












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# JAPAN, AMERICA AND THE GREAT WAR.

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## I. WHY JAPAN ENTERED THE GREAT WAR

On August 23, 1914, Japan declared war upon Germany. She was thus the fourth of the Allies to enter the Great War, and the first power outside of Europe.<sup>1</sup> Four days later Austria-Hungary declared war on her. Japan later was one of the five powers to adhere to the pact of London, joining with Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy in a declaration not to make a separate peace. Thus Japan, from the early days of the war, was one of the Allies in the strictest sense of the term.

The reason for Japan's action is not hard to find. Primarily it was based upon a fine sense of honor and the readiness in the fullest sense to meet the obligations of a treaty. In this respect the contrast between the conduct of Germany and of Japan is sharply defined from the beginning. But as human actions are rarely the result of single factors, so there were other underlying motives, in which the conduct of Germany in the Far East and the development of Japan's Asiatic policy were involved.

The Anglo-Japanese alliance was first formulated in 1902.<sup>2</sup> It was the direct result of the Far Eastern policy of Russia, which threatened the interests of both powers in North China and Korea. During the Boxer uprising in 1900 and the subsequent negotiations, British and Japanese military and diplomatic representatives worked in harmony, and thus a good understanding paved the way for a formal alliance. This was a surprising step for Great Britain to take. It was the first alliance entered into

<sup>1</sup> For texts of the ultimatum and rescript declaring war see Appendix I, p. 443.

<sup>2</sup> The text of the alliance and the history of its origin are given in *The Background of the War*, 202-204, 242-246 (*A League of Nations*, I, No. 4).

by her since the Crimean War, and it brought to an end the days of her proud isolation. It proved to be but the first step in her new foreign policy, and soon was followed by the French entente in 1904 and the Russian entente in 1907. And all three of them served to unite the four great powers in an understanding which reacted immediately to the German threat in 1914. But in many quarters, the alliance was denounced as an unprecedented union of a western and an eastern state, a Christian and a Pagan one, and Germany has never lost an opportunity to dwell upon the treason of Great Britain to the cause of "civilization." The first treaty called for joint action only when two powers combined to threaten the interests of Britain or Japan in the East, and this gave Japan the assurance that should Russia attack her, Great Britain, controlling the seas, would "hold the ring" and see that no other European power intervened, as had been the case after the Chino-Japanese War in 1895. And this is exactly what happened. Although the Kaiser sympathized with Russia during the Japanese War and deliberately broke international law in order to help coal the Russian fleet,<sup>1</sup> yet he dared not openly join her so long as Britain was ready to meet her obligations under the Japanese alliance.

It might be added that there was some question among Japanese statesmen as to whether an English or a Russian alliance would be most helpful. Prince Ito believed it would be better to ally with Russia, to work with her and endeavor to avoid friction. But the Japanese cabinet believed, and wisely, that Japan had far more in common with Great Britain than with the then government of Russia, which had already shown its cynical disregard for its plighted word.

During the Russo-Japanese War, 1905, the terms of the alliance were altered, and now both parties would join forces if the interests of either were attacked, and as the scope of the alliance extended to India it now became possible for Britain to reduce greatly her eastern fleet and commence the concentration in the North Sea which served so well in 1914. The last renewal of

<sup>1</sup> Herman Bernstein, *The Willy-Nicky Correspondence*, 57-59, 60-73, 78-81, 90-102 (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1918).



the alliance was in 1911 and the terms were again altered in order to permit the operation of arbitration treaties, and especially those which the United States had proposed to the powers.

Since 1902 the alliance with Great Britain has been the corner stone of Japanese foreign policy. In spite of criticism on the part of certain British and Japanese journalists and of narrow-minded politicians in both countries, the statesmen of the two empires have realized the value of this compact, which, as the Japanese liked to say, assured the peace of the Far East. And the existence of this agreement was often overlooked during the period of friction between Japan and the United States before the Great War. Japan, allied with Great Britain, could hardly think of forcing any issue with the country with which Britain had most in common. Instead of seeking to make trouble, Japan, as we shall see, sought to improve her good relations with the two great English-speaking powers.

The vital clause of the alliance provided that, should the territorial rights or special interests of either power in Eastern Asia or India be threatened, the two allies would unite in their defense. If the Japanese had been inclined to a strict interpretation of their obligations it would have been easy to assert that the presence of German raiders in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the existence of a German base on the coast of China did not seriously affect the territorial rights of Britain, and that only when India or the other eastern possessions of Great Britain were attacked would Japan have to intervene. But if this idea ever occurred to the Japanese statesmen it certainly did not delay their action. And in addition to the formal obligations of the alliance it was felt that Japan's own interests prompted her to enter the world war.

#### GERMANY IN THE FAR EAST

For the past 20 years Germany had been the stormy petrel of Far Eastern politics. It was Germany that arranged for the triple demonstration of Germany, Russia and France at the close of the Chino-Japanese War, which robbed Japan of Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula. It was Germany that commenced

the vicious circle of territorial demands on China, when, with the worst excuse in the world, she extorted the lease of the fine port of Kiaochow, just across the Yellow Sea from Japan. It was the Kaiser who gave to the world the bogey of the "Yellow Peril." It was Germany who behaved so badly during the Boxer uprising and the peace negotiations. It was believed that it was the Kaiser who encouraged the Tsar in his fatal Manchurian policy, which cost Japan so much in blood and treasure. And at Tsingtao (the city on the Bay of Kiaochow) Germany had built up a strong naval base which might be used for strengthening her hold upon China, or even against Japan herself. Japan, therefore, had no love for Germany. With Germany she had been able to come to no understanding, although she had an alliance with Great Britain and ententes with France and Russia. The elimination of Germany from China would fit in with Japan's new policy of checking foreign aggression there. But without the Anglo-Japanese alliance it is very doubtful if Japan would have promptly entered the European War. In my mind there is no doubt that Japan would soon have been drawn into it when Germany began her raids upon neutral shipping. But the idea that at any time Japan would have joined with Germany against the Allies is so absurd that it existed only in German minds or in the minds of German sympathizers. The last power in the world, of all the belligerents, that Japan would have fought was Great Britain. And as we have seen, she had understandings with both France and Russia. The talk of a German-Japanese alliance was made in Berlin and was primarily intended to affect such anti-Japanese sentiment as existed in the United States.

#### ULTIMATUM TO GERMANY

As soon as the news of Great Britain's declaration of war against Germany on August 4, 1914, reached Japan, she notified her Ally that she was ready to live up to the terms and duties of the alliance. Britain promptly made a formal request for Japanese aid. A few days elapsed while the Japanese studied the problem and perfected their plans. Finally, it was decided that she would

help police the eastern seas, would drive Germany out of her naval base at Tsingtao, and would capture her islands in the South Seas. On the 15th, a formal notice was served upon Germany that she must surrender the entire leased territory of Kiaochow to Japan, for eventual restoration to China, and she was given until the 23rd to reply. On that date, when the only answer Germany made was to strengthen the defenses and concentrate her reservists at Tsingtao, Japan formally declared war. This was promptly followed by the sailing forth of Japanese ships to run down German commerce destroyers and by a naval bombardment of Tsingtao.

## II. JAPAN'S PART IN THE WAR<sup>1</sup>

The operations at Tsingtao were insignificant from a military point of view. The port was well fortified, but the garrison consisted of only some 4,500 men. Japan sent over an expeditionary force of 20,000, and Great Britain co-operated with 925 British and 300 Sikh troops. In order to get at the German territory it was necessary to land on Chinese soil. This was a violation of neutrality, and was promptly decried by the Germans as on a par with the invasion of Belgium. Naturally, there was no comparison. Germany was by treaty bound not only to respect but to defend the neutrality of Belgium. But China was too weak to prevent the Germans, on her territory, from violating neutrality, and it was incumbent on the Allies to do what China herself could not do. There would have been no attack on Tsingtao if the Germans had not used it as a base of naval operations. It should also be remembered that the Russo-Japanese War was fought almost entirely on Chinese soil. In both cases it was the price she had to pay for permitting militant powers to hold and fortify leaseholds in her territory.

The investment of Tsingtao proceeded slowly, for the Japanese were unwilling to sacrifice many lives in gaining an assured victory. Finally, on November 7, after the Japanese had taken

<sup>1</sup> For a summary of Japan's attitude in the war by the foreign minister, see Appendix II, p. 445.

the dominant forts, the German commander surrendered. The prisoners were soon removed to Japan, where their lot was so different from that of prisoners of war in Germany that any comparison would be odious. And throughout the whole period the Japanese showed no bitterness toward the German residents in Japan. It was only when their courtesy was abused that they began to intern recalcitrant Germans.

#### NAVAL OPERATIONS

On the high seas the Japanese navy had been ceaselessly active. Their squadrons scoured the Pacific from Canada to Cape Horn. Other vessels served as convoys for the Australian troop-ships on their way to Egypt and the Dardanelles, and many an Australian who had dreamed of the Japanese invasion of Australia saw for the first time the sun-flag of Japan on the ships which protected him and his comrades from the German cruisers. During this time a Japanese cruiser ran aground off the Mexican coast, and the German propaganda in this country incited a great hue and cry that Japan had established a naval base to the south of California. This report was investigated by an American naval officer and the real situation reported.

It was a Japanese squadron also which swept down the South American coast searching for Von Spee's fleet, which had destroyed a smaller British force off Chile. Happily, for the satisfaction of the British navy, the Japanese drove the Germans into the Atlantic, where at the Falkland Islands the British fell upon them and destroyed them every one.

By understanding with Great Britain, the Japanese captured the German islands north of the equator, while British colonial forces occupied German New Guinea and Samoa. The Japanese took and garrisoned the Marshall and Caroline Islands in October, 1914.

With the destruction of all the German raiders and their bases, the naval operations were practically at an end. But it was the Japanese and British vessels which kept the Pacific free from the horrors of submarine warfare such as the Atlantic was soon to know.

Later services were those rendered at Singapore when an Indian regiment, incited by German propagandists, mutinied. And after Japanese merchant vessels were submarined in the Mediterranean Japan sent a torpedo-boat flotilla to those waters, where they rendered efficient service until the end of the war. In effect this was a participation in the war in Europe.

#### MILITARY SUPPLIES FURNISHED RUSSIA

But a greater, although far less spectacular, service was rendered in supplying Russia with military materials of all description as long as she remained in the war. With only one port of entry on the west, at Archangel, Russia had to depend more and more upon the goods made in Japan and shipped over the Trans-Siberian railway. Not only did the Japanese government arsenals and factories work at full blast, but the authorities encouraged private concerns to make every effort to supply the Russian needs. As a result Russia received invaluable help, and the Japanese hold some hundred millions of doubtful securities. But if this help had been denied, the collapse of Russia would have come long before it did. It would be an interesting, but hardly profitable, study to estimate what would have been the effect if Japan had been bound by a German alliance. Russia would have had to mobilize a large army in the Far East, the British colonials would hardly have dared leave their own lands, and the commerce of the Pacific would have passed out of the control of the Allies.

### III. WHY JAPAN SENT NO TROOPS TO EUROPE

These positive contributions of Japan to the Allies' cause have frequently been overlooked, and during the first three years of the war the question was often asked: Why has Japan not sent a force to Europe? In considering this question we should first of all remember that Japan was primarily charged with the maintenance of peace in the Far East and its adjacent seas. To

send a force to Europe, to France or to Russia, Japan should receive a formal request from the Allies. There is no evidence that such was made.

Instead, early in 1915, a number of articles appeared in French newspapers and reviews advocating Japanese participation. To a less extent the question was discussed in Great Britain. Among the French publicists who urged this were M. Pichon, formerly minister of foreign affairs, and M. Clémenceau, former premier and later in office at the close of the war. These proposals, which it must be remembered were informal and unofficial, generally called for the landing of a Japanese force of about half a million men in the Balkan Peninsula to co-operate with Serbia. Another proposal suggested that the Japanese move across the Trans-Siberian railway and join the Russian armies.

#### CONFLICTING VIEWS

These discussions naturally were echoed in Japan. At once a considerable divergence of opinion was expressed both there and abroad. First of all, it was held that Japan should not take part in the European battles unless her aid was absolutely essential to victory. The war began primarily as a European conflict. A sound psychology demanded, in the early period, that the armies of European states, aided by their colonies, should triumph over the Central Powers. To bring in a large force of Japanese would give the Germans a sentimental argument for use in neutral countries, and especially in America. This was realized by responsible Entente statesmen. And as to the eastern front, the Japanese, with a fine sense of propriety, appreciated that it was too soon after the Russian War for them to assume that without their aid the Russians would be defeated. Some resentment was manifested in Japan at the idea that Japanese soldiers were desired in order to spare the European troops. For it must not be forgotten that from every calculation the man-power of the Allies far surpassed that of the Central Powers. As long as Russia remained in the field the eastern front could be supported best by supplies rather than men, and Japan made every effort to meet this need.

It was not until after the collapse of Russia that the question of man-power became a serious one with the Allies. But before that day the United States had entered the field, and she could place men in Europe much faster and more easily than could Japan. The general view in Japan, except among a few outspoken advocates of the Allies' cause, was that she should thoroughly perform her duties in the Far East, and should adopt a policy of "watchful waiting" in regard to sending a force to Europe, although prepared to participate if her man-power were formally desired.

#### PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES

The sending of a force to Europe, therefore, never passed out of the stage of discussion. But in that stage certain very practical difficulties were presented. First of all was the question of transport. When we remember how every resource of ocean transportation was called upon to convey the American armies across the relatively narrow Atlantic, we can understand the almost insoluble difficulties presented in moving a force from Japan to Europe. From Yokohama to Marseilles, via the Suez Canal, is over 9,000 marine miles; from Yokohama to Bordeaux, via Panama, is over 12,000; from New York to Bordeaux is only 3,187. Given an equal number of transports, of equal size and speed, it would take three or four times as much tonnage to land a Japanese army in Europe as it would an American one of the same size. But the transportation facilities in the Far East could not be compared with those on the Atlantic. In 1914, the merchant marine of Japan numbered 168 steamers of over 3,000 tons, with a total of 922,020 tons. She possessed only eight ships of over 10,000 tons. This tonnage was worked to the fullest capacity to carry on the trade abandoned by British and other Allies' ships because of the military needs of the Entente. It requires little insight to understand that, as long as the man-power of the Allies remained superior to that of Germany, the very best use that Japan could make of her tonnage was in supplying the Allies with food and materials. The effect of withdrawing all the large Japanese vessels for transport services would

have been lamentable. But if she withdrew one-third of her available tonnage, say 300,000 tons, this would only suffice to transport and maintain 50,000 Japanese in Europe, if the moderate allowance of six tons per man were made. While British and requisitioned German tonnage has carried the bulk of the American troops to Europe, little help could have been found in those quarters for Japan. From every point of view, therefore, the transportation of an effective Japanese force to Europe seemed out of the question. But if it became absolutely necessary, then the tonnage could have been diverted, the Far Eastern trade allowed to lapse, the civilians of Europe and of Japan placed on a starvation allowance, so that Japan might throw her reserves of men into the European field. Fortunately, the war was brought to a close before such a need developed.

And a similar situation existed on the eastern front. The only means of transportation between Japan and European Russia was the Trans-Siberian railway, over 5,000 miles long. This was worked to fullest capacity to convey the supplies to the Russian front from Vladivostok. As long as Russia had hundreds of thousands of soldiers without equipment, was it not sound policy to use the railroad for transporting supplies rather than for transporting unneeded man-power which would in turn need more supplies? With the establishment of Bolsheviki control in Russia, their abandonment of the Allies, and their treachery to both the Rumanians and the Czecho-Slovak troops, the Japanese were profoundly grateful that no desire for glory had caused a Japanese force to be left at the mercy of the Germans and Bolsheviki five thousand miles from their base.

Of all the practical difficulties, that connected with transportation was the most insoluble. But two others were presented. First, was that of the expense involved. No one of the five Allies was so unprepared to finance a costly war as was Japan. She was still groaning under the burden of taxation due to the Russian War, which only ended in 1905. In 1914, the national debt of Japan amounted to over \$1,250,000,000. About 25% of the annual expenditure of the state went to paying interest. The people had borne, with increasing unrest, a burden of taxation



which Americans in time of peace would have deemed unthinkable. A study of the fiscal system shows how the Government had been compelled to tap almost every conceivable source of revenue.<sup>1</sup> Such unpopular taxes as the salt monopoly, the textile, business and transit taxes called for readjustment. One economist estimated that 44% of the people's income went for taxes. And when the low standard of living is borne in mind, the fact that in 1914 the highest skilled laborer received only about 50 cents a day, while the farm laborer received \$27.00 a year, we can understand that for the poorest of the Allies to have conducted one of the most expensive operations would have been more than any one could ask, unless the need was absolutely imperative. To be sure, the Japanese soldiers would be paid little, and their food would be cheap, but all the implements of warfare would cost her as much as any other state, while transport would cost more. Farm laborers earning \$27.00 a year can hardly bear the burden of a modern war as well as Americans whose earnings in a similar capacity would run from six to nine hundred dollars, with food and lodging provided.

The second problem was the equipment of the Japanese army. As far as man-power went the Japanese possessed a very effective force. But the Great War was largely a war of machinery. Japan was hopelessly deficient in airplanes, motor transport, artillery and machine guns. In her last war, with Russia, man-power counted for much, but in the Great War man-power had to be re-enforced by unheard-of quantities of guns, airships and motors. At the outbreak of the war Japan did not possess a single automobile factory. To equip an expeditionary force she would have had to fall back upon the overworked factories of Europe and America. That fact in itself indicates one of the great problems which the Japanese staff would have had to face.

<sup>1</sup> For details of Japanese finances see the plates prefixed to the Seventeenth Financial and Economic Annual of Japan. 1917. The Department of Finance (Tokyo, Government Printing Office, 1917).

*See mag. articles - food etc*

## IV. THE SIBERIAN EXPEDITION

In March of this year an entirely new question was presented by the action of the Bolsheviki representatives in signing the wretched treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Russia thus withdrew from the war, breaking the pact of London signed by the Tsar's Government. The eastern front had collapsed—not only was Germany free to mass most of her divisions on the west for her strenuous offensives which so promptly commenced, but there was the immediate danger of her overrunning Russia and exploiting such stores of food and supplies as might be found. Japan at once consulted her Allies as to what should be done under these new conditions. Three plans were unofficially considered. First, the immediate landing of a Japanese force to take possession of the vast amount of military supplies piled up at Vladivostok; secondly, the sending of an expeditionary force to seize the Trans-Siberian railway and thus prevent a German advance to the east, if such were attempted. This also called for the recapture and disarmament of the Austro-Hungarian and German prisoners in Siberia, who had been released and armed by the Bolsheviki. And, thirdly, the endeavor to restore the eastern front;—but this plan was recognized as impossible from the start. It was difficult to know what was best to be done because of the abnormal conditions in Russia. But one thing was certain, and that was that Japan would not act without the advice and approval of her Allies, especially Great Britain and the United States. In Japan the discussion was complicated because of a bitter political controversy then raging, and any decision of the Terauchi ministry was bound to provoke criticism, largely of a political nature.

The first step was taken on April 5, when a small force of sailors was landed at Vladivostok to protect life and property there, after a Japanese had been killed and two wounded by Russians. This was followed by the landing of British and later American sailors. In this way the great port of Vladivostok and the supplies there came under the control of the Allies. For the next few months there was indecision. President Wilson then

considered the problem and used his strong influence in favor of moderate measures. A new turn was given to the discussion when the Czecho-Slovak troops began to appear at Vladivostok, after having fought their way across Siberia, leaving most of their numbers embattled behind them.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PLAN

By August 3 the American proposal had been formulated and adopted by Japan. It called for the dispatch of a joint expeditionary force to Siberia to rescue the Czecho-Slovak troops from the German and Austro-Hungarian armed prisoners. Furthermore, this military assistance would "steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance." In addition the United States proposed to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association in order in some systematic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there. Statements were issued in Tokyo and in Washington defining the scope of the joint expedition.<sup>1</sup> The Japanese document contained this pledge: "They reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia, and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated, they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory, and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military."

#### JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION

Steps were at once taken to carry out these plans. The Japanese contingent was commanded by General Otani, who became the commander-in-chief of the joint force. Two American regiments were hurried up from the Philippines and Major-General Graves led the first troops across from the United States. After some

<sup>1</sup> For the texts of the statements, see The Supreme War Council, 413-416 (*A League of Nations*, I, No. 7).

fighting along the Amur River, the Allies and the Czecho-Slovaks were able to disperse the combined Bolsheviki-German-Austrian forces. Almost all the former prisoners were disarmed and placed under restraint, the Czecho-Slovak troops were rescued, and the Trans-Siberian railroad opened for its whole length. At present an All-Russian Council is in session in Omsk which has been recognized by the Allies. What the future holds for Russia no one can say, whether order will soon be restored or whether a long period of military occupation may be necessary. But so far as Japan is concerned, we can say that she has co-operated cordially and loyally with her Allies and with the United States in Siberia, and any future decisions will be reached as in the past, through friendly discussion and, if necessary, mutual concession.

If any one had prophesied, five or six years ago, that soldiers of the United States and of Japan would soon be fighting side by side against a European foe, he would have been laughed into silence. For at that time our relations with Germany and Austria were of the best, whereas on several occasions a rumor of war with Japan had been current in many quarters in the United States. What, then, have been the relations between the United States and Japan in the past, and what foundation has there been for alarmist reports which have dismayed many of the people of the two countries?

## V. JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

For a full 50 years the relations between the United States and Japan were more friendly than those which we had with almost any other power. They were more than "correct," in the diplomatic sense; they were based upon genuine good will on our part and a keen sense of appreciation and gratitude on the part of Japan. The United States in 1854, through kindly but firm pressure, had brought about the opening of Japan to foreign intercourse, after her ports had been closed for over 200 years to all but a limited Chinese and Dutch commerce. In the first years of Japan's new foreign relations the United States consistently tried to help the Japanese solve their many unfamiliar problems,

and repeatedly tried to moderate the less conciliatory views of European diplomats. So Japan turned to the United States for advice and assistance in many of her new ventures, and not a few of the leaders of New Japan were either educated in America or by Americans in Japan. And for more than 40 years the trusted adviser of the Japanese foreign office was always an American. Every well-informed student of international relations would testify that the official intercourse between Japan and the United States has been a model which might well have been followed by other powers.

#### CONTROVERSIAL INCIDENTS, 1906-1913

It was in 1905 that the first suspicion of friction appeared. And in the next nine years a series of incidents occasioned some ill-feeling, but it must be remembered that the friction was always between popular groups: the official relations were always cordial.

The occasions for controversy were found in both the United States and in the Far East. In the United States it arose from the agitation for the exclusion of the Japanese immigrants.<sup>1</sup> This movement began in California about 1905. It had small basis in fact, for there were relatively few Japanese in this country, but if their number continued to increase as rapidly as it had since 1900 a real social and economic problem would soon be presented. Instead of meeting this problem through diplomatic channels, the agitators, remembering the Chinese exclusion movement of an earlier generation, commenced direct action. This took the form of the so-called "school-boy incident" in San Francisco. Using the excuse that school facilities were lacking after the great fire in 1906, the school board ordered all Oriental students to attend a designated school. The Japanese, recognizing the motive which prompted this action, justly resented it. And it was the more ungracious because at the time of the earthquake and fire the Japanese Red Cross had contributed to the relief of San Francisco more money than all other foreign countries combined. They had eagerly seized this opportunity of showing their appreciation of all that the United States had done for Japan in the

<sup>1</sup>For American documents relating to this question, see Appendix III, p. 448.

past. The action of a local school board soon became a national and an international question. With the legal aspects we are not concerned here. The matter was settled, between the Federal Government and San Francisco, by a compromise. The Japanese students were admitted to all the schools as of old, and President Roosevelt promised to take up the question of immigration with Japan.

When the matter was presented in proper form, the Japanese at once met our requests. Practically all thoughtful Japanese realized the dangers involved in a mass immigration of people from a land with low standards of living to one where they were high. The understanding took the form of the "gentlemen's agreement," under which Japan promised not to give passports to laborers desiring to emigrate to the United States, and our Government in turn agreed not to subject the Japanese to the humiliation of an exclusion act. Since this agreement went into effect in 1907, it has met every need. No one has found ground for questioning the scrupulous good faith of the Japanese foreign office in the issue of passports. In fact the admission of Japanese, under the passport system, has worked out with fewer abuses than the admission of Chinese under the exclusion laws which we administer ourselves.<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately this good understanding did not quiet the agitation on the Pacific Coast. In the California Legislature in 1909, 1911 and 1913 a number of measures were proposed which would have caused discrimination against the Japanese residents of the state. These were reported to the Japanese press, and even though not passed they kept alive the resentment. Japanese who accepted our views regarding immigration did not hesitate to assert that such Japanese as were admitted to our country should enjoy rights and privileges equal to those of any alien. A crisis was reached when, in 1913, a bill was proposed at Sacramento

<sup>1</sup>The immigration from Japan by years since 1908 has been as follows:

1908 . . . . .	15,803	1914 . . . . .	8,929
1909 . . . . .	3,111	1915 . . . . .	8,613
1910 . . . . .	2,720	1916 . . . . .	8,680
1911 . . . . .	4,520	1917 . . . . .	8,991
1912 . . . . .	6,136	1918 . . . . .	10,213
1913 . . . . .	8,281		

which would deny to Japanese the right to acquire land or to lease it for more than three years. The purpose of this bill was to prevent the accumulation of agricultural land by the industrious and thrifty Japanese farmers. But the danger was largely imaginary because, due to the "gentlemen's agreement," very few Japanese could enter the country, and in 1913 less than 13,000 acres were actually owned by them. In spite of the efforts of the national administration, the bill was passed in a modified form, which made it apply only to "aliens ineligible to citizenship." This class included, specifically, the Chinese, and, by interpretation, all aliens who were not "free white persons" or persons of African nativity or descent. The act, moreover, especially asserted that it respected all treaty obligations. Thus the responsibility was thrown back upon the Federal Government, whose naturalization laws apparently debarred Japanese from citizenship. At the time Professor H. A. Millis, a well-known economist who had made the most careful study of the Japanese in the western states, did not hesitate to assert that the law was "unjust, impolitic and unnecessary legislation." Against this land law the Japanese Government protested, and our administration defended the legality of the act. But as an effort was made on both sides to avoid trouble the issue was never joined, and the exchange of notes never completed. But the so-called "alien land law" did more to disturb friendly relations than the immigration controversy seven years before. Happily, there has been no renewal of the anti-Japanese agitation in California. In 1915 Japan made a notable exhibit at the Panama-Pacific Exposition, which was properly appreciated, and since that time a better understanding has been established between the labor organizations of California and Japan.

#### FRICITION IN THE FAR EAST

The other occasion for friction was found in the Far East. The United States had befriended Japan in her days of weakness, and she adopted the same policy toward China when her "break-up" and division among the powers was openly discussed. In 1899, John Hay, the American secretary of state, sent out his "open

door" note, which was indorsed by Japan as well as the other powers. The next year, during the Boxer uprising, a second note won the support of all the powers to a pledge of the "integrity of China." Since that time the "open door" and the "integrity of China" have been fundamental principles of both American and Japanese policy in the Far East.

But after the Russo-Japanese War Japan succeeded to Russia's interests in Manchuria. American merchants had enjoyed a fair trade in that region. The propinquity of Japan, her cheap processes of manufacturing and her subsidized shipping all meant that she would soon prove a dangerous competitor for American and European traders in North China. Charges were soon made by Americans that, in addition to these advantages, the Japanese were closing the "open door" in the interests of their merchants. That Japan was trying in every way to improve her trade in that region is unquestionable. But that she deliberately and officially broke her "open door" pledge has never been proven, and after the first few years of adjustment were over, this charge was no longer heard. But there were some Americans who asserted that the United States should go to war with Japan in order to protect American trade in China. This was a proposition too absurd to be taken seriously by our people.

On the other hand a certain amount of criticism of American merchants and corporations was voiced in Japan. Up to that time railroad and mining concessions in China had generally been used by European powers for political ends. The Japanese could not understand that the United States had no intention of interfering in any way in the internal affairs of China. An American railroad or mine or dock-yard would be a business, not a political, enterprise. But it has taken time to drive this home to a certain type of Japanese writer, who constantly thought of American enterprises in terms of Russian or German procedure.

With such grounds for recrimination in the Far East and in our western states, it was not difficult for thoughtless writers to keep alive an alarming discussion. And as our people were so little informed regarding the facts and also regarding the purpose and power of Japan, it was easy for some to think seriously of the day



when a powerful Japanese squadron might, unannounced, appear off our coast and land an expeditionary force large enough to overrun the region as far as the Rocky Mountains. It is hard to realize this to-day, but many of our people feared, if they did not believe, it a few years ago.

#### GERMAN PROPAGANDA

We now know that in large part this propaganda was directed by German agencies. Before the war Berlin was the source of many of the alarming rumors of Japanese-American strife. During the war the group of newspapers in this country which had been most bitterly anti-Japanese was the most pro-German.<sup>1</sup> As soon as Japan entered the war the Germans tried in every way to use it as an argument against further American sympathy with the Allies. And just before we declared war upon Germany, our efficient secret service secured possession of the famous Zimmermann note, in which the German foreign secretary proposed a joint Mexican-Japanese attack upon the United States, and promised Mexico her old provinces in our southwest as a reward.<sup>2</sup> This, we must remember, was proposed while we were still on friendly terms with Germany. Japan denounced the attempt in the strongest terms. And a formal reply from both the United States and Japan may be found in the Lansing-Ishii exchange of notes on November 2, 1917.<sup>3</sup>

These notes were exchanged between Secretary of State Lansing and Viscount Ishii, the special Japanese ambassador. Their purpose was "to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated." The provisions were much like those in the Root-Takahira notes of 1908,<sup>4</sup> when trouble makers were criticising Japan's conduct in Manchuria. But in addition to renewing the pledge by both parties to respect the integrity of China and the policy of the open door, the United States, on the

<sup>1</sup> This group was also the extreme advocate of American intervention in Mexico and furthered its plans by frequent references to the alleged menace of Japan there.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the note and official discussions of it, see Appendix IV, p. 450.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the notes and official American statement regarding them, see Appendix V, p. 456.

<sup>4</sup> For essential text of the exchange, see *The Monroe Doctrine after the War*, 298 (*A League of Nations*, I, No. 5).

ground that "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries," recognized that "Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." Thus, in 1917, the alarmists who sought to create trouble between Japan and the United States because of the former's policy in China, were silenced. Japan once more gave a formal pledge to respect the integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry there. Until she has positively broken these assurances the self-appointed mentors might well keep their peace.

#### NO BASIS OF MISUNDERSTANDING

There has been, and is, no reasonable ground for misunderstanding between the United States and Japan. In every possible way Japan has shown that she seeks to maintain friendly relations, the "traditional friendship," with the United States. The exchange of notes and the cordial acceptance of the American plans for Siberian intervention are the latest expression of this feeling. In China the two countries may well co-operate, through their representatives and their merchants. Competition between business men may cause hard feeling, but no one should consider it a proper occasion for war. And our Government has formally recognized that Japan has special interests in China, just as the United States has for almost a hundred years asserted it has special interests in the lands to the south of us.

And at this time when America has played so important a part in redressing the wrongs of the Old World, she might well right a few in the New. The naturalization laws which debar Oriental residents from citizenship are as unjust as any of the racial discriminations of the Dual Empire. Because of our Chinese exclusion laws, the "gentlemen's agreement," and our last immigration law, only a few Orientals of a superior class can enter the country. Those that we admit should be placed on terms of absolute equality with all other aliens, and they should be permitted and encouraged to accept the responsibilities of citizenship. President Roosevelt proposed this to Congress in 1906. It might

well be passed in the year of the Great Peace. And with this national law, all discriminatory laws on the statute books of our states would become inoperative. In these ways the most irritating causes of misunderstanding would be removed, while the fundamental immigration policy would remain unimpaired.

## VI. THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN. AUTOCRACY OR DEMOCRACY

But even should the present occasions for friction be removed, there is always the danger that other misunderstandings may arise as long as the people of Japan and of the United States are so little familiar with the history, culture and ideals of each other. In the absence of the needed information, we are apt to apply to the Japanese the ideas which we have gained of peoples with whom we are more familiar. Our people knew, for example, that Japan was an empire, possessed of a relatively large standing army and navy. In these respects it seemed to have more in common with Germany than with the United States. How could Japan take a loyal part in a war which finally was designed "to make the world safe for democracy"? This point was well covered by our ambassador to Japan, Mr. Morris, in his first public statement after his arrival at Tokyo. He pointed out that the Allies were not fighting to establish democratic governments throughout the world, but rather in order that peoples might be free to establish their own governments. So, as we believe that the monarchy will be preserved in Great Britain, Belgium, Italy and among our Balkan Allies, we also believe that it will remain unimpaired in Japan. A better understanding of the Japanese governmental system would be of service to Americans.

### EMERGED FROM FEUDALISM IN 1871

First we must bear in mind that as recently as 1871 Japan was a feudal state, not unlike those of Europe in the Middle Age. The country was divided into about 300 fiefs, over which feudal lords ruled. The central power was divided between the emperor, or mikado, who was the source of all authority, and an hereditary general, or shogun, who administered the government in the name

of the emperor. This dual government, which had existed practically from the end of the twelfth century, came to a close in 1868, when the emperor resumed entire control of the state. Three years later, after the feudal lords had surrendered their power and wealth to the emperor, the feudal system was abolished, and a centralized government was rendered possible.

Those were momentous years in the history of Japan. She had emerged from seclusion in 1854 and had entered upon relations with the countries of the world. Soon after, she made the great governmental changes already described. In the next 30 years she reorganized every branch of her government, administration, judicial system, education, and economic life. This reorganization was based upon European experience and was designed speedily to transform Japan from a self-contained Oriental state into a nation organized after the best models found throughout the world.

So with the aid of foreign advisers employed in Japan, and Japanese students and commissioners who investigated conditions abroad, the transformation was rapidly effected. The resulting forms showed the influence of ideas from literally all over the world. American, British, French and German influences were the more important. In diplomacy, education, banking, postal organization, in business and to some extent in political theory, American views prevailed. In the formation of judicial codes and the organization of the courts, French and German experience was largely followed. Britain offered a model for the navy, and British advisers served in many other capacities. The army, first organized on French lines, soon followed the German methods, which were considered the most efficient in the world. The Japan of 1914 was the product of Japanese development and tradition, modified by many European and American contributions.

#### THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

Feudalism had scarcely fallen before Japanese publicists were advocating the introduction of constitutional and parliamentary government. Their efforts, commencing about 1872, resulted in

the grant of a constitution in 1889, and the assembling of a Parliament, or Diet, in 1890. Many of the popular advocates of this system were influenced by American, French, and especially British, political theories. Especially British, because no one advocated the establishment of a republic in Japan. But Prince Ito, who was intrusted by the emperor with the duty of drafting the constitution, kept in mind the real conditions in Japan, her recent change from a feudal state, and the political inexperience of the people; and he found in Prussia a constitution which was more suitable for the Japanese people in their present state than that of any other nation. The constitution, therefore, shows considerable signs of Prussian influence. But the important thing to bear in mind concerning this constitution is that it is a very concise document, framed in very general terms which are subject to interpretation. In Japan this interpretation is made, not by the courts but by the emperor, or, in other words, the government. It became possible for Japan to develop from a very conservative constitutional monarchy to a very liberal one, without any verbal change in the constitution itself. This point has been well made by Professor Latourette. "Although conservative, [the constitution] is so elastic that its real working may change with the political education of the people, and still retain its form." Such a change took place in the autumn of 1918, when a new ministry, representing the dominant party in the House of Representatives, took office. It seems doubtful if in the future a cabinet will be formed which does not have the support of the lower House; in this respect Japanese practice would exactly conform to that of Great Britain, France, and other states where ministerial responsibility is found.

#### EMPEROR REIGNS, BUT DOES NOT RULE

Under the constitution, the emperor retains all those powers which he did not specifically grant to the people and their representatives. Taken literally, this would mean almost autocratic power. But in Japan it may be accurately said that the emperor "reigns but does not rule." The Emperor Meiji, who reigned

from 1867 until 1912, was never known to act without the advice of his responsible ministers. He was keenly interested in affairs of state and participated in all the important discussions of the cabinet and privy council. His rôle was usually that of arbitrator when differences of opinion arose among his advisers. In every crisis of which we have knowledge, his influence was thrown in favor of the advocates of peace, notably during the Korean difficulty in 1873. And in the later years of his reign his views were properly received with the greatest respect because he was familiar with every step in the progress of Japan from a weak feudal state to a strong, united nation.

Because of its ancient lineage and its complete identification with the people's interests, the ruling dynasty of Japan holds the loyal affection of the nation to a degree surpassed by no other royal house. Whereas the Hohenzollerns repeatedly imposed their will upon the Prussian and German peoples, the emperors of New Japan have never been known to override the views of their advisers. And when the Emperor Meiji spoke to his people his words contrasted strongly with those of the late Kaiser. You will find in his rescripts no reference to the "mailed fist," to "standing in shining armor," or exhortations to his soldiers to "act like Huns." The famous imperial rescripts are those on education, which is memorized by every Japanese school-boy, on moral instruction, on thrift and diligence, on charity. This deep interest in the moral development of his people has given the late emperor a lofty place as a "peace-lord," in spite of the heroic achievements of his armies in the Chinese and Russian wars.

So to-day Japan enjoys a constitutional government, under an emperor who reigns but does not rule. The people still lack political experience, for parliamentary government is only 27 years old. But, through an excellent system of elementary education, and with the experience which time alone can bring, there is no reason to doubt that Japan will develop a government quite as democratic as that in any constitutional state, with the emperor, loyally revered by his people, serving practically as an hereditary president.

## NEED FOR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

But with this development of popular control there comes the greater need for sound knowledge of international relations. And this is just as essential in our own democracy, where the people, in the last analysis, control our foreign affairs. In this connection Elihu Root has said: "Democracies have their dangers, and they have their dangers in foreign affairs, and these dangers arise from the fact that the great mass of people haven't the time or the opportunity, or, in most cases, the capacity to study and understand the intricate and complicated relations which exist necessarily between nations. And being so situated that they cannot study the relations, cannot become familiar with the vast mass of facts which they involve, cannot become familiar with the characters and purposes of other nations, they are peculiarly open to misrepresentation and misunderstanding. The great danger to international relations with the democracies is misunderstanding—a misunderstanding of one's own duties, and of the rights and duties of other peoples."

And in the same address, at a banquet in honor of Viscount Ishii, Mr. Root continued: "For many years I was very familiar with our own department of foreign affairs, and for some years I was especially concerned in its operation. During that time there were many difficult, perplexing and doubtful questions to be discussed and settled between the United States and Japan. During that time the thoughtless or malicious section of the press was doing its worst. During that time the demagogue, seeking cheap reputation by stirring up the passions of the people to whom it appealed, was doing his worst. There were many incidents out of which quarrels and conflict might have arisen, and I hope you will all remember what I say: that during all that period there never was a moment when the Government of Japan was not frank, sincere, friendly and most solicitous not to enlarge but to minimize and do away with all causes of controversy. No one who has any familiarity at all with life can be mistaken in a negotiation as to whether the one with whom he is negotiating is try-

ing to be frank or trying to bring on a quarrel. This is a fundamental thing that you cannot be mistaken about. And there never was a more consistent and noble advocate of peace, of international friendship and of real, good understanding in the diplomacy of this world than was exhibited by the representatives of Japan, both here and in Japan, during all these years in their relations with the United States. I wish for no better, no more frank and friendly intercourse between my country and any other country than the intercourse by which Japan in those years illustrated the best qualities of the new diplomacy between nations as distinguished from the old diplomacy as between rulers."

NOVEMBER 20, 1918.



## APPENDIX.

Assembled here are the principal documents referred to by Professor Treat in his clear and concise account of Japan's recent international relations. Japan has the rare distinction of never having broken her word in international affairs, and the editors have prepared this appendix both to furnish documentary proof of Professor Treat's accurate estimate of events and to provide the reader an opportunity to gain from it a realistic conception of Japan's position in the family of nations.

### I. OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES WITH GERMANY.

#### I. THE JAPANESE ULTIMATUM, AUGUST 15, 1914.<sup>1</sup>

Considering it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great Britain in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in eastern Asia, which is the aim of the said agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

First.—To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds and to disarm at once those which can not be so withdrawn;

Second.—To deliver on a date not later than September 15, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or compensation the

<sup>1</sup>This ultimatum was stated at the time of its issuance to be a paraphrase of the note handed to Japan on April 25, 1895, by Russia, supported by Germany and France. For comparison the essential text of that note is here given:

"The Imperial Russian Government, having examined the terms of peace demanded of China by Japan, consider the contemplated possession of the Liao-tung peninsula by Japan will not only constitute a constant menace to the capital of China, but will also render the independence of Korea illusory, and thus jeopardize the permanent peace of the Far East. Accordingly, the Imperial Government, in a spirit of cordial friendship for Japan, hereby counsel the Government of the Emperor of Japan to renounce the definitive possession of the Liao-tung peninsula."

The Japanese rescript of May 13 following stated that she "yielded to the dictates of magnanimity, and accepted the advice of the three powers." (*Revue générale de droit international public*, II, 458-459.)

entire leased territory of Kiaochow with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.

The Imperial Japanese Government announce at the same time that in the event of their not receiving by noon August 23, 1914, the answer of the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government they will be compelled to take such action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation.

## 2. IMPERIAL JAPANESE RESCRIPT DECLARING WAR AGAINST GERMANY FROM NOON OF AUGUST 23, 1914.

We, by the grace of heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the throne occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make the following proclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects:

We hereby declare war against Germany, and we command our army and navy to carry on hostilities against that Empire with all their strength, and we also command all our competent authorities to make every effort, in pursuance of their respective duties to attain the national aim by all means within the limits of the law of nations.

Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calamitous effect of which we view with grave concern, we on our part have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, our Ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Germany is at Kiaochow, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while its armed vessels cruising the seas of eastern Asia are threatening our commerce and that of our Ally. Peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy.

Accordingly, our Government and that of his Britannic Majesty, after full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general interests, contemplated in the agreement of alliance, and we on our part being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means commanded our Government to offer with sincerity an advice to the Imperial German Government. By the last day appointed for the purpose, however, our Government failed to receive an answer accepting their advice. It is with profound regret that we, in spite of our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially at this early period of our reign and while we are still in mourning for our lamented mother!

It is our earnest wish that by the loyalty and valor of our faithful subjects peace may soon be restored and the glory of the Empire be enhanced.<sup>1</sup>

## II. JAPAN'S ATTITUDE IN THE WAR.

SPEECH OF VISCOUNT ICHIRO MOTONO, JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, JANUARY 22, 1918.

(*Extract.*)

The great war which has bathed Europe in blood for the last three years continues its grievous course, and it would seem difficult to predict the end. The valiant sea and land forces of all our friendly allied powers have fought throughout these long years amid sufferings of every kind with supercourage and unalterable confidence which call for the admiration and esteem of the entire world. Japan, faithful to her international engagements, has made every effort to aid the Entente Allies to secure the objects of the war and has co-operated by every possible means with her military and navy.

I am happy to be able to state that Japan's co-operation is highly appreciated by the peoples and the Governments of the Entente Allies. Our alliance with Great Britain always has been the fundamental basis of our foreign policy. It was, above all things, the reason why Japan participated in this war. Since then Japan has spared no effort to assist her Ally. It is an undeniable fact that the relations existing between our two countries have become more firmly cemented and more intimate.

We are unable to foresee now what may be the situation in the world after the war, but it is certain that while the common interests of Japan and Great Britain in Asia exist the Governments and peoples of the two nations will understand more and more the necessity of a loyal maintenance of the alliance, and I am firmly convinced that this should be the guiding principle of our nation.

With regard to our policies toward China, I declared on a previous occasion the Japanese Government had no intention of interfering or taking sides in internal political dissensions in China. The Japanese Government will maintain good relations with a stable Government in

<sup>1</sup> Japan's hostile relations to Austria-Hungary were not clearly defined. August 24, 1914, an Austro-Hungarian warship was "instructed to participate in the action at Tsingtao," and at the same time the Vienna Government severed diplomatic and consular relations. (Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. LXIX; Naval War College, International Law Documents, 1917, p. 51-52).

China without regard to party or faction. Such a stable Government will have always our assistance and recognition so long as the attitude and policies of that Government are compatible with the interests of our country. Since this statement was made the Government scrupulously has followed the course outlined. We now are able greatly to felicitate ourselves upon the appreciable improvement in the relations resulting therefrom.

One thing I desire particularly to speak of, namely, the decision taken by our neighbor to declare war against Germany in August, 1917. The increased German power was the greatest menace to the security of the Far East. All the powers having large interests bordering on the Pacific recognized the danger. It was for this reason that Japan forced Germany from Tsing-tao. China recognized that her interests marched with ours, and I wish now with you, gentlemen, to extend the heartiest congratulations to China for her wisdom in deciding to place herself resolutely in the camp of the Entente Allies.

The Chinese Government expressed a desire to increase the customs tax, to suspend indemnity payments, and also to modify certain conditions. Japan, therefore, in accord with all the interested powers, and wishing to show sympathy with China in recognizing the just demands, acceded to these requests.

The question of the customs increase required careful regulation, and a conference of delegates of the powers interested has now gathered at Shanghai for a discussion of the details. The Government will convey to you the results of this conference as soon as possible.

The Government last year sent a special mission to America for the purpose of conveying our sincere felicitations and at the same time to consult with the American officials regarding the co-operation of the two countries in the European war. The members of that mission exchanged frank views with the American authorities and the result was the establishment of a full mutual accord with regard to military co-operation.

Profiting by this opportunity the Chinese question was made the subject of a full and frank discussion. Being convinced of the sincerity of our determination to maintain and safeguard the independence of China and the integrity of Chinese territory, the American Government gave recognition to the special Japanese position in regard to China. Official notes were exchanged between the two Governments. Japan and America may well feel gratification at this outcome of the negotiations, because it demonstrates that the relations which already were cordial have been cemented more closely.

For some time there existed a certain doubt in America with regard to Japan's intentions toward China, while at the same time it is a fact, clearly proved, that by intrigues and underhand methods our enemies conspired to create antagonism between the two nations. It is an inestimable result obtained by our mission that it has been able to convince the people of the United States of the true sentiments of Japan and thus dissipate all misunderstandings. I desire to express the profound gratitude of the nation and Government of Japan for the reception and treatment, so spontaneous and warm, extended by the American Government to our mission.

With regard to Russia, events have followed quickly. The Government which is at present in power already has concluded an armistice with our enemies and appears to be at the point of signing a separate peace. Information reaching us regarding the negotiations are more or less contradictory. We are unable to secure definite information, but it will be necessary to exercise extreme prudence in considering measures which we may be called upon to take. We are unable to say whether the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk will reach a definite conclusion, but, in view of the friendly relations hitherto existing between Japan and Russia, the Japanese Government earnestly hopes the Russian nation will be able to establish a strong and stable government without prejudice to the interests of their Allies or the honor and prestige of Russia.

In this connection the enemy powers have frequently attempted by indirect means to draw the Entente Powers into *pourparlers*, but it is necessary to regard with much circumspection alleged proffers of peace from our enemies. We know from declarations of our friends and Allies what they consider the basis of future peace. These differ appreciably from those well known to be the objects of our enemy.

We must conclude, then, that so long as the views are thus widely apart, there is little hope of peace in the near future. Nevertheless, I desire to show you the position of the Imperial Government regarding peace. You know that by the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance the two countries have engaged reciprocally not to conclude a separate peace. At the outset Japan adhered to the Declaration of London of September 5, 1914, which obliges the signatory powers and those which may hereafter adhere to make peace only in common, and to consult mutually upon conditions proposed by the enemies. Not only has Japan not received up to this day any proposition from any allied power whatsoever concerning peace conditions, but we do not believe the time has yet come definitely to take up negotiations.

Japan is continuing to exert every effort to co-operate. It is entirely superfluous to declare that Japan will continue with loyalty to support her Allies with every means of assistance materially possible. This would merely be honorably carrying out the duties and the obligations of loyalty toward our Allies.

Gentlemen, the responsibility for maintenance of the security of the Far East lies entirely with Japan. It is proper that we should not hesitate at a moment's notice to take necessary steps in the event that our security should be menaced. I will add that in order to assure lasting peace in the future we are firmly convinced that Japan must not recoil from any sacrifice she may be called upon to make.

### III. IMMIGRATION AND THE "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT."

Section I of the act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States, approved February 20, 1907, contained the following:

Provided further, That whenever the President shall be satisfied that passports issued by any foreign government to its citizens to go to any country other than the United States or to any insular possession of the United States or to the Canal Zone are being used for the purpose of enabling the holders to come to the continental territory of the United States to the detriment of labor conditions therein, the President may refuse to permit such citizens of the country issuing such passports to enter the continental territory of the United States from such other country or from such insular possessions or from the Canal Zone.

In accordance with this provision and, it is understood, after negotiations with the Japanese Government, the President on March 14, 1907, issued an executive order which cited the above proviso and continued:

And Whereas, upon sufficient evidence produced before me by the Department of Commerce and Labor, I am satisfied that passports issued by the Government of Japan to citizens of that country or Korea and who are laborers, skilled or unskilled, to go to Mexico, to Canada and to Hawaii, are being used for the purpose of enabling the holders thereof to come to the continental territory of the United States to the detriment of labor conditions therein;

I hereby order that such citizens of Japan or Korea, to wit: Japanese or Korean laborers, skilled and unskilled, who have received passports to go to Mexico, Canada or Hawaii, and come therefrom, be refused permission to enter the continental territory of the United States.

It is further ordered that the secretary of commerce and labor be, and he hereby is, directed to take, through the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, such measures and to make and enforce such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry this order into effect.

The treaty of commerce and navigation signed between Japan and the United States at Washington, February 21, 1911, was proclaimed by the United States April 5, 1911, with the following included in the proclamation:

And whereas, the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States to the ratification of the said treaty was given with the understanding "that the treaty shall not be deemed to repeal or affect any of the provisions of the act of Congress entitled 'An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States,' approved February 20, 1907":

And whereas, the said understanding has been accepted by the Government of Japan;

And whereas, the said treaty, as amended by the Senate of the United States, has been duly ratified on both parts, and the ratifications of the two Governments were exchanged in the City of Tokyo, on the fourth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and eleven;

Now, therefore, be it known that I, William Howard Taft, President of the United States of America, have caused the said treaty, as amended, and the said understanding to be made public. . . .

The Japanese ambassador made the following declaration on February 21, 1911, which is considered as an integral part of the treaty:

In proceeding this day to the signature of the treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and the United States the undersigned, Japanese ambassador in Washington, duly authorized by his Government, has the honor to declare that the Imperial Japanese Government are fully prepared to maintain with equal effectiveness the limitation and control which they have for the past three years exercised in regulation of the emigration of laborers to the United States.

#### IV. GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO CREATE AMERICAN-JAPANESE ENMITY.

##### I. INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE IMPERIAL GERMAN SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE GERMAN MINISTER TO MEXICO.<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, January 19, 1917.

On the 1st of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America.

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan. At the same time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.

ZIMMERMANN.

##### 2. GERMAN STATEMENT ON THE NOTE, MARCH 3, 1917.<sup>2</sup>

Foreign Secretary Zimmermann was asked by a staff member of the Overseas News Agency about the English report that "a German plot had been revealed to get Mexico to declare war against the United States

<sup>1</sup> In response to a resolution adopted by the United States Senate on March 1, 1917, the President transmitted a letter from the secretary of state in which Mr. Lansing stated "that the Government is in possession of evidence which establishes the fact that the note referred to is authentic, and that it is in possession of the Government of the United States, and that the evidence was procured by this Government during the present week."

The Munich *Nachrichten*, according to an Amsterdam dispatch of October 17, 1918, stated that Professor Moritz J. Bonn, director of the Commercial High School, had disclosed that Legation Counselor Chemitz was the originator of the dispatch.

"Von Chemitz imagined himself an authority on Latin American affairs, and suggested the scheme to Dr. Albert Zimmermann, then German secretary for foreign affairs. Zimmermann discussed it with other foreign office officials, but they thought it unfeasible.

"Zimmermann kept the matter in mind. Presently von Chemitz came and told him that in the next few days an especially reliable messenger would start for Mexico, to whom the message could safely be intrusted, and that it was a matter of now or never.

"Zimmermann allowed himself to be over-persuaded, and so the fatal step was taken."

<sup>2</sup> Overseas News Agency (official German news bureau) wireless dispatch, March 3, 1917.



and to secure Japan's aid against the United States." Secretary Zimmermann answered:

"You understand that it is impossible for me to discuss the facts of this 'revealed plot' just at this moment and under these circumstances. I therefore may be allowed to limit my answer to what is said in the English reports, which certainly are not inspired by sympathy with Germany. The English report expressly states that Germany expected and wished to remain on terms of friendship with the United States, but that we had prepared measures of defense in case the United States declared war against Germany. I fail to see how such a 'plot' is inspired by unfriendliness on our part. It would mean nothing but that we would use means universally admitted in war, in case the United States declared war.

"The most important part of the alleged plot is its conditional form. The whole 'plot' falls flat to the ground in case the United States does not declare war against us. And if we really, as the report alleges, considered the possibility of hostile acts of the United States against us, then we really had reasons to do so.

"An Argentine newspaper a short while ago really 'revealed a plot' when it told that the United States last year suggested to other American republics common action against Germany and her allies. This 'plot' apparently was not conditional in the least. The news as published by *La Prensa*<sup>1</sup> (Buenos Aires) agrees well with the interpretation given, for instance, by an American newspaper man, Edward Price Bell, in Berlin and London, who said that the United States was waiting only for the

<sup>1</sup>The facts distorted by the German official at this point in his interview were connected with open efforts made soon after the outbreak of the war to protect the rights of neutral commerce in the Western Hemisphere. After the sinking of the American sailing ship *Frye*, when German raiders and a German war fleet were particularly active on both sides of South America, some of the diplomatic representatives in Washington of the Latin American countries conceived the idea of joint action to prevent the theater of war from extending into American waters.

The Governing Board of the Pan American Union appointed a special commission on December 8, 1914, to consider certain propositions advanced by individual members to protect the commerce of the Americas. The essential feature of the proposal became the declaration of a zone about 200 miles wide along the American coast from Cape Horn to Canada, within which no belligerent warships or submarines should be permitted to interfere with merchant ships. This subject was discussed in various phases for many months in a desultory way at occasional meetings, but as no substantial encouragement was received from the Department of State no attempt was made to make any report.

Later, on the announcement of the German purpose to prosecute ruthless submarine warfare, some of the Argentine papers made known the fact that Ambassador Naon had proposed joint action by some of the American nations to prevent war between the United States and Germany. It was soon declared, however, by the Ambassador himself that he had acted solely on his individual responsibility.

At the Argentine Embassy in Washington nothing was known of Zimmermann's charge. No one there had any knowledge of the so-called news article said by the German foreign minister to have been published recently in *La Prensa*. Copies of the paper received were said to contain nothing on the subject.

proper moment in order openly to assist the Entente. The same American stated that Americans from the beginning of the war really participated in it by putting the immense resources of the United States at the Entente's disposal, and that Americans had not declared war only because they felt sure that assistance by friendly neutrality would be during that time much more efficient for the Entente than direct participation in the war. Whether this American newspaper man reported the facts exactly we were at a loss to judge in satisfactory fashion, since we were more or less completely cut off from communication with the United States.

"But there were other facts which seemed to confirm this and similar assurances. Everybody knows these facts, and I need not repeat them. The Entente propaganda services have sufficiently heralded all these Entente demonstrations in the United States. And if you link those demonstrations with the actual attitude of the United States, then it is obvious that it was not frivolous on our part to consider what defensive measures we should take in case we were attacked by the United States."

### 3. IMPERIAL GERMAN SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE REICHSTAG, MARCH 4, 1917.<sup>1</sup>

(*Extract.*)

We were looking out for all of us, in the event of there being the prospect of war with America. It was a natural and justified precaution. I am not sorry that, through its publication in America, it also became known in Japan. For the dispatch of these instructions a secure way was chosen which at present is at Germany's disposal. How the Americans came into possession of the text, which went to America in special secret code, we do not know. That these instructions should have fallen into American hands is a misfortune, but that does not alter the fact that the step was necessary for our patriotic interests. Least of all are they in America justified in being excited about our action. It would be erroneous to suppose that the step made a particularly deep impression abroad. It is regarded as what it is—justifiable defensive action in the event of war.

### 4. JAPANESE REFUTATIONS.

#### a. STATEMENT OF JAPANESE AMBASSADOR AT WASHINGTON.

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1917.

With regard to the alleged German attempt to induce Japan and Mexico to make war upon the United States, made public in the press

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from Reuter dispatch from Amsterdam, March 5, 1917.

this morning, the Japanese embassy, while lacking information as to whether such invitation ever reached Tokyo, desires to state most emphatically that any invitation of this sort would under no circumstances be entertained by the Japanese Government, which is in entire accord and close relations with the other powers, on account of formal agreements and our common cause, and, moreover, our good friendship with the United States, which is every day growing in sincerity and cordiality. Japan is not only in honor bound to her Allies in the Entente, but could not entertain the idea of entering into any such alliance at the expense of the United States.

*b.* STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE.

A statement issued by the Japanese foreign office March 3, 1917, referred to frequent attempts of Germany "to sow seeds of distrust between Japan and Great Britain and to cause the estrangement of Japan and the United States," and added:

"The Government is confident that the peoples and Governments of the Entente will continue to have confidence in Japan's loyalty and its determination to extend all possible aid and share the difficulties and hardships until the struggle against Germany and German cruelties ends."

The statement, which supplemented a declaration of the Japanese Government through Foreign Minister Viscount Motono that Japan had received no proposition from Mexico or Germany to join in a possible war against the United States, was made to the Associated Press on behalf of the Government by Kijuro Shidehara, vice foreign minister.

"We were greatly surprised to hear of the German proposal," he said. "We cannot imagine what Germany is thinking about to conceive that she could possibly involve us in war with the United States merely by asking Mexico. This is too ridiculous for words. Needless to say Japan remains faithful to her Allies."

In reply to a question regarding Japan's attitude toward the anti-Japanese measures which were brought forward in Idaho and Oregon, Mr. Shidehara said he had especially requested newspapers to refrain from inflammatory comment, advising that the matter be left for treatment through diplomatic channels. It was noticeable that the agitation did not approach that of the time the matter was brought up in California in 1913, and it is doubtful whether the masses of the people were even cognizant of the Oregon and Idaho bills.

“Of course, we registered objections to the bills on the ground that they were discriminatory,” Mr. Shidehara continued. “Japan is convinced Secretary Lansing has done everything possible to prevent the passage of the measures, but regrets the apparent revival of anti-alien measures in one state. We realize the embarrassment of the central Government, owing to the system of state rights, but it is our duty to protect the dignity, honor and interest of Japanese subjects.”

Mr. Shidehara, continuing, declared that Japan hoped to discover a fundamental solution of the problems affecting Japanese residents in the United States, but had not yet found it.—*Associated Press Dispatch.*

c. STATEMENT OF COUNT SEIKI TERAUCHI, PREMIER OF JAPAN,  
MARCH 5, 1917.

The revelation of Germany's latest plot, looking to a combination between Japan and Mexico against the United States, is interesting in many ways. We are surprised not so much by the persistent efforts of the Germans to cause an estrangement between Japan and the United States as by their complete failure of appreciating the aims and ideals of other nations.

Nothing is more repugnant to our sense of honor and to the lasting welfare of this country than to betray our Allies and friends in time of trial and to become a party to a combination directed against the United States, to whom we are bound not only by the sentiments of true friendship, but also by the material interests of vast and far-reaching importance.

The proposal which is now reported to have been planned by the German Foreign Office has not been communicated to the Japanese Government up to this moment, either directly or indirectly, officially or unofficially, but should it ever come to hand I can conceive no other form of reply than that of indignant and categorical refusal.

d. ADDRESS OF VISCOUNT ISHII, HEAD OF THE JAPANESE MISSION TO THE  
UNITED STATES, BEFORE THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, WASHINGTON,  
SEPTEMBER 21, 1917.

(Extract.)

I am quite confident that some day, and I sincerely trust the day is not far distant, the eyes of all men who honestly endeavor to present the truth will be opened and that the truth about Japan and about America will be revealed to all the world. When that day comes you and all men will know how cleverly the work of deception has been carried on

and how long we have listened to lies about the ambitions and ideals of the East and West.

For more than ten years propaganda has been carried on in this country, in Japan, and in fact throughout the world for the one and sole purpose of keeping the nations of the Far East and Far West as far apart as possible, to create distrust, suspicion and unkindly feelings, all in order that Germany might secure advantage in the confusion. The world was flooded with tales of Japan's military aspirations and Japan's duplicity. Have these been borne out by history? Even now the German publicity agent whispers first in your ear and then in mine. To the accompaniment of appeals to the human heart, he tells to me stories of your duplicity and to you of mine.

These agents have been supplied with unlimited resources. No wonder we have been deceived. A short time ago a bad blunder gave us a clew. The Zimmermann note to Mexico, involving Japan, was a blunder. It made such a noise that we were disturbed in our slumbers and so were you. This gave a check for a time, but since then the agents have been hard at work; they were at work yesterday and they are at work to-day. Every prejudice, every sympathy, every available argument has been appealed to and used to show to your people and to ours what a low, cunning enemy we have each in the other, and how much dependent we are upon the future friendship, support and good will of—Germany.

Let me tell you a piece of secret history. When it became known to us that the American and British Governments were alike desirous of entering into a general treaty of arbitration, but that they found the making of such a treaty was precluded by the terms of the British alliance with Japan, as they then stood, it was not with the consent of Japan, but it was because of Japan's spontaneous offer that the stipulations of the alliance were revised so that no obstacle might be put in the way of the proposed treaty. As you know, Art. IV of the new Anglo-Japanese treaty, now in effect, excludes the United States from its operation. This is a true account of the genesis of that clause. It was Japan's own idea—her own contribution to the cause of universal peace.

Now, if Japan had the remotest intention of appealing to arms against America, how could she thus voluntarily have renounced the all-important co-operation of Great Britain? It would have been wildly quixotic.

There is, one may surely be safe in saying, only one way to interpret this attitude of Japan. It is a most signal proof—if indeed any proof is needed—that to the Japanese Government and nation anything like armed conflict with America is simply unthinkable.

## V. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN DURING THE WAR.

### I. EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING CHINA, NOVEMBER 2, 1917.<sup>1</sup>

#### a. SECRETARY LANSING TO VISCOUNT ISHII.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
WASHINGTON, November 2, 1917.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to communicate herein my understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China.

In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable.

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that, while geographical position gives Japan such special interests, they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers.

The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open door," or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

<sup>1</sup> Official Bulletin, November 6, 1917; Treaty Series No. 630.

I shall be glad to have Your Excellency confirm this understanding of the agreement reached by us.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING.

His Excellency VISCOUNT KIKUJIRO ISHII, *Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan, on Special Mission.*

b. REPLY OF SPECIAL AMBASSADOR.

THE SPECIAL MISSION OF JAPAN,  
WASHINGTON, November 2, 1917.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of to-day, communicating to me your understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China.

I am happy to be able to confirm to you, under authorization of my Government, the understanding in question set forth in the following terms:

In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable.

The Governments of Japan and the United States recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that, while geographical position gives Japan such special interests, they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers.

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Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

I take this opportunity to convey to you, sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) K. ISHII,

*Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan on Special Mission.*

Hon. ROBERT LANSING,  
*Secretary of State.*

#### C. STATEMENT BY SECRETARY LANSING.

The announcement of the exchange of notes was accompanied by the following statement from the Secretary of State:

Viscount Ishii and the other Japanese commissioners who are now on their way back to their country have performed a service to the United States as well as to Japan which is of the highest value.

There had unquestionably been growing up between the peoples of the two countries a feeling of suspicion as to the motives inducing the activities of the other in the Far East, a feeling which, if unchecked, promised to develop a serious situation. Rumors and reports of improper intentions were increasing and were more and more believed. Legitimate commercial and industrial enterprises without ulterior motive were presumed to have political significance, with the result that opposition to those enterprises was aroused in the other country.

#### SEES GERMAN INTRIGUE

The attitude of constraint and doubt thus created was fostered and encouraged by the campaign of falsehood, which for a long time had been adroitly and secretly carried on by Germans, whose Government, as a part of its foreign policy, desired especially to so alienate this country and Japan that it would be at the chosen time no difficult task to cause a rupture of their good relations. Unfortunately there were people in both countries, many of whom were entirely honest in their beliefs, who accepted every false rumor as true, and aided the German propaganda by declaring that their own Government should prepare for the conflict,



which they asserted was inevitable, that the interest of the two nations in the Far East were hostile, and that every activity of the other country in the Pacific had a sinister purpose.

#### SUSPICION WAS INCREASING

Fortunately this distrust was not so general in either the United States or Japan as to affect the friendly relations of the two Governments, but there is no doubt that the feeling of suspicion was increasing and the untrue reports were receiving more and more credence in spite of the earnest efforts which were made on both sides of the Pacific to counteract a movement which would jeopardize the ancient friendship of the two nations.

The visit of Viscount Ishii and his colleagues has accomplished a great change of opinion in this country. By frankly denouncing the evil influences which have been at work, by openly proclaiming that the policy of Japan is not one of aggression, and by declaring that there is no intention to take advantage commercially or industrially of the special relation to China created by geographical position, the representatives of Japan have cleared the diplomatic atmosphere of the suspicions which had been so carefully spread by our enemies and by misguided or overzealous people in both countries. In a few days the propaganda of years has been undone, and both nations are now able to see how near they came to being led into the trap which had been skillfully set for them.

#### CANDOR SHOWN BY ISHII

Throughout the conferences which have taken place Viscount Ishii has shown a sincerity and candor which dispelled every doubt as to his purpose and brought the two Governments into an attitude of confidence toward each other which made it possible to discuss every question with frankness and cordiality. Approaching the subjects in such a spirit and with the mutual desire to remove every possible cause of controversy the negotiations were marked by a sincerity and good will which from the first insured their success.

The principal result of the negotiations was the mutual understanding which was reached as to the principles governing the policies of the two Governments in relation to China. This understanding is formally set forth in the notes exchanged and now made public. The statements in the notes require no explanation. They not only contain a reaffirmation of the "open-door" policy, but introduce a principle of noninterference with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, which, generally

applied, is essential to perpetual international peace, as clearly declared by President Wilson, and which is the very foundation also of Pan Americanism as interpreted by this Government.

#### FURTHER PURPOSE ACCOMPLISHED

The removal of doubts and suspicions and the mutual declaration of the new doctrine as to the Far East would be enough to make the visit of the Japanese commission to the United States historic and memorable, but it accomplished a further purpose, which is of special interest to the world at this time, in expressing Japan's earnest desire to co-operate with this country in waging war against the German Government. The discussions, which covered the military, naval and economic activities to be employed with due regard to relative resources and ability, showed the same spirit of sincerity and candor which characterized the negotiations resulting in the exchange of notes.

At the present time it is inexpedient to make public the details of those conversations, but it may be said that this Government has been gratified by the assertions of Viscount Ishii and his colleagues that their Government desired to do their part in the suppression of Prussian militarism and were eager to co-operate in every practical way to that end. It might be added, however, that complete and satisfactory understandings upon the matter of naval co-operation in the Pacific for the purpose of attaining the common object against Germany and her allies have been reached between the representative of the Imperial Japanese Navy, who is attached to the special mission of Japan, and the representative of the United States Navy.

#### ISHII WON GOOD WILL OF ALL

It is only just to say that the success, which has attended the intercourse of the Japanese commission with American officials and with private persons as well, is due in large measure to the personality of Viscount Ishii, the head of the mission. The natural reserve and hesitation, which are not unusual in negotiations of a delicate nature, disappeared under the influence of his open friendliness, while his frankness won the confidence and good will of all. It is doubtful if a representative of a different temper could in so short a time have done as much as Viscount Ishii to place on a better and firmer basis the relations between the United States and Japan. Through him the American people have gained a new and higher conception of the reality of Japan's friendship for the United States which will be mutually beneficial in the future.

Viscount Ishii will be remembered in this country as a statesman of high attainments, as a diplomat with a true vision of international affairs, and as a genuine and outspoken friend of America.

*d.* DECLARATION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT CONCERNING NOTES EXCHANGED BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES.<sup>1</sup>

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have recently, in order to silence mischievous reports, effected an exchange of notes at Washington concerning their desires and intentions with regard to China. Copies of the said notes have been communicated to the Chinese Government by the Japanese minister at Peking, and the Chinese Government, in order to avoid misunderstanding, hastens to make the following declaration so as to make known the views of the Government.

The principle adopted by the Chinese Government toward the friendly nations has always been one of justice and equality, and consequently the rights enjoyed by the friendly nations derived from the treaties have been consistently respected, and so even with the special relations between countries created by the fact of territorial contiguity, it is only in so far as they have already been provided for in her existing treaties. Hereafter the Chinese Government will still adhere to the principle hitherto adopted, and hereby it is again declared that the Chinese Government will not allow herself to be bound by any agreement entered into by other nations.

CHINESE LEGATION,  
November 12, 1917.

2. EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN JAPANESE AND AMERICAN SECRETARIES FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MAY 6-7, 1918.<sup>2</sup>

*a.* BARON SHIMPEI GOTO TO SECRETARY LANSING.

Charged with the direction of foreign affairs in this ministry, owing to the regrettable illness and retirement of Viscount Motono, I need hardly assure you of as firm a determination as ever of this Government to promote and cement in every possible way the relations of mutual regard and confidence between our two nations, holding implicit faith in the final victory of our common cause, to which we are unalterably committed. I am indeed proud of the privilege that is afforded me of associating myself with you in the great task before us.

<sup>1</sup> Official Bulletin, November 14, 1917.

<sup>2</sup> Official Bulletin, May 7, 1918.

*b. SECRETARY LANSING TO BARON GOTO.*

I have received with gratification your telegram of yesterday, which expresses so frankly the spirit of good will for this country and of devotion to the common cause to which we are pledged.

It is needless to assure your Excellency that your words of confidence and esteem are fully reciprocated by this Government. Candor and friendship in all our relations are our supreme wish and purpose; and we feel confident that, guided by this spirit, the United States and Japan will enjoy an even better understanding—if that is possible—than the understanding which to-day characterizes their intercourse.

I appreciate your words concerning our personal association, and I am highly honored in this relationship, looking forward as I do with confidence to a continuance of the cordial spirit of helpfulness which has been so manifest in these days of conflict when the bonds of mutual interest draw our countries so closely together.

Please accept my expressions of sincere esteem and of earnest desire to co-operate with you in vigorously and successfully resisting our common enemy who menaces the national safety of Japan as well as that of the United States.

## RECENT WORKS ON JAPAN

- Abbott, James Francis.** Japanese Expansion and American Policies. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916. viii p., 1 l., 267 p., diagr. 20 cm.  
The author believes in a policy of active co-operation between the two countries.
- Blakeslee, George Hubbard, editor.** Japan and Japanese-American Relations. New York, G. E. Stechert and Company, 1912. xi, 348 p. 24 cm. (Clark University Addresses.)  
Twenty-two addresses delivered at Clark University by leading authorities on Japan.
- Brinkley, Frank, and Kikuchi, Dairoku, Baron.** A History of the Japanese People from the Earliest Times to the End of the Meiji Era . . . with 150 illustrations engraved on wood by Japanese artists; half-tone plates and maps. New York, Encyclopædia Britannica Co., 1915. xi, 784 p. 23 cm.  
Best history of Japan in English.
- Crow, Carl.** Japan and America; a contrast. New York, Robert M. McBride and Company, 1916. 4 p. l., 316 p. 21½ cm.  
A superficial study by an American journalist.
- Dyer, Henry.** Japan in World Politics; a study of international dynamics. London, Blackie & Son, limited, 1909. xiii, 425 p. 23 cm.
- Foster, John Watson.** American Diplomacy in the Orient. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1904. xiv p., 1 l., 498 p. 22½ cm.  
Ablest treatment of the subject, by a former American secretary of state.
- Gulick, Sidney Lewis.** The American Japanese Problem; a study of the racial relations of the East and West. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914. x, 349 p., front., plates, diagr. 21 cm.  
The author was for 27 years a missionary and teacher in Japan. Proposes a new American Oriental policy.
- Hornbeck, Stanley Kuhl.** Contemporary Politics in the Far East. New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1916. xxi, [2], 466 p., fold. map. 22½ cm.  
A scholarly study of recent political developments.
- The Imperial Japanese Mission, 1917.** Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1918.  
A record of the reception throughout the United States of the Special Mission headed by Viscount Ishii.
- International Conciliation Pamphlet No. 124.** The United States and Japan. Documents, addresses by Elihu Root and James L. Slayden, and an article by Professor Latourette.
- Iyenaga, Toyokichi, editor.** Japan's Real Attitude Toward America; a reply to Mr. George Bronson Rea's "Japan's Place in the Sun—the Menace to

America." New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916. viii p., 1 l., 94 p. 21½ cm.

A critical study of some typical anti-Japanese propaganda.

“Japan to Aid Her Allies Against Germany,” *Outlook*, March 13, 1918.

Jones, Jefferson. *The Fall of Tsing-Tau, with a study of Japan's ambitions in China.* Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915. xvii, [1], 214, [2 p.] ill. 21 cm.

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Kawakami, Kiyoshi Karl. *American-Japanese Relations; an inside view of Japan's policies and purposes.* New York, Fleming H. Revell Company, 1912. 3 p. l., 9-370 p. 21½ cm.

—, *Asia at the Door; a study of the Japanese question in continental United States, Hawaii and Canada.* . . . New York, Fleming H. Revell Company, 1914. 4 p. l., 7-269 p. 21½ cm.

—, *Japan in World Politics.* New York, The Macmillan Company, 1917, xxvii p., 1 l., 300 p. 20 cm.

—, “Japan's Attitude Toward the War,” *Review of Reviews*, February, 1918.

—, “Russia and Japan,” *Review of Reviews*, April, 1918.

—, “Japan's Difficult Position,” *Yale Review*, April, 1918.

The author was educated in America and, as the representative of several Japanese newspapers, has unusual opportunities for understanding the Japanese point of view. His books and articles serve to present the attitude of thoughtful Japanese toward contemporary problems.

Kinosuke, Adachi, “Why Japan's Army will Not Fight in Europe,” *Asia*, February, 1918.

Latourette, Kenneth Scott. *The Development of Japan.* Published under the auspices of the Japan Society. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918. xi p., 1 l., 237 p., map. 20½ cm.

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Longford, Joseph Henry. *The Evolution of New Japan.* New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913. 4 p. l., 166 p. ill., maps. 17 cm. (Half-title: *The Cambridge manuals of science and literature.*)

A brief résumé by a British consul and scholar.

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McLaren, Walter Wallace. *A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era, 1867-1912.* New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916. 380 p. 21½ cm.

A detailed study. Very critical of the bureaucracy, but overlooks other potent forces.

Millard, Thomas Franklin. *Our Eastern Question; America's contact with the Orient and the trend of relations with China and Japan.* New York, The Century Company, 1916. 6 p. l., 3-543 p. ill., maps. 21½ cm.

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- Millis, Harry Alvin.** The Japanese Problem in the United States; an investigation for the Commission on relations with Japan appointed by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1915. xxi, 334 p., plates. 19½ cm.  
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- Mitford, Eustace Bruce,** "Japan and the War," *Fortnightly Review*, October, 1918.
- Nitobe, Inazo Ota.** The Japanese Nation; its land, its people, and its life, with special consideration to its relations with the United States. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912. xiv p., 1 l., 334 p., map. 20½ cm.  
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- Porter, Robert Percival.** Japan; The rise of a modern power. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1918. xi, 361 p. ill., maps. 20 cm.  
Designed to increase British knowledge of their Ally.
- Scherer, James Augustin Brown.** The Japanese Crisis. New York, Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1916. 5 p. l., 3-148 p. 19½ cm.  
The work of a California college president who was for five years a teacher in Japan.
- Sunderland, Jabez Thomas.** Rising Japan; is she a menace or a comrade to be welcomed in the fraternity of nations? . . . with a foreword by Lindsay Russell. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1918. xi, 220 p. 19 cm.  
A sympathetic study of Japan and her place in the world to-day.
- Treat, Payson Jackson,** "Japan and America," *Review of Reviews*, April, 1917. 1'
- Uyehara, George Etsujiro.** The Political Development of Japan, 1867-1909. London, Constable & Co., 1910. xxiv, 296 p., tables. 23 cm.  
The work of an English-educated Japanese scholar.
- "Why Japan Has Not Sent a Force to Europe,"** *Outlook*, January 9, 1918.

# THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

BY THEODORE ROOSEVELT

*(Article published posthumously, in the Kansas City Star, January 13, 1919.)*

It is, of course, a serious misfortune that our people are not getting a clear idea of what is happening on the other side. For the moment the point as to which we are foggy is the League of Nations. We all of us earnestly desire such a League, only we wish to be sure that it will help and not hinder the cause of world peace and justice. There is not a young man in this country who has fought, or an old man who has seen those dear to him fight, who does not wish to minimize the chance of future war. But there is not a man of sense who does not know that in any such movement, if too much is attempted, the result is either failure or worse than failure.

The trouble with Mr. Wilson's utterances, so far as they are reported, and the utterances of acquiescence in them by European statesmen, is that they are still absolutely in the stage of rhetoric, precisely like the 14 points. Some of the 14 points will probably have to be construed as having a mischievous sentence, a smaller number might be construed as being harmless, and one or two even as beneficial, but nobody knows what Mr. Wilson really means by them, and so all talk of adopting them as the basis for a peace or league is nonsense, and, if the talker is intelligent, it is insincere nonsense to boot.

So Mr. Wilson's recent utterances give us absolutely no clew as to whether he really intends that at this moment we shall admit Russia, Germany, with which, incidentally, we are still waging war, Turkey, China and Mexico into the League on a full equality with ourselves. Mr. Taft has recently defined the purposes of



the League and the limitations under which it would act, in a way that enables most of us to say we very heartily agree in principle with his theory, and can, without doubt, come to an agreement on specific details.

Would it not be well to begin with the League which we actually have in existence—the League of the Allies who have fought through this great war? Let us at the peace table see that real justice is done as among these Allies, and that while the sternest reparation is demanded from our foe for such horrors as those committed in Belgium, northern France, Armenia, and the sinking of the *Lusitania*, nothing should be done in the spirit of mere vengeance.

Then let us agree to extend the privileges of the League as rapidly as their conduct warrants it to other nations, doubtless discriminating between those who would have a guiding part in the League and the weak nations who should be entitled to the guiding voice in the councils. Let each nation reserve to itself and for its own decision, and let it clearly set forth, questions which are nonjusticiable. Let nothing be done that will interfere with our preparing for our own defense by introducing a system of universal obligatory military training, modeled on the Swiss plan.


Finally, make it perfectly clear that we do not intend to take a position of an international Meddlesome Matty. The American people do not wish to go into an overseas war unless for a very great cause, and where the issue is absolutely plain. Therefore, we do not wish to undertake the responsibility of sending our gallant young men to die in obscure fights in the Balkans or in Central Europe, or in a war we do not approve of.

Moreover, the American people do not intend to give up the Monroe Doctrine. Let civilized Europe and Asia introduce some kind of police system in the weak and disorderly countries at their thresholds. But let the United States treat Mexico as our Balkan peninsula and refuse to allow European or Asiatic powers to interfere on this continent in any way that implies permanent or semi-permanent possession. Every one of our Allies will with

delight grant this request if President Wilson chooses to make it, and it will be a great misfortune if it is not made.

I believe that such an effort, made moderately and sanely but sincerely and with utter scorn for words that are not made good by deeds, will be productive of real and lasting international good.







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