

A27262

10/21

JHE FRIED. Role of Citizen Army in MODERN WARFARE, PRESS + PERIODICALS 1950-1955

**SURVIVAL
UNDER
ATOMIC ATTACK**

THE OFFICIAL U. S. GOVERNMENT BOOKLET

Executive Office of the President
National Security Resources Board
Civil Defense Office
NSRB Doc. 130

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1950

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D. C. - Price 10 cents

You Can SURVIVE

**You can live through an atom bomb raid
and you won't have to have a Geiger counter,
protective clothing, or special training
in order to do it.**

The secrets of survival are:

KNOW THE BOMB'S TRUE DANGERS.

KNOW THE STEPS YOU CAN TAKE

TO ESCAPE THEM.

ATOM-SPLITTING IS JUST ANOTHER WAY OF CAUSING AN EXPLOSION.

To begin with, you must realize that atom-splitting is just another way of causing an explosion. While an atom bomb holds more death and destruction than man has ever before wrapped in a single package, its total power is definitely limited. Not even hydrogen bombs could blow the earth apart or kill us all by mysterious radiation.

YOUR CHANCES OF SURVIVING AN ATOMIC ATTACK ARE BETTER THAN YOU MAY HAVE THOUGHT.

Because the power of all bombs is limited, your chances of living through an atomic attack are much better than you may have thought. In the city of Hiroshima, slightly over half the people who were a mile from the atomic explosion are still alive. At Nagasaki, almost 70 percent of the people a mile from the bomb lived to tell their experiences. Today thousands of survivors of these two atomic attacks live in new houses built right where their old ones once stood. The war may have changed their way of life, but they are not riddled with cancer. Their children are normal. Those who were temporarily unable to have children because of the radiation now are having children again.

WHAT ARE YOUR CHANCES?

If a modern A-bomb exploded without warning in the air over your home town tonight, your calculated chances of living through the raid would run something like this:

Should you happen to be one of the unlucky people right under the bomb, there is practically

4 "Modern" atomic bomb, as used in this booklet, refers to the "nominal" bomb described in the "Effects of Atomic Weapons," published in June 1950 by the Atomic Energy Commission.

CLOSE TO THE EXPLOSION, YOUR CHANCES ARE ONLY ONE OUT OF TEN.

no hope of living through it. In fact, anywhere within one-half mile of the center of explosion, your chances of escaping are about 1 out of 10.

On the other hand, and this is the important point, from one-half to 1 mile away, you have a 50-50 chance.

From 1 to 1½ miles out, the odds that you will be killed are only 15 in 100.

And at points from 1½ to 2 miles away, deaths drop all the way down to only 2 or 3 out of each 100.

Beyond 2 miles, the explosion will cause practically no deaths at all.

Naturally, your chances of being injured are far greater than your chances of being killed. But even injury by radioactivity does not mean that you will be left a cripple, or doomed to die an early death. Your chances of making a complete recovery are much the same as for everyday accidents. These estimates hold good for modern atomic bombs exploded without warning.

WHAT ABOUT SUPER BOMBS?

Do not be misled by loose talk of imaginary weapons a hundred or a thousand times as powerful. All cause destruction by exactly the same means, yet one 20,000-ton bomb would not create nearly as much damage as 10,000 two-ton bombs dropped a little distance apart. This is because the larger bombs "waste" too much power near the center of the explosion. From the practical point of view, it doesn't matter whether a build-

BEYOND A HALF MILE, YOUR CHANCES OF SURVIVING INCREASE RAPIDLY.

INJURY BY RADIOACTIVITY DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN YOU ARE DOOMED TO DIE OR BE CRIPPLED.

DON'T BE MISLED BY WILD TALK OF "SUPER-SUPER BOMBS."

ing near the center of the explosion is completely vaporized or whether it is simply knocked into a pile of rubble.

To be more specific, a modern atomic bomb can do heavy damage to houses and buildings roughly 2 miles away. But doubling its power will extend the range of damage to only about 2½ miles. In the same way, if there were a bomb 100 times as powerful, it would reach out only a little more than 4½, not 100 times as far.

And remember: All these calculations of your chances of survival assume that you have absolutely no advance warning of the attack.

Just like fire bombs and ordinary high explosives, atomic weapons cause most of their death and damage by blast and heat. So first let's look at a few things you can do to escape these two dangers.

WHAT ABOUT BLAST?

Even if you have only a second's warning, there is one important thing you can do to lessen your chances of injury by blast: Fall flat on your face.

More than half of all wounds are the result of being bodily tossed about or being struck by falling and flying objects. If you lie down flat, you are least likely to be thrown about. If you have time to pick a good spot, there is less chance of your being struck by flying glass and other things.

If you are inside a building, the best place to flatten out is close against the cellar wall. If you

DOUBLING A BOMB'S POWER DOESN'T MEAN DOUBLING THE DAMAGE IT WILL DO.

BLAST AND HEAT ARE THE BIGGEST DANGERS.

TO PROTECT YOURSELF FROM BLAST, LIE DOWN IN A SHIELDED SPOT.

haven't time to get down there, lie down along an inside wall, or duck under a bed or table. But don't pick a spot right opposite the windows or you are almost sure to be pelted with shattered glass.

If caught out-of-doors, either drop down alongside the base of a good substantial building—avoid flimsy, wooden ones likely to be blown over on top of you—or else jump in any handy ditch or gutter.

When you fall flat to protect yourself from a bombing, don't look up to see what is coming. Even during the daylight hours, the flash from a bursting A-bomb can cause several moments of blindness, if you're facing that way. To prevent it, bury your face in your arms and hold it there for 10 or 12 seconds after the explosion. That will also help to keep flying glass and other things out of your eyes.

WHAT ABOUT BURNS?

Flash burns from the A-bomb's light and heat caused about 30 percent of the injuries at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Near the center of the burst the burns are often fatal. People may be seriously burned more than a mile away, while the heat can be felt on the bare face and hands at 4 or 5 miles.

To prevent flash burns, try to find a shelter where there is a wall, a high bank or some other object between you and the bursting bomb. You can expect that the bomber will aim for the city's biggest collection of industrial buildings.

A little bit of solid material will provide flash

IN YOUR HOUSE: LIE DOWN AGAINST A WALL.

OUTDOORS: GET NEXT TO A SOLID BUILDING.

TO ESCAPE TEMPORARY BLINDNESS, BURY YOUR FACE IN YOUR ARMS.

FLASH BURNS ARE A SERIOUS CAUSE OF INJURY. SHIELD YOURSELF FROM THE FLASH.

EVEN A LITTLE MATERIAL GIVES PROTECTION FROM FLASH BURNS, SO BE SURE TO DRESS PROPERLY.

protection even close to the explosion. Farther out, the thinnest sort of thing—even cotton cloth—will often do the trick.

If you work in the open, always wear full-length, loose-fitting, light-colored clothes in time of emergency. Never go around with your sleeves rolled up. Always wear a hat—the brim may save you a serious face burn.

WHAT ABOUT RADIOACTIVITY?

In all stories about atomic weapons, there is a great deal about radioactivity.

Radioactivity is the only way—besides size—in which the effects of A or H bombs are different from ordinary bombs. But, with the exception of underwater or ground explosions, the radioactivity from atomic bursts is much less to be feared than blast and heat.

Radioactivity is not new or mysterious. In the form of cosmic rays from the sky, all of us have been continually bombarded by radiation every hour and day of our lives. We all have also breathed and eaten very small amounts of radioactive materials without even knowing it. For over half a century, doctors and scientists have experimented and worked with X-rays and other penetrating forms of energy. Because of all this experience, we actually know much more about radioactivity and what it does to people than we know about infantile paralysis, colds, or some other common diseases.

RADIOACTIVITY IS THE ONLY WAY BESIDES SIZE IN WHICH ATOMIC BOMBS DIFFER FROM ORDINARY ONES.

WE KNOW MORE ABOUT RADIOACTIVITY THAN WE DO ABOUT COLDS.

It is easy to understand how radioactivity works if we think of how sunlight behaves.

In the northern part of the world, winter's slanting sun rays seldom cause sunburn, but the hotter rays of the summer sun often do. Still, just a few moments in the midsummer sun will not give you a tan or sunburn. You have to stay in its hot rays for some time before you get a burn. What's more, bad sunburn on just the face and hands may hurt, but it won't seriously harm you. On the other hand, if it covers your whole body, it can make you very sick, or sometimes even cause death.

In the same way, the harm that can come to you from radioactivity will depend on the power of the rays and particles that strike you, upon the length of time you are exposed to them, and on how much of your body is exposed.

WHAT IS "INITIAL" RADIOACTIVITY?

Broadly speaking, atomic explosions produce two different kinds of radioactivity. First—and most important in an air burst—is an extremely powerful invisible burst of rays and particles thrown off at the time of explosion. This kind is called "initial" or explosive radioactivity. Its rays and particles fly out quickly, then promptly die. There is danger from them only for little more than a minute. The second type of radioactivity—lingering radioactivity—will be described later.

INJURY FROM RADIOACTIVITY DEPENDS ON THE POWER OF THE RAYS AND PARTICLES, HOW LONG YOU WERE EXPOSED AND HOW MUCH OF YOUR BODY WAS HIT.

EXPLOSIVE RADIOACTIVITY IS THE MOST IMPORTANT KIND, BUT IT LASTS ONLY A MOMENT.

THE BIGGEST DANGER FROM EXPLOSIVE RADIOACTIVITY LIES WITHIN A MILE OF THE EXPLOSION.

The injury range of the explosive radioactivity from a modern A-bomb is a little over 1 mile, if the bomb is exploded about 2,000 feet in the air. If it is exploded much higher, some of the radiation may not reach the ground, so the range may be less. If it is exploded much lower, the radiation also may not reach out as far, because it would be blocked by the ground or by buildings.

A little more than a mile away, the principal effects of the few dying rays that struck you could be seen only as temporary blood changes in a doctor's examination. You probably wouldn't even realize you had been exposed.

A little less than a mile from the explosion center, if you are unprotected, you are almost sure to suffer illness. Less than two-thirds of a mile away, those caught in the open are pretty sure to soak up a fatal dose of radioactivity.

Still, the possibility of your being caught without some protection is not very great. Even if you are on the street, there is a good chance that a building, or many buildings, will be between you and the burst, and they will partially or completely shield you.

Atomic explosions high above ground cause the most widespread damage. And, as happened in Japan, when an A-bomb goes off in the air you are far more likely to be hurt by the bomb's blast and heat waves than by its radioactivity. At Hiroshima and Nagasaki slightly over one-half of all deaths and injuries were caused by blast. Nearly one-third of the casualties were from the heat flash.

BUILDINGS WILL PARTIALLY OR COMPLETELY SHIELD YOU.

YOU ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE HURT BY BLAST AND HEAT THAN BY RADIATION.

Radioactivity alone caused only about 15 percent of all deaths and injuries

If the bomb were to go off close to the ground, or slightly below its surface, the range of the explosive radiation, as well as the range of the blast and heat, would be reduced. This is due to the fact that all three would be partially blocked by the earth, by nearby buildings and by other obstacles.

In an underwater burst, there would be much less to fear from blast and nothing to fear from heat. Practically all the explosive radioactivity would be absorbed by the water. However, there would be the second type of radioactivity to be described later on.

WHAT ABOUT "INDUCED" RADIOACTIVITY?

If an atomic bomb goes off in the air within two-thirds of a mile or slightly more of your home, there is no practical way of keeping explosive radioactivity out of the above-ground part of your house. It is possible that, at very short range, artificial, or induced radioactivity could be set up in gold, silver, and many other objects. However, this kind of radioactivity will never offer great danger, so don't throw away bandages and other first aid materials in the medicine cabinet. They will be perfectly safe to use.

EXPLOSIVE RADIOACTIVITY IS LESS OF A DANGER IN GROUND-LEVEL OR UNDERWATER BURSTS.

EXPLOSIVE RADIOACTIVITY CAN'T BE KEPT OUT OF THE UPPER FLOORS OF YOUR HOUSE, SO LEARN WHAT TO EXPECT FROM IT.

EVEN CANNED AND BOTTLED FOODS MAY BE IRRADIATED, BUT IT WILL STILL BE SAFE TO USE THEM.

VOMITING AND DIARRHEA ARE THE FIRST SIGNS OF RADIATION SICKNESS.

EVEN IF YOU SHOULD GET SEVERE RADIATION SICKNESS, YOU WOULD HAVE BETTER THAN AN EVEN CHANCE OF RECOVERY.

Naturally, the radioactivity that passes through the walls of your house won't be stopped by tin or glass. It can go right through canned and bottled foods. However, this will not make them dangerous, and it will not cause them to spoil. Go ahead and use them, provided the containers are not broken open.

WHAT ABOUT "RADIATION SICKNESS"?

Should you be caught upstairs or in the open at the time of a bombing, you might soak up a serious dose of explosive radioactivity. Even so, the first indication that you had been pierced by the rays probably wouldn't show up for a couple of hours. Then you most likely would get sick at your stomach and begin to vomit. However, you might be sick at your stomach for other reasons, too, so vomiting won't always mean you have radiation sickness. The time it would take you to get sick would depend on how strong a dose you got. The stronger the dose, the quicker you would get sick. For a few days you might continue to feel below par and about 2 weeks later most of your hair might fall out. By the time you lost your hair you would be good and sick. But in spite of it all, you would still stand better than an even chance of making a complete recovery, including having your hair grow in again.

WHERE IS THE BEST PLACE TO GO?

If your house is close to the explosion, there is little you can do to protect it from the bomb's blast, or pressure wave. Within one-half mile of the surface point directly beneath the explosion, the shock wave from an atomic bomb is sure to flatten most houses. Out to a distance of about 1 mile, steel, brick, and wooden structures are likely to be damaged beyond repair. Farther out, there is less destruction, but serious damage may be expected to extend as far as 2 miles.

It is only wise to figure that the upper floors of most buildings near the explosion will be pushed in. This means the basement is probably the safest place to be. If you have a basement and time to get down to it, lie flat along the outer wall or near the base of some heavy supporting column. You would be even safer under a cellar work bench or heavy table. Stay away from the middle of the floor where falling beams and other objects are most likely to strike you.

Naturally, you run a risk of being trapped in the wreckage, but your *over-all* chances of escape from the bomb in most cases are many times greater than they would be upstairs. If your basement has two exits, you will be in less danger of being trapped.

Besides protecting you from blast and heat, basements also provide shielding from explosive radia-

THERE IS LITTLE YOU CAN DO TO PROTECT YOUR HOUSE FROM BLAST.

IT IS BEST TO FIGURE ON COLLAPSE OF THE UPPER FLOORS AND TO TAKE COVER IN THE CELLAR.

**BASEMENTS
GIVE SHELTER
AGAINST BLAST
AND HEAT, AND
RADIOACTIVITY.**

**IF YOU HAVE NO
BASEMENT,
LOCATE A SHELTER
YOU CAN REACH
QUICKLY.**

**CYCLONE CELLARS
ARE EXCELLENT.**

**"FIREPROOF
HOUSEKEEPING"
IS IMPORTANT.**

tion. Because, the lower you get, the more barriers against radiation there are likely to be between you and the bursting bomb. Down in the cellar you'll probably be shielded not only by other buildings, but also by earth and the cement foundations of your own house. Earth, concrete and steel are good radiation barriers.

If you have no basement, look around your immediate neighborhood for a nearby shelter you can get to quickly in an emergency. Such a shelter might be a culvert, a deep gully, or another building within easy reach. If you live in rolling country, there is probably a hill close to you. Even a high bank will offer some protection from most bursts if it is between you and the explosion. In choosing your shelter, assume that the enemy will aim for the industrial buildings.

If you live in a State where there is danger from sudden storms like cyclones or hurricanes, you may have a "cyclone cellar" or something similar. If so, you have a shelter that will give excellent protection against atomic bombs.

HOW SHOULD A HOUSE BE PREPARED?

Starting right now you should go in for "fire-proof housekeeping." Don't let trash pile up around your house and always keep it in covered containers.

Continued on page 19.

KILL THE MYTHS

ATOMIC WEAPONS WILL NOT DESTROY THE EARTH

Atomic bombs hold more death and destruction than man ever before has wrapped up in a single package, but their over-all power still has very definite limits. Not even hydrogen bombs will blow the earth apart or kill us all by radioactivity.

DOUBLING BOMB POWER DOES NOT DOUBLE DESTRUCTION

Modern A-bombs can cause heavy damage 2 miles away, but doubling their power would extend that range only to 2½ miles. To stretch the damage range from 2 to 4 miles would require a weapon more than 8 times the rated power of present models.

RADIOACTIVITY IS NOT THE BOMB'S GREATEST THREAT

In most atom raids, blast and heat are by far the greatest dangers that people must face. Radioactivity alone would account for only a small percentage of all human deaths and injuries, except in underground or underwater explosions.

RADIATION SICKNESS IS NOT ALWAYS FATAL

In small amounts, radioactivity seldom is harmful. Even when serious radiation sickness follows a heavy dosage, there is still a good chance for recovery.

ALWAYS PUT FIRST THINGS FIRST AND

1. TRY TO GET SHIELDED

If you have time, get down in a basement or subway. Should you unexpectedly be caught out-of-doors, seek shelter alongside a building, or jump in any handy ditch or gutter.

2. DROP FLAT ON GROUND OR FLOOR

To keep from being tossed about and to lessen the chances of being struck by falling and flying objects, flatten out at the base of a wall, or at the bottom of a bank.

3. BURY YOUR FACE IN YOUR ARMS

When you drop flat, hide your eyes in the crook of your elbow. That will protect your face from flash burns, prevent temporary blindness and keep flying objects out of your eyes.

NEVER LOSE YOUR HEAD AND

4. DON'T RUSH OUTSIDE RIGHT AFTER A BOMBING

After an air burst, wait a few minutes then go help to fight fires. After other kinds of bursts wait at least 1 hour to give lingering radiation some chance to die down.

5. DON'T TAKE CHANCES WITH FOOD OR WATER IN OPEN CONTAINERS

To prevent radioactive poisoning or disease, select your food and water with care. When there is reason to believe they may be contaminated, stick to canned and bottled things if possible.

6. DON'T START RUMORS

In the confusion that follows a bombing, a single rumor might touch off a panic that could cost your life.

Remove this sheet and keep it with you until you've memorized it.

FIVE KEYS TO HOUSEHOLD SAFETY

1. STRIVE FOR "FIREPROOF HOUSEKEEPING"

Don't let trash pile up, and keep waste paper in covered containers. When an alert sounds, do all you can to eliminate sparks by shutting off the oil burner and covering all open flames.

2. KNOW YOUR OWN HOME

Know which is the safest part of your cellar, learn how to turn off your oil burner and what to do about utilities.

3. HAVE EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES HANDY

Always have a good flashlight, a radio, first-aid equipment and a supply of canned goods in the house.

4. CLOSE ALL WINDOWS AND DOORS AND DRAW THE BLINDS

If you have time when an alert sounds, close the house up tight in order to keep out fire sparks and radioactive dusts and to lessen the chances of being cut by flying glass. Keep the house closed until all danger is past.

5. USE THE TELEPHONE ONLY FOR TRUE EMERGENCIES

Do not use the phone unless absolutely necessary. Leave the lines open for real emergency traffic.

If you know you have time when an alert sounds, be sure to shut the doors and windows and pull down the shades. This will help keep out fire sparks.

If you have shutters or venetian blinds, or heavy drapes, they will also provide some protection against harm from flying glass.

Several other household precautions should be taken promptly. Atomic bombs set off high above ground seldom cause breaks in underground gas or water mains. However, shaking and twisting of the buildings by the blast wave sometimes snaps off household inlets at the point where they enter the basement. This may allow gas or oil to flow into your cellar.

To lessen the danger of fires and explosions that could result from this leakage, you should throw the electric switch that shuts off your oil burner.

Your local utility companies can give you detailed instructions about your gas, pilot lights, and so on.

If you have a coal-burning furnace or wood stove, be sure to close all its fuel and draft doors. In other words, do all you can to prevent sparks and to put out or cover open flames.

Should attack come without warning, take these same precautions right after the raid. Keep at least one flashlight handy and don't strike a match to light your way down into a darkened basement. Gas or oil fumes may be present and an explosion could result.

WHEN ALERTED,
CLOSE ALL WIN-
DOWS AND DOORS
AND GUARD
AGAINST INJURY
BY FLYING
GLASS.

TO PREVENT
HOUSEHOLD
EXPLOSIONS,
SHUT OFF OIL
BURNERS.

LOCAL UTILITY
COMPANIES WILL
GIVE YOU DETAILED
INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT
GAS, ELECTRICITY
AND SO ON.

KEEP A FLASH-
LIGHT HANDY.

WHAT ABOUT LINGERING RADIOACTIVITY?

AIR BURSTS
LEAVE NO
DANGEROUS LINGER-
ING RADIO-
ACTIVITY.

Knowing how to protect yourself from blast, heat, and explosive radioactivity, only one major problem remains: That is how to avoid harm from lingering radioactivity.

Explosive radioactivity bursts from the bomb at the time of explosion and lasts for only little more than a minute.

Lingering radioactivity remains for a longer time, from a few minutes to weeks or months, depending on the kind of radioactive material.

LINGERING
RADIOACTIVITY
COMES FROM
BOMB "ASHES"
OR UNEXPLODED
ATOMIC FUEL.

Lingering radioactivity may become a danger when atomic bombs are exploded on the ground, underground, or in the water. Air bursts leave no dangerous lingering radioactivity.

Most lingering radioactivity comes from left-over bomb wastes, or "ashes," technically called fission products. They consist of countless billions of fragments, or pieces, of atoms split up in the explosion. Smaller, and usually less dangerous, amounts of lingering radioactivity may be thrown off by scattered atoms of uranium or plutonium that fail to split up when the bomb goes off.

LINGERING
RADIOACTIVITY
ACTS LIKE
DUST AND IS
HARD TO GET
RID OF. AVOID
IT WHENEVER
YOU CAN.

These totally invisible radioactive particles act much the same as ordinary, everyday dust. When present in any real quantity, they are scattered about in patches and contaminate, or pollute, everything they fall on, including people. While

they can be removed easily from some surfaces, they stick very tightly to others. It is practically impossible to get absolutely all of them out of household corners and cracks. Most of the time, it is far easier to prevent pollution than it is to remove it.

WHAT ABOUT RADIOACTIVE CLOUDS?

In spite of the huge quantities of lingering radioactivity loosed by atomic explosions, people fortunately are not very likely to be exposed to dangerous amounts of it in most atomic raids.

Since high-level bursts do the greatest damage, that is the kind we can expect most often. When atomic weapons are exploded in mid-air, the violent, upward surge of super-hot gases and air quickly sweeps practically all the radioactive ashes and unexploded bits of bomb fuel high into the sky. Most of them are carried harmlessly off in the drifting bomb clouds. High-level explosions definitely will not create "areas of doom", where no man dares enter and no plant can grow. In fact, they will leave very little radioactivity on the ground, even near the point of explosion. Firefighters and rescue teams can move promptly toward the center of destruction with little danger of facing harmful radiation.

And regardless of all you may have heard or read concerning the dangers of radioactive clouds,

IN AIR BURSTS
RADIOACTIVE
DUSTS ARE
SPREAD SO
WIDELY THAT
THEY ARE UN-
LIKELY TO HARM
PEOPLE.

AIR BURSTS
WILL NOT
CREATE "AREAS
OF DOOM."

DON'T WORRY
ABOUT HIGH-
LEVEL RADIOACTIVE
CLOUDS.

IT WOULD TAKE
MANY THOUSANDS
OF A-BOMBS TO
PRODUCE
DANGEROUS
GROUND
CONTAMINATION.

NONE OF THE JAPANESE AT HIROSHIMA OR NAGASAKI WERE HARMED BY LINGERING RADIOACTIVITY.

SURFACE BURSTS USUALLY LEAVE A LIMITED AREA RADIOACTIVE.

after the first minute and a half there is actually little or nothing to fear from those produced by high-level bursts. While most of the radioactive materials swept up into the sky eventually fall back to earth, they are so widely and so thinly spread that they are very unlikely to offer any real dangers to humans. Thousands of bombs would have to be set off in the air before serious ground contamination would be found over really large areas. There was no ground-level pollution of any importance following either of the two Japanese atomic bombings.

It was said earlier that 15 percent of the Japanese A-bomb deaths or injuries were caused by radioactivity. But not one of them was caused by the lingering kind. Explosive radioactivity caused them all.

WHAT ABOUT GROUND AND WATER BURSTS?

Bursts on or near the ground usually will leave a limited area of rather heavy and often dangerous pollution near the explosion point. In such cases, the possibility of harm from radioactivity falling out of the clouds is greater than in high-level explosions. But even so, a person could escape contamination by simply taking refuge inside a house or even by getting inside a car and rolling up the windows. And even if some of the wastes fell on him, he would lessen his chances of injury if he promptly shed his clothes and took a bath or shower.

In underwater explosions, large portions of the bomb's radioactive wastes will be "trapped" by the water and then spread over the immediate area. Under these conditions, serious ground pollution is to be expected.

After a water or underground burst a cloud of very radioactive mist or dust might form and spread, particularly downwind, injuring people who weren't well sheltered.

If the explosion has been underground, at ground level, or in the water, stay in your shelter. If caught in the open, get indoors right away. Then stay indoors for at least an hour or until you get instructions. It may be necessary to stay inside for three or four hours. The reason for this is that most lingering radioactivity loses its power very fast. So staying undercover for a while will greatly reduce the danger.

Any rain or mist that comes right after an atomic explosion should be considered dangerous, even though it may not always be radioactive. Keep from getting wet if you possibly can.

And remember that an *air burst* will leave *no* lingering radioactivity of importance, so after a few minutes it will be safe to get out and help fight fires or to help people who may need it.

HOW IS RADIOACTIVITY DETECTED?

While we cannot see, hear, feel, smell, or taste radioactivity, its presence readily can be detected

UNDERWATER A-BOMBS PRODUCE SERIOUS LINGERING RADIATION.

STAY UNDER COVER FOR AT LEAST AN HOUR AFTER GROUND OR UNDERWATER BURSTS.

AVOID GETTING WET AFTER UNDERWATER BURSTS.

YOU WON'T
NEED AN
INSTRUMENT
TO DETECT
RADIOACTIVITY.
SPECIALISTS
WILL DO IT
FOR YOU.

with Geiger counters and other instruments. However, you won't have to know how to use one of these. Instead, you can rely on your local radiological defense teams—a small, specially trained corps of “meter readers”—to warn you of the presence of lingering radioactivity. You also can count on them to see to it that firefighters, rescue workers, and other people who may have to enter contaminated places do not remain there long enough to be injured.

But always remember our sunlight comparison. There is usually a whale of a difference between *detectable* and *dangerous* amounts of radioactivity. The rays and particles from an ordinary, luminous-dial wrist watch will cause a roar in the earphones of a Geiger counter, as just one example. We must not lose our heads just because radioactivity is reported as present.

THE RADIO-
ACTIVITY FROM
YOUR LUMINOUS
WRIST WATCH
DIAL CAN BE
DETECTED EASILY.

WHAT ABOUT PROTECTING YOURSELF FROM LINGERING RADIOACTIVITY?

While attempting to avoid exposure to the bomb's blast, heat, and explosive radioactivity, also do what you can to keep from being showered by radioactive waste materials. Inside a shelter or building there is little or nothing to fear from this source. But if caught out-of-doors, try to grab hold of something to cover yourself with when you fall to the ground. A board or some

COVER YOUR-
SELF TO AVOID
CONTAMINATION
WITH RADIO-
ACTIVE
MATERIALS.

sheets of newspaper might help, but a raincoat would be better. The object is, of course, to keep radioactive dust and raindrops off your body and clothing. When it's safe to get up, throw away your covering.

Always do what you can to help other people. There is no chance of your being harmed by radioactivity from the bodies of others, even if they have radiation injuries. Don't leave injured people where they may be burned. Direct rescue workers to persons trapped in the wreckage. If necessary to bandage open cuts and wounds and no standard first aid equipment is available, use parts of your own or the victim's clothing. But tear them from the under, not the outer garments. Underclothes are far less likely to be contaminated by radioactivity.

If you have walked through rubble from a ground burst or water from an underwater burst, be sure to change at least your outer garments and shoes. Outer clothes will automatically serve as a “trap” for most of the radioactivity you may accidentally pick up. By taking them off you will remove most of the contamination. If the clothing is heavily contaminated, it is best to bury it.

You also should manage to take a bath or shower, if you have been in an area of lingering radioactivity. It is important that all radioactive materials be removed as soon as possible from your body, and bathing is the only practical means of getting rid of them. You won't need special cleaning compounds. Warm water and soap are ideal.

In washing, pay particular attention to your

DO ALL YOU
CAN TO HELP
OTHER
PEOPLE.

CHANGE ALL
OUTER GAR-
MENTS AFTER
LEAVING A
CONTAMINATED
AREA.

TO REMOVE
RADIOACTIVE
WASTES, SCRUB
YOUR BODY
THOROUGHLY.

YOU CAN GET RID OF ALL THE RADIOACTIVE DIRT YOU'VE PICKED UP IF YOU KEEP SCRUBBING.

hair, for that is one place where the wastes are sure to pile up. Also give your hands a good scrubbing and get all dirt out from under your fingernails. If there is a radiological defense man handy, have him check you with his meter after you've finished your clean-up. Should he find your body still radioactive, again scrub yourself from head to foot. Then do it a third time if necessary. You can remove practically all of the radioactivity if you keep at it.

Remember all this is necessary only for persons who have come in contact with radioactive materials in heavily contaminated areas.

WHAT ABOUT RADIOACTIVITY IN THE HOUSE?

A few simple steps will go a long way toward keeping your house from being contaminated by lingering radioactive wastes scattered about in some bombings. As a rule, it is far easier to prevent radioactive pollution of a household than it is to remove it.

Keep all windows and doors closed for at least several hours after an atomic bombing. In fact, better leave them shut until civil defense authorities pass the word that there is no lingering radioactivity in your neighborhood. Should you get an official report that there is serious contamination in the vicinity, better cover all broken windows with blankets or cardboard.

KEEP ALL WINDOWS AND DOORS CLOSED UNTIL IT IS OFFICIALLY REPORTED THAT THERE IS NO POLLUTION IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD.

Whenever there is widespread neighborhood pollution, it will be impossible to keep your house absolutely free of it. A little is bound to seep in through cracks or else down the chimney. (By all means close the dampers in fireplace flues and shut off air conditioners and ventilating fans not equipped with special filters). Unless you are careful, some radioactivity is likely to be tracked in by people or pets. Keep your cat or dog indoors. And when you come in from outside, leave your shoes at the door, for their soles are likely to be covered with radioactive dusts. Better still, wear rubbers, galoshes or other disposable foot coverings over your shoes. Take these precautions, but don't worry. There isn't much chance really dangerous amounts will pile up in the house.

Should you help to clean up a contaminated area, you might get some radioactive materials on both your body and clothing. So don't go home and sit around in your work clothes. Take off your outer garments outdoors or in the basement. Then wash, if you can, using warm water and plenty of soap. Never fail to launder your working clothes, but don't use the family washing machine. Scrub all contaminated objects in buckets or tubs used for that purpose only.

WHAT ABOUT FOOD AND WATER?

To prevent harm from accidentally eating or drinking radioactivity, throw out all unpackaged foods that were lying around where dust from

CLOSE FIREPLACE DAMPERS AND SHUT OFF VENTILATING FANS AND AIR CONDITIONERS.

BE CAREFUL NOT TO TRACK RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS INTO THE HOUSE.

LAUNDRY CONTAMINATED OBJECTS IN SPECIAL BUCKETS OR TUBS.

**WATCH OUT
FOR FOOD
CONTAMINATION
AFTER GROUND
OR WATER
BURSTS.**

ground bursts or mist from underwater bursts might have settled on them. And before opening canned or bottled goods, wash the outside of the containers thoroughly. That will remove most of the pollution that may have gotten on them. Also be sure that all cooking utensils and tableware are scrubbed clean in order to remove any invisible, radioactive dusts. Food and utensils that were in closed drawers or tight cupboards will be all right.

If it was an air burst, don't worry about the food in the house. It will be safe to use.

**WATER IN THE
PIPES OF YOUR
HOUSE AT THE
TIME OF EXPLO-
SION WILL NOT
BE RADIOACTIVE.**

Be careful of drinking water after atomic explosions. There is little or no chance that water actually inside household pipes at the time of attack will be made radioactive. If a little is drawn off right after the burst and placed in clean containers with covers, it should tide you over the immediate post-raid period.

But even if the water continues running, don't keep on using tap water for drinking purposes unless you have received official information that the city system is safe. This is not only because of radioactivity, but because of other dangers like typhoid that can come from damaged water systems. If you have to use city water before you get official information, boil it. Boiling won't remove radioactivity, but the chances that your water supply will be radioactive are pretty slim. Boiling will kill most germs that may get into damaged water mains.

**BOIL WATER
BEFORE
DRINKING
UNLESS YOU'VE
BEEN OFFICIALLY
TOLD IT IS SAFE.**

WHAT ABOUT RADIOS AND TELEPHONES?

Neither explosive nor lingering radioactivity has any effect on the operation of most mechanical or electrical devices. Unless the wires are down or there is a power failure, both your lights and telephone should continue to work. But don't rush to the phone just to find out how Aunt Susie may have weathered the attack. Leave the lines open for real emergency traffic.

The bomb's radioactivity will *not* interfere with the operation of your radio. In the event of attack, be sure to turn it on. It may be your main source of emergency instructions. And don't forget: Battery-operated portable sets, including those installed in automobiles, will continue to work even if the city power goes off. Television reception, like radio, won't be jammed by radioactivity.

WHAT ABOUT AUTOMOBILES?

One more household suggestion: In times of emergency don't park the family automobile on the street. Leave the way clear for emergency traffic. Keep the windows rolled up to prevent possible contamination of the interior by underwater or ground bursts and don't worry whether or not it will run. Radioactivity won't interfere with operation of its fuel or ignition system.

**EVEN THOUGH
YOUR TELE-
PHONE MAY
CONTINUE TO
WORK, USE IT
ONLY FOR TRUE
EMERGENCIES.**

**KEEP THE
FAMILY CAR
OFF THE STREET.
RADIOACTIVITY
WILL NOT INTER-
FERE WITH ITS
OPERATION.**

**EVERYTHING IN
THIS BOOKLET
APPLIES TO ALL
MEMBERS OF THE
FAMILY.**

WHAT ABOUT CHILDREN?

Everything in this booklet holds true for all members of the family, including children, old people, or shut-ins. It would be a good idea to talk over the facts with all members of the family to be sure each understands. People with school children should discuss the booklet with teachers and other parents at PTA meetings and similar gatherings.

You may be sure that, in times of emergency, all schools will be well organized for the protection of children.

Children old enough to understand can be taught to do the right things. Younger children simply will have to depend on their parents.

TO SUM UP

**BLAST AND HEAT
ARE THE GREATEST
DANGERS YOU
FACE.**

To sum up, always remember that blast and heat are the two greatest dangers you face. The things that you do to protect yourself from these dangers usually will go a long way toward providing protection from the explosive radioactivity loosed by atomic explosions.

While the lingering radioactivity that occasionally follows some types of atomic bursts may be dangerous, still it is no more to be feared than typhoid fever or other diseases that sometimes follow major disasters. The only difference is that we can't now ward it off with a shot in the arm; you must simply take the known steps to avoid it.

If you follow the pointers in this little booklet, you stand far better than an even chance of surviving the bomb's blast, heat, and radioactivity. What's more, you will make a definite contribution to civil defense in your community, because civil defense must start with you. But if you lose your head and blindly attempt to run from the dangers, you may touch off a panic that will cost your life and put tremendous obstacles in the way of your Civil Defense Corps.

**KEEP YOUR
HEAD. DON'T
TOUCH OFF A
PANIC THAT
MAY COST
YOUR LIFE.**

PLEASE NOTE

With the release of this booklet, permission automatically is granted to any responsible organization, institution, individual or concern which wishes to republish it for free distribution, legitimate promotional purposes or for sale.


In reproducing this booklet, advertising, promotional material, art work, and typographical styling should conform to the tenor of the text.

No alteration should be made in the text nor should reproduction be in extract or digest form, except for review purposes.

The center insert (pages 15, 16, 17, and 18) may be published separately.

Bulk copies of this booklet may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C., at a 25 percent discount for orders in excess of 100. Individual copies are for sale at 10 cents each. Those reproducing this booklet for sale should be guided by the prices quoted above in establishing sale prices for their own editions.

The Civil Defense Office will be glad to cooperate with those who wish to reproduce this booklet by reviewing for accuracy any art or promotional material which they may decide to use.



The Price of Liberty

Official Condensation of the First Report to the Congress by the
National Security Training Commission

December 1951

The Price
of
Liberty

*A Condensed Version of the First
Report to the Congress by the
National Security Training
Commission*

DECEMBER 1951

This is an official condensation of "UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING: Foundation of Enduring National Strength", the first report to Congress by the National Security Training Commission, which full report is available from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., price 35 cents.

NATIONAL SECURITY TRAINING COMMISSION

James W. Wadsworth, *Chairman*
William L. Clayton, *Commissioner*
Dr. Karl T. Compton, *Commissioner*
Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, USN, *Commissioner*
Lt. Gen. Raymond S. McLain, USA, *Commissioner*

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

Wm. Howard Gammon, *Acting Executive Director*
Edgar G. Shelton, Jr., *Asst. to the Executive Director*

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1951

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D. C. - Price 15 cents

"Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty"—

JOHN PHILPOT CURRAN

"God grants liberty only to those who love it, and are always ready to guard and defend it."—

DANIEL WEBSTER

(III)

Contents

	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
The New Frontier	1
The Nation Acts	1
Need for a Long-Term Military Policy	2
Failures of the Past	2
The Threat to Freedom	4
The Penalty for Unpreparedness	5
The Obligation of Citizenship	5
We Must Not Again Demobilize Into a Vacuum	6
Essentials of a Balanced Security Program	7
The First Step	8
When Can the Program Begin?	8
II. SUMMARY OF COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS	10
Training Plans of Military Departments	10
Physical and Mental Standards for Induction	11
Scheduling Inductions into the Corps	11
Protection of Welfare and Morals	12
Code of Conduct for the Corps	13
Permanent Supervisory Role of This Commission	13
What Will the Program Cost?	14
Benefits of UMT Program	15
Need for Prompt Enactment of Legislation	16
The Frontier Response	16

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Liberty is not a trinket to be cheaply purchased at a bargain counter. It is the most priceless of all possessions, purchased at the price of sacrifice—retained at the price of vigilance. For this reason, courageous peoples striving for the ideals of freedom and human dignity have always been willing to pay the price.

The price of liberty is dear, but default in payment would be tragic. Americans have never defaulted.

THE NEW FRONTIER

In the early days of this Nation when the frontier lay just beyond the doorstep, citizens calmly accepted the necessity for military training for the men of their communities. These early Americans learned to expect savage and deadly attacks at any moment, and were found prepared when danger struck unexpectedly in the black of night or through the dark woods at the edge of the clearing.

The days are long since gone when the munitions of war consisted of the family musket and a few rounds of shot, and when all the men in the family over the age of 14 were capable of using these weapons to advantage.

Days of danger are still upon us.

The trend of history is beginning to run strikingly parallel to the days of the frontier. Due to the increased deadliness of weapons and speeded transportation, the United States and, indeed, the entire world, lives in a frontier environment.

On this new frontier danger can strike swiftly and unexpectedly from across the reaches of the world. The facts are clear. They cannot be ignored simply because they are unpleasant.

The return to frontier conditions demands a frontier response.

THE NATION ACTS

Through the enactment of Public Law 51 in June of this year, the Nation has responded. Thus, under the crushing press of world events, Congress has approved the principle of Universal Military Training. That law, which amended the Selective Service Act of 1948 and which appropriately renamed it "The Universal Military

Training and Service Act," provided that during the immediate crisis the United States would continue its temporary program of induction for service. The same Act created the National Security Training Corps and a permanent body, the National Security Training Commission, to which it gave two major tasks: (1) To develop the broad outline and machinery of a specific UMT program for consideration by the Congress, and (2) to exercise general supervision over the training of the National Security Training Corps, "which training shall be basic military training."

NEED FOR A LONG-TERM MILITARY POLICY

The far-reaching action of Congress in the enactment of Public Law 51 into law is deeply significant. It was taken at a time when urgent need exists for the adoption of a military program which will make its weight felt immediately upon the scales of world power. It was taken at a time when continuing need exists for a long-term preparedness through an extended program of military training.

This action reflects a realization, even in the heat and tension of crisis, that the major problems we face in the world will be of long duration. No tidy or decisive conclusion is to be expected soon.

Consequently, our basic and long-term military policies must provide for swift adjustment between periods of acute crisis and periods of relative calm. The former demand large standing forces, the latter smaller standing forces plus a large, trained, and ready reserve.

Approval of the principle of UMT reflects an understanding that in the past the Nation has not provided for intelligent, long-term military policies. Instead, the Nation has marched up and down the hill of preparedness, arming and disarming as the winds of international piracy blew hot and cold.

Foreign policy in a bandit world must be based upon strength, the only force which dictators respect. Too often ours has been based upon hope rather than might—has had for its foundation the quicksand of weakness rather than the concrete of military preparedness. This has crippled and plagued the conduct of a consistent foreign policy based upon the strength of free men.

One important lesson is apparent from this—*democracy must be durable if it is to survive.*

FAILURES OF THE PAST

The world has had repeated instruction, with all the tyrants of history as its schoolmaster, in the lesson: "Unpreparedness invites

disaster." The bully always selects as his victims those who are weak. A nation which prepares for nothing and hopes for the best is likely to suffer the worst. A nation which is prepared for the worst is more likely to avoid the cataclysm of war; is more likely to survive in a jungle world where nations of prey wait hopefully for the weak passerby.

History confirms this truth.

During the 1930's this Nation was unarmed.

Loud and feverish talk and indignation were no match for the tanks and cannons of the aggressors. We stood helpless, unable to stem the onward rush of deadly events which burst upon the world in all their frightfulness in World War II.

Lives were lost; homes were destroyed; money was spent; dreams were demolished; hearts were broken.

After enormous effort and heroic sacrifice, the Nation and its allies triumphed over the aggressors.

Yet, by 1946 another even greater menace had arisen—Soviet communism was on the march.

Once again we were unarmed.

Once again we had demobilized into a vacuum.

The red flags of warning along this Nation's route of unpreparedness are well known to all. The Berlin Blockade, the assault upon Czechoslovakia, the carefully manufactured unrest in Western Europe, were the warning flashes of lightning upon the horizon which preceded the storm in Korea.

Whether it was due to the very brilliance of the warning flashes or to our own inward blindness to reality, the Nation failed to respond in time to avoid another tragedy.

Our past weaknesses of will and arms must be regarded as moral failures, for they led to needless death and destruction. In the 1930's our failure was a practical factor in bringing on World War II.

By our studied inability to detect our true national interest, by our deep reluctance to forge strong military power, by our failure to act in time, we encouraged aggressors and dismayed our friends.

Approval of universal military training is a recognition of these grave errors of our past, and a partial reassurance that they will not occur again.

The national decision to approve an enduring system of military training reflects a more realistic view of the present conflict and the march of history which produced the struggle between the East and the West.

Now military training for all is to be integrated in the structure of our national life. The duty of citizenship will be bestowed upon all able bodied young men.

The Nation cannot but benefit.

THE THREAT TO FREEDOM

We live in a period of broad, swift, and far-reaching change.

The past 35 years have witnessed two global wars of tremendous violence and brutality.

The Russian and Chinese Revolutions led to events which dangerously challenge freedom everywhere.

The war in Korea began. Its logical conclusion cannot be foreseen. Five empires have collapsed.

The British and French imperial systems have seriously declined.

The leading nations of Western Europe have abdicated their world leadership and passed that burden and honor to the United States.

Since 1915 world power has gravitated to two centers—the United States and the Soviet Union.

The fate of Western Civilization is now in our hands.

The purposes of the two power centers—the United States and the Soviet Union—are in basic conflict. Those who control the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement aim at a slave world with the Kremlin as the master. The United States aims at the preservation of the integrity and vitality of a free society founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual. Because the leaders of the Soviet Union seek to impose their tyranny over the rest of the world, the United States and free men everywhere are engaged in a mortal struggle with Soviet communism which will continue until the conflict is resolved.

The challenge to the United States is total. It is conducted upon every plane of existence. It is an attack upon all the religious, social, and ethical values of free society and upon the physical environment in which these values have their life. Where efforts to confuse and subvert have failed, the Soviet leaders have demonstrated that their use of force is purely a matter of expediency limited only by a concern for their own interest and security.

Seen in this context of broad change and mortal conflict, Universal Military Training is an instrument ideally suited to our purpose. It can maintain a workable balance of power or provide a basis for full and rapid mobilization of trained manpower in the event of total war.

An effective Universal Military Training program can be a vital factor in the long-term task of maintaining a power balance capable of combating the hostile forces now at work in the world.

It would permit swift expansion of our standing forces for the purpose of resolving a specific local crisis by a show of force.

It would enable us to meet force with force, as in Korea.

After a reasonable period of time, along with a vigorous reserve program, UMT should permit reductions in the size of the standing

forces. Thus, the heavy financial burdens and social dangers which large regular military forces impose upon society could be eliminated.

THE PENALTY FOR UNPREPAREDNESS

UMT will also provide a fairer distribution of the military burden during the uncertain period ahead. The attack upon South Korea in June 1950 cruelly revealed the heartbreaking price that must be paid for military unpreparedness. During the immediate postwar period, the United States relied unduly upon the unproved doctrine that the advent of the atomic age had eliminated the need for large military forces. At the same time we relied unjustly upon the reservoir of seasoned veterans recently returned from Europe and the Pacific. Although this reservoir of fit and available men was steadily diminishing, its existence was used as an argument for reducing the regular Armed Forces to a dangerously low level.

When the attack came in Korea on June 25, the United States was caught in a self-induced shortage of trained military manpower. The regular units were at half-strength. There was no class of young and basically trained graduates of a UMT program ready to take their place in the battleline. With few exceptions, the reservists and National Guardsmen who had fought the Second World War were the only source of men.

The situation was desperate. Thousands of veteran-reservists were called to fill the ranks. Many have died. Many more are suffering a second disruption of their lives and careers.

While duty to country outweighs all other considerations in time of danger, it should be clear that the large-scale recall of veteran-reservists has been not only tragically unfair, but wasteful as well.

In the long-term crisis that confronts us, we must as a Nation be capable of responding to periodic military alarms, including total war, in the manner least upsetting to our society. Many reservists sent to Korea were husbands and fathers. Some were in business which rendered important services to their communities. Others were beginning to make contributions in neglected and essential professions, such as teaching. On the other hand, some who had jobs deemed essential to the national interest were deferred to the detriment of their Reserve or Guard units. Too often such occupational deferments deprived those units of key officers and noncoms. The painful necessity of recalling veteran-reservists was bitter testimony to short-sighted policy and planning. Through Universal Military Training and a workable Reserve program, this tragic situation may in time be remedied.

THE OBLIGATION OF CITIZENSHIP

The approval of UMT is significant for another supremely important reason. It is tangible evidence that the ultimate obligation of

citizenship—the bearing of arms in defense of the community—shall now be made clear.

It has always been implied.

Tragic as it may seem, every generation of Americans, without exception, has had to go to war. Yet in the past they have gone off largely unprepared, psychologically or physically. Each generation, fresh from its own sufferings on the battlefield, has wished fervently that war could be abolished, and nearly all of them have allowed this wish to blind them to the hard fact that armed conflict is a deadly disease ever present and long rampant in the world.

This disregard of reality has resulted in the needless death of many thousands. Young men, whose parents and communities have put forth great effort to prepare them for the crises of life and work, have consistently been denied the military training which would provide them with a better-than-average chance to survive in battle.

Yet in time of war the Nation has always called them to the colors and sent them into combat with hasty and sometimes inadequate training.

Too often their early education has failed to impart to them a clear awareness of their historic obligation to bear arms, to pledge their lives to duty and country. This denial to our sons of the hard facts of the world in which they live has been short-sighted and unjust. It has too often left them unprepared, in military skills and mental outlook, to face the most basic of all human challenges—the challenge of life and death upon the battlefield. Because of these successive failures, many young Americans have lost their lives who might otherwise have lived.

An effective UMT program would be a partial assurance against the recurrence of such tragedy.

WE MUST NOT AGAIN DEMOBILIZE INTO A VACUUM

Dictators' hopes for world domination have always been rooted in the belief that the democracies would eventually allow their defenses to sag into nothingness—into a vacuum. So long as the military power of the United States has been represented almost entirely by its regular Armed Forces, our enemies have believed that we would allow our strength to slip away with the years. History proves that we have an ingrained suspicion of standing Armed Forces and have cut them back at every opportunity, with small regard for the real dangers confronting us. Moreover, the economic and social dangers of maintaining large standing forces indefinitely have always been real. Even an economy as dynamic as our own would be gravely strained if it were long required to continue its present contribution

to the American Armed Forces, while at the same time lending economic and military support to the balance of the free world.

Universal Military Training provides our country with insurance against these two dangers. By transferring a large portion of the responsibility for security to a continually vitalized citizens' reserve, it provides us with depth in trained military manpower. A large reserve force is a basic need before there can be any large reduction in our standing forces. It provides a method for achieving reasonable protection at a cost that can be borne over an extended period. With an efficient Universal Military Training program operating in combination with other elements vital to our security, we may hope to remain strong enough over the years to discourage or repel any military threat. This we can do without undermining the mainstays of our greatness—industrial, scientific and educational supremacy, freedom, and democratic institutions.

ESSENTIALS OF A BALANCED SECURITY PROGRAM

UMT is only one of several elements vital to our military security. Failure to recognize this truth could be dangerous if UMT were, for example, to become an excuse for a rapid and helter-skelter reduction in the strength of our regular Armed Forces. The same would apply if reliance upon UMT were to lead us to withhold needed support from our programs of scientific research and development, industrial mobilization, the maintenance of a world-wide intelligence system, and other vital security measures.

The success of a Universal Military Training program is also closely related to the establishment and operation of a vigorous reserve program that will sharpen and keep fresh the basic and technical training which young men will receive through UMT. All of the Commission's thinking about UMT is founded upon the vital assumption that a sound reserve structure for the Armed Forces will emerge from the current congressional deliberations on this subject.

UMT has its limitations. It represents, in the period immediately ahead, no alternative to the maintenance of substantial regular armed forces.

However, there are urgent social and economic reasons for beginning to scale down the number of men required on extended active duty in the Armed Forces just as soon as enough trained reserves are available to permit that to be done with safety.

If we are to maintain our free society over the long and critical period ahead, we believe that the United States must resolve its military manpower problem through the combination of UMT and a revitalized reserve.

THE FIRST STEP

The first step toward an operating Universal Military Training program lies in congressional approval of specific legislative recommendations affecting the National Security Training Corps. In accordance with the mandate contained in the Universal Military Training and Service Act, our report contains such recommendations. If these should provide a basis for affirmative action by the Congress, UMT may get under way when the President or the Congress deem it advisable to reduce or eliminate the period of military service now prescribed for young men under 19 years of age.

WHEN CAN THE PROGRAM BEGIN?

The Universal Military Training and Service Act provides that UMT may go into operation only after the period of service for young men under the age of 19 is reduced from 24 months to some shorter period of time. This action to reduce the period of service for this age group can be taken by the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, whenever it is found that such action is justified by the strength of the Armed Forces in the light of international conditions. The Congress may also take such action by concurrent resolution.

In the light of present world uncertainties the precise date of commencement of a program of Universal Military Training is beyond anyone's power to forecast accurately.

The decision rests with the President or the Congress; and the vital question they must consider in this regard may be simply stated: **When will the general situation permit a reduction in the required period of service for young men under 19?**

At present, the Armed Forces are drawing on all physically fit men in the age groups 18½ to 26 who are not exempt or permanently deferred from military service. This means that maintenance of the present military forces of approximately 3.6 million men is requiring the extraction from the manpower pool each year of more men than are entering this manpower pool as they reach the age of 18½. Unless the present outlook materially changes, the prospect is extended military service for all young men.

The Commission is nevertheless firm in its conviction that the program should get under way at the earliest possible date. We believe the Nation must soon find relief from the crushing burdens of a huge standing Army, Navy, and Air Force.

However, we do not underestimate the present dangers.

Indeed, it is because these dangers are likely to be of long duration that we believe the Nation must reorganize its defenses. We must be able to support our defenses for a number of years without endangering our productive economy or impairing our democratic society.

As soon as a reasonable number of young men under 19 can be spared from **induction for service** in the Armed Forces, they could be inducted into a Universal Military Training program and after graduating from UMT be transferred into the reserve. Such an arrangement, which would be consistent with the provisions of Public Law 51, would permit the orderly installation of the program on a modest scale, and would constitute the first step in a gradual transition of most of our trainable men from the regular Armed Forces to UMT and the reserves.

Chapter II

SUMMARY OF COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS

TRAINING PLANS OF MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

The military departments are moving forward in their development of specific UMT programs. Tentative plans call for the Army to train 50 percent of the men inducted into the National Security Training Corps, the Navy and the Marine Corps 28 percent, and the Air Force 22 percent. Each military department will carry out the training program as a function separate from its regular functions. The instructors who will train our young men will be both military and civilian, but all will be outside the regularly authorized strength of the Armed Forces. If this separation were not maintained, the UMT program would dilute the combat capabilities of our standing forces by denying to them the needed facilities and services of officers and enlisted men required to conduct the UMT program.

We recommend that young men should receive 6 continuous months of training. During this 6 months, trainees would not be subject to military service and could not be trained at shore installations outside of the United States. Training would be both basic and technical. Training plans are not based upon marching and other routine drills. Training would be for twentieth century warfare and would take full account of modern technical developments. All the programs should be designed to send men into the reserve with a realistic knowledge of military organization and military life, coupled with enough technical training to constitute a firm foundation upon which to build in later reserve training.

Skill is not inborn in man. It takes time to develop. It can only be acquired through tough and realistic training for survival. In time of war nothing is more tragic than to see a courageous but unskilled man die simply because he does not have the skill to survive on the field of battle. The Nation owes to its sons the opportunity to survive in the eventuality of war. In the past the reasons the Nation has given for its failure to adequately train our young men have been wrong. We have said, "Do not train our young men to die on a battlefield." We should have said, "Train our young men so that they have a chance to survive on a battlefield." The untrained are those who die needlessly. A realistic training program is training for life—not for death.

PHYSICAL AND MENTAL STANDARDS FOR INDUCTION

The Universal Military Training and Service Act states clearly that the UMT program is to be exclusively military in character. This means that minimum standards of mental and physical acceptability must be adopted. These would be too high to permit of "Universal" application.

The military departments have already lowered their acceptance standards to a point where further reductions would produce serious results. Even though a truly universal program would be highly desirable, it would be better to exclude the physically and mentally handicapped from a UMT program. They could be called up quickly in time of full mobilization and their civilian skills used effectively. Six months of basic military training for this group would not increase their potential military contribution enough to justify the extra expense and administrative load which their training would impose upon the military departments. With the exception of these youths who fall below minimum mental or physical standards, all young men should be subject to induction into the Corps. In a training program of this relatively short length there should be virtually no deferments.

SCHEDULING INDUCTIONS INTO THE CORPS

Inductions should be scheduled on a basis that will minimize the disruption to the lives of our young men. That plan must represent a just compromise between the need for an efficient and economical training program and a concern for the welfare of the individual.

It is our belief that the needs of the Nation and the individual will be best served by monthly inductions through Selective Service. Every young man would have the right to volunteer for induction at a time of his choice, within the limits of established quotas. Such a combination of mandatory and voluntary inductions, intelligently administered, would prove sufficiently flexible to carry out the training program effectively. At the same time account could be taken of the wide differences in circumstances and personal preference among the trainees. With the cooperation of colleges and high schools, it should be possible for most young men who intend to continue their education to complete their 6 months of military training without the loss of a full academic year. It is believed that educators are willing to make reasonable adjustments in their schedules if they can receive some assurance that the new condition will be enduring and not merely another in an endless series of disruptive changes.

PROTECTION OF WELFARE AND MORALS

It is anticipated by the Commission that the time will eventually come when most young men upon reaching the age of 18 will be inducted into the National Security Training Corps. By undergoing training, these young men will be fulfilling one of their obligations of citizenship. At the same time the Government will assume an equally important obligation. From the care of the home, young men will be transferred to the care of the Armed Forces. The duties of these agencies are no less than the duties of good parents. The training agencies, under the watchful eye of this Commission, must provide trainees with guidance and discipline, with recreation and healthful living surroundings, with wholesome food, and with medical care. The moral atmosphere must be on a high plane. Sources of temptation must be removed from the vicinity of training centers or declared off-limits. Full facilities for religious worship must be provided for those of all faiths. Officer and training personnel must be of the highest moral type, for the trainees will look to these men for example and leadership. This much the Commission will demand as a minimum.

The program should incorporate all the advantages to health, education, character development and training for citizenship which can be provided without surrendering the essential military objectives. Unless the training contributes in a meaningful way to a youth's readiness to defend himself and his country, it cannot be justified. But there is every reason for confidence that this military preparation can be successfully combined with measures intended to make this a period of mental, physical and moral growth for our young men. Universal military training, involving as it does a sharing of the responsibility for safeguarding our democracy, can and should represent a historic step forward in the ability of Americans to live and work together for the common good.

We have recommended detailed legislative proposals to promote the safety, health, welfare, and morals of the Corps. However, the measures which can be spelled out in law are but a small part of the total required. Laws prohibit or restrict, whereas the greater need is to inspire and lead, to establish high standards of honorable conduct within the program. Evidence of these would be observed in the trainee's basic sense of responsibility, an understanding of his obligations to his country, a sense of pride in his unit, a desire to achieve excellence in military skills, moderation in his personal habits, and tolerance toward his fellow man.

The achievement of standards which would produce such qualities constitutes one of our chief goals. Our optimism on this score is bolstered by our review of the successful Fort Knox experiment. Its

lesson is clear: **The key to moral and responsible conduct on the part of trainees lies in the quality of their leaders.** It is a matter of first importance that all men involved in the training phase of the UMT program be carefully selected and thoroughly indoctrinated in the working philosophy of the program. They must accept responsibility on a round-the-clock basis. That applies to every level of leadership from top to bottom.

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE CORPS

Trainees should have a carefully limited military status. They would be a component of the Military Establishment but they would not be in the regular Armed Forces. The limited military status of trainees is consistent with the congressional emphasis on the exclusively military nature of the program, and with the assignment of the military departments to carry out the training.

We believe the Uniform Code of Military Justice should be adopted for the Corps, with a few significant modifications. These would permit a trainee accused of such major crimes as murder, rape, or robbery to refuse trial by general court-martial and to accept trial by the appropriate Federal court. Commanding officers, courts-martial, and reviewing authorities would also be directed to give full regard to the youth and inexperience of any trainee in awarding punishment for any breach of the code. We are impressed by the many improvements in military court procedures which are included in the new code. Equally important is the readily understandable and soundly constructed appellate system which it establishes. In all events, the Commission will insist that justice in its highest sense be maintained for all accused of offenses of any type.

PERMANENT SUPERVISORY ROLE OF THIS COMMISSION

Our report recommends a system of civilian inspectors and other administrative safeguards intended to enable the Commission to carry out faithfully its supervisory responsibilities assigned by law. Any new program of this magnitude requires utmost vigilance in order that its purposes may be achieved. This is particularly true of a program which involves our youth. The Commission's inspectors must have full and free access to all training records and facilities. They must be independent in their observations and in their judgments. With the help of such a small but competent staff, the Commission can be, as Congress intended, a faithful watchdog of this program.

The Commission's inspections of the training stations will be frequent, varied and thorough. All reports of injustice, low health standards, bad moral environment, and slack morale will receive our prompt attention.

The Commission has permanent responsibility in this respect. Its activities will not end with favorable congressional action on its legislative recommendations. One of the basic benefits to be derived from the continuing nature of its supervision over the entire program will be the protection it provides against any possibility that UMT might become a device for militarizing our youth. The Commission will always have a civilian chairman and a civilian majority.

We think the experience that American communities have had with millions of returning veterans in both World Wars indicates that the danger of militarization is slight in any case. Men who have been through the most gruelling experiences of war have come home firmly dedicated to the democratic process. The great majority of our military leaders have themselves consistently demonstrated their devotion to the principles of civilian control and their hostility to any usurpation by the military authority.

There is no basis for the fear that America would use its strength to make war rather than use it to keep the peace.

It is not the Commission's task to act as grandstand quarterback in criticizing the purely military aspects of the program. Only if these military aspects unduly interfere with the basic welfare of the trainee will the Commission intervene.

European systems of conscription have often been criticized, and rightly so, on the basis that they instill militarism into the young men who are trained. At this point, the Commission feels that the distinction between these systems and this program should be sharply drawn. The European systems, almost without exception, provided for **conscription for service**—and the period of service often ran into years, not months. The Commission's program calls for **induction for training** only, and this for a period of 6 short months. Almost without exception European systems were controlled by the military. This American system provides for civilian control through this civilian dominated Commission.

The possibilities of militarism diminish rapidly when such a system provides for training only—they reach a vanishing point when such a system is removed from military control and placed under predominantly civilian supervision. It is to be remembered that the Universal Military Training and Service Act provides an ultimate in civilian control and supervision. This Commission must report directly to the Congress twice each year upon the progress of this program. The people, through their elected representatives, exercise the final check.

That is as it should be.

WHAT WILL THE PROGRAM COST

The cost of UMT cannot be estimated exactly until we know how soon it can begin and what changes in price levels will occur in the

interim. However, it is possible to make some rough calculations now, based on the assumption that cost levels will remain close to those prevailing at the present time.

On this basis, the military departments have informed the Commission that the first year's cost of UMT for a fully implemented program would be \$4,187,983,600. This initial cost would include many nonrecurring items. The annual cost in later years would drop to \$2,158,746,200. A total of 800,000 young men would receive training each year under these estimates.

The Commission has further obtained from the military departments cost estimates for the beginning of UMT on a limited scale. These figures were based on the cost of training 60,000 young men per year. For the first year, the military departments have estimated the aggregate cost at \$398,895,210. The recurring annual cost in later years would be \$179,291,680 for continuing to train 60,000 men each year.

We believe it will be possible to reduce the cost of UMT below the figures put forward by the military departments. We must record our judgment that the indicated requirement of one overhead support person to every two trainees seems much too high. The Commission intends to make every effort to determine the validity of this ratio and to work for minimum overhead costs in all respects.

BENEFITS OF UMT PROGRAM

The Commission believes that the UMT program it recommends would have the following benefits:

1. It would give the Armed Services an existing training organization capable of rapidly expanding the forces to meet a general emergency.
2. It would vitalize the civilian components by producing a continuing flow of basically trained young men into the National Guard, the Organized Reserves, and the Air National Guard.
3. It would furnish trained replacements for the regular Armed Forces without the necessity of breaking up trained groups in those services.
4. It would free the regular Armed Forces to seize and hold strategic bases immediately at the beginning of a total mobilization.
5. It would distribute equally among the people the obligation to defend our country.
6. It would benefit all of our young men, mentally and physically, and give them a greater appreciation of moral values

which would be manifest in the trainee's basic sense of responsibility, an understanding of his obligations to his country, a sense of pride in his unit, a desire to achieve excellence, moderation in his personal habits, and tolerance toward those about him.

NEED FOR PROMPT ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION

We are firmly convinced that the implementing legislation for the program should be enacted into law without delay. No final plans for a reduction in our standing forces can be made unless there is firm assurance that there will be no break in the flow of trained men into the reserves.

THE FRONTIER RESPONSE

The clear prospect is that the present generation must live in danger for many years. An enemy can now strike directly against the United States from the air or from the sea. The American people must be prepared, like their forebears who pushed the frontier westward, to meet a savage and deadly attack at any moment.

We must learn to live with danger and to do it calmly.

This is a time for steady nerves.

The return to frontier conditions demands a frontier response.

The greatest purpose that this program could possibly serve would be that it would prepare our young men for a war which would never come—would give them training which they would never have to use. This could be achieved through such a build-up of reserve strength through UMT that aggressors would be discouraged, once and for all, from dreams of world conquest. On the other hand, if peace cannot be had, this program will furnish the trained men to assure final victory for freedom. It will at least assure that no young man will ever die due to lack of adequate training.

Just as important, the program will result in more equality of obligation. Most young Americans are well aware of the multitude of rights they exercise as American citizens. These rights are matched only by the duties incumbent upon that privilege of citizenship. The rights are well known, the duties sometimes more obscure. By doing their duty to country, these men will come to a fuller realization and appreciation of their rights and privileges and the sacrifices which make them possible.

We believe a UMT program will impart to our young men the arts of survival and self-defense which form the basis of confidence. The program will reveal, by bringing together young men from all backgrounds and geographical sections of the country, the great wealth,

strength, and diversity of America's human resources. UMT will seek in various ways to inform our youth of the meaning of their task. That knowledge will help them to measure the crisis, examine its causes, and search for solutions. Through a properly conducted program the young men can be provided with a basic understanding of the times in which they live, and with the skills necessary to face with confidence even the worst possibilities of a catastrophic age. If these things are achieved through UMT, as we believe they can be, UMT will indeed become one of the foundations of enduring national strength.

The price of liberty will be paid.

(Readers who desire the complete text of the Commission's First Report to the Congress, entitled "Universal Military Training, Foundation of Enduring National Strength," may purchase it from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., at the price of 35 cents per copy.)

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON
NATIONAL SECURITY TRAINING

- - - o o - - -

NATIONAL SECURITY TRAINING COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

JANUARY 1952

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON NATIONAL SECURITY TRAINING

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
1. What is the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951?	1
2. What is the National Security Training Commission?	1
3. What is the National Security Training Corps?	2
4. What is National Security Training?	2
5. What general type of training will be given?	3
6. What did the Universal Military Training and Service Act require that the Commission include in its legislative recommendations to Congress?	3
7. Has Congress approved Universal Military Training?	3
8. What must the Congress do regarding the recommendations of the Commission?	4
9. What are the statutory requirements which must take place before this program of Universal Military Training can be initiated?	5
10. What does the Commission recommend in regard to the date for beginning the program?	5
11. When can the program begin?	5
12. Will the program begin on a full scale immediately upon its implementation?	6
13. So far as the Commission itself is concerned, when can the program begin?	7
14. How universal is the program as recommended by the Commission?	7
15. What are the Commission's objectives for a UMT program?	8
16. What general policies and standards has the Commission recommended?	9
17. At what age will young men be inducted into the Corps?	9
18. What method of induction does the Commission recommend for the Corps?	9

	<u>Page</u>
19. Will trainees and graduates of the UMT program be subject to draft into the military service?	9
20. What will be the status of trainees after they finish their 6 months training under UMT?	10
21. What are the Commission's viewpoints concerning a Reserve Program?	10
22. What sort of training program has the Air Force indicated that it will have?	10
23. What sort of training program will the Army have?	11
24. What sort of training program will the Navy have?	11
25. What sort of training program will the Marine Corps have?	12
26. What is the cost of the proposed program?	12
27. What would be the cost of the Air Force program?	13
28. What would be the cost of the Navy program?	13
29. What would be the cost of the Marine Corps program?	13
30. What would be the cost of the Army program?	13
31. What sort of code of justice has the Commission recommended for trainees?	14
32. What sort of disability benefits has the Commission recommended for trainees?	15
33. What sort of death benefits does the Commission recommend?	16
34. Upon what monetary basis will a trainee's disability and death benefits be figured?	17
35. What other benefits will be allowed trainees?	17
36. If a trainee is receiving income from another source may he continue to receive such income while he is in the Corps?	17
37. If a trainee loses any of his personal property due to his duty in the Corps, may he be reimbursed?	18
38. Will trainees be allowed leave?	18
39. If a trainee has a complaint to register about the treatment he is receiving can he make a complaint to the Commission?	18

	<u>Page</u>
40. Will reemployment rights be given to trainees?	18
41. Will trainees be protected against intoxicating liquors?	19
42. Will trainees be protected against other moral hazards?	19
43. What are the existing Armed Services programs for the moral welfare of the trainees?	20
44. What does the Commission recommend in regard to special welfare protection?	20
45. In general, what will the Commission do in regard to inspection of the Corps?	21
46. May young men volunteer for induction into the Corps?	21
47. May those young men who volunteer for induction into the Corps volunteer for a particular branch of the Corps such as the Navy or Air Force?	21
48. What will be the pay of trainees?	21
49. May trainees be trained outside the United States?	22
50. Will young men who are pursuing a specialized course of study essential to the national welfare be eligible for deferment?	22
51. What does the Commission recommend in regard to conscientious objectors to military training?	22

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON NATIONAL SECURITY TRAINING

1. What is the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951?

This Act, also known as Public Law 51, 82nd Congress, and S.1, meaning Senate Bill No. 1, was actually an amendment to the Selective Service Act. The Act, in general, continued Selective Service in effect for the period of the immediate crisis, and in order to meet the manpower shortage lowered the age of induction from 19 to 18½ and extended the period of service from 21 to 24 months. At the same time, this Act approved the principle of Universal Military Training, giving to it the name of National Security Training. In approving this principle, the Act established the National Security Training Corps which will be the Trainee-training group plus all personnel necessary to carry out the training program. It also established the National Security Training Commission.

2. What is the National Security Training Commission?

The National Security Training Commission is a commission established by the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 for the purpose of exercising general supervision over the National Security Training Corps. The Commission is composed of five members. Three are from civilian life and not more than two of them can be a member of the same political party. The remaining two members are to be active or retired members of the Armed Forces. The chairman must be a civilian. The Commission is appointed by the President by and with the consent of the Senate.

The Commission is charged with the responsibility of establishing policies and standards with respect to training in the Corps and with making adequate

provisions for the moral and spiritual welfare of the Corps.

The first task of the Commission was to submit to the Congress not later than October 29, 1951, a full report and legislative recommendations concerning a program of National Security Training. Upon the adoption of this program by the Congress, the Commission's continuing functions of supervision will come into action.

3. What is the National Security Training Corps?

The National Security Training Corps is the corps established by the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 into which young men will be placed for National Security Training. It is not a corps within the organizational structure of the Armed Forces. Trainees in the Corps will not be members of the Armed Forces. They cannot be sent overseas to land installations for training. They may not be inducted for service while they are members of the Corps. The establishment of the Corps is within the constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to provide for the common defense.

4. What is National Security Training?

National Security Training is synonymous with Universal Military Training. Universal Military Training is a system under which all young men capable of performing military service will be required to train for a period of six months. This six-month period of training in either the Army, Navy, Air Force or Marine Corps will be followed by $7\frac{1}{2}$ years of service in the Reserves.

5. What general type of training will be given?

The type of training to be given as required by the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 is basic military training. The Secretary of Defense and the various Military Departments have the task of deciding the specific types of training to be given and have the responsibility of carrying out the training program in accordance with policies and standards laid down by the National Security Training Commission.

6. What did the Universal Military Training and Service Act require that the Commission include in its legislative recommendations to Congress?

The Act required that the Commission submit legislative recommendations concerning:

- (1) measures for the personal safety, health, welfare and morals of the trainees;
- (2) a code of conduct together with penalties for violation of the code;
- (3) measures necessary to implement the policies and standards established by the Commission;
- (4) a program of disability and death benefits;
- (5) recommendations regarding other benefits;
- (6) an outline of the obligations, duties, liabilities and responsibilities to be imposed upon members of the Corps.

7. Has Congress approved Universal Military Training?

By the passage of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, the Congress overwhelmingly approved the principle of Universal Military

Training. The Act provides that all young men be liable for training upon reaching the age of 18; provides that the period of training shall be six months; sets up a method by which the training program may be initiated; establishes the Reserve obligation which follows the training period; provides for permissive and statutory deferments from the training program; sets the rate of compensation for trainees at \$30 per month and their dependency allowances at the rate allowed the lowest paid enlisted men in the regular service; provides that trainees may not be sent overseas for training; provides that the Selective Service shall handle the induction process; provides that young men may volunteer for induction; and provides for the protection against the use or sale of intoxicating liquors by or to members of the Corps. The only remaining matter to be solved was the establishment of a concrete program by the Commission. This has now been done and sent to the Congress for approval.

8. What must the Congress do regarding the recommendations of the Commission?

The Congress is naturally under no obligation to enact the Commission's recommended legislation which must become law before training in the Corps can begin. The Congressional Committees on Armed Services must, however, report this legislation to their respective Houses within the first forty-five days of continuous session of the Congress which pass after the report is submitted. When these legislative recommendations are submitted to the floor of each House they will have the status of a privileged bill, i.e., a bill which may be called up for debate by any member at any time.

Amendments to this legislation may be freely made upon the floor of either House. This time limit of forty-five days will begin to run when Congress reconvenes January 8, 1952. This means that on approximately March 10 or

shortly thereafter, this legislation must be reported to the Houses of Congress by the respective Committees on Armed Services.

9. What are the statutory requirements which must take place before this program of Universal Military Training can be initiated?

(1) Congress must act favorably upon the legislation which has been submitted by the Commission. This does not mean that the legislation must be enacted without change. It merely means that some sort of bill must evolve from these recommendations.

(2) The period of service required under the Universal Military Training and Service Act for those young men between the ages of $18\frac{1}{2}$ and 19 must either be reduced from 24 months or eliminated entirely. This action to reduce or eliminate the period of service for this particular age group may be taken either by the President or by the Congress by means of a concurrent resolution.

10. What does the Commission recommend in regard to the date for beginning the program?

The Commission makes no recommendation regarding the date for beginning the program since this matter is entirely the responsibility of the President and the Congress. All the Commission must do is to prepare itself adequately so that it may begin to function immediately upon the initiation of UMT.

11. When can the program begin?

While the Commission has no responsibility in determining when the program can begin, the method of such determination is clearly stated in Public

Law 51. That law provides that the President may reduce the period of service for those under the age of 19 at such time as the Secretary of defense recommends that such action is justified by the strength of the Armed Forces in the light of international conditions. When that action is taken the program can begin.

The program may also begin at such time as the Congress by concurrent resolution reduces the period of service for those under the age of 19. At such time as the President or the Congress reduces the period of active service in the Armed Forces for persons below this age, induction into the Corps may be initiated. At that time all persons under the age of 19 who are not then in the Armed Forces will become liable for induction into the Corps.

12. Will the program begin on a full scale immediately upon its implementation?

Not necessarily. If the program begins in the near future, it may well be initiated on a small scale due to the fact that most young men will be needed for 24 months service in the Armed Forces and will thus not be available for UMT. Also, it might be desirable to start the program on a small scale building up gradually as the Commission and the Department of Defense indoctrinate themselves in the operation of the program. This will enable all parties concerned to learn by experience the best methods of operating UMT. The Department of Defense has indicated that initial implementation of UMT might well be on a scale with as few as 60,000 trainees per year. The Commission takes no stand upon this except that, whether there is partial implementation or full implementation, the Commission must stand ready to exercise supervision over the program.

13. So far as the Commission itself is concerned, when can the program begin?

The Commission would be ready to begin its supervisory role upon a few weeks notice. The Commission is ready at any time for the program to begin.

14. How universal is the program as recommended by the Commission?

The Commission made no legislative recommendation regarding the universality of the program. This is already set forth in the Universal Military Training and Service Act. That Act provides that all young men shall be eligible for training in the Corps but that the minimum standards for physical acceptability shall not be higher than those which prevailed for military service in January 1945. Likewise, the mental score is fixed at a minimum of 10 based on the Armed Forces classification test. The Commission did recommend, however, that occupational and dependency deferments be reduced to a minimum. With regard to educational deferments, the Commission recommended that young men be permitted to remain in high school until graduation or the attainment of their 20th birthday or until they fail satisfactorily to pursue their course, whichever occurs first. A young man who is attending college would be deferred until the end of his current college year or until he failed satisfactorily to pursue his course, whichever occurs first.

It is interesting to note in this regard that the Universal Military Training and Service Act provides specifically that training in the Corps shall be "basic military training". Such "basic military training" by definition involves strenuous work which is designed to prepare men for combat rather than "chair corps" duty. It is, therefore, necessary that the minimum physical and mental standards be set not lower than provided for in the Universal Military Training and Service Act. If more universality is

desired, it would be necessary to change the basic law so that training of "all types" and not just "basic military training" would be authorized. This would mean perhaps that some young men would be trained exclusively to be clerical workers, hospital attendants, vehicle operators, laundrymen, cooks, or bakers. However, this sort of specialized training for limited service personnel is not now authorized by law.

15. What are the Commission's objectives for a UMT program?

The Commission believes that a UMT program should be designed to achieve the following basic objectives:

1. To insure the existence of an active training establishment which could substantially reduce the necessity for drawing upon regular units for training duty in time of mobilization.
2. To vitalize the National Guard and the Reserves by channeling into these organizations a steady flow of basically-trained personnel in time of peace, thus reducing the time required for these components to reach combat readiness in time of war.
3. To provide a pool of basically-trained men ready for assignment with a minimum of refresher training and physical conditioning.
4. To free the regular forces more rapidly for combat missions in the event of war.
5. To develop records of individual qualifications in order to permit an orderly utilization of military personnel.
6. To impress upon the trainees their importance to the Nation in the task of protecting American institutions and freedoms.

16. What other general policies and standards has the Commission recommended?

1. Every measure should be adopted which will make the civilian community an interested, vital, and controlling influence in the direction and operation of the UMT program.
2. The program should be truly universal in its application to all physically and mentally qualified men of the age of 18.
3. Training should be intensive, realistic, and tough. Little or no leave should be granted to trainees during their period of training other than emergency leave.
4. Moral and ethical standards for the Corps should be on the highest possible level.

17. At what age will young men be inducted into the Corps?

The Commission recommends young men should be inducted into the Corps as soon as possible after attaining the age of 18.

18. What method of induction does the Commission recommend for the Corps?

The Commission recommends that the induction process be handled by the Selective Service System and that inductions be on a monthly basis with equal numbers of young men being inducted each month.

19. Will trainees and graduates of the UMT program be subject to draft into the military service?

No. They may be called into the military service only as reservists.

20. What will be the status of trainees after they finish their 6 months training under UMT?

The Universal Military Service and Training Act provides that trainees will remain in the reserves for $7\frac{1}{2}$ years after completing their training in UMT.

21. What are the Commission's viewpoints concerning a Reserve Program?

The Commission believes that the desired balance of technical skills in the Reserve can be achieved only if the UMT Program is closely related to an effective Reserve Program. If the technical proficiency required for rapid mobilization and combat is to be achieved, the Reserve Program must provide for the advancement of those skills which are imparted to the trainee in elementary form during universal military training. The success of UMT depends to a great extent upon the establishment and operation of a vigorous and workable Reserve Program.

22. What sort of training program has the Air Force indicated that it will have?

The Air Force plan calls for a 26-week program which would be divided as follows: Two weeks would be required for indoctrination and discharge; eight weeks would be devoted to basic military training; and sixteen weeks would be devoted to technical training. Sixty percent of all trainees would be given formal courses in selected technical subjects. The other forty percent would take part in on-the-job training tasks with regular Air Force units. Some of the technical courses would be full-length

versions of selected technical courses now taught in the Air Force such as photography, communications, utilities and supply. Other technical courses would be the introductory or fundamental phase of longer and more difficult technical courses. Only the best qualified trainees would be enrolled in these courses and it would be extremely important that further schooling in these fields be given in the Reserves. These more difficult courses include weather, radio and radar maintenance, aircraft and engine maintenance, armament, and wire maintenance. The Air Force would be allotted 22 percent of all trainees.

23. What sort of training program will the Army have?

The Army's training program would involve seventeen weeks of basic and individual training for all trainees and would include the specialties common to all branches of the Army. Following this seventeen-week period, six weeks of basic unit and leadership training would be given. Certain of the Army trainees would devote seven weeks of their time to specialist school training. The emphasis in the Army's program is upon the development of leadership and the trained individual soldier. The Army would train about 50 percent of all trainees.

24. What sort of training program will the Navy have?

The Navy program would be divided into three major parts. First, a twelve-week period of basic indoctrination; second, a nine-week period of elementary basic instruction in such subjects as ordnance, electronics and engineering; and third, a four-week period of on-the-job training

which in some instances will consist of duty aboard ship. The Navy would train 28 percent of all trainees. This would include the Marine Corps share.

25. What sort of training program will the Marine Corps have?

The Marine Corps program would last twenty-six weeks and would be divided as follows: eight weeks of Marine recruit training for the purpose of teaching the basic military skills; four weeks of advanced individual training; eight weeks of specialist training in subjects such as artillery, communications, supply and motor transport; and four weeks of unit training including basic amphibious training and tactics. The Marine Corps would be allotted about 1/6th of the Navy's share of trainees.

26. What is the cost of the proposed program?

The Commission has arrived at tentative cost estimates for a program of UMT, based on preliminary cost studies prepared by the Armed Forces. The Commission emphasizes the extremely tentative nature of these studies, however, and disagrees strongly with the Armed Services proposed ratio of one trainor to each two trainees as being extremely high.

The preliminary cost estimates were as follows:

- a. Full implementation, 800,000 trainees per year.
First year's cost, \$4,187,983,600 (including new facilities)
Annual recurring cost, \$2,158,746,200.
- b. Partial implementation, 60,000 trainees per year.
First year's cost, \$398,895,210 (including new facilities).
Annual recurring cost, \$179,291,680.

27. What would be the cost of the Air Force program?

Tentative estimates made by the Air Force to the Commission indicate that under partial implementation (13,200 trainees annually) the first year's cost would be \$158,549,210, while the annual cost thereafter would drop sharply to \$32,995,680. Under full implementation (186,000 trainees annually) the first year's cost would be \$1,705,197,600, a great deal of this initial cost being for the construction of new facilities; the annual cost thereafter would be \$459,139,200.

28. What would be the cost of the Navy program?

Under partial implementation (14,000 trainees annually) the Navy estimates the first year's cost at \$76,000,000; the annual cost thereafter would drop to \$44,750,000. Under full implementation (183,000 trainees annually) the first year's cost would be \$1,412,400,000, of which \$735,000,000 would be for construction. The annual cost thereafter would drop to \$534,421,000.

29. What would be the cost of the Marine Corps program?

Under partial implementation (2,750 trainees annually) the Marine Corps estimates the first year's cost to be \$28,439,000. The annual cost thereafter would be \$8,830,000. Under full implementation (37,000 trainees annually) the first year's cost would be \$308,427,000, and the annual cost thereafter would be \$102,676,000.

30. What would be the cost of the Army program?

Under partial implementation (30,000 trainees annually) the Army estimates the first year's cost at \$135,907,000, while the annual cost thereafter would be \$92,716,000. Under full implementation (400,000 trainees per year)

the first year's cost would be \$761,959,000; the annual cost thereafter would be \$1,062,510,000.

31. What sort of code of justice has the Commission recommended for trainees?

The Commission has recommended that, by and large, the recently enacted Uniform Code of Military Justice should be applied to trainees. This Code is a great improvement over the old Articles of War and Articles for the Government of the Navy. It is uniform for all of the Armed Services and, in addition, has a very intelligently planned appellate system. The Code contains many provisions which are designed to assure a fair trial to any man accused and also designed to prevent undue control of or interference with the administration of justice. It sets up a single Court of Military Appeals over all the Services. This Court is made up entirely of civilians. The Code provides that counsel shall be furnished to any man who desires to appeal his case. A revolutionary step was taken in the provision which entitles an enlisted man to have another enlisted man among the court convened to try him. Commanding officers are forbidden to censure a court-martial or any member of a court-martial. Law officers must be appointed for every general court-martial (a court which tries the more serious offenses), and in this type of court-martial both the defense counsel and trial counsel must be lawyers. There is a mandatory review of every court-martial case by the convening authority and every general court-martial case which involves a discharge, dismissal or sentence of more than one year must be reviewed by a Board of Review also made up of civil justices. These Boards of Review not only review the law but also review the facts. This, of course, is a great departure even from our civil system of justice which allows only the law to be

reviewed. A safeguard is provided here, however, in that the reviewing authority, upon the basis of new facts, cannot lengthen the sentence of the lower court. There is an automatic appeal to the Court of Military Appeals wherever a death sentence is involved. Self-incrimination is prohibited as are pleas of guilty in all capital cases.

The Commission has added a few significant modifications to the Code as it exists. For instance, the Commission requires that commanding officers, courts martial and reviewing authorities give full regard to the youth and inexperience of trainees in awarding punishment. Also, a trainee who is charged with a serious crime such as murder, robbery or rape may be tried by general court-martial only if the trainee, after consultation with his parent or legal guardian, consents in writing to being tried in such a manner. If such consent is not forthcoming, the officer involved shall report the facts and circumstances concerning the offense to the United States District Attorney for the district in which the offense was committed. At the same time, jurisdiction is vested in the District Courts of the United States to try and punish trainees for these offenses.

32. What sort of disability benefits has the Commission recommended for trainees?

The Commission has recommended that trainees be given disability benefits under the provisions of the Federal Employees Compensation Act. This Act applies to employees of the Federal Government. Due to the fact that trainees will not be in service for an extended period of time, will be trained in the United States and will thus not be subject to the hazards of warfare or overseas assignment, the Commission believes that veterans' legislation regarding disability benefits should not apply to trainees.

The cost of these disability benefits under the Federal Employees Compensation Act will probably be much less in the long run than the cost would be under the Veterans Administration. For example, the time will eventually arrive when nearly all young men upon reaching the age of 18 will undergo training in the Corps. If veterans' laws were applied it would mean eventually that anywhere from 80 to 90 percent of all young men in the Nation would be eligible to receive veterans' benefits for disabilities which might be remotely traceable to the 6 months of duty served in the Corps years before. Since veterans' benefits for disability are uniformly higher than the benefits allowed under the Federal Employees Compensation Act, this could mean a great drain on our national resources.

Under the Commission's recommendations, the training agency would make all determinations as to whether or not the disability was incurred in the line of duty. Whether or not a disability at a later date was proximately caused by prior service in the Corps would be left to the determination of the Department of Labor, the agency which administers the Federal Employees Compensation Act.

33. What sort of death benefits does the Commission recommend?

If a trainee dies while he is a member of the Corps or within 120 days thereafter, he shall have the benefit of free Government life insurance in the amount of \$10,000. The training agency will pay the burial expenses and the trainee's dependents will be paid any accrued compensation or dependency allowances due to the trainee at the time of his death. If a trainee dies before being accepted and enrolled as a trainee but after

reporting for induction to the local Selective Service Board, or he dies subsequent to 120 days after his release from the Corps, death benefits will be paid under the Federal Employees Compensation Act.

34. Upon what monetary basis will a trainee's disability and death benefits be figured?

For the purposes of the operation of the Federal Employees Compensation Act, the trainee's compensation has been deemed by the Commission to be \$150 per month. Although the trainees will be paid only \$30 per month cash in hand, it is estimated that the value of the food, clothing, shelter, entertainment and other services furnished to them brings the total to the realistic figure of \$150 per month.

35. What other benefits will be allowed trainees?

Trainees will be given all the customary maintenance benefits such as transportation, quarters, subsistence, clothing, equipment, hospitalization, and medical, surgical and dental care. They will also be permitted to retain certain personal-issue clothing after satisfactory completion of training. While a trainee is in the Corps, he will receive the protection of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 which affords men in the Armed Services certain protection against eviction, default judgments, foreclosures of liens and mortgages and other matters for their period of service.

36. If a trainee is receiving income from another source, may he continue to receive such income while he is in the Corps?

Yes.

37. If a trainee loses any of his personal property due to his duty in the Corps, may he be reimbursed?

Yes. Trainees will be allowed to file claims for any such loss or damage to their personal property.

38. Will trainees be allowed leave?

The Commission's viewpoint is that leave for trainees should be held to a minimum. Certainly, emergency leave could and would be granted. After the initial phases of the training are completed, it would be very likely that trainees would be allowed to have weekend passes occasionally.

39. If a trainee has a complaint to register about the treatment he is receiving, can he make a complaint to the Commission?

Yes. Under the legislation proposed by the Commission, it will be made illegal for the training agency to deny a trainee direct access to the Commission or its inspectors. Thus, the channel through which trainees may make complaints or suggestions is assured.

40. Will reemployment rights be given to trainees?

The Commission has recommended that trainees be entitled to limited reemployment rights. Under this provision an employee would be granted a leave of absence by his employer for the purpose of taking training in the Corps. This period of leave would extend to 30 days after the trainee's release within which time he would be expected to apply for his old job if he desired it back.

41. Will trainees be protected against intoxicating liquors?

Yes. The Universal Military Training and Service Act authorizes the Secretary of Defense to make regulations concerning intoxicating beverages. The Act further provides that any person, corporation, partnership or association who violate these regulations shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of not more than 12 months or both. The Commission has further recommended that the Commission be authorized to approve all regulations which the Secretary of Defense makes on this subject. Present regulations of the Armed Forces provide protection to a large extent against consumption of alcoholic beverages by minors. Since nearly all the trainees in this program will be legally minors, full protection will be afforded them under present regulations.

42. Will trainees be protected against other moral hazards?

Yes. The Commission has recommended that the present criminal code provision which prohibits prostitution in the locality of Service installations be reenacted into the Commission legislation and be vigorously enforced. In addition to this, the Commission has also written into its law a provision which makes it unlawful to permit trainees to enter houses of prostitution, which the head of the training agency has declared to be off-limits to trainees. A fine of not more than \$1,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, is provided for any person, corporation, partnership or association who violate this provision.

The Commission also recommends that anyone having been convicted of a felony prior to the time of his induction into the Corps be banned from the Corps.

This will protect trainees to a large extent from undesirable associates. The Commission also recommends the establishment of an inspection system under the control of the Commission. One of the duties of this system will be to keep a watchful eye on moral conditions around all training installations.

43. What are the existing Armed Services programs for the moral welfare of the trainees?

The Armed Services currently afford generous opportunity for religious worship. They have severe restrictions upon the use of intoxicating beverages. The Navy has a comprehensive Character Guidance Program under the direction of the Chief of Chaplains, while the Army has the Troop Information and Education Program, the purpose of which is to inform the men of pertinent current events and to provide a variety of educational opportunities.

44. What does the Commission recommend in regard to special welfare protection?

The Commission strongly recommends the creation of local citizen advisory committees in the towns and cities which adjoin UMT camps. The purpose of these committees would be to foster good relations and understanding between the community and the military authorities. The Commission believes that these committees would be instrumental in solving moral, ethical, and recreational problems. The Commission recommends that full use be made of the facilities of such national organizations as the Red Cross, the USO, and the National Recreation Association.

45. In general, what will the Commission do in regard to inspection of the Corps?

The Universal Military Training and Service Act requires that the Commission submit to Congress twice each year a full report upon the training program. In order to do this, the Commission will establish a system of inspection. Its inspectors will visit each installation at least twice each year to inspect all matters of interest to the Commission. These inspectors will be given full access to any and all information they need. They will be under predominantly civilian control and their reports will furnish the information which will go into the biannual reports to Congress.

46. May young men volunteer for induction into the Corps?

Yes. The Commission has recommended that persons who are liable for induction into the Corps may volunteer within the limits of the quotas. Volunteers may be as young as 17 provided they have parental consent.

47. May those young men who volunteer for induction into the Corps volunteer for a particular branch of the Corps such as the Navy or Air Force?

Yes. The Commission recommends that they be allowed this privilege within the limits of the quotas.

48. What will be the pay of trainees?

Under the Universal Military Training and Service Act trainees must be compensated at the rate of \$30 per month. Those who have dependents will be entitled to receive a dependency allowance equivalent to the sum of the basic allowance for quarters provided for persons in the lowest pay grade in the Armed Services.

49. May trainees be trained outside the United States?

No. The Universal Military Training and Service Act provides that no person inducted into the Corps shall be assigned for training at an installation located on land outside the continental United States.

50. Will young men who are pursuing a specialized course of study essential to the national welfare be eligible for deferment?

The Commission made no concrete recommendation in this regard but did suggest that study be given to the possibility of training these young men for a period of 6 months after which they would be permitted to complete their professional training without fear of interruption. To achieve this, the Commission suggests that reserve service for this group of students be held in abeyance until such time as their studies are completed. The remaining $7\frac{1}{2}$ years of reserve service would then begin to run from 2 to 8 years after completion of their training in UMT.

51. What does the Commission recommend in regard to conscientious objectors to military training?

The Commission recommends that this group be treated as they are now treated under Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. This means that those found to be conscientiously opposed to training in the Corps would be inducted and assigned to noncombatant training as prescribed by the President. Those who are found to be conscientiously opposed even to noncombatant training, would be assigned by their local board to civilian work contributing to the national health, safety or interest. The length of service in these capacities would be the same as that required for trainees: 6 months.

Autumn '48, VIII, 40.

Security without Militarism

By Elias Huzar, Cornell University

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICAN LIFE, EDITED BY JEROME G. KERWIN. The University of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. v, 181. \$2.75.

I

IT HAS been a tradition of the American political system that military power should be subordinate to civilian authority. Constitutional design and prevailing circumstances have long favored that relationship; but recent developments have threatened its maintenance and have revived fears entertained by the framers of the Constitution. They were concerned lest the military and naval forces they authorized be employed not only abroad against foreign foes but also at home against domestic freedoms. They were afraid that the armed forces might be used not merely to "provide for the common defence" but also to undermine another purpose of the Union, to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."

What are the conditions that give rise to militarism and how is civilian predominance to be safeguarded? These are the questions with which this volume deals. It provides some answers and suggests clues to others. The book is the result of eight lectures given on the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation for the Study of American Institutions at the University of Chicago during 1946-47. Waldemar Kaempfert, science editor of the *New York Times*, writes on "Science, Technology, and War." Dixon Wecter, chairman of research at the Huntington Library, discusses the transition "From Soldier to Citizen." Hanson W. Baldwin, the *New York Times'* military editor, reviews the problems involved in "The Recruitment and Training of the New Armed Forces." Paul H. Appleby analyzes the difficulties of "Civilian Control of a Department of National Defense." T. V. Smith, former director of Italian re-education for the Allied Control Commission, deals with the "Government of Conquered and Dependent Areas." Quincy Wright, professor of international law at the University of Chicago, examines the role of "The Military

and Foreign Policy." Adlai Stevenson, alternate member of the United States delegation to the UN, sketches the "Civil-Military Relations in the United Nations." Charles E. Merriam recapitulates and rounds out the series in an essay on "Security without Militarism: Preserving Civilian Control in American Political Institutions."

The study of American civil-military relations has not engaged the attention of scholars nearly so much as the contemporary importance of the subject makes one wish it had, for we are sorely in need of enlightenment. Little of the insufficient analysis we have had has been in terms of the political and administrative practice in which the realities of civilian control must be sought. Some bibliographical notes on prewar publications dealing with administrative problems of civilian mobilization were brought together under Pendleton Herring's direction and published in 1940 by Public Administration Service under the title *Civil-Military Relations*. In 1942 Farrar and Rinehart issued a useful syllabus on *War and National Policy*, edited by Grayson Kirk and Richard Poate Stebbins. Since then we have seen the start of a stream of publications about World War II, particularly the administrative histories and personal memoirs such as those of Henry L. Stimson and Donald M. Nelson. Still, there is nothing available for our own armed forces comparable to Alfred Vagts' admirable book on *The History of Militarism*, which is concerned chiefly with European experience. This is a result, partly, of the fact that our own experience has not often posed serious problems in civil-military relations of the type we face today—an historical deficiency in which we may rejoice, though we may regret the absence of the sophistication which a harsher history might have provided. Partly, also, the gaps in our understanding have been a result of an indisposition of academicians to deal realistically with the role of force in social relations. The present volume is a welcome addition, then, to a sparse, though growing, literature on what bids fair to remain a major problem in American political institutions.

Civil-military relationships in American life is a field whose boundaries are ill-defined, the more so the more "total" war has become. It is also a subject that no one book could cover adequately—at least, with our present inadequate knowledge about it. It is regrettable that room could not be found in these essays for more than brief references to our experience and problems in administration of scientific research and development and to the difficulties of mobilizing the national economy to supply our military forces and Allies. With these major exceptions, however, the eight writers manage to take up most, though they exhaust none, of the significant aspects of civil-military relations in the United States. Even though the book does not pretend to be definitive, it is full of stimulating suggestions on a timely topic. It raises more questions than it answers and poses more problems than it solves. We may share with Herbert Emmerich the hope that it will lead others to regard national defense as an obligation of scholarship and to study, write, publish, and teach about it.

II

WHAT is it that the writers of these essays fear about the armed forces? The dangers are twofold. First, there is the possibility that the professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen will become "bureaucrats" and will do a poor job in their several specialties. Second, there is the possibility that they will become "militarists" and will exercise undue influence over other than strictly military functions. The first danger is one that has not infrequently plagued our military institutions. The second is a newer and more serious threat. Both difficulties are commonly supposed to stem from certain traits attributed to professional military men.

Merriam observes that "there are virtues within the legitimate scope of military functions; courage, sacrifice, tenacity, alertness, are among these attributes encouraged in military groups under the most favorable circumstances, as over against cowardice, selfishness, indifference, weak will." (p. 158) Wright catalogs some of the chief characteristics frequently associated with "the military mind." One group of traits is lack of inventiveness, traditionalism, and incapacity to perceive the obsolescence of methods or weapons. Kaempfert documents

this point in his brief discussion of the "culture lag" in military organizations, though he demonstrates clearly that the needs of the armed forces have been a major stimulus to the development of modern science, atomic energy, for example. Another group of characteristics consists of patriotism and nationalism, advocacy of preparedness in time of peace, and an irrational conviction of the inevitability of war. A third set of traits is overconfidence in the applicability of the military method to the solution of problems in international relations. Finally, there is an alleged tendency among military men to favor discipline, order, planning, and even regimentation in economic and social as well as in military life.

How widespread these mental patterns are we do not know. In defending military men against such charges, former Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson has declared that "there is no set type of military mind. . . . I have never seen the signs of a military mind that could be identified as a single type, any more than there is a lawyer's mind, an engineer's mind or a merchant's mind. Mental equipment and outlook on life vary as much in the Army and Navy as with other occupations or callings."¹ Wright concedes that military men elected to the office of President have not displayed many characteristics of "the military mind," though he does not doubt that many military men suffer from them. However, distortions of thinking such as those listed above are not unique to military men. They are found in all professions, fostered by training, specialization, self-interest, and so on—and, in the armed forces, aggravated by the separation from civilian activities that accompanies service at isolated military posts, on ships at sea, and in overseas garrisons. Still, the fact that the difficulties may be universal does not make them any less a problem in the armed forces. It merely supplies perspective and clues for solutions.

Wright suggests that civilians have certain advantages over the military. They are readier than the professionals to accept and adapt themselves to new developments in military technology and policies. They have more confidence that the world can be organized politi-

¹ War Department press release containing the text of an address at a meeting of the Alumni Association of Columbia University, June 3, 1947.

cally for peace. They are more likely to appreciate the facts that armed forces are only one element in a nation's power; and that, even in the conduct of wars, diplomacy, economics, science, and propaganda may be more important than strictly military power, essential though that is. Finally, civilians are more disposed to support and to implement subordination of the military to the politically responsible civilian authorities.

A great deal of the superiority attributed to the (whose and how typical?) "civilian mind" is nothing more than the result of forces comparable to those which influence military men and produce limitations in civilian minds similar to those for which the military are criticized. Civilian minds may be as narrow and unadaptable as military minds—and this is a major source of the difficulties of integrating government programs for national security. In any case, military men have much of value to contribute to the process of government. Their judgments must be considered if the government is to balance ends and means, diplomatic commitments and military power. The President and the Congress must balance strategic requirements, say for overseas bases or armaments, against possible liabilities in international and domestic politics. This is where such decisions belong—not only because these politically responsible officers are the instruments through which our constitutional system works, but also because military means are only one of several, and not necessarily the best, methods by which the ends of public policy are pursued. Thus, for example, the policy for "containment of communism" is being implemented by the Marshall Plan and the Voice of America program as well as by our armed forces. Again, Congress has recognized the relationship of military policy to diplomatic and economic policies in the provisions of the law for unification of the armed service departments for a National Security Council and a National Security Resources Board. In making decisions on matters involving the national security, then, the chief civilian officers of the government should listen to our military leaders—probably more than they often have in the past, but perhaps less than they seem inclined to do in some cases at present.

In spite of criticisms of "the military mind,"

there has been a growing tendency of late to grant military men increasing influence in public affairs. It is this development and its threat to civilian supremacy, rather than "bureaucratic" weaknesses within the military establishment, that most disturbs those who are critical of "militarism."

American military men have often been successful candidates for political office, but fortunately they have not been disposed to use military strength for that purpose as frequently has been the case abroad. Wecter analyzes the composition and attitudes of the sixteen million veterans of World War II and concludes that "this nation stands in no danger from masses of soldiers who refuse psychologically to demobilize. . . ." (p. 24) At the same time, as a result of their own momentum and the wooing of interested politicians, veterans continue to be a potent force in American politics. How will their experience as military men affect their activities as citizens? Wecter suggests that they are less likely than civilians to be impressed by the mere fact that a candidate has had a war record, and that many of them have had enough of military controls. In what direction will they throw the influence they exercise through their various organizations? Will they be preoccupied with special group privileges and benefits or will they act on the assumption that the veterans' welfare is inseparably related to that of the rest of the community of which they are a part? What effect will they have on foreign policies, military preparations, and domestic economic and social programs, particularly if the country falls into hard times again? What will be their net impact on civil liberties and the democratic processes of government, especially if the country should be faced with domestic disturbances and attempts are made to enforce order and to preserve the status quo by military means, or if people succumb to the temptation to accept authority in order to escape from the exercise of their political responsibilities? These are some of the questions raised, but far from fully answered, by the essays under review.

It is not the military alone, however, who are attracted to the expansion of military influence in public affairs. Opinions differ on how much the penetration of "civilian" agencies by military men is the result of a will to power on the

part of the military and how much it is a consequence of the attitudes and actions of civilians. The military, like any other, bureaucracy are subject to imperialistic impulses which impel them not only to increase the armed forces but also to reach out to control related activities on which the success of military effort proper may depend, for example, scientific research, especially in atomic energy, and industrial mobilization. It has been easy to rationalize such expansionist tendencies in terms of national security and many civilians go along with, and even urge, growth of military influence over other-than-military agencies and programs.

This is bad business when measured by standards of efficient, as well as of popular, government. It dissipates the energies of military administrators leaving less time for management of the armed forces whose organization, strategy, and tactics stand in need of revision to bring them into line with contemporary technological and political developments. It threatens to lower the quality of administration in the nonmilitary agencies by placing their control in people less likely than appropriate civilians to manage them efficiently. It promotes the mistaken idea that military defense is synonymous with national security and thus leads to the neglect of other aspects of that security. In other words, "civilian supremacy" can be justified on grounds not only of civilian self-interest and constitutional doctrine but also of administrative effectiveness.

Despite these considerations, however, the recent tendency to staff government agencies with military men and to subject public programs to their direction or influence continues—in diplomacy, research, education, industry, and other areas. These developments have been summarized by Hanson W. Baldwin in an article entitled "The Military Move In," which appeared in *Harpers* for December, 1947. How shall we account for this tendency in face of the tradition of civilian supremacy and military subordination?

A great deal of it stems from the fear that there will be another war, a belief that we must prepare for it now, and a feeling that military men are best equipped to manage the preparations—which are conceived in more inclusive terms today than they were before wars became

"total." Some of it is the result of the failures of civilians who are insufficiently aware of our constitutional theory of, and insufficiently sensitive to the need for, a line of separation between civil and military authority. Some of it is an accident of personal acquaintance by appointing authorities who have been impressed by the administrative records made by military men in the armed services. Some of it is due to a conviction on the part of these authorities that they will be able to control their military appointees and to check any "militaristic" tendencies they may display. Some of it is a consequence of attacks on civilian bureaucrats, at the same time that glamour, prestige, and special dispensations enhance the status of the military profession. (Ironically, leaders of the armed services have complained in recent months that attacks on the military have undermined and discredited their profession and have hurt the military establishment by discouraging competent men from joining, or remaining in, the armed forces.)

Some of it is the result of the government's inability to secure the services of capable civilians because salaries and other conditions of employment are unattractive; for example, the President's attempt early in 1948 to secure special legislation for appointment of General Kuter to the CAB. Some of it results from a desire to take agencies or programs "out of politics"; for instance, the WPA after the 1938 elections. Some of it follows from the emphasis on "security mindedness" characteristic of this period of uncertainty and fear, as in proposals to restore control of atomic energy to the military. Some of it, finally, stems from an exaggeration of the competence of military men and inadequate discrimination between the civilian jobs for which their experience qualifies them and those in which it is not particularly relevant. Perhaps the most remarkable illustration of this attitude is the willingness of assorted groups to take General Eisenhower as a presidential candidate "sight unseen," without knowing his views on important public questions.

III

How, in view of these developments, is civilian supremacy over military authority to be made effective? How can we implement the

political philosophy expressed by Viscount Trenchard, Marshal of the RAF?

In a democracy, because it is a democracy, the fighting man is the servant of the statesman and strategy is profoundly affected by internal and international politics. The military chiefs are the advisers on military policy and the executives through which that policy, once decided, is put into effect. The responsibility is with the statesman who has to justify his actions and maintain his position in a legally constituted representative assembly, representative of the people, whose knowledge of military matters is nonexistent and whose judgment is frequently wrong, based as it must be in war on a necessarily incomplete possession of the facts.²

How are we to keep the military machine an instrument, and prevent it from becoming a master, of government policy?

One way out of the dilemma is disarmament. It could be argued that the happiest solution to the problem of obtaining security without acquiring militarism would be to reduce, or to eliminate the need for, armed forces in international, and domestic, politics. It seems more realistic, however, to assume that military power will continue to play a major role in public affairs in the foreseeable future—that, as Merriam says, force will continue to be "employed in self-defense to make possible the conditions under which reason and co-operation may live and advance to higher levels." (p. 159) Thus, Smith notes that in countries conquered by American forces in the late war we have been subordinating our military to their civilian authorities, that we are "determined to subordinate the military even if we have to use the military to do it!" (p. 98) Even the United Nations Charter makes provision for international application of armed force to maintain or restore peace, a function whose administrative and substantive difficulties Stevenson outlines in his essay. But the UN's experience to date has not been such that one may safely conclude there is no danger of resort to another major test of arms among the great powers. American military policy, like that of other countries, still is based on the assumption that nations must depend for their security on their own, and their allies', forces rather than on law and international armed forces. Our de-

² *The New York Times*, January 28, 1942, p. 8.

mobilization after 1945 was rapid, but the military, naval, and air establishments that remain exceed by far their counterparts in any previous period of "peace"; and the prospects seem favorable to continuance of the armed forces at high levels. A large military establishment, however, poses a problem of unfamiliar dimensions in American civilian control of the military, for standing armed forces, even if dispersed, are always a potential menace to that control—though navies may constitute less a threat of domestic oppression than do armies. As Wright puts it, "the world is still an anarchy, and states may feel compelled to become tyrannies." (p. 133)

If disarmament is not the answer to security without militarism, neither, in view of the nature of modern warfare, is resort to civilian components in lieu of professional armed services. Baldwin analyzes the nature of the military danger to the United States in a future war and outlines the strategy and forces required to meet it effectively. He foresees the principal threat not as one of large-scale physical invasion but as that of massive assault by atomic bombs and transoceanic rockets, planes, and submarines. He believes that the offensive has an ascendancy over the defensive at a time when our air and sea frontiers have become "live." How, then, are we to protect the continental United States, which is not only of tremendous importance as a supply base but also has become the main operating base of our armed forces? There can be no perfect protection against surprise attack by guided missiles and atomic explosives. On the home front, modern war calls for defenses of a magnitude and a complexity that this country has never had to provide before, though initial steps were taken in the last war. It calls not only for active measures such as air and missile interception but also for passive measures such as anti-air-borne work and disaster control. Against the enemy, Baldwin writes, "there is . . . no defense except a strong offense—the threat of retaliation in kind, the threat of worse blows against the enemy homeland than any the enemy can deliver against us." (p. 47) Such defense calls for strong forces instantly ready for offensive action; and such forces must be full-time professionals since mastery of modern arms and readiness to retaliate are beyond the capacities of

part-time civilian components, though they have a vital role in home front defense and as reserves for the regular forces. Baldwin argues against universal military training; and he contends that the necessary forces should be recruited on the basis of voluntary, long-term enlistments. He believes this is possible if service is made sufficiently attractive and if military personnel management is modernized—an estimate which, for various reasons, has not materialized, so that selective service has recently been reestablished.

If we must have a large standing establishment, how is it to be kept responsive to civilian controls? The provisions of the Constitution make clear that the Founding Fathers intended that military forces should be instruments rather than directors of public policy, and that they should be controlled by the politically responsible agencies of the government, i.e., by Congress and the President. Congress was vested with authority to raise an Army, to maintain a Navy, to make rules for government of the armed forces, to vote appropriations for their support—and thus to control their size, and to declare war. The President was authorized to appoint officers and was made Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, the final authority for direction of the armed forces. It seems to have been the framers' intention, as it has been the tradition in practice, that most presidents, and more secretaries of the armed service departments, should be civilians. These and related constitutional provisions point the direction and provide some of the safeguards needed for civilian supremacy over the country's armed forces—but they do not insure that result. Civilian supremacy requires a great deal more if it is to be made effective. As Appleby says, "Civilian control . . . cannot be achieved by slogan or by fiat. It cannot exist in an administrative vacuum." (p. 70) It requires not only submissiveness on the part of the military but also confidence, intelligence, and wisdom on the part of the top civilians; and it needs appropriate organization and staffing in the Congress and the Administration. We have been, and we remain, defective on all these counts.

It has been this country's good fortune that our military leaders have regarded themselves as servants of the people rather than their mas-

ters and have not been inclined to use their military authority as a vehicle on which to ride into public office or to maintain themselves in positions they have won by popular election. This happy result has been accidental more than it has been a matter of deliberate design. We need to know more about the circumstances that encourage such a frame of mind on the part of the military and about the conditions under which it breaks down, and to act systematically on such insight. For example, the pre-service background and the in-service training of officers and enlisted men have much to do with the respect they accord to orders of their civilian superiors. And agencies other than the top executive officers affect the responsiveness of the military establishment to civilian orders: the Congress, the courts, the people, the press, and the armed forces themselves, for the habit of obedience, to a great extent, is the result of military training. Programs for recruitment and for training of our armed forces should be planned, among other things, to promote the tradition of civilian supremacy over military authority, as well as to counteract "bureaucratic" tendencies within the armed services.

We need more than subordination of the military, however. We need intelligent direction by civilians as well. If our military officers need broader education in the conditions of the society in which they function, our civilian officials need a fuller understanding of the role of force in that society's operations and of the methods for controlling the armed services. We need civilians in the Congress and in the Administration who have confidence in their capacity to direct the armed forces—and who have the facilities, information, and judgment to justify that confidence. Adherence to the formalities of civilian supremacy may conceal wide departures from that principle. Military influence in public affairs will be as great as civilians in controlling positions are willing to allow it to be. Certainly the views of military men should have weight in public councils; but, for reasons already suggested, they should not be accepted without question, even in "military" matters. At the same time, the civilians concerned have an obligation to inform themselves so that they will not act ignorantly when they weigh military advice.

The central problem posed by claims for additional military control over agencies and programs concerned with national security is not so much one of "militarism" as it is one of domination by a part of the whole. The means for pursuit of foreign and domestic policies are multiple and interchangeable; but this basic consideration often is obscured by organization that encourages separatism instead of integration and by attitudes that confuse national security with national defense alone. National security requires over-all administrative and legislative leadership which can see things whole and relate them in thought and action, and leaders of individual agencies and committees who recognize that they are dealing with only part of a total program to which their efforts must be related.

The weaknesses of Congress in exercising its controls over the armed forces have been essentially the same as its shortcomings in directing and supervising civilian agencies. Legislative committees, like administrative departments, whose thinking they often reflect, tend to over-emphasize the particular means for promoting the national security with which they deal. And legislative leaders, like the President, lack many of the facilities needed to promote coordinated action. These problems receive little attention in the volume under review. However, Appleby observes that the decisions of the armed service committees are pretty much accepted by Congress although these committees are less civilian in character and attitude than Congress as a whole. He also warns about the dangers to civilian control that may result from congressional curtailments of presidential and secretarial authority over the military forces out of jealousy for a rival institution. Congressional weaknesses in passing on military recommendations and in supervising the armed forces have been remedied to some extent by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946; but a great deal remains to be done, especially in oversight of military administration.

The difficulties of the President and of the defense secretaries in controlling the armed forces are analyzed by Appleby in terms familiar to those who have read his *Big Democracy*. He wants to provide for such a balance in administrative structure and power as will bring up to the President the questions significant

for effective control of the armed forces—for example, by strengthening the relevant functions of the Department of State and keeping administration of embryonic civilian war agencies in civilian hands. Coupled with this need is that for adequate staff assistance—civilian as well as military, institutional as well as individual—which will enable the Chief Executive to act intelligently on the issues he undertakes to settle. Appleby declares that "the strengthening of the whole executive office staff and its better organization to make for balance, integration, and control of the executive government is the greatest single need in the field of public administration in America." (p. 89)

Appleby's comments about management of the armed service departments are in the same vein. Structure should be devised partly with an eye to its function in raising issues so that questions which require top level attention will receive it, while others are kept at appropriate lower levels; and the defense secretaries should have not only a military but also a civilian staff. He feels that intradepartmental civilian control has been too much a matter merely of political morality and too little one of administrative structure and facilities. Both, however, are essential for the purposes of real civilian control. Thus, Josephus Daniels, as Secretary of the Navy, was wrong in opposing a general staff for management of the naval establishment but he was right in sensing the danger that such a staff might also manage the Secretary.

These essays do not include a discussion of the unified defense department which Congress established in 1947; but two comments may be in order here in light of the foregoing discussion. One is that the legislation has left ample opportunity to the three armed forces—and their spokesmen have been sufficiently moved—to present their particular views to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Congress. The other is that the staffing of the department is deficient in two respects. First, the principal instruments on which the Secretary must rely for advice are joint agencies made up of representatives of the three armed services rather than truly departmental organs. Second, the civilian staffing at the secretarial level for programming, budgeting, personnel, research, and other functions probably is inadequate for

effective civilian control of the military establishment.

Civilian control of the nation's armed forces is only a special case of the management by politically responsible officers of government agencies with professional bureaucracies. Control of the military establishment may be a more formidable task than management of civilian agencies; but the lessons in the two areas are interchangeable. We need not yet despair in either case, though we have a long way to go before we fully understand what it takes to exercise that control and are able to make it effective. The essays in the book under review do not carry the analysis of the administrative

and political requirements of civilian control of military authority very far; but they do open up the way and raise enough questions to occupy for a long time those who can turn attention to civil-military relations. The necessary research, thought, and action may be encouraged by awareness that the consequences of failure in politically responsible direction and supervision may be more serious in the war agencies than in their civilian counterparts. In both cases, however, it is well to recall Appleby's warning that "civilian control is never finally achieved but poses a continuing problem requiring constant watchfulness. . . ." (p. 90)

Volunteers in Retail Price Control—A Postscript

By Charles Aikin, University of California

VOLUNTEERS IN OPA, by IMOGENE H. PUTNAM, General Publication No. 14 of the OPA Historical Reports on War Administration, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947. Pp. ix, 166. \$0.35.

I

THE OPA volunteer price control program can be described either as one of the genuinely significant administrative developments of the war period or as "the failure of a mission"; and both characterizations will be accurate. The local war price and rationing board price program never succeeded in attaining its objectives nationally because of a lack of understanding of what it was and of what could be accomplished through it, and also because of confusing commands and no small blundering on the part of OPA planners at each level of administrative authority. Yet, in exceptional cases it succeeded beyond justifiable expectations, and through its successes one finds an interesting and potentially useful device that can be valuable in the conduct of large and complex bureaucratic programs in the inevitable crises of the future.

Why was it that the heads of the national office of OPA and also those of most district offices rejected local board participation in price work for a considerable time near the begin-

ning of the program? How can one account for the fact that Washington executives—men who planned so ably in establishing the basic form of price control—did not contribute to the price work of local boards? Conversely, how was it administratively possible for a program involving scores of thousands of volunteers and devouring an ever increasing proportion of the agency's budget to be forced on a reluctant national office by field offices, and by a minority of field offices at that?

This program is a difficult one to appraise. As it is an easy one to describe and appears to be simple to understand, why was it so extremely hard to make it work? Just why was it that some boards performed ably and others, that were almost identically staffed and equipped, failed? Why was it that a good board might, after months of excellent work, suddenly cease to function? Too, what was it that happened to notoriously inept boards that—on rare occasions—led them suddenly to mend their ways?

Why were these war price and rationing board price panels so hard to supervise? Was there something peculiar about the problem of field supervision when applied to local boards? Experience indicated but did not explain why

An Appropriate Role for the Military in American
Foreign Policy-making: A Research Note

by

BURTON SAPIN, RICHARD C. SNYDER AND H. W. BRUCK

William Fox:
World Politics
Jan. 1954

Foreign Policy Analysis Project
Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 4
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR SECTION
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

July 1954

An Appropriate Role for the Military in American
Foreign Policy-making: A Research Note

by

BURTON SAPIN, RICHARD C. SNYDER AND H. W. BRUCK

Foreign Policy Analysis Project

Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 4

ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR SECTION
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

July 1954

Preface

One of the challenges usually met by those engaged in conceptual or theoretical work in the social sciences is whether their "apparatus" is of any practical use. In other words, it may be logically neat and have considerable esthetic appeal, but does it work, i.e., is it applicable to empirical research problems and, equally important, does it make any "difference" when applied to them?

We feel that this is a legitimate challenge when made in good faith, and we have therefore given some attention to the preparation and the encouragement of empirical studies using our decision-making frame of reference, insofar as this did not interfere with the major purposes of our Project. While the essay that follows does not fall into the category of empirical studies, it is an attempt to apply the decision-making scheme to the formulation of research questions in an important area of public policy and concern.

Therefore, as we suggest in our Conclusion, its worth must stand or fall on a considered judgment as to whether we have been able to demonstrate that our conceptual scheme is applicable to this problem and that it does make a difference to apply it.

We indicated our many intellectual debts in the Preface to Publication No. 3 (Decision-making As An Approach to the Study of International Politics). Since this essay is largely a by-product of that paper, we will only reiterate here our thanks to all those who have helped and encouraged us.

B.S.
R.C.S.
H.W.B.

July 1954

Copyright, 1954
by
Burton Sapin, Richard C. Snyder and H. W. Bruck
Princeton University
Printed in the United States of America

An Appropriate Role for the Military in American
Foreign Policy-making: A Research Note

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Preface	I
I. <u>Introduction</u>	1
Increasing Scholarly Interest	3
The Utility of a Decision-making Approach	5
Analytical Focus of This Research Note	6
Some Underlying Assumptions	8
Advantages of Conceptualization	10
II. <u>Military Participation in Foreign Policy Decision- making: Some Organizational Concepts</u>	13
1. The Larger Governmental Setting	13
2. Characteristics of Decision-making Systems	15
Types of Decisional Systems	16
Suggested Categories for the Analysis of Systems	18
3. Expert and Representational Roles	20
Commentary	21
III. <u>The Motivation of Military Officers: The "Military Mind"</u>	24
1. Introduction	25
2. Attitudes and Frames of Reference	26
3. Motivational Sources: Values and Intellectual Skills	29
4. The Rapidly Changing Role of the Professional Military Officer	33
IV. <u>Derived Research Problems and Questions</u>	34
1. Introduction	34
2. Some Key Research Questions	37
(1) The governmental setting	39
(2) Types of decision-making systems	39
(3) Expert and representational roles	40
(4) The "military mind"	42

	<u>Page</u>
IV. (Continued)	
Role Interpretation	43
Is There a Military Personality Type?	45
Military Thinking About Foreign Policy Problems	49
(5) When has the military establishment view predominated?	52
V. <u>A Note on Researchability</u>	55
VI. <u>Conclusion</u>	64

An Appropriate Role for the Military in American
Foreign Policy-making: A Research Note¹

I. Introduction

The greatly increased participation of the American military establishment in the making and carrying out of United States foreign policy represents one of the more important governmental developments of the last fifteen years. This new role of the military, and the political and social problems that have accompanied it, can be explained as a consequence of the major role recently assumed by the United States in world politics, involving among other things a substantial and continuing external threat to American military security. This threat is in turn sharpened by the fact that the traditional importance of military tools and techniques in international politics has been much increased by recent revolutionary advances in the technology of war. This situation has, of course, brought about a tremendous expansion in the size of the American armed forces and the nature and range of their responsibilities. The inevitable result is close interdependence and intermixture of foreign policy and military policy, reflected in the expanded military participation in American foreign policy-making.²

1. Since this Note is a by-product and application of our decision-making frame of reference, it should be read in conjunction with Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, Publication No. 3, Decision-making As An Approach to the Study of International Politics.

2. The background and general character of this new role of the military in American foreign policy-making, as well as some of the problems raised by it, are discussed in much greater detail in a recently published short study by two of the authors of this Note. See Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1954). While that volume and this Research Note are independent documents that stand by themselves, they are to a considerable extent products of a common body of thought and research experience. In fact, some of the concepts explicitly set forth and discussed in this Note guided the analysis in the other study, though to some extent left implicit in it.

The broad dilemma posed for the American nation by these developments may be thought of as the safeguarding of its essential democratic values and institutions in the face of: (1) the major military threat from abroad; and (2) the consequences that this threat has called forth within the nation (including the considerable expansion in the size and impact of the armed forces).

Within the foreign policy-making process itself, the more specific question arises of making use of those military skills and resources that seem necessary to the nation's security while at the same time maintaining a condition usually viewed as requisite to the continued health and, even, the existence of American democracy, namely, civilian supremacy or meaningful civil control over the military. Thus there are two major problems or objectives: effective foreign policy-making and better policies on the one hand, but formulation and successful execution of policies within a prescribed constitutional and institutional framework on the other. Clearly, there are a cluster of difficult problems involved here. Some of these will be suggested below.

As might be expected, there has been considerable public concern about these problems, indeed about the whole area of civil-military relations. The debate and discussion occasioned by the relief of General MacArthur in April 1951, the occasional warnings by legislators and other public figures about "creeping militarism" and the rapidly increasing influence of the military, the critical comments by such distinguished citizens as Dr. Vannevar Bush and ex-Defense Secretary Robert Lovett about the organization of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and the lack of appropriate civilian control over them, and the many governmental commissions and private study groups that have examined the structure and operations of the defense establishment in recent years -- all of these indicate that the role of the military has become a matter of considerable concern, and some confusion, to civilian officials, legislators, military critics, interested citizens and to military officers themselves.

Increasing Scholarly Interest. However, while many speeches have been made and numerous articles written, there has until recently been relatively little systematic analysis and research on these developments. Within the last year or two, though, there has been a noteworthy increase in attention to this area on the part of academic and other research groups and, with the support of some of the major research foundations, important projects have gotten under way at a number of colleges and universities.¹

In the study cited above,² two of the authors of this Note

1. Most of these are noted in William T.R. Fox, "Civil-Military Relations Research: the SSRC Committee and Its Research Survey." World Politics, 6: 278-288, (January 1954). Some of them will be commented on briefly in this paper. For a tentative formulation of its research focus and some hypotheses by one group working in this area, see Morris Janowitz, Working Paper on the Professional Soldier and Political Power, mimeographed, Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, July 1953.

Owing to space limitations, a bibliography has not been included in this paper. There are, however, extensive bibliographical and footnote references relating to the military and American foreign policy in Sapin and Snyder, op. cit., pp. 78-84. Also, the Committee on Civil-Military Relations Research of the Social Science Research Council has recently published Civil-Military Relations: An Annotated Bibliography, 1940-1952 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1954).

2. See n. 2, p. 1.

have attempted to contribute to this developing academic interest by a characterization and appraisal of the contemporary role of the military establishment in American foreign policy. An effort was made to set forth and analyze the criteria in terms of which the key question of an appropriate role for the military in foreign policy-making could be answered, and then, in the light of what seemed to be a generally accepted set of preferences on this matter in the United States, the conditions conducive to the necessary, effective and limited participation of the military in foreign policy-making were specified.

In addition to attempting to clarify the value questions involved in these issues of public policy, some attention was also given to the separate problem of analyzing and researching the role of the military in foreign policy. Considerable care was devoted to the clear, operational definition of terms and problems, and some analytic concepts that seemed to the authors useful were introduced. Also, some key research questions in the area were indicated. However, the study did not attempt any systematic presentation of major factors that needed research, concepts and categories viewed as fruitful for researching them, nor the more meaningful research questions that might be suggested by such conceptualization. That is precisely the task to which this essay is directed -- it is an exercise in conceptualization and in the application of a conceptual scheme to the description and analysis of an important social and political problem

The Utility of a Decision-making Approach. By way of further introduction, it may be appropriate to indicate how the members of the Foreign Policy Analysis Project happened to get involved in the field of civil-military relations research. First of all, it should be made perfectly clear that the civil-military field is not a primary or even major concern of this Project. However, a number of circumstances combined to make the preparation of this Note seem worthwhile. In the first place, the role of the military in American foreign policy is and has been an important personal interest, furthered by empirical research experience, of two of the members of the Project.¹ Furthermore, while the Foreign Policy Analysis Project is concerned with assessing and evaluating the literature of the field of international politics viewed essentially as an academic and intellectual enterprise, its members have at the same time been attempting to develop their own frame of reference for defining the field. This frame of reference uses decision-making as a focus for analysis.² Inevitably such an approach

1. In addition to the study by Sapin and Snyder already cited, Mr. Sapin was, from 1951 to 1953, a member of a research group of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, which examined the Japanese peace treaty as a case study in the formulation and implementation of American foreign policy. Mr. Sapin's doctoral dissertation dealt with the role of the military establishment in the making of that Peace Treaty. See also Burtin Sapin, "The Role of the Military in Formulating the Japanese Peace Treaty," in Gordon B. Turner (ed.), A History of Military Affairs in Western Society Since the Eighteenth Century (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1953), pp. 751-762 (in reprint form, Publication No. 1 in this Series).

2. The decision-making frame of reference is set forth in considerable detail in Publication No. 3 of this series (see Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, op. cit.) and will therefore not be discussed at any length in this Note.

involves considerable interest in the processes of foreign policy-making; and in the patterns of activity which characterize contemporary American foreign policy-making, the role of the military establishment is both important and revealing.

Thus, we have found the decision-making approach and the conceptualization flowing from it extremely useful and suggestive in analyzing the military's role in the formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy, and, at the same time, the latter problem has provided interesting illustrative material for the application and development of the decision-making frame of reference. In sum, by a combination of personal interest and research experience, the importance of the political and social problem presented by the role of the American military in foreign policy and the apparent usefulness of the decision-making approach in dealing with it, this group has been drawn into this area and devoted considerable time to it in hopes of perhaps contributing some concepts and formulations of key problems that might lead to more fruitful research.

Analytical Focus of this Research Note. Before proceeding to set forth some of the underlying assumptions of this Note, the limits of its concern should be made clear. The field of civil-military relations is a very broad one. It includes relationships within each of the four departments of the military establishment and among them, encompassing the many and complex problems faced in the organization and direction of the armed forces and their effective control by politically responsible civilian authority. Another very important

area is represented by military relations with other parts of the Federal Government, including Congress and its committees as well as the other departments and agencies of the executive branch. Civil-military relations can, again, be looked at in terms of the impact of the activities of the armed forces on various aspects and segments of the society -- on the American economy, on scientific research and education, and on civil liberties. These are all significant areas in need of systematic examination. However, the focus of this essay is narrower and its purposes more modest. It is directed essentially to the problem of analyzing contemporary military participation in the making of foreign policy decisions, though much of what is said will also be relevant to military activities with respect to policy implementation and to the legitimation of foreign policy decisions and programs.

In isolating our problem for purposes of analysis, we are obviously not implying that it is in fact separable from these other elements. While such a procedure makes sense in terms of analytic convenience, it is undeniable that those aspects of military participation in foreign policy-making with which this Note is concerned would become much more understandable if, for example, systematic studies of the characteristics of internal military establishment organization were available.

While the explicit range of concern of this essay is fairly narrow, it is assumed that many of the concepts to be presented would be quite useful in analyzing some of the other aspects of civil-military relations just noted. The same comment would apply

to historical research in this area. This Note is oriented to research on contemporary aspects of the role of the military in national policy-making, but it is felt that historical research on this problem or on military organization and military policy in the United States would benefit by the use of some of the decision-making concepts. In this regard, there is no intention to imply that historical research in the civil-military relations field is unnecessary. On the contrary, far too little is known about the history of the armed forces, military policy and the relations of the military to national policy-making in the United States.¹ In sum, while our primary focus of attention is present-day military participation in the processes of American foreign policy formulation and decision-making, it is suggested that the general approach and the particular concepts to be employed have a far wider relevance and applicability.

Some Underlying Assumptions. It should be clear now that one of the underlying assumptions of this Note is the usefulness of a decision-making approach to the problem. Such an approach would seem to become particularly appropriate in a situation where no responsible critic or observer is inclined to argue that military participation in the processes of foreign policy-making is undesirable or unnecessary.

1. A new program for encouraging research in this area has just gotten under way. See Gordon A. Craig and Bryce Wood, "The History of American Military Policy: A New Program of Grants for Research," SSRC Items, 8: 13-15 (June 1954). Furthermore, in the study of civil-military relations that Harold Stein is directing for the Twentieth Century Fund, one of the products will be a much-needed historical sketch of major developments in the governmental role of the American military establishment during the last twenty years.

Once military participation per se is accepted as necessary to more effective policy-making, it would then seem to become a question of establishing appropriate limits and conditions for it, in terms of those values or criteria that seem to have general acceptance in the society. Avoiding or minimizing undesirable consequences and providing conditions favorable to the development of desirable ones, in terms of both better policies and decisions and the maintenance of meaningful civil control, would seem to depend in turn on detailed and reliable knowledge about the following: (1) the types of decision-making units in which the military are involved and the roles they play in these units; (2) the nature of the communications networks linking military and civilian agencies; and (3) the characteristics of military thinking about foreign policy problems -- what values, attitudes and intellectual skills military officers bring to bear on these problems and with what results. These are some of the major factors emphasized by the decision-making approach. It is difficult to see how the role of the military in American foreign policy can be examined and evaluated without attention to such factors and their consequences.

Another of our basic assumptions is that the most fruitful research on this or any other social science problem demands explicit, systematic conceptualization. Briefly, this involves: first, explicit indication of the situations, relationships and other dimensions of the problem that seem fundamental and are to be studied; and, second, establishing explicit categories or concepts in terms of which these factors are to be investigated. Obviously these

categories must meet the tests of clarity and precision and must be operational, that is, have identifiable empirical referents. This is, of course, by no means revolutionary doctrine. It is or should be standard operating procedure for any research that labels itself social science. It is clearly not in itself a sufficient guarantor of successful or worthwhile research. The researcher still needs imagination, experience, integrity and, if possible, enough acquaintance with the literature of the behavioral sciences to choose his concepts, his theoretical formulations and his hypotheses wisely. This latter point should perhaps be underscored. Any one set of concepts is not going to be as useful as any other. A conceptual framework built on major research endeavors and significant theoretical contributions in the social sciences is likely to prove far more fruitful than categories of the more intuitive, off-the-cuff variety.

Advantages of Conceptualization. However, bearing these obvious and inevitable limitations in mind, conceptualization, if well done, should help produce a number of desirable results for research. First of all, it should make possible the asking of more searching and researchable questions. Secondly, it should provide the researcher and the "consumers" of his research with explicit criteria of selection which specify the aspects of the problem to be studied and the pertinent data. Such a "check-list" should help sensitize the researcher to aspects of the problem or relevant data that he might otherwise miss. Finally, it should make for improved comparative analysis of a problem. Comparative analysis is obviously possible when a series of studies using the same conceptual scheme

have been done. However, studies done in terms of differing interests and orientations can also be linked and common properties or uniformities perhaps discovered if they are examined in the light of an explicit conceptual scheme. There should be increasing numbers of such studies available as some of the research groups referred to earlier begin to publish the results of their work. For example, a series of case studies on civil-military relations in the foreign affairs field is going to be prepared as one part of the Twentieth Century Fund project noted above.¹ Comparative analysis could also be done on the handling of the role of the military in different political systems, in effect, comparative national experiences in this area.

Clarity of purpose and focus, categories that are operational, and questions that are researchable -- these are the theoretical virtues of bringing to bear on research problems an explicit conceptual scheme. For any particular conceptual framework, of course, the final test is in the researching, but the general advantages of such an approach seem to us undeniable.

Our procedure in this paper will be to set forth first a series of key concepts and then, in a separate section, present the kinds of research questions suggested by these concepts. The various decision-making systems that characterize military participation in foreign policy-making will be examined under two general

1. In the earlier series of public administration case studies edited by Harold Stein, The Sale of the Tankers case has some very suggestive material on the military establishment. See Harold Stein (ed.), Public Administration and Policy Development (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1952), pp. 445-532.

headings, namely, the organizational and the motivational. The section on organization will be concerned with the larger governmental setting, the characteristics of the decision-making systems involved, and the possible organizational roles that military participants can play in the decision-making process. The discussion under the second heading will focus on the individual decision-maker, dealing with the character of military thinking about foreign policy problems in terms of motivational analysis.

II. Military Participation in Foreign Policy Decision-making:
Some Organizational Concepts

As has been suggested, military participation can be viewed in organizational terms: the responsibilities and jurisdictions of the agencies involved; the complex channels of communication by which they are linked; the organizational roles of the officials involved; the systems of activity in which they participate; and the statutes, orders and regulations, and the precedents and conventionalized procedures supplementing them, which provide the rules of the game.¹

1. The Larger Governmental Setting²

We are principally concerned here with the systems of decision-making activity that characterize military participation in foreign policy-making. Our definition of the concept of decision-making system and our notions of how these systems should be investigated are set forth below. However, in order to study any particular decision-making system, it is obviously necessary to

1. We have some serious reservations about the formal-informal dichotomy as applied to the analysis of administrative organizations. We prefer to view the written, prescribed rules and regulations and the body of generally accepted but not usually explicit precedents and usages which develop over time in any organization as providing the formal structure. We would label the latter, usually referred to as the informal factors, as the conventionalized rules. This leaves the term informal as a residual category to refer to more temporary and fleeting behavior patterns which very often are not relevant to decision-making. This is admittedly a rather cryptic explanation of our reservations. For a more detailed discussion, see the section on spheres of competence in Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, Publication No. 3, op. cit., pp. 68ff.

2. Since we prefer to use the term organization to refer to any decision-making system, it seems desirable to label the totality of the structural features and activities of the various legislative bodies and executive branch departments and agencies within which these decision-making systems operate as the governmental or institutional, rather than the organizational, setting.

place it in the larger institutional framework or context of which it is a part. Perhaps the general governmental setting in which military participation in the formulation of policy and the making of foreign policy decisions takes place can be conceived of in the following terms: first, the relevant aspects of the domestic political setting, including the political parties and public opinion and pressure groups and, then, within the official governmental structure itself, members of the House and Senate and the appropriate Congressional committees and subcommittees, a large number of civilian officials and military officers at various hierarchial levels in the State Department, the defense establishment and other executive agencies, all of these people with their particular organizational roles and responsibilities, guided by a body of explicit and conventionalized rules, having available to them a number of channels of communication to other officials and agencies, and involved in a whole series of relationships with one another ranging from interdepartmental committees established by statute through State or Defense Department briefing sessions for influential Senators to informal communication over the telephone or the luncheon table. Included among these potential decision-makers are the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, their top civilian aides, and Senators and Congressmen as well as generals, colonels, Foreign Service officers, State Department desk officers and members of Congressional committee staffs. They may be high-ranking "policy-makers," middle-level office or section chiefs, members of staff units or "experts" of one kind or another. They

are all members of executive agencies or legislative bodies, committees, bureaus and other subgroups within them and perhaps inter-agency groups with assigned tasks and responsibilities.

Looking at this governmental setting in somewhat metaphoric terms, it might be said that each foreign policy problem or decision "activates" a part of this general, available pool of decision-makers. In other words, while we may talk of the State Department or the military establishment doing this or that, obviously for each decision or each series of decisions only a small number of officials are actual decision-makers and their relationships and communications are but a small part of the total ongoing activity. However, and this is the essential point, it is important to remember that the small departmental or interdepartmental group, at whatever organizational level, with which the researcher is likely to be concerned is not operating in a vacuum, that this larger framework is there and that some of its dimensions may be highly relevant to the activities of the particular decision-making systems on which research attention is focussed.

2. Characteristics of Decision-making Systems

In analyzing the processes by which a decision or series of decisions was reached, the researcher is usually, implicitly or explicitly, abstracting from a great complexity of organizational activity a number of actors (probably, though not necessarily, from different departments, bureaus or offices), who were, as he sees it, principally concerned with the problem or situation being studied. He then attempts to reconstruct the activities -- con-

ferences, communications and so on -- by which this group dealt with the matter under study. From the point of view of more systematic analysis and research, it seems to us useful to regard these groups of officials as comprising, for the purposes of the problem or situation they are dealing with, a distinct decision-making system, with its own responsibilities, its own channels of communication, its own structure of authority and its own rules of procedure.¹ The analytic usefulness of this notion of a decision-making system is of course much increased if the researcher has an explicit set of categories in terms of which to study and characterize one or more of these systems.

Types of Decisional Systems. The discussion of military participation in foreign policy-making that follows tends to be couched in terms of decision-making units with personnel drawn from various departments and agencies within the executive branch. However, as we implied in the discussion of the governmental setting above, there is no reason, from the analytic point of view, why Congressmen and Congressional committees cannot form a part of the foreign policy decision-making systems with which we are concerned. In fact, this would seem to be one of the advantages of this approach. In other words, since the decision-making system is an analytic reconstruction

1. It should be pointed out that a decision-making system can also be referred to as a decision-making unit if one wishes to emphasize the concrete membership aspects which delimit it from other systems. The terms unit and system are then in a sense synonymous, referring to the same kind of organizational group viewed from somewhat different points of view, and thus have been and will be used more or less interchangeably in this paper. For more detailed discussion of decision-making systems, see Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, Publication No. 3, op. cit., pp 58ff.

by the observer, it can cross the boundaries between the legislative and executive branches as easily as it does the boundaries between executive departments (though, admittedly, the problems of analysis may thereby be complicated). Thus, if the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or key members thereof play an important part in the development of a policy or the making of a major decision, they can quite definitely be incorporated in the decision-making system reconstructed by the researcher.

One particular subcategory of decision-making system which is typical of large-scale organizations like the executive departments of the U.S. Government is the committee or the working group by means of which a great deal of intradepartmental and, most certainly, interdepartmental decision-making and coordination is carried out. Since such committees and working groups tend to be important organizational devices for military establishment participation in foreign policy-making and execution, some of the categories in the analysis that follows are specifically oriented toward such groups, and will be so indicated. However, the list that follows should also provide appropriate categories for the study of decision-making systems which do not fall under the heading of committees or working groups.

It should be noted furthermore that the decision-making units by means of which the military participate in the foreign policy-making process can be divided into two general groups: first, those

units completely within the Defense Department (and staffed by either military officers, civilian officials or both) dealing exclusively or to a considerable extent with foreign policy problems; and, second, those interdepartmental groups with representatives of both civilian and military agencies. The categories which follow (with one exception) and the later discussions of expert and representational roles and of the motivation of military personnel would seem to apply to the former systems as well as to the latter. In fact, it would be most interesting to compare the operations and deliberations of those foreign policy units within the Pentagon with their rough equivalents in such civilian agencies as the State Department.

Suggested Categories for the Analysis of Systems. The list of eight categories that follows is regarded as providing a useful set of questions for the analysis of decision-making units in the field of U.S. foreign policy. While it is possible that they could be broken down somewhat more neatly and into a smaller number of major categories, they seem to us to point to all the important dimensions of these units. In some cases, elaboration of the category and some of the questions it suggests have been included:

(1) the way the system or unit was activated (this might be called the predecisional occasion for decision) -- planned? routine? spontaneous? officially constituted or ad hoc? who took the initiative? what negotiations took place, if any?;

(2) the basis of military participation in the unit (this category is, obviously, relevant only to joint military agency-civilian

agency systems) -- how and by whom was military participation decided: (a) military request or claim to participate and civilian acceptance of such a claim; or (b) civilian invitation without military claim or request;

(3) personnel involved: (a) number; and (b) their organizational roles or positions (spheres of competence);

(4) structure -- how is the unit or system organized? does it have a chairman or other chief, responsible official? what are his powers? what is his range of discretion? and so on;

(5) objective -- what is the group's task? is it viewed as policy-making? fact-finding? advisory? what kind of decisions is it empowered to make?;

(6) hierarchical level -- at what organizational level is the unit located -- Secretary, Assistant Secretary, desk officer, or is there personnel from several levels?;

(7) duration of the unit -- temporary, ad hoc group? assigned a limited duration problem? more or less "permanent"?;

(8) relation of the unit to other decision-making units and other aspects of the governmental setting, and to aspects of the domestic or international setting, if any -- in terms of channels of communication and information, assigned responsibilities and jurisdictions and so on.

These categories should enable the observer to analyze and characterize the unit or system he is studying in what might be called organizational or structural terms. They point to the circumstances of the system's activation, the nature of its structure

and objective, and its relation to other units and to the setting. Some concepts designed to probe the character of thinking about foreign policy problems which takes place in such systems will be suggested in a later section. However, there is one particular aspect of the possible organizational roles (see 3b in the above list) played by military participants in foreign policy-making that calls for special attention, namely, the distinction between the expert and the representational role.

3. Expert and Representational Roles¹

It seems to us that this distinction provides the student of military participation in foreign policy decision-making with a useful analytic tool. The expert and representational roles can be differentiated in terms of the following: the function performed by the military; the claims that can be made by them (or on them); and the consequences of each role for the decisional system (as for example, the civilian response to military claims). In the expert role, the military are presumably contributing to the process special skills or knowledge not otherwise available. This may consist of information, analysis and interpretation, or particular techniques. As experts, their position is assumed to be advisory, and they bear no formal responsibility for the decisions taken on the basis of

1. Most of the discussion of expert and representational roles that follows is taken almost verbatim from Sapin and Snyder, op. cit., pp. 35-40. See Ibid. for a presentation of some of the important contemporary instances of military participation as experts and as "representatives" in the making of U.S. foreign policy.

their advice. Equally, there is no basis on which they can demand that they be invited to participate or demand that their views be heeded. They are in the position of being consulted as to their views and recommendations. The advice which they offer can be judged on its merits, not on the basis of the power or influence of those who offer it.

In the representational role, on the other hand, their essential contribution to the process is not expert knowledge but, rather, representation of departmental interests and responsibilities. In other words, the problem being dealt with is, presumably, so intimately related to the interests and assigned responsibilities of the Defense Department, or one of the armed services, that they either claim or in any case are granted representation in the group dealing with the problem and thus share responsibility for the decisions reached. If the problem is a continuing one, there would seem to be, in this case, almost a right to participate and, while participating, a right to join in the decisions reached and, presumably, to block the choice of disapproved alternatives. In other words, when acting as military establishment representatives in joint civilian-military policy-making units, the military personnel are in effect members of a cooperative enterprise, in which they have recognized and prescribed claims, rather than expert advisers to be consulted if the civilian agencies so desire.

Commentary. There are a number of comments to be made on this expert-representational distinction. First of all, these are ob-

viously idealized concepts and heuristic devices. The roles tend, in practice, to shade off into one another. For example, what starts out as participation on an expert adviser basis may become so formalized that the expectation of consulting and of being consulted develops into an accepted and normal procedure. What results after a while is a highly routinized relationship based on mutual expectations. There is no thought, in a relationship of this kind, of excluding military representatives even if the problem at hand does not seem to call for special military knowledge or expertise. As a matter of fact, it might be said that while the original rationale for military participation in the making of foreign policy rested essentially on the need for their special skills and knowledge in certain areas, in most present-day instances of joint military-civilian activity in foreign policy-making the typical military role tends to be closer to the representational than the expert. This is not to say that military expertise is no longer being contributed to the process but rather that it is probably more and more being contributed in situations where the military have the rights and responsibilities of representation rather than the more circumscribed role of offering expert advice and information when called upon.

Some commentators have noted that even in the case of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by statutory prescription, general agreement and their own statements top military advisers to the President, the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council, elements of the representational have tended to slip into their role. That

is, there has apparently developed on their part some expectation of being consulted regularly on a wide range of matters of greatly varying importance and on the part of civilian leaders an accompanying unwillingness to proceed without consulting the Joint Chiefs. One possible consequence of such participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in matters where they have no special expertness to contribute may be to reduce the general quality and usefulness of their contributions when they are highly relevant. Furthermore, to the extent that they are viewed as having a responsible voice in the decisions reached, they are likely more and more to be held politically accountable for their views, particularly in a period when foreign policy and national security issues are the dominant ones for the nation.

These are merely examples of the possible consequences and implications of expert and representational roles. They will be examined somewhat more systematically in Part IV of this Note. For the moment, it should be pointed out that the distinction has a usefulness and relevance beyond the particular problem area to which it has been applied here. It is clearly pertinent to the relations between civilian officials and military officers within the Pentagon. In fact, it would seem to be a useful distinction for the whole field of civil-military relations. In broader terms, the expert-representational dichotomy may be viewed as one way of dealing with the more general problem of the role of the expert or technician in a complex organization or, even more to the point, in a governmental agency in a democratic society.

III. The Motivation of Military Officers:

The "Military Mind"

Having first looked at military participation in foreign policy-making from the viewpoint of organizational structure, the purpose in this section is to provide some conceptual tools for analysis in terms of the individuals involved and, more specifically, in terms of the "qualities of mind" they bring to bear on foreign policy problems and the nature of their intellectual operations with regard to them.

There has been a good deal written about the "military mind," some of it by responsible and knowledgeable observers and scholars. Much of this literature has been characterized by certain doubts and fears about the nature and limitations of military thinking.¹ However, while these doubts and fears with regard to the "military mind" can by no means be casually dismissed, it must be said that none of the writers who have dealt with it have done very much to clarify or develop the concept. The "military mind" has been for the most part an impressionistic notion rather than an analytic concept. It is also true, perhaps inevitably, that there has been little if any systematic scientific investigation of the motivation of career military officers.

1. See the brief survey of some of this literature on the "military mind" in Sapin and Snyder, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

If this is regarded as a worthwhile area for social research (and this would seem to be suggested by the character of public discussion about the military and by the literature referred to above), then it is obviously necessary to move beyond these loose formulations. It is the purpose of the rather brief and essentially suggestive discussion that follows to present a number of concepts in terms of which the motivation of military officers can be investigated, with a view to indicating how the "military mind" might be more meaningfully researched.¹

1. Introduction

Motivation can be thought of, in simple terms, as referring to the why of human action -- why people react in particular ways to particular situations, why one goal is pursued or one decision made rather than another and so on. Stated somewhat differently, it refers to a psychological state in which energy is mobilized and selectively directed toward various problems and situations. Motivation, then involves energy and tendencies. One can think of acts, or sequences of behavior, directed by a common motive or motives. The acts include performance, perception, thought and feeling; these are integrated through the concept of motive. Obviously, having said these things one has not said very much, nor made any progress in the difficult and complex problems of understanding and analyzing

1. A fuller and more detailed discussion of motivational analysis as applied to organizational decision-making is to be found in Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, Publication No. 3, op. cit., pp. 92-117. In fact the presentation that follows is based on this discussion.

human motivation. Nevertheless, it seems to us a useful, even necessary, start to view the problem of the "military mind" as a particular case or example of motivational analysis, the motivation of military officers.

2. Attitudes and Frames of Reference

There is, unfortunately, no one generally accepted theory of motivation or conceptual framework for the analysis of motivation. However, there are a number of widely-employed concepts which are of considerable usefulness, and some of these will be introduced in the discussion that follows. Motivation can be analyzed in terms of the attitudes (defined as the readiness to be motivated) which are "triggered" or called forth by some particular event or situation and the frames of reference that are then brought to bear on these events or situations. Included in the frame of reference are perception and valuation. Perception refers to the way in which the situation is defined or sized up by a person. It is a selective process which involves omitting and supplementing details as well as structuring or organizing the situation. Perception is influenced, obviously, by previous knowledge and by the information possessed about the situation. Valuation is the assessment of the situation in terms of certain standards or certain objectives. It may involve the investment of the situation with feeling -- fear, hostility, resignation, and so on.

Attitudes and frames of reference can be investigated in terms of the following: (1) content; (2) behavioral consequences;

and (3) sources.¹ With regard to the last-named, six major kinds of motivational data for military officers will be noted below, but at this point some further comments on attitudes and frames of reference are called for. First of all, it must be remembered that these are analytic terms, they do not refer to concrete objects, that they are not directly perceived but rather indirectly inferred from behavior. Thus the distinction between them is an analytic distinction; they are not two easily seen and easily separated concrete entities. Obviously, any one person's attitudes and frames of reference are going to be closely related and have much in common since they stem from the same values, knowledge, personality and so on. However, in any particular situation they may easily differ or have different behavioral consequences. For example, the receipt of a memorandum from the State Department by a military officer may "trigger" an attitude of annoyance with and disrespect for Foreign Service officers in general. Yet the frame of reference that the military man brings to bear on the State Department paper may also include, in addition to this feeling of annoyance, information on the importance of the problem posed therein and some perception of the dilemmas faced by the State Department people. This may in turn call forth an attitude of duty and devotion to the safety of the nation, but in any event result in an answering memorandum quite different from what might have been anticipated by the original reaction.

1. Of course, the further underlying question with regard both to the attitudes and frames of reference discovered and their sources is the extent to which any of these seem to be common to military officers. In effect, is there a "military mind" or, perhaps, several varieties of "military mind"? This fundamental question is discussed in Part IV. We are primarily concerned here with setting forth the necessary conceptual apparatus.

This is obviously an oversimplified example, but it does point up the fact that these are analytic distinctions, that the phenomena to which they refer are closely related, act upon and even modify one another but at the same time differ and may have different behavioral consequences.

Examples of the kinds of attitudes of military officers about which it would be extremely useful to have information are not difficult to find. What are their attitudes with regard to the actions of particular countries? Is there a proneness, for example, to respond to all Soviet actions as being aggressive or to all French actions as reflecting weakness and decadence? Also of considerable importance would be military attitudes with regard to various foreign policy techniques or programs and also attitudes toward civilian officials, Congressmen or, as suggested above, Foreign Service officers and State Department desk officers. Included in the latter category would be the kinds of expectations military officers have about the behavior of these civilian officials and the kind of behavior they assume is expected from them by civilian officials (leaving aside how they interpret their own organizational roles and those of their civilian colleagues, which is more a structural question, relating to spheres of competence or role interpretation, rather than one of attitudes).

With regard to the frames of reference that military officers bring to bear on foreign policy problems or situations, it would be very useful to know how various kinds of situations are perceived or defined, which elements are given special attention or emphasis

and which are not noted or given only scant attention; furthermore, how various elements are judged and appraised, and in terms of what goals or criteria. To use an oversimple example, do so-called economic or public opinion factors tend to be ignored, or perhaps explicitly to be judged as of minor importance?

Obviously, the kinds of information in the possession of these officers is of considerable significance. Certainly a great deal of worthwhile research could be done on the nature of the information relating to foreign policy problems (as well as the communication networks through which it passes) that the military establishment gathers or receives and then distributes to its personnel and, also, the nature of the information and specialized knowledge that the military themselves contribute to the foreign policy-making process.

3. Motivational Sources:

Values and Intellectual Skills

This discussion of the kinds of attitudes and frames of reference that might be important in the motivational analysis of military officers leads inevitably to the question of their sources. In our view the pertinent motivational data can be broken down into six major categories: (1) the official plans and goals of the military organization; (2) the social and cultural values held by individual officers; (3) the values of the organization or of their subgroup within the organization (for example, the infantry as distinguished from the paratroops or strategic bombing as distinguished from tactical air support); (4) the social values that they accept and act upon because they view them as expressing the preferences of the

society or perhaps an important segment of it; (5) their intellectual skills and training; and (6) individual personality factors.¹

A fundamental point to be emphasized in this discussion of the "military mind" is that the qualities of military thinking can only be adequately understood and analyzed if they are viewed in the light of their organizational setting rather than in vacuo. Clearly, this is underscoring the obvious since it is the organizational structure and processes of the armed services which in effect provide the "military" in "military mind." However, in addition to the impact of organizational training and experience, it should be kept in mind that organizational membership and goals may determine that certain things have to be said and done by military officers no matter what their personal views or preferences. Thus, the effort to protect certain organizational objectives or interests may produce memoranda and recommendations which the officers themselves know to be "unrealistic" or "unbalanced," but for which they will still argue.

Military values and value priorities represent another important area for research in this field, particularly with regard to such crucial matters as the traditional democratic principles and institutions of the society, and the various tools and techniques of foreign policy. For example -- does there seem to be a preference among military officers for the use or threat of use of military force in foreign relations as against the processes of diplomacy and negotiation?

1. For further discussion of these data, see Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, Publication No. 3, op. cit., pp 103-116.

In studying decision-making in complex organizations, individual personality factors can be viewed more or less as "given," the assumption being that these factors will not usually play an important part in the decisions made and the actions taken.¹ On the other hand, the intellectual skills and training of military officers and other decision-makers should be of considerable importance in understanding their attitudes, frames of reference and, in general, why they act as they do in particular situations. In fact the notion of a military mind implies quite clearly that a certain kind of organizational training and experience will produce among men different in many other ways certain characteristic values, attitudes, and modes of thought and problem analysis. For this reason, the intellectual skills and training of military officers seem to us to deserve special attention and consideration.

It should first of all be noted that military officers as a group are not specialists, technicians or professionals in the same sense as, for example, economists, psychiatrists, engineers or mathematicians. There are, of course, military officer specialists in all of these and many other fields. The military supply or procurement officer is likely to have training and experiences quite different from those of the infantry or tank combat officer. Adding the Navy and the Air Force to the discussion would undoubtedly complicate matters even further. All of this suggests the possibility of a considerable variety of "military minds."

1. See the discussion of personality in Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, Publication No. 3, op. cit., pp. 108-116.

On the other hand, it is reasonable to ask whether there are certain common characteristics of training and experience in a military organization or, more specifically, in the American military establishment which tend to produce certain typical ways of thinking and acting, certain typical intellectual skills and qualities. Is it possible that the kinds of work and responsibilities that are typically assigned to the military, concrete, practical activities, building bases and manning them, police duty, maneuvers and, of course, combat operations, may produce some important common characteristics -- attitudes, values, ways of looking at the world and analyzing problems -- quite a bit different from those of the diplomat, the civilian policy analyst or the academic specialist in one field or another?¹ Certainly this is a hypothesis that, more precisely formulated, might be well worth investigating.

In any event it is important, whether or not typical patterns emerge, to learn more about how military officers approach and analyze policy problems and evaluate policy alternatives, and about possible "blindspots" and biases in their analyses (that is, whether any factors or data tend to be ruled out by definition as irrelevant, or are perhaps ignored completely). Furthermore, what "theories" of politics, international politics -- and human behavior generally -- do military officers have, and with what impact on their views and recommendations? In other words, what explicit or implicit theories or interpretive schemes do they have in terms of which they gather or evaluate data and make recommendations regarding particular policy

1. See the comments on this point in Sapin and Snyder, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

problems? It is difficult to see how the motivation of military officers can be adequately understood without such knowledge about their intellectual qualities and skills, and the organizational training and experience from which these stem.

4. The Rapidly Changing Role of the Professional Military Officer.

A final factor to be noted (and one which may make contemporary research on the "military mind" even more difficult) is that the present situation of the military officer is rapidly changing. As was pointed out earlier, the role of the military establishment in American life and in national policy-making has undergone a tremendous expansion and development in just the last ten or fifteen years. Inevitably, this must mean uncertainties and ambiguities in the ways that the military define their own role in foreign and domestic policy-making and, equally, how it is viewed by the civilians with whom they work and cooperate in governmental decision-making. Also important is the extent to which military officers have begun to adapt; so to speak, to these new roles and activities, whether through new types of training and education (such as the National War College) or through fairly lengthy experience with some of these new problems and situations. In any event, these recent changes in the responsibilities and the roles of the military organization must be kept very much in mind in attempting to study the qualities of contemporary military thinking, for the "military mind" may well be in transition!

IV. Derived Research Problems and Questions

1. Introduction

It may be appropriate at this point to restate one of our essential, underlying assumptions. In our view, the fruitfulness of the kind of applied or policy-oriented research questions with which we are concerned here is likely to be much enhanced if they stem from more basic and general conceptualization, theorizing and research. As we have already emphasized, this paper rests on work carried on by this Project in the development of a decision-making frame of reference for the study of international politics.

The distinction should be clear, then, between this more basic work and the research questions which follow. The latter are designed to deal with a particular social and political problem now facing the United States and are stated specifically in terms of this problem. Furthermore, their general orientation stems from an explicit set of values which are regarded as representing the preferences of the American nation in this matter. Thus, this policy-oriented research has a more specific focus and is directed to patterns and processes at a much lower level of generality than our more basic work on decision-making.

Turning to the problem in question, it may be useful as a first step to set forth some of the questions about it as they are often asked. The following are typical:

Is there "undue military influence" on U.S. foreign policy?

How can we get the benefits of the "military view" without getting this "undue influence"?

What should (or can) the military contribute to the making of foreign policy?

What are the dangers posed by the "military mind"?

Should (or can) the military be "kept out of politics"?

Are the military "moving in," threatening civil supremacy within the American Government?

How can we keep the military "in their proper place"?

Are we threatened by "creeping militarism"?

How can the Joint Chiefs of Staff be made more political minded and less military minded?¹

What is the basic relationship between power and policy?

How are policy and force to be integrated effectively?

Sometimes, these and similar queries are simply stated as propositions, as matters of fact, rather than as questions or hypotheses. In either case, it may be asked: what is wrong with them? The answer is that, from the research viewpoint, they are inadequate simply because they are not researchable. For one thing, the problems are not stated or defined in terms that are operational, that is, having clearly identifiable empirical referents. What this means in a specific instance was pointed out in considerable detail with regard to the widely-used phrase, the "military mind." The same sort of analysis could also be applied to such phrases as "military influence" "militarism," "the military in politics," and even civil

1. This question and the two that follow are taken, somewhat paraphrased, from a recent book on the organization of U.S. foreign policy. See W. Y. Elliott, United States Foreign Policy (New York, Columbia University Press, 1952), pp. 107, 36 and 108 respectively.

supremacy or civil control.

Another basic criticism that can be made of many if not most of these propositions and questions is that the distinction between fact and value statements is not always made clear (and may not be clear to the person making the statement). There is no need to defend the view that this distinction is a fundamental one, and certainly one that the social researcher must understand. It should, for example, be clear that the statement that there is undue military influence on American foreign policy is a value statement rather than a factual statement. As phrased, it is not researchable. On the other hand, if one posits certain explicit values with regard to the American democratic system and then indicates the empirical conditions within the United States Government which will be regarded as furthering or protecting these values, then it should be possible (though it may be difficult) to establish a research project which will attempt to discover whether the existing conditions approximate the ones regarded as desirable and, if not, perhaps even what changes or reforms are required to bring about the necessary improvement. In other words, values can and do give direction to social research, can suggest priorities in the kinds of problems to be dealt with, but cannot themselves be researched (except, of course, as social data). Clearly, the researcher is likely to have values and preferences about the problem with which he is concerned, but he cannot research these. He should rather be self-conscious about them and, to the extent that they direct his research, should make them clear and explicit so that when he does make value statements, the preferences

or other criteria on which these are based are clear to all. Thus, there is no reason why the question of an appropriate, or proper, role for the military in American foreign policy cannot be a focus for empirical research as long as the criteria of appropriateness -- whether they be certain democratic values, national security requisites, views on more "rational" decision-making or notions of economy -- are made explicit. Hypotheses can then be formulated and empirical research undertaken with a view to discovering whether the desired values are being fulfilled in the relevant empirical situations and, if not, why not and what can be done about it. As a bare minimum, it is hoped that the questions which follow will meet the operational test and that the value criteria on which they are based will be perfectly clear.

2. Some Key Research Questions

The criteria used in this Note for evaluating the role of the military in U.S. foreign policy and for indicating the important research areas are set forth in detail in the study previously cited.¹ Some of them have already been suggested above. In brief, the view presented is that extensive military establishment participation in the foreign policy-making process is necessary (i.e., to the making of better policy decisions) because of the close interdependence of military policy and foreign policy, but at the same time to be limited in terms of certain values assumed to express the general sentiments of the society in this matter. The essential, underlying

1. See Sapin and Snyder, op. cit., pp. 52-59.

value is meaningful civil control or supremacy, expressed in terms of certain constitutional and institutional requirements, including the effective¹ as well as formal making of the major decisions by politically responsible civilian leaders and, also a nonpartisan, career servant role for the professional military officer. Less crucial but still important as a criterion is the most economical and effective use of military skills and resources in the foreign policy-making process (admittedly difficult to define and to get agreement about).

These are the values which point to the research problems discussed here: the nature of military officer motivation, the types of decision-making systems characterizing military participation in foreign policy-making, and, as will be suggested below, the factors making for and working against the predominance of military establishment views and recommendations, or for and against what some might regard as an overemphasis more generally on military techniques and desiderata in policy-making. Having accepted substantial military participation in foreign policy decision-making as necessary, it seems to us that the general task facing the researcher is to examine its various consequences, to attempt to explain the development of those consequences regarded as undesirable in terms of the posited criteria, and, perhaps, to suggest remedies or at least provide some prognosis for the future. Having already presented the key research areas and the concepts viewed as essential (or at

1. It is not possible in this paper to indicate in appropriate detail what our criteria for effectiveness are in this instance. See the discussion in Sapin and Snyder, op. cit., pp. 52-59.

least quite useful) to their analysis, the next step is to indicate the important kinds of questions suggested by this conceptualization.

(1) The governmental setting. One very worthwhile contribution here would be the collection and codification of all the written materials -- legislative statutes, organizational manuals, administrative orders and rulings and so on -- relating to the formal structure of military participation in foreign policy-making. This would include the laws and rules regarding those roles and responsibilities of the military establishment which involve it in the foreign policy-making process, and also all the statutes and regulations relating to the relevant organizational structures and processes. This seems like an important and obvious enough task, but it is one that, as far as we know, has not been done. To get a clear sense of the various formal communications channels that link the Pentagon and civilian foreign policy agencies, the procedural rules that govern coordinating and cooperating activities among these agencies, and the statutory and ad hoc committees and working groups that link them would be in itself most helpful.

(2) Types of decision-making systems. Obviously, it would be very useful if a significant number of the decision-making systems by means of which the military establishment has participated in the making of American foreign policy could be studied and then characterized in terms of some of the categories set forth earlier: the number and organizational roles of the personnel involved, the objective, the structure and hierarchical level of the system, its

duration, the basis of military participation, and so on. This should include units completely within the military establishment (in any of the three service departments or the Defense Department) as well as those involving military and civilian agencies. Just a reasonable notion of the sheer number of such units and the range of problem: they have dealt with would be valuable.

Furthermore, if the kind of information mentioned above were available, it should then be possible to determine what types of systems, dealing with what kinds of problems and situations, have tended to predominate, if any, and with what kinds of consequences. If such an analysis could be done for a substantial number of instances in the period since the end of World War II, it might be possible to see if any trends have developed in this less than ten year period. As will be indicated in greater detail below, it would also be of considerable interest to see whether any particular types of systems have been rather consistently linked with particular consequences, for example, fairly clearcut predominance of the military viewpoint.

(3) Expert and representational roles. Though the expert-representational distinction is really a subcategory of the previous heading, it is regarded as important enough to merit separate treatment. As suggested earlier, the obvious opening question is whether military participation has characteristically tended in the direction of the expert or the representational role. Assuming that the contribution of special skills and information was the original rationale for substantial military participation in the foreign policy-making

process, it may be asked under what conditions the military have tended to move from an expert to a more or less representational, or responsible, policy-making role in particular decision-making systems. This is a particularly pertinent question if the impression noted earlier, that present-day military participation tends in the direction of the representational rather than the expert, is an accurate one. Perhaps a part of the explanation is to be found in the following suggestion:

There seem to be two basic reasons why talented, strong-minded civilian officials may feel helpless in the face of military expertise, thus in effect endowing the military with representational prerogatives: first, the civilians rarely have reliable alternative sources of information about military matters despite the fact that military groups do not always agree; second, the civilians lack the experience and knowledge of military thinking which would enable them to challenge successfully the interpretations of military experts. Intelligent officials seldom like to argue from positions of weakness, that is, from positions not based on knowledge which is reliable or accepted as reliable.¹

At the least, these are propositions worth investigating. The same would be true for any correlations found between other characteristics of these decision-making systems and either the expert or representational role.

In those cases where the military role has either developed from the expert to the representational or has started as the latter, it would be interesting to know how often the representational role has been formally recognized and sanctioned by statute, executive order or administrative ruling, and how often it has merely been conventionalized through habit or precedent of some sort. This suggests

1. Sapin and Snyder, op. cit., p. 36.

a further question -- how self-conscious have military officers and civilian officials seemed to be about the two kinds of military roles? Has the change from expert to representational usually been recognized and understood for what it was? Have attempts been made to justify or explain the change? How often has it been a result of explicit military claim or, on the other hand, explicit civilian invitation? Furthermore, in what instances have both roles been played by different military establishment members in the same decision-making system? By different military officers in the same system? And with what apparent consequences?

Finally, it would be interesting to examine the available evidence about these systems in terms of the contributions of specialized skills and information by the military. What differences would emerge between contributions made as experts as contrasted to those made as responsible policy-makers? In general, it would be interesting to know what special or expert contributions were made by military participants in these units no matter which role they played. This suggests the further question of whether it would be possible to establish meaningful criteria in terms of which to evaluate the need for either military expertise or military representation in any particular decision-making system or with regard to any particular policy problem.

(4) The "military mind." A question which links expert and representational roles and other aspects of the organizational roles or

spheres of competence¹ of military officers with the individual-oriented variables of the "military mind" is: what kind of views do military officers have of their own roles and those of civilian officials in the policy-making process?

Role Interpretation. For the various decision-making systems in which there is joint military-civilian activity, the following questions can be raised regarding role interpretations: how self-conscious do the participants seem to be about their own roles and those of their colleagues? how would they define the roles actually being played in the particular case by the other members of the system or unit (if they were at all self-conscious about this)? what views do they have (if any) on what kind of roles their colleagues should be playing? for example, do the civilian officials have any notions about what the role of military officers should be? to what extent do these civilian officials accept as normal, or even desirable, the participation of the military establishment and military officers?

By way of illustration, it has become customary (there is no statutory prescription) for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to sit in on the meetings of the National Security Council (whose members include, among others, the President, the Vice-President and the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury) as

1. Throughout this paper, the terms organizational role and sphere of competence have been used interchangeably. Actually we prefer the latter, and it is the one used in our Publication No. 3. However, as a matter of convenience, we have tended to use the term organizational role in this paper. In any event, they are synonymous in our usage.

chief military adviser. It would be most interesting to know how the present chairman, Admiral Radford, views his role in the deliberations of the Council, how self-conscious he is about being an adviser, and, on the other hand, how his role is viewed by the civilian leaders who sit on the Council. It would also be interesting to contrast the views of and regarding Admiral Radford with their equivalents in the case of his predecessor, General Omar Bradley. There should be no need to point out the important behavioral consequences that may flow from such role interpretations.

These role interpretations, as noted earlier, should be viewed as a part of the organizational structure, with consequences for the structure. On the other hand, how individuals interpret their organizational roles will obviously be influenced to some extent by their personalities and by their individual attitudes, expectations and so on. In the latter category might be stereotypes relating to the abilities of the other group, to their intellectual skills and "blind-spots," or perhaps theories or assumptions about how one goes about getting one's way with Army colonels, or Foreign Service officers, or economic analysts. The distinction between role interpretations and attitudes, however, should be kept clear.

For example, it would be interesting to know whether a strong emphasis on "strictly military" factors and a tough-mindedness or rigidity of viewpoint on the part of military officers in dealing with foreign policy problems is a consequence of certain attitudes they have developed in the course of their military training and experience or whether, on the other hand, it is a result of their

having defined their role in the policy-making process in this way. That is, they may view their job as in part to "keep the civilians honest," to gain appropriate consideration for the "military viewpoint" by overstating it. Such an orientation may be reinforced by the traditional experience of having their requests or recommendations turned down or pared down by civilian officials, either within the executive branch or in Congress. In any event, whether this orientation is a consequence of the military's role interpretations or of their attitudes may make a considerable difference if, for example, one is concerned with altering it.

If it is true that military officers are relatively more permanent in their particular assignments and more secure (in terms of a long-term career within the military organization) than are the civilian officials with whom they deal, this suggests another kind of relationship between organizational structure and attitudes. Is such a difference in relative length and security of tenure likely to encourage a military attitude of contempt or lack of respect for civilian views and preferences?

Is there a Military Personality Type? Turning now to the whole set of concepts suggested earlier for more systematic study of the "military mind" -- attitudes, frames of reference, perception, values, goals, intellectual skills, modes of thought and problem analysis and so on -- if sufficient data can be accumulated about the motivation of military officers in these terms, it should then be possible to say some more meaningful and reliable things about this impressionistic will-o'-the-wisp, the "military mind." These are some of the questions that should be answered if possible: Does a configuration of certain characteristics emerge as more or less common among a large number of

military officers? (Putting the question in somewhat different terms, it might be asked whether a certain personality type is built up through the particular kind of common organizational experience and training involved in being a military officer?) If it is common, exactly how widespread is it? Are there a number of such types rather than only one? Or isn't it possible to generalize at all about the "military mind" (a possibility which should not be ignored)? If it is, it may be asked whether any important variations emerge at different levels and ranks in the military hierarchy? Or as between the services? If there is a configuration (or a number of them), how does it compare with what is known about the "qualities of mind" of the military officers of other nations, Germany, France, Great Britain or Russia?

Assuming the existence of one or more configurations of characteristics, the next step would be to ask whether these tend to dominate the actions of the officers involved, that is, granted their existence, how important a role do they seem to play in motivating the actions of military officers? If there are such configurations and the actions of military officers are dominated by them, a vital question would be whether these characteristics discovered to be "military" actually turn out to conflict with widely-shared values, attitudes and perspectives in the society. In other words, if there turns out to be a phenomenon that can be meaningfully labeled the "military mind," almost the first question that should be posed is whether it seems in any way threatening or inappropriate in terms of the military's greatly expanded role in foreign

policy-making, and more generally, in the life and governing of the nation. If it does, it may be asked with regard to which values or attitudes, how widely shared, in what kinds of circumstances, and with what consequences?

Most discussions of the "military mind" have tended to assume the answer to the questions raised in the previous paragraph, namely, that the "military mind" was in some ways antithetical to democratic values and institutions and therefore to be watched carefully and kept under strict civilian control. Leaving this open as a question suggests further queries. For example, if there is a configuration of motivational characteristics typical of most or many military officers, how does this configuration differ from other types about which we might have, or could gather, information, for example, the "State Department" or the "Foreign Service mind," the "bureaucratic mind," the "business mind," the "American character," or even, if you will, the "German military mind"?

The group informally associated with Professor Morris Janowitz¹ hopes eventually to prepare a series of studies on the professional soldiers of a number of modern industrialized Western nations including possibly -- in addition to the United States -- Britain, France, Germany and the Soviet Union. These studies should provide important comparative data on the characteristics of professional military officers. Professor Janowitz himself is presently concerned with the social characteristics, career patterns, motivation and

1. See the paper by Janowitz cited in N. 1., p.3.

self-conceptions, social status and prestige, and ideology and indoctrination of the top American professional officers in the period from 1900 to 1950, with particular attention to developing trends. He is also interested in the consequences for the professional military's "political power" of these recent changes in their social and governmental role and in their social characteristics, motivation, ideology and so on.

If these and other investigations reveal the existence of one or more American military personality types, another fundamental question that should be answered if possible is why they develop. What is there in the training, education and organizational experiences of the military officer that produces such a type or types? Furthermore, if some of these characteristics seem undesirable in light of the society's values and the greatly increased influence of the military establishment in national policy-making, does it seem possible to make any adjustments in the organizational training and experiences of the military officer which will help to change or modify these undesirable qualities? Or do they seem to flow inevitably from the nature of the structure, procedures and responsibilities of a military organization or, at least, of the modern American military organization?

Professors John Masland and Laurence Radway, of Dartmouth, are now working on a research project which should provide valuable information on a number of the questions raised in these pages. They are interested in: "(a) the utilization of career military officers in positions involving participation in the formulation of American national policy; (b) the skills and attitudes that appear to be

desirable in officers holding these positions; and (c) the education, training and assignment of officers, as these processes relate to the cultivation of these skills and attitudes."¹ The relation of this study to the discussions in this paper of the nature and extent of military participation in foreign policy formulation and the attitudes, values and skills of military officers seems clear.

Military Thinking About Foreign Policy Problems. These general questions about the nature and sources of the "military mind" are necessary and important, but the specific focus of this Note, the military and foreign policy, should not be forgotten. If there are typical characteristics of military thinking or typical configurations of these, then it seems pertinent to inquire into the results of their application to the problems and decisions of American foreign policy. Are there any characteristic "approaches" of the military to foreign policy problems? Are there any lines of policy view and recommendation or any modes of problem analysis and interpretation that seem typical of the military? For example, in their policy recommendations, do they tend as a rule to be self-conscious about their assumptions and the lines of reasoning that presumably underlie them? Are these assumptions usually made explicit and systematically set forth? Do they systematically analyze and evaluate alternatives and consequences?²

1. Quoted from the statement describing their project by Professors Masland and Radway.

2. Along this line, Professor William Fox of Columbia proposes under a recent grant, to investigate "some of the distinctive predispositions, beliefs, intellectual skills, and problem-solving techniques of statesmen, diplomats, soldiers and industrial mobilizers" as related to national security policy. See Fox, op. cit., p. 284.

As a further point some observers have suggested that the military's approach to foreign policy problems tends to be somewhat legalistic and formalistic in character?¹ If this is a reasonable characterization what are some of its more specific manifestations and dimensions? What kind of consequences does this approach seem to have in cases where the military establishment participates in the drafting or the negotiation of treaties or other written agreements with foreign nations?

Also, do the military in fact seem to overemphasize elements of military force, strength and strategy at the expense of non-military factors? What do military officers seem to have in mind when they refer to their presentations as "strictly military" views, judgments, analyses or recommendations? What do these "strictly military" recommendations look like from the researcher's point of view? In the study already cited, it is suggested that the phrase "strictly military," whether by conscious design or not, often accompanies recommendations whose underlying assumptions have not been made explicit.² There is certainly not enough evidence to indicate whether these assumptions are understood by the military but omitted for whatever reason or, on the other hand, are omitted because they are only vaguely or not at all understood. There is some reason to think that the latter may at least sometimes be the

1. For a more extended discussion of this and other aspects of military thinking about foreign policy problems, see Sapin and Snyder, op. cit., pp. 67-73.

2. Ibid., pp. 68-69.

case. After all, even an assumption that the larger context of the situation being dealt with, or perhaps its non-military aspects, can be ignored is still an assumption!

Another possible explanation for the widespread use of this phrase by military officers is that it may sometimes be a personal or organizational device for avoiding responsibility for larger policies or issues through an insistence that they only provided a strictly military analysis or recommendation. The "military" military officer may use this phrase to help him avoid having to think about larger situations and complicating non-military factors. The "political" military officer may use it as a means of self-protection while in fact he does move into the larger politico-diplomatic area. Still another possibility is that the phrase may be regarded as providing a kind of certainty, a reassurance about military expertise, to the civilian (and may actually perform this function in some cases).

A good part of the apprehension expressed about the increasing influence of the military establishment in the United States seems to be based on the assumption that so-called "military" values, ways of thinking and patterns of behavior tend to be authoritarian, force-oriented, impatient of dissent or disagreement and thus antithetical to American democratic values and institutions. It might therefore be said that, to a considerable extent, it is these ways of thinking and behaving that are viewed as suspect and undesirable rather than the military officers themselves. If reliable evidence should indicate that American military officers did not actually fit American stereotypes of them (and if the stereotypes were modified ac-

cordingly), there would probably be much less concern about the military's increasing influence on the contemporary scene, although there would still be other good reasons, in terms of American values, for keeping their role in national policy-making somewhat circumscribed. All of this is by way of suggesting that if it is these "military" values, attitudes and behavior patterns that are viewed as threatening, then they would be equally threatening if they began to emerge with considerable strength among the civilians of the society, whether in the Government or outside of it. Thus, if one is concerned with the extent to which American foreign policy has tended in recent years (or is likely to tend in the future) to be influenced by military values or desiderata, including a willingness to use or threaten the use of military force and a preference for military techniques in American relations with other nations, there may be a good argument for some study of the "civilian mind," of the extent to which "military" values and attitudes have been and are influential in the foreign policy thinking of Foreign Service officers, other State Department officials, Congressmen, and the like.

(5) When has the military establishment view predominated? One of the oft-mentioned concerns of many observers regarding the role of the military in American foreign policy is what is usually referred to as the fact or problem of "undue military influence." This section represents an attempt to indicate how this very important problem can be defined, and might be more fruitfully researched, in terms

of the decision-making concepts and research questions previously set forth. Perhaps the problem can be restated in the following terms: in what types of decision-making systems, with regard to what kinds of decisions and policy issues, have the (1) information and intelligence, the (2) definitions of situations (i.e., describing and assessing situations to be dealt with and analyzing alternative courses of policy action) and the (3) values and value priorities of military officers and other military establishment representatives tended to dominate, that is, to be accepted without substantial challenge or critical scrutiny by civilian agencies and civilian officials? Obviously, this is just one end of the continuum; it would also be important to know under what conditions (that is, in terms of the categories stated above) the military have seemed to be on no more than an equal basis with their civilian colleagues and their views subject to critical civilian scrutiny, and, further, under what conditions military officers have played a rather circumscribed role, pretty much of the expert adviser variety.¹

Clearly, an operational definition of critical scrutiny is called for, but this would not seem to raise any insuperable difficulties. If the kind of data suggested above can be obtained, it should then be possible to discover what significant correlations, if any, exist between degrees of military establishment predominance (as defined above) in joint military-civilian decision-making

1. Needless to say, this kind of approach to the problem of "undue military influence" is as relevant to intra-military establishment relations between military officers and civilian officials as to the relations between military and civilian agencies.

activities and such factors as the types of decision-making systems, expert and representational roles, reciprocal role definitions and expectations, the kinds of problems and decisions and analyses provided by the military.

For example, it would be interesting to know what relation there is, if any, between the "compellingness" of the situation being dealt with or, even, the hierarchical level at which the unit is located and the dominance of military establishment views. Also, one would assume that the quality of the policy analyses of the representatives of civilian agencies involved would be inversely related to the extent of military dominance (that is, the better the civilian analyses, the less likely military dominance). It would certainly be important to know if this assumption is borne out by the facts.

With such an approach it may be possible to make more meaningful statements about the extent of "undue military influence" (now operationally defined) in American foreign policy-making and about those conditions, organizational and intellectual (or, if you will, psychological), that seem to be conducive to it.

V. A Note on Researchability

Even if the concepts and research problems presented here are viewed as meaningful and pertinent, there is at least one further and major difficulty that must be faced up to, particularly in researching the fields of foreign policy, military policy, and the relation of the military establishment to foreign policy: namely, that much of the data essential or useful in answering the questions posed is simply not available or accessible to the academic researcher. In other words, these may be crucial questions, and they may have empirical referents in the world of foreign policy decision-making, but it may just not be possible to get the kind of documentation that would be necessary to answer them in any substantial and satisfactory manner.

The basic problem, of course, is that many if not most of the relevant Government documents and materials are classified and thus not normally available to the outside scholar. Furthermore, even when such materials are at times made available, the conditions under which they can be used are often not conducive to completely free and wide-ranging inquiry nor to the publication and wide dissemination of the results of the research. And of course, the more recent the problem one is interested in, the more difficult these questions of classified Government data are likely to become.

The difficulty of gathering relevant materials in this area would seem to make all the more clear the importance of the kind of explicit and systematic conceptualization argued for and attempted in this Note. If useful data is hard to come by, this

would seem to be all the more reason for considerable self-consciousness on the researcher's part regarding the problems he is interested in, the concepts and methods necessary to help research them, and the kinds of evidence and information they call for. In this way, it should at least be possible to make the most fruitful use of the data that is available.

For example, in the absence of access to the pertinent Government documents, it may be necessary to engage in what might be called "detective work" research, where the researcher depends to a considerable extent on clues and data pieced together from newspaper and magazine stories and articles and from unclassified official documents, speeches, releases and so on. This technique is often used and is obviously necessary in the field of intelligence analysis, but, skillfully and carefully done, it can also be a useful approach for more academically-oriented work. Clearly, this kind of research will be profitable almost exactly in proportion to the clarity and precision of purpose and interest brought to his problem by the researcher.

In sum, the role of the military in foreign policy, by its very nature, provides some difficult problems for the researcher, but, on the other hand, there is no reason why much productive investigation cannot be undertaken. Further grounds for a kind of restrained optimism are provided by the fact that there are some highly useful and more or less easily available sources of relevant material on this problem. One obvious, and rich, source are the published hear-

ings of certain House and Senate committees, both those dealing with substantive policy issues and those dealing with budgetary and appropriations matters. The hearings of the armed services and foreign affairs committees of the two houses would, of course, be particularly pertinent. There are any number of striking examples. The hearings on the military situation in the Far East held jointly by the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees of the Senate in the spring of 1951 following the relief of General MacArthur are certainly an important vein to be mined with regard to the military's role in foreign policy-making. The Senate hearings on such major foreign policy steps as the North Atlantic Treaty, "troops to Europe" and the Japanese peace treaty contain interesting and important testimony by members of the military establishment. Of course, the House and Senate appropriations subcommittee hearings each year on the defense establishment budget are another basic source. Sometimes, the military are questioned rather critically and severely in these hearings. Here again, there will be much in these hearings that is not particularly important or interesting, but the observer who is clear on what he is looking for will undoubtedly find grist for his mill in these lengthy documents. Our assumption is that it will require refined analytical tools to "tease out" the data desired.

There are other unclassified U.S. Government documents which are likely to prove useful. Certain basic information is to be found in the relevant statutes, in organizational charts and manuals (there is, for example, a great deal that is suggestive in the organizational manual of the Department of State), and administrative rules and

notices. Furthermore, the military establishment has had its share, probably more than its share, of government commissions, private study groups and so on, investigating its organization and operations. Most of these groups have, of course, issued their analyses and recommendations in published reports that are available. In the last year or two, there have been the reports of the groups headed by General David Sarnoff and Nelson Rockefeller, among others. Shortly after the end of World War II, an important report was issued by a committee headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt. Probably the most influential and perhaps the most useful of the studies of the military establishment has been that of the Hoover Commission. If one thinks of the work of this Commission on the national security organization as represented by a pyramid with the final recommendations of the Commission itself as the apex of the pyramid, by moving down from the apex toward the base one finds available increasingly more detailed studies and analyses of the military establishment, much of which should still be of interest. There is, of course, the very interesting printed report of the Task Force. It is in turn supplemented by a series of typescript appendices. These are in turn supported by a substantial mass of reports, documents and other raw materials now lying pretty much unused in the National Archives.

In any event, in the reports and analyses of the multitude of study groups that have examined the workings of the defense establishment since 1945 should certainly be found much interesting and useful data.

Another obvious and important source of information about the military establishment's role in national policy-making, and about the "military mind," are the memoirs published in recent years by many public figures, both civilian and military. Among the better-known memoirs of American military officers are those of Eisenhower, Bradley, Admiral King, Admiral Leahy, General Clay, Mark Clark (in two books), General Truscott, W. Bedell Smith (his account of his three years as Ambassador in Moscow), General Arnold, General Krueger, Air Force General Kenney, and General Stilwell (actually, his collected papers). Also available are a great many magazine articles and speeches by these and other officers. For comparative purposes, there are the memoirs of the officers of other Allied nations, such as those of the British officers, General Frederick Morgan and Admiral Alan Cunningham. A number of books by German officers have also been published, among them the diaries of General Rommel and the memoirs of Marshal Kesselring and General Guderian. This literature should certainly have a wealth of suggestive material on the motivation of military men.

There is also much of interest to be found in the memoirs of outstanding civilian leaders, including some who were important figures in the defense establishment. Notable among the latter are The Forrestal Diaries and the autobiography of Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War during all of World War II. Obviously, the six-volume account of the Second World War by Winston Churchill will have interesting illustrations and commentary on the role of the military in wartime as will Sherwood's Roosevelt and Hopkins and the Hull memoirs among many others.

In addition to the memoir literature, another likely source of information about military officers and the military establishment are the official and semi-official histories of the three armed services (including the Marine Corps) in World War II now being published in considerable number. These are further supplemented by the official and unofficial histories of various Army divisions that have also been appearing in recent years. For those particularly concerned with the military and foreign policy from the point of view of the nature of contemporary military thinking about foreign policy problems, the major service publications like the Combat Forces Journal, the Naval Institute Proceedings and the Air University Quarterly should certainly prove useful.

If the researcher is clear about his purposes and problems and is not merely on a "fishing expedition," there is no doubt that much valuable information and insight regarding the role of the military in contemporary American foreign policy-making can be gained from those civilian officials and leaders and military officers, recently active in the high councils of the Government, who are now temporarily or permanently retired from Government service. There seems no reason why well-prepared interviews with some of these figures could not be quite productive, and without getting involved in the problem of still-secret official information. Even a partial list of these officials is quite impressive -- former Secretary of Defense Lovett, General George C. Marshall, former Air Force Secretary Finletter, ex-Army Secretary Frank Pace, John J. McCloy, Dean Rusk, Philip Jessup, George Kennan, Charles M. Spofford, Averell Harriman, Mr. Acheson himself, and a considerable number of retired generals and

admirals -- Clark, Bradley, Van Fleet, Clay and a whole host of others. Naturally, not all of these men would be equally agreeable to this kind of interview, but even if only a small percentage could be persuaded to share some of their accumulated lore and practical wisdom with the scholar, there is no doubt that much reliable and suggestive information could thereby be obtained.

The interview technique should also be an important aid in researching the military-civilian decision-making systems discussed at length above. There is no reason why a great deal of useful data cannot be gathered about these systems (those at lower as well as higher echelons) by interviews with some of the military and civilian personnel participating in them, without getting involved in the problem of classified documents. How these systems are viewed by participants, their attitudes and expectations, the kinds of organizational and intellectual problems and difficulties that arise -- it should be possible to learn a great deal about these and similar factors without becoming concerned with and discussing highly confidential matters of foreign policy substance.

Since the role of the military in foreign policy-making and in political decision-making generally is merely a part of the larger problem of the position of the military in American society, it may be appropriate to point to a considerable number of studies of various aspects of the military establishment conducted primarily by psychologists and sociologists.¹ These studies would be most useful

1. Among the more important of these studies are the following: Samuel A. Stouffer, et. al., The American Soldier (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949), 4 vols.; studies of naval leadership conducted by the Personnel Research Board, Ohio State University; Harold Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership and Men (Pittsburgh, Carnegie Press, 1951); Arthur K. Davis, "Bureaucratic Patterns in the Navy Officer Corps," Social Forces, 27: 143-153 (1948); Charles H. Page, "Bureaucracy's Other Face," Social Forces, 25: 88-94, (1946).

in detailing the kinds of attitudes prevalent in various parts of the military establishment, the kinds of leadership situations both expected and actual, and the flexibility or inflexibility of the military organizational structure. Another group of studies relates to purely structural aspects of the military establishment. The point to be made in connection with these studies is not that they will provide immediately useful data on the military and foreign policy, but that they are suggestive both on questions of organization and of motivation.

The kinds of questions on which these studies bear include the following: What situations does the military officer find himself in at various stages of his career? What are his expectations and what is expected of him? What attitudes does he develop with respect to the manipulability of his environment? What are his attitudes with respect to his civilian fellow citizens?

It is probable that someone investigating a particular historical instance of military participation in foreign policy-making will not find these studies too relevant. However, we do believe that those whose interests go beyond the particular incident will find much that is suggestive and informative in them.

Finally, another source of information and insight about the military establishment and military officers that should not be ignored are the goodly number of first-rate novels dealing with military life, particularly during the Second World War, that have appeared in recent years. Among those that come immediately to mind are The Caine Mutiny, From Here to Eternity, The Naked and the Dead, James Gould Cozzens' Guard of Honor, Marquand's Melville Goodwin, U.S.A. and Theodore Plievier's Stalingrad (dealing with

the German Army). Obviously, what is to be found in these books is not systematic analysis but rather the insights of very sensitive and perceptive observers.

These comments on data and materials that are relatively easily available to scholars are by no means intended to be exhaustive. They are meant only to suggest and support the notion that while there are considerable difficulties in the way of doing worthwhile research in this area, these difficulties are by no means insuperable. There is a lot of easily obtainable material which has so far been rather inadequately, if at all, exploited. Furthermore, as has made clear, our assumption is that systematic and self-conscious conceptualization of the research problem or problems at hand will not only produce more useful, precise and easily comparable studies but also will enable the student to exploit to the full the data that is readily available to him.

VI. Conclusion

It was stated at the start and has been emphasized throughout that this essay was an exercise in the application of a conceptual scheme to research on an important political and social problem. Our attempt to apply the decision-making frame of reference which we have been developing in connection with the major work of this Project to the role of the military in American foreign policy-making rested on two basic assumptions. First of all, we assumed that the systematic conceptualization of any major research problem was important and worthwhile, and, second, we assumed the usefulness of our own decision-making frame of reference for dealing with this particular problem. We felt that such an approach would enable us to specify the relevant factors to be researched more clearly and precisely than would otherwise be possible, and also, to suggest concepts and methods that would make for more economic, thorough and inclusive research. Quite frankly, then, the worth of this essay must stand or fall on a considered judgment as to whether its substance supports the validity of these assumptions or raises serious doubts about them.

No. 45
WINTER ISSUE
1954-1955



PREVENTION
OF
WORLD
WAR III

Published by

Society for the Prevention of World War III, Inc.

515 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF WORLD WAR III
A Non-Profit Educational Organization

BOARD OF DIRECTORS
 MARK VAN DOREN
 Honorary Chairman
 REX STOUT
 Vice President
 DR. ALBERT SIMARD
 Secretary
 ISIDORE LIPSCHUTZ
 Treasurer

REV. HENRY A. ATKINSON
 THOMAS CRAVEN
 FREDERICK W. FOERSTER
 JULIUS L. GOLDSTEIN
 WILLIAM HARLAN HALE
 ERIC MANN
 CHAT PATERSON
 WILLIAM J. SCHIEFFELIN
 HARRY LOUIS SELDEN
 JAMES H. SHELDON
 WILLIAM L. SHIRER
 MAJ. M. WHEELER-NICHOLSON
 BELLE MAYER ZECK

ADVISORY COUNCIL

GEORGE BACKER
 CONRAD BERGOVICI
 REV. L. M. BIRKHEAD
 REV. ROELIF H. BROOKS
 FRUTHERS BURT
 STUART CLOETE
 MORRIS L. COOKE
 RICHARD DE ROCHEMONT
 BERNARD DE VOTO
 WALTER D. EDMONDS
 DOUGLAS S. FREEMAN
 LIONEL GELBER
 MARY B. GILSON
 SHELDON GLUECK
 ALBERT GUERARD
 BEN HECHT
 FREDERICK G. HOFFHERR
 JOHN R. INMAN
 FRANK E. KARELSEN, JR.
 CHRISTOPHER LA FARGE
 EMIL LENGVEL
 MAJ. ERWIN LESSNER
 MRS. DAVID ELLIS LIT
 CLARENCE H. LOW
 MRS. HAROLD V. MILLIGAN
 HERBERT MOORE
 LEWIS MUMFORD
 ADELE NATHAN
 ALLAN NEVINS
 LOUIS NIZER
 QUENTIN REYNOLDS
 LISA SERGIO
 CHARD POWERS SMITH
 MRS. HODIS SWENSON
 R. J. THOMAS
 FRITZ VON UNRUH
 FREDERICK WALLACH

CHICAGO

COURTENAY BARBER, JR.
 MRS. ROBERT BIGGERT
 J. J. ZMRHAL

LOS ANGELES

F. E. BROOKMAN
 MAXWELL DUBIN
 MAJ. JULIUS HOCHFELDER

SAN FRANCISCO

VERNON E. HENDERSHOT
 ALBERT RAPPAPORT
 SIDNEY ROGER

ST. LOUIS

J. LIONBERGER DAVIS

ALL OF THE ORIGINAL MATERIAL IN THIS BULLETIN MAY BE REPRINTED OR QUOTED WITHOUT FURTHER PERMISSION UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED. CREDIT LINE TO THE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF WORLD WAR III IS DESIRED BUT NOT NECESSARY. AS PART OF ITS EDUCATIONAL SERVICE, AND BECAUSE OF THE PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL PREVENT WORLD WAR III PRINTS FROM TIME TO TIME THE PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND ADVISORY COUNCIL ON TOPICS OF CURRENT INTEREST.

CONTENTS

WE ARE DETERMINED TO CARRY ON	1
THE FAILURE OF DIPLOMACY	3
EDITORIALS:	
"WE"	5
PRES. HEUSS' SLIP OF THE TONGUE	6
HOW STUPID CAN WE BE?	8
OBSERVATIONS ON THE GERMAN PROBLEM by R. H. S. Crossman	11
THE GIVEAWAY DEAL	13
A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT	16
JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON	17
DEMOCRACY FACES TEST IN GERMANY by Ernest S. Pisko	18
RECOMMENDED READING:	
THE SCOURGE OF THE SWASTIKA by Lord Russell of Liverpool	19
HERBERT HOOVER — WHEN WAS HE RIGHT? WHEN WAS HE WRONG?	20
WHY GERMANS GO EAST by Paul Wohl	21
SHALL WE CHEER? by Max Lerner	22
DACHAU	23
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? by Josiah E. DuBois, Jr.	24
HOW DEAD ARE THE GERMAN CARTELS?	26
OLD SIGHTS IN THE NEW GERMANY	29
THE "AGONIZING REAPPRAISAL"	30
ITEMS OF INTEREST	33
THE NEW GERMAN IMPERIALISM by T. H. Tetens	36
HOW THE GERMANS ARE MISWRITING THEIR HISTORY by Terence Prittie	40
THE PAN-GERMAN PRINCE	43
INSIDE GERMANY	46

Prevent World War III

Published by the SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF WORLD WAR III, Inc.

515 Madison Avenue, New York 22, N. Y.

Tel.: PLaza 3-4985

No. 45

Winter Issue, 1954-1955

We Are Determined to Carry On

AT the close of World War II the Society observed ominous trends in international political relations which threatened the future of the peace. This was particularly apparent with respect to the situation in Germany. Thus, we stated, "So long as Germany remains a potential asset to one or more of the allied nations, she will be used for ulterior, selfish, political, military and economic purposes, and so long will the world remain insecure. So long as Germany is available for one of these marriages, she will be in a good position to recapture her military strength. Only when we have conclusive proof supported by acts, that the big powers will not establish any liaison with Germany to use her as an eventual ally in any extra-national activity, will there be a reasonable chance of destroying mutual suspicions and of establishing a genuine world collaboration for peace" (Prevent World War III, No. 14, April-May 1946).

It remained for the victors to provide "conclusive proof supported by acts" that they were determined to lay the foundation of a durable peace in Europe.

Would they eliminate Germany's war potential and encourage genuine peace-time industry?

Would they break up the predatory trust and cartels?

Would they prevent Pan-Germans, militarists, Nazis and war criminals from regaining positions of power and influence in Germany's political and social life?

Would they provide Germany's victims with adequate reparations derived from German industry and external assets?

Would they encourage the decentralization of German political institutions, thereby avoiding the re-creation of a new Reich?

Would they develop a realistic educational program to infuse the spirit of democracy among the masses of the German people?

The Society fought persistently for this program without compromise. On the other hand, our policy makers were ensnared into the trap of wishful thinking under the influence of those having financial or

sentimental ties with Germany.

Through the realization of the above mentioned objectives a peace-loving Germany could have been constructed. Such a Germany would not have been attractive to countries pursuing the dangerous game of power politics, nor would such a Germany have been in a position to play one side off against the other in order to regain her dominant power.

However, the Western Allies, in their justified effort to check Communist expansionism were "sold" on the idea of a "German bulwark," just as they were "sold" on the same fallacy after World War I, with its tragic consequences. They deliberately refused to admit that the Russians could also "make friends" with the Germans as easily as they had fought them. The upshot of this bidding and counter-bidding for the hand of the former enemy was the scrapping of virtually every important measure designed to render Germany harmless and to engender democracy.

Thus, despite the superficial signs of progress, the evil forces which controlled Germany's destinies for generations, are growing with renewed vigor. More and more, they are assuming a decisive role in the political and economic life of the country. The proof of their power lies in the fact that even the so-called democratic leaders cater to Pan-German and neo-Nazi slogans. The forces of Pan-Germanism are on the march again. (See "German Realities 1954," Prevent World War III, No. 44.)

Having escaped the consequences of their aggressions, there is no inner conviction of repentance among the vast masses of the Germans. A people who yearn for the glories of "Deutschland Ueber Alles" cannot be won over to "our side" by heaping concessions upon them. Indeed, every concession becomes a weapon in their hands against us, and the granting of sovereignty and a new Wehrmacht fall within that category.

"Rehabilitated" with billions of dollars (and more to come), Germany will once again become a menace to the security and welfare of

the U. S. and her allies.

In the name of the "democratic process," the German totalitarians will ride to power on a new wave of militarism and chauvinism.

In the name of "free enterprise," the German cartelists will undermine the position of American and western businessmen in the world markets.

In the name of a "united Europe," the Germans will stop at nothing to destroy the independence and cultural heritage of her neighbors.

In the name of "co-existence," the Germans will make common cause with the East to isolate the U. S.

In the name of "world collaboration," the Germans will drive for world domination.

The American people have been told that the London and Paris Agreements will usher in a new chapter in our relations with Germany. Whatever can be said about these Agreements, the fact remains that the German problem is more acute than ever before. (See the article "The Failure of Diplomacy," p. 3 in this issue). Thus, the Society's educational work

takes on a more significant meaning in terms of American security.

* * *

The Society may be a small voice in the wilderness of confusion and illusion which goes under the heading of policy. However, is it not the essence of patriotism to speak the truth as it relates to the welfare of our country, rather than to join the silence of despair or the cheers of those who like to make believe? Yes, we are determined to carry on as the forsaken conscience of those who gloss over the crimes of the devil and sup at his table.

All the issues of "Prevent World War III" are living documents attesting to our painstaking efforts to enlighten the people and to maintain the vigilance of our Government. With a deep sense of responsibility to our members and the American people we reaffirm our resolution to continue exposing the conspiracies of those forces, inside and outside the United States, who would subvert our security and our international friendships in the cause of Germanism. We shall, as in the past, work for a realistic solution of the German problem as the key to world peace.



"Let the peoples extend the hand of friendship and forgiveness to each other" —Sir Winston Churchill

The Failure of Diplomacy

The acid test of successful diplomacy lies in its positive contributions toward enhancing national security. On the other hand, a diplomacy which alienates reliable friends, provides potential enemies with greater opportunities for maneuvering, and increases the chances of a new world holocaust, saps the foundations of security. It is by these standards that we must judge the results of the London and Paris meetings.

We are cognizant of the fact that the decisions to remilitarize Germany and grant her sovereignty have been hailed as historic triumphs. Following the meeting in London, Secretary Dulles said that it was "one of the greatest conferences of all times."

With all due respect to his high office, we cannot share Mr. Dulles' exuberance. We are mindful of Mr. Dulles' wealth of experience in international affairs. However, his record in calling the shots accurately is by no means perfect. Thus, his estimation of the intentions of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis turned out to be wide of the mark. In March, 1939, he told a meeting of the Economic Club in New York "only hysteria entertains the idea that Germany, Italy or Japan contemplates war upon us."

If it is unfair to rake up the past then we are prepared to challenge Mr. Dulles' estimation of the London and Paris meetings in the light of the standards which, in our opinion, define the art of successful diplomacy.

I

Ten years ago the political and moral prestige of the United States in Europe was unrivaled. We were respected and liked for our broad understanding of the problems besetting the nations ravaged by German militarism. In that spirit we contributed generously toward the rehabilitation of our distressed friends. Even our worst enemies cannot deny this proud chapter in our post-war international relations.

Times have changed. One of our most respected experts on foreign affairs, William Philip Simms (long-time foreign editor of the Scripps-Howard newspapers) reported, "The United States is about as popular in Europe today as Hitler's Germany was in 1938-1939." (New York World Telegram and Sun, 8-23-54)

Mr. Simms' observation may be challenged as an exaggeration. Yet, it is a fact, like it or not, that we are no longer regarded with the trust and friendly admiration—which had made such a profound impression on that great American, Wendell Willkie.

Undoubtedly, the Kremlin and its "busybees" in Europe have helped to bring about this change. Yet, in the last analysis, this tragedy is of our own making. When we discarded our original post-war policies for a program that treated the German enemy as a long-lost friend, the die was cast. The Communists merely capitalized on our monumental blunders.

Thus, several years following the end of hostilities, the guiding star of all our major diplomatic moves in Europe was Germany. The rebuilding of a powerful Germany began

to take priority over every other program which meant, in effect, that all other projects would have to be neglected to a smaller or larger degree. Of course, this basic change in the orientation of American diplomacy was justified in the name of developing a mighty bulwark against the Communist menace. But how did this drastic shift work out in practice? As Germany's power multiplied, it brought about a decline in the relative strength of her western neighbors. As for the Soviet bloc, the resurgence of Germany has had no damaging effects whatsoever to its military capabilities and economic power. In short, the real sufferers of the "Germany First" policy were our Western Allies.

When the French buried EDC it appeared, at least for a moment, that we were going to be saved at the eleventh hour from the consequences of our own follies. Here was the great opportunity for a genuine soul-searching re-examination of our German policy—a policy which had been regarded as sacred and untouchable ever since it was conceived. But no, our policy makers would not have it that way. They insisted on agreement no matter what the price.

Pressure grew to unheard of proportions. The French Government was attacked and insulted in the press. Needless to say, the Germans caught on quickly. Chancellor Adenauer with an arrogance typical of the German diplomat, hurled innuendoes at the French and their leaders. He went so far as to state that unless Germany got her way, she would "look" to the Soviet Union (London Times, 9-4-54). Indeed, matters reached such a pitch that one newspaper (New York Journal American, 9-25-54) prominently displayed a statement by the German war criminal, Colonel General Alexander von Falkenhausen, that France should be occupied until she was ready to submit!

The pressures and the threats worked. An agreement was reached. Europe will once again be confronted with a strong, sovereign Germany, free to act as it sees fit. To believe that the peoples of Europe will move closer to the U.S. when they behold the rhythmic marching of a new Wehrmacht, is to expect a miracle.

II

Restoring Germany's war power and uniting Western Europe simultaneously are irreconcilable concepts. The net result of combining these policies may be compared to the fruitless labors of Sisyphus. As this fundamental contradiction deepens, the opportunities for Soviet machinations increase. Witness, for example, the skill and effectiveness of Soviet propaganda as it exploits these incompatible policies. In Western Europe this propaganda raises the ominous specter of German militarism, while in Germany it revives the spirit of Tauroggen and Rapallo—symbols of Russo-German collaboration.

Soviet diplomacy is also scoring. Thus, the series of notes proposing a conference on European "security" and Germany have achieved at least several objectives: (a) The U.S. has

been put on the defensive. (b) The confidence of the Western European peoples has been shaken. (c) Flirtations between the Germans and the Soviets are on the upgrade.

The London and Paris agreements create more possibilities for Soviet maneuvering. All of the factors—ideological, economical, political—which have drawn Germany and Russia together in the past, have received a fresh impetus. Under the guidance of the German General Staff, backed by an assortment of totalitarian and reactionary groupings, the way will be cleared for constructing the bridge to the East.

The role of these forces was noted in a State Department booklet published in 1951 ("Confuse and Control"): "The business world of Western Germany has several weak points of different origin. One is the prewar habit of Eastern trade to balance manufactured goods with food supplies. Another is the fear of what might happen if the Communists should come and the Western Powers should fail to stop them. Still another is the remains of the old habit of authoritarian control, which has more affinity for Eastern than for Western forms of government. . . .

"Those Germans who are still at heart in favor of Nazism, of the orthodox militarist tradition, or of the extreme rightist position in big business, are a source of weakness, and are peculiarly susceptible to communist influence. . . .

"Hitler made much of Germany's position as the defender of Europe against the barbarians from the East. But ever since Napoleon had conquered Germany and attacked Russia, there had been much in common between the upper military and social classes in Germany and in Russia. The Tsar was closely related to the Kaiser. Bismarck's policy was always to cooperate with Russia. Now that Russia has a new ruling class as dictatorial as the old aristocracy, some of the old feeling of kinship is still to be found among extreme conservatives in Germany, from the Junkers to the ex-Nazis. . . .

"There is some feeling among the aristocrats that they might make terms with the Soviet aristocracy and because of their experience and ability might become indispensable and powerful members of the Soviet ruling class. . . ."

The State Department analysis concludes, "The tendency for the extreme right to play with treason must be listed as a definite weak point in the democratic cause."

Certainly very few Germans will accept this rather naive description of the role of these forces in German life. These powerful groupings are not alien to the German body politic. On the contrary, German policy—past and present—is deeply rooted in the Weltanschauung (world outlook) of these forces.

The London and Paris agreements were intended, so we are told, to "return" Germany to a western orientation—as though Germany was at one time firmly attached to the West. A study of modern German history shows that at no time was Germany wedded permanently to the West or the East. Indeed, for every olive branch to the West, the Germans extended one to the East.

The real German position, unembroidered by the smooth talk of some German politicians, was revealed in the sensational Madrid circular letter prepared by Germany's top politicians and published in "Germany Plots with the Kremlin" by T. H. Tetens (1953). "Our present policy must be to overcome the consequences of our previous mistakes. An

emasculated Germany should never allow itself to be used as a spearhead in an attack against the Russian colossus. This would be an insane act ('Wahnsinns experiment') and would spell our final doom, whereas Germany as the exponent of European neutrality could gain far reaching concessions from the Soviets. . . . We must not let ourselves become befogged by Washington's stupid and meaningless slogans about the 'Struggle of Democracy versus Communism.' The so-called American democracy does not deserve the sacrifice of the bones of even a single German soldier. . . . What Germany needs in the future is not democracy but a system of statecraft similar to that of the Soviet dictatorship which would enable the political and military elite in Germany to organize the industrial capacity of Europe and the military qualities of the German people for the revival of the German race and the re-establishment of Europe as the power center of the world."

A more recent expression of this position, although heavily disguised, may be found in an open letter to President Eisenhower by the extreme rightist and Pan-German organization "The Steuben Society of America": "As far as Germany is concerned—Adenauer or no Adenauer, BRUTO or no BRUTO—sooner or later she must be permitted to follow her historic role of forming the bridge between west and east—by way of neutralization or by having her own national forces. . . . Let us get out of the Fool's Paradise, in which we have lived all too long. . . ." (The Steuben News, Nov. 1954)

In the light of German history, and given a sovereign and rearmed Germany as contemplated under the London and Paris agreements, the so-called Western orientation of Germany is bound to be short lived.

III

At the Berlin Conference (2-2-54) Secretary Dulles stated: "The Soviet Union proposes that Germany should be allowed to have defensive strength on a national basis. But if Germany had national forces strong enough to defend itself from external attack, it would be so strong that it would threaten all of Western Europe." However, a careful examination of the implications of the London and Paris agreements show that what Mr. Dulles professed to object to will come to pass. The revival of the German General Staff supported by a national army of 500,000 men (with another 500,000 reservists) and equipped with the most modern weapons of warfare, bears no resemblance to the usual idyllic description of a German "defense" force.

Mr. Dulles' statement is also significant in that it recognizes that a rearmed Germany unlike one of our rearmed Western Allies, is a very risky proposition. Moreover, it is an admission that such a Germany would, in the first place, constitute a threat to the security of the West.

One can speculate as to when and where German guns will point, but there is no room for doubt as to the meaning of German rearmament. It is a long step toward World War III.

* * *

Thus, on all three counts it is our considered judgment that the London and Paris agreements do not enhance our security but, on the contrary, create new dangers.

Editorials

"WE"

The Germans have coined a word to describe the main ingredient in their foreign policies—"Realpolitik." It is a concept of conduct bereft of principle, honor or moral consideration. Essentially, it demands total allegiance to the cause of Pan-Germanism. The means are irrelevant except insofar as they help to achieve the ultimate goal. Unfortunately, the Western Democracies have been inclined to judge Germany by their own standards of morality and conduct. The net result has been that the Allies have been fooled time and again in evaluating Germany's real intentions.

Today, for example, public opinion in the West has been encouraged to believe that Germany has at last "returned" to the Western Fold. But while the cheers grow louder, Realpolitik continues to operate inexorably within the framework of German policy.

German Realpolitik has always been active on the American scene. In his book "Germany Plots With The Kremlin" (1933) T. H. Tetens describes the influence of Realpolitik among the most important sections of the German language press in the USA. High on the list is the "Bürger Zeitung" of Chicago which has advocated a Russo-German tie-up for some years. In 1949 this paper featured on its front page an "Open Letter To Stalin" (See "Prevent World War III," No. 33) which proposed a Russo-German alliance against the Anglo-Saxon bloc. The author of the letter, Bruno Fricke, has had a checkered career including membership in the Nazi party. One thing is certain: Regardless of how often he changed colors, he is Pan-German to the bone.

Herr Fricke appealed to the late Soviet dictator to join hands with the Germans. "We are actually predestined," he wrote Stalin, "for an alliance with Moscow, all the more so since mutual cooperation with the integrated bloc of the Soviet states has attracted millions of Germans educated under strict discipline. Who could resist us if both our Reichs were united? What Napoleon did not succeed in doing. Truman will not succeed in either: the subjugation of the earth!" (our Italics)

Perhaps some of our readers will say: "Well, what of it? The 'Bürger Zeitung' is a small paper and therefore unimportant." Unfortunately, this is not the case. The Bürger Zeitung boasts that it is the mouth piece for the sentiments of 500 thousand German-Americans in the Chicago area. Now, whether this is true or not, the fact remains that the Bürger Zeitung is an important publication for at least two reasons: (a) it is a reliable indicator of Pan-German thinking not only in the U.S.A. but in Germany itself; (b) its editorial opinions have proved to

be of great influence among leading English language newspapers in the Midwest.

Mr. Tetens points out that the "Bürger Zeitung" "has its place on the extreme right politically." It has been a consistent supporter of our most fervent anti-Communist crusaders. Yet, it was this paper which carried an open appeal for a Russo-German alliance! This apparent contradiction can only be explained by the decisive influence of German Realpolitik which in the last analysis motivated the Nazis to make common cause with the Communists in 1939.

Mr. Stalin is around no longer, but the Bürger Zeitung has not given up its campaign. The October 14, 1954, issue carried a lengthy article which can be regarded as the latest version of the open letter to Stalin. This time the message is directed to Mr. Molotov, one of Stalin's chief lieutenants. The writer of this piece is a character who goes under the pen name "Politicus." Ordinarily his columns are dull. They read like an old broken record repeating the stale accusations of pro-Nazis and their

"The myth of Germany's superiority over other European nations is alive. The remarkable German economic recovery since 1948, the political restoration of a truncated Germany in the form of a federal republic, the assiduous courtship of this republic by the United States and many other powers—all stimulated the myth.

"The reluctant West Germans took slowly to the idea of their indispensability to the defense of our free world. But after two years of exposure to this concept they came to believe at the same time that in a nuclear war they would be pulverized. The United States idea raised their ego, which had been ground into the dust in World War II.

"This doctrine of indispensability has encouraged the latent nationalists to try their wings again, with the result that politicians have emerged from their cocoons to recommend negotiations with the Soviet Government for a German settlement.

"The Western Allies' courtship of the Federal Republic, the economic recovery and the doctrine of indispensability were the foundations on which West German nationalists of various hues reconstructed the theory, which they would like to put into practice, of a reunited Germany playing off the West against the East—as did Bismarck and the Weimar Republic.

"The doctrine of indispensability is the handmaiden of the idea of a Germany powerful enough to play the moderator in a balance-of-power game in Europe."

(M. S. Handler, N.Y. Times, 8-28-54)

friends, that the Allies were the real war criminals and that the Germans were the victims of an unholy conspiracy. However, his column of October 14th struck a different note. It is lively and more than that, it is a revelation. By force of habit he intersperses the theme of his article with vile attacks against the French. It is not his snide references to the French which deserve comment, but rather his unambiguous declaration that the latest Molotov proposals for the "unification of Germany" should be seriously considered by the Germans. He expresses his doubts as to the efficacy of Chancellor Adenauer's present policy because it will not achieve the unity of Germany which is "the greatest and most important problem for Germany . . ." How can Dr. Adenauer, Politicus asks, achieve German unification "if we are the Allies of a Western combine."

Before proceeding to a further examination of Politicus' "letter" to Molotov the reader should note the word "we." This is not a slip of the tongue. The "we" is the quintessence of the real meaning of Pan-Germanism for no matter where and under what circumstances the Pan-German lives and operates, it is always "we." The same "we" is found in Bruno Fricke's letter to Stalin. Just imagine the uproar if the Daily Worker ran a column by a Communist leader employing the word "we" in speaking of the Russians as Politicus uses the term with respect to the Germans!

Returning to the remainder of the article, we note that Politicus insists that "the only way to get it (unification) will be to deal with Russia in a friendly way. Joining a combine of powers antagonistic to Russia is not the way." But this is not all. Politicus seems fully confident that the question of unity can be settled between the Russians and the Germans while the Western Democracies sit at the doorsteps awaiting the consummation of the deal. Politicus is emphatic on this point. "The statesmen of Germany," he declares, "should at least grip this hand and try to get through conversations . . ." with the Russians.

Ironically, he justifies his proposition on the basis of the very policy which is now pursued by the United States vis-à-vis Germany. "America has shown the way" to German-Russian negotiations when the U.S. "found out that it made a mistake in fighting Germany." Politicus refers to President Eisenhower's well known statement "let bygones be bygones." Therefore, according to Politicus, "why cannot German statesmen at least follow such an example to get on a good footing with Russia which Germany attacked, not to forget." Thus Politicus shows how American policy can turn into advantage for the future of Russo-German relations. The United States is hoisted, so to speak, by its own petard.

If past experience is an indicator of how our policy makers will respond to this latest expression of German Realpolitik, we predict that more billions will be turned over to that "great bulwark" against Soviet Communism.

PRES. HEUSS' SLIP OF THE TONGUE

During the past decade the moral climate surrounding significant aspects of international affairs has undergone a radical change. The transformation is particularly marked with respect to the treatment of the former enemy Germany. This was brought into sharp relief when the four occupying powers freed one of the major war criminals, Baron Konstantin von Neurath. It was done in spite of the fact that he had only completed 8 years of his full sentence.

The background of this event was formed by the widespread campaign in Germany to engender sympathy for all of the war criminals. The Allies, prodded on by the Chancellor himself, have sought reconsideration of the status of the major war criminals located in Spandau prison in Berlin. In this connection the New York Times (4-6-54) stated: ". . . The decision to reconsider the status of these men culminates a long series of actions by the Western Powers to ameliorate the condition of German war criminals. The moves have been made in response to German pleas for clemency and to clear the way for West German participation in the European Defense Community." Thus, on the initiative of US policy makers who seldom refuse the Chancellor a favor, the Russians were approached by the three Western Allies. However, the Russians seemed to show disinterest and, therefore, the question was shelved temporarily.

Undoubtedly, some of our own experts thought that the appeal had put the Russians on the spot and thus increased the standing of the Western Allies in the eyes of the Germans. They apparently forgot—or perhaps never had learned—that when it comes to warming up to German totalitarians regardless of color or breed, the Russians will not be outdone. Hence, in their characteristic fashion of "stealing the show," the Soviets suddenly popped the proposition to free von Neurath. The New York Herald Tribune (11-4-54) reported that "the Russian move will probably make a considerable impression on the people of Germany." Needless to say, the Allies found themselves on the short end. Nevertheless they quickly consented to the Russian recommendation. (Apparently, the only kind of agreement made these days between the Russians and the Western Allies deals with ways and means of making life more pleasant for German war criminals.)

The public was told that von Neurath's release was due to his age and ill health. We recall that when Field-marshal von Kesselring was released from prison, the papers announced that he was freed because he was suffering from cancer. Today this same von Kesselring, "victim of cancer," is among the top leaders of revived German militarism and the chief of the military organization called "Stahlhelm." We will not make any predictions with regard to von Neurath's future activities. However, his past is a matter of record.

Von Neurath was condemned by the International Military Tribunal on all four counts for having been an accomplice to the Nazis' crimes against peace and against humanity. On March 18, 1939, the Baron was appointed by Hitler as Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. In that capacity he was responsible for the destruction of democratic institutions and for the ruthless exploitation of Czechoslovakian industry to further the Nazi war effort. He was responsible for the widespread antisemitic persecution that followed the enslavement of Czechoslovakia. Von Neurath was one of the authors of the Germanization program that was to be applied in Czechoslovakia. This goal was to be achieved through the liquidation of the Czech intelligentsia and other groups who might dare to resist Germanization. Under his rule a network of concentration camps was set up and thousands of Czech civilians perished. As Minister of Foreign Affairs prior to von Ribbentrop's appointment, von Neurath was one of the architects of the Nazi preparation for aggression and conquest.

This is the man who is freed to the applause of the

German people. Chancellor Adenauer sent a wire of congratulations declaring how "delighted" he was and extended to the Baron his "best wishes." The President of the Bonn Republic, Theodor Heuss, summed up the feelings of the Germans perhaps better than any other leader. In a message to von Neurath he exclaimed:

"With pleased satisfaction, on returning from a short journey, I read the report this morning that the news of the last few days has been followed by speedy fulfilment, and the martyrdom of these years has come to an end for you."

Here in a nutshell is the most reliable indicator of the degree to which democracy has taken root in Germany. If von Neurath suffered martyrdom, does it not follow that his crimes were not crimes? To those who ignore the significance of the Heuss message on the excuse that the Germans—no matter what the cost—must be "on our side" against the Communist menace, let them ponder the words of the Bible, "for what shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul."



How Stupid Can We Be?

Among the highlights of Chancellor Adenauer's latest visit to the U.S. was his talk before the National Press Club in Washington. It is quite apparent that the Chancellor's speech was carefully planned for his U.S. audience. For example, a good portion of his address was devoted to a description of the anti-Communist attitude of the Germans. Actually, this is an old story which goes back to the days of Hitler's Third Reich. That the Chancellor should choose to reiterate this well known fact may, in all probability, be ascribed to two reasons: (a) his efforts to portray Germany as the great bulwark against Communism (which has been paying off handsomely); (b) to discredit France and Britain, where a substantial portion of the electorate seems to accept the proposition of "coexistence" with the Communist world.

Be it as it may, there is another aspect to Adenauer's speech which in our opinion is of even greater moment. After describing the "Red Terror" and how the Germans of all classes are fleeing from it in the tens of thousands, he suddenly switches his line. Let us, he pleads, "normalize" relations with the "Red Terror." To achieve this objective, the Chancellor proposes that the Communist bloc be offered a non-aggression pact.

Here is a classical illustration of Realpolitik acrobatics. Apparently only the Germans can perform this stunt and get away with it. We recall how Winston Churchill and General De Gaulle were smeared and abused by the German propaganda machine when they dared to suggest the "possibility" of "considering" the "practicability" of top level negotiations with the Kremlin. More recently, Premier Mendès-France has also come under the withering fire of the Germans and their apologists for failing to exclude the possibility of talks with the Russians. Even the New York Times which, for unknown reasons, often seems to bear a grudge against the French when it comes to matters German, has also raised a cloud of suspicion regarding Mendès-France's attitude toward Russia. (See, for example, New York Times editorial 10-29-54)

Now, when Chancellor Adenauer comes up with the bright idea of a pact with the Russians and says so publicly in the Nation's capital, the newspapers bill his remarks as though he were the great sage at whose feet we all sit waiting for his signal to act or not to act. It is even possible that sooner or later our own diplomats will fall over each other in praise of this great European for his latest display of "vision and statesmanship." In this connection the Washington Post ran an editorial (10-31-54) which said that it was "a privilege to have the thinking of this great European statesman, and the German-American treaty of friendship which he takes back with him is testimony to the esteem in which his vision is held."

This is not to imply that the Chancellor has publicly worked the Kremlin angle for the first time. We can cite a number of instances during the last two years when the Chancellor has declared his sympathy for the issue of coming to an understanding with the "Red Terror." On July 7, 1953, he told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that the German and Russian economies "once before complemented each other in a magnificent way." He expressed the hope that the future of Russo-German relations would be as promising as they were in the good old days.

In the same month the Chancellor wrote Secretary Dulles suggesting the development of an arrangement with the Soviet Union. In September 1953, Adenauer again raised the subject in a speech to the Bundestag and in May 1954, the Chancellor again returned to this theme at a press conference in Hamburg.

The Chancellor has never been alone with respect to the desire to "normalize" relations with the "Red Terror." It is no exaggeration to state that the most important sections of the German press as well as Germany's leading politicians have at one time or another called for an arrangement with Russia. (We shall be glad to supply pertinent data on this subject if desired.)

Some years ago the Chancellor used to harp on the theme that negotiations with the Russians was his supreme "nightmare." In one sense the nightmare still haunts the Chancellor. It is not negotiations with the Russians per se, which makes the Chancellor tremble with fear. What he dreads above all is a conference of the Big Four to the exclusion of the Germans. To prevent such a meeting at all cost was the acid test of Chancellor Adenauer's statesmanship. His success in influencing American policy toward the realization of his objectives raised his stature among the Germans. According to the Deutsche Zeitung (9-19-53) a popular quip has been making the rounds in Germany: "Who makes Washington's European policy?—Konrad Adenauer in Bonn."

From the moment that Chancellor Adenauer's views were given special consideration by our policy makers, the subject of negotiations with the Russians became taboo in the U.S. and remained so until the great medicine man of the West lifted the spell. Now it becomes permissible to talk about this forbidden subject, because Germany is no longer a pariah among nations. On the contrary, it is now being primed as the great defender of Western civilization against the Communist hordes. Its economic power has begun to dominate Western Europe. Hence, the Germans are no longer afraid of negotiations with the Russians. Indeed, they will now insist upon it and we can be sure that they who worship the very ground on which the

Chancellor walks, will do everything in their power to revise American policy accordingly.

Already we note a certain fatalistic attitude concerning the inevitability of negotiations with the Russians. This was the sense of an article by Mr. Walter Lippmann in his column of October 15, 1954. Another leading journalist, Joseph C. Harsh, speculating on the consequences of the Paris accords, accepts the probability of talks with the Russians but adds: "The emerging task for Western diplomats will be to see to it that West Germany negotiates as a partner of the West, not as an independent political force."

The New Republic (11-1-54) dwells on the same subject in an article entitled "Germany as an Ally." "A sovereign West German Government," the New Republic observed, "is bound to enter into discussions with the Kremlin. A rigid doctrine that equates negotiation with appeasement, can drive the discussions into a secret illegitimate frame. The safeguard for the United States and NATO is to accept the inevitability of negotiation and accommodation with Russia and thereby prevent the negotiations from developing along bilateral and anti-Western lines."

"... With East and West bidding against each other for the loyalty of the Germans, the outcome is unpredictable.

"There can be little doubt about who benefits the most from this situation. Nine years ago the armies of the East and West entered Germany as conquerors. It has taken the Germans just nine years to become the most wooed people of the world. In fact, if not in theory, they can choose between the rival offers. For that very reason the offers become steadily more favorable to the Germans.

"The London contract was more favorable for them than was EDC. What Moscow offers today is more favorable to the Germans than what Moscow offered last week.

"In retrospect, one can more easily sympathize with the French statesmen who have done their utmost to delay the events of the week, for the settlement of one problem only leads to the disclosure of a new problem just as dangerous and just as difficult to solve. . . ."

(Joseph C. Harsh, The Christian Science Monitor, 10-9-54)

"... As for the potential dangers in German rearmament, it would be idle to suppose that none exist. . . ."

"That (German national) army will not be free of international controls, it is true. But such controls can really control a sovereign armed state only so long as it chooses to be controlled. We may hope and believe that the new West Germany will stay with the West, but we have not guaranteed it; we would be foolish to forget that West Germany will be subject to powerful forces to lure it elsewhere. . . ."

(The Wall Street Journal, 10-26-54)

Perhaps negotiations with the Russians are inevitable. But some of the sophisticated commentators display a naiveté which is most perplexing. If they believe that the Germans will only deal with the Russians as part of the Western team, then these people have forgotten the lessons of history. Of course, the Germans have no such intentions whatsoever! Their press has expressed confidence that the Germans are well equipped to deal with the Russians and need not be chaperoned by the Western Allies. As early as October 3, 1953, Germany's leading paper, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, suggested in an editorial "direct talks between the Bonn Republic and the Soviets." "Only Chancellor Adenauer," the editorial declared, "can convince the Kremlin of the honesty and general usefulness of Germany's policy."

It was not the first time that this authoritative mouthpiece of German foreign policy sounded off in that vein. On April 1, 1950, this newspaper wrote: "Germany was always the bridge between the East and the West . . . The Allies are not able to come to an accord with the Russians . . . What is then more natural than for us to say, in view of the present pressure: If until now, within the framework of world events, the others were not able to make

HE'LL MAKE IT, ONE WAY OR ANOTHER



(Courtesy, The Washington Post)

an intelligent agreement, then it is our duty finally to arouse ourselves in order to obtain at least an economic understanding . . .

"In doing so we will not turn to the little bosses of the Eastern Zone but directly to the big boss in Moscow. There is where decisions are being made."

In a recent article this same German newspaper made the following significant comment: "Reunification must be the first goal of Germany's Eastern policy. It is in this connection that the question of restoring diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union must be seen. Diplomatic relations have nothing to do with the evaluation of another state. It is rather a question of the fact that Germany can no longer be forbidden to do what other states do regularly—that is, conduct conversations with the Eastern nation." (New York Herald Tribune 10-5-54)

Thomas Dehler, the Leader of the F. D. P. which is part of Adenauer's Coalition Government, has also advocated Russo-German talks and has proposed his willingness to go himself to the Kremlin. He told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (10-5-54) that for years the project of a journey to Moscow had stirred him more than a trip to Washington "because what is going on, what is planned and worked out in Moscow is more important than what goes on in the Western world." Concluding his remarks he declared his opposition to any anti-Soviet politics. "Russia," he averred, "is a realistic political power, it is necessary that we discuss and come together in a peaceful manner." A couple of weeks later Herr Dehler returned to this theme with greater emphasis and clarity. According to the New York Herald Tribune (10-19-54) Dehler said that it was "simply a matter of course that we Germans will some day enter into conversations with the Russians on unification." He added that experts (unidentified) in these matters believe that the Germans were more able to conduct such conversations than the Americans.

"Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's concern about the political and psychological loyalties of the projected West German army emphasizes the intangible problems and hidden dangers that will confront Bonn and the West as the Federal Republic takes up arms.

"There always have been dual problems and dual dangers inherent in West German armament. . . .

"John W. Wheeler-Bennett in 'The Nemesis of Power,' says the German army 'dominated the Weimar Republic from the moment of its birth . . . first supported, and then condoned, the overthrow of the Republic and . . . made a major contribution to Hitler's coming to power.'

"Dr. Adenauer's problem, and the world's problem—to paraphrase Mirabeau—is whether or not West Germany is to be a country that has an army or an army that has a country."

(Hanson W. Baldwin, The N. Y. Times, 11-10-54)

No one, so far as we know, will denounce Dehler as a crypto-Communist. On the contrary, when leading German newspapers and top politicians propose negotiations with the Russians, there is silence among our policy makers—a silence which becomes even more pronounced when the Germans advocate negotiations with the Russians to the exclusion of the Western powers.

The pattern of "excepting Germany" seems to be characteristic of our dealings with the Communist danger since the end of the war. It was the British and French who were the targets of great indignation because they had traded in strategic materials with the Communist bloc. In the case of Germany not a peep was heard although it is a matter of government record that the Germans have shipped hundreds of millions of dollars worth of strategic materials to the Communist East.

The French have been regarded as unreliable because Communists form a substantial block in parliament and the French Government is supposed to be shot through with Communist spies. But the Germans—hardly a word of criticism of the fact that Adenauer's Government is crawling with former Nazis. The defenders of our German policy have never thought of asking Dr. Adenauer why he prefers four former Hitler supporters in his cabinet to four anti-Nazis. Nor was the reliability and stability of the Bonn Government questioned following the defection of Dr. John and Herr Schmidt-Wittmack who turned up in the Eastern zone with important state secrets. And now, when this same Germany speaking through its Chancellor, calmly talks about a non-aggression pact with Russia—of course, the West will be informed about the progress—more silence.

The foregoing calls to mind a very pertinent question which was the title of a critique of American foreign policy written by James P. Warburg: "German Rearmament—How Stupid Can We Be?"

" . . . For sheer justice's sake, the Allies acknowledge a pressing necessity to grant pro-West German Chancellor Adenauer some 'dividends' for his consistent friendship the past five years. So say Paris sources.

"The obvious 'dividend' is German sovereignty. But there're some very sticky burrs usually overlooked in such a deal, observe attachés dealing with German affairs.

"THE FIRST is: The German DID lose World War II—and they must not be allowed to forget it.

"THE SECOND: Given the German record of breaking pledges, how far can you trust Germans voluntarily to restrain their traditional military expansionism—once rearmed."

(John P. Leacacos, Cleveland Plain Dealer, 9-14-54)

Observations on the German Problem

by

R. H. S. CROSSMAN

"The collapse of E.D.C.," we are told, "is the greatest Russian victory since 1945." It certainly is. But how many of the gloomy pundits go on to point out that it is a victory for which the Kremlin can take none of the credit? That is shared between Mr. Acheson and Mr. Dulles, Mr. Morrison and Mr. Eden. It is they who since September, 1950, have disintegrated the Western alliance by trying to strengthen it with twelve German divisions. All the Kremlin has done is to sit tight and profit by their folly.

No one, least of all an Englishman or an American, has the right to blame the French Assembly for delivering the death-blow which finally disposed of E.D.C. This was not a legislative murder, but killing in sheer self-defense. For two whole years an indecent attempt has been made to force France into a monstrous supra-national contraption, which neither Britain nor America was prepared to enter. At the last moment the French people have rebelled against this Anglo-American demand that they should commit national suicide in order to suit our convenience—and that of Dr. Konrad Adenauer. M. Herriot was speaking for the overwhelming majority of his countrymen when he refused to put his country alongside Western Germany inside the cage of E.D.C. Then he issued a solemn warning that the final result of this policy would be to leave the Germans free to walk out of the cage into the arms of the Russians, leaving France locked inside. . . .

But what next? The European Defense Community was perhaps the least dangerous method of rearming Germany, since its cumbersome supra-national machinery would have delayed, for a few years at any rate, the emergence of a sovereign German state. Any framework for German rearmament which is hastily contrived to replace it will not only make far greater demands on Britain (this time Sir Winston will be unable to cheer the French on from outside), but will contain even fewer safeguards against the

emergence of a German national army. Yet apparently it is the intention of London and Washington to create this new framework; and even M. Mendès-France has apparently turned his face against the alternative policy of neutralization. . . .

But now that the realists have made such a mess of their policy, it is surely time to ask ourselves whether neutralization may not be at least as practicable and at least advantageous to the West as the present feverish attempts to integrate a rearmed Western Germany into Nato.

Let us first clear our minds about the definition of neutralization. It is not the same as German neutrality, though of course the neutrality of a reunified Germany guaranteed by both East and West would be one possible way of achieving it. Neutralization means nothing more than a plan to ensure that German military strength is added neither to the Eastern nor to the Western alliance; and it is worth remembering that nearly all those who now dismiss this policy as totally unrealistic strongly favored it as late as 1948. In September, 1946, Mr.



HONI SOIT QUI MAL Y PENSE
(Evil be to him who evil thinks)

Byrnes, then Mr. Truman's Secretary of State, made a speech at Stuttgart offering the Russians to neutralize a unified Germany for 25 years; and as far as we know, this offer remained official American policy at least until the Russian blockade of Berlin. In this speech Mr. Byrnes further proposed that the cession of Koenigsberg to Russia and of the Saar to France should be confirmed, and that the Oder-Neisse line should be ratified in the Peace Treaty. He went on to outline a plan for a central German administration, supported by a National Council composed of the Minister-Presidents of the Provinces in all four Zones; and he summed up his plan in these words:

"In proposing that the four major Powers should jointly undertake to see that Germany is kept disarmed and demilitarized for a generation, the U.S. was not unmindful of the responsibility resting upon it and its allies to maintain and enforce peace under law. Freedom from militarization will give the German people the opportunity, if they will but seize it, to apply their great energies and abilities to the works of peace."

At that time, this American plan for German neutralization was contemptuously dismissed by Stalin, who was still playing for higher stakes. Now something strangely similar is proposed by Mr. Molotov, and the West implacably turns it down.

The reason for this complete reversal of positions is clear. So long as the Soviet Union was hoping to profit by American isolationism and to bring Western Germany, and indeed all Western Europe, within its orbit, neutralization was too moderate a policy to satisfy its ambitions. Since the formation of Nato—and, even more, since America rearmed and decided to wage the Cold War—it is the West which has conceived the ambition to win the whole of Germany, and ultimately the whole of Eastern Europe, to its side. Driven on the defensive, the Russians have correspondingly moderated their aims—and now favor a neutral Germany with a very small army of her own.

The real objection in Washington and Bonn to neutralization, therefore, is not that it would "favor Russia" but that it would create a powerful obstacle to the eventual liberation of Eastern Europe, including, of course, the lost German prov-

inces beyond the Oder-Neisse line. This was made quite clear in the course of the Berlin Conference, where the three Western Powers made it clear that they would consider no plan for German unification which did not permit the new central German government (i) to join Nato and (ii) to demand a revision of the Oder-Neisse line.

The first question we have to ask ourselves, therefore, is whether the West has been wise to discard the modest aims proclaimed in 1946 and to set itself the grandiose goal of integrating Western Germany into the Atlantic alliance, then adding the Eastern Zone of Germany to that alliance, and finally liberating Eastern Europe. Would it really benefit either the U.S. or France or Britain if a Greater German Reich were once again created?

And furthermore, if we give the West Germans sovereignty and encourage them to revive their national ambitions, can we be sure they will remain our faithful partners when they realize, as some of them are already realizing, that the Russians have far more to offer them than we do? At the very least it must be admitted that the effort to add German military strength to the Western alliance is fraught with danger. By attempting it since 1950, we have not only excluded a peaceful settlement with the Russians but imperilled Western unity as well. Now, if E.D.C. Mark II is successful, we shall re-create a Germany able once again to exploit its balancing position between East and West.

These dangers would not be denied, at least, by Mr. Eden and M. Mendès-France. But they would probably say, "How can we turn back now that we have gone so far down this admittedly dangerous road? The Bonn Government cannot be put back where it was in 1949, and if we tried to do so, we should throw the Germans into the arms of the Russians." This assertion flies in the face of every known fact about the state of public opinion in Western Germany. It is simply not true that the average German is enthusiastic for E.D.C. and for rearmament. On the contrary, every public opinion poll has made it clear that enthusiasm for E.D.C. is confined to relatively small circles of Catholics and European Federalists.

Both the Nationalists on the Right and

the Socialists on the Left desire to avoid any irrevocable commitments to the West; and even such sober observers as Dr. Heinrich Brüning have recently shown themselves critical of any agreement with the Atlantic Powers which could hamper later negotiations with Russia. In fact, as Dr. Adenauer knows only too well, German opinion is becoming more neutralist with every month that passes. If Britain and America were now to agree to another Four-Power conference and there propose the postponement of West German rearmament in return for Russian concessions on the issue of free elections, they would certainly finish off Dr. Adenauer, but they would also meet with overwhelming approval from German public opinion. . . .

The beginning of sanity is to realize that for four years (ever since the Acheson-Bevin-Schuman conference of September, 1950) we have been marching down a *cul-de-sac*. Now we must either let the Germans break down the wall at the end of the road, or retrace our steps and resume the policy which we abruptly abandoned in the panic mood of the Korean war. In France this decision would transform pessimism and defeatism into jubilant self-confidence overnight. In Western Germany few tears would be shed outside Dr. Adenauer's personal entourage.

Mr. Churchill would do well to sit down and re-read the Stuttgart speech in the light of his own proposal for a "Locarno arrangement" to guarantee Russia against aggression. Many of the details of the Byrnes plans have been outdated, but the main framework is as sensible today as it was when he first published it. It is for those who dismiss neutralization today and explain exactly what has happened between 1946 and 1954 to make them change their minds just when Mr. Molotov seems to be coming round to their view and to be willing to consider practical plans for peaceful co-existence in Europe. . . .

If Britain and America continue their effort to win Germany to their side instead of neutralizing her military strength, the disruption of Nato will continue; the West will inflict on itself defeat after defeat, and the Russians will sit on the sideline enjoying the spectacle.

(Condensed, Courtesy,
The New Statesman and Nation)

The Giveaway Deal

There are few success stories that can match the brilliance of German achievements since the end of the war. Unquestionably, U.S. policy toward Germany has been of great help. In our legitimate concern over the Communist danger we have gone to unprecedented extremes "to keep the Germans on our side." Naturally, the Germans have taken full advantage. In this connection Drew Pearson quotes an American attorney familiar with the German frame of mind: "The Germans seem to think they can get anything out of the United States just because we need them to oppose the Russians." (8-11-54)

The German Lobby

However, there is another side to this unusual success story which does not appear to be as obvious. We refer to the outstanding work of the German lobby in the United States. Since the end of the war the Germans have built up a powerful organization operating on all levels of American life and supported by what appears to be an inexhaustible "kitty." This lobby has proven to be a very great asset to the Germans and has netted them substantial gains. For example, it was no mean feat to succeed in convincing our policy makers that they should erase \$2 billion of postwar debts owed by Germany to the American taxpayers. This was one of Germany's solid accomplishments since the end of the war thanks to the smooth public relations job performed by the German lobby.

The Germans have had ample experience in this kind of work going back to the days following the end of World War I. Like today they sent their emissaries to the United States "to lecture" and "to persuade." One of their best propagandists was the fabulous German sea pirate Count Luckner who later bragged how he had succeeded in squeezing "tears from the ladies' eyes and dollars from the capitalists' pockets."

The "Deal"

The German lobby today is just as brazen and perhaps even more effective. They have even dared to foist upon the U.S. a deal which would discredit the moral leadership and good faith of our country in the eyes of millions of our friends abroad. We speak of their attempt to regain former enemy assets valued at upwards of \$500 million.

Following the end of World War II, the U. S. Government accepted the responsibility of compensating tens of thousands of American G.I. prisoners of war who had endured the awful sufferings of enemy prisoner of war camps. Congress passed legislation confiscating German assets in this country, and the revenues therefrom were to be turned over to the War Claims Commission to take care of these GIs or their survivors.

German Plans

While the welfare of our American POWs was of immediate concern, the official record shows that the U. S. Government desired to prevent German assets in the U. S. from being used for ulterior motives by the Germans or their dummies.

Thus on March 30, 1945, the State Department publicly announced that the German Government had developed "well arranged postwar plans for the perpetuation of Nazi doctrines and domination." The State Department went on to say: "Nazi Party members, German industrialists and the German military, realizing that victory can no longer be attained, are now developing postwar commercial projects, are endeavoring to renew and cement friendships in foreign commercial circles and are planning for renewals of prewar cartel agreements. An appeal to the courts of various countries will be made early in the postwar period through dummies for 'unlawful' seizure of industrial plants and other properties taken over by Allied governments at the outbreak of war. In cases where this method fails, German repurchase will be attempted through 'cloaks' who meet the necessary citizenship requirements. The object in every instance will be to reestablish German control at the earliest possible date. . . ."

In describing the German strategy, the State Department said: "Unless these plans are checked, they will present a constant menace to postwar peace and security."

That American public opinion in general supported a realistic policy with respect to the disposition of German assets is beyond question. Elder statesman Bernard Baruch testifying before the U.S. Senate Committee on Military Affairs in June, 1945, laid particular emphasis on the need of confiscating German assets abroad. "German business abroad," he warned, "has traditionally been an instrument of economic and propagandistic war. These assets and organizations should be rooted out and taken over—everywhere. No hokus pocus, no falling for 'dummy' contrivances. . . . Enemy assets in every country should be used to make restitution to nationals of that country for properties lost or damaged in enemy countries."

To sum up, it can be said that our Government and the Congress approved of the confiscation of enemy assets in the United States for two basic reasons, (a) to strengthen American and Allied security; (b) to undo Germany's economic penetration in the U. S. and to utilize the revenues of these assets to compensate American victims of Nazism.

"Bargaining"

For obvious reasons the Germans were silent on this question during the first years following the end of hostilities. However, when their "indispensability" began to hypnotize our policy makers, they decided that the moment was opportune to turn loose their lobby and their public relations salesmen.

During the negotiations on Germany's postwar debts to the U.S. Germany's chief delegate Herman J. Abs (one of Hitler's paymasters) hinted that unless these former assets were returned, Germany might not be able "to carry out her bargain." Apparently even the \$2 billion bargain which the Germans received, did not satisfy the insatiable appetite of Herr Abs.

Chancellor Adenauer put the matter in even blunter terms.

In the early part of 1954, the Chancellor publicly demanded the return of the former German assets alleging that they had belonged to Germans who "were always the traditional promoters of friendship between the two nations. They should be put into a position to resume that role." While the Chancellor was talking about the need for the return of these properties to foster good will and as a token of appreciation for Germany's brave role in the struggle against Communism, West German direct exports to Red China were soaring to record heights.

Traditional "Friends"

Dr. Adenauer was not specific as to whom he referred when he spoke about those Germans who were the traditional friends of the USA. It is not known whether he had in mind the I.G. Farben interests which had formerly owned the General Aniline and Film Chemical Corporation located in the USA. Nevertheless, I.G. Farben is working overtime to regain General Aniline and Film the value of which has risen from \$25 million to over \$100 million under American management. The New York Times of February 7, 1954, reported that "if all German assets blocked in the United States were released, no conceivable justification would remain for withholding General Aniline and Film Corporation stock from Interhandel . . ." On March 28, 1954, the New York Times correspondent writing from Switzerland, repeated the same thought. Certain interests in Switzerland (unnamed), according to the Times writer, prefer "to exert all their influence to approach the American Government directly, proposing rapid settlement by compromise out of court." Their efforts have been in vain because all of the authentic evidence which is in the possession of the U.S. Government, proved that GAF was a creature of I.G. Farben, even though this relationship has been disguised by dummy corporations set up in Switzerland.

Widows and Orphans

The German lobby in the United States has been a model of discretion with respect to the role of the Farben interests. They know that the name Farben is synonymous with the concentration camps of Auschwitz and Buchenwald. They are fully aware of the fact that without the criminal support of I.G. Farben, Hitler could never have launched his war of aggression. Therefore, the public relations boys employed by the German lobby, stay away from the odious name. Instead they dwell on "the little man" in Germany who is allegedly injured by the confiscation of the former enemy assets. The "widow and orphan" line is supposed to squeeze dollars out of the American taxpayers' pockets just as Von Luckner's sentimental spiels in the 1920s brought on a rain of American dollars to rebuild Germany's industrial war potential.

Though they try to hide behind the "widows and orphans," they do make clumsy mistakes which are a revelation. For example, the attorney for the Swiss dummy of I.G. Farben is Ray Jenkins (not to be confused with Mr. Jenkins of the Army-McCarthy hearings). One of the occupants of his office is John W. Nairn who is counsel for the supposedly impartial Senate Subcommittee investigating former enemy assets in the United States. According to Drew Pearson (August 6, 1954) lawyers Jenkins and Nairn "swap their secretary, Miss Anette H. Day. Efficient Miss Day has been working for Jenkins,

attorney for the Swiss German combine. Now she works for the Senate Committee investigating the possible return of the German property."

Another Aspect

There is another aspect to the question of German external assets which involves the U.S. relations with our western allies. The United States was a party to important agreements which sanctioned the confiscation of German assets abroad and many of our war time allies are categorically opposed to any plan that would scuttle those agreements and pledges. Our allies have depended upon these former enemy assets to help rehabilitate their war torn economies. The New York Times, August 4, 1954, reported that the Dutch Government would regard the return of former German assets as a "repudiation by the U. S. of an agreement it had made with its allies."

The German lobby, however, is not concerned with the sacredness of agreements (a characteristic of German diplomacy). These lobbyists harp on the principle of private property rights—as though they have always defended that principle. Of course, the whole world knows that the Germans have been among the worst offenders of private property rights when they looted Europe on a scale unprecedented in history. Yet, when a New York Times correspondent (4-5-54) confronted West German officials with the fact that the Nazis had looted 40 tons of gold from the Netherlands, these same German officials retorted, "We are allies today; how can you use the argument of a conqueror at this stage!" So, when they invoke the principle of private property rights, let us not forget that even the devil can quote Scripture.

The bill sponsored by Senator Dirksen to abrogate the present legislation is a monstrous insult to American taxpayers. They would be obliged to underwrite "a \$500 million windfall payment of Treasury funds principally to German industrialists who supported Hitler" (Francis C. Brown, head of Schering Chemical Corporation). Were these the people Chancellor Adenauer had in mind when he spoke about Germans who had always promoted friendship with the USA?

Parenthetically, it should be noted that the Bonn Government had officially agreed to recognize the validity of the confiscations. Article 3, Chapter 6 of the Convention with Germany stipulates in effect that German external assets which have not been created in the postwar years, do not legally exist (Manchester Guardian 11-10-53). The reader should judge for himself how easy it is for the Germans to go back on their own signed agreements—a point which should be borne in mind for future reference.

The Opposition

Fortunately, the Dirksen bill found rough sledding in Congress in spite of the fact that the present Secretary of State (an old hand in representing German interests) argued for it. The Attorney General's Office opposed the bill; so did many groups and individuals including the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

The Washington Post, March 23, 1954, called the Dirksen deal "a give away." In a leading editorial this newspaper noted that "in the peace treaty which Secretary Dulles negotiated with Japan, confiscation of Japanese private property in the U. S. was recognized and accepted. There is no good reason to deal with the Germans differently. . . ."

The New York Post denounced the Dirksen deal in no uncertain terms: "If German industrialists and their U.S. lobbyists win this round, they will give Germany a weighty club to extort similar concessions from small European nations plundered by the Nazis." The New York Post's observation had a prophetic quality for after the U.S. Congress failed to consider the Dirksen bill, the New York Herald Tribune of August 11, 1954, reported: ". . . the West Germans will undoubtedly continue to bring the external asset issue into trade negotiations with other smaller nations in the future. They are expected to bring as much pressure on their trading partners as the current power of West German industry will permit."

Within Congress itself, the opposition grew as the facts of the conspiracy were laid bare for all to see and to ponder. Senator Hendricksen, Republican from New Jersey, refused to agree to the Dirksen recommendations. He was joined by Senator Kefauver, Democrat from Tennessee who quoted from a report adopted by the American Bar Association (House of Delegates, December 20, 1954): "The United Nations are now establishing a method of suppressing aggressor nations, by use of sanction and threat of armed force. If the people of a potential aggressor nation, who have investments abroad, know that, if defeated, they will lose that property, the knowledge will serve as a definite deterrent to aggression. On the contrary, if they may plant property abroad on the assurance that if their aggression fails, that property, carefully preserved for them, will be returned to them by the nations they have attacked, one check on aggressors is lost. Under modern conditions international public interest and peace will be served if private property of the citizens of any aggressor nation is subject to application to that Nation's obligation to pay for the damage it inflicts on the people of the nations it assails."

As a result of the opposition, the Dirksen deal fell through—at least temporarily. Needless to say, the Germans were besides themselves. The I.G. Chemie stock listed on the Swiss stock exchange, dropped 13 per cent within several days

following Dirksen's defeat. German reaction was immediate. One prominent German industrialist, unnamed, but claiming to express the general feelings of most of his colleagues, said: "If private property in the West is not inviolable, there is no essential difference between the democratic and authoritarian principles. Consequently, we must look elsewhere" (N.Y. Times, 8-16-53). Does this German industrialist imply that the Germans play on democratic principles when it is profitable but will not hesitate to turn elsewhere when the payoff is not forthcoming?


While the Dirksen deal has been temporarily checked, there is no doubt that the powerful German lobby will be ringing doorbells during the next session of Congress. The money will flow and their paid mouthpieces will write objective newspaper columns on this subject. They will have all kinds of allies ranging from neo-Nazi sympathizers to American cartelists. They will have their slick lawyers cooking up new pseudo-legal arguments while their publicists flood the country with tear jerking propaganda.

The October issue of the U.S.-German Chamber of Commerce Bulletin runs a plea from Gordon Michler (Standard Oil) for funds to assure that the Dirksen deal is "given prompt and adequate consideration when Congress meets." All checks, Mr. Michler advises, should be sent to the Treasurer of the "Committee for the Return of Former Enemy Assets" located in Wall Street. In the face of this projected assault by the German cartel interests and their counterpart in the U.S., it would be well for the American people to redouble their vigilance. The issues involved are moral as well as fundamental to the security and good relations of this country with her western allies. The Dirksen deal is in effect a multimillion-dollar subsidy for Germany's aggressions which would come out of the pockets of the American taxpayers. On the other hand, if the American people and their patriotic organizations show the same determination as they did in the summer of 1954, it is certain that the German lobby will again meet deserved defeat.

THE GERMAN "MIRACLE"

" . . . Despite all the signs of progress and activity, some reservations have to be made. There is a very obvious undercurrent curiously blended of self-pity and self-satisfaction; an air of complete detachment from the recent past, which nobody ever mentions and nobody seems to regret or repent. There is a certain cynical and speculative streak in the firm belief of most Germans that the Americans will do anything for them, since they need them. And, finally, there is a certain light-hearted approach to business obligations and responsibilities. Were it not for such things as these, the German economic achievement of recent years would be far more impressive and would command far greater respect than it does. It all looks a little bit too 'jerry-built'; a little too much too soon and not quite genuine. . . ."

(George Soloveyitchik, The Banker (London), November, 1954)



But what precaution do we take against his suddenly vanishing?

A Letter to the President

On September 21, 1954, the Society for the Prevention of World War III, Inc., wrote to President Eisenhower urging a complete re-examination of the present policy toward Germany before granting her full sovereignty and the right to remilitarize. The Society warned that the present policy toward Germany inevitably deepens the disunity which already exists in Western Europe and, therefore, plays into the hands of Communist Russia. The President was told that a sovereign and remilitarized Germany will be in the position to strike a new bargain with Russia at the expense of Western security. The letter further stated that the present German leadership is surrounded by key advisers who are former Nazis and, therefore, cannot be trusted.

Text of the letter signed by the Secretary of the Society, Albert Simard, is furnished below:

September 21, 1954

The President of the United States
Dwight D. Eisenhower
The White House Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

It is the Society's considered judgment that the steady deterioration of our position of leadership in Europe is primarily due to our German policy. That policy has had the effect of creating a resurgent Germany which is employing its power to blackmail the West while laying the groundwork for rapprochement with the Communist East. This ominous situation has created fear among our friends and allies, has provided grist for the Communist propaganda mills and has stimulated disunity in Europe where such unity is essential for American security.

The logic of that policy brought about the fateful decision of the Secretary of State to bypass France in his recent visit to Europe. This unprecedented act of ignoring our historical ally without whom there cannot be any sound and safe solution of the German problem, will inevitably deepen the disunity already existing in Western Europe.

An examination of German diplomacy since the end of the first world war will clearly show that Germany was able to revive her power for predatory purposes and to make deals with Soviet Russia only after she had succeeded in splitting the West. If we grant the Germans full sovereignty and enable her to regain military power, the conditions will be created that will make it possible for Germany to strike a new bargain with Russia at the expense of Western security.

According to the Christian Science Monitor (June 30, 1954), a large segment of influential German opinion believes that "the situation calls for German sovereignty without restrictions as well as the right to regulate for themselves their relations with the East." The impact of full sovereignty on Germany's future decisions regarding whether or not she will make a defense contribution to the West was described by Felix von Eckardt, West Germany's press chief (A.P. 9-2-54): "We must have sovereignty first—and only then can we consider (our emphasis) giving some of it up, to international organizations."

Once West Germany obtains full sovereignty, all prior com-

mitments made by West German politicians become subject to abrogation. That Germany, if her interests so dictate, will repudiate the pledges of the present Chancellor, or that he himself may do so, must be expected in the light of Germany's notorious record on that score.

To unbiased students of German politics, the blind confidence reposed in the present German leadership by our Government could place the United States in an untenable position. Is it not shortsighted to pursue a policy the success of which depends on the continued good health and popularity of an aged German politician? Is it not dangerous to trust Adenauer's leadership when among his chief advisers is Hans Globke, head of the Chancellery and a former Nazi functionary who helped prepare the official Commentary on the Nuremberg race laws?

The Globke case is not exceptional. The fact is that the Chancellor is surrounded by other key advisers who are former Nazis, including some members of his cabinet. We cite as examples:

(1) Theodor Oberlaender, Minister for Expellees, joined the Nazi Party in 1933. He also became Reichsfuehrer of the Federation of the German East. The Federation was later classified by the Allies as a Nazi Organization.

(2) Waldemar Kraft, Minister without Portfolio in the Adenauer Cabinet, is a former major of Hitler's SS. Kraft worked closely with the Gestapo, the Nazi secret police.

(3) Gerhard Schroeder, Minister of Interior, joined the Nazi Party in 1933.

(4) Victor Emanuel Preusker, Housing Minister, became a Nazi Storm-Trooper in 1933 and joined the black shirted SS which originated as Hitler's personal guard.

Does this not indicate the futility of our German policy when Chancellor Adenauer apparently cannot find more reliable and less Nazi tainted elements for key positions in his government?

It is our conviction that any firm and lasting defense against possible aggression from the Communist East must first and foremost be based on a complete understanding and solidarity among the three major democratic powers, i.e. England, France and the United States. Our present German policy undermines that solidarity and, therefore, contributes to the strengthening of the Communist position in Europe. We, therefore, urge that our Government re-examine the policy in its entirety before taking any further action in the way of remilitarizing Germany and granting her full sovereignty.

Respectfully submitted,

Society for the Prevention of World War III, Inc.
Albert Simard, Secretary.

Certainly, it would surprise no informed person if Russia announced that East Germany was going to build up an East German armed force to counterbalance the military establishment of the Bonn Government.

But, hand in hand with that it is expected that Moscow will quickly adjust itself to the new status of Bonn and, in all probability, embark upon a calculated policy designed to lead to normal diplomatic and trade relations between Russia and West Germany.

(Harrison E. Salisbury, The N. Y. Times, 11-2-54)

JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON

The untimely death of Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson at the age of 62 creates a great gap in the ranks of democracy. The New York Times (10-11-54) describes Justice Jackson as one who will be remembered, among other things, "for the vigor, incisiveness and the clarity of his thinking as a judge. . . ." The Times noted further, "when basic human rights were, as he saw it, at stake, he rose superbly to the occasion." This is a fitting tribute to a great American and outstanding jurist.

The brilliance of Justice Jackson's career is not only due to his distinguished work in the Supreme Court. In his capacity as the Chief American Prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crime Trials, Justice Jackson also made a decisive contribution toward the enrichment of international law and morality. In this respect he helped to strengthen the fabric of Western Culture against the challenge of 20th century barbarism.

From the days of Grotius, statesmen and lawyers have talked about the necessity of creating a body of international law that could help curb would-be aggressors. Yet, all of the talk and all of the efforts—no matter how worthwhile—did not succeed in nailing down once and for all the principle that international robbers and murderers are no more sacrosanct than the petty thief and assassin. Thanks to the vision and courage of Justice Jackson, this principle was crystallized at Nuremberg.

When Justice Jackson described in detail the diabolical plot of the German leaders to destroy and enslave in the name of "Lebensraum," he was providing the basis for a great leap forward in the sphere of international law. Justice Jackson was not oblivious to the criticisms from certain quarters which deplored the prosecution of the German leaders for the crimes they committed. With great eloquence and irrefutable logic he replied to these critics in the very opening words of his address before the International Military Tribunal: "The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against the peace of the world imposes a grave responsibility. The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored because it cannot survive their being repeated. That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power ever has paid to Reason."

In this same address he met the charge that the War Crimes Trials were "unfair" because the prosecutors and the Tribunal itself represented the victors while the accused were the vanquished: "Unfortunately, the nature of these crimes is such that both prosecution and judgment must be by victor nations over vanquished foes. The worldwide scope of the aggressions carried out by these men has left but few real neutrals. Either the victors must judge the vanquished or we must leave the defeated to judge themselves. After the First World War, we learned the futility of the latter course. The former high station of these defendants, the notoriety of their acts, and the adaptability of their conduct to provoke retaliation

make it hard to distinguish between the demand for just and measured retribution, and the unthinking cry for vengeance which arises from the anguish of war. It is our task, so far as humanly possible, to draw the line between the two. We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well. We must summon such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that this trial will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity's aspirations to do justice."

In his concluding remarks he set down in clarity the principle upon which he rested the American case against the German leaders: "But the ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are inevitable in a system of international lawlessness, is to make statesmen responsible to law. And let me make clear that while this law is first applied against German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must condemn aggression by any other nations, including those which sit here now in judgment. We are able to do away with domestic tyranny and violence and aggression by those in power against the rights of their own people only when we make all men answerable to the law. This trial represents mankind's desperate effort to apply the discipline of the law to statesmen who have used their powers of state to attack the foundations of the world's peace and to commit aggressions against the rights of their neighbors."

In recent years a veritable torrent of abuse has been heaped upon Justice Jackson, his associates at Nuremberg and what they achieved. We can judge the significance of these scurrilous attacks when it is noted that they come from the very same elements who gave aid and comfort to the German effort to conquer the world. These sinister forces are still working overtime to turn history on its head. The war criminals become the martyrs and those who courageously beat back the aggressors are branded. The unpunished and the unrepentant are frustrated and restless for they know that as long as the principles of Nuremberg live on they dare not repeat their devilish deeds without invoking the wrath and just retribution of an outraged humanity. No matter how many dupes they may find in the legal profession to apologize for their crimes, the verdict of history will remain untarnished and inviolable. Freedom loving people will ever be grateful to Justice Jackson for his historic role in working out enlightened principles of justice for the defense of their dignity, liberty and peace.

"I cannot let pass the death of Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson of the United States Supreme Court without paying to him tribute which he deserved on many counts.

" . . . His service to humanity and to international justice through his successful prosecution of the Nazi criminals in the Nuremberg trials alone will give him a place in both legal and world history. To him we owe a large debt in the establishment of the judicial determination of genocide. He sustained the idea of a moral basis for international as well as national law of major historic importance. . . ."

(Jacob K. Javits, N. Y. Attorney-General, 10-54)

Democracy Faces Test in Germany

by
ERNEST S. PISKO

To draw a balance sheet of prevailing public opinion in West Germany as of this moment is not difficult. But to draw a conclusion from it and forecast the eventual direction of German thinking is virtually impossible.

Up to now, West Germany has been like a passenger in an overcrowded rush-hour streetcar. It swayed somewhat when the car bumped, but it was so hemmed in that it could neither fall nor move. It was held upright by the pressures bearing down on it from all directions.

But now the situation is changing radically. With the occupation lifted, the streetcar grows emptier, and if the ride does not get smoother—which seems rather improbable—German stability soon will be put to a grueling test.

Will it stand the test?

Democracy is threatened in West Germany from two directions—the world political constellation and the Nazi past. The political problem cannot be solved by the Germans alone; but the problem of their Nazi past can be solved only by the Germans.

One may safely assume that there will be a West German army soon and, some day, reunification of East and West Germany. What remains to be seen is whether the new army will be democratic in character and limited in size and armament; also whether any West German government can stay in power that does not press for early reunification regardless of the risks.

Regarding the Nazi past, the Germans have been reluctant to repudiate it openly. The longer they wait, the more difficult will such a step become—and the more unlikely. At the same time, pressure in the opposite direction will grow all the stronger.

All those who have a personal stake in a rehabilitation of nazism will try to persuade their fellow countrymen that the Hitler years were a period of national glory, that Hitler's political concepts were correct, and that talk about Nazi crimes is slander.

A German Nazi follower recently wrote in a letter to a United States senator that, if Hitler had not lived, Germany would have experienced a civil war in 1933, and the Soviets would not have occupied all of Europe, including Great Britain and Ireland.

These are the same falsehoods for which the Germans fell by the millions 20 years ago and may fall again. Too few of them have realized that in 1933 the only threat of a civil war came from the Nazis and that the Soviets would not be in Central Europe today, had Hitler not first made a pact with them and later engaged them in a war which he lost.

Next to these attempts to rewrite history are the efforts to make the Nazis respectable.

The change in the popular attitude toward former Nazis

was reviewed critically in the independent Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Sept. 13. In an article, written by August Dresbach, it was pointed out that at the time of the denazification procedure—between 1947 and 1950—the defendants were asked in court why they had joined the party. If they said they had not joined until after Hitler's seizure of power and only under economic pressure, the court usually exonerated them.

But now, the author said, it has become customary to ask people "why they had not been in the party." Lack of membership is taken as evidence that the person was either "not sufficiently Aryan" or married to someone racially suspect, or that he was "too black" (Roman Catholic) or "too red."

Former party membership appears to have become almost a prerequisite to obtaining one of the better jobs. This explains the warning issued by the trade union leader Adolf Kummernus, recently, that as to the number of former Nazis holding official posts, "the situation is already as bad now as just before Hitler came to power."

And Heinrich Böll, one of West Germany's most talented younger authors, wrote in the weekly magazine Aufwärts, last August, that it now is fashionable to put the terms "Nazi" and "war criminal" between quotation marks to intimate that they are used in a plainly ironical sense.

These are disturbing entries in the debit side of the ledger. They are not meant, however, as evidence that democracy has lost out in West Germany, but rather as a warning not to believe it has won or is sure to win in the near future. . . .

(Condensed, Courtesy, The Christian Science Monitor)

"Any realistic survey of the German's attitude to the economics of rearmament must begin with their plans for large-scale tax reductions. This is odd, for what other country has prepared for rearmament by cutting taxes? . . . There is a widespread feeling in Germany that Americans must bear whatever extra costs may be involved in rearmament. Some optimism on this score is justified, for the first stage at least, as the Americans will supply the heavy equipment necessary for the initial German divisions, though it has not been stated whether it will be a gift. Certainly German hopes tend in that direction. Similarly, industrialists take the view that an American loan should be provided if factories have to be re-converted to arms production. . . ."

(London Economist, 11-6-54)

RECOMMENDED READING:

The Scourge of the Swastika

by
LORD RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL

The author of this terrifying record was the former deputy Judge Advocate General of the British army of the Rhine. The dust cover informs us that he resigned because the British government objected to the publication of this volume, presumably because it would complicate relations with Germany.

Actually the Germans could not object to such a factual record, though they must be ashamed, together with all of us, that the inhumanities recorded in the book should have occurred. At one or two points the author allows himself speculative judgment on how much or how little the German people knew about the atrocities committed by the Nazis. These are the only portions of the book which one might challenge, not because they are not true but because the truth is not as well established as the record of the atrocities.

The record will, of course, not be news to any reader who followed the papers and the history of the war crime trials from Nurnberg on. But the record has a cumulative effect of terrifying proportions. The Nazi crimes on the high seas, the forced labor, the abuse of prisoners of war, the concentration camps, the extermination of the Jews in the gas chambers, the atrocities against conquered peoples; medical experiments upon prisoners; every part of the consistent inhumanity which the Nazis achieved is included.

Naturally such a book does not make pleasant reading. The question is whether it is worth reading. We had atrocity stories after the first world war and then a reaction against them because many of them were proved to be false. It is

rather ironic that the public was disposed to incredulity because of the surfeit of atrocity stories after the first world war and then in the second the atrocities were so monstrous that they caused an unjustified incredulity. That is why a report from actual records is important for history.

Lord Russell's report establishes the implication of the German generals in the atrocities, however much they have tried to create the impression that they abhorred that part of the Nazi program. It also gives a picture of unrelieved wickedness including women nurses, etc.

The wickedness is, in fact, so unrelieved that it raises some very interesting questions about human nature. Could it be true that, when the general standards of human decency are outraged, men fall into a bottomless pit of evil? These Nazi crimes, for instance, can only partly be prompted by the Nazi creed, which recognizes no human rights superior to the "survival" needs of the German nation. But the cruelties consistently extend beyond the requirements of policy and degenerate into pure sadism.

One could wish that the photos had been eliminated, particularly those of corpses. They do not add anything to the indictment and spoil the book.

(Courtesy, The N. Y. Post)

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

The Scourge of the Swastika. By Lord Russell of Liverpool. Philosophical Library, 1954.

" . . . A few years ago, while the A-bomb superiority of the West was a fact, there were three possible ways by which Western Germany could seek unity with the Eastern Provinces; by a Nato victory in a third world war; by the success of a roll-back policy achieved through the threat of preventative war; and by a bargain with the U.S.S.R. Now, with the H-bomb equality a fact, there is only the last way. "It seems almost certain that this issue of how to attain unity will dominate the political scene in West Germany in the next few years. So it seems inevitable that West Germany will start exploring all possible avenues to a bargain with the U.S.S.R. and in so doing will become an unreliable ally to the Nato Powers. I cannot see clearly how any change in Nato Defense or foreign policy can prevent this situation coming about.

(P.M.S. Blackett, New Statesman Nation, Great Britain, 8-28-54)



(Cartoon by Vicky)

Herbert Hoover

WHEN WAS HE RIGHT? WHEN WAS HE WRONG?

During his many years of service in public life ex-President Herbert Hoover has displayed a marked interest in German affairs. He has been regarded by the Germans as one of their tried and trusted friends. Indeed, when he visited Germany recently he was hailed as their "savior." Since the end of World War II, Mr. Hoover has played a leading part in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Germany. Of late, he has been quite definite in his views with regard to the future role of Germany. "I have always said that Western civilization cannot survive without a unified Germany . . ." (New York Times, 10-31-54). Mr. Hoover has stated that German nationalism is not a bad thing per se and that Germany can be depended upon to act as the great defender of democracy. "My prayer is that Germany may be given the unity and full freedom which will restore her to that mission in the world" (N. Y. Herald Tribune, 11-25-54).

Mr. Hoover did not always believe in Germany's mission to save Western civilization. In this connection we cite two examples:

EXHIBIT "A"

In 1918 a book was published entitled "The Iron Circle, The Future of German Industrial Exports, etc." by S. Herzog. Mr. Hoover signed the Introduction, excerpts of which we publish herewith:

"If there is anything to be gained by being honest, let us be honest; if it is necessary to deceive, let us deceive." Thus wrote Frederick the Great in the middle of the 18th Century—the man who laid the foundation of Pan-Germanism, which this world war was expected to achieve. Not content with dominion by force of arms, we find Germany plotting for commercial supremacy with that insolent disregard of the rights of others and that resort to deception that has characterized all her policies since Frederick the Great's reign. . . .

"For forty years the Germans have been plotting to realize their dream of Pan-Germanism—eventual world conquest and dominion. For two generations they have been thinking in terms unknown or little understood by an innocent and unsuspecting world. The Prussian philosophy that might makes right, that the State is supreme, has completely possessed the ruling and upper classes of Germany, both military and commercial, until deception and fraud form the background of their most important international relations and undertakings. They have made Germany an inherently dishonest nation. . . .

"German rule means the breaking-down of all order, the exchange of personal liberty and national freedom for force, of right for might, of justice for the mailed fist.

"The world should have been forewarned. Books were written, maps constructed, by well-known German authorities for the enlightenment of the German people, and these books

reached the outside world, but civilization, accustomed to the pursuits of peace, turned a deaf ear, and is now paying the penalty for refusing to see and hear.

"Now another conception comes out of the heart of Germany, that threatens the commercial interests of unsuspecting nations—carefully thought out, with characteristic German thoroughness, openly advocating the breaking down of all business ethics, relying upon trickery and circumvention to gain their end. This promises to stop at nothing, from national dumping of goods to crush competition to false labels and disguise of the origin and the breaking of contracts that prove disadvantageous to the German.

"Let the manufacturing and banking interests and the laboring and professional classes of all nations be warned in time to devise antidotes and counter-attacks to the Machiavelian devices of a class gone mad with lust for conquest, deliberately plotting to fatten itself upon the life blood of other peoples even after the war. Let us consider in making peace what protection we can give to the commercial existence of the freed nations."

EXHIBIT "B"

On the eve of the San Francisco Conference (1945) which created the United Nations, Mr. Hoover wrote a special piece for the North American Newspaper Alliance. Here are excerpts of this article:

"My fourth proposal for the San Francisco Conference is that agreement upon continued and total disarmament of the enemy nations must be entered into either as part of the United Nations Charter or as a separate agreement. In any event it will have to be enforced by the Security Council. And it profoundly affects the whole question of peace.

"Three years ago Mr. Gibson [Hugh Gibson, American diplomat] and I proposed that the enemy states must be completely disarmed for an entire generation. We pointed out one of the great errors of the Treaty of Versailles in which Germany was permitted to retain a professional army of 100,000 men, supposedly for the purposes of maintaining internal order. She was permitted to have a navy limited only in tonnage and type of ships. We stated that this leeway perpetuated her professional armies and navies. It perpetuated the warrior caste and all its traditions. It afforded a skeleton army and navy of skilled men ready for quick expansion. It insured the continuity of the General Staff with its military skill, brains, and ambitions. It perpetuated their know-how to make war.

"Repeated experience with the warrior caste of these nations in their intimidations, aggressions, blitzes, and attacks without even declarations of war should be enough for the world in this particular. We must make a better job of it this time. . . . We should prohibit the manufacture of arms of any kind [by these countries]."

Why Germans Go East

by
PAUL WOHL

(The defection to the East of Dr. Otto John, former security chief in the Bonn Government, and Karl Schmidt-Wittmack, member of the West German Parliament and prominent leader in Chancellor Adenauer's Christian Democratic Party, created a sensation both here and abroad. There has been much speculation concerning their motives. Perhaps the truth will not be known for a long time. Certain factors which provide the background for these defections were analyzed by Paul Wohl, outstanding expert on the Soviets for the Christian Science Monitor and a long time student of German affairs. We publish below a condensation of Mr. Wohl's article which appeared in The New Leader.)

The flight to the East of Otto John, former West German security chief, and Karl Schmidt-Wittmack, a member of the Bonn Parliament and leader of Chancellor Adenauer's Christian Democratic party in Hamburg, has been a major propaganda victory for Moscow. Bonn contends that the two men were emotionally unstable or else secret Communists or double agents who feared that the jig was up.

Propaganda-wise, this line of reasoning was not very effective. John and Schmidt-Wittmack are not only the West Germans who have sought to collaborate with the East. Among those who have done so are men whose integrity is beyond question. We may not agree with their way of thinking, but today in Europe, and especially in Germany, logical reasoning frequently carries less weight than evidence of personal integrity and idealism. Even if it could be established that Schmidt-Wittmack's trucking firm carried unlicensed goods to the East (who in the German business community can throw the first stone?) or that Dr. John was a double agent, this would not necessarily discredit them in the eyes of their countrymen. . . . For most Germans, the John and Schmidt-Wittmack affairs transcend personal motivations. They have become a signal for stock-taking. And because this is understood by Soviet propaganda, while Western spokesmen try to avoid the basic issue, the two cases have acquired much greater political significance than the defection of two British diplomats in 1951, of atomic scientist Bruno Pontecorvo or of Hungary's cosmic-ray expert Janossy—all of whom, like John and Schmidt-Wittmack, held highly respected and well-paid positions in the West. . . .

Politically, there is the idea of German unity and power through neutrality between East and West. This has long been advocated by a former Chancellor of the Weimar Republic, Joseph Wirth, and was recently endorsed by two other former Chancellors, Heinrich Brüning and Hans Luther. It is older and more deeply entrenched than Konrad Adenauer's idea of a Western European community. In Prussian North Germany, it has always come to the fore in times of stress. According to the late Walter G. Krivitsky, conservative Prussian patriots were prepared to arrest Hitler in 1937, provided they could announce to the German people that friendly relations with Russia had been restored. It was Stalin who decided against the plan. Stalin's successors, far more than the late dictator in his last years, have gone out of their way to honor East German officials and to cultivate the spokesmen for West German interests who occasionally hold clandestine meetings with Eastern representatives.

Paradoxically, German protagonists of neutrality feel stronger today than in 1937 because (1) on-the-spot observations during and after the war have convinced them of the general backwardness of the USSR, which makes it unlikely that the Kremlin will take the offensive in a major war; (2) they sense that the Soviets have lost momentum since Stalin's death and believe that Moscow will agree to creation of a neutral Germany; (3) West Germany's spectacular industrial comeback, plus a certain amount of technical progress in East Germany, have convinced them that, in ten years at the latest, they may be able to hold their own as a major world power between East and West. Some of West Germany's leading experts on Russia go even farther. In private con-

versations, they predict a long period of internal convulsion in the Soviet Union which, under certain circumstances, might enable a Germany organized along state-socialist (or state-capitalist) lines to become the nerve center of an enormous Eurasian empire extending from the North Sea to the Gulf of Tonking.

This line of thought has gained ground as a result of the difficulties encountered by Western European unity efforts, and the Communists have maneuvered skillfully to sell it to German right-wing patriots. . . .

Ideologically, the East also has certain attractions for West Germany. First of all, there is the totalitarian resemblance to the Nazi system. But there are other reasons:

- The East appeals to the average German's love of parades, of hero worship and collective self-aggrandizement.
- The East's sweatshop methods appeal to some German businessmen and members of the old officialdom as reminiscent of Prussia's legendary Spartan virtues.
- Some impoverished members of the middle class look with envy at West Germany's prosperous new businessmen and have fallen back into Nazism's anti-capitalist mood or rediscover with Oswald Spengler a close relationship between the Prussian spirit and socialism.
- The European idea now appears petty to these people. "A united Europe would have been a great thing twenty or thirty years ago," wrote one of my correspondents. "Adenauer's 'Little Europe' is a political anachronism in the day of the superperson guided missile." Such views are encouraged by East German invitations to visit China and by world youth festivals.
- A few German intellectuals have re-

turned disillusioned from America. One university professor, who had toured this country under Marshall Plan auspices and later came back as an immigrant, was forced to do unskilled work in a small plant. Writing about his experiences, he referred to the fine factories he had visited while an official guest as "the American Potemkin's villages"—a false front comparable to those set up by Soviet propaganda.

Economically, too, East Germany does not appear altogether dark and hopeless to some West Germans. Certain rationed foods are cheaper than in the West and are smuggled into the Western Sector of Berlin. Although market prices are still very high, there have been eleven successive price reductions. Last August, more-

over, nominal wages were raised as much as 20 per cent and taxes cut. For engineers, skilled workers, natural scientists and the like, conditions are improving. During the first six months of this year, alone among the Soviet satellites, East Germany maintained last year's tempo of industrial expansion, which is far greater than in the West. As in other Communist countries, unemployment does not exist. Several rows of impressive houses along East Berlin's *Stalin-Allee* show that the East Germans can build if given the opportunity to do so. East Germany has also begun to gain a foothold in some Western European and overseas markets, and it is through East Berlin that most commercial deals with China and other Soviet-bloc countries are made.

Yet, economic opportunities are the least important prospect that East Germany has to offer. Its principal attraction for West Germans at the present stage seems to lie in the conviction that, without a war, German unity can come only through reconciliation with the East. "Germans stay in East Germany or go there," one old-timer recalled, "in the same way that Frenchmen after 1871 stayed in Alsace-Lorraine or returned there despite Berlin's policy of cultural oppression." All this may appear incongruous to Americans, but it is well to remember that Germans, and especially German intellectuals, think politically in a strange, circuitous Teutonic way that is very different from the most rational approach of the freedom-loving West.

(Condensed, Courtesy, *The New Leader*)

Shall We Cheer?

by
MAX LERNER

... We are told that it is the German arms treaty which is Dulles' high historic achievement. As if to underscore this claim Chancellor Adenauer has been brought here during the week before election for high-level talks on arms and diplomacy that will cement the new alliance.

I have nothing against Adenauer, who is probably a better Chancellor than anyone Germany is likely to have as his successor. He is a guest of our government and he deserves courtesy at our hands.

But with the memory of the greatest mass-extinction in history not wholly withered in our minds, is there real cause for jubilation at the "victory" we have achieved in rearming the nation responsible for the crematoria and the human furnaces? ...

But it is one thing to say reluctantly that we had to do it, and quite another thing to make it ground for jubilation. What is there to be so happy about? The fact that there will soon be a half million German soldiers under arms and an equal number in the reserves?

The meaning of political events lies often less in the events themselves than in the moral framework in which they are placed. I have waited to hear from Dulles or President Eisenhower or any of the men around them a single word about the pain this decision caused them, about the sorrow and sadness that must mark it in the perspective of history.

They have said nothing. There has been only a barren, stony silence.

The conference at London and the signing of the treaty at

Paris had a double purpose. One was to bring Germany back into the fellowship of nations, with rearming as a symbol of its sovereignty. The other was to set up a system of controls to make sure its armed power would not again cast a shadow over Europe.

The two purposes were necessarily intertwined. Without the system of controls, the rearming would be at once cynical and dangerous.

Yet the big fact about Dulles' role at London—like his role in all the diplomatic maneuvers preceding London—was that he concentrated on the rearming and allowed others to fight for the controls.

The championing of controls—and the insistence on them—was left to Mendes-France, although Eden helped. I think a detailed analysis of the day-to-day maneuvers at London and before London would show without question that Dulles threw his weight toward the minimum of controls and toward a dilution of the arms pool. Whenever there was a showdown on these crucial questions, Dulles always stood with Adenauer.

If this is why Eisenhower described Dulles' role in so glowing terms, we ought to know whether he understands its full meaning. The best features of the London agreement—the effort to control the rearming—came despite Dulles and not because of him. It was the rearming itself on which he most firmly set his will. If this is the returning hero we are supposed to cheer, I stand mute while the parade goes by.

(Condensed, Courtesy, *N. Y. Post*)

Dachau...

... They are weeding dandelions from the blood trench at Dachau.

Roses and evergreens mark the graves of unknown thousands. German gardeners neatly clip the grass in the trench by the wall where elite guard officers once shot starving prisoners in the back.

Dachau was the first of Adolf Hitler's great prison camps, and the worst. Its record of murder and torture surpassed all others, for 300,000 persons died there, many while serving as unwilling guinea pigs for Gestapo Chief Heinrich Himmler's "scientific" experiments.

There were typhus, typhoid, dysentery and starvation. There was torture unparalleled, and an utter misery and breaking of human spirit. Jews, Poles, Hungarians, Belgians, Russians, Italians and Germans died there.

It is little more than a 15-minute drive north from Munich to Dachau, where smoke used to curl from the crematorium chimneys 24 hours a day. The elite guards did their grisly work thoroughly—in one month alone, 6000 human beings were stuffed into Dachau's long, brick ovens.

Under United States occupation, Dachau has become a memorial. The people who live there are refugees from the Soviet East Zone.

Dachau is in the middle of a big plain, and many new houses have sprung up outside the camp since the war. In 1949, a grave containing the bones of 15,000 persons was unearthed by a bull-dozer excavating for a basement. The grave is now a memorial.

Just inside the gates of Dachau's extermination area is an old pine tree, its trunk and first two limbs stripped of bark. The tree stands stark, with low-growing evergreens and a small path around it. At the foot of the tree is a small marble slab that says, in English, "hanging tree."

Nazis used to tie prisoners' hands behind them, then hang them from a limb of the tree for hours at a time. After unendurable pain, a blessed unconsciousness would follow.

Down the path a little way is the blood trench, about 22 inches deep and 15 feet long. It is marked with another small marble slab.

Farther along the path is a three-foot square of ground marked off with roses. In the middle is a slab that says, "This is the grave of unknown thousands."

It probably was there that 92 Russian officers, divided into batches of 15, were stripped, forced to kneel and shot in the back.

Still farther along the path is a three-foot square of ground bordered by roses and evergreens. In the middle is another slab that says "This is the grave of unknown thousands."

Continue along the path and there is another square, exactly like the first, only much larger. This is another grave of unknown thousands, discovered more than five years after the war's end.

Then you come to the crematoriums, two of them, with six furnaces. The furnaces are made of brick, and are more than long enough to accommodate an emaciated, tortured human body.

Victims were stuffed into the fires with long iron poles, now worn smooth at the ends. Some were burned alive.

Rafters over the crematoriums in one low wooden building are scorched black and burned partly through by the intense heat.

Fingernail scratches, made in desperation by doomed prisoners, still cover the walls of the "undressing room" and the gas chamber. Mingled with the scratches are other scratches, the marks of former Dachau prisoners who have revisited the camp, and the names of tourists.

In the last days before the United States Seventh Army arrived at Dachau, there were 112 to 135 deaths daily. Nazis were dumping prisoners into ice water until unconscious in alleged "scientific" experiments.

"Bone crusher," so-called by the prisoners, was Sgt. Kurt Moeller, whose physical strength was so great he could break arms and legs with his bare hands. Other Dachau guards used prisoners for pistol practice.

Dachau's horror came to an end when American troops arrived on April 30, 1945, but its misery did not. Advanced starvation and diseases took the lives of 60 to 100 a day at Dachau for weeks after the war ended.

Outside the camp, our troops found 50 boxcars loaded with bodies of humans who had been starved to death, or shot to death, bodies livid with bruises.

Two rooms in the crematorium were piled to the ceiling with emaciated bodies. Even Dachau could not keep up with the death pattern it had set.

(Courtesy, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*)

"We have fought two wars in this century to prevent German hegemony in Europe, and it is still our national interest to prevent such a development at all costs. A dominant Germany, once men like Adenauer are gone, could all too easily revert to the policy of Bismarck, the Weimar Republic and Hitler—a deal with Russia which would imperil the West."

The policy of basing a European policy on Germany rather than France has a fatal appeal for some British and American policymakers. A pro-German Anglo-American foreign policy, carried through in the Twenties and early Thirties, made the Second World War almost inevitable. It could have the same result again. A pro-German policy would turn the Continent—including our faithful friends in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania—into disillusioned and depressed neutralists. It would destroy the political appeal of the European idea, which would become not the dynamic rallying point of future hopes in Europe, but an abiding threat of renewed occupation by goose-stepping armies in field-gray."

(Eugene V. Rostow in *The New Leader*, 11-2-54)

What Have We Learned?

by

JOSIAH E. DU BOIS, JR.

(The article published below by Josiah E. Du Bois, Jr., is a review of "Tyranny On Trial" by Whitney R. Harris, published by Southern Methodist University Press, Dallas. Mr. Du Bois was Chief Prosecutor of the I.G. Farben case during the 1947-48 War Crime Trials at Nuremberg. He has served in important posts in the Government. He was Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury under both Morgenthau and Vinson; General Counsel to the War Refugee Board; and Counsel and Financial Advisor to the Representative of the President on Japanese Reparations. He is the author of "The Devil's Chemists, a definitive study of the I.G. Farben war criminals.")

World leaders as well as legal scholars have differed greatly in their views concerning the wisdom of the Nuremberg trials and the effect of said trials in the field of international law.

According to Judge Samuel Rosenman, who represented President Roosevelt in connection with the preparation for the trials, the British officials including Prime Minister Churchill, "wanted to take the top Nazi criminals out and shoot them without warning one morning and announce to the world that they were dead."

Secretary Hull's memoirs recite "If I had my way, I would take Hitler and Mussolini and Tojo and their arch-accomplices and bring them before a drumhead court-martial. And at sunrise on the following day there would occur an historic incident."

In writing about "the power of the victor over the vanquished," Chief Justice Stone said "It would not disturb me greatly if that power were openly and frankly used to punish the German leaders for being a bad lot, but it disturbs me some to have it dressed up in the habiliments of the common law and the Constitutional safeguards to those charged with crime."

On the other side, the late Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief Prosecutor at the major Nuremberg trial, states in his introduction to TYRANNY ON TRIAL, "The only course, in my view, was for the victors to behave as civilized victors and take the responsibilities implicit in demanding and accepting capitulation of the whole German state and population. Unless history was to lay the war guilt and the guilt for organized programs of atrocities upon the whole German people, some process must identify those individuals who were in fact responsible and make an authentic record of their deeds."

And Justice Jackson reports that: "President Roosevelt had steadily and insistently favored a speedy but fair trial for these men, fearful that if they were punished without public proof of their crimes and opportunity to defend themselves there would always remain a doubt of their guilt that might raise a myth of martyrdom."

Despite these divergent views concerning the trial and the legal efficacy of the trials, no responsible person has attempted to defend the morality of the almost unbelievable acts of barbarism and cruelty committed by the Nazi leaders; and no responsible person has been heard to say that the nature of

the punishment meted out to the arch criminals of the Nazi era was unjust.

Perhaps the most important contribution of the Nuremberg trials is the fact that they made an unchallengeable record of the incredible events of one of the most blackest periods in the history of mankind. The taking of Austria by telephone; the rape of Czechoslovakia; the subjugation of Poland; the conquest of Denmark and Norway in deliberate violation of solemn covenants; the liquidation of the three little countries of Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg; the over-running of Yugoslavia; the invasion of France; the attempt to destroy the Soviet Union; the massacre of prisoners of war; the enslavement of millions of human beings; the persecution and deliberate murder of the Jews and other minority groups; the so-called "Germanization" of the Eastern countries of Europe, including drastic restrictions upon the education and cultural life of those unfit to be "Germanized" and the sterilization of "inferior women"; the plunder of the industries of every country of Europe invaded by the Nazi armies; the looting of treasures of art; and such incomprehensible acts like the wicked experiments conducted upon human beings for testing the effectiveness of poisoned bullets, medical experiments to test untried drugs, the collection of skulls of human beings of "all races and peoples at our disposal," the gassings of millions of human beings and the burning of their bodies, the extraction of gold from their teeth and the making of soap from their fat; these events and many more were recorded for all time at the Nuremberg trials.

"... How are we to explain Germany's Untergang from civilization—not to 'barbarism' (an insult to all barbarians), but to nihilistic criminality on the part of its élite and to frenzied sadism and self-immolation on the part of its people? 'Tyranny' or 'totalitarianism' will scarcely serve as clues. . . . In any case, it is a fact . . . that the German community of our time somehow managed to attain lower depths of evil than any known to man in any of his past or present experiments in social life. . . ."

(Frederick L. Schumann, The Nation, 9-18-54)

Yet, world power politics being what it is, history also records the fact that as early as September 1944, while our GIs were still being killed by the Nazi war machine, there was circulated within the United States government, at a high level, a memorandum contending, in effect, that as soon as the war was over we should rebuild German power as quickly as possible.

As a member of the American delegation to the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, I saw this government formally endorse a program designed to insure that Germany would no longer be the dominant power in Europe. That was the program the world heard. But there was secretly circulated among the top leaders of the British and American delegations a memorandum, prepared by certain top officials in the United States government, saying in effect that this whole approach was wrong and that our real interest lay in rebuilding Germany as quickly as possible "as a bulwark against Communism."

And, finally, we have recently heard the Prime Minister of Great Britain announce at a party celebrating his 80th birthday that "Even before the war ended, and while the Germans were surrendering by hundreds and thousands, I telegraphed Lord Montgomery directing him to be careful in collecting German arms and to stack them so that they could easily be issued again to the German soldiers with whom we should have to work if the Soviet advance into Western Europe continued."

Many of the industrial, military and diplomatic leaders of the Nazi era who were convicted at the Nuremberg trials which followed the major trial are free today and back in positions of great power in Germany.

Anyone who reads TYRANNY ON TRIAL and then ponders the state of the world today must ask himself "What have we learned?"

"THE OTHER SIDE"

Speaking to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg of Nazi atrocities in the occupied territories, Sir Hartley Shawcross said: "... on the lowest computation twelve million men, women and children were done to death. Not in battle, not in passion, but in the cold, calculated, deliberate attempt to destroy nations and races, to disintegrate the traditions, the institutions and the very existence of free and ancient States. Twelve million murders! Murders conducted like some mass production industry. . . ."

This book, by Lord Russell of Liverpool who, when Deputy Judge Advocate General, British Army of the Rhine, was legal adviser to the Commander-in-Chief in respect of all trials of German War Criminals in the British Zone of occupation, gives a factual account of the appalling crimes committed and of the monstrous organization behind them. It is a formidable indictment of German barbarity, which has been fully comprehended by few people outside the occupied countries. How many in Britain realize that, of the 3,000,000 Jews living in Poland in September, 1939, not more than 50,000 could be traced in 1946 as a result of the German policy of mass extermination? How many know that 3,000,000 prisoners were killed at the Auschwitz Camp alone; that at one time 10,000 people a day were put into its gas chambers? Since the war there have been many books by German officers defending the Nazi war machine. It is as well to read the other side of the story.

(Publisher's Comment on "The Scourge of the Swastika" By Lord Russell)

THE MANY FACES OF KONRAD ADENAUER by Cummings



Through Mr. Dulles's eyes . . . Through Mr. Eden's eyes . . . Through Mr. France's eyes . . . Through Mr. Molotov's eyes . . .

(Daily Express)

How Dead Are the German Cartels?

The New York Times (10-24-54) published a letter by Sidney H. Willner dealing with the question of German cartels and monopolies. Mr. Willner's qualifications to speak on this subject cannot be challenged in view of the fact that he was formerly Chief of the Decartelization and Deconcentration Division of the U.S. High Commission for Germany.

In his letter Mr. Willner questions the accuracy of a Times report (10-12-54) indicating that all the fundamental Allied legislation concerned with the deconcentration and decartelization "will be discarded because there are no means of enforcing that legislation after the liquidation of the occupation regime." According to Mr. Willner, the Allied deconcentration program has been in the main accomplished and it is "inconceivable that there is an intention to abandon what has already so largely been achieved." In the case of Allied anti-cartel laws Mr. Willner expresses the hope that this legislation will not be discarded. One can easily get the impression that this anti-cartel legislation has been effectively enforced without fear or favor. Mr. Willner declares rightly that the scrapping of these vital Allied laws could very well result in "regression to economic feudalism" in Germany.

Judging from reports coming out of Germany over the past few years, regression to economic feudalism is no longer a hypothetical question. On the contrary, the resurgence of the trusts and cartels has been proceeding in rapid pace. Indeed, we will go further—the regression which Mr. Willner fears has not merely returned German industry to the status quo ante, but has increased the power of the monopolies and cartels to unprecedented heights.

Unquestionably this is partially due to the fact that the German cartelists have left no stone unturned to hamper and discredit the Allied decartelization and deconcentration program. But that is not the whole story. It is a fact, too, that Allied officials responsible for the carrying out of this policy, sabotaged it. This is one of the major findings of the Ferguson Committee appointed by former Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, to investigate the situation in the early part

of 1949. The Committee took testimony from the leading American officials associated with the decartelization and deconcentration program. On the basis of this testimony, the Ferguson Committee reported that a perfectly practical program for the elimination of the trusts and cartels was emasculated and undermined by a clique of American officials operating under General Clay.

These officials admitted that they were unsympathetic with the policy which they were pledged and obliged to carry out. It was the program of the President of the United States who had received his mandate from the American people. Yet, these officials, on their own authority, succeeded in blocking the implementation of this program. They put forth the view that the rehabilitation of Germany's economic power was the sine qua non for the economic welfare of Europe. Having set up this specious proposition, they felt themselves justified in crippling the deconcentration and decartelization programs alleging that this was the only way to preserve Germany's industrial power. This stereotype rationale for defending their sabotage of the U. S. Government's policy was thoroughly refuted by the Ferguson Committee's report.

The Ferguson Committee noted that officials were trying to sell the idea that the German economy could not be fully productive unless it is one that is based on excessive concentrations of industry. In answer to this allegation the report stated: "The experience in the United States is just to the contrary. Nor is there any justification for saying that Germany could not afford the waste of competition that a rich country like the U.S. can afford. In those instances, since the occupation of Germany, in which there has been deconcentration, namely, I.G. Farben, the Banks and the Ruhr, there is evidence that, rather than interfere with German production or the recovery of Germany, such deconcentration has increased production and strengthened the Germany economy.

"General Clay told your Committee that the operation of the I.G. Farben plants as separate individual units resulted in a vigorous come-back spurred by competition and that some of the units

were producing in greater volume than ever in their history in spite of the many handicaps facing German recovery.

"The decentralization of the German banks has, according to General Clay and his Finance Adviser, aided in the economic recovery of Germany."

The basic criticisms of the Ferguson Committee report were never refuted nor was remedial action taken. On the contrary, the report was filed away to gather dust while Allied officials continued to wink at the German cartelists.

In the Summer issue 1953 of Prevent World War III we published an article entitled "The Cartel Comeback—A U.S. Failure." The article contained the latest information up to that time with respect to the status of the Allied anti-cartel program. Detailed facts were presented showing that the situation had not improved since the criticisms of the Ferguson Committee, but had worsened. We concluded our analysis in these words: "It is clear that when the Allies defaulted on their own obligations to deconcentrate and decartelize German industry, it became possible for the Germans to fully exploit this failure by devising plans that not only helped to 'reform' the trusts and cartels but to give them respectability under German law. . . ."

As if to support our charges, the New York Times of November 8, 1953, quoted Professor H. Schwenk, Chairman of the Association of German Iron and Steel Mills, to the effect that the U.S. Government, through one of its agencies, was working on plans for the restoration of the Ruhr iron and steel combines. . . . Several days following Herr Schwenk's sensational disclosure, U.S. officials issued a denial intimating that Schwenk's allegations might be a reflection of the "wishful thinking" of the Ruhr industrialists. Was it only wishful thinking? Is it not true that ten days following this denial, the Allied authorities consented to maintain intact the steel trading combine of the former Vereinigte Stahlwerke although it was to be "broken up by Allied anti-cartel legislation"? (New York Times 11-22-53) Some may regard this as an exceptional case. In order to dispel such illusions we shall cite the most up-to-date information on the cartel prob-

lem derived from reliable sources, and let the reader judge for himself:

(1) On November 17, 1953, the English publication The Manchester Guardian carried a report from its correspondent in Germany under the caption "Reforming Industrial Trusts in West Germany." The Guardian correspondent described what he called "the growing campaign to recreate the old German industrial trusts. . . ." In this connection he noted that the tendency in the Federal Republic was toward "the reversal of all Allied legislation" prohibiting the cartels and trusts. He reported the view of an American spokesman that the occupying power "cannot stop such regrouping."

(2) The December 10, 1953, issue of the Manchester Guardian carried a more detailed article on this problem by the well known expert on Germany, Terence Prittie, which was entitled "The Cartels Return in Western Germany." Among the facts cited by Mr. Prittie was that "the big German banks have already begun to frame a common policy which expresses itself in identical reports." He

might have added that the very same persons who were responsible for the looting perpetuated by the big three German banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerz Bank) were once again in the same positions of power. Mr. Prittie's conclusion is significant: "The Germans, it is sure, want a disciplined and cohesive economy. They believe that cartels will play their own part in that and that Allied action in destroying the trusts was no more 'final' than that of the child who knocks down his bricks—only to build them up again tomorrow."

(3) A report to the Christian Science Monitor (12-31-53) noted that British and American officials in contrast to the French, were inclined to compromise relative to cartel and anti-trust legislation.

(4) The New Republic (1-11-54) disclosed that the German businessman was "reconstructing his prewar cartel system and, in the name of free enterprise, demanding that the Bonn Government hand over vast state-owned industries built up over the decades." The New Republic report confirmed the reports mentioned

above with regard to the resurgence of the three major banks which had dominated Hitler's Germany. It further mentioned that "the Ruhr and steel magnates dream of transforming the organization (the European Coal and Steel Community) into the logical continuation of the International Steel Cartel of 1926." In this connection it should be noted that as early as September 21, 1953 the authoritative financial weekly Barron's declared, "The Coal-Steel Community now functions as a massive steel and coal cartel."

The tendency of the European Coal and Steel Community to adopt cartel practices was noted by a number of countries at the recent conference of the "General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)" at Geneva (New York Herald Tribune 11-12-54). (The record shows that the old iron and steel cartel was dominated by the Germans and served as an effective instrument for the building up of Germany's war potential.) The New Republic report also referred to the appearance of the "old

" . . . To the Adenauer clique things looked darkest, of course, when E.D.C. died. Once it appeared there were to be no new German divisions, the Krupps and Kesselrings declared that all possibility of a Franco-German understanding was at an end. The scapegoat? The French Premier, naturally. 'Mendes-France must go,' said Adenauer, as if he were a French opposition deputy. In an interview with the London Times he even threatened to fling the Bonn republic into the arms of the Russians.

"But after the stormy summer came the sunny autumn. Not the Mar.ans but the Archangel Michael, in the person of John Foster Dulles, descended on London, Bonn, and Paris. E.D.C. is dead, long live E.D.C.! proclaimed the London conference. Amen! said the statesmen at Paris. . . . The German industrialists and generals are smiling . . . the twelve divisions and prosperity are around the corner. The Bonn government is already distributing arms contracts, and German industrial stocks are skyrocketing. . . ."

(Carolus, The Nation, 11-6-54)

* * *

"Meanwhile, what the American public doesn't realize is that German businessmen are descending on Latin America in increasing numbers, offering long-term credit and cheap prices. Thus, while the USA spends money building up Germany, Germany is indirectly using that money to unbuild American trade in Latin America."

(Drew Pearson, 11-30-54)



"Now that we can again produce our best arguments, we've at last regained the freedom of speech!"

powerful trade associations" and observed that the future airplane industry in Germany was rapidly falling into the clutches of a tightly knit group.

(5) Business Week (3-13-54) ran a full length article entitled "German Cartels Try for a Comeback." "It is the view of some American observers in Germany," Business Week reported, "that by one means or another most German industry will emerge in a cartelized form within a few years at most." This magazine summed up the effectiveness of Allied anti-cartel legislation in the words of a businessman: "Why do we need cartels legalized when all we need is a telephone to make our arrangements?"

(6) During March 1954 the New York Times carried several reports from Germany indicating that there was a bright future for the return of the German trusts and cartels. One dispatch (3-23-54) quoted the President of the German Federation of Industry Fritz Berg to the effect that the U. S. could never bring about the economic integration of Europe without industrial cartels.

(7) The Wall Street Journal (7-16-54) carried a detailed dispatch from Germany entitled "Farben's Return." This refers, of course, to the re-emergence of Germany's chemical trust I.G. Farben which was probably the most important economic prop for the Nazi regime. Here is the way the Wall Street Journal describes the return of Farben: "A ghost is stalking through some of America's big foreign chemical markets these days. Its name is I.G. Farben." The Wall Street Journal's report notes that under Allied orders Farben has been built up into three individual firms which must remain in that state until 1956 but also reports that pressures are growing and the Farben crowd is becoming "impatient." Whether they will wait for 1956 is an open question. Indeed, many of the preliminaries for the merging of the so-called independent companies have been accomplished. By the time 1956 rolls around, whatever needs to be done in that direction will be anti-climax. Thus, the New York Times (7-26-54) states: "Decartelization restrictions imposed by the Allies expire in 1956. Immediately afterwards a new I.G. Farben is expected to emerge. . . ."

(8) The Manchester Guardian (8-26-54) returned to the question of cartels in Western Germany. Here is the way the

Guardian's correspondent begins his report: "The Allied High Commission is unlikely to offer any objection to the regrouping of the German steel industry which is reported to be fully under way. This regrouping will result in an exact reversal of Allied policy in the Federal Republic, which was based on the intention to break up 'undue concentration of economic power.'" Interlocking directorates have become a common practice among the major Ruhr steel concerns. Vertical trusts are once again developing. Mergers are reoccurring in such a way that "the process of reconcentration may leave fewer than a dozen firms in a dominant position in the German steel industry." In other words, the reconcentration of heavy industry is developing with such intensity that by 1956 the world will probably witness a cartelized, trustified Germany on a scale which could very well make the monopolies of the Hitler era seem puny.

(9) The Wall Street Journal (10-5-54) published an article from Bonn which reported that, when West Germany is granted full sovereignty, "one of the casualties will be the American decartelization crusade." It noted that the so-called crusade "has been going badly almost since it formally began. . . ." The Wall Street correspondent predicts that the retreat may well become a rout by the time the Germans obtain their sovereignty. He further states that the Germans "do not believe free competition would work for Germany. . . ."

(10) The New York Herald Tribune (10-21-54) carried an article by its Bonn correspondent revealing that the German cartels have succeeded in perverting the objectives of Allied anti-cartel legislation. For all practical purposes Germany's industrial war lords will have a clear field ahead because the Bonn Government is cooperating. "The industrialists of West Germany who backed Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in the national elections a year ago, exercise a strong influence. . . ."

(11) A dispatch to the New York Herald Tribune (10-31-54) announces that West Germany's bankers "are expected to revive the big three banks of prewar Germany" after the Paris accords are ratified. The Tribune correspondent writes that the German financial world welcomed the deliberate deletion from the new agreements of an earlier Allied-

German provision calling for the continued deconcentration of the German banking system. "The nation's financial press is already discussing the problem of when and where—not whether—the great banking institutions of the past will be restored." How quickly it is forgotten that the big three banks had originally been split up precisely because they were the backbone of Hitler's aggressions resulting in the ruthless looting of German occupied Europe.

* * *

Does this brief chronology of the status of the German trusts and cartels give cause for optimism? Can we truthfully talk as though they have not emerged as yet? What does this all mean to the average person, be he an American or a European? They have heard of or experienced the unspeakable crimes perpetuated by the Nazis. But do most of them know that without the decisive help of I.G. Farben, Krupp, Mannesmann, the big three banks, etc., there would have been no concentration camps, no gas chambers and no World War II? That is why the subject of cartels and trusts is not merely the concern of the historian or the economist. It is a matter of life and death to every person who cherishes liberty and peace.

In 1945 the U.S. adopted a program which had as one of its primary objectives the smashing of German cartels and trusts "to prevent Germany from endangering the safety of her neighbors and again constituting a threat to international peace" and to "destroy Germany's economic potential to wage war." The U.S. program was prepared on the basis of careful investigations by hundreds of specialists who uncovered the influence of these forces of war and economic aggression. U.S. investigators had learned that only a few years after the end of World War I, Germany's industrial war lords, yes, even under the much advertised democratic Weimar Republic, had begun to seize the military power of Europe. Colonel William Taylor, the Paris agent for Dupont, wrote his company in 1924: "The European monopoly in military material (is) passing slowly into German hands."

It is a fact that from the very first day of peace after World War I to the moment of Hitler's accession to power, Germany was being carefully prepared for World War II through the unmatched

resources and planning of a comparatively small group of trusts, monopolies and cartels with their principal location in the Ruhr. Their sinister activities had a definite impact on American security. The U.S. Government agency, The Office of Facts and Figures, in its first "Report to the Nation," issued January 14, 1942, stated: "(The enemy) has worked for many years to weaken our military potential. Through patent controls and cartel agreements he succeeded in limiting American production and export of many vital materials. He kept the prices of these

materials up and the output down. He was waging war, and he did his work well, deceiving important American companies into agreements, the purpose of which they did not sense. Our businessmen were peaceful traders. The enemy's businessmen were and are all over the world agents of aggression.

"The list of materials affected is long—beryllium, optical instruments, magnesium, tungsten carbide, pharmaceuticals, hormones, dyes, and many more. When you match each product with its military use, the significance of the attack becomes

clear. Beryllium is a vital element for alloys that make shell springs; magnesium makes airplanes and incendiary bombs; tungsten carbide is essential for precision machine tools.

"Concealed behind dummy corporations, the enemy went unchecked for years, using our own legal machinery to hamstring us."

To be sure, the Germans lost World War II. But how meaningful is that defeat when the very instruments of her aggression are preserved?

Old Sights in the New Germany

The dispatches were filed by different men in different cities, writing at approximately the same moment:

BERLIN, Nov. 25—Berlin's Jewish communal organizations and several other groups protested today against an alleged revival of anti-Semitism and ultranationalism at a rally of the German party . . .

Several students were attacked and beaten by the crowd, apparently when they failed to stand for the singing of "Deutschland Ueber Alles." The foreign reporters were abused and menaced when they did not sing . . .

Booted orderlies quickly moved in on anyone who did not sing. Two students, reportedly mistaken for Jews, were set upon . . . At the meeting the loudest applause was for representatives of an organization of former members of the Waffen SS, the branch of Hitler's elite guard in the Army.—From a dispatch by Walter Sullivan to The Times.

BONN, Nov. 25—Two of the four government coalition parties asked today for a general amnesty for all German war criminals before the Paris agreements are ratified . . . On the basis of the record in parliament, even the Social Democratic party is expected to support, at least partly, the two right-wing parties' motion. Little doubt is felt that a large proportion and possibly a majority of the German people and members of the Bundestag do not accept the doctrine of German war guilt.—From a dispatch by Albion Ross to The Times.

* * *

Thus the sickening echoes multiply as West Germany prepares to be affectionately welcomed into the free community.

Yet there is still no sign that the U.S. Congress will seriously debate our German policy. Many months ago it became an axiom of American political life that the Germans were the guardians of Western civilization, and that there could be no serious argument on the point.

Nevertheless it becomes clearer each day that something has gone disastrously wrong with post-war Germany. The Communists offer each episode as proof that "Western imperialism" is sponsoring a revival of Nazism; in reality, of

course, the re-emergence of fallen Nazi heroes was officially sponsored in Communist-ruled East Germany long before manifestations of intolerance became acute in the Western zone. There is little comfort for free men, however, in the reminder that things are grim all over.

What is essentially being demonstrated is the failure of the Occupation. In the Eastern zone the totalitarians changed brown shirts to red; but it was in the West that the victorious battle for democracy was presumably to be waged. What happened to the forces of freedom?

Possibly the simplest answer is that the emphasis on German rearmament—rather than on German re-education—became the keynote of allied efforts long before the Germans had absorbed any lessons.

There was a steady disintegration, too, in the calibre of Occupation personnel, partly because of the irrational severities of the security program. Imaginative men who saw Germany as a challenge to creative democratic planning were replaced by brass-hats who saw Germany as a new military bastion, and who could not tell a democrat from a storm trooper.

No doubt there have been other factors: Germany is not a simple story, and there have been affirmative moments. In the Eastern zone German workers staged their memorable uprising against despotism not long ago. In the West there are decent men like Berlin's Mayor Schreiber who have spoken out eloquently against the newest outrages, and the Bundestag itself has condemned the incidents.

But democracy in Germany remains on the defensive, losing rather than gaining ground. As this is written neither President Eisenhower nor any other Western leader has taken note of the latest demonstrations; Prime Minister Churchill is busy trying to explain why he contemplated arming captured Nazis in the closing days of World War II.

How much more must happen before free men recognize and challenge the ominous symptoms?

(Editorial, N. Y. Post)

The "Agonizing Reappraisal"

Last year Secretary Dulles warned our Western Allies that unless Germany was returned to a status of power and influence, the United States would undertake an "agonizing reappraisal" of its foreign policy. Offhand, it would seem that the recent Paris agreement restoring the sovereignty and military might of Germany, would obviate such "drastic" action. Yet, we had a hunch that the so-called reappraisal project is proceeding full steam ahead. This is not to say that we can expect a radical change in the direction and content of American policy in Europe. On the contrary, we have the feeling that the "new look" will turn out to be a more intensive preoccupation with the development of ways and means which would enable Germany to dominate Europe.

Unveiling the Blueprints

An important clue, indicating where this "reappraisal" is leading us, has been provided by an expert on Germany, Professor James K. Pollock of the University of Michigan. Prof. Pollock unveiled the blue prints in an address before the Residential Seminar On World Politics at Bryn Mawr (September 1954). In a sense it was most appropriate that Prof. Pollock should choose the Bryn Mawr Conference to expound the latest thinking on the German problem. After all, the Conference was attended by influential educators from all parts of the country and their favorable response to Prof. Pollock's propositions could help condition American public opinion.

Professor Pollock began his address with a moderate declaration that his proposals were made on his own responsibility "as a working scholar without the least official connection or benediction, and only with the hope that what I say will be helpful and at least stimulating." That Prof. Pollock should make this detour before going to the heart of his subject is in itself a cause for suspicion. In any event, the humbleness of his words need to be weighed in the light of the fact that during the formative years of the American occupation of Germany he was considered "the No. 2 political adviser in the American Military Government of Germany" (AP, March 31, 1946). Any history of the development of U.S. policy in Germany since the end of the war would be inadequate if it did not take into consideration the great influence exercised by Prof. Pollock in Military Government affairs. Indeed, despite Prof. Pollock's self-effacing gesture, his address must be regarded as one of the most significant pronouncements with respect to the future course of American policy in Germany.

Germany's Destiny

Professor Pollock's talk revolved around several main topics. In the first part of his address he bemoans the fact that for almost 10 years after the surrender of Germany "we are still fumbling and talking about the German problem . . ." In this connection he denounces "the mistakes of the past decade in trying to work with what we thought were our friends. . . ." Among our false friends the French are especially condemned by Prof. Pollock.

Throughout the rest of his address the anti-French attitude of Prof. Pollock is as obvious as is his pro-German bias. Since the French cannot be trusted, according to the Professor, it is necessary that all of our plans be based on the leadership of Germany in Europe. This is what Prof. Pollock means when he proposes that "we should strike out boldly and originally along completely new lines in the development of a sound and realistic policy toward Germany." Hitherto U.S. policy has been ineffective because, in the words of our expert on Germany, the U.S. has failed "to give sufficient weight to the potentialities and dynamic power of Germany, as we are now failing to utilize that other dynamic power in the Far East—Japan." The United States must now make good its dismal failures. Let no one dare to stay in the way, the Professor thunders, "the dead feet or hands or maybe soul of France can no longer control the direction of our policy toward Germany, nor should any other similar force in any other country be permitted to prevent the formulation of a new American policy toward Germany."

What Professor Pollock is suggesting is simply this: that the country which brought untold ruin and misery to a world in two wars, which desecrated every human value, which made Europe into a vast cemetery—that nation must now be placed on the pedestal of power. As for the rest of the world—who cares!

After sounding off on behalf of Germany the Professor turns to the business at hand. The first step in implementing the "new" policy must be the remilitarization of Germany together with the granting of full sovereignty. These steps are the least that can be taken at once in view of the fact that Western Germany is "the only pro-American government in Europe." As a follow-up the Professor demands that Germany be admitted to NATO as a full fledged member. If the French or any other country expresses opposition they will, in due time, be forced to recognize "the position and power of West Germany." (At this writing it appears that the above mentioned demands of Prof. Pollock will be carried out following the Paris agreements.) Once Germany is able to regain her power and influence "to which it is entitled," the United States must develop a vigorous support for a United Europe under German leadership." Here Prof. Pollock approaches the core of his plan.

Negotiations With Moscow

The concept of a United Europe under the domination of Germany is linked up with Prof. Pollock's idea regarding Russo-German relations. The Professor demands that the U.S. underwrite "realistic German proposals for negotiations" with the Kremlin. To make sure that this proposition is not misunderstood, Prof. Pollock emphasizes that in all such moves "the Germans should be given the initiative with the Russians" and the U.S. "should be content to advise and warn." Amplifying this concept, Prof. Pollock avers, "there is no sense in reconstituting a German force and initiative if we do not intend to use it in the direction of an improvement

in our relations with the Soviet Union." Therefore, the Germans must be given the go ahead signal to do business with the Russians and "the burden of planning and action should rest with them." (Professor Pollock would have us believe that the Germans are going to wait until we say, "go.")

Professor Pollock's views concerning Russo-German negotiations are not without precedent. As a matter of fact, important sections of the German press have been spouting this line for several years and many of Germany's leading politicians including Chancellor Adenauer have also dwelt on the coming of a Russo-German rapprochement. Thus, the second part of Professor Pollock's address boils down to a plea for a meeting of the minds between the Russians and the Germans.

The Pan-German Dream

A Russo-German understanding, as advocated by Prof. Pollock, would be a major prerequisite for the establishment of Germany's paramountcy over Europe. He estimates that "German power could conservatively be calculated to increase steadily over the next 25 years." Under these circumstances it will be necessary to encourage and develop Germany's talents and influence in "legitimate areas and activities." Ergo, "Central and Eastern Europe is a natural area in which German abilities may be utilized. . . ." Toward realizing this grandiose objective Prof. Pollock proposes that the Germans be given "the idea of a Central and Eastern European Treaty Organization similar to NATO. . . ." The construction of such a block of nations would "then provide a proper outlet for German energy and ability."

" . . . under the London Treaty, the Germans will become the arbiters of Europe's destiny. Once the Federal Republic is a sovereign State, it can veto any negotiations with the Russians and with the Americans, continue to organize the cadres for armed insurrection in the Eastern Zone. Alternatively, it can use its sovereign powers to come to an agreement with the Russians; and, in that case any agreements reached with the West are no longer binding.

"We are well aware that even to express such doubts about the London Conference will be regarded in certain quarters as akin to treason. The Western alliance, we are being told, has been saved by British statesmanship, and we should all be ready to pay the very high price required in order to achieve that end. We would not grudge any price if the result were the creation of conditions for peaceful co-existence in Europe. Indeed, if similar guarantees had been offered to France at any time before 1950, we should have welcomed the initiative. What is ironical is that they are now being offered not in order to counteract the German menace but as a means of persuading France to connive at its revival."

(The New Statesman and Nation, Great Britain, 10-9-54)

Professor Pollock does not advocate anything which is startlingly original. It is a matter of record that this program has been at the heart of the Pan-German idea of a Greater Reich. As early as 1810 Adam H. Müller in his "Ueber König Friedrich II" declared, "the great federation of European peoples which will come some day as sure as we live, will also bear German hues, for everything great, fundamental, and eternal in all European institutions is certainly German." Müller's theme "engaged nearly every German writer and thinker of prominence throughout the 19th century—Friedrich List, Wagner, Nietzsche, Treitschke, Ranke." One of the most articulate proponents of a Pan-German Europe in recent times was Friedrich Naumann who, incidentally, is considered to be the intimate collaborator and teacher of the President of the Bonn Republic Theodor Heuss. In his book "Middle Europe," published in 1916, Naumann called for the organization of a European power bloc dominated by Germany. This bloc, as envisaged by Naumann, would comprise the old Austria-Hungary, Turkey, the Balkans, and would stretch from the Baltic deep into Asia Minor. "The population," wrote Naumann, "of the German Empire and of Austria-Hungary together amounts to about 116 million. Then there is the German colonial population of perhaps 14 million. If we count in with these 25 million of Asiatic Turks and about 20 million of other Europeans, with perhaps 25 million of other non-Europeans, the population of the Middle-European economic world group would be roughly reckoned at about 200 million."

In this world group Naumann wanted to have included



DON'T REACH TOO HIGH

(Courtesy, N. Y. Journal American)

some countries of Western Europe. He stated: "We shall not say very much of the Northern (Scandinavian) powers, the Rumanians, Bulgarians, Serbians and Greeks, and also of Holland and Switzerland, for it would be a mistake to include these smaller states in our scheme from the outset as fixed quantities, whilst actually they still have a breathing space before making a decision."

The "breathing space" was the First World War, whose outcome at the time Naumann published his scheme was still undecided. Professor Pollock's rhapsodic visions of a German dominated Europe are merely a more up-to-date expression of the age-old Pan-German dream.

After outlining the central idea of his program, Prof. Pollock concluded that if Germany's Europe is properly organized and encouraged "it can become next to the United States a great constructive force for economic well-being and freedom and peace in the world." Of course, Prof. Pollock is not insensitive to the fact that the satellite countries in Eastern Europe might not relish the idea of jumping from the frying pan into the fire. However, he quickly dispels these fears by trying to assure his listeners that the Germans have learned "what bitter mistakes they have made . . ."

Presumably, by "mistakes" the Professor refers to such episodes as the wholesale slaughter of peoples and the ruthless devastation of an entire continent. Prof. Pollock appears to be confident that these "mistakes" will not be committed again and that the peoples of Europe are just about ready to grasp the blood stained hands of their tormentors. In any event, he insists that "only Germany" can "rescue" Central and Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. Ironically, Prof. Pollock claims that the foregoing recommendations will go a long way toward curbing the voracious appetite of German nationalism!

The Professor's Consistency

Professor Pollock's singular devotion to Deutschtum is not of recent vintage. Even before the end of World War II he expressed views which neatly fit in with his latest plan. Speaking at Carlton College in Minnesota on February 14, 1944, the Professor said, "Personally, I feel that we should be in no hurry to demobilize the German army. In fact, it would be much wiser to continue to utilize this well-organized force for civilian purposes . . . German armed forces are needed to assist in the rehabilitation of Europe . . ." He went on to express his conviction that "it would be folly to attempt a reshuffling of European industry solely in the interests of preventing the future possibility of German rearmament," adding that "such a move would be calculated to disrupt the whole European economy, not to mention the untold and unnecessary suffering it would inflict upon millions of Germans."

Elaborating on "Germany's importance" to Europe, he stated that "a very brief consideration of Germany's capacities and resources and the nature of her population and her position in Europe should be sufficient to reject any plan which looks towards the destruction of German industry." The Professor then stated that Germany was a first class industrial country possessing "a productive capacity which will be badly needed in the reconstruction of Europe." All this was said while our GIs were struggling against the Nazi Wehrmacht

whose murderous power had been nourished by Germany's "productive capacity."

Domination via Russo-German Deal

And what about Professor Pollock's expert views on the meaning of Hitlerism? In October 1930, Prof. Pollock delivered an address before the American Association of University Women at the University of Michigan. His talk was based on a recent trip to Germany. The Michigan Daily, the University newspaper, reported his speech in its issue of October 13, 1930: "Pollock concluded by pointing out that Hitler's party embraces a doctrine of sympathy for the proletariat as well as the nationalistic attitude for which it is famous; and that, if it came to power it would, in all probability, not resort to the strong-arm measures feared in some quarters."

Only ten years ago our country together with its allies were fighting desperately to turn back the Nazi tide which hoped to conquer Europe in its bid for world domination. The Nazi armies marched under the banner of a "United Europe," but they suffered ignominious defeat thanks to the courage and determination of freedom loving peoples. The plan outlined by Prof. Pollock would realize the Pan-German dream of a United Europe as an appendage to the German eagle, blessed and financed by the United States and achieved via a Russo-German understanding.

" . . . Germans who command respect here at home, such as former Chancellor Heinrich Brüning, are beginning to criticize the Adenauer government for its close link with the United States. They imply that the Federal Republic is today in a position to strike a bargain between East and West. After all, they say, America needs us and tells us so every day of the year. Why should Germany not begin to take an independent position determined by its own strength, its own needs and desires?"

"Even American High Commissioner James B. Conant, who has so earnestly adhered to the policy of everything for cooperation with Germany, is said to have been afflicted of late by doubts. One hears in Bonn of a dispatch he sent to the State Department two months ago which he began by saying, 'I may seem to have changed my mind, but . . .' He is reported to have expressed reservations about the reliability of Germany as a Western ally once the process of rearmament with military equipment supplied by America is completed. Conant, it is hardly necessary to add, admits to no such doubts. . . ."

(Marquis Childs, Washington Post and Times Herald, 7-6-54)

* * *

" . . . Most Americans don't know whether arming West Germany is wise. We are putting guns into the hands of a nation with a bent toward militarism—a country that caused two world wars, a country that today crackles with industrial vitality and that may again be tempted by rabid nationalism. . . ."

(The New Republic, 11-1-54)

Items of Interest

DEUTSCHLAND UEBER AFRICA

"An article published in L'Information says an organization known as the 'Fund in Support of German Interests in Africa' has been set up with five immediate aims:

"1. Financing operations of German corporations and individuals in the African trade.

"2. The organization of trips by the funds representatives to Africa and the recruitment of local representatives in Africa itself.

"3. The re-establishment of the 'Reichs-Kolonialschule' and other institutions which formerly interested themselves in Germany's colonial claims.

"4. Financial support of the 'German Overseas Service' (Deutscher Ueberseedienst) which was created by the federal German government in 1952.

"5. The financing of a pro-German propaganda program in Africa."

(Wm. H. Stoneman, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 8-17-54)

★

INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE!

"An attack on French Premier Pierre Mendes-France as a Jew was made today by Major H. Krueger, chairman of the neo-Nazi German Reich Party for the state of North Rhine-Westphalia.

"Addressing a meeting at nearby Duisberg on the question of a United States of Europe, Maj. Krueger told his brownshirted audience that 'we do not want to be ruled by the Jew Mendes-France.' The audience consisted of members of the 'Reich Youth' group, whose brown shirts are adorned with belts, straps and scarves like those of the Hitler Youth formations.

"The Bonn Government recently dropped efforts to ban the German Reich Party alleging there was insufficient evidence of the anti-democratic character of the party's members.

(J. T. A., 11-2-54)

★

THE NEW ARRIVALS

"German technicians are arriving here to take up longterm engineering and contracting jobs with the Saudi Arabian Government.

"The Germans now rank in numbers second only to the American oil colony members. The Germans began to come here earlier this year when two West German companies got the biggest Government engineering and contracting concession in the country.

"The German technicians include a number of men who have adopted the Moslem religion and changed their names. Europeans in touch with the group say that some of these technicians are former Nazi officers who were converted to Islam by Haj Amin al Hussein, the former Mufti of Jerusalem, on his visit to Germany during the war."

(Reuters Dispatch, 7-10-54)

★

UBIQUITOUS KRUPP

"The Krupp interests of Essen, former leading German armaments-makers, were learned to be extensively investigating the possibilities of participation in the expanding economy of Canada.

"This is one of the latest developments in the remarkable postwar rehabilitation of the Krupp concern, which is operating on an international scale that has placed it again among the world's leading industrial organizations. . . .

"Despite the Krupp family's extended difficulties with the Western Allies in the first years after World War II, their family wealth is still estimated at upwards of 90 million dollars. . . .

"This summer, a sign of further interest in Canada came with the disclosure that a Krupp geologist was examining the possibility of applying the Krupp-Renn process in the treatment of low-grade iron ore in the Ungava Bay region of the Labrador Peninsula in Northern Quebec.

"The geologist, Dr. Edwin Krzywicki, visited the western side of the bay to examine the huge iron ore claims of the Cyrus Eaton interests. . . .

"Alfred Krupp has been in the news in another connection this week, as a result of his visit a few days ago to Stockholm, where he was a guest of the Swedish industrialist, Axel Wenner-Gren. . . ."

(Gaston Coblenz, The Washington Post, 10-27-54)

★

HERE WE GO AGAIN

"The German Dornier Aircraft Manufacturing Company has side-stepped Allied curbs on aviation activities in Germany by setting up a subsidiary company in Spain and building its first post-war aircraft there. . . .

"The authoritative British aviation annual (Jane's All the World's Aircraft) recalled that after World War I the Dornier company established a branch at Lake Constance in Switzerland to avoid controls then existing over German aviation progress. In World War II Dornier supplied fleets of combat planes for the Luftwaffe. . . ."

(New York Times, 12-9-54)

★

HOW UNAPPRECIATIVE!

"Dr. Werner Naumann, former State Secretary in the Nazi Propaganda Ministry, will claim damages from the West German Supreme Court for the time he was held under arrest on suspicion of plotting a Nazi comeback.

"The court announced yesterday that it would drop charges of subversive activity against Dr. Naumann for lack of evidence. . . ."

(Reuters, 12-4-54)

★

JAPANESE "BOY SCOUTS"

"A growing band of blue-shirted, black-booted young Japanese aim at the resettlement of Japan's millions throughout Asia and the Pacific as the solution to Japan's pressing population problem.

"But do not think that we are aggressors," said Takashige Toyota, 27-year-old leader of the 'Martyr Youth Corps.'

"There are many areas in Asia and even America in need of development.

"The Japanese people can help the people in these areas to develop them. Our aim is the establishment of a series of co-prosperity spheres."

"Toyota's corps is one of the biggest and most active of more than 100 right-wing groups which the Japanese press has labeled 'more dangerous than the Communist Party.'

"Outlawed by the occupation authorities, right-wing organizations which flourished in prewar Japan, are coming into the open again. Thousands of young, aggressive nationalists are joining their ranks . . .

"Toyota said that the membership of the corps is 260,000. If these figures are accurate the blueshirts are twice as strong numerically as Japan's army . . ."

(From Reuters, 7-28-54)

MISSION TO TOKYO

"Heinrich Georg Stahmer, who came here as Adolf Hitler's secret envoy in 1940 to conclude the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis pact, has returned to seek a Japanese market for Swiss-made guided Missiles and shooting apparatus."

Stahmer became Nazi Germany's Ambassador to Japan in 1943. Taken into Allied custody after the Japanese surrender in 1945, he was held at Sugamo prison from Jan. 1, 1946, to Feb. 21, 1947, when he was released and placed under house arrest at Atami. Later he was repatriated.

(AP Dispatch, 7-16-54)

DEFEATING THE REDS—GERMAN STYLE

"The Red China trade issue, which has caused bitter American criticism of Great Britain, may also become a source of friction between the United States and West Germany . . .

"Until now, the fact that West Germany surpassed Britain last year in direct exports to Communist China (although not in shipments through Hong Kong) appears to have escaped general attention in the United States . . .

"German industrialists and business men, almost without exception, in the knowledge of this reporter, are caustic in their criticism of American-imposed obstacles to the China trade . . .

"The business lobby in West Germany has perfected its argument to the extent of claiming that the Germans want to help the world-wide fight against Communism by building up Peking's industry. The United States, it is said, is just hampering this laudable objective . . ."

(Gaston Coblentz, New York Herald Tribune, 7-18-54)

RETURNING TO OLD STAMPING GROUNDS

"West Germany today is turning Indonesia into its principal base of operations in Asia. From here, the Germans seem eager to mount the recapture of their prewar political and trade position in the Far East.

"Doctors in the interior of Borneo are almost invariably German, employed by the Indonesian Government. In the Celebes and Sumatra, German geologists and engineers have investigated the exploitation of manganese ores and coal deposits. In central Java, an Indo-German group has financed the opening of a German radio assembly plant. In the waters around Indonesia, German ships operate on charter for embryo Indonesian national shipping companies. . . .

"In the period before World War I, when Germany was among the colonial powers, the Germans held the eastern half of New Guinea, an area today under Australian trusteeship. Consequently they are not unfamiliar with the region."

(Arnold C. Brackman, Christian Science Monitor, 8-3-54)

"COMMUNIST CAPITALISTS"

"Germany's top labor leader hinted today that the Soviet Union might be buying into the coal and steel industries of the Ruhr. . . .

"We are told the buyers are Swedish," Herr Freitag said, 'but it is to be feared that quite different powers lurk behind them. Let us hope that they are really Swedes and not circles connected with the Soviet Union.' . . .

". . . no one hitherto has suggested that the Soviet Union might be using the conventional weapons of the finance capitalism it despises to acquire influence in the heartland of German heavy industry. . . .

(New York Times, 10-6-54)

GERMAN INGENUITY

"America's war time Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, who participated in the decision to drop the A-bomb on Hiroshima, warned in 1947 that 'with its (the A-bomb's) aid even a very powerful and unsuspecting nation might be conquered within a very few days by a much smaller one.' . . .

"And while no one expects either Israel or Sweden even armed with a 'super-super' to tackle the great power Goliath, there is less security about a country like Germany.

"If an ersatz H-bomb costing an insignificant sum is ever built, the Germans will do it," one UN observer declared fatalistically. . . ."

(Joseph Lash, N. Y. Post, 11-26-54)

ON ACCOUNT

"The Russians seem to mean business with their campaign for more trade with West Germany. Moscow has just opened an account (in sterling) with Dusseldorf's Rhein-Ruhr Bank."

(Business Week, 9-25-54)

PERON'S PALS

"Otto Skorzeny, who was one of Adolf Hitler's most spectacular commando officers, took part in recent talks at Buenos Aires between Argentine President Juan D. Peron and representatives of the Krupp interests of Essen . . .

"The ubiquitous Mr. Skorzeny's home for the last six years has been in Spain . . .

"The principal Krupp representative at the talks was Eckhard von Maltzahn, an envoy of the Essen office. The conversations are said to have covered a considerable range of possible business which Krupp might undertake in Argentina."

(Gaston Coblentz, N. Y. Herald Tribune, 11-19-54)

"SPAIN WAS RIGHT"

"Espana tenia razón"—Spain was right—is a slogan much in vogue at the moment. By 'Spain' is meant Franco, for, according to another much-stressed catchphrase, 'Spain is Franco and Franco is Spain.' And what people mean when they say that Spain was right is that Franco was right in overthrowing the Republic in 1936-39 and right in sending the Spanish Blue Division to the Russian front in 1941 to help the Germans. Conversely, the Allies were wrong, after defeating Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, to penalize Franco Spain by imposing an economic and political boycott on the country. . . .

"As if to prove the point, the Spanish Government on October 25 presented the Grand Cross of Aeronautical Merit to Professor Willy Messerschmitt, one of Hitler's top designers of combat planes and today a resident of Spain. The ceremony, fully reported in the Spanish press, was the occasion for sentimental references to Spanish-German collaboration during the Civil War and World War II. 'Your compatriots shed their blood in the Spain of Franco, and the [Blue Division] volunteers of the great general Muñoz Grandes shed theirs alongside the Germans,' Air Minister General Gonzales Gallarza told Messerschmitt as he made the presentation. It was the Messerschmitt fighters, he added, that bore the brunt of the air struggle 'during the difficult times experienced by the German people.'"

(Richard Mowrer in The New Leader, 11-22-54.)

THE \$64 QUESTION

"Herr Theodor Blank, Dr. Adenauer's 'Defence Minister,' this week posted the first of 140,000 application forms to Germans who have already volunteered for the new German army.

"He and his advisers have put down 36 questions which would-be recruits have to answer. This is three less than the number which millions of Germans had to answer when the Allies took over after the collapse of Hitler.

"But Herr Blank leaves out the big query that loomed on the form of those days. It was: 'Were you a Nazi Party member?' . . ."

(The Daily Star, 5-12-54)

FRANCO'S FAST ONES

"Though a year has gone by since the U.S.-Spanish deal for military bases was signed, Dictator Franco still lags on his end of the arrangements. In international relations, however, he has been trying some fast plays, at times with assists from that shadowy figure of world intrigue, former Nazi Otto Skorzeny.

"It became known in July that Franco, while anticipating military weapons and equipment from the U. S., was selling mortars, shells and machine guns to Egypt, to the tune of \$3,500,000. In Madrid, Skorzeny carries on unmolested, stirring up trouble for the European democracies whenever he can. Now it comes to light that it was he, acting through a dummy outfit in Switzerland, who arranged the deal to supply Egyptians with weapons described as 'ideal for hit-and-run attacks.' Skorzeny's chief fame dates from his daring exploit of September 12, 1943, when his airborne commandos snatched the captive Mussolini from Allied custody. . . ."

(Worldover Press, 11-1-54)

EYEING EGYPT

"The announcement of the eventual withdrawal of British troops from Egypt has again revived sentiments for closer German-Arab relations. As the Empire sun sets, perhaps the German economic sun may rise. . . .

"No responsible German, however, believes that economic measures alone are sufficient. Germany's road to the Middle East is to be paved by political issues. This means closer German-Arab cooperation in international matters.

"This opinion is also shared by Arab spokesmen. An official of the Arab League who broadcast a few days ago over German radio stations insisted that the businessman is not the best liaison between Germany and the Arabs. He demanded that Germany send more students to the Arab countries to acquaint themselves more intimately with the political issues of the Middle East. He added that the peace of the world rests on German-Arab cooperation. . . ."

(Martin G. Phillips, WPS, 8-6-54)

REUNION AT HEIDELBERG

"Fifteen thousand veterans of Germany's World War II Afrika Korps held a reunion today. They were told a new German Army must be based on the old military principle: 'bravery till death.'

"The advice came from former Gen. Ludwig Cruewell, who succeeded Marshal Erwin Rommel as commander of the corps in 1943 . . .

"It is hoped that German soldiers will eventually be able to write Europe next to Germany on their flags."

"Taking part in the reunion were Marshal Rommel's widow and former Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, sentenced to death for war crimes but later freed."

(Report to The New York Times, 9-13-54)

The New German Imperialism

by
T. H. TETENS

Almost two years ago, T. H. Tetens presented in his book "Germany Plots With The Kremlin" startling documentation to support his thesis that U.S. policy in Europe was "leading toward a blind alley" and that the Bonn Republic "was secretly maneuvering for a new Russo-German collaboration."

In the light of recent events Mr. Tetens's book has gained even greater significance. We have asked the author to give us his analysis of the present trend in Bonn's foreign policy.

Germany's struggle for the "integration" and final domination of Europe has not been interrupted or in any way diminished since the French National Assembly refused to ratify the treaty of the European Defense Community. This negative action reflected the deep rooted distrust of the French majority towards a supernational device which doubtlessly would have furthered Germany's time-honored aspirations to dominate the European continent.

Dr. Adenauer's Disappointment

The collapse of EDC had a deep psychological and political impact on German public opinion. It dashed the high hopes which Dr. Adenauer had raised with luring statements since he became Chancellor in 1949. He had repeatedly told the Germans that Western integration would mean the overcoming of the defeat of 1945, that his policies would revive the old European "Empire of Charlemagne," and that unification of Europe would result in a strong "Third Power Bloc" independent from East and West. No wonder that the French refusal to ratify EDC was a crushing blow to these dreams. German papers were full of recrimination and innuendoes. There was strong criticism among Dr. Adenauer's own following to the effect that his policies were not flexible enough and that he had put all his chips on Washington's support, and thereby had totally neglected European realities.

To the Chancellor himself, the French action came like a thunderbolt. When his dreams and schemes were shattered, he lost his posture. Unrestrained by the customary rules of conduct among friendly nations, the Chancellor gave free reign to his real feelings. His first angry outburst was, "Mendès-France must go!" (Frankfurter Allgemeine 9-23-54) In an interview to the London Times and

in other statements, he accused Mendès-France of having sabotaged the European idea. Adenauer's attack was the cue for smears against the French Premier who was accused of playing Moscow's game. There even appeared reports that Dr. Adenauer had placed his liaison men in French political circles with the assignment to mobilize influential French factions for an organized drive to oust Mendès-France. (Der Spiegel, 9-15-54; 10-15-54.)

The New Approach

The fit of anger was only of short duration. By the middle of September the Bonn policy shapers had decided on a new approach. Indications are that they adopted a plan of action which was hatched by the industrialists within the Adenauer coalition. It is obvious that the managers of Rhine and Ruhr and their geopolitical advisors who had worked quietly for years to advance the scheme for a greater "Lebensraum," were not inclined to admit defeat. While Anthony Eden toured the European capitals in order to find a political "Ersatz" for EDC, intense negotiations were carried on between French and German industrial leaders.

Suddenly, by the middle of September, Secretary Dulles was urgently called to Bonn. After lengthy conferences on September 16 and 17, Adenauer and Dulles agreed on a new strategy. The underlying idea was to make a fresh attempt for European integration with the emphasis on Franco-German economic collaboration. Chancellor Adenauer pointed to this new strategy in the Bundestag as follows: "A United Europe," he said, "is still the aim of our policy. If we cannot reach it directly, we have to take a detour."

The "detour" calls for furthering by all means the plans of the German industrial octopus, the tentacles of which

have already reached out all over Europe and into other parts of the world. As was done in the past with the Schuman Plan and Plevin's Defense Plan, it was decided that the new line should not come from Dr. Adenauer or Secretary Dulles. Thus, the gap between France and Germany was bridged by Mendès-France himself who announced a large scale program of economic collaboration with the long range view that common industrial projects in North Africa shall finally lead to European unification.

The African Enterprise

What caused the sudden switch in the attitude of Dr. Adenauer and Dulles who both had first deliberately snubbed the French Premier after the defeat of EDC? From a careful study of the German press the following picture appears: When leading statesmen were not on speaking terms and the diplomatic machine was stalled, the German industrialists carried on high level negotiations with their French counterparts. Dr. Fritz Berg, the influential President of the Association of German Manufacturers, as well as Dr. Pohle, director of the great Mannesmann concern, mobilized their friends in the "Conseil National du Patronat Français" who paved the way for an overall agreement based on a close Franco-German economic collaboration. A gigantic European industrial cartel is in the making, a trend that has been going on for the last few years. These negotiations center around several multi-billion dollar projects; among them is the development of new basic industries in Northern Africa, of hydroelectric power production in Africa as well as in the European Alps, and also a great armament pool.

Europe, Africa and the Arab world constitute a potential market of approximately 700 million people—four times greater than the United States and three as large as the Soviet Union. The neces-

sary capital for these great investments are to be raised partly in Europe and partly in the United States.

It was on the basis of these tremendous projects that the German industrialists insisted that Dr. Adenauer should make the necessary political "concessions" to Mendès-France on the Saar issue. Without these "concessions" no French Premier could hope to gain the necessary support from the National Assembly for the far reaching treaties paving the way for German sovereignty and rearmament.

The German scheme for the industrial exploitation of Africa is an old one. At the beginning of the century, the Mannesmann concern almost precipitated a world war when imperial Germany tried to put the French out of Morocco. During the Weimar Republic, German industrialists saw clearly the great possibilities in Africa and played with the idea of a Franco-German combine for the exploitation of the Dark Continent. When Hitler had conquered Europe, the plans for many of these projects were ready for implementation, but the Nazi industrialists had to wait until the Adenauer-Schuman-Monnet crew, supported by Secretary Dulles, had prepared the political stage for a Germanized Europe with Africa as Hinterland. Dr. Adenauer acclaimed the Schuman Plan as the beginning of "a long range economic venture in Africa" (Rheinischer Merkur, 5-20-50). The details of the Adenauer-Dulles scheme on Africa can be found in my book "Germany Plots With The Kremlin." There, on the basis of considerable documentation, I pointed out that "the Germans are today the most vigorous and energetic pushers of the great African exploitation projects."

For many years, Germany's newspapers and magazines have published glowing articles about the great possibilities in Africa. On June 25, 1952, the "Frankfurter Allgemeine" pointed out in a sensational editorial the gigantic projects waiting for Franco-German collaboration in Africa. The paper stated:

"What is shaping up is based on the idea of creating a third great trading area between the 'Lebensraum' of the Soviet Union and the United States. The colonial quarrels among individual states are a thing of the past. Today we must build continental blocs."

The man who is pushing this big proj-

ect is Dr. Adenauer's African specialist, the former Nazi Dr. Johannes Semmler, a member of the Bundestag and a delegate to the Consultive Assembly of the Council of Europe. Behind Adenauer and Dr. Semmler are the industrial and financial captains of Western Germany, such as Dr. Robert Pferdmenges, Hermann Abs, Dr. Fritz Berg and scores of others. These industrial lords are the architects of the so-called "Strasbourg Plan," of which the New York Times said:

"... The 'Strasbourg Plan' proposes to create a vast new trading area embracing the British Commonwealth, Western Europe and its overseas territories, and matching either the Soviet bloc or the U.S. in economic power . . .

"... Herr Semmler said the territory of the proposed economic development pool made up more than one-third of the inhabitable parts of the globe, covering a larger area than the Soviet bloc and Communist China together." (Nov. 26, 1952)

This is the 'Lebensraum' that Hitler's armies could not conquer, but which

could now be economically "integrated" by Adenauer, Dulles and Monnet, to benefit the tycoons of the Franco-German supernational cartel.

This great African venture is slated to be carried out not through "political unification" but via the detour of "economic integration." This far-reaching project and the German demand for the immediate granting of sovereignty were the main topics of the Dulles-Adenauer talks in Bonn in the middle of September.

Franco-German "Collaboration"

The Frankfurter Allgemeine (10-21-54) called the Mendès-France proposal for Franco-German economic collaboration "a sensation." The next day the same paper stated, "all this allows only one conclusion: the idea of a unified Europe is shared by Mendès-France." The Rheinischer Merkur, however, still mistrusts Mendès-France and puts its entire hope on the initiative of Jean Monnet, former chief of the Schuman Plan Authority. In its issue of 11-19-54, this



'Never mind, son, Daddy'll be getting his toys back any day now!'

Adenauer weekly praised Jean Monnet's program for a United States of Europe and underscored his demand for a "European Parliament," "a common European foreign policy" and "a thorough political and economic integration."

The Rheinischer Merkur, together with the neo-Nazi magazine, "Nation Europa," appear as the most vigorous advocates of this new Europe-Africa scheme. The editorials in both papers seem to be a repetition of those sinister articles which Dr. Goebbels once wrote in his paper, "Das Reich." The same phrases about the "Balkanization of Europe," the "New Order," Germany's "Right to have Europe," and the concept of a "Third Power Bloc" are frequently peddled by both the Rheinischer Merkur and "Nation Europa."

In its issue of September, 1954, "Nation Europa" propagates the idea of a "European Union . . . which must become so strong that it can independently exist between the giants—the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union." The same article recommends European partnership in Africa but demands specifically "the exclusion of America."

In the August issue of 1954, "Nation Europa" declares:

"Based on . . . (the wealth of) Africa and backed by the multiple Franco-German strength, we could doubtlessly force the U.S.S.R. to withdraw their troops from all non-Russian territory. Such a Europe would at the same time be able to convince the Americans that it might be wise for them to scurry on to their ships and get out."

Of course, the Americans are expected first to finance this attractive African project to the tune of many billions of dollars, just as they did during the Twenties, when they were fleeced by the same industrialists and the Stresemann "democratic" German Republic.

The new plan of Franco-German economic cooperation, officially proposed by Mendès-France, and loudly hailed by Adenauer and Dulles, is not a new beginning in Europe, but an old scheme skillfully revived by the Nazi industrialists and their collaborating pals from the Vichy days in France.

* * *

How will the new experiment in Franco-German collaboration work out? Will the "Ersatz" give more substantial protection to the West than the doubt-

ful EDC? Does Washington now feel more assured that German divisions will be forthcoming? To answer that question, we must know what is in the back of the mind of Adenauer and his old Ribbentrop diplomatic brain-trust.

The Chancellor's Mission

On July 23, 1954, Dr. Adenauer's paper, the Rheinischer Merkur stated editorially that "EDC is only a means to serve the great end of unification." In another editorial (Feb. 19, 1954) it was stressed, that through EDC the Bonn Republic will become "an international factor which will be attractive for the West, but will become far more interesting for the East." For those who remember the wealth of documentary evidence presented in my book, "Germany Plots with the Kremlin," it will be easy to grasp the real meaning of the above weasel-worded editorial.

One thing has to be made clear from the beginning. Despite the flowery speeches he has made, Chancellor Adenauer has never regarded it as his task to become the defender of the West, but to overcome Germany's defeat. In this he has truly worked miracles. He has lulled Americans into complacency on German nationalism and he has milked billions from the U.S. taxpayers. Today Germany is the most powerful nation on the European continent because Dr. Adenauer has changed the defeat into victory.

Soon after Roosevelt's death, American policy shapers, anticipating strained relations between the war-time Allies, embarked on a new course, first to fill the power vacuum in Europe and Asia, and later endeavoring to build situations of strength in order to "contain" and "roll back" the engulfing wave of Communism.

Very early Washington planners envisioned a resurrected Germany as the "arsenal of the West" and Hitler's idle Panzer and SS divisions as "the bulwark against Bolshevism." In the case of Japan, a similar diplomatic formula was applied. However, we are failing in both objectives. During the almost ten years since the collapse of the Axis, State Department and Pentagon officials have constantly lived, and live still today, in a fool's paradise.

German leaders and industrialists have expressed their reluctance to the present booming export industries toward a new armament economy. This is the reason why they have suggested setting up a

new armament industry located in North Africa, and financed with billions of dollars by the U.S.A. Thus, there will be no arsenal for the West in Germany proper.

"Rearmament"

As far as German divisions are concerned, we have to face the same resistance and doubtful performance.

American correspondents stated that political conditions in Western Germany have changed considerably in recent months. It has been reported that the German masses show a great apathy toward the new Paris Treaty. German youth is openly and militantly opposed to service in a new Wehrmacht. Dispatches from Germany reported that the future Minister of Defense, Herr Blank, was shouted down in mass meetings and was even personally attacked. Other reports in the German press tell us of the great manpower shortage in Germany which will make it difficult to conscript hundreds of thousands of young men. German youth appear to be satisfied with their civilian jobs. According to the German press, they are deeply suspicious of the ultimate objectives of a rearmed Germany. (Frankfurter Allgemeine, 11-10-54)

The "Deutsche Soldaten Zeitung," often used as the mouthpiece of the Blank Office, stated in a front page editorial (11-15-54) that it will probably take several years until German divisions can be set up and organized. The question is, where will the 200,000 men, officers, non-coms and administrators come from for the creation of the first cadres?

War criminal Kesselring and other Hitler generals have declared that the former SS blackboots are "indispensable" in the new Wehrmacht. Thus, the Blank Office has to accept members of the former Waffen SS, the Nazi killers, the efficient professionals of Hitler's Panzerwaffe of which the Pentagon planners had dreamed as early as 1947 and Sir Winston Churchill even in 1945.

The uneasy feeling regarding German rearmament was recently aired by the conservative London Economist (Oct. 26, 1954) with the reminder that the officers of the new German Army will be recruited from the ex-colonels of the Wehrmacht, by men who once served "a criminal lunatic." As a point of consolation, the Economist has this to say:

"The most reassuring thing about the future German army is that it is not wanted by the public. It is being pressed upon the Germans as a whole by the Atlantic powers, by Dr. Adenauer, and by the professional soldiers—in each case with a different motive."

We must put the emphasis on "different motive." It has been reported from Germany that the more cautious elements among the German officers have gone into civilian life and are not inclined to go back into uniform, for the time being.

However, the rabble-rousing SS officers are eager to start all over again. But is there anyone of sound mind to believe that these butchers and criminals are willing to die for the defense of the West? These unreconstructed plotters have a burning hatred for France, Britain and the United States. The Americans have even the "honor" of being portrayed in the most contemptuous manner by the German nationalistic press.

No wonder that the highly respected "Frankfurter Hefte" (October 1954) sounded the following alarm:

"German re-militarization amounts to a catastrophe . . . An armed Germany will increase the risk of war and provocation considerably . . . Western Germany rearmed will bring a revival of the evil militaristic tradition and will lead to full (Nazi) restoration."

For Moscow's propaganda the German remilitarization is a gift from heaven. Moscow is able to rally the East European satellite peoples firmly behind its leadership because the Nazi horror is still fresh in their minds. The French people is in deep fear that the German remilitarization will lead to another catastrophe, as it did in 1939. The New York Times correspondent Harold Callender reported from Paris (10-31-54):

"The French hold it to be an axiom that the Germans are dynamically unstable, always prone to break out of bounds and upset something, as for example the peace of the world."

"This is why the French want British and American troops on German soil forever if possible. This is why the French are not in any hurry to see Germany unified in spite of official Western professions in favor of it . . ."

The "Eastern Angle"

Contrary to the French, the Germans are eager to get the American troops out of Europe as soon as they are able to

make a bargain with the East. The documentary record shows that Dr. Adenauer "follows a tremendously bold plan: first armament, followed later on by talks with the Russians, in order to persuade them to remove their armies behind the Bug River." (Frankfurter Allgemeine, April 3, 1952.)

Let us remember that Germany's leading geo-politician and foreign political adviser of the Adenauer CDU, Dr. Klaus Mehnert, stated bluntly as early as 1951:

"It would be necessary that we first create a united, healthy and strong Western Europe in whose name the following offer to the Kremlin could then be made: Continental Europe would break away from the Atlantic Pact if the Soviets agree to withdraw their forces behind the Pripet-Marshes and release not only the Eastern zone of Germany, but the whole of Eastern Europe into the European Union." (Christ und Welt, 12-27-51)

The Germans want no part in the risky Dulles' policy of "liberation." Their immediate aim is to regain full sovereignty in order to be free for unhampered negotiations with Moscow. Leading German papers, such as the "Frankfurter Allgemeine," the "Deutsche Zeitung," "Deutsche Kommentare," as well as the influential monthlies, "Aus-senpolitik," and "Geopolitik" have suggested in recent months that Adenauer must keep "the wires to Moscow open" and be prepared for a vigorous pro-Eastern orientation. On September 29, 1954, the "Deutsche Zeitung" reminded Dr. Adenauer to conduct his Western policies always "with an eye towards the East." The "Frankfurter Allgemeine" (Sept. 21, 1954) suggested the mobilization of American support for an effective German "Ostpolitik" and stated:

"Reunification must remain the primary objective of German Ostpolitik. . . . Germany must no longer be prevented from what all other nations constantly do, namely, negotiate with the countries of the Eastern bloc."

The "Fortschritt," mouthpiece for the Ruhr industrial interests, asks in a front-page editorial (Oct. 14, 1954) for a "keen German alternative in the great game of world politics." America, says the paper, is losing its influence rapidly in the world, England and France are flirting with the Soviets, and Germany is in danger of becoming the loser. Thus, the "choice of the alternative should not be too difficult."

A leading pro-Adenauer diplomat, Hans Georg von Studnitz recommends in the "Aus-senpolitik" (Aug. 1954) a German foreign policy which seeks to gain the utmost from "all combinations" in a "constantly changing world situation." Taking advantage of U.S. foreign policy in Germany was the right thing in the past, but to achieve reunification, Herr von Studnitz suggests "going together with the Soviet Union against the United States."

In the "Geopolitik" (Oct. 1954) Werner von Hentig, until recently an active diplomat in the Bonn Foreign Office, asked "full political independence from West and East and the withdrawal of all occupation troops from Europe." Germany will even take "the risk of staying unarmed" and will wait for future developments to find solutions for the territorial questions of the Saar and the Oder-Neisse-Line.

"Nation Europa" (August 1954) gives the following advice:

"Germany must not sacrifice her biological substance in a 'holy war' against Moscow. Is there a salvation against this danger? Only if Germany frees herself from ties with the West, and adjusts herself in a new Rapallo policy. Our limited freedom of action, available under the occupation regime, must be exploited to the utmost in order to serve the interests of a national 'sacro-egoismo.' This without consideration of historic sentiments or ideological complexities."

During the last year, four former Chancellors of the Reich—Dr. Wirth, Dr. Bruening, Franz von Papen and Dr. Luther—have come out in favor of a more active pro-Eastern orientation. For several years the Bonn Government has kept secret contacts with top Russian diplomats. A few months ago it was reported in German papers and in the "Christian Science Monitor," (4-17-54) that Bonn representatives had secret meetings with high Russian officials in 1950 in Moscow and another one in August, 1952, in Copenhagen. From German press reports it is known that Dr. Adenauer, in the beginning of 1954, encouraged the rightist Bundestag member, Dr. Pfeiderer, to travel to Moscow and Peiping in order to negotiate secretly on mutual Russo-German problems. (Frankfurter Allgemeine, May 14, 15, 17, 1954)

The real issue for the Soviet Union is (Continued on page 49)

How the Germans Are Miswriting Their History

by

TERENCE PRITTE

Sir Lewis Namier picked on one of the most significant features of German thinking when he pointed out, in his book *The Nazi Era*, that Germans themselves persistently miswrite German history; and what is being served up to the German public today as genuine history are absurdly unreliable memoirs and biographies. Such, for example, have been the books of Von Papen, Schacht, Fritzsche, Weizsäcker, von Dirksen. All these books have been apologia for the authors, for Germany, in places even for the Nazi regime.

The German people is in a receptive mood for apologia of this kind, and these muddled memoirs may well take the place of real historical studies in their minds. Sir Lewis Namier gives numerous illustrations of their unreliability, and takes perhaps the classic example from the memoirs of Erich Kordt, a member of the pre-war German Foreign Service. Kordt printed the text of an imaginary letter sent by Mussolini to Hitler on August 25, 1939. He left this letter out of the second edition of his book presumably because he had discovered that it had never been written. But Hitler's former interpreter, Paul Schmidt, borrowed the letter from Kordt's first edition, and used it in his memoirs. "In short," Sir Lewis writes, "it has become a fixture in German historical literature."

The Germans, Sir Lewis thought, invent, dream, and remember collectively. This may be the reason for their approach to history, which is to sort out convenient facts in order to prove a favorable historical theory. One need only ask intelligent Germans today about the last forty years of their country's history in order to discover the effects of this method. They will tell you, as they told me, that the first world war was caused by the *Entente Cordiale*; that Versailles was a deliberate act of political vandalism; that the Western Powers later sabotaged Stresemann

and the Weimar Republic; that the British twice thwarted the German resistance by capitulating to Hitler, at Munich, and by formulating the doctrine of unconditional surrender; finally, that the British and Americans are responsible for the present ills of the world because they invited the Russians into Europe.

These are some of the fables which are almost universally believed . . . But all that the counter-arguments, about the German invasions of neutral countries and what happened there, will produce is the reaction of the German journalist who said to me with a bright smile: "Well, let's admit that we've all made much the same mistakes; if we admit that, then we can get on perfectly well together" . . . It may be that these strangely mixed feelings drive Germans to the recurrent rewriting of history in order to satisfy their consciences.

Here, for instance, are a few examples of how this rewriting is done in the columns of the daily press. In May of this year, the Refugee Press Service decided to explain away the eighteenth-century partitions of Poland. Prussia and Austria only took part, the writer maintains, because otherwise Russia would have taken more, or even the whole, of Poland. Poland, moreover, had shown herself incapable of resisting continuous Russian interference. This was the secondary reason for Prussian annexation of Polish territory; and the writer points out with vapid inconsequence that the difference between Poland then and Germany today is that the latter is a vital factor in the balance of world politics. Versailles, another Refugee Press Service contributor writes, created the Polish Corridor. The Polish Corridor was the cause of the second world war. Ergo, the Poles were responsible for its outbreak. It would be a waste of time to quote to such people the words written in 1922 by General Von Seeckt, creator of the post-1919 Wehrmacht. "Poland's existence," he

wrote in an official memorandum, "is intolerable, and incompatible with the needs of Germany. She must disappear." Von Seeckt would hardly have held different views had he lived in 1772.

"Not as Bad as All That"

Not long ago, one of the joint editors of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Erich Dombrowski, produced a leading article entitled: "It was not as bad as all that." This paper is well produced and generally reliable. These were some of its editor's views. Louis Napoleon was primarily responsible for the war of 1870 because he "launched a ruthless counter-offensive to the Hohenzollern candidature for the Spanish throne." The French were largely responsible for the first world war. Countries should therefore stop worrying about their own histories, which are bound to be prejudiced. "For what is history," Dombrowski asks rhetorically, "save a sequence of stories, a ripple on the tides of eternity?" This is not an unfair description of the German approach to their own history.

"Who ever assaulted France?" was the heading chosen by the *Cellische Zeitung*, which went on to quote Dr. Adenauer as saying that French policy in the Saar was dictated by the "idea" that France was attacked by Germany in 1940, and occupied for four years. The *Cellische Zeitung's* "explanation" was that the German Government did not expect the allies to enter the war after the invasion of Poland. The Polish campaign, anyway, lasted only eighteen days, and for the rest of that winter Germany "tried every possible means of preventing an extension of the war." "The French campaign," this paper goes on, began a full nine months later, and because "France declared war on us in the first place." The *Cellische Zeitung* makes no mention of invasions of neutral Scandinavia and the Low Countries, and concludes: "Any talk of an assault on France is unjustified."

Part of the job of these re-writers in the popular press is to destroy the idea that Prussia was ever militaristic. "We should all keep on Prussia's side," wrote Egmont Roth in the weekly *Deutsche Zukunft*. And went on: "In referring to Europe, the British invariably refer to the Continent, with their feeling of aloofness from the center of gravity of the old world. This aloofness is the germ of the British policy of the balance of power after the Treaty of Utrecht" . . . Britain is Roth's chief villain in European history, and his theory is supported by the Refugee Press Service, which points out that England waged ten wars between 1815 and 1914; Russia seven; France five. Prussia waged only three; and these lasted under a year in all.

The same writer goes on to demolish that "gross lie," as he calls it, that the Prussian and German General Staff was the source of Europe's woes. Clausewitz, he pointed out, laid down that military strategy should be subject to political requirements; and the allies flagrantly broke this principle, and "are therefore responsible for the present situation in Europe."

The writer does not mention Clausewitz' brilliant pupil, Schlieffen, who evolved the plan of the right hook round the unprotected French left flank. This hook had to be delivered through neutral Belgium, and its delivery brought England into the first world war. Schlieffen's plan, in fact, made German politics exactly dependent on military strategy.

The German press often shows a curious disregard for contemporary history. Richard Tuengel, writing in *Die Zeit*, condemns the Western Powers for refusing to employ ex-nazis of talent; for appointing ex-communists to de-nazification boards; and introducing strange Anglo-Saxon forms of democracy. The *Deutsche Zukunft* maintained that British junior officers manhandled Admiral Doenitz and his staff, and "shot hundreds of thousands of Germans into famine camps which contained as little humanity as the concentration camps." Suddenly, in an article about eastern Germany, the *Düsseldorfer Nachrichten* breaks into a tirade. "Have we not," it writes, "the example of the years 1945-48, when the victors weakened us by hunger in order

to re-educate us."

When the British authorities in Hanover gave permission for the re-burying of the bodies of German war criminals, executed at Hameln, in consecrated ground, the entire press in Lower Saxony launched an anti-British campaign. Writing of the ninety-one corpses, including those of Josef Kramer of Belsen, the *Hanoversche Allgemeine* stated: "Under the conditions then prevailing, this leaves open the question whether guilty and innocent were not struck down indiscriminately. Out of this gruesome execution, it was not possible to give the executed person even a worthy resting place." . . . In reality, the British gave full particulars whenever enquiries were made; and furnished a full list of the executed, all of whom had been given fair trial for their shocking crimes. The worst of the business is that millions of Germans were deliberately misled and may believe this tale ever afterwards.

It is natural that war crimes are a sore subject for the Germans; but it would be encouraging if at least a reasonable proportion of the German people realized

EDITORIAL versus REPORT FROM BONN

" . . . Parliamentary (German) leaders no longer need look to the generals to protect the State from a series of private armies, for since the Second World War no organizations like the Stahlhelm, the S.A. and S.S., the Reichsbanner, the Rotkämpfer have arisen. Nor have the German General Staff and the officer corps retained their continuity; nor do dreams of a glorious greater Reich appeal to Germans today quite as they did twenty years ago. . . ."


(Manchester Guardian Weekly, 10-14-54)

* * *

"When the former commander of the SS division "Hitlerjugend," SS major-general Kurt Meyer who had been sentenced as war criminal was released from the prison in Werl, thousands gave him a reception. Even the church choir and the fire brigade were present. A big firm in Hagen announced they had a job for him. . . ."

(Bulletin on German Questions, London, 10-1-54)

"UNDERNEATH THE LANTERN BY THE BARRACKGATE, DARLING, I REMEMBER THE WAY YOU USED TO WAIT..."



RETURN OF "LILLI MARLENE"

what their country had been responsible for during the Nazi era. It is lamentably true that few Germans are interested in the subject. The Mayor of Bergen-Belsen can assert that he knew nothing about the camp one mile and a half from his front door. A daily newspaper can write: "But the first gas chamber seen in Germany was brought to Dachau by the conquering Americans in order to fix blame on the Germans."

Persistence of Anti-Semitism

Anti-Semitism is a terrible thing to think about after what has happened in Germany. Yet it does still exist there, and takes all sorts of bizarre forms. On April 8 this year, the chairman of the Jewish community in Mainz was asked by the local Ministry of the Interior to inspect Jewish cemeteries in the neighborhood. In nine of them he found over sixty desecrated graves at a time when the Federal Government was outlawing genocide. Local authorities round Mainz were explaining they were not responsible for repairing graves which had been damaged by "larking schoolchildren." Gravestones which would have taken two grown men to shift had been systematically hammered to bits or thrown down thirty yards off. But not a single person has so far been successfully prosecuted for desecrating Jewish graves in Germany.

A few weeks ago poems were being circulated in the Ruhr by a schoolmaster called Strunk. One poem referred to the pre-war Jewish community in Germany as "the 500,000 hyenas who tried to ruin our Germany." They emptied all our shops, and so we kicked them out, the poem goes on: "300,000 went to their Fourth Reich in America and sold up New York in no time. That left 200,000. Half of them cleared out, and we haven't killed off the rest yet. But we're glad to say that Adolf liquidated a cool 6,000,000." The schoolmaster's ode ends: "I want to spit when I see the Jewish memorials go up." Strunk was fined the equivalent of £25, and will now no doubt be pardoned under the terms of the general amnesty.

Racial lunacy still lurks only just round the corner, "Jew, go back to Israel," a voice yelled at a recent Free Democratic Party meeting. "Our members of Parliament know how to waste cash," wrote one local newspaper, "as, for instance, the 3,500,000,000 mark present to Israel." Leading Free Democrats opposed

that same reparations agreement because it might adversely affect German-Egyptian trade. In Nuremberg, ex-Nazis formed an "Association for Racial Questions," and began to collect money for their anti-semitic campaign.

B'nai B'rith, the society which recently sent its team to Germany, writes: "The assurances which we have received in some quarters that anti-Semitism no longer exists in Germany are not borne out by the evident facts. Most Germans, it is true, are embarrassed by discussion of Nazi persecutions. They seek to avoid it and block it out of their minds. . . . Opinion-testing since the war has at no time revealed a real lessening of anti-Semitism in the group that lived through the Nazi period."

It is not surprising that Lord Russell of Liverpool's book, *The Scourge of the Swastika*, has stirred up especial resentment among Germans who just want to forget. The editor of one Düsseldorf newspaper declaimed against the book, which, typically, he has not even read, on the grounds that "at least 100 books about the concentration camps have already been written." Have they? In reality, just one major work, Eugen Kogon's *The S.S. State*, has been published in the German language about concentration camps.

The classic historical study of them, Reitlinger's *Final Solution*, is unlikely ever to be translated in German. Only one German newspaper had anything to say about the English edition of the book. The *Deutsche Rundschau* thought it should not be discussed in Germany because it might disturb the peace of mind of the German citizen. The *Deutsche Rundschau* was right: most Germans prefer to remain blissfully ignorant.

The absence of honest study of the recent past leaves a vacuum, and the German, tidy by instinct and preference, does not like vacuums. All too many foolish and dangerous myths are being evolved to plug the gaps in his convenient memory. There is the myth of the allied bombing of Dresden balancing out with all the evils perpetrated by the Nazis, and this simple silly equation is often set boldly down in print.

There is the myth of the Western Powers inviting the Russians into Europe. Does any German remember the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which gave Russia the Baltic States, half of Poland, the Buko-

wina, and Bessarabia; in fact, all the vital approaches into Europe? There is the story of the second "stab-in-the-back" by the men of the German resistance who undermined the German war effort in the same way as the sailors in Kiel harbor thirty-five years ago.

There is the special myth of the first "European army," in the shape of the *Waffen S.S.* This is what one soldiers' newspaper, the *Heimkehrer* has to say on the subject. "Thousands of Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, and Frenchmen entered the war as Europeans to battle alongside the *Wehrmacht* against Bolshevism. They did this as volunteers: they were not even National Socialists. Their crime was to ally themselves with an occupying power against Europe's common danger." "What right," the *Heimkehrer* continues, "have our conquerors to treat as criminals tens of thousands of the first Europeans to jettison their national resentments?" As it happened, I was able, early in 1941, to watch one group of Belgian officers being systematically schooled for enrollment in the *Waffen S.S.* The bribe offered them was to return home from their prisoner-of-war camp, and Russia had not even come into the war at that time. Those Belgian officers were ordered to sing Nazi songs, give the Nazi salute, and study Nazi literature. But if some day the true story of the *Waffen S.S.* is written, will many Germans trouble to read it?

Today a society for the victims of anti-Nazi persecution has been formed to claim compensation for "democratic misrule." An ex-general has just been rehabilitated who had a sixty-year-old captain of the Reserve shot during the last days of the war because he tried to stop an artillery unit from defending a hospital crammed with wounded. Ex-Marshal Kesselring personally commended the general.

These happenings are the stranger when one remembers that victims of Nazi terror are still trying in vain to get compensation, and that Kesselring, lately in jail as a war criminal, has become the head of the revived and uniformed *Stahlhelm*. Such grotesque events will multiply as long as Germans, with all their good qualities, still do not find out what happened in the immediate past. Nobody should want to teach them anything; but it is perhaps about time they started learning for themselves about themselves.

(Condensed, courtesy, *The Listener*)

The Pan-German Prince

When Hitler seized power in 1933, the number of German intellectuals who went into exile increased considerably. Many of them received the warm hospitality and protection of the United States. In the eyes of most Americans they were the symbols of "the other Germany." There is no doubt that some of these exiles truly represented the best in the German tradition. On the other hand, there were others who disguised their real character and intentions by outwardly professing a democratic creed.

The late Professor John Brown of Catholic University, Washington, D. C., analyzed the activities of these individuals in an article entitled, "Deutschum and America." He noted that they had the facility of speaking through both sides of their mouths. In one breath they would proclaim their anti-Nazism and in the next moment qualify it with typical Pan-German arguments.

Anti-Nazi Pan-German

Among those "anti-Nazi Pan-Germans" discussed by Prof. Brown, is Prince Hubertus zu Loewenstein, a self-advertised foe of Nazism (at present a member of the German Parliament). The Prince was a former German youth leader and anti-Nazi. He left Germany, so the story goes, because he could no longer stomach Hitlerism. Arriving in this country in 1935, he confidently predicted that Nazism and Hitlerism would not last more than two years. In spite of the Prince's "opposition" to the Nazis, we find that at the outbreak of World War II he protested the British blockade. Yet, even this episode did not detract from his popularity among some intellectual circles in the United States.

Indeed, the Prince was a most successful lecturer in the United States. Whenever he went he was greeted by large audiences who believed him to be a genuine anti-Nazi democrat. Naturally, he put on his best front before such groups describing in vivid terms the vast anti-Nazi underground allegedly operating in Hitler Germany. He was even able to get away with this hoax among more sophisticated and presumably better informed

persons in the academic world. The Prince was among a number of alleged anti-Nazi democrats who were welcomed in the lecture halls of American universities, where he was able to put across his "line" to students and professors.

Commenting on a letter written by the Prince to the *New York Times* on August 22, 1943, Prof. Brown declared that it is a significant "indication of how even the sincere Christian anti-Nazi cannot escape the strain of the Pan-German." Implicit in Prince Hubertus' letter is an attempt of the Prince to portray Nazism as some sort of freakish phenomenon and not as the logical outgrowth of the warlike and predatory traditions rooted deeply in the history of Germany.

"International Morality"

Professor Brown's characterization of Prince zu Loewenstein is supported by the writings of the Prince during his stay in the U.S.A. as an anti-Nazi exile. One of his most definitive articles on the German problem appeared in *The New Leader* of April 15, 1944. This date should be borne in mind because the Allies were still at war and hundreds of thousands of our troops were locked in bloody battle with the Nazi *Wehrmacht*. His article had a very imposing title, "International Morality Versus Expediency."

What are some of the important elements comprising the Prince's views with respect to international morality? Among these elements is a recommendation that the Allies allow the German armies to re-

main on the Eastern Front mobilized until the "independence" of the eastern countries "has been fully established—with functioning and democratically elected governments of their own. . . ." Thus, while the free world was fighting to destroy the Nazi threat to democracy, the Prince was advocating that Hitler's armies be relied upon to serve as the guardians of the democratic process.

With regard to reparations he proposed a solution which in effect would have made the Allies pay at least part of the damages inflicted entirely by Germany.


Another part of his morality was expressed in his attempt to equate the armies of the French revolution with Hitler's Nazi hordes. In this connection the Prince spoke of the "undying glory" of the Western world's youth "on whatever side they may now have to fight." No distinction is made between Hitler youth ravaging Europe like a plague of pests, and the young people in the Allied countries fighting to liberate the enslaved from Nazi tyranny.

In his crusade on behalf of "International Morality" the Prince avoids the question of punishing the criminals who brought the world to the brink of ruin.

Writing in a liberal paper like *The New Leader* and making a generous use of liberal phraseology, the Prince appeared to be speaking as a democrat. This is the way he operated during his sojourn in the United States. However, upon his return to his beloved Fatherland, the liberal banner began to fade and the martial

The German
Hall of Fame
is the
French
Chamber of
Horror.

Courtesy
Aufbau



colors of Deutschland Ueber Alles emerged in all their glory. Reporting on an article which he had signed for the German language weekly, Deutsche Wochenschrift, The Overseas News Agency concluded that the Prince had now "come out for a form of Pan-Germanism as extreme as the Nazis" (12-12-46). The following are among his choice statements:

"The restoration of a German Reich is the first and most urgent of all tasks confronting the people in Germany and all those of German descent everywhere who are concerned with the survival of the German language culture. On the basis of natural justice, the future Reich must include all the provinces which historically belong to Germany. This means the restoration of the 1914 borders. (The territory in question involves Alsace-Lorraine, the Belgian cities of Eupen and Malmedy, Northern Schleswig, ceded to Denmark, and that part of Western Poland which belonged to Germany until 1918).

"The future Reich should also include German Austria, together with the South Tyrol. The Sudeten Germans, who have been driven out by the Czechoslovakians, must be permitted to return to their homes in which they lived for a thousand years and to decide by plebiscite whether their territory is to form part of the Reich. In general, plebiscites should be held in all contested territories."

Propagandist Par Excellence

From 1946 onwards, Prince zu Loewenstein has frequently written in German language newspapers and for some Eng-

lish language publications. An examination of his writings shows that he has had two primary objectives, (a) to break the western alliance and (b) to prevent the implementation of those policies which the United States had originally devised for the postwar treatment of Germany. He alleged that the Germans were starving; that their treatment at the hands of the Allies was far worse than that experienced by the victims of Nazism; that the English and French were looting German resources and that the Americans too were profiting at the expense of the Germans!

It is difficult to determine the precise influence of the Prince's propaganda but if we note how American policy shifted radically during the years 1946-47, then it is safe to say that the Prince helped to contribute to this change. His propaganda may perhaps best be summed up in his attempt to write a history of Germany. The quality of this work was described by the New York Times reviewer as follows: "It is five hundred pages of historicism, mystification, scholarly pretension and propaganda, adding up—in so far as it is coherent and comprehensible—to a flatly controvertible fabrication. In common with a number of recent books of German apologetics, it is the work of a German political exile enjoying asylum in this country."

Besides his frequent blasts at the Allied occupation through the medium of the German language press in the United States, Prince zu Loewenstein has taken an active role in whipping up nationalistic feelings among the Germans. Thus, in 1950 he took upon himself to become the

spokesman and leader of a German protest movement against the British policy to demolish the German naval base in Helgoland. His melodramatic antics helped fan the flames of German nationalism. He cast himself in the role of a national hero dedicated to upholding the honor and integrity of the Fatherland against "perfidious Albion."

The Prince's hatred of the British and the USA is only exceeded by his fanatical diatribes against the French. The New York Herald Tribune (April 12, 1954) reported the Prince as calling for the isolation of France and for the establishment of a German-US alliance. He voiced the opinion that such an alliance "would finally bring the French Government to its senses." His nationalistic ravings against the French have been particularly virulent as regards the future of the Saar. He has denounced the U.S. for having accepted what he alleged to be a "pro-French" solution. In this connection he has tried to comfort the Germans by stating that prominent politicians including Senator McCarthy, were of the opinion that the U.S. was under no obligation to support its original pledges and policies. It is interesting to note that this boast, made in the spring of 1954, was part of an address delivered at the Rhein-Ruhr Club, a favorite haunt of the Ruhr barons.

Prince zu Loewenstein's anti-Communism should not confuse his position on relations with Russia. In the very same speech before the Ruhr industrialists he supported the efforts of the German politician Pfeleiderer to renew diplomatic relations with Moscow. He insisted that

"Before the resonant tones of diplomatic jubilation on West German rearmament subsided, an important sideshow scrap began.

"It concerns money; money for the Germans' contribution to Western defense and to their new army. Chancellor Adenauer's government is not inclined to be extravagant with its highly prized Deutsche marks and the Finance Minister, Dr. Schaffer, is a tough man with a mark. . . .

"He is thinking of his own home industries. They are thinking about themselves, too, and they can reach Schaffer's ear quite readily. At the moment they are pretty annoyed that arms control can lay bare all German industrial secrets to other competitors, namely British and American. . . ."

(Seymour Freidin, N. Y. Post, 10-19-54)

"... The Russians hold big assets for a deal with the Germans: unification, withdrawal of the army of occupation, rectification of the frontiers, resettlement of the expelled refugees, trade, and great political influence in the destiny of Europe. This is no imaginary affair. There is powerful evidence that the pull towards a Russian deal is gaining momentum not only in the opposition to Dr. Adenauer but within his own coalition. Is it possible to prevent such a deal by a treaty which is designed to tie West Germany's hands? . . ."

(Walter Lippmann, St. Louis Post Dispatch, 9-24-54)

the Berlin Treaty of 1926 with Russia must be the aim of German foreign policy. This treaty, incidentally, served as an effective counterweight to the professed western orientation of Germany following the Locarno Pact.

More recently the Prince, in his capacity as "Fuehrer" of the so-called German Action Movement, demanded the immediate rearmament of Germany without restriction or the holding of a Four Power conference. In any event, he advocated immediate reestablishment of German diplomatic relations with the Kremlin (Manchester Guardian 9-9-54).

It is interesting to note that in outlining the program of his German Action Movement, he speaks of "German states of special character" and writes: "Switzerland is a part of Germany, the connection of which with the Reich was severed in 1648. However, the German speaking Swiss people together with the Alsacians and the Germans in South-Baden form a unity in the sense of an Allemanic race. The Swiss culture is determined by this unity of race and through it, is spiritually connected with the Reich. Only the cultivation of this awareness makes the loss

of the external attachment bearable."

The voice of the Prince is not isolated. Indeed, he expresses the views of the most decisive element in Germany today. It may be summed up in his own words: "The restoration of a German Reich is the first and most urgent of all tasks confronting the people in Germany and all those of German descent everywhere who are concerned with the survival of the German language and culture." It should be obvious that this ambitious program knows no limits for it not only includes Europe but pertains to all other countries and areas abroad, yes, even the United States. It is Pan-Germanism pure and simple.

A Story That Has a Lesson

The story of Prince zu Loewenstein—his exile as an "anti-Nazi," the welcome he received in the United States, his posture as a liberal intellectual, his ability to dupe many well meaning Americans, his return to the Fatherland on the very first boat in order to unfurl the flag of "Deutschland Ueber Alles"—should help us to be more discriminating when it comes to judging real and alleged friends

and to increase our vigilance against those who take advantage of our generosity so as to distort the real issue.

It is noteworthy that the Prince is but one of many exiles who posed as liberals in the United States only to return to the Fatherland to resume their deadly game of attacking the Allies and paving the way for a resurgent Germany.

Indirectly related to the Loewenstein "saga" is the Exchange Program financed by the U.S. Government, under which German youth is given the opportunity to visit our country, enjoy its hospitality and learn about its institutions. We recall that after World War I, democratic countries such as Norway instituted physical rehabilitation programs for German children who stayed with Norwegian families. As youngsters they came as guests, but under Hitler they returned as conquerors specifically chosen for the subjugation of Norway because of their knowledge of the Norwegian language.

The case of Prince zu Loewenstein should remind us that those who are really bent on our destruction may exploit our hospitality to further their sinister objectives.

"From the news of the past few months I guess it is safe to venture that the German victory in the last war is now clear-cut, as was the Japanese, and that if we play our cards right the Germans and Japs soon will take us into the family of nations. . . ."

"The strutting that has been going on by the backslid Nazis over the last year or so is almost unbelievable—unless you've seen it. At home in West Germany and abroad, the Deutschland ueber Alles refrain is ringing again to the point where the toe of an old GI boot is apt to itch. . . ."

"I consider the Germans a goose-step nation, ever ready to follow the new messiah, and head right back to supermanhood again. They are overbearing conquerors and sniveling supplicants. When they're up they're arrogant and when they are down they whine.

"I know nothing of foreign diplomacy, but that ain't strange, since the records shows that the diplomats don't know much about it, either. But I can smell things, like an animal smells, and what I have seen of the German abroad in the past year doesn't smell good. It smells like 1933. . . ."

(Robert C. Ruark in N. Y. World-Telegram)



EUROPEAN DEFENSE PROBLEM

Inside Germany

REWARDS

"The Bavarian state radio and the newspaper Sued-deutsche Zeitung of Munich have disseminated charges that officials are systematically withholding payments to victims of Nazi persecution but rewarding former Nazi officials and their heirs with jobs and pensions. . . .

"The authors of the charges, Helmut Hammerschmidt and Michael Mansfeld said only 136,000 of 500,000 claims filed in the United States zone of Germany had been satisfied as of April 30 this year. . . .

"Aside from the material difficulties in settling the cases, the authors cited examples of officials who, for spurious reasons and frequently for reason of discrimination, refused to accept claims.

"One case cited was that of a 76-year-old widow of a man who was killed in the ghetto of Riga, Latvia. She could not get damages because she could not produce witnesses who had seen her husband murdered. The authors said the officials had taken this line despite documentary evidence that all 27,000 inmates of the Riga ghetto had been liquidated by the Nazis.

"As opposed to this treatment of the Nazi victims, the authors cited the following cases of readiness to reward former Nazi officials and their heirs: Rudolf Diels, first head of the Gestapo, received a pension. The wife of a war criminal held in the Landsberg prison also has received a pension."

(The New York Times, 11-21-54)

"LEGAL"

"The compulsory sterilizations and castrations ordered by the Nazi regime, often under 'eugenic' pretexts in the case of political opponents, were not illegal, according to a decision handed down by the Superior Court in the Westphalian city of Hamm.

(J. T. A., 11-8-54)

IN WHOM WE TRUST

"A former prodigy of the German general staff is America's No. 1 spy abroad.

"Without Reinhold Gehlen's name ever being mentioned in an appropriation's debate in Congress, he spends six million dollars a year from the United States Treasury.

"Thousands of agents of diverse nationalities are on his payroll, together with the elite of the old German army's counter-intelligence corps. . . .

"The Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon appear to trust this retired German lieutenant general more than they do any Allied statesman.

"On his secret reports, which evaluate the findings of his costly anti-Soviet espionage operations as far beyond the Iron Curtain as Siberia, depends much of American defense planning. . . ."

(Daniel de Luce, Washington Post, 9-19-54)

ANSCHLUSS!

"West Germany's highest court ruled today that 75,000 Austrians living in Germany are still German citizens under laws passed in the days of Adolph Hitler.

"The supreme court said this status will continue for Austrians living here until a peace treaty or an agreement between Austria and Germany settles the question finally."

(From a UP Dispatch, 10-30-54)

ONLY THE "GOOD" FEATURES

"Walther Langhammer, 35-year-old Hamburg vegetable store employee, is trying to form a political party which will revive the "good features" of Nazism.

"Political sources said today that Langhammer calls his organization the 'National People's Party' and claims a membership of 4353, some of it in Communist East Germany. Among its aims are a return to Germany's 1938 boundaries, and introduction of a German welfare state.

"In Argentina this week Adolf Galland, ex-general in the German air force denied reports that he had connections with Langhammer. The latter recently described Galland as his friend and a 'hero of Germany.'"

(Report to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 10-8-54)

DENAZIFICATION

"Two thousand former Nazi Party members have called on the West German and state governments to annul all de-Nazification court convictions and pay damages to Nazis interned after the war.

"The resolution, adopted overwhelmingly at the Aug. 22 meeting of the association of Former Internees, also demanded restoration of property which de-Nazification courts had confiscated and public pensions for dependents of Nazis who passed on in internment."

(Dispatch to The Christian Science Monitor, 7-23-54)

THE EUROPEAN "HONG KONG"

"The North German port of Hamburg is making progress toward recovering its pre-war business with Czechoslovakia and Hungary. This is encouraging some Hamburg businessmen to visualize the city as becoming a profitable European 'Hong Kong' in addition to its other, larger trade as West Germany's most powerful port. . . .

"Moreover, the notion is making headway in Hamburg that it may be possible to provide the smaller Red nations with major trading advantages—if they plan to do business on the world market on a more serious basis than heretofore."

(N. Y. Herald Tribune, 11-30-54)

MEMO TO TAXPAYERS

"The United States will be the main arsenal for the rearmament of West Germany.

"More than \$1,000,000,000 in American "heavy military equipment" (tanks, planes, field artillery, naval vessels) will be required for this purpose in the next two years."

(Robert S. Allen, Cleveland Plain Dealer, 10-22-54)

IN AND OUT

"Former Nazi Gen. Otto Ernst Remer, a leader of the first sizable neo-Nazi party in postwar Germany, surrendered to German authorities after an 18-month-long police hunt.

"Remer disappeared in March, 1953, shortly before he was to start serving a three-month prison sentence for defaming members of the anti-Nazi resistance. Prosecution officials said he reported at Oldenburg jail today to start his sentence, but was set free a few hours later."

(AP Dispatch, 9-29-54.)

HEUSS HAILS KRAUSS

"One of West Germany's highest decorations was today awarded to Werner Krauss, a German actor who is identified in the public mind with the most repulsive manifestations of Jew-baiting on the Nazi stage.

"Bonn President Prof. Theodor Heuss awarded the Federal Grand Cross to Krauss on the occasion of the actor's 70th birthday. The presentation was made today in Berlin by Sen. H. Tibertius, head of the City's cultural and education department."

(JTA, 6-24-54)

"CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT"

(Exhibit I)

"Nazi Field Marshal Erhard Milch, former inspector general of Adolf Hitler's Luftwaffe, has been released on parole from Landsberg war crimes prison.

"Milch, now 62 years old, was Hermann Goering's deputy. . . .

"Milch was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Nuernberg war crimes tribunal in 1946 for his part in exploiting slave labor. His sentence was reduced to 15 years in 1951."

(Exhibit II)

"Sgt. Robert D. Raynor, of Detroit, was ordered dishonorably discharged today and sentenced to serve ten years in prison for thefts and frauds committed while he was absent without leave in England."

TOASTING TO THE "GOOD OLD DAYS"

"Chancellor Konrad Adenauer last night toasted the health of Emperor Hirohito at a dinner given in the chancellery in honor of Japanese Premier Shigeru Yoshida, who is visiting European capitals.

"In his toast, Adenauer said Germany and Japan, wartime allies, had enjoyed happy relations for a century."

(From an AP Dispatch, 10-14-54)

THE "NEW" GENERATION

"Students duels have been resumed on a mass scale. Thousands are fought every year.

"This correspondent recently witnessed a dueling session. It was a deeply disturbing experience—a glimpse into the mood of the Middle Ages. . . .

"New generations of students are starting their careers with the facial scars that in former years became a symbol of German militarism. . . ."

(Walter Sullivan, 7-25-54, New York Times)

A BRITISH CARTOONIST LOOKS AT THE GERMAN QUESTION



"The new toy"

(Illingworth in The London Daily Mail)

REPORT ON GERMANY

"In May I began my lectures at the University of Munich. This once-famous institution has been partly gutted by allied bombs. It is being rapidly repaired; but the damage that Hitler wreaked upon education will exist for many years to come.

"Too few of my graduate students knew the work of Germany's great social scientists of the Weimar era. . . .

"Like other Americans, we met with a heartening welcome from the Muncheners. How could these people, we wondered, be the same who cheered the mad speeches of Hitler. How could they have tolerated the horrible Dachau concentration camp just a few miles outside of the city? If one looks for war criminals, he is apt to conclude that he is in the wrong country. . . .

". . . Two years ago, several German public opinion institutes reported these results of a new poll: Ten per cent express unqualified enthusiasm for Hitler; another 22% gave their qualified approval. On the other hand, 28% did condemn Hitler in unqualified terms, but another 40% softened their condemnation by qualifications. . . .

". . . The worst apathy, as a recent study of 3,000 German youth shows, exists among the new generation. . . . The 3,000 German youth studied showed that they feel a bitter sense of having been betrayed by their elders and by leaders who filled them with impossible values. Very dismaying is the fact that they refuse to assume collective responsibility for a fresh democratic organization. . . ."

(Harvey Wish, Cleveland Plain Dealer, 10-25-54)



THE PRICE OF IGNORANCE

"It is an old habit of American diplomacy to put all its eggs in one basket when dealing with foreign governments. . . .

"American officials appear completely absorbed in Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. They are, of course, obeying in this the signals from Washington. . . .

"To an increasing degree, also, the Bonn Americans are being isolated from the broad stream of German life and politics by their own vast new housing project, colloquially called 'The Golden Ghetto' . . .

"Finally, the American view has been restricted by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's war on the State Department and the Voice of America, in which Scott McLeod, the McCarthy friend who is security officer in the State Department, has enthusiastically participated. There has been a real purge here, and the failure of the High Commissioner, Dr. James B. Conant, to fight it more vigorously has cost him some of the prestige that was his as president of Harvard.

"The result is that there are many new people at occupation headquarters. Some of them—perhaps all—are experienced men. But, antiseptic though they may be and dear to McLeod, they have one fatal flaw. They don't seem to know anything about Germany.

"This is the price of McCarthyism. Unless we are very lucky, it will be a high price. . . ."

(Doris Fleeson, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 9-9-54)

BOOM—BOOM!

"West Germany's economic boom has hit a record high and shows signs of further expansion. Steel and automobile production and foreign trade are smashing all previous records. . . .

"Industrial production, which accounts for more than 50 per cent of the total output of the economy, stands at 185 per cent of the 1936 level, or about 10 per cent above a year ago. . . .

"Business leaders predict that the gross national product this year will be at least 6 to 7 per cent above 1953.

"Germany's massive steel industry expects 1954 production to reach 17,500,000 tons, compared with 15,419,000 last year. . . .

"German automobile production in October ran 33 per cent above October, 1953. In October 48,100 vehicles were turned out, to push total production for the first ten months of this year to 420,000. West Germany ended 1953 as the third biggest manufacturer of cars and trucks in Europe. The industry this year expects to better last year's output of 490,000. . . ."

(The New York Times, 11-8-54)



PROMOTION

"Schleswig-Holstein's newly-elected Christian Democratic premier, 41-year-old Kai-Uwe von Hassel, has reappointed Hans Adolf Asbach, an important official of the wartime Nazi terror and murder regime in the Ukraine, as Minister for Social Affairs, Labor and Expellees in his new Cabinet.

"Asbach started out to be a lawyer, but never progressed beyond the preparatory examination. Instead, he joined the Nazi Party and by 1934, he had turned into a full-time Nazi Party functionary as Regional Legal Supervisor and Social Policy Advisory of the German Labor Front in all of Pomerania. His Nazi record was so black that, after the war, the Bar Association at Eutin in Schleswig-Holstein refused to admit him to the practice of law. He qualified as a journeyman bricklayer, but soon abandoned it for a political career in the ranks of the Nazi-infested BHE Refugee Party. . . ."

(JTA, 10-19-54)



JUST WAIT!

"A Swiss correspondent said that he had been threatened by a cabinet minister for having reported a speech by the German minister advocating the recovery of territories lost to Czechoslovakia and Poland.

"The threat, made to Dr. Eduard Geilinger, correspondent of Die Neue Zuercher Zeitung, is being publicized by the West German newspapers as proof that the government cannot be trusted when it alleges it has no intention to control the press through the newly created coordinating committee.

"Dr. Geilinger said the minister who had threatened him was Dr. Hans Christoph Seebohm, Minister of Transport. Dr. Seebohm, a former member of the Nazi party, told Dr. Geilinger on the telephone 'we'd take care of you if we had our sovereignty.' . . ."

(The New York Times, 6-24-54)

FRANCO'S PROFITABLE ANTI-COMMUNISM

"Another aspect of Spain's international trade relations is a Moscow radio report of the existence of a trade agreement between Spain and the Soviet Union. . . . Following are extracts from the Spanish Economic News Service, published in Madrid:

"March 30, 1954: 'Last week Bonn mentioned a deal of Spanish wine for Polish coal.'

"April 27: 'El Economista affirms that a deal for 200,000 tons of coal for Renfe (Spanish State Railways) in exchange for 300,000 tons of iron ore is in full swing. Licenses are said to have been granted. . . . to ships are about to leave with Menera and Setolazar ore destined for Upper Silesia' (Poland). 'If samples are satisfactory other important shipments will follow. . . .'"

(Richard Mower, Christian Science Monitor, 7-10-54)



A NEW HIGH

"West Germany's economy, certain to set post-war records in both industrial production and foreign trade this year, has a valuable asset in merchant shipping.

"While the nation's merchant fleet recently passed the 20,000,000-ton mark, about 50 per cent of the pre-war figure, tanker tonnage has reached a new high. . . ."

(New York Times, 11-7-54)



The New German Imperialism (Continued from page 39)

not the twelve German divisions, but the establishment of American bases in Europe and Asia. Russia's efforts are aimed at forcing the American withdrawal from their present European and Asiatic footholds. In the light of this basic problem, Dr. Adenauer's diplomatic maneuvering over the past five years—playing the East against the West and vice-versa—has been rewarded with fabulous success. The German Chancellor believes that he is in the driver's seat and that he can extort more concessions from the U.S.A. as well as from the Soviet, as long as the present situation continues. This fact was emphasized and came clearly to light when the "London Daily Express" published the ill-famed memorandum of the Bonn official, Dr. Sonnenhohl, who recommended agitating continuation of the Cold War in order to exact greater concessions from East and West. The fact is that the Germans, at the present time, are fearful of war but like to go on fishing expeditions in troubled international waters.

"Blitzkrieg" Diplomacy

The German industrialists and Herr Adenauer know that they do not have available another \$300 billion dollars for a new super-modern Juggernaut to conquer "Lebensraum." So why should they arm in the first place? It is for this reason that they have concentrated all their ingenuity, trickery and double-talk into large scale diplomatic efforts in order to achieve the same results which in former times were harvested only by armed aggression.

If Dr. Adenauer can build an empire by diplomatic "finesse," by Western "economic integration," by playing East against West, and finally winding up with a super-bargain with Moscow—why should Germany resort to suicidal expenditures for a super rearmament? The "Old Fox" knows that it is much safer, profitable and effective to apply "Blitzkrieg diplomacy" than to get stuck in "blitzkrieg warfare."


There is no doubt that a sovereign Germany has to bargain with the Rus-

" . . . The common distrust of Germany which unites Frenchmen is aimed at the so-called ruling circles, the group that unseated the Weimar Republic and which Frenchmen regard as once again firmly seated in the Bonn and Ruhr command posts.

" . . . 'We are all for French-German reconciliation,' one high French government official told me. 'But you know as well as I do that the Bonn administration employs thousands of former Nazis and that Dr. Adenauer's foreign office is run by many of the same arrogant people who served under a Ribbentrop. Do you expect us to stage a French-Nazi reconciliation?' The official then added:

" 'This is a fundamental matter. You Americans are a moral people par excellence. You apply the highest standards of integrity in your own Civil Service. How can you blind yourselves to the real character of these men in Bonn? Do you really believe you will find security by letting these men fill Europe's streets with the clutter of German soldiers' boots again?' "

(G. W. Herald, Gazette and Daily, York, Pa., 9-22-54)



"There is danger West Germany may be re-armed without safeguards against revival of German militarism and aggression.

"This—rather than the much publicized fear that the French will prevent arming Germany against Soviet aggression—is what worries the American and British governments. . . ."

(Ludwell Denny, N. Y. World-Telegram and Sun, 7-2-54)

sians if it goes ahead with building its empire in Europe and Africa via the detour of Franco-German "economic co-operation." Germany, says the "Aussenpolitik" (June 1954) "must become attractive as a partner for the Russians" and that it has "to pay any price for reunification."

The whole German history demonstrates the striking fact that all dynamic German moves were made either with the tacit understanding of or in active collaboration with Russia against the West. Dr. Adenauer is continuing the time-honored tradition in German world politics. The only difference is that in former times the Germans had to raise and pay for huge armies in order to conquer their "Lebensraum." However, under Dr. Adenauer, they have developed a refined procedure for imperialistic aggrandizement. Today, the masters of Rhine and Ruhr are achieving their old Pan-German objectives through Dr. Adenauer's skillful diplomacy—so highly admired by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.




AFTER WORLD WAR II. AFTER WORLD WAR III —?

(Courtesy, St. Louis Post Dispatch)

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

JANUARY 1955

50¢





The crew chief directs the firing from his position behind the gun



In position and ready for firing orders from battery headquarters, Skysweeper gun crew moves fast when the word comes

SKYSWEEPER



Targets are checked on the position indicator scope of the radar setup



A corporal technician adjusts sensitive parts of the Skysweeper's radar set

Information received from operations center is converted and plotted by battery technicians and sent to the crew chief of the gun. These Signal Corps photographs, released in December 1954, were posed by the 531st AA Battalion



MADE BY MR. & MRS. AMERICA

As each C-119 and C-123 rolls off the assembly line at Fairchild and joins the free world's powerful defensive force, men and women across our nation can look with pride on their accomplishment.

Although these great aircraft have their final assembly at the Fairchild Aircraft Division in Hagerstown, Maryland, many of the vital components originate in towns and cities all over the United States. Sub-contractors and suppliers from Manchester, New Hampshire to Trentwood, Oregon . . . from Minneapolis, Minnesota to Phoenix, Arizona keep essential parts flowing to Hagerstown.

Fairchild is grateful to these co-workers for making possible volume production of the famous Flying Boxcar and its great new partner, the Avitruc.



Other Divisions:
 American Helicopter Division, Manhattan Beach, Calif.
 Engine Division, Farmingdale, N. Y.
 Guided Missiles Division, Wyandanch, N. Y.
 Kinetics Division, New York, N. Y.
 Speed Control Division, St. Augustine, Fla.
 Stratos Division, Bay Shore, N. Y.

Enlist to fly in the U. S. Air Force

ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY

U. S. ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION, 1892-1954
 U. S. INFANTRY ASSOCIATION, 1893-1950
 U. S. FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION, 1910-1950

PRESIDENT

Lt. Gen. George H. Decker, USA

VICE PRESIDENTS

Lt. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, USA

SECRETARY

Col. Arthur Symons, Arty-USAR

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Col. Robert F. Cocklin, Arty-NGUS

ASSISTANT TREASURERS

N. J. Anthony

Lt. Arthur S. Welch, CE-NGUS

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

ARMOR

Maj. Gen. Wm. H. Abendroth, NGUS

Maj. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, USA

Col. J. Paul Breden, USA

Capt. Sam W. Sacra, USAR

ARTILLERY

Lt. Gen. W. B. Palmer, USA

Maj. Gen. Wm. F. Marquat, USA

Maj. Gen. Bryan L. Milburn, USA

Maj. Gen. Harry McK. Roper, USA

Maj. Gen. Charles G. Sage, NGUS

Col. John Lemp, USAR

Col. Darwin D. Martin, USA

Col. John S. Mayer, USAR

Col. George V. Selwyn, NGUS

Lt. Col. Francis X. Bradley, USA

Lt. Col. John E. Connor, USA

Lt. Col. Otho A. Moomaw, USA

CORPS OF ENGINEERS

Maj. Gen. Kenner F. Hertford, USA

Capt. John H. Bolton, Jr., NGUS

INFANTRY

Maj. Gen. James C. Fry, USA

Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, USA

Col. Charles W. McCarthy, USA

Col. Alex J. Robinet, USAR

Col. Charles A. H. Thomson, USAR

Capt. Barney G. Schneckloth, USA

ORDNANCE CORPS

Maj. Gen. Earl S. Gruver, USA

SIGNAL CORPS

Maj. Gen. Victor A. Conrad, USA

TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Col. William B. Bunker, USA

"The Association of the U. S. Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security."

Association's Journal

ON page 60 of this issue you'll find a list of ten books which the staff of this magazine believe to be the most significant contributions to military literature during the past year. The list includes titles of varying degrees of literary value that individually and collectively have made a considerable contribution to military history and thinking.

We began these annual awards last year because we felt some public recognition was due the authors who labor in the field of military writing to the advantage, education and enjoyment of those of us who are interested in the military field.

Soldier

Lieutenant General Raymond S. McLain, USA-retired, was the second President of the Association of the U. S. Army, serving in 1951 and 1952. He was long an active advocate of a single association and magazine representing the Army and his many contributions to the Association were especially valuable because of his business experience.

A citizen-soldier most of his life, General McLain continued to work actively in the interests of national defense after his retirement, particularly as a member of the National Security Training Commission which was a natural assignment in view of his long advocacy of universal military training.

His death on 14 December 1954 was a heavy loss to the whole nation.

The reaction to the announcement of the awards last year was most encouraging and convinced us that we were establishing a useful custom. We were delighted to find our selections approved in more learned circles, too. One of our choices, Bruce Catton's *A Stillness at Appomattox*, went on to win the National Book Award and the Pulitzer Prize.

The ten selections this year represent not only long hours of careful reading but rather extensive periods of free and frank discussion among members of the staff and others who read widely in the field. In all, about twenty books were considered serious contenders this year. The final ten were reached by the democratic process of majority vote. As a result we have a list which doesn't completely satisfy any one individual judge—and it is undoubtedly a better list because of this. We all agree, however, that every soldier will benefit greatly by reading any or all of the titles selected—that's the only unanimous vote we could get.

THE PUBLISHER

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

January 1955

Vol. 5, No. 6

PUBLISHER

Col. Arthur Symons, Arty-USAR

EDITOR

John B. Spore

BUSINESS MANAGER

Col. Robert F. Cocklin, Arty-NGUS

Associate Editors

Brig. Gen. Charles S. Harris, USA-Ret.

Norman S. Poser

Contributing Editors

Brig. Gen. Donald Armstrong, USA-Ret.

Maj. Orville C. Shirey, Inf-USAR

Membership & Circulation

D. A. Mulloy

Assistants

N. J. Anthony

Esther E. Bennett

Doris Montgomery

Mary F. Grant

EDITORIAL POLICY

The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a professional military magazine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army.

The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL strives to—
 Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.

Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.

Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.

Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.

Advance the status of the soldier's profession.
 (Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

JANUARY 1955

ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY

Announcement of the merger of the AUSA and the Antiaircraft Association. Lt. Gen. G. H. Decker, Lt. Gen. L. L. Lemnitzer, and Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway	4
Winning Seal.	52
Ten Distinguished Military Books of 1954.	61

THE CURRENT SCENE

Geography Is On Our Side. Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips	11
Nike's Nest.	16
The Gun That Might Have Won.	24
Red Parallel: The Tactics of Ho and Mao. . . Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg	28
Command Post of the Department of the Army.	32
... trouble with cavalry is. Col. Shillelagh	34
... It Will Take a Whole New Generation. Brig. Gen. Theodore W. Parker	43

MEN AND METHODS

A Medal for Horatius. Col. W. C. Hall	18
The Changing Face of War. . . Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery	20
Ski School.	37
New Incentive to Re-up?	42
Short Course for Military Managers.	48

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Skysweeper.	Cover	2
They Ride to Work. Capt. Boyd T. Bashore	25	
Extending the Range. Capt. Josiah A. Wallace	40	
Bang! You're Dead. Maj. Thomas S. Arms, Jr.	49	

DEPARTMENTS

Association's Journal	2	The Month's Reading	46
The Month's Mail	8	Cerebrations	53
Editorial	19	The Word from the Schools ..	56
The Month's Films	36	The Month's Books	58

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is published monthly by the Association of the United States Army. Publication date: 25th of preceding month. Publication, Editorial and Executive Offices: 1529 Eighteenth Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Copyright, 1954, by Association of the United States Army. Entered as Second Class Matter at Washington, D. C., additional entry at Richmond, Va., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Articles appearing in THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Department of the Army, the officers and members of the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, or the editors.

RATES. One year \$5.00; two years \$9.00 when paid in advance; three years \$12.00 when paid in advance. Subscriptions for libraries, civilian groups or activities, and others not eligible for membership in the Association of the U. S. Army \$5.00 per year. Foreign subscriptions \$6.00 payable in advance. For other rates write Circulation Manager, 1529 18th Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

ADVERTISING information and rates available from the Business Manager or any of our advertising representatives, who are:
 New York office—19 West 44th St., Murray Hill 2-5254
 San Francisco office—Duncan A. Scott Co., Mills Bldg., Garfield 1-7950
 Los Angeles office—2978 Wiltshire Blvd., Dunkerque 8-4151

ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

My dear General Lemnitzer:

I am proud and happy to extend the warm hand of fellowship of the members of the Association of the U. S. Army to the members of the U. S. Antiaircraft Association.

The four and one-half years that have passed since the U. S. Infantry Association and the U. S. Field Artillery Association joined together to form the Association of the U. S. Army have demonstrated that the idea of one strong and common association of all the arms of the U. S. Army is practical as well as desirable. We have made a good start and now that the members of the U. S. Antiaircraft Association have joined us, we shall go on to become the stalwart champion and effective spokesman for the whole Army.

Sincerely yours,



G. H. DECKER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
President

Lieutenant General L. L. Lemnitzer, President
United States Antiaircraft Association

THE U. S. ANTI-AIRCRAFT ASSOCIATION

My dear General Decker:


Thank you for your kind letter of welcome to the members of the U. S. Antiaircraft Association.

For sixty-three years the U. S. Antiaircraft Association and its Coast Artillery predecessor served its members well. Now we are happy indeed to join in the common effort of the other arms to create a single, strong and effective Association.

The overwhelming vote of our members in favor of joining the Association of the U. S. Army is convincing proof of our firm belief in the ideals and program of the Association of the U. S. Army and gives evidence that we shall do all that is within our power to make the combined Association a powerful, effective and resourceful spokesman for the United States Army.

In behalf of the Executive Council of the United States Antiaircraft Association and our entire membership, I would like to express to you, your Council and your membership, our appreciation and gratification at having so harmoniously and successfully worked out all terms and details pertaining to the union of our Associations and respective Journals. I feel confident that this merger will promote a better understanding among the members of all elements, not only of our respective Associations, but of the entire Army as well, and that it will serve to give us much greater unity and strength.

Sincerely,



L. L. LEMNITZER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
President

Lieutenant General G. H. Decker, President
Association of the United States Army

UNITED STATES ARMY

THE CHIEF OF STAFF


Dear General Decker:

I am greatly encouraged to learn that the U. S. Antiaircraft Artillery Association has joined the Association of the United States Army. Both associations have my heartiest congratulations on their decision to take this step.

The Army's branches and components are bound together by the traditions and purposes of the Army as a whole. The Association of the United States Army can play a unique and important role in strengthening the ties among us and thereby contribute greatly to the performance of duty by every soldier and ultimately to the accomplishment of the Army's missions.

I should like to say to every member of the larger and stronger Association of the United States Army that you have my wholehearted support in our common endeavor to make the United States Army a single instrument of unsurpassed military effectiveness, that it may at all times be ready to shoulder any responsibilities which may be placed upon it.

Sincerely,



M. B. RIDGWAY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Lieutenant General G. H. Decker
President, Association of the United States Army

MESSAGE FOR MEMBERS

YOUR Association of the U.S. Army has reached another milestone on the road to becoming an institution representing the entire United States Army. This is the first issue of the JOURNAL to go to the former members of the United States Antiaircraft Association, who joined with us officially on the first day of 1955.

We used the words "joined with us" because they best describe the spirit of our enlarged Association. The members of the Executive Council of the Antiaircraft Association take their places as members of an enlarged Executive Council of the Association of the United States Army. Antiaircraft's President becomes a Vice President of the new Association. The *Antiaircraft Journal's* Editor becomes a member of the staff of THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. The *AA Journal's* subscribers become members of the Association of the United States Army.

Your staff looks forward to the additional support from our augmented membership, and to the new ideas and forward thinking that will come from the members of a branch that works with the latest concepts of electronics, missile propulsion and guidance, and other new scientific developments.

The former members of Antiaircraft will receive this magazine (a monthly, as opposed to the bi-monthly *Antiaircraft Journal*) for the period of their subscriptions. Thus they will receive twice as many issues for the remaining membership period. Those members who belong to both Associations will have their membership extended by the length of their unexpired AA memberships. And AA's life subscribers automatically become life members of the Association of the United States Army.


Your Publisher is particularly happy about this new development, since he was Associate Editor of the *Coast Artillery Journal* (the *Antiaircraft Journal's* predecessor) from October, 1940 to February, 1946. For him, it will be a case of welcoming old friends and associates. At the time the United States Field Artillery Association joined with the United States Infantry Association to form the Association of the United States Army, he felt that something important was missing from the new organization. That missing "something" is now very much present.

Your staff, both of the JOURNAL and of the Association, welcomes the new members of the Association and looks forward with delighted anticipation to the opportunity to serve the wider membership. We hope you will write us often, both with praise and criticism. The first improves our morale; the second keeps us on our toes. For members in remote corners of the globe, we will be happy to perform those little military services that can best be done by a friend in Washington. Our Joseph I. Greene Memorial Library is small but useful, particularly to the historically-minded; all members are welcome to use it.

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is our principal contact with the vast majority of our members. Your Publisher, your Editor, and the other members of the staff are never satisfied with the magazine; we continue to try new things and to improve the old. We are guided to an important extent by your wishes; if you don't tell us what you think we'll never know. We count on the former AA members to offer us some new and refreshing viewpoints—and some publishable articles.

In many fewer words—Welcome!

THE PUBLISHER



Landing an LVT-5, latest model amphibian tractor designed for Marine Corps use.

ON THE JOB... not "on the way"

The men responsible for navigating and maintaining this amphibian tractor play a vital role in the nation's defense, whether in actual combat or on maneuvers. A delay in transporting these skilled technicians from one assignment to another means a loss of countless valuable man-hours to the Marine Corps.

By routing key personnel the fast, depend-

able Scheduled Airlines way, the Marine Corps and other military branches not only save time, but also millions annually in pay and per diem dollars. So, next time you're moving one man or many—or traveling yourself—call a Scheduled Airlines representative. *Compare the costs, speed and dependability* of Scheduled flight with any other means of travel.

10% DISCOUNT for official travel on TR's.

Dependable, Scheduled Service Saves Millions of Valuable Man Hours for the Military



THE CERTIFICATED *Scheduled Airlines* OF THE U.S.A.

ALASKA AIRLINES
ALLEGHENY AIRLINES
AMERICAN AIRLINES
BONANZA AIR LINES
BRANIFF AIRWAYS
CAPITAL AIRLINES
CENTRAL AIRLINES
COLONIAL AIRLINES
CONTINENTAL AIR LINES

DELTA-C & S AIR LINES
EASTERN AIR LINES
FRONTIER AIRLINES
LAKE CENTRAL AIRLINES
MACKAY AIRLINES
MOHAWK AIRLINES
NATIONAL AIRLINES
NEW YORK AIRWAYS

NORTH CENTRAL AIRLINES
NORTHEAST AIRLINES
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES
OZARK AIR LINES
PACIFIC NORTHERN AIRLINES
PIEDMONT AIRLINES
PIONEER AIR LINES
RESORT AIRLINES

SOUTHERN AIRWAYS
SOUTHWEST AIRWAYS
TRANS-TEXAS AIRWAYS
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES
UNITED AIR LINES
WEST COAST AIRLINES
WESTERN AIR LINES
WIEN ALASKA AIRLINES

THE MONTH'S MAIL

"Faithful to Our Trust"

● The author of "Faithful to Our Trust" [December issue] should raise his chest and look proud. Many of us would have liked to have said this. . . .

Like the author I'm an infantry commander and will be one when a "brush fire" starts. I couldn't agree more with the author's comments. All of the malpractices may not have existed in every outfit in Korea but I'm certain they were there in some degree in some outfits under some commanders.

When the Army stops worrying about what the newspapers and "mamas" say and start building an army based on discipline we'll be on our way back to the pre-Doolittle days when an officer's word was sufficient, loyalty went both ways and a soldier was a soldier.

LT. COL. ROBERT W. GARRETT
Arlington, Va.

● I have read "Faithful to Our Trust" three times and I infer the author subscribes to the rewriting of our tactics books to conform to his Korean experiences. As a veteran of the indignities of two wars' annual physical examinations, I have this brief but proven bit of sagaciousness to offer: deviation from tested and proven tactical principles results in disaster. This applies to squad-sized and larger units alike. Terrain may well be the principal modifying factor in applied tactics but never an excuse for the abandonment of tactical doctrine.

MAJ. H. W. RICHARDSON, JR.
New Albany, Ind.

● The Editors have read the article more than three times and cannot read into it the meaning inferred by Maj. Richardson. On page 19 of the article the author asked: "What of the even less experienced officers who know of no tactics but Korean?" The whole tenor of the article suggests that deviation from sound principles often led to near disaster.

Light Weight Otter

● "Front and Center" [November] gives the capacity of the new DeHaviland Otter as 500 pounds. That is about 2,000 pounds less than its rated ton-and-a-quarter pay load.

Though we haven't received any Otters yet we look forward to getting them early in 1955.

LT. JOHN W. GRANICHER
30th Engr Grp
Fort Winfield Scott, Calif.

● Our faces are real red from embarrassment and mystification over how that figure

ever appeared as "500 pounds." Some natural enemy of the Otter must have been on the loose in the print shop.

Equal Recognition

● I read with interest the questions of Sergeant Bowles and the answers of General Weible [November 1954] regarding the award of additional service ribbons to our soldiers. The multitude of service ribbons that we now award have cheapened our decorations to the point where Bill Mauldin's garratroopers are even gaudier than our *bona fide* heroes.

Civilians, unfamiliar with the meaning of our various ribbons, are more impressed by the blue badge of the combat infantryman than by any assortment of important decorations. But what of the combat-tested veterans of the other arms? The Yalu-traveled artilleryman has the same collection of ribbons and stars as the Pusan clerk. I'd be the last one to take a thing away from a front-line infantryman—there's no job more rugged or deserving of recognition—but how about some recognition for the artillery FOs who were with him on Old Baldy or the combat engineers who went up on Baldy to dig out men trapped in bunkers when the Chinese took over?

Members of regimental tank companies were awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge for performing the same mission as divisional tank battalions who were ineligible. Infantry unit administrators won the Combat Infantryman Badge at battalion headquarters behind artillery batteries whose men were ineligible. At one time, in 7th Division Artillery, there was no promotion from second to first lieutenant unless an officer had sixty days "hill time" and at least one patrol. Some infantrymen win recognition for one day of action.

Surely the Army hasn't so many genuine combat veterans (men who've shot and been shot at and spent a few miserable weeks in a hole) that it can't afford them suitable recognition.

Let's quit giving so many ribbons to everyone and give something to those people who do the dirty work.

LT. ROBERT F. ENSSLIN, JR.
58 Hamilton Road
Chapel Hill, N. C.

Service Stripes

● After reading "Here's Why, Sergeant Bowles," [November] my buddies and I believe that the service stripe and overseas bars—the service stripe in particular—are a mark that definitely should not be removed from the uniform. To most of us who prefer to stay in service and who more

or less feel we are professional soldiers, service stripes are a mark of pride.

SFC AUSTIN R. KEETH
Co L, 5th Cav
APO 201, San Francisco

Tac Air in Navy Blue

● The ideas presented in Colonel Reinhardt's article, "Put Tac Air in Navy Blue" [September issue] have often been discussed among Navy aviators as well as infantrymen, both Marine and Army alike. However, this is the first time, to my knowledge, that these thoughts have appeared in a widely read publication. It is encouraging to see this done. Let's hope that the proposal to place all tactical air commitments in the hands of Navy and Marine Corps aviation receives the most careful consideration.

Although it seems to be a sound idea, I cannot believe that it will be as easy as Colonel Reinhardt seems to indicate. There are certain obstacles to be surmounted before our military establishment could possibly operate under such an improved system. Some of these are briefly discussed below.

First, we must be able to supply this new force with pilots and aircraft (a tremendous number compared with the present naval air arm). This would possibly suggest the transfer of Air Force men and equipment to the Navy. But here we must consider that there are differences between Navy and Marine Corps aviators and those of the Air Force Tactical Air Command, differences which would most certainly prohibit any switch, at least for some time. For one thing, the naval aviator (and his plane) must be able to operate from an aircraft carrier. This is the principle of naval aviation which gives it its mobility and flexibility and so must remain. Besides this, it is also noteworthy that one of the foremost missions of the Navy aviator has long been close air support of ground troops, which is untrue of his Air Force contemporary. Extensive indoctrination and training would be necessary.

It should be remembered that while the Navy and Marine Corps provided excellent support for the ground forces in Korea (particularly in the operations around the Pusan perimeter and near Chosin Reservoir, where they operated independently under their own control system), this system is designed primarily for support of amphibious operations. The Navy might well be reluctant to send its air arm inland on extensive overland campaigns out of reach of its seagoing forces.

The advantages of such a move seem

obvious to anyone who thoroughly understands the two concepts of close air support delivery. Tactical air would become a far more capable infantry weapon, being available to the unit commander (down to and including the battalion commander) when and where he needed it. The time lapse between request and delivery of a close air support mission would be reduced from days—or, in some cases, hours—to minutes; and that mission would be both flown and controlled by pilots primarily trained in ground support. The superiority of this method is indisputable.

Colonel Reinhardt is to be congratulated on a fine article which brings into the open one of the vital problems facing our military establishment today.

LT. THOMAS M. MARTIN
USMC
Wing Schools, 1st MAW, FMF
FPO, San Francisco

Letter from Britain

● I have always read your magazine for its fine articles and general contribution to military studies, but in the October 1954 number I find a passage most offensive and untrue.

I refer to the last paragraph of the letter by Mr. Frederic L. Wells on page 12. This paragraph can only mean that Britain has been stripped of her "prizes" because she has lost her manhood, since she is no longer hardy and self-denying. . . . I trust your readers have more intelligence than to accept his complacent and completely erroneous statements.

As editor you should, in my opinion, have excluded this letter. Great Britain lost tremendously in the 1914-18 war—ininitely more than the United States. Even during the last war, with the U. S. more than three times the size of Britain we lost more men dead than you did.

If we lost our manhood it is because they lie dead on battlefields for liberty all over the world. . . .

T. H. MCGUFFIE
40 Crosbie Road
Harborne, Birmingham 17, Eng.

● The Editors are aware of the immense contributions and great sacrifices of the British peoples to the cause of freedom everywhere, and we hold them in highest respect and deepest affection. The last thing THE JOURNAL would do, wittingly or unwittingly, is insult the peoples of such a gallant ally and close friend of the United States. We cannot believe Mr. Wells intended any insult to the British peoples. We sent him a copy of Mr. McGuffie's letter and he replied as follows:

● I regret that my remarks should have made such an impression on any patriotic Englishman. That Britain has suffered grievously "we know, indeed"; but the point was that these tragic events occurred largely because certain things were not done that incited men like Conan Doyle

or Rudyard Kipling (note such verses as "The Lesson," "The Islanders," "The Dykes," and "Lord Roberts") warned ought to be done.

I offered my two cents' worth that my own country might learn from Britain's experience; as it is surely to Britain's advantage that this country should so learn.

FREDERIC L. WELLS
Newton Highlands, Mass.

Anniversary Issue (Cont'd.)

● I have read and re-read Colonel Dupuy's article. It is simply magnificent, by far the best article of its type that I have ever been privileged to read. I do hope that it can be published in some large civilian magazine . . . where the civilian public will have a chance to read it.

LT. GEN. HOBART R. GAY
Hq. Fifth Army
Chicago, Ill.

● I have just finished reading Colonel Dupuy's "Pass in Review" and I am so moved that I must write you at once. It is the finest picture of Army life over the years . . . I have ever seen. [It] has great historical merit but it teaches a real lesson. . . . If all our new soldiers read this, I am sure they would be better soldiers and better Americans.

COL. GILBERT BALDWIN LAMB
Scarsdale, N. Y.

● I am a retired AUS Infantry officer [and] have been a subscriber to your magazine and *Infantry Journal* for way back perhaps as far as 1914. . . .

I want to tell you what a great kick I got out of "The Journal's First Half Century." Maybe I'm wrong, but I sense a certain tone of sadness, a certain wish that some of the old customs of the service, the old spirit that caused a man to be proud of "the Dirty Third," the "Dandy First," or "the Fighting Devils" . . .

I suppose you would call me an old fossil; but old or young, fossil or otherwise, I certainly do not approve of any lowering of the standards. Clothes may not make, but "the apparel oft proclaims" the man. An officer, I was taught, must always be on parade. How disappointing the dress of Army officers here in Philadelphia. . . . Please don't misunderstand me. Maybe it's not their fault. Maybe they must wear the clothes they do. When I was in the Army, an officer prided himself in being well dressed at all times and he usually was. . . .

And almost as bad, you see majors walking on the left-hand side of captains, a captain saying to a colonel, "Bill, that was a good game we saw last night," and a lot of other things that an old foggy like me just can't stomach.

There is no substitute for discipline. Military bearing breeds discipline; discipline begets unit spirit. When you have

(Continued on page 57)

100 MILITARY PATCHES WITH FREE PATCH ALBUM

All different, colorful, authentic For decoration, display, collection. \$5.00
3 completely different assortments available.
Wolf Appleton, Inc., 564 Broadway, N. Y. 12, N. Y.

WHERE ARE YOU?
That's what our Circulation Department is asking about those of you who haven't sent in a change of address. We suggest that you do it now. Address:
CIRCULATION MANAGER
1529 Eighteenth St., N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.



*the Fatigue Cap that never shows Fatigue!

And No Wonder! It keeps you looking sharp on the toughest duty! Stands any abuse. Collapse it, step on it, sit on it—it springs right back into shape—no extra stiffeners required!

- WON'T WRINKLE
- WON'T SAG

Wind resistant. water repellent
Can be dry cleaned.

INSIST ON THE NAME
*Spring-Up
ON THE RED AND GREEN LABEL
INSIDE YOUR CAP
IT IS YOUR GUARANTEE

Ask for it at your P. X.

If not available, order by mail. Send prepaid anywhere in the world.

ONLY \$2.00 postpaid

Be Sure—Specify your size

#8590 with inside ear flap
#8593 without flap


Write for Quantity Prices

*Patent applied for.

Louisville
CAP CORP.

303 S. 30TH STREET
LOUISVILLE 12, KENTUCKY

TO THE VICTOR...




MACKAY TROPHY
1951-1954

HARMON TROPHY
1951

GUNNERY TROPHY
1954

ALLISON TROPHY
1951-1953

BENDIX TROPHY
1949



1954
U.S.A.F.
OUTSTANDING UNIT CITATION


Republic's **THUNDERJET!** In peace as in war, the skill and training of American airmen have won for the F-84 the "title" of **The World's Most Honored Airplane.** Famed as the mighty U.S. Air Force workhorse of the Korean War . . . actively serving NATO and our other allies . . . Our sincere congratulations to the USAF officers and airmen who flew or serviced the missions which gained for them these and many other awards.

CEILING UNLIMITED for the young ambitious man . . . new vistas of education, travel and security . . . all these are available to career airmen in the U.S.A.F. Every day you're in brings you greater satisfaction in the knowledge that yours is a vital and rewarding service to your country . . . to yourself.

REPUBLIC AVIATION

FARMINGDALE, LONG ISLAND, N. Y.

Designers and Builders of the Incomparable THUNDER-CRAFT



IN AIR DEFENSE

Geography Is On Our Side


BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS R. PHILLIPS




BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS R. PHILLIPS, U.S.A.-retired, has been a contributor to the military press for many years. During the pre-World War II years he wrote a number of penetrating articles on the changing face of war in both the *Coast Artillery Journal* and *Infantry Journal*. Among these were "The New Face of War" (1938), and "Traditionalism and Military Defeat" (1941). He entered the Army in 1917 and retired in 1950. Since then he has been writing on military subjects for *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*—which means that the good burghers of St. Louis are the best informed people in the country on military matters.

THE United States has a built-in geographical advantage over the Soviet Union for defense against air attack as well as for aerial operations it might conduct against the Soviet heartland. The importance of this advantage will increase as the two opposing forces approach a stalemate in air-atomic weapons—atomic and hydrogen bombs and the means to deliver them.

When stalemate comes, the ability to foil the air-atomic offensive will be the great deterrent to an air-atomic blitz. When there is comparative equality in air-atomic power, defensive superiority will become decisive. If the would-be first attacker knows that his



THE U.S.S.R. LIES OPEN TO AIR ATTACK FROM ALL DIRECTIONS



attack will be heavily blunted by the other's defenses, while his own defenses are unable to do the same against retaliatory bombers, an effective defense becomes the real deterrent. In effect it adds up to an increase in offensive power.

Thus, as the Soviet air-atomic power increases to the point where it effectively stalemates our air-atomic combination, it will become more and more imperative for us to seize the advantage geography has bestowed on us and build an effective air and anti-aircraft defense.

THE superiority that geography gives the U.S. over central Eurasia offers us two great offensive advantages. First, our aircraft can enter the Soviet Union's Eurasian heartland at any point on its 14,000-mile perimeter. This perimeter is so vast that it is impossible to set up either a complete defensive screen or a warning screen at or near the rim. This requires the Soviets to defend from regions inside the country. Thus they lose the advantage of distant warning and successive

lines of defense. It has been reported that the Moscow region is surrounded by seventeen airdromes.

The second offensive advantage comes from the much shorter distances the United States Air Force has to fly from our peripheral bases to enter a central Eurasian territory. Moscow is only 1,100 miles from Turkey, 1,600 miles from England, and 2,700 miles from Thule. There is actually no target that is more than 3,000 miles distant from some one of our peripheral bases. All can be reached by our medium bombers and, with refueling, present bombers can return to their bases.

The picture with reference to a Soviet attack on the United States is just the opposite. With the exception of Uelen—across Bering Strait from Alaska—all Soviet bases are more than 3,000 miles from targets in the United States. It is doubtful that Uelen would be usable as a base since any operations there would be picked up instantly by Alaskan radar stations and the base could be taken out at once from Fairbanks, only 675 miles away.

In addition, geography forces the Eurasian power to make its flights over thousands of miles of territory controlled by the U.S. or its allies. The approaches are channelized over natural defensive and warning areas unless long dog-legs are flown, which would increase the already great distances.

Distance is an important factor in limiting offensive capacity, simply as a function of time. A 10,000-mile flight would require from twenty-four to forty-eight hours, depending upon the type of plane. Flights of half or less than half that distance, such as from our peripheral bases to Eurasia, could be made much more often. The distance factor has the practical effect of doubling the capacity of our air force or of halving that of a Eurasian air force.

The geographical advantage to the U.S. in air defense is equally pronounced. The direct routes from eastern Siberia, North Cape (Mys Schmidt), and Kamchatka pass over Alaska or the Aleutian Islands. As previously indicated, the eastern tip of Siberia is


not usable as a base. The direct line from Kamchatka is more than 3,500 miles, while a long dog-leg to the Pacific Northwest over the Pacific to avoid the Aleutian Islands is about 4,300 miles. A long dog-leg from North Cape to avoid Alaska and to come down through central Canada to Chicago is about 4,500 miles.

OTHER North Pole approaches are no more favorable. It is about 4,000 miles from Franz Josef Land to Chicago. And no one has suggested that the Soviets might have air bases on Franz Josef Land.

The shortest air route to the United States from the east is from Murmansk. The distances are about 4,000 miles to New York and 4,400 miles to Chicago.

The routes from Murmansk cross over Greenland, Baffin Island, Labrador and Canada, and then for several hundred miles over the United States. It should be possible, from radar stations on Greenland and on Baffin Island, Labrador, and Newfoundland, to obtain warning of enemy approach 2,000 miles out

FRIENDLY LAND AREAS FLANK THE U. S. AT STRATEGIC POINTS



of New York City. Substantial progress has been made in establishing these stations.

Routes from eastern Europe which would cross the Atlantic south of Greenland are longer. It is about 4,500 miles from Lithuania or Czechoslovakia to New York. The northern route would cross Sweden and Norway and give warning, while a more southerly one would cross Germany and Scotland. It is impossible to select a route in this area that will not cross territory of our European allies, no matter how far off the direct course the flight is made.

The chart on page 13 shows that the direct air routes to the United States from either the east or west cover a width of only about 1,000 miles on the east and about 800 miles on the west in the vicinity of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. This simplifies the American defensive problem enormously. It means that distant advanced warning can be provided against direct routes of attack from the east and west by covering a space of only 1,800 miles. This compares with the Soviet problem of covering 14,000 miles to gain warning.

To evade these distant warning installations a hostile power could fly a dog-leg course. This would, of course, greatly increase the distances. This is the justification for patrolling the Pacific between the Hawaiian Islands and the Aleutians, for patrolling off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts with airborne radar planes. It also is the justification for radar patrols between Greenland and Iceland, between Iceland and the Faroe Islands, and between the Faroes and the Shetlands.

For some reason the U.S. public has given more attention to filling the gap in the warning system from the North Pole down through Canada than in getting effective warning and defense over the direct routes. The North Pole routes to the United States are the longest of all and the most difficult to navigate because of the proximity of the route to the magnetic North Pole.

A more reasonable program would be to build interceptor bases to back up the distant warning systems we have now toward the northwest and northeast.

There is a widespread misconception that warning is simple, easy, and dependable. The opposite is true. Radar is perpetually giving ghost images that have to be investigated by interceptors. A distant warning line, with present radar equipment, across northern Canada would send so many ghost images that the entire air defense system would be in a state of constant alert. Such a system is no better than none.

It is not feasible to build interceptor bases in the far north of Canada. And they are terribly expensive. Thule air base, on Greenland, has cost us about \$300 million so far. It is open to navigation about two months a year and this has been extended to three months by the use of ice-breakers. In northern Canada the sea may be open for two weeks in one year and not at all in another. The problem of building an effective warning system there, with a minimum

of interceptors to back up the radar, is insuperable.

We can hope that new developments in radar may improve performance to the point where a warning line that is not backed by interceptors will have some value.

Some U.S. scientists, supported by energetic newspaper columnists, have insisted that the United States should construct the distant warning line at once. In the Department of Defense, where there was more awareness of the logistical difficulties and also a better understanding of the usefulness of such a line with present equipment, it was felt that the defense should be expanded northward from the border.

ALONG the Canada-U.S. border is the Pine Tree Line, reinforced to the north by Canadian regional defense installations around the principal populated areas. The farthest feasible advance to the north is one which could be supplied by road and rail. This is the so-called McGill fence which runs generally from southern Alaska, north of the Canadian National Railway and to Hudson's Bay north of Churchill.

Such a warning line can be supplied and can be backed up with enough interceptors to investigate radar images. At the present time it is the most important distant warning project, next to the systems covering the direct routes from the northeast and northwest.

The Soviet Union does not have an important capability to attack the United States from the air at the present time. The Soviet long-range air force consists of about 700 copies of the U.S. B-29 with a range of about 3,350 miles. A small number, from 10 to 20, of the Type 31 turbojet, similar in characteristics to the U.S. B-36, have been built. This plane is said to have a range of 6,500 miles and a top speed of 460 miles an hour.

At the last show in Moscow the TU-37 and TU-39 jet bombers were displayed in flight. These are a heavy and a medium bomber with performance estimated to be near that of the U.S. B-52 and B-47. These should be coming into numbers in from three to five years. When the Soviets do have a long-range air force equipped with these aircraft, then the air-defense problem of the United States will become deadly serious.

The range of the Soviet's B-29 type of bomber alone is enough to indicate the impracticability of attacking the United States with it. It obviously was designed to reach all of Europe and the United States peripheral bases.

Our own Air Force would not dream of sending a B-29 over Soviet territory, nor is there any reason to believe the Russians would send one over the United States. There has been a great deal of irrational talk of one-way flights to the United States. Public imagination pictures a lone Soviet bomber with its million- or five-million-dollar bomb reaching a billion-dollar target here at the sacrifice of not returning.

This approaches fantasy. A lone bomber would not

stand one chance in a hundred of reaching its target. When high Air Force officers talk about intercepting only 40 per cent or only 70 per cent (it varies from time to time) of the attacking bombers, they are talking about what they call a serious, well-organized attack, and not one lone bomber.

A TYPICAL bomber-attack plan would call for 15 aircraft to participate. One or two bombs might be carried. Part of the aircraft would be loaded with radar-deception equipment; others would go along to divert enemy interceptors from the bombers with lethal loads. The whole scheme of deception and diversion would be most carefully worked out. When an Air general says that 60 or 30 per cent of the attacking bombers would get through, he means the atomic carriers in this sort of attack.

It seems obvious that attacks against the United

Enormous problems of air defense loom on the horizon. In a few years the Soviet Union will possess a large fleet of high-speed intercontinental bombers. We must be ready for that day with improved radar detection and guided missiles. While the Communist fastnesses can be attacked from relatively nearby bases around the perimeter of Eurasia, the Soviets must fly long distances over unfriendly territory in order to attack the U. S. This favor that geography has given us, backed up by a sound defensive system, may provide the deterrent to total war.

States by the B-29 type of bomber constitute no great danger. There are too few of the Type 31 to be considered a serious threat, for the entire stock would have to be used in a single attack. We appear to have, therefore, from three to five years to perfect our defenses before the Soviet Union will have a bombing threat to match our own. And when that time comes, as indicated earlier, the United States has a built-in geographical advantage.

Air and antiaircraft defenses are wholly dependent upon radar, and radar is going backward compared with the advance of weapons. The radar guidance and command systems in ground-to-air, air-to-air and air-to-ground rockets and pilotless aircraft can be interfered with if the frequencies are determined and the airborne equipment provided.

An antiaircraft rocket which explodes by command radio could be exploded by the enemy radio if the

enemy bombers had the proper equipment. On the other hand, radar bomb sights can also be jammed and made ineffective. To top these complications, it is perfectly possible to make a rocket with guidance that will home on any radar transmitting equipment. Equipment can be made that will detect radar as quickly as the radar detects the equipment.

The struggle in the electronics laboratories to build a jam-proof radar and to devise equipment to recognize and jam radar is as critical and arduous as that devoted to designing faster and faster aircraft and better and better antiaircraft rockets.

This battle is being fought in secrecy in scientific laboratories and at military testing grounds. Its outcome will determine whether or not many miraculous accomplishments in the guidance of rockets and pilotless aircraft will ultimately be effective in war.


AS aircraft speeds continue to increase, the problem of interception becomes almost insoluble. Radar warning does not reach out far enough to give sufficient time for interception when combined speeds of the two planes reach 1,500 to 2,000 miles an hour—2,200 to about 3,000 feet a second, equal to the speed of a rifle bullet. To expect two planes to meet when the combined speeds reach such a figure would be the same as expecting the bullets fired by two duellers to hit each other.

Nevertheless the British are preparing to defend their island entirely by antiaircraft rockets. This is a more practicable solution for Great Britain than for the United States. The areas which must be defended there are not numerous and are relatively small.

When speeds do become so great that interceptor defense becomes impracticable, the United States will face an exceedingly difficult defense problem. Continuing improvement in range of rockets and in radar is of the utmost importance to meet the defense problem in the not distant future. And looking farther ahead, it may become necessary to find a way to intercept the ballistical missile.


At the present time, however, interceptor speeds have advanced faster than bomber speeds, and the use of air-to-air homing rockets has greatly increased the power of the interceptor to kill. On the other hand, the bomber cannot use the air-to-air rocket for defense. The bomber is attacked from the rear and must fire backward. The initial speed of the rocket is decreased by the forward speed of the bomber so that it drops and loses its course.

Some time in the not distant future our survival may depend upon solving defense problems which do not yet press upon us but which do loom on the dark horizon. If we can discern the problems today we should strive now for the solutions. The two most critical ones in air defense are improvement of guided missiles and radar. A few years hence, when the offensive power of the air-atomic combination is stalemated, an effective defense may become the great deterrent to war.



From its launching site at Lorton, Va., a Nike battery guards Washington, D. C.

A Nike platform under construction. The well holds the shaft that raises the missile into firing position




NIKE'S NEST

Here's how bases for the Army's supersonic guided missile are being built outside America's greatest cities

Nike is one of the chief elements of the fist that guards the nation from air attack. Launching platforms for this potent guided missile have been built near Washington, D. C., and are in the process of construction around other vital and heavily populated areas.

Nike's nest consists of two areas: the launching site itself and the control area. More than ninety-six tons of steel and a vastly greater amount of concrete go into the building of one of these "platforms" for a battery of four Nikes. A mile or so away from the launching site are the controls, where are located the three radar units that find the enemy aircraft and "lock" the missile to it, so that their paths will inevitably meet. Two officers and thirty-six men are regularly assigned to the launching area, and five officers and forty-four men to the control area.

Used in conjunction with air interceptors and conventional anti-aircraft artillery, Nike will present enemy bombers with an impenetrable screen of fire. It has a range of approximately 50 miles and can reach altitudes of 60,000 feet. Its speed is approximately 1,500 miles an hour. Once the ground radar units have found the path of the approaching bomber, automatic controls in the Nike take care of the rest and guide the missile without fail to its target.



The plan of a Nike nest. When the radar "finds" an enemy bomber, a tracer beam locks on it, and the paths of Nike and bomber have to cross (Courtesy "Steelways")

An Army technician inspects a Nike missile before it is raised to the launching platform



The more things change the more they are the same

A Medal for Horatius

COLONEL W. C. HALL



Rome

II Calends, April, CCCLX

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Senate Medal of Honor
To: Department of War, Republic of Rome

I. Recommend Gaius Horatius, Captain of Foot, O-MCMXIV, for the Senate Medal of Honor.

II. Captain Horatius has served XVI years, all honorably.

III. On the III day of March, during the attack on the city by Lars Porsena of Clusium and his Tuscan army of CXM men, Captain Horatius voluntarily, with Sergeant Spurius Lartius and Corporal Julius Herminius, held the entire Tuscan army at the far end of the bridge, until the structure could be destroyed, thereby saving the city.

IV. Captain Horatius did valiantly fight and kill one Major Picus of Clusium in individual combat.

V. The exemplary courage and the outstanding leadership of Captain Horatius are in the highest tradition of the Roman Army.

JULIUS LUCULLUS
Commander, II Foot Legion

Ist Ind. AG. IV Calends, April, CCCLX

To: G-III

For comment.

G. C.

IId Ind. G-III. IX Calends, May, CCCLX.

To: G-II.

I. For comment and forwarding.

II. Change paragraph III, line VI, from "saving the city" to "lessened the effectiveness of the enemy attack." The Roman Army was well dispersed tactically; the reserve had not been committed. The phrase as written might be construed to cast aspersions on our fine army.

III. Change paragraph V, line I, from "outstanding lead-

COLONEL W. C. HALL, Corps of Engineers, an occasional contributor, is presently stationed at Fort George G. Meade, Md.

(Continued on page 47)

EDITORIALS

Remarkable Objectivity

WE have been impressed in recent months by the firm objectivity displayed by those engaged in seeking the best possible tactical organization for the ground arms. If anyone is engaged in honing a pet axe—or in goring someone else's pet ox—we would be very much surprised. Everywhere we go we encounter a spirit of open inquiry, best typified perhaps by an informal memorandum written by a G3 Indian that came to our attention quite by accident and in a totally different connection. "No one yet knows," the memo said, "what the future organization will be and until we do, one cannot say we are discarding anything."

Queen of Battle

ANOTHER officer wrote to us in a letter: "The problems that face the infantry are tremendous but we'll solve them if we get support and understanding." He wrote that in a plea for this magazine to give every bit of support it could to the infantrymen who are at work on infantry's modern problems. We pledge all the support we can muster. We reaffirm our belief that the infantry is the arm that all the rest of the members of the Army team labor and fight to advance. Infantry will change—it has changed mightily in the lifetime of our senior officers—but it is still the arm of decision, still the Queen of Battle.

Army in Being

WE learned long ago that we don't have to smite our readers with a broadside to make them get a point, and so we are well content to simply label "The Gun That Might Have Won," on page 24, as "a lesson for today." But we cannot resist the temptation to observe that it is becoming more and more clear that a modern army has to be an army in being on the day the embassies burn their secret papers and not an M plus 30 or 60 or 180 day force. Viscount Montgomery makes this point, as you'll note when you read pages 20 to 23. Incidentally, Colonel George B. Sloan hit hard at this need for an army in being in an article in the June 1954 issue of this magazine. If you don't remember it, you would be rewarded by digging up a copy of that June issue to read what Colonel Sloan had to say about the "Design for an Atomic Army."

Monty and SHAPE

YOU'LL not be surprised to find that Viscount Montgomery's piece is pure Montyese: honest convictions asserted boldly and without rancor. He is undeniably a most remarkable man and an able soldier. He begins his

piece by saying he is an international soldier representing the NATO countries, but is speaking his own personal views. We read that with considerable interest because we have been aware for some time that the high command at SHAPE—General Gruenther, Field Marshal Montgomery, General Norstad and others—have been deeply involved in the task of applying atomic weapons to the defense of Western Europe. General Gruenther himself has said that he believes atomic weapons would be used if war broke out in western Europe. Qualified and reliable newsmen who have visited at SHAPE have reported on the healthy attitude of inquiry and willingness to investigate new ideas that exist there. For example, Dr. Vannevar Bush told a subcommittee of the House of Representatives that he had worked at SHAPE with Field Marshal Montgomery "in planning an important command post exercise [where] there were scientific teams, the subject being modern weapons." All this gives added interest to the "personal views" of this international soldier who represents 14 NATO countries.

Tac "Strike Forces"

HERE'S something that's really not so new but you can mull over it profitably nevertheless. The aviation industry press has reported that the Tactical Air Command wants to create something called "strike forces." This idea seems based partly on TAC's desire to share in "strategic" missions with nuclear or thermonuclear bombs and partly a way to carry the ball in small periphery wars. The latter concept would have a TAC "strike force" of atomic light bombers and fighter-bombers that could strike a target—after ground forces had maneuvered the enemy into profitable concentrations. A further refinement is for the air forces of the smaller allies to be confined to close support missions. For example, the air arms of Turkey and Korea would be armed with simple, hardy close-support aircraft such as the Mighty Midget made by Martin.

Good Shooting

YOU can be proud that the U. S. Army (with a mighty assist by U. S. science and industry) is the only military service in the world to have conceived, developed and produced workable, effective guided missiles and rockets for both surface-to-air and surface-to-surface operations. We can't say what the limitations of these weapons are, but we understand their full capabilities have not yet been field-tested.

And we note that General Gavin recently said that the Army will have rockets with longer range and carrying more explosive power than the Honest John.



Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery
DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED FORCES, EUROPE

THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR

Speaking before the Royal United Services Institution in London some months ago Viscount Montgomery discussed the changing face of war in the clearest and most forceful terms any postwar soldier has used. We publish here a condensed version of that talk because we think every soldier will find it stimulating and informative. We ought to add that the Field Marshal during his recent American visit made almost the same talk before a California audience.

I SPEAK as an international soldier who is the servant of the fourteen governments of NATO. What I have to say represents my own personal views.

As we advance further along the road of development of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, guided missiles, and ballistic rockets, it will become increasingly clear that a hot war will be mutual suicide for the contestants. Therefore, the great problem regarding the cold war now in progress is how to win it without precipitating a hot war.

Local wars, e.g., Korea, Indochina, Malaya, Kenya, will no doubt continue to form part of the cold war, but there is a vast difference between them and a hot war. Both are global, the cold war and the hot war.

In trying to win the cold war one side or the other may miscalculate and bring on a hot war, though neither side wanted it.

I consider that the present state of world affairs, and the present tension, will continue for a long period. Therefore, the true objective of all military thinking today must be how to combine most economically the military measures needed for success in the cold war, with the development of the military strength needed to convince our enemies that a world hot war would result in their own destruction: no matter how great the surprise they achieved at the outset, nor how ruthlessly they conducted the contest.

The cold war calls for the use of conventional weapons; success in the hot war calls for new weapons.

It is obvious that the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons will have a profound effect on the conduct of war, on weapon systems, on strategical and tactical conceptions, and therefore on the organization of forces.

In our reorganization, we may often find a clash occurring between conventional weapons which we know about, and new weapons which we do not know about. Whenever that clash occurs, the solution should be on the side of the long-term new weapons. New weapons must be "phased in"

gradually to our existing weapons systems so as to reduce, or eliminate progressively, equipment and weapons which will become out of date as the years pass.

I want to make it absolutely clear that we at SHAPE are basing all our operational planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our defense. With us it is no longer: "They may possibly be used."

It is very definitely: "They will be used, if we are attacked!"

The reason for this action is that we cannot match the strength that could be brought against us unless we use nuclear weapons; and our political chiefs have never shown any great enthusiasm in giving us the numbers to be able to do without using such weapons.

It all calls for a certain reorganization of our forces, and in our strategy. A special group at SHAPE has had these matters under very close examination for the past year and we have reached certain conclusions. We now need the cooperation of national authorities to get those conclusions translated into practical action.

In fact, we have reached the point of no return as regards the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons in a hot war.

If we visualize an atomic war, the importance of civil defenses is apparent. That subject is grossly neglected today. Indeed, there is no sound civil defense organization in the national territory of any NATO nation so far as I know.

Let us then consider the future.

If ever war should come again to this distracted world, which God forbid, weapons of power unprecedented in the annals of war are available for employment. There are some who say that if war is joined, nuclear weapons will not be used. I would disagree with that. My opinion is that the fear of atomic and thermonuclear weapons is a powerful deterrent to war; but once a world hot war has started both sides are likely to use them. We would certainly use them ourselves if we are attacked, as I have said.

So far as we can see today we are not justified in depending on air bombardment alone, even with nuclear weapons, to bring a world war to a successful conclusion; still less a local war or disturbance. Wars today can be won only by fighting, and, in a hot world war, fighting will continue in the air, at sea, and on land until one side loses the will to fight on. We would be wise to accept these facts and to prepare ourselves accordingly.

On the other hand, the skillful employment and accurate application of superior nuclear firepower in combination with the operations of streamlined land forces, can be a decisive factor in the land/air battle. The problem will be, how to force the enemy to concentrate his armed forces sufficiently to offer a worthwhile nuclear target, without exposing our own forces to destruction by the enemy's nuclear attack.

In our forward thinking we must put the emphasis on organization, on tactical conceptions, and on the weapons and equipment that are necessary to enable us to fight in the way we want.

All our future depends on getting the right answers to the problems we now have to face.

If a hot war is precipitated by miscalculation, which is always possible, there will not have been the build-up of Eastern land and air forces, nor the strategical deployment of submarines, which are generally taken for granted. In such a case, we, the Western nations, might be temporarily surprised.

But if we can react quickly, we would win such a war.

It would take a long time for the East to build up the forces necessary to do us serious harm, and by that time our air forces will have done a great deal of damage to the Eastern countries.

This type of hot war, the war by miscalculation, may come at any time. We must fight it with the weapons we have got, and in the way our forces are trained when it begins. We must, in fact, do the best we can with what we have got, and not be tied to plans designed to meet an entirely different situation.

I suggest that such a war will have three phases.

First Phase: a world-wide struggle for mastery in the air and of the oceans. It will be vital during this phase to prevent enemy land forces overrunning and neutralizing Western bases and territories.

Second Phase: the destruction of the remaining enemy land forces.

Third Phase: the bargaining phase, when the enemy's homeland and all it contains is at the mercy of the Western

airpower. We will then carry the air attack to the point where the enemy accepts our terms.

The second and third phases may be concurrent.

Against the background of this over-all strategy, let us consider the war under three headings: the war in the air; the war at sea; and the war on land.

IT is clear from the strategy I have outlined that the dominant factor in future war will be airpower. And that is my very firm belief. But like so many things we do, we too often pay only lip service to this great truth.

The greatest asset of airpower is its flexibility. The main factors in determining the degree of flexibility are the methods of command and control, the range of aircraft, and the mobility of supporting equipment.

Flexibility and centralized control of all the air forces in a theater of war, are vital to success.

But the West has sacrificed flexibility by basing the air command organization on the requirements of "direct support" of the land forces, whereas it should be based on the organization necessary to gain the greatest measure of control in the air.

Airpower is indivisible. If you split it up into compartments you merely pull it to pieces and destroy its greatest asset—its flexibility.

If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and lose it quickly. The methods we adopted in the later stages of World War II are not necessarily those we should adopt in the next war. In World War II we had almost complete air superiority from 1943 onwards; it will not be the same in World War III, and we cannot afford to sacrifice flexibility in our air command organization.

We must be careful that we do not draw false lessons for the future from the last two years of the late war; by which time we had won the war in the air.

The land-based air forces must always provide whatever offensive air support is needed in the war on land, using air forces that are highly trained in that particular work. But they must carry out this task without sacrificing their own flexibility. On occasions the whole of the available airpower may have to be used to help to save the armies from destruction, and the air organization must provide for such a contingency arising at short notice.

Now let us examine the war in the air.

If we can maintain the ability to start a tremendous nuclear bombardment of the East the moment we are attacked, they cannot afford to do nothing about it.

It must affect the employment of their air forces.

It must force them to devote a considerable effort of their long-range air forces and nuclear weapons to attempt to hit our strategical air forces and the installations on which they depend.

It must force them to expend effort on air defense, no easy problem for them.

AGAINST this background, I suggest there are three successive stages to consider in the war in the air.

In the first stage as I see it, both sides will rely principally on piloted aircraft in both the strategical and tactical fields. In this period also we stand to gain from the balance in favor of the offensive in the air if we can react immediately.

I see no sign, within this period, of either side being able to create an air defense system which could greatly affect the present balance in favor of the offensive in the air.

But we cannot afford to rely on air resources which depend on mobilization. The air forces we need, together with all

MONTY MAKES THESE POINTS:

- **Atomic and thermonuclear weapons will be used if we are attacked.**
- **The dominant factor in future war will be airpower.**
- **Air support must be provided land forces, using highly trained forces.**
- **To fight successfully on land we must have:**
 - First-class peacetime forces in being**
 - Well organized reserve forces**
 - Sound logistic and movement organization**
 - Sound civil defense organization**
- **Land Forces must emphasize strategical and tactical mobility and simplicity of weapons systems.**
- **Suitable aircraft must be developed for moving divisions rapidly by air.**
- **Armies need a simple line of supply based on an airlift.**
- **All services must develop livelier and more opportunistic battle leaders.**

the means necessary to keep them operational, must exist in peacetime. And we must restore to the air forces the flexibility they have largely lost, by centralizing Air Command on the highest possible level.

The second stage [is] the not too-far distant future, [when] the East may create a sufficient stock of atomic weapons, and may develop the long-range means of delivering them effectively enough for them to strike at the outbreak of war a devastating blow at our means of delivering offensive airpower.

We would not then be able to apply our greater stock of nuclear weapons, and we might therefore lose the initiative in the air war at the start.

At this stage, as far as I can see, both sides will still be relying principally on piloted aircraft.

Before this period arrives, it will be of tremendous importance that we should have developed, and have in being, a highly effective global early warning system, together with the best air defense that the scientists can give us.

The third stage: further ahead in my opinion than five years from now, the East may have developed means of delivering their weapons with accuracy, both short-range and long-range, which do not rely on piloted aircraft. Our ability to counter that threat by both offensive and defensive measures will be much reduced, because the targets will be far less vulnerable—whether they are launching sites, or the weapons themselves actually in the air.

We must ask ourselves seriously what, at that stage, are to be the targets of our offensive airpower.

Will it then be true that offensive operations by our aircraft or missiles will directly affect the enemy's ability to deliver his weapons against us?

I do not see the airplane disappearing altogether.

In the tactical field I am sure that there will always be tasks for piloted aircraft in support of land and naval forces. The enemy's aircraft used for these purposes, and their bases, will remain an important target for our aircraft and missiles.

What we must do now is to organize the command and control of our air forces so as to retain the greatest degree of flexibility, centralizing command in the highest commander who can effectively exercise that command; so that he can wield the available air forces in a theater of war as one mighty weapon.

IF we are attacked, we must set in motion an immediate air offensive on the largest possible scale, directed at the enemy's air forces and at his homeland. The means of delivering an immediate air offensive must exist in peace. We must develop an effective, and global, early warning system in order to have some chance of being able to take the offensive in the air should we be attacked. And we must study air defense urgently; I will say something on this subject later on.

It is vital that our air forces should be able to absorb nuclear attack, and survive to strike back. The principle of dispersion must be explored from every angle. We must get away from the enormous concrete runways of today.

Naval forces require air support in the same way as do land forces. It is vital, in the conditions of today, that navies called on to operate in the great oceans should have their own air forces.

The navies of those nations whose work lies entirely in narrow seas such as the Mediterranean, or in European waters, are in a different situation; in my view, such navies do not need their own air forces.

The question to be faced, and decided, is, "In the future will the seas be controlled from the sea or from the air?"

When one considers the range and power of aircraft of the

future, and the progress that is likely in radar and electronics, I am personally forced to the conclusion that the time will come when the major factor in the control of the seas will be airpower.

TO fight successfully on land we need the following four essentials, as a minimum:

First: We must have first-class, "active," peacetime forces, up to strength and ready at all times to act as our shield without any mobilization procedure. These forces must be trained and equipped to the highest pitch: mobile, hard-hitting, offensive troops of magnificent morale, very highly disciplined, under young and active commanders. These are the troops and the commanders who have got to stand firm in the face of the horrors and terrors of the opening clashes of an atomic war, and they will stand firm only if they are highly trained and highly disciplined. These are the M-Day forces.

Second: We need reserve forces, well organized, capable of being mobilized in echelons, and each echelon receiving sufficient training in peace to ensure it is fit to fight at the time it is needed. These are the post M-Day forces.

Third: Our forces, active and reserve, must be backed by a sound logistic and movement [transportation] organization, which should exist in peace to the degree necessary to ensure success in the opening weeks of war.

Fourth: We must have a sound civil defense organization in each national territory.

The whole philosophy underlying these needs in land forces is that the active forces "in being" in peace will make it impossible for the East to launch an attack successfully without a preparatory build-up of their forces, which we would know about; it would be difficult for the enemy to surprise us.

Our active forces will prevent the Eastern forces from reaching our vital areas, while we are assembling and moving forward our reserve forces.

It is clear to me, and I hope to you, that adequate air strength, multiplied by the ability to use nuclear weapons in quantity, increases our chances of successfully defending the West if we are attacked.

A further point is the great effect that the progress of science may have on the time factor in war. There is a stronger requirement now than ever before for M-Day forces to be ready, in place, and fully effective against a surprise attack.

Reserve forces must be organized with relation to the time when they must be available for use. This will affect the state of readiness in which they are maintained, and, to some extent, their organization and equipment.

IT seems to me that the early phases of a third World War will shape very rapidly the course of such a war. It would be wishful thinking to say at this time that a decision would be reached in a matter of weeks or of a few months. But I suggest to you that a policy of the fullest exploitation of nuclear weapons early in a war, raises serious questions as to the military worth in peace time of contributions to the war effort which will have a delayed effect.

Let us have a last look at the war in the air, at sea, and on land.

We have got to win the war in the air.

We will not win it unless the air forces are allowed to regain their flexibility and unity, and unless air command is organized accordingly. It is vital that this matter be tackled at once on the highest political level.

We must maintain in peace the ability to launch an immediate offensive against anyone who attacks us.

The West is vulnerable to nuclear attack. Great offensive

power is wasted unless it is married to defensive power and can be launched from a secure base. As time passes and the offensive capability between East and West levels out, the advantage will go to that side which can protect itself against attack, and can survive to strike back.

There is at the present time no sure defense against the airplane or ballistic rocket. Indeed, so far as we can see today, trying to get a secure defense against air attack is rather like trying to keep the tide back on the sea shore with a picket fence. This situation must not be allowed to continue.

The best scientific brains we possess should be gathered in to help in the task, working in close cooperation with air forces. I say "air forces" because I hold the view that air defense should be organized and handled by air forces, and that antiaircraft commands should be handed over to that service.

If the armies can hold the land flanks, they help to keep the threat to proportions that will prove manageable.

Today, the navies must handle this war. They must be given the minimum means to ensure control of the seas and of the approaches to essential ports, and no more. It is essential that they should not dissipate those means on tasks which do not affect the war at sea.

But we must not be hide-bound by past traditions. I give it as my opinion that the time will come when the seas will be controlled from the air.

OF all the fighting services the armies have the most difficult task as regards organization for the future.

We must make a serious study of the shape of future war on land. It is of little use to superimpose new weapons on World War II organizations, and then to try and work out the tactical changes involved; we have got to examine the problem against a new background.

We must examine our armies, and their equipment, to see what changes are needed in an atomic age. A complete re-organization is needed of the reserve armies of all the Western nations; the present systems for producing reserve armies are mostly out-of-date.

In the organization of land forces the emphasis must be on strategical and tactical mobility, and on simplicity of weapons systems.

We need divisions that can be moved rapidly by air; this will necessitate suitable aircraft for the purpose.

To gain full advantage of the immense firepower that nuclear weapons have provided, and to avoid destruction by enemy nuclear attack, armies must develop a more lively and opportunist type of battle leader than exists at present, in both junior and senior ranks. Such a leader must have the imagination, the daring, and the resources to seize fleeting local opportunities; he must be trained to act independently and immediately within the framework of a general plan, rather than on precise and detailed orders or only after reference to a superior.

Land forces must become less dependent on roads and more capable of cross-country movement.

The supply system of land armies must be streamlined. They must become much less dependent on fixed lines of supply such as roads and railways.

Armies need a simple line of supply based on an airlift. Today, when supply lines are cut by enemy action, armies cease to operate efficiently. The system of the future should provide air supply to forward maintenance areas from base depots many miles to the rear, and well dispersed. Divisions would draw their requirements from the forward maintenance areas with vehicles having a cross-country capacity.

The airlift from base depots to forward maintenance areas must be by some type of "vertical lift" aircraft, which can take off and land vertically, and which fly at a fast speed like an ordinary aircraft in level flight. The air supply must be capable of being maintained in all weathers, and by day and night. Obviously the distance for this forward air supply should be kept as short as possible; therefore base depots should be moved forward from time to time.

I see base depots being replenished by large freight-carrying aircraft which can land and take off from PSP [pierced-steel planking] airstrips.

THERE is clearly a tremendous future for "vertical lift" aircraft, and it must be exploited for the benefit of land forces.

Whether this supply organization should be owned and operated by armies or by air forces is a matter for immediate examination on the highest inter-service level.

Finance will affect the solution.

No nation could afford to give the one service the amount of airlift that service would need at any particular peak moment in war. In the Berlin Airlift, and in Korea, it was necessary to draw on the air transport resources of all the services.

If the airlift organization is to be an organic part of an army, it will cost more than if it was under the air forces; and the army will never have enough.

In war time great flexibility will be needed, and the ability to effect rapidly a large concentration of airlift within a theater of war will be necessary. Great skill will be needed if the lift is to be maintained in all weathers. Air cover and protection will be necessary. An airlift organization must be dovetailed into air operations.

A political decision will probably be necessary as to who will man, own, and operate the airlift for land forces. That decision should be given soon, and before an inter-service argument develops which could lead to ill-feeling. It is my opinion that this vast air organization for the land armies will be best handled by the air forces.

Such a supply organization would do away with the vast array of units and headquarters which today constitute the enormous "tail" of a modern army. It would be the first step in restoring to armies the "freedom of the countryside," and the tactical mobility that have so largely disappeared. By simplifying the tail we shall get more bite in the teeth.

The armies of today have to a large extent lost their mobility; they are becoming road-bound and are weighed down by a gigantic administrative set-up in and around them. Staffs are far too big; the amount of paper that is required to produce even quite small action is terrific. We seem to have lost the art of command, other than by paper. No ordinary man can read half the paper that is in circulation; I doubt if the other half is worth reading.

IN the scientific age into which we are moving, which is also an age of ever-increasing costs, governments have got to insure that their armed forces and security measures are built up within a framework of economic realities and against a background of sound inter-service responsibilities.

If what I say has validity, then the future will call for:

- Bigger air forces.
- Smaller and more immediately ready regular armies with great strategical and tactical mobility. Better organized and more efficient reserve armies.
- Smaller navies.
- The organization of the three fighting services based on more atomic and thermonuclear power, and less manpower.

The Gun That Might Have Won

THE Austro-Prussian War of 1866 was the first (and no doubt only) war in which the soldiers of one side were armed primarily with muzzle-loaders and those on the other with the comparatively new breech-loaders. Opinion is practically unanimous that this factor, as much as any other, brought victory to the Prussians.

In July 1866, when the armies converged at Königgrätz (or Sadowa), where the Elbe meets the Orlice in what is now Czechoslovakia, the Austrians fought with all their traditional bravery, and at times with greater skill than usual. The forces were fairly even—about 200,000 to a side.

But the fire power was on the Prussian side. Its troops had their breech-loaders, the famous needle guns. Only a few Austrian units were equipped with breech-loaders, mainly Frūwirth guns. The Austrian muzzle-loaders were good weapons in one respect: they were sighted to 1,000 yards as against 400 yards for the Prussian breech-loaders. But the Prussian soldier could load from the prone position; the Austrian could not. This gave the Prussians a rate of fire more than three times faster than that of the Austrians.

After-battle studies revealed a most significant fact. Austrian losses in their muzzle-loader units were greater than Prussian losses by about the same ratio as the Prussian rate of fire was greater. In the few Austrian units equipped with breech-loaders, losses were about equal to the enemy's.

WHY were the Austrians sent into battle with their outdated muzzle-loaders? Certainly not because the breech-loader was a brand-new invention. Eighteen years before, Prussia had completed its re-equipment program to become the first European power to have an army of breech-loaders. The Austrian muzzle-loader lingered on wholly for reasons of national economy. Members of the Austrian Diet, in their periodic attacks upon the already small military budgets, habitually rationalized their parsimony into bombast masquerading as military policy. "Austria's military policy must be

a defensive one," a member said. "If we are to choose between an Army of poor striking power and a ruined economy, let us be sure to choose the first." Another member exclaimed: "A sound military policy may replace unnecessary military strength." So spoke Austria's policy makers, at a time when not far away Prussia's armament program went steadily forward.

ARMY leaders had for several years been pressing for adoption of a more modern infantry weapon. Several types of breech-loaders had been developed in Austria, any of which might have served the purpose if funds had been granted for general production. Of these, the Frūwirth gun seems to have been the best or at least enjoyed the highest favor in military circles.

By 1862, at a time when the Prussian Army had long been fully equipped with their needle guns, Austrian Army leaders managed only to equip several companies with Frūwirths. Early in 1866, as the crisis mounted, Emperor Franz Josef ordered the issuance of Frūwirths to the dragoons, hussars, and four infantry battalions. Perhaps if time had allowed, Austria might have caught up with the



Bettmann Archive
Count Benedek, commander-in-chief of the Austrian forces in 1866, paid with his professional reputation for the blunders of others.

changing times. Too late it learned that wars do not wait for armies to get ready. While the brief campaign was actually being fought, the government appropriated 1,500,000 florins for 50,000 Frūwirth guns. But florins could not stop the needle guns.

In the peace arrangements Austria lost its Italian province of Venezia and was charged an indemnity of 30,000,000 florins to Prussia—a sum that would have kept the army in breech-loaders for many years. A fraction of that amount, spent in time, might possibly have given the Austrians victory instead of defeat.

ONE aftermath of Königgrätz was hardly a unique event. The age-old, and always unedifying, sport of scapegoat hunting was indulged to the full. The Austrian commander-in-chief, Count Benedek, was summoned to explain things to the Emperor. "The troops of Your Majesty fought valiantly," the general began, "but the Prussian needle gun . . ." Here ended one of the shortest royal audiences of record, when the Emperor turned his back on the distinguished national hero, veteran of eleven campaigns and three battle wounds.

Shortly thereafter Benedek and three of his chief lieutenants faced a court-martial whose procedure was deftly rigged to assure the foregone conclusion. Since the defendants had for years been publicly pleading for better weapons and warning of the fate that Austria had now suffered, the court thoughtfully ruled out all testimony antedating the war itself. Only the defendants' conduct of the campaign could be discussed. Some reference to the Prussian superiority in weapons crept in, of course, but the court did not encourage it. For reasons that have been debated at great length, the Emperor eventually ordered the trial stopped. The results of this action were largely academic; the military careers of the principals could hardly have suffered more by an official verdict.

If there is in this tale some kind of parable for our own times, it should not be hard to detect it.

They Ride To Work

Armored infantry moves fast on personnel carriers and fights hard—from the ground. Its tactical concept and attitude are more closely related to armor than conventional infantry

CAPTAIN BOYD T. BASHORE

A dedicated infantry lieutenant of my acquaintance was assigned to an armored division a few years ago. To put it mildly, he regarded the assignment with misgivings. It seemed to him that his professional throat was about to be cut. Why, he knew armor officers who had never been assigned to an armored division! What would they do to an eager young infantry lieutenant? His only previous knowledge of armor was eight hours' training in armored infantry techniques at The Infantry School.

As it turned out, the lieutenant learned more about fire power, mobility, and shock action than he had learned in all his previous training.

When the lieutenant got his orders he decided he had better study the organization of the armored division. He discovered that it contains plenty of infantry! Of the fifteen combat battalions, four are armored infantry, four are tank, five are artillery, one is combat engineer, and one is reconnaissance.

As time went on our lieutenant learned a lot more about armor.

The armored division has a flexibility practically unknown in infantry units. The armored infantry battalion seldom fights as a tactical unit. Instead, it is divided up into companies, and sometimes platoons, which are coupled with tank, artillery, and engineer units to form task forces. The mission at hand determines the proportions of tanks and of infantry in the combat team. The switching of units can be accomplished within minutes, merely by some terse orders given over the radio.

Our lieutenant liked the mobility of

armor when he became accustomed to it. His tactics were formerly planned on 1:25,000 maps, movement was made at two and a half miles an hour, and organic supporting fires were not normally of much help at ranges of over a thousand yards.

But for the armored infantryman, even 1:50,000 maps are sometimes too small in scale because he can move at speeds up to thirty miles an hour. The 90mm guns of the tanks can support him at ranges of five thousand yards. Enemy machine guns and indirect artillery and mortar fire, while still held in healthy respect, are no longer heavy factors in tactical planning for the infantryman who rides to battle in an armored carrier. On the other hand, the infantryman's old friends—woods, ditches, streams, marshy ground, and bridges—become extremely menacing. Enemy tanks and antitank mines are his deadly foes. The armored infantry officer must stress physical fitness in his troops, because they live relatively plush and gypsy-like lives, and are likely to become unused to doing much walking.

THE armored infantry rifle squad is equipped, organized, and trained essentially the same as an infantry rifle squad. It consists of a two-man automatic-rifle team, five riflemen, a squad leader, his assistant, and a driver. The squad is transported in its own full-tracked armored personnel carrier (APC), which offers protection from artillery and small-arms fire, goes forty miles an hour, has a hundred-mile operating radius, and can cover the same terrain as a tank.

In addition to usual infantry weapons, the armored infantry squad has an organic caliber .30 A6 machine gun, and a caliber .50 machine gun which is mounted on the carrier. These weapons can make the squad's fire power almost

equivalent to that of a standard rifle platoon. Whether the carrier is the M75 used in Korea or the new M59, it is a mobile machine-gun pillbox which can support the squad with devastating fire from hull defilade.

An armored infantry platoon is composed of three of these squads, plus a machine-gun squad, which has two five-man machine-gun sections, a driver, a squad leader, and his assistant.

The armored infantry company consists of three of these platoons, plus a mortar platoon, which has three 81mm mortar squads, each transported by its own APC. In addition to having the normal supply, mess and administrative sections, it has two large maintenance sections—one for the company's vehicles and one for its radios.

The vehicles include seventeen full-tracked armored personnel carriers, two 2-1/2-ton trucks, one half-track, four half-ton trucks, and several trailers. The mounted radios are fourteen VRC-7s, five GRC-4s, and three GRC-3s; while seventeen PRC-6s and one PRC-8 are used for dismounted work.

To the average infantry officer, the armored infantry battalion is a strange unit. Tactically, it is composed of four line armored infantry companies, a 4.2-inch mortar platoon, and a reconnaissance platoon. Administratively, the battalion is entirely separate. It has its own personnel section, vehicular maintenance section, medical detachment, and supply platoon.

The armor headquarters on the regimental level is the combat command—a tactical headquarters which may be changed from day to day. The battalion is authorized its own insignia and its own battalion colors, and it writes its own unit history.

ARMORED infantry is generally used in either of two ways: the infantry



Tanks and infantry move into an attack during a training maneuver

supports the tanks, or the tanks support the infantry.

The tank, with its greater fire power, heavier armor, and greater shock action, obviously has the advantage over thin-skinned armored infantry vehicles under the right conditions of terrain. When armor can be used in its primary role, the armored infantry usually supports the tanks.

But when the terrain is unfavorable to tanks, armored infantry assumes the primary role. Such conditions occur when buildings, woods, or close terrain render the tank's cannon virtually useless and make the tank vulnerable to close-in antitank measures by enemy in-

The latest armored personnel carrier, the M59, carries twelve infantrymen, weapons and ammunition. The armor provides protection against small-arms fire and shell fragments. Tactical use is still under development.



fantry. Dismounted armored infantry is used in the leading role when streams, gullies, or minefields deny mobility to the tanks. Then the tanks provide direct-fire support and furnish antitank protection to the front, flanks, and rear of the infantry, at ranges up to 5,000 yards. Mobile defense is another new wrinkle for the infantryman suddenly exposed to armor tactics. Armor defends an area by maneuver and counterattack, and defense is seldom attempted on any level below combat command. The defense is organized into two echelons: a somewhat standard line of strongpoints, and a reserve. The reinforced infantry units are placed where they command the key terrain features and block, or at least control, the most likely avenues of approach. These strongpoints are meant neither to stop the enemy completely nor to disperse him. Their primary mission is to canalize the advancing enemy into corridors that lead to pre-chosen tank country where armor can get in its deadly licks. In this mobile defense, most of the armored infantry is usually placed in the strongpoints, while most of the tanks are held in reserve.

The armored infantryman must never become too attached to his personnel carrier. Unlike the tank, it is not a fighting compartment. The armored infantryman is a member of a standard but fast-moving infantry squad, and he must be prepared to fight hand to hand just like his walking cousin. The carrier is merely transportation, a means of moving as fast as the tank. The APC, like the aircraft and parachute of the paratrooper, merely gets him to the objective.

The M59, the latest APC, is lighter than the M75. It has the added capability of crossing bodies of water. An armored infantry outfit in M59s can set up a beachhead in an attack, crossing a river without stopping its advance.

Armored infantry tactics are still being developed. Although almost everyone pays lip service to the field manuals, few agree exactly how the new APCs should be employed, primarily because the one-inch armor on the M75 means different things to different people. There have been armored infantry commanders who stopped when they were



faced with machine-gun fire, and others who attacked into recoilless 75mm and 105mm fire. No one has put out a firm answer to the question: "Where should the carriers be?"

There have been commanders who dismounted three thousand yards away from the objective, requiring their "armored" infantry to attack on foot across a fire-swept hill, rather than endanger the carriers. There have been commanders who believed that the APCs should at all times follow only ten or fifteen yards behind the tanks, on the theory that the tanks "cover" the carrier. But most commanders have followed the more acceptable tactics of having the APCs trail four or five hundred yards behind until the tanks hit the objective, and then close the gap at top speed, dismounting riflemen right on the objective, practically jumping down the foxholes of the enemy.

To prepare himself adequately for an armored infantry command, the infantry officer, in addition to his own branch training, needs exactly the same background as an armor officer, with the possible exception of tank gunnery. Unfortunately, he usually has not received adequate armor training before he is slapped into the race and told: "Do it!" Some sound infantry officers may be hurt professionally by their inexperience when they are suddenly required to take over an armored infantry command.

Many armor officers don't fully appreciate the infantryman's dilemma. This sink-or-swim attitude is a serious deficiency in our present methods.

There is a definite need for specialized armored infantry training taught by an armored infantry department at The Infantry School or The Armored School. This training should have somewhat similar objectives, and perhaps be of similar length, as jump school, and should be conducted on an Army-wide level for all infantry officers and some noncommissioned officers, before they are assigned to an armored division.

Such a course could develop tactical policies for the armored infantryman. As it is now armored infantry doctrine is two-headed; some comes from Benning and some from Knox. This is not good.

This armored infantry indoctrination course should emphasize practical class participation, including armored infantry tactical problems with tanks. Equal importance should be given to two weeks of driver and maintenance training for every student, including officers. This should be combined with a somewhat shorter course striving for the same goals from the radio maintenance and communications standpoint. The indoctrination course should end with a brief class in the history and traditions of armor in general, and armored infantry in particular.

Infantrymen should be encouraged to volunteer for such schooling and subsequent assignment to an armored infantry unit, contingent upon graduation. And also some distinguishing insignia should be authorized for the armored infantryman, possibly a shoulder arc which says "Armored," patterned after "Ranger" and "Airborne" tabs. At the very least, official recognition should be given to a blue-braided high-peaked armor cap by awarding it free, the same as any qualification badge, to the graduate of the school.

It has been agreed that every regular infantry officer, if physically fit, should be airborne qualified. The requirements should go one step farther: every infantry officer ought to be armored infantry qualified too. Sometime during his early infantry career, every infantry officer should rotate at least one cycle through straight, airborne, and armored infantry.

Only in that way will the infantry officer realize that armor is not the private monopoly of the yellow-scarved officers and men who used to ride horses and now ride tanks; but that it is rather a state of mind, an aggressive, flexible manner of thinking by the officers and men of any combat branch, who believe in mobility, fire power, and shock action.



RED PARALLEL The Tactics of Ho and Mao

Lieutenant Colonel
Robert B. Rigg



THE parallel between tactical patterns and growth of the Viet Minh and of the Red Chinese in the Chinese civil war is so precise that even the circumstance of today's truce predicts tomorrow's trouble.

Mao Tse-tung's ten military principles

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT B. RIGG, Armor, was a member of the Marshall Mission to China in 1946. He was captured by the Communists at that time and spent two months in a Red prison. Out of that experience and much study he wrote *Red China's Fighting Hordes*. He has also written a book on training aids and expedients, which will be published this year. We count him as one of our regular contributors. He is presently assigned to G3 at the Pentagon.

have been consistently applied by Red warlord Ho Chi-minh. The Viet Minh began war on a guerrilla basis and has emerged to its brigade- and division-level period. Before long it will enter its army-level era of organization and operation.

Viet Minh foot mobility has been of the highest order, and on a parallel with that of the Chinese Reds. It is the Asiatic rebuttal to machine-age war. Ho Chi-minh's guerrillas have followed Mao Tse-tung's axiom: "We march more than we fight, but every march is for the sake of a fight." This tactic multiplied Viet Minh numbers and confused opposing intelligence officers and commanders. A formal army, like that of the French and the Chinese Nationalists, arrives at a point of justified desper-

ation when it cannot find, much less oppose, the enemy opposite it. The mobility and the elusiveness of the Viet Minh greatly prolonged the Indochina war. It was so designed by the Communists for two purposes: to allow the Viet Minh forces time to grow to full military stature, and to bring war weariness to the people of Indochina. They followed the Mao Tse-tung philosophy of "not fearing long wars" but wanting decisive campaigns within long wars.

It was the ninth of Mao Tse-tung's Ten Military Principles that accelerated his rise to power from 1946 to 1949. This principle said, in simple terms, "capture from the enemy so as to arm yourself." As the Chinese Reds gained new weapons and material in the Chi-

nese civil war, the number of offensive moves increased and they became more aggressive. While the source of supply was different for the Viet Minh, its aggressiveness and concerted military action was in direct ratio to the armament it gained, and it gained the majority of its arms from the Chinese Reds. Organizationally the Viet Minh grew larger and more formal as Red China supplied advisers, technicians, and weapons.

Red China's Ten Principles are simple rules designed for beginners in warfare. They are tailored for the patient, and they fit the ultra-patient Asiatic. Palace revolutionists or daring revolutionists would be contemptuous of their cautious and conservative advice. But they are sure and certain rules for men who have the patience and endurance to apply them. Ho Chi-minh is such a man.

First among the ten principles of the Chinese Reds is: "... strike at scattered and isolated enemies, and later strike at the ... powerful enemies." Foremost in consistency and chronology was the Viet Minh's application of this axiom, which might be called the tactics of digestion without indigestion, a principle which was proportionate to the means at hand. The Viet Minh attacked the outposts (strategic and tactical) of the French Army in this succession, and scored some very important gains in 1950-51, especially in Tonkin. Over the years the Viet Minh adhered well to the first principle but did err now and then in gauging the next degree of target to attack. For example, the Red attack on Na-Sam (November-December 1952)

was apparently preceded by faulty intelligence, or overconfidence, or a combination of both. This bloody Viet Minh attack had much of the character of the 1947 attack the Chinese Communists made on the Shantung city (a formidably walled one) of Tsining which, like Na-Sam, was an attack eventually abandoned after heavy Red casualties. Neither place had any real (local) strategic importance, yet in both instances there is now reason to believe that the Reds attacked in the hope of establishing military prestige.

VIET MINH adherence to the second principle ("first take the small towns; later the large") was leading to the application of the third: "We take the annihilation of the enemy's fighting strength, and not the holding of cities ... as the major objective. ..."

Ho's regular forces always tried to apply the fourth principle: "In every battle, concentrate absolutely superior forces. ...". This they did at Dien Bien Phu.

Consistently choosing its own conditions of battle, the Viet Minh adhered to the fifth principle: "Fight no unprepared engagements. Fight no engagements in which there is no assurance of victory. ..."

Throughout all of their campaigns with regular and irregular forces, Ho's warriors were subjected to the sixth principle, which is "fear no sacrifice, fatigue," and train to fight successive engagements within a short time.

Ambushing French columns with regularity, Viet Minh forces regularly ap-

plied the seventh principle successfully: "Strive to destroy the enemy while he is in movement. ..."

Hanoi and Haiphong stood in 1954 as Mukden and the port city of Yingkow did in 1947. The Chinese Reds eventually took Yingkow, and Mukden became an air-supported island that was later submerged into the Communist sea. Like the Chinese Reds, the Viet Minh was patient and abided by the eighth principle: "With regard to the question of assaults on cities [take] ... those which are weakly defended. At favorable opportunities wrest all of those which are defended to medium degree. Wait until conditions mature to wrest [those] ... strongly defended." As the 1954 negotiations in Geneva reached their crisis the Viet Minh began militarily to choke Hanoi and Haiphong. Conditions had matured with the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Obviously, Ho Chi-minh had wanted these cities for a long time, but he abided by the eighth axiom that Mao had demonstrated to be so successful. There is no doubt that Ho's forces would have attacked and tried to divide, so as later to devour, the delta region, had the truce not been established at Geneva. Another Viet Minh aping of the Chinese Reds—and an old Communist military-political combination—was their backing with military victories of their representatives at the diplomatic table. Asiatic Reds regard it as axiomatic and necessary to arrive at the conference table with victories current enough to force favorable diplomatic arguments. The Chinese Reds set their pattern when General George C.



The deadly parallel between the tactics of the Red Chinese and the Viet Minh is nowhere more precise than in the adherence to Mao's dictum to be cautious and pa-

tient in assaulting cities. Mukden (at left) fell to the Red Chinese in 1947 and Viet Minh forces walked victoriously into Hanoi in 1954.



Marshall tried to settle the civil war, and they applied it in Korea. It must always be expected that when a Red regime is ready to negotiate it is also ready with some soon-to-be-applied war plans.

EXAMINE the tenth principle (which the Viet Minh used) and you find yourself reading between the lines or paraphrasing its real lines:

"Be skilled at using the intervals between two campaigns for the resting, regrouping and training of troops. (Do not rest too long.) . . . Do not let the enemy have breathing space." This principle concedes that the Communists at this particular military stage of development do not always have the logistical capability of "carrying through" and that their drives will often spend themselves, yet they must always seek to resume their pressure on the enemy. Logistically the Viet Minh was not up to prolonged attacks as was demonstrated in several instances when they hit the hard core of French defenses.

The French military problem over the years was much like that of the Chinese Nationalists. Unfortunately, the French technique was parallel. Pillboxes, islands of resistance, and bristling defenses were created to ward off the Red mosquito attacks, but as Communist aggressiveness increased, the French came to rely more on these fixed defenses. In the fury of the tasks and troubles at hand the French were often blind to the potential and power of mobility. In the jungles aerial reconnaissance and intelligence were useless. What was most needed was more effective ground intelligence or information from natives made ultra-friendly by political means. British General Sir Gerald Templer proved this point in Malaya. The French wanted to engage the foe in open battle; the Viet Minh forces avoided brutal contests until they were ready, and the French lacked timely enough information upon which to launch forces to catch the Communists. Thus the French were unable to concentrate on worthwhile Red concentrations.

IN the sober application of these ten principles it must be conceded that Red Chinese advisers to the Viet Minh had their influence, and Ho Chi-minh and his officers can be credited with endurance and patience, but not with originality. The Chinese Reds spent many war years perfecting these principles, which will in the future provide the

basic guide to all other Red revolutionary moves in Asia.

Dien Bien Phu, the target of much opportunity, was enveloped vertically, just as Chanchun was in 1946 when the Chinese Nationalists airlifted twelve thousand troops into the Manchurian capital, air supplied them, and lost them to Red concentric envelopments on the ground. Like the heroic defenders of Dien Bien Phu, the soldiers of Chiang Kai-shek fought at Changchun until their perimeter was only a few hundred yards in diameter—and even then resisted until they were physically overrun and captured at point-blank range.

After seeing this battle in Manchuria I could only conclude that to survive at all, such an airhead must move and keep moving on the ground, so as to force the enemy to realign his forces and prevent him from concentrating them. To stand still (and Nationalist heroism was equal to that demonstrated at Dien Bien Phu, although the skill was somewhat less) is to invite disaster.

Dien Bien Phu was a blocking effort and an attempt to engage Viet Minh forces in open battle so as to destroy their numbers. But the key to Viet Minh acceptance of battle here lay in the Red consideration of the odds and the "favorable conditions" which Red China's great tactician and strategist, General Lin Piao, summarizes several times in his written texts and in one place says: "Calculated risk engagements . . . should not be undertaken at random . . . and only if there is a 70 per cent prospect of victory."

The Battle of Dien Bien Phu goes deeper than the French decision to establish a blocking airhead there. Whose initiative really caused the conflict? Ho Chi-minh moved certain of his troops into Laos in a maneuver that was used by Chinese generals. The "One-Eyed Dragon," Chinese General Liu Po-cheng, executed such a move in 1947 when he moved his army group from a long-established battleground in Shantung and "fled" hundreds of miles southwest to the Taipeh Mountains, where he could fight in a new area and force the Nationalists to realign their strategy. In short, Liu diverted the enemy and forced him to fight in an area favorable to his own forces.

AT the time of the Laos invasion the French were reported to have explained the disappearance of the Viet Minh 316th Division by saying that it had been "wiped off the battlefield."

The Chinese civil war proved to U.S. Army observers that one must beware of the Red division that "disappears," because it always turns up again at a very embarrassing place. The 316th Division did just that.

The Viet Minh organization of divisions on a regional rather than operational basis is taken from Mao Tse-tung's concepts of consolidation in guerrilla war, which he wrote many years ago. As Colonel Samuel B. Griffith, USMC, translated it: "Without consolidation, one will have no strength for further expansion. In guerrilla warfare, if only one thinks about expansion but forgets consolidation, he will not be able to stand up against the enemy. . . . The correct policy is to expand on *bases* of consolidation." Logistically the regional organization provided the Viet Minh with bases of food, manpower and intelligence because the Reds forced the allegiance of the people within the particular countryside. Politically it allowed them to dominate the people and indoctrinate them.

In viewing Red regional organization on a local or tactical basis, it is important to look at the Viet Minh regional, or base, organization on a strategic level. Here we find the real logistical base of the Viet Minh in South China just as the Red Chinese base for their operations in Korea was in Manchuria—or, more realistically, in the Soviet Union. Yet in both cases the bases were outside the war zone and relatively safe because to bomb or invade them was to invite a bigger third power into the war.

The Viet Minh was a "twilight army" whose strength at night could exceed the numbers usually manifest in daylight. This army, like that of the Chinese Reds up until 1949, had two parts—the guerrilla and the formal—which acted in combination and coordination with each other. In most cases either portion could avoid battle by hiding its arms and merging into the countryside as peasants. This feature of momentary obscurity in one's own land was in direct contrast to the necessary formality of the French forces which had the mission of preserving the government and vital territories. However, the Viet Nam force possessed, and still possesses, the capability of operating portions of its body on this basis.

LIKE the Chinese Reds until 1949, the Viet Minh force has lacked an air force. Ho Chi-minh's forces have also, like their Chinese predecessors, operated

with a fair minimum of motor transport, and have utilized motor vehicles for supply rather than for tactical mobility.

Oriental tactics of encirclement are not those of the half-moon diagrams we are prone to draw on maps. Instead, they are more subtle, and often part of the circle is a permanent guerrilla base which only needs the regular or more formal army to close with it. The Viet Minh's approach was often based upon this concept, long ago projected by Mao Tse-tung: ". . . if we analyze our various [regular army] bases and their interrelation, plus the relation of multiple guerrilla bases to the regular army's front lines, then we are encircling portions of the enemy. This is [a] second form of encirclement."

Ho Chi-minh's forces must now be measured in light of the progress of the Red Army of China since 1949. The "twilight army" of today will not resemble that army of the future. The Viet Minh forces are going to take on modern and formal aspect with Chinese assistance, especially now that it is not fighting.


In June 1946, a truce was superimposed on the Chinese civil war fighting in Manchuria. At that time General Lin Piao, the Communist commander in Manchuria, had an irregular to half-regular collection of well-disciplined, hardened troops. He had failed, however, in the Battle of Ssuningkai (1946) to stand up successfully against the more formal and formidable fire power of the Nationalist armies. The truce, for all of its well intended purpose, gave Lin Piao a period of many months. He utilized this interval to recruit, re-train, re-cadre, and reorganize his motley army. Logistically, he strengthened his army and made many technical improvements. It was this army, rebuilt during a truce period, that eventually attacked the Nationalists and swung the balance in favor of the Communists. Lin Piao's army was the avalanche that started the Red sweep of China.

The truce in Indochina now offers Ho Chi-minh the same opportunity and period of grace. He can now rebuild his army along more formal lines, cadre new units from among his veterans, train without having to fight at the same time, and strengthen his forces logistically and technically. The Viet Minh will not neglect to capitalize on the truce period.

Should the war be renewed, it could well be with an entirely new type of Viet Minh army.



Red armies on the march. The Viet Minh (*above*) were taught by the Chinese Communists (*below*) how to travel light and move fast.



COMMAND POST OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY




ROBERT T. STEVENS
Secretary of the Army




JOHN SLEZAK
Under Secretary



HUGH M. MILTON, II
Assistant Secretary
Manpower and Reserve Forces



GEORGE H. RODERICK
Assistant Secretary
Civil-Military Affairs




FRANK H. HIGGINS
Assistant Secretary
Logistics & R & D



GEN. CHARLES L. BOLTE
Vice Chief of Staff



CHARLES C. FINUCANE
Assistant Secretary
Financial Management



GEN. M. B. RIDGWAY
Chief of Staff



LT. GEN. L. L. LEMNITZER
Dept. C/S Plans & Research




LT. GEN. W. L. WEIBLE
Dep. C/S Opns & Adm



LT. GEN. W. B. PALMER
Dep. C/S Logistics



LT. GEN. GEORGE H. DECKER
Comptroller of the Army



MAJ. GEN. G. C. MUDGETT
Chief of Information



MAJ. GEN. W. F. MARQUAT
Chief, CA-Military Govt.



MAJ. GEN. E. C. ERICKSON
Chief, National Guard Bureau



MAJ. GEN. EUGENE M. CAFFEY
The Judge Advocate General



MAJ. GEN. W. C. ZIMMERMAN
The Inspector General


SPECIAL STAFF



MAJ. GEN. C. J. HAUCK, JR.
Chief, Legislative Liaison




MAJ. GEN. A. C. SMITH
Chief, Military History



BRIG. GEN. P. F. LINDEMAN
Exec., Reserve & ROTC Affairs



BRIG. GEN. W. C. BULLOCK
Chief, Psychological Warfare



MAJ. GEN. G. I. ARMSTRONG
The Surgeon General



MAJ. GEN. PAUL F. YOUNT
Chief of Transportation



MAJ. GEN. S. D. STURGIS, JR.
Chief of Engineers



MAJ. GEN. E. L. CUMMINGS
Chief of Ordnance

TECHNICAL STAFFS AND SERVICES



MAJ. GEN. W. M. CREASY
Chief Chemical Officer



MAJ. GEN. G. I. BACK
Chief Signal Officer




MAJ. GEN. K. L. HASTINGS
The Quartermaster General

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFFS AND SERVICES



MAJ. GEN. P. J. RYAN
Chief of Chaplains



MAJ. GEN. W. H. MAGLIN
The Provost Marshal General



MAJ. GEN. J. A. KLEIN
The Adjutant General




MAJ. GEN. B. E. SAWYER
Chief of Finance

GENERAL STAFF



MAJ. GEN. A. G. TRUDEAU
Asst. C/S G2, Intelligence



MAJ. GEN. J. M. GAVIN
Asst. C/S G3, Operations



MAJ. GEN. R. N. YOUNG
Asst. C/S G1, Personnel



... trouble with cavalry is ...

COLONEL SHILLELAGH

The cavalry General Walker was depending upon on 26 November 1950 had long since departed the Army

If always wants to do what it can do. Jeb Stuart had the only element of Lee's army which could range and raid far from the main body—so he did. To possess a capability of damaging the enemy places on any military man or force a strong compulsion to do the damage. To possess great mobility imposes a strong compulsion to use that mobility. Stuart understood the importance of his screening mission too, but he thought he could screen Lee, and ride hard and far, strewing destruction under his hooves.

Lee understood the proper use of cavalry. He knew his entire force depended on the information Stuart could collect and deliver to Army headquarters. He knew also that you cannot tie down good cavalry to the sole task of scouting ahead of the infantry. There are times when this screening job is of vital importance and there are times when such use would be a waste of good cavalry. There are times when the most vital mission is to serve the main body and other times when the independent missions are appropriate. Stuart's critical absence at Gettysburg was a matter of timing—timing influenced by the compulsion to do what he could do.

THE air age introduced cavalry with greater mobility, greater striking power and an inability to dismount and fight on foot. As the range of aircraft increased, the preoccupation of airmen with the independent mission also increased. This new capability for inflicting damage deep behind the enemy lines was much more fascinating than attacking enemy

COLONEL SHILLELAGH, a regular contributor to this magazine, was recently detailed to an extremely important assignment, and by the time you read this he may be wearing a star.

ground forces or even than jousting with other airplanes. It opened up new possibilities. That compulsion to do what men can do still existed—and always will. Other men, fearful of it, worried about what would happen to the Army while this new cavalry was off on its hard and far-ranging missions.

The compulsion to exercise the independent air capability included the compulsion to justify it; so that a whole new literature was created around the possibilities which lay in exploiting this new power. This new literature pictured the Army as a backward and reactionary service which could not understand the potentialities of the new weapon and which sought to limit its development. The efforts of serious minds to arrive at a realistic balance of missions and equipment were labeled reactionary by the exponents of victory through air power. If the Army sought to develop its requirements for close support and for reconnaissance, it got a cool reception from air soldiers with visions of independent air warfare.

WORLD WAR II provided a good test of air weapons developed in the Thirties. The bombers developed by the Army Air Corps compared very favorably with those of the independent Royal Air Force in Britain. The comparison does not support the charge that development of the independent mission had been retarded by Army control of air power in the United States. On the other hand, the comparison with the Royal Air Force in the fighter category was less favorable to the United States. It reflects the known preoccupation of American airmen with bomber development and their lesser concern with defensive warfare.

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

The real failure of the Army in this period was not in the development of air power but in the failure to integrate this power into the Army mission and structure. A contrasting trend was followed in the Navy and the Marine Corps. Whereas the Army leaders in large measure looked upon the Air Corps as another branch to support the infantry, the Navy and Marine leadership accepted aircraft as a primary combat weapon which their ground combat leaders had to learn to use as they used other weapons. The development of air power was not the exclusive concern of an air corps in the Navy and Marine Corps, but was a primary concern of the top leadership.

Of course, the Army faced the more difficult problem. The physical limitations of carriers effectively limited the Navy to short-range planes which fitted into fleet missions. The small size of the Marine Corps itself tended to limit aircraft development to the ground support and reconnaissance missions. Only in the Army did the possibility of extended aircraft range give a new lustre to the independent mission and draw the airman's interest away from the ground battlefield. The Air Corps was the logical inheritor of the cavalry tradition.

The Army did not produce a Lee who could understand both the importance of service to the main body and the importance of the independent mission, a man big enough to stick to sound principles, while recognizing that human error will sometimes spoil the best of plans. In consequence, the Army structure was badly fractured, and the Army suffered the total loss of the new cavalry potential. We may well ask, as General Gavin has, "Where was Walker's cavalry on November 26, 1950?" Was he depending upon a Stuart who had long since departed the Army?

BYOND these effects on the Army structure and power, the campaign of the air power enthusiasts to justify doing what they could do has had critical adverse effects on American concepts of warfare. The "New Look" of recent history was significant primarily in the official endorsement of a theory of war which had long been advanced by air power enthusiasts and had been accepted as a practical basis for force requirements before Korea, but had not received earlier public endorsement by our military leadership. In a sense, the announcement of the New Look was the ultimate triumph of the campaign to justify the independent air mission.

This air-power triumph is more astonishing in coming so soon after the Korean demonstration of the incapacity of air power to control ground action. True, the Army criticism of the Air Force claims has been muted by unification into a sweet note which sometimes resembles harmony. And sometimes the Army's theory of modern war has only reiterated to fearful mothers that their sons must still fight on the ground in spite of planes and atoms. Unfortunately, we have produced no acceptable theory of war for our time.

All this seriously affects our military thinking in three ways:

(1) We have accepted civil destruction as an object of war and a means of war where formerly it was an incident of war. The question raised is not of humanity but of reality—whether we have forgotten that war is still a political instrument which must have political objectives and methods. This delusion may prove to be the ultimate irrationality.

(2) We have rejected the precept that indecisive brutality and destruction which advantages neither side will be outlawed by mutual consent or forbearance. We expect war to take the form of tremendous destruction on both sides, though we find no purpose in it. We have surrendered to the idea that a capability will be exercised merely because we possess it.

(3) We have lost sight of our objective of defeating the enemy armed forces as a means to victory and have substituted for it the intangible will of the enemy to resist. This is an objective which defies definition and invites untried methods. This error leads to the brutalization of war without purpose, to a preoccupation with mass destruction, to the neglect of the political realities.

COULD the Army have retained an Army Air Force which would serve both close and distant missions? Or did the new capability of long-range aircraft truly embrace a sphere of action which was properly outside the scope of the Army mission? Or finally, if the long-range mission warranted the creation of a separate force, should this force have been entrusted with the missions of reconnaissance and close support for the Army?

The Army readily conceded that the long-range mission bore only an indirect and general relationship to the operations of the Army commander. It was not considered essential that the Army control and direct these missions.

On the other hand, tactical air was strictly an auxiliary of the Army. Splitting it from the Army could only jeopardize the effectiveness of the air-ground team. Nevertheless, the thesis that the air was a different medium and not properly subject to Army command gained remarkable currency and acceptance among Army officers whose training and experience had not stressed the requirement for command knowledge of air warfare. An Army command which had classed air support as something to be supplied by an Air Corps or an Army Air Force was too ready to conclude that it could accept this support from a separate Air Force. Unified control of the air-ground team, representing the most critical coordination required in modern warfare, was sacrificed. The all-important ground battle was split down the middle.

All the waste and inefficiency of joint operations was introduced into the ground battlefield. There is no such split of command on the naval battlefield nor on the air battlefield. The true function of joint command—coordination of the three battlefields—was not recognized. The most serious question of military organization which confronts us today is this: have we imposed on the ground battlefield a requirement of coordination which men cannot meet? The corollary question is this: will our failure to integrate our capabilities in the land battle lose that battle?

THE Army did not propose that the national interest would have been better served by keeping the independent mission in the Army than by taking reconnaissance and close-support missions out of the Army. For in truth, the strategic air force is still very much like the cavalry. It has the capability of striking far in the enemy rear; but it also has the capability of striking the enemy army, with devastating and possibly decisive effects on the ground battle. This may yet be the most important contribution of a strategic air force to

THE MONTH'S FILMS

Each month in this space Captain Jack F. McAhon, who is in charge of motion picture distribution for the Pictorial Branch, Department of Defense OPI, reports on the new films available to the services.

Guided Missiles, MF 45-8354 (28 minutes), is now ready for showings to the troops and for loan to civilian organizations. This film, which gives an overall view of our guided missile program, is an adaptation of the "Big Picture" series, the only change being the substitution of a "Miscellaneous Film" leader for the "Big Picture" leader.

The Concept of the Attack and the Triangular Infantry Organization, TF 7-1902 (21 minutes), outlines the Army's fundamentals of offensive warfare and shows how they are applied to the triangular infantry organization. Every attack poses its own problems, but the basic concepts are the same—find 'em, fix 'em, fight 'em, and finish 'em.

Exercise Ski Jump, MF 31-8290 (27 minutes), briefly covers many of the problems that occur when operating in extreme cold. The film covers such things as the selection of a camp site, pitching a hexagonal tent, making a lean-to or snow house, handling the injured, making a sled from materials at hand, the use of ski poles as tow lines, care and use of personal weapons, and the need for proper personal health habits.

The driving hazards in Germany and other sections of Europe are extremely different from those in this country. **Safe Driving Practices in Germany, SFS 20-209** (15 minutes) will prove to be a valuable film for troops stationed or expecting to be stationed in Europe.

Tankers will be interested in the two-part film, **Fundamentals of Tank Turrets. Part I, Introduction and Controls, TF 17-1974** (17 minutes), opens with a brief history of the tank and then explains the various controls in American tanks, emphasizing that though they may be located in different places and have physical differences, they are basically the same. The film outlines their operation and their safety provisions. **Part II, Vision Devices—Direct Fire Sights, Fire Control Equipment, TF 17-1975** (17 minutes), explains the function, location, and capabilities of the periscopes, telescope, direct-fire telescope, range finders, elevation quadrant, gunner's quadrant, and azimuth indicator.

Action of the Individual Tank, TF 17-1990 (20 minutes), covers the responsibilities of tank crew members and the areas of responsibility of the individual tank on the march, in the assembly position, during the attack, and during reorganization. The theme of the film is "teamwork means success," whether among tank crewmen or among the tanks themselves.

victory; but the separation of organizations and missions tends to prevent its realization.

The argument for assigning reconnaissance and close-support missions to the separate Air Force is primarily economic. There can be no doubt that these missions would be performed with greater enthusiasm and success by an air element within the Army. However, the argument is made that the planes required for the long-range mission will also perform the Army support mission, and that economy is achieved by pooling these weapons in a single force.

The P-51 of World War II was good for escort, for interception, and for ground support. Today, however, there is no such plane. The high-performance interceptor will cost five or six times as much as an attack aircraft and be much less efficient for the attack mission. It would be sheer waste to plan to use the high-priced interceptors for the attack job. So economy now requires special attack aircraft for the attack mission. Equipment development and new tactics are making clear distinctions between the air battlefield and the ground battlefield which were less apparent ten years ago.

IN the perspective of this short reach of history, we can now see what unification did to our defense organization. It took the air element, our modern cavalry, out of the Army to give emphasis to its long-range mission. It divorced the long-range air weapons from the ground battle where they have a major—perhaps a primary—role to play. It took the tactical air force off the Army team and put it on the Stratair team where coordination is difficult or impracticable. This certainly has the appearance of creating a critical breach of organization in order to correct a small point of friction.

The Army has indeed been grievously hurt in the unification act. It has lost control of the ground battle, has become dependent for vital support upon an independent cavalry which is concerned primarily with its own separate objectives. But most grievous of all has been the effect upon Army thinking. The Army has come to accept the ground battle as bounded by the use of its own weapons systems. The tactical air force operations of reconnaissance and ground support, which are as integral to the fight as division artillery, have been lost to Army thinking and Army planning.

The separate Air Force can be a tolerable arrangement only if the Army maintains a capacity for vigorous and independent thinking on the air power requirements of the ground battle. The Army can best define these requirements. It must accept the responsibility for doing so and must keep them in balance with other planning for the ground battle. It must think of the tactical air force as a part of the Army and must be prepared, if necessary, to sacrifice divisions in order to maintain a balance of tactical air force. It must define and establish the Army requirements for support from the strategic air force. It must think and plan in terms of the whole land battle. For these purposes, its leaders must be thoroughly trained in the application of air power in the land battle. These tasks may be extremely difficult under our present organization, but they are absolutely essential to the full exploitation of our national defense potential.

It is not enough to reproach the cavalry of the air age for wanting to go off and do what it can do. We must make certain that it is present and accounted for in the land battle.

SKI SCHOOL

Tough tactical exercises and winter sports are joined at the Mountain Training Center deep in the Austrian Alps



Skilled Austrian Skilehrers bring the students along fast; this first-week student shows good downhill form

IN Austria when it's too cold to fish, you learn to ski. At least that's what 600 U. S. officers and men did last winter—thanks to the USFA's Mountain Training Center at Saalfelden, deep in the Austrian Alps.

The MTC is in operation the year around. But when winter crawls down from the perpetually snow-covered peaks and ice and snow cover the cliffs and ridges used for "military assault climbing" exercises during the summer months, mountain climbing gear is stowed away and skis and snowshoes are broken out.

Students are officers and soldiers selected for the training by unit commanders of U.S. Forces in Austria. The courses last five weeks and selected students, earmarked as instructors, get three weeks of additional training. At the end of the five-week period students can perform such conventional maneuvers as the snow plow, stem turns, the stem christiania, the herringbone climb and a few variations in cross country ski running. The twenty professional instructors are Austrian

Skilehrers (ski teachers) and hilf skilehrers (assistant ski teachers)—accredited by the Austrian government, which prescribes rigid standards.

When a man reports at the school he is issued skis, ski poles, ski boots, parka, sun glasses, snowshoes, two-man tent, small cookstove, and a rucksack. From then on he learns to live on and in the snow.

He spends most of his time on the "slope"—always on skis and always carrying his rucksack. When he isn't on the slope he is probably out on a "cross country," which means toiling uphill and trekking down either on skis or snowshoes.

It's hard work during the first couple of weeks but incessant drilling and practice bring proficiency, and slopes that were dizzy, impossible inclines when the student first reported become simple challenges to his skill.

And when it is all over and graduation day comes, the student skier knows why the MTC is the most popular school among officers and men on duty in Austria.



No comfortable chair lift as at Sun Valley, but a precarious handhold on a cold, frost-covered cable that sometimes slips out of the skier's mittened hand as he nears the top of the slope, sending him slithering downward

Soldiers from Alabama, Arizona and points north learn to bivouac for the night by scooping out a trench in the snow and covering it with a shelter half held up by a pair of skis laid across the top of the trench



The parade ground is the "slope" where, except for cross-country jaunts, the soldier spends all his working hours

When the student becomes reasonably proficient on skis he joins in small-unit tactics under a full rucksack



How guided missiles and rockets are giving surface-to-air and surface-to-ground artilleries more punch, and more range, which means more mobility

EXTENDING THE RANGE

Captain Josiah A. Wallace, Jr.

THE new guided missiles and free rockets now coming into use are designed to serve a multitude of combat functions. We have surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, air-to-air, and air-to-ground missile weapons in various stages of development and refinement as well as production. It seems probable that the period of "atomic plenty" will also see these new weapons become plentiful.

The new antiaircraft artillery weapon, Nike, is presently in production. New tactical units are being formed and trained to use this surface-to-air weapon and a major share of the antiaircraft defenses of our big cities will fall to Nike outfits.

Field artillery is moving forward too. New surface-to-surface weapons are being designed and tested to increase the potential of the field artillery arm. Now in the process of testing and refinement are such weapons as the Corporal, a guided missile, and Honest John, a free-flight rocket.

Employed as a field artillery weapon, the surface-to-surface guided missiles and free rockets provide the Army with practical, dependable, all-weather weapons suitable for use in—

- Extending materially the effective range and warhead capabilities of field artillery.
- Delivering tactical atomic explosives accurately.
- Giving artillery much greater mobility.

CAPTAIN JOSIAH A. WALLACE, JR., Artillery, is on duty at the Antiaircraft Artillery and Guided Missile School at Fort Bliss. His last appearance in these columns was in the issue of May 1953.

- Reinforcing heavy fire support of ground forces in conjunction with tactical air elements or when such elements are unable to provide the desired support.
- Attacking highly critical targets that cannot be attacked by tactical air elements.

These surface-to-surface missiles appear to bear up well in analysis against an actual combat situation. An example from Korea illustrates this.

Near Kunu-ri in late November 1950 an aerial observer, operating deep behind enemy lines, detected a growing concentration of Communist infantry in what would appear to be an extension of his division's sector. Continuing his surveillance, he saw that the force, in its movement south, was confined in a narrow valley.

In answer to his request for artillery fire, he was informed that the target was beyond maximum range of all available battalions. Subsequently, tactical air was called in but failed to locate and attack the concentration.

Early the following morning, the observer, again airborne over enemy lines, picked up his target once more and discovered that the force, estimated now at nearly ten thousand men, had moved farther south during the night and had dug countless foxholes in an area five hundred yards wide and some three miles deep. Eventually, he was able to get the fire of a 155mm howitzer battalion on the target, but despite excellent initial effect on the concentration, the battalion soon was forced to displace to another position. Later the same day, this massive enemy force attacked southward against our forces, forcing the withdrawal of two of our divisions.

Surface-to-surface missiles could have been used in this situation, and effectively. Guided missiles would have been an ideal weapon against the concentration in the narrow valley, and in such an attack it seems certain that the bulk of this force would have been killed or wounded. Thus pressure on the UN lines in this area would have been reduced materially.

This example shows how surface-to-surface missiles can extend the range and destructive capacity of conventional field artillery weapons. Furthermore, had a single missile been fitted with an atomic warhead it could have destroyed the enemy force in the open.

It follows that surface-launched guided missiles will provide the army in the field with another means of delivery of atomic weapons. No longer will we have to rely entirely on air or 280mm-gun delivery. Using both the 280mm gun and guided missiles, senior commanders will have the capability of firing atomic weapons with great accuracy regardless of weather conditions that might prevent use of aircraft.

IN the Korean example, surface-to-surface missiles could have been used to destroy the combat potential of the Communist force even though that force was dug in before its attack. Such an action would have been in the nature of heavy fire support for the American forces defending near Kunu-ri. And if it had been decided to launch an attack on this force, the missile fire could have been followed with conventional field artillery and tactical air attack to pave the way for the ground advance. If we assume, for the purpose of discussion, that the Communists had air superiority near Kunu-ri, or at least behind their own

lines in that general area, tactical air would have been exposed to considerable risk in attacking such a concentration. It is of course questionable in such an event if the aerial observer would have scouted the force. Given the location of the center of this concentration, guided-missile units could have pierced the hostile air defense with ease and accuracy.

This is but one example of how surface-to-surface missiles could be used in combat. Surely there are many others. All would tend to prove that in modern war the ability to strike ever deeper and ever more effectively into the enemy's rear is of great importance. All would tend to show that the depth of a given combat sector will, in the future, be determined by the effective range of weapons at the combat army's disposal.

FROM the point of view of weight, guided missiles offer considerable advantages over conventional artillery projectiles. These advantages stem from their different design requirements.

The walls of a conventional projectile must be strong enough to withstand the tremendous external pressure exerted by

the propelling charge when the shell is fired from the tube and boosted to maximum speed within a fraction of a second. In flight, the projectile must be able to bear up under the strong centrifugal force resulting from its high rate of rotation. The external portion of the projectile must be designed to produce a minimum of air friction so that it will move along a stable, predictable trajectory.

Having designed a projectile that meets these three requirements, the ordnance engineer can then, and only then, compute the weight of the explosive charge to be carried by the shell. Fragmentation factors follow as a fifth and minor consideration.


In designing surface-to-surface guided missiles, the ordnance engineer can dispense with most of these considerations and design a missile to carry a prescribed explosive charge.

Propelled by its own power, the missile is subjected to substantially less shock of initial acceleration than an artillery projectile. Since it is guided in the air by airfoils of various shapes, there is no need to consider centrifugal force. Of prime importance, however, is the aerodynamic design.

The outer skin of the missile must be designed to attain maximum airspeed for any given amount of power. The skin and casing must be strong enough to withstand extremely high speeds and the resulting high outer-skin temperatures. But these considerations do not necessarily require material increases in the weight and thickness of the missile's casing.

Lighter casing construction permits heavier warhead charges and produces a highly favorable charge-to-case weight ratio that will probably allow an advance determination of fragmentation effects.

SURFACE-to-surface and surface-to-air guided missiles and rockets are not intended to replace any of the weapons now in use. They provide a logical supplement to these weapons, extending the range and combat potential of the field artillery. Because of their greater expense, these weapons may be used somewhat sparingly in any future conflict, but they would be available as a potent rapier with which the Army could thrust telling blows swiftly and effectively behind hostile lines. Guided missiles are coming of age.



New Incentive to Re-up?

Army pollsters bring to light some revealing attitudes towards the new unit rotation plan

THIRTY-FIVE years ago the question was, "How you gonna keep 'em down on the farm after they've seen Paree?" But today it is, "How you gonna keep 'em in the Army after they have seen all too much of the world (except maybe Paree)?"

Some hints were obtained recently by OCAFF's Human Research Unit No. 2 which went into action with a questionnaire right after the Army's unit rotation plan—Operation GYROSCOPE—was announced. HRU No. 2 asked a lot of questions of 1,200 officers and men of three different outfits in the U.S. These were the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 10th Infantry Division, and the 508th Airborne RCT—all scheduled to go overseas.

Answers made to some questions by

first-three-graders of the Regular Army are of interest. The questions and the results appear in the adjoining box.

Why did fewer Regular Army non-coms answer questions 2 and 3 affirmatively than answered question 1 affirmatively? The researchers say this was because the men were told just before being asked questions 2 and 3 that signing up in a unit rotation outfit would mean 33 months of service overseas. Many men probably figured that under the old system their chances of staying in the States were better than reenlisting in an outfit scheduled for shipment overseas for 33 months.

But the big tipoff seems to be in responses to question 6, and to a slightly lesser extent, to questions 7 and 8. Availability of dependent housing seems to

be the controlling factor, followed by "spending most of the tour with the same fellows" and having a "permanent home base to return to."

Officers were favorably inclined toward the plan. Of the officers interviewed from the 10th Infantry Division, 94 per cent said they believed unit rotation would be "some" or a "big" improvement. In the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 100 per cent of the officers tested were for the plan.

More than 60 per cent of the Regular Army first-three-graders said they "would be more proud to be a soldier" under the unit rotation plan. They also expressed the belief that GYROSCOPE would mean more adequate dependent housing both overseas and in the U.S., more authority for noncoms, and more certainty for the future.

The report lists 37 responses of first-three-graders to the question, "What is your most important reason for not wanting to reenlist in a unit rotation outfit?" Of these, 19 said they just didn't like the Army or preferred civilian life, and so wouldn't reenlist; 5 didn't like the outfit they were then serving in; 4 had family reasons (wife's health, for instance); 3 said they had had too much overseas service already; 2 simply preferred Stateside duty; 2 were so dubious about the merits of the plan they didn't want to be involved in it; 1 said he didn't want to go to the Far East; and another said, "I would not reenlist in any unit without an increase in pay scale."

Pertinent and typical objections of officers who planned to stay in the service were reflected in such comments as these:

—"Opportunities for promotion in such an outfit might be less.

—"My career may follow too narrow a field of experience which may reflect on my promotions later."

—"Possibility of getting stuck with a dull outfit and job."

Officers emphasized the possibility of improvement in combat readiness, higher morale and greater *esprit* even more than they did stability or "family reasons."

Per cent who will reenlist

	10th Inf Division	3d Armd Cavalry	508th Abn RCT
(1) Will you reenlist when your present tour of duty is over? (This question was asked before the unit rotation plan was mentioned or explained.)	62	58	62
(2) Would you reenlist for a 3-year tour with your present outfit under unit rotation? (This question was asked after all the facts about unit rotation had been presented.)	50	52	53
(3) Would you reenlist for a 4-year tour of duty with your present outfit under unit rotation?	42	49	43
(4) Would you reenlist in a unit rotation outfit for 3 years, spending 33 months in Europe?	70	62	65
(5) Would you reenlist in a unit rotation outfit for 3 years, spending 33 months in the Far East?	45	47	55
(6) Would you reenlist in a unit rotation outfit for 3 years if dependent housing were available overseas for officers and first-three-graders?	74	72	68
(7) Would you reenlist in a unit rotation outfit for 3 years if you would be spending most of the time with the same fellows?	71	75	66
(8) Would you reenlist in a unit rotation outfit if it had a permanent home base at which to train and return to after an overseas tour?	68	73	61

ARTILLERY INTEGRATION

... It Will Take a Whole New Generation

BRIGADIER GENERAL THEODORE W. PARKER

THE integration of the field artillery and antiaircraft artillery into one artillery, has led to the hottest controversy in the combat arms since we debated the merits and demerits of horseflesh and the internal combustion engine. Like the horse argument, which still persists, the artillery integration argument is likely to last for a considerable time.

The British Army has had an integrated artillery arm for many years, including the period of World War II. I have often thought that perhaps their organization may have had a contributing influence on our decision to organize similarly. It is interesting to relate, therefore, a chance conversation I had with the artillery commander of the British Commonwealth Division on the occasion of his leaving Korea to return to England. When I asked him of his plans he mentioned that he had first to attend a meeting—a meeting of senior British artillerymen to consider whether or not their field and antiaircraft artillery should be continued in one arm! His own opinion, he volunteered, was that they should not be. So a single arm of both types of artillery is not a fixed conclusion on the part of our British artillery comrades.

So far we have had only a four-year test period of single branch artillery. We can assume that the decision to integrate was a result of considered, detailed study, and with a long-term solution in mind. Thorough, open discussion of the problem should be welcomed, but as we continue to argue the pros and cons, we should base our arguments on the future possibilities of integration as well as on the present degree of successful implementation of the change. The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL could provide a very useful service, it would seem, by printing for the information


of its readers the facts upon which the official decision to integrate was based, if such facts are available and releasable.

A distinguished antiaircraft artilleryman, recently retired, has said that it will take a whole new generation of artillerymen to make integration complete. Many an artillery officer of either breed, field or antiaircraft, having spent a significant portion of his career developing the know-how of his branch, may understandably resent being placed in a position where his experience doesn't fit him for the job at hand and where he must rely on the views and experience of others for the solution of problems he feels he should comprehend by virtue of his training. Understandably, he's against integration. So we shall probably have to write off all those who were field or antiaircraft artillerymen, and concentrate our efforts on those who have never been anything but just "artillerymen." If integration is to succeed over the long run, integrated schooling, assignments in both fields, and a one-branch loyalty must be vigorously pur-

sued. The merger of our branch associations and their professional journals is a step in this direction. The young artillery officers of today must grow up with the conviction that integration is here to stay, or that any future changes will be effected in such a manner that the skills they have mastered will not become useless to them.

THE most important basic difference in the background and experience of the two types of artillerymen is that of tactical concept. The field artilleryman thinks, tactically, like the infantryman or tanker he supports. He thinks in terms of seeking and destroying the enemy. He thinks in terms of movement, mobility and offensive action. The bulk of his training is along these lines, and properly so. The antiaircraft artilleryman, on the other hand, thinks, tactically, in terms of static deployment, with little or no tactical mobility, for he must wait until the enemy comes within range of his weapons before he can engage. His training, and again

WHEN the question of artillery integration came in for renewed discussion recently, it seemed only logical for the editors to ask BRIGADIER GENERAL THEODORE W. PARKER to set down his thoughts on the subject. Having an intimacy with both kinds of artillery, General Parker is peculiarly suited to know what he is talking about. After graduating from the Military Academy in 1935, he served in several field artillery assignments before and during World War II. In Korea he was commander of X Corps Artillery and last April he returned to the U.S. to take command of the 45th AAA Brigade at Fort Sheridan, Illinois.





properly so, exclusively emphasizes defensive action. Isn't it reasonable to assume that it was similarity of mission and tactics that led to the now obsolete coast artillery branch taking over the functions of antiaircraft artillery as the need for the latter arose? There is an inherent, fundamental, and vitally important difference in the tactical training and thinking of the two types of artillerymen and in the employment of their weapons.

From this point of view a better argument might be made for the integration of field artillery with the infantry or with armor, or an integration of all three, than for the integration of field and antiaircraft artillery. Similar weapons are found frequently throughout our combat arms, often with identical or closely related techniques of employment. It is not a difference in weapons, or techniques, which basically requires the existence of separate arms. It is far more a question of difference in tactics. If integration of the two artillery branches should finally prove less effective than their separation, I am convinced that such a conclusion will result from the incompatibility of the tactics of the two.

The differences in the equipment of the antiaircraft artillery and the field artillery are not particularly important as far as integration is concerned. Each type of artillery has long included in its armament a number of calibers: light, medium, and heavy. Each has had a variety of auxiliary equipment and prime movers. An antiaircraft officer might be assigned to an automatic-weapons unit (caliber .50 machine guns and 40mm guns), then to a 120mm gun unit. A field artillery officer might serve with a 105mm howitzer unit, then a 240mm howitzer unit. Sound-and-flash

units, operations detachments, and searchlight batteries were also possible assignments for one or the other, and now the field is broadened by guided missiles, both surface-to-air and surface-to-surface. The variety of assignments is certainly expanded by integration, and this expansion generates a need for increased knowledge on the part of the individual. In itself this is not a strong argument against integration, for seldom did any one officer serve with every different type of equipment even when the two artilleries were separate.

It also seems apparent that the use of antiaircraft weapons in a ground role has little bearing on the question. Antiaircraft weapons, so used, have never played a significant part in any campaign, nor, to the best of my knowledge, in any major battle. They have contributed to successful actions on many occasions, and their use is definitely warranted whenever they happen to be on hand and not more needed in their normal role. Such use, however, has nothing to do with artillery integration.

Since the two artillery branches were integrated we have had only one period of hostilities, in which to observe the results. The Korean action should certainly not be taken as typical. On the other hand, the experience gained in it should not be discarded. The conclusion I would draw, based on my own observations, is that we did not practice artillery integration in Korea. When an artillery officer arrived in Korea he was categorized as having an antiaircraft or a field artillery background. As a first possibility, an antiaircraft officer might be assigned to the AAA brigade which was deployed in defense of the fighter bases and ports

of Korea. A field artillery officer rarely, if ever, received such an assignment. There was certainly no integration there. The majority of artillery officers were assigned to divisions. Upon arrival at division the antiaircraft officer was considered for assignment to the automatic weapons battalion of the division artillery. If there was a place for him there (taking into account the relative officer shortages and specific MOS requirements of all the artillery battalions) the antiaircraft officer would be assigned to the automatic-weapons battalion. Rarely, if ever, was a field artillery officer assigned to an automatic-weapons battalion. So there was no integration there, either.

Percentage-wise, comparing officers assigned to those authorized in the tables of organization, there was always a preponderance of antiaircraftmen over field artillerymen. Consequently, a number of antiaircraft officers were assigned to field artillery battalions, and in this manner a degree of integration was achieved. However, even when assigned to a field artillery battalion, the antiaircraft officer was a better-than-even bet to fill an S1 or S4 position, or to wind up in a headquarters or a service battery, rather than in an S2, S3, or liaison officer position or in a howitzer battery. Integration was thus partially achieved in the division field artillery battalions, but it was marginal.

Corps artillery, having no active, integral AAA units, were assigned a much smaller percentage of antiaircraftmen in their artillery officer allocations. The general pattern of the assignment of antiaircraft officers to corps units was similar to that of divisions. The corps battalions, corps artillery headquarters and the Eighth Army artillery section all had antiaircraft officers assigned, but seldom did these officers occupy positions requiring field artillery knowledge and experience.

As a part of the directed MOS system, in which certain selected senior officers were ordered to specific assignments, corps and division artillery commanders and executives were often officers of antiaircraft background. That this system worked successfully was partly because of the unusually high ability of most of the officers so assigned, and partly because, as a general rule, the concurrent assignment of antiaircraftmen as both commanders and executives of any single division or corps artillery unit was avoided. The same rule applied generally to field artillery battalions and batteries: if either the com-

mander or executive was an antiaircraft officer the other had to be a field artilleryman.

This description of artillery integration in Korea applies to the stabilized, latter phase of the conflict. It indicates that integration was only partial and all one-way: antiaircraft officers in field artillery assignments. The stabilized condition in Korea probably made the operation of integration more successful than would have been possible in a mobile situation, since there was more time in stabilized combat conditions for "on-the-job" training and since the new knowledge required of the individual was more limited. A general conclusion is that integration of antiaircraft officers into field artillery units worked satisfactorily in the top and bottom grades—general officers and colonels, and junior lieutenants—but that it was not practicable in most instances in the middle grades, where branch experience was critically important in order to perform satisfactorily in combat such duties as battalion commander, S3, liaison officer, and howitzer battery commander.

The advent of missiles, guided and free, is hailed by some as a development which makes the integration of the artillery more logical and desirable. It may be so. Surely, if one missile or one family of missiles should be developed with equal capabilities against both air and ground targets, the argument would be strengthened. However such a universal missile has not yet been developed, just as a universal air-ground gun was never developed by the United States Army. At any rate, the same tactical differences exist as between use of surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles as exist between the antiaircraft and field artillery weapons.

So far I have said nothing about the effect of artillery integration on the officers of our civilian components, although they were certainly a majority of the persons involved in the description of Korean experience. If the artillery has now become too all-encompassing for a career officer to cope with, certainly it will have to be broken down into specialties or assignment patterns for National Guard and Army Reserve officers who have much less time to devote to its mastery. The majority of our antiaircraft artillery units are now committed to static defense roles for the

protection of vital areas of the Continental United States. Both missile and gun units are so employed. Future planning is taking into consideration the fact that such static defense missions are particularly appropriate ones for civilian component units, utilizing a small caretaker detachment on-site and providing the emergency operating personnel from a unit recruited in the neighborhood of the gun or missile position. We shall probably hear more of this development as time goes on, and it may have its greatest impact on the artillery arm, specifically on the antiaircraft component.

There are a number of other factors which affect the ultimate success of the integration of the two artilleries. We are always faced with a need for a large number of officers for branch-immaterial duties such as service on high-level staffs, military attachés, military missions, and branch immaterial service school instructors. The time so spent is lost to troop duty and experience with artillery organization, tactics, and equipment. The average officer must spend a considerable portion of his career at schools, both his branch and higher schools. This requirement is increasing with the increasing complexity of our equipment. Again troop experience time is lost. As an officer progresses through his career, if he loses the opportunity for troop experience he also loses his confidence in troop leading in his arm, and he tends to seek and settle into staff or branch immaterial positions at every



level. An expanded artillery career field would seem to aggravate this condition.

For the past several years we have had the bulk of our field artillery overseas, the bulk of our antiaircraft artillery in the Continental United States. As long as rotation of personnel is effected on an individual basis the proper rotation of artillery officers is certainly more easily accomplished with an integrated artillery. Mark up a point for integration.

THIS short review of integration, with its limited number of cross assignments, indicates that each of the two arms has contributed certain of its characteristics to the new offspring. Of these I would name two as particularly beneficial. The field artilleryman has contributed the sense of urgency and flexibility of thinking that are characteristic of a mobile arm and which are needed to keep our static defenses out of the doldrums; the antiaircraftman has contributed an appreciation of the advantages of mechanical computing and automatic transmission of firing data, characteristic of his three-dimensional gunnery problem, and of fundamental importance in the development and improvement of artillery technique in general, both for aerial and terrestrial targets.

FOR the next fifteen to twenty years, while all the once-upon-a-time field artillerymen and antiaircraftmen serve out their careers, generally alternating, it is to be hoped, between assignments in both fields, we should continue to debate the issues of artillery integration with an open mind. We should practice integration to the hilt, departing from this policy only when obvious damage to operations would result (as I believe it would have resulted in Korea). We should rear a new generation of artillerymen whose allegiance is only to artillery, not to field artillery or to antiaircraft artillery. Then we should let this new generation decide, in light of their experience and the requirements of artillery at that time, whether the artillery mission or missions at that time can best be accomplished by two arms or by a single one. Artillerymen have always prided themselves on their versatility. We can prove our claim to that heritage by making integration work now, while we continue to analyze its strengths and weaknesses.

THE MONTH'S READING

The Past Triumphant

PHILIP GUEDALLA
The Second Empire
Hodder and Stoughton, 1932

When Napoleon took the field [Napoleon III against Austria in 1859], it would be as well for him to be Napoleonic; and the Emperor, who had consulted the Oracles of military orthodoxy in Paris, brought with him an authentic plan by an old master. Almost past eighty, living in the suburban peace of Passy was a Swiss soldier of the First Empire named Jomini, who had ridden with Ney's staff at Ulm and Iena and left his master as the clouds gathered after Moscow. The old man had made a plan for his master's nephew, and he made it in the full tradition of Soult and Berthier. The plan was palpable to connoisseurs as a perfect Empire piece; one could almost see the gleam of the brass gryphons on its dark rectangular joinery. It ignored completely the unauthorised innovation of railways, and it depended for its success upon the obliging courtesy of an enemy who would keep reasonably still. But since it was for use against the Austrians, it was entirely successful; and the French enjoyed in 1859 the pleasing experience of defeating with the methods of 1809 an adversary whose military thought was that of 1759. Jomini's plan, in the mode of the First Empire, was victorious over generalship which had advanced no further than the Seven Years' War; but if the Austrians had been Prussians or if General von Moltke had ridden to Pavia with the Feldzeugmeister Giulay, the French would have been swept against the Alps.

The Meaning of Korea

THOMAS K. FINLETTER
Power and Policy
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1954

The argument for extended bombing [of China] was not military in nature. It was based on a fundamental political objection to the course the US government was following in the Korean War. The US government intended to limit the war to Korea if it possibly could; it saw Korea as a war to stop aggression and to restore the *status quo ante*, as all wars to enforce collective security are supposed to be. The proponents of extended bombing wanted total victory over the Chinese; they wanted to use the opportunity to roll back the Communist power.

On the other hand they wanted to make the rollback at small cost and risk to the United States. The proposals for a tough line with Red China promised an easy victory, with little cost to the victors. The idea of using United States ground troops to support Chiang Kai-shek on the mainland of China was repudiated by the most ardent supporters of

a tough policy in China. It was not even proposed that the United States Air be used to support a landing by Chiang on the mainland; and the Air is the favorite for those who want a tough policy without much cost.

The argument for extending the Korean War beyond the limits of Korea was that a limited war was inherently wrong and that the purpose of the Korean War, like all wars, should be victory, by which was meant a clear defeat of China and, as a minimum, the rollback of Communist power out of North Korea.

Two points about this are important. First, the idea that we were after "victory" in Korea is incorrect, if by "victory" we mean the total defeat of the Chinese and their unconditional surrender. We were in Korea to stop the aggression where it started, at the 38th Parallel, which is what we did. . .

Next, all the suggestions that we should be tougher in the Korean War, were, as we have said, based on the assumption that the war could be extended and the Chinese thoroughly defeated with little additional effort by the United States. The 1950 drive by the UN Forces over the 38th Parallel was on the assumption that the Chinese would not intervene and that there would be no opposition except from the almost totally destroyed army of North Korea. The later suggestions for "victory" over the Chinese assumed that this victory could be had with only a very limited increase in the military effort of the United States.

Too Powerful to Survive?

FRANK MUNK
Professor, Political Science, Reed College
The New Leader
8 Nov. 1954

It would be difficult enough to tame the tiger of power had we to cope with domestic and internal causes alone. Yet it is evident that the real impetus in this country is due to the shift from a primarily domestic to a predominantly external state, from a state dedicated to due process of law to a state dedicated to maximization of external power. In a world of power politics, America must supplant arguments with armaments. The question is to what extent.

In the present world situation, a high degree of military power would be required even had there been no changes in the technology of war. Unfortunately, science—the power over matter—has been brought in to increase man's power over man. Science itself being blind, directionless and directiveless, socialized science easily and inevitably becomes an arm of government. Government and science together are a formidable thing, formidable enough if one had to contend with one such government alone. The fact, of course, is that we are in the presence of a competitive struggle—three governments have already exploded nuclear

weapons and more are on the way—and that no secretiveness can prevent other nations from acquiring and developing the total weapons now coming off the assembly line. Total weapons create their own total states. How much power, then, *must* the U.S. possess? Are there any built-in limitations on national power? At what point does it become self-destructive? There is no absolute level of military power at which a country would be "secure." Too little power may invite aggression, too much power invite overarmament, militarization, the hybris of expansionism. The important thing is not only the level of power, but the relative rate of increase. In the long run, the most advantageous is that level at which aggression is more risky than nonaggression.

But let us remember also that power tends to create counter-power. Our chief worry in the months to come will be not our potential enemies but our present friends. Power attracts, but it also repels. You can become so powerful that everybody fears you—especially if you succumb to the temptation of throwing your weight around.

The U.S. faces the problem of combining a government of great external power with its traditional limitations at home. Can there be a democracy permanently armed to the teeth? Furthermore, does not impairment of the democratic process also reduce our military power? Ideology, too, is part of a nation's strength. . . .

The ultimate question, therefore, is whether attempted maximization of power truly leads to its optimum, whether the pursuit of more power may not in reality tend to reduce it. The real challenge to America is to establish firm foundations of national power in which the military, political, economic and ideological components are so balanced as to constitute a mixture blended for stability, maneuverability and overall effectiveness. . . .

Electronics and the Army

GENERAL CHARLES L. BOLTE
Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Address before the Armed Forces Communications Association
December 1954

I would like to draw your attention to a recent action which exemplifies the Army's deep interest in electronic matters. Early this year the Army established the Electronic Proving Ground at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. At this installation the Army Signal Corps will perform technical and operational field-type tests on advanced communications and electronic systems which help to determine experimentally the requirements we must place on research and development. Improved doctrine and techniques will be developed at this post, and specialized individual and unit training will be provided to the personnel who will operate our electronic equipment.

For the first time, the Army will have facilities to lay out in full scale the communication and electronic operations of an entire field army for study and evaluation. The Army Electronic Proving Ground will serve as the crucible into which we pour many operational problems, and through which, by the application of experimental methods under field conditions, we expect to crystallize procedures, organizations, and systems fulfilling the demands of the future Army.

JANUARY 1955

A Medal for Horatius

(Continued from page 18)

IXth Ind. JAG. II Calends, September, CCCLXI
To: AG

I. XVII months have elapsed since event described in basic letter. Star of Bronze cannot be awarded after XV months have elapsed.

II. Officer is eligible for Papyrus Scroll with Metal Pendant.

P. B.

Xth Ind. AG. I Ide of October, CCCLXI
To: G-I

For draft of citation for Papyrus Scroll with Metal Pendant.

G. C.

XIth Ind. G-I. III Calends, October, CCCLXI
To: G-II

I. Do not concur.
II. Our currently fine relations with Tuscany would suffer and current delicate negotiations might be jeopardized if publicity were given to Captain Horatius' actions at the present time.

T. J.

XIIth Ind. G-II. VI day of November, CCCLXI
To: G-I

A report (rated D-IV), partially verified, states that Lars Porsena is very sensitive about the Horatius affair.

E. T.

XIIIth Ind. G-I. X day of November, CCCLXI
To: AG

I. In view of information contained in preceding XIth and XIIth Indorsements, you will prepare immediate orders for Captain G. C. Horatius to one of our overseas stations.

II. His attention will be directed to paragraph XII, POM, which prohibits interviews or conversations with newsmen prior to arrival at final destination.

L. T.

Rome

II Calends, April I, CCCLXII

SUBJECT: Survey, Report of DEPARTMENT OF WAR
To: Captain Gaius Caius Horatius, III Legion, V Phalanx, APO XIX, c/o Postmaster, Rome

I. Your statements concerning the loss of your shield and sword in the Tiber River on III March, CCCLX, have been carefully considered.

II. It is admitted that you were briefly in action against certain unfriendly elements on that day. However, Sergeant Spurius Lartius and Corporal Julius Herminius were in the same action and did not lose any government property.

III. The Finance Officer has been directed to reduce your next pay by II I/II talents (I III/IV talents cost of one, each, sword, officers; III/IV talent cost of one, each, shield, M-II).

IV. You are enjoined and admonished to pay strict attention to conservation of government funds and property. The budget must be balanced next year.

H. Hocus Pocus

Lieutenant of Horse, Survey Officer

47

Short Course for Military Managers

The new Army Management School aims to help commanders conduct the Army's business

ONE of a number of steps being taken to strengthen what might be called the business side of the Army, the Command Management School has been opened at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Here students get an intensive orientation in the concepts and principles governing the management of major segments of the Army. The school offers a three-week short course to senior officers and key civilian employees of the Army.

The opening of the school is evidence that the Army recognizes that every installation commander must, in effect, be a businessman if the Army's business is to be well managed. The job of the school is to help the officer who attends it become a good business manager.

The Chief of Staff, General Matthew B. Ridgway made the formal welcoming speech that opened the School. Later Assistant Secretary of the Army Charles C. Finucane spoke at a luncheon. Then the opening class, which consisted of two major generals, a brigadier general, twenty-two colonels, eight lieutenant colonels, and eight civilian employees, got down to business.

THE school is an unusual one in many ways. Take the physical plant. The students sleep, eat and study in one large brick building. Near the sleeping quarters are five lounges, each accommodating about a dozen men, where informal discussions and study sessions are held. This is particularly convenient, since the day's classes begin at 0830 and end at 2200.

Dogmatic teaching, as such, is held to a minimum. The Army assumes that the students have picked up a great deal of management knowledge in their years of Army experience. The program, as well as the actual layout of the school building, is designed to promote the free interchange of ideas.

Classes are presented by the "case method." Small groups of students, faculty members, and civilians discuss actual management situations that illustrate important problems. This teaching

method is used today by the leading civilian schools of business management.

THE opening of the Command Management School marks an important step in the development of understanding among both civilians and military men that the Army's nontactical methods as well as its fighting equipment must be kept up to date. Today's post commander is a business manager as well as a military leader. He is being given increasing authority to shift resources when necessary; he has to make up many detailed estimates and reports of his operations; he uses many highly trained civilians on the post; and the value of the funds he manages runs into millions of dollars.

With the increase in the size and complexity of the Army there came the realization that new techniques of management were needed. In 1948 the Office of the Comptroller was established to improve these techniques. Four years later, one of the Assistant Secretaries of the Army, Karl Bendetsen, directed that command management classes be included in the Army's school system. Since the results of adding this instruction would be slow to be felt, and since a cadre of senior officers who understood the fundamentals of management techniques was needed, it was decided to set up a short, concentrated course in command management.

The Comptroller of the Army retained a management consultant firm to study the problem and submit recommendations. By June 1953 it produced a plan that won Pentagon approval.

The big task was to determine the approach and scope of the school. Then a faculty had to be recruited and a physical plant obtained.

MANY suggestions were worked into the course of instruction. The program, as it was finally drawn up, consists of four phases.

General management. This covers the

relation between the installation and higher commands; the skills and tools of management; the military-civilian personnel management team; and the opportunities of building healthy community and public relations through good management.

Planning and programming. Here the students take up specific problems, with the aim of reaching a better understanding of the relationship between the Army program system, the management of installations, the Army budget, and the attendant missions and schedules relating to the allotments of funding.

Manpower management. Commanders are shown how manpower requirement policies and control techniques affect their operations.

Financial management. This concentrates on the concepts and objectives of the Army's controls and accounting techniques, and on ways in which control techniques can strengthen command.

THE staff of the school is especially well suited for its assignment. The commandant, Colonel Frank Kowalski, Jr., has had much practical experience including being chief of staff and CO of a large installation. The deputy commandant and director of instruction is Gilbert C. Jacobus, a retired Air Force colonel, who has taught graduate classes in management at George Washington University. He has also served in the Executive Office of the President and as a member of the Senior Staff of the National Security Council. The other members of the faculty have special training and experience in management.

The Command Management School promises to bring increased efficiency to the handling of the Army's vast business, and to help assure that every dollar spent on defense buys a dollar's worth of value. It will help develop field commanders who will be familiar with the conventional signs and symbols of business management as well as with the signs and symbols on military maps.

Bang! You're Dead



MAJOR THOMAS S. ARMS, JR.

A realistic umpiring system is needed for assessing casualties and destruction in atomic maneuvers. Here's a suggested system that neither gives away any secrets, nor requires you to be a physicist.

WE'VE come a long way from the broomstick and stovepipe maneuvers of 1941. Modern exercises and maneuvers come complete with an "enemy" who has his own uniforms, equipment, and doctrine, and who can usually be relied upon to follow the tactical situation and refrain from engaging in fist fights for possession of the objective. But in one sense we're right back to broomsticks and stovepipes. Our introduction of atomic warfare to maneuvers has not been a crushing success.

This is partly understandable. It is true that we have made progress in developing doctrine and staff procedures for tactical employment of atomic weapons. It is also true that the service schools are teaching the doctrine and procedures. But it is not safely possible to simulate an atomic blast—even a small one—to the extent necessary to impress troops with the enormous destructive power of the

MAJOR THOMAS S. ARMS, JR. is a 1942 graduate of the Military Academy. He completed the course at the Command & General Staff College in 1950. He is presently on duty at Fort George G. Meade, Md.

weapon. Some devices that produce explosions and small, mushroom-shaped clouds have been tried out, but there is still plenty of room for ingenuity in the physical simulation of an A-blast.

There is also another—and more important—part of the same problem. Doctrine and instruction are fine, but neither does the slightest good unless it is applied systematically. Our atomic doctrine has not been applied systematically to maneuvers, and it cannot be until a uniform system for umpiring is adopted and umpires trained to use it intelligently. Not until then will commanders and troops be able to get an accurate idea of the destructive and disorganizing capabilities of atomic weapons. Figures on effects of atomic weapons are available to authorized personnel, but there is a big difference between seeing these figures on paper and trying to plug a gap on the ground where a couple of your companies or battalions were a few minutes before.

WHAT are the requirements for an umpiring system? First, it has to be accurate without violating security.

There is little point to using atomic weapons in exercises if commanders and troops are going to get either an exaggerated or reduced picture of casualties and damage wrought by the blast.

Secondly, it has to be forcefully and uniformly applied by umpires who, having been trained in the system, can assess casualties and destruction without a lot of jawing back and forth with the commanders whose units are being chewed up.

Setting up a workable system with these characteristics is a large order. The planning has to begin at the top, at the same time that the exercise itself is laid out. A senior officer who is a graduate of a special-weapons course should sit in on all of the planning for the exercise, so that its atomic phases can be integrated realistically. Then, when an umpire planning group is formed, a special-weapons sub-section should be formed at the same time.

This sub-section has several jobs. First, at least until Department of the Army publishes uniform instructions for umpiring atomic maneuvers, it will have to prepare a set of instructions, duplicate them, and distribute them to unit umpires.

WHEN the directives and plans for the exercise have been written, the sub-section will have to prepare in overlay form a set of templates for each atomic weapon or group of yields that will be available for the exercise. (See Figure 1.) The sub-section will also have to prepare yield tables for each weapon for a ground-contaminating burst and for as many heights of burst as seem to have any point for the exercise.

These tables serve two purposes. First, used with the map template, they tell the umpire the percentage of casualties to assess against troops in different zones, beginning with ground zero and working outward (see Figure 2), and they show how much equipment in the different zones would be damaged and how badly it would be damaged. (See Figure 3.)




Figure 1: Template

Secondly, they eliminate the classification bugaboo. The man who actually prepares the templates and tables must be a trained special-weapons officer who is authorized to use classified material for his computations. Enough information about the burst is omitted from the table that unauthorized persons, even slipstick specialists, cannot work backward from the tables and come up with information they shouldn't have. This in no way affects the realism for the participating troops.

THREE more forms are also required. One is a table for the umpire to use for tagging casualties from residual radiation, if it exists. (See Figure 4.) The second is a table showing radiation dosage, which the umpire can consult if monitors with appropriate instruments

ask him for the information. (See Figure 5.) The third is a report form which will show the casualties and damage assessed from a given burst in the umpire's unit, location of the unit and ground zero of the burst, what the unit was doing at the time, and additional information the maneuver directors may want. Of course, there may be many variations of these templates and tables, depending on how much atomic play will be used in the exercise.

When the special-weapons sub-section finishes doing the preliminary paperwork, the next step is to explain it to the umpires who have to use it. This instruction in the umpire school should be given by special-weapons-trained officers who are qualified to answer the blizzard of questions the student umpires will ask about such things as the effects

Figure 2: Casualties to troops (per cent)

Z O N E	Troops in Open											
	Good Visibility		Fair Visibility		Poor Visibility		Troops in Woods		Troops in Foxholes		Troops in Tanks	
	KIA	WIA	KIA	WIA	KIA	WIA	KIA	WIA	KIA	WIA	KIA	WIA
A												
B												
C												
D												
E												
F												

ZONE	Tanks		Artillery		Vehicles		Signal		Aircraft	
	Dest.	Severe	Dest.	Severe	Dest.	Severe	Dest.	Severe	Dest.	Severe
A										
B										
C										
D										
E										
F										

Figure 3: Damage to equipment (per cent)

of the burst, types of casualties it will cause, damage to equipment, radiation effect, and interpretation of the tables.

WITH all this done, the rest is fairly simple unless the umpire starts trying to outguess the tables. His main problem will be to convince the irate commander of the 17th Balloon Regiment that he and ninety per cent of his command have just disappeared in a puff of smoke because they were too close to ground zero when Aggressor let fly with a bomb.

The umpires of units likely to be clobbered will be told through umpire channels the date and time of the burst, the ground zero, and the map template and weapons-effects tables they are supposed to use.

The umpires then count the equipment and personnel in the area and check on the positions, actions, and locations of the troops. Just before the time set for the burst, each umpire plots

his unit's location on his map, orients the proper template over ground zero, and notes the zone his unit is occupying. After the blast, he checks his tables to see how many men and pieces of equipment have been wiped out or damaged, and tags the casualties and damaged or destroyed equipment. Within four hours after the burst he tags as radiation casualties not more than ten per cent of all wounded.

If the burst leaves residual radiation, the procedure is somewhat different. If his unit is in the area at the time of burst, the umpire takes the steps that have just been outlined. In addition, he uses his table for residual radiation and tags additional casualties at the end of each hour the unit stays in the contaminated area. If the unit was out of danger at the time of the blast but moves into the area later, the umpire must also be prepared to assess residual radiation casualties.

Whether this system is the "school solution" or not remains to be seen. It was used in Exercise FLASH BURN, and it worked. More detailed reports on it have been sent forward through channels as a recommended appendix to FM 105-5 (Maneuver Control).

The important thing is not that this system or another be adopted in detail, but that atomic play be included in every tactical exercise where it is appropriate, that its effects be accurately and uniformly calculated, and that umpires be given a uniform system such as the one outlined here—a system so authoritative that unit commanders will have no choice but to accept the casualties they are assessed. If this is done, and if planning for atomic play becomes an integral part of the exercise rather than a hasty afterthought, commanders and troops will get a realistic idea of the effects of atomic weapons on every aspect of planning and operation in modern warfare.

Figure 4: Casualties from residual nuclear radiation (per cent)

Times of Entry (Hours After Burst)	Time of Stay (Hours)															
	0				1				3				5			
	1	3	5	8	1	3	5	8	1	3	5	8	1	3	5	8
Z O N E	A															
	B															
	C															
	D															
	E															
	F															

Figure 5: Ground contamination from nuclear radiation. Dose rate levels (Roentgens per hour).

Hours After Burst	ZONES					
	A	B	C	D	E	F
1/2						
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						



SEAL DESIGNED BY INFANTRY COMBAT VETERAN CHOSEN BY JUDGES IN ASSOCIATION OF U. S. ARMY'S CONTEST



MAJOR W. M. CHAPMAN

Major William M. Chapman, Infantry-USAR, was awarded the \$100 for the best design of a seal for the Association of the U. S. Army. A total of 99 entries was received. The judges were quite impressed with the general high quality of the submissions and a final decision was not easy to make. The Association is deeply appreciative of the efforts of every person who entered the contest.

Major and Mrs. Chapman and a young son live at New Castle, Del., whence he commutes to Wilmington where he is a professional advertising designer. He entered the Army as an enlisted man in 1942 and served in the Southwest Pacific with the 32d Infantry Division.

He returned to civilian life in 1946 but kept his reserve commission and is presently enrolled in the USAR School of the Delaware Military District, Wilmington.

The final decision as to whether Major Chapman's design will become the Association's official seal rests with the Executive Council of the Association which had not met to consider it at the time this issue went to press.


THE JUDGES




Mr. H. STAHLEY THOMPSON
Vice President,
Rinehart & Company
Publishers



Lt. Col.
WILLARD WEBB
Armor-USAR
Chief, Stack and Reader
Division
Library of Congress



Brig. Gen.
DONALD ARMSTRONG
U. S. A. - Retired



MAJOR IRVIN M. KENT

MAJOR SHOOT'N SALUTE

CEREBRATIONS

Land Convoys

NUMEROUS recent articles in THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL and elsewhere have discussed the tactical organization necessary for ground combat in a time of atomic plenty. While there have been numerous differences of opinion on the details, one salient fact stands out: There will be and can be no continuous, fully manned MLR in the sense of either World Wars or Korea. We are much more likely to have a very fluid front with mobile and semimobile strongpoints and task forces of either reinforced-battalion or regimental size. If we accept this our entire tactical supply setup must be radically revised.

Such a fluid front will provide many opportunities for infiltrators and partisan warriors on relatively unprotected supply facilities and columns. The day of the regimental service company and division camps sitting alone only a few miles to the rear of the front is over. So, alas, is probably the day of the MASH and other close-to-front evacuation facilities. Safety from ground attack will only lie forward within the strongpoint perimeters or way back in well policed and protected areas.

Our air-minded friends will say the obvious answer is air transport and air evacuation. They are right, but only partly so. Both will be needed for high-priority cargo, support of our own infiltrating groups, and evacuation of the most seriously wounded. But they cannot be expected to supply the front with its tremendous daily requirements of food, ammunition, POL, and replacements. These will continue to be supplied overland as in the past—but with a difference.

Supplies must be convoyed—in the naval sense of the term—and the convoys must be prepared to fight their way through and back again. Such supply columns would bring up the bulk cargoes and the replacements. Indeed, we should plan to put packets of replacements on such columns for their added fire and fighting power.

I am not advocating that armed truck companies should fight their way up

This department is designed to accommodate the short, pithy and good humored expression of ideas—radical and reactionary, new and old. We pay for all contributions published but you deserve to be put on notice that the rate of payment depends upon the originality of the subject and the quality of writing rather than length. This department is hungry for contributions, so shoot that good idea in . . . today.

alone. There are two possible solutions. One is to change the TC truck unit by assigning to it platoons or sections of armored cavalry, armored engineers, and mobile AAA. This, I imagine, will prove uneconomical, since truck units would not often need that much protection. The second, and to me preferable, solution is to make up convoys as needed, composed of TC truck units, armored cavalry, engineers, and mobile AAA. Such convoys must be under the command of a single commander whose mission would be to get the cargo through to its destination and bring them back. While this calls to mind naval tactics, it cannot be forgotten that it also was an old and respected cavalry mission during our Indian-fighting days.

On the route back, the convoy would carry salvage, prisoners, rotating personnel, wounded, and—if we can still afford that luxury—the dead. Both en route to and from destination, the convoy commander must have final responsibility for the destruction or attempted salvage of damaged vehicles and their cargoes. The job will be neither an easy nor a pleasant assignment, but it will be a vital one, requiring high skills and fortitude.

Paging Sam

THE Navy has brought back the sword. Off-post saluting is back. There are moves afoot to make the NCO something more than a private with a fatter pay envelope. It appears that the pen-

dulum is swinging back to the theory of spit, polish, discipline, and tradition.

Enlisted uniforms are becoming almost indistinguishable from officers' garb. If we're going to go back to the days when there was a difference between Os and EMs, there was, for many years, one distinguishing mark of an officer—the Sam Browne. Let's have it back.

I know many officers observed the departure of Sam Browne without even the suspicion of a tear. But who were they? They were the ones who let themselves get thick around the middle, so the belt rode like a brassiere instead of covering the web belt, like it should. They were the ones who couldn't find time to give the belt the loving care that was required to keep it looking its best. They were the ones who bought a cheap belt at Gus's Army and Navy Store and wondered why the belt never looked as good as the ones the sharply dressed officers wore so proudly.

A real officer, the hard, lean leader of men, the man who couldn't understand anything less than perfection, wore his Sam Browne proudly. This type of officer didn't gripe when the CO ordered that all Sam Brownes would match his own—he bought another like the CO's or went into his trunk and brought out another one that would fill the bill. He felt that the CO had certain privileges—and when he got to be a CO, as he fully expected, he could be as hard and demanding, assured in his knowledge that he had conformed when he was a junior.

But now that the pendulum is swinging back to making soldiering a way of life—hurrah!—or a profession, instead of an escape from Selective Service, let's go all the way. Let's impress everyone with the idea that officers are different, and that there are no poor officers. The Sam Browne can be the first blow in the campaign.

A Break for the Good Draftee

IN these days of determined and somewhat desperate effort to improve the reenlistment rate, it seems to me that we are missing a bet in not being able to

make sufficiently definite commitments to a good man who is about to be discharged and who might reenlist if the prospects were a bit more attractive. I am thinking particularly of the draftee nearing the end of his first hitch.

I know a young man who illustrates the point. He is a corporal, high school graduate, basic training infantry, upright and intelligent and a good physical specimen. He is a military chauffeur in Europe. Very shortly he will go back to a small Kansas town, to drive a laundry truck.

If I were his combat-unit commander I would take this man tomorrow as a tank gunner or assistant squad leader and would be confident of a first-class performance of duty, in either capacity, after a 30-day break-in period. In six months I would accept him as a tank commander or squad leader, and be happy to have him. But as things stand I can't offer him a thing. He wants to go back to the States, but if he should reenlist there he may be given *no* firm promises of where he may be assigned, nor any indication that he will be promoted. He must build his reputation as a worthy soldier all over again, at a place he may not want to go, with a strange company commander. So he says to hell with it.

My proposal, therefore, is this: that the Army set up a system whereby unusually good men of grade lower than E5 may after a certain period of service be put in a separate "especially desirable" category and as members of that category be given preferential treatment upon reenlistment.

I would expect no more than fifteen to twenty per cent of all men to qualify. The definition of what constitutes an "especially desirable" man can easily be drawn up. Based on these specifications, original recommendation by a company commander and approving action by a battalion commander would be enough to place a man in the select bracket. Officers recommending too many men *not* especially desirable would be subject to censure for poor judgment. In any case, the percentage could be kept at a proper level through normal administrative action.

Either the commanding officer of a soldier leaving a unit or a recruiting officer at a separation point would be privileged to commit the Army firmly as to the man's assignment and promotion, both within reasonable limits. He should be given practically unlimited choice as to geographic assignment, as much latitude as possible in choice of branch, and a one-grade promotion on the spot.

He should also be presented with a letter to his new CO acquainting him with the fact that he is the lucky recipient of a good man.

Why not? Such a system commits the new company commander no more than sending him any other NCO. The administration of the system would not be difficult. And the end result, I am confident, would be a higher rate of reenlistment of the better men—desirable for many reasons, including economic.

I don't think giving one man preferential treatment over the next has any undesirable aspects. The crying need of the Army is for good men, and the good man wants a clear differentiation made between himself and the run-of-the-mill.

BRIG. GEN. HAMILTON H. HOWZE

The Question of Status

COLONEL Dupuy's warm and absorbing "Pass in Review" [October] hit the bull's-eye in many places, especially when it observed that "the sight of a group of other officers, including colonels of thirty years' service, bent low under the burden of their own bedding roll and baggage, bobbing like a line of weary stevedores past crowds of staring, much amused enlisted men, was helpful neither to the self-esteem of the one nor the discipline of the other."

The spectacle of senior field-grade officers making like replacements with twelve weeks' service may be in keeping with the times, but I don't see it that way. If it was part of the Army's effort to appear democratic, it boomeranged, for the Army drew more brickbats than its more autocratic sister service for being undemocratic. Moreover, the Army's penchant for treating its officers and senior noncoms like recruits helped bring on our current troubles.

My journey to the Korean front via the replacement pipeline demonstrated to me the Army's knack for making and keeping bad habits. The sight of bird colonels dragging their own B-bags and making their own cots in the Port of Embarkation barracks was only the foretaste of a trip that seemed deliberately designed to deflate the self-confidence and prestige of officers on their way to assume troop command. Contact with all ranks at the various stops in the replacement pipeline brought some solace—we discovered that we were all treated like recruits. Only when most of us finally arrived in a division did we feel that we had a place in the Army. Later as a battalion commander I found it commonplace to have experienced noncoms come to the outfit indiscriminately packaged with the rawest reinforcements.

The Army has borrowed much from business, but the way it treats its commissioned and noncommissioned soldiers is consistent neither with good business practice nor with military wisdom. No corporation would ever think of treating its medium-level executives (Army field-grade officers) or its factory foremen (the Army noncoms) in a way that has become all too customary.

Before World War II an officer or a first-three-grader was somebody—at least in the Army. Inside the Army it is still possible to restore the pride and status of those who serve. If we don't, we'll become, to borrow a British phrase, an army of generals, colonels, and other ranks.

LT. COL. HERD

Shooting Can Be Fun

KOREA taught us the value of accurate marksmanship. Spraying the landscape with unaimed fire did not stop the enemy. All it did was cause our soldiers to run out of ammunition. Increased attention has been given to marksmanship training in the last few years, and there has been an improvement, but the standard of shooting still leaves much to be desired.

From hours spent on rifle ranges I have determined that the most common fault is the way young and inexperienced officers and noncoms introduce men to the rifle and shooting. It is considered merely a chore which must be accomplished. No effort is exerted to make it enjoyable or interesting. The unit commander should tell his men that they are going to engage in a form of training that will be fun. He should tell them that almost anyone can be a good shot, and that many of them can become experts. He should also tell them that a noncommissioned officer should be able to shoot well.

Expert riflemen should be paid for their skill. Why not reduce the pay of all recruits \$20 a month, and then raise the pay by that amount for those who qualify as experts? In addition, the unit commander should award prizes to individuals who shoot well on the various ranges. Rifle marksmanship must be made a genuine sport and recreation if we are to succeed in raising it to the standards desired and instilling the soldier with confidence in his weapon.

The next serious fault which has crept into our rifle marksmanship training is the universal practice of rushing the soldier through his course of instruction. Eighty hours are allotted to rifle marksmanship in our basic training programs. This should be ample for the

average intelligent soldier, but the results would indicate otherwise.

To the average young training officer today, accustomed to the eight-hour day, eighty hours of training time represents just ten days of rifle instruction. Consequently, when he makes out his training schedules, he schedules ten consecutive days of rifle marksmanship. If he sees in the training program that sixteen hours are allotted to preliminary firing and eight hours to record practice, he schedules three days of range firing. His whole company of 200 men must go out and fire preliminary and record in three days. Consequently, he hurries to the range, he hurries to get each order on line, and hurries to get them off. The individual firer consumes only a small fraction of the day in firing, and he is hurried through that. Each man does not get eighty hours, but only a portion of it. He has little or no time to think about his errors, much less correct them.

It is well known that if a subject is spread over many days, instead of being concentrated in a short period, the pupil retains more of what he is taught. So why not spread this instruction of eighty hours over twenty days, with four hours of training a day, or have a two-hour period each day for forty days? There might be difficulties in scheduling the training and securing the range, but they can be overcome. If we spend five thousand dollars to give a soldier basic training and he fails to stop the enemy because of poor marksmanship, we have failed.

Another glaring mistake is the manner in which firing positions are taught. The soldier is told to take a prescribed position as shown in the manual. Although this is technically correct, it should be explained to the soldier that the best positions are comfortable positions. Explain to him that the prescribed positions have been found best for the majority of men, but that he may require a slight variation. Any position may be used if he can hit the target. Tell him that the sling is useful to give him support, but do not put him in too tight a sling. Let the sling be loose at first, and let him tighten it up as his muscles become accustomed to it.

Instructors who possess patience and calmness are required for good rifle marksmanship training. They must insist that each step in this training be mastered. The man must be taught how to zero his rifle, even if it takes three times as many rounds as the nine now prescribed. Zeroing of the rifle with a sandbag rest is helpful to the new soldier. It proves to him that his rifle fires accurately,

but it is up to him to hold, aim, and squeeze in order to be a good shot.

A final point: Our rifle marksmanship training manual is too long. Few soldiers read it completely. Let's return to our short manual of pre-World War II. More people will read it, and some of it will stick. Ten or fifteen pages would be the ideal length, for this much could be absorbed, retained and used.

If these simple factors are applied to our marksmanship training, it is felt that the vast majority of our soldiers can be made into good or superior rifle marksmen. As many old soldiers know, these techniques are not new; we have just forgotten them.

COL. ROBERT L. COOK

Driver Badges

A RECENT check at a large post revealed that no unit on that post had awarded badges to drivers or mechanics in recent years. Few members of the administrative staffs knew that the driver badge was an item of issue. A quartermaster clerk had checked his stock records and reported that he had the badges in stock, but "nobody uses them any more." What has happened to our unit pride? Where is the soldier who once proudly turned out for inspection on Saturday morning with his badges brightly shined and prominently displayed on his chest? Are we too busy today to recognize a job well done?

The driver and mechanic badges, described in detail in AR 600-70, have been standard awards for many years and are awarded in recognition of a soldier's special qualification, just as marksmanship badges are awarded.

Driver and mechanic badges should form part of every unit's safety program. They are a goal toward which all drivers and mechanics can work; they are a mark of distinction that any commanding officer of the grade of lieutenant colonel or higher can award to deserving drivers. The timely awarding of driver badges helps build unit pride which in turn produces good safety records. It is a means of setting the man apart and giving him individual attention.

The manner of presenting awards has much to do with the pride (or lack of pride) with which they are worn. Unit commanders should remember that the driver badge is a coveted honor to a soldier *only* if his officers consider and treat it as such. If the awarding ceremony is a haphazard toss across the first sergeant's desk, the driver will probably not wear the badge. But if the battalion or regimental commander personally presents the badge at a unit parade and

invites the badge winner to take the review alongside him, the badge's prestige will be established.

We all know how costly vehicle accidents are in money and lives. The driver badge is another weapon we can use in attacking this menace. Properly used, these awards might save the reputation of a unit commander and his outfit as well as lives and money. Let's get them out of the warehouse and onto the chests of deserving soldiers.

COL. JAMES W. MILNER

Twin Firing Charts

A RTILLERYMEN can increase their batteries' firing speed, accuracy, and safety by using two firing charts instead of one in the battery fire direction center. Ignoring charges that it was not practical, we tried this system, and found that we liked it.

Here is the way it is done. When we go into a new position, we have the computer set up a firing chart on a normal grid sheet. We also have one of the radio-telephone operators set up a duplicate chart on a battle map.

When a fire mission comes in, the computer acts as a horizontal control operator and determines the firing data by the use of a Rizza Fan. The other chart operator acts as a vertical control operator. He computes the site and then checks to see if the firing data of the horizontal control operator are correct. He sounds off, of course, if he catches a mistake. The recorder relays commands to the guns and does his recording in the normal way.

The only extra equipment needed is the two Rizza Fans. No additional men are required. The computer, recorder, and two radio-telephone operators that are authorized are sufficient to make the system work. For replacements there are the two artillery mechanics, a driver, and the chief of the firing battery, just to mention those in firing battery headquarters.

There are several advantages to this system. First, you get a double check on firing data. It should give the Exec such a sense of security that he can more easily get away from the FDC to check on the rest of the firing battery.

In addition, the system makes it possible to engage two targets simultaneously. It enables two persons to receive training in the plotting of live firing data. It can give a new chart operator training in determining real fire data—putting him under the gun, so to speak—without taking a chance of having a round land on the battalion commander.

LT. JOHN H. VANSTON

THE WORD FROM THE SCHOOLS

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Graphical Firing Table Fans

Production of one thousand plastic commercial models of the GFT fan for the 105mm and 155mm howitzers was completed during November 1954. These fans are being issued through normal Ordnance supply channels to all active army 105mm and 155mm howitzer battalions stationed in the United States. Units of the U.S. Seventh Army will also receive a limited number of these fans.

These GFT fans are on sale at the Book Department, TAS. They sell for \$16 prepaid. Orders for the GFT Fan should specify the caliber of the weapon with which the equipment is to be used.

THE ENGINEER SCHOOL

Signal Instruction

By installing six "vehicular mounted" AN/GRC-9 radios in a room, TES's Communications Section has been able to overcome many of the problems relative to teaching signal communications. Power is supplied by regular storage batteries that are located outside the building. Power cords leading from the floor boards connect the batteries to the PE 237 power supply units. A battery charger housed in the building keeps the lead-acid storage batteries on a continuous floating charge while the sets are in operation.

This arrangement has several advantages: Instructional facilities are available at all times; it is no longer necessary to mount the equipment in a fleet of vehicles; and there are fewer distractions in a classroom than there would be in the case of outdoor instruction.

For Bridge Builders

TES has recently made available to qualified persons Special Text 5-261-1, "Introduction to Nonstandard Fixed Highway Bridges." It can be bought from the Book Department for \$41 (including mailing costs). The buyer must state his name, rank, and serial number, and must present a certificate from his unit commander stating that the text is to be used in pursuit of military duties.

Special Text 5-261-1 covers bridge and vehicle classification and design, construction procedures, planning, and organization. It also contains data on vehicle classification and beam characteristics.

The following special texts are also available at TES:

ST 5-7-1	Engineers in Atomic Warfare	\$.13
ST 5-32-2	Land Mines	.39
ST 5-260-1A	Nonstandard Military Fixed Bridges	1.00

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Experimental Films

A number of experimental training films, each containing one teaching point, has been produced at TIS. They are primarily designed to instruct newly inducted soldiers in fundamentals, or other personnel in "hard to teach" subjects. The films range from five to ten minutes in length.

Training films of this type are inexpensive and easy to produce and may prove extremely valuable as a training medium. The films are currently being previewed and analyzed at TIS to determine their teaching effectiveness.

Subjects include: Driver's Maintenance of Battery; Calibrating and Tuning, Radio Set, AN/PRC-10; Reciprocal Laying, 81mm Mortar; Wearing Individual Parachute Equipment; Position and Grip, Machine Gun M1916A6 on M2 Tripod; Bolt Locking Adjustment, Machine Gun M1919A1 and A6, and Machine Gun Clinometer M1917.

New Training Films

Dismounted Drill, TF 7-1947, 33 minutes. Drill fundamentals for the squad and platoon, replacing an older film on the subject.

Observation of Mortar Fire by the Combat Soldier, TF 7-1729, 41 minutes. The first training film to be produced on mortar observation by the front-line soldier.

Distribution of these films is anticipated the early part of this year. For the exact date, check your local film library.

Ranger Course Revamped

The Ranger Course (objective: the development of small-unit combat leaders) has undergone some changes.

Ranger training now consists of a seven-week course which is divided into three phases. The first, or Fort Benning phase, is concerned with laying the academic and physical groundwork for the rigorous practical training in the succeeding phases. Emphasis is placed on map reading and demolitions, as well as physical development subjects such as hand-to-hand combat, bayonet, and physical training.

The Ranger Camp in Florida is the site of the second phase, which includes swamp, jungle, and amphibious training. The final phase is conducted in the mountains of North Georgia. At these two camps the students are subjected to the most realistic combat training possible. The patrol is the principal vehicle of instruction and it is while acting as a patrol leader that the student's leadership abilities are tested.

Basic Infantry Officer and Officer Candidate graduates may skip the Fort Benning phase of instruction if they graduated from those courses no more than six weeks before the start of a Ranger class.

New Unit Designations

After four years of service in Korea, the 3rd Infantry Division returned to Fort Benning on 3 December. The Marne Division colors have replaced those of the 47th Infantry Division, which reverted to state control as a National Guard unit.

Men assigned to the 47th Division at the time of transfer have been integrated into the 3rd Division. Major General Haydon L. Boatner, who commanded the 47th Division at the time of the change, now commands the 3rd Division.

In another "transfer" that involved only the designation of units, not troops, the 30th Infantry Regiment became the 29th. This regiment is used as a demonstration and experimental outfit for TIS. The 29th Infantry was stationed at Fort Benning from 1919 to 1943.

THE AA & GM SCHOOL



Hinman Hall Dedicated

THE home of the Antiaircraft Artillery arm at Fort Bliss, Texas—"where the tactics and techniques of the weapons of the future are being developed today"—a beautiful and useful new academic and administrative building, capable of handling more than 2,000 students, was dedicated on 23 November. General John E. Dahlquist, Chief of Army Field Forces, was the principal speaker.

The building, named Hinman Hall in honor of the late Brigadier General Dale Durkee Hinman, has 59 classrooms of 50-man capacity, some of which can be converted into 100-man classrooms; a library and reading room; two communications laboratories; twelve basic electronics laboratories; an auditorium; snack bars; and administrative offices.

The building was begun during the time that Lt. Gen. Stanley R. Mickelsen was Commandant. The present Commandant is Maj. Gen. Paul W. Rutledge. Brig. Gen. R. R. Hendrix is Assistant Commandant and Brig. Gen. Earl W. Heathcote is Deputy Commander of the AA & GM Center.



MAJOR GENERAL PAUL W. RUTLEDGE
Commanding General,
The AA & GM Center

THE MONTH'S MAIL

(Continued from page 9)

unit spirit, you have a fighting group; and fighting groups win wars.

MAJ. RALPH S. CROSKY
Philadelphia, Pa.

• Your October issue was superb. Colonel Dupuy writes a classic story. In connection with his theme, it makes me wonder if the Association could not convince the Army that there is still time to rebuild an *esprit*. Whether we ever have a regimental *esprit* based on British lines is immaterial, but we do need more . . .

PAUL IASIGI

2208 Ninth St.
Lubbock, Tex.

• Your Fiftieth Anniversary issue provided many of us here with an enjoyable and informative period of reading.

Colonel Dupuy . . . places the Army in its correct historical and social perspective

within the larger history of the United States in the past fifty years. The spirit of simplicity and honesty of the "Cloistered Army: 1904-16" was brilliantly recaptured, and the confusions and triumphs of the "Semi-cloistered Army: 1920-40" brought back many memories. Certainly, the message that the modern army needs to discover and *recapture* the spirit of the past army, that spirit which provided the motivation and drive for the successes of World War II, should be carried to the soldier and to the civilian of today; an outstanding work like this of Colonel Dupuy's can well serve that need.

LT. GEN. H. I. HODES

Hq. VII Corps
APO 107, New York, N. Y.

• I should like to offer my very heartiest congratulations on the anniversary issue. . . . Colonel Dupuy's contribution was a masterly condensation of a fine record, and

an admirable piece of writing. The thing that was particularly notable was the many points of contact between the experience of your Army and our own, in both a service and a domestic sense.

I am old enough to have done my first soldiering back in the early days of the century, when small "native" wars were all we had to worry about. And it is amazing how our little problems of those days were paralleled by those with which your Forces had to contend.

Colonialism is now out of date, if we are to believe the "humanists," but while it existed it proved a wonderful school for soldiering!

Colonel Dupuy's illuminating story is one I shall put by and often con over again.

MAJ. REGINALD HARGREAVES
British Army, Retired

Wotton St. Lawrence
Nr. Basingstocke, Hants,
England

THE MONTH'S BOOKS

The Past in Color

SOLDIERS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY: 1775-1954
Drawings by Fritz Kredel; Text by Frederick P. Todd
Henry Regnery Company, 1954
144 Pages; \$12.50

Reviewed by

N. J. ANTHONY

Many Americans whose forebears saw military service in "the old country" can remember hours spent in admiring the color drawings in the "soldier picture books" those men treasured. But who can recall a similar collection depicting American soldiers? Not until 1886 did one Army agency get around to publishing a limited edition of such a work. This unhandy volume of handsome drawings that traced the evolution of the Regular's uniform was supplemented by loose sheets in 1908. Copies are extremely rare. There were no books extant on the subject until Messrs. Kredel and Todd published the first edition of their work in 1940. That edition too is a rarity.

Now they come up with a new work, having examined each plate and made necessary alterations and additions. The authors don't pretend to record the evolution of our military uniform. Each of their thirty-two plates shows two or more typical soldiers at selected periods of our history. None is repeated from the old official volumes, and none has been sketched before. These soldiers look alive, and Colonel Todd's commentary leaves no detail of dress or equipment unexplained.

Kredel and Todd concentrate on the combat soldier. Except for a plate on the WAC, one on bands, and another on the USMA cadet, we have representations of doughboys, gunners, and troopers, with some special-purpose people mixed in. They come from regulars, "common" militia, organized state forces, Volunteer units, and the Confederacy. The Civil War period provided the greatest variety in design, for colonels of Volunteer and state units vied with one another in striving for originality, a great many favoring the gaudy, baggy-pants Zouave outfits which, as Todd remarks, had by 1860

become a "widespread craze." But the demands of field service soon forced conversion to regulation blues. Adoption of the current, more practical khaki for combat came with the Spanish-American War.

Here are a few points of interest from the great many detailed in drawings and text. The only articles of uniform that have been preserved are the grays, crossbelts and tarbuckets (the uniform of the Regular infantry of 1814) worn by cadets at West Point and other military academies. What appear to have been at one time noncoms' inverted chevrons are not insignia of rank, but hash marks. The saber as part of the uniform has passed on, as well as epaulettes as insignia of rank. The plate reproducing U.S. infantry of 1862 shows the first use of unit (patch) insignia. The soldier with the solid sphere patch on

his hat, were his unit today "owned" by I Corps, would wear the same insignia on his left sleeve, but its color would be black instead of red. The use of ornate costumes declined between the Civil War and 1898, although a few local units still maintain a traditional and stately dress for ceremonies. Hirsute adornment seems to have gone out of fashion after the adoption of khaki.

Let's hope that as times require there will be succeeding editions. Messrs. Kredel and Todd rate the thanks of all military students for their superb work.

The Malayan Unpleasantness

THE COMMUNIST MENACE IN MALAYA
By Harry Miller
Frederick A. Praeger, 1954
248 Pages; Index; \$3.50

Reviewed by

MAJOR PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER

At last the recent story of Malaya is told comprehensively and well. The cruel, disheartening war in Malaya has gone on for seven years without ever being called officially "a war." The British public authorities have insisted on terming the fighting "an emergency," chiefly—I was told four years ago in Kuala Lumpur—to avoid the changes that would go into effect in British insurance policies if the legal concept of "war" were invoked.

Harry Miller presents an outstanding accomplishment in book-length journalism without digressing, as do so many newspapermen when tempted by hard covers, into pretentious history or sententious editorializing. The book has a good index and a skimpy glossary, but no other academic machinery. There are no footnotes and it is up to the reader to accept or to reject the book as a whole, since it is impossible to recheck his statements one by one.

The book should be accepted. Most of the sources cannot be checked, anyhow, since they obviously stem from first-hand conversations with participants or observers of the struggle for the peninsula.

The author starts his book with the background of Malayan Communism, including a description

of the role played by a sinister character named Yuan Ai-Kuo in Mandarin Chinese, Nguen Ai Quoc in Vietnamese. This man helped form the Chinese-dominated Communist movement of the South Seas in 1930. Today he plays a bigger role on the world scene under the name of Ho Chi-minh.

While the author's sympathies are British, they are not at all provincial or chauvinistic. He has a humane and civilized respect for the Chinese who make up one side of his story. It is a tribute to official British secretiveness, which sometimes surpasses our own official talents for burying military and political blunders, along with other assorted dead cats deleterious to official reputation, in the bottomless abysses of classified files, that even Mr. Miller

could not get the true story of the joint British-and-Communist destruction of the Malayan Kuomintang. First the Kuomintang did not exist; then they were pro-Japanese; then they were bandits; then they did not exist. Mr. Miller follows Spencer Chapman in writing of the KMT guerrillas of wartime Malaya, and crediting only the Communists for success.

The lesson to be learned from wartime Malaya is that victory is *not* the justification of *any* means whatever. While the Allies in Europe were throwing away lives by refusing anything but "unconditional surrender," the British (with respect to Malaya) and the Americans (with respect to Manchuria) purchased Communist help at a fearful price. Miller points out the military rules which the Chinese Communists

in Malaya have adopted from China for the good welfare of their infantrymen; he does not point out that in tactics and operational doctrine the Sino-Malayan Communists have remained much more the heirs of the British secret "Force 136" than of the Chinese mainland "Eighth Route Army." The enemy of Britain and of peace—for Malaya—is British-trained.

I visited Malaya in July and August of 1950, in September of 1951, and in February and April of 1954. I interviewed many of the persons whom Miller describes, all the way from that last of the British proconsuls, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, over to the brilliant ex-Communist and anti-Communist agitator, Lam Swee. I can testify that the eulogy given Sir Henry Gurney, who was murdered by a Com-

A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 64 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION MANUAL, revised edition. By C. H. Gibbs-Smith. John de Graff, Inc., 1954. 239 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$2.50. A standard work in Britain brought up to date and now to be distributed in this country through an American publisher.

BENT'S FORT. By David Lavender. Doubleday & Company, 1954. 450 Pages; Index; \$5.50. A well documented, readable history to join the flood of historical accounts of the Southwest which are coming off the presses in fairly great numbers.

THE COMMUNIST MENACE IN MALAYA. By Harry Miller. Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. 248 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.50. A Singapore-born newspaperman offers some superior reporting on the little known (in America) but bloody and destructive war that the Communists brought to the Malay peninsula.

ESSENTIALS OF MILITARY TRAINING. The Military Service Publishing Co., 1954. 905 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00. The sixth edition of what appears to be the lineal descendant of the prewar ROTC manuals. Contains much basic information for the recruit or officer aspirant, but would be of most value for use in classes which have a competent instructor.

FIRST COMMONWEALTH DIVISION. By Brigadier C. N. Barclay. Gale & Polden, Ltd., 1954. 236 Pages; Illustrated; Index. An unofficial history of the famous British formation that earned undying fame in Korea. The author is the editor of *The Army Quarterly*. Typically British in its thoroughness and understatement; a fair assessment of a great division's contribution in Korea.

THE FLOATING WORLD: The Story of Japanese Prints. By James A. Michener. Random House, 1954. 403 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$8.75. This history and back-

ground of Japanese prints by a perceptive and sensitive writer should be of value to military families who have become interested in or have collected this form of art. Contains many illustrations, some in color.

GENERAL JO SHELBY: Undefeated Rebel. By Daniel O'Flaherty. University of North Carolina Press, 1954. 437 Pages; Index; \$6.00. A biography of the Southern cavalry general, highly respected by his Union opponents.

KOREAN IN A HURRY. By Samuel E. Martin. Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1954. 137 Pages; \$1.50. "Hurry" is of course a relative term when dealing with a language as much different from our own as Korean. Well organized but written for those who have a fair formal grounding in English.

A LONG LINE OF SHIPS: Mare Island's Century of Naval Activity in California. By Arnold S. Lott, Lt. Comdr., USN. U. S. Naval Institute, 1954. 268 Pages; Illustrated; Appendix; \$4.95. Mare Island's hundred-year history. The photographs are particularly attention-compelling, especially those that go back to Civil War days.

THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION. By Wilbur Schramm. University of Illinois Press, 1954. 586 Pages; Index; \$6.00. A text for those interested in reaching great numbers of people with a sales message, whether the sale be one of products, political ideas, psychological warfare, etc. Useful for those whose fields of interest lie in propaganda, psychological warfare, politics and advertising.

REBEL PRIVATE FRONT AND REAR. By William Andrew Fletcher; Edited by Bell I. Wiley. University of Texas Press, 1954. 162 Pages; Index; \$3.75. The personal story of a Confederate enlisted man in the Civil War. Honest, humorous and readable.

THE RED CARPET. By Marshall McDuffie. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1955. 330 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.50. A travelogue with photographs of Soviet Russia, 1953. The writer, no lover of Communism and no Communist, tries to be objective but that is rather difficult. He emphasizes the difference between the people and their rulers.

SOLDIERS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY, 1775-1954. By Fritz Kredel and Frederick P. Todd. Henry Regnery Company, 1954. \$12.50. The long-awaited pictorial history of American uniforms, done in full color. An excellent gift volume for the soldier (even for your favorite soldier, yourself).

THERE IS NO ASIA. By Dwight Cooke. Doubleday & Company, 1954. 320 Pages; \$4.00. A former *Time* writer and editor and present CBS commentator writes of life in the territory which we are prone to lump together as Asia.

THIS IS OKINAWA. By Willard J. Howland and "Blackie" Bradford. Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1954. 71 Pages; Illustrated; \$1.50. A picture book in *Life* style including 180 photographs. A must for those who contemplate duty at that outpost.

TOKYO AND POINTS EAST. By Keyes Beech. Doubleday & Company, 1954. 255 Pages; \$3.50. A Pulitzer Prize winning Far Eastern correspondent for the Chicago *Daily News* and co-author of *Uncommon Valor* offers some impressions of an overseas correspondent's life and thoughts while covering several Far Eastern wars. The book includes some stirring material from the Korean war as well as personal reminiscences that never got into the newspapers.

THE NATION'S NATIONAL GUARD. National Guard Association of the United States, 1954. 119 Pages; Illustrated; \$2.50. A series of addresses by National Guard leaders tracing the history and development of the National Guard through the present day.



THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

munist ambush on 7 October 1951, is (if anything), not strong enough. The description of the ambush itself is an admirable lesson in Communist tactics and military ethics; Miller gives the best report on that to be seen in print.

Miller concludes by demonstrating that no antiguerrilla operation can succeed without an appropriate mixture of sustained intimidation combined with reasonable openings for reconciliation of the majority. He gives due credit to Sir Gerald Templer for the magnificent progress made in pacifying Malaya and he brings the story down to date by describing the British and Communist sides right down to recent months. On the British side Sir Donald MacGillivray has taken over from Templer. The country is now safe enough for vacationists to go on motor tours; on the Communist side there is real attrition.

This particular emergency is ending. Miller concludes by warning that Malaya is endemically ridden with problems. The long future of the unhappy country is still by no means settled. Malays and Chinese must still coexist, with or without Communism. They must, but can they?

Impressions and Memories

TOKYO AND POINTS EAST
By Keyes Beech
Doubleday & Company, 1954
255 Pages; \$3.75

Reviewed by

MAJOR ORVILLE C. SHIREY

This is the kind of book a man with a bad case of insomnia can often write in his mind between the hours of midnight and 0600—particularly if he has had an eventful life.

Keyes Beech's life has been eventful. He was a Marine Corps combat correspondent and made the landings at Tarawa and Iwo Jima, was a Far East correspondent for the *Chicago Daily News* when the Korean conflict broke out, won a Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of it, came back to the States and was invited to write a book. He was, he says, flattered until "I discovered that all editors want everyone to write a book on the theory that someone might write one that will sell."

Within a general chronological framework of his coverage of the MacArthur occupation of Japan and of the Korean episode, Beech has written some twenty vaguely connected or vaguely disconnected stories, impressions, memories and introspective pieces. Most of them are about the Korean conflict and its practitioners.

There are also some really fine stories on MacArthur and the occupation. In a very few pages, Beech manages to give a better-balanced picture of the General and what he accomplished than the reader is likely to get from a good many recent books on the subject. While viewing SCAP and some of its activities with a notable lack of enthusiasm, he concludes that MacArthur, though only mortal, is a great man.

It is, in fact, possible to sum up Beech on MacArthur with a phrase by Max Ways, *Time* editor, quoted in the book: "Never underestimate a man just because he overestimates himself."

There is some fine material here from the Korean fighting. Beech and two other correspondents, for example, were on the Han River bridge when it was blown in the first evacuation of Seoul. His description of the evacuation of the city, the blowing of the bridge and their eventual escape on a Korean-powered raft bring alive for the reader the reports of the early days of the war.

Beech was also with the 5th Marines on their withdrawal from Hagaru to the sea, and his account of the dogged courage and suffering of the men who fought their way out is great reporting.

But most moving—and perhaps most important for the future—is an essay titled "The Pavlov Technique," on the men who "confessed" to bacteriological warfare. Most of the space is a transcript of the account of Colonel Walker M. Mahurin, a great fighter pilot with 22 World War II kills to his credit, one of those who confessed. Reading it, one can get the full impact of the tragedy of these people. Men like Mahurin are neither weaklings nor cowards. Many of them are skilled professionals whose services we can ill afford to lose. The question is: how do we go about preparing others for the ordeal they may have to undergo in any future conflict? Beech gives no answer. We wonder, in fact, whether there is an answer.

Taken all together, this is a thoroughly fascinating book. Keyes Beech has spent a good part of his professional career among soldiers, and they can profitably read what he has to say.

War—The Dominant Factor

A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD:
From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Lepanto
By Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller
Funk & Wagnalls, 1954
\$6.00; 602 Pages; Maps; Index

Reviewed by

BRIG. GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG

In 1940 the publication of Major General J. F. C. Fuller's *Decisive Battles* provided a much needed corrective to the neglect of war in histories written by Americans. In this country our historians were inclined to crowd war off their pages and to belittle our military past.

Today there is greater awareness of the value of military history and the need for studying it. Few will quarrel with General Fuller's comment in his preface that "we live in a state of 'wardom'—a condition in which war dominates all other human activities. How long this tension will last, whether there is a definite answer to it, or whether it is destined blindly to work out its own end, no man can say; yet one thing is certain, and it is that the more we study the history of war, the more we shall be able to understand war itself, and, see-

ing that it is now the dominant factor, until we do understand it, how can we hope to regulate human affairs?" General Fuller is a guide who writes with authority and understanding.

This is the first of a three-volume history which will be the most comprehensive study in English of warfare in the Western world. Judging from this volume, and from the many earlier works on military affairs written by General Fuller, this encyclopedic study will be essential for even the most meager military library. It is a scholarly work, based on the best authorities extant, and, as was to be expected, it is well written and readable. Furthermore, it is an objective history, letting facts speak for themselves and not marshalling them to prove a thesis. Unfortunately the outline maps that were included in his 1940 book are omitted, and this necessitates having at hand a historical atlas to understand the strategic situations. The tactical sketches are ordinarily adequate for the purpose.

In comparing this volume with the 1940 book, it is evident that General Fuller has not merely revised *Decisive Battles*. This is a carefully rewritten and greatly expanded study. For example, the present volume, beginning with Megiddo in 1479 B.C. and ending with the Battle of Lepanto in A.D. 1571, has 578 pages of text while the earlier book has only 316 pages devoted to the same period.

Battles on land and sea that altered the course of history are the points at which General Fuller arrests his narrative to describe in appropriate detail the how and why of victory and defeat, and the strategy and tactics involved. The important contribution of this book, however, is the background of a succinct account of general history, showing the political, social and economic forces which created the environment and brought about the wars. There is a welcome awareness of the interaction of culture with the weapons, tactics and organization of military establishments. Grand strategy is not neglected, and since General Fuller clearly understands the influence on history of the Great Man, he has much to say about the military leaders.

Undoubtedly one of the most useful by-products of reading this book is a better understanding of the psychology of military leadership. Brief biographical sketches and character analyses of the masters of strategy and tactics, too frequently overlooked in military histories, add materially to the value of General Fuller's study. There is ample evidence, in consequence, of the truth of Carlyle's belief that "history is the essence of innumerable biographies."

General Fuller shows conclusively that single battles have frequently decided the outcome of a war, but sometimes we are in doubt whether luck or skill brought about a victory. That being the case, the lessons of this book support those opposed to deterministic thinking—to historical laws such as those defined by Spengler. Let us hope that in our own country it will be a

Ten Distinguished Military Books of 1954

The Editors of *The Army Combat Forces Journal* cite these ten books for their distinguished contribution to military literature

Cavalry of the Sky

By Lynn Montross

The story of the development of the helicopter, with emphasis on the contribution of the U.S. Marine Corps.

Combat Actions in Korea

By Major Russell A. Gugeler

An authentic picture of men at war that shows courage and cowardice, skill and error, with equal force and honesty.

Command Missions

By Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.

A memoir by a World War II commander in North Africa and Europe, unusual for its vigor and frankness.

Communist Guerilla Warfare

By Brigadier C. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn

A closely documented study of guerilla and anti-guerilla warfare in Russia during World War II.

General Dean's Story

As told to William L. Worden by Major General William F. Dean

A moving account of the life of a man who fought for his country both on the battlefield and in a Communist prison.

A Military History of the Western World

By Major General J. F. C. Fuller

A definitive work covering warfare from earliest times to the late sixteenth century.

Nemesis of Power

By John W. Wheeler-Bennett

The story of how the German General Staff dabbled in politics between 1918 and 1945, told in vivid detail.

They Called Him Stonewall

By Burke Davis

The first modern biography of Thomas J. Jackson, the magnificent Confederate battle leader.

U. S. Army in World War II: Logistical Support of the Armies, ETO, Volume I

By Roland G. Ruppenthal

An extremely valuable study of logistics that candidly weighs both successes and mistakes.

U. S. Army in World War II: The Supreme Command

By Forrest C. Pogue

A thorough and coldly objective account of the command direction of the largest and by far the most complex military organization ever created.

convincing argument for adequate military force and the highest intellectual effort on the part of professional men as well as laymen to help solve the problems of war and peace.

Anatomy of Espionage

WAR OF WITS
By Ladislav Farago
Funk & Wagnalls, 1954
388 Pages; Index; \$5.00

Reviewed by

COLONEL C. A. H. THOMSON

Ladislav Farago, in this short work, attempts to give the general reader a complete panorama of the subject of intelligence and its allied activities. Breezily and popularly written, it is not intended to do more than give a tempting glimpse of the various operations which come within the field. The bulk of attention is given to intelligence and to espionage, and relatively cursory treatment to sabotage, counterespionage, and propaganda.

Intelligence is conceived on the broadest possible scale; so much so that the cold war is defined as nothing more than an intelligence operation. There is a tendency in much of the work to idealize the intelligence operator, and to praise his many coups; this is offset in part by accounts of incidents in which vital intelligence was procured and sent to the proper authority, but overlooked or deliberately ignored. Stalin's disbelief of Churchill's reports—and those of his own agents—that Hitler would attack him in June 1941, is possibly the most striking case in point.

Many topics are treated cavalierly, with little indication of the controversy they excite in theory and practice. The book is replete with incidents, woven and interwoven into the exposition, but rarely if ever told in satisfying detail. The author has been satisfied with the most superficial conclusions, and has allowed many conflicting interpretations and implications to lie quietly side by side in his pages, with the reader all unwarned.

Farago plumps for the small good staff, rather than the full-blown organization, largely on the basis of his own wartime experience. The question immediately arises whether these paragons could be applied to agencies with global responsibilities and a full range of functions.

The Army psywarrior will not discover that G3 has anything to do with his specialty; the field of psywar is treated simply as an outgrowth of intelligence, because it uses intelligence in its output. The definitions of several key psywar functions are bizarre, and not reflected in the official Army dictionary or in practice. It does not appear, however, that the treatment of intelligence, espionage, or sabotage is as ill-adjusted to current doctrine and practice.

The most suggestive and challenging statements come in the concluding remarks, where the author examines the possibility that intelligence operations can somehow

be substituted for violence in the modern struggle between peoples and states. The main point which remains uncovered is the extent to which the threat of military strength is indispensable to psychological warfare or to diplomacy. So long as that threat remains important, it is difficult to foresee a situation in which intelligence—the war of minds—can wholly dispense with the struggle of weapons.

The most valuable part of the book is its bibliography. If the reader takes any advantage at all of the rich fare there listed, he can quickly discover for himself the full range of controversy of belief and practice which is hardly suggested by the author. And he can pursue further the intriguing cases which the author has sketched in tempting form.

Missionary's Story

FIFTY YEARS IN CHINA: The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart, Missionary and Ambassador
Random House, 1954
366 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00

Reviewed by

MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY

Dr. Stuart, born in China in 1876, has written a book which starts in the relaxed, leisurely style of a Victorian biography and gradually takes on a tenseness climaxed by the author's imprisonment by the Japanese and by the various crises he faced as American ambassador to China during the period when the Communists swept across the country.

From the purely military viewpoint, the book has two main values: a considerable insight into the Chinese mind and way of life; and commentaries on American military leaders.

China, with over 450,000,000 people—a fourth of the world's population—and with its central location in eastern Asia, is certainly a country about which the military man ought to know more than he usually does. Dr. Stuart has not, of course, written from this viewpoint, but in the course of telling his life story he makes many illuminating comments which are probably not only applicable to the Chinese people, but also to their armed forces. As a young missionary, for example, he was surprised to discover that Chinese athletic teams would rather quit a game than risk being defeated, and that a boy who was elected captain of a team had to expect that his defeated rival for the position would invariably try to ruin the team's chances of victory.

Students in the universities of China, even more than elsewhere in Dr. Stuart's opinion, are excellent barometers of popular trends—"the most highly sensitized element." The "age-long failings" of Chinese officialdom, both civilian and military, are profiteering from public funds, primary concern over welfare of family or friends or faction rather than that of the country, the pressure to maintain appearances, bureaucratic red tape,

and incompetence. These deficiencies were the basic reasons for the downfall of the National government and armed forces. "It would almost seem at times," says the author sadly, "that the Chinese have no abstract morality but are honest, truthful, kindly, and so on, only as a duty to the individuals concerned . . . their basic virtue is perhaps that of personal loyalty."

The writer pays repeated tributes to American military leaders, particularly Generals Marshall, Wedemeyer, and David Barr. Of American military personnel in general he says: "Even a layman could recognize their professional attainments and their high standards of duty."

Last and Best

GENERAL JO SHELBY: UNDEFEATED REBEL
By Daniel O'Flaherty
University of North Carolina Press, 1954
437 Pages; Index; \$6.00

Reviewed by

COLONEL R. ERNEST DUPUY

Joseph Orville Shelby of Kentucky belongs among the folklore heroes of "the dark and bloody ground." Self-taught leader of light horse, Jo Shelby was born a Southern aristocrat and a friend—but not an associate, mark you—of outlaws. His quixotic career ranged from partisan bickerings of the Kansas-Missouri borderland, through the Civil War where he rose to the rank of major general, CSA, across the Rio Grande in one of the most fantastic of *gringo* invasions, to end back in Missouri as a fighting U. S. marshal.

It was an odd quirk of fate that Jo Shelby, who refused to surrender when the Confederacy collapsed, should cap his career upholding law and order in the name of the Federal government and opposing States Rights.

Yet that is just what he did during the great Pullman strike in 1894. Governor Stone of Missouri protested Shelby's right to use Federal deputies to protect trains running through his state. "If the Governor," said Shelby curtly, "had been through what we have, he would have known that the question he thinks is still open was long ago settled in blood."

Shelby's war service was in a minor theater—the backwash of the Confederacy, the broad area of trans-Mississippi from Missouri southward. No major decisions were settled there, and, as it turned out, nothing that happened there after Nathaniel Lyon's initiative and iron hand had saved Missouri for the Union in the spring of 1861 could affect the fortunes of the Confederacy one whit. There were battles, raids, skirmishes, but all were side-shows.

So, although Jo Shelby was to make war with fiery enthusiasm, he never rose to comparison, for instance, with Stuart or Forrest as a cavalry leader. His operations are buried in the musty files of the *Official Records*. Shelby's one contemporary biographer was his adjutant, Major John Newman Edwards, whose two books—*Shelby*

and *His Men and Expedition to Mexico*—are, according to the author of this book, so fulsome and stilted as to cast an all too rosy glow upon their hero.

Mr. O'Flaherty, with but this flimsy background of source material on Shelby's military activities, has nevertheless done a monumental job of collation and documentation of material for his story. The book would have been much improved, however, had even one sketch map of Shelby's epic trail been added.

As a result, from a military viewpoint the story is disappointing, for, as the author remarks, he is "neither a military expert nor a scholar"—we doubt the last—"and has been content simply to trace the thread of Shelby's life through the kaleidoscopic pattern of American history."

This book, then, is more a revelation of the manners and *mores* of individuals and of a little-understood segment of our population during the monumental struggle of the Civil War than a military commentary. To me the depiction of the anabasis of Shelby's command cutting loose from the Lost Cause to ride into Mexico is the best part of the book.

Here was a body of light horse, a thousand strong, well armed and mounted, veterans all, plunging into Maximilian's war-torn Mexico, prepared to take service as mercenaries pure and simple—a nineteenth century White Company. Their sabers were to be at the service either of Maximilian and his alien government, or Juarez and his *revolucionarios*: whoever should be the higher bidder.

How they were turned down by both parties, their later adventures as colonists in a short-lived Utopia, and the return of the survivors to the United States, is a lively narrative.

During the Civil War, Quantrill and his bushwhackers, including Dick Yager, Cole Younger, and the two James boys, rode with Shelby's command from time to time. Much later—in 1883—Shelby, loyal to one of his old command, would be a character witness for Frank James when he stood trial for murder.

There is no evidence, however, that Shelby himself ever countenanced Quantrill's red trail of arson, robbery and murder. Jo Shelby had standards of his own, and they were high.

When, at the end of the Civil War trail, Shelby and his men—marching for the Mexican border, rode into Austin, Texas, they found a mob about to loot the sub-treasury, containing the last \$300,000 of gold and silver in the Confederacy. The looters sabered down, Governor Murrah suggested that the best disposition of the fallen government's funds would be to divide it among Shelby's men, who had not touched a penny of pay for months past.

"I came into the war with clean hands," quoth Shelby. "With God's help I will go out of it with clean hands . . . We shall not take the money."

"We are the last of our race. Let us be the best as well."



Pass In Review

In the August issue I mentioned how much I had enjoyed reading a biography of Chinese Gordon. Now I find a new book, *Gordon of Khartoum* (\$5.00), which in many respects surpasses the earlier one. This one is written by Lord Elton and is a more thoroughly researched and more scholarly work than the one by Lawrence and Elizabeth Hanson. Lord Elton's writing reminded me a good deal of that of Cecil Woodham-Smith in *The Reason Why*.

Hundreds of escape stories have been written by American and British soldiers who were prisoners of war in World War II. Here, for a change, is a story from the other side of the fence. *Prisoner's Bluff* (\$3.75) is the account of a group of Germans who broke out of a British internee camp. Posing as British officers or Swiss business men as the occasion demanded, they made their way some 1,500 miles in thirty days to reach the Japanese in Burma. For sheer excitement, it's as interesting a tale as we've seen since *The Wooden Horse*.

Major General Ellard A. Walsh, the fiery president of the National Guard Association, is well known to almost every National Guard and Reserve officer. Since the end of World War II he has been a tireless worker and a staunch defender of our National Guard system and has taken on all comers. It would be safe to estimate that he has written and delivered in ringing rhetoric several millions of words on his favorite subject to audiences large and small. There are those who often disagree with him, but he is highly respected for his intimate knowledge of his subject, and the tremendous amount of energy and time which he has spent researching and developing his arguments. A full-scale history of the National Guard has had a high priority on his list for a long time, and we are told that the actual writing is now in the mill. In the interim, the National Guard Association has published a handsome small edition of selected addresses by General Walsh and one speech by Major General Edgar C. Erickson, present Chief of the National Guard Bureau, which trace the development of the Guard down through our history and its status as of today. *The Nation's National Guard* (\$2.50) is particularly worthwhile because it provides material not otherwise readily available.

This seems to be Stonewall Jackson's year. We mentioned the fine new volume, *They Called Him Stonewall* (\$5.00) by Burke Davis sometime back, and now we have a newly edited version of John Esten Cooke's *Stonewall Jackson and the Stonewall Brigade* (\$3.50). This is a faithful reprinting of the old edition with only a few typographical errors corrected. John Esten Cooke, whom the publisher cleverly describes as the Ernie Pyle of the Confederacy, certainly captures the atmosphere of Civil War soldiering, and his book is highly enjoyable.

In the past eight years we've examined a goodly number of unusual books, games, globes and sundry other items intended to educate, entertain or amuse our military forces. This month, for the first time in our recollection, we received for review a road map! However, it's not as out of place as it sounds. This happens to be a bilingual road map of Japan, and it looks like a darned good job. It lists for 50¢ in the Far East, so I suppose anyone Stateside wanting us to get one would have to spend 75¢ or a dollar. I think I'll put this one in the old hope chest, although it will surely be out of date before I'll get to use it.

The recent spate of books about General Douglas MacArthur has stimulated discussion about the war against Japan. Russia's entry into the Pacific war and the decision to use the atomic bomb will probably remain hot subjects for debate for years to come. There is, however, a new book published by Stanford University Press that adds considerably to our knowledge as to the necessity of either of these controversial moves. *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (\$4.00) is written by Robert J. C. Butow, presently a faculty member in Princeton's history department. Butow spent several years, starting in 1945, in both a military and civilian capacity working as an intelligence officer in GHQ and SCAP. Since he was well versed in the Japanese language he devoted his time exclusively to historical research. From the welter of material through which he sifted, Butow is convinced that neither the atomic bomb nor Russia's entry into the war brought about Japan's decision to surrender—although they may have hastened the culmination. His well documented history adds a material postscript to the military studies of that war.—R.F.C.

Selected Books For Military Readers

ALL TITLES ARE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE SHIPMENT

World War II

Admiralties (Historical Division)50
Anzio Beachhead (Historical Division)	1.50
Army Air Force in World War II (Craven & Cate)	
Vol. I Plans and Early Operations	8.50
Vol. II Europe: Torch to Point Blank	8.50
Vol. III Europe: Argument to VE Day	8.50
Vol. IV Guadalcanal to Saipan	8.50
Vol. V Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki	8.50
Bastogne (Marshall) (cloth)	3.00
(paper)25
Bradley: A Soldier's Story (Bradley)	5.00
Calculated Risk (Clark)	5.00
Capture of Attu (Drummond)	2.00
Churchill's Memoirs (Churchill)	
Vol. I The Gathering Storm	6.00
Vol. II Their Finest Hour	6.00
Vol. III The Grand Alliance	6.00
Vol. IV The Hinge of Fate	6.00
Vol. V Closing the Ring	6.00
Vol. VI Triumph and Tragedy	6.00
Command Missions (Truscott)	7.50
Crusade in Europe (Eisenhower)	2.98
Fleet Admiral King (King)	7.50
Forrestal Diaries (Millis)	5.00
Four Stars of Hell (Critchell)	3.75
From Down Under to Nippon (Krueger)	6.50
History of Marine Aviation in World War II (Sherrod)	6.50
History of U. S. Marines in World War II (Historical Division)	
Battle for Tarawa	1.75
Bougainville and the Northern Solomons	2.25
The Guadalcanal Campaign	4.75
Saipan: The Beginning of the End	3.75
The Defense of Wake	1.50
Assault on Peleliu	2.75
Seizure of Tinian	2.75
Marine Aviation in the Philippines	2.75
Marines in the Central Solomons	3.25
Campaign in New Britain	4.25

Payment must accompany your order including a 25¢ handling charge for each order.

We send you bonus coupons worth 15% of your order.

Recapture of Guam	4.25
Iwo Jima Amphibious Epic	4.75
The Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo	3.25
History of U. S. Naval Operations in World War II (Morison)	
Vol. I Battle for the Atlantic	6.00
Vol. II Operations in North African Waters	6.00
Vol. III Rising Sun in the Pacific	6.00
Vol. IV Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions	6.00
Vol. V Struggle for Guadalcanal	6.00
Vol. VI Breaking the Bismarck Barrier	6.00
Vol. VII Aleutians, Gilberts & Marshalls	6.00
Vol. VIII New Guinea & the Marianas	6.00
Vol. IX Sicily, Salerno, Anzio	6.00
Island Victory (Marshall) (cloth)	2.00
(paper)25
Iwo Jima (paper)25
Kesselring: A Soldier's Record (Kesselring)	5.00
Life's Picture History of World War II. MacArthur 1941-1951 (Willoughby & Chamberlin)	10.00
Makin (Historical Division)	5.75
Makin (Historical Division)35
Omaha Beachhead (Historical Division)	1.75
Patton and His Third Army (Wallace)	3.50
Small Unit Actions (Historical Division)	1.25
Stilwell Papers (Stilwell)	1.00
St. Lo (Historical Division)	1.25
Strange Alliance, The (Deane)	4.50

Struggle for Europe (Wilmot)	5.00
To Bizerte (Historical Division)50
U. S. Army in World War II (OCMH)	
Approach to the Philippines (Smith)	6.25
Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Operations (Watson)	4.25
Cross-Channel Attack (Harrison)	6.75
Fall of the Philippines (Morton)	5.25
Lorraine Campaign (Cole)	11.00
Okinawa: The Last Battle (Appelman)	8.50
Persian Corridor & Aid to Russia (Mottler)	4.00
Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops (Palmer)	4.50
QM Corps—Vol. I. Organization, Supplies, Service (Risch)	3.75
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare—'41, '42 (Matloff)	3.75
Stilwell's Mission to China (Romanus)	5.50
The Supreme Command (Pogue)	6.50
Three Battles: Arncliffe, Altuzeo & Schmidt (MacDonald)	4.50
Transportation Corps—Vol. I (Wardlow)	3.25
War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas (Pictorial)	3.75
War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas (Pictorial)	4.00
War Against Japan (Pictorial)	4.00
Washington Command Post (Cline)	3.75
Logistical Support of the Armies May '41 to Sept. '44 ETO (Ruppenthal)	4.50
Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces (Willett)	4.25
U. S. Marines and Amphibious War (Isley)	7.50
Uncommon Valor	3.00
Utah Beach to Cherbourg (Historical Division)	2.00
Vultorno (Historical Division)40
War As I Knew It (Patton)	4.50
War Reports (Marshall, Arnold, King)	7.50
We Remained (Volckmann)	3.75
Winter Line, The (Historical Division)35

Civil War

A Stillness at Appomattox (Catton)	5.00
Bull Run Remembers (Hanson) (cloth)	2.75
(paper)	1.90
Divided We Fought (Donald)	10.00
Glory Road (Catton)	4.50
Lee's Lieutenants (Freeman)	
(3 Vols. Boxed)	22.50
Vol. I	7.50
Vol. II	7.50
Vol. III	7.50
Lincoln Finds A General (Williams)	
Vols. I & II—Set	15.00
Vol. III	7.50
Mr. Lincoln's Army (Catton)	4.00
Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant	6.00
Sheridan (O'Connor)	4.50
Stanton (Pratt)	5.95
They Called Him Stonewall (Davis)	5.00
Stormy Ben Butler (Holzman)	5.00

Other U.S. Wars

Combat Actions in Korea (Gugeler)	5.00
Decisive Battles of the U.S.A. (Fuller)	6.50
From the Danube to the Yalu (Clark)	5.00
General Dean's Story (Dean)	5.00
Korea: 1950 (Department of the Army)	1.25
Short History of World War I (Edmonds)	7.00
The River and the Gauntlet (Korea) (Marshall)	5.00

War of 1812 (Adams)	3.00
War of the Revolution (Ward)	
Vols. I & II—Set	15.00

Handbooks and Guides

American Military Government (Holborn)	3.50
Army Officer's Guide (Harkins)	4.75
Army Wife, The (Shea) (New ed.)	3.50
Art of Clear Thinking, The (Flesch)	2.75
Art of Readable Writing, The (Flesch)	3.00
Art of Plain Talk, The (Flesch)	2.50
Basic Everyday Encyclopedia (Deluxe)	2.95
Battery Duties (Cocklin) (paper)	1.50
Company Administration & Personnel Section (Virtue)	3.75
Company Duties (Boatner) (cloth)	2.50
(paper)	1.25
Food Service for the Army & Air Force (Symons)	3.50
Frontline Intelligence (Robb & Chandler)	2.50
Guerrilla Warfare (Levy)25
Handbook and Manual for the Non-commissioned Officer (cloth)	3.50
(paper)	2.50
How to Survive an Atomic Bomb (Gerstell)	1.95
How to Make Sense (Flesch)	2.75
Infantry Unit Leader's Guide (Multop & Barrett)	1.50
Intelligence Is for Commanders (Glass)	3.85
Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951	3.25
1954 MCM Supplement65
Map and Aerial Photograph Reading	2.75
Map Reading for the Soldier	1.00
Mathematics for the Millions (Hogben)	5.95
Military Management for National Defense (Beishline)	6.00
Notes For Troop Instructors:	
Automatic Pistol—Caliber .45	1.00
Interior Guard	1.50
Military Courtesy and Discipline	1.00
Officer's Guide (MSP)	4.00

Defense of the West (Hart)	4.00
Effects of Atomic Weapons (Herschfelder)	3.00
Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World (Creasy)	1.65
Infantry In Battle	3.00
Mahon on Sea Power (Livezey)	4.50
National Security and the General Staff (Nelson)	5.00
On War (Clausewitz)	5.00
Power & Policy (Finletter)	5.00
Psychological Warfare (Linebarger)	6.00
Reveries On the Art of War (DeSaxe)	2.00
Soldier's Load and Mobility of a Nation (Marshall)	1.00
Strategic Air Power (Possony)	5.00
Strategy (Hart)	5.95

General and Military History

American Campaigns (Steele) Vol. I	6.00
Beginning of the U. S. Army 1783-1812 (Jacobs)	6.00
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Gibbon) Vol. I	2.45
Vol. II	2.45
Vol. III	2.45
History of the German General Staff (Goerlitz)	7.50
Makers of Modern Strategy (Earle)	7.50
Men of West Point (Dupuy)	5.00
Military History of the Western World Vol. I (Fuller)	6.00
Military Staff: Its History & Development (Hittle)	3.75
Soldiers of the American Army, 1775-1954 (Kredel & Todd)	12.50
The Story of the U. S. Cavalry (Herr and Wallace)	6.00
War and Civilization (Toynbee)	2.50
War and Peace (Tolstoy)	2.45
Warfare (Spaulding)	5.00
War Through the Ages (Montross)	8.50

Unit Histories

Under the Southern Cross (Americal Division) (Cronin)	6.00
Battle History of the 1st Armored Div. (Howe)	6.50
Old Breed (History of the First Marine Division)	6.50
First Cavalry Division in World War II (Wright)	3.00
1st Cavalry Div. (Korea)	4.50
First Special Service Force (Burhans)	5.00
Follow Me (Second Marine Division) (Johnson)	6.00
History of the Second Engineer Special Brigade	6.00
Third Infantry Division History (Taggart)	6.00
Third Marine Division	5.00
Fourth Marine Division in World War II (Proehl)	5.00
From Salerno to the Alps (Fifth Army)	6.00
Down Ramp (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th & 6th Eng. Special Brig.)	5.00
Spearhead (Fifth Marine Division)	6.50
History of the Sixth Marine Division (Cass)	5.00
6th Infantry Division in WW II	5.00
Ninth Marines 1942-1945 (Burrus)	5.00
Conquer (Story of the 9th Army)	4.50
Eight Stars to Victory (9th Division)	6.00
Night Climb (10th Mtn Div) (Harper)	2.50
The Angels (History of the 11th Airborne Division)	6.00
Saga of the XX Ghost Corps	7.50
Children of Yesterday (24th Infantry Division) (Valtin)	3.00
27th Infantry Division in World War II (Love)	10.00
Let's Go (29th) (Ewing)	5.00
Work Horse of the Western Front (30th Division) (Hewitt)	4.00
37th Infantry Division in World War II (Frankel)	7.50
h Infantry Division	5.00
gleers (History of the 41st Infantry) (McCartney)	10.00
h Fighter Group in World War II	10.00
t Infantry Division History	1.50
h Infantry Division	5.00
s to Hold It High (77th Infantry Division)	6.00
underbolt Across Europe (83rd Division)	3.50
1 Infantry Division	5.00
e Devils in Italy (88th Division History) (Delaney)	5.00
1 Infantry Division	5.00
1 Infantry Division in World War II (Robbins)	5.00
tory of the 94th Infantry Division (Byrnes)	5.00
le Babies (99th Division) (Lauer)	6.00
devious with Destiny (101st Airborne Division) (Rapport)	7.50
of the 101st Airborne (Grout)	2.50
berwolf Tracks (104th Infantry) (Hoegh)	4.00
7th (106th Division) (Dupuy)	5.00
ration Sandstone (White)	3.50
ory of the 120th Infantry Regiment	6.50
nd to None (Story of the 305th Infantry)	5.00
ory of the 313th Infantry in World War II (Wood)	5.00
ory of the 363d Infantry Regiment	5.00
ory of the 376th Infantry Regiment '21-1945	3.50
h Bombardment Group	14.00
History of the 398th Infantry Regiment	5.00
409th Infantry in World War II (East)	5.00
Americans (Story of the 442d Combat Team)	5.00
501st Par. Regt. (4 Stars of Hell)	3.75
The 727th Ry Operating Bn in World War II	5.00



SIGN ME UP AS A MEMBER OF THE ASSOCIATION AND SEND ME THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL EVERY MONTH—

Name, Rank, Branch, Serial Number

Unit or Street Address

Post Office State

- New
- Renewal
- Bill Me Later
- 1 Yr. \$5.00
- 2 Yr. \$9.00
- 3 Yr. \$12.00

MAIL NOW—NO POSTAGE REQUIRED

Airborne Warfare (Gavin)	3.00
Art of War (Sun Tzu)	2.00
Atomic Weapons in Land Combat (2nd Edition) (Reinhardt & Kintner)	3.95
Battle Studies (DuPicq)	2.75
Caesar's War Commentaries (Warrington)	1.65
Capital (Marx)	2.45
Communist Guerrilla Warfare (Dixon & Heilbrun)	4.50
Red China's Fighting Hordes (Riggs)	4.00
Soviet Arms and Soviet Power (Guillaume)	3.50
Soviet Military Doctrine (Garthoff)	7.50

ORDER FORM

COMBAT FORCES BOOK SERVICE
1529 18th Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

Name _____
Street Address _____
Town or APO _____ Zone _____ State _____

I ENCLOSE \$ _____

PLEASE ADD 25 CENTS TO THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF YOUR ORDER TO COVER HANDLING AND SHIPPING CHARGES
Please send the following books.

YOU SAVE 15%. Upon receipt of your remittance with your book order, we will send you Book Dividend Coupons worth 15% of the amount remitted, which can be used for purchasing additional books within the time limit stamped on the coupons. (Coupons cannot be issued with organization orders.) (CF-165)

Selected Books For Military Readers

ALL TITLES ARE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE SHIPMENT

World War II

Admiralties (Historical Division)	50
Anzio Beachhead (Historical Division)	1.50
Army Air Force in World War II (Craven & Cate)	
Vol. I Plans and Early Operations	8.50
Vol. II Europe: Torch to Point Blank	8.50
Vol. III Europe: Argument to VE Day	8.50
Vol. IV Guadalcanal to Saipan	8.50
Vol. V Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki	8.50
Bastogne (Marshall) (cloth)	3.00
(paper)25
Bradley: A Soldier's Story (Bradley)	5.00
Calculated Risk (Clark)	5.00
Capture of Attu (Drummond)	2.00
Churchill's Memoirs (Churchill)	
Vol. I The Gathering Storm	6.00
Vol. II Their Finest Hour	6.00
Vol. III The Grand Alliance	6.00
Vol. IV The Hinge of Fate	6.00
Vol. V Closing the Ring	6.00
Vol. VI Triumph and Tragedy	6.00
Command Missions (Truscott)	7.50
Crusade in Europe (Eisenhower)	2.98
Fleet Admiral King (King)	7.50
Forrestal Diaries (Millis)	5.00
Four Stars of Hell (Critchell)	3.75
From Down Under to Nippon (Krueger)	6.50
History of Marine Aviation in World War II (Sherrod)	6.50
History of U. S. Marines in World War II (Historical Division)	
Battle for Tarawa	1.00
Bougainville and the Northern Solomons	2.00
The Guadalcanal Campaign	4.00
Saipan: The Beginning of the End	3.00
The Defense of Wake	1.00
Assault on Peleliu	2.00
Seizure of Tinian	2.00
Marine Aviation in the Philippines	2.00
Marines in the Central Solomons	3.00
Campaign in New Britain	4.00

Payment must accompany your order including a 25¢ handling charge for each order.

We send you bonus coupons worth 15% of your order.

Recapture of Guam	4.25
Iwo Jima Amphibious Epic	4.75
The Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo	3.25
History of U. S. Naval Operations in World War II (Morison)	
Vol. I Battle for the Atlantic	6.00
Vol. II Operations in North African Waters	6.00
Vol. III Rising Sun in the Pacific	6.00
Vol. IV Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions	6.00
Vol. V Struggle for Guadalcanal	6.00
Vol. VI Breaking the Bismarck Barrier	6.00
Vol. VII Aleutians, Gilberts & Marshalls	6.00
Vol. VIII New Guinea & the Marianas	6.00
Vol. IX Sicily, Salerno, Anzio Island Victory (Marshall) (cloth)	2.00
(paper)25
Iwo Jima (paper)25
Kesselring: A Soldier's Record	

Struggle for Europe (Wilmot)	5.00
To Bizerte (Historical Division)50
U. S. Army in World War II (OCMH)	
Approach to the Philippines (Smith)	6.25
Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Operations (Watson)	4.25
Cross-Channel Attack (Harrison)	6.75
Fall of the Philippines (Morton)	5.25
Lorraine Campaign (Cole)	11.00
Okinawa: The Last Battle (Appelman)	8.50
Persian Corridor & Aid to Russia (Mott)	4.00
Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops (Palmer)	4.50
QM Corps—Vol. I. Organization, Supplies, Service (Risch)	3.75
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare—'41, '42 (Matloff)	3.75
Stilwell's Mission to China (Romanus)	5.50
The Supreme Command (Pogue)	6.50
Three Battles: Arnville, Altuzzo & Schmidt (MacDonald)	4.50
Transportation Corps—Vol. I (Wardlow)	3.25
War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas (Pictorial)	3.75
War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas (Pictorial)	4.00
War Against Japan (Pictorial)	4.00
Washington Command Post (Cline)	3.75
Logistical Support of the Armies May '41 to Sept. '44 (Ruppenthal)	4.50
Organization and Role of the Army	

FIRST CLASS PERMIT 6200-R (Sec. 34.9, P.L.&R.) Washington, D. C.

BUSINESS REPLY CARD

No Postage Stamp Necessary if Mailed in the United States

POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY

Association of the U. S. Army
The Army Combat Forces Journal
1529 18th St., N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.

YOU SAVE 15%. Upon receipt of your remittance with your book order, we will send you Book Dividend Coupons worth 15% of the amount remitted, which can be used for purchasing additional books within the time limit stamped on the coupons. (Coupons cannot be issued with organization orders.) (CF-155)

Decisive Battles of the U.S.A. (Fuller)	5.00
From the Danube to the Yalu (Clark)	5.00
General Dean's Story (Dean)	5.00
Korea: 1950 (Department of the Army)	1.25
Short History of World War I (Edmonds)	7.00
The River and the Gauntlet (Korea) (Marshall)	5.00

War of 1812 (Adams)	3.00
War of the Revolution (Ward) Vols. I & II—Set	15.00

Handbooks and Guides

American Military Government (Holborn)	3.50
Army Officer's Guide (Harkins)	4.75
Army Wife, The (Shea) (New ed.)	3.50
Art of Clear Thinking, The (Flesch)	2.75
Art of Readable Writing, The (Flesch)	3.00
Art of Plain Talk, The (Flesch)	2.50
Basic Everyday Encyclopedia (Deluxe)	2.95
Battery Duties (Cocklin) (paper)	1.50
Company Administration & Personnel Section (Virtue)	3.75
Company Duties (Boatner) (cloth)	2.50
(paper)	1.25
Food Service for the Army & Air Force (Symons)	3.50
Frontline Intelligence (Robb & Chandler)	2.50
Guerrilla Warfare (Levy)25
Handbook and Manual for the Non-commissioned Officer (cloth)	3.50
(paper)	2.50
How to Survive an Atomic Bomb (Gerstell)	1.95
How to Make Sense (Flesch)	2.75
Infantry Unit Leader's Guide (Mulptop & Barrett)	1.50
Intelligence Is for Commanders (Glass)	3.85
Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951	3.25
1954 MCM Supplement65
Map and Aerial Photograph Reading	2.75
Map Reading for the Soldier	1.00
Mathematics for the Millions (Hogben)	5.95
Military Management for National Defense (Beishline)	6.00
Notes For Troop Instructors:	
Automatic Pistol—Caliber .45	1.00
Interior Guard	1.50
Military Courtesy and Discipline	1.00
Officer's Guide (MSP)	4.00
Orders and Directives (Chester)	3.00
Platoon Record Book50
Paratrooper (Bradley & Wood)	3.50
Preventive Maintenance Manual	1.00
Rifle Squad and Platoon in Attack (Rathbun)	2.00
Squad Record Book25
Strategic Intelligence (Kent)	3.50
Survival (Infantry Journal) (cloth)	1.50

Biography

Abraham Lincoln (1 Vol.) Sandburg	7.50
Abraham Lincoln (Thomas)	5.75
Genghis Khan (Lamb)	3.50
George Washington (Freeman)	
Vols. I & II—Set	15.00
Vols. III & IV—Set	15.00
Vol. V	7.50
Vol. VI	7.50
Robert E. Lee (Freeman) (Boxed set, 4 Vols.)	25.00
Napoleon (Ludwig)	1.45
Napoleon's Letters	1.65
Napoleon's Memoirs (DeChair)	7.50
On Active Service in Peace and War (Stimson & Bundy)	5.00
Panzer Leader (Guderian)	7.50
Rommel: Desert Fox (Young)	3.50
Rommel Papers (Hart)	6.00
Stonewall Jackson (Henderson)	6.00
The Head and Heart of Thomas Jefferson (Dos Passos)	5.00

Strategy and Principles of War

Airborne Warfare (Gavin)	3.00
Art of War (Sun Tzu)	2.00
Atomic Weapons in Land Combat (2nd Edition) (Reinhardt & Kintner)	3.95
Battle Studies (DuPicq)	2.75
Caesar's War Commentaries (Warrington)	1.65

Defense of the West (Hart)	4.00
Effects of Atomic Weapons (Herschfelder)	3.00
Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World (Creasy)	1.65
Infantry in Battle	3.00
Mahan on Sea Power (Livezey)	4.50
National Security and the General Staff (Nelson)	5.00
On War (Clausewitz)	5.00
Power & Policy (Finletter)	5.00
Psychological Warfare (Linebarger)	6.00
Reveries On the Art of War (DeSaxe)	2.00
Soldier's Load and Mobility of a Nation (Marshall)	1.00
Strategic Air Power (Possony)	5.00
Strategy (Hart)	5.95

General and Military History

American Campaigns (Steele) Vol. I	6.00
Beginning of the U. S. Army 1783-1812 (Jacobs)	6.00
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Gibbon) Vol. I	2.45
Vol. II	2.45
Vol. III	2.45
History of the German General Staff (Goerlitz)	7.50
Makers of Modern Strategy (Earle)	7.50
Men of West Point (Dupuy)	5.00
Military History of the Western World Vol. I (Fuller)	6.00
Military Staff: Its History & Development (Hittle)	3.75
Soldiers of the American Army, 1775-1954 (Kredel & Todd)	12.50
The Story of the U. S. Cavalry (Herr and Wallace)	6.00
War and Civilization (Toynbee)	2.50
War and Peace (Tolstoy)	2.45
Warfare (Spaulding)	5.00
War Through the Ages (Montross)	8.50

Weapons

Book of The Garand (Hatcher)	6.00
Centerfire:	
Vol. I Metric Pistol and Revolver Cartridges	7.50
Vol. II American & British Pistol & Revolver Cartridges	7.50
2-Vol. Set	14.00
Guided Missiles (paper)	1.00
Gunsmithing Simplified (MacFarland)	6.95
How to Select and Use Your Big Game Rifle (Stebbins)	5.00
Why Not Load Your Own (Whelen)	3.50

Leadership and Psychology

Managing Men (Kraines)	2.00
Men Against Fire (Marshall)	2.75
Psychology for the Fighting Man (cloth)	1.50
(paper)25

Dictionaries, Atlases

American College Dictionary (Regular)	5.00
(Thumb-Indexed)	6.00
American Oxford Atlas (Campbell-Lewis)	10.00
Thesaurus of Words & Phrases (Roget)	1.95
Thorndike Barnhart High School Dictionary	5.50
Thorndike Barnhart Dictionary (Thumb Indexed) Special	2.25

Communism

Capital (Marx)	2.45
Communist Guerrilla Warfare (Dixon & Heilbrun)	4.50
Red China's Fighting Hordes (Riggs)	4.00
Soviet Arms and Soviet Power (Guillaume)	3.50
Soviet Military Doctrine (Garthoff)	7.50

Unit Histories

Under the Southern Cross (Americal Division) (Cronin)	6.00
Battle History of the 1st Armored Div. (Howe)	6.50
Old Breed (History of the First Marine Division)	6.50
First Cavalry Division in World War II (Wright)	3.00
1st Cavalry Div. (Korea)	4.50
First Special Service Force (Burhans)	5.00
Follow Me (Second Marine Division) (Johnson)	6.00
History of the Second Engineer Special Brigade	6.00
Third Infantry Division History (Taggart)	6.00
Third Marine Division	5.00
Fourth Marine Division in World War II (Proehl)	5.00
From Salerno to the Alps (Fifth Army)	6.00
Down Ramp (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th & 6th Eng. Special Brig.)	5.00
Spearhead (Fifth Marine Division)	6.50
History of the Sixth Marine Division (Cass)	5.00
6th Infantry Division in WW II	5.00
Ninth Marines 1942-1945 (Burrus)	5.00
Conquer (Story of the 9th Army)	4.50
Eight Stars to Victory (9th Division)	6.00
Night Climb (10th Mtn Div) (Harper)	2.50
The Angels (History of the 11th Airborne Division)	6.00
Saga of the XX Ghost Corps	7.50
Children of Yesterday (24th Infantry Division) (Valtin)	3.00
27th Infantry Division in World War II (Love)	10.00
Let's Go (29th) (Ewing)	5.00
Work Horse of the Western Front (30th Division) (Hewitt)	4.00
37th Infantry Division in World War II (Frankel)	7.50
40th Infantry Division	5.00
Jungleers (History of the 41st Infantry) (McCartney)	10.00
56th Fighter Group in World War II	10.00
71st Infantry Division History	1.50
76th Infantry Division	5.00
Ours to Hold It High (77th Infantry Division)	6.00
Thunderbolt Across Europe (83rd Division)	3.50
85th Infantry Division	5.00
Blue Devils in Italy (88th Division History) (Delaney)	5.00
89th Infantry Division	5.00
91st Infantry Division in World War II (Robbins)	5.00
History of the 94th Infantry Division (Byrnes)	5.00
Battle Babies (99th Division) (Lauer)	6.00
Rendezvous with Destiny (101st Airborne Division) (Rapport)	7.50
Epic of the 101st Airborne (Grout)	2.50
Timberwolf Tracks (104th Infantry) (Hoegh)	4.00
St. Vith (106th Division) (Dupuy)	5.00
Operation Sandstone (White)	3.50
History of the 120th Infantry Regiment. Second to None (Story of the 305th Infantry)	5.00
History of the 313th Infantry in World War II (Wood)	5.00
History of the 363d Infantry Regiment. History of the 376th Infantry Regiment 1921-1945	3.50
390th Bombardment Group	14.00
History of the 398th Infantry Regiment. 409th Infantry in World War II (East)	5.00
Americans (Story of the 442d Combat Team)	5.00
501st Par. Regt. (4 Stars of Hell)	3.75
The 727th Ry Operating Bn in World War II	5.00

**THE ENAMELED BEAUTY OF THE DEADLY NIKE
GLISTENS AGAINST DULL CLOUDS AS A
BATTERY IS RAISED IN DEFENSE OF
THE NATION'S CAPITAL CITY**



Box 30-folder 3

AWA 262

10/22

JHE 1910-1920: Role of Citizen Army in MODERN WAR: EXCERPTS, Article Clippings 1910-1920

3-7

SEP 15 1910

1910.

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

543649 A

DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA.

2

MEMORANDUM

BY

FIELD MARSHAL VISCOUNT KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM,
G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., ETC.

CONTENTS:

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

PART I.—RECOMMENDATIONS.

PART II.—THE TRANSITION PERIOD.

Presented by Command; ordered to be printed 7th July, 1910.

[Cost of Paper.—Preparation, not given; 1,100 copies; approximate cost of printing and publishing, £14.]

LWZ

p.v. 11, 20.1

Printed and Published for the GOVERNMENT of the COMMONWEALTH of AUSTRALIA by J. KEMP,
Government Printer for the State of Victoria.

No. 8.—F.9302.

av

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

I. In compliance with the invitation of the Commonwealth Government to visit and inspect the existing military forces and system in Australia, and subsequently to give them the benefit of my experience and advice regarding the development of their latest scheme of defence, I reached Port Darwin on the 21st December, and have since visited military camps in every State.

II. The Minister of Defence kindly arranged for the assembly of troops in these camps on dates to meet my convenience, and although the season was perhaps exceptionally trying and not the most suitable for both the men and their employers, good musters were everywhere obtained.

III. My best thanks are due for the facilities afforded me on all occasions to see the troops and fixed defences, as well as for the assistance given me by General Hoad and all the senior Australian officers in my study of the existing military system and local conditions in this country.

IV. Having had considerable experience of Australians working in the field during the South African war, I was not surprised to find what excellent material existed amongst the young manhood of Australia from whom the defenders of their country must come. I noticed in the camps the great keenness displayed by all ranks in rendering themselves proficient, and in applying the military knowledge they had acquired to the practical conditions of work on the manœuvre ground.

V. In these days, however, excellent fighting material and the greatest zeal, though indispensable adjuncts, are not of themselves sufficient to enable a force to take the field against thoroughly trained regular troops with any chance of success.

VI. I do not intend to criticise in any detail what I saw in the various camps of exercise, but a great part of my suggestions for the training and organization of the Australian Citizen Forces, in Part I. of this Paper, have been devised to meet the principal defects I observed, and to enable these camps of exercise in the future to be really instructional, as well as a thorough test of the work done during the year in their home training.

VII. Success in any technical career can only be achieved after a thorough elementary grounding, and this is, perhaps, more marked in the military than in any other profession. The A B C must be carefully studied and practised so as to understand how to learn properly, as well as how to teach. It is only by correcting mistakes on the spot, and clearly explaining their nature and results, as well as how they should be avoided, that practical instruction can be given in camps both to officers and men.

VIII. The training I saw in the camps indicated that there was a distinct tendency to go too fast, and to neglect essential preliminaries of training for more advanced studies which the troops engaged were not capable of carrying out properly.

IX. The conclusion I have come to is, shortly, that the present forces are inadequate in numbers, training, organization, and munitions of war, to defend Australia from the dangers that are due to the present conditions that prevail in the country, as well as to its isolated position.

X. The danger of want of population and consequent ineffective occupation in many parts of the country is, in my opinion, a most serious existing condition in Australia, as it may greatly imperil the stability of the present state of affairs in the Commonwealth. I feel, however, that this is so well known and recognised that I need not emphasize it further.

XI. I would also mention that railway construction has, while developing the country, resulted in lines that would appear to be more favorable to an enemy invading Australia than to the defence of the country. Different gauges in most of the States isolate each system, and the want of systematic interior connexion makes the present lines running inland of little use for defence, though possibly of considerable value to an enemy who would have temporary command of the sea.

XII. The new Defence Act will give sufficient numbers to defend the country effectively if the force provided under it is efficiently trained, organized and equipped. It must, however, be distinctly recognised that a National Force maintained at a high standard of efficiency can only be produced by the work of years, and that such work must be steady and continuous; any divergence from the policy decided on may, and probably will, lead to chaos and useless expenditure of money.

XIII. If plans and essential preparations have been deferred until an emergency arises, it will then be found too late to act, because the strain of passing from peace to war will entirely absorb the energies of all engaged, even when every possible contingency has been foreseen.

XIV. Before putting these recommendations forward, I have carefully considered their financial aspect, and the burden that will thereby be thrown on the country for its defence. The annual cost when the force would be in full working order, after passing through the less costly transition period, works out to practically the same as the total sum contemplated under the Defence Bill, viz., £1,742,000.

XV. I have divided my subject into—

Part I.—Recommendations.

Part II.—Transition Period.

Part III.—Fixed Defences, which is confidential.*

XVI.—In concluding these introductory remarks, I sincerely hope that the organization I have proposed in Part I. may meet the requirements of Australia in forming an efficient National Force for the defence of the country; and I shall always take the greatest interest in the future of the national forces of Australia, and hope to be able to give the Commonwealth Government at any time such further assistance as may be in my power.

KITCHENER, F.M.

Melbourne, 12th February, 1910.

* Printed separately.

PART I.—RECOMMENDATIONS.

STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

1. It is an axiom held by the British Government that the Empire's existence depends primarily upon the maintenance of adequate and efficient naval forces. As long as this condition is fulfilled, and as long as British superiority at sea is assured, then it is an accepted principle that no British dominion can be successfully and permanently conquered by an organized invasion from oversea.

2. But in applying this principle to Australasia, considerations of time and space cannot be disregarded. The conduct of a great war depends upon the calculated and proper combination of naval, military, and diplomatic forces; and it is quite conceivable that in the future, as in the past, national considerations may require the concentration of British naval forces in one or other theatre of operations. It follows that, in seas remote from such a concentration, the British Naval Forces may find themselves for the moment inferior in force to an actual, or potential, enemy. In such a situation, although our ultimate superiority at sea might not be a matter of doubt, some time might elapse before our command of the sea was definitely assured in all waters. It, therefore, becomes the duty of all self-governing Dominions to provide a military force adequate, not only to deal promptly with any attempt at invasion, but also to insure local safety and public confidence until our superiority at sea has been decisively and comprehensively asserted. For this reason it has recently been agreed that the Home Forces of the United Kingdom should be so organized as to compel an enemy contemplating an invasion to make the attempt on such a scale as to be unable to evade our naval forces. The same arguments apply to Australasia, and its land forces should be calculated and organized on this basis.

STRENGTH REQUIRED.

3. In estimating the strength of the land forces necessary to meet this requirement, three principal factors should be considered—

- (a) The great ocean distances which lie between Australia and the territory of any possible enemies.
- (b) The armed strength and power of transportation over sea of any conceivably hostile nation.
- (c) The vast extent, and railway communication, of the Australian Continent, which covers an area of 2,948,366 square miles, and possesses a coast line of 12,210 miles; as contrasted with the smallness of its population, 4,275,000 souls, of whom 1,295,000 are males of a fighting age.

4. Consideration of these factors leads me to estimate the land forces required at 80,000 fighting troops. Of these numbers, half would be required to secure the larger cities and defended ports from attack, and so to maintain the public confidence and national credit, while the other half would be free to operate as a mobile striking force anywhere in Australia.

5. But the best defence is generally by taking the offensive, and there should therefore be no difference in the enrolment, organization, and equipment of any unit.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCE.

6. The *Defence Bill* 1909, which has just been passed by the Commonwealth Parliament, gives effect to the principle that every citizen should be trained to defend his country, and I therefore propose to base the following advice as to the manner in which the force of 80,000 fighting men should be enrolled, organized, and trained on the principle embodied in that Act, which is designed to call into existence a National Citizen Force.

7. In my opinion, the forces should be organized as—

- 21 brigades of 4 battalions each—84 battalions of infantry.
- 28 regiments of light horse.
- 49 four-gun field batteries, and
- 7 four-gun heavy and howitzer batteries, the whole totalling 224 guns.
- 7 communication companies and 14 field companies of engineers.

Departmental troops to be provided in proportion.

8. The peace and war establishments of units are given in detail in Tables V. and VI., but the rank and file may be summarized as—

	Rank and File.	
	Peace.	War.
Battalion	750	1,001
Regiment of light horse	350	470
Battery	130	146

9. The peace establishment would be found from the 80,000 trained soldiers, and the augmentation to war establishment will be provided by the addition of the recruits and the 25-26-year men.

10. In this connexion I wish to explain that, while taking the Defence Acts 1903-1909 as the basis of my proposals, I have departed from the training periods therein prescribed, because—

(a) While the cadet training is valuable as a preparation, it cannot, in my opinion, replace recruit training, which is a necessary preliminary to the production of an efficient and trained citizen soldier. For this reason I class the 18-19-year men as recruits, over and above the peace establishment of 80,000 men, but liable to be put in the ranks in war.

(b) Soldiers to be efficient should be exercised in camp annually, otherwise the men lose the incentive to home training, the habit of working in units, of moving and living in numbers, and of ready obedience to orders.

11. For this reason I advise that camp training in time of peace should be extended, and I consider that, having regard to the natural military aptitude of the Australian, favoured by the conditions of his civil life, the training should consist of six clear days annually, *i.e.*, from a Monday to a Saturday inclusive, in addition to all home training.

12. I am of opinion that, if fully utilized under thoroughly competent officers, this training will meet requirements up to the 25th year. In the 25th-26th year a muster parade would suffice.

13. The training required by law, over and above home training, would then stand—

For junior cadets, 12 to 14 years—120 hours.

For senior cadets, 14 to 18 years—equivalent to 16 days.

Recruit training, 18 to 19 years—16 days, 8 of which to be in camp.

Trained soldiers, 19 to 20 years—16 days, 8 of which to be in camp.

20-21	} years—6 days in camp.
21-22	
22-23	
23-24	
24-25	
25-26 years	—Muster parade only.

RESERVES.

14. After which they will be, for the period mentioned in clause 60 of the Act, available as reservists.

15. On this basis the yearly quotas enrolled in the Citizen Force would be—

TABLE I.—YEARLY QUOTAS ENROLLED IN THE CITIZEN ARMY.

Years.	Infantry.	Light Horse.	Artillery.	Total.	Engineers and Departments.
18-19	12,500	1,950	1,450	15,900	1,175
19-20	11,800	1,850	1,370	15,020	1,125
20-21	11,200	1,750	1,320	14,270	1,075
21-22	10,700	1,650	1,240	13,590	1,025
22-23	10,200	1,600	1,190	12,990	975
23-24	9,800	1,500	1,130	12,430	925
24-25	9,300	1,450	1,050	11,800	875
Total, 19-25..	63,000	9,800	7,300	80,100	6,000
25-26	9,200	80,100 1,400	1,000	11,600	850

NOTE.—In the above table an annual wastage of 5 per cent. is allowed for mortality, medical unfitness, absence, and other casualties.

PRINCIPLES REGARDING ENROLMENT.

16. The first and imperative principle for the enrolment and maintenance of these 80,000 men as an efficient Citizen Force is that the nation as a whole should take a pride in its defenders, insist upon the organization being real and designed for war purposes only, and provide the means for properly educating, training, and equipping their officers and men.

17. Unless these requirements be met, no military system can be devised which will be other than an illusion and a source of waste of public funds.

18. The second principle for a successful Citizen Force is a complement of the first. The force must be an integral portion of the national life. The citizen should be brought up from boyhood to look forward to the day when he will be enrolled as fit to defend his country; and he should be accustomed to practise those habits of self-denial, of devotion to and emulation in the execution of his duty, of reticence, and of prompt obedience to lawful authority, which are essential to the formation of patriotic and efficient citizen soldiers.

19. These considerations show how completely a Citizen Force should be kept outside party politics. Political feeling in an army is always a serious drawback to efficiency, and may become a danger to the State.

20. Recruits should be drawn impartially from all portions of the country, and from the whole of the community; and upon the manner in which the reciprocal obligations of the nation to the force and of the citizen soldier to the nation are brought home to the cities, towns, and shires will depend the value of the armed strength of Australia.

REGISTRATION AND EXEMPTIONS.

21. The application of these principles entails a complete and thorough registration of the youths of the country, and the adoption of a system whereby those moving from one part of the country to another will be traced and required to continue their training.

22. The question of exemptions will also arise, and in this there are, I think, two broad guiding factors—

- (a) That the welfare of the family should not be prejudiced.
- (b) That the State should get the best men available.

Factor (a) points to the exemption of those who are the sole or main support of their family, such as the only or eldest son of a widow, or of a man who is himself incapable of earning a livelihood for those dependent on him.

TABLE II.—TRAINING AREAS AND TROOPS ALLOTTED THERETO—*continued.*

Area Nos.	Battalions.	Light Horse Squadrons.	Field Artillery Batteries.	Engineer Companies.	Army Service Corps Companies.	Field Ambulances.	
191 to 193 ..	1	1	} Details for forts
194 „ 196 ..	1	1	1	..	1	..	
197 „ 199 ..	1	1	1	1	
200 „ 202 ..	1	2	1	1	
Group XX.	4	4	3	1	1	1	
203 to 205 ..	1	1	..	1	} Details for forts
206 „ 208 ..	1	1	1	
209 „ 211 ..	1	1	1	1	
212 „ 214 ..	1	1	1	
Group XXI.	4	4	2	1	1	1	
Total ..	84	112	56	21	21	21	

THE PERMANENT INSTRUCTIONAL OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE AREA.

31. The duties of the officer in charge of an area would include:—

- (a) The inspection of the junior cadets training in the schools
- (b) The organization and training of the senior cadets.
- (c) The enrolment, equipment, and training of the adult from eighteen to nineteen years of age.
- (d) The equipment, organization, and training of the trained soldier from nineteen to twenty-five years of age.
- (e) The supervision of the registration of all male inhabitants under clause 142 of the Act.
- (f) The maintenance of lists of males twenty-five to twenty-six years of age who have just completed their training.
- (g) Communication to other areas of all changes of residence of men under training, with particulars of their military proficiency.
- (h) Information regarding the numbers, residence, and classification of the reserve men in the areas, and the organization and maintenance of rifle clubs.
- (i) A thorough acquaintance with the inhabitants of his area.

32. In all these matters, except registration and enrolment, he would be assisted by the officers of the Citizen Forces of the area.

33. Detailed instructions for the guidance of area officers should be drawn up, and should, amongst other things, require a monthly statement from each area of the progress made in registration, enrolment, organization, equipment, and home training of the Citizen Forces under his charge.

34. The essential importance of these duties to the nation will make the area officer the keystone of the Citizen Force, whose organization and fitness for war will chiefly depend upon the education and training received in the "area."

35. Under this system, it is evident that the responsibilities of the area officer will make it a national necessity that he should be a carefully-selected man, thoroughly grounded and trained in his profession, and scientifically educated. No social considerations, no influence, nothing but efficiency should be allowed to affect the selection and promotion of these officers. Their work should be judged by results alone.

36. The selection and education of suitable men for these instructional duties will thus be the foundation of a proficient Citizen Force. They should be taken young, given a complete military education calculated to make them good leaders, strict disciplinarians, and thoroughly competent officers—brought up to realize that their career depends upon their ability to do their duty and on that alone.

37. In the United States of America, the Military College of West Point sets an example of a severe and thoroughly military training imposed by a Democratic Government, and I should advise that Australia can only expect to produce officers of the type required by the establishment of a Military College similar in ideals, if not altogether in practice—for that will vary with national characteristics—to West Point.

38. Hitherto it would have been difficult to find employment for the graduates of such a primary military educational establishment, but I have carefully examined this point and find that now it has been decided to create a National Force, there will be ample posts to be filled by the graduates of a Military College.

39. The area officer should have reasonable prospects of promotion, and there must be systematic supervision of his work; for these reasons I have already advised that over every ten areas a supervising officer be appointed, who would, in war time, become the staff officer of the infantry brigade drawn from his group. In addition, as now, district staffs will be required in the six military districts of the Commonwealth, officers will be wanted for the Central Administration and for the permanent troops.

FORMATION OF A STAFF CORPS.

40. My recommendation is that a Staff Corps be formed to provide the officers for all these requirements, areas, district and head-quarters staffs, and permanent troops.

41. This Staff Corps should be entirely drawn from the Military College, and its members should further be sent abroad to study, and be attached to, the other land forces of the British Empire, so that an officer of this Staff Corps would be the equal, if not superior, in military education to the officers of any army in the world.

42. The proposed organization contemplates the formation of 215 areas, which are required to produce a fighting force of 80,000 men. The officers in charge of each of these areas may be of the rank of captain or lieutenant. In addition, 22 majors will be required, one to supervise every ten areas. The six district staffs require 25 officers, mostly of field rank; head-quarters will absorb 12; the Military College 8; and the permanent forces (on the present scale) 48.

43. To allow for officers being absent in other British Dominions, on attachment to or studying other armies, at staff colleges, on leave, &c., 6 per cent. of subalterns, captains, and majors should be added. In this way an establishment of 350 officers for the Staff Corps is reached, and their distribution by ranks and duties is shown in Table III. below:—

TABLE III.—DISTRIBUTION BY RANKS AND DUTIES OF STAFF CORPS OFFICERS.

Duty.	Lieutenants.	Captains.	Majors.	Lt.-Cols.	Colonels.	Total.
Area Officers for—						
215 areas	151	64	215
In charge of 10 areas	22	22
Permanent Forces	28	11	5	3	1	48
District Staff for 6 districts	6	10	6	3	25
Central Administration at Head-Quarters	1	6	3	2	12
Military College	1	4	1	1	1	8
Spare for sick, on special courses, attached to other armies	10	4	6	20
Totals	190	90	50	13	7	350

44. If men of the right stamp are to be attracted to the corps, the pay of each rank must be good; and in this connexion it must be remembered that the circumstances of an officer's services prevent, and rightly so, his participation in commercial ventures. For the Staff Corps to be successful, its officers must concentrate all their energies on their profession, and their pay should, therefore, be sufficient not only for their keep while serving, but also to insure to them a competence when retired.

45. In view of these conditions, I recommend rates of pay shown in Table IV., with the proviso that in each rank a compulsory deduction should be made, sufficient to assure an adequate provision for maintenance on retirement.

Colonel
Lieutenant
Majors
Captains
Subalterns

shall not

the Staff
will be
ground

the military
eliminating
branches
ten per cent.
cadets

follows

area of
who will
head-quarter
tration
required
determined
Inspected

for both
a cadet
colleges

colleges
proficiency
service
nation
during
at any

taught
an element
men

his course
or to
office

TABLE IV.—PROPOSED PAY OF THE STAFF CORPS OFFICERS.

Establishment.		Pay per annum.
Ranks.	Number.	
Colonel	7	£ 800 to 900
Lieutenant-Colonels	13	700 to 800
Majors	50	550 to 650
Captains	90	375 to 450
Subalterns	190	250 to 350

THE MILITARY COLLEGE.

46. I have shown that 350 officers are required for the Staff Corps, and I shall now discuss the organization of a Military College to maintain that corps.

47. Taking 20 years as the average service of an officer, it appears that after the Staff Corps is up to establishment the yearly output required from the college will be about 18 cadets. The minimum length of course required to efficiently ground a cadet in his profession is three years.

48. As has already been pointed out, strict selection should be enforced from the moment a boy becomes a cadet. To allow for the necessary process of elimination, and also for those boys who may show proficiency for some other branch of the Public Service, I advise that thirty cadets be the annual entry; adding ten per cent. to this number for casualties, and the figure $33 \times 3 = 99$, say 100, cadets is reached as the establishment of the college.

49. The age of entry should be not less than 17 nor more than 19.

50. I consider that the method of entry into the college should be as follows:—

Candidates should be selected from the most capable of the senior cadets, each area officer submitting the name of his best cadet to the major in charge of ten areas, who will then examine these ten cadets and forward five names through the district head-quarters, who will state their recommendations, if any, to the central administration. The latter will then select from the names received double the number required, and will refer the ultimate selection from these last to an authority to be determined by Government. This authority might be a Board of Examiners, or the Inspector-General, or the Commandant of the College.

51. A cadet having joined the college, his parents should pay £80 per annum for board, lodging, books, clothing, equipment, and instruction; except in the case of a cadet obtaining a scholarship, of which there should be twenty for the whole college.

52. Until the Staff Corps is up to establishment, the full output from the college will be required; once that stage is passed, or in the case of a student showing proficiency for a career other than a military one, he might be excused from military service on the following condition: that he serves and is efficient as an officer in the national force for twelve years, and attends training, as may be laid down, and that during these twelve years he will perform any special military duty required of him at any time by the Central Administration.

53. During the course, the cadet must be kept under strict discipline, and taught to keep himself physically and mentally fit. Any cadet unlikely to make an efficient officer, or lacking in the personality necessary to influence and command men should be removed.

54. On the completion of his course at the college, the cadet should be given his commission, and sent either to India for a winter training, *i.e.*, October to April, or to the United Kingdom for a summer training, *i.e.*, April to October, as an attached officer to a British regiment. On return, he should do one year's duty under the best

st Point sets
a Democratic
duce officers
ideals, if not
ics—to West

the graduates
lly examined
ce, there will

ion, and there
ready advised
in war time,
In addition,
the Common-
the permanent

de the officers
ad permanent

College, and
to, the other
would be the
n the world.
5 areas, which
harge of each
ion, 22 majors
ffs require 25
ry College 8;

ominions, on
6 per cent. of
establishment of
aks and duties

OFFICERS.

Colonels.	Total.
...	215
...	22
1	48
3	25
2	12
1	8
...	20
7	350

the pay of each
t the circum-
in commercial
ntrate all their
nt not only for
retired.

in Table IV.,
ade, sufficient

instructional officer available in an area, in order to learn how best to conduct registration and to promote home training in the area. He should then be fully capable to take over charge of an area.

55. It will be evident that the Director of such a college must be a man of exceptional qualifications, well educated, and accustomed to do his duty fearlessly and thoroughly. He should be supplied with two assistant directors and an adjutant of similar qualifications to himself, and a staff of professors to teach the curriculum, which should be based on that of West Point. From the estimates at the end of this part it will be seen that the establishment and cost of such a college, when in full working order, will be £15,050.

56. Any political interference with the management of such institution, in which disciplinary training forms an important part, and the efficiency of which is so essential to the defence of Australia, should be strictly avoided.

THE CITIZEN OFFICER.

57. While the Staff Corps will provide the trained instructor, the leadership of units of the Citizen Force will depend on the citizen officer, and it is therefore all important that he should be of the most promising material available, chosen young and selected solely for his capacity for leadership and military knowledge, and devotion to duty. Every opportunity must be taken to educate him in the spare moments of his civil business, and accordingly means of instruction should be available at or near his home.

58. Once selected, the welfare of the force requires that officers should serve more continuously and for longer periods than their men, and in this way repay the nation for the trust reposed in them.

59. A consideration of these requirements leads to the conclusion that—

- (a) The citizen officer should be appointed as early as possible in his military career, so that he may, at the most receptive time of his life, study his duties as an officer, and develop his qualifications for imparting instruction and leadership of men.
- (b) It should be understood that the acceptance of a commission entails a liability to serve as an officer for at least twelve years, but such a liability would not interfere with free movement from place to place in Australia; nor with resignation should the Governor-General be pleased to accept it; nor, subject to the exigencies of the service, with the privilege of leave on private affairs to visit countries outside Australia.

APPOINTMENT.

60. I agree with the principle laid down in the Defence Act, that in Citizen Forces all promotions should be from the ranks; but, in order to get young officers, I advise that for this purpose service in the ranks of senior cadets should count. The ordinary procedure to be followed in the appointment of an officer would then generally be—

61. The area officer would nominate suitable senior cadets as sub-lieutenants in the Cadet Corps; such rank to carry no pay nor command outside the cadets. During the first year of their adult training these sub-lieutenants should be on probation as lieutenants in the Citizen Forces. When approved by the Battalion commander, and after passing the necessary tests, their names would be submitted, through the usual channels, for commissions.

62. As regards (b), the commission would then be granted on the declaration of the officer that he is willing to serve for twelve years. Under this system it is estimated that an officer would obtain his first commission between the ages of 18 and 20, would reach the rank of captain about 26, and of major about 30 or 32, *i.e.*, when his twelve years' service is about to expire. Above the rank of major no obligation to serve should be necessary; zealous officers would remain in order to command their battalions or regiments, and subsequently brigades.

63. A citizen officer elected to any Parliament should be at once seconded.

INSTRUCTION.

64. The instruction of a citizen officer will be in the first instance afforded to him at or near his home by the instructional officer, who will take special care that

the o
which
subje
office
over,
mean
subje
by an
shoul
in In
set, d
discu

the ci
subal
raised

bonus
throug

every-
intellig
passing
Much
and de
is done
soldier

he is
but ar
rates
will c
quent

the r
more
rates

prin
shou
ciz
cour

for
For

For
will

the officers of his unit are thoroughly taught in all the regimental work of the unit to which they belong. In addition to this instruction, special courses for technical subjects should be arranged by the district staffs, and the proficiency attained by the officer going through any of these courses be specially noted in his favour. Moreover, as these officers will doubtless have their evenings free for study, an excellent means for bringing the whole force together and of giving instruction in military subjects would be the free circulation of a military magazine which should be edited by and published under the direction of the Head-Quarters Staff. The same agency should undertake a system of correspondence which has proved to be of value in India, whereby answers are given to questions on military subjects, papers are set, duly corrected and returned, strategical and tactical problems are explained, discussed, and corrected.

65. During the training period of his arm, 16 or 24 days, as the case may be, the citizen officer should receive good emoluments, and I advise that the pay of a subaltern for this period should be increased to £1 per diem, the other ranks being raised in proportion. The rates for each rank would then be—

	£	s.	d.
Subaltern	1	0	0
Captain	1	10	0
Major	2	0	0
Lieutenant-Colonel	2	10	0
Colonel	3	0	0

66. No pay should be allowed for attendance at schools of instruction, but bonuses sufficient to cover expenses should be granted to those officers who pass through the courses satisfactorily and attain the standard of qualification.

THE CITIZEN SOLDIER.

67. The Australian citizen soldier experiences much of military value in the every-day conditions of his civil life. He is generally a good rider, active, lithe, and intelligent. As a cadet he is taught to shoot, and learns the rudiments of drill, and, passing through his recruit adult training, he joins the force as an efficient soldier. Much will undoubtedly depend on the amount of training that, through self-denial and devotion to his duty, the citizen soldier performs at or near his home, and, if this is done, in my opinion he will be able to subsequently maintain his efficiency as a soldier under the training that has been proposed in this paper.

68. Throughout the period of service, the citizen soldier must remember that he is discharging a duty to his country, and that the pay he receives is not a wage, but an allowance to assist him in the discharge of his duty. I therefore think that the rates of pay laid down in the Act are adequate, and, as under my proposals, training will continue after the twentieth year, I consider that the pay of a soldier in all subsequent years should be at the rate laid down for the 19-20 year, namely, 4s. per diem.

CITIZEN NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.

69. When, however, a citizen soldier is selected for and is ready to assume the responsibilities of a non-commissioned officer, the case is different. He is doing more than his country absolutely requires, and he should, therefore, receive higher rates of pay—up to 8s. a day for a sergeant.

70. The selection and training of the non-commissioned officer will be primarily the work of the citizen officer. Promising non-commissioned officers should be sent to schools for further technical training on the same conditions as the citizen officer; they should be encouraged to extend their services, and are, of course, eligible for commissions.

THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF UNITS.

71. The establishments of the regular army have hitherto been the standard for Australia, and this principle should be observed in the formation of the Citizen Forces.

72. In its application, however, local conditions may require slight variations. For instance, bandsmen are not necessary for a Citizen Force, drummers and buglers will supply all that is necessary; the details left at the base need not be so many.

TRAINING.

78. The training of the citizen soldier may be divided into two parts—the home training, which will take place all the year round in the vicinity of the men's homes under the Staff Corps or the citizen officers of the area; and the camp training, which will be annually held in the neighbourhood, and will generally consist of a brigade of infantry with a proportion of other arms. In order to sustain the interest of the force, the instruction given should be of a progressive nature. The soldier should annually be taught the proper practical methods of carrying out some new exercise as well as being tested in what he has learnt before. Thus a fresh exercise would be studied every year in the area, and practically tested at the camp. When this has been done, the exercise to be studied during the next year should be initiated and explained.

79. This method of training naturally necessitates a systematized arrangement by which each soldier is gradually taught on the ground how to carry out all the duties of his arm.

80. For battalion and regimental training, the assembly of the quotas from two or three areas becomes necessary, and this home training can be done at week ends. In ordinary years there will be no necessity to go beyond brigade training, which requires the assembly of quotas from ten areas. The selection of the time and place for these annual camps will be the work of the brigade major, who should consult the convenience of employers and of the men.

81. Every year, three or more brigades should be selected for concentration so as to practise commanders, staffs, and railways in dealing with large bodies of troops. These concentrations should be specially arranged for by the Government on the advice of the Military Board.

82. Training should consist of all that is essential to good marching, accurate controlled shooting, and the combination of all arms in attack and defence.

83. Throughout, the principles contained in the manuals of the Regular Army should be followed, but they must be applied with intelligence and with due regard to the local conditions of *personnel*, ground, and composition of the force. Land will be required to properly and satisfactorily carry out this work, and in the selection of its site two often conflicting conditions must be reconciled—one that it should be close to cities in order that units and brigades will lose no time on the road, and the other that it should be large enough for manoeuvres. The Act gives power to manoeuvre over country at will, but where central large training grounds can be established in each State, there are many advantages in now doing so before the population thickens and all ground is taken up. Such localities would be used for the annual trainings, and where possible might be made available for the breeding of artillery horses.

MOBILIZATION.

84. Thoroughly thought-out and practical plans for mobilization and concentration are required before the Citizen Force can be considered prepared for war.

85. Preparation for mobilization is primarily the work of the General Staff, who recommend the lines to be followed and advise where, and in what quantities, the munitions for war of the various units should be stored. Concentration can only be satisfactorily effected when the railway and military authorities are in the closest touch and work in absolute harmony. To secure this co-operation, I advise that a War Railway Council be formed, as is the case in the United Kingdom, composed of the Chief Railway Commissioner from each State, under the presidency of the Quartermaster-General of the Citizen Forces, and with an officer of the Head-Quarters Staff as Secretary.

DISTRICT STAFFS.

86. It only remains to consider the staff organization suitable to administer, control, and inspect the Citizen Force.

Establishment of a
battalions, organized

Officers and NCOs.	Rank and File.
..	18
..	15
6	880
..	18
6	931

001

the ranks will
beers.

peace and war ;

750

143

108

1,001

Officers.	Rank and File.
..	15
..	11
8	356
..	4
8	386

70

350

70

50

470

ure of the gun ;
5 officers and

130

16

146

ie., a total of



Colonel Wetzell.

decide how many they could and should allocate to each. It is just like the claims each Government Department presents to the Treasury for the coming financial year. The aggregate always exceeds what the finances of the nation can afford. The Government decide what to allow, what to reject, or how much to cut down in claims which are in themselves justifiable. This is a domain of strategy in which the Government must be supreme. An extra 200,000 men at the front would not have converted the Passchendaele fiasco into a triumph, but it might have lost the War by disorganising the services that kept the nation from the hunger and penury that destroyed Germany and Austria.

The psychological blunders perpetrated by Germany afford many illustrations of the shortsightedness of subordinating considerations of statesmanship to immediate military exigencies. Strategy must take cognisance of both. There is the occupation of Belgium. It was not sound strategy because it was a political blunder. It brought the British Empire into the War. One of the ablest of the German Generals told me recently that but for the force of four highly trained British divisions placed on the Belgian frontier the German Army would have outflanked and Sedanised the whole of the French Fifth Army and thus brought the War to a triumphant end on the Western Front. Its presence in that area was to them a disagreeable surprise. They had anticipated meeting a British contingent sooner or later. But they reckoned on its disembarking at Calais or Boulogne, and their spies having informed them that no troops had yet reached those ports, they came to the conclusion that the British Army had not arrived in France. The disembarkation at

Havre and the speed with which the Expeditionary Force was sent to France and mustered on the Belgian frontier upset the whole of their calculations and frustrated their plans. The subtlety, efficiency and celerity with which the British Expeditionary Force was transported to the Belgian frontier without the knowledge of the German Staff was almost entirely due to the genius of Lord Haldane. The way that devoted but intelligent patriot was hounded out of official life by insinuations of treason is one of the most disreputable and stupid episodes in British history. The invasion of Belgium upset the whole carefully elaborated scheme by which the Germans relied on outflanking and capturing a whole French Army. The provocation which brought America into the War was another political blunder, for which the soldiers were primarily responsible. The insistence on taking too many men from food and war production because they were needed at the front was yet another. All these issues enter into strategy and in determining them statesmen must have their say as well as soldiers. In some of them statesmanship is the more important element and statesmen ought to have the final decision—after giving due weight to everything soldiers may have to urge from their point of view.

But there is a region where the soldier claims to be paramount and where the interference of the statesman seems to him to be an impertinence. One is the question of whether a great battle which may involve enormous losses ought to be fought—if so, where and at what time. The second question is whether a prolonged attack on fortifications (practically a siege) which is causing huge loss of life without producing any apparent result, ought to

be called off. Should Governments intervene or leave the decision entirely to the soldiers? The British Government was doubtful of the wisdom of the combined offensive of September, 1915, in Champagne and Artois. It was one of the costly and fateful mistakes of the War, for whilst the Allies were entangled in an attack doomed to failure on the French Front, Germany was enabled to crush Serbia, bring Bulgaria into the War, capture the Balkans, open up her own road to Turkey, cut our communications with Russia and drive us helter-skelter out of the Dardanelles. Half the number of men we lost in that ill-judged French offensive, if sent in time to the Balkans, would have altered the whole aspect and prospect of the War. The strategical as well as tactical error of judgment then perpetrated by the Army Commanders prolonged the War by two years. Should the Asquith Coalition have exerted its overriding authority and vetoed that offensive? Their chief military adviser, Kitchener, was definitely of the opinion that it was a mistake and could not succeed. They could, therefore, had they vetoed it, claim that in doing so they were acting on the highest military judgment at their disposal. It is true that Kitchener subsequently recommended that it was not advisable to quarrel with the French about it, as Joffre had set his heart on this particular attack, had planned it with great care and was convinced he would be successful in breaking through. Ought the Government to have risked a misunderstanding with France? They would have been well within their rights as a Government and in doing so they would not have been over-ruling the opinion of their own military staffs as to the prospects of this particular offensive. It is true that had they done so and gone to the aid of

to the end of the War that a time would come when his troopers would one day charge through the gap made by his artillery and convert the German defeat into a headlong scamper for the Rhine. Needless to say, that chance never came. Generals were in every essential particular inadequately prepared for the contingencies which confronted them in this War. Had they been men of genius—which they were not—they could have adapted themselves more quickly and effectively to the new conditions of war. They were not equipped with that superiority in brains or experience over an amateur steeped in the incidents and needs of the War which would justify the attitude they struck and the note of assured pastmastership they adopted towards all criticism or suggestion from outside or below. The Generals themselves were at least four-fifths amateur, hampered by the wrong training. They knew nothing except by hearsay about the actual fighting of a battle under modern conditions. Haig ordered many bloody battles in this War. He only took part in two, the retreat from Mons and the first Battle of Ypres. And both battles were fought under the old conditions of open warfare. He never even saw the ground on which his greatest battles were fought, either before or during the fight. Robertson never saw a battle. The great Commanders of history, even when they took no physical part in the battle, saw with their own eyes aided or unaided with the telescope the ground upon which it was to be fought and watched the progress of the struggle between the opposing forces. When you come to some of the great essentials of training and preparation for modern warfare, then neither Haig nor Robertson nor any of their Staff had any previous experience that would give them

proficiency. And yet the strategy of the War depended upon these two soldiers and their military advisers.

In the most crucial matters relating to their own profession our leading soldiers had to be helped out by the politician. I have already given in detail an account of the way the Generals muddled the problem of munitions. They did not possess the necessary understanding of the probable character of the War to foresee that it would be a war which would consume a prodigious quantity of shot and shell. What they ordered was of the wrong kind. They preferred shrapnel to high explosive because the former was more useful in the Boer War. What they provided was on the assumption that the War would be conducted in the open field. When it developed into a war of deep digging they did not realise that in order to demolish those improvised ramparts it was essential to equip an army with thousands of guns of a calibre heavier than any yet trundled into the battlefield. A fortress with its flanks on the North Sea and the Swiss mountains, held by millions of men and masses of cannon and machine-guns, was a nightmare they never contemplated in their most disturbed slumbers. It took them months to adapt their strategy to this novel and unforeseen portent. They did not realise that the machine-gun and the hand-grenade would practically take the place of the rifle. Politicians were the first to seize upon the real character of the problem in all these respects and it was they who insisted on the necessary measures being taken—and taken promptly—in order adequately to cope with it. It was politicians who initiated and organised these measures. In doing so, at each stage they had to overcome the rooted traditions, prejudices and practices of military staffs.

It was politicians who insisted upon the importance of providing sufficient and suitable transport facilities behind the line on a great scale in order not only to bring up supplies, but to increase the mobility of the Army along the whole front. It was civilians, chosen by politicians, who reorganised and developed these facilities. It was politicians who foresaw that any attempt to break through the immense fortifications thrown up by the enemy on the Western Front would involve enormous carnage and a prolongation of this destructive war. It was they who urged the finding of a way round on the most vulnerable fronts. It was politicians who urged the importance of making the best use of the magnificent and almost inexhaustible fighting man-power in Russia and the Balkans by providing them with the necessary equipment to play their part in attacking the enemy on his Eastern and Southern Fronts. It was amateurs who were principally responsible for the tank, easily the most formidable of our weapons, and it was they who invented and urged the use of one of the most serviceable machines of the War, the Stokes mortar. It was a civilian who invented the hydrophone which located the deadly submarine and enabled us to hunt it down in the pathless depths of the sea.

Let anyone read the history of the War with care and then conjecture what would have happened if the ignorant and cold-shouldered civilian had not insisted on coming to the rescue of the military in the discharge of those functions which in peace and war constituted an essential part of the duties and responsibilities of the latter. I have not perused a history written by or on behalf of these great Generals which recognises fairly and generously the contribution rendered to the achievement of victory

by the unwelcome intervention of the amateur untrained in military colleges or on parade grounds.

Looking back on this devastating War and surveying the part played in it by statesmen and soldiers respectively in its direction, I have come definitely to the conclusion that the former showed too much caution in exerting their authority over the military leaders. They might have done so either by a direct and imperative order from the Government or by making representations followed, if those were not effective in answering the purpose, by a change in the military leadership. The latter method of procedure would no doubt have been the sounder and wiser course to pursue had it been feasible. The difficulty, however, all Governments experienced was in discovering capable commanders who could have been relied upon not only to carry out their policy but to do so efficiently and skilfully. The long siege warfare did not provide opportunities for resourceful men to come to the top by a display of superior skill. There was a rigidity and restrictiveness about the methods employed which allowed no play for initiative, imagination and inventiveness. The orders issued to divisional and brigadier Generals and to Colonels from headquarters were precise and could not be deviated from in any particular without risking a charge of insubordination. The men on the heights offered no encouragement or chances to genius down below. The distance between the châteaux and dugouts was as great as that from the fixed stars to the caverns of earth. No telescope was powerful enough to discern talent at that depth, even if a look-out were being kept. That is one reason why no one reached the highest ranks in the British Army except those who were there or

thereabout when the War began. No civilian rose above the rank of Brigadier, although there must have been hundreds of thousands who had years of experience in the fighting line—many of them men of exceptional capacity. Thousands of these men had passed through our Secondary Schools, hundreds through our Universities, and not a few with distinction. It is incredible that amongst men of that training and quality there should not have been found one, fit for high promotion, after years of greater experience of fighting under modern conditions than any General in the field had acquired. The regular Army before the War numbered something over 250,000. During the War four or five million young men drawn from every class of the community passed through its ranks. The wider the range of choice the better the chance of finding the right men for leadership. Besides, the Army was never considered to be a career for the talents. Rather the reverse. Boys who were endowed with brains above their fellows sought other professions where talent was more welcome and better requited. Independent thinking is not encouraged in a professional Army. It is a form of mutiny. Obedience is the supreme virtue. Theirs not to reason why. Orders are to be carried out and not canvassed. Criticism is insubordination. The object of discipline is to accustom men to respond to a command instantly, by instant action, without thought of effect or consequence. There were many intelligent officers and men who knew that the orders given them during the War were utterly stupid and must have been given by Staffs who had no understanding of the conditions. But orders were orders. And with their men they went to a doom they foresaw was inevitable.

Such an instinctive obedience to the word of command is essential to the efficiency of a body of men who have to face terror, death or mutilation in the discharge of their terrible duties. But a long course of mental subservience and suppression cramps the development and suppleness of the intellect. It makes "an officer and a gentleman" but it is not conducive to the building up of an alert, adaptable and resourceful leader of men. Haig's summary of the qualities of the French officers he met is a condemnation of the rigidity of the system. The average and commonplace men of distinguished form he picked out as "gentlemanly" and "fine soldiers." The one man of genius among them he giped at as a blatherer. In such a system promotion is a moving staircase where the man who sticks on is sure of promotion. Wheedling, pushing, intriguing enables some to wriggle through the crowd in front of him—but intellect is out of place and strength does not count. In the grand Army that fought the World War the ablest brains did not climb to the top of the stairs and they did not reach a height where politicians could even see them. Seniority and Society were the dominant factors in Army promotion. Deportment counted a good deal. Brains came a bad fourth. Men of great intellectual powers are not tempted to join a profession which offers so little scope for the exercise of their powers and where the awards have no particular reference to special capacity. To be a good average is safer than to be gifted above your fellows. The only exceptions were to be found in the Dominion forces. General Currie, the Commander of the Canadian Army, and General Monash, the Commander of the Australian Army, were both in civil life when the War broke out. Both proved

themselves to be brilliant military leaders and went right through to the top. It means they had a natural aptitude for soldiering and that the fact of their being officers in unprofessional armies gave full play to their gifts. Monash was, according to the testimony of those who knew well his genius for war and what he accomplished by it, the most resourceful General in the whole of the British Army. But the tradition of the Dominions in the occupations of peace and war is encouraging to fresh talent. For this and other reasons the British Government experienced a difficulty in securing for the Supreme Command the services of the ablest man which their great armies could have provided. There was no conspicuous officer in the Army who seemed to be better qualified for the Highest Command than Haig. That is to say, there was no outstanding General fit for so overwhelming a position as the command of a force five times as great as the largest army ever commanded by Napoleon, and many more times the size of any army led by Alexander, Hannibal or Cæsar. I have no doubt these great men would have risen to the occasion, but such highly gifted men as the British Army possessed were consigned to the mud by orders of men superior in rank but inferior in capacity, who themselves kept at a safe distance from the slime which they had chosen as the terrain where their plans were to operate.

The solicitude with which most Generals in high places (there were honourable exceptions) avoided personal jeopardy is one of the debatable novelties of modern warfare. Generals cannot any longer be expected to lead their men over the top with pointing sword. But this departure from the established methods of leadership by personal example

has gone too far. Admirals of a rank corresponding to that held by the Army Commanders took exactly the same hazards in action as the humblest sailor in their fleet. Beatty was a man of dauntless intrepidity who sought danger. His flagship was hit in the Dogger Bank fight and it was just as liable to be blown up at Jutland as the *Defence* and the *Invincible*. The Rear-Admirals commanding these battle cruisers were killed when their ships were sunk. Jellicoe was not altogether free from personal peril in the Jutland mists. When a naval battle is fought G.H.Q. moves into the battle zone. Every child knows the story of Zeebrugge, the one naval exploit of the War that moved and still moves the imagination of the nation. Sir Roger Keyes, the Admiral who directed the attack, had the unmistakable Nelson touch and took just as great personal risks as that redoubtable sailor ever faced. When High Admirals are not immune from the jeopardy of war there is no reason why exalted Generals should be sacrosanct. It is a new thing in war for generals who never set eyes on a position to command their soldiers to attack it without the slightest intention of placing themselves in any peril by leading the attack themselves, or even in viewing the ground before action or coming near the battle whilst it is proceeding to its deadly end. It is certainly a novelty in war that military leaders swathed in comfort and security should doom hundreds of thousands of their bravest soldiers to lodge for weeks in slimy puddles with Death as their fellow lodger, without even taking the precaution of finding out for themselves what the conditions are or are likely to become. In the olden days when commanders so directed a battle that it ended in a shambles for their own army, they

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATION IN THE UNITED STATES

IN the Cabinet room of the White House, every Thursday morning, the National Security Council gathers around a long, massive table. On the table are printed briefs reviewing some problem of national policy. Prepared by the Council staff, these briefs blend the views of many departments and agencies, but in Council discussions the members and advisers rehearse these views once again. The Secretary of State and others suggest desirable solutions to the policy problem, while the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff describe the military risks entailed in each alternative course of action. The President then reaches his decision, and the United States may acquire a new foreign policy or perhaps a new shading for an old policy.

Nearly all Americans agree on the need for this National Security Council. Everyone realizes that American policy has outgrown the Cabinet, just as the atom has outgrown the college laboratory. Where, fifty years ago, Secretary of State Elihu Root could disregard reports of a crisis in the Middle East, cabling the American envoy, "Continue quarrels with missionaries as usual",¹ a similar crisis today would call out instructions to diplomats all over the world, orders to military and naval commanders, anxious discussions in Washington, and an earnest session of the National Security Council. Living in a world as sensitive as a can of nitroglycerin, Americans accept the need for exact weighing of political and military factors before each policy decision.

¹ Phillip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root* (New York, 1938), II, 109.

The nation has acknowledged this need, however, for only a short time. Not before the 1940's would the majority of Americans have endorsed the rationale that underlies the National Security Council. Yet this rationale now seems self-evident: military forces are the rooks and bishops behind the knights and pawns of diplomacy; although the rooks and bishops move less frequently, their rôle in the game is no less decisive. Before the executors of foreign policy can decide what the nation ought to do, they must learn from political and military experts what the nation is able to do. They must lay objectives alongside capabilities, in the same way that business men compare the blueprints of design engineers with the estimates of cost accountants. In making foreign policy, in other words, ends must be measured against means.

Although this rationale won acceptance only recently, it is not new, even in the United States. Nowhere, in fact, is it more vigorously summarized than in Number 23 of the *Federalist Papers*, written by Alexander Hamilton. But long years of isolated safety smothered the idea of political-military collaboration. It found no new spokesman until Captain Mahan began to preach, late in the nineteenth century. Even then, the idea was not translated into action until after the conquest of the Philippines, when a few Americans, looking across six thousand miles of water at their new colony, began to believe that the United States had grafted to itself an Achilles heel. They perceived that the safety of this faraway member could not, like the safety of the homeland, be entrusted to Providence.

Realizing the need for hard, far-sighted planning, this handful of Americans also realized their lack of any planning instruments. The State Department, as Tyler Dennett characterizes it in his life of John Hay, was an "antiquated, feeble organization, enslaved by precedents and routine inherited from another century, remote from the public gaze and indifferent to it. The typewriter was viewed as a necessary evil and the telephone as an instrument of last resort."² Although the Army and Navy had professionals, while the State Department had none, the armed services were still no better outfitted for strategy-planning than the State Department for policy-planning. Before the

² *John Hay* (New York, 1934), p. 198.

Army and Navy could produce coherent advice, they had to nurture brains or general staff organizations, and such brains developed slowly. The Army's General Staff, for instance, was "only just growing to man's estate" fifteen years after its founding, according to the 1918 report of its Chief of Staff.³ This General Staff and the Navy General Board faced, in addition, the problem of welding Army and Navy differences, so that military advice on policy could be based on estimates of the total military power of the United States. Until a Joint Board of the Army and Navy and the State Department, too, perfected their internal workings, the coördination of strategy and policy could only be haphazard.

During the first two decades after the War with Spain, as a result, consultation among the State, War, and Navy Departments took the antique form of correspondence among the three secretaries. The Navy Secretary, advised by his General Board, would write to the Secretary of State, proposing acquisition of a certain naval base on foreign soil. After referring the proposal to such experts as he could collect, the Secretary of State would return his judgment, either killing the idea or pushing it up for final decision by the President.⁴

Like sophomore letters home, these begging communications from the Secretary of the Navy sometimes hinted casually at subjects under study. The Navy revealed its concern with Panama, for instance, by requesting bases across all the sea approaches to the Isthmus—on the coast of Peru, off the Pacific coast of Panama, on Fonseca Bay, and in Cuba.⁵ Never,

³ *Annual Report of the War Department, 1918: Report of the Chief of Staff*, p. 3.

⁴ See Seward W. Livermore, "American Strategy Diplomacy in the South Pacific, 1890-1914", *Pacific Historical Review*, XII (March 1943), 33-51, and "American Naval Base Policy in the Far East", *ibid.*, XIII (June 1944), 113-135.

⁵ Livermore, "American Strategy Diplomacy in the South Pacific, 1890-1914"; Jessup, *op. cit.*, I, 326. The following from Record Group 80, the General Records of the Navy Department, in the National Archives (hereinafter cited as Navy Dept. Arch., RG 80): C. Darling (Acting Sec. of Navy) to J. Hay, Mar. 5, 1903 (carbon), 8480-8; G. v. L. Meyer to P. C. Knox, Feb. 23, 1910 (carbon), 8480-9; J. Daniels to R. Lansing, Feb. 28, 1920 (carbon), "Spindle File"—State Department. The following from Record Group 45, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library (hereinafter cited as Navy Dept. Arch., RG 45): J. D. Long to McKinley, Dec. 13, 1901 (carbon), Confidential Correspondence, vol. III.

before completion of the canal, did the Navy General Board say that the Isthmus was of vital importance to the military security of the United States. Alert eyes in the State Department might have detected this thought in the Board's selections of naval bases. And eyes even less alert might have perceived the concept in two bolder letters, reminding the State Department that no great Power should be allowed to perch on Ecuador's Galápagos Islands or on Haiti's Môle St. Nicholas.⁶ But the Navy and Army rarely let fall such clues to their strategic thinking.

Neither did the State Department share its political thinking with the services. In the archives of the McKinley, Roosevelt and Taft Administrations, I have yet to find a letter from a Secretary of State, asking for a military cost accounting before some diplomatic stroke. Although Taft's Secretary of State did occasionally ask the fleet to back up his diplomacy, he never inquired ahead of time about the fleet's location and make-up. Thus, in May 1912, when unrest was sweeping Cuba, the Secretary asked for "a considerable naval force . . . in the vicinity of Havana." Only by chance, or as a result of naval clairvoyance, did nine warships happen to be handy at Key West.⁷

Letter writing in the State, War, and Navy Departments failed to bring about effective coördination of policies. As a rule, in fact, diplomatic and military recommendations reached the White House separately, and the relationship between political aims and military capabilities had to be gauged, if at all, by the President. Although this rule-of-thumb system could work for a strategy-minded President like Theodore Roosevelt, it displayed its failings even in his time.

In the summer of 1907, for example, the budding American high command, the Joint Board of the Army and the Navy,

⁶ Livermore, "American Strategy Diplomacy in the South Pacific, 1890-1914". Rear Adm. H. C. Taylor to W. H. Moody, Nov. 10, 1902 (original), Confidential Corr., vol. III, Navy Dept. Arch., RG 45. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, I, 562-563; and the following from the General Records of the Department of State, National Archives (hereinafter cited as State Dept. Arch.): Daniels to Lansing, Jan. 2, 1920 (orig.), 822.014 0/287.

⁷ Knox to Meyer, May 25, 1912 (orig.); B. Winthrop to Knox, May 25, 1912 (carbon)—both in 27868-4, Navy Dept. Arch., RG 80.

discussed the hostility growing between the United States and Japan. Realizing that war, if it came, would find most of the American fleet in the Atlantic, the Board proposed a precautionary shift of battleships to the Pacific, then asked the Secretaries of War and the Navy to suggest such a shift to the President. The Secretaries did so, writing to Roosevelt at Oyster Bay, and Roosevelt agreed, choosing, however, to disguise the movement as a good will cruise. Although he seems to have reached this decision without delay, Roosevelt waited from late June until mid-July before notifying his Secretary of State, who was still in Washington. For several weeks, therefore, the Secretary of State duelled with Japanese diplomats, wholly unaware, so far as the records show, of the Navy's preparations for a warlike gesture!⁸

The first advances from haphazard coördination-by-letter to coördination-by-conference were made, paradoxically, under an administration that would never have endorsed the rationale of political-military collaboration. President Woodrow Wilson may even have denied the need for long-range military planning. At any rate, two generals swore after World War I that Wilson had given verbal orders forbidding the Army and Navy to construct hypothetical war plans.⁹ During his Administration, furthermore, a pacifist sat for two years as Secretary of State, a near-pacifist ruled the Navy Department, and a Quaker became Secretary of War.

Perhaps a prevailing attitude of the Administration was expressed on one occasion by this pacifist Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan. Renewed tension with Japan had brought before the Cabinet another Joint Board recommendation for a fleet movement to anticipate the possibility of war.

⁸ Hermann Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood: A Biography* (New York, 1931), II, 79-81; Thomas A. Bailey, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises* (Stanford, 1934), pp. 211-227. Taft to Roosevelt, June 22, 1907, Private Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Roosevelt to H. C. Lodge, July 10, 1907, in Elting E. Morison *et al.* (eds.), *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951-1954), V, 709-710; Roosevelt to Root, July 13, 1907, *ibid.*, pp. 717-719.

⁹ Frederick Palmer, *Newton D. Baker* (New York, 1931), I, 40-41; Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood*, II, 205.

According to one member of the Cabinet, David F. Houston, this recommendation angered Bryan, who "flared up . . . got red in the face and was very emphatic. He thundered out that army and navy officers could not be trusted to say what we should or should not do, till we actually got into war; that we were discussing not how to wage war, but how not to get into war."¹⁰

Yet the Wilson Administration, with Bryan as Secretary of State, saw uniformed officers and black-tied diplomats sit down together to discuss questions of foreign policy. Tension with Mexico, during the first year of the Administration, brought Bryan himself to the White House for a conference with the War and Navy Secretaries, the Army Chief of Staff, and the head of the Navy General Board.¹¹ After war exploded over Europe, Bryan and his subordinates found a recurring need for special consultations with representatives of the Army and Navy. The uncertain character of neutral rights and duties brought into being a permanent Joint State and Navy Neutrality Board, an advisory body on diplomacy and international law. The amount of correspondence among assistant secretaries of the three departments increased three times over the pre-war average. And Bryan's successor, Robert Lansing, met almost daily, according to his desk diary, with officers from the Navy General Board and the Army General Staff.¹² Thus conferences, letters and committee meetings began to knit the three departments together.

But American policy failed to benefit from this increasing teamwork, for Wilson reached his decisions with little assistance from any of the three departments. Lansing had come into office, in Colonel House's words, as a man "to do the details intelligently,"¹³ and his Department's share in policy-making was never large. Meanwhile, the military planning agencies lacked not only the Administration's trust but also the ability to justify such trust if it were handed them. The Joint Board

¹⁰ *Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet* (Garden City, 1926), I, 66.

¹¹ Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson* (New York, 1926-1937), IX, 328-329.

¹² Private Papers of Robert Lansing, MS Div., Library of Congress.

¹³ E. M. House to Wilson, June 16, 1915 (orig.), Private Papers of Woodrow Wilson, MS Div., Library of Congress.

of the Army and Navy had virtually disbanded, because one of its recommendations had piqued the President.¹⁴ The Army General Staff had slipped into torpor, while the Navy General Board languished as a casualty of Josephus Daniels' perpetual feud with his admirals. Collaboration among these powerless agencies could result, at best, in a coordination of futilities.

The idea of political-military collaboration nevertheless survived. Since the war had revealed defects in the State Department and in the Army and Navy, the post-war years saw reforms in all three: the Rogers Act for the State Department, reorganization of the Army General Staff, progressive change in the new Office of Naval Operations, and creation of a new and stronger Joint Board of the Army and Navy. To some men in the War and Navy Departments experience had also proved the need for regular, official consultation with the State Department. And these men put forward two successive proposals for consultative organizations.

The first and most ambitious of these proposals came from Franklin D. Roosevelt, then acting as Secretary of the Navy. On May 1, 1919, Roosevelt wrote to the Secretary of State:

It is a fundamental principle that the foreign policy of our government is in the hands of the State Department. It is also an accepted fact that the foreign policy of a government depends for its acceptance by other nations upon the naval and military force that is behind it. . . .

It is probable that certain policies are of such importance to our national interests that they must be defended at all cost.

On the other hand certain policies are not, by the expense they would entail, justified if they lead to war.

Hence it is submitted that in the framing of our policies, it is necessary for the State Department to know how much they will cost to maintain by force, in order to assign them their relative importance.

Conversely, it is necessary for the Navy Department to know what policies it may be called upon to uphold by force, in order to formulate plans and building programs.¹⁵

¹⁴ Diary of Josephus Daniels entry, for May 16, 1913, Private Papers of Josephus Daniels, MS Div., Library of Congress.

¹⁵ (Orig.), 110.7/56, State Dept. Arch. The copy in the Franklin D. Roosevelt

Enclosed with this letter was a giant sheet of blueprint paper, charting with boxes and arrows an organization for planning against all possible wars. Prepared by the Naval War College, this neat chart outlined duties for a State Department planning agency, for the Army General Staff, for a naval general staff, and for a Joint Plan Making Body, composed of officers from all three staffs. To this Joint Body was to go responsibility for estimating national resources, both American and foreign, and the key rôle of defining American objectives for each possible war and assessing the force needed for success.

Although this grandiose scheme was probably unworkable, hard-headed discussion of the Navy's proposal might have engineered some practical organization for national defense. No such discussion ever took place, and, in fact, Roosevelt's letter was not even acknowledged. The letter and its enclosure went, by mistake, to the State Department's Division of Latin American Affairs. After some misspent months in that Division's filing cabinets, the document was interred in the general records, never opened by the Secretary of State.¹⁶ Indeed, when I found the original of Roosevelt's letter in the State Department archives, the blueprint was stapled to it, closed, and, as far as I could tell, the staple had never been removed, the blueprint never unfolded. Such was the fate of the first proposal for a National Security Council.

The second proposal came on December 7, 1921, this time sponsored jointly by the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War. Considerably less pretentious than the original Navy blueprint, this joint proposal offered only the idea of collaboration between the State Department and the Joint Board of the Army and the Navy. But the reasoning in the service secretaries' letter closely resembled Roosevelt's.

They put forward three proposals. The State Department should designate "a responsible official" to sit in with the Joint Board when "questions involving national policy are under

library is described in Frank Freidel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal* (Boston, 1954), pp. 19-20.

¹⁶ Memo, Division of Latin American Affairs to Index Bureau, July 21, 1919, 110.7/56, State Dept. Arch.

consideration." For similar discussions, one or more State Department people should sit in with the Joint Board's Planning Committee. Finally, the State Department should "refer to the Joint Board those national policies which may require the potential or dynamic support of the Army and Navy" and find out "whether the Army and Navy as at that time constituted and disposed are capable of supporting the policy in question. . . . All such opinions and recommendations of the Joint Board", the Secretaries added, "will be referred to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy for approval."¹⁷

This letter at least reached the desk of Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, but Hughes brushed it into his "Out" basket, noting: "This appears to me to be in substance a suggestion that at least provisionally matters of foreign policy be submitted to the Joint Board. I question the advisability of this." Taking their lead from Hughes, the undersecretary and the assistant secretaries questioned its advisability even more seriously. Consequently, Hughes suavely replied: "The only officials of the State Department who can speak for it with authority on questions of national policy are the Secretary and Undersecretary of State, and it is impossible, in the existing circumstances, for either of them to undertake this additional duty."¹⁸

Since War and Navy Department officials believed their proposal to be of great importance, they refused to accept the Secretary of State's negative reply. They countered with a new suggestion: the Joint Board should inform the State Department "whenever a subject comes before them for consideration which in their opinion is interwoven with the international policies of the United States." The Secretary of State or his representative could then attend the Joint Board's meeting. To this proposal the Secretary of State gave perfunctory agreement, thus providing the Army and Navy with a valve for

¹⁷ (Orig.) 110.7/123, State Dept. Arch.

¹⁸ Hughes to Fletcher, Dec. 12, 1921 (orig.); F. M. Dearing to Fletcher, Dec. 13, 1921 (orig.); W. J. Carr to Fletcher, Dec. 22, 1921 (orig.); Dearing to Fletcher, Jan. 4, 1922 (orig.), noted "(Mr. Fletcher concurs: JBS)"; Hughes to E. Denby and J. W. Weeks, Jan. 17, 1922 (certified carbon)—all in 110.7/123, State Dept. Arch.

starting a flow of military-political discussion.¹⁹ But the military leaders did not open this valve for over thirteen years.

Perhaps this long delay resulted from the series of slights administered to the military departments by the Secretary of State during the Washington Conference on Naval Limitation. Preparing for that conference, Secretary Hughes "worked closely with the Navy," his biographer says, and "was scrupulous in exploring the Navy's point of view while insisting that civilian statesmanship rather than naval strategy should guide the conference."²⁰ The General Board, anxious to push the Navy's ideas, presented Hughes with long, hard-thought essays on the questions apt to come up for negotiation. The Board advised that the United States fleet should equal the combined fleets of Britain and Japan, cautioned against any let-up in the naval building program, and portrayed the vital importance of fortifying Oahu, Guam and Manila Bay. But Hughes rejected each item of the Board's advice. In his opening speech to the conference, he not only proposed a 5:5:3 ratio among the three naval Powers but also offered to scrap thirty American capital ships. Later he proposed a general agreement not to fortify islands in the Pacific.²¹ Undoubtedly, Hughes based these stands on careful reasoning and broad advice, but the Navy's feelings were badly hurt, and a sense of resentment over the Washington Conference colored the writings of Navy and Army officers for decades.

As a result, these officers became even more circumspect than before in dealing with political questions. Furthermore, they fell altogether from public favor, as, during the twenties, newspapers and magazines drummed disillusionment, isolationism, and new forms of pacifism and anti-militarism. Whereas to Secretary Hughes a suggestion for political-military collaboration had seemed only imprudent, to either of his successors a similar suggestion would have seemed rash and startling. When Hoover's Secretary of State was preparing for the new naval

¹⁹ Denby and Weeks to Hughes, Jan. 25, 1923 (orig.); Memo, Fletcher to Hughes, Feb. 20, 1922 (orig.); Hughes to Weeks and Denby, Mar. 14, 1922 (certified carbon)—all in 110.7/124, State Dept. Arch.

²⁰ Merlo J. Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes* (New York, 1950), II, 460.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 460, 462, 477.

conference of 1930, for instance, he rejected out of hand suggestions from the General Board and took with him to the conference only one uniformed adviser, an admiral "carefully selected . . . by the administration's civilian leaders," one who "took a different position . . . from most of his colleagues."²²

During these years, nevertheless, the general staffs were improving their minds by cloistered study of possible wars, and junior officers in the armed services were building friendly ties with their counterparts in the Foreign Service. They were exchanging intelligence data, a practice started soon after World War I, and they were meeting on various interdepartmental boards, like the Radio Advisory Committee and the committee on strategic raw materials. Early in the twenties, too, Foreign Service officers began to attend the Army and Navy War Colleges and to give lectures before War College classes.²³ Thus the future heads of divisions and branches within the three departments laid a foundation for later coöperation on questions of policy.

Over this foundation a structure began to rise shortly after Franklin D. Roosevelt became President. His Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, found himself dealing with a newly barbarous Germany, an emboldened Italy, and a hostile Japan. As Hull stated to the Pearl Harbor investigators:

. . . soon after I came into the State Department, when I would be talking with the representatives of the thugs at the head of governments abroad. . . they would look at me in the face but I soon discovered that they were looking over my shoulder at our Navy and our Army and that our diplomatic strength. . . goes up or down with their estimate of what that amounts to.²⁴

²² Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, 1947), p. 168.

²³ Memo, A. Dulles to "Mr. Merle-Smith", Sept. 21, 1920 (orig.), 110.72/8, State Dept. Arch. J. C. Grew to E. Young, Oct. 18, 1924 (orig.); Davis (Asst. Sec. of War) to Grew, Oct. 20, 1924 (orig.); Grew to Davis, Oct. 23, 1924 (certified carbon)—all in 110.72/29, State Dept. Arch. J. M. Wainwright (Acting Sec. of War) to Hughes, July 8, 1922 (orig.); W. Phillips to Weeks, Sept. 1, 1922 (certified carbon)—both in 110.72/13, State Dept. Arch. Rear Adm. W. V. Pratt to Grew, Feb. 25, 1926 (orig.); Grew to Pratt, Mar. 11, 1926 (carbon); T. Dennett to Grew, Mar. 8, 1926 (orig.)—all in 110.75/20-21, State Dept. Arch.

²⁴ *Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 79 Cong., 1 sess. (hereinafter cited as *Pearl Harbor Hearings*), Pt. II, p. 455.

Consequently, Hull took more interest than his predecessors in military plans and opinions. Preparing for yet another naval conference, he asked the Navy to detail its wishes, and he sent to London, not just a "carefully selected" admiral, but the Chief of Naval Operations and a sizable band of naval officers. In the same year, too, he named a high State Department officer to sit in with the Joint Board's Planning Committee for a reexamination of America's military position in the Far East.²⁵ Early in his term, thus, Hull began to seat military and political thinkers at the same tables.

As Europe's war drums beat more insistently, Hull drew the State, War, and Navy Departments closer together. After suggesting special conferences on Axis infiltration of Latin America, he proposed a standing interdepartmental committee to consider, among other things, "matters of national policy affecting the three departments." He nominated Undersecretary Sumner Welles to represent the State Department. The President chose the Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff to be the committee's other members, and this three-man group took the name, Standing Liaison Committee. Thus was formed the first American agency for regular political-military consultation on foreign policy.²⁶

The Standing Liaison Committee lasted until 1943. Though it handled chiefly questions of hemisphere defense and Good Neighbor relations, it still gave the military chiefs an opportunity to learn the trends of policy thinking in the State Department. Later, too, it gave the State Department's second officer a chance to learn highly secret Army-Navy plans for possible war, plans formerly withheld from State Department eyes.²⁷

Rarely, however, did questions of policy come up for the Committee's discussion, perhaps because the members had little time for talk. The military chiefs were busy, fabricating fleets, armies and air forces out of raw metal and rawer men,

²⁵ George H. Dern and Claude A. Swanson to Cordell Hull, Nov. 26, 1935 (carbon); Hull to Dern, Nov. 27, 1935 (orig.)—both in WPD 3887, General Records of the War Department, National Archives.

²⁶ Mark S. Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, 1950), pp. 89-92.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

while the undersecretary and his department were swirling through diplomatic crises that absorbed their time and powers. So the Liaison Committee failed to march with the perilous times.

In only one instance did the Liaison Committee handle an important issue of policy, and then it patched together a compromise instead of building a solution. The issue came before the Committee in the summer of 1940, when Hitler was looking acquisitively at the Vichy fleet. The Army and Navy, fearing that Germany might seize control of the Mediterranean, proposed a shift of the American battle fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic. But the State Department disagreed. More fearful of a Japanese attack on Southeast Asia than of German naval expansion and aware that Britain held the same fear, the State Department believed the fleet more effective, stationed at Pearl Harbor, where it might deter Japan from rash aggression. Since the undersecretary and the military members all stood fast behind their differing views, the Liaison Committee's decision solved nothing. The fleet, they agreed, "should be withdrawn from Hawaii only if the Germans actually secured control of the French fleet." If that happened, of course, the issue would still exist and would simply be more urgent.²⁸

Other than this decision, the Liaison Committee accomplished little that touched the great issues drawing the United States toward double war. After November 1940, furthermore, its functions shifted to other committee and council tables. A new Secretary of War started weekly conferences with his State and Navy counterparts.²⁹ The President began to deal directly with his chiefs of staff, by-passing not only the State Department but also the civilian Secretaries of War and the Navy. By the autumn of 1941, in the tempestuous twilight before Pearl Harbor, the President was convening a War Council, made up of his State, War, and Navy Secretaries, and his chiefs of staff.³⁰

²⁸ William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940* (New York, 1952), pp. 596-597.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 10; Watson, *Chief of Staff*, p. 91; Stimson in *Pearl Harbor Hearings*, Pt. XXIX, p. 2065.

³⁰ *Pearl Harbor Hearings*, Pt. XXIX, p. 2066.

Despite the resemblance of this War Council to the present-day National Security Council, it hardly served as a palette for the mixing of military and political views. Rather, it provided the President with a platform from which to announce decisions already reached with the help of the chiefs of staff. After November 5, 1941, the War Council spent its time devising ways to carry out the strategic concept long ago devised by the Joint Board and now ratified by the President: "War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up the defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance."³¹ Then, when war broke out, the President stopped inviting Hull to the War Council's meetings, and the Council, while it lasted, became nothing more than a board of strategy.

The idea of coördinating strategy and policy seemed, indeed, to die out with the onset of war. The President began to consult only with his chiefs of staff and with a few para-military officials like Harry Hopkins. Not only was the Secretary of State excluded from meetings of the War Council, but he was left at home when the President went abroad to meet British and Russian leaders and even left outside when Roosevelt met with Churchill in Washington and Quebec.³² During most of the war, as a result, the State Department became almost an auxiliary arm of the military services.

Uniformed officers meanwhile filled the chairs left vacant by diplomats. Eisenhower, Stilwell and Wedemeyer negotiated with allied governments. The service chieftains, reorganized as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met face to face with their allied counterparts and negotiated agreements that were, in effect, military treaties, requiring for ratification only the counter-signature of the President. Although the Joint Chiefs continually disclaimed any authority in political affairs, their decisions, in fact, directed American policy. When they concluded, for example, that Russian aid was essential to victory

³¹ *Ibid.*, Pt. XIV, p. 1062; William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941* (New York, 1953), p. 846, and chapters xxvi-xxviii.

³² *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), II, 1109-1111.

in the Far East, they said, in effect, that American diplomacy should subordinate other aims in order to bring about a Russian declaration of war on Japan. Had professional diplomats desired to challenge this ruling, they would have been unable to do so. In 1944, as a matter of fact, when the State Department wanted the Dumbarton Oaks conferees to begin discussions of post-war boundaries, the Joint Chiefs checked any such discussions.³³ Quarrels among the Allies might result, the chiefs asserted, and Russia might find cause for delaying her entry into the Pacific war. Thus, during World War II, the strategists took command, and the military-State Department relation was reversed. No longer were the military leaders seeking parity with diplomats; on the contrary, the diplomats were looking for space alongside the chiefs of staff.

Not until the last year of World War II did the State Department begin to regain its lost status. Then the need for military government directives and surrender terms caused the creation of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the National Security Council's immediate ancestor.³⁴

This Coordinating Committee, composed of assistant secretaries, prepared the plans for occupying Germany, Austria and Japan, and pondered, in addition, many other questions of post-war policy. Since most or all of these questions involved fleets and forces in the theaters of war, the Coordinating Committee had to clear its decisions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and officers representing the Joint Chiefs sat in with the Coordinating Committee's staff groups. Before the Committee's recommendations went to the Secretary of State and the President, therefore, any differences with the Joint Chiefs had already been discovered and explored.

³³ See Department of State, *Post-War Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (1949), pp. 276, 660-661.

³⁴ Howard W. Moseley, Charles W. McCarthy, and Alvin F. Richardson, "The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee", *Bulletin of the U. S. Department of State*, XIII (Nov. 11, 1945), 745-747. Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* (Washington, 1951), pp. 326-330. John Carter Vincent, "The Post-War Period in the Far East", *State Dept. Bulletin*, XIII (Oct. 21, 1945), 644-648; "Germany and the Occupation", *ibid.*, XIV (May 26, 1946), 910-914; John H. Hilldring, Velma H. Cassidy, "American Policy in Occupied Areas", *ibid.*, XV (July 14, 1946), 47-48, (Aug. 18, 1946), 291-296.

Such a process brought forth, as an example, the Committee's recommendations on post-war aid to China. Had these recommendations been compounded by the State Department alone, Herbert Feis tells us in his recent book, *The China Tangle*, they "would have subordinated the program of military aid to the satisfaction of . . . political ideas"—democratic government and political unity for China.³⁵ Recommendations drafted by the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, on the other hand, would have fixed on two different objectives—territorial unity for China and military strength for the Chinese government. Thus, while the State Department thought of aid for China as a means of exerting pressure on the Kuomintang, to force a political strengthening of the Nationalist government, the armed forces tended to think of this aid solely as a means for strengthening the battle capabilities of the Nationalist forces.

Since the choice between these points of view depended at all times upon detailed, expert information, the State Department and the military had to reconcile, or at least define, their differences before going to the White House with a program for immediate post-war aid for China. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was an obvious arena where these views might be tested against each other.

The State Department drew up a statement of China policy, emphasizing the political objectives of unity and democratic government. Although this statement of policy has not been printed, an earlier model of it is visible in the MacArthur hearings, and the views of the State Department's chief Far Eastern planner, John Carter Vincent, have been published at length in the records of the McCarran committee.³⁶ In the final proposals of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, quoted in Feis's book, one can therefore detect phrases written in with stubby blue pencils by the War and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

³⁵ Princeton, 1953, p. 374.

³⁶ *Hearings before Committee on Armed Services, Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 82 Cong., 1 sess., "Military Situation in the Far East", Pt. IV, pp. 2929-2930. Hearings before Subcommittee on Internal Security, Committee on Judiciary, U. S. Senate, 82 Cong., 1 sess., "Institute of Pacific Relations"*.

The achievement of [American] objectives in China requires a friendly, unified, independent nation with a stable government resting, *insofar as practicable*, on the freely expressed support of the Chinese people. . . . The following should be established as policies of the United States:

(b) *To assist and advise China in the development of modern armed forces, ground, sea and air, for the . . .*

(1) *Maintenance of internal peace and security in China including the liberated areas of Manchuria and Formosa. . . .*³⁷

One can see also the unaltered will of the State Department in such a sentence as: "The extent to which political stability is being achieved in China under a unified, fully representative government is regarded by the U. S. as a basic consideration which will at all times govern the furnishing of economic, military, or other assistance to that nation. . . ."

Thus were political and military views brought into line, through the agency of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. That line admittedly jogged and wavered. And one can argue that events in the Far East would have followed a different course had the opinions of one department or the other prevailed. It remains true, nevertheless, that the State Department and the military departments disagreed, and this disagreement was due, not to a personal difference between John Carter Vincent and some general or admiral, but to a real difference between political and military perspectives. General Marshall, while Chief of Staff, opposed the State Department's idea of using aid to promote reforms in the Chinese government. Then, when he became Secretary of State, he defended this very idea against challenges voiced by the new chiefs of staff.³⁸ Such real disagreements between the State and military departments had to be reconciled in some place like the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, or such a committee had to define the points at issue for the President's adjudication.

But the Committee had its limitations. It suffered, in the

³⁷ Feis, *China Tangle*, p. 375 (italics mine).

³⁸ U. S. State Dept., *United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949* (1949), pp. 251-252, 255-256, 269-273.

first place, from its inability to make policy. Although the Committee was capable of rapid staff work, as evidenced in its eight-day fabrication of a workable surrender instrument for Japan,³⁹ its mill of subcommittees hummed uselessly in the spring of 1945 when Marshal Tito threatened to march against Allied forces in Trieste. The question of American action simply fell beyond the powers of the assistant secretaries who made up the Coordinating Committee; and the Trieste decision had to be made by the President and his Cabinet Secretaries with little or no preliminary staff study.⁴⁰

In the second place, the Committee went to work only when a question was referred to it by one of the departments. As a result, it failed to handle some questions well within its purview. The four-Power arrangements for occupation of Berlin were worked out hastily by soldiers and diplomats in the European Theater and approved by a nod from President Truman.⁴¹ The Coordinating Committee never had a chance to examine these arrangements, and no provision was made for guaranteeing access to the city.

The nation needed the Coordinating Committee, but it also needed a policy-making agency with the power to review all questions. President Truman fully realized this need, and so did his Cabinet Secretaries, particularly Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. Within two years after World War II, consequently, Mr. Truman, Mr. Forrestal, and a staff of experts had worked out a plan for a National Security Council. Bedded in the unification act of 1947, this plan received the approval of Congress, and the United States acquired a regular, legally established, cabinet-level agency for the coordination of political and military views on foreign policy.

Fifty years of growth and experiment lay behind this Council, and additional years of experiment lay ahead of it. The original Council showed signs, some said, of being dominated by its military members. As a result, Congress changed the member-

³⁹ *Hearings*, "Institute of Pacific Relations", *passim* (see index under "E. H. Dooman", "J. C. Vincent").

⁴⁰ Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era* (New York, 1952), II, 1474-1485.

⁴¹ Speech by Mr. Truman, *New York Times*, Oct. 5, 1952, p. 82. Speech by Mr. Eisenhower, *ibid.*, Oct. 8, 1952, p. 23.

ship in 1949, dropping out the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. And the composition of the Council has since been altered several times, by executive order or simply by invitation. Thus, for example, President Eisenhower has invited his Secretary of the Treasury to sit with every session of the Council, so that dollar costs may be reckoned with political and military costs.

These alterations, of course, reflect a change in the Council's functions. Still the patching and mending is all applied in one place, on the National Security Council, and with one aim—to perfect that Council. Instead of replacing one experiment with another, in other words, we are striving now to improve a working model.

Mechanically, of course, the National Security Council is still in its scraps-of-wire and bits-of-chewing-gum stage. While its general purposes are clear, its specific functions are not. There seems real doubt, particularly, whether the Council is meant to resolve differences of opinion or simply to bring them into the open. Is it to copy the British Committee of Imperial Defense, where variant ideas are exposed to endless debate, or Japan's pre-war Liaison Conference, where decision was the goal, and difference often resulted in resignation? Which direction the National Security Council means to take is, at this writing, far from sure.

A reflection of this uncertainty has been the tendency of the Council and its predecessors to work like church councils or party platform committees, rather than action groups. Compromises have been forged, it seems, simply for an inner feeling of righteousness and an outward appearance of unanimity. In the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee paper on China quoted earlier, for example, the State Department and the military departments did not really reconcile differences. They simply agreed on an ambiguous formula. With easier consciences, thus, each department could do what it wanted to do in the first place. Forrestal's notes on subsequent National Security Council discussions, testimony at the MacArthur hearings, and Chalmers Roberts' reports in the *Washington Post and Times Herald* on the Indo-China and Quemoy mix-ups of 1954 suggest that there have been later instances of meaning-

less compromise.⁴² Realization of the need for a coördinating committee has, in other words, sometimes obscured the truth that decision-making can become more realistic, but it cannot become easier. Coördination is no substitute for thought.

Neither has the problem of coördination itself been fully solved. While executive departments may treat one another with increasing frankness, the executive branch and the Congress retain the relationship of unfriendly sovereignties. Beside the monumental problem of harmonizing executive and congressional foreign policies, the relatively recent and minor problem of harmonizing executive views shades into insignificance. Even the simplest questions of executive-congressional coördination present absurd difficulty. "If you tell Congress nothing," as James Reston remarked, "they go fishing; if you promise nothing, they go fishing; if you tell them all, they go wild."⁴³ And, as Hanson Baldwin states the larger question: "Are national policies ever really forged in secrecy and by a small group? Do they not require the support and substantiation of Congress and public opinion?"⁴⁴

These unsettled questions of function and competence, relations with Congress, and relation to public opinion ought not to cloud the progress that has been made. A committee that effects some political-military coördination has come into existence. Fifty years ago such a committee could not openly have existed in Washington. Had it existed in secret, it would very likely have been ineffective. During World War I, when a need for coördination was recognized, actual coördination was at best haphazard, and the new crises attending World War II saw one experiment tumble after another. The National Security Council is thus the product of a long and painful history. Whatever its present inadequacies and whatever the trials that lie ahead, it is still an institution. It answers an enduring need, and it is likely to be a permanent feature of American government.

ERNEST R. MAY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

⁴² Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), pp. 454, 517-518. Roberts synthesized his newspaper articles in "The Day We Didn't Go to War", *The Reporter*, XI (Sept. 14, 1954), and "Battle on 'The Rim of Hell': President vs. War Hawks", *ibid.* (Dec. 16, 1954).

⁴³ Quoted in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 444.

⁴⁴ Letter to the author.

COMMUNISM VS. PEASANTRY IN THE SOVIET UNION

THE dramatic declaration by G. M. Malenkov, read at the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on February 8, 1955, in which he asked to be released from the duties of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, must again attract attention to one of the most crucial problems still unresolved in the USSR: the relation between the Communist Party and the peasantry. In his statement Malenkov explained his desire to retire from the leadership of the Soviet government by referring to the unsatisfactory state of affairs that had arisen in agriculture—a state of affairs for which he was "guilty and responsible".

The real reasons for Mr. Malenkov's resignation are unknown here at the present time, and it is very possible that the real causes which prompted his decision are of quite another nature. Still it is evident that the state of affairs in agriculture would never have been chosen as an explanation for his step if great inefficiency in this field did not exist at all. Thus, his declaration is significant as an acknowledgement of the lasting difficulties on the agricultural front.

In the Resolution of the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party of March 2, 1954, taken on N. S. Khrushchev's report, it was disclosed that the growing needs of the population for grain production were not met in 1953. Despite the fact that the total sowing area was increased by 6,800,000 hectares¹ in 1953 over 1940, that sown to grain decreased by 3,800,000 hectares; to grain feed crops, by 6,800,000 hectares; to groats crops, by 1,300,000 hectares; and to leguminous grain by 800,000 hectares. It also was stated in the Resolution that collective farms did not fulfill the 1953 plan for livestock breeding and that an important decrease in the number of cows took place in many regions of the Soviet Union in 1953.²

¹ One hectare equals 2.471 acres.

² *Pravda*, March 6, 1954.

Strong measures have been taken to increase agricultural production in the face of this failure of the peasantry to cooperate with the established plans. The Party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers decided to sow grain over 28,000,000 to 30,000,000 hectares of virgin and idle land in 1956. According to Khrushchev, more than 3,500,000 hectares of virgin land were sown in 1954 and more than 17,000,000 plowed up for 1955.³

One hundred thousand *Komsomol* (Young Communist League) members have been mobilized for work on this land equipped with 120,000 tractors and 10,000 combines.⁴ It is easy to imagine under what strained conditions these young people work and live in the desert. It is, however, very significant that the Soviet government did not dare to repeat the experiment of 1928-1932, the collectivization years, by forcible shifting of peasants from other parts of the USSR to the virgin land. For the herculean task in view, it had to take young people inexperienced in agricultural work.

The tremendous extension of the sown area and the use of non-peasants for the work on it are other indications that the Soviet government is unable to force the collective farmers to work more efficiently on the existing arable land, that it cannot overcome the passive but permanent resistance of the peasantry in spite of repressive measures taken to that effect. One of the measures was the increase in number of compulsory workdays to be spent by farmers on *kolkhoz* land.⁵ Indicative of the tension is also the new law sharply increasing punishment for the damaging of fields: every time the Soviet government increases punishment for a criminal action it is a sign that such actions have been perpetrated on a larger scale.

On the other hand, the Soviet government has tried to relax the tension and improve relations with the peasantry. In

³ Interview given by Khrushchev to Professor John Bernal on September 25, 1954 and published in *Pravda* on December 24, 1954.

⁴ Khrushchev asserted that 150,000 city dwellers were sent out for this work in 1954 and 165,000 will follow in 1955. *New York Times*, March 13, 1955, p. 1.

⁵ See N. Nazartsev in *Sel'skoye khozyaystvo (Agriculture)*, August 31, 1954. A *kolkhoz* is a peasant collective farm.

EMPLOYERS BACK INJURY PAY RISES

Associated Industries Stand Also Covers Dewey's Plan for Sickness Benefits

By WARREN WEAVER Jr.

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

ALBANY, Jan. 17—The state's largest organization of employers threw its weight today behind Governor Dewey's plan for increasing the maximum benefits available to workers under the Workmen's Compensation and Sickness Disability programs.

Associated Industries of New York State, Inc., which represents about 1,600 companies in manufacturing and other forms of business, announced support of the Governor's plan, although the entire cost of the increases, about \$20,000,000, will be borne by employers.

Joseph R. Shaw, executive vice president of the organization, said that "we believe the proposed increases are justifiable for bona fide injured workers who become disabled on the job."

"We also feel increases are justified for the non-occupational disability maximum benefits," he added.

Although Associated Industries normally has been in the forefront of efforts to reduce the cost of Workmen's Compensation and allied programs, its stand of today was not unexpected. Before presenting his program to the Legislature last week, Governor Dewey cleared it with officers of the organization.

Dewey Recommendations

In a special message Tuesday, the Governor urged that the maximum weekly Workmen's Compensation benefits be increased to \$36 from \$32 and that the comparable Sickness Disability benefits be increased to \$33 from \$30.

He said that he hoped the increased cost to employers would be absorbed and a net reduction in costs achieved as a result of the current Moreland Act investigation into the cost of the Workmen's Compensation program.

Mr. Shaw made it clear today that the stand of Associated Industries for higher benefits did not mean that the organization would relax its efforts to improve the administration of the Workmen's Compensation Law and reduce its overall cost to employers.

Employers have contended for some time that the cost of New York's program for reimbursing workers injured on the job was much higher than in other states, thus penalizing business in the state and making competition increasingly difficult.

Bills embodying the Governor's program were introduced in the Legislature last week. They are expected to have smooth sailing, disturbed only by probable Democratic attempts to make the benefits even larger.

'Tides of Mediocrity'

Officer Blames Uninspired Leadership for 'Present Low Morale' in the Navy

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

A letter from a junior naval officer criticizing the "tides of mediocrity and negativism" that beset leadership in the Navy epitomizes one of the fundamental causes for poor morale in the armed services.

Poor or mediocre leadership is one of the basic reasons for lack of psychic incentive and positive morale, as the Naval correspondent emphasizes.

"* * * present low morale," he writes, "is due to a lack of inspired leadership from above. I have found little of which to be proud in my contact with the more senior officers I have met. Not that many of them are completely incompetent but just that the real leaders are so few as to stand out like isolated landmarks."

"And these few seem to fight an ever losing battle against the tides of mediocrity and negativism. But the truly disheartening thing is that the mediocre continues to flourish, seemingly never detected by their own superiors, and thus giving the impression that the higher echelons are also composed of mediocre nonentities."

'Incompetents Are Promoted'

In particular, the processes of selection do not appear to be weeding out the incompetent. It is the impression of most of the young regular officers with whom I have discussed this matter, Academy [United States Naval Academy] men for the most part, that the good men are being passed over while demonstrated incompetents are being promoted * * *

"Another source of discontent is the lack of responsibility in so many junior billets. This is undoubtedly the result of the wartime inflation in rank, and is especially prevalent in the ED [Engineering Duty] group. The choice billets are monopolized by officers one or two grades senior to the billets, while many juniors are filling unnecessary supernumerary jobs * * *

"Strangely enough, as an ED officer I feel that the straight line officer is now being discriminated against much too strongly. ED officers as a body care little for the needs of the fleet, seldom even giving lip service to the maxim that the shore establishment exists to serve operating forces * * *

"This sort of thing gripes me as an ex-line officer. How much more must it gall the career line officer. I would gladly take the star off my own arm (and replace it with special insignia for special

duty) as well as that of the rest of the shore-based specialists and women officers (Waves) if it would thereby help to restore some of the prestige and authority of the line * * *"

Pendulum Swung Too Far

This officer who, of course, sees only one aspect of the services' morale problem, nevertheless is sound in the points he makes—though they are not inclusive and one or two are too generalized.

The pendulum in the Navy—like that in the Army—swung too far after World War II, and the authority and prestige of the seagoing line officer has been too much diminished. Keeping the balance true between the shore specialist and the men who run the fleets is a perennial problem of all navies; Nelson and his officers faced it.

Today, the staff expert and the specialist have too many prerogatives and too much authority at the expense of those for whom he exists—the seagoing branch. There should be a clear differentiation in insignia between women officers and shore specialists—and the fighting, seagoing command or line branch.

The specialists and the support group exist for only one purpose—the fighting fleets, and the men who handle the ships in action must have the authority and the prestige.

The correspondent is correct, too, in noting the mediocrity of leadership and the inadequate results of selection for promotion in junior ranks. The leadership weaknesses are the most serious but this problem is part of a vicious circle.

Good leaders are leaving the services because of the decreased psychic and tangible incentives to a service career; the mediocre who lack the ambition, the courage and the intellectual qualifications to carve out a civilian career remain in the services and thus create greater discontent among the good officers under them.

Selection failures have some—but by no means the major—influence in this trend. There is no foolproof promotion system. The Navy's system probably makes its maximum errors in selecting junior grade officers, for the numbers to be considered are so great that no selection board, no matter how conscientious, can do full justice to each individual.

What is most lacking in all services is a sure and definite and relatively rapid—though fair—means of getting rid of the borderline incompetent, as well as the obvious incompetent, for the greater good of the whole.

SUBWAY PLAN AIM AT ENDING 4 SNA

Continued From Page 1

local trains are served from separate platforms at each side.

Direct connections to the station mezzanine would be built from the new city Coliseum, which is to be built at Columbus Circle. Additional traffic resulting from the redevelopment of the area and free transfer privileges between the IND and I. R. T. Fifty-ninth Street will make an express station necessary, the authority said.

The cost of the project is estimated at \$5,000,000.

The next step in the West Side I. R. T. improvement would be the conversion of the present Seventy-second Street station where extremely narrow platforms are regarded as hazardous to a local stop. Entrance to the station would be from the sidewalks instead of the present building in the center of the street, where Broadway, Amsterdam Avenue and Seventy-second Street converge.

This project's cost has been estimated at \$1,000,000.

At Ninety-sixth Street a crossover of southbound Broadway and Lenox Avenue trains would be relocated to the south of the station to eliminate congestion and the station platform would be lengthened—all at a cost of \$5,170,000. The local station at Ninety-first Street would be closed after the rebuilding at Ninety-sixth Street is completed.

Problem of Power Plants

On the subject of the transit power plants, the Transit Authority told the Board of Estimates they either would have to be sold or \$176,500,000 would have to be spent to modernize them.

The plants are at West Fifty-ninth Street and East Seventy-fourth Street, Manhattan, and Kent Avenue, Brooklyn. The proposal to sell them to Consolidated Edison has been under consideration since 1946.

"One accidental failure," the authority said, "may cripple an entire [subway] division for as long as six months."

Should the plants be sold, the authority proposes to use the \$176,500,000 rehabilitation funds thus released to build a previously announced new subway line with a new tunnel under the East River at Seventy-sixth Street from Fifty-seventh Street and Avenue of the Americas to Rego Park, Queens.

Tracks of the Long Island Railroad from Woodside to Rego Park would be acquired as part of the project at a cost estimated at \$13,700,000.

Proposals RESERVE NEGLECT LAID TO PENTAGON

within seven date of its sub-

PROPOSAL

provision of a international conflicts with shall not be of ct.

n international than a treaty ctive as inter- United States of the Congress.

PROPOSAL

ter the ratifica- ment no treaty ctive law of the in pursuance ion.

provision of a international conflicts with shall not be of ct.

o international than a treaty ctive as inter- United States ex- sulation.

ny vote in the sition of ratify- be determined nays.

only Congress, could intervene. merged from the consultation re- e had been "no ay ing neverthe- not reject any oposal.

reported that r the week-end usive, too, but eek the Repub- ld adopt, how- substantially all oposal.

as one of the s, for the first orgia colleague, B. Russell. Sen- ohnson of Texas, Senate leader, n on the Demo- e table.

ican side were nd, Homer Fer- an, chairman of ublican Policy Eugene D. Milli- chairman of the ublican organiza- onference.

plain that Sena- d Russell, who, control Demo- he Senate, were "Walter," as the t.

ving notice that, s wanted a com- ould at once de- and put "some- n the way of an y would do well eorge text.

poses Ground

situation tonight, ways by the fact ional amendment approval of two- oting in the Sen- of Representatives sature of three- ates, with this: already clearly to

Senate Unit Urges Hearings to Learn What the Trouble Is and How to Solve It

By HAROLD B. HINTON

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Jan. 29—The Senate Preparedness subcommittee charged the Defense Department today with neglect of the country's Reserve forces.

It proposed a series of public hearings to determine what is the trouble and, if possible, what to do about it.

The subcommittee members are Senators Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts and Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, Republicans, and Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia.

Mr. Saltonstall is chairman of the Armed Services Committee, to which the recommendation for a public airing of the Reserve situation was addressed, which Senators Bridges and Russell are its ranking majority and minority members, respectively.

Reserve Vacuum Noted

Although the effective ranks of the Reserves and National Guard had been depleted by the Korean crisis in 1950, the subcommittee found, the vacuum had not been filled by the Defense Department in the last two and a half years. The group told the Administration that "if we reduce the size of the regular military establishment, we must have in reserve forces which will be able to take up the slack caused by this reduction."

The report referred directly to the reduction in "force levels" that President Eisenhower and Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, had decreed to curtail defense expenditures.

The subcommittee declared that "the problem of creating a strong and available reserve can never be effectively solved until a plan for creating a continuous rotating reserve is formulated."

It noted that this conclusion was not new, recalling that the Armed Services Committee previously had reported favorably on a bill to provide a program of universal military training. Such a program would supply men for a continuous rotating reserve.

The subcommittee reproached the military establishment for including an "ivory tower" figure in its budget estimates for reserve recruiting. The budget, it said, called for 599,000 Reservists by June 30, 1952, and 505,000 were enrolled on that date; 711,000 for June 30, 1953, with 535,000 actually enrolled, and 835,000 predicted for June 30, 1954.

"The committee feels the defense effort as reflected by the Reserve strength is no further along today than it was in June of 1952," the report said, adding that the implied commitment of the Defense Department to recruit 300,000 Reservists by next June 30 "is an unrealistic and

Dr. Mayo Declines to Run ROCHESTER, Minn., Jan. 17 (AP)—Dr. Charles W. Mayo, declining to seek the Uni-

Korean War Bonus Urged

1/30/54

Proposals RESERVE NEGLECT LAID TO PENTAGON

within seven date of its sub-

PROPOSAL

provision of a international conflicts with shall not be of ct.

an international than a treaty ective as inter- United States of the Congress.

PROPOSAL

fter the ratifica- ment no treaty reme law of the e in pursuance ion.

provision of a international conflicts with shall not be of ct.

o international than a treaty ective as inter- United States ex- sation.

any vote in the estion of ratify- be determined nays.

only Congress. could intervene. merged from the onsultation re- e had been "no ayng neverthe- not reject any osal.

reported that r the week-end usive, too, but eek the Repub- ld adopt, how- substantially all oposal.

as one of the s, for the first orgia colleague, B. Russell. Sen- ohnson of Texas, Senate leader, n on the Demo- e table.

ican side were nd, Homer Fer- an, chairman of ublican Policy Eugene D. Milli- chairman of the olican organiza- onference.

plain that Sena- d Russell, who, control Demo- he Senate, were Walter," as the t.

ving notice that, s wanted a com- uld at once de- and put "some- n the way of an would do well rge text.

Ground

ation tonight, s by the fact amendment al of two- in the Sen- entatives of three- this: eadly ds to the los-

by reached." The subcommittee declared that there was little enthusiasm for service in the National Guard or Reserve forces among young men, their parents, their wives or their employers. Much of the unpopularity, it said, stems from the recall, at the time of the Korean outbreak, of veterans who had not been drawing pay for Reserve drill, while individuals and units that had drawn such pay were often left safely at home.

Senate Unit Urges Hearings to Learn What the Trouble Is and How to Solve It

By HAROLD B. HINTON

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. WASHINGTON, Jan. 29—The Senate Preparedness subcommittee charged the Defense Department today with neglect of the country's Reserve forces.

It proposed a series of public hearings to determine what is the trouble and, if possible, what to do about it.

The subcommittee members are Senators Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts and Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, Republicans, and Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia.

Mr. Saltonstall is chairman of the Armed Services Committee, to which the recommendation for a public airing of the Reserve situation was addressed, which Senators Bridges and Russell are its ranking majority and minority members, respectively.

Reserve Vacuum Noted

Although the effective ranks of the Reserves and National Guard had been depleted by the Korean crisis in 1950, the subcommittee found, the vacuum had not been filled by the Defense Department in the last two and a half years. The group told the Administration that "if we reduce the size of the regular military establishment, we must have in reserve forces which will be able to take up the slack caused by this reduction."

The report referred directly to the reduction in "force levels" that President Eisenhower and Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, had decreed to curtail defense expenditures.

The subcommittee declared that "the problem of creating a strong and available reserve can never be effectively solved until a plan for creating a continuous rotating reserve is formulated."

It noted that this conclusion was not new, recalling that the Armed Services Committee previously had reported favorably on a bill to provide a program of universal military training. Such a program would supply men for a continuous rotating reserve.

The subcommittee reproached the military establishment for including an "ivory tower" figure in its budget estimates for reserve recruiting. The budget, it said, called for 599,000 Reservists by June 30, 1952, and 505,000 were enrolled on that date; 711,000 for June 30, 1953, with 535,000 actually enrolled, and 835,000 predicted for June 30, 1954.

"The committee feels the defense effort as reflected by the Reserve strength is no further along today than it was in June of 1952," the report said, adding that the implied commitment of the Defense Department to recruit 300,000 Reservists by next June 30 "is an unrealistic one and utterly incapable of being reached."

The subcommittee declared that there was little enthusiasm for service in the National Guard or Reserve forces among young men, their parents, their wives or their employers. Much of the unpopularity, it said, stems from the recall, at the time of the Korean outbreak, of veterans who had not been drawing pay for Reserve drill, while individuals and units that had drawn such pay were often left safely at home.

STATE BUDGET HEARING

Commonwealth Ministers deny to trading bloc aim. Page 30
Soviet's gold sales strengthen to free world's reserves. Page 33
Eisenhower stand cheers South African republicans. Page 34

Government and Politics

President Eisenhower declared that he would hold in abeyance proposals for universal military training as he ordered Federal agencies to cooperate in developing a new military reserve program by April 1. The President took this step after receiving a long report by a special Committee on Manpower Resources for National Security which urged an "immediately callable" and a "selectively callable" reserve force. [1:3.]

Entered as Second-Class Matter, 1/10/54 NEW YORK



Associated Press
RESERVES: Fleming, who power report.

PRESIDENT ORDERS RESERVE SHAKEUP; U. M. T. ACTION OFF

Training Project in Abeyance Till April 1—Flemming Asks 2 New Manpower Pools

Summary of report of Office of Defense Mobilization, Page 64.

By CHARLES E. EGAN
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Jan. 9—President Eisenhower today ordered all Federal agencies concerned to cooperate in developing a new military Reserve program by April 1.

In the meantime, he said, he will hold in abeyance any proposals for putting into effect the training provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act.

The President acted after receiving a lengthy report from a special Committee on Manpower Resources for National Security. It was submitted by Arthur S. Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. Mr. Flemming declared that speedy action on a military Reserve program was necessary to meet emergencies in this "age of peril."

General Eisenhower complimented the committee on its findings. In a letter to Mr. Flemming he said that "in general, I agree with the analysis contained in your letter * * * of the pressing need to strengthen our Reserve forces and with your recommendations as to the best way in which to approach the problem."

Supplements Training Plan

The special committee was named last August by Mr. Flemming.

The instru- and po- in diary of tw- built a Labor- This schro- focusing in "the process of design, and that subcom- to be named within

Peer, the Mayor's Labor- y, said yesterday

in "the process of design, and that subcom-

to be named within

s reference to the was touched off n from the floor

read a long paper ons of the Metro-

unity to the Politi- ons of a Free

per, Dr. Gulick— sident of the In-

Its full- t historically "the of party politics

ization dominated "his machine," he

politics for profit." rved earlier that

as "tempered by olutions and up-

government' at venty to thirty

H. LaGuardia Mayor in 1933; r Jr. in 1953.]

Carl Feiss of Home Finance

62, Column 1

Continued on Page 64, Column 1

Headed by Na- supplemented that of the Na- tional Security Training Commis- sion, which submitted a plan to the President last month for the training of 18-year-olds concu- rrently with the drafting of older youths for active duty.

Today's report proposed cau- tion, however, in starting such a training project until the Gov- ernment had canvassed its man- power resources more closely and had made sure it had the men to handle any conceivable mili- tary situation.

Specifically, it appeared that two separate laws would be mod- ified and coordinated if the re- port were adopted—the Universal Military Training and Service Act and the Armed Forces Re- serve Act.

Mr. Flemming described his committee's conclusions as a "new concept for the organiza- tion of a Reserve military force." The program, in substance, calls for an "immediately callable" and a "selectively callable" Reserve force. The size of both Reserve military forces, along with their composition, he said, will have to be determined by officials of the Department of Defense.

Those military Reserves sched- uled for immediate call in an emergency would consist of well- trained men ready for instant service. The "selective" group would be made up of those whose recall would be based on occupa- tional factors, equity and other considerations on an individual basis. The mobilization director

Continued on Page 64, Column 1

Arges April 1 Tax Drop Pending Is Cut by 5 Billion

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. Jan. 9 — The will expire then unless Congress

sions, at having p- ticles in paper, th- expressed contrary other me

[The tacked the par disciplin- reporte

The Djilas publicat- pending before t- mittee.

Borba- count of Djilas' v- newspaper current.

(New Th- In his Djilas ch- high rank- were snu- a top-ra-

Continu-

Reut- Now

DETROI- witness in- sination of escaped to floor hotel Detroit.

The with- 33 years old- four-hour gu- He was w- and topcoat guards, who- ing to take- said.

Ritchie w-

2 DEMOCRATS FIGHT FEDERAL DISMISSAL

Tell President They Will Sue to Resist G. O. P. 'Usurpers' on War Claims Panel

By W. H. LAWRENCE

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
WASHINGTON, Dec. 14—Two Democrats notified President Eisenhower today that they would go to court to challenge his power to remove them as members of the War Claims Commission. They charged that the Republicans he named to succeed them were usurpers and intruders.

Myron Wiener of New York and Georgia L. Lusk of New Mexico, who were removed by the President effective last Friday, sent separate letters to the White House telling the President they did not agree that he had a legal right to dismiss them.

The case may result in another important Supreme Court decision defining the power of a President to remove officials from the Government.

Early in the New Deal, President Roosevelt was reversed by a unanimous Supreme Court ruling after he had ousted a Republican, the late William E. Humphrey, as a member of the Federal Trade Commission.

No charges were filed against Mr. Wiener or Mrs. Lusk. President Eisenhower said simply that he wanted personnel of his own choosing as members of the claims commission.

3 Have Already Taken Office

Three Republicans, headed by Whitney Gilliland of Iowa as chairman, received recess appointments as commissioners last Friday and already have taken office. The other appointees are Mrs. Pearl Carter Pace of Kentucky and Raymond T. Armbruster of New York.

There was one vacancy on the commission when the President appointed the three Republicans. Daniel F. Cleary of Chicago, who was chairman, died recently.

Mrs. Lusk and Mr. Wiener contend that the law as written by Congress clearly contemplates that commissioners shall serve for the life of the commission. The White House maintains that such officials serve only at the pleasure of the President and are removable at any time by him.

The act itself says "the terms of office of the members of the commission shall expire at the time fixed * * * for the winding up of the affairs of the commission."

The commissioners receive \$14,000 a year and are empowered to adjudicate claims of persons imprisoned, interned or held hostage by the Japanese during World War II. To date the panel has paid out \$133,000,000 to more than 250,000 persons and has approximately \$55,000,000 left to disburse.

'Certainty of Tenure' Upheld

At the time President Eisenhower ordered the removal of the two officials, Mr. Wiener had said, "We are not policy makers," adding:

"We are not members of the inside 'team.' We do not serve at the pleasure of the Executive. We are creatures of the Legislature."

In his letter, Mr. Wiener said that "the duty to adjudicate the rights granted by law transcends any sense of obligation to the appointing authorities and requires a dedicated adherence to the constitutional oath of office and the principles of justice, which can best exist in an atmosphere of certainty of tenure of office."

Both Mrs. Lusk and Mr. Wiener told the President that they still regarded themselves as legal members of the War Claims Commission. Both said they would hold themselves in readiness "to perform the duties of that office."

Mr. Gilliland, the new chairman, confirmed that a stop order had

Text of an Address by Admiral Radford on the Defense Plans of the Nation

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
WASHINGTON, Dec. 14—Following is the text of an address to the National Press Club today by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Mr. Koop, distinguished guests and friends:

My span of military service covers forty-one years. When first I came into the service, the armed forces developed their plans and programs without much public attention.

Public statements about the military usually stemmed from hearings before Congressional committees. Unless something startling happened, nothing much was said about what the military were doing.

There have been many changes in these forty-one years, changes not only in weapons and techniques of warfare, but changes in communications and public information media. Today, it is considered a Department of Defense duty to help keep the public informed.

That is why I am here today. I will attempt to summarize frankly for you—and through you, for the American people—what the Joint Chiefs of Staff are doing in the way of military planning for the future.

In a sense, my two previous talks this month have been two chapters leading up to my discussion here today. In the first at West Point, N. Y., I spoke on some of the problems and conditions affecting world peace. I stressed the concept of collective security.

Describes the 'Interim Look'

In my second, one given before the American Ordnance Association of New York, I described some of the factors affecting the current planning for fiscal year 1955. I described this planning as an Interim Look, in which no material changes in force were recommended for fiscal year 1955, except for increases in Air Forces and Continental Defense. I said that changes were coming which would affect the period after fiscal year 1955.

Some news reports about my talk on the Interim Look were captioned: "Radford Against Drastic Changes." This is correct; but, if considered out of context with the whole of my two speeches, it could be misleading.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are opposed to radical changes in a hurry because they are militarily undesirable; and from the standpoint of the security of this nation, they are not practicable. By "radical," I mean the dictionary definition—"fundamental."

For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that any fundamental change could develop so fast that one service should be cut in half, and another tripled, all in one brief period.

Changes in tactics and strategy do not come that fast. That is why I said that changes would come as a process of evolution, and with deliberate and painstaking planning. The signs of the times do point unmistakably to changes in the future.

That brings us to what you have called the "New Look." First, let me give you my description. A New Look is a reassessment of our strategic and logistic capabilities in the light of foreseeable developments, certain technological advances, the world situation today, and considerable estimating of future trends and developments. It is a searching review of this nation's military requirements for security.

Notes President's Directives

The motif and the tempo for the New Look stemmed from the directive contained in the President's speech last April when he said that henceforth, planning would proceed on the basis of preparations for the long-term plan. Here is the real key to our new planning.

With the President's policy as a starting point, economically sound and mobilization plans, for this nation and for our Allies, should result.

The New Look really is not the first such review of military requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff since their inception have continuously reviewed security problems and requirements.



U. S. Navy

REPORTS ON DEFENSE:
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, who said yesterday the "new look" defense plan would give the nation superior air power and atomic weapons while reducing armed forces.

costs for a particular period of tension. That in itself makes a great difference in military planning.

When Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson addressed you about a month ago, he amplified the President's statement when he said:

"We hope to continue to build up the nation's military strength, particularly air power and air defense while at the same time making progress in reducing expenditures. This will be done through developing new strategic plans and objectives, giving proper weight to new weapons and equipment, and by continuing to make intelligent savings especially through the better organization and utilization of manpower."

The objective of the entire defense organization will be to develop the maximum military strength and security of our country that can be obtained by the intelligent expenditure of the funds the people of our country through the Congress are able and willing to make available for defense purposes."

The greatest announcement that I could make to you here today—and, from your point of view, one of the greatest news stories—would be that the United States requires strong armed forces. I can think of nothing that could be more welcome to all of us.

Unfortunately, I am unable to make such an announcement. I must state flatly, what must be obvious to all of you, that a strong military posture is not only essential to our own security, but is clearly necessary for the Free World. There can be no compromise with aggression anywhere in the world.

Last week President Eisenhower made a magnificent address on the atomic age in which he described the tremendous destructive power of atomic weapons. He said that today's stockpile "exceeds by many times the explosive equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun in every theatre of war through

that neither a global nor a localized war will be to their advantage. Then, they will be limited to seeking their objectives through political, economic, ideological and subservice actions.

Thus, our military task is complicated by the two requirements imposed upon us. We must be ready for tremendous, vast retaliatory and counter-offensive blows in event of a global war, and we must also be ready for lesser military actions short of all-out war.

Secretary Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that we must fulfill these requirements with due regard for not only military factors, but also a wider range of political and economic factors, as well as the latest technological developments. In this day and age, the military must be realistically concerned about keeping our national economy strong as an indispensable bulwark of the Free World. It is a most important facet of our national security problems.

In the meantime, there has been no reduction in the vast militant force of international communism which continues to threaten the free world.

In my speech at West Point, I reported that the forces of the United States truly are playing a vital part in the far-flung collective defense system in which circumstances have placed this nation. This deployment has helped to strengthen the determination and capabilities of the Free World to resist communism, and to arrest an attempted aggression.

Communism persists in contesting the basic tenets of our way of life. In practice today, it is using its power, secretly and openly, to undermine all efforts toward stable peace. We have convincing reason to believe that communism will desert from aggression only when free nations are united in arms, and only when they are stoutly defended.

Recurring local situations—hotspots—are going to be with us for a long time to come. Unless we are in a position to handle them positively and quickly, these hotspots will be serious and may be frequent.

If we maintain a strong armed posture—a counter-offensive capability along with mobile, combat forces in readiness—it should convince the men in the Kremlin

that neither a global nor a localized war will be to their advantage. Then, they will be limited to seeking their objectives through political, economic, ideological and subservice actions.

Thus, our military task is complicated by the two requirements imposed upon us. We must be ready for tremendous, vast retaliatory and counter-offensive blows in event of a global war, and we must also be ready for lesser military actions short of all-out war.

Secretary Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that we must fulfill these requirements with due regard for not only military factors, but also a wider range of political and economic factors, as well as the latest technological developments. In this day and age, the military must be realistically concerned about keeping our national economy strong as an indispensable bulwark of the Free World. It is a most important facet of our national security problems.

Says Allied Aid Is Needed

We are further agreed that continental defense programming is an increasingly important part of our national security planning. We want to see continental defense programming continue on an orderly basis, with phased increases in forces and facilities, to improve our defenses against bombing attack.

In addition, we are agreed that our plans and programs cannot be developed by the United States for ourselves alone. They must be worked out in cooperation with our allies, with full recognition for their problems. They must take into account the common danger and common responsibility which belongs to the Free World. Security is a cooperative venture; it is not a competitive race. To forewarn aggressors and to construct effective military might, we need partnership; not partisanship.

Under these circumstances, the concept of the New Look is the development of an armed posture which can be supported, year in and year out, on a long-term basis; not just one year—nor two

years—but for ten years or even twenty years if necessary.

As a starter, the joint chiefs of staff have picked a period through fiscal year 1957. Last week, we agreed to, and submitted a program for military forces through this period which will provide for the security of the United States; forces which will deter aggression in consonance with the concept of collective security with our allies in Europe and the Far East; and forces which would provide the basis for winning a war—an all-out war or a limited war—if war is forced upon us.

It is obviously impossible for the United States to sustain forces which will enable us to station combat-effective units of superior strength every place where aggression might occur. If we tried to do this, we could insure economic collapse. No, we cannot be strong everywhere simultaneously.

Accordingly, we plan force levels which provide us mobile, versatile, combat forces in readiness, and an adequate mobilization base. These strength levels will be of such magnitude that our allies can recognize both our determination to counter any aggression, and determination to support our national and international policies and commitments. At the same time, these levels will be those which are possible of attainment over the long pull.

New Weapons Employed

Therefore, in 1956 and 1957, the manpower allocated to our military forces will be below that planned in the Interim Look. Normal security and common prudence preclude any public statements of the detailed strength levels at this time. I can tell you, however, that in planning this reduction of manpower in our armed forces, our specific interest is in an orderly program based over a period of years.

We want to reduce overhead. We consider it imperative to improve our ratios of combat manpower to total manpower. We want a very good realistic reserve program for all services. We want to make more effective use of the manpower in uniform. To accomplish these ends we are

improving greatly our combat effectiveness by the application of new weapons and new techniques, and hope ultimately to achieve far greater flexibility than heretofore attainable.

From time to time I read of criticism about the so-called traditional adherence to the concept of balanced forces. It is quite true that the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not subscribe to the concept of relying solely on one service, or one weapon, as a short cut to easy victory. But a balanced force does not mean to us an artificial one-third, one-third, one-third, either in manpower or dollars.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that our security and that of the free world cannot at this time be entrusted to an unbalanced—unilateral or bilateral—concept of forces. This is true in Western Europe, Korea, and Indo-China today. It would be true in any other active theatre of operations. It is equally true, however, that the balance in one situation may not be proper in another. The balance in one war will not be the same as that in a later war.

Today's emphasis is actually pointed toward the creation, the maintenance, and the exploitation of modern air power. Today, there is no argument among military planners as to the importance of air power.

Offensively, defensively, and in support of other forces, it is a primary requirement. Its strength continues to grow, both through increases in combat air units, and through better equipment.

Yet now, and for an indeterminate period in the future, under most circumstances, air forces must be complemented with other forces. Land forces, amphibious forces, anti-submarine warfare forces, and other well-rounded forces are necessary. Therefore, we aim to build up also the effectiveness of the Army, Navy and Marines with better equipment, new weapons, and a better planning of reserve components.

Services' Responsibility Noted

Today, atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our Armed Forces. Each military service is capable

of putting this weapon into military use. Therefore, each service has a tremendous responsibility for living up to our expectations for a still greater and more powerful degree of combat readiness.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have no preconceived ideas as to what our armed forces will look like a decade from now. The views and estimates we submitted last week are based upon what we see today as being in the best interests of the United States and the Free World.

None of us can be certain of what will happen in the future. Improved guided missiles, atomic-powered ships and aircraft, an enlarged family of electronics, and new applications of electronics, all will have their effects and will be reflected in the evolution of our combat units.

At this time of the fiftieth Anniversary of Powered Flight, it would seem appropriate for me to amplify what I mean by national air power. As I use the term, it includes the Air Force, Naval Aviation, Marine Corps Aviation, Army Aviation, and the tremendous aircraft industry and civil air transportation systems of the United States.

You may not fully comprehend the true magnitude of today's United States national air power, but I will state unequivocally that it is superior to that of any other nation.

Furthermore, the United States has so developed certain segments of its airpower as to achieve a strategic Air Force and a Naval carrier striking force which are without peer in this world.

The President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of one mind on that matter: This nation will maintain a national air power superior to that of any other nation in the world.

This supremacy in national air power, when coupled with that of our Allies, and with our collective strength in other forces, should lead the people of the United States and the Free World to reflect with pride on the progress and the achievements of the last half century, and to look to the future with confidence and resolution.

ADLER Xmas Gifts for Him

SHOPS for MEN

STYLE 590—Rich ADLER-gator- and kid opera, Full leather lining, leather sole, rubber heel. Brown, blue, wine. Sizes 6 to 12—\$5.98. Sizes 13, 14, 15—\$6.98.

STYLE 481—Fine, genuine kidskin mule slip-on with leather sole and heel. Also soft sole. Blue, brown, maroon. Sizes 6 to 12—\$4.98. Sizes 13, 14—\$5.98.

STYLE 496—Selected, heavy-weight, genuine pigskins... a favorite with most men. Sizes 7 1/2 to 13—\$4.95.

STYLE 424—Genuine elkskin moccasin-slipper with leather sole, rubber heel. Wine only. Also with soft sole. Sizes 6 to 12—\$4.98. Sizes 13, 14, 15—\$5.98.

STYLE 3497—Handsewn true moccasin slipper in serviceable leather with heavy-duty sole and heel, baseball-vamp seam. Good for outdoor service. Brown only. Sizes 6 to 12—\$3.98. Sizes 13, 14, 15—\$4.98.

If you don't know his sock-size THESE WILL FIT!
The famous new stretch-to-fit sock that takes its size from the feet; fits better, wears longer. Assorted colors. 95¢ pr. 3 prs. \$2.75

commission when the President appointed the three Republicans. Daniel F. Cleary of Chicago, who was chairman, died recently.

Mrs. Lusk and Mr. Wiener contend that the law as written by Congress clearly contemplates that commissioners shall serve for the life of the commission. The White House maintains that such officials serve only at the pleasure of the President and are removable at any time by him.

The act itself says "the terms of office of the members of the commission shall expire at the time fixed * * * for the winding up of the affairs of the commission."

The commissioners receive \$14,000 a year and are empowered to adjudicate claims of persons imprisoned, interned or held hostage by the Japanese during World War II. To date the panel has paid out \$133,000,000 to more than 250,000 persons and has approximately \$55,000,000 left to disburse.

'Certainty of Tenure' Upheld

At the time President Eisenhower ordered the removal of the two officials, Mr. Wiener had said, "We are not policy makers," adding:

"We are not members of the inside 'team.' We do not serve at the pleasure of the Executive. We are creatures of the Legislature."

In his letter, Mr. Wiener said that "the duty to adjudicate the rights granted by law transcends any sense of obligation to the appointing authorities and requires a dedicated adherence to the constitutional oath of office and the principles of justice, which can best exist in an atmosphere of certainty of tenure of office."

Both Mrs. Lusk and Mr. Wiener told the President that they still regarded themselves as legal members of the War Claims Commission. Both said they would hold themselves in readiness "to perform the duties of that office."

Mr. Gilliland, the new chairman, confirmed that a stop order had been put on claims approved by the old commission, but said that it was a purely precautionary and temporary step. He added that the new commission simply wanted to investigate the processes under which the old one had operated.

Mr. Wiener was unwilling to describe the precise form that his legal attack upon the residential powers would take. He said Mrs. Lusk had made it clear that she would not be a party to the suit if the action hampered the rights of persons awaiting adjudication of their claims.

and objectives giving proper weight to new weapons and equipment, and by continuing to make intelligent savings especially through the better organization and utilization of manpower.

"The objective of the entire defense organization will be to develop the maximum military strength and security of our country that can be obtained by the intelligent expenditure of the funds of our country through the Congress are able and willing to make available for defense purposes."

This statement by Mr. Wilson indicates the objectives of our planning. It sums up the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are taking a long, hard look at our national strategy and strength. Certainly, it is not a matter which could be completed in time for the 1955 budget cycle. It has to be approached in a realistic, deliberate, systematic manner. It has to avoid the temptations of day-to-day expediences, and pursue instead, reasoned, intelligent, long-term judgments.

The greatest announcement that I could make to you here today—and, from your point of view, one of the greatest news stories—would be that the United States

requires strong armed forces. I can think of nothing that could be more welcome to all of us. Unfortunately, I am unable to make such an announcement. I must state flatly, what must be obvious to all of you, that a strong military posture is not only essential to our own security, but is clearly necessary for the Free World. There can be no compromise with aggression anywhere in the world.

Last week President Eisenhower made a magnificent address on the atomic age in which he described the tremendous destructive power of atomic weapons. He said that today's stockpile "exceeds by many times the explosive equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun in every theatre of war through all the years of World War II."

Yes, the destructive power, presently and prospectively available to each branch of the armed forces, dwarfs that ever experienced in the history of warfare. I am not being an alarmist in this—I am simply stating cold facts. These facts simply make it all the more important that we deter aggression and war before they happen.

God in his great wisdom has made available to mankind the knowledge of atomic fission. With this knowledge comes responsibility

of this nation's military requirements for security.

The New Look really is not the first such review of military requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff since their inception have continuously reviewed security problems and requirements.

Actually, the New Look is new in only two respects. First, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are making it, are newly appointed. Second, and more important, our current review is based on a guiding precept that is significantly different. Our "new look" prepares for the long pull; not a year-of-crisis. It is aimed at providing a sturdy military posture which can be maintained over an extended period of uneasy peace, rather than peaking forces at greater

forces in readiness—it should convince the men in the Kremlin and year out, on a long-term basis; not just one year—nor two

We want to make more effective use of the manpower in uniform. To accomplish these ends we are

Today, atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our Armed Forces. Each military service is capable

of perfect with pride on the progress and the achievements of the last half century, and to look to the future with confidence and resolution.

Notes President's Directives

The motif and the tempo for the New Look stemmed from the directive contained in the President's speech last April when he said that henceforth, planning would proceed on the basis of preparations for the long-term pull. Here is the real key to our new planning.

With the President's policy as a starting point, economically sound military and mobilization plans, for this nation and for our Allies, should result.

The New Look really is not the first such review of military requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff since their inception have continuously reviewed security problems and requirements.

Actually, the New Look is new in only two respects. First, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are making it, are newly appointed. Second, and more important, our current review is based on a guiding precept that is significantly different. Our "new look" prepares for the long pull; not a year-of-crisis. It is aimed at providing a sturdy military posture which can be maintained over an extended period of uneasy peace, rather than peaking forces at greater

States, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of one mind on that matter," Admiral Radford declared. He added that "this nation will maintain a national air power superior to that of any other nation in the world."

Any attempt to station effective combat forces around the world wherever aggression might occur, the Admiral said, can only lead to economic collapse in the United States.

He proposed that the country should rely instead on mobile, versatile forces in readiness, and on an adequate mobilization base.

In response to a question, Admiral Radford said that all he knew of Mr. Wilson's plan to cut the armed forces by 400,000 in the next eighteen months was what he had read in the newspapers.

In 1956 and 1957, however, the manpower of the armed services will be further reduced, he said. Endorsing Mr. Wilson's announced objective of "more defense for less money," the Admiral added:

"We want to reduce overhead. We consider it imperative to improve our ratios of combat manpower to total manpower * * *. We want to make more effective use of the manpower in uniform."

As for atomic weapons, he said they had "virtually achieved conventional status" in the armed forces of the United States.

"Each military service is capable of putting this weapon into military use," Admiral Radford added. "Therefore each service has a tremendous responsibility for living up to our expectations for a still greater and more powerful degree of readiness."

He suggested that the future guided missiles, atomic-powered ships and planes, an enlarged "family of weapons" and new applications of electronics would have their place in the steady evolution of more effective combat forces.

forces in readiness—it should convince the men in the Kremlin and year out, on a long-term basis; not just one year—nor two

We want to make more effective use of the manpower in uniform. To accomplish these ends we are

Today, atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our Armed Forces. Each military service is capable

of perfect with pride on the progress and the achievements of the last half century, and to look to the future with confidence and resolution.

Notes President's Directives

The motif and the tempo for the New Look stemmed from the directive contained in the President's speech last April when he said that henceforth, planning would proceed on the basis of preparations for the long-term pull. Here is the real key to our new planning.

With the President's policy as a starting point, economically sound military and mobilization plans, for this nation and for our Allies, should result.

The New Look really is not the first such review of military requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff since their inception have continuously reviewed security problems and requirements.

Actually, the New Look is new in only two respects. First, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are making it, are newly appointed. Second, and more important, our current review is based on a guiding precept that is significantly different. Our "new look" prepares for the long pull; not a year-of-crisis. It is aimed at providing a sturdy military posture which can be maintained over an extended period of uneasy peace, rather than peaking forces at greater

States, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of one mind on that matter," Admiral Radford declared. He added that "this nation will maintain a national air power superior to that of any other nation in the world."

Any attempt to station effective combat forces around the world wherever aggression might occur, the Admiral said, can only lead to economic collapse in the United States.

He proposed that the country should rely instead on mobile, versatile forces in readiness, and on an adequate mobilization base.

In response to a question, Admiral Radford said that all he knew of Mr. Wilson's plan to cut the armed forces by 400,000 in the next eighteen months was what he had read in the newspapers.

In 1956 and 1957, however, the manpower of the armed services will be further reduced, he said. Endorsing Mr. Wilson's announced objective of "more defense for less money," the Admiral added:

"We want to reduce overhead. We consider it imperative to improve our ratios of combat manpower to total manpower * * *. We want to make more effective use of the manpower in uniform."

As for atomic weapons, he said they had "virtually achieved conventional status" in the armed forces of the United States.

"Each military service is capable of putting this weapon into military use," Admiral Radford added. "Therefore each service has a tremendous responsibility for living up to our expectations for a still greater and more powerful degree of readiness."

He suggested that the future guided missiles, atomic-powered ships and planes, an enlarged "family of weapons" and new applications of electronics would have their place in the steady evolution of more effective combat forces.

RADFORD STRESSES SUPREMACY IN AIR

Continued From Page 1

Broadcasting System's "Reporters Round-up" radio program, Dr. Hannah said the suggested end strength for the fiscal year 1957 was "within the range" of 2,800,000 or 2,900,000. The 1957 fiscal year begins July 1, 1956.

Admiral Radford offered no details of the reductions in manpower proposed for the next three years, saying it would be inappropriate to do so until the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs were approved. "The concept of the New Look," Admiral Radford said, "is the development of an armed posture which can be supported year in and year out, on a long-term basis; not just for one year, nor two years, but for ten or twenty years if necessary."

This long-term approach marked a significant departure from the planning of the old Joint Chiefs toward a particular "year of crisis," he declared. Admiral Radford succeeded General of the Army Omar N. Bradley as chairman last August.

The proposed defense budget for the 1955 fiscal year, beginning next July 1, reflected an "Interim Look" rather than a wholly new one, Admiral Radford said. Looking ahead to 1956 and 1957, however, the chiefs had recommended military plans that could be maintained "over an extended period of uneasy peace, rather than peaking forces at greater costs for a particular period of tension," he added.

Through the years, he said, the armed forces must be strong and flexible enough to strike powerful retaliatory blows in the event of

global war and to deal with recurrent "hot spots" round the world in lesser military actions.

The Joint Chiefs agreed last week with Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, on a plan to meet these requirements, Admiral Radford said. He acknowledged that their estimates were based not only on military factors, but on a "wider range of political and economic factors, as well as the latest technological developments."

Program's Provisions

In the general outline made by Admiral Radford, the new program provides:

Step-by-step improvement of the nation's continental defense.

Full recognition that the security of the Free World demands cooperation rather than competition with our allies.

More effective use of manpower through new weapons and reduced support forces.

Admiral Radford made clear the conviction of the Joint Chiefs that the United States must strive for air supremacy, and that air power should have top priority in spending.

"Today there is no argument among military planners as to the importance of air power," he said. "Offensively, defensively and in support of other forces, air power is a primary requirement."

Land forces, amphibious forces and those used in anti-submarine warfare are complementary to air, he added. He emphasized that by the term air power he referred not to the Air Force alone but to Naval, Marine Corps and Army aviation as well, in addition to the country's aircraft industry and civil air transport system.

The sum total of American air power is superior to that of any other nation, he said.

"The President of the United

ADLER Xmas Gifts for Him

SHOPS for MEN



STYLE 590—Rich ADLER-gator- and -kid opera, full leather lining, leather sole, rubber heel. Brown, blue, wine. Sizes 6 to 12—\$5.98. Sizes 13, 14, 15—\$6.98.



STYLE 424—Genuine ilkskin moccasin opera with leather sole, rubber heel. Wine only. Also with soft sole. Sizes 6 to 12—\$4.98. Sizes 13, 14, 15—\$5.98.



STYLE 318—Snug, full shearing-lined leather opera with leather sole, rubber heel. Blue, maroon or brown. Sizes 6 to 13—\$3.98. Sizes 14, 15—\$4.98.



STYLE 510—All leather zipper boot with full shearing lining for ankle-deep comfort. Sueded leather sole, rubber heel. Brown. Sizes 6 to 13—\$5.98.



STYLE 4801—Fine, genuine kidskin mule slip-on with leather sole and heel. Also soft sole. Blue, brown, maroon. Sizes 6 to 12—\$4.98. Sizes 13, 14—\$5.98.



STYLE 3497—Handsewn true moccasin slipper in serviceable leather with heavy-duty sole and heel, baseball-vamp seam. Good for outdoor service. Brown only. Sizes 6 to 12—\$3.98. Sizes 13, 14, 15—\$4.98.



STYLE 343—Full leather-lined opera in soft genuine kidskin with contrast piping. Leather sole, rubber heel. Maroon, brown, blue. Sizes 4 to 12—\$3.98. Sizes 13, 14, 15—\$4.98.



STYLE 8X234—Just one of our 17 styles in famous Penobscot Trampuses that every man needs for work, play, fun. Brown, black. Sizes to 12, widths B, D and EEE—\$8.95. Sizes 13, 14—\$9.95.



STYLE 496—Selected, heavy-weight, genuine pigskins... a favorite with most men. Sizes 7 1/2 to 13—\$4.95.



If you don't know his sock-size THESE WILL FIT!
The famous new stretch-to-fit sock that takes its size from the feet; fits better, wears longer. Assorted colors. 95¢ pr. 3 prs. \$2.75



A. Genuine Argyle elastic-top shorts. All colors, sizes 10 to 13—3 prs. \$1.50. Sizes 14, 15—3 prs. \$2.75. 4-color Argyles: sizes 10 to 13—95¢ pr.

B. 6 x 3 rib elastic tops. All solid colors. Sizes 10 to 13—3 prs. \$1.50. Sizes 14, 15—3 prs. \$2.75.

C. Clocked lites with elastic top. All colors, sizes 10 to 13—3 prs. \$1.50. Sizes 14, 15—3 prs. \$2.75. Also some pure lites with Swiss embroidered clock. Sizes 10-13—95¢ pr.



Complete Shoe-Shine Kit
Esquire Footman: \$1.50 worth (4 cans) of Esquire polishes; 2 high quality shoe brushes; 2 daubers; 2 soft shine cloths; Saddle Soap; sole and heel dressing; all in a handsome, wood shine stand. Wonderful family gift—\$5.95.
(Add 50¢ postage to order by mail)

You give exactly what he wants with a **MERCHANDISE CERTIFICATE**

ORDER BY MAIL TODAY

ADLER Shops for Men, Mail Order Department
122 East 42nd Street, New York 17, N. Y.

ORDER BY PHONE
OXford 7-3790

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ Zone _____ State _____

Satisfaction guaranteed or your money refunded.

(Add 50¢ for shine kit, 25¢ pr. for slippers, 15¢ other items, to cover postage and handling) Check or Money Order enclosed

Your order will be shipped within 48 hours after we receive it!

ADLER

SHOES for MEN

141 W. 42nd St. (Bet. 6th & 8'way)
2547 Broadway (Bet. 95th & 96th)
338 E. Fordham Rd. (Nr. Elm Pl.)
JAMAICA: 165-02 Jamaica Ave.

FLUSHING: 39-07 Main St.
NEWARK, N. J.
835 Broad St. (Near Brantford)
192 Market St. (Near Broad)

see "Adler" in phone book for other stores near you

OUR FIFTH AVENUE STORES ARE
OPEN TONIGHT UNTIL 9 P. M.

For his Christmas!

Rogers Peet
SWEATERS

IMPORTED FROM SCOTLAND



\$12

SLEEVELESS REVERSIBLES

Two-Sweaters-in-one! Navy Blue on one side . . . with Wine, Natural, Light Blue, Grey or Canary on the other. Fine Wool. Knitted in Scotland expressly for Rogers Peet. Ribbed for better fit. \$12.50.



\$32

PURE CASHMERE PULLOVERS

Finest of the fine Yarns and Workmanship! Knitted in Scotland expressly for Rogers Peet. Pullovers, as illustrated, in Grey, Maroon, Light Green, Navy Blue, Red, Natural, Canary, Light Blue or Black. \$32.50.

Also Sleeveless Slipovers, \$22.50
and Cardigans, \$38.50.

Texts on Report of Training Commission

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
WASHINGTON, Dec. 14—Following are the texts of the introduction and the findings and recommendations of the report of the National Security Training Commission as sent to the President today:

Introduction

The twentieth century has placed America within striking distance of our enemies. Not since the War of 1812 has our soil been invaded. Not since the disappearance of our frontier in the middle of the last century have our citizens lived in danger of swift attack in the night.

Time and technology have changed that. A plane can fly from Europe to America and back in less time than it took our ancestors to take a long day's journey on horseback. Eighty years ago the frontier was the woods at the edge of the clearing. Today it is the air above us and the seas around us. The danger is the same; only the weapons have changed.

When our citizens in the early days of this nation were forced to live with danger, they prepared themselves for it. They learned to use the weapons of the day; they were ready to join in the common defense on a minute's notice.

One of our earliest traditions was the Minuteman, his powder dry, his musket oiled. He helped give us our nation and our heritage. Today, once more, there may be no real security from attack, but there can be preparedness. In our own time of danger, we can do no less than our forefathers. We can train and have ready our twentieth century Minutemen.

We have lived with tension for eight years without a world war, realizing more clearly as each year passed that a new phenomenon has intruded itself upon our national traditions: the vicious but slow-burning hatred of a patient and powerful foreign nation bent upon the eventual domination of its subjugating doctrine over the peoples of the world. Communism seems content for the time being to harass, undermine, skirmish. We learned in Korea, how willing Russia is to let her satellites fight blood-letting local wars. At every sensitive spot in the world, the Communists are patiently agitating, boring, inflaming. At any time these local actions can erupt into large-scale fighting.

One of the factors which will deter the Soviet Union from launching a war is the military strength of the free. A nation's military strength is measured by the amount and quality of matériel and men it has ready for defense. Of the two, men are the most important. Without trained men with high morale, matériel is useless.

Early in 1950 we had too few of the men and materials needed for defense. Monolithic Russia shoved her Korean pawn upon us. Today, after great sacrifice, great expense, great heartbreak, and terrible unfairness to some of our citizens, we are still in a stage of uncertain negotiations.

In the past we have misused the choice between our own, newly discovered peaceful people have chosen no defenses. This error, if repeated, will gravely endanger the national security.

If there is another world war, we will not be granted the two years' grace we had in 1914 and 1939. The Kremlin will not repeat the error the Germans made twice in too-recent history; we would probably be attacked first. If we do not train fighting men beforehand, we certainly will not have time to train them afterward.

'The Weak Are Attacked'

After each war in our history, we have demobilized pell-mell. We might have averted some of these wars with sufficient preparedness. The lesson of the first half of this century, the simple law of life which we have learned the hard way, is this: the weak are attacked.

Now that fighting in Korea is suspended, how are we to adjust

nities, and themselves, yet we have made them more liable for service in limited emergencies than nonveterans.

The law of the land today places upon every veteran of Korea an over-all eight-year service and Reserve obligation, yet those who have not been inducted for service have no obligation whatsoever. The moral is clear: we need enough trained nonveterans in reserve to meet the needs of partial mobilization.

In peacetime we cannot possibly maintain active forces large enough to achieve victory if a world war comes. Citizen soldiers have done the bulk of the fighting in every major American war. We had only about 300,000 service men in 1939, yet the services numbered over 12,000,000 at the peak of the war effort, and over 15,000,000 were inducted or enlisted into the various services while the war lasted. Furthermore, relying on large numbers of men in uniform when there are no active hostilities is a most expensive kind of defense.

A Reserve Forces Program

Recognizing the long-term nature of the crisis, Congress in Public Law 51, Eighty-second Congress, established the machinery by which all qualified young men not needed for service could become liable for induction for six months of National Security Training upon reaching the age of 18. After the training period these young men were to become members of the Reserve for seven months and a half year, available for recall in the event of emergency.

National Security Training is in essence a Reserve forces training program. Whether or not it is desirable depends upon the answers to three questions: Do we need a Reserve? If so, do we want it to be trained or untrained? If we want it trained, do we want it composed of veterans or nonveterans?

We believe the answers are obvious. We need a Reserve and we want it to be trained. For the sake of fairness, we would prefer that it be composed of those who have not yet served their country. Today our Reserve is weak. Too few veterans will join its units and activities; the few nonveterans we have are basically untrained. The only answer is to train nonveterans not needed for service and then transfer them to the Reserve.

National Security Training is essential for a strong, trained, nonveteran, vitalized Reserve. It would make a major contribution to the capacity of our regular forces for quick expansion from peace strength to war strength.

The program can begin at once with at least 100,000 trainees, and this level can be maintained or increased as manpower availability allows. Service is far from universal today. Even if the forces are maintained at 3,360,000 through 1960, which is highly unlikely, there will be over 2,000,000 fit young men who will not have served through 1960 after all service requirements are met.

If the services are even slightly decreased to a strength of 3,130,000 by 1955, about 3,000,000 fit young men will not have served through the rest of this decade. At a strength of 3,360,000, we estimate there will be about 1,000,000 men available for National

Security Training in 1955. To this civilian-majority commission it assigned the duties of establishing policies and standards for the conduct of the six months' training, exercising "general supervision," and submitting a comprehensive report to the Congress every six months on the operation of the corps.

National Security Training cannot be termed militaristic. To seek to prevent a war; to build a Reserve and reduce the size of the active forces; to equalize democratically the sharing of the obligation to help protect the nation; to supervise the training program with a civilian agency—all these things are compatible with the best elements of our national heritage.

National Security Training will be education for survival—the survival of our young men, the survival of the American heritage, the survival of our basic liberties and the great human

taxpayers billions of dollars. We have to stay strong, but we also have to stay solvent. The inexpensiveness of Reserve training would encourage a steadiness in our preparedness that we could never achieve by relying on standing forces alone.

It should finally be remembered that the greatest savings may be intangible. The prevention or even the shortening of war would save the nation incalculable loss of life and effort.

We learned in Korea the dangers and inequities of the unselective recall of veterans. When National Security Training is fully operative, almost every physically qualified young man in the civilian labor force will have a Reserve obligation.

Therefore, we propose that in an emergency the Selective Service System should, in accordance with the selective standards applying to young men liable for induction for service, recall Reservists who do not voluntarily join organized Reserve units and who do not have specific mobilization assignments. At the same time, we propose that veterans of two years' service be transferred, upon request, to Stand-by Reserve as the national safety permits, provided National Security Training is implemented.

The training itself would cause a minimum of interference with the educations, careers and private lives of our young men. They will take the training at the natural break between high school and college or a career.

It is true that this country has never had a long-term Reserve forces training program, although George Washington proposed one 170 years ago. It is also true that we have never maintained large standing military forces in peacetime. Our security demands that we have one or the other; our money and manpower limitations will not let us have both.

The American tradition demands a strong citizen Reserve in preference to a large professional force. We should have a tough-core active military establishment, backed up by a large, trained, citizen Reserve produced by a Reserve forces training program.

Our enemies then will have to realize that we have an immediately mobilizable Reserve to repel attack. No human mind can reason away reality. Communism cannot ignore our bombs, our planes, our trained men.

We might reasonably hope that the steady long-term reality of a large, trained, continuously maintained Reserve would help to prevent the death and waste of a third world war. By thus adjusting our defenses to the continuing danger, we will move closer to peace. In the event of war, we will be closer to victory.

Called Historic Compromise

National Security Training thus is an historic compromise between our cherished tradition against large active military forces in peacetime and our need for habitual preparedness against the implacable, continuing reality of the hostility of communism.

Congress did not neglect the element of civilian control when it established the National Security Training Corps and Commission in 1951. To this civilian-majority commission it assigned the duties of establishing policies and standards for the conduct of the six months' training, exercising "general supervision," and submitting a comprehensive report to the Congress every six months on the operation of the corps.

National Security Training cannot be termed militaristic. To seek to prevent a war; to build a Reserve and reduce the size of the active forces; to equalize democratically the sharing of the obligation to help protect the nation; to supervise the training program with a civilian agency—all these things are compatible with the best elements of our national heritage.

National Security Training will be education for survival—the survival of our young men, the survival of the American heritage, the survival of our basic liberties and the great human

rifice for it. Whenever this is not so, whenever some are required over and over again to protect the others; the spirit and morale of the nation is weakened.

In a democracy as in no other form of government, all citizens should watch the ramparts. All should be vigilant against the ever-present dangers which can strike out from half-way across the world at any moment; all should attempt to avoid danger by preparing for danger; all should share the duties, the discomfort and the dirty work. All free men should be willing to guard their liberties and each free man should take his turn at guard.

Summary of Findings and Recommendations

The Commission finds that:

[1]

All should share equally the obligation to serve the nation.

[2]

Our present reserve system is unfair.

a. About two and one-half million of the three and one-half million fit young men who became 18 between World War II and the start of the Korean emergency saw no service before June, 1950.

b. Consequently, when Korea came, more than 600,000 veterans of World War II were involuntarily recalled to duty for their second war. They were put in double jeopardy, with no consideration for their family lives or careers, while younger men went entirely unobligated or were inducted according to selective standards. Serious morale problems developed.

c. If another local emergency like Korea erupts, it will be the older veterans, not the younger men who have not served, who will have to bear the first brunt of the conflict. Veterans might again have to be recalled unselectively while young men in similar status would be deferred.

d. This unfair policy has been not only morally wrong, it has also been socially and financially costly.

e. We cannot with justice continue to place our veteran Reservists in double jeopardy while excluding our nonveterans from service or training.

[3]


Our present Reserve is inadequate.

a. About three-fourths of our Reservists are veterans of Korea, World War II, or both, and the nonveteran reservists are relatively untrained.

b. Only 32 per cent of our Reservists are participating in Reserve units. Units are seriously under strength.

c. The Ready Reserve is not a unified Reserve. The title merely describes the greater vulnerability

Continued on Following Page



\$15

A GIFT
OF UNEXCELLED BEAUTY

WHITE PURE SILK BROADCLOTH AT A
VERY SPECIAL PRICE. TOWN SHIRTS
WITH CONVENTIONAL COLLAR AND
FRENCH CUFFS. SPORT SHIRTS WITH
BUTTON CUFFS AND CONVERTIBLE
COLLAR IN PRECISE NECK SIZES FOR
WEARING WITH OR WITHOUT A TIE.

SIZES: 14½ TO 17½ SLEEVES: 32 TO 36

Mail or Telephone Orders, JU 2-3230

Finchley Gift Certificates Permit Personal Choice

Clothes • Hats • Haberdashery • Shoes

Finchley

New York, Fifth Ave. at 46th St. (36); Chicago, 19 E. Jackson Blvd. (4)

Does YOUR Santa Claus work too hard?

Does the Santa Claus in your family try to do too much—all year 'round? Is he skipping vacations, working under pressure, building up tensions, taxing his heart? Then give him, for Christmas, the gift that will enable him to take time out—to recharge his vital energies regularly—right where he is, at home or office, when he needs it, every taxing day. He'll lead a more productive, healthier and longer life.



Sit restfully

one side . . . with Wine, Natural, Light Blue, Grey or Canary on the other. Fine Wool. Knitted in Scotland expressly for Rogers Peet. Ribbed for better fit. \$12.50.

\$32



PURE CASHMERE PULLOVERS

Finest of the fine Yarns and Workmanship! Knitted in Scotland expressly for Rogers Peet. Pullovers, as illustrated, in Grey, Maroon, Light Green, Navy Blue, Red, Natural, Canary, Light Blue or Black. \$32.50.

Also Sleeveless Slipovers, \$22.50 and Cardigans, \$38.50.

\$18



LAMB'S WOOL CARDIGANS

Soft resilient Wool from the youngest shearlings. Knitted in Scotland expressly for Rogers Peet. Cardigans, as illustrated, in Natural, Grey or Navy Blue . . . \$18.

Also Sleeveless Slipovers, \$10 and Long-Sleeved Pullovers, \$15.

Sizes 38 to 46 in all Sweaters illustrated.

Rogers Peet Company

The label that adds distinction to your gift.

600 Fifth Avenue at 48th Street
479 Fifth Avenue at 41st Street
Warren Street at Broadway

And in Boston: Tremont St. at Bromfield St.

More R. P. news on pages 8, 20, 28 and 30

tion of its subjugating doctrine over the peoples of the world.

Communism seems content for the time being to harass, undermine, skirmish. We learned in Korea, how willing Russia is to let her satellites fight blood-letting local wars. At every sensitive spot in the world, the Communists are patiently agitating, boring, inflaming. At any time these local actions can erupt into large-scale fighting.

One of the factors which will deter the Soviet Union from launching a war is the military strength of the free. A nation's military strength is measured by the amount and quality of material and men it has ready for defense. Of the two, men are the most important. Without trained men with high morale, material is useless.

Early in 1950 we had too few of the men and materials needed for defense. Monolithic Russia shoved her Korean pawn upon us. Today, after great sacrifice, great expense, great heartbreak, and terrible unfairness to some of our citizens, we are still in a stage of uncertain negotiations.

In the past we have misconstrued the choice between

of this decade; in the event of reduction in the forces to 3,000,000, 1,500,000 or more young men will be available for training.

The Selective Service System can operate inductions for service and training simultaneously as long as necessary. While selecting some men for six months' training and others for two years' service by lot would not yield absolute equality of duty, it would correct the present unfairness to veterans.

In event of emergency, men with six months' training would be recalled ahead of the veterans, and nonveterans as well as veterans would have a total eight-year military obligation. As long as inductions for service must continue, a perfect fairness is not possible, since selective standards for service continue to be necessary.

Under National Security Training every young man who is not needed for service would receive six months' basic and specialist training in the military fields.

He would spend his remaining Reserve obligation in the Ready Reserve unless he elected to shorten his Ready Reserve liability by active participation in various Reserve programs.

After their training, the young men would return to their homes and communities well equipped to survive and to assist in civil defense in the event of sudden attack.

Formula Is Endorsed
The Senate Committee on Armed Services proposed in 1952 that the active forces should be decreased as graduates of a Reserve training program were produced. We endorse their formula.

If international conditions worsen or there is a world war, the size of the forces will have to be adjusted, but given any international situation except war, our active forces can be smaller if we have a large trained reserve than they would have to be if we did not.

By reducing the standing armed forces and building up the Reserve, the program could save the

Older Reservists in college were pulled into service while younger nonveteran students were deferred. Farm and industrial workers, scientists, teachers, managers—all were recalled.

The selective principle was applied in inducting nonveterans for service but not to veterans recalled for their second tour of duty. Veteran Reservists are older, more highly skilled, and more essential to their families, their professions, their commu-

have not yet served their country. Today our Reserve is weak. Too few veterans will join its units and activities; the few nonveterans we have are basically untrained. The only answer is to train nonveterans not needed for service and then transfer them to the Reserve.

National Security Training is essential for a strong, trained, nonveteran, vitalized Reserve. It would make a major contribution to the capacity of our regular forces for quick expansion from peace strength to war strength.

The program can begin at once with at least 100,000 trainees, and this level can be maintained or increased as manpower availability allows. Service is far from universal today. Even if the forces are maintained at 3,360,000 through 1960, which is highly unlikely, there will be over 2,000,000 fit young men who will not have served through 1960 after all service requirements are met.

If the services are even slightly decreased to a strength of 3,130,000 by 1955, about 3,000,000 fit young men will not have served through the rest of this decade. At a strength of 3,360,000, we estimate there will be about 1,000,000 men available for

majority commission in the duties of establishing policies and standards for the conduct of the six months' training, exercising "general supervision," and submitting a comprehensive report to the Congress every six months on the operation of the corps.

National Security Training cannot be termed militaristic. To seek to prevent a war; to build a Reserve and reduce the size of the active forces; to equalize democratically the sharing of the obligation to help protect the nation; to supervise the training program with a civilian agency—all these things are compatible with the best elements of our national heritage.

National Security Training will be education for survival—the survival of our young men, the survival of the American heritage, the survival of our basic liberties and the great human values that flow from them. It is the answer of democracy to the challenge of dictatorship. At the mid-century, as in 1775, America will meet the test of danger with its citizen reserve, skilled and ready—its twentieth century Minutemen.

We must have the materials of defense; our men must be trained and skilled in their use. Above all, our men must have the morale which enables them to use their skill and their materials courageously. Skill is worthless without morale—and morale cannot be achieved through an unfair system.

When a democratic people are called to defend their nation, they know that they are defending their own homes, their own land, their own possessions, their own government. All have an equal interest in the common defense.

We proclaim equal rights, equal benefits, and equal opportunity for the pursuit of happiness. Conversely, we should all share equally the obligation to serve the nation, to protect it and sac-

ment, backed up by a highly trained, citizen Reserve produced by a Reserve forces training program.

Our enemies then will have to realize that we have an immediately mobilizable Reserve to repel attack. No human mind can reason away reality. Communism cannot ignore our bombs, our planes, our trained men.

We might reasonably hope that the steady long-term reality of a large, trained, continuously maintained Reserve would help to prevent the death and waste of a third world war. By thus adjusting our defenses to the continuing danger, we will move closer to peace. In the event of war, we will be closer to victory.

Called Historic Compromise

National Security Training thus is an historic compromise between our cherished tradition against large active military forces in peacetime and our need for habitual preparedness against the implacable, continuing reality of the hostility of communism.

Congress did not neglect the element of civilian control when it established the National Security Training Corps and Commission in 1951. To this civilian-

shipment, backed up by a highly trained, citizen Reserve produced by a Reserve forces training program.

Our enemies then will have to realize that we have an immediately mobilizable Reserve to repel attack. No human mind can reason away reality. Communism cannot ignore our bombs, our planes, our trained men.

We might reasonably hope that the steady long-term reality of a large, trained, continuously maintained Reserve would help to prevent the death and waste of a third world war. By thus adjusting our defenses to the continuing danger, we will move closer to peace. In the event of war, we will be closer to victory.

Called Historic Compromise

National Security Training thus is an historic compromise between our cherished tradition against large active military forces in peacetime and our need for habitual preparedness against the implacable, continuing reality of the hostility of communism.

Congress did not neglect the element of civilian control when it established the National Security Training Corps and Commission in 1951. To this civilian-

shipment, backed up by a highly trained, citizen Reserve produced by a Reserve forces training program.

Our enemies then will have to realize that we have an immediately mobilizable Reserve to repel attack. No human mind can reason away reality. Communism cannot ignore our bombs, our planes, our trained men.

We might reasonably hope that the steady long-term reality of a large, trained, continuously maintained Reserve would help to prevent the death and waste of a third world war. By thus adjusting our defenses to the continuing danger, we will move closer to peace. In the event of war, we will be closer to victory.

Called Historic Compromise

National Security Training thus is an historic compromise between our cherished tradition against large active military forces in peacetime and our need for habitual preparedness against the implacable, continuing reality of the hostility of communism.

Congress did not neglect the element of civilian control when it established the National Security Training Corps and Commission in 1951. To this civilian-

majority commission in the duties of establishing policies and standards for the conduct of the six months' training, exercising "general supervision," and submitting a comprehensive report to the Congress every six months on the operation of the corps.

National Security Training cannot be termed militaristic. To seek to prevent a war; to build a Reserve and reduce the size of the active forces; to equalize democratically the sharing of the obligation to help protect the nation; to supervise the training program with a civilian agency—all these things are compatible with the best elements of our national heritage.

National Security Training will be education for survival—the survival of our young men, the survival of the American heritage, the survival of our basic liberties and the great human values that flow from them. It is the answer of democracy to the challenge of dictatorship. At the mid-century, as in 1775, America will meet the test of danger with its citizen reserve, skilled and ready—its twentieth century Minutemen.

We must have the materials of defense; our men must be trained and skilled in their use. Above all, our men must have the morale which enables them to use their skill and their materials courageously. Skill is worthless without morale—and morale cannot be achieved through an unfair system.

When a democratic people are called to defend their nation, they know that they are defending their own homes, their own land, their own possessions, their own government. All have an equal interest in the common defense.

We proclaim equal rights, equal benefits, and equal opportunity for the pursuit of happiness. Conversely, we should all share equally the obligation to serve the nation, to protect it and sac-

ment, backed up by a highly trained, citizen Reserve produced by a Reserve forces training program.

Our enemies then will have to realize that we have an immediately mobilizable Reserve to repel attack. No human mind can reason away reality. Communism cannot ignore our bombs, our planes, our trained men.

We might reasonably hope that the steady long-term reality of a large, trained, continuously maintained Reserve would help to prevent the death and waste of a third world war. By thus adjusting our defenses to the continuing danger, we will move closer to peace. In the event of war, we will be closer to victory.

Called Historic Compromise

National Security Training thus is an historic compromise between our cherished tradition against large active military forces in peacetime and our need for habitual preparedness against the implacable, continuing reality of the hostility of communism.

Congress did not neglect the element of civilian control when it established the National Security Training Corps and Commission in 1951. To this civilian-

majority commission in the duties of establishing policies and standards for the conduct of the six months' training, exercising "general supervision," and submitting a comprehensive report to the Congress every six months on the operation of the corps.

National Security Training cannot be termed militaristic. To seek to prevent a war; to build a Reserve and reduce the size of the active forces; to equalize democratically the sharing of the obligation to help protect the nation; to supervise the training program with a civilian agency—all these things are compatible with the best elements of our national heritage.

National Security Training will be education for survival—the survival of our young men, the survival of the American heritage, the survival of our basic liberties and the great human values that flow from them. It is the answer of democracy to the challenge of dictatorship. At the mid-century, as in 1775, America will meet the test of danger with its citizen reserve, skilled and ready—its twentieth century Minutemen.

We must have the materials of defense; our men must be trained and skilled in their use. Above all, our men must have the morale which enables them to use their skill and their materials courageously. Skill is worthless without morale—and morale cannot be achieved through an unfair system.

When a democratic people are called to defend their nation, they know that they are defending their own homes, their own land, their own possessions, their own government. All have an equal interest in the common defense.

We proclaim equal rights, equal benefits, and equal opportunity for the pursuit of happiness. Conversely, we should all share equally the obligation to serve the nation, to protect it and sac-

ment, backed up by a highly trained, citizen Reserve produced by a Reserve forces training program.

Our enemies then will have to realize that we have an immediately mobilizable Reserve to repel attack. No human mind can reason away reality. Communism cannot ignore our bombs, our planes, our trained men.

We might reasonably hope that the steady long-term reality of a large, trained, continuously maintained Reserve would help to prevent the death and waste of a third world war. By thus adjusting our defenses to the continuing danger, we will move closer to peace. In the event of war, we will be closer to victory.

Called Historic Compromise

National Security Training thus is an historic compromise between our cherished tradition against large active military forces in peacetime and our need for habitual preparedness against the implacable, continuing reality of the hostility of communism.

Congress did not neglect the element of civilian control when it established the National Security Training Corps and Commission in 1951. To this civilian-

majority commission in the duties of establishing policies and standards for the conduct of the six months' training, exercising "general supervision," and submitting a comprehensive report to the Congress every six months on the operation of the corps.

National Security Training cannot be termed militaristic. To seek to prevent a war; to build a Reserve and reduce the size of the active forces; to equalize democratically the sharing of the obligation to help protect the nation; to supervise the training program with a civilian agency—all these things are compatible with the best elements of our national heritage.

National Security Training will be education for survival—the survival of our young men, the survival of the American heritage, the survival of our basic liberties and the great human values that flow from them. It is the answer of democracy to the challenge of dictatorship. At the mid-century, as in 1775, America will meet the test of danger with its citizen reserve, skilled and ready—its twentieth century Minutemen.

We must have the materials of defense; our men must be trained and skilled in their use. Above all, our men must have the morale which enables them to use their skill and their materials courageously. Skill is worthless without morale—and morale cannot be achieved through an unfair system.

When a democratic people are called to defend their nation, they know that they are defending their own homes, their own land, their own possessions, their own government. All have an equal interest in the common defense.

We proclaim equal rights, equal benefits, and equal opportunity for the pursuit of happiness. Conversely, we should all share equally the obligation to serve the nation, to protect it and sac-

ment, backed up by a highly trained, citizen Reserve produced by a Reserve forces training program.

Our enemies then will have to realize that we have an immediately mobilizable Reserve to repel attack. No human mind can reason away reality. Communism cannot ignore our bombs, our planes, our trained men.

We might reasonably hope that the steady long-term reality of a large, trained, continuously maintained Reserve would help to prevent the death and waste of a third world war. By thus adjusting our defenses to the continuing danger, we will move closer to peace. In the event of war, we will be closer to victory.

Called Historic Compromise

National Security Training thus is an historic compromise between our cherished tradition against large active military forces in peacetime and our need for habitual preparedness against the implacable, continuing reality of the hostility of communism.

Mail or Telephone Orders, JU 2-3230
Finchley Gift Certificates Permit Personal Choice
Clothes • Hats • Haberdashery • Shoes


Finchley

New York, Fifth Ave. at 46th St. (66):: Chicago, 19 E. Jackson Blvd. (4)

Does YOUR Santa Claus work too hard?

Does the Santa Claus in your family try to do too much—all year 'round? Is he charging his vital energies regularly—right where he is, at home or office, when he needs it, every taxing day. He'll lead a more productive, healthier and longer life.

skipping vacations, working under pressure, building up tensions, taxing his heart? Then give him, for Christmas, the gift that will enable him to take time out—to recharge his vital energies regularly—right where he is, at home or office, when he needs it, every taxing day. He'll lead a more productive, healthier and longer life.



GIVE YOUR SANTA'S HEART A LIFT!

GIVE HIM OUR BAROALO Heartsaver CHAIR

Help him to recharge his spent energies—before he reaches that breaking point

This is the chair built for concentrated rest and so efficient that doctors recommend it—and actually use it themselves. As you relax into its cushioned comfort, you can feel—instantly—a release from tensions. Your body, supported from head to toe, seems weightless and buoyant. You rest in the "legs up" position so widely recognized as an aid to circulation, a boon to

taxed hearts. And—the patented articulated action of this chair (an exclusive feature!) lets you vary your position by simply shifting your body weight—not getting up, no locks or levers to adjust.

Your Santa Claus will appreciate this heartening gift for years to come!

STYLED LIKE CUSTOM FURNITURE! PRICED LOWER THAN YOU THINK!



We have sizes and styles to fit everybody. Special models available for the extra-tall person from 169.00. On mail orders, please tell us weight and height. We guarantee satisfaction.

Many styles, many handsome covers—in cloth, fabric, nylon, plastic or leather. Deep coil springs, foam latex cushioning. In the model shown above, covered in durable tweed-like, wear-resisting fabrics. Covered in top-quality Fabrilite plastic by Dupont. **139.50** TERMS ARRANGED

Superb, wear-defying Nylon-upholstered model, varied colors, **183.00 to 283.00**

Magnificent top-grain Leather upholstered models from **285.00 to 345.00**



Give HER Heart A Lift, Too!

She, bless her heart, will look and feel younger after quick, rejuvenating naps in this new Heartsaver chair; wing model covered in nylon, **198.00**

IMMEDIATE SHIPMENT OR DELIVERY ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD

Place your order now, we have over 200 chairs to choose from—now!

LEWIS & CONGER Heartsaver SHOP
Ave. of Americas at 45th St., New York 36, N. Y. • VA 6-2200

66 PROOF. Blended Scotch Whisky
Arthur Bell & Sons, Ltd., Distillers, Perth, Scotland
G. F. Neuhain & Bro., Inc., Hartford, Conn., U.S.A.

Fellman, Ltd.
Individuality
IN MEN'S FOOTWEAR

HEAT
for your
FEET



\$12.95
on mail
orders add 33c
sizes 5 to 12

SHEARLING-LINED
CHUKKA BOOT—

ankle-high, brown ski-leather, oil-treated to repel water, soled with sure-grip rubber! And fully-lined with genuine shearling lamb's fleece for genuine cold-weather protection!

49 W. 43d St.—6 E. 46th St.
In Newark: 855 Broad Street
*Open Thursday nights until 9

Commission Lists 'Specific Values' of Its Training Plan

Continued From Preceding Page

of certain Reservists to recall in the event of an emergency.

d. The only effective Reserve we can possibly have under the present system is a veteran Reserve. Since many veterans are understandably refusing to join units, this means our Reserve is inadequate.

[4]

At least one million men are available for a National Security Training program between now and 1960.

a. Service is not required of all today. About 1,600,000 fit young men of military age have not seen service as of now, and by 1960 this number will have increased to about 2,200,000 if the armed forces are maintained at 3,360,000 as now officially projected.

b. At least one million fit and qualified men will be available for National Security Training between now and 1960 after all service requirements are met. If the forces are reduced to about 3,130,000 men in fiscal 1955 at least 1,500,000 men would be available for National Security Training through 1960. When allowance is made for the men who would be added to the available pool by decreasing the age of liability for training to 18, the number of men available for training increases to between one and a quarter and two million men between now and 1960. These figures do not include the over one million men now classified as exempt from service.

[5]

Inductions for training and service can and should operate concurrently.

a. The Director of the Selective Service System officially confirms our belief that inductions for training can and should be conducted concurrently with inductions for service.

b. The impartial drawing of lots to decide who will serve and who will train would be much fairer than the present selection of some for service and Reserve obligation of eight years, with no obligation whatsoever for those not needed for service.

[6]

Present rejection standards for military service are not realistic in light of the nature of twentieth century warfare.

[7]

Our defense posture must be well adapted to the long-term Soviet danger.

a. The immediate crisis is part of the continuing crisis, and the immediate crisis five years from now will be only another chapter in the same crisis we face today.

b. In all our past wars we have sent inadequately trained men into battle.

c. If there is another world war, we will probably be attacked first or early in the conflict. If we do not have trained fighting men beforehand, we will not have time to train them afterwards.

d. In peacetime we cannot possibly maintain active forces large enough to insure victory in war.

e. We cannot lapse into a state of military inferiority and perhaps radiation. Our century's Minutemen must be skilled as well as brave.

Accordingly, the commission recommends that:

[1]

All fit young men of 18 should enter the National Security Training pool upon registering with the Selective Service System.

[2]

The trained nonveterans should serve ahead of the veterans to the extent practicable if there is another emergency.

a. After six months of basic and technical training, National Security trainees should be transferred to the Reserve for seven and a half years and should be liable to recall ahead of veterans.

b. As the implementation of National Security Training proceeds, veterans of the present emergency who have served two years or more and who are not voluntarily participating in Ready Reserve activities should be trans-



PANEL URGES MILITARY TRAINING: President Eisenhower receiving yesterday from the National Security Training Commission a report recommending that Universal Military Training be operated simultaneously with Selective Service. Seated with the President is Maj. Gen. Julius Ochs Adler, commission chairman. Standing, left to right, are Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, Lieut. Gen. Raymond S. McLain, Warren H. Atherton and Dr. Karl T. Compton.

Associated Press Wirephoto

ferred out of the Ready Reserve to Stand-by status upon their request as the national security permits.

[3]

The trainees should become the basis of a realistic nonveteran reserve.

a. Trainees should be allowed to satisfy their Ready Reserve liability by choosing between several options insofar as the mobilization base permits. Ready Reserve liability should be shortened depending upon the extent of participation by the individual Reservist.

b. In addition, inducements to join units should be offered to trainees to encourage voluntary unit participation.

c. The troop basis of Reserve forces should be fixed at an appropriate level based on requirements of the world situation; unorganized Ready Reservists should remain in a pool, subject to recall. There should be no effort to move all graduate trainees, either basic, specialists, or officers, into organized units above the required troop basis.

d. Each trainee upon his entrance into the corps should be screened and classified as soon as practicable to determine his aptitude for service and his aptitude to existing Reserve facilities. He should be trained as near his home as possible. He should be encouraged to pursue through existing reserve training facilities specialist skills acquired while in the corps.

e. Graduates of the program should be classified distinctly as members of a nonveteran Reserve, not intended to go on active duty unless the alternative is the recall of veteran Reservists.

f. The Reserve obligation of young men who undertake certain professional and technical training should be held in abeyance until the completion of such training if they so wish.

g. In an emergency the Selective Service System should recall Reservists who are not participating in Reserve activities and who do not have specific mobilization assignments in accordance with the selective standards applying to young men liable for service.

[4]

Young men should draw lots upon registering with Selective

Service to determine whether they will be liable for training or service.

a. They should be notified of the result immediately.

b. Young men who desire to enlist in the corps should be required to draw lots to determine whether they will be liable for training or service.

c. Volunteering for the corps by those under 18 should be restricted to young men who have graduated from high school or who have left school for good reasons and have parental consent.

d. Young men should be allowed to specify the month of the year following their 18th birthday during which they prefer to be inducted, with priority being given to college students, farm workers, and industrial workers.

e. Young men should be allowed to specify the service of their choice and should be accommodated to the extent possible within the overall quotas.

f. National Security Training should be prerequisite to the continuation of exemptions of nonveterans from induction for service because of participation in organized Reserve units, including the National Guard.

g. Permissive deferments now authorized by regulation for men liable for induction for service should be disallowed for induction for training.

h. The induction of young men in agriculture and industry should be delayed for seasonal work, although such delay should not continue for extended periods.

i. Young men in high school should not be inducted for training until they graduate, cease to pursue their studies satisfactorily, or reach their 20th birthday, whichever occurs first.

j. The induction of young men in college should be delayed until the end of the current academic year or until they cease pursuing their studies satisfactorily, whichever occurs first.

k. As an interim measure, young men who, at the time of registration, have signed R.O.T.C. contracts committing them to active duty if a commission is tendered upon graduation should be considered to have fulfilled their obligation for training. Should they subsequently fall for any reason to fulfill their contract commitments, they should be in-

ducted for training or service as appropriate.

l. Present statutory deferments should continue for divinity students, conscientious objectors, sole surviving sons, and severe dependency hardship cases, but the number in these categories at age 18 will be very negligible.

[5]

National Security Training should begin on Jan. 1, 1955, or earlier, with at least 100,000 trainees. This number should taper upward as manpower availability and the size of the armed forces permit.

[6]

In the training program, trainees should receive not more than six months and not less than 1,050 hours of actual training.

a. Existing training facilities should be utilized for this program to their fullest capacity. No new major construction should be authorized unless absolutely necessary.

b. Support personnel should not exceed the number authorized for similar training in the regular components.

c. The trainees' rights to speak, to dissent, to believe as they choose, to equal justice under law and to economic protection and good health should be maintained to the highest possible level.

d. Trainees should be reinstated within their jobs if they wish within thirty days after their release from the corps.

e. With two reservations trainees should be subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice of 1951.

f. Instructors in nonmilitary subjects should strive to present the broadest and most generally accepted principles of our society and should encourage individual discussions after formal lectures.

g. Instructors should have the highest moral and ethical standards.

h. Local citizen advisory committees should be formed to help improve the off-duty environment of the trainees.

i. The commission should be consulted by the Department of Defense about the budget estimates for the operation of their corps before they are submitted to the President and should be required to submit cost studies on the program to the Congress.

j. The commission should establish an inspection system to carry

out the supervisory and reporting responsibilities imposed upon it by the Congress.

[7]

"Basic military training" should be redefined in the light of twentieth century warfare.

a. A careful, specialized study of present physical and mental rejection standards should be made by an independent, nonmilitary group.

b. Basic literacy courses should be offered to trainees who have not learned to read and write, and every effort should be made to utilize otherwise limited personnel in the Corps.

[8]

National Security Training would add these specific values to our defensive posture and ability to survive:

a. The nation would not again have to recall veteran Reservists ahead of nonveterans, removing the present deplorable inequity which has created a class of privileged draftees, while multiplying the burden on those who volunteer or are drafted to train and serve and then are the only trained reserve for any future emergency.

b. The steadiness of our long-term preparedness might help deter war.

c. Our young men would be trained to survive, so we might expect fewer military casualties in the event of war.

d. The trainees could be of value to civil defense, especially those who joined their local civil defense units.

e. We would be better prepared to contend with local aggression; to hold or seize vital surface areas; to protect our sea and air bases; to aid our allies before they were overrun; to use or refrain from using power weapons in accordance with moral and practical considerations; to follow up aerial blows against an enemy; and to contend with fifth column activities in time of war.

f. The military establishment would be assured of the continuing existence of a training plant, manned and equipped, so that regular forces would not have to be broken up for training purposes in an emergency.

g. The civilian Reserve components would be vitalized by a steady flow of trainees with 1,600 hours of training, or about 70 per cent ready, instead of 600 hours, or less than 20 per cent ready as at present. This can be accomplished in no other feasible way over the long run.

h. Regular forces would be immediately available for duty in the theatre of operations, and Reserves could complete field training by the time shipping was available for their transportation.

i. Machinery would be created for classification and aptitude determination so that potential officers, noncommissioned officers, and specialists could be encouraged to take further training in their status.

j. The disadvantages of crisis psychology would be replaced, to some extent, by a calm sense of strength.

k. The over-all investment, less camp sites and buildings which are already available, would be less than \$2,700 per trainee. Under certain specified circumstances, National Security Training might save the nation's taxpayers several billions of dollars.

l. Disruption of civilian life and the civilian economy would be reduced because the trainees would take the training at the natural break between high school and college or a career.

m. To whatever extent our active forces could be safely reduced because of the added security of a strong nonveteran Reserve, more of our young men would have time for civilian pursuits, giving us a stronger national economy.

n. Present uncertainties about military status would be reduced.

o. National Security Training would be compatible with the best elements of our national heritage. It would not yield militarism under the provisions of law which require continuing general subdivision of the operation of the corps by this independent, civilian-majority commission.

Christmas Sale

at DAVEGA

27 TV STORES

NEW 1954 CBS-COLUMBIA TV

The Ideal Family Gift That Gives Year-Round Entertainment



17" Model 17M06

DC Available at Moderate Cost



it's new!



years ahead!



see it today at Davega!

DAVEGA'S LOWEST PRICE EVER

\$179.95

NO EXTRAS** for fed. tax, warranty & delivery!

- Buy with Confidence at DAVEGA
- Over \$4,000,000 Capital
- Friendly Salespeople to Assist You in Your Selection
- 74 Years of Dependability

PAY LESS AT DAVEGA WITH YOUR TRADE-IN TV, Radio or Phonograph

NO MONEY DOWN • 2 YEARS TO PAY

for service.

[6]

Present rejection standards for military service are not realistic in light of the nature of twentieth century warfare.

[7]

Our defense posture must be well adapted to the long-term Soviet danger.

a. The immediate crisis is part of the continuing crisis, and the immediate crisis five years from now will be only another chapter in the same crisis we face today.

b. In all our past wars we have sent inadequately trained men into battle.

c. If there is another world war, we will probably be attacked first or early in the conflict. If we do not have trained fighting men beforehand, we will not have time to train them afterwards.

d. In peacetime we cannot possibly maintain active forces large enough to insure victory in war.

e. The present Selective Service System cannot cope with the present emergency. Our century's Minutemen must be killed as well as brave.

Accordingly, the commission recommends that:

[1]

All fit young men of 18 should enter the National Security Training pool upon registering with the Selective Service System.

[2]

The trained nonveterans should serve ahead of the veterans to the extent practicable if there is another emergency.

a. After six months of basic and technical training, National Security trainees should be transferred to the Reserve for seven and a half years and should be liable to recall ahead of veterans.

b. As the implementation of National Security Training proceeds, veterans of the present emergency who have served two years or more and who are not voluntarily participating in Ready Reserve activities should be trans-

basis of a realistic nonveteran reserve.

a. Trainees should be allowed to satisfy their Ready Reserve liability by choosing between several options insofar as the mobilization base permits. Ready Reserve liability should be shortened depending upon the extent of participation by the individual Reservist.

b. In addition, inducements to join units should be offered to trainees to encourage voluntary unit participation.

c. The troop basis of Reserve forces should be fixed at an appropriate level based on requirements of the world situation; unorganized Ready Reservists should remain in a pool, subject to recall. There should be no effort to move all graduate trainees, either basic, specialists, or officers, into organized units above the required troop basis.

d. Each trainee upon his entrance into the corps should be screened and classified as soon as possible to determine his aptitude for work plans, and his ability to extend service and its nature. He should be trained as near his home as possible.

e. He should be encouraged to pursue through existing reserve training facilities specialist skills acquired while in the corps.

f. Graduates of the program should be classified distinctly as members of a nonveteran Reserve, not intended to go on active duty unless the alternative is the recall of veteran Reservists.

g. The Reserve obligation of young men should be delayed until the end of the current academic year or until they cease pursuing their studies satisfactorily, whichever occurs first.

h. The induction of young men in agriculture and industry should be delayed for seasonal work, although such delay should not continue for extended periods.

i. Young men in high school should not be inducted for training until they graduate, cease to pursue their studies satisfactorily, or reach their 20th birthday, whichever occurs first.

j. The induction of young men in college should be delayed until the end of the current academic year or until they cease pursuing their studies satisfactorily, whichever occurs first.

k. As an interim measure, young men who, at the time of registration, have signed R.O.T.C. contracts committing them to liability for two years or more of active duty if a commission is tendered upon graduation should be considered to have fulfilled their obligation for training.

l. Should they subsequently fail for any reason to fulfill their contract commitments, they should be in-

list in the corps should be re-

quired to draw lots to determine whether they will be liable for training or service.

c. Volunteering for the corps by those under 18 should be restricted to young men who have graduated from high school or who have left school for good reasons and have parental consent.

d. Young men should be allowed to specify the month of the year following their 18th birthday during which they prefer to be inducted, with priority being given to college students, farm workers, and industrial workers.

e. Young men should be allowed to specify the service of their choice and should be accommodated to the extent possible within the overall quotas.

f. National Security Training should be prerequisite to the continuation of exemptions of nonveterans from induction for service because of participation in organized Reserve units, including the National Guard.

g. Permissive deferments now authorized by regulation for men liable for induction for service should be disallowed for induction for training.

h. The induction of young men in agriculture and industry should be delayed for seasonal work, although such delay should not continue for extended periods.

i. Young men in high school should not be inducted for training until they graduate, cease to pursue their studies satisfactorily, or reach their 20th birthday, whichever occurs first.

j. The induction of young men in college should be delayed until the end of the current academic year or until they cease pursuing their studies satisfactorily, whichever occurs first.

k. As an interim measure, young men who, at the time of registration, have signed R.O.T.C. contracts committing them to liability for two years or more of active duty if a commission is tendered upon graduation should be considered to have fulfilled their obligation for training.

l. Should they subsequently fail for any reason to fulfill their contract commitments, they should be in-

[4]

Young men should draw lots upon registering with Selective

sole surviving sons, and severe

dependency hardship cases, but the number in these categories at age 18 will be very negligible.

[5]

National Security Training should begin on Jan. 1, 1955, or earlier, with at least 100,000 trainees. This number should taper upward as manpower availability and the size of the armed forces permit.

[6]

In the training program, trainees should receive not more than six months and not less than 1,050 hours of actual training.

a. Existing training facilities should be utilized for this program to their fullest capacity. No new major construction should be authorized unless absolutely necessary.

b. Support personnel should not exceed the number authorized for similar training in the regular components.

c. The trainees' rights to speak to dissent, to believe as they choose, to equal justice under law and to economic protection and good health should be maintained to the highest possible level.

d. Trainees should be reinstated within their jobs if they wish within thirty days after their release from the corps.

e. With two reservations trainees should be subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice of 1951.

f. Instructors in nonmilitary subjects should strive to present the broadest and most generally accepted principles of our society and should encourage individual discussions after formal lectures.

g. Instructors should have the highest moral and ethical standards.

h. Local citizen advisory committees should be formed to help improve the off-duty environment of the trainees.

i. The commission should be consulted by the Department of Defense about the budget estimates for the operation of their corps before they are submitted to the President and should be required to submit cost studies on the program to the Congress.

j. The commission should establish an inspection system to carry

would be assured of the continuing

existence of a training plant, manned and equipped, so that regular forces would not have to be broken up for training purposes in an emergency.

g. The civilian Reserve components would be vitalized by a steady flow of trainees with 1,600 hours of training, or about 60 per cent ready, instead of 600 hours, or less than 20 per cent ready as at present. This can be accomplished in no other feasible way over the long run.

h. Regular forces would be immediately available for duty in the theatre of operations, and Reserves could complete field training by the time shipping was available for their transportation.

i. Machinery would be created for classification and aptitude determination so that potential officers, noncommissioned officers, and specialists could be encouraged to take further training in their status.

j. The disadvantages of crisis psychology would be replaced, to some extent, by a calm sense of strength.

k. The over-all investment, less camp sites and buildings which are already available, would be less than \$2,700 per trainee. Under certain specified circumstances, National Security Training might save the nation's taxpayers several billions of dollars.

l. Disruption of civilian life and the civilian economy would be reduced because the trainees would take the training at the natural break between high school and college or a career.

m. To whatever extent our active forces could be safely reduced because of the added security of a strong nonveteran Reserve, more of our young men would have time for civilian pur-

n. Present uncertainties about military status would be reduced.

o. National Security Training would be compatible with the best elements of our national heritage. It would not yield militarism under the provisions of law which require continuing general subdivision of the operation of the corps by this independent, civilian-majority commission.



17" Model 17M06 DC Available at Moderate Cost
Davega's Lowest Price Ever
\$179.95
NO EXTRAS**
PAY LESS AT DAVEGA WITH YOUR TRADE-IN TV, Radio or Phonograph
NO MONEY DOWN • 2 YEARS TO PAY



21" CBS-COLUMBIA CONSOLE TELEVISION
with Amazing Full Fidelity Sight and *360 Full Fidelity Sound
FREE TRADE-IN ESTIMATE 5-DAY HOME TRIAL
CALL WA 4-4848
DAVEGA Trade Mark
All Stores Open Evenings
MANHATTAN: Downtown...63 Cortlandt St.
BROOKLYN: Boro Mall...380 Fulton St.
LONG ISLAND: Hempstead...45 Main St.
NEW JERSEY: Newark...110 Market St.
QUEENS: Jamaica...152-24 Jamaica Ave.
WESTCHESTER: White Plains...175 Main St.

COMMISSION URGES NEW TRAINING PLAN

Continued From Page 1

the President on a Reserve Forces Training Program."

President Eisenhower directed the commission last July 23 to make a fresh examination of inequities in the Reserve system and to report on the feasibility of a military training program to supply nonveteran Reserves while continuing the draft.

An earlier proposal to enact Universal Military Training was referred back to the House Armed Services Committee last year for further study. Although the Senate Armed Services Committee approved the bill by unanimous vote, it did not reach the Senate floor.

The commission members said they had received no indication whether the White House would seek Congressional action on their new recommendations.

Asked at a news conference whether he believed the report would be enacted, General Adler said the commission members "believe it can" win Congressional approval. It was not the commission's task to determine what Congress might do, he added.

There was sufficient difference between conditions now and in March, 1952, when the earlier Universal Military Training bill failed of Congressional approval, to warrant hope of enactment this time, General Adler said.

He added that he assumed President Eisenhower would not decide whether to request Congressional action until he received a companion report from the Office of Defense Mobilization on the question whether men of draft age would be available for National Security Training.

In 1951 the commission held that Universal Military Training could not be started while the Korean war was draining off manpower through selective service.

With the armistice, that situation has changed. Draft calls since last July have been running at 23,000 a month, less than half the

calls for an extended period during the active fighting, Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, announced last Friday that the February call would be further reduced to 18,000.

Mr. Wilson said then that the draft or some equivalent would have to be continued for the "foreseeable future."

Campaign Stand Recalled

During the 1952 campaign General Eisenhower, who had been a supporter of Universal Military Training earlier, appeared to oppose its enactment so long as the Korean war made heavy demands on selective service.

At Decatur, Ill., on Oct. 2, 1952, he said: "We have the Selective Service. Let us not have anything else piled on top of that until we solve this problem."

Dr. John A. Hannah, assistant secretary of defense for manpower and personnel, is on record as contending that the available manpower pool cannot support national training and the draft at the same time.

An opposite conclusion was reached by the commission and supported by General Hershey. The report held that any reduction of the armed forces next year as planned by Mr. Wilson would enhance the feasibility of National Service Training by making more young men available.

"The program can begin at once with at least 100,000 trainees and this level can be maintained or increased," the commission reported.

"Even if the [armed] forces are maintained at 3,360,000 through 1960, which is highly unlikely," we estimate there will be about 1,000,000 men available for National Security Training during the rest of this decade.

"In the event of a reduction in the forces to 3,130,000, 1,500,000 or more young men will be available for training."

The commission, which prepared its report before the "New Look" in defense planning was outlined by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, actually underestimated the planned reduction in active forces. Dr. Hannah disclosed this evening that the manpower cutbacks recommended to President Eisen-

hower and the National Security Council would bring the armed services "substantially below the 3,000,000 figure."

In a broadcast interview tonight, Dr. Hannah said the Defense Department was going to "read the report carefully and going to pass judgment objectively on it."

He questioned, however, whether six months' training was adequate for reservists who might be called to combat duty "almost without notice."

The main conclusions of the Training Commission are:

All young men should share equally the obligation of national service.

The present Reserve system is unfair, because veterans of World War II and Korea are in double jeopardy while younger men who have never seen active service are free of obligation. About 2,500,000 of the 3,500,000 men who reached their 18th birthday between World War II and the start of the Korean emergency did not see service until June, 1950. As a result more than 600,000 World War II veterans were recalled to duty.

The Reserve is seriously under strength as a result, with only 32 per cent of Reservists participating actively in the program. They are reluctant to join because they feel this unequal treatment is morally wrong.

Physical and mental standards of the armed services are unrealistic. These should be readjusted to make use of men who could drive a truck or serve as clerks even if they were not fit for combat duty.

National Security Training would remove the burden of double jeopardy from veterans and build a trained Reserve of nonveterans who should be called to active duty first in the event of war or emergency.

A program of national service along these lines, the commission said, would save billions of dollars by making possible reductions in the standing military forces.

Details of the National Service Training program recommended by the commission were not much different from those proposed in the 1952 Universal Military Training bill. The men would enter the corps between the ages of 18 and 19,

be assigned to camps nearest their homes and receive \$30 a month.

The commission urged that trainees be subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, with these reservations:

Young men charged with murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, robbery, maiming, arson or aggravated assaults would have the option of trial by a Federal civil court or general court-martial.

Commanding officers, courts-martial and review authorities should give full regard to the youth and inexperience of trainees in approving or affirming punishment.

Speaking of the present system, the commission declared:

"America's first line of defense, then, is older men with families, special skills valuable in civilian life, good jobs, slight panaches, and a bitterness too justified to criticize. In an emergency the younger ones who have not been and are not being prepared to defend themselves in battle again would have to be called behind the veterans, if at all, and given too-hasty, too-little, too-late training."

Trainees under the new plan, if it were adopted, would have a bigger reserve obligation than the draftees, the commission said. The trainees would have to serve seven and a half years in the Ready Reserve, which means they could be called the minute an emergency occurred. The draftees, after their two years of active military service, would have a six-year Reserve obligation, but this would be in the stand-by Reserve which would not be called in until the Ready Reserve was exhausted.

Recent Bride Killed by Auto

Mrs. Irene Mannion, 26 years old, a bride of less than a month, was killed yesterday by an automobile that threw her in front of another car on Jamaica Avenue at 201st Street, Hollis, Queens. Her home address was 91-01 211th Street, Queens Village. Mrs. Mannion was crossing the avenue at 5:10 P. M. on her way home from work. The two cars were traveling in opposite directions. No charge was made against either driver.

Former Brooklyn Politician, 82, Called Incompetent

An action to declare William J. Heffernan, 82 years old, incompetent to handle his affairs will be heard Friday in Brooklyn Supreme Court by Justice Henry L. Ughetta. The octogenarian is a former president of the Board of Elections. The suit was brought by a brother, former Representative James J. Heffernan. He asked the court to appoint a special guardian. The younger Mr. Heffernan is Democratic leader of the Twelfth Assembly District. He charged that his brother suffered lapses of memory and inability to concentrate. At a preliminary hearing yesterday Justice Ughetta reported that the elder brother, long a power in the Democratic party in Brooklyn, had married a Brooklyn woman last Saturday in Edge-water, N. J. He had been a widower since 1944.

CITY TRASH MEN WARNED

Told Not to Accept Payment for Service While Strike Is On

Sanitation Commissioner Andrew W. Mulrain cautioned city garbage collectors yesterday not to accept payment for emergency garbage service during the strike of private refuse collectors.

In a general teletype order to all locations, he said requests for payment would be made at a later date by the City Controller's office. The charge will be at the rate of \$2 a cubic yard. An emergency committee of the Health, Fire and Sanitation Departments is receiving applications for such service at 125 Worth Street or by telephone at WOrth 2-6900.

Another attempt to mediate the dispute between Local 813, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, A. F. L., and private garbage collectors was unsuccessful yesterday. Daniel Kornblum, director of the city's Division of Labor Relations, said the session was adjourned, subject to call. The strike began on Dec. 7.

COURT GUARDIAN SOUGHT

Former Brooklyn Politician, 82, Called Incompetent

An action to declare William J. Heffernan, 82 years old, incompetent to handle his affairs will be heard Friday in Brooklyn Supreme Court by Justice Henry L. Ughetta. The octogenarian is a former president of the Board of Elections. The suit was brought by a brother, former Representative James J. Heffernan. He asked the court to appoint a special guardian. The younger Mr. Heffernan is Democratic leader of the Twelfth Assembly District. He charged that his brother suffered lapses of memory and inability to concentrate. At a preliminary hearing yesterday Justice Ughetta reported that the elder brother, long a power in the Democratic party in Brooklyn, had married a Brooklyn woman last Saturday in Edge-water, N. J. He had been a widower since 1944.

REMEMBER THE NEEDIEST!

RESERVE OFFICERS HONOR RED CROSS

Cite New York Regional Blood Program for Distinguished Services to Armed Forces

The Reserve Officers Association's annual award for distinguished services to the armed forces was won yesterday by the New York Regional Blood Program of the American Red Cross.

At a ceremony in the Red Cross Manhattan center, 70 West Fortieth Street, Maj. Gen. Julius Ochs Adler, commander of the Seventy-seventh Division and vice president and general manager of THE NEW YORK TIMES, presented the scroll to Colby M. Chester, chairman of the New York Red Cross Chapter.

Lieut. Col. Abraham Kaufman, president of the Manhattan Chapter of the Reserve Officers Association accompanied General Adler, who in turning the scroll over to Mr. Chester, said:

"We who know war know the terrible price that has to be paid in blood. The Red Cross, through its Blood Donor Program, has saved countless lives, and is rendering a service of unusual type and scope to the armed forces. As Reserve Officers we are proud to acknowledge this service by the presentation of this scroll."

The Red Cross announced that it had received 1,162 pints of blood on Tuesday in its two centers and six bloodmobiles. The employees of the Railway Express Agency, 219 East Forty-second Street, contributed the largest amount, 279 pints.

It also was reported that as of Monday, the first eleven days of this month, the Red Cross received 9,255 pints, which is 900 pints more than it had gathered in a similar period last month. The February quota has been set at 30,000 pints.

Appointments for blood contributions can be made in Manhattan at 70 West Fortieth Street, MURRAY HILL 9-1000, and at the Brooklyn center, 57 Willoughby Street, MAIn 4-6001.

The U. M. T. Issue—I

2 Current Measures Held to Have Little Relation to Military Reality in Atom Age

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Universal Military Training—one of the most controversial and least understood measures in our recent military history—was once again the subject of discussion last week by both House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

The House committee completed its consideration of a bill intended to initiate U. M. T. in the near future, and the Senate committee started hearings on the same subject.

The bill, as reported out by the House committee, and the measure that is likely to be reported out by the Senate committee have little relation to military reality in the atomic age.

The proposed legislation, on which the House may vote this month, has dangerous social and political implications. But above all, its military features will inevitably complicate tremendously the already muddled military manpower situation of the nation and will be, if put into effect soon, a positive deterrent, rather than a help, to military readiness.

The implementing legislation, now under discussion, comes as a sequel to Congressional approval last year of the principle of universal military training. But the legislation that Congress approved last year was a far call, indeed, from the universal military service legislation that was recommended to the Pentagon by the late Robert P. Patterson, one-time Secretary of War, and by others.

Pentagon Plan Altered

The Pentagon program as presented to Congress was confusing and inept but Congress last year further distorted and emasculated it so that the law as passed was a hybrid of very doubtful military utility.

The late Mr. Patterson, a man of great integrity and tenacity of purpose, saw this clearly and expressed his feeling about the basic U. M. T. law, which Congress is now trying to implement, in strong terms last summer, more than six months before his untimely death in an Elizabeth, N. J., plane crash.

Mr. Patterson had almost a

Canada to Build U.S. Jets For Use by British Fliers

By The Associated Press.
WASHINGTON, Feb. 13—Air Force Secretary Thomas K. Finletter announced a three-nation agreement tonight under which Canada will build Sabre jet fighters equipped with United States engines to be flown by pilots of the British Royal Air Force.

Mr. Finletter said the planes would be used to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty forces commanded by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. Canada and the United States have been the only countries to use the Sabre jet.

The announcement said Canada would build the F-6-E jets at Canada Air, Ltd. The United States will supply the engines, instruments and other Government-furnished equipment produced only in this country. The number and production schedules of the aircraft were not disclosed, but officials said the figure would run into "some hundreds."

war, raising raw regiments when seasoned regiments were falling to pieces and many others; but it seems that we do not always learn by experience."

Mr. Patterson's main point was the logical one that what was needed now was a compulsory requirement that every youngster serve two years—anywhere in the world—in the regular Army, Navy or Air Force. He fully endorsed the principle of Universal Military Training for all boys (even in peacetime—and this is where the writer disagreed with him), but believed that present world conditions made a requirement for two years of service mandatory.

Other authorities disagreed with Mr. Patterson in his criticism of the present basic U. M. T. legislation, not because it was the legislation they wanted and not because they felt it was ideal legislation, but solely on the basis that half a loaf was better than none.

ARMY WILL TRAIN 190,000 RESERVISTS

Continued From Page 1

military experience are expected to serve a tour of duty averaging thirty days with an active Army training division. Also, 15,000 officers of the so-called Volunteer Reserve are scheduled to receive fifteen days of training in the field or at schools.

The Army authorized the Organized Reserve Corps to call 10,450 officers and enlisted men from units of the troop program for an additional four days to enable them to prepare for the field training before the main body of Reservists arrived at the camps.

The Army said that it did not yet know how many camps would be involved in the expanded training program. Last year, 151 were used. Neither did the Army have any word on plans for the summer training of college members of the Reserve Officers Training Corps.

The Army also said that it planned training for 2,677 officers and 2,805 enlisted men who were at service schools (schools operated by branches of the Army, such as infantry, artillery and armor), and for 6,774 officers and 1,954 enlisted men who were students at Army area schools (schools operated by the Organized Reserve Corps itself within Army areas).

Defense Award for Skouras

The first "merit flag" for outstanding contribution to civil defense recruiting here was presented yesterday to George P. Skouras, president of the Skouras Theatres Corporation and the United Artists Theatre Circuit, at a ceremony in his office at 233 West Forty-ninth Street. Robert W. Dowling, chairman of the Manhattan recruiting office, presented the flag as Arthur W. Wallander, retiring City Director of Civil Defense, watched.

Open a Browning King
90-day Charge Account

Pay 1/3 in March,
1/3 in April,
1/3 in May



At Liberty Music Shops
In New York and White Plains

the magnificent new
20-Inch TV Table Model

by
M...

MEN!

Take advantage of our
February Sales with an
Extended Charge Account

AGGRESSORS LUNGE INTO GOUVERNEUR

Forces in Mock War Maintain Bridgeheads Established Along Highway 11

By KALMAN SEIGEL
Special to The New York Times.

CAMP DRUM, N. Y., Feb. 13—Aggressor enemy forces continued their powerful attacks, taking Gouverneur in the early dawn, as the joint Army-Air Force cold-weather maneuver, called Exercise Snowfall, reached a crucial phase today.

The Aggressor forces scored gains of four to six miles along Highway 11 after securing bridgeheads established earlier in the night.

A strong thrust south of Highway 11 forced continued withdrawal of elements of the Third Armored Cavalry of the United States Defender Forces. Reinforcing elements from the Eleventh Airborne Division were used as a covering force for this withdrawal.

This morning the covering force was isolated by surrounding Aggressor forces south of Spragueville. It included elements of the Seventy-first and Seventy-sixth Tank Battalions of the Eleventh Airborne.

Strafed by low-flying enemy fighters, the isolated units formed a perimeter defense on high terrain from which they successfully repulsed enemy attempts to take the hilltop.

The State of the War

The over-all situation was this: United States Defender Forces had been forced back to their main line of resistance. This line runs from Theresa, across Highway 26 to Antwerp, thence south of East Antwerp through Alpina to the right boundary of the maneuver area.

They maintained an outpost line for delaying purposes from Highway 26 opposite Hyde Lake, running east across Highway 11 south of Spragueville, running southeast of Kellogg Corners to the right maneuver boundary.

Aggressor forces had succeeded in isolating a United States tank battalion just south of Spragueville.

The main attack was along the axis of Highway 11. The secondary thrust was to the south in westerly direction with the axis through Sylvia Lake.

Tanker Gets Intense

Umpires, watching the battle, tagged dead and wounded. Blank cartridge tank fire and heavy mortar fire echoed over the hill in near-zero weather as the tankers jockeyed for the best defensive positions. Simulated wounded were taken to a field hospital station and there awaited treatment.

Two Aggressor tanks, one of them a foolhardy roller, were in the middle of the perimeter. Defender tanks roared down with guns belching round after round of ammunition. Both were knocked out.

One tanker, standing tall in his turret, seemed to be enjoying the mock war around him. His driver, seriously intent, yelled:

"Get the hell out of there before you get us all killed!"

At midnight the isolated elements still held the perimeter defense south of Spragueville. The balance of the division was depending on its organized position along the general line Theresa-Antwerp-Indian Lake, with the Third Armored Cavalry providing flank security.

There is no doubt that the troops

New Chairman of Group To Aid Women Prisoners



The New York Times
Miss Henrietta Additon

Institutions for women and girls should have women as superintendents, according to a resolution the National Conference of Superintendents of Women's and Girls' Correctional Institutions adopted yesterday in closing its twenty-third annual meeting, held at the Governor Clinton Hotel. Forty-five women from this country and Canada attended.

Miss Henrietta Additon, superintendent of Westfield State Farms, was elected chairman.

The resolution said that "it is destructive to the work of rehabilitation for girls and women in correctional institutions to depart from the policy of appointing women superintendents" and that there was danger that this policy was being ignored by appointing authorities in certain areas.

Another resolution recommended closer cooperation between releasing and placing authorities and the institution staff, to produce a continuing method of treatment.

that are taking part in the maneuver have been conditioned for severe winter warfare, Lieut. Gen. Willis D. Crittenger, Commanding General of the First Army and Director of Exercise Snowfall, said today.

In a progress report on the success of the maneuver General Crittenger said he was satisfied with the performance after a month.

Defense Coordinator Named

WASHINGTON, Feb. 13 (UP)—The American Red Cross today announced the appointment of Clarence F. Rowland of Cheverly, Md., as civil defense coordinator, to maintain liaison between the relief agency and the Federal Civil Defense Administration. With the Red Cross since 1917, Mr. Rowland has been Assistant National Director of Disaster Services since 1946. He formerly served with the Red Cross in Siberia, South Russia, Turkey and Armenia and in the Midwest and South.

EUROPEAN ARSENALS EXPAND, TRUMAN SAYS

WASHINGTON, Feb. 13 (AP)—Western Europe's arsenals, in which the United States has invested millions of dollars for mutual defense, are about to quadruple the value of their contributions, President Truman told Congress today.

For reasons of military security the President did not give precise figures in making his fourth semi-annual report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

But he stated that "it may be said that the estimated total value of Western European production of military hard-goods during 1952 will be approximately four times the 1949 value." The Mutual Defense program has been in existence for two years.

Modern military weapons and supplies are moving overseas in an increasing stream, the President reported. For the period of the report—April 1 to Oct. 9,

1951—these shipments totaled \$1,439,000,000.

Among the military items which Mr. Truman said are now being produced in "significant quantity" by Allied countries in Europe are military vehicles, machine guns, mines, rockets and other ammunition. He also mentioned such heavy items as planes, tanks and warships.

Without giving the number of effective combat divisions now under the command of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, the report said that "it is not yet adequate, to be sure, but Western Europe is no longer the military vacuum it was in 1949."

Catholic Group to Seek \$950,000

A quota of \$950,000 in behalf of the 1952 appeal of the New York Catholic Charities was announced last night at an organization meeting of the special gifts committee of the Cardinal's Committee of the Laity. The meeting was held in the Empire State Club, Empire State Building. John J. Coleman, executive chairman, presided.

AVALANCHE TOLL 75; MORE SNOW IN EUROPE

ZURICH, Switzerland, Feb. 13 (UP)—New snow avalanches thundered down Alpine mountainsides in Switzerland and the Austrian Tyrol today, boosting the winter's accident death toll to seventy-five. Fresh snows throughout the area threatened more avalanches.

Two more skiers were killed. Germany is experiencing its heaviest snowfall in thirty years. Roads throughout many areas of western Europe are impassable. Mail deliveries have been delayed.

A second avalanche roared down the Brienzerthorm Mountain in Austria, destroying all buildings on the slope, including a number of chalets built in 1663, which never previously had been damaged by snowslides.

The death toll in the avalanche

which buried a tiny ski resort near Melkoede Monday rose to twenty today with the death of a German skier who was injured in the snowslide.

Snow fell for the tenth straight day in the Alpine areas of Switzerland, Austria, Germany, France and Italy. In France, record snows piled up in the Puy de Dome region, collapsing roofs and isolating several villages.

Myers Is Re-elected a Regent

ALBANY, Feb. 13 (AP)—The Legislature today formally re-elected Chancellor John P. Myers of Plattsburg to a thirteen-year term on the Board of Regents, governing body of education in this state. The unanimous action came at a traditional joint meeting of the Senate and Assembly. Mr. Myers' new term will start April 1. He was elected a Regent in 1944, and became vice chancellor three years later. He was elected chancellor by the board on Jan. 1, 1951.

Student, Staked at Brown, Stakes Others to \$1,275


SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES.
PROVIDENCE, Feb. 13—Brown University officials, harassed by budget problems, had something to cheer about today.

An undergraduate walked into the administration building and offered to repay \$1,275 he had received in scholarship funds over the last three years. Recently the unexpected heir of a substantial amount of money, the student felt that the university's past generosity should be repaid with interest.

"I could not have come to Brown without this help and now that I do not need it any more I want someone else to have the chance," he said.

The money will become immediately available for other scholarship grants. The undergraduate, an honor student prominent in campus activities, did not want his name revealed.

you too can play the
HAMMOND
CHORD ORGAN
in 30 minutes



Come in today and be convinced.

Knabe For 26 years, official piano of the Metropolitan Opera, 5th Avenue Headquarters for complete Hammond Organ selection
584 Fifth Ave., bet. 47th and 48th Sts. • Plaza 7-1900
OPEN THURSDAY EVENINGS UNTIL 9 P.M., SATURDAYS UNTIL 6 P.M.

DE SOTO FIRE DOME ON DISPLAY TODAY!



THERE'S A REASON WHY...

'ATOM SHELL' FIRED AT TROOPS UPSTATE

Fourth of Regiment Destroyed, Camp Drum Empire Rules in First Such Field Test

By KALMAN SEIGEL

Special to The New York Times.
CAMP DRUM, N. Y., Feb. 14—The "aggressor" enemy brought into play a new and lethal weapon today—a simulated artillery shell with an atomic warhead—and inflicted heavy damage on the 511th Airborne Regiment of the "United States forces" in maneuvers in the field.

The simulated atomic artillery shell was fired just before noon in the vicinity of Hall's Corners, four miles west of Antwerp, in support of an aggressor ground attack. The use of the simulated weapon was watched with high interest by Lieut. Gen. Willis D. Crittenger, Commanding General of the First Army and director of Exercise Snowfall, the joint Army-Air Force cold-weather war games now under way near here, and by other high officials and unit commanders.

The test gave the military an indication of what might happen if an atomic missile were fired into the midst of a fighting regiment. An early evaluation of the casualties and equipment damage indicated the destruction of about one-fourth of the regiment.

On the basis of umpire reports, General Crittenger announced that "the damage in this instance is assessed to be sufficient to cause a serious modification of plans for the employment of the troops in this area."

Big Factor Was Surprise

Early umpire reports indicated complete destruction of a battalion headquarters, a company and a complete battery, and partial damage to three other companies. One factor that made for the heavy "casualties," the umpires reported, was surprise.

The simulation was achieved by joining the effects of a flash bomb dropped from a B-26 bomber, a charge of T. N. T. set off on the ground and smoke streaming from three F-51 fighters. Air bursts of atom charges normally leave little residual radioactivity, and while simulated attempts to measure "radioactivity" were made, no estimates were disclosed.

The atomic "shell burst" had a threefold effect: its blast killed men and damaged equipment; its heat produced personnel casualties or caused fires in equipment; and instantaneous radiation produced rays of high and deadly intensity.

General Crittenger pointed out that since this was the first time a simulated nuclear weapon had been used in mass man-

euvers, the steps leading up to its use had been carefully and deliberately followed. Here is how it was brought into play:

Just after midnight last night an aggressor patrol captured a United States soldier with a map of the defender's troop positions. The map was carefully studied by aggressor intelligence and passed through the various levels to the aggressor commander, Brig. Gen. William Ennis.

A "Lucrative Atomic Target"

He decided early in the morning that the concentration of United States troops in a spot four miles west of Antwerp would make "a lucrative atomic target." He called for aerial reconnaissance at day-break and after studying the photos ordered visual air reconnaissance to confirm what the photos had shown. After the second check he ordered the atomic attack.

"Had we been more experienced,"

The U. M. T. Issue—II

Many Assert That Implementing Program in Present Form Would Impair Defense

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The proposed Universal Military Training plan, now under discussion in Congress, is believed by many leaders to be a definite handicap to national defense.

The view that the present law, which Congress is now trying to implement, is an entering wedge, a start from which a better law may grow later, is one that is endorsed officially by the Pentagon, but there are some in high places who do not agree with this view.

The basic U. M. T. legislation, and the implementing measures now being discussed by Congress, provide for six months' training—not for all, but for all 18-year-olds reasonably physically fit—to be started when the President or Congress decides.

The training, however, would be in a separate "National Security Training Corps," not a part of the armed forces.

The training would be military but would be supervised by a civilian commission and would be rounded with various limitations and attempted safeguards, which would make old-time top sergeants turn over in their graves, and which actually have no valid place in any military training for adults.

The National Security Training Commission, for instance, reported to Congress—undoubtedly as a sop to what it thinks is public opinion—that:

"We believe that no 3.2 beer should be sold in a U. M. T. camp or training area. We would expect the PX's, ship stores and trainee clubs within the U. M. T. area to provide adequate soft drinks, fruit juices, ice cream, and a wholesome atmosphere."

Limitations in Program

The trainees in the corps would have different pay and would be subject to laws and regulations separate from, but similar to, those governing the regular services, a feature that would certainly encourage separatism and discourage morale. Training would be limited to this country; the youths would not be liable for service overseas, and our regular forces would not be strengthened but weakened, because of additional turnover and the necessity of providing training cadres for the trainees in the National Security Training Corps.

There are many within the military service who have grave misgivings about the present legislation and are anxious to see any attempt to implement it deferred, at least for the duration of the present emergency. Some of these critics are men high in both civilian and military posts in Wash-

Draft Rule Drawn to Put War Objectors to Work

By The United Press.
WASHINGTON, Feb. 14—

Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Selective Service Director, has drawn up regulations setting forth the kind of work about 8,000 conscientious objectors must perform if they want to stay out of the armed forces.

In a publication sent to local draft boards, Selective Service headquarters said that the men would be limited to employment by the Federal Government, by a state agency or by a nonprofit organization engaged primarily in nonprofit work benefiting the public.

Under the draft law passed last year, men opposed to military service are permitted to perform twenty-four months of work contributing to "the national health, safety or interest" in lieu of induction.

Thus far, no regulations have been issued to carry out this section of the law, and objectors have not been required to do any special type of work. But

ington but most of them, following the "party line" of policy, will not speak out publicly.

Maj. Gen. John S. Wood, U. S. A., retired, a distinguished tank commander in World War II, is one exception however. He has informed Congress that "from the standpoint of national security—which should be the only basis of consideration—U. M. T. as now planned will cost enormous sums of money without providing any security whatever or in any way deterring possible aggressors."

"On the other hand," he added, "the continuation of the draft, or a requirement of universal military service for eighteen months to two years * * * seems inevitable for a long period ahead."

"Luxury We Can't Afford"

One military official on a high echelon told this writer recently that "as long as we have limited funds, U. M. T. is a luxury we can't afford."

"You don't stockpile," he said, "a guy you can teach on the production line in thirty to 120 days."

The human "stockpiling" he mentioned referred to the provision in the U. M. T. law that requires all trainees after completion of six months of training to serve for seven and one-half years in reserve components, thus building up a large mass of semi-trained manpower. This authority, he felt, as many others do, that such a policy would do nothing to increase our military "readiness," and might well impair it. The real problem of mobilization is not, and never has been, the training of large masses of military manpower, but the manufacture of arms and equipment and the organization of units.

The same man foresaw the emergence of three major problems that would greatly complicate the already enormous problems of the armed forces if U. M. T. were started during the present emergency, to run concurrently—if even on a small scale—with the draft.

These were the funding problem (money); the deferment problem—how to pick some boys for six months' training and others for two years' service; and the personnel problem, i. e., the rapid exhaustion (which is a problem regardless of whether or not U. M. T. is implemented) of presently available military manpower in the 18-to-26 age bracket.

All these objections are so cogent and so serious that Congress should give far more care to its consideration of implementing measures for U. M. T. than it has yet given.

JERUSALEM'S MAYOR WILL VISIT THIS CITY

Special to The New York Times.
TEL AVIV, Israel, Feb. 14—

Mayor Shlomo Z. Shagai of Jerusalem will visit New York next month and will receive a City Hall reception on March 6. He said today he had received a cable from Mayor Impellitteri saying he wished to reciprocate the hospitality he had received from the Jerusalem municipality during his visit to Israel last year. Mayor Shragai said he would invite Jewish organizations and communities in the United States to participate in the celebration of the 3,000th anniversary of the founding of the Kingdom of David in Jerusalem. The celebrations will begin in October and continue a year. The Jerusalem executive also said he would take to New York plans for development and investment in Jerusalem.

While in New York, Mayor Shragai will attend a conference on March 13 marking the thirtieth

anniversary of the founding of the Kingdom of David in Jerusalem. The celebrations will begin in October and continue a year. The Jerusalem executive also said he would take to New York plans for development and investment in Jerusalem.

While in New York, Mayor Shragai will attend a conference on March 13 marking the thirtieth

anniversary of the founding of the Kingdom of David in Jerusalem. The celebrations will begin in October and continue a year. The Jerusalem executive also said he would take to New York plans for development and investment in Jerusalem.

U. M. T. IS ENDORSED BY HEAD OF LEGION

National Commander Tells Senate Armed Services Committee His Views

WASHINGTON, Feb. 14 (AP)—The National Commander of the American Legion endorsed Universal Military Training today, but said the cost of the program as outlined to Congress was "unreasonably excessive."

"One sure way of killing any Universal Military Training program is to make its cost so burdensome that the people and the Congress will not support it," Donald R. Wilson, the Legion head, told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Mr. Wilson challenged official Pentagon estimates that the first year of U. M. T. training for 800,000 18-year-olds might cost \$4,000,000,000, with the annual cost running to \$2,000,000,000 thereafter.

Strong opposition to U. M. T. came from spokesmen for the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Presbyterian Church, the Friends Committee on National Legislation, and the Socialist party.

Some argued that the program would be an expensive experiment in which the military training would be wasted. Others urged world disarmament as offering a better chance for world peace.

Clarence Mitchell, Director of the Washington Bureau of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, urged the committee to include in any bill it recommends a ban on racial segregation in U. M. T. camps.

Mr. Mitchell told the Senators that "at least two of the candidates running apparently would not carry out the program of the present Administration on eliminating segregation in the armed services, if we are to judge them by their past records. * * *

"Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, who is seeking the Democratic nomination, actually voted to support segregation when this issue was before the United States Senate on June 21, 1950."

Mr. Mitchell said that Mr. Kefauver, during Senate consideration of draft legislation, had voted for a proposal to allow an inductee to choose whether he wanted to serve in a unit comprised of members of his own race.

George Willison, a member of Mr. Kefauver's office staff, read a reply. In it the Senator said that "one of the chief desires and aims of my entire life has been to better race relations."

RUSSIANS AND CZECHS BUYING TIBETAN WOOL

Special to The New York Times.
KALIMPONG, India, Feb. 14—

The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have entered the recent decision of American importers not to accept any shipment of Tibetan wool after Feb. 29.

The Russians have come into the field at a time when the Tibetan wool trade was almost on the verge of going "out of business" because of a large accumulation of stocks in this border town without buyers.

According to shipping circles here, the United States Government's policy of enforcing a rigid economic blockade on China now includes Tibet also, and consequently American buyers announced last week that Feb. 29 was the deadline for the shipment of Tibetan wool from Indian ports.

This has left Kalimpong shippers with nearly 4,000,000 pounds of wool, which they declare will be impossible to ship within such a short time. Furthermore, the prospect of the future absence of the American market that took nearly 70 per cent of the 8,000,000

CONSIDERS U. S. BIDS



The New York Times
Sir Frank Whittle

BRITISH JET PIONEER CONFIRMS U. S. OFFER

Special to The New York Times.

LONDON, Feb. 14—Sir Frank Whittle, who designed the first British jet aircraft engine and flew the first experimental plane nearly eleven years ago, may take a job in the United States because he is dissatisfied with the present trend of jet development in Britain.

He confirmed today that he had been approached by a large American corporation with an invitation to carry out research in the whole field of power production by gas turbines.

Sir Frank, who is at present honorary adviser on jet development to the British Overseas Airways Corporation and a consultant at the Ministry of Supply, said he would probably discuss the offer on a visit to the United States in about a month. He declined to reveal the name of the corporation.

His interest is in types of jet work that he feels are being neglected in Britain, notably the centrifugal jet as distinguished from the axial type.

It would be better to have work done in the United States or in the Commonwealth than neglected altogether, he declared.

Sir Frank, only 44 years of age, retired from the Royal Air Force after World War II with the rank of air commodore. While he was a regular pilot, Sir Frank's inventive talent resulted in his being sent to Cambridge and then assigned to research work, for which he set up his own company.

He voluntarily gave all patents, and eventually the company itself, to the Government, which, in turn, gave him £100,000, tax-free, in 1948.

AFRICAN ASSEMBLY SET

Special to The New York Times.
COLUMBUS, Ohio, Feb. 14—

A North American Assembly on African Affairs will be held June 16-25 at Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio, Dr. Emory Ross of New York announced tonight.

Dr. Ross, Executive Secretary of the African Committee of the Division of Foreign Missions of the National Council of Churches of Christ in America, made his announcement before the Missionary Education and Directors sections of the Foreign Missions Division.

More than 300 delegates, representing forty Protestant denominations will be present at the assembly. They will represent colonial powers in Europe, self-governing Governments in Africa, the United States, the United Nations and United States industry, philanthropic groups and education.

Dr. Harold Fey, managing editor of The Christian Century, told

SERVICES TO UNIFY BUYING OF CLOTHES

House Inquiry Is Told Agency Will Save Millions—Merger of Catalogue Lists Pledged

WASHINGTON, Feb. 14 (UP)—The Army, Navy and Air Force have agreed to buy their uniforms, shoes, sheets and other textiles and clothing through a single buying agency in a move to save millions of dollars of the taxpayers' money.

At the same time an admiral promised that he would standardize all military buying and cut down the thousands of different listings of many items in another action to reduce waste.

The officer, Rear Admiral J. W. Fowler, was promptly termed a "potential knight in shining armor" by Representative F. Edward Hébert, Democrat of Louisiana, chairman of a House subcommittee investigating military waste.

The decision on clothing purchases was announced today by John D. Small, chairman of the Munitions Board. It still must be approved by Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense, but this is considered almost certain.

Mr. Small said only that the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force had agreed on a plan for coordinated purchase of clothing. He called the action a "major step forward" in military efforts to trim costs of these items and said it "cannot help but save money." He declined to estimate how much.

Covers Nearly All Items

He also declined to give other details pending Mr. Lovett's approval. But from other sources it was learned that the plan calls for a single buying agency to be known as "the Armed Services Textile, Clothing and Footwear Procurement Committee."

The Congressional committee was told yesterday that the plan provided for all clothing purchases to be made by a single office, not for all the services to draw their clothing from a single pool. The aim is to prevent situations where the Army pays \$24 for a pair of combat boots while the Marine Corps pays \$16 for the same thing.

Military officials said the three services had been collaborating on some of their clothing and textile buying since 1945 but that the new agency would tie them together for nearly all purchases.

The new agency would not, however, handle the buying of "duck and webbing" material for tents, tarpaulins, gun covers, web belts and similar items—which are now bought for all three services by the Army.

No Phantom, But a Knight

The House committee, gratified by the plan for the single clothing agency, is still looking for what Mr. Hébert has dubbed the "phantom" of the Pentagon—the person or persons who held up the plan from the time it was approved at the "field" level last August until now.

But today the committee was

more pleased over the testimony of Admiral Fowler, who said he knew he had the job of setting up a single catalogue for all military items, that he had the power to do it and would use the power. "Like a fresh breeze into a smoke-filled room," declared Mr. Hébert, who earlier had accused defense officials of "proclaiming their virtue" while living "in the sin of waste."

"We haven't found the phantom of the Pentagon, but at least we have a potential knight in shining armor," he added. But he quickly warned that unless Admiral Fowler did what he had promised, the subcommittee "will want no part of you."

Admiral Fowler, who is retired from the Navy and now is a San Francisco consulting engineer, is head of the Munitions Board cataloguing agency. His job is to boil down some fifteen military purchasing catalogs into one and to standardize items of equipment.

He refused to predict when his job would be finished, but promised that by July 1 the standardization of spare parts for certain internal combustion engines would become mandatory. He said this would reduce from 1,187 to sixty the different types of spare items that a destroyer must carry for her auxiliary engine.

He also promised that the 2,000 applied to Hawaii, he added.

different lumber items now procured by the military eventually would be reduced to the minimum possible. He will be "disappointed" if the cut does not mount to 50 per cent.

Blankets and shoes also will be standardized, with certain possible exceptions, he added.

STATEHOOD BILLS URGED

Truman Renews His Support for Alaska and Hawaii

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 14—Renewed support for the granting of statehood to Alaska and Hawaii was voiced today by President Truman as the Senate continued consideration of the Alaska statehood measure.

Mr. Truman was asked at his news conference if he would support a bill granting the people of Alaska the right to elect their own Governor in the event the territory was not admitted to the union.

He said that he would, if necessary, but he still believed statehood would be voted for Alaska because that was what its people ought to have. The same answer he also promised that the 2,000 applied to Hawaii, he added.

AMERICAN
BRITISH
Imported TRENCHCOATS
by Aquascutum

The all-purpose coat for military or civilian wear. Smart looking, exclusively designed of finest imported fabrics. And as for value—just try to top it.

Egyptian Cotton Poplins and Gabardines, Sefflined or Plaidlined. \$50 and \$55

In Wool Gabardines; also in water repellent West of England Worsted in a variety of Plaid and Check patterns. \$95

Detachable All-Wool Warmer with sleeves. 19.50



British American
RAINCOAT COMPANY, 200 FIFTH AVE., at 23rd Street

Next To
All Theatres

BROADWAY
COCKTAIL LOUNGE

Informal and intimate. Dancing from 5:30 P.M., daily except Monday. No cover charge or minimum check.

ALAN HOLMES
and his Orchestra

Hotel Astor

TIMES SQUARE
R. K. Christenberry, President

APOLOGY!
TO THOUSANDS OF CUSTOMERS WHO
STORMED OUR STORE AND WHO COULD

Early umpire reports indicated complete destruction of a battalion headquarters, a company and a complete battery, and partial damage to three other companies. One factor that made for the heavy "casualties" the umpires reported, was surprise.

The simulation was achieved by joining the effects of a flash bomb dropped from a B-26 bomber, a charge of T. N. T. set off on the ground and smoke streaming from three F-51 fighters. Air bursts of atom charges normally leave little residual radioactivity, and while simulated attempts to measure "radioactivity" were made, no estimates were disclosed.

The atomic "shell burst" had a threefold effect: its blast killed men and damaged equipment; its heat produced personnel casualties or caused fires in equipment; and instantaneous radiation produced rays of high and deadly intensity.

General Crittenger pointed out that since this was the first time a simulated nuclear weapon was used in a mass maneuver, the steps leading up to its use had been carefully and deliberately followed. Here is how it was brought into play:

Just after midnight last night an aggressor patrol captured a United States soldier with a map of the defender's troop positions. The map was carefully studied by aggressor intelligence and passed through the various levels to the aggressor commander, Brig. Gen. William Ennis.

A "Lucrative Atomic Target"

He decided early in the morning that the concentration of United States troops in a spot four miles west of Antwerp would make "a lucrative atomic target." He called for aerial reconnaissance at daybreak and after studying the photos ordered visual air reconnaissance to confirm what the photos had shown. After the second check he ordered the atomic attack.

"Had we been more experienced," General Crittenger said, "we would have been satisfied with only the daybreak reconnaissance and the artillery could have been used earlier in the day. Because this was the first time, we thought it better to go through the extra steps."

One of the nation's top officials responsible for recommending new weapons and their uses acted as an observer at today's experiment. He is Lieut. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes, head of the Weapons Systems Evaluations Group of the Department of Defense.

"You are pioneering with a weapon so new and so costly," General Keyes commented, "that you can't fire it as a pistol. We have to go through the steps as outlined by General Crittenger. Experience will shorten this up."

Despite the enemy's atomic attack, the United States forces later in the day mounted a powerful counter-offensive along the main battle line, scoring a breakthrough on Highway 11 just north of Antwerp.

Elsewhere defender forces were also on the offensive after falling back for four days, and a defender column drove through a circular aggressor line to relieve a trapped tank battalion just south of Spragueville.

DUTCH SIFT TARIFF ACTION

May Abrogate Concessions to U. S. as Reprisal Step

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
THE HAGUE, the Netherlands, Feb. 14—The Netherlands Government is considering a proposal to abrogate certain tariff concessions to the United States at the tariff and trade conferences to be held next June, it was announced today by Johannes R. M. van den Brink, Minister of Economic Affairs.

The minister said it would first be necessary to consult Belgium and Luxembourg who are joint signatories with the Netherlands to the General Tariff Agreement.

The Netherlands delegation was already prepared at the Geneva tariff conference to propose the withdrawal of concessions from the United States in reprisal for American restrictions on cheese imports but deferred action on the State Department's promise to seek repeal of the import curb. The retaliation move was revived when the repeal action was lost in the United States Senate recently.

subject to laws and regulations separate from, but similar to, those governing the regular services, a feature that would certainly encourage separatism and discourage morale. Training would be limited to this country; the youths would not be liable for service overseas, and our regular forces would not be strengthened but weakened, because of additional turnover and the necessity of providing training cadres for the trainees in the National Security Training Corps.

There are many within the military service who have grave misgivings about the present legislation and are anxious to see any attempt to implement it deferred, at least for the duration of the present emergency. Some of these critics are men high in both civilian and military posts in Wash-

Draft Rule Drawn to Put War Objectors to Work

By The United Press.
WASHINGTON, Feb. 14

Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Selective Service Director, has drawn up regulations setting forth the kind of work about 8,000 conscientious objectors must perform if they want to stay out of the armed forces.

In a publication sent to local draft boards, Selective Service headquarters said that the men would be limited to employment by the Federal Government, by a state agency or by a nonprofit organization engaged primarily in nonprofit work benefiting the public.

Under the draft law passed last year, men opposed to military service are permitted to perform twenty-four months of work contributing to "the national health, safety or interest" in lieu of duty.

Thus far, no regulations have been issued to carry out this section of the law, and objectors have not been required to do any special type of work. But Selective Service notified the boards that the necessary regulations "are in the final stages of preparation and will probably be released in the near future."

The proposed regulations would let objectors receive standard wages paid for the type of work they perform.

LIFE OF JINNAH DROPPED

Bolitho Abandons Biography of Founder of Pakistan

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
KARACHI, Pakistan, Feb. 14—Hector Bolitho, New Zealand-born biographer, has given up an attempt to write a biography of Mohammed Ali Jinnah.

Commissioned by the Government to do a life of the founder of Pakistan, Mr. Bolitho arrived here early in January. It is understood, however, that the material necessary for his research has not been made readily available to him. Miss Fatima Jinnah, the statesman's sister and heir and a former dentist, has announced that she intends to write a biography herself.

Immediately before Mr. Bolitho's arrival a split of opinion on the propriety of having the book done by a foreigner developed within the Government and in the press.

What a SCOTCH!



White Horse... of course!

Also Available in 4/5th Pints
Blended Scotch Whisky 86.8 Proof
Brown-Vintners Co., Inc., New York
Sole Distributors

would greatly complicate the already enormous problems of the armed forces if U. M. T. were started during the present emergency, to run concurrently—if even on a small scale—with the draft.

These were the funding problem (money); the deferment problem—how to pick some boys for six months' training and others for two years' service; and the personnel problem, i. e., the rapid exhaustion (which is a problem regardless of whether or not U. M. T. is implemented) of presently available military manpower in the 18-to-26 age bracket.

All these objections are so cogent and so serious that Congress should give far more care to its consideration of implementing measures for U. M. T. than it has yet given.

JERUSALEM'S MAYOR WILL VISIT THIS CITY

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
TEL AVIV, Israel, Feb. 14

Mayor Shlomo Z. Shagal of Jerusalem will visit New York next month and will receive a City Hall reception on March 6. He said today he had received a cable from Mayor Impellitteri saying he wished to reciprocate the hospitality he had received from the Jerusalem municipality during his visit to Israel last year.

Mayor Shragai said he would invite Jewish organizations and communities in the United States to participate in the celebration of the 3,000th anniversary of the founding of the Kingdom of David in Jerusalem. The celebrations will begin in October and continue a year. The Jerusalem executive also said he would take to New York plans for development and investment in Jerusalem.

While in New York, Mayor Shragai will attend a conference on March 13 marking the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of Hapoel Hamizrachi (religious workers) organization in the United States. The Jerusalem mayor is a member of that party.

having segregation in the armed services, if we are to judge them by their past records. * * *

"Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, who is seeking the Democratic nomination, actually voted to support segregation when this issue was before the United States Senate on June 21, 1950."

Mr. Mitchell said that Mr. Kefauver, during Senate consideration of draft legislation, had voted for a proposal to allow an inductee to choose whether he wanted to serve in a unit comprised of members of his own race.

George Willison, a member of Mr. Kefauver's office staff, read a reply. In it the Senator said that "one of the chief desires and aims of my entire life has been to better race relations."

RUSSIANS AND CZECHS BUYING TIBETAN WOOL

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
KALIMPONG, India, Feb. 14

The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have entered the Tibetan wool market following the recent decision of American importers not to accept any shipment of Tibetan wool after Feb. 29.

The Russians have come into the field at a time when the Tibetan wool trade was almost on the verge of going "out of business" because of a large accumulation of stocks in this border town without buyers.

According to shipping circles here, the United States Government's policy of enforcing a rigid economic blockade on China now includes Tibet also, and consequently American buyers announced last week that Feb. 29 was the deadline for the shipment of Tibetan wool from Indian ports.

This has left Kalimpong shippers with nearly 4,000,000 pounds of wool, which they declare will be impossible to ship within such a short time. Furthermore, the prospect of the future absence of the American market that took nearly 70 per cent of the 8,000,000 pounds of wool that came into India from Tibet annually had produced an intense scare in local markets and wool was beginning to slump heavily.

would probably discuss the details pending approval. But from other sources it was learned that the plan calls for a single buying agency to be known as "The Armed Services Textile, Clothing and Footwear Procurement Committee."

The Congressional committee was told yesterday that the plan provided for all clothing purchases to be made by a single office, not for all the services to draw their clothing from a single pool. The aim is to prevent situations where the Army pays \$24 for a pair of combat boots while the Marine Corps pays \$16 for the same thing.

Military officials said the three services had been collaborating on some of their clothing and textile buying since 1945 but that the new agency would tie them together for nearly all purchases. The new agency would not, however, handle the buying of "duck and webbing" material for tents, tarpaulins, gun covers, web belts and similar items—which are now bought for all three services by the Army.

No Phantom, But a Knight
The House committee, gratified by the plan for the single clothing agency, is still looking for what Mr. Hébert has dubbed the "phantom" of the Pentagon—the person or persons who held up the plan from the time it was approved at the "field" level last August until now.

But today the committee was

300 Delegates to Attend Ohio College Session in June

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
COLUMBUS, Ohio, Feb. 14—A North American Assembly on African Affairs will be held June 16-25 at Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio, Dr. Emory Ross of New York announced tonight.

Dr. Ross, Executive Secretary of the African Committee of the Division of Foreign Missions of the National Council of Churches of Christ in America, made his announcement before the Missionary Education and directors sections of the Foreign Missions Division. More than 300 delegates, representing forty Protestant denominations will be present at the assembly. They will represent colonial powers in Europe, self-governing Governments in Africa, the United States, the United Nations and United States industry, philanthropic groups and education.

Dr. Harold Fey, managing editor of The Christian Century, told Protestant pastors and missionary education leaders the friendship of G. I. and native Christians in Korea would be important in defeating communism.

★ DUO-SPEED PENTRON TAPE RECORDER

NOW AT ALL 27 DAVEGA RADIO & TELEVISION STORES

★ DELETED OR ADD TO YOUR RECORDING WHILE PLAYING

★ Two recording speeds
★ Two playing speeds
★ Fast forward & rewind speeds
★ Finger's touch editing key
★ "Magic Eye" recording indicator
★ Crystal microphone
★ Microphone input jack
★ Radio input jack
★ Auxiliary speaker-amplifier jacks
★ Separate record & erase heads

It's all NEW—with two recording and playing speeds, and the amazing "Edit-Ear" Control that enables you to delete or add to your recording WHILE PLAYING... plus dozens of other features! Think of the exciting uses you can make of this great portable tape recorder... grand fun at parties. Smartly styled, rugged carrying case. So easy to own at Davega's low, low price and convenient terms.

Phone Orders & Information: Call BA 7-8757
Mr. Mollinger...er Write: Davega, 63 Cortlandt St., N.Y. 7

★ Stores Open Evenings

• Manhattan Downtown...63 Cortlandt St. Downtown...200 Broadway Near 13th St...331 Broadway Hotel Commodore 111 E. 42nd St. Empire State...16 W. 34th St.	• Madison St. Garden 255-8th Ave. 46th St...2365 Broadway • Harlem...125 W. 125th St. • BRONX • Fordham...31 E. Fordham Rd. 152nd St...2929 Third Ave. • BROOKLYN • Boro Hall...350 Fulton St. • Flatbush...324 Flatbush Ave.	• Kings Highway 130 • Bay Ridge...QUEEN • Jamaica...103-2 • Astoria...31 • Flushing...31 • Reg. Park...96 • LONG ISLAND • Hempstead...35 Main St.	• Kings Hwy. 106-5th Ave. • Jersey City...30 Journal Square • Paterson...181 Main St. • New Brunswick...373 George St. • Hackensack...325 Main St. • WESTCHESTER • White Plains...175 Main St. • Yonkers...27 Main St.
---	--	---	--

\$2.00 WEEKLY
Small Carrying Charge

DAVEGA

British American
RAINCOAT COMPANY, 200 FIFTH AVE., at 23rd Street

Next To All Theatres

BROADWAY COCKTAIL LOUNGE

Informal and Intimate. Dancing from 5:30 P.M., daily except Monday. No cover charge or minimum check.

ALAN HOLMES and his Orchestra

Hotel Astor
TIMES SQUARE
R. K. Christenberry, President

APOLOGY!

TO THOUSANDS OF CUSTOMERS WHO STORMED OUR STORE AND WHO COULD NOT GET WAITED ON... OUR SINCERE APOLOGY. NO ONE DREAMED OF SUCH CROWDS. NO ONE COULD POSSIBLY ACCOMMODATE THEM ALL AT ONCE. SHOP FRIDAY AND SATURDAY.

LOESER'S BROOKLYN GOING OUT OF BUSINESS SALE

OPEN FRIDAY, SATURDAY 10:30 TO 5:45!
SHOP EVERY DEPARTMENT. MORE SALES-PEOPLE. MORE STOCK. MORE BARGAINS.

Loeser's

SORRY NO MAIL, PHONE, COD ORDERS. SALE IS FOR CASH. SORRY NO CHARGES. CONVENIENT PAYMENTS ARRANGED ON FURNITURE, RUGS, APPLIANCES.

"Sale held pursuant to license No. 414857 of Department of Licenses granted the 13th day of February 1952"

AR7262

10/23

Box 30 - folder 4 JHE FRIED. vs PROGRAMS on HOLOCAUST + NUREMBERG TRIALS; 1949 - 1973 - 1976

JOHN H. E. FRIED
85 EAST 86 STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10028

TEL: 348-1498

March 24, 1976

Jack Wilder, M.D.
Associate Dean for Planning and Operations
Albert Einstein College of Medicine
Bassine Bldg. 1300 Morris Park Ave.
Bronx, NY. 10461

Holocaust Project

Dear Jack,

I have given quite a bit of thought to what we talked about the other evening. Let me summarize my proposals, and add some observations, as you suggested.

1. Since, as I gathered, not very much time will be available to the Symposium, if could be divided into two over-all topics :

A) LOOKING BACK (on the Catastrophe). What types of people were the nazi decision-makers, the specialists who organized and directed the enormous apparatus of oppression, persecution, and eventually systematic million-fold annihilation? What were their motivations, their rationalizations ?
*)

B) LOOKING FORWARD (beyond 1976). What conclusions for the future --conclusions perhaps on the "nature of man?"--are to be drawn from the still unfathomable occurrence of the Holocaust? (This topic includes the question: What psychological impact has that experience had on the 30-year period that has already elapsed since the end of Nazism?)

*)As you see, the entire, extremely complex topic of the psychology of the Jewish victims would only be inferentially treated. To treat it fully, would require more time. (Random example: The Jewish situation varied greatly at different periods and in different parts of Germany and nazi-occupied Europe. This makes generalizations very perilous.) Also, this is the most painful and controversial aspect. Above all, your project could make the biggest contribution by analyzing what is hardly ever discussed: the trauma, and that trauma's damage, the entire Hitler experience has caused to the post-Hitler period, and how that trauma could be overcome ? (See further on, in this letter.)

2. I frankly believe I could make a useful contribution by speaking during the first, historical, part of the symposium, because of my experiences at the 12 American trials at Nuremberg.

Let me say one word about those American trials. They followed the previous international (US-UK-France-USSR) Nuremberg trial, against Goering and 20 other Nazi leaders. The Goering case surveyed the entire panorama of nazø criminality, including of course the Holocaust, but concentrated on the biggest, or seminal crimes, the aggressions ("Crimes against Peace") which made all subsequent War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity possible. - The subsequent 12 American trials at Nuremberg, in turn, covered some 200 defendants, including industrialists (Krupp, IG Farben, etc.): field-marshals and generals; cabinet ministers and ambassadors; judges and prosecutors who committed judicial murders; etc. But they covered also, in much greater detail than the Goering Tribunal could, in trials each lasting for many months, what ^{can be called} the apparatus of destruction.

In order to stay within manageable limits, I would focus ^{at your Symposium} on three of those American Nuremberg cases:
**)

a) the case against the SS Fuehrers who ran Himmler's "Main Office" which was responsible for the establishment, organization, policies, and supervision of all concentration and extermination camps in all Nazi-

*) You may remember the Saphcer Tracy/Marlene Dietrich fictional-documentary film about this case, "JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG." Incidentally, I was Abby Mann's advisor on the script, and we changed it considerably.

**) My own position at Nuremberg was not with the Prosecution, but with the Judges. As their Special Legal Consultant I would, at their request, prepare legal opinions; analyze evidence; consult with the International Red Cross in Geneva, the U.N. War Crimes Commission in London, etc.; and the like. I had ample opportunity to observe the defendants in open Court, and by conducting, as Commissioner on behalf of the Tribunals, interrogations of defendants and others in the Nuremberg prison. In that capacity, I interrogated Albert Speer at Spandau, and also Hoess, the commander of Auschwitz, during his trial before the Polish People's Court at Warsaw, shortly before he was hanged at Auschwitz in sight of the main gas ovens. --I attach a letter about my work at Nuremberg by one of the Presiding Judges, written at the end of those trials.

dominated Europe. The orders concerning everything related to those camps, from food rations to punishment regulations to gassing equipment, came from that central office at Oranienburg near Berlin, and all reports from the camps, including death statistics, had to go there. (Hence, the awesome documentation that was available at Nuremberg!) It was called "Wirtschafts-Verwaltungs-Hauptamt" , translatable as "Central Office for the Management of SS Business Enterprises" because the camps were conceived or camouflaged as war production centers (where the inmates were often, as the official term was, "worked to death") and as contributors to the German Treasury *) (the victims' gold teeth and wedding rings were sent to the Reichsbank).

This Nuremberg case (known as WHA case) furnishes the most complete and authentic inside information about the Holocaust, insofar as the camps were the main places for the execution of the "Final Solution."

b) However, there were also other methods used for the "Final Solution." Two of these produced the largest number of victims, after the Auschwitz method. One was, to herd Jews into nazi-created ghettos (which one Nuremberg judgment calls vast prisons without prison wardens serving food) where the Jews were decimated by overwork, famine and sicknesses, until the survivors were killed off. - The other method , used especially in the Baltics, the Ukraine, the Crimea and elsewhere in the USSR, was to organize systematic man-hunts but then not to transport the victims to concentration camps but instead to kill them in mass executions on the spot. Those techniques were entrusted to special motorized SS formations of 500 - 800 men each, called Einsatzgruppen --literally, Units for Special Assignments.

Twenty-odd commanders and officers of such units were tried before

*) This WHA Central Office was of course in close cooperation with another of Himmler's Central Offices, GESTAPO-Jewish Section, where Eichmann played a leading role.

one of the American Tribunals at Nuremberg to which I was assigned, as Special Legal Consultant. I think I should cover this Einsatzgruppen case, too. Although the legal situation seemed "simple" (pre-meditated mass murder, uncontradictibly documented), the undertaking was so ghastly and the attempted justifications and exculpations by defendants so devious, that the Tribunal took months because, as its Judgment says, the facts

"are so beyond the experience of normal man and the range of man-made phenomena that only the most complete judicial inquiry, and the most exhaustive trial, could verify and confirm them...The charge.. reaches such fantastic proportions and surpasses such credible limits that believability must be bolstered with assurance a hundred times repeated."

With approx. one million men, women and children as victims (prevalently Jews, but also other nazi-proscribed categories: communist functionaries; doctors, teachers, agronomists and other members of the intelligentsia; gypsies; etc.), this was the second-biggest murder trial in history -- the biggest having been the Warsaw trial against Auschwitz commander Hoess.

The main difference between these Einsatzgruppen leaders and the above-mentioned WVHA leaders (which, I think, is interesting for any analysis of the Holocaust) is that the latter were "desk-murderers" who never touched a Jew but were conferring, and dictating letters, in comfortable offices, whereas the former personally enacted and supervised the indescribable and caused scenes in the field, which required some very different psychological reactions. It is also noteworthy that the massacres were actively assisted by German Army officers and units, and that among the 20-odd extermination leaders in the Nuremberg dock, were eight lawyers, a university professor, a dentist, an opera singer, an art expert, and a former priest.

c) Thirdly, I suggest, especially for your audience, to cover the famous "Medical Case," where the list of the defendants reads like a "Who is Who in German Medicine" and which has become known through Dr. Mitscherlich's book, Doctors of Infamy.

The two main topics in this case were: experiments on concentration camp inmates; and mass euthanasia killings of insane, feeble-minded, deformed, etc. German "Aryans." ("useless eaters")

The number of actual victims of the medical experiments ran "only" into the thousands, but the envisaged victims, specially of the sterilization and castration experiments, were to be millions.

The case illustrates especially two types of mentality: perverted professional ambition, to foster (real --or, as the Judgment found, often merely pretended) medical progress through cruel and often lethal experiments on humans; and abuse of medical research in a "We'll stop at nothing" mentality, to foster the obsession with mass extermination (Or what could be called the self-escalation of ~~ambition~~ an increasingly dehumanized fanaticism). Especially the sterilization and castration experiments were designed to make the Holocaust program even more efficient, by adding to the various killing techniques, the technique of delayed extinction. As one defendant, a non-physician, SS-Col. Brack in Hitler's Chancellery, put it in a memorandum to Himmler, sterilization and castration would preserve the working capacity of the 2-3 million men and women among Europe's 10 million Jews, but render them incapable of propagating.

However, in addition, these experiments were designed to extend the Holocaust program to non-Jews --perhaps starting with "imperceptible

sterilization of the three million Russian prisoners of war the Germans had captured during the first months of the Russian campaign. Karl Brandt, M.D., Hitler's personal physician, Reich Commissioner for Health and Sanitation, and head of the Office for Medical Science and Research in the Reich Research Council, stated in a Nuremberg affidavit (wishing to put the blame on Himmler, but with whom he constantly collaborated):

"Himmler was extremely interested in the development of a cheap and rapid sterilization method which could be used against enemies of Germany, such as the Russians, Poles, and Jews. One (sic!) hoped thereby not only to defeat the enemy but to exterminate him. The capacity for work of the sterilized persons could be exploited by Germany, while the danger of propagation would be eliminated. As this mass sterilization was part of Himmler's racial theory, particularly ly much time and care were devoted to these sterilization experiments." The aim was to find a method which would be not "too slow and too expensive" and which made the sterilization "not immediately noticeable." (Nbg doc. NO-440).

3. To summarize: Such Nuremberg-based presentation of the "Auschwitz" technique, as well as of the other main techniques, could give the factual background about the Holocaust, and the mentality of the perpetrators. As title for it, I suggest, simply

"The Final Solution of the Jewish Question."
(plus, perhaps, a sub-title to be agreed upon.)

4. Let me add that two core issues should be emphasized: The "Habituation - Escalation Syndrome"; and "The Problem of Obedience to Criminal Orders."

*) I am led by the idea that the enemy must not only be conquered but destroyed.... If, on the basis of this medicinal sterilization research, it were possible to produce a drug which, after a relatively short time, effects an imperceptible sterilization on human beings, we would have a new powerful weapon at our disposal. The thought alone that the 3 million Bolsheviks, at present German prisoners, could be sterilized so that they could be used as laborers but be prevented from reproduction, opens the most far-reaching perspectives." (Letter from defendant Adolf Pokorny, M.D., Skin and Venereal Disease Specialist, to Himmler, Oct. 1941. Nbg Doc. NO-035) Pokorny advocated especially experiments with the plant caladium seguinum from Brazil, and Himmler immediately ordered research also along this line.

A few words about them:

The Habituation-Escalation Syndrome is basic for the understanding of the Holocaust. It is true that many Holocaust studies deal only with the ultimate horror, what we can call the Auschwitz phases. That is a major mistake, factually and analytically. I strongly urge that your Symposium consider the Holocaust --the systematic extermination --in its perspective. It cannot be understood, unless it is seen as final culmination. The "final" solution of the Jewish Question was, indeed, the final phase of a process, lasting for many years (at least since Jan.1933), of indignities, discriminations, persecutions, atrocities, interspersed with periods of fake "stabilization", until it culminated in "Auschwitz." In fact, the Habituation - Escalation syndrome played a big role during, and is essential for the understanding of, the Auschwitz phase itself.

Similarly crucial is a proper understanding of the problem of Obedience to criminal orders. There is enormous confusion about it. To clarify it, would be an important result of the Symposium. Arguments like, "They had to obey orders"; "there must be discipline in the army"; "in a dictatorship, everybody who disobeyed would be killed", etc. have been the despair of many decent people, but the glee of the nazis whp, of course, know better.

Actually, the arguments get punctured if properly analyzed. I cannot go into the matter here, but only mention: the arguments (even if accepted!) do, of course, never exculpate the givers of the criminal orders --the top policy makers, and they, of course, caused everything that followed!! The arguments completely overlook the conflux, the identity of the attitudes of the givers and the recipients of the orders; they ate regularly offered without any protest that the obedience was dangerous.

without concrete proof that disobedience was as impossible or dangerous as the arguments proclaim; ^{*)} above all, they forget the fateful point that the top nazis were not so stupid as to entrust arch-crimes to non-congenial people ! but they always found a big supply of congenial people --from the chemists who produced the Auschwitz poison gas, to the General of the Wehrmacht who assigned ammunition and soldiers to the murderous Einsatzgruppen who pulled the shrieking women out of their huts -just as the Al Capone gang could become as efficient as they were, by obtaining the cooperation of judges, police, etc. Factually, analytically, and psychologically, the basic problem of organized mass criminality is precisely the infection of non-gangsters by gangsterism, and that the alleged difference between the givers and the recipients of criminal instructions is often non-existent, as they so often both become co-conspirators and collaborators.

To be sure, the "superior order" complex does pose some difficult problems, but that's why the above, and other points, require airing.

The two matters of the Habituation/Escalation syndrome, and the Duty to Obey problem are so important that, depending on the structure of the Symposium, and the time available, they could be presented as separate points on the agenda (topics for separate lectures or round-tables). In any case, if you invite me, I would emphasize these two matters.

**

*) Since the "I had to obey orders" argument was the principal defense at Nuremberg and all war crimes trials (e.g., Eichmann trial in Jerusalem) it was at greatest length discussed at all of those trials. It regularly collapsed because the defendants could hardly ever prove any actual examples where anything serious had happened to important people who did not want to become criminally involved. There is also the big problem of voluntary relinquishment of positions, of requests for transfers, etc. etc. On all this, the Nuremberg material contains a mass of information, and analysis.

5. I come to the second over-all topic -- the Impact of the Holocaust on the future. It could be titled, "CAN WE OVERCOME THE TRAUMA OF THE HITLER EXPERIENCE ?"

Only now, a generation later, do we see the continuation and consequences which those demoniac actions have caused to the post-Hitler world. Hence, the question which, I submit, a project like yours should pose, is: How will the world be able to free itself psychologically from that incubus? Unfathomably, those horrors have occurred; since then, Jews and non-Jews must live with the knowledge of Aushwitz. Calamities previously never considered, have become the basis of the calculus. Must this nightmare continue? Hitlerism's greatest guilt has been to bequeath a bacillus that has remained virulent: the world has become habituated to think in super-Auschwitzes.

The continuing damage can be seen, i.a., in the spread of pseudo-Darwinistic views about the "aggressive nature of man"; of fatalistic views about the "inevitability of wars"; and of the concomitant notion that the prohibition of war and of mass atrocities (all revulsion and treaties and U.N. Charters notwithstanding) has been a pipe-dream.

After the war, at the time of Nuremberg, nazi criminality was seen as abhorrent aberration. It would be considered ludicrous to see it as anything else; and, I submit, this conviction is not a matter for armchair philosophizing. Only the conviction that that dehumanization was a unique aberration, and that any repetition of Auschwitz in whatever form, not only must but can be prevented, might ^{give} the world ~~have~~ a chance to survive in the nuclear age. So, let us not deceive ourselves; doctrines about the basic badness of man and inevitability of wars with nothing barred,

in essence corrode the conviction that Hitlerism was an aberration, and come near to justifying it--not morally, of course, but ~~psycholog-~~ically or metaphysically, or anyway give a very pessimistic prognosis for the future of mankind.

I am not a psychologist, but in my long preoccupation with peace research and the phenomena of world politics, I have often been struck by the crudeness and ~~superficiality~~ superficiality of those pseudometaphysical doctrines. Above all, I am convinced that, fortunately, the very facts revealed in the nazis' own records, contradict those doctrines. The Hitler wars themselves, and the atrocities ~~perpetrated~~ perpetrated during them, were not caused by something mysterious called "man" and not "inevitably" ordained by some fate--but were decided upon by handfuls of specific persons sitting around specific tables at specific times, and who created the psychological climate and enormous apparatus required to carry their decisions out. Contrariwise, if we succumb to those pessimistic doctrines, in disregard of the historic record, Hitler is being posthumously revindicated. There is no middle way. Hitler's hybris would have set the world on an irreversible downward course.

Considering the spread of fatalism and feeling of impending doom --for example, among the present student generation who was not exposed to the Hitler trauma but is being much influenced by those pessimistic doctrines-- the need ~~to~~ to get rid of the virus becomes central.

In short, the question must be squarely faced, whether, incredible as it sounds, the Hitler trauma may have been so deep as to weaken the apparently axiomatic proposition that Hitlerism was an aberration, because that

undigested trauma has infected the thinking of psychologists, "revisionist"*)
 historians, and pessimistic cultural sociologists who are molding the
 intellectual climate. But even if this notion of a causal connection
 between the Hitler trauma and present-day pessimism is rejected, that
 pessimism itself should logically be a main concern for a project such
 as yours.

Hence my suggestion to invite Erich Fromm. In his "Anatomy of
 Human Destructiveness" he polemizes against presently influential neo-
 instinctive doctrines. He considers them to be based on a "theory that
 assures us that violence stems from our animal nature, from an ungovernable
 drive for aggression" and warns that "This theory of an innate aggressiveness
 easily becomes an ideology."**) Furthermore, Fromm is a recognized authority
 on Nazism.

I am not so naive as to expect the Symposium to "prove" that homo
 sapiens is peace-loving. There certainly will be controversy, and the pess-

 *)Here, I can only allude to some indicators: take the influential British "revis-
 ionist" specialist on the Third Reich, A.J.P. Taylor, whose books insist that
 Hitler's policies, except for the Holocaust were really merely good old power
 politics (although the Final Solution was an intrinsic part of them !);

take the acquittals by West German
 courts of GESTAPO mass murderers on the ground that, as honest believers in the
 Nazi race doctrines, they were unaware of wrong-doing !

take the doctrine of "We are all guilty"
 (somehow even the Jewish victims), to which Hannah Arendt comes perilously close in
 her "banality of evil" argument in her book about the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem;
 or the scurrilous view of John Lukacs'
 book, "The Last European War", that Hitler's extermination policy deprived the good
 old antisemitism of Czarist Russia or Horthy Hungary of respectability, which would
 otherwise have spread to America had Hitler simply exiled the Jews; and a respected
 British historian's comment in the N.Y.T. Book Review (3/21/76) that this book by an
 "able exponent of the cultural pessimism that is widely fashionable today" is "cons-
 istently interesting and provocative", with only a gentle murmur of disapproval, and
 might have an impact comparable to that of Spengler's Decline of the West ...

**)He also finds the presently prominent behaviorist school similarly "mono-explanatory"
 and relying on "dogmatic preconceptions." -At the same time, Fromm warns against un-
 critical "optimism" ("human nature is good") as providing excuses for non-involvement
 and indifference.

imists will make strong points.

To be frank, somebody like me should usefully participate in the discussion because political science and international law are intertwined with psychology : humans have murderous and predatory inclinations --and that's precisely where the political institutions and the law come in. They will never make a perfect world (murder has been prohibited for a long time, and still occurs). But, after all, the sum-total of the history of civilization consists in the efforts, by political institutions and the law, to provide barriers against murder and war. And it is the responsibility of psychology to be more aware of those efforts (and their relative effectiveness) and to help in those efforts--which in the present era of disarray in the midst of superweapons , where an Auschwitz-analogue could be produced in minutes--are more important than ever. (But forgive me: I promise, I would not preach.)

6. A last suggestion. You might also wish to invite Dr. Leo Alexander, the Boston psychiatrist. He was at my time in Nuremberg as court psychiatrist and medical expert, and was particularly active in the Medical case, which might be of particular interest to your audience. As result of his depth-interviews with the accused physicians, and others, and of his study of the Nazi documentation, he developed his theory of "Thanatology," a psychology of morbid concentration on death. I could imagine that Alexander would see a similar syndrome in the present era's search for ever more frightful means for mass extinction, which can never be used rationally but constitute a constant titillation, and might still do us all in. Another legacy of nazism ?

— Of course, Professor Gustave M. Gilbert (still at Long

Island University ?) would be a most valuable speaker. He not only acted as court psychiatrist at the Goering trial in Nuremberg, 1945/6 but also as expert witness at the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, 1961.

Three other possible speakers come to my mind: Prof. Raul Hilberg (Univ. of Vermont at Burlington), leading authority on the Holocaust, author of the definitive "The Destruction of the European Jews"; and if you wish to invite a German speaker, either Dr. Mitscherlich, or Dr. von Weizsaecker ^{relative} (Max Planck Institute, I believe. He is the strictly anti-nazi ~~brother~~ of the sinister von Weizsaecker, State Secretary in Ribbentrop's foreign Office, who was convicted as war criminal by one of the American tribunals at Nuremberg. The present Weizsaecker is a member of the international study group on "World Perspectives to the 1990's", organized by the Institute for World Order, 1140 Ave. of America, NYC., where he takes the position that a nuclear conflagration seems hardly avoidable.)

Dear Jack, as you probably sense, these remarks are not improvisations prompted by your project but some conclusions gradually reached during my long work on my forthcoming book on Nuremberg, and its message for the future. I confide them to you, in the hope they could be fertile for the project. I truly believe that the Holocaust and the entire Hitler experience are not a matter of the past but that their shadow and trauma continue to be with us, ^{with very serious consequences.} If this proposition were somehow indicated in the title of the Symposium (something like, "THE HOLOCAUST, AND ITS CONTINUING SHADOW") it could produce additional attention to the Symposium. To be sure, the knowledgeable audience might reject the proposition. But the pro-

position itself would give the project an additional dimension, which could add to the Symposium's significance.

Cordially,



John H.E. Fried
Professor of Political Science, Lehman
College, and Graduate Faculty, City Univ. of N.Y.

PS: As you suggested, I enclose
some biographical data, and
xerox showing my work at the 15 Nuremberg volumes.
Also, for good measure, letter by the Am. judge who
presided at the Medical Case, about my work in Nuremberg.

JOHN H. E. FRIED
55 EAST 86 STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10028

TEL: 348-1498

Pertinent Biographical Data:

Present position: Professor of Political Science, Lehman College, and Graduate Faculty, City University of New York

Dr. of Law, Vienna Univ.; - PH.D. (Public Law and Government), Columbia Univ. NYC.

Until Hitler's annexation of Austria, practiced law in Vienna. Came to USA, 1938.

1943 - Jan. 1947: Senior Officer, International Labor Office (League of Nations), Montreal. 1943-1945, i.a. in charge of obtaining and analyzing documentation from Europe about the Nazi slave labor program.

Jan. 1947 - March 1949: at first, Special Consultant to the Secretary of War, assigned to U.S. War Crimes Tribunals, Nuremberg; then Special Legal Consultant to the Judges of those Tribunals. (Copy of a Presiding Judges letter about my work, encl.)

Encl.

Apr. 1949 - Dec. 1950: Expert, Judge Advocate General's Office, US Dept. of the Army (Pentagon), War Crimes Division

1949: Rapporteur, UNESCO Project and UNESCO Conference, Monaco, "Causes of War."

1950 - 1952; Consultant, Human Rights Division, United Nations. Author, internal U.N. study on war crimes trials before international (Nuremberg, Tokyo) and national Tribunal of member states, in the light of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (subsequent positions at the U.N. involved international law, but not connected with Nazism or the law of war.)

1954 - 1957: Director of research project on the history of the Holocaust, YIVO Institute of Jewish Research, NYC. in conjunction with Yad Vashem Commemoration Agency on the European Jewish Catastrophe and Resistance, Jerusalem.

Bibliography Books, and chapter in book:

author, THE GUILT OF THE GERMAN ARMY. NY: Macmillan, 1942, 426 pp.

author, THE EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY. Montreal: International Labour Office, 1945, 286 pp.

co-editor, with E. Vermeil & M. Beaumont, (international, interdisciplinary UNESCO study) THE THIRD REICH. A Study published under the auspices of the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies with the Assistance of UNESCO. NY: Praeger/London: Weidenfeld, 1955, 910 pp. (volume includes my essay, "Militarisation, and Education for War.")

Co-editor (as the representative of the Judges) with D.A. Sprecher (as the representative of the Prosecution), TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS. Wash. DC.: US Govt. Printing Office, 1950 - 1953. 15 vols. appr. 15,000 pp. (xerox from Vol. I, showing credit, encl.)

Encl.

Articles and book reviews (in Am. Political Science Review, Am. Journal of International Law, etc.) & papers presented at conferences (incl. "The Promotion of Anti-Semitism through the Abuse of Democratic and Socialist Concepts", Hebrew Univ., Jerusalem, published in: YAD WASHEM STUDIES, III, 1959)

1) un militaire
pédagogue
nouveau

2) un psychologue

3) un allemand ?

4) un américain

start

Les deux aspects de Nbg: a) concernant le passé (l'époque d'Hitlerisme)
b) concernant le futur.

--Nb--~~est~~ établit, pas-seulement-

Pour cela, ~~Nbg~~ ni cette époque, ni Nbg doivent être oubliées,
ou considérées "vieille histoire". La guerre ne doit pas être oubliée
parce que.....

Nbg établit pas seulement les origines de la grande guerre,
at les délits causés par l'Hitlerisme, mais avant tout, l'esprit,
les attitudes, les notions qui causaient ses guerres et délits. Les
conclusions tirées à Nbg en 1946 appliquent, soi-disant, négativement
aux événements de l'époque pré-nbg, mais constituent des exhortations
solennelles pour le futur. Ce point est essentiel, parce que ~~les bacilles~~
les bacilles d'Hitlerisme ont montré, depuis Nbg, dans des formes diverses,
une virulence inattendue.

?

Start

Les Themes de la Manifstation.

1) Le theme central, je soumis, decrait etre, la criminalite
de la gerre d'aggresion.

"D'initier une guerre d'agression, n'est pas seulement un
"crime internationale; il est le supreme crime international"
"to initiate a war of aggression is not only an international
crime; it is the supreme international crime."

(de-mystification)
2) La de-mythologisation de guerres. (~~et par consequent~~)

~~chaque chose~~

logique
3) La conclusion/de la de-mythologisation de guerres:

La de-mytholoigsation d'actes d'etats : ~~Si~~ ~~Si~~ ~~Si~~ Si les guerres
ne resultent pas de forces mysterieuses, il suit logiquement que
le declenchement d'une guerre ~~et/ou~~ ~~de~~ ne peut resulter
que de decisions concretes et specifiques de d'individus
identifiables .

delay of trial → State Secretary

Alb. Ganzenmüller

'Democratic German Report', 5/23/73, p. 69.

Death Train Man: Trial Folds

The West German trial of the man who organised the special trains which took Jewish victims to the extermination camps was "suspended for an indefinite period" on May 3rd.

Reason given for the suspension of the trial was that the accused, Albert Ganzenmüller, former Nazi State Secretary aged 68, had had a heart attack.

Full documentary evidence of Ganzenmüller's personal implication in the mass murder programme has been in the public domain since 1946, when his correspondence with Gestapo boss Heinrich Himmler on the subject of special trains to Treblinka Camp was produced in evidence at the Nuremberg Trials. (For details see *GERMAN REPORT*, February 14th 1973).

Despite this easily-available and incontrovertible evidence, the West German authorities took no action against Ganzenmüller who returned to West Germany in 1954 from the Argentine, where he had fled at the end of the war. He worked for 14 years in a prominent position with a big Ruhr steel firm, and retired in 1968 on the very comfortable pension which the Bonn government provides for state secretaries in Hitler's government.

After extensive public urging, the West German legal authorities finally, in March 1970, filed charges against him of "knowingly aiding and abetting" the murder of millions of Jews.

Using one of their trusty delaying tactics, the prosecuting authorities prepared a monster indictment of 338 pages, and announced that

119 witnesses would have to be called from all parts of the world.

Since then, the history of the Ganzenmüller trial has been a record of delay and obfuscation. In December 1970 a Dusseldorf court moved that the proceedings be discontinued because of "lack of evidence". In June 1971 a higher Dusseldorf court reversed this decision.

The lower court then reluctantly set a trial date 15 months ahead, in October 1972.

October 1972 came and went, but the trial could not be held: the two lawyers engaged by Ganzenmüller were "busy on other cases".

The trial finally opened in March 1973; after a few weeks of desultory hearings, Ganzenmüller had his heart attack, which might even be genuine.

was
But the search for a "rapid and cheap steril. method" which could be used against
enemies of Germany, such as the Russians, Poles and Jews "altogether.*
----- This mass sterilization was part of Himmler's racial theory."

~~affidavit~~
*) Nbg ~~statement~~ by def. Karl Brandt, NO 440, Trials..695 // Brandt was Hitler's per. physician
Reich Commissioner for Sanitation & Public Health, and member of the Reich Research
Council)

~~One hoped~~, in order "to exterminate the enemy--

One hoped thereby not only to defeat the enemy but to exterminate him ~~himself~~"

frustration &
pessimism.

une seule illustration :

sur la 30^{me} anniversaire de l'ONU,
Un editorial/dans un mensuel international et dedie aux principes

de l'ONU, peut ecrire:

"..la troisieme guerre mondiale, peut-etre frolee un instant
et periodiquement prophetisee, n'a pas eu lieu. Ppur la raison
suffisante sans doute que l'arme absolue de portee universelle
n'epargnerait desormais personne, nulle part, laissant peu
de chance aux responsables de s'en tirer a l'abri d'un bunker.

Les fous ~~avant~~ a part, la prudence commence a l'implication
personnelle." (Robert Fenaux. L'ONU A TRENTE ANS. ~~maintenant~~

dans la revue, ASSOCIATIONS INTERNATIONALES, no.11, 1975,

publiee par l'Union ^{des} d'Associations Internationales, Bruxelles,
p.518.

THE FACTS REVEALED AT nbg; AND THE LESSONS TO BE DRAWN.

LESSON : All powerful groups and social forces ("elites"), and no only holders of governmental and/or legislative power, are co-responsible for ~~the~~ a country's international and domestic policies.

This holds true even under ^{Hitlertype} dictatosrhip, & all the mo so otherwie:

"Hitler could not make aggre war~~h~~ by himself. He had hve the coope~~st~~opmn pf statesmen, military leader diplomats. and businessmen. When they, with kjolwe of his/~~h~~/aims, gave h im their cooperation, they n tehmeslves parties to /his/ plan. They are not to be deemed inooent because Hitler made use of them, i they knew what they were doing." (IMT-I, 226.) That gh ere assignd to their tasks by a dictator does not ab solve them from responsivility for their acts...22 (Repeated in many ways in other parts of the IMT & US Nbg judgments.)

US Trials of 1945
 & other docs

docs, etc. etc.

ARE THE NBG PRINCIPLES ESSENTIAL FOR GLOBAL SURVIVAL ?

YES:esp. superior order doctrine ''

invite Mitscheflich.

I suggest that the nanifestation should also emphasize as a princpal message o Nbg, ~~that-the-trial-~~ that non-govtcivilians --businessmen,intellectuals, etc. also have a respnsibility ~~for-the~~ ~~to-prevent-their-country's--~~ if their coutry's govt. follos crimina, policies. If this suggestion is acepted, I would propose to invite as a speaker an outstanding West German physician,Dr.Alexander Mitscherlich, whp, at the American Nbg trial against Nazi doctors' ~~whom~~ criminal experi-ments (The Medical Case) was chosen by the German side as the head of the German MedicalCommision which was attachd to the Am.tribunal during famous that 7- onth trial. Dr.M.was imprisoed by tge nazis and thereafter had to report twice a day to the GESTALO. Be is the author o the famous book,Medizin ohne Menschlicjkeit(1947) (English edition,first 1949, Doctors of Infamy:The story of the Nazi medidal crimes. In 1965, he published with his wife ~~MMMMM~~ DIE UNFAHIGKEIT ZU TRAUERN which anayloses the reasons for the German post-Nbg psycholoical reactions ,or lack of reactions (,ence the title,die Incapacity to Mourn(namely, the victims of Nazism),*) ^(first ed.sold 100,000 copies) which The book has been very influential in WGermany,and has just been published in NY, The Inability to Mourn.(NY Praeger,1975,308 pp._)

* and rejection ~~of-a-feeling-of-colleeqie---~~ ^{of feelings of} ~~by-~~ the shared respnsibility

.

HERBERT H. LEHMAN COLLEGE
OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
(212) 960-8517

SEDGEMOND PARK BOULEVARD WEST
BRONX, NEW YORK 10468

John Fried, April 5, 1976

Tentative Outline for Program of
Commemoration of 30th Anniversary of the Judgment of the NUREMBERG

International Tribunal (October 1st, 1976)

MORNING SESSION (3 hours or 4 hours)

Nuremberg as Historical Accounting of World War II
=====

1. Introduction by John Fried (45-60 minutes)

Why was the trial held? Who were the defendants, prosecutors, judges? What facts did the trial reveal? What was the verdict? What law did the Tribunal apply? What objections have been raised against the trial? How did the Judgment answer those objections? In what sense was the Trial unique? In what sense was it not unique at all? Etc.

2. Showing of at least part of the film, TRIAL AT NUREMBERG.
(unless this should be done, for impact, at end of Afternoon session?)

3. Speeches (or Roundtable) by members of different disciplines at Lehman College, on topics selected by them. (one possibility: "How can the Unexplicable (Hitlerism) be explained?") from ~~these~~ angles.)

4. Speech by a former Nazi concentration camp inmate on his experiences.

5. Speech by a German speaker (obtainable from Bonn Consulate in NYC?) on German war crimes trials (which are still going on!)

AFTERNOON SESSION (3 hours or 4 hours)

The Continuing Importance of the Nuremberg Principles
=====

6. Introduction by John Fried (45-60 minutes)

Thesis: They are becoming ever more crucial, in view of increasing destructiveness of war technology.

Emphasis on the following Nuremberg Principles:

- a) Prohibition of aggressive war ("the supreme international crime," as the Nbg. Judgment insists)



BEDFORD PARK BOULEVARD WEST
BRONX, NEW YORK 10468

2

- b) Demetaphyxation of war: wars are not "inevitable" and not ordained but decided upon by individual decision-makers, who therefore are personally responsible for them, as well as for atrocities they order or fail to prevent, during the war.
- c) the Superior Order doctrine. Orders and laws which violate the fundamental rules of international law, must, in principle, not be carried out "if a moral choice is, in fact, possible." (show that this doctrine is not a Nuremberg invention; and that in the nuclear age, may decide survival.)
- d) "International obligations take priority over contrary domestic rules and orders.

7. Speech by a former U.S. Prosecutor at Nuremberg

on a fifth Nuremberg principle, namely, that the above-mentioned 4 Principles apply not only to Government officials including Heads of State, and military leaders, but to decision-makers in all walks of life. (The US tried and convicted at Nuremberg, e.g., top German industrialists --Krupp, IG Farben, etc., high judges, physicians, a war propagandist, etc. (after the International Tribunal had convicted the chief Jew-baiter, Streicher).

8. Speeches by members of the Lehman Faculty on any topics relating to above, selected by them.

My personal opinion is, not to shirk from discussing the post-Nuremberg (!) growth of neo-Darwinistic and other pessimistic doctrines, variously positing that "war is inevitable" or "human nature is aggressive" -which would contradict, if not make utopian, the Nuremberg message.

9. Conclusions from Afternoon speeches. (speaker ? or very brief debate?)

10. a) For impact, it might be preferable to show the film, TRIAL AT NUREMBERG, in whole or part, at end of Afternoon session; OR

b) close with a brief (10 minutes) Memorial Service for the victims of World War II.



19-3

COPY

J A M E S T. B R A N D
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
S a l e m, Oregon

April 1, 1949

To Whom it May Concern:

I wish by this letter to express my considered judgment concerning the past accomplishments, the ability and character of Mr. John H.E. Fried.

Mr. Fried was appointed by the judges at Nurnberg as consultant in connection with the trial of the major war criminals under the provisions of the London Charter and Control Law No. 10. As Presiding Judge of the tribunal which tried the Nazi jurists, I was intimately acquainted with the work which was done by Mr. Fried. Under pressure from half a dozen different tribunals at the same time, he turned out an immense amount of work of permanent value in the field of international law. His work was quietly performed, was of high quality, astonishingly accurate and greatly helpful. I am personally indebted to him for his assistance in the legal problems which arose in my case. His work dealt, not alone with questions of international law, but also to a great extent he was engaged in the digesting of evidence. I consider Mr. Fried a great scholar with a splendid grasp of the issues/~~which were raised at Nurnberg~~ which were raised at Nurnberg and of the evidence relevant to the issues. He was also appointed as representative of the judges in the preparation of condensed records of the Nurnberg trials. It is my ardent hope that some Foundation or institution will appreciate the significance of the Nurnberg trials in the development of international law and relations, and will undertake a study of the vast amount of historical material which was made available for analysis through these proceedings. I know of no one who could do a better job along that line than Mr. John H.E. Fried.

It is my intention by the foregoing to recommend him in the highest terms and without any qualification.

Sincerely yours,

(signed:) James T. Brand
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
Oregon and formerly presiding judge
of Tribunal III at Nurnberg

COPY

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOL
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
12 April 1949

Office of the Dean

To Whom it May Concern:

During a period of a year from August of 1947 to August of 1948, I was closely associated with and had the opportunity to observe the work of Mr. John H.E. Fried, Special Consultant to the United States Military Tribunals at Nurnberg, Germany. In his capacity as confidential consultant to the judges at Nurnberg, Mr. Fried performed services of extraordinary value in relation to the twelve major cases of trials of war criminals in the Nurnberg subsequent proceedings. He possesses a broad background in the field of international law and is particularly well informed on the more recent significant developments in international penal law.

Mr. Fried's ability and his interest in the work which has claimed his major attention for the past two years combine to make him an ideal person to contribute to significant literature pertaining to the Nurnberg trials. It would be unfortunate if Mr. Fried's exceptional knowledge in the field of international penal law based on the Nurnberg trials should not be utilized in the form of scholarly publications making a written record of the noted developments in the field in which he has had such a prominent part.

Mr. Fried is recommended in the highest terms as to ability, personality and character. He has the capacity to conclude at a high level of scholarship any work which he undertakes in this field. Any interested institution, group or organization will make no mistake in the sponsorship of his research and study as his work is certain to reflect credit upon him and his sponsors. He can be implicitly relied upon to make substantial contributions in the field of international law, augmenting the considerable record already to his credit of publications of the highest merit. The undersigned will be glad, upon request, to furnish any additional information concerning Mr. Fried.

(signed:) Paul M. HEBERT
Judge, Military Tribunal No. 6, Nurnberg,
Germany
(Dean, Louisiana State University Law School)

AD 7262

Box 30 - folder 5

10/24

THE FRIED, ANTICLONAL WOUNDING AND STABILIZATION UNIFORMS: 1971-1979

THE GREAT NUREMBERG TRIAL

BY

JOHN H. E. FRIED

City University of New York

Reprinted from THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
Vol. LXX, No. 1, March, 1976

The Great Nuremberg Trial*

JOHN H. E. FRIED

City University of New York

Professor Weinberg, an authority on World War II and its documentation, and the AMS Press merit great credit for republishing this principal source material on the trial of the 22 "major" Nazi leaders by the International Military Tribunal (IMT). Although during the two and one half years after the case against Hermann Goering *et al.*, twelve other trials against a total of some 200 defendants—most of them also of high position and vast power—were held in the same ornate courtroom by tribunals composed exclusively of American judges, it is the IMT case, as the most historic of these altogether 13 trials, with which the name of Nuremberg (previously identified with Hitler's pomp-and-frenzy rallies) has been linked ever since.

The original official 42-volume publication on the IMT trial (known as "blue series" because bound in blue) has long been out of print. Of poor quality paper and binding, the sets that are still available are falling apart. As Telford Taylor, the U.S. Chief Prosecutor after Justice Robert H. Jackson, recently said, "Nuremberg" has become a myth. The myth adds to the ominous confusion concerning essentials of international behavior. Because "Nuremberg" remains relevant, and factual knowledge about it should be spread, the publisher's suggestion that libraries (even those still holding an original set or what may be left of it) acquire the new edition and that interested parties acquire individual volumes while available, is well taken.

The trial was, of course, unique in its sheer magnitude.¹ The record is unique as the authentic tale of history's worst war and of its *antecedents*; unique as a battle of wits about trends, concepts

* *The Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Nov. 14, 1945–Oct. 1, 1946*. With a new Introduction by Gerhard L. Weinberg. Reproduction of the English Language Edition published at Nuremberg, 1947–1949, 42 volumes, and 2 supplements: The Indices of the German language edition (Vol. 43, 637 pp.) and *Report of Robert H. Jackson [on] The International Conference on Military Trials*. London, 1945 (Vol. 44, 441 pp.). New York (56 East 13 Street)—London: AMS Press, 1971: \$1,300.00 (buckram), \$1,150.00 (paperback). Single vols., \$31.00 (buckram), \$27.50 (paperback).

¹ Statistical data about "this gigantic trial," given in Justice Jackson's final report to President Truman, include: Over 100,000 captured German documents were screened or examined; "about 4,000 were translated . . . and used, in whole or in part, in the trial as exhibits." Sections from "[m]illions of feet of captured moving picture films" and over 1,800 from over 25,000 captured still

and forces that were at work then, and have largely remained determinative since; unique as documentation of the degradation to which ideological obsession can lead; unique in showing the psychology, personalities, and the unassailable immutability of most (but eventual contrition of some) of the protagonists. Even a reader who merely scans this record will be impressed by the vistas which "Nuremberg" opens.

Also those who do not wish to study the trial more thoroughly, should become acquainted with its flavor—the dimensions of the matters it dealt with—as an antidote against the glibness with which "Nuremberg" has been variously invoked or criticized. Because it was a major, many-faceted event, "Nuremberg" can legitimately be viewed from various perspectives; and there is no need to defend it in each and every aspect. Yet, even a small degree of familiarity with its record cannot but inspire an elemental feeling of awe in the face of so much evil and tragedy—and heroism, and render to specialists in politics, international law, and related fields a heightened sense of their responsibilities for the shaping of the future.

Since this series is a reproduction, and not a revision, of the original edition, it contains the shortcomings of the original. Those shortcomings, the editor's very informative 20-page introduction frankly admits. A fully satisfactory revision would require a very large research project in order to give, *i.a.*, completely adequate Indices and cross-references, as well as explanatory annotations (allusions to the period up to 1945 are becoming decreasingly self-evident), and to provide information on pertinent developments *after* the I.M.T. trial. For example, in order to evaluate the testimony of top-ranking defense witnesses, the reader should be told where to find the record of (or still better, be given quotations from) what they said and what transpired when they themselves were afterwards tried as suspected war criminals by American, British, Polish, etc. tribunals. Until such data will become easily available, the present edition remains indispensable; and while seeming

photographs were used as exhibits. "The U.S. staff . . . , including lawyers, secretaries, interpreters, translators and clerical help numbered at its peak 654 . . . British, Soviet and French delegations aggregated approximately the same number." ("Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson, Oct. 7, 1946, in: Supplement Vol., *Report of Robert H. Jackson . . . , l.c.*, 432–440, at 434, 433.)

a little overwhelming at first sight, it has a good logic of its own.

Structure of the Set

The set falls into four parts of unequal length: (a) Volume 1 contains the basics of the IMT trial, such as the composition of the Tribunal, the Prosecution, and the Defense; the 4-power (U.S.-U.K.-Soviet-French) Agreement and Charter for the I.M.T.²; the 4-power Indictment; essential procedural rules and initial decisions;³ the Judgment⁴ (pp. 171-341); the Soviet Judge's dissent from some of the Judgment's findings (pp. 342-364); the sentences and acquittals. (b) For anyone wishing to delve more deeply, or concerned about any of the enormous political, military, ideological, legal, economic, and other issues debated at the trial—which neither could nor needed to be completely covered in the Judgment⁵—Volumes 2 through 22 give the full official *transcripts*, in English, of the proceedings. (c) Two volumes (no. 23 and 24) contain some 1,600 pages of Indices. (d) Eighteen volumes (no. 25 through 42) reproduce Nuremberg documentary evidence, mainly in the original German.

² One of the two supplemental volumes in this series reproduces Mr. Jackson's Report on the 4-Power London Conference of July 1945 (originally published by the State Department in 1949). It shows the evolution at that Conference of the Nuremberg Charter which formed the basis of the IMT and the other 12 Nuremberg trials, as well as of the Tokyo international trial of the major Japanese War Criminals, and of what became known as the Nuremberg Principles. A *caveat* must be expressed concerning this printed version of the minutes of the London Conference. They constitute transcriptions of the stenographic notes taken in English by Mr. Jackson's secretary, and hence include translations of the statements by the Russian (Judge I. T. Nikitchenko, assisted, *i.a.*, by Prof. A. N. Trainin) and French (Judge Robert Falco, assisted, *i.a.*, by Prof. André Gros) delegations. As pointed out in the Foreword, "The minutes [were] *not* submitted to the French, Soviet or British Delegations for verification or editing [before being printed in this volume]." (p. xiii; italics added).

³ Including severance of the case of old Herr Krupp von Bohlen (too senile to stand trial) but not of Rudolf Hess (able to stand trial). The respective medical reports are also reproduced in vol. 1.

⁴ The reading of the Judgment in open court took the last two days of the trial (Sept. 30, Oct. 1, 1946). Its text therefore also appears in the record of those days (vol. 22, pp. 411-589), and shows how the four Judges alternated in the reading. This has been of interest to analysts who believe (with certain internal justifications, but without proof) that each Judge read the sections about the topics primarily assigned to him.

⁵ The arch-major criminals, Hitler and Himmler, escaped the trial through suicide. Nevertheless, Nuremberg had to deal with them, especially insofar as their orders concerned the defendants. The supersecret documents emanating from them reveal their policies and intentions in dimensions of enormity still largely not realized. On the other hand, the Nuremberg materials also throw light on various other aspects stressed by the Defense—such as the support certain Nazi aims received from important non-Germans.

The Transcripts of the Court Proceedings

The transcripts (volumes 2-22) begin with the Preliminary Hearings, the Opening Statement on November 20, 1945 by the President of the Tribunal, Lord Justice Lawrence (U.K.), and the famous opening oration (vol. 2, pp. 98-115) by the U.S. Chief Prosecutor, Supreme Court Justice Robert M. Jackson ("this trial represents mankind's desperate effort to apply the discipline of law to statesmen who have used their power of state to attack the foundations of the world's peace . . ."). They go through to the Tribunal's adjournment on October 1, 1946.

In a total of some 215 sessions—a record for concision—the four Prosecutions, by pre-arrangement, and the Defense developed their cases on the charges: aggressions, and conspiracy to commit aggressions; the slave labor program; the genocidal measures against Jews, Poles, other Slavs, Gypsies;⁶ the starvation and exploitation of occupied territories; the concentration and extermination camps; the slave labor program; etc. All of those policies, carried out on enormous scales, involved complex arrangements between governmental, party, police, and military agencies, which also had to be unravelled in the trial and are very instructive for the political scientist.

The Tribunal was able to base its findings on contemporary documents, in the light of testimony not only by the indicted protagonists themselves but by other top-ranking decision makers.⁷ No such evidence—laying bare the inner workings of a regime whose impact on the future is still unpredictable—had ever before been available to any court anywhere.

The nine-day testimony of Goering covers almost 400 pages (vol. 9, pp. 235-657, interrupted on pp. 457-491 by testimony of his witness, the Swedish businessman Birger Dahlerus on Dahlerus' last-minute efforts in summer 1939 to bring about a German-British understanding.) Less lengthy but also of great historical importance are the testimonies of the Chief of the High Command of the *Wehrmacht*, Keitel (vol. 10, pp. 468-647; vol. 11, pp. 1-28); Keitel's Chief of Staff, Jodl (vol. 15, pp. 284-561); Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop (vol. 10, pp. 223-444); *Reichsbank* President Hjalmar Schacht (vol. 12, pp. 417-602, vol. 13, pp. 1-49); Arthur Seyss-Inquart, master

⁶ The term "genocide" does not occur either as formal charge or in the Nuremberg Charter or Judgment. This would have been retroactive, as the crime was technically defined only in the Genocide Convention of 1948.

⁷ "Defense Counsel are advised that the Tribunal will not ordinarily regard as competent evidence, extracts from books or articles expressing the opinions of particular authors on matters of ethics, history, or particular events" (Ruling by the President, 22 March 1946, vol. 9, p. 673).

pp. 402–413 and the Schmundt minutes of the conference of May 23, 1939, 079-L, Exh. USA-27, vol. 37, pp. 546–556); Hitler's instructions to his Supreme Wehrmacht commander Fieldmarshal Keitel of October 17, 1938 on the "future of Poland" (a source of labor and a possible military deployment area for Germany; what parts of Poland to become Reich territory, to be cleansed of "Jews, Polacks and trash"—("Juden, Polacken und Gesindel"); etc. 864-PS, Exh. USA-609, vol. 26, pp. 377–383); Hitler's instructions for the subsequent invasions, starting with his directive of 20 Nov. 1939 for invasion of the Low Countries (440-PS, Exh. GB-107, vol. 26, pp. 37–40), and culminating in the Barbarossa directives for the invasion of the USSR, such as the one of 18 Dec. 1940 (446-PS, Exh. USA-31, vol. 26, pp. 47–52); minutes of secret conferences involving, among others, Goering, Keitel and Jodl, about the lynching of downed American "terror pilots," and Hitler's advice to Japanese Ambassador Oshima at the Berghof on 27 May 1944 to "hang, not shoot" them ("jeden amerikanischen Terrorflieger aufhaengen, nicht erschiessen") (3780-PS, Exh. GB [Great Britain]-293, vol. 33, pp. 74–80, at 79) about which the British Prosecutor, Sir David Maxwell-Fyffe, examined von Ribbentrop on 1 April 1946 (vol. 10, at 384).

Numerous other documents show the still unfathomable, continent-wide program of the "final solution of the Jewish question"; and the connection between the Nazi aims of annihilating Jewry and annihilating communism ("Bolshevism is the doctrine of Jewish Satanism—*die Lehre jüdischer Satanei*," Robert Ley stated as early as at the 1936 Olympiade Party Rally, Nuremberg) (2283-PS, Exh. USA-337, vol. 30, at p. 129). There are long excerpts (370 printed pages) from the 38 volumes of the diary of Hans Frank as Governor-General of occupied Poland, 1939–1944 (2232-PS, vol. 29, pp. 356–725); the complete transcript of the trial before the notorious "People's Court" of Fieldmarshal von Witzleben, Count Yorck von Wartenburg and six other conspirators in the unsuccessful attempt to kill Hitler on 20 July 1944 (3881-PS, Exhibit GB [Great Britain]-527, vol. 33, pp. 299–509; full text of the "People Court's" judgment, pp. 510–530); and SS General Stroop's report on the final massacre, against heroic resistance, of the survivors of the German-erected Warsaw Ghetto, "The Warsaw Ghetto Is No More" of 16 May 1943 (1061-PS, Exh. USA-275, vol. 26, pp. 628–642).

The reproduction of these documents in their original German puts them beyond the reach of many American readers. However, the most telling parts of the most significant documents were the core of the trial; cited in court in all four official languages, they are to that extent recorded in

English in the Transcripts, part of the present series (Vols. 2–22). For example, the British Prosecutor Elwyn Jones, M.P., in cross-examining Dr. Wolfram Sievers, the manager of Himmler's Race Research agency *Ahnenerbe* (Ancestral Heritage Society), about the most gruesome medical experiments, read into the English record (vol. 20, pp. 516–553) large sections of documents which in the full German texts appear in vol. 38.

It is also of some help that each German document has been given an English title, and English capsule description. Furthermore, some important Nuremberg documents are in English in their *original*, and hence are reproduced in English in Vols. 24–42. For example: Reports by the Duke of Hamilton, on interviews with Hess after the latter's landing in Scotland, 10 May 1941 (116-M to 119-M, vol. 38, pp. 174–184); numerous affidavits, including those by two American diplomats, George S. Messersmith and Raymond H. Geis, about their experiences in Berlin (2385 & 2386-PS, Exh. USA-68, 750 in vol. 30, pp. 295–311, 311–328); a Report by the Judge Advocate Section, Third U.S. Army, on their investigation of Flossenburg Concentration Camp (2309 PS, vol. 30, pp. 158–164); Report of a special 12-member bipartisan Congressional Committee headed by Senate majority leader Alben W. Barkley of 15 May 1945, about their personal inspection (requested by General Eisenhower) of Buchenwald, Nordhausen and Dachau concentration camps (159-L, Exh. USA-222, vol. 37, pp. 605–626); and the official English text of the "Czechoslovakian Report on German Crimes against Czechoslovakia" (998-PS, Exh. USA-91, vol. 26, pp. 429–522). English defense documents include, *e.g.*, the written testimony by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy, on the principles concerning the rescue of survivors of sunk enemy ships that governed naval warfare in the Pacific (Doc. Doenitz-100, vol. 40, pp. 108–111). Some documents are in French. For example: the official French government report on the fate of French intellectuals, heads of political parties and workers' organizations, Jews, and other persecuted groups (274-F, Exhibit RF [République Française]-301, vol. 37, pp. 116–188); list of 29,660 fusillated French hostages (420-F, Exh. RF-266, vol. 37, pp. 211–212); sworn statements of French and Belgian concentration camp survivors (vol. 36, pp. 261–387).

Indices. A publication of this complexity requires some comments on its indices, and their quality.

First, there is a large *Subject Index*, consisting of 660 pages in vol. 23. Regrettably, it was prepared from the *Transcripts* of the court proceedings *alone*. Hence, the Subject Index covers only

of occupied Poland, and then of the occupied Netherlands (vol. 15, pp. 610–668, vol. 16, pp. 1–113); Hitler's Vice-Chancellor and ambassador Franz von Papen (vol. 16, pp. 236–422), etc.

Among the defense witnesses were several surviving German Fieldmarshals, some of whom were themselves subsequently tried and convicted as war criminals: von Brauchitsch (vol. 20, pp. 567–594); von Manstein (vol. 20, pp. 594–646, vol. 21, pp. 3–17); Milch (vol. 9, pp. 44–133); von Rundstedt (vol. 21, pp. 21–50); Kesselring (vol. 9, pp. 174–234). Fieldmarshal Paulus, the Commander in the battle of Stalingrad, was a Prosecution witness (vol. 7, pp. 253–304), as was Intelligence chief Walter Schellenberg (vol. 4, pp. 374–385).

Other witnesses for the Defense—who, incidentally, were more numerous than those for the Prosecution—included the powerful Hans Heinrich Lammers, Hitler's right-hand man as Chief of the Reich Chancellery (vol. 11, pp. 28–154); Rudolf Franz Hoess, Commandant at Auschwitz during part of the war (vol. 11, pp. 396–422); the Acting Minister of Justice, Franz Schlegelberger (vol. 20, pp. 263–278); top Foreign Office men such as State Secretaries Adolf Freiherr Steengracht von Moyland (vol. 10, pp. 106–157) and Ernst von Weiszaecker (vol. 14, pp. 277–297); and the former high Gestapo officer Hans Bernd Gisevius who had participated in the plot against Hitler's life of 20 July 1944 (vol. 12, pp. 167–305).

The panorama of the trial was wide, covering as it did the evolution of National Socialism; its gradual undermining of Weimar Germany and then the Versailles system; the nazification of German political, constitutional, social, and economic life, and the organization of a warfare state; relations with Germany's allies and their leaders, especially Italy and Mussolini; the evolution and implications of an ever more integral racism, spreading over ever wider territories; the use of foreign peoples as "colonials" and of foreign countries as resettlement areas for ethnic Germans; the extent and excusatory weight, if any, of collaboration by the Vichy regime in France or the Quisling regime in Norway; the multiple horror, especially in Yugoslavia, of triangular war involving two warring factions plus foreign invaders.

The transcript also gives a picture of the range which the Tribunal granted to the Defense for the presentation of their arguments, and thus allows the reader to form his own opinion about the fairness of the trial. Undeniably a high point of the trial was the elaborate attack by Professor Hermann Jahrreiss (Defense Counsel for Fieldmarshal Jodl) on behalf of all defendants against what he termed the concept of "war as a function forbidden by international law" and on such other basic issues as responsibility for crimes committed under superior orders (vol. 17, pp. 458–494).

For a variety of reasons, the doctrinal and factual presentations, as well as examinations by the four Prosecutions, and especially the final statements by Justice Jackson, Sir Hartley Shawcross, M. Champetier de Ribes and General Rudenko (vol. 19, pp. 397–618) are of great interest.

In order to find his way among these 21 volumes of transcripts, the reader has to consult vol. 23, the first of two fat index volumes. In its 70-page "Chronological Index of the Trial Proceedings" Vol. 23 gives capsule information for each of the IMT's sessions, such as names of witnesses heard, topics discussed, rulings, etc.

Documents. Essential to the understanding of the IMT trial is the fact that it was based on the availability of a mass of contemporary German documents, of high (*Geheim*) and highest (*Geheime Reichssache: Nur durch Offiziere*; etc.) secrecy ratings, which had fallen into Allied hands and which often emanated from, were addressed to, or referred to individual leaders in the dock. These conference minutes, letters, orders, reports, official files, etc. cover every aspect of the trial.

Much of the second main part of this set, namely, the 18 document volumes (no. 25 through 42) are given to the reproduction in full or in part of the most significant of those documents⁸ in their German original. In precise, archival rendition, they show, for example, handwritten marginal notations, abbreviations, "receipt" stamps, and other indicators of their probative value—essential also to professional research. Because of space limitations, only some of them can be illustratively listed here: the minutes of the conferences at which Hitler revealed his initial war plans (including the "Hossbach" conference of November 5, 1937, 386-PS. Exh. USA-25, vol. 25,

⁸ Not all documents accepted in evidence at Nuremberg (and certainly not, all that were available) are reprinted in this set. Many more of them are contained in the U.S. Government publication prepared at Justice Jackson's initiative, "Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression" (Washington, D.C., 1946–1949; known as the "red series"). In these bulky 10 volumes, all documents are given in English, but the translations, done at Nuremberg under great pressure, are not completely reliable. Finally, it should be noted that the 15-volume "green series" edited by Drexel R. Sprecher and myself, "Trials of War Criminals Before the [U.S.] Nuremberg Military Tribunals" (Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1950–1953), covering the 12 subsequent trials of altogether almost 200 defendants (cases against Krupp; I. G. Farben; Fieldmarshals and generals; Cabinet ministers and diplomats; the Acting Minister of Justice and high judges; *Luftwaffe* and other physicians involved in the "medical experiments," "euthanasia," castration programs; leaders of the concentration camp system, and of extermination units; etc.) contain many documents (all in carefully checked English translations) that had been used by or were available to the I.M.T. Unfortunately, it was not possible to provide the "green series" with indices.

pp. 402–413 and the Schmudt minutes of the conference of May 23, 1939, 079-L, Exh. USA-27, vol. 37, pp. 546–556); Hitler's instructions to his Supreme Wehrmacht commander Fieldmarshal Keitel of October 17, 1938 on the "future of Poland" (a source of labor and a possible military deployment area for Germany; what parts of Poland to become Reich territory, to be cleansed of "Jews, Polacks and trash"—("Juden, Polacken und Gesindel"); etc. 864-PS, Exh. USA-609, vol. 26, pp. 377–383); Hitler's instructions for the subsequent invasions, starting with his directive of 20 Nov. 1939 for invasion of the Low Countries (440-PS, Exh. GB-107, vol. 26, pp. 37–40), and culminating in the Barbarossa directives for the invasion of the USSR, such as the one of 18 Dec. 1940 (446-PS, Exh. USA-31, vol. 26, pp. 47–52); minutes of secret conferences involving, among others, Goering, Keitel and Jodl, about the lynching of downed American "terror pilots," and Hitler's advice to Japanese Ambassador Oshima at the Berghof on 27 May 1944 to "hang, not shoot" them ("jeden amerikanischen Terrorflieger aufhaengen, nicht erschiessen") (3780-PS, Exh. GB [Great Britain]-293, vol. 33, pp. 74–80, at 79) about which the British Prosecutor, Sir David Maxwell-Fyffe, examined von Ribbentrop on 1 April 1946 (vol. 10, at 384).

Numerous other documents show the still unfathomable, continent-wide program of the "final solution of the Jewish question"; and the connection between the Nazi aims of annihilating Jewry and annihilating communism ("Bolshevism is the doctrine of Jewish Satanism—*die Lehre jüdischer Satanei*," Robert Ley stated as early as at the 1936 Olympiade Party Rally, Nuremberg) (2283-PS, Exh. USA-337, vol. 30, at p. 129). There are long excerpts (370 printed pages) from the 38 volumes of the diary of Hans Frank as Governor-General of occupied Poland, 1939–1944 (2232-PS, vol. 29, pp. 356–725); the complete transcript of the trial before the notorious "People's Court" of Fieldmarshal von Witzleben, Count Yorck von Wartenburg and six other conspirators in the unsuccessful attempt to kill Hitler on 20 July 1944 (3881-PS, Exhibit GB [Great Britain]-527, vol. 33, pp. 299–509; full text of the "People Court's" judgment, pp. 510–530); and SS General Stroop's report on the final massacre, against heroic resistance, of the survivors of the German-erected Warsaw Ghetto, "*The Warsaw Ghetto Is No More*" of 16 May 1943 (1061-PS, Exh. USA-275, vol. 26, pp. 628–642).

The reproduction of these documents in their original German puts them beyond the reach of many American readers. However, the most telling parts of the most significant documents were the core of the trial; cited in court in all four official languages, they are to that extent recorded in

English in the Transcripts, part of the present series (Vols. 2–22). For example, the British Prosecutor Elwyn Jones, M.P., in cross-examining Dr. Wolfram Sievers, the manager of Himmler's Race Research agency *Ahnenerbe* (Ancestral Heritage Society), about the most gruesome medical experiments, read into the English record (vol. 20, pp. 516–553) large sections of documents which in the full German texts appear in vol. 38.

It is also of some help that each German document has been given an English title, and English capsule description. Furthermore, some important Nuremberg documents are in English in their *original*, and hence are reproduced in English in Vols. 24–42. For example: Reports by the Duke of Hamilton, on interviews with Hess after the latter's landing in Scotland, 10 May 1941 (116-M to 119-M, vol. 38, pp. 174–184); numerous affidavits, including those by two American diplomats, George S. Messersmith and Raymond H. Geis, about their experiences in Berlin (2385 & 2386-PS, Exh. USA-68, 750 in vol. 30, pp. 295–311, 311–328); a Report by the Judge Advocate Section, Third U.S. Army, on their investigation of Flossenburg Concentration Camp (2309 PS, vol. 30, pp. 158–164); Report of a special 12-member bipartisan Congressional Committee headed by Senate majority leader Alben W. Barkley of 15 May 1945, about their personal inspection (requested by General Eisenhower) of Buchenwald, Nordhausen and Dachau concentration camps (159-L, Exh. USA-222, vol. 37, pp. 605–626); and the official English text of the "Czechoslovakian Report on German Crimes against Czechoslovakia" (998-PS, Exh. USA-91, vol. 26, pp. 429–522). English defense documents include, *e.g.*, the written testimony by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy, on the principles concerning the rescue of survivors of sunk enemy ships that governed naval warfare in the Pacific (Doc. Doenitz-100, vol. 40, pp. 108–111). Some documents are in French. For example: the official French government report on the fate of French intellectuals, heads of political parties and workers' organizations, Jews, and other persecuted groups (274-F, Exhibit RF [République Française]-301, vol. 37, pp. 116–188); list of 29,660 fusillated French hostages (420-F, Exh. RF-266, vol. 37, pp. 211–212); sworn statements of French and Belgian concentration camp survivors (vol. 36, pp. 261–387).

Indices. A publication of this complexity requires some comments on its indices, and their quality.

First, there is a large *Subject Index*, consisting of 660 pages in vol. 23. Regrettably, it was prepared from the *Transcripts* of the court proceedings *alone*. Hence, the Subject Index covers only

matters that were discussed in court and, as far as the documents are concerned, therefore refers only to the topic(s) on which a document, or some passage from it, was *quoted in court*. Any other topics contained in the document are not picked up in the Subject Index, although they may be of much greater significance for the researcher.

Even within this limitation, the Subject Index is incomplete. For example, one of the trial's main issues was the treatment of, and the law concerning partisans (or guerrillas, maquis, resistance fighters). Yet, the subentry "International law [concerning] partisan warfare" gives altogether two citations: one on "German adherence" (ital. supplied) to that law, the other on "Violations committed during" partisan warfare. Both citations refer to altogether two pages in the court transcript (vol. 21, pp. 293 and 292, respectively) which reproduce a defense counsel's argumentation about the probative value of certain prosecution and defense evidence on partisan warfare, but there is no reference to any of the documentation showing German mass atrocities against partisans, partisan suspects, partisans' families, villages hiding partisans, etc. Similarly, readers interested in the Tribunal's handling of the French Maquis question will find under "Maquis movement, French" only: "see France; occupied territories; Resistance"; and none of these entries has a subentry for "Maquis."

The Subject Index pedantically records many unimportant items, but omits matters which are crucial for the understanding of Nazi war policies and postwar plans. For example, the entry "Slavs" omits references to one of Himmler's most horrifying speeches (Poznan, 4 Oct. 1943, 1919-PS, US Exh. 170, vol. 29, pp. 110-173): the Russians are not the "noble people" ("*edles Volk*") described in German soldiers' letters home (p. 117) but "human rejects" ("*menschliche Minderware*") (p. 118), "human animals" ("*Menschentiere*") (p. 123); "We need slaves for our culture . . . Whether in the building of an antitank ditch 10,000 Russian females (*Weiber*) collapse from exhaustion (*aus Entkraeftung umfallen*) interests me only insofar as the ditch be finished. . . ." (p. 123).

Similarly, the Subject Index has no entry on the *future wars* for which Himmler, in this and other programmatic statements, made far-reaching plans: the ultimate Armageddon to be between a biogenetically strengthened Germany reaching beyond the Urals, in combination with a racially-cleansed German-dominated Europe, against the "1 to 1.6 billion hordes (*Masse Mensch*)" of Asia (vol. 29, p. 172). If readers relying on the English summary title locate the document, they will hardly be able to guess Himmler's relentlessly pursued visions from the tepid English summary, "plans for the future" (vol. 29, p. 110).

The entry "Children" does not even contain a subentry on the major Nuremberg topic of the systematic kidnapping of foreign children of "good blood" by a special Himmler organization. Himmler expected the policy (one of his obsessions) to yield eventually 30 million additional Germans, and discussed it not only in his 1943 Poznan speech but elsewhere and much earlier (for example, nine months before the start of the German attack on the U.S.S.R. in his "Otherwise Germany will not be able to dominate the earth" speech of 7 September 1940, 1918-PS, U.S. Exhibit 304, vol. 29, pp. 98-110).

Of overriding significance is the Nuremberg evidence about the Third Reich's "extermination of Communism" policies, which the Subject Index (vol. 23, p. 193) correctly spells out as extermination of Communists ("Communists, Extermination.") but for which it gives only six secondary references. Actually, this war aim was fully discussed, as recorded, by Hitler, Fieldmarshals, the SS and SD leadership, even prior to the start of the attack on the USSR on June 21, 1941, and was often linked with plans for depriving the USSR, after conquest, of its main food supplies. (Example: "Many tens of millions of people . . . will [thus] die or have to emigrate to Siberia"—for which migration no trains will be available. (Economic Policy Directions for "Economic Organization East," of 23 May 1941 Doc. 126-EC.) The famous memorandum of 25 Oct. 1942 by a top official in Rosenberg's East Ministry criticizing the atrocity policies in the occupied Soviet areas as adverse to the German war aims of "annihilation (*Vernichtung*) of Bolshevism"⁹ and "obliteration (*Zertrümmerung*)" or "dissolution (*Auflösung*)" of the Soviet Union (294-PS, Exhibit USA-185, vol. 25, pp. 331-342, at 332) is only mentioned, without capsule contents, in the Name Index under the memorandum's author, Minister Dr. Braeutigam (vol. 24, p. 316) but is omitted, like many other documents frankly discussing German war aims, in the Subject Index short entry, "War Aims, German" (vol. 23, p. 716).

The second Index volume (no. 24) opens with a *Document Index*, which lists the documents exhibited by the four Prosecutions and the Defense, but only by numbers, and without thumbnail descriptions. The bulk of the volume, almost 500

⁹ Among various statements to the same effect, see, for example, Directives by the Economic Staff East (*Wirtschaftsführungsstab Ost*) of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) of September 1, 1942: "Germany must be the power that obliterates (*zertrümmert*) Bolshevism, and the Führer must be celebrated (*gefeiert*) by the peoples of the Soviet Union as the liberator from the bolshevist yoke." (347-EC, Exh. USA-320, vol. 36, pp. 331-355, at 346). There is no entry, "Bolshevism" in the Subject Index.

pages, contains the *Name Index*. But like the Subject Index, the Name Index is culled from the transcripts only. It merely refers to the persons appearing, or mentioned, in the proceedings.

Again, within this restriction, the Name Index is not complete. To illustrate: The inclusion of Rudolf Hess (as Hitler's former Deputy, the highest-ranking defendant) in the trial has been criticized in view of his "amnesia." Strangely, his sensational admission in court on 30 Nov. 1945, of having simulated amnesia (recorded in vol. 3, p. 496: "Henceforth my memory will again respond to the outside world . . . The reasons for simulating loss of memory were of a tactical nature . . . I also simulated loss of memory [to] my . . . defense counsel. . .") is omitted in the Name Index, under "Hess, Rudolf," subentries "Health" and "Mental condition" (vol. 24, p. 424) and there is no subentry for "simulation" or for "amnesia." (Incidentally, although his amnesia and simulation were carefully discussed subjects, there are no such entries in the Subject Index, either.)

I must agree with Professor Weinberg, who says in his Introduction (p. xxiii) that whereas the Index volumes provide "fairly" good orientation for the *Proceedings*, "the indexing of the documents (ital. supplied) is wholly inadequate." To remedy this shortcoming, he added to this reprinted edition, as a supplemental volume, the single combined Index of the (1949) German-language edition of the "Blue series." He finds it better organized, and containing more document references, albeit by document number only. Alas, this supplement volume indicates the (parallel but of course not identical) pages and volumes of the German edition. If all this seems complicated, it at least gives an inkling of some of the linguistic and logistic difficulties of an international trial conducted in four official languages.

All this, too, pales in the light of the significance of the Principles, or message, of Nuremberg,—that in order to prevent the disasters of *governmentally organized international mass criminality*, the individual policy makers are bound by the fundamental rules of the world community. This record shows the reasons why, and the way in which, the Tribunal unanimously—and, in the end, with the consent of at least some of the defendants and their counsel,—reached that conclusion; as well as the precautions it added so as to make obedience to the Principle neither "unpatriotic" nor demanding martyrdom. Also, for

example, in an era when organized terrorism has become an increasingly dangerous threat, attention should be paid to the criteria by which the Tribunal declared certain entire "organizations," for example, the Gestapo to have been "criminal organizations"—so that voluntary membership constitutes in itself a legal (but, as the Judgment underscores, individually disprovable) presumption of a punishable offense.

The series, then, has many uses. One, highly desirable beyond academe in view of the widespread confusion about the crucial meaning of the trial, is to get acquainted with what the trial was really about. The Nuremberg courtroom drama gives a picture, unavailable elsewhere, of the antecedents of World War II and of the Third Reich's conduct and policies during it. In a strictly chronological sense, those events lie now more than a generation behind us. But their effects and repercussions are still with us. And these materials, by showing as they do the nature and impact of Hitler's onslaught, also explain the depth of the trauma which the cataclysm created in the different nations involved (including the Americans and the Germans).

That trauma—further intensified by the profound political changes in Europe as result of the war—has by no means been overcome; indeed it explains much that has happened since and is still leading the world on an increasingly ominous course.

In other words, the Nuremberg materials allow us not only to evaluate the factual findings, and the law of Nuremberg, but beyond that to understand the psychological and ideological *aftereffects* which Hitler's onslaught continue to exercise on world politics. Such understanding may be vital; and this exploitation of the Nuremberg materials has hardly begun.

Those interested in specific subjects, on the other hand, find here information never meant to be disclosed, on matters ranging from propaganda to high finance, from military history to euthanasia, and learned debates about the criminality or not of aggressive war, about the main defense objections ("retroactivity"; "the victors tried the vanquished"; "duty to obey even criminal orders"), to the skillful attempts to justify, or make plausible, the Nazi policies including the wars themselves; and why the entire Nuremberg effort consisted in denying such justifications, in memory of the victims, and out of worry for our own future.

Starvation as Warfare

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Vol. 7

April 193

No. 2

Editor-in-chief

Eberhard P. Deutsch

Associate Editor-in-Chief

G. Winthrop Haight

Departmental Editors

Book Reviews

Max Chopnick

Leonard Theberge

Cases in National Courts

Richard C. Allison

Congressional Affairs

Harry LeRoy Jones

Corporate Affairs

Victor C. Folsom

International and Foreign Tribunals

Malcolm W. Monroe

United Nations Affairs

G. Winthrop Haight

Board of Editors

Ex Officio Editor-in-Chief, Departmental Editors, and

Joe C. Barrett

Benjamin Busch

Max Chopnick

Edison Dick

Victor C. Folsom

David M. Gooder

James T. Haight

Harry A. Inman

Ewell E. Murphy, Jr.

Edward D. Re

Assistant to the Editor

Malcolm W. Monroe

Managing Editor

Hope M. Bulger

American Bar Association

Section of International Law

Correspondence and manuscripts should be sent to the Editorial Offices, One Shell Square, New Orleans, 70139.

Books for review should be sent to: Division of Legal Practice and Education, American Bar Association, 1155 East 60th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637.

All notices on change of address or inquiries concerning missing or additional numbers may be sent to the Division of Legal Practice and Education, American Bar Association, 1155 East 60th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637.

A Publication of the ABA Press

As a service to its members, the Section of International Law publishes in October, January, April, and July *The International Lawyer*, a quarterly law journal devoted to practical problems of special interest to lawyers concerned with international foreign and comparative law.

Any member of the American Bar Association may join the Section upon payment of its annual dues of \$10. An attorney who is not a member of the Association and requests Section membership will be furnished an application for Association membership. Institutions and individuals not eligible for Association membership may subscribe to *The International Lawyer* for \$15 per year. See last page for subscription rates, membership and order form.

Second-class postage paid at Chicago, Illinois.

The International Lawyer welcomes comments, notes of interest, letters to the editor, and submission of articles.

Manuscripts must be submitted in duplicate (with one typewritten original and one copy) prepared in standard typewriter (not script or all capitals) and must be double or triple spaced, including footnotes and any quoted or indented material.

Manuscripts are submitted at the sender's risk and *The International Lawyer* assumes no responsibility for the return of material. Material accepted for publication becomes the property of the Section of International Law of the American Bar Association. No compensation is paid for articles published and no article which has been accepted or published elsewhere will be considered.

Copyright © 1973 American Bar Association

Nothing herein contained shall be construed as representing the opinions, views, or actions of the American Bar Association unless the same shall have been first approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors, or the Section of International Law of the Association unless first approved by the Section or its Council.

Starvation as a Method of Warfare— Conditions for Regulation by Convention

I. Alternatives

To what extent is starvation a permissible method of warfare? In the context of international law, this question can be discussed on the basis of one of five alternatives. The first two imply that starvation as a method of warfare should be sanctioned either generally (alt. 1) or generally forbidden (alt. 2). However, there would be some justification for calling an advocate of alternative 1 a "hardboiled cynic" and an advocate of alternative 2 a "blue-eyed idealist."

A third solution is indicated by the American, *Mudge* (pp. 265-268). He recommends a definition of the expression "starvation as a means of warfare" which the starvation of a civilian population would be permissible by international law, only when it causes capitulation or is reasonably calculated to do so (alt. 3).¹ The main objection to this proposed definition is that it is too flexible, leaving too much scope for arbitrary implementation.

A fourth solution would be to preserve the distinction drawn by international law between combatants and the civilian population. Here we have the principle of "military necessity" ("Kriegsraison"), sanctioning the starvation of combatants, and the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law prohibiting the starvation of a civilian population (alt. 4).

However, it has been observed by *Mudge* and other experts on international law, especially Anglo-American lawyers, that in a modern war, be it total (e.g., World War II) or predominantly characterized by guerrilla warfare (e.g., the conflicts in Algeria and Indochina), it is extremely difficult in practice to maintain a distinction between combatants and civil-

*M.A. (1944), LL.B. (1948), Univ. of Upsala. Mr. Rosenblad has been a Swedish diplomat since 1948, and is head of section, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

¹Mudge notes (p. 236) that *Webster* (3rd ed., Springfield 1963) gives three different senses of the active verb "to starve somebody": "to kill with hunger, to deprive of nourishment, to cause to capitulate by or as if by depriving of nourishment."

politically inspired. The facts were more fully exposed in this case than in any other case between the contending parties.

American federal procedure, including liberal rules of discovery, gave the parties a unique opportunity to sift through opposing parties' files and interrogate opposing parties' officers and employees—an opportunity which had not been available in any of the litigation pending in other parts of the world. It was, thus, perhaps fitting that the American case, in which the facts had been probed to the fullest extent, marked the final round in the 17-year worldwide court battle between East and West.

ian population. At all events, the boundary between the two is generally indistinct.

The present article will begin with a brief summary of current international law (section II). This will be followed by an analysis of alternatives 3 and 4. Since both these alternatives are open to serious objections,² a way out of the *cul-de-sac* will also be discussed (alt. 5). This final alternative is based on the conviction that certain specific points of international law are in need of revision (post, section III). The argument leads on to a preliminary draft of convention articles (section IV).

II. Is Starvation Sanctioned as a Method of Warfare?

1. General

It is a tragic fact that, notwithstanding all the efforts of the United Nations, states are still continually resorting to war as a means of resolving disputes between them.³ In doing so, they are tempted to resort to starvation. On July 7, 1969, in other words at the time of the Nigerian conflict (1967-70), British Foreign Secretary *Michael Stewart* remarked in the House of Commons: "We must accept that, in the whole history of warfare, any nation which has been in a position to starve its enemy out has done so" (Hansard vol. 786 No. 143 c. 953).

We must therefore consider, on the basis of current conventions and of the principles of humanity and military necessity, whether starvation as a method of warfare is compatible with the laws of war (*jus in bello*). These laws distinguish between combatants and the civilian population.

2. Combatants

Current international law sanctions the starving out of combatants with a view to forcing them to capitulate. Experts are unanimous on this point (the Finlander, *Castrén* p. 197 and the American, *Greenspan* pp. 316-317).

²Alternatives 1 and 2 would not appear to require any closer consideration. Alt. 1 would imply a retrograde development contrary to the fundamental rules of existing conventions, while alt. 2 would appear to be unrealistic.

³Contrary to the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed in Paris on August 27, 1928, and to Article 2:4 of the United Nations Charter: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." In a doctoral thesis (pp. 60-63) published in 1971, the Swedish political scientist *Goldmann* notes that during the period 1945-67, 23 international wars took place involving a total of 65 belligerents. Of these wars, nineteen were fought in Asia or North Africa. Cf. *Greenspan*, pp. 20-22.

3. Civilian Population

The legitimacy of starving a civilian population to bring about capitulation has been asserted not only by various statesmen, such as *Bismarck* (*vid.* Garner 1920 Vol. II p. 337), but also by a series of Anglo-American experts on international law, *e.g.*, *Garner* (*cf.*, *supra*), *Lauterpacht* (B.Y.I.L. 1952 p. 374) and *Nurick* (A.J.I.L. 1945 p. 696). On many occasions this has been the position adopted by the maritime powers, Great Britain and the United States of America.

The Soviet Union takes a contrary view. Similarly *Mertens* (pp. 192-193), and certain Red Cross experts have contended that a blockade aimed exclusively at the civilian population must be regarded as incompatible with the general rules of humanitarian law and human rights.

The deliberate starvation of an ethnic group is prohibited by the 1948 Genocide Convention, in which "genocide" is taken to mean the intentional annihilation, in whole or in part, of an ethnic group by means of certain acts enumerated in Article II. One of these acts is defined in Article II c as "Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part."⁴

The legal position is apparently disputed. Unequivocal rules of international law would therefore be welcomed.

III. Should Starvation be Prohibited as a Method of Warfare?

1. Combatants

A prohibition by convention, of the starvation of combatants would not appear to be an urgent necessity. Such a prohibition would hardly be feasible. In a suitable context—*e.g.*, the preamble to additional protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions—it might be possible to affirm that the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy. The aim is to win the war, not to cause suffering which is unnecessary for its successful prosecution.

⁴In a Bill (1951 No. 71, p. 5) for the Swedish ratification of the 1948 Paris Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the form of action quoted here is said to comprise "such actions as subjecting the group to a system of rationing concerning essential foodstuffs making it impossible for the members of the group to subsist for any considerable period of time" . . . *Cf. Mudge* p. 265. By December 1971, the Genocide Convention had been ratified or subscribed to by 75 states, including Sweden, together with the Great Powers France, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany. On the other hand it has not been ratified by the United States. The difficulties of prosecuting infringements of this Convention, in the absence of an international criminal court (*cf.* art. V-IX), have been emphasized, *e.g.* by SCHWARZENBERGER (THE YEAR BOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS 1968 pp. 197-198).

It follows that the object of starving out combatants is to force a capitulation and not to starve them to death.

Far more important and pressing is the need to protect the civilian population from the use of starvation as a method of warfare. No doubt most people of today, with the memory of various commercial blockades, *e.g.*, the German siege 1941-43 of Leningrad still fresh in their minds, will feel that this is difficult to achieve. During the 900-day siege of Leningrad more than a million Russians died of starvation (*Wykes* p. 144). But the civilian population does not always have to suffer. General Giap's siege of the French troops in the Vietnamese mountain stronghold of Dien Bien Phu during the spring of 1954 is said to have been exclusively directed against combatants. Other instances of sieges mainly involving combatants are provided by Blitzkrieg operations, successfully carried out by Napoleon, Moltke and other war-lords.

"Dehydration" was also one of the methods of warfare employed by Alexander the Great in his war against the great King of Persia, Darius III, and the Persian fleet in the years 334-332 B.C. *Arrianos* (pp. 40, 50-51)⁵ writes that initially the quality and numbers of Darius' forces were far superior to those of Alexander. His crossing of the Hellespont was for that reason something of a gamble. Moreover, the Persians had made plans to "burn the growing crops nor spare the cities. In this manner lack of food would make it impossible for Alexander to remain in the country."

The strategy adopted by Alexander was unconventional to say the least. After besieging Miletos he disposed of his own fleet, which was too small in any case to defeat the Persians'. Instead, he occupied a river estuary near Miletos, where the Persian ships were in the habit of taking on drinking water. Before very long, *Arrianos* continues, lack of water and food compelled the "barbarians" to sail away from Miletos without having accomplished anything. During his subsequent campaigns, first in the east and then—after his victory at Issus—in the south, against Egypt, Alexander occupied one harbour after another. Gradually the once powerful Persian fleet had to be disbanded and Alexander became master of the eastern Mediterranean without having fought a single naval battle.

The method of warfare employed by Alexander was predominantly a question of tactics. Although effective it was not unreasonably cruel, particularly if one compares it with many other techniques. Its aim was to defeat the opponent as simply as possible and the spearthrust was exclusively directed against combatants.

⁵In the Swedish translator's presentation of the Greek *Arrianos*' biography of Alexander the Great, we are told that this work is one of our main sources on the career of this intrepid commander. *Arrianos*, who was born around 100 A.D., relies on documents from Alexander's own time, written by such initiated observers as Ptolemy, one of Alexander's leading generals.

2. *Civilian Population: Starvation Should Be Sanctioned only When it Causes Capitulation or Is Reasonably Calculated to do so (alt. 3)*

Mudge (pp. 266-268) recommends that starvation be defined as a lawful means of warfare "only when it causes or is reasonably calculated to cause capitulation." In other words, he wishes "to preclude deprivation of nourishment or killing from hunger where there is no military effect, *i.e.*, the causation of capitulation, or no reasonable expectation that there will be such a military effect." A definition of this kind, he says, would enable international law "adequately (to) deal with starvation in the Biafran war without rejecting traditional views."⁶

Mudge surmises that the definition thus proposed would have less effect in Europe than in Africa. "Where human starvation is accepted as a fact of life even in peace-time, it is even less reasonable to calculate that starvation as a means of warfare will cause the government of the starved population to capitulate." This would appear to be a correct conclusion. But is not the outcome also greatly influenced by many other factors, for instance by general perseverance of a population and by the power of a government over the population? *Olsson* (p. 252) has the following to say concerning the siege of Leningrad:

One condition for the survival of the City was the placid calculation by its leaders that approximately one-third of the population must succumb: so-called "dependents"—nonemployable persons other than children—were placed in a rationing class where they could hardly be expected to survive.

The actual definition is subject to serious objections. Like Article 23 of the Civilian Convention, it allows far too much scope for the discretion of the blockading power. Also it leaves the field open for uncertain assessments. Thus, how could it be "reasonably calculated" that Leningrad would not surrender, but that Biafra would?

There are obvious risks involved in a flexible definition of this kind. Evidently it would sanction any starvation of the civilian population of a state, which results in the surrender of that state. But if this result is not

⁶The essay by Mudge—entitled "Starvation as a Means of Warfare," published in January 1970 in "The International Lawyer," and the only extensive study of its kind to have appeared in recent years to the knowledge of the present writer—is a well-documented, interesting and wide-ranging analysis, thus constituting an excellent re-examination of the subject "in light of the Biafran situation" (p. 232). The article would appear to have been written in 1969 and to have been influenced profoundly by the disastrous famine then afflicting Biafra, which did not capitulate until January 12, 1970. This explains why Mudge has devoted as many as 15 of the 40 pages of his essay to the Nigerian conflict. On the other hand, he does not have a single word to say concerning the armed conflict in Vietnam, which has been in progress since 1960. This is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that cultivated land with growing crops in Vietnam has been sprayed with herbicides (*Bunn* p. 409, *Johnstone* p. 714 and *Meyrowitz* 1967 pp. 189-190).

achieved until after *several years'* commercial blockade of an entire nation or, let us assume, an entire continent, then in view of the chronological aspect one is justified in querying whether such a method of warfare reflects a reasonable relation between the laws of war and military necessity.⁷ Does this hypothetical example present acceptable proportions between means and ends? Would it not be more apt, in the light of *existing* international law (which includes the United Nations Conventions on Human Rights), to characterize such a method of warfare as prohibited?

3. *Civilian Population*

All Starvation Should Be Prohibited (alt. 4)

Powerful humanitarian arguments can be put forward in favour of alt. 4, which also presents a technical advantage.⁸

This alternative, however, presupposes that war is waged in a form which is no longer self-evident, namely, with the clear distinction asserted around the turn of the century between combatants and civilian population. Following the advent of total war, this boundary—one of the foundations of international humanitarian law—has become increasingly vague. *Lauterpacht* (B.Y.I.L. 1952 p. 364) maintains that in most respects the distinction has become "a hollow phrase," while *Schwarzenberger* (1968 Vol. 2 pp. 157-159) is still more resigned.

The same trend toward an elimination of the boundary between combatants and the civilian population distinguishes modern guerrilla warfare, itself a challenge to the law of nations, "défi au droit de la guerre" (*Meyrowitz* 1971 p. 57). According to *Mao Tse-tung* (pp. 52, 70, 134, 158), a guerrilla soldier must be able to move freely and unimpeded among the

⁷*Downey* (p. 254) suggests the following definition: "Military necessity is an urgent need, admitting of no delay, for the taking by a commander of measures, which are indispensable for forcing *as quickly as possible* (author's italics) the complete surrender of the enemy by means of regulated violence, and which are not forbidden by the laws and customs of war." Cf. the definition in the U.S. Army Field Manual 1956, sections 22-23. A number of older experts on international law—*e.g.* *Spaight* (pp. 133-139) and *Stowell* (p. 785)—show a cynical tendency to over-emphasize military necessity at the expense of humanitarian aspects. Both *Castrén* (pp. 65-66) and *Downey* (pp. 251-262) point out, however, that genuine or alleged military necessity does not justify deviations from current international law. This was expressly affirmed in a series of trials for war crimes after World War II, including the cases against Wilhelm List, *et al.* (War Crime Reports vol. 8 p. 66) and Wilhelm von Leeb, *et al.* (War Crime Reports vol. 12 pp. 93-94, 123).

⁸It should be natural to apply and obey a rule based on a clear demarcation. This argument is usually put forward in defence of international frontiers along rivers, mountain ranges, etc. *Johnstone* (p. 716) expresses the same idea when, referring to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, he says that "a line should be drawn at a clearly definable point on the scale between no gas use and total gas use." By December 1971 the 1925 Geneva Protocol had been ratified by 34 states in all, Sweden included, but not by the U.S.A., and had been subscribed to by a total of 52 states.

civilian population "like a fish in water." It is the civilian population which, in every sense of the term, "sustains" the guerrilla soldier.

Nurick (pp. 683, 696), who has made an exhaustive analysis of developments, refers to military necessity and the practice of states: "the customary practice of nations does constitute evidence of international law." Again and again he points out the importance of new rules of international law on the subject, taking into consideration the nature of war and the practice of belligerents. He says that "no purpose would be served if the next Convention on the Rules of War adopts a set of rules which in practice would be meaningless."

On the other hand the International Committee of the Red Cross (document III, 1971, p. 13), referring among other things to military manuals, contends that the distinction between combatants and civilians still remains a reality of international law. The obligation of respecting this distinction is emphasized by the Secretary General of the United Nations (Report 1970 A/8052, p. 16). A similar point of view is adopted by *Castrén* (p. 174) and the American, *Moore*. The latter has made the following noteworthy statement on p. XI of the foreword of one of his works (published in 1924 but still relevant on matter of principle):

It is hard to believe that the world is prepared to concede that, in the next war, first and legitimate measure of the belligerent forces will be to bomb or otherwise destroy producers of foodstuff and other contributory classes heretofore considered as non-combatant; and yet if the distinction between combatants and non-combatants has ceased to exist, such a measure would be legally justified and strategically correct . . . No one contributes more to this essential military gesture than the grower of grain . . . The most dangerous fighter is the tiller of the soil. It is, however, gratifying to reflect upon the fact that there is not a single government today that is either accepting or supporting such a theory.

The discussion reviewed here would appear to warrant two conclusions. The first of these is that an express prohibition by convention in line with alt. 4 can hardly be termed altogether realistic. Can one reasonably expect a belligerent completely to avoid starving out the enemy civilian population in connection with siege and blockade? And these means of warfare are both sanctioned by existing international law.

The second conclusion is that the majority of nations nonetheless affirm the fundamental convention rules concerning respect for the distinction between combatants and the civilian population.

Furthermore, we have every reason to bear in mind that "the wind of change" to which Harold Macmillan once referred, has constantly swept across the world. A case in point is the changed attitude toward the use of torture, infliction of severe physical or mental pain with a view of ex-

tracting confessions or testimony. Well into modern times this remained a lawful means of evidence, already sanctioned by Roman law. However, the use of torture was prohibited by the majority of European nations under the influence of the ideas of the Enlightenment.⁹ Today we regard torture as both a degrading and inefficient method. Although it is still practised, surely nobody would question the validity of the prohibition of torture contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

"The wind of change" is still blowing, perhaps more violently than ever in these days of the "birth pangs of the world community." Also in view of the UN Conventions on Human Rights, we should be open to second thoughts on the issues regarding starvation of civilian populations. An express prohibition *may* be a viable proposition. It should at least be investigated. It would be well in line with the main principles of international humanitarian law. Both the UN Secretary General (his report 1970 doc. A/8052 p. 18) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (Basic Texts 1972 pp. 22, 42) recommend convention provisions in this direction.

4. *Civilian Population— Certain Rules Should Be Adopted (alt. 5)*

This alternative is based on the conviction that the governments of practically all states in the world are fully aware of the horrors of modern war, and therefore desirous of rendering warfare as humane as possible. The positive attitude was already evident in 1949, as witness the four Red Cross Conventions then adopted in Geneva relative to the Protection of the Victims of War. One difficulty is raised by the notorious anxiety of the great powers to retain their freedom of action combined with differing values and modes of thought in different corners of the world. One is nonetheless disposed to believe in the possibility of widespread support for certain convention provisions.

a) PROHIBITION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF OBJECTS INDISPENSABLE TO THE SURVIVAL OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

The governments of most states should by now be prepared to forbid the destruction in the course of an armed conflict of objects which are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. Proposals for reforms

⁹In Sweden torture was abolished by King Gustaf III by a Royal Patent of August 27, 1772, ordering the destruction of the "Rose Chamber" and other "Torture Chambers," together with all instruments of torture: "all such instruments as have no foundation in law but are nonetheless inimical to liberty, humanity itself and all justice and which could be abused in the exercise of violence and tyranny against free subjects . . ."

to this effect have been put forward in many quarters: by the Institute of International Law through its 1969 Edinburgh resolution and in 1971 both by the International Committee of the Red Cross in connection with the first session of its Geneva Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts and, during this initial session, by government experts from five states (the United Arab Republic, Mexico, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden).

Certain states can be expected to object to a prohibition of this kind on the ground that it would be difficult to observe in practice and also that it would impose limitations on the freedom of action of a belligerent. However, there are powerful arguments of a generally preventive and humanitarian nature which can be put forward in favour of the prohibition. Moreover, it is contrary to all reason and, in this age of population explosion with its attendant spectre of world starvation and environmental impoverishment, unpardonable to destroy any portion, no matter how small, of the earth's limited resources of foodstuffs, cultivable land, etc.¹⁰

b) PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Another urgent requirement with a view to the survival of the civilian population, concerns the general acceptance of existing bans on the use by belligerents of weapons particularly endangering food production. These bans refer, *e.g.*, to the use of herbicides, and the dissemination of infectious animal and plant diseases.

¹⁰Statistics quoted by *Falk* (pp. 514-515) and *Palmstierna* (pp. 13, 19) show that the population of the world is doubling at an increasing rate. In round figures it was 0.5 billion in 1650, 1 billion in 1850, 2 billion in 1930 and 3.6 billion in 1970. It is now being doubled approximately every thirty-five years. If this trend continues, then according to statistical predictions, the world population will increase as follows:

to	6 billion	by	2000
"	12	"	2035
"	24	"	2070
"	40	"	2105

In 1969 it was estimated that 10,000 people die every day in the developing countries, from diseases due to malnutrition. One should also note that it is in these very countries that population is expected to rise most dramatically: from 2 billion in 1960 to over 3 billion in 1980, and upwards of 4.5 billion in 2000. *Falk* (p. 518) writes that "the continuation of these reproductive habits for many more decades is almost certain to result in national, regional, and possibly global catastrophe." Formerly, population growth was restrained by epidemics (*e.g.* the Black Death during the mid-fourteenth century), war and famine. In our own interests—if mankind is to survive—we must now try to limit population increase and with it world starvation by peaceful means. This can be done by means of birth control measures combined with active environmental protection and a better utilization and more even distribution of the limited resources of the globe.

c) REVIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF CONTRABAND OF WAR

In a review of the concept of contraband of war, two solutions may be considered with regard to foodstuffs.

One of these solutions—foodstuffs may be treated as conditional contraband of war—is based on the unratified London Declaration of 1909 Concerning the Laws of Maritime War (Art. 24, 33-36), and accords with the basic idea of many of the reforms that have now been proposed, namely that during blockade and siege a belligerent shall be duty bound to allow free passage for food consignments exclusively intended for the civilian population.

The second solution—whereby foodstuffs may not be declared contraband of war (*cf.*, *Lauterpacht* 1952 Vol. 11 p. 805)—can be justified on the following grounds. If one concedes, in accordance with the London Declaration, that foodstuffs may be treated as conditional contraband of war, experiences from both world wars testifies that one thereby paves the way to increasingly severe restrictions of food supplies. The solution whereby foodstuffs may not be declared contraband of war at all is considerably more far-reaching. A radical proposal of this kind would presumably meet with vehement opposition in certain quarters but would nonetheless appear to be of greater practical worth than the first solution. Also it is clearly in line with the purpose of a regulation by convention, which would aim at limiting the use of starvation as a method of warfare.

This question is also a matter of obvious interest to neutral states, for whom the task of arranging food supplies for their populations during an international war is both vital and difficult. Every neutral state, negotiating for safe conduct for import deliveries, should therefore welcome a convention provision aimed at unimpeded transport of foodstuffs.

d) FREE PASSAGE FOR CERTAIN RELIEF CONSIGNMENTS

Blockade, like siege, is a permissible method of warfare. As nations become more and more dependent on the mutual exchange of commodities, the effects of blockade on the civilian population are tending to become more and more disastrous. Here it will be sufficient to recall the starvation that occurred during the two world wars and during the Nigerian conflict. During these three conflicts it proved extremely difficult to obtain free passage for international aid consignments.

The root cause of these difficulties lies in the problem of total war, but to a certain extent they are also attributable to three distressing lacunae in existing international law. Firstly, Art. 23 of the Civilian Convention envisages relief supplies of foodstuffs, not to the entire civilian population but only to the most "vulnerable" groups ("children under fifteen, ex-

pectant mothers and maternity cases"). Secondly, the phrasing of Art. 23 allows far too much scope for the discretionary assessment of the blockading power. Thirdly, Art. 23 applies only to international armed conflicts (and not, *e.g.*, to civil wars).

An extension of the scope of Art. 23 is thus urgently needed. In other words, we should work for the adoption of convention articles assuring to the entire civilian population, relief consignments of essential foodstuffs during blockade and siege in any kind of armed conflict.¹¹

The militarily justifiable demands of the blockading or besieging power for guarantees against abuse—*e.g.*, through the relief consignments being delivered to combatants on the opposite side—can be met by means of a clause providing for strict control at all stages of the distribution process. This control should in the first instance be entrusted to a Protecting Power, "to a neutral Power, to the International Committee of the Red Cross or to any other impartial humanitarian body" (Civilian Convention Art. 61).

This prescription of control is designed to dispel any misgivings that may be entertained by such traditional maritime powers as Great Britain and the United States. During the 1949 Diplomatic Conference in Geneva, these states insisted on guarantees against the abuse of the right of free passage through a commercial blockade. Relief consignments were not to result indirectly in primary advantages to the enemy's war effort ("Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949" II A pp. 635-637, 763-764, 819-820).

Here again one can emphasize the powerful humanitarian considerations in favour of all civilian populations being spared from starvation as far as possible. It is therefore to be hoped that Great Britain and the United States are in principle disposed to accede to this proposal for free passage (*cf. Lauterpacht B.Y.I.L.* 1952 pp. 376, 379). In the years 1970-72 this has been put forward by the Secretary General of the United Nations, and by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and also by government experts from a number of countries.

An attempt has been made to elucidate this alternative in a later section (IV), containing a preliminary draft of convention articles, based on the

¹¹In an occupied territory it is the duty of the Occupying Power, to the best of its ability, to ensure the food and medical supplies of the population (Civilian Convention Art. 55). If the population of that occupied territory is inadequately supplied, "the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of said population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal." Such schemes, which may be undertaken either by States or by impartial humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, shall consist, in particular, of the provisions of consignments of foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing.—All Contracting Parties shall permit the free passage of these consignments and shall guarantee their protection." (Art. 59)

reforms proposed in recent years. This draft is to be regarded as a further contribution to the discussion of the matter.

5. Is Alternative 5 Meaningful?

One plausible objection to alternative 5 is that it goes too far, that it is "unrealistic." To this one can rejoin that the proposal has emerged from a review of different means of warfare (siege, blockade etc.). Other objections which lie very near at hand can be expressed in questions of the following kind: Can rules of international law which we know from experience are violated over and over again, honestly be said to serve any useful purpose? And is it not pointless to regulate one method of warfare (starvation) so long as other, far more effective methods (*e.g.*, aerial warfare) are left unregulated?

This would seem to be a telling argument. It overlooks, however, the fact that the laws and customs of war are predominantly based on humanitarian principles. With this in mind, the unflinching prevention of cruelty, the saving of human lives and the preservation of human dignity must stand forth as an urgent necessity. The nations concerned have established these principles¹² because the prevention of unnecessary suffering is a matter of mutual concern to them. Considerations of this kind, coupled with the instinct of self-preservation and the fear of reprisals, also serve to explain the "balance of terror." Moreover it will be recalled that poison gas was not used during World War II in spite of the preparations made for doing so (*Bunn* p. 386, n. 57), and that no nation has resorted to nuclear weapons since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The same interests speak for the greatest possible protection of the civilian population—not least within the context of the articles proposed here.

Greenspan (p. 22) rightly observes that "a regulated war is a lesser evil than an unregulated war." At the same time, more than one expert on international law is profoundly pessimistic on this point. *Schwarzenberger* ("The Year Book of World Affairs" 1968 p. 213) comes under this category. He does not discount the possibility of the nuclear weapon powers, in case of need, abandoning all restraint:

to forsake civilisation and accept the consequences of mechanised and depersonalised warfare or, in other words, mid-twentieth century barbarism in its most destructive form. These are the real obstacles in the paths of would-be reformers on the lines of Nuremberg and Geneva.

¹²In "Martens Clause" the High Contracting Parties refer to "the principles of the law of nations, derived from usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of the public conscience." "Martens Clause" is the declaration in the preamble to the 1907 Hague Conventions, named after Geheime Rat de Martens, one of the three Russian delegates at the 1907 Hague Conference.

But passivity and sighs of resignation solve no problems.¹³ In the words of the Swedish poet *Gustaf Fröding*, it is our task "not like barbarians to cower in fear and madness neath hard strokes of fate."

Any human being who is faced with a dangerous predicament will try to save himself, as in the case of a pedestrian leaping out of the way of an oncoming car. This cannot be called escapism. By the same token it is meaningful to put forward proposals for rules of international law attuned to contemporary requirements. *Lauterpacht* (B.Y.I.L. 1952 p. 379) has indicated a "signpost" for the review of the laws of war. Revision, he writes, should refer "not to existing law but to more compelling considerations of humanity, of the survival of civilization, and of the sanctity of the individual human being."

IV. Draft Convention Articles

(Applying to any armed conflict except where specified to the contrary.)

1. General

It is proposed that additional protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions be made to include provisions concerning the protection of the civilian population from starvation.

A preliminary draft of provisions to this effect is given below (items 2-5). It is assumed here that additional protocols will include:

- a) a preamble stating the following: according to the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, the only legitimate object of war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy. Cf. Basic Texts p. 5.
- b) provisions regarding the purpose of the protocols, their applicability, interpretation etc.
- c) definitions of the terms "civilian population," "military objectives" and "non-military objectives."¹⁴ Should possibly a definition of the term "starvation" be found desirable, a suitable basis may be found in Art. II of the 1948 Genocide Convention together with the reform proposals mentioned here (*vid.*, sections II 3 and III 4).

2. Prohibition of the Destruction of Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population

(*Vid.*, 1971 Geneva expert draft Art. 13. Cf. Basic Texts p. 17 Art. 48.)

Objects which are indispensable to the survival of the civilian popu-

¹³From this point of view it seems somewhat regrettable that the International Law Commission has not been able to devote more attention to the question of respect for human rights in armed conflicts (*Castrén* p. 7, *Greenspan* p. 21, *Lauterpacht* B.Y.I.L. 1952 p. 360 and *Schwarzenberger* "The Year Book of World Affairs" 1968 pp. 198-201). It is all the more encouraging that so much attention has been paid to the subject by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Secretary General of the United Nations.

¹⁴Concerning these definitions, *vid.*, 1971 Geneva expert draft Art. 5 and 11. Cf. ICRC's Basic Texts pp. 15-16 Art. 41-44.

lation, such as foodstuffs and food producing areas, crops, cattle, water resources and constructions designed for the regulation of such resources must never be subjected to attacks directly launched against them, nor be attacked by way of reprisals.¹⁵

3. Prohibition of the Use of Biological and Chemical Weapons

(*Vid.*, 1925 Geneva Protocol. Basic Texts Art. 30 "Means of Combat" should be amplified.)

The use in armed conflicts of any chemical or biological agents of warfare against man, animals and plants is expressly prohibited.

4. Revision of the Concept of Contraband of War

(*Cf.*, Basic Texts pp. 15-16. The section entitled "General Provisions.")

Three alternatives are put forward here for discussion:

- a. Foodstuffs may be treated as contraband of war under the name of conditional contraband.
- b. Foodstuffs may not be declared contraband of war.
- c. Additional protocols contain no provisions on this point.

5. Free Passage for Certain Relief Consignments

a. GENERAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING RELIEF ACTIONS

(*Vid.*, 1971 Geneva expert draft Art. 30. *Cf.*, Basic Texts p. 22 Art. 64 and p. 42 Art. 30.)

Relief actions. The parties to a conflict shall exercise their authority in such a way as to facilitate actions aiming at assistance and aid, including medical supplies, essential foodstuffs and other material vital to the survival of the civilian population. The offer of such assistance shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act, especially when coming from impartial international organizations.

b. FREE PASSAGE

(Civilian Convention Art. 23)

International armed conflict. (*Vid.*, Basic Texts p. 22 Art. 65. The final words of the first paragraph "of another . . . its enemy" constitute one rewording.)

¹⁵There are advocates of the idea of a prohibition according to Art. 13 of the expert draft also applying to a nation's own armed forces, *i.e.*, covering scorched earth tactics. In this case the final words "by way of reprisals" could be followed by "or destroyed by pre-emptive action" (*cf.*, Basic Texts p. 17 Art. 48:2). However, there are several objections to this idea. Scorched earth tactics must be permissible on the part of the defending side. No state is prepared to supply an invading enemy with foodstuffs, fuel, harbours, airfields, bridges, etc. Subject to certain conditions, Swedish law sanctions the destruction, in time of war or when war is imminent, of "property of such a nature that the enemy's possession thereof would significantly enhance his war effort." Before deciding in favour of destruction, the authority concerned must pay due regard to the conditions of its own civilian population.

The High Contracting Parties shall grant free passage to relief consignments destined exclusively to the civilian population of another High Contracting Party, even if the latter is its enemy.

These Parties shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements for the conveyance of relief. They may not, in any way whatsoever, divert relief consignments from their proper destination, nor delay their conveyance. They have the right to be reasonably satisfied, through the Protecting Power, its substitute, or an impartial humanitarian organization, that these consignments are used exclusively for the relief of the needy civilian population.

Armed conflict not being of an international character. (Vid., Basic Texts p. 42 Art. 31.)

In cases of blockade or siege, the Parties to the conflict, or any High Contracting Party concerned, shall allow the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing, medical and hospital stores and shelter facilities, intended only for civilians.

The Parties to the conflict, or any High Contracting Party concerned, shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements under which the passage of relief supplies shall be allowed. They shall in no way whatsoever divert relief consignments from the purpose for which they are intended or delay the forwarding of such consignments.

The Parties to the conflict, or any High Contracting Party concerned, may make such permission conditional on the distribution only to the persons benefited thereby being made under the supervision of an impartial humanitarian body.

V. Summary

Starvation is an ancient method of warfare. Its aim may be to destroy crops and other food resources *within* a state (e.g., by means of devastation or herbicide spraying), or to cut off supplies of food *from outside* (e.g., by blockade or siege).

Starvation as a method of warfare has been studied by the present writer in the light of existing international law and practice in armed conflicts and also in the context of certain proposals for reforms put forward in the years 1969-72. The result of the study is presented in this article, which shows that opinions are divided concerning the permissibility of starving civilian populations. Unambiguous rules of international law would therefore be welcome. Regulation by means of convention should relate to concrete situations. These can vary considerably in different parts of the world, and in relation to the outward framework of the conflict (its nature and scope, the resources of the belligerents, etc.).

According to one alternative (referred to here as *alt. 3*) the starvation of a civilian population would be permissible only when such an action causes capitulation or is reasonably calculated to do so. This alternative is rejected here, above all because it affords too much scope for discretionary decisions and uncertain assessments.

Another alternative which has been studied is for all starvation of civilian populations to be prohibited (*alt. 4*). A prohibition of this kind presupposes that one can still speak in terms of a distinction between combatants and civilian population. The transition to total war and to guerrilla warfare renders this distinction—one of the foundations of international humanitarian law—increasingly vague. On the other hand there is a great deal to suggest that distinction between combatants and civilian population still remains a reality of international law. Thus an express prohibition of starvation could nonetheless be a viable proposition.

The analysis leads, however, to the recommendation of a "package" containing certain rules (*alt. 5*). It is proposed that this comprise, firstly, a prohibition of the destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population and, secondly, general acceptance of existing bans on the use by belligerents of weapons particularly endangering food production as implied in the prohibition of the use of biological and chemical weapons. A revision of the concept of contraband of war is also recommended. Finally, convention articles are proposed which in any form of armed conflict would guarantee the entire civilian population essential food supplies during a blockade or siege.

Alternative 5 is elucidated by means of a preliminary draft of convention articles. This draft is based on a review of the reform proposals and is intended as a contribution for discussion. The values at stake, which constitute the fundamental motives of alternative 5, are "compelling considerations of humanity, of the survival of civilization, and of the sanctity of the individual human being."

Bibliography

1. General Works

- Arrianos. *Alexander the Great and His Martial Exploits*. Swedish translation by Ivar A. Heikel. Stockholm, 1944.
- Bunn, George. "Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should the United States Agree?" *Wisconsin Law Review*. 1969.
- Castrén, Erik. *The Present Law of War and Neutrality*. Helsinki, 1954.

- Downey, William Gerald. "The Law of War and Military Necessity." *A.J.I.L.* 47 1953.
- Falk, Richard A. "World Population and International Law." *A.J.I.L.* 63 1969.
- Fröding, Gustaf. *Collected Poems*. Stockholm, 1910. The lines quoted form the conclusion of the poem "Ur Anabasis."
- Garner, James W. *International Law and the World War*. Vol. I-II London, 1920.
- Goldmann, Kjell. *International Norms and War between States*. Three Studies in International Politics. Stockholm, 1971.
- Greenspan, Morris. *The Modern Law of Land Warfare*. Los Angeles, 1959.
- Johnstone, L. Craig. "Ecocide and the Geneva Protocol." *Foreign Affairs*. New York, 1971.
- Lauterpacht, H. *Oppenheim's International Law*. 7th ed., London, 1952. Vol. II. "Disputes, War and Neutrality."
- . "The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War." *B.Y.I.L.* 29 1952.
- Mao Tse-tung. *Selected Military Writings*. Peking, 1963.
- Mertens, Pierre. "Les modalités de l'intervention du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge dans le conflit du Nigéria." *A.F.D.I.* XV 1969.
- Meyrowitz, Henri. "Le droit de la guerre dans le conflit vietnamien." *A.F.D.I.* XIII 1967.
- . *La guérilla et le droit de la guerre. Problèmes principaux*. *R.B.D.I.* 1971:1.
- Moore, John Bassett. *International Law and Some Current Illustrations*. New York, 1924.
- Mudge, George Alfred. "Starvation as a Means of Warfare." *The International Lawyer* Vol. 4, No. 2. New Orleans-Chicago, 1970.
- Nurick, Lester. "The Distinction between Combatant and Non-Combatant in the Law of War." *A.J.I.L.* 39, 1945.
- Olsson, Jan Olof. *Leningrad*. St. Petersburg. 2nd ed. Stockholm, 1970.
- Palmstierna, Hans. *Pillage, Starvation and Poisoning*. Stockholm, 1967.

- Schwarzenberger, Georg. *International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals*. Vol. 2 London, 1968.
- . "Neo-Barbarism and International Law." *The Year Book of World Affairs*. London, 1968.
- Spaight, J. M. *War Rights on Land*. London, 1911.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). *The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare*. (1971-1972). A series of six volumes, of which vol. I, IV and V had been published by July, 1972.
- Stowell, Ellery C. "The Laws of War and the Atomic Bomb." *A.J.I.L.* 39 1945.
- Wykes, Alan. *The Siege of Leningrad: Epic of Survival*. London, 1969.

2. Red Cross Documents

Documents for participants in the 1971 Geneva Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (selection)

III. Protection of the Civilian Population against Dangers of Hostilities (Geneva, January 1971)

1971 Geneva expert draft = Outline of an Instrument on the Protection of the Civilian Population against the Dangers of Hostilities. Working paper submitted by the Experts of Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Republic and Netherlands (CE/Com.III/44; 4 June, 1971).

Documents for participants in the 1972 Geneva Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (selection)

- I. Basic Texts. Documentary Material submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva, January 1972).
- II. Commentary part one, part two (Geneva, January 1972).

3. UN Documents

Reports by the Secretary General on "Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts" (UN Dec. 1969 A/7720, 1970 A/8052 and 1971 A/8370).

A Concise Summary of the World Population in 1970 (ST/SOA/Series A/48; New York 1971).


4. Cases

War Crime Reports. Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Selected and prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commissions. His Majesty's Stationery Office, London. Vol. 8 1949; ch. 12 1949.
See also, Schwarzenberger Vol. 2 1968.

Abbreviation

- A.F.D.I. *Annuaire Français de Droit International* (Paris)
A.J.I.L. *The American Journal of International Law* (Washington, D.C.)
alt. alternative
Basic Texts. *vid.* Bibliography, ad Red Cross Documents
B.Y.I.L. *The British Yearbook of International Law* (London)
Civilian Convention. The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. By 1971 the 1949 Geneva Conventions (four in number) had been ratified or subscribed to by 127 states, including Sweden and the United States.
I.C.R.C. International Committee of the Red Cross
Land Warfare Regulations. The 1907 Hague Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. By 1971 the Hague Convention (No. IV) Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land together with its appurtenant Regulations had been ratified or subscribed to by 44 nations, including Sweden and the United States.
R.B.D.I. *Revue Belge de Droit International*. Brussels.
War Crime Reports. *vid.* Bibliography, ad Cases.
1971 Geneva expert draft. *vid.* Bibliography, ad Red Cross Documents.

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/13162
13 March 1979

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Noting with grave concern that the situation in the region of South-East Asia has seriously deteriorated,

Concerned that the mounting friction and growing tension in and around the region have resulted in an escalation of armed activities and widening of the conflict area,

Deeply regretting the armed intervention in the internal affairs of Democratic Kampuchea and the armed attack against the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

Reiterating its firm commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and to the accepted principles of international law,

Emphasizing that all States shall refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or independence of any State,

Recognizing its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Urgently calls upon all parties to cease all hostilities forthwith;
2. Further calls upon all parties to the conflicts to withdraw their forces to their own countries;
3. Appeals to them and to States outside the region to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any acts which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflicts;
4. Reaffirms that all States shall scrupulously respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of other States;

5. Calls upon all parties to the conflicts to settle their disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
 6. Welcomes the offer of the good offices of the Secretary-General in the search for a peaceful solution;
 7. Decides to remain seized of the question.
-

NATIONS UNIES
CONSEIL
DE SECURITE



Distr.
GENERALE
S/13162
13 mars 1979
FRANCAIS
ORIGINAL : ANGLAIS

Indonésie, Malaisie, Philippines, Singapour et Thaïlande :
projet de résolution

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Notant avec une profonde préoccupation que la situation dans la région de l'Asie du Sud-Est s'est gravement détériorée,

Préoccupé par le fait que la friction croissante et la tension accrue dans la région et aux alentours ont provoqué une escalade des activités armées et un élargissement de la zone de conflit,

Regrettant profondément l'intervention armée dans les affaires intérieures du Kampuchea démocratique et l'attaque armée contre la République socialiste du Viet Nam,

Réitérant son ferme attachement à la Charte des Nations Unies et aux principes acceptés du droit international,

Soulignant que tous les Etats doivent s'abstenir, dans leurs relations internationales, de recourir à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force contre la souveraineté, l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance de tout Etat,

Conscient de la responsabilité principale du maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales qui lui incombe en vertu de la Charte des Nations Unies,

1. Demande instamment à toutes les parties de cesser immédiatement toutes les hostilités;
2. Demande en outre à toutes les parties aux conflits de ramener leurs forces dans leur propre pays;
3. Fait appel auxdites parties et aux Etats situés hors de la région pour qu'ils fassent preuve de la plus grande modération et s'abstiennent de tous actes qui pourraient conduire à une nouvelle escalade et à un nouvel élargissement des conflits;
4. Réaffirme que tous les Etats devront respecter scrupuleusement la souveraineté, l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance d'autres Etats;


/...

5. Demande à toutes les parties aux conflits de régler leurs différends par des moyens pacifiques conformément à la Charte des Nations Unies;

6. Accueille avec satisfaction l'offre de bons offices du Secrétaire général dans la recherche d'une solution pacifique;

7. Décide de rester saisi de la question.

NATIONS UNIES



**ASSEMBLÉE
GÉNÉRALE**



**CONSEIL
DE SÉCURITÉ**

Distr.
GÉNÉRALE

A/34/116
S/13159
12 mars 1979

ORIGINAL : FRANCAIS

ASSEMBLEE GENERALE
Trente-quatrième session
Point 46 de la liste préliminaire*
APPLICATION DE LA DECLARATION SUR LE RENFORCEMENT
DE LA SECURITE INTERNATIONALE

CONSEIL DE SECURITE
Trente-quatrième année

Lettre datée du 12 mars 1979, adressée au Secrétaire général
par M. Thiounn Prasith, Ambassadeur extraordinaire et pléni-
potentiaire du Kampuchea démocratique

J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint, pour votre information, les dernières nouvelles de la guerre populaire de résistance contre l'invasion et l'occupation vietnamiennes du Kampuchea démocratique du 28 février au 2 mars 1979.

Je vous prie de bien vouloir faire distribuer ces nouvelles comme document officiel de l'Assemblée générale, au titre du point 46 de la liste préliminaire, et du Conseil de sécurité.

L'Ambassadeur extraordinaire et
plénipotentiaire du Kampuchea
démocratique,

(Signé) THIOUNN PRASITH

* A/34/50.

Annexe

Résumé des nouvelles de la guerre populaire de résistance contre l'invasion et l'occupation vietnamiennes du Kampuchea démocratique du 28 février au 2 mars 1979 diffusées par le Ministère de l'information du Kampuchea démocratique

L'armée révolutionnaire du Kampuchea (ARK) et les unités de guérilleros continuent à lever haut le drapeau de lutte contre les envahisseurs vietnamiens. Sur tous les fronts, les forces vives de l'ennemi sont anéanties par pans entiers. Affamés dans leurs positions encerclées par l'ARK, les envahisseurs vietnamiens tentent d'en sortir pour aller piller le riz de la population. Mais, à chaque fois, ils sont interceptés et anéantis par l'ARK et les unités de guérilleros.

1. DANS LES ENVIRONS DE PHNOM PENH

Les 26, 27 et 28 février et 1er mars, l'ARK a lancé des attaques à Bat Doeng, Chan Thnal, Kaach Poun, Phum Thmei et Kgeuk Porng. Soixante-seize soldats vietnamiens ont été tués et de nombreux autres blessés.

Le 28 février, l'ARK a complètement balayé les envahisseurs vietnamiens de Trapeang Lovea, Batt Kaun, Trapeang Veng et Vat Te Ok en leur infligeant de lourdes pertes.

2. ZONE SUD-OUEST

Le 25 février, l'ARK a complètement anéanti l'ennemi à Trapeang Andoeurk, district de Tram Kak, province de Takeo. Parmi les 45 ennemis tués sur le terrain, il y avait trois conseillers militaires soviétiques, deux tanks, trois véhicules militaires ont été détruits. En plus des deux canons de 155mm et trois canons de 105mm saisis (bilan déjà diffusé dans le bulletin No 5), l'ARK a également saisi trois camions GMC et un autre véhicule militaire.

Le 28 février, toujours sur le front de Trapeang Andoeurk, l'ARK a anéanti 150 soldats vietnamiens, capturé 10 et blessé un grand nombre d'autres. Elle a saisi deux camions, dont l'un chargé d'obus de 105mm et l'autre, de riz. Soixante-treize armes diverses et 12 postes émetteurs-récepteurs C25 ont été également saisis.

Le 1er mars, les envahisseurs vietnamiens, réfugiés sur le mont Phnom Keek Tun et affamés, sont descendus pour piller le riz de la population. Ils ont été interceptés par l'ARK, qui a tué 25 d'entre eux et blessé plusieurs autres. Le même jour, l'ARK a détruit un véhicule militaire sur la route nationale No 3 en direction de Vat Chak et a tué 30 soldats vietnamiens.

/...

Le 2 mars, l'ARK a intercepté les envahisseurs vietnamiens qui tentaient de sortir de Paing Kasey et tué 15 d'entre eux.

Le 26 février, l'ARK a lancé des attaques à Prey Sbat, Keek Tum, Batt Kaun, Vat Chhouk et Phum Thmei. Elle a tué 58 soldats vietnamiens et détruit un véhicule militaire.

Le 28 février, l'ARK a anéanti une unité entière des envahisseurs vietnamiens à Keek Tum. Le même jour, elle a intercepté l'ennemi qui tentait de sortir de Ang Rolum Torng et Phum Hang ainsi qu'au village de Champar Cher et Chrey Ho Phnaou. Bilan : 91 soldats vietnamiens tués, plusieurs blessés et nombreuses armes saisies.

3. ZONE DE KOH KONG

Le 20 février, l'ARK a totalement balayé les soldats vietnamiens dans l'île de Koh Mnoaa, en face de Thmar Sar. Parmi les 45 ennemis tués se trouvaient deux conseillers militaires soviétiques. Les restants se sont tous jetés à la mer. De nombreuses armes ont été saisies ainsi qu'un poste émetteur-récepteur C25.

Le 22 février, l'ARK a coulé un bateau de guerre vietnamien qui traversait le détroit de Pauy Yeam Sen, faisant plusieurs tués et blessés parmi les soldats ennemis.

4. ZONE NORD-OUEST

Le 27 février, l'ARK a attaqué l'ennemi le long de la voie ferrée, au sud de la ville de Battambang, a tué 15 d'entre eux et en a blessé plusieurs autres.

Le 28 février à Thmar Kol, 27 envahisseurs vietnamiens ont été tués et de nombreux autres blessés.

Le 28 février et le 1er mars, des unités de guérilleros ont tué six soldats vietnamiens et blessé plusieurs autres dans le centre de la ville de Battambang.

Le 28 février, à O Sralav et Vet Ta Mim, 15 soldats vietnamiens ont été tués, plusieurs autres blessés; de nombreuses armes et une quantité de médicaments et de matériel médical ont été saisies.

Les 1er et 2 mars, l'ARK et les unités de guérilleros ont intercepté les envahisseurs vietnamiens qui tentaient de sortir de la ville de Battambang pour aller piller le riz de la population. Elles ont tué 47 soldats vietnamiens, blessé plusieurs autres et ont saisi 31 fusils AK.

Le 1er mars, six camions militaires vietnamiens transportant des troupes et du matériel ont sauté sur des mines à la sortie de la ville de Pursat. Deux camions ont été détruits et un autre gravement endommagé. Tous leurs occupants ont été tués.

/...

Le 2 mars, les envahisseurs vietnamiens encerclés dans la ville de Pursat et affamés ont tenté de sortir pour aller piller le riz de la population à la coopérative de Roleap. Dix d'entre eux ont été tués et les rescapés se sont tous enfuis vers la ville.

Du 17 au 19 février, l'ARK a tué 50 soldats vietnamiens et blessé de nombreux autres autour de la ville de Kompong Chhaang.

Le 26 février, l'ARK a attaqué l'ennemi à Banteay Chey Kraing Leau. Elle a tué 15 soldats ennemis, blessé plusieurs autres et détruit deux canons.

Le 28 février et le 1er mars, les unités de guérilleros ont éliminé 18 soldats vietnamiens autour de la ville de Kompong Chhnang. Le 1er mars, elles ont intercepté les envahisseurs vietnamiens qui tentaient de sortir de la ville pour aller piller le riz de la population et elles en ont tué huit et mis en fuite les rescapés.

5. ZONE NORD-EST

Sur le front de Kratié, bilan supplémentaire du 21 au 24 février : l'ARK et les unités de guérilleros ont intercepté les envahisseurs vietnamiens près du village Achar Khnaol, à l'ouest de Phnom Sruoch, au village Chamrong, au village Ekpheap et à Trapeang Skor. Elles ont tué 90 soldats vietnamiens, capturé deux et blessé plusieurs autres; elles ont saisi de nombreuses armes dont 23AK, 4 B40, 10 B41, un poste C25, et détruit un véhicule militaire.

Du 25 au 28 février, l'ARK et les unités de guérilleros ont attaqué à plusieurs reprises les envahisseurs vietnamiens qui, affamés, ont tenté de sortir de la ville de Kratié pour aller piller le riz de la population. Elles ont tué 44 soldats vietnamiens et blessé de nombreux autres; elles ont coulé une barque tuant tous ses occupants.

Sur le front de Rattanakiri, les 24, 25 et 28 février, les unités de guérilleros au nord de Siempang, au Phum Srama (le long du fleuve Se San) et à Voeunaai (au barrage O Tag) ont tué 38 soldats vietnamiens, capturé deux et blessé plusieurs autres notamment avec des chausse-trapes.

Les 1er et 2 mars, les unités de guérilleros ont attaqué les envahisseurs vietnamiens dans Voeunsai, à l'ouest de Ban Lung et à O Dam Bauk. Bilan : 12 soldats vietnamiens tués et de nombreux autres blessés : deux avions militaires détruits avec tous leurs occupants tués.

BILAN DU 28 FEVRIER AU 2 MARS 1979 (avec des chiffres complémentaires du 17 au 19 février pour le front de Kompong Chhnang et du 20 au 27 février pour d'autres fronts) :


/...

A/34/116
S/13159
Français
Annexe
Page 4

- Plus de 1 500 soldats vietnamiens tués, cinq conseillers soviétiques tués;
 - Quatorze soldats vietnamiens capturés;
 - Deux tanks, un bateau de guerre, deux canons et 12 véhicules militaires ennemis détruits;
 - Sept véhicules militaires, 14 postes émetteurs-récepteurs et une importante quantité d'armes et de munitions saisis.
-

NATIONS UNIES

ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE  CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ



Distr.
GÉNÉRALE
A/34/117
S/13160
12 mars 1979
ORIGINAL : ANGLAIS

ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE
Trente-quatrième session
Point 46 de la liste préliminaire*
APPLICATION DE LA DÉCLARATION SUR LE RENFORCEMENT
DE LA SÉCURITÉ INTERNATIONALE

CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ
Trente-quatrième année

Lettre datée du 12 mars 1979, adressée au Secrétaire général
par M. Thiounn Prasith, ambassadeur extraordinaire et
plénipotentiaire du Kampuchea démocratique

J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint, pour votre information, la déclaration en date du 8 mars 1979 du porte-parole du Ministère des affaires étrangères du Gouvernement du Kampuchea démocratique concernant la mobilisation générale décrétée par l'Administration vietnamienne en vue d'intensifier sa guerre au Kampuchea.

Je vous prie de bien vouloir la faire distribuer comme document officiel de l'Assemblée générale, au titre du point 46 de la liste préliminaire, et du Conseil de sécurité.

L'Ambassadeur extraordinaire et
plénipotentiaire du Kampuchea
démocratique,

(Signé) Thiounn PRASITH

* A/34/50.

ANNEXE

Déclaration, en date du 8 mars 1979, du porte-parole du Ministère des affaires étrangères du Gouvernement du Kampuchea démocratique concernant la mobilisation générale décrétée par l'Administration vietnamienne en vue d'intensifier sa guerre au Kampuchea

Le porte-parole du Ministère des affaires étrangères du Gouvernement du Kampuchea démocratique a reçu l'autorisation de faire la déclaration suivante, concernant la mobilisation générale décrétée par l'Administration vietnamienne en vue d'intensifier sa guerre au Kampuchea :

1. La clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong et ses maîtres soviétiques ont mis en pratique leur ambition de dominer l'Indochine, l'Asie du Sud-Est, l'Asie et le Pacifique, en menant une agression armée des plus barbares contre le Kampuchea.

En effet, depuis le 25 décembre 1978 jusqu'à l'heure actuelle, les troupes d'agression de la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong, au nombre de 150 000 hommes, appuyés par de très nombreux tanks, canons, avions et navires de guerre, ont envahi et occupé le Kampuchea.

2. Face à cette invasion cruelle et barbare de la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong, l'héroïque peuple et l'héroïque armée révolutionnaire du Kampuchea, ayant des traditions de combattre et de vaincre les agressions étrangères à toutes les époques, ont rassemblé toutes les forces nationales, tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur du pays, en un large front patriotique et démocratique; sont en train de lever haut le drapeau de l'indépendance, de la paix, de la neutralité et du non-alignement; et contre-attaquent, sous toutes les formes, les troupes vietnamiennes d'invasion, anéantissant et détruisant en très grand nombre les forces vives et les équipements militaires de l'ennemi. Les envahisseurs vietnamiens sont en train de s'enliser profondément dans la guerre populaire au Kampuchea, sur tous les fronts, grands et petits. Les forces vives de l'ennemi - 150 000 hommes - et ses équipements militaires sont détruits et réduits chaque jour par les guérilleros, l'armée révolutionnaire et le peuple du Kampuchea.

Les victoires quotidiennes de la guerre populaire sur tous les fronts ont causés un manque énorme d'effectifs dans les rangs de l'ennemi vietnamien pour la poursuite de son agression et de son occupation complète du Kampuchea et pour l'application de la "khmerisation" de sa guerre au Kampuchea.

3. En raison, d'une part, de sa lourde défaite sur le front du Kampuchea et, d'autre part, des difficultés de plus en plus grandes à la fois sur les plans politique, militaire et économique qu'elle rencontre dans son propre pays, et du fait qu'elle est isolée à l'extrême sur le plan international, la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong poursuit son aventure en

proclamant la loi martiale qui décrète une mobilisation générale massive en vue de l'utiliser essentiellement contre le Kampuchea et de préparer à temps la "khmerisation" de sa guerre au Kampuchea. C'est dans cette situation que le Viet Nam intensifie sa guerre au Kampuchea de la façon la plus sauvage avec tous les risques que cela comporte.

La mobilisation générale massive et l'intensification de la guerre au Kampuchea entreprises par la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong, d'une part, causent des pertes de plus en plus nombreuses parmi la jeunesse vietnamienne, séparent les familles et aggravent la famine et la misère parmi le peuple vietnamien. D'autre part, la situation en Asie du Sud-Est, en Asie, dans le Pacifique et dans le monde, situation qui est déjà très tendue à cause de la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong et de ses maîtres soviétiques, devient et deviendra de plus en plus tendue et pourra conduire à une guerre régionale et même à une guerre plus large.

Quelles que soient les difficultés qu'ils doivent affronter, le peuple et l'armée révolutionnaire du Kampuchea, sous la direction du Gouvernement du Kampuchea démocratique, sont résolument déterminés à infliger une défaite totale à la politique et aux actes d'intensification de la guerre au Kampuchea menés par la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong.

C'est là la seule voie qui peut sauvegarder et défendre le Kampuchea, son peuple et sa nation, assurer leur pérennité et contribuer activement à éliminer la tension et les menaces d'agression de la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong et de ses maîtres contre tous les pays et peuples d'Asie du Sud-Est, d'Asie, du Pacifique et du monde.

Face à ces manoeuvres et activités perfides d'agression extrêmement fasciste et barbare de la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong et de ses maîtres, tous les pays et peuples épris d'indépendance, de paix et de justice dans le monde et, en particulier, tous les pays et peuples du Sud-Est asiatique ont leurs destinées étroitement liées et affrontent le même danger venant d'un ennemi commun, les expansionnistes régionaux vietnamiens et les expansionnistes internationaux soviétiques.

C'est dans cet esprit et en se basant sur l'intérêt commun de tous les pays épris d'indépendance, de paix et de justice que le Gouvernement du Kampuchea démocratique fait appel à la noble conscience de tous les peuples et à tous les pays du monde et, en particulier à ceux du Sud-Est asiatique pour que, étroitement unis, ils usent de toute leur influence et mènent toutes les actions possibles pour condamner et arrêter les activités de la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong visant à intensifier sa guerre au Kampuchea et pour exiger que le Viet Nam retire du territoire du Kampuchea toutes ses troupes et forces d'agression, cela afin d'éliminer la tension en Asie du Sud-Est, en Asie, dans le Pacifique et dans le monde, et, en particulier, afin d'arrêter

/...


et d'éliminer le danger d'une guerre régionale qui pourrait embraser toute l'Asie du Sud-Est en raison de l'intensification de la guerre au Kampuchea par la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong.

Le Gouvernement du Kampuchea démocratique saisit cette occasion pour exprimer ses profonds remerciements à tous les pays, les peuples, les organisations de masse, les parties politiques, les diverses organisations internationales et les personnalités qui ont soutenu et soutiennent dans tous les domaines la juste lutte du peuple et de l'armée révolutionnaire du Kampuchea pour chasser les troupes vietnamiennes d'invasion hors du Kampuchea, afin que le peuple du Kampuchea soit maître chez lui et décide lui-même de la destinée de son propre pays sans aucune ingérence étrangère.

Le monde et l'humanité ont condamné et condamnent l'invasion du Kampuchea par la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong. Ils enterreront profondément et à coup sûr la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong dans les déchets de l'histoire.

La détente, la stabilité, la sécurité, la coexistence pacifique et la prospérité naîtront alors dans les régions de l'Asie du Sud-Est, de l'Asie et du Pacifique.

UNITED NATIONS



GENERAL ASSEMBLY  SECURITY COUNCIL

Distr.
GENERAL

A/34/123
S/13179
19 March 1979
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Thirty-fourth session
Item 46 of the preliminary list*
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE
STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Thirty-fourth year

Letter dated 19 March 1979 from Mr. Thiounn Prasith,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
Democratic Kampuchea, addressed to the Secretary-
General

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, news of the most recent developments in the people's war of resistance against the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Democratic Kampuchea during the period from 3 to 8 March 1979.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this communication to be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 46 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Thiounn PRASITH
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of
Democratic Kampuchea

* A/34/50.

ANNEX

Summary of developments in the people's war of resistance
against the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of
Democratic Kampuchea during the period 3 to 8 March 1979,
disseminated by the Ministry of Information of Democratic
Kampuchea

The revolutionary army of Kampuchea (ARK) and the guerrilla units are hotly and doggedly pursuing the Vietnamese invaders on all fronts, inflicting heavy losses on them daily. They have liberated increasingly large areas of the national territory and have successfully defended the population, the national economy and all bases of the people's war of national resistance against the Vietnamese invasion and occupation.

1. In the vicinity of Phnom Penh and at Phnom Penh

(a) On 1 March, the guerrillas assigned to the city of Phnom Penh killed seven Vietnamese soldiers at Vat Phnom (centre of the town) and wounded several others.

(b) On 28 February and on 1, 2, 3 and 4 March, the guerrillas and the ARK attacked the enemy at Batt Kaun, Trapeang Veng, Vat Ta Ok, east of Oudong, Vat Angkrorng, Chan Thnal, Damnak Smach, Taing Kalat, Tbeng Kpuos, Chhlak Vien and Bat Doeng. Total casualties: 290 Vietnamese soldiers killed, many others wounded, one military vehicle and two 60 mm mortars destroyed, many weapons and munitions seized, as well as one telephone set.

2. Southern area: River Bassac front

The ARK completely controls the River Tonlé Bassac from Prek Mesoeng (frontier with Viet Nam) to Takhmao (8 kilometres south of Phnom Penh), on both the east and west banks. On the River Bassac front, the ARK has wiped out an entire enemy battalion and 152 other Vietnamese soldiers. It has also seized a large number of war matériel.

3. South-eastern area

(a) On national highway No. 3 on 28 February, the enemy preceded by four tanks and attempting to reach Prey Pchoek and Roleang Kreul, situated west of national highway No. 3, was intercepted by the ARK, which killed 130 Vietnamese soldiers, wounded a great many others, destroyed one tank and seized numerous weapons and munitions.

On 1, 2 and 3 March, at different points along highway No. 3, the ARK killed 65 Vietnamese soldiers, captured one other and destroyed one military vehicle.

/...

(b) On 3 March on the Takeo-Kampot front, 30 Vietnamese soldiers were killed and four radio transmitter-receivers were seized by the ARK.

On 6, 7 and 8 March the Vietnamese invaders were attacked at the foot of Mount Phnom Danrei Romeal, on the road leading from Chamcar Sieng to Thnal Kpaub Run and on the road from Taken to Koh Sla, at Saang and Sla, at Mount Phnom Sramauch and at Sdok (south of Tram Kak). Total casualties: 109 Vietnamese soldiers killed, one tank destroyed, numerous weapons and munitions seized. The ARK still controls Ta Ken and Koh Sla.

(c) At Kompong Som, during the night of 27 February, the ARK entered the town for the purpose of attacking the enemy at the Rolok dam and killed 20 Vietnamese soldiers.

4. Western area

On national highway No. 4, on 27 and 28 February and 1 March, the ARK launched attacks against the enemy at Cheung Chral, at the intersection with the road to Srè Ambel and on the road from Kompong Speu to Trapeang Kraloeng. Total casualties: 87 Vietnamese soldiers killed, one military vehicle destroyed and another two damaged, and two trucks - one carrying rice and the other carrying munitions - seized.

5. North-western area

(a) In the province of Battambang, the Vietnamese invaders repeatedly attempted to steal rice from the population but, each time, they were intercepted by guerrilla and ARK units. On 2 and 3 March, 44 Vietnamese soldiers were killed in the region of Me Chbar and a large number of others were injured and some weapons and munitions were seized.

On 4 March, the ARK completely destroyed the enemy's fortified position at Chruy Sdao, inflicting heavy casualties on it.

On 4, 6 and 7 March, guerrilla and ARK units attacked the Vietnamese enemy at Phnom Sampeou, as it was leaving Mongkol Borei, at Samrong, in the village of Daung Saranh, at Kout Sat and in the district of Thmar Puok. Total casualties: 205 Vietnamese soldiers killed, two captured and a large amount of enemy war matériel destroyed, including one 105 mm gun and two 60 mm mortars at Thmar Puok, one telegraph set and a large number of weapons and munitions seized.

On 8 March the enemy was intercepted by the ARK as it was leaving the town of Battambang. Total casualties: 72 Vietnamese soldiers killed, several others wounded, weapons, munitions and two radio transmitter-receivers seized.

(b) In the province of Pursat, a Vietnamese company on its way from Svay to Arel was intercepted on 27 February by a group of guerrillas, and 15 of its members were killed.

/...

(c) In the province of Kompong Chnang, on 3 March, guerrilla units intercepted the enemy in the vicinity of Kompong Boeng, at the village of Trabek and at Vat Ta Ngil, and killed 70 persons and wounded a number of others. During the same day two boatloads of Vietnamese soldiers left the town of Kompong Chnang and travelled along the River Tonlé Sap for the purpose of stealing the people's rice and were intercepted by the ARK. One boat was destroyed by the ARK and the other was seriously damaged. Many Vietnamese soldiers were killed.

(d) Along national highway No. 5, on 28 February and on 2 and 3 March, the ARK attacked the enemy in the region of Romeas and at Krakor. It wiped out 141 Vietnamese soldiers and one Soviet, seized one military vehicle and numerous weapons and munitions.

(e) In the province of Kompong Thom, on 6 and 8 March, guerrilla units killed 15 Vietnamese soldiers at Kompong Thmar and Phum Raung.

6. North-eastern area

(a) In the province of Kratié, on 1, 4 and 6 March, guerrillas attacked the enemy in the village of Thmar Reay, at Dang Tung, in the village of Srè Praing, (west of the town of Kratié) and in the village of Srot Rotes, where the Vietnamese invaders were trying to plunder the rice of the population. Total casualties: 30 Vietnamese soldiers killed, many others wounded, and weapons and munitions seized.

(b) In the province of Mondulhiri, on 22, 24, 26 and 28 February and on 1 and 2 March, guerrilla units attacked the Vietnamese invaders west of Koh Nhiek, on the road leading from Koh Mayeul to Koh Nhiek, in the village of Sok San, in the village of Royar and on the road from Koh Nhiek to Chi Meat. Total casualties: 52 Vietnamese soldiers killed, many others wounded, and two military vehicles destroyed with all their occupants.

* .
* *

Total casualties during the period 3 to 8 March 1979 (with additional figures for the last week in February and for 1 and 2 March on certain fronts):

(a) More than 1,800 Vietnamese soldiers killed, one Soviet killed, three Vietnamese soldiers captured and many others wounded;

(b) Two tanks, one 105 mm gun, four 60 mm mortars, one radio transmitter-receiver, one boat and four military vehicles destroyed;

(c) One boat, one 60 mm mortar and two military vehicles damaged;

(d) Three military vehicles, six radio transmitter-receivers, one telephone set, one telegraph set and a large number of weapons and munitions seized.

représentants régionaux de la Chine à l'Organisation des Nations Unies, ainsi que l'expulsion immédiate des représentants de Tchang Kai-shek du siège qu'ils occupent illégalement à l'Organisation des Nations Unies et dans tous les organismes qui s'y rattachent.

1976^e séance plénière,
25 octobre 1971.

2763 (XXVI). Rapport de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique

L'Assemblée générale,

Ayant reçu le rapport de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique à l'Assemblée générale pour l'année 1970/1971⁹,

Consciente que la déclaration faite par le Directeur général de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique le 8 novembre 1971¹⁰ met à jour les principaux faits survenus depuis la publication du rapport,

1. *Prend acte* du rapport de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique;

2. *Apprécie* le rôle constructif que joue l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique en ce qui concerne l'application pacifique de l'énergie nucléaire dans l'intérêt des Etats Membres;

3. *Félicite* l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique des travaux qu'elle entreprend en vue de s'acquitter de ses responsabilités en matière de garanties;

4. *Félicite en outre* l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique d'avoir coopéré avec l'Organisation des Nations Unies à la préparation de la quatrième Conférence internationale sur l'utilisation de l'énergie atomique à des fins pacifiques, qui s'est tenue à Genève du 6 au 16 septembre 1971¹¹;

5. *Prie* le Secrétaire général de transmettre au Directeur général de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique les comptes rendus de la vingt-sixième session de l'Assemblée générale traitant des activités de l'Agence;

6. *Invite* l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique à prendre ces comptes rendus en considération dans ses futurs travaux.

1979^e séance plénière,
8 novembre 1971.

2782 (XXVI). Proclamation de la Journée des Nations Unies comme jour férié international

L'Assemblée générale,

Consciente de la nécessité de souligner la valeur des buts et principes de la Charte des Nations Unies,

Tenant compte du fait que, dans sa résolution 168 (II) du 31 octobre 1947, l'Assemblée générale a dé-

⁹ Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique, *Rapport annuel, 1^{er} juillet 1970-30 juin 1971*, Vienne, juillet 1971; communiqué aux membres de l'Assemblée générale par une note du Secrétaire général (A/8384).

¹⁰ Voir *Documents officiels de l'Assemblée générale, vingt-sixième session, Séances plénières*, 1979^e séance, par. 15 à 45.

¹¹ Voir A/8487.

Declare que le 24 octobre, Journée des Nations Unies, sera un jour férié international et recommande qu'il soit célébré comme tel par tous les Etats Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies.

2000^e séance plénière,
6 décembre 1971.

Assemblée Générale 26^{ème} session (1971)

2793 (XXVI). Question examinée par le Conseil de sécurité à ses 1606^e, 1607^e et 1608^e séances, les 4, 5 et 6 décembre 1971

L'Assemblée générale,

Prenant note des rapports du Secrétaire général, en date des 3 et 4 décembre 1971¹² et de la lettre du Président du Conseil de sécurité¹³ transmettant le texte de la résolution 303 (1971) du Conseil, en date du 6 décembre 1971,

Gravement préoccupée par les hostilités qui ont éclaté entre l'Inde et le Pakistan et qui constituent une menace immédiate à la paix et à la sécurité internationales,

Reconnaissant la nécessité de traiter de façon adéquate à un stade ultérieur, dans le cadre de la Charte des Nations Unies, des questions qui ont donné lieu aux hostilités,

Convaincue qu'une solution politique rapide serait nécessaire pour le rétablissement de conditions de normalité dans la région du conflit et pour le retour des réfugiés dans leurs foyers,

Ayant présentes à l'esprit les dispositions de la Charte, en particulier celles qui sont énoncées au paragraphe 4 de l'Article 2,

Rappelant la Déclaration sur le renforcement de la sécurité internationale, notamment ses paragraphes 4, 5 et 6,

Reconnaissant en outre la nécessité de prendre immédiatement des mesures pour amener une cessation immédiate des hostilités entre l'Inde et le Pakistan et un retrait de leurs forces armées vers leur propre côté des frontières indo-pakistanaïses,

Ayant présents à l'esprit les buts et principes de la Charte et les responsabilités qui lui incombent en vertu des dispositions pertinentes de la Charte et de sa résolution 377 A (V) du 3 novembre 1950,

1. *Demande* aux Gouvernements indien et pakistanais de prendre sans délai toutes les mesures en vue d'un cessez-le-feu immédiat et du retrait de leurs forces armées se trouvant sur le territoire de l'autre pays vers leur propre côté des frontières indo-pakistanaïses;

2. *Demande instamment* que soient intensifiés les efforts déployés en vue de créer rapidement et conformément aux buts et principes de la Charte des Nations

¹² *Documents officiels du Conseil de sécurité, vingt-sixième année, Supplément d'octobre, novembre et décembre 1971*, documents S/10410 et Add.1 et S/10412.

¹³ *Documents officiels de l'Assemblée générale, vingt-sixième session, Annexes*, point 102 de l'ordre du jour, document A/8555.

Unies les conditions nécessaires au retour volontaire des réfugiés du Pakistan oriental dans leurs foyers;

3. *Demande* à tous les Etats de coopérer pleinement avec le Secrétaire général en vue de prêter assistance à ces réfugiés et de soulager leur détresse;

4. *Demande instamment* qu'aucun effort ne soit négligé en vue de protéger la vie et le bien-être de la population civile dans la région du conflit;

5. *Prie* le Secrétaire général de tenir l'Assemblée générale et le Conseil de sécurité rapidement et régulièrement informés de l'application de la présente résolution;

6. *Décide* de suivre la question de près et de se réunir à nouveau si la situation l'exige;

7. *Demande* au Conseil de sécurité de prendre les mesures voulues compte tenu de la présente résolution.

2003^e séance plénière,
7 décembre 1971.

2794 (XXVI). Admission des Emirats arabes unis à l'Organisation des Nations Unies

L'Assemblée générale,

Ayant reçu la communication du Conseil de sécurité, en date du 8 décembre 1971, recommandant l'admission des Emirats arabes unis à l'Organisation des Nations Unies¹⁴,

Ayant examiné la demande d'admission des Emirats arabes unis¹⁵,

Décide d'admettre les Emirats arabes unis à l'Organisation des Nations Unies.

2007^e séance plénière,
9 décembre 1971.

2799 (XXVI). La situation au Moyen-Orient

L'Assemblée générale,

Profondément préoccupée par la persistance de la grave situation qui règne au Moyen-Orient, particulièrement depuis le conflit de juin 1967, et qui constitue une menace sérieuse à la paix et à la sécurité internationales,

Convaincue que la résolution 242 (1967) du Conseil de sécurité, en date du 22 novembre 1967, devrait être appliquée immédiatement dans tous ses éléments en vue de parvenir au Moyen-Orient à une paix juste et durable permettant à chaque Etat de la région de vivre en sécurité,

Résolue à ce que le territoire d'un Etat ne fasse pas l'objet d'une occupation ou d'une acquisition par un autre Etat résultant de la menace ou de l'emploi de la force, ce qui est contraire à la Charte des Nations Unies et aux principes consacrés dans la résolution 242 (1967) du Conseil de sécurité ainsi que dans la Déclaration sur le renforcement de la sécurité internationale adoptée par l'Assemblée générale le 16 décembre 1970,

Se félicitant des efforts entrepris par la Commission de chefs d'Etat africains conformément à la résolution adoptée le 23 juin 1971 par la Conférence des chefs

d'Etat et de gouvernement de l'Organisation de l'Afrique unie lors de sa huitième session ordinaire,

Gravement préoccupée par le fait qu'Israël continue d'occuper les territoires arabes depuis le 5 juin 1967,

Ayant examiné la question intitulée "La situation au Moyen-Orient",

1. *Réaffirme* que l'acquisition de territoires par la force est inadmissible et que, en conséquence, les territoires occupés de cette manière doivent être restitués;

2. *Réaffirme* que l'instauration d'une paix juste et durable au Moyen-Orient devrait comprendre l'application des deux principes suivants :

a) Retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit;

b) Cessation de toutes assertions de belligérance et de tous états de belligérance et respect et reconnaissance de la souveraineté, de l'intégrité territoriale et de l'indépendance politique de chaque Etat de la région ainsi que de son droit de vivre en paix à l'intérieur de ses frontières sûres et reconnues à l'abri de menaces ou d'actes de force;

3. *Prie* le Secrétaire général de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour remettre en activité la mission du Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général au Moyen-Orient en vue de favoriser un accord et de soutenir les efforts déployés afin de parvenir à un accord de paix, comme cela est envisagé dans l'aide-mémoire du Représentant spécial, en date du 8 février 1971¹⁶;

4. *Exprime son plein appui* à tous les efforts déployés par le Représentant spécial en vue d'appliquer la résolution 242 (1967) du Conseil de sécurité;

5. *Prend note avec satisfaction* de la réponse positive donnée par l'Egypte à l'initiative prise par le Représentant spécial pour instaurer une paix juste et durable au Moyen-Orient;

6. *Demande* à Israël de répondre favorablement à l'initiative de paix du Représentant spécial;

7. *Invite en outre* les parties au conflit du Moyen-Orient à accorder leur pleine coopération au Représentant spécial afin de mettre au point des mesures pratiques en vue de :

a) Garantir la liberté de navigation sur les voies d'eau internationales de la région;

b) Réaliser un juste règlement du problème des réfugiés;

c) Garantir l'inviolabilité territoriale et l'indépendance politique de chaque Etat de la région;

8. *Prie* le Secrétaire général de faire rapport au Conseil de sécurité et à l'Assemblée générale, selon qu'il conviendra, sur les progrès réalisés par le Représentant spécial en ce qui concerne l'application de la résolution 242 (1967) du Conseil de sécurité et de la présente résolution;

9. *Prie* le Conseil de sécurité d'envisager, au cas où cela serait nécessaire, de prendre des dispositions aux termes des articles pertinents de la Charte des Nations Unies, concernant l'application de la résolution 242 (1967).

2016^e séance plénière,
13 décembre 1971.

ference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, held at Geneva from 6 to 16 September 1971;¹¹

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency the records of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly relating to the Agency's activities;

6. *Invites* the International Atomic Energy Agency to take these records into account in its future work.

*1979th plenary meeting,
8 November 1971.*

2782 (XXVI). Proclamation of United Nations Day as an international holiday

The General Assembly,

Conscious of the need to enhance the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Mindful that in its resolution 168 (II) of 31 October 1947 the General Assembly declared 24 October, the anniversary of the coming into force of the Charter, as "United Nations Day",

Believing that the anniversary of the United Nations should be an occasion for Governments and peoples to reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Declares that 24 October, United Nations Day, shall be an international holiday and recommends that it should be observed as a public holiday by all States Members of the United Nations.

*2000th plenary meeting,
6 December 1971.*

2793 (XXVI). Question considered by the Security Council at its 1606th, 1607th and 1608th meetings on 4, 5 and 6 December 1971

The General Assembly,

Noting the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 and 4 December 1971¹² and the letter from the President of the Security Council¹³ transmitting the text of Council resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971,

Gravely concerned that hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, with the issues which have given rise to the hostilities,

Convinced that an early political solution would be necessary for the restoration of conditions of normalcy in the area of conflict and for the return of the refugees to their homes,

Mindful of the provisions of the Charter, in particular of Article 2, paragraph 4,

Recalling the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, particularly paragraphs 4, 5 and 6,

¹¹ See A/8487.

¹² *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971, documents S/10410 and Add.1 and S/10412.*

¹³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes, agenda item 102, document A/8555.*

Recognizing further the need to take immediate measures to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities between India and Pakistan and effect a withdrawal of their armed forces to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders,

Mindful of the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the General Assembly's responsibilities under the relevant provisions of the Charter and of Assembly resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950,

1. *Calls upon* the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders;

2. *Urges* that efforts be intensified in order to bring about, speedily and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the East Pakistan refugees to their homes;

3. *Calls* for the full co-operation of all States with the Secretary-General for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of those refugees;

4. *Urges* that every effort be made to safeguard the lives and well-being of the civilian population in the area of conflict;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the General Assembly and the Security Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the present resolution;

6. *Decides* to follow the question closely and to meet again should the situation so demand;

7. *Calls upon* the Security Council to take appropriate action in the light of the present resolution.

*2003rd plenary meeting,
7 December 1971.*

2794 (XXVI). Admission of the United Arab Emirates to membership in the United Nations

The General Assembly,

Having received the recommendation of the Security Council of 8 December 1971 that the United Arab Emirates should be admitted to membership in the United Nations,¹⁴

Having considered the application for membership of the United Arab Emirates,¹⁵

Decides to admit the United Arab Emirates to membership in the United Nations.

*2007th plenary meeting,
9 December 1971.*

2799 (XXVI). The situation in the Middle East

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned at the continuation of the grave situation prevailing in the Middle East, particularly since the conflict of June 1967, which constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security,

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, agenda item 25, document A/8561.

¹⁵ A/8553. For the printed text of this document, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971, document S/10420.*

page 3:

up to May 2
my change in the details
was

xx successeurs (à la loi de "nouveau")

x add: footnote: rôle de
partis communistes comme organes ou quasi-organes
d'Etat

meaning: confirmés que les frontières établies auparavant?

page 5 x et les exigences de la guerre anti-Américaine?

xx pratique de champs minés par la mise de la frontière
par déplacement de pierres - et, charges dans les
carts, etc

page 6 x et élémentaire

* A member fondateur

page 7. x et en acte par attaque armée très massive

xx chapitre 2 ?

xxx la loi sur l'attaque - illegal in itself. -
p forces armées ont commis de violences

not good
distinguish

preuves des lois et coutumes de guerre
qui sont obligatoires dans tous les conflits
armés, même si ce (après 1937
Geneva 1949), même si et en combattant crimes
de guerre

et l'acte < the law strong

page 8 xx l'acte = wrong!

x adoptée

§ Article 9 x omis

~~the~~ # blue page 11 margin

why did CN not

~~the~~

did not enter it

Superior order

Himmler at Poznan

demanding

Wann hatte Pflicht,

geschrieben zur Sprache zu kommen

vol. 29, p. 150

for: a) pre-history of the X

b) conspiracy

c) complete backing

of the → Peace

d) export (act)

⊗ "1" printed opponent to legal
[court] proceedings came for
British who for a long time urged direct
military execution in stead of firm
peace + Russian support, & Am. was prevailed...
p. 587

Articles

2:

Henry L. Stimson book

On Active Service

in Peace + War

583-590

(here at Alden bookshelf!)

Ausschnitt O parte

("später hinzugefügt") = Hill's

in Europa

o. 27/3/41

(Vgl. 28. 11. 22

BRITISH NATIONAL COMMITTEE
FOR THE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Chairman : Sir William Deakin, D.S.O.
Vice-Chairman : Noble Frankland, C.B.E., D.F.C.
Secretary : J.J. Chadwick.

Imperial War Museum
Lambeth Road
London SE1 6HZ

Tel : 01 - 735 8922

12 January 1979

Dear Mr. Fried,

The British Academy has sent on to me your letter of 3rd January inquiring about the Conference on "Governments Exiled in London during the Second World War".

I do not recall there having been any reference to the evolution of the plans for the treatment of German war criminals during this Conference, but there may have been some reference in the papers which I have not recollected. The papers are not yet available, since I am in the process of seeking to arrange for their publication, together with other conference proceedings of this Committee, on microfiches. If I succeed in getting this project through then the package should become available in American University libraries. I will let you know what happens.

Yours sincerely
John H. Chadwick

John H.E. Fried, Esq.,
55 East 86 Street,
NEW YORK,
N.Y. 10028,
U.S.A.

Box 30 - folder 6 ^{10/25} JHE FMSD:re INT'L HOLOCAUST COM+ on WWII, 1949-1950

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

Strictly confidential

AMSTERDAM, February 1949.
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

A HISTORY OF GERMAN CONCENTRATIONCAMPS

Origin of the plan

1. This is a preliminary plan for a program of international research and publication on the subject of German concentrationcamps. It has been drawn up by Drs Louis de Jong, executive director of the Netherlands State Institute of War-Documentation, Amsterdam, on the suggestion of Prof. Arnold J. Toynbee, director of research of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
2. Sofar no international research has been carried out as regards the development of the German concentrationcamp-system. In several countries large amounts of documentary material have been collected less for historical purposes than for those of tracing missed persons and prosecuting Germans and other nationals suspected of the committing of war crimes in concentrationcamps. Several hundreds of books (1) have been published most of them dealing

(1) Sofar 338 books on concentrationcamps have been collected by the Netherlands State Institute of War Documentation, 118 of them in Dutch,

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

-2-

with the personal experiences of former inmates of the camps. Some of the books are of a more general character (2). Whatever their merits -and they are considerable- none of them is adequate to the subject, nor was it possible to write a fully adequate book at an earlier date. The German concentrationcamps present a subject that needs some time to "mature". The passions of war have to subside before an objective study both of the gaolers and the gaoled becomes possible. Moreover, some of the most important source-material, which is in the possession of several governments, would not have been available in the preceding years. Finally, a program of international research can only be carried out after the completion of national programs -which have, indeed, been instituted by several European governments.

3. The subject of German concentrationcamps can only be adequately dealt with on an international basis. It would be impossible for a French author to give an authoritative description of the experiences of Polish prisoners. The growth and decay of the system as a whole cannot be surveyed

(2) Dr. Eugen Kogon: Der SS-Staat, Munich, 1946
David Rousset: L'Univers concentrationnaire, Paris 1946
Dr. Benedikt Kautsky: Teufel und Verdammten, Zürich 1947

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

-3-

but from an international level.

Moral importance 4. The subject merits further close study than has been devoted to it so far not only because of the extent and the intensity of human suffering caused by it but primarily on account of the fact that the German concentrationcamps present the most typical example of what one might call a "pressurized" society. Similar societies though on a much smaller scale and in a less inhumane form have existed in the past. Never before have thirty million people been forced to live behind barbed wire; never before have twenty million people been done to death in a few years. Unless these incredible events are adequately described posterity may well disbelieve the story of Auschwitz and Belsen. An objective history of the German concentrationcamp-system would form a most impressive warning of what man can do to man. It would be a lesson in democracy and decent government. It would be a yardstick to measure comparable systems in past, present of future. It would deepen social and psychological insight. It would constantly appeal to and strenghten the conscience of Mankind.

Political factors 5. There seem to be no insuperable political objections against the international research program as planned. It should not

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

-4-

AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

be undertaken in a spirit of vindictiveness. Though confined to the development of the German system of concentrationcamps it would, if properly carried out, not lead to an indictment of the German people as such -it might rather show how this particular system came to life in a particular age and under a particular system of government. Closer study would reveal that some of the evil characteristics of the German system have been repeated in several of the internment-camps set up after the end of World-War II by the governments of peoples, both in Eastern and Western Europe, that suffered most from German rule and misrule. All observers agree that the ordinary Germans do not show any feelings of guilt in respect of the crimes committed in their name. Most of them profess not to believe that gas-chambers and death-vans are not the product of Allied and Russian propaganda, but have, indeed, been in existence. The results of an international program of research-in which, of course, Germans would have to participate on an equal basis-might, perhaps, open the eyes of some Germans, not the least prominent ones.

Sponsorship

6. Though the program as planned could not be carried out without the tacit approval and in some respects without the active support of several governments, it would seem to be impractical to suppose that an adequate general initiative in this field will be taken on an official level. The suppo-

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

-5-

sition is rendered futile by the present state of world affairs. It is to be feared that a plan proposed by the American Government would be per se unacceptable to the Government of the Soviet Union - and vice versa. If the plan were to be financed by the Governments of all peoples concerned it is likely that most of the smaller European Governments would feel themselves unable to make the necessary contributions. Even under the most favourable circumstances the initiation of such a program of international research if carried out on an entirely official level would suffer interminable, perhaps even fatal delay. The United Nations Educational and Scientific Organisation would certainly have to be associated with the program, however it may be organised. The program might perhaps even best be carried out under the auspices of Unesco. Its execution however, within the near future and on an adequate basis would in the present writer's opinion only be guaranteed if it could be sponsored by one or two Foundations or Endowments with the necessary experience in the field of international research. If they were to undertake the financing of the project -according to preliminary calculations (see below par.11- par.14) a total sum of one

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

-6-

million dollars would have to be made available -the execution would be made possible at a reasonably early date. Moreover a central driving force would be provided which seems essential to obtain a satisfactory result.

Results

7. The program of research should aim at the publication of several books on the subject of the German system of concentrationcamps. Detailed proposals for the total number of volumes and for the composition of each volume can only be drawn up by the editors. Tentatively the present writer should like to indicate that the following subjects might well be investigated and described:

1. Nazi-ideology and the persecution of opponents
2. The development of the legal system of national-socialist Germany
3. Arrests - Persecutions - Transports to the camps
 - a. Before the outbreak of World-War II
 - b. During World-War II
 - c. The persecution of the Jews
4. The SS and its organisation
 1. The State within the State
 2. The organisation of the SS and the Wirtschaftsverwaltungshauptamt
5. The development of the system of concentrationcamps
 1. Before the outbreak of World-War II
 2. During World-War II (a. Germany b. Western Europe c. Eastern Europe)
 3. The breakdown
6. The development of the principal camps
 1. The Dachau-complex
 2. The Sachsenhausen-complex
 3. The Buchenwald-complex

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

-7-

4. Mittelbau-Dora
5. The Neuengamme-complex
6. The Flossenbürg-complex
7. The Gross-Rosen-complex
8. The Auschwitz-complex
9. Jewish labourcamps in Poland and Uppersilesia
10. The Lublin-complex
11. The Polish exterminationcamps
12. Warsaw and Lwow
13. Stutthof, Riga, Balticum
14. The Mauthausen-complex
15. The Natzweiler-complex
16. The Ravensbrück-complex
17. Jewish transportcamps and ghettos
18. Bergen-Belsen and Theresienstadt
7. Organisation and administration of the camps
8. Material conditions of life
9. Labour in the concentrationcamps
10. Social and political life
11. Culture and religion in the camps
12. The psychology of gaolers and gaoled
13. Crimes - Punishments - Experiments
14. The concentrationcamps and the outside world
15. Liberation and repatriation of prisoners
16. Post-war justice and the concentrationcamps
17. Bibliography

The present writer realises that this composition may be radically altered. The eventual authors of the book should draw up the final plan. The scheme as suggested should merely be considered as an indication of the sort of subjects which an adequate history of the system of concentrationcamps would have to cover.

Sources 8. The source-material for a publication as described falls into different categories.

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

-8-

AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

a. A close study will have to be made of the most important collections of German official documents now in the possession of the victors of World War II. They comprise:

1. The records of the German "Auswärtige Amt" and the "Reichskanzlei".

These records are now somewhere in Great Britain. They are the official property of the American and British Governments whose permission would have to be obtained to be given access. Several millions of the most important documents have been microfilmed.

2. The records of the German "Oberkommando der Wehrmacht" and "Oberkommando des Heeres".

These records are in Washington. Permission to study them would have to be obtained from the Secretary of the United States Army.

3. The records of the German SS and Himmler's personal files.

The last known location of these records was Berlin (7771 US Berlin Document Center). They may now have been transferred to Western Germany.

4. The records of the International Military Tribunal and of the United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg.

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

-9-

These have been shipped to Washington.

5. The records of the German "Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine" and of the German "Oberkommando der Luftwaffe" -both collections are for the most part in London - do not seem to contain much that would be of interest for the proposed study. In several smaller European countries more or less important collections of German documents have been built up. In most cases they are under the supervision either of the National Archives or of the National Library; in some, special institutes have been set up to collect such documents (e.g. the Netherlands State Institute of War-Documentation, Amsterdam, and the Polish National Memorial Institute, Warsaw). Special collecting centres of documents on the persecution of the Jews are known to exist in Warsaw, Lodz, Paris, London and New-York.

There is no doubt that important collections of German documents have fallen in the hands of the Government of the Soviet Union. Sofar this Government has not shown any willingness to permit inspection of these documents by foreign nationals. Even if the Soviet Government would be willing to foster the purpose of the proposed program of international research, it is doubtful whether this would include permission to make a study of Russian-held German documents.

b. A picture of the development of the German legal system

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

-10-

AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

should be built up from German national-socialist publications. In the United States these may be found in the Library of Congress and in the Hoover Library on War, Peace and Revolution; in Great Britain the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Wiener Library on National-Socialism and the Persecution of Jewry may be in the possession of the most representative collections. These may be supplemented by the collections that have been built up in several formerly German-occupied countries.

c. Post-war publications dealing with life in concentration-camps or with the camp system as a whole may best be found in the National Libraries of the different countries or in libraries specialising on World War II, e.g. the "Bibliothèque Internationale de Documentation Contemporaine" (Paris) and the library of the Imperial War Museum (London).

d. Very important statistical material may be obtained from the International Tracing Service (formerly Central Tracing Bureau, Arolsen, Germany). Most European Governments have organised national tracing services. In some cases the tracing of missed persons is performed or executed by the Red Cross Organisations. The International Red Cross Organisation (Geneva)

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

-11-

AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

should dispose of valuable data as well as of much information on the war-time relief of inmates of concentration camps.

e. In several European countries large amounts of legal evidence have been collected in the form of written statements of former prisoners which have been used in the trials of Germans or other nationals who have been held responsible for conditions in specified camps. Similar statements have been collected by national organisations of former political prisoners. These are e.g. in existence in Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czecho-Slovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Roumania, the Soviet Union and Yougoslavia. The organisations are members of the International Organisation of former political Prisoners. ("Fédération Internationale des Anciens Prisonniers Politiques" Paris). In several of them a dominant part is played by the communists. The two most important German organisations ("Opfer des Faschismus", Berlin, and the "Komitee ehemaliger politischer Gefangenen", Hamburg and Frankfurt) would seem to be of special importance to collect sufficient data on the history of the concentration-camps up to the outbreak of World War II.

The written statements of former prisoners will be supplemented by the data collected by Government departments specially

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

-12-

created to assist returned prisoners. In some countries (e.g. the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries) this task was entrusted to the existing ministries of social affairs or social security; in others to specialised departments ("Ministère des Victimes de Guerre", Belgium, "Ministère des Anciens Combattants et des Victimes de Guerre", France).

Organisations 9. An adequate history of the German concentrationcamps cannot be written in the form of a symposium of national contributions. One cannot describe a tree by merely describing its branches. The concentrationcamps formed one organic system, supervised by the "SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt", Berlin. For this reason its history will only be an adequate one if the experiences and sufferings of members of nearly all European nations are integrated into the basic picture of the general development of the system, seen against the background of the rise and fall of the national-socialist regime, of the course of World War II, and of the development of the German war-economy.

The subject is too vast to be dealt with by one author. It would seem preferable to set up a Board of three Authors, e.g. consisting of an historian, a legal expert and an expert

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

-13-

in the field of social science. They will be the authors of the publication, that is to say that in close co-operation they will write the text of the final publication on the basis of their own studies and on the basis of the reports and evidence, passed on to them by scientifically qualified research-associates. One special task will be assigned to every research-associate. Some of them will make a study of the collections of German documents (see par.8, a) others of the German national-socialist publications (see par.8,b). Moreover, in each separate European country the post-war books dealing with concentrationcamps, the national collections of German documents, and the statistical or other evidence collected by Government departments, Red Cross Organisations or organisations of former political prisoners will be studied and sifted by one or two research-associates. Their work is scientifically directed and co-ordinated by the Authors. It may well be that in many cases "fresh" evidence will have to be taken by the research-associates.

According to the data collected by the Netherlands State Institute of War Documentation the number of research-associates required and the time they would need to complete their researches may be estimated as follows:

	Number of research associates	Years required
Germany	2	2
Poland	2	2

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
 INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
 Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
 Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

AMSTERDAM,
 Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

-14-

Soviet Union	2	-----	2
Baltic republics	1	-----	1
Czechoslovakia	1	-----	1
Hungary	1	-----	1
Roumania	1	-----	1
Bulgaria	1	-----	1
Yougoslavia	1	-----	1
Albania,	1	-----	1
Greece	1	-----	1
Switzerland	1	-----	1
Italy	1	-----	1
France	2	-----	2
Belgium	1	-----	1
Luxemburg	1	-----	1
Netherlands	1	-----	1
Denmark	1	-----	1
Norway	1	-----	1
Sweden	1	-----	1
Great Britain	2	-----	2
United States	4	-----	4
Israël	2	-----	2
The total is forty man-years.			

10. The research-work should be completed in two years. The entire program should be completed in three years.

Budget

11. It is estimated that per research-associate annually the following budget may be necessary:

Research-associate	\$ 5.000
Secretary	\$ 3.000
Office	\$ 4.000
Travel	\$ 2.000
Unspecified	\$ 1.000
Total	\$15.000

Research would therefore cost \$ 600.000

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

-15-

AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

12. The Central Office (preferably to be located on the continent of Europe) would be staffed by: one Director (who supervises the execution of the entire plan and who is responsible for its progress); three Authors; one Librarian; two Translators; four Secretaries and Typists.

Annual budget:

Director	\$ 8.000
Authors	\$ 24.000
Librarian	\$ 4.000
Translators	\$ 8.000
Secretaries	\$ 6.000
Office	\$ 10.000
Travel	\$ 10.000
Unspecified	\$ 5.000
Total	\$ 75.000

The Central Office would cost \$ 225.000.

13. The eventual volumes should be simultaneously published in four languages, i.e. English, French, Russian and German. If three volumes, each of approximately 800 pages, were to be published -five thousand copies in every language- the total cost of publication would be \$ 1000000. Pictures, maps and documents would have to be added to the text.

14. Total budget of the plan:

Research	\$ 600.000
Central Office	\$ 225.000
Publications	\$ 100.000
Unspecified	\$ 75.000
Total	\$ 1000.000

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

-16-

It is difficult to estimate the proceeds of the sale of the books.

Advisory Council

15. If the plan could be sponsored as described above (par.6) and carried out under the auspices of Unesco it would seem appropriate to set up an Advisory Council comprising representatives of:

the United Nations Educational and Scientific Organisation
the United Nations Social and Economic Council
the Government of the United States
the Government of the United Kingdom
the Government of France
the Government of the Soviet Union
the Government of Poland
the Government of the Netherlands
the Government of the German Bundesrepublik
the Council of Eastern Germany
the Government of Austria
the International Relief Organisation
the International Tracing Service
the Permanent Court of International Justice
the International Red Cross Organisation
the World Jewish Congress
the International Federation of former political Prisoners
the German Committee of former political Prisoners
the Royal Institute of International Affairs
the Hoover Library on War, Peace and Revolution

The Advisory Council would be presided by the representative(s) of the organisation(s) financing the program.

One meeting of the Advisory Council might be sufficient to conclude essential business. At this meeting the final program should be discussed and approved. Also, the Council might be invited to decide to delegate their function to a smaller committee composed of five of their members who

RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE

NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NÉERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE

Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER

-17-

AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065

would thereafter keep in close consultation with the Central Office.

Procedure 16. If this plan were to be adopted by a sponsoring agency, this agency might invite Unesco to issue the invitations to the governments and organisations which ought to be represented on the Advisory Council. The preparations of the first session of the Council may well take six months. The Council will have to discuss a detailed plan. Its preparation will involve thorough discussions with the prospective Authors as well as with a number of other experts on the German system of concentration-camps and on the history of World War II in general. The present writer should like to refrain from mentioning names of persons who in his opinion would be fully qualified to form the Board of Authors. He is, however, convinced that there is ample talent in Europe and elsewhere to staff the plan as described.

17. If in the autumn of 1949 a beginning could be made with the detailed preparation of the plan, the Advisory Council might be convened in the spring of 1950. Research might start in the summer of 1950. As stated, the publication would have to be ready within three years.

Amsterdam, February 1949.

Drs. LOUIS DE JONG

WORLD WAR II IN THE WEST

historical methods - documentation - research - historiography

5-9 September 1950

Amsterdam, Netherlands

a conference under the auspices of the Netherlands State Institute for War-Documentation

ORGANIZING COMMITTEE:

Prof. Dr. Z. W. Sneller, Chairman

Prof. Dr. C. D. J. Brandt

Prof. Dr. P. Geyl

Major-General D. A. van Hilten

Prof. Dr. T. H. Milo

Prof. Dr. A. J. C. Rüter

Vice-Admiral G. W. Stöve

L. de Jong, Executive Secretary

Amsterdam, April 15th 1950
Herengracht 479
Tel.: 30065

Dr John H.E. Fried
635 Riverside Drive
NEW YORK 31
N.Y. U.S.A.

Dear Dr Fried,

For a considerable time consultations have been held between official historians of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and the Netherlands to ascertain the possibility of organising an international historical conference on World War II. It has now been decided that this conference will take place and will be held in Amsterdam from September 5 - 9, 1950 under the auspices of the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation. Final plans for the conference have not yet been drawn up; we are, however, sending you a copy of the preliminary programme which, we hope, will give you a sufficiently clear idea of its aims and scope.

As you will see it is intended to organise a special section covering the field of political and diplomatic history. We should appreciate if during one of the sessions of this section an introduction could be given on the value of the Nuremberg trials for historical science. In our opinion the International Military Tribunal and the American military tribunals have made a contribution in these fields which although unknown to the general public and even to many scientists, can hardly be overestimated. It is wellknown to us that you would have admirable qualifications for giving this introduction having been Special Legal Consultant to the American military tribunals. In fact we do not think that anyone else would be better qualified to give the introduction on the proposed subject, which, in our view, might have some interest for various official agencies of your country.

Allow us, dear Dr Fried, to express the hope on behalf of the organising committee that you will be able to accept this formal invitation. We are in no doubt that your contribution would be an essential element in the proceedings of this conference which is the first of its kind to be held.

Yours sincerely,

Z. W. Sneller

Z. W. Sneller
President

L. de Jong

L. de Jong
Secretary

a conference under the auspices of the Netherlands State Institute for War-Documentation

September 1st, 1950

P R O G R A M M E

Final Version

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5TH

GENERAL SESSION (International Cultural Centre, Vondelpark)

- 2 p.m. Opening of the conference
Addresses will be made by the Burgomaster of Amsterdam
Mr. Arnold J. d'Ailly, and by the Chairman of the
Organising Committee, Prof. Jhr Dr. P.J. van Winter
- 3.30 p.m. Prof. ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, London: "Contemporary History as
a scientific problem" (in English)
Chairman: Prof. Jhr Dr. P.J. van Winter, Groningen
Interpreters: Miss Driesen, Miss Maneval
- 5 p.m. A group picture will be taken of the participants

RECEPTION (Municipal Museum, Paulus Potterstraat)

- 5.30 p.m. Reception of the participants of the conference by the
Burgomaster and Town councillors of Amsterdam.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6TH

COMMITTEE I: MILITARY HISTORY (International Cultural Centre, Vondelpark)

- 9.30 a.m. Prof. J.R.M. BUTLER, Cambridge: "Problems and development
of the British military histories of World War II" (in
English)
Chairman: Colonel C.P. Stacey, Ottawa
Interpreter: Miss de Vos van Steenwijk

SUB-COMMITTEE I (a): ARMY HISTORY (International Cultural Centre)

- 10.30 a.m. Lt. Colonel ALLEN F. CLARK, London: "The programme of the
historical section of the American Army" (in English)
Chairman: Colonel J. Schjøtz, Oslo
Interpreter: Miss de Vos van Steenwijk

SUB-COMMITTEE I (c): NAVAL HISTORY (International Cultural Centre)

- 10.30 a.m. Commander A. HAMEL, Paris: "The activities of the Historical
section of the French Navy" (in French)
Chairman: Rear-Admiral G.W. Stöve
Interpreter: Miss Mayer

COMMITTEE II: POLITICAL HISTORY (Netherlands State Institute)

- 9.30 a.m. Prof. ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, London: "The Historical programme of the Royal Institute of International Affairs" (in English)
- 11 a.m. Prof. M. BAUMONT, Paris: "Problems of publishing the records of the German Foreign Office" (in French)
Chairman: Prof. Dr. B.H.D. Hermesdorf, Nijmegen
Interpreter: Miss Maneval

SUB-COMMITTEE IV (a): HISTORY OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (Netherlands State Institute)

- 9.30 a.m. Mr. GEORGE BOURGIN, Paris: "Research in France" (in French)
- 11 a.m. Lt. Colonel S.P. van 't HOF, The Hague: "Research on military resistance in the Netherlands" (in French)
Chairman: Colonel C. Joset, Sr., Brussels
Interpreter: Miss Driesen

SUB-COMMITTEE IV (b): CONCENTRATION CAMPS AND DEPORTATIONS (Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation)

- 9.30 a.m. Mr. L. POLIAKOFF, Paris: "The Centre of Jewish Contemporary Documentation, Paris" (in French)
- 10.30 a.m. Dr A. WIENER, London: "The work of the Wiener Library, London" (in English)
- 11.30 a.m. Mr. MICHEL M. BORWICZ, Paris: "The activities of the Centre of Polish Jewish Contemporary Documentation, Paris" (in French)
Chairman: Prof. Dr J. Presser, Amsterdam
Interpreters: Miss De Bruijn and Mr. Kroonenberg

GENERAL SESSION (International Cultural Centre, Vondelpark)

- 3 p.m. Prof. EDMOND VERMEIL, Paris: "National Socialism and German Civilization" (in French)
Chairman: Prof. Th. Abel, New York
Interpreters: Miss Maneval and Miss Driesen

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 7TH

SUB-COMMITTEE I(a): ARMY HISTORY (International Cultural Centre)

- 9.30 a.m. Colonel R. TRUTAT, Paris: "The activities of the Historical Section of the French Army" (in French)
- 10.30 a.m. Colonel C.P. STACEY, Ottawa: "The programme of the Historical Section of the Canadian Army Staff" (in English)
- 11.30 a.m. Major-General D.A. van HILTEN, The Hague: "Army historical research in the smaller countries of Western Europe, especially in the Netherlands" (in English)
Chairman: Prof. J.R.M. Butler, London
Interpreter: Miss de Vos van Steenwijk

SUB-COMMITTEE I (b): AIR HISTORY (International Cultural Centre)

- 9.30 a.m. Colonel P. SAINT-PEREUSE, Paris: "The activities of the Historical Section of the French Air Forces" (in French)
- 10.30 a.m. Dr HENRY M. DATER, Washington: "Historical research as to the US Naval Air Forces in World War II" (in English)
- 11.30 a.m. Dr ALBERT F. SIMPSON, Maxwell Air Force Base, USA: "Historical research as to the US Air Forces in World War II"
Chairman: Rear-Admiral John B. Heffernan, Washington
Interpreter: Miss Mayer

COMMITTEE II: POLITICAL HISTORY (Netherlands State Institute)
9.30 a.m. Dr JOHN H.E. FRIED, New York: "The Nuremberg trials and historical science" (in English)
11 a.m. Mr. MARSEL BAUDOT, Paris: "Sources of the history of public opinion in France from the armistice till the Liberation" (in French)
Chairman: Prof. M. Baumont, Paris
Interpreter: Miss Maneval

COMMITTEE III: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY (Netherlands State Institute)
9.30 a.m. Prof. W.K. HANCOCK, London: "Problems and developments of the British Civil Histories of World War II" (in English)
11 a.m. Prof. F. BAUDHUIN, Louvain: "Research in the field of the economic history of German-occupied Europe" (in French)
Chairman: Prof. Dr. C.D.J. Brandt
Interpreter: Mr. Schutte

COMMITTEE IV (a): HISTORY OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (Netherlands State Institute)
9.30 a.m. Dr G. VACCARINO, Milan: "Research in Italy" (in French)
11 a.m. Commandant L. LEJEUNE, Brussels: "Research in Belgium" (in French)
Chairman: Mr. J. Willequet, Brussels
Interpreter: Miss Driesen

SUB-COMMITTEE IV (b): CONCENTRATION CAMPS AND DEPORTATIONS (Netherlands State Institute)
9.30 a.m. Miss G. TILLION, Paris: "Research in France" (in French)
10.30 a.m. Prof. THEODORE ABEL, New York: "Research on the Sociology of concentration camps" (in English)
11.30 a.m. Dr PHILIP FRIEDMAN, New York: "American Jewish research on the Jewish catastrophe of the years 1939-1945"
Chairman: Dr A. Wiener, London
Interpreters: Miss de Bruijn and Mr. Kroonenberg

ENTERTAINMENT

3 p.m. Boattrip through the canals and harbours of Amsterdam (by courtesy of the Burgomaster and Town Councillors of Amsterdam). The boats leave from the State Institute for War Documentation, Herengracht 479.
7 p.m. Dinner at the International Cultural Centre (no evening dress)

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 8TH

SUB-COMMITTEE I (a): ARMY HISTORY (International Cultural Centre)
9.30 Colonel JOHANNES SCHIØTZ, Oslo: "Army historical research in Norway" (in English)
Chairman: Colonel R. TRUTAT, Paris
Interpreter: Miss de Vos van Steenwijk

SUB-COMMITTEE I (c): NAVAL HISTORY (International Cultural Centre)
10.30 a.m. Prof. Dr T.H. MILO, The Hague: "Naval Historical research in the smaller countries of Western Europe, especially in the Netherlands" (in English)
11.30 a.m. Rear-Admiral JOHN B. HEFFERNAN, Washington: "The history of the US Navy in World War II" (in English)
Chairman: Commander Hemel, Paris
Interpreter: Miss Mayer

COMMITTEE II: POLITICAL HISTORY (Netherlands State Institute)

10.30 a.m. Miss ELIZABETH WISKEMANN, London: "The value of memoirs for the history of World War II" (in English)

11.30 a.m. Dr FRITZ T. EPSTEIN, Palo-Alto, USA: "The activities of the Hoover Library and Institute on War, Revolution and Peace as far as World War II is concerned" (in English)

Chairman: Mr. F.H. Slingsby, London

Interpreter: Miss Maneval

COMMITTEE III: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY (Netherlands State Institute)

9.30 a.m. Prof. Dr. HAROLD ZINK, Frankfurt: "History of the Allied occupation of Germany" (in English)

10.30 a.m. Dr. M.W. MOUTON, The Hague: "The Germans and the Hague Convention on Land Warfare" (in English)

Chairman: Prof. W.K. Hancock, London

Interpreter: Mr. Schutte

SUB-SECTION IV (a): HISTORY OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (Netherlands State Institute)

11.30 a.m. Mr. L. de JONG, Amsterdam: "Research on civil resistance in the Netherlands" (in English)

Chairman: Dr G. Vaccarino, Milan

Interpreter: Miss Driessen

SUB-SECTION IV (b): CONCENTRATION CAMPS AND DEPORTATIONS (Netherlands State Institute)

9.30 a.m. Dr I.L. SEELIGMANN, Jerusalem: "Research in Israel" (in English)

10.30 a.m. Discussion on certain problems of concentration camp history

Chairman: Prof. Th. Abel, New York

Interpreters: Miss de Bruijn and Mr. Kroonenberg

GENERAL SESSION (International Cultural Center)

3 p.m. Mr. F. DEBYSER, Paris: "A plan for an international bibliography of World War II" (in French)

4.30 p.m. The following documentary films will be shown:

1. THE GERMAN INVASION OF HOLLAND - a German newsreel dating from May 1940
2. LIFE IN OCCUPIED HOLLAND
3. THE JEWISH DEPORTATIONCAMP OF WESTERBORK - Fragments from a film made by order of the Germans in 1943-4
4. HUNGER - Shots taken during the famine-winter
5. WALCHEREN - Destruction and reconstruction of an island
6. THE LAST SHOT - A British film on life in newly liberated Holland
7. RECONSTRUCTION - a picture of the rebuilding of war-torn Holland

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 9TH

GENERAL SESSION (International Cultural Centre)

10 a.m. Closing of the conference

Chairman: Prof. Jhr Dr. P.J. van Winter, Groningen

Interpreters: Miss Driessen and Miss Maneval

a conference under the auspices of the Netherlands State Institute for War-Documentation

AMSTERDAM, September 1st 1950

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

ORGANIZING COMMITTEE:

Prof. Jonkheer Dr. P.J. van Winter, Groningen, Chairman
Prof. Dr. C.D. J. Brandt, Utrecht
Prof. Dr P. Geyl, Utrecht
Major-General D.A. van Hilten, The Hague
Prof. Dr T.H. Milo, Leyden
Prof. Dr A.J.C. Rüter, Leyden
Vice-Admiral G.W. Stöve, The Hague
L. de Jong, Executive Secretary

STAFF

Secretariat and Information:

Miss S. Meijer (Office: International Cultural Centre)
Mrs. L. Bonger (Office: State Institute for War Documentation)
Miss E. van Hoorn (Office: State Institute for War Documentation)

Interpreters:

Miss A. Maneval, Lausanne (General Sessions, Political History)
Miss M. Driesen, The Hague (General Sessions, History of the
Resistance Movement)
Miss J. de Vos van Steenwijk, The Hague (Military History)
Miss E. Mayer, Antwerp (Military History)
Mr. H. Schutte (Economic and Social History), Utrecht
Miss A. de Bruijn, Amsterdam (History of the Concentration Camps)
Mr. A. Kroonenberg, Amsterdam (History of the Concentration Camps)

Technical Assistants:

Mr. J.A. van Rhijn
Mr. H. van Male

AUSTRALIA

WILMOT, Mr. C. - Assistant Official Historian of the Australian
Forces in World War II, London

BELGIUM

BAUDHUIN, Prof. F. - University of Louvain
DEPASSE, Colonel R. - Head of the Historical Section of the Belgian
Army General Staff, Brussels

HOSPEL, Mr. P. - Curator of the War Archives, Brussels
JOSET, Colonel and Mrs. C. - President of the National Council of the
Resistance Movement, Brussels
KALKEN, Prof. F. van - University of Brussels
LEJEUNE, Commander L. Lejeune - Secretary of the Commission for the
History of the Resistance Movement, Brussels
VERHAEGEN, Major-General G.M.G. Baron - Formerly Head of the Historical
Section of the Belgian Army General Staff, St Michel les Bruges
WILLEQUET, Mr. J. - Assistant-Archivist Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Brussels

CANADA

HUNTER, Major T.M. - Canadian Historical Liaison Officer, London
STACEY, Colonel C.P. - Director Historical Section, Army Headquarters,
Ottawa

FRANCE

AUBE, Mr. P. - Secretary General of the Consultative Commission on
War Damage and Reparations, Paris
BAUDOT, Mr. M. - Public Records Office, Paris
BAUMONT, Prof. M. - Historical Adviser Department of Foreign Affairs,
Paris
BERWICZ, Mr. M.M. - Study Centre for the History of Polish Jewry, Paris
BOURGIN, Mr. G. - Vice-President of the Historical Commission on the
Occupation and Liberation of France, Paris
CHARTON-GUIREC, Mr. J. - Deputy Head of the Historical Department of
the French Army, Paris
CZERTOK, Mr. L. - Centre of Jewish Contemporary Documentation, Paris
DEBYSER, Mr. M.F. - International Library for Contemporary Document-
ation, Paris
GRANET, Mrs. M. - Historian, Paris
HAMEL, Commander - Head of the Historical Department of the French
Navy, Paris
MICHEL, Mr. H. - Secretary-General of the Committee for the History
of the War, Paris
POLIAKOFF, Mr. L. - Centre of Jewish Contemporary Documentation, Paris
SAINT-PEREUSE, Colonel P. de - Historical Department of the French
Air Force, Paris
TILLION, Miss G. - Research Assistant at the National Scientific
Research Centre, Paris
TRUTAT, Colonel R. - Head of the Historical Department of the French
Army, Paris
VERMEIL, Prof. E. - University of the Sorbonne, Paris

INDIA

MEHTA, Mr. M.S. - Ambassador of India in the Netherlands, The Hague

ISRAEL

SEELIGMANN, Dr I.L. - University of Jerusalem

ITALY

BRAGADIN, Commander M.A. - Historical Department of the Italian Navy,
Rome
GIAMMARINO, Colonel G. - Historical Section of the Department of
Defence, Rome
PIERI, Prof. P. - University of Turin
VACCARINO, Dr G. - Director of the National Institute for the History
of the Resistance Movement, Milan

LUXEMBURG

MEIJERS, Mr J. - Historian of the Grandducal Institute, Luxemburg

NORWAY

SCHJØTZ, Colonel J. - Chief of the Historical Division of the General
Staff of the Norwegian Army, Oslo

SWITZERLAND

BAUER, Prof. E. - University of Neuchâtel
SILBERSCHMIDT, Prof. dr M. - University of Zürich

UNITED KINGDOM

BUTLER, Prof. J.R.M. - University of Cambridge, Editor British
Military Histories of World War II, London
EBELING, Dr H. - Historian and Author, London
HANCOCK, Prof. W.K. - Institute of Commonwealth Relations, London
Editor British Civil Histories of World War II, London
MELLAND, Lt. Colonel B. - Historical Section Cabinet Office (German
records), London
SLINGSBY, Mr. and Mrs. F.H. - Public Records Office, London
TOYNBEE, Prof. and Mrs. A.J. - Royal Institute of International
Affairs, London
TYLER, Mr. J.E. - University of Sheffield
WIENER, Dr A. - Director of the Wiener Library, London
WISKEMANN, Miss E. - Historian and Author, London
YATES SMITH, Mr and Mrs. L.P. - Librarian of the Imperial War Museum,
London

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ABEL, Prof. Th. - Department of Sociology, Columbia University,
New York
BORN, Mr. Lester K. - Archivist-Librarian, Library of Congress,
Washington
CLARK, Lt. Colonel and Mrs. A.F. - Assistant Military Attache, London
DATER, Dr Henry M. - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval
Aviation History and Research, Washington
EPSTEIN, Dr F. - Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace,
Stanford University, California
FRIED, Dr J.H.E. - Special Legal Consultant to the U.S. War Crimes
Tribunals Nuremberg 1947-1949, New York
HEFFERNAN, Rear-Admiral J.B. - Head of the Division of Naval Records
and History, Washington
HUELE, Mr. H.A. - Consulate-General of the United States of America,
Amsterdam
HUMPHREY, Mr. Richard A. - Assistant Chief Division of historical
Policy Research, Washington
LEE, Dr and Mrs. G.A. - Historical Division, Office of the High
Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt
NEUMANN (?), Prof. F.L. - Columbia University, New York, Chairman
of the Committee on War Crimes Research of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace
NICHOLS, Dr J.P. - University of Pennsylvania
STILLMAN, Mrs. M. - Consulate General of the United States of America,
Amsterdam
ZINK, Prof. Dr H. - Chief Historical Division, Office of the U.S.
High Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt

NETHERLANDS

ADAMA van SCHELTEMA-KLEEFSTRA, Mrs. A. - International Institute for
Social History, Amsterdam
BASCHWITZ, Prof. Dr K. - University of Amsterdam, Director of the
Institute for Press Science, Amsterdam
BEMMEL, Mr. H.L. van - Netherlands State Institute for War Documen-
tation (Assistant Archivist), Amsterdam
BENDER, Dr F. - Ministry of Education, Arts and Sciences, The Hague
BEZEMER, Mr. K.W.L. - Formerly Chief of the Naval Information Ser-
vice, Naval Staff, The Hague
BOLKESTEIN, Dr G. - Formerly Netherlands Minister of Education, Arts
and Sciences (1939-1945), The Hague, Chairman of the Advisory
Council of the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation
BOLKESTEIN-KRAFT, Mrs. J. - Board of the Netherlands People's Uni-
versity, Utrecht
BOOY, Miss J.P. - Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation
(Department of Source Publications), Amsterdam
BOS, Mr. P.A. - Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation
(Department for Source Publications), Amsterdam
BRANDT, Prof. Dr C.D.J. - University of Utrecht
BROUWER, Mr. H. - Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation
(Assistant Librarian), Amsterdam
BRUGMANS, Prof. Dr I.J. - University of Amsterdam
BRUMMEL, Dr L. - Librarian Royal Library, The Hague
BUCK, Dr H. de - Librarian University of Groningen
BIJVOET-KROES, Mrs. M.J.W. - Librarian of the Netherlands State
Institute for War Documentation, Amsterdam
CALMEIJER, Lt. General M.R.H. - Assistant Chief of the General
Staff of the Netherlands Army, The Hague

To: Youth Argosy

11 July 1950

Enclosure to my Travel Service Application :

Purpose of Travel :

1. The purpose is twofold : a) to participate, and to speak, at the Conference on World War II, Amsterdam, Holland, 5-9 September 1950. - the official invitation from this Conference, I enclosed (as Encl.# 1) to my letter to Youth Argosy headquarters of 26 June 1950.

(The organizers of the Amsterdam Conference, unable to pay for my trip, approached, through the Netherlands Embassy in Washington, the U.S. Department of State.- see Encl.# 2 of my letter of 26 June 1950. The State Dept. declared not to be in position to furnish financial help, or transportation, because it is a scientific, but not a Government-sponsored conference. This information was given to me over the telephone by Mr. Frederick D. Hunt, Dept. of International Conferences, Dept. of State, Washington, DC., and confirmed by Mr. Richard Humphrey, Div. of Historical Policy Research, State Dept., Washington, DC.)

-
- b) in connection with work I am doing for UNESCO, it is very desirable for me to attend the Conference of Historians, Paris, 28 Aug.-2 Sept. 1950. UNESCO agreed with this (see Encl.# 3 of my letter of 26 June 1950).

-
-
2. Since I wrote you on 26 June 1950, I received information from UNESCO (Mr. Robert Fawtier, Secretary General, Conseil International de la Philosophie et des Sciences Humaines, UNESCO, 19mave. Kleber, Paris) that UNESCO is willing to contribute \$ 300.00 to the expenses of my trip.

In view of the fact that I have to pay the difference in the cost of the air flight, as well as the travelling expenses Luxembourg-Paris-Amsterdam-Luxembourg, and the hotel, etc. expenses while staying in Europe, I apply for the "student" rate.

John H.E. Fried

Copie pour M. FRIED.

Zürich, den 13. Juli 1950
Predigerplatz 33



An die
Zürcher Kantonalbank
Zürich 1.

Ich bitte Sie, an folgende Adresse eine Vergütung als Reiseentschädigung für den Besuch des "9. Internationale Historikerkongresses in Paris" auszurichten, unter Belastung auf unserem Konto:

US Dollars 300, aus

Dr. J. E. FRIED
Manufacturers Trust Company
3515 Broadway
NEW-YORK CITY, N. Y.
U. S. A.

Hochachtungsvoll
COMITE INTERNATIONAL
DES
SCIENCES HISTORIQUES
Le Trésorier


Anton Lergiedler

1 May 1950

Professor James T. Shotwell
President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
405 West 117 Street
New York City

Dear Professor Shotwell :

Professor Franz Neumann has advised me that the Committee has suggested my name to undertake one of the projected studies, and that the application for financing the study is now pending. In the meantime, I wonder whether I may ask you for your kind advise in the following matter.

From September 5 - 9, 1950, an International Historical Conference on World War II is to be held in Amsterdam, under the auspices of the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation. The organizers of the Conference have invited me to address the Conference on The Value of the Nurnberg Trials for Historical Science. They inform me that the other speakers will be Professor Toynbee of Britain, Vermeil of France, and Dexter Perkins of Rochester.

The Amsterdam Institute is not in a position to pay for the expenses of the trip. Instead, they approached, through the Netherlands Embassy in Washington, Mr. Hunt of the Division of International Conferences at the State Department. Mr. Hunt advised that the State Department is sending an unofficial observer to the Conference (from our Embassy in London) but cannot defray the expenses of private participants.

My question is whether you believe that the Carnegie Endowment would bear the travelling expenses; or, if not, whether you could give me a suggestion as to how I could arrange the matter. - I would like to add that, if I go to Europe at that time of the year, I would like also to attend the Paris Conference on the Documentation of World War II which is held just a few days earlier and with which the Amsterdam Conference is organically connected.

I take the liberty of enclosing the invitation I received from Amsterdam, and the program.

With best thanks and kind regards,

very faithfully yours,

John H.E. Fried

2 Encl.

OVER ER V.S.

...t zolang de strijd in
...ereenstemming over tal
...mogelijk lijkt. De V.S.,
...nkrijk zouden er niet
...enover staan, vooral
...ember-verkiezingen in
...rug zijn en er meer
...e Koreaanse kwestie,
...elating van Peking,
...panje, toelating van
...makkelijker zouden
...hoopt, dat de V.S.
...as zullen worden
...itie van Truman
...erkt. Het is ech-
...de Russen met

tse

RS-

iciteit
dan
ver-
oog
itie
nd,
nd
te

Schotse mijnwerkers in doodsgevaar

In een kolenmijn in het hart van het steenkoolgebied van Ayrshire in Schotland zitten 128 mijnwerkers opgesloten als gevolg van een instorting aan de oppervlakte van de mijn.

De instorting is het gevolg van de hevige regens der laatste dagen; reddingsploegen zijn koortsachtig aan het werk om te voorkomen dat nog meer water in de mijnschacht zal stromen.

Het reddingswerk wordt bemoeilijkt door opstijgende gassen. De ploegen moeten elkaar dientengevolge geregeld aflossen. De gehele nacht is men bezig geweest met het gooien van bommen, hooi en hout in de geweldige krater om de modderlawine tegen te houden, die de mijnschachten dreigt te vullen en de ingesloten mijnwerkers te verstikken.

Elke 15 minuten stuurt de ploegbaas van de ingesloten mijnwerkers telefonisch een boodschap naar boven, die de wachtenden weer hoop geeft. Allen zijn nog in leven.

Zeven man, die dicht aan de oppervlakte werkten, hebben kans gezien te ontsnappen.

DEFENSIECOMMISSIE UITGEBREID

*Zij vergaderde gistermiddag
met minister Schokking*

(Van onze parlementaire redacteur)

's-Gravenhage, 8 September

De Defensiecommissie is bij Koninklijk Besluit van 30 Augustus j.l. met twee leden van de Eerste Kamer uitgebreid, t.w. de heren H. Algra (a.r.) en mr W. C. Wendelaar (v.v.d.) Het werd reeds enige tijd als een lacune gevoeld, dat wel alle grote fracties uit de Tweede Kamer (behalve die der communisten) hierin waren vertegenwoordigd, maar dat geen enkel lid van de a.r. en de Tweede Kamer in deze zitting had. Het voorzitter

(Ingez. med.-advertentie)

Perzische Tapfsten

Pere

Amsterdam, De

Hilversum, Utrecht,

ELK STUK ZICHTBAAR

ONDERWIJS

Prof. dr J. A. Honing overleden

In de ouderdom van zevenentwintig is te Wageningen prof. dr J. A. Honing overleden, emeritus hoogleraar in de erfelijkheidsleer aan de Landbouwschool aldaar.

Prof Honing was in 1920 hoogleerling te Wageningen geworden, na te zijn baan als onderwijzer te Amsterdam. Hij was leraar te Haarlem te zijn begroef. Hij heeft zijn universitaire studie heeft hij aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam afgerond, waar hij in 1909 is gepromoveerd. Dat jaar tot 1920 heeft hij aan de Proefstation te Medan eerst als assistent en later als directeur gewerkt. Tevens is hij buitengewoon hoogleraar te Utrecht geweest; hij was officier in de orde van Oranje Nassau, en heeft zich ook als bestuurslid van de Centrale Organisatie voor Toegepast Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek vermeld. Hij heeft veel werk gemaakt.

De teraardebestelling is op Zaterdag 9 september om 13.30 uur op de Algemene Begraafplaats te Wageningen bepaald.

EXPLOITATIEKOSTEN VAN LAGER ONDERWIJS

Het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek heeft een overzicht gemaakt van de door de gemeenten betaalde kosten van het lager onderwijs. Het is uit dit overzicht blijkt, dat de materiële exploitatiekosten van het lager onderwijs in 1949 met 10,5% zijn toegenomen. Het is o.m., dat de kosten voor de hogere

ST IN DE TIJD

bleem van de lossen

ksmaatschappijen hebben volgens een regeling met de Oost-Sumatra 86.000 ha kking gesteld. Houdt men de noodzakelijke bosreserft er nog heel wat grond erenstand over. Volgens de n moeten er twee plannen ijnd om tot de oplossing van vraagstuk te komen: een korte baan en een plan op aan. Het plan op korte ter-voorzien in een rationele en deling van de reeds door de rs afgestane gronden en het aken van die gronden voor ngslandbouw. Deze gronden r beschikking komen van de ls een zelfstandige landbou- Het plan op lange termijn de centrale regering te Dja- rden uitgestippeld. Een spe- missie onder leiding van de dul Hakim heeft het gehele in onderzoek.

de verdeling van de reeds thans ikking gestelde gronden komen erking de „tani's", die behoefte aan grond en die het bewijs die grond waard te zijn. Het ligt doeling de grond eerst in bruik- te geven, waarbij wordt ge- naar een oppervlakte van ten 2 ha per tani, hoewel het moge- dat men hier en daar voorlopig a moet beginnen. De tot dusver de opvatting, dat alleen de e bevolking in aanmerking

Neurenberg diende wetgeving matig

Historisch-wetenschappelijk gesproken hebben de Neurenberger processen geen antwoord kunnen geven op vele problemen, bijv. op de vraag hoe het phenomeen van het Hitlerdom kan worden verklaard, aldus dr John H. E. Fried gisteren in een referaat op het internationale congres over de tweede wereldoorlog.

De processen te Neurenberg zijn gevoerd om de individuele schuld of onschuld van de verdachten vast te stellen, zodat de rechters zich konden beperken tot de behandeling van elk individueel geval, gelicht uit het geheel. Daarom heeft het Hof te Neurenberg geen geschiedenis geschreven en is het in gebreke gebleven, een volledige beschrijving van de Hitler-periode te geven. Evenmin hebben de processen de volledige rol van bepaalde nazi-organisaties aan het licht gebracht. Tribunalen kunnen recht spreken over mensen, niet over ideologieën. „Neurenberg" heeft de algemene wetgeving slechts in zeer beperkte mate gediend. Met het oog op de buitengewone praktische importantie, die de agressieve oorlog op de ontwikkeling der dingen heeft, achtte dr Fried een verder onderzoek hiernaar als een der dringendste taken van hen, die de sociale wetenschappen beoefenen.

zou kunnen komen voor grond, achtte de heer Sarimin niet steekhoudend. „In de eenheidsstaat kan geen onderscheid worden gemaakt tussen de ene en de andere staatsburger. Dit neemt echter niet weg, dat natuurlijk niet getornd zal worden aan oude eigendomsrechten e.d."

De heer Sarimin besloot met op de noodzakelijkheid te wijzen, dat de ondernemers hun „goodwill" tonen door een gedeelte van hun winsten ten behoeve van de bevolking aan te wenden. Want, aldus Sarimin, de bevolking moet beseften, dat het grootlandbouwbedrijf ook goede komt. Het argument, dat het land aan devie- tot het volk.

MEVROUW PH

Een leven zonde

„De kinderen d

(Van een onzer vers)

NIETS houdt bij het o gedachten zo levend kracht zo ongebroken durend contact met men, zoals mevrouw Siewertsz van Reesen bezig houdt met een jaar, dan is het niet in deze vrouw een vteit en levenskrachheid van de ouden is directrice van krachten volgens in Den Haag en haar inzichten over op de jon onder haar hoe zij nog voortd de gedraging heeft een on kleine studie 14 Septembe dag viert, z verzamelen vormd tot onderwijs

„Ik ben komen d systema Philipp bijzond der st mijn vader hygi de In ni w

ndernemers /door

AN 7262

10/26

Box 30 - folder 7 I. H. E. FRIEDL. FARRACH REBORN MILREBS, TRIAC & LFA 2 BLDN, 1942-1946, 1966-1968

DOCUMENTS
SOCIALISTES

277
N°4

•
**LÉON
BLUM
DEVANT
LA COUR
DE RIOM**
•

ÉDITIONS DE LA LIBERTÉ

8, B^o POISSONNIÈRE
PARIS 9^e

1945

LÉON BLUM

DEVANT

LA COUR DE RIOM



FÉVRIER-MARS 1942



PARIS

ÉDITIONS DE LA LIBERTÉ

—
1945

LÉON BLUM DEVANT LA COUR DE RIOM

Au printemps de 1942, le Parti socialiste, alors clandestin et illégal, a publié une légère brochure intitulée : « Léon Blum devant la Cour Suprême — Riom — Février-Mars 1942 ».

Pour des raisons que comprennent aisément tous ceux qui ont été mêlés à l'activité clandestine, il avait été impossible alors de reproduire intégralement toutes les interventions de Léon Blum. Un de nos camarades, fidèle militant du Parti, toujours alerte, toujours jeune de corps et d'esprit malgré son âge, avait été chargé de présenter le texte et de choisir les passages les plus importants. Nous ne pouvons encore le nommer : il a payé de sa liberté son inlassable dévouement à notre cause et son courage indomptable ; il est aujourd'hui déporté en Allemagne. Au nom du Parti socialiste tout entier, le Comité exécutif tient à lui exprimer sa gratitude. Nous reproduisons un peu plus loin la brève introduction qu'il avait rédigée pour l'édition clandestine de 1942.

Qu'il nous soit permis de rendre hommage également aux camarades de la Fédération du Nord qui avaient assuré l'impression, à ceux aussi, cheminots, camionneurs, cyclistes, qui nous ont aidé pour le transport et la diffusion de notre brochure ; à ceux enfin qui avaient accepté de garder d'importants dépôts ; certains d'entre eux sont aujourd'hui dans les camps de concentration en Allemagne.

Nous avons pensé qu'en attendant le jour où, après avoir rassemblé tous les documents nécessaires, nous pourrions publier des études plus complètes et nous faire à notre tour les accusateurs de ceux qui avaient organisé le procès et qui sont les vrais responsables de la défaite de 1940, il était urgent de faire connaître ce qu'a dit Léon Blum en face des juges de Riom.

On trouvera dans toutes ces interventions l'élevation morale, la largeur de vues, la clairvoyance, en un mot, la grandeur que nous avons toujours admirées chez Léon Blum. La lecture de ces textes nous donnera ces joies de l'esprit que nous n'avons plus goûtées depuis que nos oppresseurs l'ont empêché d'exprimer librement sa pensée.

Mais sa défense sera aussi un document d'une valeur inappréciable. C'est d'abord un magnifique exposé de toute la politique du premier gouvernement de Front populaire, en particulier de cette politique sociale qui s'est heurtée à tant de préjugés mesquins et d'intérêts sordides. C'est aussi un réquisitoire implacable contre les accusateurs ; on verra comment, par haine de la République, par haine des masses laborieuses, certains hommes, et on peut bien le dire, toute une classe ont été amenés à saboter une grande politique où tout était étroitement et harmonieusement lié : la défense de la liberté, le progrès social, l'amélioration de la production, la défense de la Patrie. Le gouvernement de 1936, le procès de Riom, c'est de l'histoire, mais c'est encore plus de l'actualité. Nous sortons à peine de la nuit où nous avaient plongés ceux qui voulaient détruire nos libertés et qui ont essayé d'anéantir la France. Il nous faut maintenant, pour reconstruire notre pays et le rétablir au rang des grandes puissances, pour renouer avec les nobles traditions de la Révolution, voir clair dans les événements qui se sont déroulés depuis dix ans. Les pages qu'on va lire nous y aideront.

Ce n'est pas tout : qu'on se rappelle les circonstances politiques dans lesquelles s'est engagé le procès de Riom. Quelques hommes seulement, obéissant à ce qu'on peut appeler un réflexe patriotique, avaient entrepris de lutter contre l'envahisseur et contre ceux qui le servaient au gouvernement de Vichy. Mais ce qui devait devenir plus tard « la Résistance » n'était pas organisé. Surtout, on n'avait pas encore des vues claires sur ce que devait être la libération de la France : libération du territoire national d'abord et avant tout, mais aussi libération du peuple par l'anéantissement des forces qui avaient conduit le pays à la défaite et à l'asservissement. Les paroles prononcées par Léon Blum devant ses juges, répandues malgré la censure et l'oppression par les publications clandestines du Parti socialiste, ont eu un retentissement considérable. Elles ont réveillé une opinion publique encore stupéfaite. Elles ont ranimé la foi républicaine et elles ont enseigné aux Français que, comme au temps de la Grande Révolution, la liberté de la Patrie et la liberté des citoyens sont toujours unies et doivent être défendues ou conquises par la même lutte.

7

INTRODUCTION A LA BROCHURE CLANDESTINE DE JUILLET 1942

Le Comité d'Action Socialiste (C. A. S.), cellule génératrice du Parti socialiste de demain, a décidé la publication en brochure de tout ce qu'il y a d'essentiel dans les déclarations et dans le plaidoyer prononcés devant la Cour Suprême de Riom par notre camarade Léon Blum.

Accusé par les capitulards et les traîtres de Vichy d'avoir « manqué aux devoirs de sa charge » en dotant son pays d'une législation du travail unique au monde, Léon Blum a fait face à la meute de ses accusateurs et l'a réduite au silence. N'osant lui répondre, elle a brusquement mis fin à un procès dont elle allait sortir démasquée à jamais.

Soyez sans crainte, vous qui lisez ces lignes : un jour, qui n'est pas tellement loin, le procès sera repris. Toutefois, les accusés ne seront pas les mêmes.

On retrouvera ci-après les hautes qualités intellectuelles et la puissance de séduction morale de celui qui est depuis vingt années, le guide incontesté du Socialisme français. On l'oblige à se taire. Sa voix, grâce à cette brochure, retentira à travers les barreaux de sa prison et, pour les grands devoirs qui nous attendent, elle sonnera le ralliement.

Non, le Socialisme n'est pas mort. Il n'a pas abdiqué. Epuré des traîtres, des lâches et des tièdes, il reprend le combat. Il remplira, quoi qu'il advienne, toute sa mission historique.

**

Nous prions nos amis, non seulement de lire cette brochure, ce qui va de soi, mais de la faire

lire autour d'eux. Chaque exemplaire, passant de main en main, doit toucher au moins cent lecteurs.

Nous comptons sur vous tous et à tous, nous disons : « Courage et...à bientôt ! ».

INTERVENTION DE M^e ANDRE LE TROQUER

Audience du 19 février 1942

M^e LE TROQUER. — Comme en écho aux déclarations qui viennent d'être faites par notre ami Léon Blum et à celles de M. le général Gamelin et des deux avocats qui l'assistent, je crois remplir un devoir en communiquant à la Cour un document singulier qui éclaire les conditions dans lesquelles nous venons devant vous.

« Consignes générales d'orientation et de censure concernant la présentation dans la presse des audiences du procès de Riom.

« 1. Ne pas oublier que l'objet du procès est limité à l'impréparation de la guerre en France de 1936 à 1940, pour des raisons qui ressortiront clairement des débats ; 2. Orienter les esprits sur les faits accablants que les audiences révéleront dans l'ordre des diverses impérities relatives à l'organisation et à l'équipement des armées de terre et de l'air, au développement de nos fortifications, à la préparation de la mobilisation industrielle ; 3. Faire ressortir que les accusés sont responsables d'avoir manqué aux devoirs de leur charge dans la période critique où ils étaient au pouvoir ; 4. Expliquer en toutes occasions que le véritable procès, c'est celui de l'état de choses d'où est sortie la catastrophe, afin de permettre au peuple français.

jeté dans le malheur, de porter un jugement éclairé sur des méthodes de gouvernement dont il est devenu la victime ; 5. Montrer que ce procès ne saurait être celui de l'armée qui, troupes et chefs, a dû se battre sans disposer d'outils indispensables dans une guerre moderne ; 6. Développer chaque jour les arguments et les réfutations qui seront fournis aux journaux par le service de presse au fur et à mesure que le déroulement des séances l'exigera ; 7. Tenir compte de cette dernière consigne de manière particulièrement rigoureuse, s'il s'agit un jour de la personne du Maréchal et de sa politique ; 8. Revenir fréquemment sur le fait que la politique du Maréchal, dans tous les domaines, a été et est inspirée par la nécessité qui découle de cette évidence : la France est condamnée à construire un régime nouveau ou à périr. »

Monsieur le Président, vous disiez tout à l'heure, en ouvrant ces débats, que, pour vous, rien de ce qui avait été fait ou dit n'existait. Il apparaît à la lecture de ce document et après les consignes verbales qui l'ont accompagné comme un commentaire curieux que les débats pourront se dérouler ici comme ils voudront. On pourra recevoir des témoignages...

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Ce serait donc une Cour de justice où il n'y aurait pas de président.

M^e LE TROQUER. — Je suis sûr du contraire, monsieur le Président. Mais je crois qu'il est de l'intérêt de tous ici qu'on sache dans quelles conditions on a l'intention de donner aux incidents qui pourront avoir lieu dans cette enceinte, un écho déformé. Les accusés sont habitués à la déformation de la vérité, à la calomnie. Les journalistes reçoivent des consignes, c'est leur conscience professionnelle qui est en cause. Mais la leur doit apprécier dans quelles conditions elle supporterait la déformation de la vérité.

Elle veut la vérité. Elle nous aura comme auxiliaires pour la recherche. Mais si elle jaillissait, si elle éclatait, elle serait néanmoins déformée à l'extérieur.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Puis-je vous demander comment ce document est parvenu en votre possession ?

M^e LE TROQUER. — Il circule dans toute la ville ; il est entre les mains de centaines de journalistes. Pour moi, l'incident est clos, mais il devait être soulevé au début de mes explications.

Je dépose sur le bureau de la Cour les conclusions suivantes :

« A Messieurs les Président et Conseillers composant la Cour Suprême de Justice, pour M. LÉOL Blum, prévenu. M^e André Le Troquer et M^e Spagnol, avocats à la Cour de Paris, contre le ministère public.

« Plaise à la Cour. Attendu que la Cour Suprême de Justice a été instituée par un texte dit « acte constitutionnel n° 5 », que son organisation, sa compétence, sa procédure, ont été réglées par une loi du 30 juillet 1940 ; attendu que le texte dit acte constitutionnel n° 5 n'a aucune valeur légale ; qu'il se réfère à la loi du 10 juillet 1940 ; attendu que cette dernière, adoptée par l'Assemblée nationale de Vichy, promulguée par le Président de la République et publiée au *Journal officiel* n° 167 le 11 juillet 1940 s'exprime ainsi : l'Assemblée nationale a adopté, le Président de la République a promulgué la loi constitutionnelle dont la teneur suit :

« Article unique. — L'Assemblée nationale donne tous pouvoirs au gouvernement de la République, sous l'autorité et la signature du maréchal Pétain, à l'effet de promulguer par un ou plusieurs actes, une nouvelle constitution de l'Etat français. Cette constitution devra garantir les droits du travail, de la famille et de la Patrie. Elle sera ratifiée par la Nation et appliquée par les assemblées

qu'elle aura créées. La présente loi constitutionnelle, délibérée et adoptée par l'Assemblée nationale, sera exécutée comme loi de l'Etat. Fait à Vichy, le 10 juillet 1940. Albert LEBRUN. Par le Président de la République, le Maréchal de France, président du Conseil, Philippe PÉTAIN.

« Attendu que le texte dit acte constitutionnel n° 5 a décrété dans son article premier, que les articles de la loi du 24 février 1875 et 12 de la loi du 16 juillet 1875 étaient abrogés ; attendu que l'article 9 de la loi du 24 février 1875 décide : « Le Sénat peut être constitué en Cour de Justice pour juger, soit le Président de la République, soit les ministres et pour connaître des attentats commis contre la sûreté de l'Etat » ; que l'article 12 de la loi du 16 juillet 1875 décide : « Le Président de la République ne peut être mis en accusation que par la Chambre des députés et ne peut être jugé que par le Sénat ; les ministres peuvent être mis en accusation par la Chambre des députés, pour les crimes commis dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions ; dans ce cas, ils seront jugés par le Sénat. Le Sénat peut être constitué en Cour de justice par un décret du Président de la République, rendu en conseil des ministres, pour juger toutes les personnes prévenues d'attentats commis contre la sûreté de l'Etat » ; attendu que l'abrogation de ces articles de lois constitutionnelles était impossible, dans les termes mêmes de la loi du 10 juillet 1940 ; attendu que l'on doit marquer les conditions exceptionnelles dans lesquelles l'Assemblée de Vichy a été convoquée ; qu'elle a siégé à quelques quinzaines de kilomètres des forces militaires ennemies, dans des conditions matérielles anormales ; qu'elle a délibéré sous la contrainte et la menace des mesures de rigueur individuelles et collectives ; que les pressions de tous ordres exercées sur elle ont affecté et vicié la valeur du consentement donné par beaucoup de ses membres ; attendu que, mal-

gré les réserves les plus expresses à faire de ce chef, la volonté de l'Assemblée nationale reste évidente et le texte de la loi constitutionnelle du 10 juillet est précis et sans ambiguïté, qu'il peut être admis, en se référant, non au texte lui-même, mais aux travaux préparatoires et aux déclarations du rapporteur Bolvin-Champeaux devant l'Assemblée nationale, que les pouvoirs exécutifs et législatifs ont été accordés au gouvernement ;

« Mais attendu que celui-ci n'avait pas le droit d'abroger les articles 9 et 12 des lois constitutionnelles des 24 février et 16 juillet 1875 ; attendu, en effet, que le pouvoir de promulguer une nouvelle constitution en un ou plusieurs actes a bien été accordé au gouvernement de la République, mais sous la condition suspensive de la ratification par la Nation et de l'application par les assemblées nouvelles ; attendu que cette double condition n'a pas été remplie.

« Attendu, en conséquence, que la Cour Suprême de justice ne pouvait être instituée par un texte manquant de base légale.

« Par ces motifs,

« Donner acte au concluant et à la défense de leur protestation solennelle contre la violation des lois constitutionnelles de la République. »

Messieurs, mon entreprise est audacieuse, elle ne peut pas être vaine. Bien que je conteste la légalité de la constitution de la Cour Suprême de justice, j'ai pour la qualité des membres qui la composent, une déférence que je tiens à exprimer. Mais nous sommes à cette barre pour exprimer ce que notre conscience nous commande, c'est-à-dire pour remplir un devoir.

Peut-on s'adresser au pouvoir judiciaire pour lui demander d'apprécier la constitutionnalité des lois qui l'ont mis en action ? Aux Etats-Unis, il existe une Cour Suprême qui a cette qualité. Ici,

la question est controversée, bien qu'en fait, on trouve des analogies qui, pour être modestes, n'en sont pas moins certaines. En France, disent certains, seul le pouvoir législatif est le souverain, interprète de la Constitution. Beaucoup de bons esprits ont exprimé une opinion contraire. Quoi qu'il en soit, nous sommes devant une juridiction à laquelle on a donné le titre de Cour Suprême. Cela lui donne des droits, cela lui crée des devoirs, les derniers sont encore plus impérieux, permettez-moi de le dire, que les premiers.

La lecture des textes inclus dans les conclusions déposées est expressive à souhait. La loi constitutionnelle du 10 juillet est claire. On peut promulguer des textes remplaçant la Constitution antérieure : ils ont une valeur virtuelle, une valeur future. Ils ne peuvent pas entrer en action, être mis en jeu ; il leur faudra pour cela une double sanction ; la ratification par la Nation et la mise en application par les assemblées qui auront été créées.

Et qu'on ne s'imagine pas qu'il s'agit d'une formalité. Impossible de soutenir cette thèse. Le texte adopté n'est pas même celui qui figurerait dans le projet de loi du gouvernement. Celui-ci s'exprimait ainsi à propos de la future constitution :

« Elle sera ratifiée par les assemblées qu'elle aura créées. »

Deux sénateurs : MM. Taurines et Dormann, au nom des groupes des anciens combattants sénateurs, firent adopter un texte décidant la ratification par la Nation avant même l'élection des deux assemblées.

Ce texte fut accepté par le gouvernement et ne permet donc aucune équivoque. Il le permet d'autant moins que le rapporteur, M. Bolvin-Champeaux, avait dit : « Il est expressément entendu que le texte nouveau du gouvernement doit être

interprété en ce sens que la ratification de la constitution et l'élection des assemblées devront faire l'objet de deux votes distincts ».

Et plus encore, Messieurs de la Cour, devant la commission de l'Assemblée nationale, le vice-président du Conseil de l'époque, délégué spécialement par M. le maréchal Pétain pour soutenir le projet du gouvernement — j'ai indiqué M. Pierre Laval — s'était exprimé de la façon suivante : « Le gouvernement, se ralliant à la thèse des anciens combattants, accepte que la ratification soit demandée à la Nation ». « Cela signifie, dit toujours M. Pierre Laval, que la ratification devra précéder le fonctionnement effectif des institutions nouvelles ».

Sur le plan juridique, sur le plan légal, je le dis maintenant, la cause est entendue.

Ainsi, Messieurs, le gouvernement n'a pas respecté la légalité acceptée, proposée par lui. Il a créé, mis en action des textes qui ne pouvaient être que des projets virtuels, ne valaient que pour l'avenir, certaines conditions étant alors remplies. Le gouvernement, sans doute, a été emporté par l'envie de copier, d'imiter. Il a dû chercher dans les sénatus-consultes et la constitution prébiscitaire du second Empire avec lequel il a la tendance de s'identifier. Il n'a rien trouvé. Mais il aurait pu, il aurait dû faire une constitution. Il y a des procès qu'on n'engage pas n'importe quand, n'importe où, n'importe comment. Le territoire national doit être libéré de l'occupation étrangère pour débattre entre Français de ce qui regarde les Français.

Après 1870, on a poursuivi le maréchal Bazaine quand le territoire a été libéré. Et encore, l'a-t-on fait parce qu'il existait dans le code de justice militaire, un texte sur les places fortes, mais on n'a pas poursuivi les ministres qui s'appelaient Emile Olivier, le duc de Grammont, le maréchal Lebœuf.

Sous le régime impérial qu'on paraît regretter, la responsabilité d'un homme écartait toutes les autres.

En 1871, il n'y avait donc pas de texte. C'était de la Constitution impériale qu'était issue l'irresponsabilité des ministres de l'époque et c'est, au contraire, dans la constitution nouvelle, celle de 1875, qu'a été inscrite la responsabilité des ministres de la République.

C'est la réponse aux affirmations quelquefois officielles, toujours solennelles, mais contraires à la réalité qui ont été produites depuis des mois. L'Empire ne fut pas le régime de la responsabilité. C'est la République, au contraire, qui a repris la tradition passée. C'est qu'en 1875, on avait le souvenir des événements qui avaient précédé la déclaration de guerre. Olivier, Grammont, Lebœuf avaient de lourdes responsabilités. Ils avaient trompé les Chambres, ils avaient trompé le pays. On avait dit que l'honneur était engagé, bien que satisfaction eût été obtenue ; on n'avait pas communiqué au Parlement, non plus qu'à l'opinion, des dépêches révélatrices ; on avait laissé croire qu'on était en liaison diplomatique avec l'Autriche et l'Italie.

On avait encore dans l'esprit les affirmations de Lebœuf sur la préparation militaire ; tout le monde avait à l'esprit l'histoire du bouton de guêtre. On a même mis ensuite en cause les quantités de matériel et l'on pourrait apporter à cette barre des documents suggestifs. On a écarté aussi les fautes de commandement, insuffisamment compensées par l'héroïsme et le sacrifice des hommes.

Dans tout cela, il y avait des motifs pour un procès de haute trahison, mais il n'y avait pas de juges.

La Constitution de 1875 y a pourvu et c'est l'organisme juridique qu'elle a prévu qui, seul, avait

qualité pour juger les hommes qui sont ici... ou d'autres.

La Haute Cour de justice est une juridiction de caractère politique, et un auteur que nous estimons, que nous apprécions, a pu dire que les hautes cours appartenaient au droit commun constitutionnel.

On a le droit de dire, d'ailleurs, que c'est rendre service aux magistrats de l'ordre public, que de les mêler le moins possible aux débats de caractère politique.

Seulement, pour convoquer la Haute Cour, il aurait fallu convoquer la Chambre des députés, seule qualifiée pour la mise en accusation. Mais les débutants dictateurs ont eu peur que l'effet de surprise du 10 juillet 1940 ne se renouvelle pas. Ils ont manqué d'audace. Ils ont cru être habiles, en violant la loi. Nous en prenons acte pour ce procès, pour demain, pour l'histoire.

Mais comment a-t-on pu en arriver là ? C'est qu'il y a eu dans la bousculade de la défaite, dans la tourmente du désastre, une véritable invasion du pouvoir.

Des hommes inattendus y sont venus. Quelques-uns étaient des chevronnés, des sortes de récidivistes.

D'autres ont été capables pour ménager la transition ; d'autres, qui n'y seraient jamais venus, se sont précipités dans une sorte de bousculade et quelqu'un qui s'y connaît bien a qualifié cela de « divine surprise ».

Les uns et les autres ont assumé de lourdes, parfois de tragiques responsabilités.

Leur premier souci — ils l'ont encore montré tout à l'heure dans la note de la censure — était d'anesthésier la République, jusqu'à l'asphyxie.

Mais, je le dis comme je le pense, leurs efforts seront inutiles et leurs espoirs ne se réaliseront pas.

Toutefois, j'ai le droit de dire encore qu'ils ont trahi le mandat formel qui leur avait été donné.

C'est du gouvernement de la République qu'ils avaient reçu le pouvoir.

L'Assemblée nationale de Vichy ne pouvait pas agir autrement : un contrat, un traité a même été passé entre le gouvernement et l'assemblée.

L'exposé des motifs du projet déposé par le gouvernement le dit expressément : « C'est dans cet esprit que le gouvernement s'est tourné vers les Chambres en leur demandant de rendre possible, par un acte solennel, dans l'ordre de la légalité républicaine, cet immense effort ».

Et le 9 juillet 1940, dans son rapport au nom de la commission du suffrage universel, devant la Chambre des députés, M. Mistler disait : « Aujourd'hui, en permettant comme le gouvernement le lui demande, l'immense effort de reconstruction du pays dans l'ordre et la légalité républicaine, le Parlement donne un exemple ». Et le rapporteur déplorait que la garantie essentielle de la République — la souveraineté du Parlement — n'ait pas été plus effective.

M. Boivin-Champeaux, rapporteur devant le Sénat et l'Assemblée nationale, avait rappelé que la Constitution de 1875 avait fait de la France « un pays libre où l'on respirait à l'aise ».

Le pacte conclu formellement, expressément, n'a pas été respecté à la faveur d'un armistice imprévoyant, bâclé dans la peur, dont la durée a dépassé les prévisions les plus pessimistes et d'une occupation prolongée des deux tiers du territoire.

On s'est installé au pouvoir, on s'en est servi, on en a abusé, on a critiqué ce qu'on appelle déjà — à tort — l'ancien régime. L'instabilité des ministères ? Qui donc, aujourd'hui, ne sourirait pas devant cette sorte de kaléidoscope qui fait défiler

qualité pour juger les hommes qui sont ici... ou d'autres.

La Haute Cour de justice est une juridiction de caractère politique, et un auteur que nous estimons, que nous apprécions, a pu dire que les hautes cours appartenaient au droit commun constitutionnel.

On a le droit de dire, d'ailleurs, que c'est rendre service aux magistrats de l'ordre public, que de les mêler le moins possible aux débats de caractère politique.

Seulement, pour convoquer la Haute Cour, il aurait fallu convoquer la Chambre des députés, seule qualifiée pour la mise en accusation. Mais les débutants dictateurs ont eu peur que l'effet de surprise du 10 juillet 1940 ne se renouvelle pas. Ils ont manqué d'audace. Ils ont cru être habillés, en violant la loi. Nous en prenons acte pour ce procès, pour demain, pour l'histoire.

Mais comment a-t-on pu en arriver là ? C'est qu'il y a eu dans la bousculade de la défaite, dans la tourmente du désastre, une véritable invasion du pouvoir.

Des hommes inattendus y sont venus. Quelques-uns étaient des chevronnés, des sortes de récidivistes.

D'autres ont été capables pour ménager la transition ; d'autres, qui n'y seraient jamais venus, se sont précipités dans une sorte de bousculade et quelqu'un qui s'y connaît bien a qualifié cela de « divine surprise ».

Les uns et les autres ont assumé de lourdes, parfois de tragiques responsabilités.

Leur premier souci — ils l'ont encore montré tout à l'heure dans la note de la censure — était d'anesthésier la République, jusqu'à l'asphyxie.

Mais, je le dis comme je le pense, leurs efforts seront inutiles et leurs espoirs ne se réaliseront pas.

Toutefois, j'ai le droit de dire encore qu'ils ont trahi le mandat formel qui leur avait été donné.

C'est du gouvernement de la République qu'ils avaient reçu le pouvoir.

L'Assemblée nationale de Vichy ne pouvait pas agir autrement : un contrat, un traité a même été passé entre le gouvernement et l'assemblée.

L'exposé des motifs du projet déposé par le gouvernement le dit expressément : « C'est dans cet esprit que le gouvernement s'est tourné vers les Chambres en leur demandant de rendre possible, par un acte solennel, dans l'ordre de la légalité républicaine, cet immense effort ».

Et le 9 juillet 1940, dans son rapport au nom de la commission du suffrage universel, devant la Chambre des députés, M. Mistler disait : « Aujourd'hui, en permettant comme le gouvernement le lui demande, l'immense effort de reconstruction du pays dans l'ordre et la légalité républicaine, le Parlement donne un exemple ». Et le rapporteur déplorait que la garantie essentielle de la République — la souveraineté du Parlement — n'ait pas été plus effective.

M. Bolvin-Champeaux, rapporteur devant le Sénat et l'Assemblée nationale, avait rappelé que la Constitution de 1875 avait fait de la France « un pays libre où l'on respirait à l'aise ».

Le pacte conclu formellement, expressément, n'a pas été respecté à la faveur d'un armistice imprévoyant, bâclé dans la peur, dont la durée a dépassé les prévisions les plus pessimistes et d'une occupation prolongée des deux tiers du territoire.

On s'est installé au pouvoir, on s'en est servi, on en a abusé, on a critiqué ce qu'on appelle déjà — à tort — l'ancien régime. L'instabilité des ministères ? Qui donc, aujourd'hui, ne sourirait pas devant cette sorte de kaléidoscope qui fait défiler

sous les yeux du public des hommes qui, successivement, passent et disparaissent ? Quelle besogne a été accomplie ? L'existence des assemblées législatives a été affirmée par un acte constitutionnel n° 10, sans qu'on ait qualité pour cela, sans qu'elles en aient besoin pour exister. Mais les garanties constitutionnelles ont été supprimées, les élus, les mandataires ont été, de toute façon, atteints à la fois dans leur dignité et leur possibilité d'existence. On espère détruire par l'usure, par une sorte d'effritement, des institutions qui pourraient être demain un suprême recours. On a entrepris et on poursuit la désorganisation de la vie régionale et locale ; on révoque les maires, on démissionne d'office des conseillers généraux, on dissout les conseils municipaux.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Nous sommes bien loin de notre procès. Revenons-y.

M. LE TROQUER. — Je vais terminer, mais je suis bien dans le cadre du procès, cadre que je me suis imposé : celui de la responsabilité de la guerre.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Diminuez le cadre.

M. LE TROQUER. — J'ai démontré l'illégalité de ce qui a été fait. Je reste bien dans le procès.

Les assemblées locales contrôlaient l'administration. On a renversé les rôles, les fonctionnaires nommés par le pouvoir central choisissent ceux qui devraient les contrôler et les mettent au pas, parfois au garde à vous ; on en a même vu à Paris qui ont été soumis à l'appel nominal.

On dénonce le capitalisme sordide dont le Chef de l'Etat lui-même a proclamé la malfaisance dans plusieurs de ses messages ; mais la liberté, les libertés sont supprimées. Il est dangereux d'exprimer une opinion, de formuler une critique qui ne soit pas au goût des maîtres de l'heure. Des hom-

mes, des femmes, par milliers, par dizaines de milliers sont en prison, dans des camps de concentration en vertu de lettres de cachet, trop souvent aussi parce que leur origine, leur religion sont honnies, des déchéances civiques, professionnelles sont ordonnées pour la même raison ; on assiste à des drames effroyables. A des hommes, on interdit d'exercer leur mandat, leur profession qu'ils honoraient, de l'aveu de leurs pairs les plus exigeants. La France, ce n'était pas cela, ce n'est pas cela, ce ne sera pas cela..

Elle a été grande par le rayonnement des idées qu'elle incarnait, qu'elle représentait ; nous ne nous résignerons pas aux abaissements qu'on lui fait subir, aux déchéances qu'on lui prépare. Les hommes qui sont au pouvoir devraient relire et méditer cet article 35 de la déclaration montagnarde du 24 juin 1793 : « Quand le gouvernement viole les droits du peuple, l'insurrection est pour le peuple le plus sacré des droits et le plus indispensable des devoirs ».

Partout, dans les campagnes comme dans les villes, on souffre du froid ; la faim est inapaisée, mais on se raidit et le moral tient ; les anciens comme les jeunes sont rassemblés, les cloisons de partis se sont effondrées, les rivalités religieuses et philosophiques se sont tuées ; les Français de toutes qualités, de toutes classes sont au coude à coude. S'il est vrai qu'une partie infime de la bourgeoisie s'est dérobée à l'honneur pour sacrifier à l'intérêt, il n'en reste pas moins que le peuple, les classes moyennes, que ce soit d'un côté ou de l'autre de la ligne de démarcation, savent montrer partout ce que c'est qu'une nation fière, qui ne doute pas de son destin. Uni dans une attente impatiente, mais avec une dignité crispée et frémissante, le peuple de France montre son espoir, sa volonté de faire revivre souveraines la Patrie et la liberté.

INTERVENTIONS DE M^e SPANIEN

20 février 1942

PREMIERE INTERVENTION

Les conseils de M. Léon Blum s'associent sans réserve aux conclusions que vient de développer M^e Ribet.

Avec une logique, à nos yeux impérieuse, elles posent un problème d'une redoutable gravité. Elles montrent d'une façon invincible que le procès de l'impréparation que vous voulez faire n'entre pas dans le cadre de la loi qui vous a institués. Elles font ressortir que ce procès de l'impréparation qui se trouve substitué à celui que vous aviez mission de poursuivre, c'est-à-dire celui de la responsabilité de la guerre et de son prolongement, que ce procès suppose l'introduction dans le débat de la substance même que votre arrêt de renvoi prétend en écarter. Cette substance, c'est la conduite des opérations militaires, c'est la recherche des responsabilités antérieures à juin 1936. Voilà la matière, la substance que vous voulez écarter ou que, accessoirement, vous prétendez vouer, dès votre arrêt de renvoi, à l'ombre et au mystère des huis-clos.

D'avance, Messieurs, vous nous avez fourni la double preuve de la vérité de la thèse qu'a soutenue ici M^e Ribet. Cette preuve tient dans l'interprétation que le réquisitoire lui-même a donnée page 63 au mot « ultérieurement ». Elle tient aussi dans l'omission par votre arrêt de renvoi de ce même mot « ultérieurement », omission pure et simple, et par les magistrats instructeurs, et par les rédacteurs de l'arrêt de mise en jugement.

Les observations de M^e Ribet s'appliquent étroitement à notre cas puisque au seuil même de l'inculpation qui nous a été notifiée par le conseiller

instructeur, la même omission systématique s'est manifestée. Or, une chose est sûre : c'est que nous sommes ici, dans la plus haute matière pénale qui soit. Dans le domaine pénal, si humble soit-il, il n'y a pas de place ni pour l'approximation, ni pour la conjecture. L'invocation d'un texte pénal, base d'une poursuite quelconque, exclut la citation inexacte, le résumé, l'extrait ou l'analyse. Et cependant, dès le seuil des réquisitions, c'est un texte incomplet qui se trouve cité, puisque disparaît du champ des réquisitions, sur la foi du rappel de la loi qui prélude aux poursuites, la mention des coauteurs et complices.

Voilà le fait, il est considérable. A nos yeux, il est sans précédent. Il vient de vous et nous pouvons dire respectueusement qu'il nous appartient. M^e Ribet vous l'a montré ; ses conclusions, auxquelles nous nous associons, vous demandent de le reconnaître. Et je crois que vous ne pouvez faire autrement, en proclamant la nullité de votre instruction et subsidiairement en réparant ce qui a été fait, en ordonnant le supplément d'instruction qui vous est demandé.

Si nous nous joignons aux conclusions de M^e Ribet, c'est que le raisonnement qu'il a développé à votre barre s'applique, à plus forte raison, au cas de M. Blum.

M. Blum ne revêtait aucune charge publique à la date du 4 septembre 1939. Or, pour avoir concouru au passage à l'état de guerre, il fallait au moins être ministre ou le subordonné immédiat d'un ministre à cette date capitale.

M. Blum n'a revêtu aucune charge publique après le 4 septembre 1939. Comment, dès lors, aurait-il pu commettre un acte répréhensible après cette date, dans le cadre de la loi qui vous a institués ?

Parmi les actes que vous avez retenus, et c'est pour nous une seconde raison de venir appuyer

l'argumentation de M^e Ribet, il y en a un seul, à nos yeux, qui a concouru au passage de l'état de paix à l'état de guerre : c'est la réunion du 23 août 1939. M. Blum n'y était pas. Il ne pouvait pas y être. Ce fait, évidemment, devrait suffire pour soustraire M. Blum à vos débats.

M. Blum, cependant, vous a dit hier pourquoi il entendait malgré tout y demeurer. Il n'y a pas là de contradiction, comme le soutenait hier M. le procureur général.

Nous avons le devoir de vous démontrer que ce procès est mal construit, entaché de vices, contraire aux principes du droit et qu'il ne correspond pas à la loi qui est à la base même de votre poursuite. Nous avons le devoir de vous démontrer que le pré-jugé le domine et nous domine du même coup.

Nos clients ont, eux, autre chose à faire et à dire. Ils ont l'ambition de défendre leur honneur, non seulement devant vous, mais devant le pays tout entier. C'est pourquoi les deux tâches se rejoignent et concourent, chacune en se plaçant sur son plan autonome. Il n'y a là aucune sorte de contradiction.

Un fait demeure et c'est pourquoi j'insiste auprès de vous, Messieurs, avec gravité, un fait demeure : si vous rétablissez le mot « ultérieurement » ou si vous lui donnez, à notre requête, son sens véritable, M. Blum ne peut matériellement être retenu dans les liens de la prévention.

Je vais vous faire une confidence. Je me suis demandé comment vous en étiez arrivés au point où vous êtes et voici la réponse que je me suis faite.

Vous êtes nés dans des jours sombres, Messieurs dans les jours les plus sombres qu'ait traversés notre patrie. Le décret du 1^{er} août 1940 vous a convoqués pour une double tâche précise et dramatique à la fois. Il vous a donné la mission de

rechercher les responsabilités de la guerre, ainsi que les responsabilités de ceux qui l'avaient prolongée inutilement.

Sans doute le texte est clair. Il n'y a point de travaux préparatoires qui puissent l'éclairer, mais il existe cependant quelque chose d'autre qui peut nous instruire ; c'est l'ambiance dans laquelle il a été promulgué.

Un journaliste, que vous connaissez, rappelait dans son livre sur les provocateurs de la guerre, à la page 2 de la préface, ce que disait la radio-diffusion officielle du gouvernement français le 1^{er} août 1940 le jour même où le texte qui nous intéresse paraissait au *Journal officiel*. Après avoir énuméré les différentes catégories de responsables qui allaient être déférés à la Cour de Riom : il ajoutait : « ceux qui ont provoqué et entretenu l'esprit de guerre en s'opposant par tous les moyens aux tentatives de conciliation et aux tentatives de paix ».

Voilà comment une voix officielle, interprétait le décret qui venait d'être pris en vue de votre convocation. Mais il y a autre chose dont M. le procureur général se souvient, j'en suis sûr. Le 15 août 1940, lorsque le procureur général a pris son réquisitoire introductif d'instance, son bagage était mince, mais enfin il existait. Le gouvernement lui avait transmis, sous la signature de M. Alibert, une lettre qui est à votre dossier. Quels sont les documents qui étaient joints à cette lettre ? J'en ai pris note sur le texte lui-même.

C'est d'abord le procès-verbal de la réunion du 23 août 1939. Nous avons reconnu qu'il y avait là un des actes qui pouvaient avoir concouru au passage de l'état de paix à l'état de guerre. Il y avait aussi le compte rendu analytique de l'Assemblée des députés tenue à Vichy le 6 juillet 1940, sous la présidence de M. Cayrel, l'intervention de M. Georges Bonnet, et M. Georges Bonnet dans

cette intervention qu'il a communiquée à l'appui des réquisitions à prendre, s'est donné la tâche de justifier sa politique. Enfin la copie de la relation sommaire de la situation vue de Londres du 17 juin au 20 juillet 1940, rédigée par M. Paul Morand et datée de Liverpool le 20 juillet 1940.

Voilà le bagage que vous aviez au départ monsieur le procureur général. Je reconnais qu'il s'est enrichi, qu'il est devenu plus lourd et plus pesant. Mais c'est le bagage originel qui, si mince soit-il, imprime sa marque à votre procédure et indique d'une façon très nette ce qu'on attendait de la mission à vous confiée.

Vous ne vous y êtes pas mépris. Ce procès qu'on vous donnait mission de faire, vous n'avez pas voulu le poursuivre, et à mes yeux c'est votre honneur. Vous avez pensé, comme nous tous, qu'il n'est pas vrai que la France, par aucun de ses hommes d'Etat, quel qu'il soit, à quelque endroit ou dans quelque moment qu'il ait rempli sa tâche, ait voulu la guerre. Vous n'avez pas voulu susciter un préjugé qui serait né de votre arrêt et qui se serait substitué au jugement de l'histoire.

Il y a autre chose encore que vous n'avez pas voulu dire pour votre gloire. Vous n'avez pas voulu instruire le procès du prolongement de la guerre. Car vous vous êtes dit, comme nous tous, qu'un tel procès suppose au moins la guerre terminée, que la coalition dont nous faisons partie, n'a pas abandonné la lutte, n'a pas déposé les armes. Tant que par le monde des hommes luttent et meurent sous les couleurs de la liberté, la question du prolongement de la guerre ne sera pas résolue. C'est pourquoi vous n'avez pas voulu essayer de la résoudre. Jamais d'ailleurs, une telle question ne pourra être résolue sur la simple constatation d'un rapport de forces. Car c'est la loi morale et non pas l'arithmétique qui règle les problèmes de la conscience.

Voilà ce que nos pères nous ont appris. Si vous aviez démenti, en faisant le procès qu'on vous demandait de faire, l'enseignement de ceux qui nous ont donné notre structure morale, de ceux qui nous ont appris à révéler depuis Léonidas jusqu'à Albert de Belgique, il aurait fallu éteindre la flamme éternelle que nous avons allumée sous l'Arc de Triomphe pour honorer le souvenir de nos héros. C'est ainsi que je me suis expliqué à moi-même l'attitude que vous aviez prise.

Mais alors — je vous le dis avec tout le respect dont je suis capable — de cette attitude il fallait tirer les conséquences.

Il fallait d'abord rendre le non-lieu qui s'imposait.

Il n'y a pas de justice sans courage et sans risque. Je sais que vous vouliez déployer ce courage et que vous vouliez affronter ce risque. Mais vous savez aussi qu'il n'y a pas de justice sans liberté. Vous avez compris, vous avez pensé que le procès que l'on vous demandait de faire était difficile sinon impossible alors que les généraux Billotte et Huntziger sont morts, alors que les généraux Condé, Bourret et Giraud, qui ont commandé des armées devant l'ennemi sont encore aux mains de l'ennemi, alors que le général Colson n'a pu obtenir de laissez-passer, pour répondre à votre convocation. La ligne de démarcation déchire encore le territoire et vous avez senti qu'il était difficile et dangereux de superposer à cette ligne de démarcation matérielle, une ligne de démarcation morale qui ruinerait l'unité du pays. Tout cela vous l'avez senti et permettez-moi modestement de vous en rendre hommage. Et cependant vous avez substitué au procès que vous ne pouviez et que vous ne vouliez pas faire, un autre procès que M^e Ribet définissait tout à l'heure. La procédure qui était morte entre vos mains, vous avez tenté de la ranimer en lui donnant une forme nouvelle.

Comment s'étonner, dans ces conditions, que le cadre qui servait à vos travaux ait éclaté ?

Voilà qui donne toute sa valeur à notre raisonnement sur le mot « ultérieurement ».

Ce mot, en effet, que vous avez omis, se trouvait sur votre passage comme un obstacle, et c'est cela qui donne à cette omission un caractère si redoutable et si grave.

Voilà où vous en étiez lorsque, comme un coup de foudre dans un ciel incertain, le message du mois d'août a retenti. La possibilité en était déjà contenue dans l'acte n° 7 et la menace s'est réalisée. En effet, après le message, ce fut la sentence.

Que dit-elle ?

Je condamne avant vous, Messieurs de la Cour, les hommes que vous devez juger. Je mets fin à vos lenteurs et à vos inquiétudes. Vous pouvez condamner ces hommes avec tranquillité : ils sont coupables moins par ce qu'ils sont, que par ce qu'ils incarnent, leur procès, c'est le procès du régime, le procès des mœurs et des méthodes.

Voilà ce que vous allez juger. Un procès différé eût été, ajoutait le Maréchal de France, chef de l'Etat, un procès manqué. C'est vrai. Mais alors il fallait ou le faire, ou se rendre compte que si on le différait jusqu'à la restauration des libertés publiques, jusqu'à la libération du territoire, il valait mieux y renoncer puisque, sous les premiers souffles des libertés reconquises, le procès, tel qu'il était prévu, se serait évanoui.

La Cour, je le conçois, lorsqu'elle a entendu retentir ce message, s'est alarmée pour sa propre indépendance. Elle s'est légitimement souciée de l'affirmer en vérifiant sa compétence. Pouvait-elle accepter d'enregistrer une condamnation déjà prononcée ? C'est pour vous dégager de cette obligation qui pouvait apparemment peser sur

l'arrêt que vous alliez rendre, que vous avez débattu et rendu votre arrêt de renvoi. Nous avons salué votre effort. Je le salue encore aujourd'hui mais, excusez-moi, messieurs, il ne nous a pas convaincus.

Ce sont bien les mêmes faits qui servent de support aux deux condamnations, à quelques différences près. Cela, vous le concédez au début de votre arrêt de mise en jugement. Puis vous ajoutez que ce que le Maréchal a voulu édicter, c'est une sanction politique alors que la sanction que vous avez mission de prononcer, c'est une sanction judiciaire.

Il n'en est rien Messieurs ! Contre M. Blum, en effet M. le Procureur général, n'a pas retenu l'accusation d'impéritie. Il a retenu seulement ce qu'il appelle, la soumission à la politique. L'affaire est donc politique dans les deux cas : qu'elle se situe sur le plan où s'est placé le Maréchal ou qu'elle se déroule sur le plan où le réquisitoire l'a placée.

Nous verrons un jour ce qu'il faut entendre par la soumission à la politique. Nous dirons ce jour-là, que la plus grande plaie de notre époque, c'est le septicisme universel à l'égard de la moralité politique. Nous viderons un jour le débat qui s'institue, comme on l'a dit, entre Catherine de Sienne et Machiavel. Entre Catherine de Sienne d'après laquelle la justice et la fidélité sont le fondement de la conservation de la cité et Machiavel avec son « évangile d'injustices intelligentes ».

Nous verrons donc ce que recouvre votre accusation de soumission à la politique. Nous verrons si ce n'est pas au contraire la fidélité politique que vous avez voulu dénoncer.

Mais le moment n'est pas venu de débattre ce sujet si grave. Ce que je veux examiner, c'est la question de savoir si votre arrêt de renvoi vous a libérés comme vous aperceviez le besoin de l'être.

92
Ce n'est pas la même forfaiture, dites-vous plus loin. La forfaiture ou la trahison des devoirs de la charge, celle que condamne le Maréchal, c'est la forfaiture issue de la violation du serment de fidélité qu'on lui a prêté. La nôtre, c'est une forfaiture strictement étroite, celle qui suppose à sa base un lien de concours au passage de l'état de paix à l'état de guerre, qui suppose l'établissement d'un lien causal entre des faits déterminés et la prolongation de cet état de guerre.

Messieurs nous n'avons pas prêté serment. Ce serment qui en oblige d'autres, ne nous oblige pas. Alors comment ne voit-on pas que la sentence du Maréchal qui recouvre la vôtre et sur laquelle le Maréchal s'est expliqué, s'étend sur un domaine qui déborde le cadre étroit dont vous vouliez fixer les limites. C'est la forfaiture en général qu'il veut atteindre, y compris cette variété de forfaiture étriquée et réduite que vous prétendez pouvoir nous imputer.

Pour être complet, je dirai un mot de cette analogie qu'établit l'arrêt de renvoi, entre notre situation et celle qui résulte des sanctions disciplinaires.

Là encore, nous ne sommes pas soumis, et nous ne pouvons pas l'être — il serait cruel d'insister — à aucune discipline du Maréchal.

De même, dites-vous, qu'une sanction disciplinaire ne s'oppose pas à une poursuite de droit commun, de même la sanction disciplinaire prononcée par le Maréchal ne s'oppose pas à ce que vous vous saisissiez de l'affaire.

Cet argument, Messieurs, ne nous convainc pas. Lorsque le même support de fait établit la matérialité d'un acte qui constitue une infraction disciplinaire et qui se présente aussi sous les espèces d'un crime de droit commun, c'est un principe constant que le criminel tient le discipli-

naire en état comme il tient le civil en état. Dans ces conditions, la sanction du Maréchal aurait dû, logiquement, suivre la vôtre et non la précéder.

En réalité, Messieurs, la sentence du Maréchal englobe la vôtre. Si vous placez la condamnation sur un plan parallèle à celui sur lequel vous vous mouvez, si vous la placez au rang des vérités qui vous sont inaccessibles, qui ne voit que vous ne vous en libérez pas ? Pour nous en libérer, il nous faudrait pouvoir nous défendre contre la sentence du Maréchal, et nous en défendre devant vous. Mais cela vous ne pouvez pas l'admettre car, si vous êtes une cour souveraine, vous n'êtes pas un tribunal d'appel ; vous vous refusez à l'être.

Dans ces conditions, nous avons raison de conclure qu'il y a chose jugée contre vous, comme contre nous.

Voilà le tragique de la situation dans laquelle nous sommes : ce sont bien des condamnés qui comparaissent aujourd'hui devant vous, car, pour qu'ils puissent se défendre librement, il faudrait deux choses : qu'ils puissent supprimer ici, le préjugé extérieur qui nous est à tous imposé, et qu'ils puissent remonter le préjugé intérieur que vous vous êtes imposé à vous-mêmes dans les termes de votre arrêt de renvoi par la suppression du mot « ultérieurement ». Aujourd'hui pour la dernière fois, vous pouvez encore rétablir l'équité avec l'équilibre. Vous pouvez encore attester votre libération à l'égard de ce préjugé qui vous oppresse comme il nous oppresse. Vous le pouvez, parce que, en vous se cumulent toutes les instances, tous les recours. S'il y avait eu un recours au-dessus de vous, nul doute que nous l'eussions exercé contre votre arrêt de renvoi. Et nous l'eussions exercé avec fruit. C'est à vous, que nous avons le droit d'adresser ce recours, car c'est la première fois que nous pouvons exercer notre défense.

Vous nous avez mis en jugement sans nous avoir

entendu, car la contradiction, sachez-le, c'est tout de même autre chose que la communication courtoise de diverses pièces.

La contradiction, c'est la confrontation avec les témoins qui accusent ; c'est la confrontation des témoins entre eux, lorsqu'ils se démentent mutuellement. Vos arrêts ont été rendus sans cette contradiction. Cette contradiction se produit pour la première fois aujourd'hui, à votre barre. Et votre arrêt ne peut avoir été rendu que sous réserve de cette contradiction, de cette lumière, que nous pourrions un jour vous apporter et que nous vous apportons dès aujourd'hui.

C'est un argument de texte que celui que nous vous proposons. Mais vous avez montré votre souci des textes dans votre arrêt de renvoi lorsque vous avez écarté les opérations militaires. C'est en vous appuyant sur le texte que vous avez écarté tous ceux qui ne sont pas subordonnés immédiats des ministres et anciens ministres, tout en oubliant que, par le moyen du paragraphe 3 qui prévoit la poursuite des co-auteurs et complices, vous aviez la possibilité de réintroduire dans le circuit de votre poursuite ceux que vous prétendez en être automatiquement écartés. Vous cumulez toutes les instances, ne l'oubliez pas. Considérez votre procédure. Il n'y a aucune espèce de différenciation entre les diverses instances qui sont d'ordinaire distinguées pour le bien de la justice et du justiciable. Vous avez été à la fois la juridiction d'instruction, la juridiction d'accusation. Vous êtes aujourd'hui la juridiction de jugement. Si l'arrêt que vous avez rendu n'était pas susceptible de ce recours que nous introduisons aujourd'hui contre lui devant vous, comme il émane de vous, il serait du même coup réputé intangible. Mais comme il émane de vous, notre condamnation y serait à l'avance préfigurée. Et n'apercevez-vous pas que, du coup, toute notre défense serait vaine ?

C'est pourquoi, je vous convie, après M^r Ribet à restituer au mot « ultérieurement » sa place et sa signification. Je vous adresse cet appel de toutes mes forces et je vous dis : prenez garde ! Dans l'arrêt que vous allez rendre, l'histoire, un jour, recherchera la preuve de votre liberté.

DEUXIEME INTERVENTION

J'ai l'honneur de donner lecture des conclusions suivantes :

« Plaise à la Cour.

« Attendu qu'avant l'ouverture des débats il a été porté à la connaissance de M. Léon Blum que, sur réquisitions de M. le Procureur général en date du 5 mai 1941, visant expressément la loi du 30 juillet et le décret du 1^{er} août 1940, la cour procède actuellement à une instruction contre X par l'organe de M. le conseiller Wateau.

« Attendu que cette instruction présente une étroite connexité avec la poursuite qui fait l'objet des débats.

« Attendu que, quelques jours avant l'ouverture des débats, la cour décidait d'extraire de cette procédure, un certain nombre de témoignages en vue de les communiquer aux accusés.

« Attendu que M. Léon Blum s'est refusé à prendre connaissance de ces pièces avant d'être fixé sur le point de savoir si cette communication était partielle ou intégrale et si la procédure en cours était jointe à l'affaire principale.

« Attendu qu'il est constant que la Cour n'a versé au débat qu'une partie des pièces, après avoir elle-même procédé à un tri, où, ni les accusés, ni la défense n'ont participé.

« Qu'il en résulte que les magistrats qui forment à la fois la juridiction d'instruction et la juridiction

de jugement ont donc, à l'heure actuelle, connaissance des pièces d'une procédure en cours dont la communication n'a été offerte aux accusés que pour partie seulement.

« Qu'en outre, si la procédure en cours ne faisait pas l'objet d'une jonction, il en résulterait que des documents nouveaux pourraient être soit gardés secrets, soit triés à nouveau par la cour en vue de nouvelles communications.

« Qu'ainsi dans une instruction dont la connexité avec la poursuite actuelle résulte des actes mêmes de la Cour, certaines pièces ont été et seront portées à la connaissance des juges et qu'elles demeureront secrètes pour les accusés et la défense.

« Qu'il y a là violation substantielle des droits de la défense.

« Par ces motifs,

« Donner acte au concluant de ses solennelles protestations à toutes fins utiles.

« Dire et ordonner que toutes les pièces sans exception dépendant de l'instruction poursuivie contre X par M. le conseiller Wateau seront intégralement communiquées au concluant.

« Ordonner la jonction de la procédure en cours au procès. Le tout pour être, sur communication et jonction de ladite procédure, conclu par M. Léon Blum et sa défense, ainsi qu'il appartiendra. »

Voilà mes conclusions. Ne redoutez pas de moi que j'affaiblisse ou que j'obscurcisse par un commentaire prolongé ce fait éclatant et brutal.

Actuellement, il y a certaines pièces qui demeurent secrètes pour la défense et que la Cour connaît.

Dans une certaine mesure c'était fatal, je peux le dire car vous avez écarté la défense de vos travaux. Je l'avais écrit un jour avec mon confrère Le Troquer au début de votre instruction : « la défense, c'est la garantie du justiciable, mais c'est aussi le

gage apparent de la sérénité du juge ». Cependant malgré nous vous avez commencé, dans une souveraineté qu'une fois pour toutes nous avons admise, par ne procéder à aucune confrontation.

Et cette procédure nouvelle aujourd'hui s'achève par le fait que certaines pièces qui vous sont connues à vous, Messieurs, restent ignorées de nous.

Votre procédure, j'ai le droit de le dire, quelle présomption déjà pour les accusés aux yeux du monde !

Qui peut dire d'avance quel sera le jugement de l'Histoire sur les choses et les hommes ? Mais ce qu'on peut dire d'avance, c'est que si votre procédure devait demeurer secrète pour partie, si vous n'apportiez pas à notre requête le remède que nous vous proposons, votre procédure, elle, serait déjà jugée.

C'est fortuitement que nous avons appris, il y a peu de temps, l'existence de cette procédure et du réquisitoire, vieux de neuf mois exactement, au hasard d'une communication sollicitée par M. Léon Blum, peu de temps avant le débat.

Cette procédure ouverte contre X est étroitement connexe à la nôtre. Je pense que je n'aurai pas de peine à en convaincre la Cour, maintenant qu'elle a elle-même reconnu le fait, en versant certaines pièces émanant de cette procédure à la procédure qu'elle poursuit contre nous.

Si vous voulez que je précise, Messieurs, je me bornerai à une brève lecture du réquisitoire lui-même. Nous en avons parlé avec M. le Procureur général, dès que l'incident nous a été connu. J'ai lu, avec vous, vous vous en souvenez, dans votre cabinet, le réquisitoire auquel je faisais allusion. Et je pense que si mes conclusions peuvent apparaître tardives, vous ne leur ferez pas le reproche d'être demeurées secrètes.

Voici en tout cas votre réquisitoire, tel que je vous le relisais dans votre cabinet :

« Nous, Procureur général près la Cour Suprême de Justice et vu la procédure instruite contre les accusés des chefs d'infraction aux articles 75 et suivants, etc... » ce sont les textes mêmes visés dans les réquisitoires introductifs, aucune discussion là-dessus. « La loi du 30 juillet 1940 et le décret du 1^{er} août 1940... », là-dessus, non plus aucune discussion et nous ferons l'économie d'un débat inutile, ces textes que vous visez dans votre réquisitoire sont ceux-là même qui commandent la poursuite actuelle et la réunion de la Cour. Je n'insiste pas, ce serait inutile. Les textes sont clairs et dans l'esprit de chacun de nous.

« Attendu — poursuiviez-vous — qu'il paraît opportun de rechercher si entre les cinq inculpés susnommés et en dehors de toute coaction ou complicité avec eux » — cela c'est une précaution juridique que vous avez prise à dessein — « d'autres justiciables de la Cour suprême ne se seraient pas rendus coupables de faits de même nature.

« Vu les textes précités :

« Requérons qu'il plaise à la Cour suprême ordonner qu'il sera procédé à cet effet à toutes investigations utiles et notamment sur le point de savoir si des agissements du parti communiste qui tendaient, soit directement, soit indirectement, à restreindre l'activité des ouvriers et des usines travaillant pour la défense nationale, n'ont pas été tolérés ou facilités.

« Riom, le 5 mai 1941 », il y a déjà près d'un an, « signé « Cassagneau ».

Messieurs, la connexité est éclatante. Je vous l'ai dit tout à l'heure, les mêmes textes commandent les deux poursuites.

Le décret du 1^{er} août 1940, vous l'avez admis de façon claire et lumineuse dans votre arrêt de renvoi, fait à la Cour un devoir de vérifier si les actes que

lui sont déferés ont concouru au passage de l'état de paix à l'état de guerre ou ultérieurement aggravé la situation ainsi créée.

Comme en exergue à votre réquisitoire du 5 mai 1941 vous visez les textes mêmes dont la Cour a défini la portée dans son arrêt de renvoi. Nul doute, que, dès l'origine, il y ait là une preuve formelle de connexité.

Voulez-vous que nous examinions alors de façon plus précise le texte même des réquisitions ? A qui fera-t-on croire que ce texte ne s'apparente pas étroitement dans ses conséquences et ses incidences ainsi que dans son objet avec la définition que vous avez vous-même formulée dans votre réquisitoire définitif ?

On sait parfaitement que ce que vous avez retenu à l'encontre de M. Léon Blum, c'est exclusivement la soumission à une certaine politique nettement visée dans le dispositif de vos réquisitions. Vous ne pouvez pas sérieusement prétendre le contraire. J'ajoute même, bien que je n'ai aucun mandat là-dessus, que en ce qui concerne par exemple M. le contrôleur général Jacomet, ou M. Edouard Daladier, ils doivent se sentir dans les termes de vos réquisitions, visés au même degré que nous par la nouvelle information. Vous y reprenez sur nouveaux faits les accusations que nous croyions closes par l'arrêt de renvoi et déferées dans un état définitif à la juridiction devant laquelle nous comparaissons aujourd'hui.

Je sais bien que vous avez pris cette précaution dont je parlais tout à l'heure : « en dehors de toute coaction ou complicité avec eux ». Messieurs, tout d'abord, si une coaction ou une complicité se révélaient, je ne crois pas que vous seriez empêchés de l'établir parce que vous auriez soigneusement délimité votre texte.

Je ne le crois pas, parce que ce n'est pas logique de le croire, mais surtout parce que, l'événement le

démontre, la même précaution juridique, conçue dans les mêmes termes, n'a pas empêché la jonction de la procédure intentée contre M. le contrôleur général Jacomet à la poursuite telle qu'elle était alors délimitée et poursuivie contre nous. Je vais vous en donner une preuve extrêmement facile, elle consistera pour moi à vous lire le réquisitoire contre personne dénommée, qui a prélué à l'inculpation de M. Jacomet en date du 21 avril. Je vais vous le lire et vous verrez qu'il est conçu dans les mêmes termes que celui du 5 mai.

« Attendu — écrivez-vous — qu'il apparaît opportun de rechercher si entre les cinq inculpés susnommés, et en dehors de toute coaction ou complicité avec eux, d'autres justiciables de la Cour suprême ne se seraient pas rendus coupables de faits de même nature.

« Vu les textes susvisés, requérons qu'il plaise à la Cour ordonner qu'il soit procédé à cet effet à toutes investigations utiles et notamment sur l'activité de M. Jacomet, ancien secrétaire général du ministère de la Guerre, etc... »

Je constate — cette constatation se suffit à elle-même — que la même précaution juridique « en dehors de toute coaction et complicité » n'a pas préservé le contrôleur général Jacomet de votre poursuite intentée contre lui et jointe à la nôtre. Elle ne nous a pas garanti contre la jonction qui s'est produite de l'affaire Jacomet à la nôtre.

Je disais au début de mes explication que la connexité était étroite, que la précaution qui a été prise n'offrait pour nous aucune garantie. Je crois pouvoir affirmer maintenant, après ce bref développement, que j'ai rempli mon propos et que j'ai démontré ce que j'avais entrepris de faire.

Donc la Cour a fait un tri. Ce qui nous a été offert, c'est un lot de dix-huit témoignages extraits par la Cour, en dehors de nous, du dossier qu'elle

avait sous les yeux. Ce tri auquel la Cour a procédé a eu comme conséquence indiscutable et matérielle que ce qui était jusque-là — théoriquement du moins — à la connaissance d'un seul juge, du seul magistrat instructeur est maintenant à la connaissance de tous les juges composant la Cour suprême.

Vous vous êtes réunis, Messieurs, puisque vous avez rendu un arrêt pour procéder à ce tri de pièces, pour faire le départ entre les pièces que vous nous donniez et celles que vous gardiez pour votre propre information. Il a bien fallu que vous preniez, que vous gardiez, la connaissance de tous les documents qui vous avaient été soumis.

Vous ne nous avez livré que des *morceaux choisis* d'une procédure dont vous seuls connaissez l'intégralité.

Voilà en toute révérence, la situation telle qu'elle se présente.

Nous avons refusé et nous nous refusons à votre barre, à prendre connaissance de cette anthologie de témoignages. Nous sommes à bon droit exigeants. Nous voulons tout ou rien. Et même si vous nous communiquez maintenant toute la procédure, le droit de la défense, au moins pour un temps, n'en aurait pas été moins compromis.

Messieurs, une autre question qui nous intéresse, qu'il faut que je traite brièvement. Si nous exprimons ici le vœu que cette communication intégrale soit aujourd'hui ordonnée par vous — pour ma part, je ne doute pas un instant que ce soit le parti auquel la Cour finisse par se résoudre — c'est parce que le sort de cette procédure latérale à la nôtre fait maintenant l'objet de nos légitimes préoccupations.

Comment se terminera-t-elle, cette procédure, si connexe à celle qui vous est déferée ? Sera-ce un non lieu ? Seront-ce des inculpations nouvelles, de nouveaux justiciables de la Cour Suprême ? Ces nouvelles inculpations modifie-

ront-elles, atténueront-elles, aggraveront-elles les responsabilités et les charges que vous avez définies et retenues contre nous ? C'est cela que nous voulons savoir.

Si d'aventure, un non-lieu intervenait, quel élément précieux de discussion pour nous, quel élément capital de justification pour nous. Il serait donc avéré, qu'en dehors de ce que vous avez retenu, à votre réquisitoire — et cela ne nous effraye pas, Messieurs — il n'y a rien, rien d'autre, aucun acte qui puisse être réputé avoir toléré, avoir constitué selon votre expression une propagande subversive ou des menées révolutionnaires.

Quelle précieuse information pour nous. Et du point de vue des droits de la défense, comment pourrions-nous en être amputés si l'on veut que ce débat soit loyal et complet, comme on nous l'a promis ?

Et si ce sont des inculpations nouvelles, comment ne serions-nous pas admis au cours de notre discussion à évaluer, à mesurer les incidences, les répercussions de toutes sortes de ces réquisitions, de ces inculpations nouvelles dans le champ de la procédure que vous jugez aujourd'hui contre nous ?

Tel est, Messieurs, le sens des conclusions que nous avons eu l'honneur de porter à votre barre.

Ne vous y trompez pas et prenez garde : Nous sommes devant vous *condamnés déjà* par le maréchal Pétain, chef de l'Etat, M. le procureur général ne cache pas son dessein de requérir contre nous avec sévérité. Il nous l'a dit. Si vous ne joignez pas aujourd'hui la procédure qui reste suspendue sur nos têtes, dont je vous ai montré qu'elle avait avec nos débats un lien infiniment étroit, nous pourrions courir le risque d'être condamnés, non pas une fois, non pas deux fois, mais même trois fois.

C'est trop. A cette situation sans exemple, je demande à la Cour de pourvoir et de remédier.

UNE LETTRE DE LEON BLUM A LA COUR DE RIOM

Bourrassol, le 20 octobre 1941.

Messieurs,

Vous m'avez imposé un délai de cinq jours pour présenter mes défenses au réquisitoire signé par le procureur général près de la Cour.

J'ai reçu communication de ce réquisitoire, le jeudi 15 courant, à 18 h. 45, quelques minutes avant qu'à la radio, M. le maréchal Pétain rendit publique la condamnation déjà prononcée par lui contre moi. Le vendredi 17, au matin, les motifs de cette sentence étaient également rendus publics, par la voix de la presse, sous la forme de propositions émises par le Conseil de justice politique : le Conseil déclare, et M. le maréchal Pétain a sanctionné cette déclaration par l'application d'une peine, que j'ai trahi les devoirs de ma charge.

C'est donc un homme déjà condamné, et condamné exactement sous la même qualification pénale que vous invitez à répondre au réquisitoire de votre parquet. N'est-ce plus autre chose qu'une cruelle dérision ? Que pourra signifier ma réponse ? Est-ce que la cause n'est pas déjà tranchée devant tous ? On a parlé de la séparation des pouvoirs, c'est-à-dire de la spécialité de l'autorité judiciaire et de son indépendance au regard du pouvoir exécutif. On a même jugé convenable de rendre hommage à ce beau principe. Mais, au fait, vous êtes dessaisis : il y a chose jugée contre vous comme contre moi. Statuant sur les mêmes faits, en vertu d'une inculpation identique, restez-vous réellement libres d'infirmier par votre futur arrêt le dispositif ou les motifs de la sentence déjà rendue par l'autorité suprême de l'Etat ?..

J'aurais honte d'insister davantage auprès de magistrats français.

Ma réponse se limitera donc à trois observations ou plus exactement à trois prises d'acte. Voici la première :

J'ignore dans quelle mesure le Conseil de justice politique a eu connaissance de votre instruction. Mais je rappelle l'attitude que j'ai conservée constamment et de propos délibéré, tout au long d'une procédure conduite selon ces pratiques secrètes que la loi française avait condamnées. Pendant mes trois interrogatoires par M. le magistrat instructeur — je ne compte pas le premier interrogatoire d'identité — je m'en suis tenu systématiquement aux explications les plus générales. Je n'ai pas appelé un seul témoin ou produit un seul document. Je n'ai discuté aucun des témoignages ou des documents recueillis par l'accusation. Je n'ai fait ressortir, comme il m'eût été facile, ni les erreurs partiales, ni les contradictions qui affectent un grand nombre d'entre eux. Explicitement et formellement j'ai réservé cette discussion, comme tous mes autres moyens de défense, pour le jour qui viendrait enfin, le jour des débats publics. Je dénie donc, d'une façon absolue, le caractère contradictoire de l'instruction conduite contre moi. Le Conseil de justice politique, même dans l'hypothèse peu vraisemblable où il aurait eu connaissance de votre dossier, s'est donc prononcé, sur mon compte, sans que les droits de la défense eussent été exercés, pour moi, ou par moi, sous une forme ou à un degré quelconque.

Homme public, accusé publiquement d'avoir compromis par mon action gouvernementale les intérêts et la sécurité de mon pays, j'avais droit à une justification et à une réparation publiques. Je le répète à regret, je ne puis plus espérer la réparation de votre justice. Mais je conserve et je revendique le droit de me justifier devant le

pays, devant l'opinion internationale, et, j'ose dire, devant l'Histoire.

Voici la seconde :

Mes conseils, Maîtres Le Troquer et Spanien, ont saisi la Cour d'une note qui lui a été remise le 18 janvier. Dès ce moment, et à travers les premiers éléments rassemblés par l'instruction, il apparaissait que la défaite des armées françaises ne pouvait plus trouver de raison suffisante dans l'infériorité numérique des engins mis à leur disposition. Nous demandions, par conséquent, à la Cour d'étendre ses investigations à la conduite des opérations militaires. Nous faisons ressortir qu'une enquête portant sur les événements tels que l'entrée en Belgique, la rupture du front de la Meuse, le défaut de contre-offensive à compter de cette rupture, présentait pour la Cour un caractère obligatoire et même à nos yeux, un caractère préjudiciel. Depuis le mois de janvier dernier, et à mesure que l'instruction se prolongeait, l'impression qui avait dicté la note de mes conseils a pris la valeur d'une certitude. Il est aujourd'hui établi que le programme d'ensemble pour l'armement des forces terrestres, mis en œuvre — pour la première fois — par le gouvernement que je présidais, était, au moment de l'entrée en guerre, en avance sur les délais prévus d'exécution.

Il est établi, pour la plupart des engins qui ont joué un rôle déterminant dans la bataille, qu'il n'existait pas de disproportion numérique sensible avec l'ennemi. Moins encore qu'en janvier dernier, les problèmes qui concernaient le mode d'emploi de ces armes et la conduite stratégique des opérations ne pouvaient être écartés de vos recherches. La Cour n'a cependant pas tenu compte de la note de mes conseils. Il en résulte que l'instruction a pu se clore sans avoir été dirigée sur aucun des deux ordres de faits que désignait irrésistiblement, au lendemain de la défaite, une opinion unanime,

l'opinion des soldats comme des citoyens : d'une part, les fautes du commandement ; d'autre part, cette combinaison suspecte de complicités, conscientes ou inconscientes, qui ont altéré la force française en face de l'ennemi et qui sont couramment englobées sous les vocables de « cinquième colonne » et de « trahison ». J'entends non pas la « trahison » des devoirs de sa charge, mais la trahison tout court.

Voici maintenant la troisième :

Il résulte tout à la fois du réquisitoire et de l'avis du Conseil de justice politique que les charges relevées contre moi visent, uniquement, les lois votées et appliquées ainsi que la politique sociale pratiquée sous le gouvernement que je présidais, à l'exclusion de tout acte positif rattachable à ma personne. Je renouvelle donc ici, avec plus de force, la déclaration que j'avais déjà fait consigner dans mon interrogatoire définitif. « Dans la constitution républicaine de 1875, la souveraineté appartient au peuple français. Elle s'exprime par le suffrage universel. Elle est déléguée au Parlement. Quand on impute une responsabilité pénale à un homme, à un chef de gouvernement, sans établir et même sans alléguer rien qui touche à sa personne, sans articuler un seul fait contraire à la probité, à l'honneur, au devoir professionnel d'application, de labeur et de conscience ; quand on lui fait crime exclusivement d'avoir pratiqué la politique commandée par le suffrage universel souverain, contrôlée et approuvée par le Parlement délégataire de la souveraineté, alors on dresse le procès, non plus de cet homme, non plus de ce chef de gouvernement, mais du régime républicain et du principe républicain lui-même. Ce procès, je suis fier de le soutenir au nom des convictions de toute ma vie... »

Je vous prie d'agréer, Messieurs, l'assurance de mes sentiments de parfaite considération.

PREMIERE DECLARATION DE LEON BLUM

19 février 1942

La décision de M. le général Gamelin n'appartient qu'à lui, mais le sens qu'elle prend et les conséquences qu'elle entraîne nous appartiennent à tous. Je demande à la Cour la permission de formuler les réflexions qu'elle m'inspire.

Je ne feindrai pas la surprise. L'attitude que vient de prendre M. le général Gamelin était connue. Elle était attendue depuis longtemps. Au moment où le geste s'accomplit comme il vient de s'accomplir devant nous, on ne peut se défendre d'une émotion assez cruelle.

M. le général Gamelin, somme toute, s'identifie avec notre armée malheureuse, et l'on ne peut que s'incliner avec gravité et douleur. Mais précisément, et c'est une première conséquence qui ne peut manquer de vous frapper comme elle me frappe moi-même, avant même que ce procès commence, c'est un abîme béant qui vient de s'ouvrir devant nous.

Messieurs, votre mission est d'établir et de sanctionner des responsabilités. Lesquelles ? Celles d'une défaite militaire. Or, par votre arrêt de renvoi, vous avez écarté du débat tout ce qui concerne les opérations militaires.

Vous êtes allés plus loin. Pour plus de sûreté, vous avez condamné à l'ombre et au silence du huis-clos, toutes les dépositions, toutes les confrontations, toutes les réquisitions, qui même accessoirement auraient pu fixer cette catégorie du problème.

Mais il resterait dans le débat la personne même de M. le général Gamelin. Présent au débat,

Il aurait attiré invinciblement cette partie du problème que votre arrêt de renvoi a entendu exclure. Sa présence à la barre, son intervention dans le débat, son choc avec les témoins de tout ordre qui ont été cités, et qui sont des exécutants de tous grades, auraient par la force même des choses, fait jaillir ici des étincelles de vérité.

M. le général Gamelin ne sera plus présent aux débats, car ce n'est pas y être présent que d'y assister en spectateur muet, même si ce mutisme est stoïque. Vous aurez retiré du débat la matière et maintenant M. le général Gamelin en retire la personne.

Nous arrivons ainsi à cette conséquence, sur laquelle j'appuie fortement devant la Cour, que dans ce débat sur les responsabilités de la défaite, la guerre sera exclue.

Il est vraiment malaisé de concevoir un paradoxe plus choquant, plus révoltant pour l'esprit. Pourquoi votre juridiction a-t-elle été instituée ? Pourquoi votre session a-t-elle été convoquée ? Parce que l'armée française avait succombé dans une campagne malheureuse, parce que le peuple français avait voulu savoir pourquoi son armée avait été vaincue dans cette campagne. Personne ne peut méconnaître, en effet, que cette défaite militaire, l'instinct du peuple lui désigne des causes militaires.

Et vous, Messieurs, chargés de la recherche de ces causes, vous qui avez fait entrer tant d'autres choses dans ce procès, voici maintenant que vous en aurez expulsé la guerre.

Car c'est bien vous, Messieurs, qui aurez réduit au silence M. le général Gamelin. Il vous a dit ses raisons au cours de sa déclaration. Il ne veut ni s'élever contre la sentence déjà prononcée contre lui, par la plus haute autorité de l'Etat, ni se faire ici à cette barre l'accusateur de ses subordonnés.

Son silence lui est donc dicté d'une part par la décision de M. le maréchal Pétain, mais aussi d'autre part, par votre arrêt de renvoi.

M. le général Gamelin, unique accusé militaire, porte sur lui, jusqu'à plus ample informé, la responsabilité globale, toute la responsabilité anonyme de la défaite. Il ne peut donc s'en laver qu'en la rejetant sur d'autres. Il ne peut l'atténuer qu'en la reportant toute, ou en partie, sur d'autres.

Or, cette détermination des responsabilités réciproques, et le cas échéant, cette ventilation, ce tri, c'était la mission de la Cour, c'était aussi son devoir; vous n'avez pas rempli cet office, et maintenant M. le général Gamelin se refuse à le remplir à votre place.

En déclinant une mission qui était la vôtre, vous l'avez contraint nécessairement, invinciblement, soit à se taire, soit à se faire ici l'accusateur public d'hommes qui, pour vous étaient des justiciables et qui, pour lui, sont restés des compagnons d'armes.

Il a choisi de se taire. Ce silence attire le respect. Mais ce silence et ce respect sont en réalité une condamnation portée contre l'arrêt de renvoi pris par vous.

Pour ma part, je dis à la Cour que je partage son respect, mais je me permets d'ajouter que nous ne partageons pas son silence. Quand je dis « nous », je parle au nom des amis qui m'assistent et en mon nom personnel.

Ce n'est pas que je me sente moins atteint que M. le général Gamelin, soit par la sentence de M. le maréchal Pétain, soit par l'arrêt de renvoi. J'ai entendu les paroles qu'à prononcées M. le président Caous au début de cette audience, mais quand M. le général Gamelin énonce cette vérité si simple qu'il est condamné avant même de comparaître devant ses juges, il a raison, et il n'est

pas le seul à se trouver dans cette situation vraiment sans exemple.

Messieurs, quoi qu'on fasse, il y a une iniquité fondamentale, il y a une tare originelle qui pèse sur ce procès.

Des hommes que votre devoir de juge, ainsi que M. le président le disait tout à l'heure, est de considérer comme innocents, jusqu'à l'heure même de votre verdict, se présentent devant vous, condamnés et cela par la plus haute autorité de l'Etat, par une autorité à laquelle vous avez prêté un serment de fidélité personnelle.

Messieurs, cette vérité si banale est étrangement confirmée par les résultats de votre instruction, car en vérité, c'est avec stupeur que la France et le monde apprendront quels étaient les rapports numériques exacts du matériel français et du matériel ennemi, soit au moment de l'entrée en guerre, soit au moment de l'attaque allemande. C'est pourquoi, dès le début de l'instruction, il y a maintenant plus d'un an, nous vous avons demandé de faire porter votre enquête sur cette question essentielle, préjudicielle de savoir si des erreurs du commandement n'avaient pas été la cause déterminante de la défaite.

C'est dans ce sens que, pour remplir entièrement votre mission, vous deviez pousser votre instruction. Or, non seulement vous n'avez pas fait droit aux conclusions dont nous vous saisissions, mais par votre arrêt de renvoi, vous avez rejeté du débat les questions que nous posions et vous nous interdisez aujourd'hui de les porter à la barre.

Je pourrais donc vous dire à mon tour, Messieurs, vous avez mutilé ma défense d'avance, au point de la rendre impossible. Jugez-moi, condamnez-moi pour la seconde fois, je me tairai, Messieurs. Nous parlerons cependant, nous ne nous bornerons pas à tirer les conséquences logiques de

la situation dans laquelle vous nous avez enfermés. Dès le début même du débat, nous allons nous associer à l'effort loyal, à l'effort persévérant qui sera tenté pour modifier ou plutôt pour rompre cette situation que vous avez imposée.

Je sais bien qu'il y a quelque chose à quoi nous ne pourrions rien changer, à quoi vous ne pourrez plus rien changer vous-même quoi que vous pensiez, quoi que vous déclariez ; c'est la sentence déjà prononcée contre nous. Au moment où elle a été rendue, la Cour a senti peser sur elle la menace, elle a senti peser sur elle l'entrave. Vous avez essayé de vous dégager dans votre arrêt de renvoi, vous avez essayé de libérer votre indépendance de juges. Mais Messieurs, vous sentez aussi fortement, peut-être plus fortement que moi, que vous n'y êtes pas parvenus. Vous croyez-vous vraiment libres de renvoyer d'ici par un verdict d'acquiescement, les hommes déjà déclarés coupables, sous la même inculpation pénale, en raison des mêmes faits, par la plus haute autorité de l'Etat ?

Vous savez bien qu'elle ne vous a laissé d'autre choix que de nous appliquer une peine plus forte que celle qu'elle a prononcée elle-même. Non, Messieurs, à cet égard, vous êtes bien réellement désaisis. Il y a chose jugée contre vous comme contre nous. Votre futur verdict ! on a imprimé d'avance sur lui une marque indélébile. Mais si nous ne pouvons rien tenter d'efficace en ce qui concerne la sentence déjà prononcée contre nous, il n'en est pas de même en ce qui concerne notre arrêt de renvoi. Sur ce terrain, nous pouvons et nous devons engager la lutte. Nous pouvons et nous devons vous demander de rétablir le débat dans sa liberté, dans sa légalité, dans son intégrité, dans sa loyauté et c'est ce que nous allons faire, avec l'ardente volonté de tirer d'un débat élargi et affranchi, tout le contenu, tout le résidu possible de vérité.

Nous le ferons, moins pour nous, Messieurs, déjà condamnés, que pour le pays, que pour l'opinion universelle et je ne crains pas de le dire, pour l'Histoire.

Nous ne désespérons pas de cet effort, avant de l'entreprendre. Dans son message, M. le maréchal Pétain avait dit, tout en vous plaçant devant le fait accompli de son jugement, « ce procès doit avoir lieu en pleine lumière. J'ai pesé les avantages et les inconvénients ».

Nous nous armons, Messieurs, de ces paroles, nous voulons les interpréter comme ayant réellement entendu laisser à votre conscience de juges, une certaine liberté.

Messieurs, j'ai été magistrat comme la plupart d'entre vous, je l'ai été pendant près d'un quart de siècle. Ma carrière de magistrat était à peu près remplie lorsque j'ai été jeté, un peu malgré moi, dans la vie publique. J'ai toujours appartenu à des instances suprêmes, le Conseil d'Etat, le tribunal des conflits. Je crois savoir ce que c'est qu'une conscience de magistrat et je crois aussi savoir ce qu'est l'état de conscience d'une Cour souveraine. La souveraineté, pour un juge et pour une Cour, n'est pas une aisance, une facilité, elle est une aggravation de la charge. Le fait de ne sentir au-dessus de soi, ni une instance d'appel, ni un pouvoir de cassation, rend plus lourd encore, plus exigeant le devoir, parce que toute décision est définitive et définitive veut dire : irréparable pour le justiciable, irréparable aussi pour le juge.

Nous ferons appel à ce sentiment chez vous, Messieurs, et en même temps qu'à cette conscience professionnelle, nous en appellerons aussi à ce sens des intérêts du pays dont vous avez déjà donné la preuve dans ce procès même.

Tel qu'il avait été engagé ce procès était celui des responsabilités de la France dans la guerre, c'est-à-dire le procès des responsabilités de la

France. Ce procès, vous vous êtes refusé à le dresser. Le signe tangible, évident de votre refus, c'est l'absence sur ces bancs de M. Paul Reynaud et de M. Georges Mendel, éléments nécessaires d'un procès en responsabilités de la guerre, visés directement par une des parties du texte qui vous a constitués — bien que, cependant l'instruction n'ait, je crois, pas même commencé — et qui, en tous cas, au lieu de s'asseoir ici à côté de nous, sont encore dans leur casemate du Portalet.

Messieurs, vous avez fait cet effort. Seulement, je vous demande de prendre garde. Le procès actuel n'est plus le procès de la France, mais il reste qu'il est, il sera fatalement — on vous en a déjà averti à la barre — le procès de la République. Un débat sur les responsabilités de la défaite, d'où toutes les responsabilités militaires ont été exclues d'avance et de parti pris, c'est nécessairement, volontairement, en même temps qu'un attentat à la vérité, une prise à partie du régime républicain.

Nous avons bien des raisons de craindre que telle ait été l'intention des hautes autorités. Mais croyez-vous, Messieurs, que ce soit là l'intérêt du pays? Croyez-vous que ce soit répondre à l'intérêt du pays, du pays qui attend la vérité, qui appelle la vérité, et qui ne renie pas la République.

Messieurs, j'achève ces observations dont je ne m'excuse pas auprès de la Cour. Nous essaierons donc — le mot « nous » dans ma bouche a toujours le même sens — nous essaierons donc à la barre de substituer à cette prise à partie partisane, contre un régime, des méthodes, des mœurs, la recherche à la fois sereine et courageuse de la vérité. Nous vous en proposerons les moyens, nous essaierons d'y parvenir grâce à vous, de votre aveu. Mais, si nous étions privés de votre concours, nous ne découragerions pas. Nous nous obstinerions au contraire, nous lutterions encore. Notre

devoir, vis-à-vis du pays qu'ici encore nous entendons servir, demeurerait le même. Il n'aurait pas été modifié par votre refus, il n'en serait devenu que plus évident et que plus pressant, car ce refus signifierait clairement et nécessairement que le débat est maintenu par vous, en pleine connaissance de cause, dans les limites et dans le caractère qui sont actuellement les siens. Procès de la République, qui est pourtant aujourd'hui encore le régime légal du pays, procès du régime, des mœurs, des méthodes démocratiques ; procès de la politique de justice et de conciliation sociale qu'avait pratiquée le gouvernement que je dirigeais.

Et alors, Messieurs, il nous incombera de montrer, de prouver à la France, qu'elle n'est pas le peuple, qui, pour avoir cru à son idéal, pour avoir cru au progrès et à la justice, doit expier sa confiance et se courber sous son châtement. Si la République doit rester ici l'accusée, nous resterons à notre poste de combat comme ses témoins et comme ses défenseurs.

DEUXIEME DECLARATION DE LEON BLUM

20 février 1942

Je désire appuyer par quelques remarques d'un ordre un peu différent les observations décisives déjà soumises à la Cour.

Le texte de l'article 1^{er}, paragraphe 1, du décret du 1^{er} août 1940 est d'une rédaction si limpide qu'il semblait devoir échapper à toute controverse.

Il fixe un repère dans le temps : le 4 septembre 1939.

Il vise deux catégories d'actes relativement à ce repère fixe.

D'une part, des actes *antérieurs* : ceux qui ont concouru au passage de l'état de paix à l'état de guerre.

D'autre part, des actes *postérieurs* ou *ultérieurs* : ceux qui ont aggravé la situation ainsi créée.

Pour la première catégorie d'actes, le texte fixe le 4 septembre comme *terme*. Pour la seconde catégorie comme *point de départ*.

Cela posé, quel devait être le point de départ de l'information pour les actes de la première catégorie ?

Le texte ne le dit pas explicitement, mais il l'indique.

Ces actes de la première catégorie sont ceux qui ont concouru au passage de l'état de paix à l'état de guerre. Les infractions que le texte vise sont donc nécessairement postérieures à l'état de paix tel qu'il a été constaté pour la dernière fois avec certitude. La paix existant à un instant donné du temps, dans des conditions incontestables, la question est de savoir comment, et par le concours de quels actes, la France est passée de cet état de paix à la guerre. Dès lors si vous aviez poursuivi votre information dans ce sens, jusqu'à quelle date auriez-vous dû la faire remonter ? Quand un état de paix incontestable a-t-il existé pour la dernière fois entre la France et l'Allemagne ? Je ne crois pas qu'une hésitation puisse s'élever à cet égard. La date indiquée par le texte était celle des accords de Munich... Munich n'a pas été seulement un arrangement spécial à une difficulté donnée, mais un engagement de paix général et solennel contracté pour une longue suite d'années, avec l'obligation bilatérale de consultations et de recherches amiables sur toutes les difficultés européennes qui pourraient survenir ultérieurement. Les textes sont formels, les commentaires du chancelier Hitler coïncident avec ceux de M. Chamberlain et

analyse
du décret
1 sup.

d'Edouard Daladier. Ce rappel peut sembler aujourd'hui... étrange. Mais le fait est là. Il avait été affirmé, promis à Munich que l'accord était la paix. Votre recherche sur le passage de l'état de paix à la guerre n'aurait pas dû remonter plus haut.

Voilà le point de départ éventuel fixé pour les actes de la première catégorie (si vous les aviez recherchés) ; pour les actes de la seconde, il n'y a pas, il ne devrait pas y avoir de discussion possible puisqu'il est fixé explicitement par le texte lui-même. Je ne reviens pas sur la démonstration sans réplique qui vous a été administrée. Pour faire entrer dans votre information des faits considérés par vous comme des actes d'aggravation mais postérieurs en date au 4 septembre 1939, il a fallu :

que le réquisitoire supprimât de son interprétation le mot essentiel : le mot *ultérieurement* (car il interprète...)

et que vous le biffiez du texte même.

C'est l'altération du texte, et elle seule qui vous a permis de remonter dans le temps en deçà du 4 septembre. Mais le point de départ légal étant ainsi écarté, éliminé par vous, lequel alors alliez-vous choisir ?

Un seul était admissible. Un seul entraînait dans la logique de votre erreur... A défaut de la date explicitement fixée par le texte, à défaut d'une indication implicite que, bien entendu on chercherait en vain, il n'y avait plus cette fois qu'un point de départ possible, celui qui correspond au délai de la prescription. Or le réquisitoire, en termes exprès, et la Cour, ainsi qu'il appert de son instruction même, ont choisi arbitrairement *le début de la législature de 1936*.

Pourquoi ? Je me permets de le demander, même après M^e Ribet. Est-ce que le réarmement de la France ne s'est imposé, comme un devoir de la charge ministérielle, qu'à partir de juin 1936 ?

Ou bien est-ce que ce devoir avait été exactement rempli jusqu'en juin 36 ?

J'indique à mon tour quelques références.

Le parti nazi prend le pouvoir en mars 1933.

Le Troisième Reich quitte la S. D. N. à la fin de 33 et dès cette époque il arme ouvertement.

Le 16 mars 1935, le service obligatoire est rétabli en Allemagne.

Je sais bien que l'année 33 marque en France un effort certain en vue de la « *coexistence paisible* » avec les dictateurs totalitaires. C'est l'année du Pacte à Quatre. Mais dès le début de 34, une offre de limitation quantitative des armements est écartée par le gouvernement français. La fameuse note du 19 avril 1934 est expédiée (contre l'avis de M. Barthou, ministre des affaires étrangères). « La France ne s'en remettra qu'à elle-même du soin de sa propre sécurité », ce qui signifie que la Conférence de désarmement est pratiquement close, et que le chancelier Hitler revendique sa pleine liberté. Dès ce moment, il faudrait réarmer, si l'on voulait maintenir la « *marge de supériorité* » à laquelle on n'avait pas voulu renoncer. Il y avait alors un *gouvernement fort* qui disposait de *pleins pouvoirs*.

Gaston Doumergue était président du Conseil. M. André Tardieu était ministre d'Etat, M. le Maréchal Pétain était ministre de la guerre. Il n'existait pas alors, en service dans nos unités, la première trace d'un matériel moderne. Qu'a-t-on fait cependant ? Quelle a été l'importance des crédits ? Quel a été le volume des commandes effectives ? Quels travaux ont été engagés ? Seul, le général Denain, ministre de l'air, a entamé sans désespérer l'exécution immédiate d'un vaste programme, mais le dossier montre avec quelle précipitation et quelle incohérence. Les devoirs de la charge ministérielle étaient évidents, impérieux ; les a-t-on remplis ?

Pour en juger, il suffit de se reporter à l'affaire du 7 mars 1936, *deux ans plus tard*. Evoquez, messieurs, vos souvenirs ! Rappelez-vous l'accent des premières paroles, prononcées publiquement par les représentants du gouvernement, puis l'affaïssement de la position française. Une information complète vous aurait appris quel compte avait été rendu alors par les ministres techniques de l'état de nos forces militaires et de quel poids leur rapport avait pesé sur la décision — ou l'absence de décision — gouvernementale. Cet incident, dont les suites ont été si graves, suffit à montrer dans quel état de *préparation matérielle* le ministère de juin 36 a trouvé l'armée. Votre instruction aurait dû dresser ce bilan. On s'en chargera sans doute à votre place. Mais depuis trois ans passés, qu'avait-on fait ? Ce qu'on a fait était-il à l'échelle des besoins, à l'échelle des dangers ?

Le mode d'emploi d'un matériel présente encore plus d'importance que sa quantité. Pendant la campagne, la caducité, l'inadéquation des doctrines de guerre, des conceptions tactiques, ont apparu avec une tragique évidence. Mais ces doctrines et ces conceptions ne sont pas venues au monde avec la législation du Front Populaire. Dès avant juin 36 — et en réalité depuis l'autre guerre — on professait, on inculquait, on pratiquait déjà la doctrine des fronts invulnérables, la foi absolue dans la fortification et dans la défensive, la méfiance vis-à-vis des engins blindés — et surtout vis-à-vis de l'emploi indépendant des grandes unités blindées — le scepticisme vis-à-vis du rôle de l'aviation *dans le combat*. Les documents foisonnent, et sous quelles signatures !

Alors pourquoi l'instruction n'est-elle pas remontée plus haut ? Votre arrêt de renvoi est muet là-dessus. Le réquisitoire s'en tient à quelques explications étrangement embarrassées. Elles pourraient se résumer à ceci : « A supposer que les

prédécesseurs des inculpés fussent coupables, cela ne les déchargerait pas de leur responsabilité... »

Quelle suprenante conception de l'égalité de la justice ! Ainsi, parmi les coupables du même crime, on frapperait les uns, on épargnerait systématiquement les autres. Sur quoi fonder cette discrimination, sinon sur des critères d'ordre politique ?... N'est-il pas évident, tout au contraire, que si nos prédécesseurs étaient reconnus coupables, notre faute serait tout au moins atténuée, car nous aurions porté le poids de la situation qu'ils nous auraient transmise... Mais le dossier établit que précisément à partir de juin 36, nous avons fait ce qu'on n'avait pas fait avant nous. Le gouvernement que je présidais a mis en train un programme d'ensemble, sans commune mesure par l'ampleur et l'importance avec tous ceux qui avaient pu le précéder, ce programme n'était pas un programme sur le papier, il a été exécuté, jamais les crédits ne lui ont manqué, *au moment de l'entrée en guerre il était en avance sur les délais prévus d'exécution*. S'il n'a pas été achevé à cette époque, s'il n'a pas été entrepris sur un plan industriel plus méthodique, en partant des bases de la production, c'est qu'il avait été mis en train trop tard et ce démarrage tardif est précisément ce qui engage les responsabilités antérieures à juin 36.

Qu'on n'allègue pas que cette date de juin 36, cette date fatidique correspond à une période dangereuse des relations franco-allemandes. Je n'entre-rais dans aucun détail sur ce point, fût-ce par voie d'allusion, mais la preuve me serait, me sera facile. Alors que représente-t-elle ? Cette date ne représente et ne peut représenter autre chose que l'arrivée au pouvoir, après des élections générales qui ont renversé la majorité, du gouvernement connu sous le nom de gouvernement de Front Populaire. Et faire partir l'instruction de juin 36, à défaut de toute autre raison concevable et intelligible, c'est recon-

naître qu'une prévention politique — peut-être une représaille politique — a dicté le choix. L'intention éclate. On cherche à faire rejaillir sur le Front Populaire, sur la politique ouvrière et sociale qu'il a pratiquée, et, à travers lui, sur les institutions démocratiques, la responsabilité de la défaite militaire

Seulement, messieurs, je vous demande d'y réfléchir : un phénomène politique comme le Front Populaire ne naît pas comme un champignon d'un ou deux dimanches de scrutin. Il est lié à ce qui précède, et, dans une large mesure, il en est issu. Il n'est pas un commencement absolu et on ne peut pas l'isoler à sa guise. Je rétablirai, quand il le faudra, la vérité méconnue et calomniée en ce qui touche le gouvernement de Front Populaire. Je montrerai ce qu'a été son œuvre dans l'ordre de la paix intérieure, dans l'ordre de la paix internationale, dans l'ordre de la préparation matérielle, morale, politique de la défense du pays. Mais si vous estimez que son œuvre a été néfaste, si vous estimez cela, alors il fallait étendre votre instruction à ceux qui l'ont déterminée soit par action directe, soit par réaction inévitable. Recherchons les auteurs principaux dont nous n'aurions été que des complices.

Car le Front Populaire n'a pas été autre chose qu'un réflexe de défense instinctive :

d'une part, contre les périls qui menaçaient la République et dont l'agitation des ligues paramilitaires et l'émeute du 6 février avaient été le signe frappant ;

d'autre part, contre la prolongation de la crise économique qui accablait les masses ouvrières, les populations paysannes, la classe moyenne du pays, et qui se traduisait par le marasme des affaires, par la baisse continue des prix agricoles et des salaires, par le chômage, par la misère.

Les promoteurs du Front Populaire en tant que

mouvement politique, ses parrains — vous serez peut-être surpris de l'apprendre — ont été M. Doriot et M. Gaston Bergery. Mais ses véritables auteurs sont ceux qui ont tenté le renversement des institutions républicaines, ceux qui, par leurs remèdes à contresens avaient prolongé et aggravé en France la crise universelle.

Comprenez donc dans votre information les conjurés du 6 février et de la Cagoule, les hommes qui ont fermé les yeux sur leurs attentats ou qui les ont couverts d'une complicité secrète. Ce sont eux qui ont provoqué la coalition spontanée des masses populaires, toujours passionnément attachées à la liberté. La répercussion directe sur la défaite est ici sensible, car ces menées factieuses ont aggravé les divisions du pays, altéré sa confiance en lui-même, dans ses institutions, dans son idéal, et, par là même, compromis sa capacité de résistance dans le danger.

Adressez-vous d'autre part aux champions de la parité-or à tout prix et de la déflation à outrance. Ce sont les coupables de cette misère, de cette souffrance, de cette révolte des classes laborieuses dont les élections de mai 36 ont été l'expression, l'expansion. Ici encore, répercussion directe du pays au moment où le réarmement massif s'imposait. Ici est la cause d'une grande partie des difficultés techniques qu'on a eu tant de peine à apaiser. Dressez le bilan. Faites le compte des usines fermées ou éteintes, des outillages non entretenus ou non renouvelés, parce que les marges bénéficiaires ne permettaient plus ni amortissement, ni investissement, des spécialistes dispersés ou usés par le chômage.

Eux pouvaient choisir et ont choisi librement leur politique. La nôtre nous était dictée par la leur. Ou plutôt nous ne pouvions plus choisir nous qu'entre la politique que nous avons pratiquée... et la guerre civile, qui n'était assurément pas le plus

sûr moyen d'accélérer les fabrications et qui n'était probablement pas non plus le meilleur moyen d'éviter la guerre étrangère.

Notre devoir — le devoir de notre charge — était de prévenir ce fléau... Il était de ranimer la confiance du pays dans les institutions libres — et par conséquent de nous montrer scrupuleusement fidèles au programme qu'avait fait prévaloir la volonté du suffrage universel. Il était de ranimer une économie épuisée et étiolée, par des méthodes contraires à celles dont l'échec avait jeté le pays dans une condition si redoutable. Ce devoir, nous l'avons rempli. Si vous estimez, comme M. le procureur général, que son accomplissement était nuisible aux intérêts du pays, commencez par rechercher ceux qui nous l'avaient fait peser sur les épaules.

En remontant dans l'histoire des dix dernières années, vous n'avez donc pas le droit de vous arrêter à l'étape que vous avez choisie. Le délai juridique de prescription peut seul vous fournir un point de départ. Vous auriez de la peine à en trouver un autre que justifiassent des raisons d'ordre historique. En tout état de cause, votre point de départ à vous ne se justifie par rien, à aucun point de vue, ni historique, ni juridique. Ma démonstration là-dessus est péremptoire, ce me semble, et je crois que je puis mettre au défi l'accusation — quelle que soit l'agilité de sa dialectique — de m'apporter là-dessus une contradiction supportable. Il ne peut s'expliquer que par une seule et unique raison, que je ne veux pas répéter et dont vous voudrez assurément vous défendre. Si vous persévérez dans le système de l'instruction du réquisitoire et de l'arrêt de renvoi, vous proclamerez par là même que ce procès est une *entreprise politique*, que vous êtes des *juges politiques* et nous n'aurions plus qu'à en enregistrer tristement l'aveu.

DEFENSE DE LEON BLUM

Audience du mardi 10 mars 1942

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — L'audience est ouverte.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Tout d'abord, il y a un point que je voudrais fixer devant la Cour et qui la surprendra peut-être un peu : je voudrais dire un mot de la durée exacte de mon existence ministérielle. Il semble que ce soit un point qui ne devrait prêter à aucune contestation.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Du 4 juin 1936 au 23 juin 1937 vous avez été président du Conseil. Vous avez été également vice-président du Conseil du 23 juin 1937 au 18 janvier 1938. Vous êtes revenu président du Conseil du 23 mars 1938 au 7 avril 1938.

M. LÉON BLUM. — C'est exact, M. le Président.

Mais au cours de l'instruction, il y a eu une tendance assez curieuse à rallonger tout à la fois et à raccourcir mon existence ministérielle. Voici ce que j'entends par là.

J'ai pris le pouvoir en effet le 4 juin au soir. Les élections générales avaient eu lieu le 26 avril et le 3 mai. Entre cette date du 3 mai et le 4 juin, il y a un intervalle, un inter-règne d'un mois à peu près. Or, il y a eu très certainement, si j'en juge par les conversations avec le magistrat instructeur, certaine tendance à anticiper quelque peu sur mon arrivée réelle au pouvoir et à comprendre d'avance dans mon gouvernement tout le mois qui s'est écoulé depuis le résultat définitif des élections générales. Je ne m'en étonne pas autrement, puisque ce mois de l'inter-règne a été également le mois pendant lequel a commencé et s'est développé le mouvement des occupations d'usines.

Je tiens à préciser très exactement que pendant ce mois, je n'étais pas le chef du gouvernement.

Je sais qu'on a insisté auprès de « mon ami » Albert Sarraut pour qu'il donnât sa démission dès que le résultat des élections fut connu. On a, d'autre part, insisté auprès de moi pour que je fasse pression sur lui et que je m'empare immédiatement du pouvoir pour lequel je me trouvais désigné par le résultat des élections. Ni M. Sarraut ni moi ne l'avons voulu. M. Sarraut, parce qu'il n'était pas, comme c'était arrivé dans des circonstances antérieures, un vaincu de la bataille électorale. Il appartenait à un parti, le parti radical, qui avait été un des partis intégrés dans la coalition du Front Populaire. D'autre part, il n'était pas dans la nature d'Albert Sarraut, qui est un homme courageux et d'un courage chevaleresque, de se dérober devant une situation difficile. Quant à moi, je me suis refusé à toute intervention et à toute pression de ce genre, pour des motifs que j'ai, d'ailleurs, exposés publiquement, parce que je tenais, en raison même des circonstances, à ce que la transmission du pouvoir s'opérât dans des conditions irréprochables de légalité républicaine et de correction constitutionnelle.

On m'a beaucoup interrogé sur les contacts que j'avais eus avec M. Albert Sarraut pendant ce mois, comme si — vous savez que c'était ma réputation — j'avais joué pendant ce mois mon rôle habituel d'éminence grise, protecteur et tyran des gouvernements ! Pendant ce mois, j'ai vu M. Albert Sarraut deux fois. Il est venu me voir un jour dans mon appartement du quai Bourbon avec M. Paul-Boncour, ministre d'Etat, chargé de l'intérim du ministère des affaires étrangères, pendant une indisposition de M. Flandin qui en était titulaire. Je ne ferai pas allusion à cet incident, si M. Flandin lui-même, à la Chambre, ne l'avait rendu public... M. Flandin essayait à ce moment de renouer

avec l'Italie des relations plus cordiales et il avait conçu l'idée non pas d'une démarche directe à Rome, mais d'un sondage préalable à Londres. MM. Albert Sarraut et Paul-Boncour sont venus m'en entretenir. Je leur ai répondu que je n'acceptais pas d'être une espèce de médecin consultant dans les affaires dont je ne connaissais pas le détail. Ils ont insisté et m'ont demandé un conseil d'ami que je ne leur ai plus refusé et dans l'espèce, sans entrer dans des détails plus approfondis, les circonstances ont, je crois, montré que ce conseil était bon.

J'ai revu une seconde fois M. Albert Sarraut qui m'a demandé de passer au ministère de l'intérieur un jour que, en feuilletant une collection de journaux, je pourrais préciser ; je crois que c'était le samedi 30 mai. Le mouvement des occupations était, dès ce moment-là, devenu extrêmement alarmant. M. Albert Sarraut m'a demandé de joindre mes efforts aux siens dans une démarche qu'il exécutait auprès de la Confédération Générale du Travail. Il m'a prié de la faire. Je l'ai faite.

Voilà toute mon immixtion dans le gouvernement de la République pendant le mois où j'étais, suivant une expression de M. Paul Reynaud, une sorte de « dauphin couronné ».

ET M. CAMILLE CHAUTEMPS ?

Cette extension de mon gouvernement, en anticipant sur sa naissance, j'ai eu le sentiment qu'on l'essayait aussi en le prolongeant au delà de son terme. Vous venez de lire vous-même, M. le Président, une pièce dans laquelle je suis qualifié d'ancien président et d'ancien vice-président du Conseil ; j'ai, en effet, été vice-président du cabinet Camille Chautemps. J'ai été renversé par le Sénat.

Le Sénat avait rejeté un projet voté par la Chambre des députés et sur lequel j'avais posé devant lui la question de confiance. Les conditions de ma chute risquaient ainsi de créer un conflit entre les deux assemblées. Car, il n'y a aucun doute que la Chambre des députés, si je le lui avais demandé, aurait persévéré dans son vote, et ce conflit entre les deux Chambres, étant donné les conditions générales de la vie publique en France à cette époque, était de nature à déterminer une crise politique assez redoutable.

J'ai eu le souci, à ce moment, d'assurer, dans toute la mesure possible, la transmission régulière, la transmission paisible du pouvoir. C'est la raison principale pour laquelle j'ai accepté d'entrer dans le cabinet de M. Camille Chautemps qui d'ailleurs, je dois le dire, pendant tout le cours de notre collaboration d'un an et même d'un peu davantage, avait été pour moi le collaborateur le plus affectueux et le plus empressé. J'ai donc accepté. Mais je n'étais pas plus le chef du gouvernement, après le 13 juin 1937, que je n'étais chef du gouvernement avant le 4 juin 1936.

Le magistrat instructeur, dans une des visites qu'il m'a faites à Chazeron, m'a dit, avec une douceur flatteuse assurément, mais redoutable : « Comment, quand un homme comme vous est dans le gouvernement, tout le monde sait bien qu'il en est le véritable chef ! » Il n'en était rien. M. Chautemps était bien le chef du gouvernement qu'il présidait, et pendant toute cette période je me suis efforcé, au contraire, parce que c'était entre lui et moi une question de délicatesse élémentaire, de m'effacer et de réserver mon attitude autant qu'il m'a été possible. M. Chautemps et M. Georges Bonnet, qui était ministre des finances, ont entrepris aussitôt une politique économique et financière entièrement contraire à celle que j'avais pratiquée et qui n'était pas sans

m'alarmer. J'avais moi-même, à un moment donné, en mars, proclamé la nécessité d'une pause. Mais une pause n'est pas un rebroussement et je redoutais, je l'avoue, d'une façon très sensible, les effets d'un retour à la politique d'équilibre budgétaire comptable et de superfiscalité. Pourtant j'ai loyalement couvert, devant mon parti, et même devant des assemblées populaires, cette politique que je n'approuvais pas.

Pendant toute cette période d'ailleurs où des soucis personnels m'ont beaucoup séparé de la vie publique, je crois ne m'être occupé d'aucune affaire importante, si ce n'est de la nationalisation des chemins de fer avec M. Queuille, affaire où j'ai pu obtenir des résultats importants, bien qu'insuffisants à mon gré. Par conséquent — j'en suis fâché — je ne peux accepter cette manière de voir qui s'est d'ailleurs atténuée, car je ne crois pas avoir été qualifié d'ancien vice-président du Conseil dans tous les derniers actes de la Cour. Ce serait d'ailleurs quelque chose d'assez étrange, vous en conviendrez, que je sois ici retenu comme vice-président du conseil d'un gouvernement dont le président est, en ce moment, nanti d'une mission officielle dans un pays étranger, soit par le gouvernement, soit par le Chef de l'Etat. Et je ne peux m'empêcher de faire à ce sujet une observation qui, à mon avis, marque dans quelle intention profonde ce procès a été entrepris.

Car enfin, M. le Président, vous reveniez tout à l'heure sur cette affirmation que vous ne perdez aucune occasion de réitérer, peut-être pour mieux vous convaincre vous-même...

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Parce que c'est l'évidence, parce que les faits parlent d'eux-mêmes !

M. LÉON BLUM. — Nous entrerons dans ce débat sur le fond quand vous voudrez, sur la question de savoir si la période de juin 1936 à juin 1937 cor-

respond en effet à une période particulièrement critique des relations franco-allemandes, et je me fais fort de vous persuader du contraire. Mais enfin, en tout cas, le gouvernement Chautemps se trouve placé pendant cette période suspecte. La législature de 1936 se divise, somme toute, en trois phases : il y a tout d'abord une phase Blum — je suis bien obligé de me nommer le premier, c'est la chronologie qui l'exige — et il y a ensuite une phase Chautemps...

M. DALADIER. — Oui !

M. LÉON BLUM. — ...qui dure près d'un an ; il y a ensuite une phase Daladier, M. Daladier est là. Je suis là ! Et l'homme qui se place entre nous deux, je le répète, est en ce moment nanti d'une mission officielle du gouvernement ou du Chef de l'Etat.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Il importe peu ! Je veux préciser simplement la situation ; il n'est pas question de vous reprocher à aucun moment les actes de M. Chautemps.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Non, M. le Président. Cependant, je le répète, dans les premiers actes de la procédure, je suis qualifié d'ancien vice-président du Conseil, en même temps que d'ancien président du Conseil. Il est très important de souligner ce fait. M. Chautemps se place bien dans la période suspecte. Les dangers dont vous parlez étaient-ils moindres pendant les deux ministères, second semestre 1937 et au commencement de l'année 1938 ? Je peux même vous dire que c'est pendant cette période, par exemple, que les insuffisances qualitatives de notre matériel d'aviation sont apparues pour la première fois d'une façon tout à fait frappante. Car pendant le premier semestre de 1937 notre matériel d'aviation, dans cette espèce de banc d'épreuve qu'était la guerre civile d'Espagne, était encore considéré comme le meilleur matériel en

ligne. C'est vers la fin de 1937 que la révolution technique, dont parle un des témoins, a commencé à se traduire sur les fabrications en série.

J'ai donc le droit de dire que l'intention du procès apparaît ici d'une façon tout à fait particulière. Je ne parle pas spécialement pour la Cour. Je ne demande pas que M. Chautemps vienne, pendant que nous nous serrerions un peu, prendre place ici à un des bancs où nous sommes assis nous-mêmes, bien que j'aie été assez son ami pour regretter qu'il ne soit pas à notre place plutôt qu'à la sienne. Mais cependant, le fait d'avoir projeté hors du débat les affaires militaires d'une part, le fait d'extraire artificiellement dans cette période de 1936 à 1939, un des gouvernements qui ont rempli cet intervalle, d'autre part, ne montrent-ils pas — et avec une évidence tangible, concrète, saisissante — une intention politique contre certains hommes considérés comme incarnant particulièrement une certaine conception politique, intention qui est à l'origine de ce procès.

POUR L'UNITE ET L'ARMEMENT DE LA FRANCE

Cette observation de ma part est légitime. Je voudrais en faire une autre. On a plus ou moins prolongé mon premier gouvernement ; on lui a ajouté une espèce d'existence avant terme et ensuite une espèce d'existence posthume. Mais j'ai été, comme vous l'avez dit, deux fois chef de gouvernement. J'avoue que je suis étonné du peu de place que mon second gouvernement a tenu dans l'instruction. Il semble que personne ne s'en soit préoccupé, qu'il n'ait éveillé aucune espèce de curiosité. Il n'a pas été long : il n'a même pas

duré un mois. Tout le monde savait qu'il serait court quand il a commencé et, je vous l'assure, je le savais aussi bien que personne. Cependant il a été marqué par des événements que vous n'avez pas le droit d'omettre si vous voulez approfondir ce que j'appellerai la moralité politique de ce procès.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Vous parlez des événements extérieurs du 15 mars 1938 ?

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je vais préciser, M. le Président. Les événements dont vous parlez étaient accomplis quand je suis arrivé au pouvoir. Mon gouvernement est du 13 mars et l'Anschluss est du 11. A la première nouvelle des événements extérieurs dont vous parlez, j'ai obtenu l'adhésion de mon parti à ce que j'appelais l'unité française. Ce n'était pas la première fois que j'essayais de la réaliser. A la fin de janvier, entre les deux ministères de M. Chautemps, le Président de la République m'avait appelé. Dès ce moment, je lui avais indiqué que je croyais nécessaire de provoquer ce que j'appelais dans une interview donnée à ce moment-là à des journalistes : « Un accord Matignon politique ». M. Lebrun m'a demandé : « Croyez-vous être l'homme le plus indiqué pour tenter un groupement unanime de ce genre ? » Je lui ai répondu : « Non ! Je ne crois pas être l'homme indiqué. » — Qui pensez-vous qui puisse le réaliser mieux que vous ? » J'ai prononcé le nom de M. Edouard Herriot. M. Lebrun m'a prié d'aller le lui proposer, ce que j'ai fait. Je suis allé trouver M. Herriot ; je lui ai fait cette proposition de la part du Président de la République ; elle n'a pas abouti.

Mais en mars, chargé cette fois d'une façon pressante, instante, de constituer un gouvernement, c'est ce que j'ai essayé. Peut-être, maintenant que j'oriente votre mémoire vers ces souve-

nirs, reviennent-ils à votre esprit ? J'ai convoqué tout d'abord chez moi les différents présidents des groupes, y compris les groupes de la droite de la Chambre, en leur demandant si, sous l'appel des circonstances extérieures, ils consentiraient à entrer dans un gouvernement d'unité française. Je leur ai dit et répété que s'ils pensaient que ce groupement fût plus facile autour d'un autre homme que moi, j'étais prêt à m'effacer. Presque tous les présidents des groupes se sont déclarés d'accord, mais ils ont trouvé de la résistance quand ils ont consulté leurs groupes respectifs. Qu'ai-je fait alors ? C'est un événement parlementaire assez original. En pleine crise, j'ai réuni à la Chambre, dans la plus spacieuse des salles de la Chambre qu'on appelle la salle Colbert, tous les députés de l'opposition. Je leur ai adressé un appel direct, instant, et je crois, à certains moments, assez pathétique pour qu'oubliant toutes nos divisions, toutes nos controverses, nous essayions de tomber d'accord pour un gouvernement commun. Je leur ai répété ce que j'avais dit à leurs représentants quelques heures auparavant : « Si vous pensez qu'un autre homme puisse plus aisément que moi obtenir ce qu'en ce moment je vous demande, dites-le et je me retire aussitôt ». Je crois que quand j'ai quitté la salle Colbert, il y avait eu en moi assez de conviction et d'émotion pour que j'aie gagné l'adhésion à peu près unanime. Quand je me suis retiré, je ne voudrais pas nommer les hommes qui sont venus me serrer les mains en exprimant le regret d'avoir peut-être porté sur moi, à d'autres moments, des jugements peu équitables. Mais après mon départ d'autres orateurs sont venus. L'effet que j'avais produit a été effacé par d'autres discours et je n'ai pas obtenu ce que je désirais.

J'ai alors formé un gouvernement. Relisez à l'*Officiel* la séance de ma présentation devant la Chambre. A la tribune, j'ai répété à l'opposition :

« Les circonstances exigeraient en ce moment l'union de tous les Français : je l'ai offert, je l'offre encore. Dites un mot, faites un geste et je descends de cette tribune pour aller porter ma démission au Président de la République, et lui désigner l'homme qui pourrait le mieux réussir dans l'entreprise que j'ai tentée vainement ». Les mêmes hommes qui avaient provoqué ce revirement dans la réunion de la salle Colbert m'ont alors répondu par un refus et c'est ainsi qu'a commencé mon second gouvernement.

Ne croyez-vous pas, que du point de vue de la moralité politique de ce procès, cela présentait une certaine importance ?

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — La moralité politique de ce procès est une question purement subjective que chacun apprécie à sa façon. Pour la Cour, le procès n'est pas et ne sera jamais un procès politique.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Il l'est et le sera malgré vous.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Pas pour la Cour, je vous l'assure.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Il l'est par sa matière même. Ne cherchez pas, dans mes paroles, Monsieur le président, un sens qui n'y est pas. Cela ne dépend pas de la Cour. Mais en ce qui me concerne, je ne peux pas ne pas considérer que la matière de l'accusation est purement politique. Ce qu'on incrimine en soi, c'est ce qu'on a appelé « un climat social », cette expression a déjà fait fortune. Vous parlez d'impression subjective : une impression subjective se nourrit d'un certain nombre d'éléments. Je ne crois pas que ceux que j'ai fournis à la Cour soient indifférents, et je ne crois pas que je sois en dehors de cette psychose du procès, comme vous le disiez.

Il y a eu autre chose durant ce court gouvernement. J'ai fait autre chose. J'ai déposé un grand

projet fiscal, financier et monétaire voté par la Chambre et rejeté par le Sénat, ce qui a déterminé ma chute. Il aurait été intéressant de voir aussi ce projet. Il est au dossier. Oh ! il n'est pas facile de l'y trouver, mais il y est. Il est enfoui dans une des énormes cantines qu'on nous a voiturées à Bourrassol ; il est perdu dans une des annexes des procès-verbaux de la Commission des finances de la Chambre. Mais enfin, il y est. Si vous jetez les yeux sur ce projet et sur l'exposé des motifs qui, cette fois, est en grande partie rédigé par moi, vous verriez dans quel esprit il est conçu.

C'est un projet qui vise à tendre toutes les forces de la nation vers le réarmement, et qui fait de cet effort de réarmement intensif, la condition même, l'élément même d'un démarrage industriel et économique définitif. Il sort résolument de l'économie libérale ; il se place sur le plan d'une économie de guerre. Il vise le contrôle des changes, la création des moyens de paiement intérieurs, un contrôle des devises qu'il permet d'affecter précisément à l'achat des matières premières, des machines-outils et des produits finis nécessaires au réarmement. Il ferme le circuit. Il aurait permis de ne pas compter avec les crédits, de ne pas compter avec les difficultés financières, monétaires et économiques pour l'effort de réarmement. Il pose aussi, j'aurai à dire dans quelles conditions, la question des heures de travail.

Pendant ce ministère court, mais comme vous le voyez assez honorablement rempli, s'est placée aussi cette crise ouvrière dont on vous a parlé à propos de la réunion du 15 mars 1938. Les contrats collectifs, conclus pour la plupart au mois de juin 1936 avaient été reconduits d'autorité pour un an au mois de juin 1937. Mais en juin 1938, le patronat n'acceptait pas une nouvelle reconduction pure et simple ; et c'est le débat autour des contrats collectifs qui était à l'origine de la crise. Qu'ai-je

fait, après la réunion du 15 mars ? J'ai aussitôt entrepris une négociation, qui essayait de fondre la révision des contrats collectifs et la révision des salaires — sur laquelle un arbitrage aurait incontestablement accordé satisfaction aux ouvriers — avec la question des heures supplémentaires. J'ai fait accepter par les ouvriers le principe de cinq heures supplémentaires ou plutôt la principe de la semaine de 45 heures considérée comme normale, non seulement dans les établissements de l'aviation, mais aussi de la guerre, et dans les établissements travaillant indirectement pour la défense nationale. Cela, qui a été à l'origine des sentences Jacomet et Giraud, méritait aussi de ne pas être écarté du débat.

Cette question de dates de mes gouvernements, comme vous le voyez, n'était pas si simple ni si élémentaire. Au fond, personne n'incrimine mon second gouvernement ; je ne vois rien qui s'y rapporte dans le réquisitoire. J'ai fixé les limites exactes de mon premier gouvernement. Il est donc entendu que c'est de ce qui s'est passé entre le 4 juin 1936 au soir et le jour de ma chute, le 17 juin 1937, que j'ai à répondre devant la Cour.

Je voudrais encore ajouter quelques mots qui répondent d'ailleurs à une observation que vous avez faite de vous-même, Monsieur le président ; cette observation est évidente ; par cela même elle apparaît superflue, mais je tiens pourtant à la formuler

Il n'appartient évidemment pas à la Cour Suprême de juger ma politique. Je dis « ma » et je serai très souvent au cours de mes explications, amené à dire : « ma » bien qu'il s'agisse d'une poli-

tique qui a été mienne en ce sens que j'étais chef du gouvernement, mais enfin, qui a été celle d'un gouvernement uni...

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Gouvernement dont vous étiez l'animateur.

M. LÉON BLUM. — J'espère en avoir été l'animateur. Je disais donc que vous n'aviez pas à juger cette politique en soi, ni même à la juger par un rapport à l'ensemble de la conjoncture politique. Vous n'êtes ni une académie, ni une assemblée délibérante : vous êtes des juges. Ma responsabilité politique, c'est devant les assemblées qu'elle était en jeu, elle a constamment été couverte en toute matière par de fortes majorités, quand ce n'était pas des votes unanimes. Pour vous, la question n'est pas là. Vous disiez au cours d'une de ces dernières audiences, qu'en ce qui concerne les opérations militaires, ce sont les Clausewitz et les Jomini de l'avenir qui les apprécieront après de longues années de recherches d'archives. Vous me permettez de ne pas partager votre opinion sur ce point. Je crois qu'il s'agit là de choses claires, évidentes, dont beaucoup échappent à toute controverse, et laissez-moi vous le dire, quand vous prononciez cette parole, elle contenait un jugement bien sévère sur le débat même auquel vous présidez. Car s'il est vraiment impossible aujourd'hui d'émettre une appréciation sur des doctrines militaires, des conceptions militaires ou des opérations militaires qui, de toute évidence, ont été la cause déterminante du désastre militaire, que veut-on dire par là si ce n'est que ce procès ne pouvait pas être jugé à l'heure présente...

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — J'ai dit qu'il n'appartenait pas à la Cour d'en juger, c'est tout ce que j'ai dit. Car enfin, c'est tellement évident, qu'on discute encore sur les fautes que Napoléon a pu commettre à la bataille de Waterloo.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Oui, mais il y a d'autres fautes certaines, même quand il s'agit de Napoléon, et il y a des comparaisons qui risqueraient d'être blessantes pour ceux qui en sont l'objet.

Ce que vous avez dit des opérations militaires, devient au contraire très vrai d'une politique qui a été complexe, qui a été controversée, qui avait des origines dans le passé, qui aura des retentissements dans l'avenir, qui a même son retentissement ici, à l'heure présente. Et alors oui, c'est vrai, en ce qui concerne cette politique, peut-être en effet, faudra-t-il attendre les Tocqueville, les Taine de l'avenir pour la juger après de longues années de travaux. Mais cette recherche en tout cas, ce n'est pas à vous qu'elle appartient. Vous n'avez pas à apprécier ma politique en soi ; vous n'avez pas à l'apprécier dans ses rapports avec la conjoncture politique générale : vous avez uniquement à l'apprécier dans la catégorie de ses effets possibles. A-t-elle eu, oui ou non, pour résultat de concourir au passage de l'état de paix à l'état de guerre ? a-t-elle eu, oui ou non, pour résultat d'aggraver la situation ainsi créée ? Je crois qu'il n'y a pas de discussion possible sur ce point. Si je transpose ces formules sur le plan de la politique concrète, à quoi aboutissent-elles ? Cela revient à dire : mes lois sociales et la façon dont je les ai appliquées ont-elles, oui ou non, provoqué des entraves ou des retards dans la conception des programmes d'armement, qui était d'ailleurs, eux aussi, l'œuvre de mon gouvernement, « mon » étant pris dans le sens que je viens d'indiquer et sans que je pense un instant à réduire la part et le mérite d'initiatives qui appartiennent à Edouard Daladier.

Que suit-il de là ? Il suit de là que l'accusation dirigée contre moi a un caractère, comment dire ? un caractère indirect, un caractère secondaire peut-être, plus exactement : un caractère

conditionnel. Car, enfin, l'accusation se fonde sur les retards et entraves que la politique de mon gouvernement aurait apportés à l'exécution du programme d'armement, mis en train par ce même gouvernement. Par conséquent, l'accusation postule nécessairement l'existence de ces entraves et de ces retards. Elle est obligée de les prouver avant de s'adresser à moi. Car si ces retards et ces entraves n'existaient pas, comment ma politique pourrait-elle être incriminée, comme l'une des causes d'un fait qui n'existe pas ? Il faudrait commencer par chercher cette preuve, et je me permets de dire que non seulement cette preuve n'est pas apportée, mais que la preuve contraire est dès à présent administrée. Elle l'a été à l'instruction écrite par les mémoires du général Gamelin et du contrôleur général Jacomet. Elle s'est dégagée de toute évidence, publiquement, de tout ce débat depuis qu'il a commencé à se dérouler. On peut tenir pour établi à l'heure présente que le programme d'armement a été exécuté, qu'il était l'expression des nécessaires et suffisants besoins de l'armée, tels qu'ils étaient estimés par le commandement...

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Attendez que nous ayons écouté sur ce point les dépositions des témoins.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je prends acte en ce moment des débats qui se sont déroulés jusqu'à l'heure où je parle. Non seulement ce programme a été exécuté, mais il l'a été à l'heure dite, ce qui serait déjà un événement bien extraordinaire pour un programme d'armement français, mais il a été exécuté en avance.

M. LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL. — Nous sommes tout à fait en désaccord.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Mais vous êtes en désaccord avec tout ce qui a été établi à l'instruction écrite et dit jusqu'à présent dans ce débat. En tout cas, j'aurais le droit de vous dire : « Commencez par

m'apporter cette preuve; vous ne pouvez vous adresser à moi, qu'après que vous l'aurez établie. Je ne peux intervenir qu'ensuite. Encore une fois il n'y a pas eu retard et entrave, et étant entendu que vous ne pouvez rechercher ma politique que dans la mesure où elle les aurait provoqués, que signifierait l'accusation dirigée contre moi

Je ne peux pas ne pas dire cela, parce que, du point de vue de ma défense, c'est un réduct inexpugnable; mais j'ajoute tout de suite que je n'ai aucune intention de m'y enfermer. Je vais répondre à toutes vos questions, pour éclairer la Cour. Et j'y répondrai car je n'y réponds pas seulement pour la Cour.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Voulez-vous cependant répondre à la question que je vous ai posée au début de l'audience ? Comment se fait-il que les modalités d'application de la loi du 21 juin 36, dite « loi de 40 heures » n'aient été organisées qu'à la fin de 1937 et en 1938, alors que cependant, en ce qui concernait les établissements travaillant pour la Défense nationale, l'application de cette loi était organisée dès le 29 juin 1936 sans aucune dérogation ?

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je n'ai pas connu ces circulaires. Mais je n'en décline pas plus la responsabilité que de tout ce qui a pu se passer pendant mon gouvernement et je montrerai avec évidence que leur effet sur le rendement de la production a été probablement nul ; car il n'est établi nulle part que pendant la période de mise en train du programme, les heures supplémentaires aient été nécessaires.

Jusqu'à présent, on m'a toujours fait le reproche contraire d'avoir hâté la mise en application de la loi, et puisque vous tenez à donner un caractère plus discursif à des explications que j'essaie pour

ma part d'ordonner, je veux vous dire tout de suite quelque chose que j'aurais été amené à vous dire par la suite.

J'ai été au contraire pressé de toutes parts d'ajourner la promulgation des règlements d'administration publique d'où dépendait l'application de la loi pour les particuliers. Que l'Etat ait donné l'exemple et qu'il ait d'abord appliqué les lois dans ses propres établissements, c'est naturel. Mais pour l'industrie privée, la loi n'était applicable qu'après la publication des règlements d'administration publique qu'elle avait prévus. La loi donnait d'ailleurs, comme toutes celles que j'ai fait voter à cette époque, une très large délégation. C'est un procédé que j'ai toujours appliqué, parce que je n'ai jamais voulu faire de décrets-lois et que je ne voulais pas cependant que les lois que je présentais se perdissent dans des discussions de détails sur des textes trop minutieux. J'ai essayé de parer à cette difficulté en faisant toujours voter par les Chambres des textes très courts, posant d'une façon précise les principes mêmes de la loi, mais remettant aux règlements d'administration publique tous les détails d'application; et je crois que cette méthode est bonne. Il en a été ainsi pour la loi des 40 heures. Mais elle prévoyait notamment la consultation des organisations syndicales et patronales, dont on devait provoquer l'avis écrit. Elle supposait ensuite — je ne crois pas me tromper bien que je n'aie pas revu le texte depuis longtemps — l'avis du Conseil national économique. Toute cette procédure prenait naturellement un certain temps. Je ne crois pas qu'il ait été possible d'aller plus vite. Le règlement d'administration publique pour la métallurgie est de septembre ou d'octobre...

M. LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL. — Il est du 27 octobre 1936.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Il n'est donc pas de décembre 1937, mais d'octobre 1936. J'étais étonné, monsieur le Président, en vous entendant énoncer votre date. De juin à octobre, c'est un délai minimum, et l'on m'a demandé, à ce moment-là, de prolonger bien autrement le délai. Savez-vous ce qui s'était passé pour la loi de 8 heures ? Elle n'était applicable, en effet, qu'au fur et à mesure qu'elle était appliquée à telle ou telle catégorie par un règlement d'administration publique. Certains de ces règlements n'étaient pas encore pris après près de 20 ans, quand nous avons fait voter les 40 heures. Ce que l'on m'a reproché à l'époque, c'est d'être allé trop vite. On m'a reproché d'avoir appliqué la loi trop tôt, de l'avoir appliquée massivement, globalement, au lieu de l'appliquer seulement pour certaines corporations. On m'a reproché de l'avoir appliquée d'un coup au lieu de l'appliquer par partie.

Savez-vous pourquoi je l'ai fait ? Je vais vous le dire tout de suite. Nos premières mesures avaient incontestablement provoqué une reprise économique. Il n'y a aucune espèce de doute, qu'en septembre et octobre 1936, dans l'industrie française, la demande était supérieure à l'offre. Il n'existait plus de stocks ; le commerce se ranimait, et le fait que la demande était supérieure à l'offre provoquait déjà une hausse, avant même que le résultat des lois sociales ait pu s'incorporer dans les prix de revient. J'ai délibéré longuement à Matignon avec un certain nombre d'hommes parmi lesquels se trouvait René Belin, que vous pourrez interroger là-dessus, car j'ai l'intention de le citer comme témoin. Nous avons discuté la question de savoir s'il fallait faire une application progressive, par catégories ou par palliers et savez-vous ce qui nous a déterminés ? C'est qu'à cette époque nous nous sommes rendus compte que le patronat justifiait déjà des prix de gros très élevés en y incorporant d'avance le coût présumé de la loi de 40 heures. Nous nous sommes dit : si nous

procédons par palliers ou par catégories, nous aurons deux hausses successives et cumulées, celle qui est déjà réalisée, déjà incorporée, par le seul fait de la mesure générale que l'on attend, et une seconde qui se produira par catégorie, par industrie, par nature de produits à mesure que nous appliquerons spécialement à cette catégorie de produits la législation générale. Voilà ce qui nous a déterminés à appliquer si vite la loi des 40 heures.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — J'ai mal cité tout à l'heure la date de ce décret sur la métallurgie. Je vais donner lecture de l'article 6 « La durée du travail effectué peut être, à titre temporaire, prolongée au delà des limites fixées aux articles 2 et 3 du présent décret dans les conditions suivantes... 2°) travaux effectués dans l'intérêt de la sûreté et de la défense nationale ou d'un service public. »

Comment alors se fait-il qu'on ait attendu 1938 pour tirer avantage de ce décret et des facilités qu'il donnait dans l'intérêt de la Défense nationale ? Je ne vous reproche pas ce qui s'est passé en 1938 quand vous n'étiez pas président du Conseil, mais je reviens sur ma question.

M. LÉON BLUM. — On ne peut pas isoler cette question des heures supplémentaires de la question de la loi elle-même, et il est impossible de distraire cette loi des conditions dans lesquelles elle a été votée.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — L'ordre dans lequel vous répondrez à mes questions m'est indifférent et je ne vois même aucun inconvénient à ce que vous y répondiez par avance.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je ne veux aucunement éluder vos questions, il vous serait d'ailleurs facile de m'interrompre.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Ce n'est pas de nature à vous gêner, j'en suis sûr.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Cela ne m'inquiète en rien, en effet.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — L'essentiel est que j'obtienne les réponses qu'il vous conviendra de faire à mes questions. Si vous n'y répondez pas au cours de vos explications, je les reprendrai par la suite.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Il y a là quelque chose que je suis obligé d'énoncer tout d'abord à la Cour, bien que ce grief ne soit pas retenu par l'arrêt de renvoi, mais enfin il a été formulé par le Conseil de Justice politique...

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — N'en parlons pas.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Ce qui s'est passé avant que vous vous soyez réunis n'existe pas pour vous, avez-vous dit, mais il existe pour nous. Cela a pour nous une existence sensible se traduisant par des données matérielles concrètes. Cela a eu aussi un retentissement dans l'opinion et je suis d'autant plus fondé à y répondre que je trouve malgré tout les traces de cette charge dans le réquisitoire.

LA DEFENSE NATIONALE ET LES CREDITS MILITAIRES

La première des charges relevées contre moi par le Conseil de Justice politique était de n'avoir pas donné à la France les armes que sa sécurité exigeait. Je crois que je cite à peu près textuellement. Je suis tout de même obligé, parce que cela tient au premier chef à la moralité tout court ou la moralité politique de ce procès, de dire à la Cour ce que j'ai fait au contraire pour donner à la France les armes que sa sécurité exigeait. Nous verrons ensuite si, comme le soutient l'accusation, j'ai repris d'une main ce que j'avais donné de l'autre. Car, au

fond, c'est bien cette expression un peu vulgaire qui fait le fond de l'accusation. Mais avant de savoir ce que j'ai, paraît-il, repris, il est peut-être intéressant de savoir ce que j'ai donné.

Quand j'ai constitué mon gouvernement, j'avais sur sa forme même un certain nombre d'idées que j'avais énoncées dans des articles de revues, puis dans un livre qui a d'abord paru sans nom d'auteur et qui a été ensuite réimprimé sous mon nom. J'avais expliqué comment, selon moi, devait être organisée la direction du gouvernement, avec un président du Conseil sans portefeuille, avec un secrétariat général autour de ce président du Conseil. J'avais expliqué que, selon moi, l'œuvre de direction et de coordination d'un chef de gouvernement ne pouvait se concevoir que par le travail direct et continu d'un président du Conseil avec chacun de ses ministres. Ce travail direct est difficile avec un nombre de ministres aussi élevé que le comportent les cabinets... pas aujourd'hui... que le comportaient hier les cabinets français. J'avais donc été conduit à la conception d'un gouvernement constitué en un certain nombre de groupes. Et, c'est peut-être encore une de mes promesses que l'on tient, j'avais déjà à cette époque pensé à une distinction entre les ministres et les autres gérants de départements ministériels du même groupe, ceux-ci n'étant que des secrétaires d'Etat. Je n'ai pas pu réaliser complètement cette conception, pour toutes sortes de raisons. Cependant, il y a au moins un de ces groupes qui a fonctionné d'une façon sérieuse; c'est justement le groupe de la Défense nationale. Quand le gouvernement s'est constitué et que M. Daladier a accepté d'être mon collaborateur, il a tout de suite été entendu, sur sa demande d'ailleurs, qu'il ne serait pas ministre de la guerre, mais ministre de la Défense nationale et de la Guerre. Les autres ministres chargés de départements militaires, nous les avons choisis ensemble. J'ai voulu qu'ils fussent à

son gré et j'ai désiré qu'ils en fussent informés de façon — comment dire ? — qu'à la coordination se mêlât comme une nuance de subordination. C'est ainsi qu'a été choisi le ministre de la Marine, M. Gasnier-Duparc, qui, à toutes ses qualités personnelles, en joignait une qui, pour nous, avait beaucoup de prix, celle d'être, à cette époque, l'un des plus intimes amis de M. l'amiral Darlan. C'est ainsi que fut choisi M. Pierre Cot, qui ne désirait pas du tout être ministre de l'Air, qui, au contraire, insistait pour qu'on lui donnât un autre département ministériel et qui, je peux le dire, sur mon premier projet de liste ministérielle, figurait en effet avec une autre affectation.

Dès la première réunion du Conseil des ministres, le 6 juin, Edouard Daladier a fait signer par le Président de la République un décret qu'on a pu compléter ensuite en faisant bénéficier cette réforme de l'expérience acquise, mais qui était le premier texte connu qui organisât une coordination permanente, sous la direction du ministre de la Défense nationale, entre tous les départements militaires. Et je me souviens que, quand nous avons quitté ensemble l'Elysée, Edouard Daladier m'a dit : « Vous venez peut-être, par ce simple décret, de rendre plus de services à la Défense nationale que beaucoup de vos prédécesseurs pendant de longs mois. »

En septembre, Edouard Daladier est venu me trouver, il m'a tenu un langage que vous connaissez d'avance, car celui-ci que je vais relater correspond exactement au compte rendu qu'il vous a donné de ses conversations avec le général Gamelin : « Le service de deux ans vient d'être rétabli en Allemagne. Il faut répondre. On peut répondre de deux façons, ou par une prolongation de la durée du service militaire, ou par un programme d'armement ». Pour des raisons qui sont celles qu'il vous a déjà données lui-même, et dont la plus forte était que sur le terrain de la durée du ser-

vice, nous étions battu d'avance par la surenchère de l'Allemagne, il a pensé que c'était un programme d'armement considérable qu'il fallait voter. Et il m'a parlé du programme qui a été qualifié de « programme des 14 milliards ». Je dis tout de suite que, quand il a apporté ce programme, j'ai eu l'impression que, probablement, c'était un programme qui existait déjà dans une certaine mesure; qu'il était l'expression de besoins déjà définis par l'Etat-major, qu'ainsi ce programme était considéré comme nécessaire, mais aussi comme suffisant à cette époque. Et j'ai eu aussi le sentiment que cette circonstance particulièrement grave, le rétablissement du service de deux ans en Allemagne, était saisi avec un certain empressement comme l'opportunité qui permettrait d'obtenir enfin le vote, longtemps attendu, des crédits nécessaires pour la Défense nationale.

Qu'ai-je répondu à Daladier lorsqu'il est venu me tenir ce langage ? Quand M. le maréchal Pétain s'est présenté devant la Commission de l'Armée du Sénat en mars 1934 et qu'on lui a demandé : « Etes-vous d'avis de rétablir le service de deux ans ? » dont il était probablement partisan à cette époque, il a répondu : « Oui, mais l'état de l'opinion publique ne le permettrait pas ». Quand M. Fabry, en 1935, est allé trouver M. Laval et lui a dit : « de très larges crédits seraient nécessaires pour la Défense nationale », M. Laval lui a répondu : « Peut-être, mais la situation monétaire ne le permet pas; il faut en ce moment songer avant tout à la défense de la monnaie et à l'équilibre budgétaire. »

J'aurais peut-être pu tenir le même langage que M. le maréchal Pétain. J'ose dire que ce langage aurait même été moins surprenant de ma part que de la sienne, car enfin, j'étais au gouvernement comme représentant d'un parti qui, des années durant, pour des raisons d'ordre rituel, avait voté contre les crédits militaires, sauf cependant lorsque son

vote était nécessaire pour les faire passer — comme ce fut le cas en 1929, pendant le ministère Herriot qui, en tout cas, avait toujours propension à demander la réduction des crédits militaires. J'avais dans mon propre parti une minorité bruyante qui réclamait chaque jour le retour au service d'un an. J'aurais pu dire aussi : « Non ! impossible. Je ne le peux pas. Il y a des raisons politiques, des raisons de parti qui m'en empêchent ». Si j'avais répondu cela j'aurais peut-être trahi les devoirs de ma charge.

Si j'avais parlé comme M. Pierre Laval, j'aurais aussi des excuses fortes. Au début de notre ministère, nous n'avons pas fait la dévaluation qui était pourtant, comme tout le monde l'a dit, inscrite dans la nécessité des choses. Si nous l'avions faite au début, nous aurions agi selon notre intérêt de gouvernement, car il aurait été sensible qu'elle était bien un legs, un héritage inévitable de la politique de nos prédécesseurs et de l'état économique du pays tel qu'il nous était transmis. Sans nous méprendre aucunement sur cet inconvénient politique, nous l'avons cependant différée. Nous avons fait une tentative, un essai désespéré, pour voir si les premiers résultats de la stimulation économique que nous voulions injecter au pays ne rendraient pas précisément inutile une dévaluation qui, pour tous les salariés, tous les rentiers, tous les détenteurs de revenus fixes, quelques précautions qu'on y prenne, entraîne des conséquences cruelles. J'aurais pu dire : « Y pensez-vous ? 14 milliards ! Nous allons annoncer 14 milliards de crédits ! Mais alors que va devenir notre monnaie ? Nous allons être acculés à la dévaluation ? » Et j'aurais été d'autant plus fondé de le dire que c'est ce qui s'est passé, que l'annonce de ces crédits massifs a eu sur le marché des changes une influence telle que nous avons été obligés dès la seconde quinzaine de septembre de négocier les accords tripartites avec l'Amérique et avec l'Angleterre et que nous avons convoqué le Parlement

a la fin de septembre pour lui faire voter la dévaluation. J'aurais pu dire cela. Si je l'avais fait, j'aurais peut-être trahi les devoirs de ma charge.

Dans l'une ou l'autre hypothèse, j'aurais fait passer des préoccupations politiques, des intérêts politiques, si hauts, si importants fussent-ils, avant les intérêts de la Défense nationale. Est-ce que j'ai dit un mot de cela à Daladier ? Je vois encore notre conversation à Matignon. Je l'ai écouté, je lui ai serré la main et lui ai dit : « Vous pouvez compter sur moi. C'est entendu. Je ferai tout le nécessaire ». Nous avons porté ensemble ce projet au Conseil des ministres et il a été voté sans l'ombre d'une difficulté, unanimement, ce qui est un fait sans exemple dans l'histoire parlementaire de la République

Est-ce que nous nous sommes bornés à cela ? Car il y a le programme de la guerre, mais en même temps nous avons adopté pour l'aviation le plan quinquennal, le plan des 1.500. Nous avons consacré à ce moment à l'aviation de nouveaux crédits considérables. Ce plan, un an après, c'est entendu, n'était pas encore exécuté. Cependant, c'est dans le plan quinquennal que se trouvent les premières commandes de Morane et de Bloch 131 qui sont entrés ensuite dans le plan V. C'est dans le plan des 1.500 que se trouvent les premières commandes de Potez 63 qui y sont entrés aussi. Ces modèles d'avions ont été ensuite multipliés par la diligence de Guy La Chambre et ont été l'élément principal de notre flotte de combat au moment des hostilités. Pour la marine, nous avons décidé de mettre en train une nouvelle tranche du programme naval sans attendre que la tranche en cours fut achevée. Le plan de la guerre le plan de l'aéronautique, la décision prise pour la marine, que M. l'amiral Darlan était venu me demander à moi personnellement pour mieux me convaincre — il n'y a pas eu de peine — j'ai chiffré pour tout cela la dépense, dans un débat de

vant le Sénat, en fin septembre, à 20 milliards, et encore je crois bien que je ne comprenais pas dans cette estimation la tranche supplémentaire du programme naval, ce qui pourrait porter cette dépense à 22 ou 23 milliards. Il s'agit là de la première estimation qui a été démesurément dépassée au cours de l'exécution, comme vous l'a dit M. Daladier.

Ce que j'ai fait là est malgré tout quelque chose qui compte. Les magistrats qui rédigent un réquisitoire ne sont jamais embarrassés, bien entendu, mais enfin, peut-être malgré tout cette pensée s'est-elle « interférée » entre eux et le papier sur lequel ils écrivaient. De ce que j'ai fait, de ce que mon gouvernement a fait, encore une fois, pas un instant, je ne veux usurper tout le mérite, mais enfin, j'étais le chef du gouvernement. On me reproche d'avoir laissé faire la nationalisation d'une certaine façon. J'ai bien le droit de me targuer d'avoir non seulement laissé faire, mais aidé à faire le réarmement massif de la France dans la mesure que l'état-major jugeait nécessaire à cette époque. On a dit : « Oui ! Oui ! Naturellement vous avez fait ce programme, seulement nous savons bien avec quelle arrière-pensée. En réalité, vous ne pensiez pas à la Défense nationale, mais au chômage ! » Je ne sais pas du tout où le Parquet a pris cette idée.

M. LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL. — C'est dans tous les textes qui ont été publiés. On y fait toujours allusion au chômage, notamment lorsque vous sollicitez l'appui des organisations ouvrières.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je n'ai fait aucune demande d'appui aux organisations ouvrières. Je vous dénie le droit de suspecter ma bonne volonté. Pas une fois, dans un texte venant de moi, vous ne trouverez cette idée que les crédits sont destinés à résorber le chômage. J'avais fait voter depuis plus

de trois mois les mesures contre le chômage, c'est-à-dire le programme des grands travaux, la loi de 40 heures, et aussi en septembre la série des prêts et des avances à la moyenne et à la petite industrie. Mais l'aurais-je fait, serait-ce bien original ? Si j'avais dit aux organisations ouvrières : « Il faut réarmer. Il le faut. Nous demandons d'énormes crédits mais ces crédits vont mettre en train des fabrications considérables qui auront aussi pour résultat et pour effet bienfaisant de réduire le chômage » ; en quoi serait-il porté atteinte à ma bonne foi d'homme politique ayant senti la nécessité de réarmer ? En rien. Mais j'ai fait l'inverse. Non seulement je n'ai pas dérivé vers le chômage les crédits votés pour la Défense nationale, mais j'ai dérivé vers la Défense nationale des crédits qui avaient été accordés par le Parlement pour la résorption du chômage. Car, pour le programme des grands travaux qui avait été voté par la Chambre avant sa séparation fin juillet ou commencement d'août, et qui, lui, avait pour objectif la résorption du chômage, quand il s'est agi entre départements ministériels, de distribuer les 4 milliards de crédits que comportait, je crois, cette première tranche, nous avons dit aux ministères de la Défense nationale : « Demandez-nous à ce titre tout ce que vous voudrez » et il n'y a pas une demande faite par ces ministères qui n'ait été accueillie. Sur les 4 milliards de grands travaux destinés à résorber le chômage, il y a eu près d'un milliard finalement affecté à ces dépenses purement militaires. Par conséquent, c'est exactement l'inverse. Non seulement il n'y a pas de chômage, mais au contraire, un détournement de chômage vers la Défense nationale.

DEVOIR REPUBLICAIN ET DEVOIR NATIONAL

J'en reviens maintenant aux circonstances dans lesquelles ont été votées, non seulement la loi de 40 heures, mais les autres lois sociales. Je l'ai dit à la Cour : cette loi de 40 heures fait partie intégrante d'un ensemble politique. Cette politique, je n'ai pas eu à la choisir, elle m'a été imposée, dans les circonstances où j'ai pris le gouvernement, par une nécessité de droit, et par une nécessité de fait, ayant véritablement le caractère d'un cas de force majeure. Comprenez-moi bien. Je ne dis pas cela pour m'en excuser, pour la désavouer. Je ne m'en excuse en rien, et je ne la désavoue en rien. Je la revendique tout entière. Mais il est impossible de l'apprécier équitablement si l'on ne se remémore pas aujourd'hui les circonstances au cours desquelles elle a été instaurée dans notre pays.

Qu'est-ce que j'entends par obligation de droit ? Nous étions en juin 1936, au lendemain des élections générales. Ces élections s'étaient présentées sous un aspect et dans des conditions assez neufs, assez originaux. Ce n'était pas la première fois, en France, qu'une coalition de partis se présentait ensemble collectivement, devant les électeurs — c'était arrivé en 1919, au moment de la coalition de partis, car si la Confédération générale du travail, la Ligue des Droits de l'Homme faisaient partie du Front populaire, la Ligue des intérêts économiques de M. Billiet faisait partie du Bloc national en 1919, et y a même joué un rôle déterminant. Mais qu'est-ce qui était neuf, original ? C'était la première et la seule fois qu'une coalition de partis se présentait devant les électeurs avec un programme commun, qui avait été au préalable débattu, délibéré entre tous ces partis, adopté

par eux, avec un programme qu'on soumettait aux électeurs, sur lequel on demandait aux électeurs de se prononcer. Cette coalition prenait en revanche l'engagement solennel d'exécuter ce programme si les électeurs lui donnaient la majorité et si le verdict des électeurs portait ses représentants au pouvoir. Jamais les élections ne se sont déroulées en France d'une façon plus franche, plus loyale. Chaque électeur pouvait se prononcer à son gré, mais il savait sur quoi se prononcer. Un programme précis lui était soumis et c'est ce programme que la majorité s'engageait à exécuter, une fois au pouvoir. Il y avait ainsi, entre l'électeur et l'élu, entre le suffrage universel, la future majorité et le futur gouvernement, une sorte de contrat. Les lois sociales figuraient au programme. La nationalisation de l'industrie et du commerce privés des armes figurait au programme. Je ne m'arrête pas ici pour l'instant à la distinction que vous avez introduite, Monsieur le président, si j'ai bien compris, entre le vote des lois elles-mêmes et ce que vous appelez leur application. Car, de même que les lois, le mode d'application était dans le programme ; il était dans l'esprit du programme du Front populaire. Le fait d'exécuter les lois sociales en complet accord, en complète collaboration avec les organisations ouvrières était incontestablement dans l'esprit du programme du Front populaire. Cela est si vrai que la Confédération générale du travail faisait partie intégrante du Front populaire. Par conséquent, qu'il s'agit de la confection, de l'adoption ou du mode d'application du programme de réformes sur lequel le corps électoral s'était prononcé, c'était à cet égard tout un. Tout cela était compris dans le verdict électoral, dans l'expression de la volonté du suffrage universel.

Or, je l'ai dit déjà dans mon interrogatoire et dans une lettre que j'ai adressée à la Cour : en France, au temps de la République, la souveraineté

appartenait au suffrage universel. Cette souveraineté était fixée par la majorité des électeurs. Elle était déléguée au Parlement. En exécutant la volonté du suffrage universel souverain, sous le contrôle du Parlement et avec l'approbation constante du Parlement délégataire de cette souveraineté, je remplissais donc le premier devoir de la charge d'un ministre républicain. C'est en manquant à ce devoir que j'aurais trahi ma charge. Je ne crois pas que vous puissiez aujourd'hui me reprocher de ne pas l'avoir trahi par une fidélité anticipée à un autre régime politique déjà préformé dans les desseins de la Providence. Nous étions en République : j'étais un ministre républicain. J'ai observé scrupuleusement ce qui est le principe de la doctrine de la République et j'ai rempli les devoirs de ma charge de ministre républicain.

J'ajoute tout de suite qu'à cette époque et à la suite d'événements qui sont aussi dans vos mémoires, il régnait dans des cercles très étendus de l'opinion publique une prévention indéniable contre le régime parlementaire. Je ne pense pas que vous jugiez utile que je vous expose quelles sont mes vues sur le régime parlementaire et sur les rapports du régime parlementaire et de la démocratie. Je ne crois pas que le régime parlementaire soit la forme, l'unique forme possible de la démocratie. Mais ce qui est sûr, et là-dessus l'expérience de l'histoire est probante, péremptoire : c'est qu'en France tout mouvement antiparlementaire a été le prodrome, l'instrument d'entreprise de caractère césarien. J'ai donc jugé nécessaire de préserver les institutions parlementaires pour défendre les principes mêmes de la République. Qu'avait-on reproché au régime parlementaire ? Précisément de n'avoir pas tenu, par la réalité de l'exécution, les promesses faites devant le corps électoral. On disait, on répétait : « Qu'est-ce que c'est que cette parodie, cette comédie ? L'électeur est souverain

pendant un jour. Le lendemain de ce jour de souveraineté nationale, l'élu ne connaît plus les engagements qu'il a pris ». Les éléments de la campagne antiparlementaire, c'était précisément — on pouvait illustrer cette campagne d'un certain nombre d'exemples — l'inexécution des engagements contractés devant le corps électoral et l'espèce d'incapacité du Parlement, quand la majorité n'était pas suffisamment unie ou le gouvernement insuffisamment énergique, d'aboutir, de réaliser. Eh bien ! il était plus nécessaire que jamais à cette époque de montrer que les engagements seraient tenus, que les promesses seraient tenues. Je ne sais si c'étaient celles des autres, c'étaient les nôtres. Nous les avions faites, nous avions signé un contrat. Il était plus nécessaire que jamais que le gouvernement donnât l'exemple de la fidélité à ce contrat. Il était plus nécessaire que jamais qu'il montrât, par la rapidité dans la réalisation, que le gouvernement parlementaire est capable de réaliser.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Si vous changiez d'ordre d'idées ?... Je voudrais vous faire part d'une réflexion. Mais je ne suis pas un tortionnaire, je ne voudrais pas vous fatiguer...

M. LÉON BLUM. — Un tortionnaire, vous ne l'êtes d'aucune façon. Enfin... on verra.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — On le verra.

Vous disiez tout à l'heure que la mise en application des lois ne peut être faite que dans l'esprit où les lois ont été votées et que vous vous sentiez obligé de suivre l'esprit qui avait guidé les électeurs jusque dans l'application même des principes que les électeurs vous avaient conduit à ériger en lois.

Ne croyez-vous pas cependant que, dans l'application des lois, il peut arriver que les circonstances imposent à ceux qui sont malgré tout les guides des électeurs puisqu'ils sont les chefs, de concevoir cette application d'une façon autre que les élec-

teurs qui sont mal éclairés des incidents qui peuvent surgir et des nécessités de la situation ? Ne croyez-vous pas que le rôle d'un guide est de conduire et non pas de suivre ? Qu'en pensez-vous ?

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec vous, Monsieur le président, et je crois que j'ai été également d'accord avec vous dans ma conduite. Je pense tout au moins que j'arriverai à vous le démontrer. Chaque fois que j'ai pris la parole devant un auditoire populaire, j'ai tenu le langage suivant : « J'ai une catégorie de devoirs envers vous en ce sens que c'est votre confiance, votre affection qui m'ont porté au pouvoir et que je dois y rester fidèle. Mais j'ai d'autres devoirs que j'ai contractés personnellement vis-à-vis de la collectivité nationale, à partir du jour où vous m'avez porté au Gouvernement. Ces devoirs, je les ai personnellement, vous les avez collectivement vous aussi. Un parti comme le parti socialiste ou une organisation comme la C.G.T. qui vit au sein de la communauté française ont des devoirs vis-à-vis de cette communauté. J'espère qu'il n'y aura jamais de discordance entre ces deux catégories de devoirs. (Je vous démontrerai le moment venu que j'ai été presque toujours assez heureux pour provoquer cette conciliation). Mais le jour où je ne pourrais plus compter sur vous, le jour où je ne vous aurais pas persuadés des devoirs qui m'incombent comme chef d'un Gouvernement responsable vis-à-vis de la communauté nationale, ce jour-là je ne resterai pas un instant de plus au pouvoir. »

Voilà ce que j'ai dit constamment. Vous ne trouverez pas dans ma bouche d'autre langage.

J'ai relu à Bourrassol, il y a deux ou trois jours, un recueil des discours que j'ai prononcés pendant la première partie de mon Gouvernement. J'aurais fait volontiers l'hommage de ce volume à chacun des membres de la Cour, mais il est frappé d'interdit et pour vous le procurer il faudra vous adres-

ser à d'autres qu'à moi. Quand on lit ces discours, on ne manque pas d'être saisi de cette espèce de permanence, de constance dans la nature des thèmes et dans le ton de l'appel. Quel que soit le public auquel je m'adresse — c'était quelquefois, comme par exemple au temps de la guerre d'Espagne, un public passionnément soulevé contre moi — vous retrouverez les formules que je viens de rappeler sur la nécessité de remplir mon devoir de chef du Gouvernement vis-à-vis de la communauté nationale. Vous les retrouverez en particulier dans mon discours de Luna-Park en septembre 1936, où j'affrontais une foule ouvrière dont la très grande majorité m'était plutôt hostile. C'est le langage que j'ai toujours tenu à la tribune du Parlement, dans les réunions politiques, c'est un thème constant c'est un mode constant. Par conséquent, Monsieur le Président, je suis parfaitement d'accord avec vous. J'avais un devoir de fidélité à l'égard des hommes qui m'avaient confié un mandat. Ce devoir de fidélité, je ne l'aurais pas trahi. Mais j'avais un devoir comme chef du Gouvernement vis-à-vis de l'intérêt national dont j'avais la charge. Si j'avais dû manquer en quoi que ce soit à l'un de ces intérêts pour rester d'accord avec mon parti, je n'aurais pas pu rester au Gouvernement et je n'y serais pas resté. Mais j'ai obtenu cette conciliation dans toutes les questions qui intéressent la Défense nationale, puisque j'ai obtenu le vote unanime, sans réserve, de mon parti en faveur des crédits de la Défense nationale, puisque, dans ces mêmes règlements d'administration publique auxquels vous faisiez allusion tout à l'heure, alors que pour tous les autres cas les dérogations sont limitées, mesurées chichement, avec une certaine méfiance, quand il s'agit de travaux intéressant la Défense nationale, les dérogations sont sans limite, sans mesure et elles ne dépendent plus que de l'accord du ministre intéressé et du ministre du Travail.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Et on n'en a pas profité !

M. LÉON BLUM. — C'est une erreur, Monsieur le Président. Vous verrez qu'on en a profité.

(L'audience, suspendue à quinze heures quinze minutes, est reprise à quinze heures quarante-cinq minutes.)

LES OUVRIERS ONT CONFIANCE EN VOUS

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — L'audience est reprise.

Voulez-vous, Monsieur Blum, continuer vos explications.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Oui, Monsieur le Président.

J'ai indiqué à la Cour ce que j'ai appelé les obligations de droit au regard des principes républicains. J'en viens maintenant à ce que j'ai appelé l'obligation de fait, celle qui est tirée des circonstances.

Je voudrais demander à chacun des membres de la Cour de faire encore une fois un effort de mémoire et de se reporter par la pensée à ce qu'était la situation quand j'ai présenté mes collaborateurs à M. Albert Lebrun, le jeudi 4 juin. Il y a dans certains documents de l'instruction une tendance visible à réduire, à atténuer après coup la gravité de la situation, telle qu'elle se présentait à ce moment. Je vous demande, Messieurs, de vous souvenir. Rappelez-vous que les 4 et 5 juin, il y avait un million de grévistes. Rappelez-vous que toutes les usines de la région parisienne étaient occupées. Rappelez-vous que le mouvement gagnait d'heure en heure et de proche en proche dans la France entière.

Des témoins oculaires vous l'ont dit. M. Albert Sarraut l'a dit. M. Frossard l'a dit. La panique,

terreur étaient générales. Je n'étais pas sans rapports moi-même avec les représentants du grand patronat et je me souviens de ce qu'était leur état d'esprit à cette époque. Je me souviens de ce qu'on me disait ou me faisait dire par des amis communs « Alors quoi ? C'est la révolution ? Alors quoi ? Qu'est-ce qu'on va nous prendre ? Qu'est-ce qu'on va nous laisser ?... »

Les ouvriers occupaient les usines. Et peut-être ce qui contribuait le plus à la terreur, c'était cette espèce de tranquillité, cette espèce de majesté calme avec laquelle ils s'étaient installés autour des machines, les surveillant, les entretenant, sans sortir au dehors, sans aucune espèce de signe de violence extérieure.

Je suis arrivé à l'Elysée avec mes collaborateurs vers 7 heures du soir. Je les ai présentés au président de la République. Au moment où nous allions nous retirer, M. Albert Lebrun nous a dit : « J'ai une demande à vous transmettre de la part de M. Sarraut, président du conseil, ministre de l'Intérieur et de la part de M. Frossard, ministre du Travail. Ils considèrent la situation comme si grave qu'ils vous demandent de ne pas attendre jusqu'à demain matin pour la transmission des pouvoirs. Ils vous prient avec instance de vous trouver l'un et l'autre au ministère de l'Intérieur et au ministère du Travail dès ce soir, 9 heures, pour qu'il n'y ait pas un instant de délai d'interruption dans le passage des services. Ils ne veulent pas plus longtemps demeurer chargés d'un intérim dans les circonstances actuelles. »

Il a été entendu que M. Lebas, ministre du Travail — qui est toujours prisonnier en Allemagne — et que M. Salengro, ministre de l'Intérieur, qui est mort dans les circonstances que vous savez, répondraient à cet appel, et la transmission des pouvoirs a eu lieu séance tenante. Mais après cet incident, M. Albert Lebrun m'a demandé de rester auprès de

lui et m'a dit ceci : « La situation est terrible, quand comptez-vous vous présenter devant les Chambres ? » Je lui ai répondu : « Après-demain, samedi, je ne vois pas le moyen d'aller plus vite. » Il me dit alors : « Vous allez attendre jusqu'à samedi ? Vous ne voyez pas ce qui se passe ? » « Comment voulez-vous que j'aille plus vite ? ai-je repris. Il faut malgré tout que je rédige la déclaration ministérielle, que je convoque un conseil de cabinet et un conseil des ministres. D'ailleurs matériellement, convoquer les Chambres pour demain serait impossible. »

M. Lebrun me répondit alors : « Les ouvriers ont confiance en vous. Puisque vous ne pouvez convoquer les Chambres avant samedi et que certainement dans votre déclaration ministérielle vous allez leur promettre le vote immédiat des lois qu'ils réclament, alors je vous en prie, dès demain adressez-vous à eux par la voix de la radio. Dites-leur que le Parlement va se réunir, que dès qu'il sera réuni vous allez lui demander le vote rapide et sans délai des lois dont le vote figure sur leurs cahiers de revendications en même temps que le relèvement des salaires. Ils vous croiront, ils auront confiance en vous, et alors peut-être ce mouvement s'arrêtera-t-il ? »

J'ai fait ce que me demandait Monsieur le président de la République, et qui, au point de vue correction parlementaire était assez critiquable, car du point de vue de la stricte correction parlementaire et républicaine, je n'avais pas d'existence avant de m'être présenté devant les Chambres et d'avoir recueilli un vote de confiance. J'ai donc pris la parole à la radio le lendemain et j'ai dit aux ouvriers ce que m'avait dit à moi Monsieur le président de la République. Je leur ai déclaré : « Parmi les revendications que vous présentez dans toutes les usines, il y en a qui sont du domaine du législateur. Dès que le Parlement sera réuni, nous

lui demanderons de voter, et cela dans le délai le plus bref possible les lois que vous attendez. Je m'en porte garant près de vous... »

Je me suis alors présenté devant les Chambres le samedi avec cette déclaration ministérielle qui a, elle aussi, un caractère assez particulier et assez original. Le Gouvernement s'est, en effet, présenté devant les Chambres en leur disant : « Je suis ici l'expression d'une volonté populaire qui s'est manifestée par un programme, je n'ai pas d'autre programme que celui sur lequel cette volonté du suffrage universel s'est prononcée et que nous avons pris tous l'engagement de réaliser. » Et en me présentant ainsi devant les Chambres, je leur ai demandé de placer à leur ordre du jour de la semaine suivante une première série de lois parmi lesquelles figuraient la loi de quarante heures, la loi sur les congés payés et celle sur les contrats collectifs.

Ce qui était l'état d'esprit du chef de l'Etat était aussi l'état d'esprit du grand patronat. La conversation avec M. Albert Lebrun est du jeudi soir. Dès le vendredi matin M. Lambert-Ribot, qui avait été mon camarade pendant de longues années au Conseil d'Etat avant d'entrer, comme un trop grand nombre de membres des grandes administrations publiques ou de l'université, au service d'organismes patronaux. M. Lambert-Ribot, avec qui j'avais toujours entretenu des relations amicales, m'a fait toucher par deux amis communs, par deux intermédiaires différents afin que, le plus tôt possible, sans perdre une minute, je m'efforce d'établir un contact entre les organisations patronales suprêmes, comme le Comité des forges et la Confédération générale de la production, et d'autre part la Confédération générale du travail. Sans nul doute, j'aurais tenté moi-même ce qu'on a appelé l'accord de Matignon. Mais je dois à la vérité de dire que l'initiative première est venue du grand patronat.

lui et m'a dit ceci : « La situation est terrible, quand comptez-vous vous présenter devant les Chambres ? » Je lui ai répondu : « Après-demain, samedi, je ne vois pas le moyen d'aller plus vite. » Il me dit alors : « Vous allez attendre jusqu'à samedi ? Vous ne voyez pas ce qui se passe ? » « Comment voulez-vous que j'aille plus vite ? ai-je repris. Il faut malgré tout que je rédige la déclaration ministérielle, que je convoque un conseil de cabinet et un conseil des ministres. D'ailleurs matériellement, convoquer les Chambres pour demain serait impossible. »

M. Lebrun me répondit alors : « Les ouvriers ont confiance en vous. Puisque vous ne pouvez convoquer les Chambres avant samedi et que certainement dans votre déclaration ministérielle vous allez leur promettre le vote immédiat des lois qu'ils réclament, alors je vous en prie, dès demain adressez-vous à eux par la voix de la radio. Dites-leur que le Parlement va se réunir, que dès qu'il sera réuni vous allez lui demander le vote rapide et sans délai des lois dont le vote figure sur leurs cahiers de revendications en même temps que le relèvement des salaires. Ils vous croiront, ils auront confiance en vous, et alors peut-être ce mouvement s'arrêtera-t-il ? »

J'ai fait ce que me demandait Monsieur le président de la République, et qui, au point de vue correction parlementaire était assez critiquable, car du point de vue de la stricte correction parlementaire et républicaine, je n'avais pas d'existence avant de m'être présenté devant les Chambres et d'avoir recueilli un vote de confiance. J'ai donc pris la parole à la radio le lendemain et j'ai dit aux ouvriers ce que m'avait dit à moi Monsieur le président de la République. Je leur ai déclaré : « Parmi les revendications que vous présentez dans toutes les usines, il y en a qui sont du domaine du législateur. Dès que le Parlement sera réuni, nous

lui demanderons de voter, et cela dans le délai le plus bref possible les lois que vous attendez. Je m'en porte garant près de vous... »

Je me suis alors présenté devant les Chambres le samedi avec cette déclaration ministérielle qui a, elle aussi, un caractère assez particulier et assez original. Le Gouvernement s'est, en effet, présenté devant les Chambres en leur disant : « Je suis ici l'expression d'une volonté populaire qui s'est manifestée par un programme, je n'ai pas d'autre programme que celui sur lequel cette volonté du suffrage universel s'est prononcée et que nous avons pris tous l'engagement de réaliser. » Et en me présentant ainsi devant les Chambres, je leur ai demandé de placer à leur ordre du jour de la semaine suivante une première série de lois parmi lesquelles figuraient la loi de quarante heures, la loi sur les congés payés et celle sur les contrats collectifs.

Ce qui était l'état d'esprit du chef de l'Etat était aussi l'état d'esprit du grand patronat. La conversation avec M. Albert Lebrun est du jeudi soir. Dès le vendredi matin M. Lambert-Ribot, qui avait été mon camarade pendant de longues années au Conseil d'Etat avant d'entrer, comme un trop grand nombre de membres des grandes administrations publiques ou de l'université, au service d'organismes patronaux. M. Lambert-Ribot, avec qui j'avais toujours entretenu des relations amicales, m'a fait toucher par deux amis communs, par deux intermédiaires différents afin que, le plus tôt possible, sans perdre une minute, je m'efforce d'établir un contact entre les organisations patronales suprêmes, comme le Comité des forges et la Confédération générale de la production, et d'autre part la Confédération générale du travail. Sans nul doute, j'aurais tenté moi-même ce qu'on a appelé l'accord de Matignon. Mais je dois à la vérité de dire que l'initiative première est venue du grand patronat.

Donc, je vous le répète, dès le vendredi matin, par deux amis communs — il y en a un que je peux nommer, c'était M. Grunebaum-Ballin, président de section honoraire du Conseil d'Etat — M. Lambert-Ribot me faisait toucher pour me demander de provoquer au plus vite le contact sur la base de relèvement général des salaires avec l'évacuation des usines en contre-partie. Dès le vendredi soir — M. Duchemin l'a relaté dans un récit très sobre, très simple, mais d'un ton très ému, qui a paru dans *la Revue de Paris* — MM. Lambert-Ribot, Duchemin, Dalbouze, ancien président de la chambre de Commerce de Paris, étaient chez moi et nous réglions ensemble une conversation avec la C.G.T. déjà acquise du côté patronal. Dans la journée du lendemain, samedi, Roger Salengro est allé négocier, rue Lafayette, avec les représentants de la C.G.T. dont il a obtenu l'assentiment. Voilà d'où est venu l'accord Matignon.

A ce moment, mes engagements vis-à-vis de la classe ouvrière étaient déjà pris. J'avais parlé à la radio. Tout le monde savait que j'allais faire voter par la Chambre la loi de quarante heures. Personne n'y faisait objection ni résistance. Tout le monde considérait cela comme une chose naturelle, nécessaire, inévitable dans les circonstances où l'on se trouvait. On ne demandait qu'une chose aux Chambres : aller vite, voter vite, afin de liquider cette situation redoutable, cette situation que j'ai qualifiée, non pas de révolutionnaire, mais de quasi-révolutionnaire, et qui l'était, en effet.

Les usines étaient occupées. Est-ce qu'on avait demandé à mon prédécesseur, est-ce qu'on me demandait à moi de les faire évacuer par la force ? Je vous le répète, on m'a demandé à moi de provoquer une reprise de contact — car il y avait déjà eu un essai sous le Gouvernement précédent — avec les organisations corporatives, les organisations centrales et la classe ouvrière pour arriver à un accord.

On n'a même pas, comme on l'a fait plus tard, à partir d'octobre et novembre, posé comme condition *sine qua non* à l'ouverture des conversations entre ouvriers et patrons l'évacuation préalable des usines.

Dans les conversations de Matignon, il est clair qu'il n'appartenait pas aux patrons et ouvriers réunis de voter sous mon arbitrage la loi de quarante heures. C'était l'affaire du Parlement. Mais il n'y a pas le moindre doute qu'au cours de ces conversations, le vote de la loi de quarante heures ait été escompté. Le sujet de ces conversations était bien simple. Parmi les revendications ouvrières, il y en avait qui dépendaient du Parlement et les patrons s'y soumettaient d'avance loyalement. Il y en avait d'autres qui regardaient les patrons seuls, à savoir les revendications qui touchaient le taux des salaires.

Je vous assure qu'à ce moment-là, il n'était pas question de diminuer l'importance du mouvement. Si vous aviez vu le visage des hommes avec qui je discutais ce soir-là, vous ne penseriez pas sur la foi de certains témoins que ce mouvement n'était rien et qu'il aurait suffi d'un peu d'énergie, d'autorité ou de poigne pour faire rentrer toute cette « racaille » dans l'ordre ! Non ! Ce n'est pas ainsi que les choses se sont passées et personne n'a jamais demandé qu'on fit usage de la force. Les patrons — M. Sarraut a rappelé leur langage — non seulement ne lui ont pas demandé d'en faire usage, mais ils l'ont adjuré de n'en pas faire usage. Ils lui ont dit : « Dans l'état présent des choses, cela ne pourrait aboutir qu'à un conflit sanglant. Or, nous ne voulons pas reprendre le travail dans des usines ensanglantées, avec des ouvriers dressés contre nous. Nous ne voulons pas non plus courir le risque de la destruction d'un outillage nécessaire à la production nationale. » Je me rappelle tous les

incidents de cette soirée et de cette nuit du 7 juin. J'entends encore Benoit Frachon, secrétaire général adjoint de la C.G.T., quand on discutait les augmentations de salaires, M. Lambert-Ribot disait : « Comment, vous ne vous contentez pas de tel taux, mais quand donc les ouvriers en France ont-ils jamais eu une augmentation générale des salaires de cette importance ? » Et Benoit Frachon lui répondit : « Et quand donc en France avez-vous vu un mouvement ouvrier de cette ampleur et de cette importance ? » A propos du relèvement des salaires anormalement bas, j'ai entendu M. Duchemin dire à M. Richemont, tandis qu'on lui mettait sous les yeux le taux de certains salaires, de salaires effroyables par leur modicité : « Comment est-ce possible ? Comment avons-nous pu laisser faire cela ? Nous avons manqué à notre devoir en laissant les choses aller ainsi. » Et cela, M. Duchemin l'a rappelé en termes voilés, mais nets tout de même, dans cet article auquel j'ai fait allusion tout à l'heure.

La contre-partie, c'était l'évacuation des usines. Dès ce jour-là les représentants de la C.G.T. ont dit aux représentants du grand patronat, qui étaient à Matignon, MM. Duchemin, Lambert-Ribot, Dalbouze, Richemont, président du syndicat de la métallurgie de la région parisienne : « Nous nous engageons à faire tout ce que nous pourrons, et nous le ferons. Mais nous vous en avertissons tout de suite. Nous ne sommes pas sûrs d'aboutir. Quand on a affaire à un mouvement comme celui-là, à une marée comme celle-là, il faut lui laisser le temps de s'étaler. Et puis, c'est maintenant que vous allez peut-être regretter d'avoir systématiquement profité des années de déflation et de chômage pour exclure de vos usines tous les militants syndicalistes. Il n'y sont plus. Ils ne sont plus là pour exercer sur leurs camarades l'autorité qui serait nécessaire pour faire exécuter nos ordres. » Et je

vois encore M. Richemont, qui était assis à ma gauche, baisser la tête en disant : « C'est vrai, nous avons eu tort ».

Voilà quel était l'état d'esprit de la réunion de Matignon en ce qui concerne Paris et la banlieue parisienne, au moment où j'ai pris le pouvoir. Qu'est-ce que je devais faire ?

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Un mot, je vous prie, Monsieur Blum. Vous savez cependant que l'indication que vous donniez tout à l'heure à savoir que les patrons ne demandaient pas l'évacuation par la force des usines est contredite par un certain nombre de témoins que nous entendrons.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Vous entendrez un certain nombre de témoins isolés qui ont pu envoyer une lettre au commissaire de police de leur quartier au moment de l'occupation de leur usine. Mais en ce qui concerne les organisations patronales, il n'y a pas l'ombre d'une discordance. Le langage des patrons a d'ailleurs été relaté... J'aurais voulu vous épargner des lectures qui sont ennuyeuses. Cependant, voulez-vous que je vous relise la déclaration de M. Albert Sarraut au Sénat, telle qu'elle est rapportée dans la déposition de M. Langeron.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Vous lirez quand je lirai d'autres dépositions.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Des témoins viennent dire : « Non ! ce n'était rien, avec un petit peu de poigne on en serait venu à bout ». Mais ce langage, je l'affirme, personne ne me l'a tenu le 6 juin, personne n'est venu me dire : il faut user de la force. A la Chambre, le 6 juin, lors de la discussion des interpellations, j'ai dit à propos des occupations d'usines comment je comptais agir. J'ai montré que je ne croyais pas possible d'user de la force. J'ai dit que si l'on voulait me demander de faire cesser les occupations coûte que coûte et par n'importe quel

moyen, c'était un engagement que je ne prendrais pas. J'ai parlé avec franchise, car je n'ai jamais manqué de franchise. La Chambre m'a répondu par un vote écrasant. Personne n'a osé monter à la tribune pour dire : « Que devient le droit de propriété ? Il faut avant tout que force reste à la loi et au droit de propriété ». Personne n'a tenu ce langage. Quand je me suis présenté devant le Sénat, en septembre, à propos de la loi de dévaluation, l'opposition sénatoriale, latente depuis le début, commençait à prendre conscience d'elle-même. Elle avait trouvé, à ce moment-là, une occasion favorable. A propos de la dévaluation, on m'a attaqué sur la question des occupations d'usines. J'ai rappelé ce qui s'était passé en juin et j'ai mis les membres de l'assemblée au défi de me citer un seul cas, un seul fait prouvant que personne m'eût demandé d'user de la force. Personne dans l'Assemblée ne s'est levé pour me contredire.

Cela a peut-être l'air singulier de parler ainsi aujourd'hui de la place où je suis et dans une situation comme celle-là. Mais je dois vous dire qu'à ce moment, dans la bourgeoisie et en particulier dans le monde patronal, on me considérait, on m'attendait, on m'espérait comme un sauveur. Les circonstances étaient si angoissantes, on était si près de quelque chose qui ressemblait à la guerre civile, qu'on n'espérait plus que dans une sorte d'intervention providentielle : je veux dire l'arrivée au pouvoir d'un homme auquel on attribuait sur la classe ouvrière un pouvoir suffisant de persuasion, un ascendant suffisant pour qu'il lui fit entendre raison et qu'il la décidât à ne pas user, à ne pas abuser de sa force. Il n'y a aucun doute possible : personne ne m'a jamais demandé d'user de la force à ce moment-là. Et si je l'avais fait, si j'avais jeté alors la France dans une guerre civile, est-ce que ce n'est pas à ce moment que j'eusse trahi les devoirs de ma charge ?

Ma politique, vous l'envisagez — vous l'avez dit et je dois le rappeler — sous un angle nettement déterminé, à savoir sa répercussion possible sur l'armement de la France. Mais, qu'est-ce que cela donnait pour l'armement de la France, la guerre civile ? Et même les bagarres ouvrières sanglantes, se prolongeant durant des semaines et entraînant des incendies, des bris de machines, qu'est-ce que cela donnait pour l'exécution des programmes d'armement ? Et si vous vous placez au point de vue « des faits qui ont concouru au passage de l'état de paix à l'état de guerre », la guerre civile en France, n'était-ce pas la plus redoutable des circonstances qui pussent amener une éventualité, un danger de guerre étrangère ?

Alors, qu'est-ce que je devais faire pour apaiser les ouvriers ? Leur faire des promesses et, ensuite, ne pas les tenir ? C'était sur la foi de ma parole, sur la foi des engagements pris vis-à-vis d'eux et du Parlement républicain que petit à petit le mouvement s'est apaisé. Il n'y a aucun doute, en effet, qu'à partir de Matignon, la décrudescence ait commencé. Il y avait 1 million de grévistes à ce moment-là et trois semaines après, 100.000. A la fin de juillet, on pouvait considérer que le mouvement était terminé. Alors, que devais-je faire ? Des promesses pour décider les ouvriers à quitter les usines, quitte ensuite à biaiser, différer, lanterner, mentir ?... C'était donc là mon devoir de ministre républicain ?... Et si j'avais agi ainsi, aurais-je rempli les devoirs de ma charge, ou les aurais-je trahis ?

Messieurs, je vous demande pardon... Je parle de moi, mais de quoi voulez-vous que je parle ? C'est bien de moi qu'il s'agit. Je suis entré, vous le savez, dans la vie politique assez tard, alors que ma vie personnelle, à d'autres égards était déjà formée et fixée. J'y suis entré, je peux le dire, dans des conditions un peu insolites, en ce sens

que je ne suis pas un homme politique qui s'est mis à faire un beau jour du socialisme, je suis un socialiste ayant depuis longtemps, depuis qu'il a l'âge d'homme, une conviction socialiste et que les circonstances ont jeté dans la vie publique, que son parti a chargé de faire de la politique. Voilà ce que je suis. Quand je suis entré au Parlement, quand j'ai eu la chance de débiter avec quelque succès, dès ce moment s'est organisé autour de moi, des années durant, une espèce de longue entreprise de séduction et de corruption. On me disait volontiers : « Ce n'est pas sérieux, ce n'est pas possible, un homme comme vous, un homme qui a rempli les fonctions que vous avez remplies, un homme de votre valeur, un homme de votre mérite »... on ajoutait même quelquefois « un homme de votre richesse », car la légende n'est pas d'hier, celle qui représente comme un dilettante fastueux un homme qui a travaillé toute sa vie et qui, depuis de longues années, ne vit plus que du produit de son travail. On m'a dit cela sur tous les tons : « Ce n'est pas possible, ce n'est pas sérieux »... On a espéré de moi une de ces évolutions dont l'histoire parlementaire de la France offre un certain nombre d'exemples généralement heureux pour ceux qui en ont été les auteurs. J'ai très bien senti, plus d'une fois, que pour gagner la sorte de considération qui me manquait, pour devenir un « véritable homme d'Etat », pour recevoir même la consécration suprême d'une académie, il m'aurait suffi de peu de temps. Il m'aurait suffi de quelques minutes, le temps d'une trahison envers ceux qui m'avaient toujours fait confiance ; il n'aurait pas fallu d'effort long.

On a peut-être attendu cela de moi dans les débuts de juin. Songez donc : quelle aubaine ! une saignée ! une saignée pratiquée par un représentant du parti socialiste au pouvoir ! Ou bien une duperie, une duperie cruelle vis-à-vis de la

classe ouvrière pratiquée par l'homme en qui elle avait mis sa confiance, l'homme qu'elle avait voulu au gouvernement ! Je n'ai rien fait de tout cela, j'ai rempli le premier devoir de ma charge qui était de maintenir ce que j'ai appelé l'ordre civique, l'ordre républicain, d'éviter l'effusion de sang, d'éviter la guerre civile et puis de tenir loyalement, publiquement la promesse que j'avais donnée.

Voilà, Messieurs, dans quelles conditions ont été votées les lois sociales dont l'accusation extrait la loi de 40 heures.

LES QUARANTE HEURES

Maintenant, Messieurs, j'en viens à cette fameuse loi et ici, je suis obligé de répondre d'un mot à une phrase du réquisitoire que, vraiment, je le dis à la Cour, il m'est impossible d'accepter. Le réquisitoire affirme que, selon moi, la loi de 40 heures n'aurait pas diminué le rendement de la production française, et il ajoute que je ne peux pas avoir prononcé une pareille affirmation de bonne foi... C'est bien cela l'expression.

M. LE TROQUER. — Avec sincérité.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je n'admets pas ce jugement. J'ai eu, dans ma vie politique, beaucoup d'adversaires, des adversaires très âpres, très acharnés. Je ne crois pas que ma sincérité, que ma probité d'esprit, que ma probité tout court aient été mises en doute ou en cause. Je dois le dire, ce qui m'étonne, c'est l'étonnement du ministère public, et vraiment, il traduit en matière industrielle — je ne me permettrai pas de dire une ignorance — mais une innocence dont je reste vraiment stupéfait. A première vue, cela a l'air d'une contradiction de dire qu'on diminue le temps de travail

et que cependant le rendement industriel ne diminue pas. C'est pourtant toute l'histoire de l'industrie, en France, en Europe et dans le monde entier.

Depuis plus d'un siècle, toute l'histoire de l'industrie, c'est la diminution continue du temps de travail associée à l'élévation constante de la production, de même que la diminution continue des prix de revient associée à l'élévation continue des salaires. Cela peut sembler un double paradoxe à première vue. Et cependant, depuis qu'il y a une grande industrie dans le monde, ces deux phénomènes contradictoires en apparence et qui ont couvert le ministère public de stupéfaction, se sont produits simultanément, parallèlement, et peut-être, mon Dieu ! en y réfléchissant, sont-ils même fonction l'un de l'autre.

Il y a eu une époque, au temps de l'enquête Villermé, au temps des premières lois industrielles en Angleterre, où des enfants de 10 ans travaillaient 12 heures dans les mines et les filatures. A ce moment, quand on a voulu appliquer les premières lois de protection légale du travail, qui fixaient un maximum légal des heures de travail (ce qui était, paraît-il, attentatoire à la liberté du patron, et même, par un comble d'hypocrisie, à la liberté de l'ouvrier qui était, disait-on, bien libre de travailler davantage si cela lui convenait), donc, quand on a présenté ces premières lois en Angleterre, les patrons, et pas seulement les conservateurs, ont tenu le langage du Ministère public. Ils ont dit : « Faites attention, si vous réduisez le travail des enfants dans les mines et les filatures, la production nationale va diminuer ». Et cependant, on a voté ces lois, on en a voté d'autres limitant le travail des femmes, des adultes, on l'a porté à des taux de plus en plus bas et durant ce temps, le rendement industriel n'a cessé d'augmenter. L'expérience a été faite également en France, au moment du vote, en 1919, de la loi de 8 heures, dont

l'application n'a nullement réduit la production industrielle dans notre pays.

Par conséquent, j'étais très sérieux, très sincère, quand je disais cela. N'oubliez pas, d'autre part, que la loi de 40 heures s'intégrait dans un ensemble de mesures dont l'objet était de relever la masse des salaires et aussi le taux des denrées agricoles, tellement déprimés pendant la période de déflation, d'instituer des avances à la moyenne et à la petite industrie, bref d'augmenter ce qu'on a appelé et qu'on appelle encore le pouvoir d'achat. En stimulant, en augmentant le pouvoir d'achat, en stimulant la consommation, en stimulant la demande, il était légitime d'espérer que cet ensemble de lois dans lequel s'incorporait la loi de 40 heures déterminerait une augmentation de la production. C'est ce qui est arrivé, en effet. L'accusation, bien entendu, a demandé un rapport à son expert universel, et l'expert universel ayant constaté qu'en effet, il y avait eu un relèvement de la production, a désigné un surexpert, lequel a déclaré que le fait était exact, mais que ce n'était pas attribuable à ma politique. On interprètera les causes comme on voudra, toutes les statistiques sont interprétables au gré de celui qui les manie, mais en fait, la statistique est là. Pendant que j'étais au gouvernement, la production a augmenté, non seulement pendant mon gouvernement, mais pendant les deux années qui ont suivi le 6 juin 1936, relativement aux deux années qui l'ont précédé. Ce n'est pas douteux.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Comment expliquez-vous, si vous croyez que la loi de 40 heures n'a pas eu d'effet sur la production, que le Comité d'enquête sur la production institué, si je ne me trompe, sous le ministère Chautemps, dont vous avez parlé tout à l'heure, ait formulé, en ce qui concerne les résultats des lois sociales, la loi de 40 heures en particulier, au point de vue de la défense nationale, les conclusions que voici :

« La durée du travail, les différentes modalités, prévues par les textes réglementaires pour donner à la loi de 40 heures toute la souplesse désirable, se sont heurtées, en pratique, à des difficultés d'application. Le comité insiste pour que les possibilités offertes par les modalités existantes soient utilisées dans toute la mesure nécessitée par les besoins de la production industrielle, et au premier chef, de la défense nationale ».

Si le Comité a éprouvé le besoin d'insister, c'est qu'il avait pour cela des raisons.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Ma mémoire me trompe peut-être, je ne le crois pas, mais si, dans cette enquête sur la production, après avoir lu les considérants, vous lisez le dispositif, vous allez voir ce que les organisations patronales qui formulaient ces critiques, réclamaient. Le savez-vous ? Elles réclamaient l'année de 2.000 heures au lieu de la semaine de 40 heures, $40 \times 50 = 2.000$ et ce qu'elles entendaient par plus de souplesse dans l'application de la loi, c'était une possibilité de répartition différente du crédit total des heures de travail résultant de la loi de 40 heures. Voilà ce qu'elles demandaient. Ceci peut avoir son importance pour une industrie saisonnière, pour une industrie qui travaille par à-coups, pour une industrie qui a tantôt un coup de feu — un coup de chien — et ensuite une période de stagnation et de demi-chômage. Mais quelle différence y a-t-il entre la semaine de 40 heures et l'année de 2.000 heures pour des usines dont le travail est continu, comme les usines travaillant pour la défense nationale et, à plus forte raison, pour les établissements de l'Etat ?

Dans les conclusions de l'enquête sur la production, on ne peut rien tirer contre ce que j'avance et c'est moi, plutôt, qui serais en droit de l'invoquer. Peut-être l'aurais-je fait de moi-même pour montrer qu'à la fin de 1937, personne ne con-

sidérait la semaine de 40 heures comme constituant une durée de travail insuffisante et que c'était plutôt des modalités plus souples d'application que, même dans les milieux patronaux, on poursuivait à cette date, car si je ne me trompe, ce rapport est daté de décembre 1937...

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Je n'ai pas la date.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je crois pouvoir affirmer qu'il est bien de décembre 1937. Mais tout cela était encore infiniment plus exact au moment où l'on a commencé à mettre en exécution le programme de septembre 1936, car enfin, est-ce que vous vous imaginez que la loi de 40 heures, au moment où elle a été votée, ait réduit la durée du travail effectif en France à cette époque ? Vous imaginez-vous qu'on travaillait 40 heures en juin 1936 ? On ne travaillait pas 40 heures. Il y a quelques lacunes dans l'instruction à cet égard.

Il existe deux statistiques officielles de chômage. D'abord, une statistique du chômage complet qui est, en réalité, la statistique du chômage secouru et qui est fournie par les relevés des caisses municipales de chômage. Edouard Daladier vous a expliqué très bien, l'autre jour, pourquoi ces chiffres sont généralement incomplets ; parce que beaucoup d'ouvriers ne se décidaient qu'à la dernière extrémité à se faire inscrire à la caisse d'assistance-chômage, et aussi pour une autre raison : c'est qu'il n'y a pas de caisses de chômage dans toutes les communes. Par conséquent, cette statistique du chômage n'a qu'une valeur relative, elle permet de suivre les mouvements dont elle dessine la courbe avec une certaine exactitude, mais elle ne permet pas une certitude quant à la quantité exacte des chômeurs.

Il y a une seconde statistique, plus précise, plus exacte : celle du chômage partiel, statistique mensuelle dressée par le service des mines, car dans

notre législation, c'est le service des mines qui contrôle les appareils à vapeur. Le service des mines dresse tous les mois une statistique portant sur les établissements à feu — c'est, je crois, le terme du règlement — ayant plus de cent ouvriers, et chaque mois il donne la statistique du nombre moyen d'heures pendant lesquelles les ouvriers ont travaillé dans les établissements qu'il contrôle.

Demandez ces statistiques à M. Belin — statistiques du chômage partiel, caisses de secours municipales, relevé mensuel du service des mines — vous verrez ce que c'était que le chômage partiel avant que nous venions au pouvoir. On me citait récemment le mot de M. Louis Renault : « la loi de 40 heures !. Ah ! si je pouvais seulement être sûr de donner 30 heures de travail par semaine à mes ouvriers ! »

Messieurs, vous ne vous souvenez donc pas de l'état des industries à cette époque, de leur état de dépression, de marasme, de pénurie dans lequel la déflation à outrance les avait plongées. Je ne veux pas insister, mais tout cela est incontestable ; au moment où nous avons fait voter la loi de 40 heures il n'y avait pour ainsi dire pas d'établissement industriel en France, où l'on travaillât 40 heures par semaine, ou bien alors, c'était une exception, un privilège dans un établissement français.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Il y a un document sur la question : ce n'est pas un document français. Il émane du Bureau International du Travail. Vous le connaissez.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Non, Monsieur le président.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Il est extrait de *l'Année sociale*, journal ou revue édité par le B.I.T. à Genève, pour l'année 1938-1939.

M. LÉON BLUM. — 1938-1939 ?

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Je vous donne le renseignement, vous en tirerez peut-être les arguments que vous croirez devoir en tirer : chapitre IV — cela émane, je le répète, du B.I.T. à Genève — Conditions de travail, durée de travail et questions annexes — France — En ce qui concerne la durée effective du travail dans les établissements occupant plus de 100 ouvriers, les statistiques montrent que le nombre moyen d'heures totales par semaine, qui était de 44,6 en 1934, 44,5 en 1935 et 44,5 en 1936, est descendu à 40,04 en 1937, à la suite de l'application de la loi sur la semaine de quarante heures, et 39,0 en 1938. » Je vous donne le texte.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Ce sont des chiffres tout à fait inconcevables en ce qui concerne le chômage partiel. Chacun a encore dans le souvenir ceux du chômage partiel ou du chômage total au moment de juin 1936. C'est un fait de notoriété publique, et je suis surpris de ces chiffres ; j'aimerais avoir le document et l'état complet, étant donné les statistiques du service des mines dont je vous ai moi-même signalé l'existence.

Ce dont je suis sûr, et je tiens à le dire, c'est qu'au moment où on a discuté la loi de 40 heures, on a fait beaucoup d'objections, de critiques ; on a manifesté beaucoup d'appréhension, mais jamais celle-là. On a parlé de concurrence à l'exportation, de répercussions et d'incidences monétaires, de difficultés pour des industries purement saisonnières ou d'un caractère particulier, comme la marine marchande, à s'adapter à un régime trop rigide. Mais personne n'a présenté d'objection de cette nature, et cela non seulement au moment du vote de la loi, mais quand j'ai été interpellé au Sénat, en 1937 quelque temps avant la chute du ministère, sur la loi de 40 heures. L'interpellation était pourtant mordante, agressive, mais pas un instant des faits de ce genre n'ont été apportés dans le débat. Je crois donc qu'on peut tenir pour

acquis, pour assuré, qu'au moment où le programme d'armement a été rédigé, personne ne pouvait s'imaginer en France que la loi de 40 heures serait un obstacle à son exécution.

Toutefois je voudrais, si vous le permettez, ser-
rer d'un peu plus près cette analyse des répercus-
sions de la loi de 40 heures sur le rendement de
la production. C'est un phénomène beaucoup plus
complexe que l'accusation ne paraît l'imaginer.

Dans une production moderne, on peut distin-
guer raisonnablement trois éléments : le premier,
c'est la nature, la qualité, le perfectionnement de
l'outillage ; c'est l'élément machine, pour tout
englober dans une seule expression. Le second,
c'est la durée de rotation de cette machine ; non
pas la durée de travail de l'ouvrier. Pour le troi-
sième élément, c'est le rendement horaire de cette
machine que l'ouvrier doit mettre en action.

Voulez-vous maintenant que nous examinions la
répercussion de la durée légale du travail sur ces
trois éléments ?

En ce qui concerne le premier — la qualité de
l'outillage — elle est certainement nulle. La qualité
de l'outillage dépend de la qualité du patron, de son
esprit inventif, de sa décision plus ou moins rapide
à renouveler cet outillage et aussi de l'état de sa tré-
sorierie, car nous nous sommes trouvés en présence
d'une industrie où la suppression des marges béné-
ficiaires et des amortissements avait arrêté complè-
tement le renouvellement des outillages.

Le second élément nous met au cœur du pro-
blème : c'est la durée de rotation de la machine.
Car il ne s'agit pas de savoir combien d'heures
l'ouvrier travaille, mais combien d'heures la machine
tourne.

Ne croyez pas qu'entre la durée du travail de
l'ouvrier et la durée de rotation de la machine, il

y ait un rapport aussi simple et aussi nécessaire
qu'on l' imagine : il n'en est rien. La durée de rota-
tion des machines et la durée de travail de l'ouvrier
ne sont pas liées nécessairement et dépendantes
l'une de l'autre, et vous allez en avoir tout de suite
la preuve.

Quel est le maximum possible pour un ouvrier ?
Mettons que ce soit 10 heures, 11 heures. Ce sont
des maxima qu'il est pratiquement impossible de
dépasser, qu'il est très difficile d'atteindre. Quel est,
au contraire, le régime avec lequel un outillage
donne le maximum de rendement ? Serait-ce par
hasard le régime de la loi de maximum de rende-
ment ? Serait-ce par hasard le régime de la loi de
10 heures ou de la loi de 11 heures pour l'ouvrier ?
Pas du tout : le rendement maximum de l'outillage
c'est l'outillage qui tourne sans arrêt pendant 24
heures par jour. Pour que l'outillage tourne pendant
24 heures par jour, vous ne pouvez pas n'avoir
qu'une équipe. Une équipe ne travaille pas jour et
nuit. Vous ne pouvez même pas avoir seulement
deux équipes. Il est à peu près impossible, dans les
conditions de travail moderne, d'avoir une équipe
travaillant 12 heures par jour, c'est-à-dire à la
semaine 72 heures. Personne, je crois, n'a jamais
parlé de cela. Alors, le régime maximum est de 3
équipes, et c'est celui que l'on pratique là où le
travail est continu. Ce que vous ne pouvez tout de
même pas faire, c'est que la journée ait plus de 24
heures. La durée de travail de l'ouvrier, qui corres-
pond au rendement maximum de l'outillage n'est
ni dix, ni onze, c'est 24 divisé par trois, c'est-à-dire
8, de telle sorte que le régime légal du travail
correspond à la rotation maxima de l'outillage,
c'est la semaine de quarante heures, si c'est 5 jours
par semaine, et au maximum, la semaine de 48
heures si on travaille 6 jours. Car il est impossible,
au moins pendant plus de quelques semaines, de
supprimer le repos hebdomadaire.

Vous saisissez tout de suite combien les deux données varient d'une façon indépendante l'une de l'autre. On a répété partout — M. le Procureur général l'a dit l'autre jour — que pendant ce temps là, en Allemagne, on travaillait 60 heures. Qu'en savez-vous ? Vous le répétez parce que le chancelier Hitler l'a dit dans un discours au Sportpalatz. Voilà, à ma connaissance, l'unique témoignage que l'on possède. En réalité, nous n'avons jamais su ce qui se passait dans les pays totalitaires, pas plus qu'un pays totalitaire n'a su, comme les événements l'ont prouvé, ce qui se passait dans un autre pays totalitaire. Peut-être travaillait-on 60 heures par semaine en Allemagne, pour les autostrades, pour la construction de la ligne Siegfried, où pour d'autres travaux de terrassement de cette nature, où seul le travail humain compte. Mais moi, sans le savoir, je vous affirme que, dans les usines de matériel de guerre, on ne travaillait pas 60 heures parce que le travail était continu, parce que les machines tournaient jour et nuit, et que si les machines tournent jour et nuit, on se trouve tout de même en présence de cette vérité plus forte que toutes les autres, c'est que la journée n'a que 24 heures, pas davantage, pas 30, pas 33. Par conséquent, dans les usines de guerre, en Allemagne, vous pouvez être assurés que l'on travaillait et que l'on travaille encore à 3 équipes par jour, 3 équipes qui sont nécessairement de 8 heures, et par conséquent 48 heures par semaine et non 60.

Une phrase jetée comme cela, imprudemment, négligemment, on ne se doute pas du mal que cela peut faire, on ne se doute pas des atteintes que cela peut causer en roulant, quand on l'a négligemment jetée comme un disque. Personne n'en sait rien. Si l'on y réfléchit, je crois que l'on est aussitôt convaincu, je ne dis pas de la vérité, car je n'en sais rien, mais de l'évidence de ce que j'affirme. Voulez-vous un autre exemple pris dans l'industrie

française ? Il y a une usine de moteurs qui s'appelle Gnome et Rhône. On y travaillait à trois équipes. Intervint une mesure d'ordre général, un décret-loi, je crois, qui d'ailleurs pour des raisons d'ordre psychologique, et peut-être autant que pour des raisons matérielles, posa en principe le système de la journée de 10 heures dans les industries travaillant pour la défense nationale. Gnome et Rhône dit : « Ecoutez : vous n'allez tout de même pas m'appliquer cette loi. Chez moi elle va faire tomber le temps de rotation des machines de 24 heures à 20 heures, ou au maximum 21 », car je crois qu'on est arrivé finalement à un régime où l'équipe de jour faisait 11 heures et l'équipe de nuit 10 heures. On lui a répondu : « C'est fâcheux, mais il faut vous conformer à la règle présente, suivre l'exemple. » Une augmentation de la durée légale du travail dans une usine déterminée s'est ainsi traduite par une réduction de la durée de rotation des machines. Vous voyez que ce n'est pas si simple, si élémentaire, que cela n'est pas une espèce de règle de trois d'école primaire !

M. LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL. — Cependant, voulez-vous me permettre de vous opposer un texte, c'est M. Daladier qui l'a donné et je l'en félicite. C'est le décret-loi du 20 mars 1939.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je viens d'y faire allusion !

M. LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL. — Ce texte qui a été fait en raison des nécessités de la défense nationale prévoit qu'il est urgent d'avoir recours aux 60 heures.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Oui, M. le Procureur général. C'est à ce décret même que je viens de faire allusion quand j'ai parlé de Gnome et Rhône. C'est par application de ce décret-loi qu'on est arrivé aux résultats que je vous dis. Je vous montre par cet exemple que l'on ne peut pas faire des raisonne-

Vous saisissez tout de suite combien les deux données varient d'une façon indépendante l'une de l'autre. On a répété partout — M. le Procureur général l'a dit l'autre jour — que pendant ce temps là, en Allemagne, on travaillait 60 heures. Qu'en savez-vous ? Vous le répétez parce que le chancelier Hitler l'a dit dans un discours au Sportpalatz. Voilà, à ma connaissance, l'unique témoignage que l'on possède. En réalité, nous n'avons jamais su ce qui se passait dans les pays totalitaires, pas plus qu'un pays totalitaire n'a su, comme les événements l'ont prouvé, ce qui se passait dans un autre pays totalitaire. Peut-être travaillait-on 60 heures par semaine en Allemagne, pour les autostrades, pour la construction de la ligne Siegfried, où pour d'autres travaux de terrassement de cette nature, où seul le travail humain compte. Mais moi, sans le savoir, je vous affirme que, dans les usines de matériel de guerre, on ne travaillait pas 60 heures parce que le travail était continu, parce que les machines tournaient jour et nuit, et que si les machines tournent jour et nuit, on se trouve tout de même en présence de cette vérité plus forte que toutes les autres, c'est que la journée n'a que 24 heures, pas davantage, pas 30, pas 33. Par conséquent, dans les usines de guerre, en Allemagne, vous pouvez être assurés que l'on travaillait et que l'on travaille encore à 3 équipes par jour, 3 équipes qui sont nécessairement de 8 heures, et par conséquent 48 heures par semaine et non 60.

Une phrase jetée comme cela, imprudemment, négligemment, on ne se doute pas du mal que cela peut faire, on ne se doute pas des atteintes que cela peut causer en roulant, quand on l'a négligemment jetée comme un disque. Personne n'en sait rien. Si l'on y réfléchit, je crois que l'on est aussitôt convaincu, je ne dis pas de la vérité, car je n'en sais rien, mais de l'évidence de ce que j'affirme. Voulez-vous un autre exemple pris dans l'industrie

française ? Il y a une usine de moteurs qui s'appelle Gnome et Rhône. On y travaillait à trois équipes. Intervint une mesure d'ordre général, un décret-loi, je crois, qui d'ailleurs pour des raisons d'ordre psychologique, et peut-être autant que pour des raisons matérielles, posa en principe le système de la journée de 10 heures dans les industries travaillant pour la défense nationale. Gnome et Rhône dit : « Ecoutez : vous n'allez tout de même pas m'appliquer cette loi. Chez moi elle va faire tomber le temps de rotation des machines de 24 heures à 20 heures, ou au maximum 21 », car je crois qu'on est arrivé finalement à un régime où l'équipe de jour faisait 11 heures et l'équipe de nuit 10 heures. On lui a répondu : « C'est fâcheux, mais il faut vous conformer à la règle présente, suivre l'exemple. » Une augmentation de la durée légale du travail dans une usine déterminée s'est ainsi traduite par une réduction de la durée de rotation des machines. Vous voyez que ce n'est pas si simple, si élémentaire, que cela n'est pas une espèce de règle de trois d'école primaire !

M. LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL. — Cependant, voulez-vous me permettre de vous opposer un texte, c'est M. Daladier qui l'a donné et je l'en félicite. C'est le décret-loi du 20 mars 1939.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je viens d'y faire allusion !

M. LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL. — Ce texte qui a été fait en raison des nécessités de la défense nationale prévoit qu'il est urgent d'avoir recours aux 60 heures.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Oui, M. le Procureur général. C'est à ce décret même que je viens de faire allusion quand j'ai parlé de Gnome et Rhône. C'est par application de ce décret-loi qu'on est arrivé aux résultats que je vous dis. Je vous montre par cet exemple que l'on ne peut pas faire des raisonne-

ments aussi simples, aussi uniformes que cela, et que, en imposant une application uniforme du décret-loi de mars, on est arrivé pour une industrie donnée à augmenter sans doute la durée du travail des équipes, mais à diminuer ce qui est une chose essentielle, la durée de rotation de l'outillage industriel.

J'en reviens maintenant au troisième élément : le rendement horaire de la machine. Car la même machine tournant un même nombre d'heures, tel ouvrier en tirera dans le même temps plus de pièces qu'un autre. Une des conditions de la production c'est de porter au maximum ce rendement horaire de la machine. Ici, vous vous trouvez en présence de faits comme le freinage dont il a déjà été question à tant de reprises. Je veux vous dire à mon tour que ce serait une grande erreur de considérer le freinage comme une espèce de sabotage ou de grève perlée. Le freinage a été un sentiment contre lequel il fallait lutter. C'était cependant un sentiment d'essence noble. Il pouvait avoir certaines racines égoïstes quand il était entretenu chez l'ouvrier par la crainte de son propre chômage ; mais il devenait un sentiment noble quand il était entretenu chez l'ouvrier par la considération du chômage de ses camarades, par le désir de procurer du travail à un plus grand nombre d'entre eux, à son propre détriment, car le salaire comportant partout au-dessus d'un taux fixé de base, des tarifs aux pièces, si l'ouvrier avait travaillé davantage, il aurait gagné davantage. Il aimait mieux gagner moins et procurer de l'ouvrage à un certain nombre de ses camarades.

Le rendement horaire, de quoi est-il fonction ? D'abord d'un certain nombre de dispositions matérielles : l'organisation intérieure de l'usine, l'éclairage, l'aération, la disposition des machines, le plus ou moins de facilité à circuler entre elles, le plus ou moins de méthode et de rapidité dans les trans-

ports intérieurs, tandis que l'objet de la fabrication passe d'un état à un autre. Il dépend de la bonne coordination et de la bonne adaptation des mouvements de l'ouvrier à sa machine ; il dépend aussi de la condition morale et physique de l'ouvrier. Il y a toute une école en Amérique, l'école Taylor, l'école de ces ingénieurs Bedeau, que vous voyez se promener dans des inspections, qui ont poussé très loin l'étude des méthodes d'organisation matérielle conduisant au maximum de rendement horaire de la machine, ce qui est précisément leur objectif. Mais il y a aussi l'école de Gilbreth qui a étudié et recherché les données les plus favorables dans les conditions physiques de l'ouvrier pour que ce rendement soit obtenu. La donnée essentielle c'est que la fatigue physique de l'ouvrier soit limitée. Il y a un exemple classique : dans un atelier de femmes on a obtenu un rendement double simplement en alternant, pour les femmes la position debout et la position assise.

Ne croyez-vous pas que cette condition morale et physique de l'ouvrier, toute notre législation sociale était de nature à l'améliorer : la journée plus courte, les loisirs, les congés payés, le sentiment d'une dignité, d'une égalité conquise, tout cela était, devait être, un des éléments qui peuvent porter au maximum le rendement horaire tiré de la machine par l'ouvrier.

Messieurs, si vous reprenez ces trois éléments, vous verrez que nos lois sociales ne pouvaient agir que favorablement sur le troisième. Notre politique ne pouvait agir que favorablement sur le premier : renouvellement et modernisation de l'outillage, puisque nous instituons par tous les moyens une stimulation de la vie économique, une circulation plus active de capitaux. D'ailleurs, nous avons aidé la petite et la moyenne industrie de ce pays pour lui permettre ce renouvellement ; indépendamment des efforts faits par des moyens spéciaux, nous lui

avons fait des prêts dont d'ailleurs, je le dis en passant, quelques-unes des plus importantes firmes industrielles de ce pays ont profité.

Quant au deuxième élément, je crois bien avoir démontré d'une façon, je ne dis pas persuasive, mais en tout cas claire, que l'essentiel n'est pas d'augmenter la durée du travail, mais d'augmenter la *durée de rotation des machines*. Quand vous passez de la semaine de 40 heures à la journée de 8 heures, c'est-à-dire à la semaine de 48, vous augmentez la durée de rotation de 25 %. Quand vous faites deux équipes, vous l'augmentez de 100 %, avec 3 équipes, vous l'augmentez de 200 %. Tout le problème essentiel était donc la démultiplication des équipes. Je sais bien, Monsieur le Président, qu'ici se pose cette question des spécialistes, qui est très importante et au-devant de laquelle je veux venir.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — C'est une question essentielle.

M. LÉON BLUM. — On a dit et répété que ce qui avait empêché la démultiplication des équipes, c'était le manque de spécialistes. Je crois que cela a été surtout la mauvaise volonté à sortir des habitudes prises et des routines acquises. Aujourd'hui, le spécialiste dans l'industrie moderne n'est pas le sursitaire de la guerre 1914-1918, ce n'est pas le tourneur ou le fraiseur travaillant sur sa fraise à main, ce n'est plus cela. Les machines de l'industrie moderne sont en grande partie automatiques, en ce sens que dans bien des cas un ouvrier peut en conduire plusieurs, et que dans d'autres cas, un ouvrier qui n'est pas un spécialiste proprement dit, mais un manœuvre spécialisé, peut les conduire. Vous trouverez dans le dossier la preuve de ce que j'avance. Par exemple, à un moment donné, la direction du Creusot demande un programme plus étendu, à plus longue portée pour la fabrication des aciers moulés destinés au cuirassement, au blin-

dage. Elle dit : si je suis en présence d'un programme suffisamment important, je pourrai acheter et installer des machines qui me permettront de faire l'économie d'un certain nombre de spécialistes. De même, il y a au dossier un rapport très intéressant fait en 1936 par le contrôleur général Bois, où il examine l'état de l'usine Hotchkiss. Il constate ce que tout le monde a dit d'ailleurs, que cette usine en 1936 fonctionne d'une façon absolument artisanale et qu'en raison du manque de perfectionnement de son outillage, elle fait une consommation de spécialistes absolument démesurée. De telle sorte qu'on aurait pu chez Hotchkiss, en renouvelant l'outillage, libérer un certain nombre de spécialistes de même qu'on aurait pu le faire au Creusot en montant des machines nouvelles.

D'innombrables témoignages qui sont au dossier, ceux de MM. Guy La Chambre, Dautry, Mahieux, montrent comment cette difficulté des spécialistes a été résolue pendant la guerre. Pendant la guerre on a formé des spécialistes ; on a fait marcher les machines, on les a fait même diriger par des femmes. Je me rappelle cette phrase restée dans ma mémoire ; elle provient d'une note de M. Guy La Chambre : « On ne se doute pas, dit-il, de la quantité de femmes qui étalent la veille couturières, qui n'avaient jamais fait marcher que des machines à coudre, qui sont devenues des fraiseuses et des décolleteuses. Si on avait voulu, on aurait une quantité suffisante de spécialistes. »

Je sais bien qu'il y a là un vice du patronat ! On a négligé l'apprentissage pendant les années de déflation. On ne s'est pas assez soucié de la promotion ouvrière. Quand on a essayé de mettre en jeu toutes ces institutions patronales à partir de 1937-1938, on s'est heurté à beaucoup d'incompréhension, à la crainte d'engager de nouvelles dépenses. C'est pour moi certain. Ce que je vais vous dire va vous paraître peut-être un peu étrange,

mais je vous assure que bien des fois, je me suis surpris étudiant ce dossier, non pas comme un accusé, mais si vous voulez bien, comme un avocat qui examinerait le dossier d'un autre, plus simplement, comme un Français, qui, à l'aide des éléments qu'un hasard mettait entre ses mains — je n'ose pas dire un privilège — essayait de voir clairement toute la vérité. Je suis arrivé pour ma part à la conviction que la démultiplication des équipes était possible, en tout cas infiniment plus que le patronat n'a voulu en convenir. Vous trouverez l'écho de cela dans des documents mesurés, nuancés, comme les rapports du contrôleur Jugnet ou de M. Valette qui constatent que ce renouvellement complet de l'organisation de l'usine, que cette introduction d'équipes multiples donnaient vraiment un supplément de peine, d'ouvrage au patronat, et qu'il aimait mieux s'en tenir à l'organisation traditionnelle de son usine. Il n'était pas sûr qu'un supplément de profit vint répondre à ce supplément d'efforts et peut-être à ce supplément de risque. Quiconque étudie ce dossier avec cette espèce de besoin impartial de trouver et de connaître la vérité qui vous étonnera peut-être chez un accusé, mais qui je vous assure me possède encore, arrive à cette conviction que la solution véritable était dans le doublement, dans le triplement des équipes.

Du côté de la classe ouvrière, on percevait les choses très clairement. Il y a une toute petite anecdote que je trouve absolument saisissante. En 1938, on enregistre des retards dans la fabrication des cuirasses de chars parce que les aciers manquent. L'ingénieur général Happich écrit à M. Lambert-Ribot. Il était en correspondance avec lui, ce qui est tout à fait naturel et louable. Il lui signale les cas litigieux en vue d'interventions du Comité des Forges qu'il suppose plus importantes et mieux accueillies que celles de l'Etat. M. Lambert-Ribot intervient donc auprès des industries inté-

ressées pour ces aciers dont la livraison fait défaut. Il y en a qui sont fournis par une maison de Saint-Etienne dont le nom est connu dans la politique et dans l'industrie, la maison Neyret. M. Neyret réunit ses ouvriers et leur dit : « Voici ce que nous allons faire : au lieu de fabriquer tous nos aciers avec les mêmes équipes, nous allons former des équipes spéciales pour des aciers destinés à la Défense nationale. Et là, nous travaillerons donc à trois équipes. » Les ouvriers répondent : « Si l'on fait cela nous consentons à travailler le samedi. » C'est-à-dire que là où elle sent de la part du patronat un effort novateur, énergique, et en même temps un signe de bonne volonté, la population ouvrière de Saint-Etienne, qui n'a pas la réputation d'être une des plus commodes, y répondait aussitôt par le geste que je viens de dire.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Vous évoquez tout à l'heure le témoignage de M. Dautry au sujet des spécialistes. Voici ce qu'il a déclaré dans une déposition le 9 octobre 1940. Il venait de parler de recruter, car la loi de 40 heures dans les chemins de fer avait eu pour résultat l'embauchement de 97.000 manœuvres, qui, disait-il, au taux moyen de 16.000 francs par an coûtaient à l'Etat une dépense supplémentaire de un milliard et demi. Mais ce n'est pas l'essentiel. Il parle des spécialistes. « Quant à nouveau à l'automne dernier, en 1939, j'ai voulu faire placer des chômeurs, disait-il, des usines Renault, on a constaté un effroyable déchet physique. Chez nous, le bon ouvrier a toujours manqué et au plus fort de la crise de chômage, on n'avait pas suffisamment de spécialistes. La perte du sixième de ces spécialistes était une véritable catastrophe pour la loi de 40 heures, car ce sixième se trouvait irremplaçable avant de très longs mois et même des années de préparation.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je suis d'accord avec M. Dautry sur un point d'ailleurs important et cependant

accessoire : c'est qu'en effet il était presque impossible, malgré les affirmations des ouvriers de trouver des spécialistes dans l'effectif des chômeurs. Le chômage est pour les ouvriers une cause terrible d'usure physique et d'usure morale. Il produit chez l'ouvrier une espèce de vieillissement prématuré. Quand on donnait aux administrations publiques ou aux offices départementaux du travail des listes de chômeurs portant leurs anciennes professions, qui étaient bien des professions de spécialistes, et quand ensuite on imposait à ces chômeurs des essais (qui ont, je crois, été trop sévères), il y avait un déchet terrible : seule une proportion infime de ces chômeurs pouvait remplir le rôle de spécialistes. Je suis d'accord là-dessus. Mais la citation de M. Dautry ne prouve rien contre ce que je viens de dire. Il s'agit de la facilité de former des spécialistes en un temps relativement court. Vous trouverez dans le dossier un document du ministère de l'Armement : c'est un grand rapport établi sur la demande de M. Mirault, dans lequel on résume l'ensemble des efforts faits pendant la guerre. Vous verrez combien pendant la guerre on a pu improviser de spécialistes, même parmi les femmes.

En réalité, ce mot de spécialiste est équivoque. Dans l'industrie moderne, le vrai spécialiste, c'est l'outilleur, c'est-à-dire celui qui affûte, soigne, met au point l'outil de la machine ; car la machine-outil est une machine qui manie l'outil semblable à un outil d'homme. C'est le règleur, celui qui surveille et vérifie le rythme des mouvements de la machine. C'est le vérificateur qui contrôle les pièces avant qu'elles passent d'un état de la fabrication à un autre. C'est le suiveur qui suit la pièce d'une machine à la machine suivante dans le rythme de la chaîne. Ce sont là des hommes qui ne peuvent être formés que par un long apprentissage. Il y a là une élite ouvrière qui correspond à une véritable maîtrise. Mais de ces ouvriers qui en effet ne peuvent

pas être remplacés par des manœuvres spécialisés ordinaires ou par des femmes dans une grande usine, il n'y avait qu'une proportion infime. Quand il s'agit de main-d'œuvre spécialisée ou de femmes se bornant à conduire les machines modernes, comment a-t-on fait pendant la guerre ? Comment avait-on fait pendant l'autre guerre et surtout pendant celle-ci ? Vous avez le témoignage du ministre de la Défense nationale, la déclaration de M. Mahieux à la commission des Finances du Sénat qui est saisissante ; vous avez ce rapport adressé à M. Mirault auquel je fais allusion. Vous verrez partout les traces du même fait. C'est qu'on a pu, somme toute, improviser des spécialistes hommes et femmes.

LES HEURES SUPPLEMENTAIRES

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Avez-vous autre chose à dire sur l'application de la loi de 40 heures ?

M. LÉON BLUM. — J'en viens maintenant à la question des heures supplémentaires que je n'ai pas abordée et que je n'entends pas du tout éluder.

J'ai essayé tout à l'heure de vous montrer quel était le régime optimum de travail dans une industrie moderne et je crois vous avoir montré clairement que ce régime était celui des trois équipes de huit heures.

Quel est, dans une chaîne de fabrication moderne, le rôle des heures supplémentaires ? Eh bien ! si l'organisation optima de travail n'a pas été réalisée, s'il n'y a qu'une équipe, par exemple, il est évident que les heures supplémentaires augmenteront le rendement de cette équipe. D'autre part même dans l'organisation optima, on peut avoir besoin d'heures supplémentaires parce que tous les éléments du travail ne s'exécutent pas avec un

synchronisme absolu, qu'il peut toujours se produire un certain décalage d'une partie de la fabrication par rapport à une autre et que pour éviter un engorgement général, il faut alors que l'heure supplémentaire intervienne pour apporter une correction, une compensation.

Notez que pendant toute la période qui m'intéresse, vous pouvez le voir dans les rapports de M. Jugnet même dans le rapport de M. Jugnet sur 1937, on n'envisage jamais les heures supplémentaires que de ce point de vue. On ne paraît pas souhaiter un régime général du travail dépassant les 40 heures et on regarde toutes les difficultés que l'on rencontre pour les heures supplémentaires de ce point de vue : compensation, correction, équilibre, harmonie. Il s'agit d'assurer, malgré les petits accidents inévitables, l'ensemble de la fabrication.

Cela dit, et le rôle des heures supplémentaires étant ainsi déterminé dans une fabrication, quel a été mon rôle à moi ?

Je crois qu'un témoin a dit que j'avais pris, à cet égard, à la Commission des Finances du Sénat, des engagements que je n'ai pas tenus. Vous pouvez vous reporter à la discussion, je me suis opposé avec une obstination invincible à tous les amendements qui voulaient me prescrire des dérogations d'une catégorie déterminée. J'ai dit : non, je n'accepterai jamais cela, jamais je n'accepterai de donner à une autorité administrative unique un pouvoir en matière de dérogation.

Je parlais ainsi, parce que pendant la première phase de ma vie, j'avais été le témoin d'un sabotage de la loi sur le repos hebdomadaire, par le système des dérogations préfectorales. Je savais aussi quelles avaient été les lenteurs d'application de la loi de 8 heures, et je ne voulais pas retomber dans de tels errements. Non seulement je n'ai pas pris d'engagement mais, je le répète, je me suis refusé obstinément à laisser introduire dans le texte

rien qui pût limiter ma liberté en ce qui allait concerner la rédaction des règlements d'administration publique. Les règlements d'administration publique ont été étudiés avec la procédure que je vous ai rappelée tout à l'heure ; ils ont été préparés par mon ami Lebas ; c'est un travail que j'ai vu de près et dont, bien entendu, je suis et étais entièrement responsable.

Or, qu'est-ce qu'ils disent les règlements ? Les règlements visent un certain nombre de dérogations possibles : un accident dans l'usine, un changement de fabrication, une influence saisonnière, etc., mais, dans tous ces cas, ils limitent de la façon la plus rigoureuse le contingent, le crédit annuel accordé à l'industriel. Tandis que quand il s'agit de travaux qui intéressent la défense nationale, alors la faculté de dérogation devient illimitée. Le gouvernement décide, après entente entre le ministre de qui le travail dépend et le ministre du Travail.

Voilà mon rôle. C'était de prendre les règlements. Mon rôle, c'était aussi, en vertu des règlements, si un conflit s'élevait entre le ministre du Travail et le ministre particulier de la Défense Nationale — si, par exemple, Edouard Daladier était allé demander à Jean Lebas des heures supplémentaires pour telle ou telle usine, et que Jean Lebas n'y eût pas consenti — mon rôle, dis-je, c'était comme chef du gouvernement, d'arbitrer ce conflit.

Sur le plan gouvernemental, il n'y avait pas d'autre rôle pour moi : faire le règlement (vous le voyez, Messieurs, je l'ai fait) et, le cas échéant, appliquer la disposition du règlement qui me conférait à moi, vis-à-vis de deux de mes ministres, un pouvoir éventuel d'arbitrage.

Eh bien ! je dis cela très clairement, mais très fermement. Je demande — et c'est un défi que je porte — qu'on me cite un seul cas où j'ai été saisi

par les ministres du Travail et de la Défense nationale d'un litige portant sur l'application de la loi de 40 heures...

M. LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL. — Ils n'ont jamais rien demandé. Nous verrons pourquoi, d'ailleurs, et vous en convenez. Ils voulaient qu'on ne fasse que 40 heures.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Jamais je n'ai été saisi d'un cas quelconque. Je demande qu'on cite même un seul cas où j'aie été saisi par une organisation patronale ou par des patrons déterminés d'un litige de ce genre.

Messieurs, on m'a reproché, pendant mon gouvernement, d'avoir beaucoup reçu d'ouvriers. J'ai beaucoup reçu d'ouvriers, j'ai aussi reçu beaucoup de patrons. Il y a des hommes comme M. Lambert-Ribot ou comme M. Petiet à qui ma porte était constamment ouverte. Pas une seule fois, pendant mon gouvernement, on n'est venu me saisir d'un cas portant sur une difficulté relative aux heures supplémentaires et que j'eusse à trancher comme chef du gouvernement. Jamais je n'ai été saisi d'un cas de ce genre.

M. LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL. — Mais je pense que vous étiez d'accord avec votre ministre de la Guerre.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je suis toujours d'accord avec mon ministre de la Guerre, quand il s'agit de vous répondre, Monsieur le Procureur général.

M. LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL. — Le ministre de la Guerre avait fait une circulaire le 29 juillet 1936 et vous savez dans quels termes elle est rédigée : « Aucune heure supplémentaire ne sera effectuée. »

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je connais cette circulaire. Pourquoi ne vous souvenez-vous pas qu'elle a été rapportée immédiatement après mon décret et par application de mon décret.

M. DALADIER. — Je vous demande pardon. Je me suis déjà expliqué longuement sur ce point et sur l'origine de cette circulaire et de sa durée. Cette circulaire a été prise — je l'ai expliqué ici dans une des premières audiences — sur la proposition de M. Guinand. C'est la circulaire dont vous citez toujours le texte. Elle a été prise dans ce but précis de contribuer de la manière la plus ferme à la résorption du chômage. En vertu de cette circulaire, M. Guinand, dont nous ferons le compte quand viendront les témoins, notamment les directeurs des arsenaux, un grand nombre d'ouvriers, plusieurs milliers, ont été embauchés. Voilà quel a été le but de la circulaire Guinand.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je voudrais ajouter un mot. Cette question des heures supplémentaires, c'est la grande trouvaille de l'accusation. Je voudrais bien savoir ce que l'accusation contre moi serait devenue si on n'avait pas fait cette découverte.

Seulement, il faut que la Cour se rende bien compte d'une chose : dans des matières comme celles des demandes d'heures supplémentaires, l'immense majorité, la généralité des cas — ceux où les heures supplémentaires sont demandées et accordées sans difficulté — ne laissent aucune trace; les cas comme ceux-là, il y en a des dizaines de milliers. Ce qui laisse des traces, surtout quand on les recherche avec tant de soin, ce sont les cas litigieux. Mais le cas normal, celui-là ne retentit pas dans l'instruction. Si vous cherchez d'où sont venues les difficultés, vous vous apercevrez que, presque jamais, elles ne se sont élevées jusqu'au plan gouvernemental. M. Guy La Chambre vous a dit que, pas une fois, il n'avait eu des difficultés avec le ministre du Travail pour faire régler des questions de ce genre. Le plus souvent, ces questions sont restées sur le plan de l'administration locale.

Il est parfaitement possible qu'à l'inspection du Travail il y ait des fonctionnaires qui se soient montrés particulièrement pointilleux ou réfractaires dans les questions d'heures supplémentaires, en s'imaginant peut-être par là qu'ils faisaient leur cour au gouvernement du Front populaire. Sous tous les gouvernements il y a des excès de zèle et, vous savez, ce sont généralement les mêmes fonctionnaires qui commettent les mêmes excès de zèle sous des gouvernements successifs et contradictoires. Les inspecteurs du travail qui hésitaient devant les demandes du patronat, que font-ils aujourd'hui ? Je n'en sais rien. En principe, il y a une fiction du gouvernement représentatif qui veut qu'un ministre soit responsable des actes de tous les fonctionnaires placés sous ses ordres. Il est censé ne pas ignorer ; il les couvre de sa responsabilité ministérielle. Du point de vue de cette responsabilité ministérielle c'est déjà aller un peu loin, mais s'il s'agit de responsabilité pénale ou de responsabilité criminelle, vous avouerez que cela passe un peu la mesure. Dire que nous sommes des criminels et des traîtres parce que, sans que nous en ayons la moindre notion, tel inspecteur du travail, dans tel département, par excès de zèle et, je le répète, par flatterie vis-à-vis de notre état d'esprit présumé, avait fait une difficulté à une demande d'heures supplémentaires légitimement formée par un patron de sa circonscription, non tout de même ! La notion de crime et la notion de trahison ne peuvent pas s'étendre jusqu'à une pareille circonstance.

Vous ne connaissez que les cas litigieux, mais quand on dépouille le dossier, oh ! naturellement, on admire avec quel soin ils ont été recueillis, montés, sertis. Il y a là un travail d'art qui fait le plus grand honneur aux joailliers qui s'en sont chargés. Mais si l'on prend une plume et un mor-

ceau de papier et que l'on fasse l'addition des cas concrets qui sont cités dans le dossier, il y a quelque chose dont on est confondu, c'est de leur petit nombre. Sur des milliers, sur des dizaines de milliers de marchés qui se sont conclus pour l'exécution du programme de 1936, combien de cas cités par M. Lambert-Ribot qui, pourtant, a dû racler tous les tiroirs du Comité des Forges pour nourrir sa nomenclature ? Combien en cite l'ingénieur général Mellon ?

J'en parle d'une façon désintéressée, car je ne sais pas si un seul des cas qu'on cite s'est produit pendant mon gouvernement. Peut-être un, et encore, je n'en suis pas sûr. Mais peu importe ! Les réflexions que je fais ont leur valeur générale, objective. Je répète que les cas sont infiniment peu nombreux. En tout cas, — et ceci je le redis d'une façon solennelle — comme chef du gouvernement, je n'ai jamais eu à en trancher aucun. On n'en a pas porté un seul à ma connaissance. Dans l'affaire des heures supplémentaires, je n'ai pas eu d'autre rôle que de participer à la rédaction des règlements d'administration publique de la loi des 40 heures et personne, je crois, n'a pu élever la moindre critique sur la façon dont ce règlement était rédigé.

En 1938, c'est autre chose. Je suis intervenu dans les questions d'heures supplémentaires, après cette réunion du 15 mars, dont M. Guy La Chambre vous a déjà parlé. A ce moment, j'ai négocié avec les organisations ouvrières, mais dans quel sens ? Dans le sens de la formule que j'avais introduite dans le discours que je prononçais à cette même époque devant la Chambre à l'heure présente : « Ce sont les besoins, c'est la rotation nécessaire des machines qui sont la donnée fixe et le travail des hommes doit être la donnée mobile ». Et j'ai donc obtenu l'accord des organisations ouvrières pour une sorte de concordat qui s'est ensuite exprimé dans l'arbitrage Jacomet

et dans l'arbitrage Giraud et qui portait à 45 heures, par addition de 5 heures supplémentaires, mais par addition si je puis dire, organique, régulière, le temps normal de la durée du travail, dans tous les établissements travaillant directement ou indirectement pour la Défense nationale.

Mais quand j'ai négocié cela, qui n'a abouti qu'après moi entre les mains d'Edouard Daladier, de Guy La Chambre et du contrôleur général Jacomet, qu'ont dit, quel langage m'ont tenu les organisations patronales ? J'ai convoqué dans mon cabinet M. de l'Escaillé, président de l'Union des sociétés nationalisées de l'aéronautique, et M. Pierre Forgeot, président de la Chambre syndicale des moteurs. Je connaissais peu M. de l'Escaillé ; au contraire, M. Pierre Forgeot était et est pour moi un ami très ancien et très intime. Je me suis adressé à eux avec toute la force de persuasion dont je puis être capable pour les convaincre de la nécessité de signer cet accord qui, dans toute l'aéronautique, aurait porté la durée normale de travail de 40 à 45 heures. Je me suis heurté à leur refus absolu et, je le répète je n'ai pu vaincre cette résistance, même auprès d'un ami personnel, très intime et très cher. Ils m'ont dit — je suis heureux qu'on ait pu les faire céder quelques jours après — « impossible ! nous ne savons que faire de vos 45 heures dans l'aéronautique ; nous n'arrivons même pas à faire travailler nos ouvriers pendant 40 heures ».

Je n'ai rien pu obtenir et, au fond, cela n'a absolument rien d'extraordinaire car, en réalité, dans toute production industrielle, il y a deux phases : la phase préparatoire, qui est celle de la détermination des modèles, de la passation des marchés, de la constitution des approvisionnements, de la commande des outillages, de la conclusion des sous-marchés, etc..., et il y a celle de la production industrielle proprement dite. Les 45 heures, on ne pouvait en avoir besoin que dans la

seconde phase. Pour la première — la préparation — on a surtout besoin de dessinateurs et d'employés de bureau et l'objection pour les spécialistes ne vaut pas ici, car parmi les dessinateurs il y avait un chômage intensif et quelques-unes des difficultés ouvrières les plus laborieuses que nous avons eues à régler ont même eu pour cause des licenciements massifs de dessinateurs dans un certain nombre de grands établissements. J'en cite un qui me revient à l'esprit : la Marine d'Homécourt. Or, pour le plan V de l'aviation dont il s'agissait à ce moment, on en était qu'à la première phase. Mais pendant mon premier gouvernement, quelles sont les fabrications pour lesquelles on avait dépassé la première phase avant juin 1936 ? Qu'est-ce qu'il y avait en fabrication au moment où nous avons fait voter la loi et où nous avons pris les règlements de la loi des 40 heures ? Il y avait un programme de 2.000 pièces de 25 anti-chars chez Hotchkiss ; 1.400 commandées par le colonel Fabry ; le reste commandé par le général Maurin. Ce programme a été exécuté fin 1936, sans retard. Il y avait des chars en commande chez Renault. Croyez-vous que chez Renault les retards pour les chars aient eu pour cause des heures supplémentaires, alors que, dans une pareille usine, ce n'était qu'un jeu de dédoubler ou de détrippler les équipes spécialement consacrées à ce genre de travail ?

A ce moment, aucun autre des matériels modernes n'est encore en fabrication. Les pièces contre avions, la mitrailleuse Hotchkiss de 25, le 90, n'ont été commandées qu'en 1938. Le 47, il n'y en a pas eu et il ne pouvait pas y en avoir de commandé en 1936. La première commande nominale est de 1937 et le début de la fabrication effective est de 1938. Par conséquent, pendant toute

cette période où je n'ai vu personne qui vint me parler de difficultés venant des heures supplémentaires, on n'en avait en réalité pas besoin, voilà la très simple vérité.

Les besoins sont venus ensuite avec la production industrielle en grande série, soit pour développer la production dans les usines où l'on travaillait à équipes uniques, soit pour obtenir cet effet de correction ou de compensation, dont je parlais dans les usines mieux outillées et mieux organisées, où les équipes avaient été démultipliées. Edouard Daladier a fait allusion aux frictions qui se sont produites, à ce sujet, en 1938. Le document essentiel est le rapport de l'ingénieur général Mallen dont il vous a parlé déjà. Dans ce rapport, comme dans le rapport Lambert-Ribot, il s'agit d'un très petit nombre de cas, intéressant d'ailleurs surtout la marine et ne portant pas sur des fournitures d'une très grande ampleur. Ces incidents ont eu des conséquences politiques très importantes parce que Edouard Daladier a eu le sentiment de se heurter là à une mauvaise volonté de la Fédération ouvrière des métaux, mauvaise volonté d'autant plus irritante, je le conçois, qu'elle prenait un caractère dilatoire. En somme, la Fédération des métaux répondait évasivement, demandait un délai, bref, prenait des attitudes qui évidemment quand il s'agit d'intérêts aussi importants peuvent, à un moment donné, épuiser ce qu'on possède de calme. Je ne nie pas du tout que, de la part des dirigeants de la Fédération des métaux il y ait eu à cette époque, des arrière-pensées politiques ; c'est parfaitement possible. Je n'ai pas à le rechercher pour ma part. Cependant, il y a quelque chose que je veux vous dire parce que, en tout, il faut être juste et dire ce que l'on croit la vérité.

Je crois qu'il y a eu ces arrière-pensées politi-

ques de la part des dirigeants de la Fédération des Métaux, mais je crois qu'il est indispensable aussi de se rendre compte que, dans la masse ouvrière, cette mauvaise volonté s'alimentait d'un état d'esprit général de méfiance, explicable à bien des égards, je veux dire méfiance vis-à-vis du patronat. Dans cette réunion du 15 mars dont M. Guy La Chambre a fait le récit, Coste était là, ainsi que Croizat et d'autres encore. Il n'est pas possible qu'il ait oublié combien un certain nombre de faits produits par Coste avaient produit de sensation sur nous. Coste nous montrait, par des détails précis, certains, comment, par exemple, dans telle ou telle usine on demandait des heures supplémentaires dans un atelier pendant qu'on faisait chômage partiel, ou même qu'on licenciait l'atelier voisin. Il nous montrait comment, dans la même équipe, il y avait demande d'heures supplémentaires certaine semaine et, au contraire, descente en dessous de la durée légale du travail une autre semaine. Il nous montrait comment des hommes, à qui on avait demandé des heures supplémentaires ou auxquels on se préparait à en demander auraient été arrêtés pendant des jours et des jours par des défauts d'organisations internes ou par des manques d'approvisionnement. Tout cela, il n'était pas possible que des ouvriers qui vivent de la vie de l'usine, ne le sentissent pas dans une large mesure, qu'ils ne sentissent pas la répugnance des patrons à faire l'effort ou les sacrifices nécessaires pour doubler ou détrippler les équipes. Quand ils constataient cet effort, ils y répondaient, comme le faisaient les ouvriers de l'aciérie Neyret de Saint-Etienne.

Il y avait quelque chose de plus grave : c'est que les ouvriers s'apercevaient que depuis le temps des accords Matignon, la position générale du patronat avait singulièrement changé. A Matignon —

je vous l'ai dit — on demandait mon arbitrage; on s'y référait, on s'inclinait d'avance devant lui. Mais si, moi, je n'ai pas voulu, une fois la crise apaisée, reprendre aux ouvriers ce que je leur avais consenti ou fait obtenir au moment du péril, dans des cercles entiers du patronat on a fait un raisonnement différent et on a pris une attitude contraire. Par exemple, en septembre, j'ai réuni de nouveau, comme à Matignon, les représentants de la C. G. T. et de la C. G. P. F. J'ai essayé d'obtenir d'eux quelque chose qui, vous n'en disconviez pas, est conforme à l'intérêt public, et que j'ai dû, ensuite, réaliser par la loi. Je leur ai demandé de conclure, par accord amiable, comme je l'avais fait à Matignon, une entente sur un système de conciliation et d'arbitrage permettant d'exclure et la grève et le lock-out. Les ouvriers y consentent. Au bout de quelques séances, le patronat rompt la conversation. Dans les discussions préalables à la publication du règlement d'administration publique de la loi de 40 heures, les organisations patronales ont eu à prendre position. Il y a au dossier la preuve écrite — je me demande par quelle imprudence on l'a laissée s'y égarer — de ce qu'était, à ce moment, l'attitude du Comité des Forges vis-à-vis d'une loi qui était pourtant la loi de l'Etat, une loi que ses représentants s'étaient engagés tout spécialement à respecter lors des conversations de Matignon. Vous verrez quelles instructions étaient données aux représentants du Comité des Forges au cours des conférences paritaires, et vous verrez ce qu'était l'intention profonde du Comité des Forges vis-à-vis de la loi.

A la fin de décembre 1936, il y eut une révolution de palais dans les organisations patronales. Tous les hommes qui avaient participé à Matignon ont été remplacés. M. Duchemin était remplacé à la Confédération Générale de la production par l'un de ces hommes qui sont étrangers au patronat, qui

sont étrangers à l'industrie et qui, soit par prévention de parti, soit par fanatisme doctrinal, apportent parfois à la défense des intérêts patronaux plus d'âpreté que les patrons eux-mêmes. M. Dalbouze quittait la Chambre de Commerce de Paris; il mourait aussitôt après. M. Richemont a quitté la Présidence de l'Union des syndicats patronaux de la Seine où il était remplacé par un patron de combat. Seul, M. Lambert-Ribot, qui n'est pas un patron, est resté à la tête des Services du Comité des Forges.

Les ouvriers savaient tout cela et il n'était pas possible que ne naquit pas chez eux cette pensée, peut-être propagée, mais trouvant son origine dans des faits qu'ils savaient et dont ils étaient témoins, c'est-à-dire que le patronat voulait revenir sur les avantages accordés à la classe ouvrière, que la loi de 40 heures était son objectif principal, qu'il usait, qu'il abusait de toutes les difficultés que le souci de la défense nationale pouvait susciter, pour les dramatiser, pour reprendre au personnel ses avantages, pour détruire le progrès acquis. Ce soupçon existait dans la classe ouvrière et sans que je veuille ici plaider pour personne, ou apporter des excuses pour personne, je dois apporter à la Cour qui juge ces aspects de la vérité.

A cette époque, plus tard encore, j'ai fait ce que j'ai pu pour préserver le principe de la loi de 40 heures. Tout en ayant dit ce que j'ai dit dans mon discours de 1938, tout en ayant tenu devant la Fédération des travailleurs de l'Etat un langage où je les incitais à accorder toutes les heures supplémentaires qu'on leur demandait, tout en ayant pris l'initiative des conversations de mars 1938 avec les chambres syndicales patronales, je voulais préserver ce principe. M. Belin l'a répété, d'ailleurs, il y a quelques mois, à Toulouse, la loi de 40 heures est encore une loi de l'Etat.

Je vais vous dire pourquoi j'y ai tenu. Dans ma pensée, la loi de 40 heures devait servir à résorber le chômage au même titre que d'autres mesures. Mais, à mes yeux, elle avait un autre sens ; elle avait une portée beaucoup plus profonde. Nous sortions d'une crise universelle que tout le monde a qualifiée de crise de surproduction. Surproduire ? Produire trop ? Trop relativement à quoi ? Certainement pas relativement aux besoins de l'humanité, mais trop par rapport à la possibilité de consommation, c'est-à-dire à la faculté d'achat. Et nous sommes arrivés, en effet, à un point, à un état de l'histoire du monde où, par suite du progrès continu de l'industrie et de la technique, par suite aussi d'un mauvais système de répartition des richesses, l'appareil universel de production crée plus de richesses qu'il n'est capable d'en répartir et que la masse des consommateurs n'est capable d'en absorber. De là ces phénomènes, en apparence incompréhensibles, ces destructions de richesses pour lesquelles il existe des besoins. Quand on brûle des sacs de café ou de blé, ce ne sont pas les besoins qui manquent, mais bien la faculté d'achat qui fait défaut. Le progrès de la civilisation, de la technique, c'est bien pourtant une propriété collective de l'humanité ; c'est l'héritage de tout ce que la civilisation nous a légué depuis les premiers tâtonnements de la race humaine. Et nous vivons dans un régime tel que ce qui devrait être le bien commun de l'humanité, ce qui, par conséquent, devrait se répartir, s'étaler en bienfaits, en profits sur tous les hommes se traduit, au contraire, par des profits démesurés pour certains, et pour la masse des autres par le chômage, la sous-consommation, la baisse des salaires, la misère. Je crois qu'un état de choses comme celui-là cessera. Cette espèce de divorce impie entre la science et la société, entre la nature et la vie, ne durera pas éter-

nellement. Toute la question est de savoir comment, par quels procédés, par quels moyens il changera. Mais, sans nul doute, un état viendra où ce qui est l'héritage de tous les hommes deviendra le bénéfice, le profit de chaque homme, où chacun touchera sa quote-part, son petit dividende, soit sous la forme d'un supplément de bien-être, pour un même travail, soit sous la forme d'un supplément de loisirs pour un même salaire.

Eh bien ! la loi de 40 heures avait, et elle a encore à mes yeux cette importance toute puissante qu'elle représentait dans le progrès de la civilisation, cette attribution aux travailleurs du dividende. Elle représentait des arrhes, un premier profit que les travailleurs pouvaient toucher, qu'ils pouvaient percevoir comme leur part légitime dans un mouvement de la civilisation et du progrès qui appartient à tous les hommes. Voilà le sens profond de la loi de 40 heures, ou plutôt le sens profond de mon attachement pour elle.

DEFENSE DE LEON BLUM

(Suite et fin)

Audience du mercredi 11 mars 1942

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — L'audience est ouverte à 13 heures trente.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je voudrais d'abord rappeler à la Cour ce que je lui ai déjà dit, c'est-à-dire que les différentes lois sociales que j'ai fait voter composent un groupe homogène, un système, qu'elles sont liées étroitement les unes aux autres. Avant d'aborder les nationalisations, qui viennent mainte-

nant à leur tour mais qui sont en réalité une matière un peu étrangère à ce système, je voudrais dire un mot des autres lois qui composaient le groupe et que l'accusation ou bien n'incrimine pas ou bien n'incrimine plus.

Au cours de l'instruction, aucune question ne m'a été posée sur des lois comme la loi sur l'arbitrage obligatoire ou celle sur les contrats collectifs

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Rendez-vous compte que vraiment cela n'intéresse pas le procès.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Aussi n'en dirai-je rien. Bien que cela fasse partie du système, l'accusation ne les a pas retenues. Ce sont pourtant des lois importantes et je suis convaincu que la Cour lirait avec intérêt, par exemple, ne serait-ce que pour marquer le caractère général de l'action que j'ai exercée, le débat de la loi sur l'arbitrage obligatoire devant le Sénat. La loi sur les contrats collectifs, j'aurai à en parler à propos d'un des reproches précis qu'on m'a faits, celui d'avoir ruiné l'autorité patronale. Elle présente aussi une importance particulière. Mais je pense que si on ne les a pas incriminées, bien qu'elles entrassent dans le système, c'est sans doute parce que, dans le régime actuel, tout en transformant l'esprit de ces lois et en y substituant des méthodes d'autorité à une méthode de liberté, on a cependant retenu un assez grand nombre de dispositions positives. Par exemple, cette fameuse institution des délégués ouvriers dont on a tant parlé, même dans l'instruction, est rappelée d'assez près par une institution comme celle des comités sociaux d'entreprises, avec cette différence que les délégués ouvriers prévus par les contrats collectifs étaient élus, tandis que les comités sociaux d'entreprises sont composés de délégués gouvernementaux.

LES LOISIRS

Mais il y a une loi sur laquelle je suis obligé d'insister parce que, sur celle-ci, j'ai été interrogé et qu'elle figure encore, si je ne me trompe, dans l'énoncé des charges tel qu'il est articulé à mon interrogatoire définitif. C'est la loi sur les congés payés. Cette loi, combinée avec la création d'un sous-secrétariat d'Etat aux loisirs et aux sports, était la base d'une des charges imaginées contre moi. On me reprochait d'avoir fait perdre le goût du travail aux ouvriers français et d'avoir encouragé chez eux ce que des personnages officiels ont appelé l'esprit de jouissance et de facilité. Cette charge ne se retrouve plus dans l'arrêt de renvoi, mais vous ne pouvez pas contester qu'elle subsiste dans l'atmosphère de l'accusation. A-t-on renoncé à la retenir explicitement quand on a appris la mort et qu'on a lu la citation posthume de l'homme qui avait été mon collaborateur direct pour ce travail, qui avait occupé la charge de sous-secrétaire d'Etat aux loisirs et aux sports, de mon ami Léo Lagrange ? Vous savez que...

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Je savais tout cela. C'est une des raisons pour lesquelles je ne vous en aurais jamais parlé.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Oui, Monsieur le Président, mais je peux tout de même dire que l'exemple donné par cet homme dont vous savez la valeur héroïque, que vous avez connu, et qui débordait de jeunesse, d'enthousiasme, prouve que l'on a pu donner pendant de longs mois toute sa foi et toute son énergie à une œuvre comme celle de l'organisation des loisirs et des sports et avoir tout de même conservé en soi quelques vertus héroïques. Mais je pense que, outre cette raison que je suis ému, Monsieur le Président, de vous entendre rappeler comme vous l'avez fait, on s'est rendu compte qu'il y avait dans tout cela une confusion qu'il n'était dans l'intérêt de

personne de prolonger longtemps. On s'est rendu compte que le loisir n'était pas la paresse, que le loisir est le repos après le travail, que le loisir et le sport sont pour l'ouvrier la santé, et aussi comme une réconciliation avec une vie naturelle dont il est trop souvent séparé et frustré. Je ne veux pas insister, encore une fois, puisque le grief ne se trouve plus dans le réquisitoire définitif ni dans l'arrêt de renvoi de la Cour. Mais, quand je pense à l'ensemble de cette œuvre à laquelle on a imputé tant de maléfices, j'y pense, moi, avec beaucoup d'émotion. Je ne suis pas sorti souvent de mon cabinet ministériel pendant la durée de mon ministère, mais chaque fois que j'en suis sorti, que j'ai traversé la grande banlieue parisienne et que j'ai vu les routes couvertes de théories de « tacots », de motos, de tandems, avec ces couples d'ouvriers vêtus de pull-overs assortis et qui montraient que l'idée du loisir réveillait chez eux une espèce de coquetterie naturelle et simple, j'avais le sentiment d'avoir, malgré tout, apporté une embellie, une éclaircie dans des vies difficiles, obscures. On ne les avait pas seulement arrachés au cabaret, on ne leur avait pas seulement donné plus de facilité pour la vie de famille, mais on leur avait ouvert une perspective d'avenir, on avait créé chez eux un espoir. Et je me rappelais avec un certain orgueil les paroles qu'a prononcées, dans la dernière occasion parlementaire de sa carrière, un homme d'Etat anglais quand, après avoir fait abroger les droits sur les blés et jeté à bas du pouvoir après cette victoire, il disait : « Je laisserai un nom qui sera prononcé avec haine ou avec colère par les monopoleurs et les spéculateurs, mais qui sera peut-être prononcé avec un sentiment de reconnaissance dans la demeure de ceux dont le lot, dans ce monde, est le travail. » J'ai éprouvé, pour ma part, une émotion, une fierté de ce genre et je crois avoir le droit de l'exprimer ici devant mes juges.

LES NATIONALISATIONS

J'en viens maintenant aux nationalisations.

Ce mot de nationalisation semble avoir, par moments, une vertu horridique. Dans beaucoup d'esprits, la nationalisation se confond avec la socialisation, avec la collectivisation et, par conséquent, avec la spoliation ! Je voudrais d'abord vous dire que l'idée de nationalisation n'est pas une idée socialiste. L'origine des nationalisations est dans les doctrines du socialisme réformiste qu'incarnait un homme comme M. Millerand, au temps du programme de Saint-Mandé. Elle est surtout dans les anciens programmes du parti radical, à l'époque de Camille Pelletan. Des nationalisations, on en a fait à propos de beaucoup d'objets, pour des raisons purement fiscales. Le tabac est une nationalisation. On aurait dû en faire pour capter à son origine, à la source, une catégorie de richesse qui commençait à se créer, qui aurait pu être captée au profit de la collectivité au lieu de devenir une source de bénéfices et de profits particuliers. Si on avait nationalisé, à son origine, par exemple, l'industrie électrique, cela aurait été sans aucun doute un bienfait pour le pays. On nationalise lorsqu'on se trouve en présence d'un monopole de fait comme pour la raffinerie de sucre ou de pétrole, ou bien quand on est devant une industrie-clef dont toutes les autres dépendent, comme le crédit. Mais pour les fabrications de guerre, on ne se trouve en présence de rien de pareil. L'industrie de guerre a été de toute éternité une industrie secrète. On commence à voir apparaître la fabrication privée d'armes au moment où on fabrique des canons en acier. C'est à ce moment que des industriels comme Krupp en Allemagne et Schneider en France, du fait qu'ils possèdent seuls les moyens techniques pour traiter de grandes masses d'acier, se mettent à fabriquer des canons.

Quels sont les mobiles qui ont fait inscrire la

nationalisation des industries de guerre dans le programme du front populaire et ensuite dans le programme ministériel ? Le mouvement s'est formé en France pendant la guerre de 1914 à 1918 et il est impossible que vous n'en ayez pas gardé le souvenir. Un mouvement public irrésistible contre l'idée du profit privé, du bénéfice privé s'est constitué pendant la guerre. Cette idée de profits privés parfois démesurés au milieu de la misère universelle et alors que toutes les nations, même les victorieuses, étaient ruinées, a soulevé une sorte de réprobation, d'indignation universelle. J'étais à Bordeaux, en 1914, lorsqu'on a compris la première fois la nécessité de constituer une nouvelle industrie privée des armes. J'ai vu arriver à Bordeaux le lieutenant Renault, le lieutenant Citroën et le lieutenant Loucheur. J'étais alors le collaborateur d'un ministre et l'ami personnel de quelques autres. On s'est demandé alors si on ne procéderait pas par voie de nationalisation totale. M. Loucheur arrivait à Bordeaux et on lui demandait d'improviser une grande usine pour fabriquer des obus. On allait lui donner des locaux, on allait lui donner la main-d'œuvre, on allait lui donner les matières premières, car c'était l'Etat seul qui importait les aciers des Etats-Unis. Tout était à l'Etat, dans cette industrie qu'on allait créer. On s'est donc demandé s'il n'était pas naturel, avec cette main-d'œuvre militaire, avec ces moyens d'Etat, avec ces chefs d'industrie qui revenaient du front, et qu'on mettait hors cadres, on s'est demandé s'il n'était pas légitime, sensé, de créer une industrie purement nationale. Si on l'avait fait, je crois qu'on aurait évité de grosses difficultés. On aurait évité le scandale des gros profits et aussi cette espèce de division publique, pendant la guerre et aussitôt après, entre ouvriers et paysans, le paysan restant au front et l'ouvrier, rappelé à l'atelier avec de gros salaires. Tout cela a été aperçu à cette époque. On a préféré le système de l'industrie privée

en pensant que, pour les patrons l'appât du profit, et pour les ouvriers la perspective de hauts salaires, amèneraient une production plus intense. Mais pendant la guerre la protestation s'est élevée à maintes reprises. Des projets de loi tendant à la réquisition générale des industries de guerre, ont obtenu à la Chambre des minorités sans cesse croissantes et peu à peu ce sentiment de gêne vis-à-vis d'un profit démesuré et illicite, si l'on se place sur un plan de haute moralité nationale, a inspiré la loi sur les bénéfices de guerre. Puis, le scandale des profiteurs de guerre et des nouveaux riches aidant, il a pris la forme d'un sentiment public irrésistible.

Ces profits, dans une période de surarmement, présentent le même caractère que pendant une période de guerre. Je prends deux exemples et je les tire d'établissements dont vous avez déjà entendu les noms à maintes reprises et dont vous entendrez encore prononcer les noms. Hotchkiss ! L'action Hotchkiss, pendant la guerre de 1914 à 1918, a été dédoublée trois fois. Le titre primitif, qui était, je crois bien, de 250 francs — je ne suis pas sûr qu'il n'était pas de 100 francs — représentait donc huit titres à la fin de la guerre dont chacun valait plus de 1.000 francs. Le capital avait été revalorisé dans une proportion de 3.000 pour cent. Ce même titre vaut aujourd'hui 4.000 francs. Dans le dossier même vous trouverez un rapport du contrôleur Millot au sujet des affaires Brandt. On y explique que les affaires d'exportation de matériel Brandt, menées de compte à demi entre l'Etat et la maison Brandt, ont donné un superbénéfice — je ne sais pas exactement ce que cela veut dire — de 30 %. On y explique que M. Brandt et son gendre, M. Renault, touchaient chaque année un dividende égal à 30 % du capital; sans compter leurs appointements, leurs frais de représentation et surtout sans compter leurs droits de licence, puisqu'ils possédaient les brevets exploités par la société. Comment est-il possible

qu'en présence de faits de ce genre, un mouvement puissant ne se forme pas pour attribuer à l'Etat le monopole de la fabrication des armes ?

Il fut un moment où l'on a voulu faire de ce procès le procès du bellicisme. Mais, l'industrie privée et le commerce privé des armes sont des industries bellicistes par excellence. Rappelez-vous l'enquête de Nye aux Etats-Unis. Rappelez-vous le mot de Briand à Genève : « C'est dans le même acier que sont taillés les canons et les plumes de ceux qui essaient de déclencher la guerre en Europe et dans le monde. » Les conséquences du commerce privé des armes nécessairement lié à l'industrie privée des armes, on les avait déjà aperçues pendant la guerre de 1914. La Bulgarie était notre ennemie. Les canons bulgares étaient, si je ne m'abuse pas, des canons français. Nous avons vendu à l'Italie, avant cette guerre, du matériel, notamment du matériel Brandt. L'idée que des soldats français puissent être atteints par un matériel de guerre fabriqué en France et dont nos ennemis usent contre eux est une idée qui a une résonance profonde dans le pays. Souvent — ce n'était pas le cas de l'Italie mais de la Bulgarie — ces armes fournies par des industriels français étaient payées sur le produit d'emprunts émis et placés en France. Comment tout cela n'aurait-il pas créé un mouvement en faveur de l'idée de la nationalisation de l'industrie et du commerce privé des armes ?

Voilà pourquoi la nationalisation, avant les élections de 1936 et du fait même du réarmement, avait provoqué un mouvement d'opinion si intense. Ce n'est pas une question dont je me sois beaucoup occupé. Je n'étais pas le spécialiste de cette question dans le parti socialiste. C'était un de mes camarades de parti — Edouard Daladier, l'autre jour, l'a désigné en termes assez clairs, mais il n'y a aucune raison pour ne pas le nommer — c'était mon camarade Paul Faure. J'ai d'ailleurs toujours pensé que

dans des programmes de coalition entre le parti socialiste et d'autres partis il fallait introduire des nationalisations, mais je pensais à des nationalisations d'un autre genre, surtout à la nationalisation des chemins de fer, d'une part, et des assurances, d'autre part, c'est-à-dire de deux monopoles privés. Mais, enfin, c'est dans ces conditions que la nationalisation a été inscrite au programme du front populaire. Pour le ministre de la Défense nationale, cela représentait un intérêt d'un autre ordre et il vous a dit lequel : l'intérêt de faciliter l'armement de la nation. C'est cette idée qui se trouve en première ligne dans l'exposé des motifs. Mais je vous rends compte, moi, des raisons pour lesquelles cette réforme a figuré dans le programme initial.

Croyez-vous qu'il y ait là l'effet d'une pression communiste ? Les communistes étaient tout à fait indifférents aux questions de nationalisation. Ils l'étaient à tel point que, quand on a débattu entre partis le programme du front populaire, les communistes étaient hostiles aux nationalisations. Vous pourriez trouver, dans le journal que je dirigeais, une polémique sur ce sujet avec un député communiste, Jacques Duclos. Croyez-vous qu'ils s'intéressaient particulièrement à la nationalisation des industries de guerre ? Vous étiez très curieux, Monsieur le Président, des influences politiques qui avaient entouré le dépôt du projet de la loi, et vous avez interrogé à ce sujet M. Daladier. Je vais vous fournir un petit élément d'information qui vous surprendra peut-être.

Au commencement de 1937, un administrateur du Creusot, qui est je crois un membre de la famille Schneider, M. de Saint-Sauveur, et qui lui-même, avant la guerre de 1914, s'occupait tout spécialement des intérêts considérables que la maison Schneider possédait dans de grandes industries russes, notamment dans les usines Poutiloff, est venu trouver l'ambassadeur de l'Union Soviétique à Paris, M. Po-

tiemkine. Il y avait à ce moment, entre le Creusot et l'Union Soviétique de petites frictions. Les Soviets avaient demandé au Creusot de grosses pièces de marine. On s'occupait beaucoup, à ce moment-là, de la constitution d'une marine soviétique. Ces pièces n'étaient pas livrées par le Creusot et le gouvernement soviétique croyait sentir de la part du fournisseur une certaine mauvaise volonté. A plusieurs reprises, le gouvernement soviétique s'en était plaint et ses plaintes avaient été transmises à l'administration de la guerre. M. de Saint-Sauveur a donc dit à M. Potiemkine : « C'est vrai ! nous avons mis beaucoup de mauvaise volonté à vous livrer ces pièces, mais jouons cartes sur table. Si vous le voulez, non seulement nous vous livrerons ce matériel très vite, mais nous exécuterons pour vous tous les autres matériels que vous nous demanderez et nous travaillerons pour vous comme nous le faisons pour la Russie tzarite. Mais, en échange, il faut que vous nous rendiez un petit service. La loi de nationalisation est votée, mais elle n'est pas encore appliquée. On discute encore au ministère de la guerre sur les établissements qui y seront compris. Nous pourrions probablement nous arranger pour que, dans les services techniques du ministère de la guerre, on n'insistât pas pour la nationalisation du Creusot. Seulement, il s'agit de neutraliser les influences socialistes. Le Creusot échappera à la nationalisation pour peu que vous vouliez bien dire un mot à ce sujet à M. Blum. » Une influence politique s'est ainsi exercée pour que le Creusot échappât à la nationalisation et cette influence politique était une démarche d'un des administrateurs du Creusot auprès de l'ambassade des Soviets à Paris.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — ...qui a continué la démarche auprès de vous.

M. LÉON BLUM. — M. Potiemkine a écouté sans mot dire, puis il a répondu que la seule chose qu'il put faire était de me transmettre purement et sim-

plement cette conversation. Mais je ne peux pas croire qu'il l'aurait fait si le parti communiste en France, qui n'était pas sans liaison avec l'ambassade soviétique, avait eu vis-à-vis de la nationalisation des industries de guerre une position bien ardente.

Je ne me serais pas permis de raconter cette anecdote, bien qu'elle soit, je crois, assez intéressante, si elle n'avait laissé une trace dans le dossier. Edouard Daladier, interrogé un jour à la sous-commission des armements de la Chambre par M. Georges Mandel qui lui demandait si des influences étrangères ne s'étaient pas exercées contre la nationalisation, a cru qu'il faisait allusion à cette visite de M. Potiemkine, dont naturellement je lui avais fait part, tout comme M. Potiemkine m'en avait parlé, un peu comme un enregistreur phonographique. Cependant, M. Mandel faisait allusion à autre chose, car, par hasard, il ignorait cet incident. La Cour le voit : quand il s'agit des influences politiques qui s'exercent pour ou contre certains actes gouvernementaux, la recherche, si on la poursuit avec un peu d'insistance, mène quelquefois à des résultats assez différents de ceux qu'on supposait.

Dans cette nationalisation qu'Edouard Daladier a fait voter conformément à l'engagement que nous avions pris dans notre déclaration ministérielle, quel a été mon rôle personnel ? Il y a un article de la loi qui avait été rédigé de ma main, avec beaucoup d'application. C'est celui qui est relatif à la fixation des indemnités. Dans la première phase de mon existence, j'avais fait par moi-même l'expérience des litiges de toutes espèces que produisent les rachats de concessions, et je voulais les éviter. D'autre part, j'étais très soucieux de ne pas grever la trésorerie par le paiement des indemnités. J'avais donc rédigé un article de loi qui était fondé sur deux idées. La première était l'extinction de la société expropriée en tant que personne morale, par le rachat des actions, ce qui supprimait tout litige

possible puisque la partie disparaissait, tandis que je crois que les litiges ne sont pas encore réglés en ce moment entre l'Etat et les établissements expropriés. Ma seconde idée était la faculté pour l'Etat de se libérer vis-à-vis des détenteurs de titres par la délivrance de rentes. C'est le même système que j'ai essayé de faire prévaloir pour la nationalisation des chemins de fer. Mais la commission des finances du Sénat a opposé à mon texte une résistance insurmontable et je le déplore encore aujourd'hui, car, d'une part, tous les litiges dont je parle n'auraient jamais existé et ensuite la nationalisation se fut exécutée, surtout pour l'aviation, dans des conditions infiniment plus aisées, car les crédits, au lieu d'être absorbés par des versements d'indemnités, auraient pu alimenter plus largement la trésorerie des entreprises. Je ne suis pas partisan des sociétés mixtes, je les considère comme une formule bâtarde qui crée à l'Etat beaucoup de responsabilités sans lui donner un pouvoir de gestion réel. En tout cas, telle est la part que j'ai prise dans la loi de nationalisation.

J'ai vu dans la déposition d'un témoin qu'à propos de la nationalisation, j'aurais pris certains engagements devant le Sénat. Je n'y suis même pas allé. Vous ne trouverez pas, dans la discussion de la loi devant le Sénat, un seul mot de moi. Je n'étais pas à mon banc. La discussion a été conduite par le vice-président du Conseil, ministre de la Défense nationale et de la Guerre. Il y suffisait fort bien, je vous prie de le croire. Je n'ai pris aucune part à cette discussion devant aucune des deux assemblées.

Maintenant, il s'agit de savoir les conséquences, les répercussions de cette loi.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Ce que l'arrêt de mise en jugement incrimine, ce n'est pas la loi sur la nationalisation, pas plus que l'arrêt n'incrimine en rien la loi de 40 heures dont nous parlions hier, c'est l'application qui a été faite de ces lois dans les matières in-

téressant la défense nationale. Nous sommes bien d'accord ?

M. LÉON BLUM. — Parfaitement, monsieur le président.

En ce qui concerne les industries dépendant du ministère de la Guerre, on peut tenir pour établi par l'instruction écrite aussi bien que par les débats tels qu'ils se sont déroulés jusqu'à ce jour que la nationalisation a augmenté le rendement de ces industries. Je dois même dire que l'hypothèse contraire présente à l'esprit quelque chose d'inconcevable. Comment, en effet, imaginer que, prenant des industries, y dépensant les millions par centaines pour développer leurs installations et pour améliorer leur outillage, alimentant leur trésorerie, leur donnant des facilités de crédit et leur assurant une continuité de commandes qu'elles n'avaient jamais connues, comment imaginer que par une espèce de miracle après tous ces efforts on ait pu arriver à une production réduite ? C'est là un mystère qui paraît indéchiffrable. Les résultats sont là. Pour chaque usine ils ont été établis et énoncés par M. Daladier. Ils seront encore affirmés ici à la barre par les témoins.

Mais il y a un point sur lequel je veux personnellement insister d'un mot, c'est celui de la nationalisation dans l'aviation. On a beaucoup parlé de l'état dans lequel M. Guy La Chambre avait trouvé l'aviation quand il est arrivé au ministère. Mais il y a dans le dossier un certain nombre de jugements très importants sur l'état dans lequel M. Pierre Cot avait, lui aussi, trouvé l'aviation, quand il a pris possession de ce même ministère. Vous n'avez qu'à vous reporter aux auditions de la commission des Finances du Sénat devant laquelle ont comparu le général Denain et surtout M. Marcel Déat. C'est M. Caillaux qui disait à M. Déat, en déplorant l'état dans lequel était l'industrie aéronautique : « mais alors il faudra bien finir par nationaliser tout

cela ». On se trouvait en présence d'une industrie dont le réquisitoire lui-même reconnaît l'état misérable : industrie artisanale — le mot revient dans toutes les dépositions — industrie dont la puissance de production est mesurée par le chiffre même auquel des experts assez bienveillants ont estimé le matériel qu'on rachetait.

Il y avait, je crois, 40 usines d'aviation qu'on entretenait avant le général Denain par le système des prototypes, ensuite par le système des commandes. Cette multiplicité des usines, qu'un homme comme M. Marcel Régnier, rapporteur général de la commission des Finances du Sénat, déplorait, a abouti à une conséquence très grave : la multiplicité des types. Pour faire vivre des usines, on ne répartissait pas entre elles les commandes d'un même appareil comme on l'a fait plus tard, on leur commandait à chacune un appareil de sa création. C'est ainsi qu'on est arrivé dans l'aviation française, au lieu de se concentrer comme l'aviation allemande sur un petit nombre de types constamment perfectionnés, à une multiplicité de types différents pour lesquels il fallait à chaque instant mettre sur pied des modes de fabrication entièrement nouveaux.

Je veux encore vous montrer à quel point cette nationalisation qui a permis la concentration — pas autant que M. Pierre Cot l'eût voulu et là aussi il s'est heurté à beaucoup de résistance — je veux vous montrer à quel point elle était nécessaire par un exemple que je tire du dossier. C'est l'honneur et le mérite de M. Guy La Chambre d'être parvenu à obtenir la fabrication en grande série des avions de chasse comme le Morane. Mais à partir de quel moment cette fabrication en grande série a-t-elle vraiment marché ? A partir — le dossier l'indique — d'octobre 1938. Pourquoi et comment ? Parce que, d'accord avec son ministre qui l'a couvert, un homme téméraire et aventureux, mais aussi avec des idées vraiment géniales, M. Caquot, a renouvelé

de fond en comble les méthodes de fabrication. Au lieu de commander à chaque usine des Morane complets, il a eu l'audace et le courage de diviser le travail entre les diverses usines. Il a dit à une usine : « Vous fabriquerez telle pièce de Morane » et à une autre : « Vous fabriquerez telle autre pièce ». Puis il a créé une usine centrale qui faisait le montage des avions complets.

Cette manière de faire a d'abord provoqué des retards parce que d'une usine à l'autre, il a fallu procéder à des transports de matériel, concentrer dans chaque usine, en l'empruntant aux autres, toutes les machines correspondant à la catégorie de pièces que cette usine était chargée de fabriquer. Mais, ensuite, quand tout a été organisé, on a obtenu de grands rendements.

Tout ce que je dis là est rigoureusement exact. Mais une concentration comme celle-là qui fait en réalité de toutes les usines nationalisées les instruments d'une même pensée et d'une même volonté, qui divise et qui partage entre elles impérativement le travail, croyez-vous qu'elle eût été possible sans la nationalisation préalable, avec des sociétés purement privées, alors même que chacune même eût dépendu rigoureusement de l'Etat par ses commandes ? Vous voyez bien que par des exemples comme celui-ci à quel point, du point de vue de l'intérêt de la défense nationale, la nationalisation était nécessaire, au même degré que pour un certain nombre de fabrication de guerre. Prenez un exemple, une usine Hotchkiss qui fabriquait du matériel de première nécessité. Les rapports contemporains qui sont au dossier décrivent dans quel état elle se trouvait, avec une surabondance de spécialistes et un outillage dont la pauvreté était lamentable.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — L'argument tel que vous l'exposez se comprendrait si l'on avait nationalisé l'ensemble des industries travaillant pour l'aéronautique, mais vous n'en avez nationalisé qu'un tout petit

nombre, parce qu'il y avait lieu évidemment de n'en nationaliser qu'un petit nombre.

M. LÉON BLUM. — On a nationalisé à une ou deux exceptions près toutes les fabriques de cellules.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Le fait est que votre argument ne porte pas.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Comment il ne porte pas ?

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Il a une portée trop générale. Pour qu'il fût vraiment solide, il eût impliqué que la nationalisation elle-même eût été générale.

M. LÉON BLUM. — La nationalisation a été, en ce qui concerne l'industrie des cellules, absolument générale. Je crois qu'il y a eu seulement une ou deux entreprises dont l'état financier était si mauvais qu'on a jugé à peu près impossible de les remettre sur pied. Presque toutes d'ailleurs étaient dans une situation financière misérable : ou bien elles étaient à la veille de la liquidation, ou bien elles étaient à la merci des banques qui leur faisaient des avances de crédit.

Il eût été, certes, préférable de nationaliser également les usines de moteurs et aussi certaines usines d'accessoires. Mais de ce qu'on aurait pu faire encore mieux, s'ensuit-il qu'on a pas fait bien ? D'ailleurs l'exemple que je vous donne et qui est saisissant, celui de la fabrication des Morane, est tiré de ce qui touche les cellules. Notez que pour les usines de moteurs, s'il n'y avait pas concentration d'Etat, il y avait concentration de fait, car, à part une seule usine qu'on a nationalisée et qui ne produisait pas grand chose, la maison Lorraine, tous les moteurs d'avions en France étaient fournis exclusivement par deux maisons : Gnome et Rhône et Hispano. Pour les accessoires comme les hélices, les trains d'atterrissage il y avait également une concentration très réelle. Au contraire, pour les cellules, il y avait cette dispersion qui est décrite en termes saisissants par M. Marcel Régner.

DESARMEMENT ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE

Il y a un point que je suis obligé d'aborder maintenant. Je dois répondre à l'accusation que l'on a tirée d'une phrase extraite de l'exposé des motifs du projet de loi.

Je ne sais qui a fait cette découverte. C'est, je crois, un des premiers témoins entendus par M. le conseiller instructeur : je ne sais si c'est M. Brandt ou un homme politique qui lui a mis sous les yeux cette phrase découpée dans un exposé des motifs où, à l'appui de la nationalisation, on formulait bien d'autres arguments et d'une bien autre nature.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Voulez-vous que je vous relise ce passage de l'exposé des motifs ?

« Les négociations poursuivies à Genève n'auront pas été stériles. Elles ont permis à la fin des travaux de la conférence du désarmement de formuler quelques principes généraux dont l'importance ne saurait être assez fortement soulignée car c'est dans ces principes que le présent projet a puisé son inspiration ».

Un peu plus loin :

« La France vient de manifester avec éclat son attachement à l'organisation internationale de la paix par la sécurité collective et le désarmement progressif. Elle peut donner immédiatement une forme concrète aux aspirations de la conscience publique en nationalisant dans une très large mesure des industries de guerre. Ce geste reconfortera les tendances pacifiques qui trop timidement s'accusent dans le monde. L'exemple que donnera la France entraînera l'opinion internationale ».

J'avais souligné ce passage de l'exposé des motifs

lors d'une précédente audience en le rapprochant de la situation internationale à l'époque où cet exposé a été rédigé.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je me rappelle très bien le jour où M. le conseiller instructeur m'a mis ce texte sous les yeux en me demandant si je le connaissais.

Je ne le connaissais pas, je ne l'avais jamais lu. Je vous ai dit quelle part j'avais prise à la rédaction du projet de loi sur la nationalisation : c'est exclusivement la rédaction de l'article sur la fixation et la liquidation des indemnités.

Seulement, j'ai compris que cet exposé me mettait dans un cas très grave. Pensez donc : M. Blum dépose des demandes de crédits pour armer la France et, en même temps, il rédige ou en tout cas il signe une phrase comme celle-là. N'est-ce pas la preuve de sa profonde duplicité ? Ne voit-on pas dans cette phrase percer le bout de l'oreille ? M. Blum est l'homme du désarmement. Il a écrit sur le désarmement des centaines d'articles. Il a même publié un livre. Eh bien ! au moment même où il se vante d'armer la France, au moment où les circonstances exigent en effet que cet effort d'armement trop longtemps ajourné soit enfin accompli, à quoi pense-t-il ? Il ne pense en réalité qu'à la désarmer. Tout le reste de l'exposé des motifs disparaît, toutes les autres raisons données s'évanouissent, tout ce qui a été dit au cours des discussions parlementaires s'envole en fumée et il ne reste plus que cette phrase accusatrice qui est devenue un signe d'aveu de ma duplicité et de ma trahison !

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Je me permets de vous rappeler dans le même ordre d'idées une autre phrase, que je n'avais pas citée jusqu'ici, mais que je vais vous relire puisque vous abordez ce sujet, phrase que d'ailleurs l'accusation vous reprochera peut-être en cherchant à connaître votre pensée intime.

Il s'agit d'une phrase extraite de votre profession de foi lors des élections de 1936 :

« La paix ne sera jamais solide dans un monde livré à la concurrence des armements et des marchands de canons. Il n'y a de vraie paix que la paix désarmée ».

M. LÉON BLUM. — Oui.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Cette phrase est dans le même ordre d'idées que la précédente. Voilà pourquoi je les rapproche l'une de l'autre pour vous donner l'occasion d'expliquer votre pensée.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je ne sais pas si j'ai rédigé en 1936 une profession de foi. C'est possible, je ne le crois pas.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — C'est probable.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Mais vous trouverez cette même formule de la paix désarmée dans 150 articles ou discours de moi. Par conséquent, il ne peut y avoir aucune espèce de discussion sur ce point entre nous.

Je vais dire d'abord à quoi correspondait l'insertion de cette phrase dans l'exposé des motifs du projet de loi sur la nationalisation, à côté, je le répète, ou plutôt après les motifs d'une toute autre nature visant la nécessité de la nationalisation d'une part et d'autre part du contrôle qu'on oublie toujours, pour le rendement des fabrications de guerre.

Mais examinons maintenant, à côté du courant d'idées qui avait déterminé l'inscription de la nationalisation dans le programme du front populaire, le courant d'idées qui avait provoqué l'insertion, dans l'exposé des motifs, d'une phrase comme celle-là.

Il y avait eu une conférence du désarmement à Genève. Elle s'était réunie en 1931. L'Allemagne l'avait quittée en 1933. La conférence avait néan-

moins continué ses travaux. Elle ne siégeait plus en séance plénière, mais elle avait laissé après elle une commission permanente qui, elle, n'avait cessé de poursuivre sa tâche.

Elle était arrivée à un certain nombre de données fermes. Elle était arrivée à cette donnée qu'une limitation des armements doit être générale et aussi qu'elle doit être contrôlée. Pour les fabrications d'Etat, les moyens de contrôle sont relativement faciles à trouver. On les avait étudiés à fond, notamment les moyens de contrôle budgétaire, car la gestion d'un établissement d'Etat transparait à travers les documents budgétaires, surtout s'il y a une convention qui impose à l'avance une forme déterminée et commune. Mais, pour les fabrications privées, quels peuvent être les moyens de contrôle international s'il n'existe pas au préalable un contrôle national ? C'est le contrôle de la Société des Nations sur les nations. C'est ainsi que par une autre voie on était arrivé à cette notion : ou bien la suppression, c'est-à-dire la nationalisation, ou bien le contrôle de l'industrie et du commerce privés des armes.

Quand le dépôt du projet de loi a été décidé, la rédaction de l'exposé des motifs a été confiée à une petite commission composée d'un très petit nombre de membres. Je crois qu'elle comprenait M. Oudinot, le contrôleur général Guinand, M. Louis Aubert.

M. JACOMET. — L'ingénieur général Happich et moi.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Dans l'exposé des motifs, on a mis en tête les motifs que l'on jugeait les principaux. Puis, à la fin, on a inséré une phrase qui répondait au stade terminal des travaux de la commission permanente de désarmement. De ces travaux, vous pouvez penser qu'ils étaient sans aucune actualité. Je le pense aussi rétrospectivement. Mais ils n'en présentaient pas moins un très grand intérêt

a cette époque, notamment dans les pays anglo-saxons comme les Etats-Unis. Tout récemment encore le président Roosevelt au cours d'une manifestation publique, avait montré l'intérêt que l'Amérique attachait aux travaux de la Conférence du désarmement où elle était représentée, alors qu'elle ne faisait pas partie de la Société des nations. A cette époque, la Conférence du désarmement et le Bureau international du travail étaient les seuls liens qui rattachaient les Etats-Unis à l'organisation internationale de Genève.

Ainsi donc, après avoir énoncé dans l'exposé des motifs les raisons d'ordre national, on a énoncé les motifs d'ordre international, et on l'a fait dans des termes qui correspondaient à la thèse qui avait toujours été soutenue à Genève au nom de la France, que le contrôleur général Jacomet qui représentait la France à cette Commission permanente y avait développée au nom de M. Tardieu et au nom du colonel Fabry.

M. JACOMET. — Et au nom de l'état-major.

M. LÉON BLUM. — J'allais l'ajouter. Thèse qui était également et qui a toujours été celle de l'état-major de l'armée, thèse qui est la thèse constante, permanente du gouvernement français et de la politique française. Cette phrase signifiait : le vote et la loi ne ferait que confirmer et consolider une position du commandement français et de tous les gouvernements français successifs.

Voilà à quoi se réduit cette terrible affaire de l'exposé des motifs.

Seulement sur ce point, vous me permettez de pousser personnellement l'analyse un petit plus profondément.

Vous êtes peut-être surpris à première vue, c'est une de ces contradictions apparentes, superficielles comme celles que je signalais hier en d'autres ma-

tières, qu'un gouvernement, tout en armant de son mieux le pays, tout en déployant l'effort le plus actif, le plus énergique pour rattraper le retard funeste dont le pays souffre, vous êtes peut-être surpris qu'il continue à parler du désarmement et persiste à agir en vue du désarmement ? Cela vous paraît sans doute incompatible, contradictoire.

Ce sont là des problèmes auxquels j'ai réfléchi pendant des années. Il n'y en a pas dans ma vie publique qui m'ait occupé et possédé au même degré. Je vous déclare que cette contradiction est toute superficielle. Dans la réalité des choses l'effort d'armement et l'effort de désarmement international, ou si vous voulez serrer de plus près ma pensée, l'effort pour armer d'une part, et d'autre part l'effort pour entretenir l'espoir d'un désarmement possible, ce ne sont pas là du tout des notions contradictoires. Ce sont au contraire des notions cohérentes, solidaires, rigoureusement complémentaires.

J'ai exposé toute ma pensée sur ce point dans un discours que j'ai prononcé à Genève dès les premiers jours de mon gouvernement et qui a eu la bonne fortune assez exceptionnelle d'avoir rallié l'unanimité absolue de toute l'opinion française telle qu'elle pouvait s'exprimer par la presse et au Parlement. La thèse que j'y avais exposée, et qui paraît vous surprendre, avait vraiment rallié l'adhésion entière du sentiment public.

Qu'est-ce que j'ai dit dans ce discours et qu'est-ce que je voulais dire dans les textes que vous pourriez retrouver, sinon dans ma profession de foi — je ne suis pas sûr d'en avoir fait une — mais en tout cas dans le discours radiodiffusé que j'ai prononcé à Narbonne, quelques jours avant les élections de 1936, et où je développais le programme de mon parti pour les élections générales ? Voici la substance de ma pensée.

Dans l'état présent du monde — depuis 1933 si vous le voulez bien — la paix ne peut être assurée

en Europe que par la sécurité collective et l'assistance mutuelle... Il existe des desseins de revanche et aussi des desseins d'hégémonie qui ne seront arrêtés que par la certitude de bloquer contre eux la totalité des nations groupées par le pacte dans la communauté internationale. Cette certitude ne sera acquise que si chacune des nations associées est résolue à tenir pleinement ses engagements vis-à-vis des autres, à honorer pleinement, coûte que coûte, la signature qu'elle a donnée. La paix ne saurait donc être préservée que si chaque nation assume courageusement le risque de la guerre et si elle se prépare à soutenir ce risque. De là découle la nécessité d'armer. Armer pour résister à l'agression, si on est soi-même attaqué, armer pour remplir les engagements de l'assistance mutuelle si une autre nation solidaire est attaquée. Armer pour couvrir la sécurité des nations que protègent notre signature et notre honneur.

Mais, comme je l'ai déclaré dans un discours de décembre 1936 à la Chambre, si, dans l'état présent du monde armer est un devoir ou plus exactement une nécessité immédiate, si l'assistance mutuelle ainsi conçue peut être efficace dans la généralité des cas et peut sans doute prévenir l'immense majorité des conflits possibles, elle pourra aussi transformer ce qui n'aurait été qu'un conflit local, en une guerre générale. Je n'ai pas besoin d'insister sur cette conséquence... Ce risque est d'autant plus faible qu'il est plus généralement accepté et plus courageusement accepté par les nations. Mais il existe. Il n'est pas éliminable dans l'état présent des choses : la France en a fait l'expérience. Et alors, comment pourrait-il être éliminé ? De deux façons seulement. Il faudrait ou bien que la communauté internationale fut suffisamment armée, ou bien que chaque nation fut suffisamment désarmée. Dans la première hypothèse, la communauté internationale posséderait en propre une force militaire assez puis-

sante pour s'opposer souverainement à toute tentative d'agression, d'infraction à ses règles, de rébellion contre ses sentences. La police internationale devrait disposer vis-à-vis de chaque Etat pris isolément de la certitude de supériorité dont la police centrale de l'Etat dispose vis-à-vis des individus. C'est dans cet ordre d'idées qu'on avait suggéré, par exemple, de réserver à la Société des Nations le monopole de l'aviation militaire. Mais, à défaut de cette première hypothèse, assez difficile à réaliser, on est nécessairement rejeté vers la seconde : celle où aucun des Etats particuliers ne posséderait plus en propre une force militaire assez puissante pour tenter l'aventure, pour braver la communauté internationale, pour la placer devant le fait accompli, pour paralyser par l'effroi et la terreur le jeu de la sécurité collective. Vis-à-vis des nations suffisamment désarmées la sentence internationale s'imposerait sans possibilité de rébellion et de défi ; à tout le moins l'effet de sanctions purement pacifiques resterait efficace. Voilà le sens profond du désarmement, de la limitation des armements. C'est seulement par le désarmement que la sécurité collective fondée aujourd'hui sur la force des armes, peut être vidée peu à peu de son contenu virtuel de guerre. Seul, il permettrait le jeu pleinement pacifique de l'arbitrage et de l'assistance mutuelle.

Dans un système comme celui-là, que j'ai constamment soutenu, au point d'affirmer qu'on avait le droit d'user de la force pour obliger une nation à y participer, vous voudrez bien reconnaître qu'il n'y a rien d'incompatible, au contraire, entre l'effort d'armement et l'effort mené, en vue du désarmement, mais qu'il s'agit, au contraire, des éléments inséparables d'un même ensemble.

Quel est le danger, d'ailleurs le danger positif, direct d'une telle politique ? Si elle réussit, on arrive à limiter et à contrôler d'une façon générale les armements, à désarmer suffisamment les nations, par

une convention unanime et loyalement acceptée, pour que l'autorité de la communauté internationale suffise à prévaloir sur la résistance possible de chacune d'elles et à assurer le règlement pacifique de tous les litiges. Dans ce cas, la paix, la paix véritable, la paix désarmée est assurée. Voilà ce que paix désarmée signifie. Et certes je souhaitais qu'il fût possible d'arriver à un état pareil : certes je considérais ce système comme un idéal pour les hommes qui gouvernent au nom de la France.

Mais si cela ne réussit pas, la position de la France n'est nullement compromise, elle est consolidée. Elle est consolidée sur le plan international parce qu'on a donné à l'opinion universelle la preuve de sa volonté profonde de paix : on ne s'est pas désarmé pour cela, puisqu'il n'a jamais été question de désarmer avant que de pareilles solutions soient définitivement acquises et cela a été dit en propres termes. Sur le plan extérieur, le plan international, la situation politique et morale est donc fortifiée, consolidée, et elle l'est également sur le plan national. Il est d'autant plus aisé, et surtout il est d'autant plus légitime d'inciter le pays aux suprêmes sacrifices pour assurer sa défense armée, qu'on a plus ardemment et plus sincèrement tenté de barrer la route à la guerre, de construire une Europe d'où le danger de la guerre serait exclu.

Messieurs, voilà quel a été le sens de notre exposé des motifs de 1936, voilà le sens de notre attitude au gouvernement.

Je pourrais vous en donner la preuve la plus évidente. Il s'est tenu le 19 mai 1937, une séance du Comité permanent de la défense nationale dont vous avez, bien entendu, le procès-verbal au dossier. A cette séance assistaient le ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Yvon Delbos, et moi. L'objet de la réunion était de définir les instructions qui seraient données aux délégués français à la commission permanente du désarmement. Je n'ai pas copié le texte

intégral de ce procès-verbal, mais j'ai pris en lisant, quand on me l'a communiqué, quelques extraits qu'il est facile de vérifier.

« Cette séance, dit le procès-verbal, a pour objet la mise au point de la position française à l'égard des questions susceptibles d'être évoquées prochainement devant le bureau de la commission permanente du désarmement.

M. Delbos fait un exposé de la question. M. Daladier déclare : « Nous ne voyons — c'était l'idée constante de l'état-major — que des avantages à ce que tout le monde suive l'exemple donné par notre loi d'août 1936 ».

« M. Delbos intervient et l'interviens à mon tour : « M. Léon Blum déclare qu'aussi bien en ce qui concerne l'Angleterre qu'en ce qui concerne la France, sa conviction est tout à fait contraire à celle qui vient d'être exprimée ». Il s'agissait de la résistance dans certains cercles de l'opinion anglaise à l'idée de la reprise des travaux de la commission permanente. « A son avis, il est d'autant plus facile d'entraîner une large partie de l'opinion au réarmement qu'on peut lui montrer le désarmement plus proche ou qu'on peut attester devant elle d'un effort loyal pour le désarmement. Sur une remarque de M. le maréchal Pétain, M. Léon Blum pose la question suivante : « Qu'advient-il si l'Allemagne et l'Italie n'acceptent pas de participer aux travaux ? » Il y répond en indiquant que, dans ce cas, notre intérêt est de pousser les travaux le plus possible, sans toutefois passer à aucune mesure d'exécution, tant que l'adhésion de ces puissances ne sera pas obtenue ».

Au cours de cette discussion, j'ai constaté l'accord absolu de pensée sur la position que j'ai définie : pousser les travaux de la commission du désarmement, continuer, même en l'absence de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie de façon à en tirer davantage vis-à-vis

de l'opinion universelle, et, bien entendu, ne passer à aucune mesure d'exécution dans notre pays, tant qu'on ne serait pas arrivé à obtenir une convention générale. J'insiste encore dans la suite de la discussion sur l'intérêt puissant d'une attitude de ce genre au point de vue de l'opinion internationale, et je trouve ceci dans mon analyse : « Le maréchal Pétain pense que l'on ne devrait aborder la question de la limitation des armements que lorsque l'Angleterre et nous aurions atteint notre maximum. M. Léon Blum déclare que c'est une condition *sine qua non* : à la base de toute limitation il faut placer l'achèvement des programmes en cours ».

La séance s'est terminée sur un accord unanime. C'est à l'unanimité qu'on a défini les instructions des représentants français à la commission permanente du désarmement. Et, je le répète, à cet accord, ont participé, non seulement l'état-major, car c'était lui qui, comme toujours, avait fait la préparation technique de la discussion, mais aussi le maréchal Pétain, qui, explicitement, au cours de cette séance, s'est déclaré en complet accord avec les idées que je venais d'exprimer.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Encore deux mots, si vous voulez bien, sur l'exposé des motifs de la loi de nationalisation des industries d'armement. Pour défendre ce projet vous vous placez sur le plan national, mais sur le plan international ? L'accusation, sur le plan international, vous fera peut-être remarquer que votre thèse impliquerait, pour avoir une autorité véritable, que les nations, toutes les nations intéressées participassent aux travaux de la conférence du désarmement. Or, deux tout au moins ne participaient peut-être plus aux travaux de la Conférence du désarmement, ou plutôt leur avis n'ayant pas été aisément acquis, cela enlevait sans doute quelque autorité à la thèse et à la position que vous preniez ainsi.

M. BLUM. — Cela nous inspirait, à coup sûr, le

sentiment que notre position avait peu de chance d'aboutir à un résultat positif, mais cela ne détruisait pas les faits, cela ne supprimait pas les avantages de notre position, ni du point de vue international, ni du point de vue national. Au point de vue international, cette espèce de mise en demeure adressée à l'Allemagne et à l'Italie, devant la conscience universelle — car elle existe, elle possède une puissance et une force réelles, nous l'avons bien vu pendant la guerre de 1914 — cette espèce de mise en demeure pour les sommer de se prononcer comme nous-mêmes pour l'effort de la limitation et de contrôle des armements, cela compte. Car personne, en somme, n'ose dire, en s'adressant à l'opinion universelle ou à son propre peuple, qu'il ne veut pas la paix sur terre. La paix, tout le monde en parle toujours. Seulement, voici l'épreuve : il faut maintenant prononcer, dire oui ou non. Allez-vous accepter ? Si oui, il y a une possibilité de paix dans le monde, sinon, la conscience universelle saura d'avance, sans qu'il soit besoin de créer pour cela des Cours suprêmes, où se trouve la responsabilité de la guerre. Elle saura avec certitude qui a été l'agresseur. Et quant à la position nationale, je répète ce que j'ai dit : c'est que vis-à-vis d'un pays à qui l'on administre la preuve tangible qu'on a tout fait pour éviter la guerre, qu'on est allé jusqu'à l'extrémité de l'effort possible, même si dans son for intérieur on ne croyait pas au succès possible, quand on a ainsi poussé les tentatives jusqu'au bout, alors on est singulièrement plus fort pour demander à un peuple de s'imposer le sacrifice suprême avec abnégation et avec courage.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Sur le plan national, peut-être l'accusation pourrait-elle vous faire observer ceci qui se rattache à l'idée que vous venez d'exposer : c'est que vous, chef de parti, chef de gouvernement et qui jouissiez d'une autorité considérable...

M. BLUM. — Pendant un certain temps.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — ...dont toute idée émise par vous à l'égard de ceux qui vous suivaient pouvait apparaître peut-être comme une idée-force, n'avez-vous sans doute pas été d'une imprudence extrême dans la rédaction des écrits que vous avez été appelé à signer. N'y a-t-il pas eu de votre part une certaine imprudence, alors qu'il apparaît que la situation commande de concentrer tous ses efforts en vue de la défense nationale, de la défense de la patrie, de la préparer à tous les dangers possibles ? N'apparaît-il pas qu'un des éléments qu'un chef de gouvernement peut à ce moment envisager le plus directement c'est la préparation morale du pays aux dangers possibles ? Et croyez-vous que ce soit préparer activement, intensément le moral du pays à l'idée de certains dangers, de certaines nécessités qui pourront lui advenir que de lui parler, même à l'occasion des industries d'armement et de la nationalisation, de certains — comment dirais-je... — de certains rêves comme la sécurité collective...

M. BLUM. — Rêves !

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — ...et le désarmement progressif ? cela contribue-t-il à faire entrer dans l'idée du peuple cette notion qu'un chef doit conduire selon les nécessités, avec la force qui s'impose à lui : l'intensité de son effort toujours plus grand... Qu'en pensez-vous ?

M. BLUM. — Nous sommes là dans un débat politique !

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — C'est vous qui l'avez commencé.

M. BLUM. — Je répondrai bien volontiers, d'abord qu'il y a une mesure en toutes choses et qu'il ne faut tout de même pas exagérer le retentissement international possible d'une phrase d'exposé des motifs, que je ne sais pas si un journal quelconque a reproduit, qui n'a été certainement connu nulle part et n'a pas été épluché avec toute la minutie

qu'ont pu y apporter certains témoins de l'accusation — ou l'accusation elle-même.

Mais prenons les textes qui, à ce moment, exposaient la pensée du gouvernement. Lisez mon discours de Genève à l'assemblée de la Société des Nations, au mois de juillet, discours approuvé par l'unanimité de l'opinion. lisez mon discours sur la politique étrangère à la Chambre en décembre, approuvé à l'unanimité par l'Assemblée. Reportez-vous si vous voulez, au discours de Lyon, au mois de janvier, qui a eu aussi un grand retentissement, et où j'ai traité spécialement des questions de désarmement et des relations entre l'Allemagne et nous. Je vous le répète, sur la question même que vous m'avez posée, je ne suis pas d'accord avec vous. Je ne crois pas que ce soit affaiblir le moral d'un peuple, que ce soit le débilitier que de lui montrer, en même temps qu'on arme autant que l'on peut parce que les nécessités de la situation l'exigent, qu'on ne laisse pas cependant se prescrire l'espoir — c'est le vrai mot, ce n'est pas un rêve, c'est un espoir — d'un arrangement international, d'un règlement international d'une organisation pacifique de l'Europe.

Il n'y a pas un peuple en ce moment, même parmi ceux des régimes totalitaires, qu'on puisse entraîner ou maintenir dans la guerre si on ne lui donne pas tout d'abord l'assurance qu'on a tout fait pour préserver la paix. Même les dictateurs s'adressant à leurs peuples sont obligés de tenir ce langage et de dire : « nous n'avons pas voulu cela, la guerre nous a été imposée, nous avons fait tout au monde pour la prévenir ». Et nous, gouvernement républicain, nous ministres républicains dans un pays d'opinion alors libre et de suffrage universel, nous y étions tenus encore davantage. Nous avons ainsi rallié toute l'opinion française et tout le Parlement autour des demandes de crédits massifs qui se sont succédé entre 1936 et la guerre.

et qui n'ont jamais rencontré l'ombre d'une difficulté dans l'opinion et dans les Chambres. L'une des raisons de cette unanimité c'est précisément qu'on savait que nous avions tout fait pour maintenir la paix en Europe et que par de semblables projets nous faisons une fois de plus tous nos efforts pour la rendre possible. Non, non, monsieur le Président, ce sont là des questions graves, non pas au point de vue de ce procès, mais pour chacun de nous vis-à-vis de sa conscience d'homme et de citoyen. Croyez-moi, c'est moi qui ai raison dans ce débat. Il y avait pour moi deux tâches à réaliser. Armer le pays, et ne pas renoncer à l'armer tant que la sécurité ne serait pas un fait certain, tangible. Mais aussi prouver au peuple qu'on ne renonce à aucune expérience, à aucune tentative qui aient la moindre chance d'être réalisées. C'est la politique nécessaire qu'il convient de suivre pour gagner et viriliser l'esprit public.

Je suis un homme dont la plus grande partie de la vie publique s'est passée à étudier ces problèmes. Je suis, paraît-il, aujourd'hui un belliciste: j'ai été autrefois un pacifiste en ce sens que j'ai consacré des années d'efforts et d'études à rechercher le moyen de prévenir la guerre et d'organiser en Europe la sécurité collective. Mais la paix telle que nous la voulions et telle que nous espérions l'organiser, c'était une paix indivisible, s'étendant à l'Europe entière, comportant un règlement général et équitable de tous les litiges: c'était une paix reposant sur la liberté des peuples, le respect des contrats, sur la prévalence de toutes les notions morales qui règnent entre les nations comme entre les hommes. Et le jour où ils ont vu l'indépendance des nations menacée, les contrats violés, le monde livré à des desseins de conquête et d'hégémonie, alors, ces hommes que l'on qualifiait injurieusement de pacifistes bêlants se sont rendus compte que si la paix reposait toujours sur la sécurité collective,

la sécurité collective. elle ne pouvait plus reposer que sur la force des armes. Les pacifistes sont devenus de soi-disant bellicistes sans avoir changé. C'est pour cela que, comme chef de gouvernement, j'ai fait ce que j'ai fait. Mais, jamais je n'ai renoncé à l'espoir du désarmement, jamais je ne l'ai laissé se prescrire. Et si, en septembre 1936, je me suis engagé dans une négociation directe et personnelle avec un représentant du chancelier Hitler, c'est parce qu'un des articles essentiels de la conversation qui s'engageait entre nous, était l'accession de l'Allemagne à une négociation sur la limitation générale et le contrôle des armements.

Le représentant du chancelier Hitler était le Dr Schacht. Il est venu me voir à Matignon, pour une conversation directe, en passant par-dessus les intermédiaires officiels au nom du Chef du Reich. J'aurais peut-être pu dire, si j'avais été l'homme qu'on dépeint : « Je suis marxiste, je suis juif, je n'entre pas en conversation avec un Etat où l'on a extirpé toutes les organisations socialistes, où l'on persécute les juifs ». Si j'avais dit cela, j'aurais trahi les devoirs de ma charge. Mais je lui ai dit : « Je suis marxiste, je suis juif, et c'est pour cela que j'ai le désir le plus vif encore de voir aboutir la conversation qui s'engage maintenant entre nous ». Il m'a répondu : « Monsieur, cela ne vous fait que plus d'honneur ». Je ne lui demandais pas ce témoignage, mais j'en tire avantage pour montrer que, lorsqu'il s'est agi de questions de désarmement, que ce fût à Genève, à Paris ou ailleurs, je n'ai eu en vue que les intérêts de notre pays. En même temps, je réalisais des plans d'armement massifs à un point tel que personne ne l'avait fait encore. Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, j'ai rempli les devoirs de ma charge, mon devoir de chef de gouvernement. J'ai rempli mon devoir de Français.

(L'audience, suspendue à quinze heures, est reprise à quinze heures trente minutes.)

LES OCCUPATIONS D'USINES

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Le troisième élément relevé contre vous par l'acte d'accusation, c'est d'avoir, par votre faiblesse devant l'agitation révolutionnaire, spécialement en tolérant des occupations et des neutralisations d'usines, amené une diminution considérable de la production: le tout évidemment en ce qui concerne les produits utiles à la défense nationale.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Les explications que j'ai à donner à la Cour se trouveront très abrégées par celles que je lui ai déjà fournies hier sur les mouvements de mai et juin 1936. La Cour sait dans quelles conditions, sous quelle forme, avec quelle généralité s'est produit le mouvement d'occupation d'usines, ce que M. Lucien Romier, dans un article du *Figaro* de cette époque appelait l'explosion sociale qui est venue frapper le ministère Blum au moment même de sa formation. Ce mouvement a commencé à décroître à compter de l'accord Matignon. La C. G. T. au cours des conversations de Matignon, s'était engagée à y mettre fin dans toute la mesure du possible. Elle s'y est efforcée. Un appel a été lancé aux ouvriers le soir même par M. Léon Jouhaux. Il a été renouvelé. J'ai indiqué ailleurs une partie des raisons qui ont rendu plus lente la décruescence de cette énorme marée humaine; mais en fait, dès le mois de juillet, on pouvait considérer que le mouvement n'avait plus qu'un caractère local. Il y a eu en septembre une petite rechute qui a été de courte durée. Ensuite, on ne s'est plus trouvé qu'en présence de cas d'espèce tout à fait particuliers sur lesquels j'aurai, dans un instant, à revenir succinctement.

Ce mot d'occupation n'était pas rigoureusement exact, bien que maintenant il soit passé dans la

langue courante. Jamais une usine n'a été occupée du dehors; jamais les ouvriers venus de leur maison ne sont allés occuper l'usine. Ce qui se passait, c'est qu'à l'heure du débrayage, quand les sirènes sifflaient le repos et le départ pour l'équipe, les ouvriers, au lieu de s'en aller, restaient. L'expression populaire qui a été employée dans la région du Nord, où cette forme de grève avait pris naissance, il y a de longues années, est beaucoup plus juste. En langage ouvrier, on appelle cela la grève sur le tas. C'est une expression très caractéristique, saisissante et qui rend mieux compte de la réalité.

Il faut noter qu'au point de vue de l'ordre public, cette forme de grève a d'incontestables avantages. Les ouvriers occupent l'usine, mais il est vrai que l'usine occupait les ouvriers. Les ouvriers étaient là et pas ailleurs. Ils n'étaient pas dans la rue. Au moment où ils étaient tous groupés dans l'usine, ils ne formaient pas ces cortèges avec des chants, des drapeaux rouges, qui viennent se heurter aux barrières de police, ce qui produit les incidents violents et quelquefois sanglants de toutes les grèves connues. Pas de contact direct sur la voie publique, avec la force publique. Il y avait violation du droit de propriété, cela ne fait aucun doute. Je n'ai jamais fait difficulté de le reconnaître. Je l'ai déjà dit à la Chambre le 6 juin. Je l'ai répété toujours avec la même franchise dans les très nombreuses discussions auxquelles, dans les deux Chambres, les incidents de cette nature ont donné lieu. Il y a violation du droit de la propriété, d'un droit de propriété — remarquons-le — abstrait, théorique puisque la grève est légale et qu'en réalité le propriétaire de l'usine n'était privé d'aucun droit utile. Mais enfin, il y avait, sans nul doute, violation d'un droit. C'est le premier devoir du gouvernement de faire respecter ce droit, comme les autres; c'est le devoir du gouvernement de faire exécuter les décisions de justice qu'un certain nombre de pa-

trons ont provoquées en introduisant par exemple des référés. Aucune espèce de doute et de restriction là-dessus.

Seulement voilà — nous allons encore parler politique, je m'en excuse — un gouvernement n'a pas qu'un devoir à la fois. Il n'en est pas des gouvernements autrement que des individus. Il y a pour les gouvernements comme pour les individus des contradictions et quelque fois des incompatibilités entre les devoirs différents. Il y a pour le chef du gouvernement des situations qui ressemblent à ce que l'on appelle dans la vie privée des cas de conscience. On est pris entre des devoirs différents et, en apparence ou en réalité, opposés, et on est obligé, chef du gouvernement ou homme privé, d'établir une certaine hiérarchie entre des devoirs tous certains, comme de faire respecter le droit de propriété et comme d'autre part de préserver la paix publique. C'est sous sa responsabilité politique dont les assemblées sont juges qu'un chef de gouvernement choisit.

Je suis pénétré encore aujourd'hui, et plus que jamais, de cette conviction qu'à cette heure, dans la hiérarchie des devoirs, celui qui primait les autres, qui devait s'imposer avant tout autre à moi, c'était de préserver l'ordre civique, c'était de préserver ce que j'appelais à la tribune du Parlement la paix civile. Je vous ai rappelé, et je défie encore sur ce point toute contradiction, que personne ne m'a jamais demandé autre chose, que, à ce moment, quand on était devant la réalité et non pas à six ans de distance, personne ne m'a proposé d'agir autrement que je ne l'ai fait. D'ailleurs, messieurs, vous pourrez apprécier, d'après l'ensemble des documents du dossier, par exemple d'après le texte que je citais hier : la déclaration de M. Sarraut au Sénat, reproduisant le langage que lui tenaient les patrons eux-mêmes quand ils parlaient « d'un potentiel de force et de passion qui animait en ce moment

la multitude ouvrière » et qui aurait donné un caractère de luttes violentes ou de guerre sanglante à tout effort fait pour chasser les ouvriers par la force des usines. Vous n'avez qu'à vous reporter à des documents comme celui-là pour vous demander si vraiment, en conscience, tel n'était pas le premier devoir de la charge

Mais examinons le problème du point de vue qui est le vôtre, celui de l'incidence sur les rendements eu sur les fabrications. L'autre jour, monsieur le Procureur général a jeté dans la discussion un chiffre qui a naturellement produit un grand effet par son volume apparent. Il a dit que d'après des statistiques dressées par le ministère du Travail la crise avait entraîné une perte de 19 millions d'heures de travail. Je ne crois pas avoir mal entendu.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — J'ajoute 19.190.196 heures.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Les statisticiens sont vraiment des gens admirables. C'est un chiffre qui fait grand effet. Mais je vais vous dire qu'il m'étonne peut-être dans un autre sens que M. le Procureur général l'a annoncé. 19 millions d'heures, mettons 20 millions en nombre rond, cela représente 2 millions et demi de journées de travail de 8 heures.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Dans la région parisienne.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Oui, dans l'agglomération parisienne. Nous avons près d'un million de chômeurs, cela représente deux jours et demi.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Seulement dans les usines travaillant pour la défense nationale.

M. LÉON BLUM. — 19 millions d'heures, ce nombre astronomique correspond exactement à 2 millions et demi de journées de travail. Pour une population de 500.000 ouvriers, cela représente 5 jours. Si vous appliquez ce nombre à une population plus étendue, c'est à peu près l'équivalent d'un jour.

M. LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL. — On aurait pu faire des avions et des chars pendant ce temps.

M. LÉON BLUM. — On aurait pu faire des avions et des chars ? Je vais vous répondre tout de suite. On aurait pu faire des avions ? En admettant même que la déperdition ait été beaucoup plus grande, en admettant, comme le fait le contrôleur général Bois dans un rapport auquel j'ai déjà fait allusion que, toutes les causes cumulées, grèves, occupations d'usines, grèves consécutives, congés payés qu'on a quasi bloqués, aient produit un retard de deux mois, qu'est-ce que cela aurait représenté pour l'aviation ? Cela représentait deux ou trois douzaines des appareils que l'on fabriquait dans ce temps-là. On fabriquait alors des Bloch 210, des Potez 54, le vieil Amiot, le vieux Farman. Cela aurait-il eu une grande importance pour la défense nationale alors que l'armée surabondait de ces types d'appareils que l'on n'aurait pas employés sur le front de 1939-1940 ? Il y aurait eu deux ou trois douzaines de ces appareils en plus. Cela aurait-il eu une influence sur le sort de la guerre ?

Réfléchissez un peu, sans prévention et sans parti pris. Quels étaient les matériels en fabrication à ce moment-là ? Nous sommes avant le programme de septembre 1936. Pour les canons antichars, avant le programme, qu'est-ce qui était en commande ? Le programme Fabry-Maurin comprenant 2.000 pièces en tout. Ces 2.000 pièces sont prévues pour la fin de l'année 1936 et sont livrées à la fin de l'année. Il y en avait 2.000 à quelques unités près livrées le 1er janvier 1937. Tous les documents du dossier sans controverse possible concordent là-dessus. Vous avez fait une observation, monsieur le Président, à propos des chars Renault. Le rapport Bois a estimé qu'en effet toutes les causes totalisées que je viens d'indiquer peuvent avoir produit deux ou trois mois de retard sur les chars Renault en 1936. Les com-

mandes de chars Renault avant notre programme portaient sur quelle quantité ? Je crois qu'il y en avait 300 en commande à ce moment-là. Le contrôleur général Bois, dans son rapport, ajoute qu'il est difficile de rattraper ce retard chez Renault. Je ne vois pas bien pourquoi. Mais il ajoute qu'il était facile de le rattraper si on voulait bien donner des commandes à Hotchkiss. Hotchkiss avait des spécialistes en surabondance et insistait pour qu'on les fit travailler

C'est peut-être une digression, mais j'ai l'occasion de le dire ici et je le dis : je ne sais pas si dans certains milieux techniques il n'y avait pas le sentiment que le char était une espèce de propriété de la firme Renault. Pour le char B, la preuve en est dans le dossier. Du fait que c'était un consortium composé de Renault, Schneider, Delaunay-Belleville et je crois les Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée qui avait financé les premiers travaux d'études sur la demande du général Estienne, on a admis qu'il existait un monopole de fabrication pour le consortium de ces quatre maisons. Il n'y a jamais eu de commandes de carcasses de chars B en dehors de ces quatre maisons. Même pour le char léger, vous verrez dans la suite de l'instruction combien malgré leur qualité excellente, la commande de chars Hotchkiss avait suscité de difficultés. Je sais que dès qu'on a commandé des chars à Hotchkiss cela a amené une baisse de prix singulièrement sensible sur les chars Renault. Alors ne parlons pas trop du retard des chars. Pour les avions, je vous le dis vraiment, le résultat est négligeable. Je répète : est-ce que cela compte quand vous faites le bilan des forces relatives de la France et de l'Allemagne au moment de l'entrée en guerre de supposer qu'il y aurait quelques unités de plus du vieux programme Denain à caser dans nos escadrilles. S'il en avait fallu quelques douzaines de plus, on les aurait trouvées sans peine. Pour les anti-

chars, en ce qui concerne la fabrication du programme Fabry-Maurin, ils étaient exécutés à la date fixée. Pour les chars, il était facile de couvrir ce retard de deux ou trois mois, qui d'ailleurs, avait d'autres causes beaucoup plus sérieuses car, pour les chars, les causes essentielles de retard ont été d'une part les difficultés de réalisation technique et d'autre part le manque de concordance, de synchronisme, entre la livraison des carcasses, la livraison des cuirasses et des tourelles. Il y a d'ailleurs deux documents contemporains qui sont tout à fait concordants : le rapport présenté à M. Fabry avant son départ du ministère où sont exposés les états des fabrications en cours et où sont expliquées les causes du retard des chars ; d'autre part, en 1938, la correspondance entre M. Happich et M. Lambert-Ribot dans des conditions que j'indiquais hier. Or M. Lambert-Ribot, au nom de la maison Renault, expose les causes de retard des chars et n'en donne pas d'autres que celle que je viens d'indiquer.

Par conséquent, n'exagérons pas, je vous en prie, l'importance de tout cela. Vos 19 millions d'heures, quand on veut bien analyser ce que cela représente, on constate que cela ne représente pas grand'chose. Quand on essaie d'en trouver le retentissement et l'incidence réelle sur ce que vous êtes chargé d'établir, c'est-à-dire sur les causes et les responsabilités de la défaite, je crois qu'il n'en reste plus rien du tout.

M. LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL. — Puis-je vous rappeler à ce sujet la déposition de M. de Lescaillé que vous avez invoquée hier ? Vous savez ce qu'il y a dedans.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Pas du tout, mais vous allez me le dire.

M. LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL. — « Dès que les résultats des élections de 1936 ont été connus, j'ai eu à

subir l'occupation d'usines à Issy-les-Moulineaux d'environ 500 ouvriers de la société Loire-Nieuport. Je me suis rendu immédiatement au ministère de l'Intérieur pour demander des instructions sur la conduite à tenir. J'ai été reçu par M. Sarraut — c'était donc avant votre ministère. Il m'a déclaré qu'il exerçait en fait l'intérim et se trouvait dans une situation difficile, mais qu'en tout cas il ne pouvait mettre à sa disposition aucun agent de la force publique. Par la suite, j'ai eu à connaître d'autres occupations d'usines comme président de l'Union syndicale; mais en ce moment les faits de cette nature n'étaient plus une nouveauté. C'est par l'intermédiaire de M. Lambert-Ribot, de l'Union métallurgique, que toutes les démarches furent faites auprès du gouvernement de M. Blum ».

M. LÉON BLUM. — Savez-vous ce qu'elles ont été ?

M. LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL. — Nous n'avons obtenu de ces entrevues aucun résultat pratique, en ce qui concerne la protection des usines.

En ce qui concerne le résultat de ces occupations, je reviens alors à la question que tout à l'heure je posais d'abord au point de vue des cadres qui ont éprouvé la perte de leur autorité. Il en est résulté une diminution de rendement très variable suivant le cas d'espèce. On peut l'estimer à 30 %. Il dépasse même ce chiffre dans certains cas. Ces occupations — je termine la citation — ont d'ailleurs été suivies par toute une période de troubles occasionnés par les représailles des ouvriers contre ceux de leurs camarades dont ils n'avaient pas approuvé l'attitude au cours des occupations. Il y a eu de nombreux cas où les ouvriers ont dû abandonner l'usine dans laquelle ils travaillaient.

Je suis amené à poser cette question : au point de vue du matériel vous verrez les déficiences que ces occupations d'usines ont provoquées et au point de vue moral, vous voyez les graves inconvénients

qui pendant plusieurs années se sont prolongés à la suite de la carence du gouvernement.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Carence du gouvernement ? Merci, monsieur le Procureur général. En ce qui concerne les résultats matériels, je maintiens rigoureusement ce que j'ai dit. Vous avez au dossier pour chaque usine le tableau chronologique des occupations et vous avez ainsi le nombre exact des journées de travail perdues. Je voudrais bien savoir ce que l'usine Loire-Nieuport fabriquait le 6 juin. Je suppose que c'était des appareils Nieuport, je n'en sais rien. Ce dont je suis sûr, c'est que c'est un appareil qui au moment de l'entrée en guerre n'avait plus aucune valeur militaire. Quelques unités de plus ou de moins, cela n'a aucune valeur quand vous avez aujourd'hui à rechercher les responsabilités de la défaite militaire. Quelles conséquences morales cela a-t-il produit ? Moi je vais vous demander quelles auraient été les conséquences morales de la politique contraire. Voilà la question que je voudrais poser. C'est en effet le choix qui se posait devant un chef de gouvernement. Je vois bien d'un côté un certain nombre d'heures perdues dont j'ai essayé de mesurer l'effet positif direct. De l'autre, si dans des circonstances pareilles aussi périlleuses, aussi dramatiques j'avais pris, ou si M. Sarraut, mon prédécesseur — puisque j'ai trouvé cette politique déjà entièrement engagée — huit jours auparavant, avait pris l'initiative contraire, nous serions allés au plus grave des conflits sociaux, et je le répète, comme conséquence fatale, à la guerre civile. C'était plus grave que ce qu'annonce M. de Lescaillé comme conséquences au point de vue du rendement. Le ressentiment qu'aurait laissé dans la classe ouvrière même vaincue une politique de sanctions impitoyables et de répression n'aurait pas été moins grave, je suppose.

Il ne suffit pas de dire à un homme : vous avez trahi les devoirs de votre charge; il faut lui dire

quels étaient ces devoirs. J'espère qu'on me les dira. J'espère qu'il existe dans l'esprit de la Cour ou du Parquet une sorte de code des devoirs d'un homme politique. Quand vous jugez un meurtrier, c'est tout simple, vous avez l'article du code. Il a tué. Le code dit : on ne doit pas tuer. Il n'y a pas de code écrit pour les hommes politiques, les ministres, les anciens ministres. Il faut que vous en établissiez un dans votre esprit avant de l'appliquer. Il ne suffit pas de me dire à moi ou à l'un de ceux qui sont sur ces bancs : Vous avez trahi les devoirs de votre charge. Il faudra me dire auquel de ces devoirs j'ai manqué. Il faudra définir mon devoir. Il faudra que vous m'affirmiez qu'à cette heure-là, dans une situation à laquelle je ne peux encore aujourd'hui penser sans angoisse, mon devoir était de jeter la France dans de tels risques, dans de tels périls, car je n'exagère pas, je ne grossis pas. Je ne crois pas vous donner l'impression d'un homme qui travestit la vérité pour sa défense personnelle. Si je m'étais trompé, qui m'empêcherait de le dire ? De quoi aurais-je peur ? Personne ne me suppose de mobile bas, intéressé. Si je m'étais trompé, ce serait par excès de confiance, d'idéalisme, d'attachement à la classe ouvrière. Il n'y a dans tout cela rien de déshonorant pour un homme. Si je m'étais trompé, qui m'empêcherait, je vous en prie, de vous en faire aveu ? J'ai eu le temps de réfléchir depuis, je vous l'assure. Non, je ne me suis pas trompé. Mon devoir était clair, impérieux. Il était d'épargner à la France, à la suite de la guerre civile, la guerre étrangère, de ne pas provoquer entre patrons et ouvriers ce que les patrons redoutaient alors le plus, cette espèce de division morale qui est plus grave et plus pernicieuse que tout, dans un pays et dans une démocratie. Mon devoir était de ne pas provoquer de semblables convulsions civiles. En tout cas, que j'aie eu tort ou raison, mon parti était pris : je n'aurais pas, moi, employé la force ; je

n'aurais pas fait marcher d'abord la garde mobile et ensuite l'armée, dont ce n'était pas la mission. Je n'aurais pas fait cela. Si je n'avais pas pu par la persuasion et la conciliation entre ouvriers et patrons ramener ce que j'ai appelé l'ordre civique, l'ordre républicain, j'aurais renoncé à mon mandat et peut-être à ma vie d'homme politique.

Un souvenir est resté pour moi plus cruel que tous les autres : c'est celui du soir de Clichy. Il y a eu ce jour-là une échauffourée sanglante. Dieu sait que je n'y étais pour rien, que j'avais fait tout mon possible. Si vous voulez vous renseigner sur les causes les plus probables de cet accident tragique, vous consulterez là-dessus un homme qui a travaillé auprès de vous, M. le Conseiller Bételle. Bien que cette journée eût été celle d'un grand succès pour le gouvernement, le succès triomphal de l'emprunt que nous avions lancé, je sais quel sentiment d'angoisse et de douleur, encore vivant, encore présent en moi, j'ai éprouvé ce soir-là.

Non, non, d'aucune façon je ne l'aurais fait. Quelques mois après, la situation était différente. Vous me parlez hier, monsieur le Président, des patrons qui, de leur cabinet, venaient téléphoner au commissaire de police pour demander qu'on les protège. Ceux-là ne voyaient la situation que de leur point de vue personnel, local. Les organisations patronales, qui elles, voyaient la situation dans son ensemble, qui savaient ce qui existait un peu partout et à quel degré, n'ont rien demandé de pareil.

Plus tard la situation n'a plus eu que ce caractère local, personnel. On pouvait faire respecter la loi sans courir de pareils risques. La hiérarchie des devoirs à partir de ce moment-là a changé. Nous n'avons pas hésité ; nous avons fait respecter le droit de propriété. Par exemple au commencement d'octobre, une grève de restaurateurs et d'hôteliers a éclaté juste au moment du Salon d'automobile. Nous avons fait évacuer les restau-

rants par la police. J'ai trouvé tout à fait par hasard, une note à ce sujet, ces jours derniers. Le soir du jour de cette opération, qui s'est faite avec un plein succès, le journal *Le Temps* me reprochait d'avoir fait procéder à cette évacuation trop doucement. Le résultat avait été obtenu ; les grévistes avaient été mis hors des locaux qu'ils occupaient ; le droit de propriété était respecté. Seulement, voilà le grand malheur ! Grand signe de la faiblesse du gouvernement ! de sa faiblesse criminelle ! il n'y avait pas eu de bagarres, il n'y avait pas eu de violence, il n'y avait pas eu de rixe entre les grévistes et les forces de police. C'est un grand malheur, n'est-ce pas, c'est un cruel et dur reproche à faire à un chef de gouvernement.

Nous avons fait la même opération le mois suivant, en novembre, dans les grèves de la chocolaterie, grèves qui ont eu à leur origine des manœuvres bien suspectes, si je songe à l'homme qui les a provoquées et au rôle qu'il joue aujourd'hui. Nous avons recommencé dans le Nord à propos des neutralisations. Une fois le principe de l'arbitrage accepté, par les patrons, nous avons fait évacuer les usines. Elles ont été évacuées — c'est ce que Dormoy répondait à la tribune du Sénat à M. le sénateur Fourcade — sans attendre que la procédure d'arbitrage fut commencée, sur la seule acceptation du principe de l'arbitrage. Monsieur le président, je crois que sur le sujet des occupations j'ai épuisé ce que j'avais à dire à la Cour. J'en viendrai ensuite aux neutralisations.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Vous disiez que vous aviez eu à choisir entre une hiérarchie de devoirs.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Oui.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — ...et que vous aviez choisi ceux qui paraissent les plus impérieux et les plus nécessaires à remplir.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Cela me le paraît encore.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Vous avez choisi par ordre de grandeur. On vous fera remarquer que peut-être la situation n'était pas si grave au point de vue des occupations d'usines quand vous aviez pris le pouvoir le 4 juin 1936, par exemple, si nous en croyons une déposition reçue à l'instruction, celle de M. Albert Sarraut votre prédécesseur.

M. Albert Sarraut nous donne des chiffres. On lui demandait quel a été le volume des occupations : « Dans la période qui me concerne, dit-il, ayant précisé que les occupations d'usines avaient commencé le 26 mai, il a fait l'intérim jusqu'au 4 juin, dans la période qui me concerne, dit M. Albert Sarraut, le volume des occupations n'a pas dépassé 70 à 80.000 grévistes qui, le 2 juin, étaient descendus à une dizaine de mille. Hier vous nous avez donné le chiffre des grévistes tel qu'il s'est trouvé au moment où vous avez exercé le pouvoir, à une date que je ne peux pas préciser. Vous avez dit : un million.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Oui.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — J'avais trouvé dans des déclarations de M. Langeron, le chiffre de 800.000, peu importe.

M. LÉON BLUM. — C'est cela.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Je donne les chiffres de M. Albert Sarraut. Mais si vous avez pris le pouvoir avec 10.000 grévistes, n'eût-il pas été possible à ce moment-là, même en respectant la hiérarchie des devoirs, d'arriver à maintenir la sécurité complète, telle qu'elle résultait de l'état social français, même la liberté du droit de propriété.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Si je n'avais eu affaire qu'à 10.000 grévistes, la situation eût été bien simplifiée. Mais vous avez le sentiment, je crois, qu'un chiffre comme celui-là ne concorde pas avec les circonstances. Nous le verrons avec M. Sarraut. II

arrive quelque fois que les dépositions ne soient pas enregistrées d'une façon qui rende tout à fait rigoureusement la pensée du déposant.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Les chiffres sont bien précis.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je vais vous lire l'extrait du discours de M. Albert Sarraut au Sénat. M. Sarraut a exposé dans la séance susvisée — je prends ce texte dans la déposition de M. Langeron (le discours est de juillet) — la réponse que lui firent les patrons. Ceux-ci lui demandèrent formellement de ne pas faire usage de la force. « Ils soulignèrent qu'aucune violence n'avait été commise dans les usines, qu'étant donné le potentiel de vigueur, de nombre, de résistance qu'opposerait la masse ouvrière, on irait à coup sûr à un conflit sanglant dont ils seraient eux-mêmes rendus responsables lorsque le travail reprendrait, que l'on risquerait également le ravage et la destruction d'usines, dont la conservation importait au pays, qu'enfin — car le patronat n'avait pas la conscience parfaitement claire et nette — qu'enfin certaines revendications étant justifiées, ils faisaient appel au gouvernement pour les aider à négocier. »

Il me semble, en effet, dans certaines pièces de l'instruction, trouver les traces de cette espèce de roman. Le mouvement d'occupations aurait été fini quand j'arrivai au pouvoir et il aurait recommencé avec une intensité bien plus grande lorsque je m'y suis installé.

J'ai été appelé à l'Elysée le jeudi 4. Je me suis présenté devant la Chambre le 6. Matignon est du 7. Il ne s'est pas écoulé beaucoup de jours entre ma prise de pouvoir, le jeudi soir et la réunion de Matignon, le dimanche matin. Tous les faits qui se sont produits entre le jeudi soir et le samedi matin : le langage de M. Albert Lebrun, les démarches des patrons auprès de moi, mon appel radiodiffusé, vous ne pouvez pas ne pas les avoir

présents à l'esprit. Des événements comme ceux des premiers jours de juin laissent une trace dans les mémoires. Cela ne s'oublie pas si vite. Ne vous rappelez-vous pas ce qu'était la réalité de ces mouvements ? Il faudrait préciser à quelle date on était tombé à 10.000 grévistes.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Le 2 juin, dit M. Albert Sarraut.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Il y a eu des conversations engagées par Frossard à un moment donné qui n'ont pas abouti et c'est peut-être après l'échec de ces conversations que le mouvement s'est amplifié à nouveau. Mais il fallait qu'il y eut quelque chose de plus grave que 10.000 grévistes pour qu'Albert Sarraut et Frossard fissent demander par la présidence de la République d'occuper les ministères du Travail et de l'Intérieur, sans perdre une heure, sans attendre jusqu'au lendemain matin pour la transmission des pouvoirs.

Du reste, il y a au dossier un certain nombre de documents concernant des occupations. On indique à quel moment l'occupation a commencé. Vous verrez si dans la plupart des documents cette date n'est pas antérieure au 5 juin, date de ma prise de possession effective du pouvoir.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Autre chose, voulez-vous, dans le même ordre d'idées. Il y a au dossier deux dépositions intéressantes : celle de M. Guichard et celle de M. Marchand, qui ont été tous les deux chefs de la police de Paris. M. Marchand, déposition du 10 juillet 1941 déclare : « J'ai l'impression très nette qu'il aurait été facile de s'opposer à ces occupations en employant les forces de police et la police armée. La chose aurait été d'autant plus facile qu'on aurait employé plus tôt les moyens de coercition. »

M. LÉON BLUM. — Oui, Monsieur le président. Lorsque des chefs d'usine ou d'entreprise télépho-

naient à la police municipale pour demander qu'on fit évacuer leur usine, les services leur répondaient qu'ils allaient en référer aux autorités compétentes et finalement aucun ordre n'était donné pour employer la force armée aux fins d'expulsion.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Autre chose : vous avez dit que les patrons n'ont pas demandé l'expulsion des grévistes occupant les usines. Voici ce que dit sur ce point M. Guichard.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Je ne dis pas que des patrons isolés n'aient pas téléphoné.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Déjà des chefs locaux avaient pris, dit M. Guichard, l'initiative de retenir des effectifs et de demander des renforts pour appuyer l'intervention qu'ils jugeaient nécessaire. C'est alors, dit M. Guichard, que je reçus du cabinet du préfet des instructions très nettes pour différer toute action de cette nature. Je dus faire rentrer à leur cantonnement les renforts des gardes mobiles déjà envoyés dans deux banlieues pour participer à des évacuations projetées. Auparavant, je téléphonai au préfet qui confirma l'instruction transmise par son cabinet vers le 26 mai 1936.

M. LÉON BLUM. — 26 mai, c'est cela.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Oui. Et un peu plus loin : « Sur les demandes des patrons, sur la recommandation du préfet, j'avais prié la Chambre syndicale patronale la plus intéressée par les occupations d'usines, celle de la rue Lauriston, de ne pas requérir notre intervention au fur et à mesure qu'une nouvelle usine était occupée et de nous laisser notre liberté d'action, ce que M. Richemond, président de cette Chambre syndicale, dut confirmer par lettre. » Il est donc difficile de dire avec autorité que les patrons n'ont pas demandé l'expulsion des ouvriers occupant les usines. S'ils ne l'ont pas demandé, c'est à la demande du préfet de police lui-même.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Mais sur la déposition de M. Guichard, je tiens à dire un mot. M. Guichard est un serviteur congédié qui a dû quitter son service à la préfecture de police dès les premiers jours de juin 1936.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT. — Il dit même pourquoi : parce qu'il avait voulu enlever le drapeau rouge sur certains établissements. C'est cela qu'il dit.

M. LÉON BLUM. — Oui, c'est cela qu'il dit, mais ce n'est pas pour cela qu'il a été congédié. C'est à cause du rôle qu'il avait joué dans l'émeute du 6 février. A ce moment, M. Guichard ne pensait probablement pas qu'on pût employer les forces de police pour réprimer une insurrection armée et lui, chef de la police municipale, n'était pas à son poste, il n'était pas à la tête de ses troupes. Voilà la raison. Vous pourrez entendre là-dessus, puisqu'il est convoqué comme témoin, le rapporteur général de la commission parlementaire d'enquête, M. Rucart, commission présidée par un homme dont le nom, je crois, attire un respect universel, M. Bonnevay.

La déposition Guichard est en réalité une déposition dirigée toute entière contre M. Langeron. Qu'ils s'expliquent ensemble. Vous les confronterez. Mais quant à M. Guichard, je le répète aujourd'hui, il a dû quitter la préfecture de police à cause du rôle qu'il avait joué dans l'affaire du 6 février où, feignant une appendicite, il n'était pas à son poste au moment du danger. Quand il sera là, je demanderai à M. Guichard s'il n'est pas exact qu'après son limogeage, comme il dit, il ne soit pas entré au service d'une organisation patronale de combat. J'attends, à ce sujet, une contradiction de sa part.

Je donne ces détails pour bien montrer tout ce qu'il peut entrer de partialité politique dans ce débat, d'où vous prétendez bannir la politique.

Et tout cas, je le répète, cette déposition Guichard qui, d'ailleurs, il l'a dit d'une façon explicite, vise surtout la première phase de l'occupation, celle pendant laquelle il aurait été possible, selon lui, d'agir avec les moyens de police ordinaire, elle est d'un bout à l'autre une dénonciation calculée contre son ancien chef M. Langeron et c'est entre M. Langeron et M. Guichard que vous pourrez vous-même instituer le débat, lors de leur venue.

Je vous ai montré tout à l'heure qu'en ce qui concernait les occupations d'usines, il y avait conflit possible entre le droit de propriété, d'une part, et d'autre part, un devoir supérieur du gouvernement : le devoir d'assurer la paix civile.

En ce qui concerne les neutralisations d'usines le conflit se pose entre deux catégories de droits particuliers : d'une part le droit de propriété du patron, le droit du patron de recruter des ouvriers en dehors des grévistes, le droit de travailler qui appartient, soit aux ouvriers de l'usine qui n'ont pas voulu se solidariser avec la grève, soit aux nouveaux ouvriers recrutés pour remplacer les grévistes, ceux qu'en langage ouvrier on appelle injurieusement les « jaunes » et d'autre part, le droit de grève avec ses conséquences nécessaires, naturelles qui comprennent entre autres, ce qu'on appelle en Angleterre et aux Etats-Unis, le picketing, c'est-à-dire, le droit pour les ouvriers grévistes, par des moyens de persuasion, ou par des moyens d'appel sentimental, d'entraîner avec eux dans la masse ouvrière en grève les quelques ouvriers qui étaient restés réfractaires à la décision prise.

Ces deux catégories de droits sont dans la loi.

Si vous les poussez l'une ou l'autre jusqu'à l'extrême — et c'est le cas de tous les droits individuels — il n'y a pas de gouvernement possible, il n'y a même pas de société possible. Si vous poussez jusqu'au bout ces deux droits, ceux qui appar-

tiennent d'une part aux patrons et aux ouvriers non grévistes, d'autre part, à la masse d'ouvriers en grève, vous aboutissez à la bataille dans la rue, vous aboutissez aux rixes et aux bagarres entre les piquets de grève et les ouvriers non grévistes ou les nouveaux engagés. Et si vous, gouvernement, vous intervenez avec une certaine rudesse pour rendre libre l'entrée des usines, vous intervenez en fait dans la grève, en faveur du patron ; vous ne tenez pas la balance égale entre les deux droits que vous devez également faire respecter.

Alors, quelle est la solution ? La solution on l'a cherchée bien souvent ; M. Waldeck-Rousseau et M. Millerand avaient cru la trouver. Ils ont déposé à l'époque où M. Waldeck-Rousseau était président du conseil et M. Millerand, ministre du Commerce, une loi sur l'organisation du droit de grève. Lorsqu'un certain nombre d'ouvriers désirait la grève, un scrutin s'instituait dans l'usine, avec des garanties sévères de sincérité, et une fois que la majorité s'était prononcée, sa décision prévalait en cette matière comme en matière politique. C'est-à-dire que la grève devenait légale, que l'arrêt du travail devenait obligatoire pour le patron, et que, par conséquent, l'usine était « neutralisée ».

Au Sénat, devant M. Millerand lui-même, qui n'a pas protesté, car il ne pouvait pas protester, je l'ai dit : « La conséquence pratique de la loi que vous aviez conçue avec M. Waldeck-Rousseau, c'était en fait la neutralisation de l'usine. »

Qu'est-ce que nous avons fait ? Nous n'avions pas le temps de faire voter la loi de Waldeck-Rousseau et de Millerand, et d'ailleurs nous pensions à une autre loi qui a été votée quelques jours plus tard, la loi sur l'arbitrage. Mais nous avons dit simplement : « L'usine est peut-être à vous, patron ; le droit de grève est peut-être à vous, ouvrier, mais la rue est à nous, gouvernement. C'est nous qui occuperons la rue, c'est nous qui maintiendrons

l'ordre contre les uns ou contre les autres. Et au Sénat, répondant toujours à M. Fourcade, mon pauvre ami Dormoy, mort assassiné, vous le savez — on l'a trouvé un matin, la tête déchiquetée par une bombe dans la ville où était fixée sa résidence surveillée, assez mal surveillée, comme vous voyez ; les auteurs directs du crime sont connus, mais je ne sache pas que ses inspireurs aient été recherchés — au Sénat donc mon ami Dormoy répondait à M. Fourcade : « Je n'ai jamais employé le mot de neutralisation et les gardes mobiles dans le Nord, — car cela se passait dans la région lilloise et dans les métallurgies de la Sambre — les gardes mobiles n'ont pas d'autre instruction que d'assurer l'ordre dans la rue contre toutes les éventualités ».

Il y avait à ce moment des grèves dans le textile et des grèves métallurgiques dans la région de la Sambre et la région lilloise. Les populations du Nord sont des populations courageuses et profondément patriotes. Ce sont aussi des populations violentes où les réflexes ouvriers présentent quelquefois un certain caractère de rudesse. D'autre part l'instruction aurait pu, je crois, sans grande peine, se rendre compte de ce qu'était à ce moment précis l'état d'esprit particulier des ouvriers dans la région du Nord. Les incidents de neutralisation d'usines se sont produits à la fin de novembre et en décembre. Or, en novembre, le ministre de l'Intérieur, qui était également le député et le maire de Lille, Roger Salengro, avait été assassiné, lui aussi. Il avait été assassiné par une calomnie atroce, dont un vote unanime de la Chambre l'avait justifié, mais trop tard pour que les effets meurtriers n'eussent pas agi en lui et ne l'eussent pas conduit jusqu'à une issue fatale.

Mais le préfet du Nord, qui est toujours le même qui est toujours à son poste, qui a vu les premiers effets des neutralisations d'usines, pourra vous dire ce qu'était l'état d'esprit de la classe ouvrière dans

cette région déterminée à ce moment-là. L'ancien maire de Lille, qui en est encore le député, pourra vous le dire. Nous avons tout lieu à ce moment-là, bien que dans le reste de la France il y eût un apaisement certain pour la raison précise que je vous indique, de redouter que les conflits à la porte des usines ne prissent un caractère violent.

On a entendu quelques-uns des patrons du Nord. Ils viendront peut-être déposer à la barre ; ce sont des patrons parfois très durs. Je me rappelle des pourparlers d'arbitrage auxquels nous procédions M. Camille Chautemps et moi. M. Chautemps est d'une très grande affabilité naturelle. Il était entré dans cette négociation avec un préjugé favorable à leur égard. Je me rappelle leur dureté et tout ce que cette dureté recouvrait d'âpreté autoritaire, de vieil esprit de patronat de droit divin. En les entendant, M. Chautemps fut soulevé d'une colère vraiment furieuse. Voilà vis-à-vis de quels hommes nous avons décidé les neutralisations d'usines.

Mais que faisons-nous en même temps. Nous préparions l'arbitrage. Nous faisons évacuer les usines, dès que le principe de l'arbitrage était accepté et c'est ainsi que les grèves se sont terminées. Je ne sais plus si c'est M. Chautemps et moi qui avons arbitré — j'en ai arbitré tant — le conflit lillois ou si nous nous étions seulement chargés de la négociation préalable qui aboutit à l'acceptation de l'arbitrage par un patronat longtemps récalcitrant.

Dans la Sambre, j'ai eu la bonne fortune de trouver l'aide — car c'est bien, j'en suis à peu près sûr, dans ce conflit-là qu'il a offert un si précieux concours — d'un homme qui était mon ami, que quelques-uns d'entre vous ont connu et que tous ceux qui l'ont connu ont respecté. Le premier président Paul Matter. C'est lui qui a arbitré ce conflit. Il m'a prêté le concours de son amitié dans cette

circonstance, sans se laisser offusquer par le scandale des mesures de neutralisation.

La neutralisation était une sorte de mise sous séquestre provisoire, de mise sous scellés durant laquelle tous les droits de part et d'autre étaient réservés. Pendant ce temps nous maintenions l'ordre dans la rue. Nous arrivions pratiquement au même résultat que celui qu'envisageaient M. Waldeck-Rousseau et M. Millerand par leur loi sur l'organisation de la grève. Nous amenions les parties à l'arbitrage. Si une des parties se refusait à l'arbitrage, c'est contre elle que nous usions de la pression dont un gouvernement peut disposer. C'est ainsi que nous sommes parvenus à résoudre ces conflits. Ils étaient encore en cours — car il a fallu une disposition transitoire de la loi pour les régler — quand nous faisons voter par les Chambres un texte sur la conciliation et sur l'arbitrage obligatoire qui interdisait la grève aussi bien que le lock-out, avant que des tentatives de conciliation et d'arbitrage eussent suivi leurs cours. Je constituai en même temps cette cour d'arbitrage dont un autre de mes amis d'autrefois, mon camarade Georges Pichat avait bien voulu accepter la présidence. Aussitôt cette cour fonctionnait et une jurisprudence de l'arbitrage s'introduisait petit à petit dans les mœurs.

Voilà comment, selon l'expression du conseil de justice politique, je transformais des réformes sociales en instrument de division entre patrons et ouvriers. C'est par la conciliation, c'est par l'accord, c'est par l'entente que j'ai essayé de régler toutes les difficultés de cette « explosion sociale » qui était venue frapper au visage mon gouvernement, dès mon arrivée. Et en cela, du terrain sur lequel la Cour se place, je pense que j'ai adopté la politique qui pouvait le moins nuire à la France et qui pouvait le mieux profiter à la production et au rendement du matériel.

Vous m'aviez cité des témoignages. Vous m'en citerez d'autres. Il ne sera pas difficile de faire défilé ici, comme on l'a fait à l'instruction, 50, 100, 150 patrons qui viendront vous dire : « Il est arrivé ceci dans mon usine ; j'ai eu tel ennui, telle difficulté ». Qu'est-ce que cela prouvera ? Cela prouvera qu'il y a eu des difficultés pendant cette période. Qui le nie ? Tout le monde le sait. Croyez-vous que je discute sur la matérialité de ces difficultés ouvrières ? Il y a eu à ce moment-là ; il y en a toujours en France, avec une gravité variable. La question n'est pas là. La question est de savoir si ces difficultés, c'est moi qui les ai créées, ou si au contraire, c'est moi qui les ai apaisées. Voilà le vrai problème. Et puis, c'est aussi de savoir si, apaisées par moi, elles ont eu cependant un retentissement sur le problème que vous avez spécialement à étudier et à régler. Mais en quoi est-ce un grief contre moi de venir me dire : telle usine a été occupée de tel jour à tel jour. Et puis après ? Je le sais, je vous assure, ces difficultés-là personne ne les a vécues d'aussi près que moi, aussi péniblement que moi. Mais quel a été mon rôle ? Ai-je eu un rôle d'excitateur, d'aggravateur ? J'ai eu un rôle de conciliateur. Je l'ai eu obstinément. Je n'ai pas essayé autre chose, et j'y ai réussi, peut-être mieux qu'un autre n'aurait pu le faire à ma place. C'est tout le problème.

LE PARTI COMMUNISTE

J'ai encore quelques mots à ajouter. Je ne crois pas avoir éludé en rien l'accusation. Mais je voudrais faire un dernier effort pour la toucher dans ce que je sens bien être son réduit intime, dans ce que je sens bien être son intention, son inspiration profonde.

Pour mon usage personnel, quand je prends des notes pour mon travail, c'est ce que j'appelle « l'argument du venin ». L'accusation semble convaincue — et c'est ce dont elle voudrait convaincre l'opinion — que ma politique a injecté dans la société française, et spécialement dans la classe ouvrière, un venin, un poison, un élément toxique, tellement toxique que ses effets délétères se sont poursuivis indéfiniment et durent peut-être encore aujourd'hui.

Je crois que c'est bien cela le fond de l'accusation, je crois que c'est bien le fond de ce qu'on retrouve sous les divers griefs, sous les divers chefs d'accusation, sous les questions de tout ordre qui n'ont été posées au cours de l'instruction. Je ne veux pas dire que cela soit articulé d'une façon l'en précise nulle part, mais je ne crois pas me tromper en affirmant qu'on sent partout cette idée latente et présente. J'ai empoisonné le pays et je l'ai intoxiqué par ce qu'on appelle ma faiblesse, ma complaisance. Ma faiblesse et ma complaisance vis-à-vis des menées subversives et, premièrement j'imagine, vis-à-vis du parti communiste.

En quelques mots, sans embarras, je voudrais m'expliquer sur mes rapports avec le parti communiste. C'est entendu, le parti communiste était entré dans la coalition de front populaire. C'est entendu aussi, l'année précédente, à la fin de 1935, un pacte dit « d'unité d'action » avait été conclu entre le parti communiste et celui auquel j'appartenais moi-même, le parti socialiste. La raison d'être de ce pacte d'unité d'action comme la raison d'être de la coalition de front populaire, je vous l'ai déjà indiquée : c'était un réflexe de défense dont étaient menacées en France, les institutions républicaines et la liberté elle-même. Mais le pacte d'unité d'action et la coalition de front populaire n'ont été conclus qu'après une certaine date, après la date où M. Laval, ministre des Affaires étrangères du cabinet

Flandin, était parti pour la Russie, avait signé un pacte avec M. Staline et où M. Staline, par une manifestation publique et retentissante, avait approuvé, avallé, les efforts qui étaient faits en France pour augmenter la puissance défensive du pays. Ce n'est qu'après cette déclaration, après que les communistes, conformément à la déclaration de Staline, eurent abandonné, en matière de défense nationale, la position dite de défaitisme révolutionnaire que Thorez affirmait encore contre moi à la tribune dans le débat du 15 mars 1935, ce n'est qu'après qu'ils eurent renoncé explicitement à leur campagne autonomiste en Alsace-Lorraine, c'est seulement après cela, qu'ont pu être conclus et qu'ont été conclus d'une part le pacte d'unité d'action et, d'autre part la coalition de front populaire.

Je ne crois pas que les dirigeants du parti communiste eussent pour moi des sentiments de prédilection particulière. J'avais été, dans le parti socialiste, l'homme qui, au moment de notre scission, avait le plus efficacement résisté à une adhésion globale du parti socialiste français à la III^e Internationale, au Komintern. J'étais l'homme qui, contre le parti communiste, avait marqué le plus fortement la distinction ou même la contradiction des deux doctrines. Malgré tout, j'ai été partisan de l'unité d'action, et de l'entrée des communistes dans le front populaire, à partir du moment où ces obstacles ont été levés : question de défense nationale et question d'Alsace-Lorraine.

Je suis devenu chef du gouvernement. Je ne crois pas que dans une seule occasion, dans une seule circonstance, je leur ai cédé ; je ne crois pas que jamais sous leur pression, j'ai abdiqué un seul des devoirs que me dictait ma mission de chef de gouvernement. Dans une circonstance à laquelle j'ai fait allusion tout à l'heure, à propos de cette entrevue dont j'ai fait revivre certains aspects

devant la Cour, le parti communiste s'était prononcé d'avance contre moi, de la façon la plus menaçante ; mon attitude, n'en a pas été modifiée. Dans la politique dite de non-immixtion en Espagne, j'ai rencontré son opposition déclarée ; je n'en ai pas moins persisté dans ce que, toutes les données du problème étant posées, je considérais comme l'intérêt de la France. A aucun moment je n'ai cédé. Il est possible qu'il n'ait pas désiré que mon gouvernement se prolongeât, qu'il ne m'ait pas toujours servi, si je puis dire, sans arrière-pensée, mais j'étais convaincu et je suis encore convaincu qu'il est impossible de défendre en France les libertés républicaines en excluant de cet effort les masses ouvrières et la fraction de l'élite ouvrière encore groupées autour de la conception communiste. Et je pensais surtout que c'était un immense résultat et un immense service rendu que d'avoir ramené ces masses et cette élite à l'amour et au sentiment du devoir envers la patrie.

Cela dit, qu'il y ait eu entre eux et moi telles ou telles difficultés cela n'a plus d'importance et, pour ma part, je les efface entièrement de ma pensée. Je n'oublie pas qu'à l'heure où je parle l'Union soviétique est engagée dans la guerre, dans la même guerre que nous, il y a deux ans, contre les mêmes adversaires. Je n'oublie pas que, dans la zone occupée, le parti communiste fournit sa large, sa très large part d'otages et de victimes. J'ai lu l'autre jour, dans une liste d'otages donnée par un journal, le nom du petit Timbaud. J'ai très bien connu le petit Timbaud : c'était un secrétaire de l'Union des syndicats métallurgistes de la région parisienne. Il était à la conversation du 15 mars. Je l'ai vu souvent, j'ai été bien souvent en bataille avec lui. Seulement il a été fusillé et il est mort en chantant la *Marseillaise*, cette *Marseillaise* que, malgré tout, nous avons réappris aux ouvriers à chanter, peut-être pas la *Marseillaise* officielle,

peut-être pas la *Marseillaise* des cortèges officiels et des quais de gare, mais la *Marseillaise* de Rouget de l'Isle et des volontaires de l'An II, la *Marseillaise* du groupe de Rude, la *Marseillaise* de Hugo « allée et volant dans les balles ». C'est comme cela qu'est mort le petit Timbaud et que sont morts beaucoup d'autres. Par conséquent, pour ma part, en ce qui concerne le parti communiste, je n'ajouterai rien.

LA LIBERTE ET LA JUSTICE ENGENDRENT SEULES LES GRANDES VERTUS VIRILES

Est-ce que j'ai été plus complaisant envers mon propre parti, envers le parti auquel j'appartenais et que je représentais au gouvernement ? Je suis toujours demeuré avec lui dans le contact le plus étroit, mais je vous ai dit hier, à une autre occasion, quelle avait été mon attitude. J'ai joué un rôle un peu singulier, un peu original dans la vie publique, en ce sens que je n'ai jamais recherché le pouvoir, que j'ai même mis à m'en écarter autant d'application et de soin que d'autres pouvaient mettre à s'en rapprocher et que j'en ai détourné mon parti aussi longtemps que cela m'a paru possible. Mais à partir du jour où les circonstances le lui ont imposé et me l'ont imposé, je n'ai jamais agi que comme chef responsable du gouvernement républicain. Si je m'étais trouvé en désaccord avec mon parti, je vous ai dit hier ce que j'aurais fait. Mais j'ai eu cette bonne fortune, tout au contraire, de le rallier à moi dans toutes les conjonctures difficiles de mon gouvernement, bien que ses premières inspirations, ses premiers mouvements fussent peut-être contraires. Il en a été ainsi dans l'affaire de la guerre d'Espagne, il en a été ainsi dans l'aff.

faire de la « Pause », il en a été ainsi lorsqu'il s'est agi, en 1938, de former un gouvernement d'unité française. Toujours, j'ai eu cette chance de pouvoir rallier autour de moi la masse de mes amis. Ce n'est pas moi qui me suis plié devant une volonté de parti, c'est moi qui ai gagné le parti auquel j'appartenais à la conception politique que je jugeais nécessaire en fonction des intérêts dont j'avais la charge. Je ne suis pas soumis à un parti, j'ai persuadé le parti de se soumettre à ce que je croyais être l'intérêt collectif, l'intérêt de la Nation. Vous pouvez, je le répète, lire tous les discours que j'ai prononcés dans toute cette période : toujours la même notion du « bien public », toujours l'appel aux mêmes sentiments : l'entente, la conciliation, la concorde. Le discours de Luna-Park, dont je parlais hier, s'achève par un rappel de la définition sublime que Hugo a donnée à la Patrie : « O Patrie ! O concorde entre les citoyens ! »

Par conséquent, je ne trouve rien dans tout cela qui peut justifier cette accusation latente et constante. Je vois, excusez-moi, le bien que j'ai pu faire, je vois que j'ai apaisé de grands conflits sociaux, je vois que, pour la première fois, j'ai groupé l'unanimité autour des crédits d'armement ; je vois que j'ai préparé les esprits en France à cette conception de l'unité française qui aurait pu, qui aurait dû être aussi belle qu'elle l'a été dans les premiers mois de la guerre de 1914, car c'est un spectacle qui laisse à tous ceux qui l'ont connu un souvenir inoubliable. Je vois ce que j'ai fait, je vois le bien que j'ai pu faire, que j'ai été assez heureux pour faire. Quel est le mal que, même involontairement, même malgré une bonne volonté et un désir de bien dont personne, je crois, ne doute, quel est le mal que j'aurais commis ? Est-ce que mon crime d'empoisonneur et de traître, c'est d'avoir — on l'a dit — ruiné l'autorité patronale, détruit les cadres

de la discipline ? Je ne le crois pas, car s'il en était ainsi on aurait incriminé ma loi sur les contrats collectifs. Cette loi sur les contrats collectifs c'est elle qui a introduit la démocratie dans l'usine, c'est elle qui frustre le patron de son droit, peut-être essentiel, lié dans une certaine mesure à son droit de propriété : le droit de discuter en tête à tête avec chacun de ses employés ou ouvriers, les conditions du travail. C'est elle qui fait du contrat de travail collectif la matière d'une discussion égale, paritaire entre ouvriers et patrons, entre collectivité ouvrière et collectivité patronale.

S'il y a une loi qui ait modifié le principe de l'autorité patronale, c'est bien celle-là. Pourtant, elle est en dehors du débat. Je ne suis pas de ceux qui aient jamais essayé de ruiner l'autorité du chef d'industrie. Trop souvent, hélas ! les patrons s'en sont chargés eux-mêmes. Je crois que, dans une démocratie ouvrière comme dans une démocratie politique, l'autorité est nécessaire et l'autorité, un chef la conquiert, quand il donne à la fois l'exemple de la compétence, du labeur, de la justice et de la bonté. Mais en revanche, je crois qu'il y a une forme de l'autorité patronale, qui a disparu et qu'on ne reverra plus ; celle dont, hélas ! pendant cette période difficile, certains patrons semblaient entretenir la réminiscence un peu douloureuse. Le patronat de droit divin est mort. L'autorité patronale analogue au commandement hiérarchique, analogue au commandement totalitaire, c'est fini, c'est mort. On ne reverra plus cela. On ne donnera plus à des masses ouvrières le sentiment qu'elles sont asservies au travail par le lien d'une hiérarchie qu'elles n'ont pas eu le droit de discuter et auquel elles n'ont pas volontairement consenti.

Tout cela est d'un autre temps. Sous quelque forme qu'on la conçoive, même quand on la conçoit comme on le fait aujourd'hui, l'organisation du travail ne sera plus et ne peut plus être qu'un système

plus ou moins complexe de coopération, embrasant tous les personnels de l'entreprise, depuis le patron jusqu'au dernier manoeuvre. On ne mènera plus la multitude ouvrière par la contrainte, on n'asservira plus les masses ouvrières au travail.

Je cherche donc quel peut être le contenu tangible, concret de cette accusation dont personne ne pourrait dire qu'elle n'est pas présente sous toutes les charges dirigées contre moi. Et quand je cherche, quand j'examine à quoi répondent ces griefs de faiblesse et de complaisance par quoi l'âme de ce pays aurait été altérée, j'en reviens toujours en dernière analyse à cette éternelle occupation des usines dont je vous ai tant parlé.

Messieurs, je ne reviens pas sur tout ce que j'ai dit. Il n'y a pas, je crois, d'argument que je n'aie fourni. Je vous ai dit pourquoi la répression, telle qu'on semble la regretter dans certaines dépositions, me semblait impossible, puisque, si elle avait été possible, elle aurait été la pire des fautes, la pire des crimes contre la Patrie.

Mais supposons que j'aie fait ce qu'on paraît me demander, ce que certains témoins, tout au moins, paraissent me demander, ce qu'on paraît regretter que je n'aie pas fait. Supposons que j'aie exécuté la saignée ouvrière, que j'aie provoqué de nouvelles journées de juin, car c'est à peu près là historiquement que l'on peut trouver l'analogie la plus vraisemblable. C'est entendu, j'aurais rétabli l'ordre, l'ordre matériel. Est-ce que vous croyez que je l'aurais rétabli pour longtemps ? Ne savez-vous donc pas qu'il y a dans ce pays un fond de générosité auquel l'usage et l'abus de la force répugnent ? Ne savez-vous pas qu'au bout d'un certain temps, dans tout mouvement de ce genre si condamnable qu'il ait paru, finalement, c'est toujours aux victimes que la sympathie publique s'attache ? J'ai remplit un rôle auquel j'oserais dire presque que j'étais des-

tiné, un rôle de conciliateur. Si j'avais fait autre chose, si j'avais été le bras qui frappe, le bras qui venge tant de peur, si j'avais usé de la force, l'ordre que j'aurais établi n'aurait été qu'un ordre fragile et précaire, parce que j'aurais heurté ce qu'il y a de plus profond, de plus sensible, de plus généreux dans l'âme de ce pays. Briand, à la Chambre, dans un mouvement admirable, disait : « Voyez mes mains, pas une goutte de sang ! » Il répondait à ce profond sentiment populaire. Hier soir, dans ma cellule, je lisais la « Révolution Française » de Michelet, et, comme par hasard comme quand on ouvre la Bible en cherchant un texte, je suis tombé sur cette phrase : « le cœur me saigne de voir couler le sang français ». La phrase entre guillemets. Qui a dit cela ? c'était Jeanne d'Arc !

Voulez-vous que je vous donne un témoignage de cette sensibilité française ? Je n'ai pas à chercher bien loin. Le 6 février, le gouvernement avait empêché l'émeute de renverser à main armée les institutions républicaines. Il avait accompli son devoir strict, je ne crois pas que nul en puisse disconvenir : en tout cas, je n'en disconviens pas. Il avait accompli son devoir en repoussant de vive force l'assaut au pouvoir donné, je le répète, par des troupes armées. Il n'a pourtant pas survécu à l'emploi de sa force. Et, par un extraordinaire paradoxe, les hommes qui ont exploité avec férocité contre le gouvernement de ce temps le malaise profond de l'opinion, cette horreur du sang répandu qui est au fond, je le répète, de la sensibilité française, ces mêmes hommes étaient précisément ceux qui avaient préparé l'émeute par leurs provocations. Et ce sont encore ceux qui me reprochent le plus àprement aujourd'hui d'avoir, par faiblesse et par complaisance coupables, ménagé le sang des ouvriers le sang du peuple. Comme s'il y avait deux espèces de sang en France. Le sang bourgeois et quand, par malheur, on le répand, on est un cri-

minel, on est un « fusilleur », on est un « galopin sanglant » et le sang ouvrier, celui-là, quand on l'épargne, on est un politicien débile, misérable, qui pervertit le pays par sa faiblesse et qui a trahi son devoir.

Pour la sauvegarde des institutions libres, c'était un crime d'user de la force, mais pour la protection de certains modes de la propriété ou de certaines formes de l'autorité patronale, c'était un crime de ne pas user de la force. Mais alors, quelles sont donc la nature, la mesure, la limite de ce droit de légitime défense qui appartient à tous les gouvernements et qui est le corollaire, le complément nécessaire de son devoir d'assurer l'ordre ? Ce droit de légitime défense a des limites pour le gouvernement comme il en a pour les particuliers. Votre jurisprudence de la Cour de Cassation en a laborieusement défini les limites pour le particulier. Il y en a aussi pour un gouvernement. Le gouvernement peut user de la force lorsque l'essence du régime est mise en cause, lorsqu'un intérêt vital de la Patrie est menacé, mais alors seulement. Dans les troubles auxquels on pense et où l'on m'accuse d'avoir été si criminellement débile, ni l'essence du régime, ni l'intérêt vital du pays n'étaient menacés. Son intérêt aurait bien autrement souffert d'une conduite contraire. Ce qui était menacé, je le répète, c'étaient certaines formes du respect dû à la propriété et à l'autorité patronale.

Messieurs, je vous assure que je suis bien là au cœur de la question ; j'y ai bien réfléchi. Le fond de la question est bien là, car si l'on recherche les causes profondes de cette émotion, de cette « grande peur » de juin 1936, on se rend compte que ce qui effrayait le plus peut-être les représentants intelligents et prévoyants de la bourgeoisie, c'était la modération même de ce mouvement, c'était le respect même de l'ordre physique, de l'ordre ma-

tériel à l'intérieur des usines. Je vous l'ai dit : les ouvriers étaient installés autour des machines, tranquilles, disciplinés, montant la garde, entretenant le matériel, désignant les corvées pour cet entretien. Ils étaient là comme des gardiens, c'est-à-dire comme des surveillants, et aussi, dans un certain sens, comme des copropriétaires. Le sens de leur attitude, et on le sentait bien quand on réfléchissait du côté patronal, c'est que, dans leur conviction, quelque chose de leur travail s'était incorporé à ces machines qu'ils avaient si longtemps maniées. Appelez cela comme vous voudrez : droit de regard, droit de protection, droit de copropriété du travail industriel sur l'appareil productif du pays, conscience de ce qu'il y a d'indissoluble dans le régime moderne de la production, entre l'instrument matériel et le travail de l'homme, on sentait tout cela, mais les ouvriers le sentaient aussi. Et cette idée, il ne faut pas vous imaginer qu'elle était toxique, qu'elle faisait parcourir dans les veines de la classe ouvrière ce poison mortel dont les effets se feraient encore sentir après tant d'années. Si vous envisagez des sentiments de ce genre avec gravité et sans prévention, vous vous rendez compte, au contraire, qu'ils ne peuvent que coopérer à un sentiment d'unité entre les différentes classes qui composent la nation. Et, du point de vue spécial qui vous occupe, constater une communauté de droits et de devoirs vis-à-vis du patrimoine national, est-ce que cela ne conduit pas à en assurer et à en préparer la défense commune, la défense unanime ? La prise de conscience de ces idées nouvelles, croyez-vous qu'elle n'a pas été pour quelque chose, bien loin de conduire le pays à son désarmement moral et à son abandon, dans cet élan unanime qui l'a, au contraire entraîné pour sa défense, au moins tant que des forces purement intérieures ont joué en France ?

Karl Marx a dit que le prolétaire n'a pas de

patrie et en cela il était d'accord avec toutes les législations anciennes, car en Grèce ou à Rome, le prolétaire n'était pas soldat, pour la raison qu'il n'avait pas de biens à défendre. Mais Jaurès a dit que si le prolétaire n'avait pas de patrie, le progrès républicain, peu à peu, lui en faisait une et c'est à mesure qu'on crée peu à peu pour les ouvriers une copropriété de la patrie, qu'on leur enseigne à défendre cette patrie.

Cet espèce d'accord unanime qu'on a trouvé en France au moment de la mobilisation était un peu la conséquence de tout cela ; et par conséquent était un peu notre œuvre. Rappelez-vous les incidents qui ont précédé la guerre de 1914, cette guerre que la République, ce régime républicain tant honni, tant décrié, a pourtant gagnée. Rappelez-vous le syndicalisme révolutionnaire ; rappelez-vous l'hervéisme ; rappelez-vous les mutineries de 1913 ; rappelez-vous l'avant-veille de la mobilisation, l'assassinat de Jaurès ; rappelez-vous quelle angoisse on pouvait éprouver alors sur ce que serait l'attitude de la masse des ouvriers vis-à-vis d'un ordre de la mobilisation. Vous n'avez rien vu de pareil, tant que ce sont des influences purement nationales qui ont joué. Vous n'avez trouvé aucune exception de cette unanimité. Cela est constaté par de nombreuses pièces au dossier et je crois que cela a été constaté dans un de ses mémoires par le général Gamelin lui-même.

Dans cette espèce de résolution silencieuse et grave qui a amené nos fils, le mien comme les autres, vers leur régiment, je crois que quelque chose venait de nous et que quelque chose tenait ainsi à notre œuvre...

Messieurs, j'ai achevé. Vous pourrez naturellement nous condamner. Je crois que, même par votre arrêt, vous ne pourrez pas effacer notre œuvre. Je crois que vous ne pourrez pas — le mot vous paraîtra peut-être orgueilleux — nous chasser de

l'histoire de ce pays. Nous n'y mettons pas de présomption, mais nous y apportons une certaine fierté : nous avons dans un temps bien périlleux, personnifié et vivifié la tradition authentique de notre pays, qui est la tradition démocratique et républicaine. De cette tradition, à travers l'histoire, nous aurons malgré tout été un moment. Nous ne sommes pas je ne sais quelle excroissance monstrueuse dans l'histoire de ce pays, parce que nous avons été un gouvernement populaire ; nous sommes dans la tradition de ce pays depuis la Révolution française. Nous n'avons pas interrompu la chaîne, nous ne l'avons pas brisée, nous l'avons renouée et nous l'avons resserree.

Naturellement, il est facile quand on dispose de tous les moyens qui agissent sur l'opinion de défigurer notre œuvre, comme on peut défigurer notre personne, notre visage. Mais la réalité est là et elle se fera jour. La durée de l'effort humain ne commande pas le rendement d'un appareil industriel, le loisir n'est pas la paresse ; la liberté et la justice n'ont pas fait de la patrie une proie désarmée ; avec les ilotes on ne fait pas plus des ouvriers que des soldats. Qu'il s'agisse de manier l'outil ou de manier l'arme, ce sont la liberté et la justice qui engendrent les grandes vertus viriles, la confiance, l'enthousiasme et le courage. Quand on nous dit : « Vous avez eu tort, il fallait agir autrement » on nous dit nécessairement, forcément, « il fallait trahir et briser la volonté exprimée par le peuple ». Nous ne l'avons ni trahie, ni brisée par la force, nous y avons été fidèles.

Et Messieurs, par une ironie bien cruelle, c'est cette fidélité qui est devenue une trahison. Pourtant cette fidélité n'est pas épuisée, elle dure encore et la France en recueillera le bienfait dans l'avenir où nous plaçons notre espérance et que ce procès même, ce procès dirigé contre la République, contribuera à préparer.



Imprimerie spéciale du *Populaire*

*ÉDITIONS DE
LA LIBERTÉ*

8 BOULEVARD POISSONNIÈRE

PARIS 9^e

PRINTED IN FRANCE

21 octobre 1968

Cher Monsieur et collègue,

Je m'excuse d'écrire avec retard pour vous remercier de nouveau de votre grande gentillesse d'avoir bien voulu arranger la photo-copie du jugement de la 2^{ème} instance dans le cas Roehling.

Je rencontrais des diverses inconveniences pendant ces dernières semaines. En outre, des voleurs pénétraient mon appartement et pillageaient mon bureau, détruisant beaucoup de mes dossiers, y incluse ma correspondance avec vous.

Si je me souviens bien, je vous envoyai des photo-copies d'un jugement du procès contre le Gauleiter Wagner. Mais je suis entièrement à votre disposition de vous envoyer des photocopies d'autres matériaux des archives de la Commission des Crimes de Guerre de l'O.N.U. Si vous voulez bien rafraîchir ma mémoire. Si vous êtes intéressé dans le cas du Wagner, j'espère que vous m'indiquerez que c'est que vous manque. Permettez-moi de vous signaler aussi que dans quelques procès militaires français summarisés dans les archives de l'O.N.U., la prosecution chargeait participation dans une "association de malfaiteurs" --une conception intéressant en vue de l'opposition, par exemple, de M. le professeur Donnedieu de Vabres contre la conception de "conspiracy".

--Je viens d'étudier la Bibliographie Mondiale des MM. Gendrel et Lafarge (1965). C'est un oeuvre remarquable. J'ai observé, cependant, que la section sur "Le Tribunal Militaire International de Nuremberg" (pp. 198) inclut aussi les 12 procès américains de Nuremberg, et ne mentionne pas la grande série publiée par le Government Printing Office de Washington, 1950-1953, sur ces cas (I.G. Farben, Krupp, Wilhelmstrasse, Marechaux, etc., etc.) pour laquelle j'étais responsable comme le représentant des juges américains. Franchement, il y a aussi un nombre d'erreurs typographiques dans des titres (et autres mots) allemands et anglais. Si vous le désirez, je serais heureux d'avoir un coup d'oeil sur les galles du prochain supplément, concernant les textes allemands et anglais.

Je vous prie d'agréer, cher Monsieur et Collègue, mes salutations les plus sincères.

John Fried

M. le Professeur G. Levasseur
Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Economiques
Université de Paris
Paris

for Levasseur: several indictments for
complicity

French case # 225: Assassinations, coups et blessures
volontaires avec préméditation et complicité (Metz)

French case # 223 Trib. Mil. Rem. de Paris, séant à Rennes

"complicité de coups et blessures volontaires

" # 216: Metz: complicité d'incendie volontaire
de destruction de Gérardmer
de départ de cette ville

int.
quod:

" # 192: Marseille → au Nalican woman, ^{member of S.D.}
judgment 23/10/47 death
accusé: Assoc. de Malfaiteurs - direction
illégale - séquestration de Personne - violence
- pillage.

int.
quod:

" # 161
Pillage ^{+ réquisition illégale}: intéressé en la mat P Paris Trib. Mil. Rem.
Abidred légal + illegal réquisitions:

→ General de Division Hans Junck

big fat case → Strasbourg GESTAPO (Trib. Mil. Rem. de la 6^e région
séant à Strasbourg)

→ 22 defendants, incl. Wilhelm Koch, Julius Behrman
(most in confinement)

UN WCC

Records Group - 30 (checked 31/1/58)

XI. Reports of Nat'l Mil. Tribunals:

Box

1. Synopsis of trial reports received by WCC 269
2. British Mil. Courts '45-47. Cases 1-524, 6 ft. 270-283
3. US Trials: 62 ft.
Cases 1-809 57 feet 284-397

~~with 4/5~~

Francisco Braganza, Manila
Dachau, Shanghai

4. Australia No. 1-256 410
microfilm copies

5. Canadian 2 ft. (5 cases)

6. Allied Court, shooting of POW in Normandy

7. French Mil Trib. Cases 1-253

23 Feb 45 - 16 Apr. 48

415

~~disorderly~~ ↑

8. Polish Tribes 419

9. one Chinese

CSB:

Greek (one case)

Neth

Norwegian

French case # 92

Pillage

Trib. Mil. Paris de Lyon, jug. of 30/1/47 -> Frenchman, soldier in 19-45

No. 84 d'ordre armé,

" 2061 de la Série Générale

Gen Police Report, Gilbert C.E. Schmitt, ex: He'

dans l'annexé Hel. + in contenance -> Capt. / C. H.

Pillages en temps de Guerre

Helmerich, (viandant) / 3rd Co. / 19th C. Police Reg.

"ou piste"

à Tainingen (Heute Savoie). Schmitt (inter-peter) acquitté

accusé + pillage of 440,000 frs, lebusmittel, etc. de 14 Jul 44

(Helmerich) ^{guilt} ^{cont} "vi violat"

accusé le 21.90 Code de Justice Militaire

Question: le dit fait accompli à l'occasion ou sous le prétexte

de l'état de guerre, était-il justifié p. les lois et coutumes de la guerre?

La loi
conspirac?

Question: est-il dit de il "en terminas on en bande ~~de~~ etc

force ouverte pillé, les propriétés militaires appartenant à

Helmerich in contenance ^{de l'annexé} le death, et art. 440 de Code Pénal, I^{er} du décret 6: du 15 sept. 39 + Ordou. de 28/8/44.

similaires: Trib. Mil. Paris. Bordeaux, jug. 25/3/47, No. 259 d'ordre armé

2002 de la Série Générale

of a Battalion of 257th Regiment, stationed at MAULEON, May 1944 (war Spain border.)

-> (viandant) Helmut H. A. Spielberg = Brandstift

accusé individuellement for Incendies volontaires + pillage en bande à force ouverte

Spielberg: 20 ans

Jugements

Tribunal Militaire Permanent à Duxen

[Signature]

file F 47 !!!

procès contre Rob. H. Wagner
Gauleiter d'Alsace +
7 autres hauts fonctionnaires

Nancy

Bordeaux

Metz

Duplex

Rastatt

Bordeaux

Marseille

Paris (voir file Fr. 235
234
219)

Lyon

Reims

Montpellier

Strasbourg

Clermont-Ferrand

Toulouse

Nîmes

en continuation file Fr 220

(file Fr 118)

grand procès contre la GESTAPO
de Strasbourg,
Reinhardt Bruner et 21 autres

also some,

eg. Lille: (file Fr. 83)

→ Naliam

voir lettre à UNWCC (file Fr. 161)

"jugements français en contournement pas
de 'considérants' ou motifs pour lesquels
le trib. statuerait sur les questions de droit.

General Hans Jurek + 4 autres

'Association de Malfoiteux'
→ Alb. Rasquin (file Fr 84)

ad penalties:

French cases often also in addition to imprisonment.

Le Trib. also "fait défense [= verbietet] au condamné de paraître pendant 20 ans dans les lieux qui lui seront signifiés par le court avant sa libération [from travaux forcés]

ex: case of Louvainant, Major H. Spießberg, in charge of Antennes Office at French/Spanish border, case judged by Trib. Milit. Perma. de Bordeaux of 25/3/47, # 259 d'ordre Annuel 2002 de la Série Générale.

Resistance has right to punish!!

ad composition of French Tribunal:

usually 5-8 members (judges + milit. officers). sometimes 1 record state, specifically child members "ayant fait partie d'une organisation de la Résistance" (X)

ex: case → ^{Mr. Schille} R. Machteiva et al. Tribunal Mil. Perma. de la 6^e Région (Metz) No. 298 d'ordre annuel, 2741 de la Série Générale,

Germanian Stealing

for stealing fraudulently 4 horses at prejudice of Lorrains expulsés

+ stealing fraudulently in chariot at prejudice de Morains ^(et Morains) expulsés

= not justified par les lois et coutumes de la guerre. (acquitted for other reasons)

penalty: 1 yr. imprisonment.

Source: France, # 110

(X) Other formulation:

"ayant appartenus à une organisation de résistance"

or simply: "résistant"; or: remplissant la condition prévue dans l'ordonnance

This was required by Ordinance of 28/8/44

JOURNAL OFFICIEL

DU COMMANDEMENT EN CHEF FRANÇAIS EN ALLEMAGNE

GOUVERNEMENT MILITAIRE DE LA ZONE FRANÇAISE D'OCCUPATION

*Amtsblatt des französischen Oberkommandos in Deutschland*Ordonnances, Arrêtés et Règlements, Décisions réglementaires
Décisions, Circulaires, Avis, Communications, Informations,
Annonces légalesVerordnungen, Verfügungen, Beschlüsse, Ausführungsbestimmungen
Anordnungen, Runderlasse, Benachrichtigungen, Mitteilungen
Art. Veröffentlichungen, Öffentl. Zustellung

Le texte français seul fait foi, la traduction n'ayant qu'un caractère d'information

Allein der französische Text ist amtlich; die deutsche Übersetzung gilt nur als Information

Direction, Rédaction, Administration

Leitung, Redaktion, Verwaltung

Journal Officiel, 2 Bäderstraße, Baden-Baden.

Abonnement: 25 numéros, 10 Marks.
Annonces légales: 70 pts la ligneAbonnement: 25 Blätter, 10 M.
Öffentliche Zustellung die Zeile 70 Pfg

Pour toute réclamation joindre la dernière bande reçue

Jeder Reklamation ist das letzte Streifenband beizufügen

**TRIBUNAL GÉNÉRAL DE GOUVERNEMENT MILITAIRE
DE LA ZONE FRANÇAISE D'OCCUPATION A RASTATT****Najwyższy Trybunał Wojskowy Francuski
Strefy Okupacyjnej Niemiec w Rastatt**

Procès des Camps de Concentration Nazis

Proces hitlerowskich obozów koncentracyjnych

de

NATZWEILER**Natzweiler**CAMPS DE SCHOMBERG - SCHÖRZINGEN
SPAICHINGEN - ERZINGEN - DAUTMergenobozów Schömberg, Schörzingen, Spaichingen,
Erzingen, Dautmergen.

JUGEMENT

WYROK TRYBUNAŁU WOJSKOWEGO W RASTATT

z dnia 21. 1. 1947 r.

Le Tribunal Général de Gouvernement Militaire de la Zone Française d'Occupation en Allemagne, séant à RASTATT, sous la Présidence de Monsieur AUSSET Jean, Président de Chambre à la Cour d'Appel de PARIS,

Opierając się na dokonywane przez Trybunał Wojskowy w Berlinie No 10 z dn. 20 grudnia 1945 r. wyroki przeciwko winnym zbrodni wojennych, zbrodni wabię, pobię i gwałtu ludzkości ogłoszonym dn. 11 stycznia 1946 r. w Dzienniku Urzęd. Naczelnego Dowództwa Francuskiego w Niemczech.

a rendu le 1er Février 1947, le Jugement ci-après.

Opierając się na zarządzenia No 36 z dn. 25 lutego 1946 r. Naczelnego Dowództwa Francuskiego w Niemczech o zwalczaniu zbrodni wojennych, zbrodni przeciwko Polakom i ludzkości ogłoszonym dn. 8 marca 1946 r. w Dzienniku Urzęd. Naczelnego Dowództwa Francuskiego w Niemczech.

Au nom du Commandement en Chef Français en Allemagne,

Vu la loi No 10, en date du 20 Décembre 1945, du Conseil de Contrôle Interallié de BERLIN, relative au châtimeut des personnes coupables de crimes de Guerre, de crimes contre la Paix et contre l'Humanité, publiée le 11 Janvier 1946 au Journal Officiel du Commandement en Chef Français en Allemagne,

zważywszy, że w myśl tych przepisów Trybunał Władzy Okupacyjnej Strefy Francuskiej są właściwe do sądownictwa wszystkich osób nie będących obywatelami francuskimi winnych zbrodni wojennych lub zbrodni przeciwko ludzkości.

Vu l'Ordonnance No 36, en date du 25 Février 1946, du Commandement en Chef Français en Allemagne, relative à la répression des crimes de Guerre, contre la Paix et l'Humanité, publiée le 8 Mars 1946 au Journal Officiel du Commandement en Chef Français en Allemagne,

Attendu qu'aux termes de ces textes, les Tribunaux de Gouvernement Militaire de la Zone Française d'Occupation sont compétents pour juger toutes personnes autres que les ressortissants Français qui se sont rendus coupables de crimes de Guerre ou de crimes contre l'Humanité,

Attendu que, dans le courant de l'année 1944, des camps de concentration dépendant du camp de NATZWEILLER-STRUTHOF et connus sous la dénomination de "Sous-camps de NATZWEILLER" furent créés sur l'ordre direct d'HIMMLER pour exécuter un plan de production appelé „PLAN GAILEMBERG" dans la Zone actuelle d'Occupation Française, en vue d'exploiter, d'une façon intensive et dans des conditions particulièrement pénibles et malsaines, les gisements de schistes pétrolifères de la région et d'effectuer, dans les mêmes conditions, des travaux importants d'ordre militaire,

Que les arrestations massives effectuées dans divers pays occupés par l'Allemagne et notamment en Belgique, en France, en Luxembourg et en Pologne, permirent aux Allemands d'utiliser à l'extrême les individus ainsi déportés, dans des conditions telles qu'elles tendaient d'une part à augmenter, par cette main d'oeuvre forcée, le potentiel de guerre de l'Allemagne et, d'autre part, à éliminer et même à exterminer systématiquement les éléments qui ne pouvaient pas s'assimiler.

Attendu que des milliers de ces déportés, en provenance de divers camps de concentration et notamment de NATZWEILLER, de DACHAU, de DANTZIG-STRUTHOF et d'AUSCHWITZ furent internés particulièrement dans les camps de SCHOMBERG, d'ERZINGEN, de SCHORZINGEN, de DAUTMERGEN et de SPAICHINGEN,

Attendu que 47 parmi les anciens chefs de ces cinq derniers camps, chefs de blocs, gardiens SS et „kapos" jusqu'ici retrouvés, comparaissent devant le Tribunal Général pour y être jugés,

Que 3 anciens Officiers SS du camp de NATZWEILLER-STRUTHOF, dont dépendaient ces cinq „Sous-camps", comparaissent également devant le Tribunal Général pour y répondre de leurs crimes mais uniquement en tant que dirigeants ou contrôleurs des „sous-camps" de SCHOMBERG, d'ERZINGEN, de SCHORZINGEN, de DAUTMERGEN et de SPAICHINGEN,

Attendu que si ces cinq „sous-camps" dépendaient du camp de NATZWEILLER-STRUTHOF, d'où les Officiers SS donnaient les consignes et venaient effectuer des inspections, — les chefs de camp, ainsi que les chefs de blocs, les gardiens SS et les „kapos" avaient une initiative et une autorité certaines pour fixer le régime spécial du camp et les méthodes de travail : que l'on peut dire qu'en fait ils y régnaient en maîtres.

Attendu qu'il résulte de nombreuses dépositions concordantes et accablantes émanant de témoins de toutes nationalités et même allemands

Qu'un travail forcé, exténuant et épuisant, était imposé par les pires brutalités, délibérément commises, avec un raffinement d'horreur et de cruauté, souvent à peine imaginables,

Que la nourriture, le logement et l'habillement étaient nettement insuffisants

Attendu que ce régime, contraire aux principes les plus élémentaires d'humanité, entraînait nécessairement l'affaiblissement physique, l'agonie morale et conduisait à la mort lente et à l'extermination systématique d'un très grand nombre d'internés,

Attendu que l'on doit constater, au vu des témoignages recueillis, qu'en raison de leurs conditions d'existence, les internés vivaient dans ces camps comme dans un véritable enfer,

Attendu qu'en dehors des brutalités, des cruautés sans nombre, du manque complet d'hygiène, les déportés se trouvaient dans un état de détresse et même de torture morale permanent, vivant sans cesse, de jour comme de nuit, sous la terreur de leurs gardiens, que cet état de choses ne pouvait encore qu'augmenter leur misère,

zwazywszy, ze na bezposredni rozkaz Himmlera w 1944r. na terenie obecnej strefy okupacyjnej francuskiej zostaly zalozone obozy koncentracyjne podlegajace obozowi Natzweiler-Struthof i noszace nazwe „podobozow Natzweiler" i ze obozy te byly utworzone w celu zrealizowania planu przemysłowego, zwanego „planem Geilenberga", zmierzajacego do intensywnej eksploatacji w warunkach wyjątkowo ciezkich i niezdrowych, znajdujacych sie w tej okolicy zloz naftowych i w tychze samych warunkach przeprowadzenie bardzo waznych prac o charakterze wojskowym;

ze masowe aresztowania dokonywane w roznych krajach okupowanych przez Niemcy, a mianowicie w Belgii, Francji, Luksemburgu, i w Polsce, pozwolily Niemcom na wykorzystanie do ostateczności ludzi w ten sposob deportowanych w warunkach zmierzajacych z jednej strony do powiekszenia przez te niewolnicza sie robocza wojennego potencjalu Niemiec, z drugiej zas strony do wyeliminowania a nawet systematycznego wytepienie elementow, ktore nie daly sie zasymilowac;

zwazywszy, ze tysiacie tych deportowanych przybylyc z roznych obozow koncentracyjnych, a mianowicie z Natzweiler z Dachau, z Stutthofu i z Oswiecimia, zostalo internowanych przewaznie w obozach Schömberg, Erzingen, Schörzingen, Dautmergen i Spaichingen,

zwazywszy, ze 47 z posrod bylych komendantow ostatnio wymienionych obozow: blokowych, straznikow, SS i „capo" dotychczas ujetych staje przed Trybunalem Wojskowym, ze trzej byli oficerowie SS obozu Natzweiler-Struthof, ktorema podlegalo tych 5 podobozow staja rowniez przed Trybunalem Wojskowym, aby odpowiadac tylko za te zbrodnie, ktore popelnili jako kierownicy i kontrolerzy 5 -ciu „podobozow" Schömberg, Erzingen, Schörzingen, Dautmergen i Spaichingen;

zwazywszy, ze jakkolwiek te 5 „podobozow" zalezalo od obozu Natzweiler-Struthof skad oficerowie SS przyjezdza na inspekcje i dawali zlecenia, to jednak kierownicy „podobozow" jak i blokowi oraz straznicy SS i „capo" mieli wlasna inicjatywe i wplyw na ustalenie porzadku w obozach oraz ustalenie metod pracy, tak ze mozna przyjac, iz byli tam faktycznymi wladcami;

zwazywszy, ze z licznych zeznan zgodnie obciazajacych zlozonych przez swiadkow wszystkich narodowosci, nawet i narodowosci niemieckiej, wynika, iz praca przymusowa wyczerpujaca byla narzucana przy pomocy jaskrawej brutalnosc, stosowanej z wytrefinowanym okrucienstwem, trudnym do wyobrazenia, ze odzywienie, warunki mieszkaniowe i ubranie byly zdecydowanie niewystarczajace;

zwazywszy, ze warunki te sprzeczne z najelementarniejszymi zasadami ludzkosci, sila rzeczy spowodowaly wycienczenie fizyczne i duchowe i doprowadzaly do powolnej smierci i do systematycznej eksterminacji wielkiej liczby deportowanych;

zwazywszy, ze jak wynika z zeznan swiadkow nalezy ustalic iz wobec tych warunkow egzystencji internowani zyli w wymienionych obozach jak w piekle;

zwazywszy, ze poza brutalnoscia, niedajacym sie zmierzyc okrucienstwem, zupełnym brakiem higieny, deportowani znajdowali sie w stanie depresji i udreki moralnej, zyjac bezustannie tak w dzien jak i w nocy pod terorem swoich nadzorcow, ze taki stan rzeczy mogl jedynie powiekszyc ich nede;

zwazywszy, ze straznicy dopuszczali sie kradziezy zywnosci przeznaczonej dla internowanych, zmniejszajac w ten sposob znacznie

Attendu que des détournements de vivres destinés aux internés étaient commis par leurs gardiens, — diminuant ainsi notablement les rations alimentaires déjà insuffisantes par rapport au travail exténuant qui leur était imposé.

Attendu que dans tous ces camps, le LOGEMENT nécessaire pour les internés n'avait pas été prévu ni organisé par la suite, de sorte qu'ils étaient parqués, dans des conditions inhumaines, dans des baraquements surpeuplés où ils devaient vivre dans la vermine et couverts de poux, sans aucune hygiène, le plus souvent sans eau et dans l'impossibilité de changer de linge.

Que, pour tout vêtement, les internés n'avaient, la plupart du temps, qu'une chemise, une veste et un pantalon rayés en fibrane, et, très exceptionnellement, un manteau en hiver; que certains de ces malheureux, pour se préserver du froid et des intempéries, portaient, en guise de sous-vêtements et au risque des plus cruelles sanctions, des sacs à ciment en papier ramassés en fraude sur les chantiers; qu'ils étaient très mal chaussés et portaient le plus souvent aux pieds des loques ou du papier; que souvent ils devaient marcher pieds-nus, même dans la neige.

Que tous étaient astreints, — sous une discipline de fer, sans égard à leur aptitude et leurs possibilités, — à un TRAVAIL très dur et d'autant plus pénible qu'il était exigé d'hommes malades, affaiblis et nettement sous-alimentés.

Qu'ils étaient notamment employés à l'exploitation des gisements de schistes et à la construction d'usines.

Qu'ils étaient en butte, non seulement dans le camp, mais encore sur le lieu du travail et en cours de route, aux MAUVAIS TRAITEMENTS, aux sévices injustes et à la brutalité des gardiens et des „kapos" souvent condamnés de droit commun; que tous ceux-ci, non seulement appliquaient avec une extrême rigueur les consignes reçues, mais encore prenaient l'initiative de frapper à coups de pied, de poing, de matraque pour les motifs les plus futiles ou même sans aucun motif.

Que certains gardiens d'une cruauté féroce matraquaient jusqu'à évanouissement et piétinaient à mort leurs malheureuses victimes; que des témoins ont même révélé que, dans certains camps, notamment à DAUTMERGEN, l'un des plus durs d'Allemagne, des internés, arrivés au dernier degré d'épuisement, n'avaient la ressource que de se cacher au milieu des morts pour tenter de se soustraire à un travail qu'ils savaient devoir leur être fatal.

Que, si un baraquement était réservé en principe, à l'INFIRMERIE du camp, il n'y existait, en pratique, aucun médicament; qu'il n'y était donné que des soins insuffisants même aux malades les plus gravement atteints; que les médecins désignés parmi les internés étaient souvent frappés; qu'ils ne pouvaient exercer leur art que sous la dépendance des gardiens et des kapos qui limitaient le nombre des malades hospitalisés ou exemptés de travail, tenant compte non des impérieuses considérations médicales, mais bien de leur volonté d'utiliser au maximum la main d'oeuvre.

Que, notamment au camp de SPAICHINGEN, une infirmière allemande avait interdiction formelle de soigner d'autres cas que les accidents de travail, et qu'elle fut même menacée parce qu'elle ÉTAIT TROP HUMAINE à l'égard d'internés de camps de concentration.

Que des cadavres nus restaient plusieurs jours exposés derrière les baraquements; qu'ils étaient ensuite entassés dans des caisses et piétinés, ou tirés à même le sol jusqu'au charnier; et que les dents en or étaient systématiquement arrachées et récupérées.

Que même en tenant compte de la situation générale en Allemagne, la nourriture, dans tous les camps, était toujours très mauvaise et nettement insuffisante; qu'elle se composait habituellement et presque uniquement d'un litre d'eau dans lequel on avait fait cuire des choux, des rutabagas, des pissenlits ou même des orties ramassées dans les champs après le travail,

racje zywnosciowe, ktore i tak nie byly wspolmierne z wyczerpujaca praca, jakiej od nich wymagano;

zwazywszy, ze w zadnym z tych obozow nie przygotowano z gory ani potym nie urzadzono niezbednych pomieszczen dla internowanych, tak ze zostali oni skupieni w warunkach nieludzkich w barakach przeludnionych, gdzie zyli wsrod robactwa, pokryci wszami, pozabawieni wszelkiej higieny, najczesciej bez wody i bez mozliwosci zmiany bielizny, ze za cale ubranie internowani, mieli najczesciej tylko jedna koszule, jedna marynarka, jedna pare spodni w pasy z fibrany i tylko w wyjatkowych wypadkach — palto na zimno, ze niektorzy z tych nieszczesliwych, aby sie uchronic przed zimnem nosili pod ubraniem, narazajac sie przez to na okrutne kary, papierowe worki znalezione na miejscu pracy, ze byli bardzo zle obuci i ze przewaznie nosili na nogach szmaty lub papier, ze czesto musieli chodzic boso, nawet po smiegu;

ze wszyscy byli zmuszeni pod zelazna dyscyplina, bez wzgledu na ich zdolnosci i mozliwosci do pracy bardzo ciezkiej, tym ciezszej, ze narzuconej ludzom chorym, oslabionym i zdecydowanie niedozyzwionym, ze byli mianowicie uzyci do eksploatacji kopalni i budowy fabryk,

ze byli maltretowani nietylko w obozie, ale takze przy pracy i na drodze do pracy, musieli znosic niezasluzone bicie i brutalnosc dozorcow i „capo" przewaznie przestepcow kryminalnych, ze wymienieni nietylko dokladnie wykonywali otrzymane polecenia, ale takze z wlasnej inicjatywy kopalni, bili piescia, palka gumowa z najbardziej blahego powodu i nawet bez powodu,

ze niektorzy straznicy o dzikiej brutalnosci bili palka az do omdlenia i kopali swoje ofiary powodujac ich smierc, ze swiadkowie stwierdzili, iz w niektórych obozach, jak Dautmergen, ktory byl jednym z najciezszych obozow w Niemczech, internowani dochodzili do takiego stopnia wyczerpania, ze chowali sie pod trupy, usilujac uniknac pojscia do pracy, ktora w tym stanie wyczerpania byla dla nich zabojeza,

ze jakkolwiek w zasadzie jeden barak byl przeznaczony na izbe chorych obozu, to w praktyce nie bylo zadnych lekarstw, ze udzielano tam pomocy niedostatecznej nawet najciezej chorym, ze lekarze wyznaczeni sposrod internowanych byli czesto bici, ze mogli oni wykonywac swoj zawod jedynie w zaleznosci od straznikow i „capo", ktorzy ograniczali liczbe chorych lub zwolnionych przez lekarza od pracy niebiorac pod uwage stanu zdrowia internowanych, lecz chec jak najwiekszego wykorzystania tak roboczych,

ze np. w obozie Spaichingen pielęgniarka niemiecka miala prawo leczyc jedynie skaleczenia doznanie przy pracy i ze grozono jej, gdyz odnosila sie po ludzku do internowanych obozu koncentracyjnego,

ze nagie trupy lezaly przez kilka dni za scianami barakow, ze je potem pakowano do skrzyń i ubijano nogami, albo tez nawet wleczono po ziemi az do cementarzyska i ze zloze zeby byly systematycznie wrywane i zabierane,

ze nawet wzlawszy pod uwage sytuacje ogolna w Niemczech wyzywienie we wszystkich obozach bylo zawsze bardzo zle i niedostateczne, ze skadalo sie zazwyczaj z jednego litra wody, w ktorej gotowano kapuste albo brukiew lub tez ziola wzglednie pokrzywy, zebrane na polu po pracy,

ze kucharze blokowi i straznicy kradli jedzenie, zmniejszajac w ten sposob bardzo znacznie dzienne racje zywnosciowe i tak juz niewystarczajace, ze w tych warunkach smiertelnosc spowodowana

Que les cuisiniers, les chefs de blocs et les gardiens commettaient de nombreux détournements de vivres, diminuant ainsi d'une façon notable les rations quotidiennes déjà très insuffisantes,

Que dans ces conditions, la MORTALITÉ, due à la sous-alimentation et aux brutalités, causes de la dysenterie et de la tuberculose, était très grande; — que si, dans certains camps, elle paraît avoir été de moindre importance, ce fut parce que les internés trop malades, trop affaiblis pour être capables de travailler, étaient évacués sur d'autres camps et qu'ils étaient aussitôt remplacés par d'autres internés devant subir le même sort,

Attendu que l'on doit constater, au vu des dépositions de tous les témoins entendus, que ces camps étaient redoutables; que même certains, comme celui de DAUTMERGEN, doivent être considérés comme de véritables camps d'extermination,

Attendu que, s'il peut apparaître que l'existence au camp de concentration d'ERZINGEN, où les internés en majorité „N.N.” furent moins nombreux, ait été moins pénible que dans d'autres camps, il n'en est pas moins vrai que le logement et la nourriture y étaient tout aussi insuffisants et que le travail y était tout aussi pénible,

Mais que dans ce camp, qui paraît avoir présenté un caractère tout différent, les internés, en raison de leur nombre plus réduit, ont pu faire preuve d'un esprit plus grand de solidarité contre les gardiens SS, grâce encore au dévouement et à l'esprit d'initiative du médecin Français du camp, également interné, les malades ont pu recevoir les soins les plus indispensables,

Que néanmoins, certains gardiens y furent d'une brutalité extrême.

Attendu que SCHWARTZ, HARTJENSTEIN et SCHMIDETSKI comparaissent en leur qualité de dirigeants des „sous-camps” faisant l'objet du présent procès, et se trouvent placés sous leur autorité et sous leur contrôle,

Qu'en dehors des instructions qu'ils pouvaient recevoir de l'autorité supérieure, rentraient directement dans leurs attributions, la surveillance de la situation matérielle et de l'état physique et moral des internés,

Qu'ils avaient notamment à s'assurer, au cours de leurs inspections de l'observation des consignes générales qu'ils avaient données; qu'ils devaient plus particulièrement veiller à ce que soient distribuées les rations réglementaires et faire respecter l'interdiction de frapper,

Que c'est en vain que ces dirigeants prétendent avoir satisfait à leurs obligations; qu'en effet, se rendant dans les camps à des heures où les internés se trouvaient dans les commandos, ils n'étaient pas à même de se rendre compte de leur état, de recevoir leurs doléances,

Qu'au surplus, ils ont omis de se faire remettre l'état numérique des morts qui leur aurait permis de rechercher les causes des innombrables décès,

Qu'en agissant ainsi, ils ont rendu possible et facilité l'exécution des crimes reprochés à leurs co-accusés,

Attendu que c'est en vain que ces trois accusés soutiennent que les entreprises industrielles ainsi que l'organisation TODT, à la disposition de qui les internés étaient mis, n'auraient pas rempli leurs obligations, notamment au point de vue ravitaillement; qu'en effet, il leur incombait d'imposer à ces organisations la stricte observation de leurs obligations,

Attendu que la plupart des autres accusés se bornent à opposer de simples dénégations,

Que si certains d'entre eux reconnaissent partiellement les faits qui leur sont reprochés, ils tentent vainement d'en diminuer la fréquence et la gravité,

brutalnym traktowaniem i niedożywieniem pociągającym za sobą biegunkę i gruźlicę, była bardzo duża, że jeżeli w pewnych obozach wydaje się ona mniejsza, to jedynie dlatego, że internowani z chorzy i osłabieni, aby być zdolnymi do pracy byli wysyłani do innych obozów, a miejsce ich zajmowali inni internowani, którzy czekał ten sam los;

zwazywszy, że na podstawie zeznań wszystkich przesłuchanych świadków, obozy te należy uznać za wzbudzające grozę, że nawet niektóre, jak Dautmergen, mogą być uznane za prawdziwy oboz eksterminacyjny,

zwazywszy, że może się wydawać, że warunki w obozie koncentracyjnym Erzingen, gdzie internowani przeważnie „N.N.” (policjanci) nie byli tak liczni, były znośniejsze niż w innych obozach, to jednak jest faktem, że pomieszczenie i wyżywienie były tam to samo niedostateczne, a praca tak samo ciężka; ale że w obozie tym, który prawdopodobnie miał mieć zupełnie inny charakter, nieliczni internowani mogli wykazać więcej solidarności w przewyższaniu metod strażników SS, a także dzięki poświęceniu i inicjatywie francuskiego lekarza obozowego, także internowanego, chorzy mogli otrzymać przynajmniej elementarną opiekę lekarską, że jedna niekiedy ze strażników odznaczała się wielką brutalnością;

zwazywszy, że Schwarz, Hartjenstein i Schmidetzki odpowiadają teraz z tytułu swojego stanowiska kierowników tych „podobozów” będących przedmiotem obecnego procesu, i znajdujących się pod ich władzą i kontrolą,

że niezależnie od instrukcji, które mogli otrzymywać od władz wyższych, do nich należał nadzór nad położeniem materialnym i stanem fizycznym i psychicznym internowanych,

że podczas swoich inspekcji mieli oni za obowiązek upewnić się przybywając do obozów w godzinach, w których internowani byli zwłaszcza czuwać nad rozdzielaniem przepisanych racji żywnościowych, sprawdzać czy zakaz bicia jest przestrzegany,

że nie jest uzasadnione twierdzenie wymienionych kierowników obozów jakoby wywiązywali się ze swoich obowiązków, że w istocie przybywając do obozów w godzinach, w których internowani byli przy pracy, nie mieli możliwości zdania sobie sprawy ze stanu internowanych, ani przyjmowania od nich zażaleń,

że ponadto zaniechali sprawdzania przedkładanego sobie liczbowego stanu śmiertelności, co nie zezwoliło na poszukiwanie jej przyczyn, że postępując w ten sposób umożliwili oni i ułatwili dokonanie zbrodni zarzucanych im współoskarżonym;

zwazywszy, że ci trzej oskarżeni niesłusznie twierdzą, iż przedsiębiorstwa przemysłowe i organizacje Todt, do których dyspozycji internowani pozostawali w obozach, nie wypełniły swoich zobowiązań, zwłaszcza jeżeli chodzi o wyżywienie, gdyż w rzeczywistości do nich należało zmuszenie tych organizacji do ścisłego przestrzegania wziętych na siebie zobowiązań;

zwazywszy, że większość pozostałych oskarżonych ogranicza się do nieprzyznawania się do winy, że jeżeli niektórzy z nich przyznają częściowo zarzucane im czyny, to starają się zmniejszyć ich skutki i ich liczbę;

Mais, attendu que le nombre et la concordance des témoignages recueillis sous la foi du serment suffisent dans la grande majorité des cas, à établir la réalité des faits reprochés qui ont concouru à entraîner non seulement la misère physique et morale de nombreux internés, mais encore la mort de plusieurs milliers d'entre eux,

Attendu que certains accusés se retranchent derrière des consignes reçues en ce qui concerne les violences qu'ils ont exercées,

Mais attendu qu'il est acquis aux débats que tout le personnel des camps avait l'ordre de ne point exercer de violences sur les internés,

Que certains accusés soutiennent qu'ils ont été amenés à frapper pour maintenir l'ordre; que cependant certains chefs de camp ont reconnu que ces brutalités étaient inutiles,

Qu'en outre, le Tribunal Général constate, que les coups donnés étaient hors de proportion avec les prétendues nécessités de la discipline,

Attendu qu'il importe enfin de souligner que si certaines violences ne portaient pas directement atteinte à l'intégrité physique des internés, elles constituaient néanmoins, par leur nature, une atteinte à la dignité humaine.

Attendu que, en ce qui concerne les responsabilités individuelles des accusés, qu'il est établi par les dépositions des nombreux témoins entendus au cours des débats et par les déclarations des accusés,

QU'AU CAMP DE SCHÖMBERG :

Le Chef de block, Unterscharführer-SS GLEICH Ludwig, dit „LUCKI“, de nationalité Allemande, alcoolique d'une grande brutalité, a frappé avec un bâton à tort et à travers pendant les appels, pour les motifs les plus futiles, — qu'il a même battu jusqu'à évanouissement, notamment un interné Français et un interné Italien qui durent être transportés à l'infirmerie où ils sont morts peu de temps après, qu'il a frappé et fait frapper le soir, au retour du travail, des internés qui lui avaient été signalés par le „Contrôleur“ du camp SEITH qui estimait qu'ils n'avaient pas suffisamment travaillé, qu'il a poussé enfin à un travail exténuant des internés qu'ils savaient épuisés.

Que le Rapportführer-Hauptscharführer-SS SEITH Willy, de nationalité allemande, „Contrôleur du Travail“, semait la terreur dans le camp; qu'il relevait notamment sur les chantiers les numéros des internés qui ne travaillaient pas suffisamment à son gré, afin qu'ils soient, le soir, au retour au camp, frappés de 15 à 25 coups de bâton; qu'il a frappé lui aussi avec les poings ou avec un bâton des internés dont il connaissait l'état d'affaiblissement extrême; que ces brutalités ont, contrairement à ses dénégations, contribué à entraîner la mort de nombreux internés,

Que le Chef de cuisine, Oberscharführer-SS BUSCH Nikolaus, de nationalité allemande, qui exerçait en même temps, par intermittence, les fonctions de sous-chef de camp, n'a jamais eu le moindre geste d'humanité; qu'il est établi, malgré ses dénégations, qu'il frappé souvent, sauvagement, sans motif, à coups de poing; que pour punir des internés Russes qui avaient dérobé un peu de nourriture, il les a forcés à manger des choux crus de plusieurs kilos, que ce supplice a provoqué la dysenterie, et, parfois même, la mort des victimes,

Attendu que BUSCH a détourné une grande quantité de vivres, ainsi que partie du contenu des colis de la Croix-Rouge,

Qu'il savait qu'en diminuant les vivres destinés aux internés, il atténuait considérablement leur résistance physique et précipitait leur mort,

Que le Sturmman-SS JETZELBERGER Josef et le Rottenführer-SS VOLLRING Walter, tous deux de nationalité allemande,

mais attendu que, par ailleurs, les témoignages de nombreux témoins, et notamment de ceux qui ont été entendus au cours des débats, prouvent que les accusés ont exercé des violences sur les internés, et que ces violences ont entraîné la mort de nombreux internés, et que les accusés ont détourné une grande quantité de vivres, ainsi que partie du contenu des colis de la Croix-Rouge,

Attendu que certains accusés se retranchent derrière des consignes reçues en ce qui concerne les violences qu'ils ont exercées, mais attendu qu'il est acquis aux débats que tout le personnel des camps avait l'ordre de ne point exercer de violences sur les internés, que certains accusés soutiennent qu'ils ont été amenés à frapper pour maintenir l'ordre; que cependant certains chefs de camp ont reconnu que ces brutalités étaient inutiles, qu'en outre, le Tribunal Général constate, que les coups donnés étaient hors de proportion avec les prétendues nécessités de la discipline, attendu qu'il importe enfin de souligner que si certaines violences ne portaient pas directement atteinte à l'intégrité physique des internés, elles constituaient néanmoins, par leur nature, une atteinte à la dignité humaine.

Attendu que, en ce qui concerne les responsabilités individuelles des accusés, qu'il est établi par les dépositions des nombreux témoins entendus au cours des débats et par les déclarations des accusés,

ze w obozie Schömberg:

blokowy Unterscharführer-SS Gleich (Ludwik) zwany „Lucki“ narodowości niemieckiej, alkoholik, o wielkiej brutalności, bił pałką podczas apelów każdego kto mu się nawalał pod rękę, bez żadnego powodu, że nawet bił aż do omdlenia, a mianowicie internowane Francuza i Włocha, którzy przeniesieni na izbę chorych zmarli wkrótce potem, że bił i kazał bić po powrocie z pracy tych internowanych, których wskazywał mu „kontroler pracy“ Seith, a którym zdaniem jego nie dość pracowali, że zmuszał do wyczerpującej pracy tych internowanych, którzy byli wyczerpani;

ze Rapportführer, Hauptscharführer-SS Seith (Willy) narodowości niemieckiej, „kontroler pracy“, był postrachem w obozie, zapisywał przy pracy nazwiska tych, którzy według niego nie pracowali dostatecznie, celem ukarania ich po powrocie do obozu do 25 kijami, że sam bił pieściami lub kijem tych internowanych, którzy byli w stanie ostatecznego wyczerpania, że brutalność jego mimo jego zaprzeczeń, spowodowała śmierć wielu internowanych;

ze kierownik kuchni, Oberscharführer-SS Busch (Nikolaus) narodowości niemieckiej, który jednocześnie wykonywał funkcje zastępcy komendanta obozu, nie wykazywał nigdy żadnego odruchu ludzkiego, że ustalono mimo jego zaprzeczeń, że bił często pieściami w sposób dziki, bez powodu, że dla ukarania internowanych Rosjan, którzy dopuścili się kradzieży trochę żywności, zmusił ich do zjedzenia kilku kilo surowej kapusty, że to znoenie spowodowało krwawą biegunkę i niekiedy także i śmierć, zwązywwszy, że Busch kradł żywność w wielkich ilościach, jak również część zawartości paczek Czerwonego Krzyża, że wiedział, iż zmniejszając ilość jedzenia przeznaczonego dla internowanych, zmniejsza znacznie ich odporność fizyczną i przyspiesza ich śmierć;

ze Sturmman-SS Jetzelberger (Josef) i Rottenführer-SS Wolfring (Walter) obaj narodowości niemieckiej, strażnicy obozu, wypełniali swoje funkcje w sposób brutalny, ale nie ma dostatecznych dowodów na to, że razy które zadawali spowodowały poważne następstwa;

sentinelles du camp, ont exercé leurs fonctions avec brutalité, mais qu'il n'est pas suffisamment établi que les coups portés aient entraîné des conséquences graves,

Que le Starmann SS. DITTMAR Karl, de nationalité allemande, sentinelle au camp, a souvent frappé les internés à coups de pied, notamment lors des appels et à coups de crosse lors de l'évacuation du camp,

Mais qu'il apparaît que cette sentinelle est un simple d'esprit dont la responsabilité est atténuée,

Qu' enfin le contremaitre civil STORZ Gregor, de nationalité allemande, amputé de guerre du bras gauche a, de toutes ses forces, frappé les internés avec une matraque et avec le poing; qu'il les poussait au travail malgré leur affaiblissement, choisissant les travaux les plus pénibles pour les confier aux moins résistants,

Qu'il a reconnu partiellement les faits, prétendant toutefois qu'il souffrait fréquemment de sa blessure de guerre, ce qui le rendait nerveux,

Mais attendu que ces circonstances ne sauraient atténuer la responsabilité qu'il a encourue, en exerçant des violences graves alors qu'il ne pouvait ignorer qu'elles étaient de nature à entraîner la mort à plus ou moins longue échéance de ceux qui en étaient les victimes.

Attendu qu'il résulte de nombreux témoignages recueillis au cours des débats :

Qu'AU CAMP de SCHÖRZINGEN :

Le Chef de camp, Rottenführer SS OEHLER Herbert, et le capo TELSCHOW Walter-Gunther, condamné de droit commun, tous deux de nationalité allemande, se sont conduits comme de véritables tyrans, martyrisant les internés et semant la terreur parmi eux; qu'ils sont responsables de la mort de centaines de déportés; qu'ils les ont continuellement frappés et matraqués jusqu'à l'évanouissement et jusqu'à la mort sous les prétextes les plus futiles et même sans aucun motif,

Que notamment TELSCHOW a frappé d'un coup de poing un interné avec une telle violence que celui-ci en tomba évanoui; qu'il a frappé et piétiné un interné Russe qui en mourut quelques jours plus tard,

Que ces deux accusés ont obligé non seulement les internés, mais encore les malades et les mourants à assister dans la neige, et exposés à toutes les intempéries, à des appels qui duraient plusieurs heures; qu'ils les ont matraqués et fait matraquer, sous leur surveillance, de 25, parfois même de 150 coups de bâton sur les reins; qu'ils ont fait lever et coucher, plusieurs fois par nuit, les internés à coups de bâton, qu'ils ont commis et fait commettre des actes de cruauté sans nombre, notamment sur des internés hongrois qui avaient tenté de s'enfuir et qui avaient été ramenés au camp, et plus particulièrement en leur mettant pendant plusieurs jours et plusieurs nuits, aux mains et aux pieds, des menottes spécialement construites et qui entraient dans les chairs; qu'ils ont enfin détourné des vivres de la cuisine ainsi que le contenu des colis de la Croix-Rouge et qu'ils se sont appropriés des objets précieux appartenant à des internés arrivant au camp, ainsi que des dents en or qu'ils faisaient arracher après leur mort aux internés repérés dès leur arrivée au camp et voués, pour ce motif, à une mort violente dans les délais les plus rapides

Attendu que pour échapper à de telles horreurs et à de telles cruautés, certains internés préférèrent chercher dans la mort la fin de leur martyre,

Que le gardien Unterscharführer SS. WINTERBAUER Oskar, de nationalité allemande, a été signalé par de nombreux témoins comme ayant été aussi un matraqueur ayant frappé les internés à coups de bottes et de bâton; qu'il a interdit au médecin du camp

ze Sturmmann-SS Dittmar (Karl) nationalité allemande, straznik obozu, kopal czesto internowanych podczas apelu, a podczas ewakuacji obozu bil ich loba, ale zachodzi prawdopodobienstwo, straznik ten jest niedorozwiniety umyslowo, wobec tego odpowiedzialnosc jego jest zmniejszona;

ze majster cywilny Storz (Gregor) narodowosci niemieckiej, a walida wojenny, jednoreki, bil internowanych z calych sil piesci i palka gumowa, ze zmuszal ich do pracy mimo ich oslabienia wyszukiwal najciezsza prace dla najmniej odpornych, ze czesciowo przyznal sie do winy, utrzymujac jednakze, ze cierpienie na skutki rany sprawialo go czesto w stan podenerwowania, zwazywszy jednak, ze te okolicznosci, ktore nie zmniejszaja odpowiedzialnosc, brutalne czyny, o ktorych wiedzial, ze moga spowodowac ewalutowa lub powolna smierc ofiar,

zwazywszy, ze w obozie Schörzingen:

komendant obozu Rottenführer-SS Oehler (Herbert) i capo Telschow (Walter, Gunther) przestepca kryminalny, obydwaj narodowosci niemieckiej, zachowywali sie jak prawdziwi tyran, druczali internowanych i szercac wsrod nich terror, ze sa oni odpowiedzialni za smierc setek deportowanych, ze bili ich ciagle, az do smierci i az do smierci pod najbardziej blahymi pretekstami, a nawet bez zadnego powodu,

ze Telschow pewnego dnia uderzyl tak gwałtownie piescia pewnego internowanego, ze ten padl zemdlony; ze innego internowanego Rosjanina tak pobil i potratowal nogami, ze ten zmarl po kilku dniach;

ze obydwaj oskarzeni zmuszali wszystkich internowanych, nie wylaczajac chorych i umierajacych, by stawali do kilkugodzinnnych apelow na sniegu i przy niepogodzie, ze bili i kazali bic internowanych pod swym nadzorem, wymierzajac im po 25, a niekiedy nawet 150 uderzen kijem, po plecach, ze wielokrotnie uderzeniami kija w ciagu nocy budzili internowanych ze popelnili lub spowodowali popelnienie niezliczonych ilosci okrucienstw, a mianowicie na internowanych Wegrach, ktorzy asilowali uciec i ktorzy zostali sprowadzeni do obozu, w szczegolnosc zakladajac im przez kilka dni na rece i na nogi kajdanki specjalnie przyzadzone, ktore wpijaly sie w cialo; i ze kradli zywnosc z kuchni, jak rowniez zawartosc paczek Czerwonego Krzyza i ze przywlaszczyli sobie przedmioty wartosciowe przybylych do obozu internowanych, jak rowniez złote zebry, ktore kazali wyrwac zmarlym internowanym juz z tego powodu przeznaczonym zaraz po przybyciu do obozu na gwałtowna smierc,

zwazywszy, ze niektorzy internowani by uniknac takich potwor-nosci i takich okrucienstw, woleli przez smierc polozyc kres swym cierpieniom;

zwazywszy, ze straznik Unterscharführer-SS Winterbauer (Oskar) narodowosci niemieckiej, zostal oskarzony przez wielu swiadkow, iz kopal internowanych i bil stale kijem, ze zabronil obozowemu lekarzowi udzielac pomocy chorym ze matowal internowanych rzuconych do sniegu, ze procz tego kazal zabopac jednego internowanego, ktory dawal jeszcze znaki zycia, ze zwrócił uwagę „capo” Telschowa na przybylego do oboza zyda polskiego, ktory miał złote uzebienie i ktory w kilka dni pozniej zostal tak brutalnie zbity, ze zmarl, poczym zebry jego zostaly wyrwane i skradzione;

de soigner les malades qu'il a piétiné des internés dans la neige ; Qu'au surplus, il a fait enterrer un interné alors qu'il était encore vivant ; qu'il a signalé au Kapo TELSCHOW un interné Juif Polonais, dès son arrivée au camp, parce qu'il avait des dents en or et que quelques jours plus tard, cet interné fut tellement battu qu'il en mourut et que ses dents furent arrachées et volées.

Attendu que l'accusé WINTERBAUER a reconnu partiellement les faits et notamment avoir frappé à coups de poing et quelquefois avec un bâton et avoir volé des bagues et objets précieux ainsi que partie du contenu des colis de la Croix-Rouge destinés aux déportés.

Attendu que le kapo STACH Lorentz, condamné de droit commun, de nationalité allemande, faisant fonctions de Chef de cuisine du camp, a frappé des internes à coups de bâton et à coups de poing ; a procédé à des fouilles et a volé des objets précieux à des internés, et s'est livré enfin à un trafic de denrées au préjudice des internés

Qu'il a reconnu partiellement les faits, mais que ses agissements ne revêtent pas une particulière gravité.

Attendu que le Sturmmann SS DORNÄUER Johann de nationalité allemande, a été un chef de bloc brutal, frappant chaque jour les internés à coups de matraque ; qu'un jour, il a cassé, à coups de crosse, les dents d'un interné ; qu'il exigeait un travail épuisant et même des travaux supplémentaires, sachant qu'il devait entraîner pour les plus affaiblis, une mort certaine.

Attendu que l'Hauptscharführer SS. HERMANN Jakob, Chef de la compagnie des gardes, de nationalité allemande a connu et constaté les brutalités exercées par ses sentinelles ; que, cependant, malgré l'autorité dont il jouissait, il a toléré ces agissements criminels ; qu'il a également détourné des vivres pour lui-même, pour sa famille et pour des civils allemands ; qu'au cours de l'évacuation, il s'est fait traîner avec sa famille et ses bagages dans une charrette attelée de déportés.

Attendu que les sentinelles SS. PFEFFERKORN Rolf, LINK Jacob, DANNECK Wolfgang, tous trois de nationalité allemande, ont également, de leur propre initiative, frappé avec brutalité des internés sans motif plausible ; qu'en outre, lors de l'évacuation du camp, alors qu'ils ne pouvaient ignorer l'arrivée prochaine des armées alliées, ils n'ont modifié en aucune façon leur attitude, continuant à frapper et à matraquer, que toutefois, il n'est pas démontré que ces coups et violences aient entraîné la mort d'internés.

Attendu enfin, que le chef de chantier de Zeptenhahn (O. T.) PATOLLA Josef, de nationalité allemande, a brutalisé des internés dont il estimait le travail insuffisant ; qu'il reconnaît d'ailleurs avoir frappé avec les mains et quelquefois avec un bâton.

Or attendu qu'il se rendait compte de l'amaigrissement et de l'affaiblissement des internés et qu'il savait les conséquences graves et même mortelles que ces coups pouvaient avoir.

Attendu qu'AU CAMP de SPAICHINGEN

Le kapo EURTLL August, de nationalité allemande, condamné de droit commun, a été reconnu formellement par tous les témoins ; que malgré ses dénégations, il est établi qu'il a agi comme un sadique, donnant des coups et matraquant par plaisir ; qu'il a frappé sans aucun motif jusqu'à l'évanouissement et même jusqu'à la mort, brutalisé les internés pendant qu'ils mangeaient afin de les empêcher, frappé un interné au point de lui casser le bras et forcé au travail même les malades jusqu'à complet évanouissement.

Que le kapo ECK Philip, de nationalité allemande, condamné de droit commun, s'est toujours conduit dans le camp comme un individu très brutal ; qu'il a, pour les motifs les plus futiles, frappé avec un bâton des internés dont certains restèrent atteints d'infirmités permanentes.

zwazywszy, że oskarżony Winterbauer przyznał się częściowo do tych czynów, a mianowicie do bicia pięścią, a czasami kijem i do kradzieży pierniczków i przedmiotów wartościowych, jak również części zawartości paczek Czerwonego Krzyża przeznaczonych dla internowanych;

zwazywszy, że „kapo” Stach (Lorentz) przestępca kryminalny, narodowości niemieckiej, pełniący funkcje kierownika kuchni w obozie, bijł internowanych kijem lub pięścią, przeszukiwał internowanych i kradł im rzeczy wartościowe i wreszcie że z krzywdą dla internowanych zajmował się handlem różnych artykułów żywnościowych, że przyznał się częściowo do tych czynów ale że jego postępowanie nie miało cięższych następstw;

zwazywszy, że Strumann-SS Dornauer (Johann) narodowości niemieckiej był blokowym brutalnym, który bijł ciągle internowanych gumową pałką i że raz wybił jednemu internowanemu zęby uderzeniem kolba, że zadał pracy wyczerpującej, a nawet prac dodatkowych, wiedząc, że przez to może spowodować śmierć najbardziej osłabionych;

zwazywszy, że Hauptscharführer-SS Hermann (Jakob), szef kompanii strażników, narodowości niemieckiej, wiedział i sam stwierdził brutalne zachowanie się podległych mu wartowników, że mimo tego, wbrew autorytetowi jakim się cieszył, tolerował te zbrodnicze postępowania, że kradł również żywność dla siebie, dla swej rodziny i dla cywilnej ludności niemieckiej, że w czasie ewakuacji kazał sobie, swojej rodzinie i swe bagaże ciągnąć w wozie, do którego zaprzęgi internowanych;

zwazywszy, że strażnicy SS Pfefferkorn (Rolf), Link (Jakub) i Dannek (Wolfgang), wszyscy trzej narodowości niemieckiej, także z własnej inicjatywy bili brutalnie internowanych bez uzasadnionej przyczyny, że procz tego podczas ewakuacji obozu, kiedy napewno wiedzieli o bliskim nadejściu wojsk sprzymierzonych nie zmienili zupełnie swego postępowania, kontynuując bicia i maltretowanie, że jednak nie jest dowiedzione, że te uderzenia spowodowały śmierć internowanych.

zwazywszy, że kierownik oddziału pracy Zeptenhagen z organizacji Todt (O.T.), Patolla (Josef) narodowości niemieckiej brutalizował tych internowanych, których robotę uważał za niewystarczającą, że przyznał zresztą, iż bijł ręką, a czasami i kijem; oteż wziąwszy pod uwagę, że zdawał sobie sprawę z wychudnięcia i osłabienia internowanych i że wiedział jak poważne, a nawet śmiertelne mogą być następstwa tych uderzeń;

zwazywszy, że w obozie Spaichingen:

„kapo” Burtel (August) narodowości niemieckiej, przestępca kryminalny, został stanowczo rozpoznany przez wszystkich świadków, że jest ustalone wbrew jego zaprzeczeniom, iż postępował jak sadysta, iż znajdował przyjemność w bieniu bez żadnego powodu, aż do omdlenia, i nawet aż do śmierci ofiar, że brutalizował internowanych, by im przeszkodzić w jezeniu, że tak uderzył jednego internowanego, iż mu złamał rękę że zmuszał do pracy nawet chorych aż do zupełnie wyczerpania.

zwazywszy, że „kapo” Eck (Philip) narodowości niemieckiej, przestępca kryminalny, postępował w obozie zawsze bardzo brutalnie, że z najbardziej blawych powodów bijł internowanych kijem tak, że niektórzy z nich zostali kalectwem,

Que le gardien SS. OTT Paul, de nationalité allemande, très dur, frappant fréquemment les internés à coups de crosse, a piétiné un interné polonais jugé par lui mal aligné lors d'un appel; que cet interné mourut le lendemain,

Que le Starmann SS. DAHLMANN Fritz, de nationalité allemande, qui prétend n'avoir donné que quelques gifflés a exercé les fonctions de gardien de la façon la plus inhumaine, et avec une brutalité telle qu'il a même une fois brisé son arme sur un interné; qu'il a frappé un Italien au point que celui-ci dût être transporté à l'infirmerie où il décédait quelques heures après; qu'il a tiré, lors de l'évacuation du camp, sur des internés épuisés et qui ne pouvaient plus suivre la colonne,

Que le gardien SS. LORENTZ Hermann, de nationalité allemande, a parfois permis aux internés de recevoir le morceau de pain qui leur était offert par des personnes compatissantes à leur misérable sort; mais qu'il s'est toujours comporté comme un gardien très brutal, spécialiste des coups de poing et de pied, de matraque; qu'il empêchait ses victimes de panser les blessures qu'il avait occasionnées; qu'il a piétiné un interné; qu'il a retiré les cuillers de certains déportés les forçant à manger avec leurs mains; qu'enfin, il a menacé l'infirmière allemande de l'usine, lui reprochant d'ÊTRE TROP HUMAINE pour un camp d'internés,

Que le cuisinier civil LEIDING Heinrich, de nationalité allemande, a souvent détourné des vivres au préjudice des internés, diminuant ainsi la capacité de résistance physique de ces derniers,

Attendu qu'au CAMP d'ERZINGEN,

MAREK Paul dit „Croquignole“, de nationalité allemande, a été un contremaitre civil particulièrement cruel et brutal, n'ayant jamais tenu compte des principes les plus élémentaires d'humanité; qu'il a brutalisé avec un manche de pioche un malade qui n'avait pas eu la force de relever un wagonnet, et frappé jusqu'au sang d'autres internés à coups de poing, parfois même avec une barre à mines, s'en prenant souvent aux faibles,

Qu'il a omis de prendre les mesures de précaution indispensables pour éviter tout accident mortel dans l'exécution des travaux qu'il dirigeait.

Que le chef de camp, Hauptscharführer SS. RIEFFLIN Karl, de nationalité allemande, s'est comporté au camp, comme un tortionnaire, semant la terreur dès qu'il apparaissait sur les chantiers, surgissant en tous moments, frappant brutalement à coups de pied et de bâton sous les prétextes les plus futiles et exigeant toujours un travail excessif,

Que le chef de camp Oberscharführer OLESCH Paul, de nationalité allemande, d'humeur inégale, impulsif, a exercé parfois des violences en portant des coups de pied et de bâton,

Mais attendu que ces violences ne présentaient pas le caractère de brutalité ou de cruauté, qu'il a en outre ait preuve en maintes circonstances, de certains sentiments d'humanité, laissant au médecin du camp interné Français, la possibilité d'exercer son art, et donnant parfois une soupe supplémentaire aux internés les plus affaiblis,

Qu'enfin, lors de l'évacuation du camp, il a pris des mesures pour sauvegarder la vie des internés.

Que le gardien SS. GEISEL Anton dit „Gants Blancs“, de nationalité allemande, réputé sévère, a fait son métier de sentinelle non seulement sans aucun geste d'humanité, mais bien avec brutalité, vociférant sans cesse, exigeant le maximum de travail, frappant à coups de pied et de crosse,

Qu'il a notamment porté des coups et fait des blessures graves à un interné qui n'avait plus la force de travailler,

ze straznik SS Ott (Paul) narodowosci niemieckiej, bardzo surowy, bil czesto kolba internowanych, ze skopal internowanego Polaka, uwazajac, ze ten nie stoi dobrze w szeregu podczas apelu i ze ten internowany zmarl nazajutrz;

ze Stummann-SS Dahlmann (Fritz) narodowosci niemieckiej, który twierdzi, iz tylko kilkakrotnie uderzył w twarz, penil funkcje straznika w sposob najbardziej nieludzki i z taka brutalnoscia, ze raz nawet zlamal swa kolbe bijac jednego internowanego i ze pobil jednego Wlocha tak mocno, iz ten musial byc zabiesiony do izby chorych i tam zmarl w kilka godzin pozniej, ze podczas ewakuacji obozu strzelal do internowanych, którzy byli wycienzeni i nie mogli nadazyć za kolumna;

ze straznik SS Lorentz (Hermann) narodowosci niemieckiej, pozwalal czasami internowanym wziac kawalek chleba zaofiarowany im przez osoby wspolczujace ich nedznemu losowi, ale ze zachowywal sie zawsze jako dozorca bardzo brutalnie, specjalnie uderzajac piescia, noga i palka gumowa, ze nie pozwalal swym ofiarom opatrzec zadanych przez siebie ran, ze potratowal nogami jednego internowanego, ze odbieral niektórym internowanym lyzki, zmuszajac ich do jedzenia rekami, ze wreszcie zagrozil pielegniarce niemieckiej z fabryki, zarzucajac jej, ze jest zbyt ludzka dla internowanych;

ze Rottenführer Opitz (Gunther) narodowosci niemieckiej, bez powodu bil nietylko internowanych pod blahym pretekstem nieprzestrzegania otrzymanych rozkazow, ze jesli nie jest dowiedzione iz te zadane razy mialy smiertelne nastepstwa, to niemniej, jest pewne, iz przyczynily sie do zniszczenia zdrowia internowanych i poglebily ich nedze fizyczna i duchowa;

ze kucharz cywilny Leiding (Heinrich) narodowosci niemieckiej czesto kradl zywnosc ze szkoda dla internowanych, zmniejszajac w ten sposob ich odpornosc fizyczna;

zwazywszy, ze w obozie Erzingen:

Marek (Paul) zwany „Croquignol“ narodowosci niemieckiej, byl majstrem cywilnym i wyjatkowo okrutnym i brutalnym, nie bioracym nigdy pod uwage najbardziej elementarnych zasad ludzkosci, ze pobil motyka jednego chorego, który nie mial sily podnieśc wagonu kolejki i ze pobil do krwi innych internowanych, czy to uderzeniem pieci, czy nawet czasem drapiem zelaznym, mszczac sie szczegolnie na slabych, ze nie przedstewzial srodkow ostroznosci niezbednych dla unikniecia wypadkow smiertelnych przy pracy, która kierowal;

ze komendant obozu Hauptscharführer-SS Riefflin (Karl) narodowosci niemieckiej, zachowywal sie w obozie jak oprawca, siejac postrach jak tylko sie ukazal na miejscu pracy, bijac brutalnie nogami lub kijem pod byle jakim pretekstem i domagajac sie zawsze nadmiernej pracy;

ze komendant obozu Oberscharführer Olesch (Paul) narodowosci niemieckiej, zmiennego usposobienia, impulsywny, wymierzal niekiedy uderzenia czy to noga, czy to palka; ale biorac pod uwage, ze te uderzenia nie nosily charakteru brutalnosc, ani okrucienstwa, ze pozatem w wielu okolicznosciach dal on dowod uczuc ludzkich, pozwalajac lekarzowi obozowemu, internowanemu Francuzowi wykonywac swoj zawod, dajac czasem najbardziej oslabionym internowanym dodatkowa porcje zupy i wreszcie, ze podczas ewakuacji obozu przedstewzial srodki, by uchronac zycie internowanych;

Que le gardien SS. KELLINGER Simon, dit „Mitraillette“, Né roumain et enrôlé dans l'armée allemande, réputé dur, brutal par peur, et n'ayant jamais eu le moindre geste d'humanité, a frappé notamment, à coups de crosse, un jeune déporté affamé qui avait ramassé un fruit,

Que cet accusé a reconnu du reste avoir parfois frappé pour des motifs futiles.

Attendu qu'au CAMP de DAUTMERGEN,

Les quatre chefs de block SS. BECKER Hans, BRAUNWARTH Andréas, THEIS Albert et BILLOTIN Léo, tous de nationalité allemande, ont été des chefs de block terribles; qu'ils ont violemment frappé les internés lors des appels interminables dans la boue et malgré toutes les intempéries; qu'ils ont matraqué et fait matraquer chaque dimanche les internés punis au cours de la semaine,

Que notamment, BECKER avait sans cesse un bâton en main dont il s'est servi pour frapper jusqu'à la mort les internés qu'il piétinait ensuite.

Que BRAUNWARTH, ayant rempli les fonctions de chef de magasin d'habillement ne s'est pas contenté de frapper à coups de bâton quand on lui demandait des effets d'habillement, mais encore qu'il a retiré aux nouveaux arrivés leurs effets chauds et leurs chaussures, refusant au surplus de donner aux internés des effets d'habillement, bien qu'il en ait eu en quantité suffisante dans son magasin,

Que lors de l'exécution d'Avril 1945, il a achevé un interné qui avait été pendu et dont la corde s'était cassée et qui avait été amené à l'infirmerie,

Que THEIS et BILLOTIN ont frappé violemment les internés avec un bâton et notamment les malades, lors des appels interminables dans la boue; qu'ils ont donné l'ordre de frapper les internés punis de nombreux coups de bâton le dimanche; qu'ils ont enfin piétiné et frappé à mort un interné malade que transportait un de ses camarades,

Attendu que le chef de kommando DEUTSCH Josef, de nationalité autrichienne, a frappé cruellement jusqu'à évanouissement, que notamment il a tiré sans sommation sur un Russe qui avait tenté de s'enfuir et l'a tué, ainsi qu'un autre interné qui avait ramassé un fruit,

Attendu que le kapo MARKUS Maurice, israélite, de nationalité polonaise, a été chef de block des Juifs au camp; qu'il a frappé à coups de matraque avec une violence telle que ses nombreuses victimes ont dû être transportées à l'infirmerie,

Attendu que cet interné soutient qu'il n'a frappé que pour maintenir l'ordre dans le camp,

Mais attendu que les témoignages recueillis démontrent au contraire qu'il frappait le plus souvent sans motif, avec une violence généralement inutile, uniquement pour se faire bien voir de ses chefs,

Attendu qu'il y a lieu de souligner qu'âgé actuellement de 23 ans, il a été déporté et interné depuis l'âge de 15 ans,

Attendu que le kapo SZCZEPANIAK Sigmund de nationalité polonaise, dit „Moundek“ a été le kapo le plus terrible, d'une cruauté sans pareille, ayant de très nombreux morts sur la conscience; qu'il a massacré à coups de bâton sur place, piétiné sur le cou et la poitrine des internés jusqu'à la mort, sadique des coups matraqueur permanent, se vantant d'avoir été un grand criminel dans son pays et de le demeurer sans cesse,

Attendu que le kapo DOBINSKI Boleslaw dit „Bolek“, de nationalité polonaise, a été un kapo sanguinaire; qu'il a frappé à de nombreuses reprises, à coups de bâton, jusqu'à épuisement total et qu'il a piétiné jusqu'à la mort,

Qu'il déclare avoir frappé simplement pour maintenir l'ordre et avoir piétiné des internés, mais conteste que ces coups auraient entraîné la mort; que ses dénégations ne sauraient être retenues en présence du nombre des dépositions précises et concordantes d'internés qui ont été les témoins des faits qui lui sont reprochés.

Attendu que les gardiens SS. LOGES Karl, NAGORSEN Reinhardt, WEBER David, BAUER Friedrich de nationalité alle-

ze straznik SS Geisel (Anton), zwany „biała rekawiczka“ narodowosci niemieckiej, znany z surowosci, pelnil swe funkcje straznika nietylko bez zadnego uczucia ludzkiego, ale z brutalnoscia, wieszczac bez przerwy, zadajac maksimum pracy, bijac kolba lub kopiac; ze np. pobil i ciezko zranil jednego internowanego, który nie mial juz sily do pracy;

ze straznik SS Kellinger (Simeon) zwany „Mitrailka“, z urodzenia rumun, który wstapil do armii niemieckiej, znany z surowosci, brutalny na skutek leku przed SS-manami Niemcami, nie majacy nigdy najmniejszego odruchu ludzkiego, pobil mianowicie uderzeniami kolby jednego mlodego internowanego, wyglodzonego, za to, ze podniosl z ziemi owoc, ze oskarzony przyznal sie zreszta, ze bil czasami z blahych powodow;

zwazywszy, ze w obozie Dautmergen:

4-ej blokowi SS-mani Becker (Hans), Braunwarth (Andreas), Theiss (Albert) i Billotin (Leo), narodowosci niemieckiej, byli straszliwymi kierownikami blokow, ze bili czesto internowanych podczas dlugotrwalych apelow, odbywajacych sie w blocie i mimo niepogody, ze co niedziele bili i kazali bic internowanych ukaranych w ciagu tygodnia;

ze mianowicie Becker mial zawsze kij w reku, zapomoca ktorego bil do smierci internowanych i potem tratalowal ich nogami,

ze Braunwarth, który pelnil takze funkcje kierownika magazynu odziezy, nietylko stale bil kijem, gdy go proszono o odziez, ale jeszcze zabieral nowoprzybylym ich ciepla odziez i buty, w dodatku odnawial rozdania internowanym przedmiotow odzieżowych, chociaz mial ich w magazynie swym dostateczne ilosci, ze podczas egzekucji w kwietniu 1945r. dobil jednego internowanego, który zostal po powieszeniu i oderwaniu sie petli przeniesiony do izby chorych,

ze Theiss i Billotin bil silnie internowanych kijem, a nawet chorych podczas niekonczacych sie apelow w blocie, ze dawali rozkaz bicia internowanych w niedziele, ze wreszcie skopali i pobili na smierc internowanego chorego przyniesionego przez jednego ze swych towarzyszy;

zwazywszy, ze szef „komando“ Deutsch (Josef) narodowosci austriackiej bil okrutnie az do omdlenia, ze nawet do jednego Rosjanina, który probowal uciec strzelil bez uprzedzenia i zabil go, podobnie jak i innego internowanego, który podniosl owoc lezacy na ziemi;

zwazywszy, ze „kapo“ Markus (Maurycy) izraelita narodowosci polskiej, byl szefem bloku zydow w obozie, ze bil gumowa palka z taka gwałtownoscia, ze jego liczne ofary musialy byc przenoszone do izby chorych;

zwazywszy, ze oskarzony twierdzi, ze bil tylko dla utrzymania porzadku w obozie, jednakze jak wynika z zeznan swiadkow bil on wlasnie czesto bez powodu i naogol z gwałtownoscia nienzasadniona, jedynie by sie wkrasc w laski swych szefow,

nalezv jednak podkreslic, iz ma on teraz zaledwie 23 lata, ze byl deportowany i internowany juz majac lat 15;

zwazywszy, ze „kapo“ Szczepaniak (Szymunt) narodowosci polskiej, zwany „Moundek“, byl straszliwym kapo i przetrwanym okraczeniem i ma na swoim koncie wiele wiecej zabitych i ze masakrowal na miejscu udezeniemami kija, potem tratalowal nogami

mande. SCHENKEL Edouard, de nationalité Russe, ont exercé leurs fonctions de sentinelles avec une grande brutalité, frappant à coups de crosse et de bâton, soit lors des appels, soit sur le chantier ou en cours de route, sous les prétextes les plus futiles, au point que plusieurs internés durent être transportés à l'infirmerie.

Attendu que le gardien SS. POSSLER Anton, de nationalité roumaine, chargé du kommando de jardinage du camp, a frappé avec brutalité la plupart des internés travaillant sous ses ordres, au point que l'un d'eux a eu un oeil crevé et que plusieurs en sont morts.

Attendu que si les gardiens SS. SCHLECHTRIEM Otto, BEFFUR Bernhardt, KIRSTEIN Paul, tous de nationalité allemande, ont rempli leurs fonctions de sentinelles avec rigueur et ont parfois battu, il semble que les conséquences de ces violences et de ces sévices n'aient entraîné aucune conséquence grave, que cependant, ils savaient qu'en se livrant à des violences sur des individus affaiblis et sous-alimentés, ils accomplissaient des actes d'inhumanité à leur égard.

Attendu que, contrastant avec l'attitude des chefs de camp, des gardiens et des kapos, seul, l'accusé DOLD Erwin, de nationalité allemande, qui fut chef de camp à DAUTMERGEN, manifesta des sentiments d'humanité unanimement reconnue par tous les internés du camp, entendu comme témoins; qu'il a fait preuve d'initiative et d'autorité malgré son jeune âge et malgré les risques qu'il pouvait encourir pour améliorer la situation générale du camp et le sort des internés, non seulement au point de vue ravitaillement, mais encore au point de vue habillement, et discipline générale; que tous les témoins entendus ont affirmé qu'il avait été pour tous d'un grand réconfort moral,

Qu'il avait déjà eu au surplus la même attitude dans un camp où il avait été auparavant gardien.

Attendu enfin qu'examinant le cas particulier des chefs de camp et de leur adjoint du camp de NATZWEILER-STRUHOF, en leur qualité de chefs des sous-camps faisant l'objet du présent procès, l'Obersturmbannführer HARTJENSTEIN Fritz, de nationalité allemande, quoique ancien Officier Supérieur d'active de la Wehrmacht (Lieutenant-Colonel) a assumé en tant que chef de camp de NATZWEILER-STRUHOF, le contrôle des sous-camps pendant au moins cinq mois.

Que pendant cette période, il s'est abstenu de procéder à des inspections sérieuses, ne recherchant en aucune façon à se renseigner sur les conditions de vie des internés, sur l'état sanitaire des camps ainsi que sur les causes de la mortalité exceptionnelle, qu'il s'est ainsi rendu sciemment complice de crimes en omettant volontairement d'user de ses prérogatives et de son autorité qui devaient en empêcher la perpétration,

Attendu qu'il en est de même de l'Hauptsturmführer SCHWARZ Heinrich, de nationalité allemande, qui a succédé à HARTJENSTEIN en Février 1945,

Que cet accusé, membre du parti depuis 1939, et depuis la même date membre des SS, a reconnu s'être, au cours de rares inspections, rendu compte de l'état misérable des internés,

Qu'il n'a cependant pas pris les mesures indispensables pour améliorer leur sort,

Qu'en agissant ainsi, il s'est également, de propos délibéré, rendu complice des mêmes crimes en omettant volontairement d'user de ses prérogatives et de son autorité qui devaient en empêcher la perpétration.

Attendu, enfin, en ce qui concerne l'Obersturmführer, SCHMIDTETZKI Walter, de nationalité allemande, volontaire SS, depuis 1934, qui fut l'adjoint de SCHWARZ à partir du 15 Février 1945, que cet accusé fut chargé plus particulièrement de l'organisation matérielle des sous-camps et des questions administratives.

Qu'il s'est abstenu délibérément, en présence du dénuement complet des internés au point de vue habillement surtout pendant la période d'hiver, de donner des instructions pour que les vêtements se trouvant en grande quantité dans les magasins du camp soient distribués aux internés,

Qu'en outre, au point de vue ravitaillement, cet accusé a reconnu que les denrées alimentaires, dont la fourniture était imposée par contrat aux firmes employant les internés, étaient en mauvais état et que les quantités prévues n'étaient pas livrées,

po szyji i klatce piersiowej internowanych aż do śmierci, sadysta, bil ciągle, chwalać się, że był w swym kraju wielkim zbrodniarzem i że nim zawsze zostanie;

zwazywszy, że „kapo” Dobinski (Boleslaw) zwany „Bolek”, narodowości polskiej, był krwiożerczym katem i że wiele razy bił pałką aż do wyczerpania i kopał aż do śmierci, że oświadczył, iż bił jedynie dla utrzymania porządku, ale zaprzecza temu, jakoby te uderzenia miały spowodować śmierć, że te jego zaprzeczenia nie mogą być wzięte pod uwagę wobec licznych, dokładnych zgodnych ze sobą zeznań internowanych, którzy byli świadkami zarzucanych mu czynów;

zwazywszy, że strażnicy SS Loges (Karl), Nagorsen (Reinhard), Weber (David), Bauer (Friedrich) narodowości niemieckiej, Schenke (Eduard) narodowości rosyjskiej, wypełniali swe funkcje strażników z wielką brutalnością, bijąc kolbą i kijem, czy to podczas apelów czy to na miejscu pracy, albo po drodze, z jak najbardziej białych powodów i z taką gwałtownością, że wielu internowanych musiało być przeniesionych do izby chorych;

zwazywszy, że strażnik SS Possler (Anton) narodowości rumuńskiej, który prowadził obozowe „komando” ogrodnicze, bił z taką brutalnością większość internowanych pracujących pod jego rozkazami, że jednemu z nich wybił oko, a wielu innych zabił,

zwazywszy, że strażnicy SS Schlechtriem (Otto), Defur (Bernhard), Kirschstein (Paul), narodowości niemieckiej, pełnili swe funkcje wartowników z surowością i niekiedy bili, zdaje się jednak, że skutki tych gwałtowności i rąw nie miały poważnych następstw tym niemniej wiedzieli oni, że bijąc internowanych osłabionych i niedożywionych popełniali w stosunku do nich czyny nieludzkie.

zwazywszy, że w przeciwieństwie do zachowania się komendantów obozów, strażników i „kapo”, jedynie oskarżony Dold (Erwin) narodowości niemieckiej, który był komendantem obozu w Dautmergen wykazał uczucia ludzkie, jednogłośnie uznane przez wszystkich internowanych obozu, przesłuchanych jako świadków, że dał on dowód inicjatywy i autorytetu, mimo swego młodego wieku i mimo ryzyka na które się naraził, aby polepszyć ogólną sytuację w obozie i los internowanych, nie tylko pod względem wyżywienia, ale także pod względem odzieży i ogólnej dyscypliny, i że wszyscy świadkowie przesłuchani stwierdzili, iż był on dla nich wielką podporą moralną, że ponadto miał taki sam sposób zachowania się w innym obozie, w którym przedtem był strażnikiem;

zwazywszy, że rozpatrując oddzielnie wypadek kierowników obozu i ich pomocnika obozu Natzweiler Struthof w związku z ich stanowiskiem szefów tych „podobozów”, będących przedmiotem obecnego procesu, Obersturmbannführer Hartjenstein (Fritz), narodowości niemieckiej, pomimo, że był wysokim oficerem w czynnej służbie Wehrmachtu (podpułkownik) miał pod swoim nadzorem „podobozów” jako kierownik obozu Natzweiler-Struthof, przez okres prawie 5 miesięcy; że w ciągu tego czasu nie wykonywał inspekcji poważnych, nie starał się zupełnie poznać warunków życia internowanych, stanu higieny w obozie, ani też przyczyn wyjątkowo dużej śmiertelności; że w ten sposób świadomie stał się współsprawcą zbrodni, nie wykorzystując z własnej woli swoich praw i autorytetu, które mogły tej zbrodni zapobiec.

zwazywszy, że sprawa przedstawia się identycznie jeśli chodzi o Hauptsturmführera Schwartz (Heinricha) narodowości niemieckiej, który przejął funkcje po Hartjensteinie w lutym 1945, że oskarżony ten, członek partii od 1939r. i członek SS od tego samego czasu

Or attendu qu'il ne justifie d'aucune démarche sérieuse et utile pour distribuer les effets d'habillement existant en réserve et qui permettraient de faire face à toute éventualité,

Attendu qu'en agissant ainsi, il a contribué à la détresse physique et morale des internés,

Attendu que tous ces agissements constituent des infractions aux Lois et Coutumes des Nations Civilisées et aux Usages de la Guerre, et des Crimes contre l'Humanité :

EN CONSÉQUENCE

et à la majorité des deux tiers au moins,

LE TRIBUNAL GÉNÉRAL.

1. — DÉCLARE l'accusé :

DOLD Erwin

NON COUPABLE des faits qui lui sont reprochés par l'accusation.

2. — DÉCLARE :

SCHWARZ Heinrich
HARTJENSTEIN Fritz
SCHMIDETZKI Walter
SEITH Willy
GLEICH Ludwig
BUSCH Nikolaus
JETZELSBERGER Josef
DITTMAR Karl
STORZ Gregor
VOLLRING Walter
MAREK Paul
PFEFFERKORN Rolf
PATOLLA Josef
LINK Jakob
DEUTSCH Josef
BRAUNWARTH Andréas
BECKER Hans
SZCZEPANIAK Sigmund
BILLOTIN Léo
THEIS Albert
LOGES Friedrich
NAGORSEN Reinhardt
WEBER David
DEFFUR Bernhard
DOBINSKI Boleslaw

RIEFLIN Karl
KELLINGER Simon
GEISEL Anton
OLESCH Paul
OEHLER Herbert
TELSCHOW Walter
WINTERBAUER Oskar
STACH Lorenz
HERRMANN Jakob
DORNAUER Johann
DANEK Wolfgang
POSSLER Anton
KIRSTEIN Paul
SCHLECHTRIEM Otto
SCHENKEL Edouard
MARKUS Maurice
BAUER Friedrich
BURTEL August
OPITZ Gustav
ECK Philipp
DAHLMANN Fritz
LORENTZ Hermann
OTT Paul
LEIDING Heinrich

COUPABLES de Crimes de Guerre et de Crimes contre l'Humanité dans les limites ci-dessus fixées.

Vu la déclaration de culpabilité précédente,

ATTENDU que tous les faits retenus à la charge des accusés sont prévus et réprimés par l'article 2 de la loi No 10 du Conseil de Contrôle Allié, en date du 20 Décembre 1945,

Qu'il n'y a donc pas lieu de faire application des articles du Code pénal Allemand visés dans l'acte d'accusation,

ET ATTENDU que le TRIBUNAL GÉNÉRAL possède les éléments suffisants d'appréciation pour fixer le montant des peines à infliger aux différents accusés déclarés coupables, compte tenu de la part prise par chacun d'eux dans la Réalisation de l'entreprise criminelle faisant l'objet de la présente procédure.

EN CONSÉQUENCE

PAR CES MOTIFS

CONDAMNE, à la majorité des deux tiers au moins, les nommés :

1. — SCHWARZ Heinrich
HARTJENSTEIN Fritz
SEITH Willy
GLEICH Ludwig
BUSCH Nikolaus
STORZ Gregor
OEHLER Herbert
TELSCHOW Walter
WINTERBAUER Oskar
DORNAUER Johann
DEUTSCH Josef

BRAUNWARTH Andréas
BECKER Hans
SZCZEPANIAK Sigmund
BILLOTIN Léo
THEIS Albert
DOBINSKI Boleslaw
POSSLER Anton
BURTEL August
DAHLMANN Fritz
LORENTZ Hermann

À LA PEINE DE MORT

qui sera exécutée conformément à la loi,

2. — RIEFLIN Karl
HERRMANN Jakob
LOGES Friedrich

SCHENKEL Edouard
MARKUS Maurice
OTT Paul

À LA PEINE D'EMPRISONNEMENT
À PERPETUITÉ AVEC TRAVAUX FORCÉS :

présumé, qu'il a en outre, en vertu de sa position, prêté son concours à la réalisation de ces crimes, et qu'il a, en conséquence, assumé une lourde responsabilité dans la commission de ces crimes, et qu'il a, en outre, en vertu de sa position, prêté son concours à la réalisation de ces crimes, et qu'il a, en conséquence, assumé une lourde responsabilité dans la commission de ces crimes,

ze jednak nie przedsięwziął niczego, aby ich los poprawić, ze postępując w ten sposób i on także świadomie stał się współsprawcą tych samych zbrodni nie wykorzystując świadomie swoich praw i autorytetu, które mogły zbrodniom tym zapobiec;

zwazywszy w koncu, że Obersturmführer Schmidetzki (Walter) narodowości niemieckiej, ochotnik SS od 1934r., zastępca Szwartza od 15 lutego 1945r., że oskarżony ten miał za zadanie organizację materialną podobozów i zajmował się sprawami administracyjnymi, że jeżeli chodzi o sprawę zupełnego braku odzieży internowanych, świadomie nie wydał on rozkazu, aby odzież te znajdującą się w dużych ilościach w magazynach obozów była rozdzielona między internowanych, że poza tym jeżeli chodzi o wyżywienie oskarżony przyznał, że artykuły żywnościowe, których dostawa na mocy kontraktu miały się zająć przedsiębiorstwa, zatrudniające internowanych, były w złym stanie i nie były dostarczane w ilości przewidzianej, zatem, że niczym nie uzasadnił dlaczego nie przedsięwziął żadnych poważnych starań w celu rozdzielania przedmiotów odzieżowych znajdujących się w rezerwie, które mogły wystarczyć na odpowiednie zaopatrzenie internowanych, zwazywszy, że działając w ten sposób przyczynił się do zwiększenia niedzy fizycznej i duchowej internowanych;

zwazywszy, że wszystkie te czyny stanowią naruszenie praw i zwyczajów narodów cywilizowanych, zwyczajów wojennych i stanowią zbrodnie przeciwko Ludzkości.

wobec czego :

Trybunał Wojskowy :

większością co najmniej dwóch trzecich głosów,

1 — uniewinnia oskarżonego Dolda (Erwina) z zarzutów oskarżenia,

2 — uznaje Buscha, Jetzelbergera, Dittmara, Storzca, Vollringa, Marka, Riffliana, Kellingera, Geisela, Olescha, Oehlera, Tetschowa, Winterbauera, Stacha, Hermanna, Domanera, Daneka, Pfefferkorna, Patolla, Linka, Deutscha, Braunwartha, Beckera, Szczepaniaka, Billotina, Theissa, Logessa, Nagorsena, Webera, Deffura, Dobinskiego, Pöblera, KIRSTEINA, Schlestriena, Schenkela, Markusa, Bauera, Burtelea, Opitza, Ecka, Dolmana, Lorentza, Otta Leidinga — winnymi zbrodni wojennych i zbrodni wobec Ludzkości w granicach wyżej określonych.

Trybunał orzeka :

Opierając się na orzeczeniu Trybunału odnośnie winy z dnia 31 stycznia 1947r.,

opierając się na dekretych No 10 z dnia 20 grudnia 1945r.,

zwazywszy, że wszystkie czyny zarzucone oskarżonym są przewidziane i karane na podstawie artykułu 2 go wspomnianego dekretu,

ze wobec tego nie ma podstaw do zastosowania odnosnych przepisów niemieckiego kodeksu karnego, powołanych w akcie oskarżenia,

i zwazywszy, że Trybunał Wojskowy ma wystarczające podstawy do wymierzenia odnosnych kar w stosunku do poszczególnych oskarżonych uznanych winnymi, stosownie do stopnia winy każdego

3. — MAREK Paul WEBER David
 SCHMIDETZKI Walter OPITZ Gustav
 NAGORSEN Reinhardt ECK Philipp
 A LA PEINE DE VINGT ANS
 D'EMPRISONNEMENT AVEC TRAVAUX FORCÉS :

4. — KELLINGER Simon PFEFFERKORN Rolf
 GEISEL Anton PATOLLA Josef
 STACH Lorenz LINK Jakob
 DANEK Wolfgang BAUER Friedrich
 A LA PEINE DE DIX ANNÉES
 D'EMPRISONNEMENT AVEC TRAVAUX FORCÉS :

5. — JETZELBERGER Josef DEFFUR Bernhard
 DITTMAR Karl LEIDING Heinrich
 SCHLECHTRIEM Otto
 A LA PEINE DE CINQ ANNÉES
 D'EMPRISONNEMENT :

6. — VOLLRING Walter
 A LA PEINE DE TROIS ANNÉES
 D'EMPRISONNEMENT :

7. — OLESCH Paul Josef KIRSTEIN Paul
 A LA PEINE D'UNE ANNÉE D'EMPRISONNEMENT :

Fixe le point de départ des peines privatives de liberté à la date de l'incarcération ordonnée par les Autorités Judiciaires Françaises, à savoir :

	pour :	
RIEFLIN Karl	au 9 Octobre	1946
HERRMANN Jakob	" 28 Septembre	1946
LOGES Friedrich	" 8 Octobre	1946
SCHENKEL Edouard	" 25 Octobre	1946
MARKUS Maurice	" 15 Mars	1946
OTT Paul	" 25 Octobre	1946
MAREK Paul	" 14 Août	1946
SCHMIDETZKI Walter	" 29 Novembre	1946
NAGORSEN Reinhardt	" 8 Octobre	1946
WEBER David	" 13 Juin	1945
OPITZ Gustave	" 25 Octobre	1946
ECK Philippe	" 21 Septembre	1946
KELLINGER Simon	" 8 Octobre	1946
GEISEL Anton	" 8 Octobre	1946
Stach Lorenz	" 10 Février	1945
DANEK Wolfgang	" 8 Octobre	1946
PFEFFERKORN Rolf	" 25 Octobre	1946
PATOLLA Josef	" 12 Octobre	1946
LINK Jakob	" 8 Octobre	1946
BAUER Friedrich	" 25 Octobre	1946
JETZELBERGER Josef	" 8 Octobre	1946
DITTMAR Karl	" 8 Octobre	1946
SCHLECHTRIEM Otto	" 25 Octobre	1946
DEFFUR Bernhard	" 21 Mai	1945
LEIDING Heinrich	" 28 Août	1946
VOLLRING Walter	" 25 Octobre	1946
OLESCH Paul Josef	" 25 Octobre	1946
KIRSTEIN Paul	" 30 Mai	1946

Les condamnés solidairement aux frais et dépens du procès.

Dit que le recouvrement de ces dépens interviendra immédiatement, et, en cas de non paiement, fixe la durée de la contrainte par corps à raison de un jour par dix Marks (10) non payés à l'expiration de la peine, sans toutefois que cette contrainte dépasse un maximum de six mois,

Ordonne la confiscation au profit de l'état des deux bagues saisies et remises au Tribunal Général au cours des débats,

RELAXE le nommé DOLD des fins de la poursuite,

Avant de clore, le Président a donné avis aux condamnés qu'ils avaient le droit de se pourvoir en révision dans un délai de dix jours francs, à compter du présent jour.

En conséquence, le Commandant en Chef Français en Allemagne mande et ordonne à toute personne légalement requise d'exécuter la présente décision et de prêter main forte à son exécution.

Fait et jugé à RASTATT, le premier Février, Mil Neuf Cent Quarante Sept.

Le Président :
 Signé : AUSSET

Le Greffier :
 Signé : GRAATZ

POUR EXTRAIT CONFORME

Le Greffier en Chef :
 Signé : PORTE

Jugement confirmé par décision en date du 27 Février 1947 du Tribunal Général de RASTATT, siégeant en matière de révision, toutes chambres réunies, pour tous les condamnés, sauf en ce qui concerne le nommé STORZ Gregor, dont la peine de mort a été infirmée et qui est condamné à nouveau à la peine des TRAVAUX FORCÉS A PERPETUITÉ.

Le Greffier en Chef :
 Signé : PORTE

z nich w popelnieniu zbrodni, stanowiącej przedmiot niniejszego postępowania,

wobec powyższego

skazuje:

SCHWARZA, HARTJENSTEIN, SEITHA, GLEICHA, BUSCH STORZA, OEHLERA, TELLSCHOWA, WINTERBAUERA, DORNAUER DEUTSCHA, BRAUNWARTHIA, BECKERA, SZCZEPANIKA, BILLOTINA, THEISSA, DOBINSKIEGO, POSSLERA, BURTELA, DAMMANN, LORENTZA —

na karę śmierci, która zostanie wykonana stosownie do przepisów prawa;

Skazuje:

RIFFLINA, HERMANNA, LOGESA, SCHENKELA, MARKUS OTTA —

na karę dożywotnich ciężkich robot;

Skazuje:

MARKA, SMIDETZKIEGO, NAGORSENA, WEBERA, OPITZA ECKA —

na karę 20 lat ciężkich robot;

Skazuje:

KELLINGERA, GEISELA, STACHA, DANeka, PFEFFERKORN, PATOLLA, LINKA, BAUERA —

na karę 10 lat ciężkich robot;

Skazuje:

JETZELBERGERA, DITTMARA, SCHLIESTRIEMA, DEFFURA, LEIDINGA —

na karę 5 lat więzienia;

Skazuje:

VOLLERLINGA —

na karę 3 lat więzienia;

Skazuje:

OLESCHA, KIRSTEINA —

na karę jednego roku więzienia;

Ustala początek wykonania kary pozbawienia wolności od daty aresztowania przez władze sądowe francuskie;

Skazuje:

wszystkich wymienionych na solidarne ponoszenie kosztów postępowania i opłat sądowych;

Zwalnia:

oskarzonego DOLDA od kary.

Rastatt, dnia pierwszego lutego 1947.

Prezes :
 (—) Ausset

Sekretarz :
 (—) Graatz

Za zgodność
 Sekretarz Trybunału
 (—) Porte.

Niniejszy wyrok został zatwierdzony w instancji apelacyjnej za wyjątkiem Storza, któremu kara śmierci została zmieniona na karę dożywotnich ciężkich robot.

W powyższym procesie brali udział dwaj przedstawiciele Polski; Major Dr. Henryk GIELB w charakterze sędziego a Major PLAWSKI popierał Oskarzenie.

JUGEMENT

Contradictoire et par contumace
rendu par le TRIBUNAL MILITAIRE permanent de
séant à

AU NOM DU PEUPLE FRANÇAIS,

Le Tribunal militaire permanent de
a rendu le jugement dont la teneur suit:

CE JOURD'HUI VINGT TROIS AVRIL DE l'an mil neuf cent quarante six
Le Tribunal militaire permanent de
composé, conformément à l'article 10 du Code de justice militaire, de MM.

- | | |
|---|--------------|
| BEGUE, Colonel, Commandant le 8 ^e Régiment d'Artillerie | } Président; |
| SIMONEAU, Chef de Bataillon, du 23 ^e Régiment d'Infanterie
ayant appartenu à une organisation de Résistance | |
| HARDEVILLE, Capitaine, de l'Etat-Major de Strasbourg
ayant fait partie des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur | } Juges; |
| GRUIDER, Lieutenant, du Dépôt de Prisonniers de Guerre n° 103
ayant fait partie des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur | |
| BUCHER, Adjudant-Chef, du 23 ^e Régiment d'Infanterie
ayant fait partie des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur | |

nommés, le Président, ~~président de~~ et les juges militaires, par le Général commandant la 10^e Région
M. DAUBISSÉ, Colonel de Justice Militaire Commissaire du Gouvernement
M. BAILLÉ, Capitaine Greffier près ledit Tribunal milit.

ayant tous prêté les serments prescrits par la loi et ne se trouvant dans aucun des cas d'incompatibilité prévus par les articles 18 et 20 du Code précité;

Le Tribunal, convoqué par l'ordre du Général commandant la 6^e Région M^{re}, conformément aux articles 69 et
du Code de justice militaire, s'est réuni dans le lieu ordinaire de ses séances, en audience publique

A l'effet de juger l'1^{er}) le nommé WAGNER Robert, Heinrich, de nationalité allemande
fils de feu BACKFISCH Jean-Pierre et de ~~veuve~~ ^{veuve} WAGNER Katharine, né le 13
~~arrondissement de~~ à Lindach département de Bade profession d'Ex-Gaul
résidant, ~~avant son entrée en service~~, a Karlsruhe (Bade) Beiertheimer-alle 42, actl. Lautenba
Taille d'un mètre 730 millimètres, cheveux châtons prisonnants, yeux marrons clair
front nez busqué, visage en toupie

Renseignements physionomiques complémentaires: néant
Marques particulières: cicatrice 1cm/1cm cuisse gauche postérieur
Numéro matricule: 1^{er} au corps: -"-, 2^{er} au recrutement: -"-

- accusé de:
- 1^{er}) PROVOCATION DE FRANÇAIS A PORTER LES ARMES CONTRE LA FRANCE
 - 2^{er}) ENROLEMENTS AU PROFIT D'UNE PUISSANCE ÉTRANGÈRE EN GUERRE CONTRE LA FRANCE
 - 3^{er}) ATTENTATS A LA LIBERTÉ INDIVIDUELLE
 - 4^{er}) COMPLICITÉ D'ASSASSINATS

Antécédents judiciaires: néant

2^{er}) le nommé RÖHN, Hermann, Gustav, Philipp, de nationalité alle
fils de RÖHN Jules et de FUCHS Elise, né le 21 décembre 1902 à Heidelberg (E
profession d'Ex-Vice-Gaulciter d'Alsace

1945-4-22776-10

Excerpt: Judgment
of Cassation against
Gaulleir Wagner et al

COUR DE CASSATION - CHAMBRE CRIMINELLE

24 Juillet 1946

M. DONAT GUIGUE, Président

WAGNER et autres c/M.P.

Sur les pourvois de : 1° WAGNER Robert, Heinrich - 2° ROEHN Hermann, Gustav, Philipp - 3° SCHUPPEL Adolf - 4° GAEDEKE Walter, Martin et 5° GRUNER Hugo, contre un jugement rendu le trois mai mil neuf cent quarante six par le Tribunal Militaire Permanent de Strasbourg qui les a condamnés à la peine de mort : WAGNER, pour "complicité d'assassinats, provocation de Français à porter les armes contre la France, enrôlements au profit d'une puissance étrangère en guerre avec la France" - GAEDEKE, pour "complicité d'assassinats et enrôlements au profit d'une puissance étrangère avec la France" - GRUNER, pour "assassinats";

LA COUR,

Sur le rapport de M. le Conseiller Battestini, les observations de Mes^{rs} Meldmann, Duriez-Maury, Bosviel, Nicolay et Galland, Avocats en la Cour et les conclusions de M. l'Avocat Général Dupuich;

Joint les pourvois en raison de la connexité;

Vu les mémoires produits;

Sur le moyen proposé par WAGNER, ROEHN et SCHUPPEL et pris de la violation de l'article 156 du Code de Justice Militaire, en ce que le Tribunal Militaire a été irrégulièrement composé, WAGNER ayant rang de Général Commandant de Corps d'Armée et le Tribunal ne pouvant par suite, être présidé par un Colonel,

Attendu qu'aux termes de l'article 5 de l'ordonnance du 28 août 1944 "pour le jugement des crimes de guerre, le Tribunal Militaire est composé comme il est dit au Code de Justice Militaire";

Attendu que les dispositions des articles 10 et suivants et 156 du Code de Justice Militaire qui modifient, suivant le grade de l'inculpé, la composition des Tribunaux Militaires, ne s'appliquent qu'aux militaires français et assimilés;

Que les dispositions de l'alinéa 13 de l'article 10, qui dérogent à cette règle et aux termes desquelles les Tribunaux Militaires,

/.....

.....

appelés à juger des prisonniers de guerre, sont composés comme pour le jugement des militaires français d'après les assimilations de grade, ne sauraient s'appliquer à WAGNER, lequel n'a pas été déféré au Tribunal Militaire comme prisonnier de guerre;

Que, dès lors, c'est à bon droit que les demandeurs ont été traduits devant un Tribunal Militaire composé conformément aux dispositions des articles 156 et 186 du Code de Justice Militaire;

Sur le moyen proposé par WAGNER, ROEHN, SCHUPPEL et GAEDEKE et pris de la violation de l'article 165 du Code de Justice Militaire, en ce que l'ordonnance de renvoi ayant été rendue le 6 avril 1946, avant le retour d'une Commission rogatoire délivrée par le Juge d'Instruction le 14 mars 1946, à l'effet d'entendre ROBBENTROP, KEITEL et LAMMERS, les défenseurs des accusés n'ont pas eu communication des dépositions des dits témoins avant la clôture de l'information.

Attendu qu'aux termes de l'article 81 du Code de Justice Militaire, applicable devant les Tribunaux Militaires établis dans les circonscriptions territoriales en état de guerre en vertu des dispositions du paragraphe 3 de l'article 179, il appartenait aux accusés de formuler le grief dont il s'agit devant le Tribunal Militaire;

Que, faute par eux de l'avoir fait, le moyen ne saurait être proposé, pour la première fois, devant la Cour de Cassation;

Sur le moyen proposé par WAGNER, ROEHN, SCHUPPEL et GAEDEKE dans sa première branche, et commun à tous les demandeurs dans sa seconde branche, pris de la violation des articles 71, alinéa 1^o, 172 et 179 du Code de Justice Militaire, 1^o de l'ordonnance du 28 août 1944, violation des droits de la défense, en ce que, d'une part, l'acte d'accusation n'a pas été notifié aux demandeurs trois jours au moins avant la réunion du Tribunal, avant le texte de la loi applicable et les noms, prénoms, professions et résidences des témoins; en ce que, d'autre part, la citation à comparaître à l'audience notifiée aux accusés ne contenait pas au nombre des textes de la loi applicable, celui de l'ordonnance du 28 août 1944, alors que cette notification est impérieusement exigée par les textes susvisés et que ladite ordonnance qui donnait aux actes incriminés la qualification de crimes de guerre servait de base aux poursuites et justifiait seule la compétence du Tribunal Militaire français à l'égard de ressortissants d'une nation ennemie ayant agi comme belligérants, était au premier chef un texte de loi applicable aux poursuites et devait dès lors être notifiée;

Attendu qu'il résulte de la combinaison des articles 172 et 179 du Code de Justice Militaire que les dispositions de l'article 71, alinéa 1^o, du même Code ne sont pas applicables aux procédures suivies devant le Tribunal Militaire établi dans une circonscription territoriale en état de guerre;

Qu'aux termes de l'article 179 susvisé, l'inculpé renvoyé devant ledit Tribunal, doit, vingt quatre heures au moins avant la

.....
 réunion de celui-ci, recevoir notification de la citation, contenant l'ordre de convocation du Tribunal ainsi que l'indication du crime ou du délit, le texte de loi applicable et les noms des témoins que le Commissaire du Gouvernement se propose de faire entendre;

Attendu que les citations ont été régulièrement notifiées aux accusés le 6 avril 1946;

Attendu, il est vrai, qu'il est soutenu que lesdites citations ne faisant pas mention de l'ordonnance du 28 août 1944 qui donnait aux actes incriminés le caractère de crimes de guerre et justifiait la compétence du Tribunal Militaire, n'ont pas satisfait aux exigences de l'article 179 du Code de Justice Militaire;

Mais attendu que la disposition dudit article invoquée dans cette seconde branche du moyen vise uniquement les textes de loi qui édictent les peines applicables aux infractions commises;

Que tel n'est pas le cas, dans l'espèce, de l'ordonnance du 28 août 1944;

Que, dès lors, les griefs formulés par le moyen, dans ses deux branches ne sont pas fondés;

Sur le moyen proposé par WAGNER et pris de la violation des droits de la défense, en ce que le Tribunal Militaire a rejeté les conclusions du demandeur tendant à faire entendre plusieurs témoins;

Attendu que, par jugement incident du 3 mai 1946, le Tribunal Militaire a rejeté les conclusions du demandeur tendant à faire entendre divers témoins, par le motif qu'il appartenait aux accusés de faire citer tous témoins qu'ils jugeraient utiles pour leur défense;

Attendu qu'en statuant ainsi, le Tribunal Militaire a fait une exacte application des dispositions du paragraphe 3 de l'article 179 du Code de Justice Militaire, aux termes desquelles : "l'inculpé a le droit, sans formalité ni citation préalable, de faire entendre à sa décharge tout témoin qu'il aurait désigné au Commissaire du Gouvernement avant l'ouverture des débats, pourvu qu'il soit présent à l'audience;"

Qu'ainsi le moyen n'est pas fondé;

Sur le moyen proposé par ROEHN et pris de la violation des droits de la défense, en ce que les circulaires du demandeur en dates des 28 janvier, 1er juin et 14 septembre 1943 qui n'ont pas été soumises à l'instruction, ont fait l'objet de débats à l'audience et servi de base à la condamnation;

Attendu que les documents visés au moyen figurent au dossier

.....

de la procédure d'information et ont fait l'objet des interrogatoires de l'inculpé ROHM en dates des 18 juin et 8 octobre 1945;

Qu'ils ont été soumis à la discussion des parties, au cours des débats, sans que d'ailleurs le demandeur ait soulevé à ce sujet aucune contestation devant le Tribunal Militaire;

D'où il suit que le moyen manque par le fait même qui lui sert de base;

Sur le moyen proposé par WAGNER et pris de la violation de l'article 4 du Code Pénal et du principe de la non rétroactivité de la loi pénale, en ce qu'il a été fait application au demandeur de l'ordonnance du 28 août 1944 alors que cette ordonnance qui réprime des faits antérieurs à sa promulgation n'a pas respecté l'article 4 et le principe susvisés;

Attendu que l'ordonnance du 28 août 1944 décide que les crimes et délits visés dans son article 1er "qui ont été commis depuis l'ouverture des hostilités" seront poursuivis devant les Tribunaux Militaires Français et jugés conformément aux lois françaises en vigueur et à ses dispositions;

Que ce texte légal, régulièrement promulgué, fait la règle des Tribunaux et ne peut être attaqué devant eux pour cause d'inconstitutionnalité;

Qu'il suit de là quel moyen ne saurait être accueilli;

Sur le moyen proposé par WAGNER et pris de la violation par fausse application, de l'ordonnance du 28 août 1944, en ce que les faits incriminés ont été commis en Alsace, annexés par l'Allemagne et sur le territoire de laquelle la souveraineté française avait cessé de s'exercer;

Attendu que la prétendue déclaration d'annexion de l'Alsace par l'Allemagne, invoquée au moyen, n'a été qu'un acte unilatéral qui ne pouvait modifier juridiquement les clauses du traité signé à VERSAILLES, le 28 juin 1919, par les représentants de l'Etat allemand;

Que, dès lors, les actes reprochés à WAGNER ayant été commis en Alsace, territoire français, constituaient des crimes de guerre au sens de l'article 1er de l'ordonnance du 28 août 1944;

Sur le moyen commun à tous les demandeurs et pris de la violation des articles 88, 90, 172 du Code de Justice Militaire, 1° de l'ordonnance du 28 août 1944, 7 de la loi du 20 avril 1810 et manque de base légale, en ce qu'aucune des questions posées aux Juges Militaires n'a demandé à ceux-ci si les faits incriminés étaient ou non justifiés par les lois et coutumes de la guerre, alors que s'agissant de la poursuite de crimes et délits commis par des ressortissants d'une nation ennemie dont les actes sont

/.....

.....

couverts par la qualité de belligérant, les questions posées devaient nécessairement faire apparaître qu'il n'avait pas échappé aux juges militaires que les faits incriminés relevaient de leur compétence, pourraient être punis des peines prévues à l'ordonnance du 23 août 1944 à raison de ce que les faits n'étaient pas justifiés par les lois et coutumes de la guerre, le silence des questions sur ce point ayant pour conséquence de faire échapper aux juges la constatation de l'élément constitutif des crimes de guerre imputés aux demandeurs :

Attendu que les crimes de guerre visés par l'article 1er de l'ordonnance du 23 août 1944 doivent, aux termes dudit article être réprimés par les Tribunaux Militaires Français, conformément aux lois françaises "lorsque ces infractions même accomplies à l'occasion ou sous le prétexte et l'état de guerre, ne sont pas justifiées par les lois et coutumes de la guerre",

qu'il résulte de ces dispositions que la justification par les lois et coutumes de la guerre des actes incriminés est, si elle est établie, exclusive de la criminalité.

Attendu dès lors, que des questions distinctes sur l'existence de ce fait justificatif n'étaient point nécessaires, puisqu'elles étaient implicites et incluses dans celles de culpabilité.

D'où il suit que le moyen n'est pas fondé;

Sur les moyens relatifs proposés par SAGNER, ROENN, SCHUPPEL et GARDKE et pris de la violation des articles 75 et 77 du Code Pénal, de l'article 24 de la loi du 25 Juillet 1931, défaut de réponse aux conclusions, en ce que les demandeurs ont été coupables d'infraction aux dits articles, alors que ces textes qui visent, le premier uniquement les Français, le second les étrangers n'étaient pas applicables aux demandeurs, ressortis d'une nation en guerre avec la France; que l'ordonnance du 23 août 1944 ne se réfère pas aux articles du Code Pénal susvisés; que la question de savoir si les provocations de Français à porter les armes contre la France avaient été ou non suivies d'effet, n'a pas été posée; que SCHUPPEL & GARDKE, si plus fonctionnaires subalternes n'ont fait qu'obéir aux ordres reçus de leurs chefs, qu'enfin le Tribunal a omis de répondre aux conclusions du défenseur de GARDKE invoquant ce fait justificatif.

Sur la première branche du moyen,

Attendu qu'une part, que l'alinéa premier de l'article 75 du Code Pénal qui déclare coupable d'espionnage "tout étranger qui se mettra l'an des actes visés à l'article 75 paragraphe 4" lequel réprimé notamment, les enrôlements pour une puissance étrangère en guerre avec la France, ne fait aucune distinction entre les étrangers suivant qu'ils sont, ou non ressortissants d'une nation ennemie.

Attendu, d'autre part, que l'alinéa 2 dudit article 77, aux termes duquel " la provocation à commettre ou l'offre de commettre un des crimes visés aux articles 75 et 76 et au présent

.....

articles, sera ainsi considérée comme ne faisant pas d'exception en faveur des ressortissants d'une nation ennemie;

Attendu, dès lors qu'on déclare TACNER, ROEHR, SCHUPPEL ET autres coupables d'avoir fait des enrôlements pour une puissance ennemie avec la France, et les trois premiers demandeurs d'avoir entraîné les Français à porter les armes contre la France, le Tribunal militaire, loin de violer les articles 75 et 77 du Code Pénal militaire, en soumettant une exacte application;

par les 1^{re} et 2^{de} branches;

Attendu qu'il n'a porté que les infractions visées au moyen, et non pas dans l'incrimination, donnée en l'alinéa 2 de l'article 75 du Code Pénal militaire de 26 tout 144, d'infractions qui notamment doivent être regardées comme crimes de guerre, la dite énumération n'étant pas de caractère limitatif;

par la troisième branche;

Attendu que TACNER, ROEHR et SCHUPPEL ont été accusés d'infractions aux articles 75 et 77 du Code Pénal, pour avoir provoqué des enrôlements à porter les armes contre la France;

Qu'en raison des réponses affirmatives aux questions de culpabilité posées à ce sujet, il y avait lieu de prononcer, comme l'a fait le Tribunal militaire, la peine prévue aux dits articles;

Attendu qu'il appartenait à la défense de demander que des questions subsidiaires fussent posées sur le point de savoir si les provocations incriminées avaient été commises par l'un des moyens énoncés en l'article 75 de la loi du 23 Juillet 1911 et n'avaient pas été suivies d'effet; mais qu'elle n'a pas usé de ce droit et en conséquence l'article 75 alinéa 1^{er} de ladite loi du 23 Juillet 1911 n'est sans application en l'espèce;

par les 4^{de} et 5^{de} branches;

Attendu que, pour chacune des infractions aux articles 75 et 77 du Code Pénal relevées à la charge de SCHUPPEL et de CARDEKE, la question a été posée au Tribunal militaire de savoir si l'accusé a agi par ordre de ses supérieurs pour des objets du ressort de ceux-ci et sur lesquels il leur devait obéissance hiérarchique

7

Attendu d'une part que la position de ces questions donnait satisfaction à la demande formulée dans les conclusions prises par CARDEKE et visée au moyen;

Attendu d'autre part, qu'il a été répondu négativement par le Tribunal à chacune des dites questions.

Que les réponses légalement faites à ces questions régulièrement posées sont irréfutables;

que par suite, le moyen n'est pas fondé;

.../...

.....

Mais sur les moyens récusés proposés, d'une part, par GRUBER d'une part, par ROSEN et C. N. II, pris de la violation de l'article 31 du Code de Justice militaire et de l'ordonnance du 23 Aout 1944 et que le Tribunal a rejeté, par jugement incident du 23 Avril 1946, les conclusions d'incompétence prises par GRUBER, par le motif que la compétence du Tribunal militaire saisi par l'ordonnance de renvoi ne pouvait être mise en question alors qu'aux termes de l'article 31 du Code de Justice militaire, l'incompétence peut être soulevée jusqu'à l'acquittement des témoins et alors, d'autre part, que les homicides volontaires commis à la charge de GRUBER ayant été commis en territoire allemand sur des prisonniers de guerre anglais, les dispositions de l'ordonnance de renvoi ne pouvaient recevoir application en l'espece,

Sur les dits articles;

Attendu qu'aux termes de l'article 31 du Code de Justice militaire "si l'accusé ou le ministère public a des moyens d'incompétence à faire valoir, l'exception doit être proposée avant l'addition des témoins et l'exception est jugée sur le champ".

que les dispositions dudit article sont applicables devant les Tribunaux militaires établis dans les circonscriptions territoriales de l'état de guerre, en vertu de l'article 173 par paragraphe 2 du même Code.

Attendu que le demandeur de GRUBER ayant avant l'addition des témoins pris des conclusions écrites tendant à l'incompétence du Tribunal militaire au motif que les faits n'avaient pas été commis, ni en France, ni dans un territoire relevant de l'autorité de la France, ni l'encouru aucun préjudice d'une des personnes visées en l'alinéa 1er de l'article 1er de l'ordonnance du 23 Aout 1944, le Tribunal militaire par jugement incident du 23 avril 1946, a ~~été~~ rejeté ces conclusions par le motif que le renvoi devant la juridiction criminelle étant attributif de juridiction et l'ordonnance de renvoi ayant acquis l'autorité de la chose jugée, faite à l'opposition, sa compétence ne pouvait être mise en question.

Attendu qu'en statuant ainsi, le Tribunal militaire a violé les dispositions susrappelées de l'article 31 du Code de Justice militaire

Attendu d'autre part, que l'alinéa 1er de l'article 1er de l'ordonnance du 23 Aout 1944 dispose "sont poursuivis devant les Tribunaux militaires Français et jugés conformément aux lois françaises en vigueur et aux dispositions de la présente ordonnance, les nationaux ennemis ou agents non français ou de service de l'administration ou des intérêts ennemis, coupables de crimes ou de délits commis depuis l'ouverture des hostilités soit en France ou dans un territoire relevant de l'autorité de la France, soit à l'encouru d'un national ou d'un protégé français, d'un militaire servant ou ayant servi sous le drapeau français, d'un apatride résidant sur le territoire français avant le 17 Juin 1940 ou d'un réfugié sur un territoire français, soit au préjudice des biens de toutes les personnes physiques visées ci-dessus et de toutes les valeurs morales françaises, lorsque ces infractions même accomplies à l'occasion ou sous le prétexte de l'état de guerre, ne sont pas justifiées par les lois et coutumes de la guerre.

.....

Attendu que le jugement du 3 mai 1946 constate que GRUNER a été par les réponses aux questions numérotées de 146 à 153, déclaré coupable de quatre homicides volontaires, spécifiés chacun, en ces termes par les questions numérotées de 31 à 38.

" Et-il constant que, le 7 octobre 1944, à Rheinweiler (Sarre) un homicide a été commis volontairement sur la personne d'un prisonnier de guerre au lieu tenu par l'ennemi ?

" Et ce crime a-t-il immédiatement été réprimé, accompagné ou suivi de mesures spéciales à la suite de la question ?

Attendu qu'aux crimes retenus à la charge de GRUNER par les réponses faites aux dites questions ayant été commis en Allemagne sur la personne de soldats d'une armée alliée ne sont pas de ceux qui aux termes de l'ordonnance du 17 août 1944 peuvent être poursuivis devant les tribunaux militaires français et jugés conformément aux lois françaises

Mais il s'agit d'un crime qui a été appliqué à GRUNER des dispositions de la loi française, le jugement attaqué les a violés et n'a pas donné une base légale à sa décision.

Attendu, enfin, en ce qui concerne WOHNER & ROHMEL, que le Tribunal militaire ayant répondu négativement aux questions qui lui avaient été posées de savoir si les dits accusés s'étaient rendus complices des crimes d'homicide volontaire commis par GRUNER, les dits demandeurs sont sensés à se faire un grief de la violation de la loi invoquée au moyen.

que par suite, le moyen, en ce qui les concerne, doit être déclaré non recevable.

Pour ces motifs et sans qu'il soit besoin de statuer sur le moyen proposé par CAEDEKE et pris de la violation de l'article 60 du Code pénal en ce qui concerne la complicité des crimes d'assassinats spécifiés dans les questions n° 1 à 26, dont il a été déclaré coupable par les réponses aux questions n° 113 à 144, la peine qui lui a été appliquée étant légalement justifiée en regard aux dispositions des articles 75 et 77 du Code pénal qui répriment le crime d'enrôlement au profit d'une puissance étrangère et à celles de l'article 411 du Code d'instruction Criminelle.

Rejeté les pourvois de WOHNER, ROHMEL, SCHUPPEL & CAEDEKE.

Condamne lesdits demandeurs solidairement aux dépens.

Casse et annule le jugement incident du 25 avril 1946 qui a rejeté les conclusions d'incompétence de GRUNER, ensemble le jugement du 3 mai 1946 mais seulement dans celles de ses dispositions relatives à GRUNER Hugo.

Et attendu que les actes relevés à la charge de GRUNER ne relèvent pas de la compétence des juridictions françaises.

Dit n'y avoir lieu à renvoi
Dit que GRUNER sera mis en liberté
s'il n'est pas déterré pour autre cause
ou à la demande d'une autorité alliée.

Pour extrait conforme
Le Greffier en chef de la Cour
de Cassation

Signé: illisible

Par décret en date du 3 octobre 1966, sont approuvées les diverses modifications apportées à ses statuts par la Congrégation des sœurs des Sacrés-Cœurs de Jésus et de Marie, existant légalement à Mormaison (Vendée) en vertu de l'ordonnance du 5 septembre 1837 et du décret du 13 novembre 1859.

Par décret en date du 3 octobre 1966, sont approuvées les diverses modifications apportées à ses statuts par la Congrégation des sœurs de la Charité, dites du Saint-Sacrement, existant légalement à Bourges (Cher) en vertu des décrets des 16 février 1811 et 30 janvier 1905, notamment la transformation de son titre en Congrégation des sœurs du Très-Saint-Sacrement et de la Charité.

**Décrets du 3 octobre 1966 portant abrogation
du titre d'existence légale d'établissements congréganistes.**

Par décret en date du 3 octobre 1966, sont abrogées les dispositions de l'article 1^{er} de l'ordonnance du 1^{er} septembre 1827 et de l'article 2 du décret du 23 octobre 1867 en tant qu'elles ont autorisé l'établissement particulier de Blesle (Haute-Loire) des Sœurs de Saint-Joseph-du-Puy.

Par décret en date du 3 octobre 1966, est abrogé l'article 1^{er} du décret du 17 février 1954 portant reconnaissance légale de l'établissement particulier d'Ernée (Mayenne) des Sœurs de la Miséricorde de Sées.

Inspection générale de l'administration.

Par arrêté du ministre de l'intérieur en date du 1^{er} septembre 1966 :

Sont inscrits au tableau d'avancement pour l'année 1966 pour l'accès au grade d'inspecteur général de l'administration au ministère de l'intérieur :

1 M. Galy. — 2 M. Wiehn. — 3 M. Fontaine.

Est inscrit au tableau d'avancement pour l'année 1966, pour l'accès au grade d'inspecteur de l'administration au ministère de l'intérieur : M. Robin.

MINISTRE DE L'EDUCATION NATIONALE

Décret n° 66-750 du 3 octobre 1966 abrogeant le décret n° 60-465 du 19 mai 1960 relatif à l'application de la loi du 31 juillet 1959 prévoyant des mesures spéciales en faveur des jeunes gens ayant servi en Algérie.

Le Premier ministre,

Sur le rapport du ministre de l'éducation nationale,

Vu la loi n° 59-960 du 31 juillet 1959, et spécialement sa section V ;

Vu le décret n° 60-465 du 19 mai 1960 relatif à l'application de la loi du 31 juillet 1959 prévoyant des mesures spéciales en faveur des jeunes gens ayant servi en Algérie ;

Vu l'avis du conseil supérieur de l'éducation nationale ;

Le comité de coordination de la promotion sociale entendu,

Décète :

Art. 1^{er}. — Les dispositions du décret n° 60-465 du 19 mai 1960 susvisé cesseront d'être applicables à compter du 1^{er} janvier 1967, sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 2 ci-après.

Art. 2. — Les jeunes gens ayant été blessés en cours d'opération en Algérie ou ayant contracté en Algérie, avant le 1^{er} juillet 1962, une maladie ouvrant droit à pension pourront solliciter le bénéfice des dispositions du décret n° 60-465 du 19 mai 1960 pendant les trois années suivant la date de consolidation de leur blessure ou la fixation du pourcentage d'invalidité.

Les prorogations accordées en application du précédent alinéa ne pourront excéder le 1^{er} janvier 1970.

Art. 3. — Le ministre de l'éducation nationale est chargé de l'exécution du présent décret, qui sera publié au *Journal officiel* de la République française.

Fait à Paris, le 3 octobre 1966.

Par le Premier ministre :

GEORGES POMPIDOU.

Le ministre de l'éducation nationale,
CHRISTIAN FOUCHE.

MINISTRE DES ARMEES

**Décret n° 66-749 du 1^{er} octobre 1966
portant règlement de discipline générale dans les armées.**

RAPPORT AU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE

Monsieur le Président,

L'époque contemporaine impose à notre pays et à son armée des changements de toute nature.

La mise en service des nouveaux armements, l'évolution de la stratégie, dominée par le fait nucléaire, conduisent à une organisation des forces plus complexe, se développant dans un cadre interarmes et souvent interarmées.

Le progrès des armes et du matériel réclame, pour leur emploi, une qualification toujours plus précise et plus longue à acquérir.

Les aspects prévisibles de futurs conflits, dont les nécessités de la défense interdisent d'exclure l'éventualité, impliquent que les combattants soient prêts à affronter les situations les plus imprévues et lourdes des périls les plus graves. Les aléas de la bataille peuvent, à tout moment, couper les communications, disloquer les unités, séparer leurs éléments de leurs chefs et, ainsi, contraindre des groupes réduits, parfois des isolés, à poursuivre la lutte en ne comptant que sur leurs propres ressources.

Aussi la préparation des armées exige-t-elle du personnel militaire des qualités morales et techniques excluant toute défaillance. Elle commande, en fait, d'augmenter la proportion des spécialistes sous contrat et de sélectionner de manière plus sévère les jeunes appelés. Mais les uns et les autres aspirent à trouver dans la vie militaire des conditions comparables à celles qu'ils trouvent dans la vie civile et qui connaissent elles-mêmes de profondes transformations.

Dans le même temps, en effet, la population s'accroît à un rythme rapide, la migration des campagnes vers la ville s'accroît ; chaque jour des progrès scientifiques et techniques modifient les conditions d'existence et de travail ; une législation sociale, maintenant généralisée, apporte la sécurité de la vie familiale et professionnelle.

De nouvelles perspectives sont ainsi offertes à la jeunesse. Plus instruit, grâce à une scolarisation plus étendue et plus longue, bénéficiant de moyens considérables d'information, se déplaçant davantage pour son travail comme pour ses loisirs, le jeune homme d'aujourd'hui entre dans la vie active avec une conscience avivée de ses possibilités et de ses droits. Il est animé par l'ambition d'acquiescer au plus tôt dans la société une place répondant à ses aspirations.

Cette affirmation de la personnalité tend à l'affranchissement de tutelles trop étroites allant parfois jusqu'à la contestation des valeurs traditionnelles. Les conditions actuelles de l'existence isolent souvent le jeune Français dans des masses anonymes, imposent à tous ses actes un rythme accéléré, le soumettent à la pression de l'actualité et estompent chez lui le sentiment de ses obligations envers la communauté nationale.

✻

Cette évolution des armées et des esprits impose que les règles de la discipline militaire soient adaptées aux conditions de notre époque. Il importe donc de réviser les décrets de 1933 et 1937 portant règlement de discipline, respectivement pour les armées de terre et de l'air et pour la marine.

Ainsi, en éliminant divers anachronismes, seront renforcées l'intangibilité et la nécessité du principe supérieur de discipline sans lequel la mission des armées ne saurait être accomplie.

✻

La discipline reste, en effet, la règle qui guide chacun dans l'accomplissement d'un devoir difficile et l'irremplaçable moyen de fortifier les caractères, d'accoutumer les esprits à l'abnégation et de préparer les hommes à l'action du temps de guerre comme à celle du temps de paix.

Mais, la discipline ne prescrit pas seulement l'exécution littérale des ordres, elle requiert aussi une initiative fondée sur la compétence professionnelle et la recherche du rendement. Elle doit se conformer aux prescriptions inhérentes à toute discipline fonctionnelle et les assortir de la fermeté indispensable au combat.

De même, le chef est amené à exercer son autorité sur une unité où sont remplies des fonctions spécialisées qui tendent à la fois à isoler les individus et à les rendre plus étroitement interdépendants. Son rôle prend ainsi une importance plus grande et devient plus complexe ; il lui appartient, en particulier, de rechercher la participation volontaire et active de ses subordonnés et son souci doit être, dans la mesure où la conservation du secret le permet, de les informer du but général poursuivi et de ses intentions.

Enfin, la spécialisation des fonctions exige la cohésion des unités fondée sur la confiance mutuelle et la solidarité.

Les normes actuelles de la discipline militaire doivent donc mettre l'accent sur l'extension des responsabilités des subordonnés, la complexité croissante du rôle des chefs et l'importance pour les unités de certains facteurs de cohésion.

Telles sont d'ailleurs les constatations résultant des enquêtes et sondages auxquels a procédé la commission constituée en vue d'élaborer un nouveau règlement.

Le décret qui vous est présenté est le résultat des travaux de cette commission. Ses dispositions s'adressent aux trois armées et leur imposent une conception identique de la discipline; des textes d'application seront élaborés pour chacune d'elles afin de respecter, quand il le faut, les particularités et les traditions.

Ce décret comprend un préambule et cinq titres.

Le Préambule est consacré aux principes généraux. Après avoir évoqué les nécessités de la défense et la mission incombant aux armées, il rappelle que la discipline fait la force principale des armées; il traite ensuite de l'esprit militaire, de la cohésion des unités et de l'obéissance.

Le titre I^{er} expose les règles de la hiérarchie et du commandement.

Il a paru nécessaire de distinguer :

- la hiérarchie des grades qui classe les militaires les uns par rapport aux autres en supérieurs et subalternes.
- la hiérarchie des fonctions qui classe les militaires en chefs et subordonnés.

La hiérarchie des fonctions est généralement conforme à la hiérarchie des grades.

L'importance du commandement est soulignée. Les règles suivant lesquelles il est exercé et maintenu sont définies d'une manière précise.

Le titre II expose d'abord les obligations incombant à tous les militaires.

Les devoirs des chefs et des subordonnés sont ensuite précisés. Ils procèdent des responsabilités inhérentes aux fonctions de chacun. En particulier le chef doit obtenir de ses subordonnés une obéissance totale et encourager leur initiative.

Le règlement met l'accent sur les responsabilités que les chefs ou les subordonnés pourraient encourir en ordonnant ou en accomplissant des actions qui constitueraient des crimes ou des délits.

Des dispositions particulières consacrées à la formation militaire indiquent les conditions dans lesquelles les chefs sont préparés à l'exercice de l'autorité et les subordonnés à l'exécution des ordres. Cette formation est dispensée dans toutes les activités individuelles et collectives de la vie militaire.

Un chapitre concerne les devoirs au combat. Il prescrit à chacun de poursuivre la lutte jusqu'à l'accomplissement de sa mission. Il fixe aussi la conduite à tenir pour ceux qui auraient le malheur de tomber aux mains de l'ennemi. Il rappelle enfin les principales prescriptions relatives aux lois et coutumes de la guerre.

Le titre III a pour objet les règles du service. Ses dispositions tendent à développer la solidarité au sein des unités et à marquer l'appartenance des militaires à la nation.

Les manifestations extérieures de la discipline, liées aux exigences particulières de la vie militaire, ont été pour la plupart conservées; certaines ont été renouvelées ou allégées.

Les principales modifications concernent le droit de revêtir la tenue civile et la liberté de circulation; l'un et l'autre ont été étendus pour tenir compte des conditions actuelles de l'existence.

Le titre IV traitant des récompenses et punitions modifie le régime des punitions actuellement en vigueur, notamment dans les armées de terre et de l'air.

Attribué à la fonction et non au grade, le droit de punir est réservé à trois échelons de commandement: le ministre des armées, les officiers généraux dans leur commandement, les chefs de corps. Ce dernier terme désigne, outre les commandants de formation formant corps de l'armée de terre, les commandants de bâtiment de la marine, les commandants de base ou de formation aérienne et les autorités équivalentes. Une délégation de ce droit peut être donnée par l'un de ces trois échelons à un échelon subordonné selon des modalités qui seront précisées dans des textes d'application. En tout état de cause, tous les échelons de commandement conservent le droit de demander une sanction et celui de prendre à l'encontre d'un de leurs subordonnés les mesures privatives de liberté que peuvent imposer les circonstances.

Toute punition fait l'objet d'une procédure qui écarte l'arbitraire: c'est le chef de corps qui est obligatoirement saisi de toute demande de punition concernant un de ses subordonnés. Un barème lui permet de déterminer la nature et le taux de la sanction à infliger suivant la faute commise. Si celle-ci exige une sanction qui excède ses pouvoirs, il transmet une demande de punition à l'échelon supérieur.

Les derniers articles de ce titre sont consacrés aux garanties. L'exercice du droit de réclamation est défini et organisé: le subordonné qui aurait à se plaindre d'une mesure injustifiée est assuré que son recours sera transmis, si besoin est, jusqu'au sommet de la hiérarchie.

Le titre V traite des dispositions diverses et fixe, notamment, le champ d'application du règlement.

Tel est l'objet du présent décret que nous avons l'honneur de soumettre à votre approbation.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'assurance de notre profond respect.

Le Président de la République,

Sur le rapport du Premier ministre et du ministre des armées,

Vu la loi du 14 avril 1832 sur l'avancement dans l'armée;

Vu la loi du 19 mai 1834 sur l'état des officiers;

Vu la loi du 30 mars 1928 relative au statut des sous-officiers de carrière de l'armée;

Vu la loi du 31 mars 1928 sur le recrutement de l'armée;

Vu la loi du 4 mars 1929 portant organisation des différents corps d'officiers de l'armée de mer et du corps des équipages de la flotte;

Vu la loi du 13 décembre 1932 relative au recrutement de l'armée de mer et à l'organisation de ses réserves;

Vu la loi du 9 avril 1935 fixant le statut du personnel des cadres actifs de l'armée de l'air;

Vu l'ordonnance n° 59-147 du 7 janvier 1959 portant organisation générale de la défense;

Vu la loi n° 65-550 du 9 juillet 1965 relative au recrutement en vue de l'accomplissement du service national;

Vu le code de justice militaire,

Décète :

PREAMBULE

I. — La loi, expression de la volonté nationale, définit la défense comme le moyen d'assurer en tous temps, en toutes circonstances et contre toutes les formes d'agression, la sécurité et l'intégrité du territoire, ainsi que la vie de la population.

L'armée assure la défense par la force des armes; sa mission et ses moyens lui sont fixés par l'Etat.

Tous les citoyens français, recrutés conformément à la loi, participent à la défense sous la forme, soit du service militaire destiné à répondre aux besoins des armées, soit du service de défense destiné à satisfaire les besoins de la défense en personnel non militaire.

II. — L'appartenance à l'armée confère, en tous temps, aux citoyens présents sous les drapeaux des devoirs et des responsabilités exceptionnels.

La discipline fait la force principale des armées. Elle définit l'obéissance et régit l'exercice de l'autorité. Elle s'applique à tous sans distinction de rang, précise à chacun son devoir et aide à prévenir les défaillances.

L'esprit militaire, qui procède de l'esprit civique, unit tous les membres des forces armées, développe en eux le sens de leurs responsabilités particulières et les incite à servir avec loyauté et abnégation. Il se manifeste par le courage, la discipline et la solidarité. Sa plus haute expression est le sens de l'honneur fondé sur le respect de soi-même et d'autrui, la fierté d'appartenir à une unité militaire et le dévouement à la patrie.

III. — La formation militaire inculque à chacun la valeur et l'exigence du devoir militaire. Elle aide à acquérir les qualités morales nécessaires pour l'accomplir en dépit des difficultés du service et des dangers du combat. Elle féconde la discipline dans la vie et l'action collectives.

La formation concourt à créer et à maintenir dans les unités la cohésion et le moral indispensables à l'exécution de la mission de l'armée.

La cohésion repose sur l'adhésion de chacun à son devoir, sur la qualité des liens qui unissent les membres des forces armées et sur la confiance mutuelle qu'exige la solidarité dans l'action.

Tout militaire doit, dans sa fonction, faire preuve de la conscience professionnelle et de la discipline nécessaires à l'accomplissement de la mission de son unité.

Chefs et subordonnés étendent leurs relations professionnelles aux relations humaines que la communauté de vie et d'action développe en eux. La valeur de la personne comme de la fonction doit être reconnue.

IV. — Conférée par la loi, l'autorité implique le pouvoir d'imposer l'obéissance. Dans l'exercice de son commandement, le chef, dépositaire de l'autorité, la maintient et la transmet intacte. Il a le droit et le devoir de donner des ordres et de les faire exécuter. Toute faiblesse, comme tout abus d'autorité, sont des manquements à la discipline.

V. — L'obéissance est le concours actif et sans défaillance apporté au chef par le subordonné. Elle procède de la soumission à la loi.

Le subordonné est responsable devant son chef de l'exécution des ordres reçus ainsi que des conséquences de leur inexécution. Le devoir d'obéissance ne dégage jamais le subordonné des responsabilités qui lui incombent au regard de la loi. Il peut en appeler à l'autorité compétente s'il se croit l'objet d'une mesure injustifiée ou s'il reçoit un ordre illégal.

TITRE 1^{er}

REGLES DE LA HIERARCHIE ET DU COMMANDEMENT

CHAPITRE 1^{er}

Règles de la hiérarchie.

Article 1^{er}.

Autorités gouvernementales.

Conformément à la Constitution et à la loi, les armées relèvent :

Du Président de la République, chef de l'Etat, chef des armées, garant de l'indépendance nationale et de l'intégrité du territoire ;

Du Premier ministre, responsable de la défense nationale ;

Du ministre des armées, responsable de l'exécution de la politique militaire du Gouvernement.

Article 2.

Hiérarchie.

1. Les armées ont une structure hiérarchique.

La hiérarchie est l'ordre des grades ; elle est définie par les statuts généraux qui régissent les personnels.

Les militaires appartiennent, d'après leur grade, à l'une des trois catégories de personnels :

Officiers.

Sous-officiers.

Hommes du rang.

2. Selon leur place respective dans l'ordre hiérarchique, les militaires ont, les uns par rapport aux autres, la qualité de supérieur ou de subalterne.

Article 3.

Grade.

1. Le grade consacre l'aptitude à exercer des fonctions déterminées. Il confère une appellation, des prérogatives et comporte des obligations.

2. A égalité de grade, l'ordre hiérarchique résulte, sauf dispositions particulières, de l'ancienneté dans le grade ; à égalité d'ancienneté dans le grade, de l'ancienneté dans le grade inférieur.

3. L'ancienneté dans le grade est le temps passé en activité de service dans ce grade.

4. Les officiers et sous-officiers en retraite ou en position interromptrice d'ancienneté, rappelés à l'activité, se classent d'après leur grade et leur ancienneté de service actif dans ce grade. A égalité de grade et d'ancienneté, ils se classent après les officiers et sous-officiers du cadre actif.

Il en est de même des officiers et sous-officiers de réserve.

En ce qui concerne les officiers généraux, le temps passé dans la 2^e section n'est pas pris en compte pour déterminer leur classement relatif.

5. Le titulaire d'un grade a le droit et le devoir de faire respecter les règles générales de la discipline par tous les militaires qui lui sont inférieurs dans l'ordre hiérarchique.

Article 4.

Hiérarchie générale des grades des officiers.

1. La hiérarchie générale des grades des officiers dans chaque armée est rappelée dans le tableau ci-après :

ARMÉE DE TERRE	ARMÉE DE MER	ARMÉE DE L'AIR
MARÉCHAL OU AMIRAL DE FRANCE (1)		
<i>Officiers généraux.</i>		
Général d'armée (2).	Amiral (2).	Général d'armée aérienne (2).
Général de corps d'armée (2).	Vice-amiral d'escadre (2).	Général de corps aérien (2).
Général de division.	Vice-amiral.	Général de division aérienne.
Général de brigade.	Contre-amiral.	Général de brigade aérienne.
<i>Officiers supérieurs.</i>		
Colonel.	Capitaine de vaisseau.	Colonel.
Lieutenant-colonel.	Capitaine de frégate.	Lieutenant-colonel.
Commandant (3).	Capitaine de corvette.	Commandant.
<i>Officiers subalternes.</i>		
Capitaine.	Lieutenant de vaisseau.	Capitaine.
Lieutenant.	Enseigne de vaisseau de 1 ^{re} classe.	Lieutenant.
Sous-lieutenant.	Enseigne de vaisseau de 2 ^e classe.	Sous-lieutenant.

(1) Ce titre est, en outre, une dignité dans l'Etat.

(2) Correspondent à des rangs et appellations et non à des grades.

(3) Ou chef de bataillon ou chef d'escadron (s) suivant l'arme.

2. La hiérarchie particulière de chaque corps ou cadre ainsi que, le cas échéant, ses correspondances avec la hiérarchie générale des grades sont définies par le statut particulier de chaque corps ou cadre. Elles sont rappelées dans l'annexe I au présent décret.

La hiérarchie du contrôle général des armées ne comporte aucune assimilation de grade avec les hiérarchies des autres corps. Les membres de ce corps sont indépendants des chefs militaires et, du point de vue de la discipline, ils ne relèvent que du ministre et de leurs supérieurs dans leur hiérarchie propre.

Les magistrats militaires sont soumis à la discipline générale. Toutefois, dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, ils sont indépendants des chefs militaires ; ils ne relèvent que du ministre et de leurs supérieurs dans leur hiérarchie propre.

Les aumôniers militaires n'ont, en cette qualité, ni grade ni rang dans la hiérarchie militaire pendant la durée de leurs fonctions. Ils sont soumis aux obligations de la discipline militaire et, à ce titre, directement subordonnés aux commandants des formations auxquelles ils sont rattachés. Ils ne reçoivent d'ordre que des commandants de ces formations et de leurs supérieurs dans leur hiérarchie propre.

3. Le supérieur s'adressant à un subalterne utilise les appellations suivantes :

a) Armées de terre et de l'air (y compris la gendarmerie nationale) :

Le supérieur appelle le subalterne par son grade en ajoutant son nom s'il le juge à propos. Si le subalterne est isolé, le supérieur peut l'appeler par son nom ou par son grade conformément aux appellations indiquées au tableau a et b ci-dessus ;

b) Armée de mer (y compris la gendarmerie maritime) :

Le supérieur s'adressant à un subalterne utilise les appellations indiquées aux tableaux a et b, sauf pour les officiers subalternes et aspirants qui sont appelés « Monsieur », éventuellement suivi de leur nom.

c) Corps assimilés :

Un supérieur s'adressant à un subalterne d'un corps assimilé ou appartenant à une hiérarchie ne comportant pas mention du grade l'appelle « Monsieur le... » suivi éventuellement du grade, sans énoncé de la classe.

d) Les soldats et matelots sont appelés : soldat, chasseur, cavalier, canonnier, sapeur, légionnaire, matelot ou toute autre appellation propre à leur arme ou service.

CHAPITRE 2

Règles du commandement et de la subordination.

Article 10.

Commandement et subordination.

1. Le commandement est l'exercice de l'autorité. La subordination est l'état dans lequel se trouve le personnel soumis à l'autorité d'un chef.

Le commandement et la subordination résultent du grade et des fonctions remplies. Ils présentent un caractère permanent ou occasionnel.

2. Dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, les militaires sont subordonnés les uns aux autres selon l'ordre hiérarchique. Cette règle peut comporter des exceptions lorsque des militaires reçoivent délégation d'autorité pour exercer des fonctions particulières.

3. Tout militaire qui exerce, même provisoirement, une fonction est investi de l'autorité et de la responsabilité afférentes à cette fonction.

4. La hiérarchie du personnel militaire féminin ne comportant aucune assimilation avec la hiérarchie générale, ce personnel est soumis à la seule subordination résultant de l'emploi tenu.

5. L'exacte observation des règles de la hiérarchie et de la subordination écarte l'arbitraire et maintient chacun dans ses droits comme dans ses devoirs.

Article 11.

Commandement des unités.

1. Le commandement d'une unité implique, à la fois, le droit et l'obligation d'exercer l'autorité sur les personnels constituant cette unité.

2. Tout commandement d'unité est attribué nominativement par décision de l'autorité supérieure, soit à titre définitif, soit, parfois, à titre provisoire.

Article 12.

Commandement territorial.

Un commandement comportant des attributions spéciales relatives à une circonscription de territoire est appelé « commandement territorial ».

Article 13.

Commandement opérationnel.

Pour la préparation et l'exécution de missions particulières, des « commandements opérationnels » peuvent être constitués pour mettre en œuvre des groupements de forces composés de plusieurs unités ou même de fractions d'unités.

Article 14.

Réunion fortuite d'unités.

En cas de réunion fortuite d'unités relevant de différents commandements et coupées de leur chef, le commandant d'unité le plus ancien dans le grade le plus élevé prend le commandement de l'ensemble.

Il confirme leurs missions aux unités. Si certaines d'entre elles ne sont plus en mesure de les exécuter, il leur fixe une nouvelle mission. Il en rend compte dès que possible.

Article 15

Continuité du commandement.

1. L'exercice du commandement doit être continu.

2. En cas d'absence du titulaire, le commandement est exercé par le premier des subordonnés selon l'ordre hiérarchique, si aucun ordre de dévolution particulier n'est prévu. Un tel commandement est dit « par intérim ».

Il s'exerce jusqu'au retour du titulaire ou jusqu'à la prise de fonction d'un nouveau titulaire.

Article 16.

Permanence du commandement.

1. L'action du commandement doit être permanente.

2. Lorsque le titulaire d'un commandement ne peut, directement et personnellement, prendre tous les actes nécessaires à l'exercice de ce commandement, il désigne l'un de ses subordonnés pour le suppléer, provisoirement, dans l'accomplissement de tout ou partie de sa mission.

Article 17.

Cas particuliers.

1. A grade égal, le commandement peut être assuré par le titulaire d'une lettre de service spéciale ou d'une lettre de commandement.

2. Les officiers et sous-officiers des corps dont le statut le mentionne sont subordonnés, quel que soit leur grade, mais dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions seulement, aux officiers et sous-officiers des autres corps.

3. Les commandants de bâtiments ou d'aéronefs, responsables de l'exécution de la mission et de la sécurité, ont à ce titre autorité sur toutes les personnes présentes à leur bord.

TITRE II

DEVOIRS ET FORMATION DES MILITAIRES

CHAPITRE 1^{er}

Devoirs généraux.

Article 18.

Devoirs généraux du militaire.

1. En tant que citoyen, il doit :
Se conformer aux lois ;
Servir avec loyauté et dévouement ;
Honorer le drapeau et respecter les traditions nationales ;
S'interdire tout acte, propos ou attitude contraires aux intérêts ou à l'honneur de la nation.

2. Membre des forces armées, il doit :
Observer la discipline et les règlements ;
Accepter les sujétions de l'état militaire ;
Se comporter avec droiture et dignité ;
Assurer la protection du secret ;
Prendre soin du matériel et des installations appartenant aux armées ou placés sous leur dépendance.

3. Responsable d'une fonction dans son unité, il doit :
Apporter un concours sans défaillance à l'autorité ;
S'instruire pour tenir son poste avec compétence ;
S'entraîner en vue d'être efficace dans l'action.

4. Chaque militaire a le devoir de se préparer physiquement et moralement au combat et d'accomplir sa mission, même au péril de sa vie.

Article 19.

Supérieurs et subalternes.

1. La hiérarchie impose des devoirs réciproques aux supérieurs et aux subalternes, quelles que soient leur armée d'appartenance et leur unité d'affectation.

2. Le supérieur doit être un exemple pour le subalterne, celui-ci lui doit obéissance et respect.

3. Un supérieur ne peut donner d'ordres à un subalterne ne relevant pas de son autorité que pour faire appliquer les règles générales de la discipline.

4. Tout militaire, quelle que soit sa qualité ou son grade, doit se conformer aux instructions ou obtempérer aux injonctions d'un militaire même subalterne, si ce dernier est en service et agit en vertu d'ordres ou de consignes qu'il est chargé de faire appliquer.

CHAPITRE 2

Devoirs et responsabilités des chefs et des subordonnés.

Article 20.

Chef et subordonné.

Tout militaire appartient à une unité où il reçoit la responsabilité d'une fonction. Il est, de ce fait, directement subordonné à un chef.

Chef et subordonné ont, à ce titre, des responsabilités et des devoirs particuliers.

Article 21.

Devoirs et responsabilités des chefs.

1. L'autorité dont le chef est investi lui donne le devoir de prendre des décisions et de les faire appliquer par ses subordonnés. Il traduit ses décisions par des ordres.

Les ordres doivent être précis et fermes.

2. Le chef est responsable des ordres qu'il donne, de leur exécution et de leurs conséquences. Lorsqu'il charge l'un de ses subordonnés d'agir en son lieu et place, sa responsabilité demeure entière et couvre les actes de ses subordonnés accomplis régulièrement dans le cadre de leurs fonctions.

3. Le chef a le droit et le devoir d'exiger l'obéissance de ses subordonnés; toutefois, il ne peut leur ordonner d'accomplir des actes dont l'exécution engagerait leur responsabilité pénale.

Ces actes sont les suivants :

Actes contraires aux lois et coutumes de la guerre, définies aux articles 34 et 35 du présent règlement ;

Actes qui constituent des crimes et délits contre la sûreté de l'Etat, la Constitution ou la paix publique ;

Actes portant atteinte à la vie, l'intégrité, la liberté des personnes ou au droit de propriété, quand ils ne sont pas justifiés par l'application de la loi.

4. Une obéissance parfaite ne peut être obtenue que si le chef exerce son autorité avec compétence, justice et fermeté. A l'égard de ses subordonnés, son attitude doit faciliter l'exercice des responsabilités qui leur incombent.

Le chef s'efforce de convaincre en même temps que d'imposer. Dans la mesure où la conservation du secret le permet, il informe ses subordonnés de ses intentions et d'ü but à atteindre, il oriente leur initiative et obtient leur participation active à la mission.

5. Le chef transmet ses ordres par la voie hiérarchique. Si l'urgence, la nécessité ou des directives particulières le conduisent à s'affranchir de cette voie, il informe tous les échelons concernés.

6. Le chef instruit ses subordonnés; il contrôle les progrès des hommes et la valeur des unités.

Il note ses subordonnés et formule ses appréciations après avoir pris l'avis de leurs supérieurs directs.

Il témoigne sa satisfaction par des récompenses, réprime les fautes par des punitions; il est attentif aux conditions matérielles de vie et aux préoccupations personnelles de ceux qui sont placés sous son autorité.

Article 22.

Devoirs et responsabilités des subordonnés.

1. L'obéissance est le premier devoir du subordonné. Celui-ci exécute loyalement les ordres qu'il reçoit. Il est responsable de leur exécution ou des conséquences de leur inexécution. Sa responsabilité exclut l'obéissance passive. Le subordonné doit donc se pénétrer, non seulement de la lettre des ordres, mais aussi de leur esprit.

2. Le subordonné a le devoir de rendre compte de l'exécution des ordres reçus.

Quand il constate qu'il lui est impossible d'exécuter un ordre, il en rend compte immédiatement à l'autorité qui l'a donné.

3. Sous réserve des dispositions des articles 114 (alinéa 1) et 190 du code pénal, le subordonné qui exécuterait un ordre prescrivant l'accomplissement d'un acte illégal visé à l'article 21-3 du présent règlement, engagerait pleinement sa responsabilité pénale et disciplinaire.

Si le subordonné croit se trouver en présence d'un tel ordre, il a le devoir de faire part de ses objections à l'autorité qui l'a donné, en indiquant expressément la signification illégale qu'il attache à l'ordre litigieux.

Si l'ordre est maintenu et si, malgré les explications ou l'interprétation qui lui en ont été données, le subordonné persiste dans sa contestation, il en réfère, avant toute mesure d'exécution, à l'autorité des échelons supérieurs qu'il a la possibilité de joindre.

A défaut de cette dernière possibilité, ou si, bien que confirmée par l'autorité supérieure, l'ordre lui apparaît encore entaché d'illégalité, le subordonné peut ne pas l'exécuter, sans être cependant exonéré des sanctions qu'impliquerait cette inexécution dans le cas où, par la suite, celle-ci ne pourrait être justifiée par une exacte appréciation du caractère illégal de l'ordre contesté.

CHAPITRE 3

Formation militaire.

Article 23.

But et caractères.

1. La formation militaire tend à développer le sens du devoir et l'esprit de solidarité. Elle prépare les chefs à l'exercice de l'autorité, les subordonnés à l'exécution des ordres, les unités à l'action cohérente.

2. La formation militaire s'adresse à tous et suppose la participation de ceux qui la reçoivent comme de ceux qui la donnent. Les rapports hiérarchiques et de camaraderie ainsi que les rapports personnels qui s'établissent dans l'exécution du service lui confèrent toute sa valeur. Il faut développer ces rapports dans les activités de chaque jour et mettre à profit certains moments de la vie militaire, tels que l'accueil des recrues, les entretiens, les inspections et les mutations, pour les approfondir.

Article 24.

Moyens.

1. La formation militaire est dispensée à l'occasion de toutes les activités individuelles et collectives.

2. L'instruction, l'entraînement et les loisirs sont les principaux moyens d'assurer efficacement cette formation. Les inspections et la notation permettent d'apprécier les résultats obtenus.

Article 25.

Instruction et entraînement.

1. L'instruction et l'entraînement rendent les hommes les unités aptes à remplir leurs fonctions et à exécuter leur mission, quelles que soient les circonstances.

2. La pratique régulière de l'entraînement physique accroit l'endurance et la maîtrise de soi, éduque les réflexes et prépare à l'action en équipe. Elle développe chez l'individu et dans le groupe le dynamisme nécessaire à toutes les activités militaires.

3. La formation technique, portant essentiellement sur la connaissance du matériel et de sa mise en œuvre, donne à

cun la qualification indispensable, le sens des responsabilités et l'exacte notion de sa place dans un ensemble.

4. La préparation au combat, en simulant les conditions réelles, montre à chacun les risques et les difficultés de la lutte et indique les moyens d'y faire face.

Les exercices et les manœuvres permettent de juger du degré de préparation des hommes et des unités.

Article 26.

Inspections et notation.

1. Les inspections permettent au commandement de constater l'état de préparation des unités. En faisant apparaître les différences qui peuvent exister entre les objectifs fixés et les résultats obtenus, elles doivent être l'occasion de préciser les responsabilités tant des chefs que des subordonnés.

2. Les notes éclairent le commandement sur la valeur, l'aptitude professionnelle et la manière de servir des militaires. Elles doivent être établies avec précision et en toute objectivité.

A l'occasion de la notation, le chef, au cours d'un entretien avec chacun de ses subordonnés directs, leur fait connaître son appréciation sur leur manière de servir et leur donne les conseils nécessaires.

Article 27.

Détente et loisirs.

1. La détente est le complément indispensable du travail, dont elle améliore la qualité et le rendement. Elle assure le bon équilibre de l'individu et entretient la cohésion et le moral des unités.

2. Les activités de détente visent à donner à chacun, dans un climat de camaraderie, la possibilité de satisfaire ses goûts et ses aspirations intellectuelles et spirituelles.

La pratique des sports individuels et collectifs complète l'instruction physique et développe un esprit de saine émulation à l'occasion des compétitions.

3. Ces activités peuvent s'exercer au sein de groupes animés par leurs membres sous l'impulsion et le contrôle du commandement, celui-ci contribue à les organiser, leur procure les moyens nécessaires et facilite les contacts et les échanges avec l'extérieur.

Article 28.

Promotion sociale.

L'armée s'attache à répondre au désir de promotion sociale qui pousse l'individu à s'élever dans la société en améliorant ses connaissances et ses aptitudes.

Le commandement informe les militaires des possibilités qui leur sont offertes pour perfectionner leur instruction générale et professionnelle. Il leur donne à cet effet les facilités compatibles avec les nécessités du service.

Article 29.

Formation civique.

1. L'armée inculque aux Français servant sous les drapeaux le sentiment de leur solidarité et des devoirs qu'entraîne leur appartenance à la communauté nationale.

2. Les actes importants de la vie militaire rappellent à chacun le devoir d'assurer la défense de la patrie. Ils doivent permettre aux citoyens de prendre conscience de leurs obligations et des sacrifices qui peuvent leur être demandés.

CHAPITRE 4

Devoirs des militaires au combat.

Article 30.

Généralités.

La force et la cohésion des unités au combat exigent que chaque militaire participe à l'action contre l'ennemi avec énergie et abnégation.

Cette action est menée, quoi qu'il arrive, jusqu'à l'accomplissement total de la mission.

Article 31.

Devoirs du chef au combat.

1. Le chef conduit la lutte et poursuit le combat jusqu'au succès ou jusqu'à l'épuisement de tous ses moyens.

2. Il stimule la volonté de combattre de ses subordonnés, maintient en toutes circonstances l'ordre et la discipline; au besoin, il force l'obéissance.

3. Le chef prend toutes dispositions pour qu'aucun document important ni matériel utilisable ne tombe aux mains de l'ennemi.

Article 32.

Devoirs du combattant.

1. Tout combattant doit remplir sans défaillance les devoirs qui lui incombent, soit à titre personnel, soit à titre de membre d'une équipe ou d'un équipage.

2. En particulier :

Il s'efforce de détruire l'ennemi ;

Il met tout en œuvre pour atteindre l'objectif désigné ou tenir le poste qui lui est assigné ;

Il maintient en état de fonctionnement les armes ou le matériel qui sert ; il s'efforce d'assurer le service des armes ou des matériels collectifs dont le personnel a été mis hors de combat ;

Il évite la capture et rejoint l'unité ou l'autorité la plus proche si, dans l'impossibilité de remplir sur place sa mission, il ne peut recevoir des ordres de ses chefs.

3. Il est interdit au combattant :

D'abandonner des armes et des matériels en état de servir ;
D'entrer en rapport avec l'ennemi ;

De se rendre à l'ennemi avant d'avoir épuisé tous les moyens de combattre.

4. Quand tous les chefs sont tombés, l'homme le plus brave prend le commandement et poursuit le combat.

Article 33.

Devoirs du prisonnier.

1. Si un combattant tombe aux mains de l'ennemi, son devoir est d'échapper à la captivité en profitant de la confusion de la bataille et de toutes occasions favorables pour rejoindre les forces amies.

S'il est gardé prisonnier, il a le devoir de s'évader et d'aider ses compagnons à le faire.

2. Un prisonnier reste militaire. Il est donc, en particulier, soumis dans la vie en commun aux règles de la hiérarchie et de la subordination vis-à-vis de ses compagnons de captivité.

3. Tout prisonnier doit conserver la volonté de résistance et l'esprit de solidarité nécessaires pour surmonter les épreuves de la captivité et résister aux pressions de l'ennemi.

Il repousse toute compromission et se refuse à toute déclaration écrite ou orale et en général à tout acte susceptible de nuire à son pays et à ses camarades.

4. Le militaire prisonnier ne donne à l'ennemi que ses nom, prénoms, grade, numéro matricule et date de naissance. Il peut contribuer à fournir les mêmes renseignements pour des camarades qui ne sont pas physiquement capables de les donner eux-mêmes.

Article 34.

Lois et coutumes de la guerre.

1. Il est prescrit aux militaires au combat :

De considérer comme « combattants réguliers » les membres des forces armées ou de milices volontaires, y compris la résistance organisée, à condition que ces formations aient un

chef désigné, que leurs membres arborent un signe distinctif, portent des armes d'une façon apparente et respectent les lois et usages de la guerre ;

De traiter avec humanité sans distinction toutes les personnes mises hors de combat ;

De recueillir, de protéger et de soigner les blessés, les malades et les naufragés dans la mesure où les circonstances le permettent ;

De respecter les hôpitaux et les lieux de rassemblement de malades ou de blessés civils ou militaires, les personnels, les formations, les bâtiments, les matériels et les transports sanitaires et d'épargner les édifices consacrés aux cultes, aux arts, aux sciences et à la bienfaisance et les monuments historiques, à condition qu'ils ne soient pas employés à des fins militaires.

2. De plus, il leur est interdit :

De prendre sous leur feu, de blesser ou de tuer un ennemi qui se rend ou qui est capturé ou avec lequel une suspension d'armes a été conclue ;

De dépouiller les morts et les blessés ;

De refuser une reddition sans condition ou de déclarer qu'il ne sera pas fait de quartier ;

De se livrer à toute destruction inutile et à tout pillage, en particulier, des biens privés ;

De prendre des otages, de se livrer à des représailles ou à des sanctions collectives ;

De condamner des individus sans jugement préalable rendu par un tribunal régulièrement constitué et assorti des garanties judiciaires prévues par la loi ;

D'attaquer ou de retenir prisonnier un parlementaire arborant le drapeau blanc ;

D'utiliser tous les moyens qui occasionnent des souffrances et des dommages inutiles ;

D'utiliser indûment le pavillon parlementaire, le pavillon national de l'ennemi ainsi que les insignes distinctifs des conventions internationales ;

De porter atteinte à la vie et à l'intégrité corporelle des malades, blessés, naufragés, à celles des prisonniers ainsi que des personnes civiles, notamment, par le meurtre sous toutes ses formes, les mutilations, les traitements cruels, tortures et supplices ;

De forcer les nationaux de la partie adverse à prendre part aux opérations de guerre contre leur pays ;

De tirer sur l'équipage et les passagers d'avions civils ou militaires sautant en parachute d'un avion en détresse, sauf lorsqu'ils participent à une opération aéroportée ;

De détruire et de saisir des navires ou des aéronefs de commerce neutres, sauf en cas de contrebande, rupture de blocus, et autres actes contraires à leur neutralité.

Article 35

Traitement des prisonniers.

Dès leur capture, les prisonniers doivent être traités avec humanité. Ils doivent être protégés contre tout acte de violence, contre les insultes et la curiosité publique. Ils ont droit au respect de leur personne et de leur honneur. Ils doivent rester en possession de leurs effets et objets d'usage personnel, sauf les armes, équipements et documents militaires.

Les prisonniers doivent être évacués dans le plus bref délai après leur capture vers des points de rassemblement situés assez loin de la zone de combat. En attendant leur évacuation, ils ne doivent pas être exposés inutilement au danger.

L'évacuation des prisonniers doit s'effectuer dans les mêmes conditions, notamment de sécurité, que les déplacements des troupes françaises.

La liste des prisonniers évacués doit être établie aussitôt que possible ; chaque prisonnier n'est tenu de déclarer, quand il est interrogé à ce sujet, que ses nom, prénoms, grade, date de naissance, numéro matricule, ou, à défaut, une indication équivalente.

Les prisonniers malades et blessés sont confiés au service de santé.

TITRE III

REGLES DU SERVICE

CHAPITRE 1^{er}

Cérémonial militaire.

Article 36.

But et esprit du cérémonial militaire.

Les cérémonies militaires ont pour but de donner la solennité qui convient à certains événements de la vie nationale et de la vie militaire.

Elles manifestent publiquement la valeur et le prestige des armées et les liens qui les unissent aux autorités et aux populations. Elles témoignent de la discipline des forces armées et de l'esprit de solidarité qui les animent.

Leur signification doit être comprise de tous.

Les autorités civiles, les associations d'anciens combattants, les associations des militaires de la réserve et de préparation militaire peuvent être invitées à ces cérémonies.

Article 37.

Règles du cérémonial.

Le cérémonial militaire comprend les prises d'armes et les honneurs militaires.

Les règles en sont fixées par le règlement sur le service de garnison et par le décret sur les « marques, honneurs, saluts, fêtes nationales et visites dans les forces navales et à bord des bâtiments de la marine militaire ».

L'instruction et la préparation des unités au combat imposent de réduire l'importance et la fréquence des cérémonies militaires. Lorsque la préparation à ces cérémonies est indispensable, elle doit être conduite de façon à perturber le moins possible l'entraînement des unités.

Article 38

Prises d'armes.

Les prises d'armes, consistant généralement en une revue suivie d'un défilé, sont organisées :

Pour rendre les honneurs au drapeau, aux morts des guerres, à une haute personnalité ;

Pour fêter un anniversaire ou rehausser l'éclat d'une manifestation ;

Pour marquer une prise de commandement, une inspection ou une visite ;

Pour remettre des décorations ou des insignes.

Elles peuvent l'être également pour assurer l'exécution de certaines condamnations.

Article 39.

Honneurs militaires.

1. Les honneurs militaires sont des démonstrations extérieures par lesquelles l'armée présente, dans des conditions déterminées, un hommage spécial aux personnes et aux symboles qui y ont droit.

2. Ils sont rendus par les troupes, les équipages, les gardes, les factionnaires, les sentinelles et les militaires isolés ainsi que par les piquets d'honneur et les détachements fournis spécialement dans un but d'apparat.

3. Les honneurs ne sont rendus qu'une fois à la même personne ou au même symbole au cours de la même prise d'armes. Lorsqu'une prise d'armes concerne une personne ou un symbole, les honneurs sont rendus uniquement à cette personne ou à ce symbole, sauf prescriptions spéciales du commandant d'armes. Toutefois, chaque fois qu'une troupe rencontre un drapeau, elle lui rend les honneurs.

L'exécution du service n'est pas interrompue pour rendre les honneurs.

X
1. 75

REVUE
DU ¹⁵⁻⁴⁰
DROIT PUBLIC
ET DE LA
SCIENCE POLITIQUE
EN FRANCE ET A L'ÉTRANGER

DIRECTEURS

MARCEL WALINE

PROFESSEUR A LA FACULTÉ DE DROIT
ET DES SCIENCES ÉCONOMIQUES DE PARIS

GEORGES BERLIA

PROFESSEUR A LA FACULTÉ DE DROIT
ET DES SCIENCES ÉCONOMIQUES DE PARIS

Secrétaire de la rédaction

THÉRÈSE PINET

SOMMAIRE

- I. LE NOUVEAU RÈGLEMENT DE DISCIPLINE GÉNÉRALE DANS LES ARMÉES.
par William COULET (p. 5).
- II. CHRONIQUES ÉTRANGÈRES.
Le système de contrôle de la constitutionnalité des lois en Italie. par Vezio CRISAFULLI (p. 53).
Les efforts de rapprochement des institutions de droit public de la R. A. U., de l'Irak, de la Syrie et de l'Algérie. par Gilbert TIXIER (p. 113).
- III. CHRONIQUE CONSTITUTIONNELLE ET PARLEMENTAIRE FRANÇAISE
Document : Les déclarations du 29 Janvier 1968 du Président de l'Assemblée Nationale. Chaban-Delmas (p. 155).
- IV. ANALYSE DES TEXTES LÉGISLATIFS ET RÉGLEMENTAIRES (1^{er} septembre - 31 décembre 1967), par Thérèse FINET (p. 101).
- V. ANALYSES DE JURISPRUDENCE
- I. NOTES DE JURISPRUDENCE, par Marcel WALINE (p. 175).
- § 1. *Les contraventions de grande voirie ont-elles le caractère d'une infraction pénale ?* (Conseil d'État, 1^{er} mars 1967, *Demoiselle Lescot*).
- § 2. *Le statut juridique des Hôtels de ville* (Conseil d'État, 17 mars 1967, *Banchem*).
- II. CONCLUSIONS DES COMMISSAIRES DU GOUVERNEMENT (p. 187).
Des effets de l'annulation pour excès de pouvoir. Absence de portée de la renonciation du requérant qui a obtenu satisfaction, à se présenter de l'annulation intervenue d'un conseil d'État. 13 juillet 1967, *École Privée de Filles de Prailles*. Conclusions de Michel BERNARD.
- III. REVUE DE JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE.
- § 1. *Règles générales du contentieux.*
A) *Compétence*, par J.-M. AUBY (p. 191).
B) *Procédure*, par Roland DRAGO (p. 197).
- § 2. *Droit administratif général*, par J.-M. AUBY (p. 207).
- VI. BIBLIOGRAPHIE (p. 221).

Pages 1 à 234

Janvier-Février 1968

N° 1

LIBRAIRIE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT ET DE JURISPRUDENCE

1.
2.

Jacques Léauté
Prof. à Strasbourg
spécialiste aussi
à cette section
(Prof. Cavasenn)
Hdru

Président de l'Assec.
Natl. de la Justice Administrative
(avec publieu a périodica)

Décret
n° 66-749
du 1^{er} octobre
1966

J.O. du
8-10-1966,
p. 8853

La réforme était donc « dans l'air » (8) et on peut dire que son élaboration a associé la participation spontanée des intéressés aux travaux et consultations officiels.

La collaboration volontaire s'est manifestée sous la forme des discussions engagées par divers groupements. Des idées nouvelles concernant les limites de l'obéissance et la nécessité d'assouplir les règles de la vie quotidienne des militaires ont été soutenues dans des articles permettant une confrontation des points de vue : ainsi une étude rédigée sous forme de conversation entre un officier supérieur, un officier subalterne et un soldat (9) suscitait la réponse critique d'un groupement de jeunes, laquelle appelait à son tour des observations d'un groupe d'officiers (10). Ces débats spontanés attestent l'intérêt porté à la réforme envisagée et la volonté des intéressés de faire prévaloir des solutions mieux adaptées aux réalités actuelles. Le but expressément visé dans ces échanges de vues était de permettre à chacun d'apporter sa pierre à l'édifice afin de promouvoir « une évolution n'affaiblissant pas l'efficacité de la discipline mais correspondant aux aspirations des citoyens sous les armes » (11).

La préparation du projet de nouveau règlement a d'abord été confiée à une Commission placée sous la présidence du Général Gambiez. Les travaux de cette Commission ont abouti en 1964 à la rédaction d'un texte particulièrement volumineux, visiblement soucieux de faire la synthèse de problèmes très différents et ébauchant sur certains points, avec quelque réticence il est vrai, des solutions nouvelles en matière de responsabilité par exemple. Parallèlement un certain nombre de consultations étaient lancées et permettaient de prendre l'avis d'associations de jeunes, tandis que la Commission « Armées Jeunesse » présentait un rapport résumant les préoccupations, les habitudes de vie

(8) En 1960, le Général WEYGAND écrivait dans son *Histoire de l'Armée Française*, Flammarion, p. 490 : « La discipline fait toujours la force principale des armées. Nous n'étonnerons personne en disant qu'elle est à reprendre : discipline extérieure et plus encore discipline de l'esprit. Très ferme mais intelligente, car il s'agit de comprendre, ... ce qui veut dire que l'initiative de chacun doit s'exercer pour obéir mieux, pour remplir au mieux la pensée du chef... ».

(9) Étude par un groupe d'officiers du G. I. T. D. M. : les jeunes et la discipline militaire, *Revue L'Armée*, n° 45, février 1965, p. 48.

(10) A propos des jeunes et de la discipline militaire : — le point de vue d'un groupe de responsables de mouvements de jeunesse, *Revue L'Armée*, n° 51, octobre 1965, p. 32 ; — le point de vue d'un groupe d'officiers, *id.*, p. 36.

(11) Art. cité, *Revue L'Armée*, octobre 1965, n° 51, p. 39.

et les besoins ressentis par les jeunes français (12). La communication du texte élaboré par la Commission du Général Gambiez devait conduire d'autre part un groupe d'officiers de l'École A. B. C. de Saumur à rédiger un rapport relatif à la formation militaire générale. Ce projet mettait l'accent sur une conception élargie de la discipline et préconisait l'emploi de méthodes actives en pédagogie ; mais la principale originalité du texte était d'envisager nettement le refus d'obéissance et de proposer l'institution d'une juridiction spéciale dont la mission aurait été de juger le bien-fondé de cette attitude et de sanctionner soit l'auteur de l'acte illégal, soit le subordonné ayant abusivement résisté à un ordre valable (13).

Le « projet Gambiez » devait ensuite être repris et remanié par une seconde Commission, dirigée par le Général Allieret, avant d'être enfin soumise à une dernière Commission, composée d'un petit groupe de fonctionnaires et d'officiers et placée sous l'autorité directe du Ministre des Armées, M. Messmer (14). Il convient de noter la participation à ce travail d'élaboration du nouveau règlement du Centre d'Études et de Sociologie Militaire (C. E. S. M.) qui a répertorié et rassemblé une importante documentation permettant une investigation historique et la référence aux normes de la discipline en vigueur dans les armées étrangères (15).

La mise en forme définitive du décret a entraîné une ventilation des éléments du projet initial, trop volumineux et général. Les dispositions relatives à l'état des militaires et aux libertés publiques ont été limitées à quelques articles consacrés à la liberté de circulation, à la résidence des militaires, aux libertés d'expression et d'association. Cette brevété ne doit pas surprendre car l'article 34 de la Constitution de 1958, sous certaines réserves résultant de l'interprétation donnée par la jurisprudence à la notion de garanties fondamentales pour l'exercice des libertés publiques, attribue dans ce domaine compétence à la loi. C'est donc en quelque sorte par tradition et pour faire suite aux dispositions des précédents règlements que le décret de

12 Colonel G. BARDON, *Les jeunes Français*, Texte ronéotypé, Doc. Minist. des Armées.
13 Centre d'Étude et de Sociologie militaire : *un sujet du projet de l'École A. B. C. de Saumur* ; Documentation à l'usage de la Commission de réforme des règlements de discipline générale ; ronéotypé.
14 Cf. Jacques ISSARD, *Le Monde* du 5 octobre 1960.
15 Fiche de Documentation, Ministère des Armées, C. E. S. M., n° 231 du 8 octobre 1964.

et les besoins ressentis par les jeunes français (12). La communication du texte élaboré par la Commission du Général Gambiez devait conduire d'autre part un groupe d'officiers de l'École A. B. C. de Saumur à rédiger un rapport relatif à la formation militaire générale. Ce projet mettait l'accent sur une conception élargie de la discipline et préconisait l'emploi de méthodes actives en pédagogie ; mais la principale originalité du texte était d'envisager nettement le refus d'obéissance et de proposer l'institution d'une juridiction spéciale dont la mission aurait été de juger le bien-fondé de cette attitude et de sanctionner soit l'auteur de l'acte illégal, soit le subordonné ayant abusivement résisté à un ordre valable (13).

Le « projet Gambiez » devait ensuite être repris et remanié par une seconde Commission, dirigée par le Général Ailleret, avant d'être enfin soumis à une dernière Commission, composée d'un petit groupe de fonctionnaires et d'officiers et placée sous l'autorité directe du Ministre des Armées, M. Messner (14). Il convient de noter la participation à ce travail d'élaboration du nouveau règlement du Centre d'Études et de Sociologie Militaire (C. E. S. M.) qui a répertorié et rassemblé une importante documentation permettant une investigation historique et la référence aux normes de la discipline en vigueur dans les armées étrangères (15).

La mise en forme définitive du décret a entraîné une ventilation des éléments du projet initial, trop volumineux et général.

Les dispositions relatives à l'état des militaires et aux libertés publiques ont été limitées à quelques articles consacrés à la liberté de circulation, à la résidence des militaires, aux libertés d'expression et d'association. Cette brièveté ne doit pas surprendre car l'article 34 de la Constitution de 1958, sous certaines réserves résultant de l'interprétation donnée par la jurisprudence à la notion de garanties fondamentales pour l'exercice des libertés publiques, attribue dans ce domaine compétence à la loi. C'est donc en quelque sorte par tradition et pour faire suite aux dispositions des précédents règlements que le décret de

(12) Colonel G. BARDOUX, *Les jeunes Français*. Texte ronéotypé. Doc. Minist. des Armées.

(13) Centre d'Étude et de Sociologie militaire : *au sujet du projet de l'École A. B. C. de Saumur* : (Documentation à l'usage de la Commission de refonte des règlements de discipline générale) : ronéotypé.

(14) Cf. Jacques ISSARD, *Le Monde* du 5 octobre 1960.

(15) Fiche de Documentation, Ministère des Armées, C. E. S. M., n° 231 du 8 octobre 1964.

France

for my letter to Polak
Finland

1966

Article
~~There is a~~ "Nouveau Règlement de Discipline Générale
dans les Armées"

in France:

see in: Revue du Droit Public + de Co. Science 1861/1966
~~extra~~ en France et à l'Étranger

Numero 1 (Jan. - Fev. 1966)
1966 p. 5-82

William Coulet

Maître Assistant délégué à la Faculté
de Droit et des Sciences Econ. de Toulouse

deal on it.

dit: on est ce que je
trouverais le rapport
au Président de la République
mentionné à p. 17
avec des p. 17 et
étude (projet Gambier)
mentionné à p. 11
le rapport Les jeun.
Français (texte rouétypé)
Mun. des Armées
par le Col. G. Bandoin
documentation historique
(note 15)

Q: Pg of illegal war
in 1st place?

Q: Où est le Centre d'étude et
de sociologie Méditerranéenne
en 10-11

= The "Nouveau Règlement" is published

in: J.O. du 8 Oct. 1966,
p. 8853

décret No. 66-749 of 1 Oct. 1966

set
photostated
at UN!

replaces décret of 1st Apr. 33 concerning ^{land + air} armed forces; +
" 26 Nov. 37 " naval armed forces

Box 30 - folder 8 107262 10/27
J.H.E. FRIED; FDR, Jewish Refugees + Problems. Excerpts: 1938-1950

The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, edited by Samuel I. Rosenman

Published in 13 Volumes as follows:

Vol. 1-5 Random House (New York) 1938
Vol. 6-9 The Macmillan Co. (New York) 1941
Vol. 10-13 Harper and Brothers (New York) 1950

~~Vol~~ Volume I - "The Genesis of the New Deal"

1928-1932

Random House - New York- 1938

No mention of Jews or Jewish problems

* * *

The Public Paper and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt edited by Samuel I. Rosenman

Volume II "The Year of Crisis" - 1933
(Random House - New York - 1938)

No mention of Jews or Jewish problems.

* * *

Volume III "The Advance of Recovery and Reform" -1934
(Random House - New York -1938)

No mention of Jews or Jewish problems.

* * *

Volume IV "The Court Disapproves" 1935
(Random House - New York- 1938)

No mention of Jews or Jewish problems)

* * *

Volume V "The People Approve" -1936
(Random House - New York -1938)

* * *

Vol. VI "The Constitution Prevails" -1937
(The Macmillan Company- New York-1941)

Index references under following headings:

"Jews" (Item 13, P.66)

"Palestine" -P.66

" National Conference for Palestine " -P.66

"United Palestine Appeal" - P.66

"A Greeting to the United Palestine Appeal" Feb.6,1937

In the form of a friendly letter to Dr. Wise, Roosevelt extends his good wishes to the Conference and says:

" The American people --- have watched with sympathetic interest the efforts of the Jews to renew in Palestine the ties of their ancient homeland -----." P.66

The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt edited by Samuel I. Rosenman

Volume VII - "The Continuing Struggle for Liberalism" - 1938

(The Macmillan Company - New York - 1941)

Index References: See "Palestine"; "Jews"; "Refugees"; "German Government"; "Hitler".

"Letter to Senator Millard E. Ewing on the Palestine Situation" 10/19/38

Roosevelt expresses "sympathy in the establishment of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine".

P. 550-551

* * *

"Presidential Statement on Refugees in Palestine" - 11/23/1938

"It is reported here that the number of refugees to be permitted entry into Palestine will be materially increased"

P. 609

* * *

"The 501st Press Conference (Excerpts)" - 11/18/38

The President was asked questions by the press about "the extension of passports for refugees".

Roosevelt proposed the extension of "Visitor's Permits" to German Refugees (Jewish and others).

P. 602-604

* * *

"The 500th Press Conference" - 11/15/38

The President is interviewed -among other things- on the racial persecution of the Jews in Germany. The President read a prepared statement as follows:

" The news ... from Germany has deeply shocked public opinion in the United States I myself could scarcely believe that such things could occur in a 20th Century civilization..."

P. 596-598

* * *

" Indorsing University Scholarships for Refugees from Germany" 12/14/38

Letter from the President to Mr. Robert E. Lane of the Harvard Committee to Aid German Student Refugees.

P. 645

"The United States Moves to Help Refugees from Germany. State Department Release.

March 24, 1938

Rosenman's note: " The foregoing release of the Dept. of State was issued when the refugee problem had reached an acute stage in 1938. At that time it became apparent that some orderly plan for inter-governmental cooperation had to be formulated to deal with the mass emigrations which had become necessary, for the facilities of private organizations to find places of refuge had become overtaxed". P.169-175

Roosevelt's note:

Roosevelt

~~THIS NOTE~~

Rosenman then proceeds to give a comprehensive review of all activities in which Roosevelt was involved on behalf of the refugees, including the following references: As follows:

US to Dr. Fried see handwritten notes enclosed

1. 3/23/38 - Roosevelt suggests formation of Intergovernmental Committee.
2. 3/38 - Roosevelt names Advisory Committee on Political Refugees.
3. 5/38 - Roosevelt appoints Myron C. Taylor with rank of Ambassador as his representative at the proposed meeting of the Committee (Intergovernmental Committee).
4. Reference is also made to the Evian Meeting to be held July 1938. Taylor was chosen Chairman by the Delegates. Mr. George Rublee, an American International lawyer, is chosen as director of the Committee appointed to negotiate with the countries of exodus and refuge.
5. Reference to the London Meeting Aug. 3, 1938
6. 10/5/38 Reference to Roosevelt's letter to Chamberlain (quoted in complete text) asking Chamberlain to personally intervene with the German Government in behalf of the refugees. (This message hitherto was unpublished. It appears on page 172.)
" In reply, the Prime Minister (Chamberlain) indicated preference for an approach to Germany through the American and British Ambassadors at Berlin". (The quotes are of Rosenmans exact text.)
7. 10/18/38 Reference to Ambassador Wilson's visit upon Herr Weizsaecker
8. 12/2/38 Reference to second meeting of the officers of the Intergovernmental Committee at London.
9. 12/15/38 Reference to Dr. Schacht's visit to London.
10. Reference to the "Rublee Plan" (an outgrowth of confidential memo from Helmut Wohlthat-Coering's aide to Mr. Rublee.). (see Item 84-1939-Vol VIII)
11. 2/14/39 Reference to full meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee held in London.

Clarify ?

p. 169-175

The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt edited by Samuel I. Rosenman

Volume VIII - (The Macmillan Company-New York-1941)
1939

1939 Volume
"War - and Neutrality"

" Address at the Meeting of the Officers of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees" - Oct. 17, 1939

Roosevelt pays tribute to the Committee for the work it has done on behalf of refugees (Jewish and others).
P. 546-552

* * *

"The President Stresses This Government's Interest in the Refugee Problem"
6/8/39

This is contained in a long letter to Mr. Myron C. Taylor, American representative on Intergovernmental Committee. P. 359-362

Also see ~~Rosenman's~~ notes containing additional data. P. 362-364

ROOSEVELT

* * *

Volume IX - 1940 Volume- "War -And Aid to Democracies"

(The Macmillan Company-New York-1941)

No references to Jews or Jewish problems.

* * *

Volume X - 1941 Volume - "The Call to Battle Stations"

(Harper and Brothers-New York-1950)

No references to Jews or Jewish problems.

Volume XI - 1942 Volume - " Humanity on the Defensive"

(Harper and Brothers - New York-1950)

" The President Announces the Plan to Try Nazi War Criminals" 10/7/42

" It is our intention that just and sure punishment shall be meted out to the ringleaders responsible for the organized murder of thousands of innocent persons" P. 410

* * *

US to Dr. Fried upon re-examination, I believe this is a note written by Roosevelt not Rosenman; see handwritten notes.

Clarby?

The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt edited by Samuel I. Rosenman

Volume XII - 1943 Volume- "The Tide Turns"

(Harper and Brothers - New York - 1950)

"Statement Issued by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin Regarding Atrocities". 11/1/1943

Rosenman note: "This statement was discussed at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers and it was issued at the conclusion of the Conference. It was the strongest statement on War Crimes with which President Roosevelt associated his name".

* * *

Volume XIII -(1944-1945 Volume) "Victory and the Threshold of Peace"

(Harper and Brothers - New York-1950)

Index References under: "Jews"; "Refugees".

"The War Refugee Board is Established" Executive Order #9417 - 1/22/44

P. 48-51

A long footnote by

~~See also Rosenman's notes that follow on pages 50-53 which summarize the work of the War Refugee Board; ~~he~~ he says in conclusion:~~

" The fate of the Jews and other minority groups is one of the blackest chapters in human history. It should be said, however, that the War Refugee Board, by direct aid, negotiation, and by clandestine means, in some measure softened the blows on the tragic victims of the Nazis". (Rosenman)

* * *

"The President Asks That Frontiers Be Opened to Victims of Nazi Oppression and Declares That War Criminals Will Be Tried and Punished". 3/24/44

The President condemned the brutality of the Nazis and described atrocities against the Jews and others, declaring:

" It is therefore fitting that we should again proclaim our determination that none who participated in these acts of savagery shall go unpunished All who knowingly take part in the deportation of Jews to their death in Poland ... are equally guilty with the executioner. All who share the guilt shall share the punishment".

P. 103-106

* * *

"The President Recommends Bringing 1000 Refugees ^{to} the United States". Cablegram to Ambassador Robert Murphy in Algiers 6/9/44 - p. 163-165

* * *

US to Dr. Fried - see handwritten notes on this.

" Message to the Congress on Refugee Policy" - 6/12/44 P. 168 - 172

US to Dr. Fried

In this message, Roosevelt advised the Congress the step he had taken to admit the 1000 refugees to the U.S. over

US To Dr. Fried long footnote appears on pages 50-53. see additional pages in long hand.

check "in"

US should be "into" my original letter contained "into" + this in context.

①

The Public Papers + Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt (Vol. VII)

Re - Page 4 - Typewritten notes -

LLS to Dr. Fried

Here is an exact copy
of the title page!

Vol. VII

↓
The Public Papers and Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt
with a special introduction
and explanatory notes by
President Roosevelt

1938 volume

The Continuing Struggle for Liberalism

The Macmillan Company, New York, 1941

LLS to Dr. Fried

In the early volumes the notes are by
Roosevelt.

Hence, on page 4 of the typewritten pages
there should be a ~~cor~~ correction -

it is Roosevelt speaking in the notes -
not Rosenman. (In this volume

Rosenman is credited ^{not} with compiling
& collecting of the material.)

(2)

Vol. VII

"The United States Moves to Help Refugees from Germany, State Department Release."

March 24, 1935

"This government has become so impressed with the urgency of the problem of political refugees that it has inquired of a number of governments in Europe and in this hemisphere whether they would be willing to cooperate in setting up a special committee for the purpose of facilitating the emigration from Austria and presumably from Germany of political refugees."

P 169

US to Dr. Fried

The Release is brief. It does not cover a full page. The ~~NOTE~~ ^{NOTE}, however, extends from bottom of p. 169 to ^{P. 174}.

I did not "spell these out" on page 4 of the typewritten notes as much of this appears elsewhere; i.e., the League of Nations official documents; State Dept. official documents; Cordell Hull "Memoirs" etc., all of which

you have.

In other words, this summation in the Note of various activities contains activities "spelled out" elsewhere.

The question arises: Do you wish each of these 11 items explained in full or is it sufficient that these activities will appear elsewhere as indicated in the official respective documents pertaining to the various ~~sources~~ activities?

This is a point that confuses me --- the duplication of the mention of the same activity in different sources. Is it essential to repeat these?

Since this material appears as a NOTE I did not consider it the "official source" and hence merely listed the ~~items~~ activities referred to but assumed the "spelling out" of these activities should appear (& would appear) in the summation of respective official documents; i.e., League of Nations, et al.

Is this correct? WS

①

Vol. VIII

The Public Papers and Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt
with a special introduction
and explanatory notes by
President Roosevelt

1939 volume

WAR - And Neutrality

The Macmillan Company, New York, 1941

"The President Stresses This Government's Interest
in the Refugee Problem." June 8, 1939

"My dear Mr. Taylor:

I wish to set forth certain considerations and
suggestions for your guidance in connection with
the forthcoming meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee:

(1) The refugee problem continues and
will undoubtedly continue for a long time
to come. It may at any time be greatly
aggravated by a new wave of persecution
in Germany."

(Continued on P. 2)

(2)

Vol. VIII

2. "This Government's interest in efforts to bring about a solution of the problem is strong."
- "This Government has naturally preferred to take such action through the Intergovernmental Committee rather than through any other agency."
3. At the same time, the imminent establishment of the Refugee Foundation - - - - have created a new situation, requiring a new integration of private and governmental effort."
4. "The Foundation, which was envisaged in the Rublee plan and is being set up in accordance with that plan, is designed to be in a position to negotiate more effectively with the German authorities concerning financial, and perhaps other questions than could the Committee."

(5) (6)

- (5) "It must be reluctantly admitted that this Government's efforts to stimulate concrete action by other Governments to meet the problems have been met at best by a lukewarm attitude."

"Subject to general approval, the Intergovernmental Committee should take steps to turn over its

③

function of negotiating with the Governments
of countries of settlement to the League of
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

If this is done, this Government is
desirous to contribute to the expense of
the High Commission for this purpose. ~~Q~~

In making this change every effort must be
exerted to minimize the risk of an unfavorable
reaction in Germany. " — — — — —

P. 359 - 362

NOTE: (extracts from pages 362 - 364)

This NOTE reviews the work of
Intergovernmental Committee established
at Evian.

US to Dr. Fried I have not amplified this ^{note} because
the official report of this meeting
appears in League of Nations official
documents as you will see from
my ^{League} notes.
Again, the question arises --- is it
necessary to explain all this as
written in Roosevelt's note when it

④

appear as part ^{of} ~~of~~ official documentation
elsewhere? Please clarify.

WS

①

W.S. TO
Dr. Fried:

{ see page 6 of enclosed
typewritten notes.

"The Public Papers & Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt"

Volume XIII - (1944-1945 Volume)

"Victory and the Threshold of Peace"

"The War Refugee Board is Established"

Executive Order no. 9417 - Jan. 22, 1944

"Whereas it is the policy of this Government to take all measures within its power to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death and otherwise to afford such victims all possible relief and assistance consistent with the successful prosecution of the war;

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the Statutes of the United States, as President of the United States and as commander-in-chief of the Army & Navy, and in order to effectuate with all possible speed the rescue and relief of such victims of enemy oppression, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There is established in the Executive Office of the President a War Refugee Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board).

(2)

2. "The functions of the Board shall include without limitation the development of plans and programs and the inauguration of effective measures for (a) the rescue, transportation, maintenance, and relief of the victims of enemy oppression, and (b) the establishment of houses of temporary refuge for such victims."

P 48-49

LV5 to Dr. Fried

The complete executive order is reproduced in toto (pages 48-50). I have herewith quoted the 2 salient points in the executive order. The remaining 4 points pertain to various general duties to be performed by State, Treasury, and War Depts, "within their respective spheres".

Rosenman's footnote to this Executive Report extends from page 50 to Page 53. In it he makes reference to the Evian Conference and the creation of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees. Rosenman writes in the footnotes:

"The foregoing Executive Order establishing
(continued on page 3)

(3)

the War Refugee Board was issued to mobilize all possible efforts of Federal agencies and foreign governments to rescue and aid the victims.

"Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. laid a good deal of the groundwork for the War Refugee Board". P. 51

Rosenman continues in his footnotes:

"Direct evacuation was one of the most difficult tasks undertaken by the War Refugee Board. In the execution of this dramatic program, persons who cooperated with the Board maintained close contact with the resistance groups within enemy territory, bribed German officials, provided false identification papers for refugees, and successfully used other underhanded means". P. 52

"Under arrangements completed by the War Refugee Board, several refugee camps were opened: (in no. Africa, in Switzerland, in the middle East)

"Through the direct intervention of the President, 1,000 refugees who had escaped to Southern Italy were brought here during the summer of
(continued on Page 4)

(4)

Vol. VIII

1944, and were housed at an emergency refugee shelter at Fort Ontario, Oswego, New York."

P. 1-2

LLS to Dr. Fried :

While ^{all} this is a "footnote", Rosenman ~~calls~~ ^{heads} this "data ~~like so:~~ ~~NOTE:~~ NOTE:" and then continues for 3 full pages (not as footnote).

LLS TO Dr. Fried Important

In the front of Vol. VIII, the following appear:

"The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt"
"compiled with special material and explanatory notes by Samuel I. Rosenman".

Then, I assume the "note" is Rosenman.
It seems, however, that in Vol. 8, the following
appears "with a special introduction and explanatory notes by President Roosevelt". This appears only in

(5.)

Vol. XIII

The Public Papers & Addresses of F.D.R.

Volume XIII

Cablegram to Ambassador Robert Murphy
in Algiers, ~~June 9~~ June 9, 1944

Dr. Fried -
(see p. 6 of
typewritten
notes)
US

* * *

US to Dr. Fried

This ^{calls} covers the 1000 refugees brought into
the U.S. "through the direct intervention
of the President" referred to in Rosenman's
notes previously explained. (see page 3 of handwritten
notes) US

* * *

"Information available to me indicates that there
are real possibilities of saving human lives
by bringing more refugees through
Yugoslavia + southern Italy.

----- "I feel that it is important
that the United States indicate that it
is ready to share the burden of caring
for refugees during the war. Accordingly, I
have decided that approximately 1000
refugees should be immediately brought
from Italy to this country, to be
placed in an Emergency Refugee Shelter to
be established at Fort Ontario near
Oswego, New York, where under appropriate

(Continued on page 6)

Some of the volumes not all of them!

5.

The Public Papers & Addresses of F. D. R.

Volume XIII

Cablegram to Ambassador Robert Murphy
in Algiers, ~~June 9~~ June 9, 1944Dr. Fried -
(see p. 6 of
typewritten
notes)
WS

* * *

WS to Dr. Fried

^{cover}
This covers the 1000 refugees brought into
the U.S. "through the direct intervention
of the President" referred to in Rosenman's
notes previously explained. (see page 3 of handwritten
notes) WS

* * *

"Information available to me indicates that there
are real possibilities of saving human lives
by bringing more refugees through
Yugoslavia + southern Italy.

... "I feel that it is important
that the United States indicate that it
is ready to share the burden of caring
for refugees during the war. Accordingly, I
have decided that approximately 1000
refugees should be immediately brought
from Italy to this country, to be
placed in an Emergency Refugee Shelter to
be established at Fort Ontario near
Oswego, New York, where under appropriate
(Continued on page 6)

16

security restrictions they will remain for the duration of the war."

P. 163 - 164

The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, edited by
Samuel I. Rosenman.

13 volumes. (vol. 1-5 :NY: Random House, 1938)

Vol. 6 - 9 : N.Y.:Macmillan, 1941

Vol. 10 - 13 : N.Y.E Harper & Bros., 1950.

Vol. 1 - V contain no reference to Jews or Jewish problems. (They cover
the years 1928 - 1936, inclusive.)

Vol. VI, The Constitution Prevails (covering the year 1938)

reproduces " A Greeting to the United Palestine Appeal" from President
Roosevelt. It is a letter to Dr. Stephen S. Wise, extending the President's
good wishes to the Conference, and stating :

"...The American people....have watched with sympathetic interest
the efforts of the Jews to renew in Palestine the ties of their
ancient homeland... "

p.66

Vol. VII. The Continuing Struggle for Liberalism. (covering the year 1938)
N.Y.E Macmillan, 1941.

"Letter to Senator Millard E. Tydings on the Palestine Situation", Oct.19,1938.

The President expresses "sympathy in the establishment of a National
Home for the Jews in Palestine...."

pp.550 /1

"Presidential Statement on Refugees in Palestine" N v.23,1938

"It is reported here that the number of refugees to be permitted entry
into Palestine will be materially increased..."

p.609

"The 500th Press Conference" Nov.15,1938

The President is interviewed, among other things, on the racial persecution of the Jews in Germany. The president read a prepared statement:

"The news...from Germany has deeply shocked public opinion in the United States...I myself could scarcely believe that such things could occur in a 20th century civilization....."

pp.596 - 598.

/full text of this statement reproduced elsewhere
in these excerpts /

"The 501st Press Conference (Excerpts)" Nov.18,1938

The President was asked questions by the press about "the extension of passports for refugees".

The President proposed the extension of "visitor's permits" to German Refugees (Jewish and others).

p.602 - 4

"Indorsing University Scholarships for Refugees from Germany" Dec.14,1938

Letter from the President to Mr. Robert E. Lane of the Harvard Committee to Aid German Student Refugees.

p.645

"The United States Moves to Help Refugees from Germany. State Department Release."

March 24,1938

"This Government has become so impressed with the urgency of the problem of political refugees that it has ~~inquired~~ inquired of a number of Governments in Europe and in this hemisphere whether they would be willing to cooperate in setting

up a special committee for the purpose of facilitating the emigration from Austria and presumably from Germany of political refugees."

p.169

This text is followed by a "Note", running from p.169, bottom to p.174, covering League of Nations and US State Dept. documents, references to Mr. Cordell Hull's Memoirs, etc. -- all of which material is referred to elsewhere in these excerpts.

The "Note" starts as follows: "The foregoing release of the Department of State was issued when the refugee problem had reached an acute stage in 1938. At that time it became apparent that some orderly plan for intergovernmental cooperation had to be formulated to deal with the mass emigrations which had become necessary, for the facilities of private organizations to find places of refuge had become overtaxed."

There follows a comprehensive review of activities on behalf of refugees, namely :

1. March 23, 1938 - Roosevelt suggests formation of Intergovernmental Committee.
2. March 1938 - Roosevelt names Advisory Committee on Political Refugees.
3. May 1938 - Roosevelt appoints Myron C. Taylor with rank of Ambassador Intergovernmental as his representatives at the proposed meeting of the Committee
4. - Evian meeting, ~~London~~ July 1938. Taylor was chosen chairman. ~~Mr.~~ Mr. George Rublee, an American international lawyer, is chosen as director of the Committee appointed to negotiate with the countries of exodus and refuge.
5. - Reference to the London meeting, Aug. 3, 1938.
6. Oct. 5, 1938 - reference to Roosevelt's letter to Prime Minister Chamberlain (letter is quoted in full) asking Chamberlain to intervene personally with

the German Government in behalf of the refugees. (This message, hitherto unpublished, is reproduced in full on p.172)

"In reply, the Prime Minister indicated preference for an approach to Germany through the American and British Ambassadors at Berlin. "

(text of Chamberlain's reply is not given.)

7. Oct.18,1938 - Reference to Ambassador Wilson's visit to Weizsaecker.
8. Dec.2,1938 - Reference to second meeting of officers of Intergovernmental Committee in London.
9. Dec.15,1938 - Reference to Schacht's visit to London.
10. - Reference to the "Ruble Plan" , as an outgrowth of a confidential memorandum by Helmuth Wohlthat, Goering's aide, to Rublee. (see below, excerpts from Vol. VIII of this series, pp. 359 ff.)
11. February 14,1939 - Reference to full meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee held in London.

~~MEMORANDUM~~ The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt. With a special Introduction and Explanatory Notes by President Roosevelt.

1939 Volume (Vol. VIII.) War - and Neutrality. N.Y.:Macmillan,1941

"The President Stresses This Government's Interest in the Refugee
roblem." June 8,1939

"My dear Mr. Taylor:

"I wish to set forth certain considerations and suggestions for your guidance in connection with the forthcoming meeting of the Intergovernmental

Committee.

"(1) The refugee problem continues and will undoubtedly continue for a long time. It may at any time be greatly aggravated by a new wave of persecution in Germany.

"(2) This Government's interest in efforts to bring about a solution of the problem is strong.....this Government has naturally preferred to take such action through the Intergovernmental Committee rather than through any other agency.

"(3) At the same time, the imminent establishment of the Refugee Foundation... has created a new situation, requiring a new integration of private and governmental effort.

"(4) The Foundation, which was envisaged in the Rublee plan and is being set up in accordance with that plan, is designed to be in a position to negotiate more effectively with the German authorities concerning financial, and perhaps other questions than could the Committee.

"(5)...

"(6)...

"(7) It must be reluctantly admitted that this Government's efforts to stimulate concrete action by other Governments to meet the problem have ~~not~~^{been} met at best by a lukewarm attitude."

.....

"Subject to general approval, the Intergovernmental Committee should take steps to turn over its functions of negotiating with the Government of countries of settlement and the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. If this is done, this Government is disposed to contribute to the expenses of the High Commissioner for this purpose.

....

"In making this change every effort must be exerted to minimize the risk of unfavorable reaction in Germany....."

pp.359-362

A "Note " (pp.362-364) reviews the work of the Intergovernmental Committee established at Evian.

"Address at the Meeting of the Officers of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees " Washington, Oct.17,1939.

The President pays tribute to the Committee for the work it had done on behalf of refugees (Jewish and others). pp.546-552

Vol. IX -- "War - and Aid to Democracies." (~~1940~~ (1940 volume)

Vol. X -- "The Call to Battle Stations." (1941 volume)

Vol. XI - "Humanity on the Defensive" (1942 volume)

Vol. XII - "The Tide Turns." (1943 volume)

contain no references to Jews and Jewish problems. In Vol. XI, p.410,

The item, "The President Announces the Plan to Try Nazi War Criminals " (Oct. 7,1942), reproduces that announcement :

"...It is our intention that just and sure punishment shall be meted out

to the ringleaders responsible for the organized murder of thousands

of innocent persons...."

With reference to the ^(p.410) "Statement Issued by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister

Churchill, and Premier Stalin Regarding Atrocities" (Nov.1,1943), Mr. Rosenman

states in a "Note" (Vol. XII, p.):

check p.

"This statement was discussed at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers and it was issued at the conclusion of the Conference. It was the strongest statement on War Criminals with which President Roosevelt associated his name."

The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Compiled with Special Materials and Explanatory Notes by Samuel I. Rosenman.

Vol. XIII. - "Victory and the Threshold of Peace." (1944-1945 volume)

"The War Refugee Board is Established."

Executive Order No 9417 - Jan. 22, 1944.

"Whereas it is the policy of this Government to take all measures within its power to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who ~~are~~ are in imminent danger of death and otherwise to afford such victims all possible relief and assistance consistent with the successful prosecution of the war:

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, as President of the United States and as commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to effectuate with ~~an~~ all possible speed the rescue and relief of such victims of enemy oppression, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There is established in the Executive Office of the President a War Refugee Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board).....

2..... The functions of the Board shall include without limitation the development of plans and progress and the inauguration of effective measures for (a) the rescue, transportation, maintenance, and relief of the victims of

enemy oppression, and (b) the establishment of havens of temporary refuge for such victims."

/ The remaining points pertain to the functions to be performed by the State, Treasury and War Departments "within their respective spheres." /
(full text of Executive Order: pp.48-50)

This is followed by a Note from Mr. Rosenman, pp.50-53, which contains also references to the Evian Conference and ~~the~~ the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees.

"The foregoing Executive Order establishing the War Refugee Board was issued to mobilize all possible efforts of Federal Agencies and foreign governments to rescue and aid the victims.....
...Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. laid a good deal of the groundwork for the War Refugee Board...."

p.51

...

"Direct~~ed~~ evacuation was one of the most difficult tasks undertaken by the War Refugee Board. In the execution of this dramatic program, persons who cooperated with the Board maintained close ~~intimate~~ contact with the resistance groups within enemy territory, bribed German officials, provided false identification papers for refugees, and successfully used other undercover means."

p.52

..Under arrangements completed by the War Refugee Board, several refugee camps were opened.... / in North Africa, in Switzerland, in the Middle East./

" ..Through the direct intervention of the President, 1,000 refugees who had escaped to Southern France were brought here during the summer

of 1944, and were housed at an emergency refugee shelter at Fort Ontario, Oswego, New York." p.52

/ Regarding these 1,000 refugees, see cablegram to Ambassador Robert Murphy in Algiers, June 9, ~~1944~~¹⁹⁴⁴, pp.163-165 /

In his long Note on the work of the ^{War} Refugee Board, Mr. ROSENMAN states in conclusion :

"The fate of the Jews and other minority groups is one of the blackest chapters in human history. It should be said, however, that the War Refugee Board, by direct aid, ^onegotiation, and by clandestine means, in some measure softened the blows on the tragic victims of the ~~Nazi/German~~ Nazis." p.53

"The President Asks That Frontiers Be Opened to Victims of Nazi Oppression and Declares That War Criminals Will Be Tried and Punished." ^U Mar.24,1944.

/The president condemned the brutality of the Nazis and described atrocities against the Jews and against others, declaring :/

~~He said~~ "It is therefore fitting that we should again proclaim our determination that none who participated in these acts of savagery shall go unpunished... All who knowingly take part in the deportation of ~~the~~ Jews to their death in Poland.... are equally guilty with the executioner. All who share the guilt shall share the punishment. "

p.103-106

~~Information available to me indicates that there are real possibilities of saving human lives by bringing more refugees through Yugoslavia and southern Italy.~~
"The President Recommends Bringing 1,000 Refugees into the United States."

"Information available to me indicates that there are real possibilities of saving human lives by bringing more refugees through Yugoslavia and southern Italy.

.... I feel that it is important that the United States indicate that it is ready to share the burdens of caring for refugees during the war. Accordingly,

I have decided that approximately 1000 refugees should be immediately brought from Italy to this country, to be placed in an Emergency Refugee Shelter to be established at Fort Ontario near Oswego, New York, where under appropriate security restrictions they will remain for the duration of the war."

p.163-4

"Message to Congress on Refugee Policy." June 12, 1944
(p.168-172)

/In this message, the President advised the Congress of the steps he had taken to admit the 1000 refugees to the U.S.:/

"...Therefore, I wish to report to you today concerning a step which I have taken in an effort to save additional lives and which I am certain will meet with your approval.

...

"Accordingly, arrangements have been made to bring immediately to this country approximately 1,000 refugees who have fled from their homelands to southern Italy. Upon the termination of the war they will be sent back to their homelands."

p.170-171

Offprint from Brecht, Heinrich Mann, Georg Büchner A27262 10/28
M.D.

die Bühne

GEORG BUCHNER Drama und Geschichte	129
GYULA ILLYES Zeichen	130
LUDWIG STRAUSS Brief eines Frontsoldaten	131
BERT BRECHT Jugend im Dritten Reich	138
CARL ZUCKMAYER Des Teufels General	139
STEPHAN HERMLIN Ballade eines Städtebewohners	145
ARNOLD BAUER Tagebuchblätter	149
ALBRECHT SCHAEFFER Das Ruinenlied	151
WALTER KOLBENHOFF Der Werwolf	153
CARL AUGUST WEBER Die Heimkehr	157
HEINRICH MANN Drei Jahrhunderte der Warnung	161
RUDOLF HARTUNG Gedichte	166
MARTIN KESSEL Von der Weisheit	167
ILJA EHRENBURG Anna A. Achmatowa	169
ANNA A. ACHMATOWA Gedichte	171
RICHARD GABEL Vom Jenseits der Musik	173
P. B. SHELLEY Osymandias	177
WERNHER SIEBERT Welt der Vergeblichkeit	178
PAUL SCHAAF Entdeckung des natürlichen Verhaltens	179

DIE FÄHRE bringt demnächst:

André Gide, Erdachtes Interview über die amerikanische Literatur. Rudolf Hartung, Marcel Proust. Emory Holloway, Whitman's Botschaft für heute. Arturo Loria, Die Perücke. Robert Musil, Beginn einer Reihe wunderbarer Erlebnisse. Hedwig Rhode-Schnell, Mohr. Romain Rolland, Die drei Blitze. Thornton Wilder, Und der Knecht hieß Malchus.

DIE FÄHRE Redaktion: München 27, Herzogparkstr. 2, Telefon 480 331. Schriftleiter: Hans Hennecke, München und Herbert Burgmüller, Mülheim (Ruhr), Platanenallee 33.

Mit der Literaturzeitschrift „das silberboot“, herausgegeben von Ernst Schönwiese, Salzburg, besteht eine Arbeitsgemeinschaft.

DIE FÄHRE erscheint monatlich und ist durch den Buchhandel im Abonnement zu beziehen. Das Einzelheft kostet RM 1.80. Falls keine Kündigung erfolgt, läuft das Abonnement weiter.

DIE FÄHRE ist veröffentlicht unter Zulassung Nr.US.E.157 der Nachrichtenkontr. der Militärregierung. Druck: R. Oldenbourg, Graphische Betriebe G.m.b.H., München. Umschlag von T. Barthel.

WILLI WEISMANN VERLAG, MÜNCHEN 27, HERZOGPARKSTR. 2

GEORG BUCHNER

DRAMA UND GESCHICHTE

Der dramatische Dichter ist in meinen Augen nichts als ein Geschichtsschreiber, steht aber über letzterem dadurch, daß er uns die Geschichte zum zweitenmal erschafft und uns gleich unmittelbar, statt eine trockne Erzählung zu geben, in das Leben einer Zeit hinein versetzt, uns statt Charakteristiken Charaktere und statt Beschreibungen Gestalten gibt. Seine höchste Aufgabe ist, der Geschichte, wie sie sich wirklich begeben, so nahe als möglich zu kommen. Sein Buch darf weder sittlicher noch unsittlicher sein als die Geschichte selbst; aber die Geschichte ist vom lieben Herrgott nicht zu einer Lektüre für junge Frauenzimmer geschaffen worden, und da ist es mir auch nicht übel zu nehmen, wenn mein Drama ebensowenig dazu geeignet ist. Ich kann doch aus einem Danton und den Banditen der Revolution nicht Tugendhelden machen! Wenn ich ihre Liederlichkeit schildern wollte, so mußte ich sie eben liederlich sein, wenn ich ihre Gottlosigkeit zeigen wollte, so mußte ich sie eben wie Atheisten sprechen lassen. Wenn einige unanständige Ausdrücke vorkommen, so denke man an die weltbekannte, obszöne Sprache der damaligen Zeit, wovon das, was ich meine Leute sagen lasse, nur ein schwacher Abriß ist. Man könnte mir nun noch vorwerfen, daß ich einen solchen Stoff gewählt hätte. Aber der Einwurf ist längst widerlegt. Wollte man ihn gelten lassen, so müßten die größten Meisterwerke der Poesie verworfen werden. Der Dichter ist kein Lehrer der Moral, er erfindet und schafft Gestalten, er macht vergangene Zeiten wieder aufleben, und die Leute mögen dann daraus lernen, so gut wie aus dem Studium der Geschichte und der Beobachtung dessen, was im menschlichen Leben um sie herum vorgeht. Wenn man so wollte, dürfte man keine Geschichte studieren, weil sehr viel unmoralische Dinge darin erzählt werden, müßte mit verbundenen Augen über die Gasse gehen, weil man sonst Unanständigkeiten sehen könnte, und müßte über einen Gott Zeter schreien, der eine Welt erschaffen, worauf so viele Liederlichkeiten vorfallen. Wenn man mir übrigens noch sagen wollte, der Dichter müsse die Welt nicht zeigen, wie sie ist, sondern wie sie sein solle, so antworte ich, daß ich es nicht besser machen will als der liebe Gott, der die Welt gewiß gemacht hat, wie sie sein soll.

GYULA ILLYES

ZEICHEN

Frostige Äste klopfen an mein Fenster, weisen auf die Landschaft:
Sieh das stille Tal, Heimat deiner Ahnen.
Müde Pappeln halten Wache dort am Bergeskamm.
Vom verborgenen Herd in dünne Winterluft steigt Rauch —,
Sich verflüchtigend: Der Armut stummes Opfer.

Auf verborgnem Herd mit geducktem Feuer brannte hier mein Leben,
Knisternd, flackernd und sich selbst verzehrend.
Aber jetzt, da diese Flamme schmerzhaft mein Herz erreicht,
Steige Rauch über das vergessene Tal,
In die klirrende Kälte, in klingende Regionen,
Und flattere wie das Notsignal der Schiffbrüchigen:
Menschen wohnen hier!
Schiffer ohne Schiff, Vergessene atlantischer Zeiten die,
Den alten Pfad vergessend, nun die Heimat und sich selbst vergessen
haben.

Aus geraubtem Boden nährt sich hier mein Busch.
Im Hof hinter dem gräflichen Park an einem Sonntagsmorgen
Aus geraubtem Boden sproß auch meine Seele,
Gebeugt, gehärtet, jedoch nie gebrochen,
Bitteres Lächeln — Du weißt es Anna — meine Blüte.

Aus geraubtem Boden hochgeschossen, müde Knechte lehrten mich
das Gehn
Sie lehrten mich das Wort, das schwer erweckt, sein Echo sucht.
Der Blick, der immer in die Ferne schweift
In gleichgültigeren Ochsenaugen Todesrätsel sucht
Und über Wälder starrt,
Ist ihre Erbschaft.

Viel bin ich in der Welt herumgekommen, wohl fühle ich mich nur
bei euch,
Die ihr still seid, so wie ich, die Herren still verachtend,
Das Licht, das hie und da in mir erglänzt, ist nicht für sie,
Einfachen Herzen wollte ich von hier ein Zeichen geben.

Deutsch von Tibor Podmaniczky

Nähe einschlug. Aber etwas war mir verlorengegangen, was jeder neue Ankömmling ins Feld mitbringt: das Gefühl der persönlichen Kugelsicherheit. Seit jenem Tag weiß ich wirklich, was ich vorher nur zu wissen behauptete: daß ich sterben werde und jede Stunde sterben kann, wahrscheinlich nicht den Heldentod, sondern irgendeinen beschmutzten und entfärbten, feldgrauen Tod. Seither weiß ich das. Weißt du es noch von dir?

Ich könnte, um dich zu beunruhigen, furchtbare Bilder beschwören, gewiß furchtbarere als die eines durchschnittlichen Tages im Stellungskriege und eines Bombardements aus Feldgeschützen. Ich könnte dir das Schlachtfeld nach dem Gasangriff schildern, mit den in den Boden verbissenen und verkrallten Leibern, die der unerträgliche Schmerz verkrümmt hat, das Feuerwerk des Nachtgefechts mit der von roten Raketen beleuchteten schwarzen Erdfontäne gegenüber, aus der zwei eben noch zusammenhängende Beine in Stiefeln und Hosen oben heraustanzten, ohne Leib durch das farbige Licht hintanzten ins Nichts. Das Trommelfeuer, den Nahkampf, das Zerspritzen des von unterirdischen Minen gesprengten Bodens und alles Lebendigen, das er trägt. Aber was sollten diese Bilder fruchten, wenn ich sie einem ausmalen wollte, den der gewöhnliche Tag, dieser, den ich schilderte, und das Entsetzen seiner Gewöhnlichkeit nicht erschüttern konnte? Ihr Vernichtungsprunk würde dich nur betäuben, statt dich wach zu machen und offen für das schmucklose Grauen, das ich dir ins Herz treiben will. Jenes Lehmlicht, das nun als einziger Inhalt erscheint, wenn ich dir mein Inneres auftue, das sollst du schmecken und schlucken, bis es dich so erfüllt wie mich. Nichts sonst.

Warum denn schreibe ich dir? Nur, weil ich nicht will, daß du dir mein Leben, wenn es denn Leben heißen darf, als deine Vergangenheit anmaßest! Nur, weil du wissen sollst, daß mein verzweifelter Fluch dem Menschen gilt, der gesagt hat, daß die Erinnerung vergangener Leiden süß sei! Kein Fremder kann mich so schändlich verraten, wie du mich verraten würdest, wenn mein Leiden dir süß würde, und nicht nur mich würdest du verraten! Aber deshalb, nur deshalb schreibe ich dir, um dir abzusagen, um dir zu melden, daß diesen Ausgesetzten hier keiner heimholen kann, auch sein eigenes künftiges Ich nicht.

Oder drängt mich doch noch anderes, dir zu schreiben? Wagt doch noch etwas in mir den Wunsch, daß du dich wirklich erinnern mögest? Daß einmal einer, ein erster von vielen, an die solche Briefe wie dieser ergehen könnten oder in Gedanken ergehen, sein vergangenes Leiden nicht verriete, sondern seinen Blick aushielte und bei ihm wachte? Habe ich dir doch, du Entrückter, nicht aus Haß geschrieben, sondern aus Hoffnung?

BERT BRECHT

DIE JUGEND UND DAS DRITTE REICH

1

Das Regime behauptet, die Jugend
Sei schon gewonnen für das Dritte Reich.
Das bedeutet, in zehn, zwanzig Jahren
Werde das ganze Volk nur noch
Aus Anhängern des Regimes bestehen.
Welch ein kindlicher Rechenfehler!

2

Die ihr Brot noch nicht verdienen müssen
Sondern es auf den Tisch gelegt bekommen, sagen:
Es ist leicht, Brot zu bekommen. Soll das bedeuten, wenn sie
In zehn Jahren ihr Brot verdienen und es ihren Kindern
Auf den Tisch legen müssen, werden sie
Immer noch sagen: es ist leicht?

3

Denen das Mark noch nicht augesogen ist, die
Loben das Regime, das soll bedeuten, wenn ihnen
Einmal das Mark ausgesogen sein wird, werden sie
Immer noch das Regime loben?

4

Die noch keine Kugel haben sausen hören, sagen:
Es ist schön, zu schießen. Das soll bedeuten, wenn sie
Einmal die Kugeln sausen hören, werden sie
Immer noch sagen: Krieg
Ist schön.

5

Ja, wenn die Kinder Kinder blieben, dann
Könnte man ihnen immer Märchen erzählen,
Da sie aber älter werden
Kann man es nicht.

6

Wenn das Regime händereibend von der Jugend spricht
Gleicht es einem Mann, der,
Die beschneite Halde betrachtend, sich die Hände reibt und sagt:
Wie werde ich es im Sommer kühl haben mit
Soviel Schnee!

HEINRICH MANN

DREI JAHRHUNDERTE DER WARNUNG — UND DER HOFFNUNG

Es gab Tage in Deutschland, an denen der Himmel vom zar-
testen Rosa über Lachsgelb bis zum flüssigen Gold in allen Farben
spielte. Der Glanz breitete sich immer weiter aus, machte aber
dann, allmählich schwächer und schwächer werdend, einem bloßen
Leuchten Platz. Vielleicht geschah das alles im Laufe einer einzigen
halben Stunde.

Dieser Vorgang am Himmel hat sein Gegenspiel unter den
Menschen. Viel seltener freilich als die Sonne auf- und untergeht,
werden die Menschen dazu entflammt, ein neues Leben zu beginnen.
Dann aber halten sie es noch einmal der Mühe wert, zu glauben
und für Frieden und Gerechtigkeit — die ewigen Sehnsuchtsziele
ihres Geistes — zu kämpfen. Nirgends und niemals wurde in den
vergangenen Jahrtausenden dieses Verlangen wirklich gestillt. Mag
sein, daß Deutschlands Anstrengungen geringer waren als die der
zeitgenössischen Nationen, die aber auch nicht zahlreich waren und
von denen sich viele als Versager erwiesen.

Da wir um Deutschlands traurige Lage und um die Wiederkehr
eines unvergleichlichen Zusammenbruches nach einer kaum ermeß-
baren Schuld wissen, ist es zugleich bewundernswert und rührend,
daß Stimmen wie die, die in dieser Anthologie gesammelt wurden,
noch erhoben werden konnten. Welches Buch hat jemals so viel
wohlbegründete Beweise — 300 Jahre alte neben solchen jüngsten
Datums — dafür geboten, daß trotz derartig zahlreicher Fehlschläge
noch immer Hoffnung für Deutschland besteht? Die Bitterkeit des
Wortes kann das Vertrauen nicht zerstören, und Zorn ist neuer
Ansporn für den Mut. In dieser Anthologie sprechen, gefolgt von
den jüngeren Schülern, den großen Alten, die der Sprache das Leben
verliehen, das selbst das Vergehen der Nation überdauert.

Aber ein Land mit einer lebenskräftigen und Widerhall finden-
den Literatur stirbt nicht. Selbst wenn seine Literatur abgeschafft
oder sogar vergessen würde, so müßte sie dennoch ein heimliches
Leben führen. Die Literatur ist Beweis für das tiefe und wahre
Wollen seines Landes: Deutschlands Literatur erstrebte immer
Gerechtigkeit und Frieden. Sie verdient deswegen kein besonderes
Lob. Jedes Volk, auch das der Deutschen, gehorcht seiner ursprüng-
lichen Natur, seinem Bedürfnis, das Leben zu erhalten und zu ver-
bessern. Jede große Literatur aber verteidigt die Rechte der Völker,
die leben wollen, und damit die Rechte der Menschheit; den Blick
auf den Tag gerichtet, an dem alle ein würdiges Leben führen
können oder vernichtet sind.

Aus eigenem Antrieb, um seines wirtschaftlichen Wohlergehens willen, hat kein Volk jemals den Krieg gewollt. Deshalb wurde ihm unweigerlich eingeredet, daß es das Opfer eines Angriffes sei. Die Völker sind sich zumindest im Unterbewußtsein darüber im klaren, daß sie durch einen Krieg nur verlieren können. Die wenigen Individuen, die einen Krieg auf Kosten des Volkes, natürlich eines siegreichen, gewinnen wollen, haben mit immer größeren Schwierigkeiten zu kämpfen, um ihre Anhänger hinters Licht zu führen. Im Falle Deutschlands hatten sie noch einmal Erfolg. Sie benötigten dazu allerdings einen beträchtlichen Aufwand an falschen, selbstmörderischen Lehren und an betrügerischen, verderblichen Versprechungen. Erfüllung fand schließlich nur das Versprechen auf „rollende Köpfe“ — solange, bis alles ins Rollen kam.

Im Gegensatz dazu stand die gesamte Literatur der Deutschen. Sie hätte warnen sollen und würde dies auch getan haben; für eine verhängnisvolle Spanne Zeit jedoch wurde sie aus dem menschlichen Bewußtsein verdrängt. Die Erkenntnis der allgemein menschlichen Werte, der wahren Bedeutung der großen Literatur wurde in Deutschland durch den blinden Wahn der Macht ersetzt. Was aber nützt die Macht, wenn durch sie die menschliche Gesellschaft mit Füßen getreten wird? Und schließlich wird — wie uns die jüngste Vergangenheit bewies — zum Bösen verwendete Macht zur Impotenz. Was seine große Literatur so lange Zeit getan hatte, das hatte Deutschland versäumt: die Erforschung seines Gewissens.

Es erscheint viel natürlicher und grundsätzlich einfacher, das menschliche Leben auf der Wahrheit aufzubauen, als es durch das Mittel ausgeklügelter Unwahrheiten unerträglich zu gestalten. Da der menschliche Geist aber die Wahrheit oft nicht aufzunehmen bereit ist, wird das Leben durch diese Erkenntnis aber keineswegs leichter gemacht. Wie ist es nun möglich, daß die bedeutenden Werke der Literatur grundsätzliche Gedanken und Geister, die nach denselben Prinzipien handeln, offenbaren? Ein Kritiker — es war Leibniz — bemerkte dazu: „In der Tat, alles was ich gelesen habe, ist richtig“ — denn die grundsätzlichen Absichten waren überall die gleichen. Wohin er immer schaute, überall ging es um die menschliche Würde, um ihre Aufrechterhaltung und um ihre Förderung mit Hilfe des Wissens. Die Ziele dieser Bestrebungen waren seit jeher Gerechtigkeit und Frieden.

Die bedeutenden Werke der Literatur müssen unmißverständlich sein; sie sind einfach, sie stimmen in der Erfassung menschlichen Wertes immer überein. Nehmt alle schönen Dinge, die jemals geschrieben wurden, ohne an die durch persönliche Ausdrucks-gestaltung geprägten Unterschiede zu denken. Dann gleicht Goethe Marx, Hölderlin Fichte und Nietzsche ungefähr Nestroy. Achtung vor allem Menschlichen ist die Vorbedingung, die von

jedem, der die Feder zum Schreiben eintauchen will, verlangt wird. Denn wie könnte er den Mut fassen, vorwärtszuschreiten, sich eine Sonderstellung anzumaßen, wenn es ihm nicht tief ernst um die grundsätzlichen Werte wäre? Er wird deshalb nie von ihnen abweichen, sondern durch sein Werk ihre latente Kraft hervorheben und allen zum Bewußtsein bringen.

Diejenigen, die an den Menschen etwas auszusetzen haben, verlangen viel mehr von ihnen, als die Nachsichtigen. Die Meister der Schwarzmalerei sind zugleich die Schöpfer der blendenden Helle; und es mußte ein Deutscher ohne Illusionen sein, der als erster die Möglichkeit des ewigen Friedens bewies. Manchmal ist es schwierig, sich Kant als Deutschen vorzustellen, oder die Deutschen als seine Gefährten. Sich nationale Verantwortung für eine derartige Höhe vergeistigter Menschlichkeit anzumaßen und dann zu handeln, als sei sie null und nichtig, ja die Menschlichkeit bis zur Selbstvernichtung zu bekämpfen — warum wurde das Land der Deutschen für dieses Schicksal ausersehen?

Sein unteilbarer Charakter konnte es ursprünglich nicht dazu bestimmt haben. Auch seine große Literatur, die ein unmenschliches Deutschland widerlegt und völlig verwirft, steht in Gegensatz zu diesem Handeln. Sie tritt unermüdlich für ein Deutschland voll guter Absichten ein, das den innigen Wunsch hat, mit der Welt in Freundschaft zu leben. Aber diese Literatur kann vergessen oder kann gefälscht werden.

Die Deutschen sind ein Volk, das als Nation wenig Glück hatte, und das erst verhältnismäßig spät zu einer nationalen Einheit wurde. Seine politischen Unternehmungen waren zu Übertreibungen und Prahlerei neigende Stümperwerke. Alles trug den Stempel der Rache — und das erklärt sehr vieles. Schneller Erfolg begünstigt mehr noch als gar keiner das Anwachsen der Unzufriedenheit. Mißtrauen quälte das jüngst unter die Weltmächte aufgenommene Land. Es hätte sich wohler gefühlt, wenn es keine Macht gewesen wäre.

Aber da es einmal so war, mußte es zur einzigen Macht werden. Das allein, so wurde fälschlich angenommen, würde Neid und Furcht beseitigen. So begann sich ein seltsames quid pro quo zu entwickeln. Dem durchaus nicht als naiv zu wertenden Eigendünkel einer Nation mittlerer Größe, die im Grunde genommen genau über sich Bescheid wußte, sollte der Stempel der Echtheit verliehen werden, vorausgesetzt, daß es ihr schnell gelingen würde, die Welt zu unterjochen. Und das war falsch, völlig falsch! Die Überlegenheit der Nation würde sich auf diese Weise ebensowenig beweisen lassen, wie ihre Eignung zur Beherrscherin der Welt. Die leidenschaftslosen und daher auf lange Sicht erfolgreichen Sieger waren nach Ursprung und Art Europa fremd, es sei denn, daß sie ihm sehr weit voraus waren.

RUDOLF HARTUNG

TÖDLICHER HERBST

Das Grün der Gärten... Sonnenblumen. Schatten
von Stimmen, rund. O gekelertes Schweigen:
Herbst. Frucht und Abschied. Aus dem blauen satten
Himmel tropft Dein Tod, Herz, tropft Dein Tod; steigen

die Lerchen nicht mehr. Nun ist es Zeit, Du,
nun, späte Rose. Weinen um Dich wäre
der Gnade zuviel; denn dem Tödlichen zu
singt es empor jetzt, strahlend. Dunkle Beere

am Strauch ruht. Weiße Schwinge der Taube
steht in der Luft zeitlos dröhnendem Erz.
Süßes Dasein und was je verrann: Traube,
volle, Du birgst es. Tod, berge mein Herz!

DIE WEISSE STADT

Fremde Straßen liegen unterm Wind
weißer Himmel. Gruß und Fülle: Turm;
grüner Berg aus Kühle... Wo wir sind,
ist Dasein: Hingehaltensein im Sturm

Fremden Weinens an die nie erreichte
Drohung, die das Schweigen maßlos macht;
Tand und Wirrsal und die kleine leichte
Hand; blaue Woge, stürzend, der Nacht.

Wo wir sind... Wir werden niemals bleiben. —
Tücher wehen, Augen blicken matt.
Ging nicht gestern, teilend sanft dies Treiben,
ging nicht Gott durch diese weiße Stadt?

DR. ERNST HAUSWEDELL & CO.

BUCH- UND KUNSTHANDLUNG
ANTIQUARIAT

AN- UND VERKAUF
VON WERTVOLLEN BÜCHERN,
GRAPHIK UND HANDZEICHNUNGEN
KUNSTAUSSTELLUNGEN
KUNSTAUKTIONEN

HAMBURG 36 · ESPLANADE 43 · 1. STOCK

VERLAG HERMANN BINN

Die hauptsächlichlichen Verlagsgebiete sind:

ALLGEMEINE GESCHICHTE
INSBESONDERE BIOGRAPHIEN

★

GEISTESWISSENSCHAFT

★

ARCHITEKTUR UND HANDWERK

MÜNCHEN 34 · SCHALTERFACH

DIE FÄHRE

BRINGT IN DEN NÄCHSTEN HEFTEN U. A.

JULIUS BAB
Zuckmayers „Des Teufels
General“

RUDOLF BORCHARDT
Epilegomena zu Homer

FELIX BRAUN
Pflanzengleichnisse

HERMANN BROCH
Demeter oder die Verzauberung

MAX BROD
Rosen — Mittelmeerlandschaft

HEINRICH CARLE
Die Erweckung des Herrn
Denfeld

LOUIS EMIE
Tanz des Morgens

HERMANN GRAB
Die Advokatenkanzlei

GENO HARTLAUB
Die Schwestern

FRIEDHELM KEMP
Comte de Lantréamont

WERNER KRAFT
Über allen Gipfeln

KARL KRAUS
Briefe an Baron Berger

ELSE LASKER-SCHÜLER
Jerusalem

COMTE DE LAUTREAMONT
Der Kampf mit dem Engel

BORIS LAWRENJOW
Die Welt in einem Stückchen
Glas

KURT LEONHARD
Das Problem der Form und
das orphische Dasein

JOACHIM MAASS
Wie ich Abschied nahm

JOSEF MÜHLBERGER
Das Knechtlein

ROBERT MUSIL
Moosbrugger

HEINRICH RINGLEB
Der Spiegel — In der Nacht

ROMAIN ROLLAND
Die drei Blitze

JULES SUPERVIELLE
Das Mädchen mit der
Gelgenstimme

FRITZ USINGER
Rudolf Pannwitz

THOMAS WOLFE
Anatomie der Einsamkeit

WILLI WEISMANN VERLAG MÜNCHEN

AR 7262 10/29

JOHN H. E. FRIED : Photo ALBUM "AUSKLAERUNGSGABTEILUNG 8"; MIT HISTORY W/PERSONAL+ PERSONNEL DATA ; 1938-1941

Aufstehen!

Aus welchem Regiment
sind Sie?

Beeilen Sie sich!

Begleiten Sie mich!

Hände Hoch!

Hände hoch,
oder ich schieße!

Haben Sie bei sich
Meldung

Halt!

Hinlegen!

Gehen Sie voran!

Kehrt!

Sie bleiben hier!

Vorwärts marsch!

Waffen ablegen!

Wo sind Patrouillen?

Wo sind Waffen?

Habt ihr Waffen
oder Munition?

Sind hier deutsche
Truppen?

Kaffee / Kawa / Kawa

Schreibweise.

Powstań

Z którego pułku
jesteście?

Pośpieszcie się!

Idźcie zębą!

Ręce do góry!

Ręce do góry,
bo strzelam!

Macie przy sobie
meldunki?

Stój!

Padnij!

Idźcie naprzód

Wtył zwrót!

Zostaniecie tu!

Naprzód marsz!

Odlóż broń

Gdzie są patrole?

Gdzie są broń?

Macie broń jub
'a municję?

Czy tu niemieckie
wòjsko?

Tee / Herbata / Herbata

Aussprache.

Pofstein!

Skutreogo pľuhku
jästäschtschä

Pospiäschtschä schiän!

Idschtschä sämnon!

Räncä do gury!

Ränzä do gure bo
stschälam!

Matschä pschüsobiä
meldunki?

Stoj!

Padnij!

Idschtschä naprzod!

Fteu swrut!

Sostaniätscha tu!

Napschod marsch!

Odwoch breun!

Gdschä schan patrolä?

Gdschä jest breun?

Matschä breun lub
amunizien?

Tsche sson tu niämiazkiä
weusko?

Zigaretten / Papiarosy / Papieresse

Ist der Weg gut?
Was für ein Dorf ist das?
Wieviel km sind nach . . .
Wo wohnt der Gemeindevorsteher?
Wohin führt dieser Weg?
Bitte Herr(Frau)(Fräulein)
Brot
Eier
Fleisch
Wasser
Ja
Nein
Quartier
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Ausprache.

Czy ta droga jest dobra
Co to za wioska?
Ile kilometrów do . . .
Gdzie mieszka
szóltys?
Dokąd prowadzi ta droga?
proszą Pana (Pani)
chleb
jaja
mięso
woda
tak
nie
kwater
jedna
dwaj
trzej
cztery
piłi
sześci
siedm
ośim
dziewięi
pzieści

Schreibweise.

Tsche ta droga jässt dobre?
Zo to sa wioska?
Ilä kilomätrow do . . .
Gdschä miäschka
scholtüss?
Dokontprowadschita droga
proschem Pana (Pani)
chläb
jaja
miensso
woda
tak
niä
kwatär
jeden
dwa
tschi
stcherü
pientsch
scheßtsch
siedem
oschem
dziewientsch
dzieschientsch

Wenn Sie die
„Photo-Illustrierte“
aufschlagen:

Bilder über Bilder, von lebenden
und ruhenden Dingen, Ausblicke
in die Weite und liebevolles Ver-
senken in das Kleinste, ein
Schwelgen in Harmonien, Linien,
Formen und Tönen! - „So
möchte ich auch photographieren!“
- Sehen Sie: Dazu will die
„Photo-Illustrierte“ gerade an-
regen - sie zeigt Ihnen in allen
Einzelheiten: „So wurde es ge-
macht!“

Die Arbeiten werden nur gegen
Vorzeigung der Einlieferungs-Nr.
ausgeliefert. Für Glasschaden und
für Arbeiten die innerhalb 30 Tagen
nach Ablieferungstermin nicht ab-
geholt sind, wird keinerlei Garantie
übernommen. **Fertig:**



No. 51417

No.

Aus jeder Zeile

und aus jedem Bild spricht eine
Unzahl brauchbarer Angaben
zu Ihnen: so vielseitig und
fesselnd sind die Agfa-„Photo-
blätter“ geschrieben! Sie zeigen
mannigfache Wege zu gutem
Photographieren - und der Fort-
geschrittene weiß kaum, was er
zuerst auswerten soll: solche Fülle
lehrreicher Anregungen zu neuen
Motiven und erprobten Einstel-
lungen findet er vor! Hefte, die
man immer wieder studiert!






Aufklärungsabteilung 8

Wehrdienst Ehrendienst

Erinnerungen
an meine Dienstzeit



Wilhelm Limpert-Verlag, Berlin

Geleitwort

Das deutsche Volk hat den Wehrdienst stets als eine selbstverständliche Pflicht empfunden; auch wenn es schwach war, sah es im Soldatentum die natürliche Ausdrucksform männlicher Tugend.

So ist der

„Wehrdienst der Ehrendienst“

den jeder deutsche Mann für Volk und Vaterland, für unseren Führer und nationalsozialistischen Staat mit voller Hingabe versieht. Die Erinnerung an die Soldatenzeit gehört zum Schönsten, was wir Deutsche haben. Aus ihr geben wir Pflichterfüllung, Gehorsam, Aufopferung und Hingabe an die weiter, die nach uns kommen.

Heil unserem Führer!

Kernan Jönny
Generalfeldwebel

Wehrdienst — Ehrendienst

Geschichte der Deutschen Wehrmacht

Von Generalleutnant von Cochenhausen

Präsident der deutschen Gesellschaft für Wehrpolitik und Wehrwissenschaften

I.

Die ersten Anfänge stehender Heere gehen in Deutschland auf die Zeit nach dem Dreißigjährigen Kriege zurück. Damals war es der „Große Kurfürst“ Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg, der mit diesen Truppen die in sein Land eingefallenen Schweden in der Schlacht bei Fehrbellin 1675 entscheidend schlug. Er sorgte für gleichmäßige Ausbildung, Bewaffnung und Ausrüstung. Neben ihm schufen die Kurfürsten Max Emanuel II. von Bayern und Johann Georg III. von Sachsen ständige Truppeneinheiten, die an den von 1683 bis 1699 währenden Kriegen gegen die Türken ebenso wie die Brandenburger ruhmreichen Anteil nahmen. Er war aber auch der Mann, der als erster deutscher Fürst den Wert einer Flotte klar und weitsichtig erkannte und der den Mut und die Tatkraft hatte, zum ersten Male nach jahrhundertlangem Erliegen deutscher Seegeltung die Flagge seines Staates, damit aber auch die deutsche Flagge, wieder auf See zu zeigen. Der uralte Wikingergeist, der in unseren Altvordern gelebt hatte, der die deutsche Gansa besetzte und seebeherrschend machte, er vererbte sich auch auf die Männer, die unter dem Roten und danach unter dem Schwarzen Adler der Kurfürsten von Brandenburg und Könige von Preußen führen. Sein Enkel, König Friedrich Wilhelm I.



Friedrich der Große



Friedrich Wilhelm, der Große Kurfürst

von Preußen, wandte sein ganzes Interesse dem weiteren Aufbau des Heeres zu. Er vermehrte es und gab ihm ein Offizierkorps von einzigartiger Gestalt. Als oberster Offizier des Heeres trug er stets Uniform und war leuchtendes Vorbild in allen militärischen Tugenden. In der Truppe herrschte unter ihm schärfste Manneszucht. An die Stelle der früheren tiefgegliederten Gewalthaufen führte er den Kampf in langen, fest geschlossenen dreigliedrigen Linien ein, die unter Salvenfeuer den Feind angriffen. Er hinterließ seinem Sohn Friedrich dem Großen ein wohlgeübtes Heer von 80 000 Mann. Dieser erhob Preußen zur Großmacht. In drei Kriegen gegen Österreich gewann er Schlesien. Er hatte in diesem Kampfe halb Europa gegen sich, aber er unterlag nicht der ungeheuren Übermacht, weil er mit rücksichtsloser Tatkraft und bewundernswerter Hartnäckigkeit immer wieder einen Feind nach dem anderen aus dem Felde schlug. Mollwitz, Zohendorf, Kossbach, Leuthen, Zorndorf sind die Namen jener ruhmreichen Siege, die er erfocht. Das Heer selbst erfuhr unter seiner Regierung eine weitere Vermehrung. Besonders war es die Kavallerie, deren Reitergeist und Schneid unter den Generalen Zieten und Seydlitz ständig wuchs. Aber auch die Artillerie wurde in ihrer Beweglichkeit und Feuerkraft wesentlich vervollkommenet. — Friedrich der Große mußte seine Hauptkraft im Kampf zu Land mit den vielen Widersachern seines Staates erschöpfen, aber trotz allem versuchte er, seinem Volk wieder den Weg zur See frei zu machen, weil er den Wert von Seehandel und Seegeltung klar erkannt hatte. Den von ihm in den fünfziger Jahren des 18. Jahrhunderts gegründeten Handelsgesellschaften, der „asiatischen“ und der „bengalischen“ Kompagnie, war zwar größerer Erfolg versagt, aber als 1758 die Schweden Stettin bedrohten, stellte der König eine Flottille von bewaffneten Handelsschiffen auf, die auch am 30. September 1759 die Ehre des Schwarzen preussischen Adlers im weißen Feld tapfer zu wahren wußte. Die notwendige Anspannung aller Kräfte des Staates zum Wiederaufbau des durch die Kriege arg mitgenommenen preussischen Staates ließ dem König leider keine Zeit und Mittel, seine Seefahrtspläne weiterzuverfolgen.

Unter den Nachfolgern des „Großen Königs“ ging auch der Wert des Heeres zusehends zurück. Man ahnte die alten Gefechtsformen nach und über sah, daß in Frankreich nach der



Sturm preussischer Grenadiere bei Großgörschen 1813

Revolution von 1789 eine neue Fechtweise entstanden war: das Schützengesecht in lockeren Linien, denen tiefe, geschlossene Kolonnen folgten.

Man über sah, daß der „Soldatenkaiser“ Napoleon I., der dort die Macht an sich riß, seine Siege über Österreicher und Russen vor allem seiner Energie und der Fähigkeit verdankte, seine Truppen für sich zu begeistern. So nahm das Verhängnis seinen Lauf. Unter dem Kommando überalterter, willensschwacher Führer wurde das preussische Heer in der Doppelschlacht bei Jena und Auerstädt 1806 geschlagen und durch eine scharfe Verfolgung völlig aufgerieben. Da die preussische Regierung fast jede Fühlung mit dem Volke verloren hatte, nahm

dieses den Zusammenbruch des Staates gleichgültig hin. Fast alle Festungen wurden dem Feinde widerstandslos übergeben. Allein der Oberst von Gneisenau hielt durch die tapfere Verteidigung von Colberg die Ehre der preussischen Waffen hoch. 1807 mußte Preußen den schimpflichen Frieden von Tilsit schließen und alle seine Länder westlich der Elbe abtreten. Es durfte nur ein Heer von 42 000 Mann unterhalten. Seine Festungen blieben von französischen Truppen besetzt. Eine Rettung aus dieser Not und Schande war nur möglich, wenn ein an-



Photo Schertl, Berlin

Scharnhorst

fen, die nun in Scharnhorst ihren zielbewußten Führer fand. Die Offizierslaufbahn, die bisher nur dem Adel offenstand, wurde jetzt auch den Nichtadligen eröffnet. Geistige Bildung und ehrenhaftes Verhalten wurden jetzt die Ideale, die das Offizierkorps erfüllten. Dadurch wurde der Offizier zum Vorbild und zum Erzieher seiner Mannschaft. Diese wiederum stellte Scharnhorst durch Beseitigung der entehrenden körperlichen Strafen auf eine höhere sittliche Stufe. Auch der einfache Soldat empfand es jetzt als Ehre, dem Vaterland zu dienen. Um mit Hilfe des Kleinen, von Napoleon zugelassenen Heeres möglichst viele Mannschaften auszubilden, führte Scharnhorst das „Krümpersystem“ ein, d. h. es wurden unter Beurlaubung länger dienender Soldaten junge Rekruten in ständigem Wechsel zu kurzer Ausbildung eingezogen. Als nun im Winter 1812/13 die „Große Armee“ des Kaisers Napoleon auf den Schneefeldern Rußlands größtenteils zugrunde gegangen war, schlug für Deutschland der Tag der Befreiung. In Preußen wurden alle wehrfähigen Landeseinwohner zum Kriegsdienst verpflichtet und aufgeboten. Neben den Linientruppen wurde die Landwehr aufgestellt.

So konnte Preußens Volksheer verjüngt und in neuer Gestalt, von Vaterlandsliebe und Opferfreudigkeit befeelt, unter tatkräftigen Führern in den Befreiungskampf ziehen. Unter Führung

derer Geist sich des preussischen Volkes bemächtigte. Dem Minister Freiherr vom Stein gelang es, durch die Lösung der Bauern aus der Leibeigenschaft und durch die Städteordnung das Verantwortungsbewußtsein des einzelnen gegenüber dem Vaterlande zu wecken. Der Bürger dieses neuen Staates empfand, daß er damit nicht nur die gleichen Rechte erhielt, sondern daß ihm daraus die neue Pflicht erwuchs, das Vaterland von der Fremdherrschaft zu befreien. So war die Grundlage für die Reorganisation des preussischen Heeres geschaffen.

Blüchers, dem Gneisenau als Generalstabschef zur Seite stand, erfochten die preussischen Truppen nach anfänglichen Mißerfolgen die Siege an der Katzbach und bei Dennewitz. Gemeinsam mit den verbündeten Österreichern, Russen und Schweden drängten sie alsdann das Heer Napoleons vor Leipzig zusammen und schlugen es in dreitägiger Schlacht entscheidend aufs Haupt. 1814 wurde der Rhein überschritten, und dank Blüchers Energie der sich verzweifelt wehrende Kaiser bis nach Paris zurückgedrängt. Er dankte ab und mußte sich auf die Insel Elba begeben. Aber schon im folgenden Jahre landete er wieder in Frankreich und beseitigte die inzwischen eingerichtete neue Regierung. Sofort waren aber seine Gegner wieder auf dem Plan. Bei Belle-Alliance schlugen die verbündeten Preußen und Engländer den Kaiser endgültig aufs Haupt. Damit war die Freiheit der europäischen Völker wiedergewonnen. Durch das Wehrgesetz des Kriegsministers von Boyen war bereits im Jahre 1814 die allgemeine Wehrpflicht in Preußen eingeführt worden. Es stand mit dieser Maßnahme allein da in Europa, denn in allen anderen Ländern, selbst in Frankreich, kehrte man zum länger dienenden Berufsheer zurück. Während dort das Heer sich mehr und mehr vom Volk entfremdete, blieb es in Preußen durch das



Prinz Adalbert von Preußen

alljährliche Kommen und Gehen der Rekrutenjahrgänge mit ihm in enger Verbindung. Aus Sparsamkeitsgründen freilich setzte man die Stärke des stehenden Heeres im Lauf der Zeit mehr und mehr herab und ließ den größten Teil der Wehrpflichtigen durch die oberflächliche, nur wenige Wochen dauernde Ausbildung der Landwehr gehen. Das rächte sich 1850, als der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland zwischen Preußen und Österreich unmittelbar bevorstand. Preußen fühlte sich nicht stark genug und mußte den entwürdigenden Vertrag von Olmütz abschließen.

Da war es König Wilhelm I., der, zur Regierung gekommen, gewillt war, Preußen wieder eine starke, neuzeitliche Wehrverfassung zu geben. Gegen den Willen der Volksvertretung führte er, mit Unterstützung seines Ministerpräsidenten Bismarck und seines Kriegsministers Roon, die Allgemeine Wehrpflicht im Geiste Scharnhorsts wieder ein. Jeder Wehrfähige mußte drei Jahre im stehenden Heere dienen. In dieser Zeit erstanden auch wieder die Anfänge einer preussischen Kriegsmarine. Prinz Adalbert von Preußen wurde um die Mitte des vorigen Jahrhunderts zum Träger und Förderer preussischer und damit deutscher Seeinteressen. Wohl versuchte auch damals das Reich, seinerseits eine Marine zu gründen, aber die Ansätze blieben in ihrem Anfang stecken. 1848 wurde die deutsche Bundesflotte mit gänzlich unzulänglichen Mitteln geschaffen, vier Jahre später schon fand sie ein ruhmloses Ende durch die öffentliche Versteigerung. Und trotzdem hatte auch sie, die in ihrer inneren Zusammensetzung eigentlich einen richtigen nationalen Kern vermissen ließ — ein Großteil der Offiziere waren Ausländer —, sich wacker geschlagen, wo sich Gelegenheit dazu bot. Preußen hatte sich an der Bundesflotte neben anderen Staaten nicht beteiligt, nicht aus mangelndem Nationalgefühl, sondern weil es die Unzulänglichkeit der Grundlagen dieser Gründung rechtzeitig erkannte. Preußens eigene

Flotte, damals nach Klein, aber von festem innerem Zusammenhalt, sollte der Grundstock der neuen, wiedererstarkenden deutschen Marine werden. Die wertvollsten Schiffe der ehemaligen Bundesflotte wurden aus der Versteigerung, ehe sie in fremde Hände fallen konnten, gerettet. Danzig wurde Kriegshafen. 1854 wurde das Jadegebiet von Oldenburg erworben. Wilhelmshaven entstand.

Unter der fachkundigen Führung des Prinzen Adalbert, seit 1854 Admiral der preussischen Flotte, ging es langsam, aber stetig aufwärts. 1864 befreite Preußen im Bunde mit Österreich Schleswig-Holstein von der Herrschaft Dänemarks. Ein ewiges Ruhmesblatt in diesem Kriege wird der Sturm auf die Düppeler Schanzen und der Übergang nach Alsen sein.

Dann kam es 1866 zu der erwarteten Auseinandersetzung zwischen Preußen und Österreich, auf dessen Seite auch das Königreich Hannover und die süddeutschen Staaten traten. Aber König Wilhelm hatte im General von Moltke einen genialen Generalstabschef. Seiner überlegenen Führung war es zu danken, daß die Hannoveraner beim Versuch, sich mit den Süddeutschen zu vereinigen, bei Langensalza nach tapferem Kampf die Waffen strecken mußten. Dann wurden drei preussische



Generalfeldmarschall von Moltke

Muster die Allgemeine Wehrpflicht ein. — Jedoch der französische Kaiser Napoleon III. beobachtete mit Neid und Besorgnis diese innere Erstarbung Deutschlands. So griff er 1870 eine nebensächliche Veranlassung auf, um Preußen den Krieg zu erklären. Er hoffte dabei, daß die Süddeutschen auf seine Seite treten würden. Darin irrte er sich aber gründlich. Wie ein Mann folgten alle deutschen Stämme dem Rufe König Wilhelms. Mit überraschender Schnelligkeit marschierten drei Armeen in der Pfalz auf und traten den Vormarsch gegen den Feind an, der seine Mobilmachung noch nicht vollendet hatte. Bei Spichern, Weissenburg und Wörth wurden seine der Grenze zunächst stehenden Korps geschlagen. Dann überschreiten die Deutschen in unaufhaltbarem Vormarsch die Mosel oberhalb Metz. In den blutigen Schlachten bei Mars la Tour und Gravelotte werden die Franzosen westlich dieser Festung besiegt und in ihr eingeschlossen. Die anderen deutschen Armeen setzen den Vormarsch fort, und es gelingt nun der genialen Führungskraft Moltkes, den Rest des französischen Feldheeres bei Sedan zu schlagen und hier 100 000 Mann zur Waffenstreckung zu zwingen. Der Kaiser Napoleon geht nach Wilhelmshöhe bei Kassel in Kriegsgefangenschaft.

Armeen aus Sachsen, der Lausitz und Mittelschlesien zum Vormarsch nach Böhmen angeferzt. Sie erkämpften sich den Austritt aus den Gebirgen und schlugen dann die Österreicher entscheidend bei Königgrätz. Währenddessen unterlagen auch im Westen die süddeutschen Truppen den preussischen in mehreren Gefechten. Preußen gewann durch den Frieden von Nikolsburg Hannover, Hessen-Nassau und Frankfurt a. M. und wurde damit der mächtigste Staat des Deutschen Bundes. Die süddeutschen Staaten schlossen mit ihm Militärverträge ab und führten nach seinem



Mit Genehmigung der Photographischen Gesellschaft, Berlin
Der Todesritt der Brigade Bredow in der Schlacht bei Mars la Tour 1870

Auch die preussische Kriegsmarine errang in dieser Zeit beachtliche Erfolge gegen die französische, die unsere Küsten zu blockieren suchte. Sie war zwar erheblich schwächer als die damals über die neuzeitlichsten Schiffe verfügende Flotte des zweiten französischen Kaiserreiches. Aber wo sie sich schlug — und sie ging keiner sich bietenden Gelegenheit aus dem Wege —, da geschah es mit Mut und teilweise auch glänzendem Erfolg, wie das siegreiche Gefecht zwischen dem Kanonenboot „Meteor“ und dem französischen Aviso „Bouvet“ vor Havanna bewies. Die deutschen Armeen rücken vor Paris und schließen die Riesenfestung ein. Aber die nunmehr errichtete französische Republik will den Kampf nicht aufgeben. Trotzdem Metz mit 180 000 Mann kapituliert, werden neue Armeen an der Loire und in Nordwestfrankreich aus dem Boden gestampft, die Paris entsetzen sollen. Vergebens! Den festgefügtten, Kampferprobten deutschen Truppen erliegen diese mangelhaft ausgebildeten Rekrutenverbände bei St. Quentin, bei Amiens, bei Orleans und Le Mans. Am 18. Januar 1871 wird König Wilhelm in Versailles zum Deutschen Kaiser proklamiert. Nach mehreren Ausfallversuchen muß nun auch Paris in die Übergabe willigen. Frankreich muß Frieden schließen und tritt Elsaß-Lothringen an Deutschland ab.

Das deutsche Volk hat leider nach diesen großen Erfolgen für den weiteren Ausbau seines Heeres nicht das notwendige Verständnis aufgebracht. Solange Bismarck noch Reichskanzler war (bis 1890), setzte er gegen den widerstrebenden Reichstag durch, daß das Heer entsprechend den starken Rüstungen unserer Nachbarn genügend verstärkt wurde. Dann aber vernachlässigte man trotz des allgemein wachsenden Wohlstandes die Wehr. Es kam hinzu, daß unsere Entwicklung zur Weltmacht eine starke Flotte notwendig machte. Unter der zielbewußten Leitung des Großadmirals von Tirpitz wurde diese seit Ende der 90er Jahre ausgebaut und erreichte allmählich eine beachtliche Größe*). Tirpitz erzog das deutsche Volk zu dem Gedanken der Seemacht und Seefahrt. Er legte die Grundlagen für den organisatorischen, technischen und militärischen Ausbau der deutschen Kriegsmarine. Die deutsche Flotte, die 1916 am Skagerrak dem Engländer siegreich die Stirn bot, ist in ihrem tiefsten, innersten Kern sein Werk. Überall dort, wo deutsche Schiffe auftraten, wußten sie die Ehre ihrer Flagge zu wahren, wurden Mehrerer von Macht und Ansehen des Reiches. So in China bei der Beschießung des Taku-

*) 28 Großkampfschiffe, 50 Kreuzer, 144 Torpedoboote und etwa 30 U-Boote mit rund 76 000 Mann.

forts, bei der sich das Kanonenboot „Itis“, der würdige Nachfolger der 1893 so ehrenvoll in Ostasien untergegangenen ersten „Itis“, unter seinem tapferen Kommandanten, Korvettenkapitän v. Lans, dem späteren Admiral, auszeichnete. So im Herero-Aufstand 1904 und bei der Niederwerfung des Aufstandes auf der Insel Ponape, an der Landungstruppen der Kreuzer „Cormoran“, „Emden“ und „Nürnberg“ mitwirkten! Zielbewußt wurde in der Heimat der weitere Ausbau der Marine durch neue Flottengesetze durchgeführt. Auch die Anfänge einer Luftwaffe entstanden in dieser Zeit infolge der genialen Erfindung des lenkbaren Luftschiffs durch Graf Zeppelin und die Entwicklung des Flugzeugs für militärische Zwecke*). Aber das Heer wurde in den ersten 12 Jahren unseres Jahrhunderts trotz des starken Anwachsens unserer Bevölkerung in kaum nennenswerter Weise vermehrt. So kam es, daß 1910 alljährlich nur noch 53 Prozent der wehrfähigen Mannschaft zum aktiven Dienst eingestellt wurden gegenüber 83 Prozent in Frankreich. Scharnhorsts Gedanke, daß jeder gesunde Mann sich im Waffendienst zum Schutz der Heimat üben müsse, war völlig in Vergessenheit geraten. Das Heer hatte aufgehört, das zu sein, was es noch unter Kaiser Wilhelm I. gewesen war:



Photo Schertl, Berlin
Großadmiral von Tirpitz

erreichte damit aber noch nicht diejenige Frankreichs, die 800 000 Mann zählte, obwohl seine Bevölkerungszahl um 20 Millionen geringer war als die Deutschlands. Organisation, Bewaffnung und Ausbildung des deutschen Heeres standen dabei auf bedeutender Höhe, aber Frankreich und Rußland besaßen eine unverhältnismäßig viel größere Zahl ausgebildeter Reserveoffiziere und Mannschaften.

II.

So brach denn Ende Juli 1914 die große Katastrophe herein. Österreichs Konflikt mit Serbien führte zum Kriege mit Rußland. Dieses wieder wurde von Frankreich, Belgien und England unterstützt. Die Masse des deutschen Heeres marschierte im Westen auf. In raschem Siegeszuge durchschritt sein rechter Flügel Belgien. Die Festungen Lüttich, Namur und Antwerpen fielen. Im Elsaß bei Mühlhausen und in Lothringen wurden französische Angriffe abgewiesen. Dann wurde das französisch-englische Heer in den Grenzschlachten bei Mons, Namur und an der Maas geschlagen. Im Osten bereiteten Hindenburg und Ludendorff den in Ostpreußen einbrechenden Russen eine vernichtende Niederlage. Unaufhaltbar ging die Offensive des rechten deutschen

*) 1914 gab es 6 Luftschiffer- und 5 Flieger-Regimenter.



Die Seeschlacht am Skagerrak Copyright by Richard Bong Verlag, Berlin

Seeresflügels bis in Höhe von Paris weiter. Dann aber erwies es sich, daß die beiderseitigen Kräfte sich die Waage hielten. Die Unterlassungsjünden der Vorkriegszeit rächten sich. Einem 60-Millionen-Volk gelang es nicht, ein 40-Millionen-Volk niederzuringen, weil dieses fast alle Wehrfähigen ausgebildet und an die Front gestellt hatte, während bei uns Hunderttausende von Unausgebildeten zur gleichen Zeit in der Heimat noch die ersten soldatischen Anfangsgründe erlernen mußten. Hierdurch und durch Fehler der Führung verebbte der deutsche Angriff an der Marne. In den weiteren Kämpfen bis zum Oktober verlängerte sich die beiderseitige Front bis zum Meer. Der Stellungskrieg begann. Im Osten hatten inzwischen die Österreicher und Ungarn nach anfänglichen Erfolgen gegenüber der russischen Übermacht Galizien nicht behaupten können. Durch zwei kräftig geführte Angriffe aus Schlesien und später aus Gegend Thorn, Richtung Warschau, brachte jedoch Hindenburg die russische Dampfwalze zum Halten und sicherte die linke Flanke der Österreicher. Dann aber kam es auch hier zum Stellungskrieg.

Das Jahr 1915 begann mit schweren Angriffen der Franzosen in der Champagne, die abgewiesen wurden. Italien trat auf die Seite unserer Feinde. Die mit uns verbündete Türkei wehrte dagegen tapfer die Angriffe der Engländer und Franzosen gegen die Dardanellen ab. Im Osten ergriffen wir Anfang Mai die Offensive, durchbrachen die russischen Stellungen bei Gorlice-Tarnow und warfen in immer wieder erneuerten Angriffen Schulter an Schulter mit den Österreicher-Ungarn den Feind aus Galizien, Polen und Litauen heraus. Erst im September mußte die große Offensive eingestellt werden, weil im Westen neue Angriffe der Franzosen und Engländer dazu zwangen, einen Teil der deutschen Kräfte auf diesen Kriegsschauplatz zu überführen. Trotzdem gelang es uns, im Herbst 1915 das serbische Meer durch einen gemeinsamen Angriff mit den auf unsere Seite übergetretenen Bulgaren völlig zu schlagen und dadurch den Weg zur Türkei frei zu machen. So stand die Lage Ende 1915 durchaus günstig.

Das Jahr 1916 brachte unseren Großangriff auf Verdun, dem leider der Erfolg versagt blieb. Im Osten setzten die Russen, namentlich im Sommer, eine Offensive auf breiter Front zur Entlastung ihrer westlichen Verbündeten an, aber die Tapferkeit der deutschen Truppen, die den Österreichern zu Hilfe eilten, fing den gewaltigen Stoß des Gegners auf. Unser Mißerfolg bei Verdun

und ein mit gewaltigen Mitteln geführter französischer Angriff an der Somme brachten uns schwere Verluste. Da trat auch noch Rumänien gegen uns in den Krieg ein und bedrohte das fast ungeschützte Siebenbürgen. Diese schwere Krisis wurde dadurch behoben, daß an Hindenburg-Ludendorff die Gesamtleitung des Krieges vom Kaiser übertragen wurde. Ihnen gelang es nicht nur, die Lage wiederherzustellen, sondern Rumänien entscheidend aufs Haupt zu schlagen.

Die deutsche Hochseeflotte wurde bedauerlicherweise zunächst nicht eingesetzt. Die im Ausland befindlichen Schiffe führten dagegen einen erfolgreichen Kreuzerkrieg. Kapitänleutnant Weddigen versenkte in Kühnem U-Boots-Angriff drei englische Kreuzer. Das Geschwader des Admirals Graf Spee schlug im Herbst 1914 ein britisches entscheidend bei Coronel, fand aber, von mehrfacher Übermacht umstellt, dann an den Falklandsinseln einen ruhmreichen Untergang.

Als Antwort auf die englische Blockade wurde alsdann im Frühjahr 1915 der U-Boots-Krieg eröffnet. Da stellte sich endlich am 31. Mai 1916 die englische Flotte am Skagerrak zum Kampf. Admiral Scheer griff sie an und fügte ihr schwerste Verluste zu.

Unsere tapferen Schutztruppen in den Kolonien wehrten sich mit allen Kräften gegen die Übermacht unserer Gegner. Aber bald fielen Kiautschou, Kamerun und Deutsch-Südwestafrika. Nur in Deutsch-Ostafrika gelang es der geschickten, energischen Führung des Oberst v. Lettow-Vorbeck, sich zu behaupten.

Auch das Jahr 1917 war wiederum erfüllt mit schweren Angriffen unserer Gegner im Westen, in Mazedonien und an der Ostfront. Überall wurde der Feind unter schweren Verlusten abgewiesen. Andererseits sank der Kampfwert der russischen Armeen infolge der hier ausbrechenden Revolution immer mehr. Der Italiener, der am Isonzo immer wieder versucht hatte, die österreichischen Stellungen zu durchbrechen, erlitt durch einen gegen seine linke Flanke geführten Großangriff eine schwere Niederlage.



Union Deutsche Verlagsanstalt Stuttgart

Gegenstoß deutscher Sturmtruppen durch das Trichtergelände in Flandern 1918

Im Februar 1917 erklärte Deutschland den uneingeschränkten U-Boot-Krieg, der auch anfangs sehr gute Erfolge brachte. Aber der bald darauf erfolgende Eintritt Amerikas in den Krieg verschlechterte die Erfolgsaussichten der Mittelmächte.

Die Luftwaffe hatte sich seit Kriegsbeginn unter der energischen Leitung des Oberst Tom sen außerordentlich entwickelt. Bereits in den Herbstschlachten 1914 hatten die Flieger sehr wertvolle Aufklärungsergebnisse gebracht, während das Luftschiff sich im Landkriege nicht bewährte.



Luftkampf 1918

Dagegen griffen die Marine-Luftschiffe mit unerhörtem Heldennut immer wieder die feindlichen Hauptstädte London und Paris an. Von 121 Luftschiffen blieben 110 auf dem Felde der Ehre. Der Name des Kapitäns Strasser und vieler anderer gehören der Geschichte an. Während der großen Abwehrschlachten im Westen erwies sich die Vermehrung unserer Flugzeuge mehr und mehr als unabweisbar, weil die Erringung der Luftüberlegenheit sich als eine der Hauptbedingungen für den Erfolg erwies. Unter schneidigen, vorbildlichen Führern wie Immelmann, Boelcke, Göring und Udet gelang es immer wieder, den zahlenmäßig überlegenen Gegner niederzuringen. Unter allen diesen Helden strahlt der Name Richt hof en in unsterblichem Licht.

Im Winter 1917/18 schied Rußland durch den Frieden von Brest-Litowsk aus der Reihe unserer Gegner aus. Die Mittelmächte besetzten zur Sicherstellung der Verpflegung die Ukraine. Im Westen schritten wir im März zur entscheidenden Offensive. Aber der Angriff lief sich trotz größter Hingabe unserer Truppen aus Mangel an Kräften fest. Im Osten befreiten wir die baltischen Provinzen

vom Terror der Bolschewiken und halfen den Finnen bei der Gewinnung ihrer Selbständigkeit. Doch diese Teilerfolge konnten die sich für uns immer ungünstiger gestaltende Gesamtlage nicht ändern. Nach mehrfach erneuerten Großangriffen im Westen mußten unsere durch Überanstrengung und Grippe erschöpften Truppen allmählich unter dem Druck der übermächtigen, durch die kampfkraftigen Amerikaner gestärkten Feinde zurückgehen.

Da brach im September die bulgarische Front in Mazedonien und die türkische in Palästina zusammen. Im Oktober löste sich das österreichisch-ungarische Heer in Italien infolge seiner Kriegsmüdigkeit auf. Nichtsdestoweniger leistete unser Westheer unerschütterlichen Widerstand. Anfang November versetzte dann die in Deutschland ausbrechende Revolution dem Frontheer den Dolchstoß von hinten.

In unerhört zähem Ringen hatte das deutsche Heer über vier Jahre gegen eine Welt von Feinden die Heimat verteidigt. Von den 12 Millionen deutscher Soldaten haben fast 2 Millionen ihre Treue zu Volk und Vaterland mit dem Tode besiegelt. Die Heimat hatte infolge der völkerrechtswidrigen Blockade Englands die schwersten Entbehrungen erduldet, war dann aber willenlos dem Terror einer Handvoll gewissenloser Verräter zum Opfer gefallen. So wurde dem Feldheer trotz seiner gewaltigen Erfolge und unsäglichen Mühen der Siegeskranz schließlich doch aus den Händen gewunden und das aus tausend Wunden blutende Deutschland der Willkür seiner Feinde ausgeliefert. Die Flotte mußte nach dem Diktat des übermächtigen Gegners ausgeliefert werden, aber die Besatzungen unter Admiral v. Reuter retteten die Ehre der unbesiegten deutschen Kriegsflagge durch die rechtzeitige Versenkung der Schiffe in der Bucht von Scapa Flow.

III.

Während das Westheer stolz erhobenen Hauptes und in tadelloser Ordnung über den Rhein zurückmarschierte, jagten Lastautos mit bewaffnetem Verbrechergesindel durch die Straßen der deutschen Städte. Während jedes Soldaten Herz der wehe Schmerz über die entwürdigenden Waffenstillstandsbedingungen zerriß, rief Herr Scheidemann vom Fenster der Reichskanzlei die Deutsche Republik mit den Worten aus: „Das deutsche Volk hat auf der ganzen Linie gesiegt!“ Und das betörte Volk glaubte diesem Betrug. Unter den Linden riß man Offiziere, die in mancher Feldschlacht ihren Leuten vorangestürzt waren, die Achselstücke herunter, warf sie zu Boden und trat mit Füßen nach ihnen. Das war der Dank des Vaterlandes für all das Heldentum der letzten Jahre, für all die Entbehrungen und Gefahren, über die sich die Heimat nie eine klare Vorstellung gemacht hatte. War es ein Wunder, daß der Feldsoldat, der tapfer seine Pflicht getan hatte, einen grimmigen Haß empfand gegen jene marxistischen Nutznießer, gegen jene Verräter, denen die Internationale höher stand als das Vaterland?

Die neuen Machthaber hatten nichts Eiligeres zu tun, als das stolze, kampferprobte Feldheer aufzulösen, weil sie fürchteten, es könne ihnen gefährlich werden. Diesen spießigen Pazifisten kam nicht der Gedanke, noch einmal das Volk zum letzten Widerstand aufzurufen, wie es die Franzosen nach ihrer Niederlage bei Sedan 1870 getan hatten. Sie lieferten dem Feinde alle Kampfmittel aus, sie machten das deutsche Volk wehrlos.

Aber bald mußten sie erkennen, daß sie der Umsturzbewegung im Innern selbst machtlos gegenüberstanden. In Berlin und in fast allen größeren deutschen Städten verübten die Spartakisten unerhörte Gewalttaten. Das, was an Truppen in den Kasernen zurückgeblieben war, weigerte sich, zu kämpfen. So mußte die neue Regierung der sozialdemokratischen Volksbeauftragten am 12. Dezember 1918 zur Bildung neuer Truppen schreiten, um mit ihnen den Spartakismus, die Diktatur des Proletariats, zu bekämpfen. Man rief nach einem alten Rezept des sozialdemokratischen Führers Bebel eine „freiwillige Volkswehr“ auf. Sie wählte ihre Führer selbst, denen zudem noch zur Überwachung ein Vertrauensrat von fünf Mann beigegeben wurde. Die neuen Truppen erwiesen sich aber bald als völlig unzuverlässig, weil ihre Manneszucht fast alles zu wünschen übrigließ.

Wer war imstande, die Bevölkerung gegen die Gewalttaten des spartakistischen Gesindels zu schützen? Womit sollte man den Polen gegenübertreten, die sich immer mehr in Posen und Oberschlesien breit machten? Da blieb jenen sozialdemokratischen Führern, die in der Vorkriegszeit die alte Armee stets nach Kräften verunglimpft, die während des Krieges planmäßig den Kampfwillen der Heimat untergraben hatten, nichts übrig, als sich an die alten Offiziere, an die Frontkämpfer zu wenden, die ihnen stets so völlig wesenfremd gewesen waren.

Der Ruf verhallte nicht vergebens. War doch in diesen Männern die Liebe und das Verantwortungsbewußtsein gegenüber Deutschland stärker als der Haß und die Verachtung, die sie den neuen Machthabern gegenüber empfanden. Bald bildeten sich Freiwilligen-Verbände aus den guten Elementen der alten Feldtruppenteile und neue Freikorps aus Geworbenen verschiedener Truppenteile. Sie besetzten die Ostgrenze und verhinderten weitere Übergriffe der

Polen. Sie boten sich an, die verlorene Provinz Posen wiederzunehmen, aber die neuen Machthaber konnten dazu den Entschluß nicht finden. Die neuen Verbände schützten Ostpreußen und die baltischen Provinzen gegen den sich immer bedrohlicher heranschleubenden russischen Bolschewismus. Im Innern schufen sie überall Ordnung; sie befreiten Berlin und München von der Spartakusherrschaft. Die Namen der Generale von Epp und Maerker sind aus jener Zeit noch heute in aller Munde. Unter dem Schutze dieser freiwilligen Verbände tagte die Weimarer Nationalversammlung, die dem Reich die neue Verfassung gab. Sie war nicht nach dem Sinne dieser Frontkämpfer, weil aus dieser Verfassung ein wirklichkeitsfremder, unterwürfiger Geist sprach. Aber man hatte wenigstens das Reich vor dem völligen Zusammenbruch, vor der Ausrottung seiner Kultur bewahrt.

Jetzt hieß es, in der Stille weiterarbeiten, um die neue, noch recht buntschekige Wehrmacht einheitlich zu organisieren. Es ist das große Verdienst des Generals Walter Reinhardt, diese schwere und vielfach angefochtene Aufgabe erfolgreich durchgeführt zu haben. Im Januar 1919 wurde im Preussischen Kriegsministerium der „Reichswehrausschuß“ ins Leben gerufen und am 6. März 1920 von der Nationalversammlung in Weimar das Gesetz über die „Vorläufige Reichswehr“ angenommen. Zunächst war beabsichtigt, die Stärke der Reichswehr auf



Presse-Illustration Heinrich Hoffmann, Berlin
Reichsstatthalter Ritter von Epp

heiten genau vor, beseitigte die Allgemeine Wehrpflicht und forderte die Einführung eines Berufsheeres von zwölfjähriger Dienstzeit. Unter dem Druck dieser Bestimmungen wurde die Stärke des Heeres nun zunächst bis zum Frühjahr auf etwa 200 000 Mann verringert. Die ganze Wut des Soldaten über jene willenslosen Erfüllungspolitiker, die an der Spitze des Reiches standen, machte sich noch einmal im Kapp-Putsch Luft. Man wollte eine nationale, selbstbewusste Regierung in den Sattel heben. Aber das Unternehmen scheiterte, weil die Zeit noch nicht reif dafür war. An vielen Stellen des Reiches, namentlich im Ruhrgebiet, erhob der Kommunismus erneut das Haupt. Der geschickten und energischen Führung des Generals von Seeckt gelang es, auch dieser Aufstände nach kurzer Zeit Herr zu werden.

Bis zum 1. Oktober 1920 wurde das Reichsheer dann auf 150 000, bis 1. Januar 1921 auf 100 000 Mann zurückgeführt. Damit hatte es die Form erhalten, die ihm das Versailler Diktat vorschrieb. Während in das alte Vorkriegsheer mit seiner zweijährigen Dienstzeit alljährlich über 300 000 junge Männer neu eintraten, um das Waffenhandwerk zu erlernen, waren dies im neuen Heer mit seiner zwölfjährigen Dienstzeit nur noch etwa 8000 Mann. In diesen Zahlen kam so recht die ganze Entmachtung unseres Staatswesens zum Ausdruck.

Es war daher klar, daß dieses kleine Heer gar nicht in der Lage war, den Schutz der Heimat gegenüber einem Angriff der Millionenheere unserer Nachbarn zu leisten. Um so weniger war dies möglich, weil dem neuen Heere alle neuzeitlichen Kampfmittel verboten waren, nämlich: 1. schwere Artillerie über ein Kaliber von 10,5 cm; 2. Aufklärungs-, Jagd- und Bombenflieger; 3. Kampfwagen jeder Art. Was das hieß, mögen nachstehende Zahlen beleuchten (Stand von 1931):

	Batterien	Flugzeuge	Kampfwagen
Frankreich . . .	656	2500	2500
Polen	462	1000	320
Tschechoslowakei . . .	330	850	100
Deutschland	72	—	—

(nur leichte)

Das Reichsheer verfügte über keine Materialreserven. Die gesamte Bewaffnung und Ausrüstung war im Versailler Vertrag bis in alle Einzelheiten festgelegt. Das ging so weit, daß die Zahl der Bekleidungs-garnituren für den einzelnen Mann vorge-schrieben war. Die Be-waffnung des gesamten Heeres bestand aus 1134 leichten, 792 schweren Maschinengewehren, 252 Minenwerfern und 288 leichten Geschützen. Nur die Festung Königsberg durfte 22 schwere Geschütze be-halten, die fest einge-baut sind. Eine staat-liche Rüstungsindustrie, über die alle ausländi-



Photo Reichswehr, Berlin
Generaloberst von Seeckt †

grenze mußten in dem Zustand verbleiben, in dem sie sich 1919 befanden. Außer Königsberg waren alle diese Festungen entwaffnet. Es gehörte eine starke Zuversicht und sehr viel innere Begeisterung dazu, angesichts dieser verzweifelten Lage einen Beruf zu ergreifen, der so hoffnungslose Aussichten für den Fall eines Krieges eröffnete. Aber die Männer, die zum Aufbau des neuen Heeres schritten, sahen in ihm nur eine Übergangsercheinung, die uns hinüber-retten sollte in bessere Zeiten. Deshalb galt es, im Rahmen der engen Grenzen, die uns gezogen waren, das Höchste an innerem Wert aus der neuen Organisation herauszuholen. Es galt, die in harter Arbeit, in Kampf und Sieg erworbenen Errungenschaften des alten Heeres zu bewahren und weiterzuentwickeln. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt begann General von Seeckt seine Arbeit. Er wurde Schöpfer des neuen Heeres. Aber auch eines Mannes müssen wir hierbei gedenken, der, obwohl selbst nicht Soldat, aber von heißer Vaterlandsliebe durchdrungen, mannhaft für die Reichswehr kämpfte: Reichswehrminister Dr. Gessler. Er war es, der acht Jahre lang die Einflußnahme der Marxisten auf die Wehrmacht abwehrte und ihr die Möglichkeit zu ruhigem, planmäßigem Aufbau schuf.

sehen Militärmächte verfügen, besaßen wir nicht mehr. Nur wenige Privatfirmen lie-ferten die Ergänzung des unbrauchbaren Ma-terials. Noch bis zum Jahre 1925 wurden Truppe und Fabriken in entwürdigender Weise von den internationalen Kontrollkommissionen heimgesucht.

Die Befestigungen an unserer Westgrenze, auf Helgoland und am Westteil der Ostsee mußten laut Versailler Diktat geschleift wer-den. So liegt unsere westliche Reichshälfte völlig schutzlos einem feindlichen Einmarsch gegenüber offen. Die befestigten Werke an unserer Süd- und Ost-

Der deutsche Soldat sah seit dem Aufkommen stehender Heere im 17. Jahrhundert seine ideale Lebensaufgabe darin, die Heimat in der Stunde der Gefahr gegen den äußeren Feind zu verteidigen. Sein Verantwortungsbewusstsein gegenüber seinen wehrlosen Volksgenossen trieb ihn, die Gefahren und Entbehrungen des Krieges auf sich zu nehmen, ja, sein Leben für sein Volk zum Opfer zu bringen. Die entwürdigenden Bestimmungen des Versailler Vertrages verfolgten bewusst das Ziel, den deutschen Soldaten an der Lösbarkeit dieser Aufgabe der Landesverteidigung verzweifeln zu lassen. Er sollte sich nur noch als Glied einer Polizeitruppe fühlen, er sollte in einem stumpfsinnigen Stadtsoldatentum versumpfen, wie wir es aus der deutschen Kleinstaaterei des 18. Jahrhunderts unseligen Angedenkens kennen. Unser Heer hätte in einer solchen Umgebung den letzten Rest seiner Fähigkeit verlieren müssen, die Heimat gegen den äußeren Feind zu verteidigen. Hierin haben sich unsere Gegner aus dem Weltkrieg geirrt. Die Reichswehr hat von Anfang an ihre Aufgabe darin gesehen, alle seelischen Kräfte, die in unserem Volksheer der Vorkriegszeit lebten, weiterzuentwickeln. Das Heer ließ sich nicht irremachen, den Landesschutz als seine Hauptaufgabe anzusehen und das Höchstmögliche in dieser Hinsicht zu leisten. Es war von der Überzeugung durchdrungen, daß nur eine auf nationaler Grundlage sich vollziehende Entwicklung uns aus unseren vielen Nöten heraushelfen konnte. Auch die Reichsmarine war sich der ihr in der nächsten Zukunft zufallenden Aufgaben voll bewusst. Waren auch die Schiffe dahin, war auch der Hoffnungspunkt, aus dem zerstörten eine neue Marine wiederaufzubauen, noch so klein, der Glaube war geblieben. Es fanden sich Männer, die trotz der scheinbaren Ausichtslosigkeit eines solchen Versuches das Unmögliche wagten. Mit zähester Tatkraft gingen sie unter Führung von Admiral v. Trotha daran, die Trümmer zu sichten. Schon wenige Jahre nach Kriegsende zeigte der wieder in Dienst gestellte Kreuzer „Berlin“ die deutsche Flagge im Ausland, fuhr drei der uns verbliebenen Linienschiffe nach Spanien. Mehr als alles andere haben diese Fahrten deutscher Kriegsschiffe dem Ausland bewiesen, daß die deutsche Kraft trotz schwerster Schicksalsschläge ungebrochen war, haben unseren Auslandsdeutschen gezeigt, daß die Heimat noch lebte und an sie dachte. — Immer mehr festigte sich der innere Kern der neugegründeten jungen Reichsmarine, die bewusst die Überlieferungen ihrer ruhmvollen Vorgängerin übernahm und weiterpflegte. Immer mehr wuchsen die Aufgaben, die ihr gestellt wurden und die sie getreulich erfüllte. Neue Schiffe wurden trotz größter Schwierigkeiten in Dienst gestellt, gingen ins Ausland, warben dort für deutsches Ansehen, zeigten unseren festen Willen, das Recht Deutschlands auf Seegeltung zu wahren.

So suchte die Wehrmacht durch die Güte der Leistung des einzelnen das wettzumachen, was ihr an Zahl gebrach; sie setzte alles daran, in ihrer Ausbildung gleichen Schritt zu halten mit den Siegermächten; sie bekämpfte mit allen ihr zu Gebote stehenden Mitteln den bei uns geduldeten und sogar gezüchteten internationalen Pazifismus; sie bildete sich einen eigenen Ehrbegriff, der dem des Weimarer Staates fremd war; sie wehrte sich mit Erfolg gegen die Durchsetzung des Soldatentums mit parteiischem Geist; sie erhielt sich in ihrem inneren Gefüge den Zustand unantastbarer Autorität; sie pflegte das ewige nationale Gedankengut in der Erziehung seines Nachwuchses. Die Reichswehr war die Klammer des Reichs in den schwersten Tagen seit 1918. Sie war der erbitterteste Feind bolschewistischer Umtriebe.

Ihrem Soldatentum drückte die verehrungswürdige Gestalt des Feldmarschalls und Reichspräsidenten Hindenburg einen besonderen Stempel auf. Er bildete das moralische Fundament, auf dem sich die Wehrmacht aufbaute. Er war der Schirmherr ihrer Waffenehre, die lebendig fortwirkende Tradition des alten Heeres. Ja, man kann sagen, daß Hindenburg das militärische Vorbild der Disziplin und Vaterlandsliebe wieder hinaustrug in das Volk. Man sah allmählich in ihm eine mythische Gestalt, den getreuen Eckhard des Deutschtums.

Aber gleichzeitig war ein anderer Mann am Werke, der das von Demokraten und Marxisten verfälschte und geschmähte Soldatentum wieder zu Ehren zu bringen gewillt war. Adolf Hitler, der Befreite des Weltkrieges, begann den Kampf, um das Volk einer neuen Weltanschauung zuzuführen, einer Weltanschauung, die die Pflicht zur Landesverteidigung wieder in

den Mittelpunkt des neuen Staates stellen will. Er griff dabei auf Gedanken der großen preussischen Reformatoren zurück, mit denen diese bereits gegen denselben verderblichen Zeitgeist angekämpft hatten. Er gab seinen politischen Soldaten das geistige Rüstzeug dieser Männer in die Hand, das in der Nachkriegszeit im Volke fast ganz verschüttet war. Wenn wir den Führer von der Ehre der Nation sprechen hören, glauben wir Clausewitz' feurige Bekenntnisse zum Vaterlande zu vernehmen. Wenn er die Verteidigung des heimischen Bodens als Pflicht jedes Volksgenossen hinstellt, denken wir an Scharnhorsts berühmtes Wort, daß jeder Bewohner der geborene Verteidiger seines Landes sei. Wenn er allein die volle Hingabe der Seele an die große Sache gelten läßt, glauben wir Gneisenaus Worte zu hören. „Keine Herzenserhebung ohne poetischen Schwung. Wer nur nach klarer Berechnung handelt, wird ein starrer Egoist.“ Wenn er schließlich das soldatische Kämpfertum als etwas Hohes, Erhabenes bezeichnet, als eines der Hauptfundamente für die erstrebte Volksgemeinschaft, denken wir wiederum an Gneisenau, der im einfachen Soldaten den „hochachtbaren Waffengefährten“ sah und nach dem Siege an der Katzbach in Liebe und Bewunderung über ihn die Worte sagte: „Gibt es etwas Ehrwürdigeres als solches Dulden, gepaart mit solcher Tapferkeit?“

Damit schuf sich der Führer eine Gefolgschaft, die in den zehn Jahren des Kampfes immer stärker wurde. Damit schuf er die leidenschaftliche Einsatzbereitschaft der Partei für seine Idee. Wie einst die Freikorps im offenen Kampf mit der Waffe in der Hand den Aufruhr der kommunistischen Internationale niederschlugen, so rangen die SA. und SS. in stillem, hartem, unentwegtem Kampf ohne Waffe um die Seele der irgeleiteten Volksgenossen. Sie zeigten dabei Züge echten deutschen Soldatentums: Opfermut, Hartnäckigkeit, treue Kameradschaft. So mancher tapfere Kämpfer mußte seine Treue zum Führer mit dem Leben bezahlen. Sie sind gefallen in der gleichen Front wie die vielen unbekanntenen Soldaten des Weltkrieges, für Deutschlands Freiheit. Als der Führer am 30. Januar 1933 aus der Hand des greisen Feldmarschalls das Amt des Reichskanzlers übertragen erhielt, war es sein fester Wille, dem unwürdigen Zustand unserer



Parade des Heeres vor dem Ehrenmal in Berlin

Wehrlosigkeit ein Ende zu machen. Am 16. März 1935 führte er aus eigener Machtvollkommenheit die Allgemeine Wehrpflicht wieder ein und legte die Stärke des neuen Heeres auf 12 Armeekorps mit 36 Divisionen fest. Er beseitigte weiter die uns durch das Versailler Diktat auferlegten Einschränkungen. Das Heer erhielt schwere Artillerie und Panzertruppen. Unter der zielbewußten Leitung des Reichskriegsministers, Generalfeldmarschalls von Blomberg, und des Oberbefehlshabers des Heeres, Generalobersten Freiherr von Fritsch, wurde es nach neuzeitlichen Gesichtspunkten gegliedert und ausgebaut. An seine Seite trat unter Führung des Generaloberst Göring eine starke Luftwaffe, die im Geiste des großen Fliegerhelden des Weltkrieges, Richthofen, bereit ist, den Schutz unserer Heimat gegen die starken Luftflotten unserer Nachbarn zu übernehmen. Und auch die Kriegsmarine beginnt unter der Leitung des Generaladmirals Raeder ihren Neuaufbau.

Der Führer hat durch die kühne Tat der Wiedereinführung der Allgemeinen Wehrpflicht die unerträgliche Schande von uns genommen, die darin ihren Ausdruck fand, daß einem großen Kulturvolk mit einer 2000jährigen ruhmreichen Geschichte das Recht verwehrt war, seinen Lebensraum mit der Waffe in der Hand zu verteidigen. Der Führer hat dabei mit richtigem militärischem Blick erkannt, daß es einzig und allein mit dieser Wehrform möglich ist, einen Staat mit so langen Landesgrenzen wie den unsrigen mit Erfolg zu verteidigen. Er weiß aber auch, daß der Allgemeinen Wehrpflicht eine besonders erzieherische Bedeutung zukommt. Der wehrfähige junge Mann glaubt, daß es eine jämmerliche Verantwortungslosigkeit gegenüber seinen wehrlosen Volksgenossen wäre, wenn er sich weigerte, diese in der Stunde der Gefahr mit der Waffe in der Hand zu verteidigen. Deshalb tritt er freudigen Herzens in die Reihen der Wehrmacht ein, wo er nicht nur das Waffenhandwerk erlernt, sondern auch zur Hingabe an die große Sache, zur Pflichttreue, zum Anstand, zur Ehrenhaftigkeit und Selbstlosigkeit erzogen wird. Jeder Deutsche aber kann unserem Führer und Reichskanzler nicht dankbar genug sein, daß er uns die Wehrfreiheit wiedererhielt und das Werk unseres großen Reformators Scharnhorst erneuerte. Dadurch ist Adolf Hitler zum Schirmer unserer nationalen Ehre, zur wehenden Fahne unserer neuen Wehrmacht geworden.



Freie-Illustration Heinrich Goffmann, Berlin

Einmarsch deutscher Truppen in das Rheinland

Die deutsche Kraftfahrkampftruppe

Von Oberstleutnant Walther Nehring

„Schnell zu sein, war zu allen Zeiten das Kennzeichen genialer Führung... Welch gewaltiges Feld eröffnet sich hier mit den motorischen Mitteln dem Feldherrn der Zukunft...“
Ehem. Preuß. Kriegsminister General Reinhardt in „Wehrkraft und Wehrwille“.

Je höher der Stand der Wehrbereitschaft eines Volkes ist, desto stärker ist seine Sicherheit und damit die Erhaltung des Friedens gewährleistet, da das Risiko des Angreifers mit der Stärke des Verteidigers wächst. Aus dieser klaren Erkenntnis heraus ergibt sich also die Forderung und Folgerung, die Wehrbereitschaft mit allen zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln zu fördern und zu verbessern. Dieser Tatsache ist der Führer durch seinen heroischen Entschluß vom 16. März 1935 gerecht geworden; er hat die Wehrhoheit des Deutschen Reiches in vollem Umfang wieder hergestellt und ein schlagkräftiges, neuzeitlich gegliedertes Volksherr geschaffen, das voll befähigt ist, den deutschen Boden zu verteidigen und Ehre und Freiheit der Nation zu wahren.

In diesem Heere spielt die Kraftfahrkampftruppe¹⁾ die ihr gebührende Rolle. Ganz allgemein gliedert sich die Kraftfahrkampftruppe in die Panzer- und Panzerabwehrwaffe, in motorisierte Aufklärungsverbände sowie in Schützen- und Krafttradschützeinheiten. Alle Teile werden entweder dauernd oder je nach der Kriegslage von Fall zu Fall in größeren Verbänden zusammengefaßt.

Die junge Panzertruppe

ist eins der hauptsächlichsten Machtmittel des neuen Heeres. Ihre Waffe ist der Panzerkampfwagen, dessen Schöpfung auf der beispiellosen Leistung des Explosionsmotors aufgebaut ist.²⁾ Neuzeitliche Heere ohne Panzerwaffen sind ebenso undenkbar wie solche ohne Luftstreitkräfte. Im Zeitalter der ungeheuer gesteigerten Wirkung moderner Waffen sind Panzer-



Photo Scherl, Berlin

General Oswald Lutz,
der erste Kommandierende General
der deutschen Panzertruppe

waffen besonders geeignet, den Willen des Gegners zu brechen. Außerdem wäre man bei ihrem Fehlen von vornherein jedem damit ausgestatteten Gegner unterlegen.

Ihre geschichtliche Entwicklung

Schon Ende 1914 nahm man in England als Lehre der Flandernkämpfe den Bau von Kampfwagen auf, und am 15. September 1916 erhielt das bis dahin streng geheimegehaltene Kampfmittel seine Feuertaupe in der Sommeschlacht. Wenn auch die Erfolge der 45 eingesetzten Panzerkampfwagen, die aus Tarnungsgründen Tanks genannt wurden, nicht überwältigend

¹⁾ Vgl. „Heere von morgen“ vom selben Verfasser, Verlag Voggenreiter 1935, 3. Auflage.

²⁾ Vgl. Bildheft „Panzer und Motor in fremden Heeren“ vom selben Verfasser, Verlag Voggenreiter 1936, 2. Auflage.

waren, so hatte man sich doch von ihrer Brauchbarkeit überzeugt und ging großzügig zur Anfertigung von 1000 Stück für die geplante Offensive des Jahres 1917 über. Nach manchen Fehlschlägen in diesem Jahre, die zum Teil auf mangelhaften Verwendungsgrundsätzen, zum Teil auf mangelhafter technischer Durchbildung beruhten, kam beim Einsatz von Cambrai am 20. November 1917 endlich die lang ersehnte Stunde. Die Schlacht war für die englischen Kampfwagen ein überwältigender Erfolg; man kann sie als die Geburtsstunde neuerzeitlicher Panzerverbände bezeichnen. Der Angriff kam überraschend wie noch kein anderer zuvor. Der Engländer verzichtete zum erstenmal auf jegliche Artillerievorbereitung.



Photo Scherl, Berlin

Eroberter englischer Tank aus der Schlacht bei Cambrai am 20. November 1917

378 Kampfwagen überrollten die überraschten deutschen Stellungen in breiter Front, walzten Gassen durch die Drahthindernisse und kämpften die MG. nieder; die Infanterie flutete nach, Kavallerie ritt darüber hinaus. Auf 13 Kilometer Breite drang der Angriff in 12 Stunden 9 Kilometer vor, 8000 Gefangene und 100 Geschütze wurden erbeutet. Bisher waren derartige Erfolge nur in monatelangen Artillerieschlachten unter eigenen schweren blutigen Verlusten erzielt worden, so daß die englische Führung damit nicht gerechnet hatte. Daher kam es nicht zur sofortigen Ausnutzung dieses Anfangserfolges und damit nicht zum Durchbruch durch die deutsche Front mit seinen unabsehbaren Folgen.

Am 18. Juli 1918 setzte Marschall Foch zum entscheidenden Gegenangriff gegen die von der eigenen Offensive erschöpften deutschen Heere zwischen Soissons und Château Thierry auf 40 Kilometer Frontbreite an. In langen Linien rollen über 600 Kampfwagen, vielfach im hohen Getreide kaum zu sehen, der feindlichen Infanterie voraus. Sie durchbrechen die deutschen Linien und bringen die 9. und 7. Armee an den Rand des Verderbens.

Am 8. August trifft die deutsche 2. Armee ein neuer Schlag des Feindes. Australier, Kanadier und Franzosen treten beiderseits Villers Bretonneux auf 30 Kilometer Frontbreite zum Angriff an, der mit den gleichen Mitteln wie am 18. Juli geführt wird. Nur ist seine Wirkung noch furchtbarer.

Beumelburg hat in seinem unvergleichlichen Werk „Sperrfeuer um Deutschland“ das Drama dieser Schlacht in unerreichbarer Weise geschildert:

„Nach wenigen Minuten eines rasenden Artilleriefeuers brechen Hunderte englischer Tanks (etwa 500) in die deutschen Stellungen ein. Künstliche Nebelschwaden verbergen sie. Unbekümmert um die deutsche Infanterie, unverwundbar und ihrer Überlegenheit bewußt, fahren sie über die rasch aufgeworfenen Gräben, walzen die Hindernisse nieder, umzingeln die Dörfer, postieren sich feuernd an den Wegekreuzen und tauchen nach einer halben Stunde mitten in den Batteriestellungen auf.“

Die Artillerie kommt im Nebel überhaupt nicht zum Schuß. Sie hört am Motorengeräusch wohl das Herannahen der dunklen Gespenster, aber sie entdeckt sie nicht, bis ihre schwarzen Schatten unmittelbar in der Geschützlinie erscheinen...



Photo Scherl, Berlin

Blech statt Panzer!

Durch den schmachvollen Vertrag von Versailles war Deutschland untersagt, Panzerkampfwagen zu bauen

hoffnungslos wehren sich einzelne Schützennester gegen die Übermacht. Es gibt Batterien, die auf fünfzig Meter Entfernung die grauen Kolosse des Schlachtfeldes erledigen und dann zum Karabiner greifen, um sich die feindliche Infanterie vom Hals zu halten...

Aus der Linie der schweren Tankkolosse lösen sich die schnellfahrenden kleinen Wagen. Kavallerie trabt hinter ihnen. Geschwader von Jagdfliegern öffnen ihnen den Weg, jeden Gegner von oben herab angreifend. Hestig um sich feuernd, eilen die leichten Tanks voraus.

So braust das über das Schlachtfeld, in dem jeder Widerstand sich verzettelt hat. Eine ohnmächtige Auflösung breitet sich aus.

Zwei Stunden nach Beginn des Angriffs erscheinen Tankgeschwader mit englischer Kavallerie 14 Kilometer tief hinter der deutschen Front in den Stabsquartieren der Divisionen. Es scheint, als ob von der deutschen Abwehr überhaupt nichts mehr übriggeblieben sei...

Ein Unglückstag, ein schwarzer Tag...

Mit kurzen Pausen folgten die Angriffe der Entente einander. Es begann die letzte „Schlacht der 100 Tage“. Unaufhörlich rollten die Kampfwagen nach vorn.

Zwischen Oise und Aisne überrannten Feuerwalze, Panzergeschwader und Jagdflieger die Stellungen der 9. Armee. Der deutsche Feldherr Ludendorff sagt über diesen neuen Mißerfolg:

„Auch der 20. August war wieder ein schwarzer Tag... die Truppe ertrug nicht mehr... den Tanksturm.“


Am 2. September wird die Notanstellung von Kampfwagen durchbrochen und muß aufgegeben werden. Eine Fiobotschaft folgt der anderen...

Die moralische Widerstandskraft der deutschen Divisionen nimmt schnell ab und der „Tankschrecken“ breitet sich aus. Bitter rächt sich die ursprüngliche Geringschätzung dieser neuartigen Waffe auf deutscher Seite, wo man nur über 20 eigene Panzerkampfwagen und etwa 25 Beutewagen verfügte, die man dem Gegner abgenommen hatte.

Die deutschen Wagen erlebten ihre Feuertaufe erst am 21. März 1918 bei Beginn unserer letzten großen Entscheidungsoffensive, hatten große Erfolge bei Villers-Bretonneux am 21. April 1918 und kämpften tapfer bei Reims im Juni, ferner in der Champagne und in der 2. Marne-schlacht im Juli, um schließlich am 11. Oktober 1918 bei Cambrai zum letztenmal eingesetzt zu werden. Sie taten mehr als ihre Pflicht; aber es war unmöglich, gegen die feindlichen Panzer-massen, die bei Kriegsende etwa 5000 Wagen zählten, aufzukommen...

Die Gegenwart

Daraus haben wir gelernt und die notwendigen Folgerungen gezogen. Nach 15 Jahren er-zwungener Untätigkeit, die auf dem schmachvollen Diktat von Versailles beruhte und nur mangelhafte Übungen mit behelfsmäßigen Nachbildungen aus Blech erlaubte, ist die Panzertruppe im Dritten Reich im Begriff, unter der zielbewußten Leitung ihres ersten Kommandierenden Generals in raschen Sprüngen das aufzuholen, was das Ausland ihr bisher voraus hatte... Es liegt die Frage nahe, wie die Panzertruppe gegliedert ist. Hier wie beim Gerät selbst ist noch vieles im Fluß, da die Entwicklung noch lange nicht abgeschlossen sein wird. Im großen ganzen



Deutscher leichter Panzerkampfwagen in Fahrt querfeldein

Photo Hoffmann, Berlin

deckt sich die Gliederung mit derjenigen der übrigen Waffengattungen. Man faßt die einzelnen Panzerkampfwagen (volkstümlich auch Tanks genannt) in Züge zu 5—7 Wagen, in Kompanien zu 3—4 Zügen und so weiter zusammen. Alle diese Verbände unterstehen dem Kommando der Panzertruppen in Berlin.

Es erscheint nicht möglich, mit einem einzigen Panzerwagentyp alle die zahlreichen Aufgaben zu lösen, die sich im Gefecht zwangsläufig ergeben. Man braucht dazu genau so, wie die Artillerie oder die Luftwaffe verschiedene Arten von Geschützen bzw. Flugzeugen benötigt, Panzerwagen, deren Bauart und Ausrüstung auf ihre Sonderaufgaben zugeschnitten sind. Bei ihrer Konstruktion sind Gewicht, Bewaffnung und Panzerung voneinander abhängig. Das heißt, je stärker Waffen und Panzer sind, desto höher wird das Gewicht des Wagens und damit auch die Anschaffungs- und Unterhaltungskosten. Daher wird die Masse der Panzerverbände voraussichtlich immer aus leichteren Wagen bestehen müssen. Das hat den Vorteil, daß man mehr Wagen bauen kann, die durch ihre größere Anzahl die feindliche Panzerabwehr mehr zersplittern, und daß man außerdem kleinere, schwer zu treffende Ziele bietet.

Abschließend sollen noch die Aufgaben von Offizier und Mann betrachtet werden, die sich im Dienst der Panzertruppe ergeben. Selbstverständlich ist bestes Kampfgerät eine uner-läßliche Voraussetzung für den Erfolg im Kriege; aber nicht die einzige. Weder Technik noch Taktik noch Tapferkeit für sich allein können den Sieg erzwingen, sondern lediglich das reibungs-lose Zusammenwirken aller dieser Faktoren. Daher kommt es darauf an, daß Offizier und Mann Technik und Taktik voll beherrschen und sich dienstbar machen. Der Soldat muß Herr der Technik und nicht ihr abhängiger Knecht sein, dann wird die tote Stahlmasse der



Ein Jahr Wehrfreiheit: 16. 3. 1935—20. 4. 1936!

Presse-Illustrationen Hoffmann, Berlin



Deutsche Panzerabwehrkanone

Broschüre-Illustrationen Hofmann, Berlin

Kampfwagen Leben gewinnen; dann werden Herz und Geist des Menschen, die Kraft des Motors und die Feuerwucht der Waffen zu einer Einheit verschmelzen, die dem Heere von heute seinen Stempel aufprägt! Daher muß die Besatzung wie ein Uhrwerk aufeinander eingespielt sein und sich gegenseitig ergänzen. Jeder ist Künstler in seinem Fach; von jedem hängt das Wohl und Wehe des Panzerwagens und der Kameraden ab. Als Panzerführer, als Fahrer, als Funker oder als Schütze müssen sie ihren schweren, aber wichtigen Dienst tun. Große Verantwortung und gespannte Aufmerksamkeit, starke Hitzeentwicklung, verbrauchte Luft und mangelndes Licht bei geschlossenen Luken, die Enge des Raums, der Lärm der Motoren, der Gleisketten und des eigenen Feuers, die schwierige Verständigung untereinander und durch Funk mit den anderen Kampfwagen, das Rollen und Stoßen des Wagens, das Prasseln feindlicher MG-Geschosse und Splitter auf der Panzerhaut zerran an den Nerven. Nur ganze Männer und Kämpfer sind hier zu brauchen und notwendig, wenn es einst zur Verteidigung der „befestigten Insel Deutschland“ heißen sollte: „Kampfwagen an die Front“!

Diese Männer sind sich der Ehre und Auszeichnung bewußt, in der Panzerwaffe dienen zu dürfen, die das jüngste Kind der deutschen Wehrmacht ist und der die Zukunft gehört. Jeder Angehörige dieser Truppe, die mit besonderem Stolz ihre schwarze Dienstuniform mit dem Totenkopf, dem Symbol äußerster Einsatzbereitschaft, trägt, ist sich darüber klar, was es bedeutet, „Panzerschütze“ zu heißen und im Kreise der Kameraden singen zu dürfen:

„Verstaubt sind die Gesichter, doch froh ist unser Sinn.
Es braust unser Panzer im Sturmwind dahin!“

Die Panzerabwehr¹⁾

Aus den Ausführungen über die Panzertruppe ergibt sich die überragende Bedeutung, die der Abwehr feindlicher Panzer, also der Panzerabwehr, beizulegen ist. Gerade weil die Panzerwaffe so ausschlaggebend ist, ist es um so notwendiger, die Abwehr dagegen auszubauen. Man

¹⁾ Broschüre vom selben Verfasser, Verlag Detke, Leipzig, 1935, 2. Auflage.

²⁾ Broschüre vom selben Verfasser, Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1936.

kann nicht an allen Fronten gleich stark sein, das heißt, Panzerkräfte in ausreichendem Maße verfügbar haben, sondern man muß sich häufig mit der Abwehr begnügen, um dann im Schwerpunkt die entscheidende Panzerwaffe in größter Stärke einsetzen zu können.

Daher erscheint es müßig, über die Notwendigkeit der Panzerabwehr und ihrer Sonderwaffen zu streiten. Ebensovienig wie die Panzerwaffe ist die Panzerabwehrtruppe aus einem neuzeitlichen Heere fortzudenken. Im eigenen Heer ergänzen beide einander in taktischer und operativer Beziehung wie Schwert und Schild; als Feinde sind sie geeignet, das alte Sprichwort wahr zu machen, wonach „ein Schwert das andere in der Scheide hält“, also entweder den Frieden von vornherein zu sichern oder im Kampf den Gegner zu lähmen, das heißt, seine Absichten zu durchkreuzen.

Die motorisierte Aufklärung

Unerläßlich für die obere Führung wie für den Einsatz aller Waffengattungen ist ferner eine vorzügliche Aufklärung. Es ist selbstverständlich, daß sie im Zeitalter der Technik motorisiert ist. Mehr als die anderen Einheiten der Kraftfahrkampftruppe werden die Aufklärungsabteilungen von der Schnelligkeit ihres Motors Gebrauch machen können und müssen, um überraschend in den Feind vorzustößen und seine Absichten aufzudecken. Kühn und verwegener muß die Truppe geführt werden; noch kühner und noch verwegener muß der einzelne Spähtrupp handeln, der der Erste am Feind ist — ganz auf seine verantwortungsvolle Aufgabe eingestellt, die ihn zum Auge und Ohr des oberen Truppenführers werden läßt...!

Sein Gerät ist der leichte und der schwere Panzerspähwagen, die in Züge und Kompanien zusammengefaßt sind.

Die motorisierten Schützen

Den Reigen der Kraftfahrkampftruppe beschließen die motorisierten Schützen, die in Verbänden bis zu Regimentsstärke im Zusammenwirken mit den anderen Teilen nicht unwesentlich



Leichter Panzerspähwagen im Gelände

Photo Schröter, Lönabrid

zu deren Erfolgen beitragen können. Panzer und Schützen ergänzen einander in vielen Aufgaben, die der andere allein nicht leisten kann. Der Panzer erobert, während der Schütze besetzt und festhält. Oder der Schütze greift an, unterstützt vom Panzer, oder er nimmt für den Panzer ungangbares Gelände in Besitz und ermöglicht so das Nachziehen des letzteren. Seine Aufgaben sind so wesentlich, daß seine Ausbildung besonders sorgfältig erfolgen muß; denn er vereinigt in sich den vorzüglich ausgebildeten Infanteristen, den geistig und körperlich beweglichen Reiter und den technisch durchgebildeten motorisierten Kämpfer!

Eine Abart der Schützen sind die Krafttradschützen; sie sind die schnellste erdgebundene Schöpfung des Motors. Ausgestattet mit zahlreichen zuverlässigen Maschinengewehren und besetzt vom kühnen, wagemutigen Geist der leichten Reiter Friedrichs des Großen, stellen sie eine neuzeitliche Waffe von hoher Feuer- und Angriffskraft und einer täglichen Reichweite von 200 bis 300 Kilometer dar. Mehr als bei den anderen Truppen kommt es hier auf den einzelnen Mann an, der ein „ganzer Kerl“ sein muß. Oft auf sich allein gestellt, sei es nun als Meldesahner über weite Strecken, sei es, abgesetzt von der Masse seiner Kompanie, im Maschinengewehrtrupp, sei es auf kühner Spähfahrt oder als sichernder Vorposten für seine ruhenden Kameraden, immer muß der Krafttradschütze das Herz auf dem rechten Fleck haben, die Lage richtig beurteilen und zweckvoll handeln können. Er ist daher kein Mitläufer in der großen Masse, sondern ein Elitesoldat in einer Elitetruppe. Die Grundlagen dazu muß der Mann mitbringen; Erziehung und Ausbildung, Kameradschaft und Korpsgeist formen ihn dann zur Vollendung, um nun mit berechtigtem Stolz singen zu können: „Wir sind die Krafttradschützen und uns gehört die Welt!“

Die Aufgaben eines Krafttradschützenverbandes erstrecken sich in gleicher Weise auf Kampf wie auf Aufklärung. Er ist für Aufgaben aller Art geeignet, vor allem für solche, die ein schnelles, sprungartiges Zufassen und Festhalten verlangen. Rasch und verwegen wird an den Feind herangefahren und die gesamte Feuerkraft schlagartig eingesetzt, um sich dann ebenso wendig vom Gegner zu lösen und an anderer Stelle erneut vorzulegen, oder ihn in Flanke und Rücken anzupacken. Zusammenfassen der Kräfte und Ausnutzen der Beweglichkeit und Schnelligkeit auch in der Verteidigung sind Forderungen, die an alle motorisierten Truppen zu stellen sind. Sie verbürgen den Erfolg. — — —

In knappen Umrissen sollte hier ein Bild vom Arbeiten und Wirken einer Truppe gegeben werden, die weiten Kreisen unserer Volksgenossen noch unbekannt ist. Wir führen hierbei die ernste Mahnung des nordamerikanischen Generalstabschefs an, die er 1933 niederschrieb: „Mehr denn je in unserer Geschichte muß jeder Bürger sein Augenmerk auf die Brauchbarkeit unseres Heeres richten!“

Denn auch wir sind mit dem französischen Marschall Lyautey (in Metz 1936) „überzeugt, daß das beste Mittel, um den Frieden zu sichern, darin besteht, stark zu sein. Man achtet nur die Starken . . . !“



Preße-Illustrationen Goffmann, Berlin
Paradeaufstellung der Krafttradschützen
vor ihrem Obersten Führer am 20. April 1936

Die deutsche Kavallerie

Von Oberstleutnant von Arnim

Die Anfänge der brandenburgisch-preussischen Kavallerie fallen in die Regierungszeit des Großen Kurfürsten (1640—1688). Er war der Begründer eines einheitlichen, disziplinierten Heeres. Für seine Kriegszüge zur Verteidigung seines Landes in Ost und West brauchte er eine schnellbewegliche Truppe. So schuf er vor allem die Dragoner, eine Waffengattung, die Schnelligkeit mit Feuerkraft in sich vereinigte.

Unter seinen Nachfolgern wurde die Kavallerie vernachlässigt, ihr eigentliches Element, die Beweglichkeit, wurde zugunsten starrer Exerzierformen eingeschränkt.

Erst als der größte Feldherr auf dem Thron Preußens, Friedrich II. (der Große), die Zügel der Regierung ergriff, schlug die Stunde der Kavallerie.

Durch sein Reglement von 1743, durch unausgesetzte gründliche Ausbildung im Frieden, wobei ihm Männer wie die Generale v. Zieten und v. Seydlitz zur Seite standen, wies er der Kavallerie den Weg zum Siege. Namen wie Hohensfriedberg, Rosbach, Zorndorf klingen in der Geschichte auf als stolze Siegestage friderizianischer Kavallerie.

Bei Zorndorf fiel das ewig denkwürdige Wort des Kommandeurs der Gardedukorps des Königs, des Rittmeisters v. Wakenitz: „Ich halte eine Schlacht nicht für verloren, in der die Gardedukorps des Königs noch nicht attackiert hat; ich attackiere!“



Photo Sächsl. Landesbildstelle, Dresden
Regiment Prinz Curland Chevaupleger bei Kolin

Solange Kriegsgeschichte gelehrt wird, werden diese Taten unvergessen sein; die Kavallerie war die schlagentscheidende Waffe.

Nach dem Tode des großen Königs sank auch die Kavallerie von ihrer stolzen Höhe. Die Befreiungskriege sahen wohl viele einzelne hervorragende Taten von Tapferkeit, allein — große, entscheidende Mitwirkung an den Schlachten blieb der Reiterei versagt, bis auf die weltberühmte Verfolgung nach der Schlacht von Waterloo (18. Juni 1815). Hier waren es die märkischen Dragoner und Ulanen, die unter Anführung des Chefs des Generalstabes der Blücher'schen Armee — v. Gneisenau — bis zum letzten Hauch von Mann und Ross die geschlagene französische Armee verfolgten, diese endgültig und vollständig zersprengten, so daß der Krieg beendet war.

Es folgten lange Friedensjahre. Die Ausbildung und die Art der Verwendung entsprachen nicht mehr den Erfordernissen des Ernstfalles — eine Erfahrung, die jede zu lange Friedenszeit bestätigt. Der Krieg von 1866 sah daher keine großen Taten; doch am Abend der Entscheidungsschlacht von Königgrätz (3. Juli 1866) ritten acht preussische Regimenter auf der blutgetränkten Walstatt von Strefetitz mit Tapferkeit und Schneid gegen die österreichischen Kavalleriedivisionen an und warfen sie.

Erst der Krieg von 1870/71 sollte wieder unvergänglichen Lorbeer um die Standarten der Kavallerie winden. Wer hat nicht schon gehört von den Attacken der 1. Gardedragonen bei Mars-la-Tour, der 7. Kürassiere und 16. Ulanen bei Dionville am 16. August 1870? In beiden Fällen wurden durch das todesmutige, energische Anreiten die vordringenden Franzosen zurückgeschlagen, der schwer ringenden Infanterie Luft gemacht und dadurch die Lage wiederhergestellt.

Am Abend desselben Tages fand auf der Hochebene von Ville-sur-Yvon, westlich von Metz, die größte Kavallerieschlacht der Neuzeit statt. Sechs deutsche Regimenter maßen sich mit der französischen Kavallerie. Das Ringen endete mit dem Rückzug der Franzosen.

Nach den Siegen des 18. August bei Gravelotte—St. Privat folgte die große Aufklärungs-tätigkeit der Kavallerie. Durch den Befehl des Generalstabschefs v. Moltke: „Kavallerie weit vor die Front“, setzten sich die Kavalleriedivisionen weit vor die Front der Armee und stellten den Abmarsch des Feindes nach Nordwesten fest.

Der vorauseilenden Kavallerie folgten die deutschen Heere, denen es gelang, das französische Heer mit seinem Kaiser bei Sedan einzuschließen und gefangenzunehmen.

In den folgenden, langen Friedensjahren wurde die Kavallerie aufs beste ausgebildet für ihre großen Aufgaben, die man ihr zugedacht: für die Aufklärung und für den Kampf mit der feindlichen Reiterei.

Man nahm als sicher an, daß zu Beginn eines Krieges auch auf der Feindseite die großen Kavalleriekörper sich zum Kampf stellen würden.

Viele Freiwillige der Reiterregimenter hatten sich in den Kämpfen in China um die Jahrhundertwende und in denen in Deutsch-Südwestafrika beteiligt und dort zum Ruhme der Waffe und zur Ehre des deutschen Vaterlandes gefochten.

Der große Krieg sah die deutsche Kavallerie in der achtungsgebietenden Stärke von 110 Regimentern gegen die Feinde ausrücken. Die Masse dieser Regimenter war in elf Kavalleriedivisionen zu je sechs Regimentern eingeteilt, während die übrigen als Divisionskavallerie — bei jeder Infanteriedivision ein Regiment — Verwendung fanden.

Die im Westen aufmarschierenden zehn Kavalleriedivisionen waren in vier Kavalleriekorps gegliedert, gegen die Russen war zunächst nur die 1. Kavalleriedivision verfügbar. In breiter Front in Frankreich und Belgien einmarschierend, lösten die deutschen Kavalleriedivisionen ihre erste Aufgabe: Schutz der deutschen Grenze und Verschleierung des eigenen Aufmarsches, in glänzender Weise. Das auf dem rechten Heeresflügel vorgehende 2. Kavalleriekorps übernahm vorauseilend die Sicherung und Aufklärung am Flügel und zog in großen Märschen durch Belgien und Nordwestfrankreich bis fast vor die Tore von Paris.

Die Marneschlacht (5. bis 15. Sept. 1914) brachte das siegreiche Vorgehen zum Stillstand. Allmählich erstarrten die Fronten im Westen im Schützengraben; für die Kavallerie bot sich hierbei kein Betätigungsfeld mehr.

Noch einmal ritten drei deutsche Kavalleriedivisionen Oktober 1914 am rechten Heeresflügel durch Flandern und Nordfrankreich weit ins Feindesland, dann zwang feindliche Übermacht auch hier die deutschen Heere zur Verteidigung.

Aber damit war die Tätigkeit der Kavallerie noch lange nicht zu Ende; ihr Schwerpunkt verlagerte sich gen Osten. Hier hatte im Sommerfeldzug die (ostpreussische) 1. Kavalleriedivision schon Hervorragendes in Aufklärung und Angriff gegen die gewaltige russische Übermacht geleistet. — Eine ihrer größten Taten war die Verschleierung gegen die russische Armee des Generals v. Rennenkampf, wodurch sie der deutschen 8. Armee, die Tannenberg schlug, den Rücken deckte und dadurch zu dem großen Siege beitrug. Im Sommer 1915 zogen deutsche Reitermassen nach Kurland hinein und eroberten hier weite Gebiete, um dann gegen Osten vorzudringen und sich an dem siegreichen Zurückschlagen der Russen zu beteiligen. Im Herbst des Jahres sehen wir ein aus fünf Kavalleriedivisionen bestehendes Kavalleriekorps in der Wilnaschlacht weit im Rücken des Feindes, dort Nachschub und Verbindung mit dem Hinterland unterbrechend und gegen die rückwärtigen Teile der russischen Armee vorgehend.

1916 hatte die Kavallerie rühmlichsten Anteil an der raschen Eroberung Rumäniens. Unter dem Generaleutnant Grafen

v. Schmettow war aus der 6. und 7. Kavalleriedivision ein Kavalleriekorps gebildet worden. Hatte dieses zunächst schwere Abwehrkämpfe in den Transylvanischen Alpen zu führen, so schlug dann nach geglücktem Kampf um den Austritt aus dem Gebirge in die weite Ebene der Walachei noch einmal die Stunde der Kavallerie. Am Flügel der Armee Falkenhayn, den Infanteriedivisionen voraus-eilend, war das Kavalleriekorps immer dort, wo es galt, durch Umfassung den




Photo Zellmann, Schwetzingen
Dragoner bei einer Kaiserparade vor dem Weltkrieg



Photo Eberl, Berlin
Ulanen bei Beginn des Weltkrieges



Übersetzen

Photo Echerl, Berlin

Feind anzugreifen und zu schlagen. Keiner der zahlreichen großen Wasserläufe, an denen der Feind die Brücken gesprengt oder die Vorbereitungen hierzu getroffen hatte — denn oft waren unsere Reiter schneller da —, vermochten den Siegesritt aufzuhalten.

Gegen die überall geschlagenen und zurückgehenden Rumänen kam die Reiterei zu vielen, schönen Erfolgen, die ihren Ausdruck in zahlreichen Gefangenen und erbeuteten Geschützen, MGs und Kolonnen usw. fanden.

Besondere Erwähnung verdient die 5. Schwadron des Kürassierregiments Nr. 2 (Rittmeister v. Borcke), der es in schneidiger Attacke bei Craiova gelang, 200 Mann feindliche Infanterie mit mehreren Offizieren gefangenzunehmen und eine Maschinengewehrabteilung auf Tragetieren zu erbeuten, die nicht mehr zum Feuern gekommen waren.

Am 5. Dezember nahmen Teile des Kavalleriekorps im Sandstreich ein Fort der Nordwestfront um Bukarest. Ein Zeichen dafür, was die Kavallerie gegen einen erschütterten Feind bei frischem Draufgehen zu leisten vermag! Der Schluß des Krieges sah die Masse der noch beritten gebliebenen Kavallerie in der Ukraine im Kampf gegen die Bolschewiken und den roten Terror und zur Sicherung der weiten, für die Ernährung des deutschen Volkes notwendigen Gebiete.

Ein Teil der Kavalleriedivisionen hatte die Pferde abgeben müssen, um als Schützen im Graben bei der Verteidigung ihrer Heimat ihren Mann zu stehen; sie haben sich als Infanteristen ebensogut bewährt wie als Reiter.

Es kam der düstere Tag von Versailles, der unser Zeer zerschlug.

Von den stolzen 110 Regimentern blieben 18 mit 97 Schwadronen, zusammengefaßt in drei Kavalleriedivisionen, übrig. Im Vergleich zu den anderen Waffen blieb noch ein verhältnismäßig starker Stamm erhalten, aus dem mit eisernem Fleiß eine neue Kavallerie geschaffen wurde, modern in der Ausbildung, aber in Geist und Erziehung auf den altbewährten Grundlagen aufbauend, würdig, die ruhmvollen, stolzen Traditionen in eine neue Zukunft zu retten. „Alles ist im Fluß“, und Stillstand ist tödlich. Unsere Zeit wird beherrscht vom Motor, seine

schnelle Fortentwicklung und Verwendung in Flugzeugen und Fahrzeugen aller Art hat auch die Bedeutung der Kavallerie — zumal in großen Verbänden — beeinflusst. Nicht mehr alle Verwendungsmöglichkeiten, die der kurze Abriss der Geschichte der Kavallerie uns zeigte, kommen heute für die Reiterei in Frage. Die Fernaufklärung haben die Flieger übernommen, und in den Rücken und in die Flanken des Feindes wird der moderne Feldherr kampfkraftige motorisierte oder Panzertruppen werfen. Mit der Einschränkung allerdings, daß ein einigermaßen ausgebautes Straßen- und Wegenetz vorhanden ist.

Im Osten unseres Vaterlandes ist dieses noch nicht in dem Maße und in der Güte vorhanden wie im Westen oder in der Mitte des Reiches. Sollten einmal kriegerische Verwicklungen eintreten, so wird der Osten noch auf lange Zeit hinaus ein Betätigungsfeld auch für größere Kavallerieverbände bieten. Hier in den weiten, menschen- und industriearmen Räumen, da haben auch heute noch Pferd und Reiter ihren Wert, da wird die Kavallerie unter tatkräftiger Führung dazu berufen sein, im Rücken oder in der Flanke eines Feindes zu erscheinen und so entscheidend an dem Siege mitzuwirken.

Um den Forderungen der Zeit gerecht zu werden, hat man sich entschlossen, manche Verbände der Kavallerie zu motorisieren. Wir sehen hierin eine notwendige Anpassung an die gegebenen Verhältnisse und betrachten die Schützen auf Kraßrad oder geländegängigem Wagen als unsere Kameraden.

Die Losung muß heute heißen: Pferd und Motor. Alle Kräfte, über die eine Nation verfügt, müssen der Verteidigung des Vaterlandes nutzbar gemacht werden.



Kavallerie auf dem Marsch

Photo Reystone, Berlin

Sind so Wandlungen im Bestand und in der Verwendung der Kavallerie nicht zu vermeiden gewesen, so bedeutet dies aber noch nicht das Ende der Kavallerie. Noch immer ist die Reiterei die beweglichste und geländegängigste Waffe. Für sie bieten weder Wald noch Berge, noch schlechte Wege, weder Dunkelheit noch Nebel und schlechte Witterung ein Hindernis.

So ist die Kavallerie so recht die Waffe für die Nah- und Gefechtsaufklärung. Vor dem Flieger hat sie voraus, daß sie genaueren Einblick in das Gelände erhält; ferner, daß sie durch das feindliche Feuer herausfindet, wo und welcher Art der Feind ist, und daß sie durch Einwohner und Gefangene wichtige Nachrichten erhalten kann.

Dem motorisierten Aufklärer gegenüber hat sie den Vorteil der größeren Geräuschlosigkeit und den, daß das Pferd seinen Reiter nicht in dem Maße beansprucht, wie der Motor seinen Fahrer, daß also der Reiter sein Augenmerk viel mehr auf den Feind richten kann. Der Reiter mit seinem treuen Pferd wird auch dann weiterreiten und an sein Ziel gelangen, wenn das Futter einmal nicht rechtzeitig oder gar nicht vorhanden ist, während jeder Motor ohne Kraftstoff sofort versagt.

Die Kavallerie stellt die Meldereiter, um die Verbindung zwischen den vorn kämpfenden Teilen aufrechtzuerhalten, wo technische Mittel noch nicht eingesetzt sind oder nicht eingesetzt werden können. Darüber hinaus aber wird der moderne Kavallerieführer auch Gelegenheiten erspähen, um auf Seitenwegen, gedeckt durch natürliche Bodenbewachung oder durch die Nacht, an den Feind heranzukommen.

So taucht die Gestalt des alten Zieten als Lehrmeister eines gewandten und verschlagenen Reiters, der sich in allen Lagen zurechtfinden muß, wieder auf. Verändert zwar die Waffen und die Bedingungen, unter denen man kämpft, aber der Geist ist der alte, der des rücksichtslosen, dreisten Vorwärtsreitens ran an den Feind!

Um diese vielseitigen Aufgaben lösen zu können, bedarf der Kavallerist einer sorgfältigen Ausbildung.



Tränken der Pferde

Photo Echerl, Berlin



Olympia-Jagdspringen

Photo Echerl, Berlin

Sichere Beherrschung des Pferdes, seines treuesten Mitkämpfers, ist erste Vorbedingung für den Reitersmann. Da das Reiten eine Kunst ist, die nicht jeder schnell erlernt, so ist es vorteilhaft, wenn die jungen Reitersleute schon von Haus aus mit Pferden umgehen können, auf jeden Fall müssen sie Lust und Liebe zu dem Tier mitbringen. Jeder Kavallerist ist ausgerüstet mit Karabiner und Säbel. Die vollkommene Beherrschung dieser Waffen wird gefordert, um sowohl als Einzelkämpfer wie auch im größeren Verband seinen Mann stehen zu können.

Welche Tätigkeit auch für den einzelnen Kavallerieverband im Vordergrund stehen mag, sicher ist, daß keine sich ohne Kampf abspielen wird, und um diesen zu führen, verfügt die Kavallerie über leichte und schwere Maschinengewehre. Alle Reiter werden am ersten, ein Teil am schweren Maschinengewehr ausgebildet. Wieder andere erlernen die Bedienung der Panzerabwehrkanonen, denn mit Sicherheit muß man heutzutage mit dem Auftreten feindlicher motorisierter Panzerfahrzeuge rechnen, und zu ihrer Abwehr verfügt auch die Kavallerie über motorisierte Panzerabwehrgeschütze.

Wieder andere werden als Kavalleriepioniere ausgebildet. Kein Wasserlauf darf das rasche Vorgehen der Kavallerie hindern, ruhende Truppen müssen durch Sperren, Minen usw. gegen Panzerfahrzeuge gesichert und Brücken, Straßen oder Bahnen für den Feind unbrauchbar gemacht werden können.

Auch sonst gibt es noch manche Aufgabe, für die die Kavalleriepioniere unentbehrlich sind. Endlich ist für jeden Kavalleristen sicheres Reiten und Zurechtfinden mit und ohne Karte in jedem Gelände erforderlich. Wieviel kann von dem rechtzeitigen Eintreffen einer wichtigen Meldung oder einer Abteilung an bestimmter Stelle abhängen!

Von den Führern aller Grade wird entschlossenes, oft selbständiges Handeln, Verständnis für die große Lage und die Fähigkeit, aus kurzen Augenblicken des Sehens richtige Schlüsse zu ziehen, gefordert.



Marſch durch Potsdam

Photo Echerl, Berlin

Wurde vor dem großen Kriege der Hauptwert auf die Ausbildung geschlossener Verbände gelegt, so liegt jetzt der Schwerpunkt auf der Ausbildung des einzelnen Reiters. Sein überlegenes Können soll ihn in die Lage setzen, es auch mit einer Mehrzahl von Feinden aufzunehmen. Bei der schicksalhaften Lage unseres Vaterlandes im Herzen von Europa müssen wir immer mit mehreren Gegnern rechnen, wie wir ja auch den ganzen Weltkrieg über stets gegen Übermacht kämpfen mußten.

Jeder deutsche Reitersmann wird während seiner Dienstzeit dahin erzogen, selbständig und entschlossen zu handeln, und sich immer klar zu sein, daß „Unterlassen und Versäumnis ihn schwerer belasten als Fehlgreifen in der Wahl der Mittel“.

Nach dem Grundsatz, daß nur Einfaches im Kriege Erfolg verspricht, sind alle gekünstelten Formen und Bewegungen, die früher das Kavallerie-Exerzierreglement kannte, verschwunden. Die Hauptform für Bewegung und Versammlung ist die Marschkolonne zu zweien.

Diese Form wird angewendet von dem Spähtrupp bis zu den größten Verbänden herauf. Die Marschkolonne eignet sich sowohl zum Bewegen auf Straßen und Wegen, wie sie auch biegsam im Gelände ist und sich überall leicht anpaßt. Eine Schwadron kann sich in Züge, ein Zug in Gruppen zerlegen und je nach Breite und Tiefe Zwischenräume oder Abstände nehmen und sich staffeln — immer in Marschkolonne — je nachdem feindliches Feuer oder Gelände oder Bedrohung durch Flieger zum Zerlegen zwingen.

Für Versammlung und Paraden stellt man die Einheiten — Züge bzw. Schwadronen — in sich in Marschkolonnen mit verringerten Abständen und Zwischenräumen auf und bekommt so eine geschlossene Masse auf engerem Raum.

Haben wir bisher von der Kavallerie als der Waffe und Truppe gesprochen, so mag zum Schluß noch auf folgendes hingewiesen werden. Das Wesen der Keiterei ist die Verbindung des Soldaten mit dem Pferde. Jedes Reiten ist aber an sich auch ein von jeher gepflegter ritterlicher Sport. Im Leben der Nationen spielt der Sport zur Zeit eine große Rolle; nach der Teilnahme an ihm und den sportlichen Erfolgen bemißt man Spannkraft und Lebenswillen der Völker. Die berufene Vertretung im Reitsport liegt bei der Kavallerie. Wir sehen daher mit Stolz in dem friedlichen Wettkampf auf dem grünen Rasen bei Turnieren im In- und Auslande unsere Vertreter der deutschen Keiterei sich mit den Besten der anderen Nationen messen und oft den Sieg erringen. Welch größerer Triumph ist wohl denkbar als der, daß bei der Olympiade 1936 in Berlin sämtliche im Reiten zu erringenden Goldmedaillen an die deutschen Reiter fielen? So tragen auch diese „friedlichen Siege“ mit dazu bei, Geltung und Ansehen unseres Vaterlandes in der Welt zu mehren.

Wir haben in einem kurzen Überblick die Geschichte der deutschen Kavallerie an uns vorüberziehen sehen, wir haben einen Einblick in das Wesen und Wirken der modernen Kavallerie getan. Nicht umsonst hat man den jetzt bestehenden deutschen Reiterregimentern Traditionen der alten Regimente gegeben. Die Erfahrungen einer langen Kriegs- und Friedenszeit, aber auch der Ruhm und die Erinnerung an stolze Taten sollen auf die jungen Soldaten der jetzigen Generation übergehen und sie mit Stolz erfüllen und zum Nacheifern anspornen.

Waffen und Kampfesart sind Änderungen unterworfen, die Grundbedingungen kriegerischen Wirkens bleiben unverändert.

Tradition verpflichtet! Eine Waffe, die so stolze und ruhmvolle Überlieferung zu wahren hat, wird auch unter veränderten Verhältnissen alles daransetzen, das Beste zu leisten und auf der Höhe der Ausbildung für den modernen Krieg zu bleiben. Mit dem Generalobersten v. Seckt sind wir der Meinung, daß „die Tage neuzeitlich ausgerüsteter und geführter Keiterei nicht gezählt sind, und daß sie noch immer zuversichtlich ihr Fähnlein im Winde der Zukunft flattern lassen darf“.

Kuft dann eines Tages das Vaterland zu seiner Verteidigung, dann wird auch die deutsche Kavallerie wieder ihren Mann stehen, zum Schutze des Vaterlandes, zur Ehre der Waffe und in Treue zum Führer!

Geschichte der II./Aufklärungs-Regiment 6

August 1934 — April 1938

von Oberleutnant von Luch

Am 1. Oktober 1929 wurde erstmalig der Versuch gemacht, durch die Motorisierung der 3. Schwadron/Reiter-Regiment 4 Erfahrungen für spätere größere Motorisierungen der Kavallerie zu sammeln. Unter der Führung von Rittmeister Schmelzer, später Rittmeister Kiebel, entwickelte sich die Schwadron derartig günstig, daß sie am 1. August 1934 zusammen mit der Kraftfabr.-Abteilung Wünsdorf die Stämme stellen konnte für die Gründung der Kraftfabr.-Abteilung Potsdam.

Am diesem Tage übernahm der Kommandeur, Major Neumann-Silfow, aus Teilen von acht Reiter-Regimentern und den Stämmen der 3. Schwadron/Reiter-Regiment 4 und Kraftfabr.-Abteilung Wünsdorf seine Abteilung, die an Bunttheit der Regimentsnummern und reiterlichem Können sich einen Namen hätte machen können, noch nicht aber im Rahmen der ihr gestellten Aufgabe, als motorisierte Aufklärungs-Abteilung weit vor den eigenen Linien und Seeersteilen aufzuklären. Mit der Roja-Waffenfarbe und der Bezeichnung Kraftfabr.-Abteilung Potsdam begann der Kommandeur mit folgenden Kompaniechefs und Offizieren an seine schwere Aufgabe heranzutreten:

Offizierstellenbesetzung:

Kommandeur:	Major Neumann-Silfow
Adjutant:	Oberleutnant von Jabeck
Hauptmann beim Stabe:	Hauptmann von Mantewffel
Stab- und Nachrichten-Zug:	Oberleutnant Beck
1. Kompanie:	Hauptmann Kiebel
Panzerpäh-Kompanie	Oberleutnant Troitzsch
2. Kompanie:	Hauptmann Müller
Kradschützen-Kompanie	Leutnant von Luch
	Leutnant von Gaudecker
3. Kompanie:	Hauptmann Febr. v. Eckhardtstein
schwere Kompanie	Oberleutnant Weltner
	Leutnant von Schkopp



Oberleutnant Neumann-Silfow
Kommandeur der II./Aufklärungs-Regiment 6



Die Offiziere der Aufklärungs-Abteilung 8

Foto: G. Berger, Potsdam



Hauptmann (E) Senke, Stab
Foto: Archiv Limpert



Leutnant Koch, Adjutant
Foto: Archiv Limpert



Stabszahlmeister Zahn
Foto: Schatzmann, Potsdam

Die Abteilung unterstand der 1. Kavallerie-Division, wo sie unter der Führung von Generalleutnant Feige und Generalleutnant Freiherr von Wilnowsky ihren ersten Zusammenhalt und Aufschwung fand und ab 1. Oktober 1935 die Bezeichnung Aufklärungs-Abteilung 8 führte. Im Verlauf des Aufbaus der Motorisierung und der Auflösung der Heereskavallerie wurde sie mit vier anderen Aufklärungs-Abteilungen am 1. April 1936 der Aufklärungs-Brigade Berlin, mit dem Brigade-Kommandeur Oberst Stever, unterstellt.

Nachdem sich in diesem Rahmen die Abteilung durch ihre Leistungen und ihren vorbildlichen Geist einen Namen gemacht hatte, wurde sie im weiteren Heeresaufbau am 1. Oktober 1937 mit der Aufklärungs-Abteilung 6 als Aufklärungs-Regiment 6, unter Führung des Regimentskommandeurs Oberstleutnant von Bülow, der 1. leichten Division unter Generalmajor Hoepner unterstellt.

Nach häufigem Wechsel einzelner Offiziere, der Heranbildung eigenen Offizier-Nachwuchses und der Aufstellung einer weiteren Kompanie im Versuch ist die Stellenbesetzung am 1. Januar 1938 folgende:

Offizierstellenbesetzung:

- Stab:
- Oberstleutnant Neumann-Silkow, Abteilungs-Kommandeur
 - Leutnant Koch, Adjutant
 - Hauptmann (E) Senke
 - Stabszahlmeister Zahn
 - Oberzahlmeister Bder
 - Regierungsbaurat Marten
 - Oberfeldwebel Wegener



Hauptmann Ziervogel
5. Aufklärungs-Regiment 6
Foto: Sandau, Berlin W 8





Hauptmann von Tabe
6. Aufklärungs-Regiment 6
Foto: Archiv Limpert



Oberstleutnant von Lutz
7. Aufklärungs-Regiment 6
Foto: Archiv Limpert

Unteroffizierkorps 6. / Aufklärungs-Regiment 6

Foto: Th. Reimers, Potsdam



Unteroffizierkorps 7. / Aufklärungs-Regiment 6

Foto: Th. Reimers, Potsdam



Unteroffizierkorps 8. / Aufklärungs-Regiment 6

Foto: Th. Reimers, Potsdam



Unteroffiziere des Stabes II. Aufklärungs-Regiment 6

Foto: Th. Reimers, Potsdam



Unteroffizierkorps 5. Aufklärungs-Regiment 6

Foto: Archiv Limpert



Hauptmann Freiherr von Eckhardtstein
8. Aufklärungs-Regiment 6



Oberfeldwebel Wegener
Stab II. Aufklärungs-Regiment 6



Oberfeldwebel Gerull
5. Aufklärungs-Regiment 7

5. Kompanie:
Stabskompanie

Hauptmann Hiervogel, Kompaniechef
Leutnant Toeske
Leutnant von Wolff
Leutnant d. R. Freiherr von Fürstenberg
Oberfeldwebel Gerull

6. Kompanie:
Panzerpab-Kompanie:

Hauptmann von Jabeck, Kompaniechef
Leutnant von Miglaff
Leutnant d. R. Molinari
Oberfeldwebel Wittenburg

7. Kompanie:
Kradschützen-Kompanie

Oberleutnant von Luck, Kompaniechef
Leutnant Graf von Pfeil u. Klein-Ellguth
Oberfeldwebel Kuschel

8. Kompanie:
schwere Kompanie

Hauptmann Freiherr von Eckhardtstein, Kompaniechef
Leutnant d. R. Dr. Richter
Oberfeldwebel Brenneisen

Mitte Februar treten vom Waffenlehrgang in Döberitz zur Abteilung die Leutnante:
von Büнау, von Studnitz, Graf von Rittberg, von Rothkirch und Panthen.

In vielen Übungen und Manövern konnte die Abteilung das, was sie im Standort gelernt hatte, durch
Erfahrungen erhärten und lernte große Teile Deutschlands mit ihrer Bevölkerung und ihren ver-
schiedensten Charakteren kennen.



Oberfeldwebel Wittenburg
6. Aufklärungs-Regiment 6



Oberfeldwebel Kuschel
7. Aufklärungs-Regiment 6
Fotos: Archiv Limpert (5), Reimers, Potsdam (1)



Oberfeldwebel Brenneisen
8. Aufklärungs-Regiment 6

Die Bayerische Pfalz, die Fränkische Schweiz, Württemberg, Hessen, das Sauerland, Westfalen sind genau so wie die Lüneburger Heide, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, Pommern und die Mark feste Begriffe für die Abteilung geworden und haben den Horizont aller erweitert und den Blick für die abwechslungsreiche Schönheit unserer Heimat geschult. Besonders sticht aus diesen Zeiten harten Dienstes und schönen Erlebens der Abteilung die Übergabe der Standarte durch den Führer und Obersten Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht bei Giebelstadt mit dem anschließenden Hessenmanöver 1936 sowie das große Wehrmachtmanöver 1937 hervor. Ebenso werden die jährlichen Vereidigungen der Rekruten der Abteilung auf dem historischen Boden im Lustgarten von Potsdam für alle unvergesslich sein.

Neben dem harten und anstrengenden Dienst unterließ es die Abteilung nicht, ihr Können durch sportliche Veranstaltungen mit Kraftfahrzeugen und dabei erzielte Erfolge unter Beweis zu stellen, in Geländebesprechungen sich weiter zu schulen, durch Sportfeste seine Vielseitigkeit zu beweisen.

Viele Goldmedaillen und Mannschaftspreise befinden sich heute in Händen der Abteilung, unter anderen der Preis des Oberbefehlshabers des Heeres für die beste Mannschaft der Brigade in der Vielseitigkeitsprüfung. Keiner der Offiziere wird die Geländebesprechungen bei Hamburg—Bremen und in den Alpen vergessen, die gleichermaßen die taktische Ausbildung wie das Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl im Offizierkorps förderten.

Durch Vorführungen, Sportfeste, Zeitungsberichte und Wochenschauen gelang es der Abteilung, über den Rahmen der Garnisonstadt hinaus mit der Bevölkerung, ihren Reserveoffizieren und aus-
geschiedenen Soldaten engste Fühlung aufzunehmen und zu erhalten.

Aus der unbekanntem, bunt zusammengewürfelten Abteilung wurde, wenn auch der Name wechselte, eine Einheit, die nicht nur im Heere, sondern darüber hinaus in ihrer Garnisonstadt und bei der Bevölkerung ein Begriff geworden ist.

Das Urteil ihrer höchsten Vorgesetzten ist der beste Beweis, daß hier ein Stein im Aufbau des Heeres gefügt wurde, der allen an ihn herantretenden Anforderungen standhalten wird, zum Wohle unseres Volkes und seines Führers.



II. / Aufklärungs-Regiment 6

Foto: Hochgeladen, Potsdam

Geschichte der Aufklärungs-Abteilung 8

Vom 1. November 1938 bis zum 1. April 1939

II. (Aufklärungs-Regiment 6)

Vom 1. April 1938 bis zum 1. November 1938

von Leutnant von Rothkirch, 3. Aufklärungs-Abteilung 8



Vier Jahre besteht die Potsdamer M. (mot.), die, den zweiten Namen tragend, für das Jahr 1938 innerhalb des Verbandes des Aufklärungs-Regiments 6 der 1. leichten Division untersteht.

Durch viele Gaue Deutschlands ist sie in dieser Zeit gerollt.

In Bergen ist die Abteilung gewesen, hat Waldbrände gelöscht, Scharfschießen und Besichtigung hinter sich und spielt sich mehr und mehr in den

Rahmen des von Oberst von Bülow geführten Regimentes ein.

Von Juli bis September liegt sie im Standort. Währenddessen tauchen am politischen Himmel Wetterwolken auf. Im Süden des Reiches macht der kleine tschecho-slowakische Staat sich immer unliebsamer bemerkbar. Doch, was kümmert's die Abteilung. Sie hat das große Sportfest vor sich, das heuer wie alljährlich den Abschluß des Ausbildungsjahres anzeigt.

Wochen und Tage vergehen schnell. Am 28. August, einem schönen Spätsommertag, ist Potsdam bei uns in der Gardes-du-Corps-Kaserne. Vor der Kaserne stehen zwei Panzerspähwagen, neben ihnen zwei Posten in der schmucken, schwarzen Uniform der Panzerschützen. Sie tragen ihre Sandwaffe, die Maschinepistole.

Die Tribünen und das weite Rund der Fahrbahn sind dicht besetzt und umstellt von einer erwartungsfrohen Menge.

Eben zeigt die Kasernenuhr 14.00 Uhr, schon kommen, tadellos ausgerichtet, im Laufschrift nach einem Kavalleriemarsch Turnabteilungen in Trainingsanzügen auf den Platz. Ein Pfiff! Leichtathletik jeder Art führen die Soldaten vor. Vom leichten Spiel mit dem Medizinball über Bodengymnastik, Röhrenradfahren bis zum schwierigsten Reck- und Barrenturnen ziehen die Bilder bunt an uns vorüber. Die Stimme des nie fehlenden Anjagers untermalt die einzelnen Übungen. Musik klingt auf, die Sportabteilungen rücken ab, um jetzt den Kradaakrobaten, unter Führung von Feldwebel Ehrhardt, das Feld freizumachen.

Da kommen sie, weiß leuchten die Anzüge, freihändig, mit den Knien das Krad lenkend, stehen sie auf der Maschine. Einmal umfahren sie das Rund des Platzes, um nun an der Ausfahrt schon mit einer neuen Attraktion zu beginnen. Erst mit

einem, dann mit zwei, schließlich mit vier Soldaten auf der Maschine. Mustergültig erfüllen sie ihre schwere Aufgabe. Beifall klingt auf, pausiert nicht, als jetzt unser Glanzstück heranrollt. Die auf zwei gekoppelten Maschinen von 15 Mann gestellte, fahrende Großpyramide. Endloser Beifall zwingt die braven Soldaten immer wieder zur Wiederholung.

So vergehen Stunden der Freude und Begeisterung, und schon am nächsten Tage sind wir in den Vorarbeiten für die Manöver.

Wieder vollzieht sich, wie in jedem Herbst, der reibungslose Ablauf aller der Arbeiten, die für die Marschfertigkeit der Abteilung noch notwendig



(Foto: Uffz. Walter 3. AA 8.)

sind. Die Stimmung der Soldaten geht hoch, liegt ja auch der schönste Teil des Soldatenjahres, das Manöver, vor uns. Die Augen aller leuchten. Sie leuchten aber in einem anderen Glanz als sonst. Liegt doch über uns allen immer dringender, immer bestimmter die Frage: „Was wird mit Sudetendeutschland?“ Ahnen doch alle, daß zur Entscheidung dieses Problems die deutsche Wehrmacht beitragen wird. Noch ist alles ungewiß.

Gar mancher schaut im Morgenmehl des 10. September mit einem letzten, liebevollen Blick über die gute, alte Kaserne. „Werden wir sie wiedersehen?“ Diese Frage liegt über uns allen, als sich um 6.00 Uhr der Schlagbaum beim Pfortner hebt und Fahrzeug um Fahrzeug aus der Kaserne rollt — hinein in eine schwere, ungewisse Zukunft.

In flottem Marsch geht es in Richtung Süden. Heller Sonnenschein liegt nun schon seit vielen Tagen über dem Thüringer Land. Übung um Übung haben wir schon hinter uns.

Noch einmal werden unsere Gedanken von den großen Ereignissen dieser Tage abgelenkt durch die letzte große Übung, das letzte Divisionsmanöver. Haben wir schon in den Wochen vorher begeistert alle Manövertage und -übungen mitgemacht, so steigt heute nach Bekanntgabe der

Lage die Stimmung doch auf den Höhepunkt. Morgen wird die 1. leichte Division ihr Können unter Beweis stellen.

Zell und sternklar ist die Nacht, als wir nach dem Übungsraum Zwickau aufbrechen. Heute haben wir „Rot“ gesetzt, heute sind wir „Feind“. Die ganze Division wird heute nur gegen drei zusammengestellte Schützenkompanien angreifen. Aus den Jügen werden Kompanien, aus den Kompanien Bataillone und Abteilungen, um den äußeren Rahmen füllen zu können, den die Lage vorschreibt.

Ostwärts Zwickau entbrennt um 9.00 Uhr der Kampf. Ungeheure Begeisterung hat uns alle gepackt, nur ungern erfüllen wir heute die Aufgabe, „Feind“ zu sein und zurückgehen zu müssen. Doch wir wissen, es ist die Generalprobe für uns alle. Sozusagen das Vorüber mit Platzpatronen vor dem Schulschießen.

Zäh und verbissen kämpfen wir um jeden Fußbreit Bodens, doch langsam, in hinhaltendem Widerstand rückwärts gehend, müssen wir Ort um Ort, Geländestreifen um Geländestreifen dem übermächtigen Gegner überlassen. Schon steht die Sonne im Zenith. Immer noch knattern die Maschinengewehre, rollt das Artilleriefeuer, bellen die Pak und 2-cm-Kanonen. Weiter und weiter müssen wir zurück. Unaufhaltsam dringt die Division vor. Endlich bei St. Egidien haben wir eine Stellung an einem Berghang gefunden, aus der wir nicht so leicht zu vertreiben sind. Hin und her wogt der Kampf, doch nirgends gelingt es dem Gegner, Raum zu gewinnen, hinter die



(Foto: Gefr. Kloss 3. AA. 8)

Bahnlinie zu kommen. Schon beginnt die Munition für uns knapp zu werden, bald müssen wir die Reservisten angreifen. Da plötzlich tauchen in der flanke Kampfwagen auf. Vor unseren Augen entrollt sich nun ein phantastisches Bild. Kampfwagen um Kampfwagen bricht aus dem Wald hervor. Sofort haben wir einen Frontwechsel voll-

zogen. Zwischen unseren MG-Stellungen haben sich Panzerabwehrkanonen geschoben und beginnen, mit feurigem Gebell den überlegenen Feind zu stoppen. Da tauchen blaue Fieger auf. Im Tiefangriff, wenige Meter über dem Boden dahinrasend, bedrängen sie hart unsere Linien und zwingen uns immer wieder, irgendwo Deckung zu nehmen. Unsere Abwehr, dadurch geschwächt, kann den Gegner nicht mehr am Vordringen hindern. Zum hinhaltenden Widerstand ist unsere Kraft zu schwach; so heißt es jetzt: Verteidigung bis zur letzten Patrone. Die Sonne geht im Westen schon zur Kiste, als endlich das von 22 000 Soldatenherzen sehnsüchtig erwartete und freudig begrüßte Signal „Das Ganze — halt!“ erklingt. Nun tauchen aus allen Vertiefungen, Bodenwellen, Gras und Getreidegarben Soldaten auf, die man vordem gar nicht gesehen hatte. Nun, da der „Krieg“ zu Ende ist, sind wir wieder Kameraden. Kameraden, zusammengeschweisst für die kommenden schweren Ereignisse, die uns bevorstehen.

Blutrot versinkt die Sonne, und bald steigt aus dem im abendlichen Nebeldunst liegenden Osten der Mond empor. Tausende und aber Tausende von Sternen leuchten über unserem Heimweg.

In Ausübung seiner Pflicht starb
der
Obergefreite Kabott (4. U. 8)

Tag für Tag neue Nachrichten, endlich der erste Befehl, der den Ernst der Stunde zeigt. In aller Stille werden daraufhin sämtliche Fahrzeuge auf den Ausweichplatz gebracht und im Schatten uralter Linden, vorzüglich gegen tschechische Fieger getarnt, aufgestellt. Auf den Dächern stehen von nun an deutsche Soldaten mit ihren Maschinengewehren, um den Tschechen das unberechtigte Überfliegen deutschen Hoheitsgebietes ein für allemal zu verfallen. Liebevoll gleitet der Blick über die blanken Messinghülsen der scharfen Munition und die schwarzen Metallteile des treuen Kameraden, des Maschinengewehrs. Wann und wo wird es zum Schutz deutscher Menschen zum erstenmal seine helle, eberne Stimme erheben?

Endlich kommt der Marschbefehl. Kurz sind die Maßnahmen, einige Stunden darauf stehen die Kompanien fahrbereit. Mitten unter uns, neben uns steht die Bevölkerung, bewußt des Ernstes der Lage, gibt sie uns ihre besten Wünsche mit auf den Weg. Blumen werden gereicht, Liebesgaben, dann braust das Lied der Motoren auf und in herrlichster Stimmung, trotz des schweren Abschieds, rollen wir hinaus aus der Stadt, die uns Wochen Heimat gewesen.

Bald rollt Fahrzeug um Fahrzeug dahin über das

weißglänzende Band der Autobahn. Schon sinkt der Abend herab, als wir, die Autobahn verlassend, die erste bayerische Stadt, Hof, erreichen. An den Straßen steht die Bevölkerung. Blumen fallen in Wagen und Kräder, Zigaretten und Schokolade wirft man uns zu. An der großen Brücke steht der Divisionskommandeur, Generalleutnant Zoepfner, und nimmt den Vorbeimarsch seiner Division entgegen. Die Nacht bricht herein. Trübe und verhangen leuchtet der Mond auf uns nieder. Die einsam bewaldeten Höhen des Böhmerwaldes nehmen uns auf.

Vorläufiges Marschziel die Stadt Mitterteich. Der Mond hat sich inzwischen hinter einer tiefhängenden, undurchdringlichen Wolkendecke versteckt, leichter Regen kommt auf. Wie Tausende von Geister sind die roten Stopplichter der Fahrzeuge anzusehen, wenn der Weg einmal eine Gegenkurve nimmt. Kein Fahrzeug darf helles Licht führen, alle Lampen sind mit blauen Blendkappen versehen. Scharf sind die Augen der Fahrer auf das rote Licht des Vordermannes gerichtet. Er darfs nicht verlieren, sonst reißt rettungslos die Kolonne auseinander. Kein Straßenrand, kein Baum ist zu erkennen, nur der vor uns fahrende Wagen zeigt uns den Weg.

Jetzt erst erkennen wir richtig den Wert der so oft verwünschten Fahrübungen bei Nacht ohne Licht. Kein Fahrer, er sei denn Soldat, kann ermessen, welche große Leistung hier von den vielen hundert Fahrern der Division vollbracht wird.

In Ausübung ihrer Pflicht starben
hier
Oberschütze Wilke (Stab)
Schütze Wegner (Stab)

Die ersten Häuser von Mitterteich tauchen vor uns auf; endlich wieder ein Licht, eine Straßenlaterne. In einer Straße kommen die Kompanien notdürftig unter. Die Fahrzeuge dicht an den Häusern. Verpflegungs- und Marschpause, Dauer zwei Stunden. Schon versuchen die Fahrer, einige Minuten zu schlafen, um bald wieder frisch zu sein. Beifahrer und Soziasfahrer, Offizier und Unteroffizier greifen zu, um den Fahrern dieses Mal die Arbeit des Tankens abzunehmen. Bald ist auch das getan. Nun noch 30 Minuten wirkliche Pause. Erschöpft fällt jeder in einen kurzen, traumlosen Schlaf. Nur die Schritte der schnell aufgestellten Wachtposten erinnern daran, daß hier noch Leben herrscht. Kaum sind wir eingeschlafen, da gellt schon wieder der Ruf: „fertigmachen!“ durch die Straße. Minuten vergehen, und dann rollen wir wie vorher auf der Straße weiter, dem neuen Marschziel, Tannesberg, entgegen. Der Regen hat aufgehört, ein eisiger Wind drückt uns

tief in die Wagenitze und läßt uns jedes Stückchen Stoff mehr heranziehen.

7.45 Uhr zeigt die Wagenuhr, als wir endlich vor uns im hellen Mondlicht den Kirchturm von Tannesberg erkennen. Hier findet die ganze Abteilung Unterkunft. Schnell sind die Ortsviertel verteilt. Bald liegen die Soldaten auf dem Stroh. Ein heller, klarer Morgen ist angebrochen. Längst steht die Sonne hoch am Himmel, als wir aus dem Stroh kriechen und die Glieder recken.

Da empfängt uns ein Gerücht, das unsere Herzen schneller schlagen läßt. Es soll losgehen. Morgen schon werden wir endgültig marschieren, um nun endlich zur Befreiung unserer Brüder im Sudetenland gegen die tschechische Willkür anzutreten. Hoch geht die Stimmung, überall nur freudige Gesichter, obwohl noch keine Bestätigung dieses Gerüchtes da ist. Liebevoll gleitet der Blick über Fahrzeuge und Maschinengewehre. Überall sind die Soldaten eifrig damit beschäftigt, die letzten Handgriffe für die Marschbereitschaft zu tun. Nun endlich wird man uns einsegnen. Nirgends ein ängstliches Gesicht, nirgends Worte der Befürchtung. Bei den Soldaten ist eine unendliche Begeisterung eingetreten.

Die Photoapparate arbeiten, um hier und da noch einmal die Züge und Gruppen in ihrer Geschlossenheit im Wilde festzuhalten. Vielleicht sind wir heute zum letzten Male zusammen.

Zugführer zum Chef. Die Spannung hat ihren Höhepunkt erreicht, nun wird uns endlich der heißersehnte Angriffsbefehl gegeben werden. Dank dem Schicksal, das uns diese großen Tage erleben ließ.

In einer kleinen Bauernstube, deren Bewohner sich für einige Minuten zurückgezogen haben, steht ein Zug. Freudig ernst auch hier die Gesichter. Wissen doch alle, daß jetzt der Zugführer den so lange erwarteten Befehl geben wird. Schweigend hören sie aus dem Munde des Offiziers die Anordnungen für den morgigen Tag. Noch einmal werden die notwendigen Vorbereitungen durchgesprochen, geprüft, dann entläßt der Zugführer seine Leute.

Das Ereignis des Münchener Abkommens zerstört alle kriegerischen Abnungen, und am 4. Oktober marschieren auch wir ein.

Wenige Sekunden noch, und der Schlagbaum bei Waidhaus hebt sich, um die Spitze der leichten Division, die II./A. 6, ins befreite Sudetenland einzulassen. Am Zollhaus steht der Divisionskommandeur und grüßt Fahrzeug um Fahrzeug seiner Truppe. Mit lachenden Gesichtern und leuchtenden Augen fahren wir heute an ihm vorüber.

Vor uns das erste „tschechische“ Dorf. Girlanden und Wimpel, Blumen und Kränze begrüßen uns am Eingang. Schnell gemalte Transparente —

sind doch die Tschechen hier erst wenige Stunden vorher abgerückt — leuchten von den Häusern. Und nun beginnt die größte Fahrt unseres Lebens. Ein Jubel ohnegleichen empfängt uns bereits hier am Anfang unseres Vormarsches. Unsere Erwartungen von der Begeisterung der Bevölkerung werden völlig übertroffen. So etwas hatten wir nicht im entferntesten erwartet, geschweige denn für möglich gehalten. Je weiter wir ins Land fahren, um so größer wird der Jubel, der uns empfängt. Blumen über Blumen, Zigaretten zu Hunderten, Brot, Obst und viele andere Dinge füllen unsere Wagen. Die Bevölkerung schreit, weint, lacht, es ist kaum mit Worten zu sagen, welche Eindrücke uns allein hier, schon kurz hinter der „alten“ Grenze, begegnen.

Die ehemals tschechischen Dorfschilder sind von der Bevölkerung längst übermalt, überall begrüßen uns schon deutsche Worte. Immer wieder, durch jeden Ort, den wir durchfahren, branden die Heil- und Jubelrufe empor. Die Bevölkerung steht seit Stunden an den Straßen. Alt und jung, Männer und Frauen sind da. Verlassen sind die Häuser, kein Mensch denkt heute an häusliche Arbeiten. Das Sudetenland feiert seinen größten Tag, den Tag der Befreiung, der Heimkehr zum Mutterlande.

Bruck am Hammer. Die von den Tschechen aufgepflügte, von den Sudetendeutschen rasch und norddürftig wieder eingeebnete Straße ist das erste, was uns an die Stunden und Tage vorher zurückdenken läßt.

Hier soll Quartier bezogen werden. Eine Wiese, schnell als Parkplatz ausgesucht, nimmt unsere Fahrzeuge auf. Dann empfängt uns die jubelnde Bevölkerung. Das Beste, was sie hat, ist gerade gut genug, um es uns, den Soldaten des Führers, geben zu können. Die Leute schlafen auf Stroh in der Scheune, nur damit die Soldaten ein Bett haben. Ununterbrochen müssen wir essen. Wir danken, lehnen ab, weil wir einfach nicht mehr können. Doch sie lassen sich nicht abweisen. Freudig geben sie uns alles, was sie haben, nur um uns damit eine Freude zu machen.

Am Abend unser erster „Manöverball“ auf tschechischem Boden. Entrüstet hat man es abgelehnt, als wir Bier kaufen wollten. Nun rollen sie es tonnenweise heran. Es ist leichtes Pilsner Bier, man kann schon eine ganze Menge vertragen. Wir singen alte und neue Soldatenlieder. Ungeheuer ist die Begeisterung, als unsere Musikkapelle den Egerländer Marsch intoniert.

Lange nach Mitternacht erst gehen wir heute zu Bett.

Klar und kalt ist der nächste Morgen, als wir uns zum Marsch wieder in Bewegung setzen. Weiter geht es, der einstigen tschechischen Befestigungslinie entgegen. Scharf sind unsere Blicke nach vorn gerichtet. Gespannt schaut jeder nach



(Foto: Lt. v. Studnitz, AA. 8)

den berühmten tschechischen Bunkern, die hier und da im Gelände verstreut sind. Drahtverhaue, Tankfallen, spanische Reiter auf deutschem Boden, von fremder Hand gebaut, um deutsche Soldaten an der Befreiung dieses urdeutschen Landes zu hindern. Hier wären wir durchgebrochen, hier wäre wohl so mancher von uns liegengelassen, um niemals die Heimat wiederzusehen. Doch wenn auch viele gefallen wären, wir wären durchgebrochen und hätten auch den letzten Winkel dieses mosaikhaften Staates erobert. Weiter geht es gen Pilsen. Unterwegs begegnen uns immer häufiger entlassene sudetendeutsche Soldaten. Sie tragen fast alle noch die tschechische Uniform, doch ihr Blick ist freudig, ihre Seele frei und begeistert rufen sie uns „Heil Hitler!“ zu. Bei einem kurzen Halt am Straßenrand wird bekanntgegeben, daß mit dem Zusammentreffen mit Teilen der „Roten Wehr“ zu rechnen sei. Erfreut nehmen wir diese Nachricht auf. Gar mancher hört schon das ehrene Lied der Maschinengewehre im Geiste erklingen. Doch nichts zeigt sich beim Weitermarsch. Überall nur die Spuren ehemaliger tschechischer Besetzung, überall Sperren, Drahtverhaue und Hindernisse jeglicher Art. Die Bevölkerung hat alle Hemmnisse weggeräumt, und so dringen wir unaufhaltsam vorwärts. Wieder teilt sich die Abteilung. Die Kompanien verteilen sich auf die Dörfer: Wscheran (Stab, 5., 6. Kompanie), Mosting (8. Kompanie), Zahradka (7. Kompanie), Kunowitz (8. Kompanie). Hier wird wohl nun die neue Grenze verlaufen, sagt man.

So vergehen die Tage. Es kommt der 16. Oktober und mit ihm die Nachricht, daß wir bald abgelöst werden. Alles freut sich schon sehr auf Potsdam, wenn uns auch der Abschied aus diesem schönen Lande nicht leicht werden wird. Haben wir doch hier so manch' schöne Stunde verlebt. „Heute Nacht geht's los,“ kommt eben ein Melder. Nun wird alles wieder gepackt. Die draußen liegenden Züge werden durch Funk und Telephon verständigt. Gegen 12 Uhr nachts gellen die Alarmtrompeten. Bald setzt sich die Kompanie wieder in Bewegung.

Nach kurzem Marsch trifft die Abteilung zusammen, und nun geht es heimwärts.

Gerade als die ersten Sonnenstrahlen das herblich bunte Laub des Böhmerwaldes aufleuchten lassen, überschreiten wir die ehemalige Grenze, um der Heimatstadt Potsdam entgegenzufahren.

Am Nachmittag des 18. Oktober zieht die Abteilung wieder in Potsdam ein.

Geschichte des AA. 8

vom 1. November 1938 bis 1. April 1939

Der 1. November ist für die II./A. 6 von besonderer Bedeutung. Die Abteilung scheidet aus dem Verbande des Aufklärungs-Regiments 6 aus und wird innerhalb der 5. Panzerdivision (Generalleutnant v. Vietinghoff) wieder selbständige AA. (mot.). Zugleich erhält sie den Namen wieder, den sie drei Jahre getragen hat: AA. 8.

Mit dem 1. November verliert die Abteilung ihre rosa Waffenfarbe, die sie seit ihrer Gründung trug, und erhält dafür goldgelb, die Farbe der Kavallerie.

Der allseitig beliebte und verehrte Kommandeur Herr Oberst Neumann-Silkow, Major v. Eckardstein, Hauptmann (E) Senke, Oberleutnant Koch, Leutnant v. Fürstenberg, Leutnant Noeske, Leutnant Graf v. Rittberg, Leutnant Kettler sowie Oberleutnant v. Luck mit dem größten Teil der 7. Kompanie verlassen die Abteilung, um in den Verband des Aufklärungs-Regiments 7 überzugehen.

So beginnt mit dem 1. November ein neuer Abschnitt für die Abteilung.

Ihre Führung liegt jetzt in den Händen von Oberleutnant Grolig (AA. 6). Ihm zur Seite stehen:

Stab: Leutnant v. Mitzlaff, Adjutant
Leutnant v. Studnitz, Nachrichten-Offizier
Stabszahlmeister Jahn
Regierungsbaurat Behrke
Oberzahlmeister Dug

1. Schwadron: Rittmeister Ziervogel
Leutnant Molinari
2. Schwadron: Oberleutnant Gassel (AA. 6)
Leutnant v. Bünau
Leutnant v. Bartenwerffer
3. Schwadron: Rittmeister Goeffner (31. D.)
Leutnant Graf Pfeil
Leutnant v. Rothkirch
4. Schwadron: Oberleutnant Dr. Richter
Leutnant Dyckerhoff

Am Ende des Jahres verläßt nach zweijähriger Tätigkeit innerhalb der AA. 8 Rittmeister Ziervogel die Abteilung, um in den Stab der AA. 6

überzutreten. An seine Stelle tritt Kittmeister Kewisch (s. A. 6).

Die Winterausbildung vergeht und die Schwadronen stehen kurz vor den Rekrutenbefichtigungen, als am Nachmittag des 13. März der Alarmruf: „marschbereit machen“ die Abteilung aus dem Einerlei des täglichen Dienstes herausreißt.

Am nächsten Morgen gegen 10 Uhr rollt die junge M. 8 aus der alten Gardes-du-Korps-Kaserne in Richtung Schlesien.

Wir sind in Kosenbain. Schnell werden die Kaspeläge ausgefucht, die Einweiser an die Straße gestellt. Kurz darauf trifft die Abteilung ein. Wir halten hier zwei Stunden.

Es beginnt jetzt stärker zu schneien. Je näher wir dem Gebirge kommen, um so höher liegt der Schnee. Im Dämmerlicht des sinkenden Tages durchfahren wir Neisse. Dunkelheit ist um uns, als wir in Ziegenhals, unserem heutigen Tagesziel, einfahren.

Das Raten nach Zweck und Ziel unserer Reise hat ein Ende, als wir am nächsten Morgen erfahren, daß der slowakische Minister Tiso nach Berlin zum Führer gefahren ist und ihn gebeten hat, den Schutz über den slowakischen Staat zu übernehmen. In der Tschechei selbst sollen die Deutschen. Wir hören man von Überfällen auf die Deutschen. Wir denken an die Worte des Führers vom September 1938: „Die Deutschen in der Tschecho-Slowakei sind weder wehrlos, noch sind sie verlassen.“ Stündlich steigt unsere Spannung, doch der Tag vergeht, ohne daß etwas Neues bekannt wird.

Neuer Befehl: „Sofort tanken und alles Gerät fertigmachen.“ Dann noch zwei Stunden Ruhe. 16.00 Uhr Abmarsch.

An die Fahrzeuge! Der Zugführer hat schon die ersten Anweisungen in der Tasche. Wenn wir sie doch auch schon wüßten. Aber Genaues ist uns immer noch nicht bekannt.

Bis Hohenstadt wird mit Licht gefahren, dann müssen wir uns so weiter bewegen. Na, bis dahin ist ja noch Zeit.

Nun beginnt ein schwerer Marsch. In keinem Tage unserer Ausbildung hat man soviel von uns verlangt wie in dieser Saunetternacht.

Es beginnt sofort nach dem Abmarsch stark zu schneien. Das Schneerreiben behindert die Sicht. Haben wir auch die Brille auf, so schlägt doch der Schnee wie mit Nadeln gegen die Gesichter. Ein eisiger Wind fährt uns an und läßt uns Gänsehaut um Gänsehaut den Körper herunterlaufen. Wir frieren stark, trotz der Gummimäntel und Kradpullover.

Eben fahren wir durch Freiwaldau. Wir sind im Sudetengau. Die Bevölkerung steht an der Straße und ruft uns zu: „Gebt's ihnen Saures!“ Das hebt unsere ohnehin freudige Stimmung noch mehr.

Bergauf geht's, hinein ins Altvatergebirge. Spiegelglatt sind die Straßen. Je höher wir kommen, um so höher liegt auch der Schnee. Er vermindert wenigstens einigermaßen die Glätte, läßt aber die Reifen auch noch rutschen. Die Solofahrer sind schlimm dran heute. Sie rutschen mehr, als sie fahren. Doch sie halten durch. Höher und höher geht's hinauf. Eine Serpentine nach der anderen wird überwunden. „Ob wir rüberkommen bei dem Schnee, ohne Schneeketten: Klar, Mensch, wir kommen rüber. Schieben können wir ja auch noch. Das hat uns doch der Fahrlehrer beigebracht.“

Der Schnee fällt jetzt so dicht, daß wir kaum den Vordermann sehen können. Das Wetter wird immer toller. Eine Kolonne von Schneemännern auf Motorrädern fährt hier durch die Winternacht des Altvatergebirges. Oft müssen wir runter von der Maschine, um ein paar Meter zu schieben. Aber wir kommen weiter. Manchmal wird sogar gehalten. Das Anfahren ist besonders schlecht. Es geht unaufhaltsam, wenn auch langsam, vorwärts. Gott sei Dank. Da ist die rote Bergbaude. Wir sind oben. Nun geht's wieder hinunter. Wir rutschen fast nur noch auf der wieder sehr glatten Straße. Rechts und links meterhohe Schneewände, die manchmal, wenn einer abrutscht, durchbrochen sind. Wie der nur wieder auf die Straße kommt: Weiter. —

Der Schneefall hört auf, dafür nimmt die Kälte wieder zu. Vor uns die Lichter eines Dorfes. Wir haben viel Zeit verloren. Nun müssen wir etwas schneller fahren. Das macht wenig Spaß bei der Straßenglätte. Zwischendurch wieder Gedanken an den Zweck unserer Fahrt, die das Herz schneller schlagen lassen.

Näher kommen wir an Hohenstadt. Wir wissen nun: fahren wir von dort aus weiter, dann wird's Ernst, dann Knallt's.

Hohenstadt. Nun Licht aus. Eine Stunde Pause. Der Leutnant ist fortgegangen, Befehle zu empfangen. Fieberhaft erwarten wir seine Rückkehr. Vor dem Landratsamt treten wir an. Der Leutnant kommt.

„2. Zug herhören. Die politische Lage ist euch bekannt. Auf Befehl des Führers werden deutsche Truppen, also auch wir, noch heute nacht die tschechische Grenze überschreiten, um im tschechischen Staatsgebiet nun auch Ordnung zu schaffen, um die Dr. Sacha, der Präsident des Staates, den Führer gebeten hat.“

Ein hörbares Aufatmen geht durch die Reihen. Der Leutnant verliest nun den Aufruf an die tschechische Bevölkerung. „Mit Überschreiten der Grenze haben wir mit Zusammenstoßen zu rechnen. Der Auftrag der Abteilung ist es, die tschechische Garnison Prosnitz zu entwaffnen. Friedlich oder mit Gewalt. Die Division nimmt gleichzeitig

Olmütz.“ Wir hören kaum noch hin, so hat uns das alles in Erregung versetzt. Erst als der Leutnant noch einige direkte Anweisungen gibt, sind wir wieder bei der Sache.

Fahrweise und Marschweg gibt uns der Leutnant noch, dann verabschiedet er sich von uns. Die Stimmung hat den Höhepunkt erreicht. Wir treten an die Fahrzeuge. Marsch. Wie Glühkäfer sehen die Kolonnen aus mit ihren blauen abgeblendeten Lichtern.

Wie im Geistermarsch geht's der Grenze zu. — Müßig. Hier noch ein paar Stunden Ruhe. Wir geben trotz der frühen Stunde in die Häuser. Es schlägt gerade 3 Uhr. Die Bevölkerung nimmt uns sehr liebevoll auf. Es sind hier alles Sudeten-Deutsche, die noch vor wenigen Monaten die Schrecken der tschechischen Herrschaft erlebt haben. Sie geben uns Kaffee, Brot, Zigaretten. Sie wissen, was uns bevorsteht und sind sehr gastfreundlich.

Ein Melder kommt. Es geht los. An uns vorbei rollen Panzerspähwagen, die heute als erste die Grenze überschreiten. Voran der Spätrupp Leutnant v. Büchau, der später in Brünn als erster Spätrupp die Verbindung mit dem aus der Ostmark einrückenden 5. Gruppenkommando herstellte. Der Chef spricht noch einmal zu uns, dann gehen wir an die Fahrzeuge. „Macht's gut!“ ruft uns der Leutnant nochmal zu, dann donnern wir los, der nahen Grenze entgegen.

Gleich hinterm Ort steht das Zollhaus. Der Schlagbaum hebt sich, es ist jetzt kurz nach 6 Uhr.



(Fotos: Gefr. Kloss 3. A.A. B)

Ein letztes „Heil Hitler!“ ruft man uns zu, dann sind wir nur noch gespannte Erwartung. —

Das erste Dorf. Die Bevölkerung mit recht grimmigen Gesichtern säumt die Straße. Viel Arbeitslose lungern herum. Sehen übel aus. Wohl alles Kommunisten. Darunter halbwüchsige Burschen, die uns herausfordernd ansehen. Wir legen die Pistolen griffbereit und die Handgranaten auf den Schoß. Außerhalb der Ortschaften schauen wir

gespannt auf jede Höhe und Erhebung, gewärtig, daß von irgendwo das Tacken eines Maschinengewehrs erklingt. Auch nach oben geht unser Blick. Wo sind die vielgerühmten tschechischen Flieger? Warum kommen sie nicht? Wir warten auf sie. Weiter geht's, bald müssen wir am Ziel sein. Kurzer Halt am Straßenrand.

Befehl vom Chef: „2. Zug, verstärkt durch eine Pak., sichert die Straße Olmütz—Prosnitz bei 270.“ Der erste Kampfauftrag ist gekommen. Stolz verlassen wir die Schwadron und donnern feindwärts. An dem Punkt 270 steht ein 8-Kad-Wagen der 2. Schwadron.

Die Panzerspähwagen brausen weiter, der Zug geht in Stellung. Blank und blitzend rascheln die Patronengurte in das Maschinengewehr, dann wird gesichert und nun: „Neunzehntel meines Lebens, wartet der Soldat vergebens.“ Nichts zeigt sich als ein paar Zivilwagen, die nach Olmütz weiterfahren dürfen. Eben kommt in einem leichten Panzerspähwagen Oberleutnant Hassel, Chef der 2., mit Dolmetscher und weißer Flagge. Er fährt nach Prosnitz. Sehnsüchtig schauen wir dem im Schneetreiben verschwindenden Fahrzeug nach.

Von rückwärts kommen jetzt deutsche Kampfwagen die Straße entlanggebraußt. Also können wir abrücken.

„Meeste Fritzge, ick für meine Person, ick jlobe nich mehr an det Erscheinen der Tschechen. Wo bleiben se denn? Die haben bestimmt det Uffstehn heute verjessen und nu is et aus mit se.“

„Is aber doch jammerschade, ick hätte so jerne eenmal scharf geschossen, eenmal so richtig, nich wie uff Krampnig A oder Kiefbruch. Nu is et wieda nijcht jeworn.“

Wir haben uns mit dem 2. Zug jetzt der 4. Schwadron angeschlossen. Es soll nach Wischau, einer




kleinen Stadt 35 Kilometer vor Brünn, gehen. Ein eisiger Wind treibt uns wieder die Schneeflocken ins Gesicht. Glatt ist die Straße und holperig dazu. Endlich sind wir auf der großen Chaussee Olmütz—Brünn. Nun geht's rasch vorwärts. Es wird wärmer, es beginnt zu tauen. Ein komisches Wetter. Rechts vor uns taucht jetzt die

Silhouette einer großen Kaserne auf. Wir wissen, daß die Abteilung hier schon durch ist, also keine Gefahr besteht. Enttäuscht geben wir die Gedanken an das so sehnlichst erwartete Scharfschießen nun endgültig auf.

Wir fahren in Wischau ein.

Die Abteilung hat schon auf dem Marktplatz Aufstellung genommen, wir fahren an unseren Platz.



(Fotos: 3. Uffz. Otdorf 3. AA. 8)



Unsere Blicke schweifen über den Marktplatz, an den Häusern entlang. Wie in den Dörfern, die wir bisher durchfahren, so stehen auch hier wieder sehr viel Arbeitslose umher. Ein für uns Deutsche vollständig ungewohntes Bild. Ein Auto fährt eben vorbei. Auf ihm stehen Männer mit einer Hakenkreuzfabne, die uns zujubeln. Es sind Deutsche aus der wenige Kilometer entfernt liegenden Sprachinsel. Sie fordern uns auf, zu ihnen zu kommen. Die Frauen dort hätten schon viel Kuchen für die deutschen Soldaten gebacken. Vorläufig müssen wir dankend ablehnen.

„Der zweite Zug stellt heute die Wache in der Panzerkaserne“, sagt eben der Leutnant. Er stellt

selbst die Wache zusammen, dann machen wir uns fertig zum Abmarsch.

Um 16.30 Uhr stellen wir uns am Eingang der Kaserne auf. „Det is aber een ziemlich eintöniges Gebäude, wat?“ „Bei uns in Deutschland sehen die neuen Kasernen doch schöner aus.“ Der Leutnant läßt jetzt stillstehen, dann übernimmt er von dem tschechischen Kasernoffizier die gesamte Wache. Wir treten weg ins Wachlokal.

„Hier is det ja fast wie in Potsdam! Een paar Pritschen, een Holztisch und eene Unmenge von Schlüsseln, deren Herkunft keener kennt.“

Die Posten werden abgelöst, die Tschechen verlassen für immer die Wache. Wir sind unter uns. Alles ist hier sehr sauber und ordentlich. Überall hängen die Wachvorschriften, Postenabweisungen und Telephonlisten. Unser sudetendeutscher Kamerad, der tschechisch spricht, übersezt uns alles.

Zum ersten Male stehe ich heute auf Posten und nun gleich in einer tschechischen Kaserne. Es ist ein eigenartiges Gefühl. Schritt für Schritt gehe ich im Kasernenbereich herum, meinen Postenweg entlang. Es beginnt dunkel zu werden. Drüben steht ein großes Gebäude, ein Kino für die Soldaten. Täglich zweimal werden dort Filme gezeigt, die die Soldaten für wenig Geld, 5 Pf., sehen können. — —

Die tschechischen Soldaten machen allmählich Annäherungsversuche. Mit Hilfe unseres sudetendeutschen Dolmetschers können wir uns ganz gut verständigen. Sie freuen sich über ihre baldige Entlassung und machen keinen Hehl daraus, daß sie gern wieder nach Haus gehen. Es beginnen Tauschgeschäfte. Tschechische Feldmützen, Uniformknöpfe und Abzeichen wechseln gegen deutsche Taschenuhren ihre Besitzer. Jeder von uns will ein kleines Andenken mit nach Potsdam nehmen; einige tschechische Soldaten, Feinmechaniker von Beruf, haben kleine Modelle ihrer Kampfwagen angefertigt, die sie uns für 40 bis 50 Kronen überlassen. — —

Die erste Nacht in der neuen Kaserne ist ruhig und ohne besondere Vorfälle verlaufen. In der Kantine kaufen wir Zigaretten und Butter. Man behandelt uns zuvorkommend und höflich.

Der Leutnant betritt die Wachstube: „Heute gegen 9.30 Uhr wird der Oberbefehlshaber hierherkommen. Vielleicht auch der Führer, der in Brünn eingezogen ist.“ Emsig gehen wir sofort daran, unseren Stiefeln, die seit der Heimat nicht mehr richtig blank waren, Glanz aufzulegen. Wir warten.

Draußen steht der Leutnant in Unterhaltung mit tschechischen Offizieren, die heute in Sonntagsuniform ebenfalls auf das Erscheinen unseres Oberbefehlshabers warten. Nach einer halben Stunde erfahren wir, daß der Generaloberst nicht kommen wird. — Schade.



(Foto: Gefr. Kloss 3. AA. 8)

Es mag gerade 11.00 Uhr sein, als die ersten deutschen Fliegerformationen über die Kaserne in Richtung Brünn brausen. Zwei Geschwader verschiedener Einheiten halten die Tschechen für ein paar Minuten in Staunen und Verwunderung. Fast ungläubig haben sie den Himmel geschaut und uns dann gefragt, ob das wirklich alles deutsche Flieger gewesen wären? Stolz haben wir geantwortet, daß dies nur ein ganz kleiner Teil der deutschen Luftwaffe war, den sie soeben gesehen haben. Sie sehen uns ungläubig an.

13.00 Uhr. Wir werden abgelöst. Es dauert eine ganze Weile, bis wir die nachfolgende Wache, gestellt von der 1. Schwadron, in schwarzer Uniform, hier in das ganze Drum und Dran eingewiesen haben. Endlich fahren wir los. Auf dem Marktplatz eine kurze Mittagspause, dann fahren wir mit der Schwadron los, um zwei deutschen Dörfern unseren versprochenen Besuch abzustatten, während die anderen Schwadronen in die fünf anderen deutschen Dörfer gehen. Wir freuen uns sehr auf die kommenden Stunden. Vor uns liegt, im Tal eingebettet, das kleine Dorf Sobitschau.

Die Bevölkerung steht am Eingang in malerisch bunten Trachten und begrüßt uns mit unendlichem Jubel. Die Schulkinder schwenken Hakenkreuzfähnchen und die jungen Mädchen singen deutsche Lieder. Es herrscht eine sehr große Begeisterung. Der Jubel steigert sich, als nach der Begrüßung durch den Bürgermeister wir im Exerziermarsch ins Dorf einrücken. Am Heldendenkmal nehmen wir Aufstellung. Der Lehrer hält eine kurze Ansprache, dann sagt der Chef Worte des Dankes für den begeisterten Empfang, wir präsentieren, das Sieg-Heil auf unseren Führer und die Nationalhymnen beenden diese eindrucksvolle Feierstunde. Der 2. Zug bleibt mit dem 1. MG.-Halbzug und der Krad-Meldestaffel hier im Dorf, während der andere Teil der Schwadron weiter nach dem Ort Kutscherau fährt. Wir stellen unsere Fahrzeuge auf der Straße auf und sind nun Gäste des Dorfes im Gasthaus. Gatten uns schon die Eingangskundgebungen vorhin in eine Hoch-

stimmung versetzt, so werden wir nun beim Einmarsch in den Saal geradezu überwältigt von dem Empfang, den man uns hier bereitet. Immer wieder ruft, jubelt und lacht die Bevölkerung uns, als ihren Befreier, zu, wir können kein Wort mehr sagen. Man setzt sich nun mit uns an die aufgestellten Tische zum Festmahl. Die Türen geben auf und die Bauernfrauen des Ortes kommen mit Kuchen und Bratenschüsseln herein. Größer und größer werden die Berge von Süßigkeiten, die die Tische fast zum Brechen bringen. So etwas haben wir, selbst beim Einmarsch in das Sudetenland, bisher nicht erlebt. Selbst der raubeste Krieger ist gerührt von dieser Gastfreundschaft.

Nach einer Stunde, längst sind die Kuchenberge wieder durch neue ersetzt, müssen wir wieder aufbrechen. Man will uns nicht fortlassen. Erst nachdem wir versprochen haben, bestimmt wiederzukommen, gibt man uns frei. Wir treten im Saal noch einmal an. Der Leutnant bedankt sich in unserem Namen für diese unvergeßliche Stunde der Gastfreundschaft in Sobitschau, wir singen das



von unserem Kameraden Kayser komponierte „Kradschützenlied“, dann verlassen wir unter dem wieder anschwellenden Jubel der deutschen Bauern den Gasthof, um an unsere Maschinen zu gehen.

Der Wagen des Leutnants ist bis oben hin gefüllt mit dem noch übriggebliebenen Kuchen, Korb um Korb wandert noch immer hinein, bis endlich die Abschiedsekunde schlägt. Die Motoren heulen auf, das Marschzeichen kommt, und fort geht es wieder nach Wischau. Wie im Traum haben wir diese letzten zwei Stunden erlebt. Jetzt auf der dunklen Landstraße wird uns erst klar, warum die Begeisterung der Bevölkerung so ungeheuer groß ist. Nach zwanzigjähriger Fremdherrschaft, in ihrem Deutschtum immer und überall unterdrückt, sind diese wenigen Deutschen, die wie ein Felsen in der Brandung gestanden und ihr Deutschtum nicht aufgegeben haben, nun durch die starke Hand



(Foto: Gefr. Kloss 3. AA. B)

des Führers, unseres Obersten Befehlshabers, fast über Nacht wieder zu ihrem deutschen Vaterlande zurückgeführt. — —

Noch lange klingt dieses Erlebnis in uns weiter, und wir werden es wohl niemals vergessen.


Eine Woche bleibt die A. S. noch in Wischau, bis die 4. Schwadron mit dem Verladen des tschechischen Seeresgerätes fertig ist.

Am 4. April Abfahrt nach Potsdam über Prosnitz—Olmütz—Sternberg—Zuckmantel—Teiße—Grottkau—Breslau.


Am 6., nachmittags 16.00 Uhr, fährt die Abteilung im Lustgarten am Kommandeur vorüber und beendet damit das unvergeßliche Erlebnis: Einmarsch in die ehemalige Tschecho-Slowakei.




(Foto: Uffz. Otzdorf 3. AA. B)



Stab




1. Schwadron



2. Schwadron



3. Schwadron



4. Schwadron

Das Jahr 1938

Von H. Martin, Major im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht

Die tiefgründige Bedeutung von Ereignissen und Erlebnissen wird dem einzelnen oft nicht klar, wenn er mitten in ihnen steht; erst wenn sich seine Betrachtung von der Vielfalt der Erscheinungen löst und sich rückblickend dem Ganzen zuwendet, weitet sich der Blick.

So werden viele Kameraden, die im Jahr 1938 den Ruck des Seeres getragen haben, erst später, vielleicht erst nach Jahren erkennen, welche geschichtlich ungeheuer wichtiges und entscheidendes Jahr sie als Soldaten der neuen Wehrmacht erlebten.

Bei Beginn des Ausbildungsjahres 1937/38 hat wohl keiner der eingestellten Rekruten, der auszubildenden Gefreiten, Unteroffiziere und Offiziere geahnt, was das Jahr 1938 an wehrpolitischen Entscheidungen bringen würde. Ruhig und zielbewußt wie immer begann die Arbeit des Winters. Im harten Dienst und mitten in der alle Kräfte in Anspruch nehmenden wichtigen Ausbildung blieben wenig Gedanken frei für die Entwicklung der politischen Lage. So mag auch wohl den vielen Kameraden, die am 9. März 1938 die Ankündigung des ehemaligen Bundeskanzlers Dr. Schuschnigg hörten, wonach er sich plötzlich zu einer merkwürdigen und heuchlerischen Volksabstimmung entschlossen hatte, in ihrer großen Bedeutung nicht klar geworden sein.

Und dann begannen sich die Ereignisse bereits zu überstürzen. Am Morgen des 12. März marschierten deutsche Truppenteile aller Waffengattungen über die ehemalige Grenze zwischen Deutschland und Deutschösterreich. Denjenigen, die damals den Befreiungsmarsch nach Österreich mitgemacht haben, werden ihr ganzes Leben lang diese Tage als besonderes Erlebnis vor Augen stehen. Als Befreier kamen die deutschen Truppen und sind in diesem Sinne von der Bevölkerung empfangen und begrüßt worden. Jeder, der an diesem Marsch teilgenommen hat, wird wohl sein besonderes Erlebnis haben, das besser als lange Worte die Freude der Bevölkerung und auch seine eigene Stimmung, die damals sein Herz schneller schlagen ließ, beleuchten kann. Aber auch diejenigen, die nicht dabei sein durften, die weiter in ihren Kasernen und auf ihren Übungsplätzen im harten Ausbildungsdienst begriffen waren und nur stundenweise an den Lautsprechern und aus den Zeitungen von dem Einmarsch ihrer Kameraden und dem Empfang durch die Bevölkerung hörten, werden wohl klar erkannt haben, welche wichtige Rolle der Führer und Oberste Befehlshaber in diesen Tagen der deutschen Wehrmacht zuerkannt hatte.



Parade vor dem Führer auf dem Heldenplatz in Wien am 14. März 1938

Reibungslos und mit erstaunlicher Schnelligkeit vollzog sich der Marsch. Trotz enger, un- gepflegter und oft verstopfter Straßen, trotz immer wiederkehrenden Aufenthalts durch die Bevölkerung, die ihre Soldaten einfach nicht losließ, wurde ein Rekord an Marschleistungen aller Truppengattungen erzielt. Wie ein Blitz war die deutsche Wehrmacht da. Das Ausland horchte auf. Es war ein grandioses Exempel, eine eindeutige Generalprobe, die das deutsche Heer hier zeigte, bedeutungsvoll besonders für diejenigen im Ausland, die sich von der Schlagkraft der deutschen Wehrmacht nach einer so kurzen Zeit des Aufbaues eine schiefe Vorstellung gemacht hatten.

Monate vergehen. Wieder verlangt die Ausbildung die ganze Spannkraft der Truppe. Es bleibt nicht Zeit zum Grübeln und Nachsinnen. Aber schon im Spätsommer des Jahres 1938 spürt so mancher — hellhörig geworden durch die Erlebnisse in Österreich —, daß in der Ausbildung ein besonderer Ton, eine besondere Forderung liegt. In allen Truppenteilen, bei allen Waffengattungen wird scharf gearbeitet. Die Einstellung des Auslandes zu den Ereignissen in Österreich läßt keinen Zweifel darüber, daß das Recht der Deutschen noch immer scheel angesehen, immer noch mißgönnt und mißdeutet wird.

Da beginnen die Nachrichten aus der Tschecho-Slowakei, die schon immer über die zunehmende Bedrückung der deutschen Brüder jenseits der Grenze berichtet hatten, sich immer bedrohlicher zu gestalten und an Umfang zu gewinnen.

3,6 Millionen Deutsche leben in der Tschecho-Slowakei. Sie sprechen dieselbe Sprache, sie haben dieselben Sitten, sie sind dieselben Menschen wie wir. Sie werden von Tschechen unter dem Beneš-System geknechtet, und es werden ihnen nicht die geringsten Rechte zuerkannt. Als sich dieser urdeutsche Stamm dagegen zu wehren anfängt und seine Forderungen auf Gleichberechtigung laut und lauter anmeldet, beginnt eine Periode einer in Europa kaum gekannten Unterdrückung. Das Ziel ist klar: Knechtung jetzt, und für die Zukunft langsame aber systematische Ausrottung. Nach dem Sieg des Nationalsozialismus in Deutschland verschärft sich der Kampf. Die Deutschen in der Tschecho-Slowakei finden, durch die nationalsozialistische Weltanschauung geeint, immer mehr zusammen. Immer schärfer werden aber auch die Unterdrückungsmethoden ihrer Peiniger. Nach der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands mit Österreich wird der Kampf auf beiden Seiten noch zielbewußter und noch härter geführt.



Tschechischer Befestigungsgürtel westlich Troppau



Waren bisher die Unterdrückungsmethoden getarnt, bestand die Methode der Auslöschung des Deutschtums hauptsächlich in einer wohlüberlegten Gesetzgebung, die sich gegen alles Deutsche richtete, und in der Anwendung vieler Kleinlicher aber für den einzelnen sich fürchterlich auswirkender Verwaltungsmaßnahmen, so wurde der Kampf jetzt offen, brutal und von Seiten der Beneš-Leute mit der Knute und dem Bajonett geführt. Es floß Blut. Immer mehr spitzten sich die Ereignisse zu. Die Prager Regierung stößt die ausgestreckte Hand der Sudetendeutschen Partei in Verkenntung ihrer Lage und vertrauend auf die Versprechungen ihrer Bundesgenossen zurück. Man versucht auf Seiten der Beneš-Partei mit geschickten Methoden Zeit und immer wieder Zeit zu gewinnen. Inzwischen müssen Deutsche bluten, müssen Deutsche sterben. Als der Parteitag in Nürnberg beginnt, ist die ganze Welt, besonders aber das deutsche Volk, auf das äußerste gespannt. Bisher ist von deutscher Seite noch keine klare und eindeutige Stellungnahme zu den letzten Ereignissen erfolgt. Aber man merkt, daß etwas in der Luft liegt. Und als am 12. September die Worte des Führers wie Hammer-

schläge fallen, „daß, wenn diese gequälten Kreaturen kein Recht und keine Hilfe selbst finden können, sie beides von uns bekommen werden“, ist das keine Sensation mehr, sondern fast eine Erlösung, eine Erlösung, besonders für die Brüder im Sudetenland, aber auch für das ganze deutsche Volk, das von der Spannung der letzten Wochen immer mehr erfaßt worden ist und auf die Entscheidung des Führers wartet.

Wie eine Lawine rollen nun die Ereignisse ab. Konrad Henlein, der Führer der Sudetendeutschen, richtet das Verlangen an Prag, das Standrecht zurückzunehmen und auch die Staatspolizei zurückzuziehen. Dreizehn Todesopfer in vierundzwanzig Stunden sind der Anlaß zu dieser endgültigen Forderung. Sie wird nicht beantwortet.

In den nun kommenden Tagen rüstet sich das deutsche Volk, seine Wehrmacht, besonders aber das Heer, zu erstem Gang. Truppentransporte beginnen zu rollen, Verlegungen von Einheiten des Heeres in Richtung der tschecho-slowakischen Grenze mehren sich. Die politische Lage ist immer noch ungeklärt. Prag vertraut auf die Hilfe der westlichen Demokratien. Während der Zusammenkunft der vier Staatsmänner, Hitler Mussolini, Chamberlain und Daladier, stehen im großen Umkreis um die Tschecho-Slowakei, in Schlesien, Sachsen, Bayern und der Ostmark, starke deutsche Einheiten bereit. Sie sind vorbereitet und gerüstet — wenn es nun doch sein soll — ihren deutschen Brüdern mit der Waffe in der Hand zu Hilfe zu eilen. Ernst und entschlossen ist die Stimmung der Truppe. Kein Strohfeder falschen Surrapatriotismus ist zu spüren. Der deutsche Soldat kennt die Wirkung moderner Waffen. Er weiß: es ist kein Kinderpiel — ein Krieg. Deshalb ist der Geist eiserner Entschlossenheit, der Wille zur Pflicht, zum Gehorsam höher einzuschätzen als eine laute und großsprecherische Begeisterung.



Der Führer in Zuckmantel

Überraschend und wie ein Wunder anmutend wird plötzlich aus den Angriffsbefehlen die Weisung für den friedlichen Einmarsch. Die überragende Politik Adolf Hitlers hat gestiegt. In die Zone I rückte am 1. Oktober die Heeresgruppe des Generalobersten Ritter von Leeb um 14 Uhr zwischen Helfenberg und Finsterau ein. Um 22 Uhr war das Tagesziel erreicht. Planmäßig hat am nächsten Tage die Heeresgruppe ihren Vormarsch fortgesetzt.

Am 2. Oktober trat die Heeresgruppe des Generalobersten von Bock um 13 Uhr zwischen Rumburg und Friedland über die Grenze und begann mit der Besetzung ihres Abschnittes. Am 3. Oktober überschritt die Heeresgruppe des Generals der Artillerie von Reichenau beiderseits des Usher Gipfels zwischen Selb und Markneukirchen die Grenze und begann mit der Besetzung des Abschnittes III.

Nur wenige Tage später, am 6. Oktober, begann die Heeresgruppe des Generalobersten von Rundstedt mit der Besetzung des Abschnittes IV, indem sie zwischen Landeck und Leobsdorf die Grenze überschritt.

In den Tagen vom 8. bis 10. Oktober haben in den genannten Abschnitten die Heeresgruppen die als „Zone V“ bezeichneten Gebietsteile im weiteren Vormarsch erreicht, wobei eine Heeresgruppe unter Führung des Generals der Infanterie List aus dem Gau Niederdonau zwischen Lundenburg und Laa a. d. Thaya sowie zwischen Drosendorf und Neu-Bistritz die ehemalige deutsch-tschecho-slowakische Grenze überschritten hat. Kurz ist die Meldung des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht vom 9. Oktober, 19 Uhr: „Unsere Truppen haben ihre Tagesziele erreicht.“

Am 10. Oktober war so das gesamte im Abkommen vom 29. September festgelegte Gebiet besetzt.

Insgesamt gehörten zu den einrückenden Truppen zehn Armeekorps mit annähernd dreißig Divisionen. Fast die Hälfte dieser Divisionen waren motorisierte oder Panzerdivisionen. Außerdem waren nicht geringe Kräfte bereitgestellt für den immerhin möglichen Fall, daß die Tschechen oder Teile von ihnen den friedlichen Einmarsch störten und damit eine kriegsmäßige Operation nötig geworden wäre.

Die zum Einmarsch bestimmten Teile des Heeres waren schon seit längerer Zeit ausbildungsmäßig auf den Kampf um Befestigungen vorbereitet; er wurde als besonderes Ausbildungsgebiet betrieben. Alle Waffen, besonders Infanterie, Pioniere und Panzerkampfwagen, hatten sich zusammen mit der Artillerie bis in alle Einzelheiten mit dieser Kampfweise vertraut gemacht.

Die ganze Welt hat den reibungslos und wie ein Uhrwerk ablaufenden Einmarsch mit Staunen, Anerkennung — selbstverständlich teilweise auch mit gemischten Gefühlen — verfolgt und begutachtet.

Die Truppen aller Waffengattungen hatten bei dem Einmarsch auch körperlich erhebliche Leistungen aufzuweisen. In dem oft bergigen Gelände hatte es besonders die Infanterie schwer; denn immer wieder wurde aus dem fast kriegsmäßigen Einmarsch eine Feier in einem Dorf oder einer Stadt, bei der ein parademäßiges Auftreten der Truppe notwendig war. Baum- und andere Sperren, die von den Tschechen angelegt waren, Brücken- und Straßensprengungen mußten überwunden, steile, oft schlechte und kurvenreiche Straßen, hohe Pässe mußten passiert werden. Unter einem Regen von Blumen, Mann, Kof und Fahrzeug geschmückt, so zogen die deutschen Bataillone, Batterien und Schwadronen ein und standen pünktlich zur vorgeschriebenen Zeit mit ihren Postierungen und Feldwachen auf den vorgeschriebenen Plätzen.

Auch hierbei wird jeder der zahlreichen Kameraden, die dabei waren, sein eigenes Erleben haben, sein Erlebnis, das ihm besser als alles andere den Sinn dieser Tage klargemacht hat: mag es das Lächeln eines jungen Mädchens, der Händedruck einer alten Frau, die Umarmung eines kleinen Kindes gewesen sein. Vielleicht war es der Augenblick, in dem seine Truppe, er selbst den Fuß über die ehemalige Reichsgrenze setzte, oder das Erlebnis der Nacht, wo er als einsamer Feldposten an der neuen Reichsgrenze stand, in das Dunkel starrte und den Schlaf seiner Kameraden und der wieder ins Reich heimgekehrten Volksgenossen in den Dörfern und Städten hinter ihm bewachte.

Aber nicht nur diejenigen, die diese Tage des Einmarsches erlebt haben, sollen von der Erinnerung des Jahres 1938 auf immer gepackt werden. Auch die Kameraden, die vom Sommer bis in den Spätherbst an den Befestigungswerken mit eigener Hand gearbeitet haben, und die oft in behelfsmäßigen Unterkünften und mit persönlichen Entbehrungen aller Art ihren Dienst tun mußten, haben für ein großes Ziel ihre Pflicht getan. Auch diejenigen Kameraden, die vielleicht überhaupt nicht aus ihrer Garnison fort waren und bis zu ihrer Entlassung ihren täglichen Dienst erfüllen mußten, müssen wissen, daß auch sie an dem Gelingen dieser in der Geschichte Deutschlands so bedeutungsvollen Ereignisse ihren Anteil hatten. Mag eine Armee noch so groß und zahlreich sein, es kommt auf jeden einzelnen an, und gleichgültig, wo er steht, er bleibt — wenn auch ein kleines — so doch ein wichtiges Rädchen am großen Uhrwerk. Sein Ausfall, sein Versagen läßt es ungleichmäßig gehen.

Derjenige, der 1938 den grauen Rock getragen hat, wird, solange er lebt, mit Stolz und Freude daran zurückdenken können. Je mehr er sich von den Ereignissen entfernt, desto klarer wird ihm werden, daß er mitgeholfen hat, einen Jahrtausende alten Traum des deutschen Volkes zu erfüllen:

die Schaffung Großdeutschland!

Fotos: Limpert-Archiv (4)

Zur Erinnerung



Freitag, 8. Juli 1938.

Gute Nacht ist gut angekommen. Lie in bester Laune.
Auf der Wiese der Höhe ist. Es ist eine ziemlich gute
bei. Gute Nacht. Haben an den Händen davon. Die
Arbeit spielt mir immer weniger. Gegen die Hitze wird
es furchtbar warm. Der Temperatur sinkt mir nur so
die Nacht so ab. Das zum Zeit 13³⁰ kommen wir
im Land an. In der Hitze geht man in einen Lauf
an die Höhe hin. Das mit dem Wetter zum Glück.
Hochste Temperatur. Temperaturen für den Aufstieg:
schlecht. Jedoch sind für wieder wenig in der Höhe
- 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 852. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859. 860. 861. 862. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 869. 870. 871. 872. 873. 874. 875. 876. 877. 878. 879. 880. 881. 882. 883. 884. 885. 886. 887. 888. 889. 890. 891. 892. 893. 894. 895. 896. 897. 898. 899. 900. 901. 902. 903. 904. 905. 906. 907. 908. 909. 910. 911. 912. 913. 914. 915. 916. 917. 918. 919. 920. 921. 922. 923. 924. 925. 926. 927. 928. 929. 930. 931. 932. 933. 934. 935. 936. 937. 938. 939. 940. 941. 942. 943. 944. 945. 946. 947. 948. 949. 950. 951. 952. 953. 954. 955. 956. 957. 958. 959. 960. 961. 962. 963. 964. 965. 966. 967. 968. 969. 970. 971. 972. 973. 974. 975. 976. 977. 978. 979. 980. 981. 982. 983. 984. 985. 986. 987. 988. 989. 990. 991. 992. 993. 994. 995. 996. 997. 998. 999. 1000. 1001. 1002. 1003. 1004. 1005. 1006. 1007. 1008. 1009. 1010. 1011. 1012. 1013. 1014. 1015. 1016. 1017. 1018. 1019. 1020. 1021. 1022. 1023. 1024. 1025. 1026. 1027. 1028. 1029. 1030. 1031. 1032. 1033. 1034. 1035. 1036. 1037. 1038. 1039. 1040. 1041. 1042. 1043. 1044. 1045. 1046. 1047. 1048. 1049. 1050. 1051. 1052. 1053. 1054. 1055. 1056. 1057. 1058. 1059. 1060. 1061. 1062. 1063. 1064. 1065. 1066. 1067. 1068. 1069. 1070. 1071. 1072. 1073. 1074. 1075. 1076. 1077. 1078. 1079. 1080. 1081. 1082. 1083. 1084. 1085. 1086. 1087. 1088. 1089. 1090. 1091. 1092. 1093. 1094. 1095. 1096. 1097. 1098. 1099. 1100. 1101. 1102. 1103. 1104. 1105. 1106. 1107. 1108. 1109. 1110. 1111. 1112. 1113. 1114. 1115. 1116. 1117. 1118. 1119. 1120. 1121. 1122. 1123. 1124. 1125. 1126. 1127. 1128. 1129. 1130. 1131. 1132. 1133. 1134. 1135. 1136. 1137. 1138. 1139. 1140. 1141. 1142. 1143. 1144. 1145. 1146. 1147. 1148. 1149. 1150. 1151. 1152. 1153. 1154. 1155. 1156. 1157. 1158. 1159. 1160. 1161. 1162. 1163. 1164. 1165. 1166. 1167. 1168. 1169. 1170. 1171. 1172. 1173. 1174. 1175. 1176. 1177. 1178. 1179. 1180. 1181. 1182. 1183. 1184. 1185. 1186. 1187. 1188. 1189. 1190. 1191. 1192. 1193. 1194. 1195. 1196. 1197. 1198. 1199. 1200. 1201. 1202. 1203. 1204. 1205. 1206. 1207. 1208. 1209. 1210. 1211. 1212. 1213. 1214. 1215. 1216. 1217. 1218. 1219. 1220. 1221. 1222. 1223. 1224. 1225. 1226. 1227. 1228. 1229. 1230. 1231. 1232. 1233. 1234. 1235. 1236. 1237. 1238. 1239. 1240. 1241. 1242. 1243. 1244. 1245. 1246. 1247. 1248. 1249. 1250. 1251. 1252. 1253. 1254. 1255. 1256. 1257. 1258. 1259. 1260. 1261. 1262. 1263. 1264. 1265. 1266. 1267. 1268. 1269. 1270. 1271. 1272. 1273. 1274. 1275. 1276. 1277. 1278. 1279. 1280. 1281. 1282. 1283. 1284. 1285. 1286. 1287. 1288. 1289. 1290. 1291. 1292. 1293. 1294. 1295. 1296. 1297. 1298. 1299. 1300. 1301. 1302. 1303. 1304. 1305. 1306. 1307. 1308. 1309. 1310. 1311. 1312. 1313. 1314. 1315. 1316. 1317. 1318. 1319. 1320. 1321. 1322. 1323. 1324. 1325. 1326. 1327. 1328. 1329. 1330. 1331. 1332. 1333. 1334. 1335. 1336. 1337. 1338. 1339. 1340. 1341. 1342. 1343. 1344. 1345. 1346. 1347. 1348. 1349. 1350. 1351. 1352. 1353. 1354. 1355. 1356. 1357. 1358. 1359. 1360. 1361. 1362. 1363. 1364. 1365. 1366. 1367. 1368. 1369. 1370. 1371. 1372. 1373. 1374. 1375. 1376. 1377. 1378. 1379. 1380. 1381. 1382. 1383. 1384. 1385. 1386. 1387. 1388. 1389. 1390. 1391. 1392. 1393. 1394. 1395. 1396. 1397. 1398. 1399. 1400. 1401. 1402. 1403. 1404. 1405. 1406. 1407. 1408. 1409. 1410. 1411. 1412. 1413. 1414. 1415. 1416. 1417. 1418. 1419. 1420. 1421. 1422. 1423. 1424. 1425. 1426. 1427. 1428. 1429. 1430. 1431. 1432. 1433. 1434. 1435. 1436. 1437. 1438. 1439. 1440. 1441. 1442. 1443. 1444. 1445. 1446. 1447. 1448. 1449. 1450. 1451. 1452. 1453. 1454. 1455. 1456. 1457. 1458. 1459. 1460. 1461. 1462. 1463. 1464. 1465. 1466. 1467. 1468. 1469. 1470. 1471. 1472. 1473. 1474. 1475. 1476. 1477. 1478. 1479. 1480. 1481. 1482. 1483. 1484. 1485. 1486. 1487. 1488. 1489. 1490. 1491. 1492. 1493. 1494. 1495. 1496. 1497. 1498. 1499. 1500. 1501. 1502. 1503. 1504. 1505. 1506. 1507. 1508. 1509. 1510. 1511. 1512. 1513. 1514. 1515. 1516. 1517. 1518. 1519. 1520. 1521. 1522. 1523. 1524. 1525. 1526. 1527. 1528. 1529. 1530. 1531. 1532. 1533. 1534. 1535. 1536. 1537. 1538. 1539. 1540. 1541. 1542. 1543. 1544. 1545. 1546. 1547. 1548. 1549. 1550. 1551. 1552. 1553. 1554. 1555. 1556. 1557. 1558. 1559. 1560. 1561. 1562. 1563. 1564. 1565. 1566. 1567. 1568. 1569. 1570. 1571. 1572. 1573. 1574. 1575. 1576. 1577. 1578. 1579. 1580. 1581. 1582. 1583. 1584. 1585. 1586. 1587. 1588. 1589. 1590. 1591. 1592. 1593. 1594. 1595. 1596. 1597. 1598. 1599. 1600. 1601. 1602. 1603. 1604. 1605. 1606. 1607. 1608. 1609. 1610. 1611. 1612. 1613. 1614. 1615. 1616. 1617. 1618. 1619. 1620. 1621. 1622. 1623. 1624. 1625. 1626. 1627. 1628. 1629. 1630. 1631. 1632. 1633. 1634. 1635. 1636. 1637. 1638. 1639. 1640. 1641. 1642. 1643. 1644. 1645. 1646. 1647. 1648. 1649. 1650. 1651. 1652. 1653. 1654. 1655. 1656. 1657. 1658. 1659. 1660. 1661. 1662. 1663. 1664. 1665. 1666. 1667. 1668. 1669. 1670. 1671. 1672. 1673. 1674. 1675. 1676. 1677. 1678. 1679. 1680. 1681. 1682. 1683. 1684. 1685. 1686. 1687. 1688. 1689. 1690. 1691. 1692. 1693. 1694. 1695. 1696. 1697. 1698. 1699. 1700. 1701. 1702. 1703. 1704. 1705. 1706. 1707. 1708. 1709. 1710. 1711. 1712. 1713. 1714. 1715. 1716. 1717. 1718. 1719. 1720. 1721. 1722. 1723. 1724. 1725. 1726. 1727. 1728. 1729. 1730. 1731. 1732. 1733. 1734. 1735. 1736. 1737. 1738. 1739. 1740. 1741. 1742. 1743. 1744. 1745. 1746. 1747. 1748. 1749. 1750. 1751. 1752. 1753. 1754. 1755. 1756. 1757. 1758. 1759. 1760. 1761. 1762. 1763. 1764. 1765. 1766. 1767. 1768. 1769. 1770. 1771. 1772. 1773. 1774. 1775. 1776. 1777. 1778. 1779. 1780. 1781. 1782. 1783. 1784. 1785. 1786. 1787. 1788. 1789. 1790. 1791. 1792. 1793. 1794. 1795. 1796. 1797. 1798. 1799. 1800. 1801. 1802. 1803. 1804. 1805. 1806. 1807. 1808. 1809. 1810. 1811. 1812. 1813. 1814. 1815. 1816. 1817. 1818. 1819. 1820. 1821. 1822. 1823. 1824. 1825. 1826. 1827. 1828. 1829. 1830. 1831. 1832. 1833. 1834. 1835. 1836. 1837. 1838. 1839. 1840. 1841. 1842. 1843. 1844. 1845. 1846. 1847. 1848. 1849. 1850. 1851. 1852. 1853. 1854. 1855. 1856. 1857. 1858. 1859. 1860. 1861. 1862. 1863. 1864. 1865. 1866. 1867. 1868. 1869. 1870. 1871. 1872. 1873. 1874. 1875. 1876. 1877. 1878. 1879. 1880. 1881. 1882. 1883. 1884. 1885. 1886. 1887. 1888. 1889. 1890. 1891. 1892. 1893. 1894. 1895. 1896. 1897. 1898. 1899. 1900. 1901. 1902. 1903. 1904. 1905. 1906. 1907. 1908. 1909. 1910. 1911. 1912. 1913. 1914. 1915. 1916. 1917. 1918. 1919. 1920. 1921. 1922. 1923. 1924. 1925. 1926. 1927. 1928. 1929. 1930. 1931. 1932. 1933. 1934. 1935. 1936. 1937. 1938. 1939. 1940. 1941. 1942. 1943. 1944. 1945. 1946. 1947. 1948. 1949. 1950. 1951. 1952. 1953. 1954. 1955. 1956. 1957. 1958. 1959. 1960. 1961. 1962. 1963. 1964. 1965. 1966. 1967. 1968. 1969. 1970. 1971. 1972. 1973. 1974. 1975. 1976. 1977. 1978. 1979. 1980. 1981. 1982. 1983. 1984. 1985. 1986. 1987. 1988. 1989. 1990. 1991. 1992. 1993. 1994. 1995. 1996. 1997. 1998. 1999. 2000. 2001. 2002. 2003. 2004. 2005. 2006. 2007. 2008. 2009. 2010. 2011. 2012. 2013. 2014. 2015. 2016. 2017. 2018. 2019. 2020. 2021. 2022. 2023. 2024. 2025. 2026. 2027. 2028. 2029. 2030. 2031. 2032. 2033. 2034. 2035. 2036. 2037. 2038. 2039. 2040. 2041. 2042. 2043. 2044. 2045. 2046. 2047. 2048. 2049. 2050. 2051. 2052. 2053. 2054. 2055. 2056. 2057. 2058. 2059. 2060. 2061. 2062. 2063. 2064. 2065. 2066. 2067. 2068. 2069. 2070. 2071. 2072. 2073. 2074. 2075. 2076. 2077. 2078. 2079. 2080. 2081. 2082. 2083. 2084. 2085. 2086. 2087. 2088. 2089. 2090. 2091. 2092. 2093. 2094. 2095. 2096. 2097. 2098. 2099. 2100. 2101. 2102. 2103. 2104. 2105. 2106. 2107. 2108. 2109. 2110. 2111. 2112. 2113. 2114. 2115. 2116. 2117. 2118. 2119. 2120. 2121. 2122. 2123. 2124. 2125. 2126. 2127. 2128. 2129. 2130. 2131. 2132. 2133. 2134. 2135. 2136. 2137. 2138. 2139. 2140. 2141. 2142. 2143. 2144. 2145. 2146. 2147. 2148. 2149. 2150. 2151. 2152. 2153. 2154. 2155. 2156. 2157. 2158. 2159. 2160. 2161. 2162. 2163. 2164. 2165. 2166. 2167. 2168. 2169. 2170. 2171. 2172. 2173. 2174. 2175. 2176. 2177. 2178. 2179. 2180. 2181. 2182. 2183. 2184. 2185. 2186. 2187. 2188. 2189. 2190. 2191. 2192. 2193. 2194. 2195. 2196. 2197. 2198. 2199. 2200. 2201. 2202. 2203. 2204. 2205. 2206. 2207. 2208. 2209. 2210. 2211. 2212. 221

Sonntag, d. 17. Juli 1941.

Heilig ist das das Wetter. Himmel 3 bis 3 - teilweise.
Denn das ist in der Richtung vom. An der Seite.
wage bin ich noch vorbringe kommen. Das dem freistück
falsch ist dem für gefügt. Am Donnerstag weiß ich noch
tuffenstücke und Stränge, jüchte mein Leberung.
Dann Abgang Appell. Ich ging zum K. Hof. Dort hing ich
eine geschlossene Kasse für ein Hof. Auf dieses steht.
Lorenz Schenkberger ist die Kasse für Anna im 1550 in
ihre Gemächer gewickelt. Die Jugend der Anna bürger ist
ihre lang und langstirbig. In die Anna bürger Angelegen
steht überall klar, den wir von der Kasse für
Jung. Anna. Vom Kassegang zu einem Hof, hat ich
auf eine kleine Zeitung und große Karte. Das dem
Abendboot vor dem ich mein Kasse im, weiß mein für.
Jung. So war wieder ein Sonntag für mich.


Donnerstag, d. 28. Juli 1941.

Gute Nacht da kommt, das die Dienstzeit bis zum 27.
September verlängert wird.
Zufolge Gesetz der Kasse zum neuen vom dem
Kasse. Ich kann mich beim Kasse vor für.
Of die Kasse der Kasse.

Sonntag, d. 11. 9. 1938.

Ein Abgang Appell hat ich von einem Kasse
Kasse im Hof Kasse Kasse auf der Hof
Kasse von Kasse im Hof. Ich kann noch 16³⁰
von einem Kasse Appell mit der Kasse.
Die Abgang Appell, so für ein Kasse Kasse
von Kasse Kasse. Für 50 Kasse von der Ab-
teilung der Kasse Kasse Appell die Abgang
Kasse.

Ich ging im Anna bürger Markt mit dem Kasse
sich von einem Kasse (Kasse) Kasse ein
Kasse Kasse. Das Kasse ist Kasse
Kasse, Kasse und Kasse Kasse Kasse
im Markt. Gut Kasse und Kasse Kasse sind
Kasse. Die Kasse Kasse ist Kasse, von dem
den Kasse zu Kasse. Kasse Kasse Kasse.





Rekrutenausbildung „Bettenbau“ 1938/39



Bekleidungsappell
„Was ist das!“ Schmotz Herr UHz. „Nein! ganz gemeiner Mist ist das, sie Köjel“



Bornstädter Feld




Pak in Stellung

Regentag Juni 1939




April 1939



Schütz. Maschke



im Hochtal



Bornstädter Feld



Pak in Stellung

Freitag Juni 1939



April 1939



Schtz. Maschke



im Fischtal



Mob.-Aufstellung Sonnabend
d. 10. März.




Bei Winterkälte unterwegs



Wischau bei Brünn (Tschechoslowakei)




Von Wischau nach Lissowitz



Rein deutsches Dorf




Betreuungsteier




Hussen der Flagge



Mob.-Aufstellung Sonnabend
d. 10. März 39



Bei Winterkälte unterwegs



Wischau bei Brünn (Tschechoslowakei)



Von Wischau nach Lissowitz



Rein deutsches Dorf



Betreuungsteier



Hissen der Flagge



Tschechische Landstrasse

Panzerkaserne II. Puv.
Wischau



Kasernenhof



Stube 29.3.1939.




Gebäude




Chet Spless
Chln Dr Richter
Wentm. Jung



Tschechischer Spahnwagen



Tschechische Panzer




Tschechische Landstrasse


Punzerkaserne II Pun
Wischau



Kasse mit Pferd



Stube 29.3.1939



Gebäude



Chet Spiess
Obttn. Dr. Richter
Wchtm. Jung



Tschechischer Spähwagen



Tschechische Panzer



In der Mitte ein Panzerzwitter fahrgestell



Waffenbeute



Esterurlaub



Havelberge



Sonne über Paterfamilias



In der Mitte ein Panzerzweiterfahrgestell



Waffenbeute



Osterurlaub



Havelberge



Sonne über Pater familias




Fett und wohlgenährt genießet das Leben!




↑ Abteilungszettel Witzschau.




Übung bei Saarmund



Hardpanzer
Zem. Schneepflug
und Mör.



Rost und Anstehbr.



in Norwegen



Horchpanzer.

2. cm Schnellfeuerkan.

und M.G.



Rast und Aufstellung



in Neumarkt



Fahrt von Hartmannsdorf



nach Jannowitz.




Im Gelände bei Seiffersdorf




Quartiersruhe in

H.-Dorf



Berliner Ring



Besuch von Breslau



Salzstr. 17



Fahrt von Hartmannsdorf



nach Jankowitz



Im Gelände bei Seiffersdorf



Quartiersstraße in
H. Dorf



Berliner Ring



Besuch von Breslau




Salzstr. 17

Urlaub nach Husum!



Holländisches
Patrizierhaus

Friedrichstadt



Blick vom Markt




Geest



Picture of the German
Soldier or Soldier who
made the photos?

Urlaub nach Husum




Holländisches
Patrizierhaus

Friedrichsstadt



Blick vom Markt



Geest



Picture of the German
Soldier or Officer who
made these photos ?



Quartiersleute Familie Sieha
Gross Hoschütz 22.8.39.




General Guderian
besichtigt unsern Fuhrpark.



Geschützreinigen



Ausmarsch 31.8.39



Ausgangsstellung Ratibor 1.9.



Quartiersleute Familie Sieha
Gross Moschütz 22. 8. 39



General Guderian
besichtigt unsern Huntpark



Geschützreinigen



Ausmarsch 31.8.39



Ausgangsstellung Ratibor 1.9.



Gefecht bei Reisco 1.9.




In Fliegerdeckung 2.9.




Nach polnischem Nachtüberfall
bei Dswieszim 4.9.



Bezwojone poln. Pak 4.3



Behöfte am Wege




Nördlich Krakau 5.3


Zurückkehrende deutsche Flüchtlinge



Gefecht bei Reisco 19



In Fliegerdeckung 29



Nach polnischem Nachtüberfall
bei Oszeszcin 4.9



Bezwungene poln. Pak. 4.9.



Gehöfte am Wege



Nördlich Krakau 5.9.
Zurückkehrende deutsche Flüchtlinge



Gebirgsfahrt 5.9.



Polnische Kate 5.9.



Wasserdurchfahrt



Bestaubte Gesichter 5.9.



Brennende Stadt Scala 5. 9.



Spernstellung bei Solomnik 6. 9.
Untersuchen der Flüchtlinge



Klimontoff

12. 9.


Juden



Gebirgsfahrt 5.9.



Polnische Kate 5.9.



Wasserdurchfahrt



Bestaubte Gesichter 5.9.



Brennende Stadt Scala 5. 9.



Sperrstellung bei Solomniki 6. 9.
Untersuchen der Flüchtlinge



Klimontoff
12. 9.

Juden



Oberstlt. Grohlich.



Staub in Galizien




Panzer helfen im Gefecht bei
Skalmierz vor. 8. 1




Ukraine 17.9



Ukrainische Begeisterung



Denkmal des unbekanntem Soldaten
Przemysl 17.9



Oberstltm. Grohlich



Staub in Galizien



Panzer helten im Gefecht bei
Skalpmierz vor 8. 11.



Ukraine 17.9



Ukrainische Begeisterung 17.9.



Denkmal des unbekanntem Soldaten
Przemysl 17.9.



Unterwegs vor Stry 18. 9.



Antreten zum Feldgottesdienst
Jaslo 2. 8. 9.



75cm Panzer in Jaslo



Pionierbrücke vor Kalabacea 19.4.



Felstürme bei Kalabacea




19. 4.



Fourkapass 21.4.



Unterwegs vor Stry 18. 9.



Antreten zum Feldgottesdienst
Jaslo 2. 8. 9.



75cm Panzer in Jaslo



Pionierbrücke vor Kalabacca 19.4.



Felstürme bei Kalabacca



19. 4.



Fourkapass 21.4.



Rast in Lamia 21. 4.



Übergang über den



Helladas, Termopyläi



22. 4.



Ausgefallene Panzer nach Angriff Thermopylen
Richtung Molos 24. 4.



Auf dem Marsch hinter
Atalanti 26. 4. 1941.



Kurz hinter Marathon 27. 4.



Auf historischen Trümmern 28. 4.



Rast in Lamia 21. 4.



Übergang über den



Helladas, Termopyläi



22. 4.



Ausgefallene Panzer nach Angriff Termopylen
Richtung Molos 24. 4.




Auf dem Marsch hinter
Atalanti 26. 4. 1941.



Kurz hinter Marathon 27. 4.




Auf historischen Trümmern 28. 4.



Akropolis



Propyläen



Erechtheion



Blick vom Innenhof auf Propyläen



Aufgang




durch


die

Propyläen






Akropolis



Propyläen



Erechtheion



Blick vom Innenhof auf Propyläen



Aufgang



durch

die

Propyläen





Niketempel



Blick von der Akropolis auf Athen.



Griechischer Gardesoldat



Strassenbild in Athen 28.4.



Strasse von Megara



nach Korinth 29. 4.



Agaven am Wege



Passstrasse, Peloponnes



Niketempel



Blick von der Akropolis auf Athen



Griechischer Gardesoldat



Strassenbild in Athen 28.4.



Strasse von Megara



nach Korinth 29. 4.



Agaven am Wege



Passstrasse Peloponnes



Kurz vor Tripolis 30.4.



Landschaft auf dem Peloponnes



Kirche in Ajon



Pope daselbst

Yonaka, Kipinik, Milla, Lila, Palu

Alpina



Alpina, Kanda, Faust, Kanda

Rast in Aliatos vom

Kai Yoda, Prüfung Jakob, Kipinik Milla



22.5. - 31.5.



1500m hohe Passstrasse vor Saloniki 5. 6.



Landschaft bei Verria 5. 6.



Kurz vor Tripolis 30.4.



Landschaft auf dem Peloponnes



Kirche in Ajon



Pope daselbst.

Homella, Sigismit Hilli, Otto, Peter, H. C. G. G. G.



Thy. Hill, Gunde, Gault, Gunde

Rast in Aliatos vom
Held, Prifing, Jakob, Sigismit Hilli,



22.5. - 31.5.



1500m hohe Passstrasse
vor Saloniki 5.6.



Landschaft bei Verria 5.6.



Verladen in Saloniki 7.6.



Fahrt am Vardar 8.6.



Sonnen an Deck



Dasselbige



Familie Mack in Maradic 10.6. - 19.6.



Bei Magdalene Schmueck Tanztee



Aufbruch 19.6.



Verladen in Saloniki 7.6.



Fahrt am Vardar 8.6.



Sonnen an Deck



Dasselbige



Familie Mack in Maradic 10.6. - 19.6.



Bei Magdalene Schmueck Tanztee



Aufbruch 19.6.



Fahrt durchs Vogtland 22.6.



Blumenschau am



Funkturm Juli



Paddeln mit Eberhard Kraft
15.7.



Auf Radtour in Mittenwald
(Mark) 8. 7.



Egon Räther (Tropisch)



See in Gross Glienicke



Fahrt durchs Vogtland 22.6.



Blumenschau am



Funkturm Juli



Paddeln mit Eberhard Kraft
15.7.



Auf Radtour in Mittenwald
(Mark) 8.7.



Egon Räther (tropisch)



See in Gross-Glienicke



Auf dem See



Badehaus meines Quartieres in Glienicke
24.6 —



La Boissière bei Rambouillet
Kaserne



Privatschloss in la Boissière





Auf dem See



Badehaus meines Quartieres in Glienitz
24.6



La Boissière bei Rambouillet
Kaserne



Privatschloss in la Boissière







A07262 10/30

JOHN H. E. FRISD PHOTO ALBUM . WWII . POLAND, GERMANY, BELGIUM, FRANCE . . . GREECE, 1939-1941



Uffz. Maschke

Steffingstr. 1. 5. 1912

Teile für die
Korruption bei Polster.





Piräus im Bombenhagel der Ju 88. Der Athen vorgelagerte Hafen Piräus war das Ziel mehrfacher, höchst wirksamer Angriffe der deutschen Luftwaffe auf Hafenanlagen und Schiffe. Zahlreiche Schiffe, vor allem britische Transporter, sanken oder wurden schwer beschädigt

Aufn. PK Gellian-PBZ.



in Jaslo
Stadt der polnischen Gelbkreuzanwendung



Markttag



28. 9. 1939



Karpathen. Strassen nach Zakopane
Rückfahrt am 29. 9.



Vorbeimarsch am Divisionskommandeur



Appeln 1. 10.



Heimatgefilde



Halt vor dem Einmarsch in Potsdam



Quartier in Mühlhausen
Westfalen



Neujahr 39/40



Strasse nach Unna



Ründerother Bergland



Gang zur hohen Warthe



Rheinbrücke in Köln

Quartier
im Januar 1940






MELCHERNICH/EIFEL, DIE ALTE KIRCHE

FOTO: NUB-SANDER, BRUNNEN, NR 116

Quartier
im Februar



Melchernich Eifel



Steilabfall Bleibergwerk
Verlassener Tagebau



Tor der alten Kirche
„Meckernicht“



Feldküche



Tag der Wehrmacht
Mechernich, Adolf Hitler
Platz. Erbsenessen!



Mann mit E.K.
"Eifelkoller"



Karfreitag in Rissdorf

Ostern in Bonn



339. Königswinter und der Drachentfels



Die Drachenburg (St. Michaelschule) m. Bl. a. Königswinter u. d. Rheintal



Mühling und Sommerfeld
auf dem Drachenfels



Siebengebirge - Blick von der Ruine Drachenfels ins Rheintal



Zahnradbahn

Aufstieg zum Drachenfels

Drachenfels



Ruine

Blick auf den Rhein



Runderoth Blick aus unserm Quartier



Essenempfang in R.



Was alles besagt!

Feldzug
in
Frankreich



Gesprengter Fahrdamm

10. 5. 1940.



vor St. Vith



Baumsperre in Belgien



Strassensperre



An diesem Wasserloch unser erstes
Gefecht. 10.5.



Chef verpflegt sich aus Belgien



Maasübergang bei Dinant.
12.5. - 15.5.



Vormarsch. 11.5. Wenig Feindberührung



Grab von Obtn. Dr. Richter
13.5. gef.



Andere Seite Maas Fr. Schlepper



Pizug, der stürmte.



Gepanzerte 15. cm Haubitze.



Gefangene an der Maas



Allotria beim Vormarsch
16. 5.



Fliegerwirkung



auf fr. Panzer in Avesnes
18.5.



Geger Flieger retarnt. Lorettöhöhe 24.5.



Get. Marokkaner bei Lens
29. 5.



Fr. Heldenfriedhof Loretohöhe



Seebad Merlimont



Feindbomber jenseits Sommes
6.6.



bei le Touquet Kanal 1.6. - 4.6.



Brest am Atlantik



École Navale 21.6. - 1.7.



Rückfahrt durch die Champagne



Fliegerbomben



auf



Notbrücke über die Seine



Rethel



Heimkehr. Marburg

Willkommen in der Heimat



Unser Geschütz beim Einzug in Potsdam

Willkommen in der Heimat





Unser Kommandeur Major Büsing



1 Mai 1940 bei Kladow



Besuch bei Hagemanns Nov. 1940



Gerade aus Polen zurückgek.

Urlaub nach Obergurgl.
28.7. - 8.8. 1940.



Obergurgl



DZug im Inntal



Mutter + Vater





Grataufstieg zum Schalfkogel



Gipfelrast



letztes Schneefeld vorm Gipfel



Über dem Gurglgletscher



Gletscherspalte Gurglgletsch.



Abstieg zur Karlsruher H.



Unterwegs zur Moosbach-H.



Auf der Hohen Mutt



An der Granatwand



Blick auf Geisberggletscher



Blick vom Münster in Ulm

Polen Wegierska Gorka

7.9.1940 - 8.1.1941.



Unser Pakzugheim



Bergkapelle



Abendsonne am Bergeshang





Spaziergang im Polenland



Fröhliche Skifahrt auf



dem Lipowska



Wohnstube im Heim.

Rumänien

3.1. - 1.3. 1941.



Strasse in Mangalia



Badestrand



Unsere Villa in M.



Die Dobrudscha



Das Schwarze



Meer



Türkische Zigeuner i. M.



Marsch in Bulgarien 2.3.



turk zigani



Bulgarische Trachten



Mittagsrast 2.3.



Prowadija 2.3.



Zigeuner in Bulgarien

Bulgarovo Bulgarien

3.3. - 1.4. 1941.



Frühlingssonne vor der Schule,
unserem Heim.



Freizeit



Bulgarovo



Weisse Bohnen in Sonnenblu-
menöl



Besuch in Kamenov
↑
slavi Bakaloff



Spiess (Fldw. Bergau) beritten



Spinnende Bulgarinnen



Bulgarisches Bauernhaus



Abschied von Gordiana und
Frau Sadgorska 1.4.



Benzindampfer im Hafen von Burgas



Leben während der Rast
Karnobad 2.4.



Blick vom Türkenviertel auf Karmobad



Der Festtagsstaat



Bulgarische Familie in Novi Zagora



kleine [↑]Russin 4.4.



Maritzatal und Balkan 5.4.



Eselskarawane hinter Sliven 3.4.



Halt in Sofia 9.4.



Passstrasse in Jugoslavien
vor Pristina 12.4.



Balkangesichter, Pristina.



Englische Panzertype auf
Passstrasse hinter Skoplje. 14.4.



Moschee in Pristina



Auf Passstrasse hinter Kasanik
auf Skoplje zu 14.4.



Bitoj oder Monastico an der
griechischen Grenze 15.4.



Alte Moschee bei Prilep 15.4.



Grab von 44-Männern an griech. Grenze



Englische Rückzugsstrasse



hinter Grevena Griechenland 18.4.

AR 7262
Box 32 = folder 1/1 JOHN H. E. FRIED. RESEARCH MISC, THE NOTES, REVIEWS 1949-1974

United Nations library

Catalogue Nos. of
War Crimes items

| | | |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first)
Institut za
Mezdunarodni
I zuchvanita
Institut des Hautes Etudes
Sofia | | |
| Call No. | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first)
Nuclea Law +
Economie
Ed. Luigi Citarista.
Ediziani SEP, via E.
Q. Visconti 55
Rome | | |
| Call No. | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|---|-----------|--------------|
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first)
Neue Justiz
Suhrverlag e DDR
Otto Grolow Pl. 17 | | |
| Call No. 108-02 | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first)
Modern Law Review
Title | | |
| Call No. | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first)
Milit. Law Rev.
Title
War. | | |
| Call No. | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first)
Israel Law Review
Ed. Arnold Spelbow.
Title Israel Law Rev. Ass. of Faculties
of Law, Hebr. Un. Jerusalem | | |
| Call No. | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | |
|--|-----------|
| USA Journal on Chemical Warfare | |
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION |
| Author
(Surname first) Armed Forces Chemical Journal | |
| Title
Scienc 1946, A
Ed: Edgar L. Newhouse
Armed Forces Chemical Assoc.
1725 K St. NW W. 20006
circ. approx. 2000 | |
| Call No. | |
| Vol.
or
Year | |
| Date due | Signature |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN L.13 (11-48) | |

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Mindszenti | |
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION |
| Author
(Surname first) Pastore, U. | |
| Title
Mindszenti. I doc-i
nasesti dal Vaticano
Milano, '49. 184 p. | |
| Call No. 282 (439.1)
P 2 | |
| Vol.
or
Year | |
| Date due | Signature |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN L.13 (11-48) | |

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Mural France | |
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION |
| Author
(Surname first) Cercle des F.F.A.
(Féd. Natle des Anciens
des Forces Françaises en Allemagne
Title et Auteur
mai 1924, A
34 rue de Caumartin, Paris 9 ^e | |
| Call No. | |
| Vol.
or
Year | |
| Date due | Signature |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN L.13 (11-48) | |

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Journal Australia | |
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION |
| Author
(Surname first) Australian Law J. | |
| Title
mai 27. Ed: P. Jeffrey
Law Book Co. Ltd.
201 Kent St. Sydney N.S.W. | |
| Call No. | |
| Vol.
or
Year | |
| Date due | Signature |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN L.13 (11-48) | |

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Herrn C | |
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION |
| Author
(Surname first) Herrmann, C. | |
| Title
Arten des Völkerrechts
mai 1946 Ed: Dr. Hans-J. Schlochauer
J.C.P. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Box 2040
74-Tuebingen,
circ. 800 | |
| Call No. | |
| Vol.
or
Year | |
| Date due | Signature |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN L.13 (11-48) | |

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Journal USA | |
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION |
| Author
(Surname first) Am. J. N. | |
| Title
mai 57. Ed: E. C. Surrency
Temple U. School of Law
1715 N. Broad St. Phila. Pa. 19122
circ. 675(?) | |
| Call No. | |
| Vol.
or
Year | |
| Date due | Signature |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN L.13 (11-48) | |

| Journal USA | | INITIALS |
|--|--|--------------|
| LAST NAME | (Please use block letters) | |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author | Am. J. of Comparative Law. | |
| (Surname first) | | |
| Title | 1952. Ed. Prof. B. J. George, Jr.
Legal Research Bldg. Univ. of Mich.
Ann Arbor, Mich. 48104 | |
| Call No. | | |
| Vol. | | |
| or | | |
| Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | |
| | | L.13 (11-48) |

| Mindszent | | INITIALS |
|--|--|--------------|
| LAST NAME | (Please use block letters) | |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author | Curtas Radburn: | |
| (Surname first) | | |
| Title | There is no good lawyer
who has not a bad conscience
for being a lawyer. | |
| Call No. | Il n'est pas de bon juriste
qui n'avait mauvaise conscience | |
| Vol. | ou à son juriste. | |
| or | | |
| Year | 9 by Henri-Henri Joubert | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| | La S. de l'Aut. de la Responsabilité
Pénale. Paris, Dalloz, 61, p. 415 | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | |
| | | L.13 (11-48) |

| bibliography | | INITIALS |
|--|--|--------------|
| LAST NAME | (Please use block letters) | |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author | Rob. W. MILLER | |
| (Surname first) | | |
| Title | Die amer. u. Pol. polit. u.
antelich. - Publikat.
S. 145-55
Frankf. 56, 40 p. | |
| Call No. | 016: 327 (43:73)
M 4 | |
| Vol. | | |
| or | | |
| Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | |
| | | L.13 (11-48) |

| US military Justice 1953 | | INITIALS |
|--|---|--------------|
| LAST NAME | (Please use block letters) | |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author | J. Suedeker | |
| (Surname first) | | |
| Title | Military Justice under
the Uniform Code.
Boston, Little Brown 53
1043 p. | |
| Call No. | 344.1 (73)
S 5 | |
| Vol. | | |
| or | | |
| Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | |
| | | L.13 (11-48) |

| Mindszent | | INITIALS |
|--|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| LAST NAME | (Please use block letters) | |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author | Doc's on Mindszent | |
| (Surname first) | | |
| Title | Case
Report, '49 96 p.
ill. | |
| Call No. | 282 (439.1)
D 637 | |
| Vol. | | |
| or | | |
| Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | |
| | | L.13 (11-48) |

| Mindszent | | INITIALS |
|--|---|--------------|
| LAST NAME | (Please use block letters) | |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author | Sheppard, A. W. | |
| (Surname first) | | |
| Title | Mindszent + the
Protestant pastor;
a factual acct of the
famous trial in Hungary +
Bielanie, Sydney, '49. 63 p. | |
| Call No. | 282 (439.1)
S 549 | |
| Vol. | | |
| or | | |
| Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | |
| | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| Journal Japan | | INITIALS |
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first) Chuo Law Review /
Hogaku Shimpō | | |
| Title Ed: Toichiro Higawa
Japan Publications Trading Co.
C.P.O. Box 722
Tokyo | | |
| Call No. | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|---|-----------|--------------|
| Revue France | | INITIALS |
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first) Revue de Science
Criminelle et de
Droit Penal Comparé | | |
| Title Centre Français de Droit Comparé
Paris, Université, Inst. de Criminologie
depuis 1936.
Librairie Sirey, 22 rue Soufflot
Paris 5 | | |
| Call No. | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| Journal USA | | INITIALS |
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first) Military Review.
Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, Command +
General Staff College | | |
| Call No. Xm
M 6445 | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| German Journal | | INITIALS |
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first) | | |
| Title [Der] Militärarzt.
nach 36 months
Sprung, Berlin | | |
| Call No. | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| Journal | | INITIALS |
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first) Jurdak | | |
| Title | | |
| Call No. | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|---|-----------|--------------|
| Journal | | INITIALS |
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first) Mindszenty, József | | |
| Title The Trial of
Budapest, Hung. State
Publ-House 1949, 191 pp. | | |
| Call No. 282(439.1)
M 663 t also: SCA | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| Philip | | INITIALS |
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first) | | |
| Title Philippine Law Journal. | | |
| Sui 1914: Ed. Steve R. Cortes
Un. N & Phil. College / Law
Diliman, Quezon City, Phil. I. | | |
| Call No. | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|---|-----------|--------------|
| Ethics: Military | | INITIALS |
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first) H.E. ECCLES | | |
| Title Military Concepts & Philosophy. New Brunswick, Rutgers UP 165, 339 1. | | |
| Call No. | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| Paris: ses Mémories? | | INITIALS |
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first) Henri Mornier | | |
| Title Bulletin 2 books, ou -
présentation des Jours d'été
en France et dans les autres
pays de l'ouest 1947
dans les pays de l'est
1949 | | |
| Call No. | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| Statistique: War Crimes | | INITIALS |
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first) Main noir, Jean Pierre | | |
| Title La répression de crimes
de guerre devant les trib. n.
fran. et allés. 1956 534 pp. | | |
| Call No. 341.4
M 457 | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| War Crimes, law Thailand | | INITIALS |
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first) Thailand | | |
| Title War Criminal Act
B.E. 2488 (= 1945) | | |
| Call No. 344.197 (593)
W 2 | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|---|-----------|--------------|
| War Crimes. German Bibl. | | INITIALS |
| LAST NAME (Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author (Surname first) Devoto, Andrea | | |
| Title Bibliografia dell'oppressione
nazista fino al 1962
Franzi 63, 149 pp. | | |
| Call No. WW
016:341.4 (43)
D 573 | | |
| Vol. or Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L.13 (11-48) |

LAST NAME

(Please use block letters)

INITIALS

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

Author

Surname first)

Mindszenty, József

Title

The Trial of

Budapest, Hung. State

Publ. House 1949, 1911p.

Call No.

282 (439.1)

M 663 t

also: SCA

Vol.

or

Year


Date due

Signature

UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY

REQUEST FOR LOAN

L.13 (11-48)



War Crimes

| | |
|---|-----------|
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION |

Author (Surname first) Hsü, Shu-Hsi

Title A new digest / Jap. War
Conduct. 1941.

Dunphy 273 16.

Call No. 341.324.55(52
H7

Vol.
or
Year

Date due Signature

UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN L.13 (11-48)

War Crimes

| | |
|---|-----------|
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION |

Author (Surname first) Fuhrman, Peter

Title Des. travaux préparés ad. Recl-
participation in Vok. R.

Munich Acad. 63
157 W

Call No. 341.4
F 959

Vol.
or
Year

Date due Signature

UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN L.13 (11-48)

War Crimes

| | |
|---|-----------|
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION |

Author (Surname first) Foy, T.P.

Title The int'l + nat'l competence
of international parliaments to
legislate in respect of extra-territ.
crimes, and war crimes

S. Brisbane, '47 90 pp.

Call No. 341.4
F 947

Vol.
or
Year

Date due Signature

UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN L.13 (11-48)

War Crimes

| | |
|---|-----------|
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION |

Author (Surname first) Boissier, Pierre

Title L'épée et la Balance
Amères Juridiques.

Genève, 1952 174 pp.

Call No. 341.4
B 684

Vol.
or
Year

Date due Signature

UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN L.13 (11-48)

War Crimes

| | |
|---|-----------|
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION |

Author (Surname first) Belgique. Comité d'Enquête
d'Enquête sur les Violations
des Règles du Droit des Gens, des Lois et
des Coutumes de la Guerre. Règles et Codes.

Brux., 1921-23

Call No. 940.3(493)
C 6

Vol. 4 vols. in 6 tomes
or
Year

Date due Signature

UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN L.13 (11-48)

Finland

| | |
|---|-----------|
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION |

Author (Surname first) Procope, H.J.F.

Title Saarijulistij über Finnland.
Programme des d. Verfassung II
Kriegsverantwortlichkeit in Finnland
Zürich 1947, 125 (Ryhi, Risto)

Call No. 343.197(471.1)
P 7

Vol.
or
Year Soviet answers?

Date due Signature

UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN L.13 (11-48)

| | | |
|---|-------------|---------------|
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author
(Surname first) Röling, B. V. A. | | |
| Title Het E. law in an expanded world.
Aust. 1966, 126 pp. | | |
| Call No. | 341
R748 | |
| Vol.
or
Year | R 748 | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L. 13 (11-48) |

Tokyo

| | | |
|---|-------------------|---------------|
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author
(Surname first) Fu. Kasaku, Teiji | | |
| Title Le Trib. de Tokyo <u>maquis</u>
de fondement legal.
Paris, 1960, (52?) 23 pp. | | |
| Call No. | 341.4(52)
F96i | |
| Vol.
or
Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L. 13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|---|----------------|---------------|
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author
(Surname first) Alberdi, Juan Bautista | | |
| Title El Origen de la guerra
Buenos Aires, Tor (1947)
190 pp. | | |
| Call No. | 341.3
A 329 | |
| Vol.
or
Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L. 13 (11-48) |

| | | |
|---|------------------------|---------------|
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author
(Surname first) Mechalov, V. V. | | |
| Title Bolshaya Logh
o Malyshevskoye
Moscow 100 pp. 1965 | | |
| Call No. | 355.4
M 687 | |
| Vol.
or
Year | (US mil. 100 pp. 1965) | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L. 13 (11-48) |

War Crimes Trial of General Densetsu, K...

| | | |
|--|-----------|---------------|
| LAST NAME
(Please use block letters) | | INITIALS |
| ROOM NO. | EXTENSION | |
| Author
(Surname first) Ausschell, Donald E. Eckert | | |
| Title Der Oberländer Prozess
Geheimes Protokoll des
Obersten M. S. DDR, 20-27. 4. 26 v. 1960
Hrsg. vom Ausschuss f. ...
(1960) 240 pp. | | |
| Call No. | 341.4(43) | |
| Vol.
or
Year | | |
| Date due | Signature | |
| UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY
REQUEST FOR LOAN | | L. 13 (11-48) |

Box 271

to be followed:

8/21/69

~~Day 46~~

~~p. 35~~

P 21-44 Smith

Day 45 : file, p. 23, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 20, 24, 37
file p. 10-13

Day 53 file, p. 12, 15

35

Box 276 (Seeger)



Seeger :

19 + 20 days:

n. 28-31
35-38-40
54 (Obs!)

20th + 21st day :

(Pres.) n. 11


12

JAG:

19-22, 26

Def. :

34-36.



✓ 6

Box 276, care 120

Mochel

plolololal p. 2, 3, 4

(look up

Mwce

IX, 75-82

Give
order!

5 yrs for order for writ
to us Occupied

plololal:

br. 124 (Yamauchi)

~~to~~ to be done from Box 276:

list of death sentences !! for script sheets.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser T. Frey. v. Wilnowsky ✓

Titel Warum wurde Knopf

Ort, Jahr vertriebt? Lyende + Judy Irving

Stg.: Vorwerk 150/ 280

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

55/I Verfasser THORWALD, J. Die ungeklärten Fälle. Udet, Dieth, Prien, Mölders, Todt, Lasch, Schörner, Model, von Reichenau. 2, veränd. u. erg. Aufl. Stuttgart: Steingrüben-Verl., 1954 254 S.

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser Herbert KRAUS

Titel Gerichtstag in Nbg.

Ort, Jahr

Hamburg: Verl. f. d. Gesetz + Recht '47. Verlagsreihe d. Rechts- + Staatswiss.

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

1964/I Verfasser F. J. P. Veale: Der Barbarei entgegen (Advance to barbarism, dt.) Wied. Rückfall in d. Barbarei Titel durch Kriegführung u. Kriegsverbrecherprozesse unsere Zukunft bedroht. mit e. Geleitw. von Lord Ort, Jahr Hankey. 2, [erw.] Aufl. - Wiesbaden: Priester (1962). 354 S. mit 166. 8° = Zeitgeschichtliche Dokumentation [Bd. 8].

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser Krausbüchler, O. Rückblick

Titel auf Ubg.

Ort, Jahr Hamburg: Zeit Verlag '49

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

! Verfasser SIEGERT, K. Repräsentation, Requisition, Der Missbrauch von Schrott und höherer Befehl. Ein Beitrag zur Rechtfertigung der Kriegsverurteilung. (Göttingen.) Göttinger Verlags-Ort, Jahr anstatt 1953. 52 S. 8° = Schriften der Forschungshilfe.

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser ~~BAR~~ Grewe, W. + O. Küster

Titel Nürnberg als Rechtsfrage

Ort, Jahr Stuttgart: Koch '47

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

61/II Verfasser FASCHISMUS Getto, Massenmord. Dokumentation über Ausrottung u. Widerstand d. Juden in Polen während d. 2. Weltkrieges. Ort, Jahr Hrsg. vom Jüd. Histor.-Institut Warschau.

Bände

Ausgew., bearb. u. eingel. von T. Berenstein, A. Eisenbach (u. a.) Mit 231 Abb. u. Faks. sowie 1 Kt. (2. Aufl.). Berlin: Rütten + Loening (1961) 609 S.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser STEINBAUER, G.

Titel Ich war Verteidiger in Nbg.

Ort, Jahr Ein Dokumentenbeitrag für Kampf 2 Oberen Klagenf.: Kaiser '50

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser Laternser, H.

Titel Verteidigung deutscher Soldaten.

Ort, Jahr Plädoyer vor alliierten Gerichten.

Bonn: Bohmeyer; Haupt: Krauer

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser BOISSIER, P. Völkerrecht u. Militärbefehl. (L'épée et la balance, dt.)
Titel Ein Beitr. zur Frage d. Verhütung u. Bestrafung von Kriegsverbrechen.
Ort, Jahr Stuttgart: Koehler (1953). 162 S. 8°

Bände
Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser Kraus, H. Staatsinteressen im internationalen Leben.
Titel nationaler Leben.
Ort, Jahr München: Isar-Verl. 1951 32 S.
= Schriftenreihe der Hochschule für politische Wissenschaften, München, H. 9.

Bände
Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser Olmes, F.
Titel Über Galgen wächst kein Gras. Die fragwürdige Kulisse d. Kriegsverbrecherprozesse im Spiegel unbekannter Dokumente. 1950.

Bände
Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser Haensel, Karl
Titel Das Organisationsverbrechen
Ort, Jahr Über Betrachtung zum Kontrollrat Prof. Dr. W. Biederstein, 1947

Bände
Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

1964/I P. Rassinier. Zum Fall Eichmann: Was ist Wahrheit? oder Die unbelehrbaren Sieger (Le véritables procès Eichmann ou Les vainqueurs incorrigibles, dt.)
Titel Leoni am Starnberger See: Drukfel (1963). 248 S. 8°
Ort, Jahr

Bände
Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser HOGGAN D.L.
Titel Im Kampf um die Wahrheit.
Ort, Jahr Die geschichtswissensch. Enttarnung d. Kriegsschuldige. '62 RM 7.20

Bände
Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser Haensel, Karl
Titel Das Gericht vertagt sich. Aus dem Tagebuch eines Major Verteidiger.
Ort, Jahr

Bände
Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser HALDER, F.
Titel Kriegstagebuch.
Ort, Jahr Tägl. Aufzeichnungen d. Chef d. Gen. Stab d. Heer 1939-42. 2. Bd.

Bände
Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser Šejnman, M. M.
Titel Der Vatikan im 2. Weltkrieg
Ort, Jahr (Vatikan vo vtoroj mirovoj vojne) Berlin: Dietz, 1954 500 S.

Bände
Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser Latenser, H.
Titel Verteidigung deutscher Soldaten '50.

Bände
Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser SCHÜTZE, H.A. Die Repräsentation unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Kriegsverbrecherprozesse.
Titel
Ort, Jahr Bonn: Röhrscheid 1950 = Rechtsvergleichende Untersuchungen zur gesamten Strafrechtswiss. N.F. 1.

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser ACHENAUER, R. Zur Frage einer Revision der Kriegsverbrecher-Prozesse.
Titel
Ort, Jahr Nürnberg [Selbstverl.] 1948

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser Bardèche, M.
Titel Politik der Zerstörung.
Ort, Jahr Nürnberg oder Europa 50.
Mareuil sur La Tenu provisoire.
Name, Vorname Göttinger: Plesse 50

Bände

Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser Kraus, H. Kontrollratsgesetz Nr. 10 Erl. von Hamburg: Rechts u. Staatswiss. Verl. (1948)
Titel
Ort, Jahr [Vart.:] Kraus: Kommentar zum Kontrollratsgesetz Nr. 10 1465

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser Kraus, H. Recht im Dienste der Menschenwürde. Festschrift für Herbert Kraus 1964
Titel
Ort, Jahr

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser HOGGAN D.L. Der erzwungene Krieg. Die Ursachen u. Urheber d. 2. Weltkriegs.
Titel (Vom Vert. autoris. Ausg. Nach d. ds. als d. Engl. übers. vom Institut f. Dt. Nachkriegsgeschichte, Tübingen). 4. Aufl. (Tübingen.) Verl. d. Dt. Hochschullehrer-Zerlung 1963. 893 S. mit Abb. gr. 80 = Veröffentlichung
Ort, Jahr Name, Vorname ungen. d. Institutes f. Dt.

Bände

Beruf Nachkriegsgeschichte. Bd. I.
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

61/11

Verfasser KASTNER, R.
Titel Der Kastner-Bericht über Eichmanns Menschenhandel in Ungarn Mitte. Vorw. von Carlo Schmid. (Red. u. Nachw. E. Landau) (München) Kindler (1961) 367 S.
Ort, Jahr

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser LUMMERT, G. Die Strafverfahren gegen Deutsche im Ausland wegen Kriegsverbrechen: Rechtsgutachten mit Gesetzestexten. Hg. Arbeitsgemeinschaft vom Roten Kreuz in Deutschland, Brit. Zone, Rechtschutzstelle 1949
Titel
Ort, Jahr

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser PROZESSMATERIALIEN in der Strafsache gegen ehemalige Angehörige der japanischen Armee wegen Verberdigung und Anwendung der Bakterienwaffe. Mit Faks. Moskau: Verl. f. fremdsprachige Literatur 1950
Titel
Ort, Jahr

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Verfasser DEUTSCHE GREVEL IN RUSSLAND.
Titel Gerichtstag in Charkow. Mit Abb. Wein: Steben-Verl. 1945
Ort, Jahr

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

Warliunout

ku HQ der Wehrmacht
39-45

Manastein

Soldatenleben Metzger
Veranl. Frh. '67 ~~Attenbach~~

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

55/L
Verfasser WELTKRIEG 1939-45. Ehrenbuch
Titel d. Deutschen Wehrmacht. Den Gefallenen
Ort, Jahr Zur Ehre + den Lebenden zur Erinnerung. In Gemeinschaftsarb. auf Grund persönlicher Kenntnis aller Kriegsschauplätze hrg.

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf Mitarb.: Frh. (Hans) von Buttlar (u.a.) mit
Wohnung 54 Karten-Skizzen u. 171 Abb.
Benutzungskarte Nr. Stuttgart: Riegler 1954
Getr. Pag.

Ausgabestempel

B Bemerkungen der Verwaltung

Germann law
de War crime absolut!!

Signatur

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Das Wehrmacht-Kriegsrecht im 2. Weltkrieg
Verfasser Saml. d. grundlegenden Gesetze, Verordn.
Titel + Gesetze. Bearb. v. Rud. Absolon
Ort, Jahr Als Ms. gedr. - Konv. in Münster
(Ks. Nachr. d. d. Abt.) Bundesarchiv Abt.
Zentral nachweisstelle 1958. XVI + 276 p. gr. 8

Bände

Name, Vorname Karl S.
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

1955/L
Verfasser LIPPERT, J. Lächle... und ~~verbirg~~
Titel die Tränen. Erlebnisse u. Bemerkungen eines
Ort, Jahr dt "Kriegsverbrechers" Zeichn. von Frey.
Leon am Starnbergersee: Druffel (1955).
222 S. mit Abb., Titelbild 8°

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

Ausgabestempel

B Bemerkungen der Verwaltung

and: Schriftenreihe
"Der Deutsche Imperialismus
+ d. 2. Weltkrieg"
Berlin: Buchverl. & Verlags

Signatur

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

1962/L
Verfasser Berber, F. J.
Titel Lehrbuch v. Vorkriegsrecht
Ort, Jahr Bd. 2 Kriegszeit '62
München u. Berlin: Beck 1962. 312 S.

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

A Aus der DEUTSCHEN BIBLIOTHEK habe ich unter Anerkennung der Benutzungsordnung erhalten:

Das Urteil im Wilkowsky-Prozess.
Verfasser Einführung v. R. W. Kerschmann & Haemann
Titel 88 x Walter Galdowski + Julia Kere
Ort, Jahr Schwäbisch Gmünd: Bürger
1950, 22 x 11, 346 ff.

Bände

Name, Vorname
Beruf
Wohnung
Benutzungskarte Nr.

HERBERT H. LEHMAN COLLEGE
OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BEDFORD PARK BOULEVARD WEST
BRONX, NEW YORK 10468

Index Cards

Literature (Italian, etc. etc.)
on War Crimes, Trials, etc

Casella, V. Danno da atto illecito e danno di guerra.
Rivista ~~com~~ 1948, II, 274.
di diritto commerciale

Bianco, D.L. Guerra partigiana e potere di confisca.
(con postilla di Sandulli A.M.)
Il foro italiano 1948, I, 322.

Alcalá-Zamora y Castillo N.
Il processo dei criminali di guerra.
Jus (Milano) 1950, 208.

Vossalli, G. Altri grandi processi contro criminali di guerra.
Giustizia penale 1948, I, 313

Biblioteca della Camera dei Deputati
Archivio penale
Viale Angelico 84 Roma

Revista penale
Via del Tritone 142
Roma

Il foro italiano
Piazza ~~Borghese~~ 3 Roma

Capotorti, F. Rappresaglie esercitate dall'occupante per atti ostili della popolazione nemica.
Il foro penale 1948, III.

Meranighini, U.

Il dovere di disobbedienza

[... per l'errore sul fatto]

Riv. Penale 1966, I, 5
Piazza Libertà, 13 - Roma

Della Paoli, G. Della illegittimità della rappresaglia per azioni di guerra compiute da appartenenti da formazioni partigiane.
Archivio penale 1954, 2°, 213.

Codice penale militare

no.

Lacconia, A. Fondamento del diritto internazionale penale nell'ordinamento giuridico positivo.
Archivio penale 1954, 189.

Bellini, V. I crimini internaz. ed il movimento per la repressione penale internaz.
Archivio penale 1948, I, 131.

Rappaport, S. t. Le varie fasi delle tendenze di evoluzione nel diritto penale internazionale
Rivista ~~mit~~ 1934, 17.
di diritto e procedura penale militare

Sedrangetta, G. Il crimine internazionale.
Jus gentium 1951, 114.

Levi, N. In tema di diritto penale internazionale.
Rivista ~~pubb~~ 1929, 3.
di diritto pubblica

Conti, U. Diritto penale internazionale.
Rivista penale 1932, 730.

Greco, P. Diritto di guerra e guerra partigiana.
Il foro italiano 1948, I, 44

Vassalli, G. In tema di diritto internazionale penale.
Giustizia penale 1951, I, 257.

Pioletti, U. Disobbedienza del militare e ordine illegittimo
Rivista di polizia 1953, 424.

A. Pistolese Le sentenze dei tribunali militari alleati.
Uno strano decreto e una più strana circolare
Rivista penale 1950, I, 242.

Delli Paoli G. Dei limiti alla cosiddetta obbedienza gerarchica.
Archivio penale, 1953, II, 407.

Palmerini, M. Sulla efficacia delle sentenze alleate.
Rivista penale 1950, II, 487.

Pedio, T. Osservazioni sulla obiezione di coscienza.
(con post. di Santucci G).
Il Foro italiano 1953, II, 206

Stellacci, P. Il reato militare e il suo giudice in tempo di pace.
Rivista penale 1950, II, 709

Capograssi, G. Obbedienza e coscienza.
Il Foro italiano 1950, II, 47

Lo Cascio, M. L'errore su legge non penale ed il reato militare.
Giustizia penale 1951, I, 84.

Zinni, F. "Giusto motivo" e "autorizzazione" nei reati di assenza dal servizio dal servizio militare.
Rivista penale 1955, I, 452.

F. A. Marina La punizione dei crimini di guerra come reati internazionali da parte delle potenze alleate.
Giustizia penale 1947, I, 91.

V.V. Sull'amnistia per i reati militari commessi in tempo di guerra.
~~Diritto~~ Diritto criminale e criminologia 1955, 160.

E. Belardinelli. Crimini di guerra. La relativa giurisdizione ed i procedimenti in Italia. Giustizia penale 1951, I, 118.

Peranghini, U. La giustizia militare in Albania.
Giustizia penale 1941, III, 496

G. Pinz de Leon. Il problema dell'ordine dell'autorità nei confronti del crimine di guerra.
Calabria giudiziaria 1946, 123

Palmerini, M. L'efficacia delle sentenze dei tribunali militari alleati.
Giustizia penale 1950, I, 353.

V. Cavallo. Il problema dell'ordine dell'autorità nei confronti degli ~~appartenenti~~ del crimine di guerra.
Calabria giudiziaria 1946, 120. 277.

Ginsburgs, George

Laws of War and War Crimes on
the Russian Front during World
War II: The Soviet View.

Sov. St. 11, 1960 (n. 3 gennaio)

Brinon, Fernand Marie de, 1885-1947. Accusato.

... Les procès de collaboration. Fernand de Brinon, Joseph
Darnand, Jean Luchaire; compte rendu sténographique.
Paris, A. Michel, [1948]. 634, [1] p. (collection des
grands procès contemporains. -).

Biss, André

Eichmann - Les négociations de Budapest
- Le témoignage d'André Biss.

Evidences, 11, 1960 (n. 84 giugno - luglio)

Greenspan, Morris

The modern law of Land Warfare. Berkeley & Los Angeles,
Univ. Calif. Press, 1959. xxiv 724 pp.
Bibliogr. p. [684]-695.

Allen, Claude G.

Revision of German Wartime Judgments
under the Bonn-Paris Agreement.

Int. Comp. L.A. 5, 1956 (No. 1)

Würtenberger, Thomas, 1907 -

Zur Rechtswidrigkeit der Kriegsverbrechen, von Thomas
Würtenberger.

(In: Festschrift für Edmund Mezger. - München u. Berlin,
1954. p. 193-[212]).

G. Vassalli

Intorno al fondamento giuridico
della punizione dei crimini di guerra.

Giustizia penale 1947, II, 618

Kaufmann, Erich, 1880 -

Die für Aburteilung von "Kriegsverbrechen" eingesetzten
Gerichtsbanken und der Kontrollrat.

(In: ... Völkerrechtliche und staatsrechtliche Abhand-
lungen; Carl Bilfinger zum 75. Geburtstag am 21 Januar
1954 gewidmet. ... Köln-Berlin, 1954. p. 123-148)

Maunoir, Jean-Pierre

... La répression des crimes de guerre devant les tribunaux français et alliés. Thèse présentée à la Faculté de droit de l'Université de Genève... par J.-P. Maunoir.
Genève, Éditions médecine et hygiène, 1956.
534 p. (In testa al front.: Université de Genève. Faculté de droit). Bibliogr. p. 528-534.

Cartier, Raymond

... Les secrets de la guerre dévoilés par Nuremberg.
Paris, A. Fayard, 1946. 318 p.

Livre blanc sur les crimes de guerre de l'inspecteur général de la Bundeswehr, le général Heinrich Trottner.
[Dresden, Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1964]. 61 p.

Aroneau, Eugène

... Le crime contre l'humanité. Préface de André Boissarie. Paris, Librairie Dalloz, 1961

322 p.
"Annexe": p. [273]-322.

Henkys, Reinhard, 1928-

... Die nationalsozialistischen Gewaltverbrechen, Geschichte u. Gericht, mit einer Einleitung von Kurt Scharf... u. einem Beitrag von Jürgen Baumann, hrsg. von Dietrich Goldschmidt.
Stuttgart - Berlin, Kreuz-Verlag, [1964]. 392 p.

Contenuto:

1. Geschichte u. Gericht der nationalsozialistischen Gewaltverbrechen, [von] R. Henkys: p. 25-266.
- II. Die strafrechtliche Problematik der nationalsozialistischen Gewaltverbrechen, [von] J. Baumann: p. 267-321
- III. Ein Volk u. seiner Mörder, [von] D. Goldschmidt: p. 323-37
- "Ausgewählte Literatur...": p. 355-82.

Quisling, Vidkun A.L.W., accusato

straffesak mot Vidkun Abraham Lauritz Jonsson Quisling
Oslo, Utgitt på offentlig bekostning av Eidsivating-lagstols landsvikarutdeling, 1946. 646 p.

Arzinger, Rudolf

La réhabilitation des criminels de guerre hitlériens et le projet d'armée européenne, par Rudolf Arzinger.
Bruxelles, Centre de documentation, [1954]. 50 p., 1 f.

Meyrowitz, Henri

... La répression par les tribunaux allemands des crimes contre l'humanité et de l'appartenance à une organisation criminelle en application de la loi n. 10 du Conseil de Contrôle Allié, par H. Meyrowitz...
Paris, R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias, 1960. 514 p.

Bibliogr. pp. [447]-503

In testa al front.: Bibliothèque de droit international sous le patronage de l'Institut des hautes études internationales des l'université de Paris. Tome X.

Nürnberg. International Military Tribunal

Njurnbergskij process. Sbornik materialov. 3ie izd. isprav. Moskva, Gosudarst. izdat. juridičeskoj literatury. 1955. 2 vol.

Sawicki, Jerzy

... Als sei Nürnberg nie gewesen... Die Abkehr von den völkerrechtlichen Prinzipien der Nürnberger Urteile. Berlin, Deutscher Zentralverlag, 1958. 458 pp.

Mayda, Giuseppe

Norimberga 1946-1966. Di Giuseppe Mayda. Lingua ill. fuori testo. Milano, Longanesi, 1966. 416 pp. Bibliogr. p. 381-95.

Ripollés, A. Quintano

Dix ans après Nuremberg.

Rev. int. Dr. pén., 26, 1956 (No. 1-2 gennaio-giugno)

Martínez, José Agustín

... Les procès criminels de l'après-guerre. (Documents pour l'histoire contemporaine). Traduit de l'espagnol par Francis de Miomandre, préface de Jacques Isorni. Paris, éd. Albin Michel, 1958. 414 p.

Rauschenbach, Gerard

... Der Nürnberger Prozess gegen die Organisationen; Grundlagen, Probleme, Auswirkungen auf die Mitglieder u. strafrechtliche Ergebnisse.

Bonn, L. Röhrscheid, 1954. 153 pp.

Jahrreis, Hermann, 1894

... L'illegalità del processo di Norimberga. [Traduzione di Adamo Degli Occhi].

(In: Mazono Carlo, Arringhe Celebri... Milano, 1956. p. 395-441).

Paolini, Fulvio

... A dieci anni dal processo di Norimberga. La sua giustificazione. Bologna, Cappelli, 1956. 129 pp.

Taylor, Telford

The Nuremberg trials.

Col. Law R. 55, 1955 (fasc. 4).

(106)

Grigiani not guilty because of
art. 54 of Code [Italiano] comune "applicabile"
(p. 274)

anche ai reati militari:

*Non è punibile chi ha commesso il fatto per esservi
stato costretto dalla necessità di salvare sé od altri
dal pericolo attuale di un danno grave alla persona, pericolo
da lui non volontariamente causato, né altrimenti evitabile,
sempre che il fatto sia proporzionato al pericolo."

Francesco Carnelutti

Contrasto . Morano Editore 1961

Napoli

memoirs of

The famous lawyer, defense counsel for Graziani.

Chapter: In Difesa di Rodolfo Graziani

n. 143 - 326



vrb

Grigiani not guilty because of
art. 54 of Code [Italiano] comune "applicabile"
(p. 274)

anche ai reati militari:

"Non è punibile chi ha commesso il fatto per esservi
stato costretto dalla necessità di salvare sé od altri
dal pericolo attuale di un danno grave alla persona, pericolo
da lui non volontariamente causato, né altrimenti evitabile,
sempre che il fatto sia proporzionato al pericolo."

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK 3, N. Y.

Nov / Dec. 69

Commit on For. Res.

W. H. H. H.

940.57

~~F 8441~~

F 8441

France. Recueil de lettres
à l'usage des conf. de la paix
6 vols. 1866-7

//

943.013
V 868

Hannah Vogt. The Pleading of Guilt A short list of
1914-1945. Finland. by Gordon H. Graf.
Mt Oxf. 1964, 318 pp
trans. of Schuld oder Verhängnis?

943

Se 32 f

E.O. Volkman, etc.

Generalbericht von See. Kr. ein Erinnerungsbuch
78p

940.32

Au 79

Imperial + Royal Austro-Hung. Ministry / for. aff.
"Collect / evidence re my P
violated / with the by P combis at word
A.H. concluded on Jan. 31, 1915. Extract / P
[up. 1915] 88 pp. illust.
Partial trans. of same & see x P 23 p
of 2 v. 4. of P 22 Staaten

940.335

G 317

Germany. Ausw. Amt. Die Völkerrechts-
widrige Führung des Belgischen Volkskriegs.
1915? 328 pp

940.338

W 183

H. Wandersbeck.
Weltkrieg + Propaganda
Hans Mittelbar + Sohn, '36, 260 p

341.6

Ap 48

Angadipuram Appadorai
the use of force in int'l relations
Bombay, Asia Pub. Co. (1958)
(Int'l Studies series, Occas. Papers, # 1)
124 p

341.31

~~341.31~~

B174

David Hunter Miller (Law / War)

Jos. R. Baker + Henry G. Crocker
The Law / Land Warfare re my P
1915 + duties / Belgium as victim
on Aug. 1, 1914

Work. Conf. P. O. 1919

Social (Hate) / Rep / Int. USA 420 p

and: 341.3

B174

Selected Topics 851 p

355.8
W 115

Curt Wachtel
Chemical Warfare 1941 312 pp.

355
F 685 ar - deutsch

Herrn. Foertsch.
The Art of Mod. Warfare
NY Uebers '40, 273 p
(Kriegskunst heute + morgen)

355.4
Su 74

Sun-tzu 6th cent BC
The Art / War, Uebers
1971

341.6234
W 422

Hans Wobey.
The Outlawry / W.W.
131 149 p

355.4
M 568

Sigf. Mette
Kau Geist deutscher Feldherren,
Genie + Technik 1800-1918
Zweis '18 296 pp.

341.6234
V 786

J. C. Vinson
Wm E. Borah + 1 Outlawry / W.W.
Ue./ Georgian '57 212 p

against w.c. trials

355
V 484 F. J. P. Veale

Advance to barbarism. How P
resents L barbarism + warfare +
war-trials menaces our future -
Africola, Wm, CC Nelson Pub Co '53 305 p

341.6 234
S1

J. F. Skottwood
War as an art / not p/d
+ its removal in 1 Pub / Paris
NY '29 310 p

ST 72

J. E. Steiner
S. O. Leinson + 1 Pub / Paris

341.3
C 661

Georg Cohn. Kriegesverhütung + Schiedsfrage
478 31 199 p
(Frankf. Pub.) - mod. Verh. 3 Hefen 23)

341.3
B 417

Pierino Belli

1502-75

De re militari et aliis tractatus.

X

341.3
A4 14

1548-84
Baltasar Ayala. De jure et officio
bellicis... Carusca 1912
2 vol.

341.153 d
Eu 74 v

Heru. Volle
Europa Archiv

Vertragswerke v. Bön u. Paris vom Mai 1552
358 p

X

335
D 395

Georgi Dimitrov
The United Front. Struggle →
Fascism + war.
NY. Nat'l Pub. (1938) 287 pp

order

320.12
Sch 56

Carl Schmitt

Völkerrecht & Raumordnung
139

X order

320.1
R 292

!!!
Karl Renner
Gesetzliche Grundlagen d. Politik
Salzbr., Pilsen u. (54)
333 v

X

172.4
L 587

John Lewis

The Case → pacifism.
Allen + Unwin 40,

23 p

! Very interesting!
defends Hitler-Stalin pact 1939!

Periodica

Int'l Conciliation. May. 1918, no. 129
(tried with Foster)

Period.

Int'l Conciliation
Mar. 1925 no. 208
(Shotwell, Plans + proposals to end war)

Temp.

Peter Wallner. Beyond the Gestapo. A record of life
in Dachau + Buchenwald concentr. camps.
London, John Murray 1941

947.033

B631

E. H. Bokhoff.
Völker- \checkmark \rightarrow Bolschevism
137

943.0357
W197

Phil. St. C. Walton-Kerr
Gestapo.
London, R. Hale, Ltd. 286 p.
Nov 39
2nd. imp. ed., Mar. 1940

943.0355
W146

The Goose step is verboten: P. C. Biny
Friday. Free Press. Glasgow 1964
294 p.

943.0355
P584

W. R. V. Pichter
Vom Wesen $\rightarrow \sqrt{h} + 82 \sqrt{h} e \underline{e}$
Stutt. Vorwerk '52 267 p.

943.014
V889

Vom künftigen Deutschen Soldaten.
Gedanken + Plannngen d. Dienststelle Blank
111 p. Bonn '55

pe ①

Q43.012
W134

R. G. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism: the Free Corps
movement in post-war Germany
1918-23 New York 1952, 349 p.

34161
B669

G. Bouche
Huit mille traités de paix
'48 248 p

still to

do:

free all done
until XIV ends.

Protostat

I, p. 2-9

II, p. 7

~~I, p. 10~~

14, 15, 16

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8

III
IV

(Belser)
4-14, 17

2, 3, 4, 6-11, 15-18



XV

p. 3, 4, 5-8, 10, 11, 13

R. P.-13(b)

CUSTOMS DECLARATION

| DESCRIPTION OF CONTENTS
The nature and value of the content should be fully and accurately stated
(See Instructions on reverse) | Value in Indian currency | | Gross weight | | Net weight | |
|---|--------------------------|----|--------------|-----|------------|-----|
| | Rs. | nP | Kg. | gm. | Kg. | gm. |
| One copy of the book entitled
Dissentient Judgment of Justice R.B.
Pal in the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East | | | | | | |
| Country of origin or of manufacture of the goods | INDIA | | | | | |

NO Commercial value

For use of Post Office of Exchange

No. of ^{grams} rates prepaid _____

Letter Parcel Bill No. _____

Entry No. _____

Date-stamp of office of exchange
MGIFPAh.—2090—26-12-62—1,00,000.

Signature and address of sender

Sanyal & Co.
1/1A College Sq.,
Calcutta 12 (India)

The Inequality of States

A STUDY OF THE SMALLER POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By DAVID VITAL, *University of Sussex*. This book is the first systematic consideration of the problems which face the small state in its international relations. Dr. Vital analyzes the primary problems faced by small powers as a result of their limited resources, considering their implications for foreign and defense affairs. He then examines the possibilities of national policy which are open to such states: passive, active, and defensive. \$4.80

 OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

look up INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOC.

LONDON 1920 POW; and Laws of War at Sea.

C RISTIANA 1905 Law of Belligerence. Neutrality.

Berlin 1906 Neutrality.

Vienna 1926 & Stockholm 1924 :adopted Statute for proposed Intl Penal Court '''

Hague 1921, ~~Bueons-Ayres-1922-~~ POW

Buenos aires 1922 CHEMICAL WARFARE

Bpest 1934 !!

Luzern 1952 State Immunity

also look up : Warsaw 1928 Extradition

Paris 1936)
Amsterd. 1938) Civilians
cambridge 1946)

also look up : 1953

1962 !!

1964 Tokyo

Also: W.E. RAPPAR's Civil Servants' Collection 1275-1788 Feb 12, 1968

Dear Hon, Your quotation from the New Engl Confed. agreem. is most intersting.

I think you will find something similar in some of the docs dealing with the SWISS CONFEDERATION. There was a great deal of discission as to who should pay for the collective security action is any one was invaded--the victim or those that came to its assistance.

W.E. RAPPAR's book on the Swiss Cbderation tells about it, also Wm. B. LLOYD, WAGING PEACE. THE SWISS EXEPERIMENT, 1958.

My address until mid-Apr is 16 Ridgeway, Ann Arbor, Mich 48104 and after that 906 Fendall Terrace, Charlottesville, Va 22903.

It was good to hear from you.

Sincerely,
QUINCY WRIGHT.

Top important

My



SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS

Being a Discourse on the Origins & Development of the First Principles of American Government—Popular Sovereignty, Natural Rights, & Balance & Separation of Powers

By Paul K. Conkin

A noted historian examines the meanings of key moral and political doctrines underlying American government in a study distinguished for its erudition and vision.

256 pages, index

\$7.95

THE PAPERS OF GENERAL LUCIUS D. CLAY

Germany 1945-1949

Edited by Jean Edward Smith

Clay's recently declassified papers from the years of his military governorship of Germany will be invaluable to those seeking a reevaluation of the postwar years and the origins of the Cold War. (A publication of the Institute of German Studies, Indiana University)

1,216 pages, 2 vols., index

\$35.00

LAW, MORALITY AND VIETNAM

The Peace Militants and the Courts

By John F. Bannan and Rosemary S. Bannan

An analysis of the trials of six groups of peace militants, including the Berrigans, Dr. Spock, and four lesser-known cases, with interviews with the war resisters and their judges.

288 pages, index

\$10.00

APR 4/74

CAPTIVE CAPITAL

Colonial Life in Modern Washington

By Sam Smith

A Washington journalist reveals the truth about life inside "the monument," describing the city's growth, neighborhoods, schools, police, and political leaders and presenting a compelling case for statehood for Washington, D.C.

320 pages, photos, index

\$8.50

THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF PEASANTS

A Study of an Egyptian Community

By Iliya F. Harik

A leading authority on political and social change in the Middle East analyzes its effects on an Egyptian village, viewing his subject in the broad context of evolutionary change. (International Development Research Center, Studies in Development No. 8)

320 pages, index

\$12.50

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS

10th & Morton Streets, Bloomington, Indiana 47401

NEW BOOKS FROM
A.W.SIJTHOFF
P.O.B.26 LEIDEN THE NETHERLANDS

L

KALSHOVEN, F.
Belligerent reprisals

Préface par Jean Pictet

Pub. March 1971

XV, 386 pages. Cloth Dfl. 45.--

Scientific collection of the Henri
Dunant Institute no. I.

ISBN 90 218 9051 8

Please circulate to:

READERSHIP: Graduate students and scholars of public international law and politics.

CONTENTS: The purpose of this study is to examine whether, and to what extent belligerent states are free, as a matter of law, to have recourse to reprisals consisting in an intentional infringement of the law of armed conflict. In the first chapter the concept of belligerent reprisals is placed, both historically and from a systematic point of view, in the context of the general notion of reprisals and, even wider, of international law and the sanctions processes forming part of it. The second and third chapters are devoted to an examination of the attitudes taken, and the rules developed, with respect to belligerent reprisals by the various Conferences and other international bodies involved in the periods prior to the First and Second World Wars, respectively. The fourth chapter deals with the British measures of reprisal taken in the Second World War in 1939 and 1940, in the context of economic warfare against Germany and her allies. Other reprisals, or alleged reprisals taken by belligerents in that war and involving such matters as indiscriminate bombardment of the enemy population and the killing of prisoners of war are examined in chapter V. The developments after the Second World War are dealt with in chapter VI: war crimes trials involving the plea of belligerent reprisals, achievements and so far unsuccessful attempts in the field of the codification and development of the law of armed conflicts. The last chapter, finally, summarizes the results of these enquiries.

AUTHOR: Frits Kalshoven, reader in international law at the University of Leyden.

The "Ministries Case", so called because among the 21 defendants were three of Hitler's cabinet ministers (Darre, Schwerin von Krosigk, and Lammers); several top functionaries of the Foreign Office (including Ernst von Weizsaecker, State Secretary under Foreign Minister Ribbentrop who was sentenced to death in the Goering Trial); ambassadors; Otto Dietrich, Germany's "Press Chief"; Ernst Bohle, Chief of the "Foreign Department of the Nazi Party" (which Department was in charge of propagation of Nazism abroad); Emil Puhl, Vice President of the Reich Bank; and several holders of top governmental economic positions, in addition to two SS Generals and a banker. This was the largest and longest of all Nurnberg cases, lasting from November 1947 until April 1949. It brought to light the greatest number of top secret documents, especially relating to the diplomatic activities in Berlin, and between Berlin and various German embassies abroad, and to the Nazi "New Order" which was built up/during the war.

Broadly speaking, the case involved most of the diplomatic and political, and many of the economic preparations for the various German aggressions, and for the wide-spread illegal programs carried out during the war - ranging from the invasion of Bohemia/Moravia in March 1939, to economic spoliation of France and Belgium, the "lynching" of Allied aviators, the murder and ill-treatment of Allied prisoners of war, the slave labor program in Russia and elsewhere, and the deportation of Hungarian Jews, through the German ambassador in Budapest, to German concentration camps in Poland. The Judgment in this case (more than 800

stewart
N21

pages long) is the only Nurnberg Judgment (apart from the "Goering Case") in which defendants were found guilty, not only of War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, but of Crimes against Peace: it found that five of the accused German statesmen had actively and knowingly participated in unleashing aggressive war which, as ~~xxxxxxx~~ the Goering Judgment states, is the "supreme crime."

Balance Sheet. Just as there had never before been a war causing nearly as much devastation, suffering and deaths as did World War II, or leading to the atrocities witnessed during it, so had there never before been such a universal demand for the punishment of war criminals through organized justice; and the Nurnberg trials were the first and the biggest trials of this type (while hundreds of smaller ones were held in many parts of the world.) Although only a comparatively small number of persons were tried in Nurnberg, many legal questions were posed by the trials, and dissenting opinions were filed by individual judges in some cases, in which certain different views were expressed. None of them, however, questioned the basic premise of these trials, namely, that aggressive war is a punishable international crime, as are offenses against the laws and customs of war, and crimes against

humanity committed in connection with war. The sentences pronounced in the Nurnberg trials, and the magnitude of the offenses, were commensurate with the magnitude of the crimes. In all together 209 persons indicted in Nurnberg, 5 committed suicide during the trials, and proceedings against 5 were suspended for reasons of bad health. Of the remaining 199, who were tried, 38 were acquitted, 102 sentenced to varying prison sentences, 23 to life imprisonment, and 36 to death.

May 6, 1968

Mr. Stefan Kapsch
Dept. of Political Science
Univ. of Minnesota
Minneapolis, Minn. 55455

Dear Mr. Kapsch,

I am returning to your friendly letter
of Feb. 26, regarding Mr. Aldana's PH.D. Thesis,
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INJURIES
TO ALIENS...

I wonder whether you would be good enough and
let me have the name and address of the Professor who
acted as Thesis adviser to Mr. Aldana; or, in case this
is not possible, whether you would advise me of the present add-
ress of Mr. Aldana.

My intention is to find out whether the Thesis
deals with any aspect of war crimes and crimes against
peace, - the subjects of my present work.

With thanks in advance,

Sincerely,

John Fried
Adj. Prof. of Political Science

UNIVERSITY OF *Minnesota*

COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE • MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA 55455

February 26, 1968

Professor John H. E. Fried
Department of Political Science
The City College
The City University of New York
New York, New York 10031

Dear Professor Fried:

Thank you for your inquiry of February 19 regarding Mr. Manuel Aldana's doctoral dissertation "The International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens in Recent International Law." Unfortunately, the Department does not have a copy of this dissertation so we are unable to comply with your request. The copies in the collections of the University of Minnesota Library and the Graduate School are restricted to local circulation. Non-local circulation of Minnesota doctoral dissertations completed after 1951 is handled through University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48106. You could obtain a copy of Mr. Aldana's thesis from them although there is a charge for their services.

Thank you again for your interest. Please feel free to write to me if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,



Stefan Kapsch
Administrative Assistant

SK:mcc

CHINA


ROY

THE BATTLE OF DIENBIENPHU

...ents of *Last Year at Marienbad* (and other "new wave") characterize this narrative of a young man's love affair in China with 28-year-old Brigitte, "her throat of a dove." Their 1964 visit, which lasted several months, ended in two. Neither could endure the conditions of constant surveillance.

...shed in tears: "Why do they pretend to love us, when it is not true? I could only hope they are Chinese." All their declarations are an indiscriminate and irrational misstatement of which we were a part."

...ut the China, "the madhouse," they can't hear, or about the sufferings of his young mistress, Roy brings to his readers the honor of a true novelist. The book is frightening. \$7.95



BROTHERS IN ARMS

by HANS HELLMUT KIRST

author of THE NIGHT OF THE GENERALS

"A German veteran's group. Six men meet regularly. They have no victories to celebrate, but they've elevated to a mystique the desperate comradeship of their last days in Hitler's army. It gradually becomes apparent that more than this binds them: the memory of one of their last acts together during the war. It transcended the brutalities of battle. A teenage prostitute, evidently a willing one, had nevertheless been killed and the murder framed on an unpopular comrade whose death had been engineered. When the supposedly dead soldier turns up alive, the reaction goes from comic fear to savage guilt. Superb storytelling."—*Kirkus Service*. "A cunning suspense exercise at the expense of Germany's guilty men grips as a witty and strongly plotted melodrama."—*The Observer* (London). "A good story, a good book and highly recommended."—*Library Journal*. \$5.95

WORLDS TO COME

SCIENCE FICTION ADVENTURES

...MON KNIGHT. Science fiction at its astonishing best! No wonder, the authors are Arthur C. Clarke, Ray Bradbury, Algis Budrys, John D. MacDonald, Heinlein, C. M. Kornbluth, and Isaac Asimov. \$4.95

AT ALL BOOKSTORES

The untold story of Jewish resistance

TODAY we halt a busy world for a moment of truth.

We are proud to call to your attention a new book which could end forever the perpetuation of the final Nazi atrocity, their biggest lie: that the Jews were cowards.

THEY FOUGHT BACK is the untold, almost unknown story of how a People, doomed by Hitler, and deserted by the allies, declared their own underground war — and all alone, day after day, carried out successful acts of sabotage and

organized armed uprisings inside virtually every city, ghetto, and concentration camp of occupied Europe.

THEY FOUGHT BACK is the result of years spent piecing together a great truth which lay buried in neglected archives — and in the living memories of men. It is the first public presentation of extensive documented evidence that the Jews fought back.

It is a missing page in history.

A Dead Sea Scrolls of the Holocaust.

Why the truth has taken so long

For a quarter of a century, most Americans — even most Jews — have quietly accepted the myth of a martyrdom without protest. Why? Because until this book, the world has had to depend, in whole or in part, on information that was either incomplete or unfactual. For example: historians and scholars who relied on German sources alone found little evidence of resistance. And for this reason: *the Nazis deliberately hid the fact that there was a network of Jewish resistance.* **THEY FOUGHT BACK**, based on Yuri Suhl's interviews with actual participants in the revolts, an exhaustive examination of hitherto untranslated monographs, and authenticated historical material, denies the Nazis their final victory — the incineration of memory.



NIUTA TEITELBOIM (the legendary Warsaw heroine known as "Little Wanda with the braids"). She was a slight, innocent girl who often wore a flowered kerchief on her head. Her specialties: executing Nazi officers, smuggling Jews out of the Warsaw Ghetto, and blowing up especially vital communication lines to the Eastern Front.



DAVID SZMULEWSKI — a Polish Jew, prisoner at Auschwitz. He hid high above the rafters of a death compound and took forbidden photographs of a sight no one was supposed to witness. These photographs were smuggled out of the Camp via the Cracow underground to provide the first graphic evidence for the outside world. (Every photograph is in this book.)

"**TREBLINKA**" The true story of how Jewish prisoners — by themselves — carried out the destruction of one of Hitler's most notorious death camps.

A few of many who fought back



ALEXANDER PECHERSKY and his men, who organized the breakout of 600 prisoners from the Sobibor extermination camp in Poland. Ten Nazi officers were quietly killed (Jewish camp tailors and shoemakers hid hatchets under their clothes and invited their "clients" in for a final "fitting"). The successful revolt, permanently ended operation of the death camp.



HERBERT BAUM, leader of "The Baum Group" — Here is the very first account in English of the incredible activities of an underground of young Jewish fighters who operated in Berlin until 1942. (One of their most spectacular feats: entering Joseph Goebbels' prize propaganda show, "Das Soviet Paradis", and setting it aflame.)

A publishing note

Even before publication, **THEY FOUGHT BACK** sold out in its first printing. (We believe it will become one of the milestone books of modern times.) A new second printing is selling out rapidly, although there are still copies available today at local bookstores. But may we suggest, to be sure of reserving your copy and getting the fastest delivery, that you please either call your bookstore or write to Crown Publishers, Dept. NW, 419 Park Avenue South, New York City, 10016. Phone: MU 5-8550.

First tributes

"Impressive and startling."

—New York Times

"Read Yuri Suhl's book! . . . it once and for all refutes the accepted thesis."

—ELIE WIESEL


"A profoundly stirring book."

—SAUL BELLOW

THEY FOUGHT BACK

Edited by **YURI SUHL**,

poet, novelist, biographer

\$5.95, now at your bookstore 

Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler



BERNARD & GRAEFE VERLAG FÜR WEHRWESEN

Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler

Vertrauliche Aufzeichnungen über Unterredungen
mit Vertretern des Auslandes. 1939-1941.

Herausgegeben und erläutert von Andreas Hillgruber. Bernard & Graefe
Verlag für Wehrwesen, Frankfurt am Main. 1967. 699 Seiten. Mit 30 Ab-
bildungen auf Kunstdruckpapier. Ganzleinen DM 58,—

Daß Hitler es meisterhaft verstand, die Massen zu beherrschen, ist un-
umstritten. Wie aber gelang es Hitler, ausländische Staatsmänner und
Diplomaten in seinen Bann zu ziehen? Wie erreichte er es, zur führenden
Gestalt einer Mächtegruppe zu werden, die der nach dem Ersten Welt-
krieg aufgerichteten Ordnung den Kampf ansagte?

Die aufsehenerregende Veröffentlichung der Protokolle seiner Bespre-
chungen mit Staatsmännern und Diplomaten der verbündeten und neu-
tralen Staaten — teilweise vorabgedruckt in der Tageszeitung DIE
WELT — zeigt Hitlers Hintergründigkeit in der Verhandlungsführung,
seine Taktik im Umgang mit Verbündeten und Umworbenen, aber auch
seine unumstößlich festliegenden ideologischen und machtpolitischen
Grundsätze.

So bilden die Protokolle, die aus den Aufzeichnungen des Chefdolmet-
schers Paul Schmidt und des Vortragenden Legationsrats Walter Hewel
stammen, eine Primärquelle ersten Ranges. Sie umfaßt Gespräche mit
Mussolini, Ciano, Franco, Pétain, Laval, Darlan, Molotow, Matsuoka,
Oshima, Antonescu, Horthy, Dahlerus, Hedin, Quisling, dem Großmufti
von Jerusalem, dem König der Belgier Leopold III., der italienischen
Kronprinzessin Marie-José, dem amerikanischen Vizepräsidenten der
General Motors Corporation, Mooney, dem amerikanischen Unterstaats-
sekretär Sumner Welles u. a.

Jeder Aufzeichnung ist eine kurze Einführung in die jeweilige Situation,
in der die Unterredung geführt wurde, vorangestellt. Diese „Texte“ ver-
binden zugleich die insgesamt 99 Aufzeichnungen. Noten und Anmer-
kungen zu den Aufzeichnungen sowie ein Personenregister erleichtern
ihr Verständnis.

Ein zweiter Band mit den Dokumenten aus der Zeit zwischen dem 1. 1.
1942 und dem 31. 12. 1944 ist in Vorbereitung.



Die letzte Begegnung Hitlers mit einem ausländischen Staatsmann, der im Bereich der großen Politik weitreichende Bedeutung zukam, war der Besuch des japanischen Außenministers Matsuoka in Berlin am 27. 3. 1941, bei dem Hitler versuchte, Japan im Sinne seines weitgespannten Kriegsplans nach Südostasien vorwärtszustoßen.

Am Abend des 12. 11. 1940 gab Ribbentrop im Hotel „Kaiserhof“ zu Ehren Molotows einen Empfang. Von links nach rechts in der Tischrunde: Molotow, Reichsinnenminister Frick, Botschaftsrat (und Dolmetscher) Hilger, Ribbentrop, Himmler.



Weitere Bücher zur Zeitgeschichte

ANDREAS HILLGRUBER

Hitlers Strategie

Politik und Kriegführung 1940/41. 1965. 704 Seiten. Ganzleinen DM 78,—

„Hillgrubers Buch . . . bietet in der kriegsgeschichtlichen Forschung über den Zweiten Weltkrieg eine bisher kaum erreichte Leistung, für die ihm hohe Anerkennung gebührt.“

Adolf Heusinger im *Spiegel*

ANDREAS HILLGRUBER / GERHARD HUMMELCHEN

Chronik des Zweiten Weltkrieges

1966. VIII, 196 Seiten. Paperback DM 19,80. Ganzleinen DM 28,—

„Ein wertvolles Hilfsmittel, das dem Leser die kriegsgeschichtlichen Fakten auf allen Kriegsschauplätzen des Zweiten Weltkrieges nach dem neuesten Stand der Forschung in konzentrierter Form darbietet.“

Allgemeine Schweizer Militärzeitschrift

Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht

Herausgegeben von Percy Ernst Schramm in Zusammenarbeit mit Andreas Hillgruber, Walther Hubatsch und Hans-Adolf Jacobsen. 1961—1965. Vier Bände in sieben Bänden. 6656 Seiten, 9 Karten, 4 Tafeln. Halbleder. Preis des Gesamtwerks DM 696,—

„Das vielleicht verblüffendste Charakteristikum des OKW-Tagebuches ist seine Objektivität . . . einer der wichtigsten Beiträge zur Kriegsgeschichte.“

Neue Zürcher Zeitung

PERCY ERNST SCHRAMM

Hitler als militärischer Führer

Erkenntnisse und Erfahrungen aus dem Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht. 2., durchgesehene Auflage 1965. 207 Seiten. DM 12,80

„Auf Grund seiner Erkenntnisse hat der Göttinger Historiker eine Studie geschrieben, von der wir glauben, daß eine neue Ära der Kriegsgeschichtsdeutung mit ihr beginnen sollte.“

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

PAUL SCHMIDT

Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923–1945

Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas. 10. Auflage 1964. 607 Seiten. Paperback DM 16,80

„Er war nur Statist, aber er dachte selbständig, und was er gesehen hat, weiß er mit dem trockenen Humor des Berliners zu erzählen. So entstand ein Buch, das dem Laien eine bunte Fülle spannender Geschichten, dem politisch-historisch Interessierten unschätzbare Material bietet.“

Süddeutsche Zeitung

WERNER MASER

Die Frühgeschichte der NSDAP

Hitlers Weg bis 1924. 1965. 496 Seiten. 13 Abbildungen. Ganzleinen DM 29,80

„Werner Maser, ein Schüler von Niekisch und Schoeps, hat hier ein Buch geschrieben, das in seiner Objektivität und Akribie nicht seinesgleichen hat.“

Wiener Zeitung

Ihre Buchhandlung:

Institut Hoover, Stanford et University - Calif.
La vie de la France sous l'Occupation (1940-1944)

Librairie Plon, 1957, 3 vol. 180 L.F.
 no index.

"312 témoignages recueillis par la Fondation Hoover sur
 la période de l'occup. alle... À la présente
 publiée en langue française comprend une édition
 en langue anglaise. (p.6)

0. Questions juives :

Chapitre X¹⁸
 Francs-Maçons
 (1 section);
 - Juifs (Hess)
 4 sections
 - Intérés
 (1 section)

par Vallat Xavier, Commissaire général des Questions juives
 (index section de G.I.F. p. 659-678 au Péris de France, 14 nov. 47)

Autignac, Secrétaire (seu. au Commissariat
 déclaration de sep. 45 p. 679-680

Alex Dozpyrou, Journaliste
 Ancien réd. en chef du 'Jour. Echo de Paris
 ancien (commencant en oct. 42)
 chargé de la direction des services de presse
 11 août 1950 p. 681-685

Georges Rouvier, ancien
 ministre de France à Lisbonne
 28 mars 49 p. 685-69.

Ch. XX, Témoignages sur Pierre Laval...
Felix Olivier-Martin, Secrétaire Gen. de la Jeunesse
 Jeunesse Juifs-Laval et des Allemands
 23/3/46 O. 1045-1051

(successeur de Georges Larrivière, 1943)
Georges Ribé, Intervenues et forces de résistance avec Lév
 n. 1082-84

délégué à Paris du Secrétaire Général de la Postie
Jean Lequay, Affaires juives - Nov. 42 -
 intervention au faveur de MM. P. Reynaud
 + G. Haugel. - Affaire Jean Azéma
 (sans date) p. 1227-1232

Paul Morand, *Aulonaxus* or *Traver*
(doc. dat. 11 Oct. 57)

h. 1632-4

Bibliography (from Ečer monographs 1968)

W.R. Bishop, Criminality / War + its Prevention Transactions
Gresham Soc. for Law 1943, London.

Lord Cave, War Crimes + Their Punishment Gresham .. 1923

E. Cohn, Problem / War Crimes Today Gresham, 1941

Ečer, Bohuslav: Declared by UN Gov't + leaders on a Subject / War Crimes . 8

Get from library / Computer

Bohuslav Ečer, Vývoj a základy Mezinárodního
Práva Trestního. (Brno 1948)

JX
6719
.E35

Schwartzberger, War Crimes.

Czechoslovak Yearbook of Int'l Law, London 1942, str. 77

La Paix de Versailles. Responsabilités des auteurs de la guerre
et sanctions. Paris, 1930, Editions int'l. [9 by Ečer, p. 10 ff.]

Kenny, Outlines / Criminal Law, Cambridge, 1936, str. 88 (9 by Ečer, p. 77)

W. PAUL GORMLEY

The University of Tulsa

**The Procedural Status
of the Individual
before International
and
Supranational Tribunals**



MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE

The most important single factor in guaranteeing the effective protection of human rights - including economic and property interests - is that private individuals and groups be capable of maintaining a judicial action against any sovereign State causing them injury. Thus, individuals must possess the necessary *locus standi* at both the regional and international levels. A private individual must be able to prosecute an action before an international tribunal - in his own name - against an offending government, particularly his own. Unfortunately, this necessary right of action was not recognised under traditional international law. It is only very recently, since the adoption of the European Convention of Human Rights and the Establishing Treaty of the Common Market, that non-governmental entities have achieved *locus standi* before international courts. The author, therefore, advances the conclusion that it is no longer valid to hold that only sovereign States are procedural subjects of international law. Nevertheless, it must - tragically - be conceded that individuals do not enjoy the same rights as do Member States. Starting with the proposition that the individual is a subject of the Law, this book not only analyzes prior examples supporting this viewpoint, but it concentrates on the more important shortcomings, primarily those currently existing within the legal systems of the Council of Europe, the European Economic Community, and the United Nations. Further, recommendations are offered as to the specific improvements that must be made in order to more realistically implement the natural law rights of individuals.

About the author: Born April 24, 1926; Studied at San Jose State College (A.B., 1949), University of Southern California (M.A., 1951), University of Denver (Ph.D. in Speech, 1952), George Washington University Law School (LL.B., 1957, LL.M., 1958), the Hague Academy of International Law, summers 1960-1961, 1963-1964; Ford Foundation Law Teacher Fellow, New York University Law School (1961-1962); Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law (1958-1961); Assistant to Associate Professor of Law, University of South Dakota (1962-1965); from 1965 Associate Professor, University of Tulsa.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Abridged)

- I. Implementing man's natural rights: the developing international law
- II. The development of procedural remedies
- III. The inter-war period
- IV. The efforts of the United Nations
- V. The Council of Europe: Political unification
- VI. European economic organizations
- VII. Conclusions

1966. XVI and 206 pp. roy. 8vo.

Guilders 27.— = \$ 7.50

**YEARBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS**

The European Commission and European Court of Human Rights

*

**ANNUAIRE DE LA CONVENTION EUROPÉENNE
DES DROITS DE L'HOMME**

Commission et Cour Européennes des Droits de L'Homme

- Vol. I: 1955-1956-1957. 1959. XIV and 276 pp. 28.— = \$ 7.80*
- Vol. II: 1958-1959. 1960. XV and 684 pp. 49.50 = \$ 13.80*
- Vol. III: 1960. 1961. XV and 773 pp. 62.50 = \$ 17.40*
- Vol. IV: 1961. 1962. XV and 682 pp. 61.50 = \$ 17.15*
- Vol. V: 1962. 1963. XV and 400 pp. 36.50 = \$ 10.15*
- Vol. VI: 1963. 1965. XV and 849 pp. 81.— = \$ 22.55*
- Vol. VII: 1964. 1966. XIX and 563 pp. 79.— = \$ 22.—*

All volumes are cloth bound.

*

**ANNUAIRE EUROPÉEN /
EUROPEAN YEARBOOK**

*Publié sous les auspices du Conseil de L'Europe /
Published under the auspices of the Council of Europe*

- | | <i>Out of print</i> |
|---|---------------------------|
| 1. (1948-1953) | |
| 2. (1954). 1956. XX and 727 pp. | Guilders 35.— = \$ 9.75 |
| 3. (1955). 1957. XX and 534 pp. | Guilders 25.50 = \$ 7.10 |
| 4. (1956). 1958. XXI and 708 pp. | Guilders 37.50 = \$ 10.45 |
| 5. (1957). 1959. XX and 755 pp. | Guilders 41.— = \$ 11.40 |
| 6. (1958). 1959. XVI and 530 pp. | Guilders 31.— = \$ 8.65 |
| 7. (1959). 1960. XX and 800 pp. | Guilders 49.75 = \$ 13.85 |
| 8. (1960). 1961. XVII and 793 pp. | Guilders 49.75 = \$ 13.85 |
| 9. (1961). 1962. XVII and 859 pp. | Guilders 57.— = \$ 15.85 |
| 10. (1962). 1963. 2 vols. Together XXV and 1293 pp. | Guilders 95.— = \$ 26.45 |
| 11. (1963). 1965. 2 vols. Together XVII and 936 pp. | Guilders 86.50 = \$ 24.10 |
| 12. (1964). 1966. 2 vols. Together XXI and 887 pp. | Guilders 97.— = \$ 27.— |

All volumes are cloth bound.

MARTINUS NIJHOFF — PUBLISHER — THE HAGUE

Robert B. Ellert, Nato "Fair Trial" safeguards. Precursor to an international bill of procedural rights. 1963. VI and 89 pp.
Guilders 9.40 = \$ 2.60

Werner Feld, The Court of the European communities: new dimension in international adjudication. 1964. VIII and 127 pp.
Guilders 13.50 = \$ 3.75

R. R. Fennessy, Burke, Paine, and the rights of man. A difference of political opinion. 1963. XIII and 274 pp.
Cloth. Guilders 27.— = \$ 7.50

Ezzeldin Foda, The projected Arab Court of Justice. A study in regional jurisdiction with specific reference to the Muslim law of nations. Presentation by A. H. Badawi, Vice President, International Court of Justice. 1957. XIV and 252 pp.
Cloth. Guilders 19.— = \$ 5.30

Manuel R. García Mora, International responsibility for hostile acts of private persons against foreign states. 1962. XVII and 207 pages.
Guilders 20.— = \$ 5.55

P. P. Remec, The position of the individual in international law, according to Grotius and Vattel. 1960. XII and 260 pages.
Cloth. Guilders 18.— = \$ 5.—

Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The power of the international court to determine its own jurisdiction. *Compétence de la compétence*. With a preface by Louis B. Sohn. 1965. XXIV and 400 pp.
Cloth. Guilders 54.— = \$ 15.05

Elizabeth Thorneycroft, Personal responsibility and the law of nations. 1961. XII and 87 pages.
Guilders 8.— = \$ 2.25

*The US \$ price is based on the
rate of exchange: 1 guilder = \$ 0.28 (August 1966)
It is subject to change without notice*

W. PAUL GORMLEY

The University of Tulsa

The Procedural Status of the Individual before International and Supranational Tribunals



MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE

Yehuda Z. Blum, Historic titles in international law. 1965. XXII and 360 pages. Guilders 40.50 = \$ 11.30

Elbert M. Byrd Jr, Treaties and executive agreements in the United States. Their separate roles and limitations. With a foreword by Elmer Plischke. 1960. 286 pages.
Cloth. Guilders 21.— = \$ 5.85

David R. Deener, The United States Attorneys General and international law. 1957. XVI and 416 pages.
Cloth. Guilders 26.50 = \$ 7.40

V. D. Degan, L'interprétation des accords en droit international. 1963. XI and 176 pages. Guilders 16.20 = \$ 4.50

Edwin C. Hoyt, The unanimity rule in the revision of treaties. A re-examination, With a foreword by Philip C. Jessup. 1959. XII and 264 pages. Cloth. Guilders 21.85 = \$ 6.10

Tae Jin Kahng, Law, politics and the security council. An inquiry into the handling of legal questions involved in international disputes and situations. With a foreword by Leland M. Goodrich. 1964. XIV and 252 pages. Guilders 27.95 = \$ 7.80

Marek St. Korowicz, Introduction to international law. Present conceptions of international law in theory and practice. Second impression. 1964. IX and 424 pages. Guilders 35.— = \$ 9.75

Victor S. MacKinnon, Comparative federalism. A study in judicial interpretation. Foreword by Arthur L. Sutherland. 1964. XXVII and 188 pages. Guilders 21.40 = \$ 5.95

Stuart Hull McIntyre, Legal effect of world war II on treaties of the United States. 1958. IX and 392 pages.
Cloth. Guilders 28.50 = \$ 7.95

B. Sen, A diplomat's handbook of international law and practice. With a foreword by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. 1965. XXXIII and 522 pages. Cloth. Guilders 58.50 = \$ 10.30

Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The power of the international court to determine its own jurisdiction. *Compétence de la compétence.* With a preface by Louis B. Sohn. 1965. XXIV and 400 pages. Cloth. Guilders 54.— = \$ 15.05

Mitchell P. Strohl, The international law of bays. 1963. VIII and 426 pages. With 25 figs. Cloth. Guilders 45.— = \$ 12.55

J. J. G. Syatauw, Some newly established Asian states and the development of international law. 1961. XII and 249 pages. With 2 maps in the text, 1 folding map and 1 table. Guilders 19.— = \$ 5.30

Maurice Waters, The ad hoc diplomat: a study in municipal and international law. With a foreword by Hans Morgenthau. 1963. XII and 233 pages. Cloth. Guilders 20.— = \$ 5.55

*The US \$ price is based on the
rate of exchange: 1 guilder = 0.28 (April 1966)
It is subject to change without notice*

Metzger Verlag hat - recht gute jur. v.
- 5. Moq.

anti - Noy Koch
by Kleit? (perhaps identical)
J Hütte

~~5: subtit.~~

Deutschland - Berichte.

Bonn; Kölnigk. 17A

Felf. Taylor: Kriegsverbrechen + Völkerrecht

Die Noy Prozesse

Europa Verlag Juris, Bernstr. 5

!!
V. Walsh. Nachwort a. Keesen?
(shows reductions of penalties, entlass, etc!!)
↑ (us in us edition!)

Pio Tronker

Tagebuch von Frank

in G...!

Warsaw!

J

order: Joe J. Heydecker - Johannes Leeb.
Der Noy Prozess. Kiepenhauer + Witsch, über 610 pp.

get.
Generalstaatsanwalt der DDR
~~Hie~~ Ministerium der Justiz der
DDR

Die Haltung der beiden
Deutschen Staaten zu den
Nazi- + Kriegsverbrechern
eine Dokument.


Staatsver. der L. Demokr. Rep. }
128 ff.

175. Liby ~ En Bundeslage v. 25.3.65 }! also
buy for: Bonner Universitätsdruckerei } abent
} Statistik

Comité International d'Auschwitz - Informationsbulletin
67 Allée de la Robertsau, Strasbourg
A: Sec. Gen. Koszykowa 6, Warsaw

ich: abonnieren

Freiheit + Recht
Am Wehrhahn 96
~~Frankfurt~~
Düsseldorf

Hotel  Pitter

250 ZIMMER 350 BETTEN
SALZBURG
TELEFON: 72 571 - FERNSCHREIBER: 06/3532
TELEGRAMM: PITTERHOTEL

Wit Kempur

Gästebriefpapier
Das Hotel ist nicht Absender

get: DER SPIEGEL issue 10 März 1965
über NS. Verjährung

Jüdischer Prozessdiener Düsseldorf N.
Ziethenstr. 10 - Fischerstr. 49

von Zeit zu Zeit Bulletins
berichten laufend & KZ Fälle
ist: write!

Wiesenthal hat viele laufende Informant.

Beurteilung v. Bundesminister & Verjährung

Editeur Redacteur en chef
Hubert Hahn
28, place Flagey
Bruxelles 5

La Voix de la Résistance Neusur

ich: abonnieren

Weitere Bücher zur Militärgeschichte

Joachim Kramarz

Claus Graf Stauffenberg

15. November 1907 bis 20. Juli 1944. Das Leben eines Offiziers.
1965. 245 Seiten. 13 Abb. Ganzleinen DM 24,80

Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht

(Wehrmachtführungsstab)

Hrsg. von Percy Ernst Schramm in Zusammenarbeit mit Andreas Hillgruber, Walter Hubatsch und Hans-Adolf Jacobsen.

1961 — 1965. Vier Bände in sieben Bänden. Halbleder. Preis des Gesamtwerkes DM 696,—

Andreas Hillgruber

Hitlers Strategie

Politik und Kriegführung 1940/41

1965. 715 Seiten. Ganzleinen DM 78,—

Karl Demeter

Das Deutsche Offizierkorps in Gesellschaft und Staat 1650 — 1945

1965. 4., überarb. und erw. Aufl. 361 Seiten. Ganzleinen DM 29,80

Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648 — 1939

Veröffentlichung des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes in Freiburg/Br. Herausgeber: Oberst i. G. Dr. Hans Meier-Welcker. 1964 ff. Erscheint in 8 Lieferungen. Gesamtumfang etwa 2000 Seiten. Preis des Gesamtwerkes in 2 Halblederbänden etwa DM 230,—. Subskriptionspreis ca. DM 176,—

Karl Dönitz

Zehn Jahre und zwanzig Tage

Erinnerungen des Befehlshabers der deutschen U-Boote im Zweiten Weltkrieg. (1965 aus dem Athenäum Verlag übernommen) 3., durchges. Aufl. 1964. 491 Seiten. 5 Kartenskizzen im Text. 16 Seiten Abb. auf Kunstdruck. 1 Ausschlagkarte. Ganzleinen DM 24,—. Paperback DM 18,50

Ihre Buchhandlung:

*R. Arnold & Gröbe
Hilf & W. W. W. W.
Frankfurt - 2/11*

Weitere Bücher zur Militärgeschichte

Joachim Kramarz

Claus Graf Stauffenberg

15. November 1907 bis 20. Juli 1944. Das Leben eines Offiziers.
1965. 245 Seiten. 13 Abb. Ganzleinen DM 24,80

Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht

(Wehrmachtführungsstab)

Hrsg. von Percy Ernst Schramm in Zusammenarbeit mit Andreas Hillgruber, Walter Hubatsch und Hans-Adolf Jacobsen.

1961 — 1965. Vier Bände in sieben Bänden. Halbleder. Preis des Gesamtwerkes DM 696,—

Andreas Hillgruber

Hitlers Strategie

Politik und Kriegführung 1940/41

1965. 715 Seiten. Ganzleinen DM 78,—

Karl Demeter

Das Deutsche Offizierkorps in Gesellschaft und Staat 1650 — 1945

1965. 4., überarb. und erw. Aufl. 361 Seiten. Ganzleinen DM 29,80

Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648 — 1939

Veröffentlichung des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes in Freiburg/Br. Herausgeber: Oberst i. G. Dr. Hans Meier-Welcker.

1964 ff. Erscheint in 8 Lieferungen. Gesamtumfang etwa 2000 Seiten.

Preis des Gesamtwerkes in 2 Halblederbänden etwa DM 230,—.
Subskriptionspreis ca. DM 176,—

Karl Dönitz

Zehn Jahre und zwanzig Tage

Erinnerungen des Befehlshabers der deutschen U-Boote im Zweiten Weltkrieg. (1965 aus dem Athenäum Verlag übernommen) 3., durchges. Aufl. 1964. 491 Seiten. 5 Kartenskizzen im Text. 16 Seiten Abb. auf Kunstdruck. 1 Ausschlagkarte. Ganzleinen DM 24,—. Paperback DM 18,50

Ihre Buchhandlung:

*Renaud & Graefe
Verlag & Buchhandlung
Frankfurt - 9/10*

LESEPROBE

gingen die Meinungen weit auseinander. Während Stein aus patriarchalischer Sicht weniger gegen den Schlag mit dem Stock an sich, als vielmehr gegen die bloße Willkür des Prügelnden eingestellt war, verfocht Gneisenau seinen Standpunkt höchst nachdrücklich: Mit der Abschaffung der Prügelstrafe „ehrt sich zugleich die Nation selbst, indem sie es ablehnt, Einrichtungen zu dulden, die sie in den Augen anderer herabsetzt“ 108).

Das Problem lag also darin, daß man allgemein lernen mußte, den Begriff „Disziplin“ zu sehen, ohne ihn mit der Prügel zu verbinden, und sich eine Armee vorzustellen, die sich nicht mehr in erster Linie selbst bewachte, sondern aus freien Männern bestand und die trotzdem funktionierte 109). Einer freien Persönlichkeit gegenüber mußte jede Züchtigung untersagt sein. Weder Spießrutenlaufen noch Stubenexekutionen, weder öffentlicher Strafvollzug noch persönliche Schikane kamen als Programm für die Aufrechterhaltung der Mannszucht in Frage. Der Soldat als konkreter soziologischer Typus, der auf Grund seiner Stellung im Staat entsprechend behandelt wurde, sollte bestätigen, daß das Menschsein in der Uniform recht und billig war 110). Die Disziplinarstrafe verlagerte sich daher auf den Freiheitsentzug, der den freien Mann härter traf als den Unfreien der Hieb.

Dieser Umbau dehnte sich auch auf die Gesamtlebensverhältnisse aus, die nach der Rechtsordnung des 18. Jahrhunderts die Absonderung der Armee noch gefördert hatten. Straf- und Familienrecht waren in die Militärgerichtsbarkeit einbezogen gewesen 111). Nun prüften in langen Verhandlungen der Freiherr von Schrötter und der Generalauditeur von Koenen, ob man den vollen Schritt ins Neuland tun sollte. Die Entscheidung fiel am 19. 7. 1809 aus allgemeinen und praktischen Erwägungen so aus, daß alle bürgerlichen Angelegenheiten den Zivilgerichten übertragen wurden, während alle „Kriminal- und Injuriensachen“ beim Militär verblieben. Nur noch für die Zeit des Dienstes war künftig der Bürger der Militärgerichtsbarkeit unterstellt, vor und nachher unterlag er der zivilen. In dieser Regelung sah man einen glücklichen Kompromiß, weil die Straffälligkeit, sofern ihre Ahndung

108) Gneisenau — zit. Hoehn, R., 1944, S. 570

109) Ebda., S. 566 ff. — Schneider, H., Die Militärgerichtsbarkeit i. dt. Heere von 1650 — 1933 in Wehrrechtl. Abhandlungen, Heft 4:

110) Hoehn, R., 1952, S. 256/297

111) S. Anm. 109 — auch 110

Hitler Was His Only Master

The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel, edited by Walter Görlitz, translated by David Irving (Stein & Day, 288 pp. \$7.95), contains top-level revelations by Hitler's loyal paladin. Louis L. Snyder, professor of history at The City University of New York, is author of "The War: A Concise History, 1939-1945."

By LOUIS L. SNYDER

THIS book should be required reading for our good friends of the British gaffly school of historiography, who, when faced with a choice between fact and witty fiction, invariably gravitate toward the academic wisecrack. In their peculiarly perverse reasoning Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany are absolved of blame for the outbreak of World War II. The pusher, Hitler, becomes the pushed, and ridicule is directed against those Allied statesmen who were outwitted by the Wizard of Berchtesgaden.

If any further proof be needed to show the bankruptcy of this view, it can be found in these memoirs of Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel. Hitler's Chief of the German High Command between 1938 and 1945 reveals that, as early as May 20, 1937, the Führer issued a directive commencing: "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future." In the summer of 1939 he had a timetable for his military operations. And Keitel, who was in a position to know, stated it plainly: "Hitler . . . staked everything on the one card: war!"

Need there be further examples of the innocent Führer being shoved into countermeasures by incompetent Allied diplomats?

Keitel was second only to Hitler in directing the German military machine in the Second World War. Born into a middle-class Hanoverian family of landowners, Keitel came from a region with a strong anti-Prussian tradition, yet he epitomized the Junker militarist—tall, broad-shouldered, with monocle firmly held in the left eye. Born in 1882, he served as an efficient young officer during World War I, in which he was seriously wounded. He was posted to the General Staff, and, in 1936, promoted to lieutenant-general.

On February 3, 1938, after scandals involving Field-Marshal Werner von Blomberg (marriage to a lady of ques-

SR/March 5, 1966

tionable virtue) and Colonel-General Freiherr von Fritsch (accusation of homosexuality), Hitler announced the retirement of the top echelon of the *Reichswehr*, and took over supreme command himself. He set up a new military authority, the O.K.W. *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*, High Command of the Armed Forces. Keitel was selected as its Chief and remained in this post until Hitler's suicide in 1945.

Keitel never felt adequate for his lofty position, but there is no question of his loyalty and complete subservience to Hitler. He was unpopular among his comrades, who called him "Yes-Keitel" and "the nodding ass." Irreverent critics went so far as to label Keitel "*Lakaitel*" from the German word *Lakai*—lackey or flunkey.

Flunkey or not, these memoirs are of considerable historical importance. After the editor's introduction on background and career, the text gives Keitel's description of the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis of 1938 with its spicy scandals; the events leading to the annexations of Austria and Czechoslovakia; the fateful month of August 1939; and the campaigns against Poland, the Low Countries, and France.

Additional chapters include an account of the planned invasion of England (omitted from the German version) and an absorbing report on the attack on Russia. Keitel describes Hitler's shifting strategy and his increasingly hostile treatment of his generals, whom he blamed for the Stalingrad disaster. Most engrossing of all is Keitel's eyewitness narrative of the last eighteen days of the



Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel—"as helpless as a babe."

Third Reich. He remained in the besieged bunker and saw the hysterical Führer conducting the Battle of Berlin with divisions that no longer existed. The memoirs give additional evidence of the crazy-quilt pattern inside the Nazi hierarchy, with ringmaster Hitler cracking the whip and the cowed generals reacting with Pavlovian reflexes.

In his apologia Keitel reveals ambivalent feelings toward Hitler. "At the bottom of my heart," he confesses, "I was a loyal shield-bearer for Adolf Hitler." He praises the Führer's iron will, his steadfastness, and his unrelenting severity in the Russian campaign, without which "the German Army would inescapably and inevitably have suffered in 1941 the fate of [the French] in 1812."

On the other hand, Keitel resented the way he was treated by his master. "I was never permitted to make decisions: the Führer had reserved that right to himself even in seemingly trivial matters." "The Führer cut me short and told me what *he* thought and what his *own* views were." "If he once got an idea in his head, no man on earth could ever shake him out of it." At one point Keitel speaks of facing up "to a demon like that man." "That I would become the victim of Hitler's unbridled dictatorship . . . no human being could have foreseen."

YET Keitel never rebelled against this degrading treatment. An otherwise undistinguished Dr. Lehmann caught the truth with this remark: "Keitel is brave enough to take on a lion in bare-fisted combat; but faced with Hitler he is as helpless as a babe."

Keitel's abject servility to Hitler brought him in 1945 before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg on charges of participation in a conspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. He was sentenced to death by hanging. He wrote these memoirs while in prison during the six weeks before his execution on October 16, 1946. His last wish, to be executed by firing squad instead of hanging, was denied.

In an *addendum*, editor Walter Görlitz presents the familiar argument that the Nuremberg trials violated the Western world's doctrine of *nulle poene sine lege*. He charges that the victors sat in judgment on the vanquished. He presents sympathetically Keitel's defense that "a soldier's cardinal virtue is obedience," and Keitel remains to him "a senior officer and gentleman." He finds Keitel "an honorable man":

He was no longer concerned to haggle and bargain for his own skin; his main objective was to establish his honor, and not only his personal honor; he believed it was his duty to uphold the honor of all German troops, because he was too honest to admit that he had

frequently proved inadequate in his defense of the traditional concept of Prussian military honor.

The word "honor" seems strange in this context. It would have been far more honorable for Keitel to refuse loyalty to a bestial hypomaniac. Or perhaps there is a better word than "honor" to describe stiff-necked, unflinching obedience in the service of barbarism. That word might well be a kind of higher "stupidity."

Mr. Görlitz, who is known for his ex-

cellent book *The History of the German General Staff*, has pruned the material by eliminating "historically unimportant" passages not bearing on military matters. The danger of this kind of editing is that historians differ on what is essential and what is of little consequence. The memoirs would be far more valuable in their original state.

The translation is generally satisfactory, although the translator, unfortunately, leans toward such slangy clichés as "sure of their stuff," "beat around the bush," and "to-ing and fro-ing."

at UN library

LAST NAME

INITIALS

(Please use block letters)

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

Secret literature

for talk ladies:

Author

(Surname first)

Title

Romashin, P.S. 1953

Book, 438 pp. in Russian

Tranin, 1956, 298 pp.

Call No.

about Tokyo:

Vol.

or

Year

Raginski; M. Iu

1950, 261 pp.

Date due

Signature

→

UNITED NATIONS LIBRARY

REQUEST FOR LOAN

L. 13 (11-48)

Poland:

Tadeusz Gyprian
& Sawicki
Pravo worymberskie

1948 601 p.

wojciech Morawiecki. 1957, 207 p.
war + int'l law.

USSR:

on war + aggression

Aleksandrov, G.
1954, 81 p.

on int'l law + war:

Kozhevnikov, F. I.

940.42(47) 1954, 219 p.
K. 89

Sokolov, G. A.

1963, 73 p. war (int'l law)

Bewältigung der Vergangenheit

Die neuen Preussen stehen am Schluss
einer neuen Endlösung der Judenfrage

Anläßlich des am 8. Juni 67 begrenzten Ende
Prozess → N.S. Richter

Vide Berlin said ~~de~~ Student demonstration:
"unter der" - 60 / 1.

Aufklärung u. s. Straftaten - Pflicht & Rechtsges.

§ 152(2) StPO } Legalitätsprinzip
160(1) " } = Pflicht & Strafverfolg

2: Kein kein Ermessen, de - y

Ermessenprinzip, Apparentes Prinzip
→ ex ante second, evident

not changed & F.

On topic of trial → S, see 468

German ~~Constitution~~ Juristatag, Essen, Herbst 66

N.S. Wednesday, 1966, 20/49

After Roth says, HSK, issued report on 11/67
"cells was 'reactions'."

Even 1940/1, some state courts wanted procedure

Entnazung - so see under.

Gov: B still doing, Berlin's position secured
for Berlin's for head.

← Any who would report de now accepted
autonomous de institutions

1 BERLIN 15 · KURFÜRSTENDAMM 23
TEL. 8810491 · FERNSCHREIBER 0183679

AM ZOO

HOTTEL



Z: The release of C proceed
identified so late. The main culprits were
released during Korean crisis by SC - so they
are free - how could you then
prosecute men who were best & "small"
compared to Schlingens (released
1950?) RSHA = Reichsbefehlshaber
Gross A.

Get Bundesstaatsrat Adolf Brandt

1965 (about need to prosecute
Gulley & K.P. (very decent!!)

for all crimes less than murder,
Verjährungsfrist over in 1960!!!!

hence, y. Secretly minimised
how soon settled free!!

Stalder Schubert

Franklin

Norman I. Ery

July 1961

Beland

POSTKARTE

the scholarly development of her occasional insight. The covert dogmatism of her intuitions prevents her from developing policy-rich alternatives, from which decision-makers might work.

After reading Mrs. Camps' book—a sequel to her *Britain and the European Community, 1955-1963*—one wonders why the Council on Foreign Relations tolerates norms in the execution of its work which seem neither to meet those of the contemporary scholar or those imperative to creative and circumspect policy work.

HAROLD GUETZKOW
Northwestern University

Das Ende des Dritten Reiches: Die Deutsche Kapitulation 1945 by
Reimer Hansen. Stuttgart, Ernst Klett, 1966.—247 pp. 19.80
DM.

It is difficult to find a parallel for the end of the Third Reich. German historians have compared it with the catastrophe of the Thirty Years' War, with the dissolution of the Holy Roman empire in 1806, and with the end of the First World War; but the German Reich survived 1648, 1806 was a symbolical rather than a real turning point in history, marking a change that had already taken place, and in 1918 a regime was destroyed but not the sovereignty of Germany as a whole. In contrast, 1945 marked the total destruction of a thousand years of history, an absolute nadir that justified those Germans who described this fateful year as *Jahr Null*.

At least, this is the view of Reimer Hansen, and because he feels this way he has thought it important to write a detailed study of the last days of the Hitler Reich, emphasizing the agonized attempts of German political leaders to avoid the fate that their ambitions had made inevitable. In doing so, he has directed his attention principally to three aspects of the story: the unconditional surrender policy of the Grand Alliance, the vain attempts of Hitler's associates to make deals with their antagonists in the days when Allied forces were converging on their capital, and the regime of Admiral Doenitz and the way in which he approached the question of capitulation.

Mr. Reimer points out that, once the Allies agreed upon the policy of unconditional surrender (and he is interesting in his treatment of Soviet ambivalence with respect to a policy that did not accord with their interests until their troops entered Poland) there were no options left to the Germans except capitulation or a hopeless fight to the end. Most

even
Or says
doubts
...
1945

→ back page

of his account is a description of mothlike flutterings against this flame on the part of Hitler's paladins, like the well-known negotiations of Himmler in Sweden. More interesting is his section on the Doenitz period, which includes a useful bibliographical essay, and which shows that, in a hopeless position, Hitler's successor was able to eke out a few small advantages in the way in which the inevitable surrender was carried out, saving about two million soldiers from captivity and arranging to have West Holland, Norway, and Denmark surrendered without needless bloodshed. On the other hand, Mr. Hansen's picture of Doenitz is so generous as to be uncritical. He seems willing even to believe that the admiral knew nothing of the concentration camps until after he had taken over from Hitler, although the capture of Buchenwald by the Allies six weeks before that time had made its horrors known to all the world.

GORDON A. CRAIG
Stanford University

The Development of Technical Education in France, 1500-1850 by Frederick B. Artz. Cambridge, Mass., The Society for the History of Technology and The M.I.T. Press, 1966.—x, 274 pp. \$7.95.

France occupies a prominent place in the history of technical education. Its Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées, founded in 1747, was the world's first school of engineering. Its famed Ecole Polytechnique, a creation of the Revolution, served as a model for scientific and engineering schools the world over, notably in Germany and for early U.S. engineering schools such as West Point and R.P.I. In this volume Professor Artz, who in a long and fruitful career has made several notable contributions to European political, cultural, and intellectual history, returns to a subject in which he has for long maintained an interest.

The book is divided into four substantial chapters dealing with, respectively, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Age of Enlightenment, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era, and the Constitutional Monarchy. Within each chapter, in addition to discussing the distinctive feature of each era, the author treats systematically technical education in elementary and secondary schools, trade schools and adult education, advanced technical schools, and military and naval education. He does not mention the universities, in which scientific study was almost as backward and neglected as technology, nor the Ecole Normale Supérieure, a more serious omission because of the excellence of its

Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938 by James B. Crowley. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—xviii, 428 pp. \$9.00.

This is a clearly written and forcefully presented study of Japan's foreign affairs between the London Naval Conference of 1930 and the Konoe declaration of January 1938. It is probably the first of its kind in a Western language that tries to penetrate standard frames of reference and reconstruct the past around a new set of conceptions.

The basic conceptual framework Crowley presents is that of national security. He argues that certain national security considerations led to the Manchurian incident of 1931, which in turn necessitated reorientation of strategic thinking. As new security problems arose, there was a corresponding increase in the role of the supreme command in Japanese decision-making. Underlying all these developments was the overriding question how to preserve Japan's military autonomy. Concepts such as "total war," "national defense state," and "self-sufficiency" interacted with specific strategic goals (for instance, to prevent the combined hostility of the United States and Britain) and determined the actual course of Japan's foreign relations in the decade.

An important corollary of this focus on security is the author's analysis of army factionalism and fanaticism. Since the security question is essentially a "rational" one, necessitating realistic calculations or risks and evaluations of capabilities, military policy could never be and was in fact never left in the hands of young fanatics. These, Crowley suggests, should be relegated to their proper, that is, minor, role in Japanese history. Senior military leaders, on their part, desired drastic national reconstruction in order to prepare for total warfare, but they could not tolerate impetuous action by immature cadets.

Holding consistently to his major thesis, the author refuses to use words such as "aggression" and "invasion" when discussing Sino-Japanese relations in the thirties. Japanese behavior in Manchuria, North China, and finally in the rest of China is examined, not as a premeditated crime against the neighboring country, but as part of the new conception of security which the military were trying to put into effect. One gets the impression that the short-lived cabinet of General Hayashi comes close to the author's ideal type; Hayashi tried to carry out national security policy without recourse to force abroad or hysteria at home. The succeeding Konoe cabinet set the stage for national disaster, but Crowley argues that Konoe did not radically depart from the basic defense policies set by his predecessors, and lauds the Prime Minister's attempt to reunify the line of command and implement a consistent China policy.

The book blames the ultimate failure of Japanese policy on the infatuation with the Imperial and pan-Asianist ideas that were not supported by a realistic appraisal of military capabilities.

There is a risk in writing about a period as recent as the nineteen-thirties, when fresh evidence is uncovered literally every day. There is relatively little new in the facts that the author has marshaled, and he has missed some pertinent facts. There are certain errors in the spelling of personal names. But the book's value lies in its superb organization, systematic analysis, and the fresh meaning it gives to well-known facts. No other book has done so well the job of discarding old clichés and laying the groundwork for new interpretations.

AKIRA IRIYE

University of California, Santa Cruz

The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System: From Private Enterprise to Socialism, 1952-1965 by Patrick O'Brien. London, New York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1966.—xvi, 354 pp. 55s.

Despite the apparent purity of the two terms in his subtitle, private enterprise and socialism, Mr. O'Brien shows us, in this able and comprehensive study, that there was a great deal of government control over economic affairs in Egypt in the three or four decades before the advent of military rule in 1952, and that the large-scale nationalization of the early nineteen-sixties has not led to much socialism in the sense of "distributive justice."

The author, lecturer in the London School of Economics, presents a detailed analysis of the nature and achievements of the Egyptian economy since 1952, against the background of its development since the early nineteenth century. He does so on the basis of an enormous number of primary sources as well as the most important secondary ones (though, among the latter, he often cites Charles Issawi's works in footnotes, he leaves them out of the long bibliography).

Mr. O'Brien divides economic history under the military regime into three periods. In the first, 1952-56, the officers had no "economic ideology," were "preoccupied with consolidating their power and expelling the British," and so did not depart seriously from the economic policies of the regime they had overthrown (pp. 68-69). In one of the most valuable contributions of the book, the author shows how the reformers mere-

Deutscher Bundestag
4. Wahlperiode

Druckache 10/3124

Bonn, 26. Feb. 65

B-Minister der Justiz
4311/6 - 1 - 20 - 466/65

Bericht & Verfolgung u.s. Straftaten

Dr. Bucher

Revue int'l de Droit Penal 1964, no 1-2

Sottile:

Revue de Droit Penal

|| each chapre no. contains enumeration list of publications!!

article by Graven contains

De la

1946, ^{no. 4} 1947 no. 1, 1957, no. 3 + following

Journal des lois et maxims belges, 1568:

'Le jugement de min. & max.
au tribunal General de Rastatt

p. 293

Brautigam, Otto, Ueberblick ueber die Besetzten Ostgebiete
wahrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges. (Studien des Instituts fuer
Besatzungsfragen in Tübingen zu den Deutschen Besatzungen im 2.
Weltkrieg. No.3.) Tuebingen, Januar 1954. (mim.) 97 pp.

Contains altogether 10 lines on "Juedisches Vermoegen"

(p.51)

USE A SEPARATE SLIP FOR EACH TITLE

CLASS MARK
(In upper right hand
corner of card)

Author:
[PLEASE PRINT]

Zweig, Arnold

*PXS

Title:
[PLEASE PRINT]

Insulted and Exiled. The
Truth about the German Jews.
London, 1937, 255 p.

BOOKS MUST NOT BE TAKEN FROM THE ROOM

SEAT NUMBER

Correct name and full legible address required.

INDICATOR NO.

Name

J. Fried

Address

55 E 86

City

NY Zone 28

form 28m

Mr. Fried:

Leo Herbert Lehmann

Vatican Policy in

The Second WW

Agora, NY 46 51 p

Union Theological Seminary,
Broadway

also

John C.M. Gianfarrà

The Vatican in a War

NY Dutton 43

344 pp.

Filed

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| Verify - - - | |
| Date? - - | |
| Editor? - | |
| Bound? - | |
| Illegible - | |
| Volume? - | |
| In use M.R.R. - | |
| Room | |
| Reserved M.R.R. - | |
| Room | |
| In Bindery - - | |
| Not available - | |
| Check slip - | |
| Missing - - - | |
| Not in S. L. - | |
| Lacking - - - | |
| More wanted? - | |

The New York Public Library

1. Please exercise care in filling out call slips. When in doubt ask a librarian. Write legibly.
2. If reference is to a periodical article, give title of periodical, date, volume number and page.
3. Books will be delivered to your seat if you write the seat number on your slips and are there to receive them.
4. Return books before leaving.
5. Ink may be used only in fountain pens. Bottles of ink are not allowed.
6. Your call slips will not be returned. Copy separately any information that you may need later.

Vittorio Zincone, Lo Stato Totalitario

Roma, Faro, [1947] 144 H.

BOOKS and the ARTS

Postscript to Power

FULL CIRCLE. The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden. Houghton Mifflin Co. 676 pp. \$6.50.

George Steiner

THIS is a somber story. Having been, for too long a time, the crown prince in Churchill's giant shadow, Sir Anthony Eden finally acceded to power in April, 1955. Less than two years later, he had to resign, broken by political circumstance and ill health. History, moreover, played him a cruel turn. The virtues which had carried Eden to high place, his skill as a classical diplomatist, his uncompromising hatred of dictatorship, and his aloofness from partisan politics, proved inadequate or inappropriate to the task. The man failed to match his hour.

Eden's conception of policy was completely molded by the events of February, 1938. At that time, he resigned from the Chamberlain government rather than condone further appeasement of Hitler and Mussolini. Two years later the world plunged into a catastrophic war. It is Eden's profound conviction that this war could have been avoided on two conditions: the Western democracies would have had to take a decisive stand against Fascism and Nazism from the start; and they would have had to work together in close, flexible alliance. When the Second World War ended, Eden was resolved that the errors of the 1930s should not be repeated. As Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, in the period from November, 1951, to January, 1957, he sought to pursue two principles: the containment of dictatorship wherever it might arise, and the transformation of the Western alliance into a structure of real and permanent security.

Both these principles are unassailable, but the difficulty lay in applying them. First, because the Western democracies no longer held even a potential monopoly of military initiative (as they did in the 1930s); second, because the allies with whom Eden had to deal were no

GEORGE STEINER, now teaching at Princeton University, was on the staff of The Economist, London, in 1952-53 and 1954-56. He was in London during the two shipowners' conferences and nearly the whole of the pre-Suez crisis. Mr. Steiner is the author of Tolstoy or Dostoevsky (Knopf).

longer a Roosevelt or a Marshall, but an Eisenhower and a Dulles. It was Eden's peculiar tragedy to have learned the lessons of history too well; he did not realize how greatly the context of power had altered.

THESE memoirs center on two crises: Indo-China and Suez. The first showed Eden at his finest; the second brought him to political ruin. In April, 1954, the French position in Indo-China was growing hopeless. On April 24, the Western leaders met in Paris. Mr. Dulles advanced the view that Anglo-American military intervention was now essential and that an air-strike should be ventured to relieve the hard-pressed garrison at Dien Bien Phu. Admiral Radford supported this view and suggested that R.A.F. units should be sent from Malaya or Hong Kong to Tongking. "Neither he nor Mr. Dulles gave any more explicit account of the joint military action they contemplated." Eden at once raised the question of a Chinese counter-intervention. "Admiral Radford replied that he had never thought that the Chinese would intervene in Indo-China; nor had they the necessary resources available. If they attempted air action, we could eliminate this by bombing the Chinese airfields, which were very vulnerable." Eden immediately returned to London, convinced that the United States had neither formulated a consequent policy nor weighed the full risk. Sir Winston Churchill concurred. As he saw it, England was being asked "to assist in misleading Congress into approving a military operation, which would in itself be ineffective, and might well bring the world to the verge of a major war."

During those hair-raising days, Mr. Dulles played his usual complex game of impulse and vacillation. By-passing the British Ambassador in Washington, he sought to suggest to the French that the British Government was now committed to some form of military action. Fortunately, M. Bidault realized that this was not the case. On the contrary: on the afternoon of April the 28th, Her Majesty's Government decided to reject the American proposal. Eden now faced an immensely difficult task: he had to justify this refusal to the imperiled French, safeguard the Anglo-American alliance, and bring

about some settlement of the Indo-China war by negotiation. In the ensuing weeks, he showed his great technical mastery of diplomacy. Although agonized by the news of the fall of Dien Bien Phu, Bidault understood perfectly British reluctance to intervene on Mr. Dulles' vague and unconsidered terms. The real difficulty lay with Washington. One cannot read Eden's account of the preliminary meeting at Geneva without an acute sense of embarrassment about the tone of American foreign policy under the Dulles regime:

Mr. Robertson, whose approach to these questions is so emotional as to be impervious to argument or indeed to facts, was keeping up a sort of "theme song" to the effect that there were in Indo-China some three hundred thousand men who were anxious to fight against the Vietminh and were looking to us for support and encouragement. I said that if they were so anxious to fight I could not understand why they did not do so.

To this perfidious objection the impassioned Mr. Robertson seems to have had no answer. Fortunately, Mr. Bedell Smith arrived upon the scene. With his help, Eden succeeded in pulling Mr. Dulles back from the brink. One more crisis occurred on June 18: "Mr. Robertson . . . at the last moment launched a violent and wholly unexpected attack on the Chinese proposals which the French were working on." But now Mendès-France was in the wings, able and willing to conclude an armistice. "He was," as Sir Anthony notes with Churchillian aptness, "the man for the short lap." Although Dulles had been largely responsible for calling the Geneva Conference, he refused to associate the United States with its outcome. Eden's achievement was nevertheless a major one: "we had stopped an eight-year war and reduced international tension at a point of instant danger to world peace." July 21, 1954, was Eden's finest hour.

The Indo-China crisis should have alerted him to the underlying stress of the Anglo-American entente. Instead, Eden abided by his lofty conception of mutual trust. The American intervention in Guatemala in June, 1954, struck the British Government as inept and perhaps unjustifiable, but London felt that the first priority must be given to the solidarity of the Anglo-American alliance. "If allies are to act in concert

only when their views are identical, alliances have no meaning." That noble doctrine was to become Eden's epitaph.

THE ROOTS of the Suéz crisis can be traced back to April, 1956. During that month, Bulganin and Khrushchev came to London. In the course of discussions on the Middle East, Eden thought it best "to be absolutely blunt about the oil, because we would fight for it." In his opinion, the standard of British life depended closely on the free flow of Middle Eastern oil and on the concomitant free passage through the Suez Canal. Whoever would threaten this flow would be putting his thumb on England's windpipe. In short, a Nasser might succeed where Hitler had failed. Eden is often charged with failing to understand the differences between the two dictators. That is not entirely true. He saw plainly that Nasser was a more petty business. But in certain respects he was better located than Hitler. He could strike at the heart of the British economy while staying close to home. Knowing, moreover, how closely Hitler followed the mad plans set forth in *Mein Kampf*, Eden took more seriously than did other Middle East experts, Nasser's avowed intention of forming a single Arab bloc from Bagdad to Casablanca. When Nasser seized the Canal, on July 26, 1956, he seemed to be on the way to his wildest ambitions.

Why did England and France not act at once? In part, because Eden hoped to prod the United Nations into action. Freedom of navigation was, after all, an international concern and the United States had long left in abeyance its solemn pledge to secure such freedom for Israeli ships. But the more important reason was one of logistics: Cyprus had no sufficient harbor for landing craft and transports, and "We had nothing like enough airborne troops." Unable to use immediate force, Eden set out to marshal world opinion and, above all, American support. The latter was forthcoming but in a manner which Eden judged fatally inadequate:

At the beginning of the crisis the Americans appeared to wish to isolate Egypt among the nations of the world, and to bring the moral pressure of combined opinion to bear upon Colonel Nasser. This was an acceptable intention, but it took no account of the probability that Nasser would show himself impervious to moral pressure. In practice it was to mean conferences and resolutions, but no action. The result was words.

This is the crux of the Eden case, and

March 12, 1960

the results of the two London conferences of shipowning nations confirmed his gloomy prediction. Nasser derided the proposals brought to him by Mr. Menzies and regarded the very fact of international concern as an insult to Egyptian rights.

Once again, moreover, Mr. Dulles played a queer, shadowy game. At one moment, he was eloquent in support of international pressure on Egypt. In the next, he would refer to the whole conflict as a distasteful vestige of British and French colonialism. One thing would be said to the British Embassy in Washington, another over the direct wire to Downing Street, and a third to State Department cronies who would then leak it to the press. On September 12, 1956, he let the cat gaily out of the bag. He let it be known, in a nearly casual manner, that the United States would not use force and that he did "not recall just exactly what Sir Anthony Eden said on this point." This was to signal Nasser that he could with impunity reject the final proposals of the eighteen-nation conference. From that moment on, Eden and Pineau knew they would either have to surrender to Nasser or go it alone.

Up to that point, Eden's account is thoroughly defensible. It is thereafter that the memoirs become as unconvincing as was the actual Suez campaign.

Eden could have argued thus: the American attitude and the Soviet veto made effective intervention by the United Nations impossible. There was clear proof that Nasser was trying to gather the Arab nations toward a renewed attack on Israel. If he were allowed to get away with his seizure of the Canal and given the time to equip his armies with Soviet tanks and planes, there would be no stopping him. This was Nasser's Rhineland. If the democracies fought back now, as they might have done in 1934 or 1936, a potential Hitler might be brought to bay. One can agree or disagree with this estimate. But it is perfectly justifiable. Instead, Eden sticks to his original contention. England and France, he asserts, wished only to separate the hostile armies of Israel and Egypt. The purpose of the entire Suez operation was to safeguard the Canal from "becoming a zone of warfare, and to arrest the spread of fighting in the Middle East."

This makes no sense. One does not arrest a war by joining it. One does not jeopardize one's most precious alliance in order to create a no-man's land between two foreign powers. And by sticking to this curious explanation of his motives, Sir Anthony does nothing to allay one of the gravest charges against him: that of collusion with Israel. Many

Ringling the Bells

And this is the way they ring
the bells in Bedlam
and this is the bell-lady
who comes each Tuesday morning
to give us a music lesson
and because the attendants make you go
and because we mind by instinct,
like bees caught in the wrong hive,
we are the circle of the crazy ladies
who sit in the lounge of the mental house
and smile at the smiling woman
who passes us each a bell,
who points at my hand
that holds my bell, E flat,
and this is the gray dress next to me
who grumbles as if it were special
to be old, to be old,
and this is the small hunched squirrel girl
on the other side of me
who picks at the hairs over her lip,
who picks at the hairs over her lip all day,
and this is how the bells really sound,
as untroubled and clean
as a workable kitchen,
and this is always my bell responding
to my hand that responds to the lady
who points at me, E flat;
and although we are no better for it,
they tell you to go. And you do.

ANNE SEXTON

observers have stated categorically that the attack on Port Said and Ismailia was timed to coincide with the Israeli sweep through the desert and that England, France, and Israel had been in close prior consultation.

BUT whatever his motives, Eden had entirely failed to gauge the reaction both in the United States and in England itself. He had thought that Washington would grant to its closest ally that benefit of the doubt which it often accorded to its enemies. The saddest passage in this sad book is that in which Eden compares the American attitude toward Hungary with its attitude toward Suez:

The United States representative . . . voiced his suspicion that we were urging the Hungarian situation to divert attention from Suez. The United States Government appeared in no hurry to move. Their attitude provided a damaging contrast to the alacrity they were showing in arraighing the French and ourselves.

Mr. Dulles seemed to find himself in full accord with Mr. Nehru. The latter thought the Anglo-French outrage against Egypt "clear as daylight," whereas he could not follow "the very confusing situation" in Budapest.

But Eden was left in the lurch not only by the United States and most of the Commonwealth. A spasm of revulsion went through England. Its extent has been grossly exaggerated, but undoubtedly a great number of English people were not prepared to support armed intervention even against Nasser. Eden tells pathetically how Lady Eden went out to Trafalgar Square to view the hostile demonstrations. It is a revealing note. Having spent his political life in foreign affairs, the Prime Minister was gravely out of touch with his own people. Here Churchill must bear part of the blame. He had long viewed Eden as his successor but done little to broaden him for the task.

The final blow, however, came neither from Moscow, nor from Washington, nor even from the flaming oratory of Mr. Bevan. On November 5, the Chancellor of the Exchequer informed the cabinet that the Suez crisis had unleashed a heavy run on sterling. Reserves were falling fast, he asserted, and he felt dubious whether England could financially sustain further military action. Again, Eden was vulnerable through lack of experience. Like Churchill, he had no interest in the "dismal science" of economics. He felt that he must take his Chancellor's estimate at full value: A cease fire became inevitable.

Now this raises a fascinating question,

for who was the Chancellor? None other than Mr. Macmillan. At the start of the Suez venture, Macmillan seems to have given Eden his complete backing. Did he swiftly reappraise the situation when he saw matters going wrong? And might he not, in that event, feel that it was his duty to the Conservative Party, to the Anglo-American alliance and to England to ease Eden out of office? Perhaps we shall never know, but it seems hard to believe that the run on sterling was quite as damaging as Macmillan made out. One cannot help wondering, also, about Churchill's role. Might he have given Macmillan a gentle nod? In view of Macmillan's

superb renovation of the Tories over the past three years this would have been ruthless farsightedness. Eden had to go.

And so he did, a sick and bitter man. It is his conviction that present trends in the Middle East are accumulating toward future disaster and that the democracies are repeating in the sixties the errors they committed thirty years ago. The *Full Circle* is a grim one; it seems to lead back to Munich. Sir Anthony is confident that the dark future will justify his action against Suez, though it may not forgive his lack of prompt success (or, one might add, his methods). Many of his readers will disagree. I believe he is right.

New Ear for Emerson

EMERSON. A MODERN ANTHOLOGY. Edited by Alfred Kazin and Daniel Aaron. Houghton Mifflin Co. 399 pp. \$4.

THE EARLY LECTURES OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Vol. I (1833-1836). Edited by Stephen Whicher and Robert Spiller. Harvard University Press. 545 pp. \$12.50.

David L. Norton

TWO GENERATIONS of our forebears looked to Ralph Waldo Emerson as the embodied spirit of religious America, and a third knew his name as the author of a set of volumes shelved prominently in every cultivated home. Then his light failed, and there are few people today in whom the name Emerson sparks more than a dim association or two. Now, suddenly, there are signs that the voice of the Concord saint will be heard again.

The psychic pendulum of the recent past has swung between anger and anguish. Ears attuned to sonic boom and cries of outraged flesh give no response to the serene harmonies of a Transcendental mystic. To have turned to Emerson in the first half of our century would have been an act of madness, like tending a rose throughout a shattering earthquake.

Curiously, both the quakes in our human foundations and the great structures which science has nevertheless managed to build on them throw cold light on two failings of Emerson—his blindness to evil and his disregard for

DAVID L. NORTON is Associate Leader of the Ethical Society of St. Louis. He writes regularly for the *Post-Dispatch* and is co-producer of a discussion program carried on the educational TV channel in St. Louis.

facts. Evil for him was a misunderstanding, a shortsightedness. It threatened only those who lacked a nobler vision. Emerson's own preoccupation with the ideal left him no room for anything less. And facts were merely springboards for the mind. "Nature is no literalist; everything must be taken genially." Facts, he thought, require only to be recomposed by Reason—by which he meant imagination. This past half-century has dealt harshly with geniality and metaphysical imagination.

But signs appear now, indicating that we are ready to forgive. These two books, one popular, one for scholars, will turn new interest toward Emerson. At least two recent studies of current values in our culture have cited Emerson, and called for reorientation on lines he laid down. A traveling exhibit of American art has been organized on Emersonian principles, opposing the sociological mode of interpretation. And soon, I predict, interest in the humanism of the late Albert Camus will evoke a perception of his startling similarity to the Concord philosopher.

If Emerson's voice is becoming audible again, this can mean only that our environment is setting us free, for a time, to contemplate ideal possibilities, to perceive the grains of beauty in ugliness, of truth in absurdity, and of virtue in the unswept corners of existence.

THE *Modern Anthology* is particularly suited as a reintroduction to Emerson's thought. Drawing from the *Essays, Journals, and Letters*, it regroups the most characteristic passages under themes of current interest. Among the chapters carved out by Messrs. Kazin and Aaron are "An Original Relation to the Universe" (metaphysics and religion),

The NATION

Y100

USSR:

Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki" (at program 57)

~~unselected tapes, e.g. Lokaruskaya k/~~

massive " Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi

Voyny Sovetskogo Soyūza '41-'45

(final vol. covers version / AWD)

German
bibliography on Nbg.

Carl Haensel. Das Gericht vertagt sich. Aus d. Tagebuch deines Nbg-
Verteidigers. Hambg: Claassen, 1950, 346 pp.

Joe J. Heidecker & Johannes Leeb. Der Nbg- Prozess. Bilanz der 1000 Jahre.
Koeln, Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Ruprecht 1957. 69 pp.

Aug. von Kniereim. ~~Mun~~ Nuernberg. Rechtliche und menschliche Probleme.
Stuttg: Klett 1953. 573 pp.

Viktor Frh. v. d. Lippe. Nbg- Taebuchnotizen. Nov. 1945- ~~La-i-1946~~ Okt. 1946,
Eine chronolog. Darstellung d. Nbg- Hauptkriegsverbrecherprozesses & seiner
Problematik. Frankf: Knapp 1951, 547pp .

Fruedr. Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe. Betrachtungen & Erinnerungen.
5th ed. Wiesbaden : Brockhaus 1955. 181 pp.

Niekisch, Ernst . Deutsche Daseinsverfehlung. Berl: Aufbau Verl. 1948. 92 p.

[Robinson, see back]

Herre Auerbach: Bibliographie \int 1945-50
num 55

Section "Das ~~Antisemitismus~~ uat. sog. be s p Juden" contains articles
1188 - 1221

all "martyrology" ^{etc} except perhaps:

look up

Parkes, J.W. ~~The Jews~~ as Weltproblem. Duisburg: Vissat, '48, 207p
G. The emergence of a Jew problem 1878-1939
NY: J. P. M. Press '47, 259p

Shdanow, J. P. imperialism character of the Russian bourgeoisie
in: Neue Welt I ('46) H. 7, 55-69.

Section: ~~be +~~ Neu-England + a Madel, 1633-1939, articles 1610-1752

possibly / articles:

look up

Degras, J. Calendar / Soviet docs on for 1917-1941
London: R. Inst / Int. Aff '48, 6m, 248p.

look up

Rot-Weiss - Rot Buch. Gerechtigkeit / ~~Österr!~~ Darstellung, Dokumente ...
Verlag + 1972 e. Otkupat ~~Österr.~~ nach amtlichen Quellen.
I Teil Österr. Staatsdruck '46, 224p.

look up!

E. Kordt. Nicht aus ~ Aktien P Wirtschaftswachstum... 1928-1945
Stud. 50, 441pp.

!

Zylen, P.V. Les Maires libres. Politique et territoire de
la Belgique 1514-1540.
Bruxelles, ed. Universelles
'50, 580p.

Darstellungen
a) Belgien

✓ 6

(for Robinson)

ich:

look up!
!!

ich bin auch gegangen. am liebsten die Gruppe
+ wurde präsentiert,

~~Woolbert~~

Woolbert

Calmette

German
bibliography on Nbg.

Carl Haensel. Das Gericht vertagt sich. Aus d. Tagebuch deines Nbg-
Verteidigers. Hambg: Claassen, 1950, 346 pp.

Joe J. Heidecker & Johannes Leeb. Der Nbg- Prozess. Bilanz der 1000 Jahre.
Koeln, Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Ruprecht 1957. 609 pp.

Aug. von Knierem. ~~Mann~~ Nuernberg. Rechtliche und menschliche Probleme.
Stuttg: Klett 1953. 573 pp.

Viktor Frh. v. d. Lippe. Nbg- Taebuchnotizen. Nov. 1945- ~~Jan-1-1946~~ Okt. 1946,
Eine chronolog. Darstellung d. Nbg- Hauptkriegsverbrecherprozesses & seiner
Problematik. Frankf: Knapp 1951, 547pp.

Fruedr. Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe. Betrachtungen & Erinnerungen.
5th ed. Wiesbaden: Brockhaus 1955. 181 pp.

Niekisch, Ernst. Deutsche Daseinsverfehlung. Berl: Aufbau Verl. 1948. 92 p.

Could the Jews have fought back at Auschwitz?

Dr. Bruno Bettelheim, of Chicago University, examines this provocative question in all its frightening aspects in his foreword to the new book, "Auschwitz—A Doctor's Eyewitness Account" by Dr Miklos Nyiszli.

Dr. Bettelheim's conclusions have already caused much controversy and discussion in magazines, newspapers and synagogues.

If you wish a free copy of this foreword, write to:

FREDERICK FELL, Inc.
Dept. N
386 Park Ave. South, New York

MAN—THE RELUCTANT BROTHER,
by Matthew Ies Spetter (Fieldston).
A book about good and evil whose burden—although it touches on many subjects and probes into many subtleties—is simple: I wish, the author says, to expose the mutilation of the human person, and I wish to arouse my generation against the paralyzing trends that make pawns out of people. Dr. Spetter, who is a specialist in mental health and active in the Society for Ethical Culture, was born in Holland, was a member of the Resistance during the war, and is a survivor of both Auschwitz and Buchenwald. He stands against all political and religious abstractions, all rationalizations of power, and all intoxications, from the chic absurdities of anti-art and the literature of despair right on down to the John Birch Society. He sees reason for hope but not for optimism in the present human condition, and his book is a clear statement of the credo of liberalism, delivered without any apology whatever.

Robert Charvin

Justice et Politique

réf. de René Jean Dupuy

Paris: Librairie Gen. de Droit
et de Jurisprudence. Pichon

R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias

20, Rue Soufflot

Paris, 1968, 543 p.

Cyprian + Sawicki. PRAWO NORYMBERSKE
(=The Law of Nuremberg) 900 pp.

Authors are leading
Polish Prosecutors
of ~~the~~ War Criminals

The book also deals with
discussions at London
U.N. War Crimes Commission
during WWII on concept
of Crimes against Peace.

Naty: Enzo Colotti,

L'Amministrazione Tedesca dell'Italia
Occupata 1943-45.

Studi e Documenti
Leici Editori
Milano '63

Bibliography

Scheffman, European Population Transfers 1939-1945. N.Y. '46.

Eichstadt, Ulrich. Von Dollbaur / Hofen.

esp. "Abhängigkeit + diplomatische Kontrolle" → Review
Kundt 11. 437-440.

Leading French text of 1945, esp.
Marcel Sirey. Traité de droit int'l public (Dalloz, Paris 57,
2 vol. 992 + 812 p) Principes f. Ulmer / U. Paris.
his life work.
over only int'l law / Peace.
Charles Rousseau, droit int'l public Revue Sirey, Paris
1953, 752 p.

Académie Diplomatique Int'lle. Dictionnaire Diplomatique. publié
1948, vol. IV. (N.Y. 565 KTH Rev)
[vol. III - 1937]

André François-Poncet. Souvenirs d'une Ambassade à Berlin.
"Als Rotschaffli - Berlin 1931-1938. Einzige deutsche Ausgabe
364 Seiten, Verlag F. Kupperberg, Mainz, 1ste Auflage 1947.)

Dr. Ernst Sauer. Souveränität + Solidarität. Göttinger Beiträge für Anfragen
Gegenwartsfragen. Bd. 9. Göttingen: Wissenschaftl. Verlag,
1954, 175 pp.

Binger Dählerus. Der letzte Versuch. London - Berlin Sommer 1938.
Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagsgesellschaft Landf. 478. 172p.

Herodotus: in place the sons bury their fathers. in war,
p father bury the sons.

had "dem u.s. Repress" ~~stets~~ heftigste Abweisung empfunden.

François - Ponce: ~~ich~~ viel liberal + humane Bildung
genossen, 2 / hielt m / unerbittliche Tyrannei
aufgebracht / - P P geltender ritterlicher Spalte 2
Friede hat, P beständiger ruhiger Verherrlichte, P
eigener Barbarei rückwärts. Die ersten 22, 2 davon 6
hervortrat, 2 organisiert Reichslandstand P Verfolg P
Juden, P log. Dem - en, 2 Konventen + Katholiken, P Anschlag 2
K22a - zentral Lager, P Ordein, 2. BV. Juni '1837
P Anschlag 2 Dollfuß hat haben 2 inauslöschlichen Abscheu +
Mißtrauen - / flucht. p. 8 ff.

für Lamm

< apparently acquired confidence / A. Fleu + many big boys.
O P only foreign, up to then, who O received by
H7en on "Halen wort" P his historical accuracy
18. Oct. 1838.

almost P only in Staatsmann, ~ F. i. 2 nicht
kritisiert (er kritisiert Nummer, Paper, Schweizer)
in Staatsrat. ~ Ausw. Minister B. W. v. Bülow.

Jackboot

The Story of the German Soldier

JOHN LAFFIN

After a detailed and intriguing study of German military lore from Frederick the Great to the present day one arrives at the inescapable conclusion— Europe will once again tremble to the tramp of the German jackboot.

“Extremely interesting.”—

ROBERT PITMAN, *Sunday Express*.

(1 30/-

for further research
Cruiser → Humant

see: D.W. Pritt, War Cruisers.

London (?) (before '48)
p. 27

Question: Does C. cruiser → Cruiser are different
for war cruisers

See also: article by Anatole Goldstein

in Leit Yearbook / Int'l Law, 1958

p. 215

(UN)

Ref

341(058)

J 3

SOCIÉTÉ INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE

Inscrite au registre des Associations du Tribunal d'Instance de Strasbourg

Secrétariat: adresse provisoire: 10, Rue Schiller - Strasbourg

Strasbourg, le

La Société Internationale de Droit Pénal Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre vient de publier les Travaux qui ont été présentés à l'occasion du Congrès de Bruxelles les 14 et 16 Mai 1959 sur le thème "ACTION PÉNALE ET ACTION DISCIPLINAIRE".

Cet ouvrage constitue une étude de droit comparé entre les diverses législations des pays du Monde Occidental en ce qui concerne le droit pénal Militaire et l'exercice de l'action disciplinaire.

D'éminents juristes spécialistes de ces problèmes ont collaboré à cet ouvrage, nous citerons parmi eux : M M. J. Barendrecht (Hollande) F. R. Bickell (Canada), Henri Bosly (Belgique), Earl V. Brown (USA), M. T. G. Carneiro (Brésil), Rodriguez Devesa (Espagne), J. Eugster (Suisse), Ivar Follestad (Norvège), Gratien Gardon (France), John Gilissen (Belgique), Otto Grunewald (Rep. Fed. d'Allemagne), R. C. Halse (Grande Bretagne), G. Landi (Italie), S. B. Nyholm (Danemark). C'est dire qu'il s'agit d'un document de grande valeur qui a sa place non seulement dans toutes les bibliothèques juridiques, mais aussi parmi les ouvrages qui ont trait à la Vie Militaire.

Cette oeuvre se présente en un volume du format 25 x 16 de 228 pages, imprimé sur papier édition bouffant.

Son prix est fixé à 20 NF.

Les commandes doivent être adressées au Secrétariat de la Société 10, Rue Schiller à Strasbourg, accompagnées d'un titre de paiement (chèque, mandat ou virement postal au C.C.P. 115-871 Strasbourg).

Le Secrétaire Général

Professeur J. LEAUTÉ

BULLETIN DE COMMANDE

Je soussigné

.....
commande à la Société Internationale de Droit Pénal Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre

..... exemplaire de l'ouvrage

"Action pénale et Action disciplinaire"

Le règlement en est effectué par

..... le

Signature



SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF LAW

3642 LINDELL BOULEVARD
SAINT LOUIS, MISSOURI 63108

September 26, 1968

Professor John H.E. Fried
Department of Political Science
Wagner Hall, City College
The City University of New York
New York, N.Y. 10031

Dear Professor Fried:

I wonder if the Gendrel-LaFarge Bibliographie has served its purpose? One of my students is engaged in a study of war crimes in connection with the new intercollegiate moot court problem and I would like to make it available to him.

Sincerely yours,

Howard S. Levie
Professor of Law

HSL:cba

October 4, 1968

Dear Professor Levie,

As of this Fall, I have moved from City College to its newest senior "brother", and hence your letter of Sept. 26 reached me only today.

The Gendrel LaFarge Bibliography will be mailed to you early next week. I should have returned it earlier. It proved to be very useful, and I want to thank you again for your great courtesy.

Incidentally, I confess that I learned only from your letter about the new moot court you refer to. Interested as I am in students' reactions to the problems of war crimes, I would like to hear more about this; and if I can be of any assistance, I hope you will let me know.

Sincerely yours,

John H. E. Fried
Professor of Political Science

Professor Howard S. Levie
Law School, Saint Louis University
Saint Louis, Mo. 63108

Pour des livres allemands

Librairie Flinker

21 quai de l'Horloge
ou 68 quai des Orfèvres 326.87.37

(pres du pont Neuf)

Karl Stitzer CRANDOUR: Mordprozess (nach Prozessberichten der „Humanität“)
Dietz Verlag GmbH Berlin, 1954, 110 pp.
c2, Wallstrasse 76-79, ~~10177~~

Jerzy Sawicki Vor dem polnischen Staatsanwalt. (Ins Deutsche übertragen von VEB Globus)
Deutscher Militärverlag, Berlin 1962, 286 pp.

H.R. Berndorff u. R. Tügel Auf dem Bauche sollst Du kriechen...
(Deutschland unter den Besatzungsmächten.)
Christian Wegner Verlag, Hamburg, 1958, 428 pp.

Herbert Jäger, Prof. X Stuhl in Marburg 388 pp. 1967. Walter Verlag, Braunschweig
Verbrechen unter totalitären Herrschaft (Olten + Freiburg, ed. Poliakoff)
recommended by Poliakoff
livre sur le U Urteile! (worked abs at Centre de
document June)
Poliakoff: travaux sérieux!

V.V. STANCIU
Maître Stanciu, Secret. Général dans nouvelle organisation
contre le terrorisme, Société Int'l de
Propagande Criminelle
42, rue du Cardinal Lemoine, Paris 5^e

(Cassini et Graven participated at 2nd Congrès
get from Stanciu the reports ~~for~~ made by various experts
for Stanciu's Congrès contre le terrorisme
juillet 1967)

id:
id: id: id:

London Univ. of Sussex: Centre for Research in Collective Psychopathology.
directors: Norman ~~Wright~~ COHN (auteur: Pursuit of
the Millennium)
3, Henrietta Street, London W.C. + Warrant for
Genocide (= au Protokolle des
Weissen von Zion)

send to Poliakoff a 1-2 page exposé of my
project - who he might send to whom
Wolfgang Schäffler, leading expert in G.A. (Prof. at Berlin) - sociologue
in Endlösung.

J. Y. Dautricourt

Maître de conférences à l'Université catholique
de Louvain

→ Schaffer 2 publications au article on Eichenau judgment
ici art 1 et article

(Books)

buy or order while in Geneva:

1) free Verlag P. G. Keller, Winterthur:

Dr. Ulrich Braun. Die Anwendung der Genfer Zivilkonvention in Kriegen
nicht-internationalen Charakters. 1962. 130pp.

Köhler, L. Alttestamentliche Versuche, die Kriegsführung menschlicher zu gestalten. Festschrift der Univ. Zürich zum 70 Geburtstag von Max Huber, Zürich 1944.

Kunz, J.L. The Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949. Law & Politics, 1953.

Pradelle de la, P. La conférence diplomatique et les nouvelles conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949, Paris 1951.

William E.S. Flory. Prisoners of War.

Wests: Am. Council on Public Affairs,
1942, 179 pp.

Bibliography

JAPAN'S QUEST FOR AUTONOMY: NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY, 1930-1938. BY JAMES B. CROWLEY. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 428 p. \$9.00.

Changing definitions of national security and national objectives within the Japanese government in the thirties. Emphasis is on attitudes, opinions and policies as articulated by the ministers of state.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL: ORDEAL AND HOPE, 1939-1942. BY FORREST C. POGUE. New York: Viking, 1966, 491 p. \$8.95.

This second volume of what will probably be the definitive biography of the late general (Volume I noted here January 1964), based in part upon Marshall's papers, covers the period from his becoming Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army to the invasion of North Africa.

ITALY BETRAYED. BY PETER TOMPKINS. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966, 352 p. \$6.50.

A former O.S.S. agent here criticizes, in a vigorous and personal narrative, the failure, quite unnecessary in his eyes, of the Allies to take full advantage of Mussolini's fall. The policy of working with Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio comes in for particular criticism.

ments, values, or a moral element from his decision.

But the moral element in law in Stumpf's view is universal, and is an integral part of those very systems that loudly disclaim it. The Soviets produced a society, for example, dedicated to the abolition of the rule of law in the traditional sense. Theoretically the dictatorship of the proletariat is its own source of authority without constitutional or statutory limitation. This follows from the Marxian idea that law is the reflection of the material order by the mind of man. Since all law is the law of the ruling economic class and contains within it no *a priori* principles, the mind is not free to create rules of human behavior, only to transform the material forces which impinge upon it into conscious formulations of rules. The consequences of this Marxist theory of the source of law are significant, says Stumpf, for when law is viewed not as the embodiment of justice but as a reflection of the material interests of the dominant class, it is reduced to the naked force of that class, and it cannot embody anything permanent. But the Soviets have not practiced what they preach. Not only have they not been able to eliminate law from their system, they have actually used the law for moral ends, for creating a moral consciousness. Law in Russia is no longer simply a power mechanism; it is "viewed as a moral vehicle which should be respected because of its intrinsic moral content." It is to be obeyed not because it is the command of the sovereign but because of the moral ends—fulfillment of norms of socialist law—it is seeking to achieve. Ideology has not only become respectable but has assumed the ethical characteristic of "ought." Even though law and morality are tied together in Soviet law, this does not mean, Stumpf tells us, that Soviet law as a legal system is under any moral restraint since the validity of law is still conditioned upon the consent of the Communist party. However, the very fact of the revival of Soviet law indicates that man's nature requires more than a command of the sovereign; it requires reasons for the command.

Probably the most interesting essays in the study are those dealing with Austin, Bentham and Hobbes. The distinction between law and morals has been a powerful influence on jurisprudence ever since Austin's time, says Stumpf, but men have always been uneasy about it. While almost all of the Austinian legal theory is found in the three concepts of sovereign, command and sanction and suggests in the abstract that the sovereign is a "morally indifferent entity," Austin is, in Stumpf's view, far from considering law in such arbitrary terms since he sees law as a corrective of evil proceeding from a "good" which in Austin's words is "bottomed in the common nature

of man." And even Bentham whose contempt for natural law was unequivocal was much concerned over law reflecting the "good" of the community when he urged that in order for law to be complete, its commands must take into account the moral concerns of society. Hobbes, too, insisted that law and morality have the same content and that the obligatory force of law was to be found in morality. Hobbes speaks of "natural reason" throughout his discourses, and although he once said that there can be "no unjust laws," he did not deny, says Stumpf, that sovereigns could give erroneous interpretations of natural law. Sovereigns can err, said Hobbes, and their acts of authority are not equivalent to morality. Fitting Hobbes into the natural law tradition depends upon one's definition of natural law, and the author is quite aware of this when he suggests that it is not necessary to say that a known set of unchanging, absolute values exists in order to have a viable theory of natural law: it is important only to agree that human nature has a permanence from which one can—as Hobbes did—derive certain natural laws. And this returns us to the central point of this study: that law is a matter of thought or consciousness, that it represents the capacity of man to transcend himself and to look at his social organization objectively. In spite of the "high degree of analytic imprecision in most natural law discourse" and "the difficulties of epistemological relativism" there is a nagging persistence that moral ends cannot be separated from law. We must conclude then that no organized legal system is ever completely positivistic and, we might add, no individual is totally a positivist.

Professor Stumpf has produced a creative and imaginative book. It adds a new dimension to the growing body of literature that is attempting to capture the idealism and morality of a great tradition in political and legal theory, that of natural law. Professor Stumpf is persuasive, not dogmatic; analytical, not autocratic; learned, not shallow. Each chapter, incidentally, is a neat, self-contained essay, but the study has a systematic unity and wholeness because the author never loses sight of his noble theme.—ROBERT J. STEAMER, *Lake Forest College*.

Morality and the Law. BY SAMUEL ENOCH STUMPF.
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1966.
Pp. xiv, 247. \$5.00.)

Does the law have any moral connotations whatsoever? Professor Stumpf poses the age-old question and then proceeds to answer it in a resounding affirmative. He builds his case by dealing with, among others, such tough areas as the Soviet Union and the international community, and he argues that all systems of political organization must, in the final analysis, construct and operate legal systems on a moral foundation. Moreover, he attempts to prove that even such avowed positivists as Austin, Bentham and Hobbes conceived of law as something more than simply commands of the sovereign, that even for them the law contained an essence springing from the nature of man and of society. The study is both a defense of the natural law tradition, albeit in modern dress, and an attack on the notion that law has no real connection with moral values.

The first chapter of the study deals with the moral element in judicial opinions, particularly those of the United States Supreme Court. Stumpf argues that law has always "been shaped to fit the contours of moral conviction," that the law "has never been able to dissociate itself fully from the notion that there is a difference between an arbitrary command and a law." His evidence for this is a very brief allusion to the classical and medieval periods and to Justice Cardozo's assertion that today's judges respond to a "moral urge." Stumpf suggests that the judge in the present day, however, has often attempted to adhere to the concept that the law has no real concern for moral and ethical values, or at least to the view that if there is a moral base for law, it must be infused in the law by the legislature and not by the judge. But a more profound influence on the American judge is the modern philosopher, whether it be Whitehead ("The conception of the universe as evolving subject to fixed eternal laws regulating all behavior should be abandoned.") or John Dewey ("The sanctification of . . . universal principles as methods of thinking is the chief obstacle to . . . social advance by means of law."). No matter how hard a judge may try, however, he cannot eliminate subjective judg-

Make footnote to Raeder, Dönitz:

see: ^{Capitaine de Frégate,} A. Vulliez, Analyse des Conférences
Navales du Fuhrer.

Paris: Les Grands Éditions Françaises, 1949, 128 pp.
(contains many docs, not done)

Commentary by Raeder on his co-defendants
presented at Noy. "Mes relations avec A. G. K.
& le Party."

NO LAURELS FOR DE GAULLE. BY ROBERT MENGIN. New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 1966, 402 p. \$6.95.

A strong anti-Gaullist appraisal based on the diary of a French journalist during
the years 1939-43.

LA REVANCHE DE 1945. BY GENERAL BEAUFRE. Paris: Plon, 1966, 313 p. Fr.
14.58.

General Beaufre's memoirs and reflections on the period 1940-1945 in France
and the French resistance abroad.

ZWEI Jahrzehnte deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen 1945-1965. Beiträge von einem
Kollektiv beim Institut für Geschichte der Völker der UdSSR an der Martin-Luther-Universität
Halle. Berlin, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1965. 269 p.
DOCUMENTS on British foreign policy. 1919-1939. Series Ia. Vol. I: The aftermath of

look up: Journal of the

Atlantic Graph etc

very well informed: Belgique

Prof. Stefan Glaser

1 and published in Belgian
periodical

Revue de Droit Pénal +
de Criminologie
(Bruxelles)

(si può fare fotocopia)

Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale
Via del Soler, Roma, 27

Biblioteca Universitaria Alessandrina
Città Universitaria

photostating possibile

Fra. Gaeta 6230600

"Processo Graziani."

Ruffolo Editore, Roma

Vol. II, 1950

p. 1397 - 1421

(Giudizio 23 febb. 1950)

Bibliography

See: Friedr. Berber: Völkerst. Dokumenten-
sammlung.

vol. II. Munich + Berlin, C. H. Beck

ou: Recht des Konflikts

1867

Buy: Marcel Merle, Paçifisme et
Internationalisme

Paris, 1966, Armand Colin

See: Wilh. Wengler, (wie Mr. Berlin)

Das Völkerrechtliche Gewaltverbot: Probleme
+ Tendenzen.

Berlin, ~~Walter~~ Walter de Gruyter, 1967

61 pp. ⚡

(Paris)

get in

Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence
Pichou + Durand

ODÉON 07-19 20, rue Soufflot, Paris 5^e

Pierre Desmottes. De la Responsabilité
pénale de Ministres en régime
parlementaire français. 40 Fcs.

get also: no 1 (Jan. Fev. 68) "Revue de Droit Public et de la Science Politique"
(containing Guillet's article on "Nouveaux
Règlements de Discipline Générale dans les Assemblées")

Bibliography

ou: direct applied / ind. law to
indiv.

Prof. Giuseppe Barile (Perugia)
~~Studi e Trattati~~
Diritto Internazionale e Diritto Interno, II
in: XL Rivista di Diritto Internazionale (1957) 26-102,
esp. pp. 44 ff.
(as transformed, etc.)

copies in Argentina. Mass centenary editions of many of Lenin's works are planned in Columbia, Venezuela, Chile, and some other Latin-American countries.

It is seen from the UNESCO figures that in our days Lenin's works have gone through a greater number of printings and larger editions than the Bible, regarded for so long as the most widely-read book in the world.

To give a correct assessment of all these facts, it should be borne in mind that the path Lenin's works have to travel before reaching the people is blocked by many obstacles—ideological, administrative, and sometimes even terrorist. In those countries where even the outward signs of democracy are scorned, the publication and distribution of the truth of history, expressed by Lenin in his writings, are considered to be crimes against the state. People responsible for the publication of these works risk not only their liberty but sometimes life itself. Nevertheless, Lenin's immortal words are to be heard everywhere—even, let us say, in Portugal.

The activities carried on by the Avante Printing-works, the organ of the Portuguese Communist Party, are truly heroic. Self-sacrificing labour and staunch devotion to the cause have enabled Avante to publish many of Lenin's works, including his articles *Concerning Strikes, Karl Marx, Class Collaboration with Capital or Class Struggle against Capital?* and the book *Left-Wing Communism—an Infantile Disorder*. José Moreira, a prominent Portuguese revolutionary, after steadfastly refusing under torture to disclose the whereabouts of the party printing-works to the police, met with a terrible death. But the spirit of those who lighten the gloom with the torch of Lenin's ideas can never be broken.

The whole world reads Lenin, ponders his works, learns from his political experience and his life; the whole world consults Lenin, the guiding spirit of the greatest social revolution, the founder of the first socialist state in the world.

VLADIMIR NAIDENOV

EYEWITNESSES FROM THE WEST

Amongst the flood of books about the Soviet people's resistance to fascist aggression there are not a few by eyewitnesses from the West-American or English authors, who happened to spend part of the war in the embattled Soviet Union. These books differ widely in style. One thing, however, merits particular attention: those accounts which were written from live observation and particularly those written immediately after events they describe are, in spite of the widely differing personalities and styles of

Western Books
on Soviet War
effort

Soviet literature 1970
No. 5 (266)

their authors, agreed if not identical in something very essential—in their appreciation of the Soviet people's war effort and their understanding of the peculiar social nature of the Soviet people's heroic and victorious struggle.

The eruption of the fiery Nazi lava-tide over the U.S.S.R. caught the American writer Erskine Caldwell and his wife Margaret Bourke-White, a skilled photographic reporter, in the depths of our country near Sochi. What they remembered from the first day of the war was the expression of iron determination on thousands of faces; people who spent their vacation in this sea resort hurried to leave for home before setting out for the front; and the volunteers, among them greyheads and young boys, besieging the Military Commissariats. In Moscow Caldwell found telegrams awaiting him from several U.S. information centres and he was soon broadcasting war-reports over the wireless. Later these were published in book form under the title *All-Out on the Road to Smolensk*; it was published in New York in 1942, one of the first Western accounts of the struggle between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Caldwell wrote from Moscow when it was under direct threat from Nazi tanks and planes, impressively conveying the atmosphere of the vast, blacked-out city preparing to resist. The news from the front at that time was depressing. The foreigners in Moscow were far from optimistic: many were convinced that the city must fall within the next two or three weeks. Nevertheless, Caldwell retained confidence in what President Roosevelt characterized as "almost super-human courage and will power of the Russians," in their readiness to forge their own victory without outside help, seven days a week and twenty-four hours a day. "After seeing the Russians in action during the first week of war, I never for a moment doubted their ability to stop the Germans," he wrote.

In August Caldwell left with a group of foreign reporters for the Western Front; in Vyazma he was caught in an air raid and closer to the front line, near Yelnya, he was shelled. That was at the time when the fascists closing in on Moscow were for the first time effectively counter-attacked: the reporters were given the opportunity to convince themselves of this in conversations with German prisoners and by inspecting the shattered remains of German weapons and vehicles.

Behind the journalistic sketches of this book one feels the author's belief in the particular, popular and nation-wide character of Soviet resistance, in the amazing stamina of the Soviet infantrymen, in the courage and daring of the fighter-pilots, who in more than one case had brought down enemy planes by crashing their aircraft into them in their defence of the Moscow skies, in the efficiency of the teenagers setting out to work at the factories, in the energy of the thousands of students, civil servants, and housewives who were out day and night digging trenches on the roads to the capital. Caldwell's journalistic love of sensational detail did not prevent

him from seeing events in depth, from understanding the sources of Soviet patriotism: "The attitude of the people towards war and their duties was as stern and inflexible as their adherence to the Socialist plan of their state. There was no suggestion of frivolousness in the character of the people. Their all-out effort to win the war is probably unique in the world's history."

Margaret Bourke-White's book *Shooting the Russian War* (1943), in which a diary-type text is excellently illustrated by nearly a hundred photographs, compliments her husband's. Margaret Bourke-White was the only Western journalist who, at the beginning of the war, was granted the right to use a camera; the reader of her book is confronted with a series of vivid photographs: the dark Moscow sky netted with searchlights, the contours of the capital during air raids, ruined cities, battlefields and, of course, people—soldiers, generals, peasants, workmen, heroes and victims of the war. This expressive documentary story in photographs of the journalist's experiences goes to make a composite picture of a people shouldering the common burden in the hour of their nation's most terrible trial.

In the book of another American journalist Henry Cassidy *Moscow Dateline* (1943) the basic stages of the Battle of Moscow are delineated. Cassidy lived in our country from spring 1941 to spring 1943 as representative of the Associated Press Agency. Summing up his impressions, he noted: "The Battle of Moscow was won by as smart and successful a trick play as has ever been sprung on an unsuspecting opponent. It was won as well by sheer strength, courage and sacrifice. Winter, silent white ally of the Russians, helped. But the most surprising, and perhaps the most important factor, was contributed by the Red Army's tactics."

Cassidy gave due credit to the fighters of the *narodnoye opolcheniye* (a kind of home guard—*Tr.*), the "communist volunteers," as he called them, often insufficiently trained and under-armed, who nevertheless stood to the last man, winning time to prepare the counter-attack. He wrote of the prodigies performed by women and adolescents working at the munitions factories and on building up the defences of the city. All this was very different from the fate of Paris, Brussels and other conquered European capitals, and the author, though far from sympathetic to the communist system, concludes: "A great people or a strong system, is one that can undergo such a test, know the danger and rise above it. That Moscow did."

One of the chapters of this book is called "General Winter." At that time (not that it never happens now) there was a tendency to believe the widespread rumours attributing the decisive role in the winning of the Battle of Moscow to the severe Russian frosts. Cassidy bears witness to the fallibility of this point of view. Touring the battlefield he was convinced that the cold made things as difficult for the defenders as for those struggling to attack through drifts of snow and blocked or muddy roads: "General Winter," wrote Cassidy, "did not belong to the Red Army. If he did, he

should have been shot for treason because he opposed the Russians just as much as he did the Germans. He was fighting for no one but himself."

The American journalist James E. Brown, then representing the International News Service, came to much the same conclusion. Joseph E. Davies, former American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., recommended Brown's book *Russia Fights* to the wide reading public of America, noting that though the author "holds no brief for the Soviet political system" he nevertheless "tells us frankly that it has brought great benefits to Russia. . . . Even his few criticisms are voiced with an honesty that lends added weight to his favourable comment." At the end of one of the most vivid episodes in the book—a record of chats with wounded Soviet soldiers who took part in the Battle of Moscow, Brown wrote: "I left the hospital with one question answered, and it was a question I had been wondering about for a long time: How was the morale of the Red Army? It was good."

Winter 1941-42 was a hard time for the allies of the U.S.S.R. in the anti-German coalition. The echoes of Pearl Harbour were still sounding, American battleships were sinking, Singapore and Hong Kong, Malaya and the Philippines had all fallen. Thinking back to this period in his book *The Year of Stalingrad* (1946) the English journalist Alexander Werth wrote: "Sub-editors in Fleet Street said: 'Thank God for Russia, there is no good news from anywhere else to put on the front page'. . . . Throughout the winter, Russia remained perhaps the only real enthusiasm of most people in England. If there was still a good chance of winning the war, people thought, it was thanks to the Russians."

The indestructible moral and political unity of the Soviet people which was one of the foundation stones of the victorious outcome of the war was particularly evident, in the opinion of many observers, during the Great Battle of Stalingrad.

James Brown, describing the fierce battles around Rzhev, the function of which was to keep the Nazi forces bogged down in this area, writing of the unspectacular gallantry of the workers, housewives and schoolchildren noted that, in those days, the word "Stalingrad" was on everybody's lips and that an awareness of participation in the fate of the hero-city inspired the thoughts and actions of all Russians. ". . . It came to be a symbol of the whole struggle against the invaders," Brown noted. "Workers and peasants were confident the Volga capital would not fall; it was a curious faith, not based on knowledge of the military factors, but simply a deep, unreasoning conviction."

And Stalingrad did not fall. The German divisions which had advanced thousands of kilometres through the countries of Europe could not conquer those last few hundred metres which lay between them and the Volga. "The Battle of Stalingrad was one of the hardest-fought sieges in modern history. . ." Brown commented. "It was the greatest defeat Hitler had received

since the beginning of the war. . . . Stalingrad will remain the proudest achievement of Russian arms."

Among the countless stories of popular courage with which the war years abound, the one to have most captured the imagination of foreigners is, perhaps, the story of Leningrad. In early 1944 Alexander Werth's *Leningrad* was published simultaneously in London and New York; its author had visited the blockaded city in September 1943 when traces of destruction were yawning on every hand and artillery shelling was a constant feature of existence. He wrote of the airmen and the writers, of the school-children who astonished him by their combination of childish thinking with the courage and resourcefulness of grown men, of the sailors of the Baltic Fleet who were such a scourge to the enemy.

Werth dedicated his book to the workers of the Kirov Factory. The factory was only two or three miles from the German positions, it was subject to constant bombing and shell-fire, people were killed in the workshops, died of starvation at their places, but *did* all that the front demanded of them. This patriotic devotion to duty had a quality of its own. "A quality which was composed not only of profound patriotism both local and national, but also a revolutionary fervour that was essentially working-class, and enthusiasm that was in the revolutionary tradition of the Petrograd of 1917."

Soon after the defeat of the Nazis at the approaches to Leningrad in February 1944, other foreign journalists arrived in the town. Among others was the *Life* correspondent Richard E. Lauterbach. The theme of Russia was an important one for his whole career as a journalist. He had first visited us in 1935. His direct contacts with Soviet people, soldiers and workers, and numerous journeys about the country gave him the rich material of which he made use in his book *These Are the Russians* (1944) with the intention to increase mutual understanding between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

"For generations there will be poems and stories and novels and plays about how the Russian people rose up and defended their cities," wrote Lauterbach. Basing his story on documents and personal impressions, he wrote a vivid account of the collective heroism of the inhabitants and soldiers of Leningrad. He was particularly struck by the massive scale on which people helped one another, by the evidence of unselfishness and humaneness; he wrote of the Komsomol members who went from house to house helping those whose strength had failed them, of the discipline in the bread queues, of the generosity of the soldiers who asked that their own far from sufficient ration should be cut to relieve the sufferings of the population; he quoted words from the letter of Leningrad workers to the soldiers of the Red Army: 'We are with you. Death will be afraid of us, before we are afraid of death.' " That was the title Lauterbach gave to his chapter on Leningrad, "Death Will Be Afraid of Us."

The endurance of Leningrad showed how firmly rooted was the new order born of the October Revolution. Ella Winter understood this better than many of her colleagues. An American journalist, widow of the distinguished columnist Lincoln Steffens, she first visited our country in 1930-31, when she spent some time living with Russian families. The result of this sojourn was the book *Red Virtue* (1933) dealing with moral problems and social relationships in Soviet Russia. In 1944 she came back to the U.S.S.R. as correspondent of the *New York Post* and in 1946 she published the book *I Saw the Russian People*. "I had seen the Russia of the Five Year Plan," she wrote, "the exciting new experiments in industry, education, art, architecture, family relations and housing. I wanted to know what war had done to Russia—to her farms and factories, her science, art, family, women and children."

Summing up what she had seen Ella Winter wrote: "... Citizen and soldier felt it was the planning and unity achieved under Soviet socialism, plus the spirit and strength of Russia, that had made the unbeatable combination of morale and fighting qualities of the victorious Red Army and people."

Since we are on the subject, all the facts and conclusions in the books of which we have been speaking here are in most definite disaccord with the theses of Harrison Salisbury's *The Siege of Leningrad* (1969), a belated attempt to discredit and turn upside down the very essence of the Leningrad epic. However, those who were already acquainted with the style of this professional "Kremlinologist" expected little else; he has as a general rule been anti-Soviet in all his previous books as well.

Objective observers saw on other parts of the giant Soviet-German front and far behind the lines the same courage and greatness of spirit, which had struck them during the battles of Moscow, of Stalingrad and during the siege of Leningrad. In the wake of the advancing Soviet forces, foreign correspondents found plenty of evidence to convince them that the population of nazi-occupied regions had not settled down peaceably under the "New Order" and had remained faithful to the Soviet system.

The American columnist Jerome Davis who was present at the liberation of the capital of Byelorussia, reduced by the Germans to a heap of rubble, recorded: "I visited Minsk when the Germans were still near the city, and it seemed from all I heard, that the Germans had been the real prisoners in Minsk and that it was the Russians who had been free. . . . The Germans were afraid to go out at night for fear of being killed—and yet vengeance reached them."

Towards the end of 1944 the Soviet Army embarked upon the liberation of Europe: entered Bucharest, Sofia, Warsaw and Budapest. When spring came in 1945 the Soviet soldiers were engaged in tough fighting round Berlin which they took in battle.

One of the first Western attempts to understand on a deeper level the lessons of the Soviet people's great Patriotic War was Jerome Davis' *Behind Soviet Power* (1946). Its author who witnessed the October Revolution, is a journalist, pedagogue and social worker; he has studied our country for many years on the basis of observations and information he has himself collected. He first came to Russia in 1916 as a worker for the Young Men's Christian Association and stayed until the end of 1918, met Lenin, witnessed the first steps of the Soviet government. Since then he paid frequent visits to our country in the twenties and thirties and from 1943-45, working as a war correspondent, he accompanied Soviet troops through Rumania and Poland.

In the foreword to his book he says: "At the start of the Revolution it seemed apparent to me that the Bolsheviks would retain control, and it was my opinion that Russia would become one of the strongest powers in Europe. . . . When Germany treacherously attacked Russia on June 22, 1941, I publicly predicted that Russia would never be defeated. . . . Later I said that the Red Army would be the first to reach Berlin" And so it all fell out.

Behind Soviet Power is a political and sociological book. Davis analyses various sides and aspects of the life of the Soviet Union and, by the logic of the facts, guides his reader to the just conclusion that the basic condition of victory in the most appalling war the earth has known was socialism, a progressive social order. Davis shows vividly how Russia had profited from the basic socialist reconstruction of her economy. He describes, on the basis of facts and statistics, how greatly over a very few years the industrial might of the country was increased; how, in place of scattered small holdings, the collective and state farms had arisen which, in spite of everything, had proved able to feed the army and the people; how titanic was the growth of Soviet culture, science, technical ability and how monolithic the moral and political unity of Soviet society, how firm the friendship forged between the nations which inhabit the wide spaces of the Soviet Union.

Albert Rhys Williams in his book *The Russians: the Land, the People and Why They Fight*, coined the happy phrase that the Russian secret weapon was the people. Those same Soviet people, who, as Alexander Werth wrote, by bearing on their shoulders the main burden of the war, had saved the lives of millions of Americans and English, were people of a new socialist era.

It would be misleading not to mention the fact that in some of his latest books Werth has proved startlingly inconsistent, contradicting many things he said at the time he was eyewitness to the struggle of the Soviet people against the fascist aggressors. Such a metamorphosis is, alas, something that occurs not infrequently in the West. But there's no arguing with facts, as the saying goes.

And everyone who knew how to look facts in the face naturally paid tribute to the worthy part played by Soviet Communists during the war, which decided the fate of so many generations and countries.

Richard Lauterbach in his book about the Soviet people in arms writes: "The party was everywhere reaching into the depths of the Byelorussian forests to organize guerillas, into Siberian factories to step up production, into the collective farms, into the press, the radio, the army. The Communists had the leadership, the programme and above all, the means. When slogans were needed, they had them by the pamphletful. When a song was needed to improve morale—they had the songs—and stirring ones, too. When a plant urgently required a high priority building material, the party channel was the quickest way around wartime red tape. The party recruited, trained, propagandized. Every day it spoke to millions in *Pravda*, it spoke through the political advisers in the Army and Navy; it spoke through the underground, through trained members who remained behind when the Germans moved in; it cemented the fortress."

Much time has passed since these books which reflect the flame of battle were first published but they still retain the readers' interest.

BORIS GILSON

SOVIET ARTISTS' WORKS ON WAR THEMES

Pyotr Osolins. *Peace to the Peoples*, a poster

Sergei Gerasimov. *A Partisan's Mother*

Solomon Yudovin. *In the Studio (In Blockaded Leningrad)*

Beniamin Basov. An illustration to Mikhail Sholokhov's story *A Man's Lot*

Mikhail Rudakov. An illustration to *The Volokolamsk Highway* by Alexander Bek

Bezhan Shvelidze. *In the Memory of the Heroes*

Mikhail Savitsky. *The Partisan Madonna*

Leonid Ostroushko. *Taking-off*

Justifying Man's Ways to Man

You Shall Be as Gods: A Radical Interpretation of the Old Testament and Its Tradition, by Erich Fromm (Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 240 pp. \$4.95), and *After Auschwitz: Radical Theology and Contemporary Judaism*, by Richard L. Rubenstein (Bobbs-Merrill. 287 pp. \$5.95), consider various aspects of Jewish identity vis-à-vis tradition. Bernard Mandelbaum is president of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America.

By BERNARD MANDELBAUM

GOD IS ALIVE! What is more, after reading what some of His children say about Him these days, He is a patient, loving Father.

Criticism of the volumes under consideration derives from more than a difference of opinion with the authors about the meaning of God. It is difficult to comprehend how two obviously creative and learned people like the psychoanalyst and philosopher Erich Fromm and Richard Rubenstein, a rabbi with a master's degree in Hebrew literature, fail to recognize a basic inconsistency in their position. It has been said: "The sign that tells you which road to take does not necessarily have to walk down the road." However, by the very nature of their enterprise, philosophers and theologians who reason about the relationship between man's thought and behavior have some obligation to relate their own principles to their practices.

It is perplexing, therefore, to find Mr. Fromm beginning his presentation with a plea for a dispassionate, unprejudiced, almost *tabula rasa* examination of what Judaism has to say to contemporary man—" . . . to avoid the danger of picking out some data to support a preconceived thesis"—and then posit the following preconceived assumption: "I wish to make my position clear at the outset . . . God is one of the many different poetic expressions of the highest value in humanism, not a reality in itself." In other words, Fromm starts with his belief that God is dead (or never lived). He then proceeds to portray a Judaism that speaks with great relevance to twentieth-century man who seeks self-understanding and the improvement of society. Fromm's amazing range of authorities for this picture is


drawn from Biblical, rabbinic, and other classical Jewish sources—all of which make the very opposite assumption. Human equality, freedom, life's uncertainties and complexities, the values and goals of existence that Fromm describes so meaningfully derive from views of rabbis, scholars, and philosophers whose wisdom is based on their belief in the reality of a God who is alive.

Actually, Mr. Fromm and the radical thinkers of our day (he uses the term "radical humanism," rather than the "radical theology" label of Mr. Rubenstein) are battling windmills. Their difficulty is the literalness of interpretation of a statement—for example, the sentence with which this review begins. Teachers of the earliest Rabbinic period (through the year 500), Maimonides and other medieval commentators are as critical of a literal, anthropomorphic reading of Scripture as the most sophisticated twentieth-century student of thought. "The Torah (*i.e.*, Bible)," they tell us, "speaks in a language that is understandable to man."

ALL the doubts, questions, uncertainties, changes in the concept of a living God which Fromm and Rubenstein invoke were part of the concern of the most pious. "Seek the Lord when He is to be found."—Isaiah. ". . . indeed there are times when it is difficult to find Him."—Zohar. "Why does the Bible state God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, repeating His name three times? Because each generation finds new meaning in God's reality."—from an eighteenth-century commentary. This is the inevitable lot of finite man seeking to understand an infinite Reality. Nothing has yet been written to compare to Scripture's Job in his blunt questioning of God's justice in a world where good people suffer and the wicked appear to prosper. The dilemma of justifying "God's ways to man," which Rubenstein raises poignantly in *After Auschwitz*, aroused a Milton of the seventeenth century, just as it perplexed wise men of the Roman period who witnessed the animality of men in a coliseum whose "thumbs down" and cheers signaled a gladiator to massacre helpless victims before their very eyes. However, when in doubt, the believer in God makes the assumption of faith in God's reality.

Mr. Rubenstein frequently quotes the

"eloquent, tough, dissenting"
Eliot Fremont-Smith, *New York Times*



" . . . must reading for anyone who would understand the meaning of Vietnam to Americans."

General James M. Gavin

"A brilliant historian presents a perceptive and forthright analysis, offering common sense suggestions, not glib solutions . . ."

General M. B. Ridgway

" . . . should be required reading for any American who wants wisdom, thought, and challenging opinions about Vietnam."

Dean Brellis

\$3.95



HMC

Speak SPANISH in 6-7 weeks!

Sounds impossible?
We GUARANTEE you can do it.

Latest "phrase-burst" method MAKES YOU speak entire phrases the very first day—speak confidently within 2 months or MONEY BACK!

OR . . .
FRENCH,
ITALIAN,
GERMAN,
MODERN
GREEK,
BRAZILIAN-
PORTUGUESE,
JAPANESE,
RUSSIAN

Only \$2⁹⁵ complete

Sure old teaching methods work—but they take too long! That's why thousands of globe-hopping businessmen, vacationers, diplomats, teachers, students now use amazing Cortina "phrase-burst" method. No long strings of unrelated words. No tiresome practice drills. You learn simple "phrase-bursts"—the very phrases you need when traveling abroad. Each takes just seconds to memorize . . . yet in only 6-7 weeks you have a complete conversational command of the language. Now in book form, the complete Cortina language course of your choice is available at all good book stores—or direct by mail from publishers. Send no money. We'll bill you for \$2.95 plus 30c postage and handling. Mail coupon to R. D. Cortina, Co., Dept. 700, 136 W. 52 St. N.Y., N.Y. 10019.

FREE L. P. RECORD
Each book brings you a FREE Cortina "self-correcting" L. P. record. Hear an expert speak the very "phrase-bursts" you're learning.

To your bookseller or mail to:

R. D. CORTINA CO., Dept. 700
136 West 52nd Street
New York, N.Y. 10019

RUSH me the following Cortina language books and bill me \$2.95 for each plus 30c postage and handling. If not satisfied I may return everything within 2 months for a full refund.

Print Name _____
Address _____
City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Check
 Spanish
 French
 Italian
 German
 Modern Greek
 Brazilian-Portuguese
 Japanese
 Russian


C-2B

words of Ivan Karamazov: "If there is no God, all things are permissible." Yet the substitute for a faith in God is not, as Fromm and Rubenstein imply, a demonstrable, scientific, experientially verifiable set of principles. What we find is the substitution of another "faith," with less proof, less authority, and less historicity.

This is particularly evident in *After Auschwitz*, by Richard Rubenstein. In a high point of this volume of essays, the chapter on "The Meaning of Torah in Contemporary Jewish Theology," he writes: "The limitation of Jewish atheism is that it offers no way of actively sharing or participating with other Jews in the wisdom, the aspirations, the remembrances and the insights of earlier generations." Yet Rubenstein fails to follow through with any significant use of these authorities for his own radical theology. His new prophets (he even uses the word "prophet" in reference to them) are Freud, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, Melville. To put it mildly, the following statements of Rubenstein, which would require a volume to refute in detail, are radical, *reductio*, and a sorry substitute for Moses, Isaiah, Rabbi Akiba, and Maimonides: ". . . human freedom is limited the moment the nursing infant is compelled to refrain from utilizing its milk teeth to bite the breast of its mother. . . . For Freud [and, therefore, beyond question] God is the projected superego of the community. . . . Norman Cohn [a minor prophet] has stressed the role of the Jew as the castrating father in the paranoid fantasies of the anti-Semite. . . . Earth is a Mother, but Earth is a cannibal Mother. Sooner or later it consumes what it gives birth to."

Nevertheless, the reader should not be discouraged from reflecting on the significant, and often exciting, contents of these two volumes. Fromm, despite his foundationless structure, gives a vivid description of a living tradition which speaks with great meaning to man in his struggle to feel at home in the world; "to bring man to life again." His extensive footnotes, in particular, contain most erudite and creative interpretations of Jewish thought.

Rubenstein's discussions are superb concerning the differences between Judaism and Christianity in the interpretation of the Messiah; the concept of law; belief versus behavior in contemporary radical theology; the depths of Nazi bestiality and its continuing threat to society; the undeniable reality that two thousand years and more of a living tradition become a part of each of us at birth.



The Mark Fein Case. By William A. Reuben. Dial. \$5. On February 20, 1964, a millionaire Manhattan industrialist was charged with the murder of a bookmaker to whom he allegedly owed \$7,200; he was convicted and sentenced to from thirty years to life, and is now serving his time in Sing Sing Prison. Trial and subsequent proceedings are here examined in close detail. (Did justice miscarry?)

The Verdicts Were Just. Edited by Albert Averbach and Charles Price. Lawyers Coöperative Publishing Company. Distributed by McKay. \$6.95. Eight nationally known trial lawyers here present their "most memorable" cases, with extensive citations of testimony; only two (Eichmann and Chessman) are criminal, the rest civil; all are fascinating.

The Secret Service Story. By Michael Dorman. Delacorte. \$5. This lively account of the work of the nation's oldest law enforcement agency is particularly enlightening and amusing in its treatment of the protection afforded a President's sisters and his cousins and his aunts.

Wolves, Widows and Orphans. By Dan Tyler Moore. World. \$5.95. Here are thirty-five brisk little narratives of con men and other slick operators who capitalize on the something-for-nothing yen we all have. Rules for self-protection are appended.

The February Plan. By James Hall Roberts. Morrow. \$4.95. USAF lieutenant's death brings father to Japan, where details of diabolical plot emerge. Beautifully integrated performance is headed for Hollywood under MGM auspices; novel is also BOMC alternate selection.

Smiling the Boy Fell Dead. By Michael Delving. Scribners. \$3.95. Connecticut manuscript dealer seeking prize item in rural Gloucestershire runs into oddballs, right guys (and gals), and murder; Anglo-American amity abounds (but not all the time.) Delightful. (Come again soon!)

The Terrible Pictures. By Ben Healey. Harper & Row. \$4.50. English artist enjoying working vacation on Côte d'Azur runs into rough stuff, including murder; light-hearted tale is skillfully wrought but accumulation of personnel is mildly bothersome.

Cable Car. By June Drummond. Holt,

Rinehart & Winston. \$4.95. Political turmoil in mountainous area near That Curtain, plus debate over new dam, imperil lives of engineer and his daughter trapped in ski-trolley. Fine suspense piece. Author, a South African, is newcomer to our shores.

Always Kill a Stranger. By Robert L. Fish. Putnam. \$3.95. Captain José Da Silva of Brazilian police moves fast to short-circuit assassination attempt when VIPs gather in Rio; Wilson of U.S. Embassy (still no first name) gets in on act. Moves up to fine climax.

The Eliminator. By Andrew York. Lippincott. \$4.95. Concupiscent hatchet man for British security set-up covers much ground and air (Barbados, Channel Islands); karate is practiced, chess played. Runs the gamut from savage to uproarious.

Death on the Reserve. By Josephine Bell. Macmillan. \$3.95. Retired medico who enjoys playing peeper has chance to show his stuff while holidaying on rugged northwest coast of England; two die. This one simmers rather than boils, but it's thoroughly enjoyable.

The Saint Magazine Reader. Edited by Leslie Charteris and Hans Canteson. Doubleday. \$4.50. Fifteen yarns are assembled in this first collection taken from the youngest of our mystery magazines. The Saint's creator adds entertaining glosses.

Sleuths and Consequences. Edited by Thomas B. Dewey. Simon & Schuster. \$4.95. Despite its corny title, this latest annual short-story anthology by members of the Mystery Writers of America maintains the high standard set by previous volumes.

House of Cards. By Stanley Ellin. Random House. \$5.95. Yank club-fighter in Paris is unwittingly involved with members of secret army that raised hob in Algeria; action moves on to Venice and Rome. Story roars along to a gory and stunning dénouement.

What Should You Know of Dying? By Tobias Wells. Crime Club. \$3.95. Knute Severson, Boston detective (who tells story), looks into refrigerator suffocation of five-year-old boy; attempt on second child brings cases into focus; goldfish-swallowing craze recalled. Holds up nicely. —SERGEANT CUFF.

The 4 Geneva
Conventions of 1949
(1960, 57 pp.)

Documents sur l'activité
dans les camps de
concentration en
Allemagne. (1946)
156 pp.

✓ 1950

Inter arma caritas.
1947 135 pp
un. # 86
4
90

19 Conference CR, New
Delhi, 1957

~~Draft rules for the~~

limitation of the

damages incurred by
civilian population in
time of war.

1956

Neuerscheinungen 1968 - eine bibliographische Auswahl

I. Die Auseinandersetzung mit der Vergangenheit 1933-1945

David Schoenbaum, Die braune Revolution. Eine Sozialgeschichte des Dritten Reiches. Aus dem Amerikanischen. 388 S., 28,-- DM. Verlag Kiepenheuer und Witsch, Köln.

Franz Josef Heyen (Hrsg.), Nationalsozialismus im Alltag. Anhand von 200 Quellen zeitgenössische Dokumente über zwölf Jahre nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft in Deutschland. 370 S., 24,-- DM. Harald Boldt Verlag, Boppard/Rhein.

Horst Ueberhorst, Elite für die Diktatur. Die nationalpolitischen Erziehungsanstalten 1933-1945. Dokumentarbericht. 350 S., 26,80 DM. Leinen. 19,80 DM Paperback. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Hajo Bernett, Nationalsozialistische Leibeserziehung. Eine Dokumentation ihrer Theorie und Organisation. Bd. 1 der Schriftenreihe zur Theorie der Leibeserziehung. 17,60 DM. Verlag Karl Hofmann, Schorndorf.

Hans-Christian Brandenburg, Die Geschichte der HJ. Wege und Irrwege einer Generation. 350 S., 24,-- DM. Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik Berend von Nottbeck, Köln.

Karl-Dietrich Abel, Presselenkung im NS-Staat. Eine Studie zur Geschichte der Publizistik in der nationalsozialistischen Zeit. Veröffentlichung der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin. 176 S., 28,-- DM. Colloquium Verlag, Berlin.

H. Weinkauff/A. Wagner, Die deutsche Justiz und der Nationalsozialismus. Bd. I. (Institut für Zeitgeschichte). Ca. 336 S., 46,-- DM. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart.

Gert Buchheit, Richter in roter Robe. Freisler, Präsident des Volksgerichtshofs. 272 S., 23,-- DM. Paul List Verlag, München.

Peter Thoss, Das subjektive Recht in der gliedschaftlichen Bindung. Zum Verhältnis von Nationalsozialismus und Privatrecht. 208 S., 24,-- DM. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt.

Kuno Bludau, Nationalsozialismus und Genossenschaften. Schriftenreihe des Forschungsinstituts der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Ca. 180 S., ca. 19,80 DM. Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschichte, Hannover.

Dieter Petzina, Autarkiepolitik im Dritten Reich. Der nationalsozialistische Vierjahresplan. Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte. Nr. 16. 204 S., 9,80 DM. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart.

H.S. Hegner, Die Reichskanzlei von 1933-1945. Gang durch 12 Jahre deutscher Politik. 554 S., 8,80 DM Paperback. Societäts-Verlag, Frankfurt.

Hans Adolf Jacobsen, Die nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik 1933-1938. Ca. 800 S., ca. 80,-- DM. Alfred Metzner Verlag, Frankfurt.

Konrad Kwiet, Reichskommissariat Niederlande. Versuch und Scheitern nationalsozialistischer Neuordnung. Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Nr. 17. Ca. 150 S., 9,80 DM. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart.

Friedrich Heer, Der Glaube des Adolf Hitler. Anatomie einer politischen Religiosität. 764 S., 48,-- DM. Bechtle Verlag, München und Eßlingen.

Karl Lange, Hitlers unbeachtete Maximen. "Mein Kampf" und die Öffentlichkeit. 211 S., 9,80 DM Paperback. W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart.

Kurt Halbritter, Adolf Hitlers Mein Kampf. Gezeichneter Kommentar. 240 S., 200 Zeichnungen, 16,80 DM. Verlag Bärmeier und Nickel, Frankfurt.

Jochen von Lang (Hrsg.), Adolf Hitler - Gesichter eines Diktators. 160 S., 120 Fotos, 20,-- DM. Paul Wegner Verlag, Hamburg.

Lew Besymenski, Der Tod des Adolf Hitler. Unbekannte Dokumente aus den Moskauer Archiven. 140 S., 10,-- DM. Paul Wegner Verlag, Hamburg.

Walter Hofer, Die Diktatur Hitlers bis zum Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs. 256 S., 19,50 DM. Akademische Verlagsanstalt Athenaion, Frankfurt.

Edouard Calic, Ohne Maske. Geheimgespräche zwischen Hitler und R. Breiting 1931. 180 S., 12,-- DM. Societäts-Verlag, Frankfurt.

H. Heiber/H.v.Kotze (Hrsg.), Das Schwarze Korps. Faksimile Querschnitt. 208 S., davon 171 ganzseitige Faksimileabdrucke, 24,80 DM. Scherz Verlag, Bern/München/Wien.

Helmut Heiber, Reichsführer!... Briefe an und von Himmler. 288 S., 24,80 DM. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart.

Wilhelm Th. Wulff, Tierkreis und Hakenkreuz. Als Astrologe an Himmlers Hof. 288 S., 24,-- DM. Bertelsmann Sachbuchverlag, Reinhard Mohn, Gütersloh.

J.P. Gallagher, Der Monsignore und der Standartenführer. Aus dem Englischen. 229 S., 18,-- DM. Verlag Styria, Graz /Wien/Köln.

Christian Petry, Studenten aufs Schafott. Die Weiße Rose und ihr Scheitern. 250 S., 14,80 DM. R. Piper Verlag, München.

Gerhart Binder, Irrtum und Widerstand. Die deutschen Katholiken in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Nationalsozialismus. 455 S., 19,80 DM. Verlag J. Pfeiffer, München.

Martin Rock, Christ und Revolution. Widerstandsrecht und Widerstandspflicht. 140 S., 5,80 Paperback. Aktuelle Reihe "Christliches Leben heute". Verlag Winfried-Werk, Augsburg.

Reinhard Dobbert, Das Zeugnis der Kirche für die Juden. Heft 16 der Schriftenreihe "Missionierende Gemeinde". 108 S., 9,80 DM. Lutherisches Verlags-
haus, Berlin.

Harold C. Deutsch, Verschöbung gegen den Krieg. Der Widerstand in den Jahren 1939-1940. Aus dem Amerikanischen. Ca. 450 S., ca. 34,-- DM. Verlag C.H. Beck, München.

Daniel Melnikow, Der 20. Juli 1944. Legende und Wirklichkeit. Aus dem Russischen. 250 S., 14,80 DM Paperback. Paul Wegner Verlag, Hamburg.

Bodo Scheurig, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin. Ein Konservativer gegen Hitler. 288 S., 28,-- DM. Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg und Hamburg.

Ingeborg Drewitz, Leben und Werk von Adam Kuckhoff. Zum 25. Todestag des 1943 hingerichteten Schriftstellers und Widerstandskämpfers. 5,50 DM. Friedenauer Presse in Berlin.

Erhard Frommhold (Hrsg.), Kunst im Widerstand. 470 S. mit 500 Abbildungen. Ca. 78,-- DM. Röderberg Verlag, Frankfurt.

Arnold Paucker, Der jüdische Abwehrkampf gegen Antisemitismus und Nationalsozialismus in den letzten Jahren der Weimarer Republik. 312 S., 25,-- DM. Leibniz-Verlag, Hamburg.

Josef Polák (Hrsg.), Theresienstadt. Aus dem Englischen. Veröffentlicht unter Förderung des Rates der jüdischen Gemeinden in Prag. 344 S., 38,-- DM. Europa Verlag, Wien/Frankfurt/Zürich.

Adolf Rieth, Den Opfern der Gewalt. KZ-Opfermale der europäischen Völker. 32 S. Text, 10 Seiten Abbildungen, 28,-- DM. Verlag Ernst Wasmut, Tübingen.

Dorothee Linn, Das Schicksal der jüdischen Bevölkerung in Memmingen 1933-1945. Ca. 93 S., ca. 7,50 DM. Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart.

Anton Keim, Tagebuch einer jüdischen Gemeinde 1941-43. 112 S., 4,80 DM Paperback. Verlag v.Hase und Koehler, Mainz.

Helmut Genschel, Die Verdrängung der Juden aus der Wirtschaft im Dritten Reich. Göttinger Bausteine zur Geschichtswissenschaft. 338 S., 48,-- DM. Musterschmidt-Verlag, Göttingen/Zürich/Berlin/Frankfurt.

Günter Altner, Weltanschauliche Hintergründe der Rassenlehre des Dritten Reiches. 82 S., 9,80 DM. Theologische Studien im EVZ-Verlag, Zürich.

D. Wagner/G. Tomkowitz, Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer! Der Anschluß Österreichs 1938. 380 S., 25,-- DM. R. Piper + Co. Verlag, München.

Herbert Rosenkranz, Reichskristallnacht. Der 9. November 1938 in Österreich. 60 S., 3,-- DM. Europa Verlag, Wien/Frankfurt/Zürich.

James V. Compton, Hitler und die USA. Die Amerikapolitik des Dritten Reiches. Aus dem Amerikanischen. 288 S., DM 26,--. Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg und Hamburg.

Arthur D. Morse, Die Wasser teilten sich nicht. Die amerikanische Einwanderungspolitik gegenüber den Verfolgten im Dritten Reich. Einleitung von Asher Ben Natan. 362 S., 20,-- DM. Scherz Verlag, Bern/München/Wien.

Nerin E. Gun, Die Stunde der Amerikaner. Die dramatische Befreiung des Konzentrationslagers Dachau. 328 S., 22,-- DM. blick + bild Verlag S. Kappe KG, Velbert.

Max Brusto, Im Schweizer Rettungsboot. Dokumentation über die Judenemigration nach der Schweiz. 146 S., 14,80 DM. Starczewski Verlag, München.

Claude Lévy/Paul Tillard, Der schwarze Donnerstag. Kollaboration und Endlösung in Frankreich. Aus dem Französischen. 224 S., 14,-- DM. Walter Verlag, Freiburg.

Johann Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich. Deutsch-jugoslawische Beziehungen von 1933-1945. Ca. 400 S., ca. 26,-- DM. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart.

Francis L. Carstens, Der Aufstieg des Faschismus in Europa. Bd. 65 der Reihe "nes novae", 305 S., 16,80 DM. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt.

Ernst Nolte, Die Krise des liberalen Systems und die faschistischen Bewegungen. Ca. 480 S., 35,-- DM. R. Piper Verlag, München.

Klaus Peter Hoepke, Die deutsche Rechte und der italienische Faschismus. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien. Bd. 38, 348 S., 48,-- DM. Droste-Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Ernst Nolte, Der Faschismus. Von Mussolini zu Hitler. Schriftenreihe "Mächte und Kräfte unseres Jahrhunderts". 400 S., 64,-- DM. Verlag Kurt Desch, München.

Rudolf Absolon, Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich. Aufbau - Gliederung - Recht - Verwaltung. Insges. 6 Bände, 1. Bd. 1968. Ca. 320 S., 30,-- DM. Harald Boldt Verlag, Boppard/Rhein.

Jürgen Rohwer/Gerhard Hümmelchen, Chronik des Seekrieges 1939-1945. Herausgegeben vom Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung u.v.d. Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte. 464 S., Subskr.Preis (bis 31.3.69) 48,-- DM. Endpreis 56,-- DM. Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg und Hamburg.

Karlheinz Völker (Hrsg.), Dokumente und Dokumentarfotos zur Geschichte der deutschen Luftwaffe. Aus den Geheimakten des Reichswehrministeriums 1919-1933 und des Reichsluftfahrtministeriums 1933-1939. Herausgegeben vom Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt. Ca. 520 S., 32 S. Tafeln, 90,-- DM. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart.

Heinz Bardua, Stuttgart im Luftkrieg 1939-1945. Veröffentlichung des Archivs der Stadt Stuttgart. 300 S., 20,-- DM. Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart.

Hans Umbreit, Der Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich 1940-1944. Militärgeschichtliche Studien, Bd. 7, herausgegeben vom Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt. 396 S., 36,-- DM. Harald Boldt, Verlag, Boppard/Rhein.

Hanson W. Baldwin, Große Schlachten des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Aus dem Amerikanischen. 500 S., 11 Karten, 22,-- DM. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf.

John Toland, Das Finale. Die letzten hundert Tage (des 2. Weltkrieges). Aus dem Amerikanischen. 600 S., 38,-- DM. Droemersch Verlagsanstalt Th. Knauer Nachf., München.

Ernst-Günther Schenk, Wer das Ende sah. Als Arzt beim Totentanz des Dritten Reiches. Ca. 550 S., 25,-- DM. Nicolaische Verlagsbuchhandlung, Herford.

Margret Boveri, Tage des Überlebens. Berlin 1945. 336 S., 19,80 DM. R. Piper + Co. Verlag, München.

Sabine Leibholz-Bonhoeffer, Vergangen - erlebt - überwunden. Schicksale der Familie Bonhoeffer. 232 S., 14,80 DM. Johannes Kiefel Verlag, Wuppertal-Barmen.

Erich Matthias (Hrsg.), Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland. Dokumentation über die sozialdemokratische Emigration. 700 S., 92,-- DM. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Otto Zoff, Tagebücher aus der Emigration 1939-1944. Herausgegeben von Lieselotte Zoff. 290 S., 28,50 DM. Verlag Lambert Schneider, Heidelberg.

Marcel Reich-Ranicki, Die Ungeliebten. Sieben Emigranten. 52 S., 3,50 DM Paperback. Verlag Günther Neske, Pfullingen.

Josef Carl Grund, Der Mann aus Prag. Geschichte des ehemaligen SS-Mannes Scherbe und des Juden Jelinek. Jugendbuch. 224 S., 10,80 DM. Arena Verlag, Würzburg.

Ludwig Marcuse (Hrsg.), War ich ein Nazi? Politik als Anfechtung des Gewissens. 168 S., 16,80 DM. Scherz Verlag, Bern/München/Wien.

Michael Horbach, Gesicht einer Generation. 400 S., 20,-- DM. Verlag Alsatia, Freiburg.

Armin Mohler, Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Von der Läuterung zur Manipulation. Schriftenreihe der Studiengesellschaft für Zeitprobleme. 102 S., 5,-- DM Paperback. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart.

Wilhelm Backhaus, Sind die Deutschen verrückt? Ein Psychogramm der Nation und ihrer Katastrophen. 324 S., 18,-- DM. Gustav Lübbe Verlag, Bergisch-Gladbach.

II. Israel und Judentum / Antisemitismus

David Ben Gurion, Wir und die Nachbarn. Gespräche mit arabischen Führern. Aus dem Hebräischen. 450 S., 28,50 DM. Rainer Wunderlich Verlag Hermann Leins, Tübingen.

David Ben Gurion (Hrsg.), Die Juden in ihrem Land. 392 S., 78,-- DM. Arena Verlag, Würzburg.

Isaac Deutscher, Der israelisch-arabische Konflikt. DM 2,50. Voltaire-Flugschriften, Heinrich Heine Verlag, Frankfurt.

Walter Laqueur, Nahost - Vor dem Sturm. Die Vorgeschichte des Sechstage-Krieges im Juni 1967. 272 S., 19,50 DM. Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt.

Christoph Freiherr von Imhoff, Duell im Mittelmeer. Moskau greift nach dem Nahen und Mittleren Osten. 434 S., 24,-- DM. Rombach Verlag, Freiburg.

Raymond Aron, Zeit des Argwohns. De Gaulle, Israel und die Juden. 210 S., 14,-- DM. S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt.

André Beaufre, Die Suez-Expedition - Analyse eines verlorenen Sieges. Vorwort von Oberstkorpskommandant Ernst Uhlmann. Aus dem Französischen. 240 S., 18,50 DM. Verlag Huber, Frauenfeld/Schweiz; Auslieferung in Deutschland F.A. Brockhaus, Stuttgart.

Günther Wagenlehner, Eskalation im Nahen Osten. Politische und psychologische Hintergründe eines Konfliktes. Schriftenreihe der Studiengesellschaft für Zeitprobleme. Ca. 160 S., ca. 8,-- DM. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart.

Sami Al Joundi, Juden und Araber. Die große Feindschaft. Darstellung des Konflikts aus arabischer Sicht. 212 S., 22,-- DM. Bechtle Verlag, München und Eßlingen.

Kurt Sontheimer (Hrsg.), Israel - Politik - Gesellschaft - Wirtschaft. 364 S., 19,80 DM Paperback. R. Piper Verlag, München.

Georges Friedmann, Das Ende des jüdischen Volkes? Aus dem Französischen. 280 S., 12,80 DM. Rowohlt Verlag, Hamburg-Reinbek.

Stuart Jackmann, Die Affäre Davidson. Ein Gerichtsfall in Jerusalem. 260 S., 18,-- DM. Peter Hammer Verlag, Wuppertal-Barmen.

H.J. Ansel, Spione machen Politik. Der Geheimdienstkrieg im Nahen Osten. Ca. 260 S., ca. 16,80 DM. Iltgau-Verlag, Pfaffenhofen.

Hermann Meier-Cronmeyer, Kibbuzim - Geschichte, Geist, Gestalt. Schriftenreihe des Forschungsinstituts der Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, ca. 250 S., ca. 32,-- DM. Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, Hannover.

Anny Latour, Israel - Gelobtes Land. Idee und Gründung eines Staates. 264 S., 18,-- DM. Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt.

Karl Katz/P.P. Kahane/Magen Broshi, Von Anbeginn. Bildband über Archäologie, Kunst und Manuskripte im Israel-Museum in Jerusalem. 288 S., 214 Abbildungen, 38,-- DM. Verlag Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg.

Hed Wimmer, Das ist Israel. 208 S. mit 160 ganzseitigen Bildtafeln. 18,-- DM. Heinz Moos Verlag, München.

Hanns Reich, Jerusalem. terra magica-Bildband mit einem Vorwort des Jerusalemer Bürgermeisters Teddy Kollek. 104 Bild-, 24 Textseiten. 26,80 DM. Hanns Reich Verlag, München.

Gabriele Rosenthal/Werner Braun, Jerusalem. "Panorama"-Buch, 104 S., mit 40 Farbtafeln, 26,-- DM. Wilhelm Andermann Verlag, München.

Kathleen Kenyon, Jerusalem. Die heilige Stadt von David bis zu den Kreuzzügen. Ausgrabungen 1961-1967. 300 S., 44,-- DM. Gustav Lübbe Verlag, Bergisch-Gladbach.

Willy Guggenheim/Annemarie Meier, Jerusalem. 186 S., 118 Bildtafeln, 28,-- DM. Atlantis-Verlag, Freiburg und Zürich.

Dagmar Nick, Israel - gestern und heute. Eine Dokumentation mit 220 Fotos. 208 S., 19,80 DM. Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, Gütersloh,

Stiasny/Harris, Nazareth. 175 S., 24 Seiten Farbbilder, 29,80 DM. Steyler Verlag, Bonn-St. Augustin.

Alfons Senfter (Hrsg.), Jahves Land. Bildbuch über das Heilige Land. 120 S., 19,80 DM. Christopherus-Verlag, Freiburg.

Gerhard Lisowsky, Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte des jüdischen Volkes. Von Abraham bis Ben Gurion. Ca. 320 S., ca. 26,-- DM. W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart.

Karl Heinrich Rengstorff/Siegfried von Kortzfleisch (Hrsg.), Kirche und Synagoge. Handbuch zur Geschichte von Christen und Juden. 504 S., 56,-- DM. Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart.

Clemens Thoma (Hrsg.), Auf den Trümmern des Tempels. Land und Bund Israels im Dialog zwischen Christen und Juden. 128 S., 10,80 DM. Verlag Herder, Freiburg/Basel/Wien.

Kurt Wilhelm (Hrsg.), Jüdischer Glaube. Eine Auswahl aus zwei Jahrtausenden. 524 S., 17,80 DM. Carl Schünemann Verlag, Bremen.

Johann Michael Schmidt, Die jüdische Apokalyptik. Erforschungen von den Anfängen bis zu den Textfunden von Qumram. 384 S., 44,80 DM. Neukirchener Verlag, Neukirchen-Vluyn.

Hans-Jürgen Hermisson, Studien zur israelitischen Spruchweisheit. 208 S., 24,80 DM. Neukirchener Verlag, Neukirchen-Vluyn.

P.J. Cools (Hrsg.), Geschichte und Religion des Alten Testaments. Aus dem Niederländischen. 352 S., 15,-- DM. Walter Verlag, Freiburg.

Talmud Babylonicum (Codex Hebraicum Monacensis 95). Faksimile-Ausgabe der einzigen erhaltenen Talmud-Handschrift. Lichtdruck in Originalgröße. 1140 S., Subskr.Preis 2.000,-- DM. Süddeutscher Verlag, München.
(In Vorbereitung.)

Die Fünf Bücher der Weisung (Fünf Bücher Moses). Verdeutscht von Martin Buber gemeinsam mit Franz Rosenzweig. Einmalige Sonderausgabe in der Reihe "Die Bücher der Neunzehn". 570 S., 14,80 DM. Jakob Hegner Verlag, Köln.

Max Tau, Auf dem Weg zur Versöhnung. 252 S., 18,-- DM. Verlag Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg.

Werner Schochow, Deutsch-jüdische Geschichtswissenschaft. Einzelveröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin, Bd. 3. 272 S., 48,-- DM. Colloquium Verlag, Berlin.

E.L. Ehrlich, Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland. 2,40 DM. Schwann Verlag, Düsseldorf.

E. Hamburger, Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands. Bd. 1: 1848-1918. Verlag J.B.C. Mohr, Tübingen. 54,-- DM.

Erwin J. David, Wege. Das Leben eines deutschen Juden. 336 S., 19,80 DM. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt.

Marcus Melchior, Oberrabbiner von Kopenhagen, Gelebt und Erlebt. Die glückliche Symbiose zwischen Dänen und Juden. 180 S., 11,80 DM. Verlag Annedore Leber GmbH, Berlin/Frankfurt.

Bruno Kirschner, Deutsche Spottmedaillen auf Juden. Fachpublikation über ein Spezialthema der Numismatik. Herausgegeben von Arie Kindler im Auftrag des Leo-Baeck-Instituts, Tel Aviv. 120 S., ca. 100 Abbildungen, 28,-- DM. Ernst Battenberg Verlag, München.

Rudolf M. Loewenstein, Psychoanalyse des Antisemitismus. 3,-- DM. edition suhrkamp, Bd. 241. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt.

Jenny Aloni, Die silbernen Vögel. Erzählungen einer Israeli. 68 S., 5,80 DM. Staczewski Verlag, München.

Jenny Aloni, Der blühende Busch. Roman über Israel. 372 S., 16,80 DM. Eckart-Verlag, Witten.

Christel Evenari-Eckern, Zitronenbäume und ein Stückchen Meer. Israelische Tagebuchblätter. 164 S., 11,80 DM. Verlag J. Pfeiffer, München.

Ephraim Kishon, Pardon, wir haben gewonnen. Satiren mit Cartoons. 144 S., 9,80 DM. Langen Müller Verlag, München.

Kishons beste Geschichten. Aus dem Englischen von Friedrich Thorberg. Einmalige Sonderausgabe in der Reihe "Die Bücher der Neunzehn". 320 S., 9,80 DM. F.A. Herbig Verlagsbuchhandlung, Berlin/München/Wien.

Ilse Ester Hoffe, Gedichte aus Israel. 48 S., 5,80 DM. Staczewski Verlag, München.

Eva Alexanderson, Ich klage um Jerusalem. Eine Frau erlebt das Heilige Land. Aus dem Schwedischen. 268 S., 19,80 DM. Herder Verlag, Freiburg/Basel/Wien.

Samuel Sandmel, Herodes. Aus den Englischen. 280 S., 18,-- DM. W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart.

Scholem-Alejchem, Tewje, der Milchmann. Aus dem Jiddischen. Bd. 210 der Bibliothek Suhrkamp, 6,80 DM. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt.

Roy McMullen, Marc Chagalls Welt. 268 S., 56 ganzseitige Bilder, 69 Reproduktionen, 92 Dokumentarfotos von Izi. 78,-- DM. Deutschsprachige Lizenzausgabe Chr. Belser Verlag, Stuttgart/Berlin/Zürich.

Max Brod, Das Unzerstörbare. 240 S., 24,80 DM. W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart.

Gertrud Isolani, Der Jünger des Rabbi Jochanan. 98 S., 9,80 DM. Starczewski Verlag, München.

Barbara Specht, Goldregen und Sterne. Roman. Appell an die Jugend zweier Nationen (Israel-Deutschland). 272 S., 16,80 DM. Hestia-Verlag, Bayreuth.

Bengt Holmquist (Hrsg.), Das Buch der Nelly Sachs. Suhrkamp Hausbuch. 400 S., 15,-- DM. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt.

Salcia Landmann, Der jüdische Witz. Vollständig neu bearbeitete und wesentlich ergänzte Ausgabe. 696 S., 24,-- DM. Walter Verlag, Freiburg.

III. Nachkriegsdeutschland/Bundesrepublik/ Auseinandersetzung mit der Jugend

Gerhart Binder, Deutschland seit 1945. Eine dokumentierte Geschichte unserer Zeit. Ca. 700 S., ca. 29,80 DM. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart.

Gerhard Loewenberg, Parlamentarismus im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Aus dem Amerikanischen. 600 S., 35,-- DM Paperback. Rainer Wunderlich Verlag Hermann Leins, Tübingen.

Franz Schneider, Die große Koalition. 112 S., 6,80 DM. Verlag v.Hase + Koehler, Mainz.

Peter Norden, Deutschland - Deine Demokratie. Zusammenfassung aller Statuten und Programme der demokratischen Parteien in der Bundesrepublik und Westberlin. 240 S., 6,80 DM Paperback. Verlag Die Fünf GmbH, München.

Paul Noack, Die deutsche Nachkriegszeit. Deutsche Geschichte von der Kapitulation bis in die Sechzigerjahre. Doppelband der Taschenbuchreihe "Geschichte und Staat". 256 S., 4,80 DM. Günter Olzog Verlag, München.

Werner Sörgel, Konsensus und Interessen. Studie zur Entstehung des Grundgesetzes für die BRD. Ca. 368 S. Frankfurter Studien zur Wissenschaft von der Politik Bd. V. Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart.

Leonhard Froese (Hrsg.), Was soll aus Deutschland werden? Neue Aspekte zur Deutschland-Politik. 295 S., 19,50 DM. Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag, München.

"Menschenwürdige Gesellschaft", Bd. 2: Ordnungsvorstellungen der Sozialisten, Liberalen und Christlichen Demokraten. Taschenbuch der Reihe "Geschichte und Staat". 256 S., 4,80 DM. Günter Olzog Verlag, München.

Wolfgang Schröder, FDP-Bilanz der Jahre 1960-1966. Braucht Deutschland eine liberale Partei? Kölner Schriften zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung. Wison Verlag Michael Wienand, Köln.

Wilhelm Hennis, Große Koalition ohne Ende? Schriftenreihe "Aktuelle Themen bei Piper". 92 S., 6,80 DM. R. Piper Verlag, München.

Elimar Schubbe, Deutschlandpolitik. Grundlagen - Ziele - Taktik - Strategie. Vorwort von Egon Klepsch. Ca. 220 S., ca. 12,80 DM. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart.

Hans Apel, Der deutsche Parlamentarismus. Unreflektierte Bejahung der Demokratie? 260 S., 4,80 DM Paperback. Rowohlt Verlag, Hamburg-Reinbek.

Willy Brandt, Außenpolitik - Deutschlandpolitik - Europapolitik. Grundsätzliche Erklärungen im Auswärtigen Amt. 168 S., 10,-- DM Paperback, 12,50 DM gebunden. Berlin Verlag, Berlin.

Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1959-1963. Fragmente. Ca. 350 S., 24,80 DM. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart.

Rainer Barzel, Gesichtspunkte eines Deutschen. 292 S., 20,-- DM. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Friedrich Henning (Hrsg.), Thomas Dehler. Reden und Aufsätze. Schriftenreihe der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung zur Politik und Zeitgeschichte. 210 S., 9,80 DM Paperback. Westdeutscher Verlag, Leske Verlag, Köln.

Gerhard Jahn/Finck von Finckenstein (Hrsg.), Wandel und Bewährung. Herbert Wehner, Reden und Aufsätze. Ca. 450 S., 25,-- DM. J.H.W. Dietz/Ullstein, Berlin.

Wolfgang Gabler (Hrsg.), Fritz Erler, Politik für Deutschland. Vorwort von Willy Brandt. 647 S., 28,-- DM. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart.

Erhard Eppler, Spannungsfelder. Beiträge zur Politik unserer Zeit. 284 S., 22,-- DM. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart.

Hermann Glaser (Hrsg.), Opposition in der Bundesrepublik. Ein Tagebuch. Das Nürnberger Gespräch 1968. 222 S., 14,-- DM. Verlag Rombach, Freiburg.

Hans Dollinger (Hrsg.), Revolution gegen den Staat? Außerparlamentarische Opposition - die neue Linke. 224 S., 12,80 DM. Scherz Verlag, Bern/München/Wien.

Wolfgang Schwerbrock, Proteste der Jugend. Pennäler, Studiker und ihre Presse. 240 S., 16,-- DM. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Hans Dichgans, Das Unbehagen in der Bundesrepublik. Ist die Demokratie zu Ende? 288 S., 20,-- DM. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Ernst Richter, Die radikale Linke. Von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. Veröffentlichung der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin. 160 S., 14,80 DM. Colloquium Verlag, Berlin.

Ulrich Sonnemann, Institutionalismus und studentische Opposition. edition suhrkamp, Bd. 280, 3,-- DM. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt.

Wilhelm Hennis, Die verantwortliche Universität. Studien zur Hochschulreform. 96 S., 7,80 DM. Paul Wegner Verlag, Hamburg.

Heinz Großmann/Oskar Negt (Hrsg.), Die Auferstehung der Gewalt. Springerblockade und politische Reaktion in der Bundesrepublik. 192 S., 5,-- DM. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt.

Lothar Menne/Claudio Pozzoli (Hrsg.), Internationale der Studenten 1968. Die antikapitalistische Studentenbewegung. 160 S., 5,-- DM. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt.

Reinhard Kahl/Michael Lukas, Die Rebellion der Schüler. Ihre Ursachen und Auswirkungen. 164 S., 5,-- DM. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt.

Eric Ertl, Alle Macht den Räten? Zur Theorie und Praxis der Rätebewegung. Ca. 104 S., 7,-- DM. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt.

H.J. Schoeps/Chr. Dannemann (Hrsg.), Die rebellischen Studenten. Elite der Demokratie oder Vorhut eines linken Faschismus? 172 S., 9,80 DM. Bechtle Verlag, München und Esslingen.

Rolf Bigler, Enteignet Deutschland. Der Aufstand der Studenten. 240 S., 14,80 DM. Verlag Fritz Molden, Wien/München/Zürich.

Fritz Leonhardt, Studentenunruhen. Ursachen - Reformen. Ein Plädoyer für die Jugend. Ca. 160 S., 12,80 DM. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart.

Schönbaum/Runge/Radunski, Die herausgeforderte Demokratie. Deutschlands Studenten zwischen Reform und Revolution. 168 S., 7,80 DM. Verlag v.Hase und Koehler, Mainz.

Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Agitationsmodell für eine Revolution. Sämtliche Reden, Schriften, politische Gespräche. Herausgegeben von Samuel Schirmbeck, 160 S., 6,-- DM. Edition Voltaire im Heinrich Heine Verlag, Frankfurt.

Stefan Reisner (Hrsg.), Briefe an Rudi D. Vorwort von Rudi Dutschke. 5,-- DM. Voltaire Flugschriften, Heinrich Heine Verlag, Frankfurt.

Rudi Dutschke, Zu Protokoll - Fernsehinterview von Günter Gaus. 2,-- DM. Voltaire Flugschriften, Heinrich Heine Verlag, Frankfurt.

Ludwig von Friedeburg u.a., Freie Universität und politisches Potential der Studenten. Über die Entwicklung des Berliner Modells und den Anfang der Studentenbewegung in Deutschland. Ca. 500 S., ca. 19,80 DM Leinen; Studienausgabe 14,80 DM. Luchterhand Verlag, Berlin/Neuwied.

Jürgen Jeziorowski, Studenten im Aufbruch. Motive - Methoden - Modelle. Herausgegeben von der Evang. Zentralstelle für Weltanschauungsfragen. 83 S., 3,50 DM. Kreuz-Verlag, Stuttgart/Berlin.

Nikolaus J. Ryschkowsky, Die linke Linke. Ausgangsposition in der deutschen Linksopposition für die Bundestagswahl 1969. Doppelband der Taschenbuchreihe "Geschichte und Staat". 256 S., 4,80 DM. Günter Olzog Verlag, München.

Hans-Adolf Jacobsen/Hans Dollinger, Die deutschen Studenten. Die Universität zwischen Reform und Revolution. 464 S., 19,80 DM. Verlag Kurt Desch, München.

Walter Rüegg, Die studentische Revolte gegen die bürgerliche Gesellschaft. 24 S., 4,50 DM. Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Erlenbach-Zürich und Stuttgart.

Detlef Claussen/Regine Dermitzel (Hrsg.), Universität und Widerstand. Versuch einer politischen Universität in Frankfurt. 192 S., DM 5,--.

Arno Morenz, Warum sie Deutschland verlassen. Reaktion der jungen kritischen Generation Deutschlands auf die Anziehungskraft der USA. 192 S., 10,-- DM. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Ernst Nolte, Sinn und Widersinn der Demokratisierung in der Universität. 77 S., 5,-- DM. Verlag Rombach, Freiburg.

Walter Tröger, Jugend rebelliert - Was sagen die Erzieher? 208 S., 15,80 DM. Arena Verlag, Würzburg.

Alexander Schwan/Kurt Sonstheimer (Hrsg.), Professoren antworten Studenten. (In Vorbereitung.) Westdeutscher Verlag, Leske Verlag, Köln.

Caspar Freiherr von Schrenck-Notzing, Zukunftsmacher. Die neue Linke in Deutschland und ihre Herkunft. Ca. 400 S., ca. 24,-- DM. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart.

Luise Rinser, Jugend unserer Zeit. 72 S. Text, 80 S. Bilder, 36,-- DM. Echter Verlag, Würzburg.

Karl H. Bönner, Deutschlands Jugend und das Erbe ihrer Väter. Wie skeptisch ist die junge Generation? 232 S., 19,80 DM. Gustav Lübbe Verlag, Bergisch Gladbach.

Hans Maier/Hermann Bott, Die NPD. Struktur und Ideologie einer "nationalen Rechtspartei". Schriftenreihe "Aktuelle Themen bei Piper". 88 S., 6,80 DM. Piper Verlag, München.

Werner Smoydzin, NPD - Partei mit Zukunft? Bd. IIIa der Reihe "Das Dokument". 120 S., 6,80 DM. Iltgau-Verlag, Pfaffenhofen.

Fred H. Richards, Die NPD - Alternative oder Wiederkehr? Kritische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Rechtsradikalismus. Taschenbuch der Reihe "Geschichte und Staat". 160 S., 2,90 DM. Günter Olzog Verlag, München.

Gerd Doerry (Hrsg.), Politische Bildung in der Demokratie. Fritz Borinski zum 65. Geburtstag. 240 S., 20,-- DM. Colloquium Verlag, Berlin.

Manfred Teschner, Politik und Gesellschaft im Unterricht. Eine soziologische Analyse der politischen Bildung. Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie, Bd. 21. 178 S., 13 Tabellen, 20,-- DM kart., 26,-- DM Leinen. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt.

Klaus Liepelt/Alexander Mitscherlich u.a., Thesen zur Wählerfluktuation. Bd. 60 der Reihe "nes novae". 141 S., 16,80 DM. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt.

Thomas von der Vring, Reform oder Manipulation? Zur Diskussion eines neuen Wahlrechts. Bd. 62 der Reihe "nes novae". 316 S., 19,80 DM. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt.

Paul Lücke, Ist Bonn doch Weimar? Der Kampf um das Mehrheitswahlrecht. Ullstein Verlag, Berlin.

Claessens/Klönne/Tschoepe, Sozialkunde in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Einmalige Sonderausgabe "Das moderne Sachbuch". 396 S., 15,-- DM. Eugen Diederichs Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Hans Roth, Besinnung und Verantwortung. Die Sozialpädagogischen Kurse im Christlichen Jugenddorfwerk Deutschlands. 68 S., 5,80 DM. Walter Rau Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Erich Knirck, Die neue Generation. Probleme moderner Bildungsarbeit. 112 S., 9,80 DM. Walter Rau Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Gerlinde Hilgenfeldt u.a., Jugend in Aktion. Zwei Modellversuche. 66 S., 5,40 DM. Walter Rau Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Albrecht Beckel, Staatsbürgerliche Erziehung in Familie, Gruppe und Heim. 84 S., 5,40 DM. Walter Rau Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Erhard Denninger, Polizei in der freiheitlichen Demokratie. 39 S., 5,80 DM. Alfred Metzner Verlag, Frankfurt.

Tonis Hunold, Polizei in Reform. Was Staatsbürger und Polizei voneinander erwarten können. 280 S., 20,-- DM. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Günter Grass, Der Fall Axel C. Springer - am Beispiel Arnold Zweig. Eine Dokumentation. Voltaire Flugschrift, Heinrich Heine Verlag, Frankfurt.

David Schoenbaum, Ein Abgrund von Landesverrat. Die Affäre um den "Spiegel". Aus dem Englischen. 256 S., 18,-- DM. Verlag Fritz Molden, Wien/München/Zürich.

Karl J. Newman, Wer treibt die Bundesrepublik wohin? Aus dem Amerikanischen. 157 S., 8,50 DM. Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln.

Ulrich Sonnemann fragt: Wie frei sind unsere Politiker? Zehn Publizisten antworten. 260 S., 16,-- DM. Kindler Verlag, München.

Hermann Behr, Vom Chaos zum Staat. Männer, die für uns begannen. 1945-1949. 328 S., 18,50 DM. Verlag Frankfurter Bücher, Frankfurt.

Propst Heinrich Grüber, Erinnerungen aus sieben Jahrzehnten. Verlag Kiepenheuer + Witsch, Köln. 432 S., 20,-- DM.

Ernst Lemmer, Manches war doch anders. Erinnerungen eines deutschen Demokraten. 400 S., 24,-- DM. Scheffler Verlag, Frankfurt.

Jürgen Neven-duMont, Zum Beispiel 42 Deutsche. Bericht aus einer deutschen Stadt. 331 S., 12,80 DM. Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung/Verlag Heinrich Ellermann, München.

Daniela Krein/R.P. Koletzko, Adenauer nahe gesehen. Vorwort von David Ben Gurion. 254 S., 18,-- DM. Alsatia Verlag, Freiburg.

Walter Henkels, Lokaltermin in Bonn. Ein Beitrag über Menschliches im Bereich der Politik. 345 S., 22,-- DM. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Josef Müller-Marein, Deutschland im Jahre 1. Panorama 1946-1948. 340 S., 12,80 DM. Paul Wegner Verlag, Hamburg.

Johannes Weidenheim, Mensch, was für eine Zeit oder Eine Laus im deutschen Pelz. Roman unserer Generation aus den ersten Nachkriegsjahren. 445 S., 24,-- DM. Paul List Verlag, München.

José Llompert, S.J., Die Geschichtlichkeit in der Begründung des Rechts im Deutschland der Gegenwart. 210 S., 27,-- DM. Alfred Metzner Verlag, Frankfurt.

IV. Verschiedenes - Grundlagen/Weimar

Ernst Bloch, Widerstand und Friede. Aufsätze zur Politik. edition suhrkamp. Bd. 257. 3,-- DM. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt.

Alfred Kantorowicz, Im 2. Drittel unseres Jahrhunderts. Illusionen, Irrtümer, Widersprüche. Einsichten und Voraussichten. 216 S., 18,-- DM. Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik Berend von Nottbeck, Köln.

Thomas Ellwein, Politik und Planung. Lebendiges Wissen. 87 S., 5,80 DM. W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart.

Wilhelm Wortmann, Demokratie als politische Bewußtseinsbildung. 128 S., 11,50 DM. Verlag Quelle + Meyer, Heidelberg.

Wilhelm Hennis, Politik als praktische Wissenschaft. Aufsätze zur politischen Theorie und Regierungslehre. 270 S., 14,80 DM. R. Piper Verlag, München.

Ernst Nolte, Die Krise des liberalen Systems und die faschistischen Bewegungen. Ca. 480 S., ca. 28,-- DM. R. Piper Verlag, München.

Theodor Ebert, Gewaltfreier Aufstand. Alternativen zum Bürgerkrieg. 408 S., 32,-- DM. Verlag Rombach, Freiburg.

Abendroth/Ridder/Schönfeldt (Hrsg.), KPD - Verbot oder mit den Kommunisten leben? 142 S., 2,20 DM. Rowohlt Verlag, Hamburg-Reinbek.

Johannes Agnoli/Peter Brückner, Die Transformation der Demokratie. 194 S., 12,-- DM. Edition Voltaire im Heinrich Heine Verlag, Frankfurt.

Martin Greiffenhagen/Christian Morys, Über Politik. Deutsche Texte aus zwei Jahrhunderten. 480 S., 24,80 DM. Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart.

Werner Maihofer, Theorie der Demokratie und politische Praxis. 80 S., 5,80 DM. Verlag Günther Neske, Pfullingen.

Hans Buchheim, Aktuelle Krisenpunkte des deutschen Nationalbewußtseins. 66 S., 4,80 DM. Verlag v.Hase + Koehler, Mainz.

Peter Schneider, Pressefreiheit und Staatssicherheit. Zur Klärung der Rechtsverhältnisse und der Verantwortung im Pressewesen. 220 S., 22,-- DM. Verlag v.Hase + Koehler, Mainz.

Rüdiger Altmann, Späte Nachricht vom Staat. Politische Essays. 80 S., 10,-- DM. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart.

Siegfried Thalheimer, Gespräch über Deutschlands Zukunft. 156 S., 7,80 DM. Verlag C.H. Beck, München.

Rolf Seelmann-Eggebert, Die ungedulden Deutschen. Unser Engagement in drei Krisenkontinenten. 160 S., 9,80 DM. Horst Erdmann Verlag, Tübingen und Basel.

Rudolf Augstein, Preußens Friedrich und die Deutschen. 420 S., 20,-- DM. S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt.

Ludwig Freund, Deutschland im Brennpunkt. Die amerikanische Politikwissenschaft und die deutsche Frage. 196 S., 18,-- DM. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart.

Paul Sethe, Ins Wasser geschrieben. Porträts, Profile, Prognosen. 368 S., 22,-- DM. Scheffler Verlag, Frankfurt.

Armin Hermann (Hrsg.), Deutsche Nobelpreisträger. Deutsche Beiträge zur Natur- und Geisteswissenschaft. 173 S., 3 Farbtafeln, 18,-- DM. Heinz Moos Verlag, München.

Hans-Jochen Gamm, Aggression und Friedensfähigkeit in Deutschland. 184 S., 10,80 DM. Paul List Verlag, München.

Rolf Breitenstein, Der häßliche Deutsche. Wir im Spiegel der Welt. 160 S., 9,80 DM. Verlag Kurt Desch, München.

Dieter Groh, Die "vaterlandslosen Gesellen" und das Vaterland. Sozialdemokratie und Staat bis zum Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges. Ca. 400 S., Leinen, 44,-- DM. Paperback 34,50 DM. Rainer Wunderlich Verlag Hermann Leins, Tübingen.

Abraham Ashkenais, Reformpartei und Außenpolitik. Außenpolitik der SPD Berlin-Bonn. 220 S., 25,-- DM. Westdeutscher Verlag, Leske Verlag, Köln.

Karl-Heinrich Schmitz, Anfänge und Entwicklung der Arbeiterbewegung im Raum Düsseldorf. Schriftenreihe des Forschungsinstituts der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 166 S., 19,80 DM. Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, Hannover.

Jörg Schadt, Die Sozialdemokratische Partei in Baden. Von den Anfängen bis zur Jahrhundertwende. Schriftenreihe des Forschungsinstituts der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 220 S., 24,80 DM. Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, Hannover.

Franz F. Wurm, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1848-1948. 400 S., 30,-- DM. Westdeutscher Verlag, Leske Verlag, Köln.

L. Helbig, Imperialismus - das deutsche Beispiel. 138 S., 5,20 DM. Moritz Diesterweg Verlag, Frankfurt/Berlin/Bonn/München.

K.M. Kühner, Nationalismus in Europa. 99 S., 4,40 DM. Verlag Moritz Diesterweg, Frankfurt/Berlin/Bonn/München.

Peter Graf Kielmansegg, Deutschland und der Erste Weltkrieg. "Athenaion-Bibliothek der Geschichte". 742 S., 11 Karten. 59,-- DM. Akademische Verlagsanstalt Athenaion, Frankfurt.

D. Karl-Heinz Janßen, Der Kanzler und der General. Die Führungskrise um Bethmann-Hollweg und Falkenhagen 1914-1916. 332 S., 39,80 DM. Muster-schmidt-Verlag, Göttingen/Zürich/Berlin/Frankfurt.

Anton Mirko Kocktanek, Oswald Spengler in seiner Zeit. Ca. 560 S., 38,-- DM. Verlag C.H. Beck, München.

Ludwig Marcuse, Börne - Aus der Frühzeit der deutschen Demokratie. 20,-- DM. Verlag I.P. Peter, Gebr. Holstein, Rothenburg ob der Tauber.

William R. Manchester, Krupp. Vier Generationen. Biographie. 800 S., 29,80 DM. Kindler Verlag, München.

Alois Friedel, Deutsche Staatssymbole. Herkunft und Bedeutung der politischen Symbolik in Deutschland. Ca. 144 S., 19,80 DM. Athenäum Verlag, Frankfurt/Bonn.

Werner Kraft, Franz Kafka. Durchdringung und Geheimnis. Bd. 211 der Bibliothek Suhrkamp. 6,80 DM. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt.

Manfred Durzak, Hermann Broch. Der Dichter in seiner Zeit. 234 S., 16,80 DM. W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart.

Max Brod, Prager Tagblatt. Roman einer Redaktion. Taschenbuch Bd. 862, Fischer Bücherei, Frankfurt.

Sigurd von Ilseman, Der Kaiser in Holland. Aufzeichnungen des letzten Flügeladjutanten Kaiser Wilhelms II. Bd. II: Monarchie und Nationalismus. 1924-1941. 366 S., 25,-- DM. Biederstein Verlag, München.

Karl-Dietrich Erdmann/Wolfgang Mommsen, Akten der Reichskanzlei 1919-1938. Gesamtwerk von 20 Bänden. Erster Band Herbst 1968: Das Kabinett Cuno. November 1922 bis August 1923. Bearbeitet von Karl-Heinz Harbeck. 800 S., 60,-- DM. Harald Boldt Verlag, Boppard.

Ernst Deuerlein, Deutsche Kanzler von Bismarck bis Hitler. 496 S., 26,80 DM. Paul List Verlag, München.

Hans Peter Bleuel, Deutschlands Bekenner. Professoren zwischen Kaiserreichen und Diktatur. 288 S., 19,80 DM. Scherz Verlag, Bern/München/Wien.

Kurt Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik. Studienausgabe mit einem Ergänzungsteil: Antidemokratisches Denken in der Bundesrepublik. 363 S., 17,-- DM. Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, München.

Hans Limmer, Die deutsche Gewerkschaftsbewegung. Überblick über mehr als 125 Jahre gewerkschaftlichen Wollens und Wirkens. Taschenbuch der Reihe "Geschichte und Staat". 160 S., 2,90 DM. Günter Olzog Verlag, München.

Karl Kautsky, Texte zu den Programmen der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1891-1925. 340 S., 15,80 DM. Jakob Hegner Verlag, Köln.

Hugo Eckert, Liberal- oder Sozialdemokratie. Frühgeschichte der Nürnberger Arbeiterbewegung. "Industrielle Welt", Bd. 9. ca. 288 S., ca. 34,-- DM. Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart.

Friedrich Andrea/Sybil Gräfin Schönfeldt (Hrsg.), Demokratie von Bebel bis Heuss. Geschichte in Lebensbildern. Taschenbuch Nr. 936, Fischer-Bücherei, Frankfurt.

Hugo Sinzheimer/Ernst Fraenkel, Die Justiz in der Weimarer Republik. Eine Chronik. 488 S., 38,-- DM Leinen, Studienausgabe 28,-- DM. Luchterhand Verlag, Berlin/Neuwied.

Werner Conze/Hans Raupach (Hrsg.), Die Staats- und Wirtschaftskrise des Deutschen Reiches 1929/33. Industrielle Welt, Bd. 8. 255 S., 24,-- DM. Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart.

Arno Scholz/Walther G. Oschilewski (Hrsg.), Ein großes Vorbild. Paul Löbe zum Gedächtnis. 60 S., 16,80 DM. arani Verlags-GmbH, Berlin.

Erich Matthias/Susanne Müller (Hrsg.), Die Regierung der Volksbeauftragten. Protokolle der revolutionären Übergangsregierung vom 9. November 1918. Schriftenreihe "Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien", Bd. 6, zwei Halbbände, zus. ca. 1000 S., 98,-- DM. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Golo Mann und Andreas Burckhardt, Prinz Max von Baden: Erinnerungen und Dokumente. Neuherausgabe nach 40 Jahren. 704 S., 37,50 DM. Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart.

Hagen Schulze, Freikorps und Republik 1918-1920. Militärgeschichtliche Studien, Bd. 8, herausgeb. vom Militärgeschichtl. Forschungsamt. 400 S., 36,-- DM. Harald Boldt Verlag, Boppard.

Peter Bucher, Der Reichswehrprozeß. Der Hochverrat der Ulmer Reichswehr-offiziere 1929/30. Militärgeschichtliche Studien, Bd. 4, herausgeg. vom Militärgeschichtl. Forschungsamt. 608 S., 38,-- DM. Harald Boldt Verlag, Boppard.

Ernst Nickisch, Die Legende von der Weimarer Republik. 240 S., 20,-- DM. Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik Berend von Nottbek, Köln.

Hjalmar Schaft, 1933. Wie eine Demokratie stirbt. 170 S., 16,-- DM. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Franz von Papen, Vom Scheitern einer Demokratie. Die letzten Jahre der Weimarer Republik von 1930/33. 408 S., 25,-- DM. Verlag v. Hase + Koehler, Mainz.

Treviranus, Das Ende von Weimar. Heinrich Brüning und seine Zeit. 450 S., 25,-- DM. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf.

Ernst Deuerlein, Der Aufstieg der NSDAP 1919-1933 in Augenzeugenberichten. 464 S., 24,80 DM. Karl Rauch Verlag, München.

Theodor Heuss, Hitlers Weg. Eine Schrift aus dem Jahre 1932. Veröffentlichung des Theodor-Heuss-Archivs, Stuttgart. 280 S., 19,80 DM. Rainer Wunderlich Verlag Hermann Leins, Tübingen.

Wilhelm Hegner, Der politische Radikalismus in Deutschland 1919-1933. Taschenbuch der Reihe "Geschichte und Staat". 256 S., 4,80 DM. Günter Olzog Verlag, München.

Heinrich Brüning, Reden und Aufsätze eines deutschen Staatsmannes. Herausgeg. von Wilhelm Vernekehl. 385 S., 19,80 DM. Verlag Regensburg, Münster.

Hermann Pünder, Von Preußen nach Europa. Lebenserinnerungen. Ca. 350 S., ca. 32,-- DM. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart.

Karlheinz Dederke, Reich und Republik. Deutschland 1917-1933. Ca. 280 S., 14,-- DM. Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart.

Eine Analyse der deutschen Buchproduktion

Ein Bericht aus "Wirtschaftsblätter Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft",
16. Jahrgang, Nr. 9.

Mit 30.683 Titeln wurde im Jahre 1967 in der Bundesrepublik einschließlich Berlin (West) die höchste Zahl an veröffentlichten Titeln innerhalb eines Jahres seit 1951, dem ersten Jahr nach dem Krieg, in dem die Titelproduktion wieder registriert wurde, vorgelegt. Gegenüber dem genannten Ausgangsjahr hat sich damit die Jahres-Titelproduktion mehr als verdoppelt (1951 = 14.094 Titel).

INSTITUT FÜR POLITISCHE WISSENSCHAFT
AN DER FREIEN UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN

-Akad.Rat Dr. J.Fijalkowski-

Wilmersdorf
1/ ~~BERLIN-DAMM~~ ~~BERLIN-DAMM~~ 31
~~GELFERTSSTASSE 11~~
~~TELEFON 762782 765261~~
Babelsberger Str. 14
12. April 1967 Fi/Gr

Herrn

Professor John H.E Fried
55 East 86 Street
New York, NY 10028/USA

Sehr geehrter Herr Professor Fried:

Ihr an Herrn Prof. Brachers Adresse in Berlin, Institut für politische Wissenschaft, gerichteter Brief vom 20. März 1967 war zunächst von uns an Prof. Bracher, der sich seit Jahren nicht mehr im Institut sondern an der Universität Bonn befindet, weitergeleitet worden und ist jetzt von Prof. Bracher an uns zurückgeschickt worden, da Sie Ihren Besuch in Berlin ankündigen.

Zur Sache selbst darf ich Ihnen mitteilen, daß seit dem Ausscheiden Herrn Brachers und Herrn Prof. Sauers, der jetzt an der University of Berkeley ist, im Institut sich niemand mehr mit dem Sie interessierenden Thema des Kriegsrechts und der Kriegsverbrecherprozesse beschäftigt hat oder beschäftigt. Unsere Bibliothek enthält zwar eine kleinere Sammlung von Titeln, die zum Thema interessant sein könnten. Eine Aufstellung darüber füge ich Ihnen bei. Größere Sammlungen von Materialien dürfen sich jedoch in der Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte in Stuttgart, bei der Wiener Library in London und beim Institut für Zeitgeschichte in München befinden.

Unter diesen Umständen werden Sie selbst am besten ermessen können, ob sich ein Besuch für Sie in unserem Institut lohnt.

In der Hoffnung, daß Ihnen diese Hinweise nützlich sind,

verbleibe ich

mit besten Grüßen

Ihr ergebener

J. Fijalkowski
(Dr. Jürgen Fijalkowski)

Anlage



STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
COLLEGE OF EDUCATION
ALBANY 3

Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland. Ihre Eingliederung und ihr
Einfluss auf Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik & Geistesleben.

herg. von Eugen Lemberg - Friedr. Edding.
in Verbindung mit Max Hildebrand Boehm-Karl Heinz
Gehrmann - Alfred Karasek-Langer

3 bde.

Ferd. Hirt, Kiel, 1959.

printed on p.: Ueberreich vom Bdsmin.fuer
Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge ' Kriegsgesiedigte .

New Books I

GERMANY

Bröss, Werner : **Gespräche mit Hermann Göring während des Nürnberger Prozesses.** Flensburg : Christian Wolff, 1950. 316 pp., illus.—Stenographic notes of talks between Göring and the assistant to Dr. Stahmer, Göring's defence counsel.

Defence in the Cold War. The task for the free world. A report by a Chatham House Study Group. London : Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950. 123 pp. ("The role of the Germans" : pp. 78-92).

Eckardt, Hans von, ed. : **Politisches Lesebuch. Schriften und Dokumente aus Geschichte und Politik.** Stuttgart : Hans E. Günther, 1948. 344 pp.—An anthology of excerpts from—mainly German—documents, letters and literature, on ethics, politics, the state, freedom of expression, etc.

Germany, 1947-1949. The Story in Documents. Washington : Dept. of State (1949). 631 pp.—American policy towards Germany, and pertinent developments in Germany, including questions of Denazification, War Crimes, Prisoners of War and DPs, Berlin Crisis, Restitution, Education Reform, Restoration of religious freedom, etc.

Görlitz, Walter : **Der Deutsche Generalstab. Geschichte und Gestalt 1657-1945.** Frankfurt a.M. : Verlag der Frankfurter Hefte, 1950. 708 pp., plus tables.

Grimm, Hans : **Die Erzbischofsschrift. Antwort eines Deutschen.** Göttingen : Plesse-Verlag, 1950. 232 pp. (see p. 28.)

Grimm, Hans : **Rückblick.** Göttingen : Plesse-Verlag, 1950. 37 pp., front. port.—Personal reminiscences.

Hartlaub, Felix : **Von unten gesehen. Impressionen und Aufzeichnungen des Obergefreiten Felix Hartlaub,** hrsg. von Geno Hartlaub. Stuttgart : Koehler, 1950. 156 pp.—Secretly recorded impressions of a young historian, employed as a minor official in the German General Staff and later in Hitler's headquarters.

Hedin, Sven : **Ohne Auftrag in Berlin.** Buenos Aires : Dürer Verlag, 1949. 283 pp., front. port.— Cf. *Wiener Library Bulletin*, vol. IV, No. 2, p. 19 : Notes on the Dürer Verlag.

Heusinger, Adolf : **Befehl im Widerstreit. Schicksalsstunden der deutschen Armee 1923-1945.** Tübingen : Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1950. 396 pp., map.—Chronology of fateful hours of the German Army, presented in the form of dramatized talks.

Howard, Elizabeth : **Barriers Down. Notes on Post-War Germany.** London : Friends Home Service Committee, 1950. 111 pp.—The story of the refugee "rest home" maintained by the Friends Committee.

Jugend unterm Schicksal. Lebensberichte junger Deutscher, 1946-1949. Ausgewählt und herausgegeben von Kurt Hass. Hamburg : Chr. Wegner, 1950. 244 pp.—Selections from life stories of German boys and girls written at their matriculation.

Kürschners Deutscher Gelehrten-Kalender, 1950. Berlin : Walter de Gruyter, 1950. 2534 pp.—The first post-war edition.

Lemberg, Eugen : **Die Ausweisung als Schicksal und Aufgabe. Zur Soziologie und Ideologie der Ostvertriebenen.** Gräfeling nr. München : Gans, 1949. 67 pp.

Tana, Peter, and Scholz, Oscar : **Luftbrücke Berlin. Ein dokumentarisches Bildbuch.** Berlin : Arani-Verlag, 1950. 116 pp., illus.

Rauschnig, Hermann : **Deutschland zwischen West und Ost.** Hamburg : Christian Verlag, 1950. 290 pp.

Rave, Paul Ortwin : **Kunstdiktatur im Dritten Reich.** Hamburg : Mann, 1949. 95 pp., illus.—The Nazi war against Jewish and "degenerate" art and artists, and the looting of art treasures.

Schäfer, Emil : **Von Potsdam bis Bonn. Fünf Jahre deutsche Nachkriegsgeschichte.** Porträt, Zeittafel und Dokumentation 1945-1950. Lehr : Moritz Schauenburg, 1950. 239 pp.

Schreiber, Georg : **Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur. Persönliche Erinnerungen an die Politik und Kultur des Reiches (1919-1944).** Münster : Verlag Regensberg, 1949. 149 pp.—The greater part of the book is devoted to the politics of the Weimar Republic.

Schröder, Gustav : **Heimatlos auf hoher See.** Berlin-Charlottenburg. Beckerdruck, 1949. 47 pp., illus.—Journey of the refugee ship "St. Louis" (1939).

Settel, Arthur, ed. : **This is Germany.** New York : Sloane, 1950. 429 pp.—A symposium by distinguished journalists and correspondents.

Wilmowsky, Tilo Freiherr von : **Warum wurde Krupp verurteilt? Legende und Justizirrtum.** Stuttgart : Vorwerk, 1950. 224 pp., illus.—The author considers Krupp's conviction at Nuremberg a miscarriage of judgment.

PERSECUTION, TERROR AND RESISTANCE

Behrend-Rosenfeld, Else R. : **Ich stand nicht allein. Erlebnisse einer Jüdin in Deutschland, 1933-1944.** Hamburg : Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1949. 301 pp.—German edition of a book previously published in Switzerland under the title "Verfehmt und verfolgt."

Boder, David P. : **I did not interview the Dead.** Urbana : University of Illinois Press, 1949. 220 pp.—Verbatim transcriptions of the narratives of eight displaced persons, interviewed by Dr. Boder, a Professor of Psychology, relating their experiences in German concentration camps.

Brand, George, ed. : **The Velpke Baby Home Trial. Trial of Heinrich Gerike, Georg Hessling, Werner Noth, Hermann Müller, Gustav Claus, Richard Demmerich, Fritz Flint, Valentina Billen.** London : Hodge & Co., 1950. 356 pp. ("War Crimes Trials," vol. VII. General editor Sir David Maxwell Fyfe.)

International Tracing Service : Catalogue of Camps and Prisons in Germany and German-occupied territories, September 1, 1939-May 8, 1945. Arolsen : I.T.S. Records Branch, 1949-50. 2 vols., maps, charts.

Krakauer, Max : **Lichter im Dunkel.** Stuttgart : Behrendt-Verlag, 1947. 131 pp.—Underground life and survival of a Jewish couple in Nazi Germany through continuous help—under peril of death—by decent Germans.

Our Destruction in Pictures. Collected and edited by Rafael Olevski—Dawid Rosental—Paul Trepmann. Bergen-Belsen : Publ. by *Our Voice* under the auspices of the Central Committee of the Liberated Jews in the British Zone, 1946. 38 pp.—Introduction and captions in Yiddish, English and German.

Philipp, Berthie : **Die Todgeweihten, Roman um Theresienstadt.** Hamburg : Morawe & Scheffelt, 1949. 447 pp.

Strobel, Ferdinand : **Christliche Bewährung, Dokumente des Widerstandes der katholischen Kirche in Deutschland, 1933-1945.** Olten : Otto Walter, 1946. 326 pp.—With list of documents and short bibliography.

Torberg, Friedrich : **Hier bin ich, mein Vater.** Stockholm : Bermann-Fischer, 1948. 348 pp.—A novel about the conflict of a young Viennese Jew, faced with the possibility of rescuing his father from Dachau by spying on fellow-Jews for the Nazis.

LAW

Foreign Office : Manual of German Law. Vol. I : General introduction, civil and commercial law. London : H.M.S.O., 1950. 297 pp.—The editor and main contributor, Dr. E. J. Cohn, stresses in his preface that "the work is mainly confined to describing the law in force in 1948, throughout the British Zone."

Godin : **Kommentar zum Rückerstattungsgesetz., U. S. Zone.** Berlin : de Gruyter, 1948. 318 pp.

Heyland, Carl : **Widerstandsrecht des Volkes gegen Verfassungswidrige Ausübung der Staatsgewalt im neuen deutschen Verfassungrecht.** Tübingen : J. C. B. Mohr, 1950. 123 pp.

Lautherpacht, Hersch : **International Law and Human Rights.** London : Stevens, 1950. 475 pp.

Mangoldt, Hermann v. : **Das Bonner Grundgesetz. Kommentar. I. Lieferung.** Berlin and Frankfurt : Verlag für Rechtswissenschaft vorm. Franz Vahlen, 1950. 123 pp.

Nadolny, R. : **Völkerrecht und deutscher Friede.** Hamburg : Hans von Hugo, 1949. 151 pp.

WORLD WAR II.

Bentwich, Norman : **I Understand the Risks. The Story of the Refugees from Nazi Oppression who Fought in the British Forces in the World War.** London : Gollancz, 1950. 192 pp.

Best, Captain S. Payne : **The Venlo Incident.** London : Hutchinson, 1950. 260 pp., illus.—The kidnapping of two British Intelligence officers (Captains Best and Stevens) at the Dutch-German frontier in November 1939, and the author's subsequent experiences in German concentration camps.

Bor-Komorowski, T. : **The Secret Army.** London : Gollancz, 1950. 407 pp., front. port., maps.—The story of Polish resistance to German occupation, culminating in the Warsaw rising, told by the late commander-in-chief of the Polish home army.

Choltitz, von : **—brennt paris? adolf hitler—. Tatsachenbericht des letzten deutschen Befehlshabers in Paris.** Mannheim : UNA Weltbücherei, 1950. 101 pp.—How the last German commander in Paris disobeyed Hitler's orders to destroy the French capital.

Dunand, Georges : **Ne perdez pas leur trace! Neuchatel (Switzerland) Ed. de la Baconnière, 1950. 244 pp.—Efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross on behalf of partisans and Jews in Slovakia towards the end of the Second World War.**

Flicke, W. F. : **Die Rote Kapelle.** Hilden/Rhein : Vier-Brücken-Verlag, 1949. 377 pp.—An exciting account of the German counter measures against a widespread net of secret wireless transmitters (working under the name of "Rote Kapelle") in Germany and German-occupied Western Europe.

Kleist, Peter : **Zwischen Hitler und Stalin, 1939-1945. Aufzeichnungen.** Bonn : Athenäum-Verlag, 1950. 344 pp. With appendix of documents.—The bid for German-Russian friendship, 1939-41 ; Germany as an occupying power, 1941-45 ; Russian peace feelers, 1943-45.

Leahy, William D. : **I was there. The personal story of the chief of staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, based on his notes and diaries.** . . . With a foreword by President Truman. London : Gollancz, 1950. 592 pp., front.

Machjiewicz, Josef : **Katyn—ungesühntes Verbrechen.** Zurich : Thomas Verlag, 1949. 222 pp.—Personal investigations and secret Polish Government documents suggest that the Katyn massacre (1943) was the work of the Russians.

Moyzisch, L. C. : **Operation Cicero. With a postscript by Franz von Papen.** London : Wingate, 1950. 208 pp.

Rossi, A. : **The Russo-German Alliance, August 1939-June 1941.** London : Chapman & Hall, 1950. 218 pp.

South African Jews in World War II. Published by the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, Johannesburg, 1950. 189 pp., illus.

Strölin, Karl : **Stuttgart in Endstadium des Krieges.** Stuttgart : Vorwerk, 1950. 68 pp.—By the former Nazi Mayor of the city.

Thorwald, Jürgen : **Es begann an der Weichsel.** Stuttgart : Steingrüben-Verlag, 1950. 352 pp.

Toepke, Günter : **Stalingrad wie es wirklich war.** Stade : Kogge-Verlag, 1949. 140 pp., maps.

Westphal, Siegfried : **Heer in Fesseln. Aus den Papieren des Stabschefs von Rommel, Kesselring und Rundstedt.** Bonn : Athenäum-Verlag, 1950. 332 pp.—A professional German soldier looks at events leading to the downfall of the Third Reich.

FRANCE

Abetz, Otto : **D'une Prison. Précédé du Procès Abetz vu par Jean Bernard-Derosne. Suivi des principales dépositions, du réquisitoire et de la plaidoirie de M. René Floriot.** Paris : Amiot-Dumont, 1949. 313 pp.

Bouthillier, Yves : **Le Drame de Vichy. I : Face à l'ennemi, face à l'allié.** Paris : Plon, 1950. 320 pp.—The author was Minister of Finance in the Vichy Government.

Isorni, Jacques and Lemaire, Jean : **Requêt en révision pour Philippe Pétain, Maréchal de France.** Paris : Flammarion, 1950. 246 pp.

Marek, F. : **Frankreich von der dritten zur vierten Republik.** Wien : Stern-Verlag, 1947. 216 pp.

Göring

Supreme orders

Heusinger

Abetz

Pétain

New Books II

PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

- Civil Rights in the United States in 1949. A Balance Sheet of Group Relations.** Published by the American Jewish Congress and the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People. New York. 1950. 71 pp.
- Davis, Jerome: **Character Assassination.** New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. 259 pp.—An analysis of discrimination against individuals and groups in the U.S.
- Fatton, Paul: **Das Rassenproblem in Südafrika.** Zurich: Wanderer-Verlag, 1950. 16 pp. (Reprint from *Evangelisches Missionsmagazin*).
- Forster, Arnold: **A Measure of Freedom.** New York: Doubleday, 1950. 256 pp.—An Anti-Defamation League Report on prejudice and intolerance in the U.S.
- Gibbs, Henry: **Twilight in South Africa.** London: Jarrolds (1949). 288 pp., illus.—The author's experiences in South Africa during a three months' visit describing problems arising out of the Malan Government's policy of "Apartheid."
- Hay, Malcolm: **The Foot of Pride. The Pressure of Christendom on the People of Israel for 1900 Years.** Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950. 352 pp., bibliog.
- Scott, Michael: **Shadow over Africa.** With an introduction by Tom Driberg, M.P. The Union of Democratic Control. London, 1950. 25 pp.—A statement by the champion of the S.W. African tribes to the Fourth Committee of the UN on November 26, 1949.
- Ussher, Arland: **The Magic People.** London: Gollancz, 1950. 158 pp.—An Irish author's overgrown "essay on the Jews," denouncing anti-semitism.

JUDAICA

- Cohen, Israel: **Contemporary Jewry. A Survey of social, cultural, economic and political conditions.** London: Methuen, 1950. 410 pp., diagr.
- Frisch, Daniel: **On the Road to Zion, Selected Writings.** New York: Zionist Organization of America, 1950. 240 pp., front. port.—By the late President of the Z.O.A.
- Roth, Cecil: **The Great Synagogue, London, 1690-1940.** London: Goldston, 1950. 311 pp., illus.
- Stern, Selma: **The Court Jew. A Contribution to the History of the period of Absolutism in Central Europe.** Transl. by Ralph Weiman. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1950. 312 pp.
- YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science,** vol. IV, 1949. New York: Yiddish Scientific Institute, 1949. 312 pp.

MIDDLE EAST

- Abdullah, King of Transjordan: **Memoirs.** Ed. by Philip P. Graves, with an introduction by R. J. C. Broadhurst. London: Cape, 1950. 278 pp., front.
- Bloomfield, Bernard M.: **Israel Diary.** New York: Crown Publ., 1950. 182 pp., illus., map.—Personal impressions and discussions, March-May 1949.
- Brod, Max: **Unambo, Roman aus dem jüdisch-arabischen Krieg.** Zurich: Steinberg Verlag, 1949. 302 pp.
- Dunner, Joseph: **The Republic of Israel. Its History and Its Promise.** New York: Whittlesey House, 1950. 269 pp., illus., map.—Part I: Historical development; Part II: The Government of Israel; Part III: Israel in World Affairs.
- Hyamson, Albert M.: **Palestine under the Mandate, 1920-1948.** London: Methuen, 1950. 210 pp.
- Israel. Documents, Facts and Figures.** London: The Diplomatic Press and Publ. Co., 1950. 48 pp., maps.—A booklet in the series "International Studies."
- Kimche, Jon: **Seven Fallen Pillars. The Middle East, 1915-1950.** London: Secker & Warburg, 1950. 326 pp., illus.—Strongly criticising British Middle Eastern policies.
- Magil, A. B.: **Israel in Crisis.** New York: International Publ., 1950. 224 pp.—Plea for a fight against "Anglo-American imperialist interests in Israel," and for "Co-operation with the Soviet Union."
- (The) Middle East. **A political and economic survey.** London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950. 496 pp., map, bibliography.—An analysis by a group of experts.
- (The) Middle East, 1950. **A survey and directory of countries of the Middle East, compiled by the publishers in collaboration with the Intelligence Unit of The Economist.** London: Europa Publications, 1950. 375 pp., maps, charts.—Includes a "Who's Who in the Middle East."
- Pearlman, Moshe: **The Army of Israel.** New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. 256 pp., illus., maps.

BIOGRAPHY

- Eckener, Hugo: **Im Zeppelin über Länder und Meere. Erlebnisse und Erinnerungen.** Flensburg: Chr. Wolff, 1949. 566 pp., illus.—With a chapter "Begegnung mit Hitler und der NSDAP. 1929-1939." pp. 439-502.
- Eucken-Erdsiek, Edith: **Grösse und Wahn. Drei Essays über Friedrich II. Napoleon I. Hitler.** Tübingen: Laupp'sche Buchhandlung, 1950. 209 pp.—A philosophical and psychological approach to the lives and actions of three dictators.
- Hindus, Milton: **The crippled giant. A bizarre adventure in contemporary letters.** New York: Boar's Head Books, 1950. 158 pp.—A study on Louis Ferdinand Céline.

- Proskauer, Joseph M.: **A Segment of my Times.** New York: Farrar, Straus & Co., 1950. 270 pp.—Great events recounted by the President of the American Jewish Committee, 1943-1949.
- Reuter, Ernst: **Ein Leben für Freiheit und Sozialismus.** Berlin: Arani Verlag, 1949. 108 pp., illus.—Collection of speeches and writings by W. Berlin's Lord Mayor, with a biographical introduction by Eduard Reuter.
- Samuel, Maurice: **The Gentleman and the Jew.** New York: Knopf, 1950. 325 pp.—Autobiography.
- Strauss, Richard: **Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen. Gedrucktes und Ungedrucktes aus den Jahren 1892-1948.** Ed. by W. Schun. Zurich: Atlantis Musikbücherei, 1949. 206 pp.
- Weber, Marianne: **Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild.** Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1950. 780 pp., front., port.
- Weizsäcker, Ernst von: **Erinnerungen.** München: Paul List, 1950. 391 pp., front. port.—Memoirs of the late Permanent Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office.
- Weygand, General: **Mémoires. Rappelé au service.** Paris: Flammarion, 1950. 600 pp.—With appendix of documents and maps.
- Willstätter, Richard: **Aus meinem Leben. Von Arbeit, Musse und Freunden.** Hrsg. von Arthur Stoll. Weinheim (Bergstrasse): Verlag Chemie, 1949. 453 pp., illus.—Memoirs of the great German-Jewish scientist, winner of the 1915 Nobel Prize for Chemistry.

MISCELLANEOUS

- Freedom of Information. A Compilation. Vol. 1: Comments of Governments.** New York: U.N. Department of Social Affairs, 1950. 271 pp.
- Jerrig F. O.: **Aus Breslau wurde Wroclaw.** Hanover: W. Kwiecinski, 1949. 59 pp., illus., maps.
- Leverkuhn, Paul, ed.: **Wirtschaftliche Bestimmungen in Friedensverträgen.** Hamburg: Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1948. 303 pp. "Hamburger Beiträge zu völkerrechtlichen Tagesfragen."
- Lipper, Elinor: **Elf Jahre in sowjetischen Gefängnissen und Lagern.** Zürich: Oprecht, 1950. 278 pp.
- Mosley, Oswald: **The European Situation. The Third Force.** Mosley Publications. Ramsbury, Wilts. March 1950. 18 pp.—As part of British Fascist propaganda, this pamphlet was also published in German under the title "Rettung des Abendlands. Die Dritte Macht."
- Schacht, Hjalmar: **Gold for Europe.** London: Duckworth, 1950. 126 pp.—A translation, by Edgar Stern-Rubarth, of Dr. Schacht's economic proposals published in Hamburg in 1949 under the title "Mehr Geld, Mehr Kapital, Mehr Arbeit."
- Sörensen, Hanno: **Finale Rumänien. Die Tragödie der 750,000 Kriegsgefangenen.** Berlin-Grünwald: Arani Verlag, 1949. 52 pp.—The fate of Germans in Rumania and Bessarabia.

Libraries in Israel

Thousands of books have been bought by the Library Division of the Israeli Ministry of Education, for distribution among new settlements and other public institutions. Since April 1950 forty new settlements received a basic Hebrew reference library of about 70 to 100 books, varying according to the character of the settlement and the composition of the group (e.g. native-born or immigrant, orthodox or non-orthodox). Discussing the work of the Division which was established in December 1949, Dr. H. Bar Dayan, its Director, said that "public libraries are one of the most important instruments of adult education, and particularly to-day in Israel." Seventy-five new libraries will be sent to new settlements shortly, and a mobile library is planned to serve those still without books of their own. It is also hoped to establish a country-wide central card catalogue, modelled on similar catalogues abroad. Another project is the establishment of a central Hebrew Braille Library for the use of Jewish blind throughout the world. An 11-member Public Advisory Committee was recently set up to draft legislation on library matters. The Committee consists of the directors of the Jewish National Library and the Tel Aviv and Haifa public libraries, the head of the State Archives and Library, also representatives of Histadruth and communal settlements. Cf. *The Jewish Agency's Digest*, Jerusalem, 15/9/50.

Dr. Weizmann's Autobiography

The publication of Dr. Weizmann's memoirs had been a long-cherished ambition of Mr. B. Horowitz whose publishing company owns the East and West Library, London. Though forestalled by Messrs. Hamish Hamilton, he has now gratified his desire by producing an edition* which enhances the interest in the text by adding 185 illustrations selected and arranged by the publisher who in doing so, offers the President of Israel his reverence and admiration. Most of the pictures depict stages in the development of Palestine. The 30-odd photos of Dr. Weizmann and his family are matched by an almost equal number of pictures of other Zionist leaders. Special attention has been given to illustrations of Jewish life in Europe during the last fifty years, in fact it was the publisher's wish "to rescue from oblivion the face of the East European Jew, that face on which the suffering of centuries is engraved." Through a perhaps characteristic accident, the illustrations of bondage are almost exactly as many as those of British leaders who, in one way or another, helped bring about the liberation. Unfortunately a number of errors have crept into the captions to some of the pictures. The photo (No. 68) purporting to show

(* Trial and Error. **The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann.** With 185 illustrations selected and arranged by B. Horowitz. East and West Library. London. 1950. 608 pp.

Mr. Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1916, was actually taken in 1918. General Allenby (No. 84) entered Jerusalem on December 9, 1917 (not in 1918), and the proclamation (No. 109) of Transjordan's independence (in 1923, not 1922) was unconnected with the Churchill White Paper.

These errors partly already occur in the text of Dr. Weizmann's autobiography which has been critically examined by Dr. O. K. Rabinowicz in a booklet entitled "Fifty Years of Zionism," and described as "a historical analysis" of "Error and Trial" (**). The learned and exacting writer points out a large number of discrepancies and inaccuracies relating to the whole course of Zionist history from Herzl to the outbreak of the second world war. Though Dr. Rabinowicz is known as a political opponent of Dr. Weizmann, he has sound reason to claim that he "only cited facts" without drawing any conclusions. His often disturbing criticism is throughout based on first-hand evidence of which invariably chapter and verse is given, lending colour to the author's statement that since Dr. Weizmann is a scholar employing scientific methods, "nothing short of a scholarly and scientific approach can claim to reach his level."

(**) **Fifty Years of Zionism. A Historical Analysis of Dr. Weizmann's "Trial and Error."** by Oskar K. Rabinowicz. London. Robert Anscombe & Co. 1950. 131 pp.

~~Sijthoff, Leyden~~

From Sijthoff, Leyden, Netherlands:

Drost, P.N., HUMAN RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS. 1965 fl.22.50

" ~~THE~~ CRIME OF STATE, Vol.I, Humanicide. 1959, fl.28.90
Vol.II, Genocide, 1959, fl. 16.95

From Doubleday :

Raymond Aron, PEACE AND WAR

1967, \$10.00



THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20540

OFFICE OF THE
LAW LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS


October 18, 1968

Dear Professor Fried:

Reference is made to your letter of October 10, 1968, in which you request information concerning the possibility of obtaining the publication Courts-Martial Law of Soviet Russia, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and Japan and the Disciplinary Code of Soviet Russia (2nd ed., Washington, Library of Congress, Law Library, 1944).

The above-mentioned item, being the latest edition of this work, is a reproduction of a type-written copy. No later edition is being prepared. It is not available commercially; however, it may be obtained on an interlibrary loan.

Sincerely yours,


Francis X. Dwyer
Associate Law Librarian

Professor John Fried
Department of Political Science
Herbert H. Lehman College
Bedford Park Boulevard West
Bronx, New York 10468

11

