

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND ISLAMIC RADICALISM


HEARINGS

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

—————
JUNE 24, JULY 15, AND SEPTEMBER 30, 1985
—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs





**BOSTON
PUBLIC
LIBRARY**



ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND ISLAMIC RADICALISM

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

—————
JUNE 24, JULY 15, AND SEPTEMBER 30, 1985
—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



CL

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida, *Chairman*

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
DON BONKER, Washington
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
DAN MICA, Florida
MICHAEL D. BARNES, Maryland
HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan
GEO. W. CROCKETT, Jr., Michigan
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California
TOM LANTOS, California
PETER H. KOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LAWRENCE J. SMITH, Florida
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
HARRY REID, Nevada
MEL LEVINE, California
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio
TED WEISS, New York
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
BUDDY MACKAY, Florida
MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona
ROBERT GARCIA, New York

WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
JIM LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
GERALD B.H. SOLOMON, New York
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
MARK D. SILJANDER, Michigan
ED ZSCHAU, California
ROBERT K. DORNAN, California
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida
MICHAEL DEWINE, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona

JOHN J. BRADY, Jr., *Chief of Staff*
ROXANNE PERUGINO, *Staff Assistant*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, *Chairman*

TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LAWRENCE J. SMITH, Florida
MEL LEVINE, California
HARRY REID, Nevada
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
MARK D. SILJANDER, Michigan
ED ZSCHAU, California
ROBERT K. DORNAN, California
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, *Staff Director*
HILLEL WEINBERG, *Minority Staff Consultant*
KENNETH B. MOSS, *Subcommittee Staff Consultant*
CHRISTOPHER A. KOJM, *Subcommittee Staff Consultant*

CONTENTS

WITNESSES

	Page
Monday, June 24, 1985:	
John L. Esposito, professor, Department of Religious Studies, College of the Holy Cross.....	2
Hermann Fr. Eilts, director, Center for International Relations, Boston University.....	24
Monday, July 15, 1985:	
Fouad Ajami, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.....	104
Augustus R. Norton, professor, Department of Social Science, U.S. Military Academy, West Point.....	107
Shahrough Akhavi, professor, Department of Government and International Studies, University of South Carolina.....	121

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Monday, September 30, 1985:	
Adeed Dawisha, fellow, Wilson Center and professor of government and politics, George Mason University.....	178
William J. Olson, Strategic Studies, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.....	188
Gary G. Sick, program officer for international affairs, the Ford Foundation.....	237

APPENDIXES

1. Chronology of major attacks of Islamic Jihad and other radical Islamic groups, prepared by subcommittee staff.....	281
2. Washington Post article entitled "The Terrorism Won't Stop Until We Deal with Iran".....	287
3. The Islamic Jihad Groups prepared by James Piscatori, Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations.....	292
4. Paper submitted by John Esposito entitled "Islamic Revivalism".....	298
5. Paper submitted by Augustus Norton entitled "Making Enemies in South Lebanon: Harakat Amal, the IDF and South Lebanon".....	314
6. Paper submitted by Augustus Norton entitled "Occupational Risks and Planned Retirement—The Israeli Withdrawal from South Lebanon".....	321
7. Paper submitted by Augustus Norton entitled "Introduction to an Interview with Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah".....	326
8. Paper submitted by Augustus Norton entitled "Haraka Amal"—The Emergence of a New Lebanon Fantasy of Reality".....	336
9. Paper submitted by Augustus Norton entitled "Political and Religious Extremism in the Middle East".....	379
10. Paper submitted by Shahrough Akhavi entitled "The Power Structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran".....	391
11. Paper submitted by Adeed Dwaisha entitled "Iran's Mullahs and the Arab Masses".....	404
12. New York Times article entitled "Coping with Islamic Fundamentalism" by Augustus Norton and subsequent subcommittee correspondence.....	411
13. Statement submitted by Raymond H. Hamden, chairman, Foundation for International Human Relations.....	416
14. Statement submitted by Daniel Pipes, visiting fellow, The Heritage Foundation.....	426

	Page
15. Biographies of witnesses:	
Fouad Ajami	440
Shahrough Akhavi	440
Hon. Hermann Fr. Eilts	440
John L. Esposito.....	442
Augustus R. Norton	442
William J. Olson	443
Gary G. Sick	443

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND ISLAMIC RADICALISM

MONDAY, JUNE 24, 1985

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 2 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. The meeting of the subcommittee will come to order. The Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East today begins a series of hearings on Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic radicalism. These hearings were planned several weeks ago and it is the intention of the Chair to have other hearings in this series to develop some useful information on an important movement which is spreading throughout the Islamic world and which has caused problems for the United States in its efforts to promote peace and to protect and advance its interests in the Islamic world and the Middle East.

We need to know more about the nature of Islamic fundamentalism and why it has some radical and extreme expressions, about why this movement seems to be anti-American and about how the United States should cope with this problem. Fundamentalism is likely to be with us for some time and will to some degree affect our dealings with the more than 1 billion Moslems who live in over 60 nations in the world.

We are fortunate to have with us today two well-known experts on Islam and the Middle East: Dr. Hermann F. Eilts, director, Center for International Relations, Boston University and Dr. John Esposito, Department of Religious Studies, Holy Cross College. Dr. Fouad Ajami from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies was meant to be with us today but he has taken ill. We wish him a speedy recovery and we hope to reschedule his appearance later this year.

Ambassador Eilts, we welcome you back before this subcommittee. You have been here on a number of occasions previously. Both of you have prepared statements. They will be entered into the record in full.

In order to make available more time for questions, I would like to ask you to limit your oral presentations to about 10 minutes, and then we will proceed with questions.

Dr. Esposito, you may begin, and then we will turn immediately thereafter to Ambassador Eilts.

**STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN ESPOSITO, DEPARTMENT OF
RELIGIOUS STUDIES, COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS**

Dr. ESPOSITO. Thank you.

Islamic fundamentalism, in its broadest sense, refers to a renewal of Islam in Moslem personal and public life. Its manifestations include: An increase in religious observances; proliferation of religious publications and media programming; calls for the implementation of Islamic law; creation of Islamic banks; and the growth of Islamic organizations and activist movements.

Incumbent governments appeal to Islam for political legitimacy and popular support for policies and programs. For example, Qadhafi in Libya; Khomeini in Iran; Zia Ul-Haq in Pakistan.

Opposition movements also use the language and symbols of Islam to criticize established governments, and to advocate actions ranging from sociopolitical reform to violent revolutionary action.

Islamic governments and movements manifest a broad range of positions in their ideology, actors, and policies. Islam has been used to legitimate monarchies—Saudi Arabia and Morocco—military regimes—Libya, Sudan, and Pakistan—and a clergy-guided State in Iran. Ideologically, self-styled Islamic regimes span the spectrum from Libya's radical socialist state of the masses to the conservative government of the House of Saud.

Islamic actors or activists display a similar diversity: Clerical and lay, conservative and modernist, highly educated and illiterate, gradualist and terrorist. Islamic organizations vary from the relatively moderate Moslem Brotherhood movement in Pakistan and Malaysia's Abim to the extreme radicalism of Egypt's Takfir wal Hijra, Lebanon's Hizbullah, Indonesia's Commando Jihad, and a variety of others.

Islamic activists or fundamentalists believe that dependence on or imitation of the West has been responsible for a failure of political systems—and relative military impotence throughout much of the Moslem world. They see these systems as having been unable to provide an ideologically successful basis for national unity and solidarity, and, hence, political legitimacy.

Despite constitutional and parliamentary forms of government, Moslem rulers are often seen as autocratic heads of corrupt, authoritarian regimes, propped up by support from Western governments and multinational corporations. Here, the United States is often blamed most strongly.

Economically, both Western capitalism and Marxist socialism are rejected as having failed to redress widespread poverty and the maldistribution of wealth. Ideologically, capitalism is condemned as consumerism, a gross materialism blind to issues of social justice.

Marxist socialism is rejected as a godless alternative, striking at the heart of religion. Socially, modernizing elites of their countries are accused of encouraging the Westernization and secularization of Moslem societies, a blind pursuit of valueless social change.

Infatuation with Western development models is blamed for moral and cultural decline—the breakdown of the Moslem family,

increased crime rates, a permissive, promiscuous society, and spiritual malaise, et cetera.

Many Islamic activists also reject politico-military dependence on the West. U.S. policy in the Middle East, including the recent involvement in Lebanon, is viewed as governed by America's special relationship with Israel. The more militant fundamentalists view contemporary Middle Eastern politics in terms of a Judeo-Christian conspiracy or alliance against the Moslem world.

If many Americans carry stereotypes of Moslems as terrorists, many Moslems see Westerners as perpetrators of a Crusader mentality toward Islam, which they believe informs a policy of American neocolonialism, both by government and by multinationals. Thus, they see a danger that America will seek to dominate political, economic and even social life in ways not unlike European imperialism.

They believe that modern states in the Moslem world are doomed to failure so long as they look to the West and fail to root their identity and sociopolitical development directly in Islam.

Thus, they speak of the third Islamic alternative. Indeed, for many, it is an imperative.

The following set of beliefs summarizes the ideological framework for Islamic organizations.

One, Islam is a total way of life. Religion, therefore, is integral to politics, state and society.

Two, the political, military and economic weakness of Moslems is due to having strayed from Islam and followed Western, secular, materialistic ideologies and values. Both Western liberal nationalism and Marxist socialism have failed because they are antithetical to Islam.

Three, Islam, as found in the guidance of revelation—the Koran—the practice of the Prophet, and the example of the early Islamic community, provides the true alternative ideology for Moslem life.

Four, the method for the renewal and reform of Moslem society is an Islamic political and social revolution, like that of the Prophet Muhammad, which brings about an Islamic system of government and law.

Five, Moslems must reestablish God's rule, the Kingdom of God on Earth, by reinstating Islamic law, the blueprint for society.

Six, this new Islamic order does not reject science and technology. However, modernization is subordinated to Islam in order to guard against the Westernization and secularization of Moslem society.

Seven, the process of Islamization requires organizations or societies built around dynamic nuclei of committed or trained believers, who call on all to repent and turn to God's path, and who are prepared, when necessary, to fight against corruption and social injustice.

For radical movements, the following assumptions or beliefs are incorporated in addition to the foregoing.

One, a crusader mentality, neocolonialist ambitions, and the power of Zionism have resulted in a Western Judeo-Christian conspiracy which pits the West against the East, or the Moslem world, in this case.

Two, since the legitimacy of Moslem governments is based on Islamic law—sharia—governments, such as Anwar Sadat's in Egypt, which do not follow Islamic law are illegitimate. Those responsible for such an atheistic state are guilty of unbelief and, as such, are lawful objects of holy war (Jihad), and thus that government must be overthrown.

Moslems are obliged both to overthrow such un-Islamic governments and to fight other Moslems who do not share their own total commitment. Militants regard such persons as no longer Moslems, but rather unbelievers.

Three, Jihad against unbelievers is a religious duty.

Four, Christians and Jews are often considered unbelievers rather than, as has been traditional in Islam, as tolerated people of the Book.

Five, opposition to illegitimate Moslem governments often extends to the official Ulama or clergy—the Shi'ites of Iran and Lebanon are exceptions—and to state-supported mosques, since they are considered to be co-opted and controlled by the government.

For the vast majority of Moslems, the resurgence of Islam is a reassertion of cultural identity, formal religious observance, family values, and morality. The establishment of an Islamic society is seen as requiring a personal and social transformation which is a prerequisite for true Islamic government.

Effective change is to come from below through a gradual process of change brought about through the implementation of Islamic law. For the majority of Moslems, the process is one of social transformation through reform.

Yet, an increasingly significant minority view the societies and governments in Moslem countries as so hopelessly corrupt that violent revolution is perceived as the only effective method. Their pagan, un-Islamic societies and their leaders, who are regarded as no better than infidels, must be eradicated.

Islamic revolutionaries reject not only the political, economic, and social status quo but also the religious establishment. In most Sunni countries, the Ulama or clergy are regarded as having been co-opted by their governments.

Radical revolutionary groups have remained relatively small in membership. However, the number of groups continues to proliferate. Though effective in political agitation, disruption, and assassination, they have generally not been successful in mass mobilization.

City life contrasts sharply with village values. Exposed in heavy doses to new ways, the contradictions of modern Moslem societies are vividly experienced: Wealth, Western dress and lifestyle and corruption are contrasted with overcrowded ghettos, poverty and massive unemployment; Western social, especially sexual, mores on the street and in the media are contrasted with traditional Islamic values regarding women and the family.

While many are drawn by the delights of city life, Islamically minded youth often experience alienation—torn between their religion and modern life styles. Islamic organizations offer a new sense of identity and community based upon an Islamic ideology which provides a critique of modern society and an agenda for change rooted in their religious world view.

Most will work for Islamic sociopolitical change within the political systems. Others, who view regimes as repressive and corrupt, as more interested in foreign political and business elites, and as fostering a Western rather than Islamically oriented society, become radicalized.

They turn to violence, convinced that they are striving—Jihad literally means striving in God's way—to realize God's will against unbelieving, despotic rulers with their Western, especially here, American, allies. Their targets are Moslem rulers and political elites as well as American citizens who represent or symbolize American influence.

What about the American situation in U.S. relations with the Moslem world? In many Moslem countries, a revivalism has not taken a violent turn. Thus, it is important to differentiate among revivalism and Islamic activism.

A majority of Moslems struggle for greater self-determination in a moral and just society versus a minority of radical extremists who seek to impose their views, the views of a small group, through techniques that are often more ruthless and dictatorial than those of the government they seek to overthrow.

For the rest, these challenges are both serious and, until recently, unfamiliar. However, I believe that increasingly we will see U.S. interests continuing to be threatened.

One of the things that I suggest is a need for re-examination of U.S. policy and attitudes.

Let me just finish by making a few points in this area.

Exploring alternative approaches to U.S. policy in the Mideast would require a shift in policy through a re-examination of the present tendency to, one, subordinate all Middle East policy to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Two, be too quick to enter or intervene in disputes such as those in Lebanon.

Four, fail to differentiate Islamic movements but rather to equate all Islamic fundamentalists simplistically with radicalism and violence.

Fail to differentiate Islamic movements but rather to equate all Islamic fundamentalists simplistically with radicalism and violence. Thus, we focus on terrorism while neglecting to devote equal energy to planning and policies which will prevent radicalism and terrorism.

Five, we tend to assume the mixing of religion and politics necessarily and inevitably lead to tyrannical governments, and indeed members of our government have made such statements.

Six, allow the United States to become too closely allied with pro-Western or anti-Communist regimes regardless of how autocratic or repressive they may be, as in Iran and the Sudan.

The concern and criticism voiced by American Government officials, for example, with regard to the Sudanese introduction of Islamic law threatening human rights, while at the same time we continue to support the Sudanese autocratic regime—here I refer to Numeiri—seem curious and hypocritical to many Moslems.

Thus, it was easier for Islamic revivalists and many others to believe that President Numeiri's crackdown on the Moslem Brotherhood in March 1985 was connected with the visit of Vice President Bush.

For the foreseeable future, a radical, alienated minority will continue to engage in terrorism and subversion. However, the vast majority of Islamic revivalists will pursue what they see is a more authentic Islamic future through peaceful transformation of society.

Whereas many will remain nonpolitical, others will seek to lobby and participate in the political process. This becomes crucial.

Government attempts, both theirs and in any way ours, through indirect influence to suppress such organizations will only encourage their radicalization. It is usually U.S. presence and policy in a given country or region, not a generic hatred of America, that motivates actions against the American Government and business interests.

I think we need to keep this in mind when people say, are Islamics simply anti-American?

In Iran, America was, especially so, responsible for restoration of the Shah and keeping him in power. More recently, in Lebanon, Americans are collaborators with an unpopular government in and with the Israelis, rather than as peacemaker. Therefore, as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution. The Sudan provides, I believe, our most recent example.

It would appear important, therefore, for us to exercise caution and selectivity in determining which governments can best profit from our support and how we can better go about providing that support.

Recognizing that special relationships with some Moslem rulers can be critical for our strategic objectives, we should also be careful not to antagonize, in the process, popular and authentically representative forces in Moslem societies.

A measure of good will can be maintained with such forces through informal contacts and an informed objective understanding of their positions. Meanwhile, a high American profile, especially military profile, can be self-defeating for all concerned.

The ability of the United States to be perceived as friendly by moderate Islamic activists is diminished when those moderates, along with most radical compatriots, see U.S. policies as tinged with neocolonialism, however inaccurate Americans believe that charge to be.

Without a perceptible Mideast policy, pro-American regimes in the Moslem world will continue to be vulnerable and condemned as client states, especially where the United States maintains a major military or multinational presence or provides substantial assistance. Americans must remember that criticism of U.S. policy is often voiced by secular elites as well as Islamic movements.

Let me just end by saying, then, in conclusion, Islamic revivalism or fundamentalism is a reality that is very much with us and will continue to be a force in Mideast politics for the foreseeable future.

Most Islamic fundamentalists will continue to emphasize greater attention to religious observances and the need for a more Islamic way of life. Most Islamic organizations will pursue an evolution from below with the risk of radicalization coming from government repression.

While not representative of the majority, radical movements will continue to operate against Moslem and Western—here, American Government—and its interests. They will not lead popular revolu-

tions in most cases, but rather aggravate and disrupt society through assassinations, bombings and kidnappings.

As we formulate responses to the threat of terrorism, we can ill afford to overlook opportunities to prevent further deterioration or radicalization in our dealings with the broader segment of Moslem activism through long as well as short-range policy planning and through more attention to the training of Government personnel and analysts.

Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you.

[Dr. Esposito's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES,
COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS

Political events in the Muslim world since the 1970s have dramatically drawn attention to the political and social potential of Islam. Religion has re-emerged, often explosively, in the politics of countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Malaysia. But what is this phenomenon called "Islamic Revivalism", "Islamic Resurgence", or "Islamic Fundamentalism"?

Islamic revivalism in its broadest sense refers to a renewal of Islam in Muslim personal and public life. Its manifestations include an increase in religious observances (mosque attendance, Ramadan fast, wearing traditional Islamic dress); proliferation of religious publications and media programming; calls for the implementation of Islamic law; creation of Islamic banks; and the growth of Islamic organizations and activist movements. Incumbent governments appeal to Islam for political legitimacy and popular support for policies and programs. Opposition movements use the language and symbols of Islam to criticize established governments, and to advocate actions ranging from socio-political reform to violent revolutionary action.

Islamic governments and movements manifest a broad range of positions in their ideology, actors, and policies. Islam has been used to legitimate monarchies (Saudi Arabia and Morocco), military regimes (Libya, Sudan, and Pakistan), and a clergy-guided state (Iran). Ideologically, self-styled Islamic regimes span the spectrum from Libya's radical socialist "state of the masses" to the conservative government of the House of Saud. Islamic actors display a similar diversity: clerical and lay, conservative and modernist, highly-educated and illiterate, gradualist and terrorist. Islamic organizations vary from the relatively moderate Jamaat-i-Islam in Pakistan and Malaysia's ABIM to the extreme radicalism of Egypt's Takfir wal Hijra, Lebanon's Hizbullah, Indonesia's Commando Jihad, and a variety of others.

Islamic activists or fundamentalists believe that dependence on or imitation of the West has been responsible for a failure of political systems throughout much of the Muslim world. They see these systems as having been unable to provide an ideologically successful basis for national unity and solidarity, and hence political legitimacy. Despite constitutional and parliamentary forms of government, Muslim rulers are often seen as autocratic heads of corrupt, authoritarian regimes, propped up by support from Western governments and multinational corporations. Economically, both Western capitalism and Marxist socialism are rejected as having failed to redress widespread poverty and the maldistribution of wealth. Ideologically, capitalism is

condemned as consumerism, a gross materialism blind to issues of social justice. Marxist socialism is rejected as a godless alternative, striking at the heart of religion. Socially, modernizing reformers are accused of encouraging the Westernization and secularization of Muslim societies, a blind pursuit of "valueless" social change. Infatuation with Western development models is blamed for moral and cultural decline--the breakdown of the Muslim family, increased crime rates, a permissive promiscuous society, and spiritual malaise.

Many Islamic activists also reject politico-military dependence on the West. United States policy in the Middle East, including the recent involvement in Lebanon, is viewed as governed by America's special relationship with Israel. The more militant fundamentalists view contemporary Middle Eastern politics in terms of a Judeo-Christian conspiracy or alliance against the Muslim world. If many Americans carry stereotypes of Muslims as "terrorists", many Muslims see Westerners as perpetrators of a "Crusader" mentality towards Islam, which they believe informs a policy of American neocolonialism, both by the government and by the multinationals. Thus they see a danger that America will seek to dominate political, economic and even social life in ways not unlike European imperialism of the 19th and early 20th centuries. They believe that modern states in the Muslim world are doomed to failure so long as they look to the West and fail to root their identity and sociopolitical development

directly in Islam. Thus they speak of the third Islamic alternative. Indeed, for many, it is an imperative.

Common Themes

While there are distinctive differences among Islamic revivalists, they share both a common Islamic heritage and confrontation with Western political and cultural imperialism. Common themes in Islamic politics may be identified: (1) the failure of the West--i.e., the inappropriateness of transplanted, imported Western models of political, social, and economic development--and the need to throw off Western political and cultural domination, which fosters secularism, materialism, and spiritual bankruptcy; (2) the need to "return to Islam" in order to restore a lost identity, moral purpose, and character; (3) an emphasis on the unity and totality of Islam, i.e., belief that religion is integral to politics and society because Islam is both religion and government; (4) a call for the reintroduction of Islamic (Shariah) law as the sine qua non for establishing a more Islamic state and society.

Ideological Worldview

The following set of beliefs summarizes the ideological framework for Islamic organizations:

(1) Islam is a total way of life. Religion, therefore, is integral to politics, state, and society.

(2) The political, military, and economic weakness of Muslims is due to having strayed from Islam and followed Western, secular, materialistic ideologies and values. Both Western liberal nationalism and Marxist socialism have failed because they are antithetical to Islam.

(3) Islam, as found in the guidance of revelation (the Koran), the practice of the Prophet, and the example of the early Islamic community provides the true alternative ideology for Muslim life.

(4) The method for the renewal and reform of Muslim society is an Islamic political and social revolution, like that of the Prophet Muhammed, which brings about an Islamic system of government and law.

(5) Muslims must reestablish God's rule, the Kingdom of God on earth, by reinstating Islamic law, the blueprint for society.

(6) This new Islamic order does not reject science and technology. However, modernization is subordinated to Islam in order to guard against the Westernization and secularization of Muslim society.

(7) The process of Islamization requires organizations or societies built around dynamic nuclei of committed and trained believers, who call on all to repent and turn to God's path and who are prepared, when necessary, to fight against corruption and social injustice.

Radical Islamic Movements

For radical movements, the following assumptions or beliefs are incorporated in addition to the foregoing.

(1) A crusader mentality, neo-colonialist ambitions, and the power of Zionism have resulted in a Western Judeo-Christian conspiracy which pits the West against the East.

(2) Since the legitimacy of Muslim governments is based on Islamic law (sharia), governments, such as Anwar Sadat's in Egypt, which do not follow Islamic law are illegitimate. Those responsible for such an "atheist state" are guilty of unbelief and, as such, are lawful objects of holy war (jihad).

(3) Muslims are obliged both to overthrow such un-Islamic governments and to fight other Muslims who do not share their own total commitment. Militants regard such persons as no longer Muslims but rather unbelievers.

(4) Jihad against unbelievers is a religious duty.

(5) Christians and Jews are often considered unbelievers rather than, as has been traditional in Islam, as tolerated "People of the Book".

(6) Opposition to "illegitimate" Muslim governments often extends to the official ulama or clergy (the Shiah of Iran and Lebanon are exceptions), and to state-supported mosques, since they are considered to be co-opted and controlled by the government.

For the majority of Islamic activists the means to achieve their Islamic goals are persuasion and gradual change; for others it is violent confrontation, armed revolution

through holy war. Differences in Islamic visions are accompanied by profound disagreements regarding the implementation of Islamic rule. For the vast majority of Muslims, the resurgence of Islam is a reassertion of cultural identity, formal religious observance, family values, and morality. The establishment of an Islamic society is seen as requiring a personal and social transformation which is a prerequisite for true Islamic government. Effective change is to come from below through a gradual process of change brought about through the implementation of Islamic law. For the majority of Muslims, the process is one of social transformation through reform.

Yet, an increasingly significant minority view the societies and governments in Muslim countries as so hopelessly corrupt that violent revolution is perceived as the only effective method. Their pagan (un-Islamic) societies and their leaders, who are regarded as no better than infidels, must be eradicated. Islamic revolutionaries reject not only the political, economic, and social status quo but also the religious establishment. In most Sunni countries (the Shia of Iran and Lebanon are exceptions), the ulama or clergy are regarded as having been co-opted by their governments.

Radical revolutionary groups have remained relatively small in membership. However, the number of groups continues to proliferate. Though effective in political agitation, disruption, and assassination, they have generally not been successful in mass mobilization.

Islamic Fundamentalists: Who are They?

But who are these Islamic revivalists? Are they uneducated peasants ignorant of the modern world, rejecting modernization in order to bury themselves in the past? Quite the opposite. The leadership are often Muslims from the educated urban classes who combine an early traditional religious upbringing with modern education at national, secular universities or abroad in the U.S., Great Britain or France. They are graduates of Harvard, the University of Pennsylvania, M.I.T. Oxford, the Sorbonne, Cairo University, the University of Malaysia, etc. Most hold bachelor or graduate degrees in science, engineering, and medicine rather than religion and the humanities. While the ulama (scholars or clerics) play an important role among the Shii of Iran and Lebanon, Sunni Muslim organizations are predominantly lay rather than clerically dominated. Thus, a general profile of many Islamic fundamentalists might read as lower middle class and middle class, first generation city dwellers who have migrated from villages and towns, well educated, pious, highly motivated. In many ways, they would be seen as upwardly mobile students and young professionals recruited from mosques, schools and universities. Indeed, a sign of Islamic revivalism has been the formation of Islamic student organizations and their remarkable dominance of campus elections at major universities and schools.

City life contrasts sharply with village values. Exposed in heavy doses to "new ways", the contradictions of modern Muslim societies are vividly experienced: wealth, Western dress and life style and corruption are contrasted with overcrowded ghettos, poverty and massive unemployment; Western social (especially sexual) mores on the street and in the media are contrasted with traditional Islamic values regarding women and the family. While many are drawn by the delights of city life, Islamically minded youth often experience alienation--torn between their religion and modern lifestyles. Islamic organizations offer a new sense of identity and community based upon an Islamic ideology which provides a critique of modern society and an agenda for change rooted in their religious worldview. Most will work for Islamic socio-political change within the political system. Others, who view regimes as repressive and corrupt, as more interested in foreign political and business elites, and as fostering a Western rather than Islamically oriented society, become radicalized. They turn to violence convinced that they are striving (jihad literally means "striving")) to realize God's will against unbelieving, despotic rulers with their Western (especially American) allies. Their targets are Muslim rulers and political elites as well as American citizens who represent or symbolize American influence. This is the logic of Egyptian radical groups such as the Jundullah (Army of God), Takfir wa'l Hijra (Excommunication and Flight), and al-Jihad, assassins of Anwar Sadat; of Lebanon's Hizbullah

(The Party of God); and of the al-Jihad groups that are active in Lebanon, the Gulf and Indonesia. However, again I would emphasize that these radicals represent neither the majority of Muslims nor the majority of Islamic fundamentalists.

U.S. Relations with the Muslim World

The Need for Objectivity and Understanding

The Muslim world extends from Sub-Saharan Africa through Indonesia. It includes some forty Muslim majority countries and almost one billion people. In many of these countries revivalism has not taken a violent turn. Thus it is important to differentiate among the many facets of Islamic revivalism and Islamic activism: a majority of Muslims who struggle for greater self-determination in a moral and just society, versus a small minority of radical extremists seeking to impose the views of their own small group through techniques that are often more ruthless and dictatorial than those of the government they seek to overthrow.

Extremists who advocate radical forms of Islamic revivalism threaten U.S. and other Western interests both directly, through such methods as terrorist attacks against embassies and personnel, and indirectly, when they threaten pro-Western leaders in the Muslim world. For the West, these challenges are both serious and unfamiliar. The intense media coverage of such events, and their impact on public opinion, further complicate the task of American and other policy-makers. The harsh, anti-Western rhetoric which extremist groups employ to explain their terrorist actions

adds to the emotional impact of the events themselves.

A Reexamination of U.S. Policy and Attitudes

Exploring alternative approaches to U.S. policy in the Middle East would require a reexamination of the present tendency to:

1. Subordinate all Middle East policy to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

2. Be too quick to enter or intervene in disputes, such as most recently in Lebanon.

3. Subordinate arms sales to moderate Arab countries, such as Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, to Israeli interests.

4. Fail to differentiate between Islamic movements but rather to equate Islamic fundamentalism simplistically with radicalism and violence. Thus, we focus on terrorism while neglecting to devote equal energy to planning and policies which will prevent radicalization.

5. Assume that the mixing of religion and politics necessarily and inevitably leads to tyrannical government.

6. Allow the U.S. to become too closely allied with pro-Western or anti-Communist regimes regardless of how autocratic or repressive they might be as in Iran and Sudan. U.S.-Sudanese relations provide an instructive example.

The concern and criticism voiced by government officials that Sudan's introduction of Islamic law threatened human rights, while, at the same time, we continued to support Sudan's autocratic regime, seemed curious and hypocritical to

many Muslims. Thus, it was easy for Islamic revivalists and many others to believe that President Numeiri's crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in March 1985 was connected with the visit of Vice President Bush.

Difficult as the circumstances may be, the overriding need is that Western responses be as calm, analytical, and objective as possible. It is not "coddling terrorism" to try to understand the historical and psychological roots of Islamic revivalism and to be discriminating when judging Islamic movements. We do as much when we distinguish between Catholic or Jewish extremist organizations in Ireland or Israel on the one hand and mainstream religious organizations on the other. Careful diagnosis of revivalism's many facets is an essential prerequisite of an effective response. More informed analysis and policy will require greater attention to the training of our diplomats and better use of existing government agencies such as USIA Foreign Service officer's and senior government analysts need to know more about the nature and causes of Islamic fundamentalism: Who are Islamic fundamentalists? What are their aspirations and grievances? How do Islamic organizations function? This understanding can only come from knowledge about Islam and Islamic movements and increased contacts and dialogue with Islamic leaders.

Implications for U.S. Policy

(1) For the foreseeable future a radical, alienated minority will continue to engage in terrorism and subversion. However, the vast majority of Islamic revivalists will pursue

what they see as a more authentic Islamic future through the peaceful transformation of their society. For these, Islamic revivalism will often continue to take the form of modern Islamic "Call" societies, whose goals are propagating the faith and religious education among both Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as social reform organizations such as clinics, hospitals and legal aid societies. Whereas many will remain non-political, others will seek to lobby and participate in the political process. Government attempts to suppress such organizations will only encourage their radicalization.

American interests will best be served by policies that walk a fine line between selective, discreet, and low visibility cooperation with friendly Muslim governments, and a clear public policy concerning the rights of citizens to determine their future.

(2) It is usually the U.S. presence and policy in a given country or region, not a generic hatred of America, that motivates actions against American government and business interests. In Iran, America was perceived as totally associated with an oppressive regime, responsible for the restoration of the Shah to power in 1953 and for his continued rule. The very high American profile made a difficult situation appreciably worse. More recently, in Lebanon, Americans have come to be seen as collaborators with an unpopular government and with the Israelis, rather than as peacemakers--part of the problem rather than part of the

solution. American support for Anwar Sadat in his last years, and for the recently deposed Jafar Numeiri in the Sudan, provide further examples. However justifiable on other grounds, that support has been taken by Islamic critics as lending substance to the charge that we buttress unpopular and autocratic "puppet" regimes despite our democratic ideals.

It would appear important, therefore, to exercise caution and selectivity in determining which governments can best profit from our support and how we can best go about providing that support. Recognizing that special relationships with some Muslim rulers can be critical for our strategic objectives, we should also be careful not to antagonize, in the process, popular and authentically representative forces in Muslim societies. A measure of good will can be maintained with such forces through informal contacts and sympathetic understanding of their positions. Meanwhile, a high American profile can be self-defeating for all concerned.

(3) There are, of course, no-win situations. Extending arms to a pro-Western regime will be seen by some Islamic groups as an unacceptable effort to prop up a regime they oppose. Refusal to supply the same arms could be seen by others as further evidence of neo-colonialist, anti-Muslim bias. This is particularly likely to be the case in the Arab world, where U.S. policy is often perceived as one of neocolonial expansion based on massive and uncritical support of Israel.

The ability of the United States to be perceived as a friend by moderate Islamic activists is diminished when those moderates, along with more radical and hostile compatriots, see U.S. policies as tinged with neocolonialism, however inaccurate Americans may believe the charge to be. Without a perceptible shift in U.S. Middle East policy, pro-American regimes will continue to be vulnerable, and condemned as client states, especially where the U.S. maintains a major military or multinational presence or provides substantial assistance. Americans must remember that criticism of U.S. policy is often voiced by secular elites as well as Islamic movements.

Afghanistan represents a unique opportunity. Active and visible involvement by the United States in helping the mujahideen and raising the issue in international forums can earn considerable good will from Muslims throughout the world.

(4) Even if a major shift in America's Middle East policy were to take place, problems for the U.S. would persist. This is because of the perception that the U.S. constitutes the most important cultural threat to traditional Islamic life and values. Western ideas, literature, dress, music and movies have proven a seductive alternative for modern Muslim elites and youth. This threat is seen as implicit in modern legal, social and educational reforms, and symbolized by the presence of American advisers, banks and corporations. Thus, for many of the more conservative as well as the more radical Islamic activists, such American presence represents a danger to

Islam.

Modernization through the application of modern technology and science is not being rejected, but rather a competing ideology of Western ideas and values. Islamic revolutionaries, like most other Muslims, do not shun modern transportation, housing, electricity, communications, or oil technology. The problem is not radio and television, but its programming. The gap is ideological, not technological or economic. It will not be bridged by a change in policy, but its force as a divisive factor can be mitigated by sensitivity and careful handling. In particular, the United States should ordinarily take care to avoid being seen as intervening in state-initiated Islamization programs, or as opposing the activities of Islamic organizations where such programs or activities do not directly threaten important U.S. interests.

Conclusion

Islamic revivalism or fundamentalism is a reality that is very much with us and will continue to be a force in Middle East politics for the foreseeable future. Most Islamic fundamentalists will continue to emphasize greater attention to religious observances and the need to lead a more Islamic way of life. Most Islamic organizations will pursue an evolutionary approach to social change "from below" with the risk of radicalization coming from government repression. However, while not representative of the majority, radical movements will continue to operate against Muslim and Western governments and their interests. They will not lead popular

revolutions but rather aggravate and disrupt society through assassinations, bombings and kidnappings. As we formulate responses to the threat of terrorism, we can ill afford to overlook opportunities to prevent further deterioration or radicalization in our dealings with the broader segment of Muslim activism.

Mr. HAMILTON. Ambassador Eilts.

STATEMENT OF DR. HERMANN FR EILTS, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Dr. EILTS. Mr. Chairman, much of what I would have said, had I been first, has already been said by Dr. Esposito, so I will not repeat it. But there are a number of points, sir, that I should like to stress that have come up first, in your remarks, and second, in his.

First, sir, you indicated that the Moslem community of the globe today is somewhere in the neighborhood of 1 billion. That is an impressive figure, but what to me is equally impressive is that Islam today is the fastest growing monotheistic religion.

This is something we have to take into account. Something is right with Islam; it is attracting a good many people, and it is attracting a good many people in the Third World in particular.

Second, Islam is monotheistic, as Christianity and Judaism are. It is a religion of ethics, a religion of justice. It sometimes is hard to realize that when one sees the actions of the terrorists in Lebanon at the present time or the reactions of the Khomeini regime.

But the point is that the most successful Islamic leaders at present and in the past have made their reputation on the basis of dispensing justice, and that is something that I think we should never forget.

Third, sir, I am glad that you have indicated that you plan to look at this problem of Islamic fundamentalism not simply in terms of the Lebanese hijacking but in the broader sense, because it is a very important problem, one that I think all of us have a great deal to learn about. It is also a problem that many in the Middle East must learn a lot more about.

It is something that is going to be with us and that needs a lot of study. It needs a lot of study in the academic community and it needs a lot of study in the political communities.

Now, sir, Islamic fundamentalism, in my experience with it in various parts of the Middle East, has generally been the result of many things. First of all, it has been a protest movement, a protest against some real or perceived wrong in society brought about either by an internal factor, a combination of internal factors or by an external factor.

I emphasize real or perceived because in so many instances, a perception that a Moslem has, wherever he may be, because of an

event is not necessarily the perception we may have of that same event.

A protest movement flows from some kind of crisis; a moral, sociological crisis, a crisis of identity, a crisis of legitimacy, economic disparities, perceived misrule, perceived coercion, and of course perceived outside influences and what they may have to do with the wrongs that exist in the society.

The second element that Islam, and especially Islamic fundamentalists, seek to correct is the role of the Ulama, the religious leaders of the Islamic community. There has been a view for many years among many fundamentalist Moslems that the Ulama, the religious leaders, have been responsible over the centuries for perverting the true meaning of Islam.

This, incidentally, is a claim that Qadhafi makes, and, curiously enough, on this particular point, while I would have great difficulty accepting the verity of anything else that Qadhafi says, he is probably right.

The Ulama, the establishment Ulama, have over the years utilized Islam in their own interests. This is one of the protests of Islamic fundamentalism.

We should always remember in looking at Islamic fundamentalism, which we see primarily in terms of its obvious threat to the West and to the United States, that another source of dissatisfaction is with the establishment religious leaders. Almost every Islamic fundamentalism movement, be it Shi'ite or Sunni, has on its litany of things that have to be corrected doing something about the religious establishment. It may be primary or it may be a secondary objective, but it is always on that list of things that have to be done.

Fourth, I have indicated that Islamic fundamentalism tends to see external threats. I think one of the tragedies of this situation, at least to me, who has spent the better part of the last 35 years in the Middle East, is the enormous shift that has taken place during that time in Islamic attitudes, and in attitudes in the Middle East in general, toward the United States.

I can remember so well when I first went to the Middle East in 1947—even before that as a soldier, but in 1947 as an American diplomat—how positively we were received by everyone, including by Moslem leaders. In a sense, they put us too high on a pedestal. We had warts perhaps even then which were not fully recognized, as the hatred of Moslems in the Middle East was directed more toward the British and the French who had been the imperialists for a long time.

It was not surprising that with greater interface with the United States they would see us more clearly. We were no longer and are no longer seen as the champions of decolonization or self-determination as included in the 14 points of President Wilson or anything of that sort. In a sense, therefore, that diminution of image was a natural development.

We have yet another problem in dealing with Moslem fundamentalists, and, indeed, this applies to fundamentalists elsewhere. We would find the same problem, I dare say, with Jewish fundamentalists. And that is, among them, Christian, Moslem or Jewish, there is an ever present difficulty in compromising.

What we consider constructive compromise when we encounter a problem, and endeavor to find a solution based on some compromise, is often unacceptable to fundamentalists of any religion. It is seen as a betrayal of their values.

Hence, the problem we always face in dealing with issues that involve Moslem fundamentalism: We want compromise of some sort, and they want something that might be called total victory.

A fifth problem that we have with Islamic fundamentalism is one that Dr. Esposito has already alluded to, and that is their perception of the American relationship with Israel. The belief exists among Moslems, I think almost everywhere, that Israeli actions are largely the result of American encouragement. Whether that is true or not is not the issue.

Again, I stress the point that that is the perception Moslems have. The very large American economic and military aid to Israel is seen as evidence of this.

The unwillingness of the United States to stand up firmly and criticize actions of Israel that even we sometimes deem improper—for example, the taking of 700-odd people out of Lebanon. We made a very pro forma protest about this.

I dare say, sir, that had we been a little stronger in our protest on that issue, even when recognizing the problems of the Government of Israel, it might have been a bit easier to handle this hostage situation.

The idea that we have—another aspect of this same issue—that if somehow the issue of Jerusalem is resolved by allowing free access to all the holy places, including the Moslem holy places, which we think is a very reasonable idea and certainly one which the Government of Israel has been perfectly willing to accept, is not one that is acceptable to Moslem fundamentalists.

The concept of sovereignty, as we know it in international law, may not be part of Islamic law, but the understanding exists among Moslems that a foreign state and another religion now have total control over the city of Jerusalem and this is unacceptable to them. I think we should never forget that Jerusalem means as much to Moslems as it does to Jews.

In saying what I just have, I want to stress, sir, I am not arguing the rights or wrongs of our policies in the Middle East. I am simply utilizing these examples to stress that we have an uphill road to climb in dealing with the question of Islamic fundamentalism.

Another issue that fundamentalists have against us is that we are today the principal purveyors of westernized modernization. I have known no Moslem over my many years in the Middle East, sir, who does not want a better quality of life for himself and for his family.

What troubles so many Moslems, however, is the kind of modernization that is being peddled, and that we are in a sense partly responsible for, is one that in their view is ethically valueless and destroys the family bonds that exist and reduces the importance of religion. This has a negative effect, and, of course, we add to that, sir, a high public relations effort, the PR hype that is so much part of our purveying of modernization.

Again, I don't say we are right or wrong in what we do; all I am saying is that the perception exists that we purvey ethically valueless forms of modernization.

There is a view among many Moslems, and among fundamentalists, that we are patronizing in almost everything we do. And let's be honest. I have seen many instances of American patronizing in my years in the Middle East. When that kind of a charge is made, I have some sympathy for it.

Finally, in that same attitudinal area, there is a belief among Moslem fundamentalists that we are not really interested in the society that they represent or even the state that they represent, that what we simply want is support from them in the superpower confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, that we don't really care very much about them.

Now, these are perceptions. I emphasize this point.

In my former position as ambassador, I would have argued every one of them in a different way, but it is very, very difficult to engage in constructive dialog with someone who is a Moslem fundamentalist, be he a Sunni or a Shi'ite. There is a limit to how far dialog will go with such a person. Very soon you come to the line where distrust and suspicion are very obvious.

What can be done about this? What kind of positions can be taken, what kind of recommendations should be made to try to ameliorate Islamic fundamentalists' perception of us?

I have done a series of recommendations, sir, that really emphasize in one way or another the need for our Government and for the Congress of the United States to develop a better understanding of Islam.

If you think about it, I think there are few societies in the world today, political societies, that know as little about Islam as we do. If I may be absolutely candid, we are essentially ignorant about Islam. The British know more about it, have known more about it for years. The French have, so have the Germans.

Granted, these states have had contacts with Moslems over the years, a great many contacts with the Moslem world, but we have deliberately, it seems to me sometimes, turned away from it.

We separate church and state, and, unfortunately, whether one likes it or not, a separation of church and state is something that Moslems generally do not fully accept.

I will not go through the list of recommendations. They are in my written statement.

They suggest better and closer dialog with Moslem leaders by American leaders, and also that an effort be made to utilize American aid in Moslem countries on projects that would help Moslem communities.

For example, Mr. Chairman, if some of the money that we have given to Lebanon in the last year and the year before had been used in southern Lebanon for rebuilding the depressed Shi'ite villages, we might have had a better reception there than we have at the present time.

All of these things are necessary and above all, dialog must be maintained. We must keep channels of communications with Moslem religious leaders open at all times, which is something we have not always done.

If I may conclude, sir, conceptually we have three possibilities as a government to handle Islamic fundamentalism.

We can accept the situation as it is and count simply upon local governments to deal with indigenous Islamic movements and hope that they have the wisdom or the power or whatever may be needed to succeed against Moslem movements. On the other extreme, we can engage Moslem movements militarily, as was considered during the time of the Iranian hostage crisis and has been from time to time talked about more recently. Frankly, this is a choice that I think would be very unwise, because it would not solve any problem. It would not have solved the Iranian hostage crisis and I don't think it will solve anything now. Between these poles is a middle course in which we rely in the first instance upon local governments, where they are still in a position to cope with Islamic fundamentalism—I exclude Lebanon and for a different reason exclude Iran from this category of governments.

We can supplement such indigenous government efforts by engaging in dialog with leaders on what we can do to assist them in their efforts to reeducate young fundamentalists as the Egyptian authorities are trying to do. We could perhaps provide economic assistance through our aid programs to depressed Moslem communities; to provide leader grant opportunities for young Moslems to enable us and young Moslem fundamentalists—and this must be done on a state-to-state basis—to understand a little better what we are about, that we are not as Khomeini charges the uncritical purveyors of evil, the great Satan, but that we are indeed a nation that is interested in human rights, is interested in constructive economic development, and is prepared to take into account, in one fashion or another, the plight, the problems of poorer elements who are often represented by Moslem fundamentalists.

Thank you, sir.

[Dr. Eilts' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HERMANN FR EILTS, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BOSTON UNIVERSITYINTRODUCTION

Islamic resurgence, contrary to a widely held, notional view, is not monolithic in nature. Rather, it is diverse and multi-faceted. Volumes have been and are being written about it. These paragraphs can only try to synthesize a complex subject, about which we still have much to learn.

Since the Ayatollah Khomeini's dramatic assumption of power in Iran in 1979, after the departure of the Shah, and the concurrent establishment of an Iranian Islamic Republic in that country, the Western world - including the U.S. - has suddenly been faced with a religio-political phenomenon dubbed, for want of a better term, "fundamentalist Islamic resurgence." The ensuing Iranian hostage crisis, lasting well over a year, humiliated this nation, graphically demonstrated that its enormous physical power was utterly impotent to deal with such an issue, raised doubts about American reliability in the minds of many friendly leaders in the Middle East and elsewhere, and

contributed materially to the electoral defeat of an American president. It was the greatest blow to American prestige experienced in years, and no amount of rhetoric or explanation alter this salient fact.

In the Middle East, and in the larger Islamic world, the Ayatollah's success in overthrowing the Shah's regime, establishing an Islamic Republic, and defying with impunity the American behemoth, was watched with rapt attention. While states in the Middle East and elsewhere with Muslim majorities are mainly Sunni, and thus looked with some distaste upon what was perceived as a Shi'i success, Islamic fundamentalist elements everywhere and of all sects were encouraged to reassert themselves within their respective polities. They did so even as some Islamic communities deplored the excesses of the Iranian Islamic Republic and rejected its vilayet-i-faqih, or governance of the juriconsult, model of government.

In short, the success in Iran of Islam, long prostrate and perceived by many Muslims as having been in centuries-long bondage to the West, was heady and infectious for Muslims everywhere. Khomeini had shown that a determined, charismatically-led Islamic movement in the Third World, even in an age of galloping technological progress, could not only overcome a secular regime, but could effectively withstand pressures from the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

In rapid succession Islamic fundamentalist movements, with varying degrees of success, sought to assert themselves in every Muslim state from Morocco to Malaysia and the Philippines, and even the Soviet Union is concerned about its fast growing Muslim "nationalities". Nowhere - at least not thus far - has any achieved the success of Khomeini, but virtually every government of a state predominantly populated by Muslims has found it prudent to seek to propitiate the demands of its Islamic constituents. Such propitiation has generally taken the form of giving higher place to shari'ah, or Islamic law, as the basis for national legislation; proscribing or reducing alcoholic use; prescribing Islamic legal penalties for crimes and transgressions by citizens and foreigners alike, and rigidifying social and dress codes. ,

Notable among the governments that have found it prudent to do so in varying degrees are Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf principalities, Tunisia and Sudan. (The U.S. has close relations with most of these states.) True, in each of these states, there are Muslim elements concerned about what they perceive to be persistent and retrogressive governmental compromise with fundamentalists, and who urge their governments to make a stand before it is too late, but such voices have of late been only dimly heard. This is in marked contrast to the situation that obtained in the Middle East as recently as ten years ago when, with some exceptions, the views of

modernist-minded Muslims were dominant, and such fundamentalist elements as existed were regarded as virtually passé. There has indeed been a Copernican change in Islamic political dynamics in the past decade. They are revolutionary.

Americans, including many in government, were slow to recognize the intensity and purposes of militantly resurgent Islam. Weaned as most Americans have been on the concept of separation of church and state, they found it difficult to conceive of a political movement combining religion and state. To them, it was an archaic political mode, irrelevant to modern times; religio-politics seemed patently anachronistic.

Moreover, having throughout this century focused on nationalism as the guiding motif for Third World nation building, not always overly accurately, many American government officials and academics sought to interpret Islamic movements in the Middle East and elsewhere as little more than reconfigured nationalist phenomena. They were convinced that the fervor manifested in Islamic fundamentalism would soon be spent in the sea of familiar nationalist ethos. Islamic resurgence has throughout history been cyclical in nature, but has each time developed a dialectic of sorts between Islam and nationalism as a pattern for future socio-political evolution. Iran, in its current war with Iraq, is the latest case in point, even though events there have not yet run their course.

Finally, modernization theorists in this country had long dismissed religion, and especially Islam, as a factor deserving weight in their ethnocentric concept of Third World modernization and had indeed held that vestigial Islamic influences were a barrier to modernization. In the past five years, it is apparent that they have demonstrated superficial understanding of the viability of Islam in the contemporary world and decanted poor advice. Contrary to their bland assertions, Islam has shown that it is alive, well and even confrontational to those governments that have blindly accepted the need for rapid modernization and have sought to force the latter's pace at the expense of social values rooted in their Islamic cultures.

(Islam, incidentally, considers "People of the Book," i.e., Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians, as acceptable communities - under certain restrictions (see below) - but there is also a certain anti-Jewishness, today called anti-Zionism, in Islamic communities, which inevitably manifests itself in times of high Arab-Israeli tensions.)

OBJECTIVES

It follows from the above that Islamic fundamentalist movements, be they Sunni or Shi'i, are essentially protest

movements against some real or perceived governmental, societal or externally wrought wrong. This type of religiously inspired socio-political protest derives from what sociologists would call personal or collective crisis situations: personal identity, regime legitimacy, fear of cultural evanescence, military impotency in the face of internal or external threats, economic disparities and resultant class conflict, and/or real or imagined governmental coercion. Equally significant in encouraging a return to religious fundamentalism, be it Islamic, Christian or otherwise, has been the inability of individuals to cope with an increasingly frenetic, dehumanized technological society. In short, the stimuli to turn to traditional religion for personal and collective succor are diverse.

Generally speaking, Islamic fundamentalist "protest" movements are aimed at several tangible targets. Specifically:

- A) Perceived ethically valueless and frequently socially and economically disruptive Western modernization concepts.

(Note: It should be stressed that most Muslim fundamentalists, like anyone else, want a better quality of life for themselves and their families. Their constant quest, and it is a difficult one, is

for an Islamic brand of modernization, conceived and implemented by Muslims with a proper regard for Islamic values, rather than by faceless, culturally insensitive Western economic manipulators of human life, statistically oriented and disinterested in societal dislocations that their modernization theories bring about. At the lower, most constructive end of this quest for an Islamic brand of modernization are the commendable schools for the poor, dispensaries, Islamic pharmaceutical companies, Islamic insurance companies that have sprung up these past fifteen years or more in all parts of the Muslim world; at the least constructive other end of this same spectrum is the so-called Islamic bomb project.)

- B) Profound dissatisfaction with the role of the traditional 'ulama, or religious leaders, as guardians of Islamic societies.

(Note: Islamic fundamentalism exists at the establishment level, e.g., the Iranian Islamic Republic, and/or at the more popular level, e.g., the neo-ikhwan of Egypt and similar groupings elsewhere. Where it exists at a governmental level, it may still be riven by tensions based on personality and ideological differences, but it is only occasionally

challenged on grounds of having failed to fulfill Islamic responsibilities. Where it exists primarily at a popular level, it tends to consider the 'ulama as having over the centuries prostituted the real values of early Islam for their own selfish purposes and of allowing themselves to be co-opted by government, e.g., the 'ulama of al-Azhar in Egypt. The charge is not always fair, but it is flailingly levelled and widely believed. In general, there is greater respect for the 'ulama in Shi'i Islam, where with exceptions they have managed to stay in touch with the aspirations of the people and where many have a grass roots reputation for effective dispensation of justice, than there is in Sunni Islam, where the 'ulama are in many instances seen as having distanced themselves from the public and established themselves as a special class.)

- C) A reaction to real or perceived foreign, non-Muslim domination.

(Note: Prior to World War II, and for a period thereafter, it was British and French imperialism that mobilized Muslim sentiment. Since 1948, the Israeli presence has also done so and, most recently, Israeli actions in Lebanon. In the last twenty years or so,

too, the U.S., whose influence is so pervasive throughout the Middle East and which is widely perceived as the indiscriminate supporter of an aggressive Israel, has become the target of Islamic fundamentalist groupings. Hence, Khomeini's description of the U.S. as the "great satan." Equally instructive in this regard is the Iranian and Shi'i use of the term, "al-Islami al-Ameriki," or American Islam, to excoriate the Saudi Arabian regime. There can be few greater slurs levelled by Muslim fundamentalists against fellow believers.

- D) The establishment of an Islamic polity in which a more equitable distribution of wealth can take place.

(Note: Examples of this objective may be found in Iran, where at least some land distribution has taken place, and in Lebanon, where the country's Shi'i plurality has for long been the most economically depressed and politically ignored segment of the population and where it now seeks a greater share not only in political rule, but also in the economic pie.)

WHO ARE THE SO-CALLED ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS

In the case of Iran, the dominant Shi'i fundamentalist oligarchy is made up of religious leaders trained in Islamic institutions. In that country, what might be called "lay" Muslim leaders, like Bani Sadr, Bazargan, Yazdi and others, have been effectively outmaneuvered by the mullahs and forced to leave the country or stripped of all their influence.

Elsewhere, however, the makeup of Islamic fundamentalist movements is somewhat different:

In Egypt, for example, apart from one or two religiously trained, shaikly leaders, the neo-ikhwan organizations are made up largely of middle, lower middle and lower class elements. Many indeed are university graduates, and graduates of Schools of Engineering, teachers and lawyers, are particularly prominent among them. This composition is worth noting since it belies the former belief that Muslim fundamentalists came largely from the poorest, uneducated classes. Instead, they represent in many instances persons with a comparatively high level of academic training and, it must be stressed, the capacity to think for themselves. They are not simply rote followers.

In Lebanon, so many of the followers of Shi'i and Sunni leaders are young, secondary or university students, who in the course of their brief lives have known nothing but fierce communal conflict. The leaderships are either religious figures, like Shaikh Mohammad Hussein Fadl Allah, the ideologue of the Amal movement; Shaikh Sadegh Mosawi, the leader of the Islamic Amal; Husain Mosawi, the leader of Hizbullah; or university-trained secular leaders like Nabih Berri of Amal.

In Saudi Arabia, they are religious students, trained in one or another Islamic university, or recently urbanized, deeply conservative, Unitarian (Wahhabi) descendants of members of the one-time powerful ikhwan tribes.

In Bahrain and Kuwait, they are mainly Shi'is from middle and lower classes, but economically reasonably well off.

In Tunisia, they originate largely in the university student community.

We need more and better composition profiles on members of Islamic fundamentalist organizations.

It should be noted that everywhere where Islamic fundamentalist organizations have surfaced, there is a curious fluidity about them. As long as a charismatic leader exists,

e.g., a Shukri Mustapha of the Takfir al-Hijra in Egypt, a Juhayman al-Utaybi of the Salafiyah in Saudi Arabia, and others like them, there is a semblance of hierarchical discipline. Depending upon the leader's positions, there may be variant operational patterns with respect to the role of women in such organizations, unitary or collegial decision making, immediate or deferred actions, etc. Once the charismatic leader disappears, or is deemed by some of his followers to be inadequately militant, or personality differences appear, some of his followers will turn to other competitive Islamic fundamentalist organizations. They are often more in the nature of "movements" than closely-knit groups, as is graphically demonstrated by the Shi'is of southern Lebanon.

Some 200 Islamic fundamentalist groupings, many of them clandestine and cellular in structure, have been identified in the Muslim world and more seem to be cropping up. Many, such as the TWA hijackers, the abductors of Americans in Lebanon, the assassins of Sadat, call their movements Jihad. This does not necessarily mean that all belong to the same organization. The term seems to be used by a spectrum of militant Islamic fundamentalists, who may have little association with one another, largely because of its "struggle" significance in Islamic history and therefore its activist, popular appeal.

PROBLEMS POSED FOR U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENTS

Against the above background observations, one may assess what kind of challenges they pose for U.S. policy in the Middle East. These are primarily functions of how they see U.S. policy.

First, disturbingly, Islamic fundamentalist leaders and organizations, be they Sunni or Shi'i, see the U.S. as the primary threat to the region in which they live. Hence, Islamic fundamentalist militancy, where it exists, as in Lebanon and Iran, is aimed first and foremost at damaging American interests.

The reasons for this unremitting and bitter Islamic fundamentalist enmity toward the U.S. are obvious:

- a) The U.S. image in the Muslim world is today in marked contrast to the pedestal image it enjoyed at the end of World War I. Regrettably, the U.S. is no longer seen by most Middle Easterners, Muslims included, as the symbol of decolonization, self-determination, human rights, freedom, etc. Rather it is seen as the legatee of British and French imperialism, and as an interventionist element in local politics. This was

inevitable as Muslims came to know us better and more U.S. interface developed with Islamic polities and societies, but it must nevertheless be flagged as a factor.

- b) Islamic fundamentalists see issues in the absolute rather than relative terms. One must be with them or against them. Constructive compromise, such as the U.S. so often advocates, is attitudinally anathema to fundamentalist thinking. It would, in their eyes, be a betrayal of values and responsibilities. Hence, American efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions to problems, where this takes place, are negatively rather than positively received.
- c) Above all, perceived uncritical U.S. support for Israeli actions, e.g., the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Washington's pro forma protests about the Israeli abduction of Shi'i hostages from southern Lebanon when leaving that country; perceived U.S. support for what is seen as Israeli expansionist objectives, e.g., the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights; the American position on Jerusalem, which is perceived as aimed at ultimate Israeli sovereignty over the entire Holy city; arms and economic aid to Israel in ever increasing amounts, etc.

(Note: Nothing hurts us more among Muslim fundamentalists.)

- d) The U.S. is viewed as the principal current purveyor of Western modernization, including both advice and equipment;
- e) Perceived U.S. (CIA) involvement in regime coercive instruments, e.g., the Shah's SAVAK, or terrorist acts against Muslim leaders, e.g., the March 19, 1985, bombing of Shaikh Fadl Allah's home in Bir al-Abed, West Beirut, in which eighty lives were lost. We may not have been responsible, but so often our local clients are and as a result we, too, become tainted with responsibility. Drawing fine distinctions between actual perpetrators and indirect trainers is hardly consistent with Muslim fundamentalist thinking processes. Conspiracy theories and suspicions are rampant among them.
- f) Perceived American cultural insensitivity to religio-political politics and societies;

(Note: This is a persistent complaint in every Muslim state in which I have lived. With rare exceptions, we are individually and collectively full of ourselves.

We view different cultures as quaint and tend to act accordingly. With all respect, witness a group of Senators or Congressmen visiting the Middle East or elsewhere and being introduced to Islamic leaders. I have had it happen once or twice, and the encounters were rather cold and disinterested on both sides. I consider it important, however, that more members of the Congress visiting the Middle East meet Muslim dignitaries and leaders of all sorts and hear what they have to say. They can also help impart to leaders the positive purposes of U.S. foreign policy.)

- g) Perceived patronizing official and unofficial U.S. attitudes toward Islamic peoples;
- h) The pervasive official and unofficial American presence in Islamic countries. Our high profile all over the place and attendant American P.R. hype grates on Muslim societies everywhere.

(Note: The higher the American profile in an Islamic country, the more it tends to be blamed for prevailing economic and social ills. Iran was a case in point; Egypt is becoming one; in Lebanon, there is clearly an Islamic fundamentalist effort to force Americans out, even those Americans with long records of friendship

toward Arabs and Muslims, e.g., the murdered AUB president, Malcolm Kerr, the abducted AUB professors and other Americans, etc.

- i) A perception that the U.S. has no interest in the Islamic states or peoples for their own sake, but is solely interested in using them in its superpower confrontation with the Soviet Union.

(Note: Without seeking unfairly to criticize, the Reagan Administration's concept that every problem, anywhere, is Soviet-inspired, and dismissing or failing to comprehend local political, social and economic dynamics, underscores this kind of perceived myopia.)

HOW SHOULD THE U.S. GOVERNMENT COPE WITH THEM?

There is no easy answer. As indicated above, the entire thrust of U.S. policy in the Middle East has been and remains aimed at ensuring the well-being and security of Israel. There is no doubt that Israel is threatened, perhaps less so by most of the Arab states that surround it, most whom have grudgingly come to accept it, but more so by Islamic fundamentalist attitudes that go far beyond the Arab world.

Paradoxically, however, the Islamic fundamentalist communities around Israel, especially the Shi'is of southern Lebanon, do not see themselves as a threat to Israel. Rather, they see Israel as a threat to their security. The origins of such a belief are obvious. While the Shi'is of southern Lebanon initially welcomed and garlanded the incoming Israeli military forces in 1982, mainly because the latter removed the Palestinians, within a short period of time the Israeli occupation had alienated Shi'is to a point where they have in the past two years engaged in terrorist actions and have in effect forced the Israelis to withdraw from most of Lebanon because of unacceptably high attrition rates. The change of Shi'i attitude toward Israel might have come anyway - occupation forces disrupt everyday life of peoples - but, it is almost dateable to the shortsighted actions of a young Israeli tank platoon commander, who in 1983 ran his tank column through a 10th of Muharram Ashura religious procession, the most emotionally charged religious event in Shi'i Islam. The Israeli authorities certainly did not want this to happen, but it appears junior commanders had received inadequate briefings on Shi'i religio-cultural sensitivities. If Israelis received little orientation briefings, one can imagine how little American military deployed to the area receive.

The U.S. will continue to support Israel and, in the light of Israel's present weak government, it will do nothing to

press Israel to change its posture in the area. Inevitably, under such circumstances, we will remain on collision course with Islamic fundamentalists.

The hijackers who seized TWA 847 may indeed be terrorists by our rather loose definition of the term, but in their eyes they are soldiers of God, utilizing the only methods available to them to combat the overwhelming physical power of this country. This is in no way said to justify their actions, which are deplorable, but unless we begin to understand that these actions are not the mindless brutalities of traditional terrorists, but expressions of Islamic militancy designed, however shortsightedly, to bring about a change in perceived hostile American policy in the Middle East or to remove or reduce the American presence in the Islamic world. Unless we understand causes and motives, we will never truly comprehend the nature of the U.S.-Islamic struggle that is currently underway. We will continue to talk at rather than with others in trying to resolve our differences with Islamic fundamentalists. It was the late Judah Magnes who said, "Two monologues do not make a dialogue." Our problem is how to get out of essentially meaningless monologues with Muslim leaders and into true dialogues.

There have been occasional suggestions that the U.S. should disengage from the Middle East area, at least temporarily, in a

kind of "benign neglect" posture. In my experience, this kind of recommendation has come up every five years or so, especially where we seem to have encountered an impasse in what we seek to do. Unfortunately, however attractive the idea sounds, it is in my view impractical. Our interests in the area are too great, our strong support for Israel will continue, and benign neglect will only cause damage to American interests. It is an unsustainable policy, interesting in theory but not in practice.

The question has been asked, What is right and what is wrong about current U.S. policy as it relates to the Islamic world? As indicated above, the Islamic world is global in scope and, equally important, polycentric in nature. Inevitably, therefore, the U.S. must devise its policies toward Islamic states on the basis of its bilateral relationship with each of those states and on the basis of the area situation in which they are located. Thus, for example, we have no serious political problems with Malaysia or Indonesia, although we are also criticized there for our position on Jerusalem, but we have intensely serious problems with Iran, Lebanon, Libya and others.

We have no policy whatsoever, at least none that I can make out, that specifically takes into account the Islamic factor in our bilateral relations. We believe in separation of church

and state and find difficulty in comprehending religio-political modes of state conduct. As a nation, we believe in rapid modernization, and many regard Islam - and especially fundamentalist Islam - as a barrier to this objective. On the critical issue of Jerusalem, we naively believe that by espousing free access to the holy places for all religions, which Israel accepts, this should make Muslims (and Arabs) more receptive to the idea of Israeli sovereignty over the whole city. We delude ourselves if we believe that this is enough to satisfy Muslim sensitivities.

We are in fact running into a religio-political reversal of a long extant Muslim Middle East system introduced by Islam. For centuries, when Islam was dominant in the area, Jews and Christians lived as dhimmis, or protected, but second-class clients in Muslim lands. This was institutionalized under the Ottomans into millet communities in which they had their own autonomous government under their religious leaders. Now the situation is reversed. Now, in Israel, the occupied territories and in Jerusalem, it is the Israelis who claim sovereignty and Arabs and Muslims who live in millet-like communities and as second-class citizens. It is hard for any Muslim, who has for long been sustained by his past history of greatness, to accept such second-class status. To the extent that the U.S. is seen as endorsing it, even passively, we incur criticism.

Since each Islamic fundamentalist organization or movement in individual Muslim states is a product of the political environment which spawned it, each has somewhat different objectives and methods. Any commonality of objectives that exists among them is, at most, generic in nature. To the extent each represents a protest movement of sorts, rooted in the belief that a return to religiosity will somehow right existing politico-economic deficiencies, each in one form or another wants to a) overthrow existing governmental structures and replace them with some kind of an Islamic structure, b) eliminate or at least reduce Western (especially U.S.) influence in that country, c) establish socio-political modes of personal and collective conduct, including making the shari'ah the basis of all legislation and not merely relegating it to personal status matters, and d) aspires to some kind of neutralism in the superpower confrontation.

On the local scene, each such movement has what might be called micro-objectives. Thus, the Shi'ite movements of Lebanon, in addition to their current anti-Israeli posture, want a drastic redistribution of power in that multi-confessional state. Their demographic plurality status makes the long-standing National Covenant confessional division of power, with its Christian and especially Maronite predominance, no longer acceptable. To the extent that the U.S. appears to be supporting continued Maronite political and

economic dominance of Lebanon, an impression our past policies has projected, the U.S. is seen as partisan in that country's confessional struggle and is therefore suspect.

In Egypt, where neo-ikhwan organizations have multiplied in the past ten years, the U.S. is likewise viewed as the prime backer of the existing political order. The situation is magnified by the high American profile in that country and is perceived by Egyptian fundamentalists as a principal barrier to the establishment of a more just society. The American-brokered Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, which is interpreted by fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist Egyptians alike, as having in effect given Israel a free hand to invade Lebanon, incorporate the Golan, treat Jerusalem as annexed territory, attack Iraqi facilities, etc., is seen as having made the Egyptian government politically impotent to play a constructive role in Middle East affairs. The crying economic disparities that exist in Egypt, including the "conspicuous consumption" brought about as one byproduct of the infitah (open door policy), Muslim fundamentalists attribute to the U.S. and want corrected. They may have no specific plans of their own on how to do so, but they believe that the existing American supported governmental structure prevents more rapid economic progress. They are unimpressed by the billions of dollars of American aid, which Egypt has in the past ten years received, and see precious few tangible accomplishments that

would improve meaningfully the quality of their lives as having come from these monies. Inevitably, in these circumstances, the assumption exists that such monies are going into private pockets.

In Saudi Arabia, the Salafiyah fundamentalists who seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, included in their litany of protests reducing Saudi cooperation with Israel's prime partner, the U. S.; the elimination of such Western-introduced games as soccer; the cessation of alleged Saudi Arabian government coddling of its Shi'i minority, etc.

In Pakistan, Islamic fundamentalist groups want a return to more traditional Muslim modes of conduct and in 1979, quite willing to believe false Khomeini public charges of American involvement in the Mecca Grand Mosque incident, burned the American embassy in Islamabad.

In Libya, while his three Green Books hardly address the subject, Mu'ammarr Qadhafi calls for a return to a divine interpretation of the Qu'ran and the Sunnah, which he contends the 'ulama have over the centuries perverted to their own advantage. Coincidentally, Qadhafi, even though his religious training is minimal, professes to know what the divine meaning of these earliest Islamic sources of law are!

Similar situations exist elsewhere throughout the Islamic world.

Islamic resurgent movements have been a constant phenomenon in the Islamic world. There is a cyclical nature to them, causing periods of infectious militant activity to be followed by periods of relative quiescence. It has been a mistake, however, to believe, as many governmental officials and even Middle East scholars have in the past done, that a lengthy period of Islamic quiescence means the effective demise of Islam as a religio-political force. On the contrary, whatever the time interval, which may be from fifteen to twenty years, militant Islamic movements again arise, Phoenix-like, to destabilize existing Muslim polities and to challenge external friends of regimes. There are always causes to protest, and no putative target is as tempting a "whipping boy" as foreign, non-Islamic influences.

PRESENT SITUATION

The present period of Islamic militant resurgence began in the sixties and reached its high point with the Ayatollah Khomeini's successful takeover of Iran in 1979. As already indicated, that Islamic success was contagious and encouraged

other Muslim fundamentalist organizations militantly to reassert themselves. This has happened throughout the Muslim world.

In Lebanon, the rise of Shi'i fundamentalism is a prime case in point. Thirty years ago the Shi'is of southern Lebanon were effectively under the control of one of the feudal families, the Assads. It was in the seventies, prior to the Iranian Islamic Revolution, that a charismatic religious leader, of Iranian antecedents and trained in Iran, the Imam Musa Sadr, made his appearance and successfully challenged the Assad family dominated socio-political order. Sadr was subsequently apparently killed by the Libyans, but has been followed by other Shi'i religious and lay leaders. His movement has been fractured, however, and would-be Shi'i leaders of south Lebanon currently vie with each other in proclaiming greater extremism in order to lay claim to leadership of the Shi'i movement.

In Egypt, after the assassination of Sadat by members of one of the numerous fundamentalist neo-ikhwan organizations, Jihad, the government found itself in a struggle with Islamic elements in the country. Through a combination of partial propitiation, re-education and selective force, it has managed to contain Islamic fundamentalist organizations. Considerable concern exists among the Egyptian populace, however, that

militant Egyptian fundamentalists will at some point again burst forth through assassinations and demonstrations. One sees more evidence than ever on Egyptian university campuses of the prevalence of Islamic fundamentalist influence on students and faculty alike.

Saudi Arabia has for long prided itself on being the guardian not only of the holy places of Islam, Mecca and Medina, but of orthodox Sunni fundamentalism (some call it Wahhabism). Yet, the Grand Mosque incident graphically demonstrated that there are Saudi Muslims who do not feel the Saudi state structure is sufficiently Islamic in nature. While the attack on the Grand Mosque was eventually brought to an end by the Saudi armed forces, the effect of the incident has been obvious. Despite earlier promises of King Fahd for an opening up of Saudi society, one sees evidence of social retrogression. These likewise represent propitiation of the 'ulama and take the form of giving the despised religious police more authority, renewed removal of women (even foreign women) from employment in the Kingdom, etc. None of the long-promised reforms have yet been forthcoming, doubtless in part due to concern over negative indigenous 'ulama reaction and over Khomeini's insidious propaganda that kingship is illegal in Islam.

In Pakistan, the government of President Zia has been forced repeatedly to compromise with local Muslim fundamentalists, even though sectarian clashes regularly take place between Sunni and Shi'i community members.

In the Sudan, former President Numeiri had to do the same and went so far as to execute a more reformist-minded Muslim leader. Numeiri's recent ouster, some argue, was the result of the totality of his policies, including endorsement of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and the successor regime shows every sign that it is not prepared to alter its predecessor's propitiatory policies toward Muslim fundamentalists.

In short, while some of the initial steam behind Islamic fundamentalism, catalyzed by the Iranian Islamic Revolution, may have somewhat subsided, it remains throughout the Muslim world a religio-political force to be reckoned with.

Islamic fundamentalism will not, in my judgment, simply go away. On the contrary, the combination of socio-economic disparities throughout the Muslim world, perceived governmental misrule, the long-stagnant Middle East peace process, Israel's actions with respect to its neighbors, and real or imagined American support for Israel, are likely to keep Islamic militancy alive for some time. It is deeply worrisome, but we

have to reckon with more hijackings of American aircraft, more abductions and killings of American citizens, etc., in the period ahead.

FUNDAMENTALISTS AND MODERNISTS

To be sure, there has been throughout Islamic history a struggle between Muslim fundamentalists and Muslim modernists. The fundamentalists wish to revive some kind of pristine-type of Islamic society and believe that the sources of Muslim law - the Qu'ran, the Sunnah, ijma (concensus), qiyas (analogy), and the ijtihad (independent reasoning) - where this is allowed - are adequate to meet the demands of the twentieth century.

The modernists, in contrast, believe that most of these Islamic sources of law are products of the seventh and eighth centuries and therefore inadequate to meet the requirements of changing twentieth century societies. Ijtihad, or independent reasoning, they believe, should be increasingly utilized to assure needed flexibility to meet new situations. In periods of Islamic quiescence, modernist theories tend to hold sway (see Fazlur Rahman's Islam). During such periods, leaders of Islamic political states tend to work for a de facto separation of church and state and seek to relegate shari'ah to personal status questions. (Sadat, for example, publicly called for

this.) During periods of Islamic resurgence, on the other hand, the pendulum swings the other way. For the past six years or so, Islamic modernists, who continue to exist, have been out of fashion in much of the Muslim world. Instead, militant Islamic resurgence has been the primary socio-political force.

ISLAMIC STATES EFFORTS TO COPE WITH FUNDAMENTALISM

It is difficult to say which Muslim countries are coping well or poorly with fundamentalist movements.

Clearly, Iran is in the grip of one, although the available evidence suggests that considerable maneuvering is taking place among Iranian mullahdom as to how the immediate post-Khomeini period will be structured.

In Saudi Arabia, with its emphasis on being a fundamentalist state, there have been no significant Salafiyah anti-government demonstrations since 1979, and the Iranian-inspired Shi'i movements in the Eastern province seem to be under control.

In Lebanon, Shi'i militancy is strong, but that benighted country is, tragically, in total chaos anyway.

In Egypt, the government believes it has the fundamentalists under control, is engaged in a program of re-educating young fundamentalists, seeks to bring Islamic fundamentalists into the political process, has co-opted the leadership of the old Muslim Brotherhood organization and has generally kept things quiet since Sadat's assassination. As indicated above, however, there is some public concern that Islamic fundamentalist organizations may simply be biding their time.

In Kuwait, where the American embassy and American firms were bombed by Iranian-inspired fundamentalists, and where prison and death sentences were meted out by the courts to perpetrators, the guilty remain imprisoned, but death sentences have not been carried out. This has led to an Iranian-inspired hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner, with killing of two Americans aboard, and the abortive assassination attempt against the ruler of Kuwait, all intended to obtain the release of the sentenced perpetrators, but thus far they continue to be held. Sooner or later, the Kuwaiti government will release all or most of them.

In Libya, Qadhafi inspires his brand of fundamentalism, a dual challenge to the U.S. and to the establishment 'ulama, and clearly controls it.

Islamic fundamentalism is also growing in Algeria and Tunisia, but for the moment remains manageable. Once Habib Bourguiba dies, however, it is likely the Islamic fundamentalists in Tunisia will have a higher profile.

In Syria, the minority Alawite government of Hafiz al-Assad has brutally crushed the Sunni Islamic movement, through the destruction of much of the city of Hama, executions, arrests, imprisonments, etc. For the moment, a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist threat does not seem to exist in Syria, although many of the leaders have fled to Jordan. They will eventually return and resume anti-government activities.

In Jordan, thanks in part to King Hussein, the Islamic fundamentalist movement seems for now to be under control.

In Pakistan, President Zia is under constant pressure from Muslim fundamentalists and has had to propitiate them by reinstating shari'ah penalties.

In Iraq, which has an Islamic sectarian split between Sunnis and Shiis as well as an ethnic split between Arabs and Kurds, the Ba'ath party regime of Saddam Hussein and his predecessors has sought to secularize the state. Shi'i discontent has long manifested itself against the Baghdad authorities, and a clandestine Shi'i organization, al-Dawa, has

on occasion engaged in anti-government sabotage and assassination attempts. The Iraq-Iran war, which the Iranians believed would mobilize Iraqi Shi'is against the Baghdad authorities, has done so only in limited fashion. Secular though the Baghdad government is, it has sought to win the support of Iraq's Shi'i majority through a combination of police coercion, visible investments in improving the Shi'i holy shrines of Najaf and Karbala, and ethnic appeal - Arabs against Iranians. While subversive Shi'i elements continue to exist in southern Iraq, the Ba'ath government's aforementioned three-pronged policy seems to have had some effect.

In Turkey, which has since Ataturk's day proclaimed itself to be laic and has in the past disestablished Islam, the last decade and a half - i.e., from before Khomeini's prominence - has witnessed a steady re-emergence of popular support for Islam. Successive Turkish governments quietly reinstated Islam in the school curriculum, re-established Islamic primary schools and 'ulama training colleges, rehabilitated old and built new mosques, etc. Political groupings, especially the so-called "Grey Wolves," based on Islamic values, have in recent years reappeared. Some have had their origins among Turkish "Gastarbeiter" abroad, who have reintroduced them into Turkey itself. There have been incidents of Islamic-inspired terrorism in Turkey. An Islamically-oriented Turkish president, who heads an Islamic party, is now in charge.

In Afghanistan, where for the past six years a series of Islamic resistance groups have fought Soviet military invaders and the Soviet supported Afghan government, American attitudes are somewhat different. There, the various Islamic resistance groups, Sunni and Shi'i, despite their bitter internecine feuding, which has limited the effectiveness of their composite military capability, have been widely lauded by official and unofficial Americans for their struggle against "atheistic communists" and have even received covert U.S. and other support. To be perfectly candid, the only difference between the Afghan Islamic resistance groups is that they see the Soviets as the primary threat, while, as pointed out elsewhere in this testimony, all too many Islamic groups elsewhere in the Middle East see the U.S. in that role. Regrettably, but not unpredictably, the Afghan Islamic resistance movements have in many instances engaged as much in armed conflict among themselves - caused by sectarian, ethnic, tribal or leadership personality differences - as they have against the Soviet and Afghan government forces. In Hazarajar, the primary Shi'i area of central Afghanistan, the Shi'i resistance movement is sharply divided between pro-Khomeini and anti-Khomeini elements, who regularly engage in bloody combat between themselves.

In Bahrain, which has a mixed Arab and Iranian Shi'i majority and a Sunni ruling family, there exist overt and

covert Sunni and Shi'i organizations. The Iranian Islamic Revolution has sought to instigate the Shi'is to revolt, and a coup attempt was barely prevented some two years ago. The Bahrain government appears to have the situation under control, through a combination of British-supervised police surveillance and generous subsidies given by the ruler of Bahrain to both Sunni and Shi'i groupings. Concern exists, however, that at some point in the future a new Iranian-inspired coup attempt will be made.

In the USSR, whose multi-ethnic Muslim population is rapidly growing and may by the end of this century become a statistical majority, the position of Islam is somewhat amorphous. Despite long-standing Soviet government efforts to suppress and discourage religious beliefs, and persistent efforts to indoctrinate Muslims in communism and co-opt them in provincial government affairs, Islam, along with ethnic identity, has remained for many a point of communal identity, even if not religious belief. There has been considerable speculation in the West about alleged Soviet concerns over a putative spillover effect of Khomeini's Islamic Revolution on their own Muslim population, but there is little evidence to date to support such a contention. In the past decade, the Soviets have, in sharply limited fashion, sought to create a type of "official" Islamic system through the re-establishment of a number of religious training institutions, rehabilitation

of a small number of mosques, allowing some Muslims to make the annual pilgrimage to Mecca each year, etc., thereby obviously hoping to be able to maintain better surveillance and control over the Muslim community. In fact, over the years, the sufi, i.e., mystical, orders in the Soviet Union, many of them operating underground but not as subversive organizations, have reportedly drawn many members. Because of their secret nature, the Soviet authorities suspect these sufi orders, but have probably penetrated them. It should also be noted that, despite obviously rapid demographic growth of the Soviet Union's Muslim community, it is divided ethnically, geographically and ideologically.

There is evidence of growing Islamic fundamentalism in parts of Indonesia, although the territorial fragmentation of that huge state makes it difficult for Islamic fundamentalists to mobilize.

In the Philippines, Islamic groups, supported by Libya, are in open revolt against the central government.

THOUGHTS ON DEALING WITH THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST ISSUE

To reiterate, there is no easy way for the U.S. to deal with Islamic fundamentalists. In saying that, I am assuming

that there will be no significant change in total U.S. support for Israel. That situation, coupled with the pervasive American presence in large parts of the Muslim world, will continue to make us the primary external target of Islamic fundamentalist militancy. Nevertheless, even if this type situation exists, there are a number of things that can be done at least to mitigate the problems that we face with Islamic fundamentalists. Specifically:

- 1) We - and especially our government officials - must learn to comprehend better what is involved in Islamic fundamentalism than has been the case in the past. I know of no one in the White House, for example, who really knows anything about Islamic fundamentalism. The same is true in most senior circles of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, CIA and elsewhere. There are knowledgeable people on Islamic fundamentalist movements in the U.S. government bureaucracy, but they have rarely been called upon for advice. Instead, issues involving Islamic fundamentalism have been handled on a policy level by essentially uninformed and superficial individuals on Islamic dynamics. That is the road to confrontations of the type tht we have experienced in the TWA hijacking incident. That incident, disgraceful as it is, regrettably has its origins in

the respective Israeli and American misadventures in Lebanon and the interconnection between the two. One wishes that the expertise of the knowledgeable bureaucracy at home and abroad - and we have excellent Middle East specialists - were more regularly heard and heeded in policy formulation.

- 2) Our diplomatic missions abroad need to be instructed to maintain closer and constant liaison with Islamic fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist leaders. Granted, this is easier said than done. There are obstacles, including a) very often local government's frown upon such American official contacts with Islamic leaders lest they add stature to those leaders in the public eye, b) American officials are suspect and there tends to be a distinct limit to the extent to which dialogue can be carried on by most American officials with Islamic leaders, and c) too many of our diplomatic officers abroad lack strong grounding in Islamic matters, hence they do not usually know the right questions to ask or how to interpret what are often elliptical answers. Despite these difficulties, dialogue with Islamic leaders abroad needs be actively encouraged.

It was shortsighted, for example, for the current NSC advisor to instruct a previous American ambassador in Lebanon to discontinue dialogue with the leader of the Druzes. The NSC Advisor has himself, these past few days, been in direct touch with Nabih Berri, one of the leaders of the Lebanese Shi'i Amal movement, which makes good sense if his dialogue did not simply take the form of an ultimatum. More and better dialogue with Islamic leaders throughout the world is essential. Channels of communication must constantly be kept open with them, and not only in crises situations.

- 3) Where possible, the American official and unofficial profile in Islamic countries should be lowered. It was far too high in Iran, which contributed to the Shah's downfall. It is, in my judgment, far too high in Egypt, where it will eventually be a source of embarrassment to the regime. It was far too high in Lebanon, prior to the outbreak of civil war there. A high American official and unofficial profile is generally perceived by Islamic fundamentalists as evidence of U.S. control over local governments. On a socio-economic level, because Americans inevitably take large numbers of scarce available housing, indigenious, poor Muslims see Americans as living "high

on the hog" - the term may not be appropriate in Muslim society, but it graphically makes the point. All of these reactions breed anti-Americanism.

- 4) Better USIS efforts in Muslim countries need be undertaken. For example, Islamic leaders should be included among target audiences. More young and middle age Islamic leaders should be included in leader grantee programs in order to give them a chance to learn first-hand something about the U.S., etc. Granted, this will be an uphill effort, but it is clearly desirable. There should also be better publicity for public-oriented U.S. AID projects. Many Muslim societies generally do not understand our positive purposes.

- 5) More emphasis should be placed upon language training. For many Muslim figures, their own language is the only one in which they can communicate. An interpreter is never a good instrument of dialogue. To language training should be added cultural, religious training on Islam. The present policy of assuming that any political or economic officer, regardless of where he has served or of his language abilities, can be sent anywhere is disastrous. It contributes materially to Washington's

general ignorance of Islamic matters and to superficial political analysis. In my personal experience, those officers who spoke Arabic, Farsi or Urdu, who had studied the Islamic culture, and who had spent long years in the Middle East, submitted the most incisive reports on the Islamic resurgence phenomenon. Both the State Department and CIA should appropriately alter their present poor assignment policies, which do not encourage incisive, well-informed reporting on indigenous developments.

- 6) In crisis situations involving Islamic groups, and when emotions are understandably high, our senior officials would be well advised to avoid empty, tough rhetoric about retaliation, this or that community becoming global outcasts, etc. Such customarily idle rhetoric does not frighten any Islamic fundamentalists. Rather it only makes such rhetoricians and the nation look impotent. Our government must recognize very clearly that the inability effectively to project American power in certain local situations, viz, the abortive Tabes rescue mission in Iran, President Reagan's Lebanese fiasco, the current TWA hijacking, has not gone unnoticed. Fundamentalists, who are in any case sustained by their faith in God and many of whom are

prepared to sacrifice their lives, believe this country is a paper tiger. Frustrating though such incidents invariably are, low rhetoric profiles and patient dialogue with all parties concerned (there is no point quibbling whether dialogue is or is not negotiation) should be the order of the day. Threats have never caused fundamentalists to give way. Rather, they have made them more adamant in their demands.

- 7) We should do a better job in Muslim countries receiving American economic aid in producing short-term projects that demonstrably help the poorer elements of that country. We need fewer studies and more performance in our AID programs.

- 8) A revived Middle East peace process, one in which the U.S. government projects itself as an even-handed partner, would help enormously in improving the American image among Middle Eastern Muslims. Pressing Hussein into direct talks with Israel will simply spell his earlier rather than later demise and will antagonize Islamic elements in Jordan and elsewhere. Unquestionably, the U.S. is committed to the well-being and security of Israel, but this should not prevent any American government from playing an

"honest broker" role. A greater willingness to criticize blatantly illegal actions, not only those of Arabs but equally illegal Israeli seizure and abduction of 700 south Lebanese Shi'i hostages, would help our image materially in the Islamic world. Had we been more forceful on that subject, we might not have had the TWA hijacking and all the grief associated with it.

- 9) We must develop new modes of diplomacy, potentially involving Islamic leaders, for possible use in crises situations. During the Carter Administration, efforts were made by President Carter to persuade estimable Islamic leaders, respected by Khomeini, to intercede with the Ayatollah for the release of the hostages. It did not work because no Islamic leader could be found with the stature to confront Khomeini on an Islamic level or a willingness to stick his neck out for the U.S. But this type of contingency, i.e., soliciting intercession on an Islamic level, should be kept in mind and planned for well in advance. Hence, the already mentioned desirability of sustaining close and constant dialogue with senior Islamic figures everywhere.

MAJOR ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST ACTS SINCE 1982

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, gentlemen. You both demonstrate your expertise.

The Chair would like to submit for the record, if there is no objection, a list of the major attacks of Islamic Jihad and other radical Islamic groups since the middle of 1982.

Mr. HAMILTON. If there is no objection, that will be made a part of the record at this point.¹

Mr. REID. Mr. Chairman, how many are in number?

Mr. HAMILTON. I am going to read off a few of them, but they make up about 4½ pages.

Mr. REID. Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. July 1982, the kidnaping of David Dodge, acting president of the American University of Beirut.

March 1983, a hand grenade thrown at the U.S. Marine patrol in Beirut, five persons wounded.

April 1983, a car bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, 63 dead, including 17 Americans.

October 1983, suicide bombing of United States and French military headquarters, 241 U.S. servicemen killed.

January 1984, murder of Malcolm Kerr, president of American University of Beirut.

March 1984, kidnaping of Jeremy Levin, American reporter.

March 1984, the kidnaping of William Buckley, political officer at the U.S. Embassy.

May 1984, the kidnaping of Benjamin Weir, American missionary.

September 1984, car bombing of U.S. Embassy in Beirut, 23 killed, including two Americans.

December 1984, presumed kidnaping of Peter Kilburn, American librarian at the American University of Beirut.

December 1984, hijacking of Kuwaiti plane to Teheran, two Americans killed.

January 1985, kidnaping of Father Jenco, head of Catholic Relief Services in Beirut.

March 1985, kidnaping of Terry Anderson, an American AP correspondent.

May 1985, kidnaping of David Jacobsen, American director of the American University of Beirut Hospital.

June 1985, kidnaping of Thomas Sutherland, American professor at the American University of Beirut.

June 1985, hijacking of TWA airliner in Athens, one American killed and others hostage today.

REASONS FOR THE TERRORIST ACTS

Now, looking over that dismal record, you have to ask yourself the question what did we do since the middle of 1982 to get ourselves into this predicament? Why are these attacks coming against Americans now? Will they continue? What do you do to get out of this mess?

¹ See app. 1.

You have been trying to address this in your statements and you have done an effective job, but I would like you to answer directly the question. What is it that got us into this predicament? Why, since the middle of 1982 have we had all these attacks, and what do we do about them?

Dr. EILTS. Are you asking me, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. HAMILTON. I am asking both of you.

Dr. EILTS. Mr. Chairman, in my judgment, there are two elements that you have to take into account and the 1982 date is a little bit arbitrary, but I understand the reason why you are using it.

One—and this first element must never be forgotten, particularly in Shi'ite communities such as those in southern Lebanon and West Beirut is the infectious effect of the Khomeini revolution, the Iranian Islamic revolution, the ability to stand up to the United States. This has encouraged Shi'ite Moslems, especially fundamentalist Moslems everywhere, including in Lebanon.

One of the things that troubles me so deeply, sir, is that the targets that have been chosen by the people to whom you have just alluded, Malcolm Kerr, David Dodge, people like that, are all Americans who have spent years and years in the Middle East and have been regarded in the Arab-Israeli context as friends of the Arabs. Yet this was not enough to prevent them being targets. They were targets because they were Americans and clearly the radicalized Shi'ite fundamentalist movements of Lebanon are determined to get Americans out. These were part of the terror tactics.

The second point that I would suggest, and here I would agree with the 1982 date, is that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon at that time, whatever its justification, has produced a traumatic change, indeed a Copernican change in the whole Middle East situation and this includes the Islamic situation in the Middle East: By that I mean:

First, it brought Lebanon into the conflict as an active participant. Up to that time, Lebanon had never been an active participant. To be sure, it was in a formal state of war, but I cannot tell you how many times I crossed the border at Naqurah with everybody laughing about the ease with which this could be done.

Now, tragically Lebanon has an active part of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Second, it was not long before the very people of southern Lebanon who so warmly welcomed and garlanded the invading Israeli troops, because they were removing the Palestinians, came to be regarded as a threat, a serious threat to the Shi'ite population. The Shi'ites have turned against them for all kinds of reasons. Occupational forces, in my experience with them, tend to become arrogant with the best will in the world. That is not necessarily the purpose of their leadership, but they tend to become arrogant. They are bored; boredom in occupation forces increasingly creates incidents all over the place.

I, sir—and I have put this in my testimony—date the beginning of the turning away of the Shi'ites of southern Lebanon from Israel to that very unfortunate action of a junior Israeli tank commander running a tank column through a Shi'ite Ashura procession. I am

sure he didn't have a clue what an Ashura procession is. It is the most sacred, holy religious ceremony in Shi'ite Islam.

We had an American vice consul shot in Iran years ago because he took a picture of one of those processions. Here we had a tank column running through such a religious procession. I know it was not the intention of the Israeli authorities, but unfortunately it is part of this occupation mentality that develops.

I think you can almost date that turnaway of the southern Lebanese Shi'ites from Israel to that regrettable incident.

You may ask what about us? How do we get associated with that?

I have suggested before, and so has Dr. Esposito, that whatever Israel does in Lebanon—including the invasion of Lebanon—whatever Israel does elsewhere in the Middle East, whether we approve of it or not, we tend to be blamed for the action and are tainted with it. Hence, the whole Arab and Moslem concept that Israel is an alien, American supported bastion in the Middle East.

What does one do about this? It is always hard to do something about the horse when the horse is already out of the barn.

But I would myself suggest that the next time Israeli actions against Lebanon are planned, unless there is very strong justification for such military actions, that the United States express its views more clearly, more forcefully opposing them.

The impression persists among friends and foes in the Middle East that the United States encouraged that Israeli invasion. The invasion was politically foolish. I think most of the Israeli body politic today rues that it took place.

But one can't pull out of a tar baby situation that easily. They are in it and we are in it, unfortunately. I would argue for more forceful public postures opposing Israel's military actions that are also likely to hurt our interests in the area.

There isn't very much you can do about this one. I guess I would also say that a little more forceful American, public statements about what I understand to be our view that the holding of the 700 Shi'ites taken from Lebanon is illegal. That would help a great deal, too.

Such a problem would, in my view, have helped us in connection with the current hostage crisis.

But we have to let the present hijacking situation die down. We have to, it seems to me, allow the President to play it as best he can. We all certainly wish him well in that.

When it is over, however, and at some time it is going to be over, it seems to me that we will have the choice of some kind of retaliation, which is indeed perhaps what some of the American public would want; or a more constructive approach along the lines that I have suggested.

Let's analyze more than we have up to now what the causes of prevailing anti-Americanism among many Moslem fundamentalists are. Can they be corrected through the application of some economic aid to parts of Lebanon or elsewhere where depressed Moslem fundamentalist societies exist?

Mr. HAMILTON. Dr. Esposito.

Dr. ESPOSITO. I agree with what Professor Eilts has said. I would like to emphasize two points perhaps. I think, No. 1, by 1982, the

message should have been clear, the message was until you get out, we will continue to hit American interests.

We may disagree with that message, but it was clearly there. We are and continue to be seen as supporting an unpopular Christian-dominated government in Lebanon which it is believed has not moved as effectively as it could to redress the Moslem ills and grievances within Lebanon, and the United States because it does aid Lebanon is seen as being in a position if it wished, if it so wished, to push the Lebanese Government a bit more.

One of the questions that gets raised to me by many is what did the United States do or say about the Israeli invasion of Lebanon; the occupation of the south; arrest of the 700 Shi'ites?

How strong are we willing to be when we disagree with those policies? This, again, dovetails with other areas of the Moslem world that cannot be pursued here, such as our response to the Israeli West Bank policy.

The belief of many activists is that if you are not going to stay out—and you ought to stay out and not use us as pawns in your United States-Soviet struggle—if you are not going to stay out, and if you are going to insist on giving substantial aid to governments such as the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel, then we expect when you see wrongs that you could have a lot more influence to stop these than you in fact seem to exercise.

I think Americans have so come to understand and sympathize with Israel's plight that we are very often loath to accuse Israel in the same way as we accuse Arabs, of overstepping boundaries, of invading, of occupying, of violating people's rights. We certainly don't do it in the same condemnatory way.

Finally, in terms of what to do, I think that it would be helpful where in fact, there are clear cases of violations for us to speak out forcefully with regard to both sides, if you will, whether it is the Israeli side or Moslem interests.

But, second, and I would really want to emphasize this, more attention must be given to policy planning, and to the training of analysts. I have great respect for members of the Foreign Service.

I have known many of them. I have been happy to be involved in training programs for them. But due to budgetary reasons, I find their training programs wholly inadequate. I have seen enough situations and even been asked questions by members in the State Department, questions that I think should easily have been answered in-house and which clearly indicated that we just didn't have or don't have the perspective that we ought to have in planning our policies and in making recommendations.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Lantos?

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

POLICYMAKERS' UNDERSTANDING OF ISLAM

I am rarely at a loss in questioning witnesses, but this time, I am because while there are a number of useful and historically accurate and analytical objective statements, there were some portions of the testimony which I can only describe as mind-boggling. So, let me deal with those.

My questions really go basically to you, Mr. Eilts. On page 37 of your testimony, you say:

Issues involving Islamic fundamentalism have been handled on a policy level by essentially uninformed and superficial individuals.

That is the road to confrontations of the type that we have experienced in the TWA hijacking incident.

Well, at the policy level, the people who have handled this incident have been the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser. I find it incomprehensible that a former Foreign Service officer who knows that Secretaries of State and National Security Advisers depend on their large and experienced staffs, that these should be labeled by a former American Ambassador as uninformed and superficial individuals.

To be specific, are you referring to Secretary Shultz as uninformed and superficial because this committee was advised that this issue was handled by the Secretary himself, as well as by Mr. McFarlane.

Dr. EILTS. Sir, I am not referring to any individual Secretary of State or National Security Adviser.

Mr. LANTOS. If you forgive me interrupting you, let me read your own statement to you, because you made a statement at a congressional hearing, you are a very intelligent, very well-educated person with great experience, you will have to answer that question which is asked of you, concerning your own statements.

I repeat your testimony:

Issues involving Islamic fundamentalism have been handled on a policy level by essentially uninformed and superficial individuals.

That is the road to confrontations of the type that we have experienced in the TWA hijacking incident.

Dr. EILTS. Yes.

Mr. Lantos, I am very happy to answer that. Let me be clear on that. I speak from my own years of experience. I know how much and how little that exists—knowledge that exists in the bureaucracy goes up and is fully digested.

I know, too, from my own experience involving fundamentalist issues elsewhere the difficulty that I have had, and that my colleagues over the years have had, in trying to get persons at a higher level to understand, for example, a hijacking issue or a hostage issue in Iran in terms other than—may I finish, sir?

Mr. LANTOS. Let's deal with the current issue. Don't talk about the past. The American people are concerned with what is happening now on the ground in Beirut. As I read your testimony, instead of blaming the hijackers, instead of blaming these hoodlums and criminals who killed in cold blood an American, young American, and threw his body out on the tarmac, instead of blaming them, you are talking about superficial and uninformed people at the policy level.

That is the issue I want you to address.

Dr. EILTS. Sir, I wrote this testimony before the TWA hijacking in the context of this committee working on fundamentalism in general, and—

Mr. LANTOS. That is incomprehensible. You are referring to the TWA hijacking.

Dr. EILTS. I did do that indeed, because I continued to alter this until this morning, as a matter of fact. I, like you, find the actions of the hijackers absolutely reprehensible. I most certainly do.

And I would add to that, sir, since I myself have been the victim of an attempted terrorist action, I have great sympathy for those who have to work with this kind of situation.

What I am saying, sir, is when it comes to an issue such as Islam, if we can for a moment remove the hijacking thing from it, Islamic fundamentalism, which has been around before this hijacking thing, it is extraordinarily difficult to get people at higher levels of government to focus on it.

They don't have the time. The whole issue of religion as a factor in politics is not one that plays a very prominent part in our thinking; it never has, and that was the context, sir, in which that statement was made.

Mr. LANTOS. Let me pursue the context.

Dr. EILTS. Please.

Mr. LANTOS. Who were these essentially uninformed and superficial individuals at the policy level in the last 15 years who have dealt with these issues?

Dr. EILTS. Among those that I have known over the years, I have yet to find an American President, or Secretary of State—

Mr. LANTOS. Or National Security Advisor.

Dr. EILTS. Or National Security Advisor, I am speaking with people with whom I have worked more closely, who had any clear knowledge of Islam and what it meant.

Mr. LANTOS. They are all uninformed and superficial.

Dr. EILTS. On Islam, yes, sir. On Islam, yes.

Mr. LANTOS. One more question, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

You made the point, Dr. Eilts, and I agree with that point, that a number of distinguished American citizens who were either kidnaped or are still being held by various terrorist groups in Lebanon, and a number who were assassinated were viewed by consensus as friends of the Arabs and who in fact gave their whole professional lives to advancing the educational and health and other needs of the people in the community, such as the President of the American University at Beirut, Lebanon.

I know that institution very well. I was once asked to be President of that institution.

Also, directors of the University Medical School at the American University. And I suspect that one would need to conclude from the brutal kidnaping and assassination of these marvelous human beings who have dedicated their lives and in some instances gave their lives to improve the conditions of the people in the area, that we are dealing with an irrational, illogical, blind, vicious hatred which clearly can be dealt with only with effective superior force, just as in the case of the persecution of the Bahais in Iran. This persecution has been fully documented, large numbers of innocent children and women and men were assassinated in cold blood by Khomeini's henchmen.

They represented no threat to those societies. They represented no imperialism, capitalism, any of the phrases you used in the early part of your presentation. They were merely innocent victims of a mindless radicalism run amok.

To place the blame on us and our democratic friends for what is happening in this area is to me sort of taking the "blame America first" philosophy that I find totally repugnant to its ultimate extreme.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Reid?

Mr. REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

IMPACT OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI

We hear a great deal about the influence of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who is a Shi'ite leader, and the Iranian revolution that he is responsible for. What impact is he making or has he made to stimulate this Islamic political sentiment outside of Iran?

What influence has he had outside of Iran? Either of you.

Dr. ESPOSITO. To begin with, he clearly has an influence on Lebanon. Let me say this: shortly after the Iranian revolution, Khomeini's prestige and influence were far more extensive in the Moslem world than are now in Lebanon and in the gulf. On the other hand, the example of some of the things he has done in the name of Islam has tended to alienate other Islamic activists in the Moslem world who, while they themselves might still look to Iran as an example of "a successful Islamic revolution," are very leery of Iran's kind of clerical state and some of the excesses that they have seen.

I think the difficult thing in this area is, to in fact measure how influential Khomeini is. What I mean is if you want to get the attention of people in government or the media, mention Khomeini and exporting of the revolution.

Yet I think that one of the problems that we do have is not only that government analysts but also in general political analysts don't really have enough data to go beyond generalization. I would caution the committee as you go through your hearings to keep that in mind.

Dr. REID. Dr. Eilts.

Dr. EILTS. Sir, in my experience it has had a number of effects. First of all, there is a negative effect because while Khomeini seeks to project his Islamic success in Iran as an Islamic revolution, it is seen in many parts of the Moslem world that are Sunni, and the Sunni part of the Moslem world is by far the greater in terms of numbers, as a Shi'ite revolution and a heretical revolution. Hence there is a sense of uneasiness in many Sunni quarters, Sunni Islamic quarters, about it.

Second, as Dr. Esposito has already pointed out, Iran has embarked on a policy of revolution for export. It has done this in a number of ways. It has done this through agents, it has done this through financing of dissident movements elsewhere; it has done this by sending pilgrims to Mecca with posters, which are passed out and it has done this through language broadcasts. The whole objective has been to encourage those protest fundamentalist movements in whatever the country happens to be the target of the process.

In some cases, they have been successful, there have been Shi'ite demonstrations in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia some years

ago. They were not strong enough, as far as numbers were concerned, that they were a serious threat, but they were located in the oil areas and that made them worrisome.

A more insidious threat, sir, is the doctrine that Khomeini peddles that kingship is illegal in Islam. That was not his original idea in his first series of lectures. But he has since come around to a view that kingship is illegal.

By peddling that kind of a doctrine to antimonarchical elements in any Islamic country that is monarchical, he is in effect giving ammunition to those antigovernment forces on the grounds that kingship is not Islamically valid.

Mr. REID. That is interesting.

MOSLEMS IN THE SOVIET UNION

Tell me, gentlemen, what effect, if any, has the Ayatollah Khomeini had on the Moslems that live in the Soviet Union, which is a large number and the most rapidly growing part of their society.

Dr. EILTS. I can only give you my impression, sir.

It is very difficult to come to a good judgment. There has been a general view that the Soviet Union, the Soviet authorities are worried about the likely spillover effect of the Islamic type of fundamentalism that has come out of Iran onto their Moslem populations. There may indeed be some worry on that score.

But I must say on the basis of my own investigation and on the basis of my own observations in the last couple of years, I don't really see very much evidence of a spillover effect.

The Soviet Moslems are feeling their oats. There is no question about that. You see it everywhere you go.

Mr. REID. Why do you say that?

Dr. EILTS. Because demographically they have the largest birth rate and by the year 2000, they are going to be probably the largest community in the Soviet Union.

However, it ought to be borne in mind that the Soviet Moslem community is also not homogeneous; rather, it is ethnically divided and geographically dispersed. What is more, the official Islam which the Soviet Union has allowed for the last 15 years or so through controlled numbers of mosques, through a number of Moslem religious teachers institutes being set up—again, largely in an effort to keep surveillance on the Moslem community—has along side of it a more secret kind of Islam represented by the Sufi orders, the mystical orders which exist throughout the Moslem world. As a matter of fact, Shi'ite fundamentalism of the Khomeini type is strongly opposed to Sufi orders.

So if it is indeed true, as many analysts of Soviet Moslems contend, that the strength of Islam in the Soviet Union is largely in the Sufi orders, this is anathema to the whole doctrine of Khomeini.

ISLAM AND MARXISM

Mr. REID. One question additionally along those lines: are fundamentalists in any way attracted to elements of Marxism?

Dr. EILTS. In my experience with them, Mr. Reid, if you use Marxism in terms of socialism, yes, they are. There is a strong

body of feeling on the part of fundamentalists, whose purpose is to go back to an ideal type of Islamic society such as allegedly existed in the times of the prophet and the first four "rightly guided" Caliphs—in other words, the seventh and eighth centuries let us say—that this was a community that was in effect socialist in nature. Existing wealth was distributed to members; the poor got wealth from the rich.

In that sense many, but not all, see a compatibility with socialism. In the sense of atheism obviously that is totally unacceptable. But the socialist part of Marxism is accepted by a good many, sir.

Mr. REID. Dr. Esposito?

Dr. ESPOSITO. A decade ago one would see more of phrases like Islamic socialism has a Western facade. They prefer to use the Now, in fact, many Moslems are very sensitive about that because Islamic socialism has a western facade. They prefer to use the phrase "Islamic social justice," and emphasize that in Islam there are limits placed by God upon wealth and upon consumption.

But I would point out that if one looks across the Moslem world, in general the reaction to Marxism, as indeed the reaction to the Soviets, at the popular level is always a very negative one.

Moslem governments are very aware of the danger in getting too close to the Soviet Union. Even where there are Soviet advisers, as was so in the case of Egypt and other Moslem countries, there is a real distancing with regard to Marxist ideology as such.

THE CASE OF SYRIA

Mr. REID. One last question, Mr. Chairman. Do you think then that the Soviets are concerned about all the money they are pouring into Syria with that philosophy in mind? The papers today say that the Ayatollah has sent representatives to Syria to discuss the war.

Syria is Iran's biggest backer in the war.

Dr. ESPOSITO. I think one of the things we need to keep in mind—in a sense this will seem as if I am contradicting something Ambassador Eilts said, and it is not totally contradictory—Ambassador Eilts pointed out that sometimes we forget that in certain areas for Moslems, if something is revealed, for example, there can be no compromising. So they will seem to be difficult to deal with because they don't seem to be open to compromise.

On the other hand, one of the things we forget when we look at "Islamic politics" is the use of Islam in politics by governments and leaders who are both religious and politically savvy. I think if we watch the way Khomeini has operated even within Iran, in the early years he allowed the more Marxist groups to continue to exist.

So what I am saying then is that whether it is a Khomeini or a Zia-ul-Haq on the one hand, they appeal to Islam, and on the other hand, they may deal with whomever they have to deal with if they have to deal with them for practical political reasons.

That kind of pragmatism is not inconsistent.

Mr. REID. Would you agree, Mr. Ambassador?

Dr. EILTS. Yes, I would, sir. I would add an additional point.

One of the questions that we were asked in the letter that was sent to us by the chairman was to try to address which countries in the area are coping with Islamic fundamentalism, which are doing well, and which are not. In a sense, one could argue that Syria is coping very well with Islamic fundamentalism.

It is not the Islamic fundamentalist state. It is a minority Alawite regime, which, until 1973, was, in Islamic terms, an outcast. It has suppressed through brutal force what you might call the Syrian fundamentalist Moslems, the Sunni Moslem Brotherhood, and has destroyed a part of the city of Hama in the process.

I think the relationship, the alliance, between Syria and the Soviets is tenuous. While Syria is receiving Soviet military assistance, largely because Syria remains the Soviet Union's last significant asset in the Middle East, the Syrian Government is not what one might call a Soviet stooge. The Syrians see Iraq as the primary threat to them for political reasons, the Baath party division that exists between Syria and Iraq, and since Iraq is at war with the Iranians, Syria finds a relationship with Iran, including provision of some military equipment, to be compatible with its intentions.

I am not at all sure that if it were suddenly to develop that Iraq was about to collapse—which I don't think is likely—that the Syrian authorities would be as joyful about their relationship with Iran as they seem to be now that Iran is engaged as part of a squeeze play on Iraq.

But I don't think that is an Islamic phenomenon, at least not in my judgment. It is more a purely political Middle East type of phenomenon.

Mr. REID. Chairman Hamilton, thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COMPATIBILITY OF FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY

We certainly welcome seeing our panelists, particularly former Ambassador Eilts, whom we have had the opportunity of meeting overseas years ago.

With regard to the Islamic fundamentalists' compatibility with democracy, do you feel that fundamentalism is compatible with democracy and with our understanding of human rights, particularly for non-Moslems?

Dr. EILTS. No. I do not think it is compatible with our understanding of human rights and of democratic procedures or of the equality of peoples and races.

There is a claim on the part of Islam, and always has been, that Islam has no racial prejudice, that all are equal under Islam so long as they are Moslems: that "People of the Book"—Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians—have special status.

The trouble, in my experience with it, is that so much of these non-Moslem categories of people allegedly having equal status tends to be subject to the interpretation of individual leaders, religious and otherwise, in Islamic countries.

Christians and Moslems and Christians and Jews and Zoroastrians, while they had certain rights, once they accepted the hegemony of the Islamic state, were always second class citizens.

They were exempted from certain duties, serving in the army, for example, but they were second class citizens.

Sometimes they were well tolerated, sometimes they were not.

I think on the whole, I would not be prepared to entrust my faith as a Christian to a fundamentalist Islamic government whatever its protestations of the equality of peoples.

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Esposito.

Dr. ESPOSITO. If I could just add to that. I would begin by saying that there are different interpretations of democracy just as there are rights within a democracy and, remember, if we begin to talk about an Islamic state, we are talking about an ideological state and that raises questions in terms of the rights of individuals or even parties, political parties, in an Islamic state. What are the limits, to the Islamic ideology of the state?

I would agree with Ambassador Eilts that traditionally the legal status of non-Moslems, from today's perspective, might be called second class citizenship. I think relative to its time it was rather advanced; certainly, for example, the legal status of Jews in an Islamic state was better than the legal status of Jews in a comparable Christian state in the past.

The issue today is, if one begins to talk about a "modern" Islamic state, is there a need for a religious reinterpretation to broaden the definition of an Islamic, ideologically oriented state, with respect to the citizenship status of non-Moslems.

Broadening the rights and duties of non-Moslems in Islamic ideological states raises hard questions. If you have an Islamic ideological state, how about those who fill the highest positions in that state? Could the president in an Islamic ideological state be a non-Moslem? Could the chief justice? The head of the armed forces?

There have been exceptions. There was, for example, a Roman Catholic head of the Supreme Court in Pakistan, an Islamic Republic. But I think this issue still needs to be faced by Moslems.

One of the things I think we have to keep in mind as we look at the Islamic world is the following: That the West took several centuries in defining, for example, the notion of the modern nation state in developing its notion of modern political systems, modern law.

The relationship of religion to the state. The relationship of religion to science, these were all products of several centuries of political and intellectual battles, a lot of blood letting, and revolutions. The Moslem world has not had that opportunity for political and intellectual self-determination and reform.

Moslem countries emerge from centuries of European colonialism. They have only had several decades of independence.

In many countries independence occurred under secular oriented states and so Moslems, at least Islamic activists, are at a crossroads. In defining a more Islamically oriented state, one needs to develop models and to experiment. In that process of experimentation, while there may be a good deal of growth, there is going to be a good deal of differences, infighting and battling going on.

IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENTS

Mr. GILMAN. I guess that leads us to the question of how do we have good relationships with a fundamentalist Islamic movement if it is not compatible with our understanding of human rights. As Dr. Eilts said, he would be very much concerned in placing his security in the hands of such a state.

How do we develop a proper relationship with this kind of a movement or this kind of a state? I address that question to both panelists.

Dr. EILTS. Let me give you my views first, sir.

I don't think there is any easy way to do it. When a state develops into an Islamic republic as was the case in Iran in what is truly revolutionary fashion and where we were the target, the perceived purveyor of evil, there is very little we can do about having good relations.

In the case of southern Lebanon we again are in a difficult situation. There is no real government there, but it is a very difficult and confused situation. One wonders what would happen if Lebanon, if the Lebanese Government, got into the hands of the people, the Shi'ite leaders from the south, each of whom is vying with each other for greater radicalism.

It would be very difficult. I think, sir, we must develop, as I suggested in my testimony and as I suggested before you came in, sir, we must develop better channels of communication as part of our political reporting process in all Islamic countries.

It is regrettable in my judgment, for example, that we did not have a dialog with Khomeini long before he became the Faqih of Iran. It was regrettable to me that we did not have a dialog with the leaders, the religious leaders of southern Lebanon, long before we did.

I think we have got to instruct our diplomatic posts abroad—and this is not easy for us to do because we as a matter of perception separate church from state—but we have to instruct our diplomatic posts abroad to develop, if they don't already have it, and to maintain contact, sustained dialog, with all aspects, all elements of indigenous Islamic society.

That is a problem because governments will in many cases say do not do so, because if you do, you will be giving them special status. But I do believe that that is a missing component in our whole diplomacy even if for very understandable reasons.

Mr. GILMAN. If I might interrupt a moment, how do we make those contacts if the host government objects to our having contact with that kind of a movement?

Dr. EILTS. Well, sometimes the host government will forbid it, sometimes it will just object. I would contend that in most places even though the host government may have some uneasiness about it, we could develop dialog.

It might have to do with the level of dialog. Perhaps the Ambassador should not have this kind of dialog because the host government would feel this gives them too much status, but we do after all have a whole series of political officers. We can do it at any level, but we should maintain dialog.

This, I think, is very important. And we should maintain that dialog at all times and we should make sure that in a country where there is fragmentation of the Islamic elements, and that is true in almost every Moslem country, that we tap not just one group or two, but that we maintain dialog with as many of them as we possibly can because if we do it with only one or two, then those groups will be seen as favored elements of the United States and it will not help us with others.

But I believe we can in most cases overcome the problem of government reluctance, sir.

DEALING WITH RADICAL GROUPS

Mr. GILMAN. Would you maintain dialog even if those groups are involved in terrorism?

Dr. EILTS. No, I would not. Not if they are terrorist groups, but once this is over, we are faced with a very interesting question, sir. Are we going to continue dialog with Nabih Berri, the principal Shi'ite leader? My argument would be, yes we should. This is assuming, of course, we get our hostages out all right.

If we don't, then it is a totally different matter. Are we going to have or begin dialog with the ideologue, the Shi'ite ideologue of the south Lebanon area, the Iman Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah?

I think we should, quite frankly. I don't know if you have had a chance to look at it, sir, but there is a Washington-based publication called "Middle East Insight," published by a Lebanese, a very interesting Lebanese gentleman, who has just had in the last issue an interview with this particular religious leader, Fadlallah.

It is one of the very first interviews with a religious leader of southern Lebanon that I have ever seen. He doesn't come through in totally negative light at all.

Now maybe this is just posturing, and it is difficult to make a judgment so long as one has the current hijacking problem, but dialog, channels of communication kept open is I think the critical element, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Would you comment, Dr. Esposito?

Dr. ESPOSITO. I would like to underscore the need for dialog by pointing out the fact that too often we are dealing with governments and we are dealing with perhaps 5 percent of the population, the elite of those governments who are in power dress the way we do, seem to speak and think the way we do. The problem is, as you can well appreciate, that in fact there is that other 90 or 95 percent of the population.

One of the hard questions that I think came out of Iran and continues to exist is why have we not known very much about the force of religion in these societies, this potential, why have we not known much about key activist leaders and movements.

I think it shows that we have failed, not just government but academic analysts, as Ambassador Eilts said, to understand the world view of Islamic fundamentalists.

We have a real difficulty accepting that for many people there is no separation between religion and politics and that Moslems don't see this as necessarily backward.

If we operate from our secular presuppositions, our natural tendency will be to ignore those people or religious elements in the society with whom we are simply uncomfortable.

If I can give you a concrete example.

Some time ago I did a training session for about 3 hours with FSI personnel going overseas, and after it one of the people said to me, "I really enjoyed that presentation. It made a lot of things clear to me. But you know with regard to the idea of mixing religion and politics, if that is the way they think, I can't talk or deal with anybody like that."

The person was very honest. My response, the response I would have liked to have given, is: "That is very honest, but you shouldn't be going overseas. It is going to affect the way you interact with people, it is going to affect the kind of contacts and reporting that you have." If I can put it negatively, we have to ask ourselves the following question, why is it that when American personnel overseas know the language or take an interest in anything but the westernized elites, they are usually seen as intelligence operatives.

I would say if we think about it long enough, we can see part of the answer.

I would just finish answering this particular question by saying this, that I have spent about the last 10 or 15 years in the Moslem world on and off and dealing a good deal with a number of the people who might be perceived today as Islamic activists.

The vast majority of them are not radical terrorists. The vast majority of them are or have been wide open to conversation, and contacts with westerners, but in fact, too often that has not occurred.

It is not in the interests very often of government personnel to develop these contacts; that is not what a political analyst based in the country gets paid to do.

It is not a priority for government analysts. They are following other factors. It has not been, frankly, in the interests of most academics until 1973 with the oil embargo and later Iranian revolution of 1978-79. Prior to 1973, most academics did not publish articles or conduct conferences or consult on issues of religion and politics.

Dr. ESPOSITO. The oil embargo and the Iranian revolution fueled our interest in a phenomenon that was there already and so we became doubly stunned.

But what is of interest to me is that I still hear the same lines that I heard after the Iranian revolution. Something happens and people say that is an isolated event, it is a cycle that is almost exhausted, it is a spent force and so we don't have to take it seriously.

It is unfortunate that Mr. Lantos is not here, but I feel I must respond to his earlier comments. I think that he is perfectly correct, and Americans are perfectly correct, in denouncing terrorists, in denouncing anyone who will maim or kill. On the other hand, until we begin to realize that this phenomenon that we call Islamic fundamentalism is a far broader phenomenon and until we begin to deal with it realistically, we run the risk of operating in an ad hoc fashion.

We don't have any approach which is aimed at prevention. Rather we wait for a crisis, to happen, but a crisis situation involving terrorism is often beyond dialog.

Mr. GILMAN. One last query.

FUNDAMENTALISTS AS RELIABLE ALLIES

One observer has written,

The determination of fundamentalists to gain power makes it virtually impossible for them to be coopted. Fundamentalists make dangerous allies and the United States should discourage its friend from bringing them into the government.

Do you agree with that view, either one of you or both?

Dr. EILTS. I agree only partly with it. There is no question in my mind that fundamentalists are not the best allies. But my view is that every Islamic government, or every government in the Middle East or elsewhere that has a large Islamic community, is probably better able to make a judgment on the extent of cooperation that is possible or not than we can.

I don't think that any advice that we offer is likely to be helpful. I think that has been the thrust of the testimony thus far on Islam—I don't think we are the best people to give advice on it.

In some cases there have been governments that have co-opted Moslem leaders, whether you want to call them fundamentalists or not. These people when in government, have shown remarkable responsibility.

In other cases, it simply has not worked. The Egyptian Government—I know you visited Egypt—has worked on the problem. President Mubarak is engaged in a very interesting effort, which may or may not work, of trying to reeducate young fundamentalists who have been involved in one or another of the fundamentalist organizations.

There is a strong body of feeling in Egypt that says you can never reeducate them, and yet there is also a body of opinion developing in Egypt that says, well, maybe something is happening at least with some of them.

So I am not sure we are the ones who should give this advice unless it affects our immediate interests. It is something that each Islamic government, each Islamic leader, is perhaps the best able to judge.

Dr. ESPOSITO. I think we need to distinguish between fundamentalists. One would have to look and say who are we dealing with. There are people that we would call Islamic fundamentalists who are educated with Ph.D.'s. Many are Islamic reformers, modernists opposed to Islamic traditionalists.

I think it would be disastrous if we adopt a policy which indicates that somehow we are going to take a public or a private position discouraging any government that wants to move in an Islamic direction. I think that we took that risk in the Sudan with disastrous effects in terms of developing in a country where there had not been an anti-American attitude, the potential for it.

We have proven as a country in the past to be willing to allow self-determination, to be willing to be sensitive to the desires of the majority of people in the country. I think if there is a sense that

people want to move in a more Islamic direction, we have to be open to that option.

We are very pragmatic when dealing with governments today. We will support dictatorial governments, despite their human rights record, because we see it in our interests. Again, I would harken to the example of the Sudan, which I think provides an example of how not to proceed.

It is not, I think, in our interest to, on the one hand, say that we are concerned about the implementation of Islamic law as possibly violating human rights, and on the other, simultaneously support a ruler Jafar Al-Numeiri, known to handle those who disagreed with him in ways that we would normally not tolerate. Yet we did this for pragmatic reasons.

For Islamic activists we come off as hypocrites and anti-Islamic. After the crackdown on the Moslem Brotherhood, there were reports throughout the Middle East linking Vice President Bush's visit with the crackdown. There were reports maintaining that among Bush's four speaking points were that Numeiri move away from Islamization and Islamic laws, and that he remove Islamic activists, that is, Moslem Brothers, from his government.

That belief was very much there. We have to ask ourselves even if we see it as a misperception, if it was that widespread, was there a basis for that misperception in what we did or what we have communicated?

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

I want to thank both panelists.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIOUS ISLAMIC GROUPS

Mr. HAMILTON. Gentlemen, I am having some trouble sorting out the players and the groups in Islamic fundamentalism. I would like for you, if you will, to kind of sketch an organizational chart for me and put in these characters.

You have got Khomeini, Asad, Qadhafi, Fadlallah, Berri, among others. You have got the Islamic Jihad, Amal, Islamic Amal, Hiz-bullah—the Party of God—and you have got me thoroughly confused with all these names and characters.

Give me an organizational chart and tell me who the principal actors are.

Dr. EILTS. Sir, there is no single organizational chart that one can give. You would have to take it country by country. Khomeini, obviously, is in Iran, the Faqih. Under the Iranian constitution, the Faqih is the jurisconsult, who is the principal head of state, the principal source of authority. He is over the president. He is over every other official. There is a council of elders, a council of advisors, which acts in some instances to limit what some of the more radical elements in the Iranian Government are doing in connection with, let us say, things like land reform, but this is a separate body of five or six people.

But that is Iran. In the case of Lebanon, Lebanon has at least three identifiable Shi'ite organizations. Amal is a movement—and when one says organizations, incidentally, one has to be careful—these are movements, they are fluid. People move between and among them.

It is not a card-carrying type of organization. Amal is the largest and the oldest.

Mr. HAMILTON. That is led by Berri?

Dr. EILTS. By Nabih Berri, right, who is not a religious leader. He is not trained in religion at all but he is a Shi'ite and a devout believer.

There is on the other extreme end the Hizbullah organization which is made up of smaller group of activists. The ideologue of almost all Shi'ites is Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah. There is a Shi'ite leader who is leader of the higher Shi'ite Council in Lebanon, Sheikh Shams Al-Din, a distinguished scholar, but he is regarded by the Amal people and Hizbullah people and by other fundamentalists as part of the establishment; hence, while he is an important figure in terms of theology, he is not so in terms of politics.

Mr. HAMILTON. What would be the relationship between Berri and Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah?

Dr. EILTS. Friends.

Mr. HAMILTON. No hierarchy?

Dr. EILTS. No; there would be none. One is a religious leader, and the other secular. In between you have the Islamic Amal organization, which is a radicalized form of Amal, but not as radical as Hizbullah in between the two.

You asked about Mosawi. There are two. Hussein Mosawi is one of the secular leaders of the Hizbullah. Sadegh Mosawi is the leader of the Islamic Amal. So one has three movements there, plus the establishment movement of Shams Al-Din plus a large group of smaller organizations which fall apart and come together again constantly. All of them, however, are separate and each such organization and each leader of each such organization is vying for power.

The tragedy of Lebanon is that each of these leaders is in the process of vying for power and finds it necessary to become increasingly radical. So often, unfortunately they are not leading, but are following. As young peoples' sentiments become more and more radical, so in order to maintain any kind of leadership, these so-called leaders follow the rest. That is the tragedy of it.

Elsewhere, in Egypt—

Mr. HAMILTON. These three groups in Lebanon, how do they view Khomeini? Is he the spiritual leader of all of them?

Dr. EILTS. Yes; he is.

Mr. HAMILTON. Would he be the single most authoritative figure among all these groups?

Dr. EILTS. He would be the spiritual and political leader of all of them in the sense that he is also a maria'-l-taqlid, and the country which he is head of today is the largest Moslem country, or one of the largest in the Middle East. The success of his revolution has inspired all of them.

But if the issue came about, and this is an interesting point—for example, in the interview with Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah—that Khomeini should give direct orders to any of these three Lebanese Shi'ite leaders to do something, it does not automatically follow that they would abide by it or accept such instruction.

As a matter of fact, in the interview Fadlallah indicates that there are differences of view between himself and the Islamic lead-

ers of Iran. So it is not a clear line where Khomeini can order and there will be hopping to and carrying out the orders.

However, his overall spiritual and political influence is enormous.

Mr. HAMILTON. What is the relationship between Amal and the Party of God, the Hizbullah?

Dr. EILTS. The Hizbullah is a break-off—Amal, remember, is a movement, I said. It is a break-off of the latter.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it more radical?

Dr. EILTS. It is. It is to the right and more radical of Amal and more under the influence of Iran than the other two are.

Mr. HAMILTON. Does it also have a military arm?

Dr. EILTS. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. The Islamic Amal has a military arm?

Dr. EILTS. They all have military arms.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, Dr. Esposito, do you want to comment? Can you give me the organizational chart I was asking for?

Dr. ESPOSITO. What I would like to start by saying is that I think your observation, your confusion is right on the mark. This phenomenon that we are dealing with is not monolithic. It is very diverse.

The danger is when we begin, because we don't know much about Islamic fundamentalism, to see it as a kind of monolithic movement. For example, a monolithic movement against the West. We can fall into it in the following way.

As you know, Shi'ite Islam comprises only 10 to 12 percent of the world's Moslems, yet it has been the Shi'ites that have gotten the most attention. As a result, we tend to see that part of Islam that has something of a hierarchy and we tend to generalize from it.

Keep in mind that in Sunni Islam you don't have such a hierarchy, so there is a great deal of disorganization, if you will.

Mr. HAMILTON. Does Khomeini have authority over the Sunnis?

Dr. ESPOSITO. No; he has no authority. The revolution and what Khomeini did could provide inspiration to other Moslems. The problem when we focus on Shi'ite Islam is that we presume we models of Christian churches in terms of organization, particularly the Catholic church.

A lot of people like to compare Khomeini to the Pope. This results in false conclusions about Khomeini's power and about the chain of command. While in Lebanon the Shi'ite groups might have a reverence for Khomeini's role and defer to him, his influence would vary from group to group in terms of direct influence.

Certainly no Shi'ite leader would make a statement that was directly critical of Khomeini. Outside of the Shi'ite community in terms of Sunni Moslems, Khomeini does not have such influence nor would he be able to exercise leadership.

SHI'ITES IN LEBANON

Mr. HAMILTON. In Lebanon, the Shi'ites represent what percent of the population?

Dr. EILTS. Forty-two percent; they are the plurality.

Dr. ESPOSITO. If you combine them with the Sunni Moslems, you have a real Moslem dominance, as compared to the way the Leba-

nese Government earlier was established on the basis of a Christian majority population.

Dr. EILTS. If I may make a point. You do have a clear Moslem majority, but what has been interesting in watching the Lebanese political scene develop has been that the Sunni element of Lebanon is as concerned, or almost as concerned, about Shi'ite assertiveness in Lebanon as some of the Christian and other groups are.

It is fine to say we are all Moslems, but when they think of Shi'ites being the dominant element, they worry about it.

Dr. ESPOSITO. When your back is against the wall, Moslems may join in opposition along common lines. When it comes time to talk about the delegation of power, you have the fracturing.

One can see this phenomenon in the post-Iranian revolution among Islamic forces. Part of the confusion is our facile use of the term fundamentalism—note the following. If we look at the Islamic world today we have monarchies that use Islam to legitimize them, like Saudi Arabia and Morocco, but also military regimes like Libya and Pakistan. If we refer to Qadhafi's Libya and Saudi Arabia, we refer to both as fundamentalist Islamic states.

There is a world of difference between the two in terms of their governments, institutions, and policies. Even more diverse are Islamic organizations. There are the radical groups that you have talked about and then a large segment of groups that also have names which, although ominous sounding, are not radical groups. They are not groups that advocate terrorism or necessarily advocate anti-Americanism. I think it is that spectrum of groups that we have to know and come to deal with.

If we don't, what I fear most is that we will push Islamic moderates into a situation where they become radicalized, that we will, in fact, if we are not careful, help a process that sometimes governments set in motion with misguided policies.

If you look at many of the Islamic movements develop, they develop within a nation state as social movements, that want to create a more Islamic society. As they become more politically oriented, often given the nature of the governments they live under, governments panic and become repressive. As a result, Islamic groups go underground and become secret. There often follows an escalation of tension and radicalization. This is a process that I think we have to come to know and understand.

U.S. CONTACTS WITH LEBANESE MOSLEM LEADERS

Mr. HAMILTON. I am not sure you would know this, but in the present circumstance in Lebanon, do we as a Government deal with all of these leaders or are we just talking to President Gemayyel and the Government? Do we have contacts on a regular, ongoing, sustained basis with the leaders of the various groups that you have identified for us in Lebanon?

Dr. EILTS. I don't have a clear answer to that, sir. I have seen press reports that Mr. McFarlane has been in telephonic contact with Nabin Berri.

Mr. HAMILTON. But that was only in connection with this hijacking?

Dr. EILTS. Otherwise, my impression is that there was a ban some time ago imposed on our Embassy on contacts with the leader of the Druze, for example, and some other leaders simply because it gave embarrassment to the central Government.

That is the kind of thing that I think is a mistake, just as it was a mistake that we did not send years ago the representative to see Khomeini in Paris who was intended.

Mr. HAMILTON. So, in effect, in Lebanon we have got an Ambassador who talks principally to a government that really doesn't govern anything—

Mr. EILTS. He does talk to Nabih Berri.

Mr. HAMILTON. On a regular basis?

Mr. EILTS. In this crisis, but I don't know about before. The previous Ambassador was forbidden, I understand, to deal with the Druze chief.

Mr. HAMILTON. He represents what percent of the population?

Dr. EILTS. Oh, about 10, 12.

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST VIEWS OF THE SOVIET UNION

Mr. HAMILTON. I wanted to get a little more clearly in mind the attitude of the Islamic fundamentalists, if we can, toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has a very large population and one might think offhand that because of that they have a certain advantage in dealing with Islamic movements.

Is that the case? How do they view the Soviet Union versus the United States in this big superpower confrontation? Do they view the United States as a greater threat?

If so, why do they view the United States as a greater threat?

Dr. EILTS. In my experience with fundamentalist organizations, Sunni and Shi'ite, most of them see the United States and the Soviet Union pretty much in the same category, purveyors of evil. We have a more pervasive presence. We are around more. Our profile is higher.

We, as has been pointed out, are perceived as supporting governments which in some instances are felt to be repressive. Therefore, we are perhaps the priority enemy, but the Soviet Union is a close second.

There is no sympathy that I have ever found among fundamentalists for the Soviets. There may on occasion be a tactical willingness to work with them, but they are regarded as equally untrustworthy.

Mr. HAMILTON. How do they view something like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?

Dr. EILTS. They are very critical of it, very critical of it.

Dr. ESPOSITO. If I could add to that. I think that Ambassador Eilts is correct in that starting from, let's say, a base zero position, Islamic movements would not be any more adverse to the United States or the Soviets. I think in fact that they are more adverse to the United States because of the specific history, for example, recent history in Iran.

One might ask since the Soviets are so much closer to Iran, why wouldn't Iran and Islamic activists in general regard the Soviets as a greater threat? However, United States actual involvement in

Iran, our strong supportive position with regard to Israel, our massive economic and military support, the west bank settlements, Jerusalem, our intervention in Lebanon—all lead to charges of American neocolonialism. There is another variable. The United States poses much more of a cultural threat than the Soviet Union.

This is true not only in the Moslem world, but worldwide. People are not running after the Soviet Union to imitate their dress, their movies, their music, et cetera.

Mr. HAMILTON. They see us as materialistic, I presume?

Dr. ESPOSITO. Yes; an unbridled materialism. Yet Islamic activists, also assert: we share so much more in common with American Christians. We are monotheistic religions. We have common enemies, atheism, secularism and materialism. Why can't we as believing people join together. Mr. Chairman you will never hear any similar line with regard to the Soviet Union.

STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

Mr. HAMILTON. The administration speaks often about state-sponsored terrorism. How do you react to that phrase? Are we dealing with state-sponsored terrorism in the hijacking case and in the other things that I referred to at the beginning of our hearing? If we are, what do we mean by the phrase "state-sponsored terrorism?"

Dr. EILTS. I can tell you what it means to me, sir. To me it means a government actively doing the planning and the implementation of a terrorist act. To me what the Government of Libya has been doing is state-sponsored terrorism.

To me, and this may be a little more tenuous, but to me it still is that the kind of encouragement that the Government of Iran seems to be giving to those elements, either Iranians abroad or Shi'ites in Lebanon, to engage in terrorism is state-sponsored terrorism.

In the case of Lebanon, it may be once removed, I grant you, but where its origin is Iran, that to me is state-sponsored terrorism. Whether this particular action, the TWA hijacking, fits into that category, I don't know.

My own impression is that it is more the result of indigenous forces in southern Lebanon, who in a state of rage and frustration, have chosen to act against the United States.

I daresay that the Iranian Government is absolutely delighted by it, but I am not aware of any direct planning. Maybe there was, but I am not aware of any.

There has also been the suggestion that I heard in Boston the other day from a distinguished fellow professor that this was all Syrian-sponsored. Maybe he has evidence, but he didn't present any.

I rather doubt it. To me, this is an indigenous movement, this TWA hijacking, and while the Iranians and others may be very happy about it, I don't have any evidence, at least, that it would fit the state-sponsored terrorism thing.

That doesn't make it any better.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. McFarlane said,

There is sufficient evidence that radical Shi'a terrorists are responsive to Iranian guidance for us to hold Tehran responsible for such attacks against U.S. citizens property and interests.

How do you respond to that statement?

Dr. EILTS. Well, if he has sufficient evidence, fine. I cannot quarrel with it.

But I would like to see the evidence. But I wouldn't be prepared to debate this point in terms of a right and wrong kind of thing. If there is evidence, by all means.

I just haven't seen it. And that doesn't mean that I have any regard for the Iranians at all. They are engaged in state-sponsored terrorism, but it is difficult to make a judgment when you haven't seen the evidence.

Dr. ESPOSITO. I would also say that I think that even if that were true at this particular point in time that might be a very unfortunate statement in terms of the hostage situation. I really don't think that military threat or flexing one's muscles will be effective as recent history in Iran, Lebanon, and the gulf indicates. Threats of retaliation will not help us at all.

NEGOTIATING WITH TERRORISTS

Mr. HAMILTON. I want to say that the quote I gave you was made by Mr. McFarlane prior to the TWA hijacking. Let me ask you, in the hijacking situation, the administration has said frequently that we are not going to negotiate with the terrorists and we are not going to make concessions to them.

Now, more recently the administration has emphasized the latter statement rather than the former statement, that is to say we are not going to make concessions. I don't recall any top person saying in the last few hours that we are not going to negotiate.

What would you advise for us to have as policy in this situation? Is it correct to take a position that we will not negotiate with terrorists? Is it correct to say that we will not make concessions to terrorists in this situation?

And how would you handle the situation we are confronted with right now? So far as the hijacking is concerned, all of us see a solution which is to let the prisoners go in Israel and they will let the hostages go, but we don't know how to get there.

Dr. EILTS. Let me give you my general view on this. I have always been a skeptic over the years on our blanket position of not negotiating. In fact, we always do negotiate. Whether we do it directly or indirectly, there are negotiations—which is in a sense dialog. Quite frankly, it has been proven through many of the terrorist incidents that you have cited that if you can keep the thing going for a period of time some of the initial steam on the part of the terrorists subsides and you have a better chance of settling it.

Negotiations can mean all kinds of things. To me negotiation is dialog, be it direct or indirect. I will certainly go along for the sake of argument with the concept that the United States should not do so, that it should if possible let somebody else do it, but frankly, we are negotiating, something is being negotiated, concessions of some kind are being made. We should not delude ourselves that this is not taking place.

I don't think I am opposed to traditional U.S. policy of not making concessions, but I think it is dangerous to make blanket statements. Sometimes things can be done that are not that much of a concession, that do not have the effect of encouraging further terrorist activity, which is, of course, what we are concerned about.

But in principal, I guess I am more sympathetic to the idea of no concessions than I am to no negotiations. I share your view that the present TWA hijacking equation is giving, releasing, the hostages, the prisoners in Israel, and getting the American hostages back.

The Government of Israel is in a difficult position because of its peculiar structure right now and because of the criticisms that have been leveled against one of its senior members for releasing the Palestinian terrorists. The United States does not want to push the Government of Israel in a fashion where it precipitates a crisis. That I have full sympathy for, but I would hope that in informal dialog and without it appearing to be U.S. Government pressure, can and will be made, if it hasn't already been done, that the sooner the Government of Israel gets rid of those Lebanese Shi'ite prisoners, the better. They have already said they want to get rid of them. So now let's get on and do it.

Posturally, governments can say there is no link. That is always done and it will always be. At the same time that shouldn't fool anybody.

Clearly there is a notional link on all of this and so I don't see our having much prospect of getting the American TWA hostages out until there is more accelerated movement on the hostages. You asked me the question, what would you do, I would really make the aforementioned point clearly and emphatically to the Israeli Government with full understanding of the problems and without any suggestion of pressure.

But that is the only way we will get those people out. There is no other way. Theoretically you can send a military force in there but the chances are pretty good those people are going to be dead by the time you get to them. They are dispersed.

Dr. ESPOSITO. To begin with, I see no reason to rule out negotiations. I think that the issue of making concessions is the more critical one. One could certainly understand why governments don't want to encourage anyone in the future to resort to the same actions, but it does seem that one does have to look upon each act in its own context, and a blanket regulation, I see as counterproductive. I think that in terms of this particular situation we ought to continue to work with Amal and hopefully they will be able to mediate.

If not, I would hope that we would renew attempts with a country such as Algeria, because I think Algeria, not only because of its success in the past—in Iran—but also because it has more credibility as has been proven by statements from those who seized the TWA plane. I think, in any event, throughout all of this process the worst thing we can do is to threaten military action, whether now or after the release. I think that that simply would be counterproductive.

RETRALIATION FOR TERRORIST ACTS

Mr. HAMILTON. Suppose you get the hostages out, and suppose our intelligence is not any more precise than has been stated by the President and others, that we really cannot pinpoint responsibility for the hijacking or the kidnaping of the seven others. What is your feeling about the use of force as a response in this situation, and what are the implications of the use of force?

It has been suggested, for example, that we might bomb Qum or Kharg Island or make some strike into Beirut where we think there is a concentration of terrorist groups, training facilities and the like.

And we have seen a number of statements by administration officials like Mr. McFarlane when he said that state-sponsored terrorism against the United States will not go without a response from the United States. How do you react then to the question of use of force?

Dr. ELTS. In my judgment, sir, force should be the absolute last resort. If, as I hope and pray will not be the case, our hostages are killed, then I must say I would see justification for a very strong military response. But it ought to be directed against at least the area, even if you haven't identified the individual perpetrators, the area where they are, and after all, that is not that difficult.

They are in southern Lebanon, they are in parts of the Bekaa, the camps of Hussein Musawi's organization are well known, the Iranian camps there are well known. There is a problem in west Beirut because if you hit west Beirut you will also be killing some innocent Lebanese. But I would myself argue that retaliation should be attempted only in that kind of situation.

The idea of bombing Qum because of what happens in Lebanon strikes me as very shortsighted. It strikes me as shortsighted for all kinds of reasons. When you bomb Qum you are bombing one of the principal Shi'ite shrines. That applies not only to Iran but to Shi'ite communities everywhere. You are going to develop a wave of anti-Americanism among some elements that are not yet strongly anti-American; that would be a very fearsome consequence.

Kharg Island, if you can do it, fine. The Iraqis haven't been able to do so effectively. We have better capabilities, but to me, sir, it doesn't really solve the problem. It is the kind of futile action that it seems to me we took when we left Lebanon, shooting vindictively and futilely, the 16-inch guns of the *New Jersey* into the Lebanese hills, creating great craters and nothing else. It may have been simply as a catharsis, a political catharsis, but it achieved nothing and hurt our already frayed image.

I would argue that the same kind of situation will apply if you go for Kharg Island. If our hostages are out, if we get them out, and I hope we get them out before long, and then something like this is done, it strikes me as another futile gesture of bravado, where political consequences would be damaging to us in the area.

You may get some of the people who are involved, but if anybody believes that is going to deter others from doing it, they are engaging in delusion. It will simply encourage new acts of violence against us and escalate the whole spiral of violence.

So, to me, the whole idea of retaliation, understandable though it is in terms of the national frustration that we all feel, is simply not sound policy. As I say, unless the hostages end up dead. That is different. That should bring immediate retaliation. One can pinpoint targets. But to do it if they do get out, that will be a mistake, sir.

Dr. ESPOSITO. In general I agree with what Ambassador Eilts has said. I will just make a couple of points. I have difficulties seeing how an indiscriminate strike—and I think if you hit Qum that is an indiscriminate strike—will achieve anything but create if you will martyrs, create symbols for future protest and resistance.

I think that there are plenty of people in the Moslem world who absolutely have no patience with terrorist actions, who would have no trouble if those who committed the terrorism were penalized. But I think that if you move against a major geographic area in which you are going to be killing an awful lot of other people, I think that it will not only set the worst kind of precedent for our Government in terms of the future, but also reinforce for many a sense that basically America is indiscriminate in its approach to the Islamic world. Such actions would be perceived as rooted in a negative anti-Islamic attitude. The question would be asked: Would you treat any other part of the world that way?

Mr. HAMILTON. How do you respond to the objection that we have had all of these terrorist activities directed against Americans for a long time now, we have not retaliated. And they keep going?

Dr. ESPOSITO. I would say that unless there is a change in our policies, we run the risk of continuing to be victims of terrorism. In other words I don't think that the fact that we haven't retaliated and now the threat of retaliation will turn things around. I think that there have to be some clear changes in our Middle East policy.

About 2 months ago I was speaking at a Government agency here and someone who is an Iran specialist and I got into a discussion in the group. He said something that I believe is very true. He said, "What I really fear is that, indeed, we are on more of a collision path because the reality is that unless the United States shifts its policy a bit, we are going to continue to have these problems." I tend to concur. Given the political realities in America and its priorities, we may not address these issues, and I think if we don't, whether we retaliate or not will have little effect. In fact, if anything I think retaliation will simply feed those who view terrorism as the only option.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you both believe that Americans will continue to be the targets of terrorism in the Middle East for the foreseeable future?

Dr. EILTS. I fear so.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you also, Dr. Esposito?

Dr. ESPOSITO. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Gilman, do you have any further questions?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes; thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FUNDAMENTALISTS

You state that we should be trying to work together with some of the fundamentalist groups. What program would they have in

common with our nation? Where would we find a common working agenda?

Dr. EILTS. I can give you a couple, sir, that occur to me.

In south Lebanon, I don't mean at this particular moment obviously because emotions are very high and inflamed on all sides, but south Lebanon is a very depressed area economically and politically, too. We may not be able to do much about the political situation there, but the investment of a bit of money in better housing, health facilities, things of that sort, would perhaps help.

On the Egyptian side, as you know, I have been a critic of aid for some time, not because it isn't trying, but because we get no political value or relatively little political value out of our substantial aid programs to Egypt.

I have always argued why not put more money into low-cost housing, for example, in a place like Egypt, recognizing all of the economic reasons against that. But why not do it, because so many of the people who belong to Egyptian fundamentalist organizations, anti-American fundamentalist organizations, are educated, they have the ability to think, these are not people who simply work by rote, they have the ability to think. They have gone through universities, but they have no opportunity or very little opportunity in the existing economic system of the state.

Their housing is abominable. Why not put a little more of our aid money into things of that sort? I cannot be sure, but I dare say that that would at least indicate, both of the projects that I have just suggested, to the peoples of those areas, that there is a genuine American interest in their welfare.

It doesn't have to have an Islamic label tied on it. That, I think would immediately be suspect, but if you carry on your aid programs in those areas where these groups are, at appropriate times, you are bound to get some positive effect from it, it seems to me.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you think that would suffice to help change their attitude?

Dr. EILTS. Over a period of time, it would help greatly if it were accompanied by a number of other things. By itself, it wouldn't do it. If in the case of Lebanon, it were accompanied by active American efforts to get the governmental structure, the reapportionment of seats and power redistributed, which has been, I understand, our objective for a long period of time. We have said we are for this.

Another point that I feel very strongly about that might help, and I know someone might challenge it citing Sadat's assassination as evidence to the contrary, we must get the Middle East peace process going again. The Middle East peace process, not in terms of Lebanon, which was always only a sideshow, and never part of the main process, but the overall Middle East peace process, with the United States acting as honest broker between the two sides.

We will always be criticized from both sides for what we try to do, but I venture to recall that during the period we had the Middle East peace process underway, that is from 1973 to the time we concluded the Egyptian-Israeli peace process, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, there may have been criticism of us from both sides, but it was also recognized by most, including Moslems, that we were trying. I would argue, therefore, that that is another line of approach that one ought to take.

Mr. GILMAN. If I might interrupt you, Dr. Eilts, in the last few months, there has been a resurrection of that peace process through the efforts of King Hussein and our own State Department. We are beginning to undertake more activity than we had over the past year, so how would you account for the fact that at a time when there is a reawakening of the peace process, we are getting a violent reaction from some of these groups?

Dr. EILTS. To me that is partly the lateness of it. The steam, the momentum for Islamic fundamentalism and anti-American activities, began in the last several years and it is not going to be stopped immediately.

The second aspect is what is taking place thus far in the peace process while I think it is commendable; it is largely procedural in form. My experience has always been that when you actually have a peace process underway, recognizing it may take time, and it undoubtedly will take time, somehow both sides seem to be able to accept delays and difficulties a little more reasonably than they do when nothing is underway or when you are just talking about procedures.

Dr. ESPOSITO. I would like to make two points and place them in this general context. I think what we need to keep in mind here is that what we call Islamic fundamentalists or movements, in the Moslem world, are called Dáwa movements, which originally meant missionary movements.

The vast majority of these movements today are not simply concerned with converting non-Moslems. They are concerned with making people better Moslems and with social uplift programs, so you have got, therefore, a very good opportunity to do a lot of what Dr. Eilts referred to in terms of the economic development projects and, educational exchange. But a second major area that I feel we have not fully taken advantage of is USIA.

I think that if USIA were encouraged more to fulfill what I understand as its original mandate, to provide a kind of cultural bridge with other countries, there is a lot of work that could be done in that area.

I think that too often we allow that agency to become politicized and that affects its work—the long-range bridge building that our government needs to undertake.

While it might be more understandable why the political affairs officers overseas in the past have not been that aware of Islamic movements, leaders and interests, it is less understandable or defensible for USIA officers.

Dr. EILTS. Mr. Chairman, may I make one additional point here?

As you know, I am a former American diplomat who, in my years of service, has had the pleasure of a good many congressional visits. As I calculate the number of Congressmen and Senators who were in Egypt during my years, it is something like 522. Sometimes I thought there were more Congressmen in Egypt than there were on the Hill, but my point here, in terms of what we are talking about, is that I am very aware of the value that it was to me as Ambassador to have congressional visits, to have Members of the Congress speak to government officials, to give them an understanding of American attitudes, not just executive branch attitudes,

but public attitudes as reflected through the Congress, and the positive nature of American purposes.

I would like to suggest that when Members of Congress travel in groups abroad that perhaps you ought to ask—again not in this immediate crisis situation—but that you ought to ask to have in the meetings that you have, wherever you go in Moslem countries, senior Islamic leaders as part of the people that you are going to meet.

I think this could be very helpful to you and it could be very helpful to the Nation and to them in understanding our positive purposes.

MOTIVATION OF SHI'ITE RADICALS

Mr. GILMAN. How do we explain the willingness of the Shi'ite radicals to engage in the kind of bombings that they have been involved in? What motivates them? Are they religious, national, family, or personal motivations, or what?

Dr. EILTS. Well, in my judgment, there are a number of factors. One is—

Mr. GILMAN. I am not necessarily referring only to suicide bombing.

Dr. EILTS. I pointed out earlier that in so many instances fundamentalist movements, Shi'ites among them, are protest movements, against a real or perceived wrong or wrong doers. When you add to that the Shi'ite sense of martyrdom, the belief that by performing Jihad in that struggle in that fashion, this is a positive religious act. It is not seen therefore as a terrorist act. It is seen as a duty in the service of God.

If you look at an act of that sort in that context, it has a totally different meaning. That doesn't justify it any more in our eyes, but in the eye of the perpetrator, it is a fighter for God, a Mujahid, a struggler.

If you apply this to the Lebanese situation, my guess is that there are local considerations as well. I don't know who the thousand demonstrators the other day were, but I dare say some of them have relatives in prison in Israel and, therefore, there is a personal aspect to it.

You will also remember sir, one of the original points that the two highjackers made, what about you Americans and the bombing at Bir Al-Abeed, the home of Imam Fadlallah; they attributed that to us, to the CIA. I am sure the CIA wasn't involved, but the people who were involved, the argument is, were at least trained by us.

So there is a sense of vengeance involved for some of them. You could get a whole series of motives. You have to take the individuals involved and get the family connections.

These people are fighters in the service of God as they see themselves.

Dr. ESPOSITO. I think it is important to recognize that Shi'ite Islam has a sense of history, a long tradition of being an oppressed, disinherited minority, first vis-a-vis their Sunni brothers and in the modern period vis-a-vis European colonial powers. Often their own governments have been seen as Western puppets, as in Iran, and to be under the influence of the American Government.

Therefore, what they are engaged in is in fact a God-mandated fight against injustice, social injustice, against the enemies of God with a purpose to create a just society. That is the motivation. That is what gives meaning to a people who look around and feel alienated, disinherited.

It gives meaning just as occurs in other religions such as Judaism or Christianity. For Shi'ite Moslems, to fight in the way of God, is to be a hero, much as we would talk about patriotism and to die for God is as positive an action as Americans would deem to die for God and our country.

~ POSSIBILITY OF DISSUADING RADICALS FROM ACTING

Mr. GILMAN. Once people have resolved to undertake that kind of an act, how could you convince them to change their objectives?

Dr. ESPOSITO. I think you have to create conditions in which people don't feel the need to resist. For example, if Americans, certainly this is true for those with strong Christian backgrounds and a memory of the Christian martyrs, came out of a tradition that says one should be willing to die for what one believes in, then both because of a sense of patriotism and a strong tradition of martyrdom we naturally would be more discriminating in our judgments. What determines in our mind whether these people are sane in what they do, is what they are willing to die for. So, for example, today we would look upon the Afghan Mujahidin and say, yes, they are indeed holy warriors, they are liberators, they are freedom fighters.

On the other hand, we will look at other Moslems in south Lebanon who also believe they are fighting God's cause and say, no, what they are doing is extremist. It seems to me the criterion for our judgment is the cause for which Islamic fundamentalists are willing to die.

In answer to your question, I think again we get back to the circumstances in which people live and those circumstances or that context is what determines how and why they respond.

I would say that the two major factors in terms of radicalization today would be the extent to which Moslem governments respond repressively to fundamentalists, and in terms of anti-Americanism, the way in which America is perceived, the way in which people find themselves experiencing the American presence and American political and military actions.

Mr. GILMAN. Once a group of this nature undertakes an act of terrorism and there is a determination by that group to act for their religious purposes, is it possible to convince them to change their objectives?

Dr. ESPOSITO. I would say, at the risk of raising something that is very sensitive and perhaps a bit controversial, I think that if one looks at past history there are enough examples of people who were freedom fighters but who would have been viewed as terrorists by those against whom they committed those actions.

So, for example, if we look at the Arab-Israeli struggle, certainly on both sides in the 1940's there were movements and leaders who engaged in actions which, depending on the side you were on, could have been seen as battles of either liberation or terrorism.

Some of the leadership in Arab countries as well as some of the recent political leadership in Israel belonged to such movements and engaged in such actions. So I think it is not entirely necessary for a people to change; the real question is whether or not they feel their grievances have been addressed. To the extent they continue to feel alienated, no, it may not be possible to change their objectives.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Ambassador Eilts.

Dr. EILTS. Let me say, I agree with Dr. Esposito, that much will depend on what can be done locally to suggest improvements, redressing of wrongs. But there are two worries that I have, particularly with respect to Lebanon, although one applies more broadly. I think what is so important is the issue of leadership. Too many of the leaders of Moslem fundamentalist movements are followers rather than leaders.

This is certainly true, it seems to me, in Lebanon. I find disgraceful, for example, this picture the other day that appeared in the press of hooded terrorists with a couple of religious leaders standing there and seeming to endorse the hoods.

The one thing that can be said for some of the Sunni fundamentalist leaders is that they are leaders. One may deplore what they have done, their objectives, et cetera, but they are leaders.

One would hope, one ought to try to see if there is not a more positive, active, charismatic leadership in the Sunni community. Shams Al-Din in Lebanon, a key Shi'ite leader—that is the person, from his position, granted it is an establishment position, who if he were a more charismatic leader could have an influence. Even then it wouldn't be easy.

The second thing that worries me and this applies to Lebanon as a whole, it seems to me, that in that country for the last 10, 15 years, since 1965 really, we have a group of young men that have grown into adolescence and early manhood who have known nothing but being in a militia, be it Sunni, be it Shi'ite, be it Druze be it Maronite, or what have you.

How you socialize those young people to play a more constructive role in life, to develop a pattern of personal and human conduct, that does not simply involve violence. That to me is something that is going to require a battalion of psychiatrists for that strife-torn country.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

I thank both of our panelists. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Gentlemen, we thank you very much for your insights this afternoon. We have had you here for a long session. You have been very, very helpful. I would like to ask unanimous consent to insert a Washington Post article that appeared June 23, 1985, by Robin Wright,¹ and an article on Islamic Jihad groups, by Mr. James Piscatori, a Council on Foreign Relations Fellow. Without objection they will both be made part of the record.²

Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

¹ See appendix 2.

² See appendix 3.

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND ISLAMIC RADICALISM

MONDAY, JULY 15, 1985

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 2:05 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee will come to order.

The Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East today holds the second in a series of hearings on Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic radicalism. In today's hearing we will hear expert testimony on several Islamic movements, especially those in Lebanon and Iran.

It is the intention of the Chair in these hearings to try to develop some useful information on an important series of movements which are spreading throughout the Islamic world and some of which have caused problems for the United States in its efforts to promote peace and to protect and advance its interests in the Islamic world and the Middle East.

The United States needs to know more about the nature of Islamic fundamentalism and why it has some radical and extreme expressions, about why these movements often are anti-American and about how the United States should cope with the problems these movements represent. Fundamentalism is likely to be with us for some time and will, to some degree, affect our dealing with more than 1 billion Moslems who live in over 60 nations in the world.

We are fortunate to have with us today three well-known experts on Islam and the Middle East: Dr. Fouad Ajami from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Dr. Augustus Norton, Department of Social Science, U.S. Military Academy, West Point; Dr. Shahrough Akhavi—do I pronounce that correctly?

Dr. AKHAVI. Correct.

Mr. HAMILTON [continuing]. Department of Government, the University of South Carolina.

Gentlemen, we are very pleased to have each of you with us before the subcommittee. Two of you have prepared statements. We will have those, without objection, entered in the record in full.

And we would like, in order to maximize time for questions, have you summarize those statements in no more than 10 minutes.

Dr. Ajami, I think you want to make a statement. Is that correct?

Dr. AJAMI. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. So we will begin, gentlemen, with your statements. We will begin with you, Dr. Ajami, and then go across the line from my left to right, your right to your left. And then after each of you have made your statements we will open it up for questions.

You may proceed, Dr. Ajami.

STATEMENT OF DR. FOUAD AJAMI. THE JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dr. AJAMI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, gentlemen.

It is an honor to testify before this subcommittee whose chairman, members and staff are known for their in-depth work and monitoring of Middle Eastern issues.

Mr. Chairman, you do not need an expert to tell you that all is not well in the Moslem world and its Middle Eastern heartland.

Vast stretches of the Moslem world are slaughter grounds. Several of its cities are either ruined or in the grip of brutal dictatorships. There is a standoff in the Moslem world of today between old privilege and new wrath. The former, the old privilege, is in the saddle, but precariously so. The latter offers anger and rage, throws away all restraint, turns politics into the realm of God and Satan and martyrology. Hardly anything grows in the middle between the old privilege and the new wrath.

The former rushes now and then to Washington to frighten the men in Washington about the dark, demonic forces that would claim them, and presumably American interests along with them, unless America came to the rescue. The latter, the new wrath, offers nothing other than the conviction that the defiling world outside has to be smashed and expelled.

The great tradition of an Arab Moslem middle class holding its world together, maintaining traditions of concern and toil and scholarship, living within time-honored limits, is coming apart. The windfall society of the last decade—enormous wealth generating deep resentment—has claimed so many time-honored truths and limits in its way.

Today the new wrath is a militant form of neo-Shi'ism. Old quiescent Shi'ism, resigned to its fate, declaring the realm of politics a realm of compromise and betrayal, awaiting the return of the Hidden Imam who will appear at the end of time and fill the earth with justice has given way to an activist faith. The millenium is no longer to be awaited and hoped for; it is to be realized here and now. Khomeini, an old cleric, brooding in exile in Iraq, returned to his birthplace: the Ayatollah became Naib-Imam, the Imam's Deputy, and then, lo and behold, the word Naib was lost somewhere on the flight from Paris. A title loaded with messianic expectations was now his.

The impetus for this neo-Shi'ism came from Iran, the only Shi'ite state in the realm of Islam. But there was plenty of material in the Arab world for this spark to feed upon.

In a nutshell, in the Fertile Crescent—and I submit to you it is really the Fertile Crescent which is a problem for us—in the Fertile Crescent an Ottomanist political culture of urban notables that inherited the remains of the Ottoman empire is being challenged from below. To borrow a Moslem saying, this is a fight between the heights and depths of society.

This Ottomanist political culture donned the garb of Pan-Arabism. But in Iraq, Syria, and in Beirut, this Ottomanist political culture was the dominion of Sunni notables and ideologues, and state functionaries and merchants.

This is not the time or the place to discuss the merits and demerits of this political culture that inherited the Ottomans.

I think its legacy is mixed. On the negative side it had its phobias. It did not integrate the hinterland. It did not come to terms in an honest way with the fractured nature of Arab society. It had the arrogance of the city toward the countryside. It was nearly racist in its sense of who is an Arab and who is not. It could not put up a fight against the outside world.

On the positive side of this account, it was not notoriously or particularly savage or repressive. It was just complacent. And now, some six decades after Versailles and the collapse of the Ottoman order, the edifice has collapsed and we see the chaos we see. Hinterland cultures in the Moslem world are warring against cities, taking over cities.

We saw this accomplished through the route of the coup d'état with the Alawi mountainside boys claiming the great city of Damascus. We have seen a variant of it in Beirut with the Shi'ite squatters and urban newcomers crossing once-forbidden lines and now laying claim to West Beirut, Moslem Beirut, the traditional home and haven of the more settled and more privileged Sunni community.

In scenarios of doom, Baghdad too would fall, and that regime, a Sunni minority regime, would collapse, to be replaced by a regime made in Iran's image.

In my view this one particular scenario will not come to pass. The force of nationalism and the depth of the Arab/Persian divide will prove more mighty than the claims of Shi'ite loyalty. Whatever their brief against the regime of Saddam Hussein, the men and women of Iraq watching the carnage and the cruelty of the Iranian state ducked for cover, fought for their own state, and hoped for the best.

But even without the collapse of the Iraqi state and the fall of its city, the claims of this neo-Shi'ite movement have served a warrant on the old order.

It is clear that the new Shi'ite movement does not have proper manners. The depths of any society rarely have proper manners. Proper manners come later after power, after men experience the fulfillments and disappointments of power.

What this movement has going for it is the accumulated force of historical grievances. And its insistence, at a time of ideological exhaustion and fatigue in the Moslem world, that it does have answers to the wider dilemma of Islam and to the dilemmas of the Arab world.

This neo-Shi'ism is the third attempt to reconstitute Arab Moslem society since the demise of Arab nationalism and Nasserism in the six-day war.

The first was the Palestinian movement, and we have seen its fate. The second was the petrol era, and we have seen it fail. Now, anticipating the fate of this third bid, this third bid, the neo-Shi'ite bid, is not a spent force, not yet. But anticipating this story, as I will for you, this bid too will fail. It will because it will hurl itself against the awesome limits of Moslem reality. It will fail because Shi'ism is a ghetto in the Moslem world, the faith of an embattled minority.

The Shi'ite themes of solitude and martyrdom cannot carry. It will fail because it is in the nature of Moslem society to alternate between two figures: the Mahdi, the Messiah, offering redemption; and then the merchant, making a deal. This is a culture, remember, where mosque and bazaar are in close proximity to each other.

Six years ago the Mahdi issued his call from Tehran; his messianic theme was appealing. But now, with a messianic man in power, this has become problematic. Six years after the Iranian revolution the elan of the revolution, its moment of enthusiasm, is spent. So while tranquility is not in the cards, there are grounds for saying that the frenzy of the Iranian revolution has subsided.

Along the way, this neo-Shi'ism will have achieved something. It will, in its better moments, integrate the hinterland into the city. It might even shed some of its passionate sectarianism as men walk out of the darkness of Shi'ite history into the daylight of politics. It will bring to the surface some of the skeletons tucked away in the dark closets of the Moslem world.

The Shi'ite story I know best is Lebanon. The Shi'ites have emerged in Lebanon as the country's principal sect. This much was the unintended outcome of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

This gives the Shi'ites in Lebanon a chance to address some historical grievances. But they cannot duplicate Iran in Lebanon. And the majority of them know it. There can be no Wilayat al-Faqih, the rule of the jurist, in Lebanon, for a radical Shi'ite enterprise would be starved by the Arab world.

All these dilemmas, all the dilemmas your subcommittee is concerned with, are Moslem and Arab dilemmas.

I have just a few remarks about the U.S. angle of this.

America cannot be a party to the deep historical splits of Moslem society. We here cannot exorcise the ghosts of that region and we should not try. We should not substitute our judgments for theirs. The regimes there will stand or fall on their own merit.

We should not overdo the panic about the future of the regimes there. Some of the key states in the region are intact. The social contract in Saudi Arabia has held and survived the turmoil of the last few years. The pharaonic Egyptian state is still in the saddle, despite the problems of the Moslem fringe and the Moslem Brotherhood.

For America, the Middle East will remain a place hard to fathom and deal with. This is a region that invites America and rails against her. There is a neurotic love-hate relationship with America and things American. This is a region that gets more anti-American as it gets increasingly Americanized in attire, in fash-

ions, in technique. The disillusionment with America, the railing against America, the scapegoating that blames the distant superpower for all things under the sun is only the other side of the dependence on America, just a response to the long shadow that America has come to cast upon the region. It was kids with sneakers and T-shirts who took on the American Marines in Lebanon.

In the Moslem world, as in much of the Third World, America has formed so many of its rivals. The images we do not like in distant societies are often reflections of ourselves. America has held up before older societies a revolutionary message of social change and political equality; yet every now and then America rides into storms that she herself helped stir up. When we here understand this, we will begin to understand the ambivalence with which the American presence is greeted in places that invite us and then reject us.

It is our scripture of self-determination and equality that young Iranians in the late 1970's, young Shi'ites in Lebanon since 1982, and young Palestinians have been deploying against us. At times it seems that the convert remembers the scripture with greater fidelity than the teacher who might have taught it in a hurry, who might have thought that these ideas were not for export.

I will make this statement available in print to your committee.

Thank you very much.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Dr. Ajami.

Dr. Norton?

STATEMENT OF DR. AUGUSTUS R. NORTON, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT, NY

Dr. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be here to present testimony before the subcommittee.

Before proceeding I would like to note that I am here in my capacity as a scholar and not as a representative for the U.S. Military Academy or any other institution of the U.S. Government. In short, the opinions expressed are my own.

I would like to start with the obvious, but nonetheless essential observation that Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism is not a monolithic entity. It is a multifaceted admixture of parties, societies, and movements, with a correspondingly diverse collection of goals, programs and motives.

In short, we are not witnessing a religiously inspired behemoth lurching across the Middle East or the Islamic world for that matter. The Islamic movements often have little in common beyond their contending claims that they indeed rally under the banner of Islam.

Our purpose is not to diminish the importance of resurgent Islam, but to emphasize that it appears in many political forms. Not all of its varieties are necessarily at odds with the United States. I think my points will become clearer by speaking to a specific case. So, I would like to talk for a few moments about the Shi'ites of Lebanon, a community that I have been researching for the past 4 or 5 years.

I should note that I have provided more extensive treatments to Dr. Van Dusen, for inclusion, as appropriate, in the hearings record.

In Lebanon, as elsewhere in the Middle East, we find that we are not always dealing with well-articulated and well-integrated political organizations. Western notions of formal membership, replete with rosters and membership cards, simply do not apply. Instead, affiliation is loose and fluid. What we are witnessing is the precise antithesis of a Kiwanis Club-type organization, which is readily identifiable. Membership is a political state of mind instead of a case of formal association. Indeed, when we are dealing with groups like Amal and Hizbullah, we are probably closer to the mark if we refer to a "following," as opposed to a body of formal members.

The upshot is that if a leader in such a movement is not sensitive to shifting political tides, he risks being stranded at port as his vessel steams off into the sunset.

A brief consideration of the development of the Amal movement will illustrate my points.

After a somewhat checkered history, Amal was well on its way to becoming the leading Shi'ite movement in Lebanon by the late 1970's. Spurred by the loss of its charismatic leader, Musa al-Sadr, who gained symbolic stature due to his mysterious 1978 disappearance in Libya; the Islamic revolution in Iran, which provided a role model for effective collective action—as well as a role model for previously quiescent Shi'ite clerics in Lebanon; and, finally, a deep resentment and hatred for the Palestinian guerrillas who occupied much of the Shi'ite populated regions of Lebanon, the Amal movement enjoyed dynamic growth in the late 1970's and early 1980's.

The Shi'ites found, solidarity in Amal, as well as an increasingly potent vehicle for collective self-defense. By the eve of the Israeli invasion in June 1982, the Amal movement was basically at war with the PLO, a war which was, as you know, recently reignited by the Amal movement.

Although the movement could only count a fraction of the Shi'ites as formal members, it came to reflect the communal political consciousness of the Shi'ites. Like many populist movements, Amal lacked [and still lacks] a definitive political program, but the outline of a program is not hard to discern.

In a nutshell, the movement stands for:

The territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon.

The reestablishment of Lebanese legality and civility.

A greater share of political power for the Shi'ites, who are the plurality in Lebanon.

And, in something of a contradiction to the last point, the abolishment of the so-called confessional system, the system whereby political rewards are distributed according to sectarian formulae.

Following Israel's June 1982 invasion, most of the Shi'ites expected the Israeli forces to withdraw from Lebanon within months, and with the PLO excised from the south and from Beirut, there were exuberant hopes for the future. Certainly, the Amal leadership expected to reap great political benefits as they shunted aside the traditional political bosses who for so long dominated Shi'ite politics. In retrospect, the Amal leadership exhibited great patience. In fact,

for more than a year men like Nabih Berri, so recently in the news and the leader of Amal since 1980, sat on their hands * * * waiting.

But if the leaders displayed patience, their followers were losing theirs. Throughout 1983 intercommunal tensions raged. The Maronites, vicarious victors in the 1982 war, showed little intention of allowing the Shi'ites a larger share of power. The Israelis seemed to be bedding down for a long stay in south Lebanon, and Amal's more radical competitors began to siphon off its following. The destruction of the U.S. Embassy in April 1983 and the marine barracks in October 1983 only served to emphasize the ineffectualness of Amal's centrist leadership.

The movement's competitors were dominating the resistance to the Israeli occupation in the south. Shi'ite clerics, who at least grudgingly accepted Amal's authority in the past, were now striking out on their own or invigorating Amal's prime organizational competitor, Hizbullah.

Although a simple dichotomy understates the complexity of Shi'ite politics, it is fair to note that the basic political conflict within the community is between two contending visions of society, represented by the Amal Movement and Hizbullah.

In the case of Amal, the vision is one of a secular Lebanon, in which religious heterogeneity is preserved. While Amal does not denigrate the Iranian exemplar, the movement's leaders have quite explicitly declared that the Islamic Republic model is not appropriate for Lebanon. Moreover, it is important to recognize that the Iranian Government has more or less declared Amal anathema because of its anti-Islamic views.

In the case of Hizbullah, the vision is of a Lebanon ruled by Islamic law, in close association with the revered Islamic Republic of Iran. Thus, the stakes in the Amal-Hizbullah competition are anything but trivial. While Amal has the members, Hizbullah has a dedicated corps of leaders whose refusal to equivocate plays well in the present climate of radicalization, proving once again that extremism feeds on extremism.

Moreover, Hizbullah seems to be generously funded, in contrast to Amal whose financial resources may indeed be more limited. (Amal's budget is largely drawn from contributions by Lebanese Shi'ites.) For instance, it is not insignificant that within the current climate of economic despair and disorder in Lebanon, Hizbullah pays its fighters respectable wages, while Amal's men are largely part-time militiamen who are poorly paid, if at all.

By the way, I should underline the fact that Hizbullah is not merely armed with placards and handguns, but with antitank and anti-aircraft weapons and towed artillery. As one veteran observer of Lebanon told me just recently, it is becoming a potent military force, by Lebanese standards, at least.

After more than a year's delay, and facing the fear of supplantment, Amal reacted, in the second half of 1983, to reverse the drain on its following. It began playing a larger role in resisting the Israeli occupation of the south. By late 1984, the majority of the attacks against Israel in south Lebanon were—according to Israeli reckoning—the work of the Amal movement. On the Lebanese political scene, the movement became much more active and militant.

Nabih Berri, whose survival instincts are indeed keen, recognized that Shi'ite politicians either adapt to the political realities of the present, or they step aside. Thus, when Berri's Amal movement moved into west Beirut in February 1984 after the Shi'ites were shelled by the Lebanese Army, it was as much to preserve a political grip, as it was to confront a Maronite-dominated regime that seemed to consider its Shi'ite constituents enemies. In my judgment, had Berri not acted, he would have been pushed aside.

Since the momentous events of February 1984, a month that not only saw the Shi'ites take over west Beirut, but the redeployment of the U.S. Marine contingent in the Multinational Force, Amal has clearly maintained its majoritarian hold, but only through shrewd maneuvering. More important, while Amal is still at the center of Shi'ite politics, the center is now far removed from where it used to be.

The recent hijacking episode illustrates Amal's—and Berri's—dilemma. To be sure, Berri did not take charge of the hostages without taking account of intra-Amal and intracommunal politics. His move was calculated to steal the march from his more extremist competitors, who reside both within Amal and Hizbullah. Moreover, Berri is sensitive enough to Shi'ite politics to recognize that had he not seized the opportunity, his following and authority would have been undercut.

But, Nabih Berri and Amal live in a tough neighborhood where anti-U.S. sentiments run deep. Dealing with the United States is a delicate, dangerous matter and without the face-saving intervention of Syria, it is not unlikely that Berri would have lost a good chunk of his following to some of his rabidly anti-American opponents.

There is no denying, by the way, that among the Islamic movements there are permanent enemies of the United States. We should make no mistake about this. I would include Hizbullah in the permanent enemy category. Hizbullah, and groups like it, are enemies whose demands cannot be met and whose enmity for the United States will not be mitigated, whatever we do or fail to do. Obviously, such organizations often need an enemy in order to mobilize support. It is always easier to blame the United States instead of oneself. Hence, for Hizbullah the United States is behind all of the catastrophes faced by the Shi'ites.

However, it seems to me that it is also important to recognize that there are those who are not, if you will, permanent enemies of the United States.

There are, situational enemies of the United States. The case of the Lebanese Shi'ites makes the point. Most of the Lebanese Shi'ites are definitely not permanent enemies of the United States, but they do believe that the United States bears a large share of blame for the events of the past few years. Obviously, the Israeli invasion and its aftermath are not easily forgotten by those who had to live through it.

To an extent that is not always fully recognized in the United States, Israel is frequently viewed as the stalking horse of American power. Thus, when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, many Arabs feel that the U.S. invaded as well. Whatever the merits or demerits of Israel's involvement in Lebanon, in the eyes of the Leb-

anese Shi'ites—and many other Moslems as well—the United States is often seen to be too inclined to turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to Israel's actions.

What I mean to suggest, is that given the high level of moral, political and financial support for Israel, we cannot afford to ignore situations where Israel's policies and actions may complicate our relations with other states and peoples in the Middle East.

I will conclude with a few brief comments about coping with Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism, in the context of U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Quite plainly, we are trying to cope with profoundly difficult political phenomena, whether in Lebanon or elsewhere—phenomena that are not always well understood in the Middle East, much less in the West.

There are no general solutions, per se. That is not to argue that the United States is powerless. The continued commitment of the United States to principles—justice, for example; the rule of law; and individual freedom—will serve its interests very well. In addition, we must continue to recognize that, in dealing with the troubled Middle East, patient diplomacy is a definite virtue. At the same time, patience does not signify disinterest or neglect. The problems of the region will not disappear. The hot spots will only get hotter if unattended. Neglect or disinterest is certainly not justified, given the complexity and the seriousness of the problems.

In closing, I am afraid that I will have to predict that this committee will have to endure many more sessions on Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism. The issue will be with us for many years to come.

Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Dr. Norton.

[The full statement of Dr. Norton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. AUGUSTUS NORTON, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE,
U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT, NY

I am pleased to have the opportunity to present testimony before the subcommittee. Before proceeding however, I would like to note that it is my understanding that I have been asked to testify in my capacity as a scholar who has spent a good part of the past five years researching and writing about the subject at hand. Thus, I feel I should emphasize that my statement and testimony do not necessarily reflect the policy of the United States Government, or the position of any of its subsidiary institutions or organizations. In short, the opinions expressed are my own.

I would like to start with the obvious, but nonetheless essential observation that Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism is not a monolithic entity, but a multi-faceted admixture of parties, societies and movements with a correspondingly diverse collection of goals, programs and motives. In short, we are not witnessing a religiously inspired behemoth lurching across the Middle East (or the Islamic world for that matter). The Islamic movements often have little in common beyond their respective — and often contending — claims that they rally under the banner of Islam. My purpose is not to diminish the importance of resurgent Islam, but to emphasize that it appears in many political forms, not all of which are necessarily at odds with the United States.

I think there is a tendency to approach the subject of the Islamic movements as if they were yet another product of the mysterious, inscrutable East. Although there are undoubtedly unique esoteric aspects to some of the movements, I would like to submit that we are observing a comprehensible form of politics that is less difficult to understand than we sometimes presume.

If there is one common denominator shared by many, if not all of the Islamic movements, it is a deeply felt sense of disenfranchisement. Few Middle East states have succeeded in providing their citizens an effective voice in government. Political participation, in the form of plebiscites or skewed elections, has more often than not been more show than substance. With few exceptions, political representation is rigged to benefit the representatives rather than the represented. Islamic movements not only offer a channel for participation but, in states where the secret police budget often rivals the public health budget, the mosque or the local religious center frequently provides a locale for meeting away from the gaze of unwanted observers.

For the past few decades, the Arab republics have dabbled with various secular ideologies, ranging from Nasirism to Arab socialism, but few of these governments have succeeded in outpacing the burgeoning demands brought about by widespread social change and disruption. In many cases, the unspoken, if not the expressed goal was to secularize society. What we are now witnessing is a dampening of the penchant for secularization. In the end, the rulers' ideologies of the 1950s and 1960s have foundered or failed, leaving in their place a vacuum yet to be filled. As leaders like

Husni Mubarak, Hafez al-As'ad and Saddam Husain grapple with the problems of the states that they lead, it is clear that while Islam may not fully shape their policies, it will certainly temper them.

It is not accurate to say that Islam has been rediscovered, it is too deeply imbedded in Middle East culture to have become "lost," but for many Muslims Islam has a renewed appeal as a culturally authentic and familiar idiom of protest and political action. Unlike communism, liberalism and socialism, Islam is untainted by recent failure or by association with the West or its values. (In the political mythology of the region the West is enthusiastically assailed for its past and present "imperialistic" deeds.)

In short, Islam serves not only as a psychic refuge, but as a political refuge; it is as much a vehicle for effective political action, as it is a form of escape from a cruel world. Just like any political ideology, Islam is subject to exploitation and manipulation by politicians -- whether they be clerics or former army officers -- who compete to employ Islamic symbolism affectively and effectively.

Islam, Politics and Pragmatism

It is particularly striking to note the essential pragmatism that seems to characterize many of the Islamic movements, notwithstanding their avowedly principled stands. In the recent general elections in Egypt, for instance, we found the venerable Islamic Brotherhood in an electoral coalition with the neo-Wafd party. The neo-Wafd is the recently revived descendant of the pre-1952 Wafd which was a lightning rod for Brotherhood attacks in earlier days. In Syria, the Sunni opponents of Hafez al-As'ad's

'Alawi-dominated government clothe themselves in Islamic rhetoric, yet when we peel away the rhetoric, we discover that their basic complaint is that the Sunni Muslims do not enjoy the majority rule to which they are entitled based on their numbers. Islamic politics are -- we need to remind ourselves -- politics and, as in politics worldwide, highmindedness often cohabits with less august traits.

The Shi'a of Lebanon

I would like to share some of the insights I have garnered through my research on the Shi'a with the subcommittee. I should note that I have provided more extensive treatments to Dr. Van Dusen, for inclusion, as appropriate, in the hearings record.

In Lebanon, as elsewhere in the Middle East, we find that we are not always dealing with well-articulated and well-integrated political organizations. Western notions of formal membership, replete with rosters and membership cards, simply do not apply. Instead affiliation is loose and fluid. Membership is a political state of mind, instead of a case of formal association. Indeed, when we are dealing with groups like Amal and Hizb Allah, we are probably closer to the mark if we refer to a "following." The upshot is that if a leader in such a movement is not sensitive to shifting political tides, he risks being stranded at port as his vessel steams off into the sunset.

A brief consideration of the Amal movement may make my points a bit clearer. After a somewhat checkered history, the Amal movement was well on its way to becoming the leading Shi'a movement in Lebanon by the late

1970s. Spurred by the loss of its charismatic leader, Musa al-Sadr, who gained symbolic stature due to his mysterious 1978 disappearance in Libya; as well as the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which provided a role model for effective collective action (and also a role model for previously quiescent Shi'a clerics); and, a deep resentment and hatred for the Palestinian guerrillas who occupied much of the Shi'a populated regions of Lebanon, the Shi'a found solidarity in Amal, as well as an increasingly potent vehicle for collective self-defense. By the eve of the Israeli invasion in June 1982, the Amal movement was basically at war with the PLO, a war which was recently reignited by Amal.

Although Amal could only count a fraction of the Shi'a as formal members, the movement came to reflect the communal political consciousness of the Shi'a. Like many populist movements, Amal lacked (and still lacks) a definitive political program, but the outlines of a program were not hard to discern. In a nutshell, the movement stands for:

- The territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon.
- The reestablishment of legality and civility.
- A greater share of political power for the Shi'a (who are the plurality in Lebanon).
- And, in something of a contradiction to the last point, the abolishment of the so-called confessional system, the system whereby political rewards are distributed according to sectarian formulae.

The Post-Invasion Period

Following the June invasion, most of the Shi'a expected the Israeli forces to withdraw from Lebanon within months and with the PLO excised from

the South and Beirut, there were exuberant hopes for the future. Certainly, the Amal leadership expected to reap great political benefits as they shunted aside the traditional political bosses who had for so long dominated the Shi'a politics. In retrospect, the Amal leadership exhibited great patience. In fact, for more than a year men like Nabih Berrī -- the leader of Amal since 1980 -- sat on their hands...waiting. But if the leaders displayed patience, their followers were losing theirs.

Throughout 1983 inter-communal tensions raged. The Maronites, vicarious victors, showed little intention of allowing the Shi'a a larger share of power. The Israelis seemed to be bedding down for a long stay in South Lebanon, and Amal's more radical competitors began to siphon off its following. The destruction of the U.S. Embassy in April and the Marine barracks in October only served to emphasize the ineffectualness of Amal's centrist leadership. Amal's competitors were dominating the resistance to the Israeli occupation in the south. Shi'a clerics, who at least grudgingly accepted Amal's authority in the past, were now striking out on their own or invigorating Amal's prime organizational competitor, Hizb Allah.

Although a simple dichotomy understates the complexity of Shi'a politics, it is fair to note that the basic political conflict within the community is between two contending visions of society. In the case of Amal, the vision is one of a secular Lebanon, in which religious heterogeneity is preserved. While Amal does not denigrate the Iran exemplar, the movement's leaders have quite explicitly declared that the Islamic Republic model is not appropriate for Lebanon. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that the Iranian government has more-or-less declared Amal anathema because of

its "anti-Islamic" views. In the case of Hizb Allah, the vision is of a Lebanon ruled by Islamic law, in close association with the revered Islamic Republic of Iran. Thus, the stakes in the Amal-Hizb Allah competition are anything but trivial.

While Amal has the numbers, Hizb Allah has a dedicated cadre of leaders whose refusal to equivocate plays well in the present climate of radicalization, proving once again that extremism feeds on extremism. Moreover, Hizb Allah seems to be generously funded, in contrast to Amal whose financial resources may be more limited. For instance, it is not insignificant that in the current climate of economic despair Hizb Allah pays its fighters respectable wages, while Amal's men are largely part-time militiamen who are poorly paid, if at all. (I was once told by a well-placed Shi'a banker that one of his contributions to Amal was carrying the two bodyguards of one of the movement's principal leaders, on his payroll. It seems that Amal couldn't afford to pay them.)

By the way, I should underline the fact that Hizb Allah is not merely armed with placards and handguns, but with anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, and towed artillery. As one veteran observer from Lebanon told me recently, it is becoming a potent military force, by Lebanese standards.

After more than a year's delay, and facing the risk of supplantment, Amal reacted, in the second half of 1983, to reverse the drain on its following. It began playing a larger role in resisting the Israeli occupation of the south. By late 1984, the majority of attacks against Israel in South Lebanon were -- according to Israeli reckoning -- the work of Amal.

Nabih Berri, whose survival instincts are keen, recognized that Shi'a politicians either adapt to the political realities of the present, or they

step aside. Thus, when Berri's Amal movement moved into West Beirut in February 1984, it was as much to preserve a political grip as it was to confront a Maronite-dominated regime that seemed to consider its Shi'a constituents enemies. In my judgment, had Berri not acted, he would have been pushed aside.

Since the momentous events of February 1984, a month that not only saw the Shi'a takeover of West Beirut, but the redeployment of the U.S. Marine contingent in the Multinational Force, Amal has clearly maintained its majoritarian hold, but only through shrewd maneuvering. More important, while Amal is still at the center of Shi'a politics, the center is now far removed from where it used to be.

The recent hijacking episode illustrates Amal's (and Berri's) dilemma. To be sure, Berri did not take charge of the hostages without taking account of intra-Amal and intra-communal politics. His move was calculated to steal the march from his more extremist competitors (who reside both within Amal and Hizb Allah). Moreover, Berri is sensitive enough to Shi'a politics to recognize that had he not seized the opportunity, his following and authority would have been undercut. But, Berri and Amal live in a tough neighborhood, where anti-U.S. sentiments run deep, and without the face-saving intervention of Syria, it is not unlikely that Berri would have lost a good chunk of his following to some of his rabidly anti-American opponents.

Permanent Enemies and Other Adversaries

There is no denying that among the Islamic movements there are permanent enemies of the United States, enemies whose demands cannot be met and whose enmity for the United States will not be mitigated, whatever we do or fail to do. Obviously, such organizations often need an enemy in order to mobilize support; it is always easier to blame the United States instead of oneself. The Hizb Allah organization, for instance, asserts "America [is] behind all our catastrophes." With such viscerally anti-American groups, there is little room or reason for dialogue. However, not all Islamic movements are ipso facto anti-American. Thus, it seems to me, that our task is to be sure that we are distinguishing those in the first category from those in the second.

The case of the Lebanese Shi'a makes the point. Most of the Lebanese Shi'a are not permanent enemies of the United States, but they do believe that the U.S. bears a share of blame for the events of the past few years. To an extent that is not always fully recognized in the United States, Israel is frequently viewed as the stalking horse of American power. Whatever the merits or demerits of Israel's involvement in Lebanon, in the eyes of the Lebanese Shi'a -- and many other Muslims as well -- the United States is often seen as being too inclined to turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to Israel's actions. Frankly, I can state from first-hand experience that in the middle of a bombing run by a U.S. manufactured combat aircraft, it is not always easy to only see IDF markings. What I mean to suggest, is that given the high level of moral, political and financial support for Israel, we cannot afford to ignore situations where Israel's policies and

actions may complicate our relations with other states and peoples in the Middle East.

Coping

Quite plainly we are trying to cope with profoundly difficult political phenomena, phenomena that are not always well understood in the Middle East, much less in the West. There are no general solutions per se, but that is not to argue that the United States is powerless. The continued commitment of the United States to the principles for which it stands — justice, the rule of law and individual freedom — will serve its interests very well. In addition, we must continue to recognize that, in dealing with the troubled Middle East, patient diplomacy is a definite virtue. At the same time, patience does not signify disinterest or neglect. The problems of the region will not disappear, and some of the hot spots will only get hotter if unattended.

In closing, I am afraid that I will have to predict that this subcommittee will have to endure many more sessions on Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism. The issue will be with us for many years to come.

Mr. HAMILTON. Dr. Akhavi.

STATEMENT OF DR. SHAHROUGH AKHAVI, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Dr. AKHAVI. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for the opportunity to address this subcommittee. My remarks will be given over to Iran and Islamic radicalism in the Middle East.

The purposes of my paper deal with who rules Iran, what the objectives of the leadership are, the linkages that this leadership might have with other Islamic movements abroad, United States policies, as I see them, as well as some suggestions that I would like to propose before the committee.

On the question of who rules Iran, it seems to me, of course, that its clerics rule—professional religionaries who are what we might call the ruling class, who are backed up in support positions by secular but religiously-minded intellectuals. In that sense, I would regard these intellectuals as, so to speak, commissioners of the clergy who implement the decisions.

Probably more interesting for you in the way of new information, though, is the background of some of these clerics—where they come from, essentially, in terms of the social basis of their power.

Research increasingly shows that these people are basically urban, lower middle class in their backgrounds, which means that

they are sons of small merchants, shopkeepers or self-employed people, on the one hand, or else they are the sons or nephews or what-have-you, of the rural poor—in other words, they have peasantry backgrounds.

Now, as far as the socialization of these people—in other words, how do they think? And what kinds of ideas do they have about world politics and the world in general?

Because of their theological seminary training, these are people with, what I would imagine, could be called a “provincial or parochial mind-set.”

If you compare them with the Bolshevik leadership after the Soviet revolution in 1917 and look at the people, the personalities, probably due to the fact that many of them spent a good deal of their time abroad before they actually seized power, they were cosmopolitan, and then they gave way to a group of people like Stalin and Molotov and Kaganovich who were more basically representatives of a provincial and inward-looking mentality.

In Iran, because of the long heritage of foreign impact, including the Russian and the British presence—and after 1953, that of the United States—there is a tendency to search for conspiracies; in other words, to explain events by relationship to the great powers and how the great powers manipulate the developments there. A good example of this, in my paper, is the Iranian calculation of how Saddam Hussein of Iraq has been able to maintain his position there.

One of the consequences of the war between Iraq and Iran has been a tempered rapprochement between the United States and Iraq. Now, this is a result, as I see, it but this very result is then taken, in fact, to be the cause of Iraq's invasion of Iran in the first place. So the top leadership in Iran today never loses a moment essentially saying and reminding the population of that country that this is not a war against Iraq; it is a war against the United States.

Of course, to a Western mind, the fact that Baghdad and Washington have reestablished diplomatic relations is largely due to the American fear of the export of Iran's revolution to neighboring countries and the destabilization of the Gulf region in general. But for the Khomeini regime, in fact, Washington was the sponsor of the Iraqi invasion from the very beginning, since, as we can now all see, warmer relations exist between the two countries.

This kind of post hoc ergo propter hoc attitude about the foreign great powers is to some extent an inevitable outcome of the narrow training, the kind of narrow vision, of the leadership.

But I do see some grounds for change in this; and I particularly focus on the Speaker of the Parliament, Rafsanjani, who appears to be moving a little bit away from this extremely provincial mindset and toward more open-mindedness. Perhaps it may represent the first beginnings of a more cosmopolitan outlook on the part of this leadership.

For example, in the release of the TWA hostages, apparently, he had some role to play, and we are still not sure whether it was the President of Syria influencing him, or perhaps the Iranian leadership going to the Syrians and saying, “You know, we really don't want anything to do with this. It is too controversial.”

So, there is one bit of evidence. Also, of course, there is his statement in general opposing hostage-taking, especially if it involves innocent people; and then the more specifically geared statement to the TWA incident—that is, that if the Iranian leadership had known about these events in advance, they would have moved to stop it. In China, he has been on a tour of countries—Japan, China, as well as Syria, of course. In China, he said, “It is not as though we forever want to have bad relations with the United States.”

You may choose to interpret these statements the way you would like, of course. But one way to interpret them is that there is the beginnings of some change here in the thinking.

Now, as to the regime’s objectives—ideally, of course, this leadership wants to have Islamic republics throughout the Middle East. But, more realistically, what we have to deal with is that, as I see it, they have three basic objectives.

First of all, as all revolutionaries want to do, they want to defend their revolution.

Second, they want to maintain—and I use that word advisedly—they want to maintain their economic relations with the Western European countries and Japan. Third, of course, they are opposed to U.S. policies in the Middle East. Among these policies of the United States in the Middle East, the Palestine issue stands out very importantly; and this issue for the regime is significant.

To be sure there is some posturing on the part of the leadership on the question of Palestine in the sense that they would like to have no enemies on the left—in the sense that they would like to be, known supporters of the Palestinians, whereas perhaps deeply down inside of them, they don’t love the blue eyes of the Palestinians all that much. But I think it would be a mistake for us simply to dismiss the sincerity of at least some of their feelings.

What could the United States do about this? It seems to me we have the President’s initiative of September 1, 1982, part of which dealt with settlements in the West Bank, and this idea of the Jewish settlements has been a controversial one of course.

One of the things the United States could do to give teeth to this statement is simply to calculate how much the Government of Israel spends on the building of West Bank settlements on an annual basis, and then deduct that from the annual appropriations to the Government of Israel.

In that sense, not seeing ourselves as subsidizing these settlements, contravening the President’s statement, we would thereby be depriving the Iranian regime of an issue with which they could beat us over the head, so to speak.

It in addition would of course show the world that the President’s initiative was not meant to die “aborning,” so to speak; and third, and not the last, I think it would encourage moderate Palestinians and, it must be added, moderate Israelis to crystallize views that they dare not make public because they are too vulnerable.

As far as the links of the leadership with radical Islamic movements abroad, the links are financial, and moral, or spiritual, but the regime has problems in its linkages to Sunni Islamic militant fundamentalist movements.

As for example in Hama, I think it was in 1982 or 1981 the Moslem Brotherhood of Syria was severely repressed by an ally of

Iran—the President of Syria—and Khomeini really did not do anything about this. I am sure that that had influence; that had some impact on the thinking of Sunni Moslems in that country as well as on the Brotherhood in other areas.

The regime seems even to have problems with Shi'ite movements in Iraq, and in Lebanon to some extent. They have not been able to rally Iraqi Shi'ites to mobilize against Saddam Hussein's government and to overthrow it on behalf of the Iranian cause.

And, even in the case of Lebanon, in the earlier period of this regime—that is, between 1979 and 1982, I really do not think that they had as good relations with the Shi'ites in Lebanon as they did with the PLO in Lebanon.

So, it is actually the impact of the events after 1982 which has made it possible, it seems to me, for the regime to establish firmer ties with breakaway Amal groups in Lebanon.

I will close with some recommendations, perhaps, on U.S. policy.

In the first place, my own personal preference would be for us to support the Brookings Institution report of 1975, which held out the possibility of a state for Palestinians.

But the very least that the United States could do is to discuss the 1982 initiative of the President and give substance to that initiative in the way of the West Bank settlements.

Second, we ought to support structural change in Lebanon, although not rapid structural change. But we ought to be aware of the realities of that country, the demographic patterns, and not be seen as members of anti-Islamic coalitions—if we can help it.

[Dr. Akhavi's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHAHROUGH AKHAVI, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

I. Introduction

As has been pointed out by previous speakers at the first session of these hearings, Islamic fundamentalism is the broad term given to a wide variety of groups and movements whose general point of reference is Islamic doctrines and practices. The differences among these groups are significant enough to warrant caution, for we ought not to attribute to them a unity that they in fact do not have. Still, it is the case that a common denominator does tie these groups together, and this Committee has already heard from expert witnesses that this unifying factor is opposition to Western models of social change, economic development and political rule.

Fundamentalism means a return to the fundamentals, and as Ambassador Eilts has argued here, the history of the modern Middle East shows that movements seeking to recapture the past tend to appear and reappear in cyclical fashion. We are currently in a period in the Middle East not unlike that in the early 20th century. By that time, Middle Eastern elites had had ample opportunity to experiment with various Western models of society, economy and politics — especially *laissez faire* economics and parliamentarism. Because the structure of Middle Eastern societies differs from that of Western countries, such models could not succeed and became discredited.

Therefore, a rejection of the models took place, accompanied by fundamentalist reassessments, and the locus of such reassessments was Egypt. But there is one major difference between the disenchantment with Westernism of the earlier part of this century and today: in the earlier period the West was in a position to dominate the area militarily, and it did so. Today, this is not the case, and this is the reason why

the repudiation of Western models today appears to be accompanied not only by rejection but violence in the last five or six years.

Other scholars and diplomats who will have appeared before this Committee shall have addressed their remarks to such questions as the implications of Islamic movements for United States foreign policy; the appropriate American response to these movements; the strengths and weaknesses of American policy; and the like. While I will be referring to these somewhat more general issues, my main purpose here will be to look more closely at the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with particular attention to its composition, objectives, possible linkages with movements in other Middle Eastern countries, and the policies of the United States.

II. The Leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Iranian leadership consists of two basic groups: (1) professional clerics; (2) religiously-minded but secular "intellectuals" -- defining that term rather broadly to include what in the West would be considered bureaucrats, administrators, managers, lawyers, doctors, engineers, teachers, etc. The second group acts in the role of commissioners who essentially either implement substantive policy decisions made by the clerics or set up agendas and plans that set the parameters for clerical decision-making on technical issues. After the early enthusiasm of the revolution, when the militant clerics practically encouraged specialists to leave the country because they allegedly lacked ideological "purity", the regime is currently trying very hard to woo these people back.

In any case, since the clerics are the ruling class in Iran today, we ought to be clear as to their origins and social composition. Research

is increasingly showing that these men are mainly from urban lower middle class or poor rural backgrounds. A very large group of them were actually students of Ayatollah Khomeini before his exile to Iraq in 1964. Their socialization is almost exclusively based on experiences inside Iran, and their information about the West is inevitably colored by this fact of their provincialism. If one compares this revolutionary elite to that of the Bolsheviks in the early period of their revolution, for example, one immediately notices the narrow horizons of the former and the cosmopolitan nature of the latter's training, orientation and outlook.

I believe that the fact that the Iranian clerics are essentially products of the internal system of theological seminaries in Iran and lack substantial foreign experience heavily influenced their thinking and behavior during the revolution and for some time thereafter. Ayatollah Khomeini's view of the West, and particularly of the United States, as the mortal threat to his revolution is something he had brought up time and time again in his lectures to his students before the revolution. Because Iran during the 19th and much of the 20th centuries had been an arena of great power conflict, the thinking there prior to the 1979 revolution was that political initiatives never come from actors inside the country but always result from decisions made in London, Moscow and, since 1953, Washington. If that was the general trend among Iranians of all social strata, all the more was it the case for the clerics. It was partly to break that pattern of external intervention that the Shi'ite clergy participated in the collective protests that ultimately brought down the Pahlavi dynasty.

These individuals see themselves as the guardians of the religious law, whose supremacy they intend to vindicate against perceived plots

by the West to weaken Islam. The religious leadership's confidence in being able to sustain Islamic law stems from the following factors: (1) the history of Shi'ite clerics since at least the 19th century in actively and successfully opposing Western policies; (2) the fact that when concessions had been granted to foreigners or treaties signed alienating parts of the Iranian patrimony to foreign powers, these undertakings were always engineered by secular elites and never members of the clergy; (3) the unprecedented relationship that exists between a Shi'ite high cleric and his followers, according to which obedience to the latter is enjoined upon ordinary citizens; (4) the powerful emotional bonding that takes place between a cleric and his followers in consequence of the theme of messianic martyrdom that seems particular to the Shi'ite rite of Islam.

Khomeini's message to these clerics after his exile to Iraq in 1964 repeatedly emphasized the need for the religious leaders to create an Islamic government and, beyond that, to exercise executive rule. Thus, when the religiously minded secularists, such as Prime Minister Bazargan, President Bani Sadr and others claim to have been deceived by a Khomeini protesting that he would retire to Qom and allow them to rule, one has to wonder where they were all those years and why were they not reading Khomeini's works seriously?!

This is not the place, of course, to investigate the complex argument Khomeini has advanced to justify clericalism (rule by the clergy). But the social origins of this clergy, with its roots in the traditional bazaar and the peasantry, indicates that their mind set is limited to their own narrow experiences. When one combines the limited horizons that provincialism features with the tendency to reason from the

consequences of events to their causes, the result is often a violent rejection of outsiders, who are perceived as meddlers and enemies. An example of this may be seen in the clergy's interpretation of the cause of Saddam Hosain's ability in Iraq to hold on to power. One of the consequences of the war between Iran and Iraq has been a tempered rapprochement between the United States and Iraq. This very result is then taken in fact to be the cause of Iraq's invasion of Iran in the first place. Thus, the top leadership in Iran today never loses a moment to remind the population that the Iranians are not fighting the Iraqis but in fact are waging war against the United States. Now, to a Western mind, the fact that Baghdad and Washington have re-established diplomatic relations is largely due to the American fear of the export of Iran's revolution to neighboring countries and the de-stabilization of the Gulf region. But for the Khomeini regime, in fact Washington was the sponsor of the Iraqi invasion from the very beginning — since, it is alleged — all can now witness the warmer relations that exist between this country and Iraq.

This sort of post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning is, to be sure, complicating efforts to ease tensions with Iran on the part of this Administration. But it is also part of a broader dynamic in Lebanon, as well, where the United States is suspected of having pushed the Israelis to invade that country in 1982. On this level, one of the consequences of the Israeli invasion was the military defeat of the PLO. But this result of the invasion is perceived in Tehran to have been the cause of the United States "unleashing" Israeli troops into Lebanon. Of course, in putting it this way I hope I am not implying that the United States had nothing to do with the Israeli invasion. On the contrary, in my opinion this government played a lamentable role in actually encouraging

this action by not taking a decisive position against it. But my larger point is that provincialism tends to limit one's thinking to the sort of quest for simple answers to the complex issues that I have been talking about.

The Iranian leadership has mainly been in the news in the United States of late because of events outside Iran. Most specifically, its role in Lebanon has attracted world attention. But in some respects one must investigate their involvements abroad in terms of a continuing power struggle inside Iran among the clerics themselves. Of course, all the important clergymen defer to Khomeini's general Manichaean perspective of the world. But policy differences are sharp, and we ought to be aware of the impact such differences may have on the politics of the Middle East as a whole.

Under the mantle of Khomeini the clergy as a whole has been able to prevent the rise of their enemies, such as the guerrilla group known as the Mujahidin-e Khalq, the exiled leaders in France, the royalist army officers, and members of the Communist Party of Iran. But this clergy seems to lack a clear sense of priorities. What unites them is their common socialization experiences as students in Qom and other religious centers. But this may be beginning to change. Although it is still too early to tell, it may be that the Iranian leadership is moving in the opposite direction from that of the Bolsheviks, to whom reference was made above. Whereas cosmopolitan leaders such as Lenin and Trotsky gave way to people like Stalin, Molotov and Kaganovich in the Soviet Union, what may be happening in Iran is that provincialist leaders are beginning to be challenged by those with at least professedly broader viewpoints. I have in mind especially the growing role of the Speaker

of Parliament, Hojjat al-Islam 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is apparently the legatee of the tradition of Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari (d. 1979) and Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti (d. 1981). By that, I mean that all three leaders exemplify a more aware consciousness of the world around them and, perhaps, a touch of pragmatism. Withal, Rafsanjani has recently been on a tour of countries, including Syria, Japan and China. His recent meeting with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad may have been critical in the decision to release the TWA 847 passengers. In China he remarked that it is not as though Iran wants to have inimical relations with the United States forever (albeit he did say it was up to the United States to take the first step to restore these relations). Finally, one must note his statement that his government is opposed to the taking of hostages, especially when it involves innocent people.

Of course, Rafsanjani's claim to be against hostage taking has a hollow ring to it in view of the events in Tehran some five to six years ago. But it may be that we are seeing the start of a change in the regime's austere isolationist views, and that taking hostages is no longer considered a means to fight one's internal power struggles.

Ranged against this possibly emerging tendency is the more orthodox xenophobic mentality that is probably more characteristic of people such as the Supreme Court Justice, Ayatollah 'Abd al-Karim Musavi Ardabili, the State Prosecutor-General, Ayatollah Yusif Sane'i, Qom Friday Mosque Prayer Leader and Chairman of the Council of Experts, Ayatollah 'Ali Mishkini, and President 'Ali Khamaneh'i. Currently, elections are under way for the presidency in Iran. The regime claims that it will allow former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, who resigned on 4 November 1979 when the American Embassy was taken, to run for the office of president.

If Khamaneh'i ends up not running, and especially if Bazargan is elected, the tendencies I have already associated with Rafsanjani may become more pronounced. Of course, all these speculations are merely guesses in what is a maddeningly obscure political drama. And certainly the best guess is that the regime cannot afford to let Bazargan really run an independent campaign, much less to win outright.

If it is true that Ardabili, Sane'i, Mishkini and Khamaneh'i are determined to pursue the previous policies, prospects for a thaw between the United States and Iran will remain poor. Most observers believe that after Khomeini, the leadership will consist of the four individuals listed at the start of this paragraph, plus Rafsanjani and Khomeini's supposedly preferred candidate, Ayatollah Hosain 'Ali Montazeri. Although Montazeri certainly has not distinguished himself for being more cosmopolitan, he has evinced a certain independent mindedness in his pronouncements and could possibly provide the leverage that people like Rafsanjani will need to evolve links with Europe and Japan. In any case, the leadership will not forever be frozen into extreme positions adopted early in the revolution, and Washington ought to be alert to possible changes in their composition and outlook.

III. Iranian Leadership Objectives

The goals of the leadership are to consolidate clericalism at home and export its revolution to other countries. I will not spend time assessing the Iranian elite's internal goals, since this is of lesser concern to the Committee. As to its foreign policy objectives, the ideal is to establish Islamic republics throughout the Middle East. The

realistic objective, however, is to defend their system while maintaining the country's economic orientation toward the West. I say maintaining advisedly, for from what may be gathered there was never any serious question of this regime orienting its trade toward the Soviet bloc. In August 1984 the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans Dietrich Genscher, declared his belief that Iran's government strongly desired the continuation of a stable economic relationship with the Western European countries and Japan. The statistics of trade show that this is, indeed, the case, as perhaps no more than 20-25% of Iran's total imports and exports is with the Soviet bloc. The balance, of course, is not simply with Europe and Japan, since countries such as India, Pakistan and Turkey represent significant trading partners. But, on the whole, this picture ought to provide some assurance in the West that, despite the rhetoric and discrete developments in Lebanon, the foreign policy goals of the regime are not necessarily totally revisionist and destabilizing.

An important reason for the revisionist tendencies of Iranian foreign policy today -- their desire to change the politics of the Middle East -- is the perception that the United States is hostile to "Islamic" causes. Of these that of the Palestinians has high priority. To be sure, a degree of the pro-Palestinian position of the Iranian government must be attributed to posturing. For example, good relations existed with Yasser Arafat and Khomeini in the early part of the revolution. But Palestinian-Shi'ite rivalry in Lebanon has put a damper on these relations in more recent times, as have Arafat's trip to Baghdad and meeting with Saddam Hosain and the generally secular line of the PLO. But it would be a mistake to dismiss Tehran's position on Palestine and the Palestinians

as insincere. In my opinion, the clergy's pro-Palestinian stand is at least to some extent genuine. Yet, withal, the United States has the capability to take some of the wind out of the sails of the Iranian regime in regard to the Palestine problem.

For example, in the President peace initiative of 1 September 1982 the United States declared that its official policy opposed further Jewish settlements on the West Bank. However, this verbal declaration has not been followed up with any action, as far as I am aware. There are at least two actions that this Administration could undertake to buttress the President's initiative in this regard: (1) it could calculate how much the government of Israel spends per year on the establishment of West Bank settlements and deduct that amount from the annual foreign aid appropriations for that country; (2) it could remove aid appropriations for Israel from the security assistance category to allow the Agency for International Development to supervise whether or not any of these monies are being spent on West Bank settlements.

Now, it could be argued that the Iranian regime would not stop its anti-American actions in the Arab-Israel core of the Middle East no matter what steps the United States took. This may be the case. But in the absence of any effective American policy change on this specific issue, it seems to me that the chances of Iranian anti-American actions are stronger than they would be if a change of this sort were instituted. Additionally, of course, effective follow-up would be a signal to the international community that the initiative was not intended to die aborning. Finally, such a move would encourage certain Palestinians within the PLO (and certain Israelis within Israel, it might be added) to crystallize their moderate views that they may be holding privately but fear

to make public because they are too vulnerable. To sum up, then, a bolder American policy on the Arab-Israel front could undercut the Iranian regime's ability to effectively isolate this country from Middle East actors.

IV. Linkages of the Iranian Regime to Fundamentalist Movements

The Iranian regime's links to revisionist elements in Lebanon and the Gulf are considered in Tehran to have high priority. There is the strongest likelihood that Iranian assistance to these groups is both financial and moral-spiritual. But it ought to be noted that the regime has not made any major breakthroughs with fundamentalist movements in the Middle East that are essentially Sunnite. To support this statement one can do no better than offer "negative evidence." If the Khomeini regime had as strong a link with the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, as it does with breakaway Shi'ite factions in Lebanon, it is not very likely that Syrian policy would continue to favor Iran. For the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood is an important one; yet, the clerical regime in Tehran hardly lifted an eyebrow when Syrian President Asad ordered the severe repression of the Brotherhood three years ago. Indeed, there is strong reason to believe that if the Iranians should achieve a major breakthrough on the Iraqi front, one would expect a rapid change in Syrian foreign policy, both in Lebanon (where it would probably expel the Iranians from the Beqa' Valley) and in Iraq (which Syria would no doubt begin to support in the war.

Yet, in Lebanon above all other areas the Iranians have set their sights on assisting in the establishment of Shi'ite power and in removing United States influence. I doubt that there is any disagreement among the Iranian leaders about these two goals, although it surely exists

over the means to achieve them.

The Iranian regime's position in Lebanon has grown progressively since the revolution. In the immediately pre-revolutionary period their representative in Lebanon was Ayatollah Musa Sadr. The Sadr family is a well-established one in the Shi'ite shrine areas to the south of Baghdad and in Iran, proper. Musa Sadr was related to Ayatollah Mohammad Baqer Sadr, of Iraq. The latter was arrested in 1980 by the Iraqi government and, together with his wife and three brothers, executed in May 1983 for pro-Khomeini activities. Musa Sadr was also related to Ayatollah Sadr al-Din Sadr, a famous Qom-based cleric until his death in 1953.

Musa Sadr was sent to Lebanon to challenge the authority of the old established conservative leadership of the As'ad family. Since Khomeini was in exile when this occurred, it is not clear under whose aegis Sadr was dispatched to Lebanon. His own disappearance in Libya (where he was probably murdered in 1978) was a blow to the Iranian clerics, who even then were probably hoping to exert greater influence in Lebanon but were not popular with As'ad's Shi'ite clan. Upon Sadr's disappearance from the scene and mounting Israeli actions into Lebanon in 1978, 1981 and, above all, 1982, Lebanese Shi'ites seemed badly divided. When many Shi'ites in South Lebanon welcomed the Israeli troops as a means to eliminate the Palestinian presence from their midst, the Khomeini regime must have been unpleasantly surprised. Certainly their ties to the Lebanese Shi'ite community seemed extremely weak. In fact, Khomeini's people appeared to have stronger links with the PLO than with the Lebanese Shi'ites at that juncture.

But as the occupation wore on, both Israel and the United States, as is now well known, became increasingly identified as the enemy by

increasing numbers of Shi'ites throughout Lebanon. The worst part, as far as they were concerned, was Washington's role in trying to broker the Israeli-Lebanese agreement of May 1983. To the Shi'ites two things were wrong with this agreement: (1) it meant another Arab state was about to undertake a de facto recognition of the historic enemy, Israel; and this time, unlike at Camp David, virtually by force majeure; (2) it signalled that the Maronites, who would be the signers of this apparently tribute peace with Israel, would retain their dominant hold over Lebanese society, assisted in this by the powerful United States.

I am convinced that the dispatch of Iranian clerics to make common cause with people such as Shaikh Hosain Musavi and Shaikh Muhammad Fadlullah was hastened by, if not due to, Israeli occupation policies and the transformation of the American forces from the status of mediator in the civil war into an actual party to the conflict on the side of the Maronites. That the Shi'ites perceived the Maronites to be the beneficiaries of any future arrangements only served to compound the difficulties into which the United States was falling. Suddenly, the United States had become transformed from a country where, before 1982, none of its citizens was taken hostage, into one where its nationals have not only been captured but even murdered.

The question then becomes: if the Iranian clergy, despite its cleavages, is united in supporting the breakaway Amal groups under Musawi and Fadlullah, what are the prospects for the future, and what ought United States policy to be? Prospects for anti-American radicalism among Shi'ites are strong unless an agreement is reached among the confessional groups in Lebanon to change the distribution of power. In effect, a historical stage has been reached in which Lebanese politics and

society can either be restructured to more accurately reflect current demographic realities; or the current dangerous situation will continue indefinitely. If the choice is between these two options, it seems to me that the American position ought clearly to be to support change. Of course, things cannot be changed overnight. In fact, precipitous efforts to bring about changes in the prevailing system in Lebanon could ignite a desperate armed resistance by confessional groups with the most to lose.

Nevertheless, the seedbed of Shi'ite radicalism is nurtured by the continued inability of that confessional community to improve its social mobility, access to services and education, opportunity for economic development and more timely movement into the ranks of the Lebanese political elite. The perception of injustice among the Shi'ites is inevitable in view of their growth to what most dispassionate observers would concede is the largest confessional group in Lebanon today.

As long as the United States is seen to be involved in anti-Islamic coalitions -- such as with Maronites and Israelis -- radicals among Islamic fundamentalist groups will act against US interests. If these anti-Islamic coalitions are not only rhetorical and diplomatic but involve military escalation (as when the battleship New Jersey was pounding Muslim positions in the context of a major Israeli military occupation), the actions can be expected to be terrorist in nature. None doubt that Lebanon has problems that are unrelated to what the United States does or does not do. For example, it may well be that armed conflict between Druze and Shi'ite groups would continue and even frustrate an eventual transformation of the structure of Lebanese society along the lines outlined above. Yet, if American policy does not change, I feel that we are

virtually guaranteed the results of continued terrorism against this country's interests in the Middle East. In that sense, I would argue that it is better to risk change than to continue in the same track as before.

I would like to close with the following observations. In the first place, the Administration ought not to feel that foreign policy defeats are equal to foreign policy victories for this country's enemies. I am reminded of the example of France in Vietnam and in Algeria. There were those in France who argued that defeat in Vietnam would be tantamount to the end of the French position in the world. After the fall of Dienbienphu in 1954, the French then involved themselves in Algeria in the effort to stem the tide of that country's revolution. The same fears were expressed again. Yet after the French withdrawals from both countries, nothing of the sort predicted for its international standing has occurred. If anything, France is viewed by many today -- and among others by the Vietnamese and Algerians themselves -- as deserving of deference and respect in the international community.

The next point is that if the Iranians have not been notably successful in exporting their revolution among Iraqi Shi'ites, it is quite likely that they will have an even harder time among Lebanese Shi'ites, with whose country the Iranians do not even share a common border. Despite Khomeini's hopes for insurrection at least among the Iraqi Shi'ite Da'wah Party of Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir Hakim, it turns out that such Shi'ites have remained loyal to their 'urubbah -- their Arabness. Musawi and Fadlullah are Arabs leading Arabs. There appears to be limits to what the Iranians are able to do, even when invoking Shi'ite symbols of martyrdom.

My final point is that it seems to me that elements are emerging in the Iranian clerical elite that may not be interested in terrorism on the international level. If I had to place my bets, I would say that Rafsanjani exemplifies a new sort of socialization pattern among the leadership. He will, of course, remain true to his mentor (Khomeini) as far as clericalism is concerned. But the regime cannot long survive if it cuts its ties to the outside world, especially the West. As the war with Iraq becomes more and more the focus of elite conflict in Iran, my hunch is that Rafsanjani will gather more adherents to his position of trying to end it. An international tribunal to try Saddam Hosain may appear to be an unacceptable demand, but it represents a movement away from a Shi'ite shari'ah (religious court) tribunal to try the Iraqi leader! Winding down the war could have spill over effects on other issues and more generally represent moves toward a breathing spell for the revolution, and that in turn could mean further normalization of relations with countries that are allies of the United States.

US-Iranian relations will not improve while Khomeini remains on the scene. His harsh anti-Americanism and encouragement to Shi'ites in the Middle East to engage in violent collective protest against US interests is, of course, extremely provocative. But this country's policy-makers would likely be better served if they avoided rhetorical escalation in favor of private diplomacy, maintaining a low profile and working for constructive change in the Middle East. In my view, there are enough elements in the area itself who also desire such change. We ought to be looking for these elements, engaging them and working toward mutually compatible goals by deeds as well as in words.

Mr. HAMILTON. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your statements.

Without objection, the Chair will enter into the record several writings that our witnesses have furnished the subcommittee.

We appreciate very much receiving those, and they will be a part of the committee record.¹

U.S. POLICY ON ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

Let's begin where you left off, Dr. Akhavi, and talk about policy.

I am trying to sort out just how important Islamic fundamentalism is to the U.S. foreign policy and what priority we ought to give it—how important a movement it is with regard to American policy—and just what our policy ought to be toward it.

So, the first question is, what do you consider American policy to be today toward Islamic fundamentalism and what's right and what's wrong about that policy?

Dr. AKHAVI. The policy, I believe, is based on the President's initiative of September 1, 1982. That is the last time, as far as I am aware, that a public statement was made on behalf of the President of a change in the policy.

It represented a change because under the Carter administration, although President Carter supported the idea of a national homeland for Palestinians, in this particular case the President was specifying where that homeland should be. It is true that he hedged as to the conditions of this homeland but, nevertheless.

In other respects, I am afraid I have to agree with some specialists who have appeared before the subcommittee before, such as, I guess, William Quandt, and Ambassador Eilts who have talked about a failed policy in Lebanon specifically. I am not exactly sure what it is we are supporting there. In my judgment, we are supporting the central government, but the problem is that there is a civil war that has been going on in that country and, therefore, to support the central government means, in effect, to support one of the confessional groups and becoming a party to a conflict. However, we want to be seen as brokers, it seems to me, rather than actual parties to the conflict.

So, with respect to Lebanon, I do not see a policy which is coherent. Perhaps it is fair to say that it is a failed policy even.

On the Iranian issue, more specifically, I think that there is not much that the United States can do at this point except simply to look around, scan the landscape in the Iranian leadership for hints of change. For example, the former Prime Minister of the provisional government, Mehdi Bazargan, has been encouraged by the leadership, for reasons I am not quite sure of, to run for the Presidency this time. The Presidential elections are about to occur. The sitting President, who is a cleric, has not acknowledged whether he will be a candidate again. If, indeed—

¹ See appendixes 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

U.S. TILT TOWARD IRAQ IN THE GULF WAR

Mr. HAMILTON. Is the tilt, the famous tilt toward Iraq, wise in the present situation? And after you have answered that, I want Dr. Norton and Dr. Ajami to respond to the broader question that I began with. Do you agree with the tilt?

Dr. AKHAVI. I am not sure what this tilt consists of, except for diplomatic support and perhaps acknowledging that weapons are being sent to Iraq against certain policy judgments. I think that if this tilt becomes more serious, we might have problems in forcing the Iranian clerics into the hands of the Soviets, though.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you approve or do you disapprove of the current tilt, as you understand it?

Dr. AKHAVI. I do not approve of it.

Mr. HAMILTON. You think it would be better to follow the strict neutrality which we claim is our policy.

Dr. AKHAVI. Yes; if it happens that the Iranians break through the lines and march toward Baghdad, I think we can in a sense count on the Syrians to begin to expel the Iranians from the Bekaa Valley and to turn toward the Iraqis with greater solidarity. But we should wait for that moment.

PRESENT AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLICY ON FUNDAMENTALISM

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Dr. Norton and then Dr. Ajami, focusing on the question of what do you think American policy is today toward Islamic fundamentalism, and what you think it ought to be.

Dr. NORTON. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, I do not think we have a policy toward Islamic fundamentalism, nor do I think we need one.

I think what we are dealing with is politics—and we are dealing with politics in an environment where solutions—which are more comfortable to Western observers, have been tried and failed. So that there is, if you will, a religious coloration to politics which is much more obvious in the Middle East today than it might have been one or two decades ago.

But, I do not think we need a specific policy toward the sort of superficial fundamentalism that we are seeing. I think what we need is a good Middle East policy. I think we need a good policy vis-a-vis the Islamic world, and if we have that, then I think the rest will take care of itself.

Mr. HAMILTON. What is a good Middle East policy—

Dr. NORTON. Well, I think—

Mr. HAMILTON [continuing]. In this context?

Dr. NORTON. I hate to use a loaded term, but I think that anything else would appear as an evasion. I think we need to pursue an evenhanded policy in the Middle East.

Mr. HAMILTON. What does that mean?

Dr. NORTON. That means that we need to take account of Arab interests as well as Israeli interests. My personal judgment is that we are much too inclined to rubber stamp the Israeli requests and demands, and we are much too inclined, if you will, not to listen with the same seriousness to the other 21 countries in the Middle East.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think the President's September 1982 initiative is a good one?

Dr. NORTON. I think it is a move in the right direction, yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. If implemented.

Dr. NORTON. If implemented.

Mr. HAMILTON. Dr. Ajami.

Dr. AJAMI. These are large questions, as you realize, Mr. Chairman.

On the President's initiative of September 1982, not so long after the President came up with this initiative, I, myself, had a modest description of it. I said this proposal is stillborn, and I have not changed my mind. It was stillborn and it remains so.

In just a way of commenting on some of these questions, I am always intrigued as to how discussions on the Middle East and how discussions on the Western World, whatever it is you discuss on the Western World, eventually become discussions of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is not a discussion of the Arab-Israeli conflict. These are internal problems of the Islamic world itself.

The fight between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites, for example, this has to do with the fight between cities and the countryside. It has to do with the split of all of Islam itself, between the Arab world and the Shi'ite stepchildren. What the September initiative has to do with it, I do not know.

You know, what the Brookings report has to do with it, I also do not know. We do know, we do know right now, and this is to return to something I said in the prepared statement, that in the Fertile Crescent, there is a problem in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, to be specific. This is where the bloodshed is; this is where the turmoil is. There the Palestinian question is a question of yesterday. This is the question that dominated Arab politics and Arab life from 1948 until 1982, 1983, or so.

Now, many people, including the Shi'ites, particularly the Shi'ites, felt slighted by this, and now some new men are putting on the agenda of Arab politics new issues, and this is something the Arab world cannot deal with. It is very easy to say, well, the Arab-Israeli question is the ultimate question there. It may be so, but I do not think so, I do not think so.

I think these are strains within Islamic society. These are fights about who is a Moslem and who is not; who is an Arab and who is not. These are fights about the distribution of resources, about how cities are to be governed, who shall control them. This is a fight between the Iraqi regime, for example, and the Shi'ite dissidents, a fight between the Alawi regime and the Sunni opposition in Syria.

Mr. HAMILTON. What shall we do about it?

Dr. AJAMI. Well, you see, now, partly America is very solutionist oriented. All discussions in America ask what shall America do about it. Indeed, in good measure, we are in trouble in that region because many things were thought to be an American concern. The idea of America being the great Satan in the region, it was just the other side of the coin, that America is the great redeemer in the region.

So, if all problems are to be solved by the Americans, which is unfortunately an Arab psychological problem today, then it, therefore, follows—that is what the Iranians would tell you, what the radicals would tell you—that all problems can also be laid at America's doorsteps.

My own feeling has been that we need a policy of probably benign neglect. We have to be modest about what America can and cannot do in that region. We should not assume all kinds of burdens.

If you talk about the Israeli-Palestinian question, that is a vastly different question.

U.S. POLICY IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Mr. HAMILTON. Do we, in your judgment, follow a policy of benign neglect now on the Iranian-Iraqi war?

Dr. AJAMI. Well, I think there has been one—you, yourself, Mr. Chairman, used the word “tilt.” There has been a tilt toward the Iraqis.

You see, the Iraqis, after they got themselves in trouble, then decided to become moderates. So, we now love Iraq. You know, what Iraq bombs in the gulf are “large naval targets.” They are not tankers, because only immature people bomb tankers.

The Iraqis have come to Washington, and they have now been telling us about their moderation and their maturity. This regime is in trouble; therefore, they discovered moderation. We do not know what the future holds for the Iraq regime; if this regime were to survive the war with Iran, then we would have to hear from Saddam Hussein again about what he thinks of America.

So, we have, in a way, placed our bets to some extent on Saddam Hussein. In my view, it is not the best bet we could make.

Mr. HAMILTON. And we should follow a strict neutrality approach?

Dr. AJAMI. Well, I think so. In the long run, Iran is a far more important and viable society than Iraq. And in the short run, the Iranian/Syrian and Shi’ite connection in Lebanon is a far more important bet to work with than the regime of Saddam Hussein.

But, for reasons which we know, now the regime of Saddam Hussein has come courting America, and many people want to accept that this is a new Saddam Hussein.

U.S. POLICY IN HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

Mr. HAMILTON. How do you translate your benign neglect into a policy when Americans are being attacked and held hostage and killed? How can America follow a policy of benign neglect?

Dr. AJAMI. That is a good question. We have to respond to crises when they erupt. The last crisis we have all been through. But, in general, I think we should be modest. My statement is really more about the mood and the philosophy than about the particular action.

Mr. HAMILTON. I understand.

Dr. AJAMI. We should be modest about what American power can produce in the Middle East. We do not understand the region very well anyway.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

I certainly want to welcome the insights of our distinguished panelists before us today. One of our prior panelists said that with regard to Islamic fundamentalism, we are pretty much illiterate. I hope you will help to raise our interest and our intelligence with regard to the approaches that we should be taking toward this phenomenon.

I am interested, Dr. Ajami, when you say the Palestinian issue is something of the past, and primarily now, a battle between the various sects. Could you touch on that a little more? Why do you feel that it is not a major issue today?

Dr. AJAMI. Well, it is not to denigrate the Palestinian question. The Palestinian question has been very pampered in Arab politics. For 30 some years, Arab life was a single issue political game. Everything had to do with the Palestinian question; the end-all and be-all of Arab politics. Anything you wanted to justify, you could say, "Oh, well, let us wait now for the question of democracy; it is too early. We must attend first to the Palestinian question."

The Palestinian question is in trouble. The Palestinians had a minirepublic in Lebanon from 1970 to 1982. They were banished from Lebanon in 1982 by the Israelis. Now the question, I think, in my opinion, is the second struggle for Palestine, the first one having been settled in 1948. The second struggle for Palestine has also been decided.

Israel is in occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestine Liberation Organization has been banished from Arab politics.

So, for me, as I see it today, the Palestinian question has become an internal Israeli question: What are the Israelis, as a liberal society, as a democratic society, to do with a million and some Palestinians who live under Israeli rule? That is the question.

For the Arab world, I feel that for the Arabs no one is going to stand up in the Arab world and say that the question of Palestine is finished; life will go on as usual. Everyone will express his fidelity to the Palestinian question, but I do not see that the question of Palestine today is a dominant motive and a dominant force in Arab politics.

Mr. GILMAN. In other words, once the Palestinian and West Bank question has been resolved, to whatever extent it will be resolved in the future, we will still have these underlying problems and the underlying conflicts that we are faced with today. Is that what you are saying to us?

Dr. AJAMI. For sure. I mean the strains we are talking about, the fight between secularists and theocrats, the fight between people who would tell you that the Koran has all the answers of life, and the people who will tell you that Western videocassettes have all the answers of life—all these things will continue.

We have tended to look at the Palestinian question, this is what the Palestinians wanted. The Palestinians have been tremendously successful in dominating the agenda of Arab politics, and the Arabs have indulged them for reasons which, you know, if you want, we can talk about until tomorrow morning.

But the questions, the large question is Islamic radicalism, the fight of the generations in the Moslem world. This has nothing to do with the Palestinian question.

Mr. GILMAN. They were there before the Palestinian question and will continue after it; is that what you are saying?

Dr. AJAMI. The relation between Islam and the West, the problematic relation between Islam and the West—actually, you do not need political scientists to deal with this. You need psychiatrists to deal with this relation—this is a 200-year question. The Palestinian question is just a facet of this. It is part of a broader encounter, problematic encounter, between Islam and the West.

Mr. GILMAN. Do Dr. Norton and Dr. Akhavi agree with this premise?

Dr. NORTON. I think it is certainly the case that there are many problems in the region that the United States might observe and might follow with interest, without direct involvement. There are a number of internal political issues in Syria, for example. There is a power distribution struggle between a majority Sunni Moslem community, and a minority Alawi community that dominates politics. These are issues which interest the United States, but which do not demand active U.S. diplomatic involvement.

I think it is certainly the case, that when one looks at the region, one should not have a sort of mechanist problem-solving attitude to the extent that one tries to solve all the problems. However, there are some problems with tremendous emotive appeal throughout the region. And, in this respect, I disagree with my colleague and friend, Fouad Ajami. I think that the Palestinian issue remains important. That is not to say that I think there is a solution. There are some problems in the world that do not have solutions, and this might be one of them.

But I do not think the United States can afford to be seen not pursuing a solution to the extent possible. At the end of the day, there may be no solution, and then we will have to adjust policy accordingly.

Mr. GILMAN. But, Dr. Norton, do you not think we have been pursuing that policy and trying to find a solution—

Dr. NORTON. I do not think we—

Mr. GILMAN [continuing]. To the Palestinian issue, and to the problems between Israel and the Arab nations?

Dr. NORTON. Mr. Gilman, it is my sense that there have been periods of time during which the Palestinian issue was relatively high on the U.S. diplomatic agenda, but there have been far longer periods of time during which the Palestinian issue was approached very formalistically, and not very seriously.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, it is certainly—

Dr. NORTON. And this is not peculiar to any one administration, I should add.

Mr. GILMAN. It has certainly been attracting a great deal of serious attention in the last year.

Dr. NORTON. Today, yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Norton, are you saying to us by your testimony that once the Palestinian situation is resolved, we will no longer have a problem?

Dr. NORTON. Heavens, no; there will be 200 more problems. This happens—

Mr. GILMAN. You seem to be focusing attention on the Palestinian issue as a major problem.

Dr. NORTON. The importance of the Palestinian issue, it seems to me, is that the Palestinian issue is keenly important in the political culture of the region. In other words, it is not an issue that we can ignore. We are going to have to take cognizance of the issues that are important to the governments of the region. It seems to me that whatever mistakes may have been made by the Palestinians in the past and whatever difficulties might lie in the path of a solution, we cannot ignore the fact that the Palestinian issue is very high on the agenda of many states in the region, including many governments with whom the United States has close relations.

Mr. GILMAN. Will that have a major impact on Islamic fundamentalism once that is resolved, with respect to the expression of that fundamentalism and radicalism in the forms we have seen it to date?

Dr. NORTON. In some cases, yes; in many cases, no. In many cases, the Palestinian issue is irrelevant to the roots of fundamentalism and radicalism.

Mr. GILMAN. But that is not what you were saying in your testimony. You were pointing to the Palestinian issue as a major problem.

Dr. NORTON. What I said in the testimony, if I am not mistaken, is that the United States has to be aware of the fact that what Israel does on the ground affects us. We have to be concerned with the fact that Israel is frequently seen as a kind of stalking horse for American policy. I was referring specifically to Lebanon; nothing to do with the Palestinian issue per se, but the point is that the Lebanese Shi'ites see themselves as being the victim of an American surrogate.

So, the United States in its connection with Israel has impact outside of the realm of the Palestinian-Israeli issue.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, Dr. Akhavi, do you agree with either one of the panelists with regard to these premises?

Dr. AKHAVI. I think I understand where Professor Ajami is coming from. What he is doing is collapsing the Palestine issue into a larger kind of context of East meets West. In this particular case, the Middle East meeting the British, and the French, and later on the United States. Therefore, it is a manifestation of the larger issue of cultures coming together and how these two cultures in some sense are irreconcilably different. If they can adjust their remaining differences, their existing differences, whatever surplus remains in the way of understanding, that is to the good.

But I disagree with Professor Ajami's willingness to say that the Palestine issue is basically an issue of the past. In my judgment, leaderships in the Middle East today are captured by the Palestine issue in a strange way. In other words, there are initiatives that they might possibly take but for the presence of the Palestine issue. I can think, of course, of the Saudi leadership that might take a different tack on particular policies, but either because of the existence of the Palestinians in their own society, including at

very high levels, or because of the Palestine problem as an historical issue of justice versus injustice, the Palestine question has a veto power, at least, over certain elites in the area.

In that sense, I think we have to address ourselves more systematically to Palestine, and the kind of arguments that are being made by them.

EFFECTS OF A SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Ajami, would you venture an opinion with regard to what would occur once the Palestinian situation was settled? Would that change any of the problems that we are confronted with?

Dr. AJAMI. Oh, it is very hard, Congressman Gilman. I mean where, specifically? For example, in Lebanon, no doubt a solution for the Palestinian question would make things relatively easier because the Palestinians, with no state of their own, assert the right to meddle in the affairs of other Arab States.

In the scheme of things, were we to pursue a viable Palestinian policy—and mind you, I do not know even what a viable Palestinian policy would be—the discussion about a Palestinian state at the moment is past. I believe we are beyond the plastic period in the international system where new states could be introduced. I do not see that a new Palestinian state is going to be introduced.

So, it depends on what you consider to be a resolution of the Palestinian question. No doubt if the West Bank problem is resolved—and it is a large problem for the Arab world, a psychological problem, a problem for the people living under Israeli occupation—the next morning the Arab world would wake up and say, “OK, the morning after; what do we do now?”

Some of these problems, the problems of political authority, of democracy, of participation, of the warring generations, all these would be with you.

THE KIND OF ROLE THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PLAY

Mr. GILMAN. And with all of those problems, you feel that we should be taking a backseat and not be that much internally involved in these efforts; is that what you are saying?

Dr. AJAMI. You mean in the search for a Palestinian settlement?

Mr. GILMAN. Well, aside from the Palestinian problem.

Dr. AJAMI. I think President Reagan came to power in 1981 with a very, very wild understanding of the Middle East, to put it mildly. And I think several years later, he has drawn back from the Middle East. I think after October 1983, after the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, I believe that President Reagan drew the right conclusions for himself that this is an area where America will be burned; that this is a no win situation.

The Lebanese themselves, and the Arabs, and the Moslems have not been winning, so to speak, in Moslom society, in Lebanese society, and in Arab society.

What a great power could do there, how it can secure its interests is a mystery. It is very hard; and I think that the second Reagan administration drew the right conclusion for itself—that it needs a lower profile in the Middle East. So, the President has to

give the Middle East a lower amount of his time and his attention on his agenda.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Solarz.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. POLICY ON ISRAEL AND
FUNDAMENTALIST ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first of all pay tribute to you for holding these hearings. We tend to be preoccupied here on the Hill with current crises rather than with underlying problems. And I think that the hearings that you have been holding on the question of Islamic fundamentalism and its implications for American interests constitute a really profound contribution to the beginning of an understanding on the part of the Congress toward this phenomenon and how we ought to deal with it.

Let me also say that I am particularly pleased that Dr. Ajami could be here. We have never met, but I have read his book on the "Arab Predicament," which I considered to be a brilliant and even breathtaking analysis of the politics of the Arab world. I have been very much looking forward to participating in this hearing in order to get the benefit of his analysis of problems that are being discussed today.

It seems to be very clear that Islamic fundamentalism poses a problem for the United States, as Chairman Hamilton indicated. It poses a problem when terrorists who appear to be motivated by the ideology of fundamentalism engage in actions which put at risk the lives of American interests and which threaten established American policies.

It has clearly been affected by the triumph of the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the establishment of a regime in that country which pursues policies which in many respects are antithetical to our own.

Some very serious questions have been raised about how do we deal with this phenomenon, and if it in fact can be dealt with. Now, I have been struck by the presence in the American press in recent weeks of a number of commentators who have suggested that one way of dealing with the problem, one way of propitiating Islamic fundamentalism, is for us to adopt, as Dr. Norton said, a more even-handed policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Yet it seems to me, and I would appreciate it, Dr. Ajami, if you could comment on this, and then if either Dr. Norton or Dr. Akhavi would care to offer some comments as well, that would be appreciated, it seems to me that the brief as it were of Islamic fundamentalism against the United States goes way beyond our policy toward Israel.

It seems to me that even if we were to modify our policy towards Israel, even if we were to fine tune it, even for that matter if we were to repudiate our relationship with Israel, which obviously is not in the cards, that that alone would not come near toward satisfying the kind of anger which Islamic fundamentalists have towards the United States as the embodiment and expression of the values of materialism and modernization which the West has

thrust on the Islamic world. Therefore, we would gain relatively little in terms of our capacity to minimize the threats, and difficulties, and problems posed for our country by Islamic fundamentalism even if we were to adopt this proscription of distancing ourselves from Israel. Because the agenda of their complaints is not only virtually unlimited, but goes to the very essence of what our society is all about.

Since we cannot transform the nature of our society, and the nature of our values, we will continue to be an anathema to these people even if we were to momentarily placate them by changing our policy toward Israel. I would like you, if you can, Dr. Ajami, to respond to that observation.

Dr. AJAMI. Thank you very much, Congressman Solarz. I am a resident of New York, so I will keep in mind what you said about my book.

Mr. SOLARZ. I do not believe that you live in Brooklyn, however.

Dr. AJAMI. I think that this is a good question: How much variance, how much peace, if you will, would one buy in America's relation to the Moslem world by a change in the American attitude and the American relation toward Israel. I think that there is no doubt that you could buy a measure of peace. You would buy 10 percent of the variance, 15 percent of the variance. I leave that to people good with statistics to work this one out.

I think that you are right, that the agendas, grievances of the Moslem radical groups—and the more radical obviously the group is, then you have to venture even further afield—are bottomless. These groups reject their own rulers. These groups hate the more pretentious classes in their own society.

Most of the time, they do not even know America. They do not know Americans. But they do see Anwar Sadat, and they resent his bantering with Americans. These groups feel betrayed. There is a sense in the Moslem world in the last decade that Moslem society has been betrayed. It has been promised something good; it has been promised prosperity, modernization, and so on.

There is a sense in the Islamic world that if only it were to change itself, if only the cities of the Moslem world were to get modernized, if only the classes in the Moslem world were to get more modernized . . . So they change their skin; they could not change their soul. In the process of changing their skin, they produce a deep wrath. And this is the term that I used before, a wrath in the Moslem world among the lower classes, among the national middle class, that large numbers of the elite have surrendered national culture, and have given in to the foreigners.

There is a tension in the Moslem world, and not only in the Moslem world, but in all societies faced with this temptation, between the foreigner on the one hand and the ancestor on the other. The message of the foreigner is the new temptation, the videos, the films, the new culture, the travel, and then the pull of one's own ancestors. That is what we have seen in the triumph of Khomeini. This tension is what we are really talking about.

FUNDAMENTALISM'S THREAT TO THE PEACE PROCESS

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, if the notion that we can buy some safety for ourselves vis-a-vis Islamic fundamentalism by distancing ourselves from Israel is fundamentally an illusion, because while it might marginally be helpful as you point out, the list of their grievances vis-a-vis the West is bottomless, there is another aspect of the whole emergence or reemergence of Islamic fundamentalism as a major factor in the Middle East which I think that we need to be concerned about.

That is its implications for the viability of the peace process between Israel and Egypt. You appear in your own reflections to have written off, as it were, the possibility of a viable solution to the Palestinian problem, and therefore to the Arab-Israeli dispute.

But let us assume for a moment that your rather pessimistic analysis is premature. That in spite of your own thinking, that it is possible to reach an agreement. I certainly think that it is, however difficult it may be. In any case, we have no alternative but to make the effort.

Nevertheless, if we were to succeed somehow or other in facilitating an agreement between Israel and the Arabs which included a solution to the Palestinian problem acceptable to the mainstream of the Palestinian people, to what extent would the emergence of dynamic fundamentalist movements in Iran, in Lebanon, and elsewhere in the region threaten the durability of those arrangements after all from the fundamentalist perspective it is not the borders of Israel that constitute an insult to Islam, as it were, but the very existence of Israel.

One has the feeling with a Hussein, obviously with a Sadat, with a Mubarak, and conceivably even with an Asad, that an arrangement is possible which would provide for coexistence between Israel and the Arab nations. But one also has the impression that for a Khomeini and for those that follow his banner, for Sunni fundamentalists, that it is not a question of the 1967 borders, or the 1947 borders, or the settlements, or who controls East Jerusalem. It is the very existence of Israel.

If that is the case, and I would like for you to comment on whether it is, to what extent could any conceivable arrangement withstand the subsequent onslaught of these forces against such a settlement on the grounds that it constituted a repudiation of fundamentalist Islamic values?

Dr. AJAMI. A tough question. I think that you know, there are some groups, there are some individuals for whom the power of Israel is not the question, and the borders of Israel are not the question. The question is the existence of Israel.

And I think short of radically remaking the region, these groups you must just simply write off. But one does not work with the fringe of a society. One must always work with the mainstream of a society, with the body of opinion in a society that cares about safety, that cares about what routine will ultimately buy.

Look at the Egyptian-Israeli peace. The Egyptian-Israeli peace has held. Now several years later, the war of Lebanon later, much turmoil later, peace between Israel and Egypt is still a fact of life.

So I think it is my reading that the mainstream of the society wishes to put the Palestinian question behind it. That means that if you can come up with a solution, if you can serve Palestinian self-determination within a framework acceptable to the international community, the mainstream of society would be willing simply to let bygones be bygones.

Then you can get a political opinion in Damascus, in Egypt, and elsewhere in the Arab world that we have given all we can to this Palestinian question, but now Israel is a fact of life, and the Palestinians have been satisfied, and so on.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think that that accurately reflects the thinking of the mainstream. My question is, were such thinking eventually to result in settlement, could the forces which represent that way of thinking withstand the subsequent onslaught of what you characterize as the fringe that would categorize such a settlement as a betrayal, a sell-out, and something which was incompatible with Islamic values?

Dr. AJAMI. There is a stereotype of the Arab world and of the Moslem world that it is eternally unstable. But in a way, if you think about it just a little, look at the regimes in the area. Look at Saudi Arabia: The Al-Saud have been in power since the 1920's, and they are still around. Look at Egypt: two regimes and only two regimes have governed Egypt since 1805 or the time of Muhammed Ali.

Look at Jordan. I was a boy when everyone prophesied disaster for King Hussein. I am no longer one, and King Hussein is still around. One family rules Kuwait, and it has been around for some time.

There is a tremendous amount of stability in the Arab world underneath the turbulence. The dominant political class if it can go to the masses with a settlement like the Egyptians did in 1978, 1979, and so on with an honorable settlement, with a settlement that they can live with, I believe that they can carry the day.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, to the extent that the existing and established regimes in the Arab world are able to go to the Arab masses with a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute to their credit, to what extent would that strengthen them against the fundamentalist challenge to their legitimacy?

Dr. AJAMI. No doubt there will be something in the way of shoring up the moderate Arab center, the center of Arab political life. But if that center could produce a viable Israeli-Palestinian settlement, and it would have to have the courage to pursue an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, that center would fare better for it.

NATURE OF THE IRAQI REGIME

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me pursue a few more brief questions. You spoke about the move toward moderation on the part of the Iraqi regime as a consequence of its problems with Iran.

Do you think that this move toward moderation is practical or strategic? You left the question open. But if you had to guess, once the conflict with Iran is terminated, would you expect the Baathist regime in Iraq to revert to its more radical ways, or do you think

that they would continue along the more moderate path that they have embarked upon?

Dr. AJAMI. Well, my own instinct on Iraq is that this regime is deeply radical, ultimately radical. This regime is a minority regime. There is something about a minority regime alienated from the popular classes, alienated from the Shi'ite masses, alienated from the Kurds that will always make it pursue a militant pan-Arab policy. This regime, if it were to emerge from this war intact, will not have to search very hard within its own soul to find deep wells of radicalism again.

ISRAELI POLICY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON

Mr. SOLARZ. I wonder if you could comment on the dilemma that the Israelis confront in southern Lebanon, which by virtue of our relationship with Israel is a dilemma for us as well. Obviously, the Israelis are concerned about the retransformation of southern Lebanon into a base of aggression against northern Israel.

My question is whether you think Israel could more effectively serve the security interests of its northern settlements, villages, and cities if it in effect totally withdrew from southern Lebanon, trusting to the efforts of Amal to maintain order and prevent the reinfiltration of the Palestinians or the utilization of southern Lebanon by fundamentalist Shi'ites who might decide, because of what happened in Lebanon over the last few years, to take revenge against Israel to maintain order. Or do you think it would be more prudent for Israel to maintain a continuing connection with the forces of General Lahad, which appears to be a continuing source of incitement for the Shi'ite community in southern Lebanon?

It seems to me that they confront a very difficult dilemma. If you looked at it from the perspective of their security interests, what would you think that they would be better off doing?

Dr. AJAMI. Let me sidestep it this way and leave it to Dick Norton. He has worked long and hard on this particular question. Maybe after he offers what he thinks about the Israeli-southern Lebanese issue, I could comment. Dick.

Dr. NORTON. You are right, Congressman. It is a very difficult problem. Frankly, I think that the kernel of the problem is the following. There is a tacit deal available, a tacit deal has been available, and a tacit deal was expected from the side of the Shi'ites.

The Israelis on their own side have had a very difficult time accepting a tacit deal properly understood, which is to say a deal which is unspoken. The Israelis spring from a culture where they expect to make a deal, where they expect to shake hands.

I spoke to Mr. Rabin about this last December, and it was very clear that he was extraordinarily frustrated, because he expected to reach out and at least have somebody shake his hand and say, "OK, you have got it." That has not happened.

But on the other hand, I think that there has been a great amount of learning going on in Israeli security policy circles. And I think that a likelihood of a tacit working security arrangement in the south is a lot higher than most people would credit. In recent weeks, a number of the Shi'ite leadership of the south have indicated good faith in that direction, and they have signaled, in their

statements to journalists and to others, their willingness to understand a tacit bargain.

Mr. SOLARZ. Can the Israelis ever hope for a peaceful arrangement in southern Lebanon without such a tacit arrangement, or should they rely instead on the forces of General Lahad to maintain order?

Dr. NORTON. In my judgment, General Lahad is an anachronism, and he will pass from the scene at one point or another. His command is slowly shrinking, and when a general's command become a captain's command, I expect him to leave.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SUNNI FUNDAMENTALISM AND SHI'ITE FUNDAMENTALISM

Mr. SOLARZ. From a political point of view, are there any differences at all between the implications of Shi'ite as opposed to Sunni fundamentalism, or are they essentially the same, Dr. Ajami?

Dr. AJAMI. Well, I have often asked it in the following way. That if you were a ruler, would you want to have Shi'ite subjects or Sunni subjects. Historically, my answer was always Shi'ite subjects. You know, they are the best. They wait for the Hidden Imam, they hold the realm of politics to be the realm of pollution, and the realm of compromise, and so on.

But lately, I think, there are also hidden wells, hidden wells of Shi'ite resentment that make them untrustworthy for any ruler, as the Shah of Iran could tell you and as others could tell you.

So the difference today is that Shi'ites themselves feel ascendent. There is something very peculiar in Moslem society today. The Sunni majority feels threatened, and is acting as a minority. The Shi'ite minority which cannot win feels ascendent, and is out to convert the majority whom it cannot convert.

Mr. SOLARZ. What about this phenomenon of suicide attacks where people make a bid for martyrdom?

Dr. AJAMI. That is a Shi'ite phenomenon.

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes.

Dr. AJAMI. The Sunnis are homicidal and the Shi'ites are suicidal. That is definitely a Shi'ite phenomenon because of the ethic of martyrdom and martyrology which is exalted in the Shi'ite experience and which knows no equivalent in Sunni life.

Mr. SOLARZ. So you would not expect Sunnis to engage in that kind of suicide attack?

Dr. AJAMI. You know, I expect many things. I grew up in that region, and I expect everything there. I expect it in the sense of Islambuli and company. They were the assassins of Sadat. They really were suicidal. They knew that theirs was a doomed mission. They walked up to the President and they assassinated him. It was a doomed trip.

FUTURE OF LEBANON

Mr. SOLARZ. Two final questions, and I will ask them together.

In your view, is Lebanon a totally lost cause in the sense that it has now become a kind of Hobbesian jungle which simply cannot be put back together again? Second, how much of a threat to the

current regime in Saudi Arabia do the forces of fundamentalism in that country pose?

Dr. AJAMI. Well, Lebanon, I think, you have to write it off. Lebanon is a string of warring fiefdoms. You have to go to China at some point with the warlord system to get an idea of Lebanon. Lebanon is a partitioned country today in all but name. There are the Druze in the Shouf; only Druze power is the issue there. There is Maronia, the Maronite piece of land. It has more land than people; it will eventually lose some of the land it holds.

Then there are the Shi'ites. They are probably 50 percent of the country today. We do not know. All numbers in Lebanon are fabrications including, I must say, my own numbers. So the Shi'ites are dominant in the Bekaa Valley. They are dominant in the south, and they are dominant in greater Beirut.

Guess who lost in this fight for Lebanon over the last decade? The Sunni coastal cities—Tripoli, Beirut, and Sidon. These were the strongholds of the Sunnis. You have to write off Sidon. This now stands in the way of the Shi'ites and they will eventually take it over. Beirut, I think also, is theirs, and will become theirs in the long run.

So, in the short run, Lebanon is finished. It does not have central authority. What it does have are these warring fiefdoms and a Syrian umbrella over these warring fiefdoms. Syria knows how to draw the line, and it draws limits for the warring fiefdoms, and all of them recognize that.

Notice that the Lebanese are very irreverent toward everyone—the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, the Americans, the Russians—but never toward the Syrians. Irreverence toward Syria could be very costly in Lebanese politics. So you have to write off Lebanon for now.

Does this affect Saudi Arabia very far away? In my opinion, not really. For a decade, there has been carnage in Lebanon and business as usual in the gulf. For any carnage and any disorder in Lebanon to go east, guess what it must do? It must cross Syria, and the Syrians will not allow it.

Today there is Iranian influence, some Iranian influence, in Lebanon, in the Bekaa Valley, but it is under the shadow of Syria. Should the Syrians want to smash that connection between Iran and the Shi'ites of Lebanon, they could effectively smash it and insulate Lebanon's troubles from the rest of the region beyond it. The Syrians are very shrewd and hardnosed.

FUNDAMENTALIST CHALLENGE TO SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. SOLARZ. When I was referring to the fundamentalist threat to Saudi Arabia, I did not mean a threat emanating from Lebanon, but I meant the threat emanating from within Saudi society itself as manifested by the attack on the Grand Mosque several years ago, and the clear contradiction between the lifestyle of the royal family and the fundamentalist values which they theoretically espouse.

I wonder whether you see within Saudi Arabia itself the seeds of its own dissolution as the result of any possible fundamentalist discontent with the character of the existing regime?

Dr. AJAMI. I do not. I do not. The Saudis have survived two moments of enthusiasm. When a regime, a monarchy, survives two revolutionary moments, you have to give it high marks for something, for some skill in managing its own affairs.

The Saudis survived the Nasserist moment in the 1960's. And everybody assumed that this regime was living on borrowed time. It survived that moment. It then survived the Iranian moment of enthusiasm in 1979, in 1980, 1981, and so on. And they have done remarkably well.

I think that the reason for Saudi durability is that there is no great Saudi ambition about forcing their society to change. They are not trying to remake their own society. They accept the limits of their own society. They have shown greater deference to the established norms of their own society.

They did not commit the Shah of Iran's mistake of dreaming that their own society could be remade in some great image. They accepted the limits of Saudi Arabia and the limits of the Saudi social contract and they have survived. They have survived rather well these two radical moments, and I think that the prognosis for them is not so bad.

Mr. GILMAN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I am finished. I just want to thank you very much for indulging me in what at least for me has been very fascinating.

Mr. HAMILTON. We are pleased to have had you, Mr. Solarz. Mr. Gilman.

FUNDAMENTALIST THREAT TO EGYPT

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Along the same line of questioning, do you see any threat to Egypt from the fundamentalists? I notice in the last few days that there has been a crackdown in Egypt on some of the fundamentalists, and 200 to 300 were arrested over the last few days.

Is there any real threat in Egypt by the fundamentalists?

Dr. AJAMI. Well, the Moslem fundamentalist groups, the Moslem Brothers in Egypt, are a phenomenon of the late 1920's. They have been around now for nearly 60 years. Will they always be there? They will always be there. Like the heat of Egypt, like everything in Egypt, like the hell of Egypt, the traffic of Egypt, the Moslem fundamentalists will be there.

They are there. Can they take over state power in Egypt? I do not think so. There is a kind of stereotype of Egypt which I think is not a bad one. Egypt is a hydraulic political culture: whoever controls the water controls the life of that society. It is a very cautious political culture.

The Egyptians know, they know very well, that they have several million Copts, several million Christians. What their place would be in a so-called Moslem polity would obviously spell hell and disaster for the Egyptians. So the Egyptian pharaonic political culture, with the man at the helm having the obedience of the society and the consent of the society, will hold.

The Moslem groups will be there. They will tell us some things. The way of looking at Moslem fundamentalism in Egypt is almost

as a thermometer of society: it tells you when the ruler is losing touch with his people; it tells you when the westernized classes are becoming just a little too obnoxious and too pretentious. And when the weddings at the Hilton and the Sheraton are beginning to cost not 30,000 pounds, but 80,000 pounds, then you will hear from the Moslem fundamentalists.

When the ruler breaks the contract with Egypt, when he corners his own society, as Sadat did in September 1981 with his crack-down, then you will hear from the Moslem radicals. But can they take over that society? I do not believe so, because Egypt is too wily a place. It is too defeated a place. It is too burdened a place. And the enthusiasm that you need to generate a takeover of the state, I do not think will be there in Egypt.

And the primary, important institutions of Egypt—the army, the bureaucracy—these are very old institutions.

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Akhavi, would you care to comment on that?

Dr. AKHAVI. On this particular question of the fundamentalists in Egypt?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes.

Dr. AKHAVI. I will go back to my remarks in my paper which were intended to send up some red flags over the one-to-one correspondence between the Shi'ite movements and Sunni Moslem movements. I do not believe that the Sunni Moslem movements in Egypt are particularly responding to Iranian developments except in the most general sense, of course, that Khomeini represents a phenomenon. I recall when I was in Cairo in 1980 and 1981 doing some work on an unrelated subject that taxi drivers had two views about Ayatollah Khomeini in fact.

One was reflecting the government line on him, that he was basically crazy. The other line was much more considered. Although they were not particularly happy with the Shi'ism of Khomeini, they were fascinated by what he represented as a blow for the cause of the East, so to speak. In that sense, they compared him to Nasser and Muhammad Mosaddeq, who was of course in earlier Iranian politics a very important figure.

As far as the specifics of these movements, including the "repentance and flight from sin" group, the Takfir wal-Hijra, for example, and the Islamic Liberation Organization, we just know too little to make generalizations. And so I would rather be cautious and not really go out on a limb and say what is the impact of the Shi'ites in Iran upon them.

But in my view, of course, fundamentalism not only feeds on the Arab-Israeli conflict, but it also feeds on domestic problems that have nothing to do with that, including the historic problems of Egypt, the poverty of the land, the wars that have been fought in the past, and the consequences of having to pay for those wars, et cetera.

FUNDAMENTALIST THREATS IN THE GULF

Mr. GILMAN. And to the entire panel, do you see any other Arab nation that is confronted with a serious threat by Islamic fundamentalism at the present time?

Dr. NORTON. I think the list of potential trouble spots is not overlong, but it's a serious list. One, I think, has to look at the gulf. One has to look at the Arabian Peninsula. In particular, I would say that I'm rather impressed by the fact that there hasn't been any difficulty, any serious difficulty in the gulf beyond the incidents in Kuwait and the attempted takeover in Bahrain in 1979.

One has to hold one's breath and perhaps wonder how long that period of quiet is going to continue.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you agree with Dr. Ajami's premise that because Syria stands in the way, there would not be any real problem in the gulf?

Dr. NORTON. I think at the end of the day the Syrians have very little to do with what goes on or doesn't go on in the gulf. I think the most important two issues in terms of determining the likelihood of any possible flareups are the outcome of the gulf war and the play of internal political struggles.

If Iran should win the war, I think we would see additional flareups.

The second thing is the outcome of internal struggles for political power and for political privilege. The fact of the matter is that many of the Shi'ite communities in the gulf feel that they're not getting their share. Certainly there's a sense of communal deprivation with respect to the Shi'ite population in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, a community which, by the way, has never been represented at the ministerial level in the Saudi Government.

There are both internal and external problems, and the interplay of these problems could have very serious effects. So I frankly think that those two concerns, or those two variables are much more important than the Syrian role, one way or another.

THREATS TO THE IRAQI REGIME

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Ajami.

Dr. AJAMI. Well, I think I agree with this. If you were to do risk analysis, and if you were to prophesy the future, which I advise you against where Middle Eastern politics is concerned, you would have to look at the Iraqi state. And I think the Iraqi state, in my opinion, stands as the most vulnerable state, because this state has not been pushed yet.

And the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war will be significant, because ultimately the Sunni minority that rules Iraq must share power, and I think even the dominant regimes in the gulf, the other regimes, the Saudis and the Kuwaitis, have been trying, to the extent that they can—though they can't very much—to convince Saddam Hussein that the basis of Iraqi society has to be extended, that you can't rule a society by 20 percent of the people, that you must include the rest.

Here in a very interesting way the Iran-Iraq war has been problematic for the Shi'ites of Iraq, because they have come to feel that Shi'ism has meant now the Iranian man's burden, to feel that the Iranians see all other Shi'ites as surrogates for them. But the Iraqis would like, if they are going to smash the Iraqi state of Saddam Hussein, to do it for their own reasons, on their own time with their own symbols and their own leaders.

So if you were to look for one likely troubled and threatened political regime, I think the regime is Iraq. The basis of that regime emerged about six decades ago, and it has not changed very much, and I think it must eventually change. It is being pressed very hard to change.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. I thank the panelists.

U.S. POLICY ON THE SEVEN AMERICAN HOSTAGES

Mr. HAMILTON. We've got a very specific problem over there now. We've got seven hostages, and what's your advice to us on how we can get them out?

Dr. AJAMI. I'll pass the microphone. [Laughter.]

Dr. AKHAVI. Well, one of the problems, I guess, is we don't know who has them, so the first thing is to identify where they are. After that is done it seems to me that it's possible to go once again to the President of Syria and see if he can pull it off, that is to say, to use his influence with those who presumably do have them. It's quite possible that they could be released.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is he our best hope here, the President of Syria, to get these seven hostages out, do you think?

Dr. AKHAVI. In the particular context of Lebanese politics today, I should imagine he is. It's kind of odd, in a way, that two states have virtually been taken off the terrorism list recently, and those are of course Iraq and Syria.

There was an article I just happened to glance at this morning in the Washington Post that talked about the—that is, yesterday's Washington Post—that talked about Hafez al-Asad's new role as a tactical ally of the United States. There's nothing wrong with this, it seems to me, for the United States to have that connection and to use it if it can deliver.

The French Government is a government that has been around for some time, and after the fall of Dien Bien Phu and after the defeats of the French in Algeria, a lot of people were predicting the collapse of France, its prestige, its historical position in the international arena.

And as a matter of fact in my own personal view I think that people in the Middle East, the people in Asia, including the Vietnamese and the Algerians themselves, tend to give a good deal of respect and deference to the French.

Mr. HAMILTON. What would you do if you were the United States, now? Would you go to President Asad and say "Look, Mr. President, we think you've got the key here to these seven hostages. We think you have the power to get their release."? Is that the way you'd approach it?

Dr. AKHAVI. Yes, I—

Mr. HAMILTON. Say "Give us a hand here." Is that what we ought to do?

Dr. AKHAVI. I wouldn't go out there with great expectations of success, but it seems to me if it's the only game in town, we ought to play.

Mr. HAMILTON. How about Iran? Are they actors here at all in trying to get the release of these seven hostages, or are they irrelevant?

Dr. AKHAVI. Well, they may indeed be involved, although they—

THE ROLE OF SYRIA

Mr. HAMILTON. What can we do about that if they are?

Dr. NORTON. Well, I think there are several things we might do which are quite important, and for different reasons. One, I think we need to stop talking about retaliation. During the recent crisis there were retired senior or former officials of the State Department who were talking constantly about retaliation and that sort of thing.

And this strikes me as the height of absurdity, because what it does is increases the value of these hostages as shields, if you will, sort of the classic use of hostages that the Romans discovered many centuries ago. Frankly, I think the public rhetoric is very unhelpful.

No. 2, we have to recognize that even the Syrians probably cannot produce these guys without a lot of hard work. It's not a matter of snapping one's fingers. It's not even clear to me, looking at it from public sources and so on, that these people are all held by the same group.

So it seems to me that enlisting the support of the Syrians might be helpful, but one has to be patient, and one has to provide, I think, the appropriate incentive to the Syrians to act with great seriousness.

Perhaps one appropriate incentive is a bit of ego-gratification for Hafez al-Asad, but perhaps something more substantive would be in order, including more direct discussions of the fate of the Golan Heights. Iran—

Mr. HAMILTON. You think the Syrians make a connection there?

Dr. NORTON. I don't know that for—

Mr. HAMILTON. If we show an interest in the Golan Heights question, would they show more interest in helping us get the seven hostages back?

Dr. NORTON. To the best of my knowledge, Congressman Hamilton, that has not been said. I couldn't support that with a source or an interview or anything of that nature.

Mr. HAMILTON. You think they're all held in Lebanon?

Dr. NORTON. That's my inference.

Mr. HAMILTON. The hostages, your impression is they're all held in Lebanon?

Dr. NORTON. I don't have access to any special information in that respect, but my sense is that they are held in Lebanon.

Mr. HAMILTON. And they are held by the so-called radical fundamentalist groups, probably?

Dr. NORTON. I don't know if the term "radical" is even strong enough. Certainly an extremist radical group, perhaps with some family connections, perhaps with some working relationships on occasion with the Syrians, but frankly, I think with the ability to remove the hostages outside the grasp of the Syrians as well as everybody else.

There are lots of rabbit warrens in southern Beirut, for example, where people can be hidden for literally months without being found.

Mr. HAMILTON. Was the President correct in leaving Syria off his list of states that support terrorism?

Dr. NORTON. It's my impression that if one wants to enlist Syrian assistance, then such symbolic steps have a certain benefit. Frankly, if I were in Hafez al-Asad's shoes—

Mr. HAMILTON. I appreciate that, but was he correct?

Dr. NORTON. Well, I don't know. And I think very few people know. Frankly, I would be very surprised to learn that anybody in our Government really knew, or really had any hard information on Syrian involvement in at least the terrorist incidents in Lebanon.

What impresses me is the extent to which we just don't know, and—

Mr. HAMILTON. Have you had any impression that military supplies are flowing to the extremist groups, the terrorist groups, through Damascus?

Dr. NORTON. My impression is that the Syrians have facilitated the resupply of the Amal militia, and they have probably facilitated the resupply of the Hizbullah group. Whether or not there is a materiel flow from Damascus to the people who have the hostages, I don't know.

WHY AMERICANS ARE TARGETED

Mr. HAMILTON. Dr. Ajami, how do you deal with this problem?

Dr. AJAMI. It's a very hard one. I think there are some very unpleasant things to be said. There is a price to being a great power, and having people, seven people, imprisoned, I'm sorry, in a place like the Middle East is part of the price of being a great power.

For example, we talked about going to Hafez—

Mr. HAMILTON. But why doesn't it happen to the Soviet Union?

Dr. AJAMI. Well, the usual answer which we all know, and I think it is no less true for being frequently said, is that there's a great premium placed on the individual in a democratic society, in a society receptive to public opinion like this one.

So 7 or 8 or 10 or 40 Americans becomes something worth holding. Now, we say "Why don't we go—let's go talk to the Syrians as long as there is no harm in talking to the Syrians about these seven?" The question is, are you willing to pay the price that the Syrians may ask, explicitly or implicitly, for talking to them about the seven?

The price may be a change, a radical change, in America's Middle Eastern policy. For example, they might want you to drop Jordan as a very important American client, and a very important American friend. They may want the United States to abandon the search for a Jordanian-Palestinian settlement and to consider Syria the most legitimate party to the question of Palestine.

Is this administration or any future administration ready to do so? And I think these are the questions that you have to throw into a consideration of the release of seven Americans.

Mr. HAMILTON. So what would you suggest we do?

Dr. AJAMI. Well, Mr. Chairman, that's why I became an academic. [Laughter.]

So I never have to solve a particular thing. I guess I would go to Hafez al-Asad, but on my flight there to Damascus I would scribble on my notebook that this is a fool's errand, that I am on a fool's errand, and I would probably be on a fool's errand.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Solarz?

RETALIATION FOR ACTS OF TERRORISM

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could pursue the point that you and Mr. Gilman have raised, and that has to do with how the United States should respond to acts of terrorism against American citizens in that part of the world, it seems to me that there are conceptually one or two possibilities when one attempts to analyze who's responsible for this.

Either you have organizations acting on their own for their own reasons unconnected in any way to a formal state, power or authority, or you have organizations that are actively receiving support from a state in the region, such as Syria, Iran, or Libya.

Do you think that it makes sense for us to take some kind of retaliatory or if possible preemptive action against them? What do we do in a situation where we determine that a terrorist group that has acted against American citizens or property is receiving tangible material support, perhaps even some form of direction, from an established state authority in the region?

What do you think we should do then in terms of retaliation?

Dr. AJAMI. In most of these cases, as you well know, we have had no smoking gun. We've had no evidence, and so in the absence of very hard evidence, if for example the Libyans or the Syrians or the Iranians sponsored a particular deed, I really agree with President Reagan when he said, in his press conference on the TWA hijacking, that if we were to do it indiscriminately we ourselves would be terrorists.

We should not do it.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, I quite agree with that, but my question assumes knowledge.

Dr. AJAMI. Right.

Mr. SOLARZ. What do we do then?

Dr. AJAMI. Well, I think then it's time to call the people who are experts in retaliation. I think then a power cannot seem to be indifferent. If you have solid evidence, if you have the proverbial smoking gun, if you have solid proof that the Syrians or the Iranians or the Libyans footed the bill, financed, trained someone, then the question is what to do—not so much about these fringe groups.

It's, as you know, very easy to find an 18-, 19-year-old boy and send him on an errand for money or for belief. I think ultimately these fringe groups—we shouldn't worry about them. The question—you're right—is the institutionalized use of terror, the terror of the kind exercised by a man like Muammar al-Qadhafi.

The question in the international community is what to do about Muammar al-Qadhafi? This man is a criminal, but he's the head of a state. This is a very fundamental issue—what to do with a man

who presides as the head of one of the 150 or so states in the world who is actually a criminal, a terrorist?

Well, the union of nation-states has had no answers. Classically, there have been no answers. But what to do about the man who's at the head of a state power who's a terrorist?

Mr. SOLARZ. Dr. Norton, what do you think we should do?

Dr. NORTON. Assuming information.

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes; assuming the kind of intelligence which we can be reasonably confident is accurate, linking a state power to acts of terrorism against the United States.

Dr. NORTON. Linking a particular group which has acted against our people, and which is not connected to a State Power.

Taking the second point first, I think if we recognized that all fundamentalists are not ipso facto anti-American, but there are some fundamentalists who are anti-American, and rabidly so, and if we identify these people, then I think we have to do what is necessary to bring them to justice.

I think the administration's position with respect to the hijackers of the TWA plane recently hijacked is precisely correct, which is to say to attempt to force the Lebanese authorities, weak as they may be, to bring these men to justice, and failing that, to pursue other means, including extradition and so on. Also, I understand an increase in the bounty is being considered. The only thing that worries me about that is I suspect that we're going to end up with 30 sets of bodies and they would all have the right passports, Lebanon being Lebanon.

I have absolutely no difficulty with the concept of bringing people to justice by whatever constitutionally sanctioned means we may be able to use.

With respect to a state, if there's hard evidence, then I think we have every reason to take appropriate countermeasures, and that may mean if Iran is involved, backing Iraq more than we might be doing.

That might mean in effect letting Iraq do the dirty work. Increasing the price of an ongoing conflict for the Iranians. If it's Syria, I think there are also measures that can be taken and not just military measures. For instance pressure on states which have been known in the past to provide financial subsidies to the Syrian Government, Saudi Arabia, for example.

EFFECT OF AN IRANIAN VICTORY IN THE GULF WAR

Mr. SOLARZ. It appears as if the conflict between Iraq and Iran has mired down into a kind of World War I version of trench warfare. But if a situation should develop where the Iranian forces broke through and in effect Iran won the war, this would clearly provide a shot in the arm to the Iranian version of fundamentalism.

Exactly how much of a problem would this create throughout the rest of the region? Would it produce a kind of Middle Eastern domino effect with one moderate regime after another falling to newly resurgent fundamentalist movements which had derived inspiration, motivation, encouragement, and legitimacy from the Iranian triumph in that conflict?

Or do you think that the consequences could be pretty much contained at the Iraqi border? What would it mean for the whole balance of power in the Middle East if you had an Iraq with its resources in effect under the control of Iran with its resources?

Dr. AJAMI. I think you have asked—I was just recently in Kuwait—you've asked the question that the people in the gulf always ask. It's the classical issue of what happens when a group that has been out of power comes to power. It's always problematic. I mean, one always over-estimates the danger, like, if you have a regime change in Iraq, then all hell will break loose in the rest of the Gulf.

I myself, I really honestly don't see it this way. I think one way or another, one day or another, today, 5 years from today, there has to be a restructuring of the Iraqi state.

If Iran won the war, it would have a problem of its own. Iran would have a problem of its own with the Iraqi Shi'ites who don't want to come under Iran's dominion. These people would like to assert that they are Arabs, that they are Iraqis, that, in a way, they understand what happened in the relations between Vietnam and Cambodia, if you recall.

You don't want Iraq a client state of Iran. There is a great deal of tension between the Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein and the Iranian regime because the Iraqi groups feel that the Iranian regime is too paternal and too arrogant in its dealings with the Iraqi opposition.

There is a fear in the gulf of what happens if either Iran or Iraq wins. Mind you, the Arabs will not let you know that. But, should Iraq emerge from this war uncontested, should Saddam Hussein emerge as the master of the gulf, there will be great problems for Kuwait and for the Saudis and for the smaller states of the gulf, particularly for Kuwait.

I believe if you were to take a delicate and secret opinion poll in Kuwait—in the heart of hearts of the Kuwaitis, and ask them, would you rather see a victory for Iran or a victory for Iraq? I don't know what the answer would be. I doubt that the Kuwaitis themselves would know, but I don't think it would simply split along the Shi'ites of Kuwait wanting an Iranian victory and the Sunnis of Kuwait wanting an Iraqi victory.

I think they worry about the hegemony of Iran and the hegemony of Iraq over the gulf. The war, terrible as it is, in the end has postponed the question, the large geopolitical question as to what country of these two countries will dominate the gulf: Iran or Iraq?

But, the question will have to be solved in the next few years anyway.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STABILITY OF THE IRANIAN REGIME

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me ask a question or two about Iran.

That regime has been quite stable. The Ayatollah has been in power now for how long? Six years? What is it?

Dr. AKHAVI. About 6 years.

Mr. HAMILTON. What do you anticipate for Iran in the near future so far as the stability of the regime is concerned?

Dr. AKHAVI. Well, of course, a lot depends on foreign policy and the policies of the Soviet Union perhaps, among others, as well as the war with Iraq. If everything remains the same, in other words the war continues, but at a very low level, I should imagine that people will be waiting for Ayatollah Khomeini's departure from the scene.

There is significant internal cleavage, Congressman Hamilton, inside of Iran that we don't really get a good handle on because the international press is more or less excluded with one or two exceptions.

Mr. HAMILTON. How would you describe that cleavage? What are the elements of opposition to the Ayatollah?

Dr. AKHAVI. Well, I think there are at least two different cleavages among the leadership: One on a political dimension, and another on a socioeconomic dimension.

I'll start with the socioeconomic dimension first. It has to do really with the role of the state in the economy of the country, such issues as banking, finance, property questions, trade, and so on.

The cleavage there is basically between those who want free enterprise to be the basis of the economy and those who want the state to interfere and intervene. I could name names—

Mr. HAMILTON. A lot of those were supporters of the Shah?

Dr. AKHAVI. Oh, no; I'm talking about clerics now. In other words—

Mr. HAMILTON. Oh.

Dr. AKHAVI [continuing]. Cleavages among the clerics themselves.

Mr. HAMILTON. I see.

Dr. AKHAVI. There is a substantial number—perhaps they're not as vocal as they might like to be—who oppose the creation of a co-operative sector, for instance, in the economy and certainly a state sector in the economy.

The parliament of the country has failed to pass legislation, important legislation, dealing with the land question precisely because a number of clerics with high positions are in a position to veto these things. They have created what we would regard in the United States as the Supreme Court which passes over the enactments of the parliament.

The other dimension is more a political one, and that has to do with the militance of the revolution. There is a kind of cleavage which in a way is tripartite rather than simply A versus B. I think there are three positions here.

The first group, which I presume Khomeini himself and perhaps his presumed successor, who is Ayatollah Montazeri, advocate permanent revolution. They try to keep the revolutionary zeal and the elan of the people up and, with respect to state agencies, try to prevent bureaucratization of power.

The second tendency supports Khomeini's idea of Wilayat al-Faqih, the supreme rule of the jurisprudent, but disagrees with the Khomeini-Montazeri line to the extent it can regarding state power and state agencies. They do because they hold political offices, and favor bureaucratization. These individuals include the president, I should imagine, of the country, as well as the speaker of the parliament, and others.

The third group includes some elements of the opposition to the regime—in other words, those not necessarily in the regime, although there are others who join them who are in the regime. There are a number of distinguished Mujahids who are either incarcerated or else silenced who oppose any role for a Faqih in the society, and have said so in the past. Of course, they paid the price for it.

But, even within the regime, there is significant resistance to the notion that one leader should really represent the Imam of the age—that is, the hidden Imam—and be able to collect taxes, for example, in the absence of that hidden Imam. These include people in the Supreme Judicial Council and the Council of the Guardians, which are important judicial organs.

Mr. HAMILTON. You've been describing people who are within the establishment—

Dr. AKHAVI. That's right.

Mr. HAMILTON [continuing]. But have very grave doubts about policy.

Dr. AKHAVI. Yes.

OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME

Mr. HAMILTON. There must be a lot of people not in the establishment. They've got a lot of unemployed people there. They've got a lot of minority people. They've got a lot of people who supported the Shah. They've got a lot of people who don't like this stringent Islamic fundamentalism and religious observance. What about these people? Are there any indications in the society that they're at the point of throwing off the regime or rebelling against it?

Dr. AKHAVI. There are certain indications that those who are in exile in Paris, whether they be monarchists or partisans of Muhammad Mosaddeq's secular line of nationalism or perhaps communists or Mujahidin, that they have been able from time-to-time to kind of orchestrate demonstrations.

The last significant one I suppose you could call a car-in. That is, people just began to drive around the capital and began to honk their horns at a designated hour as a sign of protest.

I think you've painted a picture of opposition. There are a lot of people you said, and that's true. But, in a way, that's the saving grace of the regime. The regime is unable really to have consistent policies, which it can implement on such questions as land, for example.

On the other hand, the opposition is so numerous in a way, in the sense of fragmented, that there's no real alignment among these groups and they are recriminating against one another in their press. So I think the regime has been able to stay in power more as a result of the fragmentation of the opposition than anything that it has positively done in the way of implementing policy.

WHO WILL SUCCEED KHOMEINI

Mr. HAMILTON. What happens after Khomeini?

Dr. AKHAVI. There is a provision for his succession. It's been put into operation.

Mr. HAMILTON. Has he picked a successor?

Dr. AKHAVI. We don't know. The idea is that Montazeri is his successor. Now, how do we know whether he is or not is uncertain. We can't point to a Fatwa, for instance, an authoritative opinion, by Khomeini saying this guy should be my successor.

A lot of people doubt that it would be Montazeri, as a matter of fact, because he doesn't exemplify justice, learning and piety, which are the important categories that such individuals are supposed to have as perceived by their followers. And, so, many people think perhaps Khomeini selected him in his own lifetime in order to prevent antiregime plots or schemes from running afoot.

But, probably, he would be a member of the successor council, a committee of from three to five people. Best guess is that he would be *primus inter pares*.

CHANGES IN IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. HAMILTON. You mentioned in your statement that you saw some signs of an opening in Iran's foreign policy toward the United States, toward Western Europe. Could you elaborate on that a little bit. What's happening there and why is it happening?

Dr. AKHAVI. I think the war has to do with the change. The shortage of foreign exchange as they fight this war. The fact that OPEC is in disarray and they're trying to sell their oil at as high price as they can, but they can't really convince the rest of the OPEC countries to give them a better formula within the OPEC production policies to have higher production levels. That certainly has a lot to do with it.

But, in fact it's—in my opinion—the case that people who have had experience abroad tend to have a broader perspective on the issues.

For instance, Ayatollah Beheshti, who until his death as a result of one of the Mujahidin bombs in June 1981, had spent about 13 or 14 years in Hamburg, Germany as one of the emissaries of the then-Ayatollah who was very apolitical, Ayatollah Borujerdi. If I'm not mistaken, the American Government at the early stage of the hostage-taking was negotiating basically with Beheshti. He was the one that was somewhat more pragmatic.

And, in my paper, I alluded to Rafsanjani as perhaps a legatee of the Beheshti kind of pragmatism. I'm not willing to bet 100 percent on this because there are a lot of things that keep Rafsanjani back. He's certainly committed to the Manichaean perspective of Ayatollah Khomeini about the world.

But, on the other hand, maybe there's room for—

PROSPECTS FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN

Mr. HAMILTON. But, what is the implication of this for U.S. policy? Does it give us some kind of an opening or does it not at this point?

Mr. AKHAVI. It could lead us to adopt a less pro-Iraqi—I'm not saying there's a tremendously pro-Iraqi orientation—but it could lead us to take a more modified stand in supporting the Iraqis in the war.

But I doubt that there's anything dramatic that can be done at this point. It seems to me that what we ought to do is look around and hope for the emergence of more pragmatic leaders in Khomeini's wake, such as Bazargan.

If Bazargan wins the presidency, that sure will be a sign, in my opinion, that the regime has changed.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE ANTI-WESTERNISM OF FUNDAMENTALISTS

Some of the commentators say almost all Islamic fundamentalists are anti-Western, essentially against modernization, essentially against religious freedom and essentially against democracy.

Would you say that that's a fair premise and a fair analysis of fundamentalism?

I address that to the whole panel.

Dr. AJAMI. Against democracy I suppose so. I mean, against democracy as seen in the West. Definitely so.

Yet they are also critics of the high centralization of power in persons like the Shah of Iran or the King of Morocco.

So, there is a democratic yearning. It's a populist yearning. It's a lower middle class yearning. It's a yearning of the youth for more participation in political life.

Are they innately and finally and irrevocably anti-Western? I agree with Dick Norton. Some of these people are anti-Western just because they happen to be. That's their deep conviction.

Some oppose particular Western policies.

But, to reiterate something we said at the very beginning, I mean the strains of Moslem society, the tensions within Moslem society are producing a kind of radicalism and radical youth who see in the West a scapegoat for the problems of Moslem society. I mean, they have been telling us in as many ways as they could that they hold the West at fault for the problems of Moslem society. For example, if they don't like the structure of power in the gulf, then they believe it's only American backing that keeps in power the regimes of the gulf. There's a good deal of scapegoating there.

HOW TO DEAL WITH FUNDAMENTALISTS

Mr. GILMAN. So, then the bottom line in trying to have some relationship with these groups of people, the fundamentalists, is that we would have to deal with them almost at arms length, because of that underlying feeling. Is that a direct approach?

Dr. AJAMI. I think so.

Mr. AKHAVI. Congressman Gilman, if I may just say, I think that the question of democracy has to be looked at from the point of view of its two traditions. As I see it, there are two traditions. One emphasizes individual liberty, and the other emphasizes equality among the people.

Now, I feel that the Mujtahids are not interested in the first. They're not interested in individual liberty the way in the United States there is a protection of these.

On the other hand, they do support the leveling of social differences among the population, and although I'm not a supporter of this regime, I believe income distribution there has been more equal than in the previous regime.

Therefore, there is some commonality here to the extent that in the French Revolutionary tradition, equality plays a role. Because of this, it seems to me we can, to some extent, talk in terms of their discourse.

I'm reminded of an article when the hostages were taken by Professor Mottahedeh of Princeton University in the *Journal, Foreign Policy*, in which he alluded to certain traditions of Shi'ite law that forbade the taking of such hostages. He proposed as a policy that Americans learn this discourse so they can put the onus of taking hostages on the Shi'ite high clergy and have them respond either in terms of saying they want to do it because of political purposes—they want to humiliate the United States—or else thinking twice and saying, “Well, there is in the tradition of the law something that says we can't do this. It's against our traditions.”

Mr. GILMAN. Have any fundamentalist leaders spoken out on that?

Dr. AKHAVI. Well, I don't think that the United States tried that gambit, and, of course, it was a proposal for the future because it came after the fact.

Maybe we did have people who understood their discourse and culture, but I tend to doubt it. I agree with Ambassador Eilts. We're not equipped really with our diplomatic personnel to understand that kind of discourse.

But, in the future, perhaps it might be worthwhile at least as I mentioned to put the onus of the whole thing on them to respond in their own terms. It might be worthwhile to cite the tradition of Sheikh Tusi to them. That might shake them up a little bit.

Dr. AJAMI. And, don't hold your breath while you do it.

Dr. AKHAVI. It's worth a try, certainly, in my estimation.

Mr. GILMAN. Why do you feel it would not be of any practicality, Dr. Ajami?

Dr. AJAMI. Well, look, these men are interested in power, and revenge, and change. They are very ambitious people. I mean, they have played havoc with the Shi'ite tradition itself. They've reinterpreted the view when it suits them. They have demolished it.

The notion that somehow or another that walking into someone quoting their scripture to them you will shame them is just a bit—to me, anyway—very naive considering the realities of the antagonisms that exist between America and many of these groups and many of these regimes.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, let me ask you, Dr. Ajami, what is the ultimate objective of holding these seven hostages? What is its ultimate purpose?

Dr. AJAMI. It's hard to fathom the mind of someone who would hold one, or two, or three, or four Americans, but I guess here is a way that you can speak to a great power. You can insinuate yourself onto to the agenda of a great power—in fact that it will be reported that Congressman Gilman was inquiring about this. I mean, this is the reality. This is one way that you hold seven Americans. You in effect open a channel, reluctant channel, nevertheless a

channel with the United States. The United States wants something that you are holding.

It's revenge against a great power, a great successful power. These are very small groups. The notion of Hizbullah versus the United States is very flattering to Hizbullah.

These groups—we're dealing here with societies that are failing. Now, holding a hostage, holding seven hostages is a measure of the importance—I mean, this gives one an illusion of being terribly important. During even the TWA crisis, many of the people in the Amal movement felt tremendously important; talking to them they felt they had entered the world through its gates.

So, partly it is a bid for attention, a statement of wrath, a statement of revenge, and also saying, "OK, come on, talk to us about our grievances. There is a price you have to pay for the defiling things that you do to us. We can also hurt you back."

It's mad but it makes sense to the mind of very mad men.

Mr. GILMAN. Would anyone else like to comment on that?

Dr. NORTON. I'd like to add a couple of things very briefly, if I may.

One is I would not underestimate the pragmatism of some of these groups and I think it really needs to be emphasized that we're dealing with a vast panorama of groups ranging from the grossest nuts and fanatics to the most practical of politicians. And, pragmatism for many of these people is a political principle.

To give you one example, the venerable Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt, which before the 1952 revolution literally targeted the Wafd Party, recently entered into a coalition, an electoral coalition, with this very party which was its historical enemy. Pragmatism is not unknown to some of these groups.

There is for some of the more extremist groups an abiding, deep, entrenched anti-Americanism that's going to be there and no amount of bargaining, no amount of public posturing is going to remove it. But, that's not the case with all of the groups.

And, I really think that needs to be remembered. I think there's a real difference in Lebanon, for example, between somebody like Sheikh Shaaban who is the leader of a Sunni fundamentalist group called Tawhid or Unity, and the centrist politicians of the Amal organization.

They understand a deal.

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Akhavi, did you want to comment?

Dr. AKHAVI. Just to reaffirm what Dr. Norton said. I think that's correct.

We really should take a longer term perspective, realizing, of course, that we're dealing with hostages that are taken and so we have to deal with a specific issue.

China at one time was an enemy of the United States. It seems to me that people in the Shi'ite world are human beings, too, and they will also be susceptible to changes in attitude.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE AMAL MOVEMENT

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me just ask a few questions about Amal. Is Mr. Berri a leader of a unified Amal movement?

Dr. AJAMI. In my judgment, not really. Amal represents the Shi'ite mainstream. The Shi'ite middle class in many ways—I mean many of these leaders—for example, Nabih Berri himself is a lawyer. His deputy, Akif Haidar is a former colonel even from the Deuxieme Bureau.

I mean these are not radical men. These are men who just want in to the Lebanese—

Mr. HAMILTON. What are the major divisions of Amal today?

Dr. AJAMI. I guess that—well, first of all, Amal is heavily infiltrated today. The Syrians have their own groups within Amal, and there are also personal splits within Amal because people within Amal are beginning to worry that maybe the whole movement has become just a vehicle for the ambition of one man.

The problem with the politics of Lebanon and maybe even the politics of the wider area around it is the susceptibility to the big man. So, Nabih Berri has emerged as a big man from a very modest social background.

Now, many of the Lebanese, despite the wars and the ruins, are still finicky about class, social class. I mean, one man says, "I can't obey Nabih Berri, who is only the son of Moustafa Berri, because he doesn't happen to be the son of somebody big." So, there are these personal rivalries.

Add to that the Syrian role in Amal. I mean that the Syrians have infiltrated Amal.

Then there are people who are softer on religious tradition than others, like Berri himself. I doubt if he's very devout. He now has come to pray, he has come to pay homage to the tradition, but actually he's just a Lebanese politician in a very conventional mold of the Lebanese politician.

Many of the prevailing currents of thought in Lebanon, in the Shi'ite community, will be found within Amal—more radical groups, more moderate groups, groups that will in effect still talk about just simply sectarian power for the Shi'ites, with others holding to more lofty visions.

So, does Berri control it? I think he doesn't quite control the movement as a whole. He does have the dominant voice within it, but he is challenged, eternally, always challenged.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OTHER GROUPS

Mr. HAMILTON. You read about a lot of different groups there. I have a difficult time sorting them out. You've got the Islamic Jihad—

Dr. AJAMI. Which may be even—

Mr. HAMILTON [continuing]. Islamic Amal, you've got the Hizbulah group that you've mentioned a number of times today, and the Musawi group.

Where do we fit in all of these groups? As you draw an organizational chart where do they fit?

Dr. AJAMI. Well, all the groups you mentioned—Islamic Jihad, I don't know if this exists. This could be just a mailing address; this could be just a name.

The Musawi group in the Bekaa Valley is its own universe. It's headed by a man who used to be a member of Amal but believes

that Amal has sold out, that the goals of Amal are just too conventional. He, for example, believes and I think he is right, that Amal in the south of Lebanon is susceptible to a deal with Israel.

So, Musawi in the Bekaa Valley is far to the left and a far more militant man and far more committed man to the politics of terror than Amal.

Hizbullah is its own universe.

Mr. HAMILTON. Where would he get his support?

Dr. AJAMI. Iran. Definitely, with Syria's indulgence. Again, Syria indulges these groups, particularly in the Bekaa Valley.

If Syria wanted to stamp out these groups, she would not have a very difficult time doing so.

Mr. HAMILTON. Because it could cut off supplies?

Dr. AJAMI. Right.

Mr. HAMILTON. And, how about the others, the Islamic Amal? Is that—

Dr. AJAMI. That's his group. Musawi's group is Islamic Amal.

Mr. HAMILTON. All right.

Dr. AJAMI. Hizbullah, this is the wild card. This is the product—

HIZBULLAH

Mr. HAMILTON. All right, what is the relationship between Amal and Hizbullah?

Dr. AJAMI. There is a rivalry and a competition.

Mr. HAMILTON. What is it that distinguishes—that divides them?

Dr. AJAMI. OK, for example, Amal wants a piece of the Lebanese system. The leader of Amal, Nabih Berri, was anxious to be a minister. He accepted being a minister. He accepts the sectarian nature of Lebanon. He accepts the division of power within Lebanon, which is for the Shi'ites, but he also definitely accepts the notion that the Maronites are there, and he wants to deal with them. The Sunnis are there, and the Druze are there, and so on.

Hizbullah is more ideological, more purist. For example, Hizbullah recently had a manifesto that invited the Christians of Lebanon to convert to Islam. This is the mindset of Hizbullah.

So, for the Hizbullah people who are committed to a theocracy of the kind that prevails in Iran, what Amal is doing in the south of Lebanon, accepting a de facto deal with Israel, and what Amal is doing in Beirut, accepting a role in the Lebanese Government, represent nothing but compromise and betrayal.

Mr. HAMILTON. Are Hizbullah and Islamic Amal closer to Iran?

Dr. AJAMI. Hizbullah is ideologically close to Iran, and Hizbullah claims a cleric. He does not claim them, they claim him. A man named Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, a preacher, a mullah who has emerged in the last 2, or 3 years is probably the dominant cleric in Lebanon.

Mr. HAMILTON. He was the one upon whom an attack was made?

Dr. AJAMI. Right, in March 1985.

Mr. HAMILTON. Dr. Norton, did you want to make a comment on any of that?

Dr. NORTON. I will only say one thing and that is the following.

Mr. HAMILTON. I wish somebody could furnish an organization chart for me so I could see it all.

Dr. NORTON. Let me rephrase—let me add two things, very briefly.

One, Hizbullah seems to have subsumed many of the smaller groups. There are groups like the Hussein Suicide Squad, Islamic Amal and so on. My sense is that Hizbullah has absorbed these.

Mr. HAMILTON. How about Islamic Jihad. Is that—

Dr. NORTON. To the best of my knowledge there isn't any proof that such an organization exists. It is a device by which people can claim to be acting in unity and toward the same end, even if their actual organizational connections are very different.

But, the important thing that needs to be said, Mr. Chairman, is the following.

We must remember that we're not dealing with organizations in the Western sense. We're dealing with movements which embody ideas. So, when we're trying to dichotomize between Hizbullah and Amal in terms of organizational boundaries, it won't make any sense. It's a state of political mind that we're dealing with, and whether or not Amal is predominant or Hizbullah is predominant is to say whether or not one idea or another prevails.

Amal represents a secular view of the state. The Amalists say:

We want a Lebanon like the old Lebanon, except we want a bigger share. We want our proportionate share of the pie, and we're the biggest community on the block. We specifically do not want an Islamic state. The Islamic state solution in Iran may be right for Iran but it's not right for Lebanon.

The Hizbullahs, on the other hand, say, "We want a state ruled by Islamic law." Actually they're quite candid about it. The political program they circulate that Fouad mentioned a few moments ago, is not one that pulls any punches; it's quite clear.

U.S. POLICY ON LEBANON'S FUTURE

Mr. HAMILTON. Should the United States in its policy statement say that we believe that the Government of Lebanon ought to reflect more accurately the sectarian differences in Lebanon or—

Dr. NORTON. Yes, sir, I think it should and I think it does.

I think, beginning in the summer of 1983, there was a keen awareness in the administration and in the American diplomatic community that there needed to be a reconciliation process in Lebanon, that there had to be, if you will, a sharing of power. The days of Maronite monopolization of power in Lebanon were days of old and were past.

Mr. HAMILTON. You know, as you look at it, you just cannot understand how the people of Lebanon can go through the suffering they've gone through without coming to some kind of reconciliation in their politics.

Why can't they do it? Why can't they do it?

Dr. NORTON. First of all, I, too, am absolutely amazed at the kind of destruction and havoc they've experienced and, frankly, I wonder sometimes whether or not our society could respond as resiliently through a horrific experience like that.

Why can't they do it? No one group has the power to impose its will on all the other groups. Some journalists, for example, have talked recently about the future belonging to the Shi'ites.

This is a fallacious argument. It ignores the fact that there is a majority in Lebanon, a majority opposed to any single group dominating the state. No single group has the ability to impose its will, and yet all of the groups have shared jealousies and shared insecurities, which preclude any kind of effective bargain.

I think that—

Mr. HAMILTON. But, for years and years they did have an effective bargain.

Dr. NORTON. Yes, they did, and I think the solvent, if you will, has been the Shi'ite community. The political emergence of the Shi'ites represents almost a geometric progression in the kinds of political puzzles and political problems that have had to be solved.

I agree very much with something that Fouad has said a number of times and I believe today as well, and that is that we're dealing here with a failed country. We're dealing here with a country which is going to need a decade or so just to sort things out, just so we can see which way things are going to go.

But, I need to say something, Mr. Chairman, and I think it is quite important. We may be dealing with a failed country, and we may be dealing with a country in which the problems are seemingly insurmountable, but it won't go away. It's like a festering sore or swamp or whatever. It won't go away and I think it's most important that our policy take cognizance of that.

We cannot presume that we can just wash our hands of it. We cannot simply forget the \$18 million in aid for the current year and close the door. We cannot simply say, well, Lebanon is a place that's filled with people who have no use for the United States and American interests and so on, and therefore just cut the cord. We can't do it.

And, the reason we can't do it is that Lebanon is a source of continuous danger to us and to our friends in the region, Israelis and Arabs alike.

Mr. HAMILTON. So, what does that mean?

Dr. NORTON. That means that for better or worse we need to try and keep the lid on.

I think, for example, in the recently concluded hijacking crisis it was important that Nabih Berri come out on top. Not because he was going to win all the marbles, but just to keep the lid on. Just to keep the moderates, the centrists, in the majority.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is there any hope at all for the Government of Lebanon today?

Dr. NORTON. In my judgment, I think any talk about effective reconciliation and the reinstallation of an effective government is premature between now and the end of the century. I think the society needs years in which things have to be worked out, boundaries maintained, and so on.

Mr. HAMILTON. So there really isn't any Lebanon today.

Dr. NORTON. There isn't any Lebanon today. That is not to say there will never be a Lebanon. But, I think for the next 10, 15 years we're going to be dealing with societies which are nipping at one another, which are trying to find an equilibrium at which they

can live with one another. And, in the process it's going to continue to be a dangerous place, which is why we can't afford to ignore it.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, gentlemen, we've given you a good workout this afternoon. We appreciate it very, very much. You've had some good testimony and some good insights for us.

We thank you for your appearance.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND ISLAMIC RADICALISM

The Iran-Iraq War

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1985

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 2 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman presiding.

Mr. GILMAN. The meeting of the subcommittee will come to order.

Today the committee meets in open session to examine the Iran-Iraq war, the current state of the fighting, diplomatic efforts to end the war, the war's implications for United States' policy in the region and the consequences of its continuation.

This war, now entering its sixth year, has received little attention in our own Nation, but has brought about untold tragedy to the people of Iran and Iraq and threatens to spread throughout the gulf region if the conflict is taken by the parties to the high seas and shipping through the gulf.

This hearing follows two hearings of the subcommittee last summer which examined Islamic radicalism and fundamentalism in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

Chairman Hamilton has been detained. He regrets he can't be here at the start of the meeting and expects to be here later on.

We are pleased to have with us today Dr. Adeed Dawisha, a fellow at the Wilson Center; Dr. William Olson from the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College in Carlisle, PA; and Dr. Gary Sick, program officer for international affairs at the Ford Foundation. Dr. Sick was on the national security council staff at the time of the Iranian revolution and is the author of a recent book about United States policy during that revolution.

Gentlemen, your prepared statements will be entered into the record in full. We would appreciate if you could proceed with any summarized statement that you may desire and we will proceed alphabetically.

It looks like you are seated in that order. Dr. Dawisha, would you please open up the testimony?

STATEMENT OF ADEED DAWISHA, FELLOW, WOODROW WILSON
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, AND PROFESSOR OF
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS AT GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY

Dr. DAWISHA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is almost an understatement to say that the Iraq-Iran war has been economically and socially the most damaging event in Iraq's contemporary history. Prior to the war's eruption in September 1980, Iraq, geographically central and economically rich, with a population that boasts a well-educated and dynamic middle-class, was considered a credible successor to Egypt as the leading country in the Arab world, after the latter's seeming withdrawal from inter-Arab politics as a result of the Camp David accords.

All such calculations were, however, upset when Ayatollah Khomeini returned triumphantly to Tehran to scenes of hysterical adulation from the Shi'ite Moslems of Iran, and proceeded to upset the delicate balance of Iraqi society and to undermine the hitherto careful plans of the secularist Baathist regime.

The immediate appeal of the first truly grassroots revolution that succeeded in overthrowing a "secularist monarch" was considerable among the Moslem populations of the Arab world. Iran's revolution seemed to be a living proof and lesson of what Moslems could achieve if they clung doggedly to their faith. Many Moslems saw the Iranian revolution as the first Moslem victory over non-Moslems since the 16th and 17th centuries when the Ottoman Empire was at its zenith.

To the Arab Moslems, the victories of the Ayatollahs during 1979 and 1980 represented the advent of a new heroic age of Islamic assertion and power. For Moslems, including the Arabs, who had suffered for centuries under Western intellectual, technological and military superiority, the eclipse of the Shah's, and by definition the West's, might in Iran simply emphasized to them that it was through Islam, rather than through nationalism and secularism, that the Moslem world would emerge triumphant.

When the Tehran clergy publicly and repeatedly voiced their intention to extend their revolution to the neighboring states, the Iraqi leaders decided that a military conflict had become almost inevitable. And the autumn of 1980 seemed to be the most opportune time to launch an Iraqi offensive.

Intelligence reports and expert analyses were at that time suggesting that after the early euphoria, the Iranian population was becoming disillusioned with the divisions and incompetence of the revolutionary government in Tehran; that the Iranian armed forces were demoralized; and that because of Iran's almost total international isolation, its military equipment was lacking in essential spare parts.

The Iraqis, thus, calculated that militarily the Iranians were no match for the well-equipped Iraqi army. Their thrust could aim at the Iranian region of Khuzistan, which not only produced almost all of Iran's oil, but was also inhabited by an Arabic-speaking population that had periodically demanded autonomy from the Tehran government. A swift and decisive Iraqi victory was anticipated.

Surprisingly, stiff Iranian resistance completely upset Iraqi calculations, and a military confrontation which was expected to last

a few days turned out to be a stalemated war of attrition that had a devastating effect on the two countries. By 1985, the war-weary Iraqis were well entrenched on their own side of the border, but the appalling loss of life coupled with the devastation of the economies of the two countries were manifestations of a war that dragged on senselessly at a considerable cost to the two conflicting parties.

Before the war, Iraq's most spectacular success had been in the economic and social domain with oil revenues rocketing to around \$23 billion in 1979. The main thrust of the development plans, however, was as much political as it was economic. The plans were formulated with an eye toward bridging the gap between rich and poor. This made political sense as the vast majority of the poor classes in Iraq had traditionally belonged to the Shi'ite community.

And indeed by the early 1980's, the gulf between rich and poor had decreased considerably, making Iraq one of the most socially and economically equitable systems in the Arab Middle East. Thus, for example, the industrial worker's average annual cash income increased from \$800 in 1967 to \$3,100 in 1979, while the Consumer Price Index rose an average of only 7 percent.

In addition, from 1975 onward, the regime introduced a variety of social welfare programs aimed at the poor classes, including massive and rapid improvements in housing, education, and medical services, and enacted legislation on Social Security, minimum wages, and pension rights. And many more such measures, aimed at bolstering the regime's stability, were planned had it not been for the eruption of the Iraq-Iran war in September 1980.

The Iraq-Iran war constituted the singlemost devastating reversal of what President Hussein of Iraq, of course, had once called Iraq's economic and social miracle.

Thus, Iraq's oil income which had stood at \$23 billion in 1979 had by 1983-84 shrunk to a mere \$6 billion. This, of course, happened at a time when the war effort was costing Iraq an estimated \$15 billion a year. No wonder, therefore, the massive reserves, estimated at about \$35 billion, which Iraq held in 1980, had dwindled to around \$3 to \$5 billion by 1984.

These reserves could hardly pay for the country's international debts, which in 1984 were estimated to total \$8 to \$12 billion. Iraq's economic troubles had become so acute that the country began to default on contractual payments to foreign companies working in Iraq.

An almost certain economic, and consequently probably military and social, collapse was averted for three main reasons. In the first place, the government instituted at the end of 1982 strict austerity measures which halted awards for new contracts and postponed the starting date for many already agreed-upon projects. Moreover, spending on social concerns was cut drastically, thus emphasizing that Iraq's social advances must yield, for the time being at least, to the war effort.

Second, by the beginning of 1982, Iraq's rich gulf neighbors, themselves fearful of what an Iranian military victory may do to their own countries, began to extend to the Baghdad Government credits and soft loans, something to the tune of \$15 billion a year.

Finally, by the beginning of 1984, the Iraqis were able to finance the purchase of much of their military equipment through soft loans from France and the Soviet Union.

As the war dragged on into its sixth year, it became clear that, if need be, Iraq could withstand a very long war of attrition. No longer do the Iranian leaders, at least it seems to me, believe in their ability to score a decisive military victory, nor can they any longer hope for an economic collapse or for a Shi'ite Moslem uprising against the Baathist government of President Saddam Hussein.

Even so, the Iraqis could hardly look forward to another 5 years of war. Iraq's population is only one-third that of Iran, and consequently, war casualties are bound to have a disproportionately negative impact on the country.

This is especially true in Iraq's case, since its secular leaders cannot provide, like their Iranian counterparts can, guaranteed eternal happiness in the afterlife. Moreover, while the Iraqi economy is no longer on the verge of collapse, the country will continue to experience zero or negative economic growth throughout the duration of the war. This is particularly damaging to a leadership that attained its popularity as a result of successful economic and social policies.

It is because of these reasons that, of the two combatants, it has been the Iraqis who have shown greater willingness to negotiate a peace formula. However, having become convinced that the Tehran Government intends to carry on the war effort until it achieves its declared objective of toppling the Baathist political order of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqis over the last year have escalated their own war effort by attacking gulf shipping and the oil terminals at Kharg Island.

In short, the Iraqis, as they themselves have admitted, need to end the war, and the message of the latest escalation in the level of hostilities is that if, in order to bring the war to a halt, they have to considerably and dangerously raise the stakes, then so be it. Coupled with Iran's seemingly unbending determination to press on with their war effort regardless of the cost, the scene perhaps is now set for a possible explosion that could suck in one or the other or both of the superpowers into a conflict that so far they have successfully avoided.

Now, for this to be averted, the United States should ensure that neither private arms dealers nor America's allies are allowed to furnish Iran with the kind of weaponry that would allow it to continue its war effort almost indefinitely, for at present the only incentive for the Tehran Government to end the war and come to the negotiating table would be a clear perception on the Ayatollah's part of a dramatic erosion in the Iran's war-waging capability.

While Iran does receive some Soviet weaponry from countries like Libya, and it is also said from Syria, the bulk of its arms purchases tend to be American made. Greater vigilance by United States authorities to cut off, or at least drastically decrease, American arms supplies to Iran will, I believe, increase the chances of peace settlement immeasurably.

This is true because, as I have explained earlier in this submission, the war at present seems to be a much more desperate affair for the Iraqis than it is for Iran. And there can be no doubt that,

over the last 2 years, it has been the Iranians who have been the intransigent party.

An action of this kind need not signal to either party a fundamental or permanent tilt by the United States toward Iraq. It would simply emphasize American interest, even determination, in ending this senseless carnage. Once the hostilities cease and negotiations begin over the roots and causes of the conflict, the United States could then judge each issue objectively on its own merits, thus convincing both parties of its complete neutrality. For example, it could make a public declaration that it expects the Tehran authorities to cease any interference in the internal affairs of Iraq, while at the same time publicly expecting the Iraqis to return to the status-quo ante—that is, the political and geostrategic situation of the two countries as they existed before Iraq's unilateral abrogation of the 1975 Algiers Treaty on September 17, 1980.

It is during this postwar period that a posture of neutrality is essential if the United States is not to suffer a diminution in its role and influence in the area. But to get to the postwar period the war must first end, and present hopes for an end to the war are almost negligible so long as the Tehran Government continues to reject calls for cease-fires and negotiations because of the plentiful supply of American-made weapons.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Dawisha follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADEED DAWISHA, PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
AT GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, AND FELLOW, THE WILSON CENTER

It is almost an understatement to say that the Iraq-Iran war has been economically and socially the most damaging event in Iraq's contemporary history. Prior to the war's eruption in September 1980, Iraq, geographically central and economically rich, with a population that boasts a well-educated and dynamic middle-class, was considered a credible successor to Egypt as the leading country in the Arab world, after the latter's seeming withdrawal from inter-Arab politics as a result of the Camp David accords. All such calculations were, however, upset when Ayatollah Khomeini returned triumphantly to Tehran to scenes of hysterical adulation from the Shi'i Muslims of Iran, and proceeded to upset the delicate balance of Iraqi society and to undermine the hitherto careful plans of the secularist Ba'thist regime.

The immediate appeal of the first truly grass-roots revolution that succeeded in overthrowing a 'secularist monarch' was considerable among the Muslim populations of the Arab world. Iran's revolution seemed to be a living proof and lesson of what Muslims could achieve if they clung doggedly to their faith. Many Muslims saw the Iranian revolution as the first Muslim victory over non-Muslims since the 16th and 17th centuries when the Ottoman empire

was at its zenith. To the Arab Muslims, the victories of the Ayatollahs during 1979 and 1980 represented the advent of a new heroic age of Islamic assertion and power. For Muslims, including the Arabs, who had suffered for centuries under Western intellectual, technological and military superiority, the eclipse of the Shah's, and by definition the West's, might in Iran simply emphasized to them that it was through Islam, rather than through nationalism and secularism, that the Muslim world would emerge triumphant.

When the Tehran clergy publicly and repeatedly voiced their intention to extend their revolution to the neighboring states, and when they began to translate their intentions into practice through subversion, propaganda and military incursions, the Iraqi leaders decided that a military conflict had become almost inevitable. And the autumn of 1980 seemed to be the most opportune time to launch an Iraqi offensive. Intelligence reports and expert analyses were at that time suggesting that after the early euphoria the Iranian population was becoming disillusioned with the divisions and incompetence of the revolutionary government in Tehran; that the Iranian armed forces were demoralized; and that because of Iran's almost total international isolation, its military equipment was lacking in essential spare parts. The Iraqis, thus, calculated that militarily the Iranians were no match for the well-equipped Iraqi army. Their thrust could aim at the Iranian region of Khuzistan, which not only produced almost all of Iran's oil, but was also inhabited by an Arabic-speaking population that had periodically demanded autonomy from the Tehran government. A swift and decisive Iraqi victory was anticipated.

A rapid victory would have benefitted Iraq in three ways. It would have led to a considerable diminution of Khomeini's prestige among the Shi'a and other Muslims in Iraq and the Gulf. It would have placed Khuzistan and Iran's oil in Iraqi hands, thus giving Iraq a powerful bargaining card in any future negotiations with the Tehran government. And a dramatic military victory would have confirmed Iraq as the main power in the Gulf and enhanced Hussein's leadership aspirations in the Arab world.

Surprisingly stiff Iranian resistance completely upset Iraqi calculations, and a military confrontation which was expected to last a few days turned out to be a stalemated war of attrition that had a devastating effect on the two countries. By 1985, the war-weary Iraqis were well entrenched on their own side of the border, but the appalling loss of life coupled with the devastation of the economies of the two countries were manifestations of a war that dragged on senselessly at a considerable cost to the two conflicting parties.

Before the war, Iraq's most spectacular success had been in the economic and social domain. Oil revenues had rocketed to around \$23 billion in 1979 and the country's GNP had reached a record \$31 billion. Per capita income rose in real terms from \$1,840 in 1978 to \$2,450 in 1979. In terms of OPEC's oil production, Iraq had by 1980 become second only to Saudi Arabia, with a daily production of 3.47 million barrels per day. All this facilitated an allocation for economic and social development of \$17.7 billion in 1980, almost double the amount for 1978. Industrial and agricultural production between 1976 and 1980 grew at annual rates of 18.7 per cent for the former and 9 per cent for the latter.

The main thrust of the development plans, however, was as much political as it was economic. The plans were formulated with an eye towards bridging the gap between rich and poor. This made political sense as the vast majority of the poor classes in Iraq had traditionally belonged to the Shi'i community. And indeed by the early 1980's, the gulf between rich and poor had decreased considerably, making Iraq one of the most socially and economically equitable systems in the Arab Middle East. Thus, for example, the industrial worker's average annual cash income increased from \$800 in 1967 to \$3,100 in 1979, while the consumer price index rose an average of only 7 per cent each year during that period. In addition, from 1975 onwards, the regime introduced a variety

of social welfare programmes aimed at the poor classes, including massive and rapid improvements in housing, education and medical services, and has enacted legislation on social security, minimum wages and pension rights. And many more such measures, aimed at bolstering the regime's stability, were planned had it not been for the eruption of the Iraq-Iran war in September 1980.

The Iraq-Iran war constituted the single most devastating reversal of what President Hussein had once called 'Iraq's economic and social miracle'. In the first month of the war, Iran succeeded in bombing the main oil terminals in the South of Iraq which had been the outlet for something like 70 per cent of Iraq's oil. The Iranians also destroyed other oil production and refining facilities in other parts of Iraq, as well as hitting vital economic targets, such as petrochemicals and iron and steel industrial complexes, which had cost Iraq more than \$20 billion to build. Iraq's economic problems were compounded when Syria closed the pipeline which had allowed Iraq to pump 700,000 barrels per day of oil to the ports of Baniyas and Tripoli, so that by 1982 Iraq's oil exporting capability was limited to about 600,000 barrels per day through its Turkist pipeline. Thus, Iraq's oil income which had stood at \$23 billion in 1979 had by 1983-84 shrunk to a mere \$6 billion. This, of course, hapened at a time when the war effort was costing Iraq an estimated \$15 billion a year. No wonder, therefore, the massive reserves, estimated at about \$35 billion, which Iraq held in 1980 had dwindled to around \$3-5 billion by 1984. These reserves could hardly pay for the country's international debts which in 1984 were estimated to total \$8-12 billion. Iraq's economic troubles had become so acute that the country began to default on contractual payments to foreign companies working in Iraq.

An almost certain economic, and consequently military and social, collapse was averted for three main reasons. In the first place, the government instituted

at the end of 1982 strict austerity measures which halted awards for new contracts and postponed the starting date for many already agreed upon projects. Moreover, spending on social concerns was cut drastically, thus emphasizing that Iraq's social advances must yield, for the time being at least, to the war effort. Secondly, by the beginning of 1982, Iraq's rich gulf neighbors, themselves fearful of what an Iranian military victory may do to their countries, began to extend to the Baghdad government credits and soft loans to the tune of \$15 billion a year. Finally, by the beginning of 1984, the Iraqis were able to finance the purchase of much of their military equipment through soft loans from France and the Soviet Union.

As the war dragged on into its sixth year, it became clear that, if need be, Iraq could withstand a long war of attrition. No longer do the Iranian leaders believe in their ability to score a decisive military victory, nor could they any longer hope for an economic collapse or for a Shi'i/Muslim uprising against the Ba'thist government of President Saddam Hussein. Even so, the Iraqis could hardly look forward to another five years of war. Iraq's population is only one-third that of Iran, and consequently, war casualties are bound to have a disproportionately negative impact on the country. This is especially true in Iraq's case, since its secular leaders cannot provide, like their Iranian counterparts can, guaranteed eternal happiness in the Afterlife! Moreover, while the Iraqi economy is no longer on the verge of collapse, the country will continue to experience zero or negative economic growth throughout the duration of the war. This is particularly damaging to a leadership that attained its popularity as a result of successful economic and social policies.

It is because of these reasons that, of the two combatants, it has been the Iraqis who have shown greater willingness to negotiate a peace formula. However, having become convinced that the Tehran government

intends to carry on the war effort until it achieves its declared objective of toppling the Ba'thist political order of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqis over the last year have escalated their own war effort by attacking Gulf shipping and the oil terminals at Kharg Island.

In short, the Iraqis, as they themselves have admitted, need to end the war, and the message of the latest escalation in the level of hostilities is that if, in order to bring the war to a halt, they have to considerably and dangerously raise the stakes, then so be it. Coupled with Iran's seemingly unbending determination to press on with their war effort regardless of the cost, the scene perhaps is now set for a possible explosion that could suck in one or the other or both of the superpowers into a conflict that so far they have successfully avoided.

For this to be averted, the United States should ensure that neither private arms dealers nor America's allies are allowed to furnish Iran with the kind of weaponry that would allow it to continue its war effort almost indefinitely, for at present the only incentive for the Tehran government to end the war and come to the negotiating table would be a clear perception on the Ayatollah's part of a dramatic erosion in Iran's war-waging capability. While Iran does receive some Soviet weaponry from countries like Libya, the bulk of its arms purchases tend to be American made. Greater vigilance by United States authorities to cut off, or at least drastically decrease, American arms supplies to Iran will, I believe, increase the chances of peace settlement immeasurably. This is true because, as I have explained earlier in this submission, the war at present seems to be a much more desperate affair for the Iraqis than it is for Iran. And there can be no doubt that, over the last two years, it has been the Iranians who have been the intransigent party.

An action of this kind need not signal to either party a fundamental or permanent tilt by the United States toward Iraq. It would simply emphasize

American interest in, even determination for, ending this senseless carnage. Once the hostilities cease and negotiations begin over the roots and causes of the conflict, the United States could then judge each issue objectively on its own merits, thus convincing both parties of its complete neutrality. For example, it could make a public declaration that it expects the Tehran authorities to cease any interference in the internal affairs of Iraq, while expecting the Iraqis to return to the status-quo ante - i.e. the political and geo-strategic situation of the two countries as they existed before Iraq's unilateral abrogation of the 1975 Algiers Treaty on September 17, 1980. It is during this post-war period that a posture of neutrality is essential if the United States is not to suffer a diminution in its role and influence in the area. But to get to the post war period the war must first end, and present hopes for an end to the war are almost negligible so long as the Tehran government continues to reject calls for cease-fires and negotiations because of the plentiful supply of American-made weapons.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Dr. Dawisha.
Dr. Olson.

**STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. OLSON, STRATEGIC STUDIES
INSTITUTE, ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA.**

Dr. OLSON. Thank you.

I want to thank you and the committee for the opportunity to discuss and raise, perhaps, the level of attention on the Iran-Iraq war, which has cost thousands of lives and has disturbed an important region in the world.

I would like to begin by noting that my remarks are entirely my own and do not represent the views of the U.S. Army or any other Government agency.

When I was preparing my talk here I was reminded of the fact that recently I appeared before a group of Pennsylvania superintendents to discuss the Middle Eastern crisis. In that presentation I outlined what I thought were the important causes of many of the current problems in the area, and I thought I did a very good job, and so did they, for I received a letter from the superintendents thanking me for having talked so well—on the Latin American crisis. I am glad that I found the right committee room today.

I think a good deal of what I have to say on the background of the war is covered in my written testimony, so what I would like to do at the beginning is to deal very briefly with some of the recent developments in the war and perhaps some of the reasons why we should be concerned about it.

The war has cost somewhere in the neighborhood of 500,000 to 750,000 lives; it has disturbed the peace of the region; it has defied so far, every effort at solution and it presents the prospect of con-

tinuing for the indefinite future. For these reasons, I think it is important to deal more specifically with the threat of the war and possible futures of the war. To date, the war has managed to defy any number of expert opinions about its nature and about its direction.

Initially, everyone expected the war to be over quickly. It was not. People doubted that the two major parties in the war would be able to conduct the war without their major suppliers. In fact, they have been able to find alternative sources of supply and to conduct the war rather efficiently. There was a great deal of speculation about what effects the war might have in the oil fields, not to say panic in the oil community. To date, the impact of the war on oil has been negligible. Oil prices have declined, not increased, and even with the compounding effect of the attacks on tankers in the gulf, the impact on oil prices and oil availability has been negligible.

Another important point to note about the war is that it has demonstrated the limited power of the superpowers in the region. Although many people hold the view that the war is either the product of, or continues because of, the intervention either directly or indirectly of one or both of the superpowers, I think it is important to note at the beginning that this, in fact, is not the case, that the war continues and is the product of the rivalry between the two States and is likely to continue because of their inability to find a resolution to that process.

I was recently denounced in both Izvestia and Pravda for having recommended that U.S. policy in the war should be one of bleeding both the belligerents white. I don't believe that the United States is in the position of doing that or that it has pursued such a policy. Nor should it.

What I would like to do today is to point out, first of all, some of the things that I think are changing in the nature of the war; in fact, not to concentrate on the immediate past or the immediate present, but to cast our eyes a little further down the road and look where the war might be going, because I do not believe it is a matter of indifference to the regional powers or to the United States or the rest of the world how the war might end or in fact how it might reach that end.

One of the important things to notice in the nature of the fighting is the decreased level of violence on the battlefield itself. Iran, after its offensive over the last 3 years, has suffered incredible casualties on the battlefield and it now seems to have opted for a policy or strategy of reducing its casualties on the battlefield and moving toward small infiltration raids behind Iraqi lines in an effort to try to make inroads into Iraqi positions and perhaps create a breakdown.

The major offenses we are used to noting in the past have declined and I think that is something likely to continue for the future. Another important thing to note is increasing Iraqi capabilities in the war, the steady improvement in the Iraqi armed forces, particularly their ability to use their air power and their willingness to use that power, the most dramatic demonstration of that being the tanker offensive that has developed over the last 3 years in which there have been between 120 and 130 attacks on

international shipping in the gulf region, most of which were conducted by Iraq.

More recently, of course, the Iraqis have begun effective attacks on Iran's major oil exporting facility, Kharg Island. In the past, Iraqi attacks on Kharg Island have done limited damage, but these attacks are increasing in frequency and in capability, which has long-term implications for Iran's ability to finance its war effort.

The Iraqi strategy at the moment, of course, is designed to bring pressure on Iran to force it to the negotiating table. As Dr. Dawisha noted, Iran has been the intransigent party in this affair and refuses to negotiate, and Iraq has been trying to find a strategy that will force Iran to the bargaining table.

I think one of the concerns that must be raised is that two parties in the war so far have had mismatches in their goals. Initially, Iraq wanted to influence the Iranians to stop meddling in Iraqi affairs and launched a war. They did not succeed. The Iranians now seek to change Iraq's internal affairs. They have not succeeded. Iraqis are interested in peace or at least some form of negotiations. The Iranians, in fact, are not interested, at least at this point, in negotiations and the danger is that when the Iranians are ready, the Iraqis may perceive they are in a much stronger position and raise the level of demands that they have. In other words, the danger is that war will renew itself as each party changes its goals or seeks new advantage.

This raises, I think, a long-term concern over the possible spread of the war and the ways it might spread. As noted, although the conflict is contained on the battlefield and is likely to remain so, the dangers that the war will spread into the gulf, I think, are real and there are various ways it can do so.

One way the war can spread is by the increased use of air power in the gulf, as demonstrated already by Iraq; and the other, of course, is through the threat of terrorism, sabotage, and subversion, which are things to be concerned about.

In fact, the gulf states are concerned about it. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this policy is to briefly tell an Iranian story based on a Rashti joke. Rasht is a particular town in Iran and the Iranians tell numerous stories about Rashtis. In this particular story the Rashti comes home one afternoon to find his own wife in bed with another man. He reaches into his pocket, pulls out a revolver and points it at his head. His wife immediately breaks out laughing and he says, "What are you laughing at? You are next." I think to a degree that may summarize the way some of the smaller states in the gulf feel about the present war and of its possible spread.

In that regard, then, the United States must pay attention to and must be concerned about the nature of, and the direction, the war might take and to try to devise a means, if not to end the war, at least to help contain it.

One of the things that has been recommended by some for trying to resolve the war is to exploit an Iranian open door policy that some people perceive to be emerging, and to reestablish diplomatic relations with Iran. While there are reasons to believe that there are encouraging signs in that direction, I also believe it would be premature to try, at this point, to explore at least publicly and dramatically any change in the relationship with Iran.

I think there are a number of reasons for this, in part because the Iranian system does not necessarily have its own house in order; and the dangers of becoming involved in Iranian politics and with Iranian politicians at this point would only undermine moderate Iranian leaders at the expense of more radical elements. This involvement would, in fact, be used by those elements to publicly embarrass the United States.

In addition, I believe that Iran, if there is going to be any resumption of relations, must be prepared to give up certain measures that it has conducted in the past, particularly its support of international terrorism, and it must disavow its involvement with such groups as the Islamic Jihad. There is little indication that Iran is prepared to do this.

For these reasons I don't believe that the present is an opportune time for dramatic change in the United States-Iranian relationship, although opportunities should not be ignored and should at least be pursued privately.

There are other things that the United States can do to deal with the war. One important policy for the United States to develop in the region, considering the potential threat of sabotage, subversion, and terrorism, is a long-term policy on how to confront terrorism.

I believe I have discussed that at some length in my prepared statement and will not go into detail here. Another important measure that the United States must consider, especially in terms of the continuation of the war, or in light of the fact that even after the war Iran and Iraq are likely to be major powers in the region, is to continue to promote efforts to try to strengthen friendly regional powers in order to develop the kind of ties that are necessary for long-term relationships between those states and the United States.

In other words, U.S. policy should not concentrate on the war, but should concentrate on how we are going to deal with the future of the gulf, however that war might end. I think it is important to encourage local cooperation and to provide continuing economic and military support to the local states as a means of developing support for U.S. policy in the region.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Olson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. OLSON, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE, U.S
ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA

The Gulf War: Peace in Our Times?

The Iran-Iraq War seems to defy understanding or resolution. It has endured for longer than other major conflict since World War II, with the exception of Vietnam, and in doing so it has defied various predictions about the nature of war between developing nations as well as every effort to negotiate a settlement. The circumstances of the regional environment, the goals of the belligerents, and the weight of effort committed versus results achieved do not lead to optimism about an end to the war in the near future. For those of us who are forced to be observers to this seemingly senseless slaughter in an area of vital economic and strategic importance, it is essential that we try to understand the war and to discover means to contain it and perhaps ultimately to help end it.

War is never easy to understand for its causes are generally murky and open to dispute, its direction and outcome uncertain, and the events within it confusing and subject to different interpretations. In addition, may in Western society now regard war as an aberrant social act. The use of or the threatened use of force is regarded as a fall from grace, an illegal, immoral and wanton act without justification or purpose. But for much of the world, war or the use of force remains not only an appealing instrument of state policy, but it is also seen as a legitimate means to an end. The use of force as a means to an end, however, carries no guarantee of success; and the ambiguity and friction of war can mean unexpected shifts and demands, unanticipated developments that undo all calculations and create dangerously new circumstances. This is as true for the present war between Iran and Iraq as it has been for war in the past.

Causes

As with most wars, one may discern in the Iran-Iraq war long-term and proximate causes as well as immediate precipitants. Several common elements emerge from the many lengthy lists of causes that have been enumerated since the war began. The list of long-term causes includes the following:

- An ancestral, racial conflict between Arabs and Persians.
- An ancestral, religious hostility between Sunnis and Shias.
- A long-term rivalry over disputed frontiers.

The proximate causes include the following:

- A territorial dispute over control of the Shatt al-Arab.
- An ideological clash between Arab nationalism and Iranian Islamic fundamentalism.
- Iraqi-Iranian rivalry for regional influences.

The precipitants includes:

- Border clashes involving artillery exchanges and limited, armed incursions.
- Iranian efforts to subvert Iraq by encouraging Iraq's majority Shia community and Iranian-inspired assassination attempts on Iraqi leaders.
- Iraqi belief that the resort to force would produce useful changes.

Although there is some validity in all these points, listing age-old religious and racial rivalries, or border disputes between the old Ottoman and Persian empires before 1900 is stretching a point. Nor does the cause lie purely in boundary disputes, as some have argued. The core of the rivalry consists of the ideological clash between Iraq's Arab socialism and Iran's resurgent brand of Islam and of the desire of both states to play a

major role in the region. The latter rivalry characterized Iraqi-Iranian relations under the late Shah, and that clash of interests is now aggravated by the emergence of a new dynamic force in Iran that combines an enthusiastic Iranian nationalism with an expansionist, universalist Islam that openly challenges the legitimacy of all regional regimes. Iran's revolutionary elan is similar to that in other world revolutionary movements, and its appearance is as disturbing to the interests of neighbors and those with interests in the neighborhood as any other of the world's great revolutions have been.

With the Iranian revolution an environment of invective and hostility grew between Iran and Iraq, and incidents of meddling in each other's affairs escalated. Iran encouraged Iraqi dissidents, and Iraq invited prominent opponents of Khumayni to Baghdad and gave assistance to Iranian tribal groups, such as the Kurds. Iran increasingly appeared to Iraq as a threat to Iraqi survival and to Arabism; while Iran's conviction of righteousness and indiscriminate appeals to religious zeal across national boundaries, that seemed to threaten the survival of all Arab regimes in the region, played to Iraqi fears and an Iraqi determination to protect their interests and to reap the benefits of defending the regional Arab states as well. The result was an explosion.

The war that followed, that still continues, can be divided into two major events: Iraq's war against Iran, from September 1980 to June 1982; and Iran's war against Iraq from June 1982 to the present.

The first event, Iraq's invasion, was a result of Iraq's determination to force a change in Iranian policy, a policy that in Iraq's view grew out of Khumayni's revolutionary conviction that led to Iranian meddling in Iraqi

internal affairs. Iran's enthusiasm led to broadcasts to Iraq's Shia majority and appeals to Iraq's military, all aimed at overthrowing Iraq's secular, Baathist regime. These appeals, plus increasing border strife, Iran's refusal to negotiate a settlement of differences, and an April 1980 attempt to assassinate Tariq Aziz, a leading Iraqi official, convinced Iraq's leadership to seek more forceful solutions to the problem of Iran. Although it has been argued that one of Iraq's goals was to overthrow Khomeini, it is just as likely that Iraq's goals were more limited and that the idea was to bring Iran to its senses. Whether this was wise or necessary is disputable, but it is imminently understandable. The effort, however, failed. Iraq miscalculated Iran's will to resist and instead of forcing a change in Iran's policy, pursued a course of action that created a far more dangerous situation.

The second part of the war began with Iran's 1982 victory that expelled the Iraqis from Iran. Completely victorious, the Iranians rejected Iraq's offers of negotiations and instead determined to invade Iraq and dictate terms. Iran considered the way the war began--a surprise attack--an immoral act, and it convinced Iranians that not only was Iraq in league with other enemies of Iran's revolution--particularly the United States--and was bent on destroying the revolution, it persuaded them to refuse to negotiate as long as Iraqi forces occupied Iranian territory; and afterwards, after Iranian forces drove the Iraqis from Iran in the summer of 1982, they felt that they had the right to insist on punishing Iraq, through reparations and a demand for major changes in Iraq's political system. These political demands, including the removal of Saddam Husayn, the President of Iraq, and the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iraq were unacceptable to Iraq's

leadership, of course, and the Iraqis were determined not to give in. They prepared carefully to receive Iran's invasion in 1982, and Iraq successfully resisted, and Iran has been unable to effect its goals by force of arms since. In fact, Iraq's military has grown increasingly stronger since 1982, while Iran's capabilities have steadily declined. In addition, Iran has lost tens of thousands of lives in futile infantry assaults on well-prepared Iraqi defensive positions supported by tanks and artillery, signs of Iraq's increased strength.

Yet, Khomeini's determination to punish Iraq, a determination reinforced by a conviction of moral right and sustained by the notion that suffering and martyrdom are often the price to be paid in God's service, holds Iran to its purpose. This rock-hard will has caused every peace proposal to date to founder, and a change in that determination seems unlikely as long as Khomeini lives or even should he die in the near future. Since Iran demands, in effect, unconditional surrender--the right to reshape Iraq's internal order--Iraq is equally committed to continuing the war, although it is much more ready to negotiate a settlement on the basis of the status quo ante. Even this attitude may change, however, if Iraq's military capability to project power into the Gulf grows further and convinces the Iraqis that they might be able to demand more for a settlement. Even the death or removal of Saddam Husayn is not likely to bring any fundamental change in this situation. Thus, as long as the two belligerents retain such incommensurate goals, the war is bound to continue. In this fashion, the causes of the war continually renew themselves.

The Course of the War

The war is commonly divided into a number of phases. These vary considerably and are of limited use in any event, but they at least illustrate that the war has not been a uniform affair. The war can be divided into four major phases:

- I The Iraqi Invasion, September 1980–November 1980
- II Stalemate, November 1980–September 1981
- III Iranian Initiative, September 1981–May 1982
- IV Iranian Offensive in Iraq, May 1982–present

A fifth phase might be added, in that the war is now in a new stalemated phase that overlaps with Phase IV above. Although Iran retains the semblance of initiative on the ground, this has been costly and has produced little result.

One point to note about the war is its episodic nature. The major events of the war tend to come in cycles, with long periods of relative inactivity punctuated by sharp clashes. This is due, in part, to the limits on Iran's logistical capabilities. The Iranians, in order to develop a sustained offensive, must spend months accumulating men and supplies in the area of main effort. These supplies are then quickly expended in the subsequent fighting and Iran has not had the follow-on support to continue advances or sustain gains. In addition, the long lead times involved in preparing for an offensive enables the Iraqis to identify well in advance the most likely axes of attack and to prepare for the Iranian thrust. This helps to account for Iran's limited success and the high casualties. Iran's logistical problems are not likely to be resolved for the foreseeable future and thus attrition warfare is likely to remain a key feature in Iran's strategy.

Indeed, the attrition-style warfare that characterizes recent fighting has already cost tens of thousands of lives in exchange for a few square yards of territory. This has produced comparisons with World War I. A more apt parallel, however, is with Korea, where an infantry-heavy force firmly dug in confronts an artillery-and-tank-heavy army well dug in and in which heroic, mass infantry assaults on fortified positions produces high casualties. This fact has led the Iranians to move away from large-scale offensives. The ground fighting has moved away from massed assaults and the Iranians have begun to use small, infiltration forces, reminiscent of Iran's early campaigns in 1981-82, which work their way behind Iraqi positions and try to seize ground without the heavy loss of life. The Iraqis, however, have so far foiled these efforts with vigorous counterattacks, and the ground war remains stalemated.

This recent phase of stalemate on the ground has also produced a twist in the nature of the fighting. Until August 1982, the war was confined (largely) to ground fighting along the frontier between the two belligerents; but beginning in August 1982, and increasingly ever since, Iraq has begun to use its air power in a more strategic sense--against Iranian cities and against Iran's oil-exporting network, Kharg Island and its associated facilities, as well as shipping to and from Iran's ports. This strategy was Iraq's attempt to pressure Iran to negotiate by threatening its economic lifeline, and to raise the international level of consciousness about the war, which Iraq felt the international community was ignoring. This effort represents a more strategic approach and paralleled an Iranian effort to blockade Iraq, using naval forces in the Gulf and diplomacy--principally with Syria to close Iraq's major pipeline--as a means of economically starving Iraq into defeat.

These economic strategies and the use of attrition warfare have produced limited success and since no immediate end to the war is in sight, new permutations to the war, as a result of a search by the belligerents for more effective strategies, is likely. The Iraqis, in particular, have been able to steadily improve their air power and to deliver increasingly effective strikes on Iranian shipping, towns, and the important oil facilities at Kharg Island. Iraq's strategic response is likely to continue, with further and potentially more devastating attacks on Iran's economic resources. The Iranians cannot respond in kind and it is possible that they may resort to sabotage, subversion and terrorism to intimidate local states. While the search for alternative strategies is dangerous, neither power is likely to be able to seriously upset the regional balance, at least not as long as they remain locked in their mutual conflict. This should not lead to the conclusion that it is in anyone's benefit for the war to continue, but to note that the dangers of the spread of the war are not unmanageable. In any event, neither side is likely to be able to effect a decisive result and both sides will continue to seek to expand their international contacts while trying to isolate the other.

Lessons of the War

From a tactical military point of view, there are only limited lessons to be learned from the war. Although the Iraqis use Soviet equipment and tactics, and the Iranians learned their tactics and purchased most of their military equipment from the United States, neither side has used the equipment or employed their forces as the United States or the Soviet Union would have. Both belligerents have shown a flair for certain features of war--the Iranians in their use of artillery and infiltration tactics, the

Iraqis in their use of logistical support and fortification techniques--but there are few lessons for the US military in terms of tactics or about the reliability and survivability of either US or Soviet equipment. There are, however, a number of strategic lessons to be gleaned from the conflict.

First, and perhaps most important, the war and its causes demonstrate clearly that states, even small, Third World powers with limited means and no indigenous arms capability, are perfectly capable and, just as important, are ready and willing to use force to resolve their problems. Iran was willing to use subversion and terrorism in an effort to effect a desired change in Iraq, and the Iraqis were willing to use armed force to gain their own ends. The violence of the confrontation and its longevity also demonstrates that war in the Third World does not have to be short, is not necessarily limited by dependence on external sources of supply, and is not readily open to external pressure to end it if the belligerents do not wish a settlement and are not militarily defeated.

Second, the war demonstrates the ease with which arms can be acquired, even under adverse conditions. This aspect of the war points up the proliferation of sources for arms, and it suggests a decline in the usefulness of arms sales, per se, as an instrument of policy, at least in the sense that the supply of arms gives the supplier any significant leverage with the buyer. Although the notion of the influence available to the supplier has been exaggerated in the past, it remains important to note this trend, and to further note that the number of arms suppliers is likely to increase, which will limit further the influence derived from selling arms. This does not mean that arms sales are not and should not remain important instruments of policy, but means that there needs to be an

adjustment of thinking about an arms relationship and a modification of the idea that there is any one-for-one return on an investment.

Third, the war illustrates the potential level of conflict in the Middle East. The briefness of the past Arab-Israeli wars has given rise to the idea that wars in the region are short and sharp. The Gulf War, and now perhaps Lebanon, clearly shows that this is not the inevitable pattern. Wars can be protracted. This has implications for the regional states and beyond.

While the violence and length of the war may discourage other regional states from ever considering the resort to arms, the full import of the war must wait on its outcome. If Iran succeeds in the end, for example, this may well encourage Iran or others in the future to use force. In any event, the war does demonstrate the danger for potentially protracted wars and indicates the possibility for the escalation of fighting, either in scope, in violence, or in geographical extent. Although the belligerents in the Gulf War have showed considerable restraint in this regard, the resort to gas and long-range missiles, attacks on civilian populations, and the spread of the confrontation to include shipping in the Gulf, illustrate the course open to expanding the war and suggests possibilities for future levels of violence.

The ability of regional states to field large forces, and to use various types of forces and weapons and to employ them reasonably well also has implications for the United States or the Soviet Union, for it indicates an important problem facing any projection of force into the region. The war highlights the potential intensity of regional conflict and the likely costs facing the direct use of force by the United States or the Soviet Union

against a regional power. Middle Eastern militaries are no longer ragtag forces indifferently armed. They may be misled, they may not fight as well as US or Soviet troops, but this cannot be taken for granted. In addition, the Iraqis have excelled at defensive operations, a point not lost on other Arab states, many of whom have studied Iraqi techniques closely. The employment of such techniques in other regional contexts could significantly increase the costs of any future confrontation.

Fourth, the war illustrates the limits of superpower influence. Although both the Soviet Union and the United States would prefer to see an end to the war, they have been singularly unable to bring any convincing pressure to bear on the belligerents to end the fighting. This has led to a lot of speculation that the war was either instigated by one of the superpowers or that the only reason the war continues is because one or the other of the superpowers wants the war to continue. This opinion was common in the Gulf when I visited there in December 1984, and one can find it in certain quarters of this country as well. Still, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wants the war; but both are limited in their ability to influence the outcome. Neither power, however, is indifferent to how the war might end, and this means they must maintain an active interest in the war and they will try to influence its direction or contain its effects.

Fifth, the war shows, if an example were necessary, that violence and instability are endemic to the region. Indigenous ethnic and religious rivalries, conflict growing out of competing national interests, and the question of the legitimacy of local states are endemic and long-term. Even if the war ends tomorrow, such rivalries will remain to disturb the regional domestic peace for the foreseeable future. One cannot rule out a future

war, more subversion, or another Islamic revolution. One should be careful, however, not to learn more from this situation than there is to learn.

In the first place, few areas of the world are far removed from violence and dangerous rivalry. Even Europe, where people have grown accustomed to political steadiness, the picture is far from being free of violence or instability. Few regions of the world can boast a convivial environment free of disorder or the threat of sudden violence. It is also important to note that the dire predictions for the region have not been fulfilled. The regional states have not abruptly succumbed to a wave of Islamic fanatics, war has not dramatically increased oil prices, the loss of production in the region has not caused any noticeable financial disruption, and the war has not inexorably involved all and sundry in a more general struggle. The fact that Iran and Iraq could endure years of war with virtually no internal upheaval is a measure of the stamina and durability of regional states. This is not to say that Cassandra is entirely wrong, but to note that catastrophe does not necessarily lurk in every event in the region. The local states have demonstrated considerable aptitude in meeting various threats, and have shown resilience and ingenuity in protecting their interests. Even the belligerents have exercised restraint and judgment--within limits.

Finally, drawing on the last two points above, the war underscores the fact that US policy must learn to expect that regional instability is not likely to go away or to be amenable to US solutions. There is a dynamic to regional affairs quite separate from either US or Soviet concerns and these are likely to follow their own course despite the policies of the superpowers.

The Future of the War

Having looked at the nature of the war up to the present, it is important to look beyond the present at possible outcomes of the war. While this is a speculative exercise, it is important to realize that how the war ends and how it develops toward that end will have an impact on regional affairs and US interests that should be considered.

There are four possible courses the war may take, each with permutations that will influence the future of the Gulf. First, the war can continue, with the inherent danger of escalation; second, the war could be concluded with some sort of status quo ante settlement; third, Iraq could win; fourth, Iran could win. These will be considered in turn.

The most likely scenario for the war, for the present, is more of the same. Neither belligerent is militarily capable of defeating its opponent outright, and as long as Iran adheres to its determination to change the pattern of social and political relations in Iraq and relies on a strategy of attrition, then no end is likely soon. This means continued alarms and diversions, and the potential for an escalation of the conflict. Since both sides are limited in their abilities to expand the conflict directly, this escalation is likely to involve increasing Iraqi air activity in the Gulf and possible Iranian-inspired sabotage and terrorism against other Gulf states or beyond in an effort to influence opinion and isolate Iraq.

This situation is likely to continue until there is a change of heart or of leadership in Iran. Since it is Khomeini's resolve that sustains much of the war effort, his death or a change in his attitude may produce movement towards a settlement, or at least towards a gradual winding down of the war. This is not likely in the short term, and even Khomeini's death is not

likely to produce a sudden change in Iranian policy; while the death or removal of Saddam Husayn is not likely to lessen Iran's determination to make major changes in Iraq or cause Iraq to suddenly capitulate. Nor is Iraq likely to accept a de facto end to the war if this leaves Iraq's ability to export its oil through the Gulf in doubt. Still, a combination of exhaustion and frustration may lead both societies to seek a settlement, de facto or de jure. Such a settlement, however, will not remove the basic causes of conflict between the two states--divergent geopolitical goals and mutually hostile ideologies. Thus even a settlement will not restore peace, and a cold or semi-hot war will continue to disturb regional politics.

In the case of Iran, the period of peace will mean a significant effort at internal reconstruction. Not only has the war caused severe damage and dislocations, but the ravages of the revolution and the issue of priorities and succession remain to be addressed. Thus, Iran has a number of internal issues to occupy its time. The dynamics of the revolution and its evangelicalism, however, also mean that Iran will continue to seek to spread its ideas and exercise regional influence. This is likely to mean continued efforts at subversion and the use or support of terrorism as an instrument of policy. In addition, Iran has significant economic and geopolitical interests to promote and protect and this will mean an effort to refurbish its military. Iran's large population, lengthy coastline, and dynamism assure that Iran will seek to play a major if not dominant role in future Gulf politics. This will keep alive rivalry with Iraq and will make the smaller Gulf states uncomfortable.

Peace is not likely to put an end to Iraqi ambitions either. The war has not helped Iraq's economy, but Iraq has grown stronger during the war.

Today its military is larger and better equipped than at the start of the war, and Iraq has managed to develop reasonable working relations with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait and the smaller Gulf states. The war has helped to kindle an Iraqi nationalism and has put Iraq in the position of being able to claim to be the protector of Arabism against Iran. Although a settlement in the war is likely to mean an internal debate within Iraq to settle the question of responsibility for starting the war, the Baath Party is likely to remain in power even if Saddam Hussayn does not. In any event, Iraq is likely to seek to continue to improve its influence in the Gulf, a course that will keep fresh the rivalry with Iran, and could produce tension with other regional states. Iraq, for example, learned how vulnerable its position in the Gulf was when Iran easily destroyed Iraqi oil terminals and blockaded Iraq. This reality may lead the Iraqis to insist that Kuwait give up some territory--such as the islands of Warbah or Bubiyan--to increase Iraq's coastline or its defensive depth. Iraq may also seek naval and air facilities in other parts of the Gulf. In addition, Iraq may feel it has a score to settle with Syria. Although Iraq also has a number of internal priorities--economic recovery, problems with the Kurds--and the war has taught Iraq the dangers inherent in a resort to force, Iraqi leaders are likely to continue their efforts to make Iraq a significant regional power. This effort will keep alive Iraqi-Iranian rivalry and will have unpredictable effects on regional politics.

The war, however, could end with an Iraqi victory. Although this is not likely to be the result of direct Iraqi military action, the cumulative effort on Iran of internal disruption, economic blockade, and war weariness could force Iran to negotiate, or to collapse into a state of civil war,

making an effort to continue the war against Iraq impossible. Such a development would leave Iraq intact, with a well-developed military and no strong opponent. More dangerous, however, civil disorder in Iran could have profound consequences on regional affairs.

The fall of the Shah and the transition to the Islamic Republic was relatively smooth, especially given the fundamental nature of the shift involved. This meant that the potential for disruption was minimized. Collapse of the present government under adverse conditions, however, could produce a major upheaval. Frisparous forces in Iran, held in check by the present government, could fragment Iran, a prospect with grave implications. In the first place, such disorder invites external meddling. This could mean involvement by regional states such as Iraq or Turkey or Pakistan in Iran, or, more ominously, by the Soviet Union. This meddling could exacerbate internal strife, prolonging it or propelling it in dangerous directions. Soviet support, for example, to communist elements in the country could lead to a communist-dominated state. This prospect is singularly unwelcome and to forestall it, the United States would almost certainly become involved, increasing the prospects of a direct US-Soviet clash.

Strife in Iran could also spill over into surrounding states as various Iranian groups seek external support or carry their domestic struggles beyond Iran's frontiers. This type of instability in a strategically important region, where the interests of competing states have collided in the past, has been the source of considerable mischief and misfortune, and there is no reason to be optimistic about this situation should it develop in the Persian Gulf.

Similarly, an Iranian victory is not a reassuring outcome. Once again, an Iranian victory is not likely to come through an Iranian feat of arms but as the result of some internal Iraqi collapse that undermines Iraq's ability to resist. However it came about, an Iranian victory would have serious repercussions. First, the collapse of Iraq creates a dangerous regional instability that invites the form of meddling noted above. Second, it would provide Iran with the opportunity to establish a new Islamic Republic in at least part of Iraq. Not only would this give Iran an important forward base of operations for its revolutionary cause, but it would also give weight and substance to Iran's revolutionary appeal and contribute to Iran's own conviction of self-righteousness. This combination raises concern about the future stability of the Gulf states or their ability to resist Iranian pressure.

No major upheaval or the climate of uncertainty of the sort that would follow either an Iranian or an Iraqi collapse could go unnoticed, and the consequent temptation or sense of urgent necessity to intervene in some fashion to influence events could not be resisted by any number of states. Although such a development would have unpredictable results, this very unpredictability at a time of fluid and violent change is a dangerous situation for everyone with interests in the region.

This brief discussion does not exhaust the permutations of possible developments within the outcome outlined above. Indeed, a fertile imagination can conceive an endless string of ominous contingencies. One must guard against the temptation to people the landscape with neurotic visions of possible outcomes, but it is equally important to understand that there are worse things than the continuation of the war and that how it ends is not a matter of indifference.

US POLICY: AN OVERVIEW

United States policy in the Persian Gulf is the result of an evolution of interest in the region. The initial US concern developed from the post-WWII policy of containment of the Soviet Union, in which the so-called Northern Tier states, principally Turkey and Iran, became the center for US-Soviet rivalry. In addition, the United States had reasonably cordial relations with Saudi Arabia and important military bases there. Over the years following WWII, other issues became important and added to US concern for the region. Principal among these were the establishment of Israel, the defense and support of which became an important element of policy, and the emergence of Middle Eastern, especially Persian Gulf, oil as an important element in the economic and strategic well-being of the United States and its allies. With the growth of Free World dependency on oil, the secure supply of oil from the Gulf, which supplies upwards of 30% of Free World oil, became an important national interest; and with this grew concern for regional stability.

The oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, which saw astronomical increases in the price of oil, drove home graphically the importance of a secure oil supply. Although Western dependency on Gulf oil has declined and US imports of Gulf oil is today well below ten percent of total imports, the economic impact of a prolonged disruption of oil supplies is potentially catastrophic. This vulnerability to oil stoppage also has added another aspect to the concern about Soviet penetration of the area; it also increased concern for the stability of regional states; and it led the United States to develop a Strategic Petroleum Reserve and to work out arrangements with our allies to

lessen their dependency and to support them in the event of a disruption of Middle Eastern oil supplies. Thus, over the years, four key elements have become the centerpiece of US regional policy: containment; concern for the security of Israel; concern for secure supplies of oil; and regional stability.

The evolution of this policy resulted from numerous formal and informal agreements over the years, but the landmarks for this evolution can be seen in a series of presidential statements, commonly termed "doctrines," that layout important steps in the development of a US regional posture. These statements are familiar to most, and they include the Truman Doctrine (March, 1947), the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957), the Nixon Doctrine (1968), the Carter Doctrine (1980), and what might be called the Reagan corollary to the Carter Doctrine. These position statements, elaborated by such arrangements as the inclusion of Turkey in NATO and the establishment of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), plus a variety of bilateral arrangements, often involving economic or military assistance, gradually increased US commitment in the region, a commitment fueled by a concern over Soviet penetration and for the security of oil. One of the key elements of most of these statements was the recognition that the United States was not able to defend these areas unilaterally. Instead, the United States promised economic and military aid, backed up by the US nuclear deterrent, as well as moral support to regional powers who were expected to see to their own defense. United States defense policy for the region centered on providing the necessary military equipment to regional supporters - principally Iran and Saudi Arabia - as a means of developing a regional defensive network that would help secure mutual interests. This policy

accelerated during the Nixon years, a reflection of a US retrenchment mentality over Vietnam. Even the Nixon Doctrine, which is often seen as a departure from US policy, however, was a restatement of the traditional US position. For the United States, the central purpose of the relationship was to secure the regional states from direct Soviet invasion and to strengthen them internally to resist subversion. The idea was for a cooperative arrangement in which a meaningful partnership could be worked out to the mutual benefit of all.

The major departure from the traditional US policy outlined above was the Carter Doctrine. Reacting to the Soviet invasion of Iran and the fall of the Shah, the main pillar of support for US regional policy, President Carter enunciated America's unilateral determination to protect its interests, we would meet force with force. Unfortunately, the policy did not take sufficient notice of the limitations on US power-projection capabilities, and so the United States had a policy with very little to back it up. The last five years have been spent in trying to match materiel means to policy goals. The effort has been considerable, the primary result being the development of a new Unified Command, US Central Command (USCENTCOM), but it still leaves much to be desired. In addition to the development of more deployable assets for Persian Gulf contingencies, the United States has also sought to improve regional ties and to elaborate access facilities to support any deployment to the region. Local concern about US motives and the need of local state to pay heed to a domestic climate of opinion that views foreign bases as a sign of colonialism, however, has constrained this effort. Although USCENTCOM can today boast a significant increase in capability, much remains to be done and the question

of priority for the use of force remains to be addressed. More will be said on this later.

The Reagan administration, more recently, has developed a low-key approach in the region that accords better with local sentiments; and while continuing the efforts to strengthen US unilateral military capabilities the administration also has returned to a policy that stresses cooperation and assistance.

The fly in the ointment has been that the regional states have had their own sets of interests and concerns, their own threat environment, and their own vulnerabilities apart from the preoccupations of the United States. This has meant and still means that regional states have pursued objectives either contrary to US interests or embarrassing for those interests, or have faced internal problems that have reduced their ability to support US interests. All too often, the assumption appears to be that regional friends of either the United States or the Soviet Union are clients of the superpowers acting at their beck and call. This is a very misleading image and it produces needless confusion and over-simple reactions to a complex reality. Regional allies of the superpowers are by no means puppets and they retain significant independence to act, even to undertaking actions contrary or hostile to the interests of their superpower partner. This reflects the limits of US or Soviet influence and the complexity of alliance relationships. While this is true of any alliance relationship, the fact of divergence interests and the impact these can have on a relationship is often forgotten, and hurt feelings and misunderstandings can abound. This can be clearly seen in US-NATO relations, and is a feature of the Middle Eastern subsystem as well.

Reagan policy in its early years, for example, tried to base its relations with the Gulf States on a strong anti-Soviet foundation - the so-called strategic consensus approach. This policy was innocent of the fact that while regional states did not like the Soviets, they did not share the US anti-Soviet preoccupation and were unwilling to participate in it as the keystone of a revitalized US approach to the region. The trouble that can beset an alliance policy was illustrated graphically also by the fall of the Shah and the conversion of Iran from a friend to a bitter enemy of the United States. Relationships carry no guarantee of success, of perpetual cooperation, of the identity of objectives on every issue, or on the absence of dispute.

US POLICY AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

The United States did not welcome the outbreak of the war and it has consistently supported every effort to reach a negotiated settlement. The war, as any war, is freighted with uncertainties, not only for the belligerents but for their friends and neighbors. The potential that the war might disrupt oil supplies or spread, or that the defeat of one of the belligerents may significantly and adversely affect the regional environment and beyond is an ever-present reality. For these reasons the United States is interested in seeing an end to the war.

When the war began the United States declared its neutrality, but from the beginning this neutrality was compromised. It was not that the United States favored Iraq or desired a war, but the Iranian revolution and the fact that Iran was bitterly denouncing the United States and was holding 52

US diplomats hostage meant that US neutrality was spiced with pent up fury and an in-built bias. It was a fine dilemma. On the one hand the United States did not want the Iraqis to win and establish a regional hegemony. Nor could the United States welcome an Iranian collapse with all the dangers that suggested. On the other hand, Iran was no friend of this country and so any US effort to act as an honest broker was precluded. Indeed, there is still reason to assume that Iranian hostility towards and suspicions of the United States would undermine any peace initiative in which the United States were even remotely involved. Thus, the United States found itself, as with everyone else, a spectator to the main event. This did not mean, however, that the United States did nothing.

Although this country was unable to directly influence the war, it did work to try to lessen its impact and to keep it from spreading. This involved various approaches over the course of the war. The most sustained aspect of US policy towards the war, apart from frequent statements about the desirability of a negotiated settlement, has been an arms embargo on the sale or supply of US military equipment to Iran's. Since the majority of Iran's arms are American, this has had a serious impact on Iran's ability to repair or replace its major weapons systems. In addition, the United States has encouraged other states to similarly curtail arms sales to Iran, with some success. This country has not encouraged arms sales to Iraq, but it has not gone to any great lengths to discourage such sales either. Thus, our neutrality is selective, although the United States has roundly condemned the Iraqis for the use of chemical weapons.

In addition in 1982-83, when Iraq appeared to be on the verge of collapse, the United States undertook limited measures to shore up the

Iraqis. This effort became known as a "tilt" towards Iraq. This so-called tilt involved limited assistance --commodity credits for agricultural products, support for Iraqi efforts to secure vital loans to bridge debt shortfalls, support for a UN-sponsored condemnation of Iran for attack on Gulf shipping while remaining virtually silent over similar Iraqi attacks, and continuation of the embargo against Iran-- and did not reflect a US desire to see Iraq win, but merely to see Iraq survive in order to prevent an Iranian victory. This negative solution helped to smooth the path to a resumption of US-Iraqi relations, but it has not brought an end to the fighting.

Recently the United States has agreed to sell Iraq a number of commercial helicopters that could have a military use. Widely interpreted as a further example of the US tilt towards Iraq, the sale can also be seen as part of an effort to improve US-Iraqi relations over the long term. The addition of the Bell helicopters will not add significantly to Iraq's military capability, though it may send a subtle message of US support, but it helps to lay the groundwork for future relations with Iraq and expands on the effort to diversify Iraq's dependence on the Soviets for arms and equipment. It must be remembered that US policy must not stop with considering just the war.

The United States has also reacted to other events in the war that have threatened US regional interests. This might be viewed as a version of a containment policy. In 1984, for example, when Iran threatened to close the Straits Hormuz, President Reagan made it clear that the United States would not stand by and see this vital oil route closed. The United States maintains a US carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean and a small force in

the Gulf itself as a viable sign of US capabilities . The United States also supported Saudi Arabia with AWACS and more recently with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles as a deterrent to Iranian attacks on Saudi shipping or oil facilities. The administration has also condemned Iran as a supporter of regional terrorism and has promised military support to the Gulf States should they need and desire it, and it has encouraged Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) efforts to develop a collective security system. While these efforts do not promote an end to the war, they do aim at keeping it from spreading.

The United States approach to the war has not been restricted solely to containment efforts, however. Recognizing that the United States has limited leverage with either belligerent and that an active role could jeopardize negotiations, this country has maintained a low profile but it has encouraged every effort towards a settlement. This has meant US support for various UN peace initiatives and for the efforts of various third parties such as Algeria, the GCC, and Japan. As with the labors of others, such as the Organization of Islamic Countries, the Arab League, Somalia, Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey - even the Soviets have tried - these approaches have all foundered on the determination of Khomeini to punish Iraq. As long as this remains the case, ending the war must wait on Iran's will, determination, and ability.

CONSTRAINTS ON US POLICY

When the Iran-Iraq war broke out both sides accused the other of being an agent of US imperialism. This theme can be found in pronouncements down to today. Even the Iraqis from time to time accuse the United States of

selling arms to Iran, and the opinion is common in the Gulf and the Middle East as a whole that the war could not go on were it not for US or Soviet intentions to see it continue.

This position is arrived at by a natural bent on the part of Middle Easterners towards conspiracy theories, supported by a belief that nothing happens for good or ill in the area that is not instigated by one of the superpowers. Unless, of course, one believes, as many Middle Easterners do, that the real villain is Great Britain. As one Middle East gentlemen told me, the United States may have engineered Khumayni's return and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but it was the British that tricked the United States into doing these things. This proclivity towards conspiracy is reinforced by a logical process that argues that since it is the superpowers that alone gain from the war -- distracts Iran and Iraq,, allows the US to act as a regional protector, undermines Middle Eastern self-development, etc-- they are obviously behind its continuation, else how could two small powers with no indigenous arms industries sustain a violent conflict for so long.

This mentality, the product of years of foreign domination of the region and a penchant to look to external causes to explain all events --and to escape any responsibility for actions-- reflects a naive'or willful ignorance about the goals, intentions, and capabilities of regional powers on the part of the local themselves. The war clearly shows that regional states are perfectly capable of making mistakes without assistance, and it demonstrates that not only is the resort to violence viewed as a perfectly legitimate form of interstate relations, but it also shows that there now exists a support structure to sustain such a policy. The age of dependency

on a single source of supply is passed, and since there is no reliable or meaningful means to regulate the supply of arms, the new flexibility afforded by a diversity of arms suppliers must now be seen as a major fact in interstate relations. This is one of the features that has helped sustain the belligerents in this war and it is likely to be a key element in future conflicts.

As noted above under Lessons, the impact of this situation for the United States in this and other regions is that our influence is likely to be limited and that the means available to us --diplomatic pressure, the sale of arms, the threatened use of force-- are likely to have less of an impact than they used to. We are entering a brave new world, or perhaps merely returning to a time in which instability and strife are the rule rather than the exception, and where the threatened use of force by a great power is a much devalued commodity.

This latter issue is a good departure point for considering the context in which US policy must operate and to examine some of the constraints on policy or the contradictions that beset it. It also offers an opportunity to consider several broader issues. Although the war itself is of concern, it should not obscure for us the fact that it should not be the central feature of our concern. It helps focus attention on the region, it reinforces in a graphic way certain vulnerabilities and as such it represents a sort of microcosm of regional issues and the relation of US policy to those issues, but the war itself is not the center of gravity for US policy.

The war has been a trial for all the concerned parties. Its duration and seeming endlessness is a test of endurance, patience and nerves. It

also helps to illustrate a variety of dilemmas that face the regional states and, more of concern to us, US policy.

First, the war indicates the limits on US ability to influence regional events, if a further illustration were necessary. Although this point has been noted several times above, its importance bears repeating. It is important to note that it is not that the United States wants the war to continue, but that it does not have the power to impose an end --that is, short of more forceful means that could precipitate a worse crisis, such as an Iranian collapse or a confrontation with the Soviets. Thus, although the United States has important regional interests and considerable power with which to sustain them, it lacks the sort of leverage to seriously deflect regional states from actions they deem in their own national interest. In addition, the scale of fighting in the war illustrates a not inconsiderable regional military capability that has, as noted earlier, serious implications for the possible projection of US force into the region. This means contingency planning faces a far more complex and dubious situation in which the number of threats has grown and the environment is more threatening.

The war also raises another problem, that of trying to balance conflicting interests. The United States would like to see the war end with no winner and no loser. It would be in US interests if both powers could resolve their mutual disputes and then settled down to non-adventurist policies that did not threaten regional stability or oil supplies. It would be helpful if the local states eschewed ties with the Soviets, even if this did not mean closer relations with the United States. The problem is that the belligerents are not likely to comply with US ideas and this country

lacks the means to otherwise enforce its desires. Furthermore, since the belligerents are likely to continue fighting, the danger that one or the other may collapse presents a serious problem

When Iraq appeared on the verge of collapse in 1982, the United States felt it necessary to undertake steps to shore Iraq up. Today, Iraq is reasonably healthy and is showing signs of being able to pursue a more vigorous war effort. It is Iran that now seems shaky. Inflation is rampant, oil income is down, internal economic policies are in shambles, there are increasing signs of popular dissatisfaction with the regime, Khomeini's health is waning and a struggle for power may be in the offing, and Iran's ability to conduct the war in any meaningful way has seriously declined and is not likely to improve. While Iraq is not likely to launch a major offensive that will defeat Iran, the prospect looms that Iran's stubbornness may produce a serious internal crisis. This prospect presents the United States with a dilemma. Should we now take steps to bolster Iran? A new tilt? Aside from the fact that it is far from certain that the Iranians would welcome such a tilt, the United States would risk its new relationship with Iraq and it would not be viewed favorably by the other Gulf states. Perhaps if such support were linked to a peace settlement it might be welcome, but short of this --and there are serious problems with this as an approach-- it would appear as a cynical move and as a betrayal of our other regional friends. Thus, our policy is constrained and we are not at liberty to act, at least not without accepting certain costs. Trying to balance such conflicting concerns is no mean feat, and the regional states have no particular interest in making our difficulty less so.

Related to this problem of uncertainty is the question of whether or not the United States should use force, and when it should, to protect its interests and how much force is enough. There are two contradictory worries among our friends in the Gulf, that the United States will use force and that it won't. The concern, on one hand, is that the United States will take some unilateral action without warning that could adversely affect regional states; on the other hand, the regional states worry that the United States will not support them if they should need it. While reassurances have helped in this regard, no amount of promise can ease this concern, any more than the United States can be assured that a regional partner will not take steps contrary to our interests or will provide us with the necessary facilities in the event of a crisis to sustain an action to defend US regional interests.

This raises the additional concern, also illustrated by the war, that events in the region may occur without warning or be beyond our ability to deal with. The problems of the region are diverse and complex. They are layered in a highly intricate interrelationship, like some jumbled up archaeological site, that create a variety of real and apparent tensions and conflicts as well as an undercurrent of strain and suppressed hostility that can break out in unanticipated ways at unexpected times. In addition, because of rivalries between and among groups and countries relations in the region are dynamic and unstable, thus conflict or compromise can spring up or disappear abruptly, adding to the complexity of the region and the often indecipherability and unpredictability of events. This makes it difficult to plan ahead or to know what response is sufficient. When added to the limitations on US policy already noted, this can cause doubt, confusion and indecision. We cannot know what to do and this makes us cautious.

The war points up another dilemma, the problem of trying to reconcile our policy in the Gulf with our relations with Israel. United States Middle East policy faces the problem of trying to accommodate Israeli demands and Arab suspicions. Although the Gulf and the Levant are two different areas, common issues --Israeli concern over US support for Arab military power, and Arab concern over US indifference to the Palestinians questions and unstinting support for Israel-- link the two regions. The problem this raises for the United States is that there are two military balances to consider, one Arab-Israeli, the other the security interests of the Gulf states. While separate they are also intermeshed, and this makes it difficult to devise a coherent policy. In fact, the decision-making process in this country reflects this tension. Thus, while it makes perfect sense in Gulf security terms to develop a Jordanian rapid deployment force, and to improve the Saudi armed forces, this move conflicts with Israeli threat perceptions which in turn is echoed in our policy considerations. The resulting debate and apparent fluctuations in policy creates the impression in some quarters that the United States is indecisive or biased and therefore unreliable. There is no easy way out of this situation.

A further issue for US regional policy is our relationship with our NATO allies and their role in regional defense. The NATO countries and Japan are far more dependent upon Gulf oil than the United States, yet they have been reluctant to undertake more active defense measures to defend those interests; and while they expect the United States to shoulder the majority of the regional defense effort, they have also expressed concern at not being consulted about US actions and have demonstrated a nervousness over the United States taking inappropriate actions. All this seems contradictory, and it complicates US policy.

The Europeans feel, however, that their major defense effort for the alliance must come in Europe, an attitude at one time encouraged by the United States, and given their limited overseas deployment capabilities and their own domestic constraints, this is not unreasonable. The legacy of British and French imperialism and local sensitivity to that past is yet another reason for caution in relying on European assistance. Still, NATO countries have taken steps to support alliance interests outside Europe. The French and the British have developed rapid deployment forces; both have contributed ships to patrolling the Indian Ocean; and both, along with other European states, contributed to the Red Sea mine effort. In addition, the British and the French have helped diplomatically. Thus, although differences remain, it is not a negative picture; and it is a false position to argue that since the oil dependency is our allies and not ours, they should shoulder the burden. The issue is not oil dependency, per se, but the economic viability of the Free World, and United States self-interest is intimately involved. The problems of alliance relationships, however, remain.

A final dilemma facing US policy is deciding on the best means to respond to Soviet influence in the region. A variety of measures have been tried, from complete exclusion, to bilateral military relations with local states, to economic assistance, to the development of USCENTCOM as a direct action alternative. The Soviets remain and are likely to be a considerable factor in regional affairs despite these US efforts. The reverse is also true, and so US-Soviet rivalry will remain an important regional fact. The problem for the United States in this, apart from the dangers represented by the Soviet Union, is that our preoccupation blinds us to regional issues.

In our determination to confront our major adversary we tend to overlook regional political dynamics that operate quite apart from US-Soviet imperatives.

This tendency was apparent in the strategic consensus effort and it is still reflected in USCENTCOM war planning and much of the thinking on US contingency operations in the region. Although it is generally acknowledged that a Soviet invasion of Iran, for example, is unlikely, such a scenario remains a key element in planning. Given the nature of the threat and our own preoccupation with the Soviets, this is reasonable; but it produces very unrealistic thinking about US capabilities, and such plans generally assume away logistics problems and the question of regional support for a US deployment --the latter being highly debatable and yet essential for any successful deployment. It also is based on the assumption that a small US force operating at the limits of supply lines can be sustained against much larger Soviet forces operating on far shorter lines.

It is the duty of the Commander of USCENTCOM to formulate war plans and to develop contingency operations. The problem lies in the lack of an overall planning system that can establish a clear set of defense priorities. The question that remains to be answered, however, one that should not lie with CINCCENT, is not if the United States can confront a Soviet invasion of Iran but rather should it. If, as has been argued, such an invasion constituted a casus belli, is Iran the point d'appui for a major US effort? I have argued elsewhere that in fact this is not the case, that the diversion of US men, materiel, and particularly limited lift assets to the Gulf to defend Iran would be a dangerous diversion. Instead, the United States should concentrate its planning effort on responding to the far more

likely local contingencies and developing a trip wire force, backed up by a firm policy, to demonstrate our resolve to regard Soviet invasion as a cause for war. The appropriate priorities, however, remain debatable, but we are not debating these issues wisely or well and so decisions are being made in a vacuum.

The point to be made here is that it is difficult to devise a consistent policy in this atmosphere of competing priorities and uncertainties; and the tension created in trying to balance a response to a major Soviet invasion with sensitivity to local issues undermines clear thinking. Since the answers are not self-evident and the consequences of failure ignoble, the problem is not likely to go away.

US POLICY TOWARDS THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

With this admittedly impressionistic appraisal of the regional environment and the problems inherent in developing a policy for the area, what should the United States do in regard to the war? Once again, it would be focusing on the wrong issue to deal solely with the war. One must come to terms with its context and develop responses that make sense in this larger environment.

One of the first things to consider is the possibility of some form of opening to Iran that might lead to a US-Iranian rapprochement and a move towards peace. A number of writers have argued for this point of view and have offered evidence to support the contention that Iran is ready to be more flexible on negotiations and more agreeable to a resumption of relations with the United States. They point out promising signs of Iranian

reasonableness in speeches by various leaders, including the powerful speaker of the Majlis, Hashimi Rafsanjani. In addition, the Iranians have provided some help in the recent TWA affair, which may indicate a willingness to be more flexible. This is an encouraging development that deserves close attention to see if there is room for further moderation of Iran's policies. Developments such as these lend credence to the argument that the United States should listen to these overtures and reconsider its position, in effect, tilt towards Iran. Such a diplomatic approach has some attractive aspects, especially if the present government in Iran is as ready to reach a settlement as some would have us believe. But is this the case and should the United States seek to restore relations? I would argue that the evidence of an Iranian change of heart is far from clear except to those who tend to overlook inconvenient contrary evidence, and that there are a number of preconditions before this country can pursue a meaningful resumption of relations.

It is common to burrow through various commentaries for signs of change and then to quote Khomeini and other Iranian leaders as proof of a new attitude. It is often pointed out that Iran is seeking openings to the West and Japan and that by these efforts Iran has demonstrated a surprising openness of mind. These "facts" are then presented as evidence that Iran is more flexible and willing to listen to reason. The fact that Iran's internal economy is in shambles and that there is war weariness in the country is also enlisted to argue, by extension, that Iran is being forced into a more pragmatic assessment of its objectives. It would be folly, so the argument goes, to ignore this new flexibility and so the United States ought to explore this new open door policy. Explore it, perhaps, but one should be cautious in what one believes.

The careful scrutiny of various speeches by Khomeini and others is likely to yield the results being sought. Thus, some analysts have seized on a speech Khomeini made earlier this year expressing depression over yet more battlefield failures and hinting at a willingness to consider negotiations. These same analysts, however, tended to overlook the fact that only several days later Khomeini made a blistering new speech that dismissed any idea of a lessening of resolve to continue the war until Iraq was defeated. Speeches by other leading figures are scrutinized similarly, but a recent sampling of speeches yield the impression that Iran is still "hanging tough." For example, Prime Minister Husayn Musavi has noted that what Iran lacks in material means it does not lack in spiritual means and vows to continue the war. President Khamene'i, on his recent reelection, noted that "our nation shall never tire from waging its fight." Rafsanjani, often cited as a moderate, has argued that only a deep-rooted solution can solve the problem of the Iran-Iraq war and he stressed that a military victory can put an end to the deep-rooted problem. He also noted that a ceasefire today would only leave Iraq to blackmail other states. In addition, Jumhuri-yi Islam, one of the leading news organs of the government, continues to blame the United States for the war, encourages efforts to eliminate US regional influence, and has begun viciously denouncing Kuwait as an enemy. Taken together, these pronouncements, and many others, do not indicate an unequivocal change of heart. That Iran has reduced its battlefield effort does not necessarily represent a change of goals either. As the spokesmen for the War Information Center noted, "We are trying to bring the enemy to his knees with the minimum of casualties and bloodshed." Iranian battlefield tactics are tending more towards

small-unit, infiltration techniques, but this does not represent a change of heart merely a new method.

Iranian openings to the West and Japan are not necessarily a move towards a settlement either. The Iranians recognize that part of their problem has been diplomatic isolation and Khomeyni and the Majlis have sanctioned efforts to break out of this isolation. The motive is debatable, but it is at least as plausible to argue that the aim is not to seek an end to the war but to gain access to sources of economic and diplomatic support and arms as a means of getting around internal problems. Iraq has employed a similar strategy with some success. Of course, the Iranians argue that the war was imposed and they feel that everyone is against them. This would make anyone keep up a bold front. But Iran, in fact, continues to encourage regional terrorism and is no friend to this country, and well-meaning but biased counsel that would simply wish these realities away is not a sound basis for policy.

The fact remains that Iran continues to fund and train terrorists and to provide them with documentation, and cover and refuge; and despite prior statements about not really wanting to spread the revolution by force, the Iranians have encouraged subversion, assassination, kidnappings and bombings as instruments of state policy. The Iranians also maintain ties with Syria and Libya and have established relations with Nicaragua in an attempt to spread their effort to join in a general anti-American scheme. These actions are not likely to cease, nor is any premature US overture to Iran likely to moderate this behavior, though the present Iranian government may be willing to exploit it.

We in the West have become accustomed to think of the international system as a worthy device for regulating disputes and the relations among states. After WWII we invested the United Nations with our hopes for a more orderly and peaceful mechanism for regulating international aggression, and we have slipped into a psychology that any use of force for any reason, especially to defend something so mundane and vaguely immoral as national interest, is somehow repugnant and vile. Much of the world, however, does not share this view, though other states may be perfectly willing to maintain the idea as a double standard in order to incapacitate the West. But there is a more sinister feature to this.

To a considerable degree, there is a separate international system beginning to emerge. This is composed of a number of states and individual groups that resent the present system, which is largely an artifact of Western design, and are seeking to develop a new system based on subverting the old and establishing a new balance. While this process goes on, they continue to work within the older system but use it to cover their other acts, and they use its very principles to undermine it. In this environment terrorism and the transnational support of millennial revolutionism --what I have called support for the programmatic state-- are the instruments designed to effect the desired change. Within this system terrorists move freely, receive economic support and training. The ultimate goal is to use these methods to replace the international system as we know it. Iran is a ready player in this environment, and as such its motives must be regarded with suspicion, and naive views that interpret Iranian behavior through the lens of the international system as we knew it miss an important dimension.

Furthermore, we have become accustomed to think of the state as the institution that maintains a monopoly on violence, both domestically and international. While this is true in some cases, it is also true that the proliferation of states and would-be states has raised a challenge to this concept, and there has been a significant decline in state power and an increase of force available to even small groups. The spread of weapons and an acclimation to violence has had its influence on state and non-state actors alike. Lebanon is a stark reminder of the fragility of government and the fact that the means of violence are by no means a monopoly of the state. Iran has contributed to this environment by providing arms and assistance to terrorists. Thus, any move to interpret Iran's motives and to pursue a resumption of relations should proceed very cautiously.

There are a number of guidelines to keep in mind. First, Iran is no friend of the United States, and until there are more unequivocal signs that Iran is moderating its anti-US stance and is withdrawing from terrorist involvement, then relations should not change dramatically. Second, Iran still has a lot to answer for, and the present regime should not be rewarded for its holding of US diplomats and involvement in the bombings of US facilities by an over-eager desire to jump at any sign of a thaw. Americans tend to have a mentality that seeks to reward those who have snubbed and abused them, as if our goodwill and a desire to forgive and forget was reciprocated. Third, and following from these, any steps to resume relations should be linked to a ceasefire and an Iranian effort to cease terrorist activities. It is up to Iran to make the first move. Fourth, it is important to note that Iran does not have its own house in order. Various elements of the government do not agree with others and this can

produce a rivalry that means one set of officials can act without the approval of others. Thus, the Foreign Ministry in Iran might genuinely seek rapprochement, while elements within the Revolutionary Guard, the office for Islamic Guidance, or even within the Foreign Ministry itself may continue to support terrorism, and undermine the policy of the Foreign Minister. This has another aspect.

Given the incipient struggle for power within the Iranian government, individuals who approach the United States could easily find this fact used against them. Thus, the Iranian government is not necessarily free to act, nor is it necessarily able to guarantee its intentions. This is not an encouraging environment for any major new demarche.

This does not mean that the United States cannot explore, privately, avenues to reestablish relations. For the reasons noted earlier, it is by no means in the interest of the United States to undermine Iran or to encourage its collapse. Certainly informal discussions should not be ruled out, but a too rapid rush to restore relations is likely to be rejected acidly by Iran and achieve little more than embarrassment.

Aside from a rapprochement with Iran, what other steps should the United States consider in dealing with the war? Basically the United States should continue its efforts to contain the conflict, support its regional friends, and encourage efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. The development of policy also depends on coming to terms with the limitations on US abilities noted above, and on devising the means to manage the contradictions that are now an essential feature of US regional involvement.

Efforts to contain the war should include measures to continue the embargo on Iran and to develop a regional deployment capability to support

the regional states or to respond directly if that is necessary. In conjunction with this, the United States should continue to supply military equipment to its regional friends, and to support local efforts at collective defense. This involves support to the GCC and to individual states. The value of a Jordanian rapid deployment force, for example, remains real, as does the need to support both Jordan and Saudi Arabia with arms and technical assistance. As noted above, Iran and Iraq are not only likely to remain rivals for dominance in the Gulf, they are also likely to increase their capabilities to pursue that objective. This will mean the potential for future clashes and the possibility of pressure on the smaller Gulf states. An example of such pressure could be Iranian and/or Iraqi insistence on joining the GCC, a move that would undermine that body as an effective instrument of collective security for the smaller states. Iranian or Iraqi pressure could also undermine the stability of these states or force them to reconsider their position vis-a-vis the United States. Thus, sustained attention and efforts to build strong ties to these states in the present climate are essential for long-term US interests.

The United States should also develop its regional policy with less of a Soviet preoccupation. This means stressing military planning better designed to deal with local realities and contingencies, something a Jordanian RDF could contribute to. The United States, however, also needs to make it quite clear to the Soviets that armed aggression in the region would contribute to a war climate and the United States would respond to such a move. The development of clear, consistent policies for the regional are essential in this effort. Our interest in the region tends to wax and wane on a cycle of bureaucratic interest, crisis, or Congressional and

Presidential politics rather than on any precise effort to deal with the region on the basis of a rational assessment of threats and goals. This tends to make US policy appear inconsistent and it undermines our credibility.

One of the key elements of policy should be a clear idea of what the United States would like to see as the situation once the Iran-Iraq war is over. Thus, efforts at improving US deployment capabilities and improving the capabilities of US friends in the region is important. In addition, this means continuing efforts to build on the rapprochement with Iraq and encouragement for an Egyptian-Iraqi resumption of formal relations. Iraq has embarked on a more pragmatic policy and this should be encouraged. The United States, however, should also move to strengthen its ties with Kuwait and help to create a climate in which potential Iraqi and Iranian pressure on that small state can be confronted.

The United States should also continue explorations with Japan and the European allies for means of supporting mutual interests. This needs to include, however, a recognition of limitations on European and Japanese cooperation and a realization that future assistance is likely to remain low-key and to be scenario dependent.

In addition to these issues, the United States faces a major challenge to its presence in the Middle East, namely, the use of terrorism by local groups and states, and US policy must devise means of responding to this threat. Terrorism must now be considered as a semi-permanent feature of regional politics. The advantages that accrue to non-state and state actors from this form of coercion or indirect war are such that even if one group or another is dealt with replacements can be found easily. The United

States will remain a key target for such groups. This is true for several reasons.

First, because such states as Iran or Libya see terrorism as a cheap means to pressure the United States or others to withdraw from the region or to change their policies. Since the resort to terrorism has been virtually risk free for such state actors, the incentive to use it remains. Second, the United States is an attractive target because its facilities and people are vulnerable, widespread and susceptible to this form of violence. Third, many opponents of this country have identified the United States as a good pressure point. Recognizing or believing that the United States can make things happen, the idea is to apply pressure on this country and force a response in the desired direction. This could be seen in the recent TWA hijacking in which Americans were kidnapped in order to pressure Israel. Terrorism, in this form, is a type of negotiation strategy, and as such it is likely to appeal to any number of groups that feel powerless and want a quick return for limited investment. Ironically, the image of US capability is thus a source of disadvantage for the United States. Given the ease involved in establishing a terror organization the number of such groups is likely to increase while the ability to attribute responsibility or to hold some one to blame is likely to remain confused. This very ambiguity is another factor reinforcing the value of terrorism.

While there are no simple or uniform responses, the United States must work to increase the cost of terrorism. This does not mean unfocused or kneejerk violence, which can backfire by generating new recruits for terror--the classic action-reaction cycle that politicizes and alienates further. To a degree the situation cannot be met by dealing with symptoms.

Instead, there needs to be an effort to address the social, economic, and political issues that occasion terrorism. There are limits to what the United States can do in this regard, however. Many regional problems are beyond anyone's ability to resolve. Furthermore, there are some for whom violence is the goal or they are determined to exclude US interests regardless of US policy. This means that the United States must also explore means to pressure supporters of terrorism and to identify and punish the terrorists themselves.

The problem, of course, is identifying terrorists and their supporters in the shadow world of international terrorism and designing responses that are both effective and precise. Responses also involve perplexing moral issues as well. Thus, it is not a simple matter, and it involves actions not only against individual, hard to trace groups, but also against state sponsors, which raises a whole series of political and diplomatic complications. And through it all runs the likelihood that any response may only make the situation worse, may cause an escalation in the process.

I do not intend to develop in detail what appropriate responses should be; there are numerous and informed efforts to this effect already. Instead, I will make a few general observations. First, the United States must work to establish an international effort, something that is being worked on, to coordinate information and develop a more consistent international response. Such an effort must consider means to make hijacking more difficult and must consider sanctions against states harboring or supporting terrorist hijackers. Second, the United States must develop the forces and the planning system to respond to terrorists acts, and develop the intelligence network, based on a strong, international human

intelligence-gathering effort, designed to penetrate groups or suborn them. Third, the United States must develop the means to identify and respond to the state sponsors of terrorism. For example, the United States could develop a variety of responses to Iran's support of terror bombings and assassinations by a form of discreet or indirect--but believable--pressure, ideas I would be happy to expand on more privately. Finally, the United States must begin to act, not simply develop forces and plans. Here is where the real rub lies, for acting raises all the concerns noted earlier. It raises thorny moral questions, it raises a variety of legal issues, and it means being involved in sometimes squalid and mean-spirited actions that are offensive to our sense of propriety and fair play. It involves the disturbing prospect of, in some cases, resorting to the means employed by our enemies, a wholly distasteful idea. Yet, the nettle must be grasped. Hopefully, by public debate of this issue we can forge the national consensus that is vital to effective action of any sort.

Finally, US policy should explore means of resolving one of its most upsetting dilemmas -- that of trying to devise a policy for two areas in which interests in each conflict with one another. It is important to encourage efforts towards a resolution of the Arab-Israeli confrontation as a means to reduce the contradiction that tortures much of our present policy. The progress, such as it is, in trying to reach an Arab-Israeli settlement and a resolution to the Palestinian issue should be sustained. While this effort will not solve the Middle East dilemma it is essential at this juncture to do everything possible to liquidate this core problem that keeps the region in turmoil. The problem we face is that we have interests involved in the settlement process, thus the United States is not a

disinterested party to the effort. In addition, both sides in the dispute have claims on our support, and the evolution of US regional interests apart from these claims complicate our efforts to arrive at impartial solutions. As noted earlier, the ability of this country to manage regional conflict is limited and our efforts to do so are troubled by our own conflict over priorities. The proliferation of challenges to our interests only complicates the search for effective responses further. Still, the United States is viewed as the power most likely to be able to make things happen and as long as this remains true it will impose a burden upon us as well as afford us opportunities. How well we suffer our burden and take advantage of our opportunities history will judge.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Dr. Olson.

We will hold our questions.

We are joined now by Congressman Smith of Florida.

Dr. Sick.

STATEMENT OF GARY G. SICK, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS PROGRAM OFFICER, THE FORD FOUNDATION

Dr. SICK. There is a widespread misperception that the land war between Iran and Iraq is essentially a static contest, comparable in some respects to the trench warfare of World War I, with both sides launching repeated offensives at each other along a well-established front, producing few military results but many casualties. That description could have been applied accurately to the war at several stages but it has not been true for most of the past 2 years and has been the exception rather than the rule throughout the 5-year history of this brutal and inconclusive conflict.

Indeed, far from being a perpetual stalemate, the Iran-Iraq war has been characterized by dramatic shifts and reversals of fortune that have profoundly affected the policies of the two adversaries. Each side has had to adjust its political and military strategies and objectives in response to unpleasant and unexpected developments, and each has learned some very painful lessons. The learning process experienced by both protagonists provides the necessary context for understanding the undeclared bargaining process that is going on beneath the military and rhetorical surface of events.

There is not time in this brief oral summary to identify what I consider to be the seven distinct phases of the war to date. Instead, I will quickly describe the situation as it exists today and then identify some of the underlying trends and changes that I believe are important for U.S. policy.

Today, neither Iran nor Iraq believes that it can prevail militarily over the other in the short term. Iraq probably came to the conclusion several years ago that its decision to invade Iran in September 1979 was a strategic blunder of historic proportions. Iraq would

certainly like to see the war end but, unlike Iran, Iraq cannot afford a prolonged state of no war, no peace, which requires constant mobilization and a massive diversion of human and material resources. As a consequence, Iraq is talking peace while vigorously prosecuting the war. Taking advantage of its technological edge, Iraq over the past 10 months has been conducting a brutal bombing campaign against Iranian cities and civilian targets in addition to its attacks on tankers in the northern Persian Gulf.

Also, in the past month or two it has stepped up its attacks against the Iranian oil loading facility at Kharg Island. Presumably its objective is to generate antiwar sentiment in Iran and to disrupt Iranian hard currency earnings from oil, thereby driving Iran to the negotiating table against its will. Although Iraqi attacks have been increasingly effective on the technical level, they have not yet produced the desired result.

Iran, also, I believe, grudgingly concluded in 1983 and 1984 that it could not win, after its forces failed to break through Iraqi defenses despite a series of massive infantry assaults that may have cost Iran more combat casualties than any nation has suffered since World War II. In February of this year, the Speaker of the Iranian Majlis and Khomeini's representative on the Supreme Defense Council of Iran, Mr. Rafsanjani, spelled this out quite clearly. "What we have in mind," he said, "is to achieve victory with as few casualties as possible." That statement implicitly acknowledged that Iran's human wave tactics had failed and that a new strategy was required.

That new strategy on the part of Iran, in my view, is to try to minimize actual fighting in order to regroup, repair and, if possible, re-equip its badly eroded military capabilities. Iran does not want a formal end to the war under present circumstances since that would require giving up the stated objective of bringing down the Baathist regime of President Saddam Hussein of Iraq.

Iran probably believes that it will ultimately prevail in a long-term war of attrition with Iraq, due to its superior manpower, size and resource base; but in the short term it would prefer a situation of no war, no peace. Such a situation existed from June 1984 to about February 1985 as the result of a truce negotiated by the U.N. Secretary General. Iran would almost certainly be prepared to accept and respect such an arrangement again.

The interesting analysis that grows out of this lesson is that both parties are presently bargaining even as they fight. Each side now tacitly recognizes that its prospects for decisively defeating the other in the short term are extremely slim and each would like to find a way out, albeit on its own terms.

Although that is no grounds for unbridled optimism, it does at least provide room for creative diplomacy. The most promising avenue for pursuing a cease fire probably lies with the U.N. Secretary General who has established his credibility with both parties and who successfully negotiated the only effective cease-fire in the 5 years of this war. Since the United States has little direct influence over the course of events in this war, in my view, U.S. policy should quietly lend its support in every way possible to the efforts of Secretary General Perez de Cuellar.

A second set of observations that I would like to make relate to superpower politics and the possibility of a United States-Soviet confrontation growing out of the Iraq-Iran war. Despite fears to the contrary, the most notable characteristic of superpower behavior in the war—and during the Iranian revolution that preceded it—has, in fact, been the exercise of restraint. Ever since the confrontation over Iran at the end of World War II, both superpowers have recognized that Iran was one of those danger points in the world where superpower rivalry and competition could potentially set off a global conflict. Perhaps for that reason both superpowers have exercised considerable caution. In fact, in view of the extreme political turmoil in the region over the past 30 years, the fact that neither superpower has interceded directly almost suggests a tacit agreement to keep military forces out of Iran.

In no case has United States-Soviet caution been more evident than in the 5 years of this war. Although each superpower has seen its interests engaged and each side has tilted toward one or another of the protagonists at various times, both the United States and the Soviet Union have attempted to preserve a posture of neutrality and have avoided identifying themselves with the war aims of either side.

Since Iran made its disastrous decision in mid-1982 to attempt to invade Iraq—a mirror image, by the way, of Iraq's original decision to invade Iran, and equally incorrect—both superpowers have found themselves in the unaccustomed position of being on the same side of a Third World conflict. Specifically, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union saw it in its interest for Iraq to be defeated or dominated by Iran. The United States has agreed to restore diplomatic relations with Iraq and has relaxed some of its previous restrictions on sales of commercial aircraft and other non-military items. The Soviet Union, of course, after initially stopping delivery on major military items of equipment to Iraq, has now opened the pipeline.

I would like to quickly identify two other major changes that I think are quite important and that are not commonly identified in this crisis. The first, which I will simply state bluntly, is that contrary to popular opinion, the United States has, in fact, been in the process of reducing its military presence in that region over the last several years. In fact, although I don't have any precise figures at the moment, U.S. military presence in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf in terms of active military forces has declined about 50 percent over the past 4 or 5 years.

The administration is not doing this as a unilateral step toward disarmament. They are, instead, recognizing: one, that those forces were extremely expensive to maintain there; and two, that they were accomplishing absolutely nothing and even served as a target. To the extent that the posture has been reduced, I think that is a healthy thing.

The second change that I would like to identify is the evolution of Soviet policy with regard to this conflict. Originally the Soviet Union, when it was looking at the Iranian revolution, tried to keep its options open. It was very careful to maintain as good relations as possible with Iran simply because I think the Soviets felt that they could inherit the revolution at some stage or at least come to

have a major influence on it. That meant in their propaganda and other statements that they were careful never to identify Khomeini by name in any kind of criticism and that they identified with the aims of the revolution even when they found that certain policies were, as they put it, misguided by circles around Khomeini.

That has changed dramatically. In the past year the Soviet Union has begun openly in its propaganda statements, not in Pravda and Izvestia, but the propaganda statements that come out of the clandestine stations in southern Russia that broadcast in Persian to Iran and claim to be broadcasting from Iranian territory—in these propaganda broadcasts they have begun openly naming Khomeini as responsible. They are now attacking the revolution and in some instances calling for its overthrow.

That is a dramatic shift of Soviet policy and I think it has important implications. I would like to just quote one very brief statement that was made on those radio broadcasts a few months ago talking about some of the human rights abuses that had taken place in Iran. They said, quote:

In the final analysis, all these death sentences and dreadful crimes are endorsed by Mr. Khomeini himself.

That is quite a change from what they have been doing before. Second, they said:

We realize that our nation—i.e., Iran—is confronting the bloodiest regime of all, which under the banner of religion and Sharia standards and by pretending to be religious, has surpassed all bloody fascist regimes. The Iranian people will never forgive them for these crimes. The day is not far off when the Iranian people will avenge the blood of their dear ones * * * that historic day, the day of the nation's vengeance.

Now, if the United States were broadcasting propaganda like that toward Iran, I think people would be very much aware of it. The fact that the Soviet Union is beginning to broadcast propaganda of that sort is something I think we should not overlook, and perhaps in the course of these hearings we will have a chance to explore some of that further.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sick follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GARY G. SICK, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS PROGRAM OFFICER,
THE FORD FOUNDATION

THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

There is a widespread misperception that the land war between Iran and Iraq is essentially a static contest, comparable in some respects to the trench warfare of World War I, with both sides launching repeated offensives at each other along a well-established front, producing few military results but many casualties. That description could have been applied accurately to the war at several stages--particularly the eighteen months or so after mid-1982 when Iran mounted a series of unsuccessful offensives intended to drive into Iraqi territory--but it has not been true for most of the past two years and has been the exception rather than the rule throughout the five year history of this brutal and inconclusive conflict.

Indeed, far from being a perpetual stalemate, the Iran-Iraq war has been characterized by dramatic shifts and reversals of fortune that have profoundly affected the policies of the two adversaries. Each side has had to adjust its political and military strategies and objectives in response to unpleasant and unexpected developments, and each has learned some very painful lessons.

To the extent that we--as outsiders whose access to information is exceptionally skimpy--can understand the nature of this conflict, we must approach it as a learning process on the part of both protagonists. That process is interesting and instructive, and it provides the necessary context for understanding the undeclared bargaining process that is going on beneath the military and rhetorical surface of events. Consequently, this analysis will begin with a brief overview of the seven phases of the war to date, with particular emphasis on the evolution of attitudes and objectives by the two warring parties.

Phase I: The Iraqi Invasion

The original offensive by Iraq into the Khuzestan province of southwestern Iran lasted approximately seven weeks from the initial attack on September 22, 1980. The most interesting question on the Iraqi side is the rationale that led them to launch such an attack. There is no definitive answer to that question, but Iraqi thinking seems to have been based on the following elements:

-- A belief that the Iranian military was so disorganized and demoralized in the wake of the revolution that it would no longer be capable of resisting a determined military attack;

-- Interest in altering the terms of the 1975 Iran-Iraq border agreement, which President Saddam Hussein of Iraq believed had been imposed on him by the pressure of the Kurdish rebellion, supported by the shah of Iran, Israel and the United States;

-- Longstanding Iraqi claims on Khuzestan and an apparent conviction that the Arab population of that territory would welcome "liberation" by Iraq;

-- Apparent belief (probably reinforced by Iranian exiles and opposition elements) that Khomeini's rule would be unable to survive what was expected to be a lightning military defeat and that a successor regime would be composed of individuals less hostile to the existing order; and

-- Expectation that a quick and total defeat of Iran would shift the balance of power in the Persian Gulf, fulfilling Iraq's ambition to be regarded as a regional superpower and as a leader in Arab politics.

Ironically, the results of the Iraqi invasion produced a set of results precisely the opposite of those intended. The attack helped Khomeini to consolidate his control by rallying nationalist sentiments

around the revolution, suppressing internal critics and accelerating efforts to rebuild an effective military machine along Islamic lines. At the same time, Iraq's political and military failures undermined Iraq's regional influence and left it far more dependent on the financial and political support of its oil-rich Arab neighbors than ever before.

The involvement of the superpowers during the initial stages of the war was extremely muted. Although some individuals in Iran and elsewhere were inclined to see the Iraqi attack as part of a U.S. plot to bring pressure on Iran to end the hostage crisis, in fact U.S. policymakers for the most part regarded the Iraqi attack as an unwelcome development.

Iran had approached the United States in early September 1980 with a promising set of proposals to end the hostage crisis, and meetings between Iranian and U.S. representatives had taken place in Germany about a week prior to the Iraqi attack. The outbreak of the war stranded the Iranian representative in Germany and thoroughly distracted the Iranian leadership, probably prolonging the crisis. Although the United States quickly maneuvered to deter a possible Iranian strike at Arab oil fields, it attempted to maintain a position of neutrality between the two sides.

The Soviet Union also found itself in an awkward position. It had a substantial military supply relationship with Iraq but was also attempting to maintain good relations with Iran's revolutionary leadership. The available evidence suggests that the USSR attempted to avoid taking sides, halting most military deliveries to Iraq and counseling restraint by both parties. Both superpowers were wary of the dangers of being drawn into a conflict in a volatile area of the world in which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could have high confidence of exercising control.

Phase II: Stalemate

After the Iraqi attack bogged down in November 1980, a military stalemate ensued until the summer of 1981. During this period, Iran began to reorganize its military forces. The Khomeini regime was also urgently required to address a series of critical problems of oil production, refinery capacity and internal distribution of energy supplies created by the partial occupation of Khuzestan and the loss of the huge Abadan refinery, which had traditionally supplied more than half of Iran's refined petroleum products.

Phase III: Iranian Counteroffensive

From September 1981 through May 1982, Iran conducted three major military offensives that succeeded in pushing Iraqi forces back to the original border in most places. Although the Khomeini regime, under great pressure, demonstrated a capacity for organization and technical competence far beyond the expectations of its opponents, it also benefited enormously during this period from the infrastructure and military supply system developed by the shah.

The redundancy and decentralization of refinery capacity, together with the substantial stockpiles of military equipment accumulated under the shah's regime, made it possible for Iran to mount an effective counter-offensive despite the fact that it had only limited access to external supplies and assistance. Some critical military items (such as tires for its American-built F-4 fighters) were obtained from Israeli sources, and limited supplies were provided by Syria, Libya and North Korea. However, the backbone of Iran's military effort relied on existing national stockpiles, cannibalization of available equipment and domestic production of artillery, ammunition and other military items.

During this same period, Iran mounted a diplomatic offensive to isolate its enemy. Its most important success was to persuade Syria (in return for assured supplies of oil at bargain prices) to close the Iraqi oil pipeline to the Mediterranean. This meant that Iraq, which had lost its oil loading facilities in the northern Persian Gulf as a result of the war, was reduced to a single outlet for its oil--a pipeline of limited capacity across Turkey. Unable to export its oil in sufficient quantities, Iraq was forced to turn to its oil-rich Arab neighbors in the Gulf for financial support.

Phase IV: Attempted Iranian Invasion of Iraq

At this point, by mid-1982, Iran appeared to have seized triumph from disaster. The revolutionary regime had shown extraordinary resilience and flexibility in dealing with a crushing series of problems. Like its revolutionary predecessors in France, Russia and China, it had succeeded in bringing up younger military talent that was committed to the revolution, thereby defeating what appeared to be a superior military force. It had overcome seemingly insuperable technical problems despite widespread international opposition and sanctions. It had fashioned an effective diplomatic coalition. And it had established momentum on the battlefield.

By contrast, Iraq's forces seemed to have collapsed in the face of the Iranian counteroffensive. Its oil exports were reduced to a small fraction of their pre-war volume (while Iran was still able to export its oil through the Kharg Island terminal), and the Baghdad regime seemed confused and uncertain about how to proceed.

As Iran's forces pushed back near the original border, there was a pause that for the first time seemed to offer opportunities for a negotiated settlement. Consequently, early 1982 was a time of intensive diplo-

matic contacts and attempted mediation efforts by the UN Secretary General, the Islamic Conference, and the leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement as well as several heads of state and foreign ministers. Potentially the most important of these efforts was by the government of Algeria, which had not only brokered the original 1975 border agreement between the shah and Saddam Hussein but had also demonstrated its diplomatic skills by mediating the release of the U.S. hostages from Iran in January 1981. Algerian Foreign Minister Benyahia launched a major effort in early 1982 to seek a diplomatic settlement of the war.

Within Iran itself, a major debate ensued about whether to stop at the border or to press its military advantage with an attack into Iraq. There were intense disagreements inside the top leadership. The matter seemed to come to a head in early May, when the Algerian foreign minister led a delegation on a secret peace mission to the region. On May 3, as his aircraft was proceeding from Turkey toward Tehran, the plane was shot down by an air-to-air missile from an unidentified fighter aircraft in Iranian airspace killing the foreign minister and all the members of his entourage.

The full story of this tragedy has not been told and may never be known. Although Iran and Iraq each accused the other of complicity, the only parties who seemed likely to gain anything from this incident were the hardliners in Iran who were arguing in favor of an attack into Iraq and against a negotiated settlement. The location and timing of the event are consistent with such an interpretation. In any event, the effect of the shootdown was to remove the most promising peace initiative of the time.

There is also circumstantial evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union quietly attempted to persuade Iran to halt at the border. The USSR had attempted to disassociate itself from Iraq's aggression, but it would

be difficult for the Soviets to continue to refuse military assistance to Iraq if its national territory were under attack.

In the end, the hardliners in Iran won the day. Immediately following the Israeli attack into Lebanon in early June, 1982, Iran announced that its forces were "going to liberate Jerusalem, passing through [the holy city of] Karbala" in Iraq. Shortly thereafter, Iran launched the first of a series of massive offensives intended to break through Iraqi defenses, cut Iraqi supply lines between the south and the capital, and bring down the hated Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein.

Although the Iranians never spelled out the underlying reasons for this decision, it appears to have been a mirror image of the original Iraqi decision to launch its invasion of Khuzestan. Carried away up by its own revolutionary hubris, Iran seems to have calculated that the Iraqi military was demoralized and would collapse in the face of a determined attack, that the Shi'i population of southern Iraq would welcome the Iranian army as liberators, that Saddam Hussein's regime would dissolve and that Iran would emerge as the major power in the Gulf.

The outcome was similarly disastrous. The Iraqi army stiffened in the defense of its homeland, and the conflict quickly degenerated into a war of attrition. At the same time, the Iranian air force, which had performed admirably in the early stages of the war, began to erode seriously for lack of spare parts, as did Iran's armored forces. As time went on, Iran was unable to provide even rudimentary armored and air support for its ground forces, and it was reduced to throwing wave after wave of young men in increasingly futile attacks against Iraqi guns and armor. Iraq in turn began attacking civilian targets in Iran with missiles and aircraft, even

eventually resorting to chemicals and poison gas to thwart Iranian human wave tactics.

The Soviet Union resumed deliveries of military equipment to Iraq. Iran retaliated in early 1983 by demolishing the Soviet supported Tudeh Party in Iran, arresting all of its key leaders, subjecting them to show trials, executing many of its officials and supporters, and destroying the party structure down to the working level. Soviet-Iranian relations sank to their lowest level since the immediate post-WW II period.

Phase V: The Tanker War Begins

By mid-1983 it was becoming clear that the Iranian ground offensive, despite massive casualties, was unlikely to yield a decisive military outcome. At approximately the same time Iraq was completing an arms deal with France that provided it with Super Etendard fighters and Exocet missiles. As a consequence, the war began to shift in focus from infantry and armor along the border to an air and missile war against shipping in the northern Persian Gulf.

Iraq first used the Exocet missile in November 1983. Over the following year some 70 maritime attacks were carried out, including attacks on 34 tankers, leading to nearly fifty confirmed deaths. The sporadic nature of the Iraqi attacks suggested either an inability to sustain an effective air war or an unwillingness to press too hard and thereby risk an escalation of the conflict to the rest of the Gulf--including the ships and oil facilities of the Arab nations financing Iraq.

Whatever the reasons, the Iraqi attacks failed to accomplish their objective of halting Iranian oil exports. It is true that Iranian oil sales dipped sharply on several occasions, creating a measure of alarm among the Iranian revolutionary leadership. However, by providing rela-

tively modest price discounts on its oil and by using its own tankers to shuttle some oil from Kharg Island to an improvised loading point at Sirri Island further south beyond the range of Iraqi aircraft, Iran was able to maintain a sufficient level of oil exports.

Iran also retaliated with some psychological warfare of its own, attacking ships in the central Persian Gulf from time to time as a warning that the conflict might spread and that the Arab supporters of Iraq were not immune from retaliation. Iran also warned that if its oil line was cut, it would act to close the Strait of Hormuz.

These threats were taken with the utmost seriousness in Washington, and Iran was officially put on notice that the United States would not tolerate a disruption of Persian Gulf oil supplies. In early 1984, the United States set a higher state of alert for U.S. forces in the region, Secretary of State Shultz threatened preemptive attacks against Iranian targets associated with terrorist activities, and a brush between the U.S. Navy and an Iranian reconnaissance aircraft seemed to point toward a direct confrontation.

However, both sides seemed to have second thoughts. Iran softened its rhetoric and the United States lowered its military profile. This cooling-off process was reinforced in June 1984 when Saudi F-15 fighters, assisted by targetting data from U.S. AWACS aircraft, succeeded in shooting down two Iranian F-4 fighters. Not only did this event cast doubt on the credibility of Iranian military threats, but it also suggested that the United States could afford to maintain a less conspicuous military presence.

Phase VI: No War No Peace

In January 1984 Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz of Iraq observed that "the war has objectively ended." However, he added immediately, "this does not mean that the war is going to stop." He and many other observers had concluded that neither side could prevail militarily. Moreover, it appeared that both parties had finally absorbed that lesson. Nevertheless, neither side was willing to make major concessions, and Iran in particular was so wedded to its revolutionary image and its commitment to toppling Saddam Hussein that it would not participate in direct peace talks. The obvious alternative was mediation by a trusted intermediary.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, had taken an active interest in ending the Iran-Iraq war from the time he assumed office in 1982. Through personal diplomacy he established his credentials as an intermediary with both warring parties, and in June 1984 he succeeded in arranging a limited cease fire along the southern front. Although neither Iran nor Iraq renounced its war aims, the level of conflict on the ground was reduced to a tiny fraction of its earlier levels and even the tanker war subsided. The cease-fire held for about seven months, almost unnoticed by the rest of the world since the rhetoric of war continued unabated.

In Iran's case, the attractiveness of the cease fire was apparent. Iran did not wish to sue for peace; however, its repeated infantry assaults had proved futile and costly, while its air force and armored forces had eroded dangerously for lack of spare parts. Under the circumstances, Iran found it more convenient to conduct the war by blazing speeches and press releases while licking its wounds. Iran continued to export its oil, and it could envision settling down for an extended war of attrition in which

its size, population and relative wealth would slowly work to its advantage in the contest with Iraq.

Iraq's position was more ambiguous. The limited cease fire could not relieve Iraq of its costly burden of mobilization, nor would it restore access to the oil export facilities Iraq had lost early in the war. Iraq was not well positioned to withstand a lengthy war of attrition, so its reasons for accepting the cease fire had to lie elsewhere. It is significant that the limited truce came at a moment when Iraq was determinedly seeking international support and was interested in projecting an image of moderation and reason. Specifically, the agreement came just at the moment when Iraq was completing discussions with the United States about resumption of diplomatic relations. A lull in the intensity of the fighting may have been consistent with Iraq's short-term objectives at the time.

In any event, immediately following the resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States in late November 1984, Iraq resumed the tanker war with renewed ferocity. Then, in February 1985, Iraq began a campaign of air strikes against Iranian civilian and economic targets. The truce was over.

Phase VII: Iraq's Military Drive to the Peace Table

During most of 1985, Iraq employed its advantage in the air much more consistently--and more devastatingly--than at any time in the past. Iran's once powerful air force had deteriorated to such an extent that it was incapable of mounting an effective air defense.

Iraq could operate in Iranian air space with virtual impunity, so long as its planes remained above the reach of anti-aircraft artillery. During a three-day period in March 1985, Iraqi aircraft flew 198 missions over Iran, primarily against cities and non-military targets, killing some

600 people and wounding many others. Only one Iraqi plane was reported hit.

The Iraqi strategy seemed intended to deny Iran the luxury of a lull which it could use to recover, rebuild, resupply and regroup. Recognizing that a condition of "no war no peace" worked to the advantage of Iran and that Iran was dependent on continued sales of oil, Iraq began stepping up its pressure much more consistently than in the past. Beginning in August 1985, Iraq began to conduct air strikes against Kharg Island--Iran's major oil loading facility--much more frequently and effectively than at any time in the past.

From a technical point of view, Iraq's military performance seemed much improved--partly as a result of new infusions of advanced military equipment from France and the Soviet Union, but perhaps also due to growing confidence that Iran's air defenses no longer posed a serious threat. Iran, by contrast, was reduced to periodic appeals to the United Nations and to generalized threats about military retaliation against Iraq that rang hollow.

As the Iraqi air campaign picked up momentum, Iran seemed to have three options:

-- First, Iran could attempt to shift the war from the southern front to the north, where anti-Khomeini Kurdish forces had largely been defeated in six years of almost constant fighting and where pro-Khomeini Kurds were prepared to carry their traditional guerrilla war across the border into Iraqi territory. This was the same strategy

Iran has experimented with various retaliatory measures, including launching approximately a dozen conventionally armed surface-to-surface missiles against the Baghdad area. Although Iran officially claims that these missiles are "made in Iran," most observers believe they are Soviet manufactured SCUD missiles, probably obtained from Libya.

that the shah had used so effectively in the early 1970s to pressure Saddam Hussein into accepting the 1975 border agreement.

-- Second, Iran could attempt to impose at least a limited blockade on Iraqi supplies by halting or slowing maritime deliveries through the Strait of Hormuz. In August and September 1985, a number of ships destined for Kuwait were halted by the Iranian navy and goods destined for Iraq were removed.

-- Third, and most dangerously, Iran could attempt to bring pressure on those states supporting Iraq in the war. In August, Iran again began to strike selectively at non-Iraqi shipping in the central Persian Gulf, and it accompanied these strikes with a marked escalation of rhetoric. The speaker of the Majlis, Mr. Rafsanjani, said on September 13: "If one day we were to find ourselves unable to export oil through the Persian Gulf, then the Persian Gulf would not be used by anyone else to export oil; and if one day our oil taps were to be turned off, we would do something to turn off all the oil taps in the Persian Gulf...our nation would launch such an onslaught that no one would remain safe in the Gulf." Underlining the unspoken threat of terrorist attacks on Gulf oil facilities, he noted that Iran's "forces are ready to wage another form of war if the country is faced with an abnormal situation."²

By the end of September 1985, there was evidence that Iran was pursuing--or actively considering--all three of these options. A fourth strategy--rebuilding its air and armored forces--seemed effectively thwarted for the time being by the reluctance of any major power to ally

²Public statement in Tehran, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

itself with Iran.³ However, the rebuilding and resupply of its military forces must be regarded as a continuing objective of Iran's revolutionary leadership that will be pursued as circumstances permit.

Outlook and Prospects

Unwilling to make peace with a hated enemy yet unable to prevail militarily, Iran's strategy is to insist noisily on continuation of the war while quietly seeking ways to minimize combat and casualties. Iraq's position is almost exactly the opposite. Iraq finds "no war no peace" intolerable since its vital oil outlets through the Persian Gulf remain closed, multiplying the costs of permanent mobilization for its smaller population. So Iraq, while loudly proclaiming its desire for peace, constantly escalates the military conflict in a brutal and dangerous attempt to drive Iran into negotiations.

It is frequently asserted that this seemingly interminable conflict will end only when Khomeini or Iraqi President Saddam Hussein dies or is overthrown. That may in fact be the most likely scenario. However, both sides are bargaining as well as fighting, and it would be a mistake to regard the situation as immutable or permanently frozen.

Although Iran has an almost limitless supply of young men (60% of Iran's 43 million people are under the age of twenty), Iran's leaders seem finally to have concluded that the bodies of young zealots are no match for Iraqi tanks, aircraft, helicopter gunships and, on occasion, poison gas. After expending perhaps 200,000 lives over the past three years, the

³A chartered aircraft was reported to have landed in Israel in mid-September after taking off from an Iranian air base, again raising suspicions about a possible Israeli military supply conduit. At about the same time, the Iranian air force again began to conduct occasional raids into Iraqi air space after a long hiatus, thus suggesting some improved capability. However, any improvement was marginal at best since Iran's air force was still unable to defend its critical oil loading facilities at Kharg Island against sustained Iraqi aerial bombardment.

speaker of the Majlis, Mr. Rafsanjani, announced at the beginning of 1985 that it is now Iran's intent "to achieve victory with as few casualties as possible."⁴

That statement represented a fundamental shift in Iran's military strategy. In subsequent months, Iran resorted to human wave tactics on occasion to retaliate against Iraqi bombing raids, but such efforts were relatively brief and undertaken with no apparent illusions of decisive victory. What remains to be seen is whether Iran will be able to sustain its inherently contradictory policy--minimizing casualties while insisting on continuation of the war--in the face of concerted Iraqi attacks on Iranian military, civilian and economic targets.

Although the present situation offers little immediate grounds for optimism about a negotiated settlement, it does at least provide room for creative diplomacy. Realistically, the objectives of a diplomatic initiative must be modest--a limited cease fire rather than a formal peace settlement--and understood to be part of a long-term process. The most promising avenue for pursuing such an effort probably lies with the U.N. Secretary General, who has established his credibility with both parties and who successfully negotiated the only effective cease fire in the five years of this war.

The United States has, for the most part, quietly pursued a sensible policy of restraint and realism in the Persian Gulf in recent years, with lowered military profile and greater reliance on regional security efforts. However, neither Western nor regional powers are well positioned to influence the course of this tragic war. Instead, they should lend their

⁴Public statement in Tehran, February 5, 1985, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

resources and support to Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's efforts to find a suitable diplomatic formula to end or reduce the fighting.

Superpower Policies: Trends and Observations

Despite fears to the contrary, one of the most striking characteristics about superpower policy and behavior in relation to the Iran-Iraq war has been the exercise of restraint. Ever since the United States and the Soviet Union experienced a near-confrontation in Iran immediately after World War II, both superpowers have recognized that Iran was one of the danger points in the world where their rivalry could potentially set off a global conflict.

Perhaps for that reason, both powers have exercised considerable caution. Despite extreme political turmoil in the region over the past 30 years, the fact that neither superpower has interceded directly almost suggests a tacit agreement to keep military forces out of Iran.

That fundamental caution has been particularly evident during the five years of the Iran-Iraq war. Although each superpower has seen its interests engaged and each has tilted toward one or another of the protagonists at various times, both the United States and the Soviet Union have attempted to preserve a posture of neutrality and have avoided identifying themselves with the war aims of either side.

Moreover, since Iran made its disastrous decision to attempt to invade Iraq in mid-1982, both superpowers have found themselves in the unaccustomed position of being on the same side of a third world conflict. More precisely, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union considered that its interests would be served if Iraq were to be defeated or dominated by Iran. As a consequence, both are presently "tilting" toward Iraq--the United States by restoring diplomatic relations and by relaxing some of its

previous restrictions on sales on commercial aircraft and other non-military items; the Soviets by reopening their substantial pipeline for the sale of major items of military equipment.

There are two other developments in the region that deserve more attention than they have received. The first is the unpublicized but substantial reduction of U.S. military presence in the area of the Persian Gulf and northern Arabian Sea. In the immediate aftermath of the hostage crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. force presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean climbed to its highest level level in history. In subsequent years, those force levels have quietly been allowed to decline until today they are only approximately half of what they were four years ago.

This decline was not a unilateral step towards arms reductions by the Reagan administration. Rather, it represented a practical recognition that these forces were extremely expensive to maintain on a continuous basis so far from any established support facilities and that they had no identifiable mission. In the aftermath of the Beirut experience, there may also have been a quiet recognition that these forces constituted a target as well as a deterrent. Although I regard the lowered U.S. military profile in the region as a healthy development, it may also prove temporary since U.S. forces could again be surged into the region if circumstances required.

Even less noticed has been the absence of a Soviet attempt to match or counter the U.S. military buildup in the region. In the 1970s there was a good deal of talk about a U.S.-Soviet arms race in the Indian Ocean in which a military action by one side immediately prompted a reaction by the other. In the publicity attending the very substantial U.S. military

buildup in 1980-81, it went virtually unnoticed that the USSR maintained very nearly a constant--and extremely modest--naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. There are several possible explanations for this apparent shift in Soviet naval strategy, but for the purposes of this hearing it suffices to note that both superpowers--for reasons of their own--have chosen to reduce rather than expand their naval presence in the region.

Finally, I would like to draw the committee's attention to the evolution of Soviet policy with respect to Iran over the past year or two. In the immediate aftermath of the Iranian revolution, the USSR made a concerted effort to keep its options open with respect to Iran's new religious leadership. Specifically, the Soviets were careful in their propaganda never to attack Khomeini by name, even when they were critical of political events in Iran. Instead, they attributed such developments to "misguided elements" around the Ayatollah. The reason for this was not difficult to adduce. The USSR probably hoped that the Tudeh Party or other forces sympathetic to the Soviet Union would eventually achieve a position of political influence in the chaos of revolutionary Iran.

That situation has changed dramatically. Over the past year, the propaganda statements from the clandestine Soviet radio station near Baku--the so-called National Voice of Iran (NVOI) that broadcasts in Persian--have begun openly accusing Khomeini for the failures of Iranian policy. They have also begun to attack the Islamic revolution in vitriolic terms and, in some cases, have even begun calling for the overthrow of the regime.

A few brief quotations will illustrate the point. In February, 1985, NVOI commented that "in Iran's contemporary history [never] has such a

bloody and ruthless government reigned in our country [i.e. Iran]." On the Iran-Iraq war, NVOI commented that the "rulers of the Islamic Republic are continuing it with stupid and hysterical intransigence. The main and principal responsibility in this connection lies with Mr. Khomeini."⁵ "We realize," said NVOI, "that our nation is confronting the bloodiest regime of all which, under the banner of religion and Shari'a standards...has surpassed all bloody fascist regimes. The Iranian people will never forgive them for these crimes. The day is not far off when the Iranian people will avenge the blood of their dear ones....that historic day--the day of the nation's vengeance."⁶

The most obvious reason for this dramatic shift in the tone of Soviet propaganda can be attributed to Iran's virtual elimination of the Soviet-supported Tudeh Party in 1983. It should also be noted that these attacks are reserved for clandestine broadcasts that at least pretend to be Iranian in origin and hence deniable as official Soviet policy. Nevertheless, the virulence of the attacks and the open incitement of the Iranian people to overthrow the theocratic regime in Tehran are an interesting indication of the state of mind in the Kremlin. As such, they deserve to be highlighted as a significant new development and as potentially ominous harbingers of Soviet policy for the future.

⁵National Voice of Iran, February 3, 1985, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

⁶NVOI January 17, 1985, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, gentlemen.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE GULF WAR

Perhaps touching on that last question, Dr. Sick, do you see this as information warning of Soviet intervention?

Dr. SICK. I see it as a shift in the direction of Soviet policy. I think the Soviets were interested, as I said, in maintaining a foothold in the revolution, hoping to have an influential position in Iran, and they were trying to play it one way. Now they have given up, I think, on trying to woo Khomeini and to identify themselves with the Iranian revolution, and they have taken a much more open posture of opposition.

That does have implications for Soviet policy. I would just remind you that the traditional Soviet policy toward this region, one that was exploited on a number of occasions in the past, was to build up proxy support by certain factions inside the country which were then used to serve as spokesmen, in effect, for Soviet interests.

In the past, right after the revolution, they had the Tudeh party which was able to play that role, and that was their reason for not opposing the revolution. The Tudeh party was totally destroyed—as totally as any party can be—by the Iranians in 1982 and 1983. It is no longer an effective instrument, and I think the Soviets are looking for alternative instruments. I think that accounts for why they have changed their tune and it makes us wonder then where are these other instruments that they will be looking for.

I would just note that the traditional, historical Soviet policy has been to build support along the border in northern Iran, in Azerbaijan, as a base of support for their activities. The fact that they now have a member of the Politburo who was a KGB operator along that border for many years, and he is now sitting in the Politburo in Moscow with an intimate knowledge of Iranian internal policies, gives me reason to think they may be looking at that strategy again.

Mr. GILMAN. Do the other panelists agree with that observation?

Dr. OLSON. If I might make one observation, I believe it is important to note that fluctuations in Soviet policy or at least Soviet broadcasts to Iran over long periods, are fairly common. If you start under the Shah's regime and go through to the present regime in Iran, you will find similar broadcasts either pro or con, depending on the line the Soviets are taking to the regime at that time, some of which has to do with the direction of policy of the local government itself.

So you will find in the fifties, for example, Soviet denunciations of the Shah because of his relationship with the United States and the presence of Americans in his country; and then, when the Shah established the rapprochement with the Soviet Union, you find a dramatic decrease in these anti-Shah statements, or increase in trade between the two countries and the development of at least correct relationships, if not cordial ones.

You also find when the revolution came that the Soviets were somewhat taken aback by it and they had some difficulty in determining what to make of it and what direction their propaganda re-

garding it should take. They eventually decided to come down in favor of the revolution largely because of its anti-American tone, and they were willing to encourage it and to try to befriend it. The objective, of course, was to try to establish a relationship with a regional power that was anti-American, the idea being to use this as a means of reducing, if not limiting, American interests in the region as a whole.

When that did not work because the Soviets were unable to convert the Iranian regime into a tool for their interests, they began to move away from that idea and back towards supporting Iraq. Too much can be made of the fact of these shifts in Soviet broadcasts and in Soviet contacts.

I think Soviet policy is fairly consistent in what the Soviets are seeking, which is the elimination of American influence in the region, and they are willing to use whatever means are available to them, or what they think will work at the time, to make that possible.

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Dawisha.

Dr. DAWISHA. I rather tend to agree with Dr. Olson. The Soviet Union over the last 30 to 40 years, not only in Iran but throughout the Middle East, has acted basically opportunistically. It is in the area for what it can get. In Iran, the major shift occurred in the summer of 1982 when the Moslem revolution itself turned on the pro-Soviet Tudeh party.

Until then there was a de facto alliance. The Soviet hopes for the Iranian revolution emanated from the leader's anti-American tone, as well as the alliance that existed between the Tudeh party and the Islamic revolution. Once the Moslem revolution turned against the Tudeh, the Soviets became convinced that their time was up and that they really did not have much more yardage in Iran. That was the turning point.

SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR IRAN AND IRAQ

Mr. GILMAN. What do you see as the major involvement by other countries in the Iran-Iraq war? Who is supporting whom?

Dr. DAWISHA. Well, so far the main support that the two combatants are receiving actually is coming from the area itself, not in military terms, but basically in economic and diplomatic support.

What is interesting is that support that is given to both combatants has come particularly from the Arab world. The Arab world itself has been divided into two camps. The camp that supports Iran can be identified by the radical states of Syria, Libya, to a lesser extent Algeria, and until recently the Palestinians, particularly the more left oriented of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

The rest of the Arab world tends to support Iraq in the war. The arguments on that are usually couched in ideological terms. The countries that support Iraq evoke Arabist symbolism—that it is the duty of Arab countries to fight on behalf of their Arab brothers.

The countries that support Iran argue that Arabism can be sometimes misleading because what you have in Iran is an Islamic revolution which overthrew a monarch who was supportive of Israel. The Khomeini and the Ayatollahs transformed Iran into a country

that was blatantly anti-Israeli, violently supportive of the Arab cause. Then an Arab country attacks it literally at the time when Iran could have been a help to the Arab cause. These are the kind of arguments that have been spelled out in the Arab world. What is interesting is that one would have thought that the Arab world would automatically stand beside an Arab brother. In fact, there is a great division in the Arab world on the war.

Mr. GILMAN. Did you note that most of the support is economic and nonmilitary?

Dr. DAWISHA. Well, to my knowledge, although there have been in Iraq some reports of Sudanese, Jordanians, and other Arabs fighting the war, this has been a matter of personal choice. There has not been an official policy by any Arab country to actively support Iraq by committing its armed forces to the war.

The support has been mainly economic and moral and most of the economic support to Iraq, as I said in my testimony, comes from the countries of the Arabian peninsula, basically because they themselves are as worried as Iraq is about Iranian perceived expansionism.

Mr. GILMAN. Where is the chief economic support for Iraq coming from? From which country?

Dr. DAWISHA. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar to a lesser extent. It is estimated that on average they are contributing something like over a billion a month, which is about \$12 billion a year. It had gone up to \$15 to \$16 billion. During 1984 it went down a bit as a result of some difference of opinion as to the conduct of the war. But, basically, it runs around \$15 billion.

ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAQ AND IRAN

Mr. GILMAN. Where are the arms coming from primarily?

Dr. DAWISHA. To Iraq?

Mr. GILMAN. To both.

Dr. DAWISHA. Let me tell you about Iraq because I feel much more comfortable about that. The Iraqis get their arms primarily from the Soviet Union and from the French. Up to about 1977-78, something like 90 percent of the Iraqi Armed Forces were Soviet equipped. From about 1977 onward, Iraq shifted its concentration of arms and began to get more arms from France to the extent that by 1980 only about two-thirds of Iraqi arms were Soviet made. Once the Iraq-Iran war started, the Soviets appeared to be neutral in the war because they thought there was an opportunity for them in Iran. The Iraqis naturally became extremely distressed about Soviet policy since they had held a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviets since 1972.

In fact, the Soviets stopped an arms shipment which was already on its way to Iraq and was nearly entering the gulf. The Soviets stopped it and turned it around the moment the war started. The relationship between Iraq and the Soviet Union became very, very cool, and for about 2 years up to about the autumn of 1982, there was hardly any military equipment transferred to Iraq from the Soviet Union.

Only when the Soviets became disappointed with the Iranian revolution, as a result of the persecution of the Tudeh party, did the equipment begin to come into Iraq again, and I suspect that now Iraq probably gets as much from the Soviet Union as it ever did in the past.

Mr. GILMAN. Soviet Union, France and any other suppliers?

Dr. DAWISHA. Of course, there are other suppliers like Italy, Brazil, Yugoslavia, Romania, even Britain, but the bulk of Iraq's military force is actually Soviet and French made.

Mr. GILMAN. What about Iran?

Dr. DAWISHA. My understanding is that most of the equipment that Iran has is American-made. Don't forget that the Shah had built a massive arsenal before the revolution and that, therefore, the revolution was able to use this massive arsenal for a long time. When the problems began to occur with the supplies, spare parts, obsolescence—some of the equipment was going completely obsolete—the Iranians began to get help from countries which had themselves depended on the United States for military supplies.

There was talk at that time that Israel, South Korea and countries like Taiwan were helping in replenishing Iran's equipment. Then lately there is increasing evidence that most of Iran's supplies, in fact, is coming from the open market; mostly American equipment, bought on the open market.

But I think I would rather defer to my colleagues on the subject of Iran.

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Sick, Dr. Olson, do you care to comment about the supplies?

Dr. OLSON. Yes, I think so. The international system, is sometimes referred to as a functioning anarchy or, if you will, a malfunctioning anarchy, and the point to note in that regard is the lack of discipline in the international system to try to regulate the control of arms or to use economic measures or other types of coercion to try to control the behavior of other states.

One thing that the war in the gulf has demonstrated is the availability of arms on a large scale from a variety of sources and the fact that alternative sources of supply for arms are increasing worldwide. The number of people becoming involved in the development and sale of arms has increased dramatically so that the United States and the Soviet Union, which used to be and still are for that matter the dominant powers in transferring arms, are no longer alone as suppliers. There is a significant export capability growing in other parts of the world.

What that means for various states is the opportunity to find alternative sources or arms and to diversify their supply. This is particularly illustrated by the case of Iraq which over the course of the war despite combat casualties and difficulties, has managed to double the size of its armed forces. This is indicative of Iraq's stability but also of its ability to find alternative sources of supply.

Many of these are fairly well known and I think Dr. Dawisha listed many of these. Iran has had much less success in finding such alternative sources of supply. Of course, at the start of the war their principal supplier had been the United States. But because of the Iranian revolution that source of supply was largely denied to them and much of their war effort, of supporting it mili-

tarily, has been based on the large stockpiles the Shah had managed to accumulate before he fell. That, and because of the fact that in the first 2 years of the war the Iranians managed to capture a significant quantity of Iraqi equipment, particularly down to 1982, which is one reason why you find large numbers of Soviet tanks and armored personnel carriers and other kinds of equipment in the Iranian inventory.

The Iranians have tried over the intervening years to find various sources of supplies for spare parts and for sources of supply of American equipment. The nature and source of that supply is very difficult to trace. Once again, you are in the realm of rumor, and rumors abound. The North Koreans have been named as people involved in the transfer of arms. The Chinese have been named as another source of support and supply, although interestingly enough you do not find as yet Chinese equipment showing up in any quantities in the Iranian inventory, which would suggest perhaps that that is still in the realm of negotiation. In addition, the Iranians have had a very active campaign of buying arms from the international arms dealers in Europe and elsewhere. In some cases they have managed to secure arms from these people, and in some cases they have bought arms that did not exist.

I think recent reports in the press indicate that they have, in fact, agents in this country trying to find sources of supply and arms. It is very difficult to keep a record of all of these efforts, a problem we are experiencing in trying to deal with the transfer of technology to other countries, particularly the Soviet Union. It is very difficult to track and to stop this kind of shipment, and that is why some American arms are reaching the Iranians.

But I think the United States, in fact, is conducting an extremely successful program in doing this, which is illustrated on the battlefield by the continuing decline in Iranian military capability in every category of arms.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Dr. Sick, did you want to comment?

Dr. SICK. Just two very brief points.

First of all, I think if we are talking about support, it has to be not just military support, but political as well. I would identify Syrian support for Iraq as extraordinarily significant, particularly the fact that Syria was prepared to agree to close down the pipeline from Iraq to the sea, which then reduced the amount of oil sales that Iraq could muster. That had a tremendous impact, as much as anything one can do on the battlefield, in terms of making Iraq become more dependent on its Arab suppliers and the like.

Two, I would make a distinction between different kinds of military supply. One is the sort of bread and butter of military forces: rifles, standard ammunition, artillery, howitzers. Those you can go to the open market and buy. They are readily available. In some cases, it is overlooked, Iran actually makes them. It developed an arms manufacture industry that is being exploited rather successfully. So for infantry arms and artillery, Iran is basically pretty well supplied.

There is the second category, however, of high technology material—equipment such as avionics material for F-4's or even something so simple as tires for F-4 fighters. If you are flying heavy combat sorties, you need to replace those tires periodically. In fact

there is not much of an open market in items such as F-4 avionics or tires, and Iran has had a tremendously difficult time trying to resupply.

The bottom line in terms of judging Iran's resupply is to look at what their forces are capable of doing. The fact is the Iranian Air Force has eroded to such a degree that it is scarcely effective at all anymore. It is incapable of maintaining any kind of air defense against Iraq. In one 3-day period in March, the Iraqis flew 198 bombing missions over Iran and dropped bombs on cities, civilian targets, economic targets, and the like. They lost only one plane in that entire period. So if we talk about greater effectiveness on the part of the Iraqi Air Force, the reason for it is very simple. At the beginning they were terribly worried about the Iranian Air Force, about missile defense and the like. They are not worried about it today. Iran cannot mount an effective military defense.

So when we talk about supplies getting through to Iran, it is clear the leakage is not at such a level that it is really affecting their military capability.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. ROLE IN ENDING THE CONFLICT

I was wondering if—any of you can comment if you wish—as to the extent of what you think could be the involvement of the U.S. Government in terms of bringing the conflict to some kind of resolution. What role can the United States play in trying to end the war, for instance?

Dr. SICK. I think from my point of view, Congressman Smith, the answer is, "not very much." I really don't think that we have the kind of credibility with either of the parties or the kind of influence with either side that we would have to have to be able to exercise some kind of really active engagement.

So my view is that the best we can do is attempt in every way we can to support the activities that are underway that are most likely to be successful. To me the most promising, though not certain case, is the very quiet personal diplomacy that the Secretary General of the United Nations is carrying out. He has shown he could negotiate a truce once. It did break down, but he has retained a degree of credibility that I think no other intermediary has. So to the degree that the United States can aid and abet his efforts by working behind the scenes, that would seem to be one of the most useful things that we can do.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Was there any significance to the renewal of diplomatic ties between the United States and Iraq?

Dr. SICK. It was rather amusing that the temporary truce, as it turns out, was most effective in the period just prior to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Iraq. Iraq was on its very best behavior during the few months from June until November 1984 when we reestablished diplomatic relations.

I think they wanted to make a good show and convince everyone they were in favor of peace. Interestingly, immediately after the re-

sumption of diplomatic relations, Iran launched a barrage of tanker attacks and other attacks. In effect, it looked as if the gloves had come off again.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. What about you, Dr. Olson? Do you feel there is any positive role that the United States can play in this conflict?

Dr. OLSON. Well, I think in direct terms in trying to bring an end to the war I agree with Dr. Sick. There are very limited options open to the United States in trying to bring either one of the belligerents to the table. I think because of the establishment or re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Iraq and the support we have given to them, there is at least a channel of communication now with Iraq that we did not have when the war began.

We do not have, however, a similar channel of communication with Iran and I don't believe that we are likely to, and to a large degree it is Iran's intransigence in the war that has kept negotiations from happening. This has led me to observe in the past or to propose that there are two possible means to bring an end to the war. One is the realistic way and one is the miraculous way. The realistic way is for God and all the angels to descend from heaven and bring an end to the war. The miraculous way is for the two sides to do it themselves.

I think that is the situation that we face.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. The first takes a little while, the second takes a little bit longer.

Dr. OLSON. A little bit longer. The problem is that as long as Iran remains intransigent, negotiations are not possible. The danger of direct United States involvement at this point, given the Iranian attitude toward the United States, is that it could do positive harm.

THE ABILITY OF BOTH SIDES TO CONTINUE TO WAGE WAR

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Before, Doctor, we get to that and I would like to hear what you say to that—let me get back to that intransigence because that has always struck me as something interesting.

To pick up where Dr. Sick talked about the basic supply of the fundamentals of making war, artillery pieces, rifles, ammunition and the like and that they are well supplied, can they in the future continue to wage war supplied basically with just the fundamentals? For instance, we have some good credible idea that there is a very, very minimal capability with their air force. You alluded to the fact that the Iraqis lost only one plane making a number of sorties. They have responded with the crudest kind of forward technology—those things that hit Baghdad.

Dr. DAWISHA. SCUD missiles.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Thank you. SCUD. That is about the best they can do. We estimate they may have something in the neighborhood of 40 planes left, of which 25, 30 percent at any time may be their maximum operational. Given that circumstance, can they continue to wage war or will they fall into periods of waging war and then stopping and waging war and stopping just to perpetuate the war, but never really having an active war?

At what point will that make some kind of more improved basis for some ability to bring this to a conclusion?

Dr. OLSON. To some degree the nature of the war from its inception has been episodic, especially since 1982. A great many of the Iranian offensives that have been planned have been restrained by logistical problems. You have seen over the course of the war sudden increases in Iranian activities and then long periods of inactivity. This is largely because the Iranians have had difficulty building up a stockpile of material necessary to sustain or to launch an offensive. So the episodic characteristic of the war is something that has been with us for some time.

As far as the Iranian ability to conduct war is concerned, I think they have a long-term capability to maintain it at the levels we now see it. That they can in fact launch the kind of military campaign that could bring Iraq to its knees, no, I don't think that is possible.

The Iraqis, on the other hand, have considerable military capability. Whether that would be sufficient to overrun Iran, which has, as you are aware, a tremendous geographic depth and tremendously difficult terrain, and given past Iraqi demonstrated military capability is not very likely either. So the most likely consequence of all of this is that the war will continue, on the ground anyway, as we see it. The danger lies in the way that the war might spread in other directions in the Gulf.

Dr. SICK. I might just add very briefly to that that Iran today has really shifted its strategy very dramatically. I believe that Iran is, in fact, looking for opportunities to have a cease fire—not a termination of the war with a peace treaty—because it needs it, because its own military situation is so bad and it is so vulnerable.

Whether the Iranians can maintain the war in their rhetoric and conduct the war by blazing press releases—which is the way they would prefer to conduct it right now—or not, is really what they are fighting about currently.

Iran has, it seems to me, come to the conclusion that its human wave tactics, the infantry attacks, assaults, simply don't work. They are not going to work, and Iran has largely stopped them. In the last year or two there have been very few major ones, but a lot of talk about it—a lot of hints that something big was coming, a final offensive.

It does not come. And it does not come because they know very well that it would not succeed.

IRAN'S CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS

Mr. SMITH of Florida. They still maintain a large army, however, on the eastern border of Iraq, but those are composed mainly of fairly young boys, aren't they?

Dr. SICK. They just don't have the technological punch to break through Iraqi lines and sustain an offensive.

The second element of this is not so much on the military side for Iran, but is the oil. As long as Iranian oil continues to flow and they are able to finance their internal development and other things, everything else can take care of itself. The oil is critical and in that sense the Iraqi tanker war makes a lot of sense. That is, if

you can in fact stop the oil flowing, Iran is going to have to come to terms with you one way or the other or it is going to have to find another way out.

So far the Iraqi attacks have not been successful in doing that, but in the cases where they have attacked successfully and oil exports dropped off, there were signs of genuine concern in Tehran and a quick hunt to try to find alternative ways out.

When the oil is flowing, the Iranians quit worrying about it.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Dr. Dawisha.

Dr. DAWISHA. I would agree with both my colleagues. I would, however, disagree on the nuance of the whole thing. I, myself, am not convinced the Iranians are changing their tactics that much. You see, for the war to end there has got to be one or the other of two conditions. Either the idea is changed or the ability to wage war is diminished. What I mean by that is if Iran's war waging capability gets to a situation whereby it finds it difficult even to wage the kind of war it is waging now, then sooner or later on a pragmatic sense, it will realize that it will have to stop the war. The Iranian revolutionaries, as they have shown in the past on one or two occasions, are very practical people. The main example that I can think of is, of course, the American hostages where they were quite willing to release them in exchange for the defreezing of the funds that they had in the West.

So, revolutionaries that they are, they, nevertheless, are practical. When they get to a situation where their war waging capability diminishes to the extent that they not only can not defeat the Iraqis, but they themselves might be defeated or at least might suffer a major setback, then they might think of stopping the war.

Stopping the war because of a change in their ideas, that is a different matter altogether. Ayatollah Khomeini gained precedence over at least four or five more prominent Ayatollahs not because of his religious status, but because of his political activity. He was the one around whom the whole opposition to the Shah coalesced. He was the one that inspired the revolution and, therefore, when the revolution occurred, it was Khomeini, the man nearest to God, Imam Hussein and Imam Ali, who was responsible for overthrowing somebody who was thought literally invincible 2 or 3 years earlier.

When the war started one of the first things Khomeini said was that he was going to acquire the scalp of Saddam Hussein. He himself came to the radio on the day the Iraqi armed forces invaded Iran and said that the invasion was in fact inspired by God. This was the way God was going to eliminate Saddam Hussein for attacking the seat of Islam, Iran's Islamic Republic.

Five years later Saddam Hussein is still ruling in Iraq, and the Iraqis are doing reasonably well. If the Ayatollahs seek peace now, they will have to explain to their people—those whom they have sent to war, those young men who walked on landmines and gave their lives for the revolution and Islam—why after 5 years, things could suddenly change so that now we can forgive Saddam Hussein, we can talk to him, we can compromise. I think the cast is now set. The momentum of hostility has gone beyond any compromises that the Iranians can give. This is why I don't believe that they can change their attitudes.

THE POSSIBILITY OF CHANGING REGIMES IN IRAN

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Let me ask you this. If that is the case, the scenario most likely to end the war would seem to be at the moment a change of regime in Iran. More than any other single factor, there would have to be from your point of view—and I don't know if the others agree, maybe in the answer to this question they can—almost an absolute commitment by some group within or without Iran to make a concerted effort to remove or at least wait until Khomeini is no longer capable of running the country and I don't know at what stage that might be.

He is not a young man but he does not show any signs at the moment of being incapable, of waiting until that stage before there could be any possible progress. I tend to agree with you that they have started the war which now has become a self-fulfilling prophesy which they can no longer back away from and that to sell out the fundamentalists would sell themselves out at the same time and they might not be able to do that and stay in power.

Where does that leave us in terms of Iran? Is there a light at the end of this tunnel in terms of the possibility? Has Khomeini, as a matter of fact, to be practical about it, has Khomeini made any effort that we can see to assure a transition to the next regime beyond himself which has the same dedication to the same fundamentalist beliefs?

Dr. DAWISHA. There are three ways you can end the war: a possible change of regime in Iran, a possible change of regime in Iraq, and the grinding to a halt of arms exports to one or the other of the combatants.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Exports of the oil, that would also be a way, I suppose.

I left those other two, the oil support which Dr. Sick talked about, in terms of the oil and I left the Iraqi suicide for a moment because it seems to me at this moment unless something unique were to happen and another third party perhaps were to get in there and squeeze Iraq from the other side, I think it is possibly more productive to think in terms of the change of regime in Iran rather than Iraq.

Dr. DAWISHA. I agree. In terms of Iran, if the Ayatollah does the decent thing and departs this world, there might very well be possibilities.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Is there any possibility to believe he might do that?

Dr. DAWISHA. This is the problem. I think he has a father or mother or a close relative who is about 105 or 110 years old. There is no reason why Ayatollah Khomeini should not reach that ripe old age.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. That does not give great hope to his son.

Dr. DAWISHA. The Islamic revolution has not become a monarchy yet. They have been trying very hard to institute a system of succession whereby once the position of Al-Faqih, which is Khomeini's position, is vacated, then a committee of Ayatollahs will assume that mantle. There can be no one person who can assume the role. This is out of the question. So they have been trying to institute a process whereby a council will act as the supreme politi-

cal and moral authority that Khomeini now represents in Iran. But there has not been much agreement between factions within the Islamic revolution, between the so-called conservatives and the so-called radical Ayatollahs, as to how this can be worked out, and to my knowledge up until this moment nothing has been decided.

But even if it is decided, it is almost certain that a struggle for power will follow on Khomeini's death, the result of which no one can predict. No one can actually predict who is going to be the person who will take over from Khomeini and if he takes over what his ideological orientation will be and whether he will ever have the kind of moral authority that Khomeini has been able to establish as a result of his overthrow of the Shah.

So, given an anarchic situation like this, the common denominator will always be to take the easy option of continuing the policy of the great leader and great teacher, Khomeini. This is why even in the case of change of the regime, I still am skeptical about an end to the war. This is why I say again that the best possible method of stopping the war is an erosion of Iran's war-waging capability.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Dr. Olson?

Dr. OLSON. There are three points I would like to make in response to that. I agree about the problems with succession in Iran, that major changes in policy at a time when there is a change in leadership is not likely to be something we will see right away, partially because there will be a rivalry going on for succession. Anybody who does anything dramatic could find that action used against him by his rivals and, therefore, they are likely to be cautious. I do not think we can expect that Khomeini's death will make a major change in Iranian policy, at least not right away.

The other question, then, is relating the war and succession—

FUTURE OF IRANIAN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Excuse me. Let me just add, could you anticipate if Khomeini were to die at some point in time that the fundamentalist movement might get ever more radical as those who are trying to take power have to consolidate that power by being even more repressive and aggressive within the country?

Dr. OLSON. That is a possibility, and one of the directions it could take. It would be difficult to determine the outcome because at the moment it is even difficult to determine which individuals in Iran constitute moderates and radicals. This collection tends to change depending on the issue. When political survival is at stake, however, and because the nature of rivalry that might follow would be very difficult to predict, there might be a tendency to take up, at least publicly anyway, stronger and more radical positions in order to be able to distinguish oneself from the pack and stake out a claim.

But I would like to pick up something said earlier and say something about the idea of wearing Iran down. That is certainly an important point to consider, but I would like to point out a danger that is involved in the wearing down of Iran. In 1982 we were concerned about the collapse of Iraq because of the threat that that posed then to regional stability, the possibility of the establishment

of an Iranian state or at least of an Islamic republic in Iraq and the possible spread of the Islamic revolution.

But another concern I think that all of us have to face is the reverse, and that is some kind of collapse in Iran, that political authority might collapse on the Iranian plateau. A strategy—once again the role we play in that would be minimal that wears down the Iranian regime and brings it to the negotiating table must be a fairly finely tuned one. In other words, people must be able to determine in both Iraq and Iran at what point Iran has reached the breaking point and is ready to negotiate.

The concern that I have in that regard is that the Iranian regime with all the other problems it has and the questions of internal rivalry we just discussed, may not be able, in fact, to determine finely at what point it must go to the negotiating table to save its own neck. If it passes that point, there is the potential that Iran could dissolve into internal anarchy, which I think is not a happy prospect for the region or for U.S. interests in the region. So, whereas a strategy for wearing down Iran holds some hope and should be considered, I think we should also be aware there are a number of dangers involved in it.

I would also like to make one final point on the question of the winding down of the war, the question of a no-win, no-peace stalemate. I think you have to look at not just Iranian strategy on the battlefield and the fact they are moving away from dramatic battlefield activity, but also one must look at Iranian strategy overall to determine whether Iran has changed its goals. Iran is still employing a strategy of attrition, the idea being to wear Iraq down, wear down its determination, wear down the ability of that society to survive. In fact, Iran was the state to first begin the imposition of economic warfare. It has closed the gulf to Iraqi oil exports. It has conducted relations with Syria to cut off Iraqi exports through Syria and has tried in one way or another to interrupt the other oil route through Turkey in order to strangle Iraq and force the change it wished to see in that country. That strategy has not changed; and if you look in the strategic area overall and not just the ground war you find Iran's determination remains the same.

The converse of this is that until Iran is willing to back off and stop this kind of economic warfare the Iraqis cannot afford to accept a winding down of the war that does not at least see them once again able to export their oil and their other goods through the gulf itself. Until that happens Iraq is not likely to buy a simple winding down of the war.

Dr. SICK. Congressman, just to add a footnote to what has been said in terms of whether Khomeini's death would change the situation. I think that to base your policy on that is a very thin reed. The war will end some day and Khomeini will die some day, but it makes a lot of difference whether that is tomorrow or 5 years from now. It seems to me one has to be prepared for that eventuality in time to put together some kind of a policy. But it is not the basis on which you can build an effective policy in the region.

In regard to your other point about the regime becoming more repressive instead of less, it is reminiscent of other revolutions. The death of Lenin led to Stalin and to a regime which did not have the same kind of charisma but had the power and repression to hold

one man in power for a long, long time. That is not a bad model to look at with respect to Iran.

Over this period of the revolution the Iranians have, in fact, developed rather strong institutional roots, and they have also learned ruthlessness in dealing with oppositions in the street and on the battlefield. I think that any successor regime would be even less inhibited about using those instruments than the present regime.

The question one has to ask is whether those instruments will, in fact, break apart. Will there be differences of opinion in a power struggle and will they come apart? I do not think we can tell that, but I do not think the prognosis is particularly good from that perspective.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

U.S. CONTACTS WITH IRANIAN OPPOSITION GROUPS

To all of the panelists, if you were to consider the present Iranian regime's antipathy to the United States, sometimes referred to it as the Great Satan, should our Government try to cultivate contacts with the anti-Khomeini organizations?

Dr. SICK. Well, if I may begin, the Great Satan designation of the United States is one that we became very familiar with during a very sad point in our history and is one that I think is not going to go away easily. It means that, in fact, a U.S. strategy of opening up to Iran is not a real option. That simply is not an option that is available to us.

The other choice that you suggest—of the United States actively supporting an alternative faction or outside elements to try to overthrow the regime—is one that I think at best should be regarded with great skepticism and caution on the part of the United States. It would require the judgment certainly that such a faction or group was, in fact, capable of carrying this out and that the outcome of the thing in terms of U.S. involvement would not, in fact, make things worse; and I think that is a very difficult judgment. It would involve, in effect, a major strategy of covert action to try to overthrow a government halfway around the world. Our record in that regard is not a brilliant one, and I think I would recommend against it.

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Olson?

Dr. OLSON. I think I would like to echo these sentiments for a variety of other reasons as well. The present regime in Iran has gone to some degree to guarantee its survival. In fact, the strength of opposition groups within the country is now fairly limited. The present regime has used a degree of candid violence against those opposition groups to eradicate them or to drive them out of the country or underground, and that the political backing that these groups now have within Iran is very tenuous and their support is dubious. What could happen if the United States supported alternative groups is that instead of achieving the results that we desire by becoming involved with these groups, we could achieve the re-

verse effect: One concern is that we might create a more unstable situation in Iran.

Iran at this moment is under a variety of internal stresses because of the war and unresolved issues in the revolution, and a concern then must be that such an action could destabilize the country and precipitate major rivalry for power or civil war.

In such an eventuality there is the potential for direct United States and Soviet confrontation over the fate of Iran.

SUPPORT FOR EX-PRESIDENT BANI SADR

Mr. GILMAN. Does former President Bani Sadr, who is in exile in France, have any significant following in Iran?

Dr. OLSON. That is difficult to say because his following in Iran does not stand up and identify itself, for obvious reasons. His relationship with one of the major opposition groups, the Mujahidin-i-Khalq, has been severed or is tenuous, and his political backing in the country, which initially was largely derived from his relationship with Ayatollah Khomeini and religious clergy in the country, he has been cut off. So his political support within the country is, I think, also subject to question.

Mr. GILMAN. Is he still allied with the People's Mujahidin?

Dr. OLSON. He has a relationship with them, but that relationship has deteriorated since they both went into exile.

MAJAHIDIN-I-KHALQ

Mr. GILMAN. Is that party, as Assistant Secretary of State Murphy depicted it, "militantly Islamic, anti-democratic, anti-American, and anti-Western?"

Dr. OLSON. The Mujahidin-i-Khlaq?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes.

Dr. OLSON. They have been called a number of things over the past few years. They have been called Marxists and there is a Marxist element. They have been called Islamic and there is an Islamic element. I think when you are dealing with the Middle East, with Islamic states, there is going to be an element of Islam in all activities, so you cannot rule that out. But there is a mish-mash of socialist ideology, Islamic philosophy and modern doctrine of various sorts put together to try to develop an ideological whole. Their main aim is political domination in Iran, and the policies that they are likely to pursue will be similar in many ways to the policies of Ayatollah Khomeini—that is, a policy of neither East nor West—but the emphasis will fall in different areas.

Mr. GILMAN. Should we be opening a dialog with that group?

Dr. OLSON. I do not believe we should close the doors to talking to anybody. The question is what you do on the basis of those kinds of conversations. In the past the information provided by various kinds of exile groups has not been terribly reliable. It has in some cases been wrong and, of course, a lot of it is self-serving. So you have to be extremely careful about what these groups have to say.

An example of that might be the fact that before the Iran-Iraq war began, Saddam Hussein invited a number of important Iranian exiles to his country to tell him what the situation was like. We were not there and we do not know what was said, but it is quite

conceivable that these exiles pointed out to him the instability in Iran, that they had their own support there, and that all the Iranian Government needed was a slight push over the edge and then they would go back and all the issues would be resolved. If Iraq made its decisions on the basis of that information, we see what kind of "tar baby" it is dealing with.

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Dawisha?

Dr. DAWISHA. I agree. There is nothing that I want to add to that.

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Sick.

Dr. SICK. Could I add just one point in regard to your later question? I believe the fundamental appeal of the Mujahidin and why it was a major factor in Iran and conceivably could continue to be a major factor was its appeal to the youth of the country. Something like 60 percent of the population of Iran, which is rather large, is under 21 years of age today. The revolution was in many ways made by young people, secondary school people out in the streets, the young soldiers who are prepared to go out and give their lives for the cause, and so on. This youthful culture is, in fact, tremendously important. The fact is that the Mujahidin represent a kind of progressive Islam that had a tremendous appeal to a lot of young people. That is where it got its support. Its support was badly bruised, if not demolished, during the confrontation in the streets that took place in 1981 and 1982. The Mujahidin really lost that battle. Whether they can make a comeback or not, I do not know.

But I would say that the key element to their appeal was to the youth and that that is an element that we really need to take very seriously. It is one we overlooked. There is this huge tidal wave of young people about to break over the Iranian society that is going to have tremendous implications for the future of that country, and I think we have a very hard time telling what that may be.

Mr. OLSON. I would like to say one thing in regard to that. While it is true that the majority of the Iranian population is under 21 years of age, the support for the Mujahidin among the youth was basically confined to much of the elite among that group. Much of that elite group was the target of the Islamic Republic and they were destroyed or driven from the country, while a vast majority of the youth in Iran today have gone enthusiastically into the ranks of the military and have marched off to the war to die in their thousands for the present regime, which can still count on a good deal of support from that element.

The question that must concern us is whether or not the regime will use up its capital and its principal with these people and that a new wave of discontent in society as a whole will appear. Whether the Mujahidin-i-Khalq will emerge as leader of that regime is open to question.

IRAN'S SUPPORT OF TERRORISM

Mr. GILMAN. The President has said that Iran forms a terrorist network with Libya, Cuba, Nicaragua and Syria. Is there any evidence Iran cooperates actively with these countries?

Dr. SICK. There is no lack of evidence that Iran does harbor some terrorist elements, and it trains them, particularly for operations in Iraq. It openly announces it does that. It describes the camps. It invites people over from Iraq to make statements against the regime there and then publicizes the terrorist activity.

When you get beyond that—to those areas where Iran really does not want anyone to be sure of what it is doing—it is very difficult to find out and we would have to be intelligence analysts to pull out that information. I am a little skeptical of the impression that is left that terrorism is a well-managed, well-organized, highly-coordinated, worldwide activity with the United States as its principal target. It mostly is the activity of desperate parties who have no other way of getting their voices heard and who take what action is available to them. I have no doubt in my own mind, though I cannot prove it, that Iran has been engaged with major groups that have conducted terrorist activities in Lebanon and the Middle East. I think that is absolutely true. To characterize that as a sort of international conspiracy of terror, where various countries and organizations are all working together, probably overstates the situation rather badly.

I would just make one other very brief point. That is, let us remember that in these terrorist activities which humiliate us and which annoy us tremendously, in fact, the terrorists lose, while we, as a Nation, continue to survive. Our basic values are not really at stake in these cases and partly the degree to which we feel the pain is a self-inflicted wound. We bring it upon ourselves because we take it very seriously that our people should be protected, which is a natural reaction on our part. But, in fact, the terrorists do not win in the sense of changing our policies. In fact, what we should avoid more than anything else is giving in—either for self-perception or other reasons—and doing what the terrorists want us to do: Leave the territory, abandon our interests. That is what they are after and as long as we do not do that, they ultimately lose.

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Olson?

Dr. OLSON. I would like to make a couple of points on that.

If we look at the international system and the relations among organized states as we know them, I think you will find a great deal of disunity, a great deal of confusion, a lack of coordination among those states. But it is still possible, in fact, for groups of nations to work together to achieve common ends, to establish relationships, to exchange information and carry on a fairly active relationship.

I think that we have to begin to look at what is going on and what we are calling international terrorism in somewhat the same way—that is, as a parallel or developing international system in which, of course, there may not be absolute coordination of all the efforts. But there is the equivalent of diplomatic relations. There is trade, there is exchange of information, and I think it is fairly clear that there is a degree of coordination going on.

The Iranians, many of the present regime, some of their followers and some of their opponents, in fact, were trained by Palestinians. The Iranians themselves are providing training to people who are operating in Lebanon and providing equipment, false papers, and other support for this kind of international activity.

So if you look at it in those terms, while there is not absolute coordination, there is a good deal of organized activity and an effort to make it even more organized; and the terrorists, at least the state-sponsored terrorists have had a number of successes. I think we only need to recall the recent TWA hijacking, and although to some degree that was a self-inflicted wound in terms of perception, it also released several hundred Shi'ites in Israel.

The recent attacks on the American Embassy in Lebanon and the Beirut Marine headquarters were largely responsible for the liquidation of the American presence in Lebanon, and I think that is an indication that terrorism can be successful. Given the relative instability or at least the question concerning the legitimacy of many of the Gulf States, or many of the other states in the region, acts of terrorism, subversion, or assassination of key figures in fact can have a profound effect, though it may not be the one intended by the terrorists.

In 1981, it was very clear that Iran was intimately involved in an effort to try to subvert Bahrain, with consequences, of course, that we cannot now know because it did not happen. But there have been similar kinds of activities in other states and attacks on American facilities and attacks on our friends and allies in the region in an attempt to try to intimidate them.

I think when you take all of that together that there is something of value for the terrorist and for those who sponsor terrorism, which is one reason why they see as it an instrument at least to experiment with. I think we need to take measures to try to respond to them.

Our greatest danger, however, and I agree with Dr. Sick in that, is to overreact to these kinds of situations and to be carried away by our own anger and to do things that will make the situation worse.

FUTURE OF THE WAR AND U.S. POLICY

Mr. GILMAN. The panelists seem to indicate that we are at a stalemate at the present time.

What are the implications for the U.S. policy of a continued stalemate, and can you give us a short summary statement of what you think our best policy is for the future with regard to both nations?

Dr. OLSON. Well, I think of the four possibilities of the way that the war might go at this point, the most likely one is a continuation of the war as we see it, with the possibility that it will expand in ways that I think I indicated earlier.

The use by Iraq of its air power and the efforts on the part of both Iran and Iraq to influence the opinions of the international community, which I think is also something that is very significant in what they are trying to do as a means of bringing pressure on the other side, will continue; and there remains the question of sabotage and subversion.

Iran is faced with the fact that militarily, at least on the ground, its means are limited. It may begin to explore the possibility of using the instrument that it has used in other areas to try to influence local politics—terrorism against the Arab States of the Gulf to

try to force them to stop the economic support of Iraq that they are currently providing. Iran is also likely to continue stopping shipping in the gulf to check for "contraband" to Iraq. This practice could escalate with serious results.

The other directions the war might take are an Iraqi collapse as a result of a successful war of attrition, or an Iranian collapse—both of which I think are major concerns for the United States, for reasons I think I indicated. The question of an Iranian or an Iraqi victory—the spread of the Islamic revolution or civil war in Iran—are concerns that the United States needs to devote a good deal of attention to in order to try to arrange now what its responses are going to be to such an environment.

One of the most important things that the United States can do is to develop its relationships or continue to improve upon its relationships with the area states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the smaller states of the gulf, to encourage regional cooperation among those states and to improve local defense capabilities, and to encourage, at least unofficially, whatever activity may be going on to try to bring the two sides to a negotiated settlement.

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Dawisha?

FAILURE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENTS

Dr. DAWISHA. Mr. Chairman, I think apart from what I said about the United States trying to be more vigilant in stopping the arms supplies going to Iran, there really is very little that the United States can do. It may not be a bad idea just to adopt a policy of wait and see for a short period.

We have been so obsessed, so seduced by the idea of Islamic fundamentalism, that we are not at present aware that it might have actually reached its peak and is going downhill. A lot of people continue to talk about Islamic fundamentalism as though we are still in 1979 and 1980 with all those successes—the Iranian revolution, the takeover of the Mosque in Mecca, the assassination of President Sadat. Since then, however the Islamic revolutionary groups have met with a number of very, very major setbacks.

One of these major setbacks is the refusal of the Iraqi Shi'ite population to join forces with their moral leaders in Tehran against their political leaders in Iraq. That must have been one of the greatest setbacks to the concept of a universalist Islamic revolution.

Another setback is that most of these revolutionary groups, whether in Egypt, in Jordan, in Syria or in Iraq have been taken on by the state and ruthlessly cast aside.

We don't have one single example of a successful Islamic revolutionary group. The only possible success was in Egypt when they assassinated Sadat, but even here the political system has hardly changed. Egypt's political relations have hardly changed. All they did was assassinate one man and bring in another man who is actually emphasizing more or less the same moral and ideological goals that Sadat had set for Egypt.

Mr. GILMAN. You characterize that as a success, though, are revolutionary success?

Dr. DAWISHA. If we are talking about a tide of Islamic fundamentalism, they can turn to their followers and say "we have assassinated the other Shah. We have eliminated a corrupt Western-oriented secular leader, who is a lackey of America."

Mr. GILMAN. But even so, they didn't change the form of government, so it is hardly a success.

Dr. DAWISHA. Precisely. That is what I was arguing. The assassination is hardly the success they claim it is because nothing has changed in Egypt. The same government remains, the same political relationship remains, the same political system remains. The one success that one might point to is, of course, the rise of Shi'ite fundamentalists in Lebanon, but Lebanon is a unique case.

Mr. GILMAN. That too is far from a successful case.

Dr. DAWISHA. So far, too. What is interesting about the Shi'ite movement in Lebanon is that group which is now most successful is, in fact, the most secular of the Shi'ite groups. The ones that are ideologically and religiously tied to Iran and to Khomeinism are very small and operate basically in the Bekaa Valley, primarily through infusion of a number of Iranian irregulars that come through Syria.

So when one surveys the Arab Islamic Middle Eastern situation now, one gets the impression that in fact the Islamic tide may very well be on the way down, and if that is the case, if failure after failure after failure confronts the Islamic tide, we may not be very far—I am not talking in terms of days, maybe not even months—from the day when Islamic fundamentalism, as we know it now and as we are afraid of it now, will cease to be the kind of threat that at present we think it is.

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Sick?

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS

Dr. SICK. In looking at the broad range of U.S. policy and options in the region, I think it is important to start to maintain a sense of perspective about what has not happened.

If anyone had proposed 10 years ago that you would have this kind of war—revolution and war in the northern Persian Gulf—it would have been seen as a potential catastrophe. It would have destroyed the world oil market. It would have brought the United States and the Soviet Union in direct conflict. The worst was perceived. None of that has happened.

I think it is important for us to keep that in mind as we think about policy options for the future. Things don't always work out for the very worst. They may not be great, but they certainly could be a good deal worse than they are.

With regard to U.S. policy and what in fact might happen from here, it seems to me the present policy, which I interpret as being one of U.S. restraint and Soviet restraint, is absolutely critical. The two superpowers need to stay out of the conflict. The United States, for instance, has reduced its military profile in the region. I see that as a boon. I think that is a step in the right direction of reducing the chance for direct intervention on the part of either of the superpowers. That, it seems to me, is critical.

Second, and something we haven't—

Mr. GILMAN. You wrote in June you saw a chance for a limited deescalation of the conflict in a tradeoff between Iran's desire for de facto cease-fire and Iraq's desire for access to oil-loading ports in the Persian Gulf and reduce pressure on its port.

Is a successful tradeoff still possible, do you think?

Dr. SICK. I think it is. It was never what I consider to be an 80-percent probability.

The analysis is based simply on the fact a lot has changed. I put quite a lot of emphasis on the fact Iran today is functioning on a different basis of strategy than it was a year ago or 2 years ago, that there is a kind of bargaining under way between the two parties that does leave open the opportunity for creative diplomacy. I think it is not beyond the realm of possibility that those possibilities exist.

We should recognize the possibilities that exist and do whatever we can, or support whatever actions we can to make those possibilities come about. They may be slim but they are different than the possibilities were, say, a year ago or 2 years ago. Things have changed and Iran's policy is changing substantially.

I think that Iran has really come to the conclusion that it can't win this war in the short term. It wants to go for a long-term solution—to have its cake and eat it too. I think that leaves room for negotiation that simply wasn't there before, and I put a much greater premium on Iran's pragmatism than others do.

Mr. GILMAN. Do any other panelists have any comments before we conclude?

If there are no further questions or comments, the meeting stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX 1

MAJOR ATTACKS OF ISLAMIC JIHAD AND OTHER RADICAL ISLAMIC GROUPS

MAJOR ATTACKS OF ISLAMIC JIHAD AND OTHER RADICAL ISLAMIC GROUPS

- July 19, 1982: Kidnapping of David Dodge, acting president of the American University of Beirut
-- released July 22, 1983
-- no specific groups claimed responsibility, but pro-Iranian Shi'ites suspected
- March 16, 1983: Hand grenade thrown at U.S. Marine patrol in Beirut
-- 5 Marines slightly wounded
-- claimed by Islamic Jihad Organization
- April 18, 1983: Car bombing of U.S. Embassy in Beirut
-- 63 dead, including 17 Americans; 100 wounded
-- claimed by Islamic Jihad
- October 23, 1983: Suicide bombing of U.S. and French military headquarters in Beirut
-- 241 U.S. servicemen killed; 58 French troops killed
-- claimed by Islamic Jihad and by Free Islamic Revolutionary Movement; the State Department later accused Islamic Amal of the bombing
- December 12, 1983: Car bombings of 6 sites in Kuwait, including U.S. and French embassies
-- 4 people killed, 54 wounded
-- claimed by Islamic Jihad
- December 21, 1983: Remote-controlled explosion at French military command post in Beirut
-- 17 Lebanese and 1 French soldier killed; 100 wounded, including Lebanese Minister of Information
-- claimed by Jihad and by previously unknown Black Palm Organization
- January, 1984: Kidnapping of Hussein Farrash, counsellor at the Saudi Embassy in Beirut
-- released May 20, 1985
-- claimed by Jihad
- January 18, 1984: Murder of Malcolm Kerr, President of American University of Beirut
-- claimed by Jihad
- February 10, 1984: Kidnapping of Frank Reiger, professor at the American University of Beirut
-- released April 15, 1984
-- claimed by Jihad

- February 18, 1984:** Murder of General Gholam Ali Oveissi, Teheran martial law administrator under the Shah, and his brother in Paris
-- claimed by Jihad
- March 1984:** Jihad threatened to attack the U.S., French, British, and Italian Embassies in Jakarta
- March 7, 1984:** Kidnapping of Jerry Levin, American reporter for Cable News Network in Beirut
-- escaped February 14, 1985
-- claimed by Jihad
- March 16, 1984:** Kidnapping of William Buckley, political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut
-- claimed by Jihad
- May 8, 1984:** Kidnapping of Reverend Benjamin T. Weir, American missionary in Beirut
-- released September 14, 1985
-- claimed by Jihad
- May 15, 1984:** Jordanian Prime Minister Ubaydat told Parliament that the government had arrested members of the Islamic Jihad Organization which had recruited civilian and military citizens in Jordan
- August 1, 1984:** Jihad claimed to have mined the Red Sea
-- explosions caused damage to several ships in July and August, including a Soviet freighter in the Gulf of Suez, July 9, 1984
-- minesweepers from the U.S., Britain, France, Italy and the Soviet Union joined ships from the local states in looking for mines
- September 3, 1984:** Jihad threatened attack in Mecca against Saudi monarchy
- September 14, 1984:** Murder of a Saudi engineer and wounding of another Saudi in Marbella
-- claimed by Jihad
- September 20, 1984:** Car bombing of U.S. Embassy in Beirut
-- 23 killed, including 2 Americans
-- claimed by Jihad

November 6, 1984: Jihad threatened to kill President Reagan

November 28, 1984: Murder of Percy Norris, British Deputy High Commissioner in Bombay
 -- claimed by Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims
 -- same groups claimed responsibility for murder of Kenneth Whitty, a British diplomat, in Athens in March 1984; and for kidnapping of Jonathan Wright, British correspondent for Reuters, in Beirut.

December 3, 1984: Presumed kidnapping of Peter Kilburn, an American librarian at the American University of Beirut
 -- claimed by Jihad

December 4, 1984: Hijacking of Kuwaiti plane to Teheran
 -- 2 Americans killed, several other passengers beaten
 -- carried out by a group of Arab radicals who did not specifically use the name Islamic Jihad but who wanted to secure the release of the people imprisoned for the Kuwaiti bombings of December 1983

January 8, 1985: Kidnapping of Father Martin L. Jenco, Head of Catholic Relief Services in Beirut
 -- claimed by Jihad

January 14, 1985: Murder of Patrice Grecourt and Henri Perrot, French peacekeeping observers, in Beirut
 -- claimed by a person saying he represented Jihad; another person denied that Jihad was involved, saying however on January 15 that "we are not opposed to such methods"

January 16, 1985: Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia announced "full support" for Islamic Jihad

January 23, 1985: Jihad threatened to strike at Italian targets

February 1985: Jihad threatened to attack UNIFIL forces in southern Lebanon

February 16, 1985: Jihad said that one American hostage had been sentenced to death

- March 14, 1985: Disappearance of Father Nicolas Kluiters, Dutch priest working in Lebanon
 -- body found, April 1, 1985
 -- claimed by Vengeance Party and by the Jundullah ("Army of God")
- March 14, 1985: Kidnapping of Geoffrey Nash, British metallurgist working for the Lebanese government, in Beirut
 -- released March 27, 1985
 -- claimed by Jihad and by Khaibar Brigade
- March 15, 1985: Kidnapping of Brian Levick, British director of Coral Gasoline Distribution Co., in Beirut
 -- released March 30, 1985
 -- claimed by Jihad and by Khaibar Brigade
- March 16, 1985: Kidnapping of Terry Anderson, American AP correspondent, in Beirut
 -- claimed by Jihad
- March 22, 1985: Kidnapping of Marcel Fontaine, French vice-consul in Beirut; Marcel Carton, French political attache; and Mrs. Danielle Perez, secretary at the French Embassy in Beirut and daughter of Marcel Carton
 -- Mrs. Perez released March 31, 1985
 -- claimed by Jihad and by Khaibar Brigade
- March 25, 1985: Kidnapping of Alec Collett, British UNRWA employee
 -- claimed by Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims
- March 29, 1985: Bomb attack on Paris movie house holding a Jewish film festival
 -- 20 wounded
 -- later claimed by Jihad
- April 11, 1985: Kuwaiti newspaper al-Qabas said that William Buckley had been moved from Lebanon to Iran via Syria
- April 12, 1985: Bombing of restaurant outside Madrid used by American servicemen
 -- 18 Spanish dead; 82 injured, including 15 Americans
 -- claimed by Jihad in retaliation for car bomb explosion outside Sheikh Fadlallah's house in Beirut on March 8, 1985; Jihad had also claimed that the attack on the Paris cinema on March 29 was in retaliation for the car bombing in Beirut

- May 14, 1985:** Jihad threatened the "greatest military operation" ever against U.S., France, and Kuwait unless the 17 people convicted of the Kuwaiti bombings in December 1983 were released
- May 15, 1985:** Kidnapping of Aiden Walsh, Irish deputy head of UNRWA in Beirut
 -- released May 16, 1985
 -- claimed by Islamic Jihad and by Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims
- May 18, 1985:** Two street explosions in Riyadh
 -- 1 person killed, 3 injured
 -- claimed in name of Jihad, which said that it had cells operating in Saudi Arabia; later denied by Jihad
- May 25, 1985:** Attempted assassination of Kuwaiti Emir, Shaykh Jaber Ahmad al-Sabah, by suicide car bombing
 -- 3 people killed; Emir slightly injured
 -- claimed in name of Jihad; later denied by Jihad; Kuwaiti government identified attacker as member of the Iraqi Da'wa group
- May 26, 1985:** Kidnapping of Michel Seurat, French social science researcher, and Jean-Paul Kaufman, French journalist, in Beirut
 -- claimed by Jihad
- May 28, 1985:** Kidnapping of David Jacobsen, American director of the American University of Beirut Hospital
 -- claimed by Jihad;
- May 28, 1985:** Murder of Denis Hill, British professor at the American University of Beirut
 -- claimed in name of Jihad; later denied by Jihad
- June 10, 1985:** Kidnapping of Thomas Sutherland, American professor at the American University of Beirut
 -- claimed by Jihad
- June 14, 1985:** Hijacking of TWA airliner in Athens
 -- 1 American killed
 -- all hostages released by June 30
 -- Accomplice captured by Greek authorities claimed that hijackers belonged to Islamic Jihad; group holding the airliner called themselves "Oppressed of the Earth"

July 2, 1985: Bombing of British Airways office (target may have been TWA office immediately above) and grenade attack on Royal Jordanian Airline office in Madrid

- 1 killed, 27 wounded
- claimed by Organization of the Oppressed

July 7, 1985: Jihad said that it would not follow the advice of President Assad, "who has a special place in our hearts", to release the remaining American hostages

July 23, 1985: Bombing of Northwest Orient Airlines office and Jewish Synagogue in Copenhagen

- 27 injured
- claimed by Jihad

July 25, 1985: Murder of Ziyad al-Sati, First Secretary of the Jordanian Embassy in Ankara

- claimed by Jihad and by Black September

August 20, 1985: Car bombings in Tripoli, Lebanon

- 44 dead, over 100 wounded (including a political leader of Jundullah)
- claimed by Jihad

September 16, 1985: Bombing of a cafe in Rome

- 39 people injured
- claimed by Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims

September 25, 1985: Bombing of British Airways office in Rome

- 14 people injured
- claimed by Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims

September 30, 1985: Kidnapping of Valery Mirkov, Oleg Spirin, Nikolai Virsky, and Arkady Katkov of the Soviet Embassy in Beirut

- Arkady Katkov killed, October 2
- remaining 3 hostages released October 30
- claimed by Islamic Liberation Organization, although one caller claimed Jihad was responsible

October 4, 1985: Jihad claimed that it had "executed" William Buckley in retaliation for Israel's raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis 3 days before, but no body has been found.

APPENDIX 2

WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE ENTITLED "THE TERRORISM WON'T STOP UNTIL WE DEAL WITH IRAN"

[From the Washington Post, Sunday, June 23, 1985]

THE TERRORISM WON'T STOP UNTIL WE DEAL WITH IRAN

(By Robin Wright ¹)

Shortly after American hostages were taken at the United States Embassy in Tehran in 1979, President Jimmy Carter summoned University of Virginia Prof. R.K. Ramazani, America's leading expert on Iranian foreign policy, to a meeting in the Oval Office. Repeatedly Carter emphasized that the United States was not in conflict with Islam, only the Iranians, Ramazani recalled later.

Carter was right in recognizing the problem, but events have proven that separating the two is not quite so easy. In Islam, politics and religion are inseparable. And in the late 20th century, the Islamic fundamentalism preached from Iran has become the most potent force for discontent and revolution throughout the Middle East.

That force is behind the hijacking of TWA 847, as well as the earlier bombings of the Marine compound and two U.S. embassies in Beirut, and the American mission in Kuwait over the past 26 months. American diplomats throughout the region now work behind tank traps and machine gun placements in diplomatic fortresses. U.S. citizens often live as recluses.

Five months after the 1983 Marine bombing, Dr. Marvin Zonis, director of the Middle East Institute at the University of Chicago spoke on "The Psychological Roots of Shiite Terrorism" at a State Department seminar. "The message from Iran—no matter how bizarre or trivial it sounds on first, second, fourth or 39th hearing—is in my opinion the single most impressive political ideology which has been proposed in the 20th century since the Bolshevik revolution," he said. "This powerful message will be with us for a very long time, no matter what happens to Ayatollah Khomeini."

The killing last week of the 264th American since 1983 by Shiite fanatics was just one of many indications that resolution of the immediate hijacking ordeal will not mean the end of the U.S. conflict with Shiite militants in Lebanon or elsewhere.

In effect, the United States is engaged in a war, perhaps the most trying and unconventional conflict it has ever faced. The opposition is amorphous and diffuse, often without identifiable leaders, members or headquarters.

It is tempting to want to strike back, to confront attackers with conventional military force. But the nature of this war is such that it is not against a state or an area with borders, against which it would be easy to launch air strikes or land assaults. America's foe is a religious movement whose foot soldiers are not confined to a single country or sect.

Yet a state—Iran—is the locus of the acts that are so disturbing to the U.S. In 1983, the Reagan administration officially labeled Iran a primary sponsor of state-supported terrorism. It is more accurate to call it state-inspired, for the Islamic Republic's main role is as a model and catalyst.

But beyond the theological and intellectual ties, Shiite fanatics in Lebanon, and elsewhere, do have visible links with Iran. Several leading Lebanese mullahs travel regularly to Tehran. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards stationed in Lebanon's eastern Bekaa Valley since 1982 have provided material and political support for the burgeoning extremist factions. Dozens of young fighters from different groups have received military training at camps scattered throughout Iran. Among them is the current military chief of Lebanon's Amal movement, a youth who between 1979 and 1982 hijacked six planes traveling to or from Libya.

Yet neither the Iranian revolution nor the subsequent war would have happened if there had not been deepseated antagonism toward the United States. Islamic fundamentalists feel they have not initiated the trouble, but have only responded to an opponent that they feel started it. Their extremism is not for love of violence. Their revolution is against what they feel is foreign domination and encroachment in every aspect of their lives—symbolized most often by the United States.

¹ Robin Wright, who was Sunday Times of London's Beirut correspondent for four years, is the author of "Sacred Rage: The Crusade of Militant Islam" which will be published next fall.

One point of consensus among the diverse and disparate Shiite groups, who are often in disagreement with each other on other major issues and tactics, is that they see themselves as having lived under the heel of the United States for 40 years—since America became the main influence in the Middle East.

Among the most oft-cited American "offenses" against Moslem lands and peoples: CIA assistance to Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in the 1953 overthrow of a nationalist movement led by Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, who had been successfully undermining the royal family's then fragile position.

Nationalists and Shiite fundamentalists came to share a common resentment of what they saw as the shah's servile attitude toward the United States.

The United States is criticized by militants for trying in the 1960s to manipulate coups in Syria and backing a corrupt king in Libya. In the 1980s, American troops and warships went on the offensive for the first time since Vietnam—against Moslems. The use of American firepower was not because American lives were endangered but to protect a minority government in Lebanon, supposedly one of the Arab world's few democracies.

The United States was most recently linked indirectly to a bomb that went off last March near the home of one of Lebanon's most militant Shiite clerics, killing more than 80, although not the cleric. The bombers reportedly had ties to a group being trained by the CIA.

The long record of fears and suspicions about U.S. intentions in the region was reflected in the manifesto of Lebanon's Hizbollah, or Party of God, released a month later: "Imam Khomeini, the leader, has repeatedly stressed that America is the reason for all our catastrophes and the source of all malice. By fighting it, we are only exercising our legitimate right to defend our Islam and the dignity of our nation. We have opted for religion, freedom and dignity over humiliation and constant submission to America and its allies."

A member of Hizbollah said in an interview shortly after the bombing of the second U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut last September: "We aren't against the American people. We are against oppression and injustice. The fire of Islam will burn those who are responsible for these practices [against Islam]. We have been dominated by the U.S. government and others for too long."

American foreign policy in the Middle East, which emphasizes the security of Israel, is also a major cause of the militants' wrath. But the militants' reaction to the United States is probably linked more to American policy on other Islamic issues in the past 40 years than to U.S. positions on the Arab-Israeli dispute over the Palestinians.

Indeed, for more than a month before the TWA hijacking, Shiite militamen were engaged in bloody clashes with Palestinians. The Shiites' desire for the return of historic Jerusalem is primarily because it contains the third holiest site in Islam, and less because the Palestinians want a homeland. Settlement of the Palestinian question and return of the holy sites to Muslim control might end the conflict with Israel, but it would probably not end the fundamentalists' anti-American crusade.

Nor would dispatching American troops or conquering foreign territory end the conflict. The extremists are now simply too spread out and too numerous for this war to be ended by conventional means.

Yet the hijacking of TWA 847 could serve as a turning point for U.S. policy to end a conflict that is taking a mounting toll in American lives. But the Reagan administration must use extreme caution in analyzing which of three main policy options it adopts: force, sanctions or rapprochement. Otherwise, the U.S. may face an escalation that will make the recent wave of bombings, kidnappings and hijackings seem small-scale by comparison.

Unfortunately, since the attacks began, U.S. policy makers have seen only the violence in the extreme fundamentalist groups without understanding their political roots or their social importance. And the Reagan administration, backed by an angry public according to the television vox populi, now seems intent on sending a message to the militants and their sponsors by using force, probably a quick, supposedly surgical strike after the hijacking is resolved.

What has made Iran such a frustrating conundrum to American policy makers is the perception that it acts on the basis of passion rather than thoughtful policy. Ironically, the Reagan administration may be in grave danger of succumbing to the same emotionalism that it sees in the fundamentalists.

But the use of force, the first policy option, is likely to be catastrophic in the long run for the United States for three reasons. Contrary to public hopes that it will cripple or discourage the movement, the use of force against the Shiite crusaders would only fuel their resentment and commitment, providing new reasons for seek-

ing revenge against the "Great Satan," as well as creating an even more hostile, anti-American atmosphere, thereby attracting new recruits.

The Shiite extremist has become a Hydra: Kill one and two appear in his place. The movements in general have simply become too big to stop by cleaning out a training camp or two, especially with the growth over the past 18 months of a large politicized body of Shiites who agree with the zealots' motives and goals, if not their specific tactics.

As Israel's tragic experience in Lebanon showed, an "an eye for an eye" policy only escalates the cycle of violence into a long-term confrontation. The Shiite militants are truly prepared to die in acts that they do not view as terrorism, but as noble deeds against perceived aggressors in defense of their faith and independence.

The dimensions of the problem are reflected in attempts to pinpoint the groups or individuals responsible. Washington officials last year charged that the Party of God was responsible for the second embassy bombing, which elicited a bitter snicker from an American diplomat on the ground in Lebanon. "That doesn't tell us anything," he said. "Every Shiite in Lebanon is now Hizbollah"—a statement that was only a slight exaggeration.

The name of Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, the cleric whose neighborhood was bombed last March, keeps appearing in relation to various acts, including charges that he provided or blessed the suicide drivers who bombed the Marine compound. Heated debate still rages over his involvement, but even if the allegation were true, proving it would be difficult since he has repeatedly and publicly condemned hijackings, kidnappings and bombings as "un-Islamic" and his headquarters is a mosque.

Unlike most other insurgency movements, the Shiites have often used legitimate institutions as centers of operations. "You simply can't raid a mosque or penetrate a cell centered around an Islamic social center," explained a Gulf state intelligence officer. "And even if you did, you would probably be unable to find anything incriminating beyond a copy of the Koran."

2nd, the use of force would also endanger our allies, especially the moderate Moslems who already have problems with fundamentalists at home, in part because of their ties to the United States. Although the fundamentalist crusade is unlikely to bring down other Moslem governments, it can force them through continuing intimidation and terror to accept their extremist tenets.

3rd, the use of force is not foolproof. It carries the danger of defeat that could in turn lead to intervention by the Soviets or others. The basis of the conflict is both political and religious, impervious to the use of force.

The second policy option is economic sanctions, which is unlikely to work because of Iran's oil. Iran's revolution has proven to be defiantly durable, surviving the drain of earlier sanctions, the challenge from opposition groups both right and left, the trauma of almost five years of war and the isolation and hostility incurred because of its policies. The reality is that many Iranians, who are already living with meat and fuel rationing, appear to be prepared to endure further hardships to protect their Islamic form of government.

American vulnerability, on the other hand, has never been greater. More than 55,000 American diplomats and federal civilian employees now live abroad in 10,000 different facilities—not including thousands of American military personnel at bases around the world. The State Department unofficially estimates that more than 1.7 million American civilians live overseas. Merely tightening security, discouraging the use of certain international airports or spending millions to improve diplomatic installations is not going to prevent further attacks.

To end the Shiites' war against the United States, the Reagan administration has no alternative but to defuse the tension with Iran, which has led Islam to its first total "victory" of this century, causing most serious militants to follow the Iranian lead.

As unpopular or uncomfortable as it may be, especially after two major hostage traumas and the rapidly increasing toll of American lives, the United States must then begin looking at the possibility of rapprochement with Iran. It is a bitter pill to swallow, but no other option is effective or practical for a democracy. Equally important, the war is unwinnable.

Just a year ago, I would never have believed I would write these words, after watching rescuers dig through rubble at two American embassies and the Marine compound in Beirut looking for my friends, who were often recovered in bits and pieces. But a certain degree of realism is needed to avoid the loss of more lives, without America's seeming to cave in or concede.

The Iranian revolution is not a mirage, and the elimination of certain radical mullahs or activists will not make it or the crusade disappear. Most Middle East

experts now agree that, despite Iran's many ongoing problems, Khomeinism—or rule based on Islam—is certain to survive Ayatollah Khomeini.

The United States now needs to demonstrate the maturity and confidence of a superpower. Indeed, the outcome of this confrontation with Moslem extremists may depend more on the political initiative by the United States than on the success of Iranian propaganda and the training of suicide commandos at Iranian bases.

Rapprochement will not be quick, or easy, especially for a nation where elections are held every four years. It will not reach fruition during the Reagan administration. And it will probably not happen during the lifetime of Ayatollah Khomeini. But that does not mean that the United States should not position itself by laying the groundwork earlier, which also might help save American lives during the period in between. The alternative is continued conflict and possible further escalation and higher death tolls.

And there are some hopeful signs. "No matter how virulent their rhetoric, the Iranian leaders have finally come to believe that the very survival of their revolution will be in jeopardy if they fail to cope with mounting domestic political and economic pressures by breaking down the walls of their international isolation," Prof. Ramazani said this week.

In fact, Iran is moving to end its isolation. This year economic ties with Europe have almost returned to prerevolutionary levels. Japan and West Germany are now among Iran's main trading partners. Behind-the-scene contacts have begun with western states as well as Islamic rivals, including the Saudi foreign minister, who visited Tehran last month.

Iranians have also occasionally allowed pragmatic considerations to overshadow attempts to export their revolution, including not closing the strategic oil lanes to the West through the Strait of Hormuz, comparative restraint in responding to Iraq's aerial strikes on tankers ferrying oil from Iran and the ongoing, if troubled, relationship with other Moslem states in OPEC. The Iranians also did not retaliate when the Saudis, aided by U.S. AWAC aircraft, shot down one of their planes in mid-1984.

The major pragmatic consideration for Iran and the Shiite extremists is that the war with the United States is unwinnable, even though they can wreak havoc and destabilize governments along the way.

During the rapprochement process, neither side need "succumb" or lose face—as important a factor to a comparatively young American nation, especially after the Vietnam War, as it is to the Oriental Moslems. No one need apologize or acknowledge fault since neither side can alter the past, or bring back the dead.

The United States could relay quiet messages through intermediaries that it recognizes the Islamic Republic of Iran has a wide base of support, and that the United States has no intention of repeating the CIA-sponsored operation that restored power to the shah in the 1950s—which would be folly anyway. Such messages would go a long way toward easing the tension.

Sending a message to Iran would also deal with what is at the core of the conflict and what the militants want from the United States: They are seeking respect and independence on equal terms instead of being looked at as client states or as pawns in bipolar games. They feel the United States is a current and future threat because the Americans have a record of intervention. They use terror since it is the only effective weapon that an emerging movement can use to challenge a superpower.

Precedents for rapprochement do exist—with the Soviet Union in the 1930s, after thousands of American troops, along with forces from 15 other nations, failed to stamp out the Bolshevik movement in Russia after World War I, and with China in 1972, after 23 years of a cold war, broken by two "hot" wars with Asian communists.

The theocratic regime in Iran, which has consolidated its hold on power, is now more secure than during the era when Carter attempted to improve relations to help end the United States' first hostage crisis. Indeed, some Iranian leaders have even hinted at a willingness to begin contacts with the West again. In a speech to the Iranian parliament, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Vellayati said last year: "The world is determined on the diplomatic scene. If we are not present, it will be determined without us."

The stakes are too high, the alternative too deadly, for the option of rapprochement to be discarded simply because it means acknowledgment of Iran, a former client state turned hostile, as a major new dynamic force. The goal must be to channel the growing destructive energies behind the Islamic Republic and the many arms of the crusade into a constructive form.

As Ibn Khaldun, a 14th century Moslem philosopher, wrote: "Man's distinguishing characteristic is the ability to think . . . and through thinking to cooperate." The Koran itself demands of the faithful: "And if they incline towards peace, incline yourself also towards it."

APPENDIX 3

THE ISLAMIC JIHAD GROUPS

by James Piscatori
Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic radicalism have appeared in a variety of forms. Much attention has been particularly given to the Islamic Jihad Organization because of its association with violent activities. But very little can be said of it for certain. There is even a dispute as to whether "Islamic Jihad" exists as a single organization; some people argue that it is simply a convenient label for a variety of uncoordinated terrorist activities.

Islamic Jihad is probably the general name for several groups that form a loose terrorist network linked to Iran, Syria, and perhaps also to Libya and the Syrian-supported Saiqa faction of the PLO. Other names that have been used are the "Hussein Suicide Commandos"; "Defenders of the Islamic Revolution"; and the "Khaibar Brigade". Another group, "The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims", does not seem to be related and has concentrated its attacks on British diplomats and citizens.

Jihad is an Arabic word that is most often translated as "holy war", though it also has the more general connotation of religiously-inspired "striving" or "effort". Those who participate in Jihad are called mujahidin, and if they fall in battle, they become martyrs and are guaranteed a place in Paradise. Jihad is thus a highly emotive term and is invoked by many different Muslims, both Sunnis and Shi'ites, who all seek to legitimize their particular struggle -- e.g., by anti-Soviet Afghans, anti-Khomeini Iranians, or anti-Israeli and anti-American Lebanese.

In the particular case of Lebanon, the common thread of Jihad groups is the desire to establish an Islamic state -- though this remains undefined -- and to eliminate anyone -- Israeli, American, Christian, Arab or pro-Western Muslim -- who appears to stand in the way. In this regard, they have singled out Americans, the French, Saudis, and Kuwaitis: Americans for their direct intervention in Lebanese affairs and alliance with Israel; the French for their similar intervention in Lebanon and for selling arms to the Saudis; the Saudis for generally supporting American policy; and the Kuwaitis for supporting Iraq in the Gulf War and for failing to release 17 people convicted of bomb attacks in Kuwait in December 1983.

The Islamic Jihad groups must be seen in the context of Lebanese Shi'ite politics. Most Shi'ites acknowledge the spiritual guidance of Musa Sadr, an Iranian-born cleric who organized a social and political movement to improve the Shi'ites' position. This is known as Amal ("Hope"). When Musa Sadr mysteriously disappeared while visiting Libya in 1978, there was contention over who should lead Amal. In 1980, Nabih Berri, a lawyer, emerged as its head, but others were resentful and particularly objected to his joining a political coalition of Bashir Gemayel and Walid Jumblatt in 1982. When this happened, Hussein al-Musawi broke away from Berri's Amal to form a less compromising group, Islamic Amal.

For all intents and purposes, Islamic Amal is part of a broader political movement, Hizbullah, "the Party of God." Hizbullah was originally centered in the Bekaa Valley and called for an Iranian-style revolution in Lebanon. Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, Abbas al-Musawi, and Hassan Nasrallah are important figures in it, but its spiritual leader is Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, whose popularity has helped the Hizbullah to extend its support outside the Bekaa to the Shi'ite suburbs of Beirut.

Because of his reputed connection with Islamic Jihad, Fadlallah was the target of a car bomb attack in March 1985 by a group that evidently received training (although no authorization) from the CIA. However, Fadlallah repeatedly denies that he advocates violence and has even questioned whether any organization called Islamic Jihad really exists; he says it is a "telephone organization" only. There is no clear proof of his connection with terrorist activities, but it is known that he is close to Hussein al-Musawi whose involvement in the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in April 1983 and of the U.S. and French military headquarters in October 1983 is also suspected. Fadlallah is also thought to be close to Abu Haydar al-Mussawi, head of the Hussein Suicide Commandos and cousin of Hussein al-Musawi.

The Islamic Jihad groups appear to be the commando units of al-Musawi's Islamic Amal, or broadly speaking, of Hizbullah. In short, Islamic Amal seems to be the military wing of Hizbullah, and the Jihad groups the commando wing of the Islamic Amal. Despite these roots in Lebanon, the Jihad groups are essentially transnational in character.

The connection with Iran is clear. Sheikh Fadlallah is close to Iranian clerics and to the Da'wa ("Islamic Call") group in Iraq that seeks to overthrow the Ba'thist government in Baghdad and that receives Iranian help. Hussein al-Musawi receives direct support from Iran as well -- from the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard) troops in the Bekaa and from Tehran. The Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Tehran is the center for this support. It runs training camps in Ahwaz, Tabriz, Qum, Isfahan, and Tehran where recruits spend approximately three months learning military skills from diverse instructors (Iranians, Afghans, Pakistanis, North Koreans, Libyans) and religious skills mainly from Iranian mullahs. Another indication of the connection with Iran is the fact that David Dodge, acting president of the American University of Beirut who was kidnapped in July 1982, spent the last six months of his captivity in Iran. There have been reports that one of the current hostages, William Buckley, has been moved from Lebanon to Iran.

The Syrian connection is also strong. There are training camps in the Bekaa set up and run by the Syrians, and the Iranian Embassy in Damascus is an important conduit of Iranian support to the Lebanese groups. The relationship with Libya is uncertain, but the Egyptians believe that Qaddafi was behind the Jihad's claim in August to have mined the Red Sea. Evidence linking Jihad groups to PLO factions, notably Saiqa, is circumstantial, but it is believed that Saiqa was involved in the attack on the American and French military headquarters in 1983.

The Lebanese Jihad groups have links with similar groups elsewhere in the Middle East. There is a particularly close connection with the Da'wa group and the Islamic Amal group in Iraq. Sheikh Fadlallah is an intellectual disciple of the founder of the Da'wa Party, Muhammad Baqir Sadr, and has incorporated Da'wa members into his Hizbullah Party in Lebanon. There is also a close connection with the Islamic Amal of Muhammad Taki al-Mudarrissi, which has operated mainly within Iraq but is also linked to the Islamic Amal in Lebanon. The hijacking of a Kuwait jet and the subsequent murder of 2 American passengers in December 1984 were the work of Lebanese extremists and Iraqi Da'wa members. An Islamic Jihad group claimed responsibility for the attempted assassination of the Kuwaiti Emir in May 1985, but the Kuwaiti government has identified the attacker as a member of the Da'wa group based in Iraq. There is speculation that Lebanese Jihad groups are linked to the Jihad group in Egypt (responsible for the assassination of President Sadat), but there is not direct evidence of this.

Jihad groups have also been active outside the Middle East. In March 1984 a group calling itself Islamic Jihad threatened to attack the British, French, Italian and American embassies in Jakarta. In Spain such a group has claimed responsibility or been blamed for an attempt on the life of a Kuwaiti publisher in August 1984, the murder of a Saudi engineer in September 1984, and the killing of 18 people at a restaurant outside Madrid frequented by American servicemen in April 1985. In France Islamic Jihad has claimed responsibility for an attack on a Paris cinema in March 1985 during a Jewish film festival. In June 1985, Islamic Jihad commandos claimed to have hijacked an American plane in Athens.

There is no proof that these incidents in Europe were the work of one organization, or that they were coordinated. But intelligence experts believe that there is some connection between them and that, in addition to the links with Iran, Syria and perhaps Libya, there may be links with European terrorist organizations, such as Direct Action in France, the Red Army Faction in Germany, and the Red Brigades in Italy.

An Islamic Jihad group has threatened to assassinate President Reagan and to attack American interests in the Middle East, Europe and the United States itself.

APPENDIX 4

PAPER SUBMITTED BY JOHN ESPOSITO, ENTITLED "ISLAMIC REVIVALISM"

Six years have passed since Americans and much of the world were stunned by the Iranian revolution. The American media had been fostering images of a moderate ally, ruled by an enlightened Shah, committed to the rapid modernization of Iranian society. As recently as New Year's Eve of 1978, President Carter had visited Tehran and toasted Iran as an "island of stability." With this background, the fall of the Shah and the subsequent seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran seemed incomprehensible.

No image of the revolution was initially more baffling than that of gun-toting mullahs leading a broad-based, popular revolution under the banner of a world religion—Islam. Thus did the Iranian revolution signal a phenomenon that had gone largely unnoticed by most analysts and policymakers, the reemergence of Islam as a major political force in the Muslim World.

Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, religion has continued to play an important role in Muslim politics. Anwar Sadat's assassination, terrorist attacks against American Embassies and personnel, and implementation of Islamic laws from Sudan to Malaysia all serve as examples. But what is this phenomenon called "Islamic Revivalism," "Islamic Resurgence," or "Islamic Fundamentalism?" Why has it occurred, what does it mean, and where is it going?

Islamic revivalism in its broadest sense refers to a renewal of Islam in Muslim personal and public life. Its manifestations include an increase in religious observances (mosque attendance, Ramadan fast, wearing traditional Islamic dress); a revitalization of sufi (mystical) orders; proliferation of religious publications and media programming; calls for the implementation of Islamic law; creation of Islamic banks; and the growth of Islamic organizations and activist movements.

Growing out of this context, Islamic revivalism has led to the reassertion of Islam in politics. Incumbent governments appeal to Islam for political legitimacy and popular support for policies and programs. Opposition movements use the language and symbols of Islam to criticize established governments, and to advocate actions ranging from socio-political reform to violent revolutionary action.

The forms that Islamic revivalism takes vary almost infinitely from one country to another, but there are certain recurrent themes: a sense that existing political, economic, and social systems have failed; a disenchantment with and even rejection of the West; a quest for identity and greater authenticity; and the conviction that Islam provides a self-sufficient ideology for state and society, a valid alternative to secular nationalism, socialism, and capitalism.

This paper will consider such general factors, then apply them to actual situation in brief case studies of Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Malaysia. Several conclusions will be drawn:

- There is a great divergency of opinion within Muslim societies over who should lead the way toward Islamic revival and over what interpretation of Islam should prevail.
- Muslim nations need to work out syntheses between indigenous values and imported modern technology, as have Japan and other non-western nations. This will be long and difficult process, requiring a higher degree of consensus about the nature of Islam than currently exists. Deep-seated suspicions of the West also obstruct this process.
- Some forms of Islamic revival have been facilitated by Arab oil wealth, but not root causes lie elsewhere.
- The Iranian revolution was made possible by a combination of factors intrinsic to that country and is unlikely to be repeated elsewhere, at least on anything resembling the Iranian model.
- Western observers should view Islamic revivalism objectively, distinguishing between a Muslim majority pursuing moderate aims and a radical minority.
- American policy in the Islamic world should be carried on in a context in which ideological differences between the West, and Islam are recognized and, as far as possible, accepted or at least tolerated.

Recent history

Current Islamic revivalism builds on a considerable tradition of revival and reform. Two historic periods have played particularly important roles in shaping the outlook of contemporary Islamic activists.

During the 18th and 19th centuries, Islamic religio-political movements of a revivalist nature occurred across the Muslim world. In some areas—northern Nigeria, Sudan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Indonesia—Islamic states were established. The leaders of these movements were responding to a perception of social and moral decline, which they attributed to a departure from the straight path of Islam. They saw the political fragmentation of Muslim communities and their economic decline as side effects of this process. A common theme was the need to purify Islam through the suppression of foreign (un-Islamic) practices and to return to the fundamentals of Islam—The Koran and the model of Muhammed and the early Muslim community. These movements consisted of communities of the faithful who were dedicated to the cause of establishing Islamic states and societies through preaching, teaching, and, when necessary, waging holy war. It is this legacy that contemporary Islamic revivalism appropriates.

The second major influence on contemporary Muslim activists is that of the Islamic modernists. Beginning in the late 19th century, a series of Islamic reform movements, collectively known as "Islamic modernism," tried to bridge the gap between their Islamic heritage and modernity, in order to restore the pride, identity, and strength of a debilitated community. Modernists advocated various forms of what was essentially a process of Islamic acculturation, emphasizing the compatibility of Islam with reason, science, and technology. Islamic modernism inspired movement for educational and social reform, and for national independence, but it remained in many ways attractive only to an intellectual elite. Its impact was limited because it failed to produce a systematic reinterpretation of Islam and to develop effective organizations to preserve and propagate its message more broadly in Muslim society. Muslims at the grass roots level remained in the market for concepts that would help them cope with the growing disparity between their religious beliefs and modern times.

It was this need that led to the emergency of Islamic organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Jamaat-i-Islami (The Islamic Society) in what is now Pakistan (see boxes on pages 5 and 7). Their influence as prototypes of contemporary Islamic groupings cannot be overestimated. They have contributed two important dimensions: (1) the belief that Islam affects public policy as much as private worship (which flows from the delineation of Islam as an ideology covering all aspects of life); and (2) the objective of establishing effective organizations to implement an Islamic system of government and law through social programs and political action.

Ideological and psychological alienation from the West

During the postwar era, virtually the entire Muslim world achieved independence from former colonial rulers. Many Muslims did not see this as advancing their causes, however, for in their view their countries continued to be dominated by the West. The elites of these countries were Western-educated and oriented, and their governments modeled political, economic, and social development along Western lines. Not only science and technology but education, law, and the judiciary were based on Western models and institutions, developed in a foreign soil that embodied alien secular values and attitudes.

Islamic activists believe that this imitation of the West has been responsible for a failure of political systems throughout much of the Muslim world. They see these systems as having been unable to provide an ideologically successful basis for national unity and solidarity, and hence to achieve political legitimacy. Despite constitutional and parliamentary forms of government, Muslim rulers are often seen as autocratic heads of corrupt, authoritarian regimes, propped up by support from western governments and multinational corporations. Economically, both Western capitalism and Marxist socialism are rejected, as having failed to redress widespread poverty and the maldistribution of wealth. Ideologically, capitalism is condemned as consumerism, a gross materialism blind to issues of social justice. Marxist socialism is rejected as a godless alternative, striking at the heart of religion. Socially, modernizing reformers are accused of encouraging the westernization and secularization of Muslim societies, a blind pursuit of "valueless" social change. Infatuation with Western models is blamed for moral and cultural decline—the break-

down of the Muslim family, increased crime rates, a permissive, promiscuous society, and spiritual malaise.

Many Islamic activists also reject politico-military dependence on the West. United States policy in the Middle East, including the recent involvement in Lebanon, is viewed as governed by America's special relationship with Israel. The more militant Muslim activists view contemporary Middle Eastern politics in terms of a Judeo-Christian conspiracy or alliance against the Muslim world. If many Americans carry stereotypes of Muslims as "terrorists," many Muslims see Westerners as perpetrators of a "Crusader" mentality towards Islam, which they believe informs a policy of American neocolonialism, both by the government and by the multinationals. Thus they see a danger that America will seek to dominate political, economic and even social life in ways not unlike European imperialism of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

The Early Islamic State as a paradigm

Many political activists in the contemporary Muslim world are inspired by an idealized perception of the Islamic world at the time of the Prophet and his four immediate successors. This concept of the Early Islamic State as a "Golden Age" plays a major role in determining the goals they establish for their own activities. Muhammed's successful union of tribal forces under the banner of Islam, his revolt against the Meccan oligarchy, his creation of a just Islamic society and state, and the extraordinary early expansion of Islam—all are primal events to be recalled and emulated today.

Herein lies the significance and early attraction of the Iranian revolution for many Muslims. Like the early Muslims, the Iranians overcame great odds in the name of Islam, and overthrew a corrupt political and social establishment. Iran provided the first example of a successful modern Islamic revolution. Islam provided the symbols and inspiration for a mass popular revolution against an oppressive, "unIslamic" regime whose ruling elite was supported by the West. Muslims could now re-establish Islamic rule and governance as had occurred in the past when Islamic empires stretched from North Africa to Southeast Asia. The call of Ayatollah Khomeini for the spread of the Islamic revolution struck a chord with Islamic organizations through much of the world.

SELECTED COUNTRY PROFILES

Introduction

Islamic movements and governments manifest a broad range of positions in their ideology, actors, and policies. Islam has been used to legitimate monarchies (Saudi Arabia and Morocco), military regimes (Libya, Sudan, and Pakistan), and a clergy-guided state (Iran). Ideologically, self-styled Islamic regimes span the spectrum from Libya's radical socialist "state of the masses" to the conservative government of the House of Saud. Islamic actors display a similar diversity: clerical and lay, conservative and modernist, highly educated and illiterate, gradualist and terrorist. Islamic organizations vary from the relatively moderate Jamaat-i-Islam in Pakistan and Malaysia's ABIM to the extreme radicalism of Egypt's Takfir wal Hijra, Lebanon's Hizbullah, Indonesia's Commando Jihad, and a variety of others.

Given such diversity, no satisfactory analysis of Islamic revivalism can be based exclusively on factors that are characteristic of the Muslim world as a whole. The country profiles in this section illustrate the interplay between pan-Islamic and local or regional factors, an interplay that produces a textured pattern of Islamic revivalism as rich and varied as that of the world of Islam itself.

Egypt

For Egypt as for much of the Arab world, Israel's quick, decisive, and total defeat of Arab forces in the 1967 war was a catastrophe and a historic turning point. Gaza, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Jerusalem, the third holiest city in Islam, had been lost. Many Western-oriented secular elites concluded that both their nationalist ideologies and their Western friends, who had persisted in supporting Israel, had failed the Arabs. Self-criticism and disillusionment were accompanied by a search for identity, an attempt to anchor Arab pride more firmly in an Arab/Islamic past.

This was the psychological climate Anwar Sadat inherited when he succeeded Gamal Abdul Nasser in 1970. From the outset he appealed to Islam to legitimate his rule and gain popular support. Sadat appropriated the title "The Believer President," had the mass media cover his prayers at the mosque, increased Islamic Programming in the media and Islamic courses in schools, built mosques, and employed Islamic rhetoric in his public statements. Sufi mystical orders and the Muslim

Brotherhood, suppressed by Nasser, were permitted to function freely. The Sadat government supported Islamic student organizations to offset the influence of Nasserites and Marxist students.

Sadat's use of Islam was particularly evident in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The October War was cast in an Islamic mold, appealing to Islamic symbols and slogans. From its code name to its battle cry, it was a holy war. And after than war, Sadat marshalled the support of the religious establishment to legitimate key government policies: the Camp David accords, reforms in family laws, and condemnation of increasing challenges to his regime by Islamic activist groups.

By the mid-1970's Sadat's controlled use of Islam had begun to lose its effectiveness. The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic student organizations were increasingly critical of Sadat policies such as his support for the Shah of Iran and, later, Camp David. A new crop of secret, more radical Islamic Organizations, some founded by disaffected Muslim Brothers, began to challenge the government and what they viewed as Sadat's hypocritical "manipulation" of Islam for his own purposes. In 1974 Shahab Muhammed ("Muhammed's Youth"), also known as the Islamic Liberation Organization, seized the Technical Military Academy in Cairo as part of an attempted coup d'etat. In 1977 another group, Takfir wal Hijra ("Excommunication and Emigration"), kidnapped a former Minister of Religious Affairs and executed him when demands for the release of imprisoned comrades were not met. Although the leaders of the two organizations were executed or imprisoned, many of their followers simply went underground and joined other groups that were now mushrooming, such as Jund Allah ("Army of God") and Jamaat al-Jihad ("Holy War Society").

The militants who formed these radical organizations were not uneducated peasants rejecting modernization and seeking to flee to 7th century desert life. They were from the upwardly mobile professional middle class, often combining early traditional religious schooling with a modern university education. Salih Siriya, founder of Muhammed's Youth, had a Ph.D. in science. Shukri Mustafa, founder of Takfir, held a B.S. in agriculture. Al-Jihad's leadership was a cross-section of the society to which these groups appeal: civilian, military and religious. It included Muhammad al-Farag, its ideologue (whose *The Forgotten Obligation* reasserted the belief that jihad is the sixth pillar of Islam); Colonel Abbud al-Zumur and Lieutenant Khalid Istambuli, who were responsible for the recruitment, planning, and assassination of Sadat; and Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, the cleric whose rulings provided religious sanction for an-Jihad's actions.

Springing up in provincial towns and cities, such groups recruited heavily among university students and at private (non-government supported) mosques. Despite internal differences they all condemned contemporary Egyptain society as anti-Islamic and controlled by infidels, western laws and lifestyle. Sadat's open door policy to greater trade and thus economic dependence on the West, and Egypt's break with the Arab World over Camp David were opposed as capitulation to the West and a betrayal of Islam. All demanded the reimplementation of Islamic law and believed that, given the decadence of society, armed struggle was the only solution, the only acceptable form of jihad, obligatory for all true believers. In October 1981 Anwar Sadat, the believer president, was assassinated.

Egyptian politics during the 1970's provides a clear example of the way in which a politicized Islam has been used by both government and opposition forces. It vividly demonstrates how a regime's appeal to Islam can prove to be a two-edged sword—how a useful source of legitimacy can become in turn a yardstick for judgment and condemnation.

Pakistan

Pakistan is unique in the Muslim World in that Islam is the primary reason for its statehood. It was born as a homeland for Muslims when British India was partitioned in 1947. Throughout the postwar era, the struggle to define and institutionalize Pakistan's Islamic identity has remained unresolved.

The 1971 civil war that led to the loss of East Pakistan and its re-creation as Bangladesh caused the question of national identity and ideology to resurface. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a socialist, came to power at a moment when many were questioning Pakistan's very *raison d'être* as an Islamic state. Largely for economic and strategic reasons, Bhutto turned Pakistan away from India and concentrated the nation's attention on strengthening its ties with its oil-rich neighbors on the Gulf. Partly to support this effort, his regime consciously stressed Islamic ties. It used slogans like "Islamic socialism," hosted an Islamic Summit Conference, passed new laws and regulations, and increased government sponsorship of Islamic activities.

None of these activities assuaged growing domestic criticism. By 1977 a spectrum of Bhutto's religious and political opposition had formed a coalition movement, the

Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), led by religious parties such as Mawlana Mawdudi's Jamaat-i-Islami (see box). The PNA used Islamic ideology, symbols, and political rhetoric to condemn Bhutto's policies as a hypocritical manipulation of Islam. The pervasive mosque-mullah network throughout Pakistan provided an informal system for communications, political organization and action. Bhutto reacted to his Islamic critics by introducing more Islamic measures and promising more Islamic law. Thus the appeal to Islamic legitimacy by both the Bhutto government and its opposition had led to the reemergence of Islam as a major political force.

When General Zia ul-Haq seized power in 1977, he moved quickly to legitimize his coup and martial law regime in the name of Islam. Bhutto was imprisoned and executed, and Zia pledged to realize Pakistan's Islamic identity and ideology by Islamizing the system of government and law. General Zia's program of Islamization has by now significantly affected political, legal, and social aspects of Pakistan life.

Politically, Zia has used Islam to justify his martial law regime. Though he originally promised elections within 90 days of taking power, elections were cancelled or postponed for seven years and all political parties were officially disbanded while the government sought to determine whether its Western-based political system was Islamic. Zia appointed a consultative Federal Advisory Council to fill, at least temporarily, the void created by the continued absence of elected provincial and federal assemblies.

Recently, Zia held a referendum in which people were asked to approve his Islamization program—on the understanding that such approval would also constitute authority for Zia's continuing as President for another five years. The turnout was unimpressive—perhaps 20–35% of the electorate—but such votes as were cast were overwhelmingly for Islamization. In subsequent elections held to determine membership in the national and provincial assemblies, the Jamaat-i-Islami fared poorly, as did candidates closely identified with Zia's regime.

Pakistan's legal system has been reviewed and laws amended to conform with Islamic law. The Penal Code has been amended to permit such penalties as amputation for theft, flogging for drinking alcohol, and stoning for adultery. A Federal Shariah Court has been established to review all petitions challenging the Islamic acceptability of Pakistan's laws. The court has reviewed such issues as the permissibility of cinema, the playing of women's sports before a mixed audience, the stoning of adulterers and whether women can serve as judges.

On the economic front, a potentially far-reaching change is the abolition of interest or usury. In January 1981 interest-free bank accounts were introduced on a voluntary basis on all Savings and Fixed Deposit (time deposit) accounts. The system, called Profit/Loss Sharing (PLS) is based on the traditional banking institution of *mudaraba*, under which a depositor and the bank enter into a partnership and share in profits or losses.

The trend toward Islamic revivalism has sharply affected the status of women. Examples are the increasing debate in the newspapers as to whether a sari is Islamic, incidents in which women with uncovered heads have been reprimanded and even accosted in public, the banning of women's hockey before mixed audiences, and the issuance of *fatwas* (legal opinions) by some religious leaders declaring that women may not hold public office. The example of the post-revolutionary Iranian government's actions regarding women's status—from veiling to the repeal of Iran's progressive Family Protection Act—have reinforced many women's fears that Pakistan's *ulama*, who have been vocal in their pronouncements in the mosque and the media, will persuade the country to follow a similar path.

The revision of Pakistan's Law of Evidence Act also reinforced the fears of many Pakistani women. The draft submitted by the Islamic Ideology Council, with support from the vast majority of religious leaders, incorporates the traditional Islamic legal viewpoint that the evidence of two women equals that of one Muslim male.

Islamization in Pakistan has travelled a rocky road. When Zia ul-Haq assumed power in July 1977, his commitment to the implementation of an Islamic system of government was greeted with skepticism by some but with enthusiasm by many. Since then the reassertion of Islamic identity and ideology in Pakistan appears to have created more conflict and questions than unity and harmony. The use of Islam to legitimate military rule, cancel elections, outlaw political parties, impose Islamic taxes and punishments, and ban alcohol and certain forms of entertainment has caused many to ask "Whose Islam?", and "To what ends?"

Iran

During the 1960's and early 1970's many sectors of Iranian society became increasingly opposed to the autocratic regime of the Shah. This trend was supported and reinforced by a more generalized discontent arising from the fast pace of mod-

ernization and westernization. In the face of the regime's refusal to entertain demands for broader political participation, an alliance evolved between traditional religious leaders and lay intellectuals.

For the religious classe, Pahlavi rule had come to mean the erosion of their status and sources of revenue, the undermining of their ideology, institutions and values, and the imposition of an alien way of life. Meanwhile, many non-clerical Iranian intellectuals, including some who had benefited from Western-style educations, had become gravely concerned about the influence of the West, especially the United States, upon Iranian politics and society. America through its CIA had helped the Shah return from exile in 1953. Since that time, American advisers had played a major role in the training and development of Iran's military and secret police as well as its economy. By 1978 there were 41,100 Americans in Iran. The growing American diplomatic, military, and corporate presence, and the very nature of Iran's Western-oriented development programs, fueled fears of a loss of national autonomy and identity.

Military and economic dependency were matched by the progressive westernization of Iranian education and society. Religious and lay shared a common concern about cultural alienation due to what the secular intellectual, Jalal Ali Ahmad, called "Westoxification" or "Weststruckness," that is, the indiscriminate borrowing from and dependence on the West.

As opposition mounted within Iran, Shia Islam emerged as the most viable vehicle for an effective mass movement. It provided a common set of symbols, a historic identity, and a value system which was non-Western, indigenous, and broadly appealing. It also offered an ideological framework within which a variety of factions could function. The religious leadership was untained by cooperation with the government, and also provided a hierarchical organization and leadership in its charismatic Ayatollahs. A number of them (the Ayatollahs Khomeini, Talleqani, and Shariatmadari) had suffered under the Shah for their opposition to the government. Moreover, Islamic lay reformers like Ali Shariati and Mehdi Bazargan enjoyed wide respect, especially among an alienated and increasingly militant younger generation. The ubiquitous system of mullahs and mosques provided a natural informal communications network.

Most importantly, Shia Islam offered an ideological view of history that gave meaning and legitimacy to an opposition movement, for in a very real sense Shi-ism is itself a religion of protest. Unlike Sunni Islam with its sense that early success and power were signs of God's favor, Shia history documents the persistent denial or frustration of God's will regarding leadership of the Islamic community. The martyrdom of Ali's son Hussein in 680 AD, and its annual ritual reenactment during the month of Muharram, provide Shi-ism with the character of a protest or opposition movement in which a small but righteous party struggles against overwhelming forces of evil. This battle against social injustice and corruption is to continue until, with God's guidance, a messianic guide or mahdi returns as leader to usher in God's rule and a socially just society.

Thus Shia Islam, the religion of most Iranians, provided the ideology and symbols for a popular revolutionary struggle. For many Iranians the Shah and his overwhelmingly strong army, like that which martyred Hussein, represented the evils of corruption and social injustice. Under the umbrella of these revolutionary symbols, different groups in the Iranian political spectrum, from secularists to conservatives and Islamic modernists, and from liberal democrats to Marxists, joined together.

All of these groups shared the goals of overthrowing the Shah and creating a more indigenously rooted regime. However, the religious and political outlooks and agendas of these groups were highly diverse. For many, the Islamic alternative meant a return to Islam, the establishment of an Islamic state and society. Others wished to restore national pride and identity through a conscious incorporation of Iran's Persian/Shia cultural heritage within its modernization process. Sharp differences among the various revolutionary factions came to the surface as soon as the Shah was overthrown and Iran's new leaders turned to the task of implementing the concept of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Central to the argument were the questions of where the clergy would stand in relation to the state, and the implementation of Islamic law. There were two major schools of thought. The liberal constitutionalists were willing to give the clergy an indirect role in government through the creation of a committee of religious scholars who could veto any law judged contrary to Islam. This group included Islamic modernists, secularists, and some religious leaders like Ayatollah Shariatmadari. The second group led by Ayatollah Khomeini and supported by a majority of the mullahs advocated direct rule by the religious leaders and the full implementation of traditional Islamic law. The latter position won.

While the new constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran has many of the provisions for a modern parliamentary system of government, Ayatollah Khomeini and his Council of Guardians oversee the conduct of the state. Moreover, the clergy-dominated Islamic Republic Party controls the Parliament. Under Khomeini's doctrine of Velayati-Fagih ("Governance of the Jurist"), Islamic government is defined as the rule of Islamic law, as interpreted by the supreme leader or Islamic jurist. Using this doctrine, Khomeini oversees affairs of state, approving the credentials of the President and the Prime Minister, serving as Supreme Commander of the Army, and so forth. Thus the responsibility not only for overseeing the government, but for determining how Iran's Islamic identity and ideology will be defined has been concentrated in a group of religious leaders led by Ayatollah Khomeini.

This system continues to enjoy a considerable measure of support. It has, however provoked division and dissent, involving some of the leading Islamic figures in the revolution. Dissident Ayatollahs like Shariatmadari have been isolated and silenced; Mehdi Bazargan (Iran's first Prime Minister after the Shah's departure) resigned; Iran's President Abol Hasan Banisadr fled the country; and Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, a former aide to Khomeini and foreign minister, was executed for plotting Khomeini's assassination.

While Islamic symbolism functioned effectively as a battle cry and standard for the revolution, it has proven more difficult to fashion a new identity and ideology for Iran out of Islamic doctrine. So far, the introduction of Islamic government and law has included restrictive press and book censorship, measures to assure the ideological purity of university professors and curricula, restrictions on women's participation in society, and prohibitions on alcohol, gambling, night clubs, drug use, and sexual offenses. Islamic judges and courts have been used to justify the punishment and execution of individuals convicted of offenses ranging from drug smuggling to homosexuality to political dissent. The abuses of the court system became so blatant at one point the Ayatollah Khomeini himself issued a warning to Islamic judges.

It can be argued that Iran's Islamic Government has succeeded in creating an infrastructure out of the chaos that inevitably follows a mass popular revolution. In the process it has managed to retain the support of the majority of the population, with patriotism arising from the Iran-Iraq war presumably providing some extra support. But the question arises, "At what price." Although the experiences of Pakistan and Iran are in many ways dissimilar, the respective efforts at Islamization raise similar questions: "Whose Islam is this?" and "Why emphasize a negative Islam?"

Malaysia

Malay Muslims constitute slightly under half the country's present population. They dominate the government, its leadership, and its political parties. Chinese constitute 38% of the population and are economically vigorous, non-Muslim, and largely urban. The majority of the Malays are still rural although great strides in their economic status have occurred since 1969. During that year Malay resentment over their perception that they were falling farther and farther behind the Chinese, economically and politically, exploded in anti-Chinese riots that left hundreds of dead and wounded, and caused Parliament to be suspended for almost two years. During that period, Malaysia's National Operations Council instituted a far-reaching "New Economic Policy" for Malay uplift. Islam, already a critical element in Malay cultural identity, became an even more powerful ideological and political force and deeply reinforced previously existing communalism.

Before the riots the government has pursued a pluralistic approach in public life. Although the special position of Malays was guaranteed by the Constitution, Chinese and Indians had prospered while Malays, relatively, had not. The New Economic Policy set out to reduce economic and educational disparities through an affirmative action program of special rights, quotas and subsidies for Malays in business, industry and education. While the program has encouraged Malay socio-economic development, it has also reinforced the bond between religion and ethnicity, as part of a process of renewing and reasserting Malay pride, identity and solidarity.

This has been particularly evident among the younger generation of Malay students and university graduates. As in Egypt and other Muslim countries, urban universities have become centers of Islamic revivalism. Uprooted from the integrated life and security of their rural environments and trust into modern, westernized cities dominated by non-Malays, many Malay youths turned to their Islamic heritage to preserve their sense of identity. Meanwhile, Malay students returning from studies in the United Kingdom and the United States have come back with an Is-

lamic commitment reinforced by exposure to students from other Muslim countries, and to the thinking of Islamic revivalists from the Arab World, Iran and Pakistan.

Events elsewhere in the Muslim World have also influenced Malaysia's Islamic Revival. The Arab-Israeli war and the oil embargo of 1973 brought an outpouring of popular Islamic sentiment and stronger governmental and non-governmental ties with the Arab world. Pakistan's Islamization program and Iran's Islamic revolution encouraged Islamic activists. At the same time, concern about the influence of Iranian and Libyan radicalism contributed to government sensitivity to Islamic sentiments and issues.

The United Malays National Organization (UMNO) has been the leading Malay party since the early 1950's. UMNO has been pragmatic and politically deft. However, it is rivalled by the less secular, more fundamentalist Pan Malaysian Party (PAS), which appeals primarily to rural Malays. PAS cannot match the smoothly functioning, well-financed UMNO party machinery, but its rejection of UMNO's secularism and Islamic modernism gives it a powerful inchoate grassroots appeal.

During recent years the Malaysian Government has emphasized Islam both domestically and internationally, for reasons relating to internal politics as well as the personal beliefs of its leaders. On the domestic front, it has provided support for expanded coverage of Islam in the mass media, for school and university curricula, for a new International Islamic University, for an Islamic Bank and insurance company, and for religious organizations. Public speeches by political leaders have often relied heavily on Islamic rhetoric to gain support for social and economic policies.

Internationally, Islam has been invoked to obtain cooperation and economic help from oil-rich Arab states, and to promote Malaysian exports to these countries. Malaysia plays an active and important role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, as well as organizing Islamic conferences on its own, for example in the fields of youth and missionary activities (dakwah).

Meanwhile, Islamic revivalism in Malaysia has encouraged the development of an Islamic opposition. In large-part this has been due to the rapid spread of the dakwah (dawah) movement. *Dakwah* ("the call") refers not simply to traditional missionary organizations committed to the conversion of non-believers, but also to those who seek to make believers better practicing Muslims. These organizations tend to condemn the tendency of Western and Chinese values to subvert Malay Muslim identity, integrity and solidarity. They advocate a return to Islam as a total way of life. The dakwah movement embraces a variety of groups. It includes underground radicals, and revivalist communities that emulate seventh century Arab Islamic dress and life. It also includes the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM), created to mobilize Muslim students and young professionals to spread Islamic revivalism in Malaysia and to implement socio-economic reforms. Anwar Ibrahim, the charismatic founder-president of ABIM, proved so successful that Prime Minister Mahathir brought him into the government as a cabinet minister—an act that the government's Islamic opposition views as a further effort to coopt Islam and blunt its demands for a more Islamic state.

Malaysia's attempt to improve the status of its Malay Muslims has been successful, but at a cost. In a pluralistic state, Islam has become a major point of contention in political life, dividing Malay Muslims among themselves and heightening concern among non-Malays about their future. The examples of infringement on non-Muslim rights in the Islamic Republics of Iran and Pakistan underscore for non-Malays the potential threat of Islamic revivalism in Malaysia. The Malaysian Government has shown sensitivity to non-Malay concerns about Islamization, and has indicated it will modify and stretch out the time-table for achieving New Economic Policy goals. However, it will have to walk a narrow path between heightened Malay aspirations and Chinese feelings of being disadvantaged.

ISSUES

Islam and the State

Muslims are at a crossroads, emerging from European colonial dominance and struggling with the transition from traditional to modern societies. Western observers should not forget the lessons from their own turbulent history—the post-enlightenment debates over the relationship of religion and science, and the political and social upheavals that attended the forging of modern national states. Yet in contrast to the West, the Muslim world has had only a couple of decades or so of political independence. The present reassertion of Islam in political and social life has not been preceded by any protracted period of internally actuated religious and educational reform.

Given this historical backdrop, when the government of a Muslim nation becomes ideologically committed to Islam, questions arise for which there is no obvious consensus. Who is to determine and define the nature of the state and its institutions: monarchs, the military, the clergy, or perhaps the people, through some kind of electoral process? How can traditional notions of community consultation (*shura*) and consensus (*ijma*) be translated into modern representative institutions, such as advisory bodies or elected parliaments? What are the implications of a state's Islamic ideology for the existence and role of competing political parties, for the status of women or religious minorities, or for the expression of religious or political dissent?

A closely related issue concerns the application of sharia, or Islamic law. Because sharia law is believed to provide the basic blueprint for the ideal Muslim society, calls to reinstitute it raise the most fundamental issue facing contemporary Islam—restoration vs. renovation. Is the reinstatement of a more Islamic way of life to be based on the restoration of traditional legal regulations, or on an attempt to reinterpret and reformulate the sharia? At issue here is the question of change—how much is possible and how much is needed. Conservatives tend to turn to traditional beliefs and practices as embodied in medieval legal manuals produced, preserved, and interpreted by the ulama. Reformers wish to use Islamic principles and values to reformulate fresh appropriate responses to modernity.

Judging from events in the Muslim world today, the conservative or traditionalist approach toward sharia law is somewhat more popular than that of the reformers. Until time and experience permit the development of alternative Islamic models, the implementation of Islamic law and values will often mean the imposition of traditional standards. However appropriate these laws and practices may have been in the distant past, their literal application in contemporary times can raise serious issues, for example with regard to restrictions on the social and legal status of women. The attempt to impose Islamic law on non-Muslim communities and other minorities can be even more disruptive in its implications.

Some contemporary political and social uses of Islam also raise questions for which there is no consensus readily at hand. State-imposed Islam in the Sudan, Libya, Pakistan and Iran is seen by many to be a manipulation of religion to enhance legitimacy for authoritarian regimes, and to restrict elections, opposition in political organizations, and dissent generally. Islamization of state and society has often unleashed clerical voices more concerned with restoration of traditional jurisprudence than in seeking a new community consensus (*ijma*) for modern Muslim societies. Too often these voices appear more concerned with controlling women's dress and modesty, and with suppressing minorities such as the Bahai in Iran, the Ahmadi in Pakistan and Nigeria, or the Republican Brothers in the Sudan, than with issues of political freedom and socio-economic justice.

The oil factor

To what extent is the current interest in Islamic revival a product of and dependent on the relatively recent phenomenon of oil wealth? Oil revenues provide a source of renewed pride, new wealth, and funds for a Libya or a Saudi Arabia to extend its influence internationally. Oil revenue has been used to support innumerable international Islamic conferences, organizations, and political activities. Yet it is naive to attribute the Islamic revival mainly to oil.

Islamic revivalism is a product both of general causes found across the Muslim world, and of the specific political and social realities of individual countries. Oil revenue has assisted a process set in motion by other factors but has not itself been the primary cause or catalyst. In many cases, such as the Wahhabi and the Mahdi, and more recently the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic revivalist movements arose before the oil boom and occurred without oil revenues.

The challenge all Muslim states face is to produce a more authentic ideological synthesis that ties them as modern states to their Islamic heritage. Failure to achieve such a synthesis will perpetuate cultural schizophrenia and encourage Islamic political activism, whether or not the individual state concerned has oil itself, or has oil-rich friends.

Is Iran's revolution exportable?

Another issue currently being debated in the West is whether the Iranian revolution has set a precedent that will be followed elsewhere. Is that climatic event a harbinger of the future throughout much of the world of Islam? Recent events in countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Pakistan; an abortive coup in Bahrain; and the eruption of terrorist activities in the Gulf and in Lebanon have all contributed to fears that further Islamic revolutions on the Iranian model are possible, and perhaps even inevitable. These concerns are reinforced by fiery broadcasts by Iran's "Voice of the Islamic Revolution."

And yet, more than six years later, the Iranian revolution remains unique. It is the only example so far of a successful, popularly based, mass-supported Islamic revolution in modern times. In other Muslim states militant groups have occasionally succeeded in disrupting society, but they have been unable to generate enough mass support to seize power. These groups have tended to be relatively small networks, whose leadership, agenda, and actions are primarily local rather than international.

There are several reasons why the Iranian revolution has not been replicated. The Khomeini regime's early excesses dampened enthusiasm, not for the revolution but for the clerical state which followed. The protracted Iraq-Iran war, which both reflected and exacerbated historic Arab-Persian rivalries, introduced issues of real-politik that overrode Muslim solidarity and guaranteed the hostility of many Arab regimes. Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states have deployed oil revenues to support Iraq and have become more sensitive to potential security problems from Shia elements of their populations. Iran's appeal to Iraq's Shia majority has proven ineffective, as Saddam Hussein's regime has moved to enhance Iraq's internal security against the Iranian threat.

Most important, differences between Shia and Sunni Islam militate against clergy-led revolutions in countries where the Sunnis are dominant. Shia Islam, which is predominant in Iran, provides an ideology for protest and revolution; in principle it does not recognize the legitimacy of temporal authority, and it possesses an established clerical hierarchy. However, Sunni Islam long ago developed a more accommodationist approach to state power, accepting the rule even of a tyrant if he officially recognized Islamic law. Moreover, Sunni clergy have traditionally accepted close ties with the state, and Sunni clerics, unlike the Shia, have no hierarchical organization or authority.

ISLAM AND THE WEST

The need for objectivity and understanding

The Muslim world extends from Sub-Saharan Africa through Indonesia. It includes some forty Muslim majority countries and almost one billion people (see map and table on pages 8 and 9). In many of these countries revivalism has not taken a violent turn. Thus it is important to differentiate among the many facets of Islamic revivalism and Islamic activism: a majority of Muslims who struggle for greater self-determination in a moral and just society, versus a small minority of radical extremists seeking to impose the views of their own small group through techniques that are often more ruthless and dictatorial than those of the government they seek to overthrow.

Extremists who advocate radical forms of Islamic revivalism threaten U.S. and other Western interests both directly, through such methods as terrorist attacks against embassies and personnel, and indirectly, when they threaten pro-Western leaders in the Muslim world. For the West, these challenges are both serious and unfamiliar. The intense media coverage of such events, and their impact on public opinion, further complicate the task of American and other policy-makers. The harsh, anti-Western rhetoric extremist groups employ to explain their terrorist actions adds to the emotional impact of the events themselves.

Difficult as the circumstances may be, the overriding need is that Western responses be as calm, analytical, and objective as possible. It is not "coddling terrorism" to try to understand the historical and psychological roots of Islamic revivalism and to be discriminating when judging Islamic movements. We do as much when we distinguish between Catholic or Jewish extremist organizations in Ireland or Israel and mainstream religious organizations. Careful diagnosis of revivalism's many facets is an essential prerequisite to an effective response.

Implications for U.S. policy

(1) For the foreseeable future a radical, alienated minority will continue to engage in terrorism and subversion. However, the vast majority of Islamic revivalists will pursue what they see as a more authentic Islamic future through the peaceful transformation of their society. For these, Islamic revivalism will often continue to take the form of modern Islamic "Call" societies whose goals are propagating the faith and religious education among both Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as social reform organizations such as clinics, hospitals and legal aid societies. While many will remain non-political, others will seek to lobby and participate in the political process. Government attempts to suppress such organizations will only encourage their radicalization.

American interests will best be served by policies that walk a fine line between selective, discreet, and low visibility cooperation with friendly Muslim governments, and a clear public policy concerning the rights of citizens to determine their future.

(2) It is usually the U.S. presence and policy in a given country or region, not a generic hatred of America, that motivates actions against American government and business interests. In Iran, America was perceived as totally associated with an oppressive regime, responsible for the restoration of the Shah to power in 1953 and for his continued rule. The very high American profile made a difficult situation appreciably worse. More recently, in Lebanon, Americans have come to be seen as collaborators with an unpopular government and with the Israelis, rather than as peacemakers—part of the problem rather than part of the solution. American support for Anwar Sadat in his last years, and for the recently deposed Jafar Numeiri in the Sudan, provide further examples. However justifiable on other grounds, that support has been taken by Islamic critics as lending substance to the charge that we buttress unpopular and autocratic “puppet” regimes despite our democratic ideals.

It would appear important, therefore, to exercise caution and selectivity in determining which governments can best profit from our support and how we can best go about providing that support. Recognizing that special relationships with some Muslim rulers can be critical for our strategic objectives, we should also be careful not to antagonize, in the process, popular and authentically representative forces in Muslim societies. A measure of good will can be maintained with such forces through informal contacts and sympathetic understanding of their positions. Meanwhile, a high profile can be self-defeating for all concerned.

(3) There are, of course, no-win situations. Extending arms to a pro-Western regime will be seen by some Islamic groups as an unacceptable effort to prop up a regime they oppose. Refusal to supply the same arms could be seen by others as further evidence of neo-colonialist, anti-Muslim bias. This is particularly likely to be the case in the Middle East, where U.S. policy is often perceived as one of neocolonial expansion based on massive and uncritical support of Israel.

It is not the purpose of this paper to argue for or against specific policies, in the Middle East or elsewhere in the Muslim world. It is important to bear in mind, nonetheless, that the ability of the United States to be perceived as a friend by moderates in the Muslim world is diminished when those moderates, along with more radical and hostile compatriots, see U.S. policies as tinged with neocolonialism, however inaccurate Americans may believe the charge to be. Without a perceptible shift in U.S. Middle East policy, pro-American regimes will continue to be vulnerable, and condemned as client states, especially where the U.S. maintains a major military or multinational presence or provides substantial assistance. Americans must remember that criticism of U.S. policy is voiced by moderates as well as radicals.

Afghanistan represents a unique opportunity. Active and visible involvement by the United States in helping the mujahideen and raising the issue in international forums can earn considerable good will from Muslims throughout the world.

(4) Even if a major shift in America's Middle East policy were to take place, problems for the U.S. would persist. This is because of the fairly widespread perception that the U.S. constitutes the most important cultural threat to traditional Islamic life and values. Western ideas, literature, dress, music and movies have proven a seductive alternative for modern Muslim elites and youth. This threat is seen as implicit in modern legal, social and educational reforms, and symbolized by the presence of American advisers, banks and corporations. Thus, for many of the more conservative as well as the more radical Islamic activists, the American presence represents a danger to Islam.

It is not modernization through the application of modern technology and science that is being rejected, but rather a competing ideology of Western ideas and values. Islamic revolutionaries, like most other Muslims, do not shun modern transportation, housing, electricity, communications, or oil technology. The problem is not radio and television, but its programming. The gap is ideological, not technological or economic. It will not be bridged by a change in policy, but its force as a divisive factor can be mitigated by sensitivity and careful handling. In particular, the United States should ordinarily take care to avoid being seen as intervening in state-initiated Islamization programs, or as opposing the activities of Islamic organizations, where such programs or activities do not directly threaten important U.S. interests.

American policy in the Muslim world should, in short, be carried on in a context in which ideological differences between the West and Islam are recognized and, to the greatest extent possible, accepted or at least tolerated.

COMMONLY USED CONCEPTS

Westernization: The attempt to adapt to modern conditions through uncritical imitation of Western institutions and culture. Attacked by many contemporary Islamic revivalists as "Westomania" or "Westoxification."

Islamic Modernism: Late 19th and early 20th century Islamic reform movements which tried to revitalize the Muslim community by appropriating the best of Western science and technology, and offering Islamic rationales for modern political, legal and social change.

Fundamentalism and Traditionalism: All Islamic revivalists are fundamentalist in their insistence on a return to the fundamentals of Islam, that is, the Koran, and the "Example" or Sunnah of the Prophet. For some, the Early Islamic Community must be restored. For others, the Islamic model to be followed is that developed by the clergy during the first several centuries of Islam and preserved in medieval manuals of Islamic law (the sharia).

Establishment Islam vs. Populist Islam: Establishment Islam is state imposed and implemented by ruling elites and heads of government, often with the cooperation of the religious establishment. Populist Islam is based on grass-roots organizations and is aimed at introducing change from below.

Independent Judgment or "Ijtihad": Ijtihad is the application of independent judgment in applying the Koran and the Prophetic traditions to contemporary issues.

Jihad: "Struggle in the path of God." Striving to realize God's will in individual and community life. Thus jihad includes the struggle to lead a virtuous life, establish a just social order and, if necessary, wage war in defense of Islam.

Sharia: Islamic law as derived from divine revelation (the Koran) and the example of the Prophet (Sunnah) through the interpretation of the ulama.

Ulama: The "learned"; religious scholars.

Mullah: A local religious leader or preacher.

Ayatollah: Literally, a sign or exemplar of God; a title given to a leading Shia religious scholar.

IDEOLOGICAL WORLD VIEW OF ISLAMIC ACTIVISTS

The following beliefs provide the ideological frame for Islamic organizations:

(1) Islam is a total way of life. Therefore religion is integral to politics, state, and society.

(2) The political, military, and economic weakness of Muslims is due to having strayed from Islam and followed western, secular, materialistic ideologies and values. Both western liberal nationalism and Marxist socialism have failed because they are antithetical to Islam.

(3) Islam, as found in the guidance of the Koran, in the practice of the Prophet, and in the example of the early Islamic community/state provides the true alternative ideology for Muslim life.

(4) Therefore Muslims must reestablish God's rule, the Kingdom of God on earth, by reinstating Islamic law, the blueprint for society.

(5) The method for the renewal and reform of Muslim society is an Islamic political and social revolution, like that of the Prophet Muhammed and later 18th century Islamic movements, which brings about an Islamic system of government and law.

(6) This new Islamic order does not reject science and technology. However, modernization is subordinated to Islam in order to guard against the westernization and secularization of Muslim society.

(7) The process of Islamization requires organizations or societies built around dynamic nuclei of committed and trained believers, who call on all to repent and turn to God's path and who are prepared, when necessary, to fight against corruption and social injustice.

For the most radical Islamic activists, the following assumptions or articles of faith are incorporated in addition to the foregoing:

(1) A crusader mentality, neo-Colonialist ambitions, and the power of Zionism have resulted in a Western Judeo-Christian conspiracy which pits the West against the East.

(2) Since the legitimacy of Muslim governments is based on the sharia governments, such as Anwar Sadat's Egypt, which do not follow the sharia are illegitimate. Those responsible for such an "atheist state" are guilty of unbelief and as such are lawful objects of jihad.

(3) Muslims are obliged both to overthrow such governments and to fight those Muslims who do not share their own total commitment. Like the Kharijites in early Islam, militants regard such persons as no longer Muslims but rather unbelievers.

(4) Jihad against unbelievers is a religious duty.

(5) Christians and Jews are considered unbelievers rather than "People of the Book."

(6) Opposition to "illegitimate" Muslim governments extends to the official ulama or clergy, and to state-supported mosques, since they are considered to be coopted and controlled by the government.

THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

The inspiration and ideological legacy of the Muslim Brotherhood is largely the product of two men: Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), its charismatic founder, and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), its most prolific ideologue.

Hasan al-Banna established the Brotherhood in 1928. Raised and educated in Ismailiyya and Cairo, he had experienced at first hand the challenges to traditional Egyptian society posed by the political, economic, and religio-cultural impact of the British occupation. He concluded that Westernization—not only as carried out by the British, but also by westernized Egyptian elites—was a major threat to Egypt and Islam which could only be countered by a return to the basics of Islam.

The Brotherhood grew rapidly and developed a well-knit organization with a network of branches that were further divided into secret cells. Membership extended beyond its rural, lower class origins to the urban middle class, attracting a cross section of society: teachers, physicians, lawyers, judges, bureaucrats, merchants, and university students. During the first decade, the Brotherhood concentrated on educational, social and moral reform, supporting schools, neighborhood mosques, clinics, cottage industries and social clubs. A press and a weekly magazine disseminated its ideas throughout the Muslim world.

During the 1940's the Brotherhood became increasingly involved in anti-British and anti-Zionist activities, clashing with the government of King Farouk. In 1949, Hasan al-Banna was assassinated by Egypt's secret police in retaliation for the murder of Egypt's prime minister by a young Muslim Brother. By this time the Brotherhood had an estimated membership of 500,000 with some 2,000 branches.

During the 1950's the Brotherhood became further embroiled in politics and its ideology and actions became more radical. Initial support for the July 1952 revolution gave way to opposition when Gamal Abd al-Nasir did not establish an Islamic state. It was during this period that Sayyid Qutb joined the Brotherhood, to become its leading theoretician.

Originally a western-oriented intellectual, Sayyid Qutb had become disillusioned by the West's role in the establishment of Israel and by his experiences during a two-year visit to America. Influenced by Hasan al-Banna and the writings of Pakistan's Mawlana Mawdudi, Qutb's prolific writings exemplified the tendency of the times to move from a relatively pacific view of Islam as a comprehensive alternative to western systems of government, to an Islamic imperative which required struggle (jihad) and even death (martyrdom) of its true believers. Imprisoned from 1954 to 1964, he was released, rearrested, and then executed. Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb are remembered as "martyrs of the Islamic revival."

The Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt has inspired the growth of similar organizations in Sudan, Syria, Kuwait, and other Middle Eastern states.

THE JAMAAT-I-ISLAMI

(The Islamic Society)

Mawlana Mawdudi (1903-1979) was a contemporary of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. Raised during the Indian independence movement, he came to view Hindu and Muslim nationalism as well as British imperialism as a threat to Indian Muslims. Mawdudi rejected both the Congress Party's call for a united, secular Indian state and the Muslim League's proposal to partition Indian and create Pakistan as a separate Muslim state. Mawdudi viewed nationalism as antithetical to Islamic universalism and regarded the Muslim League's leaders as "Westernized" Muslims.

From the 1930's onward, this journalist and editor committed himself to an Islamic alternative to nationalism, advocating an Islamic revival based on the renewal of Islamic society through a gradual social revolution. For Mawdudi, the Islamization of society was a prerequisite to the reestablishment of a true Islamic state.

Mawdudi founded the Jamaat-i-Islamic in 1941, after he had moved to Lahore in what is now Pakistan. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Jamaat was an ideological rather than political party. Its membership was limited to pious Muslims who would be trained to constitute a righteous society of Islamic leaders capable of transforming society. In his journal, *Exegesis of the Koran*, and in a host of volumes (such as "The Process of Islamic Revolution," "First Principles of the Islamic State," "Islam-

ic Law and Constitution," and "Economic Problem of Man and its Islamic Solution"), Mawdudi asserted a self-sufficient and comprehensive blueprint of Islam for political, legal, economic and social life.

Although initially against the establishment of Pakistan, the Jamaat under Mawdudi became closely involved in Pakistan's politics, participating in its early ideological and constitutional debates, opposing the Bhutto government, and generally supporting General Zia ul-Haq. Jamaat organizations may be found in Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, and Afghanistan. Mawlana Mawdudi's ideas inform Islamic revivalists from Cairo to Jakarta.

THE PEOPLE OF ISLAM

[Population in thousands]

Country	Total population	Percent Moslem	Moslem population
Afghanistan ¹	15,500	99	15,345
Albania	3,000	70	2,100
Algeria	22,200	99	21,798
Bahrain	400	99	396
Bangladesh	101,500	89	90,335
Benin	4,000	16	640
Bhutan	1,400	5	70
Brunei	200	64	128
Bulgaria	8,900	11	1,014
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)	7,000	44	3,080
Burma	37,000	4	1,480
Cameroon	9,600	22	2,112
Central African Republic	2,622	8	210
Chad	5,000	51	2,550
China (PRC) ²	1,042,000	1.44	15,000
Comoros	424	99	420
Cyprus	700	18.5	130
Djibouti	300	90	270
Egypt	48,000	91	43,680
Ethiopia	36,000	35	12,600
Fiji	700	8	56
Gambia	650	87	565
Ghana	14,500	15	2,175
Greece	9,900	2.5	250
Guinea	5,700	69	3,933
Guinea-Bissau	850	38	323
Guyana	800	9	72
India	750,000	12	90,000
Indonesia	165,000	85	140,250
Iran	43,000	98	42,140
Iraq	15,000	95	14,250
Israel ³	4,200	12.5	525
Ivory Coast	9,500	25	2,375
Jordan	2,900	93	2,700
Kampuchea	6,200	2.4	149
Kenya	20,000	6	1,200
Kuwait	1,475	95	1,416
Lebanon	3,000	57	1,710
Liberia	2,200	21	462
Libya	3,600	98	3,528
Madagascar	10,000	2	200
Malawi	7,100	16	1,136
Malaysia	15,700	49	7,693
Maldivé Islands	200	100	200
Mali	7,700	80	6,160
Mauritania	1,900	100	1,900
Mauritius	1,000	17	170
Mongolia	1,900	9.5	180
Morocco	23,000	99	22,770
Mozambique	13,800	13	1,794

THE PEOPLE OF ISLAM—Continued

[Population in thousands]

Country	Total population	Percent Moslem	Moslem population
Nepal.....	17,000	5	850
Niger.....	6,400	87.4	5,593
Nigeria.....	89,000	45	40,050
Oman.....	1,000	100	1,000
Pakistan ⁴	95,000	97	92,150
Panama.....	2,000	4.5	95
Philippines.....	56,000	5.6	3,136
Qatar.....	280	96	270
Reunion.....	500	2.4	12
Rwanda.....	6,000	8.6	516
Saudi Arabia.....	9,000	99	8,910
Senegal.....	6,500	91	5,915
Sierra Leone.....	3,600	40	1,440
Singapore.....	2,600	18	468
Somalia.....	5,000	99	4,950
Soviet Union.....	277,000	18	49,860
Sri Lanka.....	16,000	8	1,280
Sudan.....	21,700	72	15,624
Surinam.....	400	14	57
Syria.....	10,200	88	8,976
Tanzania.....	21,500	30	6,450
Thailand.....	52,000	4	2,080
Togo.....	2,900	16	464
Trinidad and Tobago.....	1,200	6.5	78
Tunisia.....	7,100	99	7,029
Turkey.....	50,000	99	49,500
Uganda.....	14,700	6.6	970
United Arab Emirates.....	1,000	90	900
U.S.A. ²	238,900	0.6-1.2	1,500-3,000
Yemen (North).....	6,066	100	6,066
Yemen (South).....	2,200	100	2,200
Yugoslavia.....	23,000	16	3,700

¹ Estimated 2.5 million Afghan refugees are included in Pakistan, not Afghanistan.

² Countries with less than 2% Moslem population have not been listed except for China and the U.S.A., which were included because their total populations are large enough so that their Moslem populations are numerically significant.

³ Does not include Moslem populations of West Bank and Gaza, estimated at total of 1,100,000.

⁴ Estimated 2 million expatriate Pakistan workers are included elsewhere, esp in the Gulf countries, not in Pakistan figure.

Other Notes

(1) The data listed above are for mid-1985.

(2) Figures for the Gulf states include workers as well as citizens.

(3) Sources include the Population Reference Bureau, the IBRD, the State Dept., other published and unpublished materials, and previous studies by AIA. The principal source for Moslem populations was the second edition of "Moslem Peoples, A World Ethnographic Survey," by Richard V Weekes (Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1984).

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Akhavi, Sharough, "Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran." Albany: SUNY Press, 1980.
- Ayoob, Mohammed (ed.), "The Politics of Islamic Reassertion." New York: St. Martin's, 1981.
- Dekmejian, R. Hrair, "Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World." Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985.
- Desouki, Ali E. Hillal (ed.), "Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World." New York: Praeger, 1982.
- Donohue, Hohn J. and Esposito, John L. (eds.), "Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives." New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- Enayat, Hamid, "Modern Islamic Political Thought." Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982.
- Esposito, John L., "Islam and Politics." Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984.

- Esposito, John L. (ed.), "Islam and Development." Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982.
- Esposito, John L. (ed.), "Voices of Resurgent Islam." New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Haddad, Yvonne Y., "Contemporary Islam and the Challenge of History." Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982.
- Keddie, Nikki R., "Iran: Religion, Politics and Society." London: Frank Cass, 1980.
- Kelly, Marjorie (ed.), "Islam: The Religious and Political Life of A World Community." New York: Praeger, 1984.
- Mortimer, Edward, "Faith and Power." New York: Random House, 1982.
- Piscatori, James P. (ed.), "Islam in the Political Process." Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Ruthven, Malise, "Islam in the World." New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.
- Voll, John Obert, "Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World." Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1982.

The author of this Occasional Paper, Dr. John Esposito, is one of America's leading academic authorities on Islam. A prolific writer, he has authored or edited many books and articles on Islamic subjects, including "Islam and Politics" (1984), "Voices of Resurgent Islam" (ed., 1983), "Women in Muslim Family Law" (1982), and "Islam and Development" (ed., 1980). Currently he is Professor and Chair, Department of Religious Studies, College of the Holy Cross, in Worcester, Mass. Before he joined Holy Cross in 1972, Dr. Esposito studied Arabic at the University of Pennsylvania and at the Middle East Studies Center in Lebanon. He has a Ph.D. from Temple University.

The author is indebted to Ambassador Ronald Palmer at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, to Dr. James Piscatori, International Affairs Fellow with the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, and to Dr. John Voll of the University of New Hampshire. Each of these individuals made useful and constructive suggestions regarding an early version of this paper. Invaluable as their contributions have been, the author alone bears responsibility for the final product.

APPENDIX 5

[From Middle East Insight, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1984]

PAPER SUBMITTED BY AUGUSTUS NORTON, ENTITLED "MAKING ENEMIES IN SOUTH LEBANON: HAKARAT AMAL, THE IDF, AND SOUTH LEBANON"

The Israeli-Palestinian 35-year war has been a costly one for the belligerents, but no people have paid more dearly for the conflict than the bystanders of South Lebanon. Caught in a cruel crossfire, these people have paid a continuing toll in death, destruction, upheaval and insecurity. Among the population of the South are the Lebanese Shi'as (who predominate in the area) who for many years had been the perfect punching bag—they didn't hit back.

By the late 1970s, the Shi'as were discovering their political voice in an organization known as Harakat Amal.* Propelled by the potent combination of socio-economic change and war, a politicized Shi'a community was increasingly unwilling to bear the costs of the struggle for Palestine. While both Israel and the *fedayeen* exacted a bloody toll in the South, it was the *fedayeen* who increasingly came to represent an oppressive occupying force that earned the antipathy of the people. By 1980, many Shi'a peasants would volunteer their view that "The Palestinians are the basis of the problem," a remarkable transformation for a people who only a decade earlier put the onus on Israel.

As Harakat Amal grew in size and sophistica-

tion, its militia frequently clashed with the *Quwat Mushtarika* (or Joint Forces) dominated by al-Fatah, despite the attempt of leaders on both sides to at least maintain an armed truce. By early 1982 relations between Amal and the *Quwat Mushtarika* had passed the breaking point. After serious clashes in January and April 1982, it was a foregone conclusion that Shi'a interests could no longer be reconciled with the *fedayeen* presence. While the movement was still significantly outgunned by its opponents, tactical improvements and a militarily wiser leadership helped to make the movement an increasingly formidable threat. With its fighters scattered from village to village, Amal lacked the geographic concentration of its brethren in the Beirut suburbs, but it compensated for its weakness by launching hit-and-run attacks, diversionary actions and carefully defending village strongpoints.

No doubt Amal's growing effectiveness played an important role in the Israeli decisionmaking that led to the June 1982 invasion. While Israeli planners grossly misinterpreted the longer term meaning of Amal's militance, they were certainly correct if they anticipated a paucity of indigenous support for the *fedayeen*. No Amal leader of stature could accept an overt relationship with the IDF or with their puppet, Sa'ad Haddad, yet there was no lack of understanding of the benefits

Augustus Richard Norton worked in southern Lebanon in 1980-81 and now teaches in the Social Sciences Department at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Lt. Colonel Norton, a regular contributor to Middle East Insight, is the author of The Emergence of a New Lebanon (forthcoming).

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed to represent the position of any institution, branch or organ of the U.S. Government.

*"AMAL" is an acronym for *Afwaj al-Muqawimah al-Lubnaniya* or the Lebanese Resistance Detachments, the word, "amal," also means "hope." Hence, Harakat Amal is often translated as the Movement of Hope. For extended treatments see the author's contributions in: *Middle East Insight*, v. III, no. 2 (1983); *Political Anthropology*, v. III (Transaction Books, 1984); and *The Emergence of a New Lebanon* (Praeger Publishers, 1984).

of a tacit alliance. In fact, after hearing the definition of an "objective alliance," one key leader acknowledged that it was indeed a good description of the movement's relationship with the IDF and Haddad. Some reports have exaggerated the level of collaboration between the invading IDF and Amal, but it is clear that especially in the first weeks of the invasion, residents of the South provided assistance in such matters as pinpointing *fedayeen* arms caches or identifying leaders of adversarial groups.

It is no overstatement to note that many southern Shi'as welcomed the Israeli invasion. One leader even stated that had Israel not invaded, a war between Amal and the *fedayeen* was inevitable. It should be stressed, that the mood in the South was not neatly replicated in the other two Amal strongholds—Beirut and the Beka'a. It was only in the South that the Shi'as were constantly exposed to the deadly weight of Israeli military power and it was only in the South that the fortunes of geography forced the Shi'as to choose between supporting or resisting the Palestinian presence. It was the shortsightedness of the PLO, and in particular the preeminent *al-Fatah*, which helped to decide the choice. Notwithstanding an active Israeli program to alienate the people of the South from the guerrillas, the brash, arrogant and often cruel behavior of the *fedayeen* rendered the choice really no choice at all. Outside of the South, Amal defined its adversaries more narrowly. Thus, south of Beirut, around Burj al-Burajinah for example, fighting involving Amal tended to be against forces perceived as viscerally anti-Shi'a (or anti-Iran), such as the Iraqi-sponsored *Jabhat Arabiyya* (Arab Liberation Front). The contrast in situations is well illustrated by the fact that while the Amal fighters in the South watched as the Israeli tank columns rolled by, those from al-Shiyyah, Ouzai, and Ghobierre mounted some of the most spirited and aggressive defensive actions against the invaders.

True, the invasion accomplished what Amal could not, namely the expulsion of the *fedayeen* from the South, but the glee of the Shi'as was short-lived as it became clear that for the cost of their suffering they may merely have witnessed the supplanting of one occupation force by another. Furthermore, as a result of the invasion Harakat Amal found itself faced with a new panoply of problems, which if not satisfactorily resolved could well threaten the viability and even the survival of the movement.

Just as an earlier phase in the political mobilization of the Shi'as by Imam Musa al-Sadr was interrupted by the cascading violence of 1975-1976, so the events of the Summer of 1982

seemed likely to short-circuit the renewed mobilization efforts that had commenced in 1978 and 1979. At first glance it even seemed that Amal's very *raison d'être* in the South—communal security—had been obviated. While the anti-Pahlavi Iranian revolution and the disappearance of the Imam al-Sadr (during a trip to Libya in 1978) were important mobilization symbols, the decisive factor was the increasingly serious and violence-fraught estrangement of the Shi'as from the Palestinian Resistance Movement. With the *fedayeen* excised, the critical question was whether a membership fed by the attraction of collective security could be maintained when the imperative of collective security was much weaker or at least less obvious. Put another way, could Amal redirect its efforts so as to retain its primary leadership role for a politicized Shi'a community, or would the organization prove to be an anachronism in the "New Lebanon"?

Notwithstanding an active Israeli program to alienate the people of the South from the guerrillas, the brash, arrogant and often cruel behavior of the fedayeen rendered the choice really no choice at all.

In effect, the organization faced challenges at three distinct levels: from within the organization, from within the Shi'a sect and from external actors.

INTERNAL CHALLENGES

Amal was never a tightly integrated organization and the possibility of fissure had always been latent within the organization. Not unexpectedly, given the organization's inchoate quality, there were keen regional splits which roughly corresponded with relative proximity to the Israeli (and Syrian) border. In addition to disparities born of locale, the movement subsumes an admixture of political perspectives and ideological preferences. While the critical mass of active members and leaders agree that the appropriate focus of their demands is a reformed Lebanese political system, there are segments that reject this relatively modest objective.

In addition, Amal has always contained its share of agents and opportunists who were perfectly willing to return to patron-client relationships outside the organization. For these people, the movement's instrumental value was simply as a substitute for preferred patrons—whether they be this or that *za'im*

(political boss) or organization. (One of the more fascinating political spectator sports has been watching the *zu'ama* who had been made increasingly irrelevant by the continuing civil war, attempt to elbow their way back into power after the 1982 invasion. Kamel al-Asad, whose constituency is unapparent, is typical of the genre.) Moreover, more than a few secularly oriented Shi'as had merely found it astute, and even advantageous to support or join the movement rather than overtly opposing it. Many of the latter category dropped away from the movement after June 1982, when this pragmatic rationale became much less compelling.

Further threats to the movement's viability were mounted by those who raised serious challenges regarding the political objectives of Amal, including questions as to its very authenticity as a Shi'a movement. One such challenge was mounted by a member of the 25-member Command Council, Hussayn Musawi. In July 1982, Musawi charged the movement's leaders with blatant collaboration with the invading Israelis, and—apparently with Iranian support—attempted to reorient the movement to what he saw as its proper objective: the replication of Iran's Islamic Revolution in Lebanon. Musawi was subsequently expelled from the movement during the Summer of 1982. He is, as of late 1983, esconced in the Ba'albek area, in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa where he leads the Islamic Amal Movement in apparent cooperation with a contingent of *Pasdaran* (Revolutionary Guards) dispatched by Iran to Lebanon. He has been implicated in a number of acts of political violence, including the kidnapping of the President of the American University, David Dodge, and the destruction of the U.S. Embassy in April 1983. In November, Musawi and his followers were the targets for Israeli and French air attacks because of their suspected complicity in the truck bombing attacks on the Multi-national Force, and the subsequent bombing of an Israeli interrogation center in Tyre. While Musawi's following is limited, his activities, buttressed as they are by the Syrian occupation of the Bekaa, serve to remove the sizable Shi'a population of the Bekaa from the organizational grasp of the mainline Amal organization.

SHI'A COMPETITORS

As alluded to above, the post-invasion period spawned reemergence of a number of the traditional Shi'a leaders, who while lacking sizable constituencies, still maintained important political ties outside of the Shi'a community. Of course, the most notable was Kamel al-Asad, the speaker of the Parliament, but there were others

as well with familiar names like Hamadeh, Khalil and Osieran. These *zu'ama*, often denoted "semi-feudal leaders" by articulate Lebanese, were increasingly anachronistic. Their control of segments of the Shi'a community was tenuous even before 1975, as demonstrated by the successes of Musa al-Sadr in the early 1970s, when, much to the chagrin of men like al-Asad, al-Sadr gained increasing recognition as the preeminent Shi'a leader. Indeed, the social mobilization process that helped to bring about a politicized Shi'a community, had, by definition, reduced the fragmentation of the community and concomitantly, the ability of a *za'im* to control geographically isolated communities.*

The glee of the Shi'as was short-lived as it became clear that for the cost of their suffering they may merely have witnessed the supplanting of one occupation force by another.

Nabih Berri, the current leader of Amal, in many ways epitomizes the newly assertive Shi'as. Unlike the *zu'ama*, Berri, 43 years old, and a lawyer by profession, cannot claim descent from a notable family. (Recently one *za'im* contemptuously asked, "Who is this Ibn Mustafa Berri?") Lacking the flamboyance, charisma and lineage of his *za'im* competitors, Berri represents a largely unappreciated phenomenon in Lebanon, the emergence of a new political class that is not willing to blithely follow traditional leaders. This is not to say these socio-political changes have been recognized (or accepted) by the Shi'a *zu'ama* or their Lebanese and non-Lebanese allies. As we shall explain below, attempting to turn back the clock of Shi'a politicization can be an attractive—albeit naive—maneuver for devotees of a Maronite-controlled Lebanon, as well as for outside powers thwarted in their attempts to manipulate Harakat Amal. While external manipulation may keep the *zu'ama* off the endangered species list, it is very doubtful that they will ever recapture the influence and control that they once enjoyed.

Without a question, the most serious challenge to Amal's primacy in the leadership of the Shi'as has not come from a *za'im*, but from a cleric, Mufi Muhammed Mahdi Shams al-Din. Shams al-Din, while technically a principal in Amal (he is a member of the Command Council), is probably the most important Shi'a cleric in Lebanon. His

*For a discussion of this point, see the author's article in the *New York Times*, January 3, 1984.



Mufti Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din (left) and Imam Musa al-Sadr together on a poster with Harakat Amal symbol (in the center circle) and teachings. (Middle East Insight)

only real competitor for that distinction is the Jafa'ri Mufti al-Mumtaz, Abd al-Amr Qabalan. Since the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, who led the Harakat Amal while simultaneously chairing the Supreme Shi'a Council, the two leadership positions have been split along secular-clerical lines. Hussayn Hussayni, a parliamentary deputy, and now Nahih Berri have led Amal, while Shams al-Din has chaired the Council (while retaining the title, Deputy Chairman). Al-Husayni, an intelligent and sincere man from an important Shi'a family, is now aligned with Shams al-Din in the contest to determine who would speak for the Shi'a community.

The details of the struggle for supremacy between Shams al-Din and Berri are not altogether clear, nonetheless it is obvious that a competition has been underway. In early 1982 for example, press reports indicated that there was a power struggle between Berri and Shams al-Din. The Israeli invasion seemed to push Berri closer to the Mufti, although there was some controversy between the two concerning the extent to which Amal fighters should confront the IDF. Berri, according to some informants, was pushing for a more aggressive role, especially in Ras Beirut, but he was successfully overruled by Shams al-Din. In the months following the inva-

sion, the two men temporarily accommodated their differences. Berri, arguably the weaker of the two in terms of legitimacy and qualifications, seems to have been somewhat strengthened by the active support of Shaykh Qabalan, the competition again became heated in early 1983, when it was announced that Shams al-Din had broken off all relations with the leadership of Harakat Amal. Whatever the motives behind the announcement, it had the effect of placing the Mufti above the fray, validating his prospective claim for the principal leadership role of the Shi'as. Since the dramatic announcement, Shams al-Din has continued to deal with Nabih Berri and other movement leaders, so it is quite possible that the severing of ties may have merely been an object lesson for Amal. At this writing, it remains clear that the consolidation of leadership in the Shi'a community is an ongoing process, and the outcome is anything but predetermined.

EXTRA-COMMUNAL ACTORS

At this juncture it is appropriate to note what has undoubtedly been the most serious challenge to Amal's authority in the South. This refers to Israel's attempts to co-opt and emasculate Amal. Buoyed by its reception in June 1982, Israel set

about using the existing Amal organization in the South as a adjunct to, or even substitute for Sa'ad Haddad's militia. In what can only be described as a supreme miscalculation, the IDF and/or Mossad mistook the alienation of the Shi'as from the Palestinians as positive evidence for the possibility of establishing close ties between Israel and the Shi'a community. In fact, most of the population had no desire to trade one foreign overlord for another. Such wishful thinking on the part of Israel is not altogether surprising however. Notwithstanding some sycophantic reporting in the U.S. press, the Israelis seem to have clearly understood that Haddad and his weak militia were, as one IDF adviser put it, "unacceptable" to the majority of the population. When asked why he cooperated with Haddad and Haddad's Israeli handlers, one Shi'a, who was obviously unenthusiastic about the arrangement, pleaded his impotence, saying, "They have the guns." As Clinton Bailey, an Israeli academic who served as an Arab affairs adviser on South Lebanon, observed in December 1982, the Shi'a members of Haddad's militia were "looked upon as the dregs of Shi'a society."

Initial efforts to co-opt Amal intact, promptly failed. While the southern leadership did not eschew a dialogue with Israeli personnel, they were both unwilling and unable to allow themselves to follow the Haddad prototype. Nonetheless, there were no outward displays of belligerence, and there were a number of cases of small scale collaboration. The first phase was shortlived as the Israelis arrested 13 of the Amal movements leaders and began a process of alienation that still continues.

The initial phase was followed by an Israeli campaign to recruit individual Amal members and Shi'as into a network of village militias that would form a regional grouping paralleling Amal. Simultaneously, the IDF apparently sponsored the return of the traditional leadership, which would further undercut Amal influence in the area.

Faced with an obdurate Amal leadership, the Israelis created, during the summer of 1982, an organization purportedly independent of Haddad's force. The organization, the *Haras al-Watani li-Qura' al-Junub* (National Guard for the villages of the South) was intended to unite village militias created under Israeli pressure. While there were some local successes, the attempt basically failed. The principal cause of failure was the inability of Israel's and Haddad's agents to recruit locally respected leaders. Even where the *Haras al-Watani* have been relatively active, as in Jwayya, and Majdel Silm, the groups remain transparent implantations.

Recognizing their failure, the Israelis

renovated the militia scheme, and in January 1983, created the Organization for a United South, since renamed the United South Assembly (USA). The USA, apparently based on the West Bank Village League prototype, is to be comprised of village committees of from five to eight men, and each village is supposed to have a 60-man militia. While the USA has not been enthusiastically received, the skillful use of coercion has helped to produce some 30 village militias.* For example, the respected *Christian Science Monitor* reporter, Trudy Rubin, reported that in Sarafand, a local Amal leader was arrested and the village notables were told that the price of his release was the formation of a militia. In a number of cases, the only leaders available have been those who are, for one reason or another, held in disrepute by the villagers. Many Amal officials have noted the irony that in many instances, the very men recruited to serve in the militias are the social misfits and toughs who have been terrorizing the South for years.

This is not to say that the militias will wither away though, because they serve two complementary Israeli interests. First, they provide a justification and facade for Israeli involvement. Second, and this may well explain their morphology, while spawned of coercion, the militia may be converted into the partisan forces (*al-Ansar*) which are esconced in the Lebanese-Israeli agreement of May 1983 and which are supposed to play a role in maintaining security in the South. The existence of the militia will have been given a stamp of legitimacy. Along these lines, it is important to note that *Haras al-Watani* has been renamed *Ansar Jaysh Lubnan al-Hurr* (Partisans of the Army of Free Lebanon) or briefly *al-Ansar*, thus corresponding in title to the militia created by the Lebanese government a decade ago—a shrewd psychological gambit. However, even with Israeli shepharding it, it remains doubtful that the village militias, as constituted, will ever attain any significant role in the security of the South. Presently, there may be 30 village militias manned by five or six hundred men. They are, for many Shi'as, merely a symbol of continuing Israeli occupation.

Of less importance, but also indicative of Israeli intentions, has been the return of a few of the Shi'a zu'ama to the South under IDF sponsorship. For example, after an absence of seven years, Kazim al-Khalil a political affiliate of Camille Chamoun's National Liberal Party, returned to Tyre. When Khalil first returned in July 1982, he attempted to reach a rapprochement

*Three journalists, Robin Wright and Trudy Rubin of the *Christian Science Monitor*, and Herbert Denton of the *Washington Post*, have provided noteworthy reports on Israeli-sponsored militias in the South.



A scene from the incident that occurred in Nabatiyya, on October 16, 1983 during the commemoration of 'Ashuura

(An-Nabari)

with Amal, but one Amal leader claimed the *sulha* (reconciliation) quickly evaporated after a few acts of violent intimidation authored by Khalil's son. With IDF assistance, Khalil did establish a small (40 man) militia which was armed and uniformed by the Israelis. However, few southerners believe that Khalil could retain his parliamentary seat in anything approaching a fair election, so his presence in Tyre only serves to modestly undercut Amal. Nonetheless such measures are part of the whole cloth of the Israelis' campaign to fragment a Shi'a community it cannot control as a single unit.

Phalangist militiamen have also been permitted by Israel to operate in the South. One press report cites a prescient Lebanese government study that states the harassment of Shi'as by the Phalange is so serious that it is the greatest flash-point for future civil strife. (The Israelis have wisely decided to restrict Phalange activities in recent months.)

Since October 1983, two Shi'a leaders of the Israeli-sponsored militia have been assassinated. Intensified Israeli efforts to build a subservient Shi'a militia is hardening the position of Amal's leadership in the South, and the sometimes counterproductive actions of the IDF further feeds their resolve. No doubt one of the most significant precipitants, to date, for opposition to the Israeli scheme, was an incident that occurred in Nabatiyya, on October 16, 1983. During the commemoration of 'Ashuura (i.e. the tenth of Muharram, the anniversary of the martyrdom of

the Prophet Muhammed's grandson, Imam Husayn), in an incredibly clumsy move, an IDF convoy tried to make its way through a crowd of at least 50,000 celebrants. A confrontation ensued, at least two Shi'as were killed and a number wounded when the IDF opened fire. (The IDF has taken disciplinary measures against those responsible.) Coincident with the Nabatiyya incident, Mufti Shams al-Din declared a *fatwa* (an authoritative interpretation of religious law) calling for the Shi'as of the South to initiate "comprehensive civil resistance" to the Israeli occupiers. The *fatwa* is enormously important, since it legitimizes opposition to the Israeli attempt to erect an infrastructure of control which would allow Israel to keep South Lebanon in its grasp.* In addition, the *fatwa* makes it increasingly difficult for even nominally religious Shi'as to justify collaboration with Israel.

Over the past eight months, nearly one Israeli soldier has died every three days in Lebanon (and the majority of the casualties have been suffered in the South). These losses will continue. As the Mayor of Saida (Sidon), Ahmad Kallish recently noted: "Israel has much to admire, and we could have become admirers if they treated us with dignity. But the Israelis have turned us into enemies. They invaded us to hunt Palestinians and have stayed to occupy our land." Indeed,

*For the development of this argument, see the author's article in *The New York Times*, February 22, 1983; and, *American-Arab Affairs*, Spring 1983.

most Lebanese share the view of Israeli Defense Minister, Moshe Arens, that the Lebanese are "The unfortunate victims of unnecessary, unjustified, and prolonged occupation by numerous foreign military elements." Unlike Arens, many Lebanese would include the IDF in the latter group.

In the South, growing antipathy toward Israeli occupation forces is serving to reinvigorate Amal. Whatever complacency the June 1982 invasion might have spawned has now disappeared. By attempting to control the area, Israel has managed to alienate even those who were formerly willing to reach an accommodation with it. Nabih Berri's threat—once thought empty—that the Shi'as would become the "New Fedayeen" has become a matter of urgent concern for Israeli decision-makers. Every act of resistance against the IDF emphasizes that it is not only the *Fedayeen* that can wear out a welcome in *al-Junub*.

AMAL SURVIVES

Admittedly, Amal has lost a number of marginal members and sympathizers since the Israeli invasion, but it has withered what could have been a fatal organizational crisis incredibly well. While its militia days have not been totally surmounted, the movement has moved to the center stage of the Lebanese political scene, while simultaneously consolidating its constituency. In the latter regard, Amal has identified key social welfare activities that meet pressing needs while giving the organization a high and favorable profile in the Shi'a community. Thus, in *al-Junub* it has opened a series of Spartan, yet adequate clinics which are accessible to all citizens for a modest fee (with free care available when justified). The clinics are well-planned and are clearly not fly-by-night operations. The first important evidence of the movement's sustained vitality came in September 1982 when as many as 250,000 gathered in Tyre to commemorate the fourth anniversary Musa al-Sadr's disappearance. A similar but smaller demonstration was held in Nabatiyya a few days later. Periodic strikes have also served as continuing evidence that the movement's fundamental influence has not waned.

While Israel's massive invasion was still in progress, Nabih Berri was serving as a member of the National Salvation Committee formed to begin what will continue to be a bumpy road of national reconciliation. While the movement could not openly support the election of Bashir al-Gemayel, it did privately pledge support, as did the two major Shi'a religious leaders. Given Amin al-Gemayel's less problematic resume, Amal was able to support Amin's election largely on the

presumption that Amin would continue his brother's political program which included cutting the Shi'as in for a larger share of power. Unfortunately, President Amin al-Gemayel has seemed to be much more comfortable dealing with the established *zu'ama* than with their challengers in Amal. Thus, the old rivalry with *za'im* like Kamel al-Asad has been resurrected with a vengeance.

In the Fall of 1982 Amal had adopted a patient stance, expecting that *al-sabr mistah al-faraj*—patience would be the key to success. Many of the movement's principals merely expected modest incremental concessions from the government, as well as the extrication of foreign forces from Lebanon. Sadly, neither expectation has been met. Over time, the Shi'as have come to believe that they are serving as the whipping boys for a president who cares more for his weak Maronite constituency than for his stronger non-Maronite constituency. Therefore it should hardly be surprising that the Shi'as came to lose patience. The result has been a series of clashes with the Army as well as a purely tactical (and very cynical) alliance with the customarily distrusted Druze.

The prevailing attitude within the Amal leadership is well summarized by a joke that was printed in a column that appears in the movement's paper, *Amal*:

A man was on an airline flight, and after the airplane took off, he entered the plane's cockpit drawing a pistol, indicating that the plane was being hijacked. "For what reason?" the captain asked him, "and to what destination?" The hijacker insisted on going to Los Angeles, and the plane's stated destination was Los Angeles anyway. When the plane arrived at the Los Angeles airport, the man routinely disembarked with the rest of the passengers. The newsmen on the scene asked him, "Why did you do this?" So he said, "This is the third time that I have taken off on a plane to go to Los Angeles to meet my family, and each previous time the plane was hijacked to another place, so I wanted to hijack it this time before some other hijacker took it to another place."

The point of course, is that the danger of the Lebanese ship of state being hijacked is seen as a real one. Thus, so long as the danger persists Amal must be ready to guide it to its proper destination. The Lebanese Shi'as may not be able to insure that the plane reaches Los Angeles, but they are capable of preventing it from reaching any other destination. For most of the newly assertive Shi'as, a legitimate government that neglects the Shi'as is only a contradiction in terms.

APPENDIX 6

[From Middle East Insight, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1985]

PAPER SUBMITTED BY AUGUSTUS NORTON, ENTITLED "OCCUPATIONAL RISKS AND PLANNED RETIREMENT—THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH LEBANON"

THE ISRAELI CABINET'S JANUARY 1985 decision to withdraw its military forces from south Lebanon was not just an overdue decision to extricate its army from a morass, but it was also an admission of defeat and an expression of trepidation at the prospect of staying in Lebanon. The grandiose plans of 1982—the defeat of Palestinian nationalism, the establishment of a friendly and malleable government in Beirut, and the establishment of a security buffer in south Lebanon—have been left behind in the mire of hubris, deception and naivete which marked yet the latest unsuccessful attempt by an external power to dominate Lebanon.¹

According to published reports, Israel will withdraw its forces in three stages, with the first stage ending in February and the last to be completed by the end of the summer of 1985. In fact, the intention seems to be to leave Lebanon as soon as possible, perhaps by the early summer, when only proxy forces and a few Israeli "liaison" and intelligence officers will remain. Both Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin have developed a keen understanding of the perils and futility of staying in Lebanon, and in this judgment they seem to be joined by a majority of the Israeli public. This is not to say that there are no pit-

falls along the withdrawal route, but before discussing them it is instructive to consider an overview of the Israeli dilemma in the south.

Discovering the Shi'i Genie

IT IS NO SMALL IRONY THAT IT IS THE SHI'IS who have so complicated Israel's situation in Lebanon. The Shi'i community had no place in Ariel Sharon's blueprint for a Maronite-dominated Lebanon, and when the Maronites proved a weak and unsteady political reed, it was the Lebanese Druze card that was played. Yet, the Shi'is, especially the half a million or so living in the south, were in many ways the objective allies of Israel. Living in a border region contiguous to northern Israel, the Shi'is, like their Sunni and Christian cohorts, recognized a sound pragmatic rationale for maintaining peaceful relations with their militarily superior neighbor.

Although the Shi'is had earlier lent their manpower to the Palestinian resistance forces based in Lebanon, by the beginning of the 1980s the Shi'i community as a whole had tired of paying the cost—in blood and sorrow—of the armed guerrilla presence in their midst. By 1981 and early 1982, the Shi'is were actively fighting the guerrillas and were doing so with at least modest success. Indeed, it is not at all far-fetched to argue that had the Israelis not invaded in 1982, a very serious Shi'i-Palestinian conflict would have erupted in Lebanon. It is certainly revealing to note that many of the Shi'i villages which were more steadfast in confronting the PLO, have also proven to be among the most important centers of resistance to the Israeli occupation: a clear lesson, it would

Dr. A.R. Norton is Associate Prof. of comparative politics at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y. He visited Israel in December and discussed south Lebanon with Israeli officials, journalists and scholars. The opinions expressed are not necessarily representative of the US Government or its institutions.

seem, about the Shi'is' attitude toward domination by foreign forces.

But, Israeli policymakers seem to have been strangely ignorant of the interesting developments among the Shi'is. In point of fact, a recent visitor to Israel would learn, to his or her surprise, that Israeli officials have only now discovered Lebanon's Shi'i community. It is a sad fact that only when Shi'i fanatics began driving bomb-laden trucks that they were noticed by Israeli decisionmakers. Mr. Rabin, for example, argues that the Israeli invasion and its aftermath let the Shi'i genie out of the bottle, and his view is not untypical. One cannot help but wonder what analytical blinders helped to produce such an incomplete picture of what was actually going on in Lebanon prior to 1982. Well before June 1982, the Shi'is had broken out of their political isolation and were finding their political voice in several organizations, but especially in the Amal Movement. The several traditional political bosses who had long dominated and represented the community were finding the span of their authority challenged and their influence progressively constricted. While the Iranian revolution had an influence on the nature of the political mobilization of the Shi'i community, the revolution was only one of several factors which shaped political action. Unlike their cohorts in Iran, most of Lebanon's Shi'is had no desire to bring about a reply of the Islamic revolution, they simply wanted to be secure in their homes and to enjoy improved socioeconomic status. In short, after years on the bottom rung of the ladder, they wanted their share. It is accurate to note that the Shi'is were not simply Shi'is, they were Lebanese-

Shi'is, and as such they well understood that their communal integrity was bound up with the survival of Lebanon.²

With the invasion in June 1982, several important Shi'i leaders expected a tacit—and therefore unpublicized—alliance to emerge between the Shi'i Amal Movement and Israel. However, rather than quiet arrangements, it soon became clear that Israel sought overtly manipulable clients in south Lebanon who would serve as security-ensuring surrogates in an infrastructure which would put the south under effective Israeli control.³ Instead of dealing with those at the center of Shi'i politics, Israeli officials opted for a security structure heavily dependent upon non-Shi'is, such as the border militia of the late Major Saad Haddad. Not coincidentally, some Israeli officials in the security services had tied their professional reputations to the success of the Haddad force, and for them to jettison Haddad would have been tantamount to admitting serious professional miscalculation. (A well-placed Israeli official claims that one senior Israeli based in Marjayoun, the headquarters for the Haddad militia, threatened to resign if a serious effort—meaning one which would challenge Haddad's central role—was made to deal with the Shi'is.)

Following Haddad's death to cancer in January 1984, a retired Christian Lebanese general, Antoine Lahad, took command of the ambitiously-named South Lebanon Army (SLA). (Lahad is a business partner of former Army Commander Ibrahim Tannous.) Lahad's force, comprising some 2,000 militiamen armed and equipped by Israel, includes no more than 10% Shi'is and it is widely viewed by the Shi'is as a

perishable and artificial implantation. Lahad suffers from no pretensions about the durability and representativeness of his "army." When asked by an Israeli correspondent how long the force would retain its small Shi'i membership following an Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon, he replied, "five minutes." While Israeli officials are reluctant to say so publicly, in private many concede that the SLA project is a failure. It is absolutely clear that Mr. Rabin is under no illusions about the SLA. During the cabinet debate over the withdrawal decision, the future of Lahad was not even discussed seriously, according to a well-placed official. Some of those centrally involved do not know if Lahad will remain in the south or leave; and in

either event, it probably makes very little difference. Few believe that the SLA is capable of playing an effective role in any more than a thin border strip along Israel's northern border, much like Haddad did from 1978 to 1982, and even its capacity to fulfill that role is uncertain.

As a complement to the SLA, Israel did attempt to create a network of village militias, as well as an independent Shi'i military contingent, but for the most part, the only volunteers for such forces were men from the margins of Shi'i society. Perhaps the most telling

commentary on the types enticed to join, is the fact that a fair number of the recruits were precisely the petty gangsters, goons and hoods who had prospered during the pre-invasion days. For more than two years those collaborating with the occupation forces have been prime targets for assassination, and not surprisingly Israel has found it increasingly difficult to cultivate even the seamiest allies. Hit lists, listing collaborators by name, are widely circulated, and more important, many of those named have been wounded or killed. Others have prudently decided to leave the south.

Israeli officials now concede that they badly mishandled the Shi'is, and that they could have done more to reach an arrangement with them.

This is not to say that these same officials believe such an effort would have succeeded, but the attempt might have at least been made more adroitly and with greater seriousness. Frankly, I sense that much of the implied skepticism is merely self-justification. The fact of the matter is that a deal was possible, but it had to be quiet. Far too many of the Israeli officials charged with making and carrying out policy in Lebanon were caught up in realizing Israeli suzerainty over Lebanon; they had no interest in reaching an accommodation with a social group such as the Shi'is. Unlike the Druze, who through their brethren in Israel have an effective lobby group to represent their claims (a subject we need to know a lot more about),

the Shi'is had only the ever present image of Khomeini and a heritage of victimization in south Lebanon. Given the inattention of Israeli officials to what was actually underway in the Shi'i community, as well as the unappealing stereotypes which dominated Israeli perceptions of the Shi'is, it was predictable that Israel would blunder.

The dangerous dynamics of the situation have not been hard to read. As the occupation of the south has worn on, with debilitating effects for the economy and political stability of the area, moderation

has been discredited and extremism has been validated. The imperatives of political and physical survival have pushed responsible, centrist leaders into the resistance. As a result, Israeli officials found that no significant Shi'i leader was even willing to respond to their quiet advances.

So while Israeli goals in Lebanon shrunk immensely throughout 1984, especially after the abrogation of the May 17 Agreement and the Israeli election of last summer which brought the Labor Party back into the government, Israeli officials failed to find a negotiating partner who could let them off the south Lebanon hook. The floundering military talks in Nakura were unlikely to produce an agree-

“

The
Shi'is were not
simply Shi'is, they
were Lebanese-Shi'is,
and as such they well
understood that their
communal integrity
was bounded up
with the survival of
Lebanon.

”

ment which would simultaneously satisfy all sides. Syria, the behind-the-scenes choreographer for the Lebanese delegation—and in the words of one senior Israeli official, the “victor” in Lebanon—was clearly unwilling to accept any arrangement which would permit a palpable Israeli presence in the south. The continuing operation of Israeli-created proxy forces has been similarly rejected.

Thus, Israel faced an excruciating dilemma in its lonely search for a security framework that would permit it to bring its occupation of south Lebanon to a close. Even as it groped for a way to extricate its army from the deepening morass, it was discovering that the longer its army remained on Lebanese soil, the greater

the store of enmity that it is building among the predominately Shi'i Muslim population of the south. (In a late-December discussion, Mr. Rabin indicated that seventy to eighty percent of all attacks on Israeli forces are the work of southern Shi'is.) This was a crucial discovery, for with it the decisionmakers' calculus changed. Until late 1984, the dilemma was framed as follows: We want to get out, but how can we afford to give the security risks? In late 1984, the dilemma came to be framed differently: Given the risks of staying, how can we afford not to leave? This is not to argue that all Israeli officials accept the calculus. For example, Professor Moshe Arens does not agree that Shi'i enmity is a product of the Israeli occupa-

tion of Lebanon.⁴ While this is a minority view at the moment, it remains an important one because Arens and his allies in the cabinet (notably Yitzhak Shamir and Ariel Sharon) would like to see the IDf retrench in south Lebanon, 20-25 kilometers north of the international border.⁵ If the withdrawal bogs down because of real or supposed threats to Israel proper, this position could well gain force.

Pitfalls Along the Way

ISRAELI OFFICIALS are bedeviled by the obsessive fear that Israel has been so successful making enemies in Lebanon, that Shi'i militants will not be satiated by an Israeli withdrawal, but instead will attempt to attack Israeli targets in Israel. Therefore, a crucial question facing Israeli policymakers is what will happen after a unilateral and comprehensive withdrawal. If rockets begin raining down on northern Israel, not only will the survival of the current

government be in question, but Israel may feel compelled to reenter Lebanon.

No one knows, with any acceptable degree of certainty at least, how much residual animosity the IDF will leave behind, and whether the animosity will be so strong that significant armed operations will be launched from the south into Israel. It is clear however, that the people of south Lebanon retain a deep hatred for the Palestinian guerrillas who controlled the south until the 1982 invasion. The lessons of the last decade have been hard ones, and it remains very unlikely that the Shi'is of the south would permit the reestablishment of PLO bases in the area. As disunited as the Shi'is may appear at times, they are certainly as one on this point. This does not preclude occasional incidents obviously; but the recreation of the systematic network of Palestinian guerrilla positions clearly seems improbable.

The fear though is that the Shi'is will replace the Palestinian attackers, and one of the key questions is whether Amal will be able to successfully assert its authority throughout the community. Certainly the past two years have produced serious challenges to the authority of Amal's centrist leadership, and not only in the south. Amal is faced with a panoply of challengers, ranging from local *shaikhs* who have managed to attract scores of followers in various localities; contending organizations, such as Hizb Allah, which are less accommodative than Amal, and more strident both in rhetoric and action; remnants of the leftist parties which have been active in the resistance; and, various small terror-violence groupings, such as the shadowy Islamic Jihad. And the preceding is only a sampler. Some groups are dedicated to attacking Israel and its supporters regardless of where they are found, and therefore their hostility to Israel is independent of the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon; however, for the vast majority of the Shi'is, it is not Israel per se which is the focus of their enmity, but *Israel in Lebanon*. While it is only a reasoned prediction, I believe there is good reason to believe that the logic of law and order will replace the logic of resistance when law and order is no longer seen as a complement to Israeli occupation. Put another way, extremism is not a permanent characteristic of the Shi'is, it is a reaction. Nonetheless, with every passing day of the occupation, the reestablishment of civility becomes more problematic. What could have been accomplished rather easily two years ago, will be difficult in 1985, and will become

even more difficult later.

Moreover, comprehensive Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon has enemies both in Israel and in Lebanon many non-Shi'i Lebanese are positively fearful of the Shi'is, whose numbers and demands threaten the privileges and power of virtually every other community. Thus, the prospect of a relatively unified Shi'i community, rejuvenated by the expulsion of the IDF, could well spawn actions intended to slow down or stop the IDF withdrawal. The Druze, who have skillfully balanced relations with Syria and Israel, certainly recognize that the withdrawal will jeopardize the delicate balancing act if, as many expect, the Druze take over the Iqlim al-Kharoub following the first stage of the withdrawal, they will be able to regulate the movement of the Lebanese Army to the south and they could succeed in disabling or preventing its effective deployment. The Christian population in the south, especially prominent in the environs of Sa'ida (Sidon), as well as along the border with Israel, has some incentive to do what is necessary to keep the IDF in the south, especially considering the frailty of the SLA. Within Israel itself, some Likud principals have not given up their transparent objective of controlling south Lebanon and they can be expected to be vocal advocates of hunkering down after stage one of two of the withdrawal. Therefore, the announced withdrawal is anything but a sure thing. Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin have many pitfalls to avoid before they have fully implemented their wise policy. □

Footnotes

¹By far the most important account of the war is *Israel's Lebanon War* by Tzvi Schif and Elud Yalari (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). Also see the author's *External Intervention and the Politics of Lebanon* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1984).

²For analyses of the changes underway in the Shi'i community see the author's chapter in *The Emergence of a New Lebanon: Fantasy or Reality?* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984) and "Shi'ism and Social Protest in Lebanon" in *Shi'ism and Social Protest* edited by Juan Cole and Nikki Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, forthcoming).

³For an analysis see "Making Enemies in South Lebanon: Harakat Amal, the IDF, and South Lebanon," *Middle East Insight* 3, 3 no. 5 (1984), pp. 13-20. For a briefer argument see "Lebanon for the Lebanese," *New York Times*, February 22, 1985.

⁴See Arens' interesting interview on Tel Aviv IDF Radio translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Middle East and North Africa, January 24, 1985, pp. 14-15.

⁵Ambassador Eli Lubrani, appointed in May 1983 by Moshe Arens to his position as Coordinator for Lebanon, noted on January 22, 1985 that "we should not go south of the Katyusha line, which is about 20-25 km away from the international border." Quoted in *Year of Ignorance* which was translated by FBIS Middle East and North Africa, January 24, 1985, pp. 14.

APPENDIX 7

[From Middle East Insight, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1985]

PAPER SUBMITTED BY AUGUSTUS NORTON, ENTITLED "INTRODUCTION TO AN INTERVIEW WITH MUHAMMED HUSSEIN FADLALLAH"

AS DESPAIR HAS DISPLACED HOPE IN Lebanon, many Shi'is have sought a refuge in Islam. More than ever before in modern Lebanon, the battle is drawn along sectarian lines. Shi'i politicians urging secular solutions have failed to deliver on their promises. Nabih Berri, the leader of the moderate Amal Movement, participates in an ineffectual government that oscillates between empty promises and inactivity. The traditional political bosses, now stripped of much of the power that they held for so long, are reduced to giving meaningless interviews. The custodians of power in the Shi'i community are those personalities who can appeal to the newly politicized Shi'is, the men of the street, the displaced refugees from the south, and a new middle class that has been unable to translate its new wealth into meaningful political power.

Shi'i politicians either adapt to the political

realities of the present or they step aside. Thus, when Berri's Amal Movement moved into West Beirut in February 1984, it was as much to preserve its political grip as it was to confront a regime that seemed to consider its Shi'i constituents as enemies. In the south, where a multifaceted resistance movement has successfully confronted the mighty Israeli army, it was not the moderates who led the charge, but those at the more extreme flanks. Only after a long period of sitting on their hands did the moderates join the fight, and in the process they too moved away from the political center. The heroes of the resistance are enraged villagers, committed young bloods and regional leaders who have heretofore preached moderation, but the leaders are also the local religious leaders—like the assassinated Raghib Harb—who skillfully used Shi'i myths and symbolism to enlist support. No single party or leader can take credit for the defeat of Israel's occupation, but certainly a sizable part of the credit belongs to the more extreme factions.

In 1982 when one discussed the leading organizations in the Shi'i community, the list was not long. However, today one must take into account a number of formations. Among them is Hizb Allah (the Party of God), which has steadily drained followers from the moderate center. Hizb Allah's strident program includes the goal of establishing Islamic rule in Lebanon, and unlike the Amal Movement it clearly stands for close relations

Augustus Richard Norton, a Shi'i expert, worked in southern Lebanon in 1980-81 and now teaches in the Social Sciences Department at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Dr. Norton, a regular contributor to Middle East Insight, is the author of The Emergence of a New Lebanon.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed to represent the position of any institution, branch or organ of the U.S. Government

between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon.

While many in the West seem to have a hard time understanding the concept of membership as it applies to those groups, it is important to note that we are not dealing with well defined organizations, replete with membership lists and membership cards. Instead, we are dealing with a very different dynamic. Many of the newly politicized Shi'is do not belong to any organization, although they may identify with the message of this or that group. In effect, affiliation is loose and fluid. For instance, when people in a southern village said they were with Amal, they were usually not saying that they were actually members in the movement, they were making a statement of approval for what Amal was doing and for what it stood. Conversely, a formal member of a movement like Amal or Hizb Allah does not by the fact of membership necessarily deny the influence of a political figure who happens to be non-affiliated.

Thus, a charismatic figure who can exploit the political tenor of the moment often exerts an influence that transcends organizational boundaries. In the present circumstance, Mubammed Hussein Fadl Allah is such a figure. Born near the Israeli border in Ainata, trained in the religious schools of Najaf, Iraq, long resident in the suburbs of Beirut, Fadl Allah is one of the most influential Shi'i clerics in Lebanon (and his influence extends to the Gulf as well).

Some correspondents have reported that Fadl Allah is the leader of Hizb Allah, and others have reported allegations that he was centrally involved in the anti-US terror bombings that have taken over 250 lives. As to the first charge, Fadl Allah has consistently claimed that he is not the leader of any party or movement, though he acknowledges his own influence among the Shi'is. Frankly, it is unimportant whether he is or is not the leader—and I do not believe that he is—of

Hizb Allah. The most important fact is that his message resonates throughout the Shi'i community. Moreover, it should be added, Fadl Allah's message is one that combines a call for intercommunal toleration with a call for the adherence of Muslims to Islamic law. While he does not deny that he would like to live in an Islamic State, he does not think the conditions in Lebanon are appropriate for the establishment of such a state. There is reason

to believe that during his last visit to Iran, in February 1985, his refusal to demand the establishment of an Islamic State in Lebanon led to a cold reception. Much piffle has been written about Fadl Allah's views, but the fact is that in comparison to many of his cohorts, he is no fanatic. Indeed, his interviews are lucid, substantive and detailed expositions which leave room for dialogue. Some at the center of Shi'i politics believe that Fadl Allah has a crucial role to play in consolidating the leadership of the community.

As to the second allegation, that Fadl Allah has played a role in spawning or facilitating terror attacks, the simple fact is that it is doubtful that anyone in the West really knows. There is no denying that Fadl Allah's message has inspired opposition to the United States and Israel—he concedes as much—but whether he has taken a more direct role is at least unclear. Fadl Allah has his share of enemies, quite independent of his role in any particular incident, and one should presume that there is much disinformation available (from all sides). The March 1985 car bombing outside Fadl Allah's home and office in Bir al-Abid, which took eighty lives, was a vivid and horrendous reminder that Fadl Allah is not without enemies in Lebanon.

To the best of my knowledge, this is the first detailed interview with Sheikh Fadl Allah available in English. George Nader conducted the interview at his home in Bir al-Abid in the southern suburbs of Beirut.

Interview with
**Sheikh Muhammed
 Hussein Fadl Allah**

by George Nader

Q. Sheikh Fadl Allah, could you tell us about your political program?

SHEIKH FADL ALLAH: For me, Islam is the basis of all of my social and political thinking and opinion. I do not consider Islam a religion in the sense that religion is understood in the West—i.e., solely a relationship between God and man and having nothing to do with man's temporal needs except where this concerns moral values and ethics which believers observe haphazardly.

I believe that our religion is more than just man's relationship to God. It is a total way of life, including laws regulating temporal life as well. This, for me, is Islam. I base this on my study of the Shari'a—the Islamic Holy Law—and past Islamic governmental rule. This is why I refuse to view Islam in confessional terms, the way the people outside and inside Lebanon do.

Islam has nothing to do with confessional fanaticism. It is a philosophy—an ideology which is to supercede any other existing ideologies. It has room for everything and everyone, including those who espouse opposing ideologies. It is not fanatical. On certain issues, Islam and opposing ideologies agree. In others, they do not.

Islam has rules and regulations for co-existence. Accordingly, no one has the right to impose his will upon another, except in a righteous manner. In some circumstances, people do have the right to impose their will on others, but Islam regulates how this can happen. What is important is that man is free.

As Imam 'Ali stated, "Do not be the slave of another man because God has given you freedom." And as God states in the Koran, "Dignity is to God, his Prophet, and to the believers." And as one of our Imams said, "God has allowed the believer everything, but he has not allowed the believer to humiliate himself." A person cannot become a slave, with or without his own consent.

We therefore oppose colonialism, because it robs man of his freedom, exploiting his economic, social, and cultural existence to colonialism's benefit. All exploited people have the right to live in freedom and dignity. This is why we oppose colonialism, be it American, European, or Soviet.

We oppose all repressive regimes and oppressive leaders, because we believe in justice for all people, including sinners.

Because we believe that an ideology cannot be imposed by force, we believe in dialogue with all those opposing us. This includes both Marxists and others because we live in a pluralistic society and believe in co-existence.

Islam, historically, has been a religion of co-existence. Though it has ruled this region for 1400 years, and many other areas for at least 1300 years, it has allowed other religions such as Christianity, Judaism, and others to exist. At times, there have been problems between the Christians and the Jews, but not between the Muslims and either of the others.

Furthermore, in the past, all those who ruled the Islamic world in the name of Islam

did not represent Islam as they should have. For example, we do not believe that Ottoman rule was just, free, or Islamic.

We believe in the liberty of man and the struggle for liberty. This is the basis for our struggle with Israel which we believe has no legitimate right to Palestine. That they were living there or ruling that land over 2000 years ago is a historical or political joke.

They stole that land and expelled its people. That is why we tell the Israelis to get out of Palestine and let them return to the lands

as Muslims cannot accept the separation of religion from the state because this is a concept alien to Islam.

Only those religions devoid of rules for governing could countenance the separation of religion from the state. In Christianity, for example, there is a clear difference between the temporal and spiritual realms. As they said, "Render unto God what is God and unto Caesar what is Caesar's." Christianity does not concern itself with the state, and as such, has no rules for government. Muslims, on the other

“

If the Americans
try to understand us,
try to feel the tragedy,
or understand the causes
that created this tragedy,
then they would understand
martyrdom.

”



from which they came. The Jews who lived there beforehand have the right to remain there, as do the Christians and Muslims who lived there as well.

We have said that even if the Israeli Jews became Muslims, they do not have the right to remain in Palestine because they stole other people's homes and land—which is unlawful. The problem has nothing to do with Jews or non-Jews. It is simply a matter of returning the land to its rightful owners.

Q. How do you view calls for Islamic rule, on one hand, and the principle of separation of church and state, on the other?

SHEIKH FADL ALLAH: As I said earlier, Islam has its own theory of power, rules and regulations for governing, and its own political way of dealing with the world. Accordingly, we

hand, do have these rules, and must abide by them in all walks of life—whether political, commercial, or economic.

In the absence of an Islamic state, we must abide by Islamic law in our political, social, and economic life. As we have the obligation to pray, it is also our obligation not to take interest. Following Islamic law is mandatory, even in the absence of an Islamic state.

A Muslim who lives in a non-Islamic state faces a dilemma. That is why Muslims tend to live in states under the rule of Islamic law.

Q. Let us speak about Lebanon today. The Lebanese political situation is highly complicated—being composed of many religions and sects. How do you view the structure of Lebanese society, and do you have any clear proposals for saving Lebanon? And furthermore, do you wish

to transform Lebanon into an Islamic Republic similar to the Islamic Republic of Iran?

SHEIKH FADL ALLAH: The Lebanese situation is extremely complicated. We can say that the political situation in Lebanon is probably more difficult than the political situation of any other country, as a result of the broad pluralism that exists here. This situation creates as many psychological barriers as there are confessional groups in Lebanon. This has brought about partisan-confessional, confes-

down the confessional system. All the Lebanese will have left then are their human qualities and the government will have to deal with them as individuals, not as members of one confessional group or another.

Islam, like Marxism, proposes a system—an ideology—while Christianity does not. Christianity is not a political party. The Christians in politics are either Liberals or Marxist. Their religion does not imply a specific political line. You can speak about the interests of the Christians as a community but not about a Christian political line or ideology.



“
I believe
 that we must first
 bring down
 the confessional system.
 All the Lebanese
 will have left then
 are their human qualities
 and the government
 will have to deal with them
 as individuals.
 ”

sional-partisan conflicts resulting in a partisan mentality. Consequently, every confessional group acted like an independent state, having its own existence, independence, and interests. Ideas could not be exchanged freely between the members of the different communities. This is what immobilized Lebanon. Lebanon will continue to deteriorate as long as we have a confessional system.

The confessional system is not based on humanitarian principles or on an intellectual theory; it is based on an alliance, similar to a feudal alliance, only concerned with reciprocal interests, not on any general principles. This means we cannot think as one nation; instead we think as if we are many nations.

Many people call for cantonization. In fact, people today are living in psychological cantonization or something similar to that.

This is why I believe that we must first bring

Religion is something specific in Islam. I will speak about change itself. In principle you can propose any system or ideology. It is an exchange of ideas. But I do not think that you should use violence to bring about a change. In a recent article published by *Al Mountalak*, I say that we can bring about a change in Lebanon by educating and enlightening the people from within the social and political institutions.

You can do a revolution only when the ground is ready for it. Take for example the case of Iran. There you have a population composed of Muslims only, which accepts the line of Islam, and a regime that had become an obstacle in the way of Islamic rule. The only solution was to fight this regime. It is possible that revolution is not always the good solution. Sometimes there are obstacles that a revolution cannot eliminate.

There are other ways to do it. You can start by convincing the people, the same way the Christian preachers do, or Marxists do. When we convince an overwhelming majority of the people to convert to Islam, and we have favorable political conditions, then we could bring about an Islamic republic. In the same way a country can become a Marxist republic, a Western democracy, etc.

In Lebanon we have a retarded mentality. We do not accept any change. We are like that and we want to remain like that. But what about future generations? I think the confes-

Q. The Christian community is afraid. The Christians were recently uprooted from the mountains (Shouf) and there is a danger of more uprooting of Christians in the South. The calls for an Islamic Republic are increasing. What do you think is the future of the Christians in Lebanon?

SHEIKH FADL ALLAH: The Christians have always lived together with the Muslims in Lebanon. The Muslims have never uprooted any Christians. There were some problems between Christians and Druze. These were not

“

I tell the American people, you have to understand politics. You have to be very concerned about foreign policy. Foreign policy will have negative or positive results on your internal politics.

”



sional system should be eliminated. Some people may promote a secular system and not a religious one, but I say that the system we have today is a secular one, with only the exception of personal status affairs, like marriage, divorce or inheritance being run according to religious communal laws. Personal status issues can create some problems in Lebanon, but they do not alone constitute Lebanon's problems. The problem is the confessional system. We should not look for how many Christians there are or how many Muslims. This system should be abolished.

It is the right of a human being to have and express his political opinions. Coming back to your question—do we want Lebanon to become an Islamic Republic like Iran—Lebanon's situation is different from Iran's, and I do not believe that the same changes that took place in Iran could take place in Lebanon.

conflicts between *Christianity* and *Druzism*, but the result of a *political* struggle. Muslims are not destroying Christians in Lebanon. In fact, there are situations where the Muslims helped and protected the Christians. I lived in Bint Jbeil, and there were Christians living in the nearby villages of Debel and Ain Ebel.

I can easily say that the Muslims of Bint Jbeil are more friendly with the Christians than they are among themselves. They do everything possible to avoid hurting the Christians' feelings. In 1920, it is true, there was an attack on Ain Ebel carried on by Muslims. But those Muslims were manipulated by the French. It was not an indigenous situation.

I think that the problem of the Christians is a political problem of parties or even a party in particular. A group of adventurers is trying to create a complex amongst Christian people within the Lebanese society—like the Zionist

movement which created the complex of the persecuted Jewish people. They created a sort of racism among the youth. At school and at the university they tried to separate the Muslim youth and the Christian youth to avoid any interaction between them.

The Lebanese crisis has internal causes, but we know the development of this crisis is complicated by ties with foreign countries. One of the problems of the Kataeb party (Phalange) is that they rely totally on external powers to protect their interests. That's why you see them changing alliances all the time — from Europe to the USA, from Syria to Israel, and then from Israel back to Syria. Take the example of the mountain war. They tried to exploit the Israeli victory, but Israel sided with the Druze.

It is in Israel's interest to work with a minority in Lebanon which has no ties with the external world. Maronitism or Christianity has an international presence. I read somewhere that Israel once thought of working with the Christians, on the basis that they were isolated and Israel could exploit this isolation. When the battle for Zahle took place in 1981, the Christians were able to mobilize the media in an international campaign, and the world responded in a strong way. The Israelis, who were watching the situation closely, understood that the Christians were not an isolated minority and Israel could not be their only protector and thus exploit them.

It was then that Israel started to look to the Druze, who were really an isolated minority. I will not go into the details of this relationship. The result was that the Christians were cooperating with Israel for their own interest and Israel was cooperating with them for its own interest. They thought (the Christians) that they could get more from Israel and ride on its back, but Israel was more intelligent. We understand Israel asked many things from Bachir Gemayel, but he was not willing to give them much. Therefore, the mountain issue is an Israeli problem and not an Islamic one.

I lived in "Nabaa" (East Beirut) for 10 years, from 1966 to 1976. There were half a million Muslims living in East Beirut, in Borj Hammoud, in Tall El-Zaatar, in Sinn el-Fil, in Jdeide. Those people used to work in factories belonging to the Christians. The Kataeb came and uprooted them.

Regarding the problem of the South, I have

tried to do everything in my power to avoid confessional strife there. I asked everybody not to participate. I even asked the people of the South to take a purely defensive stand. According to my information, it was not the Palestinians who started the fighting in Sidon. It is true that the Palestinians have some ambitions, but they were afraid and anyhow they were not ready for it. It was the Lebanese Forces who started the fighting following their new alliance with Israel. It was a new adventure aimed at uprooting the Christian population in the name of the Kataeb's superiority complex.

If the Kataeb continue to gamble with the fate of the Christians, they will jeopardize their existence in Lebanon. They are building up a racist mentality which will raise barriers between them and the Arab countries. The Arab countries are now providing jobs to the Christians in their companies, but if the Christians acquire a Zionist Christian complex, the Muslims will naturally have a different position, particularly if the Christians succeed in creating a Christian canton.

I believe the Christians should not be afraid in Lebanon. The Muslims never exploited them in the past. The opposite has happened. The present Christian areas used to be Muslim areas. Take Kesrouan for example. It was a Shi'ite region. The presently Christian families of the Hashems, the Hushaimi, and the Shibabs are originally Muslim families. On the other hand, there are no Christian families that converted to Islam. The Islamic calls, which are considered extremist, are not more dangerous than the calls for Marxism. If the Muslims want to create an Islamic state, and there is no such thing, for now, the Marxists want to create a Marxist state which is a total denial of Christianity. Why, then, are they afraid of Islam which has common values with Christianity, and they are not afraid of Marxism? If it is a question of maintaining Christian faith, and the existence of the Christians, they should not be afraid of Islam. I think that this issue is exploited in the Lebanese political market place, and has nothing to do with political or religious thoughts.

The problem of both the Muslims and the Christians in Lebanon, is their own politicians who trade on their backs. I will tell you a funny idea: take all the confessional leaders and put them on an island away from Lebanon and the

Lebanese will immediately find a formula for coexistence

Q. Many people are expecting religious strife: assassination and liquidation to occur in West Beirut. How do you face such a possibility and can you tranquilize people?

SHEIKH FADL ALLAH: I do not foresee religious strife. I have confidence in the Islamic base in West Beirut. As for the Christians living in West Beirut, the political parties as well as the Muslim population believe that they should be protected. Some casual incidents can occur.

“

We will not recognize Israel under any circumstances. We do not say either that we have an Israeli complex and that we go on killing every Israeli.

”



A Christian can be kidnapped following the kidnapping of a Muslim, or vice-versa. Houses of a Christian or a Muslim may be attacked. But this is due to the absence of sufficient security. It is not a situation proper to West Beirut. I think that you can be 80% sure that nothing will happen.

Following the Israeli invasion, many political factions tried to create discord among the Muslims but did not succeed. In the case of assassinations, it is a Lebanese political practice. There are also many intelligence services present in Lebanon. Some say 17; some say 22. There are external, regional and internal secret services. The work of these services and their agents is to commit assassinations, bombings and similar actions. We are working with all the faithful to prevent such things from happening.

Q. A lot has been said about your recent visit to Iran—about some tension in your

relation with Iranian leaders. What is the truth? What are your true relations with the leaders of Islamic Iran?

SHEIKH FADL ALLAH: This information is not precisely true. I have an old relationship with the leaders of Islamic Iran which started long before the Islamic Republic. It is a relationship of friendship and mutual confidence. I gave my opinion, which in its general lines is in harmony with the Iranian thinking in the same context of our evolving Islamic thought. I am an intellectual. I have books that were published 25 or 30 years ago about this matter. The Iranian leaders are not thinking of

an Islamic Republic in Lebanon in the least as the media reported. There are some differences.

There are some Iranian scholars and some officials who are perhaps not fully aware of the situation in Lebanon. They spoke about it, but not the leaders. We told them that Lebanon was different, that we do not have sufficient and necessary conditions for an Islamic Republic. These discussions were with people outside the decision-making circles, with intellectuals and scholars.

Q. What is your evaluation of the situation in South Lebanon after the Israeli pullout? Do you expect Israel's northern borders to be safe?

SHEIKH FADL ALLAH: This is not the question. The question is, will we be safe north of the Israeli border? Israel is threatening the whole area. It is exploiting every change to acquire a new advantage or new territories. At



the beginning of this interview, I said that Israel has no legitimate right to exist. Therefore I consider that it has no right to security. It is the right of the Arabs, the Muslims or the Palestinians to take back their land. But, we in Lebanon do not have the means to bring back Palestine. We only have a few opportunities to liberate our territory. What happens after that depends on the larger plans set to confront Israel. We will not recognize Israel under any circumstances. It is contrary to Islam. You cannot as a Muslim say stealing somebody's land is righteous. It is like adultery. As a Muslim you cannot say that adultery is righteous.

We have some fears concerning our security. Israel is saying if I am attacked, I will retaliate. But Israel could send one of its agents to shoot a Katousha, and use it as a pretext to attack Lebanon like it did in 1982, when it used the assassination attempt against its ambassador to Great Britain to invade Lebanon. We are not willing to give Israel a security card. Israel is an aggressive country, and cannot accept peace except on its own terms.

We should act within our capacities. We do not have unlimited capacities. We do not say either that we have an Israeli complex and that we go on killing every Israeli. The Islamic Resistance never killed a civilian. All those who were killed were Israeli soldiers. We have nothing to do with civilians. We do not like to bomb civilians. Our problem is with the state of Israel, with the Israeli administration, the Israeli soldiers, the Israeli political and military apparatus.

Q. The USA accuses you of creating a religiously fanatic atmosphere which is driving some people to commit suicidal operations against American interests. Others say you are the spiritual leader of Hizb Allah (the Party of God). What is this all about?

SHEIKH FADL ALLAH: The West accuses me of violence. In fact, I am a man of dialogue. I have books and a school in dialogue. I ask people to solve their problems through love and understanding, not through the use of violence. Several years ago, I published a book called "Islam and the Theory of Force."

The Americans are concerned about sports. They are not concerned with politics or what their administration is doing. Perhaps that's why Americans do not understand us. If the Americans try to understand us, try to feel the tragedy, or understand the causes that created this tragedy. Then they would understand martyrdom.

The Americans are like the Queen of France, "Marie Antionette." The demonstrators were asking for bread and she gave them cake. She could not understand that they were hungry and needed food. The problem of the Europeans and the Americans is that they forgot history. They forgot colonialism. They do not understand anymore what it means to live under colonialism.

What happened in Lebanon is only a sequence in the pattern of violence engulfing the area. It is not something new for which I am responsible. Violence is present in the area,

with the Muslims, with the Christians, and with the Palestinians. The US is exploiting this vicious circle of violence. Kissinger created the Lebanese crisis or at least planned it. Then Israel, with the approval of the US, invaded Lebanon. This invasion was based on an American decision and American help. Beirut was destroyed and thousands of people were killed by Israeli forces.

We consider, the ordinary people consider, if you take a poll you will see that everybody considers the US responsible for what happened. The presence of the Multinational Force was perceived by the people as an umbrella protecting the regime, protecting Israel, not protecting the people.

The Multinational Force during their stay in Lebanon, did not impose order. They had the power to, but they never did. Instead they got involved in internal politics. They became a militia. The Marines became a militia holding the green line in Hayel-Sellom in the face of another local militia. That was how the people perceived them. These same people had to express themselves and they could do it either in a traditional manner or in a nontraditional manner. They chose suicide attacks, which is another form of struggle.

The Muslims believe that you struggle by transforming yourself into a living bomb like you struggle with a gun in your hand. There is no difference between dying with a gun in your hand or exploding yourself. Most of the concepts I am speaking about are intellectual concepts. In a situation of struggle or holy war you have to find the best means to achieve your goals.

Yes, I speak with the people about facing American imperialistic plans, as I speak with them about the European and Soviet plans. But I do not tell them, I do not specify, for example, "blow yourself up."

I heard from a *Washington Post* correspondent that Kataeb intelligence sources accused me of blessing the attackers. I call for freedom. I call for the liberation from colonialism. I call to fight colonialism. If colonialism oppresses a people, the people should fight it. But to say that I lead people to do violent acts—no. The American administration should understand that *it* itself is leading people towards violence. We try our best in some cases to contain violence and keep it under control. This is the big problem of colonialism.

The problem of the oppressors is that they see a phenomenon but they do not try to look for its causes. Their problem is that they see the tragedy in the reaction to their action but they do not see the tragedies created by their action. I think that if the American people or the people of Europe come to understand us they will revolt against their own administrations, their own governments.

I told some French people, "You call us extremists because we are fighting Israel and facing American plots. If this is true then we can call De Gaulle a terrorist because he was fighting Hitler." The problem of a person who does not experience hunger is that he cannot understand hunger. That is why he cannot understand the screams of a hungry man. A person who does not understand colonialism does not understand the pain caused by colonialism.

Q. Do you have a word of advice to convey to the American people or to the American administration?

SHEIKH FADL ALLAH: I do not think that the American administration is interested in any advice. Because this American administration spends its time distributing its advice to other people to give concessions to American policy and economy. They advise other people to accept all instructions and plans that they impose on them. But I say to Americans who still consider that the Statue of Liberty represents American civilization and policy: If you understand Liberty, then you should understand the meaning of the liberty of other people.

I say to the American people: You have to study the negative results that at least this present administration is trying to create—hostility towards other people—and this hostility in turn is transformed into negative results for those Americans around the world. Oppressed people cannot always behave in a reasonable manner. Reason cannot face up to a rocket. Reason cannot face a destroyer. The people that are oppressed in many ways may try to use all means to relieve the oppression. I tell the American people, you have to understand politics. You have to be very concerned about foreign policy. Foreign policy will have negative or positive results on your internal politics. There are no internal politics which exist in isolation from the external world. □

APPENDIX 8

[From *The Emergence of a New Lebanon—Fantasy or Reality?* 1984]

PAPER SUBMITTED BY AUGUSTUS NORTON, ENTITLED "HARAKAT AMAL—THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW LEBANON FANTASY OR REALITY"

The cascading violence in Lebanon has—over the span of nearly ten years—confounded all but the most recalcitrant optimists, while it has swelled the pessimists' ranks. As the situation has gone from bad to worse and from worse to seemingly worst, spectators and participants alike have learned to be skeptical about even the dimmest rays of hope. Thus, only a fool would venture any specific hopeful prediction as to the future of Lebanon, or even the possibility that Lebanon has a future. However, there is one prediction that is safe to make, and that is the following: whatever the future will hold for this ill-fated country, it is indisputable that the Lebanese Republic's plurality, the Shi'a, will play a decisive role in shaping it—for better or worse.

Long on the periphery of Lebanon's political system, and on the bottom of the country's economic system, the Shi'as only began to find their political voice in the late 1960s. Notwithstanding the political activities of individual Shi'a *zu'ama* (political bosses) who controlled respective segments of the community, the Shi'as as a group have been marked by quiescence and even irrelevance for politics in Lebanon.¹ This chapter treats, in three parts, the mobilization of the Shi'a community by the movement that has come to be known as Harakat Amal. †

* I would like to thank Brian Jenkins and the splendid staff of the RAND Corporation for the extraordinary research assistance that was made available during my September 1982 stay at that unique institution. Naturally, only the author is responsible for any errors or shortcomings in the present chapter. This chapter should not be construed to represent the position of RAND, or any organization, branch, or agency of the U.S. Government.

This chapter is dedicated to the memory of Musa Baddah.

† Harakat Amal means, literally, The Movement of Hope; however, 'Amal is also an acronym for *Afwai al-Muqawimah al-Lubnaniyah*—the Lebanese Resistance Detachments, a meaning that is now seldom mentioned by movement officials.

Part I discusses the socio-economic status of the community and describes the processes of social change that have affected the Shi'as. Part II takes the reader from the late 1960s through the civil war years of 1975–76 and the key events of 1978 and 1979, and concludes on the eve of Israel's June 1982 invasion. Part III analyzes the reaction to the invasion, and the adaptive responses of the Amal leadership to the dramatically changed political context of post-invasion Lebanon.

BACKGROUND

While population estimates for Lebanon are always risky—the last official census was conducted over fifty years ago—many observers agree that the Shi'as presently comprise the largest single confessional group, representing approximately thirty percent of the population which is to say from nine hundred thousand to one million members.² Thus, the Shi'a population now surpasses both the Maronite and Sunni sects that have dominated the republic since the attainment of self-rule in 1943. Lebanon's confessional political system institutionalizes a Maronite presidency, a Sunni premiership, and a Shi'a speakership in the chamber of deputies, all by virtue of the respective population shares established by the 1932 census. Should the Shi'as successfully demand that the political system reflect the logic of changed demographics, it is clear that a substantial reallocation of political power in Lebanon would result. However, for the most part, the Shi'as have been occupied by far less grand objectives, in particular, the amelioration of their economic plight and the rampant insecurity that they have suffered, especially in *al-junub* (the south).

Lebanon's Shi'as have long been considered the most disadvantaged confessional group in the country. By most, if not all, of the conventional measures of socio-economic status, the Shi'as fare poorly in comparison to their non-Shi'a cohorts. For example, using 1971 data, Joseph Chamie noted: the average Shi'a family's income was 4,532 Lebanese pounds (£L; 3£L = \$1, in 1971), in comparison with the national average of 6,247£L; the Shi'as comprised the highest percentage of families earning less than 1,500£L; they were the most poorly educated (fifty percent with no schooling vs. thirty percent state-wide); and, the Shi'a was the *least* likely, in comparison with other recognized sects, to list his occupation as professional/technical, business/managerial, clerical, or crafts/operatives, and the *most* likely to list it as farming, peddlery, or labor.³ In his 1968 study, Michael Hudson found that in the two regions where the Shi'as predominate, *al-Beqa'a* and *al-junub*, the percentage of students in the population

(about thirteen percent) lagged by as much as five percentage points behind Lebanon's other three regions.⁴ Riad B. Tabbarah, analyzing educational differentials, found that in 1971 only 6.6 percent of the Shi'as had at least a secondary education, compared to at least fifteen percent and seventeen percent for the Sunnis and the Christians, respectively.⁵ Citing official Lebanese government statistics for 1974, Hasan Sharif found that while the south had about twenty percent of the national population, it received less than 0.7 percent of the state budget.⁶ Sharif's description of the underdevelopment of the south illustrates the conditions under which many Shi'as have had to live.

The South has the fewest paved roads per person or per acre. Running water is still missing in all villages and towns although water pipes were extended to many areas in the early sixties. Electricity networks were erected at about the same time, but they are inoperative most of the time. Sewage facilities are available only in large towns and cities. Outside the larger centers telephone service is completely absent except for a single manual cabin which is usually out of order. Doctors visit the villages once a week and sometimes only once a month. Clinics are maintained only in large villages and do not function regularly. Hospitals and pharmacies are found only in the larger population centers. [The] Elementary school is usually run in an old unhealthy house provided by the village. Intermediate schools were introduced to the large towns in the mid-sixties.⁷

Based on this writer's field work in Lebanon from 1980 to 1982, Sharif's description is still essentially correct. While there have been some minor improvements, the conditions depicted are for the most part at least as bad as noted, and in many respects have only been exacerbated by nine years of conflict and social disruption.

THE SOCIAL MOBILIZATION OF THE SHI'AS

Even before the onset of civil war in 1975, Lebanon was experiencing profound and rapid social change. The importance of this social change is anticipated in Karl W. Deutsch's important 1961 article, where Deutsch elaborates the concept, "social mobilization."⁸

Social mobilization, in effect, has two dimensions: first, it is an indicator of the modernization process (while Deutsch cautions, it is not identical with the "process of modernization as a whole").⁹ Second, it speaks to the consequences of modernization. As an indicator, the concept subsumes a wide range of variables that when measured over

time signal the extent of the changes that are taking place in a given country. Thus, Deutsch counsels that we pay attention to the following clusters of change: exposure to aspects of modern life (e.g., the media, consumer goods, and technology); changes in residence, in particular rural to urban migration; occupational changes, for example shifts away from agrarian employment; literacy rates; and, changes in income.

The consequences of social mobilization were described by Deutsch as follows:

In whatever country it occurs, social mobilization brings with it an expansion of the politically relevant strata of the population.¹⁰

Social mobilization also brings about a change in the quality of politics by changing the range of human needs that impinge upon the political process. As people are uprooted from their physical and intellectual isolation in their immediate localities, from their old habits and traditions, and often from their old patterns of occupation and places of residence, they experience drastic changes in their needs.¹¹

Taking Deutsch's concept as his inspiration, Michael Hudson examined social mobilization phenomena in Lebanon and offered persuasive, if sometimes circumstantial, evidence that the country was—in the late 1960s—undergoing rapid, but uneven, social mobilization.¹²

While reliable data are scarce, especially by confession, the limited available data point to profound socioeconomic change in Lebanon over the past several decades. Of particular importance are changes in employment and residence patterns, changes which are central to Deutsch's concept of social mobilization, and which can reasonably be inferred to have disproportionately affected the Shi'as.

From 1960 to 1980 the percentage of the total labor force employed in agriculture declined from thirty-eight percent to eleven percent, with most of those displaced moving to the services sector which increased from thirty-nine percent to sixty-two percent of the labor force over the same period.¹³ The reasons for this occupational shift are complex, but in addition to the dislocations incidental to warfare, they include: stagnant prices for cash crops (*viz.*, tobacco and sugar beets); an increase in capital-intensive citrus-crop cultivation; a relatively high rate of growth in the labor force (three percent per annum in the 1970–1980 period); an uncertain and dangerous security environment (especially in *al-junub* and *al-Beqa'a*, areas accounting for well over fifty percent of the Shi'a population—the remainder are found in Beirut and its suburbs); and a decisive lack of budgetary support from the government, and bank

credits from the private sector (respective rates were 2.3 percent of the state budget in 1973, and 2.3 percent of total bank credits in 1974). Not surprisingly, the result has been a growing impoverishment of the small freeholder, who typically owns three hectares or less and accounts for about three-quarters of the rural population. (One 1973 estimate shows an annual per head of household income of 500£L for agriculture, as compared to 1,100£L in industry and 8,060£L for the services sector.) By the late 1960s—well before the onset of serious conflict—fifty-six percent of those engaged in agriculture in south Lebanon took second jobs, usually as laborers.¹⁴

The decline of the agrarian sector has been an important impetus for internal migration, usually to Beirut and its environs, as well as for external migration, for the Shi'as typically to West Africa. Even before the events of 1975, about forty percent of the population of south Lebanon, and about twenty-five percent of the population of *al-Beqa'a* had emigrated.¹⁵ Coupled with other important if less dramatic changes, such as a doubling of per capita energy consumption in the period 1960–1979, Lebanon was experiencing profound changes of the sort anticipated by the social mobilization construct.

While under some circumstances the end result of the social mobilization process is the emergence of a shared nationality, Deutsch cognized,¹⁶ a propos of Lebanon, that in some political settings the social mobilization of a population would not lead to assimilation, but differentiation.

... the same process may tend to strain or destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or basic ways of life.¹⁷

The data, sparse as they may be, certainly hint that ever larger numbers of Shi'as would be available to political action (i.e., for recruitment); however, the forms of their political activity as well as the context were clearly not predetermined. That the Shi'as should act as Shi'a-Lebanese and not as Lebanese was not unexpected as the preceding quotation from Deutsch emphasizes. But, that the rural setting was seemingly as important as the urban as a locus for political mobilization, is, at least at first glance, something of a surprise. Finally, that the successful political mobilization of the Shi'as should have led to Harakat Amal is a result of several developments that are addressed below.

The most obvious explanation for the relative solidarity of the Shi'as is the commonplace that it is nearly impossible to escape from one's confessional identity in Lebanon. From the identity card specifying

religion to the allocation of political privilege and reward along particularist lines, the Lebanese citizen is constantly reminded that he is a hyphenated Lebanese (e.g., Shi'a-Lebanese, Druze-Lebanese, etc.). Not that fervent religiosity is necessarily widespread of course, but religious identity defines one's primary social organization through which political security is maintained.¹⁸ The Shi'as' confessional consciousness was even further enhanced by the widespread—and not unjustified—belief that they had suffered the costs of the continuing conflict in Lebanon far more grievously than any other group in the country.

As for the several hundred thousands of Shi'as who settled, both permanently and temporarily, in and around Beirut, it is now well acknowledged that urban residence does not necessarily erase sectarian identities and often has quite the opposite effect.¹⁹ As Hudson remarked, "the crucible of Beirut does not appear to be molding less particularistic Lebanese citizens. . . . Urbanization appears to fortify, rather than diminish Lebanese parochialism. . . ." ²⁰ Furthermore, even if the urban dweller seeks to cut his village ties, electoral law makes it difficult, even impossible to do so. (The complicated and lengthy legal process involved in an attempt to shift voting rights from one constituency to another effectively forecloses the possibility for most Lebanese.) As Fuad I. Khuri notes, while only seventeen percent of Lebanon's population remained rural after the migrations of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, these important demographic shifts remained unrecognized in the electoral law.

A citizen, irrespective of where he was living or for how long, was required to return to his home-town to exercise the right to vote. Shifting voting rights from one constituency to another is a complicated procedure that requires a court decision. Had the electoral law been amended to give seventeen percent of the parliamentary seats to the rural areas and eighty-three percent to the urban areas, the political structure of Lebanon would have been turned upside down. As it was however, the electoral law helped to bind the voter to his village. . . .²¹

Thus, the village followed the villager into the city in both the social and the political realms; and yet, as argued below, the city is both figuratively and literally close to the village.²²

As we shall see, the villages of southern Lebanon have been at least as important as Beirut's urban quarters and the surrounding poverty belt as a spawning ground for the political mobilization of the Shi'as. This may be mildly surprising, even taking into account the extraordinary security situation in the south, since some of the fundamental

tenets of political development theory claim an important relationship between urbanization and manifestations of increased political activity (viz., participation). Before reconciling this apparent divergence between the actual and the theoretical, it is pertinent to briefly review some representative authoritative statements on the subject of urbanization and political participation.

Daniel Lerner, in *The Passing of Traditional Society*, treats urbanization as the first phase of modernization and he claims:

It is the transfer of population from scattered hinterlands to urban centers that stimulates the needs and provides the conditions for "take off" toward widespread participation.²³

Karl Deutsch equates, in large part, the very process of change that transforms a society from traditional to modern ways of life with urbanization. Thus, as noted above, to measure social mobilization such variables as "changes in residence," "changes from agricultural occupation," and, specifically, "urbanization" are proposed. As a society experiences greater social mobilization (hence, urbanization), we are taught to expect an expansion of "the politically relevant strata of the population,"²⁴ which in turn leads to "increased political participation."²⁵ Finally, Samuel Huntington makes the point most directly.

Urbanization, increases in literacy, education, and media exposure all give enhanced aspirations and expectations which, if unsatisfied, galvanize individuals and groups into politics.²⁶

Obviously, the object here is not to trivialize the work of other scholars, but to make an important point with respect to Lebanon. The special meaning of urban residence for political participation has been lost in Lebanon, not because of faulty theorizing, but because for Lebanon the urban-rural distinction has lost much of its meaning.²⁷ In a country of 4,015 square miles, a country in which traveling by road to major urban centers from even the most remote villages is possible in three hours and usually much less, a country in which external migration (and return) is a tradition, and in which brutal pulses of violence have propelled cycles of internal migration, the vast preponderance of the population is psychically nonrural.

The pristine village is not just uncommon in Lebanon, it is a rarity. For reasons that are well expounded by Fuad Khuri, the isolated village, safe in its customs and traditions and unaffected by the dynamics of modernity, is a vestige of dusty ethnographies.

Generally speaking, no community (village, suburb, or city) in Lebanon today has physical boundaries corresponding to its sociocultural limits, although this is a matter of degree. What emerges is a phenomenon in which social groups transcend territorial boundaries, a phenomenon more characteristic of suburban than city or village traditions.²⁸

Khuri's work, published in 1975, is even more relevant in light of the changes that have taken place since its publication.

Thus, in considering the political emergence of the Shi'as, which is described in the remainder of this chapter, it should hardly be surprising either that an important locus of political mobilization has been in the village or that the patterns of recruitment have followed confessional lines rather than alternative, nonparticularistic ones.

FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1980s

Notwithstanding their relative impoverishment, the Shi'as were not, as we have seen, divorced from the processes of social change underway in Lebanon. Nonetheless, politicization is one thing and political action is another. The question in the late 1960s seemed not to be whether the Shi'as would find their political voice, but who, or what organization(s) would provide it. As Hudson noted in his prescient 1968 book, *The Precarious Republic*:

One of the more interesting political developments in the postwar period has been . . . the gradual modernization of Shi'a leadership, a trend accompanied, of course, by demands for a greater share of power.²⁹

Musa al-Sadr

Of those contending for the leadership of the Shi'a community, the most important was no doubt a charismatic religious leader, Musa al-Sadr.³⁰

Al-Sadr was born in Qum, Iran, in 1928, the son of Ayatallah Sadr al-Din Sadr. He was educated in Tehran, and received his religious training in a Qum *madrasa* (religious school), one of the many such institutions referred to as *Maktib-i-Islam* (or school of Islam). He first visited Lebanon, his ancestral home, in 1957. In 1959, after receiving an invitation from the Shi'a community in the southern port city of Tyre, he relocated in Lebanon.³¹ By a special presidential decree, President

Shihab (1958–1964) granted him Lebanese nationality, a rare act that was an early confirmation of his growing influence in Lebanon.³²

By the end of the 1960s, al-Sadr had established himself as the leading Shi'a cleric in the country, a status that was confirmed when he was named, in 1969, to be chairman of the newly formed Supreme Shi'a Council by the government. The Council, created by the Lebanese parliament, was a direct response by the government to the growing demands of the Shi'as, demands which were loudly and effectively voiced by al-Sadr (who had by this time taken the title "Imam"). The creation of the Council with Musa al-Sadr at its head was a significant political victory, and was one of the many rounds in the battle for supremacy between the Imam and Kamal al-Asad, the most powerful Shi'a *za'im* (political boss).

In 1970, one year after the formation of the Supreme Shi'a Council, al-Sadr organized a general strike "to dramatize to the government the plight of the population of southern Lebanon vis-a-vis the Israeli military threat."³³ Shortly thereafter, the government created the *Majlis al-Junub* (Council of the South), which was capitalized at thirty million £L and was chartered to support the development of the south. Unfortunately, the *Majlis al-Junub* quickly became more famous for being a center of corruption than for being the originator of beneficial projects.³⁴

With the influx of thousands of fedayeen in 1970 and 1971, following the bloody conflict in Jordan, the already difficult social and economic problems of the Shi'as were compounded by a rapidly deteriorating security situation. As the pace of fedayeen attacks and Israeli counterattacks accelerated, life in the south became increasingly perilous. With the Lebanese government unable to protect its citizens, al-Sadr made armed struggle one of the motifs of his campaign to mobilize the Shi'as. Following the October War of 1973, he declared that there was "no alternative for us except revolution and weapons."³⁵ He asserted that "arms are a symbol of manhood,"³⁶ and at one rally, he angrily declared:

From now onwards we're not *metwallis* [a somewhat derogatory term for Shi'as]; we are rejectionists; we are avengers; we are a people who revolt against any kind of oppression.³⁷

Citing the government's failure to provide either security or economic well-being for its Shi'a citizens, Musa al-Sadr became increasingly vehement, and finally, in 1974, he founded the *Harakat Mahrumeen* (the Movement of the Deprived). With his new movement, he vowed to struggle relentlessly until the social grievances of the

Shi'as (and other deprived Lebanese) were satisfactorily addressed by the government. As Kamal Salibi reports:

He even warned that he would soon have his followers attack and occupy the palaces and mansions of the rich and powerful if the grievances of the poor and oppressed were left unheeded.³⁸

Just one year later, al-Sadr's efforts were overtaken by the onset of civil war in Lebanon. By July 1975, it became known that a militia adjunct to the *Harakat Mahrumeen* had been founded.³⁹ The militia, *Afwaj al-Muqawimah al-Lubnaniyah* (the Lebanese Resistance Detachments), better known by the acronym Amal (which also means "hope"), was initially trained by Fatah, and it played a minor role in the fighting of 1975 and 1976. Musa al-Sadr's movement, including the Amal militia, was affiliated with the reform-oriented Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and their fedayeen allies during the first year of the war, but when the Syrians intervened in June 1976 to prevent the defeat of the Maronite-dominated Lebanese Front, al-Sadr split with his erstwhile allies and staunchly supported the Syrians. The movement's estrangement from the LNM has continued ever since, as has its close association with Syria.⁴⁰ Subsequently, the name *Mahrumeen* fell into disuse, and the movement that al-Sadr founded came to be known as Harakat Amal (or simply, Amal, not, as is sometimes thought, al-Amal).

The Decline and Reemergence of Amal

The growing influence of Imam Musa (as he is called by his followers) prior to the civil war was certainly a bellwether for the increased politicization of the Shi'as; however, in point of fact, Musa al-Sadr only led a minority faction of the politically affiliated Shi'as. Indeed, it was the multiconfessional reform-oriented or revolutionary parties and militias that attracted the majority of the politicized Shi'as. Musa al-Sadr had significantly reduced the power of the traditional Shi'a elites, the *zu'ama*, but it was the civil war itself that made these personalities increasingly irrelevant in the political system.

Many young Shi'a men joined such groups as the (pro-Syrian) Ba'ath organization, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the (Iraqi-supported) Arab Liberation Front (ALF),* or one of several Com-

* Strictly speaking, the ALF (*Jabhat Arabiyya*) is a constituent group in the PLO. Its Lebanese counterpart, within the LNM, is the Iraqi faction of the Ba'ath Party. However, there have been Lebanese in both segments, and, as a result, most Lebanese do not distinguish between the two in common usage.

munist organizations.⁴¹ Such groups represented a wide range of grievances and programs, and their only common denominators were opposition to the Kata'eb-dominated Lebanese Front, and their support for the Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM). While the discernment of the motives of individual recruits is patently difficult, there were clearly those who were motivated by ideological and revolutionary objectives, but many simply found membership the requisite for a fairly attractive salary. (It is probably impossible to find a Shi'a village or urban quarter where stories about unemployed *shabab*—young bloods—departing one day to join a militia and returning a few weeks later sporting a Kalashnikov rifle or a pistol and a wad of Lebanese lira are not told.)⁴²

Thus, while al-Sadr's partisans sometimes played consequential roles in the 1975–1976 fighting, they were only one group among several that counted a significant Shi'a membership. In fact, the most valuable political currency from 1975 forward was armed strength, and Musa al-Sadr's not inconsiderable charisma (his devotees typically described him as a giant among men) was no substitute for his inability to field a more substantial force than the fifteen hundred or so fighters in Amal. Overshadowed by the military might of his many competitors for political influence, and somewhat discredited for his alleged complicity in the August 1976 fall of the Palestinian-held Shi'a quarter of Beirut, known as Nabaa, to the Kata'eb,⁴³ al-Sadr retreated to the south with a coterie of dedicated followers. While he remained active giving speeches and buttressing his following in the south, his national influence waned significantly between 1976 and 1978. There are reports that he played an important role during this period arousing opposition to the Shah among Iran's Shi'as, but the specific nature of his activities is still somewhat obscure.⁴⁴

Three events transpired in the ten-month period from March 1978 to January 1979 that accelerated the political mobilization of the Shi'a community and contributed to the growing consolidation of the Shi'as' political influence in a revitalized Harakat Amal. In March 1978, the Israelis launched their first major invasion of Lebanon, the Litani Operation; in August 1978, the Imam Musa al-Sadr disappeared during a still enigmatic visit to Libya; and, in January 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Revolution toppled the Shah. It was the occurrence of these three events that, on the one hand, focused the resentment of the previously empathetic Shi'a community on the Palestinians, and, on the other, provided an important myth and an exemplar which facilitated the recruitment of Shi'as by Harakat Amal.

The Litani Operation

Israel's 1978 invasion, which claimed some one thousand—mostly Shi'a—lives and resulted in the destruction of a number of homes throughout *al-junub*, not only demonstrated the heavy human price that the Israelis would exact from the residents of the area as a result of the extant armed Palestinian presence, but also signaled the conclusive end of one Israeli security policy—a policy of retribution—and the beginning of another—a policy of relentless disruption. After the Litani Operation the IDF moved far beyond all but the slimmest pretense of retaliation in its military operations in south Lebanon. Instead, the IDF sought to keep the PRM (and its supporters and sympathizers) constantly on the defensive with an active campaign of air attacks, raids, kidnappings, and house bombings. Until the cease-fire of July 1981 the disruption campaign was remarkably successful. Palestinian-initiated actions in or from south Lebanon were rare as the fedayeen found themselves almost constantly reacting to Israeli military initiatives. The IDF's guiding principle was confirmed by then-Chief of Staff, General Rafael Eytan, when he noted:

We will continue to take action where we want, when we want and how we want. Our own self-interest is supreme and will guide us in our actions not to allow terrorists [i.e. *fedayeen*] to return to the border fence.⁴⁵

A significant consequence of the IDF's offensive was that the residents of the south were constantly reminded that a continuing Palestinian presence in the region would preclude any surcease to the Israeli campaign. Villagers, particularly those living in areas adjacent to the border strip controlled by Israel through their agent, Sa'ad Haddad, lived in fear of nighttime raids carried out against those who sympathized with the Palestinians or who were suspected of being members of Lebanese groups hostile to Israel or Haddad. (Such raids sometimes cut a wide and bloody swath as villagers found that by denouncing their adversaries they could enjoy the nectar of revenge and settle old feuds: more than a few political innocents suffered the unwitting IDF's heavy hand.) In a typical raid, carried out in December 1980, Israelis and Haddad's militiamen attacked five villages, killing three in cold blood, wounding ten, and damaging or destroying 14 houses.⁴⁶ Such raids had several important effects. First, persons affiliated with the LNM tended to stay away from their villages, and hence from additional recruits. Thus, the field was increasingly open to Amal which was viewed with favor by the IDF. Second, heretofore apolitical villagers learned that the best protection against unwanted early

morning visitors was affiliation with a movement (viz., Amal) that would prevent "undesirables" from entering their villages. In a number of towns and villages, local residents even established their own local security forces, which would patrol during the hours of darkness. Over time, these ad hoc militia groups tended to affiliate with Amal. Third, the net result of the campaign was a clear and widening gulf between the PRM and the villagers of the south. Simultaneously, similar developments were underway in the Shi'a quarters of Beirut.

By 1980 and 1981, many of even the simplest peasants adopted anti-Palestinian slogans. Rather than casting blame on the Israelis—as had been the case in the past—the cause of the villagers' plight was often said to be the Palestinians. This alienation represented an important and easily understood success for the Israeli security apparatus. However, it should be noted that it was the intensity of the Shi'a villagers' feelings that was remarkable rather than their originality. In fact, the roots of the villagers' disenchantment may be traced to the early 1970s when the Shi'as rallied in support of the Lebanese Army after clashes between the army and the *fedayeen*.⁴⁷

As the conflict in Lebanon progressed, the Shi'as were increasingly isolated as a community. In the early stages of the civil war, the Shi'as provided the cannon fodder for most of the groups aligned with the PRM. Indeed, as a dispossessed people they were often and aptly described as the natural allies of the Palestinian people. However, they increasingly became the communal victims of the Palestinian-Israeli war for Palestine-Israel. In a mean dialectical process, the Shi'as found themselves targeted by the Israelis for their geographic proximity to the *fedayeen*, and as they attempted to put distance between themselves and the *fedayeen* they were viewed with increasing contempt and suspicion by the *fedayeen*. Israel's campaign would not have been nearly as successful had it not been enhanced by the often arrogant, insensitive, and capricious behavior of the *fedayeen*.⁴⁸ By the late 1970s, it was common when visiting Shi'a villagers, to hear all kinds of vignettes in which Palestinians were the villains and Lebanese the victims. The IDF's intensive campaign, beginning in 1978, served to bring the latent contradictions and tensions to the surface,⁴⁹ and the resultant alienation of the Shi'as from the Palestinians served as a fertile context for the growth of an organization, Amal, that promised to fill a most basic need, security.

the Disappearance of Musa al-Sadr

Accompanied by two associates, Sheikh Muhammed Shahadeh a'qub and Shafi 'Abbas Badr al-Din, Musa al-Sadr arrived in Libya

on August 25, 1978, for a visit of unspecified length and purpose. One of Imam Musa's close associates has indicated that the visit was in response to an invitation from the Libyan leader, Mu'ammār al-Qaddāfi, which al-Sadr accepted so that he could "advocate the return of peace to Lebanon and to work for peace."⁵⁰ Prior to his arrival in Libya, al-Sadr had visited Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Algeria, ostensibly for the same purposes.

According to a sympathetic account, the Iman Musa decided to leave Libya on August 31, 1978, the eve of the Libyan national holiday commemorating the September 1, 1970 Revolution. During the visit, al-Sadr was met by the Chief of the Libyan Foreign Relations Office, al-Sayed Ahmed al-Shahatey and presumably, al-Qaddāfi. The Libyans claim that Musa al-Sadr and his companions left Libya on an Alitalia flight bound for Rome, but his followers deny this and claim that he never left Libya.⁵¹ One senior associate, who claims he urged al-Sadr not to go to Libya, states that the Libyans sent three persons intended to pass for the traveling party, along with the party's luggage on the flight to Rome.⁵² At any event, Musa al-Sadr has not been heard from since, although occasional reports of dubious origins indicate that he is still alive.⁵³ Most impartial observers believe him to be dead, as do a good number of his followers—when speaking privately.

Several explanations have been offered for the disappearance, but only one has been supported by more than conjecture or rumor, and that version, which involves the Syrians, is anything but a conclusive account. It is germane to at least touch upon the proffered explanations, since they each tell us a bit about al-Sadr's opponents, if not about the fate of Iman Musa himself. According to one version, al-Qaddāfi had earlier provided three million £L (about one million dollars) to al-Sadr, and he could not satisfactorily account for the money, which allegedly ended up in a Swiss bank account. As a result of this malfeasance, the Libyan leader had al-Sadr murdered or incarcerated. There are several reasons to doubt this report. First, Libyan monies have been distributed to a number of Palestinian and Lebanese organizations (e.g., the *Ittihad al-Ishtiraki al-Arabi*—the Arab Socialist Union) without any semblance of close or even cursory accounting. Second, al-Sadr's closest companions claim that he was deeply in debt (two million dollars) when he disappeared, largely as a result of loans he had personally signed to support the large Technical Institute in Burj al-Shamali (near Tyre). An examination of his personal accounts revealed very modest sums of money. Third, al-Sadr's life style was simple, if not ascetic, and there is no reason to believe that he would have hoarded money that might have been used to support his movement. Indeed, interviews with individuals who knew him,

including some of his adversaries, have not produced even one accusation of corruption on his part. Finally, al-Sadr's followers claim that they have told al-Qaddafi that if he can substantiate any financial misconduct on al-Sadr's part they would gladly agree to his imprisonment or even execution.⁵⁴

Another version of the story has the Shah of Iran employing his intelligence service, SAVAK, to eliminate the Imam who apparently played at least a minor role in exciting anti-Pahlavi sentiment in Iran. There has traditionally been a very close relationship between Lebanese and Iranian Shi'a religious leaders, particularly since many Lebanese *sheikhs* were trained in the *madaris*—religious schools—of Iran. (Musa al-Sadr of course studied in Qum.) Furthermore, al-Sadr was not only an Iranian by birth, but he was linked by marriage to the Ayatollahs Khomeini and Taba'taba'i. (His sister is married to Khomeini's son, and his daughter is the wife of Sadiq Taba'taba'i, the son of the elder Taba'taba'i.) Thus, there is a certain plausibility to this variant of the story. In fact, when the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was formed in the spring of 1978, Iran provided a battalion—reportedly well manned by SAVAK agents—to the force. The Iranian unit was, according to a correspondent's report, busy "identifying and isolating followers of the anti-Shah leader, Imam Musa al-Sadr."⁵⁵ Nonetheless, while the Shah had the motive and no doubt the means to eradicate al-Sadr, Imam Musa's followers as well as the current Iranian regime—both with every incentive to blame the Shah—persist in placing the blame on al-Qaddafi's shoulders. As an Iranian official noted in 1980, "we consider the Libyan Government directly responsible for the mystery that continues to hover over this matter."⁵⁶

Yet another version of the disappearance saga is offered by Shahpur Bakhtiar, to whom the Shah handed power when he fled Iran in 1979. Bakhtiar claims that al-Sadr was sent to Lebanon by the Shah in furtherance of a scheme to create a Shi'a state consisting of Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. They subsequently fell out over the failure of the Shah to disburse a promised five hundred thousand dollars. However, it is not the Shah that Bakhtiar claims was responsible for the disappearance, but Khomeini, for whom al-Sadr was purportedly a very strong and dangerous competitor.⁵⁷ Especially well-informed observers have noted that even after the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, there was real fear that the "Amalists would take over the revolution." Interestingly enough, the latter explanation is given credence by one of al-Sadr's close associates, who believes that the Imam was murdered as a result of a Syrian-Libyan-Khomeini plot. This individual adds that al-Sadr and Khomeini did not like one another, marital and religious ties not-

withstanding. Apparently, it was the Syrians, and particularly Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam, who urged al-Sadr to accept the Libyan invitation; obviously, it takes a rather substantial inferential leap to arrive at a full-blown assassination plot, but the possibility cannot be dismissed.⁵⁸

While the mystery of Musa al-Sadr's fate remains, his disappearance has been of enormous symbolic importance to Harakat Amal. His persona has been elevated to that of a national martyr for many of Lebanon's Shi'as. By 1979, his face had been added to the panoply of posters that testify to the multitude of causes and movements in Lebanon. The movement's newspaper, *Amal*, uses a picture of Imam Musa on its masthead and regularly reprints his speeches and commentary (usually accompanied by additional photographs). From time to time, movement members will identify themselves as "Sadrieen." Most of the younger members of Harakat Amal wear a button or a pendant with al-Sadr's visage on it, and some even sport silk-screened t-shirts depicting him. In a country with precious few contemporary heroes, Imam Musa has achieved an especial degree of fame.

Had Imam Musa passed quietly from the scene, it is likely that Shi'a politics in Lebanon would have been far more fractious than they have been for the past four years. While his followers applaud his humanity, selflessness, and staunch commitment to Lebanon's "disinherited," and to Lebanon itself, Musa al-Sadr's detractors point to his tactical shifts of alliances, the witting or unwitting role he played to the benefit of "counterrevolutionary" institutions and interests (viz., the *deuxième bureau*—Army Intelligence), and his political ambitions. Hence, had he continued his efforts in Lebanon, it is unlikely that he would have been able to repair or surmount the fissures that divided him from the Shi'a *zu'ama* and their followers, and from many of the groups that were affiliated with the LNM. While his disappearance has not eliminated the fissures, it has made them somewhat irrelevant. Many Shi'as find in the vanished Imam a compelling symbol for the expression of their discontent with the cruel malady that they have had to suffer. Al-Sadr's disappearance has complemented and fed a political mood and has been propitious for the crystallization of the populist movement he left behind, Harakat Amal.

More than a few Amal leaders concede that a "disappeared" Imam is doubtlessly of greater value for the political mobilization of the masses than a "present" one. Not only did the Imam's mysterious disappearance make it much more difficult for adversaries to criticize the movement that reveres his memory and which symbolizes his work, but his "occultation" is plainly reminiscent of the Shi'a dogma

of the hidden Imam, a fact which lends further authenticity to the only wholly Shi'a political organization in Lebanon. As one thoughtful movement member conceded, the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr is the single most important thing that has happened for Harakat Amal.

The Islamic Revolution

There is no question that the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran was keenly affective among the Shi'as of Lebanon. The deposition of the Shah in January 1979 served as an important exemplar demonstrating what a pious, well-organized, and motivated *umma* could accomplish in the face of oppression and injustice. Even more important, the new regime in Tehran promised to be an important source of material and political support.

One interesting example of the close relationship between Tehran and the Lebanese Shi'a community is the case of Doctor Mustafa Chamran. Chamran, an Iranian, was the director of the Burj Ash-Shamali Technical Institute—which was probably partially financed with Iranian monies—until 1979, when he departed Lebanon to become a member of the Supreme Defense Council in the new Islamic Government. While it is not illogical to presume that such a well-placed official would have been of immeasurable assistance in securing substantial assistance for Amal, the mysterious death of Chamran in 1981, reportedly while visiting the Iraqi front, casts some doubt on such presumptions. Many Lebanese affiliated with Amal believe that Chamran's death was the work of persons or parties affiliated with Khomeini's regime who saw the American-educated engineer as a threat to their control of the regime. Thus, it may well be that popular notions about extensive and consistent support flowing from Tehran to Amal are inaccurate. It is not possible to accurately gauge the extent or dimensions of the support provided by Iran to Amal, but it appears to be quite possible that the relationship is much more problematic than glib press reports indicate.

Even in the event that the Iranian Government provided no more than rhetorical support, the very fact that the Islamic Revolution succeeded has been an important source of pride and inspiration to Lebanese coreligionists. But, while the Islamic Revolution is an important exemplar, it is not widely seen as a model for Lebanon, but rather as a sample that is more important for its emotive significance than for its political form. Some minor Shi'a clerics in Lebanon have attempted to mimic their brethren's success by taking a militant role in secular affairs, but such cases have been the exception rather than the rule. For the Muslim mainstream in Lebanon, there has been no indication that

Shi'as or Sunnis would care to transplant the Islamic Revolution to Lebanon; indeed, many Lebanese Muslims are both contemptuous and fearful of what they sometimes describe as Khomeini-ism.

The steady growth of Harakat Amal since 1978 is no doubt interesting. However, the fundamental significance of this dynamic movement is not to be found in its structural characteristics, but rather in its sociopolitical meaning to which we now turn.

Sociopolitical Dimensions

Harakat Amal has been, to a large extent at least, the beneficiary of a number of circumstances that it did little to foster. The movement was rescued from obscurity because it offered a hero, an exemplar, and the promise of security for Lebanese Shi'as, who had tired of paying *diyya* (blood money) on behalf of Palestinians, Israelis, and non-Shi'a Lebanese. There was nothing deterministic about the emergence of Amal or an organization like Amal. Had Musa al-Sadr returned from Libya, or the Shah prevailed in Iran, or the fedayeen comported themselves less antagonistically in their dealings with their host Lebanese, the past few years would have been very different—in political terms—for the Shi'as. It is not difficult to conceive of circumstances in which the political mobilization of the Shi'as might have been a centrifugal rather than a centripetal process. The fact that the process has tended to be centripetal was in large part especially due to the security situation in south Lebanon where the Shi'as paid in spades for the misfortune of being caught in the Israeli-Palestinian crossfire.

The credit that Amal's leadership deserves is for capitalizing on a fertile context—indeed, perhaps recognizing an historic opportunity—and having done so, filling a vacuum that under other conditions might have been filled by the *zu'ama*, the government, or the parties affiliated with the LNM.

The early 1982 comments of Nabih Berri, who has served since early 1980 as the Chairman of the Amal Command Council, as to the price paid by the Shi'as are notable in that they accurately represent the communal sense while they are also very restrained in comparison to the vehement opinions one would hear in the villages of the south. (Berri is a lawyer whose family home is in Tibneen, a major town close to the Israeli border.)

The people of the south, including the Shi'as, have given the Palestinian cause more than all the Arabs combined have given it. They have given the cause their land, their children, their security, their orchards— everything but their honor and dignity.⁵⁹

For the villager, for whom Berri's eloquent language was a strange diplomatist's tongue, it could all be put more simply: "We gave the Palestinians everything and they gave us back insults, corpses, and a lesson in corruption." Asked who or what was the source of their problems, Shi'a peasants as well as those higher up on the economic ladder would answer "the basis of our problem is the Palestinian presence." (Incredibly enough, I have even heard this muttered as the Israelis were attacking Lebanese territory.) Thus, peasant, worker, farmer, and teacher were ready to support a movement that would protect them and their families.

We tend to view events through familiar structural prisms, so much of the attention devoted to Harakat Amal has been in the sense that the Shi'as had simply organized themselves in a paramilitary organization that was challenging many of the other paramilitary groups that populated the Lebanese scene.⁶⁰ But such notions entirely miss the significance of Amal. As a combatant, the movement has more often than not been overshadowed by its adversaries; even its leaders have been quick to recognize its military weakness.

If you go by arms, ammunition, and equipment, we are probably the weakest party in Lebanon: The smallest organization is probably better armed and better equipped than we are, but our strength lies in our ability to make the people, the masses, carry out our orders, and they do it because they know we are out to meet their demands.⁶¹

While the preceding assertion by Berri somewhat overstates Amal's military weakness, it does highlight what has been the movement's real strength—its capacity for transcending raw military power, and having done so, exerting not insubstantial political influence in Lebanon.

In the south, where Amal has drawn much of its strength, and nurtured its growth, the number of actual members (as opposed to sympathizers) has been extremely small. In one major Shi'a village only ninety persons even held membership out of an active male population of over fifteen hundred. In two other important villages only thirty to forty were officially members. Yet each of these villages was considered an Amal stronghold. The point is not that the significance of the movement has been exaggerated, but that we have to consider Amal in its wider meaning, viz., as a political statement to which Shi'as affiliated ideationally, if not officially.

In more than a few village in al-junub, residents identified themselves as Amalists, yet they often had no official connection with

the organization. Of course for many villagers the best politics was no politics at all, a feeling that is well summed up in the folk proverb, "*Ra'ih al bagir ahsan min siyasat al-bashar*" (the intellect of a cow is better than the politics of the people). But politics, especially in violent variants, was impossible to escape. Thus, it was quite common to encounter a village replete with posters depicting Imam Musa and the Ayatollah Khomeini where the *mukhtar* and the village notables, as well as the peasants voiced the mottoes that so well exemplified Amal, and yet discover that Amal officials, who had every reason to claim a large membership in the village, could not claim one registered member in the village. When the villager said, "I am with Harakat Amal," he was merely confirming that Amal's populist message was striking a fundamental and authentic chord. While the Amal leadership might contemplate the restructuring of the Lebanese political system and the role of the Shi'a sect in such a restructured system, the villager's objectives were far less ambitious—in a word, he sought *security*. Hence, the appeal of a movement that called, without equivocation, for the reestablishment of the legitimate government and its institutions (and especially the army); for the support of the Palestinian struggle in Palestine, not Lebanon; and, for the disarming of militias, thugs, and marauders that have proliferated in all parts of the country.⁶²

It was from the villages and towns that Amal drew its strength, and at the same time derived its weakness. Merchants, the small agrarian middle class, and overseas Shi'as were important financial supporters of the movement, but these people did not represent readily mobilizable coercive strength. In other words there was no functional equivalent to the armed militias of the LNM (or the Lebanese Front). For example, the wealthy Shi'a citrus growers of the southern coast (especially south of the Rashidiyye refugee camp), were keenly ardent contributors to the movement; yet beyond an occasional meeting (which in itself could be dangerous), their active participation in Amal affairs outside their respective villages was nearly nil. (Having attended several of these meetings, this author can attest to the very elementary level of organization enjoyed by the movement in 1980 and 1981.) Dependent as it was on a geographically diverse base of support, of which the basic unit was the village, Harakat Amal was only infrequently capable of concentrating coercive military or political power. Thus in al-junub, but less so in al-Beqa'a or in Beirut, Amal was defensive in orientation. This was certainly true at least through 1981.⁶³ In short, Amal was usually at a decided disadvantage when it had to confront its adversaries on the adversaries' terms.

Arguably it is not even accurate to speak of one Harakat Amal. In an important sense, for every village where pro-Amal sympathies

predominated, there was a separate Harakat Amal. The result was an organization that accurately claimed wide support, but that often was unable to translate its affective force into effective control over its members and their activities. Indicative of this lack of control is the following candid comment made by an important movement leader:

Remember that Amal is a movement. Thus, direct orders can often not be given. Instead leadership must be a combination of persuasion, moral example, and the like.⁶⁴

While not lacking in funds or weapons, the movement's infrastructure in the south was very weak as late as 1982. Beset by constant clashes with its Lebanese and Palestinian adversaries, many of its most competent leaders spent the vast preponderance of their time quelling armed clashes and attempting to maintain at least the fiction of a brotherly relationship with the overtly less hostile segments of the *Quwat Mushtarikah* (i.e., the "Joint Forces" which brought together PLO and LNM fighters). Organization-building efforts were further stalled by the simple fact that many of the principal leaders continued to pursue a livelihood (usually out of necessity). Physical security was also a major preoccupation in that many leaders lived in villages that while internally secure were located adjacent to military positions manned by the *Quwat Mushtarikah*. In one extraordinary case, a key leader in the south lived less than two hundred meters from a military position that had apparently been sited for the express purpose of intimidating and observing him. The movement was much less vulnerable in the Beirut suburbs, especially in its Ghobierre stronghold, where larger concentrations of Shi'as and the self-contained nature of the community facilitated both the growth of the movement and the exclusion of "aliens." (One Ghobierre resident bragged that "fedayeen and leftists do not dare to enter.") Hence, in a violence-ridden environment like contemporary Lebanon, it was the degree of geographical integrity of respective Shi'a population clusters that largely determined the extent of Harakat Amal's "official" or public growth.

In the south (and al-Beqa'a), the result of the absence of a well-integrated organization was that the label "Amal," was sometimes free for the taking. For many Shi'a villagers the movement's name was merely a synonym for any collective self-defense activity carried out in the village. This, in itself, was a persuasive if ambiguous indicator of the degree to which Harakat Amal had come to be seen as the quintessential Shi'a organization. The Amal name was adopted, in at least a few cases, by local *shabab* (young bloods) who found that it

provided them and their activities a certain legitimacy that they could not otherwise provide. Furthermore, more than a few Shi'as who had previously belonged to the ALF, or any of the several communist organizations, tested the wind and found that the time was propitious for a change of labels. This latter tendency was serious enough that in the spring of 1981 Harakat Amal temporarily suspended its recruitment activities, at least in the south, because of the well-founded suspicion that it had recruited quite a few members of questionable loyalty and background. (Lest the reader be misled, it is germane to note that while the parties of the "left" were being overshadowed by Amal in the early 1980s, successful recruiting campaigns were conducted by the Lebanese Communist Party right up to the 1982 invasion.)

The characteristics and developments described above are neither surprising nor dysfunctional for an emergent communally-based organization such as Amal. However, the movement's weak infrastructure had made it potentially vulnerable to cooptation by those who could manipulate the same symbols as Amal, viz., the Shi'a clergy. The leadership that replaced Imam Musa in Amal is basically secular in orientation and while contacts with Shi'a religious leaders are assiduously maintained, there is very little evidence of any participation in Amal per se by individual *sheikhs*. Doubtlessly, there are those within the movement who would like to see the integration of Amal with the Shi'a clergy, but this seems to be a minority tendency.⁶⁵ In early 1982 there was some evidence to indicate that the Imam Muhammed Mahdi Shams al-Din, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Shi'a Council (Imam Musa is still officially the chairman), was challenging Nabih Berri for the leadership of the Shi'as—and doing so successfully. While this particular power play seems to have been short-circuited by the Israeli invasion, it was, as we shall see, reinitiated after the invasion.

On the local level, a few *sheikhs* who were sympathetic to Amal's objectives were reluctant to concede a leading role to its secular leaders. Taking the Iranian mullahs as their role models, several of these men took a direct part in organizing village chapters of Amal replete with militiamen and security activities. One colorful case involved the southern village of Siddiqine, where the local *sheikh* was incensed because his house had been bombed, reputedly by the ALF. Ignoring movement representatives in the village, he directed and apparently led the village militia. When Amal officials attempted to bring the maverick *sheikh* under control, he refused to concede their authority. It was only after Shams al-Din, at the behest of the Amal leadership, convinced the *sheikh* of Siddiqine to cooperate that he began to do so, and then only grudgingly. Contemptuous of the right

of secular officials to represent his constituency or direct his efforts, the *sheikh* remarked: "I am Siddiqine and Siddiqine is me."

The Movement's Agenda

With the plethora of militias and political groups in Lebanon, there has been a surfeit of political programs replete with prescriptions for curing the country's ills.⁶⁶ Before examining Amal's contribution to this crazy quilt of political platitudes and proposals, it is pertinent to briefly discuss the reasons it is difficult to definitively present the political program for Amal—or any other political grouping for that matter. Most obviously, among the early casualties of any war are the grand ideals for which men believe that they fight. The Lebanese conflict that began in 1975 was different only in that the idealism of the participants faded with astonishing rapidity. While each of the militias that fought could—to a greater or lesser extent—claim some semblance of a political rationale, the (il-)logic of the conflict quickly reduced the basis for individual campaigns and clashes to military pragmatism. Wars start with objectives writ large, but are fought for objectives writ small. Indeed, even the tactical rationale for specific clashes was suspect, given the large number of violent incidents sparked by affronts at checkpoints, killings, or kidnappings of friends and relatives, or merely the opportunity to loot and pillage.⁶⁷ War becomes its own justification, and men engaged in it have little time or inclination to reflect on their collective future. Thus, in an environment of near anomie, prescriptions for eradicating the conditions that engendered the conflict often must wait until the combatants exhaust themselves (or each other), or until decisive results (i.e. "victory" and "defeat") are achieved.

It is important to recognize that Harakat Amal was, before the 1982 invasion, acting on two complementary agendas: a first, implicit, and publicly unacknowledged by its officials, and a second, explicitly enunciated agenda. Before dealing with the latter, it is a propos to elaborate the movement's implicit or hidden agenda.

As we have seen, at the local level the primary motive for joining or supporting the movement was—plainly and simply—to find some relief from the rampant insecurity that gripped much of Lebanon. As the increasingly serious and frequent Amal-*Quwat Mushtarikah* clashes of 1981 and 1982 indicated, the primary threat to the Shi'a community's security was believed to emanate from the fedayeen and their supporters in the Lebanese National Movement.⁶⁸ In that the presence of the Palestinian fighters and their allies was seen as an invitation for Israeli attacks, villagers were not surprisingly opposed to the location of fedayeen positions in their midst. Furthermore, not

only was there the ever-present fear of Israeli strikes, but all too often the propinquity of the fedayeen meant the expropriation of agricultural lands, and communal and privately owned buildings, not to mention exposure to constant coercion and physical intimidation. (These unsavory side effects were of course not restricted to locales occupied by the fedayeen, but were only one symptom of the devolution of coercive power to armed groups and paramilitary groups throughout Lebanon.)

The frequent Israeli raids, artillery bombardments, and air strikes dictated the dispersion of fedayeen positions; otherwise the Palestinians would have been even easier targets for Israeli guns. But the dispersion of Palestinian resistance forces fed the anxiety, resentment, and resolve of those who paid the heaviest price—the villagers. Accordingly, as Harakat Amal gained strength it would only further limit the freedom of action of the *fedayeen* and render the fedayeen ever more vulnerable to enemy attacks. Thus, Amal's implicit agenda that aimed at denying the *fedayeen* access to the Shi'a community could only weaken the *fedayeen*. It is hardly surprising that the consequences of the growth of Harakat Amal were recognized both by movement officials and leaders of the various organizational components of the *Quwat Mushtarikah*. Those groups that were most directly threatened by the resurgence of Amal pursued an aggressive campaign to stifle and even eliminate the movement. In particular, the *Jabhat Arabiyya*, which because of its close association with the Baghdad regime of Saddam Hussein was anathema to the pro-Iranian Amal, and the various communist factions that were prime competitors for Shi'a recruits, were among the most militant in their opposition to Amal.

While Fatah officials recognized the threat represented by a strong Amal, they also recognized the imperative of maintaining at least the appearance of good relations with the most important organization in the Shi'a community. Hence, Fatah strove to avoid any public involvement in open hostility to the movement. For their part, Amal officials were quick to express their distrust of Fatah, which they believed was instigating anti-Amal activities, but they also recognized the temporary utility of the largest PLO group as a *wasita* (mediator). In fact, Fatah was unquestionably the preeminent organization in the *Quwat Mushtarikah*, and the only group that was capable of even attempting to impose any discipline on Amal's adversaries. The significant if transitory importance of a relationship with Fatah was illustrated in late March 1980, when bloody street battles erupted in Beirut between Amal on the one side, and the *Jabhat Arabiyya* and the Popular Nasiserite Organization on the other. The

fighting, which left twenty-seven dead, so alarmed Yasir Arafat (leader of Fatah and chairman of the PLO Executive Committee) that he interrupted his attendance at the Fourth Fatah Congress, then in progress in Damascus, and returned to Beirut to mediate the conflict.

By the Summer of 1980, two tendencies with respect to the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon were discernible within Harakat Amal. The more moderate tendency, stemming from sympathy for the Palestinian cause and a recognition that the *fedayeen* presence was not likely to be soon terminated by a peaceful solution, held that Amal's enemies were those who were affiliated with despicable governments (viz., Iraq and Libya). Fatah for those espousing this point of view, was not only a useful *wasita*, but a worthy ally. The second tendency, which even in 1980 clearly represented the mainstream in the south, held the Palestinian fighters and *all* foreign interlopers responsible for the continuing troubles in Lebanon. According to the latter perspective, any relationship with Fatah (or any *fedayeen* organization for that matter) was merely tactical and transitory.

Despite the public posturing of Amal's officials and the staunchly pro-*fedayeen* line of the movement's weekly organ, *Amal*, the delicate partial entente between Amal and Fatah steadily deteriorated between 1980 and 1982. Clashes occurred with increasing regularity and all but the pretense of amity vanished. While Fatah attempted to maintain a modicum of control over the movement through local joint security committees (which in practice it dominated) and various forms of pressure and intimidation, the movement's geographic dispersion, diffuse leadership, and a rapidly growing amount of public support, made such attempts increasingly ineffective.

One corollary of the movement's hidden agenda that bears noting at this point is the consistent public support that it declared for the deployment of the Lebanese Army throughout Lebanon. While the LNM and the Lebanese Front represented alternative legitimacy structures, Amal firmly committed itself to the reestablishment of the central government's authority—an essentially conservative position that seemed to well serve the interests of a constituency that sought security *plus* a fair share of political rewards. Amal's stand on the deployment of the army did not endear it to its erstwhile allies who continued to see the army as a Maronite-dominated force that was opposed by definition to the reformist National Movement (and its Palestinian allies).⁶⁹ Thus, Amal's support of the army further emphasized its anti-theoretical position to the *Quwat Mushtarikah*, and it also fed the suspicion that the movement (or at least segments of it) was no more than a stalking horse for the army's intelligence bureau, the *deuxième*

bureau. (While Amal's support certainly warmed some hearts in the Lebanese Army, it is not clear that the Army directed or buttressed Amal to any significant extent.)

In addition to supporting the army, the movement sought to associate itself with any program or institution that symbolized legitimate governance in Lebanon. Furthermore, it seized every opportunity to compel the government to extend its authority. As previously noted, one consistent focus for Amal has been governmental indifference to the plight of those living in al-junub. A palpable symbol of that neglect has been the *Majlis al-Junub* (Council of the South). Originally chartered in 1970 to foster economic development, the council has languished corruption-ridden. Amal made the council a constant target for criticism and protest, and in September 1980, occupied the council's offices in Saida and prevented its employees from entering the building. Simultaneously, Nabih Berri announced a series of demands, including the more timely and adequate compensation of those who had been displaced or who had suffered property damage due to hostilities. The movement threatened to take over the operation of the *Majlis al-Junub* if its demands were not met.⁷⁰ It is hard to conceive that a more politically lucrative target could have been chosen. By attacking the council, Amal raised an issue of widespread concern, forced the feeble government of Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss to take—or at least purport to take—a keener interest in the welfare of its citizens, and astutely identified itself with a legitimate governmental function.

While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully explore Harakat Amal's relationship with Syria, it should be acknowledged that the relationship has been close indeed. Amal's weapons were acknowledged to be supplied "via" Syria,⁷¹ and the Syrians seem to have played a role in training Amal militiamen, especially since 1980. Berri affirmed his movement's relationship with the Damascus government in February 1982, when, in an enunciation of Amal's goals, he included:

The definition of special military, security, economic, and cultural relations between Lebanon and Syria, and the specification of Israel as Lebanon's arch-enemy.⁷²

The Amal-Syria relationship served as yet another proof of the danger that Amal represented for the *Quwat Mushtarikah*. Certainly since the June 1976 Syrian intervention on the side of the Lebanese Front, relations between Syria and Fatah (and its allies) had been frosty to say the least.⁷³ It should be recalled that Imam Musa broke with

the LNM in 1976 when he supported the Syrians against his former allies. It is not unreasonable to presume that Amal was, to a degree at least, a means by which Hafiz al-Assad could temper and even control the actions of those groups which he could not directly influence. Plainly the strongest fedayeen presence was south of the "red line" delimited by Israel, and thus in the area from which Syrian forces were excluded, and its influence limited.

By early 1982 relations between Amal and its adversaries further deteriorated as widespread skirmishes broke out in a number of southern villages. Then in April 1982 fighting erupted in Beirut and in sixteen villages in al-junub. According to an Amal account, elements belonging to or aligned with Fatah conducted a ten-hour bombardment of the Technical Institute in Burj al-Shamali during the April fighting.⁷⁴ These serious clashes represented an important watershed for several reasons: When the fighting was brought to a halt, Amal forces—for the first time—remained in control of formerly disputed villages.⁷⁵ While the movement was far from being a well-oiled military organization, it showed significant tactical skill, even to the extent of mounting diversionary attacks and feints. Most significantly, through the auspices of the Syrian-dominated Higher Coordination Committee (comprised of representatives from the PLO, Amal, the LNM, and Syria), it was agreed that the PLO "should henceforth not involve itself in Lebanese internal security matters" but should concentrate on "strategic security." No one really expected the PLO to fulfill the agreement, but its very promulgation served as an indictment.

In the months preceding the Israeli invasion, the contradictions separating the *Quwat Mushtarikah* from Amal had become highly salient. The deteriorating character of the relationship was well illustrated by the contrasting statements of Salah Khalaf (whose *nom de guerre* is Abu Iyad and who is usually identified as the second-in-command in Fatah) and the leading Shi'a cleric, the Imam Muhammed Mahdi Shams al-Din. When Khalaf was asked in December 1981 about Fatah's relationship with Amal, he replied:

In fact, there is no conflict between the [Palestinian] resistance and the Amal movement. Indeed relations are good.⁷⁶

Commenting on the same subject, just two months later, Khalaf had clearly lost his patience with Amal:

We address our brothers in the Amal movement, not the schemers in Amal, but the brother nationalists whom we know take the initiative in the Amal movement and participate in the joint command

and the joint forces in the South so that we can prevent all evil elements and schemers in various areas from scheming in southern Lebanon. We reaffirm that we are concerned about the Amal movement . . . so that they will be with us in the same trench, within one joint command.⁷⁷

Following the April fighting, Shams al-Din offered his first public criticism of the fedayeen and the LNM. His strongly worded statement, which follows, was widely interpreted as an important hardening of the Shi'a (and the Amal) position.

The Supreme Shi'a Council urgently asks *those responsible in the Palestinian resistance and the Nationalist Movement* to stop the shelling of the villages immediately, to pull the gunmen out of them and to withdraw the weapons directed at them. The continuation of this situation portends grave consequences for the entire Arab situation. The people of the South are now facing Arab bullets, which are supposed to be directed at Israel, and are being displaced from their homes not by Israelis but by fellow Arabs. [italics added]⁷⁸

Even Nabih Berri, who had previously adopted a conciliatory public stance,⁷⁹ did not hesitate to contradict the PLO leadership's claims that Palestinians were not involved in the April clashes.⁸⁰

Amal's Public Agenda

Harakat Amal's publicly proclaimed agenda has combined a call for the restoration of unified Lebanon with demands for the gradual reformation of the polity. As alluded to above, the movement's immediate objectives have included the reimposition of state authority and sovereignty.⁸¹ Consistent with these goals, the movement opposed any effort to proliferate alternative governmental structures. Nabih Berri even suggested that the heavy fighting in April 1982 was precipitated by the LNM's attempt to elect "local councils" in Ras Beirut. The election of such councils was seen by Amal as a "form of autonomy" that might be preliminary to the partition of Lebanon.⁸²

While the immediate goals have been relatively modest, the longer term prescriptions promoted by the movement amount to changing the criterion—confessional identity—by which political rewards have traditionally been allocated in Lebanon. Berri has argued that confessionalism has precluded the development of a Lebanese nationality and has been the root cause of the country's troubles.

This [confessional] hallucination that we have in our minds has made us behave like tribes instead of like people of one country. The 1943 National Pact that we created is a partitionist pact. It helped us to build a farm, not a country. . . . I say this Pact is the root of all our troubles.⁸³

Because here the economic and employment competition is built on a purely sectarian basis. Sectarianism is imposed on us. They are making us wear turbans and priests' robes and forcing us to think confessional.⁸⁴

Consistent with Berri's remarks, until early 1982 Amal called for the abolition of confessionalism "from the top of the pyramid to its base,"⁸⁵ excepting the top three political positions only so long as necessary to demonstrate that deconfessionalism was working. However, by February 1982, the position had softened somewhat, although deconfessionalism was still proclaimed the ultimate goal.

The abolition of sectarianism must at least start in the army and in education, in the hope that this will lead to the total abolition of political sectarianism in Lebanon eventually.⁸⁶

At first glance the position publicized by Berri is not complementary to the collective interests of the Shi'a community that would stand to benefit from a reallocation of political positions and rewards proportionate to their share of the demographic pie. However, on closer examination, two factors justify the call for jettisoning—albeit slowly—confessionalism. Most important, it was the proliferation of parochial sectarian interests that, according to one principal's interpretation, made the civil war possible and thwarted the cessation of violence. Berri's deputy, Hasan Hashim, has asserted that the outside powers—especially the East and West military camps—were able to exploit sectarianism in furtherance of their aim of controlling the Palestinian Revolution. Hashim notes:

Lebanon is a victim of the dirty political game laid out by the Eastern and Western Camps. All of the organizations active on the Lebanese stage (except Harakat Amal) were connected and affiliated toward one of the Arab countries or an outside foreign power, and all of these groups and organizations were deeply and thickly involved in Lebanon and in the developments which took place in it.⁸⁷

Thus, to leave the Lebanese system unchanged is to maintain its vulnerability to meddling by outside powers. Obviously there is a very good dose of truth in this analysis, but here is another side to the

position, and that is the position, voiced from time to time in the movement's weekly, that the Shi'as were the only sect lacking an outside sponsor. Lacking a political sugar daddy, the Shi'as suffered accordingly.⁸⁸

Deconfessionalizing Lebanese politics is obviously a profoundly difficult matter and one that requires the support of precisely those who stand to lose the most if it is to be implemented. Less radical reforms that preserve confessional politics, but recognize Shi'a claims through the reallocation of political privileges, may well satisfy an assertive Shi'a community without exacerbating the existing insecurities in other confessions. As Fuad Khuri notes, the formula (i.e., the 1943 Covenant) might be preserved, but the equation by which political roles have been distributed would be changed to reflect new realities.⁸⁹ There is certainly evidence that Amal is aiming at an important revision of the political equation. Specifically, Nabih Berri and others in the movement have made statements which betoken a blurring of sectarian-based allocations between the Shi'as and the Sunnis. By minimizing or even denying differences between the two Muslim sects, the way may be opening for Shi'a claims to Muslim (i.e., Sunni) seats of power (viz., prime minister). For example, speaking in the wake of the Israeli invasion, Berri observed:

There is one Muslim community in Lebanon, and there are no differences. Regrettably, however, we still have the mentality of 1943, and I dread to say the mentality of 1864. I say it is absolutely impossible to disregard any side in the Lebanese arena. The Muslim community in Lebanon constitutes half of the population of Lebanon and even more, and it has its rights. It has discharged many duties. I add that our Christian brothers cannot be dispensed with or replaced. As a cohesive national unity, we must rise with Lebanon from a Lebanese premise and not from a sectarian premise.⁹⁰

Although the Amal position has expressly excluded federalist or confederalist solutions,⁹¹ such as the Lebanese Front has proposed from time to time,⁹² the movement has been careful not to exclude the discussion of any political program. In short, it has striven to project a conciliatory pose that makes it a natural interlocutor for any party willing to discuss incremental reforms. Berri has stated that any changes that are undertaken should result from a dialogue between "all active forces in Lebanon without exception."⁹³ Given the movement's troubled relations with the PLO, its strong relationship with Syria, and its promotion of Lebanese nationalism, its presence in any Lebanese government might solve problems for the Maronite community and

salve any misgivings about power-sharing arrangements with the Shi'as.

In discussing the movement that venerates Musa al-Sadr, it is appropriate to note that observers often found al-Sadr's intentions elusive. As one writer put it, "no one could specify where he stood politically."⁹⁴ One great admirer of Imam Musa, whose relationship began over twenty years ago, often remarked that "Imam Musa was a pragmatist, not an ideologue." Thus, we should probably not be surprised to find that Imam Musa's political heirs proved to be rather more interested in short-term gains than in long-term consistency.

AFTER THE 1982 INVASION

By early 1982 relations between Amal and the *Quwat Mushtarikah* had passed the breaking point. After the serious clashes of January and April, it was a foregone conclusion that Shi'a interests could no longer be reconciled with the fedayeen presence. While the movement was still significantly outgunned by its opponents, tactical improvements and a militarily wiser leadership helped to make the movement an increasingly formidable threat. With its fighters scattered from village to village, Amal lacked the geographic concentration of its brethren in the Beirut suburbs, but it compensated for its weakness by launching hit-and-run attacks, diversionary actions, and careful defense of village strongpoints.

No doubt Amal's growing effectiveness played an important role in the Israeli decision-making that led to the June invasion. While Israeli planners grossly misinterpreted the longer term meaning of Amal's militance, they were certainly correct if they anticipated a paucity of indigenous support for the fedayeen. No Amal leader of stature could accept an overt relationship with the IDF or with its puppet, Sa'ad Haddad, yet there was no lack of understanding of the benefits of a tacit alliance. In fact, after hearing the definition of an "objective alliance," one key leader acknowledged that that was indeed a good description of the movement's relationship with the IDF and Haddad. Some reports have exaggerated the level of collaboration between the invading IDF and Amal, but it is clear that especially in the first weeks of the invasion, residents of the south provided assistance in such matters as pinpointing fedayeen arms caches or identifying leaders of adversarial groups.

It is no understatement to claim that many southern Shi'as welcomed the Israeli invasion. One leader even stated that had Israel not invaded a war between Amal and the fedayeen was inevitable. It

should be stressed, however, that the mood in the south was not neatly replicated in the other two Amal strongholds—Beirut and the Beqa'a. It was only in the south that the Shi'as were constantly exposed to the deadly weight of Israeli military power and it was only in the south that the fortunes of geography forced the Shi'as to choose between supporting or resisting the Palestinian presence. It was the shortsightedness of the PLO, and in particular the preeminent Fatah, which helped to decide the choice. Notwithstanding an active Israeli program to alienate the people of the south from the guerrillas, the brash, arrogant, and often cruel behavior of the *fedayeen* rendered the choice really no choice at all. Outside of the south, Amal defined its adversaries more narrowly. Thus, south of Beirut, around Burj al-Burajinah for example, fighting involving Amal tended to be against forces perceived as viscerally anti-Shi'a (or anti-Iran), such as the Iraqi-sponsored *Jabhat Arabiyya*. The contrast in situations is well illustrated by the fact that while the Amal fighters in the south watched as the Israeli tank columns rolled by, those from al-Shiyyah, Ouzai, and Ghobierre mounted some of the most spirited and aggressive defensive actions against the invaders.

True, the invasion accomplished what Amal could not, namely the expulsion of the *fedayeen* from the south, but the glee of the Shi'as was short-lived as it became clear that for the cost of their suffering they may merely have witnessed the supplantment of one occupation force for another. With the invasion *Harakat Amal* found itself faced with a new panoply of problems, which if not satisfactorily resolved could well threaten the viability and even the survival of the movement.

Just as an earlier phase in the political mobilization of the Shi'as by Musa al-Sadr was interrupted by the cascading violence of 1975–76, so the events of the summer of 1982 seemed likely to short-circuit the renewed mobilization efforts that had commenced in 1978 and 1979. At first glance it even seemed that Amal's very *raison d'être*—communal security—had been obviated. While the Iranian exemplar and the disappearance of the imam were important mobilization symbols, the decisive factor was the increasingly serious and violence-fraught estrangement of the Shi'as from the Palestinian Resistance Movement. With the *fedayeen* excised, the critical question to be faced was whether a membership fed by the attraction of collective security could be maintained when the imperative of collective security was much weaker or at least less obvious. Put another way, could Amal redirect its efforts so as to retain its primary leadership role for a politicized Shi'a community, or would the organization prove to be an anachronism in the "New Lebanon"?

In effect the organization faced challenges at three distinct levels: from within the organization, from within the Shi'a sect, and from other—non-Shi'a—actors in Lebanon's political system.

Internal Challenges

As we have noted, Amal was never a tightly integrated organization and the possibility of fissure has always been latent within the organization. Not unexpectedly, given the organization's inchoate quality, there were keen regional splits which roughly corresponded with relative proximity to the Israeli (and Syrian) border(s). In addition to disparities born of locale, the movement subsumes an admixture of political perspectives and ideological preferences. While the critical mass of active members and leaders agree that the appropriate focus of their demands is a reformed Lebanese political system, there are segments that reject this relatively modest objective.

In addition, Amal has always contained its share of agents and opportunists who were perfectly willing to return to patron-client relationships outside the organization. For these people, the movement's instrumental value was simply as a substitute for preferred patrons—whether they be this or that *za'im* or organization. (One of the more fascinating political spectator sports has been watching the *zu'ama* who had been made increasingly irrelevant by the continuing civil war, attempt to elbow their way back into power after the invasion. Kamal al-Asad, whose constituency is unapparent, is typical of the genre.) Moreover, more than a few secularly oriented Shi'as had merely found it astute, and even advantageous, to support or join the movement rather than overtly opposing it. Many of the latter category dropped away from the movement after June 1982, when this pragmatic rationale became much less compelling.

Further threats to the movement's viability were mounted by those who raised serious challenges regarding the political objectives of Amal, including questions as to its very authenticity as a Shi'a movement. One such challenge was mounted by a member of the 25-member Command Council, Hasein Musawi. In July 1982, Musawi charged the movement's leaders with blatant collaboration with the invading Israelis, and, apparently with Iranian support, attempted to reorient the movement to what he saw as its proper objectives: the replication of Iran's Islamic Revolution in Lebanon. Musawi was subsequently expelled from the movement during the summer of 1982. He is, as of late 1983, ensconced in Ba'albek, in the Syrian-controlled Beqa'a where he leads the Islamic Amal Movement in apparent cooperation with a contingent of *Pasdaran* (Revolutionary

Guards) dispatched by Iran to Lebanon. He has been implicated in a number of acts of political violence, including the kidnapping of the president of the American University, David Dodge, and the destruction of the U.S. Embassy in April 1983. While Musawi's following is limited, his activities, buttressed as they are by the Syrian occupation of the Beqa'a, serve to remove the sizable Shi'a population of the Beqa'a from the organizational grasp of the mainline Amal organization.⁹⁵

Shi'a Competitors

As alluded to above, the post-invasion period brought a reemergence of a number of the traditional leaders, who while lacking sizable constituencies still maintained important political ties outside of the Shi'a community. Of course, the most notable was Kamal al-Asad, but there were others as well with familiar names like Hamadeh, Khalil, and Ossiran. These *zu'ama*, often denoted "semi-feudal leaders" by articulate Lebanese, were increasingly anachronistic. Their control of segments of the Shi'a community was tenuous even before 1975, as demonstrated by the successes of Musa al-Sadr in the early 1970s. Indeed, the very processes of mobilization that helped to bring about a politicized Shi'a community, had, by definition, reduced the fragmentation of the community and concomitantly the ability of a *za'im* to control geographically isolated communities. This is not to say these sociopolitical changes have been recognized (or accepted) by the Shi'a *zu'ama* or their Lebanese and non-Lebanese allies. As we shall explain below, attempting to turn back the clock of Shi'a politicization can be an attractive—albeit naive—maneuver for devotees of a Maronite-controlled Lebanon, as well as for outside powers thwarted in their attempt to manipulate Harakat Amal. While external manipulation may keep the *zu'ama* off the endangered species list, it is very doubtful that they will ever recapture the influence and control that they once enjoyed.

Without question, the most serious challenge to Amal's primacy in the leadership of the Shi'as has come from one individual, Mufti Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din. Shams al-Din, while technically a principal in Amal (he is a member of the Command Council), is probably the most important Shi'a cleric in Lebanon. His only real competitor for that distinction is the Jafa'ri Mufti al-Mumtaz, Adb al-Amr Qabalan. Since the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, who led the movement while simultaneously chairing the Higher Shi'a Council, the two positions have been split along secular-clerical lines. Hussein Husseini, a parliamentary deputy, and now Nabih Berri have led Amal, while Shams al-Din has chaired the Council (while retaining the title, Deputy Chairman).

The details of the struggle for supremacy between Shams al-Din and Berri are unavailable; nonetheless it is clear that a competition has been underway. In early 1982, for example, press reports indicated that there was a power struggle between Berri and Shams al-Din. The Israeli invasion seemed to push Berri closer to the Mufti, although there was some controversy between the two concerning the extent to which Amal fighters should confront the IDF. Berri, according to some informants, was pushing for a more aggressive role, especially in Ras Beirut, but he was successfully overruled by Shams al-Din. In the months following the invasion, the two men temporarily overcame, or at least accommodated their differences. Berri, arguably the weaker of the two in terms of legitimacy and elite constituencies, may have been somewhat buttressed through the active support of Sheikh Qabalan. The competition again became heated in early 1983, when it was announced that Shams al-Din had broken off all relations with the leadership of Harakat Amal.⁹⁶ Whatever the motives behind the announcement, it had the effect of placing the Mufti above the fray, validating his prospective claim for the principal leadership role of the Shi'as. Since the dramatic announcement, Shams al-Din has continued to deal with Nabih Berri and other movement leaders, so it is quite possible that the severing of ties may have merely been an object lesson for Amal. At this writing, it remains clear that the consolidation of leadership within Amal is an ongoing process, and the outcome is anything but predetermined.

Extra-communal Actors

At this juncture it is appropriate to note what has undoubtedly been the most serious challenge to Amal's authority in the south. This refers to Israel's attempts to coopt and emasculate Amal. Buoyed by its reception in June 1982, Israel set about using the existing Amal organization in the south as an adjunct to, or even substitute for, Sa'ad Haddad's militia. In what can only be described as a supreme miscalculation, the IDF or Mossad mistook the alienation of the Shi'as from the Palestinians as positive evidence for the possibility of establishing close ties between Israel and the Shi'a community. In fact, most of the population had no desire to trade one foreign overlord for another. Such wishful thinking on the part of Israel is not altogether surprising, however. Notwithstanding some sycophantic reporting in the United States, the Israelis seem to have clearly understood that Haddad and his weak militia were, as one IDF adviser put it, "unacceptable" to the majority of the population.⁹⁷ As Clinton Bailey, an Israeli who served as an Arab affairs adviser in south

Lebanon, observed in December 1982, the Shi'a members of Haddad's militia were "looked upon as the dregs of Shi'a society."⁹⁸

Initial efforts to coopt Amal intact promptly failed. While the southern leadership did not eschew a dialogue with Israeli personnel, they were both unwilling and unable to allow themselves to follow the Haddad prototype. Nonetheless, there were no outward displays of belligerence, and there were a number of cases of small-scale collaboration. The first phase was short-lived as the Israelis arrested thirteen of the movement's leaders and began a process of alienation that still continues.

The initial phase was followed by an Israeli campaign to recruit individual Amal members and Shi'as into a network of village militias that would form a regional grouping paralleling Amal. Simultaneously, the IDF apparently sponsored the return of the traditional leadership, which would further undercut Amal influence in the area.

Faced with an obdurate Amal leadership, the Israelis created an organization purportedly independent of Haddad's force. The organization, the *haras al-watani li-qura' al-Junub* (National Guard for the villages of the South), was intended to unite village militias created under Israeli pressure. While there have been some local successes, the attempt has basically been a failure. The principal cause of failure has been the inability of Israel's and Haddad's agents to recruit locally respected leaders. Even where the militias have been relatively active, as in Jwayya, Majdel Silm, and Sarafand, the groups remain transparent implantations. In Sarafand, for example, a local Amal leader was arrested and the village notables were told that the price of his release was the formation of a militia.⁹⁹ In a number of cases, the only leaders available have been those who are, for one reason or another, held in disrepute by the villagers. This is not to say that the militias will wither away, though, because they serve two complementary Israeli interests. First, they provide a justification and facade for Israeli involvement. Second, and this may well explain their morphology, while spawned of coercion, the militia may be converted into the partisan forces (*al-ansar*) which are ensconced in the Lebanese-Israeli agreement of May 1983. Thus, the existence of these militias will have been given a stamp of legitimacy. Along these lines it is important to note that the *haras al-watani* has been renamed *ansar jaysh lubnan al-hurr* (Partisans of the Army of Free Lebanon) or briefly *al-ansar*, thus corresponding in title to the government of Lebanon-created militia—a shrewd psychological gambit.¹⁰⁰ However, without Israeli shepherding, it remains doubtful that the militias, as constituted, will ever attain any significant role in the security of the south. They are, for many Shi'as, merely a symbol of continuing Israeli occupation.

Of less significance, but also indicative of Israeli intentions, has been the return of a few of the Shi'a *zu'ama* to the south under IDF sponsorship. For example, after an absence of seven years, Kazim al-Khalil, a political affiliate of Camille Chamoun's National Liberal Party, returned to Tyre. When Khalil first returned in July 1982, he attempted to reach a rapprochement with Amal, but as one Amal leader reported, the *sulha* (reconciliation) quickly evaporated after a few acts of violent intimidation authored by Khalil's son.¹⁰¹ With IDF assistance, Khalil did establish a small (40-man) militia which was armed and uniformed by the Israelis. While few southerners believe that Khalil could retain his parliamentary seat in anything approaching a fair election, his presence in Tyre does serve to modestly undercut Amal and it is part of this whole cloth of the Israeli campaign to fragment a Shi'a community it cannot control as a single unit.

AMAL SURVIVES

Admittedly, Amal has lost a number of marginal members and sympathizers since the Israeli invasion, but it has weathered what could have been a fatal organizational crisis extremely well. While its militia days have not been totally surmounted, the movement has increasingly moved to the center stage of the Lebanese political scene, while simultaneously consolidating its constituency. In the latter regard, Amal has identified key social welfare activities that meet pressing needs while giving the organization a high and favorable profile in the Shi'a community. Thus, in *al-junub* it has opened a series of bipartisan yet adequate clinics which are accessible to all citizens for a modest fee (with free care available when justified). The clinics are well-planned and are clearly not a fly-by-night operation. The first important evidence of the movement's sustained vitality came in September 1982 when as many as two hundred and fifty thousand gathered in Tyre to commemorate the fourth anniversary of Musa al-Badr's disappearance. A similar, but smaller demonstration was held in Nabatiyyah a few days later. Periodic strikes have also served as continuing evidence that the movement's fundamental influence has not waned.

While Israel's massive invasion was still in progress, Nabih Berri was serving as a member of the National Salvation Committee formed to begin what will continue to be a bumpy road of national reconciliation. While the movement could not openly support the election of Bashir al-Gemayel, it did privately pledge support, as did the two major Shi'a religious leaders. Given Amin al-Gemayel's less problematic

resume, Amal was able to support Amin's election largely on the presumption that Amin would continue his brother's political program which included cutting the Shi'as in for a larger share of power. Unfortunately, President Amin al-Gemayel has seemed to be much more comfortable dealing with the established *zu'ama* than with their challengers in Amal. Thus, the old rivalry with *zu'ama* like Kamal al-Asad has been resurrected with a vengeance.

In the fall of 1982 Amal had adopted a patient stance, expecting that *al-sabr miftah al-faraj*—patience would be the key to success. Many of the movement's principals merely expected modest incremental concessions from the government, as well as the extrication of foreign forces from Lebanon. Sadly, neither expectation has been met. Over time, the Shi'as have come to believe that they are serving as the whipping boys for a president who cares more for his weak Maronite constituency than for his larger constituency. Thus, it should hardly be surprising that the Shi'as came to lose patience. The result has been a series of clashes with the army as well as a purely tactical (and very cynical) alliance with the customarily distrusted Druze.

The prevailing attitude within the Amal leadership is well summarized by a joke that was printed in a column that appears in the movement's paper, *Amal*:

A man was on an airline flight, and after the airplane took off, this man entered the plane's cockpit drawing a pistol, and indicating that the plane was being hijacked. "For what reason?" the captain asked him, "and to what destination?" The hijacker insisted on going to Los Angeles, and the plane's stated destination was Los Angeles, anyway. When the plane arrived at the Los Angeles airport, the man routinely disembarked with the rest of the passengers. The newsmen on the scene asked him, "Why did you do this?" So he said, "This is the third time that I have taken off on a plane to go to Los Angeles to meet my family, and each previous time the plane was hijacked to another place, so I wanted to hijack it this time before some other hijackers took it to another place."¹⁰²

The point of course is that the danger of the Lebanese ship of state's being hijacked is seen as a real one. Thus, so long as the danger persists Amal must be ready to guide it to its proper destination. The Lebanese Shi'as may not be able to ensure that the plane reaches Los Angeles, but they are capable of preventing it from reaching any other destination. If Lebanon has a future—and it may not—Shi'a interests as mediated by Harakat Amal will have to be accommodated; that much, at least, is clear.

NOTES

1. One measure of the marginality of the Shi'as is the fact that most political studies written prior to the civil war almost totally ignored them. The following two books are notable exceptions: Michael C. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon* (New York: Random House, 1968); and, David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, *The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana* (New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., 1975).

2. Useful population estimates may be found in the following two sources: Joseph Chamie, "The Lebanese Civil War: An Investigation into the Causes," *World Affairs* 139 (Winter 1976/1977): 171-88; and, Riad B. Tabbarah, "Background to the Lebanese Conflict," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* vol. 20, nos. 1-2 (1980): 101-21.

3. Chamie, "Lebanese Civil War," 179.

4. Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, 79.

5. Tabbarah, "Background to the Lebanese Conflict," 118.

6. Hasan Sharif, "South Lebanon: Its History and Geopolitics," in *South Lebanon*, eds. Elaine Hagopian and Samih Farsoun (Detroit: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, August 1978), 10-11.

7. Hagopian and Farsoun, *South Lebanon*, 11.

8. Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review* vol. 55, no. 3 (September 1961): 493-514.

9. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization," 493.

10. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization," 497-498.

11. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization," 498.

12. See Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, esp. 53-86.

13. World Bank, *World Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 147.

14. Salim Nasr, "Backdrop to Civil War: The Crisis of Lebanese Capitalism," *MERIP Reports*, no. 73 (December 1978), 3-13.

15. Nasr, "Backdrop to Civil War," 10.

16. For a useful critical discussion of Deutsch's position on assimilation versus dissimulation, see Walker Connor's important article: "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics* vol. 24, no. 3 (April 1972): 319-55, esp. 321-28.

17. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization," 501. See also Deutsch's *Politics and Government: How People Decide Their Fate*, 3d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974), 544, where he notes:

Social mobilization makes people more available for change. It does so by inducing them or teaching them to change their residence, their occupations, their communications, their associates, and their outlook and imagination. It gives rise to new needs, new aspirations, new demands and capabilities. *But all these patterns of behavior may disunite a population or unite it. They can make people more similar or more different. They may produce cooperation or strike, integration or succession.* [Italics added]

18. See Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, 21.

19. On the preservation of sectarian identity in Beirut, see Fuad I. Khuri, "The Social Dynamics of the 1975-1977 War in Lebanon," *Armed Forces and Society* vol. 7, no. 3 (Spring 1981): 383-408; and, Khuri, "A Comparative Study of Migration Patterns in Two Lebanese Villages," *Human Organization* 26, no. 4 (1967). See also Smock and Smock, *Politics of Pluralism*, 93.

20. Hudon, *Prekarious Republic*, 61.
21. Khuri, "Social Dynamics of the War," 392.
22. For an instructive (and controversial) fictional treatment of a young Shi'a woman's attempt to "escape" from her village and her sect, see Tawfik Yusuf Awwad, *Death in Beirut*, trans. Leslie McLoughlin (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1976).
23. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press, 1958), 61.
24. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization," 497-8.
25. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization," 499.
26. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 47.
27. While the urban-rural distinction may have lost much of its meaning in the context of political development, there is no denying that the individual Lebanese finds the distinction very important, since the rural village is a place of relaxation, refuge, retreat, and retirement.
28. Fuad I. Khuri, *From Village to Suburb: Order and Change in Greater Beirut* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 8.
29. Hudson, *Prekarious Republic*, 31-2.
30. Before the civil war began in 1975, the political loyalty of the Shi'a community was fragmented. In addition to al-Sadr, the principal contenders for power included Kamal al-Asad, the scion of a famous Shi'a za'im; the al-Khalil family of Tyre; and various political parties, including the several Ba'ath factions, Communists, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and a few Nasserist groups.
31. Biographical data have been extracted from al-Sadr! (Beirut: Dar al-Khalud, 1979), 11-17.
32. Raphael Calis, "The Shiite Pimpernel," *The Middle East*, November 1978, 52.
33. Smock and Smock, *Politics of Pluralism*, 141.
34. Sharif, "South Lebanon," 18.
- Many Lebanese refer to the council as the *Majlis al-Juyub* (the Council of the Pockets) in recognition of the council's reputation for bribery and illegal diversions of funds. As will be noted below, the *Majlis al-Junub* became an important target for Amal activism in 1980.
35. "Rivalry to Lead the Shi'a in Lebanon," *The Arab World Weekly* (Beirut), February 16, 1974, 11.
36. Calis, "The Shiite Pimpernel," 11.
37. Calis, "The Shiite Pimpernel," 11.
38. Kamal S. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976* (Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1976), 78.
39. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, 119.
40. The precise dimensions of the relationship with Syria are difficult to discern. My impression is that conjecture to the effect that the relationship is based on religious affinities is incorrect. While Hafez al-Assad does belong to the 'Alawi sect that some consider to be an offshoot of the Shi'a, the relationship is pragmatically founded. Syria's proximity—as one Amal official said: "You can ignore history but not geography"—and utility as an ally explain the ties.
41. The authenticity of Shi'a Communism is—prudently—treated with skepticism by Kamal S. Salibi. See *Crossroads to Civil War*, 143. See also Iliya Harik, "Lebanon: Anatomy of Conflict," *American Universities Field Staff Reports*, no. 49 (1981), 3.
42. John Kifner estimates that twenty-five million dollars per month flowed into Lebanon to support the various militias. "Life Among the Ruins in Beirut," *New York Times Magazine*, December 6, 1981, 162.

Amal officials claim that their members are not paid, and, in fact, that they pay monthly dues (from 5–10 £L upward). While the truth of this claim may be questioned, I do know that many rank-and-file members take great pride in their lack of remuneration.

43. In his very useful book, John Bulloch argues that the August 6, 1976, fall of the Nabaa district of Beirut to the Kata'eb was facilitated by al-Sadr's defection (in league with his longtime adversary, Kamal al-Asad) to the Syrians who were at that time supporting the Maronite militia. See *Death of a Country: The Civil War in Lebanon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), 172–3.

44. Calis, "The Shiite Pimpernel," 54.

45. Quoted in the *Jerusalem Post*, March 25, 1981.

46. *Monday Morning* (Beirut), December 22–28, 1980, 13.

47. See Smock and Smock, *Politics of Pluralism*, 142; and Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, 63–4.

48. For a noteworthy recounting see David K. Shipler, "Lebanese Tell of Anguish of Living Under the P.L.O." *New York Times*, July 25, 1982.

49. See Walid Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 1979), 115–16.

50. Based on a private communication.

51. *al-Sadr!*, 61–2. The documentation produced in this book substantiates the claims of al-Sadr's followers.

52. Private interview.

53. A report of September 9, 1980, indicated that al-Sadr was being held in a Libyan military camp near the Algerian border. *New York Times*, September 10, 1980.

54. Private interview.

55. *Christian Science Monitor*, April 17, 1978.

56. *L'Orient-Le Jour*, September 16, 1980.

57. Shahpur Bakhtiar, "The Catastrophe," excerpts from his book, *Ma Fidelité, Al-Watan al-Arabi*, October 8–14, 1982, 54–6. See esp. p. 56.

58. Private interview.

59. Lydia George, interview with Nabih Berri, *Monday Morning*, February 1–7, 1982, 14–25, trans. by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report-Middle East and Africa*, February 10, 1982, G1–G6, quote at page G-4. Foreign Broadcast Information Service is hereafter referred to as "FBIS."

60. For example see John Yemma, "Lebanon's Shiite Muslims Flex Their Military Muscles," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 12, 1982; Thomas L. Friedman, "One Civil War Is Over, Others Fast Multiply," *New York Times*, May 23, 1982; "The Rise of Yet Another Enemy for the Palestinians," *The Economist*, May 1, 1972, 65; and Scheherazade Faramarzi, "Shiites Get Some Hope: New Force Arises in Lebanon," *Sunday Record* (Middletown, NY), February 28, 1982. Cf. Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon's Shiites," *New York Times*, April 16, 1982.

61. Nabih Berri interview, February 1–7, 1982, G2.

62. For descriptions of the situation in Lebanon circa 1981 and 1982, see Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon's Shifting Political Landscape," *The New Leader*, March 8, 1982, 8–9; Norton, "The Violent Work of Politics in Lebanon," *Wall Street Journal*, March 18, 1982; and William Haddad, "Divided Lebanon," *Current History*, January 1982, 30–35.

63. Lest the reader be left with the wrong impression, it should be noted that members of the movement were not reluctant to take offensive action when possible. Nor was the movement shy about taking action against its opponents. For example, on February 18, 1981, an attempt was made to kidnap a cleric, Sheikh Ahmad Shawkey al-Amin, of Majdal Silm who opposed Amal. In Beirut, Amal was thought to have initiated hostilities on a number of occasions.

64. Private interview.
65. *Le Matin* (Paris), May 28, 1982.
66. For the positions of various groups and factions prior to June 1982, see *Monday Morning* issues of December 22-28, 1980; December 29-January 4, 1981; January 12-18, 1981; January 19-25, 1981; and January 26-February 1, 1981.
67. For a personal account stressing this dimension of the civil war, especially in Beirut, see Lina Mikdadi Tabbara, *Survival in Beirut: A Diary of Civil War*, trans. Nadia Hijab (London: Onyx Press, 1979).
68. Note that it was only in early 1982 that the public statements of Amal officials began to match their private assessments.
69. Figures on the confessional profile of the Lebanese Armed Forces are closely held, and even authoritative estimates are hard to find. It seems that officer recruitment is being carried out along strict confessional lines, with a 50-50 split between Muslims and Christians and proportionate allocations within each major category for the respective 17 sects. Some estimates hold that there is a 60-40 split among the enlisted ranks in favor of the Muslims, and a 60-40 split in the officer corps favoring the Christians (reflecting Maronite overrepresentation in the grades of major and above). See Chapter 5 above.
- For a rare detailed discussion by the Armed Forces Commander, see interview with Ibrahim Tannous, *Al-Watan al-Arabi*, June 17-23, 1983, 44-6. Tannous concedes that in 1983 there are three Muslim recruits for every two Christians.
70. *An-Nahar*, September 18, 1980.
71. Nabih Berri interview, February 1-7, 1982, 62.
72. Nabih Berri interview, February 1-7, 1982, 62.
73. See Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf) with Eric Rouleau, *My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle*, trans. Linda Butler Koseoglu (New York: Times Books, 1981, *passim*).
74. Private communication.
75. *The Economist*, May 1, 1982, 65.
76. *Al-Watan* (Kuwait), November 25, 1981.
77. From a speech by Salah Khalaf, broadcast by the Voice of Palestine, trans. by FBIS, February 4, 1982, p. G3.
78. Interview with Mufti Muhammed Mahdi Shams al-Din, *An-Nahar al-Arabi wa al-Dawli*, May 24-30, 1982, 13-15, trans. by FBIS, June 3, 1982, G2. (Emphasis added.)
79. A number of Amal officials, among them moderates, were critical of Berri's penchant for equivocation.
80. Interview with Nabih Berri, *Monday Morning*, May 10-16, 1982, 14-19, reprinted by FBIS, May 25, 1982, 63.
81. Interview with Nabih Berri, 64.
82. Interview with Nabih Berri, 64.
83. Berri's analysis is certainly shared by a number of longtime observers, including Michael Hudson: "The confessional system itself—as the embodiment of a consociational model—was the root of the problem." In "The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits of Consociational Democracy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 5, nos. 3-4 (Spring/Summer 1976): 114.
84. Berri cited in Lydia Georgi, "The 'New Lebanon' File—Part 6: The Amal Movement: The Myth of Pluralism," *Monday Morning*, January 26-February 1, 1981.
85. Georgi, "The 'New Lebanon' ," 23.
86. Georgi, "The 'New Lebanon' ," 23.
87. Interview with Hasan Hashim, *Amal*, April 17, 1981, 8.

88. See, for example, an interesting commentary by a movement writer on an article that appeared in the *Kata'eb* organ, *al-'Amal*, on the subject of Harakat Amal. *Amal*, April 17, 1981, 6-7.
89. Khuri, "Social Dynamics of the War in Lebanon," 393-5.
90. From a program broadcast by the Beirut Domestic Service, July 19, 1982, trans. by FBIS, July 20, 1982, G2.
91. See Berri's comments in : *An-Nahar al-Arabi wa al-Dawli*, April 20-25, 1981, 10-11.
92. See footnotes 66 and 91.
93. Quoted in Georgi, "The 'New Lebanon' ," 26.
94. Calis, "The Shiite Pimpernel," 54.
95. See Augustus Richard Norton, "Aspects of Terrorism in Lebanon: The Case of the Shi'as." *Clandestine Tactics and Technology: Update Report*, 9, no. 4 (1983). Published by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.
96. Interview with Muhammed Mahdi Shams al-Din, *al-Mustaqbal*, March 5, 1983, 28-31.
97. Clinton Bailey, "A Change of Partners," *Jerusalem Post*, December 14, 1982.
98. Bailey, "A Change of Partners."
99. *Christian Science Monitor*, September 8, 1983.
100. Voice of Hope broadcast, May 13, 1983, trans. by the Joint Publications Research Service, *Near East/South Asia Report* (no. 2759), May 26, 1983, 133.
101. Private interview.
102. *Amal*, October 25, 1982.

APPENDIX 9

PAPER SUBMITTED BY AUGUSTUS NORTON, ENTITLED "POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST"

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Virtually every ethnic, national and religious group in the Middle East has been involved in extremist activities over the past few years. The belief that only certain groups--such as Shi'i Muslims--or certain countries--such as Iran--are responsible for all extremist acts is ill-founded.

The growth of Islamic extremism is largely the result of the failure of secular political leaders to improve the well-being of their people. As the emptiness of secular ideologies became apparent, many Muslims returned to Islam as a culturally authentic refuge and ideology.

Although the roots of extremism in any given country are essentially internal, there is no question that the experience of the Iranian revolution has served as a source of inspiration and support to groups in other countries.

The Gulf has not been plagued by extremism to date, but it is here that the influence of events in Iran is most evident. Sizable Shi'i populations in Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province are particularly susceptible to the Iranian example. Ayatollah Khomeini's propagation of an activist, revolutionary Shi'ism is directed primarily at these Shi'i groups.

The anti-American trend in the Middle East poses a profound long-term threat to U.S. interests in the region. This is the result not only of U.S. support for Israel, but also of the widespread rejection of Western values and culture. Nevertheless, whatever the intensity of religious sentiment among extremists, the people of the region as a whole have evidenced a desire to continue strong commercial ties with the West, including the U.S. It is notable that, while the American and Western diplomatic presence has been the target of extremism in the Middle East, Western business interests have not.

POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Overview

Extremism is on the rise in the Middle East. If extremism could be ascribed only to a specific group, such as Shi'i Muslims, or to a single sponsor, such as Iran, the phenomenon would be considerably less important. The reality, however, is far more complicated. Despite the best efforts of demonologists to hold the PLO, Iran, Libya, and Syria responsible for everything that goes wrong in the Middle East, careful analysis of recent trends shows that such allegations are often ill-founded. This is not to argue that these players are free from involvement in extremist violence, but simply to note that other forces are at play.

Virtually every significant ethnic, national and religious group in the Middle East has been involved in extremist activities--ranging from violent demonstrations to political assassinations--over the past few years. The causes of this surge in extremism include intercommunal competition and enmity; disruptive social, political and economic change; the failure of political leaders; the role of external sponsors, and hostility toward Western influence in the region, including a disturbing brand of anti-Americanism. Unlike the period between 1967 and 1973, when extremism was linked to secular nationalist movements, the current wave comes from groups that claim inspiration from religious principles.

The principal focus of this report is the extremism that is linked to Muslim groups in the Fertile Crescent and the Gulf, but incidents staged by non-Muslim groups or by other states in the Middle East should not be ignored. Consider these illustrations:

- A Jewish terrorist network has operated in Israel at least since 1980. The Israeli police broke up one group of 27 Jewish terrorists in 1984 after a string of successes, including the car-bombing in 1980 that maimed the Palestinian mayors of Ramallah and Nablus and a rocket attack on an Arab bus in Jerusalem in October 1984.
- Palestinian extremists have continued to commit terrorist acts against Israel and Israeli targets abroad. An assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador to Great

Britain, attributed to an anti-PLO Palestinian group, provided the justification for Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

- Sunni Muslim opponents of the regimes in Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have engaged in antigovernment violence, in some cases to bring down the targeted governments and in others to make a symbolic statement of protest.
- In Syria, opposition by the majority Sunnis to the Alawi-dominated government of President Hafez al-Assad took the form of bombings and assassinations. These became serious enough in the late 1970s and early 1980s to place the government in tenuous straits. In 1981, 64 people were killed by a bomb planted in Damascus, and two years earlier over 60 Alawi cadets were killed at the Artillery Academy in Aleppo. Al-Assad's major response to his opponents came in Hama, Syria's third-largest city, in February 1982. A large part of the city was leveled by government forces, and several thousand residents were killed. The destruction in Hama has interrupted the anti-regime campaign, but few experts believe that al-Assad's adversaries have been defeated.
- In Egypt, militant Islamic protest movements have proliferated. One recent inventory identified 20 such groups, and the count is probably higher. Although only a few of these groups espouse violence, some have adopted extremist methods. The al-Jihad group, for example, was implicated in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in October 1981.
- In Saudi Arabia, a fanatical band of Sunnis shook the Saudi regime to the core by seizing and holding the Great Mosque in Mecca for three weeks in 1979. Shi'i Muslims in the Eastern (oil-producing) Province have risen in opposition to the Saudi regime on at least two occasions since 1978.
- Shi'i enemies of President Saddam Hussain in Iraq have continued their violent opposition, despite the regime's equally violent response. The Iraqi militants benefit from Teheran's support and encouragement, and perhaps its sponsorship.
- In Bahrain, a well-armed attempt by some 70 insurgents to bring down the government was thwarted in December 1979. The Teheran-based Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, led by an Iranian Shi'i clergyman, was responsible.

- In Lebanon and Kuwait, car and truck bombs took over 300 lives in 1983. The terrorists, apparently acting with Iranian support and assistance, hastened the demise of the Multi-National Force in Lebanon and sent tremors throughout the Gulf.
- Throughout 1984, the mysterious Islamic Jihad--unconnected to the Egyptian al-Jihad group, and perhaps a cover name for a method of action rather than an organization--continued its campaign of kidnapping and terrorism in Lebanon. The organization, which many believe is merely a front for Iranian-sponsored terrorism, added Dr. Malcolm Kerr, a distinguished scholar and President of the American University of Beirut, to its list of victims in January 1984. In its telephone call taking credit for the act, Islamic Jihad vowed to drive all Americans and Frenchmen out of Lebanon. Four Americans and one Saudi diplomat, all kidnapped in Lebanon, are still being held. Three former captives--an official of the American University of Beirut, and a British and an American newsman--were freed after long periods of detention.
- Meanwhile, Shi'i extremists in Lebanon continue to challenge the authority of moderate Shi'i leaders. In West Beirut, Shi'i zealots have attacked bars, restaurants and other manifestations of Western "decadence." They seem bent on destroying the intercommunal tolerance that has characterized social life in the Western sector of Beirut.
- Atrocities and the murder of several hundred people by Maronite militiamen in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in September 1982 proved once again that no Lebanese community is free from extremism.
- Druze and Maronite militias traded well-founded charges of killings and gross cruelties as they fought for supremacy in the mountains south of Beirut following the Israeli invasion of 1982.
- In southern Lebanon, Shi'i irregulars resisted the Israeli occupation of the area by a campaign of harassment, ambush and assassination that helped to hasten the Israeli withdrawal now in progress. Many analysts, especially in Israel, worry that extremist elements, emboldened by their success against the Israelis, will capture the political heart of the Shi'a community in Lebanon.

The Roots of Extremism

As the foregoing examples show, extremism has been spawned both by internal factors and external sponsorship. This section traces the origins of contemporary extremism in the Arab states of the Fertile Crescent and the Gulf.

Influenced by the Western tradition of secular modernization, many scholars believed that economic and political development in the Middle East would reduce the role of religion in Middle Eastern politics. Many Middle Eastern political leaders actively pursued programs of political and economic development that gave short shrift to Islam. The failure of these attempts to bypass Islam has helped to set the stage for a resurgence of Islam. This resurgence, in turn, led to a proliferation of Islamic organizations and movements, some of which have adopted violent methods.

Arab rulers have worked hard to secure their positions, to stabilize their governments and to quash dissent, but in many cases they have failed to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of their people. Most Middle Eastern governments have been more successful in creating sophisticated mukhabarat (secret police), national police and paramilitary forces than they have been in meeting the growing demands of their constituents. Social justice all too often remains a distant goal. Political participation is limited and often synthetic, career opportunities are inadequate for the growing numbers of educated men and women, and national incomes are unevenly distributed. In Iraq, for instance, 5 percent of the households receive about 35 percent of total national income; the poorest 20 percent receive about 2 percent. Ruling elites, often perceived as corrupt and motivated entirely by greed and self-interest, are frequently seen as parasitic and unconcerned with public welfare.

Political failure is not restricted to domestic politics. Many Arabs still wax poetic about the Arab nation, but the past two decades have provided eloquent testimony to the demise of pan-Arabism and the growth of state power. Stamped by failure and vainglory, Arab nationalism has failed to meet the challenges of the post-World War II era. The emotive Palestinian issue remains unresolved, and the possibility of a settlement seems as remote in 1985 as ever.

Israel, viewed by most Arabs as palpable proof of their failure, remains the dominant military power in the region. The "victory" promised by the 1973 war has not been realized. Instead, Egypt's dominant military role in the Arab world has been diminished by a separate peace that many Arabs continue to decry as a gross strategic error. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, in part made possible by the separation of Egypt's military strength from the Arab world, is widely regarded as an Arab humiliation. Arab oil wealth, which once promised the

Arab world decisive political leverage, has been depleted as a result of global market forces, the pursuit of grandiose development projects and enormous purchases of arms.

The dominant ideologies of the past three decades--Nasserism, Ba'athism and Arab socialism--all too often seem only empty slogans on the lips of selfish politicians. As the emptiness of these secular ideologies has become apparent, many Arab Muslims have returned to Islam as a culturally authentic refuge and ideology. The return to Islam has occurred in a political environment where charges of repression, corruption and injustice are not merely antigovernment slogans but are characteristics of widespread political malaise. In contrast to the perceived profligacy of the rulers, Islam offers an austere alternative unbesmirched by the corruption and failure that has marked political life in the modern era. In short, Islam is a familiar ideology in a region where alternative ideologies have failed. This is not to say that the current resurgence of Islam is a novel development. It is only the most recent example of a cyclical phenomenon whose modern origins can be traced to the Islamic revival at the beginning of this century.

None of the Arab states contains an integrated, financially independent and hierarchically organized clergy such as that found in Iran. Nevertheless, common Islamic institutions have provided a locus for political action, even where the right of free political association has been limited or proscribed. Islamic groups often have been able to organize in the mosque and, in the case of the Shi'is, in the Husainiyya (a community religious center), relatively free from the government's gaze. Only a fraction of the nascent Islamic associations and movements (there are more than 100 in the Arab countries) are led by clerics, and a fair number are avowedly anticlerical. But it is striking that many of the new groups draw their membership from the relatively well-educated middle and lower middle classes whose needs their governments are not meeting. Although Islamic activists are frequently inspired by religious values and a desire to protect traditional customs against the modern onslaught, they are also concerned with who gets what, when and how much. In a fundamental sense, the Middle East is witnessing a comprehensive form of political action rather than an esoteric movement of pious Muslims.

Most Islamic activists have been no more extreme in their methods and goals than their secularly-inclined political cohorts, but some groups have interpreted Islam as providing an ethos and ideology that justifies, or even demands, violence.

It has become popular among some observers to regard the proliferation of extremist Islamic protest movements and dissident groups as an outgrowth of the Iranian revolution. This view is partly true, but, by presuming that every group is sponsored by Qum or Teheran, it grossly oversimplifies the nature of the phenomenon.

For example, one of the most venerable activist groups, the Muslim Brotherhood, with branches in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Europe, the Gulf, and the territories occupied by Israel, dates from 1928. Its most recent period of activism, began in Egypt in 1971. But Ayatollah Khomeini's success has provided an exemplar for the disaffected--in short, an example of what pious, well-organized Muslims can accomplish in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds. Even those Islamic groups that do not seek to establish an Islamic state may derive inspiration from the success of their Muslim colleagues in Iran.

The Syrian case may be the most interesting example of the strength of the Iranian experience. Sunni militants in Syria derived a spur to action from the events in Iran, yet in opposing the al-Assad regime in Damascus, they opposed the regime most closely allied with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Indeed, even if al-Assad's Sunni opponents succeeded in seizing power, they probably would not seek to establish close ties with an Iranian government that has denied them support in order to maintain close ties with al-Assad's 'Alawi regime. Moreover, despite the Syrian-Iranian alliance, al-Assad did not hesitate, when it suited his purpose, to clamp down in August 1984 on the Iranian revolutionary guards who had been stationed in Lebanon since 1982. Nor has this "anti-Islamic" action damaged the close ties between the two countries. These ties are based on shared political interests rather than shared conceptions of society or Islam.

Lebanon is another interesting case. The most important Shi'i organization in Lebanon, the Amal Movement, has had poor relations with Iran at least since 1981, largely because the Amal leadership has foresworn support for Islamic solutions in multiconfessional Lebanon. One of the most curious relationships in Lebanon involves a militant Sunni group--Tawhid (unity). This organization is based in Tripoli and aggressively opposes the spread of Syrian influence in the city. Tawhid has enjoyed Iranian financial support.

Populist Islamic movements among the Shi'i and Sunni Muslims of the Arab states of the Gulf have grown rapidly. Adherents of both sects take inspiration from Iran as well as from the resistance of the mujahidin to the Soviets in Afghanistan, but there is a keen antipathy between Sunni and Shi'i activists. For example, in September 1983, Sunni militants set fire to a Shi'i mosque under construction in Kuwait. Despite these strains, however, Sunnis and Shi'is in the Gulf share an Islamic ideology. In brief, this ideology encompasses a fundamentalist faith in Islam, opposition to corrupt and unjust government, commitment to social justice and equal rights, and an antipathy to external meddling in the area.

The Gulf has not been plagued by extremism to date, but the prospect of future problems, especially involving Shi'i groups, has been a major worry of the Sunni rulers of Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. In general, these governments have been inclined to accommodate the demands of Sunni activists, while ignoring or even suppressing their Shi'i counterparts. There are some 200,000 Iranians living in the Gulf Arab states, including sizable populations in Bahrain (70% Shi'i) and Kuwait (about 25% Shi'i). The restive Shi'a of Saudi Arabia's oil-rich Eastern Province have been a particular concern to the Saudi government, which has not been very responsive to meeting their social, economic and political needs. (There has never been a Shi'i minister in the government.) The enlightened handling of the Eastern Province Shi'is by ARAMCO, which employs many of them, probably has helped to keep a lid on Shi'i activism.

Despite the long shadow cast by Iran, Muslims of the Gulf region, whether Sunni or Shi'i, have sponsored few acts of violence. Violence in the Gulf generally has been directed against indigenous rivals and diplomatic targets. As yet, there has been no significant pattern of attacks against foreign business interests. This may reflect the pragmatic acceptance of beneficial business activities, even as the activists resent western values and culture. The two most important incidents since the overthrow of the Shah, in addition to the seizure of the Grand Mosque, seem to have originated outside of the Gulf: the abortive coup in Bahrain in 1974, and the December 1983 bombings in Kuwait, both of which have been linked to Iran.

Iran and Extremism

Whatever the Iranian role in sponsoring extremist acts--and there is reasonable evidence for suspecting that Iran has played a direct role in some incidents--the Islamic Republic clearly has propounded an ideology that can be used to legitimize the use of violence. In addition to the importance of the revolution as an exemplar for Muslims, Ayatollah Khomeini's reinterpretation of Shi'ism has helped to provide a rationale for activism, revolution and extremism.

In Khomeini's view, Iran is the only truly Islamic state. All other Islamic states are illegitimate. If they do not reform on their own, then Iran has the right to force them to do so. Iran sees some governments, especially that of Saddam Hussain in Iraq, as bastions of atheism and beyond reform. Since dependence on outside powers, especially on the United States, serves only to weaken and divide the Islamic community (umma), any state that maintains such ties is a servant of a superpower. This epithet applies to Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Egypt. As Khomeini declared in late 1983, "The Qur'an says: 'Hold ye fast to the rope of Allah,' yet ye are holding the ropes of America or the Soviet Union."

As the superpowers are the strongest international actors, Khomeini holds them responsible for "all world corruption." The superpowers, especially the United States, are a legitimate target for violence. They must be punished and humiliated for the evil things they have done to Muslims. In Khomeini's words, the superpowers should be "slapped in the face" or "punched in the mouth."

The view from Qum is that the Shi'is are the only true representatives of the oppressed and deprived masses. Ayatollah Khomeini, in his role as jurisconsult, authoritatively interprets the meaning of Islam. Indeed, in the new Iranian constitution, Khomeini is referred to as the representative of the Twelfth (or hidden) Imam who will one day return to inaugurate the age of justice. Only by accepting the Khomeini version of Shi'ism can Muslims meet the dictates of their faith. Moreover, Iran is the vanguard of Islam, and it has a sacred duty to propagate the faith. Whether propagation of Islam extends to sponsoring and organizing political extremism is not always clear. Khomeini has condemned various extremist acts, including the mining of the Red Sea and the hijacking of aircraft (as in the December 1984 incident perpetrated by Lebanese Shi'i terrorists), yet he has also overseen the training of non-Iranian militants whose education has included exhortations to lead "Islamic revolutions."

Since 1975, there has been a threefold increase in the number of students studying at the religious schools in Qum. By all appearances the curriculum is heavily laced with Khomeini's activist version of Islam. In addition, a conference was held in Teheran in 1982 on the subject of the "Ideal Islamic Government." After the conference, the Iranians are said to have decided to train thousands of Muslim militants from two dozen Islamic states and to send them back to their home countries to act as "messengers of the true Islam." Several weeks before the conference, Khomeini said, "We shall export our revolution to the whole world." At a 1983 meeting attended by about 500 foreign clerics, Khomeini told his audience, "You should discuss the situation in Iran. You should call on people to rebel like Iran."

Lebanese newspapers reported in 1983 that some 2,000 revolutionary missionaries, including 300 Shi'is from Lebanon and 1,000 from Iraq, were receiving religious, military and political training in a special center north of Qum. Some observers believe that the suicide drivers for the truck-bomb attacks of 1983 were recruited in this center, which is also alleged to have been the training camp for the insurgents who attacked Bahrain in 1979.

The Iranian role in specific acts of violence is sometimes obscure. There can be little doubt, however, that Iranian officials approve of many of the incidents and probably have

sponsored some of them. The clearest case of Iranian sponsorship is the "Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq." This organization is based in Iran and led by an Iraqi cleric (Hojatolislam Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim). Several scholars believe that the Supreme Assembly is intimately associated with the al-Da'wa (The Call) party, one of the most important underground Shi'i groups in Iraq. Members of al-Da'wa were identified as participants in the bombing of seven Arab and Western installations in Kuwait in December 1983. Al-Da'wa is also believed to have been responsible for the destruction of the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut in late 1981.

Anti-Americanism

Veteran observers report a significant anti-American trend in the Middle East that poses a profound long-term threat to U.S. interests in the region. The United States is increasingly viewed with animosity, in large part because of its unwavering support of Israel. Moreover, individual Americans are no longer accepted merely as private citizens unassociated with the policies of their government. The United States is often held responsible for much of the political blight that is alleged to afflict the Muslim world. U.S. immobility on the Palestinian question, its suspected complicity in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and Washington's support for "anti-Islamic" regimes (such as that of the former Shah), are commonly-heard charges. Western values and culture, of which the United States is the vanguard, are often considered a threat to Islamic culture, especially by those segments of society that have benefited least from an association with the West.

The most disturbing aspect of the anti-American terrorism in Lebanon is the ease with which Americans have been regarded as legitimate targets. While some U.S. officials have categorized this trend as indicative of a virulent, unjustified hostility to the United States, the environment in which such attacks occur is one in which the U.S. is viewed with suspicion. This condition, in part, is a reaction to United States policy. This means that, while the U.S. undoubtedly has permanent enemies in the Middle East, the climate that encourages anti-American extremism is subject to improvement. Whatever the intensity of religious sentiment among Islamic activists, the people of the region as a whole have displayed an understanding of the rewards of mutually beneficial relations, including business relationships, with the U.S.

Implications

Many of the recent incidents of terrorism share a common characteristic--a link with Islam. But it is evident that we are not dealing with a single, destabilizing giant lurching about the Middle East. Instead, Islamic activism is a mixture

of movements and organizations that can be understood in a narrower political context. In Syria, for instance, the cause of Sunni extremism is not resurgent Islam, but majority claims in a state dominated by a minority sect. In Lebanon, Muslim extremism has been, to a significant degree, a response to outside meddling in that troubled land. In Saudi Arabia, the Shi'is of the Eastern Province have responded to government neglect by demonstrations against the government's authority.

The Islamic coloration of contemporary extremism is notable, but the coloration is in varying hues of green (the color of Islam), not just Iranian green. More important is the fact that each state in the Fertile Crescent and the Gulf is traversing the bumpy road of modernization. During the journey, those who are left behind or disadvantaged by change are likely to continue to seek the familiar refuge of Islam. In these circumstances, it will become even more important for Middle Eastern leaders to face squarely the issues of social justice and equity. The point is not to reward extremists, but to isolate them by building support for government policies and resource distribution among the population at large.

Extremism feeds on extremism. When it gorges on itself, the consequences can be destabilizing and uncontrollable in the short term. The case of the Shi'a in Lebanon illustrates the point. Before the Israeli invasion, the Shi'is were engaged in struggles with the fedayeen in southern Lebanon and Beirut. The Shi'is welcomed the Israeli invaders in 1982, especially in the south, with at least grudging thanks for the expulsion of the PLO fighters from the area. If, on the heels of the invasion, the Israelis had made a quiet, tacit deal with the moderate Amal movement, and had then quickly withdrawn, the prospects for stability in southern Lebanon (and peace along Israel's northern border) would have been much brighter.

Instead, Israel tried to establish proxy forces of Christians to emasculate the Amal movement. Israeli policy thus created a political environment in which political authority was fragmented. Resistance to the Israeli occupation spread like a cancer. Extremism was validated, and the voices of law and order were muted. Today, as the IDF retreats from the area, the Shi'a and other southern Lebanese face an uncertain future in which the character of communal leadership is yet to be determined. The centrist politicians who hold a tenuous grip on the leadership of the Shi'i community face an uphill struggle, as demonstrated in Sidon by the militant Hizb Allah (Party of God) in February 1985.

For the United States, appropriate measures will be needed to confront extremism aimed at American personnel and installations. It is also imperative that Americans be sensitive to the need to balance U.S. interests and Middle East realities. Although forward basing facilities in the Gulf make

tactical sense, the aversion of the people of the region to such "external intervention" must not be ignored. By the same token, while U.S. leverage in Middle Eastern politics is in part a direct result of its heavy support for Israel, it is necessary for the U.S. to continue taking decisive steps to help bring solutions to the extant issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The danger in the current climate, in which many Americans seem traumatized by the extremists' campaign, is that Americans will be so preoccupied with terrorism that they lose sight of the country's larger regional interests.

For the American businessman dealing with the Gulf, there is good reason to take heart from the absence of attacks on foreign business interests. Although the environment has become more dangerous for Americans, the evidence suggests that American business will continue to play a welcome role in the Gulf. The recent events do suggest the absolute necessity of staying in touch with local developments. Executives must remain sensitive to the need to avoid the appearance of corrupt practices, as well as the actual engagement in them. Finally, fair wages and hiring practices are essential for maintaining a congenial business environment.

The threat of extremism in the Middle East cannot, and should not, be summarily dismissed, but by attempting to understand the problem as it exists, rather than demonologically, we can at least approach the phenomenon with intelligence.

AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON

Augustus Richard Norton earned his Ph.D. in political science at the University of Chicago. His early publications dealt with terrorism. More recently, he has written extensively on political and religious extremism in the Middle East. His important study, Shi'ism and Social Protest, will be published this year by the Yale University Press. He is currently editing a book on the international relations of the PLO, which is scheduled for publication by the Southern Illinois University Press in 1986.

The opinions Dr. Norton expresses in this report are his own.

APPENDIX 10

PAPER SUBMITTED BY SHAHROUGH AKHAVI, ENTITLED "THE POWER STRUCTURE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN"

Since mid-1981, political power in Iran has reposed in the hands of people with the organizational wherewithal to defeat those whom they oppose. This organizational weapon, however, is not sufficiently strong to enable the leadership to rule unambiguously and with a clear sense of policy priorities and action. Thus, the political system is characterized by rivalry and lack of clear policies.

There can be little doubt that factionalism exists among the ruling elites. This can best be seen in an analysis of the speeches of Ayatollah Khomeini himself, but especially the statements of his supposed successor, Ayatollah Hosain Ali Montazeri. The conflict has allegedly been between those called *Maktabi*—or followers of the imam's (Khomeini's) line—and those termed *Hujjati*. Some observers claim these labels are false ones, used by the pro-Khomeini factions to attack their rivals. But whatever labels are used, the issues continue to be the following: private property, trade, banking, industrial and agricultural policies, the war with Iraq, and even the principle of *Velayat-e Faqih*. The latter is the ideological foundation of clericalism in Iran today.

Who rules Iran then? The answer seems to be a coalition of clerics who derive their power from their control of judicial organs and benefit from the support of the following sources: the *Pasdaran* (Revolutionary Guards), members of the revolutionary committees (which still exist despite efforts to gradually vest power in state agencies), and elements known as the *Hezbollah* ("those of the party of God").

The military contingents, of which the ground forces alone seem relevant, can be counted, for the time being, as supporters of cleri-

calism—not of any particular clerical faction. This seems much less the case with the *Pasdaran*, for example, members of which have often contended with one another in the streets of major cities since 1981. Despite the creation of institutions whose aim is to integrate their membership, such as the Ministry of Pasdaran Affairs and its highest collective organ, the Supreme Council of Pasdaran Affairs, and despite efforts to keep the commanders of these units in touch with one another through the holding of periodical seminars, the corps as a whole appears to be divided fairly sharply.

The picture that emerges then is of private armies loyal to particular well known, powerful clerics. During the lifetime of Ayatollah Khomeini, it is not likely that these divisive tendencies will assert themselves in a major way. But in the post-Khomeini period, the new leadership will probably be unable to harmonize these competing interests.

As for the revolutionary committees, these were of great importance in the earlier years of the revolution. Next to the revolutionary guards and the loyal contingents of the armed forces, the committees proved indispensable in helping to secure the urban base of the clerics' power. Recently, they have been officially merged into the Ministry of Interior. Today they seem to be charged with combating drug traffic and addiction, assisting in the distribution of goods, and enforcing public morality. In any case, they apparently continue to exert influence as quasi-autonomous agencies. To the extent that they are able to link their actions with mobilization of the *Hezbollah*, especially by using as intermediaries what in Arab politics are called *futuwaat*, or local urban bosses, they will remain a valuable asset to the regime.

These groups are the key support organizations of the clerics, who rule Iran at the most general level through the Constitution of 1979, which sanctions the preeminence of clerical institutions. The judicial institutions that they command are the central committee and secretariat of the Friday Mosque Prayer Leaders (FMPL), the Council of Guardians of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the central secretariat of the Society of Combatant Clergymen, the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), the offices of the state prosecutor general, the revolutionary courts (officially dissolved but apparently still active, at least locally), and the courts of the Ministry of Justice. In addition, in every significant state and nonstate agency Ayatollah Khomeini has his personal representatives who report directly to him and act as his liaison with those institutions.

The clerics also simultaneously sit in powerful political, administrative, and legislative bodies. Thus, they sit on the Supreme Defense Council (SDC) and dominate the parliament through its speaker, Hodjat-el-Islam (H.I.) Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. And, of course, they are also members of the cabinet, where some of them, such as President H.I. Ali Khamanahi, Interior Minister H.I. Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, and newly appointed Information and Intelligence Minister Ayatollah Mohammad Rayshahri, are powerful figures. Their links to the popular organizations, including the Reconstruction Crusade, the Martyrs Foundation, the Refugee Foundation, and the like are well established. Their representatives sit on such bodies as the Central Council of Guilds, the Central Headquarters for the Selection of Personnel (and its provincial branches), the National Inspectorate Organization, and the Islamic committees in factories, cooperatives, government departments, schools, and universities. Because there is no equivalent in the Islamic Republic of Iran of a *nomenklatura* (the Soviet ruling elite), we can only make intelligent guesses as to the identity of Iran's elite. The following list may not be far off the mark, although the names are not listed in any particular order:

1. Ayatollah Rouhallah Khomeini
2. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani—speaker of Parliament; Khomeini's representative in the SDC; provisional FMPL of Tehran; vice chairman of the Council of Experts;
3. Ali Khamanahi—president of the Republic; chairman, SDC; secretary general and president, Islamic Republic Party (IRP);
4. Hosain Ali Montazeri—head of the Secretariat, FMPL; presumed successor of Khomeini;
5. Abd al-Karim Musavi Ardabili—president, Supreme Court; chairman, SJC;
6. Yusef Sanei—state prosecutor general;
7. Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri—minister of interior;
8. Mohammed Reza Mahdavi Kani—chairman, Society of Combatants;
9. Mohammad Rayshahri—minister of information and intelligence;
10. Ali Meshkini—FMPL, Qumm; chairman, Council of Experts.

Factions in the Ruling Elite

Trying to determine the relevant power centers among the clerical leadership in the Islamic Republic is difficult because one must

infer positions from statements made or not made. The president, his prime minister, the speaker of Parliament, the Supreme Court chief justice, and a number of other figures in the regime routinely deny differences in opinion among themselves. Yet they also acknowledge that differences in viewpoints exist and argue that it would be unreasonable to expect unanimity. A recent example is a speech given by President Khamanahi to a conference of secretaries of the IRP. Taking note of foreign radio broadcasts discussing conflicts among the top leaders, he flatly denied conflicts existed.

Khamanahi deliberately distinguished between "differences in views" (*ekhtelaf-e nazar va saliqah*), which he regarded as objectively good, and "conflict and clashes" (*ta'arod va tazadd*), which are destructive. But he then went on to deny completely any difference in the "views" on private property ownership among Montazeri, Rafsanjani, and himself.¹

This is not an isolated example. Toward the end of May 1984, Ayatollah Khomeini publicly worried that "satanical elements" twisted his words to show clerical cleavages. Urging a unity of ranks, he conceded that differences exist, but "they are within the nation and not among individuals." He admonished those creating divisions among the people that they would be accountable to God as "anti-Islamic."² And as recently as August of 1984, Khomeini warned against the regime's leaders airing their differences for fear of the adverse impact that would have on the people of Iran.³

Ayatollah Yusef Sanei has demanded a halt to criticisms of the government, saying: "Everyone must not criticize the government whenever he wants."⁴ Ayatollah Hosain Ali Montazeri, however, has not only admitted the factionalism but has publicly aired some of his disagreements with certain leaders, including Rafsanjani and Khamanahi. In late June 1983, he acknowledged that "what is being forcefully felt today is the danger of discord among forces, the feeling of isolation by competent and dedicated forces."⁵ But about five months later, in a statement to a gathering of IRP Executive Committee members, he admonished Khamanahi and Rafsanjani to "attend to the party more . . . [and] also take into account the conditions of the provinces in addition to cities." Repeating his call for the two to be more attentive to the IRP, Montazeri added for good measure that criticism ought not to bother people, "and this applies to Messrs. Khamanahi and Rafsanjani."⁶

As mentioned earlier, the key conflicts have to do not simply with lapses in implementation of policy but what policies to follow in the first place. Should land and private property be subject to con-

fiscation, expropriation, nationalization, and redistribution? It may well be that a majority favor these positions, but, because of repeated vetoes of bills with such intent—such as the land legislation—by the Guardian Council, the measures have not been carried out. In October 1981, Rafsanjani asked Khomeini to devolve some of his powers as *faqih* (the top clerical leader) upon Parliament on the basis of the “secondary principles” of the faith. While Khomeini supposedly assented, nothing more was heard of this attempt until mid-February 1983. Then, in a speech to the nation, Khomeini held that “there is no connection between the secondary decrees [principles] and the implementation of *Velayat-e Faqih*.” This was a clear rebuff for Rafsanjani and those who argued that there is no categorical protection of private property in the Islamic law.⁷

I will not make a detailed examination of clerical factionalism and the issues over which clerical groups are currently contending. It is not misleading, though, to suggest two basic cleavages: the first is a socioeconomic one based on the state’s role in the economy; the second is a political one based on clericalism and ongoing revolution. The socioeconomic dimension seems to range Khamanahi, Rafsanjani, Ardabili and others on the side of strong state role; arrayed against this group is one led by Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, Latfollah Safi, Ahmad Jennati, Abu-al-Qasem Khazali, and their allies, who view property as sacrosanct.

The political dimension reveals a tripartite factionalism. One stands for continued revolutionary zeal and perhaps even “permanent revolution.” Ayatollahs Khomeini and Hosain Ali Montazeri belong to this group. But a clarification is in order. Their perception of permanent revolution is not Maoist in the sense that the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976 featured perpetual violent conflict carried out by regime “yes-men.” Montazeri has frequently bemoaned what he sees as a loss of dynamism in the revolution as careerists and opportunists are increasingly usurping it. At one point late in 1983, he called for true revolutionaries who would stand up for their beliefs even if it would mean confronting the prime minister, the speaker of Parliament, or the president. Individuals in this clerical faction, such as Khomeini and Montazeri, insist on *Velayat-e Faqih* and generally resist incorporating revolutionary organs into the state machinery.

A second group, consisting of Khamanahi, Rafsanjani, Ardabili, Sanei, and others also stress *Velayat-e Faqih*. But as incumbents in official positions, they favor the bureaucratization of power in the interests of state-building. Compared to Montazeri’s independent-

minded “dynamic revolutionaries” this group prefers regime adherents who are highly disciplined and prepared to carry out orders. Rafsanjani, in particular, has warned against allowing freewheeling spokesmen from mounting the speaker’s rostrum in the Parliament, implying that he preferred obedience to creativity in the new Iranian revolutionary man.

The third faction consists of those who do not favor *Velayat-e Faqih* but instead hope for *Vesayat-e Faqih*, a general oversight exercised by the clergy over the state but not direct rule by them. They are anxious to implement Article 2 of the 1906-1907 constitution, which sanctioned clerical repudiation of legislation deemed harmful to Shi’ite Islam. Members of the group consist of several grand *mujtahids* who are opposed to the regime—Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Golpaygani, and Ayatollah Hasan Tabatabai Qummi— plus others who served on the Supreme Judicial Council or the Guardian Council, such as a Kani, Jennati, Safi, and others.

The Succession Problem

Whoever succeeds Khomeini, either individually or as a member of a small committee, will require the support of some key FMPL. These individuals bear an intriguing resemblance to their counterparts under the *ancien regime* in at least one respect: namely, their reputation as “politicals” rather than as learned individuals. Invariably, they are not the most distinguished clerics of their regions. Nevertheless, they are important mobilizers of their populations on behalf of the clerical regime. They include the following:

1. Ayatollah Ali Meshkini, FMPL Qumm
2. H.I. Abbas Vaez Tabasi, FMPL Mashhad
3. Ayatollah Malakuti, FMPL Tabriz
4. Ayatollah Jalal al-Din Taheri, FMPL Isfahan
5. H.I. Ha’eri Shirazi, FMPL Shiraz

The FMPL of Tehran has shifted among Rafsanjani, Khamanahi, Ardabili, Kani, and H.I. Mohammad Emami Kashani (who is currently also a member of the Guardian Council and head of the Administrative Justice Tribunal). Other cities where the FMPL network is important for the regime include those in or near the war zone (such Bushehr, Abadan, Khuninshahr (formerly Khorramshahr), Ahvaz, Dezful, Hamadan, Bakhtaran (formerly Kermanshah). If dissatisfaction builds within the ranks of the armed forces,

links of military commanders with leaders in these regions could be crucial to the success or failure of their plans. Other areas of lesser importance in the FMPL network include Kurdistan, Kerman, and Yazd. Kurdistan is a critical region, to be sure, but most Kurds are Sunnis and would not be susceptible to the influence of a Shi'ite FMPL. Kerman and Yazd are in less populous areas of the country and therefore removed from the centers of activity.

The ability of Ayatollah Montazeri to be in regular contact with the preachers of the important urban centers enhances his prospects for the succession. But this is only true if such preachers, in turn, can deliver mass support through the instruments of the local *Pasdaran*, revolutionary committees, and *Hezbollah* forces. Militating against his chances are his inability to attract the support of the most distinguished clergymen, either because they are antiregime or quiescent. Their failure to support Montazeri will not necessarily be fatal to him for although learning has traditionally been a vital indicator of clerical leadership, presumably the classical criteria of advancement are subject to change. But even then, no one can be sure that the various *Pasdaran* factions that support local FMPL clergymen will remain loyal to Montazeri at the national level.

Pasdaran factionalism has been very upsetting to the regime, because of armed clashes in such areas of the country as Mashhad, Isfahan, Kurdistan, Fars, Amul, and Rasht. The most notorious case involved two claimants for the FMPL position in Isfahan, who, oddly, could contend for it even though Ayatollah Khomeini's personal representatives to the major cities are also *ex officio* FMPL. Clashes between the adherents of Ayatollah Jalal al-Din Taheri and Ayatollah Hosain Khademi in Isfahan extended to armed conflict among *Pasdaran* units loyal to each. Ayatollah Montazeri was brought in to heal the rift, and the upshot was the appointment of a new commander of the *Pasdaran* for the Isfahan region. In mid-November 1983, Ayatollah Taheri, reconfirmed as FMPL in Isfahan, admitted to a climate of discord existing between some of the government departments and many of the Friday imams of the province. At the investiture of the new *Pasdaran* commander for the Isfahan region in the presence of both Ayatollahs Taheri and Khademi, each of the latter spoke of the dangers involved in *Pasdaran* groups attaching themselves to particular factions.⁸

This is the kind of problem that Montazeri will have to contend with. *Pasdaran* factionalism should not be overstated, of course, but it is noteworthy that many unit commanders have been killed over the last few years. The regime usually explains that these deaths

are attributable to the war with Iraq, but it is not unlikely that at least some of the casualties are the consequence of clashes among rival factions or guerrilla actions on the part of regime enemies (especially the Kurdish Democratic Party militants and the *Mujaheddin-e Khalq*).

The most likely succession scenario will be a committee in which Montazeri either serves as member or as *primus inter pares*. The other members of the committee will include the president, Khamanahi, Parliament Speaker Rafsanjani, Qumm FMPL Meshkini, and either Supreme Court Chief Justice Ardabili or State Prosecutor General Sanei.

Exile groups have claimed that Ayatollah Khomeini's will, which has been deposited with the leadership of the Council of Experts (an 83-member body elected in 1983 to choose his successor), specifies these eight individuals to succeed him: Kani, Rafsanjani, Khamanahi, Montazeri, Ardabili, Meshkini, Sanei, and Safi, who is a current member of the Guardian Council. But there is no reason to give such claims greater credibility than those of others.

Press speculation suggests a conflict at the top between Khamanahi and Rafsanjani, who allegedly take respectively dovish and hawkish stands on the war. Yet, if either emerges triumphant in post-Khomeini Iran, it will probably be as an *éminence grise*, because the Iranian clerical establishment will no doubt require an individual with a higher degree of status in clerical ranks than either of them possess. In this connection, it may be interesting to note that Rafsanjani has referred to Montazeri in very positive terms on three separate occasions in the last year. In late May 1983, he called him "the hope of the people." About seven months later, he again voiced his support and approval for Montazeri when he called him ". . . the most powerful arm of the revolution after the Imam [Khomeini] . . . the hope of our nation. . . ." During the visit of West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher to Iran in the summer of 1984, Rafsanjani told European reporters that he supported Montazeri as the next *faqih*, the supreme religious leader. As Rafsanjani put it: "If, God forbid, such a day [the day of Khomeini's death] came to pass *and circumstances were as they are now*, in my view Ayatollah Montazeri is one who can gain the unanimous vote of the Council of Experts" [emphasis supplied].⁹

These references to Montazeri are probably strictly tactical on the part of the Speaker of Parliament. It is more appropriate, rather, to see Montazeri and Rafsanjani as rivals, although clear proof to support this contention is lacking. I have already alluded to differences

between the two over the role of the party and the relative emphasis given to urban and rural development. Another indication that all is not harmonious may be had from comparing their speeches given at the same time in 1983. According to Montazeri,

Some people [i.e., Rafsanjani?] want others to obey them like dumb animals, and if they express an opinion, they will be rejected, even if they are believing, wise, and revolutionary. On the contrary, believing, independent, and brave people should find their way to the religious seminaries, the government, and the Majlis [parliament]. . . .¹⁰

Rafsanjani's clear preference, however, for people who will be "safe" may be seen in his own comments: "The Majlis rostrum is a dangerous place, and a person might do something to create a poisonous climate of opinion. . . . In the Majlis, above all, we want a good and pious person. . . ." ¹¹ Rafsanjani's base of support seems to be the broadest of those not having the rank of ayatollah. His constant presence in Parliament allows him to develop ties of support with other clerics and townspeople outside the capital.

President Khamanahi supposedly represents the nation but does not have the regional organizational ties established by Rafsanjani. Nonetheless, he allegedly has firm ties with the military in his capacity as commander in chief of the armed forces. Both have been the FMPL of Tehran over the years, and their connection to the masses is consolidated by this contact. At first, Khamanahi's prestige seemed to be greater because he was subject to an assassination attempt, whereas Rafsanjani was suspiciously absent during the explosion that destroyed the leadership and headquarters of the IRP in June 1981. Rafsanjani, however, seems to have weathered whatever suspicions may have been voiced, and his robust state of health contrasts favorably to Khamanahi's physical infirmity.

Should the Council of Experts decide against Montazeri because he seems to lack the qualities of leadership that Shi'ites normally demand, then it is likely that either of the other senior ayatollahs might be advanced. Sanei has good credentials because he is a former member of the Council of Guardians as well as a current member of the Supreme Judicial Council and State Prosecutor General. Khomeini once said of him that he had reared him like a child.¹² Ardabili's prospects are strong because of his contact with the judges of the country. He can also claim close contact with the nation's FMPL network because he has served in that capacity in Tehran, just as Sanei has done in Qumm.

To the extent that the new leadership can convince the *Pasdaran* units, the revolutionary committee leaders, the urban bosses, and *Hezbollah* of the necessity for unity, it can probably carry on for some time. But if the history of the country is at all indicative, a successful transition from Khomeini to a committee is unlikely. Not only have Iranians traditionally been divided, but the political action of leaders also suggests that collective rule will prove difficult. Ayatollah Montazeri recognized the problem of fragmentation when he suggested that the Thermidorean reaction that apparently besets modern revolutions was also affecting the Iran's. Speaking before a group of FMPLs in late 1983, he said: "There is a famous saying in the world that revolutions devour their children. Today, I feel the same thing is happening in our society . . . a gradual and creeping coup is under way. . . ." ¹³ Needless to say, if this sentiment represents the feelings of the leadership while Khomeini is alive, then things look bleak for a post-Khomeini Iran.

The Iranian Power Elite (As of September 1984)

I. Judicial Organs

A. Council of Guardians (clergymen only)

1. Ayatollah Ahmad Jennati
2. Ayatollah Lotfollah Safi
3. Ayatollah Abu al-Qasem Khazali
4. H.I. Mohammadi Gilani (formerly revolutionary prosecutor general, Tehran)
5. H.I. Mohammad Emami Kashani (head, Administrative Justice Tribunal)
6. H.I. Mohammad Momen

B. Supreme Judicial Council (SJC)

1. Ayatollah Abd al-Karim Musavi Ardabili (chief justice, Supreme Court; temporary FMPL Tehran)
2. Ayatollah Yusef Sanei (state prosecutor general)
3. H.I. Moqtadai
4. H.I. Abu al-Fazl Mir Mohammadi
5. H.I. Mohammad Musavi Bojnurdi
6. H.I. Mohammad Mohammadi Rayshahri (formerly, revolutionary prosecutor general of the armed forces; currently, minister of information and intelligence)

C. Central Committee, Council of Experts

1. Ayatollah Ali Meshkini, chairman (FMPL, Qumm)
2. H.I. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (Speaker of Parliament)
3. Ayatollah Mohammad Mehdi Rabani Amlashi (formerly state prosecutor general)

D. Friday Mosque Prayer Leaders (FMPL) Network

1. Ayatollah Hosain Ali Montazeri, (chairman and secretary general? *Faqih* designate?)
2. H.I. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani: Tehran (provisional; also Majlis Speaker)
3. H.I. Ali Khamanahi: Tehran (provisional; president of the Republic)
4. Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani: Tehran (provisional; general secretary, Society of Combattant Clergymen, Tehran)
5. Ayatollah Abd al-Karim Musavi Ardabili: Tehran (provisional; chief justice, Supreme Court; member, SJC)
6. H.I. Mohammad Emami Kashani: Tehran (provisional member, Council of Guardians; head, Administrative Justice Tribunal)
7. Ayatollah Malakuti: Tabriz
8. Ayatollah Jalal al-Din Taheri: Isfahan
9. Ayatollah Abbas Vaez Tabasi: Mashhad (administrator, Imam Riza Shrine, Mashhad)
10. Ayatollah Haeri Shirzai: Shiraz
11. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khatami: Yazd
12. H.I. Jafari: Kerman
13. Ayatollah Hosain Nuri: Hamadan
14. H.I. Abu al-Hasan Nuri: Khorramshahr
15. H.I. Ibadi: Zahedan
16. H.I. Mehdi Yasrebi: Kashan
17. H.I. Musavi: Kurdistan
18. Ayatollah Qazi: Dezful
19. H.I. Gholam Reza Hasani: Rezaiyah

II. Military and Paramilitary Organizations

A. Supreme Defense Council

1. H.I. Ali Khamanahi (chairman)
2. H.I. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (imam's representative)
3. Mir Hosain Musavi (prime minister)

4. Ali Akbar Velayati (foreign minister)
5. Brigadier General Qasem Ali Zahirnezhad (chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
6. Colonel Mohsen Rezai (commander, *Pasdaran*)
7. Colonel Mohammad Salimi* (minister of defense)
8. Mohsen Rafiqdust (minister of *Pasdaran* affairs)
9. Kamal Kharrazi (director, IRNA; head of war propaganda)
10. H.I. Hasan Ruhani (chairman, Majlis Armed Services Committee)

B. Supreme Council *Pasdaran* (within Ministry of *Pasdaran*?)

1. Mohsen Rezai (commander, *Pasdaran*)
2. Mohsen Rafiqdust (minister, *Pasdaran*)
3. Shamkhani (deputy commander, *Pasdaran*)
4. H.I. Hasan Taheri (imam's representative)
5. H.I. Fazlollah Mahallati (imam's representative)
6. 11 District Commanders of *Pasdaran*?

C. Armed Forces, Police, Gendarmerie

1. Colonel Ali Sayyad Shirazi (commander, Ground Forces)
2. Captain Eskandar Hosaini (commander, Naval Forces)
3. Colonel Hushang Seddiq (commander, Air Force)
4. Colonel Khalil Samimi (chief, National Police)
5. Colonel Ali Kuchekzadah (commander, Gendarmerie)

D. Intelligence Apparatus

1. General Hosain Fardust? director, SAVAMA? (former aide of the shah)
2. H.I. Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, minister of interior
3. H.I. Mohammad Mohammadi Rayshahri, minister of information and intelligence
4. H.I. Mohaqqeq Damad, director, National Inspectorate Organization
5. H.I. Qorban Ali Duri Najafabadi, chairman, Supreme Council of National Recruitment**
6. Director, Intelligence Department of *Pasdaran*
7. Directors, Military Intelligence for Ground Forces, Air Force, and Naval Forces

* No confidence vote in Majlis, August 1984; no replacement as of 10/30/84.

** Literally called Supreme Council of National Selection, which has provincial, district, city, and functional branches, such as in ministries, universities, factories, with power to oversee recruitment.

III. Leading Clerics in the Cabinet

1. H.I. Ali Khamanahi, president (occasionally attends and chairs sessions at these times)
2. H.I. Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, minister of interior
3. H.I. Mohammad Mohammadi Rayshahri, minister of information and intelligence

IV. Officers in the Parliament, Second Session

1. H.I. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker
2. H.I. Mohammad Mehdi Karrubi, deputy speaker
3. H.I. Mohammad Mehdi Rabani Amlashi, deputy speaker
- [4. H.I. Musavi Khoayniha, deputy speaker, First Session]
- [5. H.I. Mohammad Yazdi, deputy speaker, First Session]
- [6. H.I. Mohammad Khamanahi, deputy speaker, First Session; brother of the president of the Republic]

V. Supreme Council, Islamic Republic Party

1. H.I. Ali Khamanahi, chairman and secretary general
2. H.I. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
3. H.I. Mohammad Mehdi Rabani Amlashi
4. H.I. Abbas Vaez Tabasi
5. H.I. Movahhedi Kermani (also imam's representative in the National Police)

VI. Popular and Professional Organs

1. Society of Combatant Clergymen
2. Revolutionary Committees
3. Reconstruction Crusade
4. Foundation for Deprived
5. Refugee Foundation
6. Housing Foundation
7. Martyrs Foundation
8. National Syndicate of Guilds
9. Islamic Committees

APPENDIX 11

PAPER SUBMITTED BY ADEED DAWISFA, ENTITLED "IRAN'S MULLAHS AND THE ARAB MASSES"

It was during those unforgettable, almost unbelievable, days of January 1979, when Iran, the seemingly most stable political order in the Middle East, the country which the United States had confidently depicted as the model and guardian of security in the area, suddenly became the Mecca of revolutionary spontaneity; when the hungry and neglected peasants became overnight the fist-clenching revolutionary soldiers of Islam—it was then that the love affair began.

The world at large looked on in uncomprehending amazement, as the once all-powerful King of Kings was summarily dispatched to the rubbish heap of history by a frail old cleric thousands of miles away. The people on the other side of the Gulf, however, watched with almost numbed adulation, for they saw in Iran's unfolding drama

their own suppressed aspirations, and in the long term, if Allah were to will it, their own long-awaited salvation.

They might have begun to despair, for they too had tried to effect radical changes in their societies. In the 1950s and 1960s, secular Arab nationalism, with its emphasis on ethnic continuity rather than religious affinity, and on Arab rejuvenation rather than Islamic resurgence, constituted the main vehicle for revolutionary change in the Arab world. Then, the passions of the masses were fired by nationalist fervor, the disciples of which, such as President Gamal Abd el-Nasser of Egypt and the leaders of the Ba'ath Party in Syria and Iraq, did not see a great role for Islam in their visions of the future.

The Ba'ath ideologists certainly acknowledged the debt of Arab nationalism to Islam,

Dawlisha

but in the process stressed only the moral and spiritual aspects of Islam. They consciously disregarded its political and constitutional strictures, and pointedly insisted on its complete subordination to Arab nationalism. Nasser, who by the late 1950s had personified for most Arabs the moving spirit of Arab nationalism, similarly accorded Islam a secondary role in his scheme of things. Nasser reminded the Arabs, in one fiery speech after another, of the continuity of their history and the cohesion of their cultural heritage. And the message was simple: if the Arabs were to progress and stand up to the western "imperialists," then they must rediscover their Arab essence, remold their Arab personality, and recreate in their future the glory of Arab history. In Nasser's spellbinding oratory, Islam figured very little.

But then Arab nationalism met its Waterloo in June 1967. It was put to the test and was found wanting. On the crucial Arab nationalist issue of Palestinian rights, it could not deliver. Indeed, after a whole decade of nationalist rhetoric and radical politics, the Arabs went to war against the "Zionist entity," confident of their inevitable victory under the banner of Arab nationalism, only to suffer the most humiliating defeat of their contemporary history. So it was only natural that in the shocked aftermath of the war, the Arab masses would turn against the secular nationalism that promised so much yet delivered so little.

The alternative was Islam, but in the decade following the June 1967 war, it was a deradicalized form of political Islam that dominated the Middle Eastern political scene. The disillusionment with revolutionary politics following the Arab defeat in 1967 was the springboard for a process of regional deradicalization which gathered momentum with the defeat of the Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan in September 1970, reaching a zenith during the October 1973 war. In the 1970s, the Arabs put their faith in devout, conservative Muslim leaders like King Faisal and King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, and President Sadat of Egypt. The accent was on pragmatic politics emanating

from a form of cautious institutionalized Islam

But this did not work either. It seemed to the Arab people that while revolutionary nationalism had plunged them into ignominious defeat, the era of institutionalized Islam only succeeded in delivering Egypt to Israel, as a result of which the Arab world stood more impotent than ever in the face of Israel on the question of Palestinian rights. It was then that the radical version of political Islam began to come into its own. The Organization of Muslim Brotherhood proceeded to gain new adherents and to take bolder initiatives. The Brotherhood's activities spanned not only Egypt, but also Syria and Jordan. Other Muslim fundamentalist groups became more vociferous in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms, and radical Islam generally began to challenge vigorously the established orders in countries such as Sudan, Algeria, Morocco, and even in a country of such long traditions of secularism as Tunisia.

It was in the midst of this mood of increasing Islamic rebellion that the Iranian revolution exploded on the Middle Eastern political stage. The immediate appeal of the first truly grassroot revolution that succeeded in overthrowing a secularist and Westernized 'tyrant' was immense within the Muslim population of the Arab world. The Islamic revolution in Iran was accepted by both Arab and non-Arab Muslims as a proof and a lesson of what Muslims would do if they clung doggedly to their faith. Many Muslims saw the Iranian revolution and other related activities, such as the takeover of the American embassy, as the first Muslim victory over non-Muslims since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when the Ottoman empire was at its zenith. To the mass Arab Muslim public, the victories of the ayatollahs during 1979 and 1980 over the enemies of Islam, embodied by the West and its enfeebled lackeys in the Muslim world, represented the advent of a new heroic age of Islamic assertion and power. For the Muslim Arabs, suffering for centuries under Western intellectual, technological, and military superiority.

Dawisha

the eclipse of the shah's—and by definition the West's—power in Iran simply emphasized that it is only through Islam, rather than nationalism, Westernization, and other such modern concepts, that the Muslim Arabs could defeat the Western imperialists.

In this regard, the Gulf rulers, as indeed the Muslim rulers in the rest of the Arab world, were at a disadvantage. Unlike the Iranian clergy they were neither able nor prepared to confront the enemies of the Muslim world; on the contrary, many were allied closely to the very people who had humiliated Islam for so long. Therefore, when Tehran called on the faithful to rejoice with Iran over its defeat of the "American Satan," the people went to the streets in Dhahran, in Dubai, and in Bahrain and rejoiced. No one questioned the substance of the message: the masses were seduced by the imagery and the symbolism. The other Muslim rulers could do little more than wait and hope that the crisis would pass. To the Arab rulers and particularly those of the small Gulf states, the power of the ayatollahs seemed overwhelming and at times even invincible. At the height of the love affair between Iran's mullah's and the Arab masses, on the first anniversary of Khomeini's triumphant return to Iran from exile, major riots occurred in Kuwait and in Bahrain which took two whole days to quell, and in Qatif in Saudi Arabia which led to the near demolition of two banks, the burning of over 50 buses and cars and the local electricity office, and the death of at least four people.¹

But like most tempestuous love affairs, the initial intoxication begins to wane as frailties start to appear with increasingly regularity. Thus the Iranian revolution began gradually to lose its appeal in the eyes of the Arab masses, as the expected improvement in Iran's social and political situation never materialized. In a message in February 1982 to the "children of the revolution," Ayatollah Khomeini himself admitted that

the Iranian nation is facing difficulties and problems which are unavoidable consequences of any revolution... the

people should not listen to the hostile propaganda of the enemies of the revolution and of Islam, who with all their might try to make people lose hope and despair of the Islamic Republic... the deprived and afflicted classes of the revolution have not endured as much hardship and difficulty as the great prophets and the illustrious Prophet of Islam throughout his life.²

Notwithstanding the Imam's rationalizations, there is no doubt that as Khomeini's promised land recedes further away into the distant horizon, the early euphoria of the Muslim masses is quickly turning into disillusion. The Iranians, as makers of the revolution, are likely to cling to the last vestiges of hope that the revolution will be redeemed, that it will soon deliver, and that it will come good in the end. Meanwhile, they are still prepared to believe in the revolution, to fight for the revolution, and to die for the revolution. But those on the other side of the Gulf have not physically lived through the revolutionary experience. They have neither suffered the pain, nor experienced the ecstasy, and as such, they are more fickle, more impatient and less committed.

Just as damaging to the mullahs' prestige outside Iran has been their war with Iraq. True, Iran has survived the conflict and, through a fusion of patriotism, religious orthodoxy, and military pragmatism, Iran turned what appeared to be a runaway Iraqi victory at the beginning of the conflict into a ruinous war of attrition that turned Iran's way. But the non-Iranian Muslim no doubt remembers well how, at the outset of the war, the Iranian clergy had confidently predicted that the Iraqi Muslim soldiers would soon revolt against the "worthless infidel who opposes Islam." The message Tehran sent to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on the day of the Iraqi invasion in September 1980 was clear and confident:

God will defeat your devices. In the coming days you will learn how the Muslim people and army of beloved Iraq will respond to you, and how the Muslim Iranian army and people will respond to you. You will know how you

Dawlisha

have dug your own grave—the grave of shame and humiliation in this world, and the grave of hellfire in the hereafter.³

The ensuing bloody stalemate in the war was, therefore, damaging to Khomeini's prestige. For it must be remembered that in the minds of Muslims, there existed a crucial difference between the secularist Hussein and the spiritual, to some even divine, ayatollah: while Hussein fought the war with mechanical means, such as airplanes and tanks, Khomeini's devices were mystical, employing the power of God and his angels. Hussein, therefore, unleashed a power against Iran whose failures and fragilities were recognized and understood. Khomeini's power, on the other hand, by its very mystical definition, could not have any frail-

Iraqi regime worried about the effect the ayatollah's victory in Iran and his conscious effort to export the revolution to the rest of the Islamic world would have on its Shi'ite population. And, indeed, this concern probably constituted the immediate cause of the war. Less than a week before embarking on his ill-fated invasion, Hussein, who should have known better than to attack a revolution, declared:

The ruling clique in Iran persists in using the face of religion to foment sedition and division among the ranks of the Arab nation . . . The face of religion is only a mask to cover Persian racism and a buried resentment for the Arabs. The clique in Iran is trying to instigate fanaticism, resentment, and division among the peoples of this area.⁴

“Many Muslims saw the Iranian revolution . . . as the first Muslim victory over non-Muslims since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when the Ottoman empire was at its zenith.”

ties. Nor were the ayatollahs capable of achieving the one thing which they and their followers and admirers had so confidently anticipated: namely the overthrow of Hussein by the Muslims, or least the Shi'ites, of Iraq. The Muslims, particularly the Shi'ites, of the Arab world must have wondered frequently throughout this senseless war why it was taking the “divine” ayatollah such a long time to dispose of the “worthless infidel.” Surely Iraq should have been the ayatollahs' most fertile ground. It was the only other Muslim country where the Shi'ites actually formed a majority, a country that bordered on Iran and in which Khomeini himself spent sixteen years in exile from the shah. At the beginning of the revolution and at the height of Khomeini's prestige, the

After months of war, it had become obvious that the Shi'ites were not going to revolt against the Baghdad government. Maybe it was because the ethnic divide between Arabs and Persians proved a more potent force than the religious affinity between Iraqi and Iranian Shi'ites; maybe because the vigorous social policies of the Iraqi regime had succeeded in transcending sectarian division; maybe because the ayatollahs' power was simply exaggerated by friend and foe alike; or maybe because the simple, semi-literate masses of southern Iraq and the Gulf could reach beyond the mist of Tehran's propaganda and see an Iranian reality that did not correspond to the clergy's sterling claims. For whatever reason, the Iranian clergy, vigorously using religious symbolism, were not

Dawlisha

able to induce the dislocation of Iraq. And this time, a clearly relieved Hussein was confidently to declare that the war with Iran was a struggle "of the whole unified Iraqi nation."⁵

Khomeinism, as a symbol of Islamic rejuvenation, and a standard by which devout Muslims, particularly Shi'ites, evaluated their own political leadership, is no longer the threat to Arab and Gulf stability it was in the heyday of the Iranian revolution. The loss of potency is evident in Iran's own behavior. Whereas in the past, the clergy's influence emanated from the strength of its mystical and religious symbolism, it now increasingly resorts to war and to physical acts of subversion in asserting its power. During the mullahs' days of glory, it was the impact of the spoken and written word that shook the very foundations of the neighboring countries. Now, the ayatollahs are reduced to behaving like mortals, sending troops and training guerrillas and still unable to induce the required changes in the neighboring countries.

The decline in Iranian fortunes is evident from events in Bahrain. In February 1980, the mere anniversary of Khomeini's return to Iran created disturbances of such proportions that internal security forces, behaving with a brutality unseen before, needed a number of days to restore order. Almost two years later, Tehran had to train over 70 guerrillas and plant them in Bahrain with promises of support from the Iranian navy in order to destabilize the Bahrain regime.⁶ This increasing resort to force as an instrument of foreign policy is a clear indication of the rapidly dwindling potency of Khomeinism as a revolutionary symbol that might destabilize the Arab and Gulf states.

In the Iraq-Iran war, it has been the battered, humiliated, and demoralized Iraqis, who have been suing for peace at almost any price. On the other hand, the ayatollahs, seemingly uncertain of their domestic support, are finding the war a convenient vehicle for bolstering internal moral and revolutionary unity. This may very well be the reason for Iran's invasion of Iraqi territory in July

1982, after the Iraqis, beaten in Dezful and Khorramshahr, had withdrawn into their own border.

But this may be an overly cynical interpretation of Iranian motives. Iran's own declared objective in carrying the war into Iraqi territory was to topple the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein and institute an Iranian-style Islamic republic. In a speech on June 21, 1982 Ayatollah Khomeini explained the purpose of Iran's war effort: "When Iran defeats Iraq, Iraq will be annexed to Iran: that is, the nation of Iraq, the oppressed people of Iraq, will free themselves from the talons of the tyrannical clique and will link themselves with the Iranian nation. They will set up their own government according to their own wishes—an Islamic one."⁷ For this purpose, Iran had a team of Iraqi divines ready to go into Iraq and set up an Islamic government. The man who seemed to have been entrusted with the task of forming the government was 38 year-old Hojatilislam Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim, the son of Iraq's late grand Ayatollah Mughsin al-Hakim, the man who brought Khomeini to Iraq when the latter was expelled by the shah in the early 1960s.

The Iranian invasion of Iraq on July 13, 1982 was meant to bring about the swift demise of the "tyrannical Saddam" and his Ba'ath Party while simultaneously ushering a popular uprising amongst the Iraqi Shi'ites which would sweep al-Hakim into power in Baghdad. Immediately after Iran's invasion, as the "martyrs of Islam" were walking on Iraqi minefields, Ayatollah Khomeini went on the radio to address the "beloved Muslim people of Iraq":

Beloved Iraqis: rise up, and with inspiration from the great religion of Islam attack the enemies of Islam, because with the valuable help of you beloved ones, your Iranian brothers will excise these cancerous tumors from the body of your Islamic country and will make the noble Iraqi nation govern their destiny. You the zealous inhabitants of Basrah, welcome your faithful brothers and cut short the oppressive hands of the blasphemous Ba'athists from your land.

Dawlisha

You the respectable inhabitants of the holy shrines of Najaf and Karbala, you zealous youths who have attacked these filthy ones at every opportunity, use the opportunity offered to you by God and rise up in a manly manner and fulfill your own destiny. . . . I beg the Almighty for the victory of Islam and the Muslims.⁸

This messianic conviction that the Muslims of Iraq will rise against Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party the moment Iran's armed forces set foot on Iraqi soil must have been sorely dented when the Iraqis, in fierce fighting in the summer and autumn of 1982 and winter of 1983, successfully contained the Iranian advance. And the Iranian mullahs must now be a little wiser about their popularity and their prestige outside the borders of Iran. For they must have wondered: Why did

And even the Iranian clerics, enveloped as they are in their own mystical world, should by now know that if they were not able to fire the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Iraqi Shi'ites, or indeed the other Shi'ites of the Gulf, then they face a prohibitively exhaustive task among the predominantly Sunni Arab masses.

Leaders in the Gulf and in the rest of the Arab world who in the past might have spent many sleepless nights worrying over the ayatollahs' hold over the hearts and minds of their populations, no longer seem to concern themselves unduly with Tehran's moral strictures and admonishments. Not one of the Arab leaders who had adopted the Fahd Middle East peace plan at the Fez summit in September 1982 bothered to respond to Iran's howling accusations of treachery and blasphemy. More significantly, not one mass

"Islamic fundamentalism has been taken on and ruthlessly cast aside by state power in Saudi Arabia, in Iraq, and most strikingly, in Syria.

the Iraqi army suddenly reverse the military balance? Where were the welcoming Shi'ite masses of southern Iraq? What happened to the expected spontaneous uprising in Shi'ite Basrah? The ayatollahs should recall Iraq's own mistake of expecting the Arab population of southern Iran (which the Iraqis persist in calling Arabistan) to come flocking to the welcome of the invading Iraqi forces. Nothing of the sort happened then, and it should be clear to Iran's mullahs now that the Shi'ites of southern Iraq are not likely to shower flowers on the invading soldiers of Islam.

To be sure, Iran's military and human capability is such that it could still defeat the Iraqis and occupy parts of Iraq. But as the Iraqis themselves could testify, military occupations lacking popular support have a tendency to turn into ignominious defeats.

demonstration of Arab support for the mullahs' militancy was reported in any part of the Arab world. The fear of Arab leaders now is neither of determined and messianic revolutionary Iran, nor of the charismatic Khomeini, but of a militarily powerful Iranian state.

This may very well be a sign of the times, the gradual ascendancy once again of states over revolutionary groups, and of institutionalized coercive power over revolutionary enthusiasm. Indeed, Islamic revolutionary activity has not fared particularly well recently in the Arab world. Islamic fundamentalism has been taken on and ruthlessly cast aside by state power in Saudi Arabia, in Iraq, and most strikingly in Syria. Only in Egypt were the fundamentalists able to score a dramatic success with the assassination of Anwar Sadat, but for what they did

Dawlisha

the results were indeed meager. The actors have certainly changed, the screenplay has been somewhat modified, but the plot has remained essentially the same. And crowning this process of Islamic revolutionary decline was the failure of Iran's Islamic republic, both domestically and in its war with the Iraqi "infidels." To the Arab masses this means that the bitter experiences of the past seem to be incarnated in the disillusionment of the present. Just as Nasser's Arab nationalism failed them in the 1960s, Khomeini's Islamic fundamentalism has failed them now. And in this, there is a natural revulsion to revolutions and with the ways of revolutions, and tendency to move back under the protective umbrella of the state.

For the moment, the clergy's hold on Iran itself seems to be secure. Opposition is growing and becoming increasingly violent, but the opposition groups are disunited, and at present seem unable to mount a real challenge to the regime. Moreover, there can be no denying the military threat that Iran poses to the Arab regimes, particularly to the Arab countries on the other side of the Gulf. But all this hides the main weakness of the Iranian revolution. The mullahs' hopes, so real during the heyday of the revolution, that

Arab countries would soon emulate the Iranian example, are no longer a serious possibility. The truth is that the Muslim Arabs are no longer infatuated with the revolutionary clerics. The love affair has lost its sparkle. And while this may not necessarily be the end, it certainly is the beginning of the end. **TWA**

NOTES

1. *The Times* (London), March 12, 1980.
2. British Broadcasting Corporation, *Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4: The Middle East and Africa* (hereafter cited as *SWB*), ME/6953/A/2, February 13, 1982.
3. *SWB*, ME/6531/A/7, September 24, 1980.
4. *Al-Thawra* (Baghdad), September 18, 1980.
5. *Al-Thawra* (Baghdad), March 3, 1981.
6. For the details of the plot, see *al-Mostakbal* (Paris), January 23, 1982, pp. 10-12; see also the account of the attempted coup by David Ignatius in *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), February 10, 1982, and by Robert Fisk in *The Times* (London), March 28, 1982.
7. *SWB*, ME/7059/A/8, June 23, 1982.
8. *SWB*, ME/7079/A/10, July 16, 1982.

APPENDIX 12

NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE ENTITLED "COPING WITH ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM" BY PROFESSOR AUGUSTUS R. NORTON AND SUBSEQUENT SUBCOMMITTEE CORRESPONDENCE

[From the New York Times, Tuesday, August 6, 1985]
COPING WITH ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM¹

(By Augustus R. Norton²)

WEST POINT, NY—In the aftermath of the Beirut hostage crisis, many in Washington are searching frantically for an American policy toward Islamic fundamentalism. This is a foolish search for a policy we do not need.

Spurred by the need to render complex events comprehensible, many scholars and policy makers have grossly simplified Islamic fundamentalism. Relying on demonology rather than analysis, such people frequently assume that the fundamentalists' *raison d'être* is fighting the United States. At best, the Islamic movement is approached as yet another mysterious product of the inscrutable East. Neither approach will help us understand or deal with fundamentalism. The fact is that it is a rather familiar kind of political phenomenon, considerably less difficult to grasp than we sometimes assume.

Although it is widely varied and often a product of particular domestic political circumstances, there are certain common traits shared by many of the Islamic movements. The most important of these is a deeply felt sense of disfranchisement.

Few Middle Eastern states offer their citizens an effective voice in government. Political participation—in the form of plebiscites or elections—is often more show than substance, and political representation is generally rigged to benefit the representatives rather than the represented. Against this background, Islamic movements offer a crucial channel for participation. In states where the secret-police budget often rivals the public-health budget, the mosque is often the only place where one can meet without unwanted observers.

Islam has not been rediscovered; it was never "lost." It has, however, been reappropriated for a new purpose. For many Moslems, it has a renewed appeal as a familiar and culturally authentic idiom of protest and political action. Moreover, unlike Communism, liberalism and socialism, Islam is untainted by recent failure or by association with the West. Islamic politics are just that—politics. And like any political stirring, Islam is subject to exploitation and manipulation, in this case by clerics and former army officers.

What this means is that many of the Islamic movements can be surprisingly pragmatic in their political maneuverings. In Egypt, for example, in the general elections in May 1984, the Islamic Brotherhood joined in an electoral coalition with the neo-Wafd Party, the political descendent of a traditional bitter rival. The opponents of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad also clothe themselves in Islamic rhetoric, but when we peel away the religious language, we discover an essentially political complaint—that the Sunni Moslems of Syria, the majority of the population, do not wield the political power warranted by their numbers.

There is no denying that the Islamic movements include permanent enemies of the United States—enemies whose demands cannot be met and whose enmity will not be mitigated whatever we do or fail to do. Such organizations need as enemy in order to mobilize support: It is easier to blame America than to take responsibility oneself. The Hezbollah organization of Lebanon, for instance, asserts: "America is behind all our catastrophes." With such viscerally anti-American groups, there is little room or reason for dialogue. But not all fundamentalists are by nature anti-American or pro-terrorist.

To be sure, many Moslems, fundamentalist or not, object to some aspects of American policy in the Middle East. But objecting to policy and agitating violently against it are two very different things, and the small cells of fanatical terrorists who have forced their way to our attention in recent years are hardly representative.

Fundamentalism is not a monolithic body of fanatical extremists whose idea of a good time is killing Americans and humiliating the United States Government. The notion that such behavior is somehow typical is a bigoted and mistaken idea that can only obstruct our efforts to come to terms with an important new political movement.

¹ Copyright 1985 by the New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

² Augustus Richard Norton, associate professor of comparative politics at the United States Military Academy, is a contributing author of the book, "The Emergence of a New Lebanon."

DAITE S FABCELL, FLORIDA, CHAIRMAN

LEE H. HAMILTON, INDIANA
 GUS YATRON, PENNSYLVANIA
 STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, NEW YORK
 LON BOWKER, WASHINGTON
 GERRY E. STUDS, MASSACHUSETTS
 DAN RICA, FLORIDA
 MICHAEL D. BARNES, MARYLAND
 HOWARD WOLFE, MICHIGAN
 GEO. W. CROCKETT, JR., MICHIGAN
 SAM GARDINISCH, CONNECTICUT
 SHERYLL M. DYSMALLY, CALIFORNIA
 TOM LANTOS, CALIFORNIA
 PETER W. KOSTMAYER, PENNSYLVANIA
 ROBERT G. TORPCELL, NEW JERSEY
 LAWRENCE J. SMITH, FLORIDA
 HOWARD L. BERMAN, CALIFORNIA
 HARRY REID, NEVADA
 MEL LEVINE, CALIFORNIA
 EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, OHIO
 TED WESSER, NEW YORK
 GARY L. ACKERMAN, NEW YORK
 BUDDY MACLAY, FLORIDA
 THOMAS K. UDALL, ARIZONA
 ROBERT GARCIA, NEW YORK

WILLIAM S. BROOKFIELD, MICHIGAN
 BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, NEW YORK
 ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, CALIFORNIA
 JIM LEACH, IOWA
 TONY ROTH, WISCONSIN
 GUYMILA J. SHOWE, MAINE
 HENRY J. HYDE, ILLINOIS
 GERALD B. H. SCLOMON, NEW YORK
 DONALD BIERUTER, NEBRASKA
 BRAND D. BILLARDER, MICHIGAN
 ED ZISCHAU, CALIFORNIA
 ROBERT K. DORNAN, CALIFORNIA
 CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, NEW JERSEY
 CONNIE MACE, FLORIDA
 MICHAEL DUNNIVE, OHIO
 DAN BURTON, INDIANA
 JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA

JOHN J. BRADY, JR.
 Chief of Staff

Congress of the United States Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515

August 13, 1985

Professor Augustus R. Norton
 Department of Social Science
 Thayer Hall
 U.S. Military Academy
 West Point, NY 10996

Professor Norton:

I am writing in regard to your Op-ed piece in the New York Times of August 6, 1985 entitled, "Coping with Islamic Fundamentalism."

I note that in your first paragraph you say that "many in Washington are searching frantically for an American policy toward Islamic fundamentalism." I would like to know whether you are referring to the recent series of hearings on Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I would also be interested in learning if you look upon these as part of what you call "a foolish search for a policy we do not need."

May I point out that these hearings were not hastily put together in response to the tragic TWA hijacking or to any other specific event, but were in the planning for several months. I have long been concerned that Islamic movements come to the attention of the American government and public only when there are acts of terrorism against Americans, and that these inevitably generate a negative and simplistic image of Islam and Muslims in the United States. It was in the hope of dispelling the stereotypes and informing the Congress and public of the complexity of Islamic fundamentalism and of the policy choices and problems these Muslim groups pose, that we invited experts such as Professors Hermann Eilts, John Esposito, Shahrough Akhavi, Fouad Ajami, and yourself to testify.

In the written statements and oral testimony, I believe, the issue received a fuller airing than has occurred before in public in Washington. The discussion of what the various groups want; how they differ; whether US policymakers are adequately trained to deal in general with religious issues in international politics and in particular with Islam; what are the root causes of anti-Americanism in the Middle East; and what the US can or cannot do to contain the more extreme manifestations of Islamic radicalism — all these issues hardly seem a "foolish search" to me, but rather a long overdue examination of US policy options in the Middle East and Islamic world.

I appreciate your consideration of this matter and look forward to hearing from you.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Lee H. Hamilton
 Chairman
 Subcommittee on Europe
 and the Middle East

LHH:MVDdmh

DAVTE B. PARCELL, Florida, Chairman

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
 GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
 STEPHEN J. BOLARZ, New York
 DON BOWEN, Washington
 GERRY S. STUDD, Massachusetts
 DAN BEICA, Florida
 MICHAEL D. BARNES, Maryland
 HOWARD WOLFE, Michigan
 GEO. W. CROCKETT, Jr., Michigan
 SAM DELPONDON, Connecticut
 MERVYN M. DYWALLY, California
 TOM LAFFOR, California
 PETER N. EOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania
 ROBERT G. TORRCELLI, New Jersey
 LAWRENCE J. SMITH, Florida
 HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
 HARRY REID, Nevada
 MEL LEVINE, California
 EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio
 TED WEISS, New York
 GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
 BUDDY MACKAY, Florida
 MORRIS R. LUDALL, Arizona
 ROBERT GARCIA, New York

WILLIAM B. BROOKFIELD, Michigan
 BELLAIRN A. SILMAN, New York
 ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
 JIM LEACH, Ohio
 TONY NOTI, Wisconsin
 OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
 HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
 GERALD B. SOLOMON, New York
 DOUG BENETER, Nebraska
 MAURE D. BILANDER, Michigan
 ED ZECHAU, California
 ROBERT E. DORNAN, California
 CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
 CORNIE MACK, Florida
 MICHAEL DRYWINE, Ohio
 DAN BURTON, Indiana
 JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona

Congress of the United States
 Committee on Foreign Affairs
 House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515

September 18, 1985

JOHN J. BRADY, Jr.
 Chief of Staff

Professor Augustus R. Norton
 Department of Political Science
 Thayer Hall
 U.S. Military Academy
 West Point, New York 10996

Dear Professor Norton:

Thank you for your letter of September 11. I appreciate your kind comments and the fuller explanation of your comments made in the op-ed piece.

I share your view that Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism cannot be dissociated from the broader political currents and from general U.S. policy in the Middle East. I also agree that Islam should not be viewed as a monolith and that a great deal of thinking in Washington and elsewhere is based on this faulty premise. It is far too simplistic, of course, to conclude that Muslims are at war with the United States, and I trust that our two hearings, including your excellent testimony, helped to dispel that view.

I do feel we need to give careful scrutiny to policies to deal with Islamic fundamentalism. The alternative to ill-considered policy that promotes force as the appropriate response to Islamic fundamentalism may be a series of policies carefully tailored to specific countries, but policies nonetheless. Because of the uniquely Islamic dimension, these movements are often not as "familiar" a "kind of political phenomenon" as we usually confront. In practical terms this means policymakers need to understand that the indiscreet promotion or display of our cultural and philosophical values may contribute to the development of anti-Americanism. Moreover, our diplomats in the area as well as officials in Washington need to appreciate that Muslims the world over believe politics to have a religious nature, and that this perception often motivates their conduct.

We will certainly confront individuals and groups who will not be dissuaded from their antipathy to the United States no matter what our actions or attitudes may be. But, as you would agree, there are many more Muslims who are not radicalized, and if they are to remain that way, we must try to deal with their aspirations. Because these aspirations are increasingly expressed in terms of Islam, it is important that we formulate policies that take them seriously.

I appreciated your letter and clarifications. I will probably insert this correspondence into the record of the hearing as an appendix along with your op-ed piece unless you contact us to the contrary. I hope you will stay in touch and I want again to thank you for your useful testimony.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,



Lee H. Hamilton
 Chairman
 Subcommittee on Europe
 and the Middle East

Department of Social Sciences
 United States Military Academy
 West Point, New York 10996
 September 11, 1985

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton
 Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East
 Committee on Foreign Affairs
 United States House of Representatives
 Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Hamilton:

Although the subcommittee hearing was my first face-to-face encounter with you, I have long admired your serious approach to foreign policy issues. Your monthly newsletter is pithy and intelligent (in fact, I often distribute it to my students), and the public record of your hearings concerning Middle East issues stands as testimony to your dedication to objectivity and a thorough airing of contending perspectives. In short, you are the last member of Congress that I would seek to offend, and I am troubled that I may have done so.

In answer to your letter of August 13, I did not intend that my August UP-ED article should be read as a commentary on the hearings in which I participated, and I am distressed that the article may have been so interpreted. My purpose in writing the article--drawn in large part from my statement before the subcommittee--was to provide an antidote and riposte to the piffle one hears in some of the salons and public offices in Washington and New York.

With respect to the substance of the Times article, my unspoken point is that Islamic fundamentalism may be a regional phenomenon, but its individual manifestations vary widely from one to another, rendering all but the highest level generalizations of suspect accuracy. In contrast to some commentators who persist in using fundamentalism as a synonym for terrorism, I would urge--as you note in your letter--that we take due note of the diversity and complexity of Islamic fundamentalism and recognize that in many instances all we are witnessing is a comprehensible, if culturally authentic form of politics.

I agree that we need to know more about Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism. I certainly agree that your subcommittee provided a forum for an extensive airing of

information and analyses; moreover, I expect that the hearing record will serve as an important source document for the interested public. Admittedly, I have my quibbles and quarrels with some of the comments of my co-witnesses, but this is hardly a surprise. In my judgment the hearings were constructive, well-informed and timely. Indeed, I expected no less, and that is why I enthusiastically agreed to participate.

There are some in the Washington policy community, and some who aspire to join policymaking circles, who believe that the fundamentalist Muslims of the Middle East have, in effect, declared war on the United States. Some of these people urge that the United States should respond with a policy in kind. It is people of this ilk who are engaged in a foolish and, I might add, counterproductive search.

While the Islamicists resent my demystification of their stock-in-trade, and the veiled bigots resist the consideration of the fundamentalists as political actors rather than violently inclined fanatics, I am trying to comprehend the fundamentalists in terms that clarify who they are and for what they stand. The upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism not only reflects issues in the domestic political environments of individual Middle East states, but perceptions about the regional role and objectives of major powers, and especially the United States. In the latter respect, the upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism reflects, in part, a dissatisfaction with the policy of the United States, a dissatisfaction that is not restricted to fundamentalists. Thus, it is important to examine the aspects of U.S. policy in the region that provoke disgruntlement, criticism and, at times, violence. In my opinion, the results of such an examination will clearly show that our foreign policy is hardly seen by many Middle Eastern observers as balanced and impartial.

If I were to add anything to the OP-ED piece, it would be the following observation (which I also made during the hearings): It is not that we need a policy vis-a-vis fundamentalism, but a fair and consistent policy that takes a longer view of developments than some of our regional friends might urge upon us. In short, we must break out of the incremental policymaking that will forever condemn us to reacting to events. If I were asked what principle should underly our policy in the Middle East, I would say that the United States should avoid acting as though the Muslims were enemies, otherwise a process of self-fulfillment will insure that many Muslims will become enemies of the United States.

By way of closing, I must tell you that many readers of the OPED piece have written me, and while not all letters have been filled with praise, a solid majority have applauded the article as an assault on those who would misconstrue, overgeneralize and sensationalize Islamic fundamentalism. To those ends, I would like to think that the Times article and the hearings you chaired complement one another.

With best wishes,

Yours truly,



Augustus Richard Norton

APPENDIX 13

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY DR. RAYMOND H. HAMDEN, CHAIRMAN,
FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RELATIONS

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman
Staff Director Michael H. Van Dusen
Subcommittee on Europe And The Middle East
U.S. House Of Representatives
Rayburn House Office Building, B-359
Washington, D.C.

July 1985

Dear Congressman Hamilton, Mr. Van Dusen,
Distinguished Members of the Committee
and Staff Members

The following paper is a brief political psychology rendition on the current Middle East kidnappings and sky-jacking. The article **Islamic Fundamentalism: Terrorism or Psychological Resistance** gives definition to fundamentalism, terrorism, psychological resistance and discusses some of the treatment hostages incurred upon returning to their homes in the United States.

The Recommendations section and the Summary are in concise form but deserve a more complete presentation. Other topics that should be reviewed are **Relationship between Beliefs and Roles in Shaping Government Foreign Policy, Perceptions and Misperceptions of International Dilemma, The Media and Public Action, Torture and the Torture, Assistance for Hostages & Family Support Systems, Psychology of Terrorism and Controlling It, et cetera.**

While looking forward to peace, international cooperation, and the fostering of human rights for all, I remain

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Raymond H. Hamden
Chairman of the Board

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM:
Terrorism or Psychological Resistance

* * * * *

Raymond H. Hamden, Ph.D.

The world is drifting towards the danger of more devastating terroristic acts. Sky-jackings, kidnappings, and other techniques of torture have not been oppressed and eliminated by individuals, groups, or governments. The resolution to this international conflict may first begin with a level of understanding of fundamentalism, terrorism, and resistance.

FUNDAMENTALISM

By definition, religious fundamentalism is a movement that arises from an existing body of spiritual believers. It stresses the infallibility of the Holy texts in all matters of faith and doctrine, accepting it as a literal record of history; the basic underlying principles, the original and primary source of ideas, and the groundwork of a system. Fundamentalism is synonymous with essential and necessary laws and rules. Therefore, to the "believer", the law (fundamentalism) is indispensable.

In the early part of the 20th Century, American Protestantism arose as a fundamental act against social behavior which seemed to be loosing ethical values and the significance of "true" religion in the lives of individuals. Islamic fundamentalism

also arose to revive the true spirit of Islam because Moslems, according to some, had parted from true Islam. An important factor to remember is that Western Civilization was credited with influencing the modernizing movements in Islam. Also there was a need to live by the codes and ethical values of Islam.

Living in the Islamic faith is living in the Shari'a (system of law or legal principles of life) and following the Sunna (words and actions of the Prophet). (1) There is no difference between Islam as a religion and Islam as a political society (not limited to the acquisition of power).

In Arabic, the word Islam, means "submitting oneself to God". The religion is sometimes incorrectly referred to as "Mohammadanism" with the mistaken implication that the Prophet Mohammad himself is worshipped, rather than God. The Islamic faith has at least 72 sects which are off-shoots of the Sunni or the Shi'a. (2) Fundamentalistic concepts have been initiated in both, but the majority of the followers seem to remain moderates.

TERRORISM

This term can be defined as the use of or the threatened use of violence for political purposes to extort, intimidate, or coerce others into modifying their behavior.

All the necessary persons will die in Argentina to assure the country's security...A terrorist is not just someone with a gun or a bomb but also someone who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western Civilization.

President Jorge Rafael Videla
of Argentina, May 1977 (3)

The practice of torture may be synonymous with terrorism. Torture often involves the application of sophisticated psychological and pharmacological techniques which result in intense pain but at the same time leave few overt signs of physical abuse.(4) In his paper, Lippman also named 14 physiological, psychological, and pharmacological techniques of torture as falange, sensory deprivation, and drug abuse.

Although the practice of torture is prohibited in virtually all comprehensive international human rights instruments, the attempts to prevent terrorism have failed. The threat of retaliatory force against terrorism is now an all too familiar paradox of international diplomacy.

When discussing terrorism, torture and torturers, the psychological concept of **hostility** needs to be mentioned. Hostility and violence seem to be more ingrained in human feelings than in the vast majority of animal species. There is however, little evidence that hostility is instinctual; it seems to be **mainly the result of frustration**.(5) Hostility leads to despair, fear, and unhappiness.

PSYCHOLOGICAL RESISTANCE

Resistance is the dynamic power which interferes with the process of conflict resolution. It is the part of the individual or group personality which resents the basic aim of change, particularly if force or the threat of force are indicated.

In the case of victimization and political violence, the victimizer must feel narcissistic reinforcement because he or she is "doing something right" and therefore, guilt is not necessary.

Should sudden loss of external or internal control result, then narcissistic mortification is the emotional experience. The resultant response would be **fright, not fear**. The feeling of fright (terror or horror) is a reaction, not to the anticipated danger of a blow, but to a defeat.

In practice, retaliation should not be used, particularly while victims of terrorism remain captive. The victimizers may need to overcompensate (killing hostages) for their sense of defeat and loss of control.

Americans have learned of those who are "willing to die for the cause" in the recent Middle East episodes. When the United States government and its people talk of "big-gun" retaliation, fear of death is non-existent in the minds and hearts of the victimizers; however increasing resistance results in the form of acting-out.

Acting-out is the discharge of wishes through the process of gratification, thus avoiding verbalization and resolution. Now the victimizer becomes the victimized. Individuals and groups who feel victimized will embrace and emotionally synthesize in action with individuals and groups who have been victimized. This amplifies reinforcement of fundamental goals and encourages **self-victimization**, the risking of occupation and domestication for the purpose of the belief.

THE HOSTAGES AND THEIR FAMILIES

Several topics were discussed with a former hostage and the families of current hostages. The areas of concern were social, emotional, intellectual, spiritual, occupational, and physical. In general, an attitudinal assessment "of life" was investigated.

The families of current victims reported adjustment phases similar to the experience of death and dying: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. A sense of **disbelief and isolation** of the horror was the first reaction to the news that a loved one has been kidnapped or sky-jacked. As personal attempts were made to seek information from government sources, the lack of adequate or reassuring response resulted in **frustration and anger**. Energy was directed by the individual to pursue matters independently and tactics were imagined for "saving" the captives. This seems to be the **bargaining phase** manifested with "If I (do this), then this (may result)" or "If I (didn't do that), then this (would not have occurred)"; also in this phase, persons make promises to God, "If You get this resolved, I promise to (do all kinds of worshipful deeds)". Usually, this is met by unfavorable results and realization of wasted energy is confronted. This outward energy is then turned inward (feelings of impotence and ineffectiveness) and **depression** sets in. As the emotional resolution to this devastating feeling develops, one reaches **acceptance** and the reality of the situation.

These phases are cyclical. Following acceptance, the person re-enters denial. The second time through the phase is usually shorter than the first; the third is less time than the second; and so on. Also, several phases may overlap and not necessarily be in the indicated order. Both the victims and the families suggested an increase in spiritual awareness and need.

The social aspects were of great interest because of an irony. The recent sky-jacking in Beirut, Lebanon by a few members of an Islamic group, developed cognitive dissonance for Americans. The American captives were not harrassed by the "holding group" as U.S. government and media reported at the onset of the crisis. The hostages seemed to be "doing well" under the conditions of being held involuntarily and, there was no direct evidence of terrorism or torture after the aircraft passengers were taken off-board. This was contradictory to the on-board behavior of hostility.

While Americans in the U.S. became more angered at the anticipated and fantasized situation of fellow Americans in captivity, the hostages were not in fact being mistreated or brainwashed. A sense of understanding, not sympathy, was learned by those held. (6) (7) (8) (9)

Upon returning home, they were met with hostility rather than an understanding welcome. The anger of Americans at home was displaced. While maintaining rage for the supposed terrorists for symbolically holding the United States in captivity, those

representing the U.S. were not suffering "as they were suppose to". They were not being tortured as Americans may have thought.

Citizens were unable to target the U.S. government and media for not disseminating the actual facts and for exploiting the nations' emotions. So, this energy of anger was displaced to the victims (symbolic of American struggle and yet seeming to have betrayed an allegiance).

Regardless, the victims and the families have an allegiance to the United States and its citizens. They are working to create a network to be a supportive body of people who have suffered or will suffer some form of national and international violence.

RECOMMENDATION

a) The **National Organization for Victims Assistance (NOVA)** has been initiated and should be supported by the United States government as well as the encouragement of such programs in cooperation with other countries.

B) Future crisis resolution processes should include family members in a more consist and direct manner. They need to feel less impotent and vulnerable.

C) Participate in a more direct reenstatement of the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Protection of All Persons Being Subject to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders.** Foster an international system of support.

SUMMARY

Americans are like the farmers who work with all types of crops. When a plant disease approaches we must leave our crops and deal with the disease that threatens all. We are facing the possibility of one of the most devastating diseases recorded in history. Terrorism, torture, and sky-jackings can contaminate the world. Everyone may be threatened.

Despair, anxiety, helplessness, stress, and other psychological pain are pervasive but paradoxically hopeful. Our pain and anticipated pain can motivate our work for international understanding and cooperation.

Our ability to respond can facilitate awareness. We can encourage people to act on truth, fostering personal integrity and maximizing the likelihood of empathy and compassion among peaceful nations. We can explore nonviolent conflict resolution.

Psychological development and understanding is as necessary as social, political, and economic change.

We can make a difference in these types of crisis and prevention; certainly with the quality of life. To do so, we must work intensely and directly with the most critical threats to human rights and life. The opportunity and ability to respond is to facilitate the sources of hope, courage and peace through effective communications, understanding, and cooperation.

REFERENCE

- (1) Interview with Dr. George Atiyeh, Head of Near East Section, Library of Congress; and The Honorable Samah H. HeLal, Theosopher of the Druze Faith. July 1985.
- (2) Interview with Dr. Sami N. Makarem, Professor of Religion and Philosophy, American University of Beirut. June 1985.
- (3) Videla quoted in Stephen Kinzer, "Argentina in Agony", New Republic 179 (23 and 30 December 1978): 17, 18.
- (4) Lippman, Matthew, "Torture and the Torturer: an overview of the findings". Presented at the panel on Human Rights and the Torturer, June 25 , 1982. International Society of Political Psychology, Washington, D.C.
- (5) Fine, Reuben, Psychoanalytic Psychology, Jason Aronson, N.Y. 1975.
- (6) Interview with Sis and Jerry Levin at their Washington, D.C. home, July 1985. Mr. Levin is a Cable Network News correspondent who was kidnapped and held captive for 11 months.
- (7) Interview with Peggy Say of Botavia, N.Y., July 1985. Ms. Say is the sister of Terry Anderson who was kidnapped in Beirut on March 16, 1985.
- (8) Interview with Eric Jacobsen of Huntington, CA, July 1985. He is the son of David Jacobsen, Hospital Administrator at the American University of Beirut, who was kidnapped on May 28, 1985.
- (9) Interviews with others in July 1985. They requested anonymity.

* * * * *

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Hamden is a Washington, D.C. psychologist. He has worked areas of **international/cross-cultural** and **Political Psychology**. Membership is held in the International Society of Political Psychology, International Council of Psychologists, World Affairs Council, United Nations Association of the U.S.A., and others.

Awarded **Fellow** status in The American College of Psychology and The Royal Society of Health, Dr. Hamden is also a **Diplomate** in International Health Care as well as in various fields clinical psychology. He has consulted with government agencies and international organizations. Dr. Hamden may be contacted at The FOUNDATION For INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RELATIONS in Washington, D.C.

APPENDIX 14

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY DANIEL PIPES, VISITING FELLOW, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION

FUNDAMENTALIST MUSLIMS AND U.S. POLICY

INTRODUCTION

Fundamentalist Muslims have emerged in recent years as a major political force in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Although their activities sometimes do bring advantage to the United States (as in the Afghan civil war), these more often pose a danger to American interests. It was fundamentalists who, for example, overthrew the pro-Western regime of the shah of Iran, attacked the Grand Mosque in Mecca, assassinated Sadat, and blew up the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. The prominence and power of fundamentalist Muslims, as well as their deep hostility to the United States, force the U.S. government to develop guidelines for dealing with them.

These should include, in the case of Muslim governments friendly to the United States, such as Morocco, Egypt, the Sudan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan:

(1) No help for the fundamentalists in the opposition. U.S. contact with them helps, of course, to understand their views and monitor their influence, but no assistance should be provided to them.

(2) Dissuasion of Muslim governments preempting fundamentalists. Bringing them into the government or applying their program inevitably lead to repression, instability, and anti-American policies.

(3) Reduction of public U.S. links to Muslim governments, especially in countries where powerful fundamentalist movements exist. Discreet cooperation, not visible ties are to be built.

In the case of Soviet-backed Muslim governments, including Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan, U.S. policy should be to:

Note: Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

(1) Assist fundamentalist groups only with great caution and as a last resort.

(2) Refuse assistance that establishes fundamentalist groups as the major alternate opposition to the Soviet allies.

(3) Help non-fundamentalist Muslim opposition groups organize against Soviet-backed regimes.

As for neutralist governments, Iran especially, try to convince them that the U.S. poses less of a threat than the USSR.

FUNDAMENTALIST MUSLIM MOVEMENTS

Fundamentalists have established major political movements in many Muslim countries during the past fifteen years. Examples include, from west to east:

* * Senegal, where several fundamentalist organizations, including the Union Culturelle Musulmane, the Assembly for National Salvation, and the Islamic Party, have shaken up the sedate compromises made by Senegalese Muslim leaders.

* * Morocco, where since the mid-1970s the government of King Hasan II has faced increasing opposition from fundamentalist groups calling for complete application of Islamic law. Hasan's two-pronged policy has been to co-opt the fundamentalists by adding an Islamic tone to this government and isolate them by cracking down on fundamentalist organizations.

* * Algeria was turned into a secular society through the long French occupation (1830-1962), but since 1973 fundamentalist groups have demanded application of Islamic law. Algerian fundamentalists face the unique challenge that almost no one in their country is familiar with that law or the way of life that accompanies it.

* * The Islamic Movement of Tunisia, established in June 1981, gave fundamentalists a unified voice after a decade of increasing presence in Tunisian political life. Fundamentalists are likely to have a major influence in the country once President Habib Bourguiba steps down from the office he has held since 1956.

* * The Muslim Brethren of Egypt, the leading fundamentalist movement of the twentieth century, was founded in 1928 and played a key political role before being outlawed in the 1950s. The Brethren became more moderate in recent years, leaving violent action to such groups as the Islamic Liberation Army, Takfir wa-Hijra, and the group that assassinated Anwar as-Sadat, New Jihad.

* * Fundamentalist groups in the Sudan mounted strong challenges to the central government for many years. These culminated in an attack on the capital city in March 1970, which was put down

by the air force at a cost of some 10,000 lives. Leading fundamentalist organizations include the Muslim Brethren and two Sufi (mystical) organizations, the Ansar and the Khatmiya. The leader of the Muslim Brethren, Hasan at-Turabi, is counselor to the president and an influential advocate of the application of Islamic law. President Ja'far an-Numayri imposed Islamic law in September 1983 and subsequently made it the primary principle of legislation.

* * In Syria, the main opposition to the secularist regime of Hafiz al-Asad has since 1976 come from the Muslim Brethren. The government revealed its concern by its draconian anti-fundamentalist measures: the worst of these was the destruction of large parts of the city of Hama in February 1982, leading to the deaths of some 20,000 Syrian citizens.

* * The government of Saudi Arabia espouses fundamentalist principles, but since the 1920s has moved away from applying them. A growing discrepancy between rhetoric and actions creates tensions with the fundamentalists. This triggered the takeover of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in November 1979, an attempt by fundamentalists to overthrow what they see as a compromised regime.

* * Until Ataturk's death in 1938, Turkey was the only Muslim country consistently to apply secularist principles in public life. Since then, however, secularism has been eroding. Fundamentalist influence peaked in the mid-1970s when the small National Salvation Party participated in a government coalition.

* * Iran experienced secularist policies during the rule of the two Pahlavi shahs, 1925-1979. These were dramatically reversed when Ayatollah Khomeini took power in February 1979. His regime has endeavored to apply the Islamic law in its entirety. Iran is today the country watched around the world by those wishing to see if the fundamentalist experiment can work.

* * The imposition of Marxist rule in Afghanistan in April 1978 sparked widespread revolt against the central government. Of the six most important groups fighting in the resistance, four are led by fundamentalists. Fundamentalists among the Afghan rebels have fought other mujahiden to position themselves to rule in the post-Soviet era.

* * The secularist Zulfikar Ali Bhutto lost power in Pakistan to the fundamentalist Zia-ul-Haq in a coup d'etat in July 1977. He declared an ambitious program of Islamization in February 1979 which he put partially into effect. Zia has used Islam as a mechanism to add legitimacy to his regime and increase his support.

* * Bangladeshi politics went through a secularist period after independence in 1971 but since 1975 have taken on a fundamentalist cast. Today's government pledges to turn Islam into an "Islamic state."

* * In Malaysia, fundamentalist organizations such as Parti Islam and ABIM put pressure on the government to increase its fundamentalist orientation. In the process, they threaten to upset the delicate balance that exists between the Muslim Malays and the non-Muslim Chinese and Indians. A number of fundamentalists who belong to UMNO, the ruling party, now occupy high government positions, exacerbating inter-religious and interracial tensions.

* * Indonesian fundamentalists, repeatedly frustrated by their poor showing in national elections, have resorted to non-democratic means--demonstrations, provincial rebellions, terror--to get their way and put their program into effect.

OBJECTIVES OF FUNDAMENTALIST MUSLIMS

In every one of these countries, fundamentalist Muslims pursue a political program that derives from their understanding of the Islamic law, the Shari^Ca. For them, the regulations contained in this divine code are the key to politics.

The Shari^Ca is a massive body of regulations based on precepts found in the Qur'an and the other holy books of Islam. It covers both the most intimate aspects of life (such as personal hygiene and sexual relations) and the most public (such as taxation and warfare). The law of Islam has changed very little during the past thousand years; it represents the permanent goals incumbent on believers.

In the public sphere, however the Shari^Ca sets out goals so lofty, Muslims have never been able fully to achieve them. The ban on warfare between fellow believers, for example has been repeatedly breached, while judicial procedures have almost never been followed and criminal punishments have not been applied. Because its demands exceed human capacity, full implementation of the Shari^Ca has always eluded Muslims.

In centuries past, pious Muslims coped with the problem of not attaining their religion's goals by lowering their sights. They postulated that full application of the law would occur only some day in the distant future. For the meantime, they agreed, it had to be adjusted to meet the needs of daily life; this they did by applying only those regulations that made practical sense. Those that did not they circumvented; religious leaders found ingenious methods to fulfill the letter of the law while getting around its spirit. For example, by devising ways to ignore the prohibition on usury, they enabled pious Muslims legally to charge interest on loans. This pragmatic approach to religion which predominated for hundreds of years, is known as traditionalist Islam.

Traditionalist Islam began to lose its hold in the late eighteenth century, as the success of the West began to cause a

steep fall in the power and wealth of the Muslim world. Many Muslims responded to their decline by looking to Europe for new ideas and methods. In the process, they forsook well-established practices. The traditionalist approach to Islam lost support as Muslims increasingly experimented with Western-influenced interpretations of the sacred law. Their efforts resulted in three new approaches to Islam: the secularist, reformist, and fundamentalist.

Secularist Muslims believe that success in the modern world requires the discarding of anything that stands in the way of emulating the West; they therefore argue for the complete withdrawal of religion from the public sphere. Rejecting the commands of the Shari'a, for example, they do not allow a man to marry more than one wife, nor do they require the head of state to be a Muslim. Governments in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq subscribe to secularist principles, as do a few others.

If secularists push away the Shari'a entirely and embrace Western civilization, reformist Muslims incorporate parts of both. They interpret the Shari'a in such a way so that its precepts become compatible with Western ways, facilitating the acceptance of whichever Western practices they wish to see adopted. Reformists transform Islam after their own fashion into a religion that forbids polygamy, encourages science, and requires democracy. The flexibility of their approach appeals to many Muslim leaders, so the great majority of them endorse reformism. (The Libyan ruler, Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, is a reformist who pursues a unique personal notion of Islam.)

Fundamentalists, in contrast to both these groups and to traditionalist Muslims as well, believe that the law of Islam must be implemented in its every detail.¹ They point to the exact fulfillment of God's commands in the Shari'a as the duty incumbent on all Muslims as well as their principal source of strength. The law is as valid today, they insist, as in the past. For fundamentalists, the challenge of modernity centers on the issue of how to apply the Islamic law in changed circumstances. Secularists and reformists accept Western civilization in varying degrees, but fundamentalists reject the West in its totality.

Although aiming to recreate what they think of as an ancient way of life, fundamentalists in fact espouse a radical program that has never been implemented. They claim their goal is to return to traditional ways, but their program differs from the traditionalists' in many respects. Where traditionalist Islam

¹ Fundamentalist Muslims, not traditionalists, secularists, or reformists, are discussed in the following pages. Fundamentalists alone have the consistent and deep hostility toward the United States described here; other Muslims have a great diversity of views, including ones favorable to the United States.

is pragmatic, the fundamentalist version is doctrinaire. The former allows for human frailty, the latter demands perfection. Traditionalist Islam achieved a way of life so successful, it lasted for hundreds of years without major changes; fundamentalist Islam requires so much, it has yet to be achieved. (A fundamentalist like Ruhollah Khomeini is often spoken of as "medieval"; in fact he is unlike anyone who lived in the past centuries and is very much a creature of his time, responding to the challenges of the twentieth century.)

The appeal of fundamentalism grows most when Muslim societies intensely experience modernization. The leaders who are typically the first Muslims to encounter the modern West--government officials, military officers, aristocrats, merchants--tend to experiment with secularism and reformism. But as the masses get caught up in modernizing, they try hard to preserve accustomed ways. Fundamentalism attracts them precisely because it promises a method to fend off Western influences and practices. Fundamentalist organizations grow in strength as Muslim masses seek solutions to modern dilemmas.

Differences in sect and location have hardly any effect on their viewpoint. Communal disagreements aside, fundamentalists who are Shi'i hardly differ from fundamentalists who are Sunni on goals or methods. Though they live in different parts of the Muslim world--West Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia--fundamentalists everywhere pursue the same objectives. These include: a penal code based on the Qur'an; taxation according to Islamic levies; second-class citizenship for non-Muslims; warfare against non-Muslims only; harmonious relations between Muslim governments; and ultimately a union of all Muslims living in peace under one ruler.

What differences do exist between fundamentalists are primarily a matter of commitment. Some of them live normal lives and promote their ideals in peaceable ways. But others are so consumed by the vision of a society ordered along Islamic principles, they can no longer tolerate the failings of their government. These fervent fundamentalists reject the existing political system in its entirety. If a few retreat peaceably from society, most declare war on the rulers. They attack the authorities for pursuing policies not in accordance with the Shari'a; whatever failures a government experiences--poverty, military defeat, injustice, inequity, moral laxness--they blame on its divergence from the sacred law. Totally convinced of the righteousness, as well as the urgency, of their cause, fundamentalists often use violent methods. Not infrequently, they resort even to terrorism.

Should they reach power, fundamentalists attempt to implement a program deriving from the Shari'a. Because this inevitably arouses widespread resistance (among non-Muslims, secularists, reformists, and even rival groups of fundamentalists), they soon find it necessary to exercise coercive control. Fundamentalists are a minority in the Muslim world; their views are hotly disputed by other Muslims. As Islamic laws are applied, government

rule becomes increasingly arbitrary and dictatorial. In the effort to build an order unlike anything now in existence, fundamentalists are prepared to impose their views on all opponents.

In sum, fundamentalists believe that Islamic law holds the answers to modern problems and that they alone are sincere about implementing the law. They disdain non-fundamentalist Muslims, are hostile toward non-Muslims, and act with the self-assuredness and determination that accompanies absolute certainty about knowing God's will. Accordingly, they feel justified in using any means to achieve power and often adopt extreme tactics. Most important for relations with the United States, fundamentalists have a deep and abiding hatred of Western civilization, which they see as the supreme obstacle to their goal of applying Islamic law.

THE PRO-SOVIET BIAS OF FUNDAMENTALIST MUSLIMS

From this point of view, the United States and the Soviet Union appear more alike than dissimilar. Though political enemies, the two countries share much that fundamentalists reject. The men wear neckties, the women wear skirts, classical music appeals to the cultured, and many social and sexual mores are similar. Americans and Russians are historically both Christian peoples whose culture derives from Western civilization. They share a scientific methodology, humanistic idealism, and secularism. Their similarities extend even to ideology, the area where they differ the most, for Marxism is a strain of Western thought and Marxists never dispute the primacy of Western civilization. In contrast to all this, political differences between the two countries appear relatively minor to fundamentalists.

Of the two, however, the United States poses greater problems. The result is a slight but consistent bias among fundamentalists in favor of the Soviet Union and against the United States. This is apparent in three domains: culture, ideology, and international relations. American culture is the more threatening, its ideology the more alien, its power the more feared.

The Western Cultural Challenge

Soviet influence derives almost exclusively from its military prowess: its dreary state culture and moribund economy have virtually no impact on the Muslim world. Who learns Russian, listens to Radio Moscow, watches Soviet films, buys Czech watches, or invests in the Ukraine? It is the United States and West Europe, rather, that influence Muslims everywhere. Their pop music, movies, video games, comics, textbooks, literature, and art reach throughout the Muslim world. Their clothing, foods, household items, and machines are found in towns and villages. Their universities, banks, and oil companies beckon aspiring Muslims. Their sexual customs--contraception, abortion, dancing, dating, nightclubs, pornography, mixed social drinking, tight clothing,

scant swimming suits, mixed bathing, beauty pageants, co-education, and female employment--break down the divisions required by Islamic law.

This wide appeal of American and West European culture deeply disturbs fundamentalists. Some fear the erosion of Islamic customs and laws, others worry about the very survival of Islam itself. In answer, they counterattack. They condemn Western culture as aesthetically loathsome and morally decadent; they spread conspiracy theories to inspire fears in Muslims of American motives; and they warn of disasters befalling those who abandon the Shari'a.

Fundamentalists also strongly discourage instruction of European languages and attendance at American schools. This explains why they assaulted two successive presidents of the American University in Beirut. David Dodge was kidnapped in July 1982 and held for a year; Malcom Kerr was then assassinated in January 1984. Although both were prominent sympathizers of the Arabs and Islam in the United States, their politics mattered less to the fundamentalists than that they both headed A.U.B., the outstanding bastion of U.S. culture in the Middle East. Little upsets fundamentalists more than Muslim youth absorbing American customs, precisely what happens when they attend a Western-style university. What Americans see with pride--the unselfish spread of advanced methods--appears to fundamentalist Muslims as a mortal danger. They stop at nothing to eliminate the offending cultural presence.

Fundamentalists view the culture of the United States and West Europe as the main threat because its influence so greatly exceeds that of the Soviet bloc.

Between Liberalism and Marxism

With regard to ideology, fundamentalists find American political ideals even more alien and challenging than Soviet ones.

Liberalism, socialism, nationalism, and other systematic political programs developed in the West offer Muslim goals unrelated, and often contrary, to the Shari'a. For example, whereas Islam calls for ultimate loyalty to the whole community of Muslims, nationalism directs loyalty to the nation state; and these two units cannot be reconciled. Ideologies present a major danger to fundamentalists; from the nineteenth century on, as increasing numbers of Muslims have been attracted to Western ideologies, these have inexorably alienated them from Islamic practices.

As Muslims fall under the influence of Western ideologies, winning them back to the Islamic law and keeping others from straying becomes a preoccupation of fundamentalists. To achieve this, they turn Islam into an ideology, transforming its theology and law into a system of economic, political and social theories.

In the prit must be emphasized, fundamentalists endow Islam with unprecedented political role. They contend that Islam cor political program comparable to, but better than, thcinating in the West. They find grievous fault in all Westelologies--anarchy in liberalism, brutality in Marxism, ssness in capitalism, poverty in socialism--and argue th,ms should ignore all these in favor of an Islamic ideology

Funist Muslims live, however, on a globe dominated by two wuperpowers, each promoting its own ideology. Which ofes the fundamentalist Muslim vision resemble more closely, ism (meaning here, the classic tradition of Locke and Milxism? Which do fundamentalists find less obnoxious? O Marxism appears to them the lesser evil. They find llin some ways to be the preferable of the two, for, lil it respects religious faith, the family unit, and prerty. In contrast, of course, Marxism abolishes each ofid replaces them with dialectical materialism, the state, inal ownership.

Butxists a compatibility of spirit between fundamental and Marxism that more than makes up for their differels compatibility has several aspects. Both fundamental and Marxism make claim to a whole truth, both entailcing systems, both have holy books giving guidance on allf matters, private and public, great and small. Their regulations differ very much, of course, but details matter; the fact that each of them aspires to regulate all of

lists and Marxists alike see government as an instrumolding society in conformity with highly elaborated theories. Unlike liberalism, which has no overriding purposews each citizen the freedom to choose his own path, theseprecise visions of righteousness. If Islam begins with e sphere and then extends to control the public, and Mes in the other direction, in the end both touch on ne aspect of life. Even such activities as drinking wine g abstract canvases have political implications and thvolve government control. Both systems discourage disse who insists on proceeding his own way is severely punis

plies, they also differ from liberalism in the ambitic programs. In contrast to liberalism's mundane aspiriam calls for a society in harmony with God's laws whilevisages a society in accord with "scientific" huma-on their own, humans do not live according to divitific standards. Their religious bond of Islam leads to an of war between Muslims; the class solidarity of Marxo demands for total allegiance to one's class. Neite goals are fulfilled, however, as Muslims and propriably do clash among themselves. Similarly,

Islam outlaws the charging of interest on money and Marxism prohibits profits; but interest and profits are economic necessities, so they never can be eliminated, only disguised. In both cases, the unsuccessful effort to achieve lofty goals brings on a sense of inadequacy; this can prompt a redoubling of efforts and a turn toward extremism.

Two other features spawned by liberalism menace fundamentalist Muslims and Marxists alike. Liberalism is closely associated with the development of the national state, while fundamentalist Islam and Marxism are both universalist affiliations for which national divisions are artificial and deplorable. Also, liberalism allows an open way of life that challenges the highly structured patterns required by fundamentalists and Marxists. Though in no way inherent to liberalism, the self-indulgent and individualistic features of contemporary Western life appear to them both as damaging by-products that invariably follow from relaxing state control.

These shared traits do not mean that fundamentalist Muslims approve of Marxists or resemble them, only that they have more in common with Marxists than with liberals. When forced to choose between the two, they are more likely to work with Marxists.

Between the U.S. and USSR.

International relations is the third factor that biases fundamentalist Muslims in favor of the Soviet Union. As with culture and ideology, they distrust both powers and want nothing better than to stay out of the Soviet-American conflict. Fundamentalists have little stake in its outcome and wish both sides to be exhausted in their struggle. They want no part of the battle: "Capitalism and communism are not our concern; let the Christians fight these matters out on their own." Fundamentalists everywhere resist superpower involvement. The side does not much matter: in Turkey they press for disengagement from NATO and in Syria they terrorize Soviet technicians.

Cooperation with a superpower is tactical only: the fundamentalists' long-range goals differ too profoundly for common purpose with the Christian rulers of America or the atheists of Russia. The issues contested by these two countries are irrelevant to the fundamentalists' goal of applying the Islamic sacred law. Their aligning with a superpower is like Americans cooperating with Communist China against the Soviet regime. Both these coalitions are forged reluctantly and for specific goals, without expectations of friendship.

This inclination toward disengagement notwithstanding, fundamentalist Muslims usually see themselves more threatened on the international level by the United States. In their eyes, Washington more often appears to stand in the way of Muslim independence. Ironically, for it was instrumental in the post-World War II decolonization by Great Britain and France, the United States has

inherited their imperial mantle. Despite Russian rule over fifty million Muslims in Central Asia, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet control of South Yemen, and the evident Soviet interest in controlling Iran and the Persian Gulf, fundamentalist Muslims see U.S. power as the greater threat.

Iran is a case in point. Although the leaders of Iran wish to avoid aligning with either great power (as their slogan "Neither East nor West" indicates), they maintain somewhat better relations with the Soviet Union. Despite the much greater threat to Iran posed by the Soviet Union along their long common border, Khomeini and his followers vent their fury less against it than against the U.S. Blaming almost every problem in Iran on America, from traffic jams to the shah's death, from drug addiction to Iraq's decision to go to war, leaves little attention for the USSR. In the fundamentalists' view, the Russian record of aggression against Iran over the past 250 years pales in comparison with what they see as the U.S. role in the 25 years before Khomeini's revolution. According to Khomeini, the U.S. put the shah in power in 1953 and kept him there; during those years he was an agent or puppet of the American government. In effect, Khomeini argues, the U.S. occupied Iran in that period. The Soviets may loom across a long border but many in Iran believe the Americans were already within and want to return. Khomeini sees it as his duty to lead Iran away from American occupation (not Soviet) and back to Islam.

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDAMENTALIST MUSLIMS IN U.S. POLICY

Muslim countries can be divided into three sorts: those with governments friendly to the U.S., those backed by the USSR, and those neutral.

Governments Friendly to the U.S.

A dilemma confronts the United States whenever friendly governments face major fundamentalist opposition. The U.S. is tempted to assist them, but the more aid they accept, the more vulnerable they are to fundamentalist accusations of selling out to Washington. Often referred to as the "kiss of death," the problem of contamination by association is especially delicate in the Muslim world (where it plagues the Soviet Union no less than the United States).

This dilemma is compounded by the fact that leaders of Muslim countries are sometimes blind to the dangers of fundamentalist reaction. The shah of Iran became far too closely associated with the U.S. for his own good; likewise with Sadat. As secularist and reformist Muslims, these leaders were so oriented to the West, they underestimated the power of fundamentalists. Their cases demonstrate that non-fundamentalist Muslim leaders cannot be left on their own to judge what is the appropriate relationship with the U.S. This is, rather, something Americans must decide.

In assessing relationships with friendly Muslim countries, a key factor is the conspicuousness of the American connection. Fundamentalists attack only what they know about. The import of wheat prompts less animosity than the import of films and clothes. American soldiers isolated from indigenous populations pose less of a problem than the same soldiers stationed in cities. Quiet political cooperation provokes less opposition than open declarations of support at an international forum. Caution must be exercised not to take steps that will unnecessarily make America the focus of the fundamentalists' anger. Strong relations need not have a high profile; indeed, they can be almost invisible.

The determination of fundamentalists to gain power makes it virtually impossible for them to be co-opted. Like Communist parties, they often use others (as in Iran) and are hardly ever used themselves. Fundamentalists make dangerous allies and the U.S. should discourage its friends from bringing them into the government. Similarly, it does not want them to satisfy fundamentalists by applying the Shari'a; the record shows that whenever a non-fundamentalist (like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan) tries to win their support by resorting to Islamic law, they still distrust him. And to the extent that he does apply the law, the result is an upsurge of repression, instability, and anti-Americanism.

The adoption of fundamentalist programs creates two sources of tensions with the United States. First, Americans have difficulty supporting a government that flogs alcohol drinkers, cuts the hands off of thieves, and stones adulterers. These practices are abhorrent to Western morals and create ill will on the U.S. side. Second, the imposition of Islamic law strengthens some of America's most profound antagonists, creating a dynamic that usually sours relations. For these reasons, the U.S. should in every case strenuously oppose the imposition of a fundamentalist program in friendly countries. Although fundamentalist Islam is preferable to totalitarian ideologies, it is worse than almost any other political program.

Similarly, the United States itself should not assist fundamentalist movements that oppose friendly governments. Contact with them is necessary, of course, to understand their views and to monitor their influence, but no assistance should be provided to them.

Among the friendly governments under attack by fundamentalists, Morocco faces the greatest danger. King Hasan II has aligned himself so conspicuously with the U.S. that fundamentalists appear credible when they point to him as an agent of Washington. His arms come from the U.S., he takes steps to win Jewish support in the U.S., and he makes no secret that U.S. intelligence services operate in Morocco. That the U.S. is represented in Rabat by a flamboyant American ambassador only makes matters worse.

Egypt today hosts the largest United States embassy staff anywhere in the world and the embassy is building a high-rise to house all its activities. Formerly, the largest embassy was the one in Teheran. Need one say more?

In the Sudan, the U.S. has become far too closely associated with the regime of Ja'far an-Numayri. As he applies the Islamic law, the U.S. should distance itself from him by a reduction of arms, economic aid and political support.

On the surface, Turkey appears to be a steady ally of West Europe and the NATO alliance; in fact, there is significant pressure, from fundamentalists and others, to move away from a Western orientation and to drop commitments to the Atlantic Alliance. Although weaker now than in the mid-1970s, these sentiments are by no means dead.

In Saudi Arabia, the regime is torn. It wishes to strengthen military ties with the U.S. but fears the political ramifications. The presence of many American technicians and military personnel in the kingdom makes this issue all the more sensitive.

In Pakistan, emphasis on Islam does help relations with the United States to the extent that it complements Zia-ul-Haq's position of helping the Afghan rebels and facilitates the acceptance of U.S. aid against the Soviet-backed government. But it also spurs opposition forces to unite, strengthening both radical anti-American forces, fundamentalist (the Jami'at-i Islami) and leftist (the PPP).

Governments Backed by the USSR

As for Muslim fundamentalists opposing governments allied with the Soviet Union, the U.S. is tempted, naturally, aid to anyone against the governments in Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan. But aid to fundamentalists must be given, if at all, with extreme caution and with a full understanding of the dangers involved. It can inadvertently make fundamentalism the only alternative to communism by strengthening the two extremes against the middle. Moderate forces tend to get squeezed out between Soviet clients and fundamentalist Muslims. Assistance to build up fundamentalist forces even for the short-term must be executed with extreme caution, lest those whose views most closely correspond to America's are destroyed. Fundamentalist Muslim groups should receive U.S. aid only when two conditions are met: (1) the government they oppose creates major problems for the U.S. and (2) they are the only non-communist groups available to support.

Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan all meet the first criterion. But Libyan fundamentalists do not meet the second, for they are only a minor element in the opposition to Qadhafi's regime. American aid should therefore go only to the non-fundamentalist opposition. In Afghanistan, too, the second condition is not met. Non-fundamentalist mujahidin groups are active both in the fighting in Afghanistan and in the refugee politics in Pakistan and they deserve military, political, and financial support from the United States.

In Syria, however, the second condition is met. Fundamentalist groups such as the Muslim Brethren lead the opposition to the regime of Hafiz al-Asad. They have, furthermore, repeatedly proven their determination and resourcefulness. There being no moderate force to support, Syrian fundamentalists should receive U.S. aid.

Neutralist Governments

The U.S. can try to eliminate the bias of fundamentalists by emphasizing the greater threat posed by the Soviet Union. Little can be done about the cultural and ideological challenges presented by the United States to fundamentalists. But they can be convinced that the perception of the U.S. as an imperial power is wrong--that this description really fits the Soviet Union. Fundamentalists should be often reminded that Russians rule fifty million Muslims in Central Asia, that Moscow controls South Yemen as a neo-imperial power, and that the USSR is expanding its empire through the brutal invasion of Afghanistan.

This approach should be effective even with regard to Iran, the outstanding neutralist government in which fundamentalists play a powerful political role. Exactly how the Soviet Union threatens the independence of Iran needs to be brought out in detail by the U.S. government.

CONCLUSION

Fundamentalist Muslims share with the United States a hostility toward Marxism and the Soviet Union. This tends, however, to be more than cancelled out by an even greater hostility toward liberalism and the United States. Tempting as it is to ally with fundamentalists against Moscow, it is hardly ever possible. Fundamentalists are to be avoided except in the rare situations where they alone are available to be supported in opposition to the Soviet Union.

Daniel Pipes*
Visiting Fellow

* Daniel Pipes is a lecturer in history at the Harvard University Center for Middle Eastern Studies.

APPENDIX 15

BIOGRAPHIES OF WITNESSES

FOUAD AJAMI

Professor Fouad Ajami is Director of Middle East Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University. Prior to this appointment he taught at Princeton University, in the Department of Politics from 1974-1980.

In 1973-1974, he was a James P. Warburg Fellow at Princeton University.

In 1975, he was awarded a Fellowship by The Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton.

In 1978-1979 he was a Research Fellow of the Lehrman Institute in New York City.

He is the author of "*The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought Since 1967*" and other works.

In 1978 he served as a Foreign Affairs Columnist for The New York Times. His essays have appeared in The New York Times Book Review; Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The Nation, The New Republic, Harper's Magazine, al Anba', and other forums.

In 1979 he was awarded The Philip Lindsley Bicentennial Preceptorship by Princeton University for "excellence in scholarship and teaching."

In July 1982, he was awarded the five-year MacArthur Price Fellowship, an award granted to "individuals of exceptional talent" in the arts and sciences, in recognition of their work. His work on Middle Eastern politics and culture was cited by the MacArthur Committee.

He was born in 1945 in Arnoun, a small village in Southern Lebanon.

DR. SHAHROUGH AKHAVI

Dr. Shahrough Akhavi is professor of government and international studies at the University of South Carolina in Columbia, South Carolina. He also is the Middle East editor of SUNY University Press in Albany and the book review editor of the Journal of Iranian Studies. His publications include "Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran" (State University of New York Press. 1980).

HERMANN FREDERICK EILTS

CURRICULUM VITAE

Position: Boston University, Distinguished University Professor of International Relations, 1979-present. Director, Center for International Relations, 1982-present. Chairman, Department of Political Science, 1982-present.

Previous position: Foreign Service Officer. Career Minister.

Date and place of birth: March 23, 1922; Weissenfels/Saale, Germany.

Personal history: Immigrated to the United States in 1926 with parents. American citizenship obtained in 1930 through derivation from father.

Martial status: Married to former Helen Josephine Brew. Two sons: Conrad Marshall Eilts, Frederick Lowell Eilts.

Education

Primary and secondary schools, Scranton, Pennsylvania. Ursinus College, Collegeville, Pennsylvania, 1939-42, B.A. (with distinction). Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Massachusetts, 1942. School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., 1946-47, M.A. (with distinction). Foreign Service Institute, Washington, D.C., 1950, Arabic and Middle East Studies.

University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1951-52, Middle East Studies. Dropsie College, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1951-52, Middle East Studies, National War College, Washington, D.C. 1961-62, Diploma (with distinction). Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 1972, Diploma (with distinction).

Military Service: United States Army, 1942-46, First Lieutenant, Military Intelligence, North African and European Theatres of Operation.

Military decorations: Purple Heart, Bronze Star, Seven European/North African Campaign Stars.

Professional service

United States Ambassador to Egypt, Cairo, Egypt, 1973-79.

Deputy Commandant and Diplomatic Adviser, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1970-73. United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Jidda, Saudi Arabia, 1965-70. Counsellor and Deputy Chief of Mission, Charge d'Affaires, American Embassy, Tripoli, Libya, 1964-65.

First Secretary, American Embassy, London, England, Political Officer handling all Middle East and Cyprus Affairs, 1962-64. Department of State, Washington, D.C., Officer-in-Charge, Arabian Peninsula and Near Eastern Regional Affairs, 1960-61. Department of State, Washington, D.C., Officer-in-Charge, Baghdad Pack (CENTO)/SEATO Affairs, 1957-59. Second Secretary, American Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, Chief of Political Section, 1954-56.

Consul and Principal Officer, American Consulate, Aden, Arabia (concurrently accredited as Second Secretary to non-resident American Legation, Taiz, Yemen, and American Consul, British Somaliland), 1951-53. Third Secretary, American Embassy, Jidda, Saudi Arabia, economic and political work, 1948-50. Third Secretary, American Embassy, Tehran, Iran, consular and administrative work, 1947-48. Joined Foreign Service through examination process, July 1947. Member of United States' delegations to various international conferences (UN, NATO, CENTO, SEATO, US/Egyptian/Israeli meetings, including the Camp David Summit).

Professional honors

Author S. Fleming Award for Distinguished Government Service, 1953. Department of the Army, Distinguished Civilian Service Decoration, 1972. Ursinus College, Alumni of the Year Award, 1974. Department of State, Distinguished Honor Award, 1979. Joseph C. Wilson Award, 1979. Egyptian Collar of the Nile, First Class, 1979. Johns Hopkins University, Distinguished Alumnus Award, 1980.

University honors

Ursinus College, LL.D., 1959. Boston University, LL.D., 1978. Dickinson School of Law, LL.D., 1978. Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt, Ph.D., 1979. Juniata College, L.H.D., 1980. Baltimore Hebrew College, L.H.D., 1983.

Membership in professional organizations

Royal Geographic Society, Fellow. Royal Asiatic Society, Fellow. Royal Society for Asian Affairs, Fellow. Middle East Institute, Member. Pennsylvania Historical Society, Member. Essex Institute, Salem, Massachusetts, Member. Peabody Museum, Sa'em, Massachusetts, Fellow.

American Foreign Service Association, Member. Council on Foreign Relations, Member. Middle East Studies Association of North America, Member. Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs, Member. The Shaybani Society of Muslim International Law, Member. Institute of Yemeni Studies, Member. The American Academy of Diplomacy, Founding Member.

Professional activities

American University in Cairo, Board of Trustees. Sultan bin Qaboos bin Said Research Center, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., Member, Advisory Committee. Ursinus College, Member, Board of Directors. Middle East Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, Member, Development Advisory Committee.

American-Arab Affairs Council, Member, Diplomatic Advisory Committee. Strategic Review, Member, Editorial Board. National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, Member, Advisory Committee. Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, Faculty Associate.

American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies, President. Dewey F. Bartlett Program, Energy and Security Studies for the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Georgetown University, Member, Executive Council, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Villanova University, Associate Editor. American Institute for Islamic Studies, School of International Service, The American University, Member, Advisory Council.

Publications

"Ahmad bin Na'aman's Mission to the United States in 1840: The Voyage of al-Sultanah to New York City," 1942 (third printing) in both English and Arabic.

"Savvid Muhammed bin 'Aqil of Dhufar: Malevolent or Maligned?," 1973.

"Security Considerations in the Persian Gulf," "International Security," Fall 1980, Vol. 5, No. 2.

"Saving Camp David: Improve the Framework," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1980-81, No. 41.

"150 Years of Friendship and Commerce," A Sesquicentennial Commemoration between the United States and Oman, United States Information Agency publication, 1983, in both English and Arabic; reprinted by The Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman as "Oman-U.S.A.: 150 Years of Friendship," 1983.

Numerous articles and book reviews.

Listed in

"*Men of Achievement*," 6th edition, International Biographical Centre, Cambridge, England.

"*Community Leaders and Noteworthy Americans*," American Biographical Institute.

"*The Blue Book*," 1976, St Martin's Press.

"*The International Who's Who*," 1984-85 and previous, Europa Publications, London, England.

"*Who's Who in the World*," 7th edition, 1985-86 and previous, Marquis.

"*Who's Who in America*," 43d edition, 1983-84 and previous, Marquis.

"*Who's Who in Government*," 3d edition, 1977-78 and previous, Marquis.

"*Who's Who in American Politics*," 1975-76, Marquis.

"*Personalities of America*," 3d edition, 1985, American Biographical Institute, Inc.

JOHN L. ESPOSITO

John L. Esposito is Professor of Religious Studies, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA. Professor Esposito has focused on the role of Islam in Muslim politics and society, travelling extensively from the Sudan to Indonesia. He has served as a consultant to the State Department and a lecturer at the Foreign Service Institute. His publications are: "Islam and Politics," "Voices of Resurgent Islam," "Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives," "Women in Muslim Family Law," and "Islam and Development".

AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON

CURRICULUM VITAE

Personal Information: Born: September 2, 1946, Brooklyn, New York. Social Security No. 078-36-2930. Married: Deanna Lampros, December 27, 1969. Son: A. Timothy Norton, Born January 18, 1973.

Degrees: BA magna cum laude (political science), 1974, University of Miami (Florida). MA (political science) 1974, University of Miami (Florida). PhD (political science) 1984, University of Chicago.

Experience: U.S. Military Academy—Associate Professor, Social.

Academic: Sciences Department, 1984-present. Assistant Professor, Social Sciences Department, 1981-1984. Old Dominion University (Virginia)—Adjunct Assistant Professor of Political Science, 1979-1980. Campbell College (North Carolina)—Course Professor in Political Science, 1978. University of Illinois-Chicago Circle Campus—Adjunct Assistant. Professor of Political Science, 1975-1977; and, Assistant Professor of Military Science, 1974-1978.

Military: Serving officer in the U.S. Army, 1967 to present. Present rank: Lieutenant Colonel. Highest military school attendance: Armed Forces Staff College (1979-1980). Last overseas assignment: Military Observer, U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (in South Lebanon), May 1980-June 1981.

Honors, Offices and Scholarships: Delta Theta Mu (Arts and Science Honorary), Phi Kappa Phi, Pi Sigma Alpha (Political Science Honorary), Senator, Academic Senate, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle Campus, 1975-1977; Invited Scholar, Scholar-Diplomat Seminar on Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State 1975; Political Science Fellowship, University of Chicago, 1976-1977; Fellow, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Elected 1977; and Regional Coordinator, Northeast Region, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, since 1982.

Professional Associations: American Research Center in Cairo; American Political Science Association; Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (1974-1977); International Institute for Strategic Studies; Middle East Studies Association; and University Seminar on the Middle East, Middle East Institute, Columbia University.

Languages: Arabic (Modern Standard and Levantine) and Spanish.

WILLIAM JOSEPH OLSON

Born 13 Aug. 1947. Dr. Olson received his Ph.D. in 1977 from the University of Texas, Austin. In 1977-78 he was the Leverhulme Post-Doctoral Fellow at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. In 1978-81 he was a University Fellow at the University of Sydney, Australia. In 1981 he became a research associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University. In 1982 he became a research analyst on Middle Eastern Affairs at the Library of Congress. In 1983 he became the senior Regional Security Affairs Analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College. Dr. Olson is the author of "Britain's Elusive Empire in the Middle East, Anglo-Iranian Relations During World War I," and numerous articles on the Iran-Iraq War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and on US policy in the Middle East.

GARY G. SICK

Gary G. Sick served on the National Security Council staff under presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan. He was the principal White House aide for Iran during the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis and is the author of "All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter With Iran" (Random House, 1985). He is a captain (ret.) in the U.S. Navy, with service in the Persian Gulf, North Africa and the Mediterranean. Mr. Sick, a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University, is at present with the Ford Foundation, where he is responsible for programs relating to U.S. foreign policy. He is adjunct professor of Middle East politics at Columbia University.




BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY



3 9999 00430 696 3

Boston Public Library

COPLEY SQUARE
GENERAL LIBRARY



The Date Due Card in the pocket indicates the date on or before which this book should be returned to the Library

Please do not remove cards from this pocket.

