES BIDS 30 NATIONS PROTEST TO PEIPING ON ARREST OF WARD—NOTE ASKS COUNTRIES TO STATE CONCERN AT VIOLATION OF BASIC CONCEPTS OF WORLD TIES—ACTION IS UNPRECEDENTED—ACHESON SAYS CHINESE REDS STILL BAR NEWS ON MUKDEN CONSUL AND FOUR AIDES

By Clayton Knowles

WASHINGTON, November 21.—The United States made a bid today for a world-wide protest to the Chinese Communists against the ill treatment of the American consular staff at Mukden during the past year. This treatment was capped last month by the imprisonment of Angus Ward, the consul general, and four others.

In a note to 30 nations in every quarter of the globe, including the Soviet Union and 4 others within its sphere of influence, Secretary of State Dean Acheson asked that they express to the highest authorities at Peiping their concern over a "direct violation of the basic concepts of international relations."

This action, without known precedent in State Department annals, emphasized the urgency and importance of "concerted action by those countries which respect international law."

The note, dispatched Friday to all nations maintaining diplomatic or consular representatives in China was kept a closely guarded secret until shortly after noon today.

REACTION IS FAVORABLE

The immediate reaction to the note here was favorable. Many considered the Secretary, while hoping the note itself would bear fruit, was intent upon building a case for presentation of the matter to the United Nations. Senator Irving M. Ives, Republican, of New York, took this line.

He said this country "should use every legitimate pressure we can apply to bring about Mr. Ward's release" and envisaged an ultimate appeal directly to the United Nations.

[Distribution to United Nations delegations of a message from the Chinese Communist regime calling for the unseating of the Nationalist delegation was ordered Monday by Brig. Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, President of the General Assembly.]

In the note, the Secretary, beset on all sides with demands for action, said the entire consular staff and their families had been detained under house arrest inside the consular compounds since November 1948.

He stated that all communications between the staff and the United States had been strictly controlled by local authorities and that for one 7-month period no communication of any kind had been possible.

With Mr. Ward and four of his staff held incommunicado in jail, the Secretary declared that it was not even now possible for others of the staff "to report their situation in an effective manner."

SAYS PROMISE WAS NOT KEPT

This present tense situation, the Secretary told the other nations, came about after the Chinese Communist authorities had reneged on a promise made last June, to permit the departure of the consul general and his staff and to provide the necessary transportation.

Withdrawal of the consular staff, the Secretary recalled, had been decided upon last May 19 after it had become apparent that it could not possibly function properly under the restrictions that had been imposed.

The first this country learned of the imprisonment of Mr. Ward and the others came from Chinese press and radio announcements of the arrests on October 25, a day after the event.

"This Government has not been informed in any way, except by press and radio reports," the note said, "of the reasons for the arrest of Mr. Ward and the four members of his staff. The efforts of the United States consul general at Peiping to determine the facts in the case and secure the release of Mr. Ward and the others have been completely ignored."

Even as the text of the note was released, the department reported that William N. Stokes, vice consul at Mukden, had reported that he was still unable to obtain permission to visit the prisoners and get their version of what had happened.

Chinese news sources reported that the consular official had been jailed for beating a former Chinese employee when he protested dismissal without severance pay.

As a breach of fundamental concepts of international relations, Mr. Acheson said, the whole episode was "of direct and immediate concern to all countries interested in diplomatic intercourse, particularly to those with missions or consulates in China."

The State Department announced, meanwhile, that the United States Embassy staff, evacuated from Chungking to Hong Kong, was awaiting the decision of the Chinese Nationalist Government on the site of a new capital. The implication of the announcement was that, when a site was selected, the Embassy would be reopened there.

Michael J. McDermott, Department press officer, noted that a similar course had been followed when the Embassy staff had been evacuated from Canton to Hong Kong in August.

EXHIBIT No. 532

[From the New York Times, Thursday, November 24, 1949]

COMMUNISTS RELEASE WARD, ORDER HIM TO LEAVE CHINA—CONSUL, 4 AIDES RECEIVE SUSPENDED SENTENCES OF 3 TO 6 MONTHS

(By Walter H. Waggoner)

WASHINGTON, November 23.—The State Department announced today that the Chinese Communists in Mukden had freed Consul General Angus Ward and ordered him to leave the country.

Mr. Ward and 4 members of his consulate staff—2 of them Americans—were imprisoned on October 24 on charges of having beaten a Chinese employee. All 5 were found guilty by a People's Court, according to the State Department, and

sentenced to prison terms ranging from 3 to 6 months, with 1 year parole. All sentences were commuted to deportation, however, and the five were released to yesterday, according to reports to the State Department.

Mr. Ward and his staff had been trying for several months to leave Mukden, after a decision by the State Department last November to close the Mukden consulate. In spite of promises of cooperation by the Communist authorities, the consul general had been unable to obtain transportation for his departure.

The consul general reported his freedom and details of his release in a personal telephone call to O. Edmund Clubb, United States consul general in Peiping. Mr. Clubb relayed the information to the State Department, with the advice that the five men all were "up and about."

The Department promptly instructed Mr. Clubb to tell Mr. Ward and his entire staff to "depart from Mukden forthwith."

Imprisoned with Consul General Ward were Ralph Rehberg, a Foreign Service clerk, of Rochester, N. Y.; Shiro Tatsumi, a Japanese-American mechanic; Franco Cicognia, and Alfred Kristan. The last two are European employees of the consulate.

The State Department announcement followed earlier reports from Allegan, Mich., and Rochester, N. Y., where the families of Mr. Ward and Mr. Rehberg had already been notified of their release.

Mr. Ward was sentenced by the People's Court to 6 months imprisonment; Messrs. Rehberg and Kristan, 4 months imprisonment, and Messrs. Tatsumi and Cicognia, 3 months imprisonment. All were granted a year's parole, and all sentences were then commuted to deportation.

Mr. Ward also reported to Mr. Clubb that, in addition to the charge of assault against the Chinese worker, he was charged with "certain financial obligations, including compensation to the injured, severance pay, and extra salary payments."

"The latter two charges," the State Department said, "apparently are in connection with closure of the consulate and discharge of the staff."

The alleged beating was said to have taken place on October 11, but the State Department said today that it still had not received Mr. Ward's telegraphic report of "what actually happened" on that day and up to the time of the arrests.

EFFECT OF APPEAL INDICATED

Department officials were inclined to withhold comment today on the reason for Mr. Ward's release, explaining that the consul general was not yet out of the country and implying that nothing should be said that might jeopardize his prompt departure.

There was a feeling in some quarters, however, that the appeal for help made to 30 countries by Secretary of State Dean Acheson on Monday had played a significant part in the release of the imprisoned consulate members 2 days later. The possibility that recognition would be withheld from the Chinese Communist regime, not only by the United States but by others more likely to grant it, unless Mr. Ward was released was also seen as a factor contributing to yesterday's action.

Secretary Acheson told a news conference 2 weeks ago that there would be no consideration of recognizing the Communist regime while Mr. Ward and his associates were imprisoned. In his 30-nation appeal of Monday he asked that the governments express their "concern" over the treatment of the consul general by the Mukden Communists.

Officials here said it was probable Mr. Ward would go by rail to Tientsin and then by sea to Hong Kong or Korea. From there his journey would probably be by air to the United States.

They added that there were no plans for Mr. Ward's reassignment at this time. He and his fellow prisoners have at least 60 days of leave due them, plus whatever extra leave is necessary for rest, hospitalization, or medical care.

BRITISH APPROACHED REDS

LONDON, November 23 (AP)—A day or two before Mr. Ward and his four aides were released by the Chinese Communists, Britain expressed her concern to the Communist government over the United States diplomat's arrest and month-long detention.

A Foreign Office spokesman disclosed this tonight and added that "unofficial channels" had been used to convey the British views to the Communists. He refused to say what those "unofficial channels" were.

It is an open secret that Britain maintains contacts with the Peiping authorities on various matters.

Senator WELKER. May I inform the committee's staff and those of you who came here to hear the testimony that I will send the record of this hearing to the Department of Justice. I am convinced that our committee unanimously will ask vigorous, honest, fair prosecution as a result of these hearings.

Those of you who would desire to see the photographs, the closest things that are here on the wall, you have a perfect right to do so.

In saying goodbye to you, I want to say I appreciate the fact that you came out here to hear what little we could do to try to protect you. I am happy to have been here; my adopted State, California.

Thank you.

The meeting is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 5:25 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene subject to call of the Chair.)

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