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# THE WORKS

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# A TREATISE

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OF

*The primeval Estate of the first Man. Of the Manner how Sin found Entrance into, and is propagated in the World. Of the Nature of Sin. Of our first Servitude to it. Of that poor Remnant of Freewill left in the Sons of Adam, with Directions to use it aright, and how we are set free by the Son of God. Of Mortification. Of the right Use of Reason, or Rules of Art, for determining Doubts in Divinity, &c.*

IT was a very wise saying of one, who (if we may approve Julius Scaliger's censure of him) was none of the wisest doctors, *Tractare res humanas nōrunt plurimi, æstimare paucissimi*<sup>a</sup>. To attain unto a large measure of skill or cunning, whether in contriving or managing mundane or merely human affairs, is a matter more easy or more common, than to be able to set a just price or estimate, whether upon the things or works themselves, or upon the artificer's skill in contriving or working them. This maxim is altogether as true, and somewhat more improvable in businesses sacred, especially in such as have been heretofore handled in part, and come now to be further discussed. The first part of the KNOWLEDGE of JESUS CHRIST, and of him crucified, raised from the dead, &c., is a great deal more easily learned, than the second, unto which

The general contents or full scope of this whole work.

<sup>a</sup> Cardanus in lib. de Utilitate ex adversis capienda.

these present meditations are addressed. The first part of this heavenly knowledge consists principally in the display of the harmony between the prophetic and evangelical writings, or the parallels between matters of fact recorded in the Old Testament, and the events answering in proportion to them in the New, already exhibited, and further to be accomplished before the end of this world, or in the world to come.

2. The second part of the KNOWLEDGE of CHRIST consists in the true estimate or experimental valuation of his death and sufferings, of his resurrection from the dead, and exercise of his everlasting sacerdotal function. To this latter part of the knowledge of Christ and him crucified, &c., that knowledge which in philosophy or in other sciences we call *a posteriori*, that is, which we gather from the effect, or learn by experience, doth answer in a true kind of subproportion. Unto this second part of the knowledge of Christ somewhat more is required than hath been expressed in the former part; betwixt which and those scientific conclusions in sciences which we call *a priori* there is perfect analogy or correspondency; somewhat, or a great deal more, than such knowledge of God and of his providence, as most of the schoolmen or historians, whether ecclesiastical or secular, do present unto us.

The know-  
ledge of  
ourselves  
the best  
method to  
know God  
or Christ.

3. *Ut Deum cognoscas* (saith an ancient and pious father<sup>b</sup>) *teipsum prius cognosce*: we must learn to know ourselves before we can attain unto the true or perfect knowledge of God, whether as he is our Creator, our Redeemer, or our Sanctifier. And this true knowledge of ourselves hath a double aspect, the one unto the estate from which, the other unto the estate into which we are fallen. The chief, if not the only reason, why the Godhead or eternal Sonship of Christ Jesus

<sup>b</sup> Cyprian.

is, in this last age questioned, why his meritorious satisfaction for the sins of the world is by some flatly denied, is, because the parties this way peccant, or such as can with Christian patience or without disgust, read or hear their discourses, do not know themselves either in the individual, as they are mortal men, and tainted with many actual sins, or in the general, as they are the sons of Adam. They understand not the prerogatives that man had in his first creation above other creatures; nor yet trouble their thoughts how that which they and we call *sin* found first entrance into the world; how it hath been propagated throughout all mankind; or what be the special properties, the true effects, or power of it. Now without the knowledge or serious consideration of all these points, it is impossible for us, for any man, to take a true, much less a full or competent estimate of Christ's sufferings upon the cross; or of the efficacy of his resurrection from the dead; of the fruits of the Spirit, which he promised to all his followers, upon his ascension into heaven, and sitting at the right hand of God the Father.

## 3

## SECTION I.

*Of the first Man's Estate, and the Manner how he lost it. How Sin found Entrance into the World. Of the Nature of Sin. How it was, and is, propagated unto Adam's Posterity.*

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 CHAP. I.

*Of the primeval Estate of the first Man, and of the Variety of Opinions about it.*

More contention than contradiction about the first man's estate.

1. ABOUT the prerogatives or preeminences of the first man, over and above all others, which by natural descent have sprung from him, a great variety of opinions there is, more than is about the limitation or extent of the prerogative royal in most kingdoms Christian, as now they stand. But the several opinions contained within this great and spacious variety, concerning the estate or prerogatives of the first man, are (in my opinion) very compatible: few or none of them contradict others. And it is the part of divines by profession, not to sow any seeds of contention between the authors or abettors of several opinions, which in their nature imply no contradiction. Yea in times ancient and impartial, it hath been accounted one special part of priests or professed divines, to solicit or mediate for compromise between parties at difference, whether in matters civil or criminally capital; much more to endeavour for reconciliation of opinions or controversies properly belonging to their own profession.

2. Now it is confessed by all good Christians, that the first man was made in or according to the image



of God which made him. But wherein this image of God, or the live copy of it exhibited in the first man, did properly or chiefly consist, is a problem wherein many good writers, both ancient and modern, do somewhat vary. Some would have the prerogatives, which did result from the likeness of God imprinted upon the first man, to consist principally in that power or dominion which he had over all other visible or sublunary creatures. But though it be true of these present times as it was of former, that *dominium non fundatur in fide, id est*, kings and supreme governors have their right of dominion over their subjects or inferiors, albeit such kings and governors have not at any time been true Christians, or have degenerated from such Christian faith as they have sometimes professed or maintained; yet without all controversy, that sovereignty or dominion which the first man had over all other visible creatures, was founded upon that integrity of soul, or righteousness inherent, which he lost. Since the first man and his successors became corrupt in all their ways, that primeval dominion which the first man had, did cease by degrees to be so entire as once it was: nor is there any hope to have it fully restored unto any sovereignty, or private members of any sovereignty or kingdom in this life: nor are all they, which well agree in this general, ‘That the first man’s similitude with his Maker did radically and punctually consist in righteousness and integrity of soul and body,’ at so fair accord among themselves, wherein this righteousness or integrity did properly or formally consist, or of what rank or order it was.

## CHAP. II.

*Wherein the Righteousness of the first Man did consist.*

Original  
righteous-  
ness no su-  
pernatural  
grace.

1. MANY great divines or doctors heretofore have been, and some, or rather many, to this day there be, who peremptorily determine, and would persuade others, either by their authority or by reason, to believe, that the righteousness of the first man did formally consist in a peculiar grace, supernatural even to him. If this opinion were true, the same grace should have been more than supernatural to his successors; supposing that they continued by natural propagation, in the same state and condition wherein the first man was created. To maintain this opinion, ‘That the righteousness or integrity of the first man did consist in a supernatural grace,’ the Romish church (specially since the publishing of the canons of the Trent council) is deeply engaged. For unless this *postulatum* or supposition be granted, many dogmatical resolutions which the whole Christian world is by the Romish church bound to believe *sub pœna anathematis*, that is, under penalty of that church’s solemn curse or everlasting damnation, cannot possibly, or with any mediocrity of probability, be maintained. The points of belief which from this *postulatum* or supposition—‘That the righteousness wherein the first man was created was a grace supernatural’—might with some probability be maintained, are principally these :

Of the in-  
conveni-  
encies  
which will  
follow upon  
the affirma-  
tive opi-  
nion.

2. First, that sin which we and the Romish church call *original* should be no more than a mere privation of original justice, that is, of that image of God wherein the first man was created. But the ingenuous reader will perhaps demand—what further inconvenience will follow upon the yielding or granting of the former

*postulatum* or supposition unto them? This in the second place; That Adam's successors, whether immediate or intermediate unto the world's end, should have a greater measure of that which they call *liberum arbitrium*, or *freewill*, than the word of God doth acknowledge, or any ingenuous man, that will subjugate his reason to be regulated by the written word, or ancient rules or canons of faith, can allow or approve. This deduction following is clear by rules of reason, viz. 'If the righteousness of the first man did consist in a grace supernatural, or in any quality additional to his constitution, as he was the work of God; this grace or quality might have been, or rather was lost, without any real wound unto our nature; or without any other wound than such as the freewill, or right use of reason, or other natural parts, (which after the loss of this supposed supernatural grace or quality were left,) might instantly have cured, or yet may cure.' Or in other terms (more scholastical perhaps) thus: 'If the integrity or righteousness of the first man were lost only *demeritoriè*, by way of demerit, without any physical or working cause of its expulsion, or without any wound made in our nature by such positive cause; the same righteousness which the first man had, might have been regained by the right use of reason which was left unto him, or of those natural faculties which he had *pro prima vice* abused.' From these premises the necessary consequence will be this: That the satisfaction of our Lord Christ for sin (original at least) had been superfluous. And according to this tenet, the opinion of the Socinians would be more tolerable and more justifiable than the doctrine of the Romish church, so far as it concerns the value or efficacy of Christ's sufferings, or satisfaction by his merits, or justification by works, rather than by faith, especially works of the

moral law, or observance of those two great commandments, *To love God above all, and our neighbours as ourselves*: or of that other, *Whatsoever you would that men should do unto you, even so do unto them*.

3. Lastly, if all or any of these opinions were granted to the church of Rome, we of reformed churches should be concluded to yield, that Adam's posterity, or as many of them as are or shall be justified, were to be formally justified by inherent righteousness; that is, they have, or might challenge absolution, from the first sentence denounced against Adam, by way of legal plea or satisfaction. The deduction or remonstrance of this demonstrative inference is clear to any artist, to any reasonable man, unless his reason be overgrown by faction, or by mingling of passions with his understanding. The remonstrance of this demonstrative inference is thus: it is *in confesso*, and more than so, an undoubted maxim, subscribed unto by the church of Rome, that the grace which is infused by and from our Lord Jesus Christ is a supernatural quality, or a qualification more sovereign than the first grace which God the Father bestowed upon the first man. Now, if that grace were a superaddition to his nature or constitution, as he was the work of God, the loss of this grace or quality could not have made any wound in the human nature, which the least drop of that grace which daily distilleth from the second Adam might not more than fully cure; yea, such grace would sublimate our nature so cured unto an higher pitch or fuller measure of righteousness than that which was bestowed upon our father Adam. In respect of these and many other reasons which might be alleged, all such congregations or assemblies of Christian men, as have departed, or have been extruded out of the Romish church, stand deeply engaged to deny that the



righteousness of the first man was a grace or quality supernatural.

## CHAP. III.

*Whether original Righteousness were a Quality natural, or a mean betwixt natural and supernatural.*

1. To affirm that the righteousness wherein the first man was created was a gift rather natural than supernatural, would be no solecism; no assertion any way more incongruous, than many resolutions of the Roman doctors in like cases are; no grosser blemish or deeper impression than might easily be salved or wiped off with that distinction usual amongst them, in other the like or rather the same cases—That the righteousness wherein Adam was created was natural, *quoad terminum productum, non quoad modum productionis*;—a natural endowment in respect of the essential quality produced, albeit the manner of producing it were somewhat more than supernatural. But this is a dispute which for the present shall be waved, because the original difference betwixt us and them may be more punctually stated, and the questions dependent on it may be more clearly resolved from these *postulata*, or presumed maxims: first, ‘that God did make the first man after his own image;’ secondly, ‘that the first man being so made was righteous and just.’ Neither of these are denied by any. The state of the original controversy unto such as are disposed to have it plainly propounded in constant or unfleeting terms, is thus: ‘Seeing man was made after the image of God, and being so made, was just and righteous; whether there were two works of God, or two distinct effects of his work of creating the first man in righteousness and in his own image: and whether the one of them was terminated to his own image imprinted in

The true state of the question proposed.

man, and the other to his original justice.' If these two expressions made by Moses of *God's image* and *man's righteousness*, express or include no more than one and the same work of God, or effect of his work in man; the loss of original justice, or defacing of God's image enstamped upon him, was more than a mere privation, and necessarily presupposeth a positive cause in our first parents, and a positive effect wrought by that cause whereunto the privation of original justice was concomitant, or rather consequent. Whatsoever controversy may be moved concerning the cause or manner how this effect was wrought, the effect itself was a deadly wound in our nature; a multitude of wounds, all by nature, or any endeavour of nature or performances of such freewill as was left to mankind after these wounds were once made, altogether incurable, without the help or assistance of better grace or endowments than were bestowed upon the first man. The cure of these wounds wholly depends upon that grace whose being and bestowing the second Adam did merit from the Father of lights, or from the divine nature or Deity.

2. To win the assent of every rational Christian man unto the former part of this determination—'That original justice did consist in that image of God wherein the first man was created, and did not imply any other work of God, whether precedent or consequent, besides the special work of his creation'—no other argument is either necessary or so available, as the taking of the words of Moses, where he describes the manner how the first man was created, into serious consideration. For original justice had more essential dependence upon the image of God in man, than rotundity hath with a sphere, or globosity with a globe. Now in the making of a sphere or body perfectly round,

there be not two works, nor two distinct effects of the artificer's skill ; one in making a round body, another in making rotundity. And it is a grosser solecism in divinity to say or think, that the image of God in man was one work of God, and original justice another, than it would be to maintain that the rotundity of a sphere, and the sphere, are two works of the same hand, severally intended by the artificer which makes the sphere.

3. To evince the latter part of the former assertion—Original sin more than a mere privation. ‘ That original sin is more than a mere privation, more than a mere want of original justice, a multiplicity of wounds or diseases in our nature’—any man living, which hath so much memory or reason as to reflect upon his own disposition or untowardliness in his childhood, or skill to contemplate the estate or condition of poor infants, will easily subscribe unto that great Roman naturalist's<sup>c</sup> judgment or observations, in his preface to the seventh book of his Natural History, to be insisted upon hereafter, when we come to treat of the symptoms or properties of sin original. The next inquiry, according to the method proposed, is, How sin did enter into the world ?

## CHAP. IV.

7

*Of the Manner how Sin found Entrance into the Works of God, and did seize upon all Mankind, the Man Jesus Christ only excepted.*

1. THE highest offer of any which I have read, for the resolution of this problem, is that inquisition made by some schoolmen, *An dari possit creatura impeccabilis*, so they render the Greek *ἀναμάρτετος*. The problem in distinct and plain English is thus—‘ Whether No creature from the first moment of its creation was altogether impeccable.

<sup>c</sup> Pliny.

it be possible, according to the rules of reason, that any created substance should be from its creation totally secured or absolutely freed from all possibility of falling into sin? Some of the ancient and most orthodox fathers of the church, as their opinions are alleged by some schoolmen, stand for the negative part of this problem, to wit, 'That it is not possible for any mere creature to be from the moment or first time of his creation altogether impeccable, or secured from all possibility of falling into sin.' But whether the reasons or expressions of these ancient fathers will reach home, or amount unto the tenents of such schoolmen as avouch not only their reasons, but authority, is not so clear but that the discussion, whether of their authorities, meanings, or expressions, might breed more quarrels than the schoolmen have already begun. However, the disputes already moved about this point must in the first place be restrained to mere creatures rational, that is, to angels and men. The rational creature, or Son of man, who is likewise the Son of God, must be exempted from this inquiry. And this additional must in the second place be admitted: 'Whether it were possible that any man or angel could be perpetually freed from all possibility of falling into sin, and have been withal from the first moment of his creation intrinsically just and righteous?'

2. That men and angels might (by the power of God, or special contrivance of his providence) have been secured from all possibility of falling into sin, is a position amongst rational men unquestionable; but it is not so, whether men or angels being so secured from all possibility of sinning could have been intrinsically or formally righteous, or by the eternal rules of justice and equity itself truly capable of everlasting punishments or torments, or of joy and happiness everlasting. The



negative part of this problem is in my judgment far more probable than the affirmative. For if the first man, or angels which fell, had been, either by the power of their almighty Creator, or by the undefeatable contrivance of his wisdom, absolutely freed from all possibility of sin, from the first creation unto this day, they could neither have deserved any great blame or praise by continuing after this manner righteous or conformable to the divine nature for integrity of life. The case of the first man, if he had lived to this instant without sin by such contrivance, or necessitating guidance of God's providence, had been the same, as if the child whiles his master leads his hand should write a fair copy, being otherwise unable to cast a letter aright when his master's hand should be taken off from his. Now if the child or young clerk should not in good time learn to cast his letters or draw his lines aright, he could not pretend any title to commendation or reward, how well soever his work were performed; the whole praise would of right belong unto the manuduction or guidance of his master. But if the young clerk, growing stronger, should disturb or wrest the hand of his guide awry, or not suffer him to rule his hand, as before he had done; by thus doing, he would deserve both blame and correction.

3. Our father Adam, in his first estate, had a great deal more power to regulate his own thoughts and actions by the ordinary guidance of God's providence, than a child hath either to cast his letters or draw his lines aright by the sight of a copy or ordinary direction of his master. Yet this same first man had a power withal to neglect the guidance or slight the directions of his Creator; a power much greater to do both these ways amiss, than a child hath to refuse or resist the manuduction of his writing-master. By the first woman's

ignorance or contempt, through her husband's negligence and inadvertence to that first and great commandment, which was given to both of them, *Of the tree in the middle of the garden ye shall not eat, &c.*, that which we call *original sin*, or the main root of all sins, found entrance into the visible world, that is, into the nature of man. The extract of what we have said, or have to say, concerning this point, is very well set down by St. Austin, and some others of the ancients— 'That the first man was truly endowed with a free-will or power, not to have sinned at all; that if he had used this power aright, or implored the assistance of his Creator in competent time for so using it, he should have been endowed with a perpetual immunity from sin;' that is, 'Albeit he was not from his creation either by nature or by supernatural endowment utterly impeccable; yet, by the assistance and benignity of his gracious Creator, he might have attained unto such a perpetual estate or immunity from falling into sin.'

The question about merit of works, no way concerns the first man in his primeval estate.

4. Suppose he had preserved or employed the talent concredited unto him at his first creation aright, should the superaddition or crowning of his first estate with perseverance have been a mere gift of grace, or rather a kind of merit? This is a question not very pertinently moved by some schoolmen, and the contradictory to their determination more inconsiderately maintained by some modern disputants or logical critics. For seeing Adam received that great talent concredited to him in his creation, not absolutely, or to use it as he pleased, but at his peril, or under express penalty, that if he misemployed it, or contemned his commandment which bestowed it upon him, he should die the death; it is no way improbable, that if he had improved his talent for some competent time, that the state wherein he was created should have been hereditary to him and his;

not by such free grace as is bestowed upon us under the gospel, but by the way of merit *de congruo*, though not according to commutative, yet to distributive justice, rather than by mere mercy or benignity. But this opinion I vent not with any intention to move or abet disputes or controversies already moved about this curious question; but rather persuade the reader, that all questions concerning the merits of works, or of perseverance in that grace by which all good works are wrought, must be reduced or confined to the estate or condition of mankind since Adam's fall. Of which question thus stated or limited, I shall, I hope, be able to give the reader, or any that will soberly dispute or confer with me in it, better satisfaction, *viva voce*, than this treatise without digression will permit me to do. The principal points in it, or which I had in my thoughts, either to prosecute or propose, are these following :

First, that albeit the first man were by virtue of the creation righteous and just, yet were neither his perseverance or non-perseverance in this righteousness absolutely necessary; both of them possible. That both were possible hath been declared at large both in the sixth book of Commentaries upon the Creed, unto which I refer the ingenuous reader, where he may find this proposition (as I take it) demonstrated<sup>d</sup>; 'That to decree or appoint a mutual or reciprocal possibility between our first parents' perseverance or non-perseverance was facible to the omnipotent Creator, because it neither implies nor presupposeth any contradiction *in terminis*.' And whatsoever effect or prenotation answerable unto it implies no contradiction either in itself or to the goodness of the divine nature or Deity, is facible by power omnipotent: that is, the almighty Creator

The first man was neither necessitated to continue good, nor to become evil.

<sup>d</sup> In part 2. sect. 2. chap. 13, &c. of the Attributes.

might have decreed, or yet may decree it when he pleaseth.

The second principle or supposition in this place to be handled, is, 'Whether the almighty Creator did *de facto* decree or ordain that neither the perseverance or non-perseverance of the first man, or of our first parents, should be absolutely necessary, but contingent.' Or, in other terms, thus; 'That the estate or condition wherein they were created might have continued to this day for them and their successors undefeatable.' That their perseverance, or the perseverance of their posterity in the state of righteousness wherein they were created, was not necessary by any divine ordinance or decree, is clear from the event; because the first man and the first woman did fall *de facto* from the estate wherein they were created; which neither of them could have done, if their first estate had been by virtue of the Almighty's decree, or any ordinance from him immutable or absolutely necessary. But can it be as strongly proved, that the fall of our first parents, or their eating of the forbidden fruit, did not proceed from any necessitating decree, or undefeatable contrivance of the almighty Creator's wisdom? To persuade men which have not their senses exercised in points of logical or scholastic disputes, that the fall of our first parents was not necessary, no, not in respect of the divine decree or ordinance, would be a harder task, than to prove that their perseverance was not in respect of that decree necessary. That our first parents did fall from their estate is a question of fact, of which every honest good man may be a competent judge, at least able enough to resolve himself. But whether it was as possible for them not to have fallen as it was to fall, is *quæstio juris*, or more than so, a point of metaphysical or theological disquisition,



wherein it would be very hard to find a grand-jury of professed divines in any one county almost throughout this kingdom, which could be competent judges or fit inquisitors: not that they want either skill or industry for interpreting sacred scripture, which is the only true rule of faith and manners, aright; but for want of skill or memory in secular arts, how to examine or determine what consequences or inferences are consonant or dissonant to the undoubted rule of faith, or to the unquestionable maxims contained in it. For deciding or waving such controversies as are emergent not so much out of the sense of scriptures, as out of such inferences or consequences (whether negative or affirmative) as contentious or unresolved spirits would fasten upon it, *recta ratio*, that is, reason regulated by rules of unquestionable arts or sciences, is the most competent judge. That there is but one God and one Lord—that the only God is a God of goodness, and willetth no wickedness—are positive points of faith and Christian belief, fundamental maxims in theology. To dispute or move any question directly about the truth or limitation of these maxims would be a branch of infidelity, or, which perhaps is worse, an approach to blasphemy.

## CHAP. V.

10

*Of the right Use of Reason, or Rules of Art for determining Controversies in Divinity, whereof the sacred Scripture is the sole Rule.*

I. BUT admit this maxim, ‘ There is but one God, and he a God of goodness, no author or abettor of evil, were undoubtedly believed by all, yet this inference or consequence might be (as it hath long time been) controverted, whether he that avoucheth, ‘ This only God to have decreed the fall of the first man to have been

Of the use of arts in discussing controversies in theology.

necessary or inevitable,' might be demonstratively convinced to make him the author and cause, the only cause of the first man's sin, and of all the sins which necessarily issue from it, or from the nature of man corrupted by it. For the full resolution of this question, the sacred scriptures are not the sole competent judge or rule. Nor doth the determination of it belong to the cognizance of such as are the best interpreters of sacred writ, for the true grammatical or literal sense of every proposition contained in it. This case must be reserved to the schools of arts, or to the certain rules of true logic and philosophy, which are the best guides of reason in all discursive faculties. But here I am engaged to do that which in other cases I have endeavoured to avoid; that is, to make repetition of two great problems in the science or faculty of theology, heretofore in their several places handled, and in some ensuing meditations to be hereafter inculcated. The first problem is, 'In what sense, or with what limitations, the scripture is held by all reformed churches to be the only rule of faith:?' the second, 'In what sense, or how far it is true, that *recta ratio*, reason rectified or rightly managed, may be admitted a competent judge in controversies belonging to the faculty of theology.'

2. To the first problem—'In what sense the scripture is held by us to be the sole and competent rule of faith and manners'—I have no more to say for the present, than hath been long ago published in the second book of these Commentaries upon the Apostles' Creed, sect. 1. ch. 11. The sum of all in that place delivered, is, to my best remembrance, this: No Christian is bound to admit or receive any doctrine or proposition as an article of his faith, unless it be contained in the Old or New Testament, either *totidem verbis*, or may be conclusively or demonstratively deduced

from some sacred maxim or proposition expressly contained in the canonical books in the Old and New Testament. Such maxims as are expressly and plainly contained in scripture, every Christian man is bound to believe absolutely. But such propositions or conclusions as may be demonstratively inferred from canonical unquestionable maxims, they are only bound absolutely to believe which have so much use of reason or skill in arts, as may enable them clearly to discern the necessity of the consequence, or concludent proof of the deduction. The ignorant or illiterate are only bound to believe such deductions conditionally, or to practise according to their teachers' instructions, with such reservation, or under such conditions, as have been expressed in the second and third book of these Commentaries<sup>e</sup>.

3. But what propositions, though expressly contained in scriptures, be negative or affirmative, universal, indefinite, particular, or singular; or how any or all of these be convertible, whether absolutely, by accident, or by contraposition; or how to frame a perfect syllogism out of them: these or the like are points which the Holy Ghost, who spake by the prophets and 11 other penmen of sacred and canonical writ, did never undertake or profess to teach. The discussion or determination of questions of this nature must be had from the rules of reason, sublimated or regulated by good arts or faculties. And for the bettering or advancing of natural reason in this search, the most learned or most sanctified Christian this day living, should be very unthankful to the only Lord his Redeemer and Sanctifier, if he do not acknowledge it as an especial branch of his all-seeing providence in raising up unto the world such lights of nature and guides

<sup>e</sup> See the second book, chap. 2. and 4. &c.

of reason, as Aristotle, Plato, and others of the ancient philosophers were. True reason in whomsoever seated, whether in the natural or regenerate man, unless it be advanced and guarded by such rules of arts as these sages of the old world have by God's providence invented or bettered, can be no fit judge, but being so advanced and guarded, is the most competent judge of controversies in divinity; of such controversies, I mean, as arise from consequences or deductions, made by way of use or application out of the uncontroverted maxims of sacred writ. And if we would sequester grammatical or rhetorical pride, and partiality to the several professions wherein respectively men glory, we might easily discern all or most of those unhappy controversies which have set the Christian world for these late years in combustion, to have been hatched, maintained, and nourished by such pretended favourites of the Spirit, as either never had faithfully learned any true logic, philosophy, or ingenuous arts, or else had utterly forgotten the rules which they had learned or heard, before they begun to handle controversies in theology, or entertain disputes about them.

Obliquity  
can have no  
other cause  
beside that  
which is the  
cause of the  
act whence  
it necessa-  
rily results.

4. The hypothesis, for whose clearer discussion these last theses have been premised, is this; 'Whether it being once granted or supposed, that the Almighty Creator was the cause either of our mother Eve's desire, or of her actual eating of the forbidden fruit, or of her delivery of it to her husband, or of his taking and eating it, though unawares; the same Almighty God must not upon like necessity be acknowledged to be the author of all the obliquities which did accompany the positive acts, or did necessarily result from them?' This is a case, or *species facti*, which we cannot determine by the rule of faith: it must be tried by the undoubted rules of logic, or



better arts. These be the only perspective glasses which can help the eye of reason to discover the truth or necessity of the consequence; to wit, 'Whether the Almighty Creator, being granted to be the cause of our mother Eve's first longing after the forbidden fruit, were not the cause or author of her sin?' Now unto any rational man that can use the help of the forementioned rules of arts, (which serve as perspective glasses unto the eye of reason,) that usual distinction between the cause or author of the act, and the cause or author of the obliquity which necessarily ensues upon the act, will appear at the first sight to be false or frivolous, yea to imply a manifest contradiction. For obliquity, or whatsoever other relation, can have no cause at all, besides that which is the cause of the habit, of the act or quality whence it necessarily results. And in particular, that conformity or similitude which the first man did bear to his Almighty Creator did necessarily result from his substance or manhood, as it was the work of God undefaced. Nor can we search after any other true cause of the first man's conformity to God, or his integrity, besides him who was the cause of his manhood, or of his existence with such qualifications as by his creation he was endowed with. In like manner, whosoever was the cause whether of his coveting or eating of the tree in the middle of the garden, was the true cause of that obliquity or crooked deviation from God's law, or of that deformity or 12 dissimilitude unto God himself, which did necessarily result from the forbidden act or desire. It was impossible there should be one cause of the act, and another cause of the obliquity or deformity, whether unto God's laws or unto God himself; for no relation or entity merely relative (such are obliquity and deformity) can have any other cause beside that which

is the cause of the *fundamentum*, or foundation whence they immediately result. It remains then that we acknowledge the old serpent to have been the first author; and man (whom God created male and female) to have been the true positive cause of that obliquity or deformity which did result by inevitable necessity from the forbidden act or desire, which could have no necessary cause at all. For the devil or old serpent could lay no absolute necessity upon our first parents' will, which the Almighty Creator had left free to eat or not to eat of the forbidden fruit. That they did *de facto* eat of it was not by any necessity, but merely contingently, or by abuse of that freewill which God had given them. Briefly, to say or think that our first parents were necessitated by the Divine decree to that act, or any part of that act or desire, whence the first sin did necessarily result, or to imagine that the act or desire was necessary in respect of God's decree, is to lay a deeper and fouler charge upon the Almighty, *that Holy One*, than we can, without slander, charge the devil withal.

5. Charity binds me to impute the harsh expressions of some good writers and well-deserving of all reformed churches, yea, the errors of the Dominicans or other schoolmen, (which were more faulty than Zwinglius or his followers in this point,) rather unto incogitancy, or want of skill in good arts, than unto malice, or such malignancy as the Lutheran long ago had furiously charged upon the Calvinist, as if they had chosen the devil, not the Father of lights, maker of heaven and earth, to be their God. And I could heartily wish that Pareus had not entered into that dispute with Becanus about this controversy: but seeing I cannot obtain my wish, I must be sorry that he came off no better than he did, especially for Calvin's credit, or for

Much wrong done to worthy writers by unskilful apologizers for their harsh expressions.

his own. I did not believe the relation of the conference which I read long ago in Canisius, until I read the like set forth by Pareus<sup>f</sup> himself, wherein he professeth that he likes better of cardinal Bellarmine's opinion than of Calvin's, concerning the controversies or questions about the first cause of sinning. But were it any part of my present task, I could easily make it appear, even by the testimony and authority, or, which is more, by the concludent arguments of some learned Jesuits themselves, that cardinal Bellarmine, and many others of Aquinas's followers, do make God to be the author of sin, by as clear infallible consequence as either Zwinglius or Piscator have done. And he that would diligently peruse Aquinas's writings, and in particular his resolution of that question, *An detur causa prædestinationis*, may find him as straitlaced as Calvin was; one and the same girdle would be an equal and competent measure for both their errors.

<sup>f</sup> Tum D. Serarius: Scimus vestros ita distinguere, quod non improbanus. Calvinus vero in scriptis suis omnem Dei permissionem in peccatis simpliciter rejicit: et opera malorum, etiam quoad malitiam, efficaciam Dei tribuit: atque sic Deum authorem peccati manifeste facit. Ego vero: Utrum hæc sit Calvinus sententia quam vos ei tribuitis, postea videbimus. Jam accipio, quod datis, nostros, quos *Calvinistas* vocatis, eo modo, quo dixi, distinguere; quodque distinctionem nostram non potestis improbare. Hinc vero evidenter conficitur, *Calvinistas*, quos vocatis, Deum peccati autorem nequaquam facere: ac proinde falsam esse D. Becani minorem, quod Calvinistæ faciant Deum autorem peccati: eoque et con-

clusionem esse calumniosam, quod Calvinistarum Deus sit Diabolus.

Ibi D. Serarius, pro ingenio suo intelligens nodum: Ergo, inquit, deleatur illud *-starum*: erit tamen Diabolus Calvinus, si non Calvinistarum Deus. Quo dicto D. Becanus subrubescens, cum socii ingenuitatem improbare non auderet, subjecit et ipse: Bene, deleatur *-starum*; manebit tamen Deus Calvinus Diabolus. Tum ego, dextra eis præbita, pro tanta liberalitate gratias agens, Satis mihi nunc est, inquam, quod fatemini, *-starum* delendum esse, ut jam non Calvinistarum, sed Calvinus Deus, secundum vos, sit Diabolus.—Pareus Act. Swalbacen. part. 1. coll. 2. de Autore Peccati.

The best apology that can be made for either must be taken from the Roman satirist's charity, *Opere in longo fas est obrepere somnum*. Calvin and Aquinas were *homines πολύγραφοι*, that is, somewhat more than authors of long works; authors of many various works in respect of the several subjects or arguments: which is the best apology that Jansenius could make for St. Jerom's contradicting of himself in several works, as Espenseus doth the like for St. Austin.

6. But of that pardon which learned men that wrote much and handled many much different matters may justly challenge, such as stand to be their followers (though afar off) are no way capable; men, I mean, who having other ordinary works or vocations to follow, do busy their brains and abuse their auditors or readers with idle and frivolous apologies for those slips or errors of worthy writers which stand more in need of ingenuous censure, of mild interpretation or correction, than a justifiable defence. More there have not been, as I hope, nor more peccant in this kind in any of reformed churches, than in this church of England, though not of it. Some treatises I have read and heard for justifying the escapes or ill expressions of Calvin and Beza, by improving their words into a worse and more dangerous sense than they themselves meant them in, or their followers in the churches wherein they lived did interpret them. Had these unscholastic apologizers been called to a strict account or examination of their doctrine by the rules of art, this haply would have bred a new question in our schools; 'Whether to attribute such acts or decrees unto God as they do, and yet withal to deny that they conclusively make him the Author of sin, doth not argue as great a measure of artificial foppery, or (which is more to be feared in some) of supernatural infatuation, as it



would do of impiety, to resolve dogmatically *in terminis terminantibus*, that God is the author of sin?

CHAP. VI.

*The usual Distinction between the Act and Obliquity of the Act can have no Place in the first oblique Act of our first Parents.*

1. THE former question or problem might justly be allowed in any academical act or commencement, albeit the answerer or defendant were furnished with no other grounds or occasions of his theses besides that usually avouched distinction between the act and obliquity of the act, specially if the distinction were applied unto the first sin of our first parents. In that sin, whether we refer it to our father Adam or to our mother Eve, the act and the obliquity are altogether as unseparably annexed, as rotundity or roundness is with a sphere or moulded bullet. And to imagine there should be one cause of the act, and another of the obliquity or sinfulness of the act, would be as gross a solecism, as to assign or seek after any other cause of the rotundity or roundness of a sphere or bullet, besides him that frames the one or moulds the other; or as it would be to inquire any other cause of the equality between two bodies before unequal, besides him that makes the quantity to be of one and the same size or scantling; or of the similitude between the fleece of a black sheep, and of a white sheep perfectly dyed black, besides the dyer. Now the similitude betwixt that which is perfectly dyed black and that which is black by nature, doth inevitably result from the dyer, without the intervention of any other cause imaginable. Easy it were to produce a volume of like instances in the works of nature, or of men's works and practices upon

The illustration of the fore-mentioned distinction retorted upon such as use it.

14 them; all of them concludently enforcing the resolution of the former problem to be allowable in schools, by most perfect and absolute induction, if arts or sciences were once so happy as to have none but true and accurate artists to be their judges. As indeed they are the sole competent judges in like cases, and judges they are within these precincts, as competent as the reverend judges of this or any other land are in causes civil, municipal, or criminal.

2. Admit then a man were found guilty of murder by a jury of his honest neighbours upon the authentic testimonies of two or three witnesses, which had seen him run his neighbour through the body in some vital part, or to cleave his head in two, and a philosopher or physician should undertake to arrest the judgment or make remonstrance to the judge, that the delinquent arraigned and convicted by the jury was not the true or immediate cause of the other's death, upon these or the like allegations out of his own faculty: 'That death properly consists in the dissolution of natural heat and moisture, whereas the party arraigned did never intend to make any such dissolution, or to terminate his action to the point of death, but only to thrust his sword through him, or to knock him in the head, which actions can have no direct term, besides the *ubi* or term of local motion.' Can we imagine that any judge could be so mild as not to censure such an apologizer for a saucy artificial fool, or a cracked-brained sophister? And yet this apology is not, cannot be in vulgar judgments so censurable of artificial folly as the former apology for salving the escapes, errors, or ill expressions of some learned and pious men, by nice distinctions betwixt the act and the sinfulness of it in our first parents' case, was. For there is not so immediate or so absolute or necessary con-



nexion between death and the deadliest wound that can be given to any man, as there is between acts peremptorily forbidden by the law of God and the obliquity or sinfulness of them. For there is not, neither is it possible there should be, any minute of time, or, which is less than the least part of a minute, any moment of time, betwixt such acts and the obliquity resulting from them. Both of them come together, both in respect of order of time and of nature, by absolute indispensable necessity : whereas between death and wounds given meritorious of capital punishment, there usually is a distance of time, and oftentimes no absolute or unpreventable necessity that the one should follow within a year and a day of the other.

3. But the best method to convince such as invented or used the former distinction, of gross error, and somewhat more than so, will be to retort their own illustrations or justifications of it upon themselves, as I have learned by successful experience upon some learned ingenuous students which have revoked their own opinions, and reclaimed others, upon the reading of my meditations upon this argument in another dialect. One of the most usual illustrations or intended corroborations of the former distinction is borrowed from a man that rides a lame or halting horse. Such a rider, say they, (especially if he ride with switch and spur,) is the cause why the horse goes or runs as fast as he can, but not the cause of his lameness or of his halting. Of his lameness—suppose he was lamed before—the rider, I confess, is no cause ; yet of his actual halting downright, or of the increase of the lameness which will follow upon the unseasonable riding or over-riding, he is the only cause. For if the poor beast might have rested his bones when he was enforced to trot or gallop, he would not have halted at all at that time, nor would

he have been so grievously lame as by such unseasonable usage he is. But this instance or illustration, 15 suppose it were not much amiss in respect of men now living, can no way suit or fit the question concerning the sin of our first parents. For Adam at his creation was no way lame or defective either in soul or body, before he tasted of the forbidden fruit. Now if the Almighty Creator had been the cause of this act, he had been as true a cause of the first sin, or of Adam's halting in his service, as he that bestrides a sound and lusty horse, and runs him upon the spur in a rugged and stony ground, or in a deep way, is of the lameness, of the death, or any disease which ensues such desperate riding.

Many commit more gross idolatry with their own fancies, than the heathen did with their idols.

4. To imagine that God should deal so hardly with the first Adam, as to give him a law which he intended to make him break, and yet to punish him with death for the breach of it; or that the second Adam, the Wisdom of God, should send wise men and prophets to Jerusalem, to the intent or end that she should stone or put them to death; or for this purpose, that their blood should in later days be required of her, (as some in our times have publicly taught,) is an imagination in itself much worse and more dangerous than the erection of images (though Romanwise) in reformed churches; a greater abomination than any idol of the heathens. For images or idols are but the external objects of or enticements unto gross idolatry. Nor was it the carpenter or statuary that did make the heathen gods or idols. Who then? *Qui colit, ille facit*;<sup>g</sup> he or they alone turn images or pictures into idols or false gods, which worship or adore them. But the former opinion or imagination, whether in respect of

<sup>g</sup> *Qui fingit sacros, auro vel marmore, vultus  
Non facit ille deos; qui colit, ille facit.*

God, as he was the first man's Creator, or of the Wisdom of God, as he is our Lord and Redeemer, is intrinsical and formal idolatry, or idolatry in the abstract, without any external object to dote upon, or to entice men to bestow worship upon it. The heathens committed idolatry in their temples or in their houses, but this idolatry is committed within his brain that entertains it: the essence of it formally consists in the reflection of the imagination upon itself, or in the complacency which men take in such reflections; if any man haply (which I much doubt) can be delighted with such imaginations. The very height of heathenish idolatry, as our apostle instructs us, Rom. i. 23, &c. did consist in *changing the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things.* Now if the Wisdom of God had sent wise men and prophets unto the Jews, unto the end that Jerusalem should be destroyed, and righteous blood required of them, his weeping over Jerusalem had better resembled or expressed the disposition of a crocodile, than the nature either of God or any good man. Nor was it greater idolatry in the heathen to change the glory of the uncorruptible God into the image or likeness of a crocodile, as the Egyptians did, than it is to ascribe the properties of this noisome beast, or any such disposition as the historical emblem of the crocodile doth represent, unto the Son of God, who came into the world, not to destroy or hurt, but to save sinners, and to be consecrated to be *the author of everlasting salvation to all that obey him*<sup>h</sup>. These two branches of idolatry—the one planted in the Egyptian, who worshipped the crocodile for his God; the other in such as worship or nourish such sinister imaginations (of the Son of God)

<sup>h</sup> Heb. v. 9.

as have been specified—differ no more than the way from Athens to Thebes doth from the way from Thebes to Athens.

The original occasion of the former errors or ill expressions.

5. The main head or source original whence all or most of the harsh expressions whether of reformed writers or of Roman catholics, whence all the aspersions which both or either of them indirectly, or by way of necessary consequence, cast upon our Lord Creator and Redeemer, naturally issue, is that common or fundamental error, that all things (the changes and chances of this inferior world not excepted) are necessary in respect of God, or of his irresistible decree; that nothing, not human acts, can be contingent, save only with reference to second causes. Now if there be no contingency in human acts, there neither is, nor ever was, nor ever can be, any freewill in man. The original of this common error, 'That all things are necessary in respect of the divine decree,' hath been sufficiently discovered in the sixth book of these Commentaries upon the Apostles' Creed, sect. 2. chap. 12, where the reader may find the truth of this proposition or conclusion clearly demonstrated: 'That to decree a contingency in some works or course of nature, in human acts especially, was as possible to him unto whom nothing is impossible, as it was to decree a necessity in some other works or courses of nature.' As for instance, to decree or constitute that our father Adam should have a free power or faculty either to eat or not to eat of the forbidden fruit, doth imply no contradiction; and therefore was absolutely possible to the Almighty Creator so to ordain or decree. But many things (as the observant reader will except) are possible, which are not probable, or never are brought into act. True; yet that the Almighty Creator did *de facto*, or actually, decree a mutual possibility of Adam's falling and not



falling, or between his fall and perseverance, hath been in this present treatise and in some others demonstrated from the article concerning the goodness of God or his gracious providence, by such demonstration as the case now in handling is capable of; that is, by evident deduction of the contradictory opinion to this impossibility, 'That God otherwise was the only cause of our first parents' sins, and of all other sins which necessarily issue from their sins; unless it be granted and agreed upon, that Adam's falling or not falling should both be alike possible; that neither should or could be necessary either to the first or second causes.' To deny that God did ordain or constitute a true and facible mean between the necessity of Adam's perseverance in the state wherein he was created, and the necessity of his falling into sin, i. e. a mutual possibility of falling or of not falling into sin, would imply as evident a contradiction unto or impeachment of his goodness, as it would do to his omnipotency, if any man should peremptorily deny that the constitution or tenor of such a decree were possible to his almighty power. To say God could not possibly make such a disjunctive decree, or such a tenor of mutual possibility betwixt things decreed, as hath been often mentioned, would be a gross error, yet an error, I take it, not so dangerous as to deny that he did *de facto* make such a decree. For our gracious Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier is doubtless more jealous to have his goodness impeached or suspected, than to have his almighty power questioned.

6. Thus much of the main general query, concerning the manner how sin (or that evil which we call *malum culpæ*) did find first entrance into the works of God, and in particular into the nature of man: from the first moment of whose creation, he and all the rest of God's



visible works had this eulogium or commendation, that they were *exceeding good*: no entrance of sin into the works of God, into man especially, was possible, without the incogitancy or inadvertency of a free cause or agent. The true nature of the first sin and of its heinousness did especially consist in this, that whereas our gracious Creator had endowed our first parents with a power or faculty to do well, exceeding well; and given them good encouragement to persevere in so  
 17 doing, they should so incogitantly and quickly abuse this power, and the divine concurrence or assistance that did attend it, to do that which was evil; that which the Lord their Creator had so peremptorily forbidden them to do, under commination of a dreadful punishment to ensue upon the doing of it. The difficulty or main query which remains (all that hath been said being granted) is principally this—‘How this one sinful act of our first parents could possibly produce a habit of sin, or that which is more than a habit, an unmovable custom of sin, or an hereditary disease of sinfulness throughout all the successions of the sons of Adam, to the world’s end.’ The second query (yet in the first place to be discussed) is this—‘Wherein the nature of that hereditary disease which we call *sin original* doth properly consist.’ The third—‘How this hereditary disease doth bring all mankind into a true and proper servitude to sin, and by sin unto Satan,’ &c. In the discussion of this and many other difficulties depending upon it, I shall endeavour to observe that rule which Chemnitius in many of his works hath commended to the observation of every student in divinity; and his rule is this: “To state all questions upon those places of scripture out of which they are naturally emergent, or out of those passages upon whose mistakings or non-observance of them many theological controversies

were first occasioned, and are to this day abetted or maintained with eagerness of dissension." To begin first with that most heavenly discourse of our Saviour, John viii. 30, &c.

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## SECTION II.

*Of the Properties or Symptoms of Sin Original, and of the Nature of Sin in general.*

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### CHAP. VII.

*Containing the State of the Controversy, or Debate betwixt our Saviour and the Jews, John viii. 30—36: "As he spake these words, many believed on him. Then said Jesus to those Jews which believed on him, If ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed; and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. They answered him, We be Abraham's seed, and were never in bondage to any man: how sayest thou, Ye shall be made free? Jesus answered them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin. And the servant abideth not in the house for ever: but the Son abideth ever. If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed."*

WHETHER that reply or saucy interruption, ver. 33—*We be Abraham's seed, and were never in bondage to any man: how sayest thou, Ye shall be made free?*—was made by those Jews whom our evangelist avouches did *believe on him*, ver. 30, or by some other bystanders, hath been discussed in a sermon lately delivered, which by God's assistance shall be annexed to the discussions following, which better befit the press or the schools than the pulpit. So that I

A para-  
phrase on  
John viii.  
34, &c.

18 must take my rise from our Saviour's rejoinder to that former saucy reply, ver. 34: *Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whosoever committeth sin &c.* The forecited sentence of Cyprian doth here again opportunely interpose itself: *Ut Deum cognoscas, teipsum prius cognosce*—"That thou mayest know God aright, first learn to know thyself." The advice is as true and fitting to our present purpose, *Ut Christum cognoscas, teipsum prius cognosce*: There is no better way or method to know Christ as he is in special our Lord God and Redeemer, than by knowing or understanding ourselves to be servants, and wherein that servitude consists from which we are redeemed. That we are by nature servants unto sin, you will require no further proof, nor can there any other be found better than our Saviour's own authority: *Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin.* The assertion is emphatical, and as peremptory as plain. But concerning the extent or limitation of it, there may be some question made, or scruple cast in; by the ordinary hearer or reader. For seeing—as Solomon long ago hath taught us *ex cathedra*—*there is no man that sinneth not*; and our apostle to like purpose, *If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and there is no truth in us*; then, if it be universally true which our Saviour here saith, *Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin*, the very redeemed of the Lord, the best of his saints here on earth, may seem concluded to be *servants to sin*; seeing he that sinneth doth commit sin. The argument is somewhat captious, and would be stronger, if *to commit sin* were a verb of the present tense, and were to be no further extended. But the word in the original is not a verb, but a participle of the present tense,  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \delta\ \pi\omicron\iota\omega\upsilon\nu\ \tau\eta\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$ , not  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \delta\varsigma \pi\omicron\iota\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \tau\eta\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$ : and participles of that form

(as every young student in the Greek tongue, ecclesiastic especially, well knows) are according to Hebraisms most frequent in the Greek Testament fully equivalent to Latin verbals. *Vinum appetere*, that is, *to call for a cup of wine*, any ordinary man may without impeachment to his sobriety, or censure of temulency; but to be *homo appetens vini*, is in the Latin tongue a full character or expression of a winebibber, or a drunkard. So that  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \delta\ \pi\omicron\iota\omega\nu\ \tau\eta\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\iota\alpha\nu$  is as much as if he had said in Latin, *operarius iniquitatis*, which is the best expression of the Hebrew פועל און. Not every one that committeth a sin, or more sins than one, but every one that is *a committer of sin*, or *a worker of iniquity*, is *the servant of sin*. And such all of us are by nature, and so continue until we be redeemed by the free grace of Christ from the dominion of sin and tyranny of Satan. But before we can come to know the manner how we are made free by the Son of God, we must (as it hath been intimated before) first know wherein our servitude to sin doth consist. And this we cannot well know without some prenotation, or description at least, of the properties or conditions of sin especially original. To omit the distinction of sins of omission and commission, there be of sin generally or indefinitely taken (I dare not say divers kinds, but) divers stems, roots, or branches. The first root of sin was the sin of the first man, which was both an actual and habitual sin in him; the second is sin original, which is more than an habit, an hereditary disease of our nature, altogether incurable, save only by the free grace of the Son of God. Over and above both these roots or stems, there be other branches, as some sins habitual, which are acquired or produced by such precedent actual sins as we freely and frequently commit,



without any necessity imposed upon us by the inhabitation of sin original in our nature.

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## CHAP. VIII.

*Of the Sin of the first Man, and of Sin Original which was derived from him: of Sins Actual, and the difference betwixt them. That of Sin Original the Heathens had a natural notion.*

1. CONCERNING the actual sin of the first man, and the habit which it produced in himself, I have not much more to say than hath been said before, to wit, that neither could have any necessary cause, but a cause contingent only, or a free agent. Nor is there (I take it) indeed any other cause of actual or habitual sins, *præter diabolum seducentem, et hominem libere consentientem*, that is, “besides the devil who still laboureth to seduce or tempt us, and man’s free consent or voluntary yielding to his temptations.”

2. Between sin original, which is the effect, and the sin of the first man, which was the cause of it, some have acutely observed this distinction<sup>k</sup>: “That the person of the first man by his sin corrupted our nature; and our nature being corrupted by him, corrupts all our persons that come by natural descent from him.” Unto which they add, “that every one of us by committing actual sin doth corrupt or pollute his person.” But whether any person besides our father Adam do or may by frequent commission of actual sins, without any necessity derivable either from our first parents’ sin or from the effect of it, which is sin original, corrupt or pollute the nature of such persons as lineally

<sup>k</sup> Vid. Locorum Theologicorum Compendium, pro Scholis Wratislaviensibus concinnatum.

Adam’s first sin did pollute our nature; our actual sins pollute our persons.



descend from him, is a point capable of question, and worthy of more accurate discussion than my abilities afford, or my years will permit me to bestow any long or serious studies in. Such as are or shall be disposed to handle this, or any of the former questions proposed, more exquisitely, must make their entrance into this search by the same plain way which I intend to follow; that is, to guess at the cause by the effect; or at the nature or essence of sin original, by the known properties or symptoms of it. And in this plain search an observant student shall hardly find such fair hints or good helps from the schoolmen, ancient or modern, as he may from some schoolboys, or at least from some good books which they usually read and better remember than the schoolmen do.

3. As for the substance or reality of that which we call original sin, though unknown to them by that name, and of our natural servitude to sin, a serious divine may find more solid and lively<sup>1</sup> expressions in

The pregnant testimonies of heathens, poets, naturalists, &c. concerning sin original.

<sup>1</sup> ..... Ingenium est omnium  
Hominum a labore proclive ad libidinem.—

*Terence, Andr. I. i. 50.*

Nec natura potest justo secernere iniquum,  
Dividat ut bona diversis, fugienda petendis.—

*Hor. Sat. I. iii. 113.*

Me trahit invitam nova vis; aliudque Cupido  
Mens aliud suadet. Video meliora, proboque;  
Deteriora sequor.—*Ovid. Metam. vii. 19.*

Quæ nocuere sequar; fugiam quæ profore credam.—

*Hor. Ep. I. viii. 11.*

parallel to that of St. Paul, Rom. vii. 21—23.

Nitimur in vetitum semper cupimusque negata:  
Sic interdictis imminet æger aquis, etc.—*Ovid. alibi.*

parallel to Rom. vii. 8, 9. Man's servitude to sin is well set down by Horace, lib. II. sat. 7. and in Persius, V. 75, &c. consonant to John viii. 34. And that in Pers. II. 61—

O curvæ in terras animæ, et cælestium inanes!  
Quid juvat hoc, templis nostros immittere mores,  
Et bona diis ex hac scelerata ducere pulpa?—

is parallel to Ps. l. 21: *Thou thoughtest wickedly that I was such an one as thyself.*

some heathenish naturalists, or in the Roman orator, or ancient Latin poets, than he can do in the great master of the sentences, in Aquinas, (though sainted as much for learning as for sanctity by the Romish church,) or in their followers, or such as comment upon their writings. And no marvel, if so it be, seeing the naturalist (as his profession leads him) hunts after the truth upon a fresh unfoiled scent, always insisting upon those which we call the *first notions*: whereas the schoolmen, the later especially, have been delighted to draw all doubts or queries about the most solid points in divinity, or matters most capable of philosophical expressions, into second notions or terms of art, or artificial fabrics of words; as if they meant to rend  
 20 or dissolve strong and well woven stuff into small and raveled threads; to entangle themselves and their readers in perpetual fallacies, *a rebus ad voces*. *Nitimus in vetitum semper, cupimusque negata*, was a good lesson which the facile Roman poet had not learned by hearsay or got by rote; but had got it by heart from a good instructor, as willing and ready to teach us as him; that is, from undoubted experience of his own or other men's dispositions or affections. This good poet, with some other of his profession, and other heathen orators or philosophers, have excellently observed, that the nature of man was farther out of tune or frame, had greater discord or contrariety of inclinations within itself, than the nature of any other living thing besides<sup>m</sup>. But unto the nature or reality of that which divines call *original sin*, the Roman naturalist, (Pliny I mean,) in his proeme to the seventh book of his Natural History, speaks most fully and most appositely. The passage is (for ought I know) well translated into our English; or, if ought be amiss, the Latin reader

<sup>m</sup> Isa. i. 3. Jer. viii. 7.

may correct or amend it by the Latin copy hereto annexed :

*Mundus, et in eo terræ, gentes, maria insignia, insulæ, urbes, ad hunc modum se habent. Animantium in eodem natura, nullius prope partis contemplatione minor est, si quidem omnia exsequi humanus animus queat. Principium jure tribuetur homini, cujus causa videtur cuncta alia genuisse natura, magna sæva mercede contra tanta sua munera: non sit ut satis æstimare, parens melior homini, an tristior noverca fuerit. Ante omnia unum animantium cunctorum, alienis velat opibus: cæteris varie tegumenta tribuit, testas, cortices, coria, spinas, villos, setas, pilos, plumam, pennas, squamas, vellera. Truncos etiam arboresque cortice, interdum gemino, a frigoribus et calore tutata est. Hominem tantum nudum, et in nuda humo, natali die abjicit, ad vagitus statim et ploratum, nullumque tot animalium aliud ad lacrymas, et has protinus vitæ principio. At hercules risus, præcox ille et celerrimus, ante quadragesimum diem nulli datur. Ab hoc lucis rudimento (quæ, ne feras quidem inter nos genitas) vincula excipiunt, et omnium membrorum nexus: itaque feliciter natus jacet, manibus pedibusque devinctis, flens animal cæteris imperaturum: et a supplicii vitam auspicatur, unam tantum ob culpam, quia natum est. Heu dementia ab his initiis existimantium ad superbiam se genitos! Prima roboris spes, primumque temporis munus quadrupedi similem facit. Quando homini incessus? quando vox? quando<sup>21</sup> firmum cibus os? quamdiu palpitanus vertex, summæ inter cuncta animalia imbecillitatis indicium? Jam morbi, totque medicinæ contra mala excogitatæ, et hæc quoque subinde novitatibus victæ. Cætera sentire naturam suam, alia pernecitatem usurpare, alia præpetes volatus, alia ire, alia nare: hominem scire nihil sine*



*doctrina, non fari, non ingredi, non vesci: breviterque non aliud naturæ sponte, quam flere. Itaque multi exstiterè, qui non nasci optimum censerent, aut quam ocissime aboleri. Uni animantium luctus est datus, uni luxuria, et quidem innumerabilibus modis, ac per singula membra: uni ambitio, uni avaritia, uni immensa vivendi cupido, uni superstitio, uni sepulturæ cura, atque etiam post se de futuro. Nulli vita fragilior, nulli rerum omnium libido major, nulli pavor confusior, nulli rabies acrior. Denique cætera animalia in suo genere probe degunt: congregari videmus, et stare contra dissimilia: leonum feritas inter se non dimicat; serpentium morsus non petit serpentes: ne maris quidem belluæ ac pisces, nisi in diversa genera, sæviunt. At hercules homini plurima ex homine sunt mala.*

“ Thus, as you see, we have in the former books sufficiently treated of the universal world, of the lands, regions, nations, seas, islands, and renowned cities therein contained. It remaineth now to discourse of the living creatures comprised within the same, and their natures: a point doubtless that would require as deep a speculation as any part else thereof whatsoever, if so be the spirit and mind of man were able to comprehend and compass all things in the world. And to make a good entrance into this treatise and history, methinks of right we ought to begin at man, for whose sake it should seem that nature produced all other creatures besides; though this great favour of hers, so bountiful and beneficial in that respect, hath cost full dear: inasmuch as it is hard to judge, whether, in so doing, she hath done the part of a kind mother or an hard and cruel step-dame. For first and foremost, of all other living creatures, man she hath brought forth all naked, and clothed him with the good and riches of others.



To all the rest given she hath sufficient to clad them every one according to their kinds: as, namely, shells, cods, hard hides, pricks, shag, bristles, hair, down, feathers, quills, scales, and fleeces of wool. The very trunks and stems of trees and plants, she hath defended with bark and rind, yea and the same sometimes double,<sup>22</sup> against the injuries both of heat and cold: man alone, poor wretch, she hath laid all naked upon the bare earth, even on his birthday, to cry and wraule presently from the very first hour that he is born into this world; in such sort, as among so many living creatures, there is none subject to shed tears and weep like him. And verily to no babe or infant it is given once to laugh before he be forty days old, and that is counted very early and with the soonest. Moreover, so soon as he is entered in this manner to enjoy the light of the sun, see how he is immediately tied and bound fast, and hath no member at liberty; a thing that is not practised upon the young whelps of any beast among us, be he never so wild. The child of man so untowardly born, and who another day is to rule and command all other, lo how he lieth bound hand and foot, weeping and crying, and beginning his life with misery, as if he were to make amends and satisfaction by his punishment unto nature, for his only fault and trespass, that he is born and brought into the world! O folly of all follies, ever to think (considering this simple beginning of ours) that we were sent into this world to live in pride, and carry our head aloft! The first hope that we conceive of our strength, the first gift that time affordeth us, maketh us no better yet than fourfooted beasts: how long is it ere we can go alone! how long before we can prattle and speak, feed ourselves, and chew our meat strongly! what a while continueth the mould and crown of our heads to beat and

pant, before our brain is well settled! the undoubted mark and token that bewrayeth our exceeding great weakness above all other creatures. What should I say of the infirmities and sickness that soon seize upon our feeble bodies! what need I speak of so many medicines and remedies devised against these maladies; besides the new diseases that come every day, able to check and frustrate all our provisions of physic whatsoever! As for all other living creatures, there is not one, but by a secret instinct of nature knoweth its own good, and whereto he is made able: some make use of their swift feet, others of their flight wings: some are strong of limbs, others are apt to swim, and practise the same: man only knoweth nothing, unless he be taught; he can neither speak, nor go, nor eat otherwise than he is trained to it: and to be short, apt and good at nothing he is naturally, but to pule and cry. And hereupon it is, that some have been of this opinion, that better it had been, and simply best for man, never to have been born, or else speedily to die. None but we do sorrow and wail; none but we are given to excess and superfluity infinitely in every thing, and shew the same in every member that we have. Who but we, again, are ambitious and vainglorious? Who but we are covetous and greedy of gathering good? We, and none but we, desire to live long and never to die, are superstitious, careful of our sepulture and burial, yea, and what shall betide us when we are gone. Man's life is most frail of all others, and in least security he liveth: no creature lusteth more after every thing than he: none feareth like unto him, and is more troubled and amazed in his fright: and if he be set once upon anger, none more raging and wood than he. To conclude: all other living creatures live orderly and well, after their own kind: we see them

flock and gather together, and ready to make head and stand against all others of a contrary kind. The lions, as fell and savage as they be, fight not one with another; <sup>n</sup> serpents sting not serpents, nor bite one another with their venomous teeth; nay, the very monsters and huge fishes of the sea war not amongst themselves in their own kind; but, believe me, man at man's hand receiveth most harm and mischief." Thus far Pliny.

4. We have no reason sufficient to persuade us to believe or to suspect that this great naturalist did ever peruse any part of the book of grace, not so much of it as is contained in the history of Moses, much less such passages in it as concern this point as are comprehended in the prophets, in the evangelists, or in St. Paul's Epistles. Or if any man have better reasons than I have to believe or suspect that he might read them all, or the most part of them, it would notwithstanding be a groundless surmise to imagine that he had been catechised by Christ's apostles or their deputies, or that he had received any spiritual grace, either by baptism or imposition of their hands. Now albeit we suppose or grant that

Heathen naturalists hold better consort with the primitive church concerning the nature of sin original than the Soci-nians do.

<sup>n</sup> Sensum a cœlesti dimissum traximus arce....  
Sed jam serpentum major concordia. Parcit  
Cognatis maculis similis fera. Quando leoni  
Fortior eripuit vitam leo? quo nemore unquam  
Expiravit aper majoris dentibus apri?  
Indica tigris agit rabida cum tigride pacem  
Perpetuam: sævis inter se convenit ursis....  
Aspicimus populos quorum non sufficit iræ  
Occidisse hominem, sed pectora brachia vultum  
Crediderint genus esse cibi. Quid diceret ergo  
Pythagoras, quo non fugeret, si hæc monstra videret.

*Juvenal. Sat. xv. 145.*

Like psalm xlix. 20, *Man that is in honour—is become like the beasts that perish*; Isaiah i. 3, *The ox knoweth—Israel doth not know*; Jerem. viii. 7, *The stork &c.*

he had read the books of Moses, or some passages in the prophets, but deny (what I think no man will affirm) that he was baptized or made partaker of grace by Christ, the case is clear, that he could have no better guide for searching after or finding out those orthodoxal truths or notions which he hath most elegantly expressed than *recta ratio*; that is, the right use of reason, which nature, though corrupted in him, had not utterly extinguished, but much weakened. And here I can rather wish than pray, that this man had lived in this age, or might be restored to life again, to encounter those semi-Christians which contend for the sovereignty of *recta ratio*, as if it were the only guide or rule of Christian faith. But albeit I dare not pray, nor can I hope, to hear Pliny speak to this or any other good purpose in this life, yet I verily believe that the writings which this uncatechised heathen hath left, and he himself, shall rise up in judgment against those proud, phantastic spirits, which have been baptised in the name of Christ, and catechised in the fundamental points of Christian faith, do either flatly deny or captiously question, whether our nature were so deeply tainted with that sin which we call original, or so far deprived of freedom or power to restore ourselves to our primeval state of nature, as that the death and resurrection of a Redeemer, more than mere man, and his everlasting priesthood, were necessarily required for freeing us from the bondage of Satan.

23

5. Seeing this modern sect of men, as Pelagius their father, (whose errors concerning the state of the first man and of sin original have been mightily improved by them,) have been and are such notorious truants in the book of nature, and such schediastic surveyors of the book of grace, as none have been or can be

St. Austin  
not the  
first that  
did main-  
tain ori-  
ginal sin.



beside ; and such as in their sceptical contrivances hold it a part of policy or state to draw all or most such forces of reason as nature or grace had implanted in their breasts, to guard their brains or fortify the inventions of their fancies, it is not to be expected that they should much regard the unanimous consent of the orthodoxal and primeval church. Some of this sect are well contented to oppose the consent of such antiquity (as in other points they slight) against those who reverence the memory of the ancient martyrs or fathers, especially before St. Austin's time. Others of them are not ashamed to accuse this great and learned father for being the first author of that doctrine which we maintain concerning the nature of sin original. Now to press them with his authority whom they accuse as an author of error, would be bootless ; wherefore, waving his authority for the present for being any competent judge or advocate in this controversy, no ingenuous or sober man can except against him as an unfit witness in this cause concerning the tenets of the ancient church, or against others whom he produceth as witnesses beyond all exception, which either Pelagius himself, his followers, or the Manichees, could have taken against them in his time.

*Neque enim ex quo esse cœpit Manichæi pestilenti-  
tiosa doctrina, ex illo cœperunt in ecclesia Dei parvuli  
baptizandi exorcizari et exsufflari, ut ipsis mysteriis  
ostenderetur non eos in regnum Christi nisi erutos a  
tenebrarum potestate transferrî..... Quid autem dicam  
de ipsis divinarum scripturarum tractatoribus, qui in  
catholica ecclesia floruerunt, quomodo hæc non in alios  
sensus conati sunt vertere, quoniam stabiles erant in  
antiquissima et robustissima fide, non autem novitio  
movebantur errore. Quos si colligere et eorum testi-*

*moniis uti velim, et nimis longum erit, et de canonicis auctoritatibus, a quibus non debemus averti, minus fortasse videbor præsumpsisse quam debui. Verumtamen ut omittam beatissimum Ambrosium, cui Pelagius, sicut jam commemoravi, tam magnum integritatis in fide perhibuit testimonium, qui tamen Ambrosius nihil aliud defendit in parvulis, ut haberent necessarium medicum Christum, nisi originale peccatum: numquid et gloriosissimæ coronæ Cyprianus dicitur ab aliquo, non solum fuisse, sed vel esse potuisse Manichæus, cum prius iste sit passus, quam illa in orbe Romano pestis apparuit? Et tamen in libro de baptisate parvulorum, ita defendit originale peccatum, ut propterea dicat, et ante octavum diem, si necesse sit, parvulum baptizari oportere, ne pereat anima ejus. Quem tanto vult intelligi ad indulgentiam baptismi facilius pervenire, quanto magis ei dimittuntur non propria, sed aliena peccata. Hos iste audeat dicere Manichæos, et antiquissimam ecclesiæ traditionem isto nefario crimine adspersat, qua exorcizantur, ut dixi, et exsufflantur parvuli, ut in regnum Christi a potestate tenebrarum, hoc est, diaboli et angelorum ejus eruti, transferantur°.*

*Of the Properties or Effects of Sin Original, known by the Light of Nature and by Scripture.*

1. ENOUGH it is to persuade any reasonable man that original sin is not a mere privation, or a proportioned shadow of being, without a reality answering to it; seeing that in man (the note or character of whose distinction from or excellency above all other visible

The property of original sin is to lust after things forbidden by the law of God and of nature.

° Aug. l. 2. de nuptiis et concupiscentia, cap. 29.

creatures, is the use of reason) there usually is such a lethargy or slothful deadness to do that which the very law of nature or reason doth dictate unto him or command him to do; and such an eager proneness or appetite to do those things which the law of reason or of nature forbids him to do; and those things with greater eagerness which the same law of reason, or other positive laws derived from it, most peremptorily and upon severest penalties forbid him to do. It hath been observed by many authors, that the unnatural sin of parricide (wilful murder of father or mother, or of superior kindred) did not become rife or frequent amongst the Romans until they had upon particular sad accidents enacted a public law, and ordained a special kind of torment for transgressors in this kind. Lucius Ostius was the first amongst the Romans that did commit this unnatural sin; and he lived almost six hundred years after the city was founded, a little after the second Punic war. Some good writers<sup>p</sup> ascribe the long abstinence from this unnatural sin unto the wisdom of Romulus, their founder, who enacted no law against, much less appointed any peculiar kind of death unto this crime, which he expected

<sup>p</sup> See Plutarch in the Life of Romulus, Laertius in the Life of Solon, and Tully in his second oration, Pro Roscio Amerino, who gives the true character or expression of that speech of Laertius, Διὰ τὸ ἀπελπίσαι, unto-wardly rendered by the Latin interpreter, Καὶ μέχρι χρόνων πολλῶν ἔδοξεν ὀρθῶς, ἀπογνώσαι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀδικίαν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔδρασε τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν ἐν Ῥώμῃ σχεδὸν ἐτῶν ἑξακοσίων διαγενομένων. Ἄλλὰ πρῶτος μετὰ τὸν Ἄνναβαϊκὸν πόλεμον ἱστορεῖται Δεύκιος Ὀστίος πατρόκτο-

vos γενέσθαι. Plut. in Rom. p. 32. Ἐρωτηθεὶς (Solon) διὰ τί κατὰ πατρόκτονον νόμον οὐκ ἔθηκε, Διὰ τὸ ἀπελπίσαι, ἔφη. Diog. Laert. l. 1. in Solone. Is (Solon) cum interrogaretur, Cur nullum supplicium constituisset in eum, qui parentem necasset, respondit, Se id neminem facturum putasse. Sapienter fecisse dicitur, cum de eo nihil sanxerit, quod antea commissum non erat, ne non tam prohibere, quam admonere videretur.—Tull. Orat. 2. Pro Sext. Roscio Amerino. cap. 25.



should never be committed by his posterity. Certain it is, that Solon, for the like reason, did not so much as mention this crime in his (otherwise) most severe laws. But this observation was taken from the heathen Romans in times ancient and far more remote, and doth not (as haply will be objected) hold in these times or places wherein we live. Yet the ingenuous and learned French historian<sup>9</sup> (who meddles with the history of his own times only) tells us, that the like unnatural sin towards children or infants did never come to so high and far-spreading a flow in the great city of that kingdom, until the state or parliament had erected a peculiar court to be held, for examination or trial of such cruel mothers as sought to salve the breach of one commandment by the violation of another; to cover the shame of their own wantonness by murdering the tender fruits of their folly: as if the dam which the law had set for repressing or stopping the course of this bloody sin had but provoked the stream or current to swell higher and greater, to overburst all obstacles or inhibitions which the laws of God, the laws of nature, and of the kingdom, had set against it.

2. Again. Why pulpit pride, why clergy cunning, insolency, or malice, should grow into a proverb throughout most Christian kingdoms or provinces, as if these or like transgressions in our profession were of such a scantling as could hardly be matched  
25 by the laity, I cannot give a more probable reason (if the imputation be true, or the occasion of the proverb just) than this: that men of our profession, who are God's peculiar inheritance, are bound by the laws of God to more strict observance of our Saviour's

<sup>9</sup> Thuanus.



precepts concerning humility, meekness, brotherly love, and charity, or peaceable disposition towards all, than ordinary men, or men of other callings or professions, are. And we know whose saying it is, 'That if we do not continue as we are by the place wherein he hath set us (*the salt of the earth, and light of the world*), we shall become the most degenerate, unprofitable members of the land and church wherein we live.' And if the whole tribe were to bear peculiar arms, (as some other ingenuous professions do,) no device could so well befit us as Jeremiah's two baskets of figs. *Then said the Lord unto me, What seest thou, Jeremiah? And I said, Figs; the good figs, very good; and the evil, very evil, that cannot be eaten, they are so evil.* Jer. xxiv. 3. The bad figs were the emblem of the disobedient refractory, as the good figs were of the obedient and believing Jews in the prophet's time: both parts of the emblem are as applicable to the sons of Levi in our days. Such of this tribe as suffer sin to reign in their mortal bodies are generally the worst of sinners: such as mortify the works of the flesh by the Spirit, by prayer, and other good services of God, and seek their freedom or manumission by the Son of God, working out their salvation with fear and trembling, are the best of all God's saints on earth.

3. But the greatest part of the induction hitherto made for finding out the properties or symptoms of sin original will be excepted against, especially by such as are mere strangers to their own breasts, or dispositions of their hearts; because the particular observations or experiments whereof the induction consists have been made by the heathen, or related by authors not canonical. But the exception will void itself, if we shall make it clear to men altogether unexperienced of themselves, that the like experiments

The proper effects or symptoms of sin original described by St. Paul.

or observations have been made, and more fully expressed, by one whose authority is canonical, whose testimony of experiments made in himself, and taken by himself, is most authentic—it is St. Paul. That sin original was in the world before the law was given, is clear from this apostle, Romans v. 13: *For until the law sin was in the world: but sin is not imputed when there is no law.* So our English and most other modern translations render the Greek *οὐκ ἐλλογείται*: none of them altogether so well as it might be rendered. Better thus: ‘There is not, there cannot be any true estimate or full reckoning made of sin where there is no law to give the charge<sup>r</sup>.’ And again, ver. 20: *Moreover the law entered, that the offence might abound.* This abounding of the offence, whereof he speaks, was the issue or effect, τὸ πέρασ, not τὸ τέλος, the end or final cause why the law was given: for so the Lawgiver might be suspected to have been the author of sin, or at least of the increase or abundance of it in the world. The apostle’s meaning is, that the law was given as a preparative physic or medicine, to let such as were sick of sin (as all were before the law was given) understand in what danger they were, or to give them notice of the abundance of corruption which was so deeply seated in their nature, that it could not be thoroughly purged by the law, which only set sin a working, that men might seek more eagerly after a better medicine, to wit, faith in Christ. That this

<sup>r</sup> The Syriac reads it, *Usque enim ad legem, peccatum, quum esset in mundo, non reputabatur peccatum, propterea quod non erat lex.* That is, *Sin, though it were in the world until the law, yet was it not reputed or reckoned for sin until the law was given.* But if it be true which the apostle saith, *That sin reigned unto death until the law,* I hope it was imputed with a witness.

was our apostle's true meaning in this place is apparent from the parallel passages to these. Rom. vii. 7: *What shall we say then? Is the law sin? God forbid. Nay, I had not known sin, (that is, I had not taken true notice of the measure or danger of it,) but by the law: for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet.* The law to which these words refer is the tenth commandment, wherein 26 the coveting of some few particulars, as of our neighbour's wife, or of his goods, is only expressly forbidden: but sin, taking occasion by this negative commandment, wrought in our apostle (as he himself testifies) all manner of concupiscence. *For without the law sin was dead:* that is, he did not feel the motions or paroxysms of sin until the law was laid unto him, as a preparative medicine unto better physic. And again, ver. 9: *For I was alive without the law once: but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died.* And again, vv. 11, 12, 13: *For sin, taking occasion by the commandment, deceived me, and by it slew me. Wherefore the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good. Was then that which is good made death unto me? God forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin, working death in me by that which is good; that sin by the commandment might become exceeding sinful.*

It is a point observable and fully parallel to our apostle's doctrine, that the eastern part of the world did rather loathe than long after circumcision, until our Saviour's resurrection, and the apostle's peremptory forbidding the practice of it. From the former doctrine of our apostle I have learned satisfaction to a problem which had often and long perplexed my thoughts. The problem was this: Why men, unto whose care and



fideliety a man might safely commit his fortunes or his life upon their honest word, became most careless and unfaithful in matters whereto they are punctually tied by oath? The reason is, because the interposition or obligation by oath, is as the coming of a law which provokes the corruption of nature, whose longing or lust after things forbidden, rather than it should be unsatisfied, draws men, otherwise morally honest, to become like wayward, intemperate patients, which rather choose to nourish the longing humours of the disease or infirmity than to observe the prescription of the chirurgeon; ready to pull off the plaster, though with the live skin or flesh, rather than to endure the working of it for a moment.

4. But here some have questioned, Whether this chapter be meant of the regenerate or unregenerate man? A captious interrogatory, if regeneration were but one act, or a resultance of some few acts or conflicts between the flesh and the spirit; but seeing regeneration, in true theology, includes acts almost numberless, or a combat somewhat longer than mortification doth; this chapter, if we speak of Christians, must be meant, not of the man truly regenerated or perfectly mortified, but of a man, *inter regenerandum*, during the intermediate acts or conflicts betwixt the beginning and consummation of his regeneration<sup>s</sup>. Or if we speak of one that believes the Old Testament better than the New, as of a Jew or Mahometan, it cannot be meant of a lawless man, but of a man under the hammer of God's law given by Moses. For there must be a laying of some law or other to the heart before the conflict here mentioned can begin, or sin

<sup>s</sup> See the Ninth Article of the Church of England.



inherent be so provoked as our apostle tells us it is.

5. He that will diligently peruse our apostle's fore-mentioned passages, Rom. vii, in the language wherein he wrote, will easily observe with me, that the occasion which sin took by the law to deceive him (as it doth yet to deceive us) was from the negative precepts or commandments of the law, not from the positive or affirmative. Now why the negative precepts, that one especially, *Thou shalt not lust, Thou shalt not covet*, should a great deal more provoke or more forcibly revive the seeds of original sin inherent in us than the affirmative precepts usually do, the reason is evident, because nothing is nominated or proposed unto us in the affirmative precepts but that which in its nature is truly and sincerely good, without the mixture of evil: and being such, is more apt to revive or quicken the notions of the law of nature or reason, or those relics of God's image which remain in our nature since our first parents' fall, than to enliven the seeds of sin, or to provoke our inclinations unto evil. On the contrary, in every negative precept there is a proposal or representation of those things which be in their nature truly evil, and therefore most apt to incite or provoke our natural inclinations unto the evil forbidden, or to enrage the relics of our first parents' sin inherent in us, after the same manner and for the same reason that the representation of red colours (without any other provocation given) is to provoke or stir the blood of beasts or cattle which are of a more pure or sanguine constitution. Thus some tame beasts (as bulls or kine) are aptest to turn mankeen upon such as are clothed in bright red or scarlet. And a grave, learned histo-

Why sin original is more provoked by the negative than by the affirmative precepts.

rian<sup>t</sup>, sometimes chronicler to Charles V, in an epistle of his to his friend, relates a sad accident of a bear, which had never been observed to have raged upon any, yet being let loose from her cage, and having opportunity to have exercised her rage upon others, did single out a courtesan of Spanish progeny, whom she did as cruelly tear in pieces as if she had been robbed by her of her whelps, wearing upon that day a garment of somewhat a darker colour than the scarlet or bright red, and so much the more apt (as philosophers teach us<sup>u</sup>) to provoke or enrage this or other ravenous creatures, which be of more dusky and melancholy blood. And the author<sup>x</sup> of the first book of Maccab. vi. 34, relates a warlike practice for encouraging the elephants to fight more fiercely against their enemies, by representing or (as it seems) squeezing the blood of grapes and mulberries in their sight or view.

6. Now the sight of semblable colours can have no greater force or efficacy to stir up the blood of creatures like unto them, than the solemn proposal or representation of sins prohibited hath to provoke or

<sup>t</sup> Scortum Hispani generis lepidum, ut ferebatur, et formosum, mula, ut Romæ meretrices cum amatoribus solent, animi gratia gestabatur. Hæc cum venisset ad thermas Diocletianas, vivarium ferarum ingressa, nec contenta cicures vagantes spectasse, precibus contendit et ægre impetrat a belluarum magistro, ut ingenti urso caveaseparatim incluso, sed quem constabat in neminem antea desæviisse, exitum aperiret. Facta potestate ursus erumpit, mulam terrefacit, excussam mulierculam,

cæteris, qui aderant, diffugientibus, invadit, dictoque citius strangulat, et contrito capite primum avulsa ubera, deinde natem alteram devorat, unguibus et dentibus laceratam. Effertam bestiam existimo, colore coccineæ vestis, quam induerat misella, speciem sanguinis præferentem. Sepulveda, Epist. l. 2. ep. 15.

<sup>u</sup> See Scarmilion De Coloribus.

<sup>x</sup> Τοῖς ἐλέφασιν ἔδειξαν αἷμα σταφυλῆς καὶ μύρων, τοῦ παραστήσαι αὐτοὺς εἰς πόλεμον.

enrage the relicks of sin original, or to procure the fits or motions of it, without the assistance of grace by Christ to restrain them. And I cannot persuade myself, that some sins (not to be named) could ever have been, or yet could be so frequently practised in divers regions which have submitted themselves unto the discipline of the Romish church, to all her canons and constitutions, save only from the representation or expression of the nature of such sins in those loathsome and abominable interrogatories which Romish priests use in taking auricular confession.

## CHAP. X.

*Containing such Description or Definition of original Sin as can be gathered from the Effects or Properties of it beforementioned.*

1. FROM these discussions of the properties or symptoms, we may frame this or the like description of original sin itself: 'That it is such a disease of the soul, or such a corruption of the human nature, as the dropsy or other like corrupt humours are of the body;' the one sort includes a thirst or longing after such things as are forbidden them by the physician of their bodies; the other, an appetite or hunger after such diet as is in special prohibited by the Physician of their souls. And all diseases (we know) are dangerous wherein the longing of the corrupt humour or matter which breeds them is much greater than the longing or appetite of nature; especially if we give satisfaction to such intemperate desires or appetites.

Sin original such a disease of the soul as the dropsy or other like diseases are of the body.

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2. Or if the reader desire more than a description, that is, some competent definition of sin original, the best which for the present I can exhibit is this: That it is a positive retinency of the flesh or corrupt nature of man against the spiritual law of God, especially

against the negative precept, being first occasioned or rather caused by the transgression of our first parents; especially from the intemperate longing of our mother Evah after the forbidden fruit. For, as our apostle instructs us, 1 Tim. ii. 14, *Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression*; that is, more deeply in the transgression than the man, because she seduced him to eat the forbidden fruit, as the serpent had done her, or as the flesh or sensitive part of our nature doth yet often seduce the reasonable will to yield her tacit or implicit consent unto such actions as they have expressly resolved upon or undertaken, without consulting reason, or the masculine part of our nature.

3. From this first transgression of our first parents, from the birth of Cain unto this present day or hour, the forementioned observation of the Roman poet (*Nitimur in vetitum semper cupimusque negata*) was never out of date, but continued still in full force and strength amongst all the sons of Adam throughout their several generations, unless perhaps in some few, who by special privilege or peculiar grace have been redeemed from the reign or dominion of sin from the womb, or from the time wherein they begun to know the difference between good and evil. Our blessed Saviour (who was no mere son of Adam, but the true and only Son of God) was absolutely free from the womb, from his conception as man, from all tincture of sin original, from all inclinations to attempt or desire any thing that was evil or forbidden by the law of God.

4. Now the nature, properties, and conditions of sin original being such as have been described, it is easy to be conceived how potent it is to conquer us, and to bring us into servitude unto itself and unto



Satan, or how it is that very snare, or a great part of it, whereby such as oppose the truth are *taken captive by the devil*, as our apostle speaks, *at his will or pleasure*, 2 Tim. ii. 26. But of this point hereafter.

## CHAP. XI.

*Containing the Resolution of the main Difficulty proposed, to wit, how the first actual Sin of our first Parents did produce more than a Habit of Sin, an hereditary Disease in all their Posterity.*

1. THE chief difficulty (at least as some make it) is, how the first sin, whether of our father Adam, or of our mother Evah, or of both, could possibly produce a perpetual habit of sin in themselves, or an hereditary corruption of the human nature, propagated from them throughout all generations. This difficulty, though, cannot be pressed or drawn unto any contradiction to the unquestionable rules of reason or true philosophy. The full and clear solution of it only surpasseth the reach of reason merely natural, or of philosophy not enlightened by sacred history or Mosaical relations of the estate wherein man was created. Surely if Pliny, or some other naturalist, had been so happy as to have diligently perused and believed the oracles of God delivered by Moses, Gen. i, ii, iii, &c., we Christians, this day living, might have had more satisfactory resolutions for clearing this point than we can gather from the schoolmen or many of the ancient fathers<sup>y</sup>. Some schoolmen do think that our nature was corrupted by the poisonous breath of the old serpent in his conference with our mother Evah. I neither know nor remember whether they have any ground of this conjecture from

The eating of the forbidden fruit did pollute or poison the nature of man.

<sup>y</sup> Gregorius de Arimino.

true antiquity, or whether it be a masterless piece of their own coining. The conjecture or fancy itself is for this reason less probable, because the nature of our father Adam, who held no parley with the old serpent, was no less corrupted than the nature of his consort Evah. Other good writers are of opinion, that *the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil* was for its specifical quality of a poisonous nature, both to the soul and body; at least, apt to taint or corrupt both: and the first man's nature was tainted by tasting or eating of it. For of it he did eat as much as Evah did, if not more, though she were more in the transgression, because she had plucked it from the tree. And I cannot conjecture any ground why any ingenuous reader of the sacred story should peremptorily reject this opinion, which I, for my poor talent in divinity, hold in some better esteem than a mere or probable conjecture. No article of Christain faith it is, (though we should suppose faith itself to be no more than an opinion,) yet to be admitted into the list of *pie credibilia*, or to be ranked amongst such opinions as may be more piously and more safely believed than peremptorily rejected or derided. The consequence of this opinion or supposition is, that Adam did become his own executioner, or, as the canonists speak, *incidere in canonem*, did absolutely inflict that punishment upon himself, unto which his Creator had but conditionally sentenced him. Gen. ii. 17: *But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.* There was no necessity laid upon him by his Creator that he should eat of it, but such a peremptory restraint or command to the contrary, that whensoever he did eat of it, death should necessarily follow. And so it did; for mortality and corruption

did enter into his nature with the fig or apple which he tasted, not only upon the same day wherein he tasted it, but in the very same moment. And the same mortality and corruption are propagated to all his sons from the first moment or point of time wherein they begin to be his sons. Or more briefly, the forbidden fruit, of what sort soever it were, did as truly beget or bring forth corruption and mortality in our nature, as Adam did beget Cain, or Evah bring him forth.

2. But it may be (and I presume will be) objected, Objections that are or can be made against the former resolutions answered. that not the forbidden fruit only, but the whole tree whereon it grew, root and branch, were immediately created by God, before Adam could taste or eat of it. And if it were for specifical quality poisonous, or did necessarily taint the whole human nature, being once tasted of, how can either fruit or tree be conceived to be any part of God's six days works, all of which were *very good*? Or how shall we salve, or be able to maintain that maxim of the wise man, *God did not create death*<sup>z</sup>, seeing he did create that poisonous fruit by which our nature was deadly poisoned? *Facilis solutio*, the answer is ready: Albeit deadly poison be not good to him that takes it, yet that there should be poison, or herbs and fruits in their nature poisonous, as well medicinal or wholesome, is, and from the beginning was, very good. Good likewise it was, exceeding good, that the first man should have death as well as life <sup>30</sup> proposed to his free or unnecessitable choice. So the whole fault was in himself, no part in the fruit which God had forbidden him to eat: for he by thus eating of it did choose death before life. And however the fruit, which we suppose to have carried deadly poison with it into his body, were immediately created by God, yet that of the prophet is more remarkably true

<sup>z</sup> Wisd. i. 13.

of our first parents than of Israel, unto whom it was directed: *Perditio tua ex te*; ‘O Adam, thou wast the cause of thine own and of our destruction:’ but of our salvation, in and through the promised seed, our gracious Creator is the sole cause and author. Again, albeit Adam did exceeding ill in choosing death before life, yet this in the consequence, by special dispensation of divine mercy, was good for us. Our nature was not so much wounded or made worse by that unhal- lowed food, as our persons are bettered and our estate amended by the new covenant in Christ’s blood, unless we abuse those talents which our gracious Creator and Redeemer hath given us, as Adam did his. Were free choice left unto us which now are living, whether we would accept that estate or condition of life wherein Adam was created, or that which is granted us by the new covenant in Christ’s blood, he should commit as great a folly as our first parents did, that would not embrace the latter condition, and refuse the former.

3. But for the former difficulty, how more than a habit of sin—an hereditary disease of nature—should be produced by one or two acts, I am afraid some men make it seem a great deal greater than it is, more by their own incogitancy than by any positive argument that can be brought to enlarge or press it further than at the first sight it appears to every young student. First, these men take it not into consideration, that our first parents might commit more actual sins than that one often mentioned, before the corruption of nature was propagated to their successors. Besides, the alteration of their diet, change of dwelling and air, might depress their nature, and dispose them to a deeper degree of mortality and corruption than they were subject unto when they were first driven out of paradise. And paradise, for aught we know, or can possibly



object to the contrary, might, for many conveniences and conducements to preservation of health, whether of body or mind, exceed all other habitations, as far as princes' palaces do common gaols. What further impressions other occurrences besides these mentioned, intervenient between our first parents' grand sin and the birth of Cain, of Seth, or others of their children, from whom all the kindreds of the earth lineally descended, might make in the nature propagated from them, or what effects or symptoms our mother Evah's longing after the forbidden fruit might leave in herself or in her children, is unknown to us; yet a point to be considered by such as think it scarce possible for one act to produce a habit. This we know in general, that the eager longings of mothers, or distastes or affrightments taken by them, do often imprint many hereditary dispositions in their children. And from this original, all or most of those strange antipathies unto meats or drinks, in themselves good and wholesome, and unto other live or liveless creatures no way noisome, do (as learned physicians resolve us) naturally issue. Yet no antipathies in private families can be so perpetually hereditary as those inclinations unto evil, or antipathies unto goodness, which proceeded from the first well-head or spring of our nature, to wit, from our mother Evah: that being once corrupted, could not but corrupt the whole current. As for Evah's lusting after whatsoever other unlawful pleasures, her longing after the fair-seeming fruit of the tree of knowledge we may hence gather to have been <sup>31</sup> very intemperate, and exuberant beyond the ordinary size of unruly appetites, in that *holiness with sobriety* is more especially, at least under more express condition, required unto the salvation of the weaker sex, as our apostle hath it, 1 Tim. ii. 15: *Notwithstanding*

*she shall be saved in childbearing, if they continue in faith and charity and holiness with sobriety.* And so is abstinence from some peculiar sins, or from occasions of temptations to such sins as their progenitors have been most prone unto, more peremptorily required in their children, than in other men, whose ancestors or progenitors have not been tainted with the like sins, nor obnoxious to like temptations.

Whether all branches of sin original do necessarily spring from our first parents' sin.

4. But here, if any man be otherwise minded, or disposed to contradict what I have said or shall briefly say concerning this point, I profess I shall not be willing to debate the problem any further with him. Only I must for mine own part protest, that there never yet arose any doubt or question between me and my most retired thoughts, whether there may not be and are sundry particular branches of sin, or natural inclinations unto evil, propagated from intermediate parents unto their children or families for many generations, which do not by any natural necessity grow out of that original stem or root of corruption whereof all of us are partakers by the fall of our first parents. Yet I would entreat the reader to take this consideration along with him, that such hereditary ill dispositions or inclinations to some peculiar vices as we mean, may abate, remit, or revive and be improved, through several successions or collateral lines of the same stem, unto which they are (for some generations) hereditary, or finally expire, after the same manner that similitude of bodily lineaments, feature, or visages doth vary, alter, or expire in many ancient families: some children being more true pictures of their great grandfathers, or grandfathers, or great uncles, than of their immediate parents: others again more like their immediate parents than to any of their ancestors, whether by father or mother. Concerning the cause or

manner how similitudes of feature, of bodily lineaments or visages, do or may abate or remit in the first or second descent, and revive in the third or fourth, this the reader must learn from philosophers or physicians<sup>a</sup>, as Aristotle or Galen, which of purpose have searched into this secret of nature. For illustration of the manner how hereditary indispositions of the heart or affections may abate, revive, or expire in the several descents of families, the determination of that moral problem, *An nobilitas generis desinat in uno vitioso?* will be pertinent.

Now that nobility of blood, or those inclinations unto heroical virtues, for which some ancient families have been famous, do not necessarily cease or expire through the viciousness of one succession, was a point determined in the schools when I first knew them. And experience may teach a longlived observant man, that two vicious or lewd successors do not oftentimes so abate or utterly dead those seeds of virtue which were propagated to them from their ancestors, but that they may revive, or be improved in the fourth generation or descent. The abating, reviving, or expiring of them depends most upon their education: and so doth the abatement or improvement of original sin, or inclinations unto evil. Even that corruption of nature which we necessarily draw from the loss of paradise, is not equal in all the sons of Adam, though it be most true, that every one of us is as truly tainted with it as any other. Again, though it be universally true, that all men are by nature sinners; all destitute of the grace of God; yet it is no part of this universal truth to deny, that some race or brood of men are from their birth or conception, much more by education, more <sup>32</sup> graceless than others are. And yet, for such as have

<sup>a</sup> Vid. inter alios Franciscum Valleriolam in Com. in Hippocr.

the least measure of sin, whether original, habitual, or actual, or for men, as we term them, of sweet dispositions or good nature, it is as impossible to be freed from natural servitude unto sin, without the special grace of God in Christ, as it is for the greatest sinners or most graceless brood of men. The best of us, even after the participation of grace in some degree, have a greater measure of one or other kind of sin than we take notice of, or than we can learn from most professors of divinity, which have purposely undertaken to decipher the nature and heinousness of it.

## CHAP. XII.

*Containing the true and solid Definition of Sin, whether original, or acquired by vicious Acts or Dispositions.*

1. THE best attempt that I have read or heard to this purpose was made long ago by one who hath been so buffeted on both sides which he sought to teach or instruct, as would make an ordinary soldier in our Christian warfare afraid either to be his second or to come unto his rescue; Flaccius Illyricus I mean; a man most happy in political undertakings and achievements, which were rather below than beyond his profession; yet in his treatise concerning the nature of original sin, or the nature of sin in general, two ways unfortunate: first, in that he was not so profound a philosopher or exquisite artist as it were fitting every divine which will undertake to handle this part of divinity, or others which have connexion with it, should be: secondly, in that he was a better philosopher and more exquisite artist by much, than such divines, whether in reformed churches or others, which have taken upon them to rectify or confute his errors. These, for the most part, run a wider bias on the left hand towards the nominals, than he doth on the right

Illyricus' definition of sin original how far blameable, how far commendable.



hand from the real philosophers or divines. This man went the right way to his work, and begun it like a good artist, by defining or displaying the nature or essence of original righteousness, before he entered into that dispute concerning the nature of original sin, or unrighteousness. He rightly, and upon demonstrative grounds, denies original righteousness to be any quality supernatural, any accident or property adventitious to the human nature; if we consider that, in the estate wherein it was first created. Nor did he commit any error (much less incur any censure of heresy) by avouching original righteousness to have been the essential form of man, if he had expressed his meaning with this addition, or limited his expressions thus—‘as the first man was the work of God, or considered as he was created in his image.’ For (as I am forced often to repeat) there were not in man’s creation two works of God really distinct, either in order of nature or in respect of time; nor so distinct, as that the one might be imagined to be the nature of the first man, or of God’s image in him; the other, a coronation of his nature or image of God, with a grace or righteousness supernatural. For righteousness original, to speak properly, could be no other work or effect imaginable, save only the resultance of that image of God wherein our nature was first moulded. And this resultance was as immediate unto, and as unseparable from the image of God wherein the first man was created, as roundness is from a perfect sphere or well moulded bullet, or as equality is from identity of quantity: of none of which there can be two distinct causes or operations.

2. To make the image of God, or that righteousness 33 which by immediate necessity resulted from God’s image or work, the substance, nature, or essential form of man, *qua talis*, as he is a man, would be a gross

error or grievous solecism in philosophy: for so Adam should not have been the same individual party or person after his fall which he was before. And this error in philosophy uncontrolled would necessarily induce a more dangerous heresy in divinity, to wit—that the same party which was made righteous by God, should not be punished for losing this righteousness, but some other for him. By the same reason the human nature itself, which is now polluted by sin, should not be so much as specifically the same with that which God did in the beginning create; our nature, as now it stands, should be wholly a work or creature of the devil.

3. But this good writer—I mean Illyricus—*iterum et identidem*, often and again disclaims all opinion or thought conceived by him of any specific change of the essence or nature of mankind, from the first creation to the world's end; or of any essential change or destruction of the individual nature or persons of our first parents; yet his expressions of his meaning sometimes may seem to infer either a change of nature or a destruction of the two individuals first created by God. It may be that opinion of some late philosophers, *Principium individuationis est a materia*—‘That the root of individuation or distinction of one particular person from another was wholly from the matter, not from the form, which is the principal part of every man's essence or person’—was embraced by him. But seeing he utterly disclaims the former conclusions or inferences, which some would put upon him, it would not be ingenuous to charge him with them upon consequences, not of his own, but of other men's making. The learned and ingenuous reader will easily excuse him from this one error in philosophy, seeing he hath taught such as will be taught by him so many good useful lessons, as

no divine (which I have read) in modern churches hath taught more, for avoiding sceptical or merely dialectical, and making solid and theological definitions in substantial or fundamental points of divinity. For no definition, of sin especially, or of freewill, or other controversy depending upon their determination, can be truly theological, or such as a professor of divinity, if he be a true artist, can brook, unless it be truly and solidly philosophical.

4. The difference between a nominal or merely dialectical, and a true philosophical or physical definition of one and the same real effect, affection, or property, is excellently set down in sundry treatises by the great philosopher. If this question, *Quid est ira?*—‘What is that which we call wrath or anger?’—were proposed to a mere logician, or dialectical grammarian, his answer is upon his tongue’s end—*Ira est appetitio vindictæ*—‘Wrath or anger is a desire or appetite of revenge.’ But this is only *λόγος ὀνοματώδης*, a mere expression what the word doth signify; or at the best but *ὀυσιώδης*, a definition only of the abstract essence of the accident or affection. But if the same question were proposed to a true philosopher, to a good naturalist or learned physician, his answer would be—*Ira est ebullitio sanguinis circa cor*—Wrath or anger is in truth and indeed neither less nor more than the boiling of the blood about the heart: this is the only root or real cause whence anger immediately grows. Yet if we would take a full definition of this most unruly passion, (which is the usual commander-in-chief of greatest commanders,) it must be this, according to the rules of art; *Ira est appetitio vindictæ propter ebullitionem sanguinis circa cor*—‘Wrath or anger is an appetite of revenge caused by the boiling of blood about the heart;’ and from this definition every

The difference between merely dialectical and philosophical or theological definitions.



34 good moralist (such all true divines should be, and somewhat more) may learn in part how to curb or tame this unruly beast : according to the old proverb, *Equo ferocienti subtrahendum pabulum*; by abstaining from all choleric meats, and by withdrawing himself from all probable occasions, which by one sense or other may set his best blood on boiling.

5. He that saith, ‘ An eclipse is the privation of light in the moon or other heavenly star,’ speaks properly enough : for this is the essential definition of that which we call an eclipse, whether in the sun or in the moon : yet but a nominal definition, which every young scholar or academic may learn out of his lexicon. What more then is required to a philosophical or real definition of an eclipse, whether in the moon, sun, or other stars ? Nothing besides the assignation of the real cause by which this defect of light is wrought, whether in the sun or moon. The real cause of this privation of light in the moon is the diametral interposition of the shadow of the earth between the moon and the sun, from whom as from the fountain of light, this second light or governess of the night doth borrow its light or splendour. Albeit of these two definitions, the grammatical or nominal be most proper ; yet the causal (though taken alone as philosophers used to express it) is most real and more satisfactory. ‘ An eclipse in the moon is the interposition of the earth betwixt the sun and it ; the eclipse of the sun is the interposition of the body of the moon betwixt the sun and us, that be inhabitants of the earth.’ Hence we may learn that however the nominal or essential definition of an eclipse, whether in the sun or moon or other star, that is, a privation of light, be one and the same ; yet we may learn more from the causal definition of either of them, than we can from the nominal



definition of both. In an eclipse of the sun there is no defect or privation of light in it: we inhabitants of the earth only are deprived of the light or lustre of this glorious star by the interposition of the body of the moon between it and our bodily sight. Whence we may truly infer, that the body of the moon is in itself as impenetrable by light, or as incapable of transmission or free passage of light through it, as the body of the earth is; that the surface only of this great star is capable of light by reflection, as a globe of steel or other solid body, whose surfaces are smooth and equable; it doth not, it cannot transmit light, or suffer it to be transfused through it after the manner of glass. Yet if we should give a perfect and absolute definition of an eclipse in the moon, we must add the abstract or nominal definition of the eclipse unto the real or philosophical, as thus—‘The eclipse of the moon is a true and real privation of light or splendour, not in respect of us only, but in itself, caused by the interposition of the body of the earth, which hindereth the transmission of light which it borrows from the sun. But the eclipse of the sun is only a privation of our sight or view of it, occasioned or caused by the interposition of the dark body of the moon betwixt this glorious star and fountain of light and our eyes.’

6. The main business, wherein Illyricus is so zealous, was to banish all such nominal or grammatical definitions as have been mentioned out of the precincts of theology, and to put in continual caveats against the admission of abstracts or mere relations, into the definition of original sin, or of that unrighteousness which is inherent in the man unregenerate. And however St. Austin, Aquinas, and Melancthon say in effect as much as Illyricus did, if their meanings were rightly apprehended or weighed by their followers; yet his

expressions of the nature, cause, and properties of original sin were to his own, and so they are to my apprehension more clear, more full and real, than any  
 35 definitions of Aquinas or Melancthon, even where they speak most fully according to their own principles, unto this point. Aquinas (as this author quotes him) somewhere grants, *Originale peccatum non esse meram privationem justitiæ originalis*—‘that original sin is not only a mere privation or want of original righteousness, but a positive or forcible inclination contrary to it.’ Melancthon with many others of the most learned writers which have been in the German or French church since Luther began to renounce the Romish church, acknowledge and define the same sin to be ἀταξία, a disorder of our faculties and affections, or, which is more, a depravation of our nature, or in other terms, whether Greek or Latin, fully equivalent unto these. Wherein then doth this singular writer (as some do censure him) either differ from or go beyond Aquinas, Melancthon, or others? all of whom respectively grant as much, and some of them more than is included in the definitions or descriptions of sin forecited out of Aquinas and Melancthon.

7. Illyricus defines original sin not by the abstract, but by the concrete, as thus—‘Original sin is the nature of man corrupted, or the affections or faculties of our souls and bodies disordered and depraved,’ &c. He nowhere defines it to be the nature, the substance, or faculties of men absolutely considered, or without limitation; yet to be all these so far as they are depraved and corrupted, or transformed out of that image of God which was seated in them by creation, into the image or real similitude of Satan. In man, considered as he was the work of God, or made after his image, there was an exact harmony or consonancy of will

unto the law and will of God ; an exact harmony of faculties and affections amongst themselves, and a sweet subordination of them unto the reasonable will or conscience, whilst that held consort with the will and law of God. But by the first man's fall, or wilful transgression, all parts of this harmony are lost : the sensitive desires, faculties, or affections, are at continual jar and discord amongst themselves. The best consort they hold is to fight jointly against the reasonable soul and conscience, or spiritual part of our nature ; especially so far as it holds any consort with the will of God. His definition then of sin by the substance or nature of man, as that is depraved or corrupted, and the definitions of other writers, which define it to be the deprivation of our nature ; or the difference between him when he defines it by the faculties or parts of our nature as these are disordered or instamped with the image of Satan, and other divines, who define it to be an *ataxy* or disorder of the affections and faculties, if we calculate their several expressions aright, they come all to one reckoning ; there is no more material question or real difference betwixt them, than if we should dispute whether three times four or four times three, or two times six or six times two, do better express or decipher the number of twelve ; or whether harmony be a consonancy of true voices or sounds, or true voices or sounds perfectly consonant.

## CHAP. XIII.

*Calvin and Martyr, &c. consent with Illyricus in the Description of original Sin : how far Sin original may be said to be the Pollution of the whole Nature and Faculties of Man, or the Faculties of Man as they are polluted.*

1. BESIDES many other good writers, Calvin and



The opinion of Calvin and Martyr concerning the nature of original or acquired sin.

Martyr, in their definitions or descriptions of sin in the unregenerate man, consort so well with Illyricus, that he that will condemn any one of them will be concluded not to acquit either of the other two; he that approves one of them cannot but approve the other, if

36 he either understand himself or them.

*Calvinus definit peccatum originale esse naturæ pravitatem ac corruptionem, ac mox exponens se, dicit: Imo tota hominis natura quoddam est peccati semen: ideo non odiosa et abominabilis Deo esse non potest. Quæ profecto ipsissima ratio formaque peccati originalis est, et ipsam certe essentiam hominis pessimam describit. Martyr quoque super Rom. definiens peccatum originale, eamque definitionem explicans, non obscure id ponit in ipsa mala essentia hominis: dicit enim totum hominem corruptissimum esse, definit vero inquit: Est ergo peccatum totius hominis naturæ depravatio a lapsu primi parentis in posteros traducta, et per generationem, etc. Et mox definitionem explicans inquit: In hac definitione omnia genera causarum habentur: pro materia aut subjecto habemus omnes hominis partes aut vires. Forma est earum omnium depravatio, &c. En audis ei originale peccatum complecti etiam ipsas hominis partes ac vires, quatenus sunt corruptæ ac depravatæ.—Illyricus in libello cui titulus Γνωθι σεαυτόν. Basileæ| impresso anno 1568. pp. 140, 141.*

“ Calvin defines sin original to be a pravity and corruption of nature: and presently, explaining himself, saith, ‘ Yea the whole nature of man is a kind of seed of sin, and therefore cannot but be odious and abominable to God, which truly is the very form (essence or definition) of original sin, and describes (or descries) surely the being of man to be very evil.’ And Martyr upon the Rom. defining *original sin*, and explaining that defini-



tion, manifestly places it in the evil essence of man ; for he says, that ‘ the whole man is most corrupt.’ And then defines it thus—‘ Sin is the depravation of the whole nature of man, transmitted to posterity from the fall of our first parents, and by generation,’ &c. And then opening the definition, he says—‘ In this definition are found all kinds of causes. For the subject or matter we have all the parts or powers of man. The form is, the depravation of them all.’ Lo ! you see, according to him [Martyr] sin original comprehends the parts and powers of man so far forth as they be corrupted and depraved.” Illyricus, in a book intitled, *Know thyself*.

2. But these definitions or descriptions, though (for aught I know, or have to except against them) they may be most orthodoxal for their truth or substance, yet the right limitation of them, or of the subject defined, is not free from further question ; as, first, whether the subject of them be sin original or acquired, as one or both of them are seated in the natural or unregenerate man, or as they are inherent in part in the best men after their regeneration, or purification of their hearts by faith. If every part, if every faculty or member of the human nature be from the womb tainted with this foul leprosy, it will be somewhat hard to conceive how any part or faculty should be absolutely freed from all degrees of corruption by regeneration ; unless we grant, that all are in some measure freed from it, and acknowledge some relics of sin original to remain in every part or faculty of the man truly regenerate, or renewed in the spirit of his mind. It may in the first place be conceived, that the mind or conscience of men so renewed may be thoroughly cleansed, not only from the guilt, but from the real stain or pollution of sin, and yet the flesh, or whole sensitive

parts or faculties of the same man, still lodge some relics of original corruption in them; though in a lower degree or less measure than the same corruption dwelleth in the conscience or spirit of the unregenerate  
37 or natural man. Or if we grant the mind and conscience of sanctified men to be yet subject to some tincture or relics of corruption, yet these we must acknowledge to be so weak and feeble, that they cannot hinder or diminish the reign or sovereignty of the spirit over the flesh, by which the yoke of servitude unto sin, or slavery unto Satan, (unto which all men before regeneration are by nature subject,) is utterly broken. If we consider man as he was first moulded by God, he was for nature, substance, and faculties of his soul, like a sound instrument well stringed and better tuned. But by eating of the forbidden fruit, and loss of paradise, his very substance was corrupted, and deprived of life spiritual; and all his powers or faculties not only corrupted, but distuned. Our nature by regeneration is restored to life spiritual, yet not to perfect health and strength, so long as we carry this burden of flesh and mortality about with us. By the same spirit of regeneration the powers or faculties of our souls, and our sensitive affections, are better tuned than they were before; yet not so sound or well tuned as in the first creation they were, but like to asymmetrical or harsh voices, which never hold consort with sounds or voices truly harmonical; or like to those which we call *false-strings* in a stringed instrument, which by no skill, either of him that tunes or handles it, can be brought to bear a part in exact harmony: both such voices and such strings will still retain some jarring sound or discord in an accurate and observant musician's ear; though much less when the string is stricken open, or upon a lower stop, or the voice taken at a lower key.

than when they are stretched higher. For with the height of either sound the discord or disharmony is still increased.

3. But when Calvin, Martyr, and Illyricus make original sin to be the whole nature of man and all his faculties, so far as they are corrupted and tainted; I know not whether their meaning were, that there is no action or thought of man, though regenerate, into which this corruption of nature or taint of sin hath not some influx; or whether they did actually or expressly mind this or other like inference, when they exhibited unto us the former definitions of sin. For myself, as I make no question but that the blessed Virgin herself was by nature the daughter of Adam, and therefore not so absolutely free from her conception as her Son our Saviour was; so I am afraid to avouch or think, that either sin original or acquired (it being supposed that she had some relics of both in her) should have any influence into or commixture with that good thought or actual consent which she yielded to the angel Gabriel, Luke i. 38: *Ecce ancilla Domini, &c.—Behold the handmaid of the Lord; be it unto me according to thy word.*

Whether sin original or acquired have an influx into every act of the human soul.

4. But these are niceties which I would not have touched, had it not been that some (whom I name not) have gone too far in opposition to the papist or Pelagian; unto whom, others, by coming too near, have fallen much wide or short of the truth. My aim and intention (as I often profess) is not to take upon me either by voice or pen to instruct such as are, or take themselves to be, *pro modulo viatorum* perfectly regenerated, much less men altogether certain of their own personal election or salvation. The utmost of my endeavours is to direct myself; and the height of my desires in this work, is, to advise others what we are to do for ourselves, or



what is to be done for us after baptism or confirmation, that we may be thoroughly regenerated, or, which is in effect all one, make our election sure. We are, I take it, in the first place to calculate the number of our sins, and to measure or weigh the body of sin inherent in us, whether by nature, or invited by ourselves, (not by 38 a corrupt worldly dialect, but,) according to the scales or standard of the sanctuary. And to this purpose no man hath given better hints or directions than Illyricus. For as he often observes and well illustrates, in the dialect of our Saviour himself, of his apostles and evangelists, whatsoever is repugnant to the law of God, or abominable in his sight, is accounted sin; and so are not accidents or mere abstracts or relations only, but specially the very substance or nature of man, so far as that is polluted or corrupted with sin, or wrought and transformed into the image of Satan. Now though it be true which was said before, that in exact philosophical or theological calculation, the definitions of sin given by St. Austin, Calvin, Martyr, &c. and Illyricus, come in the issue to one and the same reckoning; yet to vulgar or ruder apprehensions, Illyricus' definitions, which for the most part are causal, but especially his illustrations of them out of scripture, are far more dilucide, and more powerful to work upon our affections, and to encourage our spirits to undertake our Christian warfare against the old man or body of sin.

Illyricus' illustrations of sin more consonant to scripture than Calvin's or Martyr's.

5. To what purpose were it to tell unlettered or ordinary men, that the old man, or body of sin which we are to crucify or mortify, is *ἀταξία* or *ἀνομία*, *inordinatio* or *depravatio*, unless we could persuade them that these were names of giants, and paint them with far more hands than Briareus, with ten times more heads and mouths than Cerberus or Geryon had, and with more snakes instead of hairs upon their heads



than Medusa (according to poetical pictures) is emblazoned with; or make some representation of them in more ugly and horrible shape than the devil and infernal fiends are pictured by old monks and friars in their books and legends: albeit even these be but silly representations of infernal powers, with whom even Christian children, after they come to the use of reason, are to wage war, as *Æcolampadius* somewhere excellently observes. For every man, to whom God hath given grace or power to reflect upon his younger years, or to survey his own heart, his affections or inclinations either past or present, may respectively find a more exquisite live image of Satan within himself, than any painter can make. Though few or none in this age be bodily possessed with a legion of devils, yet most men, either by nature, ill breeding, or bad company, if they would rightly examine themselves, their actions, their passions, or projects, by the rule of scripture, might easily discover more than a legion of unruly, lewd, or vain thoughts, of unhallowed desires or vicious habits; such as are malice, pride, envy, uncharitableness, &c., which daily plead or fight for the sovereignty of the law of sin or lusts of the flesh, over the dictates or motions of the law of the mind or spirit. And these are the true and most exquisite pictures or images of the diabolical nature. And it was a wish or prayer worthy to be written with the point of a diamond, as I have seen it written, though in no sacred place, "Lord, deliver me from myself." His meaning which wrote it, I take it, was, that he might be delivered from vicious or unruly thoughts or habits, or otherlike soldiers of Satan, which every man before mortification of the flesh, or renovation by the Spirit, doth suffer to be lodged or billeted in his breast.

6. For conclusion, to give the intelligent reader a

more full definition of sin, or of the old man, which we are to crucify: It is, or contains, all the works of the flesh, or inclinations contrary to the law or Spirit of God, necessarily resulting from our nature or substance since it was corrupted in our first parents by the subtilty or power of Satan as the efficient cause, still labouring to obliterate the image of God wherein we were created, and to mould us into his own likeness; to the end that he may withdraw us from the service of God, which is perfect freedom, and make us everlasting slaves to himself and his infernal associates.

7. Likely it is I should have slighted Illyricus as much as many other of my profession do, upon a prejudicial noise or cry raised against him—at least I should not have taken that care and pains in perusing and examining his opinions which I have done—unless the book or treatise had been long ago commended to a learned friend of mine, upon very high terms, by that reverend and great divine Dr. Field, then dean of Gloucester.

SECTION III.

*Of Servitude unto Sin : who be properly Servants unto it, and by it unto Satan.*

CHAP. XIV.

*That even those Jews which did in part believe in Christ, were true Servants unto Sin. John viii. 31—33 : “ Then said Jesus to those Jews which believed on him, If ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed ; and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. They answered him, We be Abraham’s seed, and were never in bondage to any man : how sayest thou, Ye shall be made free ?”*

1. As we rightly gather that part of man’s body to be most corrupt, unsound, or ulcerous, which is most afraid of the chirurgion’s hand or instrument, which must heal or cure it; so these Jews may hence be truly convicted to have been, as our Saviour censures them, truly *servants unto sin*, or, in St. Peter’s expression, *servants of corruption*, in that they are so touchy and jealous of the very mention of being made free; albeit our Saviour (if you mark his process) doth handle them as warily and tenderly as any skilful chirurgion could do the most dangerous sores or ulcers of his most impatient patients. For he did not say, *If ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed, and I will make you free.* Although if he had thus said, he had said the truth. For HE it is, and HE alone, that must make all the sons of Adam free. But as he had an eagle’s eye to discover their hidden sore, and a lion’s heart to unrip or lance their sore unto the quick; so he had likewise the third property of an excellent

A para-  
phrase  
upon John  
viii. 31, &c.

chirurgian, to wit, a lady's hand, to touch them gently and tenderly. He tells them the truth, but in a placid and most inoffensive manner, by soft and gentle degrees: *If ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed; and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.* And who could be offended, or unwilling to be made free by the truth, but such as were desperately sick of falsehood and corruption? Such and so affected were these Jews, which did in part believe on our Saviour. For they had no sooner heard him making mention of *being made free*, though by the truth, but they instantly return this repining and impatient answer—*We be Abraham's seed, and were never in bondage to any man: how sayest thou, Ye shall be made free?*

- 40 2. Many good interpreters do question the truth of their answer, as whether they were not at this very time in bondage to the Romans. And Tully in his Oration *pro Flacco*, (whose crime was aggravated, for that he had alienated or detained some gold which had been gathered towards the adorning or beautifying the temple at Jerusalem,) to elevate or lessen that conceit which many Romans had of the nation of the Jews, as of a people better beloved of the gods than other people were, objects little less unto them, than (as they apprehend) our Saviour in this place doth; to wit, 'that they were in bondage to the Romans:' or at least (if they were not in bondage) they were more beholding to the clemency of the Romans, that did not make them servants, having lately conquered them, than unto the favour of their God or gods, which had suffered them to be conquered. For it was an unquestionable prerogative of the conquerors in those days, to bring all such as wilfully or desperately resolved to try their cause in battle with them into civil servi-



tude or bondage if so they pleased. They held it no sin, but rather a matter of courtesy or kindness, to exchange death, which by title of war was due unto the conquered, for servitude, or civil bondage.

3. But to do these Jews no wrong, their answer unto our Saviour was not altogether so false as captious, seeing it consists of two parts, both negative: the one *de facto*, that they were not servants; that they *never had been in bondage unto any man*. And this part of their answer may well seem false, if they extend the meaning of it unto the time of Abraham or Jacob. For Jacob's seed or posterity was in bondage unto the Egyptians. The condition of the whole nation under the Babylonians or Chaldeans was little better. But it may be, that they intended their answer only in respect of themselves, or their own times: and so it is true, that they were not *de facto* in bondage to the Romans, or to any man. For the Romans suffered them to enjoy the privileges of free men; to use the liberty of their own laws, though with subjection or subordination in many points unto the laws of the Romans.

The Jews in our Saviour's time were no slaves unto the Romans either *de jure* or *de facto*.

4. The other part of their answer was *de jure*; and this was most true; that being the seed of Abraham, they could not justly (especially so long as they continued in their native country) be made servants or bondslaves by the Romans, in that they had a more just title unto the land of promise by being the seed of Abraham and sons of Jacob, than the Romans themselves had unto the kingdom or empire of Italy, or unto Rome itself. The mighty God, and supreme Lord and sole possessor of heaven and earth, had given the land of Canaan unto Abraham and to his seed, by more express covenant and peculiar title than the kings of nations had to their crowns or sceptres: all which notwithstanding they hold immediately from the same

God. The attempts or practices of other nations against this people were always frustrate and void in law, even by the law of God, save only in case that he were displeased with them, and suffered such as hated them to be lords over them; in which cases they were to be no longer in civil subjection unto others than till they returned to him by repentance, confessing their sins and the sins of their forefathers. Thus doing, their charter for free enjoying the land of Canaan was so absolute, so durable and strong, that no authorized customs of men or nations could prevail or prescribe against it. So that the matter of their answer in respect of civil servitude or bondage was absolutely true *de jure*; and *de facto* too, if they meant it, or we restrain it unto the time wherein they were under the government of the Romans.

41 5. But how true soever both ways it were, it was altogether impertinent, nothing at all to the purpose or point in question; for our Saviour no way intended to object, nor doth his speech any way imply, any civil servitude, or that they were or ought to be, or had been at any time, servants unto men, but only that they were servants unto sin, which indeed was the worst master that they or any man could serve. Thus much his reply unto their impertinent allegation expressly and emphatically avers: *Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin.* And though by title of law, as well divine as human, he be, whosoever it is, a king or lord over others in respect of civil servitude or dominion, yet, till he be freed from the dominion of sin, he hath the condition or property of a servant. What is that? Our Saviour tells us in the next words: *The servant abideth not in the house for ever*; that is, he hath no right nor interest in the house wherein for the

The fore-mentioned Jews were true slaves unto sin.

present his abode or continuance is, but only *durante domini beneplacito*, so long as it shall seem good unto his master, and no longer. *But the son*, saith our Saviour, *abideth in the house for ever*, because the inheritance belongs to him. This saying or maxim of our Saviour is grounded upon the civil customs or law of nations, concerning the right or privilege of the son or firstborn in respect of servants; but is most remarkably true of the Son of God: he is the only Son, the only Heir, not apparent only, but the only Heir possible of that house, whose builder and maker is God. In that he is God's only Son, he is the only Lord, the only Heir of all things that were builded, that were created by him; not free only in his person, but endued with full power and authority to make all others free that seek unto him. And this his power is so absolute and plenary, that without him none can be truly and indeed set free. For so he himself concludes: *If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.*

#### CHAP. XV.

*Containing the general Heads of this whole Treatise, and of the Distinction betwixt Slaves and those which we call hired Servants, or Apprentices, or freeborn Persons in their Nonage.*

1. THAT we may understand our own estate by nature, and the inheritance whereunto we are entitled by grace, better than the Jews did, we are to discuss these three points:

First, wherein civil bondage or servitude doth consist; or, what be the properties wherein servants differ from free men.

Secondly, what proportion or analogy servitude to

sin hath unto civil servitude; and whether such as our Saviour saith are truly servants unto sin, be more truly and properly servants than such as are legal and civil servants.

Thirdly, the manner how the Son of God doth set us free from the bondage or servitude of sin.

Of the condition of slaves and hired servants.

2. Servitude is opposed to freedom; and we cannot well know what it is to be a servant, unless we first know what it is to be a freeman. We do not mean a freeman of this or that corporation, but a freeman simply, or one that is free by birth or condition of life. Every one in this sense is said to be free that hath right or power to dispose of himself, of his children, of his lands or goods, or of his own actions or employments. Every one likewise is a servant, that being come to full years is deprived of this right or power to dispose of himself, of his lands, of his goods, of his actions or employments, either in whole or in part. As for children, or such as are under years, though born to be lords over others, yet whilst they are under years, they are properly neither freemen nor servants: although, as the apostle teacheth us, Gal. iv. 1, 2, they participate more of the nature of servants than of freemen: *Now I say, That the heir, as long as he is a child, differeth nothing from a servant, though he be lord of all; but is under tutors and governors until the time appointed of the father.* For this reason, one and the same word in the original is promiscuously used for children and for servants, because neither of them are at their own disposals, but at the disposals of their guardians or masters.

3. According to the several extents of this want of power or right to dispose of themselves, of their actions or employments; or rather, according to the extent of others' right or power to dispose of them



in all these, there be several degrees of servitude, and divers sorts of servants. Some, as the great philosopher in his Politics would have it, are *servi a natura*, "were framed by nature only to serve," or to be at other men's disposals, as not being able to dispose of themselves. Such as had strong bodies but weak brains were in his judgment more fit to be governed by others than to govern themselves. But this kind of servitude is improper. For, *omnis servus est aliqujus domini servus*, "every servant is the servant of some particular lord or master," whose interest, whether in his person or employments, must be grounded upon some special title. Such as by nature are destitute of wit or reason, do not thereby become servants, unless we should say, they were every man's servants that are disposed to employ them. And this privilege they have of others, that they are not capable of any contract or legal title, by which they may make themselves or be made this or that man's servants; and being no man's servants, they can be no servants.

*Qui ubique est, nusquam est: "He that is everywhere, is nowhere."*

4. Though our English "servant" be derived from the Latin *servus*, yet "servants" in our English tongue we call many which a good Latinist would rather call *famuli* than *servi*, being indeed servants, that is, at other men's disposals but in part only, not in whole, whom for distinction sake we call *apprentices* or *hired servants*; over whose actions or employments their masters, during the time of their hire or apprenticeship, have full right and interest, and authority likewise over their bodies or persons, to correct or punish them if they take upon them to dispose of their actions or employments otherwise than for their masters' behoof, or as they shall appoint; but over their persons, their bodies, their goods or children, their masters have no right nor interest. They may not

take upon them by our laws to dispose of these as they do of their day labours or bodily employments. Yet are these properly called *servants*, as having made themselves such, or are so made by their parents or guardians, upon some contract, or by some branch or title of commutative justice, in which there is always *ratio dati et accepti*, somewhat given and taken that binds both the parties; as in this particular case, the master gives and the servant receives, meat, drink and wages; and in lieu of these benefits received, the servant yields up, and the master receives, a right or interest in his bodily and daily labours, and a power to dispose of these. Yet are they servants, as we said, only in part, not mere servants.

- 43 5. Mere servants (or servants absolutely or in whole) were such as the Latins called *mancipia*, such as we call in English *slaves* or *bondmen*, or such as sometimes, out of a superfluity of speech, or expressing ourselves in our native dialect, we term *bond-slaves*; for a slave is as much as a bondman, and no bondman can be any more than a slave. A *bondslave* is a name which hath no reality answerable or fully commensurable unto it. Unto this state or condition of life, that is, of being a slave or bondman, no man is bound or subject by nature; no man will willingly or voluntarily subject himself. Such as heretofore have been, and in divers countries yet are, servants in this sense, were made such by others from a pretended right or title of conquest, and were called *mancipia quasi manu capti*, because they had been taken in war, and might by rigour of justice, at least by rigour of hostile law, be put to death, as men convicted of rebellion by taking arms. Now the price of their redemption from death was loss of civil liberty, as well for themselves as their posterity. These were

truly and properly called *servi*, according to the native etymology of this name in Latin, *servi quasi servati*: they were again wholly and merely servants, according to the utmost extent of the nature and of the real conditions or properties of civil servitude; that is, their lords or masters had an absolute right or interest, not only in their bodily actions or employments, but over their very persons, their bodies, their children, and whatsoever by any title did belong unto them. The interest, power, or dominion which masters by the civil law, or law of nations, had over their *servi* or *mancipia*, their "slaves" or "bondmen," was altogether such, and as absolute, as a freeholder hath over his own inheritance or fee-simple; that is, a power or right not only to reap or take the annual fruits or commodities of it, but full right to let or set for term of years, or to alienate or sell the property; for so were bondmen and their children bought and sold, as lands and goods or cattle are with us. All the right, dominion, or interest which masters with us have over their servants or apprentices, is only such as a tenant or leaseholder for some limited time or term of years hath over the ground or soil which he payeth rent for; that is, a right or property in the herbage, a right or power to reap the fruits or increase of it during the time of his covenant, but no right to alienate or sell so much as the earth or gravel, much less to alienate or make away the fee-simple or inheritance, which is still reserved unto the owner. Thus the bodies or persons of hired servants are their own; their minds and consciences are free, even during the time of their service: but the use or employment of their bodies, in services lawful and ingenuous, is their master's. So are the services of

their wit, for accomplishing with care and diligence what by duty they are bound to perform.

## CHAP. XVI.

*That the former Difference of Servitude or Distinction of Servants is set down and allowed by God himself.*

1. THIS difference of servitudes or distinction of servants is expressly delivered in holy scripture, allowed and approved of by God himself, Levit. xxv. 39, &c. *If thy brother that dwelleth by thee be waxen poor, and be sold unto thee; thou shalt not compel him to serve as a bondservant: but as an hired servant, and as a sojourner, he shall be with thee, and shall serve thee unto the year of jubile: and then shall he depart from thee, both he and his children with him, and shall return unto his own family, and unto the possession of his fathers shall he return. For they are my servants, which I brought forth out of the land of Egypt: they shall not be sold as bondmen.* From this place these two points are clear: first, that if an Israelite were waxen poor or in debt, he might lawfully sell or alienate the use of his own or of his children's bodily employments unto his brother, for the maintenance of his and his children's lives, or for the discharge of his debt, until the year of jubilee, but no longer; but to sell the bodies or persons of himself or of his children was not permitted by the law of God. Nor might any son of Abraham or Jacob buy or sell any of their brethren, though willing to sell themselves or their children; but on the contrary, if through necessity, that knows no law, any son of Jacob sold himself unto the heathen, or in case he and his children had been seized upon for debt, his kinsmen

A para-  
phrase upon  
Levit. xxv.  
39, &c.

44



or brethren were to redeem him, or at least not to suffer him to serve any longer than the year of jubilee. And during that term he was to serve only as a hired servant, and not as a bondman. From this law, if they had no other reason, the Jews here spoken of might safely plead, 'That inasmuch as they were Abraham's seed, they neither were nor could be in bondage unto any man *de jure*.' The reason why the Lord would not have them to be in bondage unto any man, is in the law expressed; because they were his servants by a peculiar title, because he had redeemed them from the bondage and thralldom unto which the Egyptians had, *de facto*, not *de jure*, most unjustly brought them.

2. Secondly, from this law it is clear, that God did both allow and authorized the Israelites and seed of Abraham to have bondmen of the nations round about them, or of the strangers that sojourned amongst them, that they might bequeath the very bodies and persons of them and their children as an inheritance and possession unto their sons and posterity for ever, vv. 45, 46. That is, they had the same title or interest in them, the same absolute power or dominion over them, as they had over their lands, their goods or cattle; that is, power to alienate or sell them or their children, for their best commodity, at their pleasure. Of this second sort of servants or bondmen, which were, in *bonis alterius*, the goods or possessions of their masters, are our Saviour's speeches in most parables to be understood, wherein mention is made of servants without distinction. So we read, Matt. xviii. 25, *that the lord of that ungracious servant which would not forgive his fellow an hundred pence, commanded him to be sold, and his wife, and children, and all that he had, and payment to be made.* Our

Saviour's speech, though it be a parable rather than an history, is grounded upon an historical or positive truth: he speaks according to the common custom of those times and places, by which, not only the servants themselves and their children, but whatsoever they had gathered together, were wholly at their lord's or master's disposing. For, as we say, *Superficies sequitur solum*; he that is lord or owner of the soil or ground, becomes thereby lord and owner of the house, which another man builds upon it: so in like case, he that is lord of another man's person or body, doth thereby become lord of all his goods, or whatsoever he may be thought to possess. But so it is not with hired servants amongst us; for, inasmuch as their bodies or persons are free, and are no part of their master's goods or possession, they may be true owners, lords, or possessors of whatsoever they got, either by their own industry, or what otherwise may fall unto them by deed of gift, by death of friends, or the like.

- 45 3. But though bondmen and hired servants do in other points differ, yet in many they agree. Most maxims, whether legal or moral, which are true of the one, are true likewise (though in different manner or proportion) of the other. As for example, when our Saviour saith, *No man can serve two masters; but he shall either love the one or hate the other; or lean to the one and despise the other*; this saying in many cases may be specially and more remarkably true of slaves or bondmen, yet very true of hired servants: for every man is so far truly and properly a servant, as he is at another man's disposal. And every man is so far truly and properly a lord or master over another man, as he hath right or power to dispose either of his body, or of his actions or labours. Now inasmuch as the master of an hired

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points  
agree.

servant or apprentice hath as absolute right or interest in his actions, his labours, or employments, as the master of a slave or bondman hath in the actions or employments of his bondman; it is as impossible for the one as for the other to execute the will and pleasure of two men that differ in their particular employments or designs. It is the duty of a faithful servant to execute, not his own will, but the will and pleasure of his master. But if so it happen that two men or more may concur or consent to employ one and the same man in the selfsame business and service, then, as we say, ‘Many stones make but one load,’ and many things of several weight but one burden; so, in this case, two or three or more men thus concurring in the same designs make but one master. But faithfully to execute the wills of men that differ in their designs, or fully to satisfy two or more men that have several and full interests in one man’s actions and labours, is as impossible as for a body to move two contrary ways at once.

4. The most general and most essential property wherein both sorts of servants do univocally agree, by which they formally differ from a man absolutely free, is thus gathered by Tully: *Liber est qui vivit ut vult*; He is civilly free (for that was the chief freedom that he knew, and the freedom whereof we now do treat) that may live or do as he will in matters of civil pass or commerce. And by contrary, he is a servant that in matters civil, *non vivit ut vult*, that either cannot do as he would, or oftentimes must do as he would not. Or, to give the very radical point of difference betwixt the master and the servant, of what rank soever the servant be, we are first to know wherein they agree. Both of them essentially agree in this, in that they have a reasonable will or desire

How bondmen or hired servants are differenced from freemen.

to do themselves good. For such as God hath deprived of the use of reason, whether by nature or from their birth, or by subsequent mischance or accident, are neither capable of dominion nor servitude, they can neither properly be masters nor servants. He that is a freeman or master in those things wherein he is free or a master, hath not only *voluntatem propriam*, but *arbitrium proprium*; not only a reasonable will or desire to do himself good, but withal a power or faculty to dispose of his time, of his actions or employments, for compassing or attaining the good which he desires. The servant, whilst he is a servant, hath no *arbitrium proprium*, no right or power to dispose of himself, or of his actions or labours, for compassing or achieving that good which, in that he is a reasonable creature, he can as truly affect or desire as his master doth. Any master or man that is free, if at any time he find himself melancholy or misaffected in body or mind, may allot what hour or hours of the day he please for the exercise of the body or recreation of his mind, and make choice of what company, of what sport or recreation he please, so it be civil and ingenuous, or such as the law doth either approve or not condemn: but this may not a servant do without his master's especial leave or license. For seeing his  
46 master hath as good right or interest in his actions or labours, as he that payeth rent for grounds, or hire for a horse, hath in the use of both during the times of their hire; it is a branch of the same fraud or cozenage in a servant, either to alienate or convert his actions or labours to any other end than to his master's behoof, as it is in a man that takes money of another for his lands or grounds, and yet will reap part of their annual fruits or commodities; the same offence in a servant to misspend that time in play, sport, or idle-



ness, which should be spent in his master's employments, as for a man to take interest for money lent, and not suffer the party to enjoy it wholly during the time for which he paid interest.

5. Again, a hired servant may as truly and lawfully desire to increase that power, stock, or means, which he hath either gotten by his service, or hath been left him by his friends, as his master in like case may do. But he may not use, it is unlawful for him to use, the same means for increasing his portion that his master may do: for, first, he cannot without wrong to his master take so much time for contriving his own profit or commodity, as his master without wrong to any man may do: or, secondly, though he had time enough to contrive his ends, yet can he not without wrong to his master have time enough or take liberty to practise the means for effecting or accomplishing what he hath contrived: as he may not without his master's leave frequent markets or meetings, where gainful bargains, or opportunities of increasing his means, are to be had.

6. Again, it is lawful and honest for a servant to wish well unto his friends, or to be willing to do them good that have done him any; but it is not so free or lawful for him to employ himself, his time, or labours, to do them any real good or friendly office, as it is in like case for his master. Nay, a servant in this case shall oft be constrained to bestow his pains for their good whom he least affects, and to neglect or to do nothing for them to whom he wishes most good, whom he loves best. For all his actions or employments are at the disposal of his master, who if he command him to do some business for his own enemy, but his master's friend, though to the prejudice of his own friend, but his master's enemy, (unless the action be

unjust, or by the public law forbidden,) he must do his master's will, not his own. Nor would any ingenuous man like worse a servant in thus doing, but rather the better. So that every servant hath a freedom of will to desire that which is good for himself or to his friend; but hath oftentimes a necessity laid upon him, *aut non agendi quod vult, aut agendi quod non vult*: "either of not doing that which he most desires to do, or of doing that which he most desires not to do." But unto this necessity or inconvenience no freeman is either by law or conscience subject; and no ingenuous man will voluntarily subject himself for any other man's pleasure, especially if he be but his equal, or one that hath no more peculiar interest in him than another man may have. The answer of the Roman orator doth better become a free and ingenuous man, as he was, than a servant. When his potent adversary expostulated with him, *Cur tu inimicum meum defendis?* he wittily replied, *Cur tu amicum meum accusas?* It was as free for him to defend him that was an enemy to the accuser, as it was for the accuser to accuse his friend. And it may be the elegant poet of these later times did take the hint or matter of his epigram from this passage in the orator:

Odero, si jubeas, Selium tibi scilicet hostem :

Si, mihi, tu Selium, quod sit amicus, ames.

"Selius, because your foe, I'll hate in mind,

So you will love him, for that he's my friend."

47 Thus much of civil servitude, or the condition of servants. The second point was, what analogy or proportion this servitude or servants to sin have to civil bondage, or to such as are truly and properly servants by human and legal constitutions.

CHAP. XVII.

*What Analogy or Proportion civil Servitude hath with true Servitude unto Sin.*

1. FOR the truth of this conclusion, *Whosoever* Servitude to sin the most proper kind of servitude. *committeth sin is the servant of sin*, no further or better proof (as hath been premised) can be expected than our Saviour's authority. But in what sense this conclusion is true, or whether such as commit sin be truly and properly termed servants, or servants only in a metaphorical or borrowed sense, some haply will make question or doubt; for mine own part, I make none, as being from many particulars sufficiently informed, that such of our Saviour's speeches, as not unto ordinary hearers only, but unto many good interpreters, seem only borrowed or metaphorical, have for the most part a more exquisite literal and concludent sense than the same words or speeches have in common language, or in ordinary faculties or vulgar arts: and such a metaphysical sublime concludent sense, his words that *spake as never man spake*, always have, when his speeches are doctrinal and assertive; as his words are John viii. 34, most universal, most peremptory and dogmatical, *Verily, verily, I say unto you, &c.*

2. Now as it cannot be denied that this name of *servitude* is, as we say, ἀνάλογόν τι, a term that may be properly attributed in different measure to many subjects of divers natures or conditions, so the prime and principal subject of it, unto which it agrees in most exquisite and ample manner, is not the legal or civil servitude whereof we have hitherto treated, but the servitude of sin whereof our Saviour here speaks. Whence, although we stand bound to believe the truth of this conclusion from his authority alone,

yet this no way bars us from searching other reasons or arguments, whether from art or nature, for illustration of this truth, or for confirmation of our belief or knowledge of it. Or rather his emphatical manner of averring it ought to incite us to sound the meaning of it a little deeper, and to discover the reason of it to the bottom. And thus doing we shall but follow the steps of two of our Saviour's apostles, St. Peter and St. Paul, in this very particular: both of them having occasion to use the same assertion that our Saviour here doth, give us the reason of the truth or property of this assertion. So saith St. Paul to the Romans, chap. vi. 16: *Know ye not, (as it were matter of gross ignorance or imputation not to know,) that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey; whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness?* So that there is a proper servitude in yielding unto sin; and whosoever yields his consent or obedience unto sin, doth thereby make himself the true and proper servant of sin.

3. And St. Peter, second epistle, chap. ii, having sharply taxed such carnal gospellers as had forsaken the right way, and followed the way of Balaam, which loved the ways of unrighteousness, brands them with this note or character: *That whilst they promise liberty unto others, they themselves are the servants of corruption.* And this assertion he ratifies by this reason or doctrinal principal: *Of whom a man is*  
 48 *overcome, of the same is he brought into bondage.* This reason toucheth the very root of bondage or servitude properly so called, which had no other title to its first being or introduction into the world, besides the right or title of victory or conquest. Now to be subdued or vanquished against their wills, though in a doubtful or bad cause, is not so meritorious of



slavery or bondage, as to suffer ourselves, through our sloth, through our cowardice, our supine negligence or treachery, to be overcome in a true, a just, a necessary, especially in a religious cause. He to whom men yield themselves servants by betraying or not defending such causes, though he love the treason whereby he gains the victory, will use the traitor, or party vanquished by him, but as a slave or bondman.

4. The first and radical point of difference betwixt a servant and a freeman in matters civil was before set down; and it was this: A man that is civilly free hath not only *voluntatem propriam*, a reasonable will to desire his own good, or a freedom of consultation to contrive the means how this good may be attained, but withal a right or power to dispose of himself, of his time, of his bodily actions or employments for executing his intentions or consultations. The servant hath the like reasonable will to desire his own good; a natural power or faculty to deliberate or consult by what means the good which he requires may be attained; but no right or power to dispose of himself, of his time, of his bodily labours, of his actions or employments for executing his desires or deliberations: for in all these he is at his master's disposal. Now the want of this power or liberty to prosecute their own contrivances, makes servants for the most part more slow and more dull in their desires, and more unapt to contrive the means for compassing what they desire.

5. From this difference between servitude and freedom, or servants and freemen, in matters civil and politic, it is but a short cut and easy passage to discover the right difference betwixt servitude and freedom in matters moral and sacred. *Sin*, as the apostle speaks, *is the transgression of the law*: and every transgressor of the law, to wit, of the moral law of God—

The measure of transgression of the law of God, the only true measure of servitude.

that is, every such transgressor as we call *malefactor* or *offender*—every one that delights in transgression, or hath no power to resist temptations to transgress—is truly and properly the servant of sin: *Rectum*, saith the philosopher, *est mensura sui et obliqui*: “A right line is the measure of that which is crooked as well as of that which is straight.” Now the right line or rule by which as well our desires as our actions must be framed, by which the obliquities of both must be discovered or censured, is the moral law of God. This is the only rule by which the height or degrees, as well of our freedom as our servitude, must be measured. For want of this rule to direct them, the wisest among the heathens have either much erred in the definition of liberty or freedom, or at least come far short of the truth in defining it: *Quid est libertas nisi potestas vivendi ut velis?* “What is liberty or freedom,” saith Tully<sup>a</sup>, “but a power or faculty of living as we would?” But this definition or description of liberty or freedom is very defective and lame, like a sentence without the principal verb, or a body without a soul. Man’s will in the state of corruption, or since Adam’s fall, is no competent rule for human actions: itself must be regulated by the law of God, whether positive or eternal. The very life and spirit of perfect liberty, in whomsoever, is *potestas volendi quod lex divina jubet*; that is, “a power or faculty of willing that which by God’s law we ought to will.” And this power or faculty being supposed as the soul, *potestas vivendi aut agendi quod volumus*, that other “power,” which Tully only mentions, “of living or doing as we  
49 will or desire,” is but the body of true freedom or liberty. So that he only is a true and perfect freeman that hath both the body and soul of perfect freedom;

Wherein the best of the heathens did err, as well in their definitions of liberty as of happiness.

<sup>a</sup> In Paradoxis.

that is, *tam potestatem volendi quod deceat, quam vivendi ut vult*, “as true a power to will what he ought, as to do what he will.” So much as man hath of this freedom, so much and no more he hath of true happiness. Some philosophers there were which defined happiness after the same manner that Tully defined liberty: “Him they accounted happy which lived according to his own will.” But “God forbid,” (saith St. Austin, Epist. 121, *ad Probam*,) “that we should take this for gospel.” *Quid si enim nequiter velit vivere?* “For what shall we think if a man were disposed to live wickedly or naughtily?” *Nonne tanto miserior esse convincitur, quanto facilius mala ejus voluntas impletur?* “May he not hence be convinced to be so much the more miserable, by how much it is more easy for him to accomplish his naughty will?” And therefore this opinion (as the same father avoucheth) was rejected by such philosophers or wise men as were without knowledge of the only wise immortal God. For one of those philosophers or wise men, saith the same father, *vir eloquentissimus*, (whether he meant Cicero or Seneca, or some other, I know not,) condemns the former opinion as an heresy in philosophy, and gives this reason for it: *Velle enim quod non deceat, id ipsum miserrimum: nec tam miserum est, non adipisci quod velis, quam adipisci velle, quod non oporteat*: “To will that which a man ought not to will, is the greatest misery that can befall a man: nor is it so great a misery not to achieve what we desire, as to desire to achieve, or endeavour to compass, that which we ought not to desire.”

6. *Quid tibi videntur hæc verba*, (saith the same

<sup>a</sup> August. Epist. (121.) 130. sect. 10. tom. 2.

father unto his friend to whom he wrote this epistle,) *nonne ab ipsa veritate per quemlibet hominem dicta sunt?*—“What, do you think, were not these words derived from the fountain of truth, by what conduit or channel soever they have been brought unto us?” Therefore we may say of this saying as St. Paul doth of a prophet or poet of Crete, whose sentence did please him—*Testimonium hoc verum est*—“This testimony is true,” and worthy the receiving. And from this saying that reverend father concludes—*Ille igitur beatus est, qui omnia quæ vult habet, nec aliquid vult quod non decet*—“He is truly happy that hath all things which he desires to have, being disposed to desire nothing which he ought not.” This conclusion is as necessary and true in the argument whereof we treat: ‘He only is a true and perfect freeman, which hath a power or freedom to desire nothing but what he ought, and a power or freedom to dispose of himself, and of his endeavours for attaining or compassing what he thus desires.’ So that this freedom consists in the service of God: and that consists in a submission to his will, and in reliance upon his most absolute power to accomplish whatsoever he will, or whatsoever he shall think fitting for us to will or desire at his hands.

7. As absolute happiness, so absolute freedom is only in God. Both are essential only unto him: that is, he only cannot be deprived either of happiness or of freedom by any other: nor can he be willing to deprive himself of them. *Non Deus volens iniquitatem tu es*, saith the psalmist, psalm v. 4, *Thou art not a God that canst will iniquity*, as the gods of the heathen did. It is as impossible for our God to make such laws, or to grant such dispensations with his own laws, as the god of Rome and Roman catholics, the pope, doth, as it is for this god of Rome to make himself the God of heaven.



He cannot dispense with the law forbidding marriage betwixt uncle and niece: he cannot make laws to authorize murder. It is the first part of his happiness to be able to will only that which is good, just, and 50 holy; the second, in that he hath absolute power to do whatsoever he will in heaven and earth.

8. Men and angels in their first creation had a true image of this their Creator's happiness and freedom. And this image of their freedom did consist in a power or faculty of willing only such things as were good and pleasing to their Creator; secondly, in a power or faculty of framing their inferior desires or appetites of sense, and of squaring all their actions and endeavours, according to the rectitude or rule of their reasonable will. But this power or faculty, wherewith both men and angels at their first creation were endued, was in respect of both its objects or branches, as well in respect of willing only that which was good, as of their ability to do what they would, mutable or contingent: it was not essential to them as to God. Though man by right of creation was truly free; yet he had a true possibility of losing his freedom, a greater possibility of ceasing to be a freeman than of ceasing to be a man. As he was created after God's image, he was actually and truly endued with freedom; but as he was a man created of nothing, he was capable of servitude; and by his folly or wilful presumption he brought himself and his posterity into bondage unto Satan, who, by the like but greater presumption, and more wilful abuse of his freewill or power over himself, did bring himself and his confederate angels into greater and more desperate servitude unto sin and wickedness than he could draw our first parents unto, albeit he drew them into true and proper servitude, and to this day draws all such as seek not to be set free by Christ in this

acceptable time, which is allotted here on earth, into absolute, complete, and desperate servitude—into such an irrecoverable estate as he and his angels are in.

## CHAP. XVIII.

### *Of the several Branches of Servitude unto Sin.*

1. THE principal branches or stems of this our servitude unto sin are four: the first, an impotency or want of power of doing that which we would, or a necessity of not doing that which reason and our own conscience tell us to be good, or that which the word of God expressly requires at our hands, as a due service unto our Creator and Redeemer. The degrees or latitude of this branch must be taken from the necessity of the duty or precept commanding obedience, and from the degrees of our impotency or want of ability to do what is commanded, which sometimes grows into a necessity of non-performance. The second branch of our servitude consists in a necessity of doing what we would not: that is, of doing that in the particular which we utterly dislike in the general, as being contrary to the rule of reason, or to the dictate of our consciences in our sober and retired thoughts, or contrary to the express word of God, which ought to be the rule as well of our actions as of our wills and desires. Of these two branches of servitude is that of the apostle, Rom. vii. 14, 15: *For we know that the law is spiritual: but I am carnal, sold under sin. For that which I do I allow not: for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I.* And ver. 19: *For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do.*

The degrees or latitude of the first, second, third, and fourth branches of servitude unto sin.

2. The third branch of this servitude unto sin consists in an impotency or want of ability to will or

desire those things which we ought to desire. The <sup>51</sup> root of this branch is ignorance, either of those good things which may be known by natural light of reason or by the word of God. Of this branch of servitude, or of servants of this rank or condition, is that of the apostle especially true and intended by him, *that they have their minds darkened, and the eyes of their understanding blinded, through the ignorance that is in them.* Eph. iv. 18.

3. The fourth and last branch, which is likewise the worst, consists in a necessity of willing and desiring that which we ought not to desire or will. Against this branch of servitude, or men thus affected, is that *woe* of the prophet in particular denounced—Isaiah v. 20: *Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter!* Of this third and fourth branch is that of the apostle, Eph. iv. 19: *Who being past feeling have given themselves over unto lasciviousness, to work all uncleanness with greediness.*

4. The third branch, or impotency of willing that which we ought, or that which we are in duty bound, not only to will but to do, is such an infirmity of the soul, as we see in some men's bodies, which have lost not only their digestive faculty, but all appetite of wholesome food. This fourth and last branch, which consists in a necessity of willing that which we ought not to will, is like to that distemper of body which physicians call the *pica* or the *malacia*, that is, a ravenous appetite or greedy longing after such things as are loathsome and unnatural.

5. All these branches of servitude, but especially the first and the third, are twofold; either natural or acquired: or, to speak more properly, the roots and first

These branches of servitude unto sin either natural or acquired.

seeds of them are natural, and hereditary from our first parents; the nutriment, the growth or increase of them, is for the most part from men themselves, not from Adam : these are acquired or purchased by ill education or breeding, by lewd company or bad customs. Never was there any son of Adam but upon examination might have found himself oftentimes indisposed, unapt, or altogether unable, to do many things which in the general he approved as good, and in his retired thoughts he desired to do ; and for the not doing of which, when opportunity served, and occasions required, his wakened conscience or after-thoughts would often check him. Never was there any son of Adam, whose conscience, upon a review or examination of his actions, would not accuse or condemn him for doing many things which in better mood he desired not to do, and such things as he had promised to himself and his own conscience, if not to others, not to do.

6. But this necessity of doing many things which in their sober mood they resolve not to do, or of doing them in such a high measure and degree as oftentimes they are done, is not hereditary to any son of Adam. This is a necessity which men bring upon themselves, either by frequenting lewd company or by bad custom, or at least have it brought upon them, not by Adam, but by the bad example or ill instructions of their immediate parents or overseers. As for the fourth branch of servitude, which consists in a necessity of willing or desiring those things which men ought not to desire, this, of all the rest, is least hereditary; for it includes a degree of iniquity with which we cannot charge our father Adam. He indeed sought to mince or mitigate his offence after he had wilfully committed it; and thus to do was a grievous fault or offence; but we never read, nor have we any reason to suspect, that he did



delight or glory either in this or in any other sin; or use his sins past as an advantage or rise to mount himself to sin. We do not read that Cain did glory in the murder of his brother Abel, or that Judas did make himself merry with the price of blood: both of them were servants unto sin, and by sin unto Satan. Their servitude unto sin in general was hereditary, and necessarily derived unto them, as it is naturally unto all us, from our father Adam. But neither was the one a murderer or fratricide, nor the other a traitor by natural descent or inheritance. Judas became a traitor by making himself as base a servant or vassal to covetousness; yet not so great a servant to the one or other sin, as those which delight and glory in these or the like sins. For though *the scripture hath concluded all under sin*, as well the Jew as the Gentile; though the best of men, as the scripture teacheth us, be by nature the servants of sin; yet we read of some whom the scripture hath branded with this mark, *that they have sold themselves to work wickedness or do mischief*. And these are slaves to sin, and bondmen unto Satan by a double title; the one by natural descent or inheritance; the other by their own voluntary acts, as it were of bargain or sale. Cain, and those Jews mentioned, John viii, which persecuted our Saviour, because his works were good and theirs were evil, were not only the sons of Adam, (though that were enough to make them servants of sin,) but, as our Saviour tells them in ver. 44 of that eighth chapter, *they were of their father the devil*.

7. But to descend unto a more particular survey of every branch, beginning with the first and second, which are for the most part coincident, and so mutually wrapped together, that we cannot truly handle the one but we must touch the other: for, the first (as hath

been said before) consists in an impotency or impossibility of doing that which we oftentimes desire to do, and approve as good: and this impotency or impossibility doth ordinarily proceed from or draw after it a necessity of doing that which we desire not to do, and which in our better thoughts we altogether condemn as naughty, and unfitting to be done.

8. Some measure of these branches was clearly discovered by the wiser and more sober sort of the heathen; and the men which were most subject to either were adjudged by them to be true and proper servants; slaves in a higher degree and larger measure, according to a more base and odious slavery, than such as by legal title were slaves or bondmen; unless these also were equally subject to the like base conditions or lewd disposition of mind. However, this lewd disposition of mind, or corruption of manners and affections, whether in bondmen or in their masters, was adjudged by the very heathen to be more base and servile, than the legal estate or condition of known slaves or bondmen. But before I acquaint the reader with the opinions of heathens in this point, I must request him not to mistake my meaning or intention, as if I esteemed the verdict or testimony of the best philosophers amongst them to be in themselves of any credit or authority in matters sacred, in mysteries of faith or divinity. I would rather request him to consider with me, that many testimonies, which are of no credit in themselves, nor can borrow any authority from their authors, may be notwithstanding of very good use for the confirmation of better authority, or for the discovering or bolting out the truth; whose authority, by what means soever once discovered, or from whomsoever it do proceed, is always great, and ought to prevail, as in the end it certainly will prevail, against ignorance and

How far the testimonies of the heathen are authentic for the truth of this doctrine delivered.

error, in whomsoever they be found, though patronised by men otherwise of extraordinary parts and deserved authority. For example, the testimony of a known liar, whose oath we would not take for sixpence, is good and lawful against himself; a notorious thief or malefactor's own confession, especially if it be deliberately made, and judicially taken, is a conviction as sufficient and authentic, as the depositions of two, or three, or more, most honest men. Now the same law or reason of the law, which in some cases admits the testimony or confessions of dishonest men for legal proof, will warrant us to admit the opinions, but especially the reasons of ancient heathens, which never knew the true God, nor Jesus Christ whom he had sent, for sufficient and authentic testimonies to convince the atheists of latter times, or such as live without God in this present world, or such amongst us, as having much better means than the best of the heathen had to know God and his Christ, yet live altogether without any true fear or love of either, and in as little sense or feeling of their own natural servitude or present bondage unto sin, as the rudest or worst sort of heathen did.

9. Yet further, albeit the wisest and best sort of heathen philosophers lived in bondage unto sin, and died servants of corruption; yet did they not always speak out of the corruption wherewith their very souls were tainted. Many things they spake and wrote out of the law of nature, *written* (as our apostle testifieth, Rom. ii. 15.) *in their hearts*. By the light of which law likewise they did many things contained in the written law of God: for not having that law, as the apostle there saith, *they were a law unto themselves*. Now as the testimony or confession of a notorious malefactor voluntarily and judicially made against himself, is

sufficient to condemn that judge or juror of injustice or partiality, that would not take it for a legal proof or conviction, so shall the allegations or collections of the heathens, which were themselves servants unto sin, be of authority enough to condemn us of a worse crime, unless upon their informations we make more particular and exact inquiry; first, into the servile estate or condition wherein we were born, and in which, until our regeneration, we still continue; secondly, into the means by which we may be redeemed from the same estate or condition. Now the means by which we must be redeemed, the most learned amongst the heathens, after long search, guided in part by the light of nature, could not discover. But as in other cases, so in this; when they seemed to be wise, they became fools; when they sought to set themselves free, by rules of art or philosophy, from one or few branches of this servitude, they entangled themselves faster in some others.

10. It was a beam of truth, a step or approach to freedom, rightly discovered by Tully<sup>c</sup>, *Si servitus sit, sicut est, obedientia fracti animi, et abjecti, et arbitrio carentis suo, quis neget omnes leves, omnes cupidos, omnes denique improbos esse servos?* "If servitude," saith he, "be (as no man, even in the most strict, proper, and legal sense, can make any more of it than) the obedience of a broken or crazed abject mind, deprived of all power or right to dispose of itself or of its own actions, who can deny all inconstant, vain men, all covetous, generally all wicked men, to be truly servants?" To press his general reason a little further, and to draw it from the very first root or spring of servitude properly so called, all men, as well the wicked as the vain or unconstant, have

<sup>c</sup> In paradox v. §. 1. "Ὅτι πάντες σοφοὶ ἐλεύθεροι, &c.



a desire to be happy; for happiness is the mark whereat our intentions aim, but of which most men in their courses fall much wide or short. For inasmuch as we cannot attain unto the end but by the means (or mean) which are useful for attaining that happiness which we most desire, partly through our natural weakness, but especially through Satan's cunning, these useful means intercept most of our time, most of our pains and endeavours, which should be reserved for purchase of the end. For so it is with most of us by nature, as with young, unexperienced or<sup>54</sup> careless apprentices or factors, who finding some extraordinary contentment in the first inn they come at, spend most of their time and money there, which should have been spent at the fair or mart for which they were bound. The special means, whose use is necessary to the attaining of that happiness which we most desire, are specially three—delight of mind, contentment of the body, and competency of wealth. Now albeit in our first aims or intentions we desire not these for themselves, nor in any extraordinary measure; <sup>d</sup>yet such is the frailness of our nature, that

<sup>d</sup> See ch. 21. §. 5. S. Aust. Confess. l. 8. c. 5. says, "I was bound, not in gaoler's irons, but by my own iron will; the enemy had made a chain of that. My perverse will became lust. Lust served, became a custom. And custom let alone, became necessity. In a chain made up of these links, lay I, a poor and miserable slave to sin.—Therefore, *Give the water no passage*, Eccus. xxv. 25. *Let every one that names the name of Christ stand (aloof) off from iniquity*, 2 Tim. ii. 19. *Let not sin enter the first door of sense, (eye or ear, or &c.) nor the second of*

fancy, nor the third of understanding, nor the fourth of will; lest it break out into act. And one act will produce two, and two four, and so it will double infinitely, and soon bring the heart to be as hard as the nether millstone, the anvil, or the adamant, obliterating very principles of nature and grace; and implanting such reprobate and debauched notions (rather fictions) of men's own corrupt minds, as shall serve their turns and lusts, and at last drown them in perdition." See Jer. xiii. 23. Rom. ii. 5. Isa. v. 20. See ch. 31. §. 5.

whatsoever things we much accustom ourselves unto, they will at length plead custom, or prescribe a kind of right or interest in our affections, actions, and endeavours. And the greater right or interest the desire of wealth, of bodily pleasures, or delights of the mind, gain in our affections, in our expense of time, in our thoughts or employments; the less power or ability we have to do that which in the general we most desire to do; the greater impossibility we bring upon ourselves of doing those things which are most available to the attainment of true happiness. And to be thus indisposed or disenabled to use our best wits or best endeavours for purchasing that pearl which we most esteem, is a true and natural branch of servitude and bondage.

### CHAP. XIX.

*Of the excellent Notions which Tully, and some heathen Romans of lewder Life than he, had of Servitude unto Sin, or Vice.*

1. THIS Roman orator had <sup>e</sup>observed some of great

<sup>e</sup> So had Horace in Damasippus :

..... quærere amabat,

Quo vafer ille pedes lavisset Sisyphus ære :

Quid sculptum infabre, quid fusum durius esset.

Callidus huic signo ponebat millia centum.....

Insanit veteres statuas Damasippus emendo.—Sat. II. iii. 20.

Tu cum Pausiaca torpes, insane, tabella .....

..... ego, cum Fulvi, Rutubæque

Aut Placideiani contento poplite miror

Prælia, rubrica picta aut carbone, velut si

Re vera pugnent, feriant, vitentque moventes

Arma viri ?

Sat. II. vii. 96.

I nunc ; argentum, et marmor vetus, æraque, et artes

Suspice : cum gemmis Tyrios mirare colores.—Idem, Epist. I.

vi. 17.

Et cum Parrhasii tabulis signisque Myronis,

Phidiacum vivebat ebur, necnon Polycleti

Multus ubique labor ; raræ sine Mentore mensæ.—*Juvenal*,

VIII. 103. See XI. 92. 120. XIV. 305.

Several sorts of servitude observed by Tully, in paradox, *Quod soli sapientes liberi ; stulti, servi.*

birth and place to spend much of their means in buying curious pictures, statues, or the like; and much of their time in contemplating and admiring the skill of the artificer. These he censures as servants unto toys and fooleries. Yet if one should ask these men that had thus enthralled themselves unto their idle fancies, whether they did not in heart desire to be truly happy, they would have answered that they desired nothing so much—nothing else. Now he that by his own confession desires nothing so much as to be truly happy, is by the light of reason and rule of nature bound to will nothing besides happiness so much as that which comes nearest unto it, or is most available for the purchase or attaining of it. And who then but a slave or vassal to his own fancy, or one whose fancy had made a fool of him, could ever hope or imagine, that a living man could be made happy by gazing on 55 lifeless pictures, or admiring images of the dead? But if this question had been distinctly put unto them, haply they would upon deliberation have denied that they did seriously hope to become happy by this practice, in which notwithstanding they most delighted. Herein then they were most unhappy, most miserable, true and proper servants; in that by inconsiderate accustomed themselves unto these or the like unnecessary 55 delights or fruitless fancies, they had utterly disabled themselves from living such a life, as at the first they most desired to live, and yet most desire that they could live, but are not able, as having alienated the use of their time, of their imaginations, of their understandings, of their best endeavours, from the service of virtue, or serious study of true wisdom, in which happiness, by their own acknowledgments, did properly consist.

2. Others, the same Tully in his time had observed, who, though they were noblemen by birth, yet were slaves or servants in a more base kind of servitude and bondage than the former; servants according to the second branch of servitude before mentioned. "Shall I ever count him a freeman," saith he, "over whom a woman beareth rule? one who suffers his mistress to impose <sup>f</sup>laws upon him? If she ask, he must give; if she call, he must come:" *Ego vero istum non modo servum, sed nequissimum servum, etiamsi in amplissima familia natus sit, appellandum puto.* This heathen, by light of nature and help of art, had discovered and made observation of that general truth, which our apostle delivers, Rom. vi. 16: That unto what desire soever a man doth yield himself, or consecrates his principal time, his actions or employments, he makes himself a true and proper servant unto it. The desire of <sup>g</sup>honour, of superiority, or sovereignty over others, which seems to be the most free; yet even this, as by instance he proves, is a hard and imperious and cruel mistress unto him that entertains her best. Not one of a hundred that hunts after honour or preferment, but hath more than ten masters to one for

<sup>f</sup> Nil unquam invita donabis conjuge : vendas  
 Hac obstante nihil : nihil, hæc si nolet, emetur.  
 Hæc dabit affectus : ille excludetur amicus  
 Jam senior, cujus barbam tua janua vidit.—*Juvenal*, VI. 211.

<sup>g</sup> Quosdam præcipitat subjecta potentia magnæ  
 Invidiæ, mergit longa, atque insignis honorum  
 Pagina . . . . .  
 . . . . . qui nimios optabat honores,  
 Et nimias posebat opes, numerosa parabat  
 Excelsæ turris tabulata, unde altior esset  
 Casus, et impulsæ præceps immane ruinæ.—*Idem*, X. 56.  
 Jus habet ille sui palpo, quem ducit hiantem  
 Cretata ambitio? Vigila : et cicer ingere large  
 Rixanti populo . . . . . *Persius*, V. 176.



every servant that he keeps. As for the inordinate desires of wealth, of lands or inheritance, they are no parts of a freeman<sup>h</sup>, but the properties of a base or sluggish servant. But—which is worst of all—after excessive desires have got the victory over our souls, they bring in a new lord or cruel master, worse than themselves, that is, fear or terror, arising from the consciousness of sin, into which there is no excessive or immoderate desire, though it be of things in themselves not unlawful, but will in the end plunge our souls, when we shall, as one day we must, call our souls unto an account for our expense of time and employments.

These and the like paradoxes (as Tully himself did foresee they would be esteemed no better) were dogmatically avouched by Horace<sup>i</sup> in the age following,

<sup>h</sup> “ Rather of a madman,” says Hor. Sat. II. iii. 81 :

Dum doceo insanire omnes, vos ordine adite.  
 Danda est hellebori multo pars maxima avaris ;  
 Nescio an Anticyram ratio illis destinet omnem.  
 Sed plures nimia congesta pecunia cura  
 Strangulat . . . . . *Juvenal* X. 12. (See Hor. Sat. I. i.)

<sup>i</sup> Horace’s live characters of true slaves, Sat. II. vii.

See Persius’s imitation of Horace, in this (as he doth in other passages, very much) sat. V. 124, &c. in his dialogue betwixt Dama a slave (lately) and a Stoick :

*D.* Liber ego. *Sto.* Unde datum hoc sumis, tot subdite rebus ?  
 An dominum ignoras, nisi quem vindicta relaxat  
 . . . . . intus, et in jecore ægro  
 Nascuntur domini . . . . .  
 [sc. pigritia, avaritia, libido, ambitio a quibus]  
 . . . . . Duplici in diversum scinderis hamo :  
 Huccine, an hunc sequeris ? subeas alternus oportet  
 Ancipiti obsequio dominos ; alternus oberres.  
 Nec tu, cum obstiteris semel, instantique negaris  
 Parere imperio, Rupi jam vincula, dicas.  
 Nam et luctata canis nodum abripit : attamen illi,  
 Quam fugit, a collo trahitur pars longa catenæ.

See his dialogue (there, ver. 161.) between Davus and Chærestratus, taken out of Menander.

under the person of a Roman slave or bondman. 56 Davus (whom this witty poet brings in, acting the one part of a satirical dialogue with his master, according to the ancient custom of the Romans, by which their slaves were authorized to use liberty of speech more than civil, in their Saturnal, or December feasts) first taking this general as granted, 'That all men, at least the Romans, were true slaves,' divides them into two sorts or kinds :

Pars hominum vitiis gaudet constanter, et urget  
 Propositum ; pars multa natat, modo recta capessens,  
 Interdum pravis obnoxia. Sæpe notatus  
 Cum tribus anellis, modo læva Priscus inani,  
 Vixit inæqualis, clavum ut mutaret in horas ;  
 Ædibus ex magnis subito se conderet, unde  
 Mundior exiret vix libertinus honeste ;  
 Jam mœchus Romæ, jam mallet doctus Athenis  
 Vivere ; Vertumnis, quotquot sunt, natus iniquis.  
 Scurra Volanerius, postquam illi justa cheragra  
 Contudit articulos, qui pro se tolleret atque  
 Mitteret in phimum talos, mercede diurna  
 Conductum pavit ; quanto constantior isdem  
 In vitiis, tanto levius miser ac prior ille,  
 Qui jam contento, jam laxo fune laborat. . . . .  
 . . . . . Si nusquam es forte vocatus  
 Ad cœnam, laudas securum olus, ac, velut usquam  
 Vincetus eas, ita te felicem dicis amasque,  
 Quod nusquam tibi sit potandum. Jusserit ad se  
 Mæcenas serum sub lumina prima venire  
 Convivam ; Nemon' oleum fert ocius ? ecquis  
 Audit ? cum magno blateras clamore furisque.  
 Mulvius et scurræ, tibi non referenda precati,  
 Discedunt. Etenim fateor me, dixerit ille,  
 Duci ventre levem, nasum nidore supinor,  
 Imbecillus, iners, si quid vis, adde, popino. . . . .  
 . . . . . O toties servus ! Quæ bellua ruptis  
 Quum semel effugit, reddit se prava catenis ?

Tune mihi dominus, rerum imperiis hominumque  
 Tot tantisque minor, quem ter vindicta quaterque  
 Imposita haud unquam misera formidine privet? . . . . .  
 . . . . . Eripe turpi  
 Colla jugo, Liber, liber sum, dic age! Non quis :  
 Urget enim dominus mentem non lenis, et acres  
 Subjectat lasso stimulos versatque negantem.  
 Tu, mihi qui imperitas, aliis servis miser atque  
 Duceris, ut nervis alienis mobile lignum. . . . .  
 . . . . . Adde, quod idem  
 Non horam tecum esse potes, non otia recte  
 Ponere, teque ipsum vitas fugitivus et erro,  
 Jam vino quærens, jam somno fallere curam ;  
 Frustra : nam comes atra premit sequiturque fugacem.

*Hor. Sat. II. vii. 6, &c.*

4. The first sort did constantly delight in some one or few vices ; the other, being of better birth, were fluctuant between virtue or civil honesty and base vices.—*Modo recta capessens interdum pravis obnoxia*, &c. he instanceth in one Priscus, who was never uniform to himself, much less conformable to 57 any constant rules of good life ; sometimes wearing three rings on his left hand, with other cognizances of his gentility, or ingenuous birth ; sometimes not so much as one ring upon either hand, nor observing any other garb or token of gentility. Oftentimes, having touched at some great senator's or nobleman's house in a robe befitting his calling, would instantly change his habits, and hide himself in such base houses as no cleanly libertine (that is, as we say, a freeman of the first head) would willingly be seen to go in or come out of. For the other part of this slave's division of men, he instanceth in one Volanerius, an old sink-  
 anter or gamester and scurrilous companion by profession, who was so delighted in this accustomed trade of life, that after the gout had so hammered and bemauled

his joints, that he could not so much as finger a pair of dice, did hire a slave to take them up and throw them for him. This man, in this slave's opinion, was so much less wretched or base than the former gentleman Priscus, by how much he was more uniform to himself, and more constant in his wonted course of life; whereas the other was perpetually tossed between contrary inclinations, as if he had been sometimes so hard tied, that he could not but stand upright; oftener let loose, to fall foul or grovelling.

5. The hypothesis or issue of this saucy thesis or generality was this: that the gentleman Priscus did represent his lord and master, as Volanerius did Davus himself, who by his own acknowledgment was constantly addicted to one or two of his master's bad qualities, yet a servant but to one lord besides his belly; whereas his master had subjected himself to many unruly appetites and enormous desires, all contrary to the dictates of his own reason or conscience in his more private and retired thoughts. So much of the law of reason and of nature was implanted in this his master, that he could highly commend the manners and practices of the ancient Romans; and yet, if any good spirit did invite or move him to follow their example, he was as ready to kick at the motion or the practice in particular, as he had been to commend the pattern set him by the ancient Romans considered only in the general. Being not invited by his betters abroad, a moderate homely dish of broth, of herbs, &c., was most applauded by him; and his family free from molestation. But if Mecænas or any other great potentate had upon short warning invited him to supper, he instantly declared himself to be a slave both to his belly and to his superiors; and a tyrant withal to his



servants; chiding one for not bringing him oil; beating another for not bringing him water or other preparatives, with more speed than could in reason be expected. From these and the like inductions Davus concludes his master to be more than a slave or ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, an instrument endued with life and motion; a mere ἄψυχον ὄργανον, or wooden picture of a man which had no mastery over his own motions or resolutions, having subjected his will and reason to dance attendance upon every great man's will or pleasure, like a puppet upon a string, which it hath no power to wag or move, but is moved upon it at the pleasure of the master or practiser of this kind of childish sport. The rest of this slave's arguments, (all concludent,) to prove his master, or such men as he was, to be more sottish slaves than himself, the reader may find briefly set down in the eighth book of these Commentaries, sect. 2. chap. 7. vol. vii. p. 430.

CHAP. XX.

58

*Of the Fruitlessness of the former Notions in the best Heathens.*

1. BUT what did it boot this satirist to know all this, or to mark the most of the Romans his countrymen to be indeed true servants? He himself laid nothing of all this to heart. The best use we can in discretion presume to be made of this observation, was to make himself and others merry; setting down his observations by way of play or interlude. He lived, and, for aught we know, died an epicure, not in practice only, but in opinion; one that accounted it the greatest part of misery or servitude to be wedded to one kind of bodily pleasure, or carnal delight. And

Horace and Tully both true servants, though they knew not to whom.

the greatest happiness he aimed at, was to be free to taste and try all kind of pleasures, so far as they were not hurtful unto his body.

2. As for Tully, though he handled his matters a great deal more gravely and soberly, and were much better in opinion, yet in the issue of his discourse he seems rather to change his master, than any way to set himself free. He was not indeed such a servant to his own imagination or fancy, not such a servant to covetousness, to lust, perhaps not to ambition or superiority of dominion, as he observed the most other Romans to be; yet he was a greater servant to his own will, than others were to their inferior desires. His very will itself was in servitude, as having no rule to rectify it, unless it were the Roman laws, which though in many particulars they were good, yet such as were too much addicted unto the entire frame of them, or such as gloried in the wisdom or excellency of them, were brought unwittingly to exercise enmity against God and his anointed Christ. Such as the Romans accounted their godliest patriots or commonwealth's men, were always the greatest enemies unto the Jews or professors of Moses' law before our Saviour's time, as unto the Christians after our Saviour's death. God in his just judgments did send them such cruel kings as Tiberius and Nero, because they were so cruelly bent against the professors of his gospel. What could it advantage these or any other heathens to know themselves to be in servitude, not knowing unto whom they were in servitude, or whose servants they were *de facto*, nor by whom they were to be made free? Some good notions they had of vice or of sin; but of Satan or his wicked angels they had not so much as heard; or at least what they had heard of

them, they accounted but toys or fables. And that which was the root of their misery, and strongest bond of their slavery, was, that they worshipped fiends or devils, as if in their opinion they had been gods, because able to do them bodily harm or bodily good. Now *in offering sacrifices* (as our apostle saith) *unto devils*, they did solemnly and publicly profess them to be their lords and masters. So that they were not only professed servants unto sin, but professed servants unto Satan. In worshipping them, and doing them service, they did that which was worthy of stripes, and were to be beaten, yet with fewer stripes than the wicked Jew, or such as confess Christ to be their Lord, and yet will not learn to deny ungodliness. For these heathens did not know that they had such a Lord or Master, whom they were bound to serve; and not knowing him to be their Master, how was it possible that they should know his will? But we acknowledge him to be our Lord; we know his will; we know the end of his coming into the world was to destroy the 59 works of Satan. Now if we should labour to build up that which he came to destroy, we shall prove ourselves not only to be servants to sin, and by sin servants unto Satan; but professed enemies and traitors unto Christ.

3. Our Saviour's sentence is universal; *Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin*. As you shall think or meditate upon the same, let me request you to take this addition or supplement into consideration with it—Whosoever is the servant of sin, is the servant, the slave or bondman of Satan. Let no man therefore flatter himself with this or the like conceit—That because he professeth Christ to be his Lord, he cannot therefore be so true a slave and bondman unto Satan, as the idolatrous heathen were, which offered sacrifice unto him. They did indeed unwittingly, im-

Many that  
call Christ  
Lord true  
servants t  
Satan.

plicitly, and really acknowledge him to be their lord, and themselves his servants, by paying rent or tribute unto him ; <sup>k</sup> but such as deny all such rent or service may make him their lord, and themselves his slaves or bondmen, by prescription or continual possession.

4. The heathens which offered sacrifice unto Bacchus, as to a supposed god of riot or good fellowship, or a patron of boon companions, did indeed offer sacrifice and do solemn service unto Satan and his angels, the authors, the favourers and furtherers of all riot and excess. Now if any that calls himself a Christian, or is a Christian by calling or profession, have been as long accustomed to the like riot or excess, or take as great delight in this sin as they did which offered sacrifice unto Bacchus, he is as true and proper a servant unto Satan as they were. For Satan did desire the sacrifice or other service but as an homage, rent, or tribute, whereby he hoped to gain the possession of their souls, or a right or interest in their actions or employments, a power of disposing or commanding their affections, which offered him sacrifice or paid him tribute. Now if he have gotten the like interest in their actions or employments, or the like command over their affections, which profess themselves to be Christians; they are his by possession or occupation; he needs no sacrifice or solemn tribute from them, which, as we say, he holdeth in his own hands. Briefly, the heathens which offered sacrifice unto Bacchus, unless by this custom they brought themselves to be in servitude unto the sin of drunkenness, were not more grievous sinners, nor greater bondmen unto Satan, than Christians are which are in greater servitude unto this loathsome sin.

5. Such of the heathens as worshipped Venus as a

<sup>k</sup> Vid. Salvianum, l. 6.



supposed goddess, or patroness of love and wantonness, did indeed and in the issue worship Satan and his unclean spirits, which are the authors, the nourishers and maintainers of all bodily filthiness and uncleanness. If any which professeth himself to be a Christian, be as much given over unto wantonness and uncleanness as the heathens were, which worshipped Venus ; he is as true and absolute a slave to Satan as they were, and shall be sure to have his wages (without repentance) as truly and fully paid him as the other shall. The least and best wages which he payeth for the use of their actions or employments during this short and brittle life, is an endless and never-dying death.

6. Such of the heathens as offered sacrifice unto Pluto, whom they supposed to be the god of riches or of wealth, lord paramount of gold, of silver, of all kind of metals, or whatsoever else was contained under the surface of the earth, did indeed worship Satan and his infernal powers. And the sacrifice which they offered, and other solemn services which they did unto him, shall be as evidences against them at the last day, 60 that were his servants, as a pledge or earnest to bind them to accept his wages. If any Christians, how precise or devout soever they seem to be, though daily frequenters of public prayers, though diligent hearers of sermons, be as covetous, as great oppressors of their poor brethren, as unconscionable in their gettings, as unsatiable in their desires of gain, as the heathens were, which thought to purchase wealth by sacrificing unto Pluto ; the bond of their servitude unto Satan is altogether as firm and strong ; their servitude or bondage itself altogether as hard, as great and dangerous, as the servitude or bondage of the heathens was ; and whilst they are in servitude unto Satan, whatsoever they profess or make show of, they cannot be the

servants of God or Christ. For *no man* (as our Saviour tells us, Matt. vi. 24) *can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon.* But what doth he mean by *mammon*? wealth or riches only? Certainly a part of his meaning is, that every covetous man, that every one which is extraordinarily careful for gathering things of this life, every one that minds most his gain or getting of riches, is a servant to his riches or to his desires of them. The other part of his meaning is—that he which is a servant to his desire of riches is a servant likewise unto him whom the heathens called *Mammon*, and worshipped as a supposed god of riches; for *Mammon* in the Syriac tongue is as much as Πλοῦτος in the Greek. Albeit we Christians know and believe, that there is no such god or lord of wealth, and that there is but one God and one Lord, who is the Lord and Owner as well of the earth and things in it, as of the heavens; yet have we no reason but to think, that the infernal spirits have their several wards or quarters. Some of them have better skill or more experience in humouring covetous and worldly minded men; others in humouring or enticing wantons; others have more skill and experience in alluring men unto drunkenness; *et quam unusquisque novit artem, in ea se maxime exercet.* They quarter themselves, according to their several skills or experience, into several regiments. Some keep watch and ward over covetous men, and present unto them all opportunities of making unlawful gain, or of overreaching their brethren in bargaining. The chief of this ward or regiment, or perhaps the whole regiment itself, is called *Mammon*. Other lie leigers about such as are more prone to wantonness. Their chief care or employment is to present them with

all opportunities or allurements unto pleasure. Other lie as agents in taverns or tippling-houses; and their care and employment is to provoke men to excess, and to such other enormities or breach of God's commandments as accompany excess of drinking.

7. Now this methinks should be a great motive to deter or dehort any man from yielding obedience to his own desire of what transitory good or pleasure soever, if he would but consider, that, in yielding obedience to his own desires, he becomes the servant of some sin or other; and that in becoming the servant of any sin whatsoever, he becometh the bondman or slave of Satan, who hath one bad property which no other master, how cruel or devilish soever, besides himself, hath; and that is, to plague or torment them most, which have done him most continual and faithful service. And yet even this diabolical disposition of his becomes the faithful executioner of God's justice. For every degree of their service done to Satan doth include in it a like degree or portion of treason or infidelity towards Christ. And it is just and holy on God's part, though satanical and devilish on Satan's, to recompense such as have done Satan in this world greatest service, with the greatest portion or measure of vengeance in the world to come. All of us have 61 some one or other of this infernal crew daily attending on us, hourly watching or dogging us in all our designs or projects throughout our whole course of life.

CHAP. XXI.

*Of the Manner how Satan brings Men to be his Slaves.*

1. IT was truly said by one<sup>1</sup>, had his meaning been as truly taken, *Nemo sponte malus*—No man is wit-

<sup>1</sup> Plato.

*Nemo  
sponte ma-  
lus, how  
far true.*

tingly a naughty man; at least, no man desires to be such. For whether original corruption be wholly derived from Adam, or whether we draw it in part from our immediate parents, no man, I am persuaded, was ever by nature or by corruption merely original, of disposition so wicked and ungracious, as that he did or could directly desire, intend, or affect to be unnatural or disobedient to his natural parents; to be contumacious or rebellious towards magistrates or other superiors, whom the law of God commands him to obey and honour. Corruption merely original impels no man's reasonable will to desire or affect to be an adulterer, a drunkard, a murderer, or an intemperate person; it impels no man to desire or affect to be a thief; to be a perjured, infamous or envious person, or to be a notorious offender, or criminous transgressor of the second table, or of laws agreeable to it. There is no man but is naturally (I mean by the bent or inclination of corrupt nature itself) more unwilling to be tainted either with these mentioned, or with any other like crimes, forbidden by the six last commandments, than he that is freeborn is to be subject to the legal estate or condition of a servant. And yet the most of men in the issue, or in some part of their course of life, become subject to some one or other of these crimes mentioned. The most part of men have their wits and affections usually and customarily employed in some one or other part of Satan's service, in some businesses, which in the end brings them to be such men as they do no way desire to be; that is, either unnatural, disobedient, cruel, intemperate, felonious, perjured, or envious persons—men in whose souls Satan hath purchased a greater interest, over whose desires and affections foul and unclean spirits have gotten a greater command, than earthly lords or masters have



over their bodies, or bodily labour of their servants— a power or command to make them forbear those things which their minds or consciences do most approve ; a power to impel them unto those courses which they sometimes most abhorred—and over some a power to change or invert their wills or desires, even to make them willing to continue and increase their native slavery and misery.

2. The means and manner by which Satan gets this power and sovereignty over men's souls, are the very same with the means and manner by which bodily and earthly lords or masters gain a title or interest in the bodily labours or employments of such as by this interest once gotten become their servants. No man is naturally willing or desirous to be another man's servant ; all men rather desire to be free. Yet inas- much as all men naturally desire the continuance of bodily life and health, and neither life nor health can be maintained or continued without food and raiment, and other necessaries ; hence it is, that the more inbred and deeper rooted desire of life and health, doth over- sway the natural desire of liberty and freedom in all such as are not provided of things necessary for the 62 maintenance of this life, not able to satisfy their natural desire of meat, drink, or apparel, otherwise than by resigning or making over their bodily employments or labours to some other men's use, which in lieu of these will satisfy their former natural desires of food and raiment, and afford them means necessary to hold soul and body together.

3. The original or fundamental temptation by which Satan draws men into this snare of servitude or bondage spiritual, is by enlarging or improving their desires, not of things simply evil, but of things either natural

The ori- ginal temp- tation by which men are drawn to Satan's slavery.

or indifferent ; that is, for their kind or quality not unlawful. These desires being improved unto the full, or unto some excessive measure, do, by long custom or continuance, require satisfaction by as strong a law of <sup>m</sup> necessity (at least as importunately) as our natural desires of food or raiment do. The more excessive or exorbitant any desire is, the more impatient it is of repulse. It is as impossible for a greedy or ravenous appetite to be satisfied with a spare or moderate diet, as for a moderate appetite to be satisfied without any food at all. A vain fantastic, that takes proud clothes to be part of himself, is as desirous of change of suits or costly apparel, as a poor man is of apparel itself, or of such stuff as is sufficient to keep out cold and wet. An ambitious spirit is not so well content with an ordinary place or rank amongst freemen, as an ingenuous mind will be with the estate or condition of an hired servant, if no better, by means fair and honest, be likely to befall him. A man apt to overprize himself, and jealous withal of contempt, of wrong, or of gross abuse, is not so easily appeased with streams of blood, as a calm and gentle spirit is with an ingenuous acknowledgment of wrongs done, or with a courteous answer for wrongs suspected. The desire of wealth or worldly goods, after it hath once exceeded its lawful bounds, becomes as unsatisfiable as <sup>n</sup>hell ; it enlargeth

<sup>m</sup> See ch. 18. last paragraph.

<sup>n</sup> Isaiah v. 8. Hab. ii. 5.

Mille talenta rotundentur, totidem altera, porro et  
Tertia succedant, et quæ pars quadret acervum.

*Hor. Epist. I. vi. 34.*

Vende animam lucro : mercare, atque excute sollers

Omne latus mundi . . . . .

Rem duplica. Feci : jam triplex, jam mihi quarto,

Jam decies redit in rugam. Depunge, ubi sistam.

*Persius, VI. 75.*

itself by often satisfaction, and of all earthly and mortal things, it knows no stint or period of growth, but grows strong and lusty by waxing old.

4. None of these desires of meat, of drink, of apparel, of satisfaction for wrongs done or suspected, of honour, riches, or preferment, are in themselves or for their quality unlawful. Their unlawfulness consists only in their excess. But even the best of these or like desires, being improved beyond its measure, will for its private satisfaction betray the soul which gives it harbour into Satan's hands. He doth not, he need not tempt any man directly to be a thief, a robber, or a murderer. For (as St. James tells us, ch. i. 14.) *every man is tempted* (to these and the like crimes) *by his own concupiscence*. And our concupiscences and sensual desires are always increased by custom. He that hath long inured himself to exceed either in quality of meat or drink, or to fare deliciously, desires only to satisfy his appetite, or to observe his delightful custom: so these may be satisfied, he hath no desire to be a thief, to be a cheater, or cozener. But rather than his intemperate appetite should be unsatisfied, he will take himself to some other part of Satan's service, and adventure on theft or murder, or any other breach of God's commandments.

5. Satan in his first onsets tempts no man to be an extortioner, a griping usurer, or a tormentor of men in their estates, by the engine of money. The first advance 63 which in this part of his service he gets over men's souls is from occasions given by men themselves. It is a point of wisdom whereunto Solomon by the

Sume duos Equites, fac tertia quadringenta.  
 Si nondum implevi gremium, si panditur ultra:  
 Nec Cræsi fortuna unquam, nec Persica regna  
 Sufficient animo, nec divitiæ Narcissi.

*Juvenal, XIV. 326. 110, &c.*

example of the ant (others by the example of the bee) adviseth us, to lay up in summer against winter; to be well provided in youth against old age. The forecast itself is not amiss—it is no transgression of our Saviour's precept, *Be not careful for to-morrow*; yet is the practice dangerous, unless it be guarded with a watchful care, that this provision, whether of money or other external means necessary for the support of life, do not bespeak our souls for themselves, or divert our desires from the end for which at the first we only did and still ought to desire them. The fundamental and most transcendent fallacy, by which men suffer themselves to be deceived, is by suffering those things which by the law of nature or God's ordinance are appointed only as means useful for attaining some better end, to intercept our desires of the end which is good in itself, and to be desired for itself, and the means only to be desired for it. And our desires being once intercepted or diverted from the end unto the means, the means likewise take up our principal care and chief employments. As for example: food and raiment are by God ordained as means useful for preserving this mortal life, but as things not absolutely good, nor to be desired for themselves: for in that better life we shall have no need, no use or desire of them. Yet in this life we see many so far transported with the desire of them, as if life had been given them only to eat and drink, or to wear gay apparel; as if they had not received these blessings of God, to the end that life and health might be preserved by them. This diversion of men's desires from the right end (from the comfort of life and old age) unto the ordinary means thereunto destinated, is more easily wrought by money and coin, than by any other external means whatsoever. The reason is plain, because money, by custom and consent

Why money hath the greatest command over most men's desires.



of nations, is made as the °common measure of all commodities or external means for support of life : it hath more power over men's desires than all other means external have ; because in a sort it contains all others in it. He that hath store of it, may have store of any other ordinary commodities he pleaseth. And for the same reason, that old saying is most peculiarly true of money, <sup>P</sup>*Crescit amor nummi, quantum ipsa pecunia crescit*—‘The love of money still increaseth as the money increaseth.’ Now after the love of it be grown so excessive, that men begin to desire it for itself, it brings a necessity upon them of desiring it. So that this is laid as a principle or maxim of law,

° ..... omnis enim res,  
 Virtus, fama, decus, divina humanaque pulchris  
 Divitiis parent ; quas qui construxerit, ille  
 Clarus erit, fortis, justus—Sapiensne ? Etiam, et rex,  
 Et quidquid volet ..... *Hor. Sat. II. iii. 94.*  
 Scilicet uxorem cum dote fidemque et amicos  
 Et genus et formam regina pecunia donat,  
 Ac bene nummatum decorat Suadela Venusque.

*Idem, Epp. I. vi. 36.*

..... νόμισμα γίνεται πως μέσον ἡμῶν.—*Arist. Ethic. Nicom. v. 5.*  
 πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ.... διὸ νόμισμα Nummus sponsor est, vel, fide-  
 καλεῖται.... πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα jussor. *Eccles. x. 19: Money*  
 .... νόμισμα οἶον ἐγγυητὴς ἐστὶν *answereth all things.*

Protinus ad censum, de moribus ultima fiet  
 Quæstio. Quot pascit servos ? quot possidet agri  
 Jugera ? .....  
 Quantum quisque ..... *Juvenal, III. 140.*

<sup>P</sup> ..... Ergo paratur  
 Altera villa tibi, quum rus non sufficit unum,  
 Et proferre libet fines, majorque videtur,  
 Et melior vicina seges : mercaris et hanc et  
 Arbusta, et montem. *Idem, XIV. 141.*

..... O si angulus ille  
 Proximus accedat, qui nunc denormat agellum !  
 O si urnam argenti fors quæ mihi monstret.  
*Hor. Sat. II. vi. 8.*

*facias rem*—their stock of money MUST be increased : and this is the hypothesis or supposition, *recte si possis*—if by fair means it may be increased, it is well ; <sup>9</sup> *si non, quocunque modo rem*—if not, by any means whatsoever, let it be increased. *Oportet habere.*

64 6. Though all the faculties of the human soul are by Adam's fall become like an instrument out of tune ; yet are no man's affections so ill set by corrupt nature, no man's desires so far misplaced, but that he can wish every man's good word rather than his ill word ; and had rather to be a benefactor than an oppressor, specially if he be of a disposition free and bountiful. Yet if Satan can once impel or allure men thus disposed, to overlash in bounty, or stretch their desires of getting praise by doing good to others beyond their means or abilities, he gets a command over their dispositions or affections, and can enforce them to do him service in that kind which by nature they most abhor. For wastefulness or <sup>r</sup>prodigality is the mother of avarice, of violence, and oppression. Even vanity and superfluity, (things without substance, and such as can yield no nutriment to any thing else, no profit to such as nourish them,) being once confirmed by custom, will require satisfaction with as great eagerness and extremity, as any other desires, whether natural or acquired. And this is the misery of miseries, the very

<sup>9</sup> Hor. Ep. I. i. 66. Juvenal, Sat. XIV. 176 :

..... nam dives qui fieri vult,  
Et cito vult fieri. Sed quæ reverentia legum,  
Quis metus aut pudor est unquam properantis avari ?

<sup>1</sup> Tim. vi. 9 : *They that will be rich, &c.*

<sup>r</sup> Creverunt et opes, et opum furiosa cupido,  
Et, quum possideant plurima, plura volunt.

Quære ut absumant, absumpta require certant,  
Atque ipsæ vitiis sunt alimenta vices.—*Ovid. Fast. I. 211.*

dregs of slavery, when a man which in his first practice and course of life intended bounty and liberality, shall be enforced to suck the blood of the poor and needy, for satisfying vanity, or feeding others in their superfluity. How many thousands of poor souls throughout this kingdom in our days, have scarce had flesh to cover their bones, for maintaining the outside of others' pride! for garnishing the surface of undecent bravery!

7. But no kind of creature in the issue, or through their whole course of life, is further transported from its intended end, than the ambitious or aspiring mind. The port which this bravado is bound for, at his first setting forth, is superiority, rule, or dominion over others, perhaps his equals by birth, and for good qualities his far betters. But ere he can attain to this heaven of happiness, as he esteems it, he must <sup>s</sup>couch down like Issachar, between two burdens, and take Cham's curse upon him for his viaticum or loading in his way or journey. He must be a servant to greatness, though in despite of goodness; a vassal to the dispensers of that honour which he seeks; (though these be vassals to baseness or other bad qualities;) a slave unto the corruption of time, and, in a preposterous imitation of our apostle, he must become all things unto all men, and even enforce himself (against the bent of proud affections) to fawn upon such as can feed him with hopes of honour, to lenify the rotten sores of their ulcerous consciences with a smooth and flattering tongue. If he be a clergyman or messenger of Christ that is tainted with this humour, he must become more than a Balaam to every Balak; such a one as Balaam would have been, if the angel had not withstood him: he must set himself to bless where God hath cursed,

Ambitious  
desires  
draw men  
into the  
worst sla-  
very.

<sup>s</sup> See Horace, Epp. I. vi. 49. Si fortunatum, &c.

and to curse where God hath blessed. There is no part of this servitude of sin or Satan so irksome as this, to an ingenuous spirit, or to a mind fraught with any internal worth, but especially with the knowledge of Christ and him crucified: no slavery of the soul so odious to God; none that includes greater enmity or antipathy to the Wisdom and Son of God; none that includes greater affinity with Satan. This unquenchable desire of honour, falsely so called, (as some philosophers from due examination have determined the question,) commands all other affections whatsoever, even love itself, whether towards parents, towards wife or children, kindred or country. And by this affection of ambitious pride Satan hath often commanded the greatest commanders, in more vile and detestable  
65 services, than he can impose upon the most vile and most abject creatures living. Unto this idol, or to so small a piece of it as may be enshrined in some one great man's breast, whole legions, whole armies of men, for whom Christ shed his dearest blood, have often been sacrificed; for whose burnt offering goodly towns and cities have been set on fire. What absolute command Satan gets over men's souls, in which ambitious desires come to their full height and growth, may easily be calculated from those detestable services into which Satan (by so little a sprig of this forbidden tree, as many Christians would not suspect to bear any forbidden fruit) did impel Pontius Pilate. This man thought in his conscience that our Saviour was innocent; that he was more than a man, and was exceedingly willing to have saved him from death: and yet Satan works him, not to do as Pilate himself would, but as Satan would have him to do. *Pilate*, saith the evangelist, *sought to release him: but the Jews cried out, saying, If thou let this man go, thou art not Cæsar's friend: whoso-*



*ever maketh himself a king speaketh against Cæsar.* And when Pilate heard that saying, he proceeds to sentence: and when the chief priests further prosecuted their wonted form, *We have no king but Cæsar—he delivered Jesus unto them to be crucified,* John xix. 12. 15, 16. To have corrupted this man by bribes or gifts to have given wrong sentence against our Saviour, had been impossible for these Jews. Satan himself had not command or interest in his service by this title. The only possession or interest he had in him to this purpose, was not so much desire of new or greater honour than he had, as fear of disgrace or disrespect with Cæsar, if, when the mutinous Jews protested *they had no king but Cæsar,* he should suffer a man to live that was accused, and in some sort convicted, to have suffered himself to have been entitled *King of the Jews.* Though this ambition was not great, yet it exposed him to desperate, base, and detestable servitude or bondage. It is not half so base or servile to be a hangman, or other more contemptible minister or executioner of public justice, as it is to be the instruments or ministers of greatest Cæsars in condemning the innocent, or sentencing such to death as have no ways deserved it. If Pilate had taken courage to protect this just and holy One against the malicious calumnies of the Jews, God's providence, no doubt, had protected and shielded Pilate's breast from the violence of Pilate's own right hand; whereas he, after having lost Cæsar's favour, which he sought by these unjust means to retain, did, out of the apprehension of his discontent or disgrace, make away himself, as the Ecclesiastical History<sup>t</sup> tells us. Such are the best rewards that Satan bestows upon his servants: though miserable and shameful death be rather the earnest and pledge only

<sup>t</sup> Eusebius (English) book 2. ch. 7.

of the wages which he never pays to his servants till after death, when he hath got their souls into his custody.

The dangerous slavery into which the Romish church hath brought herself.

8. If the desire of any honour, if the fear of any disgrace or disrespect with men, were in themselves or of their own kind absolutely good, or were any honours to be desired for themselves, or such that their excess could not draw us into Satan's servitude or bondage; then, certainly, desire of being members of God's visible church, or fear of being cast out of it as heretics, were of all secondary means or desires the most safe. But through desire of yielding absolute obedience to God's visible church, and through immoderate fear of being by the church disgraced or excommunicated, Satan hath twice drawn a great part of God's people, such, I mean, as profess the knowledge of God and of his anointed Christ, into a slavery or bondage more detestable and greater by a threefold measure than any slavery or bondage into which he was able to draw the most wicked and most idolatrous heathen since the 66 first revolution of time affording him opportunity of temptation. The first notorious or famous conquest that Satan got over the visible church was in the days of our Saviour's pilgrimage here on earth; the second, over the visible Romish church within these later years, wherein they have resumed the title or prerogative which the Jewish church did stiffly challenge, but with lamentable success, for some years after the first and second destruction of the temple at Jerusalem. The title which that church did challenge—but with greater moderation than the present Romish church doth—was the absolute infallibility of the church representative, that is, of the chief priests and elders. Yet this absolute infallibility the Jewish synagogue did never confine unto the bosom of the high

priest, either sitting in Moses' chair, or when he entered into the *sanctum sanctorum*, but to the sanhedrim, or common council of the priests and elders, whereof the high priest was a more principal than necessary member.

9. The improvement of this Jewish heresy and slavery to Satan, throughout the patriarchate of Rome, had its original from an ambitious error in that church through succession of times not very ancient, by laying challenges to all God's promises made to his universal or catholic church as to her own peculiar prerogative. And as if this had not been enough, the successors of these desperate challengers have contracted the catholic church (which in their language is all one with the church of Rome) unto the pope and his cardinals, or, as they term it, *the sacred consistory*. Some later canonists and parasites to the pope, Jesuits especially, have laboured to drive the universal church (like a camel through a needle's eye) into the pope's breast alone, whensoever he shall deliver his sentence *ex cathedra*; as if, as well all God's promises as blessings promised to his catholic church were, the one to be disposed of, the other to be dispensed by him, as by Christ's sole vicar-general or viceroy here on earth. But these positions, some interimists or labourers for reconciliation betwixt the church of Rome and of England will haply reply, are but the opinions of private men, not maintained or taught by the catholic church. Yet none of them, whether cardinals, Jesuits, or casuists, whether priests or laics of inferior rank, will or dare deny that the infallible guidance of the Holy Ghost for leading Christ's church into the truth, is immediately annexed to the Roman church representative, that is, to all such councils or assemblies of Christian men as are called by the pope as Christ's

viceroy, and approved of by him and his assistants. The necessary consequence of this position is, that no one council which hath been called by the pope and approved by him did ever heretofore err, or can err hereafter.

10. The former misinterpretation of God's promises made unto the universal church (that is, as Romanists say, unto the church of Rome) is excellently refuted by the author<sup>u</sup> of that matchless piece heretofore annexed to Dr. White's learned answer to the Jesuit Fisher, since published by the author of it, in his own name, with many learned and pious additions: of all which I have no more for the present to say than this, *Respondent ultima primis*—Both the first and second edition are worthy their author: and this is more than I know otherwise how to express. The first edition I had the happiness to peruse when I had finished this treatise of Servitude to Sin, for my private use, and for the benefit of such as were committed to my pastoral charge, and had entered upon another treatise concerning Christian Obedience, for preventing the spreading infection of a pestilent book, dispersed through the northern parts of this kingdom, set forth by a Jesuit under this saucy title, "The Prelate and the Prince." And for preparing the antidote I found good directions and ingredients from the fore-mentioned author.

11. But suppose the rest of the church be disposed to believe this doctrine of the pope's infallibility. Wherein doth the matchless slavery of the Romish church unto Satan in respect of Jews or heathens punctually consist? In this especially, that if any council wherein the bishop of Rome, or patriarch of

<sup>u</sup> He means W. Laud the right rev. the lord archbishop of Canterbury's book.



the West, (as his style sometimes was,) had any principal interest or prerogative either in calling or confirming it, have erred, the present pope and his adherents, whether priests or laics, are bound by solemn oath, and under a dreadful curse, to make up the measure of their forefathers' errors, negligences, ignorances, or other enormous sins and iniquities, whether committed against the rule of faith or against the law of God. For all which they are also bound by their own doctrine and liturgy to beg pardon, as well for their forefathers' transgressions as for their own, in respect of what is past, and to pray for the prevention of the like in times to come. Now this is the greatest yoke of slavery that Satan durst or could attempt to lay upon the neck of Christ's church militant here on earth; albeit he could by subtilty prevail to place his *primogenitus*, (that is, such an Antichrist as many in the Romish church conjecture shall hereafter come,) that is, a man begotten by the devil of a woman or daughter of the tribe of Dan, as Christ's vicar-general, in St. Peter's chair. If any such Antichrist shall hereafter arise, the measure of personal iniquity may be greater than any pope's, or the papacy hitherto hath been, but the kind must be the same. A worse or more desperate kind of iniquity or antichristianism than this late mentioned cannot be imagined.

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It was the author's fashion mostly to preach upon such texts as might ground the matter that he intended after to treat upon in his writings, and so to weave his sermons into the body of his discourses or tracts as occasion required. The studious reader knowing this, and observing, 1. a passage at the beginning of the second section, (page 33, the seventh chapter of this book,) which promises to annex to these discussions a sermon about that sort of Jews which made that saucy reply to Christ, John viii. 33, whether

they were such as, ver. 30, were said *to believe on him*, or no: and then, 2. taking notice of the title of the 14th chapter, (it begins the third section, page 79,) which is, 'That even those Jews which did in part believe in Christ were true servants unto sin'—he will see the reasons that procured the insertion of these two sermons or tracts ensuing here at this place; as being conceived most nearly allied to the matter preceding, and more accommodate to the reader's use, who, (as is probably presumed,) if he had but only been reminded of this in the margin, before he had proceeded to read the fourth section, would first have sought out and read these two discourses, in case they had been deferred and placed in the rear of this book.

*A Postil or short Discourse upon our Saviour's Words, John viii. 36: "If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed."*

The connexion of this verse with the precedent.

1. THIS verse is inferred by way of conclusion from the verse precedent—*The servant abideth not in the house for ever: but the Son abideth for ever*. The difficulties emergent be two; the former concerning the true sense and meaning, or at least the limitation of the antecedent, to wit, *The servant abideth not in the house for ever*, &c.; the other concerns the inference or connexion betwixt this antecedent and the conclusion, *If the Son therefore &c.*

The opinion of the ancient fathers.

Some of the best note amongst the ancient or middle rank of interpreters, as Cyril, Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Euthymius, are of opinion that our Saviour in these words, *The servant abideth not in the house for ever*, did intend either to prevent or answer the secret objection or reply which the Jews did or might have made unto his former conclusion,

ver. 34: *Whosoever committeth sin (or whosoever is a worker of sin) is the servant of sin.* Unto this assertion the Jews (as these good authors think) might have answered thus: "Admit we daily incur some degree or other of servitude unto sin, yet we have usual and daily means to blot out the stain of sin, and to free us from thralldom, and final servitude unto sin and Satan." There is no question but the Jews did account the sacrifices which Moses did institute fully sufficient and effectual for both these purposes. Yet that they did herein err, that these sacrifices instituted by Moses could not free them from this servitude of sin, our Saviour (as the forecited good authors think) proves from this reason: "Moses was but a servant in the house of God, and no servant hath power to free himself, much less to set others free, from the yoke of servitude, or to secure his estate in his master's house." But Maldonate, the Jesuit, thinks that place, Heb. iii. 3—6, did deceive these good fathers, or at least that they misapplied St. Paul's comparison betwixt Christ and Moses unto this present argument. For our Saviour (saith this learned Jesuit) speaks of another kind of servitude in this place, than St. Paul speaks of in the third to the Hebrews, and of a servitude unto which Moses was not subject: for Moses is commended in the third to the Hebrews, and elsewhere is termed *the man of God*, not *a servant to sin* or *Satan*.

Maldonate's censure of their opinion.

2. Not to question the solidity or pertinency of this Jesuit's exceptions against the interpretation of the ancients; I must confess his opinion is very probable, and their interpretation somewhat farfetched, if not forced, and supposed that for its ground which hath not much probability in itself, to wit, that these Jews either would confess, or by way of supposition admit, that

they were such servants to sin, or transgressors of the law, as to become thereby the servants or sons of Satan. For they presume in the words following, that  
69 by being the children of Abraham, and by their observance of Moses' law, they were the sons of God.

He prefers  
one Leon-  
tius before  
the fathers.

This learned Jesuit prefers the interpretation of Leontius (a man otherwise of mean note in comparison) before the joint interpretation of the forecited famous fathers. "Our Saviour," saith Leontius, "intended only to prove what is inferred here in this 36th verse, that none besides the Son can have power to set men free, because the Son only remains in the house for ever." Unto this interpretation Maldonate adds his own; "That every servant had need to be set free by authority, because no servant hath any right or title to continue for ever in the house wherein he lives, or to be the owner or possessor of any other, it being still in his master's power either to sell him, or to turn him out of his house, or to dispose of him at his pleasure. If some servant continue in his master's house for ever, or to his dying day, yet this falls out seldom or by chance; whereas our Saviour frames his argument from that which usually happens, or for the most part." All agree that by *the house* in this place, the church of God is principally meant, in which the Son of God remains for ever, in which no servant, unless he become a son, can remain but for a short time. For though sinners and servants to sin may remain in the true visible and militant church during this life, so mingled with the sons of God, as they cannot by men be discerned from them, yet after death, as St. Cyril saith, they are cast out into utter darkness, unless during this life they be set free from the servitude of sin, from which none but the Son of God can free them, because he only is the Heir and Lord of



God's house; he only hath power to grant or deny freedom unto what servants he pleaseth.

3. This is the sum of that connexion which the best interpreters, ancient or modern, make of the former verse and of these words of my text. Unto this I may add, that these, as most other speeches of our Saviour, have reference unto some historical relation or matter of fact contained in the Old Testament; and that this speech or passage hath special reference unto the story of Hagar and Ishmael; and so the antecedent, *the servant abideth not in the house for ever*, though grounded but upon one particular instance, yet that instance or example, being related in the sacred story as a type or picture of what was to come, will infer our Saviour's intended conclusion much better and more forcibly, than a full induction of other instances and examples not related in scripture, not framed or intended by the Spirit of God for types and shadows of things which were to come. This universal negative, *No servant abideth in the house for ever*, will not so forcibly infer this particular conclusion—*ergo, No servant of sin can abide in God's house for ever*, as this particular instance, 'Ishmael did not abide in Abraham's house for ever,' infers this conclusion—'Therefore the Jews, which thus contested with our Saviour, were not to abide in the house of God for ever.' So that if it be lawful to paraphrase upon our Saviour's words, their full meaning is as if he had said thus: "Do you think yourselves free from the servitude and wages of sin, because ye are the seed of Abraham? So was Ishmael, whom Abraham once intended for his heir, who lived a long time in Abraham's house, but, being the son of a bondwoman, he was by legal condition but a servant, and therefore not to live in it for ever, but to be cast out by God's appointment, as it is

The words relate unto the story of Hagar and Ishmael.

The sense of the text.

written, Gen. xxi. 10 : *Cast out this bondwoman and her son : for the son of this bondwoman shall not be heir with my son, even with Isaac.* These were the words of Sarah, for a while displeasing unto Abraham, until God did ratify them by interposition of his authority : and thus is your case.”

- 70 4. For albeit these Jews, with whom our Saviour here disputes, were the sons of Abraham by Sarah, (and so the progeny of Isaac,) yet so long as they mocked and persecuted the true Seed of Abraham, whose coming into the world Isaac did prefigure, cleaving unto the testament given upon mount Sinai (or Agar) in opposition to the testament given upon mount Sion, they became sons of the bondwoman, (as the apostle infers, Gal. iv. 24. to the end of the chapter,) subject to the same conditions in matters spiritual that Ishmael was subject to in matters temporal. The exposition of that allegory, Gal. iv. 24, you have heard before at large<sup>u</sup>. The apostle’s conclusion is the very same with our Saviour’s here in my text, to wit, that this people were to be cast out of the house of God, as Ishmael was cast out of Abraham’s house. That whilst they remained in it, they remained only as servants or sons of the bondwoman, not as the freeborn sons of the heavenly Jerusalem. Of which society none are capable, save only so far as they are set free by the Son, who is the Builder and Maker of this house of God, as the apostle tells us, Heb. iii. 3—6 : *For this man was counted worthy of more glory than Moses, inasmuch as he who hath builded the house hath more honour than the house. For every house is builded by some man ; but he that built all things is God. And Moses verily was faithful in all his house, as a*

<sup>u</sup> See book 7. sect. 2. ch. 12. lic Church, book 1. ch. 10. more §. 2 ; and Treatise of the Catho- largely.

*servant, for a testimony of those things which were to be spoken after; but Christ as a son over his own house; whose house are we, if we hold fast the confidence and the rejoicing of the hope firm unto the end.* But the best is, we need not stand long or curiously upon the meaning of the antecedent, or manner of the inference, seeing we believe (as we are in duty bound) that our blessed Saviour was a Prophet most true and most infallible, as well in every conclusion or proposition which he uttered, as in the premises whence he inferred them, or in the manner of the inference. It shall suffice us then to fasten our belief upon the conclusion, *If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.*

## CHAP. XXIII.

*The second Discourse or Sermon upon our Saviour's words, John viii. 36: "If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." That that sour Reply to Christ, We be Abraham's seed, &c. was made by those very Jews which were said (ver. 30) to believe on Him; and, that Men which for a while believe, may in Temptation, or strong Assaults of Passions, fall away.*

1. THESE words contain one of the most remarkable passages, and of best use for surveying the rest, of that long dialogue between our blessed Lord and a great <sup>The coherence.</sup> 71 assembly of the Jews of divers sorts and qualities. The dialogue continues from the twelfth verse of this chapter unto the end. The former part, from verse the twelfth to the thirtieth, contains so many and so profound mysteries concerning the eternity of Christ's Godhead, and of his mission, &c. from his Father to this people, that for the present I must apply that saying, which the woman of Samaria directed to our Saviour, unto myself—*The well is deep, and I have*



*nothing wherewith to draw*, neither strength of body, of mind, or skill; nor opportunity, if these were greater, to present so much of it as I could perhaps draw for mine own use, clear and perspicuous to the major part of this audience in a short discourse. Let it suffice then, I pray, to acquaint you with the vent or outburst of this deep fountain of life, which none of these Jews could sound the one half of the way, though all catechised by the Lord of life himself. The issue of this catechism from verse the twelfth you have verse thirtieth—*As he spake these words, many believed on him.* A good issue of so gracious a sermon, concerning the Fountain of Life, had his auditors had the grace to have followed the clear current of it, not mingling it with their own muddy passions, as in the very first issue or outburst they did. For our Saviour had no sooner uttered those words of comfort to the Jews which believed on him—*If ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed; and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free,* vv. 31, 32—but some of his auditors, whosoever they were, tartly reply, *We be Abraham's seed, and were never in bondage to any man: how sayest thou, Ye shall be made free?* ver. 33. Unto this passionate reply, or impertinent interruption, our Saviour's rejoinder is calm and meek, but fortified with a double seal of truth, Ἀμὴν, ἀμὴν, λέγω ὑμῖν, *Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin. And the servant abideth not in the house for ever: but the Son abideth for ever,* vv. 34, 35. Thus, by following the current of the former words, I am fairly arrived at my text, (it being our Saviour's own inference out of his former assertions,) *If the Son therefore shall make you free, &c.*

2. But before I can conveniently unfold the meaning



of our Saviour's former speeches, or the connexion betwixt my text and them, I must briefly discuss a question naturally emergent out of ver. 33, to wit, whether the passionate reply or interruption, *We be Abraham's seed, and were never in bondage to any, &c.* was made by those Jews, which in ver. 30 are said to have *believed on him*, or by some other auditors which did not believe on him at all, but were, at least for the time being, mere bystanders at this debate? Some of the choicest commentators upon this Gospel are of opinion, that the forementioned sour reply, *We be Abraham's seed, and were never in bondage to any man*, was returned by the Jews which for the present did not believe. Yet the greater part of more judicious and discreet interpreters of our Saviour's discourse in this chapter, or of St. John's relation of it, take it as granted, "that the reply was made by those very Jews which (v. 30) *believed on him.*" And unto any rational man, specially, well conversant in scriptures, or well experienced in his own or other men's affections, it will, upon short examination, appear, that the contradictory opinion of cardinal Tollet and some others could never have found entrance, much less any settled habitation or rest in any learned man's judgment or apprehension, unless they had been first surprised by that general incogitancy or common error, from which many plausible pulpitmen, and some otherwise most acute divines, have taken occasion; the one sort to deceive their hearers, the other not to discover the deceitfulness of their own hearts. Neither of them take it into due consideration, that this word *belief* is not a term indivisible, but admits of many degrees, as well for the certainty of the <sup>x</sup>assent or apprehension, as for the radication of the

Which sort of Jews made that passionate reply to Christ: believers or others.

Some interpreters say unbelievers.

More for believers.

\* This great author in his first book, ch. I, defined *faith* by an *assent*. If any think amiss of that, let him please to take no-

truth (rightly apprehended) in their hearts, or centre of their affections.

3. Though *recta ratio* be not the rule of faith, nor any competent judge of divine mysteries; yet it is a very competent witness or informer. Now to any reasonable or well experienced man, it is evident that there may be, and ofttimes are, many true apprehensions of objects or truths to be believed, whether moral or divine, which may make deep impression, not in the brain or fancy only, but upon our  $\gamma$  affections, whilst these are calm and unprovoked, and yet both the apprehension and impression quickly vanish upon the starting or provocation of contrary fancies or affections. To begin with observations moral. He that should have seen Alexander Pheræus <sup>z</sup>weeping-ripe at the representation of a foreign and perhaps a feigned tragedy, and so affable withal as to excuse his departure from the stage unto the principal actor, might easily have mistaken him to have been of the same metal and mould that ordinarily <sup>a</sup>good men are; a man rather of a gentle and melting, than of a flinty and stony heart; whereas his apology or excuse did abundantly witness the contrary. His apology was, that he did not depart because he misliked the actor, whom by a private

tice, that St. Austin did so too: *Ipsium credere nihil aliud est quam cum assensione cogitare.* Lib. 1. de Prædestinat. Sanctorum, cap. 2. §. 5. tom. (7) 10.

$\gamma$  Was it not so with St. Peter,

when he said, he would die rather than deny Christ? and in those who would have made Christ a king, John vi. 15, and soon after raged against him?

<sup>z</sup> Proverb.

<sup>a</sup> Ἀγαθοὶ δ' ἀριδάκρυτοι ἄνδρες.

..... Mollissima corda  
 Humano generi dare se natura fatetur,  
 Quæ lacrimas dedit: hæc nostri pars optima sensus.  
 Plorare ergo jubet causam dicentis amici.  
 Naturæ imperio gemimus, quum funus adultæ  
 Virginis occurrit, vel terra clauditur infans.

Juvenal, Sat. XV. 132.

messenger he requested to go on with his play; but for shame or fear, if he should be espied to shed tears upon the stage at the sight of a foreign tragedy, he should move new discontents or derision from his subjects, seeing he had spilt most of the noble blood of Thessaly with dry cheeks, without mingling so much as one tear with it. What might be the reason why this man should be so courteous or tenderhearted in jest, and so cruel and doggedly hardhearted in earnest? Hecuba and Andromache, whose tragedy he did then behold, had been dead many years before, and could not provoke his affections. That prosperity wherein they sometimes had lived, could not have been so great an eyesore unto him as the representation of their last misery was; whereas, if Priamus, Hector, with all their families, had been then living, and standing in opposition to his heady wilful designs, the tyrant would have made no scruple of conscience to have sacrificed them all quick to his ravenous and vast desires, though in the flames of Troy itself, without the help of one tear from his eyes to quench them.

4. A notable instance of the like alteration of present affections, or inconstancy in forward resolutions upon new proposals, we have in that famous mutiny of the commons against the senate of Capua. The storm was violent for the time, but quickly allayed by the subtilty of one Pacuvius Calavius, a man of good place, and popular; who having long sought to win both the senate and people to his disposal, took first opportunity upon this occasion to make his game by playing (as we say) both with the stock and cards dealt. First he pretends to the senators, that he was in as great danger as any of them were, and yet would free them all, so they would give him leave to act his part. Having persuaded the senators to shut themselves up

Instances of  
strange al-  
tering of af-  
fections.

73

in the porch of their house of assembly, and deliver their keys to his custody, he instantly carries them to the commons, telling them they had now a fair opportunity to be revenged of the senate, to punish every man amongst them according to his deserts, without any danger of bloodshed to themselves: but adds this advice withal, that seeing they must of necessity have a senate or council of state, they would not depose or punish any of the present senators, before they had nominated a fitter man in his place. After two or three had been proposed by some few ringleaders, the major part of the mutineers did reject them upon this allegation, that some of them they did not know, others they knew too well, and so, in conclusion, were content to submit themselves to their ancient senators, rather than to such new ones as were commended unto them by their ringleaders.

5. Machiavel's aphorism or animadversion upon this story, is, "That the vulgar or common people are of weak judgments in generalities, but judges competent enough in particulars." The observation is not amiss, and so far as it is not amiss, will better befit the issue of this dispute between our Saviour and the Jews, than it doth the senate and commons of Capua. The exact truth is, that not only vulgar persons or plebeians, but even wise and learned men must needs err in judgment or apprehension, whilst they weigh either their present discontents or grievances, or their persuasions or good-liking of men, or their belief of wholesome doctrine without a counterpoise. So long as these men in my text, of which divers, no doubt, were more than vulgar or plebeians, did hear our Saviour dispute with the learned Pharisees about the eternity of his person, and authority delegated unto him as man from God the Father; they like well of him, and could be content to become



his patients rather than their great rabbins' scholars.

But as soon as this heavenly Physician began to come near the sore whereof they were dangerously sick, before he did directly touch it, they kick at his medicine. Pride of heart, and confidence in their prerogative of being Abraham's seed, was the imposthume whereof, without speedy help, they were ready to perish. Now our Saviour had no sooner promised to set them free, or cure them, but they presently fly in his face, as if he had upbraided them with slavery. For to be made free is peculiar to servants, slaves, or bondmen. Hence they reply to this purpose—'*We be Abraham's seed*, and though conquered by the Romans, yet are we not made slaves, or brought into bondage by them; *how sayest thou then, Ye shall be made free?*' The manner of the regection seems to imply, that they had now begun to be sorry that they had so far believed on him, or given that respect unto him which immediately before they had done.

The Jews  
liked Christ  
dearly well  
till he  
touched  
their sore.

6. But this revolt our Saviour did foresee, and gave them a caveat to prevent it, ver. 31, where he saith not, as some zealous professors have in his name mistaught<sup>74</sup> their auditors in our days—'If once ye <sup>b</sup>believe in me, ye cannot fall away from me;' but thus he taught them expressly, *If ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples*, ἀληθῶς: so that it is one thing to believe in Christ, another to be truly his disciples; one business to believe his doctrine, another to continue in his word; that is, to persevere in true faith, and maintenance of his doctrine unto the end. Nor is it perhaps all one to be made free by the truth, and to be set free indeed, ὄντως, which, I take it, includes some-

<sup>b</sup> If any say, it is not true belief if it fade or fail; they may believe, that if they put perseverance into the definition of

true faith, they null the question, and make it, whether faith that cannot fail, may fail.

what more than ἀληθῶς, *a reality or solidity of truth*. All these gradations are literally and emphatically implied in the plain grammatical sense and meaning of our Saviour's speech, from ver. 30. to the words of my text, and more apparently in the next verse following; *I know that ye are Abraham's seed; but ye seek to kill me, because my word hath no place in you*. These words were not directed to the altogether unbelieving or contradicting Jews, with whom he had disputed from ver. 12. to ver. 29; they necessarily refer unto those Jews which had believed in part, and afforded the assent of the brain unto his doctrine, but left no place for his word in their hearts; these being full stuffed with corrupt affections, as with pride, ambition, and hopes of earthly pomps and dignities from their expected Messias. When he saith, *because my word hath no place in you*, we are to understand, *no place of residence, or permanent habitation*, although it had found some entrance into their fancies. Or will ye have a further reason, why his *word*, that is, the fundamental point or mystery of faith, which he had lately taught, had *no place* in them? Take it in his own words: *I speak that*, saith our Saviour, *which I have seen with my Father, and ye do that which ye have seen with your father*, ver. 38. He had granted them before to be Abraham's seed, but now expresseth his meaning to be, that they were a kind of abortivate or ill thriven seed, no true sons or children of Abraham. But as yet they did not fully understand whom he meant by *his Father*, or whom by *their father*. And for this reason they only resume the same reply, which they had made before, ver. 33. *Abraham is our father*, say they, ver. 39, without adding any gall unto it. But our Saviour's rejoinder is not altogether the same, but somewhat more smart and full. Before, he had granted them to be *Abraham's seed*, but now, he denies them

to be *Abraham's sons*, in the latter part of the same ver. 39: *If ye were Abraham's children, ye would do the works of Abraham. But now* (ver. 40) *ye seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth—this did not Abraham.* And again, ver. 41, he intimates unto them who was their true father, that was neither God nor Abraham. Who then was their true father, or whose children were they indeed? This he tells them plainly, ver. 44: *Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him*; that is, by not abiding in the truth, or that image of God wherein he was created, he lost all seeds of truth, and became a mere liar and the father of lies. And so these Jews were in the truth whilst they believed on him who was the true Son of God, yet did not abide in it after he had told them *the truth should make them free.* And out of this swelling pride of heart they enter odious comparisons, that they were sons of God, in an equal or better-manner than he was. And in conclusion, after he had told them, that they were as yet the sons of the devil, that is, men of murderous minds and envious to the truth; they answer him boldly, and glory in their answer too, *Say we not well that thou art a Samaritan, and hast a devil?* ver. 48. And if a Samaritan, then no Son of God, but a conjurer or servant of the devil.

7. Thus you have heard to what height of contradic-<sup>75</sup>tion to the truth, to the Son of God, (who is the Truth and the Life of the world,) and to their own profession, men in part believers may be drawn, by indulgence to their own corrupt affections, specially of pride, ambition, and covetousness; all which ought to be and must be renounced before they can be ἀληθῶς μαθηταὶ Χριστοῦ, *true disciples of Christ.* And here I cannot



but wonder why men conversant in scriptures, or experienced in their own or others' affections and conditions, should move any question, whether those which thus unmannerly contested with our Saviour throughout the latter part of this chapter were the same men which in ver. 30. are said *to have believed on him*. And I wonder the more, because every serious reader, much more the learned interpreters of this chapter, might have observed many like animadversions or observations of this our apostle and evangelist concerning the disposition of the Jews, which in part or upon fair occasions believed on Christ. I shall for the present instance only in two like places, of which the one is a parallel, the other more than a parallel to the revolt or backsliding of these believing Jews, ver. 31. The one place is an overture or presage; the other contains the fulfilling or accomplishment of our Saviour's prophecy or prediction of those men's disposition which entertained him with the often forementioned dispute, from ver. 31. to the end of this chapter. The overture or parallel we have, John ii 23, &c.: *Now when he was in Jerusalem at the passover, in the feast day, many believed in his name, when they saw the miracles which he did*. May we hence conclude or safely collect that these men were ἀληθῶς μαθηταὶ, *truly his disciples, or believers indeed*, ὄντως, although it be unquestionably true (for the evangelist affirms it) *that they did believe in his name?* If we should make this construction of the evangelist's meaning in that place, that is, that those men were *truly disciples, believers indeed*, his words immediately following would irrefragably confute us. For although they did believe in his name, yet he did not believe them: or, to use the apostle's words, ver. 24, Οὐκ ἐπίστευεν ἑαυτὸν αὐτοῖς, that is, as our English renders it, *He did not commit*

Two instances of the like or worse recoils and revolts of the Jews.



*himself unto them.* And why would he not commit himself unto their trust, seeing they believed on him? The evangelist resolves us in the next words, *Because he knew all men, and needed not that any should testify of man, for he knew what was in man.* And knowing all men, he knew the disposition of these men to be such, that although they did for the present believe in his name, upon presentation of discontent, or denial of satisfying their desires or hopes of earthly dignities, they would revile him as the believers in my text did, and maliciously contradict his doctrine; or, if opportunity served, betray him into his enemies' hands, or at least offer him such violence as was offered him in the last verse of this eighth chapter: *Then took they up stones to cast at him: Ἰησοῦς δὲ ἐκρύβη, that is, he made himself invisible to their sight, and went out of the temple, going through the midst of them, καὶ παρήγγεν οὕτως, and so avoided their attempted violence, because the hour was not yet come wherein he was willing to suffer violence.*

8. But this dangerous disease of the Jewish nation, or the particular indisposition of such as in the second and eighth chapters of this Gospel are said to believe in him, did not come to so perfect a crisis, that others besides Christ himself, who *knew what was in man*, could take notice of it, until that passover wherein he was betrayed by Judas. At the beginning of this great feast, most of the seed or progeny of Abraham by Isaac, not inhabitants of Judæa only, but wheresoever scattered through other nations or provinces, did believe in his name after a better manner, and expressed their belief and observance to him in far higher terms than those men to whom my text refers, or those mentioned by St. John, chap. ii, or any other ordinary assemblies had done before. And this they did without

The second instance of Jewish revolt from Christ, or rather turning clean counter.

contradiction of any, save of the scribes and Pharisees, priests and elders. Scarce any king or emperor, whether Christian or heathenish, since the world began, was entertained with such lofty gratulations, from so many mouths and hands at once, as our Saviour, some three or four days before he was betrayed. The triumphant salutations which had been tendered to David by Judah and Israel at his coronation, were but a model of the loud echoes of *Hosanna to the Son of David! Hosanna in the highest! Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord!* and other expressions of this people's joy, when our Saviour, according to the prophecy, came into Jerusalem. What was the reason of their unparalleled exultation? Only their belief of the late miracles, which he had wrought upon Lazarus and some other private men, and their hopes that he would do greater wonders than these for their good, and for the glory of their nation; as, first, to deliver them from the present Roman yoke, and afterward to make them lords of the nations through which they were scattered. But after he had by his Father's appointment rendered himself to the high priest and elders, without a blow given, beside that which Peter gave to Malchus, and submitted himself to the Roman deputy without resistance; they begun to cast doubts in their minds, and thought, that he who could not or would not defend himself from such violence, was not able, or would not be willing, to protect, much less to advance them unto greater dignities. And so, by degrees, within a short space, the very same parties of exultant believers in him became cruel persecutors of him; changing their late joyful hymns of *Hosanna to the Son of David* into sad madrigals of *Crucifige, crucifige—Let him be crucified, let him be crucified* like a slave. And thus the whole nation almost did

remarkably fulfil our Saviour's prediction of these Jews, mentioned ver. 44. of this chapter: *Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth.* Hereby we may know them to have been the devil's own sons, in that when Pilate had proposed unto them him, whom they had lately confessed to be the Son of David, with Barabbas, a notable thief and a murderer, they importunately solicit with open mouth the deliverance of Barabbas, by interpretation, *the son of their father*, and the execution of Jesus their Saviour, and changed their late belief and allegiance professed to Christ, who is Truth itself, and Son of God, unto the service of the father of lies.

9. The resultance of that which hath been said (or, if you will, the main stem unto which all the forementioned scattered seeds of truth afford nutriment) is this— 'That men in part believers, or to their own apprehension, zealous and sound professors of Christian faith, may be as yet servants to sin, and by such service slaves to Satan.' The useful branches springing from this stem are these: first, to know the nature, condition, or properties of our natural lord and master, to wit, sin original, whether hereditary merely, or as by us improved. The second, to know our own condition or estate, or wherein our servitude to sin doth properly consist. Thirdly, the degrees or manner how we are, or may be made free indeed by the Son of God. But with these branches I dare not meddle for the present, the best use which can be made of this short remnant <sup>77</sup> of time will be to reflect by way of use or application upon that which hath been said.

10. Were this question proposed to this present or The application.

any other congregation throughout this city<sup>c</sup>, punctually in these terms, ‘Whether do ye love God and his anointed Christ with all your hearts and with all your souls?’ we should find but a very few, if any at all, which would not as willingly subscribe unto this, as unto that solemn covenant made by them or by others for them to this effect at their baptism. Nor will Christian charity permit us to suspect, much less to deny, that they did make this recognition heartily and unfeignedly according to their present apprehensions or persuasions of their belief, specially if they made it in the calm of their unprovoked affections. But if we should cast in that counterpoise which our Saviour himself hath given us for the due examining of our apprehensions or persuasions of our love and loyalty towards him, most of us might justly dread lest that handwriting against Belshazzar, *Mene, Mene, Tekel*, might as well be applicable to ourselves as it was to him. Fear we might, lest our apprehensions or persuasion of our belief, of our love and loyalty towards Christ, would prove a great deal too light, if we should weigh them (as we ought) by the true scale of the sanctuary. One counterpoise there is which would quickly recall or check our forward apprehensions or boastings, and that is given us by our Saviour himself in this Gospel, chap. xiv. 15, 23, 24: *If ye love me, keep my commandments*. And again, chap. xv. 10: *If ye keep my commandments, ye shall abide in my love*. How many may we find, who in distress or danger, whether by sea or land, specially in grievous storms or sickness, will seriously purpose and resume that branch of their

<sup>c</sup> This sermon is supposed to have been preached at Oxford, in a time of God’s visitation by the plague of pestilence.



vow in baptism, "to forsake the devil and all his works, the lusts of the flesh, the pomps and vanities of this wicked world:" and yet the same men, being restored to health and probable safety, will, of late zealous professors and solemn votaries, turn Gadarenes or Gergesites, ready upon new opportunities or provocations of untame desires, to wish Christ to depart out of their coasts, rather than his residence in their hearts or brains should give a continual check to their swinish appetites or brutish fancies. And thus to do, is not to keep but to violate Christ's commandments, which whosoever doth not keep as well in this particular of mortifying the works or lusts of the flesh, as in other duties, doth not truly believe in him, shall not, without hearty repentance, or new purification of the heart and spirit, either see God or be partaker of Christ's kingdom.

11. Another precept of Christ there is, more general than the former: *Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do unto them: for this is the law and the prophets.* So far is the whole Christian world (as we call it) from keeping this commandment, that the practices most contrary to it are so universal, and so violent, as that both the casuists and professed interpreters of scriptures have almost lost the true meaning of it, at least have utterly neglected the extending or branching of it into useful rules of good life, or for bringing forth *the fruits of the spirit.* And, which is worse, such learned and pious men, as have undertaken the cure of souls, and have been solemnly sworn to the faithful execution of pastoral charge, dare not press the observance of this great commandment upon their flock, which daily and hourly most shamefully transgress it; partly by the uncontrolled practices of stubborn people, partly by

authorized rules in courts of justice. No prophet of the Lord dare speak his mind, or interpreter of the 78 gospel or spiritual governor dare put his commission from Christ in execution, unless such as are resolved to suffer a martyrdom from their flock, or from the professors of the one or other law established throughout this kingdom. Without reference to any particular cause or person, I dare boldly pronounce in the general, that not the twentieth part of tedious suits or vexations in law, or other grievances or oppressions, would either be set on foot by the people, or suffered to be prosecuted by men in authority, if the fear of God, belief in Christ, loyalty to their sovereign lord, or good affection to their country, were planted in either of them, truly or indeed.

12. The general neglect of this great commandment, *of doing as we would be done unto*, in former times of our security and peace, hath been always dangerous; but the violation of it in these times of mortality, of calamity, and more than wonted danger of worse to ensue, is prodigious. For preventing the execution of God's judgments threatened for our violation of this and other commandments of Christ, I must entreat all sorts of men that hear me this day, in the same words for sense and meaning which a zealous and learned father sometimes used in like case: *Parcite regi, parcite regno, parcite populo Anglicano, parcite animabus vestris*; If there be any true love and loyalty in us towards our gracious sovereign lord and his royal issue, any good affection towards our native country or to our souls, let us abate our wonted pride and luxury, our wonted covetousness. Let us not think it sufficient to abstain from unjust, unchristian vexation and oppression of our neighbours, unless we seriously account that measure of contentment (of

our desires of what kind soever) which heretofore hath been lawful, to be in these times more than most unexpedient. To use that plenty of diet or measure of recreation, but especially that benefit or advantage of laws for advancing ourselves or increasing our fortune, which heretofore we have done, perhaps without sin, let this also in these times be esteemed impious, or a sin not to be expiated without hearty repentance and extraordinary performance of works of mercy<sup>d</sup>.—The end of the second sermon.

13. <sup>e</sup>But the more we labour further to unfold this argument of our natural servitude unto sin, the faster we shall draw another knot: or the more we press the several branches of this servitude upon the conscience of the unregenerate or not well sanctified man, the greater perplexity we shall create unto him in another part of theology, whose knowledge is altogether as necessary and as useful as our experience of natural servitude unto sin is. The knot or perplexed difficulty is; ‘What kind or what portion of freedom of will is or can be compossible with absolute servitude unto sin in the unregenerate or unsanctified man?’

<sup>d</sup> Daniel iv. 27.

<sup>e</sup> The author's connexion of the 21st chapter to the 4th sec-

tion, as it was before these two sermons were inserted.

## SECTION IV.

*Of that Faculty of the reasonable Soul which we commonly call Freewill. Of the Root and several Branches of it in the Generality. What Branches or Portion of this Freewill is in the Man altogether unregenerate, or in debauched or heinous Sinners.*

## CHAP. XXIV.

*Of the Difficulties of the Controversies concerning Freewill, with the Reasons why they have troubled the Church so long.*

1. IF we should abstract this problem from the difficulties wherewith it may seem to be entangled by the former discourses concerning our servitude to sin, and consider it only in its own nature and essence, this question alone hath ministered more matter of intricate disputes than any other controverted point in theology. He that hath leisure, skill, and opportunity to take an accurate historical survey of the true state (or rather of the instability or ill stated tenor) of this point since the death of our Saviour's apostles, or other canonical writers of the New Testament, will easily discover that the disputes about it *pro* and *con* have been like to a pair of scales which never came to any permanent stay or constant settling upon the right centre, but have one while waggled this way, another while that way. The orthodoxal truth concerning this point, as it was taught by our Saviour himself, and by his apostles, and maintained by those who did immediately succeed them, is, that there was no other state or fatality in human affairs or events, save only this ;

The main point about freewill scarce well stated in any age since the apostles' times.



That such as sought after glory and immortality by well doing, should undoubtedly be rewarded according to their works; that all such as continue in impious or ungodly courses, shall treasure up wrath against the day of wrath, and bring a necessity upon themselves of being everlastingly tormented.

2. The Stoicks first, and after them the Manichees, did oppose this heavenly doctrine, by maintaining a strange and more than brutish opinion, which had been hatched before our Saviour Christ was born, to wit, That all effects or events, whether contrived by men, or otherwise projected by nature itself, did fall out by an indispensable and unconquerable necessity. The necessary issue of this doctrine (as was apprehended by all Christian antiquity) did amount thus high—<sup>f</sup> That all those exhortations to repentance, to sanctity, or to newness of life, and to the practice of good works moral or spiritual, (whether these were given to us men by our Saviour Christ or by his apostles,) had been better directed to horse or mule, (or other more docile reasonless creatures,) than unto the unregenerate man, from whom to take away all freedom of will (as fate or necessity doth) were to make him a degree lower, and place him in an estate or condition of life much worse, than the most foolish or most noisome reasonless creatures do by their Creator's bounty enjoy.

3. The ancient fathers of the first and best ages,<sup>80</sup> Justin Martyr, Origen, Athanasius, Nyssen, Jerome, &c., did so zealously intend the extirpation of this heresy, or rather heathenish infidelity, which necessarily deprived men (whether regenerate or unregenerate) of all freedom of will in what action soever, that they

<sup>f</sup> See St. August. tom. 1. book modo jubet Deus, si non est libe-  
3. de Lib. Arb. et tom. (7.) 10. rum arbitrium.  
L. de Lib. Arb. et Grat. c. 2. quo-

seldom mentioned the use or necessity of grace for performance of actions truly good<sup>g</sup>. For this (as some have well observed) was impertinent to the question then only agitated betwixt them and graceless men, Stoicks, I mean, or Manichees. They only sought to fortify the sentence contradictory unto these blasphemous tenents concerning the absolute fatality of human actions, whether good or bad. Now Pelagius, having observed that such of these reverend fathers as lived and writ before him did say little, or sometimes nothing, for magnifying of grace, but exceeding much and very well for establishing some kind of freewill in men, more than is to be found in beasts, took hence occasion to exalt freewill and depress grace, even whilst the controversy was about the concurrence of God's free grace and man's freewill, a point not thought of amongst Christians in primitive times, it being then taken as granted by all, that however freewill be necessary unto salvation, (a quality without which a man is neither capable of reward nor punishment,) yet the only cause of man's redemption from servitude to sin, or of salvation by such redemption, was the free grace of God, as it issues from the sole fountain of life and grace, the man Christ Jesus, God incarnate<sup>h</sup>.

4. Pelagius having drawn the one scale of this dispute so far awry on the one side, did provoke certain monks in Africk (whose founder or principal benefactor was one Valentinus) to wrest the other

<sup>g</sup> St. Chrys. tom. 1. Hom. 62. Orat. 2. de Fato, says, that a fatalist cannot be saved.

<sup>h</sup> Tolle liberum arbitrium, non erit *quod*;

Tolle gratiam liberam non erit *quo*, salvetur.

Tolle liberum arbitrium quomodo Deus judicabit?

Tolle gratiam quomodo salvabit mundum?

Epist. (1. ad Valentin. tom. 7.) 214. tom. 2. S. Augustini.

scale as far amiss on the other side, and to jump with the Stoicks' or Manichees' opinion. This stirred up the spirit of that most learned father of those times, (I mean for rational or scholastic disputes,) St. Austin, to attempt the drawing of a middle line between these two extravagancies or extremities, which he oftentimes performed with a steady and constant hand, yet sometimes, too often, (if so it had pleased the Lord,) did falter. Since his death, not only the forementioned difficulty concerning the compossibility of God's free grace and man's freewill, but the very true and punctual meaning of this learned moderator, hath been by his followers, whether fathers, schoolmen, or others, so meanly tufted, and so unskilfully hunted after, as a man that would take pains to read them may fitly apply that conceit which a pleasant wit entertained of a text forsaken by the preacher or professed handler of it, to the true state of the main question concerning freedom of will; that is, 'a march hare might have sit upon it and never have been started for all the barking and bawling of contrary factions or opposite sectaries,' some three or four (not so well esteemed or seconded as they deserved) only excepted.

5. One principal reason of so little speed and less good success in this search hath been, because the most of such as have undertaken this task usually took no more of the main controversy into due consideration than did lie just under their level, or between them and the scope at which they aimed. And that was, if not only, yet principally the confutation of others' errors or heretical doctrine: an attempt which seldom finds any good achievance, unless it be managed with much discretion, with moderation of passions or affections. Nor will this suffice, unless the party thus qualified be enabled with good literature

distinctly to set down the true and positive grounds of that truth, about whose meaning or extent questions usually arise, or to resolve the several branches of controversies moved into their first stems, roots, or seeds. He that will adventure to write or speak of election, reprobation, or predestination, before he be so well instructed in the grounds of philosophy both natural and moral, as to understand the nature, properties, and several stems of freewill; or to make search after all or any of these, before he clearly know what necessity and contingency are, wherein they differ, or how they sometimes intermingle, or the one of them grow into the other, shall (as too many in our times have done) so cross-shackle himself with ramistical pothooks or dichotomies, that he shall be enforced either to stumble or interfere at every second or third step. For avoiding this inconvenience, into which I had from my youth observed many otherwise learned writers (through want of skill in true and solid logic, but especially in philosophy) to fall, I have premised what I hope was rightly conceived concerning the forementioned fundamental points of fate, necessity, and contingency<sup>i</sup>. And by help of those principles, as clearly as the matter would suffer heretofore discussed at large, I trust I shall be able to treat of this present argument of freewill, and hereafter of predestination, so far as is fitting, (or shall be permitted me by authority,) consequently to mine own grounds or positions, without interfering or stumbling in my course, without crossing or trenching upon any point of catholic faith or orthodoxal doctrine.

<sup>i</sup> See part 2. sect. 2. vol. v. p. 464.



CHAP. XXV.

*Of the divers Acceptions or Significations of Freedom or Freeness ; and of the several Sorts or Degrees of Freedom in Creatures inanimate, vegetable, sensitive, and rational.*

1. *FREEDOM* or *freeness* in our English tongue sometimes imports no more than *spontaneum* doth in Latin. And according to this sense or signification, every thing is said to be done *sponte*, or *freely*, or freely to come to pass, which is done or comes to pass by the proper or natural inclination of any bodily substance, whether it be endowed with life or sense, or with motion only. Thus we say, the water hath a free course, or runneth freely, when it runs that way which nature inclines it, without any let or hinderance, or without any artificial or external help to draw, move, or impel it. *Freedom* in this sense is opposed only to *coaction*, to *constraint*, or *enforcement*. As when water is drawn or impelled to such a course, which, left to itself, it would not take, we say it is a forced stream or current, not a free stream: and so we call those grounds *forced*, which bring forth little or no fruit, without great labour, toil, or cost, unto such as till or dress them. And in this sense the Latin word *liberum*, unto which our English *freedom* or *liberty* doth more properly and directly answer than unto the Latin *spontaneum*, is sometimes used, to wit, as it is opposed only to coaction or enforcement: so a poet, describing the happy estate of the world in the golden age, saith—*Ipsaque tellus omnia liberius nullo poscente ferebat*—"The earth did bring forth all things necessary or expedient for the use or comfort of man freely:" that is, of its own accord, without the labour, industry, or provident dressing of man. Thus, this and other

Of freedom in creatures inanimate, as it is opposed to enforcement.

82 poets<sup>i</sup> speak of the golden age, from some broken notions or traditions of man's first estate in paradise, and of that estate wherein the world and all things should have continued, if man had not fallen. But this temper of the earth is much altered, or rather inverted, by the fall of man. Most men, it may be, have heard or read of that answer which an ancient philosopher made to this question: "Why nettles, thistles, and other like weeds, should grow so fast in such abundance, of their own accord; whereas flowers, herbs, or comfortable fruits did not grow at all, or seldom come to any good proof, without the extraordinary pains or skill of man?" The best answer which the philosopher could make was this—"That the earth was a natural and kind mother unto nettles, weeds, and grass; but a step-mother only to flowers, herbs, or fruit." Now the answer, though for those times held witty, was no way satisfactory. For a man might have further asked him, "Why the earth should be a kind mother and loving nurse to weeds, and a hard or cruel stepmother to herbs or fruits?" Unto this question the youngest child amongst us that is rightly catechised in the grounds of religion, or hath but read the three first chapters of the first book of Moses, may give a more full and satisfactory answer, than the wisest philosophers, without the principles of Christian religion, could do. The cause then, or reason, is from the curse wherewith God cursed the earth for man's transgression,

<sup>i</sup> Of that age, Ovid. *Met.* lib. i. 101, &c.

*Ipsa quoque immunis, rastrisque intacta, nec ullis  
Saucia vomeribus, per se dabat omnia tellus . . . . .  
Mox etiam fruges tellus inarata ferebat,  
Nec renovatus ager gravidis canebat aristis.*

See Horace's *Arva Beata*, *Epod.* xvi. 43. 49:

*Reddit ubi cererem tellus inarata quotannis, etc.  
Illic injussæ veniunt ad mulctra capellæ, . . .*

Gen. iii. 17—19: *Because thou hast eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee, saying, Thou shalt not eat of it: cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life; thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field; in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground.* But though the heathens could not know this story by light of nature; yet thus much being revealed or made known unto them, they might easily have gathered, that if the earth was thus accursed for man's sake, the nature of man was first accursed or corrupted: as in very deed this preposterous and untoward inclination of the earth to bring forth weeds freely and plentifully, and good fruit hardly or by constraint or coaction, is but an emblem or visible picture of the untoward and corrupt disposition of man's heart to bring forth the fruits of the flesh voluntarily, freely, and plentifully; whereas it doth not, it cannot, bring forth the fruits of the Spirit, without the skill and husbandry of him that made it. We have the seeds of sin and iniquity planted in us by nature, and they fructify and increase by our sloth and negligence. As for the fruits of righteousness, the seeds of them must be sown in us by the Spirit of God; and being sown, they do not grow up and prosper without his extraordinary blessing upon his own plants, and his servants' labours. Though *Paul may plant, and Apollos water, yet it is God only that gives the increase.* *I am the vine,* saith our Saviour, John xv. 1, *and my Father is the husbandman;* and, as the apostle, 1 Cor. iii. 9, speaks, *we are his husbandry.* So that in respect of the fruits of righteousness and works spiritual, man's nature is not free according to this first acception or sense of *freedom*; that is, as it was opposed unto coaction:



but in respect of the fruits of the flesh our corrupt nature is most free; these it brings forth of its own accord more freely and more plentifully than the earth (which God hath cursed for man's sake) doth nettles, thistles, or any worse kind of weed. And yet the more freely our nature brings forth the fruits of sin, 83 the more deeply it is still tainted with the servitude of sin. So that freedom and servitude in some cases, at least in respect of divers objects, are not opposite, but coincident or compatible in one and the same subject or person.

Of the radical difference between creatures inanimate and vegetables.

2. This kind of freedom, which is only opposed to coaction or enforcement, though it be truly and properly in creatures inanimate and void of life, yet it is in a higher degree in creatures vegetable or sensitive. Inanimate or lifeless creatures have their inclinations so set by <sup>k</sup>nature, that no contrary inclination can be implanted in them by custom: as, if you move a stone every hour of the day upwards, it will still move itself as freely and as swiftly downwards, as it did at the first. We cannot work any inclination or propension in it, either to move itself upwards, or to be more easily moved by us. But vegetables, of what kind soever, grass, corn, (or weeds which grow up with them,) herbs or plants; albeit they have no freedom or power at all to move themselves out of the places wherein they grow, yet have they a natural faculty to increase themselves, or be augmented by the benignity of the earth wherein they grow, and the influence of moisture and heat from heaven; a capacity withal, which stones, or other inanimate creatures, have not, to be much bettered, both in growth and quality, by the industry

<sup>k</sup> Arist. Eth. Nicom. lib. 2. φερόμενος, οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθεῖη ἄνω φέρε-  
 cap. 1. οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλ-  
 λως ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω  
 τισι ἄνω ρίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω.



or skilful husbandry of man. Another degree or rank of animate or living creatures there is, which the Grecians call ζωοφύτᾱ, and the Latins as well as they can express the Greek, *stirp-animalia*, or (*plant-animalia*,) that is, living creatures in some respects best resembling mere vegetables; in others, sensitives, which we call *animalia*. The most of this rank live in the sea, as oysters, cockles, muscles, or other duller kinds of shell-fishes, which herein agree with mere vegetables, in that they can hardly move themselves out of their places, as from the rocks or sands wherein they breed, and yet have a sense or feeling of their proper nutriment, or of its want, which mere vegetables have not; and a motive power within themselves, answerable to this sense of pain or pleasure, of opening or shutting their mouths, or those instruments of sense by which they suck in their food or nutriment. Some land creatures there be, (if we may believe good writers without our own experiments,) that hold the same correspondency between mere vegetables and sensitive creatures, which the forementioned shell-fishes or sea creatures do. To omit the reports of the Russian lamb, or other like sensitives which are fastened to the earth out of which they grow: it hath been in my hearing, and in a solemn audience avouched by as great a philosopher and divine as any that have written of the West Indies, that there is a kind of herb or plant about Portrico, which though it cannot move itself out of its place, yet hath as nimble and wily motions within itself, as great a command over its own branches, to decline ungrateful touches, as any perfect sensitive creatures have, which are tied to a certain station, or settled footing.

3. Creatures truly sensitive, (that is, such as far exceed vegetables or the ζωοφύτᾱ,) besides the sense of

Of the difference betwixt vegetables and sensitives, and their motive power.

pain in want or indigence of food, or the pleasure they take when it is in competent measure afforded them, have a power (some greater, some less) to move themselves out of their places, and to seek their nutriment: and after satisfaction made to hunger, to betake themselves unto places most convenient for their rest or sleep. This capacity of sense, whether of pain or pleasure, or of motion to enjoy the one and avoid the other, is in every sensitive creature, even in the worm or snail, in some degree or other, but not equal in all. Some are most swift in their motions, though much defective in other senses, as flies, gnats, beetles, or other meaner volatile or flying creatures, which are not capable of durable pain, nor of memory to avoid  
 84 such pain as they are capable of; being apt to be quelled with such light blows or touches as cannot annoy stronger sensitives or fourfooted beasts. Amongst the more perfect or stronger sort of sensitives or brutes, some are indued with better memory, or dexterity of exercising their senses or motive faculties, than we men are. But the best of mere sensitive creatures, especially such as are by nature tame, or apt to be tamed, as horses, hounds, hawks, &c., although they have no other freedom than that which is opposed to coercion, yet are their inclinations alterable by custom, as Lycurgus made proof and demonstration to the Lacedæmonians by his two <sup>1</sup>whelps of the same kind, whose inclinations by nature were the same, yet both much altered by breeding or training.

4. Wherein then do we reasonable creatures exceed the best of these docile sensitives? In this; that albeit they exercise their faculties of sense or motion more dexterously and more sagaciously by instinct of nature, and have a greater aptness to perceive approaching

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch de Liberis Educandis : et in Laconicis Apophthegm.

danger, or to receive impressions or occurrences from wind and weather, than men have; yet have they no power, no freedom at all to reflect upon such occurrences or impressions, much less to calculate or weigh them aright, but an excellent capacity only to entertain them as they are offered. Thus sheep and other cattle, divers sorts of birds or fowls of the air, do often unwittingly prognosticate the alteration or change of weather by their voice or motions, before wiser men or astronomers can take just notice of it, save only by their motions, voices, or gestures.

5. Now as sensitive creatures do far exceed mere vegetables in sense of pain and pleasure, and in the motive faculty; so the reasonable creature doth far exceed the best and most docile sensitives, in a faculty or power peculiar to himself alone, amongst all visible or corporeal substances; that is, in a power to reflect upon what he hath seen, heard, or felt, or remembers, either concerning motions or impressions made by or within himself, or in any other part or member of this visible world. A power or faculty likewise every son of man who hath attained unto the use of reason hath, to number such occurrences as have befallen himself, or such as he hath observed to befall others, or to have happened (however) within his memory, and a further branch of the same reflective power or faculty to calculate and weigh them with their circumstances, whether of time or place, and to compare occurrences past, or matters observed before, with occasions or occurrences present, and out of the consideration of both, to make observations or presages of what by probable conjecture may ensue.

Of the true  
difference  
betwixt  
mere sensi-  
tive and  
reasonable  
creatures.

6. From this reflective power or faculty, and branches of it, all of them being peculiar to man, amongst all visible or middle-world creatures, doth that freedom of



will immediately result: the search of whose several branches, whether growing by nature, and bettered by God's special providence, or immediately implanted or ingrafted by grace, is the principal subject of the treatises following.

7. The first root of this kind of freedom, as it is man's peculiar above all other visible creatures, is that reflective power before mentioned upon his observations, whether made upon the dispositions or docility of sensitive creatures, wild or tame, or upon the suggestions or operations of his own senses, or that part of those faculties of his soul or body, in which he is rather a sensitive contradistinct to mere sensitives, than any way supereminent to them. Now there is not, at least  
85 there ought not to be, any scruple or question, whether every man which hath attained to the use of reason, or of ordinary discretion, have not the same power or faculty to correct or improve his own natural dispositions or sensitive inclinations, which Lycurgus practised with good success upon his two whelps of the same kind. No question again there is or ought to be, whether parents or other instructors have not the like power to correct or alter the inclinations of children in their minority or nonage, by good discipline or education. Whence if we should grant that *postulatum* or supposition, which Galen, that great philosopher and physician, with much diligence hath endeavoured to demonstrate, *Mores animi sequuntur temperamentum corporis*—"that the manners or dispositions of men unto moral virtues or vices necessarily depend upon the temperature of the body;" yet can it never be evinced or made probable, that the peculiar temperature of any man's body may not be altered by the fore-mentioned reflective power which every man hath, and may exercise over his own senses, humours, or manner



of diet ; or to ruminate upon the advertisements given him by philosophers or physicians, either for correcting his inordinate appetites or dispositions, or for improvement of such seeds of virtue as are in some degree or other by nature implanted in men or children of the worst temperature of body. And though Galen, for aught we know, did die uncured of that erroneous or heretical opinion which was the scope of his book, or of that distemperature, whether of body or of mind, which did breed that opinion ; yet a late learned commentator<sup>m</sup> hath so cured his book, that sober young students may peruse or visit it without danger of infection from it.

8. But the principal, if not the only stem of the fore-mentioned freedom, consists in man's power to reflect upon his own rational thoughts or projects ; and this power or faculty, no man, no power on earth can alter or take from another, how mean soever ; for it is truly said, if it be rightly applied, that thought is free, not from punishment, if we think amiss—for the Searcher of hearts will judge the most secret thoughts—but free from coaction, from constraint, or enforcement. We may be commanded or enforced to do what another will have us to do ; but we cannot be compelled to think what another would have us think, or to will what they would have us to will. They may propose some particular unto us, being in itself very good and agreeable unto our desires ; yet the goodness of it, unless we please, cannot constrain or enforce us to desire it for that time. If we want some other particular good of the same kind, to counterpoise or withdraw our desire from it, the very goodness of the free exercise of our own will, will

<sup>m</sup> Baptista Persona.

suffice. The very trial or experiment of this our freedom and power to abstain from many things in themselves desirable, and with which most men are tempted and overswayed, is oftentimes more pleasant than any particular sensitive good.

9. This is all I had to say concerning such several kinds or degrees of freedom or power in visible creatures, or of freewill, a faculty peculiar to man, as may be learned from the book of nature. All these several sorts or degrees of freedom hitherto expressed in English are answerable to that which the Latins call *spontaneum, liberum, or libera voluntas*. But whether *liberum arbitrium*, an expression (used by many good Latin writers) of the Greek *αὐτεξούσιον*, be a style whereof men in this life be capable, or what ranks of men be capable of it, is a point which cannot be determined without examination of the properties of free causes or agents.

*Containing the Definition and Properties of free Causes or Agents properly so called.*

Freedom, or  
liberty of  
choice.

Agency  
immanent,  
transient.

1. *CAUSA libera est, quæ, positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, potest agere vel non agere.* This definition of a free cause, so far as it concerns man, whether regenerate or unregenerate, is orthodoxal and sound; but not so orthodoxal and sound in respect of all free agents, at least not so unquestionable in respect of them; for there is in all free agents an agency as well immanent as transient. That we call (as our betters before us have done) an agency immanent, which produceth no effect, save only in the agent. But every true cause, whether free or natural, is always presumed able to produce some effect *extra se*, which shall not be ter-

minated within itself, but such as doth or may appear in the visible book of the creatures<sup>n</sup>.

2. The omnipotent Agent or supreme Cause of causes, throughout all eternity can work or not work whatsoever, whensoever, it pleaseth him, without any matter preexistent to his work, or any condition requisite or prereduced to his working. He freely, that is, without necessity, made all things of nothing, without any counsellor or adviser, either for proposing or soliciting, much less for limiting or prescribing the laws or manner of all secondary causes' workings, or of the effects possible to be wrought by them. The bounds or limits of all secondary agents' operations are necessity and contingency. Such agents as by the laws respectively given unto them by the supreme Agent and Lawgiver are said to produce their operations by necessity, or by determination to this or that purpose and to no other, cannot without solecism be accounted or called free agents or causes. The premised definition then, *Causa libera est, quæ, positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, &c.*, must be restrained to the angelical and human nature. Neither of these two natures or agents can produce any real effect *extra se*, without themselves, unless they have some matter preexistent to work upon; nor any immanent action within themselves, without such concomitancies or assistances as are requisite to the use or exercise of their natural freedom. So that both of them are only so far free in their actions or choices, as the omnipotent Creator shall permit or give them leave to use or exercise their natural freedom. Now their natural freedom, as it is opposed to that which we call *spon-*

The former definition restrained to the angelical and human nature.

<sup>n</sup> Concerning this definition, *Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit illum in manu consilii sui.* see Victoria in his 13th reflection upon that of Ecclus. xv. 14:

*taneum* or *lubency* in vegetables only, or mere sensitive creatures, is but a branch (as hath been intimated before) of contingency; so that we cannot annoy and hurt the one, but we must annoy and hurt the other: *Id contingens est, quod potest esse vel non esse*; That only in true philosophy and divinity is properly contingent, which heretofore so hath been as it might not have been; or hereafter may as well not be as really be, or come to pass. So far then is that vulgar, but lately received opinion, 'That nothing is contingent, save only in respect of second causes,' from all show of truth or probability, that all things indeed, besides the supreme Agent or Cause of causes, *ὁ ὄν*, are, in respect of him, contingent. For HE alone being absolutely, independently, and uncontrollably free in all his actions, had an absolute freedom, either to create or not to create this world as now it is; an absolute freedom likewise to endow angels or men with such a freedom as now they have, that is, a power of contingency in their operations, or rather of producing effects contingent; that is, such effects as have been so produced by them as that they might not have been produced, or may hereafter (always presupposing the limitation or moderation of the supreme Cause or Agent) be produced or not produced.

Freewill of  
two sorts.

3. This kind of freedom is of two sorts, or rather hath two branches: it is either of mere contradiction, or of contrariety: or, in other terms, it is either *quoad exercitium*, or *quoad specificationem*. As for example; it is free for us to walk or not to walk in the morning: and if we resolve not to walk, not determining what else to do, this is *libertas contradictionis*, or *quoad exercitium*. It is likewise free for us to read or not to read: and after we have resolved to read some book

Contingentia est duplex; in-  
trinseca, ex elec-  
tione; ex-  
trinseca, ex  
casu, orta.  
See Suarez  
Metaphys.  
disp. 19.  
sect. 10.  
num. 4.



or other, it is free for us to make choice of some godly treatise, or of some lascivious pamphlet. In choosing the one and refusing the other, we are said to do freely *libertate contrarietatis, or quoad specificationem.*

4. All the controversy amongst divines is about the second kind of freedom, which is opposed to necessity. About this, the question is, whether it be common to every rational or intelligent nature; or if in some degree or other it be common to all, how far communicable to every such nature, according to their several states or conditions?

5. Without prejudice to other men's opinions, which we rather seek to reconcile and to be reconciled unto, than to contradict or to be contradicted by them; our first assertion shall be this: 'There is no rational or intelligent nature, but is free according to the second kind of freedom, (that is, it is freed from all necessity of doing or not doing of what it doth or doth not,) in respect of some acts, operations, or objects.' This assertion we take as granted out of the grounds of philosophy. For this freedom whereof we treat is one of the most essential, if not the very first and radical prerogative which reason hath above sense.

6. Our second assertion shall be this: 'The most excellent intellectual nature, the very excellency of nature, essence and intellection, is not free with this freedom of indifferency or option in respect of every object.' God Almighty himself is not free with this kind of freedom, to act or intend good or evil. The infinity of his transcendent goodness, or (which is all one) the immensity of his all-sufficiency, absolutely exempts him from all temptation or possibility of intending harm to any of his creatures which are capable of wrong. In that he is the infinite fountain of goodness moral, he cannot be the author or abettor

of any thing which is morally evil; nay, the very best operation that can be ascribed to the almighty Father, (to wit, the eternal generation of his only Son,) is not free in the second, but only in the former sense above mentioned. He was begotten of the substance of his Father before all worlds by necessity more than natural. And he that from eternity thus begat him, doth so infinitely and eternally love his only begotten Son, as he can never cease to love him, or begin to hate him. So that the Almighty himself, in respect of his love to his only Son, was never free according to either branch of freedom mentioned, to wit, either with the freedom of contrariety or contradiction. But, as the apostle saith, *of his own will begat he us with the word of truth*: we are his sons by adoption, not by nature, nor by any necessity equivalent to that which is natural. It was more free for him to adopt or not to adopt us, than it is for any father to appoint his heirs or executors, or to estate or dispossess his children.

- 88 7. Inasmuch as goodness is the essential object of our heavenly Father's most holy will, it is most essential and most necessary to him to will nothing but that which is good: yet is he not hereby either essentially or necessarily tied to will this or that particular good. All things that are truly good were created by him; nor was it necessary that he should create these particulars and no others. Yea, it was free for him to create or not to create any thing at all. So then within the sphere of goodness, he is *liberum agens*, "an agent most free." It was free for him to create or not to create us: it is free for him to preserve or not preserve us, yea to preserve or destroy us: it is free for him to elect or not to elect us, or to destinate us to life or death eternal. *He woundeth*

and he maketh whole: he giveth life and taketh it away at his pleasure: he bringeth down unto the grave, and raiseth up the dead again: "He freely bestows his blessings on whom he will, when he will, and in what measure he will<sup>o</sup>." It was free for him to decree or not to decree any thing concerning us: nor hath he decreed any thing for us or against us which may be prejudicial to his eternal liberty. For if his supposed decrees should necessitate his will in those particulars wherein it was absolutely and from eternity free, he should freely make himself or his will mutable; whereas we are bound to believe that his will is immutably free, or that the very freedom of his will is immutable.

8. The angelical nature was created free in respect of good and evil. Every angel had a twofold power or possibility: one, of continuing in goodness or in the ways of life; another, of diverting from it to the ways of death. Satan and his angels have lost all freedom in respect of goodness in the ways of life, but not all freedom simply. For albeit they have no possibility left them of doing or willing any good, yet have they manifold possibilities of doing several evils; more free to sin than before. They have brought a necessity upon themselves of intending nothing but that which is hurtful to the sons of men; but they do not necessarily intend this or that particular hurt which they do *de facto*, and no other; nor do they so necessarily hurt this or that particular person at this instant, but that it was possible for them to let him alone, and to hurt some other. Some or more (it may be) of this infernal crew are always attending our public or private meetings, especially about sacred affairs or devo-

No agent free in respect of all, every rational agent free in respect of some objects.

<sup>o</sup> Spiritus est ubi vult, sua munera dividit, ut vult:

Dat cui vult, quod vult, quantum vult, tempore, quo vult.

tions. The only end of their coming is to dishonour God, and to do mischief unto man. In respect of this end, indefinitely taken, they are not free, unless with that kind of freedom which is opposed only unto coercion: both branches of this end they intend so willingly, that they cannot cease to intend them, or to will the contrary.

9. Yet, notwithstanding this necessity, they have freedom left to cull or choose out the parties whom they mean to tempt: and after they have determined on the party, they have freedom left to make choice of the particular temptation; as whether to solicit them to pride rather than to lust; whether to provoke them to anger or to ungodly mirth: a true freedom likewise they have (after the choice of temptation made) to continue or change their baits, to prosecute or give over their particular present projects.

10. The angels which kept their first station when the rebellious did forsake it, have since, by God's providence, lost all freedom of will to do evil, but with increase of their freedom in doing well. A necessity is laid upon them of serving God and him only, yet not hereby necessarily constrained or wrought; no, not by the incomprehensible and sweet contrivance of the divine decree, to do him this particular service at this time and no other; not necessarily enjoined by God's will or their own, to abide so long in this place as they do, and no longer or shorter while. Their intentions towards man are always good, yet not necessarily bound to do that determinate good which they do to this man and no other. To make choice of the party whom at this instant they especially mean to protect, is as free for them, as it is for us, among a multitude of beggars, to make choice of some one or two, on whom to bestow our benevolence. Now in the dispensing of



alms to the needy, or bequeathing legacies to our friends, we are, I take it, free, not only from necessity of coercion or constraint, but also free from such necessity as by virtue of the eternal decree is inevitable.

## CHAP. XXVII.

*Of the Difference betwixt Servitude and Freedom in collapsed Angels and unregenerate Men; and of the Inequality of Freedom in respect of divers Objects and Degrees in natural Men.*

1. BUT before we come to speak of the unregenerate man's freewill and its proper subject, we must lay this charge upon the reader, not to interpret or rather mistake us, as if we questioned, whether man were able to do any thing or no without God's concurrence or assistance, or any spiritual good thing without grace. We only seek what kind of freedom or possibility of avoiding evil, or doing better, or less evil than oftentimes we do, is appointed to man by the immutable decree. If this decree allow or permit us any freedom of will in these points, they wrong mankind much, and the Divine nature more, that seek either by nice distinctions utterly to take it from us, or by timorous scrupulosities to quell or weaken our spirits or industry in use of it. This point also I would commend to every reader's consideration, that between a mere natural man, and a man utterly forsaken of God, there is a mean or difference; yea, perhaps a greater difference (in respect of the end of these ensuing queries, to wit, the salvation of men's souls) than is between the state of a man utterly forsaken of God, and of Satan and his angels.

What freewill is in the natural or unregenerate man.

2. In respect of good and evil, the human nature in the first creation was as truly and as properly free as the angelical. The first man was like his Creator,

truly and inherently good, endued with power of doing well: but this his power was matched with a possibility of doing evil. And by his free and wilful reduction of this power into act, he and his children have utterly lost all possibility of doing well. By nature, all of us are the children of wrath; the servants of sin from our birth: nor can we be freed from this servitude till we be made the sons of God by the grace of adoption.

3. But though this tenent of reformed churches be most true, to wit, that the human nature before Adam's fall was as truly free as the angelical, and that all the sons of men since his fall are as truly subject to sin as the collapsed angels; yet neither was our freedom before his fall equal to angelical freedom, nor this servitude of sin in us so great, as that which is in the  
90 devils. For not to speak of the elect, or such as are certainly destined to salvation, the state of Cain (the father of reprobates) before he slew his brother Abel, (though we consider it with reference to the eternal decree of reprobation) was not so desperate as the estate of the old serpent. For God certainly did never use that mild and gentle language either to Satan or his angels, which he did to Cain a little before he slew his brother—*And the Lord said unto Cain, Why art thou wroth? and why is thy countenance fallen? If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door. And unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him.* Gen. iv. 6, 7. Howbeit, if at any time it had pleased the wisdom of God to make loving proffers of impossibilities to his creatures' choice, Satan and his angels, by rule of retaliation, had been the fittest subjects of such proffers, because it is their continual practice to delude mankind in their misery, with fair promises of those

things which either they are not able, or never purpose to perform.

4. But seeing the sons of men (until they be redeemed by Christ) and wicked spirits are both alike servants to sin, though their servitude to it be not equal; the question is, wherein the inequality of their servitude consists. The depth of the angels' fall was by the eternal rule of justice proportioned to the height of their knowledge and happiness when they stood. Now their first station was much higher than man's; the one in heaven, the other in paradise. And as they sinned more wilfully and haughtily, so they continued more wilful and stubborn in the course of sin than man. The necessity which they brought upon themselves is twofold: first, a necessity of doing always that which is in its own nature evil; secondly, a necessity of doing such evil, with positively evil intentions. It is their delight to countermand God's laws, to make his negative precepts their affirmatives, and his affirmatives their negatives. And knowing much better than most men do, with what particulars God is more specially offended, they tempt every man, as opportunity serves, to do those things wherewith he is most offended. To tempt some men unto gross, foul, or base sins, they see it bootless; nevertheless, inasmuch as no man can be without some sin or other, they solicit all to be like themselves in one sin at least, that is, in impenitency. And to be finally impenitent for the least sin, is more offensive to the goodness and mercy of God, than all other sins that can be by man committed.

5. But some haply will thus far plead for Baal or Beelzebub and his followers, that many good turns are done by them to some men; yet even their best favours or greatest benefits are worse than a biting usurer's kindness. Unto this man they may lend wealth; to

that man health ; to a third procure ease from pain, or use of limbs : but all this with purpose to get the eternal inheritance of their souls.

The unregenerate sin not in every action against men.

6. The merely natural or unregenerate men in some actions sin not at all against their neighbours or fellow-creatures, to whom ofttimes they heartily do that good which they truly intended. And in such actions, their offence, in respect of God's law, is to be accounted (as I take it) privative only, no way positive. Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Anacharsis, perhaps Diogenes himself, and many other heathen, would have done as the good Samaritan did, to any passenger or citizen of the great city. Now the Samaritan's action was not against God's law, though not altogether according to his law. Neither the intention nor performance in like deeds of mercy done by heathen or mere natural men are void of evil, because the doers are never affected with that sincerity of heart, or with those bowels of compassion which God's law requires, much less with those references which are due unto God's glory. Yet if any man be of opinion, that the heathen or unregenerate man doth positively and actually sin against God's laws in the best works that he can do, I will not contend with him : for albeit I think my former assertion to be true, yet is it not my purpose to take the truth of it for any ground of the ensuing discourse, concerning the proper subject of man's freewill.

The unregenerate man hath a true freedom in doing evil.

7. Supposing it were most true, that the best of unregenerate men do positively and actually sin against God's law in every action that they do ; yet this shall no way infringe our first assertion, which is this—' The unregenerate man hath a true freedom of will in the choice of those particular evils into some one or other of which he necessarily falls.' For as the absolute impossibility or want of freedom to do evil, doth not



bereave the Almighty of absolute freedom in doing well ; so neither doth the unregenerate man's impossibility of doing good strip him of all freedom in doing evil. Though he cannot but do evil, or do every thing that he doth amiss, yet is there no necessity that he should do so great evil as oftentimes he doth, or do it so far amiss as he doth. Few men have any power or freedom of will not to be angry when they are provoked ; nor to allay their anger so soon as they ought, after it be once, upon what terms soever, kindled. Yet even such as necessarily sin this sin of unadvised anger in some degree or other, do not thereupon necessarily commit manslaughter, murder, or blasphemy. Many men have power or freedom of will in ruling their tongues, which have no freedom or power to stay the boiling of the heart in anger. Many again in their passions have a free power over their hands, which have none over their tongues. Many that can hardly hold their hands in heat of anger, have a freedom of will not to strike with edge-tools, or weapons that may make deadly wounds.

8. Every unregenerate man, at his first arrival at the use of reason, is free in respect of the height or extremity of those very sins unto which he is either by general corruption of nature or peculiar disposition of body most subject. It is not necessary that he which is by nature, education, and diet, most prone to wantonness, should delight in adultery, or be overtaken with temptations to unnatural lusts<sup>p</sup>. Into acts or crimes, whether for their kind unnatural or prodigious, or for degree extremely evil, no natural man did ever necessarily fall, *nisi necessitate ex hypothesi*, that is, unless it were for abusing that freedom of will or choice, which naturally he hath in ordinary evils, in things

<sup>p</sup> Juvenal, Sat. II. 83.—Nemo repente fuit turpissimus.

moral or indifferent. But by sinning in a higher degree or oftener in any kind than the corrupted estate of nature, or sin merely inbred, did necessitate us unto, we exempt ourselves from the protection of God's ordinary and wonted providence : and thence exempted, we naturally fall into an estate or disposition of mind most unnatural, and bring a necessity upon ourselves of sinning extremely. Finally, without God's special grace, the best of us sin in every action : without the guidance of his fatherly providence, we sin extremely against every divine commandment.

9. All of us, at the first use of reason, have a true freedom of will in avoiding such occasions or opportunities to sin, as being not avoided, but voluntarily and freely affected, draw a necessity upon us of falling into foul and grievous sins. It was perhaps impossible for Ægisthus to avoid adultery so long as he betrothed himself to sloth. But it was not impossible for him, nor for any, to have avoided this disease, or at least to have been divorced from it, after he had been betrothed to it. The poet, in my opinion, gave us a truer cause of this man's fault, than those divines possibly can which make all events necessary or unavoidable in respect of God's decree :

Quæritur Ægisthus quare sit factus adulter ?

In promptu causa est ; desidiosus erat.

10. Supposing his slothfulness had been no sin in itself, yet would it be a grievous sin in us to say, that the Almighty did decree he should be slothful, that he might become an adulterer ; or be an adulterer, that he might become a reprobate, for manifestation of his glory. His slothfulness, in true divinity, was the true and necessary cause of his filthiness ; but of his slothfulness there was no necessary cause, but a cause con-

To use free-will extremely amiss, is not necessary but contingent.

9 See above, p. 108, paragraph 10, and page 125, paragr. 3, 4, 5.

tingent only. The only cause it had was the ill use of that freedom which he had in doing amiss, or avoiding occasions of doing greater evil. Now to use our free-will further amiss than is necessary, is merely contingent, no way necessary. Albeit he could do nothing as he ought; yet he might have done less ill in being employed in some honest vocation or lawful exercise, than by giving himself over to pamper, ease, and sloth. In lawful employments, we are commonly freed from all other ill guests besides ourselves: in living idly, or doing nothing, we make our very hearts, our brains, and souls like empty rooms for the infernal spirits to set up shop in. The poet's observation is very useful for all, but most peculiar for younger students, and expressed in terms to their liking:

Si non ante diem librum cum lumine poscas.  
 Invidia vel amore vigil torquerere; si non  
 Intendas animum studiis, et rebus honestis <sup>r</sup>.

If men would give some divine precepts or sentences full possession of their morning thoughts, these would serve as so many armed men to keep out the suggestions of the devil, the world, and the flesh, from entering into their hearts.

11. To hold this freedom of will in avoiding occasions or motives to sin, is most agreeable to the doctrine of the reformed churches. All which, if I mistake not, permit a moderate and lawful use of vows, not only to men already sanctified, or in the estate of grace, but unto all such as desire to avoid sin and the motives thereunto, that they may be sanctified. In these two points I hope we shall all agree: first, that we may not vow any thing which is not in our power; secondly, that the avoidance of occasions or motives to gross or

<sup>r</sup> Hor. Epp. I. ii. 35.

known sins, is one of the most proper and most safe objects of solemn vows.

12. Some of our wise and godly founders of colleges, which died before reformation begun, do not tie us by oath, never to transgress in matters of manners or crime : but to undergo punishment for breach of good manners they strictly tie us, *virtute juramenti*. What is the reason? Surely that which we said before : they well knew, that to undergo ordinary punishment, as loss of commons, or the like, was in our power, and consequently just matter of vow ; but to avoid all actions punishable was not (as they foresaw) in our power ; no part of the object of our freewill : and therefore they made it no branch of that solemn vow which we make to God for observation of their statutes.

13. Now, as it is lawful to vow strict observance of outward means, either useful for avoiding grosser sins, or for repenting for them once committed ; so God, upon diligent and faithful observance of our vows in these or the like subjects, doth not only free us from being led into grievous temptations, but so enlargeth our freedom of will in other points, that by the assistance of his gracious providence, we gain some power over our own desires and affections, which before we had not. This cannot seem strange in the course of nature, especially if we consider it as subject to God's favourable providence. For seeing our carnal appetites or affections are always nourished and strengthened by external occasions or opportunities, they must needs be starved or weakened by subtraction of this their nutriment. And the weaker they are, the better hand the spirit or conscience gets over them ; the easier they are to be tamed and nurtured.



14. Many men have not the power to abstain from dainties when they are set before them, or when they are invited to taste them : and the more yielding they are to such invitations, the greater liberty will their appetites take, and leave them less power to abstain from riotous feasting. But, until long custom hath brought forth a worse disposition than we bring with us from our cradles, it is far more free and easy for us to abstain from houses of unhallowed mirth, (or good-fellowship, as they are termed,) than to abstain from those courses which are usually followed in them, after we be once accustomed to them. In respect of every negative precept of things forbidden, it is always more easy to avoid the first occasions<sup>s</sup>, than to resist ensuing opportunities. And the more careful we are in avoiding first temptations, the more capable we are (as was before intimated) of God's peculiar providence to shield us from the assaults of Satan. Not that the less abuse of our freewill in evil, or in avoiding occasions that lead unto it, can merit any such favour ; but the extreme abuse of such freewill as we have, exempts us from those privileges which God's infinite bounty bestows on us.

<sup>s</sup> This is manifest in that great example and champion of chastity, holy Joseph. Who durst not stay to struggle for his garment, (though it concerned him highly to have got away that which he knew would be made a cloak for his mistress' sin, and a colour of his,) but hasted and fled. Choosing rather to leave behind him a seeming argument of his guilt, than by longer stay, (or reasoning, after those two arguments, of wrong done a good master, and sin

against a good God, would not dissuade,) to incur a real danger of becoming guilty. Even so it is commanded, 2 Tim. ii. 22 : *Fly away from lust.* We may and must resist the devil, and fight it out against him ; but for lust, the only way is, (as when the house is on fire,) avoidance and flight. Haste away, escape for thy life, (and thy soul's life,) look not behind thee, nor stay, lest the fire overtake thee, and so thou be consumed in flame.

15. But let us take a man which hath been so far from avoiding, that he hath been always industrious in seeking out occasions to transgress ; a man that by continual entertainment of all opportunities to sin, hath yielded up his soul to many foul and grievous sins : what freedom of will, what choice of means for working mortification or amendment can be imagined to be left in such a man ? Shall we say he hath freedom of will *inter mala* ? this were *destruere suppositum*.

What portion of freedom is in such as sin extremely.

We will rather suppose him to have so far abused that freewill which men naturally have in doing evil ; that of two, of three, of four, or more evils proposed together, he would be ready to choose the very worst ; always prone to embrace those opportunities with greatest speed which lead to greatest mischiefs ; one, *cui, e malis, id maxime placet, quod est maximum*. Is there any method or place for medicine to this disease ? *The wicked, saith the prophet, are like the troubled sea, when it cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt. There is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked.* Isaiah lvii. 20, 21. Now as the most dangerous and turbulent seas do not rage when the  
94 winds are calm, so neither do the wicked foam out their shame when actual temptations or provocations cease. And, inasmuch as occasions and opportunities do not at all times present themselves, even he that hath no power to resist the least temptation that offers itself, nor freedom of will to refuse the greatest evil and choose the least, when both are actually proffered, may in the cessation of actual temptations reflect upon his former acts, and take a survey of his life past ; especially if he be thereto occasioned or persuaded by a discreet admonitor, one that will not affright him with the marks of reprobation. The first branch of

freedom, or rather the very root of freewill in every reasonable creature, is seated in this power of reflection upon its own acts. This is the first point or property wherein reason doth exceed sense. Now he that hath but this branch of freedom to calculate his former acts, hath with it a power to charge his soul with the heavy burden of his sins. The conscience will always be ready in quiet thoughts to accuse the flesh, and urge the soul to bear testimony against it. And the soul or conscience once brought to loathe or dislike some special sins is thereby made more free; apt to bewail all other sins whatsoever, whether actual or original. Unless David had been throughly stung with the conscience of murder or adultery, that sweet confession had never found such perfect vent as it did: *Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me:* psalm li. 5. Every creature on whom the Creator hath bestowed any sense or feeling of pain or pleasure, hath power to employ some motive faculty for avoiding things grievous or hurtful, or for attaining things pleasant and useful for bettering their present estate. And if man have any sense or feeling of his heavy burden, he cannot but in some sort or other desire to be released from it. Upon this principle is that exhortation of our Saviour grounded: *Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will ease you.* Matt. xi. 28.

16. So then albeit there be a true freedom of will in all the sons of Adam, (which are not utterly or finally forsaken of God,) yet is not this freedom the same in all, neither in respect of its objects or acts, nor in respect of its degrees or strength. Some have a competent measure of liberty to avoid occasions or external motives to known sins; but either no portion of like liberty, or a very little one, to resist such temptations

to foul sins as come upon them unexpectedly. Others have a competent measure of like freedom to resist temptations or opportunities to gross sins, but little or none at all to bewail their natural misery, or to beat down their inbred pride by contemplation of sin original, or by reflecting upon sins of omission, or positive acts of ordinary transgression. Others again, which had deprived themselves of all freedom for avoiding occasions, or resisting temptations to certain sins, have a larger measure of freedom than others have, to be humbled under God's mighty hand; which is in order the first, and by disposition of the Divine Providence the most available means for attaining mortification; which must be the subject of the next discourse, wherein I must follow my method proposed, to wit, to discuss the true meaning of those scriptures wherein the difficulties or questions concerning this duty are properly seated. To begin with that of our apostle, Rom. viii. 11.



## SECTION V.

95

*Of the great Duty of Mortification: and of the Use of Freewill for performing it.*

## CHAP. XXVIII.

*Of the general Contents which concern the Duty of mortification: and which be the special Works of the Flesh we are to mortify.*

## ROMANS viii. 11—13.

But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you. Therefore, brethren, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh. For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die: but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live.

1. THIS portion of scripture is more fit to ground the connexion of what goeth before or cometh after it, from the beginning of this eighth chapter unto the end, than to receive any bounds or limitation which it is capable of, from any reference to other passages, either for the plain and full grammatical, or for the moral and theological sense. The grammatical construction of the twelfth verse, though, for so much as some of our modern translations suggest unto us, it afford but one proposition, and that a negative, *We are debtors not to the flesh*; yet, according to the original character or full construction, it contains two emphatical propositions, the one affirmative, the other negative. The affirmative, Ὁφείλεται ἐσμεν, *Debtors we are*; and debtors for a greater sum than all mankind's either real or personal estates in this world are able to

A brief  
paraphrase  
upon Rom.  
viii. 12, &c.

discharge. The negative, ‘Debtors we are in no wise, either in whole or part, unto the flesh,’ unto which we owe nothing besides revenge or mortification of it; that is, by delivering it up captive to the Spirit, unto whom we owe more than our temporal estate here on earth, our very souls. The ἐξήγησις, or full declaration of both propositions, follows, ver. 13: *For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die*: this is the unsupportable debt which the flesh hath brought and seeks to bring upon us: *But if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live* for ever. This is a greater boon than we can deserve—as much as we can desire—more than we can make any part of requital for.

2. For stating cases of conscience (not for dealing betwixt man and man, but) betwixt the Judge of quick and dead and our own souls, I know no portion of scripture, whether in the Old or New Testament, of better or more frequent use than this thirteenth verse. Let such as are so minded maintain tenents  
96 already set on foot, or multiply questions to the world’s end about the certainty of their personal estate in grace, or final salvation, or bestow their marks and tokens, whether of absolute election or reprobation, as they please; yet unto honest-hearted Christians, or such as desire so to be, there can be no sign or token of salvation, either firmer in itself, or more certain to them, than the right computation of their constant progress in the mortifying of the flesh by the Spirit.

The first question or examination of our progress in this duty is to know, ‘What be the deeds of the flesh or body which we are to mortify, and how far we are to mortify them?’

The second, ‘How the flesh is mortified by us, how by the Spirit?’

The third, which haply will intermingle itself here and there with the first and second queries, is, the limitation of these two propositions: *If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die: but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live.*

3. Touching the first point, 'What be the deeds of the flesh or body which we are to mortify;' they are set down by our apostle, Gal. v. 19—21: *Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these; Adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like.* It shall suffice, by the way, to note in a word that *the flesh* or *body* is sometimes taken for the fleshly nature or bodily substance itself; sometimes for the corruption of the flesh, or nature corrupted. And in this latter sense it is to be taken in this place.

This word, *flesh*, sometimes signifies our bodily substance; sometimes, our corrupted nature.

4. That we may the better understand this duty of mortification by sounding the bottom of it, we are in the first place to take it into serious consideration, that the words by which our apostle here expresseth *the works* or *deeds of the flesh*, are not to be measured according to that carnal conceit or gross sense which the flesh itself, always partial for itself, is ready to suggest, but according to the scale of the sanctuary. When he saith, *adultery, fornication, &c.*, are the works of the flesh, we must not understand only those acts of adultery or fornication which come under the cognizance or censure of courts civil or ecclesiastic; not the fruits or blossoms, but the very first seeds of these sins; all inclinations of the flesh, or secret desires of the heart of this kind. This art or method of measuring these words, or the sins comprehended under them, our Saviour hath taught us, Matt. v. 27, 28:

*Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery: but I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.* When he reckons *lasciviousness* amongst the works of the flesh, we must not restrain this word to actual lasciviousness, or lasciviousness in attempt: we are to extend it to every degree of this sin in word or thought; to every motion of the tongue, of our heart, or senses, by which either the ears or senses of others, or our own souls or consciences may be polluted. When he saith, *idolatry* is a work of the flesh, we must not take idolatry only for the visible or external act of adoration proffered either to creatures or their images; it comprehends all inordinate affection of the heart to any creature. For to love money more than God, than our neighbours, or more than equity or just dealing, is a branch of the idolatry here mentioned by our apostle: for so he interprets himself, Ephes. v. 5: *For this ye know, that no whoremonger, nor unclean*  
97 *person, nor covetous man, who is an idolater, hath any inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God.* Again, when he reckons *murder* amongst the works of the flesh, we must not measure this monster only by such pictures of it as are drawn in blood: for even hatred, wrath, strife, and sedition, are true lineaments or live limbs of this giant. *Ye have heard, saith our Saviour, that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill; and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment: but I say unto you, That whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council: but whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire.* Matt. v. 21, 22. Lastly, we



are not to take the works of the flesh (albeit we take them in the grossest sense) for those acts, habits, or accustomances only, which are seated in the flesh or bodily part of man, but for those acts or inclinations which are accomplished in the operations or exercises of the reasonable soul. For, if we mark the apostle's words, not witchcraft and idolatry only, which are usually accomplished in some external or bodily act, but even *heresy* itself is expressly mentioned amongst the works of the flesh: and yet is heresy the proper offspring of the supreme faculty of the human soul, that is, of the intellective faculty or understanding. The most dangerous heretics have been always men of great understanding, and for wit acute and subtle. Nor are we to restrain this word *heresy* to professed opinions, or errors expressly maintained or subscribed unto. We are to extend the apostle's meaning unto the first seeds or roots of this sin; as, to emulation, to affectation of applause, to secret pride of heart, or hearty desire of vainglory or excelling others. These are the general seeds of the most gross sins here mentioned, and therefore our apostle in the conclusion of this fifth chapter to the Galatians strikes at the very root: *Let us not be desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another.* If we harbour these or the like desires, though secretly in our breasts, they will, as opportunity serves, betray us to the grossest sins here mentioned; as, to murder, to heresy, or the like. Now not of these grossest sins only, as murder, adultery, heresy, or idolatry, but of their first seeds or roots our apostle forewarns these Galatians, as he had done in times past, *that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God*, Gal. v. 21. And who then shall inherit this kingdom? for who is he is not subject to some one or other of these misde-

meanours or perverse inclinations? who is he that doth not either consent to unlawful lust, or entertain desires of applause, or of excelling others, or doth not often either envy or emulate his equals or betters? True it is, that no man can say, his heart is clean in respect of these acts, or inclinations unto them. Shall no man therefore (seeing no man is altogether free from these) enter into the kingdom of heaven? God forbid. It is one thing *to do* such things according to the ordinary use and construction of this phrase in our vulgar language, another thing *to be a doer* of them, or to make these misdoings the chiefest of our doings, which is the meaning of the Holy Ghost in this and like sayings. So when it is said, *He that doeth sin is the servant of sin*; the meaning is, He that is a doer of that which is sinful is the servant of sin: but so is not every one that sinneth, for there is no man which sinneth not. It is well observed by Maldonate the Jesuit, that this word *to do*, in the Hebrew dialect, includes not the present act or operation only, but the *habit* or custom of doing. There is no man which  
98 sometimes doth not some of the works here mentioned by our apostle. And yet there is no man which hath mortified the flesh, or seriously intends this work of mortification, that habitually or customarily doth any of the works by him mentioned. But this point will come more fitly to be handled in discussing the second branch or member of the first of our three general inquiries, propounded in the fore part of this chapter, which was, concerning the extent of this precept or duty; or how far we are to mortify the deeds of the body, that we may live.

CHAP. XXIX.

*How far the Duty of Mortification is universal ; how far indefinite.*

1. THE question concerning the extent of this duty is twofold: first, it is to be considered in respect of the persons whom this duty of mortification concerns; secondly, in respect of the duty itself, or matter enjoined. Many propositions there be, which are universal in respect of the persons, and but indefinite in respect of the thing itself, or matter proposed. As contrariwise, other propositions or precepts there be, which are of universal extent in respect of the matter proposed or duty enjoined, and but indefinite in respect of the persons whom they concern. In respect of the matter proposed or duty enjoined in this place, this proposition is not universal. No man is tied under the strict penalty of damnation to an universal or total mortification of the flesh. Unto a mortification of all the deeds of the flesh every man is bound; but not to a total mortification of every work of the flesh in respect of all the degrees of it; for so, no flesh should be saved. But of the limitation of this proposition in respect of the duty itself, we shall have better occasion to speak hereafter. In respect of the persons which are to perform this duty, the precept is universally and absolutely true of ALL that are endued with reason, and are capable of instruction. ALL are bound to MORTIFY the deeds of the flesh without exception of any man's person. Kings are as strictly bound under pain of damnation to perform this duty, as the subjects are; and subjects as strictly bound under the same penalty, as magistrates are. For God is no acceptor of persons. And God's will, which is the rule of faith, will not warrant any man, of what degree soever, to

Mortification universal in respect of men's persons, not so in respect of the duty to be performed.

presume upon any exemption from the duty itself; no, not to hope for a dispensation.

2. It is a question well moved by some schoolmen, *Ad quid teneatur homo cum primum venerit ad usum rationis*<sup>s</sup>?—"What is the first duty or consideration whereunto every one is tied after he once come to the use of reason?" Their answer for the most part is not so pertinent or satisfactory, as the question is useful. And no place of scripture affords a fitter answer to the question proposed than these words of St. Paul do. For seeing, as he saith, *the works of the flesh are manifest*, and, as we may add, in a manner evident to every man's sense: every one when he first comes to the use of reason, may with more facility, or less observation, apprehend the truth and necessity of this duty, than he can do many other precepts of life, which in their rank and order are necessary likewise unto salvation. No point of belief is more evident or sensible to the natural man, than the corruption or imperfection of his nature. Some mere naturalists (such, I mean, as knew no other article of Christian faith) have delivered their minds in a manner orthodoxally concerning this point, to wit, about the general deficiency or imperfection of nature in man. No Christian man which sees thus much, but sees withal the enemies against whom he is to fight; and may, from experiments in himself answerable to this rule of our apostle, perceive a necessity laid upon him, either of killing them, or of being killed by them. Besides the apprehension of this necessity, (which ordinarily inspires cowards with valour,) every Christian stands engaged, by SOLEMN vow made in baptism, to undertake this fight. For the first branch of THAT TRIPLE VOW is, "to forsake the devil and all his works, the pomps and vanities of this

<sup>s</sup> Vid. Victor. Relect. 13. pag. 642, &c.



wicked world, and all the sinful lusts of the flesh.” The duty of mortification here enjoined consists in the performance of this part of our vow. And seeing this is the first service unto which we are engaged by that solemn vow, the answer to the question proposed by the schoolmen must be this—‘The first duty whereunto every man is tied, when he comes to the use of reason, is, the consideration of this duty, and the undertaking of Christ’s battle against the devil, the world, and the flesh.’ The first march or progress, or rather the first preparation to this battle, is, the serious apprehension of the necessity of mortification.

3. Howbeit, even this preparation is, though not directly or in express terms, yet by necessary consequence or in effect, denied by the Romish church, and by some others who have professed themselves members of the present English church: for, all they in effect deny or gainsay the necessity or universality of this duty, who teach, that original sin is utterly taken away, or that our regeneration is instantly and fully wrought by the sacrament of baptism. That children rightly baptized are truly regenerated by the Spirit of God, we deny not. And in case being so baptized they die before they come to the use of reason, or apprehension of this duty here enjoined, yet ought we not to doubt of their salvation, because they have been baptized, and by baptism made partakers of regeneration in such a measure as is requisite and sufficient to their salvation whilst they are infants. But that original sin, the lusts of the flesh, or the old man, should be utterly extinguished or killed in them before their death, we must deny, otherwise we shall contradict our apostle in this place, and overthrow the foundation or ground whereupon this precept, or the necessity of this duty, is built. Now the ground or foundation of this duty

is this : that all men unto whom this precept is directed (and directed it is to ALL that are capable of his meaning) have sundry deeds of the flesh, sundry relics of the old man, in them. And if either original sin, the relics of the old man, or lusts of the flesh, be to be mortified in all, when they first come to the use of reason, they could not be utterly abolished or dead before. For to kill or mortify that which is already dead, or without all sense or motion, is impossible.

Original sin  
not utterly  
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tism.

4. If original sin, or the old man, with his members, be utterly extinguished in young infants by baptism, I demand, how possibly they could revive in the same parties after they have put off infancy or childhood, or as soon as they come to the use of reason. For these being killed or extinguished before, they cannot revive themselves. Or if children by baptism were restored unto that state of innocency which our parents once had, this innocency could not be lost without some actual transgression, like unto that transgression by which our first parents lost their innocency or justice original. Actually to transgress after the similitude of Adam, infants, whilst infants, cannot. For such transgression consists in a sinister choice of the will, or in the ill use of reason. And all ill use of the will or understanding presupposeth an use of reason, which cannot be in infants. Again, there is no necessity that all children should actually transgress when they first come to the use of reason, if before that time they had been freed from all original corruption or relics of the old man by baptism. For to lay a necessity of sinning actually upon any that had been freed from all original sin, or restored to the state of innocency which Adam had, were to make God the author of such actual sin. Adam himself did not actually sin upon any necessity, but voluntarily and freely. If the first sin had not

been an actual sin, or if that actual sin had been committed upon necessity, not Adam, but God had been the author of it. Certain then it is, that this duty of mortification is necessary in respect of ALL, without any respect of persons. Every one at their first arrival unto the use of reason, or at their passage out of infancy into youth, are under this yoke, which is no evangelical counsel, but a peremptory precept. And if this duty necessarily concern ALL at that time, ALL must of necessity have original sin, or some relics of the old man in them; yea, such strong relics as will impel them to some actual sin or other, or to some transgression of some of God's commandments, when they come unto the use of reason; otherwise this duty or precept could not universally concern ALL without exception. For by the contrary doctrine, some at least, when they first come to the use of reason, should have no deeds of the flesh, which they were bound to mortify. Most of the Romans unto whom our apostle here writes had been baptized after they had come to years of discretion. And baptism without all question had been as effectual in them, as it hath been in any other since; yet our apostle supposeth some deeds of the flesh to be in ALL of them, (even in such as had lateliest been washed in the laver of regeneration,) which were to be mortified in them. So that baptism is rather a sacramental consecration of us to undertake this fight with the works of our flesh, or corruption of our nature, than an utter extinction or absolute drowning of these enemies.

5. Another necessary corollary or consequence of this doctrine there is, not usually observed by modern controversors, and it is this: 'That the same measure of regeneration which sufficeth children or infants dying before they come to the use of reason, will not suffice



such as attain to the use of reason, or years of discretion.' For if it did or could, they might be saved as infants are, without performance of this duty of mortification. One of these two must necessarily be granted, as, either that children or infants are not so thoroughly sanctified or regenerated as is necessary to salvation, before the hour of their death, (which no man to my remembrance hath taught;) or else, he that affirms them to be truly regenerated or sanctified in their infancy must yield to us in this, that such children or infants as have been formerly regenerated, in a measure sufficient to their salvation, outgrow this measure of regeneration or sanctification after they come to the use of reason or years of discretion, as they do their apparel or clothes, which were fit for them whilst they were infants. And no question but the old man, after we come to the use of reason, grows stronger and  
 101 stronger in all of us, until we abate his strength and mortify his members by the Spirit. Wherefore—leaving children or infants unto the Spirit of God alone, who doth regenerate them by baptism, and preserve them in the state of grace, without our ministry of preaching—this precept is a precept of working faith; the duty here enjoined is a duty necessary unto all that are of years fit to be instructed, or of capacity to understand the scripture or rule of faith expounded to them. Let us then take his words into a second consideration: *If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die.* He saith not, if ye have lived after the flesh, ye shall die: for this had been rather a certain prognostic of death, than any medicinal advice or prescript unto his patients. One man there was (and no more) who was first good and afterwards bad—this was the first Adam; another there is (and no more) who was never bad, always good—this is the second Adam, Christ Jesus, blessed for ever.

Of the nature of the fight with our own bodies in general.



Of all the rest, that is most true which a father hath, *Nemo unquam bonus, qui non ante fuit malus*—"No son of Adam ever proved good, who was not sometimes bad." The apostle's saying is in this case true: *First is that which is natural, then that which is spiritual.* We, even the elect themselves were the sons of Adam before they were the sons of God in Christ. All or most have lived after the flesh, before they come to live after the Spirit. Thus much our apostle's second proposition will infer: *If ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live.* Inasmuch as mortification of the flesh is necessary to all, it is presupposed that all have a flesh which may be mortified, or a life of the flesh; seeing nothing can be mortified but that which hath life in it.

6. Again, our apostle saith not, 'If the deeds of the flesh be mortified in you by the Spirit, ye shall live.' For so we might haply have dreamed of a mortification already wrought in us, or to be wrought in us without our consent or endeavours, as well whilst we are asleep as whilst we are awaking; or we might conceive it to have been so wrought by the Spirit in our cradles, as we might presume to pass the time of our youth in play and pastime; or we might hope to have it so fully accomplished by the same Spirit alone in our youth or maturity, as we might spend our old age in sleep, without setting a careful watch over works or thoughts. His words, if we observe them, are thus: *If ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the flesh, ye shall live.* So then we see the flesh must be mortified, and mortified it must be by us: every man must mortify his own flesh, although he cannot mortify it but through the Spirit. It is the Spirit alone which giveth victory; yet this doth not privilege us from being his soldiers. It is the Spirit of God which works in us the will and

the deed : yet this doth not license us to be idle. Fight we must, not with our own shadows, but every man with his own body ; not with a body already dead or mortified, but a living active body, that may be mortified. And this disadvantage we have, that our adversaries are got within us before we are aware of them ; so that we cannot fetch such fierce blows at them as may kill them at once, or, as we say, out of hand. Sometimes our adversary lies so close, that we can hardly hurt him without danger of hurting ourselves ; as some, by offering too much violence to their bodies, have ensnared their own souls. But this is no usual fault of this age or of this nation.

7. Howbeit, for the reasons specified and the like, it is not so in this combat (which every man must enter-  
 102tain between himself and his own flesh, or between his spirit and his body) as it is in duels, or single combats, *in quibus aut cita mors venit, aut victoria læta* ; in which, one half hour brings forth either certain death or certain victory to the combatant ; nor as it is in pitched battles, in which, one day is the making or marring of whole nations or mighty kingdoms which have been many years in growing. This our warfare is like unto a strait and lingering siege, in which patience and perpetual vigilancy are no less requisite than present valour or strength of arms, especially on the behalf of the party besieged. *Animus uniuscujusque est unusquisque*—“ Every man’s soul is himself.” And every man’s soul is more strictly begirt and environed by his body than any city can be by any army. The gates of his senses are always open to let in such objects or temptations as take part with the flesh. Herein this war with our souls is unlike unto ordinary sieges, in that the party besieged may sooner starve or bring under the party besieging, than be starved or brought under

by him, so the besieged will be watchful. Let us take into our consideration what one of the most expert soldiers in this kind, which ever fought under Christ's banner, (one that had a long time served in both camps, first fighting stoutly for the body or flesh, and afterwards more victoriously for the spirit,) hath left registered for our instruction: *So fight I, not as one that beateth the air: but I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection: lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a castaway.* 1 Cor. ix. 26, 27. If so stout a champion, after so many years' service in the camp of Christ, was not secure of the adversary which he carried about with him; how dare some freshwater soldiers say, (or what truth is there in their sayings,) that they have made full conquest of their adversary, and are most certain of their own salvation, before they know what *certainty* means, or which be the several branches of it? But of this point, if God permit, elsewhere. <sup>s</sup>

CHAP. XXX.

*Containing the true Rule for examining our Persuasions concerning our Estate in Grace.*

1. IN the mean time it will not be amiss for every man to examine himself by this rule of our apostle concerning the first branch of certainty, that is, a moral certainty or strong probability that he is in the state of grace or regeneration. *If ye live after the flesh, ye* Our progress in mortifying ourselves, the best rule for knowing our estate.

<sup>s</sup> It will be useful for the reader to know, that, if he please, he may read more about this subject of mortification (either now, immediately before he proceed to ch. 30, or after the reading of ch. 35, or of this whole section 5.) in the appendix at the end of this book; in which, the third general inquiry proposed, ch. 28. parag. 2.—touching the limitation of the two propositions, *If ye live after the flesh ye shall die: If ye... mortify... ye shall live*—and promised chap. 35. parag. 10, is handled.



*shall die*:—this is the rule. Doth any man amongst us spend most of his time in revelling or drinking, in strife or variance, or in jest or merriment? If such a man have any seeds of faith, though moral, it will assure him for the present, that he cannot be so much as morally certain of his regeneration. The best advice which for the time being can be given him, is, so to mingle his hope with fear, as that fear be predominant. If otherwise his hope in this case shall bear down fear, or be not borne down by it, there is no other likelihood  
103 but that his hope will grow into stiff presumption; and stiff presumption will exclude repentance, on which, hope, if it be sure, must always be grounded.

2. But most men's consciences perhaps can truly tell themselves that they do mortify the deeds of the body. Here is just ground of hope and moral certainty, if this testimony of the conscience be sincere. Howbeit even here again is place for advice. And the best advice that I can give to any in this case is, that he do not seek to buy with one weight and sell with another, but plant his hopes and displant his fear by one and the same rule or line. The rule for the planting hope and preventing despair is this: when our apostle saith, Gal. v. 21, *He that doth such things* (any works of the flesh by him there mentioned) *shall not inherit the kingdom of God*; we are to take the value or weight of this word DOTH, not by the present acts or operations, but from the usual practice, habit, or custom of doing them. Continual approved practice of the least sins there named by him excludes from grace. This is the weight or scale by which men are willing to sell, or to put off fear or despair; but they must remember withal to be as ready to buy with the same weight; that is, as ready to measure their hopes, or entertain the certainty of their estate in grace, by the same scale. The



apostle saith, *If ye mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live.* From this general proposition most hearers of the word will be ready to assume—‘But I, God be thanked, do mortify the deeds of the body by diligent hearing the word preached, by frequent receiving of the sacrament: *ergo*, I shall live.’ But here we are to consider, that as other words implying action, so this word, *I do mortify*, in the language of the Holy Ghost, (specially in those places whereto God’s promises are annexed,) is not to be restrained to the interposed acts or interrupted operations of the Spirit, but directly imports the habit, the custom, or assiduous practice of mortification. If in this sense we do mortify the deeds of the body; that is, if we make this work the chief of our doings; if most of our care and industry be addressed to the perfecting of this work; then our assumption or minor proposition is good, and the conclusion will follow, if not *certitudine fidei*, by the certainty or full assurance of faith, yet by certainty more than moral, by an assurance of hope. But if we mortify the deeds of the body only now and then, or by fits; or if we intend this work but slightly, or (as it were) upon the by; then our former assumption—‘I do mortify the deeds of the body’—is impertinent, and will sooner bring forth presumption, than any assurance of hope or moral certainty of our estate in grace. For conclusion of this point; let every one of us take heed not to measure our hopes of regeneration, or degrees of mortification, by our readiness or desire to hear the word preached, until we have examined ourselves, whether this desire in us be a desire of the spirit, or of the flesh; or whether it proceed from true religion, or from humour or fashion of the place. Certainly, if this desire in many were from the spirit, or from true religion, it would be more uniform and like itself in

the practice ; they would be as ready, at least in some good measure or proportion, to frequent public prayers, as to go often unto public sermons. For the faith of Christ can be had no more with respect of Christian duties than with respect of persons. And the same authority, whether divine, or human or ecclesiastic from  
 104 it derived, which enjoins us to hear the word preached, doth more strictly enjoin us to frequent public prayers, specially in seasons wherein we are specially required by authority to thank God for our manifold deliverances from the messengers of his wrath. But from what cause soever our desire of hearing the word preached proceedeth, our backwardness in frequenting public prayers, without all doubt, ariseth from some works of the flesh, or relics of the old man, which must be crucified.

3. *They that are Christ's*, saith our apostle, Gal. v. 24, *have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts*. Take we heed, that none of us argue thus : *I am Christ's* : therefore *I have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts*. The apostle's meaning is, that the safest way for us to know whether we be Christ's or no, is from this experiment within ourselves, *if we have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts*. But what doth he mean when he saith *the affections and lusts must be crucified*? Doth he require an utter extinction, or total mortification, or absolute death, of all carnal affections and passions, before we can be assured that we are Christ's? No, such a total mortification cannot be hoped for in this life. We are said *to be crucified to the world*, or *to have the flesh with the affections crucified in us*, first, by profession or consecration; so all that are baptized into Christ Jesus are said *to be dead to sin*, yea, *to be buried with him by baptism*, Rom. vi. 2. 4; secondly, we are said *to be*

*crucified unto the world, or to be mortified to the flesh*, not by profession only, or resolution, but by practice : and this *crucifying* or *mortification* admits of many degrees.

4. *Crucifying*, taken in its proper sense, was a most lingering kind of death or torture. And men were said to be crucified from the very first moment of their nailing to the cross, albeit the conflicts betwixt life and death were many and strong for divers hours after. Now it is not to be expected that any of us will be as eager or violent in crucifying our own flesh as the Jews were in crucifying our Saviour. Seeing the party to be crucified in us is part of ourselves, we cannot but use it more mildly and gently, than the Romans did such as they crucified for malefactors ; whom they would not so violently have handled, unless they had first adjudged them for no members, or but for rotten and putrefied members of their body civil. The less violent the conflict is between the spirit and the flesh, or between the old man and the new, the longer will the old man live in us, the more frequent and sensible his motions will be. And finally, as he was born with us, so he will die with us ; hardly before us. Yet may we be truly said *to have crucified the old man with the affections and lusts*, from the very first time wherein we begun to nail them to the cross of Christ ; if so we still watch them, and seek to quell their motions by the Spirit. They are daily crucified by God's children, and yet are daily reviving.

5. As often as we receive the sacrament of the eucharist with due preparation ; every remembrance or meditation of Christ's death upon the cross, if it be wrought or managed by the Spirit, will be as the fastening of a new nail into the old man or body of sin, which we carry about with us. We cannot think

Mortification and crucifying, terms not indivisible, but of large extent.



of Christ's death, or of the causes of his crucifying, aright, but every thought will be a degree of weakening or enfeebling the old man, whom we must by this and the like means daily weaken, otherwise he will be our destruction.

*How the Flesh is mortified by us ; how by the Spirit.*

This was the second general propounded, ch. 28, and the parts of this inquiry be three :

First, In what sense WE, whom this duty concerns, can be said to mortify the deeds of the body ?

The second, By what spirit we are to mortify them : by the Spirit of God, by our own spirit, or by both ?

The third, The manner and order of the Spirit's working, or of our working by the Spirit ?

Seeing to mortify implies an action, how man can mortify his flesh.

1. THE first point is most material, and of most use in respect of modern controversors. If mortification be (as I think none upon better consideration will deny) a true part of our conversion, how can we be said to *mortify* the body or flesh, unless we may be said to convert ourselves ; which is a doctrine that few will like of, as being prejudiced by contrary tenents much embraced by men deservedly well approved of by all or most reformed churches. For resolution of this doubt, we are in the first place to consider, that *regeneration, conversion, or mortification*, are terms in their proper nature indefinite, and so used by the Holy Ghost. The actions or qualifications comprehended, especially under conversion and mortification, are not of one rank. There is a conversion spiritual, and a conversion only moral ; there is a mortification likewise either merely moral, or truly spiritual<sup>u</sup>. The matter

Conversion or mortification spiritual and moral.

<sup>u</sup> See the note at the end chap. 36. of this book, p. 265.



signified or imported by these words *mortification* and *conversion*, whether moral or spiritual, is not indivisible. Whence it is, that we often deceive ourselves and others, by giving one and the same answer to all or most questions that are or can be moved concerning these duties. That may be true of mortification or conversion, (whether spiritual or moral,) taking it in some degree, which is altogether false, if we apply it to the same qualification or duty, taken or considered according to another degree. Thus much they better saw than considered, who have entertained dispute *pro* or *con* in that question—*An homo in prima conversione ad Deum sit mere passivus?*—“Whether man in his first conversion be merely passive?” The issue would be easier, shorter, and more certain, if the same question were proposed thus: *An homo quoad primum gradum conversionis sit mere passivus?*—“Whether man be merely passive in the first degree or degrees of his conversion or mortification?” For mine own part, as I acknowledge many degrees of conversion, and many precedent motions to true and complete mortification; so I should think the most men living, that are thoroughly converted and truly mortified, to be merely passive, not in the first, second, or third degree only, but in all or most of the intermediate degrees of mortification, which are precedent to the habit of it, or rather to the gift of perseverance in it; and being once habitually mortified, we are in a sort active.

2. But if in the first, second, or subsequent degrees of mortification we be merely passive, how shall we avoid that imputation which is laid upon our church by the Romanists? The imputation is this—That albeit we grant men to be mortified, and require the duty of mortification at men’s hands, yet we acknowledge them not to be men, but mere stocks in the acts or interims

106 of their conversion or mortification. To this we answer, that although we be merely passive in the acts of mortification, yet are we not passive after the same manner that stocks and stones, or creatures merely sensitive, are passive. Nor are creatures endued with sense passive after the same manner that stocks and stones, or creatures without sense, are. There be passives inanimate, passives sensitive, and reasonable passives or patients. Every faculty of sense is merely passive in respect of its proper function or sensation; and yet the ignoblest faculties of sense are in some sort active, that they may be sensitively passive, or passive after another manner than stocks and stones, or things inanimate, are. The sense of touching, which of all the five external senses is most ignoble and least active, may notwithstanding be less passive, or more or less capable of pain, by the activity or motion of the body. But of the more noble senses the maxim is most true, *Sentire est pati*—"All sensation is a kind of passive or suffering." And it is generally resolved in schools, that *visio fit intromittendo, non extramittendo*; sight or vision (although it be the most noble external sense) is not made by extramission, or sending out of the rays or beams of the eye, but by impression of the object seen; and impression is a passion. So that sight itself consists in passion, and the eye itself, in respect of its proper function, is merely passive: and yet he that will see the sun or other objects visible, must be content to open his eyes, not to wink; yet to wink or open the eyes is no passion, but an action. He that desires to see objects obscure or less visible, must intend the optic nerves, otherwise he shall not be sensitively passive.

In what sense we are said to be passives in our conversion.

And he that desires to hear well, especially if he be afar off, must be content to listen: and listening includes an intension of the organ or instrument of hearing, an

action in the hearer, that he may be sensitively passive. He that speaks is the agent or actor: and yet how pleasant soever his speech be, the hearer must be active to find him ears. Now faith is as the eyesight of the soul and understanding; and yet *faith*, as the apostle saith, *comes by hearing*. Our mortification or conversion, which is a work of faith, is never wrought without some sense or feeling. And in these works, if they be spiritually performed, the spirit of man is as merely passive as the bodily eye is in the sense of sight, or the ear in the act of hearing; but merely passive after a more remarkable manner in the first degrees of mortification or conversion, than in their accomplishment. The resolution then of the former doubt is this: 'We are merely passive in the degrees or works of mortification or conversion: we are not merely passive, we must be active in some works, by the providence of God presupposed for accomplishment of these works,' or for his accomplishing these works in us by the Spirit.

3. For illustration of that which in this point may be easily conceived by all, without offence, as I hope, to any. We will take, for instance or example, a man whose heart hath never found any internal comfort of the Spirit, a despiser of the means which lead to grace—a young man every way as dissolutely bent as his years and experience will permit him. This man, upon some loathsome concomitants which follow riot, or upon some grievous mischance that hath befallen him or his friend in an unruly place upon the Lord's day, abjures the like place and company for a while; and being not able or unaccustomed to be alone, resolves to make trial whether he shall speed better by repairing at times seasonable unto the Lord's house. In thus resolving, and in thus repairing to the church, he is not merely passive, but an active. This is no work of true faith,



no degree of true conversion or mortification spiritual ; yet a motion by God's providence presupposed, or  
 107 rather prerequisites to his future regeneration or conversion. He is active likewise in lending his ears with some tolerable attention unto the preacher. The theme whereupon the preacher (without any notice of this party's dispositions or occasions) doth insist we will suppose to be that portion of scripture which was the means of St. Austin's first conversion to Christianity, without any choice made by him, but presenting itself (in respect of his present thoughts or purpose) by mere chance. The theme which first wrought his conversion, as he himself in his Confessions acknowledgeth <sup>x</sup>, was Rom. xiii. 13, 14 : *Let us walk honestly, as in the day ; not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying. But put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh, to fulfil the lusts thereof.* A discreet methodical application of such doctrines as this text affords, would much move any dissolute young man's heart, which had been impelled or drawn upon the former presupposed occasions, to hear these words opened or discoursed upon without his choice, and beyond his aim or expectation. And in this supposed motion or relenting of his heart and conscience, the party moved is a mere passive. In thus fitting the discourse to his former life or cogitations, the preacher himself is God's instrument, not the agent. He had no suffrage in the choice of his text, at least in suiting it to this particular occasion, much less any hand or finger in the issue or success : both these are wholly from the disposition of Divine Providence.

4. But now that the party's heart is touched by these or the like occurrences, unexpected either by this

<sup>x</sup> Confess. tom. 1. lib. 8. cap. 12.



patient or by his physician, doth he still remain as merely passive as he was, in the accomplishment of his mortification or conversion? Surely, the thoughts of a mere natural civil or moral man are free and able to reflect upon those motions in respect of whose production his best faculties are merely passive; free and able to revise and work upon those occurrences and dispositions of Divine Providence, on which he did not so much as think, before they set his thoughts on working. But supposing him to be thus able, thus free and willing to reflect upon his former thoughts, and to revise what lately hath befallen him; are such reflections able (without God's special grace infused) to produce any further degree of mortification or conversion? Or is the party thus affected merely passive, or a coagent with the Spirit of grace in the production of such further degrees of mortification as shall afterwards be produced? He is, in my opinion, a mere passive in the production of all degrees which shall be produced, until his conversion or mortification shall be accomplished. Are then such reflections upon his former ways, or revises of what hath befallen him for them, to no purpose? No man, I think, will avouch this. But if to any, to what good purpose do they serve? Shall they make him a more towardly passive in the next good motions (which it shall please God to put into his heart) than he was in the former? Shall he, by often thinking upon his former courses, or by abstinence from evil company, be enabled so to qualify his heart, that the same or like touches of God's providence shall mollify or affect it more at the second time, than they did at the first, or at the third more than at the second, or at the fourth more than at the third? I know no harm, I cannot conceive the least suspicion of danger in this or the like assertion, so long as we still acknowledge him

Men must be in some sort active, that they may be towardly passive in the work of mortification.

to be no more than a mere passive in all the degrees of his conversion or mortification.

5. Notwithstanding, how harmless soever this assertion be in itself, I can be content to relinquish the use of it, rather than any good Christian should be 108 offended with it, or put into doubt, lest it come too near popery or other modern heresy. But he that shall deny me the liberty of thus expressing myself, shall give me leave to retain this conclusion: ‘ He which is diligent in reflecting and ruminating upon what hath befallen him by God’s special providence, upon the first or second time wherein he hath been impelled to take notice of it, shall be sure to have his heart more deeply touched with the same or like occurrences the third or fourth time, than he which hath been always negligent to ruminate or reflect upon such invitations or admonitions as by God’s providence have been tendered unto him.’ In respect of our purpose, (which is only to leave sloth or negligence without excuse,) it is all one, whether a man after the first degree of mortification may positively and actually concur to make himself *a more* towardly passive against the next touch of grace or document of God’s special providence, or whether, his heart remaining still at the same passive bent which it had when it was first touched by grace or special call of God’s providence, God be pleased to multiply the active means of mortification, or to make their contrivances and disposition more remarkable and effectual than they were before. This is most certain, that he which will not take such warnings as God shall send him, into his serious consideration, shall bring this two-fold inconvenience upon himself: first, his soul shall be every day than other more unapt to be wrought unto repentance, or to have mortification wrought in it, by such means as formerly would have wrought it ;

secondly, God in justice will deprive him of such ordinary means or motives to mortification as before he had. Man's extreme want of all ability so to prepare or mollify his own heart, as it may be more towardly passive than it hath been, cannot disenable God from multiplying his blessings, or from granting grace sufficient to mollify their hearts which are not able to mollify themselves, yet have been diligent, according to that ability which they have, to reflect and ruminate upon his providence summoning them to repentance; always diligent, and ready to acknowledge their own insufficiency, and out of this acknowledgment more earnestly to solicit his grace and favour for enabling them to do better.

6. So then man's endeavours are not available, not of force, to produce mortification spiritual; yet are they two ways necessary; *necessitate præcepti, et necessitate medii*—by a necessity of duty, and by a necessity of means, that spiritual mortification may be accomplished in us. And because man by the assistance of God's special providence (without the concurrence of sanctifying inherent grace) is enabled to do somewhat, which being done, his conversion or mortification shall undoubtedly be accomplished; therefore are we said to *mortify the body*; and not so only, but to *make our election sure*; yea, to *work out our own salvation*<sup>y</sup>, for so the apostle speaks, Phil. ii. 12. But how are we said to *work out our own salvation*? *Non formaliter, sed consecutivè*; in such a sense as we say, one man's rising is another's fall; or, the ruin of one or more great families is the raising of others; or as it is said in philosophy, *Generatio unius, est corruptio alterius*, i. e. not formally or properly, (for generation and cor-

In what sense we are said to work out our own salvation.

<sup>y</sup> Or rather, *industriously* to *μετὰ φόβου καὶ τρόμου τὴν ἑαυτῶν labour for our own salvation: σωτηρίαν κατεργάσθε.*



ruption are opposites,) but by way of consequence : for inasmuch as the one is the necessary consequent of the other, the one is said to be the other. And thus, when the apostle wills us *to work out our own salvation with fear and trembling*, he gives the reason in the next words : *For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure*, Phil. ii. 13. So  
 109 that God truly and properly worketh all, as well the *will* as the *deed* : yet it is his good pleasure to work both only in them which work with fear and trembling, as being most afraid to neglect so great salvation as God is ready to work in them and for them. And because God never fails to work salvation in them and for them that are diligent in seeking it, or afraid to neglect it ; therefore they are said *to work out their own salvation*, not properly or formally, but *consecutivè* : that is, salvation is the necessary consequent of their working, or doth necessarily follow upon their work, not by any force or efficacy of their work, or by any natural connexion, but merely by God's appointment or decree. The very same phrase in the original our Saviour useth unto the people, John vi. 27 : 'Εργάζεσθε μὴ τὴν βρωσιν τὴν ἀπολλυμένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν βρωσιν τὴν μένουσαν εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον, ἣν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑμῖν δώσει· τοῦτον γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ἐσφράγισεν ὁ Θεός. Which words can bear no other construction than that which we have made of St. Paul's words, Phil. ii. 12, no other interpretation than our English hath already made : *Labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life*. And so the Vulgar Latin doth not render them verbatim, *operamini cibum*, but *operamini cibo*; not, *work that meat*, but *work for that meat*. For if *that meat* which endureth to eternal life must be given by the Son of God ; if *this meat* be the very body and blood of the Son of God, it cannot



be the proper effect of any man's work, or any merit of man, but the end or consequent of our labours or endeavours; and yet we are said to work this meat in the same sense that we are said to work our salvation, viz. *consecutivè*, because God doth infallibly make us partakers of it, if we diligently seek after it, or labour for it.

7. By the right use of this distinction we may reconcile many places of holy scripture which seem repugnant one to another; as likewise qualify many speeches, whether of the fathers or some good modern writers, which otherwise would seem harsh and offensive. *Who can say*, saith Solomon, Prov. xx. 9, *I have made my heart clean?* This interrogation is in all men's judgment equivalent to this universal negative; 'No man can say, I have made my heart clean;' howbeit the psalmist, psalm lxxiii. 13, saith, *Verily I have cleansed my heart in vain.* There is no contradiction between this psalmist's particular affirmative, 'I have cleansed my heart,' and Solomon's universal negative, 'No man can say, I have cleansed my heart.' Solomon speaks of the *internal purification*, which is the proper effect and sole work of God's Spirit: the psalmist speaks of *his own labours or endeavours* that his heart might be thus purified by the Spirit of God: he then did cleanse his heart *consecutivè, non formaliter.* *Every one*, saith St. John, *that hath this hope in him purifieth himself, even as he is pure*, 1 John iii. 3. This place, perhaps some will say, is meant of men regenerate only, seeing they only have that hope whereof the apostle here speaks. Many other such places of scripture there be, in which we are said, and sometimes commanded, to *purify ourselves*; as James iv. 8: *Cleanse your hands, ye sinners*;

*and purify your hearts, ye double minded.* This place cannot be meant of men truly regenerate: for even sinners and double minded men (such as men regenerate are not) are commanded to cleanse their hands and to purify their hearts. Many other places likewise there be, wherein this purifying of the heart is wholly ascribed unto God: *God*, saith St. Paul, Acts xv. 9, *put no difference betwixt us and them, purifying their hearts by faith.* Not this purification only, but all other good works are said to be wrought by God, as Isaiah xxvi. 12: *Lord, thou wilt ordain peace for us: for thou also hast wrought all our works in us, or for us.* And our Saviour saith, John 110 xv. 5, *Without me ye can do nothing.* Both parts of our former distinction are included in that of St. Paul, 2 Tim. ii. 21: *If any man purge himself from these, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, and meet for the master's use, and prepared unto every good work.* His speech is, if we mark it, *He shall be made a vessel unto honour, if he purge himself:* he doth not say, 'He shall be enabled to make himself a vessel of honour:' nor doth he in propriety of speech, or, as we say, formally or efficiently purge himself: but in that he doth those things, whereupon this purification by God's Spirit doth immediately follow, man is said *to purge himself.* And so are we in this place of St. Paul, Rom. viii, said *to mortify the deeds of the body by the Spirit* when we do those things whereupon this mortification doth immediately ensue, not by any merit or causality of our works, but by God's mere grace, by the counsel of his holy and irresistible will, by the determination of his eternal decree, by which it hath pleased him to appoint the one as a necessary consequent of the other; to wit, spiritual

mortification, or life itself, as the issue of our endeavours *to mortify the flesh*. This kind of speech is usual, not in scripture only, but in other good writers, and in our common dialect. So Tully tells us of a Roman orator, who, for want of skill in civil law, *petiit revera ut causa caderet*, made a motion that he might lose his cause. This motion he did not make directly or formally: his meaning is, that if his motion had been granted, he must by necessary consequent have lost his cause. Thus when we see a man look old, whom we know to be much younger than ourselves, we usually say, 'You make me an old man:' not hereby meaning that he hath brought old age or grey hairs upon us by any trouble or vexation, but that he who is much younger than we, being apparently old, we must by consequence be old. So that he makes us old, not efficiently, but only by consequent truly argues us to be old. According to this analogy of speech, by which he is said to make us old whose age doth truly argue us to be old, is that prophecy literally meant of Jeremiah, which was punctually or formally fulfilled in God or his Christ, Jer. i. 10: *See, I have this day set thee over the nations and over the kingdoms, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy, and to throw down, to build, and to plant*. Jeremiah did never levy an army, or incite any people to take arms for the deposition of their present governor, or for the alteration of any state; yet inasmuch as he foretold the extirpation of some kingdoms, and the erection or plantation of others; and inasmuch as what he foretold did certainly come to pass, he is said to have done that which did follow upon his predictions, though many years after his death. And in the same sense we are said *to mortify the flesh—to cleanse our hearts—to work out our salvation, yea to*



*make our election sure*, when we do those things whereupon our purification or mortification shall be wrought, though many years hence; and always wrought by the omnipotent power of that decree by which those kingdoms were overthrown, and others erected in their place, whose erection or ruin Jeremiah had foretold. Now to inquire how man or his freewill doth cooperate with God's Spirit in the first, second, or third act of his conversion, is, to my apprehension, a question, not inextricable only, but as impertinent as to make a philosophical or political search how Jeremiah did concur with God in the destruction of the Babylonian, or Isaiah with the same God in the erection of the Persian empire; or more punctually to our present purpose, how he that should open another man's mouth that were unable or unwilling to  
 111 open it himself, and yet so desperately sick, that unless he took some physical receipt to remove the matter of his disease, or to revive his spirits, he should certainly die, might be truly said to save his life; yet not to save it *efficienter*, by way of efficiency, but by consequence; that is, because the physic, which without opening his mouth could have no operation, did revive or restore his wonted health. And in this sense Lydia<sup>z</sup> may be said to have saved her own soul by way of consequence, because she opened her ears unto St. Paul's doctrine, and heard him with attention: which being done, the Lord opened her heart to feed upon the word of life, the only physic of her soul. So that the word of life, or Christ, who is the eternal Word of God, did immediately and formally open her heart, and save her soul: but unless she had opened her ears whilst Christ did knock at these doors of her outward senses by St. Paul's voice, Christ

<sup>z</sup> Acts xvi. 14.



had not come into her heart, to have entertained her at his spiritual banquet, as she did Paul and his company with bodily food.

## CHAP. XXXII.

*Whether Mortification and Conversion may be said to be ex prævisis Operibus, though God alone do properly mortify and convert us.*

1. BUT be it as we have said, that we are said to mortify the deeds of the body inasmuch as we do that morally which being so done God doth work mortification spiritual in us, all is not so well as might be wished. For this resolution seems to breed another difficulty of greater danger, or rather to establish a rejected error. For hence it may seem to follow, that mortification spiritual is *ex prævisis operibus*, from the works which we do, or which God foresees that we shall do. And if the accomplishment of spiritual mortification be *ex prævisis operibus*, then life itself here promised should likewise be *ex prævisis operibus*, by our works, or from God's foresight of our works. And if either mortification or spiritual life be *ex prævisis operibus*, then our election likewise should be *ex prævisis operibus*, by our works, or at least from God's foresight of our works; especially if that be true, which before hath been delivered, that none of years and discretion are in the estate of the elect, but such as have truly mortified the deeds of the body; and that all such as have thus truly and thoroughly mortified the deeds of the body are in the estate of the elect. What shall we say then? that election is *ex prævisis operibus*, by our works, or from God's foresight of our works? This is a bugbear indeed, by which many of God's children (so I account them)

The main objection against the former doctrine fully answered.

have been and are much affrighted; but of which they shall not need to be afraid, if they will give us leave to unmask it: for being unmasked, it will appear to be of the same visage and countenance that their own doctrine is of, and a great deal more consonant to their own main principles, than many other principles or conclusions unto which they seek to consort it. And unmask it we may with this distinction—mortification, vivification, or election may be said or conceived to be *ex prævisis operibus*, by our works, or from God's foresight of our works, two ways: either *tanquam ex causa aut titulo*, as from the efficient cause or moral title unto these graces; or, *tanquam ex termino aut objecto non implicante contradictionem*, as from the term or object unto which God's decree for producing the works of spiritual

112 mortification (by which our election is made sure) is terminated. To say that mortification or election should be by or from our works in the former sense, that is, from our works as from any true cause of their production, or as from any merit or title that they may be produced in us, is an error indeed deservedly rejected by most reformed churches. To say that mortification or election itself is by our works or from our works in the second sense, that is, *tanquam ex termino*, as from a term or object, without whose presence or coexistence God doth not work or accomplish our mortification by his Spirit, nor admit us into the estate of the elect; this is no error, but an orthodoxal doctrine void of all danger. For it being granted (which is as much as can be demanded) that mortification spiritual is a work of creation, and proper only unto God, yet even creation itself, taken in the stricter sense, was *ex termino præviso*, from some term, though not out of any cause or matter preexistent. For when we

say, that God created the heavens and earth of *nothing*, that is, out of no matter preexistent, we necessarily include that this *nihilum* or *nothing* was the negative term of this creation. Logical possibility, that is, whatsoever includes no contradiction, is the object of Omnipotency;—and creation itself is the reduction of such possibility into act or real effect. If there had been any thing besides God preexistent to this work of creation, or unless *nothing* had been precedent (not preexistent) to all things that are or have existence, there could have been no such creation, as we believe there was, of the heaven and of the earth; or of the first mass, out of which all things were made.

2. But herbs and grass were not made out of mere nothing, as the heaven and earth were: for they were made of the earth, as it is, Gen. i. 11: *God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after his kind.* He did not in this sort say, ‘Let nothing bring forth the heavens and the earth:’ for so *nothing* should have been *something*. Or if God had made herbs and grass after the same manner that he made the heavens and the earth, we could not say, that they had been made of the earth: for so the earth should have been nothing. And yet the making of grass and herbs out of the earth was a true and proper creation: because<sup>a</sup>, although God did make them of the earth, yet he made them not of the earth *tanquam ex materiali causa*, as of their true material cause, but of the earth *tanquam ex termino positivo*, as of the term or object unto which his creation of them had reference; that is, he did not decree to make them until the earth was made; or, he did not determine to make them but out

<sup>a</sup> Vid. Erastum Disput. contra Paracelsum.

of the earth; not of the water or other element, as he made the fishes of the water, not of the earth. So that grass was made of the earth, and fishes of the sea, not as of any cause concurrent to their making or production, but *tanquam ex termino aut objecto præviso*. The whales and great fishes, which God created on the fifth day, were not from the time of their creation so much as a material cause of the fry or spawn which proceeded from them, until God bestowed his blessing upon them, saying, *Be fruitful, and multiply, and fill the waters in the seas*. The effect of this blessing was a true and proper creation: for hereby they became in their kinds efficient and material causes. And from this blessing they received the first possibility of propagation or continuance of their kind, by succession or generation of the like. Admit then our mortification as well as our vivification is a work of creation; God createth life in baptized infants: and this production of life spiritual in them is like unto the creation of  
 113 the heaven and earth, or of the first mass, that is, not *ex prævisis operibus*, neither by their works, nor from God's foresight of their works. Thus much the Romish church confesseth in the prayer used at the burial of infants baptized: *Omnipotens et mitissime Deus, qui omnibus parvulis renatis fonte baptismatis, dum migrant a sæculo, sine ullis eorum meritis vitam illico largiris æternam, sicut animæ hujus parvuli hodie credimus te fecisse*<sup>b</sup>. In this creation there is no qualification<sup>c</sup> or disposition precedent, either by way

<sup>b</sup> Ex Rituali Romano Pauli Quinti, impresso Antverp. 1635, (in 8vo. ex offic. Plantiniana Moreti,) in officio defunctorum. De exequiis parvulorum, p. 244.

<sup>c</sup> Query if it be not otherwise

in a pagan of years, coming to Christianity. Without baptism, either obtained or desired, he cannot be saved. And baptism he may not have without qualifications preparative, professed



of title, or by way of term or object. Or if we grant any term or object of this creation, it must be the entity of the infant, or its capacity of baptism, or the baptism itself.

3. But as it was the Almighty Creator's pleasure, not to make herbs until he had made the earth; nor fishes, until he had made the sea, out of which he made them *tanquam ex termino*, as of a positive term or object preexistent, though not positively concurring to their creation or coworking with him: so (as we suppose) it was his pleasure, not to work mortification, or to create life in such as are capable of reason, until some works which he requires be done by them; albeit the best works which any can do, be as little conducent by way of causality or title to the production of life or mortification spiritual, as the red earth was to the creating of Adam, or Adam in a dead sleep was to the creation of Eve. Adam was the sole work of God, and so was Eve, though made of Adam, as well as the heaven and the earth were the sole works of God. And so is our election, so is our new life, so is our mortification spiritual, as truly and entirely the work of God, though not wrought without some works of ours pre-existent, as the creation of life in infants is God's work, although they have no works pre-existent. And as Adam, though Eve was made of him, had no more share with God in her creation, than *nothing* had with him in the creation of the heavens and the earth; so neither have we, after we have done the works required to mortification, any greater share or title of causality in the production of life or mortification spiritual, than infants have in their regeneration.

How it is said, all things were created of nothing.

to the church, that he may be admitted to it; and real in his soul, that he may have *rem sacra-* *menti*, that is, become partaker of the inward and spiritual grace.

4. It may be objected, that the works preredquired by us to mortification spiritual are more truly ours than any action that can be imagined as requisite in the heavens for creation of the sun, moon, or stars; or in the earth, for the creation of herbs and trees. It is true, some actions are required in us, <sup>c</sup> that grace may be created in us; yet not to make us more capable naturally of grace, but to make us mere passives not uncapable of it, or not positively contradictory to his majesty or eternal equity. Man from the beginning had a freedom of will to deprive himself of such blessings as God in his bounty had provided for him. Our first parents, by the abuse of their freewill betwixt good and evil, made themselves uncapable of any blessing or reward from God's justice or mere bounty; yet were they not hereby made uncapable of his infinite mercy. Nor are his posterity made uncapable of it by sin merely original, but by abuse of that freewill which is left them as the proper fruit of sin original, that is, a freewill to do evil. We have a power or freedom left us to make ourselves more uncapable of God's mercy 114 than we were in Adam; no power at all to make ourselves more capable of it; it is God alone which increaseth this capacity in us. That of St. Austin is notwithstanding most true in respect of all that are come to years of discretion; *Deus qui fecit te sine te, non salvabit te sine te*: "God which made thee without any endeavours of thine own, will not save thee without thine own endeavours." And yet the best of our endeavours are but to keep ourselves in the same state wherein we were when we had no works, no endeavours, that is, when we were infants. And happy is he that doth not by lewd endeavours or ill works evacuate the fruits of baptism in himself. For him that doth

<sup>c</sup> See the second note at the end of this section, ch. 36.

finally so (cassate or) void them, it had been better if he had never been baptized, if he had never been born. For by frustrating the hopes which he had in baptism, he makes himself more incapable of God's mercy for having the spirit of life created in him, than the earth was of God's power to have man created of it.

CHAP. XXXIII.

*By what Spirit we are said to mortify the Deeds of the Body.*

1. IF the deeds of the body or flesh must be mortified by the spirit of man, then man hath not only freedom of will, but *liberum arbitrium*, an ability to mortify his own flesh, or to free himself from the servitude of the flesh. These and the like inconveniences have persuaded some to attribute this whole work unto the Spirit of God, which is able to do all things without the coagency or consort of the spirit of man. But thus to avoid the former inconveniences, is but as if a man having found a way out of a thicket of thorns, should instantly entangle himself in the briers. For it is not so great a solecism to say, that the spirit of man, or man himself should be an agent in this business, as to affirm that whence it would follow, that the Spirit of God should in this work of mortification be man's instrument. For that which man worketh *by the Spirit*, man is more properly said to work it than the Spirit. Now our apostle saith that we must *mortify the deeds of the body*: and he that mortifieth is the agent: that by which we work this mortification is but our instrument. And better it were to say, that the spirit of man should be man's instrument in this work, rather than the Spirit of God.

Of the difference betwixt the Spirit of God and the spirit of man.

2. It were according to our former principles easily answered, that we, by our spirit, mortify the deeds of

our bodies *consecutivè, non formaliter aut efficienter*, that is, not by any efficacy in us, or influence derivable from us: the Spirit of God must directly work or effect it. But though this be true, yet is it not punctual to the point proposed. For by this answer the *spirit* here meant should only be the spirit of man: for by this spirit only we work our mortification *consecutivè*. That which the Spirit of God doth work in us, it works directly, immediately, and entirely: and in producing its proper effects it hath no partner or coagent. It may notwithstanding be yet further replied, that we must mortify the flesh by the Spirit of God, not as by any instrumental cause subordinate to us, but in such a sense as we say inferior magistrates do the acts of the magistracy by the king's or supreme magistrate's authority, unto which they and their magistracy are

115 subordinate. Thus some good interpreters<sup>d</sup> upon this place say, that we must mortify the flesh by our own spirit, but by our own spirit as it is subordinate to the Spirit of God: and consequently to this assertion it must be granted, that this subordination of our spirit to the Spirit of God is in this place necessarily included or presupposed, though not expressed by our apostle. All this, for aught I know, may be most true and orthodoxal, but withal too general: for inferior or subordinate magistrates are more properly said to be the agents, even in those things which they do by the authority and warrant of the superiors; whereas the Spirit of God is not only the Author or sole Authorizer, but the principal Actor or Agent in this work of mortification. For a more particular and punctual resolution of the question proposed, we are to unfold the diverse acceptions of these words or terms, to wit, THE SPIRIT, and MORTIFICATION.

<sup>d</sup> Pasqualius.



There is *the Spirit of God*, and there is *the spirit of man* : both of them have their several and diverse importances in scripture. The spirit of man may be considered as it is in the natural man, or in the man altogether unregenerate ; and this spirit is at enmity with God : or, in the man as yet unregenerate, yet in the way to regeneration. And the spirit of this man is privatively opposite to the Spirit of God ; so as darkness is to light, blindness to sight, or death to life. There is a spirit likewise in the man regenerate, the same for substance with the spirit of the natural man ; the same for substance that it was in himself before regeneration, but altered in quality : and this spirit, though it cease not to be in man, yet it is not usually called *the spirit of man*, as being no way opposite unto the Spirit of God, but subordinate unto it ; so subordinate unto it, that it is called *the spirit that is of God*, and sometimes *the spirit of God*.

4. These diverse acceptions of the word SPIRIT, as likewise the distinction or opposition between *the Spirit of God* and *the spirit of man*, are set down by our apostle, 1 Cor. ii. from the ninth verse unto the end of the chapter : *What man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him ? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God*, ver. 11. He doth not say, *the Spirit of God which is in God*, or *with God*. And when he saith, *What man knoweth the things of man, save the spirit of man ?* he supposeth there is even in the natural and unregenerate man *a spirit*, able to discern the secret thoughts and imaginations of his heart, though blind and ignorant in the things concerning God. Again, when he saith, *the things of God knoweth no man*, he excludeth the natural man only, or the man to whom God hath not imparted the gifts of *the Spirit*. For so

he hath said, ver. 9: *Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him.* Into what man's heart have they not entered? Or unto what man doth this negative belong? Only to the natural or unregenerate man. For so he adds, ver. 10: *But God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit: for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God.*

5. What *Spirit* is this which *searcheth all things, even the deep things of God?* the Spirit of God which is without us, or which communicateth knowledge, and reveals things hidden unto us? If this Spirit were here meant, how should those *deep things of God* be revealed unto us? Revealed to us they cannot be, unless they be known by us; and known by us they cannot be but by the spirit which is in us. So he adds more expressly, ver. 12: *Now we have received, not the spirit*  
 116 *of the world,* (that is, the spirit which is of man,) *but the spirit which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God.* If by the spirit which we have received, we know the things which are freely given to us of God, this spirit must be made ours; it must be one with our spirit; it is not the Spirit of God which is without us, or which works our regeneration, but the spirit by which we become formally regenerate and spiritual. And punctually to this purpose the apostle having said, ver. 14, *The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them,* (so long as he remains a natural man,) *because they are spiritually discerned:* he adds, by way of opposition, vv. 15, 16, *But he that is spiritual judgeth (or discerneth) all things, yet he himself is judged of no man. For who hath known the mind of the Lord, that he*

may instruct him? But we have the mind of Christ. When he saith, WE have the mind of Christ, he includeth ALL such as he was, that is, all men truly regenerated by the Spirit, whom God hath instructed to discern the things of God. By the mind of Christ, the apostle meaneth the selfsame thing that he did by the spirit of God. Between the mind of Christ communicated unto us, and the spirit of God communicated unto us and received by us, there is no difference or distinction; the importance of both speeches is the same. Our mind being changed from evil to good, or from minding of carnal things to the minding of spiritual things, is called the mind of Christ by participation, and so likewise the spirit of God by participation. But the Spirit of God which communicates this mind or spirit unto us, or by which we are said to receive it, hath not always the same importance: between the importances there is no dissension, yet a distinction. Sometimes by the Spirit of God, God the Spirit, or God the Holy Ghost is meant, who in a peculiar manner is said to sanctify us, to regenerate us, to quicken us, to work mortification in us. Sometimes again by the Spirit of God is meant the Spirit which is in Christ, which is the fountain from whence all gifts of the Spirit are immediately derived unto us, though the derivation be immediately wrought by the Holy Ghost. And when the apostle saith that we have the mind of Christ, this mind of Christ which we have received, supposeth a mind or Spirit in Christ which participates it unto us, or from which we receive it by participation. We may not imagine a transmigration or transmission of the Spirit which is in Christ from him to us, but a participation only. God hath anointed him with the oil of gladness above his fellows. God giveth not the Spirit by measure to him. From the fulness of this Spirit in him we receive grace for



grace ; albeit this grace be distributed or portioned out unto us by the Holy Ghost. Christ sends the spirit of mortification or regeneration into our hearts, as the fountain or conduit head doth the water into a city : the Holy Ghost prepares our hearts to receive this spirit of Christ, and brings it unto us, after such a manner as he that makes the aqueducts or conduit pipes doth convey water into a town or city otherwise destitute of good water.

6. But what doth the apostle mean by *the spirit of man*, as it is contradistinct or opposite to *the Spirit of God*? the whole reasonable soul or form of man by which he is distinguished from other creatures? or some principal part which hath least commixture with the flesh or body, that which we commonly call *the conscience*? This part of the soul, even in the unregenerate man, oftentimes disallows such things as are entertained by the reasonable soul, and condemns such actions as are undertaken by reason, and managed with  
117 extraordinary understanding. *When the Gentiles*, saith our apostle, *do by nature the things contained in the law, they shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their CONSCIENCE also bearing witness, and their thoughts accusing or else excusing one another*, Rom. ii. 14, 15. In this accusation or process in the very heathen, there is a combat or conflict between the spirit and the flesh, or between the mind and the affections.

7. But may not the same part or faculty of the reasonable soul disallow or condemn at one time the selfsame things which at another time it well approves? If it may, there is no necessity of distinction between *the soul* and *the spirit*. But if there be any conflict between reason itself and the spirit, at one and the same time, there must needs be a distinction betwixt them. Now it seems that even whilst the reasonable



soul doth contrive mischief, or give her consent to things unjust or unexpedient, whilst it hatcheth heresy, the conscience doth secretly check it, and endeavour to restrain it. And this, conscience could not do, unless it were in some sort distinct from that reasonable part or faculty of the soul which is endued with freedom of will. For there can be no conflict but between two different parties or capacities.

8. This is most consequent to Plato's philosophy and to true theology. For as the Platonics distinguish between *the soul* and *the mind*, so our apostle distinguisheth between *the soul of man* and *the spirit of man*: 1 Thess. v. 23: *And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly; and I pray God your whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.* Our sanctification is not entire or universal in respect of the parts, (universal it cannot be in respect of all degrees,) until the soul as well as the spirit, until the body as well as the soul be thus sanctified as our apostle wisheth. Every part of man must be in part or in some good measure sanctified. But before this entire or whole sanctification can be wrought, there must be a mortification of the body or of the flesh: and under *the flesh* (as hath been observed before) the reasonable soul with its best faculties is usually comprehended by our apostle. Howbeit we do not read of any mortification of the spirit, but of renovation, vivification, or quickening of it.

The spirit of man is not said to be mortified, but quickened by the Spirit of God.

9. What shall we say then? that the spirit or conscience of man is altogether free from the contagion of the flesh? that it stands in no need of mortification? St. Paul tells us of some men, whose *conscience being weak is defiled*<sup>e</sup>. But *the conscience* in his language

<sup>e</sup> 1 Cor. viii. 7.

perhaps is not altogether the same with *the spirit*; but the *synteresis*, in all likelihood, is. And again he tells us, that there be *men of corrupt minds, and destitute of the truth, which suppose that gain is godliness*, 1 Tim. vi. 5. And we read of a *soundness of mind*, 2 Tim. i. 7. But that defilement or corruption of the spirit or mind seems by our apostle not to be ordinary. However the mind or conscience may be polluted by the contagion of the flesh, yet are they not so radically polluted as the flesh is. The flesh is the seat of the disease. The idiopathy, as physicians speak, is in the soul; the sympathy only in the spirit or conscience: so that if the deeds of the flesh be mortified, there needs no peculiar cure or mortification of the spirit. So it falls out in diseases of the body. If the protopathy be cured, the sympathy will fall of itself: as many are vexed oftentimes with great aches or pains in the head; some with fits of the epilepsy or fallingsickness, whenas the root of the disease is in the stomach. In these cases there needs no peculiar physic for the head; but cure the stomach, and the head will recover without further medicine. From this analogy or proportion betwixt the diseases of the soul and of the body, it is,

118 I take it, that we are not enjoined to mortify the spirit. For the apostle supposeth, that the flesh being mortified, the cure is wrought, without any peculiar mortification of the spirit distinct from it. Or rather, he supposed and knew, that the mortification of the flesh could not be wrought without renovation or quickening of the spirit. For though it be true which some moralists say, *Mens deprecatur ad optima*—That the spirit or conscience doth as it were entreat and counsel malefactors themselves unto that which is good; yet the spirit and conscience of the best men, before they be renewed by the Spirit of God, doth perform this

work but weakly, slightly, or cowardly. And the reason why the spirit or conscience of men, of good men in respect of others, is so defective in this performance of its proper function, is only because it is overborne, or kept under, or in part corrupted by carnal affections or contrary inclinations of the body or flesh, which for this reason must be mortified. Therefore the apostle, when he exhorts *to put off the old man which is corrupt through the deceitful lusts*, enjoins them *to be renewed in the spirit of their mind*, Ephes. iv. 22, 23.

10. There is a twofold mortification: the one consists in the weakening, deadening, or benumbing of carnal affections or desires; the other is always wrought and perfected by a positive purification of the heart, or fountain whence the affections flow. A man may cease to be unchaste or lascivious by age or other casual impotency: so may a man cease to be drunk, by some disease or distaste. Another may cease to be ambitious, or have his ambitious desires benumbed or weakened, as being either bereaved of opportunities to raise his fortunes, or disenabled to follow his suits or hopes of preferment. Mortification is then perfect, when the affection itself is as it were rescued from the carnal desires or delights wherein it was involved, and is won or trained to the service of the Spirit.

## CHAP. XXXIV.

*Containing the Manner and Order of the Spirit's Working, or of our Working by the Spirit.*

1. THE question remains—How these two sorts of mortification are wrought by the Spirit or by us. To this disquisition concerning the cure of the soul, there is a question very pertinent amongst the physicians of the

Whether the cure of men's souls be wrought by contraries or symbolicals.

body. One sort says, *Omne remedium fit per contrarium*; the others say, *Omne remedium fit per simile*. The difference betwixt them may be easily reconciled with the distinction of the infirmities and diseases which are to be cured, or of the subject whereunto the said medicine may be said to be like, dislike, or contrary.

2. The medicine may be sometimes contrary to the matter of the disease, but like unto the nature opposed. Sometimes again, the medicine may be contrary to the nature, but agreeable with the matter of the disease wherewith nature is opposed. Some diseases properly consist in mere weakness of nature or languishment of spirit: and these must be cured *per simile*, by administration of such diet or receipts as may immediately comfort the fountain of life, which consists *in calido et humido*, in moderate heat and moisture: as, for this reason, hot waters to men in swoons are fittest; and  
 119 warm broths or cordials, to men otherwise feeble or deprived of heat and moisture. Other diseases consist either in excessive heat, or abundance of blood; and these must be cured by the contrary; as by opening a vein, or by cooling diet, or medicines. Too much fullness of body cannot be holpen but by abstinence or evacuation. “However, both sorts of physicians agree, that when all is done, nature is the best physician; and that is the best physic which sets nature free to exercise her own strength, or strengthens her to expel noisome humours, which cloy or molest her.” But oftentimes it falls out, that nature cannot be thus freed of bad humours which are settled in the body without administration of something that is contrary unto nature, but consorteth so well with the humours which oppress her, that nature being enforced to expel this inmate or newcomer, doth with the same force expel a secret or domestic enemy which had associated him-



self unto it: as sometimes the law cannot proceed against secret enemies of the state, until they be drawn to associate or join themselves to other apparent foreign enemies, with whom they perish, or are expelled their native country together with them. Again, although the conflict be always most eager and keen between natures most contrary, yet that which every contrary agent doth in the first place aim at, is, not utterly to destroy its opposite, but to make it like itself; albeit the one often come to destroy the other by seeking to make it grow like itself. The heat of the fire doth not directly aim or strike at the cold in the water, but seeks to communicate its own heat unto it; and the heat produced in the water doth immediately and directly expel the cold, and at length consume the substance of water.

3. For better explicating the manner how both kinds of mortification are wrought by the Spirit; or how they are wrought by the Spirit of God, how by the spirit of man, or by the spirit which is in man; or how by contraries, how by similitude; we are in the first place to consider three estates or conditions of men: the first, of the natural man, that is, of him which as yet is in no sort partaker of the Spirit of God, which hath had no touch or feeling of its operation in him or upon him. The second is, of men which have been partakers of the Spirit, but, as we say, *in fieri*, not *in facto*; such as feel the motions of God's Spirit whilst it moves them; that is, they are partakers of its motions or touches, but not of its residence in them, or of any permanent impression made upon them. The third sort is, of men made partakers of the Spirit in habit, that is, as the apostle speaks, they have *the Spirit dwelling in them*, and are enlivened and enquickened by it. The manner how mortification is wrought in these three several sorts or conditions of men by the Spirit is not the same. In the first sort,

How the cure of the soul is wrought in several sorts or conditions of men.

the cure is commonly begun by the contrary, but always finished by assimilation. God sometimes weakens the inclinations of the natural man against his will, without consent of his own spirit. Some men are prone to offend or to surfeit of the flesh unto death, by the abundance of health, or too lively plight of body; and these God in mercy sometimes visits with grievous sicknesses, for preventing the diseases which would otherwise grow upon them. And many natural men, (as a <sup>f</sup> heathen confesseth,) being thus visited, first begin seriously to think themselves but men, subject to misery and mortality; and that there is a God or Divine Power, which is the Author and Giver of life. Others are prone to incur danger of death by abundance of wealth; which the more it abounds, the more it commonly increaseth the disease: for *crescit amor nummi quantum ipsa pecunia crescit*; as money or wealth increaseth, so ordinarily the love of it increaseth. And these God oftentimes in mercy visiteth with loss of goods, or with some other cross or affliction which either deprives them of opportunities, or deters from the means of increasing wealth. And this is a part of the cure, or a preparation to it, and is usually wrought by contraries. Others are prone to incur hardness of heart, by pride and overprizing of themselves; and these God oftentimes visits with disgrace, with contempt or scorn of others. Now the rule is general, that if the parties thus visited or cured in part by contraries, duly compare their visitation with their sins, which in justice have procured it; the spirit gets great advantage of the flesh, and is more capable and sensible of the motions or impulsions of God's Spirit. Howbeit, man himself, and the spirit of man,

<sup>f</sup> [I think he means Pliny epistle, lib. 7. See the note in junior, in that excellent 26th the end of ch. 36.]

in this first cure or part of mortification, is merely passive. And it is well if by often ruminating or reflecting upon what hath befallen him by the providence of God, and by the sense or feeling of the impulsions of his Spirit, he can content himself to be merely passive, or a towardly patient in the next degrees of his mortification or conversion, which are still wrought by the Spirit of God as by the agent or efficient cause.

4. From these observations the resolution of the former question, so far as it concerns the man unregenerate, is easy and perspicuous. The question was—‘How this mortification is wrought by the Spirit of God which is without us, but always assisting us; how by the spirit of man, or by the spirit which is in man, though partaker of the Spirit of God?’ The answer is—‘So much of the cure as is wrought, is wrought by the Spirit of God, as present to man but not in man, as by the only agent or efficient cause;’ for that is the efficient which begins and continues the motion; ‘the same cure is wrought by the spirit which is in man, as by the immediate and formal contrary:’ that is, it is formally wrought by the spirit which is in man, as by an agent *per emanationem*, as it is moved by the Spirit of God: so the native cold is expelled out of the water by the fire, as by the only agent or efficient: and yet the same cold is immediately and formally expelled by the heat which the fire produceth in the water, as by a formal and incompatible contrary. The only end or immediate effect at which every natural agent directly aims, is the assimilation of the subject whereon it works unto itself. And this assimilation is wrought by introducing the like quality into the subject unto that by which the agent or efficient worketh: as the first thing which the fire seeks to effect is to produce heat in the water: but the heat once produced expels

the cold as immediately and as formally as the depression or pulling down one scale lifts up the other. The manner how this mortification is wrought in us by the Spirit of God is the very same: the immediate and direct effect at which it directly aimeth, is, the transformation of our spirit into the similitude of the Spirit of Christ: and this consists in the production or creation of the spirit of grace. The spirit of grace being produced in us, or our spirit being touched by the Spirit of Christ, as the steel is by the adamant, formally expels or abateth the lust of the flesh. And when the flesh is thus truly mortified by the spirit, that sanctification of which the apostle speaks, 1 Thess. v. 23, is wrought in us.

5. The first part of this cure, as was said, is wrought by contraries; that is, by freeing the spirit of the unregenerate man from the burden of the flesh, which overmasters it, or enticeth the soul to such practices as the spirit dislikes. And from this burden of the flesh the Spirit of God, or his peculiar providence, doth free the soul, or spirit of man, by laying some one kind or other of bodily affliction upon him, which is more displeasing to his nature than the former motions of the  
 121 flesh were pleasant. But the spirit of man thus freed in part from the burden of the flesh, wherein it lay smothered or much oppressed, cannot so perfect mortification begun, as nature freed by physic from oppressing humours digests the relics or remainder, and by digesting them, recovers health and strength. What advantage then doth accrue unto the spirit of man by weakening the inclinations of the flesh? Much every way. For, the flesh being thus weakened, the spirit doth hereby become more towardly passive than it was before, more apt to be moved by the Spirit of God, and by such motions more capable of spiritual cure. Every



motion of our spirit by the Spirit of God doth abate or weaken the inclinations of the flesh ; and every such abatement, or degree of weakening the flesh, is a degree of mortification.

6. These first degrees of mortification are commonly wrought by interposed fits or motions of the spirit of man, produced by the Spirit of God. The men that are partakers of them have liberty or respite in the mean time to reflect upon them; and by thus reflecting upon them, or by taking them into serious consideration, are enabled to avoid such external occasions as strengthen the inclinations of the flesh, and to cut off their food and nutriment. For albeit the spirit of man be in the first cure merely passive ; yet it is not so passive as stocks and stones, or other senseless creatures are ; it hath a true sense or feeling of the motions put upon it, or produced in it, by the Spirit of God. Nor is the spirit of man sensible only of such motions, in such sort as flies or gnats, or other imperfect sensitive creatures are of bodily motion ; that is, sensible only for the present, without any remembrance of what is past, or consideration of the like to come. Partly from the memory of former motions, which have been put upon it ; partly from the representation or consideration of the like apprehended by it, as possibly future or approaching, the spirit of man, though it cannot move or expel the inclinations of the flesh by way of proper agency or efficiency, is yet able so to countersway them, as that they cannot exercise their intended motions, or accomplish their attempts.

7. This is the apostle's doctrine, Gal. v. 16, 17: *This I say then, Walk in the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh.* He doth not say, ye shall not be opposed or assaulted by the lusts of the flesh ; for (as in the next words is included) the flesh will

still attempt the execution or exercise of its motions. *For the flesh*, saith the apostle, *lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh : and these are contrary the one to the other : so that ye cannot do the things that ye would.* That is, the flesh can neither do the things that it intendeth to do, nor the spirit produce those effects which it wisheth and much desireth ; no more than heat can produce its proper effects when it is overmatched (in the same subject) with cold ; or than cold is able to produce the proper effects thereof, whilst it is attempered or counterswayed by heat. Now *the spirit* whereof our apostle speaks in this place is *the spirit of man*, at least the spirit which is in man, though in part renewed by the Spirit of God. For, as the apostle speaks, the flesh and the spirit here meant are contrary : and it is the nature of contraries to be in one and the same subject : and it is the true property of contrary inclinations to move and sway upon one and the same centre or point of rest or dependance. Otherwise, how strong soever the one contrary be, it could not countersway nor counterpoise  
122 the other. The point or centre whereupon the inclinations of the flesh and spirit do move or sway is the soul, which sometimes inclines more unto the spirit, sometimes more unto the flesh or carnal affections. The whole work of mortification is but a putting off the old man and putting on the new. The more the inclinations of the flesh are weakened, the more apt is the spirit of man to be moved, impelled, or strengthened by the Spirit of God ; and the more apt it is to be moved by the Spirit of God, the more easily and readily will the inclination of the flesh or old man be weakened by it. So that there is a continual reciprocation betwixt the weakening of the flesh and the strengthening or renewing of the spirit. In every several act or motion

of God's Spirit, by which the spirit in man is renewed or quickened, the spirit of man thus assisted by the Spirit of God gets a double advantage of the flesh: first, it directly weakens the inclinations of the flesh or old man, and by weakening them, gains further possession or interest in the affections, wherein the lusts or desires of the flesh were seated. Secondly, the spirit of man being revived and quickened by the Spirit of God, doth not only countersway or curb the flesh, but withal doth purify the soul, or the fountain of the affections, and in the next conflict useth the service of the soul and inferior affections to conquer and expel the remainder of carnal desires or concupiscence, or at least doth keep them under, that they cannot make head or open rebellion as it were to depose the Spirit of its sovereignty, after once it hath gotten it; specially if men which have proceeded thus far in this conflict be wary and vigilant, always remembering that their greatest strength consists in imploring the assistance of the Spirit of God, in waiting his approach, and attending his motions. But let no man think he hath got the victory over the flesh, or hath performed this duty of mortification as he ought, until the desires or inclinations of the flesh be mortified by the vivification or quickening of the affections wherein they were seated: or until the spirit and soul of man renewed, as hath been said, by the Spirit of God, have won the soul and affections unto their side or part.

## CHAP. XXXV.

*Wherein the Accomplishment of Mortification, or of Conversion unto God, doth properly consist.*

1. AFTER this preparative to mortification thus begun by the Spirit of God, or by his peculiar providence, the whole cure consists in the assimilation or transformation of our spirit into the similitude or likeness of the Spirit of God: and this is wrought by the renewing of God's image in us. Some relicks there be of God's image in the natural man, the like whereof are not in devils: and these are seated in *the spirit* or *synteresis*. Howbeit these in themselves are no better than dead stocks or roots, until they be revived by the Spirit of God and secret influence of his graces: but so renewed they naturally diffuse the influence of life into the stems or branches. The soul and body of the whole man are so quickened by them, as the branches or stems in the spring time revive by the return of sap from the root: both are quickened and revived by the Spirit of God, and by the sweet disposition of his providence, as trees, as herbs, grass, and other vegetables are by the sun, by the sweet influence  
123 of heaven, and by the moistened earth, whereby the roots are immediately cherished.

2. This vivification or renewing of the spirit in man is immediately wrought *per simile*, as our animal or vital spirits in swoons are revived by the spirit of wine or other comfortable water. First, the relics of God's image, or implanted rules of conscience, have more immediate similitude with the Spirit of God or of Christ, than the inferior faculties of the soul or body have. And yet these relicks of God's image, or rules of conscience, being true parts or native branches of the spirit

Some relicks of the image of God in man, which are not in devils.



of man, symbolize better with the soul and body of man, than this Spirit of God, which worketh this mortification, doth. So that albeit the Spirit of God, or his preventing grace, doth always begin this mortification, without any operation or coagency of the spirit of man; and albeit the spirit of man be a mere passive in all the motions by which itself is renewed and quickened: yet after it be not only moved, but thus touched and quickened by the Spirit of God, *actus agit*; it works, not only by countersway or renitency, but it diffuseth the influence of life and grace which itself receiveth entirely from the Spirit of God, throughout the inferior faculties of the soul: it takes the place or room of so much of the lusts of the flesh, as it expels; and as well in the expulsion of the lusts of the flesh, as in taking possession of the body wherein they were seated, it useth the soul as the *medium deferens*, as the mean, at least, for communicating life to the flesh or body. And by this diffusion of the spirit of life, or influence of grace throughout the faculties or affections of the soul, the second part or accomplishment of mortification is wrought, which (as was said before) consisteth in the rescuing or winning of the natural affections from the flesh unto the spirit.

3. For better understanding the manner how this accomplishment of mortification is wrought, we are to consider, that albeit the lusts of the flesh are simply evil; yet the affections wherein they are always seated, are in their nature neither simply good nor simply evil, but of an indefinite or indifferent temper between moral goodness and that which is morally evil. They become good or evil, or at leastwise more or less evil, according to the several marks at which they aim, or the diversity of the objects on which they bestow themselves, or of the issues which they find. True it is, that the foun-

tain of our affections is so tainted by original corruption, that no affections or desires, as they issue from the heart of the natural collapsed man, are pure or free from stain or sin; yet they become more or less filthy or criminous according to the course or current which they take. The fountain of the first man's affections was clear and pure; yet were his desires polluted by the vent or issue which they took; as a stream or rivulet which takes its original from a pure rock, doth instantly lose its original purity by falling into a muddy channel, or running through a filthy sink, especially if the current, by stoppage or other external cause, do reciprocate upon the fountain or spring. On the contrary, the water which springeth out of a moss or quag, becomes purer and clearer by taking its course through a rock or gravel. It being granted then that the very fountain of our affections or desires is polluted and unclean, the mortification whereof we speak is then truly wrought, when the natural affections, wherein the lusts of the flesh are seated, are recovered or diverted from the course of the flesh, and won unto the conduit  
 124 of the spirit. The flesh or deeds of the body must be mortified; but this mortification must be wrought, not by mortifying or destroying, but first by purifying, then by quickening or reviving the natural affection, wherewith the lusts of the flesh do mingle, as mire or filth doth with water which falls into it, or as bad humours do with the blood.

4. Lasciviousness is reckoned by St. Paul amongst the works of the flesh: and Mary Magdalene, who had been notoriously wanton and lascivious, had this member of the old man truly mortified in her, without enfeebling or benumbing the affection of love itself, which was as strong in her as ever it had been, but set upon its right mark, and employed in the service of the

Spirit. *She stood, saith the text, at our Saviour's feet behind him weeping, and began to wash his feet with tears, and did wipe them with the hairs of her head, and kissed his feet, and anointed them with the ointment,* Luke vii. 38. Thus she did, because she loved much: and she loved much, because many sins were forgiven her. Her wanton love, or rather the wantonness of her love, was truly mortified by the vivification or quickening of spiritual love in her: for the love of the flesh was mortified by the love of the spirit.

5. Amongst other deeds of the body, amongst all the lusts of the flesh, pride or ambition is the most dangerous, and must be mortified by the spirit. But wherein doth the true mortification of it consist? Not in negatives; not in an absolute disesteem of all honour, or disclaiming all desire of praise or reputation. For this may stand with stoical stupidity, or cynical sloth, or nasty proud contempt of the world; which kind of temper hath least affinity with that mortification which becomes a Christian; for this requires that the affection itself remain entire for the service of the spirit, Rom. vi. 19. The affection out of which pride or ambition groweth (as a wen out of a comely body) is a desire of praise or honour. Neither is all desire of any honour, nor the excessive desire of some honour, a work or lust of the flesh, or any branch of pride or ambition, which properly consists in the immoderate desire of that honour which is from men. This indeed is a lust of the flesh, or carnal concupiscence, which must be mortified. And the best method for the mortification of this desire, is by raising the esteem or price of that honour which cometh from God. This desire must have the predominant sway in our heart before we can be true believers. So our Saviour teacheth us, John v. 44: *How can ye believe, which receive*

The accomplishment of mortification consists not in deading, but in winning the affections unto the spirit.

*honour one of another, and seek not the honour that cometh from God only?* Now without true belief there can be no true mortification. The same Spirit which worketh faith or belief in us, doth, with it and by it, give us the true esteem of *that honour which cometh from God alone.* The true esteem of this honour being imprinted upon our soul and spirit doth increase the desire of it. And as the desire of it is increased, pride and ambition (which is but a desire of that honour which is from men or from the world) must needs decrease, and by thus decreasing be truly mortified.

6. Another most dangerous work of the flesh is covetousness. The mortification of this work or member of the old man doth not consist in a retchless temper, or neglective content in living from hand to mouth, without any provident care for times future; for this is sottishness. The desire of riches is not a sin, but a natural affection, which must not be mortified, 125 that is, not destroyed, but revived and quickened. Wherein then doth covetousness consist? Not simply in the desire of riches, but in the excessive desire of such riches as perish, or of such other means or necessities of life, as are less worth than life itself. The affection or desire of riches is not to be quelled, but to be diverted from its muddy channel by the spirit of mortification. This Spirit of life doth draw or conduct our desires that way which the Lord of life commands them to take; that is, to seek after riches, but after riches of another kind: *Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal: but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal,* Mat. vi. 19, 20. By the parable likewise of *the unjust steward,* and that



other of *the talents* we are commanded to imitate, or rather to outstrip the usurer or cunning bargainer for worldly commodities, in diligent care and watchful observance for increasing this heavenly treasure; in being as wise and careful in doing good to others, as worldlings are in doing good unto themselves. No man offends in being vigilant and careful; but in employing his wits and care for gaining transitory wealth, which is less worth than his life or soul, whereas this bodily life itself is well lost or laid to pawn for gaining treasure in heaven.

7. Drunkenness is a work of the flesh which must be mortified. The affection whence this loathsome stream doth spring is a desire of mirth or pleasure; for no man directly desires to be drunk. All men naturally desire to be merry, as having an internal spring of delight or mirth in themselves, which naturally desires an issue or vent, otherwise the soul and spirit become sodden in melancholy. Hence it is, that many men's affections detesting this melancholy humour, be drenched in this filthy sink or puddle of drunkenness, which is but a sinister or preposterous issue of inbred mirth. The true mortification of this monster is not to be sought by quelling or weakening the affection whence it springs, but rather by giving it another issue or vent. Thus much is implied in our apostle's advice, Ephes. v. 18, 19: *Be not drunk with wine, wherein is excess; but be filled with the Spirit; speaking to yourselves in psalms and hymns and spiritual songs, singing and making melody in your heart to the Lord.* Our apostle here supposeth, that the Spirit of God, which alone worketh the mortification of this sin and other lusts of the flesh, although he detests all drunken riotous mirth, is not a dull spirit of melancholy. It delighteth much in its own

music, always desirous to hear pleasant songs of its own setting. And there is no means so effectual for drowning drunken mirth as a full consort of the music of this spirit: *Beatus populus qui scit jubilationem hanc*: “Blessed are the people that can rejoice in thee, O Lord.”

8. Thus it is plain how this cure must be wrought by contraries, and yet *per simile*, by the like too. The lusts of the flesh must be *mortified by the Spirit*, and yet these are contraries. But if we descend unto particulars; ambition, or desire of honour, must be mortified by desire of honour—covetousness, which is a desire of riches, must be mortified by the desire of riches—drunkenness, which is a desire of mirth, must be mortified by a desire of mirth—immoderate carnal love must be mortified by excessive love of Christ and of things spiritual. Between the desires themselves there is as true similitude as is between the several currents of water which issue from the same spring or fountain; but as perfect a contrariety between the  
126 objects and issues of the desires, as there is between the several waters of the same fountain, whilst the one runs in a pure rock or conduit pipe, and the other into a sink or puddle.

9. To conclude then; the Spirit of God doth first purify the fountain of our desires, that is, the spirit or conscience of man. The spirit of man being thus quickened and purified, doth, by direction and assistance of the same Spirit of God, divert the current of his desires, and give a new vent or issue to his affections. And the desires or affections by this diversion of their current, receive a further degree of purification from the ocean or sea into which they empty themselves, that is, from heaven and the heavenly lights on which they are set. Between the current of our desires or

affections thus purified by the Spirit of God, and the celestial objects whereon they are set, there is such a reciprocation or mutual recourse, as it were between a stream of pure water and a sea of nectar; the stream or spring still falling into the sea, and the sea still sweetening the stream by reflowing upon it. The Spirit of Christ, which knows no bounds or limits, which is more boundless than the ocean, delights in our desires or affections whilst they are set upon heavenly things. And the more his Spirit is delighted in our desires and affections thus emptying and pouring out themselves, the more he purifies and sweetens them by the influence of his gracious Spirit. Yet are not any man's affections so thoroughly sweetened by the Spirit of grace in this life, as not to retain some permanent tincture or mixture of the flesh. Howbeit, every man is thoroughly mortified in whom the Spirit of Christ hath gotten the sovereignty over the flesh, and won the better part of the natural affections to its service. But whether this sovereignty being once gotten, may not finally, or for a time at least, be lost, I leave it to the determination of the schools. My application for the present shall be from the words of the son of Sirach, Ecclus. xxxviii. 24, 25: though the book be apocryphal, yet his observation in this place is canonical: *Σοφία γραμματέως ἐν εὐκαιρίᾳ σχολῆς: The wisdom of learned men cometh by opportunity of leisure: or (as some read) by right employment of his vacant time: and he that hath little business shall become wise. How can he get wisdom that holdeth the plough, and that glorieth in the goad, that driveth oxen, and is occupied in their labours, and whose talk is of bullocks, or of the breed of bullocks* §?

§ —καὶ ἡ διήγησις αὐτοῦ ἐν νοῖσι ταύρων;

for the most part true of men full of that which we call *book-learning*, or employed in matters of government of state: would to God it were not too true of many that have little business! In respect of this private learning, every one of us, especially in these times, have books enough of our own, so we would sequester some competent times or vacant seasons for serious perusing them. Every man's course of life and daily actions are the best books for this learning: and no man can so well read them as his own spirit and conscience. Herein then consists the wisdom of him that is in part, and desires to be a better Christian: first, in careful observing the touches of God's punishing or chastising hand: secondly, in reflecting upon the motions of his Spirit: thirdly, in duly examining every day what advantage the flesh hath gotten against the Spirit, or the Spirit against the flesh. All this being done, the best employment of all these talents which God commits unto our trust must be in acknowledging our whole strength to be from God, and in consecrating our best endeavours by continual prayer for the assistance of his Spirit. In this last point we are active, yet  
127 active only to the end that we may be towardly passive, that we grieve not the good Spirit of God by which our sanctification must be wrought. He will not forsake us, unless we forsake him first. But as water which hath been heated by the fire congeals the soonest after it be taken off and removed from it, so they which have felt the motions of God's Spirit, and have been in some measure mortified by it, freeze the soonest in the dregs and lusts of the flesh; and have their hearts extraordinarily hardened if once they forsake him, or so grieve him, that he cease to renew or continue his former motions. *But he that will give his heart to resort early to the Lord that made him,*



and will pray before the most High, and will open his mouth in prayer, and make supplication for his sins. When the great Lord will, he shall be filled with the spirit of understanding. Ecclus. xxxix. 5, 6. O how much better had it been for us to have had our hearts filled with this spirit, the spirit of comfort, than to have our dwellings, as now they are, possessed with grief and heaviness; and the whole people enraged with jealousies, with furious zeal and discontent! Now all this is come upon us for no one sin more, more for this one than for all the rest, I mean our negligence in frequenting the house of God at those times, or our ill employment of those vacant times, which authority had sequestered and set apart for solemn prayer and thanksgiving.

10. But here the reader will remember, and perhaps challenge me, either of forgetfulness or of breach of promise, for not discussing the third general proposed, which was, the exact limitation of these two propositions: *If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die—If through the Spirit ye do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live*<sup>h</sup>. My apology must be this: that having taken some more pains in this point than in the rest concerning mortification, I find the limitation so enwrappt with the true state of the question concerning election and reprobation, that I cannot touch the one but I must handle the other: and for this reason have deferred, not forgotten, the determination of the third point<sup>i</sup>, until I have finished what I have long conceived, of the points concerning election, reprobation, or predestination, points, as I have often intimated in public meditations, of more easy and facile resolution, than most other controversies in

<sup>h</sup> See above, p. 195.    <sup>i</sup> See the Appendix at the end of this book.

divinity, if so we would take these terms, *election*, *reprobation*, &c., as we ought to do, in their passive or concrete sense. But if we take them in the active or abstract sense, or as they are acts in God, their determination is to mankind, even to general councils, altogether impossible; yea to attempt this work is either an undoubted spice of phrenetical pride, or an infallible symptom of divine infatuation.

## CHAP. XXXVI.

*Containing the Scope or Sum of what hath been said concerning Freewill, and the Service of it in the Duty of Mortification.*

Needless  
speculations  
about  
freewill,  
&c., chief  
occasions of  
our negli-  
gence in  
good prac-  
tices.

I. THE utmost aim or final cause of all these former discussions was to make them an introduction unto the second part of the Knowledge of Christ and of him crucified, and of his resurrection from the dead, and sitting at the right hand of the Father; that is, in a word, how he doth set us free indeed from the servitude of sin and Satan. The second end, and most immediately subordinate to this purpose, was, to provoke or rouse up our spirits to shake off that slumber which hath possessed a great part of the Christian world, specially since those unfortunate controversies betwixt the Jesuits and Dominicans, and the like betwixt the Lutherans and the Zwinglians or Calvinists, set forth of late in a new dress between the Arminians and the Gomarists, have so contentiously been debated. The only issue of which debates amongst the learned hath been to bring their auditors or readers to a gaze or stand, and to cause them to make a sinister use of that maxim in law, *Lite pendente nihil fit*; whilst the controversy has been under debate nothing has been done, even in duties most

necessary to their salvation. Both parties, how great soever the disagreement betwixt them hath been, have agreed too well in this resolution, *aut otiosos esse, aut (quod pejus est) nihil agere*; “either to be altogether idle, or (which is worse) to take a great deal of pains to no purpose,” in reading much and resolving to do nothing, until the controversy betwixt grace and nature were fully determined, and the bounds or mere-stones betwixt God’s part and man’s part be set forth, that we might punctually know what he is willing or would be pleased to do, and what we may and ought to do, for working out our own salvation, or for being made *free indeed* by the Son of God.

2. The points useful for clearing this business are but two; and both of them have been handled before. The sum of the former in brief was this: What freedom of will may be conceived compatible with absolute servitude to sin and Satan? The answer in brief was this<sup>k</sup>: That without some portion of freewill, even in the natural and unregenerate man, all the admonitions given by our Saviour in the eighth of St. John’s Gospel unto the Jews, or afterwards by his apostles to both Jews and Gentiles, had been much better bestowed on brute beasts, whether wild or tame, nay even upon stocks and stones, than upon men. For the true reason why brute beasts or other creatures cannot be servants, is, because they are not endowed with reason, or (which is all one) with some freewill. Every civil servant or slave hath as free a will as his master hath, sometimes a great deal more free<sup>l</sup>. The essential difference betwixt them is this; that a servant hath no *liberum arbitrium*, no power or arbitrement to dispose of his own actions or employments according to his own freewill or choice, but according to the freewill

<sup>k</sup> See above, ch. 24.    <sup>l</sup> See the notes at the end of this chapter.



or appointment of his master. Briefly and more punctually thus: it were impossible there should be any such *servum arbitrium*, or true servitude unto sin, as Luther contended for, where there is not *libera voluntas*, such freedom of will as we now treat of. And this was all that Erasmus did conclude, or, I take it, did intend to make good against him. It was an oversight in Luther, and in most of his followers, (learned Chemnitius only excepted,) not to distinguish *inter liberum arbitrium et liberam voluntatem*<sup>m</sup>.

3. The second useful point is to know, What branch of freewill either the natural man before he come to profess Christianity, or Christian children baptized, are bound in the first place to exercise? To this the answer is easy, and hath already been given before<sup>n</sup>; That every Christian child, or other capable of being catechised, are in the first place bound to exercise that part of freewill whereby mankind is radically and primarily distinguished from brute beasts, that is, the freedom or power of reflecting upon their own thoughts or actions, or upon others' advice or counsel for casting off the yoke of servitude to sin. Now the greater impotency or want of power any man finds in  
 129 himself to set himself free, or to do well, the greater opportunity and better motives he hath to beseech God and the Son of God our Saviour Christ to set him free, and to enable him to do those things which being done he shall be set free. For the question is not, nor ever ought to have been made, Whether we have any freewill or power to make ourselves free? but, Whether we have a freewill or some ability to do those things which being done we shall be made free,

<sup>m</sup> Vid. Chem. Comm. in Melan. de Liber. Arbit. sive (ut Chemnitius agnoscit luculentio- rem esse titulum) de Viribus Humanis.  
<sup>n</sup> Chap. 25. and 29.



which being left undone, we have no hope or probable assurance that we shall be made free indeed by the Son of God ?

4. Let every one that is called a Christian, and is not ashamed of the cross of Christ, or of baptism in his name, account it an open shame or scandal both to his person and profession, either to deny or suspect that he hath not the same measure of freewill (or a greater) which Naaman the Syrian had when he came to the prophet. Now he had a true freedom of will or choice of hearkening or not hearkening to good counsel. The one branch he exercised in not obeying the prophet's command ; the other he practised in hearkening to his servant's advice or counsel. And it went better with him that he did so : for otherwise he might have gone home a more grievous leper than he came, and made himself incapable of the miracle wrought upon him by God alone. Let us likewise account it a shame to suspect, that we have not the same freedom of will which the widow of Sarepta had. Now she had a true freedom of will or choice, either to relieve or not to relieve the prophet out of her small store. If she had not relieved him, she and her child might have died for hunger within few days after. But she making choice of the better part of such freedom of will as she had, was with her child preserved alive by miracle. Let such as be servants to sin, as she was then, when the prophet came to her, use that portion of freewill which they have, either as well or not further amiss than she did hers : and the Lord, no doubt, will work as great miracles in and upon their souls, as he did upon her poor pittance of oil and meal. Let not any man that professeth himself the servant of Christ be more prone to tempt God by distrusting, than to try his goodness

by practising the like works of mercy and charity, as that poor widow did.

5. Even such amongst us as are most conversant and busiest in the meddling or marketway to gain or preferment, and by their several trades or callings which they have made choice of more obnoxious than other men are to the temptations of the prince of this world, will scorn to be suspected not to have as much freewill, or good nature, or as good affection towards Christ and his gospel, as the Roman soldiers or publicans had unto John Baptist's person, or his doctrine of repentance. And a freedom of will or ability they certainly have, as well to be contented with their wages or fees, and to deal conscionably, as to exact more than their due, or to oppress others by bribery, extortion, or unjust exactions. If they make choice of practising this latter branch of such freewill as they have, this is but to take earnest money to become hired servants unto mammon. If they make choice of that part of freewill which Zacchæus did practise, that is, to be charitable, liberal to the poor, and to make such restitution as he did, to those whom they have wronged; then they shall be made children of Abraham, or (which is more) true servants of God, and of Christ, "whose service is perfect freedom."

6. Again, albeit not many of us (scarce ten in any age since the apostles' times) have any freedom of will  
130 or ability to determine or examine the controversies  
about the power of grace and nature; about justification or election; yet even the meanest amongst us have a freedom of will, either to say or not to say their daily prayers or devotions; and a like freedom of will, to frequent or not to frequent the solemn prayers of the church, and to hear them either negligently or atten-

A brief rule  
for right  
stating the  
questions  
concerning  
the concu-  
rence of  
grace and  
freewill.

tively; and a capacity withal to understand the meaning of them, being expounded unto them by their ordinary pastors or catechists, whom I could wish to make this one special work of their function.

7. For conclusion, I shall commend to every reader's or teacher's meditations, that prayer of the church appointed to be read (amongst others) in the second service—"Prevent us, O Lord, in all our doings with thy most gracious favour, and further us with thy continual help, that in all our works begun, continued, and ended in thee, we may glorify thy holy name, and finally, by thy mercy, obtain everlasting life, through Jesus Christ our Lord." In the first part of this godly prayer we have the state of the question concerning the concurrence of grace and freewill, more pithily and more plainly set down, than in any controversy-writers, whether in the Romish or reformed churches. The sum is, that without God's preventing grace, or peculiar disposition of his favourable providence, we cannot do any good works at all, though but civilly or morally good, (as a learned Jesuit acknowledgeth,) nor any works spiritually good without God's assistant grace or gifts of the Spirit inherent in us. This is that which is in the same prayer better expressed by "the furtherance of his continual help." In the latter clause of the same prayer, "that in all our works begun, continued and ended in thee, we may glorify thy holy name, and finally by thy mercy obtain everlasting life," we have all, I am persuaded, that the Romish church would have said concerning the necessity of good works, whether unto salvation or justification; and all again that the Protestants have said, or can say, against the Romish church, concerning justification by faith only, without works. When we pray, that we may glorify God's name by our good works, this argues their ne-

cessity unto salvation, if not to justification. And when we pray, that after we have glorified God's name by our good works, we may attain everlasting life, by God's mercy in Christ, and through Christ; this is an argument most concludent, that we must not rely upon, or put our confidence in the best works which we do, though we do them continually, but in God's mercies and Christ's merits only. And this is the full and lively expression of our apostle's meaning, when he saith, *we are justified by faith in Christ alone*. Finally, let all of us remember this lesson, that when it is said, we are to renounce good works in the plea of faith, or all trust or confidence in ourselves, or in our merits or works; this must always be understood of the good works which we have done, not of the good works which we have left undone, much less of works which we have done amiss. We must, as our Saviour instructs us, Luke xiv. 26, and in many other places, deny ourselves and forsake all, before we can be truly his disciples. And we must be truly his disciples, before we can be made free by him indeed, as is apparent from the words of our Saviour heretofore recited, John viii. 36. Let us therefore beseech him which quencheth not smoking flax, and crusheth not a bruised reed, to plant in us good intentions, to grow by his assisting grace into good desires; and good desires, into firm and constant resolutions of doing that which is good and acceptable in his sight; and finally to crown our best endeavours wrought in us by his grace with everlasting life and glory, through his mercy in Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen, amen.

The end of chap. 36. and of the fifth section.



Notes relating to the preceding Chapters by the 131  
 Publisher of the folio edition, 1673.

THOUGH I hope the strong and learned will not boggle at those terms, *conversion moral*, *mortification moral*, in the thirty-first chapter; yet my heart misgives me, that they may be taken to scandal by some scrupulous but wellminded and pious reader. And therefore, though what follows (of the author's in that chapter, &c.) might well quiet such reader's mind, and ascertain him that there is no snake, nor other brood of the old serpent, latent under those herbs, yet shall I, out of my poor talent, contribute a poorer mite towards his satisfaction; though only by casting an handful of dust into the scale, which may make some addition to the number, none at all to the weight of what the author himself hath already there spoken to that point.

\* 1. We see what power art hath over nature as to materials inanimate: the potter over fowl clay; the cutter over hard stone; the carver or carpenter over knotty carcasses of trees, which the axe hath reduced to the capacity of stones; the finer and founder over ore and metals: first to work, prepare, and purify them; afterwards of them to make, at pleasure, vessels of honour or of basest use; to shape them into figures of beasts or men, (not to say of gods, though *κατὰ μίμησιν*, or equivocal <sup>a</sup> gods only; and yet hath besotted man adventured upon that contradiction also, Isa. xlv. 10, &c.) Which forms or new qualities introduced, (rather educed *e potentia materiæ sive naturali sive obedientiali*, or perhaps only discovered by the artist, who seems to add nothing to what was in the matter before,) give us cause to think, and say, there is a strange alteration, change, *tantum non* conversion, wrought in those subject materials. And now I have led the reader thus far out (if yet it be out) of his way, let me carry him one stonescast further; and it is to shew him Socrates' meditation, partly mixed of admiration<sup>b</sup>, at the singular care of artists, partly of indigna-

<sup>a</sup> Hor. Sat. I. viii. 1: Olim Maluit esse deum. Deus inde truncus eram ficulnus, inutile ego—  
 lignum, Quum faber, incertus <sup>b</sup> Diog. Laert. lib. 2.  
 scamnum faceretne Priapum,

tion at the strange negligence of men : that those should be so scrupulously careful to make their statues so like unto men, and that these should be no more careful lest by their own sloth they should become (as Theocritus calls them) *σύνκινοι ἄνδρες*, like unto statues. This consideration the satirist has improved, and fixed upon his gilded gallant, whom, having nothing good in him but his parents' blood, nor any thing like good about him but clothes, wealth, and relations, he thus taxes :

Hic petit Euphraten armis industrius : at tu  
 Nil nisi Cecropides truncoque simillimus Hermæ ;  
 Nullo quippe alio vincis discrimine, quam quod  
 Illi marmoreum caput est, tua vivit imago.

That poor man's virtuous thus, and so ; but you  
 Are mere sheer pedigree, Hermes' statue :  
 'Twixt which and you there's no other diff'rence  
 Save that it says nothing, you speak nonsense. Juv. viii. 51.

But though Mercury's statue, according to this account, had a little the worse, yet had Memnon's effigies something the better of him, at least if that was true which Tacitus (in second book of Annals) reports of it, that (*Radiis icta solaribus vocalem sonum reddidit*, in plain English, I dare not say, true) it spoke ; and if it did, we may not count the words less than Apollo's oracles.

132 \* 2. c A power equal to, rather greater than the former, hath industry and culture over the next rank of naturals—vegetables. This is seen in such effects as spring from the artificial modelling and qualifying of plants, far otherwise than they by nature were, or than, if left to themselves and let alone, they would have been. Art hath made barren trees fruitful, sour fruits sweet, and crooked plants straight. Art can form even these, (whose peculiar tendencies, till they be superseded, incline more powerfully than the former, quite another way,) into better resemblances or features, than nature, left to its course, would have produced. It can alter or better them so much from what they were or would have been, as may give us reason enough to give the same attributes of change, alteration, conversion, and that with more proper verification to these than to

c See the lord Verulam's Nat. Hist. cent. 6.

inanimates. And surely he that carefully reads the eleventh chapter to the Romans, and sees what use the Holy Ghost hath made of the art of ingrafting in general, (yet must it not, though much to our present advantage, be dissembled, that the metaphor is highly improved there, and that the antitype of ingrafting is supernatural or contrary to nature; as, that an evil scion should be inoculated into a good stock, and by virtue thereof be changed into the goodness of the stock; the practice of art being to graff a good scion upon an evil stock, which shall meliorate, overrule, and change the ill juice of the stock into the nature of the imp,) will not grudge such effects as are wrought by the art of ingrafting, to beentitled so.

\* 3. But what a largeness or latitude of power human industry hath over the memory, the imaginative and locomotive faculties of sensitives, is most abundantly manifest. 1. In the training of horses even to admiration, as hath been seen in our time. 2. Of oxen, as those at Susæ in Babylon, which after they had gone so often or so many turns for water, could not with strokes be forced to stir one foot more upon that account. 3. In the tutoring of elephants: Pliny in his Nat. Hist. lib. 8. c. 3. tells it upon the report of a credible Roman, that saw an elephant write a sentence of thirty or forty letters. Suetonius (in Galba) tells of a new show or sight, *elephas funambulus*—one that danced upon the rope. Seneca, Ep. 85, says, *Domitores feras docent pati jugum—usque in contubernium mitigant. Leoni manum insertat magister, osculatur tigrim custos, elephantem minimus Æthiops jubet—ambulare per funem.* 4. In the disciplining of <sup>d</sup>dogs: Plutarch says, that himself saw a dog at Rome imitate a mimus, (or mountebank,) counterfeiting a man taking poison, sickening, dying, and reviving at his just cues, all in a very punctual decorum. 5. Of fishes; to come when they are called by name, says Martial. The fingers-ends of the hand that writes this have been sucked by fishes used to be called and fed, to which they would come as fast as pigs or chickens. 6. In the rare teaching of birds (*ὥστε ἕπος ἐπείν*) to speak, *nostra verba conari; negatas sequi voces.* Bishop Jewel, part 2. fol. 126, truly cites Cælius Rodoginus' third book, ch. 32, reporting that cardinal

<sup>d</sup> Plutarch. de Solert. Animal. Ep. 30. l. 4.

Ascanius had a popinjay that could articulate the whole Apostles' Creed by rote or syllable. But of that power or command that man hath even over the very appetite of brute beasts, whether irascible or concupiscible, experiments are frequent. Besides what is above touched on out of Seneca, touching the cicuration—*Feræ mansuescere jussæ*, of the tiger and of the lion; the rare exchange of courtesies passed between Androclus and the lion, that made the people of Rome cry out, 'Lo, here the man that cured the lion, here the lion that entertained the man<sup>e</sup>!' may well go for an instance of a kindly conversion. *Leo homini homo*, is better far than *Homo homini lupus*. As that for the irascible, so this next for the concupiscible. The ravenage or voracity of dogs is such, that the exorbitance of a diseased appetite in man is therefrom denominated *caninus appetitus*. Out of it poets (wise men in their generations) frame proverbs:

133

Nec canis a corio unquam deterrebitur uncto.

Hor. Sat. II. v. 83.

———— Χαλεπὸν χορίων κύνα γεῦσαι.

— Καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὕπνοις πᾶσα κύων ἄρτως μαντεύεται. Theocrit.

Yea the word of God has made the proverb, *Canis ad vomitum*, canonical. Yet may the appetite of this creature, enormous even to a proverb, be so conquered and habited by nurture and custom, (rather desuetude,) that it shall have some lineaments of that temperance which the *pugiles* or *athletæ* of old used to maintain their bodies in pancratical plight for masteries at all points; and which St. Paul thought worthy his notice, and used as a motive to provoke Christians to practise in an heroical degree, and for attaining a crown incorruptible. Let Horace's verses go for a rule:

Militat in sylvis catulus venaticus, ex quo

Tempore cervinam pellem latravit in aula. Epp. I. ii. 67.

And let Lycurgus's practice go for an example<sup>f</sup>; who took two whelps of one litter, or, as some told it, one an hound, the other an house-cur: this latter he trained up in hunting; the hound-whelp he kept in the kitchen continually at trough: by

<sup>e</sup> See the story in Aul. Gellius, lib. 5. cap. 14.

<sup>f</sup> Plut. de Li-

beris Educ. et Lacon. Apoph.



which severalty of nurture the nature of this became wholly disprincipled, whereas the other's, by constant training and restraint was advanced unto a degree of generosity which naturally it had not. In short, as if they had changed strains, the cur became an hound, the hound turned cur perfectly. Now the effects of nurture in these (this inoculation of better sciences in animals) must have a name, and without harm, I hope, (rather better than both the former,) may pass under the title of an alteration, change, or turning. Or if these be thought terms too good, let it be called *a turkoising of sensitives*.

\*4. From these ascend we to the fourth rank of essences, the rational; which adds a diadem of excellency to the three degrees above mentioned, being an approach unto the nature angelical and divine. Now, 1, inasmuch as the human body partly agrees with the first rank of materials inanimate, so can art partly use it as it uses them; to frame (rather to modify the frame of) it into great variety: the head thus, the nose so, and other ductile parts, as is seen and read, after other fashions. 2. Art can do something to the body answerable to what gardeners do to plants. If our blessed Saviour's words, Matt. vi. 27, deny all possibility of adding procerity or tallness to the stature, yet, as the lord Verulam notes, to make the body dwarfish, crook-shouldered, (as some Persians did,) to recover straightness, or procure slenderness, is in the power of art. But, 3. much more considerable authority has it over the humours; either so to impel and enrage them, that like furious streams they shall dash the body (that bottom wherein the precious soul is embarked) against dangerous rocks, or run it upon desperate sands; or so to attemper and tune them, that they shall become like calm waters, or harmonious instruments for virtuous habits, introduced by wholesome moral precepts to practise upon. It is scarce credible what service the noble science of physic may do unto moral (yea to grace and Christian) virtue, by prescribing diet to prevent, or medicine to allay, the fervours and eruptions of humours of blood, and of that *irriguum concupiscentiæ*, or *ὁ τροχὸς τῆς γενέσεως*, especially if these jewels (their recipes) light into obedient ears. The rascal *Histriones*<sup>g</sup> amongst the heathen had the device

g Martial, Juvenal.

(of a fibula) to coerce lust; and this care they took to save their voices, not their souls<sup>h</sup>. The Athenian women, to keep themselves chaste against their Thesmophoria, did bestrew their beds with the herb *ἄγνος*, or *vitex*. Their professed athletæ did wear plates of lead upon their reins, to prevent the illusions of fancy, or blushful accidents of sleep. The Egyptian priests<sup>i</sup> abstained wholly from salt, as having in it an *urtica*, or incentive of salacity. Some religious single persons use *saccarum Saturni*, as a friend to chastity. Who knows not, that to be without apparel was not nakedness or shameful, till forbidden diet made it so? St. Austin notes, that *situs membrorum* shews *ordinem vitiorum*, sins of the belly beget sins of lust. *Monstrum esset libido sine gula*, says Tertullian. Wisely therefore did Pythagoras rank his precepts (of diet) in such order<sup>k</sup>:

Ταῦτα μὲν οὕτως ἴσθι, κρατέω δὲ ἐθίξω τῶνδε,  
 Γαστρὸς μὲν πρότιστα, καὶ ὕπνου, λαγνείης τε.  
 Εἰθίξου δὲ διαίταν ἔχειω καθάριον, ἄθρυπτον.

First watch thy belly, secondly thy sleep,  
 Thirdly thy lust. Pure thinning diet keep.

And this he kept himself, being of the primitive diet, abstaining wholly from flesh; and because of some resemblances, (which Lucian<sup>l</sup> takes notice of,) from some sorts of pulse also; for which, Horace, Sat. II. vi. 63, smiling, calls *fabæ Pythagoræ cognata*. This I suppose true; but if any man long to see it gainsaid, let him see what one Aristoxenus (had it been Philoxenus, that *gluto nobilis*, I should more have suspected it) says, in Aul. Gel. 4. c. 11.

All these forementioned helps of bettering nature are within her lowest and middle region of diet and medicine. Step we up into her third story, and see what remembrances we find there of those rare effects which moral precepts have wrought, (correspondent to inoculation in plants,) not only in towardly, but upon depraved inclinations, whose biases and corrupt bents have been so altered thereby, that their affections have

<sup>h</sup> Pliny, Nat. Hist. lib. 24. venter bene moratus. Sen. Ep. cap. 9. Dioscor. lib. 1. cap. 135. 123.

<sup>i</sup> Plut. Sympos. lib. 5. fine.

<sup>l</sup> In his Dialogue, called *Βίον*

<sup>k</sup> Magna pars libertatis est *πράσις*.

been taught<sup>m</sup> to hunt counter for pleasure, and seek delights in difficulties and duresses; to take contentment in denying themselves content; and with much pleasure to detest pleasure (that sorceress, which, as Aristotle observes, is born with us, incorporate and ingrained in us, being sucked in with our first milk), *despectare procul*, to look down upon it with scorn, as upon the covering of their feet, or an excrement of nature; to reckon it not only as a nullo or cypher that multiplied man's account, but as a mere vacuum or nothing. Καὶ γὰρ αὐτῆς τῆς ἡδονῆς καταφρόνησις ἡδυπάτη, said Diogenes. (Laert. lib. vi.) *Omnis voluptas pro nihilo deputanda est*, said Tully: and his reason is, *quod cum præterierit, perinde sit ac si nulla fuisset*.

I shall now prove this by instance; and that I may imitate nature, (which *non facit saltum*,) I will do it first in younglings, whose age defines them by appetite, they being but few degrees in nature removed from wild asses' colts. Plutarch (in Lacon. Apoph.) tells of a Spartan stripling that had stolen a (young thief or) fox-cub, which being sought and he searched, as it lay pressed within his clothes near his body, did so gnaw his bowels that he died on't. This the poor man (the nearness to his end and his great tolerance name him so) endured with all imaginable constancy, according to the discipline of his country, never the least quelching at it, saying, "It was better to die, than by crying to be discovered." Another, *ex eodem ludo*, fighting with his compeer, was by him wounded to the death; yet when he heard his friends threaten death to the killer, "O do it not," said he, "for it is unjust; I had a vney or bout for it, and the intent, though not the hap, to kill him." I expect to hear, both these did *uti bono animo in re mala*. Was not this virtue better placed than (at least in the general) in that child, whose office was, as I remember, at Alexander's solemn sacrifice, (to be *δαδοῦχος*, that is,) to hold a torch? The melted wax dropped, and burnt, and flamed upon his flesh somehow, yet did he

<sup>m</sup> —Gaudet patientia duris, tanta est improba Siren Desidia.—Hor. Sat. II. iii. 14.  
Lætior est quoties magno sibi  
constat honestum. Claud.—Vi-

(as his rules of reverence obliged him) endure this torment with such constancy, as that he never the least changed posture, nor, I think, colour for it.

Let us now look up higher, and take out some graver examples. Socrates confessed, to the wonder of all, that  
 135 Zopyrus the physiognomer said true, when he stigmatized rather than characterized him, (not to his credit, namely,) for a man of vile affections; “I was so inclined indeed,” said that saint and martyr of nature, “but philosophy, philosophy, that hath quite altered me.” Equal to this his chastity was his charity towards his accusers; but far above the ordinary size of that virtue with us. What one is there amongst the higher sorts of Christians, (as they be called and would be thought,) who, though not ignorant of the measure or purport of that glorious and holy name, that it not only carries an olive leaf in the mouth, but is wholly made up of oil, and signifies a man composed of honey and balm, of love and meekness; that does not, in point of self-revenge, bow down his soul to that most accursed principle of the first murderer, and of Cain his firstbegotten son in blood? yea, that would not think it a shame to be thought afraid or unwilling upon occasion to subscribe to it with his hand or sword in letters of blood, as it should be printed,

*Est vindicta bonum vita jucundius ipsa?*

Yet does the poor purblind ethnick satirist methinks heartily detest it, reason right against it, and prove it to be no better than the qualm or ferment of a female spirit:

*Nempe hoc indocti, quorum præcordia nullis  
 Interdum aut levibus videas flagrantia causis.  
 Quantulacumque adeo est occasio, sufficit iræ.  
 Chrysippus non dicet idem nec mite Thaletis  
 Ingenium dulcique senex vicinus Hymetto,  
 Qui partem acceptæ sæva inter vincla cicutæ  
 Accusatori nollet dare . . . . . Quippe minuti  
 Semper et infirmi est animi exiguique voluptas  
 Ultio. Continuo sic collige, quod vindicta  
 Nemo magis gaudet quam fœmina.*

*Juven. xiii. 180.*



" Sweet is revenge, sweeter than life itself !"  
 The rude assertion of some waspish elf,  
 Made all of tinder, touchwood, sulphur, ire,  
 Who at each puff or spark, fures, flashes fire,  
 And thunders out, " My right hand is my God ;  
 Vengeance is mine ; my sword's my iron rod,  
 Dubs myself judge, my will law ; right or wrong ;  
 Wounds ; blood ; kill or be kill'd ; hell heav'n's a song.  
 Bear an affront ? rather damnation !"

Chrysipp said no such word, nor Thales, nor  
 Saint Socrates, made all of honey ; for  
 Though he durst die, and smiling drink the cup of  
 Chill hemlock, yet durst he not wish one sup of  
 It in's accuser's heart ; good health to him  
 He drunk in cup of charity full brim.  
 Revenge is cow'rdice, below man. Revenge is  
 Th' abortive lust or longing of she-twinges.

And yet to do right to that sex, and in memory of a most tender mother, I know not whether Livia or Augustus deserved greater praise for a most solemn remarkable piece of pardoning mercy. Seneca<sup>n</sup> tells it curiously ; I thus: L. Cinna conspired against Augustus, who had not only forgiven the enmity of war, but regiven him his estate, and conferred honours upon him to the envy of his own party. The time, place, partners, manner of the plot, was discovered to Augustus, who intended to revenge it. Livia seeing him troubled, comes to him, saying, " Sir, will you once take a woman's counsel ? Then truly forgive him ; it may do you good ; the plot being 136 known, it cannot hurt you." Augustus thanks Livia for playing the advocate ; sends for Cinna, clears the room, and makes him sit down by him, enjoins him no other punishment, but with silence and patience to hear an excellent speech of above two hours long, setting forth his fault and Cæsar's mercy ; dismisses him with these words ; " I gave thee life before as an enemy, now I give it thee a traitor : let us henceforth be friends and vie *utrum ego meliore fide vitam tibi dederim, an tu debeas.*" This was partly the effect of that charm which Athenodorus gave Augustus against anger ; to say over the twenty-four letters<sup>o</sup>. I cannot forbear to mention

<sup>n</sup> De Clem. lib. I. cap. 9.

<sup>o</sup> See Seneca, de Ira, lib. 3.

an example or two more out of Seneca. 1. Among other Athenian ambassadors that came to Philip of Macedon, Demochares (for his ill tongue surnamed Parrhesiastes) was one. Philip treated them very benignly, asking them what courtesy they wanted that was in his power? Demochares, with most prodigious barbarity, unexpectedly answered, that Philip might do the Athenians a great kindness, if he pleased to hang himself. The hearers gnashed their teeth for indignation, but the king quieted them, and dismissed him safe, only bidding his fellows tell their masters of his courtly faculty in compliments. The second of Diogenes the Stoick<sup>p</sup>. He was reading a lecture about anger, when, lo, on a sudden comes in an impudent youth, and spits in his face; thinking perhaps to try whether himself had learned what he taught; as he had indeed, for, not moved at all, he said, “I am not yet, but I begin to doubt whether I ought not to be angry at this.” A third was Cato Minor, who when Lentulus in the face of the court most contumeliously spit in his face, said no more than this, *Affirmo, Lentule, fulli eos qui negant te habere os.* St. Basil, tom. 1. hom. 24, tells this of one Pericles: A circumforaneous base fellow railed on him bitterly for a whole day together; this he endured with much patience, and with more kindness lighted him home at night. 2. Of Euclid of Megara: A man in his rage swore he would kill him; he swore again, that if he did, he would take it patiently, forgive him, and be reconciled unto him. 3. Of Socrates, who having suffered a fellow with great patience to beat his face black and blue, did no more but lay upon the spots a paper inscribed *ὁ δέϊνα ἐποιεῖ*. This deed of his, says St. Basil, was *ἀδελφὸν*, near of kin to that duty enjoined by our Saviour, *To him that smites thee on the one cheek—*; as the former two to Christ’s other precept, *Do good to them that hate you—*. And sure from Socrates did Plato (in Crito) learn that axiom of peace, *Ὀυδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν, οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν*. “He has hurt himself in wronging me; I will not hurt myself by wronging him,” said Epictetus. <sup>a</sup>*Non ut in beneficiis honestum est, merita meritis repensare, ita injurias injuriis. Illic, vinci turpe est: hic, vincere. Inhumanum ver-*

<sup>p</sup> De Ira, lib. 3. cap. 38.<sup>a</sup> De Ira, lib. 2. cap. 32. Lips. not.

*bum est (et pro justo receptum) ultio.... Qui dolorem regerit, tantum excusatius peccat.*—Seneca.

Our next instance shall be Themistocles, the turpitude of whose youth was branded by his father's abdication of him, and executed by his poor mother's hanging herself for grief at his lewd courses; yet was this young man so reformed by philosophy, that he became the best blood of Greece: *Clarissimus virorum Graii sanguinis*, says V. Max. lib. 6. cap. 9; and the centre upon which did sway the reciprocating hopes and despairs of Europe and Asia. We mentioned before Pythagoras' rules for diet; those he laid as the grounds of moral virtue: upon these, with good success, he raised fair structures of justice and moderation, yea some *vaïdia* of religion too. That precept of his, *Σέβου ὄρκου*, "Fear an oath," made such an impression upon Clinias Pythagoricus, one of his scholars, that when, in a suit depending before the judges, he might, by taking a true and just oath, have freed himself from a fine of three talents, he chose rather to pay down the mulct, than by swearing truly to avoid it. He held not so much money so much worth as to call God to witness and judge about it. 137  
*Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus Inciderit*——. Whether every reader will think this worthy his notice, I know not; this I know, St. Basil thought it worthy his. See tom. i. hom. 24. De Legend. Libr. Gentil.

Another of his precepts was, *Μετὰ φωνῆς εὔχεσθαι*—"Let your prayers be vocal." I suppose he was not ignorant, that God could hear mental prayers, and that he considered not the angels, who can understand words, but not thoughts. His design then was—

Tollere de templis murmurque humilesque susurros. . . .

O si nunc patrum præclarum funus! et, O si

Pupilli! Nerio jam tertia ducitur uxor!—See Persius, Sat. ii.

to teach men to put up to God pure prayers; not such as they would shame that honest men, nay the vilest of men, should hear. *Quæ nisi seductis nequeas committere divis*—Such as were fit for none but devils to be of counsel or advocates in. Such as Horace, Epp. I. xvi. 60, detests, and derides thus:

..... Pulchra Laverna,  
 Da mihi fallere ; da sanctum justumque videri :  
 Noctem peccatis, et fraudibus objice nubem.  
 Laverna fair ! teach me the holy cheat ;  
 Though goat or wolf, to seem saint lamb, and bleat,  
 To gild sin, cloud or justify deceit.

In sum, his meaning was to teach men *aperto vivere voto*—so to speak to God as if men heard ; to which other philosophers have added another clause ; “ So speak to men as in God’s hearing.” Seneca Lipsii. Epist. 10. Macrob. Saturnal. lib. 1. And for this we have the authority of Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromat. lib. 4. fine. These for religion ; the next for justice.

Seneca, l. 7. de Benef. c. 21, has a story of a Pythagorean that had bought a pair of shoes upon trust, and at length coming to pay for them found the shoemaker dead, and the shop shut up ; whereupon he went home, shaking the money in his hand, and well pleased with the chink of it, as who should say, ‘ This is clear gain : ’ but lo suddenly his heart smote him for having joyed in such a poor but unjust thing ; back he speeds to the shop, says to himself, *Ille tibi vivit, tu redde quod debes* : and so put the money in through a crevice or the keyhole of the door, laying this, *nomine pænæ*, as a fine or amercement upon himself for his evil covetise, and to teach himself, *ne alieno assuesceret*, hereafter not to long for other men’s goods. Christian reader, look about, and find me such faith here in this our Israel.

And for matter of moderation, how happy his endeavours were, see Justin (20th book). The Crotonians being vanquished by the Locrians, desperately cast off all practices of virtue, military or moral ; and but for Pythagoras had been quite overrun with luxury. He having travelled through Egypt, Babylon, and Lacedæmon, and learnt the laws of Minos, Lycurgus, &c., did, with them, and his own authority added to them, so indefatigably ply that people, that at last, what by praising frugality as the mother of all virtue, what by inveighing against luxury, and numbering the sad examples of cities destroyed thereby ; exhorting sometime the graver sort of women to modesty and dutifulness, sometime their youth to



soberness and industry ; prevailed so much by this assiduity of discoursing, that the women were persuaded to leave off all wearing of gold, to cast away all their ornaments of dignity as filthy ensigns of luxury, to bring them all into Juno's temple, and there consecrate and leave them. Their youth also he reduced to an excellent temper, as may be collected from the cure he wrought upon the women whom he taught to forget their beloved ornaments. And here I cannot forbear but I<sup>138</sup> must appeal to my reader, and ask him sadly and seriously, whether he thinks that if St. Chrysostom or St. Austin were now here alive again upon earth, and should desire him to pick out and point unto them the best (as he thought) of those our cities that most flagrantly profess Christianity, wherein they might hope with most probability of success to attempt the like cure of vanity either in women or men, he could promise those holy fathers any hopes that they should speed so well amongst Christians as Pythagoras did amongst the Crotonians. Whether he thinks, that at this time, this juncture, or rather this fracture of time ; when at God's chiding the springs of water are seen, the foundations of the world are discovered ; when his wrath being kindled, yea not a little, he hath stained the pride of glory, and still *calls aloud to weeping, and to mourning, and to baldness, and to girding with sackcloth*, Isai. xxii. 12 ; when spots, and paint, and powder, glorious and strange array, seem to be as ominous to men, as the gilded horns and ribbons were to the white oxen that were suddenly to be sacrificed, they could persuade any ten wanton young men but to observe that rule of the apostle prescribed women—*whose adorning, let it not be that outward of plaiting hair, wearing gold, or donning apparel, but the dress of the inner man, the heart and spirit, with ornaments of grace* ? Or any five daughters of Zion, that walk (according to Ovid's rule) with stretched out necks, to cover themselves decently, (as those fathers should judge, or as themselves or their mothers had judged sometime decent,)—though they should be allowed to do it with the most precious riches of the east, silk and pearl, and the gold plate of Uphaz ? Yet was affected curiosity of hair and dress in men so monstrous, even in the sight of that monster of mankind Caligula<sup>r</sup>,

<sup>r</sup> Seneca, de Ira, lib. 2. c. 33.

that he put a young gentleman to death for it, *Munditiis ejus, et cultioribus capillis offensus*. And nakedness so odious in the sight of modest heathen women, that Clemens Alexand., Strom. l. 4, reports it in praise of a certain *mulier Lysidica*, who, δι' ὑπερβολὴν αἰδοῦς, used to go into the bath with her clothes on.

And yet I fear, (or fancy) some reader that could not do this, would grudge to allow the Crotonian reformation the honour to be styled *a moral conversion*. Will he then allow that title to our next instance? which I will commend, that though few do imitate, yet some may admire it. It is of Polemo<sup>t</sup>, the debauched Athenian ruffian, *Perditæ luxuriæ adolescens*, says Val. Max. l. 6. c. 9, who upon a time having made an end of his accustomed all-night revels by that time of the morning that Xenocrates was at his moral lecture in the schools, and having occasion, as it fell out, to pass that way, struck into the school, with design rather to jeer and affront the grave philosopher, now busy at lecture, than to learn any thing of him. He seeing Polemo come in such a pickle as a *pernox convivator* must needs be, and besides, in a prodigious equipage and garb of luxury, crowned with rosebuds, and hung with all the imaginable fanes, labels, and swaddling-bands of fancy, composed his countenance to the utmost dimensions of gravity, removed his discourse (whereupon he was when Polemo came in) into the theme of temperance; and this he pursued with so much sweetness, power, and eloquence, (without taking any notice of him, whom he most thought on,) that this younker began first to startle as one waked out of a trance, then to look up towards Xenocrates as soberly as he could; next, he stole his garland off his head, and laid it from him; after that, he pulled his arms in under his cloak, and other ways expressed what effect that morning lecture had upon him; in sum, he went out of the school a clean other man, *mutatus Polemo*, changed even to a proverb, and turned so constant a student and good proficient in morality, that he succeeded his master in his school.

139 ..... *Hic vir, hic est quem quærimus*; but where shall we find the like amongst Christians? An hundred of our

<sup>t</sup> See S. Aug. tom. 7. lib. 1. Ep. 130. and more places, where contr. Julian, cap. 7. and 4. and he takes notice of Polemo.

sorry lectures scarce produce one such convert, I mean *like and such* in proportion to the means of grace tendered in Jesus Christ.

..... quæro, faciasne quod olim  
Mutatus Polemo, ponas insignia morbi,  
Fasciolas, cubital, focalia, potus ut ille  
Dicitur ex collo furtim carpsisse coronas,  
Postquam est impransi correptus voce magistri ?

Hor. Sat. II. iii. 253.

This cure Xenocrates wrought upon another (upon many disadvantages); but you will ask, perhaps, had the physician healed himself? Yes, it seems he had got an excellent *magisterium*, or ἀγιστικὸν, against that epidemical putrid hereditary disease of mankind, lust. Phryne (that *nobile scortum Atheniense*, as Val. Maxim. l. 4. c. 3. calls her) had laid a wager with some of her customers, that she would conquer Continence and this philosopher both at once. To him she comes at an opportunity not ordinary, when the man was *bene potus*, (perhaps this signifies not what ill it sounds, but only plenitude,) uses all the immodest arts and modes she had to allure him; it may endanger the modesty of some sort of readers to write what she did, though it moved him no more than a dead man; in short, she did tempt him to the utmost; yet was not he tempted, but received this testimony of chastity, from harlotry itself—that he was invincible.

I presume the objection, that this was a natural deadness, no mortification moral; a cold palsy fit of age, no voluntary continence. I say, then, 1. They be weak authors that report it to us, and so admire it themselves. 2. Sure, they were both wiser and honester, than to commend unto posterity impotency instead of exemplary virtue. 3. He seemed as free from the proper vice of old age, as from that of youth. Plutarch tells it of him, that he refused fifty talents sent him by Alexander the Great †, with this excuse or reason returned, Διὰ φιλοσοφίαν Ξενοκράτης οὐκ ἔδειτο πλούτου—Philosophy had taught him, not to contract or amass wealth, but to shrink up his desires.

So had it taught others: 1. Crates, the rich and noble Theban, who cast two hundred talents of silver into the sea;

† 1. Orat. de Fort. Alex. M.

or as some say, into the common bank, upon condition, that if his sons were idiots, they should have it again <sup>u</sup> : if philosophers, he reckoned they would not need wealth, and then it should be given to the people. This same Crates, when Alexander asked him if he would have his country repaired, said, No ; another Alexander would come and spoil it again : but he had a country *ἀνάλωτον τῇ τύχῃ*, built upon poverty and contempt of honour, which none could impair. 2. Aristippus, who, though none of the strict ones, is said to have cast his gold into the sands of Libya :

..... Quid simile isti

Græcus Aristippus, qui servos projicere aurum

In media jussit Libya, quia tardius irent

Propter onus segnes?..... *Hor. Sat. II. iii. 99.*

3. So had philosophy taught Epicurus himself. For though he kept his estate, (thinking that Pythagoras<sup>x</sup> community was a sign of diffidence, not of friendship,) and very handsomely disposed of it by will after death ; yet was he content with so small a proportion (the total of his pleasure in a manner consisting of a garden, and freedom from pain), that Juvenal thought his *quantum* worthy to be made the standard of moderation or competency :

..... Mensura tamen quæ

Sufficiat census, si quis me consulat, edam :

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In quantum sitis atque fames et frigora poscunt.

Quantum, Epicure, tibi parvis suffecit in hortis,

Quantum Socratici ceperunt ante penates.

*Juvenal, Sat. XIV. 316.*

And well he might propose him for an example ; for Laertius says, that this man, so defamed through all the world for a beast, was content with bread and water for the first, and with cheese for the second course. And Stobæus brings him in bragging of the luscious pleasure he found in such cheer : *Βρῦάζω τῷ κατὰ σωματίον ἡδεῖ, ὕδατι καὶ ἄρτῳ χρώμενος. ....* So does Seneca, Epist. 2, quote him triumphing and pronouncing, *Honesta res est læta paupertas*. And beside other great store of such wholesome senses of his, stuck thick in many other

<sup>u</sup> Diog. Laert. lib. 6.

<sup>x</sup> D. Laert. lib. 10.



epistles, in the 18th and 20th he exhorts Lucilius—*imaginaria paupertate se exercere ad veram; redigere se ad parva unde cadere non possit; præoccupare tela fortunæ*—to set apart three or four, or more days together for fasting, and to do it in good earnest, with so slender and coarse fare, and coarser clothing—*ut non sit lus, sed experimentum. Liberaliora ut sint alimenta carceris*<sup>y</sup>—that a gaol could not worst him. In a word, so to bear himself, to descend so low, that fortune itself, doing its worst, could not pinch him; but that he might with the plain wise man Ofellus, who it seems had endured (*dura belli*) all the consequences of war, challenge her and say,

Sæviat atque novos moveat Fortuna tumultus;  
Quantum hinc imminuet? quanto aut ego parcius, aut vos,  
O pueri, nituistis, ut huc novus incola venit?

*Hor. Sat. II. ii. 126.*

And all this he does from the precepts of divers noted men, and from the monthly practice of some others, and amongst these of Epicurus, who had such set days of fasting. *Certos habebat dies ille magister voluptatis Epicurus, quibus maligne famem extingueret.....non toto asse pasceretur.....* And as his life, so his death seems to have been a very calm: for lying, *in officina voluptatis*, in torments of the stone ready to expire, after fourteen days' patience, he writes to Idomeneus, *Beatissimum hunc et ultimum diem ago.....*

To conclude; if Plato's philosophy<sup>z</sup> was as it pretended, an assimilation to God, it was a moral conversion, or furbishing up of the poor relicks of God's image remaining in the conscience of the natural man. If it was a meditation of death, it was a moral mortification. Now whether this was a main branch both of his and others', I refer myself to their books, especially to Seneca's, which have whole swarms of good advisements, such as these<sup>a</sup>: *Magna res est, et diu discenda, cum adventat hora illa inevitabilis, æquo animo abire. Tu mortem, ut nunquam timeas, semper cogita*, Ep. 30, which in sanctified translation

<sup>y</sup> Seneca, Epp. 66. and 92.  
Laert. lib. 10.

<sup>z</sup> Bonum tuum quid? Animus purus, æmulator Dei....  
Seneca, Ep. 124.

<sup>a</sup> Epict. Arrian. lib. 2. cap. 14.  
κατὰ δύναμιν ἐξομοιοῦσθαι θεοῖς.  
Ὡς θεοῦ ζῆλωτὴν πάντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν.

is, 'He that will not fear death must die daily.' *Quando dabitur omnibus oppressis affectibus hanc vocem emittere vici? quem vicerim quæris? non Persas.....sed avaritiam.....metum mortis, qui victores gentium vicerit.* Sen. Ep. 71.

Let there be no strife about words or names. Till we have agreed to coin better new ones, let us keep the old. *Conversion* is a kind of protean term, fitted in various analogy to logic, physics, ethics, not appropriate to theology, and may in good equity be predicated on some of the foreinstanced moral changes. So may *repentance*. *Non tanti emam pœnitere*, said Demosthenes. *Quem peccasse pœnitet pene est innocens*, says Seneca the tragedian. *Scelerum si bene pœnitet, Eradenda tibi sunt prava cupidinis elementa*, says Horace <sup>b</sup>. Μετάνοια, τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀρχή, saith Hierocles. It cannot be denied but some of the aforesaid acts were acts of self-denial, actual forsaking all. Ulysses' tying himself to the mast (or the moral of it) methinks is a kind of taking up his cross: yet should I not dare to call it so, but that the phrase *σταυρὸν ἐκφέρειω* is used in Plutarch. de Sera Num. Vindicta.

Nor is *mortification* a term peculiar to divinity. There is a  
 141 vicious mortification; to kill or cast out one vice by another, more contrary to God's law than to itself: as prodigality with covetise; libertinism with schism; presumption with despair: and, *e contra*, so a less vice with a greater; as to put off pride in apparel, and clothe ourselves with spiritual pride; to dead the appetite and quicken the affections: as some weeds or vermin destroy others; and devils will go out upon compact. *Qui in agone decertant ab omnibus continent, ut corruptibilem coronam accipiant; a cujus tamen vana cupiditate non continent.* *Hæc enim cupiditas vana ac per hoc prava, vincit in eis, et frænat alias cupiditates, propter quod dicti sunt continentes.*—S. Austin <sup>c</sup>. There is a superstitious mortification: such, or worse, a degree of *suicidium*, was Baal's priests cutting and lancing, and such like as is said to be used still by some, not Christians, in remote parts: such is that of some few Christians, who think they do God service in making the body unserviceable. St. Paul's practice was, 1. ὑποπιέζειν τὸ σῶμα,

<sup>b</sup> Carm. III. xxiv. 50.

<sup>c</sup> Tom. (7) 10. lib. 4. c. 3. cont. Jul. §. 18.

to take all fair hold or advantage, to throw and keep it down, (as wrestlers do the bodies of their adversaries,) lest *iniquitas calcanei* danger to supplant us in our race for the prize; and, 2. δουλαγωγεῖν—to make the body tributary or servant; yet so, that the brute might have the use, not the excess of his master's crib; might be strong to labour, though not to lust. But far more, God knows, are *ventris mancipia*, slaves that pay tribute of all creatures in kind to their belly; χαλεπῶ δεσπότη φόρους ἀπάγοντες, as St. Basil says, Hom. 24.

And subservient to St. Paul's end, there is a medicinal mortification. Narcotics in this kind might be useful. Any bodily pain (*dolor*) is a good physical help against ordinary paroxysms of lust. So is labour, or taking pains, *Otia si tollas*.....  
 Ἐρως σχολαζόντων ἀσχολία, said Diogenes; and if love be the business of holyday men, or idle persons, honest employment is a fit pin to drive it out.

Lastly, there is a moral mortification by rules of reason; for surely reason is not disenabled by being a *forma informans*, or in the same soul and subject with sense; that it cannot master the lower soul in man, as well as it can do the appetite of brutes, where, at best, it resembles but an assistant or external form.

I have yet one thing to do, and that is, to amolish the suspicion of praising, much more of vending, what has been long abroad, such spoiling philosophy as in its essence includes enmity to the ineffable and free saving grace of God in Christ Jesus. My answer to them that examine me anent that point is this: If the apologizer offend, who will make a defence for him? If I build up what I pretend and ought to destroy, I make myself a double transgressor; having as bountifully as many others been offered, and daily needing more extraordinary influx of grace than any other does. Lord, keep thy servant from pride and presumptuous sins.—He that once dares say with Mezentius, *Dextra mihi deus est*, or the Epicurean porker, *Animum æquum mi ipse parabo*—“My own right hand shall bring salvation”—will soon fall from one wickedness to another; from trust in himself, to deny or defy God; into an impudent mind or giant-like temper, to cry, as Seneca says





the light of nature, which like glowworms made some show in the night : in Tertullian's hyperbole, *Testimonia animæ naturaliter Christianæ*<sup>e</sup>. Dictates or notions of conscience, the human spirit or lamp of the Lord, *satisfac conscientiæ, non famæ, sequatur mala dum bene merearis*, Sen. de Ira, l. 3. c. 41. These Egyptian jewels were ornaments to the persons that wore them, and worth our borrowing and polishing, and consecrating towards the adorning of the tabernacle. They had some good influence upon the generations and communities where they were acted. And as they were not effected without God's good providence, (as St. Austin observes<sup>f</sup>, that all the various dispositions or temperaments of men are not,) so they passed not without some notice taken by his bounty, or temporal reward given them by God ; and at the great day of recompenses shall have considerable allowance or abatement, as to degrees of punishment ; *Minus enim Fabricius quam Catilina punietur, non quia iste bonus, sed quia ille magis malus ; et minus impius, quam Catilina, Fabricius, non veras virtutes habendo, sed a veris non plurimum deviando*<sup>g</sup>. So St. Austin. And Mr. Hooker of Cambridge has, to my remembrance, a very sad saying to that purpose, and not to be gainsaid ; "The pagan and the philosopher shall have a cool summer parlour in hell, in comparison of the debauched Christian." But we have a surer word of the great Prophet—It shall be more easy for Sidon and Sodom, two sinks of sin, than for Chorazin and Capernaum, two despisers of grace. O that we could believe what strange unconceivable confusion will seize upon the Belial Christian, when he shall see the queen of the South and men of Nineveh condemn the Jew ; and hear the Pythagorean and Epicurean (impanelled into one jury) sentence the graceless vile Christian ! When we shall see Christians damned, for cheating one another, out of Tully's Offices ; and subtle seraphical scholars for ill manners sentenced without book out of the law written in the hearts of analphabet idiots ; when it would be counted a favour, far above Dives' desire, if God would grant it, *sit anima mea cum philosophis*. All which, in effect, shall be, if we be not more free from vice, or not better virtued, than these forementioned philosophers

<sup>e</sup> Apol. c. 17.<sup>f</sup> Contra Jul. Pelag. lib. 4. cap. 3.<sup>g</sup> Ibid.

were, whose works, as they were done and raised up, so are their writings preserved by God's providence to yield us provoking examples to imitate, and by the help of God's grace to outstrip and excel. The Pharisees were fasters, prayers, sabbath-keepers, abhorred idols, tithed strictly, and I think revered the sanctuary; far, I am sure, far excelled the  
 143 ethick heroes; yet, except the righteousness of us Christians exceed theirs, our portion shall be with those hypocrites, as theirs was with others.

And that we may the better know what we have to excel, take notice, that some heathens were excellent, did their work, *cum intuitu*<sup>h</sup>, with an eye to God, though Θεῶ ἀγνώστῳ, and to the immortality of the soul. And they that sometimes doubted of both, reasoned well. "I will reckon that the soul is immortal," said Tully; "that is the surest way. If it be so, I shall meet the mortalist, and tell him he was deceived; if it be not, he shall never tell me so." "Either there is a God, or Democritus' atoms," said Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. "If there be a God, his providence will take care of me and the rest of the world; I will depend upon him. If nothing but chance, who would care for such a world, where all things fall out at adventure?" Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 4, wonders at Epicharmus' expression: "With the pure soul it shall go well after death."

And as to the particular end, many of their actions were right. S. Aug. t. 3. de Spir. et Lit. c. 27<sup>i</sup>, says, There were some facts of the heathen, *quæ secundum justitiæ regulam non solum vituperare non possumus, verum etiam merito recteque laudamus*. S. Jerom. in Ep. ad Gal. cap. 1. says more, that some were done *vel sapienter vel sancte*. As, to honour parents, give alms, do as they would be done to. *Non tamen hæc tribuens dederim quoque cætera.....* I must take heed, lest, while I do these virtues civil right, I sacrilegiously wrong the grace of God. I therefore (yet protesting my loathness to judge those that are without, especially in any thing that looks like goodness) thus tax these gentile virtues: 1. They were sick of divers privative defects. The spring was foul, (not

<sup>h</sup> Arr. Epict. lib. 1. c. 14: Shut doors! draw curtains! ye are not alone. God is within. <sup>i</sup> See Voss. Hist. Pelag. lib. 3. part. 3.

washed with the water that issued out of Christ's side,) not purified by faith; which is the *πρώτη σωτηρίας νεύσις*, in his <sup>k</sup>judgment who is held one of the Gentiles' best friends; faith, animated and acting by love. Some of their love was but a kind of *dilectio Babylonica*, as St. Austin says. That which made the *Decii mori pro patria*, was (not charity inspired *ἄνωθεν, ἀλλ' ἐπίγειος*) but sucked from the breasts and sweetness of their native soil. Some of their virtues were *hybridae*, spurious mongrels, begot by vices. St. Austin says, Covetise made some prudent, temperate, valiant, industrious, *per mare pauperiem*.....<sup>1</sup>, yea in some things just; some, but apes of true virtue, like the circumcision used by nations not in covenant. Some were monstrous, made up of contradictions to their own rules. Diogenes was content with a little, yet held sacrilege lawful, and man's flesh man's meat: like rowers, they looked one way and went another. 2. Mostly they fell short of the end—the great universal right end—God's glory. Those few that aimed at any mark above the moon did but feel after the most conspicuous Being whose invisibilities are manifest.

As many of their eyes were dim, so few were single, or of right intention; yet, by the by, some thought of schooling the eye, or making a covenant with it. Pericles rebuked Sophocles for an eye full of adultery, when he gazed upon strange beauty, *oculos etiam castos habere decet*<sup>m</sup>. 2. As they were faulty in their principle and end, so were they in their rule. They did things of the law not legally; good not well: *ἂ δεῖ οὐκ ὡς δεῖ*. Alas! they were a law to themselves, *non taliter omni genti*—they had not the knowledge of God's law. The consequence is plain, their *bona* were not *beatifica*. Their labours do not follow them, so that these men shall be blest in their doings. I know it is said usually, They were but *splendida peccata*. I shall not say they were *ὄλως φαῦλα*, because I think otherwise; nor shall I contradict it, because use has given authority to say so.

This I shall say though, that we Christians have both infinite obligation and encouragement, to maintain, to be cheerful and

<sup>k</sup> Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 2.    <sup>1</sup> Cont. Jul. lib. 4.    <sup>m</sup> Val. Max. lib. 4. c. 3.



144 ready to every good work, to abound in the work of the Lord, knowing that our labour is not in vain in the Lord: that not a cup of cold water, (sans cost of fire, only warmed with charity,) not a thought or wish that springs out of a pure heart, shall lose its reward. Knowing the miraculous nature of faith, that like a spiritual elixir, it transforms the lowest act of drudgery that the poor moor of the kitchen can do in fear of God and obedience to man, into an acceptable remunerable divine sacrifice°.

Now for a close to this long note, I will but name two or three of our Christian worthies, which will not commend us of this present age; but will shine all these twinkling stars of ethnick glories into night, and shame and shrink them into nothing. For number they be none in comparison of our Christian calendar: every day in the year, except the kalends of January, having, I think, more martyrs than the stories of all ages have noted philosophers. Against the three youths instanced above, p. 271, I put in the scale: 1. Epagathus, that young noble advocate of Christians, and martyr. 2. Origen, who within the years of childhood was martyred *in voto*: and when his mother kept him naked to keep him alive, encouraged his father, by pen, to suffer p. At eighteen years old was catechist at Alexandria. And as all the world knows, cut off his right foot for the kingdom of heaven. 3. Ponticus, a youth of fifteen, bitterly tormented. I could cast in Attalus, with his iron chair; Maturus and Sanctus, (men of their own names,) tortured and beheaded. And women too: Potamiæna, Blandina, Biblis, and St. Basil's forty martyrs, in a severe frost put into a pond, and then burnt. Holy Barlaam outvies the torchbearer in kind. Val. Max. l. 3. c. 3, says he held a censer, and that a coal burnt his flesh till it smelt. St. Basil, in his homily of him, says that St. Barlaam let the incense, by violence put in, burn and drop through his hand, and would not shake it off, lest he might seem to do it to the idol. Against Polemo's, set St. Austin's conversion, and the three thousand at one sermon of a poor fisherman's. Against Xenocrates' chastity, set Joseph's and Ephræm Syrus', who being tempted by a woman, untempted her thus: "Carry me,"

° See Herbert's poems. The Elixir. P Euseb. lib. 5. c. 1. 10. lib. 6. c. 2.



said he, "into such a place," naming the open market-stand in the city of Edessa, where this fell out, "that all the world may see what we do, else I shall not consent to your desire." The woman startling at this, and answering, that it would be an open shame to do such a thing in the sight of men <sup>p</sup>; the holy man replied, If she was afraid of the eyes of men, how much more ought she to fear and shame to do it in the sight of God! which correction of his made such an impression upon the woman, that she of a concubine became a convert. See here a ζωγραφία, a live draught of virtues. The other was only, as St. Basil terms it, σκιαγραφία τῆς ἀρετῆς, yet such a shadow as may be to us beneficial; and compared to the new light of our modern good works, is a pillar of fire.

The second note relating to p. 230. "Some actions are required in us, that grace may be created in us." I might save myself a labour of saying any thing to this point, by referring my reader to this author's soul-searching treatise of Justifying Faith, vol. iii. sect. 3. p. 378 <sup>q</sup>, where he shews, that this belief of ours, 'That faith is the sole gift of God, wholly infused, not in part acquired by us,' should rather quicken than quell Christian endeavours for attaining it; as this belief, that God alone infuses the soul into the embryo, encourages them that intend to be parents (according to the tenor of psalm cxxviii, appointed by our church to be used at marriages) to enter the holy estate and ascend the undefiled bed. And the comparison suits well, thus: As God, who can raise children from the rock, does not infuse the rational soul into stones and statues, but into organized bodies; so doth he not ordinarily bestow grace on every reasonable soul, but on such only as have a passive idoneity thereto. And as those parents, upon whose offspring depends the nursing <sup>145</sup> of God's people, are tied to be more cautious than others; even so they that attribute the most to that fundamental grace of faith, (none can give enough to it; the solifidian that gives it most in words, in deeds takes most from it,) are most obliged to teach men to use all possible means to seek the best instruments of believing, planters, waterers, helpers of faith; above all, to

<sup>p</sup> See St. Greg. Nyss. in vita S. Ephr.

<sup>q</sup> And to his treatise of Unbelief, §. 6. ch. 49, 50. vol. iv. p. 403.

sue to God to give the increase: to cheer men up *to work out their salvation with fear and trembling, because it is God that works both will and deed*<sup>r</sup>.

Yet shall I add *de proprio*, a word to those that have scarce the patience to hear of any thing prereduced in man unconverted, that grace may be created in him. My argument with such an adversary is this: Let us take a Polemo, that is, *pro tempore, a ganeo; non tantum illecebris, sed ipsa infamia gaudens*. Upon this man, we desire the work of the Lord by our ministry may be prosperous. We must either tell him that there is something required of him in this present state, unconverted as he is, and so set him a task, or that nothing at all is expected from him. These two be points contradictory diametrically, there is no mean betwixt them. I say, that of this man something is required. The first, *minimum quod sic*, is reflecting upon his own actions, and the law writ in his conscience. Next I would apply some of God's words, spoke by the prophets to some sinful people or person, as, Isaiah i. 16, 17—*Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings; cease to do evil; learn to do good*: or that of St. James iv. 8: *Draw nigh to God. Cleanse your hands, ye sinners; and purify your hearts, ye double minded*<sup>s</sup>—and would affirm, that these words signified something, were (not empty noises, but) precepts; and if precepts, have some duty correspondent to be performed by him to whom I laid them; which is *quod quærimus*, that I would have done. My adversary must say, Nothing is to be done; it is no purpose for me to exhort, or him to try, nothing can be done to purpose. Now what will the poor patient say? men are naturally inclined to believe them that most ease, and please their natures best. The least consequent of this doctrine that he will or can make—and that if he were a good natured man too—will be this; 'Why then I will betake myself to a negative idleness, wrap my body in my arms, sit still, and wait the good hour when grace shall breathe upon me.' A second will say, 'Go to then, I will eat my meat with joy, and take my portion of the things of this life, till tastes of a better

<sup>r</sup> Philipp. ii. 13.

<sup>s</sup> Or I would read to him Ezekiel xviii.

drop into my mouth from heaven.' A third may perhaps do worse; wend to a tavern or worse place, and make work for grace, with a graceless desperate hope, that the more he sins, the more grace may, when it comes, abound; that *quo sceleratior eo gratiæ vicinior*. If my adversary says, 'Nay, he must abstain from lewd courses;' we are half agreed: is not that part the same with Isaiah's, *Cease to do evil?* If he maintain his conclusion, I have no more to say, but to enter an appeal to God, and this protestation to man, according to the sense of this author; That I disclaim all such dispositions, preparations, endeavours, as cooperating to the production of grace after the manner that temperate behaviour concurrerth to produce the habit of temperance, or that natural qualities do to produce forms merely physical. And this will quit me from Pelagianism or popery; but he shall never be able to free himself from the errors of the Stoick or Manichees, that holds it indifferent what works a man does before he be regenerate.

The third note refers to pag. 242, "As a heathen man confesseth." I conceive he means Pliny junior, and therefore I have caused that 26th Epist. of his 7th book to be inserted here, being loath to charge the margin with it there. *C. Plinius Max. suo S.: Nuper me cujusdam amici languor admonuit, optimos esse nos, dum infirmi sumus. Quem enim infirmum aut acaritia aut libido sollicitat? Non amoribus servit, non appetit honores, opes negligit, et quantulumcunque, ut relicturus, satis habet. 146 Tunc deos, tunc hominem esse se meminit: invidet nemini, neminem miratur, neminem despicit, ac ne sermonibus quidem malignis aut attendit, aut alitur: balinea imaginatur et fontes ..... Innoxiam beatamque destinat vitam. Possum ergo, quod pluribus verbis, pluribus etiam voluminibus philosophi docere conantur, ipse breviter tibi mihique præcipere, ut tales esse sani perseveremus, quales nos futuros profitemur infirmi. Vale.*

The fourth note relates to p. 259, "Every slave hath as free a will as his master: oft a great deal more free ....." Seneca, l. 3. de Beneficiis, c. 18—20, has a deal to this purpose<sup>t</sup>: *Errat, si quis existimat servitutem in totum hominem*

<sup>t</sup> See Macrob. Sat. lib. 1. c. 7.

*descendere : pars melior ejus excepta est ; corpus adscriptum domino, mens sui juris, libera, comes caelestibus exeat.* Epist. 31. *Animus bonus, Deus in humano corpore. Hic tam in servum potest cadere, quam in Rom. equitem. Quid eques Rom., quid libertinus, quid servus? nomina ex ambitione aut injuria nata.* And Epist. 47: *Ego non ministeriis servos æstimabo, sed moribus. Servus est ; sed liber animo. Servus est ; imo conservus. Servus est ; quis non? alius libidini servit, alius avaritiæ, ambitioni alius. Dabo consularem, aniculæ servientem ; divitem ancillulæ : nobiles juvenes mancipia mimorum : superbos osculantes manus servorum alienorum. Stultus ..... Equum empturus stratum tantum et frænos ..... Stultissimus qui hominem ex conditione quæ vestis est, æstimat.* The Spartan youth used this freedom preposterously, when stomaching the disingenuity of his master's command, (to give him an urinal,) he went up to the garret and threw himself headlong. Diogenes<sup>u</sup> asserted this liberty even while he was a prisoner to the pirate Scirpalus, and in Crete upon sale to Xeniaades, the fine Corinthian, εὐπάρυφος, whom he desired to be sold unto ; saying, (for so he guessed, seeing him pass by in such a garb,) Οὗτος δεσπότου χρήζει, " That man needs a master ;" as before he had bidden the *præco* cry, " Who will buy a master ?" saying, " that he knew how to rule men." And so it seems he did : for Xeniaades, that bought him, made him tutor to his sons, and ruler of all his house, and joyed strangely in the bargain, saying, Ἄγαθος δαίμων εἰ σελήλυθε, " that some good genius (or angel) was come into his house : " and when Diogenes' friends would have redeemed him, he said, " They were fond men : lions were not servants to their keepers, keepers were servants to the lions : and that servants obeyed men-masters, but ill masters were worse servants to lust." So a Spartan (in Plut. Lac. Apoph.) suffered not the bellman to cry, " Who will buy a slave ?" Ἄνδράποδον ; ᾧ κατάρατε ..... " Thou cursed wretch," said he, " cry, Who will buy a captive ?" Αἰχμάλωτον ; Joseph may be sold and serve. Naaman's maid may be captive or

<sup>u</sup> Laert. lib. 6.



taken; but slavery in grain cannot be without vice, nor genuine freedom with it<sup>x</sup>.

The fifth note refers to chap. 8. p. 37, &c., last marginal note, "Heathen's testimonies of original sin."]

Nam vitiis nemo sine nascitur; optimus ille est,  
Qui minimis urgetur . . . . . Denique te ipsum  
Concute, num qua tibi vitiorum inseverit olim  
Natura . . . . . Hor. Sat. I. iii. 68.

Damnatos tamen ad mores natura recurrit:  
Fixa et nescia mutari. Juv. xiii. 240.

Parcendum teneris: nondum implevere medullas  
Nequitiae mala nativæ. Idem, xiv. 216.

Unicuique dedit vitium natura creato. Propert.

It is true indeed, Aristotle says, in his third book De Anima, that the human soul is like a white paper, or table-book that has nothing written in; and, in the second Ethic, that ἀγαθὸν 147 ἢ κακὸν οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει, lib. 2. cap. 5, but that we are born, as it were, in an indifferency, or middle temper. Yet this in all reason can but be meant of moral habits, or personal qualifications, which are to be got only by custom. And the care he would have taken for young ones' education, δεῖ ἡχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ ἢ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὐτῆ ἐστίν, shews that he was afraid of some secret bias or taint, and chiefly that of pleasure, which he calls πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένου τῷ βίῳ, δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῶν συντέθραπται. Lib. 2. cap. 3.

St. Austin, tom. (7.) 10. l. 4. contra Jul. c. 12, quotes Tully in his third book De Republica, complaining: *Hominem non ut a matre, sed ut a noverca, natura, editum in vitam; corpore nudo, fragili, infirmo; animo autem anxio ad molestias, humili ad timores, molli ad labores, prono ad libidines; in quo tamen tanquam obrutus quidem divinus ignis ingenii et mentis.* And in Hortensius, thus: *Quis nisi gurges . . . . .? quis bona mente præditus non mallet nullas omnino nobis a natura voluptates datas?* And afterward thus: That soul and body were put together as a living man and a dead. Sophocles censures lust,

<sup>x</sup> Read Epictetus Arriani, and see the freedom of a servant.

as a raging tyrant, saying, *Libenter profugi illinc tanquam ex aliqua furiosa dominatione*. Val. Max. lib. 4. cap. 3.

The sixth note, to page 44. He that minds to see more of the ancients' opinions about original sin, let him read St. Austin, cont. Julian. lib. 1; where divers fathers be cited about that head.

The seventh note, to chap. 9. pag. 46, the margin. Seneca, De Clement. lib. 1. cap. 23: *Videbis ea sæpe committi, quæ sæpe vindicantur. Pater tuus (Claudius) plures intra quinquennium culleo insuit, quam omnibus seculis insutos accepimus: multo minus audebant liberi nefas ultimum admittere, quamdiu sine lege crimen fuit. Prudentissimi viri maluerunt, velut incredibile scelus, et ultra audaciam positum præterire, quam, dum vindicant, ostendere, posse fieri. Itaque parricidæ cum lege cæperunt, et illis facinus pœna monstravit—Natura contumax in contrarium atque arduum nitens*. And so Seneca, De Benef. lib. 3. cap. 16, says, *Nulla virum habet (fœmina) nisi ut adulterum irritet*.

Quod licet ingratum est, quod non licet, acrius urget.

Quicquid servatur cupimus magis; ipsaque

Præda vocat . . . . .

The eighth note, to page 146. The story of Alexander Pheræus is in Plutarch's Orat. 2. De Fortun. Alexand. Magni.

The ninth note, to page 147. The story of Pacuvius Calavius, is in Livy, book 23; or, as some count, Decad. 3. l. 3.

The tenth note, to page 162. The words of St. Chrysostom, touched in the margin, (if they be surely his) are these: *οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸν εἰμαρμένῃ προσέχοντα δυνηθῆναι τῶν οὐρανῶν ἐπιτυχεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ δυνηθῆναι τὴν γέενναν καὶ τὴν κόλασιν ἐκφυγεῖν*.

The eleventh note, to page 165: Ipsaque tellus . . . . . They be Virgil's, Georg. i. 125:

Ante Jovem nulli subigebant arva coloni;

Nec signare solum, aut partiri limite campum

Fas erat: in medium quærebant; ipsaque tellus

Omnia liberius, nullo poscente, ferebat.

All these refer to the five precedent sections, which the

reader, if he please, may take for the whole tenth book ; and reckon what follows betwixt this and the eleventh for the appendix spoken of by the author in the thirty-fifth chapter, and mentioned in the marginal note there. Or else he may count on, as, for the better help to memory, it is placed, and because of the orderly disposition and nearness of the matter coming most patly and fitly in, it is numbered, the sixth section of the tenth book.

## AN APPENDIX;

OR,

## SIXTH SECTION.

*Concerning the Limitation of these two Propositions, Rom. viii. 13: "If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die—If through the Spirit ye do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live."*

1. BOTH propositions are (as we say) hypothetical or conditional; and if either should be denied or questioned, the only course which the schools (which are the high courts of reason for judging of arguments) afford, would be to plead these categorical or absolute propositions: *Whosoever lives after the flesh shall die—Whosoever mortifies the deeds of the body through the Spirit shall live.* And our apostle himself, ver. 6, had premised two absolute categorical propositions, to infer or prove these two conditional propositions in the text: for so he saith, *To be carnally minded is death; but to be spiritually minded is life and peace.* Now albeit he hath added no quantity to these two categorical propositions, yet in that he saith, *To be carnally minded is death; and to be spiritually minded is life;* this infers, that death is the necessary consequent of carnal living, and life likewise the infallible consequent of being spiritually minded. And it is an infallible rule of reason, 'That any proposition, betwixt whose parts the connexion is necessary, is equivalent to an universal, although it be delivered in terms indefinite, or without addition of any quantity.' So that when

All must mortify, though not totally.



our apostle saith, *To be carnally minded is death—To be spiritually minded is life*; his speech is altogether as full, and more emphatical, than if he had said, *Whosoever lives after the flesh shall die—Whosoever through the Spirit mortifies the deeds of the body shall live.* Howbeit, these two propositions in the text, thus reduced to categoricals, and rendered universal by a note or sign of such quantity, are universal only in respect of the persons whom this duty of mortification concerns; universal they are not, but indefinite, in respect of the duty enjoined, or matter proposed.

2. To find out some more distinct (limit or) limitation of them, in respect of the matter proposed, we are to begin, as in the like cases the method requires, from negatives. The first negative is this: ‘Though all men, after they come to years of discretion, be necessarily tied to mortify the flesh, yet no man is tied under pain of damnation to an absolute or total mortification of it.’ This is impossible in this life. Though *sin*, as the apostle speaks, be *the sting of death*, and carnal intentions be the arrows or darts of Satan, yet is not every carnal thought, or every degree of minding the flesh, so deadly in the issue unto the soul as the Parthian arrows were to men’s bodies; for they carried death upon their points, and gave it possession of every body whose skin they brake: *fatumque in sanguine summo est*; “they let death in at the least breach whereat blood could come out.” But every moment of life led after the flesh doth not thus necessarily bring forth the death here meant. The second negative is this: ‘It is not every degree or part of mortification that will suffice to bring forth the life here meant.’ For he doth not say, *if ye have mortified the deeds of the body*, but

The limitation set out in three negatives.

149 *if ye do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live.*

These two negatives are as the two tropics, betwixt which the limitation of the former proposition, in respect of the matter proposed, or duty enjoined, is wholly situate. It is a positive mean between them—somewhat less than any absolute or total mortification—somewhat more than every degree or practice of mortification : yet all this is but indefinite. This positive mean betwixt the former negatives must of necessity be either some kind of mortification for quality more precious than the mortification which most men ordinarily affect or practise, or some greater measure of the same mortification whereof most men are partakers at some times.

3. As great men's quick goods are presumed to be of a better kind or breed than the like goods of their poor neighbours (for noble men's geese, as the proverb is, are swans), so there be some, who will have all qualifications, whether of life or practice, all acts of duty or performances, to be of a better kind or rank in the elect, than they are in others. And in these men's dialect or divinity, the answer to the proposed query were easy, and would be this—They which mortify the deeds of the body in such sort as the elect do, they certainly shall live, for the elect do truly mortify them, albeit not in so full a measure. And as belief, so mortification, in them especially, how little soever it be, so it be true, will suffice unto salvation. But in the divinity which I have learned, the points of election and reprobation are to be determined of (if at all they may be determined of) by the resolution of other more general and more facile queries. They are preposterously brought to the determination of any other difficulties. Always the resolutions of the generals must be introductions to the resolution or clearing of

Points of election, &c. are not to determine, but to be determined by more general points.

more special difficulties. Special difficulties can be no introduction to the resolution of general queries. Now this duty of mortification, and the transgression of it, to wit, *living after the flesh*, are far more general than the estate of election or reprobation. Seeing, as I am often forced to repeat, it is but a little point of mankind, a small portion of men, (which are partakers of the word or sacraments,) which are for the present contained under either part of this division, either in the state of election or reprobation. But under this division of *living after the flesh*, or *after the spirit*, all are comprehended. Again, inasmuch as we ourselves are all employed in this work of mortification, we may have more certain experiments of our progress in this duty than we can have of our estate of election, which is merely the work of God; we have no finger, no employment in it. The truth is, only they who have mortified the deeds of the body in such a measure as our apostle here requires are in the state of election; only they who have made up such a measure of sin, or *living after the flesh*, as induceth the sentence of death here mentioned, are in the absolute state of reprobation. So that the positive mean between the two former negatives must be taken from the measure, not from the specific quality or nature of mortification. The very phrase or character of our apostle—*If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die: but if through the Spirit ye mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live*—necessarily includes a perseverance in either kind. A perseverance there must be in this duty of mortification, before we can have full and perfect interest in this promise. Without perseverance or continuance in this life of the flesh, none are inevitably sentenced unto the death here denounced against all that *live after the flesh*.

All are not elect, or reprobate; but all live after the flesh, or after the spirit.

4. But even *perseverance* itself is a term indefinite and illimited; it admits, though not altogether so many determinate degrees or portions as *mortification* doth, (for there must be some set degrees of mortification before there can be any perseverance in mortification,) yet a great many degrees or parts. And all the degrees of perseverance are measurable by continuance of time. Some there be who require a perseverance in mortification unto the hour of death, before a man can be infallible heir of the blessing here promised. They say of this and the like blessings or prerogatives promised, as Solon did of happiness or felicity: ..... *Dicique beatus ante obitum nemo supremaque funera debet.* No man can be said to be thus happy, as to be in the assured state of life, until he hath persevered in this duty of mortification unto death. And in this tenor many of God's promises seem to run; as when it is said, *He that continues to the end, he shall be saved, &c.* This limitation, though true, is not satisfactory to the point in question. This negative is true—'He that doth not persevere in this duty of mortification unto the end of his life, can have no interest in this promised life.' But this being granted, it may be further questioned, whether a man may not have the gift of final perseverance infallibly collated upon him by the virtue of this promise, before he come near to the end of his mortal life? Whether some may not have it collated a longer time before, some a shorter time, some not until the last day of their life or hour of death?

5. This point again admits of a double inquisition—the one, *de certitudine objecti*; the other, *de certitudine subjecti*. The one concerns the certainty of the object, or gift of perseverance itself; as whether this gift be immutably bestowed upon any man before his

A double inquiry about perseverance.



death : the other concerns the certainty of our apprehensions or persuasions, that this gift of perseverance is or may be bestowed upon us in particular. Or, if any man in this life can be thus certainly persuaded, the last query is, By what degree or kind of certainty he can be assured that he shall finally persevere in this duty of mortification, or that he shall so persevere in it as he shall not finally fall from grace? To begin with the first branch of this inquiry, to wit, Whether the gift of perseverance, or certain estate in grace, may be infallible or immutable in this life. Our first proposition shall be this: 'There is a degree or measure of mortification, (best known unto God,) which may be obtained before the hour of death, by some later, by others sooner, unto which whosoever doth attain, he is not only actually instated in this promise of life, but confirmed in grace, and endued with the gift of perseverance.' The measure is not the same to all; some may be confirmed in grace before they attain unto the same height of mortification which others must exceed. *To whom much is given, of them much shall be required.* The second proposition is this, 'There is a degree or measure of *living after the flesh*, (best known unto God,) which may be made up in this life, by some sooner, by others later, which measure whosoever doth make up or go beyond it, doth hereby become liable to the sentence of death hereby denounced, and falls into the state of reprobation<sup>a</sup>.' The truth of both propositions may be inferred from the analogy of faith, or points of doctrine heretofore delivered concerning the certainty or continuance of public weal or prosperity, and the certainty or infallibility of ruin and destruction to states and kingdoms. Saul's kingdom was upon the point of being perpetually confirmed unto him, 1 Sam.

<sup>a</sup> See his sermons upon 2 Chron. vi. 39. and upon Jer. xxvi. 19. preached before the king, vol. vi. pp. 1. 49.

xiii. 14, but by his folly and disobedience, his own ruin, and utter deposition of his line, became inevitable and irrevocable. The rule often mentioned in other treatisesw as general—That blessings promised to any nation, whilst they were only promised, not confirmed by oath, were but mutable and conditional, and the promise revocable : that cursings likewise, only denounced by way of threat, not ratified by oath, were  
 151 but conditional, were evitable, and the sentence revocable : that plagues or blessings denounced by oath were inevitable, unpreventable : instances were then given in Saul; and in the children of Israel, which were cut off by oath from entering into the land of promise, as others were assured by oath that they should enter into it.

Promises or threats without oath revocable; under oath, irrevocable.

6. Now albeit the interposition of God's oath was always an infallible argument, that the thing which he did swear (were that matter of promise or of threat, blessing or cursing) was immutable; yet the interposition of the oath did not first make men's estates, whether in his promises or in his threats, to be immutable; but rather declare them to be such. Their estates were the one way or the other immutable before the Lord did so declare them, and immutable their estates always became, not by any specifical qualities of the duties performed, or of the iniquities committed by them; but by the just measure, or full degrees, whether of dutiful obedience, or of disobedience and transgression. The best argument in this case we can use must be drawn from the type unto the anti-type, from the legal shadow unto the evangelical body. This kind of argument our apostle hath warranted, and in a manner fully drawn unto our hands, Heb. iii. 7: *Wherefore, as the Holy Ghost saith, To day if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts; ver. 13: But exhort one another daily, while it is called To day;*

(i. e. whilst there is time left for repentance;) *lest any of you be hardened through the deceitfulness of sin; for we are made partakers of Christ, if we hold the beginning of our confidence steadfast unto the end; μέχρι τέλους*: what *end* doth he mean? the end or utmost period of life? This end may be comprehended under this phrase; which notwithstanding is not necessary to be restrained unto this end: for so the instances alleged by the apostle would not conclude his main allegation; yea, they include the contradictory to this restraint: thus much at the least, that some, of whom he speaks, were confirmed in the promise, and declared to be so confirmed by oath; others of them were sentenced by oath unto death, without revocation or appeal, long before the end of life or approach of death. *Some, when they had heard, saith the apostle, did provoke: howbeit not all that came out of Egypt by Moses, ver. 16.* Not all that were above twenty years old; for Caleb and Joshua, being at that time forty years of age, did enter into the land of promise, after all the rest which were above twenty had perished in the wilderness. But the apostle further demands, *With whom was he grieved forty years? was it not with them that had sinned, whose carcasses fell in the wilderness? And to whom sware he that they should not enter into his rest, but to them that believed not? So we see that they could not enter in because of unbelief.* He saith not, *they did not enter in because of unbelief, but they could not enter in because of unbelief.* This argues that the possibility of entering in was utterly cut off; and we know it was so cut off, because the Lord had sworn they should not enter in. But what was the true or adequate cause why they could not enter in, or why their former possibility of entering in was utterly cut off? The apostle mentioned only two—*unbelief* and *sin*. But are his words only

to be understood of ordinary sin, or simple unbelief? or was there any sin or unbelief for specific quality so deadly as could utterly exclude them from all possibility of entering in? Or do these terms, though indefinite in themselves, necessarily include a certain measure or high degree of unbelief or sin? This point may best be resolved by the historical relations of Moses, whereunto our apostle's discourse throughout the whole third chapter to the Hebrews hath special reference, and on which his exhortation or main argument is wholly  
 152 grounded. This story is set down at large, Num. xiv. 21: *As truly as I live*, saith God to Moses, *all the earth shall be filled with the glory of the Lord*<sup>b</sup>. This is the express form of the oath. The contents of the same oath, or the articles unto which God swears, are set down at large in the words following, in which likewise the measure and quantity as well of their positive sin as of their unbelief, is emphatically expressed: *All those men which have seen my glory, and my miracles, which I did in Egypt and in the wilderness, and have tempted me now these ten times, and have not hearkened to my voice; surely they shall not see the land which I sware unto their fathers, neither shall any of them that provoked me see it.* They had seen, or known by certain relation, ten several mighty wonders, which God had wrought in Egypt upon Pharaoh, upon his land and people. Now the contempt and neglect of so many wonders, besides the miracles which he had wrought for them in the wilderness, argue a great measure of disobedience or unbelief, a great measure of omission or neglect of this duty of mortification, which is necessary to all; a great measure of life stubbornly led after the flesh; howbeit their sins were most grievous, which had seen the good land

<sup>b</sup> Of promises or threats without or under oaths, see his 7th book, c. 13. and 9th book, c. 18.



which God had promised by oath unto their fathers, as is clear from Numb. xiv. 36, 37: *The men which Moses sent to search the land, who returned, and made all the congregation to murmur against him, by bringing up a slander upon the land; even those men that did bring up the evil report upon the land, died by the plague before the Lord:* and so they died before their brethren, which had given credit unto their report, and out of their unbelief did murmur against their God. Howbeit even these, with all the rest above twenty years old, (except Caleb and Joshua,) were utterly cut off from all possibility of entering in, before the time or hour of their death; yea they died before their ordinary times for this their provocation; as is emphatically expressed, ver. 34: *Ye shall bear your iniquities forty years: and ye shall know my breach of promise;* that is, the revocation of the blessing promised.

7. That Caleb and Joshua had their estate or interest in the same promise irrevocably confirmed unto them, long before their time of their entering into the promised land, may be gathered from the exception inserted in the oath; for the Lord had sworn that none of the rest should enter in besides Caleb and Joshua<sup>c</sup>. This exception in ordinary construction seems to include, that the Lord did positively swear, that these two should enter into his rest. Howbeit this exception alone is but a presumption, or a proof not concludent without favourable construction, and as lawyers say, *favorabiliora sunt amplianda*—favourable promises are to be taken in the ampler sense. But thus we may not interpret God's promises without warrant from him. That God's meaning in the former clause or exception concerning Caleb and Joshua was to be taken in this

<sup>c</sup> Num. xiv. 30.

favourable and ample sense, we have a further positive and concludent proof from the petition which Caleb exhibited unto Joshua, and Joshua granted, Josh. xiv. 6. 9—13: *Thou knowest, saith Caleb unto Joshua, the thing that the Lord said unto Moses the man of God concerning me and thee in Kadesh-barnea. Moses swear on that day, saying, Surely the land whereon thy feet have trodden shall be thine inheritance, and thy children's for ever, because thou hast wholly followed the Lord my God. And now, behold, the Lord hath kept me alive, as he said, these forty and five years, even since the Lord spake this word unto Moses, while the children of Israel wandered in the wilderness: and now, lo, I am this day fourscore and five years old. As yet I am as strong this day as I was in the day that Moses sent me: as my strength was then, even so is my strength now, for war, both to go out, and to come in. And Joshua blessed him, and gave unto Caleb the son of Jephunneh*

153 *Hebron for an inheritance.* Such is the force and efficacy of God's promise confirmed by oath, that it not only kept Caleb alive, but in the same strength and activity of body till eighty-five years, in which he was at forty years. It was as remarkable in preserving his life and strength, as it was in bringing mortality upon others. Yet was not his promise so confirmed by oath unto all that were excepted from the plague denounced by oath, as it was unto Caleb and Joshua. For all that were under twenty years old were excepted from the plague denounced by oath, yet were they not all assured by oath that they should enter into the land of promise. The exception of them in the oath only reserves that possibility or that interest which their fathers had in the promise, as entire to them as it was at the first. Their estate was but conditional, and

held as it were the mean between the estate of Caleb and Joshua, which was confirmed by oath, and the estate of their forefathers, which were excluded by oath : for so Moses saith unto the tribe of Reuben and Gad, whose disobedience and backsliding he feared, Numb. xxxii. 14, 15 : *Behold, ye are risen up in your fathers' stead, an increase of sinful men, to augment yet the fierce anger of the Lord toward Israel. For if ye turn away from after him, he will yet again leave them in the wilderness ; and ye shall destroy all this people.* Moses in this speech supposeth that these men were not so immutably interested in God's promise as Caleb and Joshua were. These men stood in need of repentance, and their repentance is specified, vv. 16—18.

But was this decree of God concerning Caleb and Joshua terminated to their individual entities, or inseparably annexed unto their persons before they were born, or did it suppose some measure or degree of belief or obedience in them ? Yes ; as the others' exclusion by oath did presuppose an extraordinary measure of disobedience and unbelief ; so the ratification of the same promise unto them by oath did presuppose a measure more than ordinary of belief and obedience. Thus much is included in the reason of their exception from the common plague, Numb. xxxii. 12 : *For they have wholly followed the Lord :* which speech is likewise resumed by Caleb, Josh. xix. 9.

8. So then these three points be clear. First, That such as had God's promise for entering into the land of Canaan were cut off from all interest in this promise, as appears from the words recited, Numb. xiv. 34 : *Ye shall know my breach, or nullification of my promise ;* for God's promise could not be nullified or revoked, unless it had been sincerely and really made unto them.



The second, That this promise was not only revoked or nullified, but that the parties to whom it was made, were utterly cut off from all hope of possibility of having the like interest in the land of promise renewed unto them, albeit they sought the renewing of it with tears, and testified their repentance with hazard of their lives. This point is clear from Numb. xiv. 39—43 : *So when Moses told these sayings unto all the children of Israel, the people mourned greatly. And they rose up early in the morning, and gat them up into the top of the mountain, saying, Lo, we be here, and will go up unto the place which the Lord hath promised: for we have sinned. And Moses said, Wherefore now do ye transgress the commandment of the Lord? but it shall not prosper. Go not up, for the Lord is not among you; that ye be not smitten before your enemies.* The event did prove his words true: for when they presumed to go up unto the hill top, then the Amalekites came down, and the Canaanites which dwelt in that hill, and smote them, and discomfited them, even unto Hormah, ver. 45. Deut. i. 41.

The third point, That the general promise wherein all the people had a true interest, but from which most of  
 154 them were utterly cut off, was irrevocably ratified and confirmed unto Joshua and Caleb upon their perseverance in belief and obedience. The like ratification of God's promise upon the like occasion, we have in the history of Abraham. First, he had God's promise that he should be *the father of many nations*, that he should possess the land of Canaan; but this promise presupposed or preredquired a measure or degree of obedience in Abraham; for he was to forsake his kindred and his father's house at God's commandment, before he could claim interest in this promise. He had likewise fought the battle of the Lord before this promise was



further ratified or enlarged by the solemn blessing which Melchisedec bestowed upon him in the name of the most high God. Yet even unto this measure of obedience God's promise was not irrevocably terminated, the blessing promised was not as yet so immutable as it afterwards became. To what measure of obedience then was it so immutably terminated? To his obedience in offering up his only son Isaac; upon this fact the former promises were solemnly confirmed by oath; and being so confirmed, the blessings promised could not be recalled or repealed. By this last measure of belief or obedience that scripture was fulfilled which saith, *Abraham believed God, and it was imputed unto him for righteousness*, as St. James instructs us, chap. ii. 23. As this fact was the accomplishment of Abraham's former obedience, so the interposition of God's oath upon this fact was the full or final ratification of God's former promises made unto Abraham.

9. *Now all these things*, as the apostle in the like case saith, *happened unto them for ensamples or types: and they are written for our admonition, upon whom the ends of the world are come. Wherefore let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall*, 1 Cor. x.

11, 12. The special points of our admonition or instruction from the former types or examples may thus be gathered by warrant or imitation of the apostle's argument in the like case. Whosoever doth in any sort mortify the deeds of the body, hath a true interest in this promise, *ye shall live*. Every subsequent degree of mortification is a degree or approach unto the final ratification of the promise. The blessing promised notwithstanding is not irrecoverably ratified, the gift of final perseverance in this duty is not immutably established, until we attain unto a certain measure of mortification, answering in proportion unto the measure

Every degree of mortification an approach to the final ratification of the promise.

of Abraham's obedience, when he offered up his son Isaac, or unto the obedience of Caleb and Joshua, when the Lord sware unto them that they should enter into the land of Canaan. Again, every degree or portion of life led after the flesh, is a degree or approach unto the sentence of death here denounced—*If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die.* The further we go on in the ways of the flesh, the more we endanger our interest in the promise of life, the more obnoxious or liable we become to the sentence of death. Howbeit, the sentence of death becomes not irrevocable until we come unto a full measure of disobedience in following the ways of the flesh, answering in proportion unto the measure of their disobedience or unbelief who were cut off from all possibility of entering into the land of promise. Again, as these disobedient men did make up the full measure of their disobedience before they made up the full measure of their days, and as Caleb, Joshua, and Abraham did attain unto the measure of belief and obedience, unto which God's blessings were immutably annexed by oath, long before they came unto the end of their life; so likewise we may come unto that measure of disobedience, or *living after the flesh*, unto which the sentence of death is inevitably awarded, before we cease to be in the flesh; and, on the other side, we may attain  
155 to the measure of mortification whose necessary consequent is an immutable estate in life spiritual, before we come to the end of our bodily life. And unto this point some may arrive sooner, others later, according to the fervency of their endeavours, or victorious constancy in the service of God.

The objection answered.

10. The only objection that is or can be made against this resolution or determination in the point proposed, was intimated before; the whole strength of it relies upon those places of scripture wherein it is

said, *He that continues unto the end shall be saved*; or, *We are partakers of Christ and his promises, if we continue the beginning of our confidence steadfast unto the end.* But though it be true, that no man which falls off from the spirit unto the flesh, before the end of his bodily life, can be partaker of the promises; yet is it never said, that no man is or can be so confirmed in grace before the end of his life, that he cannot totally or finally fall. As for that speech frequent in scripture, *He that continues unto the end, &c.*, it doth not so punctually point out the end of life, as it doth the end or just measure of this duty here enjoined; *μὲχρι τέλους*, or *εἰς τὸ τέλος*, in the language of the Holy Ghost, oftentimes signifies as much as *ad victoriam*; and denotes that point of time wherein we get that *victory* or *conquest* over the flesh or other enemies of the spirit. And the apostle's words, Heb. iii. 14, may well bear this interpretation: *if we hold the beginning of our confidence steadfast unto the end*; that is, unto the end or full measure of our confidence. And all the glorious promises which are made unto such as continue unto the end are as often made and conceived in this tenour—*To him that overcomes.* So it is, Rev. iii. 5: *He that overcometh, the same shall be clothed in white raiment; and I will not blot out his name out of the book of life, but I will confess his name before my Father, and before his angels.* And again, ver. 12: *Him that overcometh will I make a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go no more out: and I will write upon him the name of my God, and the name of the city of my God, which is new Jerusalem, which cometh down out of heaven from my God: and the writing of this name of Jerusalem, which cometh down from heaven, upon men, imports, it shall be thus*



written whilst they live here on earth, or whilst it comes down to them, not when they ascend in soul unto it. And when St. Paul saith, that the names of Clement and other his fellowlabourers were *written in the book of life*, Phil. iv. 3, questionless his meaning is, that they were so written in it, that they should never be blotted out, and yet were they so written long before they died. *I saw*, saith St. John, *the dead, small and great, stand before God; and the books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the book of life: and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books, according to their works.* Rev. xx. 12.

But although men in this life may attain unto an immutable estate of grace, yet many finally miss of this estate, because they know not where to find themselves, or in what estate or condition they should for the present rank or esteem themselves.

11. Some there be, which either expressly, or by inevitable consequence of what they expressly affirm, divide mankind as formally into reprobates and elect, as philosophers do substances into corporeal and incorporeal. By this kind of division (were it sound and orthodoxal) every man from his birth unto his death should be either a reprobate or one elect. Now were this doctrine true, we that are Christ's messengers should be at a nonplus, either for administering comfort to our hearers in trouble of conscience, or for preventing and assuaging presumption in such as are not conscious of any grosser sin, or not dejected by the thundering threats of God's law.

156 The truth is, there be three estates or conditions of men, not only in general, but of every man in particular which finally attains unto salvation ;

The division of all mankind into elect and reprobates, not right.



First, The estate or condition of man as he is the son of Adam : for every man, as he is the son of Adam, is the son of wrath.

Second, The estate or condition of man as he is reconciled to God, and admitted into the privilege of his son by baptism, or ingraftment into his mystical body, the church.

Third, The estate or condition of complete regeneration, or of election.

The first estate or condition is the *terminus a quo*. Eternal salvation, or admission into the everlasting state of bliss, is the *terminus ad quem* of every true Christian's progress. The two estates intermediate, that is, the estate of the sons of God in general by baptism, and the estate of election, which we have in this life, are the two several degrees or steps of our progress in Christianity.

But inasmuch as all men be not at all times either in the estate of election or reprobation, and yet all in the end become either sheep or goats, we must observe four estates of men in general :

The first, The estate of the sons of wrath.

The second, The estate of reprobates.

The third, The estate of the sons of God, by adoption or baptism.

The fourth, The estate of the elect, or completely regenerate.

12. That there is a difference between the estate or condition of the sons of wrath and the estate of absolute reprobation, a difference likewise between the estate or condition of the sons of God and the estate or condition of the elect, may be demonstrated from the several estates or conditions of the first man. Adam in his first estate was the son of God, yet not then in the estate of election, for so he could not have fallen so

Four  
estates of  
men in  
general.

fouly as he did. After his fall, he was in the state or condition of a son of wrath; yet not in the estate or condition of absolute reprobation, for so he could not have attained unto the estate of election or salvation. So then every reprobate is the son of wrath, but every son of wrath is not a reprobate. Every elect person, or every man after election, is the son of God, but every son of God is not in the number of the elect. The award allotted to every one of these estates is either an act of mercy or of justice divine. But unto the individual nature or persons of men, no effect of justice or mercy can be awarded: and therefore the individual entity or nature of man cannot be the immediate object of the Divine decree. No part of misery can be determined upon any man, or decreed against him, before he be the son of wrath or a reprobate: for God doth never punish where he is not displeased, and displeased he cannot be with our mere natures. Now to be the son of wrath in the lowest degree supposeth some work of Satan wrought in the party which is the son of wrath; that only makes him the son of wrath. Adam could not have become the son of wrath, unless he had suffered the devil to deface God's work in him, and to instamp his own image upon him. No son of Adam could have been born the child of wrath, unless this work and image of Satan had been propagated unto him by inheritance from his father Adam. Now, if to be the son of wrath in the lowest degree presuppose some work of Satan, the estate or condition of reprobation always includeth or presupposeth a greater measure of Satan's works; and unto this work, not unto men's persons or individual natures, is the irrevocable sentence of reprobation awarded.

157 13. To be the son of God includeth or presupposeth more than the mere nature, essence, or individual sub-

stance of man. What more doth it include? It always includes some work of God wrought in the nature, either as an eminent effect or resultance of his creation; or some work of God produced in man after his birth, conception, or creation. Adam by creation was the son of God, because he was created just and good. And albeit there were not two creations, one of Adam's nature, another of his righteousness; yet was his righteousness a thing distinct from his nature; otherwise Adam by his fall had not ceased to be the son of God. For after his fall he remained the same man he was for nature and substance, but not the same man he was for quality. It was then his first qualification, to wit, his righteousness, by which he was made the son of God, and it was the loss of this qualification which made him the son of wrath. His nature or substance was no part of the object of the Divine decree; not capable either of reward or punishment, but according to the two former qualifications. In every son of Adam, which in time becomes the son of God, there must be a creation or new production of righteousness by the birth of the Spirit, besides his birth or conception natural, by which he becomes a man. In every elect person there must be a greater work of God, a greater measure of regeneration or of new birth, than that by which he is first made the son of God. And this measure of righteousness or of regeneration is the immediate and formal object of the eternal decree, or of that eternal rule of Divine mercy or bounty by which the immutable estate of election or of grace is awarded. The point then is clear as the sun, that neither the decree of election or reprobation are terminated to the nature or individual substance of men, without respect or relation to their works or qualifications. The works of Satan are essentially and formally included in the object of

Election  
and repro-  
bation look  
upon qua-  
lifications.



reprobation; the works of God to be wrought in man, not for man only, are essentially and formally included in the object of absolute election.

14. That which the authors or favourers of the contrary opinion (I am persuaded) would have said, or should in reason say, for their absolute election or reprobation, is only this: that albeit the works of God be essentially included in the object of the eternal election, as the works of Satan are in the object of eternal reprobation; yet God did so absolutely decree to work these works which are required to the object of election, that it was necessary from eternity they should be wrought in all the vessels of election: and that he did from eternity so absolutely decree to suffer Satan to work those works which are included in the object of reprobation, or those works which make men *vessels of wrath fitted to destruction*, that this qualification or temper could not possibly be avoided. This indeed is one of the two main questions which only ought seriously to be discussed between the Arminians and their opposites, all the rest are but word-bates, or verbal quarrels, arising from ambiguous or unscholastic expressions of their opinions or conceits.

The first question is already discussed, and is, Whether men in this life ordinarily do or may attain unto an immutable estate of grace; that is, whether their election until the hour of death be absolute, or but conditional?

The second, which now remains to be discussed, is, Whether this absolute estate of election or reprobation during the time of this life being granted, the attaining unto the one estate, or falling into the other, be from eternity necessary; so necessary, that no man, which hath fallen or shall fall into the absolute estate of re-  
158 probation, hath had, or hath, any possibility to avoid



his fall? Or again, Whether every man that now is in the absolute estate of election were so destined to the same estate from eternity, that no occurrences possible could prevent it? If the Arminians would yield to the church of England in the former, I think no true member of the church of England would much dissent from them in the latter: which may be expressed, in terms perhaps more perspicuous, thus: Whether God, in his foresight of all men's natures, did set apart or design some individual essences or natures, with purpose to frame and fit them to be vessels of honour, without possibility left for them to frame themselves to be vessels of dishonour? And whether he did, by the same foresight or inspection, set apart or design other individual natures or substances to be vessels of wrath or dishonour, without any purpose or will to frame or fashion them to be vessels of election? To discuss both questions, first in *thesi*, then in *hypothesi*; that is, first, Whether election itself were absolutely necessary from eternity? secondly, Whether the election of this or that man were absolutely necessary from the hour of his birth or conception, or rather begins to be necessary from his progress in grace, or from his plenary and full conversion unto God, which sometimes, and in some men, is not accomplished before the hour of death?

15. No man's election or designment to the immutable A sorites. state of grace can be more necessary from eternity than his reconciliation is. No man's reconciliation unto God the Father can be more necessary from eternity than his interest is in the pardon purchased by the Son of God. No man's interest in this pardon can be from eternity more necessary than was the death of the Son of God. The death of the Son of God was no more necessary from eternity than the fall of Adam was. The fall of Adam neither was nor could be

from eternity more necessary than the first sin or transgression was. The consequences of these truths are most necessary, most immediate. If Adam had not transgressed God's commandment, he had not fallen into the state of God's wrath and curse. If Adam had not fallen into God's wrath or curse, the Son of God had not become accursed, had not died. If the Son of God had not died for us, our pardon had not been purchased. If our pardon had not been purchased, there had been no reconciliation of mankind unto God the Father. If there had been no reconciliation of mankind to God the Father, there had been no election in Christ. So that though it be most true, that Christ was *Agnus occisus ab origine mundi*—"the Lamb slain from the beginning of the world," yet was it not necessary from eternity, that this Lamb should be slain; for Christ's death was no more necessary than Adam's death or transgression was. Now no man, I hope, well advised, will affirm, that God did destinate Adam's transgression as a necessary means that Christ should die, for so he should make him the Author of sin in Adam, before he became the Fountain of mercy in Christ. The truth then is, that Adam having sinned, not of necessity, but freely, God, out of his free mercy and compassion towards mankind, did destinate the incarnation, the death and passion of his only Son, as the only means of our redemption and reconciliation to himself. And did likewise destinate the consecration of his Son (by his death) unto his everlasting priesthood, as the only means for the accomplishing of our redemption, that is, for making our election sure and absolute. As Christ's priesthood is then most unchangeable and most necessary, yet was it not necessary from eternity that he should be made a priest by the suffering of death: so our estate of election in him is

most absolute and necessary after we attain unto it ; yet was it not necessary from eternity that we should 159 attain unto it ; not absolutely necessary that any should attain unto it, but necessary only upon supposal of Adam's transgression, (which was no way necessary, but free and contingent,) and of God's infinite wisdom and mercy in sending Christ Jesus our Lord.

16. If no man's destination or designment to the absolute state of election in Christ were absolutely necessary from eternity, but necessary only upon the supposals last made, which were not necessary ; much less was the designment of any man's individual nature or person to the absolute state of reprobation or damnation absolutely necessary from eternity. Damnation, as all grant, is the end of sin, or rather an endless misery, into which no man can fall but by sin: whence if this endless misery had been absolutely necessary from eternity, or decreed by God as the goal of any man's course of life ; the means likewise, or only way by which men come unto this end or goal, must have been by a like degree of necessity destinated and decreed by God ; and the only way or means, by which men come unto this end, is sin: so that God, by this opinion or doctrine, should have been as immediate a cause of sin and death, as he is of the punishment of sins or of nonrepentance for sins committed. And this is contrary to the fundamental principles of Christianity, of religion itself: by both which we are taught, that God, as a righteous judge, is the sole author of the decree or sentence against impenitent sinners, but no cause at all, no author of their sins or impenitency, and therefore no cause, much less any necessary cause, of any man's falling into the absolute state of reprobation. Our Saviour Christ, as then designed to be the future judge of quick and dead, did pronounce that woful sentence



Judas not  
reprobated  
from eter-  
nity.

against Judas, and against him alone for aught we read: *It were good for that man if he had never been born.* We may hence safely conclude, that Judas from that time was in the absolute state of reprobation, and had now deserved (without hope of pardon) this fearful sentence, as having now resolved in his heart, without remorse or compunction, to betray the Son of God into the hands of sinners. He became an absolute reprobate by resolving to betray the Son of God; he did not resolve to betray the Son of God because he was an absolute reprobate from eternity, or from his birth. He was not liable to this woful sentence from his birth or in his infancy; for if it had been better for him from his birth, or from his calling to the apostleship, not to have been born at all, or not to have been so called; God, howsoever most gracious and good in himself, had not been good or gracious to Judas in giving him being, in making him an apostle, seeing it had been much better for him not to have been either a man or an apostle, if from the time of his birth or apostleship he had been inevitably designed to the absolute estate of reprobation, to a greater measure of everlasting punishments than other men ordinarily are. But the truth is, the greater measure of his punishment did presuppose a greater measure of his unthankfulness; and the greater measure of his unthankfulness (in respect of other men) did presuppose a greater measure of God's favour and goodness towards him in giving him birth and being in the days of his Son's incarnation, or in calling him to the fellowship of his apostles or ambassadors. And thus we come *a thesi ad hypothesis*—from the general speculative truth unto the particular use or application.

17. All of us do (I am persuaded) unfeignedly acknowledge ourselves to have been by natural birth the sons of wrath; and to be the sons of wrath includes



in it some work of Satan, wrought not in Adam only, but in our nature, which we derive from him; and this work of Satan is twofold—sin original, and the curse 160 thereunto annexed; this latter part, to wit, the curse, Satan's work twofold—sin and curse. must be dissolved by faith, as by the instrument: *For he that believeth not*, saith St. John, chap. iii. 36, *shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him*, that is, it was upon him from his first being, and rests upon him until it be removed by faith in the Son of God. Now in that this work of Satan (that is, the curse due to sin original) is removed by faith in the Son of God, the Son of God is the principal cause or agent which removes it by his sacerdotal or princely blessing upon our ministerial act or function of baptism. It is a truth unquestionable, (especially in the doctrine of the church of England,) that as many as are baptized, are, from their baptism and by their baptism, translated from the estate or condition of sons of wrath to the estate or privilege of the sons of God. This doctrine of our church is necessarily grounded upon the saying of our apostle, Gal. iii. 27: *As many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ*. Now it is impossible that any should put on Christ and not receive him. *And to as many as receive him*, saith St. John, ch. i. 12, *to them he gives power (right or privilege) to become the sons of God*.

18. But here some will demand, If all that are baptized become the sons of God, do they not all likewise by this new birth become heirs with Christ? Yes, all that are sons are likewise heirs, but not therefore undisinheritable, because heirs; not therefore in the estate of absolute election, because they are in the estate of the sons of God, or heirs with Christ by baptism. For many, whom God hath graciously accepted for his sons; many, who during the time of their

infancy have enjoyed the estate or privilege of the sons of God, may in riper years turn prodigal sons, and disinherit themselves; and none can be disinherited but he that hath been in the estate or condition of an heir; or until with Esau he have *sold his birthright*. Both parts of this assertion—‘That all that are baptized in their infancy, become the sons of God, and during their infancy do live to God;’ 2. ‘That sin, even in such, may revive, and wound, some grievously, others mortally’—are included in our apostle’s dispute, Rom. vii.9: *I was once alive*, saith the apostle, *without the law: but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died*. Doth he speak this of himself only, or of all men without exception or restraint that were without the law? Not absolutely of all men that were without the law; for so the Gentiles, which were not under the law, which knew not God nor his laws, should have been so alive as the apostle there saith he sometimes was; because they were more without the law than he at any time was. Nor doth he speak this of himself alone, but of all such as he was; that is, of all such, and only such, as were the seed of Abraham, and had been circumcised the eighth day, and by circumcision became under the law, though for the present without the law. So that as baptism now, so circumcision then did free the children of Abraham from the curse of the law; did translate them from the estate or condition of the sons of wrath, to the condition or privilege of the sons of God. But did the apostle or his brethren which were made alive by circumcision in their infancy, continue in the same estate of life until their mortal lives’ end? No, the apostle expressly adds, *but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died*. So that sin, before the commandment came, was dead, and revived when the law came. And the apostle, before

the same point of time, was alive, but then died. When then did the commandment come, which by its coming did bring life to sin, and death to this our apostle, and such as he was? It is an observation of very good use which St. Basil hath to this purpose in his com-161  
ment upon the first psalm, Ἐπειδὴν δὲ ὁ λόγος ἡμῶν συμπηρωθῆ..... “When our reason comes once to ripeness or perfection, that is fulfilled which is written, *Adveniente mandato revixit peccatum*—When the commandment comes, sin revives<sup>d</sup>.” For when such as have submitted themselves to the law of God come to the use of reason, or to take their estate into consideration, they begin to examine their consciences by the law of God; and sin, which was before inherent, though quiet, being called in question, grows desperate and rebellious against the law, by which it is examined; against the judge, which condemns it; and against the party which calls it in question. The extract, as well of our apostle’s speech, as of St. Basil’s observation upon it, confirms the truth which was before delivered in the treatise of Mortification<sup>e</sup>, That the same measure of regeneration which sufficeth during the time of infancy or childhood, sufficeth not to save the same parties when they come to use of reason or consideration; for then the commandment comes upon us, a commandment to mortify the deeds of the flesh by the

<sup>d</sup> See St. Basil, tom. 1. (Paris. 1638. Græco-Lat.) fol. 113. Comment. in Psalm. 1 : Μακάριος οὖν ὁς ἐπὶ τῆς ὁδοῦ τῶν ἀμαρτωλῶν οὐκ ἔστη. Τὸ δὲ [οὐκ ἔστη] τί ἐστίν; ἔτι ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης ἡλικίας ὄντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὔτε ἐν κακίᾳ ἐσμέν, οὔτε ἐν ἀρετῇ· (ἀνεπίδεκτος γὰρ ἡ ἡλικία τῆς ἕξεως ἐκατέρως) ἐπειδὴν δὲ ὁ λόγος ἡμῶν συμπληρωθῆ, τότε γίνεται τὸ γεγραμμένον, [ἐλθούσης δὲ τῆς ἐντολῆς ἡ

ἀμαρτία ἀνέζησεν, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπέθανον.] ἐπανατέλλουσι γὰρ λογισμοὶ πονηροὶ ἐκ τῶν παθῶν τῆς σαρκὸς ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐντικτόμενοι. Τῷ ὄντι γὰρ ἐλθούσα ἡ ἐντολή, τουτέστιν ἡ διάγνωσις τῶν καλῶν, ἐν μὴ κατακρατήσῃ τοῦ χείρονος λογισμοῦ, ἀλλὰ συγχωρήσῃ ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν ἐξανδραποδισθῆναι τὸν λογισμὸν, ἀνέζησε μὲν ἡ ἀμαρτία, ἀπέθανε δὲ ὁ νοῦς νεκρὸς γενόμενος τοῖς παραπτώμασι.

<sup>e</sup> See above, chap. 29. par. 5.



spirit, to enter the lists or combat with sin reviving in us which will certainly kill us, unless we mortify it as it reviveth in us, or quell it as it rebels against us. So that the estate or condition of such as have been baptized, after once they come to the use of reason, is an estate different from their estate in their infancy or childhood ; an estate likewise different ordinarily from the absolute estate of election. But of this estate, and of our Christian demeanour in it, I shall now only say thus much in general. This mortification of the flesh, which our apostle enjoins, Rom. viii. 13, is that *reasonable service*, which the same apostle requires, Rom. xii. 1: *I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service.* But why a *reasonable service*? In opposition to the service of the law, which did consist in the sacrifice of bulls and goats, and other reasonless creatures, which yet were offered by the holy men of God in testification of their faith, or expectation of the promised Messias. This reasonable service or mortification of the flesh must be performed by us in testification of our belief, that he hath accomplished the sacrifices of the law by the sacrifice of himself. Again, this sacrifice or offering of ourselves, that is, of mortifying our brutish or unreasonable affections by the Spirit, is a great deal more acceptable to God, than the offerings which the three kings or wise men offered unto our Saviour Jesus Christ<sup>f</sup>. They offered gold, myrrh, and frankincense, in testimony or acknowledgment that the child then born was *the King of the Jews*. But inasmuch as we know that *we are not redeemed with silver and gold, but with the precious blood of Christ,*

<sup>f</sup> Aurum, thus, myrrham, Juvenus, an old poet and father, regique hominique Deoque, says that lived an. Christi 330.



*as of a Lamb without blemish*, we cannot either symbolize with the sacrifice of our High Priest, or attain to that live sympathy with him by the offering of silver, gold, or any other kind of offering besides the sacrifice of *a broken and contrite spirit*. If as he offered himself by the eternal Spirit to God the Father for us, so we again offer up ourselves to him by mortifying our earthly man by the Spirit; then his blood, as the apostle speaks, Heb. ix. 14, shall throughly *purge our consciences from dead works to serve the living God*, and finally cleanse us from all our sins. Unto this reasonable service, or offering up of ourselves, we were consecrated by baptism, and bound by solemn vow then made; and if we continue constant in performing this vow after we come to riper years, we shall continue in the state or condition of the sons of God, which we had by baptism; and by continuance <sup>162</sup> or progress in this estate we shall arrive at the immutable state of grace, or absolute election; for the end of the Son of God's appearance or manifestation was, that he might thus lead us on from strength to strength, until we appear before our God in Zion<sup>s</sup>.

The doctrine of mortification, (and the consequences thereof,) were it thus taught, and laid to the consciences of Christian people as a main part of their baptismal vow, and pressed home as a duty that concerned their everlasting salvation, would, by God's blessing, be likely to prove fruitful, as indeed it is useful. For somewhat to enlarge that which hath been touched on, in the foregoing chapter, this may be more particularly considered:

First, It leaves sloth and negligence in this good duty, and of so high concernment, clean without excuse.

The use of the former doctrine to condemn sloth: to prevent presumption and despair.

§ This was a sermon preached upon the Epiphany, as I take it.

Secondly, Being rightly applied, it serves as an antidote both against presumption and despair.

20. There is no way to make a coward hardy or resolute in fight, but by putting him upon some manifest exigent, or apparent necessity, either of killing his adversary, or of being killed by him. So long as there is hope to escape by flight or non-appearance, it is a matter almost impossible to make a timorous spirit try his strength or ability. The foes or enemies with whom we are here enjoined to fight, are our own bodies, or our own flesh, which still fighteth against our souls; from whose assaults there is no possibility of flight. There is an apparent necessity laid upon us, either of killing *the deeds of the body*, or of being more than killed by them. For *if we live after the flesh*, or suffer the works of the flesh or deeds of the body to live or reign in us, *we shall die* the death of the soul. Did we truly apprehend the necessity of this choice, how were it possible for us to defer this conflict with our own flesh for one moment!

21. Some, notwithstanding, there be, which see in part this necessity of dying, by living after the flesh, and yet submit their wills and affections unto the desires and lusts of the flesh, as men condemned by law do their bodies to the officers of justice or executioners. This these poor souls do, some out of conscience, because they hold it unlawful to resist authority, some out of weakness, as being not able to prevail if they should struggle with authority. But neither of these motives can have place in the former case: for, first, the conflict or resistance of the flesh is not only lawful, but necessary; so necessary, that if, after our promise in baptism and participation of the word and sacraments, we neglect the undertaking of this war with our own bodies, we are

in the same case that soldiers are, which, after they have received press-money and good pay, run from their colours. We justly incur the sentence of everlasting death, by not seeking to put the deeds of this mortal body to death. We become perpetual slaves to Satan, by refusing to fight with sin, which is Christ's enemy, and Satan's agent.

22. Nor can we pretend that our endeavours to mortify the deeds of the body are hopeless or vain, because we are not able of ourselves to think a good thought, much less to give good success to our best endeavours. For the apostle (as you heard before) enjoins us *to work out our salvation with fear and trembling*; that is, as men afraid to be idle or slothful for a moment, even for this reason, *because it is God that worketh in us both the will and the deed*. And though the same apostle hath elsewhere said, *That it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy*; yet it is a general rule in 163 divinity, *Finis dicendorum est ratio dictorum*, our apostle's speech must be taken from the end or general scope at which he aimed. To what end then doth our apostle give us the former or like rule? to the end that we should not will or desire our mortification, nor run with alacrity towards the goal; which in every epistle he sets before us, to wit, the mortification of the flesh and life of the spirit? or rather to kindle our desires to work, and stir up our alacrity in working, yet so as we still rely, not upon our works or endeavours, but merely upon the good will and mercy of our God. He that saith, *It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy*<sup>h</sup>, did never say, that it was not the good will or pleasure of God to shew mercy unto all, that, abandon-

<sup>h</sup> See chap. 41. and 42.

ing all other ways, run with what speed and alacrity they can unto his mercy. He that saith, *God will have mercy upon whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth*, did never say, that it was God's will to harden any which deny themselves and their own doings, and wholly betake themselves to his infinite goodness. His meaning, sure, in that place is, that as God will have mercy on none that seek salvation by works or other prerogatives of the flesh, so he will harden none that put their confidence, not in their works, but in his mercy.

23. The sum of all that can in this point be said, is, that no man can be partaker of the promise of life, but he that faithfully seeks for mercy in Christ Jesus. And no man can faithfully seek for mercy in Christ, but he that sincerely renounceth his own works and merits. And no man can sincerely and truly renounce his own works and merits, but he that is industrious and laborious in these works of mortification here enjoined. Hypocrites and ungodly persons will be ready in the day of trial, to deny all hopes of salvation by works, or confidence in merits. But as was intimated before, no man can be truly said to renounce those good works which he hath left undone, but those works which he hath done<sup>g</sup>. No man can truly deny himself, but he that exerciseth himself in these works of mortification. We cannot possibly know our own impotency or want of strength to perform these works of mortification as we ought, unless we make proof or trial of our strength in working them as we can. The more we try our strength, the more insufficient shall we find ourselves; and the better experience we have of our own insufficiency, the more earnestly will we (if we do as we ought for our ow good) crave the

<sup>i</sup> Chap. 36. parag. 7.



assistance of God's Spirit ; the more faithfully will we rely on Christ, who is our strength and the rock of our salvation, and so not presume.

24. Again, the former doctrine is useful to prevent despair in the days of temptation ; albeit we find our transgressions of this precept to be great and many. Our apostle saith not, If ye have lived after the flesh, ye shall die—for so no flesh should be saved ; but his words are, *If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die.* If any man find his conscience burdened with an heavy load of the works of the flesh, let him not take the frights, no nor the scars of conscience wounded by sins past, or the impressions by sin present, as undoubted marks of reprobation ; yet let him call to mind, as often as he finds himself prone to the works of the flesh, that he may fall into reprobation before he be aware, if he continue secure in that course of life which formerly he hath taken ; let him withal remember, that *præterita non nocent si præsentia non placent.*

On the other side, is there any man whose conscience can truly inform him that he hath sincerely <sup>164</sup> laboured to *mortify the deeds of the body* ? his faith upon this information will assure him that he is in the way of life, and that in *patient continuance in well doing* he shall be *a vessel unto honour, and make his election sure.* But let not any man hence conclude that he is already in the immutable state of grace. For our apostle doth not say, If ye have mortified the deeds of the body by the Spirit, ye are in the immutable state of life ; but he saith, *If ye mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live* : that is, if ye continue to mortify the deeds of the body, God will continue the blessing and means of life unto you, yea confirm you in the immutable state of life and saving grace.

25. If any man list to examine himself, whether he

be in the state of election or reprobation, let him measure or moderate his persuasions of the one or other estate by his proficiency or negligence in this duty of mortification. Otherwise, to be prepossessed with strong persuasions of being in the immutable state of grace or election, before we have given all diligence to make our election sure by performing this duty of mortification, is the readiest or most compendious way that Satan yet hath found out to cast men into a reprobate sense, that is, to make them without sense or feeling of their sins; or, which is worse, to mispersuade them that those very deeds, whilst done by them, are no sins, or sins of infirmity only, which being done by others are even in their judgments gross and capital sins. The method by which Satan works this mispersuasion in men (strongly persuaded of their own immutable state of grace, before their due time) is immutable and infallible. For it is an infallible rule in logic and nature, that an universal negative may be simply converted. If no rich man (whilst a rich man) can be a beggar, then no beggar (whilst he is a beggar) can be a rich man. If no covetous, no proud, no envious, no seditious or uncharitable man, no doer of any of those works of the flesh mentioned by St. Paul, Gal. v, can enter into the kingdom of heaven; then no man, whose entrance into it is immutably determined, can be a covetous, an envious, seditious or uncharitable man. Whence, if a man be once persuaded that his entrance into the kingdom of heaven, or his estate in grace is unchangeable, he cannot possibly persuade himself, or be persuaded by others, that he is a covetous, proud, envious, seditious or an uncharitable man, albeit he do all the works that a covetous, proud, envious, seditious or uncharitable man doth.

26. Lastly, although it be the safest way to examine our estate in grace by our diligence in this duty of

mortification; yet I must admonish men not to examine their proficiency or progress in performance of this duty by mere abstinence from the works of the flesh, which they sincerely dislike or condemn in others. I know we condemn the blind obedience of the Roman catholics, that are ready to do and believe as the church commands them, without examination, as a work of the flesh, of which we are freed; yet this doth not argue that we have mortified this work of the flesh, this blind obedience, unless our consciences can truly inform us that we are ready to obey the church our mother in things lawful, or in things which, upon diligent examination, are not evil, but indifferent.

We likewise condemn as well the affected ignorance of the Romish catholic, in that though he may, yet he regards not to hear the word preached in a language that he knows, as his blind devotion, in that he can be content to make his prayers, or to hear public prayers in a language that he understands not, for works of the flesh. In both these we do well: yet are neither of these works truly mortified in us by the Spirit, unless we be as ready and zealous to join with the <sup>165</sup> congregation in public prayers of the church celebrated in a known tongue, as we are to hear or read sermons. The ministers must preach, that the people may know how to pray aright in private. And the people must join with them in public prayers appointed by the church, that both may practise according to the rules of life delivered, whether by the word read or preached. The communion of saints, or that part of it which can be had betwixt saints here on earth, doth specially consist in the unity of faith, and of prayers publicly celebrated according to the common rule of faith.

## CHAP. XXXVIII.

## A SERMON

PREACHED ON ST. SIMON AND JUDE'S DAY, 1629.

JUDE, ver. 4.

“ For there are certain men crept in unawares, who were before of old ordained to this condemnation, ungodly men, turning the grace of our God into lasciviousness, and denying the only Lord God, and our Lord Jesus Christ.”

The scope  
of the  
epistle.

1. THE end and scope of this epistle you have set down in the third verse. And it is, in brief, to exhort these his flock or charge, *to contend earnestly for the faith which was once delivered to the saints*. The word ONCE is emphatical, and imports thus much: that the rule of faith had been *once for all delivered* unto them, so full and so complete, that if they would hold close to it, and use it as the rule of life, they should need no other additions, or increase of new

166 points to be believed or practised. The special occasion which he had to write unto them for this end and purpose was, because there were *certain ungodly men crept into* their society, which did overthrow or contaminate that rule of faith which had been *delivered unto the saints*. But how they did overthrow it is not expressed in particular. Most certain it is, (for St. Jude expressly affirms it,) *that they did deny the only Lord God, and our Lord Jesus Christ*. Now to deny God or Christ, there be but two ways possible: either by opinion and doctrine, or by matter of fact and practice. And these men it seems did both ways deny God and his Christ, though not directly and expressly, yet by necessary and unavoidable consequence. But wherein they did deny God and Christ shall be touched in the use and application.

The occasion  
of  
writing.

Two ways  
of denying  
God.

Two points  
of doctrine  
handled.

The doctrinal points to be discussed are two:

First, Unto what condemnation they were of old ordained.



Secondly, How, or in what manner they were ordained unto it.

2. There is an English note upon this place, a very strange one, yet gathered as it seems from some good writers, who did not so clearly express themselves in their comments upon this place as might have been desired, and yet are far worse understood by many of their followers than they meant. The English note<sup>k</sup> seems to imply, that these men were ordained to trouble the church, or to follow those lewd opinions or practices whereby the church was troubled, and the faith of many brought into manifest hazard. Yet to say that any man is ordained by God to this or the like end will be very harsh to any Christian ears, and was (I am persuaded) either a branch of their heresy which are here said to be *ordained to condemnation*, or a branch of the same root, worse than any heresy which they maintained. And yet to say, That men are ordained to trouble the church, to be ungodly, and to deny Christ, is but the necessary consequent of their opinion, who hold, That all things, every action of man, even sinful actions, are so ordained and determined by God, that they cannot come to pass otherwise than they do in the individual, either for the matter and substance, or for the circumstance of the action. Thus to write, and thus to speak, some are emboldened, because nothing can fall out without God's foresight, yea without his cooperation; for in him all things living do live, all things endued with motion do move, and have their being. And in that nothing can be done without him, in that he is omnipotent, and supporteth the world by the word of his power; they do not collect amiss that they cannot lay a load too heavy upon him. But they should consider, that seeing he

God ordains no man to sin.

<sup>k</sup> See the first note at the end of this chapter.

God is no  
less holy  
and just  
than pow-  
erful.

is holy and just, no less holy and just than he is powerful, they may lay that upon him which is a great deal too foul for him to bear. The foulest aspersion that can be cast upon his holiness is to make him the author of sinful actions; to say or think he did ordain men to trouble the church, or to be (as these men were) ungodly persons, deniers of Christ.

3. To avouch in plain terms that God is the author of sin, is, as most confess, a dangerous heresy, a sign of a darkened mind in spiritual knowledge: and yet the blindness or ignorance would be more gross if any man should grant the antecedent, and deny the consequent: that is, if one should grant, that God did ordain any man to persecute the church, to turn his grace into wantonness, and yet withal deny that God in thus doing should be the cause and author of sin<sup>1</sup>. 'He that is author or cause of any action which is essentially evil, or universally inseparable from evil, is the author and cause of all the evil which is inseparable from the action, even in that he is the cause of the action. For that which they call the *obliquity* of the action, or *malum formale*—formally evil, can have no other cause at all than that which is the cause of the action, from which this formal evil is unseparable.' So that if God's ordinance be the necessary cause of such an action, to wit, of troubling the church, the same ordinance must be the cause of the obliquity or evil which is annexed unto it. Satan and wicked men should be but causes instrumental at most; that is, such a cause as the sword is of the murder which a man commits with it. So that the case is clear, that if to trouble the church with lewd opinions be a sinful action, then God, who is no author of sin, did never ordain men unto that action: for whatsoever God doth ordain

<sup>1</sup> See the 6th chapter.

or decree, he is the author of it. These inferences will admit no plea or traverse amongst such as are instructed in the fundamental rules of art or nature: for all do grant, that which they call *obliquity*, or *formal evil*, to be a relation, that is, such an entity or being, unto which no action can be immediately terminated; it hath its being only by concomitance or resultance from some other effect, which hath a direct and immediate cause. Of this nature are equality or inequality of bodies, similitude or dissimilitude. Now it is impossible that man or angel, or any cause whatsoever, should produce an equality between two bodies formally unequal, by any other means than by altering the quantity of one or both; or to make one body dislike unto another but by altering their qualities. Altogether as impossible it is to produce an obliquity or crookedness in men's ways by any other mean, than by producing those actions which are in their nature perverse and crooked. He which is the cause of such actions in the individual, is the cause of that crookedness or obliquity which is inseparably annexed unto them.

God is author of that which he ordaineth.

4. That God is not the cause, not the author of such actions, or that such actions are not necessary in respect of his decree, Christianity itself, or the rule of catholic faith, binds us to believe as firmly as that there is a God, who is the Author or Fountain of goodness. Hence saith St. James, chap. i. 13, 14, *Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man unto evil: but every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed.* And unto this inconvenience of being tempted by his own lust, man was not subject until he was beguiled by Satan; nor could this great tempter work evil in man

immediately or directly, but only by tempting or enticing him to that action to which evil was unseparably annexed, that is, to taste of the fruit which God had forbidden. The tempter knew that if he could entice our first parents unto this action, there was no possibility of shedding the obliquity or formal evil from it, which was essentially annexed unto it. Now if God had ordained man to this individual action, or to the condemnation which was due to this action, without possibility of avoiding it, his ordination had been a more true cause of the first man's sin, and of his death and ours, than Satan was. For Satan had no power, either natural or permitted him by God, to make any ordinance or decree for man, no power, either given or permitted, to lay a necessity of sinning upon our first parents. All that he was able or permitted to do, was only by way of temptation or enticement. Adam, as all grant, had a freedom of will in respect of Satan, or any enticement that he could propose unto him; but freedom of will he could have had none in respect of God's decree or ordination, if it were true that God had ordained him to eat the forbidden fruit.

168 For the rule is most certain, that God is the cause and author of whatsoever he ordains men to do; and hence we read, *that God hath ordained us to good works, to newness of life*, to the performance of all those duties which are commanded. But we never read in scripture—and let it never be read in any other book but with indignation, let it never be spoken or thought upon by any Christian but with detestation—that God should ordain men to walk in the ways of Cain, or to tread in the paths of ungodliness. The conclusion then is firm and sound, 'That these men here mentioned in St. Jude were not ordained to trouble the church, but ordained, and that of old, unto that condemnation which

The conclusion of the first point.



is due to such as trouble the church, or to ungodliness; and that is a fearful condemnation, as St. Jude expresseth it, ver. 13: *for to them, saith he, is reserved the blackness of darkness for ever.* And if this were reserved unto them, or for them, they were first ordained unto it; the sentence was already passed upon them, albeit the execution be deferred until *the judgment of the great day.* But unto this condemnation they were ordained, because they had *followed the ways of Cain, and run greedily after the error of Balaam,* as St. Jude tells us, ver. 11. But far be it from us to think that they were ordained to follow the ways of Cain, who was the first troubler of the church, that they might be condemned. And thus much of the first point, what *condemnation* is here meant, or unto what they *were ordained*; that was, not to trouble the church, but to everlasting torments for troubling the church by wicked lives and lewd opinions.

5. The second general was what *ordination* is here meant, or in what manner these men are said *to be ordained to this condemnation.* Many take it as granted, that ordination to everlasting death is the very same that reprobation is; yet if this were a time, or this a place fitting for discussion of this point, it might be easily made to appear, that although reprobation include surely an ordination to death, yet every ordination to death doth not include reprobation; for ordination to life and predestination, and ordination to death and reprobation, differ as much as *genus* and *species*, as a reasonable creature doth differ from a sensitive creature. But to let this pass; this place of St. Jude is, in the opinion of many good writers, equivalent to that of 1 St. Peter, ii. 8: *They stumble at the word, being disobedient: whereunto also they were appointed.* But for that place, it is ingenuously and discreetly ex-

The second point.

pounded by a late English writer<sup>m</sup>, in his Comments upon that epistle. And it were to be wished, that his exposition were sincerely embraced by such as had the man in esteem while he lived, and are much beholding to his writings (especially upon this epistle) since he died. I shall only now give you notice, that the original word in this place of St. Jude, rendered by *ordained*, is not the same with that in St. Peter; that is ἐτέθησαν, and is well rendered *appointed*. Nor is it the same with that of St. Paul, Acts xiii. 48: *As many as were ordained* (ἦσαν τεταγμένοι) *unto eternal life, believed*. St. Jude's word here is προγεγραμμένοι, that is, as some render it, *præscripti*—prescribed; *of whom it was forewritten to this condemnation*. But as Beza, *descripti*; that is, as men designed, taxed, or proscribed to this condemnation. It includes then an *ordinance* or somewhat more, to wit, an *ordinance upon record*: but in what record? In God's everlasting book of death? or may we say that he hath such a book? It is evident that there be more books than one out of which men shall be judged at the last day, according to their works, as St. John tells us, Rev. xx. 12.

169 The points then remaining to be discussed are two.

The second  
general  
subdivided.

First, In what sense these men are said to be *fore-ordained* to everlasting death, or in what sense men are said to be reprobated from everlasting, or from eternity?

The second, Whether our apostle in this place did expressly and punctually mean God's eternal decree of reprobation, or some other ordination to death?

6. In handling the first point, I shall only explicate that which I have elsewhere delivered<sup>n</sup>, to wit, "That

<sup>m</sup> I suppose he means Mr. Byfield, who is far from the rigidness of some in that point.

<sup>n</sup> See chap. 37, Numb. xvi, and Pharaoh's hardening.

albeit whosoever is reprobated is reprobated from eternity, yet no man at the time of his baptism is a reprobate; few or none are born in that estate or condition; but such as finally perish do fall into it." The case may be made clear by divers instances, wherein men, even by human laws, may be sentenced to death or other punishment before they be born, and yet at the time of their birth, or within some few days before their death or punishment, be no more liable to the sentence of the law than other men are. For unto death, or other grievous punishment, there is required for the most part as well the sentence of the judge as the sentence of the rule or law. And yet in some peculiar cases no more is required than the sentence of the law or rule, which was made and given many hundreds of years before the party was born which is sentenced by it. Every one that committeth murder is liable to death by the law; but besides the sentence of the law, or the rule, which is general to all, there is required the sentence of the judge to apply the law to this particular; and before he give sentence, there is further required a formal process, not only for proof of the fact itself, but of the quality of it. And until this process be observed, the judge himself may not give sentence, although he himself saw the fact committed; nor may the party be executed or put to death by any, until the judge have given sentence. He is condemnable before the jury pass upon him, but not condemned when the jury finds him guilty, until the judge pass sentence upon him. But if a private man shall take up arms against his sovereign lord, or the state wherein he lives, he is rebellious *ipso jure*, he is a rebel by law, there needs no other trial or formal process besides the evidence of the fact. The martial or general is only to put the law in execution, and the party thus rebelling

*Sententia  
judicis, et  
sententia  
juris.*

is sentenced to death by the law, which was in force many hundreds of years before the party offending was born, who notwithstanding is not liable to this sentence of death till he commit the fact, at which the law doth immediately strike, not at his person. Again, there is ordinarily required to excommunication, not only *sententia juris*, but *sententia judicis*; though the canon by which he is excommunicated were made long before, yet he that offends against the canon is not forthwith excommunicated by it, until he be refractory or contumacious. The judge may admonish before he give sentence, and without his sentence judicially given the party is not excommunicated by the law. But some peculiar cases there be, wherein a man may stand immediately excommunicated by the law or canon without the sentence of the judge: there is no place left for admonition or recanting. The fact being once proved, either by witnesses or by its own evidence, the judge hath no more to do but to read the canon, and to pronounce that the party hath fallen upon it. So that he is said to be excommunicated by the law or canon, which was made perhaps a thousand years before he was born, and yet not born an excommunicate person, or in the state of excommunication; into this estate he falls by doing some fact or other, at which the rule or canon doth immediately strike, without further process or conviction. Now inasmuch as the sentence was given before he was born, it cannot be denied but that  
 170 he was excommunicated before he was born, and yet had not been excommunicated at all, unless he had done that fact which requireth excommunication by the law.

7. Some founders of colleges appoint a process or formal proceeding against offenders, even in grosser crimes: as for adultery, murder, manifest perjury, or



the like, before any man can be expelled for these and the like crimes. Such as they appoint judges must give sentence *viva voce* upon the examination, not of the fact only, but of the quality of the fact; as whether it be scandalous in so high a degree as deserves amotion without further admonition or expectation of amendment. And every one that is in these cases amoved or expelled, is expelled by his present judges, not immediately by his founder or his statutes; though the judges must proceed according to their intent or meaning. But in case any of the same society, the very governors themselves, should obtain a license or dispensation for their oath, there needs no sentence of any judge, there is no place for admonition or traverse, because the founders themselves, even when they made these laws and statutes, inflicted these punishments upon all such as in this kind transgress their statutes. Now upon whomsoever the founder of any society, which died some two or three hundred years ago, did inflict the punishment of expulsion by virtue of this present statute, he did inflict it before the party offending was born: and yet this punishment had not at all fallen upon him, unless he had committed that fact, which the founder in his lifetime did thus severely censure, whensoever it should by any of his society be committed. Now in this case we may truly say, that the party thus offending doth<sup>o</sup> expel himself by committing that fact for which he was expelled by his founder. The founder then expels him before he was born, without any respect unto his person; for no law-giver makes any decree or law against any man's person, but against men's misdemeanours; but the party cannot be said to expel himself before he doth dash against the inflexible law or statute.

<sup>o</sup> See the note at the end of this chapter.

8. And if no lawgiver on earth, how partial soever, make any capital decrees against any man's person, far be it from us to think, that the eternal Lawgiver, who is himself the everliving Rule of justice and equity, should sentence any man's person to everlasting death; albeit whosoever is sentenced to everlasting death be so sentenced from eternity, because God himself, who is eternal, is the very Rule or Law, a law or rule inflexible, which cannot alter, and yet rewards every man according to all his ways and works, not according to his person or individual nature. Whosoever then is reprobated by God is reprobated by him before he be born, even from eternity; and yet no man baptized is born a reprobate, or becomes so until he reprobate himself by committing those sins, or rather that measure of sin, unto which the eternal Lawgiver did, before all times, award final exclusion from the benefits of Christ's death and passion. Now unto such *ungodly men* as St. Jude here speaks of this award was allotted from eternity, and thus they were *ordained to condemnation*: but their persons were not created or made to ungodliness. Taking them as now they are, there was a necessity from eternity that they should perish; but there was no necessity from eternity that they should be such ungodly men as now they are. This necessity did accrue in time, they wilfully and freely brought it upon themselves.

Thus much of the first part of the second general, to wit, in what sense it is true, that whosoever is reprobated or ordained to everlasting death in time, was so reprobated or ordained from eternity. The meaning  
 171 is, that the law or rule, by which he is reprobated or ordained to death, hath no beginning of date, it was unchangeably set from eternity. Yet was this law or rule an immanent act, that is, contained in him only

who is eternal; it did not produce any real effect answerable unto it, either for the creature before he was made, or in the creature after he was made, until he have made up that measure of sin unto which everlasting death was by this eternal living rule awarded. But the measure of sin being made up, then (as the lawyers speak) *judicium transit in rem judicatam*, that is, the eternal law or sentence produceth a transient effect in the creature so qualified, and that is an ordination passive, the beginning of that death which shall have no end.

9. The second part of the second general which was the last doctrinal point, was, Whether St. Jude in this place be to be understood of God's eternal design or ordination unto death, or of some written ordination or ruled case, which did as truly fit these men, taking them as now they are, as it did other ungodly persons of old, against whom the sentence of condemnation here meant was denounced or declared by other of God's ambassadors. That these *ungodly men* here in St. Jude were *foreordained to this condemnation*, the word *προγεγραμμένοι* doth literally and clearly evince: but whether this foreordination were in St. Jude's intent or meaning a foreordination from eternity, the literal importance of the word *πάλαι*, *of old*, doth make it questionable, or rather puts it out of question that he did not so mean. For it is an adverb of time, and never reaches, to my observation, so far as *ἐν ἀρχῇ*, or *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*; is not so much as if he had said, *in the beginning*, or *from the beginning*; much less doth it amount unto so much as if he had said *before all worlds*, or *before the foundation of the world was laid*; which words or the like do import *eternity*. And unto this literal importance or signification of the word *πάλαι*, the material or real circumstances do fully

Second part  
of the se-  
cond gene-  
ral.

accord: both do fully witness that he speaks only of some foreordination, made or declared in the compass of time; as ver. 11: *Woe unto them! for they have gone in the way of Cain, and ran greedily after the error of Balaam for reward, and perished in the gainsaying of Core.* This *woe* denounced takes date only from the time of their following the ways of Cain, of Balaam and Corah. God did not ordain either from eternity, or by any written sentence upon record, that these men by name should go on in the *ways of Cain*, should *run after the error of Balaam*, should *perish in the gainsaying of Core*. But now that they had visibly followed the ways of these wicked men, they were *προγεγραμμένοι*, *foresentenced*, or *foreordained* to the same condemnation which had fallen upon Cain, Balaam, and Corah. The sentence or judgment declared of old against these three was as a ruled case for the condemnation of these men that St. Jude speaks of; they had incurred the sentence of condemnation given of old, as we say, *ipso facto*, that is, by doing the same things which Cain, Balaam, and Corah had done. And St. Jude, whether by the spirit of revelation, or by evidence of their facts themselves, doth but declare or pronounce that these ungodly men had fallen foul upon that immovable rule or canon, which had formerly been declared against Cain and Corah and his confederates.

10. That these men now were in the same state wherein Cain and Corah were after they had committed these foul sins for which they were condemned, our apostle takes it as granted, vv. 12, 13: *These are spots in your feasts of charity, when they feast with you, feeding themselves without fear: clouds they are without water, carried about of winds; trees whose fruit withereth, without fruit, twice dead, plucked up*  
 172 *by the roots; raging waves of the sea, foaming out*



*their own shame; wandering stars, to whom is reserved the blackness of darkness for ever.* He speaks of them as of reprobates, or men ordained to condemnation. For being in the same state or condition, for the quality and measure of their sins, that Cain, Balaam, and Corah had been, they were foreordained with them to the same condemnation; and this their foreordination was upon record in all that Moses or others had written concerning God's judgments upon Cain, upon Balaam, and Corah. That our apostle means such a *foreordination* upon ancient record we gather from ver. 14: *And Enoch also, the seventh from Adam, prophesied of these, saying, Behold, the Lord cometh &c.* If Enoch ALSO did prophesy of them, then some other besides Enoch had prophesied of them. So had Moses, who relates God's judgments upon Cain, prophesied of their judgments who followed the *ways of Cain*; and in foretelling God's fearful judgments upon Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, he foretold the condemnation of all such as followed their ways, and were foreordained to the like condemnation in their condemnation; but more expressly foreordained of old unto the same condemnation by Enoch's prophecy, which was more ancient than Moses' writings, although Moses mentioned it not. The form of his prophecy, or of his judgments denounced against all ungodly men, was upon record in our apostle's time, in a book called *the book of Enoch*<sup>p</sup>, unto which, or so much of which as concerns this place, St. Jude gives authentic testimony, ver. 14, &c.: *Behold, the Lord cometh with ten thousand of his saints, to execute judgment upon all, and to convince all that are ungodly among them of all their ungodly deeds which they have ungodly com-*

<sup>p</sup> The book of Enoch. Of it, cap. 3. and the Annot. upon that see Tertull. de Cultu Fœm. lib. 1. place.

*mitted, and of all their hard speeches which ungodly sinners have spoken against him.* This prophecy was literally meant and in particular directed against the ungracious seed of Cain, and other such ungodly men of the old world, as did oppose or malign the church of God, then seated in the posterity of Seth; of which Enoch was a principal member, a man of high place or dignity; but the same prophecy was literally meant of these ungodly men, which did oppose the church, and deny that Lord which Enoch foretold should come *to give judgment upon all such as continue in ungodliness.* And though this prophecy were verified, or in some measure fulfilled, in the ungodly men of the old world, yet was it more exactly fulfilled in these ungodly men here in St. Jude, and shall be fulfilled again upon all such as they were, unto the world's end; and all, in whom it is, or hath been, or shall be fulfilled, are by it ordained to the condemnation here meant; and St. Jude having perfect notice that these ungodly men had followed the ways of Cain, and of Corah, doth but pronounce or declare them to be liable to the condemnation foretold by Enoch. But whether all of them were at this time in the absolute state of reprobation, that is, irreversibly ordained to everlasting death, or whether the gate of mercy and way to repentance were everlastingly shut up against all of them, that we leave to the eternal Judge, seeing ver. 22. mentions *compassion for some, and making a difference.*

11. However, this prophecy of Enoch was so famous and so authentic in the Jewish church before St. Jude wrote this epistle, that their GREAT AND FEARFUL EXCOMMUNICATION was conceived in the very form of words which St. Jude here, out of Enoch's, useth. And as writs amongst us have their name or title from

The Jews' highest ex-communication taken from Enoch's words.

the first and principal words contained in them, as some are called *sub pœna*, some *nisi prius*, &c.; so the greatest and most fearful excommunication, which the Jewish church did use was called THE EXCOMMUNICATION OF *DOMINUS VENIET*: THE LORD SHALL COME. St. Paul, as we read, Rom. ix. 3, did wish that he himself might be *anathema*, one excommunicated or separated *from Christ for his countrymen, or kinsmen according to the flesh*. But he did not wish himself to be *Anathema Maran-atha* for their sakes. This kind of anathema or excommunication, though, he confidently denounceth against all such in the church of Corinth as did not love their Saviour: *If any man*, saith he, 1 Cor. xvi. 22, *love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be Anathema Maran-atha*; that is all one as if he had said, "Let that sentence which Enoch first denounced against all ungodly and wicked men, especially against all blasphemers of God, of Christ, or the ways of the truth, fall upon him, whosoever he be, that, after so many miracles wrought in Christ's name, and so great manifestation of the truth revealed in his gospel, *doth not love the Lord*, which hath redeemed him." So then all in the church of Corinth that did not at this time *love Christ* were excommunicated, or *ordained of old* to that condemnation by the sentence which Enoch had given in general: and St. Paul only declares them *incidisse in canonem*, to have fallen under that fearful sentence of condemnation. Thus far of the two doctrinal points proposed; as, first, 'What condemnation it is whereunto these men were ordained;' secondly, 'In what manner they were ordained of old.'

12. Now for application, let us inquire what special sins they were by which they fell under this sentence first denounced by Enoch against the ungodly men of his time; or denounced by God himself against Cain.

The applica-  
tion.

or by his servant Moses against Corah. One principal sin was, *to despise dominion, and speak evil of dignities*; that is, of men in high place or authority, whether in church or commonwealth, Jude, ver. 8. And this sin he aggravates from the contrary behaviour of Michael the archangel, even towards the devil himself, who had no dignity or dominion, but usurped, ver. 9: *But these men speak evil of those things which they know not: but what they know naturally, as brute beasts, in those things they corrupt themselves.* Now as we know the form or figure of the seal, which we see not, by the impression or stamp which it leaves in the wax or paper, so some men there be in our time who express that character which St. Jude hath put upon these ungodly men as fully in their daily talk and conversation, as if St. Jude had fitted it for them, or expressed them by name. Such there are that bring railing accusations against their betters, against all of what rank or place soever in the church, which dissent from them in opinions concerning election or reprobation, or the tenor of God's decree, being points which they understand not; and yet speak evil of them that seek to rectify their error. But in things which are plain and easy to be understood, which the very heathen knew by light of nature, as in points of obedience to their lawful prince, or to such as are in authority under him, in these (shall I say as our apostle says?) *like brute beasts they corrupt themselves*: sure I am they are more brutishly ignorant than the ancient heathen Romans, or than the modern Turks, or most modern infidels are. Another special branch of these men's ungodliness was the *turning the grace of God into wantonness*: and what do they else, that trouble themselves and their neighbours with intricate disputes, how the grace of God doth cooperate with man



in his conversion or regeneration; and yet in the mean time violate the bond of peace and charity by their uncivil rude behaviour, and scurrilous manner of speech and writing. But it is no marvel if they sow discord amongst Christian men, who bend the strength of their wits and pens to (nurse or) course a faction betwixt God's grace to his elect, and his goodness towards all; especially to whom he vouchsafeth the <sup>174</sup> use of his sacraments. Now to deny God's infinite goodness, or to cut the wings of his mercy so short as <sup>How some deny Christ.</sup> some men do, is *to deny the Lord God*, and that in a worse manner (for matter of opinion) than these men here in St. Jude can be convinced to have done. But do they likewise deny the Lord Christ? Surely they deny him to be the Lord Redeemer of mankind, by denying that he paid the ransom for ALL; especially for ALL that are baptized in his name. For if Christ did not pay the ransom for ALL that are baptized in his name, then is he not their Lord by right of redemption, as well as by right of creation; that is, then he is no otherwise Lord of them than he is of devils, for even of them he is Lord by right of creation; and if Christ be no otherwise Lord of such as are baptized in his name than he is of devils, then we are false witnesses of Christ, when we teach such as are baptized, such as shall be admitted unto baptism to believe in Christ as their Redeemer. Again, were it true that Christ did die for the elect only, then no man could be more sure that Christ did pay the ransom for his sins, and that he hath purchased the remission of his sins, than he is that he is in the number of the elect<sup>q</sup>. Now no man is bound to believe, no man may safely believe, at his first admission into the church, that he is in the number of the elect; that is, in the number of such as

<sup>q</sup> See the third note at the end of this chapter.

shall not finally perish. If then we should teach men or children that Christ died only for the elect, we shall leave no possible mean between infidelity and presumption; for if we teach them that Christ died only for the elect, they must remain in the estate of infidels and unbelievers, until they believe that they are of the number of the elect. And if we teach them to begin their belief in Christ at this point, that they are of the number of the elect, then both they and we fall into the very dregs of their heresy whom St. Jude here saith were *foreordained to condemnation*. This was the very root of their ungodliness: and for this reason St. Jude, in the very next verse unto the text, puts the church (to whom he wrote his epistle) in remembrance of that which had been before delivered unto them; to wit, that albeit God had delivered *all* the people out of Egypt, yet afterwards he destroyed such as *believed not*, that is, such as continued not in their first belief. This then was the sum of *the faith once delivered unto the saints*; that they were all delivered by Christ's death from the slavery of Satan, and that this deliverance was as truly sealed unto them by the blood of Christ, as the deliverance of the Israelites out of Egypt was by the blood of the paschal lamb. Yet for all this they must not presume that they could not or should not finally perish, seeing God destroyed many in the wilderness which he had delivered out of Egypt. Our apostle then, if we follow his directions, puts us into the middle or safe way, between the contrary extremes of reprobation or election; and the mean or middle way is, that a great part of men, which have been baptized, are neither in the one state nor in the other, but as hath been before declared in the last foregoing chapters.

Notes by the Editor of the folio edition, 1673.

THE first note, relating to this 38th chapter, pag. 333, to those words of paragraph 2, “ There is an English note upon this place, a very strange one.”] This note is to be found in the impression of a quarto Bible, of a black English letter, printed at London, anno Domini 1598, by the deputies of Christopher Barker; and it runs thus—the text: *Of old ordained to this condemnation.* The note (e): “ He con-175 firmeth their heart against the contemners of religion and apostates, shewing, that such men trouble not the church at all adventures, but are appointed thereunto by the determinate counsel of God.” Thus it is in that edition; though in some Bibles with notes, since printed, some words or part of that note is omitted.

The second note, to pag. 341, to those words in the seventh paragraph of this 38th chapter: “ The party thus offending doth expel himself——.”] The heathens had a notion very remarkable, that the gods were desirous to shew mercy, at least to be quiet, and not to have their justice provoked by the sins of men. *Cælum ipsum petimus stultitia, neque Per nostrum patimur scelus Iracunda Jovem ponere fulmina*, says Horace, Carm. I. iii. 38. It is a complaint usual with Salvi- an, in his books De Gubern. Dei, that though God were loath to punish, yet men did *exigere et extorquere ut perirent*<sup>r</sup>; and that they did *vim facere, manus inferre pietati divinæ, et omni peccatorum scelere quasi omni telorum genere misericordiam Dei expugnare*: and yet for all this complained of God’s severity: whereas, *nos nobis, nos accusandi sumus*<sup>s</sup>. *Nam cum ea quibus torqueamur admittimus, ipsi tormentorum nostrorum auctores sumus*——. *Unusquisque nostrum ipse se punit, et ideo illud propheticum ad nos dicitur: Ecce omnes vos ignem accenditis, et vires præbetis flammæ, ingredimini in lucem ignis vestri et flammæ quam accendistis*<sup>t</sup>. *Totum namque humanum genus hoc ordine in pœnam æternam ruit, quo scriptura memoravit. Primum enim accendit, postea vires ignibus præbet, postremo flammam ingreditur quam paravit. Quando igitur primum sibi homo æternum accendit ignem? sc. Cum primum peccare incipit. Quando autem vires ignibus præbet? Cum utique peccatis pec-*

<sup>r</sup> Salv. lib. 1.

<sup>s</sup> Ib. lib. 4. p. 75.

<sup>t</sup> Isaiah l. 11.

*cata cumularit. Quando vero ignem æternum introibit? Quando irremediabilem jam omnium malorum summam crescentium delictorum iniquitate compleverit. Sicut Salvator noster ad Judæos ait, Implete mensuram patrum vestrorum —<sup>u</sup>. And in his seventh book<sup>x</sup>, Quicquid actum est, peccatis, non Deo ascribendum: quia recte illi rei factum ascribitur, quæ ut ita fieret, exegit. Nam et homicida cum a judice occiditur suo scelere punitur: et latro aut sacrilegus cum flammis exurit, suis criminibus concrematur.* This agrees with the rules of civil law; *Qui causam dat damni ipsum damnum dedisse videtur. Qui sceleratum consilium cepit, exinde quodammodo sua mente punitus est.* So the emperors Severus and Antoninus, (in lib. 34. D. de Jure Fisci:) *Rescripserunt Asclepiadi; Ipse te huic pœnæ subdidisti. Ex quo notant DD.: Eum qui delinquit, hoc ipso præsumi voluisse obligare sese ad pœnam ei delicto præstitutam.* (See Macarius, hom. 4, where he cites Rom. ii. 5: *Thou ..... treasurest up to thyself wrath ..... and hom. 12. interrogat. 5.)* Yea sure, most certain it is, that every one which commits any sin, together with, yea in the very commission of that sin, enters an obligation, and forfeits himself to the very same punishment which the divine justice hath inflicted or awarded unto that sin, in the examples recorded in holy scripture. Achan bound himself to appear in the valley of Achor or Trouble, by the very taking of the wedge and clothes, which were indeed no other than the earnest of those wages which were there paid unto him. Ahab and Jezebel, by seizing on Naboth and his vineyard, forfeited their bloods to the dogs. Gehazi brought back the Syrian leprosy wrapt up in the raiment, &c. Even so! *Holy, and true, and righteous, are thy judgments, O Lord: who would not fear thee, O King of nations,* which hast ordained that an inordinate mind should not only breed and bring forth, but be a punishment, an executioner, a witness, and a judge unto itself? This last observation is (partly) St. Austin's; that which follows is a heathen's:

Exemplo quodcumque malo committitur, ipsi  
 Displicet auctori. Prima est hæc ultio, quod se  
 Judice nemo nocens absolvitur, improba quamvis  
 Gratia fallaci prætoris vicerit urna, &c. Juv. xiii. 1.

<sup>u</sup> Matt. xxiii. 32.

<sup>x</sup> Salv. lib. 7. pag. 166.



The third note (taken out of the author's writings) relates to page 349. Some deny all baptismal grace; others grant that some grace is given to infants in baptism, but restrain it only to infants elect. So they expound the Church Catechism, which teaches children to believe, "that as Christ redeemed them and all mankind, so the Holy Ghost doth sanctify them and all the elect people of God." But who can think that our church meant to teach children, at the first profession of their faith, to believe they were elect, that is, such as cannot finally perish? This was to teach them their faith backwards, to seek heaven by descending from it. St. Paul, nay, the angels that have kept their first estate almost six thousand years, could not reach higher. Yet would our church have every one, at his first profession of faith, believe that he is one of the elect people of God. Those right reverend fathers that composed the Catechism, and our holy mother that did authorize it, did in charity presume, that every one which would take upon him to expound that Catechism, or other principles of faith, should first know the distinction between elect, that is, such as cannot perish, and the elect people of God; or, between election unto God's ordinary grace, or means of salvation, and election unto glory. Every nation or company of men, when first converted from Gentilism to Christianity, became an elect people, a chosen generation; that is, they and their seed were made capable of baptism, received an interest in God's promises, &c., which heathens, whilst heathens, could not have. All of us are in baptism thus far sanctified, that we are made true members of the visible church, qualified for hearing the word, receiving the sacrament of Christ's body and blood, and all other benefits of Christ's priestly function that are committed to the dispensation of his ministers here on earth. Out of this, the reader may easily pick what is pertinent to that place, page 349.

*Dr. Jackson's Vindication of himself<sup>x</sup>, written above twenty years ago; or, a serious Answer to Mr. Burton's Exception taken against a Passage in his Treatise of the Divine Essence and Attributes.*

AGAINST a treatise of the Divine Essence and Attributes lately published by me, some exceptions have been taken, many sought, as if it did open a gap unto Arminianism. And yet I have not had the happiness to know, either what points of Arminianism they be which I am suspected to favour, or the particular proposition in that treatise upon which the indefinite or confused suspicion is grounded. Only thus far I have been beholden unto one man, that it hath pleased him to avouch a quarrel against one passage in my book, with subscription of his name. And it is expected by some (but by few of my good friends) that I should give him a serious answer. For my own part, I have ever held it a point, not of folly only, but of cowardice and inhumanity, to accept a challenge from a man desperately set to waste his spirits, to spend his strength, to wound himself and the cause he undertakes,

<sup>x</sup> This learned author, in the year 1628, published his sixth book of Comments upon the Creed; or his Treatise of the Divine Essence and Attributes. Immediately whereupon, Mr. H. Burton taking offence, published his book styled "Israel's Fast," perhaps he might preach some part of it at the fast held in the beginning of the parliament called that year. In the Epistle Dedicatory prefixed to that book, he hath the words cited in the following chapter.

See "Israel's Fast," printed in the year 1628, which is owned by Mr. Burton's name sub-printed; though neither the printer nor the place where it was printed be set down. See also the Narration of Mr. H. Burton's Life, written by himself, and printed in London 1643. (the printer's name is not there set down); in the fifth page of which book, he owns the book styled "Israel's Fast," and says it was published at a general fast.

by a long and furious fight with his own shadow, before he can find the way into the appointed field. Wherefore, leaving him with his assistants and abettors, to wrestle or combat with their own imaginations, which (as I see) will find them play enough, and make the enemies of that religion which they would profess, (if they knew how,) too much sport; I shall crave leave, first, to unfold this man's notorious falsification of my assertion; secondly, to shew the orthodoxal truth of that assertion which he falsifieth, with the dangerous and unchristian consequences of the proposition contradictory unto it; thirdly, to make it appear how deeply it concerns every loyal member of the church and commonweal of England, (especially such as are engaged with me to maintain the religion which we all profess, against the doctrine of the church of Rome,) to prevent the further spreading of that rigid doctrine of absolute reprobation, as it is held by most, if not by all, which have hitherto excepted against the forementioned treatise of the Divine Essence and Attributes.

2. The first exception, which to my knowledge was taken against it, was in a book entitled "Israel's Fast," dedicated to "the royal Joshua, and loyal elders of Israel," now happily assembled in parliament. In the epistle before that book, he hath *verbatim* these words: "These neutralizers, or popish Arminians, or Arminian papists, or what you will, under the name of the church of England, dare vent any Arminian heresy. As in a book lately printed, by authority too, there is this most blasphemous Arminian heresy, 'That there is a goodness objective in the creature, which in order of nature is precedent to the act or exercise of God's will;' thus, 178 by necessary consequence, making the creature a god, having a self-being independent, but only upon God's

bare prescience, upon which, and not upon that supreme cause of causes, God's will, he hangeth the being and wellbeing of all the creatures." And in the margin of that epistle, just over against the words last quoted, he hath these words also: "God's eternal and blessed will, providence, wisdom, free grace, glory, and consequently his whole essence, overturned by an Arminian trick, and that also backed with abused authority."

3. If the exhibiter of this complaint will acquit himself from a double slander, he must (as I conceive the course of all justice requireth) prove these two points following :

First, That the proposition which he chargeth with "most blasphemous Arminian heresy," is or hath been maintained by Arminius, or some Arminian.

Secondly, That the same proposition hath been uttered or maintained by me.

That Arminius, or any Arminian, did ever in writing or otherwise deliver or maintain that proposition which this objector hath censured for a "most blasphemous Arminian heresy," is more than I know, more than I can suspect, and more (I think) than the author of this accusation can prove; unless his meaning be, that any absurd or blasphemous opinion may justly be fathered upon Arminius, or ascribed unto the Arminians. And if this be his meaning, he will prove himself to be a more gross Arminian heretic than those whom he only suspects (but proves nothing) of "most blasphemous Arminian heresy." For I never heard or read that proposition which he chargeth with "most blasphemous Arminian heresy" delivered by any, save only by the author of the forementioned epistle to "the royal Joshua and loyal elders of Israel."

4. This proposition following I acknowledge to be mine, and have avouched it in a treatise of the Divine



Essence and Attributes, chap. 13. par. 4. vol. v. pag. 134. "As there is a logical possibility presupposed to the working of the Almighty power, so there is a goodness objective precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of his will." That either this logical possibility which is presupposed to the working of the Almighty power, or the objective goodness which is precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of God's will, should be *IN THE CREATURE*, I never writ, I never said, I never was so uncharitable as to think that any man in his right wits had ever said or writ it, until I read it in the forecited epistle, without any distinction of letter, point, or parenthesis, to notify whether these words, *IN THE CREATURE*, were contained in my proposition, or inserted by the author of that epistle, out of some probable collections from words or circumstances precedent, that my meaning was as he doth make it, though my words were not so as he relates them.

5. That the author of this epistle might conceive such a proposition, charity may attribute it to his ignorance in matters handled in that chapter wherein my former proposition is contained. But why he should insert these words, *in the creature*, into the proposition by me delivered, Christian charity itself, which is not suspicious, which believeth all things that may without imputation of folly be believed, cannot attribute it to his ignorance, but to his passion, or to his too much credulity unto others, who suggested the former proposition unto him, as worthy of a parliamentary 179  
censure, or to his zeal to have me censured as one of the Achans that trouble Israel. But what he can say for himself in excuse of this palpable falsification of my words, I leave to them who have just cause and full authority to examine him. That there could be any

goodness in the creature before the creature was, or had actual being, no man did ever avouch. That any creature could possibly have actual being, or goodness actual or existent in it, without some precedent act of God's will, I had expressly denied in the proposition immediately precedent to the proposition which the author of the Epistle hath falsified, by inserting these words, *in the creature*. He might by the like omission of the proposition precedent (without any intersertion or falsification) have proved this proposition to be David's—*There is no God*. For this proposition is expressly set down by David, psalm xiv. 1, *Non est Deus*. And this proposition would well please an epicure or atheist, if he took not the words precedent into consideration with it. *Dixit insipiens in corde suo, Non est Deus—The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God*. And when I shall avouch the proposition wherewith he chargeth me otherwise than with this addition, 'An ignorant or unwise man hath said it, or laid it to my charge,' let me be censured for a fool, for a blasphemmer, or what you will.

6. The proposition delivered by me is so clear, that no artist, if he be a Christian, can deny it. The proposition consists of these two parts:

First, There is a logical possibility presupposed to the working of the Almighty power.

Secondly, There is an objective goodness precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of God's will.

Against the first part I do not hear of any exception made or taken: yet to make it plainer unto those who are not willing to except against it, I will explicate the meaning of it in a particular instance.

The first man was made of the earth by the working of the Almighty power; and the earth whereof he was made was by the same power made of nothing.

Both were made by the working of the Almighty power within the compass of these six thousand years current. But before time had any being, even from eternity, there was a logical possibility that the earth might be made of nothing, and that man might be made of the earth. He, unto whom nothing is impossible, he, unto whom *all things are possible*, did know the making of both to be logically possible (that is, to imply no contradiction) before he made them, much better than we know that they were made by him. For this we know, and must believe, that the Almighty power worketh nothing, maketh nothing without foreknowledge, not only of it as possible, but as future.

Not the creation of man only, but the creation of man after God's own image, was logically possible (that is, it did imply no contradiction) from eternity. The possible creation of man after this manner was the object of God's power before he said, *Let us make man after our own image and similitude*. This was the act or exercise of God's power or will. For the power whereby he is able to do all things never worketh without some act or exercise of his will; for, as the apostle saith, Ephes. i. 11, *He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will*.

The second part of the proposition was, 'There is a goodness objective precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of God's will.' For further declaration of this truth, I added this proposition: 'Unto some things considered as logically possible, this goodness objective is so essentially annexed, that if it be his will 180 to give them actual being, they must of necessity be actually good; nor can he that can do all things will their contraries' For example, the creation of man after God's own image was logically possible from eternity, and was the object of God's power, of his



knowledge, and will, before man was thus created. Now unto this possibility of man's creation after God's image, (which was objectively in God's knowledge from eternity,) there was a goodness also objective, so essentially annexed, that whensoever God should be pleased to make man after this pattern, he was of necessity to be actually good.

7. Not to conceal any part of my meaning in this thirteenth chapter, unto the former proposition—'The creation of man after God's image was logically possible before the act or exercise of God's will, before the working of his almighty power, by whose concurrence man was upon the sixth day created'—I will add these propositions following :

1. To create man after God's own image, and not to create him good, was never logically possible ; it could be no object either of God's almighty power or will. This proposition had no objective truth in his foreknowledge, whose knowledge is infinite, whose power is omnipotent, whose will is irresistible.

2. The act or exercise of God's omnipotent will was the true cause, the only cause, why man was created after his image. But that man, being created after his image, should be good, the act or exercise of God's will or omnipotent power were not the cause.

3. The connexion between the image of God, and that goodness which was in man created after his image, (albeit we consider this connexion as possibly future from eternity,) was essential and eternal, and was the object of God's eternal prescience or foreknowledge, which in order of nature is precedent to the acts or exercises of God's will.

4. God's will, or the act or exercise of God's will, is the cause why man was made, why being made good he was tied to the observance of God's moral law ; not



the cause why man's observance of the moral law was or is in its nature good.

5. The end of the moral law, or of precepts evangelical, is to frame us to a conformity with our heavenly Father's nature, to be *holy as he is holy*. God's will declared in the moral law, and working in us both the will and the deed to observe it, is the cause by which we are made conformable to the Divine nature; but God's will declared in that law enacted, is not the cause why our conformity to the Divine nature is good; he rather wills us to be conformable to his nature, to his will, that is, to be *holy as he is holy*, because such conformity was essentially and eternally good. All goodness in the creature, whether actually existent, or considered as possibly future, is unseparable from this conformity or consonancy to infinite and eternal goodness, which is the infallible rule of all created goodness, the eternal rule, from which the acts or exercises of God's will, either in making, in preserving, or governing the creature, take their validity. Objective being, or logical possibility of being, is opposed to actual being or existence; goodness objective is opposed to goodness subjective, that is, to goodness actually inherent, or existent in any substance. In the divine and infinite essence nothing is or can be subjectively, all things are in him objectively, and were so in him before they had actual being. And if all things had an objective being in him before they were, then the goodness of every creature which is good had an objective being in him 181 before it could have any subjective being in the creature. The beauty of Solomon's temple, whilst it stood, was subjectively in the materials rightly proportioned and adorned, but objectively in the spectator's or surveyor's eye. The same beauty was objectively in the architect's brain or fancy before it could be either sub-

jectively in the material temple or building, or objectively in the spectator's eye. In like manner, justice, or goodness original, was subjectively in the first man after his creation, but was objectively in God before the first man was created.

8. Yet if another man had written, that there was an objective goodness in the creature precedent to the act or exercise of God's will, I should not have had the malicious wit or invention to have charged him, as the forecited author hath done me, with the overthrowing of any divine attribute, or with making the creature a god, or with blasphemous Arminian heresy. Charity would rather have moved me to make this construction of his words: "If we consider these three: man—the image of God—goodness—as all of them were objectively in God before they had any actual being, God's image might be said to be in the man, and goodness in God's image, in such a sense as every attribute is said to be in the subject of a proposition abstract from sense." He that saith, Socrates is a reasonable creature, must acknowledge reason to be in Socrates. The connexion between the subject and the attribute in abstract propositions is essential and eternal. So necessary and so eternal was the connexion between man made after God's image (or so considered) and goodness, that whensoever it should please God to give this subject, *man after his image*, actual being, the attribute likewise, to wit, *goodness*, was of necessity to have actual being or coexistence with its subject, without intervention, or interposition of any other cause. If, besides the act or exercise of God's will, by which man was created after his image, any other act or exercise of his will had been necessary or useful to make him actually good, then goodness or justice original should not have been natural, but supernatural to the first

man; which no good protestant may grant. The first man's goodness, so long as it continued, was continued by preservation of God's image in him, and cannot be renewed otherwise than by renovation of the same image in him: so that the goodness of God is the rule of goodness, the ideal form or pattern of goodness in the creature. The act or exercise of the Divine will makes no creature morally or spiritually good, but by making it conformable unto his own goodness. This and no other was my meaning in that thirteenth chapter, and this my meaning, as I thought, was sufficiently expressed by me, and is so acknowledged by ingenuous and understanding readers.

9. If any man be disposed to except either against any particular proposition in this thirteenth chapter  $\gamma$ , or against my general declaration, in what sense God's will is said to be the rule of goodness, I shall request him positively to set down the proposition contradictory to any proposition of mine which in that chapter he thinketh to be erroneous. And if he can conclusively draw any such dangerous consequence out of the propositions avouched by me, as I shall do out of his, I faithfully promise to retract what I have said. But until I see better proofs than this objector brings any, I rest confident, that howsoever some divines of our times will be ready to contradict this proposition—'All things are not good, only because God willeth them; but God willeth some things because they are good'—whiles this controversy is only betwixt him and me, in <sup>182</sup> this particular; yet I shall be sure to find the same man to contradict himself, and to confess as much as I

$\gamma$  Nihil in bonis numerandum nisi quod per seipsum sit laudabile, i. e. sponte sua possit laudari Tull. de Leg. l. 1. p. 163. quod a. laudabile sponte sua, illud ante et sine præcepto bonum et laudabile.



here avouch, whensoever he shall have occasion to dispute with the Jew, or to assign the difference between the ceremonial and the moral law, or the reason why the one is to be perpetually observed, the other not so.

The shedding of innocent blood was evil before any law was made against it, before God's will was declared to the contrary.

Cain did suffer punishment for the fact, before any positive law, and before any act of God's will declared, to prohibit it. The shedding of innocent blood then was not evil because it was forbidden, but it was afterwards peremptorily forbidden because always evil. Cain's enterprise against his innocent brother was objectively evil, before there was any man that could commit this or the like enormity. Charity, peace, brotherly love, are good, not only because God hath commanded them, or willed us to follow them, but God by his law doth will and command us to follow after these things because they were always good, even before he willed or commanded us to follow them. The time will never be wherein innocency, brotherly love, charity, peace, and lovingkindness, shall be as displeasing to God as murder, hatred, malice, cruelty, and uncharitableness hitherto always have been. He cannot enact a law, either to authorize these or the like practices, or to prohibit the contrary virtues. But inasmuch as rites and ceremonies, sacrifices, circumcision, &c., which God sometimes did will and command men to observe, were only good because God did will and command them; hence it is that they are now abrogated, and their use inverted, without any change of God's eternal will or of his divine nature. The negative precepts concerning rites and ceremonies have been turned into affirmatives, and the affirmatives into nega-



tives ; because the one containeth no other goodness, nor the other any evil in them, which did not entirely depend upon God's positive will to command or forbid them. And seeing his will, though most immutable, is immutably free, though not to do good or evil, yet free to make that which is not in its nature, or essentially, good, to be good for one time or season, not for another ; and that which is not in its nature, or essentially, evil, (but of an indifferent nature,) to be sometimes good and sometimes evil ; therefore hath he made the omission of some ceremonies to be as good in latter times, as their observance was in former ; and the observance of others to be as evil, as their former neglect or contempt was under the law, or from the date of God's first covenant with Abraham until the ratification or publication of the new covenant made in Christ. *The uncircumcised manchild*, saith God to Abraham, Gen. xvii. 14, *whose flesh of his foreskin is not circumcised, that soul shall be cut off from his people*. But seeing the observance of that which is here commanded was only good because it was thus peremptorily willed, commanded, or required by God, not objectively good from eternity ; the observance of the same thing commanded is now as dangerous and displeasing to God, as the neglect or nonobservance of it in Abraham's, in Moses', in the prophets' times had been. Hence is that wish of our apostle, Gal. v. 12, *I would they were even cut off that trouble you* ; that is, I would that they which press circumcision upon you and upon your children, might be sentenced according to God's law enacted against such as during the first covenant did omit or neglect it.

10. Partly from ignorance of this distinction between 183 the nature of things commanded and forbidden by the moral and ceremonial law, partly from ignorance why

obedience to the law of ceremonies was so strictly enjoined, and the neglect of it so severely punished, oft-times by God's immediate hand, the Jews were drawn to place as great sanctity in the observance of rites and ceremonies as in sincere obedience to the moral precepts. This was one main root of their hypocrisy, a sin from which it is scarce possible any hearer of the word should be free, unless he be taught to put some difference between the nature of things good and evil, of things commanded and forbidden, besides the will or authority of the commander. If the acts or injunctions of God's will were the only rule of goodness, and had not eternal goodness rather for their rule, it would be hard to avoid the stoical error, that all sins are equal; besides a kind of fatality in human affairs, worse than stoical.

The Turks acknowledge God's will to be a rule of goodness as sovereign as the author of the forementioned epistle doth to be such a cause of causes as he would have it. But being ignorant, or not considering, that there is an immutable goodness precedent to the act or exercise of God's will, a goodness whereof his will, however considered, is no cause—for it is coeternal to his will, to his wisdom and essence—they fall into grossly absurd errors. And consequently unto this their ignorance, or to the common error that all things are good only because God willeth them, they sometimes highly commend, and sometimes deeply discommend, the selfsame practices for quality and circumstances, wit has great vehemency of zeal and spirit, and with as fair protestations of obedience in all things to God's will, as any other men do.

For Selimus to attempt the deposition of his father was in their divinity a good and godly act: for Bajazet

to take arms against his brother was an abominable impiety. What was the reason? Selimus's attempt found good success; for he prevailed against his father; and this was an argument, that it was God's will that he should so do. But Bajazet miscarries in his attempt against his brother; and his disaster was a proof sufficient that God was displeased with his attempt, it was not his will that he should prosper. And seeing his will is the only rule of goodness, seeing he did predestinate these two princes, as he did Jacob and Esau, the one to a good end, the other to an evil; the selfsame fact or attempt was good in the one, but wicked in the other. We all condemn it as an error in the Turk <sup>a</sup>,

<sup>z</sup> Injecta forte Bajazetis mentione, cœpit Chiaussus in eum inclementius invehi, quod arma sumpsisset contra fratrem. Ego contra dicebam videri mihi miseratione dignum, cui inevitabilis necessitas imposita esset, aut capiendorum armorum, aut certæ pestis subeundæ. Sed cum Chiaussus nihilominus execrari pergeret. Vos, inquam, immanis facinoris reum facitis Bajazetem. At Selimum, hujus imperatoris patrem, qui non modo contra patris voluntatem, verum etiam salutem arma tulit, nullius criminis arguitis. Recte, inquit Chiaussus, nam rerum exitus satis docuit illum, quod fecit divino fecisse instinctu, et cœlitus fuisse prædestinatum. Tum ego, si hoc more agetur, quicquid, quamvis pessimo consilio susceptum, si bene cedat, recte factum interpretabimini, et Dei voluntati adscribetis, Deum facietis authorem mali, nec quicquam bene aut sequius factum, nisi ex eventu pendetis. Sumus aliquandiu in hoc sermone com-

morati, cum uterque non sine animorum et vocis contentione, quod proposuisset defenderet. Collecta utrinque plura sacre scripturæ loca—*Nunquid potest vas dicere figulo, Cur me ita finxisti? —Indurabo cor Pharaonis.—Jacob dilexi, Esau odio habui*—atque alia ut veniebant in mentem.—Auger. Busbequ. Epist. 4. pag. 239.

<sup>a</sup> Ex quo satis constitit, non avi misericordia eo usque nepoti parcitum, sed ex opinione quæ Turcis insedit, ut res quocunque consilio institutas, si bene cadunt, ad Deum auctorem referant. Propterea quamdiu incertum fuit, quem exitum Bajazetis conatus sortirentur, abstinendas ab infantis injuria manus Suleimanus statuit: ne si postmodum res melius vertisset, obniti voluntati Dei voluisse videretur. Sed nunc illo extincto, ac veluti divina sententia damnato, causam esse non putabat, cur filio diutius parceretur, Ne malum ovum ex malo corvo relinqueretur.—Ibidem.



for measuring the difference between good and evil by the event. But even this error hath an original which is worse. They therefore measure all good and evil by the event, because they ascribe all events (without exception) to the irresistible will of God, and think that  
 184 nothing can fall out otherwise than it doth, because every thing is irresistibly appointed by God's will, which in their divinity is such a necessary cause of causes, and by consequence of all effects, as the author of the said Epistle would have it to be. Whosoever he be, whether Jew, Turk, or Christian, which thinks that all events are so irresistibly decreed by God, that none can fall out otherwise than they do, must of necessity grant, either that there is no moral evil under the sun, or that God's will (which is the cause of causes) is the only cause of such evil.

11. But is the like sin or error expressly to be found in Israel? Do any make the same fact for nature, quality, and substance, to be no sin in one man, and yet a sin in another? or to be a little sin in one man, and a grievous outcrying sin in another? Though they do not avouch this of rebellious attempts against prince and state, or of other like public facts, cognoscible by human law; yet the principles of predestination, commonly held by them and the Turk, draw them to the like inconveniences, in transforming the immutable rule of goodness into the similitude of their partial affections in other cases.

The adultery and murder which David committed had been grievous sins in any other man, but in David, being predestinated, they were but sins of infirmity, sins by which the outward man was defiled, not the inward man. Such a sin was incest in Lot; such are all the sins committed by the elect. And so were all the sins of the elect remitted before they were com-



mitted. But the question is, whether God did so absolutely decree the remission of any man's sin from eternity, as that their remission was from eternity absolutely necessary. If God did absolutely decree that the sins of the elect should be remitted, then he did absolutely decree that they should be committed. For even in God's eternal foreknowledge of all things that fall out in time, the commission of sins hath precedency of their remission; and if their remission were in respect of his foreknowledge or decree absolutely necessary, their commission was as necessary. It is impossible there should be any remission of sins without a presupposal of their commission. Yet are the former conclusions not muttered in corners, but maintained as part of that holy doctrine which hath been delivered unto us by the masters of Israel, approved by the best writers in reformed churches.

Sin not re-  
mitted be-  
fore com-  
mitted.

These and the like doctrines are held in so precious esteem, that if the lawful pastor seek to root them out where they have been planted by others, or to prevent their growth or spreading, he shall be traduced for an Arminian, and, as they hope, be so censured by the high court of parliament. But my hope is, that no loyal elder of Israel shall ever so far forget himself, as either to attempt or seek to have those and the like conclusions ratified by our great Joshua's royal consent. Sure I am these are no branches of that ancient catholic apostolic faith, of which we acknowledge our sovereign lord to be the defender; and God grant that he may ever defend and keep it pure and undefiled from these and the like conclusions, that it may defend him and his people from their adversaries.

12. Yet to seek the correction of these and the like conclusions, though malapertly maintained by some of the flock against most of their pastors, or the punish-

ment of those which so maintain them, until the principles from which they naturally issue be checked or inhibited, were but tyranny. These here related are the least, not the worst part of those noisome branches which spring from this one root—‘ That God’s irresistible decree for the absolute election of some, and  
185 the absolute reprobation of others, is immediately terminated to the individual natures, substances, or entities of men, without any logical respect or reference to their qualifications.’ This principle being once granted, what breach of God’s moral law is there, whereon men will not boldly adventure, either through desperation or presumption, either openly or secretly? For seeing God’s will, which in their divinity is the only cause why the one sort are destined to death, the other to life, is most immutable and most irresistible; and seeing the individual entities or natures of men, unto which this irresistible decree is respectively terminated are immutable: let the one sort do what they can, pray for themselves, and beseech others to pray for them, they shall be damned, because their entities or individual substances are unalterable; let the other sort live as they list, they shall be saved, because no corruption of manners, no change of morality breeds any mutability or change in their individual natures or entities, unto which God’s immutable decree is immediately terminated; whatsoever become of good life and manners, so the individual nature or entity fail not, or be not annihilated, salvation is tied unto it by a necessity more indissoluble than any chains of adamant.

13. This assertion, ‘ Whosoever was elected from eternity was never the child of wrath, save only in the esteem of men,’ I found delivered in certain papers at my first entrance upon my pastoral charge in the

town of Newcastle, written by one that had been a great rabbi in some private conventicles in and about that town. And for the refuting of this opinion, and the principles out of which it doth most necessarily follow, it was presently conceived by some of my auditors, that I went about to refute the doctrine of all reformed churches concerning election and reprobation. And amongst the doctrines of reformed churches, which it was vehemently suspected I went about to refute, this was expressed for one, 'That the sins of the elect or regenerate were remitted before they were committed.' A doctrine which for my part I dare not charge any one reformed church with, though some in reformed churches have stiffly maintained the principle out of which this conclusion will necessarily follow; and some few have in express terms delivered the conclusion; but so hath not, to my knowledge, any reformed church or entire congregation (besides the familist, to which this error properly belongs). The council of Dort hath expressly delivered the contrary; so have others which write against the Arminians. But in this point a reverend and learned pastor in the city of London hath saved me a labour.

The false principle from which both these conclusions—1. 'The sins of the elect are remitted before they are committed;' 2. 'Whosoever is elected, being elected from eternity, never was, never could be, never can be the child of wrath'—will most necessarily follow, is the forementioned error; which ties or terminates God's eternal and irresistible decree for the absolute election of some, and the absolute reprobation of others, to the individual natures, persons, or entities of men elected or reprobated. But to omit (for the present) the question concerning such absolute elec-

tion; not the most tyrannical lawgiver that to this day hath breathed on earth did ever declare himself to be so far the son of the devil, as to make solemn decrees against men's persons without respect or reference to their qualifications. It is the property of the enemy of mankind to delight in man's punishment, as he is a man, or a reasonable creature; to desire to have any man as he himself now is, but sometimes was not, a vessel capable only of vengeance or punitive justice, altogether incapable of God's free bounty, mercy, or favour. And seeing this most  
186 honourable court of parliament, now happily assembled to make wholesome laws, doth not intend to make any punitive laws or decrees (specially capitally punitive) against any men's persons or nature, but against men's ill qualifications and misdemeanours; I am confident that every member of it doth firmly believe, that our heavenly Father did never make any such decree or law. Again, seeing God hath revealed his good will and pleasure to be this, *to reward every man according to all his ways*, I shall find no opposition or contradiction to this conclusion (as I hope) among good Christians; 'God did from eternity decree to reward every man, not according to his individual nature, but according to his ways, his works, or qualifications, which he did no less certainly foresee than he did his individual nature.' He hath decreed from eternity to reward the wicked and ungodly for their wicked works, according to the inflexible rule of his immutable justice; and to reward the penitent sinners, (though sometimes children of wrath,) not for their works, yet according to their works or qualifications: and so to reward them, not by the rule of his justice, but out of his mere mercy; or out of that most free and gracious bounty, which gave us all



life and being, when we were not, and therefore could not by any works deserve the least of all his blessings.

14. If to maintain these conclusions be Arminianism, I profess myself not to know (in these particulars) wherein the Arminians differ from the orthodox and ancient church. But if Arminius and his followers have taught or maintained any other conclusions, by which the least tittle may be derogated from God's free mercy and grace, by which any thing besides death or non-deserts may be ascribed to man's works or freewill, I no way partake with them in those and the like errors. I shall in good time, by God's assistance, make it appear, that I truly acknowledge both God's mercy and grace towards men, and men's sins, the best men's sins and unthankfulness towards God, to be much greater than he doth or can acknowledge either of them to be, whosoever he be, that shall hold the contradictory to any conclusion in this chapter for which I am accused of Arminianism, or to any principal conclusion maintained in my book of the Divine Essence and Attributes, or to any conclusion which I have delivered, or shall deliver, concerning election or reprobation.

15. The imputations laid upon me by the author of the epistle are heavy and grievous, if they could be proved; however most injurious, being made so public before I heard of them, or could prevent their spreading. Yet, for my own part, if it were in my power to censure him, my resolution should be like to that of a civilian: when the question was propounded to him, *An liceat meretrici quæstum facere?* his resolution, as I remember, (for it was long since I read it in Bodin,) was to this effect: *Pessime facit, quod artem meretriciam exercet, sed meretrix cum sit, non malefacit quod ex arte quam exercet quæstum facit.* The

author of the epistle hath much wronged himself and me, in suffering himself to be so far misled with the doctrine of absolute election and reprobation as it seems he is. But being thus far misled by it, and wedded unto it, his practice in slandering me, without any relentance which as yet I hear of, is but consequent to his doctrine, if he were thoroughly examined upon it. And he that should punish him for his slander, and not condemn his doctrine, should do me small right, and should do him as much wrong, as he that should punish a scholar for holding a false conclusion without questioning or disproving the premisses from which it necessarily follows. For it is as impossible for him that thinks himself to be in the immutable estate of  
187 grace or election, or is certainly persuaded of his salvation before his time, to suspect, much less to recant any lewd practice or dangerous error whereinto he may fall, until he renounce his opinion, or his immature persuasion of his own estate, as it is for any scholar to revoke a false conclusion, which still maintains the erroneous premisses out of which it necessarily follows.

16. The point then to be proved is, 'That the justification of slander, how virulent soever, and indulgence to corrupt affections once implanted, do as necessarily follow upon immature and preposterous persuasions of men's immutable estate in grace, or election, as any conclusion doth out of its natural premisses.' Now the truth of this point may be made as clear as any rule of art or reason can make the truth of any other. For it is a rule of nature, tried and approved by art, a fundamental principle in both their schools, that an universal negative may be simply converted; as thus: 'If no man can be a stone, or an inanimate creature, then no stone or inanimate crea-

ture can be a man.' The scripture, which is the rule of faith, gives us these universal negatives: *No adulterer, no covetous person, no idolater, no murderer, no slanderer or virulent railer, can inherit the kingdom of God.* These universal negatives being granted and believed, nature and art, and common reason, must admit of their conversions: 'No man that must enter into the kingdom of heaven, no man that is truly certain of his salvation, can be an adulterer, can be a covetous person, can be a murderer, can be a slanderer, or virulent reviler of his brethren.' Now if any man which believes himself to be in the immutable state of election, (so certain of his salvation, that if he instantly die, he shall instantly go to heaven,) shall happen to do the same things that adulterers do, that covetous men do, that murderers, slanderers, or virulent revilers do, it will be impossible for him to suspect himself of being an adulterer, of being covetous, of being a slanderer or reviler, so long as his former persuasion concerning his absolute estate of salvation, &c. is not recalled. For if he must enter into the kingdom of heaven whensoever he dies, if this be a part of his belief, he cannot believe or suspect that he is a doer of those things which whosoever doth cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven. Thus, as the presumed absolute infallibility of the visible Romish church for the time being doth lay a necessity upon their successors of freezing in the dregs of their predecessors' errors; so this immature persuasion of men's particular estate in election, grace, or salvation, doth lay a like necessity upon such as are overtaken with it, of having their hearts hardened with hypocrisy, with security or secret indulgence to their corrupt affections. And for this reason, amongst others, did the sage and reverend reformers of the church,



wherein we live, worthily admonish that the points of election and predestination are to be warily thought upon, they are no fit themes for every man's private meditations, much less fit seeds to be promiscuously sown in every congregation by any seedsman.

17. Had any man in this kingdom, of how dis-tempered behaviour soever, so he had been seasoned with the knowledge of ingenuous arts or civil education, slandered me in his cups or passions, amongst private or common friends, so deeply and upon so gross mistaking, as the author of the epistle hath done, slandered me unto the highest authority on earth, his heart in his sober thoughts would have smitten him long ere this, and I should have had some ingenuous satisfaction voluntarily tendered from him. But from men misled with wild zeal unto the doctrine of absolute election and reprobation, as it hath of  
 188 late years been taught by some, and from men jealous of others (as if they were Arminians) that in this point dissent from them, I can expect no voluntary satisfaction, but rather continuance of the like, unless I could dissuade them from their doctrinal error. For whilst this veil is spread over their hearts, envious or malicious slander, whilst it exonerates itself upon such as they suspect for Achans and Arminians, will be interpreted zeal; violent passions will be taken for the power of the Spirit; such nasty solecisms or rude scurrility as would seem loathsome to heathen artists, will go current with themselves and their associates for sanctified eloquence; and so will ignorance in philosophy or school-divinity be applauded for holy simplicity.

But seeing their tongues and pens are their own, seeing they have cast off the yoke of obedience, and begin to proclaim, not mutter, '*With our tongues we*



*will prevail*; we are they that ought to speak, and print books; *who is Lord over us?* let them use what language they please, the print-houses in this interim, possessed and employed by them, shall but exercise my patience, as some (I hope) by usurpation, not by just warrant, pulpits, here and there, ever and anon, for these three and twenty years, have done; during which time, whilst such schediastics as these have preached of absolute election or reprobation, I still have prayed, *Father, forgive them, for they know not what they said.* And so I suppose many more of my profession in this kingdom have done. God in the meanwhile hath enlightened the hearts of many, by our prayers and ministry, to see their error, and hath made me a witness of many men's sorrow for being misled. And whensoever the veil shall be taken from the heart of such now living in this land as still maintain that rigid doctrine, their sorrow and compunction will be no less than the sorrow and compunction of those Jews which had (through ignorance) consented to the crucifying of the Lord of glory.

18. The practice of the Jews was in the issue more desperate than men in this age, no less zealous of that which they apprehend for truth, can have opportunity to attempt. But the error which led the Jews to that desperate practice against the Son of God is no way impaired, but rather enlarged by some Christians of these times. Our only comfort is, that however the common error of both times be rather strengthened than any way enfeebled by such in our times as nurse it, yet is it neither so general, nor so inveterate in this land, as it was in the Jewish nation before their final destruction. The governors of our church and state, the learned pastors, or conformable laity, are not so infected with it as the Pharisees, scribes, and elders in

Judæa were in our Saviour's time. Their excessive pride and hypocrisy made them so extraordinarily impatient of reproof and contradiction, and their extraordinary impatience of reproof in matters of practice, and of contradiction in point of opinion, hatched that cruel and murderous hate against the Son of God. The settled matter of their deadly malice was pride and hypocrisy of heart; that wherewith this corrupt matter was continually fed, was passionate zeal to maintain the absolute election of their nation, and the absolute rejection of the Gentiles; humorous persuasion of their own immutable estate in God's promise, first occasioned or strengthened by reflecting upon the accurate reformation, which (to their seeming) they had made of their forefathers' idolatry, of sabbath-breaking, and other palpable transgressions of God's law. But, however cruelty and fury have no such objects to practise upon in these latter days as the Jews and as the scribes and Pharisees had; yet is not bodily death a more usual effect of pestilent  
189 fevers, than slander, persecution, cruelty, and murderous hate are in all ages of ignorant zeal, pride, and hypocrisy. Nor do putrefied or malignant humours more usually breed pestilent fevers or other dangerous diseases in men's bodies, than immature persuasions of their own immutable estate in grace, or indigested resolution concerning absolute election or reprobation, do hatch pride and hypocrisy in men's souls. And the most infallible symptom of pride and hypocrisy is jealousy of being contradicted by such as contradict them not, or impatency of mere logical contradiction, without gall or bitterness, in point of opinion. Another accidental improvement of the Jews' murderous hate against our Saviour was the hotness and blindness of their zeal to Moses' writings. Yet were not Moses'

writings in higher esteem with them than St. Paul's Epistles are deservedly with us. And would to God some amongst us did not further mistake or pervert his scope and aim in that ninth chapter to the Romans, than the Jews did Moses' meaning!

But the parallel between the Jewish mispersuasions of love and zeal to God and his servant Moses, and the mispersuasions of many modern Christians' presumed love to our Saviour and his apostles, is elsewhere<sup>b</sup> handled in the general, and shall, by God's assistance, be further prosecuted in some particulars. My purpose for the present is, to shew how nearly it concerns myself, and all that seek to prevent the resubmission of this people unto the Roman yoke, to beware of peremptory resolutions concerning absolute reprobation.

19. It was well observed by Œcolampadius, that the ordinary pictures of God, or of his enemy, were no good books for instructing laymen or children in the nature of God or of Satan<sup>c</sup>. The truest representation that can be made of God, would be to teach them what truth is, what mercy, what love, or goodness is. The best picture that can be taken of Satan would be the true characters of falsehood, malice, hatred, cruelty, envy. Yet by this good author's leave, however Satan be the father of lies, the author of malice, the hatcher of envy and hatred, the comploter of cruelty; yet can he not so truly and properly be called falsehood

<sup>b</sup> See his Treatise of Justifying Faith, sect. 2. vol. iii. p.195, &c.

<sup>c</sup> Puerorum major pars nescit quid sit Deus, quid Sathan, quid bonum, quid malum, idque firmiter credo. Neque talis Deus, vel Sathan, quemadmodum pictores in tabellas, aut parietes pingunt. Si nosti quomodo Deus misericors sit, benignus,

mitis, mansuetus, longanimis, patientis, justus, etc. vere Deum agnoscis, per illas enim res proprie, quid sit Deus discimus. E contrario Sathan nihil aliud est, quam immisericordia, odium, invidia, homicidium, mendacium, irrisio proximi, et omne malum. —Œcolamp. Concione ad Adolescent. pag. 349.



itself, envy itself, hatred itself, cruelty itself, in the abstract, as God is said to be *truth itself, love itself, mercy itself, and goodness itself*. For though falsehood, hatred, envy, cruelty, &c. be now become natural to the old serpent, yet were they adventitious to his prime nature and substance; he was not from the beginning invested with these or the like habits. But if the opinion of some men amongst us concerning absolute reprobation were from above, he, whom we profess to be the Almighty Creator of heaven and earth, should be as truly and properly falsehood itself, hatred itself, cruelty itself, as he is truth itself, love itself, mercy itself, goodness itself. The branches of the doctrine concerning absolute reprobation which bear this fruit are—to omit others for the present—specially these two: the first, That the manifestation of God's punitive justice was a part of the object of God's primary will, and an exercise of his will, as directly, as immediately, and as irresistibly intended by him in the creation, as the manifestation of his goodness and bounty, or reservation of his mercy to such as shall be saved was. The second, That God from eternity did as truly hate all  
 190 those who perish, without respect or reference to their works or qualifications, as he did love those who shall be saved.

Now if the number of such as perish be much greater than the number of such as shall be saved; and if the same God did from eternity as truly hate the greater sort of men, as he did love the less, without all respect or reference to their works or qualifications; if he did out of his eternal hatred as peremptorily decree the endless torments of the one, as he did the everlasting happiness of the other: these conclusions of the Lutherans (avouched by them in some catechisms, which I have seen, before the name of Arminius



was heard of in these parts) will necessarily follow; viz. That such as maintain this rigid doctrine of absolute reprobation do not believe in or acknowledge the same God which the Lutherans, with all antiquity, acknowledge: for they acknowledge their God to be truth, mercy, love, and goodness; whereas the stiff maintainers of absolute reprobation confess their God to be hatred and cruelty itself. Now to acknowledge one and the same God to be truth, love, mercy, and goodness itself in respect of some, and in respect of others to be falsehood, hatred, cruelty itself, is a grosser heresy or transformation of the Deity than was the heresy of the Manichees, which acknowledge two Gods, or independent originals of all things; the one as fountain of all goodness; the other, the author of all evil. For avoiding these and the like conclusions, no evasion or observation hath been or can be pretended, by such as make the entity or individual natures of men the formal objects of reprobation, besides this one, viz. That God's will is so the rule of goodness, that if he will the death of all that die without respect unto their works or qualifications, this must be good. If he be pleased to hate the greater part of mankind without all reference to their qualifications, the hatred of them must be as good as his love of those few which shall be saved. And the apostle did advise them to rest upon this answer when he saith, *O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, &c.* But whether this use of our apostle's doctrine in that place be according to his meaning, or whether any conclusion can be drawn from that chapter which may make for absolute election or reprobation, is elsewhere examined<sup>d</sup>.

<sup>d</sup> See chap. 42. numb. 9, 10.

By that which hath been said, it may appear, that such in this land as stiffly hold the tenet of absolute reprobation, (which the Christian world besides hath for the most part forsaken,) have some reason, though no just cause, to question the truth delivered by me, in what sense God's will is said to be the rule of goodness. For unless they can disprove my tenet, (which, God be praised, hath stronger supporters than my weakness can afford,) they must either revoke their error, or admit God to be more than the author of sin, as truly ἡ πονηρία, as ὁ ὄν, as properly *sin itself*, as *being itself*, or *life itself*. And yet, if they could persuade the ignorant that God's will is the rule of goodness in such a sense as they would make it, the inconveniences which the Lutherans object would be rather for a while removed, than clearly avoided; they might be pressed upon them again with greater force and advantage, with this addition they maintain the Turkish opinion concerning fate and providence. And upon this ground only (as I conceive) do the Lutherans instyle the Calvinists *limbs of Gog or of the eastern Antichrist*. But the best is, that of such who at this day do not disclaim the name of *Calvinists*, the most and best learned dislike the opinion of absolute reprobation, and so, I hope, in good time will every faithful pastor in the  
 191 church of England, and every loyal elder in this our Israel. For admit we could make full proof unto the congregations committed to our charge, that papistry is, as some have instyled it, *the ocean of heresies*; that the absolute infallibility of the pope or consistory exceeds the mixture or combination of all other particular heresies which have been; that the idolatry which the Roman catholics, from the belief of the pope or church's absolute infallibility, are enforced to commit and practise, doth equalize the idolatry of those heathens

which solemnly worshipped the devil ; yet all this being proved by us, and firmly believed by our flocks, would be of small force or sway to retain understanding men in their allegiance to their sovereign lord, or in obedience to the laws ecclesiastic or civil of this kingdom, if once the doctrine of absolute reprobation might be fastened upon the church of England, or be embraced by her learned pastors or governors. For so they might as concludently prove us to be as gross heretics as we say they are, and evince our church's doctrine to be as blasphemous as theirs is idolatrous.

To have this rigid doctrine generally embraced or acknowledged by us, or at least to have the world believe that it were generally acknowledged by us, is the very thing, and the main business which the factors for the Romish church for these many years have earnestly solicited. This is the very net wherein Satan hopes to catch this island : he hath set the Jesuits to spread and hold it, and, when opportunity serves, to draw it. And the Jesuits, as they have long used our pulpits and print-houses, so they attempt to use some in our parliaments as their podders, to drive us into it. Their prey, they know, must needs be great, if they can bring us into these straits, or put a necessity of this hard choice upon us—Whether were better to live in obedience to a church which adores wicked and naughty men, devils incarnate, (for such some of their popes have been,) as gods on earth ; or to hold communion with that church or society of men, which makes the God of heaven, the Almighty Creator of all things, visible and invisible, much worse than an incarnate devil, yea than any wicked spirit, or than the devil himself, can without slander be conceived to be ?

Isaiah lviii. 4 : *Behold, ye fast for strife and debate, and to smite with the fist of wickedness : ye shall*

*not fast as ye do this day, to make your voice to be heard on high.*

## CHAP. XL.

*A Paraphrase upon the eleven first Chapters of Exodus, with useful Annotations, Observations, and Parallels.*

ALBEIT the ancient heathens (however they came by them) had many excellent notions, and some exquisite discourses upon those notions, of a divine providence, which even to their apprehension did usually overreach and control all politic projects of greatest princes; yet, such exquisite maps or live patterns of the only wise God's proceedings in counterplotting the subtlest contrivances of mightiest princes, or of the 192 profoundest professors of mysteries of state, or other subordinate projectors, as the history of Joseph (wherewith Moses concludes the book of Genesis) or the history of Pharaoh (wherewith the same Moses begins the book of Exodus), the best of the heathens had none. Nor may this present age expect any equal, though every age (in one kingdom or other) afford some matter of history like unto them, *quoad veritatem, licet non quoad mensuram*. With the history of Joseph I am not at this time to meddle, any further than as it may lead me or instruct me to take a more exact survey of God's process with Pharaoh, or of the manner how, or of the means by which he hardened him.

3. So long as that great, and (in his kind) religious Pharaoh lived, (whose life, and prosperous estate of the kingdom whereof he was lord, Joseph, by God's good providence and peculiar instructions, had both preserved and advanced,) nothing went amiss with the stems of Jacob; all of them, from the highest to the lowest, fared well for Joseph's sake; and (which was more than all the matter of their welfare) the Egyptians,



amongst whom they sojourned, did not envy or repine at their prosperity; at least they durst not profess any enmity or attempt to wreak their malice (if they had conceived any) against them. The fresh memory of Joseph's good deservings, at the king's, princes', and people's hands, did prevent all practices of hostility or repining cruelty, (though but intended against them,) so long as that Pharaoh, which had so well rewarded Joseph, and had him in so great esteem, did sway the sceptre of Egypt. But it seems that this gracious king died about the same time that Joseph did, or rather before him. For Moses instructs us, *Exod. i. 8, There arose a new king which knew not Joseph*, (that is, either had no memorial record, or took no notice how well he had deserved both of the king and kingdom of Egypt,) *and he said unto his people, Behold, the people of the children of Israel are more and mightier than we, &c.* Josephus, in his second book of Judaical Antiquities, informs us, (and his information will much advance the true value of the literal sense of the sacred context according to the original,) that this latter Pharaoh, or new king, mentioned by Moses, chap. i. ver. 8, was of another line; no son or heir, unless by adoption, of that great Pharaoh, and grand patron of Joseph, but at the best of some collateral line. Now, whether it were out of real fear, or out of pride of heart, or popularity, this new king, to give some document in the beginning of his reign of more care and wisdom for maintaining and advancing the welfare of the natives than his predecessor had practised, (who had placed his special favours upon foreigners and strangers,) thus resolves with himself, and proposeth his resolution to his council of state or war: *Come on, let us deal wisely with them; lest they multiply, and it come to pass, that, when there falleth out any war, they join also unto*

*our enemies, and fight against us, and so get them up out of the land.* ver. 10.

The first project of this new king was to keep the Israelites from mutiny, (whereunto their number might, as he thought, provoke or tempt them,) by laying the yoke of servitude and hard labour upon them. But perceiving that the more he did press them, the more they multiplied, and grew stronger, his second project became more cruel, for it was to destroy or put the males of Israel out of this world as fast and as soon as they came into it.

Neither of these two projects were any part of God's ordination or design: both were suggested to this proud  
193 king by God's enemy, who is the father of all bloody politicians, and chief master of all unhallowed policies. However, the entertainment of this satanical suggestion, and the putting of it in execution by royal authority and command, was an inchoation, or rather a large measure of that ordination or coaptation of this kingdom and state to that destruction whereof our apostle speaks, Rom. ix. 22: *What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much longsuffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction?*

The infant-killer, and hardened, two several Pharaohs.

3. But that new king which devised all the fore-mentioned evils against the children of Israel was not the subject of that obduration mentioned by our apostle, and recorded by Moses, Exod. vii.—xi: for that bloody king which caused all the males of Israel to be cast into the river died before God appeared to Moses in the bush, as is evident from Exod. ii. 23—*And it came to pass in process of time, that the king of Egypt died: and the children of Israel sighed by reason of the bondage, &c.*—and is expressly avouched by Josephus, in his second book of Jewish Antiquities, chapter 5. However, this other Pharaoh becoming

successor to that cruel king, mentioned Exod. i. 8, not in place only, but in cruelty and oppression ; the wickedness and wrongs practised by the former Pharaoh and his subjects are charged upon the second and his people, because they were bound by the law of God and by the law of nature to have given better satisfaction to the Israelites than they did ; so much at least as Moses in his first message to Pharaoh, Exod. iv, did demand. And this Pharaoh's heart to whom he was sent was more capable of, or rather more fitly disposed to, that obduration which befell him, because he could not be ignorant of the ill success which his predecessor's cruel intentions against the infant males had found. It was the former Pharaoh's main project to destroy the Hebrew males ; and in the heat of this persecution Moses is born, but hid for three months from Pharaoh's ferrets (or bloodhounds rather) by his parents. This providence in his parents was not from secret instinct of nature, but from true faith, or supernatural revelation, as our apostle instructs us, Heb. xi. 23 : *By faith Moses, when he was born, was hid three months of his parents, because they saw he was a proper child; and they were not afraid of the king's commandment.*

4. Josephus tells us, that the occasion which Pharaoh took to murder all the Hebrew males was from a constant fame or prenotion, suggested unto him by a secretary of state, that about this time there should an Hebrew male be born, that should work wonders for the good of his people : and their good could not be dislinked from the Egyptians' harms or losses, although no better fortune were to befall them than their safe escape out of the land without any just revenge upon their oppressors. Some prenotion or revelation of that (which Josephus saith) had been made to Moses' parents, and believed by them ; and

made them the more careful, first to hide him, then to commend to God's providence in an ark of bulrushes floating down the river, to which it is probable they knew Pharaoh's daughter did usually resort. Their wisdom in the contrivance was more than natural—a true work or suggestion of faith; the disposition of all occurrences to effect their hope beyond their expectation was an extraordinary act of God's peculiar providence. After the adoption of Moses to be the son of Pharaoh's daughter, we read not of the continuation of the former butchery: nor is it probable it should continue after Moses came to years of proof, enabled to give pregnant documents of his worth as well in martial as in civil affairs. Whether he were intended and designed, as Josephus tells us he was <sup>e</sup>, to be heir unto  
 194 the kingdom of Egypt, (this cruel king having no child besides his merciful daughter, nor she any child of her body,) we dare not peremptorily avouch or gainsay. Or whether Moses did that Pharaoh (whose daughter had saved his life) that admirable service in subduing the Ethiopians, as Josephus in the same place relates, be believed or waved; probable it is, that either by this or some other great service done by him in Egypt, or for the Egyptians, it was foreshewed, so as his brethren might have understood that God had some great work in hand to be wrought by him, besides the mere killing of the Egyptian that had wronged one of the Hebrews.

But whatsoever good intentions this Pharaoh had towards Moses for his daughter's sake before he killed the Egyptian, it is evident that he hated him extremely afterwards for this very fact; and that Moses, for fear of his displeasure, left Egypt, and sojourned many years in Midian, *Exod. ii. 15.* *Now it came to pass*

<sup>e</sup> Antiq. lib. 2. c. 5.



*in process of time*, saith the sacred story, ver. 23, *that the king of Egypt* (that king whose daughter had saved Moses' life; yea the same who sought to slay Moses for killing the Egyptian) *died*: but the great and grievous oppression of the poor Israelites did not die with him; *mutarunt dominum, non servitutem*; they were freed from this one cruel oppressor, but not from cruel oppression: for there arose another tyrant, as bad or worse than this, under whose heavy yoke *the children of Israel sighed by reason of the bondage, and they cried, and their cry came up unto God by reason of the bondage. And God heard their groaning, and God remembered his covenant with Abraham, with Isaac, and with Jacob. And God looked upon the children of Israel, and God had respect unto them.* Exod. ii. 23—25. Unto this latter of the two bad Pharaohs, who had no spleen against Moses in particular, as being perhaps unknown unto him by face, is Moses commanded to address himself as a special messenger from the Lord God of their fathers, who appeared unto him after a strange manner in mount Sinai, as is expressed at large, Exodus iii. Moses, after much reluctance, undertakes this service, *volens nolens*: and just cause he had to fear, (as the event did shew,) first, that his own brethren, the seed of Jacob, would hardly believe his report, or yield obedience unto his commission; secondly, that after his brethren were persuaded that God had sent him unto them, it was (as he foresaw) very incredible that Pharaoh would give any credence either to him or to the elders of Israel, whether jointly or severally employed in this great business.

5. That full measure of induration, or hardness of heart, which afterwards fell upon this second Pharaoh, was no otherwise wrought by God, than by reiterated

gentle and civil checks of that unhallowed resolution, begun by his predecessor, and continued by him. In the most of Moses' messages unto him, God (whose ambassador Moses was) did advise or command him to do as in justice and equity he ought to have done, but no way necessitate him to do as he did. The tenor of Moses' advertisements unto him was, first, to relinquish all former resolutions or intendments of oppression unto the Israelites; and secondly, to make some equitable satisfaction for the wrongs formerly done unto them. All this, Pharaoh might have done; and all this, any wise man, which had feared God and hated covetousness, would have done. But for this Pharaoh, as he was (no doubt) wise enough for worldly business, so he was exceeding proud, exceeding covetous; and by these qualities, to Godward most unwise. So that his pride and covetousness did directly and immediately harden his heart. On God's part we may not imagine  
 195 or suspect any other causality of hardening him, besides the proposal of those conditions unto him, whose performance he knew was very incompatible, though not impossible with haughty pride or tenacious avarice. The only necessity which God, in his allseeing wisdom, put upon him, was either to break his resolution, and work a relentance or release of those cruel practices and oppressions towards the Israelites, which pride or avarice had put him upon; or else, to be hardened by his wilful continuation of his first resolution at that high bent at which it stood when Moses was first sent unto him.

6. To descend to a more particular survey of the pride and avarice of these two Pharaohs. We are to take our hint or rise from that passage set down by Moses, *Exod. i. 10: Come on, let us deal wisely with them; lest they multiply, and it come to pass, that,*

when there falleth out any war, they join also unto our enemies, and fight against us, and so get them up out of the land. This was the utmost of the former Pharaoh's fear in the beginning of his project against them. But what cause had he to fear their departure out of the land, seeing they could not carry with them the lands and possessions which his predecessor, Joseph's good lord and patron, had bestowed upon them? Surely this haughty prince did politicly foresee, that the recovery of these possessions to the Egyptians, or confiscation of their personal estates, could not be so beneficial unto him as the possession of their lives and bodily service: for even these, according to the custom of those times, were accounted *in bonis ipsius*, as his proper goods and chattels. Now to be lord of so many slaves (for under this title he challenged them) was a greater revenue than any prince besides himself in those times had; and a great deal more than all the land of Goshen, which the Israelites then possessed, was worth. And this revenue he saw would grow greater every day, albeit his predecessor's cruel project against the male children had succeeded according to his intention; for the female sex would still have multiplied; and these he thought to be a secure possession, as being not likely to make insurrection against him, or to become confederates in war with his enemies. Nor is it probable that either of the two Pharaohs ever intended the extirpation of the males any further, than that they might have enough to propagate such a perpetual generation or succession of slaves, so competent in number as the Egyptians might easily master them.

7. This attempt had been less dangerous, and the cruel practice less wicked, against any other people under heaven, than against the seed of Abraham and of Isaac,

because these were the Lord's own inheritance, his peculiar charge. This people, when they were first invited into Egypt, was scarce an oligarchy; a small congregation of men endued with no other power or jurisdiction, but only such as every father of a family hath over his children and grandchildren and theirs. And this jurisdiction, after Jacob's death, was divided amongst his sons: every one of them was a patriarch, that is, a chief over his own tribe or clan. Nor had these twelve patriarchs any civil or coercive power one over another, or respectively over their several families, after they settled in Egypt, but as the king and state of Egypt would permit or allow of; not any power at all to make any war, whether offensive or defensive, or leagues of peace with any other nation. Freemen notwithstanding they were *de jure*; and this new king of Egypt, which knew not Joseph—much less considered upon what title of deservings Jacob and his sons were permitted to enjoy a competent measure of the land of Egypt—did most unjustly attempt to put the yoke of  
196 slavery upon their necks. Yet how to right themselves they knew not, as having no superior lord on earth unto whom they might appeal from Pharaoh. But the more destitute they were of any help from earth, the more easy and speedy entrance their prayers found into heaven; their tears and cries were accepted of the Lord God of their fathers for more than legal appeals.

8. But from the time of his appearance to Moses in the bush, (which was after the first hardhearted Pharaoh's death,) the Lord himself vouchsafed to become their King; not in general only, (as he is Lord of all lords, and King of all kings and people throughout the world,) but in a proper and peculiar manner. Whatsoever authority or power of jurisdiction the kings or



supreme majesties of other nations or sovereignties did exercise, or by divine permission and ordinance of providence do now exercise over their people, (as power of life and death, or of making laws or leagues, whether of peace or war with other states;) all these and the like prerogatives the Lord of heaven and earth did reserve immediately unto himself alone, over the seed of Jacob and of Abraham his friend. Upon the Lord's reservation of this royal power entire unto himself, Moses is delegated to be his ambassador unto the king and state of Egypt, and constituted his deputy or viceroy over Israel. Nor shall the reader, whether Christian or other, be ever able to understand the literal or punctual meaning of the history of Exodus to the fourteenth chapter, or of those places in St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, which refers unto that history, unless he take this rule or principle along with him whilst he reads them, viz. 'That all the messages which Moses delivered to Pharaoh from God, and all the answers which Pharaoh returned by him, were true and formal treaties of a legal and solemn embassy.' The law of nature and of nations was never so accurately observed by any ambassador as it was by Moses (whilst he exercised this function) in his many treaties with Pharaoh. One principal, if not the only fact, that can come within the suspicion of injustice on Moses' part, was the spoiling the Egyptians of their jewels. But if we consider what insufferable wrongs the king and people of Egypt had done unto this people of God, which had now become his peculiar subjects, or his proprietary lieges; this fact, even by course of human law, or law of nations, was more justifiable than royal grants of letters of mart, or other like remedies against such other nations as have wronged their subjects, or suffered them to be wronged by any under

their command, without restitution, when they solemnly or by way of embassy demanded it, are. Whatsoever the Hebrew women had borrowed of or taken from the women of Egypt, they took and did possess it *reprisaliorum jure*—by the law of reprisal, that is, by way of special warrant granted by God himself, as he was now become, not only this people's God, but their King in special.

This warrant for spoiling the Egyptians, not by any strong or violent hand, but with their own consent, we have registered, Exod. iii. 21, &c. : *And I will give this people favour in the sight of the Egyptians : and it shall come to pass, that, when ye go, ye shall not go empty : but every woman shall borrow of her neighbour, and of her that sojourneth in her house, jewels of silver, and jewels of gold, and raiment : and ye shall put them upon your sons, and upon your daughters ; and ye shall spoil the Egyptians.*

9. In all this time, or in all the instructions given by God to Moses, Exod. iii, there is no mention of God's purpose or menacing to harden Pharaoh, but only a divine prediction that *Pharaoh would not let the children of Israel go* ; and yet be at length as willing 197 to let this people of God depart, as Pharaoh's people should be to bestow their jewels and other rich presents upon them.

Moses' miracles letters of credence.

The miracles which Moses was for the present and afterward authorized and enabled to work, both in the sight of his own people and in the presence of Pharaoh, were as authentic letters of credence, legible enough to the Egyptians, that the Lord of hosts had designed him unto this embassy, and given him power to command all the hosts of reasonless creatures to fight for Israel against the Egyptians. All the several armies of inferior creatures, which brought the many

ensuing plagues upon the Egyptians, were but as so many fingers of that mighty hand, by whose strength God had lately foretold Moses, that Pharaoh would in the issue be content to let the Israelites depart upon fair terms out of his land.

10. The former Pharaoh and his predecessor (according to the apprehension of their proud imaginations) had played the foregame so cunningly against the seed of Jacob, that this present or later Pharaoh at least thought himself sure of winning the set, or of drawing the whole stake about which the controversy was, and that was the present liberty, or perpetual thralldom of Israel. Now God instructs his ambassador Moses to play the aftergame with such skill and circumspection, that unless Pharaoh would give over in good time, he should be sure to lose his own life, and the life of his princes, or chief commanders in war, besides the loss of every firstborn male in Egypt, whether of man or beast; besides the loss of the greatest part of that year's revenue of the whole land of Egypt. Pharaoh in all this process demeans himself, first, like a bold, then like a wilful chafing gamester, who, after once he hath begun to vie upon or provoke his adversary, resolves to revie upon him, and to provoke him further when the game is desperate, as will further appear in his answer to every several message delivered unto him from God by Moses and Aaron.

11. The sum or abstract of the fourth chapter contains Moses' debate with God, or humble entreaty to be spared from this great service, in respect of his slowness of speech, and insufficiency (as he took it) to be his ambassador. And in this mind he continued until God himself did overawe him by his authority, and yet withal gently persuade him by reason. *Then the Lord was very angry with Moses, and said, Do not I know*



*Aaron thy brother the Levite that he himself shall speak? for lo, he cometh also forth to meet thee, and when he seeth thee he shall be glad in his heart. Therefore thou shalt speak unto him, and put the words in his mouth; and I will be with thy mouth, and with his mouth, and will teach you what you ought to do. And he shall be thy spokesman unto the people: and he shall be, even he shall be as thy mouth, and thou shalt be to him as God.* chap. iv. 14—16. The reason which specially moved Moses to undertake this service is expressed, ver. 19: *For the Lord had said unto Moses in Midian, Go, return into Egypt: for they are all dead which went about to kill thee. Then Moses took his wife, and his sons, and turned toward the land of Egypt, &c.* The instruction for his embassy undertaken upon these motives, follows, vv. 21—23: *And the Lord said unto Moses, When thou art entered and come into Egypt again, see that thou do all the wonders before Pharaoh, which I have put in thine hand: but I will harden his heart, that he shall not let the people go. Then thou shalt say to Pharaoh, Thus saith the Lord, Israel is my son, even my firstborn: wherefore I say to thee, Let my son go, that he may serve me: if thou refuse to let him go, behold, I will slay thy son, even thy firstborn.* This passage contains the first mention either of God's purpose or prediction to harden the heart of Pharaoh.

198 12. Upon Moses and Aaron's meeting *in the mount of God*<sup>f</sup>, not by human compact or contrivance, but by God's special appointment, and upon the sight of the miracles which God enabled Moses first to work in private, *the people of Israel believed that the Lord had visited the children of Israel, and had looked*

<sup>f</sup> Exod. iv. 27.



down upon their tribulation: and upon this belief they bowed down and worshipped. *Exod. iv. 31.* Now upon this consent and obedience unto their proposal, Moses and Aaron went and said to Pharaoh, (like ambassadors of state,) *Let my people go, that they may hold a feast unto me in the wilderness. And Pharaoh said, Who is the Lord, that I should obey his voice to let Israel go? I know not the Lord, neither will I let Israel go, &c. ch. v. 1, 2.* Unless the former bent of Pharaoh's pride and avarice had taken occasion to enlarge and stiffen itself from this fair message delivered unto him, he would not have returned that haughty supercilious answer unto Moses, God's ambassador, and Aaron his interpreter: *Moses and Aaron, why cause ye the people to cease from their works? get you to your burdens. ver. 4.* Nor was his choler or superciliousness only against Moses and Aaron, but against the whole people of Israel, on whose behalf God had made them his ambassadors: for Pharaoh said furthermore, *Behold, much people is now in the land, and ye make them leave their burdens. Therefore Pharaoh gave commandment the same day unto the taskmasters of the people, and to their officers, saying, Ye shall give the people no more straw to make brick, as in time past: but let them go and gather them straw themselves. Notwithstanding lay upon them the number of brick which they made in time past, diminish nothing thereof: for they be idle; therefore they cry, saying, Let us go to offer sacrifice unto our God. Lay more work upon the men, and cause them to do it; and let them not regard vain words. vv. 5—9.*

13. That which did most discourage Moses from having any more to deal with Pharaoh, was his experience of his uninclinable disposition to any good motion which he could make on the behalf of God's

people. And this diffidence or backwardness in Moses received nutriment from the wayward and grumbling disposition of the Israelitish people against him and Aaron, after Pharaoh had given them a peremptory charge to perform the same task which they had done before, when they had allowance of straw from the Egyptians. *Then the officers of the children of Israel saw themselves in an evil case, because it was said, Ye shall diminish nothing of your brick, nor of every day's task. And they met Moses and Aaron, who stood in the way, as they came forth from Pharaoh: and they said unto them, The Lord look upon you, and judge; because ye have made our savour to be abhorred in the eyes of Pharaoh, and in the eyes of his servants, to put a sword in their hand to slay us.* vv. 19—21.

After the Lord had given Moses more special instructions and new encouragements, chap. vi. 1, and laid a stronger tie upon him and Aaron to deliver his message unto Pharaoh than he did upon Pharaoh to obey it—*And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Go in, speak unto Pharaoh king of Egypt, that he let the children of Israel go out of his land. And Moses spake before the Lord, saying, Behold, the children of Israel have not hearkened unto me; how then shall Pharaoh hear me, who am of uncircumcised lips? And the Lord spake unto Moses and unto Aaron, and gave them a charge unto the children of Israel, and unto Pharaoh king of Egypt, to bring the children of Israel out of the land of Egypt.* vv. 10—13.—yet this charge doth not altogether charm Moses' muttering; for he takes up, as it seems, the same note again, v. 30: *Then Moses said before the Lord, Behold, I am of* 199 *uncircumcised lips, and how shall Pharaoh hearken unto me?* But perhaps this last clause might be a

mere repetition of the former, interserted by Moses, the writer of this story, rather than a reiteration or resumption of the former complaint, or matter of grievance. Unto this conjecture I should the more incline, had not the Lord given Moses a second encouragement much different from the former, immediately after the repetition or resumption mentioned, chap. vi. 30. For so it follows in the next words, chap. vii. 1, 2: *Then the Lord said unto Moses, Behold, I have made thee Pharaoh's god: and Aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet. Thou shalt speak all that I command thee: and Aaron thy brother shall speak unto Pharaoh, that he send the children of Israel out of his land.* Here was a great encouragement to undertake so hard a service. But what encouragement could either Moses or Aaron take from the next passage of God's instructions or declaration of his will unto them, ver. 3—*But I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my miracles and my wonders in the land of Egypt?* This is a question worth the asking, and the resolution of it worth considering: for that which most discouraged Moses from obeying the Lord's commands, was his suspicion or presumption that Pharaoh would not hearken to him, nor regard his signs as equivalent to letters of credence. How then should he take heart and courage by knowing that perfectly which before he did but suspect or fear, to wit, that Pharaoh would not, or that he could not hearken unto him? Now thus much Moses could not but know from God's own declaration of his purpose to harden the heart of Pharaoh, vv. 3, 4, &c. And this question will beget a second, on whose resolution the clearing of the main difficulty will most depend. This second question or query is, 'What manner of harden-



ing the Lord meant in the forecited third verse? whether he meant a positive and direct hardening, by way of necessary causality, or physical determination of Pharaoh's will or spirit unto obstinacy, or unrelenting stubbornness, (at least from the date of God's forementioned declaration of his will unto this purpose,) or a privative, or some other way † ?

14. This question is so captious, that it is incapable of any one punctual answer, whether affirmative or negative. The best is, that the whole knot may be clearly dissolved by distinguishing the differences of times or several treaties between Moses and Pharaoh. In respect of the three or four last signs, and the treaties upon them, this affirmative answer is punctual—"Pharaoh's heart was positively hardened by God, or rather infatuated, by means extraordinary and altogether unusual, unless in two or three like extraordinary cases." In respect of the five or six first signs or miracles wrought by Moses and Aaron in the sight of Pharaoh, this negative answer is as punctual—"Pharaoh's heart was not hardened by God either positively or directly, much less irresistibly." The means or manner how his heart became hardened were but ordinary, only by Moses' proposal of such conditions unto him as his proud heart was naturally averse from; and by pressing him to grant them in such a manner as would provoke his avaricious mind to resist or deny them. The true tenor of God's former speech to Moses is but this: "If Pharaoh will not hearken unto thee, nor let my people go upon the sight of the first signs and wonders which thou shalt be enabled to work before him and his people, let not this dismay thee, or make thee give over thy charge; for the longer he is

† See below, ch. 42. numb. 4.



or shall be in yielding, the greater will be thy victory, and his case the harder : for, assure thyself, in the end he shall be willing to let you go ; both he and his people shall entreat you to be gone out of their coasts : I will multiply my signs so fast upon them, that Egypt and all other nations shall be taught to know who is the Lord, even the Lord God of the Hebrews and of Israel <sup>h</sup>.”

15. But more particularly to revise the characters of 200 Mosaical expressions <sup>i</sup>, how Pharaoh's heart, upon the sight of Moses' signs and miracles, became hardened by several degrees. Upon the exhibition of the first wonder, which was the turning of Aaron's rod into a serpent, it is thus written, ch. vii. 13: *So Pharaoh's heart was hardened*, רַחֲזָק לֵב פֶּרַעַה, *and he hearkened not unto them ; as the Lord had said.* This phrase, *Pharaoh's heart was hardened*, may refer more properly to Aaron than unto God as the agent, if the speech be to be construed personally ; or otherwise, to Aaron's rod, or to the sign and wonder itself: in which (to speak with due reverence unto the truth) there was no such extraordinary force as would have inclined an unregenerate man's heart, though by nature and habit no way so stubborn as Pharaoh's was, to have yielded forthwith to Moses' requests or demands, seeing the magicians of Egypt did the like. This only may be said, (and it is all that can be said to the contrary,) that the devouring of the magicians' rods, turned into serpents, by Aaron's rod first so turned, was very ominous,

<sup>h</sup> This is the answer to the former question propounded in the thirteenth paragraph—“ What encouragement could either Moses. . . . ?”

<sup>i</sup> All the discouragements that Moses had either from Pharaoh, from the Egyptians, or from the

Israelites, are cured by this, that God would break through all difficulties, he would lay his hand on Egypt, and bring forth his armies, and make the Egyptians, &c. know that he was the Lord. See Exod. vii. 4, 5.

so ominous as the observation of it could not but either mollify or harden Pharaoh's heart ; as perhaps it did, both according to the several times or vicissitudes of reflecting upon it. For his heart and desires being once drawn a little from their natural bent, (by the sight of this wonder,) but not fully broken, must either stand at the point to which they were drawn, or return with greater violence to their former station. The Lord speaking in his own person to Moses, ver. 14, saith not, *I have hardened Pharaoh's heart*, but *Pharaoh's heart is hardened, he refuseth to let the people go* : which can imply no other hardening than such as did result or rebound upon the sight or consideration of the wonder. Upon the exhibition of the second sign, to wit, the turning of the waters of pools and rivers into blood, which was somewhat more fearful than the former, Moses' expression of Pharaoh's disposition is impersonal, ver. 22: *And Pharaoh's heart was hardened*. And it was no extraordinary wonder that his heart should be hardened again, in such a sense, or after such a manner as it was upon the sight of the first wonder, seeing the magicians or sorcerers did the like : thus much only may seem extraordinary, or to carry a great deal of odds on Moses and Aaron's behalf, in that this plague could not be removed by any magician's spell or skill in sorcery, but only by Moses' prayers unto God. This might well have wrought reluctance in any ordinary heathen prince, which had but the patience to take the circumstances into consideration. But the Holy Ghost (to my apprehension) gives the true reason why, and by what means Pharaoh's heart was at this time hardened, ver. 23: *And Pharaoh turned and went into his house, neither did he set his heart to this also*. And his not setting his heart to this wonder, with its circumstances, did bring a necessity

upon him to have his heart hardened in some further degree than it had been with the first wonder. But Pharaoh (as we read) was more terrified with the sight of the frogs, which, notwithstanding, the Egyptian magicians did by sorcery produce, or at least which Pharaoh their master was persuaded that they did produce.

But the production could not be without his help, nor the persuasion but by his permission or sufferance, who had enabled Moses to do this strange work: in which this is most remarkable, that Pharaoh should so earnestly entreat Moses and Aaron to remove this plague, or to confine the frogs unto the river only, *Exod. viii. 8: Then Pharaoh called for Moses and Aaron, and said, Intreat the Lord, that he may take away the frogs from me, and from my people; and I will let thy people go, that they may do sacrifice unto the Lord.* And Moses is as ready to grant, as Pharaoh was earnest to request this favour of him, *vv. 9—11: And Moses said unto Pharaoh, Glory over me: (that is, you shall command me:) when* 201 *shall I intreat for thee, and for thy servants, and for thy people, to destroy the frogs from thee and thy houses, that they may remain in the river only? And he said, To-morrow. And he said, Be it according to thy word: that thou mayest know that there is none like unto the Lord our God. And the frogs shall depart from thee, and from thy houses, and from thy servants, and from thy people; they shall remain in the river only.*

But this relittance in Pharaoh was but like the devil's vow to turn monk in a languishing fit; but as soon as the fit was off him, (as the fable is,) he turned to his wonted bias, and became, and so continues, an erranter knave than he was before: for so it follows,



verse 15: *But when Pharaoh saw that there was respite, he hardened his heart, and hearkened not unto them; as the Lord had said.* This cannot be understood save only of such an indirect or concomitant obduration as hath before been expressed, that is, a resumption of his former proud and avaricious resolutions; the resultance of which could be no other but a measure of induration so much greater than the former that had befallen him, by how much the sight of the frogs had mollified his heart more than the two former wonders had done. Yet doth not Pharaoh, upon the sight of any of these three, bewray such a stubborn wilful disposition as he did upon the exhibition of the fourth miracle, which his enchanters did plainly confess surpassed their skill, ch. viii. 18, 19: *And the magicians did so with their enchantments to bring forth lice, but they could not: so there were lice upon man, and upon beast. Then the magicians said unto Pharaoh, This is THE FINGER OF GOD: and Pharaoh's heart was hardened, and he hearkened not unto them; as the Lord had said.* The finger of God then was remarkable in working the miracle which the magicians could not, but no way remarkable in hardening Pharaoh: nor is it either said or intimated, that the finger of God did harden Pharaoh's heart, but *Pharaoh's heart remained obstinate, and he hearkened not unto them; as the Lord had said*, ver. 19: his not hearkening unto them was the cause of his induration.

16. But this miracle of the lice was to Pharaoh more loathsome than terrible: and for this reason haply he did not either so fairly or so earnestly intreat Moses and Aaron to pray for him, as he had done upon the sight of the frogs: and as he straightway after did upon the noisome experience of the mira-



culous swarms of flies, vv. 21—24, and ver. 25: *Then Pharaoh called for Moses and for Aaron, and said, Go, do sacrifice unto your God in this land.* The offer is so niggardly, that Moses disdains to accept of it, cannot so much as hear it without such indignation as is expressed, ver. 26: *It is not meet to do so; for then we should offer unto the Lord our God that which is an abomination unto the Egyptians: lo, can we sacrifice the abomination of the Egyptians before their eyes, and they not stone us?* Notwithstanding all the former documents of God's power and wisdom in still overreaching Pharaoh's skill or potency, yet the caitiff out of covetousness seeks to drive his bargain as low as may be: for when Moses was peremptory to go three days' journey into the wilderness to sacrifice, Pharaoh yielded somewhat more than he had done in the former grant, to wit, that they might go into the wilderness; but (as if he had known neither what to say nor what to do) he instantly limits his commission, ver. 28: *And Pharaoh said, I will let you go, that ye may sacrifice unto the Lord your God in the wilderness; but go not far away.* And (as if that had been the least part of his present intentions) he adds immediately, and as it were with the same breath, *Pray or Intreat for me.* And so Moses did, as it follows, ver. 29, but with this ca-202 nonical and peremptory monition: *But let Pharaoh from henceforth deceive no more, in not suffering the people to sacrifice unto the Lord.* Upon his fraudulent contempt of this peremptory monition, the Lord begins to deal more severely with him, and to proceed unto sentence, and that a more dreadful one than had befallen him, if he had not dealt so deceitfully as he did at this turn also; for it follows, ver. 32, *Yet Pharaoh hardened his heart at this time also, and*

*did not let the people go.* Moses in his next treaty repeats the sum of his first embassy unto him; and presseth him, by thronging new plagues upon him, to come to his trial, chap. ix. 1, 2, 3: *Then the Lord said unto Moses, Go in unto Pharaoh, and tell him, Thus saith the Lord God of the Hebrews, Let my people go, that they may serve me. For if thou refuse to let them go, and wilt hold them still, behold, the hand of the Lord is upon thy cattle, &c.* This word *ecce*, as in most other places, is here a special character of the speedy execution of the plague that was threatened, and of the remarkable manner how it was executed, vv. 4, 5, 6: *And the Lord shall sever between the cattle of Israel and the cattle of Egypt: and there shall nothing die of all that is the children's of Israel. And the Lord appointed a set time, saying, To-morrow the Lord shall do this thing in the land. And the Lord did that thing on the morrow, and all the cattle of Egypt died: but of the cattle of the children of Israel died not one.* Pharaoh's experience of the former plagues foretold by Moses, and accomplished in his own sight, did persuade him so far to believe his prediction of this, that he sent into Goshen to know the truth of that part of it: *And, behold, there was not one of the cattle of the Israelites dead,* ver. 7. And yet, as it follows in the same verse, *the heart of Pharaoh was hardened, and he did not let the people go.*

17. All or most of the former signs were respectively rather more noisome and terrible, than detrimental unto Pharaoh and his people. We do not read before this time of the death or destruction of any useful creatures besides of fishes, when the waters were turned into blood. And this calamity was neither so grievous nor so universal as the murrain of

cattle was. It extended only to that part of the river, or those waters that were nigh to Pharaoh's court; otherwise the magicians or enchanters could have had no place to practise their skill in. But this murrain of the most useful creatures was very general: nor would the magicians have attempted the like, if it had been apprehended as facible by them, seeing both the Egyptians and themselves should have been greater losers by the practice of their own cunning. But seeing this plague did not infect Pharaoh's coffers or treasure cities, (which the Israelites were enjoined to build, or to prepare materials for their building,) nor yet Pharaoh's chariots or stables, hence haply it is that he is not so much affected with the wonder, as he had been with some of the former. And yet, because this wonder did give little or no check unto his proud stubborn thoughts, the Lord instantly and without further commission (as being now in process of sentence) commands Moses to bring another plague upon the Egyptians, more terrible and noisome than any of the rest had been: Then *the Lord said unto Moses and unto Aaron, Take to you handfuls of the ashes of the furnace, &c., ver. 8. And they took ashes of the furnace, and stood before Pharaoh; and Moses sprinkled it up toward heaven; and it became a boil breaking forth with blains upon man, and upon beast. And the magicians could not stand before Moses because of the boils; for the boil was upon the magicians, and upon all the Egyptians.* vv. 10, 11. Whether Pharaoh did resume or continue his former resolutions without any relentance, the text is silent, but express 203 enough to this purpose—that the Lord did from this time harden the heart of Pharaoh after a more extraordinary manner than it had been hardened before: for so the words do run, ver. 12: *And the Lord*



*hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not unto them; as the Lord had spoken unto Moses.*

But what was it that the Lord had spoken unto Moses? or where did he specially speak to this purpose? The place whereto these words, *as the Lord had spoken unto Moses*, do punctually refer, is, as our English margin directs us, Exod. iv. 21: *And the Lord said unto Moses, When thou goest to return into Egypt, see that thou do all those wonders before Pharaoh, which I have put in thine hand: but I will harden his heart, that he shall not let the people go.* In most of the former treaties between Moses and Pharaoh, or in the relation of the success or effect of his speech or works, this epiphonema or close comes often in, that *Pharaoh hearkened not to Moses and Aaron; as the Lord had spoken.* But in none of them besides this present is it so expressly added, that *the Lord did harden the heart of Pharaoh; as he had spoken unto Moses.* This different character of this close from the rest, gives us to understand, or intimates at least, that this plague of blains was the first of all the plagues in which the Lord did harden the heart of Pharaoh after any extraordinary manner.

But after what manner did he now harden it? Not by infusion of any bad quality or new unhallowed resolutions, but by giving him up to his own lusts, or by leaving him more open and exposed to the temptations of Satan than he had been. From this time, and not before, doth that of our apostle, Rom. ix. 17, (*For this very purpose have I made thee stand, that I might shew my power in thee,*) commence, or begin to take place. Now thus to infatuate Pharaoh, or suffer him to infatuate himself, after he had so often hardened his own heart and slighted God's fore-warnings, was a true act of justice, and withal a



prognostic that the just Lord was now purposed to destroy him. So the heathens, out of their broken speculations of Divine Providence, have observed: *Quos Jupiter vult perdere, prius dementat*: infatuation is commonly the usher of fearful destruction.

God in all this deals no otherwise with Pharaoh, than Pharaoh had done with the poor oppressed Israelites, immediately after the delivery of Moses' first embassy unto him. Pharaoh upon this occasion (as was observed before) severely exacts the same tale of bricks, after he had prohibited the taskmasters to afford them any straw, which they performed before, when they had plenty of straw allowed them. The Lord, in like manner, requires but the same obedience of Pharaoh after he had deprived him of understanding, and of the sweet influence of his ordinary general providence, which he had required of him before, or at the exhibition of the first signs or wonders. And this only is it which ministered the occasion or matter of that question made by our apostle, *Τί ἔτι μέμφεται*; *Why doth he yet chide?* unto which I have no more to say for the present, than may be found in the treatise upon that place, Rom. ix. 19.—See chap. 42. of this book, num. 6.

18. But to finish this present survey of the Mosaical story concerning this proud and foolish Pharaoh: it is a witty character which Josephus<sup>k</sup> hath made of his humorous wilful disposition, That after he had seen, and in some measure felt, three or four several plagues, he had a kind of itching humour, or longing desire, to have more variety of experiments in the like kind. This the diligent reader may with me easily observe; 204 that upon his sight of the first signs and experiments

<sup>k</sup> Καὶ ὥσπερ πλείονων παθημάτων ἐφίει τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μοῦσῃν τὴν ἔξοφύσεις βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, οὐκ ἐτι δον, &c. Antiq. Jud. lib. 2. c. 5.

of the plagues which did accompany them, he demeaned himself like a proud fantastic humorist, and did many ways bewray such a temper, as it was impossible for him to become wise until he had abandoned his former dispositions or resolutions. But after the plagues of the murrain of cattle, and of the blains upon the enchanters themselves, this proud fantastic falls into a phrensy, and fares like a distracted bedlam, and raves as if his brains had been blasted by the fumes or steams of his cauterized heart or seared conscience: witness those passages following, Exodus ix. 27, 28: *And Pharaoh sent, and called for Moses and Aaron, and said unto them, I have sinned this time: the Lord is righteous, and I and my people are wicked. Intreat the Lord (for it is enough) that there be no more mighty thunderings and hail; and I will let you go, and ye shall stay no longer.* Now albeit Moses, after he had promised him to remove this plague, did foretell him that he would not be so good as his promise, ver. 30—*But as for thee and thy servants, I know that ye will not yet fear the Lord God—yet, as it followeth, ver. 34, when he saw that the rain and the hail and the thunders were ceased, he sinned yet more, and hardened his heart, he and his servants:* and again, chap. x. 7, after his servants, upon the sight of the plague of the locusts, did thus boldly entreat him, *How long shall this man be a snare unto us? let the men go, that they may serve the Lord their God: knowest thou not yet that Egypt is destroyed?* though he yield to their request in part, yet he instantly falters, vv. 8—11: *And Moses and Aaron were brought again unto Pharaoh: and he said unto them, Go, serve the Lord your God: but who are they that shall go? And Moses said, We will go with our young and*

*with our old, with our sons and with our daughters, with our flocks and with our herds will we go; for we must hold a feast unto the Lord. And he said unto them, Let the Lord be so with you, as I will let you go, and your little ones: look to it; for evil is before you. Not so: go now ye that are men, and serve the Lord; for that ye did desire. And they were driven out from Pharaoh's presence.* The like raving fit or phrenetical symptom you may observe in him, vv. 16, 17: *Then Pharaoh called for Moses and Aaron in haste; and he said, I have sinned against the Lord your God, and against you. Now therefore forgive, I pray thee, my sin only this once, and intreat the Lord your God, that he may take away from me this death only.* Now though Moses did remove this plague, yet upon his fresh entreaty for Moses to remove another plague, to wit, of palpable darkness, he turns unto his vomit again, vv. 24, 25: *And Pharaoh called unto Moses, and said, Go ye, serve the Lord; only let your flocks and your herds be stayed: let your little ones also go with you. And Moses said, Thou must give us also sacrifices and burnt offerings, that we may sacrifice unto the Lord our God.* And ver. 28: *And Pharaoh said unto him, Get thee from me, take heed to thyself, see my face no more; for in that day thou seest my face thou shalt die:* a speech more foolish than proud, to come from a man whom the Lord had so much impoverished, and so often humbled, and given sufficient proof of his power to bring far greater plagues upon him.

19. Though his heart had been thus often hardened, yet is it not become so flinty, but that the slaughter of his own and of every firstborn male in Egypt did make deeper impression upon it, than any of the

former plagues had done. The mighty outcry which followed upon this sad and woful spectacle, to be seen in every house, did so far awake the drowsy spirits amongst the Egyptians, even of such as had no children to mourn for, that they joined in petition with the rest, to have the Israelites fairly dismissed : and were ready  
205 to make them a golden bridge for their speedier passage out of Egypt. From this time, and not before, were the women and maids of Egypt willing to bestow their jewels and earrings upon the Israelitish women, that they might woo their men and children to depart with speed. Thus then, that which the Lord had indefinitely promised unto Moses, from his first instructions given unto him, Exod. iii. 21, was not accomplished till this last plague was exhibited. Nor was the like prediction of hardening Pharaoh, Exod. iv. 21, put in execution, before the plagues of the murrain of cattle and of blains, Exod. ix. 12.

20. But from this mollification of Pharaoh and of his people's hearts by the slaughter of the firstborn, there did result a more strange induration than at any time before had befallen them. Of all the infatuated resolutions which either king or people had adventured upon, the pursuing of the Israelites with such a mighty army or strong hand, after they had fairly entreated them to depart out of their coasts, may well, to every indifferent reader, seem the most stupid. And so the author of the book of Wisdom censures it, ch. xix. 3 : *For whilst they were yet mourning and making lamentation at the graves of the dead, they added another foolish device, and pursued them as fugitives whom they had entreated to be gone.* Yet Josephus, a grave and sagacious historian, gives the intelligent reader good hints, that even this effect or phrenetical symptom of divine infatuation was but such as hath



seized upon worldly-wise princes and statesmen in former ages, and hereafter may be inflicted upon more. The greatest variety of miracles or wonders in any one age experienced, is scarce sufficient to make up a perfect induction, to persuade superstitious, profane, or wilful spirits of God's absolute power to effect, or of his wisdom to contrive the like in every kind. Most men are prone by nature to make such collections as the servants of the king of Syria did: *Their gods are gods of the hills ; therefore they were stronger than we ; but let us fight against them in the plain, and surely we shall be stronger than they, &c.* 1 Kings xx. 23. The undoubted experiments of the forecited signs, all done in Egypt, might well persuade Pharaoh and his people, that the Lord God of the Hebrews was more skilful in producing wonders, than the gods which the magicians of Egypt served were ; that Moses under him had a greater command over the wind and water, over the air and clouds, over the dust of the earth, and over all the host of reasonless creatures, than either the king, the princes, or priests of Egypt could ever procure from their gods, a more sovereign authority over flies, than Beelzebub had. All this being granted, they might notwithstanding thus reason in their hearts—"Who knows whether all this power was given unto Moses, to be exercised only within the meridian or climes of Egypt, or whether his commission might extend over Palestina and Madian?" The Egyptians at least presumed that the Lord God of the Hebrews had not given Moses such a great command over the armies or hosts of men as the king of Egypt had, because the Israelites (they knew) had no skill in feats of arms, no captains of infantry, no cavalry at all, no weapons or engines of war, offensive especially, amongst them : of all which the Egyptians had abundance—plenty of magazines full of them.

21. Upon these or the like presumptions or vain collections, they became foolhardy, and desperately resolute to be avenged upon the children of Israel, for all the miseries, harms, and losses which Moses and Aaron, their chief leaders, had brought upon them : whereas 206 the Lord God of the Hebrews had at this time purposed solemnly to declare to all the world, that vengeance belonged unto him alone, and that he would repay it upon those who had best deserved it ; that was upon the Egyptians, who for a long time, by many ways and in divers kinds, had wronged the Israelites, who at no time had wronged them. As for the Egyptians' loss of cattle and of grain, or for their bodily annoyances by frogs, by blains, &c., these were the just awards of God's punitive justice upon Pharaoh and his servants, for part of the wrongs which they and their predecessors had done by bringing them into undeserved bondage.

But the Lord God of the Hebrews had not as yet called this present Pharaoh, or the state of Egypt, to an exact reckoning or full account for making away so many infant males of the Hebrews by drowning them in the river, or other like cruel practices against them. Now, that the Egyptians might become the chief executioners of God's vengeance upon themselves for the shedding of innocent blood, he gave them over to their own proud fancies, to their own vain imaginations or presumptions of good success, by pursuing the Israelites, whom they had upon fair terms requested to depart out of their land. And of all the hardenings or infatuations which had possessed the heart of Pharaoh and his council of state, this was the greatest and strangest, that they should adventure to give the Israelites fierce chase, after they saw or might have perceived the Red sea to open her bosom to give the children of Israel passage. All this was the Lord God of the Hebrews

his doing, that the blood of the Hebrew infants might be required of the Egyptians *κατὰ ἀντιπεπονθός*, according to the law of retaliation, or most exquisite rule of punitive justice.

This present Pharaoh's predecessor, (whether his father or no, I know not,) with the advice of his council of state and war, had designed the poor Hebrew infants as a prey to the fishes or other ravenous water creatures. Now the righteous Lord God of the Hebrews makes this proud Pharaoh's successor, in the height of his strength, and his mighty army and statesmen, a prey, not only to the fishes and sea monsters, but a visible booty to the promiscuous sorts of ravenous creatures which inhabit the wilderness<sup>1</sup>, psalm lxxiv. 14: *Thou brakest the heads of leviathan in pieces, and gavest him to be meat to the people inhabiting the wilderness.*

22. He that would in vacancy from other businesses diligently peruse the history of Exodus from the first chapter to the twelfth, may find many fair, and unto this day fresh maps of God's patience and longsuffering toward sinners; of his mercy and lovingkindness towards his servants, specially to the oppressed; and many live durable pictures of his justice punitive upon obstinate incorrigible transgressors; but no type or shadow of peremptory absolute reprobation: not one clause is there in all this long relation which looks or can be wrested that way; no, not in the construction or paraphrase which the author of the book of Wisdom makes upon it—a man (I must ever acknowledge) of an excellent contemplative spirit, as full as the moon in points of high speculation of God's general providence in governing the world; and yet a man, when he comes

<sup>1</sup> See the ninth book of Comments upon the Apostles' Creed, chap. 43. numb. 2. vol. viii. p. 497.

to discuss the different manner of God's dealing with the righteous (these in his language are *the seed of Abraham*) and the wicked heathen, so far from being canonical, that he is scarce orthodoxal: often by fits exhibiting certain crises to the observant reader, that he  
 207 was in some measure infected with that disease whose cure St. Paul did so earnestly wish unto his countrymen the Jews. The radical disease common to the whole Jewish nation of that time, and to this learned author, (whom for this reason alone, were no others alleged by the learned Rainolds, I should conjecture to be Philo Judæus<sup>m</sup>,) was this—"That because they were the seed of Abraham, they were the only righteous seed: and however the Lord God of their fathers did often chastise and correct them, yet all his corrections were filial; that he would not or could not at any time plague them as he had done the unrighteous heathens, or punish them with like blindness of mind or hardness of heart as he had done the Egyptians." The receipt or medicine given by our apostle for curing this disease in his countrymen then living, and for preventing the like in after-ages, whether in Jew or Gentile, we have set down, Rom. ix. 18: *Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.* The extract or quintessence of which aphorism is this—"That the Lord was not so tied by oath or promise unto Abraham, but that he might and would harden the hearts and blind the eyes of his seed after the same manner he had done Pharaoh's and the Egyptians'; if at any time they should become as obstinate as Pharaoh and his people had been, or harden their own hearts by indulgence to their lewd affections, or by neglect and contempt of God's forewarnings, specially

<sup>m</sup> Philo Judæus, author of the Book of Wisdom.



these being seconded by signs and wonders no less admirable than Moses had shewed in Egypt.

23. To harden the seed of Abraham, even by Sarah, or to suffer them to harden their own hearts after a stranger manner and for a longer space than the Egyptians were hardened, upon supposal or discovery of the like (though less) pride of heart, obstinacy, or contempt of God's ambassadors, could be no prejudice to God's oath to Abraham, no impeachment of promised loving-kindness unto David, but rather a *constat* to all the world that the God of Abraham was *no respecter of persons*: but that in every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, shall be accepted. Acts x. 34, 35. And by the authentic rule of contraries, every nation, all and every one of any nation, that despiseth him, and worketh unrighteousness, shall be rejected by him: and they above others most obnoxious to grievous temptations and induration, who had better opportunities to know him, and greater motives to fear and love him; and out of love towards him to do that which is right and good, both in his sight and in the sight of men. This was the state or condition of the seed of Abraham from time to time after their deliverance out of Egypt, specially after the building of the second temple, and rebuilding it by Herod.

24. The principal point remaining only to be touched upon by me, but which I would commend to the serious consideration and accurate sifting of other students in divinity, is—a parallel between the cruel oppression and stubbornness of Pharaoh and his people in Moses' time and a little before; and the ingratitude, stubbornness, and malicious cruelty of the Jews towards God's people, and his ambassadors for their good, in the days of our Saviour and his apostles. Equality of cruelty, ingratitude, or contempt of God's messengers in the Jewish

A parallel  
betwixt  
Pharaoh's  
cruelty to-  
wards the  
Jews, and  
the Jews'  
cruelty to-  
wards  
Christ and  
his apostles.

nation, must needs, by the rule of justice, induce an excess of induration or infatuation upon them.

To draw the parallel aright. After the first cruel Pharaoh had begun to oppress the Israelites and murder their infant males, Moses is born, and designed by God  
208 to be his ambassador unto Pharaoh for his people's release from bondage. Upon the continuance of this oppression by the second Pharaoh, which the former had begun, *the Lord said, I have surely seen the affliction of my people which are in Egypt, and have heard their cry by reason of their taskmasters; for I know their sorrows; and I am come down to deliver them out of the hand of the Egyptians, and to bring them up out of that land unto a good land and a large, unto a land flowing with milk and honey.* Exodus. iii. 7, 8. The seed of Abraham was no less grievously oppressed by the Romans, and by Herod the Great, their deputy. And (which is worst of all) their own governors laid heavy burdens of conscience upon them: many of them were tormented in body, if not in soul, by the devil. The depth as well of the people's as of the governors' misery was, that they did not perceive or rightly apprehend the danger of their disease. In commiseration of all these and other parts of their affliction, the same Lord God which had appeared to Moses in the bush, and testified that he was come down to see the affliction of the Israelites under Pharaoh, did now the second time descend from heaven to earth to visit the affliction of his people under the Romans and their governors; shewing his commission to this purpose by many signs and wonders, much greater and more gracious than Moses had wrought in Egypt; most of them respectively exhibited in the sight of the Pharisees, priests, and elders, and of all the people, but with worse success, in respect of them for whose good

they were purposely and especially wrought, than Moses' miracles had found in Egypt. The Egyptians (it is true) did not hearken unto Moses, nor hold his miracles in that esteem which they deserved : but to persecute, to stone, or otherwise to slay or murder Moses, we do not read of any attempt made by them, until after he had departed with God's people out of Egypt. Whereas the scribes and Pharisees, with the priests and elders, upon the more frequent sight of our Saviour's miracles, did not only harden their own hearts, but wrought the people (otherwise well inclined unto his doctrine) to such an hardness of heart, that they persecuted the God or great Angel of the covenant, who had appeared to Moses in mount Sinai, unto a bloody ignominious death ; and (which doth aggravate the sin) sought the release of Barabbas the murderer, that is, by name and quality, *the son of their father* the devil, whilst he stood in competition with the only Son of God for enjoying the benefit of that boon, which by the indulgence of the Romans was granted to them at every feast of the passover, in remembrance of their fathers' deliverance out of Egypt.

25. More foolish again by much these scribes and Pharisees, with their complices, were, than the Egyptians in Moses' time had been, in that they persecuted (as far as in them lay) the Lord God of their fathers after his departure out of this world, by procuring a watch or guard to be set about his grave, seeking thereby to stop his passage, which he had foretold, from death to life. But he in the mean time gives evident proof, that he had greater power and more sovereign command over the earth, over the rocks and grave itself, than Moses had over the waters of Egypt or the Red sea, which Moses (by virtue of his power, whose ambassador he was) did command to swallow up the Egyp-



tians alive. This second Moses, or great Prophet like unto him, after his death, commands the rocks to cleave asunder, and the earth and grave to give up their dead. No marvel if, after the Jews had thus wilfully and desperately hardened their own hearts, the Lord God of their fathers have hardened their hearts after a 209 stranger manner than he did the hearts of Pharaoh and his people, and for a longer space, even to this present day.

Besides all other odds of circumstantial considerations from our Saviour's forewarnings or admonitions, the measure of that blindness or induration which possessed these later Jews did most justly accrue from neglect of that peremptory monition which Moses their lawgiver had given them, Deut. xviii. 15—19: *The Lord thy God will raise up unto thee a Prophet from the midst of thee, like unto me; unto him ye shall hearken; according to all that thou desiredst of the Lord thy God in Horeb in the day of the assembly, saying, Let me not hear again the voice of the Lord my God, neither let me see this great fire any more, that I die not. And the Lord said unto me, They have well spoken that which they have spoken. I will raise them up a Prophet from among their brethren, like unto thee, and will put my words in his mouth; and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him. And it shall come to pass, that whosoever will not hearken unto my words which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him.*

26. Here were a fit place and fair occasion to institute a parallel, or decipher the similitude between Moses and Jesus, *the great Prophet*, as the people did often instyle him: a point whereunto I have spoken somewhat in the third book of Comments upon the Apostles' Creed, chap. 11. The diligent reader, I know,

A parallel  
betwixt  
Moses and  
Christ  
Jesus.



may find much more for his better satisfaction in many learned commentators upon Deut. xviii. and Acts iii; and amongst others, in the learned Gualter, who is not in this point so prolix as in most other of his comments upon the Acts. At this time and in this place, these two circumstances only present themselves to my memory, which I shall commend to the ingenious reader's view. The first, That Moses was born at that very time wherein the Pharaoh which then ruled over Egypt had a design to make away all the Hebrew infant males, being thereunto solicited or provoked (as Josephus tells us) by the suggestions of his secretary, upon a prenotion or fame, (which he had heard or learned, God knows from whom, or by what means,) that there should about that time arise a prophet, or more than a prophet, which should work great wonders for the good of the Hebrews or Israelites, his kinsmen according to the flesh, which could not be effected, *rebus sic stantibus*, as the case stood then, without dangerous prejudice to the Egyptians. Upon the like jealousy, occasioned by more than a public fame, an authentic prenotion, that there should about the latter end of Herod's reign arise a Star in Jacob, a true King of the Jews, the bloody tyrant caused all the males of Judah and Benjamin about Bethlehem, which were under two years, to be cruelly murdered; and yet left the true King of the Jews, the Heir of David, the Flower of Jesse, and Hope of Israel, untouched.

The second circumstance, or remarkable similitude between Jesus and Moses, was this: Moses, after the first cruel Pharaoh's death, was commanded by God to return into Egypt, his native soil, upon assurance given him that they were dead that sought his life. Joseph is warned in a dream, or divine vision by night, to return with Jesus and his mother out of Egypt into

the land of Israel, *because they were dead that sought the young child's life*<sup>n</sup>, to wit, Herod and his complices. But my aim in this place (of which I hope I have not fallen much wide or short) was to set the parallel aright between the induration or infatuation of the Egyptians in Moses' days, and the excecation of the Jews, 210 after their contempt of our Saviour's miracles, and more than prophetical monitions.

The calendar made by the learned author of the Book of Wisdom, for the opposite fates or destinies of the Egyptians and of the Jews, began in his own time, and shortly after our Saviour's resurrection, to be out of date, and more than so quite inverted. *Versa tabula currebant qui modo stabant*; the lot or destiny which this good author assigned unto the ungodly Egyptians, did fall upon his presumed holy ones the Jews his countrymen: *Unto these the destroyer gave place, and was afraid of them: for it was enough that they only tasted of the wrath. As for the ungodly, wrath came upon them without mercy unto the end: for he knew before what they would do.* Wisd. xviii. 25. and xix. 1. Of the Jews saith St. Paul, *They please not God, and are contrary to all men: forbidding us to speak to the Gentiles that they might be saved, to fill up their sins alway: for the wrath is come upon them* εἰς τὸ τέλος, *to the uttermost, or to the end.* The author of the Book of Wisdom, whosoever he were, Philo or some other, did slide or draw himself into a twofold error only by overstretching two undoubted canonical truths: he had rightly observed, that as the Canaanites, so the Egyptians were an accursed seed from the beginning, as being the offspring of Cham; and that the children of Israel were a seed two ways blessed, as being the progeny of Shem and faithful Abraham. Wherein then

<sup>n</sup> Matt. ii. 20.

did he err or fail in his collections? First, in that he presumed the curse derived from their father Cham should be perpetually upon the Egyptians; secondly, that the blessing derived from Shem and Abraham unto their seed should be absolutely everlasting. Our apostle St. Paul, partly by observation, but especially by the Spirit of prophecy, did know or foresee that the seed of Shem and of Abraham should fall into a greater measure of induration, to continue for a longer time, than that which had befallen the seed of Cham or the Egyptians: yet did he not hence collect, or occasion us to think, that this curse upon his countrymen the Jews should be either universal or perpetual, but *to continue only until the fulness of the Gentiles were come in* °.

Neither doth he intimate that this blessing upon the Gentiles, specially the sons of Japhet, which were heirs in reversion unto the blessing bestowed upon Shem, should continue unto the world's end; but rather to determine with the recalling of the Jews, whose restoration (it is probable) shall be wrought or occasioned by the infatuation or obduration of the Gentiles, which through their ingratitude and contempt is likely to become more grievous than the induration either of the Egyptians in Moses' days, or of the Jews after our Saviour's death.

27. If we would look upon the face of Christendom at this instant, how small a portion of it shall we find, not either besmeared with its own blood, or disfigured with wounds and scars, or other like signs of more than Jewish infatuation! and, which is of all the rest the most ominous presage or symptom, the hearts of most princes and statesmen are so addicted to their own politic resolutions, that if God's true ambassadors, though prophets raised for this purpose from the dead,

° Rom. xi. 11.



should take upon them to forewarn them, as boldly as Moses did Pharaoh, to submit themselves unto the Lord, they should find more harsh entertainment in ordinary assemblies than Moses did in Pharaoh's court; as bad as our Saviour's apostles and disciples found in Jerusalem or in Jewish synagogues. The best excuse or apology which best divines or preachers of the gospel, through-  
211 out most Christian or other nations, can make for their backwardness or want of boldness to deliver God's message unto greatest princes or other statesmen, will be this, that seeing the spirit of prophecy is now taken from them, they may not take upon them to use the boldness or animosity which Moses and Aaron and other ancient prophets did even in the presence of greatest princes. One duty, notwithstanding, the ministers of the gospel, or Christ's ambassadors, may duly practise without danger, in the midst of his perverse and crooked generation in every state and kingdom—a duty which we of this church and kingdom are specially bound to perform—that is, to pray and entreat the same God and Lord Jesus Christ, which hardened king Pharaoh's heart, to remove his plagues from all Christian kings and statesmen, as also from Turkish, Mahometan, or heathenish princes; and to use these and the like parts following of our English Litany or Liturgy more than thrice a week, as we are enjoined, twice at least every day, evening and morning, either in our public or private devotions—"From all blindness of heart; from pride, vainglory, and hypocrisy; from envy, hatred, and malice, and all uncharitableness, &c.; from hardness of heart, and contempt of thy word and commandment, good Lord, deliver, not only all Christian kings, but even such kings as Pharaoh was by profession; and take from all Jews, Turks, infidels, and heretics, all ignorance, hardness of heart, and contempt



of thy word, and make us all one flock, under one Shepherd, Jesus Christ the great Bishop and Shepherd of our souls. Amen."

## CHAP. XLI.

SALVATION ONLY FROM GOD'S GRACE;

OR,

AN EXPOSITION OF ROMANS IX. 16:

*So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth,  
but of God that sheweth mercy.*

THESE words (as every observant eye may see) bear the stamp and form of a conclusion or collection; containing matter for its truth as unquestionable, and of as large extent for good use, as any maxim in this whole discourse. This illative being turned into a simple assertive, *Non est volentis neque currentis, &c.*, is as the axis whereon the whole doctrinal part of this epistle revolves. But taking this verse as it here lies, (being both a principle and a conclusion,) the lists of my inquiry into it at this time (by God's assistance) shall be but two: *unde infertur? quo refertur?* Two inquiries. 1. from what premisses it is gathered; and, 2, to what end it is referred, or, to what use or purpose in the apostle's intent it is specially applicable.

The premisses whence it is gathered first well sounded, will rectify our aim or level at the scope whereto it is directed; and the end or scope being known, will easily impart the right use or application. Amongst many uses whereto these words may serve, it is not the least, that their just extent once rightly taken, will serve as 212 a just measure or scantling to notify and unfold the contents of many *δυσνόητα* in this chapter, which have been as much perverted as any places in all St. Paul's

epistles, because they have been the common themes of every illiterate vocalist or rural scholar.

2. It is (I take it) agreed upon by all, (at least it will be denied by none,) that the principal end of this epistle is, to establish these Romans (whether Jews or Gentiles by progeny) in that faith wherein they had been instructed. And by the line or level which is directed to this end must the argument of this present chapter (as of all the rest) be squared. The materials here handled differ somewhat from the former; but *modus considerandi*, their reference or aspect to the proposed end is the same. What the apostle in this place here inserts, either concerning the hardening of Pharaoh, the reprobation of the modern Jews, or free election of their fathers, is purposely inserted for underpropping or fortifying his former assertion—‘That justification or salvation must be sought by faith only without works.’ To persuade the truth of this our assertion, no particular allegations of authorities or reasons can so much avail with an ingenuous auditor, as his own diligent perusal of the tenth and eleventh chapters; in which, the resumption of his former argument is to clear-sighted men more evident than the continuance of it is in this: and with his former doctrine, in those two chapters resumed, he intermingles powerful admonitions to the Gentiles to make their *election sure*; unto which purpose the original and manner of the Jews’ rejection is in this chapter premised. And he that shall please in his more retired thoughts unpartially to survey the connexion which the tenth and eleventh chapters, with the last part of this ninth, have with the former, specia!ly with the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth, the stream or current of the discourse will evidently bewray itself to be the

same : howsoever it may seem (a little before and after this ver. 16) to run a close way, or underground ; yet so as the opening of it is apparent, vv. 30—32 : *What shall we say then ? That the Gentiles, which followed not after righteousness, have attained to righteousness ; but Israel hath not attained to righteousness, because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the works of the law.*

3. The fairest connexion of this ninth chapter with the former, in my opinion, is this—“The apostle, having in the latter end of the former chapter confidently avouched the infallible assurance of their hopes which, renouncing works, seek salvation only by faith in Christ ; and his heart having been dilated with joy and exultation of spirit in contemplation of their happiness, is in the rebound more deeply touched with sorrow for the Jews, his countrymen and kinsfolk according to the flesh ; the lamentable issue of whose excellent prerogatives, and strange miscarriage of their extraordinary pains and zealous care in observing the law, might well have daunted the late converted Gentiles, to whom he writes, and in men’s esteem much impaired the strength of all former assurances which he had given them, unless he had further manifested the true original of the fall or rejection of God’s ancient people. This unfeigned sorrow for their misery is so much the greater, (as every good man’s in like case would,) by how much their means of welldoing had been the better, their approach to true happiness nearer, and their interest in Gods promises more peculiar than other men’s were. It little moves us to see a lazy un-<sup>213</sup>thrif come to be a beggar ; but to see a man extraordinarily industrious in his calling, not to thrive, or utterly to overthrow himself and his posterity by some one wilful humour, is grief to every other man that can

take pains for his living. This original of our apostle's sorrow is expressly intimated by himself, Rom. x. 1, 2: *Brethren, my heart's desire and prayer to God for Israel is, that they might be saved. For I bear them record that they have a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge.* And in the eleventh chapter he tells us Gentiles, (what Moses before had told these Jews,) that whensoever they should turn again to the God of their fathers, they were to have precedency of all other people in the world, in his everlasting and unchangeable love: *I say then, Have they stumbled that they should fall? God forbid: but rather through their fall salvation is come unto the Gentiles, for to provoke them to jealousy. Now if the fall of them be the riches of the world, and the diminishing of them the riches of the Gentiles; how much more their fulness? ch. xi. 11, 12.* And again, vv. 28, 29: *Concerning the gospel, they are enemies for your sakes: but as touching the election, they are beloved for the fathers' sakes. For the gifts and calling of God are without repentance.* And would it not grieve any zealous soul that loves the memory of his fathers, to see them so far estranged from their God, who is not altogether estranged from them, but always ready, when these prodigals shall return unto him, to embrace them as his dear sons?

These are points whose contemplation in our apostle was deeper than our shallow wits can rightly sound, and did cast him out of such an ecstasy of joy into such a sudden trance of sorrow, that he had no leisure to express the causes of it in the beginning of this ninth chapter, but is fain to reserve it to the beginning of the tenth. The very depth of sorrow had swallowed up the very stream or current of his discourse, and causeth him to begin thus abruptly:



*I say the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost, that I have great heaviness and continual sorrow in my heart. For I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh: who are Israelites; to whom pertaineth the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises; whose are the fathers, and of whom as concerning the flesh CHRIST came, who is over all, GOD blessed for ever. Amen.* Rom. ix. 1—5. He concludes his sorrow as though he had still prayed for them whilst he sorrowed.

If it be further demanded what peculiar occasion he had to be overtaken with these sudden pangs of sorrow rather in this place (the beginning of this ninth chapter) than any other, the special occasion, as I intimated before, was, the present opportunity or necessity of answering an exception, which, from the rejection of these Jews, might have been taken against those confident assertions wherewith he had concluded the former. And being to anatomize their wounds, for others' instruction, unto the quick, the sight of their grievousness could not but make his heart to bleed.

4. Against his former assertions (he saw) the Gentile or Jew late converted would be ready thus to object: "If they of whom Christ according to the flesh came; if they for whose miscarriage Christ in the days of his flesh was more sorrowful than thou canst be; yet they, notwithstanding all these prerogatives and peculiar interests in God's promises, are <sup>214</sup> fallen away, and utterly separated from God; where is the infallibility of our assurance? what is the ground of thy boasting, *that neither death, nor life,*

*nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord?* Rom. viii. 38, 39. Have we any warrant thus to persuade ourselves besides God's word? any better assurance than his promise? and seeing these Jews, thy countrymen, as thou often inculcatest, had both these in as ample manner and form as we can expect; if neither took effect in them, why may not both want their effects in us?" With this objection the apostle (if we duly mark the closure of his protested sorrow for the Jews' fall) directly meets, Rom. ix. 6: *Not as though the word of God had taken none effect.* It was in his eye when he fell into the former trance, out of which awaked, he falls in hand with it afresh again.

5. The more often and more seriously we read the doctrinal part of this Epistle to the Romans, or of those other to the Galatians and the Hebrews, the juster occasion we shall have always to admire our apostle's skill, as well in right applying the typical prenotions or enigmatical portendments of the Old Testament to the events in the New, as also in making use of whatsoever by the Jews, or any on their behalf, could be objected, for establishing the truth which he maintained against them. For instance, at this time, take only the manner of his retorting the former objection, wherein this whole chapter and the other two following are wholly spent. The manner is thus: "It is true, the Jews, my kinsmen, who had greater interest in God's love and promises than any people besides them hitherto have had—as great as any after them can expect—are become castaways. But spend your thoughts, not so much in wondering at this, as

in considering that the only cause of their fall was no other than ignorance of this doctrine which I now teach, being formerly taught by the law and the prophets. Be ye not therefore partakers with them in this their error; and so God's promises shall undoubtedly take effect in you, for he hath ordained that their fall shall be the means of your establishment."

The ignorance of these his countrymen was not *ignorantia puræ negationis*, but *pravæ dispositionis*; an ignorance rooted in carnal pride, the offspring of another pernicious error. They thought it sufficient to salvation that they were Israelites and the seed of Abraham; herein most grossly ignorant, and more inexcusable than the heathen; seeing the scripture had plainly given them to understand, that *they are not all Israel that are of Israel, neither all children that are of the seed of Abraham*; for Abraham had Ishmael and many other children besides Isaac: and yet the Lord had said to Abraham, *In Isaac shall thy seed be called*. The mystical or evangelical sense of which words in our apostle's exposition, ver. 8, is this: *They which are the children of the flesh, these are not the children of God: but the children of the promise are counted for the seed*. The true and orthodoxal construction of this apostolical declaration (upon Moses' words), if we apply it unto the Romans, to whom, or unto ourselves, for whose good he wrote it, and refer it to the end by him intended and supposed throughout this whole discourse, is as much as if he had said—"Stand not ye upon the prerogatives of the flesh, as my rejected countrymen have done, but betake yourselves wholly to God's promises, as Abraham did, and ye shall undoubtedly remain the chosen seed of Abraham and children of God." His assertion (or assurance) is the same in 215



effect with that of St. John, chap. i. 12, 13: *As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name: which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, but of God.* Nor doth our apostle, either here or in any other part of his writings, once intimate any other cause of these Jews' rejection, besides that hereditary disease whereof the Baptist foresaw their best teachers dangerously sick, and for whose prevention he prescribes a wary diet, whilst he offers the medicine of baptism unto them. *When he saw many of the Pharisees and Sadducees come to his baptism, he said unto them, O generation of vipers, who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come? Bring forth therefore fruits meet for repentance: and think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father: for I say unto you, That God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham.* Matt. iii. 7, 8, 9. Had they steadfastly relied upon God's power, manifested in the miraculous birth of Isaac, and the mighty increase of his posterity, as they did upon this glorious title of being Abraham's and Isaac's seed, they might have been sons, not of Abraham only, but of God. And no place of scripture, in my observation, warrants us to think that they were excluded by any immutable decree or irrevocable act of omnipotency from thus relying on God's power, or from following Abraham's footsteps. Let us not then, I beseech you, in a matter of so great consequence, presume to understand above that which is written, or to make a further resolution of men's reprobation than our apostle hath done. And the first and only cause into which he resolves the rejection of the Jews, as from the conclusion of this discourse, Rom. ix. 32, is apparent, is, *That they*



sought salvation not by faith, but by works; not by reliance on God's power or promises, but by confidence in these carnal prerogatives.

6. As it is dangerous to assign any cause of reprobation without warrant of scripture, so is it a preposterous presumption to pronounce their persons reprobated or accursed, whom the scripture hath proclaimed for blessed. Yet some in our times (unless my memory fail me) have ranked Ishmael amongst the reprobates, whenas Moses had registered the grant of Abraham's petition for him—*As for Ishmael, I have heard thee: Behold, I have blessed him*<sup>v</sup>. Now Abraham doubtless did pray in faith, and his faith questionless did as well respect the kingdom of God and his righteousness, as the blessings of this life; yea, his prayer for him was conceived in that very form which (as I have learned from some too rigid in the doctrine of reprobation) is the true character of God's elect and chosen. And for justifying their observation of this use of the phrase in other places of scripture, they allege this petition of Abraham, *O that Ishmael might live before thee!* which is as if he had said, "O that thou wouldest take Ishmael to be thy servant, and admit him into thy favour!" Just Abraham prays for, and the Almighty grants, Ishmael's admission into that presence of God, from which David desires he might not be cast out, ps. li. 11.

7. But whatsoever became of Ishmael, our apostle foresaw the proud Jew would except against this instance, (as they did against the like of our Saviour's, John viii. 41, *We are not born of fornication*,) "We are Abraham's sons, not by the bondwoman but by Sarah; and why then twittest thou us with Ishmael?" His rejoinder followeth in the next words to this

P Gen. xvii. 20.

q Gen. xvii. 18.

effect; “Esau was Isaac’s son by Rebecca, conceived at the same time, and born before your father Jacob, who notwithstanding got the blessing of birthright 216 from him.” Was Esau therefore an accursed reprobate? God knows; I cannot tell: the bounds of my present inquiry is, to what end or use this instance is brought by our apostle, and how it infers the conclusion here in this verse 16. Now from our apostle’s principal intent or scope, we can gather no other pertinent use of his instances (in Esau and Jacob) save only this; that God in his all-seeing wisdom did by these types mystically forewarn their posterity, (as John Baptist his messenger, and his Son our Lord and Saviour expressly and literally afterwards did,) not to stand on their genealogy, their birthright, or other prerogatives, wherein flesh and blood, Abraham’s seed above all others, were apt to boast, but wholly to betake themselves to his promises.

The circumstances which evince and justify this observation are remarkably contained in the holy stories, whereto our apostle, as his manner is, briefly and *in transcurso* refers us, that we might see the truth which he taught with our own eyes, and rear our faith upon the same foundations from which his faith had been raised. Abraham, after God had promised him—*I will make thee a mighty nation: In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed*—did yet suspect, lest all this might be fulfilled in his heir by adoption, though by birth a stranger, and by condition a servant, until the Lord made a fuller declaration of his meaning, Gen. xv. 4: *This (Eliezer) shall not be thine heir; but he that shall come forth out of thine own bowels shall be thine heir.* After all this, Sarah complains, *Behold now, the Lord hath restrained me from bearing.* And Abraham, hearkening

to her counsel which this distrust had suggested, took Hagar her maid to wife, hoping the former promise might be accomplished in her offspring, as it is Gen. xvi. 2. Abraham (to speak with reverence of his infirmity) did herein mistake the tenor of God's promise, as he had done once before : and to rectify his error, God further explicates his meaning in promising Isaac, Gen. xvii. 15, &c. Now that which our apostle would have us specially to observe, is, that the Almighty in thus crossing righteous Abraham's will and purpose, first to make Eliezer, then Ishmael, his heir, did hereby give posterity to understand, they were not to rely on the will of man, or any inventions of flesh and blood for attaining the blessing, but merely on his will revealed, who is able and willing to effect his promise, though by means more miraculous than was Isaac's birth, or (to use St. John Baptist's words) *though it were by raising up children out of stones to Abraham.*

8. Isaac also had a greater longing to bestow his birthright upon Esau his eldest son, than to eat of his venison : for he sent him out to catch it, to the end he might bless him with greater cheerfulness : and Esau was more forward to gratify his old father's desire than was his brother Jacob. Yet, that posterity might always bear in memory the blessing did neither depend on Isaac's willingness to bestow it, nor on Esau's running to deserve it of his father, but wholly and merely on God's purpose, Rebecca, to whom his purpose was long before made known, finds a means to derive the birthright to her younger son, while the elder was ranging abroad to compass it. It seems she had not imparted the oracle to old Isaac before, or he perhaps had forgotten it, until the event called the meaning of it to his memory : and this perchance may be the reason why he is so patient of circumvention by



his wife, as now perceiving it to be the Lord's doing. However, the Lord, before the children were born, before they had done either good or evil, had told Re-  
 217becca their mother, that the nation which should spring from the elder should be the weaker, and serve the offspring of the younger: and from this intimation she wisely gathered, that the birthright or blessing was, according to the tenor of God's free donation, to be conveyed unto the younger. Had not this purpose of the Almighty been revealed before the children had been born, before either father or mother could have had any reason to affect the one more than the other; Jacob's posterity (as they have been too foolish and arrogant) would have boasted, that either their father Jacob, or his mother Rebecca, which loved him more than his brother Esau, had better observed those rites and customs wherein they placed righteousness, than Isaac or Esau had done; and that God upon these motives had bestowed the birthright or blessing upon Jacob before Esau. And to no other purpose, for aught I can by analogy of scripture conceive, save only to prevent this pride and hypocrisy in the Jew, or to leave it without excuse, doth our apostle note that circumstance of the story, *before they were born, or had done good or evil.*

9. But as this takes away the former reply or apology, so it breeds a new objection: for did not God by his law allot the firstborn a double portion, and give him in every respect the preeminence of his brethren?

If this law were just and right, were it not unrighteousness in God to bereave Esau of his birthright or other prerogative before he had offended the law or the Lawgiver, before he had done good or evil? No; he bestowed a greater inheritance upon Esau than either his father Isaac or his brother Jacob lived possessed of,



greater than by any customary laws of nations he could lay claim unto. And the firstborn among the sons of Jacob were bound to bless him for his goodness in allowing them a double portion in blessings temporal : but he had forewarned them, as well by his own practice in Jacob's case, as by his instructions given to Moses, not to seek his special goodness by plea of law, or by custom of nations; not to urge his own law concerning blessings temporal, to overrule his will in bestowing blessings spiritual. All then which our apostle meant in his reply to this objection, *Is there unrighteousness with God?* is no more in effect than this: "God hath reserved it as an eternal prerogative to himself, *to have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and to have compassion on whom he will have compassion*, not on them whom the present sons of Jacob think worthiest of mercy and compassion, because they are Abraham's seed, or because they being Gentiles love their nation, and build them synagogues." Corah and Dathan, with their complices, because some of these men descended from Levi, as Moses and Aaron did, others from Reuben, Jacob's eldest son, thought themselves men as holy and just, at least as capable of God's favour and graces, as Moses was ; but God's judgment of them was far otherwise. And when man hath done what he list, or what he can, God will use his own judgment and not his, in the disposing of mercy and judgment ; for *he worketh all things according to the counsel of his will* ; (whatsoever the devices of man's heart be) that must stand. *So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.*

10. What is not *of him that willeth* ? what is not *of him that runneth* ? Neither election, nor salvation, nor any spiritual grace thereto tending. The proposition

is universally negative; neither first plantation, nor increase; neither the beginning, middle, or ending, nor any other part of any spiritual blessing is in the power of man: all and every part is from God alone that sheweth mercy.

The second  
inquiry.

218 And so I come to the second inquiry—To what end or purpose this universal assertion is referred? the discussion whereof will justify my interpretation of former passages: for surely our apostle intended no more in the premisses than is contained in the main conclusion, *Non est volentis, &c.*

Is it then to no purpose what end the man, as yet unregenerate, propose to his will, whether good or bad? or, after the end proposed, skills it nothing what choice he make of means? or after choice of means, no matter how he prosecute them, whether carelessly and slothfully, or with diligence and alacrity? <sup>r</sup> Suppose we were to preach to a congregation of which the most part were not (for aught discreet charity could presume) in the state of grace, nor assured of their salvation, and yet desirous to use the means for attaining this assurance; should we from this doctrine tell them, all were one in respect of their conversion or regeneration, whether they confessed one God or no—whether they swear by his name in truth and judgment, or use it rashly and vainly—whether they profane the sabbaths, or religiously observe them—whether they run to suspicious houses, or repair to the temple—whether they be willing to hear a lascivious song or a sermon, common talk or common prayers, upon festival or solemn days? or doth the undoubted truth of this doctrine, to wit, *Jacob was elected before he had done good or evil*, sufficiently warrant us to make this use of it to an unregenerate audience—“ Seek ye neither to do good nor

<sup>r</sup> See chap. 32.

evil till ye be elected; for, do ye what ye can, if God's will be to convert you, ye shall be converted at the time appointed; if it be not his will to have you converted, do what you can, you shall never be converted?" No minister of God that understands himself, but would be more afraid of these consequences, than Moses was of his rod when it was turned into a serpent. And yet, unless those inferences be true, every will, every purpose and endeavour of man, is not excluded by the former universal negative from being available, as means ordinarily necessary, but only from being meritorious causes of regeneration, or legal titles to election. Some will and some kind of endeavours are in their kind as effectual, as others are idle and impertinent, or demeritorious of God's grace, to convert us.

11. If we consider (in heart) that the principal and last end of our apostle's endless pilgrimages and indefatigable labours in the gospel was to gain multitudes of souls unto Christ; that the means subordinate to this end was to encourage all without exception to come, and to shew them the way (as he doth in this epistle) by which they must come, to wit, *not by works, but by faith*; we shall much wrong St. Paul, and our own souls more, if we apply these words, *It is not of him that willeth*, &c. to any other purpose, or stretch them further than thus: "Every man must sincerely and truly renounce his own will, that he may unfeignedly submit himself to God's will; every man must utterly revoke his own ways, and abandon those courses wherein flesh and blood most delight, that he may run (as we say) with might and main to God's mercies, and, freely denying himself, wholly betake himself unto them." Or taking the whole proposition—*It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy*—it is all one as if he had said,



“ It is to no purpose what ye *will*, or whither ye *run*, unless ye run unto God’s promises made in Christ : by proving most excellent in any other course of life, though in the excellent knowledge of the law, unless  
219 withal ye bend your course unto this mark which I set before you, you may make yourselves such as God hath decreed to harden ; for as *he sheweth mercy on whom he will shew mercy, so whom he will he hardeneth.*”

12. But doth this conclusion of the apostle’s any way import, that God should deny mercy to any that unfeignedly seek it ? It rather implies, that he shews mercy to all such in abundance. The principal and most pertinent sense of God’s words urged by our apostle, as they respect Moses’ petition concerning himself, is this—“ Where I shew mercy, I will shew mercy to the purpose.” For when he had told Moses, that he would proclaim his name before him, his first titles are, *The Lord, The Lord God, merciful and gracious, longsuffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, &c.; visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, &c.* Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7. This sense well fits our apostle’s instance in Jacob and Esau ; for God was merciful unto Esau, whom he blessed<sup>s</sup>, and made a father at least of one considerable nation ; but exceeding merciful unto Jacob, because his purpose was to give the world a manifest proof of his extraordinary goodness in him ; as he did of his severity in hardening Pharaoh, who had made up the measure of his forefathers’ iniquity, which God (as in the former place he had said to Moses) did visit upon him. But of this instance concerning Pharaoh, and the similitude which the apostle borrows from the potter, we shall speak, if God permit, hereafter.

<sup>s</sup> See Gen. xxxvi.



13. If we put the former verses and the words of this verse together<sup>t</sup>, our apostle saith neither more nor less in them than our Saviour implied in that speech, *Whosoever he be of you that forsaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple*. And not being his disciple, it is impossible he should find mercy; or professing himself to be his disciple, and not willing to learn this lesson of *denying himself*, (the latter end shall be worse than the beginning; that is,) he shall be hardened.

But shall all that truly forsake themselves be assuredly his disciples, and find that mercy which God promised unto Moses? Yes, Christ hath promised to all without exception: *There is no man that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my sake, and the gospel's, but he shall receive an hundredfold in this life, and in the world to come eternal life*. Mark x. 29, 30.

14. But if there be a possibility for all unfeignedly to fly unto God's mercies, and if all that fly unto them shall undoubtedly find them, and make their election sure, how is not election *ex prævisis operibus*<sup>u</sup>, seeing to fly unfeignedly to God's mercies is truly a work, yea an industrious work?

Now to make works necessary or ordinarily available to our first conversion, may seem a point of popery, if not a degree of Pelagianism. To this purpose some sons of our common mother would interpret my meaning, should I utter this doctrine in some public audience<sup>x</sup>. Howbeit, in truth and verity there is no doctrine under heaven with which my

<sup>t</sup> See chap. 42. num. 9.

in Corpus Christi College chapel

<sup>u</sup> See chap. 32.

in Oxford.

<sup>x</sup> This was a sermon preached

former assertion may better stand, than with the doctrine of the English church: no tenet or principle of any other religion whatsoever that can so directly clear the former objection, as doth the fundamental article of that religion which is professed by all the reformed churches: do not all these expressly teach, “that men are justified by belief in Christ without  
220 works?” Now let any man rightly answer an argument usually made by the papists, and as commonly denied by every protestant, and I shall make his answer as well fit the former objection, or any inconvenience that can be pretended against the former assertions. The argument used by our adversaries is—  
‘Works of faith are true works: and to believe in Christ is a true work of faith. Now if we cannot be justified but by believing in Christ, it is impossible we should be justified without good works.’

The answer to this captious syllogism, most used by the reformed writers, is, *Fides justificat, non qua opus, sed relative*. I like their meaning well; but their manner of expressing is not so artificial as it might be, and therefore more obnoxious to exception. I would answer (as I take it) more appositely to the same effect: ‘To renounce all works, and seek salvation only by plea of mercy, is the proper and formal work of faith, and therefore is essentially included in the act of justification; not included in the universality of works, which are excluded from justification.’

Did not priests (as the proverb is) forget that they had been clerks, or rather, could great clerks in divinity remember what they had learned when they were puny artists, the former objection or the like could never have troubled them; the form of it (drawn into mood and figure) being so childishly

captious, as would be exploded out of the schools of arts, should it be stood upon in good earnest. If such divines as urge it most should come into our *per-vices*, and apply it to matters there discussed, thus—

Omne visibile est coloratum :

Omnis color est visibilis: *ergo*,

Omnis color est coloratus—

I hope a meaner artist than this nursery (God be praised) hath any, would quickly cut off their progress with a distinction of *visibile ut quod, et visibile ut quo*; and shew that the major, though universally true of every subject or body that may be seen, did not nor could not comprehend colour itself, by which they are made visible, and by whose formal act they are denominated *colorata*. The fallacy of the former objection drawn into mood and figure is the same, but more apparent :

Every will or work of man must be utterly renounced from the act of justification or conversion :

But to deny ourselves, and renounce all works, is a work :

*Ergo*, This work must be excluded from the suit of mercy, as no way available. *Cujus contrarium verum est.*

Seeing this is *opus quo renunciamus*, the formal act by which all works must be renounced, this work must of necessity be included in the suit of mercy, and is always precedent to every man's first conversion, whose calling is not extraordinary. Neither may we, that are ministers of God's word and sacraments, presume to give any man hope of being converted without this work or act. Unless we thus distinguish between works and renouncing of works, and grant in man before his effectual vocation or

conversion as true a possibility to do the one, as want of ability to perform the other, we shall set the souls of our hearers in a perpetual backwater, or cause them to float ambiguously, as it were, between the main current of sacred scriptures and the stream of ancient interpreters, both graciously inviting all to God's mercy, and the fierce current of modern opinions, which deny all possibility of running (in any sort) to God's mercy before grace infused do draw us. The unseasonable overflow of which newly outburst doctrine throughout our land doth more mischief 221 to men's souls, than the summer floods do to their fields. But if we give that vent or issue to this eddy or whirlpool, which the former distinction naturally implies, we shall set our auditors or hearers at liberty to take searoom enough; and the breath of God's Spirit, plentifully diffused throughout the whole current of his word, will, as a gentle gale, impel them forward unto that haven whereunto these present meditations are bound, which only affords safe harbour unto all that seek to arrive at it, be they never so many.

15. Instead of an exhortation, you, my brethren, that are anointed to preach God's mercy to the people, give me leave to propose that counsel which I follow myself. Seeing the iniquity of the times wherein we live will not suffer us to persuade ourselves that the most part of those to whom we preach are in the state of grace, let us make this account, that there is a far greater necessity laid upon us to teach the means how men may be brought into the state of grace, than to frame characters whereby they may know themselves to be (what indeed they are not) God's elect children. It is the chief mystery of the ministerial function to set into the work of conversion aright,



and to impel men those ways to which each disposition is most inclinable. Now I know not how it comes to pass—but questionless by the infinite wisdom and never sufficiently admired goodness of our God—that there is no object of belief, of whose truth the unregenerate man can have such strong historical or moral persuasions as of the points now delivered; no practice whereto they can with like facility, or hope of sureness, be swayed or wrought, as unto denial of themselves, and desire of his mercy. Do ye demand of me a reason of this assertion? It is plain and palpable to your own senses: that which disables them for performing any good, and makes them incapable of all other saving truths, is by Divine Providence made a natural ground of these persuasions; their very dulness is as a spur to incite alacrity in these duties. Every man's conscience that hath any touch of moral honesty, any sense of good or evil, will thoroughly instruct him, that the more impotent and unable he is to follow that in practice which his mind approves, the deeper sense he may have of this his impotency, and surer arguments of the slavery of his unregenerate will. Now it is the infinite mercy of God, not to exact more of any than they are able to do before their conversion; that is, not to exact any thing of them that is truly good; or, if you will, any thing which doth not in its own nature deserve hell: and yet his infinite justice requires of all that they sincerely and heartily, though but morally, acknowledge and bewail this their natural impotency or want of ability to do any thing that is good, before they can be converted or enabled to do better. The not using of this natural capacity, whereby collapsed man only exceeds devils in natural goodness, or rather comes short of them in natural iniquity,

is that which makes all that hear the gospel, and obey it not, inexcusable. But shall all that use this capacity right be assured to have it filled with grace? Yes: the Spirit hath sealed their assurance: *Draw near to God, and he will draw near to you. Cast down yourselves before the Lord, and he will lift you up*<sup>y</sup>. So then we have better abilities or opportunities to cast ourselves down, than to lift ourselves up; and the Lord hath a more special hand in lifting us up, than in casting us down. Our impotency to walk uprightly, our natural proneness to all manner of evil, and the weight of our actual sins, do much help, and in a manner impel us (so we would not be wilful) to cast ourselves down before the throne of grace, by whose power only we must be lifted up, without any help or endeav-  
 222 vour of our own. Herein I must commend the anti-Lutheran's modesty, for not calling St. James's authority in question, albeit his testimony in this point makes more against him than it doth against the Lutheran or other protestants in the point of justification: and it is good wisdom for him so to do, at least it were bootless for him to do the contrary, seeing our Saviour hath said no less—*Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.* Matt. xi. 28. The greater our labour is, the heavier our load, or the more weary we grow under it, the readier we are to run with better speed to Christ, unto whom the feeble, blind, and lame were most frequent and most earnest supplicants. And our coming to him consists not either in strength or agility of body, but in the frequency of supplications and depth of groans. It was his saying, *They that are whole need not the physician, but they that are sick.* We must feel ourselves sick at the heart before this our

<sup>y</sup> Isaiah i. 16. James iv. 8, 10.

heavenly Physician will begin his cure, or use his skill by applying the medicine of saving grace.

16. Is it then impossible for the unregenerate man to feel his infirmity, to be morally persuaded of the soul's immortality, or to be somewhat affrighted with terror of conscience? or so affected, is it impossible to implore his heavenly Physician's help with as great care and diligence as he would an earthly physician's presence to save his body in a dangerous sickness?

It were rather impossible, that any, who is not an absolute atheist, (such as it is scarce possible for any man to be,) should be so slothful and careless in coming to Christ as the most part of men are, were they not (through our sloth or ignorance, or through our factious skill and industry that should instruct them) led on, as it were, in a drowsy dream, to imagine that God's mercy would either come unto them without seeking, or that it were impossible for them to do any thing, before it apprehend them, that might infallibly avail for the finding of it, or rather for being found and embraced by it. The natural man is not so unnatural to himself, as not to desire ease in true sense of actual pain, or exemption from danger which his soul doth dread; nor is he so brutish as to think himself not beholding to him that in these cases is able and willing to afford him comfort. It is the duty, and should be the care of us, whom that great heavenly Physician hath appointed to visit his patients, first, to work a sense and feeling of that natural infirmity, whereof the great naturalist<sup>z</sup> was (without an instructor) very sensible; secondly, to confirm their belief of this article—That no present fee, or hope of praise amongst men, can make any earthly physician half

<sup>z</sup> Pliny. See chap. 8.

so ready to cure their bodies, as he that out of his free bounty made their souls is at all times to repair them, so they would but implore his omnipotent mercy with as true and hearty affections as they do the help of their bodily comforters in distress.

GOD'S JUST HARDENING OF PHARAOH, WHEN HE HAD FILLED UP THE MEASURE OF HIS INIQUITY;

OR,

AN EXPOSITION OF ROMANS IX. 18—24.

*Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will? &c.*

THE former part of this proposition, here inferred by way of conclusion, was avouched before by our apostle as an undoubted maxim ratified by God's own voice to Moses: for he said to Moses, *I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion*, Exodus xxxiii. 19: the true sense and meaning of which place I have before declared, in unfolding the sixteenth verse of this chapter, so that the latter part of this eighteenth verse, *whom he will he hardeneth*, must be the principal subject of my present discourse.

The antecedent inferring this part of this conclusion is God's speech to Pharaoh, Exod. ix. 16: *Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I may shew my power in thee; and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth.* The inference is



plain, seeing God's power was to be manifested in hardening Pharaoh.

2. The points of inquiry (whose full discussion will open an easy passage to the difficulties concerning reprobation and election, and bring all the contentious controversies concerning the meaning of this chapter to a brief perspicuous issue) are especially four :

1. The manner how God doth harden.

2. The pertinency of that objection, *Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will?* and the validity of the apostle's answers.

3. The logical determination of this proposition—*Whom he will he hardeneth*: what is the proper object of God's will in hardening.

4. What manner of division this is—*He will have compassion on whom he will have compassion, and whom he will he hardeneth*.

For the right opening of all four difficulties, the explication of the single terms, with their divers acceptions, serves as a key.

The terms briefly to be explicated are three :

1. God's will.

2. Irresistible.

3. Induration, or hardening.

The principal difficulty or transcendent question is, In what sense God's will or induration may be said to be irresistible—*whom he will he hardeneth*.

3. Not to trouble you with any curious distinctions <sup>224</sup> concerning God's will (this is a string which in most God's will. meditations<sup>a</sup> we were enforced to touch); albeit God's will be most truly and indivisibly one, and in indivisible unity most truly infinite and immutable; yet

<sup>a</sup> See Attributes, part 1. chap. 15, [vol. v. p. 148.] and [vol. v. part 2. chap. 18, &c. : in what sense, or in respect of what objects, God's will is said to be irresistible.

is it immutably free, omnipotently able to produce plurality as well as unity, mutability as well as immutability, weakness as well as strength, in his creatures. By this one infinite immutable will, he ordains that some things shall be necessary, or that this shall be at this time and no other. And such particulars he is said, by an extrinsical denomination from the object, to will by his irresistible will. The meaning is, the production of the object so willed cannot be resisted, because it is God's will that it shall come to pass, notwithstanding any resistance that is or can be made against it. If any particular so willed should not come to pass, his will might be resisted, being set only on this.

By the same immutable and indivisible will, he ordained that other events should be mutable or contingent, viz., that of more particulars proposed, this may be as well as that, the affirmative as well as the negative. And of particulars so willed, no one can be said to be willed by his irresistible will. If the existence of any one so willed should be necessary, his will might be resisted; seeing his will is that they should not be necessary. Each particular of this kind, by the like denomination from the thing willed, he may be said to will by his resistible will. The whole *συζυγία* or list of several possibilities, or the indifference betwixt the particulars, he wills by his irresistible will.

The psalmist's oracle (psalm v.) is universally true of all persons in every age, of Adam specially before his fall: *Non Deus volens iniquitatem tu es*; "God doth not, he cannot will iniquity:" and yet we see the world is full of it. The apostle's speech again is as universally true: *This is the will of God, even your sanctification: that every one of you should know how to possess his vessel in honour*, 1 Thess. iv. 3, 4. God

willeth, and he seriously and earnestly willeth sanctity of life in ourselves, uprightness and integrity of conversation amongst men: and yet behold a vacuum in this little world in the sons of Adam, whom he created after his own image and similitude. So then he neither wills men's goodness nor nills their iniquity by his irresistible will. He truly willed Adam's integrity, but not by his irresistible will: for so Adam could not have fallen. What? shall we say then that God did will Adam's fall by his irresistible will? God forbid; for so Adam could not but have sinned. Where is the mean or middle station on which we may build our faith? The immediate object of God's irresistible will in this case was Adam's freewill, that is, *potestas labendi, et potestas standi*; "power to stand and power to fall." By the same will he decreed death, as the inevitable consequent of his fall, and life, as the necessary and unpreventable reward of his perseverance. Thus much briefly of God's will, in what sense it is said to be resistible or irresistible.

The nature and property of an hardened heart cannot in fewer words better be expressed, than by the poet's character of an unruly stubborn youth: What it is to harden.

*Cereus in vitium flecti, monitoribus asper.*—*Hor. de Arte*, 163.

It is a constitution or temper of mind as pliant as wax to receive the impressions of the flesh, or stamp of the old man; but as untoward as flint, or other ragged stone, to admit the image of the new man.

*The first general: the manner how God doth harden.* 225

4. The difficulty is, 'In what sense God can be truly said to be author of such a temper.' The proposition is of undoubted truth, whether we consider it The first general.

as an indefinite, 'God doth harden;' or as a singular, 'God hardened Pharaoh;' or in the universality here mentioned, 'God hardeneth whom he will:' the apostle's meaning is, that God can harden whom he will, after the same manner he hardened Pharaoh.

Concerning the manner how God doth harden, the questions are two :

1. Whether he harden positively, or privatively only ?

2. Whether he harden by his irresistible will, or by his resistible will only ?

To give one and the same answer to either demand, without distinction of times or persons, were to entangle ourselves (as most writers in this argument have done) in the fallacy *ad plures interrogationes*.

God doth  
not harden  
all men, or  
any man at  
all times,  
after the  
same man-  
ner.

Touching the first question, some good writers maintain the universal negative, 'God never hardens positively, but privatively only;' only by substracting or not granting grace or other means of repentance, or by leaving nature to the bent of its inbred corruption<sup>b</sup>. Others, of as good note and greater desert in reformed churches, better refute this defective extreme, than they express the mean between it and the contrary extreme in excess; with the maintenance whereof they are deeply charged, not by papists only, but by their brethren. How often have Calvin and Beza, &c., been accused by Lutherans, as if they taught that God did directly harden men's hearts by infusion of bad qualities; or that the production of a reprobate or impenitent temper were such an immediate or formal term of his positive action, as heat is of calefaction, or drought of heat. But if we take privative and positive induration in this sense,

<sup>b</sup> Vide Lorinum, Act. Apost. vii. 51. p. (322.) 369. col. 1.



and set them so far asunder, the division is altogether imperfect; the former member comes as far short of the truth, as the latter overreacheth it. God sometimes hardens some men neither the one way nor the other; that is, as we say in schools, *datur medium abnegationis* between them. And perhaps it may be as questionable, whether God at any time hardens any man *merè privativè*; as it is, whether there can be *peccatum puræ omissionis*, any sin of mere omission, without all mixture of commission. But with this question here or elsewhere we are not disposed to meddle, being rather willing to grant what is confessed by all or most, that he sometimes hardens *privativè*, if not by mere subtraction of grace, or utter denial of other means of repentance, yet so especially by these means as may suffice to verify the truth of the proposition usually received, or to give the denomination of *privative hardening*. God sometimes hardens privatively only.

But many times he hardens *positivè*, not by infusion of bad qualities, but by disposing or inclining the heart to goodness, that is, by communication of his favours, and exhibition of motives more than ordinary to repentance; not that he exhibits these with purpose to harden, but rather to mollify and organize men's hearts for the receiving of grace. The natural effect or purposed issue of the riches of God's bounty, is to draw men to repentance. But the very attempt or sway of means offered, provokes hearts fastened to their sins to greater stubbornness in the rebound. Hearts thus affected treasure up wrath against the day of wrath, in a proportioned measure to the riches 226 of bounty offered but not entertained by them. And such a cause as God is of their treasuring up of wrath, The manner of God's positive hardening. he is likewise of their hardening, no direct, no neces-

sary cause of either : yet a cause of both more than privative, a positive cause by consequence or resultance ; not necessary, or necessary only *ex hypothesi*. Means of repentance sincerely offered by God, but wilfully rejected by man, concur as positively to induration of heart, as the heating of water doth to the quick freezing of it, when it is taken off the fire and set in the cold air. Both these actions, or rather both these qualities of heat and cold, have their proper influence into this effect: if a physician should minister some physical drink unto his patient, and heap clothes upon him, with purpose to prevent some disease by a kindly sweat, and the patient, thoroughly heated, wilfully throw them off, both may be said positive causes of the cold, which would necessarily ensue from both actions, albeit the patient only were the true moral cause, or the only blameworthy cause of his own death or danger following. Just according to the importance of this supposition or similitude is the cause of hardening in many cases to be divided betwixt God and man.

The Israelites did harden their own hearts in the wilderness, and yet their hearts had not been so hardened, unless the Lord had done so many wonders in their sight. In every wonder his purpose was to beget belief : but through their wilful unbelief, the best effect of his greatest wonders was induration and impenitency. Now as it suits not with the rules of good manners for physicians to tie a man's hands (of discretion or place), lest he may use them to his own harm, so neither was it consonant to the rules of eternal equity, that God should necessitate the Israelites' wills to a true belief of his wonders, or mollify their hearts against their wills ; that is, he neither

hardens nor mollifies their hearts by his irresistible will; nor did he at all will their hardening, but rather mollification.

5. All this is true of God's ordinary manner of hardening men, or of the first degrees of hardening any man. But Pharaoh's case is extraordinary. Beza rightly infers against Origen and his followers, "that this hardening, whereof the apostle here speaketh, was irresistible—that the party thus hardened was incapable of repentance—that God did shew signs and wonders in Egypt, not with purpose to reclaim but to harden Pharaoh, and to drive him headlong into the snare prepared for him from everlasting." All these inferences are plain. First, that the interrogation, *Who hath resisted his will?* is equivalent to the universal negative, 'No man, no creature can at any time resist his will.' That is, according to the interpretation premised, 'Whatsoever particular God's will is to have necessary, or so to be as the contrary or contradictory to it shall not be, the existence of it cannot be prevented or avoided.' Now that God did in this peremptory manner will Pharaoh's hardening, is evident from the emphasis of that message delivered unto him by Moses, *Εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ, Even for this very purpose*, and for no other end in the world possible, *have I raised thee up, that I might shew in thee my power*: and his power was to be shewed in his hardening. For from the tenor of this message the apostle infers the latter part of this conclusion in the text, *Whom he will he hardeneth*; yea he so hardeneth as it is impossible they should escape it, or his judgments due unto it.

In all these collections Beza doth not err. Yet was Beza (with reverence be it spoken) more foully to blame than this "filthy writer," (for so it pleaseth him

to entitle Origen,) in that he refers these threatenings, *For this very purpose have I raised thee up, that I may shew my power in thee*, not only unto Pharaoh's exaltation to the crown of Egypt, (as I think Origen did, but we need not, we may not grant,) but to his extraction out of the womb, yea to his first creation out of the dust; as if the Almighty had moulded him by his irresistible will in the eternal idea of reprobation, before man or angel had actual being, as if the only end of his being had been to be a reprobate or vessel of wrath. Beza's collections to this purpose (unless they be better limited than he hath left them) make God, not only a direct and positive cause, but the immediate and only cause of all Pharaoh's tyranny; a more direct and more necessary cause of his butchering the Israelites' infants, than he was of Adam's good actions during the space of his innocency. For of those, or of his short continuance in the state of integrity, he was no necessary nor immutable cause; that is, he did not decree that Adam's integrity should be immutable. But whether God's hardening Pharaoh by his irresistible will can any way infer that Pharaoh was an absolute reprobate, or born to the end he might be hardened, we are hereafter to dispute in the third point. All we have to say in this place is this; if as much as Beza earnestly contends for were once granted, the objection following, to which our apostle vouchsafes a double answer, had been altogether as unanswerable as impertinently moved in this place. Let us then examine the pertinency of the objection, and unfold the validity of the answers.

Whether Pharaoh were an absolute reprobate, or created to be hardened.



*The second general point, concerning the pertinency of the objection.*

6. *Why doth he yet find fault? Τί ἔτι μέμφεται; or Why doth he yet chide? With whom doth he find fault? or whom doth he chide? All that are reprobates? Doth he only chide them? is this all that they are to fear? the very worst that can befall them<sup>c</sup>? Were this speech to be as far extended as it is by most interpreters, no question but our apostle would have intended the force and acrimony of it a great deal more than he doth; thus far at least: ‘Why doth he punish? why doth he plague the reprobates in this life, and deliver them up to everlasting torments in the life to come, seeing they do but that which he by his irresistible will hath appointed?’ Or suppose the Greek μέμφεται might, by some unusual synecdoche, (which passeth our reading, observation, or understanding,) include as much or more than we now express, all the plagues of this life, and all the torments which befall the reprobates in the life to come: yet it is questioned what ἔτι hath here to do; it must be examined whence it came, and whither it tends. It naturally designs some definite point or section of time, and imports particulars before begun and still continued: it can have no place in the immovable sphere of eternity, no reference to the exercise of God’s everlasting wrath against reprobates in general.*

That the objection proposed hath reference only to Pharaoh, or to some few in his case, not all that perish or are reprobated.

7. These queries, which here naturally offer themselves, (though, for aught that I know, not discussed by any interpreters,) have occasioned me in this place to make use of a rule, more useful than usual, for explicating the difficult places of the New Testament.

<sup>c</sup> See book 7. chap. 19. num. 4, 5, 6. [vol. vii. p. 159.]

228 The rule is this—To search out the passages of the Old Testament, with their historical circumstances, unto which the speeches of our Saviour and his apostles have special reference or allusion.

Now this interrogation, *Τί ἔτι μέμφεται*; was conceived from our apostle's meditations upon those expostulations with Pharaoh, *Exod. ix. 16, 17: And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for to shew in thee my power; and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth.* Ἐτι οὖν σὺ ἐμποιῆ; *As yet exaltest thou thyself against my people, or oppressest thou my people, that thou wilt not let them go?* Chap. x. 3, 4: ἔτι μέμφεται, *he yet chides and threatens him again, How long wilt thou refuse to humble thyself before me? let my people go, that they may serve me. Else, if thou refuse to let my people go, behold, to morrow will I bring the locusts into thy coast.* That which makes most for this interpretation, is the historical circumstance of time and manner of God's proceeding with Pharaoh. For this expostulation, whereunto our apostle in this place hath reference, was uttered after the seventh wonder wrought by Moses and Aaron in the sight of Pharaoh; upon which it is expressly said, that *the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, that he hearkened not unto them.* Whereas of the five going before, it is only said, that *Pharaoh hardened his heart, or his heart was hardened, or he set not his heart to the wonders*<sup>d</sup>. The Spirit's censure likewise of Pharaoh's stupidity, upon the first wonder, may be read impersonally, or be referred to the wonder itself, which might positively harden his heart in such a sense as is before expressed. Nor is it to be omitted, that upon the neglect of the seventh wonder, the Lord

<sup>d</sup> See above, p. 401, chap. 40. num. 15.

enlargeth his commission to Moses and his threats to Pharaoh, *Exod. ix. 13, &c.*: *Thus saith the Lord God of the Hebrews, Let my people go, that they may serve me. For I will at this time send all my plagues upon thine heart, and upon thy servants, and upon thy people; that thou mayest know that there is none like me in all the earth. For now I will stretch out my hand, that I may smite thee and thy people with pestilence; and thou shalt be cut off from the earth:* or, as Junius excellently rendereth it, “*I had smitten thee and thy people with pestilence, when I destroyed your cattle with murrain, and thou hadst been cut off from the earth, when the boils were so rife upon the magicians: but when they fell, I made thee to stand;*” for so the Hebrew is verbatim: “to what purpose? that thou shouldst still stand out against me? nay, but for this very purpose—that I might shew my power and declare my name more manifestly throughout all the earth, by a more remarkable destruction than at that time should have befallen thee.”

8. This brief survey of these historical circumstances presents unto us, as in a map, the just occasion, the due force and full extent of the objection here intimated (*in transitu*); *Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault?* As if some one on Pharaoh's behalf had replied more expressly thus: “God indeed had just cause to upbraid Pharaoh heretofore, for neglect of his signs and wonders: for it was a foul fault in him not to relent, so long as there was a possibility left for him to relent. But since God hath thus openly declared his irresistible will to harden him to destruction, *τί ἔτι μέμφεται*; why doth he chide him any longer? why doth he hold on to expostulate more sharply with him than heretofore, for that which is impossible for him to avoid? For

The true occasion of the former objection.

is it possible for him to open the door of repentance, when God hath shut it? or to mollify his heart, whose hardening was now by God's decree irrevocable?"

I have heard of a malapert courtier, who, being  
 229 rated of his sovereign lord for committing the third murder after he had been graciously pardoned for two, made this saucy reply: "One man indeed I killed; and if the law might have had its course, that had been all: for the death of the second and of the third, your highness is to answer God and the law." Our apostle, being better acquainted than we are with the forementioned circumstances of time, and with the manner of Pharaoh's hardening, foresaw the malapert Jew or hypocrite (especially when Pharaoh's case came in a manner to be their own) would make this or the like saucy answer to God: "If Pharaoh, after the time wherein by the ordinary course of justice he was to die, were by God's special appointment not only reprieved, but suffered to be more outrageous than before, yea imboldened to contemn God's messengers, the ensuing evils committed by him, and the miseries which by his stubbornness befell the Egyptians, may seem to be more justly imputed unto God than unto him; at least the former expostulation might seem now altogether unseasonable."

The apo-  
 stle's first  
 answer to  
 the former  
 objection  
 explicated.

9. To this objection our apostle opposeth a twofold answer: first, he checks the sauciness of the replicant: *Nay but, O man, who art thou ὁ ἀνταποκρινόμενος; qui Deo respondes*, saith the Vulgar; Beza (as he thinks) more fully, *qui responsas Deo*; our English better than both, *that repliest against God*. The just and natural value of the original doubly compounded word will best appear from the circumstances specified: first, God by Moses admonisheth Pharaoh *to let his people go*: but he refuseth. Then God expos-



tulateth with him, *As yet exaltest thou thyself against my people, that thou wilt not let them go?* The objection, *Τί ἔτι μέμφεται;* made by the hypocrite, is as a rejoinder upon God's reply to Pharaoh for his wonted stubbornness, or as an answer made on his behalf, or others in his case, unto the former expostulations. For *ἀνταποκρίνεσθαι* is *respondenti respondere*, to rejoin upon a reply or answer. Now this rejoinder (to speak according to the rules of modesty and good manners) was too saucy, out of what man's mouth soever it had proceeded. For what is man in respect of God? any better than an artificial body in respect of the artificer that makes it? or than an earthen vessel in respect of the potter? Now if we might imagine a base vessel could speak, (as fables suppose beasts in old time did,) and thus expostulate with the potter: "When I was spoiled in the making, why didst thou rather reserve me to such base and ignominious uses, than throw me away; especially when others of the same lump are fitted for commendable uses?" it would deserve to be appointed to yet more base or homely uses. For a bystander, that had no skill in this faculty, for the potter's boy or apprentice, thus to expostulate on the vessel's behalf with his father or master, would argue ignorance and indiscretion. The potter at least would take so much authority on him as to reply: "I will appoint every vessel to what use I think fit; not to such use as every idle fellow or malapert boy would have it appointed."

Now all that our apostle in this similitude intends, is, that we must attribute more unto the Creator's skill and wisdom in dispensing mercy and judgment, or in preparing *vessels of wrath* and *vessels of honour*, than we do unto the potter's judgment in discerning clay, or fitting every part of his matter to its right and most

commodious use. Yet in all these *the potter is judge*<sup>e</sup>, saith the author of the Book of Wisdom. That very vessel which ministered the matter of this similitude to our apostle, Jer. xviii. 4, was so *marred in the potter's hand*, as he was enforced to fashion it again to another use than it was first intended for. That it marred in the first making was the fault of the clay; 230 so to fashion it anew, as neither stuff nor former labour should be altogether lost, was the potter's skill. And shall we think our apostle did intend any other inference from this similitude, than the prophet from whom he borrows it had made to his hand? *O house of Israel, cannot I do with you as this potter? saith the Lord. Behold, as the clay is in the potter's hand, so are ye in mine hand, O house of Israel.* Jer. xviii. 6.

10. The true and full implication is thus much and no more: "Albeit God sought to prepare them to glory, yet had they a possibility or liberty utterly to spoil themselves in the making. Howbeit, if so they did, he was able to form them again, to an end quite contrary unto that whereto he first intended them." So the prophet explicates himself, vv. 9, 10.

And here we must request our reader always to remember, that the apostle compares God, not to a frantic or fantastic potter, delighted to play tricks to his loss, as to make a vessel scarce worth a groat, of that piece, which, with the same ease and cost, might be made worth a shilling, only to shew his imperial authority over a piece of clay. He imagineth such a potter, as the wise man did, that knows a reason why he makes one vessel of this fashion, another of that; why he appoints this to a base use, that to a better: albeit an unskilful bystander could

<sup>e</sup> Wisdom xv. 7.

perhaps discern no difference in the stuff or matter whereof they are made.

The sum then of our apostle's intended inference is this; "As it is an unmannerly point for any man to contest or wrangle with a skilful artificer in his own faculty, of whom he should rather desire to learn with submission, so it is damnable presumption for any creature to dispute with his Creator in matters of providence, or of the world's regiment; or to debate his own case with him thus; 'Seeing all of us were made of the same mass, I might have been graced as others have been, with wealth, with honour, with strength, with wisdom, unless thou hadst been more favourable to them than to me.'" Yet that which must quell all inclination to such secret murmurings or presumptuous debates, is it our steadfast belief of his omnipotent power or absolute will? No: but of his infinite wisdom, equity and mercy, by which he disposeth all things, even men's infirmities or greatest crosses, to a better end in respect of them, (so they will patiently submit their wills to his,) than they could hope by any other means to achieve.

11. God's will to have mercy on some and to harden others, or howsoever otherwise to deal with men, is in this sense most absolute—'Whatsoever we certainly know to be willed by him, we must acknowledge, without examination, to be truly good. Whomsoever we assuredly believe it hath been his will to harden, we must, without dispute, believe their hardening to have been most just.' Yet thus to believe we were not bound, unless it were a fundamental point of our belief, that this his most absolute will hath just reasons (though unknown to us) why he hardeneth some, and sheweth mercy unto others; yea such ideal

In what sense God's will is said to be the absolute infallible rule of equity or justice.

reasons<sup>f</sup>, as when it shall be his pleasure to make them known to us, we shall acknowledge them to be infinitely better, and more agreeable to the immutable rules of eternal equity, (which indeed they are,) than any earthly prince can give, why he punisheth this man and rewardeth that.

The contrary, in consequence, which some would infer out of our apostle in this place, is the natural, true, and necessary consequence of a misconstruction which they have made of another most orthodoxal principle, 'God's will is the only infallible rule of  
231 goodness,' that is, in their exposition, things are good only because God doth will them; whenas in truth, his will could not be so infallible, so inflexible, and so sovereign a rule of goodness, (as all must believe it to be, that think themselves bound to conform their wills to his,) unless absolute and immutable goodness were the essential object of this his most holy will. Wherefore, though this argument be more than demonstrative—'It was God's will to deal thus and thus with mankind, therefore they are most justly dealt withal'—yet, on the other side, this inference is as strong and sound; 'Some kind of dealings are in their own natures so evidently unjust, that we must believe it was not God's will to deal so with any man living.' Abraham did not transgress the bounds of modesty in saying to God, *That the righteous should perish with the wicked, that be far from thee: Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?* yet, were God's will the rule of goodness in such a sense as some conceive it, or our apostle's meaning such in this place as many have

<sup>f</sup> Vide Coppen in Ps. xxxvi. 7. num. 9. of this tenth book; and col. 388. B. C. D. see Attributes, part 1. sect. 2.

<sup>g</sup> See above, p. 363, ch. 39. chap. 13. [vol. v. p. 132.]



made it, Abraham had been either very ignorant or immodest in questioning whether God's will concerning the destruction of Sodom (lovingly imparted to him, Gen. xviii.) had been right or wrong; whether to have slain the righteous with the wicked had been unjust, or ill beseeming the great Judge and Maker of the world.

Howbeit, to have slain the righteous with the wicked would have been less rigorous, less unjust, than to harden men by an inevitable necessitating decree, before they had voluntarily hardened themselves, or unnecessarily brought an impenitent temper or necessity of sinning upon themselves. And for this cause we may safely say with our father Abraham, *Thus to harden any whom thou hast created, that be far from thee, O Lord*: far be it ever from every good Christian's heart to entertain any such conceit of his Creator.

12. Albeit this first answer might suffice to check all such captious replies as hypocrites here make, yet, as our apostle in his second answer imports, we need not use the benefit of this general apology in Pharaoh's case. The reason or manner of God's justice and wisdom in hardening and punishing him is conspicuous, and justifiable by the principles of equity acknowledged by all: for Pharaoh and his confederates were vessels of wrath, sealed up for destruction: hell (as we say) did yawn for them before God uttered the former expostulations; perhaps from that very instant wherein he first sent Moses unto him. It being then granted, that God (as we indeed suppose) did from the plague of murrain, or that other of boils, positively and inevitably harden Pharaoh's heart; and after he had promised to let the Israelites go, infatuated his brain to wrangle with Moses, first, whether their

The apostle's second answer to the former objection.

little ones, afterwards, whether their flocks should go along with them; yet to reserve him alive, upon what condition or terms soever, (though to be hardened—though to be threatened—though to be astonished and affrighted with fresh plagues, and lastly to be destroyed with a more fearful destruction than if he had died of the pestilence when the cattle perished of the murrain,) was a true document of God's lenity and patience, no impeachment to his justice; a gentle commutation of due punishment, no rigorous infliction of punishment not justly deserved.

For what if God had thrust him quick into hell in that very moment wherein he told him, *Ad hoc ipsum excitavi te—For this very purpose have I reserved thee alive, that I might shew my power in thee*<sup>h</sup>. No question but as the torments of that lake are  
 232 more grievous than all the plagues which Pharaoh suffered on earth, so the degrees of his hardening (had he been then cast into it) had been in number more—his struggling with God more violent and stubborn—his possibility of repentance altogether as little as it was after the seventh plague, if not less. But should GOD therefore have been thought unjust, because he continued to punish him in hell after possibility of repentance was past? No; Pharaoh had been the only cause of his own woe, by bringing this necessity upon himself, of opposing God and repining at his judgments without possibility of repentance. All is one then in respect of God's justice, whether Pharaoh, having made up the measure of his iniquity, be irrevocably hardened here on earth or in hell. To reserve him alive in the state of mortality, after the sentence of death is passed upon him, is no rigour, but lenity

<sup>h</sup> So the Septuagint expresseth the sense of the Hebrew phrase; *Καὶ ἔνεκεν τούτου διετηρήθης.*

and longsuffering ; although God's plagues be still multiplied on Egypt for his sake, although the end of his life become more dreadful, than by the ordinary course of God's justice it should have been, if he had died in the seventh plague.

13. Another reason why God without impeachment to his justice doth still augment Pharaoh's punishment, as if it were now as possible for him to repent as once it was, is intimated by our apostle to be this ; that by this lenity towards Pharaoh he might shew his wrath and declare his power against such sinners as he was, that all the world might hear and fear, and learn by his overthrow not to strive against their Maker, nor to dally with his fearful warnings. Had Pharaoh and his people died of the pestilence, or other disease, when the cattle perished of the murrain, the terror of God's powerful wrath had not been so manifest and visible to all the world, as it was in overthrowing the whole strength of Egypt, which had taken arms and set themselves in battle against him. Now the more strange the infatuation, the more fearful and ignominious the destruction of these *vessels of wrath* did appear unto the world, the more brightly did *the riches of God's glory* shine to the Israelites, whom he was now preparing for *vessels of mercy* ; the hearts of whose posterity he did not so effectually fit or season for the infusion of his sanctifying grace, by any secondary means whatsoever, as by the perpetual memory of this glorious victory over Pharaoh and his mighty host. But this faithless generation (whose reformation our apostle so anxiously seeks) did take all these glorious tokens of God's extraordinary free love and mercy towards their fathers, for irrevocable earnest or obligations to effect their absolute predestination unto honour and glory, and

to prepare the Gentiles to be vessels of infamy and destruction. Now our apostle's earnest desire and unquenchable zeal to prevent this dangerous presumption in his countrymen, enforceth him, instead of applying this second answer to the point in question, to advertise them for conclusion, that the Egyptians' case was now to become theirs; and that the Gentiles should be made *vessels of mercy and glory* in their stead. All which the event hath proved most true. For have not the sons of Jacob been hardened as strangely as Pharaoh was? Have they not been reserved as spectacles of terror to most nations, after they had deserved to have been utterly cut off from the earth, yea to have gone quick into hell? Nor have the riches of God's mercy towards us Gentiles been more manifested by any other apparent or visible document, than by scattering of these Jews through those countries wherein the seed of the gospel hath been sown<sup>i</sup>.

233 *The third general point proposed, concerning the logical determination of this proposition, 'Whom he will he hardeneth;' or concerning the immediate or proper object of the induration here spoken of.*

14. PHARAOH, we grant, was hardened by God's absolute irresistible will. Could Beza, can Piscator, or any other expositor living, enforce any more out of the literal meaning of these texts? Whether, granting thus much, we must grant withal (what their followers, to my apprehension, demand) that Pharaoh was an absolute reprobate from the womb, or that he was by God's irresistible will ordained to this harden-

<sup>i</sup> See book 1. chap. 24 and 27, &c.



ing, which by God's irresistible will did take possession of his heart, is the question to be disputed. They (unless I mistake their meaning) affirm—I must even to death deny. Willing I am to put my life in question with my opinion, upon condition I may enjoy the ancient privilege of priests, to be tried by my peers, which (God wot) must be no great ones. I will except against no man, of what profession, place, or condition soever, either for being my judge or of my jury, so his brains be qualified with the speculative rules of syllogizing, and his heart seasoned with the doctrine of the ninth commandment, which is, *Not to bear false witness against his neighbour*, against his knowledge.

15. To avoid the sophistical chinks of scattered propositions, wherein truth often lies hid in rhetorical or popular discourse, we will join issue in this syllogism :

‘ Whatsoever God from eternity decrees by his irresistible will, is absolutely necessary and inevitable, or impossible to be avoided :

‘ God from eternity decreed to harden Pharaoh by his irresistible will :

‘ *Ergo*, The hardening of Pharaoh was absolutely necessary, and impossible to be avoided.’

And if his hardening were inevitable, or impossible to be avoided, it will be taken as granted that he was a reprobate from the womb : *damnatus antequam natus* ; the absolute child of eternal death, before he was made partaker of mortal life.

The major proposition is a maxim not questioned by any Christian, Jew, or Mahometan ; and out of it we may draw another major as unquestionable, but more immediate in respect of the conclusion proposed : ‘ Whomsoever God decrees to harden by his irresistible will, his hardening is absolutely inevitable, altogether

A discovery of the fallacy where-with Beza and others have in this argument been deceived.

impossible to be avoided.' The minor, 'Pharaoh was hardened by God's irresistible will,' is granted by us, and (as we are persuaded) avouched in terms equivalent by our apostle. The difference is about the conclusion or connexion of the terms, which, without better limitation than is expressed in the proposition or corollary annexed, is loose and sophistical.

16. Would some brain which God hath blessed with natural perspicacity, art and opportunity, vouchsafe to take but a little pains in moulding such fit cases for the predicates, as Aristotle had done for the subjects of propositions, (though those we often use not, or use amiss,) those seeming syllogisms, whose secret flaws clearsighted judgments can hardly discern by light of arts, would crack so foully in the framing, that blear eyes would espy their ruptures without spectacles. It shall suffice me at this time to shew how grossly the syllogism proposed fails in one fundamental rule of all affirmative syllogisms: the rule is, *Quæcunque conveniunt cum aliquo tertio, inter se conveniunt*. All other rules concerning the quantity of propositions, or <sup>234</sup>their disposition in certain mood and figure, serve only to this end, that the convenience or identity of the major and minor with the medium may be made apparent. This being made apparent by rules of art, the light of nature assures us, that the connexion between the extremes is true and indissoluble.

Now this identity or unity (for that is the highest and surest degree of convenience) is of three sorts; of essence, of quality, of quantity or proportion, under which is comprehended the identity of time. Whatsoever is truly called one and the same, is so called in one of these respects. And all these identities may be either specifical (or common) or numerical, mixed or single. Most fallacies arise from substitution of one

identity for another: as he that would admit that proposition for true of specific identity, which is most true of numerical, might be cheated by this syllogism:

I cannot owe you the same sum which I have paid you:

But I have paid you ten pounds in gold:

*Ergo*, I do not owe you ten pounds in gold.

The negative included in the major is true of the same individual or numerical sum, but not of the same specific. For suppose twenty pounds in gold were due, the one moiety might be paid and the other yet owing. But men of common understanding are not so apt to be deceived in matters of money or commodity, with captious collections of this kind, as unable to give them a punctual solution. Every creditor in his own case would be ready to give this or the like sufficient practical answer: "I do not demand my ten pounds which are already paid, but the other ten pounds which are yet behind:" that is, (as a logician would say,) the same sum *specie* which hath been paid may yet be owing, not the same *numero*; or the same sum by equivalence, not the same individual coins.

17. But the intrusion or admission of one numerical identity for another of different kind, is not so easily discerned in matters not so distinguishable by common sense; especially if the relative or antecedent be in ordinary discourse promiscuously matched with both, and that *conjunctim* or *divisim*. The numerical identity included betwixt the relative *whatsoever* and *whomsoever*—*quis*, *quicquid*, *quæcunque*, &c., and their antecedents, whether expressed or understood, is sometimes an identity of essence or nature only—sometimes of quality only—sometimes of quantity or proportion only—sometimes of essence, quality, and quantity or

proportion—sometimes of essence and quality, but not of quantity—sometimes of quality and quantity, but not of essence.

These rules are universally true: Wheresoever the minor proposition is charged with an identity of quality, quantity, time, or essence, wherewith the major is not charged: or, *e contra*, Wheresoever the major is charged with any one or more of these identities, from which the minor is free, the syllogism, if it be affirmative, must needs be false, and tainted with the fallacy of composition.

Of the former rule that vulgar example, because best known, is most fit:

Quas heri emisti carnes, easdem hodie comedisti:

At heri emisti carnes crudas:

*Ergo*, Hodie carnes crudas comedisti.

The identity included between the relative and the antecedent in the major proposition is an identity of essence or substance only: the minor includes another identity, of quality, which cannot be admitted in the conclusion, because not charged in the major. Had  
235 the assumption been thus, *At heri emisti carnes ovillas*, the conclusion would rightly have followed: *ergo, Carnes ovillas hodie comedisti*; for this is a part of essential unity.

The fallacy is the same backwards and forwards:

Quas hodie comedisti carnes, easdem heri emisti:

At hodie tostas comedisti:

*Ergo*, Heri tostas emisti.

Examples of fallacies against the latter rule are more frequent in most men's writings than vulgarly known. This for one:

'The same sound which once pleaseth a judicious musician's constant ear, will please it still:



‘ But this present voice or sound, which is now taken up, (suppose a young quirister were singing,) doth please his master’s ear :

‘ *Ergo*, It will please it still, to the very fall.’

The major supposeth an exact identity not of essence or quality only, but of proportion : otherwise it is false. For the articulate sound may be numerically the same, as being uttered with one and the same continued breath. The voice likewise may be for its quality sweet and pleasant, but so weak and unartificial that it may relish of flatness in the fall, and so lose the proportion and consonancy which in the beginning or middle it had with a judicious musician’s ear or internal harmony.

18. The form of this following fallacy is the same : The object of divine approbation or reprobation is not the individual abstract human nature.

‘ Whatsoever the eternal and immutable rule of goodness once approves as just and good, it always so approves.’ For in that it is immutable, it is still the same ; and if the object remain the same, the approbation must needs be the same.

‘ But the eternal and immutable rule of justice once approved the human nature, or the corporeal reasonable creature, as just and good :

‘ *Ergo*, It always approves at least the human nature, or reasonable creature, as just and good.’

The conclusion is evidently false, albeit we restrain it to the same individual human nature, or reasonable creature, which immutable goodness did actually approve. What is the reason ? or where is the fault ? In the connexion. The major includes an exact identity not of essence or substance only, but of quality, or rather of consonancy, to the immutable rule of goodness. And whiles this identity of quality or consonancy lasts, the rule of goodness cannot but approve the nature thus consonant : otherwise it should

The old man and new suppose not two distinct persons, and yet the rewards of joy and pains everlasting are allotted to them.

be mutable in its judgment or approbation. The minor proposition supposeth the same identity of quality or consonancy, but not the continuance of it. And therefore the conclusion is only true of that time wherein the identity of consonancy remained entire. That is in few words; Though the human nature continue still the same, or though Adam were still the same man, yet he was not still one and the same in respect of divine approbation. For that supposeth an identity of quality, of justice and goodness. As these alter, so it alters.

The syllogism last mentioned would be unanswerable, were their doctrine not fallacious, or rather altogether false, which would persuade that every entity, nature, or creature, *qua talis*, as such, is good and approvable by the Creator. Was it then the human nature? No; but the human nature so qualified as he created it, which he approved. And whatsoever other nature is so qualified as Adam's was when he approved it, hath still the same approbation from the immutable rule of goodness which he had: because the consonancy to the divine will may be the selfsame in natures numerically distinct.

236 The syllogism in which we stated the seeming endless controversy last, hath all the faults which these two last fallacies had, and a great many more. The syllogism was this:

‘Whatsoever God from eternity hath decreed by his irresistible will, is inevitable.’ Or thus:

‘Whomsoever God from eternity reproves or decrees to harden by his irresistible will, that man's reprobation or induration is inevitable.

‘But God from eternity reproved Pharaoh, and decreed to harden him by his irresistible will.

‘*Ergo*, Pharaoh's reprobation or induration was inevitable.’

The major supposeth an identity, not of person only, but of quality; yea of degrees of quality. For as the immediate object of divine approbation is justice, consonancy or conformity to the immutable rule of goodness, so the immediate object of reprobation or induration is not the abstract entity or nature of man, but the nature misqualified, that is, unjust or dissonant from the rule of goodness. And according to the degrees of injustice or dissonancy, are the degrees of divine dislike, of divine reprobation or induration. The minor proposition includes not only an identity of Pharaoh's person, but such a measure of injustice or dissonancy, as makes him liable to the eternal decree of reprobation and induration by God's irresistible will. But it supposeth not this identity of such bad qualities, or this full measure of iniquity, to have been always in him. Without alteration of his person or nature, he was subject to great variety of qualifications; and each qualification capable of divers degrees and different disproportion with the eternal and unchangeable rule of goodness. And therefore the minor proposition, albeit eternally true, yet is eternally true only with reference to those points of time wherein Pharaoh was so qualified.

'No universality can infer any more particulars than are contained under it, and all these it necessarily infers.' An universality of time cannot infer an universality of the subject; nor can an universality of the subject infer an universality of time. This collection is false: 'God from eternity foresaw that all men would be sinners: *ergo*, He foresaw from eternity that Adam in his integrity should be a sinner.' The inference in the former syllogism is as bad; 'God decreed to harden Pharaoh from eternity: *ergo*, He decreed to harden him in every moment of his life;'

or, *ergo*, 'He was a reprobate from his cradle.' This conclusion rightly scanned, includes an universality of the subject, that is, all the several objects of divine justice which are contained in Pharaoh's life, not one particular only. Whereas Pharaoh in the minor proposition is but one particular or individual object of induration, or of the divine decree concerning it.

19. And thus at length we are arrived at that point, whence we may descry the occasions by which so many writers of good note have missed the right stream or current of our apostle's discourse, and gravelled themselves and their auditors upon byshelves.

Albeit Pharaoh was always one and the same man, yet he was not always one and the same object of the divine decree. That Pharaoh in the syllogism proposed is no singular but an indefinite term.

All this hath been from want of consideration, that albeit Pharaoh from his birth unto his death were but one and the same individual man, yet was he not all this while one and the same individual object of God's decree concerning mercy and induration. The difference betwixt these we may illustrate by many parallel resemblances. Suppose that sceptre (whose pedigree Homer, *Iliad*, lib. 2, so accurately describes) had in that long succession lost some part of his length, this had broken no square nor bred any quarrel whether it had been the same sceptre or no. Yet if the first and last owners should have sold or bought scarlet by this  
 237 one and the same sceptre, they should have found a great alteration in the measure. So then it is one thing to be one and the selfsame standard, and another thing to be one and the selfsame staff' or sceptre. The least alteration in length or quantity that can be, doth alter the identity of any measure; but not the identity of the material substance of that which is the measure. The same grains of barley which grow this year, may be kept till seven years hence; but he that should lend gold according to their weight this year, and receive it according to their weight at the seven years' end, should



find great difference in the sums: though the grains be for number and substance the same, yet their weights are diverse. Or suppose it be true which is related of the great Magore, that he weighs himself every year in gold, and distributes the sum thereof to the poor, and that he had continued this custom from the seventh year of his age; yet cannot there be half the difference betwixt the weight of one and the same prince in his childhood and in his full age, (after many hearty prayers to make him fat,) as is between the different measures of Pharaoh's induration within the compass of one year.

Therefore this argument, 'Pharaoh was hardened after the seventh plague by God's irresistible will: *ergo*, He was an irrecoverable reprobate from his childhood,' is to a man of understanding more gross than if we should argue thus; 'The great Magore distributed to the poor five thousand pounds in gold in his fortieth year: *ergo*, He distributed so much every year since he began this custom of weighing himself in gold.' For as he distributes unto the poor, not according to the identity of his person, but according to the identity or diversity of his weight, so doth the immutable rule of justice render unto every man, not according to the unity of his person, but according to the diversity of his work. Unto the several measures of one and the same man's iniquities, several measures of induration (whether positive or privative) are allotted from eternity. But final induration by God's irresistible will, or irrecoverable reprobation, is the just recompense of the full measure of iniquity; or (as the prophet speaks) to harden thus, is *to seal up iniquity to destruction*<sup>k</sup>, without hope or possibility of pardon.

<sup>k</sup> Query, Whether he mean Dan. ix. 24.

20. These two propositions are of like eternal truth ; ‘ God from eternity decreed by his irresistible will to harden Pharaoh, having made up the full measure of his iniquity :’ and ‘ God from eternity did not decree by his irresistible will that Pharaoh should make up such a measure of iniquity.’ For he doth not decree iniquity at all, much less full measures of iniquity. And yet unless he so decree, not iniquity only, but the full measure of it, Pharaoh’s induration or reprobation was not absolutely necessary, in respect of God’s eternal decree : for it was no more necessary, than was the full measure of iniquity unto which it was due. And that (as hath been said) was not necessary, because not decreed by God’s irresistible will ; without which, necessity itself hath no title of being.

From these deductions I may clear a debt, for which I engaged myself in my last public meditations<sup>1</sup>. My promise was then to make it evident, that these two propositions—1. ‘ God from eternity decreed to harden Pharaoh by his irresistible will ;’ 2. ‘ God from eternity did not decree to harden Pharaoh by his irresistible will’—might easily be made good friends, if their abettors would cease to urge them beyond their natural dispositions : for in their natures they are indefinites, not singulars. Both, in a good sense, may be made to tell  
238 the truth. But a wrangler may work them both to bear evidence for error—‘ God from eternity decreed to harden Pharaoh by his irresistible will.’ It is true of Pharaoh so misqualified as Moses found him perhaps when he brought the first, at least when he brought the seventh message to him ; but false of Pharaoh in his infancy, or not laden with such a measure of

<sup>1</sup> That the contention concerning Pharaoh’s induration hath no contradiction for its ground, see Attributes, part 1. chap. 15. num. 7. [vol. v. p. 159.]

iniquity as by the divine decree was from eternity sealed up for death. 'God from eternity did not decree to harden Pharaoh by his irresistible will,' is true of Pharaoh in his infancy or youth, but false of Pharaoh after his wilful contempt of God's summons by signs and wonders.

21. Beza's collection upon this place is grounded upon the indefinite truth of this affirmative—'God from eternity decreed to harden Pharaoh.' But he extends this indefinite truth beyond its compass. For he makes it an universal, in that he terminates the irresistible decree to every moment of Pharaoh's life, without distinction of qualification. And it may be he was of opinion, that as well each several qualification as each different measure of Pharaoh's hardening or impenitency, did come to pass by God's irresistible will. His error, into which the greatest clerk living (especially if he be not an accurate philosopher) might easily slide, consists originally in confounding eternity with successive duration; and not distinguishing succession itself from things durable or successive. He, and many others in this argument, speak as if they conceived that the necessary coexistence of eternity with time did necessarily draw every man's whole course of life, *motu quodam raptus*, after such a manner as astronomers suppose that the highest sphere doth move the lower; whereas, if we speak of the course, not of Pharaoh's natural but moral life, it was rather an incondite heap, or confused multitude of durables, than one entire uniform duration. And each durable hath its distinct reference to the eternal decree. That which is eternally true of one, was not of all, much less eternally true of another. Eternity itself, though immutable—though necessarily, though indivisibly coexistent to all—was not so indissolubly linked

The conclusion of the syllogism proposed, indefinitely taken, is most true; but universally taken is altogether false.

with any, but that Pharaoh might have altered or stayed his course of life before that moment wherein the measure of iniquity was accomplished ; but in that moment he became so exorbitant, that the irresistible decree of induration did fasten upon him. His irregular motions have ever since become irrevocable ; not his actions only, but his person, is carried headlong, by the everlasting revolutions of the unchangeable decree, into everlasting unavoidable destruction.

22. The proposition or conclusion proposed, ‘ Pharaoh was hardened by God’s irresistible will,’ indefinitely taken, is true from all eternity, throughout all eternity, and therefore true from Pharaoh’s birth unto his death : but not therefore true of Pharaoh, howsoever qualified, or of all Pharaoh’s qualifications throughout the whole course of his life. For so the proposition becomes an universal, not only in respect of the time, but of the subject ; that is, of all Pharaoh’s several qualifications. The sense is as if he had said, ‘ God from eternity decreed to harden Pharaoh, howsoever qualified, as well in his infancy as his full age, by his irresistible will :’ and thus taken, it is false. The inference is the same with the forementioned— ‘ Adam in God’s foreknowledge was a sinner from eternity : *ergo*, Adam was always a sinner ; a sinner before he sinned, during the time of his innocency :’ or with this— ‘ God from all eternity did decree by his irresistible will, that Adam should die the death : *ergo*, He did decree by his irresistible will, that Adam should die as soon as he was created, or be a sinner all his life long.’

239 To reconcile these two propositions aright ; ‘ God from eternity decreed by his irresistible will that Adam should die’— ‘ God from eternity did not decree by his irresistible will that Adam should die ;’ other-



wise than we have reconciled the two former—‘ God from eternity decreed to harden Pharaoh by his irresistible will’—‘ God from eternity did not decree to harden Pharaoh by his irresistible will,’ no writer, I presume, will undertake. The only reconciliation possible is this; ‘ God did decree by his irresistible will that Adam sinning should die;’ ‘ God did not decree by his irresistible will that Adam not sinning should die;’ nor did he decree by his irresistible will that Adam should sin, that he might die. For (as we said before) God did neither decree his fall nor his perseverance by his irresistible will. And his death was no more inevitable than his fall. Nor was Pharaoh’s final induration more inevitable, than the measure of iniquity to which such induration was from eternity awarded by God’s irresistible will. Of Pharaoh thus considered, the conclusion was true from eternity; true in respect of every moment of Pharaoh’s life, wherein the measure of his iniquity was or might have been accomplished, though it had been accomplished within three years after his birth. And this accomplishment presupposed, the induration was most inevitable, his final reprobation as irrecoverable, as God’s absolute will (taking *absolute* as it is opposed to *disjunct*) is irresistible.

In what sense the conclusion proposed may be said universal *universalitate temporis*, as to Pharaoh.

23. The same proposition, in respect of reprobation, is universally true *universalitate subjecti*, that is, of every other person so ill qualified as Pharaoh was when God did harden him. ‘ Whosoever shall at any time become such a man as Pharaoh was then, is a reprobate from eternity by God’s irresistible will.’ And seeing no man is exempted from his jurisdiction, he may *harden whom he will*, after the same manner that he hardened Pharaoh, although *de facto* he doth not so harden all the reprobates; that is, he reserves

In what sense the conclusion proposed may be said to be universal *universalitate subjecti*.

them not alive for examples to others, after the ordinary time appointed for their dissolution. Nor doth he tender ordinary means of repentance unto them after the door of repentance is shut upon them. God in his infinite wisdom hath many secret purposes incomprehensible to man; as, ‘Why, of such as are equal offenders, one in this life is more rigorously dealt withal than another: Why, of such as are equally disposed to goodness moral, one is called before another by his irresistible calling.’ That thus to dispense of mercy and justice in this life, doth argue no partiality or *respect of persons* with God, is an argument elsewhere insisted upon<sup>m</sup>.

24. The point whereupon we are now to pitch is this indefinite: ‘Men usually are called, elected, reprobated, or hardened by God’s resistible will, before they be called, elected, reprobated, or hardened by his irresistible will.’ All these terms are indefinite, and, according to their different measures, as truly mutable as immutable from eternity; or, as in other meditations<sup>n</sup> we have shewed, there is a state of election under promise, and a state of election under oath, of which the latter only is absolutely immutable. The like we may say of reprobation: it is either under general threat, or upon oath; the former is mutable, so is not the latter. No man living shall ever be able to make this inference good—‘Pharaoh was absolutely reprobated from eternity;’ that is, ‘his reprobation was immutable from eternity; *ergo*, Pharaoh in his youth or infancy was a reprobate.’

To infer the consequence proposed, no medium more probable than this can possibly be brought; ‘Pharaoh

Whether granting that Pharaoh was a reprobate from eternity, we must grant withal that Pharaoh was a re-

<sup>m</sup> See his Treatise of the Signs of the Time, the third or moral part of it, vol. vi. p. 110, &c.

<sup>n</sup> See above, p. 300, chap 37. num. 5, 6. and book 9. chap. 18, &c. vol. ix. p. 295.

from his infancy to his full age was always one and <sup>240</sup> the selfsame man:’ *et de eodem impossibile est idem affirmari et negari.* The consequence notwithstanding <sup>probate in his middle age, youth, or infancy.</sup> is no better than this following: ‘The last eclipse of the moon was necessary from the beginning; *ergo*, The moon was necessarily eclipsed in the first quarter, or in the prime; because the moon, being of an incorruptible substance, hath continued one and the same since the first creation.’ But unto this consequence every artist could make reply, that the proper and immediate subject of the eclipse is not the nature or substance of the moon, howsoever considered, but in certain opposition to the sun. So that albeit this proposition, ‘The moon shall be eclipsed,’ be true and necessary from everlasting, yet it is necessary, yet it is true only of the moon in such diametral opposition to the sun, that the earth may cover it with her shadow as with a mantle. Whensoever it is in such opposition, it is necessarily eclipsed. Whensoever it is not in such opposition to the sun, it cannot possibly by the course of nature be eclipsed.

25. It is in like manner true, which we have often said, that the proper and immediate object of the eternal decree concerning induration or reprobation, was not Pharaoh’s individual entity or essence; but Pharaoh charged with a certain measure of iniquity, or separation from his God. Granting then that Pharaoh’s substance from his infancy to his full age was one and the same, as incorruptible as the moon, yet the degrees of his declination from the unchangeable rule of justice, or of his opposition to the Fountain of mercy and goodness, might be more than are the degrees of the moon’s aberration or elongation from the sun.

Now the all-seeing Providence did more accurately



calculate each work, each word, each thought of Pharaoh, and their opposition to his goodness, than astronomers can do the motions of the moon or planets. And will he not make his payment according to his calculation? *Tu, Domine, nosti, utrum radix sit dulcis, an amara, de qua foris pulchra folia emittuntur: tu judex interius melius ipse me nosti, et etiam medullas radicum subtilius, perscrutaris, et non solum intentionem, sed radicis ejus medullam intimam disertissima tuæ lucis veritate colligis, numeras, intueris, et consignas, ut reddas unicuique non solummodo secundum opera vel intentionem sed etiam secundum ipsam interiorem absconditam medullam radicis, de qua procedit intentio operantis*<sup>o</sup>. So that in one and the selfsame Pharaoh there might be more several objects of the eternal decree, than are minutes or scruples in forty years' motion of the moon. Not the least variety or alteration in his course of life, but had a proportionate consequent of reward or punishment allotted to it from all eternity by the irresistible decree. Unto Pharaoh then, having made up the full measure of his iniquity, irresistible induration and unrecoverable reprobation, was, by virtue of this eternal decree, altogether necessary and inevitable. But unto Pharaoh, before this measure of iniquity was made up, neither induration nor irrecoverable reprobation was so necessary or inevitable. To think the unchangeable rule of justice should award the same measure of induration or reprobation unto far different measures of iniquity, goes deeper than the dregs of heathenism; it is a doctrine which may not be vented where any Christian ear is present.

26. The former resemblance is fully parallel to our

<sup>o</sup> Augustin. in Soliloq. cap. 14. p. (142.) 91 E. tom. 6. Append.



resolution in all other points, save only in this, that the eternal decree did not so necessarily direct or impel Pharaoh to make up the full measure of his iniquity, as it doth direct and guide the course of the moon, till it come in full and diametral opposition to the sun. Therefore this similitude will not follow—‘As the<sup>241</sup> moon, though at this time not eclipsed, yet holds that course by the unchangeable decree which in time will bring it to be in diametral opposition to the sun, and by consequence to be eclipsed; so, though Pharaoh in his infancy was not reprobated or hardened by God’s irresistible will, yet was he by the eternal decree ordained to such reprobation or induration, without possibility of altering his course, or avoiding that opposition which his full age had unto divine goodness.’

As every true convert or regenerate person may say with him in St. Ambrose, *Ego non sum ego*; ‘I am become another man:’ so might it be truly said, in a contrary sense, ‘Pharaoh sometimes was not Pharaoh;’ *when he was a child, he spake as a child, he thought as a child*; his mouth was not opened against God—his mind was not set on murder. To have seen the Israelitish infants strangled, or exposed to the merciless floods, would more have affected his heart, being young and tender, than afterwards it did his daughter’s. Nor was that cruelty, which in his full age he practised, so contained in his infancy, as poison is in the serpent’s egg. It did not grow up by kind or necessity of his natural temper, much less was it infused by God’s irresistible will, but acquired by voluntary custom. ‘The seeds of it were sown by his own selfwill—ambitious pride was the root—politic jealousy was the bud—tyranny and oppression the fruit.’ Neither was it necessary by the eternal

decree, that this corrupt seed should be sown; or that being sown it should prosper and bud; or that after the budding it should ripen in malignity. During all this progress from bad to worse, the immediate object of God's immutable and irresistible will was mutability in Pharaoh. But this progress, which was not necessary by any eternal decree or law, being *de facto* once accomplished, his destruction was inevitable—his induration irresistible—his reprobation irrecoverable, by the eternal and uncontrollable decree.

27. That Pharaoh in his youth or infancy was not such an object of God's irresistible will for induration, as in his full age he became, may be thus demonstrated:

That Pharaoh in his youth or infancy was not excluded by God's irresistible will from possibility of repentance.

'No man whose salvation as yet is truly possible, is utterly excluded by God's irresistible will from salvation:

'But the salvation of Pharaoh in his youth or infancy was truly possible:

'*Ergo*, Pharaoh in his youth or infancy was not excluded by God's irresistible will from salvation.'

Therefore he was not then the object of God's irresistible will for induration.

The major is evident from the exposition of the terms: for God is said to will that only by his irresistible will, which hath no possibility to the contrary. The necessity of it likewise may be made evident by the rules of conversion; 'No man's salvation, that stands excluded by God's irresistible will from salvation, is truly possible: *ergo*, No man, whiles his salvation is possible, is utterly excluded by God's irresistible will from salvation;' or, which is all one, 'No man, whiles his salvation is possible, is either hardened or reprobated by God's irresistible will:' or in Latin more perspicuously thus: *Nullus per irresis-*

*tibilem Dei voluntatem a salute exclusus, est servabilis: ergo, Nullus servabilis (id est, quandiu servari potest) est a salute exclusus per irresistibilem Dei voluntatem.* No argument can be of such force<sup>242</sup> or perspicuity as is this primary rule of argumentation: *Negativa universalis simpliciter convertitur.* The minor, ‘Pharaoh’s salvation in his youth or infancy was truly possible,’ is as evident from another maxim in divinity: *Quicquid non implicat contradictionem, est possibile, sive objectum divinæ potentiæ.* Now what contradiction could it imply to save this child, suppose Pharaoh, more than it did to save another, for example, Moses? unless we will say, that Pharaoh was made of another mould, or a creature of another Creator, than Moses or other children are. To save Pharaoh, as a son of Adam, could imply no contradiction; for so, no flesh could possibly be saved. If to save Pharaoh, after he had committed many actual sins and follies of youth, did imply any contradiction, what man of years (in this age especially) can hope for pardon?

28. It will be replied, that albeit to save Pharaoh in his youth or infancy did imply no contradiction in the object, and therefore his salvation was not absolutely in itself impossible; yet it being supposed, that God from eternity decreed to harden him, and destroy him by his irresistible will, it must needs imply a contradiction in God’s decree or will to save him; and by consequent his salvation was impossible *ex hypothesi.*

This answer is like a medicine which drives the malady from the outward parts, whereto it is applied, unto the heart. It removes the difficulty into a more dangerous point. For we may with safety infer, ‘That God did not decree by his irresistible will to



exclude Pharaoh in his youth or infancy from possibility of salvation: because, to have saved Pharaoh in his youth or infancy was in itself not impossible, as implying no contradiction.'

Whatsoever is absolutely possible to God, is always alike possible to him.

For God's eternal decree can never prejudice the eternal liberty of his omnipotency. Whatsoever in itself is possible, yea whatsoever is not absolutely impossible, is absolutely possible to God from eternity: and whatsoever is once possible unto him can at no time become less possible to him. The evangelist's rule, *Non est impossibile apud Deum omne verbum*, would fail even in its proper and native sense, if that which is absolutely possible could become impossible to God, though by interposition of his own decree.

The most absolute monarch on earth may impoverish his estate or weaken his power by his own voluntary grants; but it is the prerogative of Omnipotency that it cannot be prejudiced or impaired by any decree or act, though of its own making; for always acting, it never passeth any act; whence (as elsewhere is proved at large) it doth not, it cannot oblige, or bind itself, being eternally free and incapable of any bound or limit. They that speak or think of the eternal decree (of reprobation or election) as of an irrevocable act long since past, not freely concurrent to every action, to every thought of men throughout their several successions, make eternity subject to change, and mortality the subject of immutability.

No alteration in the object can make any thing less possible to God than it

Unless we grant the former proposition—'Whatsoever is or was absolutely possible to God, is eternally alike possible to him, notwithstanding any decree that can be imagined to the contrary'—we must of necessity



admit a change, either in the omnipotent power, as being less able since the date of this supposed absolute decree than before, to produce the selfsame effect, viz., the salvation of Pharaoh in his youth or infancy, or in the object of his power; and this were *destruere suppositum*. For if the object be changed, another comes in his place, it ceaseth to be what it was, and continueth not the same: if so it did, the possibility of it would be the same in respect of the unchangeable power unto which nothing is impossible.

was, unless it be such an alteration as implies some contradiction in the object which before was not implied in it.

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In bodies natural, so long as the passive disposition or capacity continueth the same, the same effect will necessarily follow, unless the efficacy or the application of the agent alter. *Idem secundum idem, semper natum est producere idem*: He which is always the same without possibility of alteration in himself, is at all times equally able to do all things that in themselves are not impossible. And no man, I think, will say that Pharaoh's election in his infancy was in itself more impossible than his own reprobation was. And he that thinketh his own reprobation was in itself impossible, cannot think himself so much bound to God, as he maketh show of, for his infallible election.

29. If from the former proposition, 'Whatsoever is absolutely possible to God is always possible to him,' a man should thus assume; 'To have shewed mercy to Pharaoh was absolutely possible to God,' and hence conclude; '*Ergo*, It is possible to God to shew mercy on him at this instant;' the illation, whatsoever the assertion be, includes the same fallacy of composition which was before discovered in the syllogism,

Quas emisti carnes, easdem comedisti:

Sed crudas emisti: *Ergo*, &c.

For Pharaoh, though unto this day one and the same

reasonable soul, yet is he not one and the same object of God's eternal decree for hardening or shewing mercy. To save any man of God's making, implies no contradiction unto that infinite power by which he was made. To save any man that hath not made up the full measure of his iniquity implies no contradiction to his infinite goodness, no impeachment to his majesty; it is agreeable to his mercy. To save such as have made up the full measure of their iniquity always implies a contradiction to his immutable justice. And all such, and (for aught we know) only such, are the immediate objects of his eternal absolute and irresistible will, or purpose of reprobation. But when the measure of any man's iniquity is made up, or how far it is made up, is only known to the all-seeing Judge. This is the secret wherewith flesh and blood may not meddle, as being essentially annexed to the prerogative of eternal Majesty, belonging only to the cognizance of infinite Wisdom.

*The fourth general point concerning the extent or nature of this division—"He will have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth."*

As some do lose the use of their native tongue by long travelling in foreign countries, so minds, by too much poring on the rules of logic, or too much accustomed to the logician's dialect, without which there can be no commerce with arts and sciences, oftentimes forget the character of ordinary speech in matters of civil and common use.

In arts or sciences, divisions should be either formal by direct predicamental line, as that—'Of creatures indued with sense, some have reason, some are reason-

less;' or at least so exact, that the several members of the division should exhaust the whole, or *integrum* divided. As if a geographer should say—'Of the inhabitants of the earth, some are seated on this side<sup>244</sup> the line, others beyond it, or just under it,' the division were good: but very imperfect if he should say—

This division is not formal, not so exact as is required in arts.

'Some are seated between the tropic of Cancer and the arctic circle; others betwixt the tropic of Capricorn and the circle antarctic:' for a great many are commodiously seated betwixt the tropics, (as experience hath taught later ages to reform the error of the ancient,) and some likewise betwixt the polar circles and the poles.

But in matters arbitrary and contingent, (as matters of common use for the most part are,) to exact alike formal or accurate divisions, is ridiculous; especially when as well the members of the division, as the dividend itself, are terms indefinite. As if a man should say of men, 'Some are extraordinarily good, some extraordinarily bad;' or of academics, 'Some are extraordinarily acute, some are extraordinarily dull;' though every one will grant the division to be indefinitely true, yet no man almost would acknowledge himself to be contained under either member, as the most part of men are not indeed. Or if one should say, 'Every prince sheweth extraordinary favour to some of his subjects, and some others he maketh examples (or subjects) of his severity;' who could hence gather, that no part or not the greatest part were left to the ordinary course of justice, or to the privileges common to all free denizens? Now we are here to remember what was premised in the entry into this treatise—'That albeit God's will be most immutable, yet is it immutably free, more free by much than the changeable will of man. So are the

That most men are not comprehended under either member of this division.

objects of this his freewill more arbitrary than the designs of princes. The objects of his will, in this our present argument, are mercy and induration; and these he awards to diverse persons, or to the same persons at diverse times, according to a different measure. Whence, if we take these terms in that extraordinary measure which is included in this division, the most part of men, with whom we shall usually have to deal, do not fall within either member. The proper, perhaps the only subjects of this division itself in Moses' time, were the Israelites and Egyptians: in our apostle's time, the castaway Jews, and such of the Gentiles as were forthwith to be ingrafted in their stead. If we take mercy and induration in a lesser measure, according to their lower degrees or first dispositions, scarce any man living of riper years but hath devolved from the one part of this division unto the other oftener than he hath eaten, drank, or slept: *Christ's disciples*, saith St. Mark, vi. 52, *had not considered the miracle of the loaves; because their hearts were hardened*; yet shortly after to be mollified, that God's mercy and Christ's miracles might find more easy entrance into them. Our habitual temper is, for the most part, mutable; how much more our actual desires or operations! And whatsoever is mutably good or mutably evil in respect of its acts and operations, (which are sometimes *de bono*, sometimes *de malo objecto*.) hath its alternant motions from God's decree of hardening towards his decree of shewing mercy, and *e contra*.

One and the same man, according to the diversity of time or qualification, may be the true and proper subject of both parts of this division.

31. The doctrine contained in this passage of scripture will never sound well for the right settling the affections and consciences of such as be novices in faith, until they be taught to run this division upon the same string:



‘Hast thou been enlightened, and tasted of the heavenly gift, made partaker of the Holy Spirit? Thy sin is great, and thou art found a despiser of the riches of his bounty, unless thou embrace these illuminations as undoubted pledges of his favour, and assured testimonies of his good purpose to make thee <sup>245</sup> heir of eternal life. Worthy thou art to be numbered among those perverse and wayward Jews, whom our Saviour compares to children playing in the market, if while these good motions and exultations of spirit last, thou givest not more attentive ear (than he that danceth doth to him that pipeth or harpeth) unto that sweet voice of thy heavenly Father, encouraging thee in particular, as he did sometimes the host of Israel: *O that there were such an heart in thee always, that it might go well with thee for ever!*’

But eschew these and the like inferences, as cunning sophisms of the great tempter, that old and subtle serpent—‘I thank God I have felt the good motions of the Spirit, I perceive the pledges of his good purpose towards me: but his purpose is unchangeable: therefore is my election sure enough, I am a sealed vessel of mercy, I cannot become a vessel of wrath.’ If such thoughts have at any time insinuated into thy heart, or be darted upon thee against thy will, remember thyself in time, and thus repel them: ‘If God harden whom he will; if his will be immutably and eternally free; it is as free for him to harden me as any other.’ And consider withal, that albeit thou canst not make or prepare thyself to be *a vessel of mercy*, yet thy untimely presumption, if it continue long, in the end will make thee, as in the beginning it doth prepare thee, to be *a vessel of wrath*. This was the disease whereof the whole nation of the Jews did perish.

Dost thou see thy brother, one baptized in the name of Christ, go on stubbornly in his wicked courses? thou dost well to threaten him with the sentence of death. Yet limit thy speeches by the prophet's rule, Jeremiah xviii; pronounce him not, for all this, an absolute reprobate, or irrecoverable vessel of wrath; give him not forthwith for dead, but rather use double diligence to prevent his death, and tell him, 'If God shew mercy upon whom he will shew mercy; if this his will be eternally free, it is as free for him yet to shew mercy upon supposed castaways, and to harden uncharitable and presumptuous Pharisees, (for the present manifestation of his glory,) as it was for him to reject the Jews and choose the Gentiles.'

Finally, this division, though we take *mercy* and *induration* according to their indefinite or lowest measure, is not more universally true in respect of the innumerable subjects or parties unto whom it may fitly be applied, than it is in respect of the time wherein it may be applied to any determinate individual subject, which hath not made as yet either the full measure of his iniquity up to the brim, or his election immutably sure. Of all and every person and subject not thus qualified, it is universally true—'He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.' In respect of every particular and determinate person not thus qualified, it is universally true—'He hath mercy when he will have mercy, and when he will he hardeneth.' And he hardeneth at no time sooner than when men (what men soever) are most confidently presumptuous of his mercy, or untimely secure of their perseverance in faith or continuance in his favour.

32. Perhaps the ingenuous and hitherto indifferent reader will here begin to distaste these last admissions, and for their sakes most of our resolutions, as prejudicial to a commonly received doctrine concerning the certainty of salvation. And I must confess that upon first sight they may seem suspicious, in that they suppose our election to be not only uncertain in respect of our apprehensions, but mutable in its nature.

That this doctrine delivered is no way prejudicial to the certainty of salvation; but rather directs us how to make our election sure.

But if it please him either to look back into some passages of the former discourse, or to go along with me a little further, I shall acquaint him (though not with a surer foundation, yet) with a stronger frame or structure of his hopes than he shall ever attain unto by following their rules, who, I verily think, were fully assured of their own salvation, but from other grounds than they have discovered to us.

Surer foundation can no man lay than that whereon both parties do build, to wit, the absolute immutability of God's decree or purpose. Now admitting our apprehensions of his will or purpose, to call, elect, or save us, were infallible, yet he that from these foundations would rear up the edifice of his faith after this hasty manner—'God's purpose to call, elect, and save me, is immutable; *ergo*, My present calling is effectual, my election already sure, and my salvation most immutable'—becomes as vain in his imaginations, as if he expected that walls of loam, and rafters of reed covered with fern, should be able to keep out gunshot, because seated upon an impregnable rock.

For, first, who can be longer ignorant of this truth than it shall please him to consider it—That God's purpose and will is most immutable in respect of every object possible: that mutability itself, all the changes and chances of this mortal life, and the immutable state of immortality in the life to come,

are alike immutably decreed by the eternal counsel of his immutable will? Now if mortality and mutability have precedence of immortality, in respect of the same persons, by the immutable tenor of his irresistible decree, can it seem any paradox to say, 'That man's estate, whether of election or reprobation, is even in this life usually mutable before it come to be immutable, and that by virtue of the same unalterable decree?' or, 'That ordinarily there should be in every one of us as true a possibility of living after the flesh as of living after the Spirit, before we become so actually and completely spiritual, as utterly to mortify all lusts and concupiscences of the flesh?' Until, then, our mortification be complete and full, we may not presume all possibility of living after the flesh to be finally expired and utterly extinct in our souls. And whether this possibility can be in this life altogether so little, or truly none, as it shall be in the life to come, after our mortal hopes are ratified by the sentence of the Almighty Judge, I cannot affirm, if any man peremptorily will deny it; nor will I contend, by way of peremptory denial, if it shall please any man upon probable reasons to affirm it.

33. But if to such as finally perish no true or real possibility of repentance during the whole course of this mortal life be allotted by the everlasting irresistible decree, in what true sense can God be said to allow them a time of repentance? how doth our apostle say, that *the bountifulness of God doth lead or draw them to repentance*, if the door of repentance be perpetually mured up against them by his irresistible will?

If in such as are saved there never were from their birth or baptism any true or real possibility of run-



ning the ways of death, the fear of hell, or the declaration of God's just judgments, (if at any time they truly fear them,) is but a vain imagination, or groundless fancy, without any true cause or real occasion presented to them by the immutable decree. Or if by his providence they be at any time brought to fear hell, or the sentence of everlasting death, yet hath God used these but as bugbears in respect of them, though truly terrible to others. And bugbears, when children grow once so wise as to discern them from true terrors, do serve their parents to very small purpose.

For mine own part, albeit I fear not the state of<sup>247</sup> absolute reprobation, yet so conscious am I to mine own infirmities, that I would not for all the hopes, or any joy or pleasure which this life can afford, abandon all use of the fear of hell, or torments of the life to come. But whatsoever the tenor of my estate in mine own apprehension heretofore hath been, for the present is, or hereafter may be, I am (and I think shall so continue) absolutely persuaded that the absolute impossibility, whether of apostasy from faith professed, or of becoming true and steadfast professors, is the usual successor, as heir by conquest, of mixed possibility of becoming as well vessels of wrath as vessels of mercy; and *e contra*.

34. Upon this real possibility of becoming *vessels of wrath* doth our apostle ground those admonitions, Heb. iii. 12, 13: *Take heed, brethren, lest there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief, in departing from the living God. But exhort one another daily, while it is called To day; lest any of you be hardened through the deceitfulness of sin.* And again, chap. iv. 1: *Let us therefore fear, lest, a promise being left us of entering into his rest, any of you*

*should seem to come short of it.* These and the like admonitions, frequent in the prophets and the gospel, suppose the men whom they admonish to be as yet not absolutely reprobated, but in a mutable state, or in a state subject to a mutual possibility of becoming *vessels of wrath* or *vessels of mercy*; and by consequence, not altogether incapable of that height of impiety unto which only the eternal and immutable decree hath allotted absolute impossibility of repentance, or of salvation.

Upon the true and real possibility of becoming *vessels of mercy*, supposed to be awarded by the eternal and irresistible decree to all partakers of the word and sacraments, doth St. Peter ground that exhortation: *Brethren, give diligence to make your calling and election sure: for if ye do these things, ye shall never fall: for so an entrance shall be ministered unto you abundantly into the everlasting kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.* 2 Peter i. 10, 11. The end of this exhortation was to bring his auditors unto that full growth in grace and good works in this life, unto which absolute impossibility of apostasy is as irresistibly assigned by the eternal and immutable decree, as final induration or impossibility of repentance is unto the full measure of iniquity.

35. In what proportion these two contrary possibilities may be mixed in all or most men, before they arrive at the point of absolute impossibility either of apostasy or of repentance, we leave it to every man's private conscience to guess or examine *grosso modo*, and to infinite and eternal wisdom exactly and absolutely to determine. Unto whose examination we likewise in fear and reverence refer it, whether the impossibility of repentance be absolute or equal in all that

perish; or the impossibility of apostasy be absolute and equal in all that are saved, at one time or other, before they depart hence: or whether the mutual possibilities of becoming *vessels of mercy* or *vessels of wrath* may not, in some degree or other, continue their combination in some men until the very last act or exercise of mortal life.

But unto one and the same man, until he come to one of these two full points or periods, God always speaks (whether by his word preached, or otherwise by his peculiar providence,) as unto two; because every such man hath somewhat of the flesh and somewhat of the Spirit. For men as they are the sons of Adam are carnal; and God's words are all<sup>248</sup> spiritual, and always leave some print or touch behind them, whereby the soul, in some degree or other, is presently either hardened, or presently mollified; or at least disposed to mollification or induration. Continual or frequent calcitration against the edge of this fiery sword breeds a callum, or complete hardness; or, as the apostle speaks, it *sears the conscience*. But where it entereth, it causeth the heart to melt, and makes way for abundant mercy to follow after.

36. Men as yet not come to a fulness either of iniquity, or of growth of faith, are but children in Christ, and God speaks to his children, while they are children, as wise and loving parents do to theirs. Now if a kind loving father should say to one of his sons, whom he had often taken playing the wag, 'Thou shalt never have penny of what is mine;' and to another, whom he observed to follow his book or other good exercises well pleasing to him, 'Thou shalt be mine heir;' a man of discretion would not construe his words (though affectionately uttered) in

such a strict sense as lawyers would do the like clauses of his last will and testament, but rather interpret his meaning thus ; that both continuing in their contrary courses, the one should be disinherited, and the other made heir. Though God, by an angel or voice from heaven, should speak to one man at his devotions, ‘Thou shalt be saved ;’ and to another at the same time blaspheming, ‘Thou shalt be damned ;’ his speeches to the one were to be taken as a good encouragement to go forward in his service ; his speeches to the other, as a fair warning to desist from evil : and not as ratifications of immutability in either course —not as irrevocable sentences of salvation or damnation in respect of their individual persons, but in respect of their present qualifications in whomsoever constantly continued. Saul the persecutor was a reprobate, or *vessel of wrath* ; but Paul the apostle, a saint of God, a chosen vessel. It is universally true, the seed of Abraham or Israel was God’s people : and yet it is true, that the Jews (though the seed of Abraham and sons of Israel) were not partakers of the promise made to Abraham. For they became those Idumæans, those Philistines, and those Egyptians, against whom God’s prophets had so often threatened his judgments, whom they themselves had excluded from God’s temple. One principal cause of their miscarriage was their ignorance of the prophetic language, whose threats or promises are always immediately terminated, not to men’s persons, but to their qualifications. In their dialect, only true confessors are truly Jews ; every hypocrite or backslider is a Gentile, an Idumæan, a Philistine. None to whom God hath spoken by his prophets were by birth such obdurate Philistines, as had no possibility of becoming Israelites or true confessors. The children of Israel



were not by nature so undegenerate sons of Abraham, as to be without all possibility of becoming Amorites.

37. The true scantling of our apostle's upshot—*He will have mercy upon whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth*—rightly taken, reacheth exactly to these points following, and no further :

First, to admonish these Jews, by God's judgments on Pharaoh, not to strive with their Maker, not to neglect the warnings of their peace, upon presumption that they were *vessels of mercy* by inheritance : seeing they could not pretend any privilege able to exempt them from God's general jurisdiction of *hardening whom he would*, (as well of the sons of Abraham as of the Egyptians,) or of diverting those beams of glory which had shined on them upon some other nation.

It, secondly, reacheth to us Gentiles, and forewarns 249 all and every one of us, by God's fearful judgments upon these Jews, not to tie the immutability of his decree for election unto any hereditary, amiable, national disposition, much less unto the individual entities of our persons, as if it were like a chain of adamant to draw us out of the womb into the grave, out of the grave into paradise. Our apostle makes a quite contrary use of this doctrine ; his division of *hardening* and *shewing mercy* holds true (as hath been declared) in one and the same person ; and every one of us, for this reason, is bound always to fasten one eye as steadfastly upon God's *severity* towards the Jew, as we do the other upon *the riches of his glory and mercy* towards ourselves : *for if he spared not the natural branches, let us take heed lest he also spare not us*, who have been hitherto the flower and bud of the Gentiles : *Behold therefore the goodness and severity of God : on them which fell, severity ;*

*but toward thee, goodness, if thou continue in his goodness: otherwise thou also shalt be cut off. And they also, if they abide not in unbelief, shall be grafted in: for God is able to graft them in again.* The one aspect breedeth fear, the other bringeth forth hope: and in the right counterpoise of hope and fear consists that uprightness of mind and equability of affections, without which no man can direct his course aright unto the land of promise. This manifestation of God's mercy to one people or other, after a kind of equivalent vicissitude, perpetuated from the like revolution of his severity towards others, was the object of that profoundly divine contemplation, out of which our apostle awaking, as out of a pleasant sleep, cries out, *O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!* Rom. xi. 33.

38. He that desires to have his heart filled with such a measure of joyful admiration as will seek a vent in these or the like unaffected serious exclamations, must feed his thoughts with contemplation of divine attributes; specially with those of infinite duration or eternity—of infinite wisdom—of infinite goodness and love to man. In all which I have adventured to tread a path for others to correct or follow upon trial; being assured of this, that without the knowledge of these generalities, nothing can be said to any purpose in the particulars thus far prosecuted, or in the like to be prosecuted more at large, when God shall grant leisure and opportunity.

39. These present disquisitions (though seeming curious, as the resolution is truly difficult) have a vulgar and immediate use; yet not so vulgarly plain or common to all, as profitable to every particular

Christian not fully persuaded of the certainty of his salvation.

The special aim of my meditations in this argument is, first, to deter myself and others from all evil ways whatsoever; but especially from those peculiar and more dangerous sins which make up the full measure of iniquity with greatest speed: secondly, to encourage mine own soul, and others with it, to accomplish those courses unto which the immutability or absolute certainty of election itself (which must in order of nature and time go before our infallible apprehensions of it) is inevitably predestinated by the eternal and irresistible decree.

These exhortations are more fit for popular sermons, than such points as hitherto have been discussed; whose discussion nevertheless hath seemed unto me very expedient, as well for warranting the particular uses which I purpose (if God permit) to make out of the chapters following, as for giving such satisfaction to<sup>250</sup> my best friends as God hath enabled me to give myself, concerning the apostle's intent and meaning in this ninth chapter.

40. If what I have said shall happen to fall into any man's hands which hath a logical head, and bears a friendly heart to truth, (though otherwise no friend to me, yet,) I presume he will not be so uncharitable towards me, as to suspect that I have intended these premisses to infer any such distasteful conclusions as these: 'That election should be *ex fide aut operibus prævisis*, for our faith or works' sakes—that any man should be more than merely passive in his first conversion—that the working of saving grace might be resisted; or lastly—that in man before his conversion there should be any spark of freewill remaining, save only to do evil.' Whosoever will grant me

these two propositions, 'That the unregenerate man hath a true freedom of will in doing evil, and the eternal Creator a freedom of will in doing good;' I will engage myself to give him full satisfaction, that no difference betwixt reformed churches concerning predestination or reprobation is more than verbal, or hath any other foundation besides the ambiguity of unexplicated terms. The errors on all sides grow only from pardonable mistakings, not so much of truth itself, as of her proper seat or place of residence.

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CHRISTIAN READER,

THIS last discourse was published without the author's consent or knowledge, as he says, book 9. chap. 12. vol. 8. page 256, note <sup>b</sup>. He that will compare, shall find very considerable meliorations in this now printed after an exact copy: which also had a solemn dedication prefixed. I feared these late revolutions might have made the ritual publishing it prejudicial to the honourable persons. Therefore have I placed it here, as in the dark behind a curtain, where the reader may have the same benefit, though the author's friends have not either the honour intended, or the accidental prejudice.

TO THE

TWO NOBLE GENTLEMEN, HIS MUCH HONOURED FRIENDS,

Mr. R. S. and Mr. E. S. Sons to the R. H. L. S.

The blessings of this life, and of the life to come be multiplied.

NOBLE SIRs,

THERE is no argument in divinity, wherein every soul that earnestly seeks salvation (or the avoidance of damnation) ought in reason to be more desirous of satisfaction, than in the point of eternal election and reprobation. Nor are scho-



lastic disputes concerning these points in themselves so dangerous, as they are made by such as are more apt to abet contentions set on foot, than able rightly to examine whence the quarrel first began, upon what terms it stands, or how it may fitly be composed. In searching out the true sense and meaning of whatsoever it hath pleased God to reveal, there can be no offence; in the manner of the search we often offend. Diligence and accurate pains are always commendable, as in every other subject, so in this, wherein curiosity is only dangerous: howbeit, wheresoever curiosity of search is dan-<sup>251</sup>gerous, peremptory resolutions (whether negative or affirmative) must needs be pernicious, seeing suspension of assent in difficult or controverted cases is a property no less essential to true faith, than firm adherence to divine truth known and acknowledged. And if the blame were bestowed in that proportion it hath been deserved amongst the several commentators upon the scriptures prefixed to these discussions, the heaviest burden would lie, not upon such as make new queries, but upon such as have taken upon them to give absolute determinations without accurate search of the apostle's meaning; preposterously seeking to comprehend what they should admire, and endeavouring to stir up affected admiration of that which every novice might fully comprehend, were their resolutions in this argument as orthodoxal as they are peremptory.

The end of these present queries is to find out a middle way, how to maintain some principal conclusions of reformed churches (specially concerning the servitude of man's will—the nullity of merits or of works foreseen—and the irresistible efficacy of saving grace), without association of those rigid premisses which latter ages have invented for their maintenance, as astronomers of old did epicycles, and Copernicus of late the motion of the earth for salving their celestial phenomena. To pick quarrels with antecedents of good use, whereas the fault lies only in the inference, is a fault too common to controversy-writers in every age. And thus to spite an erroneous conclusion, the foundations of many useful truths are often overthrown, and new false principles brought

in their place, which will bring forth dangerous errors by faultless consequences.

I have often been enforced to season my retired thoughts with sighs or tears, whiles I beheld the factious oppositions of foreign reformed churches abetted, animated, and propagated by men whom God had placed as bystanders or impartial umpires, and blessed with all opportunities of making peace amongst others, so they themselves had been the sons of peace. The parties here meant were English divines, men freed by God's especial providence from all vicinity of public adversary, or such politick provocations as their foreign brethren were often misled with. Some, or rather a great many, of no mean note, have held it as a matter of conscience, and affected it as a choice fruit of zeal, to press those rigid opinions upon their auditors which the first authors of them would never have conceived, or quickly would have abandoned, if they could with safe conscience have subscribed unto the English liturgy. And in very truth this peculiar symptom of the crazed and ill-tempered presbytery (I mean zealous adherents to rigid tenents of reprobation) hath been an especial motive to withdraw many hands and pens from subscription to our Common Prayer Book, or Book of Homilies. It was a subject of much sadder contemplation to see (as who sees not, that hath not resolved to wink at the solecisms of his good friends?) many divines, well fitted and engaged for better employments, become anxious solicitors for the admission, or rather intrusion, of that very error into reformed churches, whose extirpation in the synagogue, the prevention of whose propagation throughout the churches of the Gentiles by him planted, was a great part of his labours, who in sacred labours was more plentiful than any, than all his fellow apostles.

The attempt for this intrusion found no such furtherance from the pretended title of ancient orthodoxal truth, as from present opposition to modern errors; as if the parties of whom I speak had held it an aphorism of sacred policy to entertain any heathenish, Jewish, or Turkish fugitives, able to do service against the Lutheran. That sundry writers, of greater note and name than here to be named by me, have

(out of opposition to the Lutheran) given more suspicion of concurrence with the Stoick, the modern Turk, or Jews that lived in our apostle's time, than the Lutheran doth of any 252 concurrence with the papist, or other heretic whatsoever; I shall be able to inform him that will friendly and privately debate this seeming paradox with me, whether by writing or by word of mouth. But, as the world now is set, openly and publicly to confront a countenanced error, would breed greater dissension between brethren in profession and affection, than the unseasonable publication of truth (specially by so mean a messenger of truth as myself) could recompense:

Dum furor in cursu est currenti cede furori :

It is one thing to give the way unto such fierce oppositions as daily meet us, and another to be carried headlong with them, or to follow them, as their patrons too often follow princes' courts, that is, as we say, afar off.

Whilst I was an artist, I liked the old prescript well, *Loquendum cum multis, philosophandum cum paucis*. The medicine a little corrected is not much amiss in divinity: *Theologizandum cum paucis, non loquendum contra multos*, unless it be unto some few, and those no parts of the multitude or vulgar sort, either for judgment or affection. Amongst my choicest acquaintance and most respected friends, I had no choice left in competition with yourselves, to whom, in all congruity, I rather ought, or more safely might communicate, what I conceive of this or other like points of divinity, more necessary to be inquired into by such as are intelligently ingenious, than expedient to be published or communicated without distinction of times and persons. For of my choicest meditations heretofore, either published or privately perused, I have ever liked the impression much better, whilst I looked upon it in your disposition and conversation, than whilst I read it in mine own papers, or from the press. *Vos estis epistola mea*: of all my labours in the ministry, I have reaped no comfort like to this—that it hath pleased God to use me sometimes as a waterer of those precious seeds unto which he himself hath given plentiful increase; and to withhold any thing that my conscience tells me may yield wholesome nourishment (though but rudely and homely dressed, as this small present

is) unto those sacred plants which the right hand of our heavenly Father hath planted in your breasts, were to rob myself of my chiefest joy. Thus I have adventured in a case (as it is commonly apprehended) of great danger to be your taster, being more willing (as I know you are persuaded of me) to drink the deadliest bodily poison that could be ministered unto me, than willingly to infect your souls with any poisonous doctrine. Howbeit, I proffer not these brief receipts as mountebanks do their drugs, or tradesmen their wares, upon oath or confident asseverations, but rather refer them to the further trial of your less partial, more judicious taste, faithfully promising on my part all readiness to recall, amend, or alter whatsoever upon better examination shall be found amiss, whether in the matter, the method, or manner of speech.

And upon these terms I interest you by these presents in other treatises of this argument, all which I have purposely consecrated as a memorial pledge of those kind references which heretofore have been betwixt us, of that respect which I will ever bear unto your persons, and of the honour due (from me especially) to your virtues. VALETE.

Yours ever in all love and observance,

THOMAS JACKSON.

From my study in Corpus Christi College,  
Jan. 1. 1619.



## SECTION VII.

253

*A Treatise concerning the Acts or Exercises of the Son of God's everlasting Priesthood; or, containing the manner or means by which the Son of God, through the continual exercise of his everlasting priesthood in his heavenly sanctuary, doth now de facto set free indeed all such as seek for the working out of their own salvation with fear and trembling.*

## CHAP. XLIII.

1. THE manner how the sons of Adam are set free by the Son of God hath been in part heretofore—or rather the first part of this freedom hath been—declared at large in the eighth book of these Commentaries, sect. 2. chap. 6, &c. Amongst other qualifications of the Son of God incarnate, for destroying the works of the devil, it was a special one, that he should take upon him the form of a servant, to the end he might without any wrong to his person, or any injustice done upon his human nature by God the Father, die the death of a servant, that is, the death of the cross, and by such death and sufferings pay the full ransom of all mankind's redemption, and set us all free *de jure*. The main business yet remaining to be discussed is—‘concerning the manner, the several ways or means, by which he doth *de facto* set free indeed (that is, perfectly) all such as seek to work out, or rather industriously labour for the working of their own salvation with fear and trembling’—that is, I take it, with such fervent prayers and supplications to God the Father, through him, and by him, as he tendered for himself in

his agony, or in the days of his consecration to that everlasting priesthood which he now exerciseth in the heavenly sanctuary, where he now sitteth at the right hand of God the Father.

2. With the manner of Christ's sitting at the right hand of the throne of Majesty, I am resolved not to meddle in this book<sup>a</sup>; the manner of his sitting there being no article of our faith, nor any of the most useful appertenances (as I conceive it) to that grand mystery of his exaltation as man above all powers and principalities. St. Austin's answer unto Dardanus, who (as far as my reading serves me) first moved that curious question which of late hath much troubled the church—'Whether Christ's sitting at the right hand of God the Father include any **UBIQUITARY PRESENCE** of his humanity'—doth very well satisfy me, and I intreat the ingenuous reader, it may (for this time) suffice him, till it please God that he see more<sup>b</sup>.

The sum of this reverend father's answer is—'That the session of Jesus Christ the Son of God at the right hand of the throne of Majesty, is to be extended neither further nor shorter than to the place, or heavenly places, whence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead.' From much better authority than St. Austin's, or any visible church representative here on earth, either in or since his time, we are taught and enjoined to believe, that the Son of God, by whom the world was made, sitteth now in our nature at the right hand of the Almighty Creator, and that this his seat is in the heavenly  
254 sanctuaries, which are not made with hands, (as the first tabernacle in the wilderness, and as the temple at Jerusalem were,) that he sits there as the High Priest of our souls, continually exercising his function for ac-

<sup>a</sup> See the ninth book, sect. 6. chap. 39. vol. viii. p. 465.

<sup>b</sup> See the eleventh book, vol. x.

complishing the redemption or freedom of all such as are capable of it; giving all men a competent time (the definite extent whereof is only known to God and to himself) for their repentance and conversion unto him. Only thus much we know indefinitely, that there he shall sit as our High Priest, until the enemies of his gospel and despisers of his priesthood be made his footstool; that is, until the iniquity of the retchless part of mankind, and the number of such as are predestinated unto eternal life, be accomplished. This glass being run, he will appear as King, to give royal sentence upon all such as shall be alive at his coming, or have been dead before, and render to every man according to his works. Thus much we may learn from our apostle, in the eighth and ninth chapters of that divine Epistle to the Hebrews, which I have proposed as my guide or map for my safe conduct through this treatise, concerning the power and continual exercise of Christ's priesthood in his heavenly sanctuary.

## CHAP. XLIV.

*The Coherence of the eighth Chapter to the Hebrews with the seven preceding and two following.—The exact Proportions or Parallels betwixt the mundane Tabernacle, with the two Sanctuaries therein, and the celestial with those in it; betwixt the Manner or Rites in the Consecration of the one and the other; betwixt the High Priests of the Old Testament, and Christ our only High Priest of the New, intimated in this, explicated in the following Chapters.*

## HEBREWS VIII. 1, 2.

*Now of the things which we have spoken this is the sum: We have such an High Priest, who is set on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens; a minister of the sanctuary, and of the true tabernacle, which the Lord pitched, and not man.*

1. THESE words have a double reference—the one,

unto that which he had said in the seven chapters precedent; the other, unto some passages following in this eighth, ninth, and tenth, &c. Of the doctrinal parts of the seven chapters precedent, and of the mysteries contained in them, it hath been my lot to treat in former books of these Commentaries; and as the matters handled in them did minister occasion, upon a great part of the first chapter, upon some principal passages in the second and third, upon the most part of the fifth, sixth, and seventh, the reader may find what I did conceive to be most useful for his instruction or meditation, in the seventh, eighth, and ninth books of the Commentaries.

2. The places whereunto the first verse of this eighth chapter hath more special reference are the four first verses of the first chapter: *God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds, &c.; who when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high; being made so much better than the angels, as he hath by inheritance* 255 *obtained a more excellent name than they, &c. But to which of the angels said he at any time, Sit on my right hand, until I make thine enemies thy footstool?* ver. 13. Another place (whereunto the same words, ch. viii. 1, refer, most to be observed as a principal pillar of our belief concerning the heavenly sanctuary wherein Christ sits on the right hand of God) is that, ch. vi. 19, 20: *Which hope we have as an anchor of the soul, both sure and steadfast, and which entereth into that within the veil; whither the forerunner is for us entered, even Jesus, made an high priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec.*



3. With this last passage of chap. vi, the mysteries contained in the eighth, ninth, and tenth chapters do most immediately accord. *Mysteries* I am bold to style them, (though some interpreters make them no more than metaphors, or unhandsome rhetorical tropes,) because the matters contained in them are expressed in divine allegories, which (as hath been observed before) do herein far exceed allegories merely rhetorical, or concerning matters secular, in that they always afford concludent proof, that is, true arguments of real proportions. The principal terms, or real subjects of proportions, in the eighth and ninth chapters of this Epistle, are these following: the earthly or mundane tabernacle, and the celestial—the two sanctuaries contained in the earthly tabernacle, and the two heavenly sanctuaries which in proportion answer to them—the several manner of dedication or consecration of all these sanctuaries—the several manner of rites used in the dedication of all these sanctuaries—the distinct offices of the high priest and ordinary priests of the old testament or covenant, and of the only High Priest of the new.

4. In the earthly tabernacle, framed and pitched by Moses, and so likewise in the temple of Jerusalem, projected by David, but finished and consecrated by Solomon his son, there were two sanctuaries or holy places: one, into which the ordinary priests were by precept to enter every day; the other, into which it was lawful for none save for the high priest alone to enter, and that but once every year. Now this earthly or mundane tabernacle (which contained these two sanctuaries) being erected by God's special command unto Moses, according to the pattern which had been shewed him in the mount, it is a clear case, from our apostle's authority and exposition of Moses, that both these sanctuaries, or holy places made with hands, were but

types or shadows of two sanctuaries not made with hands, but prepared or created by God himself in the heavens. *Every high priest is ordained to offer gifts and sacrifices: wherefore it is of necessity that this man have somewhat also to offer. For if he were on earth, he should not be a priest, seeing that there are priests that offer gifts according to the law: who serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was admonished of God when he was about to make the tabernacle: for, See, saith he, that thou make all things according to the pattern shewed to thee in the mount.* Heb. viii. 3—5. These words contain a fundamental principle, which were it exactly surveyed, and a profound mystery, which, were it well sounded, would guide us to the discovery of many more throughout this Epistle, and afford much variety of admirable consequences to every learned, or, however, matter in store, of admiration to every ingenuous reader.

5. To give some hints unto the one, and directions unto the other: the heavenly sanctuary represented by the most holy place (or that which they call *sanctum sanctorum*) in the earthly tabernacle or material temple, as is evident from our apostle, ch. i, was that heavenly sanctuary whereunto our High Priest Christ Jesus is entered once for all, and wherein he continually exerciseth his everlasting priesthood. *And after the second veil, [was] the tabernacle which is called the Holiest of all; which had the golden censer, and the ark of the covenant overlaid round about with gold, wherein was the golden pot that had manna, and Aaron's rod that budded, and the tables of the covenant; and over it the cherubims of glory shadowing the mercyseat; of which we cannot now speak particularly. Now when these things were thus ordained, the priests went*

*always into the first tabernacle, accomplishing the service of God. But into the second went the high priest alone once every year, not without blood, which he offered for himself, and for the errors of the people : the Holy Ghost this signifying, that the way into the holiest of all was not yet made manifest, (that is, not yet opened, but close shut,) while as the first tabernacle was yet standing. Heb. ix. 3—8.*

6. But unto whom was the way into the most holy place so shut? unto men only, as unto Enoch and Elias, or unto the souls of patriarchs, of prophets, or of other saints deceased? or unto all besides the Son of God, the holy angels not excepted?

## CHAP. XLV.

*That the Souls of righteous Men, Abraham, &c., were in a blissful heavenly Mansion before ; but after the Kingdom of Heaven was perfectly set up and open to all Believers, by Christ's placing as Man at the right Hand of God, their Condition was bettered.*

1. WERE not the souls of righteous men, of Abraham, of David, of patriarchs, of prophets, in a place of bliss, or in heaven itself, before our Saviour's ascension thither? I make no question but they were estated in some blissful heavenly mansion. For it is not to be suspected that Abraham from the day of his death was not as near unto the throne of Majesty, and in a place of as great happiness as the penitent malefactor's soul was admitted into, some few hours after his torments upon the cross were ended. Now the place whereunto he was in soul admitted the same day he died, was a true *paradise*, not that terrestrial paradise which Adam lost, much less any region under the earth, or concavity in the earth, as some have imagined that which they call *limbus patrum* to be; but that celestial mansion



which the first earthly paradise did represent: that, into which Adam, if he had not forfeited his estate in the first paradise, should in good time, it may be, have been translated in body. That Abraham was in a place of bliss, and of reward or recompense according to the righteousness of his ways, is clear from the parable of Lazarus, whose soul was carried by the angels, not into any subterranean vault, (of which or like places the holy angels are no officers or attendants,) but into *Abraham's bosom*. So all English translations render that place without any dissent or discord to the Greek or Latin; from neither of which, notwithstanding, this sense or signification of the word can be conclusively inferred. For *sinus* in Latin, or *κόλπος* in Greek, do signify or import as well that which we call in English a *bay*, a safe *road* or harbour for ships, as a *bosom*. And with the warrant of the most learned and punctual interpreters of the scripture amongst the Greek fathers, that place, Luke xvi. 22—'Ἐγένετο δὲ ἀποθανεῖν τὸν πτωχὸν, καὶ ἀπενεχθῆναι αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγγέλων εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ Ἀβραάμ—may be rendered thus, that *the*

257 *soul of Lazarus was carried or wafted by the angels into the bay of Abraham*, that is, into some one of those heavenly places wherein the souls of Abraham and other righteous men did rest, as ships in a safe bay or harbour, freed from all dangers of wind and other annoyances, expecting time or opportunity, to arrive, or to be transported, into the royal seat or haven of blessedness, which, as hath been said, was not open or passable until the King of glory did enter into it. So that Abraham and many others were blessed in soul in those heavenly harbours into which they were wafted or safely conducted by the angels, but did not, but possibly could not, receive the accomplishment of such bliss, as the human sanctified soul, though separated



from the body, is capable of, until the Son of God did enter into the holy place not made with hands; that is, not till his ascension both in body and soul into the highest heaven, not before his enthronization in his seat of majesty at the right hand of God the Father.

2. The truth of this last assertion—‘Albeit Abraham were in a blessed haven, yet the anchor of his hopes did not approach the true seat of bliss before our Saviour’s ascension’—may be inferred from our apostle, Heb. vi. 19, 20: *This hope we have as an anchor of the soul, both sure and steadfast, (ἀσφαλῆ τε καὶ βεβαίαν,) and which entereth into that within the veil; whither the forerunner is for us entered, even Jesus, made an high priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec.* As also from another place, much mistaken by some of the ancients, and not well translated by many modern interpreters, Heb. xi. 39, 40: *All these, (of which number Enoch, Abraham, and Moses were three principal ones,) having obtained a good report through faith, received not the promise: God having provided some better thing for us, that they without us should not be made perfect:* that is, should not be consecrated to be kings and priests, before such of the faithful as lived at the time of our Saviour’s ascension were consecrated with them. And in this sense that of St. Ambrose, (with whose expressions of this mystery many in our times have been altogether causelessly much offended,) “When thou hadst overcome the sharpness of death, thou didst open the kingdom of heaven to all believers,” ought to be taken. Nothing can be more plain or more conclusively proved from our Saviour’s own words, and his apostles’ comments on them, than this—That the kingdom of heaven itself was not erected, was not established, until that Jesus, whom the Jews had

crucified was made both Lord and Christ, and placed as man at the right hand of his Father.

3. To dilate further upon this point for this present I dare not, lest I should lose my way, or forget to return to the other parallel proposed, to wit, ‘What heavenly mansion or sanctuary the first part of the earthly tabernacle or court, whereinto the ordinary priests went every day, did represent or foreshadow?’ I shall not trespass against any article of faith, or rule of interpreting scriptures, nor, I hope, offend any ingenuous conscience, by delivering my opinion in a point wherein the scripture (as I conceive) is silent, or which can neither be enforced upon us as any part of Christian belief, nor be refuted by any rule of faith. To my apprehension of our apostle’s meaning, *Heb.* viii. 5, that place or mansion in the heavenly tabernacle wherein Abraham, Lazarus, &c., did rest, before the kingdom of heaven was set open to all believers, was that place or court which *atrium sacerdotum*—the court of the priests in the first tabernacle, or in Solomon’s temple—did picture out unto us. Or, if the souls of the faithful were not admitted into that place before Christ’s death, we cannot allot a lower or outermer mansion in heaven itself than that which *atrium congregationis*—  
 258 that is, the court of the congregation in Solomon’s temple, whereinto the congregation of Israel which were no priests were admitted and taught by the priests—did represent. However it be, that heavenly mansion or sanctuary, which in proportion truly answered to the sanctuary or court of priests in the material temple, was no such happy seat of bliss before Christ’s death as it was made by it. For by his blood it was finally consecrated or dedicated to be what now it is, a true temple, which was the second parallel proposed.

## CHAP. XLVI.

*A Parallel betwixt the Rites of Dedicating the Tabernacle, the Vessels, &c. with Blood of Beasts, and of Consecrating the heavenly Places with the most precious Blood of Jesus Christ.*

1. THE place or station for drawing this parallel aright is Heb. ix: *Neither the first testament was dedicated without blood. For when Moses had spoken every precept to all the people according to the law, he took the blood of calves and of goats, with water, and scarlet wool, and hyssop, and sprinkled both the book, and all the people, saying, This is the blood of the testament which God hath enjoined unto you. Moreover he sprinkled with blood both the tabernacle, and all the vessels of the ministry. And almost all things are by the law purged with blood; and without shedding of blood is no remission.* vv. 18—22. All this he speaks, according to the plain literal sense of the law, concerning the purifying or consecrating of the earthly tabernacle with its vessels or implements. The mystical sense or meaning of the matters of fact or practices performed by Moses and Aaron, when they consecrated the first tabernacle with the blood of bullocks and goats, &c., is literally explained unto us by this our apostle in the verses following: *It was therefore necessary that the patterns of things in the heavens should be purified with these; but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these.* ver. 23. These words admit no metaphors or tropes, but have their proper and real logical sense. The argument is most punctually concludent—‘The similitude or patterns of heavenly things were purified with blood; therefore the heavenly things themselves, that is, the celestial tabernacles, were to be purged and consecrated with the blood of Christ our High Priest, which is now

entered into them for our sanctification and final redemption.' To inquire what should become of all our Saviour's blood, whether shed in his agony or upon the cross, will seem, I know, a curious question, specially to slothful students in divinity. On the other side, it would argue a drowsy fancy, either voluntarily to imagine, or to be by others persuaded, that his most precious blood being shed in such abundance should be like water spilt upon the ground, either swallowed up by the dry earth, or mingled with dust, or dispersed by the heat of the sun, and resolved into vapours. Seeing every drop of it was truly *the blood of God*, it can be no sin to suppose, nay to believe, that all of it was by his death made, as his body now is, immortal; that all of it was preserved entire and sincere, and brought, either by his own immediate power, or by the ministry of his holy angels, into those heavenly sanctuaries, which were to be CONSECRATED by it, to be the seats or mansions of everlasting bliss unto all true believers, and thus brought in at the time of his entrance into paradise in soul, though not in body, which was immediately after he had commended his spirit unto his heavenly Father.

259 2. If unto all that hath been said in this argument, I should further add, that the most precious blood of the Son of God, which was shed for the ransom of our sins in the garden or upon the cross, and brought into the celestial tabernacle upon his death, (whether reunited to his glorified body, or glorified in itself, and preserved, apart from his body,) doth still retain an everlasting efficacy for the daily purifying of our hearts, and working sanctification in us; I presume the intelligent or ingenuous reader will interpret this assertion rather for a point of speculation, not much thought upon by others, than any paradox or heterodoxal doctrine of my



own invention. But of the true virtual presence, or real operation of the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ upon our souls, in so great distance as is between the most high and most holy celestial sanctuary and these material temples here on earth, wherein we celebrate and solemnize the memory of his death and passion, more punctually and more fully, if God shall be pleased to give leave, hereafter<sup>c</sup>. All which I have here affirmed or intimated will uncontrollably follow from our apostle's doctrine in this Epistle, and from other passages of his fellow apostles. To begin with that of Heb. ix. 11, &c. : *Christ being come an high priest of good things to come, by a greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands, that is to say, not of this building; neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us. For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh: how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?* In this passage we have the true mystical or prophetic sense of sundry Mosaical rites or sacrifices plainly deciphered, without metaphor or figure; the very literal historical or civil sense of some of which, or of the legal precept which enjoins, or of the rule for right using them, but a few Christian writers have duly considered or rightly understood. It shall suffice me to insist upon the parallel between such Mosaical rites as I understand, with their right use or end, and the evangelical mysteries forepictured by them.

<sup>c</sup> In the eleventh book, vol. x.

## CHAP. XLVII.

*Before the fuller Draught of that Parallel (If the blood of bulls... and the ashes of an heifer... much more the blood of Christ... ) treated on in the two next Chapters, the Apostle's translating the Hebrew Word Berith by Διαθήκη, is shewed to be, not a mere Allusion, but of strict Propriety.*

1. THE height and depth of the mysteries contained in these two verses, Hebrews ix. 13, 14, cannot in this life be truly sounded. And before I can survey the surface of the parallel intended by our apostle, I must endeavour to charm the tongues and pens of some saucy critics in these last ages : such, for the most part, are mere grammarians, or men in whom grammatical skill is too predominant. For of this light kind of learning, that of our apostle, *Scientia inflat*, as Ludovicus Vives somewhere well observes, is most punctually or peculiarly true. And the man whose brain is full of this skill, and whose breast is empty of morality, or other solid and ingenious literature, is like a pinnace ballasted with cork, or some lighter stuff, bearing the 260 sail of a galleon or carack. And if this mere verbal skill be matched with some slight dialectical terms, as with *second notions* or *dichotomies*, these serve as engines to set words dictated by the Holy Ghost, or the several significations of one and the same word, at opposition one to another ; whereas they admit only some difference, no way opposite, but subordinate, or truly concordant. Some of this crew in the Romish church (with whom I dare not avow that none in the reformed churches are participant) have been so bold as to impeach the author of this divine Epistle (if not directly, yet by necessary implication) either of ignorance in the Hebrew dialect, or of such fancies or delight to play with words, as have been too frequent

in these later ages. For so they say that St. Paul (or whoever he were that was the author of this Epistle) doth play with the Hebrew *berith*, when he translates it, in this ninth chapter or elsewhere, by the Greek *διαθήκη*, which primarily and properly signifies *a testament*, or disposition of goods or inheritance bequeathed; whereas *berith* doth punctually and formally signify *a league or covenant*.

2. All this, notwithstanding, argues only some diversity in the signification or interpretation of the words, no real difference or opposition of the matter signified by them; no more (if so much) than is between a living creature endued with sense, and a man or sensitive creature endued with reason. Now though every creature endued with sense be not a man or reasonable creature, yet every man essentially is a creature endued with sense. The connexion between these two words, which some critics have set at variance, to wit, between a *covenant* and a *testament*, is altogether as essential and formal, as the former betwixt a *man* and a *sensitive creature*: for albeit every covenant be not truly and formally a testament, yet every *testament*, truly so called, essentially is or includes a true and proper covenant. So that one and the same word *berith*, in some places of the Old Testament imports no more than the *genus*, or general signification, to wit, *a covenant*; in other places it necessarily imports *a testamental covenant*, and must be rendered, as the apostle here doth, by *διαθήκη*, that is, *a last will or valid testament*. Our blessed Lord and Saviour (I believe, and those which impeach our apostle in this place will not, I hope, deny) did understand the meaning of the Hebrew *berith*, as it is used in that great covenant with the Israelites, (whereof Moses by God's appointment was the mediator,) much better than any modern grammarian critic

does. Now our Saviour instructs us, that the covenant made by Moses betwixt God and the Israelites was a true and proper testament. *This cup* (saith he, in the institution of the new covenant) *is the new testament in my blood, which is shed for you.* And if this *new covenant* (as Jeremiah instyles it) were truly and properly a testament, then questionless the old covenant, which God made with his people in the institution of the passover, and renewed by Moses in the wilderness, was a *testament*, truly and properly so called, and ought to be translated by the Greek *διαθήκη*. All the covenants which God made with his people, whether concerning the blessings of this life or of the life to come, were but introductions, parcels, or appendices unto the old and new testaments.

3. Wherein then doth a *testament*, properly so called, exceed a naked covenant? There may be, and usually are, many covenants wherein there is no free *donation* of either party covenanting, but a mutual reddition of *quid pro quo*, or (as some civilians speak) *ratio dati et accepti*: and such a covenant, or act of commutative justice, cannot properly be conceived be-  
 261 twixt God and man, or other creature; none of which are able to give their Creator any thing which was not his own before, or which was not received from him by free gift. Every last will or testament includes or presupposeth a free donation of some goods or lands, &c. by the testator, though oftentimes upon covenant or subsequent condition of executing or performing the will or testament; otherwise the legatee or executor may forfeit his estate or interest in the goods freely bequeathed unto him. And of this nature are both the old and new testaments. Neither of them was absolute in respect of all that had interest in the blessings bequeathed; which howsoever they were most



freely bequeathed, did tie such as had interest in them unto performance of such conditions, as being neglected or contemned by them might deprive them of the inheritance or blessings bequeathed. The blessings bequeathed by Moses (God's ambassador both to Pharaoh and to his people; or, as the apostle instyles him, *the mediator of the old testament*) were, first, the deliverance of the sons of Jacob from Egypt, secondly, the inheritance of the land of Canaan. The blessings bequeathed by *the Mediator of the new testament*, and ratified by his blood, were, the deliverance of mankind from the powers of darkness, and the inheritance of the kingdom of light.

4. The parallel between the institution of the pass-over and of the Lord's supper, or of the two inheritances bequeathed, the one by Moses, the other by Christ, is so plain, that it needs no comment. It only requires a diligent reader or hearer; or what is wanting on the ordinary hearer's part may be supplied by every ordinary catechist before the receiving of the sacramental pledges. One point yet remains more pertinent to the unfolding of our apostle's meaning, Hebrews ix. 15—*And for this cause he is the mediator of the new testament, that by means of death, for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first testament, they which are called might receive the promise of eternal inheritance. For where a testament is, there must also of necessity be the death of the testator. For a testament is of force after men are dead: otherwise it is of no strength at all while the testator liveth*—and it is this: As the Israelites did not enter upon the inheritance, or take possession of the land of Canaan, till after Moses, the testator or mediator of the old testament, was dead, so neither was the kingdom of heaven,

our everlasting inheritance, set open to all or any believers until Christ Jesus, the testator or mediator of the new testament, was crucified, dead, buried, and raised again to immortal glory. Since which time, as is the King, so is the kingdom or inheritance bequeathed—so is the testament itself, being sealed by his bloody death—all and every of them truly everlasting.

#### CHAP. XLVIII.

*The Parallel between the most solemn Services of the Law and the one Sacrifice of Christ : and the high Preeminence and Efficacy of this in comparison of those. The Romanists' Doctrine, that in the Mass Christ's Body is identically carnally present, and that there is a proper Sacrifice propitiatory offered, derogates from the absolute Perfection of Christ's Offering himself once for all.*

1. THE principal terms of proportion in this parallel, which serve as so many several kens or marks for the right surveying of it, are the services of the law, or the offices of legal priests, and the perpetual function of our High Priest. The services of the law, 262 wherein our apostle instanceth, are the principal and most solemn sacrifices which were enjoined to the priests after the order of Aaron. The one sort whereof were anniversaries, as of bullocks and goats, and to be offered every year upon the day of atonement, and so to be offered from the first erection of the tabernacle in the wilderness, so long as the law of ceremonies was *de jure* to continue, until our Saviour's death upon the cross : since which time all bloody sacrifices have lost their legal use. The other service was that sacrifice of the red heifer, and the consecration of water by the sprinkling or mingling her ashes ; which perhaps was not anniversary, nor

often put in practice from the time of Moses' death until the ascension of our Saviour into heaven.

Now our apostle takes it as granted, that if these choice sacrifices of atonement, and of the red cow, were altogether insufficient to purify the hearts and consciences, or the souls and spirits of sinful men; the ordinary or meaner sacrifices of the law were much more insufficient to all such purposes as the sacrifice of our High Priest was all-sufficient and most efficacious for. The eminency of Christ's bloody sacrifice upon the cross (in respect of all legal sacrifices of what rank soever) consisteth, first, in the efficacy which it had and hath for remission of all sins committed against the moral law of God; that is, of all such sins as immediately pollute the reasonable soul and conscience. The least degree of such purification no legal sacrifices could immediately effect, reach, or touch. To what use then did they directly serve? or what was the proper effect unto which they were immediately terminated? That was the purification of men's bodies from mere legal uncleanness; that is, from all such negligences, ignorances, or casual occurrences, as not being expiated by the priest did exclude the parties so offending from the tabernacle of the congregation; or, as our apostle speaks, to purify them for such uncleannesses of the flesh, as did but foreshadow or picture the uncleanness of the soul, or the dead works of sin, all which, being not expiated by a more excellent priest than any was after the order of Aaron, will exclude all from entering into the heavenly tabernacle.

2. Such legal uncleanness as did exclude the parties polluted with it from the tabernacle of the congregation, was many ways contracted; as, by touching of the dead—by eating of meats forbidden by the law—

or by not eating meats allowed of by the law according to the rule or prescript for such ceremonial services—or by the like omissions or practices which were not in their own nature or to all men sinful, but sinful in the seed of Jacob only, to whom they were evil only because forbidden, not forbidden because they were evil in their own nature. Even in regard of such shadows or typical offices for purifying men legally unclean, the best and most solemn sacrifices of the law (though offered once at least every year, and otherwise as often as daily occasions or occurrences did require) were no way so efficacious or effectual, as the one sacrifice of the Son of God, offered by himself but once for all, is for the perpetual purifying of our souls from the dead works of sin, and for our consecration to the everlasting service of the everliving God, which is that *freedom indeed* wherewith his only Son hath promised to set all such free as believe in his name and abide in his word, John viii.

3. The eminency of Christ's priesthood and sacrifice, above the priesthood and services of the law, is deeply wronged by the doctrine and practice of secular and regular Roman catholic priests, as they do term themselves; and so is our apostle's doctrine in the ninth and tenth chapters to the Hebrews, more prominently contradicted by them than it was by the incredulous or unbelieving Jews in his lifetime. The western Antichrist (so the Lutherans distinguish them) hath in this particular so far outbid the Antichrist of the east, that if *ὁ ἄνομος ὁ Ἀντίχριστος*, that *law-opposer*, or *man of sin*, were to be followed close with hue-and-cry, or his footsteps to be traced for these nine hundred years, by the Christian kingdoms or states, the chase and cry would sooner fall into Rome or Trent than into Constantinople, though that,



no question, be now the seat of Gog and Magog, or of the eastern Antichrist. That *contradiction of sinners* which our Saviour Christ did *endure* here on earth, Heb. xii. 3, improved by the Roman church in later days, against all such as rightly believe in him, specially against such as duly administer his holy sacraments, may with its improvement be conclusively inferred by the tenents and daily practices of that church, both which are as punctually and as fully contradictory to the doctrine of the author of this Epistle, chap. ix. and x, and to many other principal maxims of Christian religion, as any doctrine, tenent, or practice can be one to another. *For the law having a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things, can never with those sacrifices which they offered year by year continually make the comers thereunto perfect. For then would they not have ceased to be offered? because that the worshippers once purged should have had no more conscience of sins. But in those sacrifices there is a remembrance again made of sins every year. For it is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins.* Heb. x. 1—4. *By the which will we are sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ ONCE FOR ALL. And every priest standeth daily ministering and offering oftentimes the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins: but this man, (or rather this priest,) after he had offered ONE SACRIFICE for sins, for ever sat down on the right hand of God; from henceforth expecting till his enemies be made his footstool. For by one offering he hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified. Whereof the Holy Ghost also is a witness to us: for after that he had said before, This is the covenant that I will make with them after those days, saith*

*the Lord, I will put my laws into their hearts, and in their minds will I write them; and their sins and iniquities will I remember no more. Now where remission of these is, there is no more offering for sin. vv. 10—18.*

4. The force of our apostle's inference, and the very pith of his discourse throughout these passages presented to the reader's view, doth more punctually refute the doctrine of the Romish mass, than it did the contradicting Jews, or other blasphemers of Christ's name and office, either before or since this divine Epistle was written. The pith and marrow of all his arguments consists in this; that even the best of legal sacrifices or services (were they bloody or unbloody) were altogether insufficient to purify the conscience, could never take away sin; because they were to be reiterated, the best and most solemn of them every year, and many of them every day, others as oft as casual occasions did require. Now if this argument be concludent (as no Christian can deny it to be) against the Jews which pleaded for the sufficiency of legal sacrifices, it will conclude *a fortiori*, or with a *πρόσω μᾶλλον*, Heb. ix. 14, against the absolute perfection or sufficiency of our Saviour's sacrifice of himself (supposing that it should be as the Romanists teach). Thus much it will inevitably infer, according to the peremptory canons of the Roman church, which plainly teach—and under pain of damnation injoin all Christians to believe—that Christ's body and blood, that very same body, that very same blood, which were once offered by himself upon the cross, are daily offered by the mass priest. Or, as if this  
 264 were not enough to outvie the Jewish synagogue in the sin of contradiction to Christ, they add, that every such offering is a propitiatory sacrifice as well for

some that be dead, as for the living. And I think such oblations as they make, do the one sort as little good or as little harm as they do the other, unless they solicit the priest to make this kind of atonement for them. But to such solicitors, or executors of such solicitations, both doctrine and practice must needs create as great danger as any heresy or branch of contradicting infidelity hath done or can do to the maintainers of it. This branch of the Roman church's doctrine doth as punctually contradict that fundamental doctrine, Heb. ix. 13, *If the blood of bulls and goats, &c.*, as it doth the forecited passages, Heb. x.

5. But the authorized practice of consecrating their holy water for remission of sins and sanctification is most palpably contradictory to our apostle's meaning, or to the meaning of the Holy Spirit in that other instance of *the water of sprinkling*, wherein the ashes of the red cow were special ingredients, and gave the virtue and tincture unto it, for purifying men from such legal uncleanness, as the best ceremonies of the law, and this water in special was consecrated for. The law for the consecrating this water, and the use or ends for which it was consecrated, we have Numbers xix. The mistaking of which place, and the gross misuse of the like water, solemnly consecrated by that canonical authority which the Romish church doth challenge over all other churches, is set down in such plain terms, that no honest-hearted Roman catholic, specially of the English, Scottish, Netherlandish, or German nation, if he be able to read the New Testament in his own native language, but he will be either heartily sorry for Alexander the Fifth, who made this canon, or at least ashamed that their forefathers should approve it, or that it should be practised by their instructors, if they would permit them to have the reason



of the canon or decree rightly translated into a language which they understand. The canon, with the gloss upon it, is here transcribed, in the same words wherein it was first conceived and published, in Decreti part. 3. de Consecrat. distinct. 3. cap. 20. prout habetur in Corpore Juris Canonici, jussu Gregorii XIII. Lugd. impresso, anno 1618.

6. “ *Aquam sale (u) conspersam populis benedicimus, ut ea cuncti aspersi sanctificentur, (x) et purificentur. Quod et omnibus sacerdotibus faciendum esse mandamus. Nam si cinis vitulæ (y) sanguine aspersus populum sanctificabat, (a) atque mundabat: (b) multo magis aqua, sale aspersa, divinisque precibus sacrata populum sanctificat, atque mundat. Et, si sale asperso per Helisæum (c) prophetam sterilitas aquæ sanata est: quanto magis divinis precibus sacratus † sal sterilitatem rerum aufert humanarum, et coinquinatos (d) sanctificat, atque mundat, et purgat, et cætera bona multiplicat, et insidias diaboli avertit, et a phantasmatum versutiis hominis defendit?*”

*Sic se habet glossa in hunc locum :*

“ *Aquam sale]* Hæc est decima pars dist. secundum Joan. de Fant.

“ *CASUS.* Quæritur quare aqua cum sale benedicatur? Et respondetur, ut ea homines aspersi sanctificentur. Cum enim in Veteri Testamento cinis vitulæ sanctificabat, et sal per manum Helisæi prophetæ sanavit sterilitatem aquæ: multo magis aqua cum sale benedicta omnia conspersa purificat.

(u) “ *Aquam sale]* Quia per aquam confessio, per salem amaritudo signatur et morsio: unde hæc est mistura unde geminus procedit partus: divisio scilicet delictorum, et ortus virtutum et bonorum operum 22. q. 1. c. cum renuntiatur. Hæc designata est per misionem Judæ, qui confessio dicitur; et Thamar, quæ amaritudo dicitur; unde Phares divisio, Zaram ortus, geminus scilicet partus provenit. Hu. <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Hu. stands for Hugo Card.



(x) “*Sanctificentur*] Quæritur quomodo aqua benedicta di- 265  
catur populum sanctificare vel mundare. ADDITIO. Ad hoc  
potest responderi secundum id quod no. su. ea dist. 2. c. sig-  
num, in glo. 2. vers. propter humilitatem, etc. alias illa glossa  
ponitur, ea dist. institutio. ARCH. <sup>b</sup>

(y) “*Cinis vitulæ*] Histor. legitur in Levitic. <sup>c</sup> quod decima  
die Septembris tollebat sacerdos de proprio vitulam rufam tri-  
mam et immaculatam, quæ nondum portaverat jugum, et im-  
molabat eam pro peccato suæ domus: et hircum quem sumebat  
ab universa multitudine, immolabat pro peccato populi: pelles  
et carnes et fimum vitulæ et hircum comburebat extra, et  
cinerem servabat, et inde per totum annum fiebat aspersio  
aquæ, qua purificabantur immundi de quibusdam quæ in lege  
immunditiæ dicebantur: ut puta si aliquis tetigisset cadaver  
hominis mortui vel sepulchrum, erat immundus usque ad diem  
septimam: et hac aqua mundabatur.

(a) “*Sanctificabat*] Tunc sanguis vitulæ fuit remissio pecca-  
torum: ut I 2. q. 2. c. gloria.

(b) “*Mundabat*] A venialibus. su. distinct. 50. in capite.  
in. dist. c. 4. nequaquam. Nam sacrificiis venialia delentur.  
su. d. 2. c. cum omne. de pœn. dist. 3. c. de quotidianis. Nam  
si qua tunc habebant, mortalia erant. De Pœn. dist. 6. c. 1.  
circa medium.

PER HELISÆUM. Historia legitur in lib. Reg. 4. cum He-  
lisæus esset in eremo: venerunt ad eum viri civitatis, et  
dixerunt: *Ecce habitatio hujus civitatis optima est, sicut tu  
ipse bene nosti: sed aquæ pessimæ sunt et steriles. At ille ait:  
Afferte mihi vas novum, et mittite in illud salem: et ait: Dicit  
Dominus, Sanavi aquas istas: et non erit ultra in eis mors  
neque sterilitas. Sanatæ ergo sunt aquæ illæ usque ad diem  
hunc juxta verbum Helisæi quod locutus est Dominus.*

(c) “*Per Helisæum*] Inde est quod cum aqua exorcizatur  
dicit sacerdos: ‘Deus qui per Helisæum prophetam salem in  
aquam mitti jussisti,’ &c.

(d) “*Et coinquinatos*] Venialibus tantum.”

7. But wherein did the Roman church so grossly  
mistake the meaning of the Holy Ghost in that instance

<sup>b</sup> Arch. for Archidiaconus; su. for supra; in. for infra.

<sup>c</sup> See chap. 50. num. 1.

of the red heifer, Heb. ix. 13 ; or, to what mischievous inconvenience doth her practice unto this day, upon this mistake, amount ? To no less inconvenience, to no lower degree of antichristian impiety, than this, that the legal priests, with their ceremonies or sacrifices, should be truer types of every mass priest, whether of higher or lower rank, and of their services, than of Christ Jesus our high priest, or of his everlasting sacrifice, and perpetual function. Both which were and are performed by him in his own person, not by any deputies or vicars. But to me it is no wonder, if that church do make Aaron, Eleazar, and their successors, rather types of mass priests than of Christ ; seeing (as hath been observed before) they make Melchisedec himself (according to whose order the Son of God only was to be consecrated high priest) a more lively type of meanest mass priests, than any true adumbration or shadow of Christ Jesus ; and the service of the mass priests at the altar to be the accomplishment of Melchisedec's priesthood.

8. Had then the anniversary sacrifices of bulls and goats upon the day of atonement no reference or relation to the sacrament of Christ's body and blood ? nor the water of sprinkling, mingled with the ashes of the red heifer, no semblance with the sacramental water of baptism ? Yes, doubtless both these ceremonies had special reference unto, and exact semblance with these two blessed sacraments ; and yet were both of them shadows or types only of Christ's bloody sacrifice upon the cross, and of the perpetual exercise of his everlasting priesthood, since he ascended into his heavenly tabernacle. Christ Jesus only, and his everlasting priesthood, is the very body or solid substance of all legal  
266 rites or services ; and of this body, the anniversary sacrifices, whether of atonement or others, were true

types or shadows. And of the same body or substance, the sacraments of his body and blood, and of baptism, are somewhat more than types—true representations of what is past, assured pledges of all the blessings promised to the fathers and patriarchs in the Old Testament, and actually exhibited in a better manner than they were to them, unto all believers, since his entrance into the most holy place.

## CHAP. XLIX.

*That the foreign Maintainers of the more than fatal irrelative rigid Decree make Christ Jesus rather a mere Sacrifice, than a true everlasting Priest acting for us, and daily working out our Reconciliation to God. So do such as teach, 'That the Sins of some were remitted before they were committed.' Of the Superexcellency of Christ's Priesthood and one Sacrifice, in comparison of the Aaronical Priesthood and the many Services thereof.*

1. BUT here I must expect this or the like reply from some interimists, or such peaceable men as desire a reconciliation betwixt ours and the Romish church—"If to celebrate the sacrifice of the mass, that is, so to offer up Christ's body and blood, or whole Christ upon the altar, be a branch of Antichristianism, or an implicit denial of Christ's everlasting priesthood, will you undertake to acquit *the reformed churches* (as you term them) from the like sin or sacrilegious opinions, or from robbing Christ of his greatest honours as he is man, which are, to be King, Priest, and Judge?" For any entire reformed churches or Christian sovereignty whose public confessions or authorized catechisms it hath been my hap to read, I know not one that is this way faulty; nor do the bitterest adversaries of the Gallican, Switzerland, or German churches, lay Antichristianism to the charge of their authorized canons or constitutions, albeit they indict a great number of private



writers, pastors, or teachers in Germany, France, and Switzerland, many in England, and more in Scotland, for being devoted members of the Eastern Antichrist, the height of whose heresy or infidelity they place in the maintenance of that more than fatal irrelative decree, in respect of which all things (Christ's death itself not excepted) be said so to fall out, as that they could not fall out otherwise, or be prevented.

2. For such private writers as have gone too far in the points mentioned, in what Christian church soever they be, I leave them to answer for themselves, and for those whose doctrine they follow. My purpose is only to request my brethren of the church of England (however for the present they stand affected in these points) to take it into more deep and logical consideration than hitherto it hath been taken by English preachers or writers—"Whether according to foreign rigid tenets of predestination, or of God's absolute irrelative decree for election and reprobation, (which came to us English at the third hand, as from Zwinglius, &c., which they had at the first from some ancient Romish schoolmen,) it be possible for us or them to maintain, by any rational way, that our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ either now is or hath been a true Priest or Sacrificer, rather than a mere sacrifice, predestinated from eternity for taking away the sins of the elect only? Or whether such as they term *elect from eternity* needed any priest at all besides God the Father, who did destinate  
267 his only Son to be a sacrifice or a mean necessary (though subordinate) for effecting the principal or utmost end of his decree; to wit, his own glory by the salvation of the elect?" My poor capacity for these thirty-four years, wherein I have lived a minister or priest of the Church of England, could never, nor yet can, find any tolerable answer or evasion, to free such



as maintain the oftenmentioned rigid decree from these two imputations—the one, that they cannot truly, or by any rational way, acknowledge Christ to be a priest after the order of Melchisedec; the other, that they cannot acknowledge him to be properly instyled such a *judge* as in our Creed we profess him to be. They will at length be enforced to borrow a more fit expression of his office from our sister nation, and instyle him to be the *doomster* or *doomsman* of the quick and of the dead; that is, *an inferior officer*, which hath no hand or vote in the course of justice for life and death, but only a power or delegated authority to read or pronounce the sentence which the judge or chief officer of state had written before; though not so long before, or in such indelible characters, as the doom which our Saviour Christ shall pronounce upon every man at the great day of his appearance, was written in the life-books of life and death everlasting. My exhortation unto every man amongst us which believe in his name shall be that of the learned and pious Hemingius—“That we seek not our assurance of faith or hope in *Parcarum tabulis*, which were irreversibly written before any part of the world was made, (if we may believe some heathen poets or stoicks,) but in God’s promises made to Abraham, and to be performed by Jesus Christ, as he is now our High Priest and King, and as the supreme Judge of quick and dead.

3. Having thus far endeavoured to sever the dross, or wipe off the aspersion (or such meaner stuff) as have been cast upon, or mingled themselves with that golden foundation laid by our apostle, Hebrews ix, my next addressment must be to dilate or diduct the precious metal contained in it, or in the third parallel proposed. The parallel was between the anniversary sacrifices of atonement, the sacrifices of the red cow,

and the one sacrifice offered once for all by our everlasting High Priest. His sacrifice is truly instyled *everlasting*, not for this reason alone, that it was of infinite value, or a full price for purchasing the everlasting redemption of mankind; but in this respect also, that it hath an everlasting efficacy for the daily remission of actual sins, for purifying the hearts and consciences of all such as in faith daily pray unto the Father in the name and mediation of his only Son, who is likewise rightly instyled an *everlasting Priest*, not in regard only that he is now altogether immortal, but more especially in that he perpetually executeth the office of the high priesthood, by making continual intercession for us, and by accomplishing our reconciliation unto the Godhead. *All things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation; to wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them; and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation.* 2 Cor. v. 18, 19. This reconciliation, *qua Deus nos sibi reconciliavit*, was wrought by Christ whilst he went about on earth doing good, and by his sufferings upon the cross, &c.; the other part of our reconciliation, or reconciliation taken in the passive sense, *qua nos Deo reconciliamur*, is daily wrought in true believers by this our High Priest, and so wrought by the continued participation of his Spirit, by the interposed renovations or nourishments of that grace which immediately descends to us from the sweet influence of this Sun of righteousness, now sitting more glorious (by much) in his heavenly tabernacle, than the visible sun in its sphere. And of this part of reconciliation, or of reconciliation in the passive sense, must that of our apostle be understood: *Now then we are ambassadors for Christ, as*

*though God did beseech you by us : we pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God. For he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin ; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him. 2 Cor. v. 20, 21.*

4. He that desires to guess aright at the eminency of Christ's priesthood and sacrifice, in respect of the Aaronical or legal services, or to take such an indefinite estimate of both as may advance his meditations upon the knowledge of Christ crucified and ascended into the heaven of heavens, may follow the scale set by astronomers betwixt the space of local distances on earth and the space of the highest celestial orbs or spheres which answer in proportion to them ; always allowing a greater excess of proportion between the excellency of Christ's priesthood beyond Aaron's or Melchisedec's, than astronomers allot betwixt the space of so many degrees in the heavens and so many miles on earth.

5. The legal priests or sacrificers were, at the same time and by succession, many, their sacrifices or services were, both for their kinds or matter, and for the solemn manner of their offerings, more. The several kinds of their sacrifices and solemnities I leave unto the reader's search, this being an argument whereof many have written copiously enough in most modern churches. It will be enough for me to observe, or call thus much to the reader's remembrance, that all the offices or services of legal priests were fully accomplished in the consecration of the Son of God to be our everlasting High Priest ; that all their offerings and sacrifices (whether bloody or unbloody, whether of vegetables, as of herbs, or green ears of corn, of meal, of loaves ; whether anniversary, or upon special occasions) were more than accomplished in his own once offering of himself. The



all-sufficiency of this his oblation of himself will best appear from the due consideration of the multiplicity of the former sacrifices, and the often reiteration of them. Of bloody sacrifices some were reiterated every day, others every year, or in set festivals, or upon special occasions for private persons: and this last sort of sacrifices or offerings were to be reiterated so often as occasions or occurrences did interpose. No one sacrifice could purify the same party, though peccant only against the law of ceremonies, from his legal uncleanness for any more turns than one. Every recidivation or relapse into the same sin or error was to have a new purification.

6. Now if it were possible to calculate, first, the multitude of sins and of sinners against the moral law of God, in comparison of such as did sin against the law of ceremonies; secondly, the excessive number of sins committed by every particular Christian man; and bear this truth in mind, that there needs no other sacrifice either for sin or sinners besides that one of Christ himself upon the cross, the influence of whose infinite value is daily and hourly communicated to all such as seek salvation by him; the superexcellency of this our High Priest, and of his sacrifice, in respect of all legal priests and services, will far surmount the compass of the highest heavens or orbs imaginable, in comparison of the least sensible part of the earth.

7. But some new-started opinions there be, which take away much matter of admiration in this great subject of divine meditation, and dull the spirits of otherwise wellminded men in the search after the  
269 virtue of Christ's everlasting sacrifice and priesthood. Of these new opinions, one special one is, (for I must not here touch upon the rest,) that the sins of some



men, of all the elect, were remitted before they could be committed: an opinion void of all reference to any pious use or practice—a speculation most untrue, prodigiously absurd. For no actual sin, by whomsoever committed, can be remitted to men living here on earth, otherwise than by some new influence from the everlasting sacrifice of Christ, or (as our apostle speaks) without the *sprinkling of that blood, which speaketh better things than that of Abel.* Heb. xii. 24. As much as I here intimate, that passage of St. John (if it be rightly scanned) will clearly evince—*If we say that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth: but if we walk in the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin. If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.* 1 John i. 6—8.

8. So then, even such as walk in the light, stand in need of cleansing by the blood of Christ. And with reference to this place, (as I conceive,) that maxim of St. Austin, well approved of by the best reformed writers, was first conceived by him—“Our justification consists in the perpetual remission of sin.” But an error there is, which I know not when it did first creep into the world, but creep in it did by the incogitancy or indistinct notions of some late writers—“That justification is but one act, never to be resumed or reiterated.” This assertion may be true in respect of that justification, *qua Deus nos justificat*, or of justification taken in the active sense, as it concerns God; for no act of his can be resumed or reiterated, nor admit any interpositions or interims of time. But if we speak of justification in the passive sense, or as it is an effect wrought in our souls by the Spirit of Christ,

Justification consists not in one indivisible act.

there may be and are many acts, many resumptions or renovations of the same act or effect ; all being wrought in us by interpositions or several interims of time. Our natural bodies do not require so many refections of meat and drink for continuation of life, of health, and strength, as the faith by which the just do live, and other spiritual graces which accompany faith in the purification of our souls, do admit, yea require refections spiritual. Of these refections, or refreshments of faith or other graces, some are obtained by our daily prayers; others, being like extraordinary feasts or banquets, are wrought in the participation of Christ's body and blood, so often as we receive that blessed sacrament as we ought to do. But the most of us which enjoy the liberty of Christian laws do not receive it so often as we ought; fewer as they ought. And whosoever receives it unworthily, receives it too often, if he so receive but once. Unto the worthy receivers of the sacramental pledges of Christ's body and blood, how often soever and how many soever receive them, the blood of Christ, though but once shed, becomes a perennial unexhaustible fountain of life everlasting. But of the right interpretation of our Saviour's testament or institution of this blessed sacrament, more at large, by God's assistance, in the article of the holy catholic church. In the mean time two prayers there be commanded by the church our mother, to be used in the visitation of the sick, at the administration of the sacrament unto them; both which, *mutatis mutandis*, I would commend to every piously minded Christian's meditations, (or to every professed Christian that desires to be such,) both before and after he present himself at the Lord's table, though he so present himself in perfect health of body and mind.

and relieve this thy servant. Look upon him with the eyes of thy mercy, give him comfort and sure confidence in thee, defend him from the danger of the enemy, and keep him in perpetual peace and safety; through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.”

And, 2. “ O most merciful God, who, according to the multitude of thy mercies, dost so put away the sins of those who truly repent, that thou rememberest them no more ; open thine eye of mercy upon this thy servant, who most earnestly desireth pardon and forgiveness. Renew in him, most loving Father, whatsoever hath been decayed by the fraud and malice of the devil, or by his own carnal will and frailness ; preserve and continue this sick member in the unity of the church ; consider his contrition, accept his tears, assuage his pain, as shall seem to thee most expedient for him. And forasmuch as he putteth his full trust only in thy mercy, impute not unto him his former sins, but take him unto thy favour, through the merits of thy most dearly beloved Son Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.”

#### CHAP. L.

*The Rarity of that Rite of Consecrating the Water of Sprinkling by the Ashes of the red Heifer, an Emblem of Baptism and the Singularity thereof. Our Church's Meaning in some Expressions at the Administration of that Sacrament.*

1. BUT although the frequent use of the sacrament of Christ's body and blood be needful or necessary by precept, and a means much available for strengthening of faith, or for repairing those decays or ruins which the subtilty of Satan works in our souls ; yet the reiteration of the sacrament of baptism is neither necessary nor allowable, much less commendable for such purposes. And the rarity, or rather singularity of it, was,

to my apprehension, emblematically prefigured by the sacrifice of the red heifer, or the water of sprinkling, which was legally sanctified or consecrated by her ashes. The law concerning this kind of purification is not to be found (I take it) in Leviticus, at least not in that sixteenth chapter, wherein the law of the sacrifice of atonement is punctually set down, however the forementioned<sup>d</sup> glossary upon the Romish canon for consecrating holy water, either through negligence or ignorance, or both, avouch that place for it. If the sacrifice of the red heifer had belonged unto the feast of atonement, it must have been reiterated once every year, whereas the Hebrew antiquaries affirm, that this solemnity was not used above ten times during all the time of the law of the tabernacle or temple. And whether it were so often used may be questioned, because there is no law or precept for the continuation of it, but only for the use of the water of sprinkling, (being once consecrated by it,) so often as the occasion specified in the law did require.

2. But unless the frequent use of the water so mingled with the ashes did waste or exhaust the ashes of that one sacrifice which Eleazar, not Aaron, was commanded to offer, these might have been preserved without putrefaction for a longer time than the law of ceremonies was to endure. For ashes (as good naturalists tell us) being well kept are immortal, or an emblem of immortality. But it may be, that as soon or as often as the ashes of any such sacrifice were by frequent use of the water of sprinkling exhausted or wasted, the legal priests were bound, by the law mentioned, to offer another, for consecrating the water of sprinkling, whose use was to continue as long as the reason mentioned in the law did endure.

<sup>d</sup> See chap. 48. numb. 6. p. 532.



3. The chief use or end of the water of sprinkling, 271 mingled with the ashes of this sacrifice, was to purify such as had made themselves legally unclean, or had casually fallen into such uncleanness. One branch of this uncleanness was the touching, or being touched by any dead corpse. And unto this use of the water of sprinkling, mentioned Numb. ix. 11, that of our apostle, Heb. ix. 14, hath special reference—more than allusion: *How much more shall the blood of Christ purge our consciences from DEAD works?* That this legal sacrifice for sin was an exquisite type of Christ's bloody death and sufferings, or an exact picture of his blood, wherewith the heavenly sanctuary or holy places were purified, (although the blood of this legal sacrifice were not brought into the earthly sanctuary,) no good writers which I have read either deny or question. That the water of sprinkling, consecrated by the aspersion of the ashes of this legal sacrifice, did truly resemble the water of baptism, by which we are washed from sin, and consecrated unto God as clean persons, that is, made members of his church here on earth, is so evident in itself, that it needs no paraphrase or laborious comment upon the forecited law. Yet to this purpose the learned reader may find much pertinent matter, in Chytræus' Comments upon the Book of Numbers, and in many others. It will be more needful or better suiting with my intentions in this place, to prevent the captious exceptions which some anti-papists have heretofore taken, and now resume against the expressions of our public liturgy, in that part of it which concerns the administration of baptism:

“ Almighty and everlasting God, who of thy great mercy didst save Noah and his family in the ark from perishing by water; and also didst safely lead the children of Israel thy people through the Red sea, figuring

thereby thy holy baptism; and by the baptism of thy well-beloved Son Jesus Christ, in the river Jordan, didst sanctify water to the mystical washing away of sin; we beseech thee, for thine infinite mercies, that thou wilt mercifully look upon these children; wash them and sanctify them with the Holy Ghost; that they, being delivered from thy wrath, may be received into the ark of Christ's church; and being steadfast in faith, joyful through hope, and rooted in charity, may so pass the waves of this troublesome world, that finally they may come to the land of everlasting life, there to reign with thee world without end; through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen."

"Seeing now, dearly beloved brethren, that these children are regenerate, and grafted into the body of Christ's church, let us give thanks unto Almighty God for these benefits; and with one accord make our prayers unto him, that these children may lead the rest of their life according to this beginning."

"We yield thee hearty thanks, most merciful Father, that it hath pleased thee to regenerate these infants with thy holy Spirit, to receive them for thine own children by adoption, and to incorporate them into thy holy church. And humbly we beseech thee to grant, that they, being dead unto sin, and living unto righteousness, and being buried with Christ in his death, may crucify the old man, and utterly abolish the whole body of sin; and that, as they are made partakers of the death of thy Son, they may also be partakers of his resurrection; so that finally, with the residue of thy holy church, they may be inheritors of thine everlasting kingdom; through Christ our Lord. Amen."

4. It is no part of our Church's doctrine or meaning, that the washing or sprinkling infants' bodies with consecrated water should take away sins by its own imme-

ciate virtue. To affirm thus much implies, as I conceive, a contradiction to that apostolical doctrine—*The* <sup>272</sup>*like figure whereunto even baptism doth also now save us (not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience toward God,) by the resurrection of Jesus Christ: who is gone into heaven, &c.* 1 Pet. iii. 21, 22. The meaning of our church intends no further than thus—that if this sacrament of baptism be duly administered, the blood, or bloody sacrifice of Christ, or (which is all one) the influence of his Spirit, doth always accompany, or is concurrent to this solemn act. But whether this influence of his Spirit, or virtual presence of his body and blood, be either immediately or only terminated to the soul and spirit of the party baptized, or have some virtual influence upon the water of baptism, as a mean to convey the grace of regeneration unto the soul of the party baptized, whilst the water is poured upon him, is too nice and curious a question in this age for sober Christians to debate or contend about. It may suffice to believe that this sacramental pledge hath a virtual presence of Christ's blood, or some real influence from his body, concomitant, though not consubstantiated to it, which is pre-figured or signified by the washing or sprinkling the body with water.

5. But it will be, or rather is objected—but only by private or some saucy spirits—that if the doctrine of our church were true and sound, then all that be rightly baptized should be undoubtedly saved, being once washed or cleansed from their sins. The objection were of some force, if the church of England did hold or maintain such doctrine or tenets as they do which make or favour it, to wit, That the sins of the elect only are remitted by baptism, or by the sacrament of Christ's body and blood; or, that sins once remitted

cannot be remitted afresh ; or, that the party which is once pardoned for his sins, before committed, cannot afterwards be condemned. The orthodoxal truth is, that albeit the original sin of children truly baptized in the name of Christ, or the actual sins of young or elder men so baptized, and the sins of their forefathers, (so far as it concerns men of riper years to repent them of both,) be so truly remitted in baptism, that neither young men nor old may be baptized again ; yet the *astipulation of a good conscience*, wherein the internal baptism (as St. Peter tells) doth consist, may and ought, by the law of God and of Christ's church, to be reiterated<sup>e</sup>.

And this astipulation of every Christian, male or female, though baptized after they have passed their nonage for civil contracts, ought to be resumed or re-acknowledged so often as they intend to receive the sacramental pledges of Christ's body and blood, either privately or in the public congregation. But for all such as have been baptized in their infancy, the personal resumption or ratification of that vow, which their fathers and mothers in God did make for them at the sacred laver, is to be exacted of them *ore tenus*, in some public congregation, before they can be lawfully admitted to be public communicants of Christ's body and blood.

6. There is then no default or defect in the Church of England's doctrine or laws concerning baptism, or

<sup>e</sup> Though baptism may not be reiterated, yet the astipulation of a good conscience (or the inquiring to God) may daily, and must often be renewed. No child or infant baptized may or ought to be admitted unto the sacrament of Christ's body and

blood before he have in his own person ratified that vow, which his sureties or spiritual guardians did make for him at the sacred font, where Christ is as truly present as at *the sacrament of the altar*, as some term it.



confirmation of such as have been baptized in their infancy. But I dare not avouch so much for justifying the men unto whom the execution of these laws is especially commended, whether they be of lower, of higher, or of the highest rank. It hath not been my hap to peruse very many presentments of churchwardens or inferior priests in visitations; yet of those few, or any whereof I have had some cognizance, I have observed but a very few, or scarce remember any tendered against the parents, or such as were sureties for infants at the sacred font, for not bringing them at convenient times to be confirmed, or blessed by the<sup>273</sup> bishop of the diocese, or against inferior ministers for not preparing those, the cure of whose souls was immediately committed to them, to receive the confirmation of their faith, by the benediction of the diocesan; much less against diocesans themselves, for not executing their office in this great service of the church, either in their own persons or by their suffragans.

7. Whether the solemn baptizing of all infants, which are the children of presumed Christian parents throughout this kingdom, without solemn astipulation that they shall at years of discretion personally ratify their vow in baptism in public, in such manner as the church requires, be not rather more lawful or more tolerable than expedient, I leave it, with all submission, to the consideration of higher powers. In the mean time I shall every day bless my Lord God, as for all others, so in particular for this great blessing bestowed upon me, that I was in a convenient age, in a happy time and place, presented by my sureties in baptism to ratify the vow which they made for me, and to receive the benediction of the bishop of the diocese, being first instructed in the Church's Catechism by the curate of the parish, from whose lips (though but a mere gram-

mar scholar, and one that knew better how to read an homily, or to understand Hemingius' or other Latin postils, than to make a sermon in English) I learned more good lessons than I did from many popular sermons, and to this day remember more, than men at this time of greater years shall find in many late applauded Catechisms.

#### CHAP. LI.

*Inordinate Liberty of Prophesying brought Errors into the Church, disgraced and hindered the Reformation.*

ALBEIT the reverend fathers of our church, and their suffragans, should use all possible care and diligence for performing of all that is on their parts required; yet without some better conformity of Catechisms, and reformation of such as write them, or preach doctrines conformable to them, there is small hope, that in such plenty of preachers as now there are, this work of the Lord should prosper half so well as it did in those TIMES and in those dioceses, wherein there were scarce ten able preachers besides the prebendaries of the cathedral church, under whose tuition, in a manner, the rest of the clergy were. I well remember—and I cannot but remember it with joy of heart—that the synods in that diocese wherein I was bred, did constantly examine the licensed readers how they had profited in learning, by their exercises, which they did as duly exhibit unto the chancellor, archdeacon, &c., as they did their orders or their fees. Such as had profited well were licensed to preach once a month or once a quarter, having certain books appointed, from whose doctrine they should not swerve, but for the most part translate. The authors then in most esteem were Melancthon, Bullinger, Hemingius (especially in postils and other opuscula of his), or other writers, who were

most conformable to the Book of Homilies, which were weekly read upon severe penalty.

2. But since the liberty of prophesying was taken up, which came but lately into the northern parts, (unless it were in the towns of Newcastle and Berwick, wherein Knox, Mackbray, and Udal had sown their tares,) all things have gone so cross and backward in our church, that I cannot call the history for these forty years or more to mind, or express my observations<sup>274</sup> upon it, but with a bleeding heart. The first declination from the ancient church was concerning the death and passion of our Saviour Christ; of which the forward zealots, or rigid reformers of popish merits, did make more malicious and scandalous use upon use, than the papists themselves, or other heretics, did of any doubtful or difficult place of scripture. The people were in a manner taught to believe, that τὸ *credere*, to believe this article was sufficient to salvation, live they in the mean time how they list. This foolish doctrine did begin and propagate itself in Germany, before Melancthon did correct Luther, or, as Chemnitius thinks, did record his own recantation. But the infection in the mean time did so far overspread the church of England before it heard of the remedy, that it moved sir Thomas More to lay aside jesting, and deplore the miseries of his times in earnest, to see men given over to revelling, bousing, or drinking, or to other worse vices, and yet continue confident that the sufferings and passion of Christ should fully pay the shot, or discharge the reckoning, how great soever it were.

3. It was but an implicit branch of the former error, which at the first did not break forth in express terms, to teach men to believe *secundum πληροφορίαν*, with full assurance of faith, that Christ died for them in particular, before they had any assurance that Christ died

for all men. A strange conclusion, which they sought to cover or overshadow with a more dangerous branch of the same error, to wit, that every man was to have *fiduciam*, or full assurance of his own estate in grace, or interest in Christ, not from God's general promises made in him, but from special or particular faith. This was that unfortunate doctrine which gave such scandal to the beginning of reformation in Germany, that not three hundred Bellarmines, not so many Valentias, or other learned Jesuits which have lived since, could ever withdraw the tenth part so many from reformed religion, as Dr. Hessils did withhold from embracing it by exagitating this *sensual doctrine*, as he styles it, as if it had been conceived or maintained of purpose, that some professing reformation might continue and increase their drunken and voluptuous, others their lascivious and wanton kind of life; and yet be as sure of their personal salvation as either St. Peter or St. Paul were during their pilgrimage here on earth. This was that gin or noose which Satan sought to draw upon them, as knowing that he had this kind of people at greater command than ever he had any besides. For (as is intimated in some former meditations published, and in some others in due time to be communicated to learned and pious readers) there is not, there cannot be any possible evasion out of this snare, but by recanting the former opinions or errors themselves. For every novice in arts hath learned, that every universal negative proposition may be converted *simpliciter*. Now the scripture gives us this universal negative again and again: That *no adulterer, no covetous person, no slanderer or reviler of his neighbour, no seditious or rebellious spirit, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven*. The other universal negative which they deliver up as their deed and writing unto the father of



lies, and of all wicked cunning, is this—‘ That no man which must of necessity enter into this kingdom, though he die this day or to-morrow, can be an adulterer, a covetous person, a slanderer or reviler of his neighbour, or carry a seditious, rebellious, or traitorous spirit to his king and country.’ Now by this noose or gin which they have cast for themselves, the great tempter can draw or lead them to all manner of mischief and hypocrisy, to envenom their thoughts with malice and slander, with treason, sedition and disloyalty, and yet assure them, that they are no slanderers, no traitors, &c., but zealous and godly persons, because they must enter into the kingdom of heaven. 275

The last and worst branch of the former bitter root is an assertion which I never read in any foreign writer, but of late set down in *terminis terminantibus* by some English zealots, whose study and practice it hath been either to improve or malignify foreign errors. The improvement of the former errors, which outlandish writers did rather not take into consideration than maintain, is, the division of all mankind into two sorts, that is, into elect and reprobate. An error, I confess, which can do no great harm upon such saucy malapert vocalists as have the gift to let the word of God run as fast out at their mouths as it comes into their brains either by the ear or eye. But if it enter once into the thoughts of a sober conscientious spirit, whose brain and heart have daily intercourse or commerce, it is impossible but it should put him into a dangerous perplexity, either of being carelessly presumptuous, or of falling into utter despair. Experiments of this latter evil have been more frequent in our church, and in these times, than in any other church or times before us.

4. For conclusion of this tragical consideration, I would request all such as sit in judicature, specially in causes criminal, to call to mind, or suffer me to be their remembrancer of a grave saying, delivered by a great prelate in the high court of parliament, "That severity without instruction is a kind of tyranny." More particularly my humble request is, that with good leave I may put such in mind as judge seditious, turbulent, or enormous practices, (or censure *fellones de se*,) that they shall mightily condemn themselves by judging them, unless they be as forward withal to quell the erroneous doctrine (whether by laws ecclesiastical or civil) whence the former practices spring, as that kind of sedition, stubborn disobedience, disloyalty, *scandalum magnatum*, or privy conspiracy, under whose heavy burden this state and church doth now sigh and groan. These and divers other like branches of the devil's service are as true and proper effects, or natural issues, of the forementioned preposterous belief, or doctrine of special faith or division of all mankind into two sorts, as Christian charity, humility, obedience, penitency or contrition of spirit, are of the true and well-grounded belief of Jesus Christ and of him crucified.

5. The best instructions that can be given for rectifying the former errors is that of our apostle, Rom. iv: (though we follow the interpretations or hints of those writers whom these zealots most admire) *He staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief; but was strong in faith, giving glory to God; and being fully persuaded that, what he had promised, he was able also to perform. And therefore it was imputed to him for righteousness. Now it was not written for his sake alone, that it was imputed to him; but for us also, to whom it shall be imputed, if we believe on him*

*that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead; who was delivered for our offences, and was raised again for our justification.* vv. 20—25.

## CHAP. LII.

*That Justification consists not in one single Act. In what sense Fides est Fiducia is true.*

1. MUST we then with the Romish church admit of a first and second justification? one, by Christ's death; another, by his resurrection from the dead? or 276 two imputations of his righteousness? Surely neither justification nor imputation of Christ's righteousness consists in one single act; both admit divers degrees or parts, or rather contain a long process. The best way to assoil the difficulty proposed, will be, first, to set forth the proper effects or duties of our belief, as it is terminated to Christ's death and sufferings; secondly, the proper issues or effects of our belief of his resurrection from the dead. We believe that by his death our sins, even the sins of the world, were taken away. That Adam, and all that came of him, were thus far redeemed by him, as to be set free *de jure*, from the bondage of Satan, and purchased as a peculiar people to himself. Thus we often read, that we are *redeemed by his blood*, shed on the cross; that is, by that one sacrifice of himself the ransom of mankind's redemption was fully paid. Of this, all men are bound to have full assurance, and in respect of this general it is truly said, *fides est fiducia*, faith is a confidence in the blood of Christ. And thus firmly believing, our faith is imputed or reckoned to us for righteousness, as it was to Abraham.

2. But many may be redeemed from captivity, and yet have a desire to continue in the land or territories

of their former captivity, or no great desire to be transported out of it, into a safer soil. Some, with Gryllus in the poet, desire rather to continue swine, than to be retransformed into the image of God. And unto these Christ's death is not available, shall not be imputed, unless it be to their greater condemnation. But from the general confidence that Christ hath redeemed us from the bondage of Satan and curse of the law, the church our mother hath wisely and piously ordained, that all professing Christianity, yea infants born of Christian parents, or others exposed by their incredulous parents to the tuition of the church, shall be forthwith transported out of the hemisphere of darkness into the sphere of light, to be visibly ingrafted into the mystical body of Christ. The duty whereto all such as are thus transported are bound, is to promise and vow obedience unto Christ as to their sole Lord and Redeemer, "to forsake the devil and all his works, the pomps and vanities of this wicked world, and all the sinful lusts of the flesh, and to fight manfully under Christ's banner unto their lives' end," that is, to take up their cross and follow him; and as he died for them, so to be ready to lay down their lives for the brethren, if need require, in his service; or, to use our apostle's words, Phil. ii. 5—8, *to put on the same mind which was in Christ Jesus: who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross.* Another, not altogether so diverse, as rather the same immediate and formal effect of our belief in Christ's bloody sacrifice on the cross, is daily to offer up the sacrifice of a broken heart, of an



humble and contrite spirit. And for offering this sacrifice, every man must in part be his own priest and confessor, that he may be partaker of the blessing and grace of the High Priest of our souls, from his heavenly sanctuary where he sits at the right hand of God.

## CHAP. LIII.

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*Christ's Parable, Matt. xii. 43, &c., applied. Two Degrees of Reconciliation: the first active, or but mere grammatically passive; the other, real passive. So, correspondently, two Branches of Justification: the one, from Christ's Death; the other, from the Benefit of his Priesthood daily participated to us.*

1. To proceed thus far in the knowledge of Jesus Christ and of him crucified, and in the practice of Christian duties concomitant to such knowledge, is more, I am afraid, or rather fully persuaded, than most of such as take upon them to seal assurance to themselves and to others of their salvation (by marks and tokens of the elect of their own coining) have rightly got by heart. And yet to rest secure upon these grounds, though learned by heart, of their personal salvation or irreversible estate in grace or in God's favour, doth open a gap unto hellish hypocrisy, which our Saviour himself hath commanded us to beware of, or rather to shut it out, as it is in that parable, Matt. xii. 43—45: *When the unclean spirit is gone out of a man, he walketh through dry places, seeking rest, and findeth none. Then he saith, I will return into my house from whence I came out; and when he is come, he findeth it empty, swept, and garnished. Then goeth he, and taketh with himself seven other spirits more wicked than himself, and they enter in and dwell there: and the last state*

*of that man is worse than the first. Even so shall it be also unto this wicked generation.*

For the right application of this parable to the Jews, with whom our Saviour there disputes, as also unto men of this and former ages, I refer the reader to Jansenius and Maldonate in their learned comments upon this place, but especially to Jansenius.

2. Thus much is sufficient to our present purpose, and thus much is most clear, that it is not the sweeping or garnishing of the heart, or emptiness of such vices as do reign in the hearts of infidels, and give Satan possession of them, (all which may be wrought by the serious consideration of Christ's death, passion, and by the imputation of his merits,) that can secure us from further assaults of Satan to our final destruction. Rather, for us to presume upon these without experiments, without a continual guard upon our own souls, is but as if a man having beaten his adversaries out of his house, should set up his staff or sword, or other instrument of war, without the door, to entice his enemy by this opportunity to make forcible entrance when he is least aware. To what end then doth the contemplation of Christ's death or the imputation of his merits serve us? do these beget no portion or degree of any certainty of our estate in Christ, or of salvation? Yes, they always bring forth a certainty, though not of faith, yet of hope, that God in his good time will accomplish these good beginnings, and crown them with more than a moral, with an experimental certainty or assurance of our estate in grace. For regulating our persuasions in this point, there can be no better rule than that of our apostle, Rom. v. 1, 2: *Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ: by whom also we have access by faith*

*into this grace wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God. And again more fully, vv. 8—11 : God commendeth his love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him. For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life. And not only so, but we also joy in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the atonement. The ground then of our hope, or of such certainty as we can attain unto in this life, is our reconciliation to God, of which our apostle speaks more fully and divinely, 2 Cor. v. 17—19 : If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature : old things are passed away ; behold, all things are become new. And all things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation ; to wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them ; and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation. But if this reconciliation were sufficient for our certainty of salvation, what need were there of a second reconciliation, or a second part (at least) of the same reconciliation, which our apostle presseth upon us, vv. 20, 21 : Now then we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us : we pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God. For he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin ; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him. The first part of reconciliation is active, or at the most part but a grammatical passive. As a man is said to be called when he is summoned to appear, though he make no*

personal appearance ; so are we said *to be reconciled* to God when pardon for our sins is proclaimed, though before we could take notice of it. The second reconciliation is a real passive, and includes a turning unto the Lord by acceptance of our pardon, and by serious pursuing the allowance of it. The former part of reconciliation is wrought by mere imputation of Christ's death and merits ; the second is wrought partly by imputation, but especially by real participation of grace from Christ, and gifts of the Spirit. These are they that must defend and guard our souls against the reentry or repossession of Satan and wicked spirits, whether by fair or forcible means.

3. Answerable to the two sorts or degrees of reconciliation, there are two sorts or two branches of justification : the one, by mere imputation of Christ's death and passion, which was once wrought for all, at his consecration to his everlasting priesthood : the other, by participation of his grace, or operation of his priesthood, since his resurrection and ascension. During the time of legal sacrifices, whether for sins against the ceremonial or moral law, the people were bound, upon new occasions, to bring new sacrifices unto the priest, and he bound to offer them up unto the Lord for their reconciliation or atonement. For us Christians to think or conceive of more sacrifices for sin than one, that was once offered for all, were to deny Christ, or the efficacy of his everlasting priesthood. But as for the sacrifices of prayers, praises, or thanksgiving for what is past, or supplications for the assistance of Christ's Spirit for the time to come, these we are bound to offer up to God by Christ more frequently than the Jews could offer up their bloody sacrifices, or than the priests could attend this service, which they were to attend only at certain hours or solemn times, because



they were but mortal men, and could not perform their office *εἰς τὸ διηνεκές*, or *διὰ παντός*. But Christ, since his resurrection and ascension, is not only an everlasting high priest, but doth exercise this his function without intermission: *Every priest standeth daily ministering, and offering oftentimes the same sacrifices which can never take away sins. But this (Priest) after he had offered one sacrifice for sin sat down on the right hand of God for ever.* So the Syriac reads and points it, much better than 279 the ordinary English doth, or the Greek, as may appear from a parallel place, Heb. vii. 3, *Μένει ἱερεὺς εἰς τὸ διηνεκές*, *He remaineth a priest for ever.*

4. Briefly, though every sin, perhaps every gross sin, which we commit, after our justification by the resurrection of Christ, and real participation of his grace, doth not work a total interruption in our estate or interest in him; yet every such sin doth work a decay or diminution of grace, or some extinguishment of the spirit of life; both which must be repaired by the efficacy or exercise of his everlasting priesthood. None is so just, whether by imputation of his merits, or by increase of grace, but may and must be daily more justified; so that the Son of God doth set us free, first, by his sufferings upon the cross; secondly, by the laver of baptism, and by participation of his life and spirit; and lastly, he will set us free indeed at the resurrection of the just, when we shall be translated into that heavenly house or mansion wherein he abideth for ever.

5. Thus much of the knowledge of Christ and of him crucified, and of the exercise of his everlasting priesthood; points wherein I could wish to take more pains, though to the wasting of my bodily spirits, upon condition I could persuade a great part of the clergy of

this kingdom not to make Christ crucified, and raised from the dead, a mere bystander in most of their disputes concerning election, &c., as if he had shed his precious blood to no other purpose, save only the purchase of their own salvation, or the eternal excommunication or damnation of others. Now whether I have justly charged them with denial of Christ's everlasting priesthood, or of his absolute dominion or final judicature, I here solemnly appeal unto Him in that great day when he shall come (as I verily believe he shall) to judge the quick and the dead; to reward every man according to all his works, whether his writings, sayings, or actions.



C. READER,

THE main work of the sixth section was to prepare and clear the way for the exercise of Christ's everlasting priesthood, by amoving that great mountain of the rigid decree, which, in the author's judgment, did obstruct the general approach to the throne of mercy, and the issues of grace flowing thence: it making Christ a mere spectator, at most an instrument to execute a decree passed before all worlds, and no actor, advocate, or intercessor. This following eighth section treats of certain errors, which, though some of them do not wholly evacuate or null, yet do all of them disparage and entrench upon the virtue and efficacy of Christ's priesthood. Some of them were touched before; here they are more fully handled.

## SECTION VIII.

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## CHAP. LIV.

*Three Errors disparaging Christ's Priesthood:—1. The Novatian, denying the Reception of some Sort of Sinners. 2. A late contrary Error, affirming, that every Sin which some Sort of Men commit, is pardoned before it be committed. 3. The Romish Doctrine of the Mass, giving Scandal to the Jew. All of them respectively derogating from the infinite Value or continual Efficacy of Christ's everlasting Priesthood.*

THE first error in this kind which did grow into an heresy was that of Novatian<sup>a</sup>, *qui negavit lapsis pœnitentiam*, who would not have backsliders, or revolters from Christianity, to be, upon any terms or testifications of repentance, readmitted into the church, or made partakers of absolution. This heresy (as all others) took its original from a plausible truth or practice of former times. The truth is, that in those times, wherein men professing Christianity were every day called unto the fiery trial, this backsliding, or relapse unto idolatry, or outward profession of idolatry, even after baptism, was so rife, that the church would not admit any such as had thus revolted unto the estate or condition of penitentiaries, nor give them absolution upon private testifications of sorrow for their revolt. Now if Novatian did only deny that unto such backsliders or revolters which the church in her purest times would not grant them, why was he condemned by the church in ages following for an heretic? if his opinion were an heresy, why was not the practice of the ancient church heretical? Some

<sup>a</sup> Of Novatus, see Euseb. vi. c. 42, and Socrates, lib. 4. cap. 23.

grave and learned late writers would have the Novatian's heresy not precisely to consist in that he denied absolution, or communion with the church, unto revolvers, but in that he maintained, that the church had no right or power to grant absolution unto such backsliders as Cornelius then bishop of Rome (with the advice and consent of his clergy) did grant unto, but that this was a case reserved to God himself.

That such backsliders or revolvers might at the point of death be absolved, Novatian himself had once solemnly professed. But after Cornelius, his competitor for the bishoprick of Rome, (being preferred to that dignity,) had authorized this practice, he begun to set abroad his error, (whatsoever that were,) and to accuse Cornelius and his adherents as authors of heresy and novelties in the church. Had this Novatian been constant to his former tenets and profession, made before Cornelius was chosen bishop of Rome against him, he could not have denied either of these two points of truth:—either that God had mercy in store for revolvers from Christianity when they did repent; or the church's power to grant absolution, or other comfort spiritual, unto those to whom she might out of charitable discretion presume God was merciful, or to whom God had not forbid her to shew mercy or compassion. For Christ had commanded her to be merciful, as her heavenly Father is merciful.

But it were too much charity to presume, that a man of such a proud and turbulent spirit as Novatian was, (in the depth of such discontent as took possession of his spirit, upon Cornelius's preferment to so great a dignity as the bishoprick of Rome, unto his prejudice,) would be constant to his former principles, either in whole or in part; as either to grant



that God had mercy in store for revolters, or that the church had power to absolve them upon such signi-285  
fications of repentance as belonged unto her cogni-  
zance. Nor can we without breach of charity think,  
that either Novatian, or any other heretic in those  
times, would be so gross as to deny the church's power  
to absolve men from any sin, from which they were  
persuaded God had or would absolve them. And it is  
a clear case, that the Novatians did ground their error  
or contradiction to the church wherein they lived upon  
that place of the apostle, Heb. vi. 4—6 : *It is impossi-  
ble for those who were once enlightened, and have  
tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers  
of the Holy Ghost, and have tasted the good word of  
God, and the powers of the world to come, if they  
shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance ;  
seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God  
afresh, and put him to an open shame :* and grounding  
their error, or maintaining it, by this place, it is evi-  
dent that they held *lapsos*, or revolters from Chris-  
tianity unto heathenism, to be in the same estate which  
modern divines conceive all such to be in as sin against  
the Holy Ghost. But of the true meaning or extent  
of the apostle's words in the forecited place, or how the  
absolute unpardonableness of sin against the Holy  
Ghost may be thence concluded, I have nothing for  
the present to say. It sufficeth to know, that this error  
of the Novatians was by the ancient church wherein  
they lived condemned for an heresy. Yet hence it will  
not follow, that their heresy (in the judgment of them  
which condemned it) did properly or precisely consist  
in denying the church's authority to absolve sins of  
what kind soever ; but rather in avouching this par-  
ticular sin of apostasy, or revolting from Christianity,  
to be in itself unpardonable, or incapable of repentance.

If it had been in itself unpardonable, or so adjudged by the primitive church, Novatian had been no heretic in withstanding Cornelius bishop of Rome, and the particular churches which consented with him, or in denying to admit the revolvers from Christianity unto the estate or condition of penitentiaries in the church; or in refusing to give them absolution, or to hold communion with them, after they had voluntarily, or otherwise, observed such a course of life as the church had appointed for penitentiaries.

That the ancient church did neither admit open revolvers to enter into this course or rule of life, nor absolve them after they had voluntarily, though most strictly (to the eyes of men) observed it, doth no way argue that the church in which Cornelius lived (or which lived after him) did err, much less incur the censure of heresy, which Novatian objected unto them, in admitting open revolvers unto the estate and condition of penitentiaries, or in absolving them from their sins after performance of such religious duties as were by the church required of men admitted into that estate or condition.

The primitive church did hold both to be lawful, but not expedient for the present times.

2. The primitive church did deny unto revolvers both these favours—1. Admission to the state of penitentiaries; 2. Absolution upon their good behaviour after testification of repentance—only *de facto*, not *de jure*. The church in later times did only alter the practice or discipline (as is to be presumed) upon good cause or consideration. And to conclude or limit the authority of the present church only by matter of fact or practice of the church in former times, is matter of heresy, at least of schism. And this, it may be, was a branch (but not the root) of Novatian's heresy. His radical error or heresy was, in justifying the practice of the former church, and in condemning the resolution of

the church wherein he and Cornelius lived, by the fore-cited place of our apostle, Heb. vi. ; or by his misinterpretation of it, that God would not be merciful unto such as in time of persecution had denied Christ, and either by word or practice approved the rites of the heathens : this sin of revolt indeed was a foul and <sup>286</sup> grievous sin, yet not alike foul and grievous in all that were guilty of it. But even the foulest sin that can be imagined is but a work of the devil, and there is no work which the devil can work in man so foul, which *the Son of God*, who was manifested to this purpose, that he might dissolve the works of the devil, is not able to dissolve. Only the full measure of sin, or of obstinate continuance in foul and grievous sins, is excluded from repentance, or other benefits of Christ's passion. Nor is the sin against the Holy Ghost, for its kind or quality, unpardonable, but because it is always a symptom of the full measure of sin, or of obstinate and unrelenting continuance in some sinful course of life.

3. But even this fundamental truth, ' that no sin for its nature or quality is unpardonable, through the bad disposition of men,' hath yielded nutriment to an error so lately sprung up, that it is not as yet condemned for an heresy, though in itself as damnable as Novatian's error was. The error is this, ' that every sin which some sort of men commit is pardoned before it be committed;' for so the authors or maintainers of this error argue : " If every sin, especially every grosser sin, which the elect or men regenerate do commit, were not forgiven through the merits of Christ's passion, the elect themselves, or men regenerate, may totally or finally fall from grace, seeing every sin in its nature deserveth everlasting death. But that the elect or men regenerate may either totally or finally fall from



grace, or be for the present in state of condemnation, is the utmost absurdity or inconvenience, which, in divinity, they seek to bring their opposites unto.

Not to trouble the church with discussion of the antecedent, ‘Whether the elect or regenerate may fall from grace either totally or finally?’ the argument or consequence is worth the traversing, to wit, ‘Whether, it being granted that neither the elect nor men regenerate can fall from grace, we must by necessary consequence grant, that the sins which men elect or regenerate do after their regeneration commit, be actually or in particular forgiven before the actual commission of them?’ or, ‘Whether it were not much better to grant, that men regenerate may fall from grace, than that their sins be in particular forgiven before they be actually committed by them, if the connexion of these two were so infallible, that there were a necessity of granting both by granting one?’ Unto this query our answer is—That if the impossibility of falling from grace after regeneration cannot be maintained without supposal or grant, that their sins are forgiven before they be committed; or that God hath, as it were, antedated a pardon for them in particular, from the hour of Christ’s passion, the medicine would be much worse than the disease for which it is sought. This very conceit or persuasion, that our sins should be forgiven before they be committed, will do the soul which harbours it greater harm than a total falling from grace could do it: for a total falling from grace doth neither argue nor occasion just despair of pardon upon repentance; whereas the mispersuasion or prejudicate opinion, that our sins are pardoned before they be committed, will necessarily puff up our souls with presumption, whose swelling imposthumations are no less deadly than the wounds of despair. Though



most popes, with their followers, blasphemously teach, that with what facts soever God himself at any time hath dispensed, every pope for the time being may dispense with the same, and that he may pardon every sin so far and in such manner as God the Father and God the Son have pardoned the like; yet some later popes, upon suit made to them, have made a demur, whether God at any time since the creation did grant a pardon or dispensation for any fact before it was<sup>287</sup> committed, which, without pardon or dispensation, was unwarrantable, or in its nature damnable: and upon this scruple or demur have denied to antedate any dispensation for those facts or practices which their predecessors had condemned for heinous sins, unto those persons whose welfare and security from temporal danger they much tendered, and unto whom they shewed themselves willing to grant a pardon for those very practices *post factum*, which they would not pardon or dispense withal before they were committed. So that to deliver it as a point of orthodoxal doctrine, that God doth freely and absolutely pardon any particular sins, even of his elect and dearest children, before they be committed by them, is an error which transcends the licentiousness of popery—a licentiousness which for degrees and malignity exceeds the contrary rigorous Novatian error, which denies possibility of pardon unto some grosser sins, as unto relapse unto idolatry.

4. Yet is this licentious error but a particular branch—and not the worst branch—of that fundamental or radical error before mentioned, which makes or strives to make the individual nature, substance, or entity, that is, in one word, the bare persons of men<sup>b</sup>, the immediate object of the omnipotent, irresistible, and

<sup>b</sup> See his answer to Mr. B. [p. 354 of this volume.]

immutable decree concerning election and reprobation. The manner how this licentious error of antedating pardons for sins springs from this poisonous root is conspicuous and palpable. First, the decree of God, as all grant, is altogether immutable and irresistible; and secondly, the individual nature or essence of every man, that is, his particular person, is, though not irresistible, yet indivisible and immutable, it changeth not with the conditions or dispositions of men: for though a man of a young saint become an old devil, though of a civil, sober, and peaceable man, he become a riotous, unruly, seditious man, yet he still remains the same person he was; he cannot plead in courts of human justice, that it was another party, not he, which committed the misdemeanours for which he is questioned: though his qualities or conditions alter, yet his substance or person alters not; whence, if God's immutable decree of reprobation or election were immediately terminated unto men's individual natures or substances, that is, if he had absolutely decreed to reward some particular men with everlasting bliss, and others with everlasting misery, without respect unto their works; this consequence would be immutable, infallible, irresistible—"Let the one sort live as they list, in adultery, theft, and murder, they should be saved; let the others do what they can, sell all that they have, and give it the poor, fast and pray most days in the week, they should be damned; yea, the evil deeds of the one should be forgiven before they were committed; the others' good works, or abstinence from evil works, should not be capable of pardon: for as election unto life eternal, if it were terminated to men's persons, (without respect unto their works,) doth include, not only a general antedated pardon for all the sins they can commit, but privilegeth them also from

all question; so doth reprobation include an utter exclusion from all hope of pardon, what course of life soever they take, if so be it were terminated to their persons or entities, without respect unto their works."

The orthodoxal truth then is, that God hath decreed to reward every man according unto all his works, not according to the foresight of his individual nature or person. And though it be true, that it is impossible for any man to fall from the estate of election into the estate of reprobation, and as impossible for any man to ascend or be transported from the estate of reprobation unto the estate of election; yet is it not alike impossible for him that is for the time present in a <sup>288</sup> middle state betwixt both, that is, a man capable of God's promises in Christ, and yet liable to his judgments, either to proceed unto the estate of election, or to fall into the state of reprobation. There is a necessity that every elected man shall be saved, that every man reprobated shall be damned, but no like necessity by the eternal decree, that this or that particular man shall attain to the state of election, or fall into the state of reprobation. Their works or measure of working, whether well or ill, their faith or want of faith, the measure and manner of both, are not so immutable or unchangeable as their natures or persons are. Now God's immutable decree doth infallibly reward them according to the measure, manner, or quality of their works, or of their faith or infidelity. For albeit the works or acts of man's faith be mutable, yet God's purpose of rewarding every man according to his works, or different measure of faith or infidelity, is most immutable.

5. But albeit God do not antedate any pardon in particular for the sins of the elect, is it safe hence to conclude that he is not more favourable unto them than unto other men? or doth his peculiar favour to them (being granted) conclude him to be an acceptor of



persons? Surely it would, if we did maintain that his eternal decree for shewing peculiar favour and mercy towards the elect did respect only men's persons or individual substances; but, laying this foundation— 'That God from eternity hath decreed to reward every man, not according to the prevision of his individual manhood or substance, but according to all his works'— God's peculiar favour may, without imputation of partiality or acceptance of persons, be extended, not to the elect only, but unto all that are within the covenant— unto all that, without hypocrisy or sinister respects, have subscribed unto it. Yet, though this peculiar favour be to be extended to all within the covenant, we may not deny, but that it reaches the elect in an extraordinary measure; for ordinarily none are admitted into the number of the elect, which have not done some works, which others not of that number have not done. And if God out of his free bounty reward not the men, but their works, more bountifully than he doth the works of other men, whose persons are not within his covenant, whose works are not so capable of bounty; he cannot hence be conceived to be *a respecter of persons*, but *an accepter of such in every nation as work righteousness*, or do less evil than others do. The works which St. Peter requires to the *making of our election sure*, are all in their nature and quality good— all, parts of righteousness; and though we cannot do them aright, yet such as hope to be partakers of God's peculiar favour must be industrious in doing them. But not these works only, but even our subscription unto the covenant of grace, our profession of being Christ's disciples, is a work capable of mercy, of peculiar favour, (in respect of others which neglect this covenant,) though no work meritorious of grace, or of better abilities to proceed in Christianity; nor are the best works of the elect in their nature such.



6. First, the good works which he doth that is within the covenant are more capable of reward, than the like works of men which are without the covenant: and yet the good works of the elect are more capable of reward than the best works of him that is only within the covenant, not in the state of election, not confirmed in grace. Secondly, the good works of men within the covenant do facilitate their progress towards grace, and lengthen their possibilities of being confirmed in grace. The good works of the elect do more than strengthen their present estate in grace, they make them capable of greater glory than others elect are which work not after the same manner or measure as they do. But leaving the elect and their works to God, who only knows them; the good works of such as are within the covenant, though as yet not confirmed in grace, do in some degree shelter them from danger of final apostasy, or of exclusion from grace. The more good works such men have done, the better fruits of faith they have shewed, the firmer they stand in the day of temptation, wherein the fruitless hearer shall fall. Thus much is included in the close of our apostle's words, Heb. vi. 7, 8: *The earth which drinketh in the rain that cometh oft upon it, and bringeth forth herbs meet for them by whom it is dressed, receiveth blessing from God: but that which beareth thorns and briers is rejected, and is nigh unto cursing; whose end is to be burned.* These Hebrews had come as near to that shelf upon which others had made shipwreck of faith, as any men since have done, which have escaped it. And if they had been to be judged by men according to their present facts, they had incurred that dreadful sentence of final rejection or reprobation which the apostle there denounceth against backsliders. What then was the sheet-anchor, which, in our apostle's

God's graciousness to the elect, and his respect to their good works.

divinity, did hold them from striking against the immovable rock of reprobation? the merits of their former works? So some great professors of Romish divinity do teach in their lectures *de reviviscentia meritorum*, that is, of the revival of merits, being dead or abated by relapse or backsliding. This title they ground upon this very text of scripture, being otherwise groundless, as they themselves confess. The words of the apostle are, vv. 9, 10: *Beloved, we are persuaded better things of you, and things that accompany salvation, though we thus speak. For God is not unrighteous to forget your work and labour of love, which ye have shewed toward his name, in that ye have ministered to the saints, and do minister.* Had it been any injustice in God to have forgotten their former works? if it had, their works were truly meritorious, or capable of reward by plea of justice. For that work unto which reward without injustice cannot be denied, is meritorious, or worthy of the reward; yet the apostle implies, that God should have been *ἀδικος*, *unjust*, if he had so utterly excluded these Hebrews from entering into his rest, as he did their forefathers from entering into the land of promise: for albeit their later works had been much like their forefathers', yet their former works had been much better. But in what sense doth the apostle say, *ὀκ ἀδικος*, *God is not unjust?*

7. This word *injustus* is sometimes no more than *non benignus*, or *non misericors*, that is, *not bountiful*, or *not merciful*, to such as are in misery<sup>c</sup>. Though works of pity, of bounty, be not works of justice or equity, yet sometimes he that shews pity or favour, though in cases wherein the positive law of God requireth justice or severe execution, if the case come

<sup>c</sup> See book 9. chap. 12. num. 3. [vol. viii. p. 258.]

before the magistrate, is said to deal *justly*, that is, *not rigorously, not hardly*. So the Holy Ghost, when he gives the reason why Joseph did not seek publicly to be divorced from his espoused wife THE BLESSED VIRGIN, saith, he did thus resolve, because he was a *just man*, that is, a *courteous and mild-hearted man*: not a *just man according to strict and legal justice*. For by the positive law of God, the crime which he suspected, was punishable, not with divorce only, but with death. If Joseph then, in resolving to put away his espoused wife privately, did the part of a just and upright man, he had been ἀδικος, that is, *an unjust man* in our apostle's sense, if he had resolved to use the remedy or benefit of the law. Yet can no man be said strictly or properly to be unjust for using any lawful remedy, but *non benignus*, or *non mitis*; he may be said to deal rigorously, or hardly, or uncourteously in using the extremity of the law. To apply this distinction to the point in question: if God had excluded these Hebrews from entering into his rest, after they had accomplished such a measure of works as the<sup>290</sup> apostle there intimates, he had not been so merciful and bountiful unto them as the scripture teacheth he is to all, he had not shewed himself so gracious a Lord, nor given such encouragements to his other servants of not being weary of well-doing, as he always useth to do. Briefly, when the apostle saith οὐκ ἀδικος, the phrase in the original is as much as if he had said: "So far is God from being unjust, that you shall find him a most gracious and loving Father; so far will he be from forgetting your works and labour of love, so far from cutting you off from entering into his rest, that he will remember you with his best blessings, even with the blessing of salvation, however your late backslidings have deserved the contrary."



8. But however God be a gracious and loving Father to all that call upon him, to all that are within his covenant, but especially to his elect; albeit this his graciousness consists in the not imputing or in remitting of their sins; yet is there not the least sin which any within his covenant, or which any of his elect, do commit, whose pardon must not be sought for after the commission of it, and must actually be obtained, otherwise they should die in their sins: for though the Son of God did take away the sins of the whole world by his sufferings upon the cross, yet were no man's sins so taken away by him, or so dissolved, as that he from that time did cease, or yet doth cease to dissolve them, whensoever they are committed, and their dissolution by repentance sought for. Unless he did yet dissolve the works of the devil in us, unless he did yet in peculiar manner remit sins, even our petty sins would inchain us unto the servitude of Satan. St. John no way excludes the elect, but speaks to men regenerate, albeit not to them alone, when he saith, *If any man sin, we have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous.* 1 John ii. 1. Now the office of an advocate is to plead his client's cause before his judge, as, either for justice, if his cause be good, or for mercy, or mitigation of justice, if his client be delinquent. God, we know, is as well a God of justice as of mercy, and hath as well one ear open to the accusations which are brought against us, as another attentive to the intercessions which are made for us. Satan is our professed adversary, and, after he hath enticed us to do his work, he never ceaseth to solicit the execution of God's justice or vengeance upon us. Not the best of God's saints may at any time plead their own cause, or join this issue with him: "Lord, let justice be awarded with speed, either for us or against us; either let our



adversary be condemned for accusing us falsely, or let us be condemned with him, if we have done unjustly." This were to become, not our own advocates, (which yet were presumption,) but to turn Satan's solicitors, even to supplicate for woe and vengeance upon our own souls. David hath taught us the form of our plea with God, even whilst we stand upon best terms: *Lord, enter not into judgment with this thy servant; for no flesh is righteous in thy sight.*

9. But will the almighty Judge of all the world be so unmindful of his great attribute, as to deny execution of judgment upon such as have deserved it, being thereunto solicited and importuned by his professed adversary? or will the Son of God be so partial as to plead for their acquittal which confess themselves guilty of the crimes objected? To this we answer:

1. God hath two covenants; one of justice, another of mercy. And albeit God the Father should do us no wrong, no injustice, but do himself right, if he did, upon every accusation, instantly condemn us; yet seeing his only Son hath by a full and all-sufficient price purchased a reconciliation for us, he may maintain the plea of justice, even before the almighty Judge, against our adversary, for us; or (having satisfied the 291 justice of God for all the sins of mankind) he may remove our trial from the bar of justice to the throne of grace and mercy. 2. Neither God the Father could deny execution of justice upon us, nor could God the Son plead so much as for our reprieval, if we should stand upon our own integrity or our own justification: so that our confession of guilt is so far from doing us prejudice, that it is a most necessary condition of our acquittal.

If God the Father then at any time (as hitherto at all times he hath done) defer the execution of justice upon us, which our adversary daily solicits against us,

he defers it at the plea or intercession of this our Advocate, not for our own sakes. And it is worth the noting, that as the reason why the psalmist will not have us join issue with our adversary in point of justice, is, because *no flesh is righteous in God's sight*; so our apostle, to shew that our Advocate, though partaker with us of flesh and blood, is exempted from this universal negative, instyles him by the name of *Jesus Christ the righteous*. If he were not righteous, even in God's sight, he could be no fit Advocate to stand betwixt us and God's justice, to avert his judgments from, and draw down his mercy and blessing upon us.

But in respect of what sins is *Jesus Christ the righteous* said to be our Advocate, an Advocate even for the elect and regenerate? Is he their Advocate only in respect of sins committed before their regeneration, or before their confirmation in grace? or an Advocate also for the remission of those sins which they have committed after their regeneration by baptism, or after the increase of justifying or sanctifying grace, whether procured by receiving of Christ's body and blood, or by other means? If our Advocate he were only in respect of sins committed before baptism, or of sins inherent by nature, the apostle had not said, *If any man sin we have an Advocate*, but, *If any man hath sinned he hath an Advocate*, or, *Intercession is already made for him by his Advocate*. The title which he bestows upon his disciples, *little children*, argues them to have been, in his esteem, men regenerate, and more free (as he hoped) from ordinary sins than other men; at the least he wrote unto them to the end that they should not sin after they had been cleansed from their sins; but yet he adds, *if any man shall hereafter fall into any sin, we* (he saith not YOU, as taking himself included in the number of those which stood in need of advocation) *have an Advocate*

with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous. This implies that Christ doth not cease to execute the office of an Advocate for the regenerate, so long as they live here on earth: for it is not the office of any advocate to plead for the remission of those sins which are already remitted, or from which he knows his clients to be clear exempted before they have committed them. If then the Son of God make intercession for the sins of the elect or regenerate, whilst they live here on earth, their sins are not remitted until he have made intercession for them, nor doth he intercede for actual sins till after they be committed.

10. However, if the Son of God be our Advocate only unto God the Father, whether in respect of sins past or now present, he as an Advocate doth only plead our pardon; it is God the Father then which must grant the pardon; and if every sin be a work of Satan, the pardoning of sin is the dissolution or the destruction of the work of Satan: how then is it said that *the Son of God doth destroy or dissolve the works of Satan in us?* As the Almighty Father is said to have made the world—for *he spake the word and it was made*—yet he made it by the eternal Word his only Son: so albeit the Father likewise do give the fiat or warrant, that our sins may be remitted, or that the works of Satan may be dissolved in us, yet they must be dissolved by the Son, as immediately by the Son as the world was created by the Son. For this reason the apostle in the forecited place<sup>d</sup> doth not content himself with the only title of *Advocate*, but adds withal, that *he is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world.* He saith not, (though that be most true,) *he hath made the propitiation for our sin*; lest haply any man should collect that

It is the advocate's office to plead for pardon, the judge which hath power.

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<sup>d</sup> 1 John ii. 1, 2.



all his sins were forgiven before they were committed, because the propitiation was made for them before they were committed. For albeit the propitiatory sacrifice was of value infinite, and all-sufficient for the full ransom of the world; yet is it not sufficient for us, which believe that Christ died for us, to look only upon the propitiation which he then made for us, (for that is past,) but upon himself as he still continues the propitiation for our sins: so saith the apostle, *He is the propitiation for our sins*; not only an Advocate, to plead for us unto his Father that our sins may be remitted, but, this request being granted, he is withal the High Priest which must remit them; and not our High Priest only, but the propitiation by which every work of Satan in us must immediately be dissolved. Again, though all unto whom St. John wrote this Epistle were not regenerate, yet it is certain that all such as walk in the light are regenerate; yet saith St. John, chap. i. 7, *If we walk in the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son*——What hath it done? *Cleansed us from all our sin?* Though that be in a good sense most true, yet our apostle doth not so speak, lest haply such as had attained unto this communion of saints, or participation with the children of light, being thus far cleansed by Christ's blood, might take occasion to think, that all their sins, as well those that are to come as those that were past, were already pardoned by him, or that they were as truly cleansed from the guilt of sins future as of sins already committed and past. But the apostle (making himself one of the number to whom he speaks) says, *If WE walk in the light, the blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin*; that is, it never ceaseth to cleanse the elect or regenerate from the sins which they never cease, in some measure



or other, to commit or harbour in them. And if there were not a perpetual remission of our sins, or if this cleansing us from our sins by the blood of Christ were not as perpetual and continual as our commission of sin is, our case, even the case of men regenerate, would be lamentable. So far is it from truth, that the sins of any man be forgiven before they be committed, or that any man is by the blood of Christ actually cleansed from those sins which as yet have not actually polluted his soul and conscience, that, as bad diet casts men into a relapse of those diseases from which they had been lately cured, so the sins which we commit this hour will call our former sins to remembrance in God's sight, until these later as well as the former be actually forgiven, or until we be actually cleansed from these later by the blood of Christ. I should now proceed unto the manner how the Son of God doth dissolve those works which Satan worketh in us after baptism or regeneration, or how we are actually cleansed from sin by his blood.

11. But here again I find the truth beset with two errors or extremes: one positive, or an heresy maintained by the Romish church, which in effect denies the infinite value or everlasting efficacy of Christ's bloody sacrifice upon the cross: the other extreme is an incogitancy of some men which magnify the everlasting efficacy or infinite value of Christ's bloody sacrifice, not too much, (for so they cannot,) but amiss; they make it everlasting after such a manner, or rather make such use or application of its everlasting efficacy or infinite value to themselves and to their hearers, as makes his everlasting priesthood to be useless or needless. To begin with the first error or extreme.

The error of the sacrifice of the mass.

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Is it possible, that that church which challengeth the title of catholic as her own peculiar should deny

the most fundamental article of catholic faith, as is the everlasting efficacy or infinite value of Christ's bloody sacrifice?

In express terms, or directly, she doth not deny it; her advocates dare not profess the denial of it: for so most of their faction, whom they lead blindfold, would forsake them, as heretics and aliens from the ancient and orthodoxal church. Yet the more stiffly the greatest scholars in that church deny the imputation or charge which we lay upon them, the better proof we shall gain from them, that they are the men, which, as the apostle saith, are given over to believe lies; that they are the men on whose souls the spirit of delusion hath seized, if we shall decipher the impression or character of that spirit so clearly, that every one which is not sworn to their faction, whether Jew, Mahometan, or heathen, or other more indifferent, though but indued with common reason, may run and read it. Let us see then how they expose the greatest mysteries of our salvation unto the just scorn and derision of the Jew, Mahometan, or heathen, without possibility of apology for their manifest contradicting the principles, not of Christianity only, but of common reason. Thus you may imagine any Jewish schoolboy, or young artist, catechised in the rudiments of his own religion, would oppose the greatest rabbins in the Romish church: "We of the Jewish nation once had our ordinary priests, which offered sacrifices daily in the temple; we had our high priest, which went into the most holy place once a year with the blood of the anniversary and solemn sacrifices; ye Christian catholics (so ye term yourselves) teach your hearers, as your apostle hath taught you, that the best sacrifices which our fathers used were but shadows foreshadowing the taking away of sin; they did not,

they could not, take away sins, or cleanse the consciences of such as offered them: and why could not our sacrifices take away sin? your apostle gives this reason, *because they were often offered*, Heb. x. 1, 2, &c. Ye Christian catholics have your High Priest, who, as ye say, offered himself up in bloody sacrifice unto God for your sins: was this his sacrifice perfect, or was it not? did it take away sins more perfectly than the sacrifices which our fathers used, or did it not? Ye say, it did; we say, it did not, it could not, if your apostle's principles or expositions of scripture be true, and your practice not false or unlawful. Your priests (as you confess) stand daily ministering and offering the same sacrifice which your High Priest did offer; and therefore, by your apostle's argument against us, and by your practice, this sacrifice can never take away sin: it is more the same sacrifice than the sacrifices of the law were, and yet it is offered oftener, and in more places, than any legal sacrifices were."

12. Some, devoted to the Romish religion, will perhaps say in their hearts, "The doctors of our church know well enough how to untie these knots which the Jews cast, albeit so learnedly and so subtly that no unlearned man can perceive how they untie them." If men will thus believe or rely upon their teachers' skill without any true experiment of it, we cannot help it. Yet if you will believe me, upon the faith of a Christian, I never yet could see any Romish writer which leaves not the former knot worse than he found 294 it, after he had used all the pains and skill he had to untwist it. The wisest and most learned of them usually let it slide away without meddling. Many of you perhaps have read what the Rhemists in their notes upon the tenth chapter to the Hebrews have attempted, to make you believe that all is loose: "The

apostle," say they, "speaks of the sacrifices of the law, not of the sacrifice of the mass." It is true indeed he speaks of the sacrifices of the law, for he proves them to be unperfect, unsufficient; but he proves them to be unsufficient by such a reason as will conclude more strongly, not only against the sacrifice of the mass, (if so be the sacrifice of the mass were as lawful as the legal sacrifices sometimes were, or the reiteration of it not more abominable in the sight of God than the restauration of legal bloody sacrifices at this day would be,) but against Christ's bloody sacrifice upon the cross<sup>1</sup> also. The only reason by which the apostle proves the best kind of legal sacrifices, even whilst they were lawfully used and according to God's appointment, to have been altogether unsufficient for taking away sin, is, because they were to be *often offered*: now every particular must be proved by an universal, and a true universal rule or principle includes the same reason in every particular. The apostle could not prove the legal services to have been imperfect for this reason, that they were often offered, unless this universal were true, and taken by him as granted, 'that no sacrifices or sacrifice, of what kind soever, which is often offered, can be perfect, or sufficient to take away sins.' This universal reason the apostle takes as granted, by light of nature and common reason, and so frames his argument from the authority of scriptures and the consonancy of common reason or light of nature: *The Holy Ghost ALSO is witness, &c.* Heb. x. 15.

It is as idle and as frivolous a shift wherewith the same Rhemists seek to put off their ignorant readers, when they tell them, that "Christ's body was but once offered up in a bloody manner, but may and ought to be

<sup>1</sup> He means, if it needed to be often offered.



often offered up in a bloodless manner." The very root and ground of this distinction, if you examine it by our apostle's argument, includes a confession or acknowledgment of the CRIME or HERESY which we object unto them, to wit, that the bloody sacrifice of the Son of God is not by their doctrine of infinite value, nor of force and virtue everlasting, but infinite only *secundum quid*; i. e. infinite in the nature of a bloody sacrifice, not so simply infinite as to exclude all other sacrifice or offering for sin. For if it had been of value infinite, or all-sufficient to take away sin, whilst it was offered up in a bloody manner, there had been no more offering either required or left for sin, whether a bloody or a bloodless offering, whether after a bloody or a bloodless manner; for if once offered it were in the nature of an offering infinite, it necessarily took away all other offerings or manner of offering for sin.

*A note relating to the precedent chapter.*

EUSEBIUS, Socrates, and Theodoret, amongst the Greeks, Primasius and Austin amongst the Latins, do not distinguish betwixt these two ominous names, *Novatus* and *Novatianus*; but St. Cyprian, in his forty-ninth epistle, shews plainly that they were of two distinct persons, though agreeing too well in schism and heresy. Novatus was an African, (new monster,) a presbyter in the church of Carthage, (where St. Cyprian was bishop,) *vir sui nominis*; for he was *rerum novarum semper* 295 *cupidus*, disobedient to his bishop, spiteful against the order, unnatural to his father, (who died for hunger, and lay too long unburied,) unfaithful to the orphan, the widow, the church-stock, unkind to his wife, whom he made to miscarry with a kick. (*Damnat sacrificantium manus ipse nocentior pedibus*, says St. Cyprian.) Thus qualified, fearing excommunication, he fled to Rome, and joined with Novatianus, a Roman presbyter, who was about that time brewing his schism against Cornelius bishop of Rome: these two were the ringleaders of the sect of the Cathari. See St. Cyprian, Epist. 49, (and Epp. 51, 52,) with Rigaltius' Notes.

## CHAP. IV.

*From the text, Heb. x. 1, 2, 16, 17, and from this maxim, 'that Christ's one sacrifice of himself was of value absolutely infinite,' it follows not, that such as worship God in spirit, or such as are received into the covenant of grace, have their sins remitted before they do commit them.—That doctrine makes Christ's resurrection useless (in respect of us) and baptism needless. Legal worshippers conscious, and their sins remembered in such a sort as evangelical worshippers' are not. The vast odds betwixt Christ's one sacrifice and the many legal. We must distinguish betwixt the infinite value and infinite virtue of Christ's sacrifice.—The precious effects of holy baptism and the eucharist, flowing from the efficacy of Christ's sacrifice and priesthood. How legal sacrifices, &c., did prefigure Christ's.*

An objection made.

1. BUT unto men which have not their senses exercised in the prophetic and evangelical writings, or in the harmony betwixt them, the words of the apostle in that tenth chapter to the Hebrews, vv. 1, 2, 16, 17, do minister some scruple.

His words, vv. 1, 2, are these: *The law can never with those sacrifices which they offered year by year continually make the comers thereunto perfect. For then would they not have ceased to be offered? because the worshippers (that is, such as were observers of the legal worship only) should have had no more conscience of sin.* From this opposition between the condition of God's people under the law, and the condition of his people under the new covenant, that is, of such as worship him not by legal sacrifices, but in the spirit, it may seem to be concluded, that such as are within the covenant of grace, or worship him in spirit, have their sins remitted before they can commit them, or as soon as they begin to worship God, not by legal sacrifices, but in the spirit. For if the sins of men thus qualified were not remitted before they were

received into the covenant of grace, or at least at the time when they were thereunto admitted, they should at least have as much (if not more) conscience of sin, as the legal worshippers had.

2. The scruple or question which the words of the apostle, vv. 1, 2, do minister, may be fortified or augmented from the same apostle's inference, ver. 17, *And their sins and iniquities will I remember no more.* Fortified. This is the privilege of such as are within the new covenant. Now if, according to the tenor of this privilege, God will no more remember their sins and iniquities who are comprised within the new covenant, the cause or controversy may seem concluded, that God will neither punish their sins, nor question them for them: for all punishment of sin, all inquisition after sin, doth include or presuppose a remembrance or cognizance of the sins for which men are punished or questioned. 296

Both these scruples may receive strength or countenance from that general maxim unto which we willingly subscribe, 'that the bloody sacrifice, whereby this new covenant was made and ratified, was of value absolutely infinite for taking and putting away sins.' Reinforced. And how could it possibly be of value infinite for taking away sins, unless the sins of all, all their sins for whom it was offered, were by it taken away or remitted—so taken away, that they should be no more remembered in God's sight, *that they should have no more conscience (or horror) of sin?*

3. The clear and unquestionable points of truth included in the apostle's words are but two: Answered.

The former, that the legal worshippers were conscious of sin in such a sort as the evangelical worshippers, or men comprehended under the new covenant, are not conscious.

The second, that God did remember the sins of such as were under the former covenant after such a manner as he doth not remember their sins who are under the new covenant of grace. But for the distinct meaning of the apostle, that is, how far the legal worshippers had a consciousness of sin, how far the evangelical worshippers have none; in what sort, measure, or manner, God did remember the sins of his people under the old covenant, and not remember the sins of his people under the new covenant of grace; we can have no better scantling, no more indifferent standard, than the words of the same apostle in the same tenth chapter, ver. 3: *But in those sacrifices* (to wit, which were offered by the law) *there is a remembrance* (or *commemoration*) *of sin made every year.* But wherein did this annual remembrance or commemoration of sin consist? The law, as the apostle elsewhere speaks, was but a *schoolmaster unto Christ*; and the lessons which this schoolmaster did—the annual or other bloody sacrifices especially—teach, were these: ‘That the men, by whom or for whom these bloody sacrifices were offered, had deserved, and as often as they offered them did deserve, to be tormented and mangled as these sacrifices were; that the butchery of them was but *favorabilis commutatio pœnæ*, “a favourable exchange or diverting the punishment” from themselves upon these brute beasts; that whiles the fire under God’s altar did continue, God’s wrath against sin and sinners was not appeased, nor could be appeased by this kind of bloody sacrifices.’ All this, the yearly and daily offering of bloody sacrifices did clearly testify unto the consciences of such as offered them; and that so often as God required these sacrifices he did *call their sins unto remembrance*, and, as it were by matter of fact, proclaim



unto the world, that as yet his wrath against sin was not, could not be appeased by these or the like kind of sacrifices. But inasmuch as the law, though in itself imperfect, (and therefore could make nothing perfect,) was yet an introduction to a better hope, the continual reiteration or repetition of these bloody sacrifices did teach such as used them aright, to expect a more sufficient bloody sacrifice, which should fully appease the wrath of God, and testify unto men's consciences, *that he did remember their sins no more* in such sort as during the time of the law he had done; that is, there should be no more exchange or commutation of punishment, no *solemn remembrance* of sin, by any sacrifice (of what kind soever) for sin, but *this one sacrifice* should suffice for all.

4. That we may ascend by degrees unto the infinite value and everlasting efficacy of the sacrifice of the 297  
 Son of God, we are in the first place to consider the odds or difference between this only sacrifice and the sacrifices of the law. The odds or differences between them may be reduced unto these two heads: first, to the diversity of their immediate effects; secondly, to their different efficacy or proportion for effecting the several ends to which they were especially destined.

1. The immediate effect of the bloody sacrifices of the law was to cleanse or purify the offerers from sins committed against the law of ceremonies; and this, as the apostle terms it, was a *purification* or *sanctification according to the flesh*. Howbeit, this sanctification was a shadow or picture of that purification of the conscience, or sanctification of the spirit, which was to be effected by the bloody sacrifice of the Son of God. 2. The sacrifices of the law were no way so powerful or sufficient for effecting *the sanctifying of the flesh*, as the sacrifice of the Son of God is for

effecting the sanctification of the spirit and conscience. There was no one kind of legal sacrifices which might make a full atonement for all sins or sinners against the law of ceremonies; for every different sin, or legal uncleanness, they had (for the most part) a different kind of sacrifice or offering: and if a man had been this day cleansed by sacrifice from some particular sin or legal uncleanness, and had fallen again unto the like to-morrow, the blood of the former sacrifice could not stead him the second time; every particular relapse into the same sin was to have a particular offering or fresh sacrifice, though of the same kind with the former.

5. The infinite value of the bloody sacrifice of the Son of God may from this imperfection of the legal sacrifices be distinctly apprehended, if we consider, that not the Jew only, but the Gentiles, one and other, were enemies and rebels against God, all by nature the sons of wrath and perdition, and yet the favour of reconciliation for all that then were, or afterwards should be, (albeit this world should continue a million of years,) was purchased by this one bloody sacrifice, as by a just and full price. What sins soever any man had committed, they did not prejudice his interest in the pardon purchased; it was universal in respect of all sinners, and in respect of all sins. The Almighty Father's wrath against mankind was by this only sacrifice so well appeased, so fully satisfied, that he is ready to receive all into the favour and privilege of sons, which will with due reverence accept of the pardon offered, and sue it out by such means as he hath appointed. Now this universal favour for all men, to whom nothing but vengeance was in justice due, could not possibly be purchased by any sacrifice which was not of value absolutely infinite. But to grant an

absolute pardon, not only for all sins past, before the acceptance of the pardon, but for wilful obstinacy or continuance in sin or rebellion, after so gracious a proclamation of pardon, could be no effect of God's infinite mercy, no fruits of Christ's infinite merits. For infinite merits cannot benefit men altogether unqualified or incapable of them. And mercy infinite must retain the nature of mercy ; it reacheth not beyond the proper object of mercy : and the proper object of mercy is penitency, or sorrow for misdemeanours past or present. Wilful continuance or obstinacy in exorbitant courses, or contempt of mercy offered, is the object of justice or indignation.

6. But besides the infinite value, we are to acknowledge the infinite or everlasting efficacy, or operative virtue of this bloody sacrifice of the Son of God. Want of distinguishing between these two hath occasioned many 298 errors or oversights in divinity. That there is a distinction to be put betwixt them, we may thus conceive: Suppose the Son of God, immediately after he had paid the ransom for our sins, or in that instant in which he said, *Consummatum est*, "All is finished," had deposed or laid aside the human nature, in which he was conceived and born to the end and purpose that he might die in it (or according to it), his offering or sacrifice had been of value infinite, in that it could purchase so universal a pardon at God's hands for all sinners and for all sins. Yet if he had laid aside the human nature immediately after his suffering, the everlasting efficacy of this infinite sacrifice had been cut off. Now besides the infinite price of our redemption, which was then paid when Christ said, *Consummatum est*, another end of his assumption and retaining the human nature was, that we might be partakers of the everlasting virtue of his sacrifice and priesthood. And herein doth

this sacrifice truly differ from the sacrifices of the law, from all sacrifices whatsoever, in that we obtain remission of sins by it and through it, not only as it was once offered, but by the real communication of its virtue unto our souls. If there were any use or need of a second, third, or reiterated offering of it, the virtue and efficacy of it could not be imagined to be perpetually everlasting or uncessant, but endless or uncessant only by vicissitude or turn; in such a sense as we say, 'the moon shall be eclipsed to the world's end;' yet is it not eclipsed at all times, but at some special times, throughout all ages of the world. But if both the value of the sacrifice be truly infinite, and the virtue of it everlasting without interruption or discontinuation, more uncessant than the motion of the heavens, or the rest of the earth; the often offering of the sacrifice, after what manner soever, is superfluous and blasphemous. The true reason then, why the body of Christ is not or ought not to be often offered, is not because all our sins were actually remitted by the once offering of it, or remitted before they were committed; but because the substance or matter of the sacrifice is of the same force at this day to remit sins, that it was of whilst it was offered: for his human nature was consecrated by death, and by his bloody passion, to be a sacrifice of everlasting virtue, to be the continual propitiation for our sins.

7. If either the actual sins of all men, or the sins of the elect in special, had been so remitted by Christ's death as some conceive they were, that is, absolutely pardoned before they were committed, there had been no end or use of Christ's resurrection in respect of us; no need of baptism: yet was baptism, from the hour of his resurrection, necessary unto all that did believe in his death and resurrection. The urgent and indis-

Christ's resurrection, and our baptism need- less, if sins be remitted before they be committed.



pensible necessity of baptism, especially in respect of actual believers, is not any where more emphatically intimated than in St. Peter's answer to the Jews, whose hearts were pierced with sorrow that they had been the causes of Christ's death. They, in this stound or sting of conscience, demand, *Men and brethren, what shall we do ? and Peter answered them, Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins. And they that gladly received his word, were baptized the same day.* Acts ii. 37, 38, 41. These men had been deeply tainted with sin, not original only, but with sins actual of the worst kind; guilty they were in a high degree of the death of the Son of God; yet had they as well their actual as their original sins remitted by baptism. It is then unsound and imperfect doctrine, that sin original only is taken away or remitted by baptism; for whatsoever sins are remitted or taken away by 299 Christ's death, the same sins are in the same manner remitted and taken away by baptism into his death; actual sins are remitted in such as are guilty of actual sins, when they are baptized, though only sin original be actually remitted in those which are not guilty of actual sins, as in infants. No man's sins are actually remitted before he be actually guilty of them.

8. The question is, how either sin original is remitted, or how any work of Satan is dissolved by baptism? And this question in the general is rightly resolved, by saying, They are remitted by faith. But this general resolution sufficeth not, unless we know the object of our faith in this particular. Now the particular object of our faith, of that faith by which sins (whether by baptism or otherwise) are remitted, is not our general belief in Christ: even our belief of Christ dying for us in particular, will not suffice, unless it

include our belief of the everlasting virtue of his bloody sacrifice, and of his everlasting priesthood for purifying and cleansing our souls. No sins be truly remitted, unless they be remitted by the office or exercise of his priesthood; and whilst so remitted, they are not remitted by any other sacrifice than by the sole virtue of his body and blood, which he once offered for all, for the sins of all. It is not the virtue or efficacy of the consecrated water in which we were washed, but the virtue of his blood which was once shed for us, and which by baptism is sprinkled upon us, or communicated unto us, which immediately cleanseth us from all our sins. From this everlasting virtue of this his bloody sacrifice, faith, by the ministry of baptism, is immediately gotten in such as had it not before. And in such as have faith before they be baptized, the guilt of actual sins is remitted by the exercise or act of faith, as it apprehends the everlasting efficacy of this sacrifice, and by the prayer of faith and supplication unto our High Priest. Faith then is as the mouth or appetite by which we receive this food of life, and is a good sign of health; but it is the food itself received which must continue health, and strengthen spiritual life in us; and the food of life is no other than Christ's body and blood, and it is our High Priest himself which must give us this food.

*Baptism*, saith St. Peter, 1 Pet. iii. 21, *doth save us: what baptism doth save us? not the putting away the filth of the flesh, (yet this is the immediate effect of the water in baptism,) but the answer (or stipulation) of a good conscience toward God.* But how doth this kind of baptism, or this concomitant of baptism, save us? The apostle in the same place tells us, *by the resurrection of Jesus Christ: the answer or stipulation of a good conscience* includes an illumination of our spirits

by the Spirit of God ; a qualification by which we are made sons of light, being before the sons of darkness. But that by this qualification we become the sons of light—that this qualification is by baptism wrought in us—that by this qualification, however wrought in us, we are saved from our sins ; all this is immediately from the virtue of Christ's resurrection ; that is, as you have heard before, he was consecrated by the sufferings of death to be an everlasting Priest, and by his resurrection from death, his body and blood became an everlasting propitiation for sins, an inexhaustible fountain of grace, by which we are purified from the dead works of sin.

9. It is true again, that in the sacrament of Christ's body and blood there is a propitiation for our sins, because he is really present in it who is the propitiation for our sins. But it no way hence follows, that there is any propitiatory sacrifice for sin in this sacrament. He becomes the propitiation for our sins, he <sup>300</sup> actually remits our sins, not directly and immediately by the elements of bread and wine, nor by any other kind of local presence or compresence with these elements, than is in baptism. The orthodoxal ancients use the same language for expressing his presence in baptism and in the eucharist ; they stick not to say, that Christ is present or latent in the water, as well as in the elements of bread and wine. Their meaning is, that neither of these elements, or sensible substances, can directly cleanse us from our sins by any virtue communicated unto them or inherent in them, but only as they are pledges or assurances of Christ's peculiar presence in them, and of our true investiture in Christ by them. We are not then to receive the elements of bread and wine only in remembrance that Christ died for us, but in remembrance or assurance likewise, that

his body, which was once given for us, doth by its everlasting virtue preserve our bodies and souls unto everlasting life, and that his blood, which was but once shed for us, doth still cleanse us from all our sins from which in this life we are cleansed or can hope to be cleansed. If we then receive remission of sins, or purification from our sins, in the sacrament of the eucharist, (as we always do when we receive it worthily,) we receive it not immediately by the sole serious remembrance of his death, but by the present efficacy or operation of his body which was given for us, and of his blood which was shed for us.

10. The reason why the blood of bulls and of goats had no longer force or efficacy to cleanse men, though but from sins against the law of ceremonies, than whilst they were offered, was because their blood was corruptible blood, and did perish with the using. *But we are not redeemed, saith St. Peter, with corruptible things, as silver and gold, but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot*<sup>f</sup>. One part of the preciousness of his blood is, that it is far more incorruptible than silver, gold, or other precious metal; and the less corruptible any metal is, the more precious it is; and the more precious it is, the more incorruptible.

Though Christ then was truly mortal when he died for us, yet the blood that he shed forth for us at his death did not become like water spilt upon the ground, which cannot be gathered again; it did not vanish or consume as the blood of legal sacrifices did; as his body, so his blood was not to see or feel corruption: not a drop of blood which was shed for us, whether in the garden or upon the cross, but was the blood of the Son of God; but was shed by him, as willing at this

<sup>f</sup> 1 Pet. i. 18, 19.



price to become the everlasting High Priest of our souls : and not a drop of blood which was so shed did cease or shall ever cease to be the blood of the Son of God. His soul and body, we know, were disunited by death ; yet were neither of them disunited from his Godhead or divine person. His body whilst laid in the grave was still the body of the Son of God, as still retaining personal union with his Godhead ; so was his soul, so was his blood, the soul and blood of the Son of God, as being indissolubly united to his Divine person. Though his blood, whilst it was shed or poured out, did lose its physical or local union with his body, though one portion of it were divided from another, yet no drop of it was divided from his infinite person : and that which the Romish church would transfer unto each several crum of bread or drop of wine in the eucharist, is originally and properly true of the several drops of divisibilities of Christ's blood which was shed for us ; whole Christ was in every one of them, indivisibly in every one of them God was, the 301 Godhead was and is personally united to all of them.

11. Whether all and every portion of his blood which was then shed, were, by the power of the Godhead, recollected and reunited to his body, as his body was to his soul at the resurrection, we cannot tell; God knows  $\text{g}$ . But this we know and believe, that the selfsame blood which was then shed, whether it were gathered together again or remained dispersed, whether it were reunited to his glorified body or divided from it, is still united to the Fountain of Life, to the Godhead in the person of the Son. And being united to this Fountain of Life, (who dwelleth in it, as light within the body of the sun,) it is of efficacy everlasting; it hath an immortal power or force to dissolve the works of Satan in us, as well those which he worketh in us after baptism

$\text{g}$  See chap. 46. num. 2. [p. 520 of this volume.]

as before. The virtue of it, to cleanse and purge us from our sins, (of what kind soever,) is at this day as sovereign as if it had been sprinkled upon our souls whilst it issued out of his body. It is impossible it should lose its virtue in or upon our souls, unless we first lose our interest in it, which we cannot lose but by abandoning the ways of light, and polluting our souls with the works of darkness. For so long as *we walk in the light, the blood of Jesus Christ the Son of God doth cleanse us from all our sins* <sup>h</sup>.

12. This present efficacy of Christ's body and blood upon our souls, or real communication of both, I find as a truth unquestionable amongst the ancient fathers, and as a catholic confession. The modern Lutheran and the modern Romanist have fallen into their several errors concerning Christ's presence in the sacrament, from a common ignorance; neither of them conceive, nor are they willing to conceive, how Christ's body and blood should have any real operation upon our souls, unless they were so locally present, as they might *agere per contactum*, that is, either so purge our souls by oral manducation, as physical medicines do our bodies, (which is the pretended use of transubstantiation,) or so quicken our souls, as sweet odours do the animal spirits, which were the most probable use of the Lutheran consubstantiation. Both the Lutheran and papists avouch the authority of the ancient church for their opinions, but most injuriously. For more than we have said, or more than Calvin doth stiffly maintain against Zuinglius and other sacramentaries, cannot be inferred from any speeches of the truly orthodoxal or ancient fathers; they all agree, that we are immediately cleansed and purified from our sins by the blood of Christ; that his human nature by the inhabitation of the Deity is made to us the inexhaustible fountain of life. But about the particular

<sup>h</sup> 1 John i, 7.

manner how life is derived to us from his human nature, as whether it sends its sweet influence upon our souls only from the heavenly sanctuary wherein it dwells as in its sphere, or whether his blood which was shed for us may have more immediate local presence with us, they no way disagree, because they in this kind abhorred curiosity of dispute. As for ubiquity and transubstantiation, they are the two monsters of modern times, brought forth by ignorance, and maintained only by faction.

And thus much of the infinite value and everlasting virtue of Christ's sacrifice in comparison of legal sacrifices. The next query is, How the everlasting efficacy of his sacrifice or of his priesthood was prefigured by legal sacrifices or purifications for sin ?

13. The legal sacrifices, as all agree, did generally foreshadow Christ's only and all-sufficient sacrifice. But inasmuch as they were corruptible, and their virtue transient, and by reason of their corruption and transient virtue were often to be reiterated, they could not be so much as true shadows either of his offering of 302 himself once for all, or of the everlasting virtue of his only sacrifice once offered. Their imperfection, corruption, or transient virtue, did serve as foils to set forth the glory and splendour of his everlasting sacrifice and most perfect offering. Of all the legal sacrifices which present themselves unto my former observation or present memory, there is one kind only which can bear the true shadow, or serve as a model of the everlasting efficacy of his only sacrifice once offered for all; and that was the sacrifice of the red heifer, Numb. xix, and the legal use which GOD's people under the law were to make of her ashes.

The correspondency between the effects of the ashes of this sacrifice and of the blood of Christ, is gathered

by our apostle, Heb. ix. 13, 14: *If the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh: how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?* But wherein did this sacrifice picture out the everlasting efficacy of the blood of the Son of God in more peculiar manner than other legal sacrifices did?

14. First, in that all such as were legally unclean, by touching a corpse or grave, by coming into a tent wherein a corpse lay unburied, or suffering the vessels in such a tent to be uncovered, were to be purified by the water of sprinkling, which was qualified or consecrated to this purpose by the ashes of the red cow or heifer, and as often to be purified by this water as they should incur this legal uncleanness: and yet the sacrifice of this beast was not to be offered so often as this people did incur these kinds of legal uncleanness. Thus much is evident from the practice of the Jewish church during the time of the law.

For this water of purification was often every year, oftentimes every month, to be sprinkled upon some one or other of this people, oftentimes upon one and the same man within one and the same year, even as often as he should by chance or negligence incur any of the former branches of uncleanness. Yet was not this sacrifice, whose ashes were still to be mingled with the water of purification, to be offered once every year, in every age, or in many ages.

The sacrifice of the red heifer, as the Jews confess, was but nine times offered during the time of the law; once by Eleazar, Aaron's son, in the wilderness. And this sacrifice was not reiterated until the destruction of Solomon's temple, that is, not during the space of a



thousand years and more. It was the second time offered by Ezra, after this people's return from captivity, and but seven times after, unto the destruction of the second temple. And this foolish nation since that time hath not presumed to offer it, but expects the offering of it the tenth time by their king Messias. Thus is the faithless synagogue, by God's providence, the keeper, not of the sacred oracles only, written by Moses and the prophets, but even of those traditions which testify the sum and truth of these oracles, to wit, that this legal sacrifice, amongst the rest, was to be accomplished in their Messias. He was indeed to set the period to this legal rite, and to all the rest, not by offering them after a legal rite or manner, but by offering up himself instead of them all, once for all, in bloody sacrifice, in whose infinite value and everlasting efficacy all other sacrifices or offerings for sin were so terminated or swallowed up, as land rivers or currents of waters are in the sea. But what circumstance have we from the written text, that this sacrifice was not to be so often offered, as this people had occasion to use the water of sprinkling or the ashes of this sacrifice to 303 cleanse them from their former legal pollutions? It is said <sup>i</sup>, that *the ashes should be laid up without the camp in a clean place, εἰς διαθήρησιν, and reserved or kept for the congregation of the children of Israel for a water of separation.* The ashes were to be reserved, not for this generation only present, but for the use of posterity. As manna, which was commanded in the same character to be reserved in the ark, was the type of Christ as he is the food of life, or the bread which came down from heaven; so were these ashes, as an emblem of the everlasting efficacy or operative virtue of his sacrifice. There is no bodily

<sup>i</sup> Numbers xix. 9.

substance under heaven, which can be so true an emblem or model of incorruption as ashes are. Being the remainder of bodies perfectly dissolved or corrupted, they are not capable of a second corruption. And when it is said, *that the ashes should be reserved for a water of separation*, the meaning is, that one sacrifice might afford ashes enough to season or qualify as many several vessels of water, as this people for many generations should have occasion to use for legal purification. So it is said in the same ninth verse, that the reservation of these ashes *was a purification for sin*. A purification, not in act only, or for one or two turns, but a continual purification; or, as a treasury or storehouse for making as many purifications or waters of sprinkling as this people had occasion to use. And so Christ is said, Heb. i. 3, to have made a purification for our sins: *When he had by himself purged our sins*, (saith our English,) *he sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high*. But the translation (under correction) comes somewhat short of the original; and the shorter it comes of it, the more advantage it yields unto their opinion which think their sins were actually remitted and purged before they were actually committed. The apostle's words are, *καθαρισμὸν ποιησάμενος*, *having made a purification for sin, he hath ascended into heaven*. The word *purification* is not to be restrained to one act or operation, but includes or implies the *perpetual quality* of himself, or substance of his sacrifice, being by this one act consecrated to be a perpetual fountain of purification. As he did not only make one propitiation or atonement for our sins, but remains still the propitiation for our sins; so neither did he once actually purge us from our sins by offering up himself, but still remains the purification of our sins: that is, he doth still purify and cleanse us from

our sins, as often as we seek by faith and true repentance to be cleansed and purified by him.

15. So then the blood of the legal sacrifice or heifer did consecrate the ashes to be as a storehouse or treasury of legal purification; and the ashes thus consecrated by this sacrifice did hallow or consecrate the water which was put into them, to make actual purification as often as occasion required. So did our High Priest, by the one sacrifice of himself, consecrate his blood to be an inexhaustible fountain of purification evangelical. And his blood and body thus consecrated once for all do consecrate or sanctify the water of baptism to cleanse or wash infants from sin original, and such as are of years when they are baptized from sins actual against the moral law of God. So doth his blood, or operative virtue of his everlasting sacrifice, consecrate or qualify the elements of bread and wine to purify and cleanse our souls from such actual sins as after baptism we have committed. This perennial efficacy or operative virtue of Christ's body and blood, consecrated once for all by the sacrifice of himself, to be a perpetual purification for such as were to be consecrated kings and priests unto their God, which was thus pictured by the former legal or Mosaical rites, was more expressly foretold by the prophet Zechariah: for having in chap. xii. 304 ver. 10. prophesied of the *piercing* of the Son of God's most precious body by the Jews, (for which, when God should open their eyes to see the truth, they should lament and mourn,) he explicates the use or end to which the Divine Providence had destinated this their malicious cruelty, chap. xiii. 1: *In that day there shall be a fountain opened to the house of David and to the inhabitants of Jerusalem for sin and for uncleanness.* By this offering of himself once for all, by this opening of his precious side, he hath consecrated all that are

sanctified, and all that are sanctified are sanctified by it; yet not actually sanctified or actually consecrated by his blood before it be sprinkled in our hearts by faith. And to instruct us that the legal water of separation or sprinkling did foreshadow the blood of Christ, the apostle terms it *the blood of sprinkling*, Heb. xii. 24.

## CHAP. LVI.

*The Efficacy of Christ's Sacrifice, and the Use of his Priesthood, two distinct several Things. Wherein the Exercise of his Priesthood doth consist. How it was foreshadowed. Ordinances effectual by Virtue of Christ's Presence. Virtual Presence is a real Presence.*

1. SUCH as deny the everlasting efficacy of Christ's sacrifice may be presumed likewise to deny the use of his everlasting priesthood: howbeit, all such as grant the everlasting efficacy of his sacrifice cannot hence be concluded to admit the everlasting use of his priesthood: for these be two distinct points of our belief. If belief in Christ's death, or in the everlasting efficacy of his sacrifice, were all that we are bound to believe, we were not bound to acknowledge any other act of his priesthood besides the offering up of himself in sacrifice; but by this one act of his priesthood he was consecrated to be an everlasting Priest. And if he be an everlasting Priest, he still executes the office or function of an high priest. And it is our duty, the chief point of our religion, to supplicate unto him, as to the only High Priest of our souls, that he would make us partakers of his everlasting sacrifice, as we say, *ex officio*, by exercising the office or function of an high priest.

The question is, Wherein the function or exercise of his priesthood doth consist? To this we answer, first,



negatively ; that it doth not consist in the often offering up of himself by his priests or ministers here on earth ; *For if he were on earth*, saith the apostle, Heb. viii. 4, *he should not be a priest*. This argues that he exerciseth his priesthood in the heavenly sanctuary, not in temples made with hands. So saith the apostle more expressly, Heb. ix. 24, 25 : *Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are the figures of the true ; but into heaven itself ; now to appear in the presence of God for us : nor yet that he should offer himself often, as the high priest entereth into the holy place every year, ἐν αἵματι ἄλλοτρίῳ, with blood of others ; for then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the world : but now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.*

The truth then is, as you have heard before, that Christ by his bloody sacrifice upon the cross was consecrated to be an everlasting Priest ; and that this consecration was not accomplished until his resurrection from the dead : for it is not conceivable that he should be an everlasting priest before he became an <sup>305</sup> immortal man, and by his rising, &c., opened the gate of everlasting life. After he was thus consecrated by death, and by the resurrection from the dead, to be an everlasting Priest after the order of Melchisedec, he was not to offer any sacrifice : nor do we read that Melchisedec offered any <sup>k</sup>. Wherein then did Melchisedec's priesthood consist ? Only in the dignity of authoritative blessing. *He was*, saith Moses, *the priest of the most high God, and he blessed Abram, and said, Blessed be Abram of the most high God, possessor of heaven and earth.* St. Cyril, in his parallel betwixt Christ and Melchisedec, speaks more

<sup>k</sup> See book 9. chapters 9. and 11. [vol. viii. pp. 234. 245.]

expressly, and reads the text more punctually for the opinion of reformed churches, than we ourselves for the most part do <sup>l</sup>.

2. This exercise of Christ's spiritual priesthood in the heavenly sanctuary was foreshadowed by sundry services and sacrifices of the law, by that solemn atonement which the high priest made in the most holy place, and, as we have often said, by the sacrifice of the red heifer also; albeit that solemnity did prefigure him likewise in the act of his consecration, or designation to his heavenly sanctuary. This heifer was slain by another without the camp, in Eleazar's sight, and yet Eleazar the priest was to sprinkle the blood of this sacrifice *before the tabernacle of the congregation*, that is, *with his face towards the sanctuary*, on which unless he did constantly look whilst he did sprinkle the blood, the service was frustrated, as the Jews say. This testified that the validity of this act, or the purification intended by it, was to be expected from the sanctuary: Christ likewise was slain by the hands of sinful men without the city; and yet, though slain by them, *he offered himself by the eternal Spirit* <sup>m</sup>. And whether by this eternal Spirit, or by his spirit as man, or by both, certain it is, that by the Spirit he sprinkleth the blood of the new covenant upon us, and prepareth a way for us to the heavenly sanctuary. As the people under the law might not enter into the congregation, nor the priests into the sanctuary, until they had been purified from their uncleanness by the water of sprinkling, so neither could we or any of God's people have access unto the most holy place or heavenly sanctuary, until the way were prepared for us by the blood of the Son

<sup>l</sup> See the note at the end of this chapter.

<sup>m</sup> Heb. ix. 14.

of God, nor until we be sprinkled and purified with his blood. *Having therefore, brethren, boldness to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus, by a new and living way, which he hath consecrated for us, through the veil, that is to say, his flesh; and having an high priest over the house of God; let us draw near with a true heart in full assurance of faith, having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience, and our bodies washed with pure water.*

Heb. x. 19—22. He consecrated the *way* itself by his bloody sacrifice upon the cross; from the very moment in which the veil did rend asunder, the door was opened and the *way* prepared. But we must be qualified for walking in this way, and for entering into this heavenly sanctuary, by the present exercise of his everlasting priesthood, which is a priesthood of blessing, not of sacrifice. And yet he bleaseth us by communicating the virtue and efficacy of his everlasting sacrifice unto our souls.

This participation, and this blessing by it, the full expiation of our sins, we are to expect from his heavenly sanctuary.

3. *God*, saith the apostle, Heb. vi. 17, *willing more abundantly to shew unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel*, ἐμεσίτευσεν ὄρκῳ, *interposed himself by an oath*, or, word by word, *he mediated by an oath*<sup>n</sup>. The tenor of this oath, as you have heard before<sup>o</sup>, was, that he would requite Abraham, as we say, in kind; that as Abraham was then willing to offer up his son, his only son Isaac, in bloody sacrifice unto him, so he would offer or give his only Son for Abraham, and for all such as should

<sup>n</sup> See book 9. ch. 19. [vol. viii. page 149.] and book 9. chap. 17. page 304.]

<sup>o</sup> See book 8. ch. 30. [vol. viii.]

306 follow his example of faith and obedience. It was in the same promise (confirmed by oath) implied, that this only Son of God should be the seed of Abraham ; that in this one seed of Abraham all the nations of the earth should be blessed ; that for the derivation of this blessing upon all the nations upon earth, this seed of Abraham should be made a priest after the order of Melchisedec. The hope in this promise, thus confirmed by oath to Abraham, is by the apostle in the same sixth chapter, ver. 19, termed *an anchor of the soul, both sure and stedfast*. But why *an anchor, sure and stedfast* ? Because *it entereth into that within the veil*, to wit, into the heavenly sanctuary, which was prefigured by the most holy place within the material tabernacle or earthly sanctuary, into which none might come besides the high priest, nor he saving once a year, and then not without blood ; for he was to purify or sanctify it by the blood of the sacrifices which were offered without the camp or congregation upon the day of the atonement. And thus the Son of God, being crucified without the city of Jerusalem, did by his blood then shed enter into the heavenly sanctuary, and even purify it by his blood, Heb. ix. 23, 24. But what doth our hope apprehend within the veil ? The apostle tells us, Heb. vi. 20, *Even Jesus, made an high priest after the order of Melchisedec* ; that is, an high priest to bless us in the name of the most high God, to make us blessed, even blessed as the sons of God, or such as he himself as man is, that is, kings and priests unto our God. That this his priesthood is a priesthood of blessing, and offereth the blessing promised unto Abraham to all the nations of the earth, as well unto the Gentile as unto the Jew, (though in the first place unto the Jew,) St. Peter witnesseth, Acts iii. 25, 26 : *Ye are the children of the prophets,*



*and of the covenant which God made with our fathers, saying unto Abraham, And in thy seed shall all the kindreds of the earth be blessed. Unto you FIRST God, having raised up his son Jesus, sent him to bless you, in turning away every one of you from his iniquities.*

4. Yet seeing he entered not into the heavenly sanctuary without blood, seeing he purified even heaven itself by his blood, we may not expect the blessing promised unto Abraham otherwise than by the virtue of his blood, nor may we expect that his blood or virtue of it should be communicated unto us, otherwise than by the exercise or office of his everlasting priesthood, unto which he was consecrated by his blood. He now works the like cures in our souls by the virtue of this priesthood, which he wrought in men's bodies, whilst he lived here on earth, by the virtue or presence of his prophetic function. We may baptize with water in his name, and with water sanctified by his blood; yet unless he baptize with the Spirit sent from his heavenly sanctuary, and say unto every one whom we baptize, as he did unto the leper, *I will, be thou clean*, our washing is but in vain, our whole action is but a ceremony. We his priests or ministers may, upon confession made unto us, either in general or in particular, absolve his people from their sins; for this authority he hath given us—*Whose sins ye remit, they are remitted—Whose sins ye retain, they are retained*; yet unless he by his Spirit, or sweet influence of grace, say unto the soul whom we absolve, as he sometime did unto the man sick of the palsy, *Be of good cheer, thy sins be forgiven thee*, our absolution is but a compliment; although without our absolution he do not in this sort absolve his people oftentimes from their sins.

We may consecrate the elements of bread and wine, and administer them so consecrated as undoubted pledges of his body and blood, by which the new covenant was sealed, and the general pardon pur-  
307 chased ; yet, unless he grant some actual influence of his Spirit, and suffer such virtue to go out from his human nature now placed in his sanctuary, as he once did unto the woman that was cured of her issue of blood—unless this virtue do as immediately reach our souls as it did her body—we do not really receive his body and blood with the elements of bread and wine ; we do not so receive them as to have our sins remitted or dissolved by them ; we do not by receiving them become of his flesh and of his bones ; we gain no degree of real union with him ; which is the sole use or fruit of his real presence. Christ might be locally present, as he was with many here on earth, and yet not really present. But with whomsoever he is virtually present, that is, to whomsoever he communicates the influence of his body and blood by his Spirit, he is really present with them, though locally absent from them. Thus he was really present with the woman which was cured of her bloody issue, by touching the hem of his garment. But not so really present with the multitude that did throng and press upon him, that were locally more present with him. She did not desire so much as to touch his body with her hand, for she said in herself, *If I may but touch the hem of his garment, I shall be whole.* And yet, by our Saviour's interpretation, she did touch him more immediately than they which were nearer unto him, which thrust or thronged him. And the reason why she alone did more immediately touch him than any of the rest, was, because virtue of healing did go out from him to her alone. It is true

then—for our Saviour saith it—*Her faith did make her whole*; and yet she was made whole by the virtue which went out from him: this was the fruit or effect of her faith, or rather the reward or consequent of her faith. In like sort, as many as are healed from their sins, whether by the sacrament of baptism or the eucharist, are healed by faith relatively or instrumentally. Faith is as the mouth or organ by which we receive the medicine; but it is the virtual influence derived from the body and blood of Christ which properly or efficiently doth cure our souls, and dissolve the works of Satan in us.

This woman, as St. Matthew relates the story, had said within herself, *If I may but touch the hem of his garment, I shall be whole*: she wanted either the opportunity or boldness to touch the forepart of his garment, or to come into his sight or presence. Yet he then knew, not only that she had touched the hem of his garment, but what she had said within herself; and out of his knowledge of this her faith and humility, he did pronounce and make her whole. Now it is but one and the same act of one and the same divine wisdom, to know the hearts and secret thoughts of men afar off and near at hand. And therefore a matter as easy for the Son of God, or for the man Christ Jesus, in whom the Godhead dwelleth bodily, though still remaining at the right hand of God, to know the hearts and secret thoughts of all such as present themselves at his table here on earth, as well as he knew the secret thoughts of this woman which came behind him. What need then is there of his bodily presence in the sacrament, or of any other presence than the influence or emission of virtue from his heavenly sanctuary unto our souls? He hath left us the consecrated elements of bread and

wine, to be unto us more than the hem of his garment ; if we do but touch and taste them with the same faith by which this woman touched the hem of his garment, this our faith shall make us whole, and stanch the running issues (and cleanse or cure the leprous sores) of our souls, as perfectly as it did this woman's issue of blood.

308 But of Christ's presence with us, (especially in the blessed sacrament of his body and blood,) we shall take occasion to speak somewhat more in handling the article of his sitting at the right hand of God, which may perhaps give the reader some degree of satisfaction, and line out the right mean betwixt consubstantiation and transubstantiation, or between the Romanist and the Lutheran, at least between the Lutheran and other reformed churches.

*A note relating to the precedent chapter ; first paragraph, or numb. 1, those words, " St. Cyril in his Parallels," &c.*

I conceive the author means St. Cyril's Comments or Strictures upon Genesis : and in them this place, or these words, *προσεπόγει δὲ, καὶ Μελχισεδὲκ βασιλεὺς Σαλῆμ ἐξήνεγκεν αὐτῷ ἄρτους καὶ οἶνον* ..... and in these words his eye was fixed upon *ἐξήνεγκεν*, *extulit*, or *protulit* ; it is not *προσήνεγκεν*, *obtulit*. That is, *Melchisedec brought out*, or *carried forth*, not *offered* bread and wine. Cyril. Alex. tom. i. Glaphyrorum, lib. 2. Paris. edit. 1638. fol. 47.

To which I may add, that the same St. Cyril in the same book, pag. 62. says, that Melchisedec, *ἐξεκόμιζεν ἄρτους καὶ οἶνον* ; i. e. (according to Sylburgius, Suidas, and Hesychius,) *procuravit, adornavit, exportavit, commeatum commodavit* ; not *obtulit*, as Andr. Schotus translates it there. And again, pag. 63. *ιέρειά-προσάγοντα ἄρτους καὶ οἶνον*, i. e. *apportantem, afferentem*, not *offerentem*, as the same Schotus translates it



also. But it is the Roman *ingenie* to catch at this place. So Maldonate, to despise Calvin, corrects the magnified Vulgar Latin, altering it to—*et erat sacrificans*—but partially; for his criticism being given, it will amount to no more than, *erat ministrans*.—See this author's ninth book, chap. 10. [vol. viii. pag. 239.] where he cites Philo Judæus, lib. 2. sacr. leg. Allegor., making Melchisedec's *bringing forth bread and wine* not an act of piety and religion, but of hospitality, opposite to Ammon's churlish niggardliness, who afforded not the posterity of Abraham in their travel bread and water.

END OF VOL. IX.











