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Mr. MOULDER. All persons in the hearing room heard the announcement by counsel.

The Chair repeats that announcement, that all witnesses who were subpoenaed for attendance here today before the committee are requested to appear here in the hearing room for appearance before the committee tomorrow afternoon at 1:30 p. m.

The committee will stand in recess until 9:30 a. m. in the morning. (Whereupon, at 5:25 p. m., Monday, April 16, 1956, the committee was recessed, to be reconvened at 9:30 a. m., Tuesday, April 17, 1956, Representatives Moulder, Doyle, and Scherer being present at the taking of the recess.)

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TESTIMONY OF NIKOLAI KHOKHLOV

THOUGHT CONTROL IN SOVIET ART AND LITERATURE AND THE LIBERATION OF RUSSIA

(INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE LOS ANGELES, CALIF., AREA—PART 8)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 17, 1956

Printed for the use of the Committee on Un-American Activities

(Index in Part 10 of This Series)



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COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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CONTENTS

| | Page |
|------------------------------------|------|
| April 17, 1956 : | |
| Foreward----- | VII |
| Testimony of Nikolai Khokhlov----- | 3755 |
| Appendix----- | 3804 |

PUBLIC LAW 601, 79TH CONGRESS

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American Activities operates is Public Law 601, 79th Congress (1946), chapter 753, 2d session, which provides:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, * * **

PART 2—RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

RULE X

SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES

* * * * *

17. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine members.

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

(q) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities.

(A) Un-American Activities.

(2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 84TH CONGRESS

House Resolution 5, January 5, 1955

* * * * *

RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress, the following standing committees:

* * * * *

(q) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine members.

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

17. Committee on Un-American Activities.

(a) Un-American Activities.

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time, investigations of (1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

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FOREWORD

Mr. Khokhlov's testimony goes far beyond the important question of Communist thought control over art and literature. It also deals with the possibility of an internal revolt of the Russian people against their Soviet slave masters. Khokhlov shows how the contemporary Kremlin display of bravado abroad is motivated by well-founded terror of great trouble at home. It would be an irreparable tragedy if the free world were to permit itself to be deceived by the smiles, handshakes, and false promises of evil men, driven only by fright over what may happen within their own country.

Whenever the Soviet leaders are prepared to back up their pretense of friendship with sincere deeds, the free world should stand ready to respond. In the meantime, it must not become addicted to the drug of unsupported promises of peaceful coexistence. It can never afford to forget what Khrushchev said at the 20th Party Congress (February 1956), about the possibility of peaceful coexistence:

Comrades, I should like to dwell on some fundamental questions concerning present-day international development which determine not only the present course of events, but also the prospects for the future.

These questions are the peaceful coexistence of the two systems, the possibility of preventing wars in the present era, and the forms of transition to socialism in different countries.

Let us examine these questions in brief.

The peaceful coexistence of the two systems.—The Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems has always been and remains the general line of our country's foreign policy.

It has been alleged that the Soviet Union advances the principle of peaceful coexistence merely out of tactical considerations, considerations of expediency. Yet it is common knowledge that we have always, from the very first years of Soviet power, stood with equal firmness for peaceful coexistence. Hence, it is not a tactical move, but a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy.

* * * * *

Leninism teaches us that the ruling classes will not surrender their power voluntarily. And the greater or lesser degree of intensity which the struggle may assume, the use or the nonuse of violence in the transition to socialism, depends on the resistance of the exploiters, on whether the exploiting class itself resorts to violence, rather than on the proletariat.

In this connection the question arises of whether it is possible to go over to socialism by using parliamentary means. No such course was open to the Russian Bolsheviks, who were the first to effect this transition. Lenin showed us another road, that of the establishment of a republic of Soviets, the only correct road in those historical conditions. Following that course we achieved a victory of world-wide historical significance.

* * * * *

In the countries where capitalism is still strong and has a huge military and police apparatus at its disposal, the reactionary forces will of course inevitably offer serious resistance. There the transition to socialism will be attended by a sharp class, revolutionary struggle.

Whatever the form of transition to socialism, the decisive and indispensable factor is the political leadership of the working class headed by its vanguard. Without this there can be no transition to socialism.

It must be strongly emphasized that the more favorable conditions for the victory of socialism created in other countries are due to the fact that socialism has won in the Soviet Union and is winning in the People's Democracies. Its victory in our country would have been impossible had Lenin and the Bolshevik Party not upheld revolutionary Marxism in battle against the reformists, who broke with Marxism and took the path of opportunism.

TESTIMONY OF NIKOLAI KHOKHLOV

THOUGHT CONTROL IN SOVIET ART AND LITERATURE AND THE LIBERATION OF RUSSIA

(Investigation of Communist Activities in the Los Angeles,
Calif., Area—Part 8)

TUESDAY, APRIL 17, 1956

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Los Angeles, Calif.

PUBLIC HEARING

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met at 9:40 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 518 of the Federal Building, Los Angeles, Calif., Hon. Morgan M. Moulder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Morgan M. Moulder, of Missouri (presiding), Clyde Doyle, of California; Donald L. Jackson, of California; and Gordon H. Scherer, of Ohio.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Courtney E. Owens and William A. Wheeler, investigators.

Mr. MOULDER. The committee will be in order.

The Chair wishes to announce at this time that the members of this subcommittee have received instructions to return to Washington for an important proceeding and a vote to be had in Congress tomorrow. The subcommittee will leave tonight. However, instructions have also been received directing the subcommittee to reconvene in Los Angeles for further inquiry into the matters presently under consideration.

Therefore, and in accordance with such direction, the subcommittee will reconvene in this hearing room in the city of Los Angeles on Thursday morning, April 19, 9:30 a. m., and will proceed with the regular order of business established in the Chair's opening remarks, made yesterday.

Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, will you be prepared to proceed with the work today for the entire day?

Mr. MOULDER. Yes; the committee will be in session the entire day. Call your next witness.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like to call, as the first witness this morning, Mr. Nikolai Khokhlov.

Mr. MOULDER. Will you hold up your right hand and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I do.

TESTIMONY OF NIKOLAI KHOKHLOV

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state your name, please, sir?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. My name is Nikolai Khokhlov.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you spell Nikolai, your first name?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. N-i-k-o-l-a-i. The last name is Khokhlov, K-h-o-k-h-l-o-v.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you spell your last name again, please.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. K-h-o-k-h-l-o-v.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Khokhlov, when did you first arrive in this country?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. On the 6th day of May, 1954.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you a citizen of the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I suppose I still am because the legal steps to deprive me of the Soviet citizenship have not as yet been taken by the Soviet Government.

Mr. TAVENNER. So far as you know, you still occupy the status of a citizen?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Probably.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you at one time an official of the Soviet Union?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. What type of a position did you hold in the Soviet Union?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. The last position I occupied in the Soviet Union was an officer of Soviet intelligence on the German-Austrian desk.

Mr. TAVENNER. By that, do you mean that matters relating to Germany passed through your hands?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. This desk was concerned with intelligence operations within the territory of Germany and Austria, or operations working out of Germany and Austria.

Mr. TAVENNER. I believe you have testified before another congressional committee; have you not?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes, I did.

Mr. TAVENNER. The subject of your testimony before that committee related to the method by which you came to the West and the circumstances leading up to your decision to come to the West?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. I believe in that testimony you narrated in detail the circumstances under which you were assigned to direct the assassination of Georgi Okolovich, a leader of the émigré movement, then residing in West Germany?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. You also testified, I believe, before that committee that you refused to carry out that assignment?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. You testified that, instead of carrying out that assignment, you surrendered to the person who had been marked for assassination?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now it is not the purpose of this committee to rehash testimony which you have given before another committee. You have been subpoenaed here because the committee is interested in obtaining from you any knowledge or information that you may have relating to certain incidents which occurred in the Soviet Union between the early 1940's and the present time.

We will ask you to confine your testimony to those matters rather than to go into matters which you have already explained in testimony before other committees.

I would like to begin my questioning by asking you to tell the committee, first, what your educational training was in the Soviet Union prior to your first employment.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I was born in the Soviet Union and I entered high school in Moscow in 1930, from which I graduated in 1940. Then, simultaneously with high school, I took special courses of theatrical studies. I got my first certificate for directing some short stage plays in the summer of 1941 in a theater in the suburbs of Moscow.

Next, to prepare myself for a career as a movie director, I entered as a student in the motion-picture department of a college of fine arts.

In order to support myself, I worked in several Soviet movies as a bit actor. I also served as an apprentice to an assistant movie director.

At the same time I took part in show business, performing in various stage shows, traveling all over the Soviet Union with road shows. That was actually my first employment.

When the Second World War began, my theatrical activities were, for the most part, interrupted.

Mr. TAVENNER. During the period which followed, did you still keep in touch with the theater and the arts generally?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes. I did it in two ways: First, my job in intelligence was connected with the use of art for intelligence purposes. Secondly, I maintained many contacts with people in show business, movie industry, literature and art, because of my own prior work in this field and also because of my personal connections.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you tell the committee, please, from your experience in the theater and in the field which you have described, and from your knowledge of it after the beginning of World War II, what part the arts played in the Soviet Union in the support of various positions that the Soviet Union took in regard to its own welfare?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Actually, from the experience of my life, art was one of the very important methods used by the Soviet State in order to survive.

You see, the power of communism depends upon a struggle for thought control. The Soviet State has three main means to mold public opinion. One is direct propaganda used in party schools or even in public schools, combined with some special courses in politics and social sciences.

The second means is the press. And then, of course, the arts.

From the beginning, the Soviet rulers used the first two means very extensively. Through misuse of these means they lost much of their influence. The common people began to be fed up with direct propaganda and began to realize that the Soviet newspapers were not worth anything because they presented only the narrow propaganda line of the state.

So, logically enough, the importance of the arts as an instrument to mold public opinion increased enormously.

The struggle of the Soviet system to survive has always been a struggle for the minds and souls of people. At every step in the development of this totalitarian system, the Soviet rulers have paid enormous attention to the arts, and always tried to maintain complete control of the arts, to use them only for their own purposes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Would you say that the Soviet Government did completely control the arts in the Soviet Union?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Not always. They always tried, but sometimes they had to retreat.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have stressed the importance of the arts in the ability of the Soviet Union to maintain itself. Now can you give the committee more concrete instances or factual information which would support what you have to say regarding your conclusion?

Mr. SCHERER. May I interrupt a minute, Mr. Tavenner? I, for one, would like to know up to what period of time the witness is testifying; namely, when was the date that he came over to the West? I think we should know at the outset how recent his testimony is and what period it covers.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

I believe you testified that you came to the United States in May of 1954.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the date of your leaving the Soviet Union?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. January 1954.

Mr. TAVENNER. January of 1954?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right. That was the last time I was in Moscow.

In reply to the question asked by the member of the committee, I would like to say that during the past 2 years I have not lost contacts with events in the Soviet Union. I receive Soviet newspapers, and some information through underground channels. You see, I could not lose this contact, because the fight against communism is my fight too, to which I have dedicated myself.

So I would say that my analysis covers the most recent events in the Soviet Union.

Mr. SCHERER. Then his testimony, for all practical purposes, is current.

Mr. TAVENNER. Correct.

Mr. SCHERER. That is what I wanted to know. That makes it so much more valuable.

Mr. TAVENNER. I think this witness, in the course of his testimony, will make it abundantly clear that he is developing the policies of the Soviet Union up to the present time.

Mr. SCHERER. That is what I wanted to know.

Mr. TAVENNER. But he is basing, as I understand it, his analysis of the situation on his full experience within the Soviet Union, as well as what is happening at the present moment in the Soviet Union.

Mr. SCHERER. It is abundantly clear now what he is testifying to. At least it carries us up to January 1954, from his own knowledge, and, since that date, from information he has received through underground channels and through his studies of current publications.

(Representative Donald L. Jackson left the hearing room at this point.)

Mr. TAVENNER. I called your attention to your conclusion as to the importance of the arts to the Soviet Union in maintaining itself.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

If the committee will permit, I will give a short description of the history of the Soviet State and the way it had to handle the problem of the arts.

In 1917, when the Communist Party took over, it knew very well that the future of the Soviet State could not be based on older generations.

(Representative Donald L. Jackson returned to the hearing room at this point.)

Mr. TAVENNER. You say older generations?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right; on the older generations. The rulers knew that the future of the Soviet State could be based only on young people, born and raised under the Soviet system.

It was their hope that the task of indoctrination would bring them millions of fanatic supporters of the system, who in never having had freedom, wouldn't know what freedom was. And, presumably, they would blindly follow the Soviet system.

By a coincidence, this belief that such a breed of people could be created was not a monopoly of the Soviets. It was unfortunately accepted by too many people in the West.

This was actually the beginning of a system of misconceptions about the Soviet Union. This is how Russia became a mystery.

You see, the struggle for the survival of the Soviet system began immediately after 1917.

It is very important for us to remember that the people who followed the Communists didn't follow them necessarily for the sake of material goods or for the raising of the standard of living. They knew—the millions of workers, farmers, the soldiers who followed the system—knew that they themselves probably would not get the opportunity to live well and rich during their lifetime. They believed in the words of the Communists, that "they have to build a better world of tomorrow."

Thus the idea of a headquarters for an international movement was born and accepted by millions of Soviet citizens.

The fraud behind the pretense that the Communists really would fulfill their promises was very quickly understood by the older generations. For instance, Navy people, who in their lives and work actually had more freedom and more opportunity to build friendships in the service and to travel abroad, realized that they were being deceived.

So in 1921 occurred the first uprising of Navy people against the Soviet system. This was a signal for the Government to begin the mass extermination of millions of the older generations.

And later came the directive to convert the farms into collective farms, which gradually became a mass extermination too.

Mr. SCHERER. May I interrupt?

Could you elaborate on your statement as to the time when there was an extermination of older groups?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

Mr. SCHERER. Could you elaborate on what took place?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

The Soviet Government then established a so-called special committee or an "extraordinary commission", known by the name of Chekha (Cheka).

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you spell it?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Chekha. I don't know exactly how to spell it in English, but it sounds like "Chekha".

To the uninitiated, the task of this committee was represented as defense of State security. But this was not true. In the Soviet Union then, it was not necessary to be an open enemy of the system, in order to be exiled. It was enough merely to be a liberal. By that, I mean an individual inside of the Soviet Union who would not speak openly against the Soviet system or compromise himself in any way.

Mr. TAVENNER. I did not understand.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. He would not speak openly against the system, but because of his private beliefs would not support the Soviet system.

Thus, millions of teachers, professors, engineers, doctors, artists, and other people who had too much intelligence to believe in the Soviet system and were smart enough to realize that this was all a fake, were arrested by Chekha agents and, without any trial, just sent to Siberia or killed.

I could tell you a fact very well known inside of the Soviet Union, that today you will find in the Soviet Union extremely few families which were not affected by this system of terror. You will not find many families of which a member was not at one time exiled or just disappeared or shot. Some of my own family were persecuted too.

Mr. SCHERER. Let me get this clear.

Do I understand then that these older people who were not mentally qualified to accept the Soviet system were either exiled or disposed of?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

Mr. SCHERER. Whether or not there was any active opposition to the system?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

Mr. SCHERER. Merely because they would not accept it?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

In the early years of the Soviet State, some groups which actively opposed the Soviet system, were treated as such. They were arrested, brought to trial, and executed. You will remember them as Trotskyites, Zinovievists and Bukharinists, and other so-called deviationists. This was merely a way for Lenin and Stalin to exterminate their political enemies.

Mr. SCHERER. Do you mean execute potential political enemies whether they were political enemies at the time or not?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

Mr. SCHERER. They might be potential enemies because they, as you point out, were not mentally or emotionally qualified to accept the Soviet system.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

Mr. MOULDER. What do you mean by mentally qualified? So the record may be clear on how you are using that phrase.

Mr. JACKSON. Mentally too well qualified.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Let's say people who, for reasons of spiritual inheritance, family traditions, education, or just personal intelligence would be opposed to the Soviet system.

Mr. MOULDER. You mean by that they couldn't mentally adjust their understanding or cooperation with the system. Is that what you mean by mentally qualified?

Mr. SCHERER. I perhaps did not use a good word.

Let's say their background was such or their previous experience was such that they couldn't accept the system. Maybe mentally is not a good word.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

Behind this terror drive was still another goal—to exterminate not only those people who almost certainly would not adjust themselves to the system—but also to spread fear and terror among the masses of people. The Soviet rulers feared that older people would transfer their experience and understanding of events to the younger generation.

Mr. DOYLE. May I ask this question, Mr. Chairman, please?

Did I understand you to say a minute ago that some members of families were exterminated or exiled on account of family traditions?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I would say family traditions. I would say that—

Mr. DOYLE. Does that go to the point of exterminating present, living people on account of what previous living members of that family had done?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. It could be one of the charges. But maybe I did not explain too well.

I would like to repeat that in every family you have some traditions of education. In one family, for instance, parents might pay much attention to the reading of the old Russian classics and to respect for national customs and habits, or for religion as a highly developed code of morality and decency. For instance, this was the case with my own wife's family. In the free world this is regarded as a virtue, but under the Soviet system, it is a very dangerous frame of mind.

Or a teacher who perhaps would not attack the system, would educate his own pupils in the best traditions of Russian history, and give them a deep understanding of morality, of decency, and values much higher than the Communist doctrine. Thus, his influence over the younger generation was a threat to the system. So the Soviet rulers tried to form a kind of psychological shell around every individual in order to separate everybody from everybody, to erect a kind of iron curtain between father and son, mother and daughter, brother and sister.

Mr. MOULDER. And separate them from independent thought?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

They wanted to drive a wedge between the generation which knew the truth and the generation which had to be indoctrinated.

Mr. SCHERER. We call that brainwashing in this country.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Maybe.

Mr. SCHERER. So that the younger generation could be more easily brainwashed.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

It made possible the brainwashing of the younger generation.

For instance, I will call to your attention an event which will prove to you the importance of separating the younger generation from the older.

A Young Pioneer, which means member of the Communist movement for children, by the name of Pavlik Morozov was a child who betrayed his own father to the secret police. His father was a kulak, or a rich farmer, who did not want to join a collective farm.

The father, together with his brother, a peasant also, began to make propaganda in order to mobilize other farmers against collectivization. The son overheard their discussion, went to the secret police and reported his father. As a consequence, his father and uncle were brought to trial and shot. Later, most of their relatives were exiled to Siberia.

Normally the boy's conduct would be an example of the lack of love for family. But the Government made him a kind of national hero. And the principal means they used to do this was art. They gave the job to a Soviet poet. His name, I guess, was Tschipachov.

Mr. TAVENNER. A Soviet playwright? Did you say?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Poet.

He was assigned to write a poem which was used in every school, and it was actually a "must" in the repertoire of every concert, and every holiday evening in the high schools.

Mr. MOULDER. May I interrupt you to ask one question? I am sorry to interrupt your line of thought, but what qualifies a farmer—I mean what wealth, property, or resources—qualifies a person to be referred to as a rich man in Russia? I am curious to know that. I do not understand what you mean by rich man in Russia.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I used the word "kulak," a completely artificial designation introduced at that time by the Soviet rulers. They divided all the farmers into so-called kulaks, which meant people who owned at least a horse or employed other people to work for them. Next came the serednyaks, the middle farmer, who usually owned a horse, but never employed farm helpers. Then followed the last category of farmers who didn't have anything. They were called bednyaks; poor people.

As far as I know, Pavlik's father owned two horses and sometimes employed farmhands.

Now to go back to the psychological drive designed to spread fear and artificial isolation among the masses, we see that it was immediately combined with an attempt to control the arts, and to use them to mold public opinion.

I could name two people who actually were instruments of the Soviet Government in taking over control of the arts. They were the Soviet writer Maxim Gorki, and the Soviet poet Vladimir Maiakovsky. In the early thirties, the Soviet Government called a big congress of the Union of Soviet Writers, at which, for the first time in Soviet history, was raised the principle of so-called Socialist realism.

(Representative Donald L. Jackson left the hearing room at this point.)

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Maxim Gorki then openly declared that art must serve the system and its ideology, and that there is no such thing as independent art.

Mr. SCHERER. What kind of art?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Independent art.

He pointed out that nobody could write or create just for pleasure, or for art's sake. Every piece of creative work must serve the system, or, as he interpreted it, the building of a better world.

It is significant that at this time there was generally adopted an expression of Stalin, who described writers as "the engineers of human souls." Since then, this designation has always been used in connection with Soviet literature.

Mr. DOYLE. When you use the term "art" do you include music?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Positively. I will be more specific about that later.

Mr. MOULDER. Pardon me. I am sorry to interrupt your very interesting and impressive testimony at this point, but I feel it is proper to announce that Mr. Laughlin E. Waters, United States District Attorney for the Southern District of California, has honored us with his presence here in the hearing room to hear your testimony.

You may proceed.

(Representative Donald L. Jackson returned to the hearing room at this point.)

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Now it would be fit to remember that since 1917 Russia has ceased to exist. By this I mean that the national feelings of the Russian peoples had to be suppressed.

The Soviet rulers then said that now is the time to build a new state in which no citizen would have the right to regard himself as an individual, but must regard himself solely as a citizen of a new kind of state—Soviet State.

Thus, one could no longer be a Russian; or any longer praise the old Russian classics; you could no longer imitate Russian folk music, Russian customs, Russian habits. And even Russian national holidays were suppressed.

In this way, the Soviet Government tried to create a new breed of man—the Soviet man.

By the way, this is one of the great differences between Nazi Germany and the Soviet State. Nazi Germany was a state, based upon national feelings, pushed to the extreme. And the Soviet Union was built on exactly the reverse principle. To be a Soviet citizen you had to cease to be a Russian.

And this principle was, of course, of tremendous importance to the arts. You see, all art had to become Soviet art.

So one of the main purposes in the 1930's was to create this Soviet art.

But it is very difficult to force a man to renounce his nationality. It requires much control and much pressure.

So, the rulers organized a vast system of control and pressure.

Mr. MOULDER. At this point may we take a recess, if it is agreeable with the committee?

Mr. SCHERER. May I ask one question before we lose it?

Did I understand you to say, that to be a Soviet citizen, you had to cease to be a Russian?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is correct.

Mr. SCHERER. Is that what you said?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Positively.

Mr. SCHERER. When you say a Soviet citizen is that synonymous with a Communist?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. No. He would be any man permanently residing within the borders of the Soviet Union. It doesn't matter if he is a member of the Communist Party or not.

Mr. DOYLE. If they ceased to be Russians, if that was the propaganda and the pressure beginning in 1930, what did they become? Citizens of what nation?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Citizens of the nonnational Soviet State. This is not always understood in the West. Actually, the Soviet State is not a state like other countries such as England, France, or Russia before 1917. In November 1917, Russia became a state, established as the headquarters of an international movement designed as a world conspiracy to supplant the national sentiments of man.

Therefore, a Communist in the United States is as much a citizen of the U. S. S. R. as a man living in the Soviet Union.

Mr. SCHERER. That is the point I was trying to make.

Therefore, to be a Communist in the United States, you have to cease to be an American.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Positively. The first purpose of the Soviet State is to represent itself as the motherland of the so-called workers of the entire world. In other words, the followers of the Soviet system.

Mr. MOULDER. At this point the committee will stand in recess for a period of 5 minutes, and then you may resume your interesting and impressive testimony.

(Whereupon, a short recess was taken, Representatives Moulder, Doyle, Jackson, and Scherer being present.)

(At the expiration of the recess, the committee was reconvened, there being present Representatives Moulder, Doyle, Jackson, and Scherer.)

Mr. MOULDER. The committee will be in order.

Will you proceed, Mr. Tavenner?

Mr. TAVENNER. You were describing to the committee the history of the Soviet Union insofar as the arts played a part in the control exercised by the Government over projects in which it was interested. Will you continue now with your discussion.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. The attack of the Soviet system against the national feelings of the individual was only a part of its strategy.

Not less important for them was the drive to convert every individual into a mere tool, a mere instrument in the hands of the Soviet State. Here we may find the key to understand the strange problem of music in the Soviet Union. At first sight, it seems impossible to express social ideas through music.

Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the witness to repeat that statement, please?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

It seems at the first sight that it would be impossible, by means of music, to propagandize Communist ideas or to oppose them. But the Soviet rulers had their own idea about that.

They consider a musician or composer not only as an artist, but also as a public figure, as an individual who has some social influence, some social connections, and occupies an important place in the so-called Soviet elite.

As an individual he had to be put under control.

For instance, all musicians were forced to work within the frame of the so-called Union of Soviet Composers.

Mr. DOYLE. You say they were forced to?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

Don't confuse it with labor unions in the free world. It is a different kind of union which I will describe later. Well, let us go back to the Soviet doctrine that the only art existing within the Soviet Union must be Soviet art.

It means that the art was used to mold public opinion and mobilize it for the service of the Soviet system.

Stalin often repeated that art—all branches of art—is an exceptional means to influence the masses and to mobilize them in the fight for socialism.

If the composers in the Soviet Union would be permitted to introduce in their music some American tunes or some jazz motifs, or would compose in the modern way used in the Western World, it would affect the integrity of Soviet art, and make the Soviet art depend upon Western art. That was what the Soviet leaders feared.

Because of their determination to preserve the integrity of Soviet art, the composer Dmitri Shostakovitch, for instance, in 1936 was degraded and punished for his opera entitled "Lady Macbeth of the Mzensk District."

Mr. SCHERER. You say he was punished?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

Mr. SCHERER. How was he punished?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I am going to explain.

In a decision of the Communist Party, Shostakovitch was accused of adopting a so-called formalistic approach to music.

The opera is actually an important item in the field of music. Opera not only has music, but it has characters, libretto, action, and so on.

Shostakovitch allegedly did not use the new approach to music required from Soviet composers. Thus he became a traitor to Socialist realism.

Nothing was said about legal punishment. But Shostakovitch was immediately removed from his position which he occupied on the board of directors of the Union of Soviet Composers. He was deprived of state allowances and of some special privileges such as an exclusive Moscow apartment, access to exclusive shops, and so on. Moreover, he was subjected to ostracism, to which an artist is always very sensitive.

Mr. DOYLE. May I interrupt there?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

Mr. DOYLE. What board or what officials thus punished this musical composer? Who did it? Who decided it?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. The details were taken care of by the board of directors of the Union of Soviet Composers. This union alone decides, for instance, to whom will be given financial allowances, as well as the distribution of apartments.

Mr. DOYLE. Was this a labor union, a union of musicians?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. No. I especially emphasize that it is not a labor union. It is a kind of apparatus especially created by the Soviet State to control the musicians.

Mr. DOYLE. In other words, it is a Soviet State union.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

Mr. DOYLE. Formed by the Soviet State music in the Soviet Union?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right. A composer could not publish his work or obtain allowances except through the state, because the state pays him. There are no private organizations which would buy your song. There are no agents. It is only the state, always and only the state.

This drive to make individuals serve the state above everything else was the main reason for a similar drive directed against authors, theatrical writers, movie producers, and even painters.

Through this psychological pressure and economic blackmail, sometimes even through exile to Siberia, the Soviet rulers established a complete control of the arts, in the late 1930's.

Mr. JACKSON. I dislike to break your trend of thought, but what was Mr. Shostakovitch's reaction to the discipline and the censure of the board?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. At that time he could afford to remain silent. Later, in 1948, he had to confess his mistakes openly.

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you.

Mr. TAVENNER. Can you give the committee any other instances of the nature of the control that this government-organized group exercised over persons in the arts?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. This control was exercised in many ways, but I would like to mention only two of them. First of all, the control of the personality of the artist himself. It was done in many ways.

In order to become an artist, an author, a songwriter, or even a pianist, one could go not to a private employer—private employees do not exist there. It is true, you could participate in a so-called amateur group, but you would never get money for it. In order to become a professional, you have to be registered in one of the local branches of the All-Union Organization.

For instance, suppose you would like to write a book or a novel. You could not go to a publisher because there are no private enterprises. There are only the state publishing enterprises. You would have to go to the Union of Soviet Writers or one of its branches. They have a special section called the Education of Young Writers.

Mr. TAVENNER. May I interrupt you a moment. When you say Union of Soviet Writers, are you speaking of unions in the sense of a labor union?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. No. This union is not a labor union.

Mr. TAVENNER. I think you should make that clear because our understanding in this country of a union is different.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Well, actually there is a labor union, as such, in the Soviet Union, which is called the Labor Union of Artists. It is a labor union as far as it is actually possible in the Soviet Union. It gives you a membership book and it takes care of some of your medical expenses, compensations, pensions, and so on. Usually everybody who is working in the field of the arts joins this labor union.

Parallel to this labor union, there are the so-called unions for the various arts. For instance, the Union of Soviet Composers, Union of Soviet Painters, Union of Soviet Writers, whose unique and only function is to exercise control over the artist.

Mr. SCHERER. Are they really state agencies or bureaus?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

Mr. SCHERER. As we would know them in this country?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

But an agent here does not have control over apartments or allowances, and he would not report you to the secret police if you deviated from the state line; or your agent here cannot psychologically oppress you, which a Soviet-controlled union does. So it is a kind of tentacle of the state which exercises full control of writers, musicians, and even painters.

Mr. SCHERER. Those unions to which you refer are agencies of the state or part of the state?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes. They are agencies of the state, and they are part of the state. We could call them "control unions," maybe.

Mr. DOYLE. Do I understand that if an artist or a painter creates a beautiful painting he can sell that to some store?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. No.

Mr. DOYLE. Why not?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. If he painted something of little artistic value, he could sell it for a few rubles in a public market. But that is not the way to promote himself as a painter. If he would like to become known as a painter he has to organize an exhibition of 2 or 3 of his better works, or have them included in an exhibition. Expositions or exhibitions are held only by the Union of Painters, that is, the state union, not the labor union. They promote some painters and exhibit their pictures.

But you cannot, as an individual, ask the director of exhibitions to accept your work. If he will take a look at your work he will never tell you whether or not he likes it. He will call your painting to the attention of the Union of Soviet Painters, and they will decide its future.

Not only your painting will be considered, but your entire background will be checked.

Mr. DOYLE. May I interrupt? Is that board of directors a state agency?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Positively. The board is largely composed of party members.

Mr. DOYLE. Then the only market, as I understand it, for a creative painting or a work of art is the state.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes, the only one.

Mr. DOYLE. The Soviet State.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Right. You cannot get money from any individuals. Well, you could get money from individuals for some old painting of already-recognized masters, but not in order to promote yourself.

Mr. DOYLE. If I asked you the same question about a musical composition or an opera, would your answer be the same?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. In the musical field, the state control is more complete than in paintings. A kind of private transactions with paintings is practiced, very seldom, but yet it is done.

In music, that possibility does not exist. I will speak more detailed about music later. Now let us return to the control exercised over the individuals by these "control unions." It is exercised from the very

beginning of the artist's career. At the beginning, a young author is taken under the wing of some older, more experienced writer who theoretically should guide him, but actually is controlling him. In time, they give some reports about him to the control union. The party organization checks him. If he is finally considered as talented and reliable, the state union could approve some financial help for him in order to give him free time to continue his work. Then, as a result of the author's record, or even the political expediency of his work, the state will decide to publish it, selecting a publishing house for him.

Mr. SCHERER. You are subsidized by the state.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

But should he try to be independent or contradict in any way the Communist Party line, it is easy for the control union to cut his allowance, and cease to promote his work. They just won't publish it and he is finished. It is a sort of economic blackmail and a very effective one.

As to the composers it works the same way. The composer is under the control of the union of composers and is treated the same as the writers. This way of control concerns primarily the individual himself.

But there is another way of control which deals with the work of art, itself.

Books and music works, even popular songs, have to be approved by a special state committee, the main task of which constitutes the approval of all works of art. The committee puts its stamp of approval which has to be on your copy of the work. Without this stamp of approval, your work is worthless.

For instance, suppose you wrote a song, "Oh, My Baby." It has a tuneful melody and catching words, but no performer can sing it in public. Even if she likes it, she cannot yet use it.

You have first to go to the committee for approval. You file three copies of your song with the special committee. And it will first check to see that it was not stolen.

Mr. SCHERER. If it is what?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Stolen. That is what they say, but in reality the committee does not care much whether it is stolen. Many songs and many tunes of the best composers in the Soviet Union are sometimes stolen.

What they are checking is to see whether it conforms with the party line. And they also check on the man who wrote it: Is he on a good list or on a bad list?

If everything is all right, they give it a stamp of approval. Only then you are permitted to use this song. Then you can sell it to various state agencies.

Besides the Union of Soviet Composers which can pay money for it, there are some so-called philharmonics. These philharmonics exist in about all the big cities, and control the orchestras, musicians, and artists. They put them into groups and arrange concerts for them.

An artist cannot perform without the approval of the local philharmonic. Therefore, he is merely an employee of a philharmonic which is completely controlled by the party committee. It has its board of directors, which establishes a quota—the number of per-

formances an artist must fulfill in a month. He must fulfill this quota, otherwise part of the salary will be taken away and he will be subjected to administrative criticism which can lead to his expulsion.

Mr. DOYLE. May I interrupt?

Mr. КНОКНЛОВ. Yes.

Mr. DOYLE. How can they cut off part of the salary? Where does the salary come from?

Mr. КНОКНЛОВ. You have this quota, a fixed number of performances. For instance, when I worked in show business I had to fulfill the 16 performances in 1 month assigned to me. I performed in the Moscow Conservatory, also at clubs and theaters. For these 16 performances I received a fixed salary of 1,500 rubles. After that I was on my own.

Mr. DOYLE. Who paid it?

Mr. КНОКНЛОВ. The philharmonic; and actually, through the philharmonic, the state.

For instance, the theater gets money from tickets, which is turned over to the state.

Part of this money goes to the philharmonics. But the philharmonics actually don't receive money directly from the theater. Both theater and the philharmonic have accounts at the state bank, just as every institution or enterprise in the Soviet Union. So the philharmonic pays real money to its account, and the philharmonics get real money for guaranteed salary of the employees from its accounts.

But in various business transactions between the enterprises themselves, real money is very rarely used. Actually, thousands of institutions and enterprises inside of the Soviet Union operate with millions of rubles without at any time actually having the money. These enterprises just transfer from one account to the other various figures of rubles existing only on paper. This exchange of calculation between enterprises is called by a special Soviet term—*baznalitchnai raschet*, which means calculation without cash. But in order to pay a salary to a musician, a member of the philharmonic, a singer or a pianist, the philharmonic gets and pays, of course, real money.

All these control unions and committees of approval serve as an instrument to oppress the arts. It is just a part of the overall system to dominate the arts.

So in going back to the historical aspect, we could recapitulate that until the beginning of World War II, the only art permitted to exist in the Soviet Union was Soviet art. In other words, the artists had to serve the system and never art itself.

At that time, one of the biggest mistakes for an artist was to seek freedom in art.

The Soviet art as an instrument to mold public opinion, to indoctrinate the minds of the young generation, and to make them believe that the highest goal in life is to serve the Soviet system, fulfilled its purpose. It succeeded in poisoning the minds of millions of young people. Of course, millions of older people saw through this fraud.

But the power of influence exercised by a book, for instance, is always great. As an example, in order to force the peasants to join the collective farms, the Soviet Communist Party commissioned in the late thirties, a well-known Soviet writer, Mikhail Sholokhov, to produce a book on the beauties of collective farming. So the book was written and baptized Tilled Virgin Land.

By the way, this procedure by which a writer is commissioned by the state or party to produce a book or a novel, has, in Soviet language, a special term "Socialist order." Even an opera or an anthem and even a popular song could be ordered by the state. The artist who fulfills such a "Socialist order" is usually very well paid for it. Only trusted people are assigned to fulfill such orders.

In this way, many works of so-called art were created with the sole purpose of supporting a specific political drive. Thus, millions of copies of Tilled Virgin Land were printed and distributed to every library, school, and reading room. The book described the alleged enthusiasm with which the Soviet peasants accepted the idea of collectivization. In this way, the people in the cities were partly confused about the true situation in the country.

This campaign of indoctrination might have gone on successfully for a long time if something very important had not happened in the history of the Soviet Union—World War II.

I suppose that future historians will consider the beginning of World War II as the beginning of the end of the Soviet system.

The outbreak of the war brought a great awakening of the Soviet people. For the first time in their lives, the Soviet rulers were confronted with a situation in which they could no longer create history. Thereafter they had to follow events.

Mr. SCHERER. I did not hear what you said. They had already what?

Mr. КНОКИЛОВ. They had to follow events, to meet them, to defend themselves against this turn of events. You see, when millions of people were brought together at the front, psychological isolation, distrust, and fear were broken.

The people began to speak openly and began to trust one another. Very quickly they discovered that the Soviet system was a fake, that the Soviet ideology was a fake, and that Soviet art was also a fake. The people felt that the so-called Socialist realism, acclaimed by Gorki—the writer I quoted—was not realistic at all because it did not reflect reality in the country.

Then a very unusual thing occurred. The Russians at the front began to defect in millions to the Nazis. As soon as the people began to analyze the reasons behind this mass defection, they understood that the masses did not like the Soviet system, and didn't want to defend the Soviet State. The spiritual contact between the older generation and the younger generation was reestablished. When the masses understood that the Soviet system was not worth defending, the Nazi armies entered the Soviet Union as a knife enters butter, quick and easy.

The Soviet rulers had only one way to save themselves—allow national feelings to be revived again.

Mr. TAVENNER. Which had been the thing they had been attempting to destroy?

Mr. КНОКИЛОВ. That is right.

That was their first general retreat, and one of the most dangerous. Here again they used propaganda, the press, and, of course, the arts.

They now told the Russians to regard themselves as Russians again. Suddenly some old Russian classics reappeared, the Russian religious holidays were allowed again, religion could be professed openly.

Old Russian military dress, even the traditional Cossack costumes were restored; the Russian national heroes were brought out of the dust and even some high decorations of the Soviet State began to bear the images of some old czarist generals and admirals. And, of course, there was a switch in the policy toward the arts.

For instance, Shostakovitch came back in favor. Now he could write a symphony with all his modernistic and formalistic techniques.

Mr. SCHERER. Mr. Chairman, it is difficult to follow this, and if some of the people in the hearing room do not want to listen to this testimony—and I can see the reason they don't want to listen to it—I think we should have that disturbance stopped, because I can hear the overtones.

Mr. MOULDER. The doors will be closed.

Mr. JACKSON. I ask the hall be cleared.

Mr. SCHERER. Let's clear the hall.

Mr. JACKSON. I do not see why we should not have air in the room because of the convenience of people who do not want to come in. It may be a little painful for some of them to listen, but it might be a good idea for them to get some information.

Mr. MOULDER. May I ask how long have you been speaking English?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. One year and a half. When I testified in the summer of 1954, I could not speak English at all, and spoke through an interpreter.

Mr. MOULDER. You certainly have acquired it in an amazingly short time, and very fluently. I think this statement is in order to explain sometimes your search for words and your hesitancy in finding the proper word.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I am very sorry.

Mr. MOULDER. But you speak very effectively.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Thank you.

Mr. TAVENNER. What languages do you speak?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I speak German, French, Rumanian, and Russian, of course.

Mr. SCHERER. And English, very well.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Thank you.

Mr. TAVENNER. I intended a little later to ask your age, but I will do that while we are waiting for the people to be seated.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I shall be 34 in June of this year.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now if you will resume, please.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Shostakovitch wrote his symphony about Lenin-grad, which was surrounded by the Nazi armies, but which did not surrender.

This symphony dealt with hunger, starvation, sufferings and death, and the unbreakable will to exist. He used, in full, all the modern means of composition.

At that time even lyric poetry reappeared.

You see, it is a very interesting thing that in order to make the individual regard himself only as a Soviet citizen, that is, as a soldier of the world movement, Soviet rulers for many years tried to eradicate all tender, human feeling.

Thus, lyric poetry above love, moonlight, serenade, and flowers was banned for many years. It was considered decadent and rotten. In

its place were put the lyrics of Maiakovsky. One of his most known poems was a hymn of praise sung by a worker who was moved from his former flat to a new apartment in a state house. The worker describes the apartment, floors and bathroom, cold and hot water, and draws the conclusion that "All this is given to me by the Soviet State. This is my system. This is my state. This is my bathroom and my luxury which is now allowed to me. I am a worker and, therefore, I am entitled to enjoy all this."

In other poems, Maiakovsky sang the praises of the Soviet State, the Communist Party and, of course, Lenin. One of his most known sentences publicized in every corner of the Soviet State, was "I am praising the Communist Party and Soviet State, my party, and my state."

These were the only kind of lyrics that could be published. Of course in high school and college, one studied the lyrics of Alexander Block, Vera Inber, and Anna Akmatova. But because their works were regarded as decadent and overpessimistic, they were kept out of public circulation. Other poets learned how to sacrifice their integrity and to combine tender lyric sentiments with crude praise of the Soviet State. For instance, one of the greatest Russian lyric poets, Sergei Essenin, had to follow this path. Essenin is generally loved and admired by the Russian people for his so-called peasant lyrics. But in order to get these peasant lyrics published, he had to include in his verses some praise of the Soviet State. The finished work would look like a painting by Raphael with a party slogan printed across the face.

In my opinion, the conflict between the sentiments of his genuinely poetic soul, and the hideous duty to insert the party line in his verses, eventually led him to suicide. By the way, Maiakovsky committed suicide because of his disillusionment with the system which he had once so ardently praised. You see, it was almost impossible to write lyric poetry before World War II.

But suddenly, with the beginning of World War II, there emerged the poet Constantin Simonov. He emerged not by chance. I assume he got a blessing from the Communist Party. His poems dealt with the feelings of the soldiers at the front. The popularity of these front lyrics was tremendous. One of his poems entitled "Fox Hole" was later adapted to music. Everybody sang it. This poem did not contain anything about the Soviet system or the Communist Party. It was a very normal, sad story of a soldier sitting in a fox hole thinking about his wife, his family, his beloved. "Between you," he says to his wife, "and me, there are a thousand miles. Between me and death there are only four steps."

Thus, the human beings were again allowed to be human.

What was more, a Russian was again allowed to be a Russian. This had its effect. As soon as the people understood they now had to defend their native land, their own soil, their own folk traditions, they began to fight to the death. Besides, they hoped that this mellowing of the system would not be something temporary, but would develop further.

At this time, the Nazis committed one of their biggest mistakes. They began to direct their war not against the Soviet system, not against the Communists, but against the Russians. Nazi propaganda

said that the Russians are a barbarian, primitive people, who like to be tortured and are used to dictatorship.

Hence, they must be converted to slaves of the great Nazi empire.

Because of this, there were no more defections, and the Nazi Army was destined to be destroyed.

During World War II, the Russians learned two great lessons. First, that the Soviet system was not the best system of all. The main means of indoctrinating people like me—because I was indoctrinated, too—was to keep us in ignorance about realities abroad. Because of Soviet paintings, I visualized New York to be a city where streets were narrow, dirty, and without light—which they really are. I also visualized the streets filled with poor, jobless, starving people. But I did not know about prosperity in the United States. Instead I was told how horrible fat capitalists throw millions of pounds of coffee and rice into the sea in order to keep prices from dropping.

I thought, "Well, our system is not very good now, but it is still the best of all because it is the most just." This illusion was widespread, especially among the young people.

Then the Soviet armies went abroad, and millions of soldiers saw with their own eyes what living is like in the so-called capitalistic countries. I remember I was told about an incident when a soldier, a young man—probably a son of a farmer—entered a home in Germany near the border. He saw that this was a house of a worker. He saw some overalls and some tools there. And then he saw a living room and a porcelain set, unthinkable even for—

Mr. SCHERER. What was that? I did not get that.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. A porcelain set, a set of porcelain. The Germans like this kind of thing.

Then this Soviet soldier took his rifle and destroyed this set with sadness. He didn't realize himself that in this very moment he destroyed the meaning, the illusion planted in his mind by Soviet rulers that life under the Soviet system is the best and most justified of all.

In a similar way millions of us understood that life abroad has many things we never dreamed of. I do not mean necessarily Western material wealth. You see, the system in the Soviet Union is not primarily based on the lack of material goods. It is based rather on the lack of freedom, lack of the right to be an individual, to maintain your personal decency and morality of a human being.

Russian soldiers, in talking with Germans, Poles, Czechoslovakians, Rumanians, and Austrians, realized that an individual in the Western World is much more a human being, more free to preserve his personal decency than inside the Soviet Union.

But that was only the beginning. We got our second lesson in the satellite countries.

Mr. TAVENNER. The satellites?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. The satellite countries—Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and others.

There we saw with our own eyes how countries, only yesterday capitalistic, were sovietized in a few months. And we saw with astonished eyes how some former Fascists, common criminals, some cheap bums—people without any human values—hurried to join the party. They were after power and they got it.

I was myself in Rumania then and saw all this.

There then, for the first time in my life, I thought that if this is the kind of people the Communist Party needs, I cannot be associated with such an institution.

And I decided to postpone as far as possible my own entrance into the party.

By the way, I joined the party only in 1953, when I considered it too dangerous to stay out any longer. Right there, in Rumania, I understood that the Soviet system brings too much wrong to other countries and I decided I should not serve it any more.

But millions of people felt the same way. At the same time the meaning of our families, parents, relatives, and friends increased in our hearts during the war because we missed them and they missed us, and we understood what each meant to the other. So when we came home as veterans from the front, we told what we had seen, and we were listened to, and trusted.

Thus, our realization that the Soviet system is a fake was spread across the whole country through the best means of communication—rumors.

Mr. SCHERER. Through what?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Rumors.

After the war the majority of people already knew that the Soviet system was positively and definitely wrong and it ought to be done away with. But we did not know what to do; besides, we hoped that the government would have to retreat even more. We thought that things could not return to the way they were before the war.

This was our opinion.

But it was not the opinion of Stalin and the Communist Party. They wanted us to become again Soviet citizens, and to cease to be Russians.

Mr. TAVENNER. You are speaking now as of the conclusion of World War II?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes. After World War II, we wanted to continue to be Russians, as we had been allowed during the war temporarily. We wanted to enlarge this freedom and to bring it to a normal way of life. And we expected the government to recognize this way. We did not realize then that it would be impossible for the Soviet system to treat us as Russians and as individuals, because the Soviet system can exist only through complete control over individuals, through terror, fear, distrust, and oppression.

Immediately after the end of the war, Stalin and company began to organize their campaign to bring us—the millions of Russians—back to their obedience.

Mr. TAVENNER. What means were used by the Soviet Government after World War II to restore the discipline and control that the Government had formerly exercised over the people?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. One of the first means they used were the arts. They began to restore complete control again over the books, poetry, movies, paintings, and music. In the fall of 1947, there began a series of so-called governmental decisions which actually were decisions of the Communist Party concerning the arts. They began with the decision about writers and literary magazines. The phantom of Socialist realism was revived. Again the writers were told that the only

way to create is to create in the Soviet way, to serve the Soviet system, and to follow the doctrines.

By means of the arts, they wanted to bring the people back to obedience.

The next move was the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party about the movie industry, then about the theater and stage, and, finally, on the 10th of February 1948, they published a decision concerning music.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who published that decision?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. It was signed by the Central Committee of the party.

Mr. TAVENNER. Of the Communist Party?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes. It was not even signed by the Union of Soviet Composers. It was not even signed by the department of propaganda and arts of the central committee. It was signed by the central committee itself, which left no doubt who was boss of the arts in the Soviet Union.

To some people, it seemed very strange how music can be connected with ideas. But I would like to repeat once again that the struggle by which the Communists tried to control the free world and its own people, is a struggle for the minds and souls. Access to the mind and the soul of a human being is mainly through art. In the decision of February 1948, the party condemned the composer Muradeli, and his opera Great Friendship. But it was not against him alone. Many other composers were also named. Again the same poor Shostakovich and Prokofiev and Khachaturian.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the accusation made by the central committee?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. The accusation was a very old one—formalism. In other words, some composers tried to regard their work as the independent work of an artist. They had the wrong idea that they were free in their creation, that they could use even the Western way of composing. They forgot their Soviet status.

So the party indirectly reminded the composers that they would have to be primarily and exclusively Soviet citizens and Soviet artists.

Mr. TAVENNER. May I interrupt you a moment?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. When you spoke of the decision condemning Muradeli, were you speaking in connection with the opera Great Friendship?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I can explain it very briefly. This opera dealt with events which happened in south Russia in the last days of the czarist rule, and was adapted in November of 1947 at the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow, in connection with commemorative holidays of the Bolshevik Revolution.

This theater is the biggest showplace in the Soviet Union.

Perhaps, because of the publicity that Muradeli's opera received, the party especially attacked it in order to prove that even great composers and great personalities had to follow this line of so-called Soviet art.

Mr. TAVENNER. I believe this would be a good place to recess.

Mr. MOULDER. The committee will stand in recess until 1:45 p. m.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee was recessed, to be reconvened at 1:45 p. m., the same day. Present at the recess were Representatives Moulder, Doyle, Jackson, and Scherer.)

AFTERNOON SESSION, TUESDAY, APRIL 17, 1956

(The subcommittee reconvened at 1:55 p. m. Present: Representatives Moulder (presiding), Doyle, and Jackson.)

Mr. MOULDER. The committee will be in order.

Proceed with the examination of the witness, Mr. Tavenner.

TESTIMONY OF NIKOLAI KHOKHLOV—Resumed

Mr. TAVENNER. The morning session was ended with your description of certain decisions that were made in 1947 by an agency of the Soviet Government relative to the arts. Would you pick it up from there and proceed?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. The decision in February of 1948 concerning the music did not specifically mention popular music, jazz, or folk songs. But one of the most known jazz conductors of the Soviet Union, Leonid Utiosov, who was permitted during World War II to perform even American songs, suddenly disappeared from the stage. Many songs were again prohibited. For instance, this song which I mentioned—Fox Hole—was completely forbidden. It disappeared from the stands, from music libraries, and was taken out of the repertoire of show people.

But evidently the drive against independence in the arts didn't succeed quite as well as the Soviet rulers expected. Really, the Russian people had learned too much to be easily driven back to the prewar obedience.

Therefore, the Soviet rulers decided to take more drastic steps.

In 1949, the so-called Leningrad trial was staged, a trial about which much was written in the West. But unfortunately, the true meaning of this trial has not yet been emphasized.

Some party officials actually in between the government and the masses were brought to trial on the charge of so-called great Russian chauvinism.

This is an expression of extreme national feelings. In other words, these people were accused of regarding themselves as Russians, not primarily as Soviet citizens, of calling the Soviet Union "Russia" and of trying to promote Russian customs, habits, and traditions.

You see, it is not difficult for Westerners to call the Soviet Union "Russia" and the Soviet citizens "Russians," but, in the Soviet Union such terminology would border on a crime against the state.

So, some very high top-party officials had to be sacrificed in order to reestablish the priority of the Soviet State and Soviet citizenship over the Russian national feelings. Early in 1949 they were condemned in Leningrad, exiled, and many of them died in concentration camps.

Even that evidently was not enough. The people still did not want to return to the straitjacket of the prewar Soviet pressure. Not by chance, the people most sensitive to those attempts to exterminate the national feelings were Jews. The Jews in the Soviet Union always occupied a special position. Most of them considered Russia as their home, but they never forgot Israel, the land of their origin.

This was one of the things which the Soviet system could not accept.

In view of the drive against nationalistic feelings in 1949, it was

evident that the Jews would be persecuted, not only because they were nationalists, but also because of the large role which the Jews played in the arts.

The anti-Jewish campaign began with purges among Jewish writers, artists, and musicians.

I knew many composers and friends, who were arrested without any evidence, and disappeared. One of the best writers in the Soviet Union, Bruno Yasenski—a Polish Jew—who had written a very well-known book entitled "A Man Changing His Skin," also disappeared because he was a Jew.

A very well-known poet by the name of Lev Kvitko, and many others disappeared. And only this year we learned that their posthumous works will be published by the state. In other words, for the first time it was confirmed that both had died, probably in concentration camps.

The Jewish Theater in Moscow was the first to be closed. But the greatest actor of this theater by the name of Mikheols was assassinated by some agents of the secret police and the murder was blamed upon the Zionists.

After this, the anti-Jewish campaign became worse and more. It reached even to general and high intelligence officers. Some of my superiors—I was then in intelligence—disappeared.

And then in late 1952 was staged the high point of the anti-Jewish campaign—the so-called doctors' plot.

But all these extraordinary steps, taken by Stalin to impress the people, to destroy their spiritual resistance, had only a superficial effect. The flame, the fire of resistance and opposition to the system was not at all extinguished. It was smoldering in the hearts and souls of the people, and only the Soviet authorities knew how explosive the situation was.

But a hypnosis, a kind of autosuggestion, among the popular masses that Stalin is all-powerful and that the secret police are all-present, kept the Russian people from action. Actually, we didn't then know exactly what we could do.

About this time I entered Moscow University as a student of modern languages.

MR. JACKSON. I beg your pardon?

MR. KHOKHLOV. Of modern languages, which are called philology in Europe.

I became a student of philology and met hundreds of university students of fine arts, mathematics, physics, biology, the people who apparently should not have much to do with politics. But once again I realized that there are no such things as independent science or art in the Soviet Union. All the students had to begin with the study of Marxist doctrine and had to pass exams in Soviet social sciences.

At the same time I learned from private conversations that even this young generation knew about the fraud of the Soviet system and resented it and wanted to have it changed. I, myself, for the first time, heard the expression "Russian Anti-Communist Revolution"—that is, the eventual overthrowing of the Soviet system by the Russian people themselves. I was assigned to Berlin in 1952 where I was a member of the Soviet Intelligence staff with the rank of first lieutenant. For the first time I saw some leaflets and newspapers

gotten out by the Russian anti-Communist underground inside the Soviet Union. This organization operated through many cells, but had its headquarters in West Germany. I was astonished when I learned about the response of the Russian people to this idea—the idea of getting rid of the Soviet system by our own forces, realizing that this is actually the only way to end the unsupportable situation in our country.

But I repeat, the inertia and fear were too great.

Then Stalin's death in March 1953 changed the picture. The Soviet rulers knew how bad the internal situation was even while Stalin was alive.

But after he died they became really scared—scared of their own people, and realized that they must immediately make some kind of retreat. So they proclaimed a new program, the so-called Malenkov's program. Malenkov's government claimed that from then on, the people will receive more material goods and personal freedom. A new period began in Soviet art which can be called by the title of a very well-known novel published at the time, *The Thaw*, by Ilya Ehrenberg. And it was really a kind of "thaw" because suddenly the writers and artists received permission to act freely. The lyrics, modern music, and relatively free expressions reappeared in novels and books, and it helped very much.

The Soviet rulers did not miss the mark this time. This program had its effect on the people, yet the lure of material goods alone would not have had such an effect.

The conflict between the people and government, once again, I repeat, was not merely on the basis of material goods, but upon the depreciation of human freedoms.

Thus the granting of some kind of freedom to the arts had its effect.

Even my wife and I began to hope that perhaps the Soviet system can still change itself. We still didn't yet realize that the Soviet system is entirely a Communist system, which could not give us the changes we hoped for.

One of the things supporting our hope was the uprising of the East Germany workers on the 7th of June, 1953.

This uprising was not emphasized enough in the West, but it had a tremendous influence over the Russian people.

It is not well known, but the Soviet Army of Occupation in East Germany refused to shoot at rebellious German workers. The total number of German victims arrested by Soviet authorities in East Berlin amounted to about 10.

But in Magdeburg alone, a town in East Germany, some 18 Russian soldiers and officers were shot for their refusal to suppress the German uprising. I was on the German desk then and knew that at the same time about 4,000 Russians were arrested in East Germany because of their refusal to serve the Soviet rulers in suppressing the uprising. The military jails, as I remember, were overcrowded.

The East German authorities had to turn over some of their civil jails to the Soviet authorities for the temporary confinement of the arrested Soviet soldiers.

Mr. JACKSON. May I ask a question?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

Mr. JACKSON. Were you at this time, during this period in Germany, a member of the Soviet Intelligence?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I was at that time an officer in the Soviet Intelligence, with a position on the German desk, with headquarters in Berlin. I kept traveling back and forth between Moscow and Berlin, and one of my temporary assignments was to collect information on the background of the June 7 German uprising.

Mr. JACKSON. Did you prepare such reports and submit them?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right. I received reports from some members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of East Germany. I learned the reaction of the East German Communists, how the uprising was brought about, how it went, and its probable results if the West would react in the proper way. But the West didn't.

And so the first opportunity to destroy the Soviet system by means of the enslaved people themselves died.

But it had a very great influence upon the Russian people, who were shocked. I remember I met one of my friends at the university, a former Air Force officer. He told me, with a voice of distress, "Who are we if we shoot the workers who are uprising for just reasons?" I got the same reaction from people on trade missions—even in Intelligence.

The Soviet rulers got the idea that the refusal of the Soviet Occupation Army to obey them was a result of the Russian anti-Communist underground. They were right, because thousands of soldiers and officers were influenced by the leaflets and propaganda material of this underground.

Through the rotation system, hundreds of thousands of soldiers of occupation went back to the Soviet Union, and the truth about the uprising was told by eyewitnesses.

In the summer of 1953, came uprisings in Soviet concentration camps. When I was still in the Soviet Union I learned from some personal acquaintances in GULAG that the number of inmates in concentration camps in the summer of 1953 was about 13 million—twice as many as the membership of the Communist Party.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you say 13 or 30?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Thirteen.

In 1953 there were about 7 million official Communist Party members. In this way, for every official member of the party who was not necessarily a supporter of the system, you had two officially recognized enemies of the Soviet system—Russians—imprisoned in concentration camps.

But even although these people in concentration camps knew they would be killed, they revolted and went against the machineguns. Indeed many of them died.

(Representative Gordon H. Scherer entered the hearing room at this point.)

Mr. KHOKHLOV. What is very significant in the concentration camp uprisings is that the inmates did not primarily ask for a better diet, better clothes, or an extra piece of bread. No. They wanted to be treated as human beings. This reflected in the general feeling of the Soviet people in 1953. We wanted to be treated at last with the right to personal freedom and the right to maintain one's personal decency.

So under this pressure from below, the Soviet rulers had to denounce even the secret police. In the West there was much speculation about the downfall of Beria. I was very often asked who got whom: Did Malenkov get Beria or did Bulganin get Beria? And what was Khrushchev's role?

If it were only a matter of personal revenges, Beria's rivals could have liquidated him in secrecy—by poisoning, or automobile accident, as they often did to others. Or Beria could very easily have died from influenza in one of the best hospitals of the Soviet Union. But he did not. Instead, they openly and publicly dethroned one of the gods in the Soviet hierarchy.

It is an interesting fact that denunciation of Beria was connected with the denunciation of Stalin.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is generally not known?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. No, it is not. But the first time Stalin was denounced in very sharp terms was actually in July of 1953. Then I was already a member of the Communist Party. At that time I had to join it.

Mr. JACKSON. In 1953?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. 1953. I had to join it in March of 1953.

Mr. JACKSON. You haven't much seniority in the Communist Party around Los Angeles.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I am not informed about that. But I know that thousands, hundreds of thousands, even maybe millions of people like me, tried hard for many years to stay out of the Communist Party because they already knew that to be associated with the Communist Party is not a decent thing.

Mr. SCHERER. Not what?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. A decent thing.

For instance, in a factory, an engineer could be popular among the workers as long as he would not become a member of the party. But as soon as he becomes a member of the Communist Party the workers usually cease to trust him. He loses much of his popularity and influence, because the workers do know who is their principal enemy. I mean the party.

Mr. TAVENNER. Let me interrupt you a moment. The Communist Party in this country boasts of its contention that it is the vanguard of the working people.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is because the Communists here never worked in a Soviet factory and they were never forced to take a job they did not want. But at every step the ordinary man in the Soviet Union is treated as a slave.

Let me give an example: You are a worker in a plant, you don't like your job, but you cannot quit. If you try to leave, the director—or I should say the boss assigned by the party, can always stop you—even arrest you—because you do not have the legal right to leave your job.

Or, if you come 20 minutes late on your job, automatically you get a 25-percent cut in your salary for 6 months. This is a part of the labor discipline decree published in 1940 and still maintained in force.

If you came 20 minutes late a second time, you should be brought to trial, carrying a penalty up to 1 year in jail. This usually doesn't happen because the director of the plant or factory is interested in

keeping you on the job, and, therefore, he just overlooks it. But he continues to take the 25 percent of your salary for another 6 months. But all this, I think, is widely known.

I would like to stress another point which maybe is not so widely known. All citizens in the Soviet Union have to have a passport. In other words, an identification booklet, which you may need at any time. If you cross the main street anywhere not permitted by traffic law, the first thing the police will ask for is your passport. In this booklet, besides your personal identifications, your civic status, relation to military service, have also to be recorded, all your movements throughout the country.

You cannot even move from one house to another without an entry being made in the book, and you cannot stay in a town other than your own, longer than 24 hours without getting your book stamped. Everybody in the Soviet Union except the peasants, must have identification books. But millions of peasants do not have any identification papers.

Mr. TAVENNER. Does that mean that the Russian peasant does not have the right to travel as others?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes. He cannot move from his farm. If he leaves, for instance, to sell potatoes in a nearby city, he usually gets a temporary leave signed by the head of the collective farm, which allows him to stay 2 or 3 days in the city without molestation, but then he has to go back. For a peasant to obtain permanent registration in a city is almost unthinkable.

There are various other things which bother the Soviet people. I can recall while lecturing at Yale University that I was asked a tricky question by one of the professors, who apparently was a liberal. He probably never had been in the Soviet Union and asked me in a rather sarcastic tone: "Well, Mr. Khokhlov, is it not true that a college student in the Soviet Union gets a job immediately after graduation?" I replied: "Oh, yes, this is true, he gets a job all right."

Mr. SCHERER. Pardon me, where did the professor ask you this?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. At Yale, in New Haven.

Mr. SCHERER. I can understand that.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Then I asked him, "All right, he gets it; but aren't you interested in knowing what happens to the student if he doesn't take the job?"

He was not interested.

But I can tell you what happens to such a student.

Legally he must be brought to trial. His family problems, and the fact whether or not this job is acceptable to him, are disregarded. For example, one of my friends, a doctor, who graduated from a medical school, was sent to a very remote district. His wife, a teacher of the French language in a Moscow school, had just had a baby. Actually, his whole family plans were threatened with ruin. For many months he tried hard to get this decision postponed, or even canceled, because he had a place to stay in Moscow, and connections to find a job there. But despite all his efforts, he had to leave in the summer of 1953, and I know it was a great tragedy.

Mr. SCHERER. You mean that Yale professor was not interested in this explanation of what happens to a student who refuses a job?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. No; he wasn't. He told me, "I don't want to hear propaganda."

I guess he didn't want to hear the truth.

Mr. SCHERER. He didn't want propaganda?

(Representative Morgan M. Moulder left the hearing room at this point.)

Mr. KHOKHLOV. He said "I already know it is bad there."

Mr. DOYLE (presiding). May I interrupt? Who offered that job to the student?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Nobody offered it to him.

Mr. DOYLE. Who directs him to take the job?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. The Department of Labor Reserves sends the university board a quota of desired personnel—where they are needed, how they are needed, and what kind of professions are needed there. The students are arbitrarily assigned to different places by a panel composed of university people, party and Komsomol officials. It's like a subpoena. A student must go before the factory board which will tell him where to work and where to stay.

Of course you can sometimes choose between being sent to Kazakhstan—about 1,000 miles from Moscow, or to Turkestan—about 1,500 miles from Moscow. Sometimes the university asks you where you prefer to go.

Mr. DOYLE. Why couldn't that graduating student get a job of his own choice? He has graduated from school. Why couldn't he go and get a job?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. This regulation originated at the time that students didn't have to pay tuition. They were educated at state expense. So they had to go where the state sent them. But in 1940 a directive was introduced requiring all students to pay their own tuition. After the war this tuition became pretty high, but still not so high as in the West. In the West, however, a student can earn real money. But in the Soviet Union he must work very hard to feed himself, to buy his clothes. He has a very hard time getting by even with the help of a supplementary job. A few of the best students get state grants—Stalin grant, or honor student grants. The basis for these grants is not only the student's marks, but especially his political correctness.

It is true that the university authorities help you to get a part-time job. As soon as you are registered at a university, you can contact a special assignment man who gets you the job.

You see, it is a very interesting thing that for many years the expression "to buy" has not been used in the Russian language. We use instead the word "to get," because even if you have money you cannot always buy what you need. Either you have to go to the black market and pay exorbitant prices, or to keep hunting in the state stores and trusting to luck.

To give you a picture of how people live in the Soviet Union. One of my wife's friends was a senior engineer. My wife, incidentally, is a construction engineer. It is one of the accomplishments of the Soviet system that women not only have the right to be housewives and mothers, but also the right to work hard away from home. They have the right to do the same kind of heavy work as men, even mining, dock work, roadbuilding, and so on.

Getting back to my wife's friend—the senior engineer. Sometimes when I visited him to pick up some blueprints, I found him sitting only in pajama slacks because the slacks of his only one suit were

washed by his wife. He couldn't get another suit because the money he earned had to be spent primarily for food, and getting a new suit requires too much time and too much luck.

In order to be impartial, I should say that not all the people in the Soviet Union have such a bad life. Members of the elite sometimes enjoy a very good living. I could take as an example the living conditions of the officers who were in the same service with me in Moscow. For instance, people who worked in services like my own—the Officers of Secret Service—couldn't complain that the State treated them badly. Quite the contrary. Let me use myself as an example. I had a very good salary, a nice apartment, an official car, television and hi-fi sets, and so on. Very often I went abroad and could bring back freely many things, including Paris dresses for my wife. As far as material things were concerned, we couldn't wish for more. The other officers, high party officials and Army generals, and some of the writers and artists had the same standard of living. But the masses, the millions of them, were in extremely bad shape. And I will later quote the words of Mr. Khrushchev himself to prove this.

But I would like to stress once again that the conflict between the Soviet people and the Soviet Government is not primarily based upon the standard of living. The conflict was and is based upon the lack of personal freedom.

Let me now go back to what I said a little while ago about the first time Stalin was denounced, in July 1953. At that time, they sacrificed Beria. They denounced him publicly and what is more, they denounced him as Stalin's associate.

In the summer of 1953, I got my hands on a small red booklet entitled, "The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the Case of Beria." In denouncing Beria this decision also denounced Stalin, who was described as a man who used wrong methods—the methods of a one-man dictatorship.

This booklet which was distributed only to a relatively small number of party officials, indicated the last resort they could use in dealing with the popular discontent. In other words, when it was necessary they could even blame Stalin. And this already in July 1953—but only by party activists.

At the same time thousands of members of the secret police were thrown out of office to show the people that even secret police prestige can be sacrificed to please the people. This new campaign had its effect.

Mr. TAVENNER. May I interrupt you there a moment?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Why was it that those in authority felt at that time that it was necessary to resort to such means? That is, openly to criticize Stalin and to—

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Because they realized that the popular discontent went too deep to be counteracted only by Malenkov's promises to provide material goods. The Government wanted to show the people that for the sake of individual rights, it would sacrifice even the secret police itself. But this was not true.

Only we, the members of the Soviet secret apparatus, knew that the only people who were sacrificed were the ones who were actually not too necessary for the secret police.

One of my generals told me this when I wanted to use this situation in order to resign.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were those concessions made to the people because of a fear on the part of the leadership that some drastic results might occur?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes. In the summer of 1953, the Russian anti-Communist underground was declared within the Soviet Secret Service in a special instruction, signed by the Minister of State Security, to be enemy No. 1 of the Soviet State. Enemy No. 1 is an American expression, but whenever we wrote a document about the Russian anti-Communist underground, we had to mark it in a special way—with 5 letters, T. S.: N. T. S.—that is, extraordinary report: Russian anti-Communist underground.

Thus the Russian anti-Communist underground was regarded as enemy No. 1 of the Soviet system. But the attempt to deceive the people and to tell them that the Soviet rulers are ready to sacrifice the secret police, the rulers overplayed their hand, and even made themselves look foolish.

For instance, in the summer of 1953, I was in my apartment in Moscow which was on the basement floor. My window opened onto an inside yard, where I heard some young workers—boys and girls—playing the guitar and harmonica. One of the Russian popular songs is Dark Eyes. And one of the refrains goes like this:

Kiss me, and then I'll kiss you, and then you'll kiss me again; then we'll kiss each other.

The Russian words "kiss me" rhyme with "arrest me." So they changed the song to sound like this:

"Arrest me, and then I'll arrest you, then you'll arrest me again, and then we'll both be arrested."

Everybody got a big laugh out of that. They even cheered, because it was at this time that the Soviet rulers arrested Beria on the pretext that Beria wanted to arrest them.

You see, the people immediately understood the phoniness of the Beria story.

Anyhow, the policy of the Soviet Government in 1953 and 1954 was a policy of apparent softening of the line, a policy of promising material goods to the people, and some individual freedom.

(Representative Morgan M. Moulder returned to the hearing room at this point).

Mr. KHOKHLOV. In the background, Mr. Khrushchev and his associates worked secretly. Mr. Khrushchev is a very good student of communism, who knows that communism cannot permit itself the luxury of becoming liberal.

Mr. SCHERER. Luxury of what?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Of becoming liberal. People like Khrushchev know that with all the alleged good will of Mr. Malenkov, the Soviet system would never be able to raise the standard of living. They also know that to give freedom to the arts and to the individual would be to undermine the basis of the Soviet system itself.

So Khrushchev knew that the promises of Malenkov could not be fulfilled. Already at that time he began to prepare a field—

Mr. TAVENNER. Prepare what?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. A line, a strategic line to revive Stalin's policies of complete control over the people and suppression of individual freedom.

What is very interesting for us is that the first steps in his campaign were directed against the arts. The first signal that the Stalin policies were being revived was the calling of the All Union Soviet Congress of Writers and Poets at Moscow in late fall of 1954.

Mr. MOULDER. May I interrupt you there.

May we give our reporter a brief recess for a period of approximately 10 minutes.

(Whereupon, a short recess was taken, there being present Representatives Moulder, Doyle, Jackson, and Scherer.)

(The committee reconvened at the expiration of the recess, there being present Representatives Moulder, Doyle, Jackson, and Scherer.)

Mr. MOULDER. The committee will be in order, please.

All the people standing in the corridor who wish to come into the hearing room and be seated will do so immediately so as not to disturb the proceedings of this committee.

The committee wishes to announce that all witnesses who were subpoenaed to appear before the committee on Monday, as well as all witnesses who were subpoenaed to appear before the committee today and tomorrow and who have not been heard, are directed to appear before the committee at 9:30 a. m., Thursday morning, unless otherwise notified prior to that time.

Is that right, Mr. Tavenner?

Mr. TAVENNER. That is right.

Mr. MOULDER. Proceed, Mr. Tavenner, with the examination of this witness.

Mr. TAVENNER. May I state that, as far as we can determine, there will not be an opportunity for any witnesses to be heard this afternoon. I don't know if that question has been raised.

So I believe you had better release any one who desires to leave now for the rest of the afternoon.

Mr. MOULDER. I thought in my announcement I covered that.

Mr. TAVENNER. Several raised the question since your announcement.

Are you ready, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. MOULDER. Yes, Mr. Tavenner.

Mr. TAVENNER. At the time of the recess, Mr. Khokhlov, you were telling the committee of the events occurring in the Soviet Union at the time Stalin and Beria were first criticized, and at the time that certain promises were being made to the people of the Soviet Union. Will you begin there and continue?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Apparently in late 1954, Khrushchev and his lieutenants got the idea that Stalin's policy could be revived, so they called the Congress of Soviet Writers in order to tell them that freedom of thought and expressions in the arts had gone too far, and had now to return to Socialist realism. In other words, creative art had to be put in a straitjacket of thought control.

At this time Stalin's name reappeared in the leading Soviet newspapers which played him up as the one really great man in Soviet history, as the father of mankind, as the man who led the Soviet Union to all its victories and successes. Some editorials emphasized

the priority of heavy industry over light industry, a favorite thesis with Stalin. In other words, the Soviet citizen must once more sacrifice his clothes and the butter on his bread, in order to help to build a state powerful enough to conquer the world, or at least to support the international movement for the so-called better world of tomorrow.

And so Malenkov had to go.

In February of 1955, Khrushchev conceived of himself as a potential dictator, a man capable of reviving old Stalin policies.

But in the spring of 1955 the Western World was not the same as it was when Stalin was alive. By this time the free world had come to understand many things. It had decided to defend itself against the dangers of subversion and infiltration carried out by Communist parties abroad, outside the Soviet Union.

Mr. SCHERER. Who did you say began to understand that?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. The Western World.

Mr. SCHERER. Finally.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Finally. Still not enough, but at least it began to understand something.

Mr. SCHERER. That is what this committee has been trying to tell them for many years.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Well, I wouldn't know.

Mr. SCHERER. It is just a comment.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. It seems that Khrushchev decided to be a Stalin inside the Soviet Union and a Malenkov abroad.

I am sure he was proud of this invention when he created the Geneva spirit and the policy of coexistence which required shaking the hand of Mr. Eisenhower.

But one thing Mr. Khrushchev and company underestimated: they underestimated the Russian people who were no longer the same. The Russian people had already outgrown the Soviet system, and understood in full that in order for them to be moral, decent human beings, the immoral Soviet Government had to go.

Once again, the Soviet rulers tried to mobilize the young generation to follow their ideas. Thus was born the big plan of Mr. Khrushchev, a plan called development of unexplored land. This plan called for mobilization of hundreds of thousands of young people, who would go out into virgin territory and work hard for nothing, even sacrifice themselves, just to fulfill the designs of the Soviet rulers.

Besides, Mr. Khrushchev had the idea that the pressure put upon the peasants would make them produce.

And at the same time the revival of Stalin's ideological approach would mobilize the young workers and intellectuals to work more actively.

Mr. Khrushchev failed. Why did he fail?

Actually, the only success which the Khrushchev strategy had accomplished was his big victory over the West. The Western World believed—at least its leaders believed—that the Soviet system is capable of changing itself, and that there are only two ways to meet communism—atomic war or coexistence.

We all know, and I guess we all agree, that a war, especially an atomic war, would be an inhuman thing. And to take the smallest risk of involving humanity in such a tragedy would be a crime.

But one thing which the people here in the United States don't often realize—

Mr. SCHERER. I did not get that. One thing what?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Which the people here in the United States, in the free world, do not realize is that there is a third way to resolve the conflict, and this is the way of destroying the Soviet system by the forces of the enslaved peoples themselves.

Mr. SCHERER. Within Russia?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Within Russia, the Russian people themselves.

Mr. SCHERER. That is what Eugene Lyons says in his recent book—

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I see.

Mr. SCHERER. Our Secret Allies—The People of Russia. He comes to the same conclusion that you have here today.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes; but in one respect he may be wrong. The Government of the United States and the Russian people are not equally allied. Actually the Russian people are more strongly allied to the United States than the United States is to them.

Mr. SCHERER. That is what he meant.

“Our Secret Allies” is the title of his book—the people of Russia are our secret allies.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Unfortunately I haven't yet had the opportunity to read his book.

Mr. SCHERER. He says in his book substantially what you have said here today.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is very good. That means that I am not saying anything very new.

Mr. SCHERER. I did not mean that in any way. You are telling us what he surmised, because he wasn't there. It is his conclusion.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. All right. In 1955, the Soviet rulers realized what too few people here realize, that it is impossible to indoctrinate millions of young people by means of simple repetition for 38 years that evil is good.

Let's take a look at a few facts and figures to appreciate what may have happened in 1955, to astonish the Soviet rulers.

It is true that at the 20th Party Congress Khrushchev declared the plan for developing unexplored lands was fulfilled.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you explain in a little more detail what you mean by unexplored land?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. There are large areas of virgin land previously used only for grazing, such as Kazakhstan, parts of Siberia and the Trans-Ural. They are very far away from transportation lines, have a bad climate and are difficult to develop.

Mr. TAVENNER. We would refer to them here as vacant lands probably.

Mr. JACKSON. Undeveloped.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. All right, undeveloped lands.

I don't know what Khrushchev really wanted more, to get some grain from this land or to find a means of making the youth again serve the system in a fanatical way. Well, how did the young people react to all this?

Let's take a look at some figures which the Soviet rulers themselves quoted at the 20th Party Congress.

One of the Communist Party's top officials, the Secretary General of the Komsomol,—Shelepin, told to his distress, that in 1955, 209,000 young people were sent out to do forestry work. And do you know how many of them deserted? 205,000.

In other words, just about all of them. To give another example, the Communist movement planned to use 100,000 young people to build plants for making cement. But the local party cells were able to assemble only 13,000.

Perhaps the best way to understand why all this happened is to take a look at a stage play written in 1955 by Nikolai Pogodin.

Wrongly assuming that the youth this time could be told the truth, he wrote a stage play which he entitled "We Three Went Out to the Undeveloped Lands."

This play was allowed to appear on the best stage in Moscow in November of 1955, but lasted only about 2 weeks. The reason for its being canceled was that Mr. Pogodin had made the mistake of being too impartial.

None of the characters in his play were of the type who cared about the plans of the Soviet rulers.

Some of them left Moscow because of unhappy love affairs. Others were the kind who had stolen some money and wanted a chance to start a new life. Pogodin's play revealed how the young people went far away not to fulfill Khrushchev's plan, but for personal reasons. Thus his play exposed the principal failure of the Soviet system in 1955—its inability to make the youth accept the new enforcement of Soviet ideology.

So the young generation in 1955 gave Mr. Khrushchev proof that the young generation would no longer serve the Soviet system, but even oppose it. As we all know, it is very difficult to mobilize young people only through promises of material goods. They need something more—spiritual incentives.

One of the reasons why the rulers began to think of a so-called revival of Leninism was their attempt to bring the youth back into their camp. Thus the idea of the final public denunciation of Stalin, a kind of second death for him, was born there and then.

At the same time the situation in agriculture continued to be desperate.

Some liberals, or even some deliberately unintelligent people in the West, often say that the peasant in the Soviet Union may not have it so good today, but at least he is much better off than before.

In Mr. Khrushchev's own words at the 20th Party Congress, the total area planted in 1953 was exactly the same as it was in 1913 when the population was much smaller and when Russia didn't have to support so many international operations and movements.

For instance, if we use the figures quoted by Khrushchev himself as to production of meat and other things in 1955, and divide them by the number of people in the Soviet Union, we will see that the average person got only 2 pounds of meat a month, a little more than 2 pounds of fish a month, and only a yard of wool stuff a year. Besides, Khrushchev hardly understated his case.

But keep in mind that not everybody gets 2 pounds of meat a month. Thousands of people eat as much as 30 pounds of meat a month. These are the few favored ones.

This gives you some idea of how desperate is the condition of the rest of the population.

Mr. SCHERER. May I interrupt?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

Mr. SCHERER. From what you say then, it would be impossible for Russia at this time to fulfill the obligations that she is now committing herself to in offering technical assistance to some neutral countries.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I wouldn't agree with that. Some of them could be fulfilled. The Soviet citizen is robbed in such an inhuman way that the rulers can sometimes scrape together enough exports to promote their propaganda program.

Mr. SCHERER. They would not be able to do so without inflicting serious harm upon the Soviet people.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

Mr. SCHERER. Actually they are not able to fulfill their obligations.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Well, right now it would be twice as hard as it was before for them to make these exports for propaganda purposes. Let me show you what Soviet statistics really mean.

For example, Mr. Khrushchev said that the total area of cultivated land was much greater in 1955 than in 1954.

A local newspaper in the Soviet Union described this kind of thing in the Kalinin district, which is one of the largest districts in the middle of the Russian Republic—RSFSR. The local newspaper stated that in 1955, 70,000 hectares more were cultivated than in the previous year. Then the newspaper went into detail.

Of this 70,000, 18,000 hectares didn't produce anything, but the paper didn't explain why no crops came up. The other 52,000 hectares produced about 3½ tons of unripe crops which had to be converted into ensilage; that is, cattle feed.

In the same district there were 15,000 fewer head of cattle than in 1954. In addition, the newspaper declared there was a decrease of 12,000 pigs and 43,000 sheep. I think that the people probably slaughtered them for their own needs.

The newspaper was much alarmed because there were not even enough seeds for spring planting. This will show you why the Soviet rulers have reason to be worried. The people would not cooperate.

This may have caused the party secretaries to rush around the country throughout the summer and fall of 1955 in a desperate attempt to stop this passive resistance on the part of the people.

When they did not succeed they realized that something drastic had to be undertaken, a kind of big retreat in order to save themselves.

So the Soviet rulers decided to adopt a new policy, that of abandoning Stalin's programs and returning to Lenin's. They hoped that the young generation would not remember that the principles of Stalin and Lenin were practically the same. In other words, they wanted to put a new look upon the old objectives. This plan included a public denunciation of Stalin as a one-man dictatorship. They could not attack Stalin's ideology because that is exactly what they wanted to preserve. So they attacked his methods.

At the opening of the 20th Congress, they probably wanted to make this denunciation in a soft way; that is, so as not to blame themselves. They hoped to combine the denunciation of Stalin with various measures of pleasing some strata of society. For instance, they informed students that they would no longer have to pay their own tuition.

At the same time Khrushchev presented his own plan for special schools to be sponsored by the state. These schools were designed for the education of a new breed of Soviet youth fanatically devoted to

the system. Thus he hoped to show the delegates to the Party Congress how a new generation would be trained to back them up. Evidently, the youth of today is not supporting them.

Next the workers were told that wages will be raised and the working day shortened.

They also told the army that pensions will be granted on a fairer basis.

The stratum of Soviet society which they evidently regarded as hopeless was the peasants. No concessions were made to them.

On the contrary, after the 20th Congress, the Government issued a special directive which authorized the local managers to expel the peasants from the collective farms and deprive them of their individual pieces of land and their individual cattle.

If you will remember that a peasant cannot leave the country and work in a city you will understand what this meant to him—starvation. In other words, the Government introduced a kind of legal economic blackmail.

So that is what made the Soviet rulers denounce Stalin; it was the fear of an explosion which made the Soviet rulers denounce Stalin. They were afraid that the entire Soviet economy would disintegrate and that the youth would openly rebel. At the outset the Soviet rulers probably didn't intend to go very far in denouncing Stalin.

When Khrushchev opened the 20th Congress he made only a few derogatory remarks about Stalin.

Anastas Mikoyan, another top party leader, used much stronger language with regard to Stalin. He also did something else. Perhaps he got the idea that now is a good time to get Khrushchev out of the way. Thus, he brought up the matter of some old Bolsheviks who were liquidated at the time of the purges in the Ukraine for which Khrushchev was responsible. In this way he implicitly associated Khrushchev with Stalin.

Apparently, Khrushchev became afraid that if the people now associated his name with Stalin his power would be destroyed. In my opinion, that is why Khrushchev had to prepare a hasty speech in which he blamed Stalin much more than the Communist Party intended at the outset. In other words, things had gotten out of control. What does this mean for us?

It means that a revolution has begun inside the Soviet Union. You see, a revolution need not always be an uprising or a shooting.

In Lenin's own words a revolution begins when the masses of people no longer want to live as before. On the other hand, the Government is not able to change its way of ruling.

That is what is going on now in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet rulers had to retreat, because the will of the people in the Soviet Union today is stronger than the Government itself. But the Government cannot make the changes which the people want without abolishing the system itself.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Khokhlov, what will be the effect of all this upon the danger of war?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I think there is less danger of an atomic war now. The people wouldn't follow the Soviet rulers who started such a war. You see, it is not enough to drop a few atomic bombs to win a war. A lot of people are needed to make a war machine effective. Today it

would be very difficult for the Soviet rulers to get the necessary cooperation from millions of officers and men.

Mr. MOULDER. May I interrupt you to inquire, do you believe that as a result of the danger of the leaders losing their power that they would, in desperation, probably unleash and make an abrupt attack of war and use atomic bombs in order to retain their position by creating such an emergency?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. No; I wouldn't think so, and I will tell you why: The Soviet rulers now see that their own house is on fire. If they started such an adventurous war tomorrow they would only accelerate the process of their own downfall.

However, they might be able to take such a risk if the policy of the United States would help the Soviet rulers confuse the Russian people and make the people believe that the United States wants to destroy the Russian people, rather than the Soviet system. But I think there is very little chance that such a lie would be accepted by the Russian people.

Mr. MOULDER. I do not know whether I make myself clear. They could create a situation, a condition whereby they would bring about war themselves and accuse the United States of being the aggressor, as they have in other instances.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

Mr. MOULDER. Thereby retaining the following and loyalty of their people to wage a war against us.

Mr. JACKSON. And recreate again the same spirit of nationalism which existed before Leningrad.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

But right now the Russian people are so thoroughly confirmed in their belief that the Soviet system is wrong that the Soviet rulers would not dare to risk a conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. On the other hand, it makes them all the more anxious to stir up trouble between the United States and some countries in Asia and the Near East, as they had done in Korea. In this way they hope to lessen the prestige of the United States. But if the United States were to reduce its military potential, then the Soviet rulers might take a chance upon the prospects of an easy victory. But, of course, prediction is an easy thing.

Mr. JACKSON. May I ask a question on this particular point?

Why is there the obvious reluctance to approach some genuine understanding on the matter of armaments?

Is it a sincere fear on the part of the Soviet Union that the United States is prepared to or has the intention of attacking the Soviet Union?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. If the United States should agree to disarm, it would, of course, require adequate inspection and control in other countries. But the Soviet rulers cannot allow any kind of control or any kind of inspection in their own country. If they did you would learn the whole truth, not only about their military potential, but also about their internal troubles. And this is what they fear most.

Notice how Mr. Khrushchev opened the 20th Party Congress. According to him, there are only two possibilities for the human race—atomic war or coexistence. "There is no third way," he said. But

in his heart he was worried because there is a third way, and he knew very well what it is—the eventual overthrow of the Soviet system by the force of the Russian people themselves. And Khrushchev is afraid that the Western World will understand the significance of this third way, which is the real Achilles heel of the Soviet system. Consequently, he can never permit adequate arms inspection.

Mr. JACKSON. To what extent do these groups in the exchange-of-persons programs, farmers, cultural artists and so forth, have an opportunity, if any, to mingle with the Russian people? I distinguish now between Russian people and Soviets.

Mr. КНОКНЛОВ. Very little. First of all, they are not allowed to have real contacts with the Russian people. Secondly, the Russian people themselves would not dare to tell them much. Thirdly, only those that are checked and approved by the Soviet State Department are allowed to visit the U. S. S. R.

Let me say by way of conclusion to my analysis of the recent events in the Soviet Union, the situation is no less dangerous for the West. On the contrary. You see, the Communists never really relied upon armed conflict as the way to conquer the world.

Their unique weapon, which the West doesn't possess, has always been infiltration and subversion. Today their only hope for survival, for keeping the Soviet system alive, is through disintegrating the West, through the promotion of softness and disunity in the West.

After they have created enough softness and disunity in the West, the Soviet rulers can tell the Russian people that the West will not be able to support any popular opposition to the Soviet system.

For instance, Malenkov, Bulganin, and Khrushchev were invited to England. But they did not accept the invitation in order to promote world peace. What they had in mind was what they could say to the people back in Russia. For example, "Look. See how the Prime Minister of England shook hands with us. He did not tell us we are immoral. He considered us as a legal, normal, decent government. The President of the United States, the fortress of freedom and justice, also shook hands with us. Then who are you to criticize us? Who are you to protest and to oppose us?" This propaganda line could have its effect.

What I want to emphasize is that the Soviet rulers understand how important it is for them now to have at their disposal every member of the Communist parties around the world. Today this is the only army upon which they can rely. They cannot rely any longer on the Russian soldier. But they can rely on—

Mr. SCHERER. You mean on their espionage agents and collaborators?

Mr. КНОКНЛОВ. Not only upon that. It is important for them to get all the information they can. But it is much more important for them to shape public opinion in the West.

Mr. SCHERER. And how do they shape public opinion?

Mr. КНОКНЛОВ. I will explain. But before I go into that, the most important weapon was not and is not the atomic bomb or the H-bomb, but the misconception existing in the free world that the overthrow of the Soviet system by means of enslaved people themselves is not possible.

In order to make people in the West believe such nonsense, that is, a popular revolution inside the Soviet Union is an impossibility, the

Soviet rulers must be able to influence public opinion in this country. It is too late for the Daily Worker to do that. But this shaping of public opinion can be brought about by people who are not intentionally associated with the Communist Party.

For example, a movie director, a journalist, a producer, a painter, even a musician who is not necessarily associated with the Communist Party of Soviet Intelligence. Perhaps such a person would not realize that he is doing the work which the Soviet rulers want him to do.

However, in helping to prevent the United States from allying itself with the Russian people, from inspiring the Russian people to revolution which would accelerate the destruction of the Soviet system, such a person is actually doing a more important job for Soviet Intelligence than if he were to obtain some information about guided missiles.

Mr. MOULDER. It is your belief that as long as the free world remains united together and keeps a firm stand and that our Nation's economy remains strong, that Russia will disintegrate and the Soviet Union in its plans will be destroyed internally. Is that the summation of what you say?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I firmly believe today that the Russian people will eventually overthrow the Soviet system, or, better said, will successfully pursue its struggle until the Soviet system is completely destroyed. Sooner or later that day will come with the help of the West or even in spite of the West. It will come much sooner and be much more advantageous to the West itself if the free world helps.

I believe that today is the time to consider the deep significance of what is going on in the Soviet Union. Today is the time for every American citizen to recognize the responsibility placed upon him by history.

If Americans come to understand the timeliness and the necessity of assuming their responsibility toward mankind, the day on which we will be rid of communism and have a genuine guaranty of peace and happiness for future generations will not be far off.

Mr. SCHERER. Have you told this story that you told us here today to the State Department?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

But I would like to add that there are in your Government some people who don't know, some people who don't want to know, some who are smart, more who are ignorant, and too many who are deliberately unintelligent.

Mr. MOULDER. May I ask this question? Concerning the so-called foreign-aid program, what is your opinion or what information do you have concerning the overtures or the alleged offers on the part of the Soviet Union to aid and assist other countries' economy?

Do you think it is offered in good faith, or is it purely propaganda on their part to lead us to world competition in making greater aid in the form of aid appropriations?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes. I wouldn't say that the Soviet leaders acted from philanthropic motives. It is only a propaganda move, made to involve the United States in the field of economical competition, to make the United States forget that the Achilles heel of communism is in the realm of ideas. The Soviet rulers want the United States to be distracted from this last point.

But I am glad they began this drive of economic competition because there are so many hungry people in the world, and if this eco-

conomic competition provides millions of people with another piece of bread, it would be a good thing.

Mr. MOULDER. Do you believe that the Soviet economy could stand substantial assistance to other countries?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I don't think so.

Mr. MOULDER. Mr. Jackson?

Mr. TAVENNER. May I ask a question in that connection?

Mr. MOULDER. Yes.

Mr. JACKSON. I don't want to leave this point without clarification.

For instance, on the construction of the high Aswan Dam in Egypt, which will, when completed, cost in the vicinity of \$200 million or \$300 million, the United States and Great Britain are undertaking to underwrite a considerable portion of the initial phase of the cost to the extent of some \$75 million, with a commitment, an implied commitment which will extend beyond that amount. The Soviet Union has made an offer which is, in essence, an offer to construct the dam for nothing.

It occurs to many of us that it might be a good idea to say to the Soviet Union, "Very well, your profession is to raise the standards of living of underprivileged people. That is ours also, and not only our profession but our national record over the course of the years. Go ahead and build the high Aswan Dam."

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That is right.

Mr. JACKSON. But would that seem to you to be a logical approach?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

First of all, you would put them to the test. Secondly, if they really do construct the dam, why not let the people have it? But remember the Soviet rulers would not construct the dam in order to help humanity. If they really loved humanity so much, they could begin by constructing more dams for their own people.

They could treat their own people as human beings. Why should they show preference for foreigners except for propaganda purposes?

Mr. JACKSON. That is a question that some of our own people ask some of the Members of Congress. That is a very touchy subject every time the foreign aid bill comes up.

I am interested to have your viewpoint with respect to this and other offers made elsewhere throughout the world; for instance economic assistance in Latin America to the extent of a billion dollars.

In matters of this kind it seems to me that the time has come for us to say, "Very well, we certainly won't stand in the way of anything you want to do to lift the oppressed peoples. If you can lift your own oppressed peoples at the same time that is so much to the good."

Let them spend their money and let the Russian taxpayers write to the Politburo or the Supreme Soviet, if they dare do so.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have a question on that line of Mr. Jackson's.

Mr. MOULDER. Proceed, Mr. Tavenner.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like to know whether or not it has been the practice of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to give financial aid to the Communist parties abroad, such as the Communist Party in Yugoslavia, the Communist Party in the United States.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

I wouldn't say that any money passed through my own hands to the Communist parties abroad. I did not see any records. But I knew from my contacts with the France and American desks, and from my

private contacts with people on the staff of the Central Committee, that very large amounts are actually sent abroad for this purpose.

Mr. SCHERER. You mean to the Communist Party in the United States?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Positively.

They are probably sent under various camouflages. But the Russian people felt the heavy burden of the expensive subversion work abroad.

Mr. SCHERER. That is to support the Communist Party and its activities in the United States?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes, more than that. In order to assure their own survival, the Soviet rulers must support the Communist parties abroad.

Mr. MOULDER. Mr. Doyle?

Mr. DOYLE. I just want to ask a couple of questions, not disregarding the international aspect of this discussion brought to us so ably, but here we are a committee of Congress studying ways and means to meet the Soviet Communist Party threat in our own Nation.

Briefly, let me make this statement before I ask you the question. When I was in Europe and Asia as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I interviewed certain high intelligence officials, some American and some foreign, and they all told me that the Communist Party's subversive activities in the United States, with which this committee is concerned, was part and parcel of the international Soviet conspiracy.

Do you believe that is true?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Positively, because the Soviet rulers have always regarded their state as the headquarters of an international conspiracy, the final purpose of which is to establish a Communist society all over the world. They don't even conceal this fact. Mr. Khrushchev, only a few months ago, emphatically stressed it. In effect he told the West, "Please don't fool yourselves. We will never renounce our objectives. Our final purpose is to establish a worldwide Communist society by any means at our disposal. To expect us to give up communism is like expecting a shrimp to whistle."

Mr. SCHERER. Pardon me for interrupting.

When you say, "any means," does that include force and violence?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Well, his latest version is that violence is not always absolutely necessary. That does not mean that he is altogether abandoning violence.

But he did say that the course of history will in this century lead to the final victory of communism.

Mr. DOYLE. May I ask this:

If the pronouncement is as you have related, that the Soviets say it is not necessary to emphasize the use of force and violence, what is your opinion as to whether or not they are postponing that propaganda or that policy of advocating force and violence, but anticipating its use, and they emphasize more or less the practice of subversion, of infiltration, say in the United States Communist Party, of propaganda activities?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes; I thought I mentioned that they must now resort to subversion and infiltration as their only chance for survival, as the only way to postpone their end.

Mr. DOYLE. One more question. I have never asked you this question, and I have never discussed it with you. I don't know what your answer will be. But whatever it may be, will you give us the benefit of your considered opinion as to whether or not the United States Congress should and must continue, or should discontinue a function of this sort of a committee in the United States? Is this sort of a committee necessary? Is it a wise expenditure of the taxpayers' money? Are we accomplishing a result that is necessary to be done, or what?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. My own knowledge about the activities of your committee is very limited. When I got the subpoena a few days ago, I didn't exactly know what the work of your committee is. Besides, I wouldn't permit myself to comment on internal American affairs.

But I would like to say one thing: In my own life I had to struggle very hard to get away from the spoiling influence of communism; I had to sacrifice all that I had. I had to give up, at least temporarily, my country and my family. All that I did I did for the sake of my people. I know that it is impossible today to be a decent person and a Communist at the same time.

Mr. SCHERER. I didn't understand that last sentence.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Today it is impossible to be a Communist and a decent man at the same time. I know it from my experience in the Soviet Union.

Therefore I was amazed and surprised that so many Americans who could have known about all the tragedy and crimes the Communists have committed consider it possible to defend or even help communism. This is something which I simply cannot understand. In your country you have freedom, and yet there are here some people who endanger their own freedom by associating with Communists.

Mr. MOULDER. The committee will stand in recess for a period of 5 minutes in order to give the reporter a brief rest.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken, there being present Representatives Moulder, Doyle, Jackson, and Scherer.)

(The committee was reconvened at the expiration of the recess, there being present Representatives Moulder, Doyle, and Jackson.)

Mr. MOULDER. Let's proceed, Mr. Tavenner.

I understood you had some statement to make.

Does that conclude your general statement, Mr. Khokhlov?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes, that concludes my statement.

Mr. MOULDER. Mr. Doyle, do you have any questions?

Mr. DOYLE. I have just one more question. I know this will interest all the American women if you are able to answer it.

What is the status of the Russian woman under the system of Soviet communism?

(Representative Gordon H. Scherer returned to the hearing room at this point).

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Well, I could say one thing. When communism is finally destroyed and humanity is no longer in danger, a monument should be raised to the women of Russia. The Russian woman today carries all the burden of responsibility for the Russian family. She not only has to work in the same way that her husband does, she has full responsibility for the children, for their education, how they will grow, what they will believe, what they will think. In addition, she

has the responsibility for their breakfast, dinner, clothes, and house furniture.

And, I repeat once again, every item of it is a big problem. Only by means of the extremely rich soul of the Russian woman could the Russian spiritual treasury and devotion to high moral principles have been transmitted to the new generation. Only in this way was Soviet indoctrination opposed and finally compelled to retreat.

At the same time they want to be ladylike; to dress and take care of their appearance as American women do. This is not easy in the Soviet Union. Even the most ordinary items of makeup and dress accessories are often not available.

Don't forget that she must carry out a heavy job, and to be a front-line soldier in the fight against the poisonous influence of the Soviet system.

Mr. SCHERER. It is very difficult, then, for us to understand how some of these American women who have appeared before this committee as witnesses can be such dedicated Communists.

Mr. DOYLE. I have no further questions.

Mr. MOULDER. Mr. Jackson?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Khokhlov, there is one question bearing on your testimony which I should like to ask you to extend very briefly.

From the testimony you have given I gather that in your official capacity as a member of the Soviet Intelligence you were in a position of relative luxury, let us say, in the way of living accommodations and other perquisites which were yours. It might have been an easy matter for you to have continued indefinitely with promotions and so forth had you seen fit to do so.

Would you care to state—and I know that there are personal considerations involved in any answer which you might give which I don't want to press, and, that is to say, I have some knowledge of a tremendous personal sacrifice which has been involved in your leaving the Soviet Union—but would you care to tell the committee, for the record, the fundamental things which brought about the decision on your part?

Mr. КНОХЛОВ. Actually I had no choice.

Paradoxically, the same reasons which once made me join the Soviet Intelligence, later led me to join the free world. Before the war I planned to become a movie director, but when war broke out I joined Soviet Intelligence. Because the Soviet Intelligence always had much use for show people as instruments of infiltration and penetration into the enemy system, I was assigned a place on a special show team, which would be left behind for guerilla operations in case Moscow had to be surrendered.

That happened in the late fall of 1941. I was then 19 years old and firmly convinced that the Soviet State and Russia were one and the same thing. In accepting this assignment with Soviet Intelligence, I was convinced that I was fighting for my motherland. I knew it would not be child's play, but I put my country's interest above my own.

Later on I was assigned to go behind the enemy lines. I had to learn enough German to be able to pass as a German. I got a Nazi officer's uniform from Soviet Intelligence, and I spent a year in guerilla territory passing myself off as a German. I was actually proud to do that.

In 1953, I was ordered to become part of an assassination team. At this time this was for me nothing but a calculated murder.

You see, during the war I was assigned to assist in the killing of Wilhelm Kube who was a Nazi general and gauleiter of Byelorussia. He was the deadly enemy of my people, and responsible for the killing of many thousands of my compatriots. I considered it an honor to take part in his assassination.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you mean that you were assigned to the part of directing that it be done, or that you participated in it?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I personally made contact with a servant who worked where Kube lived. Because this servant was kept under constant Gestapo surveillance, she could not be approached by a person who looked too much like a Russian. Dressed in the uniform and provided with the papers of a Nazi officer, I was able to penetrate into the restricted area, to contact the servant and persuade her to place a bomb under the gauleiter's bed. So he was blown up. It was just a wartime assignment.

But in 1953 it was quite a different story. First, I met my wife in 1949. And it was she who taught me the true nature of communism.

Mr. SCHERER. She taught you what?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. The true nature of communism. Secondly, through her I learned to understand the Russian people. For the first time in my life I began to feel how my people think.

I saw that the majority of my people were opposed to the Soviet system. Therefore, in 1953 for me to serve my country required that I should help the Russian anti-Communist underground and not the Soviet system.

When I first heard about this anti-Communist underground in 1952, I was afraid to cooperate with it because we already had a son.

When, in 1953, the Soviet Government realized that this Russian anti-Communist underground was enemy No. 1 of their system, they planned to assassinate one of its leaders who lived in Frankfurt in West Germany.

Two East German Communists were assigned to get out of the party and pass themselves off as Austrian merchants. Next they had to go through Switzerland to West Germany on an assignment to kill this leader.

Because I worked at the Austrian and German desk, I was also assigned to take part in this operation. My task was to plan their route, to provide them with papers.

After that I had to go to Switzerland to supervise this operation, and to serve as the liaison officer between the assassins and Moscow.

But, as I said before, my sympathies were already with the Russian anti-Communist underground. I simply couldn't help Soviet Intelligence kill this man. However, at first, I was afraid to do something active.

If it were not for my wife, I would merely have stood aside and not taken an active part in the affair. After all, I had to explain the situation to her, because if I failed in my plan not to take part in the assassination she and our child would have to pay the consequences. I could not regard defection to the West as a way out because I could never forget my country.

There never will be any country in the world, even one as beautiful as the United States, that can be for me a second home.

So I asked my wife whether she would object to my letting the assassins do the job by themselves. I explained to her that I could not reject the job outright, but I wouldn't help the assassins. I could not prevent all the political murders in this world. Then she told me something which gave me no choice. She said, "Of course I know what you are worried about. You are worried that if you try to prevent this murder, our son and I can be sent to a concentration camp. But if I go to a concentration camp we will still be husband and wife, and the spiritual love and understanding between us will still be there. But what will happen if you take part in this murder? Perhaps we will stay free, but I will no longer be able to be your wife. We will lose each other forever and live the rest of our lives in the concentration camp of our own conscience."

I knew that she was right.

We had no other choice but to stop this murder.

So I decided to go and see the intended victim in order to warn him to join the anti-Communist underground, without contacting any Western authorities, and to return to Moscow and eventually work for the revolution. This I already considered to be my duty to my own people.

So I left my family behind in Moscow. I couldn't take them with me. I arrived in West Germany, contacted and warned the intended victim and asked him to help me obstruct the plot in such a way that Soviet Intelligence would be deceived.

Unfortunately, we thought it necessary to contact American and British Intelligence because he explained that in the brief time at our disposal, the Russian anti-Communist underground wouldn't be able to carry out this deception by itself. This was very unfortunate for all of us because the American officials didn't believe either him or me.

The fact that I did not ask for political asylum made the American officials suspicious of me. They couldn't believe that a Soviet Intelligence officer would risk his life to help a Russian emigré. They couldn't believe that all I wanted was to prevent this murder and to join my own anti-Communist underground.

They told me that what I said ran counter to what they had learned from Russian research centers in the United States. According to these centers most Russians were supposed to support the Communist system. So they regarded my entire story as phony.

They arrested me and checked on me for 2 months. Thus valuable time was lost, and there was no hope for me to return home. When they understood that I was sincere and that every word I said was true, they tried to save my family. The plan called for my making a statement over the radio of the Voice of America. I was to explain my wife's part in my decision. This statement was to be used as a pretext to get her to a safe place in Moscow. The Americans assured me that the plan would be carried out. So I went along with it because it seemed the only possible way to save her. I did my part, but, unfortunately, the American officials did not do theirs.

Mr. SCHERER. Did not do what?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Did not do their part. Because nobody went to pick up my wife, and she was automatically taken into custody by the Soviet secret police.

After this I had to remain in the West. I agreed to come to the United States in order to testify before the Federal Government, be-

cause the task which I am obliged to do for my wife and child is now to help destroy the Soviet system. This is the reason why I came here, why I am here, why I am fighting communism, and why I agree to give my testimony to your committee.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Khokhlov, it is almost impossible for me to express my appreciation for your testimony. I have been on the committee something over 6 years. We have had effective, coherent witnesses on many occasions, but I do not know of any witness whose personal experiences and personal knowledge of the situation as it exists in the Soviet Union has been as complete or as well presented as your testimony today.

I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that upon the return of the subcommittee to Washington, following the conclusion of these hearings at the end of this week, that a special resolution could be presented to the House, requesting publication of this testimony in documents, printed greatly in excess of what we generally ask for, and that if it is considered desirable by the House, that the testimony be translated into German, into Russian, or whatever the decision may be, and that it be given the widest possible circulation in the Western Zone of Germany.

This is a great message, and it is unfortunate that we lost about half of our audience here a while ago. The air has been a little better, but it is unfortunate, whether they left by direction or left on their own volition, that they had perhaps not the courage nor the stomach to listen to what you had to say.

I think it is unfortunate, Mr. Chairman, that the testimony of this witness was not on television, in order that every citizen of this community and every citizen of southern California could have heard the devastating damning testimony, which I think will do as much to destroy the backbone of the Communist effort in this community as anything that has ever taken place in this city.

As an American citizen, I want to thank you very sincerely. And I know that I express the gratitude of the House of Representatives and the Congress of the United States.

Mr. MOULDER. Mr. Scherer, do you have any questions or statement you want to make?

Mr. SCHERER. I concur in everything that my colleague, Don Jackson, has said. I am just wondering whether we could offer a resolution in the United States House of Representatives commenting on this man's testimony and saying in that resolution some of the things you said here so ably.

Mr. JACKSON. Yes; and I would enclose a copy of the resolution in every copy of the translation which is sent, in order that it might express to the Russian people, as distinguished from the Soviet rulers, some of the things which you have so forcibly put forth, Mr. Khokhlov.

Mr. SCHERER. Frankly, I intend to explore—and I think the committee should explore—the possibilities of a proper resolution passed by the Congress of the United States with respect to this man and the devastating blow that he has given to the Communist conspiracy in this country.

May I ask one further question. What percentage of the Russian people are dedicated Communists?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. In official figures there are about 7½ million members of the Communist Party today, which constitutes about 3 percent of the entire population. But we must take into account that more than half of them joined the party during World War II, when soldiers at the front were forced to join the party before going into attack, because the party wanted to be associated with victories at the front. Many of these are not genuine Communists at all. I think that perhaps 2 percent of the entire population today continue to be staunch defenders of the Soviet regime.

Mr. SCHERER. And that 2 percent can control Russia under the system you have just described to us, because that 2 percent controls the army, controls the police, and the secret police?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. That was true before, but not any longer. As recent events have shown us, they cannot have complete control today.

Mr. SCHERER. They can stay in power because of that?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes; but not only because of that. Of course, it is important to them to have the secret police and the army. But you see, even the secret police apparatus is as much exposed to the influence of the anti-Communist underground as the army or the farmers. I was, for example, an officer of the secret service. I am here today because people in this privileged position sometimes get firsthand information about the revolutionary movement, get their hands on leaflets and see reports about the true mood of the people. In fact, it is they who are first exposed to the influence of revolutionary developments.

Mr. SCHERER. Answer me this question in your own way: How is it that this 2 or 3 percent, then, can control the Government of Russia today?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. They began with a complicated system of ideas which they made the people adopt. Then with the help of the secret police they introduced terror, distrust, and isolation back in the thirties. After World War II, they relied upon the ignorance of the West about the Soviet Union. They also relied upon the confusion, inertia, and hypnosis of the Russian people, who still believed that they were not able to do anything against the Government. But every day more Russian people come to understand that something can be done about overthrowing the Soviet system.

Mr. SCHERER. There are some people in this country, particularly those that oppose this committee, that say we are exaggerating the Communist menace, and that there are only a handful of Communists in this country. Yet we have here your testimony under oath saying that only 2 percent of the Russian people are Communists, and yet that 2 percent is able to still maintain control over the Russian people. I think it negates the argument that we hear so often, that only a handful of Communists in this country is nothing to worry about. But here you have demonstrated that just a very few, placed in the proper positions, and with the proper backing, with the proper armaments, can control the whole country.

Mr. MOULDER. Any further questions?

Mr. SCHERER. I have no further questions.

Mr. MOULDER. Mr. Doyle, do you have any more questions?

Mr. DOYLE. I just wish to join very cordially with the other members of the committee in commendation and best wishes and appreciation to you for coming.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Thank you.

Mr. MOULDER. Mr. Tavenner?

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I feel that I should ask this witness one other question.

You have given the committee your conclusion that the real hope of the Russian people is in the revolution, which you say has started. In what way, would you suggest, could this country be of assistance to the people of Russia in the situation confronting them?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I suppose first of all that American people should come to understand that communism is an immoral system, a system which deprives you of your decency, of your right to be an individual, and which will exploit you drastically in order to achieve its own ends.

Besides, you must believe and understand that the Russian people don't want communism, that the Russian people are moral and very religious despite of all the oppression of the Soviet system, and that they are the first victims of communism. As soon as you understand this, you will realize why the Russian people cannot support the Soviet system, but must fight it. And all they need from you in this fight is your confidence and your spiritual support.

You are in a unique position. You have at your disposal extremely powerful technical means for broadcasting and printing. You have other technical means. If you could bring your faith and trust in the Russian people directly to them, it would help tremendously. I am not sure whether this next point fits in here, but perhaps it does. The early Christians did not follow Christ because He presented them with facts and figures that He would emerge victorious. They followed Him because they believed it to be their duty. Today it would be difficult to present facts and figures to prove that the Soviet regime can soon be overthrown by the force of the Russian peoples themselves. But we know that it is our duty to try.

You see, nobody will be able to destroy humanity if all the peoples of the world will help one another spiritually. This is why you should believe in the possibility of a third way of meeting communism—overthrow of the Soviet system by the enslaved peoples themselves.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you acquainted with what is known as the Sarnoff plan, which was discussed with and submitted to the President?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I remember Sarnoff's memorandum. I exchanged letters with him. His plan calls for the organization of a subversive network in the Soviet Union by means of some American authorities who would hire and use defectors from the other side. I replied that in my opinion, this plan could never be accepted by the United States Government or by the Russian people.

Because of international law, the United States Government could never support a subversion program.

Mr. JACKSON. Not support what?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. A subversion program.

Mr. JACKSON. Could not support subversion?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. A subversion task, a subversion program.

Mr. JACKSON. Under international law the Soviet Union labors under no such handicap.

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes; they do, but you don't object. If you would object, they still wouldn't stop.

To get back to my second point, why wouldn't the Russian people accept it? Let's not discuss the question of whether the United States would be able to support it or not. I don't know about that, but I do know that the task of reestablishing freedom inside the Soviet Union can be done and will be done mainly by the Russian people themselves.

But you can help us in many ways. Mr. Eisenhower, the President of the United States, may not be able directly to help the Russian people get rid of communism because the United States has diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

But Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, as an individual, could state that he doesn't trust the immoral Soviet Government; that he doesn't think this Government could be improved and that this Government has a right to exist. In this way, Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower as an individual would be sympathizing with the Russian anti-Communist underground, would believe in the Russian people, and would hope that they will succeed in their task. Actually, this is all we need, and we don't ask for more.

We want also that you, who are American officials, will ask yourselves what you really want from us, the Russian people, and tell us frankly.

Mr. MOULDER. Do you have any more questions, Mr. Jackson?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes; I just have one brief observation, and I trust that you will not be offended by what I am going to say. This committee constantly comes under attack for the use of, quote "paid informers." And in order that the record on this may be absolutely clear, I should like to have it understood that the present witness, when contacted in New York relative to these hearings, volunteered to come to Los Angeles at his own expense, in order to tell his story before this committee. Unfortunately, the rules of the committee are such that we cannot accept that offer and the witness will be paid his travel expenses and expenses incurred while he is here. But any charge in the Daily Worker or any charge from any other quarter that this witness is in any manner paid, is an absolute falsehood.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, this witness will receive the same compensation which the witnesses who relied upon the fifth amendment received.

Mr. DOYLE. How much is that, Mr. Tavenner, so the people will know.

Mr. TAVENNER. It is a per diem of \$9 a day.

Mr. MOULDER. Do you have any more questions, Mr. Scherer, or any more statements?

Mr. SCHERER. No.

Mr. MOULDER. Is that all, Mr. Tavenner?

Mr. TAVENNER. That is all.

Mr. MOULDER. I wish to say the suggestions or recommendations made by Mr. Jackson and Mr. Scherer in connection with a resolution which they are going to offer will be duly considered by the subcommittee, and in my opinion will be adopted by the full committee.

Mr. Khokhlov, I as subcommittee chairman, wish to express my appreciation for your cooperation. This committee and our professional staff deeply appreciate your clear, convincing, interesting, and important information concerning communism, its functions in the Soviet Union, and its application to our country. Your impressive and valuable contribution to this committee and the people

of America will be recorded as a permanent monument to you, your sacrifices, and the courage which you exhibited, in support of all the liberties of the free world. And I consider it also as a commendation, as a monument to our purpose and the continuous work of this committee in connection with our legislative duty, and exposing, warning, and alerting the people of America to the dangers of communism. Your sincerity and impressive testimony is of greater importance because of your extensive knowledge and recent experience as an intelligence officer of the Soviet Union. Your analysis of the events in the Soviet Union will serve as an important addition to the symposium now being prepared for publication by this committee, setting forth the view of approximately 40 specialists in this field. We admire your courage and sincerity, Mr. Khokhlov, and we are deeply grateful for your cooperation.

The committee will recess until 9:30 Thursday morning.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the committee recessed, there being present Representatives Moulder, Doyle, Jackson, and Scherer.)

(At 5:02 p. m. the committee was reconvened and the following proceedings were had, there being present Representatives Moulder, Doyle, Jackson, and Scherer.)

Mr. MOULDER. We will be in session.

Mr. Khokhlov, the committee, by unanimous decision has directed me to inform you that we extend in full force and effect your subpoena. In other words, it is still in full force and effect and you are not released or excused as a witness.

(Whereupon, at 5:03 p. m., Tuesday, April 17, 1956, the committee was recessed, to be reconvened at 9:30 a. m., Thursday, April 19, 1956, there being present Representatives Moulder, Doyle, Jackson, and Scherer.)

APPENDIX A

When the second U. S. S. R. Writers Congress was held in the closing days of 1954, the CPSU naturally told the delegates what to think. Art for art's sake was, of course, declared to be nothing but a false and hypocritical bourgeois deviation. Ideologically correct writers must master the profound realities of Marxism-Leninism, become true socialist realists, and extol the achievements of the Soviet economy, especially those of heavy industry and the proposed development of marginal lands.

In the following "greetings" which were reprinted in *Masses* and *Mainstream* for March 1955, pages 16-21, no mention is made of Stalinism.

MESSAGE TO SOVIET WRITERS

This text of greetings sent by the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. to the Writers Congress provides background material for the literary discussion reported by Jack Lindsay in the preceding article.

The Communist Party sets a high value on the role of Soviet literature in the upbringing of the new man, in the consolidation of the moral and political unity of Soviet society, in the efforts to build communism.

In the years that have passed since the First Writers' Congress Soviet literature has made considerable progress.

Literary works have been created that truthfully reflect the enthusiasm of building socialism, the unprecedented exploits of Soviet patriots in the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War, the labor heroism of our people in restoring

the economy after the war. And never before has any literature had such a broad circle of sympathetic and responsive readers as our Soviet literature.

The rapid economic, political and cultural development of the Soviet republics has led to the flourishing of the literatures of the peoples of the U. S. S. R. The development and mutual enrichment of the national literatures are taking place with close co-operation of the writers of all the fraternal republics. A multi-national literature of historic significance, embodying the progressive ideas of our times, has been created in the Soviet Union.

During these years the international prestige of Soviet literature has grown and the number of its readers beyond the frontiers of the U. S. S. R. has immeasurably increased, particularly in the people's democracies. Soviet literature has won recognition among millions of foreign readers because it always comes out in defense of the working people's interests, counters the man-hating imperialist ideology with the ideas of humanism and the struggle for peace and friendship among the peoples, and is permeated with an optimistic faith in the bright future of mankind.

In their creative activity Soviet writers are inspired by the great ideas of the struggle for communism, for the genuine freedom and happiness of the masses of the people, against every kind of oppression and exploitation of man by man.

To the false and hypocritical bourgeois slogan of the "independence" of literature from society, and the false concept of "art for art's sake" our writers proudly oppose their lofty ideological stand of serving the interests of the working people, the interests of the nation.

The Second U.S.S.R. Writers' Congress is called upon to discuss the most important problems of creative work and to map out ways for the further advance of our literature to new heights.

Our country and the entire Soviet people are at present faced with magnificent tasks. On the basis of the successes achieved in socialist industry and agriculture important measures are being carried out, aimed at the further development of all aspects of the socialist economy and culture, which is essential for the strengthening of the socialist society and for the gradual transition from socialism to communism. The competition between socialism and capitalism, whose aggressive and reactionary circles are ready to use force in order to hinder the growth of the forces of socialism and the aspirations of the peoples for emancipation from the capitalist yoke and colonial oppression, is unfolding and going over to a new and still higher stage on an ever-increasing scale in the international arena. In these conditions the role of Soviet literature in transforming society and its active educational role are increasing immeasurably.

Literature like all other forms of art is called upon to inspire the Soviet people in their creative labor and in overcoming all difficulties and shortcomings on this road, in the great cause of building communism.

The Soviet people expect their writers to create truthful and vivid pictures of our glorious contemporaries who are carrying out the colossal tasks involved in the constant development of our heavy industry, which is the basis for the further progress of the entire national economy and a guarantee of the impregnable of our frontiers; our contemporaries who are building gigantic power stations, perfecting the methods of construction, bringing millions of acres of virgin land under the plough, working for the advance of our entire agriculture and still greater satisfaction of the growing requirements of the people as regards foodstuffs and consumer goods.

The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. urges writers to make a profound study of reality on the basis of creative mastery of Marxism-Leninism, which teaches us how to see the genuine truth of life, in all its complexity and fullness, as it arises in present-day international conditions when the struggle is unfolding between the camp of imperialism and the camp of socialism and democracy, to understand the processes of development that are taking place in our country and which are directed by the Communist Party, to understand the laws and prospects of the development of our society, and to reveal the contradictions and conflicts of life.

In their writers the Soviet people want to see ardent fighters who actively intervene in life and help the people to build a new society in which all the resources of the social wealth will give of themselves to the full, in which a new man will grow up whose psychology will be free from the survivals of capitalism. Our writers are called upon to educate the Soviet people in the spirit of communism and communist morality, to further the all-sided and harmonious development of the individual, the full blossoming of all the creative inclinations and talents of the working people.

The duty of Soviet writers is to create a truthful art, an art of great thoughts and feelings, profoundly revealing the rich inner world of the Soviet people; to embody in the portraits of their heroes all the many-sided character of their work and social and personal life in their intrinsic unity. Our literature is called upon, not only to reflect the new, but also to facilitate its victory in every way.

An important and honorable task of our literature is the upbringing of the youth, the young workers, collective farmers, members of the intelligentsia and servicemen of the Soviet Army in the spirit of love for labor, cheerfulness, fearlessness, confidence in the victory of our cause, and in the spirit of selfless loyalty to the socialist motherland and constant readiness to deal a crushing blow to imperialist aggressors if they attempt to interfere with the peaceful labor of our peoples. At a time when the aggressive imperialist circles are once again rallying and reviving the forces of defeated German fascism, Soviet literature cannot remain aloof from the struggle against the reactionary forces of the old world.

Soviet literature is called upon to foster with all its revolutionary ardor, and to strengthen the patriotic sentiments of the Soviet people; to fortify the friendship among the peoples; to promote the further cohesion of the mighty camp of peace, democracy and socialism; to foster the sentiments of proletarian internationalism and fraternal solidarity of the working people. The duty of Soviet writers is to raise still higher the banner of struggle for the unity of all peace-loving forces in the interests of the security of the nations, and to expose and brand the criminal plans of the imperialists who are threatening to unleash a new world war.

Continuing the finest traditions of the classical literature of Russia and the world, Soviet writers are creatively developing the method of socialist realism which was founded by the great proletarian writer Maxim Gorky, and are following the traditions of the militant poetry of Vladimir Mayakovsky. Socialist realism demands of the writer a truthful, historically concrete picture of life in its revolutionary development.

To be able fully to live up to the tasks of socialist realism means to possess a profound knowledge of the real life of the people, their sentiments and thoughts, to display genuine sensitiveness to their feelings and an ability to depict all this in an interesting and comprehensible artistic form, worthy of the true standards of realist literature—presenting all this with proper understanding of the great struggle that is being waged by the working class and all the Soviet people for the further consolidation of the socialist society which has been created in our country, and for the victory of communism. Under present-day conditions the method of socialist realism demands of the writer an understanding of the tasks involved in the completion of the building of socialism in our country and in our country's gradual transition from socialism to communism. Socialist realism gives vast opportunities for the manifestation of creative initiative and the choice of different forms and styles in accordance with the individual inclinations and tastes of the writer.

Deviations from the principles of socialist realism are detrimental to the development of Soviet literature. In many respects our literature still lags behind life, which is rapidly developing, behind the requirements of the reader, who has grown politically and culturally. Some writers do not show the exacting attitude to their work which is necessary, and release for publication mediocre and weak productions which make Soviet reality look insipid.

There have been few striking and artistically impressive portraits created recently which could serve as an inspiring example for millions of readers. There are as yet no monumental literary works about the heroism of the Russian proletariat and the party of Lenin in the first Russian revolution and in the Great October Socialist Revolution, and we have few books about our Soviet Army—the reliable sentinel of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people. Literary criticism and the history of literature, which should develop the rich heritage of our classics, draw general conclusions from the experience of Soviet literature, and promote the ideological and artistic progress of our literature, are still lagging behind.

The tendency in a number of works to embellish our reality and to pass over in silence the contradictions of development and the difficulties of growth has had an unfavorable effect on the development of our literature. The survivals of capitalism in the minds of the people do not find ample reflection in our literature. On the other hand, certain writers who have become divorced from life, in looking for far-fetched conflicts have written pot-boilers giving a distorted

and at times libellous picture of Soviet society, blaming the Soviet people without any reason.

Actively supporting everything new and progressive which is promoting the advance of our society, Soviet writers, with all their energy and ardor, must castigate survivals in people's minds of the old world of proprietors, castigate those who are indifferent and inert, help to uproot from our life all that is anti-social and decrepit and hampers the rapid growth of the socialist economy and culture.

The Party calls on writers to engage in bold creative endeavors, to enrich and further develop all forms and genres of literature, to raise the level of their artistic skill in order fully to satisfy the ever-growing intellectual requirements of the Soviet reader.

Soviet writers have most favorable conditions for creative work.

They have millions of friendly readers—friends of whom the writers of the past could only dream—exactng, conscious and mature readers who love their literature.

Soviet literature, which is an inspiring example for foreign writers and a source of experience in the struggle for a new, advanced and progressive art, at the same time becomes enriched by utilizing the best achievements of progressive foreign writers in the course of developing and perfecting itself. Our writers can and must continue to utilize to a still greater extent the valuable experience of our foreign friends in the endeavor to achieve high standards of artistic mastery.

Of great importance for the accomplishment of the honorable and responsible tasks facing Soviet literature is the work of the Union of Soviet Writers, which during the last two decades has grown into a mighty public organization built on the principles of collective leadership and uniting all the creative forces of the writers, both those who are members of the Party and those who are not.

Soviet literature and Soviet writers have grown ideologically and have been steeled in battles against various alien influences, against manifestations of bourgeois ideology and survivals of capitalism. In the future, as in the past, the Union of Soviet Writers must concentrate its main attention on the ideological direction of Soviet literature, on ideological education and enhancement of the writers' artistic skill it must fight resolutely against departures from the principles of socialist realism, against attempts to divert our literature from the life of the Soviet people, from the urgent problems of the policy pursued by the Communist Party and the Soviet government, and fight against relapses into nationalism, cosmopolitanism and other manifestations of bourgeois ideology, against attempts to push our literature into the swamp of philistinism, art without a message, and decadence. Soviet literature is called upon to serve the cause of the working people as the most advanced literature of the world, and to be at the summit of world artistic endeavors.

The Union should constantly see to it that writers live the life of the people, understand their interests and aspirations, are active participants in the building of communist society, know our contemporaries, the real heroes—builders of communism.

One of the main tasks of the Union of Soviet Writers is to give constant aid to young writers in their creative development, and to secure the enrichment of Soviet literature by young talent.

The greater ideological unity of all the active forces of the writers, the bold unfolding among the writers of criticism and self-criticism based on principle, and comradely discussion of creative problems will be a guarantee of fresh successes in Soviet literature.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party wishes the Second Congress of Soviet Writers success and expresses firm confidence that our writers will give all their energies to selfless service of the Soviet people and will create works worthy of the great epoch of the building of communism.

APPENDIX B

Mao Tse-tung's lectures on literature and art have been very widely distributed by the CPUSA. From the following excerpts it is clear that Communists cannot produce art, literature, and music for their own sake, but only for "political reasons"—that is, for the good of the

Communist movement. In Mao's own words those writers, artists, and musicians who persist in expressing liberal and individualistic sentiments "should be extirpated to make room for the new."

Mao Tse-tung, *Problems of Art and Literature*, New York, International Publishers, 1950, pages 5, 7, 8-14, 29-30, 32-34, 35-41, 44-45.

EDITOR'S NOTE

A conference on the Problems of Art and Literature as related to the struggle for liberation in China was held from May 2 to May 23, 1942, in Yen-an, then the capital of the Liberation Movement. Writers and artists from all parts of China came to participate in the Yen-an Conference—from Japanese-occupied Shanghai and Nanking, from Kuomintang Chunking, as well as from the liberated provinces.

The conference seems to have been conducted in a leisurely manner; only three formal plenary sessions were held, the rest of the time being devoted to individual study and group discussions.

Mao Tse-tung, Communist and Liberation leader, opened the conference on May 2 with a short introduction presenting the fundamental questions of the Liberation struggle and the role of writers and artists in this struggle (see pages 7-14). He spoke again, on May 23, and this time extensively, at the closing session of the conference, analyzing the work of the conference and giving detailed answers to the moot questions which were raised during the three weeks' debates and discussions (see pages 15-48).

It is worth noting that this writers' and artists' mobilization in May, 1942, was held five months after Pearl Harbor. The organization of a nation-wide conference on literature and art during that very critical period for China—the military and political struggle against the Japanese invaders and for Chinese unity—attests to the confidence of the Liberation Movement and the understanding of the need and manner of mobilizing all the popular forces, including the cultural, in the waging of a war of national liberation.

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INTRODUCTION

Comrades: You have been invited to this meeting so that we may discuss the correct relationship between literature and art, on the one hand, and revolutionary work in general, on the other, with a view to properly developing our revolutionary literature and art, and making them more effective in support of our other revolutionary activities. By this means, we shall be able to defeat our national enemies and fulfill our task of national liberation.

Our struggle for the liberation of the Chinese nation is being waged on a number of fronts, and on the cultural as well as on the military front. While victory over our enemies depends primarily upon soldiers with guns in their hands, nevertheless troops alone are not enough. We must also have a cultural army in order to accomplish our task of uniting the nation and defeating the enemy.

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We have called this meeting for the express purpose of making literature and art part of our revolutionary machinery, so that they may become a powerful weapon with which to unite and educate our people, to attack and destroy the enemy, and to help our people fight the enemy unitedly. What questions must be solved in order to achieve this objective? The questions of our position, our attitude, our public, our work and our study.

The question of our position: Our standpoint is the standpoint of the proletariat and the masses. Members of the Communist Party must adopt the standpoint of the party, and of party policy. Is it true that many writers and artists still lack a clear and correct understanding of our position? I think so. Many of our comrades often slip into an incorrect position.

The question of our attitude: After the question of our position comes the question of our attitude toward concrete matters. Take, for instance, the question of whether to praise or to expose? It is a matter of attitude. What attitude should we adopt? I say that we should adopt either one or both, depending upon the subject under consideration. There are three kinds of people: our enemies, our allies, and ourselves—the proletariat and its vanguard. We should have a different attitude toward each of these three categories.

Should we praise our enemies, the Japanese fascists and all other enemies of the people? Certainly not, for they are evil reactionaries even though they may, technically, have some strong points. They may, for example, have excellent guns and artillery, but these good weapons in their hands become instruments of reaction. Our military forces have the task of seizing these weapons and turning them against the enemy. Our cultural army must undertake the task of exposing the atrocities and treacheries of our enemies, of making it clear that their defeat is inevitable, and of encouraging all anti-Japanese forces to rally with one heart and spirit in determined battle against our enemies.

With respect to our friends and our different allies, our attitude should be one of coalition and of criticism; there are different kinds of coalition and different kinds of criticism. We support their resistance against Japan; we must praise their accomplishments. But at the same time we must criticize those who are not active in the war of resistance and oppose those who take sides against the Communists and the people, and those who are gradually following the road to reaction.

Our attitude toward the masses, toward their work and struggle, and toward the people's army and party obviously must be one of praise. The people, of course, also have shortcomings. Among the proletariat many still possess a petty-bourgeois ideology. Some of the peasants and members of the petty bourgeoisie have remnants of a backward ideology. This hinders them in their struggle. We must patiently devote ourselves to the long-range task of educating them. We must help them throw off their burden so that they may advance with great strides. They have reformed or are reforming themselves in the course of the struggle, and our literature and art should describe the change instead of viewing them from one angle only, of jeering at their mistakes, or even showing open hostility to them. Our work must help unite the masses to enable them to advance; to rally them with a single heart and spirit for the struggle ahead; to help them rid themselves of their backwardness and develop their revolutionary qualities. Our work should not be in the opposite direction.

The question of our public: For whom should literature and art be created? The answer is different in the Shansi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and in our anti-Japanese bases in north and central China from what it is in the general rear* and in pre-war Shanghai. Before the war the public for revolutionary works of literature and art in Shanghai consisted mainly of students, professional and white-collar workers. Since the war, the reading public in the general rear has grown somewhat but in the main still consists of the same groups since here the government keeps revolutionary literature and art out of the reach of workers, peasants, and soldiers.

In our areas, the situation is entirely different. Here the workers, peasants, and soldiers, side by side with our cadres in the party, government, and army, form the reading public and audience for our revolutionary literature and art. We have students too at our bases, but they are not the old-type students. If they are not already our cadres, they will be in the future. All sorts of cadres—soldiers in the army, workers in the factories, and peasants in the villages—all want to read books and newspapers as soon as they have learned to read. Even those who cannot yet read want to see plays and look at pictures; they want to sing and hear music. They form the public for our literature and art.

Take the cadres, for example. Do not think for a moment that they represent merely a small segment of the population. They outnumber the readers of any single book in the general rear where a book is published in an edition of only 2,000 copies. Even if a book were issued in three editions, it would total only 6,000 copies. But in Yen-an alone, we have more than 10,000 cadres who can read. Moreover, most of our cadres are revolutionaries who have been forged through long years of experience and suffering. They hail from all four corners of the country, and they will be sent to work in difficult areas. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance to educate these people, and our writers and artists ought to try to do an excellent job among them.

Since literature and art are created for the workers, peasants, soldiers, and for the cadres among them, the problem arises of how to understand and get to know the people. In order to understand and know all sorts of things and to understand and become acquainted with all sorts of people, one must do extensive work among them wherever they are to be found—in party and government organs, in villages and factories, in the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

*Kuomintang areas.—*Ed.*

Writers and artists should, of course, pursue their creative activities, but their first and foremost duty is to get to know the people and to understand their ways.

What have our writers and artists been doing in this respect? I do not think that they have learned to know or understand the people. Not knowing the people, they are like heroes without a battlefield. Writers and artists are not only unfamiliar with the subjects they describe and with their reading public, but, in some cases, are even completely estranged from them. Our writers and artists do not know the workers, peasants, and soldiers, or the cadres emerging from among them. What do they not understand? The language. They speak the language of the intellectuals, not the language of the masses.

I have said before that many of our comrades like to talk about "popularization," but just what does "popularization" mean? It means that our writers and artists must weld their ideas and emotions with those of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. In order to bring about this unity, we must start by learning the language of the masses. If we do not even understand the language of the masses, how can we possibly talk about creating literature and art.

When I spoke of heroes without a battlefield, I meant that the masses are not able to appreciate theories if they are abstract. The more you try to show off, the more you strut and preen as a great talent or a great hero, the harder you try to put yourself over, the more emphatically will the people reject your work. If you want the masses to understand you, if you want to fuse yourself with the masses, you must be determined to undergo a long and sometimes even painful tempering process.

Let me tell you of my own experience; let me tell you how my feelings toward the people changed. I was once a student and in school I acquired student habits and manners. For instance, I was embarrassed when I had to carry my luggage on a bamboo pole in the presence of my fellow students. They were so refined that they could not stand having any weight press upon their shoulders and disdained the very thought of carrying anything in their hands! At that time I was convinced that only intellectuals were clean, that workers, peasants, and soldiers were unclean. I would, therefore, readily borrow clothes from an intellectual but never from a worker, or a peasant, or a soldier because I thought that their clothes would be unclean.

During the revolution I began to live among workers, peasants, and soldiers. Gradually I began to know them, and they also began to know me. Then, and then only, did the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sentiments inculcated in me by the bourgeois schools change fundamentally! Ever since then, whenever I compare unreformed intellectuals with workers, peasants, and soldiers, I realize that not only were the minds of those intellectuals unclean but that their bodies were also unclean. The cleanest people in the world are the workers and peasants. Even though their hands may be soiled and their feet smeared with cow dung, nevertheless they are cleaner than the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. That is what I mean by a transformation of sentiments—a changing over from one class to another.

If our writers and artists who come from the intelligentsia want the masses to welcome their work, they must bring about such a transformation in their thinking and their sentiments. Otherwise they cannot do an effective job; for their work will never be spread among the people.

The question of learning: This is a question of studying the principles of Marxism-Leninism and society. Anyone who considers himself a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary writer, especially a writer who belongs to the Communist Party, must have a general knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. At present, however, many of our comrades fail to understand even the most fundamental concepts of Marxism-Leninism. It is, for example, a fundamental concept that objective conditions determine the subjective, that the objective conditions of class struggle and national struggle determine our thinking and our sentiments. In fact, these comrades reverse this principle. They say that everything begins with "love." Speaking of love, there can be only love of a class, or class-love, in a class society. Yet these comrades seek a love that stands above all class distinctions; they seek abstract love, abstract freedom, abstract truth, abstract human nature, etc., and thereby prove how deeply they have been influenced by the bourgeoisie. We must uproot this influence and bring an open mind to the study of Marxism-Leninism.

It is true that writers and artists must learn more about the methods of creative work but Marxism-Leninism is a science which every revolutionary must study, and writers and artists are no exception. Writers and artists must also study our society—they must study the various classes composing society, their

relation to each other, their conditions, attitudes, and psychology. Only when they have thoroughly understood all these factors can they give our literature and art a rich content and a correct orientation.

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Our writers and artists are working primarily for the masses and not merely for the cadres. Thus, Maxim Gorky edited histories of factories, guided corps of village newspaper reporters, and taught the youth. Lu Hsün devoted much time to corresponding with young students.

Our literary experts must give their attention to the wall newspapers of the masses and to news reporting in the army and in the rural areas. Our drama experts must give their attention to the small repertory theatrical groups in the army and the rural areas; our music experts to mass singing; and our art experts to popular art. All these experts must maintain close contact with the comrades propagandizing literature and art of the lower levels among the masses.

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Since we realize that our literature and art must serve the masses, then we can go a step further and discuss (1) the inner-party problem of the relation between the literature and art work of the party and party work as a whole; and (2) the problem of our relations with those outside the party, *i. e.*, the relation between party writers and artists and non-party writers and artists; in other words, the problem of a united front in literature and art.

Let us consider the first problem. All culture or all present-day literature and art belong to a certain class, to a certain party or to a certain political line. There is no such thing as art for art's sake, or literature and art that lie above class distinctions or above partisan interests. There is no such thing as literature and art running parallel to politics or being independent of politics. They are in reality non-existent.

In a society with class and party distinctions, literature and art belong to a class or party, which means that they respond to the political demands of a class or party as well as to the revolutionary task of a given revolutionary period. When literature and art deviate from this principle, they divorce themselves from the basic needs of the people.

The literature and art of the proletariat are part of the revolutionary program of the proletariat. As Lenin pointed out, they are "a screw in the machine." Thus the role of the party's work in literature and art is determined by the over-all revolutionary program of the party. Deviation from this principle inevitably leads to dualism and pluralism, and eventually to such views as Trotsky advocated: Marxist politics but bourgeois art.

We are not in favor of overemphasizing the importance of literature and art but neither must we underestimate it. Although literature and art are subordinate to politics, they in turn exert a tremendous influence upon politics. Revolutionary literature and art are part of a revolutionary program. They are like the aforementioned screws. They may be of greater or lesser importance, of primary or secondary value when compared with other parts of the machine, but they are nevertheless indispensable to the machine; they are indispensable parts of the entire revolutionary movement. If we had no literature and art, even of the most general kind, we should not be able to carry on the revolution or to achieve victory. It would be a mistake not to recognize this fact.

Furthermore, when we say that literature and art are subordinate to politics, we mean class politics and mass politics, not the so-called politics of a few politicians. Politics, whether revolutionary or counter-revolutionary, represent the struggle between two opposing classes, not the behavior of isolated individuals. The war of an ideology and the war of literature and art, especially the war of a revolutionary ideology and the war of revolutionary literature and art, must be subordinate to the political war because the needs of a class and of the masses can be expressed in concentrated form only through politics.

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Literary and art criticism constitutes a major weapon which must be developed to carry on a struggle in literary and art circles. As many comrades have rightly pointed out, our past work has been inadequate in this respect.

Criticism of literature and art presents a complicated problem requiring special study. Here I shall discuss only the problem of basic standards of criticism. I shall also comment on various problems raised by comrades and the incorrect views expressed by some.

There are two standards for literary and art criticism. One is the political standard and the other, the artistic standard.

By the political standard, artistic production is good, or comparatively good, if it serves the interests of our war of resistance and unity, if it encourages solidarity among the masses, and if it opposes retrogression and promotes progress. Conversely, artistic production is bad, or comparatively bad, if it encourages dissension and division among the masses, if it impedes progress and holds the people back.

Shall we distinguish between the good and bad on the basis of the motives (subjective intention) or the effects (actual practice in society)? Idealists stress the motives and deny the effects; mechanical materialists stress the effects and deny the motives. We are opposed to both approaches.

We are dialectical materialists; we insist upon a synthesis of motive and effect. The motive of working for the masses cannot be separated from the effect which is welcomed by the masses. The motive and the effect must dovetail. A motive engendered by individual self-interest or narrow group-interest is not good. On the other hand, a good intention of working for the masses is of no value if it does not produce an effect which is welcomed by the masses and benefits them.

In examining the subjective intent of a writer, that is to say, in determining whether his motive is correct or good, we cannot depend upon his own declaration of intent; we must analyze the effect which his behavior (his creative product) has on society and the masses. The standard for examining a subjective intent is social practice; and the standard for examining a motive is the effect it produces.

Our criticism of literature and art must not be sectarian. Bearing in mind the general principles of the war of resistance and national unity, we must tolerate all works of literature and art expressing every kind and shade of political attitude. At the same time, we must be firm in principle and in our position when we criticize. This means that we must criticize severely all literary and artistic works which present viewpoints that are opposed to national, scientific, mass, and Communist interests because both the motives and the effects of this so-called literature and art jeopardize our war of resistance and wreck our national unity.

From the point of view of artistic standards, all works of higher artistic quality are good, or comparatively good while those of inferior artistic quality are bad, or comparatively bad. But this criterion also depends upon the effect a given work of art has on society. There are few writers and artists who do not consider their own works excellent.

Also, we must allow free competition of various types and shadings of artistic work. At the same time, we must criticize the work correctly, by scientific and artistic standards, in order gradually to raise art of a lower level to a higher level, and to change art which does not meet the requirements of the people's struggle (even when it is on a very high level) to art which does.

We know now that there is a political standard and an artistic standard. What then is the proper relation between them? Politics is not at the same time art. The world outlook in general is not at the same time the methods of artistic creation. Not only do we reject abstract and rigid political standards but we also reject abstract and rigid artistic standards. Different class societies have different political and artistic standards as do the various classes within a given class society. But in any class society or in any class within that society, political standards come first and artistic standards come second.

The bourgeois class rejects the literature and art of the proletariat, no matter how high their artistic quality. The proletariat must likewise reject the reactionary political essence of bourgeois literature and art, and extract their artistic quality very judiciously. It is possible for outright reactionary literature and art, the creative work of Fascists, to have a certain measure of artistic quality. Since reactionary productions of high artistic quality, however, may do very great harm to the people, they must definitely be rejected. All literature and art of the exploiting classes in their decadent period have one characteristic in common—a contradiction between their reactionary political content and their artistic form.

We demand unity between politics and art; we demand harmony between content and form—the perfect blending of revolutionary political content with the highest possible level of artistic form. Works of art and literature without artistic quality are ineffectual no matter how progressive they are politically.

Thus we condemn not only works of art with a harmful reactionary content but also works done in the "poster-and-slogan style," which stresses content to the exclusion of form. It is on these two fronts that we must fight in the sphere of literature and art.

Many of our comrades suffer from both defects. Some tend to neglect artistic quality when they ought to be devoting much more attention to advancing artistic quality. But even more important at present is their lack of political quality. Many comrades lack fundamental political common sense, with the result that they entertain all sorts of confused notions. Let me give you a few examples of the notions entertained in Yen-an.

1. "The theory of human nature"—is there such a thing as human nature? Yes, certainly, but only concrete human nature. In a class society human nature takes on class characteristics; there is no abstract human nature which stands above class distinctions.

We stand for the human nature of the proletariat, while the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie advocate the human nature of their respective classes. And while they may not express it in so many words, they consider that theirs is the only kind of human nature. In their eyes, therefore, the human nature of the proletariat is contrary to human nature. There are in Yen-an some who think along similar lines; they advocate the so-called theory of human nature as the basis for their theory of literature and art. This is absolutely wrong.

2. "The origin of all literature and art is love, love of mankind." Love may be a starting point, but there is still another even more basic starting point. Love is a concept which is the product of objective experience. Fundamentally we cannot start from an idea; we must start from objective experience.

The love that we writers and artists with our intellectual background bear for the proletariat stems from the fact that society has forced upon us the same destiny as it has forced upon the proletariat and that our lives have been integrated with the life of the proletariat. Our hatred of Japanese imperialism, on the other hand, is the result of our oppression by Japanese imperialists. Nowhere in the world does love exist without reason nor does hatred exist without reason.

As for love of mankind, there has been no such all-embracing love since the human race was divided into classes. The ruling classes have preached universal love. Confucius advocated it, as did Tolstoy. But no one has ever been able to practice it because it was not attained in a class society.

A true love of mankind is attainable, but only in the future when class distinctions will have been eliminated throughout the world. Classes serve to divide society; when classes are eliminated, society will be united again. At that time, the love of mankind will flourish but it cannot flourish now. Today we cannot love the fascists nor can we love our enemies. We cannot love all that is evil and ugly in society. It is our objective to eliminate all these evils. The people know that. Cannot our writers and artists understand it?

3. "Literature and art have always presented impartially and with equal emphasis the bright and dark sides, always as much of one as of the other."

This remark reflects a series of muddled ideas. Literature and art do not always present the bright and dark impartially. Many petty-bourgeois writers have never discovered the bright side; they depict only the dark side and call their work "exposé literature." They even produce works which are devoted entirely to spreading pessimism and defeatism.

During the period of socialist reconstruction the literature of the Soviet Union primarily described the bright side. Although shortcomings were admitted, they were presented as shadings against a background of over-all brightness. There was no equal emphasis of the bright and the dark.

During periods of reaction bourgeois writers and artists have characterized the revolutionary masses as bandits and gangsters but referred to themselves as god-like. Thus have they distorted the bright and the dark sides.

Only truly revolutionary writers and artists can correctly solve the problem of balance between praise and exposé. Every dark force which endangers the masses must be exposed while every revolutionary struggle of the masses must be praised. This is the fundamental task of revolutionary writers and artists.

4. "The function of literature and art has always been to expose." This kind of talk, just like the previous remark, shows a lack of understanding of the science of history and historical materialism.

As I have pointed out, to expose what is bad is not the only function of literature and art. Revolutionary writers and artists should limit the subject matter of their exposure to the aggressors, exploiters, and oppressors. The

people, naturally enough, also have shortcomings, but their defects are produced in large measure by the rule of the aggressors, exploiters, and oppressors. Our revolutionary writers and artists must lay the blame for these shortcomings upon the crimes committed by the aggressors, exploiters, and oppressors, not expose the people themselves. As for the people, our only problem is how to educate them and raise their level.

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8. "Learning Marxism-Leninism is a mechanical repetition of dialectical materialism, which will stifle the creative spirit."

Learning Marxism-Leninism means only observing and studying the world, society, literature, and art from the point of view of dialectical and historical materialism. It does not mean that one must include an outline of philosophy in a work of literature or art.

Marxism-Leninism embraces but does not replace realism in creative literature and art, just as Marxism-Leninism can only embrace but not replace the theories of atoms and electrons in physics. Empty, dry dogmas truly stifle the creative spirit; furthermore, they destroy Marxism-Leninism. Dogmatic Marxism-Leninism is not Marxism-Leninism; it is contrary to Marxism-Leninism.

Will not Marxism-Leninism then destroy the creative spirit? Oh yes, it will. It will destroy the feudal, bourgeois, and petty-bourgeois creative spirit; the creative spirit that is rooted in liberalism, individualism, abstractionism; the creative spirit that stands for art-for-art's sake and is aristocratic, defeatist, and pessimistic. It will destroy any brand of creative spirit which is not of the masses and of the proletariat. And is it not right that these brands of creative spirit should be destroyed as far as proletarian writers and artists are concerned? I think so. They should be extirpated to make room for the new.

APPENDIX C

Just two months previous to Mr. Khokhlov's testimony before this committee, Nikita Khrushchev expressed his "views" on the role that literature and art must play in Communist life. Let no true Communist artist get the silly idea that Khrushchev's earlier remarks about peaceful coexistence were to be taken too literally. As long as there remain "survivals of capitalism," Party vigilance must never be relaxed.

The following paragraphs are reprinted from New Times, February 16, 1956, pages 68-69, 71.

It is incumbent on Party organizations to heighten their vigilance in ideological work, strictly safeguard the purity of Marxist theory, wage a resolute struggle against all throwbacks to bourgeois ideology, intensify the drive against the survivals of capitalism in the minds of men and expose their carriers.

In this connection, we cannot pass by the fact that some people are trying to apply the absolutely correct thesis of the possibility of peaceful co-existence of countries with different social and political systems to the ideological sphere. This is a harmful mistake. It does not at all follow from the fact that we stand for peaceful co-existence and economic competition with capitalism, that the struggle against bourgeois ideology, against the survivals of capitalism in the minds of men, can be relaxed. Our task is tirelessly to expose bourgeois ideology, reveal how inimical it is to the people, show up its reactionary nature.

In the battle which our Party is waging against the moribund ideas and conceptions of the old world, for the dissemination and affirmation of communist ideology, a major role belongs to the press, literature, and art. While noting the considerable achievements registered in this field, it must nevertheless be said that our literature and art still lag behind life, behind Soviet reality, for these are immeasurably richer than their reflection in art and literature. It is legitimate to ask: have not some of our writers and art workers been losing contact with life?

Art and literature in our country can and should take first place in the world not only for wealth of content, but also for artistic power and execution. We cannot reconcile ourselves to pallid works bearing the stamp of haste, as some comrades in art organizations, editorial offices, and publishing houses are doing.

Mediocrity and insincerity are often not given a sufficient rebuff, and this is detrimental to the development of art and the artistic education of the people.

We can note some progress in the cinema. More films are now being produced than before. Yet, in their drive for quantity, cinema workers often are less discriminating as regards the ideological and artistic quality of pictures and turn out feeble, superficial productions dealing with petty and insignificant phenomena. This practice must be ended, remembering that the cinema is a powerful instrument of communist education of the working people.

The Party has combated and will continue to combat untruthful depiction of Soviet reality, both attempts to varnish it and attempts to scoff at and discredit what has been won by the Soviet people. Creative work in literature and art must be permeated with the spirit of struggle for communism, it must instill buoyancy and firm conviction in people's hearts and minds, cultivate a socialist mentality and a comradely sense of duty. Particular attention must be devoted to enhancing further the part played by the press in all aspects of ideological, political, and organizational work.

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Our party is full of creative strength, mighty energy, and inflexible resolve to achieve the great aim—the building of communism. In all human history there has not been, nor can there be, a loftier and nobler aim. Communism will bring about the fullest development of all the productive forces of society; it will be a social system where all the fountains of social wealth will flow freely, where every individual will work with enthusiasm according to his abilities and be compensated for his labour according to his needs. On this basis the prerequisites will be created for the all-round development of the individual, of every member of the communist society. (*Prolonged applause.*)

That is why the ideas of communism possess a tremendous magnetic power and attract ever new supporters. There is nothing more absurd than the fiction that people are forced to take the path of communism under pressure from without. We are confident that the ideas of communism will triumph and no "iron curtains" or barriers erected by the bourgeois reactionaries can halt their spread to more and more millions. (*Loud applause.*)

At the same time we firmly stand for peaceful co-existence, for economic competition between socialism and capitalism; we follow a consistent policy of peace and friendship among nations.

Our Party has many enemies and ill-wishers, but it has a great many more tried and tested friends and loyal allies.

Our cause is invincible. It is invincible because, together with the great Soviet people, many hundreds of millions in fraternal People's China and in all the other People's Democracies are carrying it forward. (*Loud applause.*) It is invincible because it enjoys the ardent support and sympathy of peoples and countries which broke out of national and colonial oppression. It is invincible because it is supported by the working people of the whole world. No one can intimidate us, compel us to withdraw from the positions we occupy, to renounce the defence of peace, democracy, and socialism. (*Loud applause.*)

The future is with us, for we are confidently marching forward along the only correct path, the path charted for us by our teacher, the great Lenin. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*) Hundreds of millions of men and women, inspired by the ideas of a just social system, the ideas of democracy and socialism, are rallying around us and our friends.

Under the banner of Marxism-Leninism, which is transforming the world, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will lead the Soviet people to the complete triumph of communism. (*Loud and prolonged applause and cheers. All rise.*)

APPENDIX D

Perhaps by the time this appendix is printed, William Z. Foster may no longer be chairman of the CPUSA. His successor, of course, will hold the same ideas about art and culture.

Foster's advice to "friendly" artists is very interesting: Be sure to pick up your capitalist pay check while trying your best to subvert the capitalist system.

The following excerpts are reprinted from *New Masses*, April 23, 1946, pages 6, 8, and 9:

ELEMENTS OF A PEOPLE'S CULTURAL POLICY

The chairman of the Communist Party discusses art as a weapon; foresees a resurgence of progressive spirit in all cultural fields

(By William Z. Foster)

As a start on a people's cultural program, there must be a clear understanding that "art is a weapon" in the class struggle. Not only is art a weapon, but a very potent one as well.

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The new, elementary people's culture is developing along two general avenues. For one thing, progressive artists are raising their voices independently in literature, in the theater, and in various other artistic fields. At the same time they are also exerting constructive pressures upon the organized, capitalized cultural forms: the radio, the press, the motion pictures, etc.

Communist and other democratic artists should cultivate both of these streams of the new people's art. As the very basis of their activity, they should further the growth of every form of democratic cultural activities outside direct capitalist control, including the work of independent artists in every field, the publication of good books and the production of progressive plays, the promotion of artistic and general cultural work by trade unions, Negro groups, farmers' organizations and other people's groupings, the development of democratic art projects by the local, state and national governments, the strengthening of publication facilities by the Left, and the establishment of organized artists' movements. It was one of the worst features of Browder's revisionism in the cultural field that, with its policy of tailing after the bourgeoisie, it tended to liquidate these independent artistic endeavors.

Progressive artists should also strive to make their constructive influence felt within the scope of the great commercialized organizations of the bourgeoisie—motion pictures, radio, literature, theater, etc. Artists must eat, like other people. Many artists, therefore, are necessarily constrained to work under direct capitalist controls, on employers' payrolls, pretty much as workers are. It is also a political and artistic necessity to penetrate the commercialized art medium. It would be as foolish for artists to refuse to work for bourgeois cultural organizations as it would be for workers to declare a permanent strike against the capitalists' industries. But this does not mean that artists so employed should become servile tools or prostitutes for these exploiters, as unfortunately many do. On the contrary, the progressive artists have a double responsibility. Not only should they actively cultivate every form of independent artistic activity, but they should also fight, as workers do in capitalist industry, to make their democratic influence felt in the commercialized cultural organizations.

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The special task of the Communists in the development of the new democratic trends in our national culture is to enrich culture with Marxian understanding and to carry it to the people. The Communists must, above all others, be the ones to understand the true significance of art as a weapon in the class struggle and to know how to combat all reactionary capitalist ideological hindrances to the development of the new people's democratic art. They must realistically develop a penetrating Marxist criticism. They must strive for the utmost excellence in their own artistic creative work. They must take the lead in educating and mobilizing the great masses to support all independent art projects of the people, the fight against reactionary trends in the capitalistically organized literature, theater, radio, motion pictures, etc., and to insist upon democratic artistic expressions through these powerful mediums. They must ceaselessly teach artists the elements of Marxism and inspire the whole body of artistic and cultural workers with the perspective of the great cultural renaissance that socialism brings with it.

The Communists, to be effective in all this work, must be alert to fight against the Left and Right dangers. Left sectarian trends are prominent in the new people's democratic art. They have done great harm in the past and are still not without considerable negative effects. Among such leftist trends may be noted tendencies to sweep aside all bourgeois art, past and present, as useless and dangerous, to have contempt for all art that is not immediately

expressive of the class struggle, to fall into narrow cultism of various sorts, to idealize the working class, to disdain high standards in artistic technique, to adopt sectarian attitudes toward the problems of artists working in the organized art mediums and cultural organizations of the bourgeoisie, etc. Such leftist conceptions have nothing in common with a people's cultural policy. The Communists, contrary to all such narrowness, should have the highest appreciation, as exemplified by Lenin and the Russian Bolsheviks, of bourgeois artistic achievements; they should have the broadest of all conceptions of what art is and of its vital social role; they should strive to be masters of artistic techniques and should eagerly learn much that bourgeois artists have to teach in this respect; they should be militant opponents of every conception of "artists in uniform" controls; they should be leaders in the artistic fight in every field not only in the initiation of independent art activities, but also in cultivating democratic expressions within the scope of the bourgeoisie's organized, capitalized cultural mediums. They must especially fight against the destructive effects of Trotskyism in every cultural field.

Left sectarian trends are still highly corrosive to a democratic cultural program. Nevertheless, the main danger in the cultural field is the Right danger, which is the direct pressure of capitalism itself. This Right danger, in general, expresses itself in the tendency of cultural workers to fall victims of, or surrender to, the insidious attempts of the bourgeoisie to stifle every manifestation of the new people's art and to enslave ideologically the people's artists. Among the major manifestations of the Right danger is the acceptance of the bourgeois propaganda to the effect that art is "free" and has nothing to do with the class struggle; that the artist has no democratic message for the people; that the man as artist has no relationship to the man as citizen, and that technical content and not social content is the essence of art. Such ideas not only liquidate the democratic ideology of the artist, but also degenerate him into a puppet of the bourgeoisie, a defender of every detrimental feature of capitalist culture, an acceptor of the wages of the capitalists in return for poisoning the minds of the people. Browderism tended to cultivate all these enervating Right tendencies. The Communists must be the leaders in fighting against such Right dangers, which operate to make the artist merely an appendage and servant of the decadent capitalist system and its sterile art.

The present debate now going on in the left-wing press over the original Albert Maltz article in *NEW MASSES* is a healthy sign of the correction of our revisionism in the cultural field, as well as in other branches of our Party's work. For Browder, with his imperialistic theories to the effect that the American bourgeoisie has become progressive, not only set our Party to tailing after the capitalists in the field of politics, but also in that of culture. Maltz's article expressed elements of this Right trend, now happily being corrected by Maltz himself. From the course of the debate it is clear that the necessary rectifications in our Party's understanding and practice are being made.

The tone of the debate has been sharp. Some people attempt to interpret this sharpness as an indication that the Communist Party wants to regiment the artists. But this is decidedly not the case; the Party wants to cultivate the maximum freedom of artistic expression among cultural workers of all kinds. It knows full well that without such freedom there can be no productive people's art. But Maltz's article was of a highly theoretical character, and in matters of theory Communists insist upon clarity. Maltz in his article attempted to lay down, and incorrectly, the line that should be followed generally by progressive artists in every field of culture. Hence his proposals had to be discussed with all the sharpness necessary to achieve theoretical clarity. The debate is a healthy one. The Communist Party and its friends are now getting a much-needed lesson in the principles of Marxism in the cultural field, and the Party is actively laying the basis for the soundest artistic program it has ever had.

The next years will show a tremendous resurgence of progressive spirit in every cultural field. Capitalism is sinking deeper into its general crisis, and the reactionaries, who see their precious social system threatened, are moving again in the direction of fascism and another world war in an attempt to save it. More and more the democratic forces, here and abroad, are going over onto the political and ideological offensive against capitalist decadence in all its manifestations. These awakening masses and peoples will increasingly demand the voice of every kind of artist in their struggle against reactionary capitalists, especially American big capital. Hence our Party must be fully prepared to play a vital leading role in this broad cultural movement of the people, even as it does in every other phase of the class struggle.

APPENDIX E

As cultural commissar of the CPUSA, V. J. Jerome would be in a position to explain how culture can be used as a weapon. The following paragraphs taken from his *Grasp the Weapon of Culture*, lay stress upon certain aspects of the united front in artistic and scientific circles.

V. J. Jerome, *Grasp the Weapon of Culture*, New York, New Century Publishers, 1951, pages 20-21.

The intellectual's work in the peace movement, however, has tended to be limited to the direct political plane, to participation only as "citizens." Such activity, in the form of rallies, petitions, statements to the press, etc., is most valuable and needs to be greatly expanded through united-front efforts in many directions. Yet the full value of the contributions of men and women of the arts and sciences in such progressive coalition actions demands for its realization that they participate consciously as *artists* and as *scientists* in the great struggles of our times. Such integrated cultural endeavor is vital to the development of the peace movement and of an independent people's culture. A novelist who fights with his voice but not with his pen, an artist who gives his name to the fight but not his brush, a scientist who fights against the destruction of his civil rights but not of his science, fights with one hand, and with the other objectively aids the enemy.

Reactionary content in culture cannot be fought in the economic and political sphere solely; it must be challenged and fought with the counter-ideology of progressive and working-class culture, which the Communists must lead in developing. The "practicalism," rationalized by the pressures of the work for peace, that cannot pause for concern with the content of the artist's or scientist's work, is opportunism, analogous to "economism" in the trade unions.

Nor can we effectively wage the broad battle of ideas, unless we battle for the advanced, Marxist-Leninist ideas in culture. For example, to combat the general run of anti-Soviet discussions of the sciences, literature, and the arts, is to leave these vital cultural fields to the enemy and to weaken the struggle against anti-Sovietism as a whole.

However, it would manifestly be wrong to demand of everyone who participates on a political-cultural basis in a united-front peace activity or organization that he necessarily give full expression to the proletarian class ideology. What should be expected of him is that he express himself as citizen and as artist on the level of his own understanding. Of course, it is the task of Communists to help the non-Communists in the united front to understand that the cultural forces with their pursuits and talents can, in alliance with the working class, labor and struggle to hasten the end of a system which, historically doomed, enslaves and humiliates them.

APPENDIX F

From personal experience, Sidney Finkelstein could appreciate the problems confronting "independent" Communist writers and composers. In 1950, his own work, *Art and Society*, had been discovered to contain dangerous bourgeois sentiments which, of course, Finkelstein quickly corrected.

Sidney Finkelstein, *How Music Expresses Ideas*, New York, International Publishers, 1952, pages 101-105.

In the Soviet Union, criticism is a sign of the high regard the people have for music and its creators. This will seem especially strange to composers in the United States, who regard critics as arch-enemies except when they themselves become critics. Yet the proof of the regard lies in the high position Shostakovich has always held in Soviet musical life, in the fact that his melodies are hummed by millions, in the fact that his successful symphonic works are known by music lovers as thoroughly as they know the great classics. The Soviet criticisms are part of the flourishing musical life of the country, of the give and take between artist and people. They are part of the process through which the composer is made aware of the progress of the people themselves, and the need to catch up

with them and at the same time give them a consciousness of their being through his work that they could not attain by themselves. Through these criticisms Shostakovich has grown, as few other composers in these difficult times. His deeply moving expressions of pain and tragedy, his joyfulness and impish humor have become a world cultural possession. This growth is true of other Soviet composers; and in general, Soviet music as a whole, in spite of red-baiting, has become the most popular body of contemporary music. It is popular in the real sense of the term, not the commercial best-seller sense, which creates works to be consumed and destroyed so that they may make room for others. It is turned to again and again. Not every work is a masterpiece, but every work is human, and the listeners feel in the music a deep regard for themselves.

One of the effects of the Soviet criticisms has been to puncture the carefully nurtured myths about "modernism" in music, myths so well publicized that the listeners who felt only boredom, distaste, or confusion at this music began to feel that the fault was in their own lack of "finer sensitivities." The Soviet Union has raised questions of music, asking that it possess not only "talent," or cleverness, or experimental novelty, but seriousness and depth. This, too, has been well expressed by Shostakovich, on his visit to the United States in 1949 as a delegate to the Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace. "Bringing into being a work which must be permeated with great ideas and great passions, which must convey with its sounds tragic suspense as well as deep optimism, and must reaffirm the beauty and dignity of man—this is the difficult and complicated task which realism demands." And the great power of realism is that it enables the composer himself to be a powerful factor for peace against war. And so Shostakovich asks, "How can we musicians serve the cause of peace, democracy and progress with our art?"

The criticisms and discussions of 1948 were again derided throughout the capitalist world by composers and critics, especially in the United States, along with a fury of Soviet-baiting and dire predictions of the imminent collapse of Soviet music. And while writing these attacks in the name of "freedom" of the composer to compose music, these same composers were worrying about when they could find some spare time to compose, how they could make some money out of their composition, and why nobody seemed either to like their music or even to be interested in their existence. Needless to say, these critics and "authorities" have made no attempt to prove or disprove their predictions by examining the new works of Soviet music, such as Shostakovich's "Song of the Forest," a cantata for chorus and orchestra on a grand scale, with a rich and fresh melodic quality, celebrating in words and music peaceful life and construction. It is one of the few really "new" works of the postwar years, for it deals with the vistas opening up before humanity after the defeat of fascism. And the music fits the subject, having a lyric sweetness and a joyousness surpassing everything in his previous work.

The criticism of 1948, which inaugurated widespread discussions by composers, musicians, critics, and the public was aimed at accelerating the development of Soviet music by making the composers aware of the vast changes that had taken place among the people, the new avenues of musical composition that were opening up, the new needs of the people. It laid the basis for a new level of socialist realism, breaking down all previous opposition that had existed between concert hall and opera, between music for professional and music for amateur, between instrumental music and vocal, between music of the most serious "classical" principles and music for popular use. It pointed out that Soviet music had developed one-sidedly, in its attention to the concert hall; that the tens of thousands of amateur choral and instrumental groups offered Soviet composers great opportunities for reaching audiences far beyond the concert hall, providing the people with music of the best quality, and raising their level; and that this effort would in turn, enable the composer to develop new resources of human imagery in music. It called for a serious and far deeper approach to the problems of opera than had been made hitherto, pointing out that Soviet composers had suffered from the failing to write for the human voice and the neglect of vocal music and song, characteristic of the decline of bourgeois music in general. One of the profound remarks made by Andrei A. Zhdanov (1896-1948) in his speech at a conference of Soviet musicians was as follows: "I shall now pass on to the danger of losing professional mastery. If formalistic distortions make music poorer, they also entail another danger: the loss of professional mastery. In this connection it would be well to consider still another widespread misconception: the claim that

classical music is supposedly simpler, and modern music more complex, and the complexity of modern music represents a forward step." This is true of a great number of contemporary composers, who speak in mysterious shop-talk terms of their "advanced" techniques, when they have actually lost basic skills, such as those of constructing a large-scale dramatic work, writing an opera that presents credible human characterizations on the stage, or even writing a genuinely emotional and singable melody.

Opera happens to be one of the richest historic musical forms, capable of both the greatest music and the greatest popularity, educating people in the meaning of all music by associating music with dramatic events and experiences. Like all forms of theatre, it has been feared and censored by reactionary governments, and it is significant that the Soviet criticisms call for even more intensive work on opera, and a devotion to the most real and contemporary themes. The criticism attacks narrowness and calls for more breadth, for "works of high quality and high ideals in all genres—in the field of operatic and symphonic music, in the creation of songs, in choral and dance music."

The criticism touches on other points that could well be examined in the United States: the charge, for example, that music criticism "has made itself a trumpet for individual composers. Some music critics have taken to fawning upon one or another of the leading musicians, praising their works, in every way, for reasons of friendship, rather than criticising them on the basis of objective principles." The cliquishness dominating the circles in which contemporary music is discussed in the United States, is obvious to anyone who has contact with them.

Zhdanov called for more "creative discussion," saying: "When there is no creative discussion, no criticism and self-criticism, there can be no progress either. * * * When criticism and creative discussion are lacking, the well-springs of growth run dry, and a hothouse atmosphere of stuffiness and stagnation is created." Self-criticism is nothing new in musical history. Every great artist has gone through periods of deep self-examination, harshly criticizing his previous work and trying to discover new pathways to growth. The new aspect of Soviet criticism is that it is more open, social, and collective, more conscious of the historical forces that in fact have always forwarded the progress of music. Again Zhdanov said: "Not everything that is comprehensible is a work of genius, but every genuine work of genius is comprehensible, and it is all the more a work of genius, the more comprehensible it is to the broad masses of people." This is a restatement of nothing more than what the history of music displays, for Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Verdi, Tchaikovsky were comprehended in their time, within the limits of the audiences they could reach. It does not say that all great music is immediately comprehended by all listeners. It says that great art can be explained and taught, and to claim that today's art will be understood only by the "future" is to hide its poverty-stricken content.

Again Zhdanov declared: "Internationalism arises from the very flowering of national art. To forget this truth is to lose sight of the guiding line, to lose one's own face, to become a homeless cosmopolitan. Only the nation which has its own highly developed musical culture can appreciate the music of other peoples. One cannot be an internationalist in music, or in any other realm, without being at the same time a genuine patriot of one's own country. If internationalism is founded on respect for other peoples, one cannot be an internationalist without respecting and loving one's own people." This too is worthy of study by many composers in the United States, who produce a music according to an atonal or polytonal set of formulas that is exactly like the music produced by the same formulas in Paris, Vienna, London, and Rome, and which is profoundly boring to audiences both abroad and at home. Internationalism is the mutual help and interchange of ideas, experiences and knowledge among peoples. Cosmopolitanism is the attempted dictatorship of a dominant imperialist culture over peoples through the insistence on musical systems that preclude realism or human imagery, and which destroy national cultures wherever their influence is felt. Today the cosmopolitan dictatorship of atonality and polytonality, and of the manufactured music of Tinpan Alley, go hand in hand, and their destructive influence is easy to see, both in Europe and in the United States itself.

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