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JOURNAL

OF THE

AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY.

EDITED BY

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TWENTIETH VOLUME,

FIRST HALF.

THE AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY.

NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT, U. S. A.

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[This volume is for January-July, 1899. Issued, March, 1899, in an edition of 500 copies.]

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Assyrian Prepositional Usage.—By J. DYNELEY PRINCE,
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THE discussion of the syntax of *ina* (JAOS. xvi. pp. ccxviii-ccxxvi) and of *ana* (JAOS. xviii. 355-360), which are by far the most flexible particles in Assyrian and therefore merit a special consideration, should be supplemented by an examination into the syntactical peculiarities of the other prepositions. These will be treated under two heads: 1. Those which like *ana* and *ina* are syntactically independent, i. e. which, as far as can be determined from the published inscriptions, do not follow another preposition in a combination; and 2, those which have retained their substantival nature to such an extent that they may be used in a subordinate position, following and supplementing an independent preposition.

I. The members of the first class which appear most frequently and with most varied usage are *adi*, *ultu*, *ištu*, and *itti*, the first three of which are primarily prepositions of motion.

1. *adi*. The fundamental force of *adi*, like that of *ana*, is motion towards, but with this difference, that the local *ana* means simply 'unto,' while *adi* denotes primarily 'as far as, up to.' This meaning occurs not only with verbs of going such as *aláku*, Shalm. Ob. 69, and *arádu*, Ašurn. iii. 30, 44, but with other verbs, like *kašádu* 'conquer'; thus, Ašurn. iii. 23, 'he conquered *adi Karduniaš*, as far as K.' The temporal sense 'until,' which occurs in a number of passages, is plainly a development from the fundamental local signification. From this in turn was evolved the meaning 'during, while,' seen in phrases like *adi um balṭu* 'during his life,' V. R. 56, 59. The adverbial use of the prepo-

sition in such expressions as *adi la baše*, 'completely,' literally 'until it is not,' seems to be a development from the temporal usage; cf. also *adi šina* 'for the second time,' IV. R. 7, 21 a. *Adi* appears also as a conjunction in the senses 'until' and 'while' (Sm. 125, 67 a, and V. R. 56, 60).

The only Semitic cognate is the Heb. עַד, Aram. ܥܕ, which is used in exactly the same way as its Assyrian counterpart. Thus, locally עַד הַנְּהַר; temporally, 'until,' עַד הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה, Gen. xxvi. 33, 'during,' 2 K. ix. 22; and conjunctively and adverbially as in עַד מְאֹד 'exceedingly.'

Two distinct secondary meanings of the Assyrian *adi* are found: *a.* 'besides, as well as, together with,' lit. 'even up to this'; for example, *adi x alāni* 'together with ten cities,' Ašurn. ii. 74; and, *b.* 'according to,' as in *adi adē u mamīt ša (māt) Aššur* 'according to the ordinances and oath of Assyria,' Senn. ii. 70-1. A double use of *adi* is seen in the same sentence in *adi šarrāni ša adi libbi ūme anne* 'together with kings who (ruled) until these days,' Ašurb. vi. 2. The Hebrew use of עַד in עַד רִכְבָּה עַד פְּרוּחָה 'both its base and its flowers,' Num. viii. 4, seems parallel to *adi* 'together with.' This idiom is usually found in Hebrew with negative phrases, e. g. לֹא עַד אֶחָד 'not even one,' Jud. iv. 16.

Adi (עַד), like most prepositions, was originally a substantive, probably *adu*,² with the meaning 'progress, duration' (cf. Heb. לְעַד 'for ever,' Am. i. 11), from a stem meaning 'to go, depart,' Aram. ܥܕ, Ar. عدا, Eth. *adawa*.

2. *ultu, ištu*. The prepositions *ultu* and *ištu* are closely allied in meaning and usage and probably also etymologically. Their fundamental signification is 'motion out of.' Thus, locally, *ultu ašrišunu assuxšunāti* 'out of their habitations I dragged them,' Sarg. Prunkinschr. 57, and with *ištu*, Ašurn. i. 54; temporally, *ultu ūme pāni* 'from (since) former days,' Esarh. ii. 14, and *ištu ūm gāti* 'since days of yore,' Tig. iii. 78-9. We find also *ultu—adi* and *ištu—adi* frequently in the sense 'from—unto' (cf. Heb. מִן—עַד). Both *ultu* and *ištu* occur commonly as conjunctions in the sense 'after, since.' The former, however, seems to have also the meaning 'as soon as' in Höllenf. rev. 16.

¹ Identical with *itti*, q. v.

² The form *adu* occurs Sm. 1064, marg. (Delitzsch, *HWb.* 22).

³ Found also with *ina*, JAOS. xvi. p. ccxxv.

Utu has secondarily a causative meaning 'by reason of,' as in K. 618, 11, *ultu dabābe anne* 'on account of these words,' thus encroaching on one of the meanings of *ina* (JAOS. xvi. p. cccxiv). *Ištu* means secondarily 'along with, together with,' in a few passages, as *ištu nuduniša ma'adi* 'along with her great dowry,' II. R. 65, obv. c. ii. 35.

The etymology of these two prepositions is doubtful, but they are probably from the same stem $\sqrt{as, is,}$ denoting direction (cf. *ištānu*, *iltānu*, 'north'), from which the Eth. *eska* and *esma* may perhaps be derivatives.³ *Ištu* in this case would be the older form and the ending *-tu* would be simply the sign of the feminine. *Ištu* is written *iltu* in a few passages (Delitzsch, *HWb.* 152), a form in which the vowel may have approached very closely to the *u* in *ultu*, a thick *i* like that heard in modern Arabic. *Utu* may have originated in this way.

3. *itti*. The primary meaning of *itti* is 'alongside of, by'; cf. V. R. 10, 2. From this are derived five secondary uses: *a.* *ittiki* 'with,' as in *lullik* 'I will go with thee,' Ašurb. Sm. 125, 62; also with verbs of speaking, as *qibā*, Ašurb. v. 25, *dabābu*, Ašurb. iii. 84, etc. *b.* 'besides, as well as (among),' Tig. ii. 19; 61. A somewhat unusual use of *itti* with *manā* is seen in Tig. iv. 30-1, *itti dagil pān Ašur belea amnušunāti* 'I reckoned them among the subjects of A. my lord.' *c.* 'against,' only with verbs of fighting and rebelling, such as *maxāqu*, Šamši Ram. iv. 42, *nakāru*, Ašurb. iv. 100, and *balkātu*; e. g. *ittia ušbalkitma* 'he made (them) rebels against me,' Sarg. Prunkinschr. 34 (cf. **נלחם עמ**, 2 K. xiii. 12). *d.* Possibly connected with this idea of hostility appears the rare sense 'away from,' e. g. *itti gab'ani dannāti-lušērida* 'I brought down from the mighty hilltops,' Tig. iii. 17, and IV. R. 59, nr. 2, 20 b, *itti lumni šātiqanni* 'save me from the evil'; cf. also *itti puli u ēpriša utir* 'I cleaned it of its stones and dirt,' Rammannir. obv. 6. *e.* Finally, *itti* is employed very rarely instrumentally, 'by means of,' as in *itti puli u ēpri-ēpuš* 'I built it by means of stones and earth,' IV. R. 39,

¹ In spite of Delitzsch, *Prol.* 132 ff., 141, rem.

² The form *ištānū*, syn. *irtānū*, V. R. 31, 40 e. f., has no connection with this.

³ *Westa* may also be derived from this stem, but Dillmann (*Aeth. Gram.* 311) makes it a derivative from *wasafa* 'be in the middle.' If this is so, we must suppose that the original *t* became assimilated to *f* under the influence of the sibilant (see JAOS. xvi. p. cccix n.).

5 b. This signification belongs properly to *ina* (JAOS. xvi. p. ccxxiii).

The form *issi*, *isi* = *itti*, found e. g. IV. R. 61, 17 b, is an instance of the aspirated post-vocalic *t* (*th*) = *s* (absence of *dag. lene*), as in the modern German pronunciation of Hebrew *rēšis* for *rēšith*. This phenomenon is also found in *ma'assu* for *ma'adtu* and in *kaša*, *kaši* for *kata*, *kati* (Haupt, ZK. ii. 282). The Assyrian post-vocalic *t* may frequently have been pronounced *s*, even when written *t*.

The Heb. **אִתִּי**, whose fundamental meanings are the same as those of *itti*, 'alongside of, in company with,' is certainly a cognate. *Itti* is clearly a fem. of *idu* 'side'; cf. *itu* 'side' = **idtu*, which itself is used as a prep.; *itāša* (accus.) 'near it,' Esarh. vi. 16. It has been conjectured that Eth. *enta* may also be a development from the primitive stem **אִתִּי**¹ = *itu*, *ittu*, but this is doubtful.²

Other independent prepositions which do not occur in such a variety of meanings as the four just discussed are *ellāmu*, *ellānu*, *ullānu*, *aššu*, *gādu*, *kī*, (*akī*), *kīma*, *kām*, *kēm*, *lām*, *māla*, *niš*, *pux*, and *šut*.

4. *ellāmu* is used in the sense 'before,' both locally (Senn. ii. 77) and temporally (V. R. 4, 127). It is a cognate of the Hebrew architectural expression **אֵלֶּם**, **אֵלֶּם**,³ Ezek. xl. 16, 36, *πρόναος*, 'the front part or room of a temple' (also **אֵלֶּם**, 1 K. vii. 6-8).

5. *ellānu* (from **עֲלֵה**), originally a substantive denoting the upper part, means simply 'position over or above'; Ašurn. ii. 130. The form *elēnu* is found Khors. 154; *elēn* Senn. Bell. 58. Motion upwards is expressed by *ana* with *elāni* or *elēni*.

6. *ullānu* (also from **עֲלֵה**) is used prepositionally in two senses; viz. 'before'; e. g. *ullānia* 'before me (temp.),' Senn. iv. 5; and 'without' (*sine*), as in *ullānuku* 'without thee,' Nbk. i. 55. Its substantival force is distant past time.

7. *aššu* is used primarily with infinitives in the sense 'in order to';⁴ *aššu danān Ašur bēlia niše kulhumimma* 'in order to show the people the power of A. my lord,' Esarh. ii. 20-1. It appears secondarily in two distinct senses; *a*. 'by reason of'; *aššu ipšēti*

¹ See Delitzsch, *Prol.* 115.

² Cf. ZDMG. xl. 738 ff., and Haupt, ZA. ii. 279.

³ Haupt, *Assyr. E-vowel*, 14.

⁴ Also *ana*, JAOS. xviii. 358.

annāti 'on account of these things,' K. 2675 rev. 10; and, *b.* 'concerning, regarding'; *aššu tibāti Elāme* 'concerning the approach of the Elamites,' Ašurb. Sm. 119, 20. Its conjunctival force is always 'because,' V. R. 2, 112.

Delitzsch considers it a combination of *ana* + *šu* = **anšu* = *aššu* (*HWb.* 151), but this is doubtful, first, because the preposition is written *ašša*, K. 84, 27, in the accus., which would seem to imply that it was regarded as a noun, and, secondly, because *ana* is never combined directly with a suffix. *Aššu* is probably a masc. formation from the same directive stem \sqrt{as} , *is*,¹ from which we have the feminine forms *ištu*, *ultu*.

8. *gādu* (*ga-a-du*, Sarg. Ann. 47, but generally *ga-du*) is employed exactly like *adi* 'until' (temp.); *gādu ullu libur* 'may it (the temple) last for ever,' Nbk x. 4; and 'together with'; *nīše Akkadī gādu Kalda* 'the people of A. together with K.,' Ašurb. iv. 97.

It is possible that this somewhat rare word may be etymologically connected with some stem 𐎧𐎺, a metathesis of which seems to exist in the Eth. *ṭāqā*, *ṭēqā*,² used prepositionally, 'near, hard by,' Matth. xx. 30; Ex. xxix. 12. It is doubtful, however, whether any connection can be established between Eth. *ṭaqaqa* and Heb. 𐤒𐤒. The latter is represented in Eth. by *gedād*.

9. *kī* (*akī* with the demonstr. 𐎧 prefixed) and the mimimated form *kīma*³ denote fundamentally the idea of similarity to. This primary meaning appears in a great number of passages. Thus, *kī mē* 'like water,' Mich. iv. 8; *ṭēmu akī annima* 'an account like these,' K. 181, 54; *kīma šadē* 'like mountains,' Rammannir. obv. 31. *Kīma* is the preposition regularly used with *emū* 'be like'; *kīma til abubi ušemešu* 'I made it like a ruin,' Sarg. Prunkinschr. 134, but also *kī* NE. 48, 182, var. It is easy to see how the sense 'according to' was developed from this; cf. the common expression *kī pī mušaria* 'according to (the mouth) of my document,' Ašurn. Mon. 54; *akī duppe ša Ġilla* 'according to the tablets of Ġ.,' Str. ii. 964, 7. Furthermore, *akī* appears in the allied sense 'for, instead of'; *akī 1/3 manī kaspi* 'for 1/3

¹ BA. i. 442.

² *ṭaqaqa*, Dillm. *Lex.* 1224.

³ *kimma*, IV. R. 9, 44 b.

⁴ See Prince, *Mene, Mene*, 74. *Ēmū* is the same stem as Heb. עם 'with'; cf. Assy. *mašalu* = *ēmū*, V. R. 47, 23 a, and Eth. *mesla* 'with'; Heb. 𐤎𐤍𐤔𐤀𐤁.

mina of silver,' Strm. ii. 348, 6. *Akī* and *kīma* are used as conjunctions both alone and with *ša* in this same sense, IV. R. 49, 46 a. *Kī lā* means 'against, without,' Sarg. Prunkinschr. 124.

A second development is seen in expressions where *kī* means 'as, for the purpose of,' usurping one of the functions of *ana*.¹ Thus, *kī liṭāti* 'as hostages,' Ašurn. 1. 108. *Kī lā* with the infin. as the negative of this idea has the force 'in order not to'; *kī lā amāri* 'in order not to see,' I. R. 27, nr. 2, 65. In such expressions as *kī ša*, *akī ša*, the *ša* must be treated quite separately from the *kī* and *akī*. Both prepositions are used very commonly as conjunctions 'as, just as.' *Kī* also appears with the sense 'when, if,' and *kīma* means 'as soon as' in K. 525, 39.

Cognates of *kī* exist in Heb. כִּי (כִּי) and Arabic كَيْ. It is probable that the original form of the preposition was *ka*, with the accus. vowel. The Heb. כִּי is used rather more variedly than Assy. *kī*. It corresponds exactly to *kī* in the usual senses 'like, even as, according to,' but not in the quantitative uses, as, for example, כִּיּוֹם תָּמִים 'nearly a whole day,' or כְּעֶשֶׂר שָׁנִים 'about ten years,' etc. The Hebrew differs also in having a distinct fuller form for the conjunction; כִּי־. In the Arabic كَيْ the original substantival force appears perhaps even more strongly than in Hebrew or Assyrian. It always means 'like,' and is invariably construed with the genitive.²

10. *kûm* and *kêm*, 'instead of,' are constructs of *kāmu* and *kēmu* respectively, from כּוּם 'to stand'(?). *Kām* appears more often as a subst. than a prep., but cf. V. R. 8, 46; *kêm*, however, is always used prepositionally.

It is quite possible that the stem כּוּם, in spite of the כ, is identical with the common Semitic קוּם. It is not unusual to find in Assyrian *t* for *ṭ* and *k* for *q*, especially before the hard vowels *a* and *u*. This is because the pronunciation of *t* and *k* before these vowels is very close to that of *ṭ* and *q*, so that no inconsistency was felt by the writer; cf. *axtu* for *aṭtu*, IV. R. 10, 40 b.

11. *lām* has only the temporal meaning 'before'; *la-am šamši napāxi* 'before sun-rise,' Ašurn. ii. 106. It is probably a combination of the negative *lā* with the mimmation; cf. *ina šēri lām šamaš aḡe* 'in the morning not yet' the sun having risen' (be-

¹ JAOS. xviii. 358.

² Caspari, *Arab. Gram.* § 354, rem. c.

³ *Ana lā*, JAOS. xviii. 356 and n. 7.

fore), IV. R. 3, 38-9 a. The etymological Arabic equivalent *ن* is used as a pure negative with the Jussive, which then represents the ordinary Perfect.

12. *māla*, possibly from *מול*, means, *a*. 'for the purpose of,' *māla aban* 'for a stone,' I. R. 7, nr. E. 5; and, *b*. 'in company with' (*HWb.* 409).

13. *niš* is the usual particle of adjuration, generally found with *tamū* or *šaqdru*; *niš ilišunu itmū niš šarrišunu isquru* 'they swore by the name of their god, they asseverated by the name of their king' (*HWb.* 483).

14. *pux*. The preposition *pux* has just been discovered by Meissner in a newly published legal tablet, K. 4223. It seems to be used in the sense 'instead of' commonly expressed by *kēm*, e. g. *puxšu*, col. iii. 28. It is probably a derivative from *puxxū* 'to exchange.'²

15. *šut*, the last of the strictly independent prepositions, is syntactically closely allied to *ša*, both as a *nota gen.* and as a relative; *ilāni šut šame u ercitim* 'the gods of heaven and earth,' V. R. i. 86. In Ašurb. v. 36, *šut* means 'on account of'; *šut amāti annāti* 'because of these things.' *Šut* is clearly a fem. constr. formation from the same demonstrative stem as *ša*. The various uses of *ša* have been exhaustively treated by Kraetzschmar in BA. i. 379-442.

II. The most important prepositions of the second class which may be used as supplements to the independent prepositions are *eli* (syn. *muxxi*), *gir*, and *arki*.

1. *eli*,¹ from *ēlā* 'go up' (Heb. *עלה* Ar. *على*), denotes fundamentally 'that which is above,' and must be understood thus when found combined with *ana*, *ina*, *adi*, *ultu*, or *ištu*. Its primary meaning, therefore, is 'over,' as in *eli nārī* 'over the river,' Str. ii. 435 (cf. Heb. *הָקַם עַל*, 2 S. xxiii. 1, and *עַל* 'over,' Job xxix. 3; also Ar. *على حائط*). From this comes its second and very common meaning 'upon' (local, or motion on), in which sense it is used both alone and in combination with *ina*, (so also *على*, *على* and Eth. *lā'el*).

¹ JAOS. xviii. 358.

² BA. iii. 497.

³ *Eli* is written also *el*, IV. R. 12, obv. 16, and *ili*, K. 4931, obv. 16 (also *ela*, *elat*, Delitzsch, *Assyr. Gram.* 223).

From these two conceptions are developed nine secondary significations: *a.* With verbs of imposing, either alone (Ašurn. i. 17), or with *ana* (Ašurn. ii. 11), or with *ina* (Tig. v. 80). *b.* With verbs of adding; thus *ruddā* (V. R. 7, 5). *c.* The *eli* of the comparative 'more than' seems to be a development from *b.*; *eli šarrāni abēa* 'more than the kings my fathers,' Sarg. Cyl. 48 (cf. *על אחיך* 'more than thy brethren,' Gen. xlviii. 22; Ar. فَضِّلْ آدَمَ عَلَى الْمَلَائِكَةِ 'the preference for Adam over (more than) the angels'). *d.* To these should be added *eli* in the sense 'except'; *eli idāši* 'except me,' V. R. 6, 4 (cf. *על פני* 'except me,' Ex. xx. 3; Eth. *ld'el*, Gen. xxxi. 50). *e.* The common use of *ina eli* 'concerning, relating to,' is a legitimate development from the idea 'upon' (Heb. *חזה על*, 1 K. xxii. 8; Ar. *قال على ذلك*); as is also, *f.* the causal *eli*,¹ as *eli ammāti annāti* 'on account of these things,' V. R. 4, 21 (*על שם הפור*, Esth. ix. 26; Ar. *عليه* 'because of it'). *g.* The use of the preposition with verbs of motion, almost in the sense of *ana* 'towards,' is very common; cf. *eli Tarqā . . . ūma'iru rakbēšu* 'he sent his messengers unto T.,' Ašurb. i. 123-4. This of course occurs quite ordinarily in combination with *adi* and *ana* (*על*, 1 S. ii. 11 and Ar. *على الخير* 'unto good,' with *حمل* 'impel'). *h.* Just as we find *ana* used as a Dat. Comm., so *eli* also is commonly employed with *tābu*; *ša šangutšu eli ilāna itību* 'whose priesthood was pleasing to the gods,' Shalm. Obel. 18 (*טוב על*, Esth. iii. 9; *נלחם על*, Jud. ix. 17). *i.* Finally, *eli* appears in the same way as a Dat. Incomm., 'against,' with verbs denoting hostile action, Ašurb. iii. 50 (*על* 'against,' Jud. xvi. 12; Ar. *خرج عليه* 'he went against him').²

eli is found combined with *ana* and *ina* in all the above significations.

2. *muxxu*, an exact synonym of *eli*, appears in nearly all the meanings just mentioned (*HWb.* 398). It is probably a loan-word from the non-Semitic *mux*, 'top, upper part.'

3. *ġēr* is the constr. of *ġeru* 'back' (the upper part), and, like *muxxu*, is used exactly like *eli*, although not so extensively.

¹ JAOS. xvi. p. cccxiv.

² Both *על* and *على* have developed many uses which are not found with *eli*.

Thus, 'upon,' *ukin ġerušu* 'I laid on him,' Senn. Bav. 56; *ġer tamli šātu* 'on this foundation,' Senn. vi. 41; and in the sense of motion towards, *ġerušu ipxurūma* 'they gathered unto him,' Senn. v. 11. It means also 'against,' Senn. v. 61. It is combined with *ultu*, III. R. 4, nr. 4. 49; *ultu ġer sise* 'from on the horses.'

The similarity of *ġeru* 'back' (ظهر) to *ġeru* 'field' (مزرعة) has caused the ideogram of the latter E. DIN. to be frequently used to express the former.

4. *arki*, gen. of *arku* 'rear,' is used prepositionally alone and with *ana* and *ina*; *a*. in the local sense, *a*, position; *arkia umaššir* 'I left behind me,' III. R. 15 c. iv. 15; *β*, motion; *arkišunu lū ēlī* 'I went up after them,' Tig. iii. 25; and *γ*, hostile; *arki limutti tebū* 'has he pursued after the evil?' IV. R. 51, 9 b. *b*. In the temporal sense, *arkišu* 'after him,' Senn v. 3-4. *Arku* is also used adverbially, both locally and temporally.

Cognates of *arku* are ירך, ירכה, and Ar. ورك (see Lagarde, *Übersicht*, 72).

The remaining dependent prepositions of less importance syntactically, which occur both alone and combined with *adi*, *ana*, *ina*, *ištu*, and *ultu*, are fifteen in number.

5. *irtu* 'breast' is used prepositionally in the sense 'against,' I. R. 47, col. v. 43.

6. *balū* 'without,' from *balū* 'nothing' (Heb. בלי; Ar. بَلْ), occurs with *ina*, and is probably a combination of the prepositional element 𒂗 and the negative element *l(d)*.¹

7. *birit*, constr. of *birtu* 'middle,' 'between' is generally construed with *ina* and *ana*. It means also 'among,' Ašurn. ii. 78, and 'within,' Beh. 8, 9, 95. The forms *beri*, *biri*, Nbk. viii. 52, V. R. 9, 58 must be classified here. The derivation is uncertain (*HWb.* 183).

8. *battubatti*, *batabati* 'around, about,' IV. R. 61, 25 b, is combined with *ina* and *ištu*.

9. *ṭix* (constr. of *ṭixu*) 'near to,' Tig. jun. obv. 24, and with *ina*, IV. R. 27, 48 b. For *ṭexu* 'touch,' cf. דחה 'push,' Ar. دحا.

10. *qirib*, constr. of *qirbu* 'midst,' is of very common occurrence.

¹ The prep. 𒂗 is found in the stem *bašū* = *ba* + *šu* (Haupt). It occurs also in the Canaanitish gloss *badiu* 'in his hand' in Tell-el-Amarna Letters, no. 72.

11. **libbu** 'heart, midst,' is a syn. of *qirbu*. The use of both these prepositions, as well as that of *qabal*, is dependent on that of *ina* and *ana*.

12. **lapâni**, a combination of the ancient Semitic prepositional element *la* with *panu* 'face.' Its primary meaning is local, thus: 'to flee before,' Esarh. i. 15. Hence 'fear before,' Senn. vi. 7-8 (cf. 1 Chr. vi. 17).

13. **maxar** (constr. of *maxru*) 'before,' is used with *adi*, *ina*, and *ana* both temporally and locally.

14. **pan**, constr. of *panu* 'face,' 'before,' is construed with *ana*, *ina*, *ultu*, and *ištu*, and is used both temporally and locally. For *ištu pan* with *palâxu* 'fear,' cf. Ašurn. ii. 80, 61-2.

15. **pî**, gen. of *pâ* 'mouth,' 'according to' is combined with *kî*, but occurs also alone as a pure preposition, I. R. 27, nr. 2, 45.

16. **pût**, fem. of *pâ* 'mouth,' means 'opposite' (freq.), and 'instead of (against), for,' especially in the contracts (*HWb.* 518). The dental is not quite certain, but it is probably *t*, although written occasionally *ṭ* (see above on *kûm*).

17. **qabal**, constr. of *qablu* 'midst,' occurs alone and with *ana*, *ina*, and *ultu*. It is a syn. of *qirbu*, *libbu*.

18. **šapal** (constr. of *šaplu*) 'below,' also *šupli*, with *ina*, Sarg. Cyl. 77.

19. **tarçu**, lit. 'direction,' is used locally with *ina* 'at, near,' Synchr. Hist. ii. 16, and with *ana* 'towards, against,' Sarg. Prunkinschr. 25; and temporally, *ina tarçi abîa* 'at the time of my fathers,' Esarh. iv. 23.

The following table will illustrate more fully than a long discussion could do the great variety and flexibility of Assyrian prepositional usage, and will also demonstrate to how great an extent the different prepositional meanings overlap.

Above, see Over.	As (instead of), <i>kî</i> .
According to, <i>akî</i> , <i>kî</i> , <i>pî</i> , <i>kî pî</i> .	As soon as, <i>ultu</i> , <i>kîma</i> .
Adverbial use, <i>ina</i> , <i>ana</i> , <i>adi</i> , <i>adi lâ</i> .	At, <i>ina</i> . At the time, <i>ina tarçi</i> .
After, <i>arki</i> (temp. and local).	Before, <i>ana</i> , <i>ina</i> , <i>maxar</i> , <i>ana pan</i> ,
Against, <i>eli</i> , <i>ana</i> , <i>ina</i> , <i>irtu (ina)</i> , <i>itti</i> , <i>kî lâ</i> , <i>çir</i> , <i>tarçu</i> .	<i>ina pan</i> , <i>ellâmu</i> , <i>lapâni</i> (temp. and local).
Among, <i>ina</i> , <i>itti</i> , <i>birit</i> .	Before (temp.), <i>ullânu</i> , <i>lâm</i> , <i>ana lâ</i> .
Around, <i>battubatti (ina)</i> .	Behind, <i>arki</i> .
As (in order to be), <i>ana</i> , <i>ina</i> .	Below, <i>ina šapli</i> , <i>ina šupli</i> .

¹ Cf. *mixrit* (local), Sarg. Prunkinschr. 163.

Besides, <i>itti</i> .	Like, <i>kî, kîma</i> .
Between, <i>biri, birit</i> .	More than, <i>eli</i> .
By (near), <i>ṭix, ina tarçi</i> .	Near, see By.
By (swearing), <i>niš</i> .	Of (part.), <i>ina, ša, šut</i> .
By means of, <i>ina, itti</i> .	Of (with <i>palaxu</i>), <i>ina, ištu pan</i> .
By reason of, <i>eli, ultu, ina, aššu, šut</i> .	Out of, <i>ina, ultu, ištu</i> .
Concerning, <i>ina, eli, aššu</i> .	On, <i>eli, ina, ina libbi, muxxi, çir</i> .
During, <i>ina, adi</i> .	Opposite to, <i>pât, ina pâṭ</i> .
Except, <i>eli</i> .	Over, <i>ina, eli, ellâmu</i> .
For (the benefit of), <i>ana</i> .	Since, <i>ultu</i> .
For (in order to be), <i>ana, ina, kî, mâla</i> .	To (dat.), <i>ana</i> .
From, <i>ultu, ina, ištu, itti</i> .	Together with, <i>adi, ana, ištu, itti, gâdu</i> .
In, <i>ina</i> .	Toward, <i>eli, adi, ana, adi eli, ana eli, ana tarçi</i> .
In spite of, <i>ina</i> .	Until, <i>adi, ana, gâdu</i> .
In order to, <i>ana, aššu</i> .	Unto, <i>eli, ana, ina, çir (w. paxaru)</i> .
In order not to, <i>ana lâ, kî lâ</i> .	Upon, see On.
Instead of, <i>aki, kûm, kêṁ, pux</i> .	When, <i>ina</i> with infin., <i>kî</i> .
Instead of (for), <i>ina pâṭ</i> .	With, <i>itti</i> ; see Together with.
Into, <i>ina, qirîb (ana, ina), libbi (ana, ina), qabal (ana, ina)</i> .	Within, <i>ina</i> .
Just as, <i>kî, kîma</i> .	Without (<i>sine</i>), <i>ullânu, ana lâ, balû, ina balû</i> .

Sanskrit Diction as affected by the Interests of Herdsman, Priest, and Gambler.—By CHARLES R. LANMAN, Professor in Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

THE name "Semantics"¹ may now be said to be fairly established as a designation of the doctrine of the principles² that underlie the processes of the development of the meanings of words. In the study of any of these processes (for example, of generalization or of specialization of meaning), it is needful to keep in mind certain still broader considerations, in order to determine the true sequence of development in any given case. To one such consideration the title prefixed to this paper refers. In like manner the Latin lexicographer would have to bear in mind that the speech of the Romans was strongly tinged by their mercantile life.

To the student of the Veda it is a source of perhaps contemptuous surprise, and to the teacher a source of some little embarrassment, that this venerable document smells so strong of the cow-pen and the byre. Nearly twenty years ago, H. Zimmer³ gave by the way some interesting illustrations of this fact; but it may still be worth while to set the fact into relation with similar ones from other languages and literatures and to show how universal and natural is the effect of the more prominent or absorbing occupations of a people or a community upon the diction of its daily life or of its literature.

We have only to con our English dictionary in order to see how often some important word of an art or handicraft, or some

¹ It was used by Arsène Darmesteter, *La vie des mots*, Paris, 1887, beginning of chap. iii.

Then by the present writer, in 1894, in a paper entitled "Reflected meanings; a point in semantics," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, vol. xxvi., pages xi-xv of the Proceedings for Dec. 1894.

Then by Michel Bréal in his interesting and important volume entitled *Essai de sémantique*, Paris, 1897 (8°, pages 349).

² Some of these were set forth in my *Sanskrit Reader*, Boston, 1883, preface, pages vi and vii, and abundantly exemplified in the appended vocabulary.

³ *Altindisches Leben*, Berlin, 1879, pages 221-5.

word that has attained great notoriety by reason of its connection with some notorious event, has become the basis of some figurative expression which comes perhaps to be more serviceable than the original in the general uses of the language. 'A young man drifting on to the *lee shore of vice* and crime,' 'a firm that is making *financial leeway*,'—such phrases illustrate how the experience of a sea-faring race tends to enrich its language with metaphors from nautical life. Or, to take the notorious murders done by Burke (for which he was hanged in 1829), we find that, after the name of *burking* was applied to his peculiar crime of smothering his victims in order to sell their bodies for dissection, the verb *to burke* was soon used in a figurative sense, 'to smother, hush up, suppress quietly,' as in the example given by Murray, 'A book suppressed before issue is popularly said to have been *burked*.'

To show "how far the phraseology of the mine and the card-table can be made to go in figurative substitution for ordinary speech," Professor Whitney cites¹ the "interview between the preacher and the gambler who wants to get his late exemplary partner decently buried," as described by Mark Twain in *Roughing It*, chap. xlvii. The gambler's inability to understand the sesquipedalian verbiage of the "gospel-sharp" is expressed in phrases like "You ruther hold over me, pard. I reckon I can't call that hand. Ante and pass the buck." "That last lead of yourn is too many for me. . . . I can't neither trump nor follow suit." And the decease of his "pardner" is announced in varying figures: "One of the boys has gone up the flume—thrown up the sponge—passed in his checks—death has scooped him," etc.

The importance of the incidents and objects most prominent in the life of the pioneers of what have been at one time or another our border states is abundantly reflected in their topographical nomenclature. In the *U. S. official postal guide* of Jan. 1884 we find no less than eleven postoffices named *Fair Play*; and on p. 367 it is noted that the name of *Sevenup*² in Tennessee has been changed to the more innocent but less racy name of *Seven*. In the same state occurs the name *Trump*; and with the Californian

¹ W. D. Whitney, *Life and growth of language*, New York, 1875, near the beginning of chap. vii.

² For readers who do not speak English it may be explained that *seven-up* is primarily the name of a game of cards.

You Bet are perhaps identical in origin, as they certainly are in phonetics, the *Ubet* of Montana and *U Bet* of Tennessee. The relevancy of *Gun-lock* and *Gun-sight* and *Tin Cup* is fairly obvious; and that of *Cut-hand*, *Skull Creek* and *Dead Man's Gulch* entirely so. Doubtless many of the most racy and striking names invented by the pioneers failed to pass the censorship of the Department at Washington and so do not appear in the official list.

English diction has for centuries been influenced by words pertaining to athletic sports. From Shakespeare, Professor Kittredge notes for me *bias* and *rub* as taken from the terminology of bowling, and *blank*, *level*, and *clout* from that of archery; and he adds *disaster*, *influence*, and *aspect* as of astrological origin. Recently, the language of the college press and of the alumni dinner has been sensibly affected by the game of foot-ball. From the paper¹ I cite a few words: "Yale activity, which . . . broke into sudden glories . . . , when the last *touchdown* had been made in Alumni Hall." And in the report² of the address of a distinguished professor is found the following statement of the situation at Yale: "The large divisions in which men are necessarily handled and the impossibility of individual treatment by the instructor encourage *mass* intellectual *plays*. Genius suffers, of course, but learns the great lesson of *standing shoulder to shoulder* with fellow-men."

As examples of technical expressions which have passed into general use with a figurative sense, H. Suchier cites³ *hasard*, *il a le dé*, *je me suis blousé*, which are properly terms of dicing and billiards and have become generalized. Fr. Kluge⁴ gives *kaput* as one of a number of French gaming terms which migrated to Germany in the Thirty Years' War and came at last into general use in their present transferred senses.

The passion of our Germanic ancestors for gambling is directly attested by Tacitus in the *Germania* (cap. xxiv.), and also indirectly by such monumental evidence as the history of the word *gefallen*, 'to please.' In Middle High German this is always

¹ *Yale Alumni Weekly*, April 14, 1898, p. 4 b.

² *New York Daily Tribune*, March 24, 1898.

³ In G. Gröber's *Grundriss der romanischen Philologie*, i. 634.

⁴ *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache*,⁵ s. v. *kaput*.
 "Capot" se dit, au jeu de piquet, du joueur qui ne fait aucune levée."
 —Litttré.

qualified by *wohl* or *übel*. Kluge¹ thinks that *es gefällt mir wohl* is an expression of the warlike life of the ancient Germans, equivalent to *das Los fällt gut für mich*, and used originally of the allotment of booty by the throw of the dice. As further evidence of like sort he cites *Sau* and *Hund*, which seem originally to have meant the best and worst throw respectively and then good and bad luck in general.

The Hindu passion for gambling is well known and goes back to the time of the Vedas.² In the Mahābhārata, the famous gambling match is one of the most essential elements of the great blood-feud. Duryodhana begs his father to consent to a game of dicing with his cousins, *durodaram pāṇḍavāis tvaṁ kuruṣva*, ii. 56. 14=1978, using *durodara* in its proper sense of 'game.' But at ix. 11. 5=533, the 'battle' (*saṁgrāma*) is spoken of as a 'horrible, life-robbing *durodara*'; and similarly, at vii. 133. 4=5458, and at viii. 82. 31=4210, and at ix. 15. 8=760, the 'battle' (*yuddha*) is called 'the game whose stake is life' (*prāṇa-duroḍara* or *prāṇa-dyūta*). And Nala says to Puṣkara, 'If thou art not eager for a [plain] game [of dice] (*dyūta*), then let the game-of-battle (*yuddha-dyūta*) begin,' iii. 78. 8=3037.

The most striking object of the wishes and prayers of the Rig Veda is abundance of cattle and children. The poet prays for a thousand steeds, and for soma and gold in moderation; but for a hundred thousand cows, RV. iv. 32. 17-19. Similarly viii. 78. 2, 9. And at i. 92. 7, he says: 'Thou metest out unto us, O Dawn, the blessing which abounds in children, in men, which is based on horses and culminates in cows.' Protection is implored at AV. viii. 7. 11, for 'kine, horses, men, and cattle.' Abundant examples are cited by Zimmer, l. c., especially at p. 223. It is thus very natural that cows should often suggest material for comparisons. At RV. viii. 95. 1 the poet says, 'Unto thee, O Indra, our songs have gone sounding like the lowing kine to the calf.' So viii. 88. 1. And at viii. 92. 12, we read, 'In our songs of praise we make thee to rejoice as do cows in the meadows.' The stanza i. 25. 16 looks like an inferior imitation of stanza 4 above, and in it the worshipper says, 'Away, to seek the far-seeing [god], go my prayers, as cows to the meadows.' From a nearly related subject is drawn the comparison of x. 60. 8, in

¹ S. v. *gefallen*. See also Kluge's articles on *Sau*, *Hund*, *Daus*; and further, *Schenk*.

² H. Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, pp. 283-7.

which the exorcist conjures back to life the soul of the sick man, saying, 'As they tie a yoke with a strap so that it holds, so have I held thy spirit to life, that it may not die.'

It has long since been noticed that the compounds of *go*, 'cow,' lose their special reference to cows and take on a more general meaning. Thus *gavyāti*, properly 'cow-path,' and then simply 'path': see Geldner's interesting remarks, *Vedische Studien*, ii. 291. And three words which properly mean 'seeking or desiring cows,' to wit *gavyant*, *gavyu*, and *gaveṣana*, are all applied, in the sense of 'eager for booty or battle,' to a chariot (viii. 2. 35, iv. 31. 14, vii. 23. 3). So wholly faded out is the reference to cows in *gaveṣay*, that in Kathāsaritsāgara lxxv. 28-30 a treasurer says 'I will look for the fruits (*phalāni gaveṣaye*) which the mendicant gave me.' And at MBh. xii. 132. 20=4812 we find the proverbial expression, 'The track of virtue, like that of a snake, is hard to seek or follow,' *aher iva hi dharmasya padam duḥkham gaveṣitum*.

In like manner *go-pā* or *go-pa*, properly 'cow-keeper,' becomes 'keeper' in general. Thus the worshippers pray, 'May we have the gods for our keepers,' *devāgopāḥ syāma*, RV. v. 45. 11. Especially notable is the denominative *gopāy* or *gopay*, which is used, for example, of 'keeping' or 'retaining' what one has learned (*śrutam*, Tāitt. Up. i. 4'), and of 'keeping in' or 'restraining' one's speech, that is, of 'keeping silent' (*sarasvatīm gopayānāḥ*, MBh. xiii. 107. 33=5237). Indeed, the origin of *gopa* is so completely forgotten that a new secondary root *gup* (*jugopa*, *jugupsita*) has been formed from it and is in frequent use.

It will surprise no one who knows the importance attached by the Hindus to all that concerns the sacrificial ritual, that their literature should be strongly tinged with words and metaphors drawn from the terminology of the sacrifice. With a few illustrations of this matter I will close. In the drama *Çakuntalā*, stanza 50, the boys from the hermitage say to King Duṣṇanta, 'The Pāuravans are initiated in the sacrifices of fearlessness for the distressed,' that is, 'the duty to which they are consecrated is that of providing security for their distressed subjects.'

In the Epos, examples abound. Thus, at MBh. x. 9. 8=486, when the three surviving Kuru princes find King Duryodhana, who had been left in darkness and alone to die on the field, we

¹ Cf. *aedificare naves*, οἰκοδομεῖν νῆκτας, a brass shoe-horn, etc.

read that the king, surrounded by the three blood-stained champions comforting him, '(shone or) was glorious as is the altar surrounded by the three sacred fires'—*ṣuṣubhe sa vṛto rājā vedī tribhīr ivāgnibhiḥ*. Again, at ix. 17. 49=912, Çalya 'for a reception, roared unto' the dart that slew him, that is, 'he greeted or received the dart with a roar, as the fire receives with a roar the stream of sacrificial butter.'

*pratigrahāyābhīnanarda çalyaḥ
samyag-ghutām agnir ivājya-dhārām.*

At ix. 21. 35=1127, 'Duryodhana stood in the battle, ready, resplendent, as at the sacrifice a mighty fire consecrated by sacred texts.' And at xi. 18. 18=536, the shining gear of the warriors is compared with sacred fires well fed with oblations of butter, *pāvakān suhutān iva*. Similar metaphors are employed with elaborate detail at xi. 1. 40=41, where Saṁjaya says to Dhṛtarāṣṭra, 'Twas thou, with thy son, by whom this fire, to wit Pārtha, was stirred by a wind, to wit [thy and his] words, and besprinkled by sacrificial butter, to wit [thy and his] lust [for dominion], [till it] blazed or burst into a consuming flame. Into this, [thus] enkindled, have fallen like moths thy sons.' Compare ix. 14. 12-13=716-7; iv. 48. 14-15=1520-1.

An uncommonly striking example is found at MBh. xi. 2. 17=62 (cf. xi. 9. 20=265). After saying, 'Not by sacrifices and gifts, not by penance, not by knowledge, do men get to heaven as surely as do heroes slain in battle,' Vidura adds:

'In fires [which were] the bodies of [opposing] heroes
Have they [the slain] offered their oblations [which were] arrows.
And the arrows offered [by those heroes]
Have they, the illustrious, in turn endured.'

*çarīrāgniṣu çārāṇāṁ juhuvus te çarāhutīḥ
hūyamānāṁ çarāṇṇ cāiva sehus tejasvino mithaḥ.*

Lexicographical Notes from the Mahābhārata.—By EDWARD WASHBURN HOPKINS, Professor in Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

UNDER the title *Epic Diction* a paper was presented at the meeting of the Society in Hartford, April 1898, in two parts. The first part, dealing with epic phraseology and parallel passages found in the two epics, is published in full in the *American Journal of Philology*, vol. xix. The second part, containing lexicographical notes, is given here.¹

I. These words or meanings are found in the Petersburg lexicon, but they are not cited from the literature (starred in pw.). They occur in the Mahābhārata as follows :

tr̥ṣṇākṣaya, xii. 174. 46 and 177. 51 :

*yac ca kāmāsukhaṁ loke yac ca divyaṁ mahat sukham
tr̥ṣṇākṣayasukhasyāi 'te nā 'rhataḥ ṣoḍaṣṭim kalām.*

For the last *pāda* compare M. ii. 86.

durodara, PW. 3), pw. 4), stake at play, ii. 60. 8 :

*santi me maṇayaḥ cāi 'va dhanāni subahūni ca
jayaśvāi 'naṁ dūrodaram.*

manu, 3) a, fem., i. 65. 45.

ṣukta = *pariṣuddha*, xii. 71. 10 ; C. 2724 reads *ṣulka* : *bali-ṣaṣṭhena ṣuktena*. N. says *ṣukta* = *ṣuddha* (but *ṣuktaṁ pūtāmla-niṣṭhura, iti Medinī*). Compare *ṣaḍbhāgapariṣuddhaṁ ca kṛṣer bhāgam upārjitam*, xiii. 112. 19.

I may add that *kalahapriya*, which as an epithet of Nārada is referred in the Petersburg lexicon only to “ÇKDr. for Mbh.,” is found in ix. 54. 20 ; and that Andhraka, though in PW., is marked in pw. as ‘unbelegt.’ But it occurs, apart from the compound Mahāndhraka, in xii. 207. 42 :

*dakṣiṇāpathajānmānaḥ sarve naravarā 'ndhrakāḥ
guhāḥ pulindāḥ ṣabarāḥ cūcukā madrakāḥ saha.*

¹ Of the other papers presented by Professor Hopkins (see Journal xix. 2, p. 168), that on “The Village Community in Ancient India” is published in the *Political Science Quarterly*, Dec. 1898 (see below, p. 22, n. 1) ; “Guilds in Ancient India,” in *The Yale Review*, May and August, 1898 ; and “How gods are made in India,” in *The New World*, Mar. 1899.

These are the wicked people of the South. In the next verse are mentioned those of the North : Yāunas, Kāmbojas, Gāndhāras, Kirātas, Barbaras. It is significant of the relation between the early and late epic that we have mentioned here the Southern Madrakas, with no mention at all of the Northern Madrakas, who in the battle-epic are the chief of sinners and live in the Puñjāb west of the Sutlej and Ravi, viii. 44. 17. In the verse quoted C. 7559 reads *dakṣiṇāpathagāminyaḥ* and *cūcukā(h)*.

2. The following compound words I believe are not in the Petersburg lexicon. Where similar compounds are given in the lexicon I have sometimes cited them as parallels.

anukarṣaka, vārtā°, xii. 76. 7.

uparājan, xii. 80. 32 : *uparāje'va rājardhiṃ jñātir na sahate sadā*.

gopāna, vii. 73. 42 (omitted in C.) : *gopāneṣu vighnadāḥ* are criminals. The first means a place where cows drink. The second (like *garada* and such compounds in PW.) is also omitted from the lexicon.

dviradāroha, viii. 20. 9 (compare *aṣvāroha* and such compounds in PW.). As a reference to *aṣvāroha* from the Mbh., and to *hayāroha*, may be useful, they will be found viii. 28. 19-22.

-patākin and **°ka** in **bahupatākinaḥ**, vii. 193. 12 ; (like cited *abhi°*) *atīpatākaḥ*, viii. 59. 67 ; *calatpatāka* also occurs, but my reference is lost.

patisthāna, xii. 133. 17 : *striyā moṣaḥ patisthānaṃ dasyuṣv etad vigarhitam*. This compound is taken by N. in the pregnant sense of (oppressive misrule in village) lordship.

pāñcarātravid, xii. 336. 25.

pāñsparṣa, xiii. 93. 72 (compare *pādasparṣa*) : *abhigamya yathānyāyāṃ pāñsparṣam athā 'carat*. This may perhaps be a 'hand-shake,' which appears to be intended in *kareṇa karaṃ gr̥hya muditaḥ*, iii. 262. 25. But in iii. 37. 2, *pāñinā parisam-spr̥ṣan* is merely 'stroke,' as perhaps here also. It may be observed, however, that *karagrahaṇa* (in distinction from *pāñi-graha*, marriage) is a fighting term, ii. 23. 11. To 'give the hand' is the sign of a pledge or promise, as in iii. 238. 24, *tataḥ prahasitāḥ sarve te 'nyonyasya talān daduḥ*. So R. (Gorr.) iv. 34. 22-23, *pāñisaṅgrahaṇa*. When the former expression is used of an insult it refers, as in ix. 32. 44, to mock applause by clapping the hands, though genuine applause is also expressed

by the same means, as in ix. 56. 44, *talaṣabdāiḥ*. PW. cites Hariv. 15741, where 'giving the palm' with laughter is as in the case cited above. In R. iv. 4. 14, *hastan̄ pīdayām āsa pāṇinā* is a genuine hand-shake, to seal a promise. I may add that bowing with the head is as common in obeisance and entreaty, as is the body-bow which accompanies the *añjali*. Compare viii. 32. 4, *tat tvām prayāce 'hañ ḡirasū vinayena ca*; and R. ii. 113. 24, *ḡirasū tvā 'bhiyāce*. The superior is spoken of as *ḡṛhann añjalimālāḥ* before a crowd of courtiers, iii. 252. 49.

pretarāj (**pretarāja** is cited), viii. 14. 17: *antakāle yathā kruddhaḥ . . . pretarāt*. In R. vi. 58. 21, *pretarādviṣayaṁ gataḥ*.

vadhyadhana, xii. 96. 6: *na tu vadhyadhanam̄ tiṣṭhet*. I cite this mainly for the phrase, as Professor Bühler has said (*Ep. Ind.* ii. 256) that an executed criminal's goods would be confiscated. I think he is right, though this rule stands to the contrary (*tiṣṭhet*, like the use of *sthā* in M. viii. 33-34). The sentence seems to mean that the booty of an executed criminal (a thief, N.) should not be kept by the king. The context seems to show that it ought to be given to the priests. But this, like the preceding rule, which enjoins a year's respite for a girl captured in war, probably represents a theory rather than a fact.

vighnada, see **gopāna**, above.

viprasva (like **deva°**, **brahma°**), (theft of) priestly possessions, in a pregnant sense. As the passage is not compared in Professor Bühler's synopsis (nor did I notice it in reviewing his *Manu* in this Journal), and as the following verses contain a few unusual words also, I cite the parallel and the group of words together:

xii. 165. 34 ff. (like M. xi. 55):

*surāpānam̄ brahmahatyā gurutalpam̄ athā 'pi vā
anirdeḡyāni manyante prāṇāntam̄ iti dhāraṇā*

35: *suvarṇaharaṇam̄ stāṇiyam̄ viprasvam̄ ce 'ti pātakam̄
viharan̄ madyapānūc ca agamyāgamanād api*

36: *patitāiḥ saṁprayogāc ca brāhmaṇīyonitas tathā
acireṇa mahārāja patito vāi bhavaty uta*.

Then follows M. xi. 181. Thereafter occur: *avyasanī bhavet* (38); *dūṣayitā* (in PW. only from Purāṇ.) *tasyāḥ* (43); *avagarhya* and *avagarhyeta* (43, 45; in PW. from R.); *pratiṣṭhām̄ nādhi-gacchati* (i. e. after death, *pretatvān na mucyate*, 44); *stryākārām̄* (v. l. *ākāra*) *pratimām̄ liṅgya* (in PW., 49); *brahmahā savanī*

bhavet (= *triṣavaṇasnāyī*, 54);¹ *brahmacārī kṣitīcāyāḥ* (55). I do not understand *vīryam* (= *hiraṇyam* N.) in 39: *annam vīryam grhītavyam pretakarmany apātite*. In xii. 96. 22, *grotriyaśva*, not cited, is a parallel to *vīprasva*.

castrajña, xii. 107. 21 (like *dharmajña*, etc.): *gūrāḥ castrajñāḥ cāstrapāragāḥ*, rather an interesting anticipation of the Lions of the Puñjāb and their "Sword and Book."

sannyāsaphalika, sic, xii. 321. 4: *sannyāsaphalikaḥ kaṣcīd babhūva nṛpatiḥ purā Māithilo Janako nāma Dharmadhvaḥ ita grutaḥ*. Dharmadhvaḥ should be added in PW. s. v. 2) to the Puranic reference. N. defines the first word as *sannyāphalanī samyagdarśanaṁ tad asyā 'stī 'ti*. Under *as* with *sa* + *ni* might be added from vs. 2: *saṁnyasyate yathā 'tmā 'yam vyaktasyā 'tmā yathā ca yat*.

3. The following words are cited in the Petersburg lexicon from the Rāmāyaṇa, while no reference is given to the other epic. In comparing the two epics a double reference is often important. Hence I give here passages from the Mbh. where each word occurs. The list of course is not complete: *agrarūr*, *nṛṇām*, ix. 61. 37; *āṅkita*, *pārthanāmāṅkitāḥ śarāḥ*, ix. 24. 60; *aṅgada* 3), vi. 114. 18; vii. 41. 16; *aṅgulitṛa*, viii. 58. 22. etc.; *aṅgulitrāṇa*, vii. 41. 16; *aṭavī*, xiii. 66. 35; *adhivāsa*, 'home,' vii. 38. 10; xii. 36. 19 (to *adhivāsa*, 'having incense,' may be added vii. 82. 10, *āplutaḥ sā 'dhivāsena jalena*); *anāyaka*, of king, xiii. 61. 32; *anāvṛṣṭi*, ix. 48. 36; *anukūlatā*, *gūdre*, x. 3. 19; *anvaya*, *tad*°, vii. 26. 20; *aparādhin*, xii. 71. 10; *abhītaḥ* 2), *abhīto ratham*, iv. 64. 33; *abhilāṣuka*, *yuddha*°, viii. 87. 95 (R. *abhilāṣaka*); *alātacakra* (cited from R. and Hariv.), viii. 81. 40; vi. 59. 22; *ākarnāprahita*, often, e. g. ix. 28. 5; *ākṛānti*, xii. 97. 8; *iṣ* + *prati*, 'receive,' xiii. 93. 43; *iṣvastram* (*akarot*), xii. 2. 18 (also add to the meaning 'science of arms' in pw., ix. 6. 14, *daṣāṅgam yaç catuspādām iṣvastram veda*); *udāradhī*, i. 183. 10; with R.'s *sāṇyakakṣa* compare *senākakṣa*, viii. 55. 28; *kaṅkṣa*, vii. 187. 47; *kalahapriya* 1), of Śakuni, xi. 18. 24 (of Nārada, see above, § 1); *kāpuruṣa* 1), vii. 22. 2; *kuthāra* 1), battle-axe of Paraṣu-Rāma, xii. 49. 34 (cited from Mbh. only as 'name of a snake'); *gaḍ* + *ni* with double accusative, viii. 83. 29; *triyāma* 1), vii. 184. 14, *triyāmā rajanī*; *nṛpātmaḥ* occurs in Mbh., but my reference is

¹ For *savanī* (*bhavet*) C. reads *sa munir*. The former word is not in the lexicon.

lost; *bahuvārṣika*, iii. 310. 6; vi. 64. 10 (C. omits); *vac* 2), = *nind* (cited from R. and Hariv.), xii. 132. 6, *kas taṁ vā vaktum arhati* (N. *ninditum*); *vikṛta* 2) b, or *vikṛta* 2), nom. prop., xii. 335. 36 = 12686 has *vikṛta*; *samudrānta*, adj. of earth, xiii. 62. 66: *dadāti yaḥ samudrāntām pṛthivīm*, in vii. 198. 55 (cit. pw.), a noun.

4. Notes on various words, chiefly epic, found in the Petersburg lexicon. When a simple reference is given it is to the *Mahābhārata*.

agrahāra. This word is cited once, from the Nala. It is significant of a certain stage of social conditions, and its rare occurrences are important, as I have pointed out in my paper on *Land-tenure in Ancient India*.¹ Here I will simply speak of the three passages where the word occurs in the *Mahābhārata*, ignoring the earlier 'gifts of a field,' *kṣetra*, and 'gifts of a village,' *grāma*. The *agrahāra* is technically an estate, usually a whole village, given to one or more Brahmans. The original signification of *agra* is the (taking of) the top or pick of a heap of grain, and conversely the gift of it, as in *Pāras*. ii. 9. 11; then the gift of good things in general, and finally the gift of land. These gifts of land begin to appear in the *Sūtra* period, and are mentioned in Brahmanical as well as Buddhist *Sūtras*. In the epic nothing is commoner than gifts of land, fields, villages, towns, or "the whole earth." The earliest allusion to a formal *agrahāra* may possibly be found, as Professor Bühler has suggested, at *Bāudh*. i. 5. 9. 8; but this case is very doubtful, as even the law-book of Yājñavalkya, which speaks of copper-plate grants, does not yet employ the word *agrahāra*. The epic perhaps refers to *agrahāras* when it speaks of a queen's *mahādānāni*, a technical term which seems to occur thus for the first time in xv. 17. 17. The full expression, *grāmāgrahāra*, occurs, so far as I know, but once in the epic, xv. 14. 14. The form *agrahāra* occurs in iii. 68. 3-4 in a king's promise to give "one thousand cows, and *agrahāras*, a town, *grāma*, equal to a city." The king fulfills his

¹ This paper was presented to the Society under the title "Village Communities," and is published in the *Political Science Quarterly* of Columbia University, N. Y., Dec. 1898, under the title "Land-tenure in Ancient India." The paper reviews the conditions of land-ownership in ancient times and criticises Mr. Baden-Powell's views as expressed in his recent work, *The Indian Village Community*.

promise by the gift of "cows, with a town and wealth," ib. 69. 27. It may well be that in one other passage we have to understand, as the commentator asserts, a mere gift of food to priests at the end of a sacrifice, when a queen gives the *agrahāra* mentioned at iii. 233. 45 : *tān sarvān agrahāreṇa brāhmaṇān vedavādināḥ Yathārhaṇ pūjayāmi sma pānacchādanabhojanāḥ* (loquitur Krishnā). It will be noticed that only food and clothes, but not jewels and cows (the usual accompaniment of the greater gift), are here mentioned besides the *agrahāra*. Another passage, xiii. 63. 22, gives to the Brahman "guest of all" the epithet *prasṛtā-grabhuk*, which means a guest who gets the pick of the pile offered in the outstretched hand, a term of the Brāhmaṇas as well. When a real *agrahāra* is meant, the kind of village or town, for the words are often interchangeable, is a matter of importance in the eyes of the recipient, as "the village which has only one well" causes the Brahman who lives there to become a *Çūdra*.¹ Instead of this term *agrahāra* the usual expression is *bhūmidāna*, *medinībhāga*, or simply *nagara* and *grāma*, more particularly *vāiṣyagrāma* and *grāmavara*, that is to say *grāmā bahugokulāḥ* as they are called in iii. 310. 2. Such gifts, when on a large scale, are said to be veritable sacrifices, and hence they are called *bhūmisattra*, a word which occurs, I believe, but once, though synonyms are found.²

atiçīta. The *ati*-compounds in the epic deserve perhaps no special mention here, and I will only add to cit. in pw. *atyartham akarod rāudram . . atyamarsaṇaḥ*, xi. 18. 28; but *atiçīta* earns an entry, less perhaps for the later (pw.) parallels and that in Pāṇ. (PW., in another sense), than on account of the passage in which it occurs. In *Rājasūya*, p. 87 ff., Prof. Weber has drawn rather important historical conclusions from the circumstance that in the Tāitt. Br. the time to begin a march is set as in the *çigira* month, which, he says, "does not agree with the Indian climate,"

¹ Mbh. xii. 165. 27, *udapānodake grāme*; xiii. 94. 23, *udapānaplave grāme (ekakūpe, N.)*; Bāudh. ii. 3. 6. 31.

² xiii. 62. 81-82 (cited in PW.). In xv. 14. 16 ff. *dānayajña* and *dāna mahākratu* are parts of a genuine sacrifice. In general compare xiii. 62. 2-4: *ati dānāni sarvāṇi prthivīdānam ucyate . . na bhūmidānād astī 'ha param kiṃ cit*. I have spoken of the lack of all epic mention of land-grants (inscribed deeds of land) in reviewing Dahlmann, *A. J. Phil.* xix. 1. The inscriptional *grāmamaryāda*, or charter, is also unknown to the epic.

nor with the epic. But the epic not only enjoins a spring march but recognizes that it may last into the rainy season, thus covering the time which, as Prof. Weber thinks, indicates a cis-Indic climate in the Brāhmaṇa. Nor is the close of the rains especially recommended; it is only an alternate season, both in M. vii. 182 and in Mbh. xii. 100. 10 ff.:

*cāitryāṃ vā mārگاçīrṣyāṃ vā senāyogaḥ praçasyate
pakvasasyā hi prthivī bhavaty ambumatī tadā
nāi 'vā 'tiçīto nā 'tyuṣṇaḥ' kālo bhavati. . . .
ib. 25, padātīnāgabahuḥ prāvṛtkāle praçasyate.*

Here early spring is also recommended as a time to set out on a march, and an army of foot-soldiers and elephants is recommended "in the first rains," which corresponds to the *jaghanye nāidāghe* or "close of the hot season," which has offended Prof. Weber in the Brāhmaṇa account. A similar verse is cited in the Jātakas, Nidānakathā (p. 121 of Rhys David's translation): "And on the full-moon day of March Udāyin thought: 'The cold season is past; the spring has come; men raise their crops and set out on their journeys.'" Then follows the verse: "Red are the trees with blossoms; 'tis not too hot; 'tis not too cold," etc.

adāivam. The citation given, *adāivam dāivataṃ kuryuḥ*, will be found at xiii. 33. 17.

advāra. The following passages may be added to those cited s. *dvāra*: ii. 21. 53; iv. 23. 18; x. 8. 10. I omit other *a*-privative words except, as a rare word used here in a concrete sense, *akutsā*, a blameless act, xiii. 135. 9; and *atathya*, in *tathyān vā 'py atha vā 'tathyān* (*guṇān āhuḥ*; compare PW. s. *tathya*), xii. 41. 2; *atathya* is cited only from Hit. (pw.).

adhikāra, cited from Manu; add xii. 297. 25.

anapatyātā, cited from Çāk.; add i. 100. 67 = 4031, v. 1.

anuyoga. The meaning (cited only from Nyāyas.) in pw., "rüge," is found iii. 192. 56: *nā 'nuyogā brāhmaṇānām bhavanti vācā rājan manasā karmaṇā vā*. In the case cited in PW., xiii. 93. 82, *anuyogo me na kartavyaḥ*, the meaning is simply 'question.'

abhīçu (ṣu). It is perhaps worth mentioning that this Vedic word in the meaning of 'rein' is current in the epic, e. g. viii. 32. 6 and 19. Both B. and C. have *abhīṣu*, sic. In the last passage cited, *abhīṣugraha*.

abhyadhika. In further illustration of the meaning the following passages may be added : vii. 10. 47, *yasmīnn abhyadhikā vire guṇā sarve dhanāñjayāt*, "who has all virtues more (better) than (has) Arjuna"; and viii. 83. 31, *sarvebhya evā 'bhyadhiko raso 'yam*, "best of all."

abhyasūyaka, cited from Bhag.; add xii. 24. 19.

ayoguḍa, cited from Manu; add as weapon in battle, vii. 30. 16; 178. 23, etc., a frequent word. I may add that *cakra* and *ardhacandra* are also common missiles, by no means peculiar to gods.

avani is a house or homestead, iii. 310. 6 (pw. as "platz").

avaskanda as 'attack' is cited from later works; add x. 3. 27: *avaskandaṁ kariṣyāmi çibirasya . . . tān avaskandya çibire*. The verb is cited from R.

ahnāya, sic, B. vii. 73. 29 (as well as iii. 35. 10, cited as *ahnāya* in PW.).

ācaraṇa is practicing, not performing, in v. 39. 40, *trivarga°*.

ātreyī. N. always explains as pregnant, but Medh. to M. gives the grammarian's alternative: *ātreyīm striyam Atrigotrājātām*; v. PW. s. v. 3) b.

ucchitti, cited from earlier and later works, is found in xii. 12. 36: *brāhmaṇasya no 'cchittir vidyate*.

udagra means 'active,' opposed to *nirudyama*, in *udagra-manas*, ix. 5. 49.

upakurvāṇaka, cited from a Purāṇa scholiast, occurs at the end of the first chapter of Vyāsa's Smṛti.

upaniṣad. M. vi. 29 should be added to references.

upasarjana, 'means of injury,' as in *upasarga* 2), and *sarj* + *upa* 6), in xii. 103. 41.

upasparçana in xiii. 65. 13 is not very clear: *upasparçanaṣaḍ-bhāgam labhate*. N. says it is *dāna*, but it is probably the (virtue of) ablution, the usual sense with pregnant force.

uṣṇapa. PW. gives only *uṣṇapa*, and pw. marks *uṣṇapa* as 'fehlerhaft.' At xii. 36. 9 N. at any rate read *uṣṇapa*, as may be seen in his etymology: *uṣṇapo bhavet, surām eva 'ṣṇām kṛtvā pibet iti kecit*. B. has *uṣṇapa*.

ūna, for construction add ix. 5. 50, *ūne dviyojane gatvā*.

ekacchatra, cited from Purāṇa, and Spruch 1358, occurs in xii. 321. 134: *ya imāṁ pṛthivīm kṛtsnām ekacchatraṁ praçāsti ha, eka eva, sa vāi rājā*.

oghavati, the Sarasvatī, ix. 38. 27; xii. 50. 7.

Āuddālaki, add ix. 38. 22-24 (*uttare kosalabhāge*).

kakuda, add xii. 88. 30: *kakudaṁ sarvabhūtānāṁ dhana-sthaḥ*.

kaṅkaṇa, at the only loc. cit. for Mbh., iii. 271. 22, B. has *kinkinī*.

kiṁkara, add ix. 32. 50: *tam udyatagadam viraṁ menire . . vāivasvatam iva kruddhaṁ kiṁkarodyatapāṇinam*, and compare *kiṁkarapāṇin*.

kuṭicaka. The citation given without a reference in PW. App. vol. v, will be found at xiii. 141. 89 (Nil.).

kuṇḍadhāra is clearly *jaladhara*, a cloud or cloud-demon, in xii. 272. 2.

kṛtā, a well. I venture to think that this is the meaning of the word in RV. ii. 35. 5, *kṛtā ivó 'pa hi prasasré apsú*, and that the same word is found in the epic. In PW. the word is defined as 'Abgrund or gorges,' in pw. as 'Spalt,' but the context points a water-holder of some kind. In the epic, when the *āudakāni*¹ are described the *kṛtāḥ* are differentiated from the 'tanks' of ancient and modern India: *taḍāgānāṁ ca vaksyāmi kṛtānāṁ cā 'pi ye guṇāḥ*, xiii. 58. 4. After the general remark that *sarvadā-nāir gurutaraṁ pāṇiyam* (instrumental with comparative is not so common in Mbh. as in R.) the writer of this chapter discusses the 'tanks,' and paraphrases *kṛtā* with *khāta jalāgraya*. He in whose *taḍāga* thirsty animals and men drink receives the fruit of sacrifice; he in whose *khāta* cows and good men drink, would save his whole family (vss. 16-17). On account of *cā 'pi* it is impossible to take *kṛtānāṁ* as a participle here unless it is differentiated from *taḍāga*, as in RV. vii. 49. 2 *khanūtrima* is differentiated from *svayamjā*; but the *taḍāgaṁ sukr̥tam* and *kurvita* of this very chapter show that there is no such differentiation. The names in different sections are so various (compare ib. 65. 3, *kūpāṇṣ ca vāpṣ ca taḍāgāni ca . . khānayet*) that *kṛtā* may well be accidentally kept in one passage. Such epic preservation is seen elsewhere, as in *abhīḡu*, *kāulāla*, etc.

kṛṣṇajiraka, 'masc.' In pw. as *Nigella indica*. According to N., on xiii. 91. 40, neuter, and identical with *kṛṣṇājāḡ*.

Kṛṣṇātreyā, cited first from Hariv., and as physician in Caraka. Add xii. 210. 21, where it is said that he *cikitsitaṁ veda*.

¹ This word is a noun in xiii. 58. 3, and should be defined as *taḍāgādi*. The form *taḍāka* is found in Rām. Bomb. edition.

kāulāla = **kulāla**, 'potter,' N. to vii. 142. 62, *yathā cakram tu kāulālah*.

krama 8). Gālava, Bābhavyagotra, Pāñcāla, the grammarian, through the especial grace of the deity (who is *kramākṣaravibhāgavit*), and being instructed in the method of Vāma (deva), became the first shining light as a *krama*-specialist, xii. 343. 100-104. In vs. 105 appears Kaṇḍarika (in PW. only for Hariv.). The words *babhāu prathamam* may mean that Gālava invented the *krama* method of reading, but the reference to Vāma would seem to show that he did not get his wisdom directly from Vishnu.

kṣaya is an ordinary house, as well as that of gods; thus in xii. 168. 32, the house of a robber. To *kṣaya*, 'destruction,' add *koṣa°*, ruin of exchequer, xii. 321. 144.

khalīna. Nowhere does this word in the epic seem to mean a bit, but only a bridle. There is here no parallel to the later *khalīnam mukhe prakṣīpya*; nor is there, as in the Phaedrus, any mention of biting the horses of passion, a continuation of the metaphor almost inevitable, were bits in use. No word in fact is used that suggests a bit. Like the reins, *raçmi*, the *khalīna* is golden and is distinguished from the *yoktra* or *yugacarmāṇi*. The gender of the word is uncertain, neuter in vi. 54. 59, masculine in vii. 202. 75.¹ In the latter passage the *khalīnāḥ* of four horses are represented allegorically by the *upavedāḥ*; the (double) *pragraha* by *sāvitrī* and *gāyatrī*. No word like the later *kavi*, *ādhāna*, *mukhayantraṇa* is to be found in the epic, which seems to represent an interval between the headstall-bridle I have elsewhere described from the sculptures of the north *torāṇa* at Sānci,² and the post-epic mouth-bit. The former is evidently intended in Çat. Br. vi. 3. 1. 26-27, where the bridle that "lies around the mouth" is spoken of (*abhidhānā*). The allegorical car of viii. 34. 30 has *raçmayah* as counterpart of the *khalīna* and *pragraha* of the one mentioned above. Again, in viii. 24. 64, the only word to represent the bridle is *khalīna*, where ridden horses are "deprived of breast-coverings, tail-bands, ornaments, trappings, plumes, blankets, and *khalīnas*." Though the evidence is negative it is strong, and I think that *khalīna* in the epic means the bridle with a restraining band (perhaps spiked) behind the jaw, like those in the oldest sculptures.

khātapūrva, in *na khātapūrvam kurvīta (dhanam)*, xiii. 61. 25, is technical enough to deserve a special entry: "(A king)

¹ Starred as such in pw.

² JAOS. xix. 2, p. 31.

should not make (money by a tax collected on crops raised by people who in time of drought have been obliged to dig) wells, before (they can get a supply of water)."

gam with the dative, 3) c), is generally supposed to be syntactically the same with the accusative in epic Sanskr̥t. But the latter means 'get to,' 'arrive at,' while the former means 'start toward,' and answers not to the acc. alone but to *prati* with acc. Thus vi. 64. 82, *jagmuḥ svaçibiraṁ prati*, and 86, *prayātāḥ çibirāya*. So with other verbs of this sort. The goal aimed at is, moreover, almost always a resting place or abiding place. Examples: *gamis̥yāmi gr̥hāya* does not mean "I will arrive at" but "I will start for home," as is shown by the context, viii. 32. 51. So *prayayāu çibirāya*, *jagmuḥ svaçibirāya*, "started for the camp," viii. 95. 11; 96. 52; so too *vraja çibirāya*, *dudruve çibirāya*, viii. 94. 23; 95. 5; but the accusative *çibiraṁ gatvā* in 96. 7 means "after he had got to the camp." Compare also vi. 109. 7, *abhyavartanta yuddhāya*, "turned themselves to (the) fight," or, clear purpose (infinitive), *vadhāya nispetuḥ*, "came out to kill." A good instance of the purely local 'toward' meaning is found in iii. 113. 5, *paryāvavṛte çramāya*, "turned himself back toward the hermitage." So it is said, ib. 7, *bhavato çramāya gacchāva yāvan na pitā mamāi 'ti*, "let's start for your asylum before father comes." In R. also we have *gaccha antaḥpurāya*, 'start back for,' and *çatruvadhāya*, R. vi. 44. 15. The purpose, like the movement, is expressed with dative or *prati* as in (Mbh.) vi. 48. 90: *gadām jagrāha Bhīṣmasya nidhanam prati*. The difference is of course often imperceptible, for it is not always easy to say whether the poet means 'start for' or 'get to,' but when there is opportunity to see it the distinction is clear. With some verbs the exact action is never plain. Thus *tān prāhiṇon mṛtyulokāya*, vi. 54. 82, is not equal but parallel to the colloquial *agamayaḥ yamasādanam*. In 'casting toward,' however, the dative is used rightly, *arjunāya prajighāya bhallān*, vi. 59. 110. The fact that when attainment is clearly intended the acc. and not the dat. is used seems to strengthen the view that there is still a difference of meaning. So in the case cited above, the soldiers "made a great noise as they were going toward the camp," *çibirāya*; but elsewhere, "they went to bed after they had got to the camp," *nyaviṣanta gatvā çibiraṁ*, vi. 96. 80.

guṇabhāj, cited only (pw.) from Çāṅgadhara, Spruch 7669; add x. 3. 18: *samādhatte guṇabhāj guṇam*.

gr̥ñjanaka, in the passage cited, in PW., is explained by the scholiast not as a vegetable, but as the flesh of a wounded poisoned animal; that is, as identical with *gr̥ñjana*.

carma-vat, see **bāṇa-vat**.

cokṣa or **cāukṣa**, also in B. i. 214. 2 (v. l. *bhāikṣa*), a word of the later epic period.

jayaṣabda, ascribed to post-epic literature; add ix. 6. 22, *jayaṣabdāṅṣ ca cakrire*. As the compounds are somewhat irregularly entered, *tāla°* and *pāda°* as special words, *tala°* from Hariv., *jyā°* from Ṣāk., I add vii. 16. 36, *talaṣabdam mahat kṛtvā*; vii. 38. 19, *jyāṣabdaḥ guṇruve tasya talaṣabdaḥ ca dāruṇaḥ*; ib. 12, *bāṇaṣabda* (ib. 13, *jyātalatrasvana*); ix. 9. 14-15, *khuraṣabda* and *°svana*.

jihvāgra, cited from Vedic and classical literature; add xii. 206. 16.

tāla 3) f. **tālā**. The proposed reading (PW.) is a Gauda variant, according to N.

turaṅga, rare metrical variant; add to cit., viii. 27. 37.

tāilapāyika, sic; contained in some MSS. of Medh.'s text, M. xii. 63 : *tāilam vai tāilapāyikaḥ*.

trika 5) b), cited from Hariv.; add *bhagnapr̥sthatrikān, vāra-nān*, vi. 62. 51.

tritaya, cited from xiii; add ix. 64. 21 : *tritayaṁ sevitaṁ sarvam*.

triṣūlapāṇin, vii. 202. 42. Cited in PW. are *°varapāṇin*, *°hasta*.

darvihomin. To Nir. i. 14 add Jāim. Br., *aṣvīnāu darvihomināu*.

diṣo gacchati, cited only for persons, means 'is dispersed, is lost,' e. g. ix. 4. 42, *bhinne hi bhājane tāta diṣo gacchati tadgatam*, "when the dish is broken the contents is lost." Under the 'seven' *diṣaḥ* should first be cited RV. ix. 114. 3.

dharmahantar, with one epic reference; I add xii. 32. 8 for Professor Holtzmann (*honos auribus sit*), as it is the Kurus who are here called *dharmahantāraḥ*.

paṣuyājīn, cited only from Māt. S. in pw.; add ix. 50. 31, *lokāḥ paṣuyājīnām*.

prātisīma, cited from Divyāvad. in final App. pw.; add xiv. 4. 16 : *tatas tām ajayat sarvān prātisīmān narādhipān*. C. has *pratyamitrān*.

bāṇa-vat. The adverb I believe is not cited. It occurs xiii. 93. 47, *tr̥ṣṇā vidhyati bāṇavat*. I add here another reference to

the adverb *carmavat* (besides the one cited from the Upaniṣad), viz. xii. 110. 26: *ya imān sakalāñ lokāñ carmavat pariveṣṭayet*.

brāhmaṇacāṇḍāla. As some of the compounds are not referred to Mbh., I cite the whole of xii. 76. 6: *āhvāyakā deva-lakā nākṣatrā grāmayaṅjakāḥ Ete brāhmaṇacāṇḍālā mahāpathika-pañcamāḥ*.

mahājanāḥ, plural, xii. 321. 143; earliest case?

mahādāna, technical, cited from post-epic literature; add xv. 17. 17.

mitravatsala, cited only from Mudrār.; add ix. 6. 24.

rathaçakti. In pw. "wohl der Fahnenstock." But in ix. 16. 42 (cited), and in ix. 10. 38 ff. and xii. 4. 18, it is a sharp-pointed polished missile, with a golden handle (like other spears), and is regularly employed to kill people with, while it is not spoken of as holding a banner. It is probably a heavy spear.

a-çraddadhānā dharmasya te nacyanti na saṁçayah, iii. 207. 47, is cited as from "Brāhmadharma" in Spruch 3317. The first half of this Spruch is 46 b of loc. cit. above. The next half-verse, 47 b, contains one of the frequent epic Vedicisms, *mahā dṛtir ivā 'dhmātaḥ pāpo bhavati nityadā*, which shows that Bergaigne's interpretation of RV. vii. 89. 2 is also native, as does the parallel in xii. 95. 20-22.

sattra 3), pw. 4), as *dambha* or *vastra*; add xii. 321. 71 and 184, where the *bhikṣatī* is *satra* (sic) *praticchannā* (= *kapāṭa-sannyāsini* or *veṣāntareṇa guptā*, N.).

sampūrṇa as 'all'; add x. 1. 25, and note that in this verse *aṅguka* has the meaning of embroidered *vastra* or 'cloth of gold' (cited from drama and Spruch 7813 from Kalpataru): *grahanakṣatratūrābhīḥ sampūrṇābhīḥ alamkṛtam, Nabho 'ṅgukam ivā 'bhātī*.

suduçcara, cited from M.; add Mbh. ix. 48. 4, of *niyama*.

snigdhatva, cited once from Mbh. as Spruch, but with v. l. Add the passage ix. 35. 90: *snigdhatvād oṣadhīnām ca bhūmeç ca . . . jānanti siddhāḥ . . . nastām api sarasvatīm*. This is at the village Udapāna, where the river utterly disappears (as usually explained, because she is afraid of the Abhīras and Çūdras), but here she apparently leaves a trace above ground in the verdure over her supposed course; probably indicated by a green belt in the desert.

Asha as The Law in the Gâthas.—By LAWRENCE H. MILLS,
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Introduction: Methodological Principles.

ONE of the first results which we arrive at in a critical examination of the Gâthas is the discovery that the exact bearings of the words which may be said to express the names of the so-called *amesha spenta* (amshaspendas) are very different. Each of these names was obviously at first an abstract, and they are still often used as such in their more natural general sense; but again each is used equally often as 'applied,' to borrow an expression. To illustrate what I mean I will select the term *asha*.

The word *asha* is taken at times in its more general, and in what would seem to us to be also its more natural sense, as the *rta* of the Avesta, the rhythm of universal law. This, beyond a doubt, was first recognized in the regularity of natural phenomena; then it was regarded as an attribute of a beneficent deity who was its author and upholder, and also as the attribute of all personal beings who were in moral harmony with this deity and in ceremonial communion with him; then this quondam abstract becomes even yet more objective when spoken of (at first rhetorically) as a sub-god or archangel, the son of Ahura; and then we clearly see that at times the word actually occurs in such a way as to leave little doubt that it was used as the name of a being who was positively believed to exist. Then again, in a sense much lower than that first mentioned, it becomes the name for the unbroken regularity of certain definite external religious rites, in honour of both the chief deity and his personified attributes, which rites were performed in a certain sense in imitation of the phenomena of nature and by the use of the chief of them. From this stage the word became applied to the rules of the civil law; and finally, strange as it may appear, this term *asha* is used for the community itself, regarded as sacred, the nearest approach to which might be said to be the use of Israel as the name of the chosen race; and perhaps at times *asha* may even mean the individual orthodox believer.

This variety in the manner of applying this important concept of sanctity as inherent regularity, and so justice, does not sever

the idea in any of these applications from its original basis: it remains as much *asha*, the universal law, when embodied in the orthodox community as when regarded as the abstract justice or as the attribute of the Ahura or as his subordinated and affiliated companion. Nevertheless, in view of all the circumstances, this multiplicity in the usage of the word is singular in the extreme; and, strange to say, the tendency of criticism is rather to multiply than to condense these subdivisions, all beginners at the first revolting from such conclusions. Not that these subdivisions are at all definitely expressed in the language of the Gâthas; on the contrary, the absence of all definite designation is exactly what we remark as a striking peculiarity of the hymns; it is this poverty in the expression of ideas which lays upon us an endless task in endeavouring to exhaust the possibilities of exegesis. In interpreting such a word, one method, which seeks every possible feature in the direction of realism, aims first at the reproduction of whatever is commonplace, and so of the more probably historical; and insists, for example, first on our seeing the Congregation, as Roth would say the 'Gemeinde,' in *asha* wherever it may be at all possible. After that it looks out searchingly for the sub-god or archangel as the next least abstract and most realistic rendering; then as the law, 'das Gesetz,' it seeks to find *asha* first as the ritual—it is for this reason that I try to render the word 'holiness' rather than 'honesty' where it may be possible. As the next step it seeks to discover the civil statute; last of all, the purely moral law; and even this last concept it strives to see confined to personal subjects, divine or human, as an attribute; and only as the last possible resort should it acknowledge a pure abstract idea, totally apart from any particular being.

An analogous state of facts exists as regards *vohu manah* and each of the other *amshaspendas*, and it is worthy of further illustration here. To be critical, we should, for example, first seek to discover passages in which the word *vohu manah* occurs as expressing different shades of the idea in exactly the reverse of their usual and natural order. Thus, in the logical order of ideas, *vohu manah* would be, first, 'benevolent intelligence' (or possibly the word might mean what its root idea implies, the enlightened or bright intellect, in the abstract); then next in logical order it would be the same as the attribute of Ahura; third, the various abstract qualities as generated and maintained also within the mind of the orthodox citizen; fourth, this last rhetorically per-

sonified; fifth the Good Mind as an arch-angelic being or sub-god actually believed to exist; and, finally, the words 'good mind' are sometimes used quite simply for the good-minded citizen, the orthodox saint in full ecclesiastical standing. So much from the standpoint of logic. But according to the procedure of a critical school we should, on the contrary, first seek to discover every possible place where *vohu manah* can be recognised as meaning the good-minded man; then, when we have exhausted these passages, we should search for the occurrences of *vohu manah* as the sub-god; and so backward from each more realistic concept, never recognising the more abstract 'mental benevolence' till we are forced to it.

The same is true with regard to *khshathra*. The word primarily denotes the concept of 'ruling power'; then this power as the attribute of Ahura and his immediate servants; then this last rhetorically personified as a sub-god or archangel; then the same viewed as the actual personal archangel or sub-god fully believed to exist; then this authority is further personified in the chiefs of the little nation, the permanent government and administration, so to speak, of the day; then doubtless, groups of individuals, if not the head of the state, were at times intended to be indicated by the use of the word; and, finally, *khshathra* may well have meant at times even the land (but always in a semi-sacred sense). So, logically, and in the more natural order which a beginner seizes upon at once, and often retains with obstinate tenacity. But the procedure of criticism, on the other hand, should seek to find *khshathra* first as the land wherever it may be at all possible; then as the administration, the government; then as the kingdom; then as the archangel of the sovereign-power,—first as an actual being, then as rhetorically represented; then as the attribute of God; and only last of all as ruling authority in the abstract.

The same is true again of *armaiti*. In the light of logic, *armaiti* denotes first the mental motion, the alert or ready attention, prepared to act—'zeal' might be a good word for it, or 'devoted care'; then it was this special characteristic viewed as the attribute of Ahura and his immediate representatives, in the exercise of which he was prepared to act for the interests of his holy people (in this sense the word may be sometimes a masculine as in the Rk); then it was this attribute personified, at first rhetorically and then actually, as a being really believed to

exist; then it represents this devotion as embodied in the active functionaries of the holy church polity; for all we know, the word may have been used as we might use 'the democracy,' or 'the aristocracy,' so designating a definite group perhaps as 'the loyalty.' But in the light of criticism we should first seek to find this last of all the concepts, and see where it may be possible to speak of a party nicknamed 'devotion,'—not 'zealots' but 'zeal.' Then we should consider carefully whether some set of active functionaries were not often understood by the term; and so again backward, recognising the abstract 'alertness of attention, ready-mind,' only last of all.

We may turn to the two other abstractions. First, *haurvatât* is a somewhat different concept from the preceding; its natural meaning is 'wholeness, healthful well-being'; but it is used also as an attribute of the good deity inducing him to watch over the welfare and health of his people; then it is often this Health personified, first rhetorically, and then as a sub-god actually believed to exist, or the agent of Ahura that cares for his people; then, often in the later Avesta and possibly sometimes in the Gâthas, it seems to point to the source of health, the waters which were so justly sacred. But experienced students first seek to find the word in this latter application, and so backwards in the reverse of the natural and logical order. Similarly *amertât* is first 'deathless long life,' the remote postponement of death (for 'a hundred autumns,' as the Rk expresses it); then it represents this long life as shutting out the idea of death altogether, and, by a break, as the renewed long life after death, immortality (which was altogether a secondary concept); then it was this long life as the attribute of Ahura; then this attribute rhetorically personified; then actually personified as a sub-god imparting long life to the people. Then, in the later Avesta and perhaps even once in the Gâthas (?), it may point to the nutriment offered for the support of life by the vegetable world.

It may indeed seem very much more than curious that such shades, not to say divisions, of meaning should be discoverable in the use of terms, and that within the short compass of the Gâthas; but my business at present is not to deal with what is astonishing, but with what is the fact. I myself resisted these views as long as it was possible, and I finally yielded to them under the influence of Roth. Not only does criticism tend to recognize such distinctions and even to sharpen them, but it is true that even yet it

remains an extremely difficult thing to decide with absolute certainty where any given one of these shades of meaning is absent. Moreover, when it is acknowledged that any one of them may be present in any given passage, it often becomes exceedingly difficult to decide as to which particular one this is. In other words, it is difficult to determine the idea which the composer actually intended to express as the most immediate meaning to be conveyed in the language of which he made use. This peculiar circumstance presents the one difficulty which beyond all others tends to make the Gâthas the enigma which dismays investigation. In fact, these particular problems are not susceptible of a certified solution; for the key to them has perished with the life of the man, or men, who composed the verses.

Whether intervening explanatory matter has fallen out between the verses of the Gâthas, or whether it never existed, the fact remains indisputable that *asha*, *vohu manah*, *khshathra*, and the rest are not only used in the differing senses partially indicated above, but they are so used in passages closely contiguous to each other, and with no intermediary gradations of ideas expressed. To account for this we must frame an hypothesis as to detailed instructions by teachers. This, however, presents no difficulty. Priests went about, as a matter of course; and where they recited the Gâthas they explained these and their other now lost masses direct from the lips of their composers, and it is very probable that while Zarathushtra lived, this oral teaching was fairly accurate.

But although exact certainty as to the definite points expressed in the Gâthas can never be reached, a certainty within very clearly defined limits is easily attainable, nay, it is inevitable; for the terminology of the Gâthas is made up for the most part of extremely simple words, and these are largely dominated by the ever-recurring presence of one or other of the six, or, with Ahura, seven, names or expressions which I have roughly explained above. It is therefore obvious that the meanings which are prevalent in the successive strophes cannot deviate from a certain standard in their main tone; and if the paucity of the particles and terminations which express the syntax allows two, three, or even four possible alternative meanings, no one of these renderings can differ radically from the others as to the one characteristic of most value to the history of comparative religion and comparative morals, viz., the presence of a lofty tone. The fact that the Gâthas deal from beginning to end in apostrophes and

prayers addressed to a holy God, imploring of him the exercise of his truth, benevolence, authority, and energy, to secure for faithful men enduring welfare, comes out inevitably at every turn. Nay, the results that we may reach are not all limited to these. While the syntax is wretchedly poor in some respects, it is sufficiently forcible in others; and even if we leave out the more difficult words and indicate their absence by blank spaces, nevertheless enough remains to express some of the loftiest and noblest aspirations which had been experienced by human beings at the period in which we are forced to place the Gâthas, and amid circumstances such as those which we are obliged to recognize as the actual scene of the then existing civilization.

We are therefore more than amply rewarded by the meaning which we may succeed in setting free from the débris of these loosely associated fragments; and it becomes our duty to pursue our investigations till every recess, not to say every department, of our subject has been thoroughly examined with all the light that it may be possible to bring to bear upon it, sparing no labour whatsoever to uncover the most deeply-buried factor which may contribute toward the final completion of our task. To this object, as is known, the present writer has devoted many years; but as yet the work is hardly more than begun. To unfold the worth or errors of our Asiatic predecessors in a manner at all exhaustive, and in all their translations of the Avesta, of itself presents a task of extraordinary extent and difficulty; yet till that has been fully done, every conclusion which can be reached must be considered to be tentative. I am heartily in favour of attempting provisional conclusions, and at every step; but let us always plainly avow on what amount of investigation they have been hazarded.

In attempting to formulate the theology, or theologies, of the Gâthas, the first problems which confront us are those connected with the attributes, as we may for the sake of convenience call them. It will be necessary to trace out and collect all the passages in which each of the names that I have mentioned occurs, and to examine each of the possible meanings or shades of meaning, and endeavour to show in how far they agree as well as where they differ. I deal first with *asha*, as being the most prominent name next to that of Ahura in the Gâthas.¹ The order in which the

¹ *Vohu manah* assumes the first place only in the later Avesta, and possibly owing to a misconception of the meaning of Y. 28, 2.

differing phases of the idea may be viewed has been already indicated, but some words must be added to define more clearly the spirit in which we should proceed.

Two things are necessary: an energetic suggestiveness and a remorseless negative criticism. We should consider every idea that has ever been advanced on the subject, from whatsoever serious quarter it may have come, and we should add whatever schemes we may be able to invent; but we should not allow any views, however profoundly elaborated and by whatsoever gifted expositor, to pass without subjecting them to a severe and unrestrained scrutiny in a spirit of total distrust. To offset our liberties in free rendering (which I acknowledge are often most salutary, if not necessary), we should present as a *sine qua non* literal and verbatim renderings in the proper languages for such a purpose, that is to say, in Latin, and for oriental scholars beyond a question also in Sanskrit; for there is nothing which a superficial reproducer so dislikes as to have his audience see the letter of his texts, and on the Gâthas, strange to say, agreement, if not unanimity, can be very much more closely approached by the verbatim rendering of a great part of them, their difficulties, enormous as they are, lying chiefly in the syntax. From verbatim rendering we should proceed to practical suggestions in the most realistic possible sense, strictly postponing all consideration of the possible presence of any advanced religious sentiment approaching the modern tone.

It was far more natural, we may well say, that the early composers, deeply engaged as they were in a quasi-political struggle with marked religious elements, should speak first of the 'holy church,' *asha*, in any given passage where it may be possible so to render, rather than of the archangel *Asha* (see above). We should adhere to this view until we are positively driven from such a position, and then only should we yield to the claims of the personified sub-god for recognition. Then if we are indeed obliged to take up our stand upon the recognition of the archangel as the next least realistic view, our effort to resist any further encroachment of the abstract upon the domain of the objective should be genuine; all the available resources of investigation and argument should be brought to bear, and so at each succeeding approach of the claims of the more ideal views we should use the like defensive tactics with the most serious possible purpose, seeking to rescue the commonplace from the sentimental, the safe

from the hazardous, and only when totally unable to resist should we yield to the predominant presence of those loftier elements in *asha* which a beginner is nearly sure to find in it everywhere. In the same way we should conduct our investigations into the interior sense of *vohu manah*, *khshathra* and the rest.

Every expert in philology will know what I mean ; we must yield only when totally unable to resist our convictions, if those convictions point to the superspiritually religious or to the abstract moral sentiment in any given passage ; and this in the teeth of the fact that the abstract sentiment is literally expressed in the language as it stands before us in our texts. But such a determined scepticism ought to stimulate rather than depress our inventiveness, even when exercised in the very direction where the most suspicious of all possible conclusions are to be found ; for just in proportion as we exercise our iconoclastic repudiation of old beliefs in our first reported renderings, just in that proportion shall we feel the more free for alternative translation, which seems to me, after verbatim renderings, to be a great desideratum. Let us, as the first of all requisites in procedure, come to the closest possible quarters with our subject. And we need not be discouraged in adopting a procedure so drastic as that which I have sketched ; for, do what we may to overthrow every preconceived idea as to the presence of profound concepts in the Gâthas, we shall find that we are unable to succeed in annihilating them, for they will survive our most stringent tests.

It is necessary to state that our efforts must be regarded as limited, when directed towards the exclusion of concepts ; we are not called upon to decide that the higher meanings are positively absent from any given collection of words, for all the concepts, as we have often intimated, rest in a closely sensitive connection ; but we are called upon to decide, so far as we may be able to do so, as to which of the several concepts is the one originally intended by the composer to be immediately expressed in the words of any given passage which may be under discussion.

Asha as The Law.

In conducting my inquiry I shall follow, for the sake of convenience, the order of the strophes as they appear in the MSS. It will also be best not to attempt any too close distinctions in this section between the various shades of meaning which may be included within the concept of *asha* as understood to mean

primarily 'the law.' When we have reached this concept as a characteristic of the deity, it is only with difficulty that we can define it further except as an abstract. Even the main distinction between the attribute of the justice of Ahura and this attribute as personified, and also as embodied in the holy community, can never be traced with certainty in very many of the passages in the Gâthas. Owing to the poverty of the diction, which it is necessary to bear continually in mind, how much less should we expect to distinguish with complete assurance between the more subtle details into which the Avesta concept of Law itself alone could be divided. It is only proper to state on what principles we might divide such a concept, if division were possible and desirable at this place; and these subdivisions have been already indicated roughly, but with sufficient closeness for our present purpose.

In the following analysis, then, of *asha* as meaning 'the law,' the latter term will be regarded for convenience as including every subdivision of the idea from that of the abstract justice, which would be the highest, to that of the rubrics of the ritual, which might be regarded as the lowest, not forgetting that the same exceedingly close connection exists between these subdivisions of this idea of law as existed between the various principal conceptions of *asha* in general, of which 'the law' was simply a single item. And not only this: such a connection between the divided parts of the more closely defined *asha* (as 'the law') must of course be far more intimate than the connection existing between the less closely defined items of the main division; and for this reason our logical dissection must be all the more difficult and hypothetical, and strictly limited when attempting to say what meanings do *not* lurk in each of the concepts which we may define. My present task, therefore, is solely to point out what I regard as the main idea most distinctly intended to be conveyed by the language in the strophes; and it is not at all my duty to show that any one of the various shades of thought was positively or at all shut out, and not even believed to linger as latent in the words; just as in the entirety of the main or principal divisions one great idea pervades the subdivided details, so much the more does one controlling idea pervade each one of these still further subdivided elements.

The first possible occurrence of *asha* as immediately expressing the law as an attribute of Ahura is in Y. 28, 2: "Grant me the

acquired advantages of the beatific recompense, *dyaptā ashāt hacā*, in accordance with thine unfailing justice." The form here is the ablative of congruity, as we might term it, but the pervading mobility of the ideas shows itself at once. "In accordance with justice, or regularity," might possibly refer to the human supplicator, who asks for rewards well-earned by actions done by him, the supplicator, in obedience to the spirit of the law, as well as to the beneficence of the supreme dispenser of the recompense held in view; yet in either case, whether the words apply to the manner in which the rewards were earned or to the attribute of the rewarder, the concept present is that of law; "in accordance with *Asha*," as the archangel, would be an extremely improbable rendering, and is not at all indicated here, even in the most distant possible of inclusive allusions. God would not be guided by his own angel; much less is "in accordance with the members of the holy community" indicated, for these latter are especially excluded as being the recipients; they did not constitute the force which qualified the expected act of gift.

In Y. 28, 6: *vohū gaidī manānhā dāidī ashā-dāo daregāyā ereshvāiš tū ukhādhāiš Mazdā*, we have *asha* in *ashā-dāo* most probably as a member of a compound, but even in this position it expresses a qualification of the gifts, or giving, of Ahura, and it therefore qualifies his attribute of exact fidelity or justice; but see the passage treated elsewhere with terminology varied as much as possible for the purpose of expressing the various shades of the ideas which may possibly be present.

In Y. 28, 10: *at yēng ashātēā vōistā vanhēušcā dāthēng manānhō erethwēng mazdā ahurā aēibyō perenā āpandīš kāmēm*, the ablative of source or causality (so possibly) qualifies the mental action of Ahura, so to say, and refers to the exactness of his knowledge; it seems, in fact, to express his omniscience; but, with the ever present mobility of the idea, it is also possible, and perhaps rather more probable, that *ashāt hacā* may refer to the nature of the laws rather than to the knowledge of Him who establishes them.

We may have the ablative of congruity (so again to express this particular relation in the Gāthas) describing what he knows to be *ashāt hacā*, and the words may therefore refer only in a secondary sense to the manner in which Ahura exercises his knowledge; but at this place either rendering expresses a concept which belongs here, under the heading of law, and I am not

aiming at the present moment to treat any one of the differing divisions which lie under this general head apart and separate from its companion ideas. In Y. 29, 6: *nōit aēvā ahā vistō naēdā ratuš ashātciḥ hacā*, the words *ashāt hacā* qualify the sacred characteristics of the religious chief.

In Y. 29, 10: *yāzhēm aēibyō ahurā aogō dātā ashā khshathrem*, "Do ye, O Ahura, grant to these strength and a government in accordance with thy law," or "through thy fidelity," we have of course the divine attribute, if *ashā* was indeed intended to be understood as the adverbial instrumental expressing the action of the subject for the moment under view.

And here let me say that everything combines to induce us to recognize this adverbial instrumental where it may be at all possible to do so, rather than to take the word as being in the instrumental of association expressing companionship with another in the action described.

No serious reader anywhere, or at any time, so far as I am aware, has ever doubted that *ashā* means in some instances, at least, the abstract quality of regularity, as characterizing the action of Ahura in an adverbial instrumental case; and if this be the fact, how difficult it becomes to think of the instrumental *ashā* as merely sociative. Occasionally we may be able to degrade the term to such a meaning, and, as I have endeavored to show above, we must degrade the expression in this manner whenever it may be at all possible in producing our first renderings; but it is hard indeed to drag *ashā* down from its obvious work as the great adverb qualifying the manner in which the Supreme Good Being does, says, or thinks anything, and to make it mean, as we should indeed try to do, "in company with his archangel." *Ashā* is instrumental, rather than instrumental-sociative, in the Gāthas, whenever it can be shown to qualify the action of the Deity or indeed of holy men; and it is especially a most marked and noble term in this latter connection; for whenever we can render a sentence, "He," meaning a human being, "thinks, says or does anything *ashā*," we express the activity of the personal subject at the moment when all that is best in it is vitally aroused; and if man be ever a moral being at any time within the compass of these strophes,—and this is almost the chief question which we have before us,—he is such when this term is made use of to qualify his mental activity or its verbal and physical expression.

In Y. 30, 5 : *ayáo maniváo varatá yē dregváo acishtá-verazyó ashem mainyuš spēništó*, "Of these two spirits he who was evil chose to himself effecting the worst things, but the most beneficent spirit chose *asha*, the holy truth of the law," we may well have a dramatic allusion to the original exercise of the attribute of exact justice or regularity (not however in the instrumental), rather than merely the choice of a sub-god or archangel, the most bounteous spirit chose the Holy Law, exercising his attributed characteristic. So in Y. 31, 3 : *yām dáo mainyā áthrácá ashácá cóiš ránoibyá khshnátem*, "What satisfaction thou mayst cause to the two contenders by the fire, and the holy regulations," the holy fidelity (*ashá*) with which Ahúra assigns satisfaction to the two contenders is of course the exercise of the attribute of exact order (in the grammatical adverbial instrumental of activity). He did not, of course, use his holy justice as a mere tool or instrument foreign and external to himself; "What by fire thou didst establish, O spirit, and with thine exact regularity (*ashá*) for the two contending parties."

So in Y. 31, 5 : *tať mói vícidyái vaocá hyať mói ashá dátá vahyó*, "Tell me this, that I may discern it, since ye grant me through *asha* the better lot," cannot well mean "in company with *Asha*," much less "in company with, or by means of, the congregation," but "in accordance with thy law and impelled by thy justice" (the adverbial instrumental of action, and not of association).

So also as regards Y. 31, 13 : *tá cashmēñg thwísrá háró aibi ashá vaēnahí víspá*, we could not possibly say, "with thy brilliant eye as a guard on all in company with *Asha*," much less "with the congregation" thou art gazing.

In Y. 31, 21 : *mazdáo dadát ahuró haurvató ameretátascá búr-óiš á ashahyácá*, "May Mazda Ahura grant healthful weal and deathless life with the fulness of *asha*," the last words must of course refer to the plenitude of the holy system with all its manifold devices arranged for the acquisition of healthful weal and longevity. We could not possibly say, "with the fulness of the people themselves," who were to be the recipients of the advantages named.

In Y. 33, 5 : *apánó daregó-jyáitím* (sic) *á khshathrem v. m. ashát á erezūš pathó yaēshú m. a. shaētī* (sic), "The paths that are straight from their truth in which Mazda Ahura dwells," must refer (metaphorically) to the laws of the holy state, rather than to the community itself; the ways were the ways of holiness.

In Y. 33, 7: *dareshatcā ashā vohū manañhā yā sruyē[-vē] parē magdunō [-gavanō]*, we have what seems to be an indefinite *dareshat*, "Let him, i. e. let one, see through *asha*"; so, if the word is in the instrumental, "Let one of you Amesha (?) see, or let some representative of Ahura see, with holy insight." (But it would perhaps be better to render, "O Asha, let him, or one, see how I am heard"; the poverty of the syntax forces us to consider an alternative definition of the case.)

In Y. 33, 10: *vohū ukhshyā manañhā khshathrā, ashācā ushtā tanūm*, "Increase our bodily welfare through *asha*," must mean, through the practical effect of the holy statutes and regulations of the churchly state.

In Y. 33, 12: *us mōi uzdrshvā ahurā ārmaitī tevīshīm dasva . . . ashā hazō ēmavaṭ vohu manañhā feseratūm*, "With *asha* (if the word is in the instrumental) give us mighty strength"; that is to say, give us fortitude and facilities as the result of religious discipline; but the figure of the personified concept arises at once as an immediate secondary thought. (For *Ashā* as a possible vocative in an alternative sense, see elsewhere.)

In Y. 34, 1: *yā shyaothanā, yā vacañhā, yā yasnā ameretatātem ashemoḍ taḍibyō dāonhā*, Ahura gives *asha*, that is to say, the holy law with its various statutes, as both the expression and the application of his fidelity; he could hardly give either the community or the ameshaspend, although he might send the latter.¹

In Y. 34, 4: *aṭ tōi āthrēm, ahurā ajojōnhvañtem ashā usēmahi*, "strong through *asha*," said of the fire, cannot well mean that the holy fire was strong on account of the people (*ashā*); certainly not in consequence of their contributions of fuel. Nor was the personal Asha so immediately thought of; the sacred flame was strong through the entire service of the sanctuary and the law which hallowed it. So in Y. 34, 7: *naēcīm tēm anyēm yāshmaṭ vaēdā, ashā athā nāo thrāzdām [= °dvem]*, we have "through *asha* now do ye save us"; at first sight of course we think of the personal sub-god sent as the angel of deliverance (see below on Y. 43, 16); but I think that the efficiency of the religious sanctions was an equally prominent idea, or, if not that, then certainly a closely following secondary one.

¹ Yet Asha was not either an archangel or an angel in the Gāthas in exactly such a sense as that of a messenger sent, although he might indeed well have been so represented (see below on Y. 34, 7).

The expression *sēnghūš* leads us at once to the concept of the law as the source of instruction; so in Y. 34, 12: *sīshā náo ashā pathō vanhēuš hvaētiēng mananhō*, "Show us the paths through *asha*," must refer to the guiding statutes and admonitions of the civil and ecclesiastical law; wherever imparting information or arousing to action is the idea present, there we naturally render *asha* as the guiding or hortative law. So in Y. 34, 15: *mazdā at mōi vahishtā sravāoscā shyaothanācā vaocā tā tū vohā mananhā ashācā ishudem stūtō*, "Tell me, *asha*," means beyond a doubt, "instruct through the truthfulness of the law and in accordance with thy fidelity." It would not be in harmony with the prevailing tone in the Gāthas to render, "tell me through your messenger Asha," and still less so to translate, "tell me through the congregation."

In Y. 43, 2: *yā dāo ashā vanhēuš māyāo mananhō*, "what truths by *asha*," the instrumental of subjective activity, means, "what truths thou dost establish in the exercise of thine holy regularity and fidelity."

In Y. 43, 6: *yehyā shyaothanāiš gaēthāo ashā frādeñtē*, "By deeds of whom the settlements are furthered through *asha*," would not so naturally mean "through the community"; for the settlement itself practically expresses the idea of the community, and the community was to be the recipient and not the bestower of the benefits described. "Through Asha," the sub-god, would perhaps be our first thought (see above on Y. 34, 7); but the holy system in its entirety was the most emphatic *asha* which could be thought of, and it seems to arise at once as the completion of the impression ultimately made upon us by the words of the line.

So in Y. 43, 10: *at tū mōi dāiš ashem hyat mā zaozomī*, "Do thou show me *asha*," refers of course to the inherent sanctity, justice, and order of the law, which the deity is besought to reveal more fully to his disciple; "show us thine archangel" would be obviously absurd, though not so much so as "show us thy congregation." If the verb should be rendered 'provide' the case would be even stronger.

In Y. 43, 12: *hyatcā mōi mraoš ashem jasō frākhshnenē*, where Ahura says "come for light to *asha*," the word must refer to his law as the expression of his attribute; for he would not so naturally invite the people to approach the congregation *asha*, or even to approach the church *asha* unless that church *asha* was considered to be in a very especial sense inspired and guided as the

divine instrument for the enunciation of precepts and other enlarged revelations to the people; that is to say, *asha* could not so well represent the priesthood here as the exclusive source of enlightenment; for such a meaning, though natural enough to our ears, was hardly possible at the Gāthic period, while "come to Asha," the personal archangel now revealed in vision to you, is highly improbable if not impossible, and again absurd.

In Y. 43, 14: *hyat̐ thwā khshathrā ashāt̐ hacā frāštā*, "When in thy government (endowed with political office in the holy state) I stand forth,¹ *ashāt̐ hacā*," "in company with the congregation," is not a probable rendering in any sense, while to stand forth in presence of them cannot be regarded as expressed in the words; nor is it likely that we have a bodily appearance, so that the sage might be supposed to utter the words, "at the side of the archangel, *ashāt̐ hacā*." It is of course possible that the personified holiness was meant; but if so it is mentioned in an especially deep and spiritual sense, as we should say, "filled with thine Holy Spirit," which partakes too much of the superspiritual religious sentiment. A better rendering would be, "when fortified by thy sovereign power in accordance with thy holy law (ablative of congruity) I stand forth." That *ashāt̐ hacā* should here refer to the community is further improbable from the fact that *ashavan* in that sense (or near it) appears in the succeeding strophe. When a word with a possessive suffix appears in an immediate context with the word which constitutes its own base, and in an occurrence where the full suffixed word has a certain realistic meaning, it seems unjustifiable to attribute the full realistic meaning of the suffixed formation to its bare unsuffixed base or stem which so immediately precedes: if *ashāunō* means 'of the saint' in Y. 43, 15, *at̐ tōi vīspēñg añgrēñg ashāunō ādarē*, *ashāt̐ (hacā)* cannot well mean 'with the saint' in Y. 43, 14; and the improbability of such an idea is still greater in view of Y. 43, 16, *astvat̐ ashem hyāt̐ uštānā aojōñghvat̐ . . .* (than which there is no more striking passage in the literature of the period to which we must approximately assign the Gāthas), "Let *asha* become *astvat̐*, clothed with body." "Let the congregation (*asha*) become incarnate," would of course be nonsense. If the word *asha* in Y. 43, 16 needs to be qualified by such a strong adjective as *astvat̐* in order that it may possess sufficient force to represent the idea 'people,' it is hardly

¹ This rendering for *frāštā* is not essential to the present point.

possible that *asha* can mean the people in the closely preceding strophe where it stands without either suffix or adjective. To consider this Y. 43, 16 in itself, we may say that the personified *amesha* might be regarded as meant, but only as in a figure of speech. The meaning beyond all question is, "Let the law be so firmly embedded in the convictions of the communities that its holy injunctions may be represented by living persons devoted to them," with the result that they may secure the rewards; for *vohā manāhā* in the last line is certainly the adverbial instrumental of action, and expresses neither the name of the archangel nor the good-minded man, but the benevolence present in the bestowal of the rewards. If Asha as the archangel were intended, he could only be referred to here as in the supposititious case just mentioned above; that is to say, in a sense the most emphatic possible, and including within himself the presence of the holiest principles of truth and justice in the fullest exercise: "Let Asha, the holy archangel of piety and honour, become incarnate in our tribes"; but this would differ little from the view described above as our own "Let the law be embodied."¹

In Y. 44, 1: *aṭ nē ashā fryā dazdyāi hākurenā . . .*, "Give us with *asha* friendly coöperations" (or some other friendly concessions), cannot mean in company with Asha, nor with the congregation, but it must mean, in accordance with thine holy fidelity as made known in the moral, civil and ritualistic statutes of thy law.

So in Y. 44, 2: *hvō zī ashā spēntō irikhtem vīspōibyō hārō mainyā ahāmbiš urvathō* (sic) *mazdā*, the action of Ahura is qualified by *asha*, the holy law, in the adverbial instrumental case, as the means of the expression of his attribute in its action: "Through his holy equity and by means of the discipline of his law he holds ruin afar"; (or if this rendering be not liked, then "he holds some evil afar." The particular nature of the evil is not here essential to our point).

In Y. 44, 6: *yā fravakhshyā yezī tā athā haithyā ashem shyaothnāiš debāzaitī ārmaitiš*, "Doth Armaiti increase *asha*," *ashem* must mean the personal devotion and sanctity of the indi-

¹ Notice how impossible *asha* becomes when understood as the mere ritual; "May the ritual become incarnate" does not offer a possible solution. In passing, see also *ashi* close to *asha*, necessitating a certain sanctity in our concept of the reward, the sacred recompense hallowed by the solemn guarantees of the law.

vidual citizen, reflecting the great attribute indeed, but by no means identical with it; how could any power increase *asha*, or the holiness of the law.¹

In Y. 44, 8: *yācā vohā ukhdhā frashī manānhā yācā ashā anhēuš arēm vaēdyāi*, in the words, "And what things are for the knowing or obtaining of *anhēuš arēm* through *asha*," we have evidently the divine machinery of the holy ritual and revelation. In Y. 44, 10, "The furthering of the *gaēthā* is through *asha*," as the combined detail of the holy statutes and regulations; but the form of the great Immortal also reveals itself in the sentiment expressed. Notice the *ashavā* of Y. 44, 12, *kē ashavā yāiš peresdi dregvāo vā*, in its natural meaning 'saintly citizen,' which, as in the case noticed above in Y. 43, 15, renders it still more difficult to translate the foregoing *asha* (not yet provided with the suffix) as meaning 'the congregation'; if *asha* meant the congregation in one strophe, *ashavan* in the next would more naturally mean 'the person who possessed the congregation'; but this would not express any probable meaning.

In Y. 44, 15: *yezī ahyā ashā pōi maṭ khshayehī*, "If over this event thou rulest by *asha*," can only mean, "if thou rulest in accordance with, and by virtue of, thy law and fidelity"; he could not rule over things by means of the congregation; and *khshathra*, not *asha*, would be the proper personification of his authority if the personal concept is supposed to be the one immediately intended to be described.

If Y. 44, 17: *sarōi bāzhdyāi haurvātā ameretātā avā māthra yē rāthemō ashāt hacā*, should read, "With that *manthra* which is our guiding charioteer," then *ashāt hacā* can not so well mean "in company with the people" as "in accordance with thy law." "How with justice (*ashā*) shall I gain the reward" is doubtless the meaning in Y. 44, 18; *kathā ashā taṭ mīzhdem handnī*, and not, "how with, by, or through the congregation shall I acquire it," for the congregation could only in a very especial connection be regarded as the source of benefits, much less of the bestowal of rewards; they were almost invariably, as has been remarked above, either the recipients or the anxiously expecting supplicants pleading for some expected advantage.

In Y. 44, 20: *noīti hīm mīzēn ashā vāstrem frādaiñhē*, "to cause the meadows to prosper" would be quite probably referred

¹ This occurrence of *asha* must be recalled under another heading.

to Asha as the archangel, but "through the sacred and practical regulations of the agricultural state" would be the real sense, while "through the congregation" is excluded; for the pastures closely represented the interests of the people; such a rendering would give, "Mayst thou advance the prosperity of the property of the people through the people themselves," an idea too advanced for the period and the circumstances.

If in Y. 45, 4: *at fravakhshyā anhēuš ahyā vahištem ashāt hacd vaēdā mazdāo yē īm dāt*, we have "Mazda knows the best person, or thing, in accordance with *asha*," then *asha* must represent his innate sense of fitness, the attribute of exact adjustment; *ashāt hacd* is therefore again the ablative of congruity (so to term it), while "with the congregation" would quite invert the sense.

In Y. 45, 6: *at fravakhshyā vīspanām mazištem stavas ashā yē hudāo yōi heñtī*, we have *ashā* as ritual, "praising with *asha*"; so in Y. 45, 8: *vīduš ashā yēm mazdām ahurem*, the word *asha* is the liturgy, the law which constitutes the means by which the composer believes himself to know Ahura. Here *ashā* could not possibly mean, "with the people," still less, by means of them; see also *ashāunō* again as "one of the people" in the preceding strophe. We must not be tempted to attribute a superspiritual sense here; "knowing Ahura through the vivified instincts of a holy disposition," was a concept which may have arisen as a sort of response in the mind of the composer, but it was hardly the first and immediate idea intended to be conveyed in the language of which he made use. Notice the singular application of *asha* in Y. 45, 9, in the inner circle (so to speak) of these heptade ideas, *vanhēuš ashā haozāthvāt ā manānhō*, "through the *asha* of *vohu manah*," through the holiness of the benevolence in the good citizen the herds and population were prospered. Even if we had taken *vanhēuš manānhō* here as 'the disciple' endowed with a 'noble disposition' by *asha*, it would not do to render "in accordance with, or through, the congregation," as the first and immediate sense intended to be conveyed by the words "through the *asha* of *vohu manah*"; *asha* might possibly represent the archangel here; but surely it was not through the church (so to speak) in Y. 45, 10, *hyat hōi ashā vohucā cōišť manānhā khshathrōi hōi haurvātā amerētātā*, that Ahura establishes "healthful weal and deathlessness" within that church itself. It was through the beneficent operation of his own holy law that this was accomplished, in restraining the deleterious

influences of vice and the neglect of productive labour with sanitary discipline.

The instrumental *ashá* in Y. 46, 2: *ákhsó vaiñhēuš ashá ištīm manāñhó*, continues to exclude the immediate expression of the idea of the congregation or the church. Ahura does not teach (so rendering) through the congregation the riches of *vohu manah*; still less would he be asked to hear (so preferring) the prayer of the good man (so rendering also here) in accordance with the sentiment of the people, or with their help.

If in Y. 46, 9: *yá tōi ashá yá ashái gēuš tashá mraot*, the "kine's creator" be Ahura (in his immediate and personal agency), then *asha* is of course the attribute; we might even say that *asha* was the attribute in case the kine's creator represented a somewhat subordinate conception, that is to say, God in the person of his closely associated subordinate agent. The word is in the adverbial instrumental of activity.

In Y. 46, 13: *tēm vē ashá mēhmaidī huš-hakhāim*, *asha*, while closely referring to the influences of the law, recognizes them as operating within the mind through saintly character, here of the human individual, whose character, when it is described as righteous by the use of other forms of *asha*, is mentioned elsewhere.

Y. 46, 17: *yē vīcinaot dāthemcā adāthemcā dañgrā mañtū ashá mazdāo ahuró*, "May Ahura give heed with his holy fidelity, *asha*," is equivalent to a prayer that he may exercise his attribute.

In Y. 46, 18: *mazdā ashá khshmākem vārem khshnaoshemnó*, if *asha* be in the instrumental (?), it refers to internal spiritual character, here of the human individual (as to which see also elsewhere); so also at Y. 46, 19: *yē mōi ashāt haithīm hacā vareshaitī*.

In Y. 47, 1: *hacā ashāt shyaothnācā vacaīñhācā, ashāt hacā* really appears in the sense under consideration, as it qualifies in the adverbial ablative case the action of Ahura; but it evidently projects the idea beyond such a concept into that of the derived activity of the faithful citizen: if Ahura with *vohu manah*, *khshathra*, and the rest, grants weal and deathlessness to his people in accordance with *asha* in words and actions, these words and actions must naturally be those which his holy order inspires within the community.

I should say that we are almost warranted on the whole in attributing personification to Asha in Y. 48, 1: *yezī adāiš ashā drujem vēññhaitī* . . .; it is only with some effort that we are able

to say that the heroic leader might conquer his profane opponent "influenced by the holy attribute of the supreme beneficent deity," although the idea of the leader's rectitude certainly lurks in the place; but we are not dealing here with what lurks,—all the differing shades of meaning may lurk here as everywhere. Yet I experience much hesitation here; the instrumental, almost in the sense of a nominative, seems certainly possible, "the one-with-*asha*"; so Y. 29, 3.

As to the recurring instrumental in Y. 48, 3: *aṭ vaēdemnāi vahishtā sāśnanām yām hūdāo sāsṭi ashā ahurō*, it cannot of course refer to the people as the instrument through which Ahura declares his doctrines; for these latter were addressed to the church by the saoshyants and not by the church (as yet) to the pagans; *asha* is here the divine attribute, the word being adverbially used to qualify the utterance. In the closely following Y. 48, 6: *aṭ ahyāi ashā mazdāo urvarāo vakhshat ahurō . . .*, it might seem at first sight as if the people as agriculturists were meant as those through whom "Ahura caused the crops to grow," yet looking further we see that it was "at the begetting of the primeval world" that this took place, in which case it would not refer to the people; *asha* might here be almost that universal law of regularity in nature, aside from any developed religious sense, in accordance with which Ahura caused vegetation to develop as the source of nourishment for the animal world. In Y. 48, 7: *yōi ā vanhēnš manānhō dīdraghzhōduyē ashā vyām yehyā hithāuš nā speñtō*, the faithful would not so naturally be admonished to "hold by the refuge, or the way," with the help of those faithful themselves (*ashā*), especially not when the words "the holy, or bountiful, man" immediately follow; the faithful are those who are exhorted to cling to the *vyām* in the exercise of holy characteristics.

So also in Y. 48, 8: *kā thurōi ashā ākáo aredrēng ishyā*, it is the religious characteristic which is referred to as expressing itself in the prayers of the holy ritual, and the meaning is not at all, "how shall I search out the helpers together with the congregation *asha*," which is of course impossible. The adverbial instrumental in Y. 48, 9: *kadā vaēdā yezī cahyā khshayathā mazdā ashā yehyā mā . . .*, of course applies to the activity of the holy order of the deity as an attribute, and the words hardly mean, "over what do ye rule with the help of the congregation (*ashā*)"; for it was the leaders of the holy church who were themselves anxiously

putting the question whether God through his holy order was ruling over anything whatsoever. In Y. 48, 12: *yôî khshnûm vohû mananhâ hacâontê shyaothndîš ashâ (thwahyâ mazdâ sēng-hahyâ . . .)*, "Aye, those shall be the princely saviours of the provinces who follow closely the propitiative worship in deeds (of exact external ceremonial and internal justice, done) in accordance with the law, *ashâ*," and not done "in connection with the holy community and by their help." The conception of social relations in the sparse settlements was as yet largely aristocratic, the saoshyants would help the people, and not the people them. This Y. 48 seems to be a strong *asha* chapter; and in nearly all the occurrences the word refers to the law, sometimes in a sense approaching the personification, but still it is the law not yet embodied in the holy state. In Y. 49, 1: *yē dušerethrîš cikhs-nushâ ashâ mazdâ . . .*, the defeated princely priest does not hope to win over either the disaffected among the subdued community or the furious conquerors in their momentary triumph with the help of, or by means of, the holy church itself, but for the holy church and by the exercise of a moral characteristic, whether or not the notion of the stately ecclesiastical ceremonial was also included within the idea.

In Y. 49, 5: *ârmatôîš kascîš ashâ huzēntuš . . .*, *ashâ* refers to the divine attribute as reflected within the human subject. In Y. 49, 7: *sraotâ ashâ gûshahvâ tû ahurâ . . .*, whether *ashâ* is to be taken in the quasi-nominative sense or not, i. e. "he-with-*asha*," the word must mean "hear with the divine holiness," or, "let one hear because the divine holiness is in him"; a rendering "listen with the congregation" would be an extreme *reductio ad absurdum* in view of the tone of Gâthic expressions throughout.

If *ashâ* in line c. Y. 50, 7: *aš vē yaojâ . . . mazdâ ashâ ugrēng vohû mananhâ . . .*, refers to Mazda, we have the divine attribute indicated; if to the composer, we have the human. In the latter case, however, it may be the ritual with which the believer "yokes on the mighty steeds," or indeed it may be with this that he prays Ahura to yoke them on; but we must never forget that the ritual was to the congregation, if not to the princely priest, almost as the echo of the articulate voice of the deity; and this, whatever may happen to be our opinion of the teachings and practices which gradually developed such a sentiment; the fact that the liturgy was the first thought on hearing the words of this strophe from the lips of the priest by no means excludes the fact that the

attribute of the divine holiness was from the very nature of both concepts also intended to be expressed by the words as a sort of after-thought.

So in Y. 50, 9: *táiš váo yasnáiš paiti-stavas ayenī mazdā ashā vanhēuš shyaothanāiš manānhō . . .*, it may be that the ritual was meant, but if so then its holiest associations were uppermost in the composer's thoughts.

In Y. 51, 3: *ā vē gēushā hēmyāntā yōi vē shyaothanāiš säreñtē ahurō, ashā-hizvāo ukhđhāiš vanhēuš manānhō . . .*, we might offer an alternative in the sense, "They are gathering for the sake of your hearing," in order that you may hear, . . . "those who are guarded by your mighty deeds of providence and ceremonial" (?); "they are gathering with *ashā*-tongue," that is to say, with the recital of the ritual, as alternative to "O Asha."

In Y. 51, 16: *tām kavā vištāspo magahyā khshathrá nāsať vanhēuš padebīš manānhō yām cistīm ashā mañtā . . .*, *tām . . . cistīm ashā* must certainly express a holy gnosis, "in accordance with the divine sanctity of which Mazda conceived it"; the personified archangel is hardly indicated. And in Y. 51, 22: *yehyā mōi ashāt hacā vahištem yesnē paiti vaēdā ahurō . . .*, while the concept of the personified Asha may seem to be expressed, I think on reflection that *ashāt hacā* here means the ritual, with distinct allusion to the Yasna itself. "Mazda Ahura recognizes him whose best gift is presented with exact regularity, *ashāt hacā*, in the course of the celebration of the Yasna."

In Y. 53, 1: *yezī hōi đāt áyaptā ashāt hacā ahurō . . .*, the *asha* which appears in *ashāt hacā*, and in accordance with which Ahura is said to bestow his gifts, must be the divine attribute, as the immediate thought uppermost in the mind of the composer and intended by him to be most prominently conveyed in the language of which he made use. On the other hand *ashā* in *ashā vē anyō ainīm vivēnghatā . . .* in Y. 53, 5, expresses the characteristic of fidelity in the affections of human beings.

It is then abundantly clear that *asha* very often means the characteristic of holy regularity, sanctity, and justice in the Gāthas; and that this is especially the case when the word stands in the instrumental case and qualifies a verb, expressed or understood, the subject of which is Ahura. Whenever Ahura is said to think, speak, or do anything *ashā*, we have almost always beyond question the regular adverbial of the characteristic in

the exercise of which he so thinks, speaks, and acts. That is to say, this is the first and natural use of such a noun in the instrumental case in such a connection, and its force is the more unmistakable here because the original meaning of the word of itself leads us to regard it as qualifying the action of a deity. That meaning expresses one of the very first conceptions of the idea of law which the human race could have formed for itself. An undeviating regularity soon began to be observed in the appearances, movements, and disappearances of the heavenly bodies, and as the human being rose still more fully out of his animal condition, the recurrences of the differing seasons began to be recognized, and each of these phenomena was attributed to a divine agency. Therefore, when we meet the word in the Gâthas inflected in the manner described, and pronounced in immediate connection with the activity of Ahura, the conclusion is irresistible that the word expresses the sublime rhythm in the regularity of his procedure which was supposed to follow from the internal characteristic or attribute which was believed to reside in his nature. So simple and strong is the impression which we receive from the language in the various passages where the word occurs that it requires very positive circumstances to induce us to superimpose upon this concept (that of the regularity of his action) the further concept of hypostatization; that is to say, it is difficult for us to supersede in our exegesis the adverbial of the thought by the adverbial of association expressing the coöperation of an affiliated person who corroborates the influence of the Almighty by assisting him in his work. Certain it is that no such concept as Asha, the archangel, could ever have arisen without the previously conceived idea of such a sanctity as is described seated in those very preliminary sensibilities which alone could prepare the way for the mental conception of the existence of such a being.

Indo-Iranian Contributions.—By A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON,
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1. *Sanskrit váhīyañs.*—2. *Sanskrit karṣa, a weight, in Ancient Persian.*—3. *Sanskrit chala in Ancient Persian.*—4. *Avestan aoda, Sanskrit uda-, udan-.*—5. *Avestan vītāpəm, Yt. 19. 82.*—6. *Avestan spəñtō-frasnā, Vd. 22. 19.*—7. *The curse of a cow brings childlessness.*—8. *The hōm-plant and the birds in the Dinkart.*—9. *The national emblem of Persia.*—10. *Ancient Persian τικτά in Hdt. ix. 110.*

1. *Note on Sanskrit váhīyañs.*—In ZDMG. l. 423 Oldenberg emphasizes the fact that, according to Indic usage, Skt. *váhīyañs* in the Rig-Veda indicates the good driving qualities of horses, or their merits in a draft capacity ($\sqrt{vah-}$). The same observation may be made regarding an Iranian matchword to *váhīyañs* which I noted at the annual meeting of the Society a year ago, April 1897. In the Avesta, Yt. 10. 20, *vazyāstra* (metrically *vazyās-tara*) is to be identified with Skt. *váhīyañs*. The double comparative (here formed on the strong stem) is to be explained like Skt. *gariyas-tara*, etc., Whitney, *Skt. Gr.* § 473 d. The text of Yt. 10. 20 is accordingly given, and is translated: *aspacī yōi miθrō-drujām | vazyāstra bavaiñti | taciñtō nōi apayeñti*, “Of those who deceive Mithra, even the horses which are best at drawing do not succeed in overtaking, though they run.” My rendering in the Proceedings for May, 1889=JAOS. xiv. p. cxxvi, is to be corrected accordingly.

2. *Sanskrit karṣa-, a weight, in Ancient Persian.*—I am not sure whether attention has been called to the fact that Skt. *karṣa-*, signifying a special weight (cf. PWb. s. v. *karṣa-*), is also to be found with a similar meaning in Ancient Persian. This word occurs on a denominational weight that is found in the British Museum and is stamped with the name of Darius: *ii karšā. Adam Darayavauš Xšayaθiya . . .* “a two (2) *karsha*-weight. I am Darius,” etc. (Cf. Weissbach und Bang, *Alt pers. Keilinschriften*, pp. 7, 40, and Weissbach, *Achäm. der zweiter Art*, p. 95.) Notice also the dual form in *ā*, like AP. *gaušā*. It

remains for a mathematician to work out the proportional relation between the Hindu and the Persian weight of this denomination. [This calculation my pupil, Mr. Louis H. Gray, has since made; and he finds there is as great a variation in the weight of the *karša*, *karša* as there is in the *pound* in different countries and at different epochs. Mr. Gray's notes show, from Pwb., Skt. *karša* = 16 *māsha* = $\frac{1}{4}$ *pala* = $\frac{1}{4} \frac{1}{16}$ *tulā* = 11.375 grammes. The Persian weight in question weighs 2573 grains Troy = 176.7304 grammes (1 gr. Troy = .0648 gramme) = 15.5 Ind. *karšas*, whence 1 Pers. *karša* = 7.25 Ind. *karša*.]

3. Skt. *chala-* in Ancient Persian, NRa 52; a suggestion.—For the fragmentary word |ΞΞ| in the ancient Persian inscription, NRa 52, which has long been a crux to interpreters, I should suggest an identification of the form with Skt. *chala-*, 'deceit, fraud, treachery.' This answers the phonetic requirements *r/l*, and we have other examples of Skt. *ch* = Iranian *s*, e. g. Anc. Pers. \sqrt{ras} -, Mod. Pers. *rasīdan* = Skt. *rechati*. The sense would be excellent in connection with the familiar *drauga-*: "May Auramazda protect me and my house and this country from treachery (or deceit)," *mām auramazdā pātuv hacā sar . . . utāmaiy vitham utā imām dahyāum*. Whether we are to read the ablative as *sar(āt)*, *saru(kāt)*, or the like, must depend upon the nature of the broken part of the stone. Bezold's translation of the Babylonian version (p. 37) is "vor allem Bösen."

4. Avestan *aoda-*; cf. Sanskrit *uda-*, *udan-*.—For the etymology of Av. *aoda* in the loc. pl. form *aodaēšu*, Vd. I. 19, Yt. 12. 18, we may compare Skt. PWB. *uda-*, *udan-* 'water,' in *uda-dhi-*, *uda-megha-*, and similar words. To explain Av. *ao* = Skt. *ū*, *ū*, I should suggest consulting Caland, KZ. xxxii. 466. Thus *aodaēšu Ranhayā* is "at the streams of the Ranha"; for the rendering 'streams' see also West on the Pahlavi text in *SBE*. xlvii. 151, note. [As an addition in the proof-sheet I refer also to R. Otto Franke on *uda* in Pāli, in *ZDMG*. xlviii. 85.]

5. Avestan *vītāpəm*, Yt. 19. 82.—The word *vītāpəm* is somewhat troublesome in Yt. 19. 82. The passage which describes how the Kingly Glory flies away to escape capture reads: *ā-taṭ xʷarəṇō frazgaḍata | avi vayān vītāpəm*. For *vītāpəm* I should propose the meaning 'out of reach'; and I should construe it as an adjective, in the predicate, with *xʷarəṇō* almost as a synonym of the oft-recurring *axʷarətm*, cf. also *dužāpəm* (-īm). We may then refer to *vīta* in Vd. 9. 11, and for the usage of *ap-*, *āp-* 'to

reach,' we may turn to Ys. 57. 29. For further suggestions as to the signification and as to *vayān*, see Geldner, *Studien zum Avesta*, 160 f. Thus *gloria discedit intacta in auras* would be the idea of the phrase, for as soon as the wicked Fransyan tried to seize it "the Kingly Glory vanished out of reach (*vitāpəm*) into the air."

6. *Avestan spəntō-frasnā*, Vd. 22. 19.—In the form *spəntō-frasnā* we are to see a dual at Vd. 22. 19, *gairīm avi spəntō-frasnā | varəšəm avi spəntō-frasnā*, "To the mountain of the holy-questioners, unto the wood of the holy-questioners." The two that are holding communings are Ormazd and Zoroaster. This is evidently borne out by the Pahlavi Version, ed. Spiegel, p. 232: *gar avar aiγ afzūnīk frāz ham-pūrsūt aūharmazd zaratūšt; vanāšak (?) madam aiγ afzūnīk frāz ham-pūrsūt aūharmazd zaratūšt*, "Unto the mount that is of beneficence where Aūharmazd conversed with Zaratūst; Unto the forest," etc. The grammatical form *frasnā* is to be explained as gen. du. from an *an*-stem *frasan-*, like *māθran-*, *puθran-*, cf. Skt. *in*-stems; see Whitney, *Skt. Gr.*² § 1183 and Bartholomae in *Grundriss d. iran. Phil.* i. § 188, 2. [As a postscript in the final proof-sheet I add that Bartholomae has just sent me his 'Arice X' in *IF.* ix. 252 f. I am interested in seeing that he has dealt with *spəntō-frasnā* on p. 273 f., and has come to the same conclusion. For *vanāšak (?)* read *u vēšak* with B.]

7. *The curse of a cow brings childlessness*.—For a Sanskrit parallel to the passage in the Avesta, Ys. II. 1, where the curse of a cow brings childlessness upon the one who has offended the creature, compare, among other parallels, Kālidāsa's *Raghuvans'a* i. 75 f. Of a different character is Mhbh. i. 118. 5-34.

8. *The hōm-plant and the birds in the Dīnkart*.—It may possibly interest those who have been attracted by the Vedic legend of Soma and the Eagle (e. g. Bloomfield, *JAOS.* xvi. 1 ff.) to know that there is a very distant and remote likeness in a Pahlavi passage of the *Dīnkart* (7. 2. 22-28), which associates in a curious manner the hōm-plant and the birds. The text is translated by West, *SBE.* xlvii. 24; but the resemblance is so slight that the point is of little importance; it is merely the association that may be worth recording.

9. *The national emblem of Persia*.—Persia is known to-day as the Land of the Lion and the Sun. For the legendary explanation of the symbol Sol in Leo, see Gordon, *Persia Revisited*, pp.

131, 137. In earliest times the leathern apron of Kāvah the Blacksmith served as the royal banner of the Peshdadian dynasty, and it continued to be the ensign of Iran down to the fall of the Sassanian kingdom, cf. *Kāviyānī dirafš*, Shāh Nāmah ed. Vullers, i. p. 48, and Justi *Namenbuch*, p. 160, s. v. 'Kāweh.' There seems to be good reason also for recognizing, by the side of this, the eagle as the kingly emblem of Persian sovereignty (compare the American eagle beside the Stars and Stripes). So far as I know, the classic writers regarded the eagle as the regal standard of Iran; see Xenophon, *Cyropædia* vii. i. 4, *Anabasis* i. 10. 12; Aeschylus *Persæ* 205-210; and perhaps likewise compare Isaiah xlv. 11 (Haug's *Essays*, p. 4, note). This is in keeping with allusions to the eagle or falcon in such passages as Avesta Yt. 19. 34, Pahlavi *Kārnamē ī Artakshūr ī Pāpakān*, 3. 10-20 (ed. Darab D. P. Sanjana), and it accords with the references in the Shāh Nāmah, ed. Vullers-Landauer, i. p. 295, iii. p. 1544; Mohl, *Le Livre des Rois*, i. p. 363-4, iv. p. 345; and the citations s. v. *humāi* in Vuller's *Lexicon Persico-Latinum*, p. 1472; Nöldeke, in *Grundr. d. iran. Phil.*, ii. 133; Robinson, *Persian Poetry for English Readers*, p. 487.

10. *Ancient Persian τυκτά in Herodotus ix. 110.*—Herodotus ix. 110, mentions the festival of Xerxes' birthday, and he says that the feast which is prepared once a year to commemorate the day on which the king was born is called *tuktá* (τυκτά); this, he adds, is to be interpreted in the Greek as meaning 'perfect' (τέλειον). The text runs: τὸ δαίπνον παρασκευάζεται . . . ἐν ἡμέρῃ τῇ ἐγένετο βασιλεὺς· οὐνομα δὲ τῷ δαίπνῳ τούτῳ Περσιστὶ μὲν τυκτά, κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἑλλήνων γλῶσσαν τέλειον. But *tuktá* (τυκτά) is rather to be explained as 'birth-festival, birthday banquet'; for I should suggest making the word a regular formation from the Indo-Iranian root *tuk-*, *tuc-*, see Whitney, *Roots and Verb-Forms*, p. 63, Skt. *tuc-* 'generate' (give birth), cf. *-tuka*, *toká*, *tókman*, *tókma*, and compare Av. *taoxman-*, Anc.P. *tauma-*, Mod.P. *tuxm*. The form would be sufficiently close.

The Worship of Heaven and Earth by the Emperor of China.

—By HENRY BLODGET, D.D., Bridgeport, Conn.

THIS worship is invested with the deepest interest to the student of the ethnic religions. The antiquity of its observance, the magnificence of its altars, the exalted personages by whom it is performed, the imposing nature of its rites, not less than the controversies which for three hundred years have been waged among Christians in regard to it, combine to give this worship a very conspicuous place in the study of the religions of the ancient nations.

The state worship of the earlier kings of Egypt, Greece, Rome, Phœnicia, Assyria, Babylon, India, no longer exists in real life. If we study it, we do so from books and from the monuments of antiquity. But here we have the ancient worship of China preserved in a living form to the present time. Minor changes in place, form, circumstances, there may have been; but the essential things remain unchanged. The worship by the Emperor, as now seen in Peking, expresses the mature judgment of Chinese scholars as to the ancient religion of China. This is the orthodox cult, according to the classic writers and the best traditions of the empire.

The altar to Heaven, *T'ien T'an*, is located in the southern suburb of Peking, three miles from the palace of the emperor. The altar to Earth, *Ti T'an*, is in the northern suburb, about two miles from the palace. This location of the two altars is in accordance with the dual principle, *yin* and *yang*, which pervades the worship and Chinese philosophy in general. The south is the region of light and heat, the *yang*; while the north is the region of cold and darkness, the *yin*. Hence the altar to Heaven, which is also *yang*, must be on the south, and the altar to Earth, which is *yin*, must be on the north. It may be remarked in passing that the altar to the Sun is on the east side of the city, and the altar to the Moon on the west. Each of these four altars is situated in a large park, planted with rows of locust, pine, and fir trees.

The largest of these parks is that which surrounds the altar to Heaven. This contains some five hundred acres of ground, and

is enclosed by a wall of brick fifteen feet high and above three miles in length, covered throughout with tiles. Within this park, extending nearly the entire distance from north to south, is a second wall enclosing the sacred places, buildings and altars. Here, in the northern part of the enclosure, is an altar for prayer for bountiful harvests, which is crowned by a dome-shaped pavilion above one hundred feet in height, having three successive roofs covered with azure tiles, the two lower roofs extending out in widening circles around the dome, while the upper roof covers the dome and is surmounted by a large gilt ball. The whole is designed to represent the blue vault of heaven, and presents a very grand and beautiful appearance. The name of this edifice is *Ch'i Nien Tien*, Temple of Prayer for the Year, that is, for a year of abundant harvests. This altar and temple, however, are only mentioned by the way, as adjoining that to which attention is mainly directed.

The open altar to Heaven has the greatest antiquity and importance. This is situated in the southern part of the enclosure mentioned above, and is separated from the temple in the northern part by a high wall. The altar to Heaven is built of white marble, and stands under the open sky. The structure is in three concentric circular terraces, rising one above another, and each surrounded by a richly carved marble balustrade. The diameter of the lowest terrace is two hundred and ten feet, of the middle terrace one hundred and fifty feet, and of the uppermost terrace ninety feet. The last is a circular flat surface, about eighteen feet above the level of the ground. It is paved with white marble slabs, which are so arranged as to form nine concentric circles around one circular stone in the center. Upon this stone the Emperor kneels when he worships. The innermost of these circles has nine slabs, and the number of slabs in each receding circle is a multiple of nine, the outermost having the square of nine, which is a favorite number in Chinese philosophy.

The altar is round, as representing the circle of Heaven. It is built of white marble rather than of dark, because Heaven belongs to the light, or *yang*, principle in the dual philosophy. The ascent to the altar is by three flights of steps on the north, the east, the south, the west, each flight having nine steps. The first flight lands one on the first terrace, the second flight on the second terrace, the third flight on the third terrace, or top of the altar.

Besides the two walls already mentioned, there are two nearer walls surrounding the altar at some distance from each other, and having a grove of ancient cypress trees between them. Between the third and fourth wall is a hall for the five hundred musicians, and a stable for the sacrificial victims. Within the fourth wall, that nearest the altar, is the Hall of Abstinence and Fasting, for the use of the Emperor during the night previous to his annual sacrifice; also the small round building called the Temple of the Imperial Expanse, in which the tablet to Heaven and the tablets to the Imperial Ancestors are deposited when not in use; two smaller temples containing the tablets for the secondary objects of worship; the Depository for the Sacred Utensils; the Depository for the Sacrificial Vessels; the House for Slaying the Victims; the Furnace for the Holocaust; the poles for the lanterns, and the other things necessary for the worship.

Answering in all important respects to the altar of Heaven is the altar to Earth, on the north side of the city. The grounds of this park are square, and contain about three hundred acres, the whole being enclosed by a high wall two miles in length. The altar itself and the buildings erected upon it are second in magnificence only to the altar to Heaven and its buildings, even as the place which the worship of Earth holds in the national cult is second only to that of the worship of Heaven.

The altar to Earth is square, while the altar to Heaven is round, the Earth being square and the Heaven round. The altar to Earth is made of dark-colored marble, since the earth belongs to the *yin*, or dark principle. It has two terraces instead of three. The lower terrace is one hundred and six feet square, the upper terrace, or top of the altar, is sixty feet square, and it is open to the sky, as is the altar to Heaven. This terrace is about twelve feet above the level of the earth.

The top of the altar is paved with marble slabs quadrangular in form and laid in squares around a central square upon which the emperor kneels in worship. Each of these squares consists of successive multiples of eight, instead of nine as in the circles on the altar to Heaven. Balustrades of dark-colored marble surround both terraces.

This altar is encompassed at the base by a stone-walled trench, six feet wide and eight feet deep. At the time of the sacrificing this trench is filled with water. There are four bridges across the trench, each opposite to, and connecting with, one of the four

flights of steps at the cardinal points of the compass by which the altar is ascended.

Like the Altar to Heaven, this altar also is separated from the street by four walls, which are covered with yellow tiles, as representing the color of the earth. Within the fourth wall, that nearest the altar, are the Hall of Abstinence and Fasting; the small square building called the Temple of the Spirit (or Goddess) Imperial Earth, in which are deposited the tablet to the Earth and the tablets to the deceased Emperors of the present dynasty; two smaller temples which contain the secondary tablets used in the worship of Earth; the Depository for the Sacred Utensils; the Depository for the Sacrificial Vessels; the House for Slaying the Victims; and the open iron urn for burning the offerings.

What is to be noted in regard to these buildings is, that in their location and form they are arranged in accordance with the dual principle, *yin* and *yang*, as are the two altars themselves and all the rites of worship. The temple for depositing the tablet of Earth, and the buildings for the secondary tablets, are on the south side of the altar, facing the north, which is *yin*, while the corresponding temple and buildings at the Altar to Heaven are on the north of altar, and face the south, which is *yang*. The temple for the tablet of Earth is square, built upon a square elevation, and surrounded by a square wall, as for the worship of Earth; while that for the tablet of Heaven is round, built upon a round elevation, as for Heaven.

The entrance to the Altar to Earth is from the west, through a very imposing honorary portal, and over a fine paved causeway.

The altars to the Sun and Moon, though secondary in rank, are constructed on the same general plan, and with constant regard to the dual principle. Similar are the altars to the Gods of the Land and Grain, to the Spirits of Heaven, to the Spirits of Earth, and to the Divine Husbandman, all of which are in the open air.

Having described the grounds, buildings, and altars, it will be in order next to speak of the tablets, their position on the altars, and the offerings set before each. When the time of worship has come, these tablets are brought out from the temples in which they are kept, and with great reverence placed, each in its proper position, upon the altars. First of all the tablet to Heaven is placed upon a table, within a circular tent of blue satin, on the north part of the upper terrace of the Altar to Heaven. Thus the tablet will face the south, since it belongs to the *yang* principle, and the emperor will prostrate himself towards the north.

Upon this tablet are inscribed in gilt six Chinese characters (皇天上帝之位), of which the sound is *Hwong T'ien Shang Ti Chih Wei*, and which signify, "The Throne of Sovereign Heaven, the Supreme Ruler." There is a double apposition in the inscription, *Shang Ti*, Supreme Ruler, being in apposition with *Hwong Tien*, Sovereign Heaven, so that "Supreme Ruler" is none other than "Sovereign Heaven." Thus it is understood by all native scholars. There may be some who would fain regard "Sovereign Heaven" as the dwelling place of *Shang Ti*, whom they somehow conceive to be distinct from and above Heaven, in fact as the true Lord. Such should be reminded that in the ancient classics and in Chinese dictionaries *Tien*, or Heaven, is always the equivalent of *Shang Ti*, Supreme Ruler, and that we may not depart from Chinese usage in rendering this inscription.

Upon this same upper terrace of the altar, on the east and west, are placed, in tents of blue satin open toward the center of the altar, tablets of the deceased Emperors of the present dynasty. Each tablet stands in a finely carved and gilded case, resting on a pedestal of corresponding workmanship. These tablets are arranged according to their priority on the throne. The founder of the Manchu dynasty occupies the place of honor, which is the first place on the left of the tablet to Heaven. The second place, that at the right of the tablet to Heaven, is occupied by the second Emperor of the dynasty, and so on in the order of their succession to the throne. There are no other tablets on the upper terrace besides those which have been mentioned,—the tablet to Heaven and those to the Imperial Ancestors.

It is to be observed that in this arrangement the tablets to the deceased Emperors are regarded as *P'ei Wei* (配位), that is, mated with, equal to, associates of, *Shang Ti*, or *Tien* (Heaven) in honor and worship. Similarly on the Altar to Earth these tablets are regarded as *P'ei Wei*, mated with, equal to, associates of, Earth in honor and worship. Of course it can not be intended that the Emperors at death have become equal in magnitude and dynamic forces to Heaven and Earth. The idea would rather be that they are exalted to this honor as being equal in virtue to Heaven and Earth, and as having lived throughout all the functions of their being in entire conformity to that universal law which pervades Heaven and Earth, that is to the law of nature. It may also include the idea that the Emperor is the vicegerent of Heaven and Earth in the sway he exercises, his authority over men. It is

said also of Confucius that his virtue was equal to Heaven and Earth, *T'eh p'ei T'ien Ti* (德配天地).

The offerings which are set forth on this uppermost terrace of the round altar are in accordance with the idea of the equality of the tablets. Before the tablet to Heaven are placed the libation of wine, offerings of silk, the round blue jade stone as the symbol of Heaven, a young heifer, a sheep, a swine, and the various viands, twenty-eight in number, all arranged in suitable vessels and in proper order. The same offerings, including the heifer, and excepting only the jade, the sheep, and the swine, are placed before the tablets to the Imperial Ancestors on the east and west sides of the altar.

On the second terrace, which is six feet lower, and encircles the uppermost terrace with its white marble-paved surface thirty feet wide, are placed, on the east fronting the west, the tablet to the Sun, and on the west facing the east, the tablet to the Moon, each enclosed in a blue satin tent, with offerings of the medium class, less in dignity than those on the upper terrace, arranged before them.

Next to the tablet to the Sun on the same terrace, also on the east and facing the west, are tablets to the Seven Stars of Ursa Major, the Five Planets, the Twenty-eight Constellations, and to All the Stars of Heaven. These tablets are all placed in one satin tent, with offerings of the inferior class according to the ritual arranged before them.

On the same terrace, on the west side and facing the east, next to the tablet to the Moon, are placed in one satin tent, four tablets, one each to the Clouds, Rain, Wind, and Thunder, with offerings of the same class set before them.

Such are the tablets and such the order of their arrangement on the Altar to Heaven. On the Altar to Earth the tablets and their arrangement correspond, *mutatis mutandis*, to those just described. First of all on the upper terrace is placed the tablet to Earth, enclosed in a yellow satin tent, on the south side of the altar, the tablet facing the north, which belongs to the *yin*, or dark principle. Thus the emperor, entering the inner enclosure and ascending the altar from the north, will prostrate himself toward the south, the reverse of all which takes place at the Altar of Heaven.

Upon this tablet are inscribed, in gilt, Chinese characters of which the sound is *Hwong Ti Ch'i chih Wei* (皇地祇之位), and

which signify, "The Throne of the Imperial Earth Spirit (or Deity)."

Along with this tablet are placed upon the same upper terrace, on the east and west sides of the altar, the tablets of the Imperial Ancestors of the present dynasty. These are arranged on either side of the tablet to Earth, in tents of yellow satin, each tablet enclosed in a carved and gilded case, the order being the same as on the Altar to Heaven. These tablets are the *Pe'i Wei*, that is, they are mated with, equal to, associates of, Imperial Earth in honor and worship. The tents are of yellow color, in order to correspond to the color of the Earth.

Upon the second terrace, which is six feet below the upper, and extends out beyond the upper twenty-three feet on each side, are placed secondary tablets. On the east facing the west, in tents of yellow satin, are tablets to the Five Lofty Mountains, to the Two Mountains Ch'i Yün and Lung Yek, to the Three Hills of Perpetual Peace, and the tablet to the Four Seas. On the west facing the east, in similar tents, are tablets to other Five Celebrated Mountains, to the Pillar of Heaven, to the Two Mountains of Splendid Fortune, and the tablet to the Four Great Rivers. All of these, it will be noticed, represent parts and powers of the Earth, as in the worship of Heaven the secondary tablets stand for parts and powers of Heaven.

The offerings set forth on the uppermost terrace before the tablet to Earth are the same as those set forth before the tablet to Heaven, excepting that the jade is yellow and square, as symbolizing the Earth, instead of being blue and round, as symbolizing Heaven, and the offering of silk is yellow instead of blue. There are the same libations of wine, the young heifer, the various viands, some twenty-eight in number, all arranged in suitable vessels and in proper order. The offerings to the Imperial Ancestors are the same on both altars, and of the same class as those to Heaven and Earth.

Before the tablets on the second terrace of the Altar to Earth are placed in order offerings of the second and third class according to the ritual.

The time of the worship is also arranged according to the dual principle, *yin* and *yang*. The worship of Heaven comes at the winter solstice, because then the power of the *yin*, or dark principle, has run its course and is exhausted, and the power of the *yang*, or light principle, represented by Heaven, again begins to assert

itself. The days begin to lengthen; nature prepares herself once more for the glories of spring and summer.

The worship of Earth comes at the summer solstice. Then the power of the *yang*, or light principle, is exhausted, and the power of the *yin*, or dark principle, represented by Earth, begins in turn to assert itself. The days begin to grow shorter. Forces have come into operation which in due time will bring autumn and winter. Such are the ideas underlying and controlling the times of this worship.

On the day previous to the winter solstice "the Emperor comes forth from his palace in great state, proceeding to the sacred grounds, part of the way in a chair, part in a chariot, attended by a large retinue composed of officers of every rank, military guards, musicians and others, to the number of nearly two thousand." Arriving at the place, he first burns incense and prostrates himself before the tablet to Heaven and the tablets to his Ancestors. This is done in the little temple in which these tablets are deposited when not in use. Then he inspects the altar, and the various sacred buildings, implements, and sacrificial victims. This done he retires to the Hall of Abstinence and Fasting for the night.

About two hours before sunrise he is summoned to engage in the worship. Arrayed in sacrificial robes of azure color, to represent the color of the sky, he proceeds to the southern gateway of the enclosure containing the altar. There he remains standing outside the gate while the proper officers of the Sacrificial Court with great ceremony remove the tablets from the sacred buildings in which they are deposited, and place them in due order upon the upper and second terraces of the altar.

When the announcement is made that all is in readiness, the tablets and offerings being all arranged according to the ritual, the Emperor passes through the gate and proceeds to the altar to perform the worship. Everything is done according to the most elaborate and carefully prescribed rules, and under the direction of the Master of Ceremonies. Each position and motion of the Emperor, as well as of the imperial princes and high magistrates attendant upon him, also of the musicians and others engaged in the worship, even down to the soldiers and servants, is regulated by these rules.

The service opens by peals of music. The Emperor in his robes of azure ascends the altar by the steps on the south, and

advances to his place at the center of the round altar in front of the tablet to Heaven, having on his right and left the tablets to his Ancestors. There he stands while the whole burnt offering is consumed in the furnace southeast of the altar. The "three kneelings and nine prostrations"—three prostrations with the head to the pavement at each kneeling—are now performed before the tablet to Heaven and before each of the tablets to his Ancestors. The libations are poured out, the offerings are presented, and the written prayer.

The whole scene is very impressive. The gray dawn, the pale light from the suspended lanterns, the absence of any images, the silence of the multitude in attendance, interrupted only by the swell of music, while the Emperor and, as it were, High Priest of four hundred millions of people, attended by princes, magistrates, soldiers, musicians, servants, here pays his annual worship to High Heaven and his Imperial Ancestors, and to all the Powers of Heaven.

When the service is ended, the round azure jade, the symbol of Heaven, and all the tablets are returned in the same reverential manner, each to its proper temple and place. The written prayer, the rolls of silk, and all the offerings on both terraces, are removed and burnt, or otherwise disposed of; the Emperor retires from the scene of worship, ascends his chariot, and returns to his palace.

The worship on the Altar to Earth is very similar to that just described. On the day previous to the summer solstice the Emperor comes forth from his palace in like magnificent state, with a like retinue, and proceeds to the Altar to Earth in the northern suburbs of the city. Arriving there, he first burns incense and prostrates himself before the tablet to Earth and to his Ancestors, in the small temple in which these tablets are deposited. After this he proceeds to inspect the altar and buildings, as in the worship at the Altar to Heaven, and then retires to the Hall of Abstinence and Fasting for the night.

About two hours before sunrise the time is announced by the officer in attendance, and the Emperor, arrayed in his sacrificial robes, repairs to his place of waiting outside the north gate of the square wall nearest the altar. Here he remains while the tablets are removed with great ceremony from the sacred buildings, and placed in order upon the upper and second terraces of the square altar.

When all is in readiness, at a word given by the Master of Ceremonies, the Emperor ascends the altar and performs the worship, the time, attendants, music, and ritual, in all respects corresponding to that on the Altar to Heaven. His robes and the satin tents are yellow, as befits the color of the Earth. He ascends the altar from the north and worships toward the south. As on the Altar to Heaven, so here, before the tablet to Earth and the tablets to his Ancestors he performs the "three kneelings and nine prostrations." The libations are poured out, the offerings are presented, and the written prayer.

As in the worship of Heaven, so here in the worship of Earth, the high position of the chief worshipper, his princely attendance, his numerous cortège, the absence of any image, the grey dawn, the profound silence, interrupted only by the swelling strains of music, all conspire to render the service impressive in the highest degree.

When the worship is ended, the square jade stone of yellow color which is the symbol of Earth, the tablet to Earth, and the tablets to deceased Ancestors, with the tablets to the various parts and powers of Earth, are all returned to their places for safe keeping in the adjacent temples, while the written prayer, the rolls of silk, and the other offerings are either burnt or otherwise disposed of.

The Emperor retires from the scene in due form, ascends his chariot, and is escorted to the palace.

Such in general outline is the worship of Heaven and Earth by the Emperor of China, performed annually in the suburbs of his capital. It will have been observed that the offerings and prostrations to Heaven and to Earth are essentially the same, even as the parks, altars, and buildings mutually correspond. If there is any difference in the honor paid to Earth and to Heaven, it is only in subordinate respects, and analogous to that paid to the father and the mother in ancestral worship. This analogy is expressed in the couplets "*T'ien Ti, Fu Mu*, (天地父母) "Heaven and Earth, Father and Mother," which are in the mouth of every Chinese, and express what are to him objects of deepest reverence.

This solstitial worship, as it is most ancient, so also is most sacred in the regard of the Chinese. No one but the Emperor or one of highest rank, delegated by him, is allowed to perform it. It occupies the first place in the Ritual as laid down in the Stat-

utes of the Empire, the *Ta Ching Hwei T'ien* (大經會典), and stands at the head of all the objects of worship laid down in the imperial cult.

The Christian scholar will ask how this worship stands related to the worship of the true God, the Lord. Acknowledging its great antiquity, he will recognize the fact that it is invested with a high degree of reverence and solemnity; that the religious feelings are deeply moved in performing its sacred rites; that there is a certain elevation of mind, a grandeur and awe, which attaches to the worship of the vast Heaven and broad Earth, the sum total of all created things, performed as it is by the monarch of so many millions of human beings. He might grant also that, in the view of those who engage in this worship, there may be a certain force or energy immanent in, and inseparable from, Heaven and Earth, dual in its nature, and conceived of sometimes with greater, and at other times with less of intelligence and personality, able to produce all things, and adequate to the greatest operations and transformations in nature, instituting and maintaining the moral order of the world. Thus it will seem to him to be a system of pantheistic nature worship.

But he will be unable to regard this worship of Heaven and Earth, or of Heaven only, as the worship of the true God, whom Christians adore, for the following reasons :

First, the worship of the true God is the worship of the *Creator* of Heaven and Earth, not of Heaven and Earth.

I think the challenge may safely be given to any student of the Chinese language to produce a single passage from the ancient classics of China in which *T'ien*, Heaven, or its equivalent *Shang Ti*, Supreme Ruler, is spoken of as the Creator of Heaven and Earth.

Second, this worship of Heaven and Earth is pervaded by the dualism of Chinese philosophy, which is wholly foreign to the worship of the true God.

In the description above given of this worship, attention was drawn only to what is external and phenomenal in the operation of this dual principle. As regards its internal forces and workings, the discussion is endless. A few sentences taken from the prize essay of Kung Hsien Hō, written for the recent Parliament of Religions, will illustrate this. He writes, "The Absolute, or the Great Extreme (so these words *T'ai Chih*, 太極, are translated in dictionaries and by scholars) producing *yin* and *yang*

(陰陽), the dual principle, is law producing forces. When *yang* and *yin* unite they produce water, fire, wood, metal, earth. When these five forces operate in harmony, the four seasons come to pass. The essences of the infinite, of *yin* and *yang*, and of the five elements combine, and the Heavenly becomes male, and the Earthly becomes female. When these powers act on each other all things are produced and reproduced and developed without end."

Whatever the ideas of this writer may be, if indeed he had any distinct ideas, it is plain that the worship of Heaven and Earth, into which this dualism enters so largely, belongs to the ethnic religions, and can have no affiliation with the Christian doctrine of God.

Third, the solstitial worship of Heaven and Earth is materialistic in its nature and tendency.

Fourth, the worship of Heaven and Earth stands at the head of the Chinese Pantheon, and is inseparably bound up with the worship of numerous other beings and things. The Pantheon of China is large. It includes the various parts and powers of nature, the deceased emperors of every dynasty, deceased sages, heroes and warriors, distinguished statesmen, inventors of useful arts; in general an under world made up of all the objects of worship in the three great religions of the land.

Sanskrit jana, Avestan zana.—By ARTHUR F. J. REMY, A. M.,
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THE occurrence of the Sanskrit word *jana* in Avestan has not been noted, I believe, although it is found in Old Persian. But the Avestan equivalent of this word exists, as I hope to show.

In Yasht xix. 43 occurs the passage: *Yō janat Snāvidkəm yim srvō-zanəm . . .* The reading *srvō-zana* here given is that of Geldner's edition, and is supported by all the better manuscripts. The common text, as found in Westergaard and followed by most translators, differs from Geldner's in having *srvō-janəm* instead of *srvō-zanəm*. *Srvō-janəm* is explained as composed of *srvō* (from *srvā*) Latin *cornu*, Greek *κέρας*, 'horn or nail,' and *jana*, a derivative from $\sqrt{\text{jan}}$ 'to smite.' The meaning then given is either 'killing the kine' (de Harlez, Geiger) or 'striking with the claws or nails' (Spiegel, Justi, Darmesteter). Neither of these renderings is acceptable, since they are based on the reading of inferior manuscripts. As already stated, all the better manuscripts have *zanəm*, not *janəm*.

Bartholomae (*Grundriss der iranischen Philologie*, i. 243 f.) rightly follows Geldner's correct reading, but he etymologizes *zana* through the Latin *gena* 'cheek,' and renders 'mit hörnern Backen.' It seems to be simpler, however, to connect *zana* here with Sanskrit $\sqrt{\text{jan}}$, Greek $\gamma\epsilon\nu$ -, Latin *gen*-, in which case *srvō-zanəm* would mean 'belonging to the horned race.' *Zana* is thus to be identified with Sanskrit *jana* (cf. Petersburg *Wörterbuch*, s. v., see especially *pañca-jana*). Iranian *zana* = Sanskrit *jana* occurs also in the ancient Persian inscriptions, in which we find *vispa-zana*, 'consisting of all the races,' and *paru-zana*, 'consisting of many races.' Furthermore, it is to be noticed that almost all the sculptured monsters on the walls of the palace at Persepolis (see Stolze, *Persepolis*, i. 4) have a horn on their foreheads, so that the epithet *srvō-zana*, when applied to them, is literally true. Apparently *Snāvidka* was conceived as such a horned Ahrimanic monster.

¹ Previously, however, he had translated, 'die Hörner (der Rinder) abschlagend' (see *Handbuch der altiran. Dialekte*, 240).

The Life of al-Ghazzālī, with especial reference to his religious experiences and opinions.—By DUNCAN B. MACDONALD, Professor in Hartford Theological Seminary, Hartford, Conn.

IN the history of the development of Muslim theology two names stand out conspicuously, each marking a great point of departure. They are those of al-Ash'arī¹ and al-Ghazzālī. The former was the principal founder of scholastic theology in Islām; it was under the hands of the latter that that theology took its final form, and the Church of Muḥammad owes it to his strange experiences in personal religion and in the emotional life that the form was not even harder and more unyielding than we find it now. What rigidity of grasp the hand of Islām would have exercised but for the influence of al-Ghazzālī might be hard to tell; he saved it from scholastic decrepitude, opened before the orthodox Muslim the possibility of a life hid in God, was persecuted in his life as a heretic, and now ranks as the greatest doctor of the Muslim Church.

Of al-Ash'arī I do not purpose to say anything here. On scholastic theology as al-Ghazzālī found it, I shall let him speak for himself; the strife of dogmaticians so far removed from us in time and interest sounds hollow on our ears. Al-Ash'arī died about A. H. 320, with a curse of heretics as the last murmur on his lips. Al-Ghazzālī, who knew what it meant to be cursed himself, was slow to curse others, and is memorable among the theologians of Islām in that he, over his formal signature, forbade to curse Yazīd, the slayer of al-Ḥusayn the well-beloved.² It is necessary to make mention of al-Ash'arī, if only to show the

¹ On al-Ash'arī see Spitta, *Zur Geschichte Abu 'l-Ḥasan al-Aš'arī's*, Leipz. 1876, and Mehren, *Exposé de la réforme de l'Islamisme commencée au iiième siècle de l'Hégire par Abou-'l-Ḥasan Ali el-Ash'ari et continuée par son école. Avec des extraits du Texte Arabe d'Ibn Asākir*. Vol. ii. of the Transactions of the Third Session of the International Congress of Orientalists. I shall refer frequently to the biographies of Ash'arites given there from Ibn 'Asākir.

² See the life of al-Kiyā in Ibn Khall. ii. 229 ff. Al-Kiyā was asked the same question, was it legal to curse Yazīd, and authorised the cursing with great alacrity and at great length. Al-Ghazzālī's reply

recoil and compromise in the work of al-Ghazzālī. We have here, as everywhere in the development of an idea, the movement of the Hegelian dialectic. The two streams of tendency—dogmatism on the one hand, logical, legal, systematic, and mysticism on the other, transcendental and intuitionist—had separated far back, and the separation had kept becoming more and more pronounced until the one crystallized in lifeless form and the other ran wild in shapeless fantasy. Al-Ghazzālī, by training a theologian and lawyer, bridged the widening gap, took over mysticism with its intuitionism and spiritual life into the dry body of theology, and gave the Church of Islām a fresh term of life. It is this spiritually real and living side of his character and work that constitutes his abiding interest for us. Other theologians of Islām are important as links in an historical chain; he, in virtue of what he was in himself, of the conversion he went through and the experiences he had. I propose in a subsequent paper to translate one of the books of his great work the “Revivifying of the Sciences of the Faith,”¹ and to endeavour by this means to throw some light on his position as a theologian and a thinker generally. I have chosen the book which deals most with his mysticism, as his attitude to that constitutes his principal claim on our interest. But the careful reader of the

forbidding it is eminently characteristic of the man, of his balance of mind and agnostic position: It is forbidden to curse a Muslim; Yazīd was a Muslim. It is not certain that he slew al-Ḥusayn, and it is forbidden to think ill of a Muslim. We cannot be certain that he ordered his death; really we cannot be certain of the cause of the death of any great man, especially at such a distance of time. We have also to remember the party spirit and false statements in this particular case. Again, if he did kill him, he is not an unbeliever because of that; he is only disobedient to God. Again, he may have repented before he died. Further, to abstain from cursing is no crime. No one will be asked if he ever cursed Satan; if he has cursed him he may be asked, Why? The only accursed ones of whom we know are those who die infidels. See, further, on this abusing of Yazīd, Goldziher, *Muham. Studien*, ii. 97, and especially the case of the Ḥanbalite theologian, ‘Abd al-Mughīth b. Zuhayr al-Ḥarrī, who actually wrote a book *Fi faḍā’il Yazīd*.

¹ The text which I have used is that of the edition of Cairo 1302. I have employed also the commentary of the Sayyid Murtaḍā, *Ithāf as-sāda*, 10 vols., Cairo 1311. The text as given by the SM. (so I abbreviate throughout) is sometimes slightly different; that given on the margin of his commentary is the ordinary Cairo printed text. Without the preliminary matter of the SM., vol. i. pp. 1-54, I could not have compiled the following life.

little treatise will find much more in it than simple theology. It deals formally and at length with the whole subject of the relation of music and song to the emotional nature; it asks and endeavours to answer the question of the meaning of music in itself—how far it has such a definite meaning, and how far its influence is dependent on the mood of the hearer; the question also of the moral effect of music, when it is for good and when for evil. I know nothing in English dealing with the same problem in the same way except the curiously mis-named book of Mr. Haweis, "Music and Morals," and it is surprising at what similar results the Arabic and the English writer have arrived. It raises the whole question of the professional as opposed to the amateur; it shows how the Qur'ān suffers from possessing no human element; it considers the question of recreation in a delightfully reasonable fashion,—such are some points in which it will interest those to whom Muslim dogmatics are not in themselves interesting. I shall give later an analysis of the whole.

As al-Ghazzālī's theological position sprang directly from his spiritual experiences, so the best introduction to an understanding of that position is the story of his life. We are fortunate in that he has left us a book,¹ almost unique to my knowledge in the

¹ This is the *Munqidh min ad-dalāl*. I have used of it the *editio princeps* in Schmoelders' *Essai*, the translation of the same by Barbier de Meynard in the *Journal Asiatique*, 7^{ème} sér., tome ix., and the Arabic text of Cairo 1803. It forms the basis of my work, and the result of a careful study of it has been to convince me of the essential truth of the picture which al-Ghazzālī there gives us of his life. I thus cannot agree at all in the attitude assumed toward it by Gosche. I have also found very valuable the extracts from early biographers given in the preliminary matter of the SM. This is especially true of 'Abd al-Ghāfir and Ibn as-Sam'ānī; the first knew al-Ghazzālī intimately and discusses his character with great freedom; the second belonged to the next generation. For 'Abd al-Ghāfir I have been able to compare the text given in Mehren's *Exposé*, referred to above. The life in Ibn Khall. (ii. 621 of de Slane's translation, which I use throughout except when some other reference is necessary) I have found of comparatively little value. Of European productions the life by Schmoelders in Ersch and Gruber is the best. Gosche (*Ghazzālī's Leben u. Werke*, from the Abhandl. der königl. Academie der Wissensch. zu Berlin, 1858) has collected much valuable material. Munk's *Mélanges* has been inaccessible to me. My materials have thus been printed only. By consultation of as-Subkī's *Tabaqāt*, as-Sam'ānī's *Ansāb*, and the others referred to, I have no doubt that much that is here obscure and uncertain could be cleared up. The publication of as-Sam'ānī is especially to be desired.

literature of Islām, in which he tells us about his early doubts and struggles; how at one time all light had died out from his mind, how he gradually came back to some certainty, passed through a slow but real conversion, and reached a faith which nothing could shake. It is essentially an *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, a defence of his life as a mystic against all his assailants, theological and philosophical; and in its autobiographic element may stand beside that of Newman. But it is also a defence of the faith written for a time of universal, all-threatening doubt, and sketches the attitude which the believer should take and the arguments which he should use against the unbeliever and the heretic. In the following outline of al-Ghazzālī's life, fuller and more accurate, I believe, than any hitherto given, I have used this autobiography as a basis. Other records are largely mixed with legendary and mythical elements,—al-Ghazzālī in Islām became a wonder-working saint, possessed of miraculous powers, by earlier writers ascribed to him after his death, by later even during his lifetime,—and it is difficult to avoid mere subjective standards in separating what may be regarded as historically authentic from what must be viewed as the play of devout fancy. Very early such stories began to gather round his figure, and even his immediate contemporaries cannot be literally believed.

Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad aṭ-Ṭūsī al-Ghazzālī was born A. H. 450, at Ṭūs, now a ruin in the neighbourhood of the modern Meshhed.¹ There had already been two scholars in the family; one, known thereafter as al-Ghazzālī al-kabīr,² at whose tomb in the cemetery of Ṭūs prayer was answered, a paternal uncle of his father, and the other a son of the same. The elder al-Ghazzālī had taught law (*fiqh*) to the al-Fārmadī who was later one of the teachers in Ṣūfīism³ of our al-

¹ Curzon, *Persia*, i. 174.

² Died 435; Wüstenfeld, *Schāfi'iten*, 244 f. But Wüstenfeld, while calling him *al-Ghazzālī al-kabīr*, speaks of him as uncle to our al-Ghazzālī. If I understand rightly the somewhat confused quotations in the SM. (pp. 18 f.) he was a granduncle, and had a son yet more learned than himself.

³ The Ṣūfī is the Muslim mystic. On the derivation and use of the term see Nöldeke in ZDMG. xlviii. 45 ff. On Ṣūfīism generally see Hughes, *Dict. of Islam*, 608 ff.; but it should be noticed that he ignores the important division of the Ṣūfīs into Monotheists and Pantheists;

Ghazzālī, and died in A. H. 477. But the fame of the younger scion of the family completely obscured these earlier names, and in later times many, as adh-Dhahabī and the father of Ibn as-Subkī,¹ were found to doubt their very existence. The story is told, apparently on the authority of al-Ghazzālī himself, that when death drew near for his father, he committed his two boys, Abū Hāmid and Aḥmad, to the care of a trusted Ṣūfī friend to educate and bring them up. Education had been the unfulfilled desire of his own life, and he determined that his boys should not miss it. So he left in trust to his friend for that purpose what little money he had.² The friend was faithful, and taught them and cared for them till the money was all gone. Then he advised them to go to a Madrasa and become students there, "seekers of science," in the Arabic phrase; they would thus get food for their need. Apparently for professed students there was provided some means of subsistence at Madrasas; or they may have wandered like the soup-eaters of the Spain of Cervantes.³ Al-Ghazzālī used in later life to tell this story of how he and his brother first turned to theology, and would add the remark, "We became students for the sake of something else than God, but He was unwilling that it should be for the sake of aught but Himself." The little anecdote is significant for al-Ghazzālī's attitude towards religion down to the time of his conversion. It is evident from the whole development of his life and character that his theological and legal studies and labours down to that time were on a purely business basis, and that he thought only of the

see on this von Kremer, *Herrschende Ideen*. It is also worth noticing that the statements found in Hughes refer to a Ṣūfiism of a later date and a more advanced development than that of the school of al-Ghazzālī. For definitions of terms, etc., the *Risāla* of al-Qushayrī is a more contemporary authority. The *Imlā* of al-Ghazzālī himself (on margin of SM. i. pp. 41-252) is also of value for this. It should be noticed that the text of the *Imlā* is disarranged in this edition. The breaks come on p. 164, line 4, p. 204 at §, p. 222, line 29, and p. 241 at §. The order should be pp. (41-164) + (222-241) + (204-222) + (164-204) + (241-252). Besides this the text is often defective and corrupt.

¹ See on the as-Subkīs (father and son), Ibn Khall. i. p. xxviii.

² According to Leo Africanus (Fabricius, *Bibliotheca Graeca*, xiii. 274) his father had been wealthy. The source for this I have not found.

³ In de Slane's Ibn Khall., i. p. xxviii, there is a quotation from as-Subkī by as-Suyūṭī to the effect that, though Niẓām al-Mulk was not the first to establish Madrasas, yet he was probably the first to establish in them a fixed allowance for the support of students.

reputation and wealth which they were bringing him. He himself tells us that he broke from *taqlīd*,¹ simple acceptance of religious truth on authority, from his earliest youth, and that his investigation of theological differences began when he was under twenty. At Ṭūs he studied jurisprudence under Aḥmad b. Muḥammad ar-Radhkānī, and thereafter travelled to Jurjān and studied further under the Imām Abū Naṣr al-Ismāʿīlī. With this teacher he took copious notes, but neglected to impress on his memory what he had written. This was characteristic of him, and the results are evident all over his work. His quotations are exceedingly careless, and it was one of the great charges brought against him by his assailants that he falsified traditions; the fact was that he quoted from memory and very freely. But on his way back to Ṭūs from Jurjān he was to get a lesson. He tells the story himself. Robbers fell upon him, stripped him, and even carried off the bag with his manuscripts. This was more than he could stand; he ran after them, clung to them though threatened with death, and entreated the return of his notes—they were of no use to them. Al-Ghazzālī has a certain quality of dry humor, and was evidently tickled by the idea of these desert thieves studying law. The robber chief asked him what were these notes of his. Said al-Ghazzālī with great simplicity, "They are writings in that bag; I traveled for the sake of hearing them and writing them down and knowing the science in them." Thereat the robber chief laughed consumedly and said, "How can you profess to know the science in them when we have taken them from you and stripped you of the knowledge and there you are without any science?" But he gave him them back. "And," says al-Ghazzālī, "this man was sent by God to teach me." So al-Ghazzālī went back to Ṭūs and spent three years there committing his notes to memory as a precaution against future robbers. But he was a man of too large calibre to watch his quotations, and they were loose to the end of his life.² The meaning stood to him, as his defenders said, for more than the letter. Thereafter

¹ He uses the term *taqlīd* in a broad sense. For the narrower and commoner usage see Goldziher's *Zahiriten*, 30 ff.

² Perhaps the most astonishing case of this is where he quotes 1 Corinth. ii. 9 as though it were a passage from the Qur'ān. The matter is further interesting as it involves the New Testament origin of a tradition ascribed to Muḥammad. In al-Fārābī's *Philosophische Abhandlungen* (edit. Dieterici, p. 71) is the earliest occurrence I have found. It

—I cannot give dates for this part of his life—in a company of youths from Tūs, he went to Naysābūr and attached himself to the Imām al-Ḥaramayn, for whom Nizām al-Mulk had founded the Nizāmiya Madrasa.¹ He became one of the Imām's favourite pupils, and stayed with him until his death on the 25th of Rabī' II, 478. During his life at Naysābūr, which must have extended over several years, his studies were of the broadest, embracing theology, dialectic, science, philosophy, logic. He easily took a commanding place among the other scholars, and wrote and disputed his way up the ladder of reputation. He may, like his contemporary al-Khawāfī, have been an under-tutor with the Imām; at any rate, 'Abd al-Ghāfir tells us (Mehren, p. 322) that he would "read to his fellow-students and teach them, and in a short time he became infirm and weak." We have the common case of a country boy going to college and wearing out all his health in the vigor of his onset upon knowledge. Perhaps he never recovered from this and we have to find here the cause of his early death. The Imām said of him and two others, "Al-Ghazzālī is a sea to drown in, al-Kiyā (Mehren, p. 321; Ibn Khall. ii. 229) is a tearing lion, and al-Khawāfī (Mehren, p. 321) is a burning fire." Another saying of his about the same three was, "Whenever they contend together, the proof belongs to al-Khawāfī, the war-

runs, describing *al-malakūt*, the Unseen Universe: *mā lā 'ayna ra'at walā 'udhna sami'at walā khaṭara 'alā qalbi bashar*. That it is a tradition is evident from another occurrence in Ibn Rushd's *Tahāfut at-tahāfut* (p. 140 of edit. of Cairo 1302): *waqāla-n-nabīyu, 'alayhi-s-salām, fihā mā lā 'ayna ra'at walā 'udhna sami'at walā khaṭara 'alā qalbi bashar*. In the *Tahāfut* of al-Ghazzālī I find it twice: p. 2 exactly as in al-Fārābī; p. 86, after *waqawluhu ta'ālā* and a quotation from the Qur'ān, comes: *waqawluhu a'dadtu li-'ibādī-s-ṣāliḥīna mā lā 'ayna ra'at*. That the source is Corinthians, and not Isaiah lxiv. 4, is evident. The same saying is also quoted by Reland (*De Rel. Moh.*, lib. ii. c. xvii., p. 203 of ed. Utrecht, 1707), through Hyde in his notes to *Bobovii Turcarum Liturgia* (p. 21 of edit. of Oxford 1690, p. 284 of edit. of Hyde's works, Oxford, 1767), from a Moroccan ambassador, who says: *paradisum esse talem locum cui in hoc mundo nihil assimiletur, talem quem non oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in animum hominis intravit*. It occurs also in al-Ghazzālī's *Maḍnūn*, p. 41 of edit. of Cairo, 1303. On the currency among Sūfis of quotations from the Christian Scriptures see Goldziher's article in ZDMG. xxxii. 352. [Dr. C. C. Torrey tells me that the tradition is found in the *Futūḥ Miṣr* of Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam (died A. H. 257) in the fuller form quoted above from the *Tahāfut* of al-Ghazzālī, p. 86.]

¹ Ibn Khall. ii. 120; Mehren, p. 317.

like attacks (? *ḥrbāt*) to al-Ghazzālī, and clearness to al-Kiyā.” To this period of his life belongs this remark also, made by some one unnamed, “The Imām showed externally a vain-glorious disposition, but underneath there was something that when it did appear showed graceful expression and delicate allusion, soundness of attention, and strength of character.” I cannot ascertain whether while he was still at Naysābūr he touched those depths of scepticism of which he speaks in the *Munqidh*. They must certainly have been reached some time before the year 484, and must have been the outcome of a long drift of development; but probably so long as he was under the influence of the Imām al-Ḥaramayn, a devout Ṣūfī, he would be held more or less fast to his old faith.

But now came a great change which led him into public life. His master the Imām died in 478, and this death seems to have set him free, or driven him away from Naysābūr. He went out to seek his fortune, and it brought him to the camp-court¹ of the great Wazīr Nizām al-Mulk. On this man had weighed for more than twenty years the burden of the empire of the Seljuqs. He had served Alp-Arslān, the successor of Tughril Beg, the first great Seljuq (Ibn Khall. iii. 224 ff.). In 429 Merv and Naysābūr had fallen to the Seljuqs; in 447, three years before al-Ghazzālī was born, Tughril Beg had entered Baghdād, been proclaimed Sultān, and freed the Khālifa from the Shī‘ite yoke of the Buwayhids; and before 470 all western Asia, from Afghanistan, where the Ghaznavids still somewhat held their own, to the border of Egypt with its Fāṭimid dynasty, and to the Christian power of the Greek Empire, had become Seljuq and orthodox Sunnī. To Alp-Arslān, the successor of this Tughril Beg, Nizām al-Mulk had been Wazīr since his accession in 455. On the death of Alp-Arslān in 465, he had secured the Empire to his son, Mālik Shāh, and, from that time until his assassination on the 10th of Ramaḍān 485, was the greatest man in the Empire and its real ruler. When he fell, the united Empire fell with him; Mālik Shāh survived him but thirty-five days, and civil war broke out. Science, too, felt his fostering care. I need not tell again the story of how he and ‘Umar Khayyām and al-Hasan b. aṣ-Ṣabbāḥ studied together at Naysābūr and promised one another

¹ Mehren, p. 238, most strangely reads *Mo’asker* as though it were a proper name.

that whichever of the three came to eminence would help the others. The story is probably not true,¹ but it is true that 'Umar lived peacefully in the shadow of his beneficence, helped to reform the calendar, and wrote his Algebra, to say nothing of his *Rubū-ʿiyāt*, which he probably did not flaunt before the world. Further, if Nizām al-Mulk was not the first to found Madrasas, he at least extended them largely. His influence went also to restrain the strife of sects. Up to his accession to the wazīrship, the Ashʿarites had been cursed in the Friday prayers along with the Rāfiqites—a very strange combination due, apparently, to Seljuq incuriousness in theological matters;² but he did away with that, and it was again possible for Ashʿarite theologians to live under the Seljuqs. It was, then, at the camp-court of this man that al-Ghazzālī sought advancement. There, among the scholars and theologians that surrounded the Wazīr, he had the same success as at Naysābūr, and in 484 he was appointed to teach in the Madrasa at Baghdād.³ Thus embarked on a career as an independent teacher, his lectures drew crowds. He taught, he gave *fatwas*, or legal opinions of weight and determining influence, he wrote, and all seemed to go smoothly until, so it seemed from the outside, he was struck down by a mysterious disease; his speech became hampered, his appetite failed, his stomach could digest nothing. His physicians gave him up; they said that the malady lay in the heart, and that there was no hope for him if he could not overcome the mental unrest that had befallen him. Then he suddenly quitted Baghdād in Dhū-l-Qaʿda 488, ostensibly on pilgrimage to Mecca.⁴ He appointed his brother Aḥmad to teach in

¹ Chronologically it is impossible, and historically it has no foundation. See Houtsma's preface to his edition of al-Bondārī, p. xiv, note 2.

² Ibn al-Athīr, *sub anno* 485, the year of the death of Nizām al-Mulk, and under 456, the year of the death of 'Amīd al-Mulk al-Kundurī, Wazīr to Tughril Beg and a violent anti-Shāfiʿite. He persuaded Tughril Beg to order that the Rāfiqites be solemnly cursed from the pulpits, and added the Ashʿarites apparently on his own responsibility. He appears to have been a Ḥanafite and therefore a follower of al-Māturidī, the rival of al-Ashʿarī in scholastic theology. This led to a four years' exile of al-Juwaynī at Mecca, and gained him the name of Imām al-Ḥaramayn. See Ibn Khall. iii. 290. [On this persecution see now Schreiner, ZDMG. lii. 488 f.]

³ Houtsma, *al-Bondārī*, 80.

⁴ Going on pilgrimage was a not infrequent way of retreating from an untenable position in public life. It may be questioned to what extent al-Ghazzālī's contemporaries were deceived by the pretext.

his place in the Madrasa, and abandoned all his property except so much as was necessary for his own support and that of his children—he had only daughters;¹ what he kept he secured by *waqf* so that the income should be paid to him or his descendants so long as there were any, and when heirs failed should revert to the establishment, *maṣjid* or *madrasa* as the case might be, that had charge of it. This retirement from a splendid position was unintelligible to the theologians of the time. Those in al-ʿIrāq criticised him with one accord; none of the motives they could think of was good. The best they could say was that it was a calamity thrown on Islām by destiny. Those at a distance thought that his flight was dictated by fear of the government. This hypothesis seemed plausible, though the efforts made by the government to detain him showed its falsity. Ground for fear there might be. The times were out of joint. In 483 al-Ḥasan b. aṣ-Ṣabbāḥ had seized Alamūt; since then his power had been steadily growing, and his sect of the Ismāʿīlites was developing into what we know as the Assassins. In 485 Niẓām al-Mulk, the patron of al-Ghazzālī, had been assassinated, and shortly after, in the same year, died Mālik Shāh. Then came civil war, confusion, and the breaking into pieces of the Seljuq empire. In 487 Bargiyāruq became Great Seljuq, but with shorn dominions. At the beginning of the same year al-Mustazhir became Khalīfa, and in the civil war between Bargiyāruq and his uncle Tutush he espoused the cause of Tutush. At one point victory for Bargiyāruq seemed absolutely impossible, and the Khalīfa committed the imprudence of inserting Tutush's name in the public prayers. But the situation suddenly changed, and in Ṣafar 488 Tutush was defeated and killed. Under such circumstances the Khalīfa might well feel uncomfortable, and the theologians and advisers of his court might begin to look out for themselves. Other political entanglements and responsibilities seem to fall at this time. One of these connects al-Ghazzālī with the extreme West. In 479 the epoch-making battle of az-Zalāqa² was fought in Spain, and Alfonso of Castile³ was driven back by the combined Muslim

¹ SM. p. 11, line 17.

² With single *l* according to the MS. of 'Abd al-Wāḥid, edit. Dozy, 94, 16.

³ This was the Alfonso of the Cid Campeador, who died at Valencia, A. D. 1099 = A. H. 493.

princes of Spain (the Reyes de Ṭāʾifas) aided by the Murābiṭ Sulṭān of the Maghrib, Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn. After the battle Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn returned to the Maghrib, but in 484 he came again, and Muslim Spain was annexed to his own empire. This addition seems to have compelled him to see to the legitimacy of his title as a Sulṭān of the Muslims. Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630) in the *Kāmil*, after his account of the battle of az-Zalāqa, says that the 'Ulamā of Spain represented to Yūsuf that, to make his title perfect, he would require to seek formal investiture from the 'Abbāsīd Khalīfa; that he did so, and that al-Muqtadī, the Khalīfa of the time (d. 487), gave him the titles of Amīr of the Muslims and Nāṣir ad-Dīn. At his account of Yūsuf's death Ibn al-Athīr repeats this information, with the difference that the Khalīfa is said to have been al-Mustazhir, who immediately succeeded al-Muqtadī. Here there is no mention of al-Ghazzālī; but if this investiture dates after 484, when he was appointed to teach in the Madrasa at Baghdād, there can be little doubt that he, the principal theologian at the court of the Khalīfa, had some part in it. The point in question was the legality of the claim of Yūsuf to sovereign authority under the Khalīfa, and that could only be settled by trained theologians. The story as told by Ibn Khaldūn¹ is longer and more complicated. Between 481 and 483 Yūsuf obtained *fatwas* from the 'Ulamā of Spain and from foreign theologians, among them al-Ghazzālī and aṭ-Ṭarṭūshī (Ibn Khall. ii. 665), legalising his position and giving him the right to depose the Muslim princes of Spain (the Reyes de Ṭāʾifas). In this connection there is no mention of the Khalīfa. Again, after 493, he sent an embassy to the Khalīfa al-Mustazhir (Ibn Khaldūn gives the names of the ambassadors) to ask formal investiture as a sovereign prince and the use of the title Amīr of the Muslims which he had himself assumed. This was granted him by the Khalīfa, and al-Ghazzālī and aṭ-Ṭarṭūshī again supported him with *fatwas*.² It is curious that 'Abd al-Wāḥid, who wrote in 621, makes mention of neither investiture nor *fatwas*. He calls Yūsuf Amīr of the Muslims from the very beginning of his story (see, e. g., p. 91 of Dozy's edition). In the *Qartūs* a dis-

¹ *Hist. des Berbères*, trad. de Slane, ii. 79-82.

² See generally Dozy, *Histoire*, iv. 234 ff. As-Suyūṭī in the *Ta'rikh al-khulafā* says that the *taqlīd* was sent by al-Muqtadī in 479. This is probably nothing but an erroneous abbreviation of Ibn al-Athīr's first statement.

inction is made between him and his father. His father is called the Amīr simply ; but (p. 88 of Tornberg's edit.) we are told that Yūsuf was saluted by the kings of Spain as Amīr of the Muslims after the battle of az-Zalāqa, and that he struck coins acknowledging the 'Abbāsīd Khalīfa al-Muqtadī.

Such is one public act in which we can perhaps trace al-Ghazzālī. Another and more certain one lay nearer home. Almost immediately after his accession al-Mustazhir commissioned him to write a book against the Ta'limites, as the Ismā'īlites or Bāṭinites were called in Khurāsān. This book was the *Mustazhiri* of which he speaks in the *Munqidh*.

I have already shown how al-Ghazzālī's conversion and great renunciation must have looked from the outside. Fortunately, he has laid bare before us in the *Munqidh* the true causes of this step, so mysterious at the time and so momentous in the future for the Church of Islām. In that book, as said above, he tells us the story of his spiritual development from the earliest stage up to the time of his writing, when he was over fifty (lunar) years old, i. e., after 500. In his earliest youth he had given up acceptance of religious truth on authority ; that his masters so taught him was no longer a sufficient reason for his belief. Further, when he was under twenty, he began to examine theological questions and quarrels, and the effect upon him must have been very much the same as that which befell Gibbon. So he drifted on, probably restrained only by the influence of his great teacher, the Imām al-Ḥaramayn, a man of the deepest religious character ; but at the camp of Nizām al-Mulk, if not earlier, the strain became too great, and for two months he touched the depths of absolute scepticism. He doubted the evidence of the senses ; he could see plainly that they often deceived. No eye could perceive the movement of a shadow, but still the shadow moved ; a gold piece would cover any star, but still the star was a world larger than the earth. He doubted even the primary ideas of the mind. Is ten more than three ? can a thing both be and not be ? Perhaps ; he could not tell. His senses had deceived him, why not his mind ? May there not be something behind the mind, transcending it, which would show the falsity of its convictions even as the mind showed the falsity of the information given by the senses ? May not the dreams of the Ṣūfīs be true, and their revelations in ecstasy the only real guides ? When we awake in death, may it not be into a true but different existence ? All this,—perhaps.

And so he wandered for two months. He saw clearly that no reasoning could help him here; he had no ideas on which he could depend, from which he could begin. But the mercy of God is great; He sends His light to whom He wills, a light that flows in, and is given by no reasoning. By it al-Ghazzālī was saved; he regained the power to think, and the task which he now set before him was to use this power to guide himself to truth. When he looked around, he saw that those who gave themselves to the search for truth might be divided into four groups. There were the scholastic theologians, who were much like the theologians of all times and faiths. Second, there were the Ta'limites, who held that to reach truth one must have an infallible living teacher, and that there was such a teacher. Third, there were the followers of philosophy, basing on logic and rational proofs. Fourth, there were the Ṣūfīs, who held that they, the chosen of God, could reach knowledge of Him directly in ecstasy. With all these he had, of course, been acquainted before to a greater or a less degree; but now he settled down to examine them one by one, and find which would lead him to a certainty by which he could hold, whatever might come. He felt that he could not go back to the unconscious faith of his childhood; *that* nothing could restore. All his mental being must be made over before he could find rest. He began with scholastic theology, but found no help there. Grant the theologians their premises, and they could argue; deny them, and there was no common ground on which to meet. Their science had been founded by al-Ash'arī to meet the Mu'tazilites;¹ it had done that victoriously, but could do no more. They could hold the faith against heretics, expose their inconsistencies and weaknesses; but against the sceptic they could do nothing. It is true that they had attempted to go further back and meet the students of philosophy on their own ground, to deal with substances and attributes and first principles generally; but their efforts had been fruitless. They lacked the necessary knowledge of the subject, had no scientific basis, and were constrained eventually to fall back on authority. After study of them and their methods it became clear to al-Ghazzālī that the remedy for his ailment was not to be found in scholastic theology.

¹ See on them generally Steiner, *Die Mu'taziliten*, and *Zur Geschichte des Aš'arīenthums*, in *Actes du huitième Congrès International des Orientalistes*. Sec. i. Fasc. i., pp. 77 ff., Leide, 1891; Spitta and Mehren, *opp. cit.*

Then he turned to philosophy. He had seen already that the weakness of the theologians lay in their not having made a sufficient study of primary ideas and the laws of thought. Three years he gave up to this. He was at Baghdād at the time, teaching law and writing legal treatises, and probably the three years extended from the beginning of 484 to the beginning of 487. Two years he gave, without a teacher, to the study of the writings of the different schools of philosophy, and almost another to meditating and working over his results. He felt that he was the first Muslim doctor to do this with the requisite thoroughness. And it is noteworthy that at this stage he seems to have again felt himself to be a Muslim, and in an enemy's country when he was studying philosophy. He speaks of the necessity of understanding what is to be refuted ; but this may be only a confusion between his attitude when writing after 500 and his attitude when investigating and seeking truth fifteen years earlier. He divides the followers of philosophy in his time into three : Materialists, Deists (*Ṭabīʿiyyūn*, i. e. Naturalists), and Theists. The materialists reject a creator ; the world exists from all eternity ; the animal comes from the egg and the egg from the animal. The wonder of creation compels the deists to admit a creator, but the creature is a machine, has a certain poise (*ʾitidāl*) in itself which keeps it running ; its thought is a part of its nature and ends with death. They thus reject a future life, though admitting God and His attributes. He deals at much greater length with the teachings of those whom he calls theists, but throughout all his statement of their views his tone is not that of a seeker but that of a partisan ; he turns his own experiences into a warning to others, and makes of their record a little guide to apologetics. Aristotle he regards as the final master of the Greek school ; his doctrines are best represented for Arabic readers in the books of Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī—the works of their predecessors on this subject are a mass of confusion. Part of these doctrines must be stamped as unbelief, part as heresy, and part as theologically indifferent. He then divides the philosophical sciences into six, mathematics, logic, physics, metaphysics, political economy, ethics, and discusses these in detail, showing what must be rejected, what is indifferent, what dangers arise from each to him who studies or to him who rejects without study. Throughout, he is very cautious to mark nothing as unbelief that is not really so ; to admit always those truths of

mathematics, logic, and physics that cannot intellectually be rejected ; and only to warn against an attitude of intellectualism and a belief that mathematicians, with their acuteness and success in their own department, are to be followed in other departments, or that all subjects are susceptible of the exactness and certainty of a syllogism in logic. The damnable errors of the theists are almost entirely in their metaphysical views. Three of their propositions mark them as unbelievers : *First*, they reject the resurrection of the body and physical punishment hereafter ; the punishments of the next world will be spiritual only. That there will be spiritual punishments, al-Ghazzālī admits, but there will be physical as well ; *Second*, they hold that God knows universals only, not particulars ; *Third*, they hold that the world exists from all eternity and to all eternity. When they reject the attributes of God and hold that He knows by His essence and not by something added to His essence, they are only heretics and not unbelievers. In physics he accepts the constitution of the world as developed and explained by them ; only all is to be regarded as entirely submitted to God, incapable of self-movement, a tool of which the Creator makes use. Finally, he considers that their system of ethics is derived from the teachings of the Sūfis. At all times there have been such saints, retired from the world—God has never left Himself without a witness ; and from their ecstasies and revelations our knowledge of the human heart, for good and evil, is derived.

Thus in philosophy he found little light. It did not correspond entirely to his needs, for reason cannot answer all questions nor unveil all the enigmas of life. He would probably have admitted that he had learned much in his philosophical studies—so at least I gather from his tone ; he never speaks disrespectfully of philosophy and science in their own sphere ; his continual exhortation is that he who would understand them and refute their errors must first study them ; that to do otherwise, to abuse what we do not know, brings only contempt on ourselves and on the cause which we champion. But he cannot found his religion on intellect ; nor can I understand that a man of al-Ghazzālī's temperament could ever have persuaded himself to find peace in pure thought. He could be indifferent, a keen legal-minded onlooker upon the theological fights round him, such as we find him in his earlier life ; but once the religious instinct was aroused, nothing could satisfy him except what he eventually

found. It is absurd to speak of him as a renegade from philosophy, as one who turned his back on the light in which he had walked for a season and went again into the darkness of the obscurant. He was never a cold-brained student like al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, or, later, Ibn Rushd. He had never given his allegiance to pure reason, he had hardly even been a student of philosophy until he took it up in his search for help in the darkness; he had been a student of law, and what went with it, scholastic theology; but when his heart awoke and cried out and he found himself standing alone with the great world stretching around him, he could have followed no other path than that in which he did tread. It is still more absurd to speak of him as a conscious traitor, as one with a secret teaching only confided to his closest pupils, an unbelieving philosophy running in the teeth of his public utterances. His story rings true from beginning to end; his mental development is clear; we can see how, point by point, such and such only could he have been.¹ And so, two possibilities and two only were before him, though one was hardly a real possibility if we consider his training and mental powers. He might fall back on authority. It could not be the authority of his childish faith; "our fathers have told us," he himself confesses, could never again have weight with him. But it might be some claimer of authority in a new form, some infallible teacher with a doctrine which he could accept for the authority behind it. As the Church of Rome from time to time gathers into its fold men of keen intellect who seek rest in submission, and the world marvels, so it might have been with him. Or again he might turn directly to God and to personal intercourse with Him; he might seek to know Him and to be taught of Him without any intermediary, in a word, to enter on the path of the mystic.

He came next to examine the doctrine of the Ta'limites. And here we touch at last a dating point. He tells us that just when he felt driven himself to study this sect, the Khalifa of the time laid on him a command to write a book against their teachings. We must remember that he was an eminent professor in the Madrasa at Baghdād, was in the odour of orthodoxy, and would naturally be called upon to write against any heretical sect that might be troublesome at the time. The book which he wrote

¹ See further on this, pp. 125 ff.

was the *Mustazhirī*, which shows that the Khalifa in question must have been al-Mustazhir, who succeeded al-Muqtadī on 15th Muḥarram 487. As al-Ghazzālī finally left Baghdād in Dhū-l-Qa'da 488, he must have been studying the Ta'ālimites early in 487.¹ He says that they were a sect which had recently appeared; and from the Khalifa's command we can see that their teachings were making rapid strides, and that orthodox Islām felt it necessary to enter the field against them. From the nature of their doctrines as developed by al-Ghazzālī, it is evident that we have here the sect of the Ismā'īlites that was founded by al-Ḥasan b. aṣ-Ṣabbāḥ. Ash-Shāhrastānī² has described his teaching, and shows that it began and ended with the claim that only by an infallible teacher could truth be reached, that his sect had such a teacher or Imām, and that no other sect had. This is exactly the position which we find al-Ghazzālī combatting. He does it with a warmth which shows how close the battle was. He gives in detail how such a claim should be met, what arguments may be used against it, and what are useless. I need not give these arguments here. They would add nothing to our knowledge of al-Ghazzālī at this point of his life, as they were intended for the assistance of good Muslims at the time of his writing the *Munqidh*. (It is enough that al-Ghazzālī found the Ta'ālimites and their teachings eminently unsatisfactory; they had a lesson which they went over parrot-fashion, but beyond it they were in dense ignorance. The trained theologian and scholar had no patience with their slackness and shallowness of thought. He

¹ There is a curious mistake in Stanislas Guyard's article in the *Journal Asiatique*, 71^{ème} sér., ix. 324 ff., "Un grand maître des assassins." On pp. 338, 339, he dates the *Munqidh* before the rise of Ḥasan b. aṣ-Ṣabbāḥ, and before the development of the Ismā'īlian heresy into a political sect at open war with all around. But Ḥasan seized Alamūt in 483, and the *Munqidh* was written after 500; between, to follow certain historians, came some of the most important assassinations in their record, Niẓām al-Mulk, Mālik Shāh, Fakhr al-Mulk. There must be another reason for the moderate terms which al-Ghazzālī uses towards them in the *Munqidh*. Even the *Mustazhirī* was written after the seizure of Alamūt, which may, indeed, have been its cause.

² Haarbrücker's translation, i. 225. Ash-Shāhrastānī was a younger contemporary of al-Ghazzālī. He went to Baghdād in 510. I do not attempt here to enter on a consideration of the truth of the history of Ḥasan and his sect as commonly received. It is in great part based on very late authorities, and seems open to grave doubt.

laboured long, as ash-Shāhristānī confesses he too did, to penetrate their mystery and learn something from them, but beyond the accustomed formulae there was nothing to be found. He even admitted their contention of the necessity of a living, infallible teacher, to see what would follow—but nothing followed. “You admit the necessity of an Imām,” they would say, “it is your business now to go and seek him; we have nothing more to do with it.” But though neither al-Ghazzālī nor ash-Shāhristānī, who died 43 (lunar) years after him, could be satisfied with the Ta’līmites, many others were. The conflict was hot, and al-Ghazzālī himself wrote several books against them; the *Mustazhiri* already mentioned; a *Hujja al-ḥaqq*, also written in Baghdād but perhaps during his second residence there; a *Mufaṣṣil al-khilāf*, written at Hamadān (when he was there I do not know, perhaps during his ten years of wandering life); a *Kitāb ad-durj*, written in tabular form, the record of a controversy at Tūs; also in his *Qistās*, an attempt to lay down a rule of guidance in theological dispute, there is a demonstration that those who have such a rule have no need of an Imām.

The other possibility, the path of the mystic, now lay straight before him. In the *Munqidh* he tells us how, when he had made an end with the Ta’līmites, he began to study the books of the Šūfis, without any suggestion that he had had a previous acquaintance with them and their practices. But probably this means nothing more than it does when he speaks in a similar way of studying the scholastic theologians; namely, that he now took up the study in earnest and with a new and definite purpose. His native country was steeped in Šūfism; his old teacher, the Imām al-Ḥaramayn, had been a devout Šūfī; according to the tradition the friend to whom his father had entrusted his brother and himself had been a Šūfī. The Sayyid Murtaḍā also enters into some details on his Šūfī studies, though these, of course, cannot be depended upon absolutely and are largely mixed with legend. His principal teacher—this on the authority of ‘Abd al-Ghāfir is certain—was the Imām, the Zāhid, Abū ‘Alī al-Faḍl b. Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Fārmadī aṭ-Ṭūsī (SM. p. 19; I give the name in full, as the only reference I can find to him is a mere mention in Yāqūt under Fārmadh), one of the chiefest of the pupils of al-Qushayrī,¹ the author of the celebrated *Risāla*, and, on the

¹ Ibn Khall. ii. 152; Mehren, p. 315.

authority of as-Sam‘ānī in his *Ansāb* (SM. p. 19), a pupil of the older al-Ghazzālī, the grand-uncle. Al-Fārmadī died in Ṭūs in 477, and there al-Ghazzālī studied with him.¹ ‘Abd al-Ghāfir tells how, after he had made great progress in science, he was seized with disgust and weariness at it, and turned to what would avail for the future life. Al-Fārmadī guided him, and he followed his path² and imitated all the practices that were put before him. He took part in *dhikrs*,³ and passed through all the laborious and wearying life of the Ṣūfī neophyte, but did not attain what he sought. Obviously, his time was not yet come; his mind was not yet prepared to open to spiritual light. So he went back to his worldly studies, to the weighing of proofs and the settling of legal difficulties. But, at last, in ‘Abd al-Ghāfir’s picturesque phrase, a door of fear was opened upon him, and the change described above came. Further, there is mentioned a certain Yūsuf as-Sajjāj, or, an-Nassāj, of whom elsewhere I can find no trace. The following story goes back directly to al-Ghazzālī through the autograph manuscript of Quṭb ad-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Irdibīlī (SM. p. 9.): “I used at first to deny the ecstatic states of the saints and the grades of advancement of the initiated until I companied with my *shaykh* Yūsuf an-Nassāj in Ṭūs, and he kept polishing at me with exercises until I was graced with revelations and I saw God in a dream and He said to me, ‘O Abū Ḥāmid!’ I said, ‘Is Satan speaking to me?’ He said, ‘Nay, but I am God that encompasseth all thy ways; *am I not [thy Lord]?*’⁴ Then He said, ‘O Abū Ḥāmid, abandon thy formal rules, and company with the people whom I have made the resting-place of My regard in My earth; they are those who have sold the Two Abodes for My love.’ Then I said, ‘By Thy might, I adjure Thee to give

¹ Mehren has curiously misunderstood and mistranslated what ‘Abd al-Ghāfir says, making al-Ghazzālī study at Naysābūr after his ten years of wandering life. But al-Fārmadī, as we have seen, died in 477.

² The “Path” (*ṭarīqa*) of the Muslim mystic is the discipline which he follows on his way to his ideal of absolute communion with the Divine. See Hughes, *Dict. of Islām*, pp. 608 ff., and Flügel’s article on ash-Shā‘rānī in ZDMG. xx. 41, note 52.

³ For the religious services called *dhikrs* see Hughes, *Dict. of Islām*, pp. 793 ff., Lane, *Modern Egyptians*, chap. xxiv.

⁴ Qur. vii. 171; a celebrated passage where God takes a covenant from all men, as the seed of Adam, on the day of his creation, that they will acknowledge Him on the day of Resurrection as their Lord. There are many references to the day of *alastu*.

me again to taste good thought of them!’ Then He said, ‘I do so; that which separated between thee and them was thy being occupied by the love of this world, so come out from it by free will before thou comest out from it abjectly [at death]. I pour forth upon thee lights from the protection of My holiness, so seize them and apply thyself.’ Then I awoke in great joy and went to my shaykh Yūsuf an-Nassāj and related to him the dream. And he smiled and said, ‘O Abū Ḥāmid, these changing states and grades we obliterate with our feet; yea, if thou companiest with me the glance of thy insight will be kohled with the *ithmid* of succor until thou seest the Empyrean Throne and those around it. Then thou wilt not be satisfied with that until thou witnessest that to which glances can not attain, and thou wilt be purified from the uncleanness of thy nature and ascend beyond the limits of thy reason and hear discourse from God Most High like Mūsā, *Verily, I am God, the Lord of the Worlds.*’”¹ Another story is traced back through ‘Abd al-Wahhāb ash-Sha‘rānī: “Al-Ghazzālī was wont to say, ‘When I wished to plunge into following the People and to drink of their drink, I looked at my soul and I saw how much it was curtained in,’—at this time he had no shaykh,—‘so I retired into solitude and busied myself with religious exercises for forty days, and there was doled to me of knowledge what I had not had, purer and finer than what I had known. Then I looked upon it, and lo, in it was a legal element. So I returned to solitude and busied my-

¹ I am not certain that I have read or rendered the last two words rightly. I read *fafuz wanul*.

² Qur. xxviii. 30. All Muslims, heretical and orthodox, laymen, theologians, and philosophers, believed and believe in dreams. Dreaming is one six and fortieth of prophecy, according to the tradition, and in dreaming the soul is set free to visit the upper world of the Unseen and learn its mysteries. This is a formal part of both philosophy and theology, and is presupposed by al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd, al-Ghazzālī, and all the rest. The ordinary man is freed from the darkening veil of the body in sleep, but then only, and not at his own will. The saint can also rise to spiritual intuition by ecstasy, which he can himself bring on. On ordinary—non-religious, mystical—dreams, see Ibn. Khall. i. 47 and iii. 32. He evidently believed that he had actually seen Surayj and Mubarrad. On seeing *God* in a dream, see i. 46, note 7, and references there; also al-Ghazzālī’s *Maḍnūn*, edit. of Cairo, 1303, pp. 5 ff. See, too, Patton, *Aḥmed Ibn Ḥanbal*, 192, note 4. Curiously enough, Patton seems to regard it as a proof of peculiar superstition in Ibn Ḥanbal that he believed in dreams.

self with religious exercises for forty days, and there was doled to me other knowledge, purer and finer than what had befallen me at first, and I rejoiced in it. Then I looked upon it, and lo, in it was a speculative element. So I returned to solitude a third time for forty days, and there was doled to me other knowledge; it was finer and purer. Then I looked on it, and lo, in it was an element mixed with a knowledge that is known [i. e. not simply perceived, felt], and I did not attain to the people of the inward sciences.¹ So I knew that writing on a surface from which something has been erased is not like writing on a surface in its first purity and cleanness, and I never separated myself from speculation except in a few things.’” On this there is the remark, “May God have mercy on Abū Ḥāmid, how great was his justice and his guarding of himself from making any claim!”

We may take these stories for what they are worth. The last, which evidently describes his effort to free his mind from the burden of all his legal and theological studies and present it as a *tabula rasa* to the new impressions, has great psychological probability. But in the *Munqidh* we have numerous details as to his struggles at this period and how he came out of them, which must be regarded as authentic. He recognized that for him study of the doctrines of the Ṣūfīs as contained in their books was easier than following their practices. He therefore read carefully the *Qūt al-qulūb* of Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī,² the works of al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī,³ the fragments of al-Junayd,⁴ ash-Shiblī,⁵ and Abu Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī.⁶ He had also the benefit of oral

¹ *Al-‘ulūm al-ladunīya*. Al-Ghazzālī in the *Iḥya* (vii. p. 260) explains this by a reference to Qur. xviii. 64, *wa-‘allamnāhu min ladunnā ‘ilman*. All knowledge is from God, but that which is immediately revealed by Him in the secret heart, *fī sirri-l-qalbi*, without any intermediary is called *‘ilm ladunī*. Compare de Sacy, *les sciences qui sont en Dieu* (*Notices et Extraits*, xii. 303, note 3), and Goldziher, *die geheime Wissenschaft*, ZDMG. xxviii. 321.

² Ibn Khall. iii. 20. Died 386. He was not “originaire de la Mecque,” as Barbier de Meynard says, but only a resident there, a *Jār Allāh* or *Nāzil Makka*.

³ Ibn Khall. i. 365; Patton, *Aḥmed ibn Ḥanbal*, 41 ff.

⁴ Ibn Khall. i. 338; also references in Flügel’s article on ash-Sha‘rānī in ZDMG. xx. 41, note 53.

⁵ Ibn Khall. i. 511.

⁶ *Risāla* of al-Qushayrī, p. 17 of edit. of Cairo 1304. Barbier de Meynard prints the name Zeīd, but that is an error.

teaching; but it became plain to him that only through ecstasy and a complete transformation of the moral being could he really understand Šūfiism. He saw that it consisted in feelings more than knowledge; that he must be initiated as a Šūfī himself, live their life and practice their exercises, to attain his goal. On the way on which he had gone up to this time, he had gained three fixed points of faith. He now believed firmly in God, in prophecy, and in the last judgment. He had also gained the belief that only by detaching himself from this world, its life, enjoyments, honours, and turning to God could he be saved in the world to come. He looked on his present life, his writing and his teaching, and saw of how little value it was in the face of the great fact of heaven and hell. All he did now was for the sake of vain glory and had in it no consecration to the service of God. He felt on the edge of an abyss. The world held him back; his fears urged him away. He was in the throes of a conversion wrought by terror; his religion, now and always, in common with all Islām, was other-worldly.¹ So he remained in conflict with himself for six months, from Rajab of 488. Finally, his health broke down under the strain. In his feebleness and overthrow he took refuge with God as a man at the end of his resources. God heard him and enabled him to make the needed sacrifices. As I have already described, he abandoned all and wandered forth from Baghdād as a Šūfī. He had put his brilliant present and brilliant future absolutely behind him, had given up everything for the peace of his soul. This date, Dhū-l-Qa'da 488, was the great era in his life; but it marked an era, too, in the history of Islām. Since al-Ash'arī went back to the faith of his fathers in 300 and cursed the Mu'tazilites and all their works, there had been no such epoch as this flight of al-Ghazzālī. It meant that the reign of pure scholastic theology was over; that another element was to work openly in the future Church of Islām, the element of the mystical life in God, of the attainment of truth by the soul in direct vision. But to trace these consequences belongs to a history of Muslim theology.

He betook himself at once to Syria, and remained there almost two years, living in strict retirement and giving all his time to

¹ On the other-worldliness of Islām compare the case of Ibn Rushd, a man at the opposite pole of thought from al-Ghazzālī, *Philos. u. Theol. von Averroes*, übers. von M. J. Müller, 18.

the religious exercises of the Sūfis¹ with prayer and contemplation. While at Damascus he used to go up into the minaret of the mosque,² shut the door upon himself, and there pass his days. From Damascus he went to Jerusalem and shut himself up similarly in the Dome of the Rock.³ Now he began to feel himself drawn to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. It had been under pretense of a pilgrimage that he had stolen away from Baghdād and fled to Damascus; but apparently at that time he could not bring himself to such a step. Whether he felt himself too unclean, or his religious faith was too uncertain, might be hard to settle; at any rate it was only now, after long meditation and discipline, that he at length performed the culminating act of the religious life of a Muslim. From Jerusalem he went to Hebron to visit the grave of Abraham, *al-Khalīl*, the Friend of God, and thence to the Hījāz and Mecca and Medina. With this religious duty his life of strict retirement ended. It is evident that he now felt that he was again within the fold of Islām. In spite of his former resolution to retire from the world, he was drawn back. The prayers of his children⁴ and his own aspirations broke in upon him, and though he resolved again and again to return to the contemplative life, and did actually often do so, yet events,

¹ What these exercises were may be learned best from the tractate which I translate. I may be permitted to refer to one result of interest for the history of Old Testament prophecy. That a theologian of the rank and learning of al-Ghazzālī could have part in the darwish-performances of the Sūfis shows that Wellhausen's strict division between Samuel, on the one hand, and the roving bands of *nbī'im*, on the other, cannot stand. Samuel would have had no difficulty in taking part in any *dhikr*, and would have been among the prophets as much as Saul.

² For the minaret of al-Ghazzālī at Damascus see Le Strange, *Palestine under the Moslems*, 246 and 264, quotations from Ibn Jubayr and Yāqūt. It is that on the S.W. of the Umayyad Jāmi', and according to Baedeker (*Paläst. u. Syrien*, 332), the only one accessible to non-Muslims. Yet Lady Burton had no difficulty in visiting both the others.

³ Mujir ad-Dīn (d. 927), in his *History of Jerusalem*, p. 265 of edit. of Cairo 1283, says that he lodged in the Zāwiya, on the east of Jerusalem, beside the Bāb ar-Rahma known before as a Zāwiya Nāṣiriya, but thereafter, as the Ghazzālīya on his account. In the time of Mujir ad-Dīn it was ruined. [There is still a Zāwiya Ghazzālīya in Jerusalem.] Further, some said that he wrote the *Iḥyā* there.

⁴ It is worth noticing, though in a Muslim biography not strange, how few are the references to his daughters, and that there is no reference at all to his wife or wives. Some of the letters that passed between himself and his children would be more valuable to us than the whole introduction of the SM.

family affairs, and the anxieties of life, kept continually disturbing him. This went on, he tells us, for almost ten years, and in that time there were revealed to him things that could not be reckoned and the discussion of which could not be exhausted. He learned that the Sūfis were on the true and only path to the knowledge of God; that neither intelligence nor wisdom nor science could change or improve their doctrine or their ethics. The light in which they walk is essentially the same as the light of prophecy; Muḥammad was a Sūfī when on his way to be a prophet. There is none other light to light any man in this world. A complete purifying of the heart from all but God is their Path; a seeking to completely plunge the heart in the thought of God is its beginning, and its end is complete passing away in God. This last is only its end in relation to what can be entered upon and grasped by a voluntary effort; in truth, it is only the first step in the Path, the vestibule to the contemplative life. Revelations (*mukāshafāt*, unveilings)¹ come to the disciple from the very beginning; while awake they see angels and souls of prophets, hear their voices, and gain from them guidance. Then their State² passes from the beholding of forms

¹ According to al-Qushayrī in the *Risāla* (p. 50 of edit. of Cairo 1304), *mukāshafa* comes after *muḥāḍara* and precedes *mushāhada*. *Muḥāḍara* is simply a presenting of the heart before God, on the part of the worshipper. *Mukāshafa* joins to this the quality of explaining (*bayān*), without the need in this state of considering a guide or a means, and no one seeks aid against causes of error, and no one is curtailed off from the Unseen World. *Mushāhada* follows, and in it there is the presence of the Truth itself without any anxiety remaining; there are no veiling clouds, and the sun of witness shines brightly. Al-Junayd said, "It is the presence of the Truth along with the lack of Thee." Al-Qushayrī adds much more. See, further, Flügel's article on *ash-Sha'rānī*, ZDMG. xx. 25, note 6; al-Ghazzālī's *Imlā*, margin of SM. i. p. 54.

² State (*ḥāl* and *ḥāla*, pl. *aḥwāl*) is a term which will occur very frequently in the translation from al-Ghazzālī, sometimes in its ordinary meaning and sometimes in the technical meaning here intended. Al-Qushayrī in the *Risāla* (pp. 40 ff.) explains it, and distinguishes it carefully from *maqām*, station. It is a condition of joy or sorrow, of elation or depression, of longing, of reverence, etc., which descends upon the heart without intention or assertion or seeking on its part. States are pure gifts, but stations are sought-for gains. States come without effort, but stations are gained by the utmost application. He who is in a station remains there, but he who is in a state is always mounting higher from that state. Further details follow in the *Risāla* as to the possibility of the continuance of states. See, too, al-Ghazzālī's *Imlā*, margin of SM. i. p. 52.

to stages where language fails and any attempt to express what is experienced must involve some error. They reach a nearness to God which some have fancied to be a *ḥulūl*, fusion of being, others an *ittiḥād*, identification, and others a *wuṣūl*, union; but these are all erroneous ways of indicating the thing. Al-Ghazzālī notes that in his *Maqṣad al-aqṣā*¹ he has explained wherein the error lies. But the thing itself is the true basis of all faith and the beginning of prophecy; the *karāmāt*² of the saints lead to the miracles of the prophets. By this means the possibility and

¹ In Ibn Ṭufayl's *Risāla Ḥay b. Yaqṣān* (edit. Pococke, p. 22) this is *Al-maṣṣad al-asnā*. A *Maqṣad al-aqṣā* is described by Gosche (p. 251) as on the *Names*, but there must be some mistake; Gosche's descriptions of the MSS. used by him are not faultless, e. g. that of the MSS. of the *Durra*, see Gautier, pp. viii ff. In the SM.'s list there is neither a *Maqṣad al-asnā* nor *al-aqṣā* but there is a *Kitāb al-asmā al-ḥusnā*, evidently on the *Names*. In HKb. vi. 89 there is a *Maqṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ al-asmā al-ḥusnā*, apparently the book in the SM.'s list. So, also, is the title in the list of books by al-Ghazzālī in Casiri, i. 465, no. 1125. (Note, *contra* Gosche, that there is no evidence that this list is of date A. H. 611.) Azīz b. Muḥammad an-Nasafī wrote a *Maqṣad al-aqṣā* (HKb. l. c.), translated by Palmer in his *Oriental Mysticism*, Cambridge, 1867, the contents of which seem the same in character as those of the book mentioned here. Evidently the title could apply to a book of the nature required by this reference and by that in Ibn Ṭufayl.

² With the *karāmāt* of the saints (*awliyā*) Lane compares the *χαρίσματα*, 1 Corinthians xii. 9, and suggests as a rendering 'thaumaturgy.' They are wonders granted by God to His *walīs*, who may be ignorant that they are working them, and who ought rather to conceal them than to show them openly. They are sharply distinguished from the *mu'jizāt*, or miracles of the prophets, which are evidentiary signs proving the truth of the claim to prophecy, and therefore of a public, open nature. The prophet works *mu'jizāt* at his will; the saint has wonders worked for him by God, and he may not know it. But *karāmāt* are granted also to the prayer of the saint, and it is lawful for him to show them to chosen persons. So the essential difference is that they are not used as proofs and coupled with a claim to prophecy. See the *Risāla*, pp. 207 ff. of Cairo edit. 1304; the *Ishārāt* of Ibn Sinā (edit. Forget, pp. 207 ff.); al-Fārābī's *Philosoph. Abhandl.*, edit. Dieterici, p. 72 (on miracles of prophets and their possibility in the scheme of nature); the SM. in his commentary, vol. ii. pp. 203 ff.; al-Ghazzālī himself, vol. vii. pp. 244 ff. (in '*Ajā'ib al-qalb*'); at-Taftāzānī's *Sharḥ* on the '*Aqā'id* of an-Nafasī, edit. Constant. 1310, pp. 175 ff.; *Dict. of Tech. Terms*, i. 444 ff., under *khāriq*, i. e. what violates the ordinary course of nature. Also Flügel's article on ash-Shar'ānī in ZDMG. xx. p. 34, note 36, and p. 42, note 58; al-Ghazzālī's *Imlā*, margin of SM. i. p. 204; Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddama*, pp. 395 ff. of edit. of Būlāq.

the existence of prophecy can be proved, and then the life itself of Muḥammad proves that he was a prophet. Al-Ghazzālī goes on to deal with the nature of prophecy, and how the life of Muḥammad shows the truth of his mission; but enough has been given to indicate his attitude¹ and the stage at which he had himself arrived. During this ten years he had returned to his native country and to his children, but had not undertaken public duty as a teacher. Now that was forced upon him. The century was drawing to a close. Everywhere there was evident a slackening of religious fervor and faith. A mere external compliance with the rules of Islām was observed; men even openly defended such a course. He adduces as an example of this the *Waṣīya* of Ibn Sīnā. The students of philosophy went their way, and their conduct shook the minds of the people; false Ṣūfis abounded, who taught antinomianism; the lives of many theologians excited scandal; the Taʿlīmītes, of whom we have already heard, were still spreading. A religious leader to turn the current was absolutely needed, and his friends looked to al-Ghazzālī to take up that duty; some distinguished saints had dreams of his success; God had promised a reformer every hundred years, and the time was up.² Finally the Sulṭān laid a

¹ There is a curious parallelism in al-Ghazzālī's attitude here to the latest phase in Christian apologetics. The argument from miracles seems now to be practically thrown aside; the doctrine rather must prove the miracle. The unique fact of the life and person of Christ is emphasized; it is shown how it appeals immediately to the human consciousness, and on that the proof of the truth of His mission is built up. Logically this position is faulty; and practically it proves whatever you wish. Al-Ghazzālī uses it to prove the truth of the mission of Muḥammad. Miracles are difficult, almost impossible to prove—here we have again his attitude of historical agnosticism; but if any one will read the record of Muḥammad's life, he will receive a general impression that will assure him of the truth of the mission. The personality of Muḥammad will be its own proof.

² The SM. devotes an entire section to the tradition promising a renewer of religious life every hundred years. He then gives lists of all those for whom the honour of being such a reformer had been claimed. At the end of the first century came ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, the pious Umayyad Khalīfa, who died in 99. At the end of the second, ash-Shāfiʿī, who died in 204. The honour of reforming the fourth century was claimed for al-Ashʿarī (d. 320?) and also for Ibn Surayj (d. 306). For the fifth century three names are given, al-Isfarāīnī (d. 406), aṣ-Ṣuʿlūkī (d. 387 or 402 or 404), al-Bāqilānī (d. 403). The position of al-Ghazzālī as reformer of the sixth century seems undisputed, though, at one time, the Khalīfa al-Mustarshid was set up against him (Mehren, p. 181).

command upon him to go and teach in the Madrasa at Naysābūr, and he was forced to consent. His departure for Naysābūr fell in Dhū-l-Qa'da 499, exactly eleven years after his flight from Baghdād.

So far I have followed in this sketch of al-Ghazzālī's wandering life his own account in the *Munqidh*, but it can be supplemented from other sources. These, it is true, contradict one another flatly and tell many things that are evident impossibilities, but some gleanings of fact are possible. Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630) in the *Kāmil* (*ḥawādith* of 488), tells us that al-Ghazzālī composed the *Iḥyā* at this time, returned to Baghdād after pilgrimaging in 489, and from there went to Khurāsān. This is all probably correct, though it is difficult to make up al-Ghazzālī's "almost two years" between Dhū-l-Qa'da 488 and Dhū-l-Ḥijja 489. That the *Iḥyā* was written about this time his biographers agree, and we may accept it as tolerably certain. The stories which they tell of his life at Damascus are by no means so certain, though some of them seem to go back through adh-Dhahabī (d. 748) to Abū-l-Qāsim b. 'Asākir, the author of the great history of Damascus, who died in 571. After al-Ghazzālī himself, the best authority on his life is undoubtedly the 'Abd al-Ghāfir already mentioned, who was an immediate contemporary and personal friend. What he tells us of al-Ghazzālī's life must have been gained from personal knowledge or go back immediately to al-Ghazzālī. According to him, al-Ghazzālī set out on pilgrimage to Mecca (*qaṣada ḥajja bayti-llāhi* as in SM., not *qaṣada bayta-llāhi waḥajja* as in Mehren), then went to Syria, and remained there wandering from place to place and shrine to shrine nearly ten years. At this time he composed several of his works, the *Iḥyā* and books abbreviated from it such as the *Arba'in* and *Rasā'il*, besides laboring at his own spiritual advancement and growth through the religious exercises of the Ṣūfīs. Then he returned to his home (*watan*) and lived there a retired life for some time, absorbed in meditation, but gradually becoming more and more sought after as a teacher and guide in the spiritual life. At length Fakhr al-Mulk 'Alī b. Nizām al-Mulk Jamāl ash-Shuhadā, who had previously been Wazīr to Bargiyāruq,¹ became Wazīr to Sinjar² the son of Mālik Shāh at Naysābūr, and by him such pressure

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, A. H. 488, *ḥawādith*.

² Ibn Khall. i. 600.

was put on al-Ghazzālī that he finally consented to resume teaching in the Maymūna Nizāmīya Madrasa there. As Fakhr al-Mulk was assassinated¹ by a Bāṭinī on the day of 'Āshūrā, i. e. the tenth of Muḥarram, 500, it is evident that al-Ghazzālī's own date of Dhū-l-Qa'da 499 is the latest possible, and is thus protected against the suspicions of Gosche. It may also be worth noticing that Bargiyārūq had died in Rabi' II, 498; this may have removed an obstacle to al-Ghazzālī's return to public life. It will be remembered that his flight from Baghdād fell after the final victory of Bargiyārūq over Tutush, and that the Khalīfa, at whose court he was, had declared for Tutush.

It remains now to endeavor to gather up what can be gained from other sources with regard to this mysterious ten years. Ibn al-Athīr (*loc. cit.*) tells us that on his journey he composed the *Ihya*, and that many heard it from him in Damascus; and that after he had pilgrimaged he returned to Baghdād. 'Abd al-Ghāfir has already told us about the writing of the *Ihya*, and this dating point renders possible the dating of some other of his books. In the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* (p. 4 of Beer's text) he states that he intends to follow it immediately with a book to be entitled *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*. There is a corresponding statement in the prologue to the *Tahāfut* (p. 6 of edit. of Cairo 1303), only there the *Maqāṣid* is called *Mi'yār al-'ilm*; but Gosche has already noticed that these two are titles of one book. Further, in the *Tahāfut*, p. 21, it is explained that it in turn is to be followed by a *Qawā'id al-'aqā'id*. Such a book does not appear in the SM.'s list, but stands 41 in the list in Wüstenfeld's *Academien*. I would suggest that the book in the *Ihya* which bears this title is meant, the second of the first *Rub'a*. These three books are all closely related to one another, and al-Ghazzālī in the places cited has explained their relationship. The *Maqāṣid* is a compendious statement of the true teachings of the philosophers in all those subjects where doubt can enter, that is logic, physics, and theology. Arithmetic and geometry are excluded as resting on an absolutely demonstrable basis. You may be a believer or not, but you must accept their results in these subjects. All that he intended in this book was to state the facts as to the views of the philosophers. Then in the *Tahāfut* these views are overthrown

¹ Ibn al-Athīr, A. H. 500; Houtsma, *al-Bondārī*, 265; Weil, *Chalifen*, iii. 209.

by argument; the aim is purely destructive. Finally, in the *Qawā'id* a system of positive truth is built up to take the place of the errors of the philosophers. Thus the three books follow and complement one another. If, then, the *Qawā'id* here spoken of is the book so called in the *Iḥyā*, written in the earlier part of his retreat, are we to see in the *Maqāṣid* and *Tahāfut* the results written at Baghdād of his study of philosophy there? This seems highly probable; we can then regard the *Maqāṣid* as in a sense notes of his two years' reading, and the *Tahāfut* as the fruit of his further year of meditation.

To return to his stay at Damascus; that he taught the *Iḥyā* there may be taken as tolerably certain. Adh-Dhahabī (d. 748) gives us from Ibn 'Asākir (but the SM. could not find it in Ibn 'Asākir's text) that he used to sit a great deal in the corner (*zāwiya*) of the Shaykh Naṣr al-Maqdisī in the Umawī Jāmi', which is on that account called the Ghazzālī corner. This must be Abū-l-Faṭḥ Naṣr b. Ibrāhīm al-Maqdisī, no. 41 in Wüstenfeld's *Academien*.¹ Ibn Shuhba (died at Damascus 850 or 851) says there (p. 5 of the Arabic text) that Abū-l-Faṭḥ became acquainted with al-Ghazzālī there and learned from him. As he died in Muḥarram 490, al-Ghazzālī must have been at Damascus for some time before that date. Wüstenfeld (p. 33) says that in this corner the Madrasa Ghazzālīya was afterwards established. That may well have been the case, but I have found no authority for his statement. Adh-Dhahabī goes on to say that he was finally driven away from Damascus by hearing himself quoted formally as an authority by a teacher in the Amīniya Madrasa. This story can not be true as it stands, for that Madrasa was not founded till 514; and the further stories with which he follows it up are equally impossible. Al-Ghazzālī is said to have gone to Alexandria, to have stayed there a time, and to have determined on setting out to Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn, the great Murābiṭ Sultān of the West on whose behalf we have already found him giving *fatwas*, when the news of the latter's death arrived. 'Alī, the son and successor of Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn, did not show the gratitude for those *fatwas* which might have been expected. Some such influence as that of al-Ghazzālī could have been was badly needed in the West. The study of the Qur'ān, of tradition, and of theology in the narrower sense (*kalām*), fell into complete disrepute, and

¹ See, too, Mehren, p. 320; Ibn Khall. i. 42.

fiqh or canon law was the only branch that continued to receive attention. When al-Ghazzālī's books began to arrive, the western *faqīhs* speedily saw that the return to Qur'ān and tradition and to the study of *kalām* championed in these ran in the teeth of their own interests. The result was a *fatwā* issued by Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Ḥamdīn, the chief Qādī of Cordova, and supported by the other Qādīs, solemnly condemning the books of al-Ghazzālī and forbidding the study of them. This *fatwā* was accepted by 'Alī, and copies of the books were burned at Cordova and other Spanish cities, while the reading or possession of them was prohibited on pain of death. No date is given; 'Alī reigned from 500 to 537. This is the story as told in part by 'Abd al-Wāḥid (wrote in 621; pp. 123 ff. in Dozy's edition). Dozy (*Histoire*, iv. 253 ff.) refers also for some of the above details to the *Hulūl*. I can find nothing in the *Qarṭās*, in Ibn al-Athīr, or in Ibn Khaldūn. The subject will come up again in connection with the miracles ascribed to al-Ghazzālī.

To return; that al-Ghazzālī should have been prevented from setting out for Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn in 500 by the report of the death of the latter is impossible, as we have seen that he was summoned to teach at Naysābūr by Fakhr al-Mulk, who was assassinated in the first month of 500. Further, according to the SM. (p. 44), he was accompanied in his wanderings by a certain Abū Ṭāhir Ibrāhīm b. al-Muṭahhar ash-Shaybānī. The latter had been a pupil of the Imām al-Ḥaramayn at Naysābūr, but went with al-Ghazzālī to Al-'Irāq and Syria, then returned to his native place in Jurjān, taught and preached there, and died a martyr in 513. The SM. tells also of another pupil of al-Ghazzālī at Damascus. He was Abū-l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Muslim b. Muḥammad b. 'Alī as-Salmī, Jamāl al-Islām (Mehren, p. 328), and studied with al-Ghazzālī all the time of his stay at Damascus. When al-Ghazzālī left Syria he said, "I have left behind in Syria a youth who, if he lives, will amount to something." These statements I am unable to control, except as regards as-Salmī, and give for what they may be worth; but it is different with an anecdote of his life at Jerusalem. As-Sam'ānī relates (SM. p. 44, foot) that he heard Abū-l-Futūḥ Naṣr b. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Marāghī al-Adharbījānī dictating at Āmul in Tabaristān as follows: "There came together the Imāms Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī and Ismā'īl al-Ḥakīmī and Ibrāhīm ash-Shibākī¹ and Abū-l-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, and a large number of

¹ Is this a *nisba* to Shibāk in Yāqūt?

foreign elders, in the Cradle of 'Īsā' (upon him be peace!) in Jerusalem, and he (al-Ghazzālī, apparently) recited these two lines,

'May I be thy ransom! were it not for love thou wouldst have ransomed me, but by the magic of two eye-pupils thou hast taken me captive.

I came to thee when my breast was straitened through love, and if thou hadst known how was my longing, thou wouldst have come to me.'

Then Abū-l-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī constrained himself to an ecstasy¹ which affected those that were present, and eyes wept and garments were rent, and Muḥammad al-Kāzarūnī² died in the midst of the assembly in ecstasy. I was myself present and saw it." For the people of Jerusalem, according to SM. (p. 42), he wrote the *Risāla al-Qudsiya*, as Gosche has already guessed (p. 251). The full title is *Ar-risāla al-quḍsiya bi'adillatihā al-burhāniya fī 'ilm al-kalām*; a *sharḥ* to it was written by the author. All this must have been before 492, for in Sha'ban of that year Jerusalem was captured by the crusaders after having been taken in 491 from the Seljuqs by the Fāṭimids. It seems possible to fix with tolerable definiteness another point in his wandering life. Adh-Dhabī says that he returned to Baghdād, and taught the *Ihya* and preached there. That he was a preacher is certified by his book of sermons, *Al-Majālis al-Ghazzālīya* (SM. p. 42). As-Subkī narrates that when he acted as preacher at Baghdād, people

¹ On the little Masjid near the Stables of Solomon called Mahd 'Īsā, see Le Strange, *Palestine under the Moslems*, 166, and Baedeker, *Paläst. u. Syrien*, 54.

² From the root WJD, meaning 'to find,' then 'to know' by means of the intellect, and 'to love passionately,' come a number of words of the greatest importance in Sūfiism. Among them are *wajada*, 'to fall into an ecstasy,' *tawājada*, 'to constrain oneself to an ecstasy,' by the will; *wajd*, 'an ecstasy'; *wujūd*, 'knowing.' On the progress toward God, first comes *tawājada*, he constrained himself to an ecstasy; then *wajd*, the ecstasy itself; then *wujūd*, the actual knowledge. The use of *takalluf*, or straining to attain ecstasy, is defended by the tradition of the Prophet, "Weep, and if you cannot weep, then strive (or feign) to weep." See *Risāla*, pp. 43 ff., and al-Ghazzālī's *Imlā*, SM. i. pp. 60 and 65, margin.

³ This cannot be the Muḥammad al-Kāzarūnī in Ibn Khall. i. 377; he died 455.

crowded to hear him, and Šaʿīd b. Fāris, known as Ibn al-Labbān, sat in the background and took down his sermons to the number of 183; then he read them over to al-Ghazzālī, who corrected them and gave him an *ijāza*¹ to teach them. The following story is told of his life at this time. I have no other authority for it than the mere name of Abu Saʿīd an-Nawqānī as quoted by SM. (p. 25), but it fits psychologically into this period of al-Ghazzālī's life. He says that al-Ghazzālī once when teaching the *Iḥyā* at Baghdād began to quote,

“He has made beloved the homes of men, as abodes of desire which the heart has decreed them;

Whenever they remember their homes these remind them of the pledges of youth there, and they long thither.”

Then he wept and those present wept with them. Thereafter some one saw him in the open country with a patched darwīsh-garment on, a water-vessel and an iron-shod staff in his hand,—all in strange contrast to the state in which he had seen him before, with three hundred pupils around him including one hundred of the chief men of Baghdād. So he said, “O Imām, is not the teaching of science more fitting?” But al-Ghazzālī looked at him with red eyes and said, “When the full moon of happiness rises in the firmament of will, the sun of setting departs in the East of union.” Then he recited,

“I abandoned the love of Layla and my happiness was far,
and I returned to the companionship of my first alighting-place; then cried to me my longings, ‘Welcome! these are the alighting-places of her whom thou lovest, draw up and alight.’”

What he thought of preaching, and how dissatisfied he was with himself as a preacher, is evident from the following quotation which as-Samʿānī (SM. p. 12) gives from a letter of his, “I do not think myself worthy to preach; for preaching is like a tax, and the property on which it is imposed is the accepting of preaching

¹ An *ijāza* is the formal certificate given by a master that his pupil has learned such and such from him, and has liberty to teach it to others.

² Perhaps he means that his will has at last become strong enough to turn him to his home and the contemplative life. Thus the moon of true happiness is rising and the sun of public work is passing away into union with God. But this is very doubtful.

to oneself. He, then, who has no property, how shall he pay the tax? and he who lacks a garment, how shall he cover another? and 'When is the shadow straight and the wood crooked?' And God revealed to 'Īsà (upon him be peace!), 'Preach to thyself; then, if thou acceptest the preaching, preach to mankind, and if not, be ashamed before me.'"

So he came back at last to Ṭūs, his native place, towards which he had so longed, and settled down to study and the contemplative life. We have already seen what theological position he had reached. Philosophy had been tried and found wanting. In the *Tahāfut* he had smitten the philosophers hip and thigh; he had turned, as in earlier times al-Ash'arī, their own weapons against them, and shown that with their premises and methods no certainty could be reached. In that book he goes to the extreme of intellectual skepticism, and, seven hundred years before Hume, he cuts the bond of causality with the edge of his dialectic and proclaims that we can know nothing of cause or effect, but simply that one thing follows another. He combats their proof of the eternity of the world, and exposes their assertion that God is its creator. He demonstrates that they cannot prove the existence of the creator, or that that creator is one; that they cannot prove that he is incorporeal, or that the world has any creator or cause at all; that they cannot prove the nature of God, or that the human soul is a spiritual essence. When he has finished there is no intellectual basis left for life; he stands beside the Greek skeptics and beside Hume. But his end is very different from that of Hume. We are thrown back on revelation, that given immediately by God to the individual soul or that given through prophets. All our real knowledge is derived from these sources. So it was natural that in the latter part of his life he should turn to the study of the traditions of the Prophet. The science of tradition must certainly have formed part of his early studies, as of those of all Muslim theologians, but he had not specialized in it; his bent had lain in quite other directions. His master, the Imām al-Ḥaramayn, had been no student of tradition; among his many works is not one dealing with that subject (Wüstenfeld, *Schāfi'iten*, p. 252). Now he saw that the truth and the knowledge of the truth lay there, and he gave himself to the new pursuit with all the energy of his nature. Ibn as-Sam'ānī (SM. p. 19) tells us that he invited the *hāfiẓ* Abū-l-Fityān 'Umar b. Abū-l-Ḥasan ar-Ru'āsī ad-Dihistānī to Ṭūs, and heard

from him the two *Ṣaḥīḥs*, that of al-Bukhārī and that of Muslim. The names of others with whom he studied *ḥadīth* are given by his biographers, and all agree in the fact of his change of study. The only point of doubt is whether it fell before or after his call by Fakhr al-Mulk to teach at Naysābūr. For he did not teach there long; before the end of his life, which was near, we find him back at Tūs, living in retirement among his personal disciples, and having in charge a Madrasa for students and a Khānqāh, or monastery, for Ṣūfis.¹ There every moment was filled with study, teaching, or devotion, until the end came. The keenness of his intellectual life and the austerities and privation of his long wanderings early wore him out. Nor was his latter end one of peace. ‘Abd al-Ghāfir tells us that it was clouded with controversy, envy, and slander, and perhaps in that lay the cause of his removal so soon from Naysābūr to Tūs. Ibn as-Sam‘ūnī (SM. p. 12) tells a story that seems to fit in at this point, and which shows us al-Ghazzālī’s position and influence. He gives it as having been heard by him in Marw directly from the narrator, the *muqri*’ Abū Naṣr al-Faḍl b. al-Ḥasan b. ‘Alī, “I went in to the Imām Abū Ḥāmid to take leave of him, and he said to me, ‘Carry this letter to al-Mu‘īn Abū-l-Qāsim al-Bayhaqī.’ Then he added, ‘There is a complaint in it against al-‘Azīz, the superintendent of *waqfs* in Tūs’ [al-‘Azīz was the nephew of al-Mu‘īn]. Then I said, ‘I was at Harāt with his uncle al-Mu‘īn, and a deputation came from Tūs with a petition praising al-‘Azīz, and your writing was in it. His uncle had rejected him and driven him away, but when he saw your writing and your praise of him he received him back into favor.’ Then the Imām said, ‘Give the letter to al-Mu‘īn and write in it this line,

“I have never seen tyranny like the tyranny he has brought on us; he does evil to us, then commands us to be grateful!”

A man of this kind in such a position could not easily keep out of trouble. Yet his friends recognized how much he was changed

¹ ‘Abd al-Ghāfir (Mehren, p. 324), with regard to his retirement from public teaching, says, “Thereupon he retired from that before he was compelled to retire, and returned to his house,” etc., but I am very doubtful if I have read the passage correctly. It runs *thumma taraka (?) dhālīka qabla’an yutraka (?) wa’āda ’ilā baytihi*. Compare the similar retirement of his contemporary Sahl b. Aḥmad al-Ḥākim, who died 499; Wüstenfeld, *Schāfi’iten*, No. 527.

from the supercilious, self-confident, fighting al-Ghazzālī of his earlier life. 'Abd al-Ghāfir has a remark which throws a flood of light upon him at both periods: "However much he met of contradiction and attack and slander, it made no impression on him, and he did not trouble himself to answer his assailants. I visited him many times, and it was no bare conjecture of mine that he, in spite of what I saw in him in time past of maliciousness and roughness towards people, and how he looked upon them contemptuously through his being led astray by what God had granted him of ease in word and thought and expression, and through the seeking of rank and position, had come to be the very opposite and was purified from these stains. And I used to think that he was wrapping himself in the garment of pretence, but I realized after investigation that the thing was the opposite of what I had thought, and that the man had recovered after being mad."² We see here the difficulty that his acquaintances had in grasping the change that had been worked in the brilliant legist. Again, no one ever accused him of a desire for gain. According to Ibn 'Asākir (SM. p. 11) he had by inheritance³ and by what he had earned a fortune sufficient to supply his own needs and those of his family and children. He never needed to appeal to any one in worldly goods, and though fortune presented itself to him he would not receive it, but turned aside from it and was satisfied with that amount by which he could protect his religion and escape the need of asking from any one. How rare this was among Muslim scholars, it is hardly necessary to say.

Another curious illustration of the completeness of the change that came over him and how it was recognized by others is to be found in the fate of his book, the *Manḥūl*. It was written in his latter period, for in the *Mustasfā* (SM. p. 42), after mentioning

¹ I have put this together from Mehren, p. 323, and SM. p. 8. The readings in Mehren's text are sometimes better, but he has altogether omitted the most important part. His abbreviation of Ibn 'Asākir is unfortunate, and the further abbreviation in the French version is often misleading.

² The honesty of this opinion is shown by the fact that 'Abd al-Ghāfir in some respects thought more highly of al-Kiyā; see Mehren, p. 321, and Ibn Khall. ii. 229.

³ This seems in contradiction with the story told of the small sum left by his father in charge of his Šūfī friend, above, p. 75.

the *Ihyā*, the *Kīmiya as-sa'āda*, and the *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān*, he goes on, "Then the divine decree drove me to promotion to teaching (*sāqanī ilā-t-taṣadduri lit-tadrīs*), and they (my pupils) wrote down some of my notes in the science of the bases of *fiqh* and obtained a composition whose like never happened in the orderly statement of the bases. Then when they had completed it they offered it to me, and I did not reject their labor but named the book the *Manḥūl*." But in this book were certain grievous statements¹ with regard to the Imām Abū Ḥanīfa. They are to be found also in the life of the Imām in the *Ta'rīkh* of the Khaṭīb² and in the *Muntazim* of Abū-l-Faraj al-Jawzī,³ and do not seem, as given in these last, to have referred to points of doctrine.⁴ Al-Ghazzālī was a Shāfi'ite and he did not spare the feelings of the Ḥanafites. These met the attack in different ways. Some answered railing with railing. So al-Kardārī;⁵ he attacked in his reply both al-Ghazzālī and ash-Shāfi'ī. Others, again, could not understand how the writer of the *Ihyā*, with its words of praise and respect for Abū Ḥanīfa, could say these things of him. Ibn Ḥajar considered either that the book was forged or that these passages were interpolated. Some went the length of saying that there was a certain Maḥmūd al-Ghazzālī,⁶ a Mu'tazilite, to whom the book ought to be ascribed. But Ibn as-Subkī and

¹ Here I use the *Khayrāt al-ḥisān fī manāqib al-Imām Abī Ḥanīfa* by Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, pp. 4 and 17 of edit. of Cairo 1304.

² Died 463. Ibn Khall. i. 75; compare on these animadversions of his on Abū Ḥanīfa, Ibn Khall. iii. 562.

³ Died 597. Ibn Khall. ii. 296; but al-Jawzī was noted as a fanatical Ḥanbalite and assailant of all the other Imāms and their sects.

⁴ Schmoelders in his life of al-Ghazzālī in Ersch and Gruber says that al-Ghazzālī's attack evidently bore on very slight details of the ceremonial law. He bases this view on the counter-attack of Muḥammad al-'Imādī al-Kurdī, which he examined in the *Refā'iyyah* MS. 152. With this falls to the ground the note of Gosche (p. 308, note 63). He endeavors to prove from al-Ghazzālī's having fallen foul of Abū Ḥanīfa, his wide divergence from orthodox Islām. It was really a case of the *ta'assub* that always raged to a greater or less degree among the followers of the different Imāms.

⁵ *Bi-faṭḥi-l-kāf*, Ibn Ḥajar, p. 16. Is this al-Kurdī, the author of *Refā'iyyah* 152?

⁶ HKh. iii. 352, No. 5897, on the authority of al-Faṭḥ b. Khāqān (author of the *Qalā'id*), who had found a marginal note to that effect in a MS. Yet mystics were hostile to Abū Ḥanīfa; see Goldziher in ZDMG. xxviii. 303.

others, especially pupils of at-Taftāzānī,—and this is the point to which I would draw attention,—considered in the teeth of al-Ghazzālī's own statement, or in ignorance of it, that the *Manḥāl* was a work of his youth, of his green and fighting days before his conversion. From the way in which Ibn Ḥajar speaks it is evident that there was a great gulf recognized between his two periods. In the first he was an unregenerate lawyer, jealous for his own party and given up to dialectic controversy of a *burschikos* nature, if I understand rightly the Arabic *bi-ḥuḏūḏi ṭalabati-l-'ilm*; in the second he was a theologian, grave and reverend in his attitude and methods, though in the *Iḥyā* he sometimes displays a vein of humorous sarcasm that must have made him a terror in his younger days, as when, in defence of the singing of poetry, he explains elaborately that nightingales do not recite from the Qur'ān.

The last of his works¹ was the *Minḥāj al-'ābidīn*, a guide on the way to the other world for those who were not fitted to understand the *Iḥyā*. Muḥyī ad-Dīn Ibn 'Arabī claimed it for a certain Abū-l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Khalīl as-Sibtī.

Al-Ghazzālī died on Monday, the fourteenth of Jumādā II, 505 (Dec. 18th, 1111). His brother Aḥmad (quoted by SM. p. 11 through Ibn Jawzī's *Kitāb ath-thabāt 'ind-al-mamāt*) gives the following account of his death: "On Monday, at dawn, my brother performed the ablution and prayed. Then he said, 'Bring me my grave-clothes,' and he took them and kissed them, and laid them on his eyes and said, 'I hear and obey to go in to the King.' And he stretched out his feet and went to meet Him, and was taken to the good will of God Most High." He was buried at, or outside of, Tābrān, the citadel of Ṭūs, and Ibn as-Sam'ānī visited his grave there.

Such is the simple story of his death and burial which his immediate biographers give; but the pious imagination could not be so easily satisfied, and legends soon began to spring up. One of them is given by the SM. (p. 11) from the *Bahja an-nāẓirīn wa'uns al-'arīfīn* by Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Uzummūrī;² a source which I am unable to verify. His story runs, "When death drew near to the Imām Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī, he com-

¹ SM. p. 43, and Schreiner in ZDMG. xlviii. 43, with references there.

² Abū-l-Fidā, *Geography*, p. 125 of Arabic text. In *Yāqūt* there is only a line saying that Uzummūr belongs to Ṣanhāja.

manded his servant, an excellent and religious man, to dig his grave in the middle of his house and to summon the people of the neighboring villages to attend his funeral; that they should not touch him, but that a company of three men unknown in the region of al-'Irāq would come out of the desert, that two of them would wash him and the third would undertake the prayer over him without the advice or command of anyone. Then, when he died, the servant did according to all that he had commanded, and required the presence of the people. And when the people gathered to attend the funeral, they saw three men who had come out of the desert. Two of them began to wash the corpse, while the third vanished and did not appear (*wakhtaḥā-th-thālithu walām yaẓhar*, but?). But when they had washed him and arranged him in the grave-clothes and carried his bier and laid it on the edge of the grave, the third appeared wrapped in his robe with a black border¹ on both sides, turbaned with wool, and he prayed for him and the people prayed with him. Then he gave the benediction and departed and hid from the people. And some of the excellent of the people of al-'Irāq who were present at the funeral had noticed him carefully, but did not know him until some of them heard a *Hātif*² in the night saying to them, 'The man who led the people in prayer is Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Ishāq Amghar, the Sharif. He came from the farthest Maghrib, from 'Ayn al-Qatr (?), and those who washed the corpse are his comrades Abū Shu'ayb Ayyūb b. Sa'īd b. Uzummūr and Abū 'Isā Wāzjih.'³ And when they heard that they journeyed from al-'Irāq to Sanhāja of Uzummūr, to the farthest Maghrib, and when they had reached them and asked of them their prayers, they returned to al-'Irāq and related it to the Ṣūfis and published their miracle (*karāma*). Then a company of them, when they heard that, went to visit them and found them to be those whom they had noticed carefully, and they asked of them their prayers. And this is a strange story."

¹ *Alam*? see Lane, p. 2140a, *sub voce* and p. 2870c on *nūr*. I do not know what fraternity of Darwīshes is thus indicated.

² The *Hātif* is the Hebrew *Bath Qōl*, a wandering voice which comes, warning or informing or inspiring. It seems to be a form of appearance of the Jinn. Cf. Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidentumes*, 139, note.

³ De Slane, transl. of Ibn Khaldūn's History of the Berbers, ii. 159.

There is also a story¹ told of a celebrated saint, the Quṭb Shihāb ad-Dīn Aḥmad aṣ-Ṣayyād al-Yamanī az-Zabīdī,² a contemporary of al-Ghazzālī, that he said, "While I was sitting one day, lo, I perceived the gates of heaven opened, and a company of blessed angels descended, having with them a green robe and a precious steed. They stood by a certain grave and brought forth its tenant and clothed him in the green robe and set him on the steed and ascended with him from heaven to heaven³ till he passed the seven heavens and rent after them sixty veils, and I know not whither at last he reached. Then I asked about him, and was answered, 'This is the Imām al-Ghazzālī.' That was after his death; may God Most High have mercy on him!" The same writer tells us on the authority of Ṣaʿīd al-ʿAmūdī that al-Ghazzālī enjoyed the supreme dignity of *quṭb*⁴ for three days. Naturally, the working of miracles (*karāmāt*) was ascribed to him,⁵ and we can trace the development of belief in this. ʿAbd al-Ghāfir, his personal friend, does not seem to ascribe *karāmāt* to him anywhere, but Abū Bakr ash-Shāshī (d. Shawwāl 507, rather more than two years after al-Ghazzālī; see Mehren, p. 324, and Ibn Khall. ii. 625) has a story that is worth telling. "In our time there was a man in Egypt who disliked al-Ghazzālī and abused him and slandered him. And he saw the Prophet (God bless him and give him peace!) in a dream; Abū Bakr and ʿUmar (may God be well pleased with both of them!) were at his side, and al-Ghazzālī was sitting before him, saying, 'O Apostle of God, this man speaks against me!' Thereupon the Prophet said, 'Bring the whips!' So the man was beaten on account of al-Ghazzālī. Then the man arose from sleep, and the marks of the

¹ From the *Taʾrīf al-aḥyā bi-faḍāʾil al-Iḥyā* by ʿAbd al-Qādir b. Shaykh b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Shaykh b. ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿAydarūs Bā ʿAlawī; 978-1038. He is No. 54 in Wüstenfeld's *Çufiten in Süd-Arabien*, and this book is No. 12 on p. 33 of the same. He, therefore, cannot be the al-ʿAydarūs of whom the SM. speaks on p. 18 as his shaykh, and says that he heard from him. On the meaning of ʿAydarūs and Bā ʿAlawī see Wüstenfeld's book above.

² I can find no trace of him. The SM. also was from Zabīd, and his *nisba* is not *Zubaydī* as sometimes written.

³ Compare the *Durra* (edit. Gautier), 11 ff.

⁴ Goldziher, *Muham. Studien*, ii. 288, and the passages there referred to. Also Flügel in his article on ash-Sharʿānī, ZDMG. xx. 37 ff., notes 45-50.

⁵ Goldziher, ii. 372 ff.

whips remained on his back, and he was wont to weep and tell the story." The Muslim imagination was evidently tickled by this kind of dream, for a similar story is told, with a long *isnād*, of Ibn Ḥirazaham al-Maghribī,¹ another assailant of al-Ghazzālī. At first the miracles were ascribed to al-Ghazzālī after his death. Fakhr ad-Dīn ibn 'Asākir (d. 620) says that God distinguished him with different kinds of *karāmāt* in the other world, as He had distinguished him with various sciences in this; but 'Abd al-Qādir (quoted above) boldly changes (margin of SM. p. 28) "with various sciences" (*bi-funūni-l-'ilm*) into "with them" (*bihā*), and gives him miracles in both worlds. In some cases these later miracles involve chronological difficulties so serious that even the SM. sees them. Several (pp. 10 and 22) are connected with the burning of the *Ihyā* at al-Mariya by order of the last Murābiṭ Sultān, 'Alī b. Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn (reg. 500-537).² According to the story the fortune of the Sultān changed immediately thereafter, and the success of the Muwahhid leader 'Abd al-Mu'min b. 'Alī was due to the insult to al-Ghazzālī. Certainly the punishment was long in coming if we are to believe another story, which dates the burning on the eleventh of Muḥarram or Šafar 500.³ On that date a certain Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad 'Abd al-Mun'im al-'Abdarī saw in sleep at Alexandria the sun rising in the west. Dream-readers interpreted this as of some strange event happening there, and in a few days news arrived of the burning. But the most impossible of all chronologically is a story of the fate of the Qādī 'Iyāḍ who gave a formal *fatwā* condemning the books of al-Ghazzālī. He is said (in its later forms the story is long and picturesquely told) to have died suddenly in the bath at the moment when al-Ghazzālī cursed him.⁴ Even the SM. stumbles at this, and points out that the Qādī 'Iyāḍ died 544, thirty-nine years after al-Ghazzālī.⁵ Further, this must be some quite different story of the condemnation and burning of the *Ihyā*, for in 'Abd al-Wāhid's narrative and that in the *Hulūl* (*vide supra*) the

¹ SM. p. 27. Compare HKh. i. 81 and vii. 570, where the story is given at length.

² Ibn. Khall. iii. 208 and iv. 462.

³ *Vide supra*, where, however, the *Ihyā* is not specially mentioned and nothing is said of al-Mariya. In the narrative here I use the SM.

⁴ Compare the story of aṭ-Ṭartūshī and how he killed al-Afḍal Shāhin-shāh; Ibn Khall. ii. 666.

⁵ Ibn Khall. ii. 417.

Qāḍī Abū-l-Faḍl ‘Iyād does not come in at all. Nor can I find in the lives of him in Ibn Khallikān, in the *Ṣila* of Ibn Bashkuwāl (no. 972), or in the *Mu‘jam* of Ibn al-Abbār (no. 279), any reference to this incident, or to that other story of his death which the SM. tells, how the people of his district accused him to Ibn Tūmart, the Mahdī, of being a Jew because he did not come among them on the Sabbath,—this was really because he was writing at that time his great book the *Shifā*,—whereupon the Mahdī had him put to death. In such a bundle of anachronisms it is a mere detail that the Mahdī died in 524, twenty years before his victim. It is, further, hardly necessary to point out that the burning cannot be dated in 500 on any hypothesis, least of all if the Qāḍī ‘Iyād is to be made responsible for it; at that date he was only twenty-four.

But there does seem to be foundation for the story which ascribes to al-Ghazzālī an early influence on the life of Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh b. Tūmart, the Mahdī of the Muwahhids, or Almohades, called shortly Ibn Tūmart or al-Mahdī.¹ The materials for his life are tolerably copious and most intolerably contradictory. I have been unable to find any that can be regarded as first-hand sources. I have here to deal only with that part which brings him into contact with al-Ghazzālī. ‘Abd al-Wāḥid (wrote 621) says that Ibn Tūmart traveled in the East in pursuit of knowledge in 501 (this makes Ibn Khallikān’s statement that he was born in Muḥarram 485 scarcely possible), and that he met al-Ghazzālī in Syria in the latter’s ascetic days—but God knows best. (‘Abd al-Wāḥid’s doubt is justifiable, for we have seen that al-Ghazzālī’s wandering life ceased in 499.) Further, that al-Ghazzālī was told in Ibn Tūmart’s presence about the burning of his books, and thereupon cursed ‘Alī and prayed that his kingdom might pass away and his children be slain, “And I do not think that he who is entrusted with that is any but one present in our assembly,” al-Ghazzālī added. Then Ibn Tūmart returned to the Maghrib by way of Alexandria by ship. On the voyage he so worried the crew with his exhortations to piety that they flung him overboard. He is kept afloat and alongside the ship for half a day till the crew see he is a saint. Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630) *sub anno* 514 also gives a life of Ibn Tūmart: he

¹ The SM. gives him in the list of al-Ghazzālī’s pupils (p. 44), but has no details.

travels as a youth in al-‘Irāq and studies under several theologians; the story of his meeting al-Ghazzālī is an invention of the Maghribī historians; he makes a stay at Mecca and returns to al-Mahdiyya in Africa in 505. Ibn Khallikān, iii. 205 ff., gives a long life: Ibn Tūmart went in pursuit of knowledge to al-‘Irāq, there met al-Ghazzālī and others, pilgrimaged, and stayed a long time at Mecca, returned home by way of Cairo and Alexandria, and arrived at al-Mahdiyya some time between 505 and 512; al-Qiftī (d. 646) is quoted as dating his departure from Egypt in 511. In the *Qarṭās* (edit. Tornberg, pp. 110 ff.) we have a similar story: he studied with al-Ghazzālī, who paid great attention to him and said he showed the qualities of a founder of empire. He spent three years with him, and left the East finally in 510. Ibn Khaldūn (*Histoire des Berbères*, trad. de Slane, ii. 163 ff.; and on Ibn Tūmart as Mahdī, *Prolegomènes*, trad. de Slane, i. 53) tells of an interview of Ibn Tūmart with al-Ghazzālī, who encouraged him in his design; but from the tone it is doubtful whether Ibn Khaldūn believed this. It seems to be certain that Ibn Tūmart travelled and studied in the East during the latter part of al-Ghazzālī’s life, and perhaps after his death. An early and persistent tradition among Western historians makes him a pupil of al-Ghazzālī, and in this tradition there is nothing impossible. That he commissioned Ibn Tūmart to avenge the burning of his books we may leave alone; it is improbable that that event took place during his life-time. Even that he saw in Ibn Tūmart a future regenerator of religion in the West may be regarded as unlikely. He had not long before given a *fatwā* in support of Yūsuf b. Tāshfin, the father, and the corruption of manners and hostility to the study of theology could not, before his death, have gone so far that he would turn against ‘Alī, the son. But it is undoubted that the victory of the Muwahhids was a victory for the theology with which al-Ghazzālī had identified himself.¹ Though Ibn Tūmart professed to be the Mahdī and a descendant of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, he was an orthodox Ash‘arite in all but two points: he held the impeccability of the Imām; and inclined to Mu‘tazilite views as to the Qualities (*ṣifāt*) of God, running perilously near, if not entirely

¹ Since writing the above I find the same general conclusion reached by Goldziher in his article on the Almohades in the ZDMG. xli. 30-140; see especially p. 66.

into pantheism. Otherwise he laboured, though in a very different way, to bring about in the West the same revival of faith and religious life to which al-Ghazzālī gave himself in the East. That is the evident historical and theological fact; and, on the side of legend, only in this way can we explain the persistence of the tradition among the Muwahhids that their Mahdī had been a favorite pupil of al-Ghazzālī's, marked out by him for great things.¹ How far this went with them is evident from the story of the death of Ibn Tūmart as told in the *Qarṭās* (pp. 116 ff.). There, at death, he commits to his brethren the book *al-Jafr* "which had journeyed to him from the presence of the Imām Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī."² All this is evidently pure legend, and

¹ It may be worth noticing that Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Māzarī (d. 536; Ibn Khall. iii. 4) regarded the *Ihyā* as made up of a mixture of the doctrines of the Muwahhids, the Philosophers, and the Šūfis. Al-Māzarī's chronology is shaky, but he gives early testimony to the belief in a connection between al-Ghazzālī and Ibn Tūmart. The SM. (p. 28) quotes him apparently through Ibn as-Subkī, who goes on to discuss his position, and explains it as due to Mālikite, especially Maghribī, anti-Šhāfi'ite jealousy. Al-Māzarī further asserts that al-Ghazzālī based on the books of Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawhīdī; this is combated by Ibn as-Subkī, who says that rather the reverse is true, *al-amru bi-khilāfi dhālika*. If this is the Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawhīdī of Ibn Khall. i. 50 and iii. 264, who was a shaykh of the Šūfis and was alive in 400, I do not understand how he could say so; but I can find no other Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawhīdī. HKh. gives many of his books. It is also a possibility that al-Māzarī's reference may not be so anachronistic after all. He may not have meant the political sect of the Muwahhids, which was only rising to importance in his day, or the pantheistic views of Ibn Tūmart in which he separated from the Ash'arites (see his Tawhīd formula in Goldziher, ZDMG. xli. 72 ff.). There may have been a religious sect of old date holding the same or similar pantheistic views, and the curious *nisba*, *at-Tawhīdī*, may be related to it. The explanations of the *nisba* given by Ibn Khall. and the *Ansāb* writers are evidently absurd. *Tawhīd* as a theological formula usually refers to God's oneness; but it may also have had another, narrower, and somewhat pantheistic nuance. Ibn Khall. iii. 20 tells us that Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, a high Šūfī and the author of the *Qūt al-qulūb*, wrote on *Tawhīd*.

² On the original book *al-Jafr*, left by 'Alī, but only to be interpreted finally by the Mahdī, see *Dict. of Technic. Terms*, i. 202 f.; Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddama*, Bulāq ed. 278 f.; HKh. ii. 603 ff. On 'Ilm al-Jafr and the literature it produced see Ahlwardt in *Berlin Cat.*, iii. 551 ff.; Rieu, *Suppl. to the Cat. of Arab. MSS. in Brit. Mus.*, No. 828, and literature

legend, too, constructed by some one who had no very intimate acquaintance with al-Ghazzālī's views. We have seen what he thought of the Ta'limites with their infallible Imām. I have not yet found any allusion in him to the *Jufr*, but he probably thought the same of it and of the believers in it. Evidently he was regarded by the Muwahhids as its custodian till it passed into the hands of Ibn Tūmart, the Mahdī and its final interpreter.¹ The story goes in the same class with that of his three days Quṭb-ship; I have no further light on either.

So much it has seemed necessary to add concerning al-Ghazzālī's position in the popular mind after his death, and the legends that gathered round his figure. It now remains to consider somewhat more systematically his theological and philosophical position, and especially, the charge which has been brought against him of insincerity and of having a secret doctrine. This consideration of his intellectual position can lay no claim to be exhaustive—the time has not yet come for such a treatment; its aim is only to bring out the salient points of his teaching and to render somewhat more intelligible his mystical views.

And here, in the first place, it must be said that his views tend upon examination to lose their peculiar individuality. He does not cease to be either a mystic or a sceptic, to lead men back to the study of Scripture and Tradition, or to arouse their consciences by the fear of hell, but we find that others—his predecessors, contemporaries, and successors—were and did the same. Thus the *Mutakallims*, Ash'arite, Māturīdite, and Mu'tazilite, were sceptics before him; all, philosophers and theologians, were mystics more or less; reform in Islām and re-arousing of religious life had always come and have always come through a return

there; Steinschneider in ZDMG. xxviii. 630 and 653. Compare, too, on the whole subject, Goldziher, *Literaturgeschichte der Ši'a*, 54 ff.; de Goeje, *Mémoire sur les Carmathes*, 115 ff.; Goldziher, ZDMG. xli. 123 ff.; Kay, *Early Mediæval History of Yaman*, pp. 19, 145, 249. M. P. Casanova, in an exceedingly interesting and important *Notice* in a recent number of the *Journal Asiatique* (9^{ème} sér., xi. 151 ff.), brings together the equally mysterious *Jāmi'a*, the *Ikhwān as-Ṣafā*, and the Assassins. His promised article in the *Notices et Extraits* will evidently throw much light on all three.

¹ Compare the similar story given from a Turkish MS. by Goldziher in ZDMG. xli. 124, note 1.

to the study of the simple Word and a realization of the terrors of an avenging God. Al-Ghazzālī becomes part of a stream of tendency, and shows his greatness in that, with the same views and starting-point as those around him, he has transcended all the other doctors of Islām and graven his name ineffaceably in the record of the toils and triumphs of the human mind.

His views on science, as we have already seen, were the same as those of the contemporary students of natural philosophy. Their teachings he accepted, and, so far, can be compared to a theologian of the present day who accepts evolution and explains it to suit himself. (His world was framed on what is commonly called the Ptolemaic system.¹ He was no flat-earth man like the present ‘Ulamā of Islām ; God had “spread out the earth like a carpet,” but that did not hinder him from regarding it as a globe. Around it revolve the spheres of the seven planets and that of the fixed stars ; Alfonso the Wise of Castile had not yet added the crystalline sphere and the primum mobile. All that astronomers and mathematicians teach us of the laws under which these bodies move is to be accepted. Their theory of eclipses and of the other phenomena of the heavens is true, whatever the ignorant and superstitious may clamor. Yet it is to be remembered that the most important facts and laws have been divinely revealed ; as the weightiest truths of medicine are to be traced back to the teaching of the prophets, so there are conjunctions in the heavens which only occur once in a thousand years and which man can yet calculate because God has taught him their laws. And all this structure of the heavens and the earth is the direct work of God, produced out of nothing by His will, guided by His will, ever dependent for its existence on His will, and one day to pass away at His command. So al-Ghazzālī joins science and revelation. Behind the order of nature lies the personal, omnipotent God who says, “Be !” and it is. The things of existence do not proceed from Him by any emanation or evolution, but are produced directly by Him. The Ṣūfīsm in which he had found light tended later to ally itself with a form of Neoplatonism,²

¹ The system of Dante and Milton and Shakspeare ; see a good description of it and of its use by Dante in *The Quarterly Review* for April, 1898.

² How far al-Ghazzālī would have assented in its details to the view of the origin of the universe developed on Aristotelian and Neoplatonic lines by al-Fārābī in his *‘Uyūn al-masā’il* (edit. Dieterici, pp. 56ff.),

assimilating to itself the system of Plotinus with its *ἐν*, its *ψυχή*, its *νοῦς*, its receptive and active intellects, its being and non-being, a tendency which so increased in time that Šūfiism came to mean pantheism;¹ but al-Ghazzālī is still a strict theist.

Further, there is another side of al-Ghazzālī's attitude towards the physical universe that deserves attention but which is very difficult either to grasp or to express. Perhaps it may be stated thus: Existence has three modes; there is existence in the '*ālam al-mulk*, in the '*ālam al-jabarūt*, and in the '*ālam al-malakūt*.' The first is this world of ours which is apparent to the senses; it exists by the power (*qudra*) of God, one part proceeding from another in constant change. The '*ālam al-malakūt* exists by God's eternal decree, without development, remaining in one state without addition or diminution. The '*ālam al-jabarūt*' comes between

might be difficult to say. But that tractate gives a good idea how the origin was viewed by Muslim philosophers in general; and I do not think that al-Ghazzālī would have modified it much, except to lay somewhat more stress on the fact that the *wājib al-wujūd* and *as-sabab alawwal* was God Most High, and that all depended absolutely on His will.

¹ For a good example of this, and an acute discussion of some of these developments, see the translation of 'Abd ar-Razzāq's (first half of xiv cent.) treatise on the freedom of the will by S. Guyard in the *Journal Asiatique*, 71^{ème} sér., i. 125 ff. From al-Ghazzālī's position, in which all existence depends on the will of God, it is not hard to come to that of 'Abd ar-Razzāq that God is all. Along another line the Aristotelian philosophers advanced to the position that all, *i. e.* the universe with all its spheres, is God. Thus the two pantheistic positions developed within the fold of Islām.

² *Imlā* on margin of SM. i. 218 f. Comp. *Dict. of Technic. Terms*, p. 1339, foot.

³ I suspect that these three terms go back to the Christian phrase "the kingdom, the power and the glory" (cf. Goldziher, *Muham. Studien*, ii. 386); but "some suspicion is a sin" (Qur. xlix. 12), and that especially in things critical. The facts in the case seem to be as follows: The lexicographers (*Lisān*, s. v., xii. 382) give *mulk* and *malakūt* (and *malkuwa*) as meaning exactly the same thing, *i. e.* in the case of God '*a'zamatuhu wasultānuhu*, and in the case of man '*izzuhu wasultānuhu*'; you can say of a man, *lahu mulku-l-'Irāq* or *lahu malakūtu-l-'Irāq*. With this agrees the Qur'ānic usage; *mulk* and *malakūt* seem to be interchangeable. On vi. 75 al-Bayḍāwī remarks, *al-malakūt a'zamu-l-mulk wat-tā' fihī lilmubālagha*. *Jabarūt*, or *juburūt*, does not occur in the Qur'ān, but in two traditions (*Lisān*, s. v., v. 182, ll. 18 and 23 ff.; see, too, Lane, s. v., 374a, and *Gharīb al-ḥadīth*, s. v.), *subḥāna dhi-l-jabarūt wal-malakūt*, and *thumma yakūnu mulkun wajabarūtun*. The word is defined as the

these two; it seems externally to belong to the first, but in respect of the power of God which is from all eternity (*al-qudra al-azaliya*) it is included in the second. The soul (*nafs*) belongs to the *‘alam al-malakūt*, is taken from it, and returns to it. In sleep and in ecstasy, even in this world, it can come into contact with the world from which it is derived. This is what happens in dreams—sleep is the brother of death, says al-Ghazzālī (*Mad-nūn*, p. 42); and thus, too, the saints and prophets attain divine knowledge. Some angels belong to the world of *malakūt*; some to that of *jabarūt*, apparently those who have shown themselves here on earth as messengers of God (*Durra*, p. 2). The things in the heavens, the Preserved Tablet, the Pen, the Balance, etc., belong to the world of *malakūt* (*Imlā*, pp. 216 ff.). On the one hand, these are not sensible, corporeal things; and on the other these terms for them are not metaphors. Thus al-Ghazzālī avoids the difficulty of Muslim eschatology with its bizarre concreteness. He rejects the right to allegorize—these things are real, actual; but he relegates them to this world of *malakūt*.¹ Again, the Qur’ān, Islām, and Friday (the day of public worship) are personalities in the worlds of *malakūt* and *jabarūt* (*Durra*, pp. 107 ff.). So, too, the world of *mulk* must appear as a personality at the bar of these other worlds at the last day. It will come as an ugly woman, but Friday as a beautiful young bride.² This personal Qur’ān belongs to the world of *jabarūt*, but Islām to that

quality denoted by the epithet *jabbār*. I can give nothing to bridge the gap between these usages and those of al-Ghazzālī. Al-Fārābī already appears to have the same view of the words as al-Ghazzālī; see his *Philosophische Abhandlungen*, pp. 69 and 71, §§ 13 and 26, in the Arabic text of Dieterici’s ed.—the German transl. is hardly adequate. But after him ‘Abd ar-Razzāq (*l. c.* p. 164) explains the world of *jabarūt* as that of the angels, whose qualities and perfections *repair* the imperfections of the other beings, or who *constrain* the other beings to seek perfection, according to the two meanings of the root JBR; and (p. 107) the world of *malakūt* as that which moves by the permission of God, sets everything in motion, and directs the affairs of the universe, evidently thinking of the name as meaning *reigning, ruling*. The world of *mulk* is referred to by ‘Abd ar-Razzāq as the world of *shahāda*, i. e. of witness, or the sensible world.

¹ *Durra*, 70. With an appreciation of this falls to the ground Nöldeke’s criticism of al-Ghazzālī in his review of the *Durra* in the *Liter. Centralblatt*, Jan. 12, 1878, col. 56.

² Is there a connection here with the Sabbath Bride (Heine’s Princess Sabbath) of Judaism?

of *malakūt*, thus agreeing with the later position of 'Abd ar-Razzāq (*l. c.* pp. 166 ff.), who gives as a name for the *'ālam al-jabarūt*, the *umm al-kitāb*, and for the universal soul which exists in the *'ālam al-malakūt*, the *lawḥ al-mahfūz*.

But, just as those three worlds are not to be thought of as separate in time, so they are not separate in space. They are not like the seven heavens and seven earths of Muslim literalists, which stand, story-fashion, one above the other. Rather, they are, as I expressed it above, modes of existence, and might be compared to the speculations on another life in space of n dimensions framed, from a very different starting point and on a basis of pure physics, by Balfour Stewart and Tait in their *Unseen Universe*. On another side they stand in close kinship to the Platonic world of ideas, whether through Neoplatonism or more immediately. Sūfīism at its best, and when stripped of the trappings of Muslim tradition and of Qur'ānic exegesis, has no reason to shrink from the investigation either of the physicist or of the metaphysician.¹ And so it is not strange to find that all Muslim thinkers have been tinged with mysticism to a greater or less degree, though they may not all have embraced formal Sūfīism and accepted its vocabulary and system. This is true of al-Fārābī, who was avowedly a Sūfī;² true also of Ibn Sīnā, who, though nominally an Aristotelian, was essentially a Neoplatonist, and admitted the possibility of intercourse with superior beings and with the Active Intellect, of miracles and revelations;³ true even of Ibn Rushd, who does not venture to deny the immediate knowledge of the Sūfī saints, but only argues that the experience of it is not sufficiently general to be made a basis for theological science.

In ethics, as we have already seen, the position of al-Ghazzālī is a simple one. All our laws and theories upon the subject, the analysis of the qualities of the mind, good and bad, the tracing of hidden defects to their causes, and the methods of combatting

¹ The later Sūfīism of Ibn 'Arabī and his followers seems to have borne much the same relation to the Sūfīism of al-Ghazzālī and his times that in Neoplatonism was borne by the Syrian thaumaturgic school of Jamblichus and his followers to the earlier Alexandrian school of Plotinus.

² See his life by al-Qiftī in Dieterici, *Philos. Abhandl.*, 116.

³ Mehren, *Vues d'Avicenne sur l'astrologie, etc.*, 3 ff. and Ibn Sīnā, *Le livre des théorèmes*, edit. Forget, 207 ff.

these causes,—all these things we owe to the saints of God to whom God Himself has revealed them. Of these there have been many at all times and in all countries,—God has never left himself without a witness,—and without them and their labors and the light which God has vouchsafed to them, we could never know ourselves. (Here, as everywhere, comes out clearly al-Ghazzālī's fundamental position that the ultimate source of all knowledge is revelation from God. It may be major revelation, through accredited prophets who come forward as teachers, divinely sent and supported by miracles and by the evident truth of their message appealing to the human heart, or it may be minor revelation—subsidiary and explanatory—through the vast body of saints of different grades to whom God has granted immediate knowledge of Himself. Where the saints leave off, the prophets begin; and, apart from such teaching, man, even in physical science, would be groping in the dark.

This position becomes still more prominent in his philosophical system. I have already sketched his agnostic attitude towards the results of pure thought. It is essentially the same as that taken up by Mansell in his Bampton Lecture on *The Limits of Religious Thought*. Mansell, a pupil and continuator of Hamilton, developed and emphasized Hamilton's doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, and applied it to theology, maintaining that we cannot know or think of the absolute and infinite, but only of the relative and finite. Hence, he went on to argue, we can have no positive knowledge of the attributes of God. This, though disguised by the methods and language of scholastic philosophy, is al-Ghazzālī's attitude in the *Tahāfut*. Mansell's opponents said that he was like a man sitting on the branch of a tree and sawing off his seat. Al-Ghazzālī for the support of *his* seat went back to revelation, either major, in the books sent down to the prophets, or minor, in the personal revelations of God's saints. But in this sceptical attitude al-Ghazzālī was not original; it had been already held by the *Mutakallims*, or scholastic theologians, and for an excellent development of their philosophical system reference can be made to Ritter's Essay *Über unsere Kenntniss der arabischen Philosophie*.¹ This I consider the best part of

¹ Göttingen, 1844. Not so good in his *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Hamburg, 1844, vii. 703 ff. The strict founder of the sceptical school of scholastic theologians appears to have been al-Bāqilānī (d. 403); see on him Schreiner, *Zur Geschichte des As'aritentums*, 108 ff.

his treatment of the Arabic philosophy, and his judgment that it is rather in the schools of the Muslim dogmatic theologians than in those of the Arabic Aristotelians that the real Arabic philosophy is to be sought, to be the truest word yet spoken on this subject. Further, it was not only in the Muslim schools that this attitude towards philosophy prevailed. Yehuda Halevi (d. A. D. 1145; al-Ghazzālī d. 1111) also maintains in his *Kusari* the insufficiency of philosophy in the highest questions of life, and bases religious truth on the incontrovertible historical facts of revelation. And Maimonides (d. 1204) in his *Moreh Nebuchim* takes essentially the same position.¹

Of his views on dogmatic theology little need be said. Among modern theologians he stands nearest to Ritschl. Like Ritschl, he rejects metaphysics, and opposes the influence of any philosophical system on his theology. The basis must be religious phenomena, simply accepted and correlated. Like Ritschl, too, he was emphatically ethical in his attitude; he lays stress on the *value for us* of a doctrine or a piece of knowledge. Our source of religious knowledge is revelation, and beyond a certain point we must not enquire as to the how and why of that knowledge; to do so would be to enter metaphysics and the danger-zone where we lose touch with vital realities and begin to use mere words. On one point he goes beyond Ritschl, and on another Ritschl goes beyond him. In his devotion to the facts of the religious consciousness Ritschl did not go so far as to become a mystic; al-Ghazzālī did. But, on the other hand, Ritschl refused absolutely to enter upon the nature of God or upon the divine attributes—that was mere metaphysics and heathenism; al-Ghazzālī did not so far emancipate himself, and his only advance was to keep the doctrine on a strictly Qur'ānic basis—so it stands written; not, so man is compelled by the nature of things to think.

Passing from these general considerations to details, any one who will read his creed, translated by Ockley and prefixed by him to his *History of the Saracens*, and compare it with that of al-Ash'arī,² or with such a standard creed as that of an-Nasafī,³ will see that he stood on the basis of orthodox Islām. It is true that

¹ Ueberweg, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 427 ff. of the English trans. of 1876.

² Spitta, *Al-Ash'arī*, 88 ff.

³ Translated and commented on in *The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, xii. 93 ff., and xiii. 140 f.

he was attacked by the theologians of his own time and later. Among them were al-Māzarī (d. 536; Ibn Khall. iii. 4), aṭ-Ṭarṭūshī (d. 520; Ibn Khall. ii. 665), Ibn aṣ-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643; Ibn Khall. ii. 188), and Ibn Qayyim (d. 751; HKh. *sub* Shems ad-Dīn Mohamad b. Abī Bekr); but the points which they raise are either trifling or show that their objection is to his method of approaching theology, that is either to his philosophical or to his Ṣūfī studies. In this connection it must always be borne in mind that being a Ṣūfī says nothing as to a theologian's dogmatic position. He may be orthodox or heretical, an Ash'arīte, a Māturīdite, or a Mu'tazilite, a theist or a pantheist, a Shāfi'ite or a Ḥanafite. Thus al-Ghazzālī was a theist, an Ash'arite, and a Shāfi'ite, but, so far as his Ṣūfiism was concerned, he might have been anything else. One of the most important of the points raised against him was that he said that this was the best possible world, and that he therefore limited the power of God. The SM. (i. pp. 32 ff.) deals with this point himself; but it had arisen even in al-Ghazzālī's time, and he has treated it at length in the *Imlā'* (edit. on margin of SM. i. 92 ff.). Taqī ad-Dīn as-Subkī also wrote a defence of al-Ghazzālī, and the SM. (i. p. 31) quotes an interesting passage from it, in which he compares al-Ghazzālī to a Muslim champion who attacks the unbelievers, defeats them, and drives them in flight; then he returns, bespattered with their blood, washes it off before the people, and engages in public prayer; some Muslims imagine that he has not washed it off completely, and blame him. Evidently as-Subkī felt that some experiences of al-Ghazzālī in his polemic life might have been compromising, or some of his utterances rash, but that he had later cleared himself, and that these should be passed over for the services done by him to the Faith. Another point often raised against him was that he degraded the scientific study of theology and opposed to it the pietism and ecstasies of the Ṣūfis. All his theological opponents seem to have alleged this (for an account of these attacks generally see SM. i. pp. 28-40), and we find it also brought forward, from a philosophical standpoint, by Ibn Rushd.¹ Yet no reader of the little treatise which I have translated can fail to notice the emphasis which al-Ghazzālī throws upon *'ilm*, or science, in theol-

¹ The SM. mentions Ibn Rushd's reply to the *Tahāfut*, but does not seem to know anything more about him. His book on the relation of philosophy and theology, to which we shall come shortly, was evidently unknown to him.

ogy. It is a case of the common inability of one theological mind to appreciate or to do justice to the position of another. In this respect the history of Muslim polemics is even more exasperating to the student than that of Christendom; and in this case Ibn Rushd, the Aristotelian philosopher, is quite as blind a partisan as any of the theologians; Ibn Ṭufayl (*Ḥay b. Yaqzān*, pp. 18 ff.) shows much more appreciation and insight. From the account which has preceded of al-Ghazzālī's experiences in his own search for truth, the relation which he laid down between scientific theology and the immediate insight of the Ṣūfī should be clear. He had gained a knowledge of, and a belief in, God, prophecy, and the future life, through thought; but it was not an absolutely certain knowledge. It did not stand so sure to him as that the whole must be greater than the part; but yet it was a satisfactory, sufficing knowledge and belief. It had broken down before, it might break down again; yet, where one could not have any more, it was ample for the religious life, and the man who had it should call himself a believer. But through the vision of the Ṣūfī it became absolutely certain and immediate; these things from objects of thought changed to objects of direct knowledge. And so he held that any one who wished to reach such absolute certainty and immediate knowledge must follow the path of the mystic; only so could he find rest. But, again, no one except one who was theologically schooled should venture to enter upon that path. It was beset with pitfalls; at every turn lay the risk of some frightful blasphemy. Many had been ruined in this way, and none could pass safely but the scientific student.

* I give now a brief statement of al-Ghazzālī's work and influence in Islām. It may be said to have been four-fold: *First*, he led men back from scholastic labours upon theological dogmas to living contact with, study and exegesis of, the Word and the Traditions. What happened in Europe when the yoke of medieval scholasticism was broken, what is happening with us now, happened in Islām under his leadership. He could be a scholastic with scholastics, but to state and develop theological doctrine on a Scriptural basis was emphatically his method. We should now call him a Biblical theologian. To get back in this way to fundamental facts, and away from the reasoning about facts, has always proved, and it alone can prove, the exit from scholasticism. Al-Ash'arī had done the same two hundred years before. One hundred years later Ibn Rushd again attempted it. In our

own time Aloys Sprenger tried the same path to introduce new life into Indian Islām,¹ but he failed. The bones were too dry, or he had not the faith and personality of al-Ghazzālī.

Second, in his preaching and moral exhortations he re-introduced the element of fear. In the *Munqidh* and elsewhere² he lays stress on the need of such a striking of terror into the minds of the people. His was no time, he held, for smooth, hopeful preaching; no time for optimism either as to this world or the next. The horrors of hell must be kept before men; he had felt them himself. We have seen how other-worldly was his own attitude, and how the fear of the Fire had been the supreme motive in his conversion; and so he treated others.

Third, it was by his influence that Šūfiism attained a firm and assured position within the Church of Islām. He did not first introduce it to orthodox Islām; from its earliest beginnings it had been within the pale; though, it is true, there had always been a pantheistic Šūfiism without the pale, compromising that which was within.³ The Imām al-Haramayn had been a devout Šūfi: al-Qushayrī, the well-known author of the *Risāla*, had been a Šūfi; many besides of his teachers had been Šūfis. But just as al-Ash'arī's introduction of *Kalām*, or scholastic theology, had been but the final stage of a long previous development, culminating in his personal experience and public work,⁴ so it fell to al-Ghazzālī to give *taṣawwuf* formally a place in the system of Islām. With the names of those two men are associated the two greatest turning-points in the history of the Muslim Church; both were great leaders, men of intense personality and force, yet both were, in a singular degree, children of their times.

Fourth, he brought philosophy and philosophical theology within the range of the ordinary mind. Before his time they had been surrounded, more or less, with mystery. The language used was strange; its vocabulary and terms of art had to be specially learned. No mere reader of the Arabic of the street or the mosque or the school could understand at once a philosophical tractate. Greek ideas and expressions, passing through a Syriac version into Arabic, had strained to the uttermost the

¹ For an account of this see ZDMG. xxxii. 12.

² See Goldziher in ZDMG. xxviii. 323.

³ On this most interesting and essential distinction see von Kremer's account of the origins of Šūfiism in his *Herrschende Ideen*, 59 ff.

⁴ Spitta, *Al-Aš'arī*, 9 f.

resources of that most flexible tongue. A long training had been thought necessary before the elaborate and formal method of argumentation could be followed. All this al-Ghazzālī changed, or at least tried to change. His *Tahāfut* is not addressed to scholars only; he seeks with it a wider circle of readers, and contends that the views, the arguments, and the fallacies of the philosophers should be perfectly intelligible to the general public (edit. of Cairo, 1303, p. 5). This is what peculiarly arouses the wrath of Ibn Rushd in the tractate with which I shall come immediately to deal more fully. Here he, the supposed scientific-minded and thorough-going Aristotelian philosopher, is much more an obscurant than al-Ghazzālī. He would have the state step in and absolutely forbid the treatment of these subjects in books intended for general reading, and also the general circulation of books dealing with these subjects. On this account the destruction and prohibition of al-Ghazzālī's works met with his approval, and he would have approved of such another burning.¹ It is true that al-Ghazzālī in many places urges caution in the communication of doctrines, proofs, and theological reasonings generally, to those who are not fitted to receive and understand them; but he did not do this to the degree that Ibn Rushd required. The position of the latter was that in the presence of the great multitude all reasoning about religion should be dropped, and the simple doctrines of the Qur'ān taught in the literal sense. Al-Ghazzālī perceived that the time had gone by for such trifling, and that philosophy and theology must come into the open if religion were to be saved.

Of these four phases of al-Ghazzālī's work, the first and the third are undoubtedly the most important. He made his mark

¹ M. J. Müller, *Philosophie u. Theologie von Averroes*, Münch. 1875, p. 17. This is a translation of Ibn Rushd's *Faṣl al-maqāl* and other *Rasā'il*, of which Müller had published the Arabic text in 1859. It is a curious proof of Ibn Rushd's complete failure to make any impression on Islām that his answer to the *Tahāfut* of al-Ghazzālī and a reprint of this text edited by Müller are the only works of his which have appeared in type in the East. The answer to the *Tahāfut* was printed along with it and the third *Tahāfut* by Khawāja Zāda at Cairo in 1303, apparently from an earlier Constantinople edition, and the reprint of this present work appeared in 1313. That it is a reprint of Müller's text is evident by its reproducing his conjectural emendations even in cases where they were unnecessary. Compare with the Cairo text Müller's translation, p. 22, note 3; p. 23, note 1; p. 27, notes 1 and 3; p. 116, note 5; p. 120, note 4.

by leading Islām back to its fundamental and historical facts, and by giving a place in its system to the emotional religious life. But it will have been noticed that in none of the four phases was he a pioneer. He was not a scholar who struck out a new path, but a man of intense personality who entered on a path already trodden and made it the common highway. We have here his character. Other men may have been keener logicians, more learned theologians, more gifted saints; but he, through his personal experiences, had attained so overpowering a sense of the divine realities that the force of his character—once combative and restless, now narrowed and intense—swept all before it, and the Church of Islām entered on a new era of its existence.

This view of his character and work, if it is just, itself disposes of the third question to which I now turn. Had al-Ghazzālī an esoteric teaching, did he secretly accept and teach the positions of the Aristotelian philosophers, while publicly branding them as unbelief? I cannot believe that the attentive student of his life will hesitate as to the answer to this question. The psychological development which I have traced above speaks for itself. Al-Ghazzālī has taken us into his confidence, and laid before us, step by step, his doubting youth, his descent into the abyss of scepticism, and his gradual re-ascent to light and faith. From point to point each change is motivated, and organically united with what precedes and follows it. Only at the supreme moment does the chain break; then all al-Ghazzālī can say is that God had mercy upon him, and gave him back the power to think and a trust in the operations of the mind. And this is psychologically true: arrived at such a point, no formula, no argument, could have saved him; there had to come, as did come, the free spirit of God, the wind that bloweth where it listeth.

The evidence for an esoteric teaching is twofold. It consists, *first*, of what he has said himself in his acknowledged works against the communication of certain doctrines and reasonings to those who are not fitted to receive them; and, *second*, of what has been said by others concerning alleged esoteric books of his, and the contents of these books when they can be found. As to the first point, it is perfectly true that he preached an economy of teaching. In the *Imlā* (SM. i. pp. 159 ff. and 247 ff.) we have a formal defence of the practice of keeping certain theological

reasonings and developments secret from those who are not in a position to hear them understandingly and who would therefore be led by them either into unbelief or into actions contrary to the Law. But we must distinguish this sharply from an esoteric teaching in the ordinary sense. In this advanced teaching there was nothing contrary to that of the earlier stages; it simply went further into details of doctrine and of argument. It was in fact an application of the principle of *bilā kayfa*, i. e., 'without enquiring how,' which had long been laid down and accepted in Muslim dogmatics. Spitta¹ has traced for us excellently the early development of *kalām*, and how the orthodox theologians fought against its introduction. Ash-Shāfi'ī (d. 204) said that whoever busied himself with *kalām* should be fettered to a post and carried through the land with a herald proclaiming, "This is the reward of him who abandons the Revelation of God and the Sunna of the Prophet to take up *kalām*." Yet he is said to have admitted that a few men might take up the study in order to protect the Faith against heretics; only the study should not be allowed to become public, and those who did undertake it should be of approved diligence, intelligence, and moral conduct. Al-Ash'arī (d. 324) introduced *kalām*, as we have seen, into orthodox Islam, but under limitations. When he considered that further public examination or discussion of a doctrine was unadvisable, he cut it off with the above phrase, since then famous, *bilā kayfa*. Thus, in his creed (Spitta, pp. 45 and 96) he lays down that God has two hands and two eyes, "without inquiring how." To advanced students, who were capable of entering upon such studies without injury to themselves and to whom such studies for the defence of the Faith were necessary, he permitted to go further; but that was all. Now this was essentially al-Ghazzālī's attitude. In the *Munqidh* he warns against the study of philosophy; but he warns those who, in his opinion, are unfitted for it and would be injured by it, not those who, on account of their intelligence and character, could go through its fires untouched. In the *Ihyā* he divides knowledge (*ilm*) into useful and harmful, and thus greatly shocks Gosche, who considers that Ibn Rushd stands incomparably freer in his estimation of philosophy (pp. 256 ff.). But the fact is that Ibn Rushd took up exactly the same position, and in his turn was shocked because al-Ghazzālī had not gone so far in it as he him-

¹ Al-Ash'arī, 52 ff. For later developments see Schreiner, *Zur Geschichte des Asaritentums*, and Goldziher, *Zahiriten*, 133 ff.

self thought right. In the collection of *Rasā'il*¹ mentioned above, Ibn Rushd makes it absolutely clear how he felt on this matter generally, and how the thing to which above all others he objected in al-Ghazzālī was the openness and publicity with which al-Ghazzālī had discussed difficult and contested points of theology. As his theological attitude in this respect seems to be little known and is of the first importance for our understanding and judging that of al-Ghazzālī, it will be necessary to enter into some details. The *Rasā'il* in question were written in 575, when the author was in favour with the Muwahhīd Sulṭān, Yūsuf b. 'Abd al-Mu'min (d. 580). Their object was to bring about a reform of religion in itself, and also of the attitude of theologians to students of philosophy (p. 26 of translation). In them he sums up his own position under four heads: *First*, that philosophy agrees with religion and that religion recommends philosophy. Here he is fighting for his life. Religion is true, a revelation from God, and philosophy is true, the results reached by the human mind; these two truths cannot contradict each another. Further, men are frequently exhorted in the Qur'ān to reflect, to consider, to speculate about things; that means the use of the intelligence, which follows certain laws long ago traced and worked out by the ancients. We must, therefore, study their works and proceed further on the same course ourselves; *i. e.* we must study philosophy.

Second, there are two things in religion, literal meaning and interpretation. If we find anything in the Qur'ān which seems externally to contradict the results of philosophy, we may be quite sure that there is something under the surface. We must look for some possible interpretation of the passage, some inner meaning; and we shall certainly find it.

Third, the literal meaning is the duty of the multitude, and interpretation the duty of scholars. Thus the external content of religion for different classes must vary. Those who are not capable of philosophical reasoning must hold the literal truth of the different statements in the Qur'ān. The imagery must be believed by them exactly as it stands, except where it is absolutely evident

¹ That the translation appeared so long after the text (see note above, p. 124), seems to have prevented much notice being taken of either. Renan in his *Averroes et l'Averroïsme*, 167 ff., knows the text but makes little use of it. I doubt if he had read it. It appeared too late to be used by Munk, who has given an analysis from a Hebrew version.

that we have only an image. On the other hand, philosophers must be given the liberty of interpreting as they choose. If they find it necessary, from some philosophical necessity, to adopt an allegorical interpretation of any passage or to find in it a metaphor, that liberty must be open to them. There must be no laying down of dogmas by the Church as to what may be interpreted and what not. In Ibn Rushd's opinion the orthodox theologians sometimes interpreted when they should have kept by the letter, and sometimes took literally passages in which they should have found imagery. He did not accuse them of heresy for this, and they should grant him the same liberty.

Fourth, those who know are not to be allowed to communicate interpretations to the multitude. So 'Alī said, "Speak to the people of that which they understand; would ye that they give the lie to God and His messenger?" Ibn Rushd considered that belief was reached by three different classes of people in three different ways. The many believe because of rhetorical syllogisms (*khiṭābiya*),¹ i. e. those whose premises consist of the statements of a religious teacher (*maqbulāt*), or are presumptions (*maznūnāt*). Others believe because of controversial syllogisms (*jadliya*), which are based on premises which are conventional principles (*mashhūrāt*) or admissions (*musallamāt*). All these premises belong to the class of propositions which are not absolutely certain. The third class, and by far the smaller, consists of the people of demonstration (*burhān*). Their belief is based upon syllogisms composed of propositions which are certain. These consist of axioms (*awwalīyāt*) and five other classes of certainties. Each of these three classes of people has to be treated in the way that suits its mental character. It is wrong to put demonstration or controversy before those who can understand only rhetorical reasoning. It destroys their faith and gives them nothing to take its place. The case is similar with those who can only reach controversial reasoning but cannot attain to demonstration. Thus Ibn Rushd would have the faith of the multitude carefully screened from all contact with the teachings of philosophers. Such books should not be allowed to go into general cir-

¹ On these different types of syllogism see the *Risāla Shamsīya*, edit. Sprenger, pp. 27 ff. In Müller's translation the point is left unexplained, and the passage is thus very puzzling. Without doubt, this is because he did not live to publish the translation himself.

culatation, and if necessary the civil authority should step in to prevent it. If these principles were accepted and followed, a return might be looked for of the golden age of Islām, when there was no theological controversy and men believed sincerely and earnestly.

But, in the second place, the existence has been alleged of esoteric books by al-Ghazzālī which taught doctrines directly opposed to those in his public writings. Ibn at-Tufayl (d. 1185 ; pp. 18 ff., ed. Pococke) treats of al-Ghazzālī in his *Risāla*, and tells that there were certain books of his asserted to be of an esoteric nature, but they had not come to Spain, so far as he knew. Some of an alleged esoteric character had reached Spain, such as the *Ma'ārif al-'aqliya*, the *Nafkh wat-taswiya*, and the collection of *Masā'il*, but he himself could find nothing peculiar in their teaching. Ibn Rushd speaks more dogmatically and goes much further. Ibn at-Tufayl appears to have thought that these esoteric books—if they existed, which he doubted—only entered into greater mystical detail, and were heretical by admixture of pantheistic Šūfīism. Ibn Rushd, on the other hand, sees in al-Ghazzālī a philosopher who, for the sake of peace and worldly profit, has given himself up to the enemy and professed to embrace their faith, though all the time holding and teaching secretly the doctrines of the philosophers whom he has betrayed (Renan, *Averroes et l'Averroïsme*, 98 and 164). Over some of the proofs of al-Ghazzālī's duplicity brought forward by Ibn Rushd we do not need delay. They are simply bits of wrong-headedness, perhaps wilful, like the accusation against Ibn Rushd himself that he taught that the planet Venus was a divinity (Renan, p. 22). For example, Ibn Rushd alleges (trans. p. 67) that al-Ghazzālī said in his *Jawāhir* that the positions of his *Tahāfut* were purely dialectic, while he had laid down the truth in his *Maḍnūn*. When we consider that in the *Tahāfut* there is no attempt to establish anything at all, but only to destroy the positions of the philosophers, we can easily see how al-Ghazzālī came to express himself so.

But the weight of the whole accusation is founded on the book entitled *Al-maḍnūn bihi 'alā ghayri 'ahlihi*, "That which is to be reserved from those who are not worthy of it." Its existence is certain ; there are MSS. of it, and it has even been printed in Cairo, 1303. [Along with it is printed the *Nafkh wat-taswiya* spoken of by Ibn at-Tufayl, and I agree with him in being unable

to find in that any points of heresy.] The title has been a stumbling-block to many European writers, but, after what has been said above, it should be clear that it may mean only a further development for professional students of doctrines known and admitted. But many Oriental writers assert specifically that in it he taught the eternity of the world, that God does not know particulars, and that existence in the next world will not be physical—all in flat contradiction to his position elsewhere. It is not specially surprising that his opponents should have spread this assertion—controversy among Muslims, as among ourselves, is sometimes conducted very curiously; but I do not understand how the SM., who knew the *Maḍnūn*, accepts, as he does, what is said of it. On pp. 43 f., after the list of al-Ghazzālī's genuine works, he adds four which, he says, are ascribed to him, but falsely. They are (1) *As-sirr al-maktūm fī asrār an-nujūm*, some ascribe this work to Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī; (2) *Tahsīn az-ẓunūn*, Ibn 'Arabī (d. 638) rejected al-Ghazzālī's authorship; (3) *An-nafkh wat-taswīya*; (4) *Al-maḍnūn*, Ibn as-Subkī said that Ibn as-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643) mentioned its being assigned to al-Ghazzālī, but that he rejected it himself; in it, according to the SM. who had a copy, the eternal pre-existence of the world and the denial that God knows particulars, are taught. Ibn 'Arabī assigned the book to 'Alī b. Khalīl as-Sibtī, a contemporary of his own, to whom he also assigned the *Minhāj al-'ābidīn*; and Abu Bakr Muhammad al-Mālaqī (d. 750) wrote a reply to it. If the *Maḍnūn* spoken of by these is our printed *Maḍnūn*, I cannot understand their position. In it, on p. 3, he expressly teaches the creation (*khalq*) of the substance (*madda*) of the world. On pp. 32 ff. and 38 ff. he teaches the return of souls (*arwāḥ*) to bodies (*abdān*) at the resurrection, treating it as a second creation (*nash'a*), and that the pleasures and pains of the next world will be physical (*ḥassī*, i. e. sensuous) as well as imaginative (*khayālī*) and rational (*'aqlī*). The book is dedicated to his brother Aḥmad (pp. 2 and 45), and is intended to be read by theologians fitted to understand and follow it. There is no suggestion of anything to contradict his other teaching; he only goes into more detail in the way of proof and to show the reasonableness of the several doctrines; he deals also with knotty questions that would only occur to a professional student. On God's knowledge of particulars I can find nothing direct, but the whole tone of the passages in which the Qualities (*ṣifāt*) are spoken of implies that he has such knowledge.

Of course it is quite possible and in accordance with the rules of Muslim polemic that there should also have been in circulation a false *Maḍnūn* teaching these heretical doctrines. Many such cases occur. A book against the belief in saints was ascribed to Abu Bakr ar-Rāzī (d. cir. 290–320),¹ and, it was suspected, falsely, in order to bring him into discredit. The same thing happened to ash-Shaʿrānī. One of his enemies obtained a copy of his *Al-baḥr al-mawrūd*, left out parts, and inserted others of an heretical nature, and then spread it as the original work. In defence ash-Shaʿrānī was compelled to lay before the ʿUlamā of Cairo his original copy signed by themselves, and so demonstrate the spuriousness of the other. Again, ash-Shaʿrānī had to defend Ibn ʿArabī against a similar injury. Some hostile theologians interpolated his *Futūḥāt* with heresy. Even Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī suffered from this; and there were enough such cases for ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Miṣrī to make up a list of them. So we need not be at all surprised if this befell al-Ghazzālī also; Goldziher (*loc. cit.*) indeed says that it did.

The latest attempt to prove a secret teaching on the part of al-Ghazzālī is by Dr. Heinrich Malter in his *Abhandlung des Abū Ḥamid al-Gazzālī. Antworten auf Fragen die an ihn gerichtet wurden.* (Frankfurt a. M., 1896). Dr. Malter has evidently read the printed *Maḍnūn*, and sees that it can form no basis for a charge of heresy. Instead, he falls back on the little tractate which he has here edited. It exists only in Hebrew, but has been translated apparently from Arabic. In its MSS. it is ascribed to al-Ghazzālī, as also in a commentary by Moses Narbonnensis on a Hebrew translation of the *Maqāṣid*. Otherwise it is unknown to the biographers of al-Ghazzālī, Eastern and Western. Dr. Malter (p. xv, note 1) suggests that this lack of mention is of no force, as we know many books of al-Ghazzālī which are unknown to the native bibliographers. In saying this he can hardly have reckoned with the list in Wüstenfeld's *Academien* or with the still fuller and more careful one in the SM. i. pp. 41–44. Schmoeders, on whom Dr. Malter relies, had a very incomplete acquaintance with this bibliography.

The tractate is made up of extracts from the *Maqāṣid* and the Astronomy of al-Farghānī (d. circ. A. D. 830), and in it the

¹ Goldziher, *Muham. Studien*, ii. 373, note 5; ZDMG. xx. 2, and 4, xxxviii. 681.

eternal pre-existence of matter and time is distinctly taught (pp. 24 ff.). These extracts are put together very clumsily (see especially pp. 7 and 16), and this alone, to my mind, would prevent the ascription of the book to al-Ghazzālī; I doubt, even, if it were ever current among Muslims. Certainly if he, after writing the *Tahāfut*, had wished, even in a secret tractate to draw back from the position there assumed, he would have taken a little more care in what he wrote, and not simply thrown together passages from one of his former works and extracts from a handbook of astronomy. The opinion of the commentator Narbōnī¹ is worth nothing critically, as every one who has studied such questions knows. The other points brought forward by Dr. Malter are of little weight. The form of treatment in the tractate was common to the time, and the saying ascribed to 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib,² "Speak to the people according to their understanding," was quoted by all—a very large number, including as we have seen Ibn Rushd—who held that different methods must be used in approaching different grades of intelligence. Dr. Malter's description (p. xii) of al-Ghazzālī as a man who tried to keep on good terms with all parties, though based on Ibn Rushd, is singularly opposed to the facts of the case. Rather, he got himself into trouble with all parties. He had a combative nature, especially in his earlier life, and later it took much grace and discipline to keep it down.

If the charge of a secret doctrine is to be proved against al-Ghazzālī, it must be on other and better evidence than that which is now before us.

¹ Delitzsch in *Cat. codd. hebr. bibl. Lips.*, No. 26. Narbōnī, like Ibn Rushd, exhibits a personal hatred of al-Ghazzālī which shows how hard a blow the latter had struck.

² In the *Imlā*, margin of SM. i. pp. 123 and 225, it is ascribed to the Prophet himself.

[The name of al-Ghazzālī is now generally written with single z, al-Ghazālī. My reasons for adhering to the older spelling will be given at length elsewhere.—D. B. M.]

Dust, earth, and ashes as symbols of mourning among the ancient Hebrews.—By PROFESSOR MORRIS JASTROW, JR.,
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I.

AMONG the ceremonies observed by the ancient Hebrews in mourning and also as signs of distress or deep grief, the placing of earth (אֲדָמָה) or dust (עָפָר) on the head, and different uses of ashes (אֶפֶר), are peculiarly interesting. The references to these customs in the Old Testament are the following :

1. אֲדָמָה, *earth*.—1 Sam. iv. 12. The messenger who brings to Eli, at Shiloh, the tidings of the defeat of the Israelites by the Philistines approaches with his clothes (מָדִי) rent and earth on his head.—2 Sam. i. 2. Similarly, the messenger who brings David, at Ziklag, the news of the death of Saul and Jonathan comes with torn garments and with earth on his head.—2 Sam. xv. 32. During the rebellion of Absalom, Hushai the Archite, as a mark of sympathy with David's distress, comes to the king with torn tunic and with earth on his head.—Neh. ix. 1. The people, as a sign of repentance for their neglect of the Law, are gathered together, with fasting and with sackcloth, and earth upon them.¹

2. עָפָר, *dust*.—Jos. vii. 6. At the time of the defeat of Joshua's men by the people of Ai, Joshua tears his garments, and both he² and the elders of Israel put (literally lift up, וַיַּעֲלוּ) dust upon their heads.—Job ii. 12. Job's three friends upon approaching him and seeing his sad condition, weep, tear their mantles, "and sprinkle the dust upon their heads towards heaven."³—Ezek. xxvii. 30. The prophet in describing the grief at the destruction of Tyre, says that the people will weep bitterly, put (וַיַּעֲלוּ) dust on their heads and roll themselves in ashes (אֶפֶר).—Lam. ii. 10. In the mourning for the destruction of Jerusalem, the elders of

¹ בָּצִוּם וּבִשְׂקִים וְאֲדָמָה עָלֵיהֶם .

² The text is slightly ambiguous.

³ The meaning of this phrase is explained below, p. 146.

fair Zion are portrayed as putting (הֵעֵלָה) dust upon their heads and girding themselves with sackcloth.

In the apocryphal literature, also, there are two references to this custom, both in the Second Book of Maccabees.—2 Macc. x. 25. The followers of Judas Maccabeus, upon hearing of the approach of Timotheos with a great host, seek refuge in prayer, and as a sign of grief scatter earth on their heads,¹ and gird their loins with sackcloth.—2 Macc. xiv. 15. On a later occasion, when the report comes that Nicanor is advancing with a large army, the Jews “bestrewing themselves with earth” engage in prayer.”

3. אָפֶר, *ashes*.—The only passage in the Old Testament in which there is a direct reference to the custom of placing ashes on the head is 2 Sam. xiii. 19, where Tamar, after having been outraged and then dismissed by Amnon, is portrayed as “taking ashes on her head,” and going about with a torn tunic (כְּתֹנֶת) (הַפָּסִים) and with her hand on her head. Elsewhere the references are to covering oneself with ashes, sitting in ashes, or wallowing in ashes. According to Isaiah lviii. 5 it appears to have been customary on the occasion of a fast to spread ashes over one’s body, שֶׁקֶ וְאָפֶר יִצִּיעַ, “sackcloth and ashes being spread.” When, therefore, we are told in Dan. ix. 3 that Daniel, upon reading in the prophecies of Jeremiah that for seventy years Jerusalem should lie in ruins, was so overcome with a sense of his people’s guilt that he sought the Lord “with fasting and sackcloth and ashes,”² it seems likely that the custom of putting ashes on the body in general is referred to. Somewhat more definite is the passage Esth. iv. 1, where Mordechai, to indicate his distress at hearing of Haman’s plot to kill the Jews, “puts on sackcloth and ashes,” and goes about the city crying bitterly. Comparison with verse 3, where it is related that the Jews in the provinces of the Persian empire engaged in “fasting, weeping, and lamentation,”³ sackcloth and ashes being spread for many,” shows that the ‘spreading’ is synonymous with putting ashes over one’s body. Covering with ashes is also referred to in

¹ γῆ τὰς κεφαλὰς καταπάσαντες.

² καταπασάμενοι γῆν. Frey, *Die altisraelitische Totentrauer*, p. 5 (Inaugural Dissertation, 1898), erroneously says “Asche.”

³ See also Matt. xi. 21 and Luke x. 13.

⁴ The word used (מִסְפֵּד) is one of the regular terms for the lament over the dead.

the metaphor **הִכְפִּי־שָׁנִי בָאָפֶר**, Lam. iii. 16, in the sense of humiliating oneself.

Sitting in ashes is twice spoken of: Job ii. 8. Job, after the many misfortunes that have come upon him, "seats himself in the midst of ashes."—Jon. iii. 6. While the people of Nineveh, upon hearing Jonah's gloomy prophecy, fast and put on sackcloth, the king in addition "sits in ashes." See also Job xlii. 6. There are likewise two references to rolling oneself in ashes—merely another way of covering oneself with them. In Jer. vi. 26 the prophet, describing the approach of the terrible northern conqueror, calls upon his people, "Gird thyself with sackcloth and roll thyself in ashes." The second is Ezek. xxvii. 30, cited above (p. 133) in connection with putting dust on the head.

The explanation of these customs usually offered, namely, that the earth, dust, or ashes is an appropriate symbol of the humility and depression that accompany grief and distress, begs the question, and is unsatisfactory in other respects. Scholars are agreed that in the case of ancient customs there is always a *specific*, and not merely a general, reason why certain rites are observed in certain cases. Robertson Smith, accordingly, has thrown out the fertile suggestion that the dust used was taken from the grave and the ashes from sacrifices performed at the grave.¹ Schwally, while not altogether satisfied with this view, is inclined to adopt it in default of a better explanation; but also adds a suggestion of his own that the rites in question may have some connection with the institutions of slavery.² Benzinger, in his *Hebräische Archäologie*, is silent on this point. Nowack quotes Robertson Smith, without committing himself;³ while the latest writer on the subject, Johannes Frey, expresses his dissent from Schwally's surmise that the rites have something to do with the institutions of slavery,⁴ but, again falling back on the general notion of humility expressed in the customs, adds nothing of any moment to the solution of the problem. Robertson Smith's hypothesis remains, then, the only one to be considered. Its value will be shown in the course of this paper.

¹ Not 'sprinkle on the head,' as Schwally, *Das Leben nach dem Tode*, 14, erroneously interprets.

² *Religion of the Semites*, 413 f. [omitted in 2^d ed.].

³ *Das Leben nach dem Tode*, 15.

⁴ *Lehrbuch der hebräischen Archäologie*, i. 194.

⁵ *Die altisraelitische Totentrauer*, 16-19.

II.

The question which suggests itself at the outset of our investigation is, Does the use of earth, dust, and ashes, signify the same thing? An examination of the passages cited above enables us to answer the question in the negative. Earth and dust may indeed be regarded as practically synonymous. Hence on the occasion of a defeat either earth (1 Sam. iv. 12) or dust (Jos. vii. 6) is employed, but not ashes. Again, while in the instances where earth or dust is mentioned there is a direct indication that the one or the other is placed on the head, there is only one passage (2 Sam. xiii. 19) where "ashes on the head" are spoken of. The expression, "And Tamar took ashes on her head,"¹ is awkward and ambiguous to say the least; we should expect **וַתִּשֶׂם** or **וַתַּעַל**. The fact that the Greek translators² found it necessary to make an addition, rendering, "And Tamar took ashes and put them on her head," only increases the suspicion that the original text has in some way been interfered with. Further on in the same verse we are told, **וַתִּשֶׂם יָדָהּ עַל רֹאשָׁהּ**. It is unlikely that Tamar first placed ashes on her head and then put her hand on her head,³ or rather on the ashes. Now the verb **לָקַח** means not only to 'take,' but also to 'take away, remove.' If, now, by a slight change we read **פָּאָר** instead of **אֶפֶר**, we shall obtain a much more satisfactory sense: "And Tamar took off the tiara on her head, and the richly colored garment she had on she tore; and she put (or threw) her hand on her head and went about weeping bitterly." The **פָּאָר**, as is well known, is distinctively an article of feminine luxury,⁴ worn on the head, which in days of mourning and distress is taken off (Ezek. xxiv. 17, 23). A perfect parallel to the phrase **פָּאָר עַל רֹאשָׁהּ** in the sense of "the tiara which was on her head," is furnished by Ezek. xxiv. 23, **פָּאָרְכֶם עַל רִאשֵׁיכֶם**. The play upon **פָּאָר** and **אֶפֶר** in Is. lxi. 3, **לִתֵּת לָהֶם פָּאָר תַּתֵּת אֶפֶר**, shows how easily the transposition might take place. If, however, this proposed emen-

¹ **וַתִּקַּח תָּמָר אֶפֶר עַל רֹאשָׁהּ**.

² Followed by the Syriac and Arabic versions.

³ The putting of the hand on the head occurs on Egyptian monuments as a sign of grief.

⁴ As in the famous passage Job i. 21.

⁵ Though worn by men also, Is. lxi. 10.

dation appear improbable in view of the Septuagint,¹ which presupposes אֶפֶר, there can certainly be no objection to reading אֶפֶר, a word which occurs in 1 Kgs. xx. 38, 41, where it is some part of the head-dress, a sort of turban worn around the head which could be stretched down over the eyes.² There is no doubt some etymological connection between אֶפֶר and פֶּאֶר.³ From an interesting passage in the Midrashic commentary on Numbers known as *Sifre*,⁴ it appears that some of the ancient scholars were inclined to interpret the passage in the way proposed. One of the rabbis remarks that "the daughters of Israel were in the habit of covering their heads; and although there is no positive proof for this assertion to be brought from the Bible, a support (זֶכֶר לְדָבָר) for it may be recognized in the words, וְתָקַח תָּמָר אֶפֶר עַל-רֹאשָׁה." This rabbi evidently took אֶפֶר in the sense of a head-covering, as otherwise his remark would have no force.⁵

Whether we accept the emendation פֶּאֶר—which on the whole is preferable—or merely change the vowels to אֶפֶר, in either case some article of dress is referred to, not ashes. The reading אֶפֶר was certainly in the text before the Greek translation was made; and the translators finding it impossible to make any sense of the words as they stood, inserted the words καὶ ἐπέθηκεν σποδόν between

¹ But for LXX. we might be inclined to read מַעַל רֹאשָׁה for עַל, though this is not necessary if we take פֶּאֶר עַל רֹאשָׁה as a single phrase, "her head-dress."

² In the Assyrian *aparu* (VR. 28, 9 g) we have the exact equivalent of the Hebrew אֶפֶר. The verb *apāru* is used in the sense 'put something on the head, wear a head-gear,' e. g., a crown or a helmet. See Delitzsch, *Assyr. Handwb.*, 115.

³ Cf. כֶּבֶשׂ and כִּשָּׁה; שְׂמֵלָה and שְׂלֵמָה, etc., etc.

⁴ The passage, to which my father, Rev. Dr. M. Jastrow, kindly directed my attention, occurs in connection with Num. v. 18.

⁵ See the recent discussion on the meaning of this phrase by B. Jacob, *Zeitschrift für alttest. Wissenschaft*, xvii. 72 f., xviii. 300-304, and W. Bacher, *ib.* xviii. 83-98.

⁶ It is probable that this Rabbi also took וְתָקַח in the sense of 'putting on'; but to suppose that Tamar put on a head-gear as a sign of grief is contrary to Hebrew and Semitic customs. It was precisely such articles of attire that were removed on these occasions. Moreover, as emphasized above, וְתָקַח cannot mean 'put on.'

אֶפֶר and עַל רֹאשָׁהּ. It is interesting to note that the same confusion between אֶפֶר and אֶפֶר occurs in the Vulgate, Syriac, and Arabic versions of 1 Kgs. xx. 38, 41 [also Aquila and Symmachus], where the Septuagint correctly renders אֶפֶר by τελαμών, a long bandage, or broad band.

The explanation here offered throws an unexpected light upon a passage in the Book of Judith which has hitherto been cited as a second instance in Biblical literature of the custom of placing ashes on the head as a symbol of mourning; I refer to Judith ix. 1. The situation is this: Judith, after the death of her husband, Manasses, passed three years and four months in mourning for him (viii. 4). Instead of living within the house, she set up a tent on the roof, girded herself with sackcloth, and wore the widow's garb (5 f.). Full of grief and indignation at the cruel treatment to which her people, the Jews, were subjected at the hands of Holophernes, she formed the design of killing the tyrant. She accordingly sends for the elders of Jerusalem and announces her intention of doing a deed which will go down to the remotest generations (32). After giving some directions to the elders she dismisses them, and they withdraw from her tent (36). From the fact that the interview takes place in the tent on the roof, we must infer that Judith still wore the garb of mourning. The Greek text of chap. ix. begins as follows: ¹ Ἰουδαίη δὲ ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ πρόσωπον, καὶ ἐπέθετο ² σποδὸν ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐγύμνωσεν ὃν ἔδεδύκει ³ σάκκον, "Judith fell on her face, and placed ashes on her head, and stripped herself of the sackcloth in which she was clothed."

The contradiction between the two acts is most puzzling.⁴ The placing of ashes on the head is intelligible only as a sign of mourning or grief, whereas the taking off of the sackcloth signifies exactly the opposite. It is evident that there is something wrong in the Greek text; and since scholars are generally agreed that the Greek Judith is a translation of a Hebrew original,⁵

¹ Codex B (Swete).

² Var. ἔθετο.

³ Var. ἐνδεύκει (N, cf. x. 3) and ἐνεδιδύσκετο (A).

⁴ The contradiction has been noticed by scholars, but the explanations offered have been forced and unnatural; see below.

⁵ See the summary of modern views in Strack's *Einleitung in das A. T.*, 152. Jerome knew that the Greek was a translation, but his view that the original was written in Aramaic is now generally discarded.

we are justified in suspecting an error on the part of the translator. Fritzsche and others have pointed out various mistakes in the Greek text which must have arisen from a misunderstanding or misreading of the original language,¹ and I believe that we have here another instance. The translator, like his predecessor in 2 Sam. xiii. 19, mistook אֶפֶר for אֶפֶר 'ashes.' The correct translation therefore is, "Judith . . . put on her head-dress and laid aside the sackcloth in which she was clothed."² She feels that the time has come for her to lay aside her weeds; she is about to proceed to the camp of Holofernes, and in order to carry out her purpose must appear joyous. In confirmation of this view, we find in chap. x., where the thread of the narrative is again taken up after the prayer of Judith which fills the whole of chap. ix., the more explicit statement made (x. 2 f.), "She arose, and called her maid, and descended into the house where [hitherto]³ she abode [only] on the Sabbaths and festivals, and removed⁴ the sackcloth in which she was clothed, and took off the garments of widowhood, and bathed her body in water, and anointed herself with fine myrrh, and arranged the hair of her head and put on the headdress,⁵ and put on the festive garments

¹ Collected by Ball in his industrious Commentary in Wace's *Apocrypha* (Speaker's Bible).

² The view advocated by Ball (*l. c.* i. 319), that ἐγύμνωσε corresponds to a Hebrew גָּלָה, and is to be rendered, "uncovered the sackcloth," thus making her mourning garb visible by putting off or rending what she wore above it, is untenable, and shows to what awkward straits commentators are reduced to remove the contradiction between putting on ashes and taking off sackcloth. Ball's reference to the Syriac only proves that the translator who made this version (from the Greek) felt the difficulty, and tried to remove it by introducing words not in the text from which he translated. The sackcloth was generally worn over the ordinary dress; but even assuming, as viii. 5 might seem to imply, that Judith wore it directly on her loins, what particular reason could she have, after having worn it for three years and more, to reveal it just at a time when she felt that the days of inactive mourning must give way to vigorous action? Moreover, nothing is said in ix. 1 of her tearing off her upper garments to expose the sackcloth underneath. The text implies that the sackcloth constituted the chief garment in which she was clothed. The "garments of widowhood" further mentioned in viii. 5 and x. 3 were some additional mourning apparel.

³ During her period of mourning; see viii. 6.

⁴ περιέλατο.

⁵ καὶ ἐπέθετο μίτραν ἐπ' αὐτῆς.

in which she was attired in the days when her husband Manasses was alive."

The fourth verse goes on to describe the various other articles of luxury with which she bedecked her person, things of which during her period of mourning, in accordance with the old customs,¹ she had deprived herself. The *μίτρα* spoken of in this verse is precisely the *אֵפֶר* mentioned in 1 Kgs. xx. 38, 41, or possibly the *פֶּאֶר*;² and we may, therefore, feel quite certain that the same word *אֵפֶר*, and not *אֶפֶר*, was the word intended by the author in ix. 1. The repetition of the statement need not cause us surprise. In ix. 1 the author wishes to indicate, in a general way, that Judith resolved to put off her mourning; and contents himself with saying that she once more put on the headdress which it was the custom of women in ordinary conditions of life to wear, and that she took off the sackcloth which was the most distinctive badge of mourning. Judith then engages in prayer; and after she is through removes all traces of mourning. In the course of his detailed description of the way in which she accomplishes this, the author repeats the reference to the headdress and the sackcloth. Judith's action is accordingly just the opposite of Tamar's. The latter, as a token of grief, begins by removing the *אֵפֶר* and rending her garments; Judith, to show that her mourning is over, puts on the *אֵפֶר* and takes off the sackcloth. The two passages thus placed side by side are confirmatory of each other and of the opinion here maintained, that there is no reference in either to a custom of putting ashes on the head as a sign of mourning; and inasmuch as in the other passages where ashes are mentioned in connection with grief or distress, only sitting in ashes, or covering oneself with ashes, or rolling about in ashes, is spoken of, not putting them on the head, we are justified in removing the use of ashes from the same class with the use of earth or dust, at least until positive evidence is adduced that the ancient Hebrews were accustomed to strew ashes also on the head as a symbol of mourning.

On the other hand, it is evident that there is not much difference whether earth or dust is put on the head. Dust, as used in

¹ See Frey, *Altisraelitische Totentrauer*, 15.

² The Septuagint renders *פֶּאֶר* by *μίτρα* in Is. lxi. 10, and the Vulgate uses the same word Ex. xxxix. 26.

the Old Testament, is always earth. It is sufficient for our purpose to point to Gen. iii. 19, where in the same verse אֲדָמָה and עֹפֶר are used quite interchangeably. It is also clear that the placing of earth or dust on the head is originally a mourning rite, and that, from being a token of grief for a departed relative or friend, it was extended until it became a sign of distress in general. Of the four instances above quoted in which אֲדָמָה is used, three occur in connection with the death of some person or persons; and similarly in all the four passages in which עֹפֶר is employed the context indicates that deaths have taken place (so in Jos. vii. 6, Job ii. 12), or the writer employs language or metaphors drawn from the mourning for the dead (so in Lam. ii. 10, Ezek. xxvii. 30). Natural as the custom of putting earth or dust on the head as a sign of mourning may appear to us, we cannot be content in explaining ancient customs with merely natural appearances.

III.

Taking up now Robertson Smith's suggestion that "the dust strewn on the head is primarily the dust from the grave," it may be said at once that it is plausible; yet the question still remains, why should the dust have been placed on the head? I venture to suggest that the custom is the survival of an act which originally formed part of the burial rites.

On one of the oldest monuments found beneath the soil of Babylonia, the so-called Stele of Vultures,² there is a representation which furnishes, as I believe, the clue to the custom under discussion. The monument, found by De Sarzec at Telloh, depicts the triumph of Eanna-tuma over his enemies. We are concerned with only one of the various compartments into which it is divided.³ This represents the burial of the fallen soldiers of the victorious army. While the corpses of the enemy are left exposed to the air and light—the greatest misfortune that could happen to a dead person—and are, in consequence, being torn to pieces by vultures, the bodies of Eanna-tuma's soldiers are carefully arranged in symmetrical rows one above the other. At one side are seen attendants, stripped to the waist, with baskets

¹ *Religion of the Semites* (1st ed.), p. 414.

² De Sarzec, *Découvertes en Chaldée*, pl. 3.

³ See next page.

on their heads, climbing up a mound which adjoins the place where the rows of corpses are. That these attendants are engaged in burying the dead soldiers is evident; and there is no reason to doubt that they are building the mound upon which they are climbing, as the burial place.



The great age of this remarkable monument justifies the conclusion that earth-burial was practised in ancient Babylonia. In the later modes of burial, in which the dead were placed on the ground and covered with an oblong clay dish,¹ we have in the shape of this dish the trace of the mound which it was once customary to build over and around the dead person; and the tenacity of custom is to be recognized in the present day fashion of raising a small mound where the dead are buried, although the bodies are sunk deep into the ground.

¹ See Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, 597.

The attendants being engaged in building the mound, it is most natural to suppose that in the baskets which they have on their heads they are carrying the earth used in making the mound. It is on the head that in the ancient Orient, as in the East of to-day, burdens are usually borne. In the inscriptions of Assyrian and Babylonian rulers there occur frequent references to this workman's basket, the *dupšikku* as it was called.¹ Several kings pride themselves upon having taken the basket on their head, and upon having pressed their sons into service to assist in the sacred task of building a temple to a god.

Heuzey, in his remarks on the monument found by De Sarzec, at first explained the scene as has been done above; but afterwards changed his mind so far as the contents of the baskets were concerned. Instead of supposing that these baskets contained earth to be used in raising the mound, he expressed the opinion that the baskets contained the provisions for a sacrifice to the dead. He was led to this view through the frequent representation in statuettes and votive offerings of a person with a basket poised on his or her head.² It is true that when the offerings consisted of cereals or fruits, it was carried in a basket placed on the head of the person who was about to enter the sanctuary, or the presence of a deity,³ and there is reason to believe that among the Hebrews likewise, when the firstfruits were brought to the temple by the offerer in a basket,⁴ the basket was carried on the head; but it does not follow that the basket on the head in every case indicates the bringing of a sacrifice. Why should the attendants be represented in the act of climbing up the mound, unless they were engaged in building the latter. The sacrifice to the dead is brought at the grave; but in the compartment in question the dead are still exposed to view, and hence are not yet buried. Moreover, beside the attendants with baskets, others are seen arranging the dead neatly in rows. From this it is clear that burial is taking place, but that it is not yet completed. Perrot and Chipiez in their discussion of the monu-

¹ See Delitzsch, *Assyr. Handwb.*, 227, and Muss-Arnolt, *Assyrian Dictionary*, 264, for the passages in question.

² See, e. g., the illustration in Lehmann's *Šamašsumukin*, frontispiece, and De Sarzec, *Découvertes en Chaldée*, pl. 28.

³ See De Sarzec, *Découvertes*, pl. 2 bis, where Ur-Nina appears stripped to the waist and with a basket on his head.

⁴ Deut. xxvi. 2, 4.

ment¹ also reach the conclusion that the scene represented is a rite of burial, and call attention to the fact that the action of the figures with the baskets "indicates that the weight they are carrying is greater than a basket full of cakes, fruits, and other things of that kind would account for."

Everything, therefore, points to the correctness of Henzey's first surmise, that the baskets contain earth to be used in burial. Another circumstance which adds to the probability of this view is the fact that the attendants are stripped to the waist. In the monuments of ancient Babylonia, persons engaged in a religious act sometimes appear naked, or stripped to the waist,² just as the preislamic Arabs when they came to their sanctuaries stripped themselves;³ but this was only done, so far as the monuments show, when the worshipper entered the presence of a deity, not when merely bringing a sacrifice. The removal of a man's ordinary clothes, however, is a feature of the ancient mourning rites in the Orient; for, as will be shown in a special article on the subject, the rending of the mourning garments so frequently spoken of in the Old Testament was originally a tearing off of the garments, while putting on the שָׂרָא (sackcloth) is the girding oneself with a piece of stuff which represents a return to simpler fashions of early days. To this day in the Orient it is the mourners themselves who dispose of the dead. In the Old Testament, it is always assumed that the father is buried by his sons.⁴ The mourning proper, therefore, began with the act of burying the dead. It was at this time that the mourner tore off his garments and girded about his loins a simple cloth which hung down so as to cover his nakedness. This is precisely the kind of garb which the attendants pictured on the Stele of Vultures have on. They are dressed as mourners would be when about to dispose of their dead. It has been conjectured that these attendants are priests. There is no special reason for this opinion, but whether priests or laymen, their peculiar garb is not to be thus accounted for. Their dress is not that of ordinary workmen, for these appear on the monuments with an upper garment, though without sleeves.⁵

¹ *History of Art in Chaldaea and Assyria*, ii. 178.

² Peters, *Nippur*, ii. 380 (Plate II. no. 11); other examples in De Sarzec, *Découvertes en Chaldée*, pl. 2 bis. See Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, 666.

³ Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidentumes* (1st ed.), 106.

⁴ See, e. g., Gen. xxv. 9, xxxv. 29.

⁵ Layard, *Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon* (London, 1883), pp. 113 and 134.

Accepting the interpretation proposed, the scene on the Stele of Vultures, as will now be apparent, helps us to understand the juxtaposition of rending the garments and putting dust on the head which occurs in the Biblical passages quoted at the beginning of this article. Hushai the Archite, the messenger who brings Eli tidings of the death of his sons, the one who brings David the news of the death of Saul and Jonathan, and, similarly, Joshua and the elders of Israel as a sign of grief, and lastly the friends of Job to express their sympathy with the hero, so sorely tried by death in his household and other misfortunes, all appear with torn garments, and earth or dust on their heads. The conventional rending of the garments succeeds an earlier custom of tearing or stripping off the ordinary clothes and girding on a cloth hanging down from the loins. So frequent is the conjunction of the tearing of the garments and the putting on of sackcloth that there can be no doubt of a direct connection between the two acts. The one was preliminary to the other;¹ and hence the single phrase, either the tearing of the clothes or the putting on of sackcloth, could be used to imply both acts. But just as this act of tearing off the garments in order to put on the sackcloth develops into the conventional custom of merely making an incision into the seam of one's coat, as still practiced by orthodox Jews,² so the practice of putting earth in a basket to be used in the act of burial becomes a conventional symbol of mourning. Instead of carrying earth on the head and in a basket, the earth is shovelled into the grave and heaped up into a mound. The basket no longer serves any practical purpose and is discarded; but as a trace of the ancient manner of performing the act of burial earth is placed on the head, and the mourner goes about in a garb which was originally the one he put on when about to bury the dead with his own hands.

It is of interest to note in this connection the traces of similar customs among the ancient Egyptians. In the days of Herodotus,³ male and female mourners still went about bare to the waist. Representations on Egyptian monuments confirm this statement of Herodotus,⁴ as well as his observation that the mourners smeared their heads with earth or mud. This custom furnishes a

¹ This is also the opinion of Frey, *Altisraelitische Totentrauer*, 6.

² The modern Persians continue to tear their garments down to the waist. ³ Hdt. ii. 85. ⁴ Rawlinson's notes on Hdt. l. c.

parallel to the Biblical passages in which the placing of dust or earth on the head is referred to ; and it is fair to presume that among the Hebrews the custom was modified so that the earth or mud was no longer taken directly from the grave. That earth burial was practiced in early times by the Egyptians is certain. The change to the later custom of placing the embalmed bodies in sepulchral chambers would naturally lead to profound modifications of burial customs ; and as a matter of fact, the mere placing of the hand upon the head became a symbol of grief.¹ If Herodotus is right in saying that "sometimes even the faces" were besmeared with mud, it would only show how entirely the original purport of the custom was lost sight of in the course of the changes which the mode of disposing of the dead underwent among the Egyptians. In direct continuation of the ancient practices the women among the peasantry of Upper Egypt at the present time "daub their faces and bosoms and part of their dress with mud ; and tie a rope-girdle generally made of the coarse grass called *khalfa* round the waist."² Among the Greeks the custom of bedaubing the face with mud is met with, but not in connection with funeral or mourning rites.³

The explanation here offered of the custom of placing earth or dust on the head enables us to understand the hitherto obscure expression at the end of Job ii. 12 "sprinkling the dust . . . towards heaven." If we start from the assumption that the earth was originally placed in baskets on the head, the natural destination for the earth would be to be thrown over the dead body or into the grave. Instead, therefore, of supposing that the earth which is placed on the head is taken *from* the grave, as Robertson Smith suggests, it is *for* the grave that the earth is intended. With a change in the manner of burial and the consequent discarding of the basket, there would naturally remain as a symbol of mourning the placing of earth on the head ; and then, since this would be done after the actual burial was over, the earth would be thrown off from the head, no longer towards the ground but into the air. That is what the friends of Job actually did. "They scattered the dust on their heads towards heaven" (ii. 12), i. e. threw it off their heads into the air.

¹ See the illustration in Rawlinson's Herodotus, i. p. 124.

² Lane, *Modern Egyptians* (London, 1837), ii. 369.

³ See Pausanias, vii. 22, 9, and Frazer's note in his edition of Pausanias, vol. iv. p. 101.

It has already been pointed out that the placing of dust on the head as a concomitant act to tearing or tearing off the garments was extended in usage from an actual mourning rite to a symbol expressive of grief in general, or even of sympathy with one in distress. In the New Testament we find a further extension of the same custom to express a form of grief in which indignation is largely commingled. Passing by Rev. xviii. 19, where the people are represented as casting dust on their heads upon witnessing the destruction of Babylon, there are three passages in which the tearing of the clothes is a symbol of indignation, viz. Mark xiv. 63 with the parallel Matt. xxvi. 65, and Acts xiv. 14. The high priest, upon hearing Jesus proclaim himself by implication to be the Son of God, "rent his garments, saying, he hath spoken blasphemy." When Paul and Barnabas heard the Lycaonians call them Mercury and Jupiter, they rent their garments in indignation and horror. Here the passage from grief to indignation is easy. Still more significant is Acts xxii. 23, where the Jews, listening to Paul's defence, are unable to restrain their indignation, and when he declares his mission to the Gentiles, cry out, and throw off their garments, and cast dust into the air. We have here the same combination of the tearing, or tearing off, of garments and the throwing of dust into the air which we found in Job ii. 12. There is no possible doubt that the same custom is referred to in the two passages. In the one case, the gesture derived from the burial rites is used as a token of sympathy with Job in his misfortune; in the other, its significance is extended so that it becomes a sign of utter repudiation—Paul is treated as one dead to his people. At the same time it is worth while to note that in the New Testament passage the dust is not put on the head before being thrown into the air or towards heaven. As the custom became further removed from its original import it underwent slight modifications. There being no special reason for placing the dust on the head, this feature was dropped.

The development of the custom may, therefore, be summed up as follows :

1. At the time when the act of burial was performed by the immediate relatives, it was customary for the latter to strip themselves to the waist, place a basket containing earth on their heads, and pour this earth over the corpse or into the grave where the body lay, in this way raising a mound which marked the place of burial.

2. The garb worn at the funeral became the mourning dress. The use of the basket was discarded, but the placing of earth on the head became a symbol of mourning.

3. Long after the mode of burial underwent a change, the custom of tearing off the clothes and putting on sackcloth continued, and what was originally a practical feature of the interment was maintained as a ceremony of mourning. We have unfortunately no means of ascertaining for how long a period the mourning garb was worn by the ancient Hebrews. The indications are that this period was originally seven days,¹ which remains to this day the duration of *strict* mourning among the Jews; but the tendency soon developed to extend the term. It is hard to suppose that the dust was kept on the head for any length of time. From the passage in Job we may infer that after being placed there it was immediately thrown off into the air. At all events, the act of placing the dust on the head became a mere conventional symbol and in the course of time fell into disuse, the mourners contenting themselves with simply taking up some earth and throwing it into the air. In the days of Paul this had become the general custom. There appears to be a close connection between this custom and the custom, still observed in various parts of the world to-day, of taking up some handfuls of earth at the open grave and throwing them upon the corpse or the coffin in which the body rests.

4. The tearing off of the clothes was originally the preliminary act to putting on the simpler garment hanging down from the loins. Instead of a hasty and violent removal of the clothing, the tearing became conventionalized until it was accomplished merely by ripping open a portion of the upper garment. A simple loin-cloth took the place of a more elaborate piece of clothing which was worn under the ordinary dress. In time this custom died out, and the conventional rent in the coat alone remained. There appears again to be a direct connection between the loin-cloth and the mourning-band worn around the hat or sleeve by mourners in Occidental countries; while the mourning dress worn by women at the present day bears witness to female conservatism in religious fashions which stands in notable contrast to the frequent changes in their secular attire.

5. The conventionalized tearing of the garments and the placing of dust on the head were extended in their use, and served as

¹ So in Job ii. 13.

indications of sympathy with one in mourning, as symbols in making announcement of a death, and then as quite general signs of grief and distress. Removed in this way from their original import, the same gestures were also employed to give expression to a feeling of grief in which indignation was a prominent factor; either an indignation produced through holy horror or an indignation springing from a feeling of repugnance.

V.

Coming back, in conclusion, to the use of ashes in days of mourning, it is possible, as Robertson Smith suggests, that the ashes which the mourner rubbed over his person, or in which he rolled himself, or sat, were originally taken from the remains of the sacrifice offered at the grave. Among the Semites such sacrifices were as common as among the Greeks and other peoples of antiquity. At all events, if the inferences drawn above be sound, the totally different significance of the use of ashes from that of the use of dust or earth follows as a matter of course. Setting aside the single Biblical reference (2 Sam. xiii. 19) and the passage in Judith (ix. 1) as irrelevant, a reference to the placing of ashes on the head in Talmudical literature confirms this conclusion. In Mishna *Taanith* ii. 1, we are told that a feature of the religious fasts was the purification of the chest containing the tablets of the law. In connection with this purification the chief officials put ashes on their head. Although the assertion is made elsewhere in the Talmud that **אפר** is sometimes used for **עפר**,¹ the addition in *Taanith* of **מקלה** to **אפר**, expressly explained by Bertinoro as 'burnt ashes,' makes it certain that ashes are here meant and not dust. Burnt ashes, moreover, suggests that a sacrifice of some kind was once connected with the purification, and that the placing of ashes on the heads of the officials had an expiatory significance. To suppose that the use of ashes as a sign of mourning points to the custom of cremating the dead is impossible; for we know that, so far as the ancient Semites were concerned, the destruction of the body by fire was a punishment, and generally looked upon as a misfortune. Nor is it at all improbable that the placing of ashes on the head, when this was done, is an imitation of the other and very old custom of putting dust or earth on the head. At all events, from the practice of rubbing

¹ *Hullin* 85^b; see also *Taanith* 16^a.

one's face or body with the ashes of a sacrifice—either an offering at the grave or an expiatory offering—we can understand how the custom arose of covering the body with ashes, or sitting in ashes, or of wallowing in them.

If we turn to other nations, we shall find that there also ashes in mourning customs have a totally different meaning from dust or earth. In the *Iliad* there is an interesting description of Achilles, on hearing of Patroclus's death, pouring hot ashes on his head.¹ This act, it must be noted, took place at the tent of Achilles, and not in any connection with the burial. The ashes, therefore, could not have been taken from any cremation ceremony; Leaf, in his commentary, suggests that the ashes were taken from an altar to Ζεὺς Ἐρκεῖος which stood in front of the tent.² The more common custom among the Greeks was to grasp clods of earth and put them on the head and over the face. My colleague Professor Lamberton, who kindly directed my attention to the passage in Homer, is of the opinion that the use of ashes as a sign of mourning is an early and comparatively rare custom; outside of the single reference in the *Iliad*, it is not mentioned in Greek literature.³ I call attention to this, because many writers on Hebrew antiquities refer to the supposed corresponding custom of the Greeks.

So far as I have been enabled to extend my investigations on this point into the funeral customs of other nations than Semites, Egyptians, and Greeks, I find a confirmation of the thesis here maintained, which connects dust and earth directly with rites of interment, and separates from this the use of ashes. While the employment of dust or earth in some way as a symbol of mourning is common, the use of ashes forms, to say the least, the exception. Indeed, I have been unable to find that ashes were employed by the Romans, the ancient Teutons, or the North American Indians, in either direct or indirect connection with funeral rites or mourning for the dead; but on this point, I shall be glad to be enlightened by those who have made a more special study of funeral and mourning rites.

¹ Σ 22 f. ἀμφοτέρησι δὲ χερσὶν ἔλων κόριν αἰθαλόεσσαν χέεατο καὶ κεφαλῆς. [Cf. ω 316 f.]

² *The Iliad*, vol. ii. p. 223.

³ In Herrmann's *Lehrbuch der griechischen Privatalterthümer* (3 ed.) no mention is made of the practice.

Taboo and Morality.—By PROFESSOR CRAWFORD H. TOY, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

TABOO differs from other early institutions of society in that it relates largely to everyday conduct. It is obvious that a universally accepted system of prohibitions in a community must have some effect on men's idea of what constitutes right and wrong, and that a widespread institution must be intimately connected with the history of civilization. What is the relation between taboo and civilization, and especially between taboo and morality? Mr. Frazer, in his article "Taboo" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, holds that taboo "subversed the progress of civilisation by fostering conceptions of the rights of property and the sanctity of the marriage-tie." He adds, "We shall scarcely err in believing that even in advanced societies the moral sentiments, in so far as they are merely sentiments, and are not based on an induction from experience, derive much of their force from an original system of taboo." Mr. Jevons, in his interesting *Introduction to the History of Religions*, accepts Mr. Frazer's statement, and goes farther. "The imperative of taboo," he says, "is categorical, not hypothetical." "The sentiment, merely as a sentiment and apart from the reason or justification of it, is the same in all cases, namely, that the thing must not be done." "The essence of taboo is that it is *à priori*, that without consulting experience it pronounces certain things to be dangerous. These things, as a matter of fact, were in a sense not dangerous, and the belief in their danger was irrational. Yet, had not that belief existed, there would be now no morality, and consequently no civilisation." "This belief was a fallacy . . . but this fallacy was the sheath which enclosed and protected a conception that was to blossom and bear a priceless fruit—the conception of Social Obligation. To respect taboo was a duty towards society, because the man who broke it caught the taboo contagion, and transmitted it to everyone and everything that he came in contact with."

It thus appears that, of the two sides of moral life—the sentiment of obligation, and the determination of what is right and what is wrong—the former is regarded by Mr. Jevons as owing its effective existence to the institution of taboo. He does not

say in so many words that the sentiment of obligation was created by taboo (which he regards as irrational and non-moral), but he declares that it lived and grew only by reason of the protection which taboo afforded, that without taboo there would now be no morality.

Now it is true in one sense that in a line of advance every antecedent is a necessary condition of its consequents. But it does not follow that for a given antecedent some other might not have been substituted. Or, rather, as it is more accurate to say, in a complex antecedent, it is necessary to determine what is the active element of advance, and what is the merely formal and accessory condition. We must, therefore, ask to which of these categories taboo belongs, or whether it partakes of the nature of both.

The question of the universality of taboo need not detain us. In the nature of the case its universality cannot be absolutely proved; but it is now found among uncivilized peoples in all the great divisions of the world, traces of it are discoverable in the great ancient religions and in modern civilized communities, and for our purposes it may be assumed to have belonged to all early stages of social organization. Nor is its transmissibility a point of moment for an inquiry into its moral influence. This character seems not to be hard to understand from the point of view of the early man, and it no doubt contributed powerfully to maintain the influence of the institution; but it does not affect the fundamental question of the relation between taboo and morality. It is simply one feature of the custom, depending for its effect on the social instinct and on social organization.

It may be assumed that the sentiment of obligation preceded the institution of taboo. The latter can hardly be said to belong to the earliest stage of the life of men. It supposes not only that men have come into conscious relations with the Unseen Powers, but also that special relations have been instituted between these Powers and certain objects and acts—it supposes, in a word, an organization of religion, and a relatively advanced organization. But there is reason to believe that the germ of the moral sentiment existed in the prehuman period, and that man, at the moment when he became man, was already potentially a moral being. He was doubtless also at the same moment potentially a religious being, and the two attitudes or qualities were elevated into independent and recognizable form by the same general fact, that is, by his experience of life. Without undertaking a dis-

cussion of this point, it may be said that man's contact with his fellows, with the animal and vegetable world, and with the powers of nature, forced on him, or developed in him, the sentiments of dependence and deference. These sentiments in their manward activity, aided by the instinct of sympathy, produced morality, and in their godward activity produced religion. It may in like manner be assumed that a certain social organization was coeval with the life of man as man, and preceded the institution of taboo.

In our own life we know of nothing except social intercourse that directly affects either the moral sentiment or the moral code. This intercourse may be with men or with gods. This latter side has become in modern times simply an aspiration; in the earliest human stage with which we are acquainted it is an objective fact—the powerful god and the powerful man are feared, propitiated, and obeyed in very much the same way. There are duties toward the gods and duties toward men, and both go back to the initial sentiment of dependence. Taboo deals with the first class of duties, ordinary morality with the second.

Duty toward man (if we leave out of view such instincts as sympathy and maternal love) is defined by the necessities of social relations. *That* we are to defer to our fellow man, and *how far* we are to defer to him, are things taught us by experience. Early man's code of natural individual rights contained only two particulars: the right of life (including happiness), and the right of property, and these were founded partly on the perception by each man of his own rights, and partly on the conviction that his rights could be secured only by recognizing the rights of others. Hence, for example, the rules "thou shalt not kill," "thou shalt not steal," "thou shalt not take thy neighbor's wife." All such rules regard man's relations with man, and of necessity take form whenever men undertake to live together as friends.

Duty toward a god is, in like manner, in early life defined by social relations with the god. It becomes known, for example, that he dwells in a certain animal or tree or grove or stone, and man's common sense teaches him that he must be cautious in his dealings with these objects. If a hut is built for the god or for the object in which he dwells, and a man is selected to guard it, then the hut and man are to be respected as the god is respected. If a chief is known to be a god, his person and his property are of course sacred. If the god chooses to manifest himself in sickness, in death, in birth, objects connected with these facts are to

be treated as the god is treated, not to be lightly touched, but to be left in the god's possession. All such rules spring from duty to the god, who is known, no matter how, to assert possession of certain things.

Here, then, are two systems of regulations which arise in different ways, and may easily come into collision one with the other: the sentiment of pity for the sick, for instance, may clash with the taboo which forbids one to touch the sick. In such cases the sentiment which is the stronger at the moment will prevail. Greed or fear may override the recognition of property-rights: a chief touches a boat with his hand or his spear and declares it to be his, and the owner submits; the chief simply uses his power to steal, and the victim is afraid to resist—this is not a strange procedure even in our day.

Sometimes the two sets of principles coalesce: taboo apparently entered the region of purely human relations. A man might declare his land taboo, and thus save it from depredation; a married woman was taboo to all men but her husband. This is in accordance with religious history everywhere: religion always appropriates and supports the moral rules which spring from the ordinary social relations. In the cases mentioned above the right of property in land and wife was not created or suggested by taboo; men avail themselves of a current religious belief in order to enforce an existing right. In like manner ancient religious asylums represented regard for human life, which was originally the product of a purely human instinct—there is no proof that the early man respected his fellow as a child of a god, and therefore entitled to the same regard which was paid to the god. But the religious taboo obviously reinforced the non-religious sentiment of right.

Taboo was in its essence non-moral. In its practical working it was often anti-moral, since it elevated to the rank of duties actions which not only had no basis in human relations, but were antagonistic to the natural healthy human instinct of right. Hence ensued a conflict between it and morality—a conflict which has lasted to the present day, and has formed a large part of the ethical history of the race. Of the issue of such a conflict there could be no doubt, since of the parties to it one is rational and the other irrational. But here by some writers a grave difficulty has been supposed to exist. Taboo, it is said, is irrational, it does not depend on experience, and cannot be tested by experience—there are stories of men who have died of fright on finding out

that they have violated some absurd rule ; thus, it is said, early man is enclosed in a vicious circle from which there seems to be no escape. As to this, it is to be remarked that the assertion that taboo is independent of experience is without foundation. On the contrary, all the evidence points to the fact that it is the product of experience. But, leaving this point aside, there is no more difficulty in this problem than in all the other problems of human progress. If certain religious authorities declared that kings were divine, that women were an inferior order of creatures, that the sun went round the earth, how did men ever come to think otherwise ? How but by that progress of thought which belongs in some degree to all communities of men ? Human societies, it is true, differ greatly in their power of observation and thought. There are some that have never got beyond believing that the earth is flat, and in such as these taboo still reigns. But the peoples of progress have thrown off taboo as they have thrown off a hundred like things. Mr. Jevons, however, has another explanation of the rationalization of taboo. "Wherever," he says, "the operation of taboo is accepted as an ultimate fact which requires no explanation, there no advance towards its rationalization can be made, and progress is impossible. But as soon as a taboo is taken up into religion its character is changed ; it is no longer an arbitrary fact, it becomes the command of a divine being, who has reasons for requiring obedience to his ordinances." Thus, according to Mr. Jevons, it is religion that has brought taboo into the domain of reason, and made its rationalization possible. The taboos not adopted by religion, he goes on to say, are neglected by the community, and thus the irrational restrictions are gradually dropped. I say nothing here of the expression "taken up into religion," because it connects itself with Mr. Jevons' view of the origin of taboo, which I cannot here discuss ; in point of fact, we know of no taboos which were not in some way connected with religion. Leaving this question aside, Mr. Jevons' statement of the effect of religion on taboo seems to me to be the precise opposite of the fact. The term "religion" is, of course, here used in the sense not of the simple sentiment, but of a body of thought regulated by an authoritative body of men. In this sense religion has, as a rule, been the guardian of taboo, and has modified its material of taboo only as this material has been modified by the general opinion of the community. A better statement of the fact would be that the religious sentiment, under the guidance of enlightened thought,

has been constantly occupied with setting aside the irrational restrictions which were imposed on men by earlier unenlightened thought. The old requirement that the worshipper should change his clothing on entering a sacred place has been set aside simply by a broader view of the nature of worship. Instead of saying that religion by adopting certain taboos has suppressed others, it would be better to say that religion has from time to time dropped those taboos which the community would no longer tolerate. A striking illustration of this principle is afforded by the history of the abolition of taboo in Hawaii eighty years ago. Before missionaries had visited the islands, or any attempt at reform had been made from without, certain members of the royal family, having made up their minds that the institution was intolerable, publicly violated its rules. Thereupon the whole structure fell with a crash. The people, with few exceptions, welcomed the release from a painful burden. The priests had not been consulted, but threw themselves heartily into the movement. The leader in the reform was a woman; taboo pressed most heavily on women. The source of the revolution was the natural human revolt against an evil which observation showed to be unsupported by real authority. The people had seen Europeans living unharmed amid constant violations of taboo.

It has here been assumed that taboo is essentially religious; but it will amount to the same thing, for the point under discussion, if we admit that, wherever we can with some distinctness trace it to a beginning, we find it connected with religion.

If the positions taken above are correct, it follows that taboo has been not the creator of the moral sentiment or the moral code, but a concomitant of man's moral life which has sometimes opposed, sometimes coalesced with natural morality. Like all widely-extending institutions it has tended in part to weld men together, like all irrational restrictions, it has tended in part to hold men apart; like all positive law it has fostered the sense of obligation, like all arbitrary law it has damped the power of intelligent and moral obedience. It was not the guardian of morality, but a temporary form in which a part of the moral law expressed itself. The real moral force of society was sympathetic social intercourse, which under the guidance of an implicit moral ideal, was constantly employed in trying to rationalize or to reject those enactments of taboo which were proved by experience, observation, and reflection to be irrational.

The Metres of Bhartrihari.—By LOUIS H. GRAY, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.

THE object of the present paper is simply to record the main data concerning the metres of the stanzas that bear the name of Bhartrihari. The three centuries ascribed to him contain about 326 stanzas on Ethics, Love, and Renunciation. Although the number of stanzas varies considerably according to the different manuscripts and editions, I venture to think that the ratios here presented will give an approximately correct idea of the metrical usage in the collection under consideration.¹

Classes of Metres in Bhartrihari.—The metres employed by Bhartrihari in his three centuries number twenty-four. They fall into two classes, *Vṛtta* and *Jāti*. Of the *Vṛtta*, which is the older form, there are nineteen varieties in Bhartrihari; of the *Jāti* there are five. There are three subdivisions of the *Vṛtta*: *Samavṛtta*, in which all quarter-verses are the same; *Ardhasamavṛtta*, in which the alternate quarter-verses have the same scheme; *Viṣamavṛtta*, in which no two quarter-verses correspond. Of the nineteen *Vṛtta*'s of Bhartrihari, fourteen fall under the *Samavṛtta*, one under the *Ardhasamavṛtta*, and four under the *Viṣamavṛtta*.

Verse-arrangement.—It may be noted that no uniformity in the division of lines of text is found either in the Indian editions of Bhartrihari or in Böhtlingk's *Indische Sprüche*. A very few examples will show this. Thus, in the *Çālinī* we have two distichs written in the Bombay edition at i. 48, but at i. 69; ii. 24, only one. In the *Mālinī*, at i. 17, Böhtlingk (No. 227) has one distich, but at i. 79 he writes two (No. 4691). In the *Drutavilambita*, Böhtlingk (Nos. 3, 2060) has one distich for i. 52; 91, but (Nos. 6147 7163, 4680) he writes two for i. 63; 92; ii. 30 (in both the latter cases the native text is uniform with two and one distichs respect-

¹ It is a pleasure as well as a duty to acknowledge my indebtedness to Weber, *Metrik der Inder*, and to Böhtlingk, *Indische Sprüche*. The edition of Bhartrihari's *Çatakatrāyam* which has been the basis of my study is that published by the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press at Bombay in 1888, which contains also the commentary of Mahābala Kṛṣṇaċāstri. For the sake of brevity I cite the *Nītiçataka* as i; the *Çṛṅgāraçataka* as ii; the *Vairāgyaçataka* as iii.

ively). Finally, in the *Vasantatilakā*, over against thirty-one cases of two distichs we find three single ones at i. 40; ii. 1; 60, for which Böhtlingk in two cases writes one distich (Nos. 2533, 6237) and once has two (No. 6408).

Two points with regard to the *Anuṣṭubh* and the *Āryā* deserve special mention. From the thirty-seven occurrences of the *Anuṣṭubh* in Bhartrihari we derive the following scheme :

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
<i>ab</i>	x	x	x	x	x	ū	ū	x		x	x	x	x	o	-	o	-
<i>cd</i>	x	x	x	x	x	-	-	x		x	x	x	x	o	-	o	-

Syllable 5 is long in *ab* only in ii. 58 and 79, and in *cd* only in ii. 81. Syllables 6 and 7 are always long in *ab* except at i. 24 and ii. 76; in *cd* they are long without exception.

We should also note that both lines of i. 104 have the same metrical scheme, and that the first line of iii. 70 has the same scheme as that of ii. 61.

With regard to the *Āryā* metre it is to be stated that in all of its twelve occurrences the ninth syllable of *pādas b* and *d* is invariably short. This is true likewise in the cases of the *Gīti* and *Pathyā*, which occur but once each.

To sum up the results, we find that of the twenty-four metres employed in the collection, sixteen occur in the *Nītiçataka*. The *Ṣṛṅgāraçataka* contains seven metres not found in the *Nītiçataka*, viz., *Upacitrā*, *Gīti*, *Dodhaka*, *Pathyā*, *Puspitāgrā*, *Rathoddhatā*, and *Vaitaliya*. The only metre of the *Vairāgyaçataka* which does not occur in the other two centuries is the *Indravaṅçā*. In no case in the entire collection is there any violation of metrical laws.

The appended statistical table will give most concisely the chief results of this note on Bhartrihari's metrical usage.

STATISTICAL TABLE OF THE METRES OF BHARTRIHARI.

Name.	Occurs in Book i.	Ratio to Book i.	Occurs in Book ii.	Ratio to Book ii.	Occurs in Book iii.	Ratio to Book iii.	Total Occurrences.	Ratio to Total.
A. <i>Vṛtta</i>	103	.9363 +	91	.91	115	.9913 +	309	.9478
a. <i>Samavṛtta</i>	81	.7363 +	67	.67	107	.9224 +	255	.7822 +
1. <i>Ārdūlavikṛīḍita</i>	33	.30	20	.20	44	.3793 +	97	.2975 +
2. <i>Ākharinī</i>	10	.0909 +	12	.12	31	.2672 +	53	.1625 +
3. <i>Vasantatilakā</i>	18	.1636 +	9	.09	7	.0603 +	34	.1043 +
4. <i>Sragdharā</i>	3	.0272 +	9	.09	10	.0861 +	22	.0674 +
5. <i>Mālinī</i>	3	.0272 +	6	.06	3	.0258 +	12	.0368 +
6. <i>Mandākrantā</i>	1	.0090 +	1	.01	6	.0517 +	8	.0245 +
7. <i>Hariṇī</i>	2	.0181 +	3	.03	3	.0258 +	8	.0245 +
8. <i>Drutavilambita</i>	4	.0363 +	1	.01			5	.0153 +
9. <i>Prithvī</i>	4	.0363 +					4	.0122 +
10. <i>Vañcastha</i>	1	.0090 +	1	.01	2	.0172 +	4	.0122 +
11. <i>Rathoddhatā</i>			3	.03			3	.0092 +
12. <i>Ālīnī</i>	2	.0181 +	1	.01			3	.0092 +
13. <i>Indravaṇṣā</i>					1	.0086 +	1	.0030 +
14. <i>Dodhaka</i>			1	.01			1	.0030 +
b. <i>Ardhasamavṛtta</i>			1	.01			1	.0030 +
1. <i>Puṣpitāgrā</i>			1	.01			1	.0030 +
c. <i>Viṣamavṛtta</i>	22	.20	23	.23	8	.0689 +	53	.1625 +
1. <i>Anuṣṭubh</i>	13	.1181 +	17	.17	7	.0603 +	37	.1134 +
2. <i>Indravajrā</i>	1	.0090 +	2	.02			3	.0092 +
3. <i>Upendravajrā</i>	2	.0181 +					2	.0061 +
4. <i>Upajāti</i>	6	.0545 +	4	.04	1	.0086 +	11	.0337 +
B. <i>Jāti</i>	7	.0636 +	9	.09	1	.0086 +	17	.0521 +
1. <i>Āryā</i>	7	.0636 +	5	.05			12	.0368 +
2. <i>Ġitī</i>			1	.01			1	.0030 +
3. <i>Pathyā</i>			1	.01			1	.0030 +
4. <i>Upacitrā</i>			1	.01			1	.0030 +
5. <i>Vaitaṇya</i>			1	.01	1	.0086 +	2	.0061 +

The Site of 'Bethulia.'—By Dr. CHARLES C. TORREY, Andover
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ONE of the most perplexing features of the book of Judith is its geography. The author of the story brings into it an unusual number of geographical and topographical details; names of countries, cities, and towns, of valleys and brooks. With regard to a part of these details, especially those having to do with countries or places outside of Palestine, it can be said at once that they are mere literary adornment, and are not to be taken seriously. Such, for example, are the particulars regarding Nebuchadnezzar's campaigns in the East, i. 5, 6, 15; his journey westward, ii. 21-26; the pursuit and slaughter of his army by the Jews, xv. 5. The especial fondness of the writer for introducing into his narrative such particulars as these is further illustrated by the names of the men who play a part in the story. Some of these, already familiar in the Old Testament, are now made to do duty in strange places; see, for example, i. 1, 5, 6; ii. 23. Even the less important personages are regularly called by their proper names. Thus, Achior, the captain of the Ammonites, v. 5, 22, xi. 9, xiv. 6, 10, etc.; Bagoas, the chamberlain of Holofernes, xii. 11, 13, 15, xiii. 1, 3, xiv. 14; Ozias, Chabri, and Charmi, the chief men of the city, vi. 15 ff., vii. 23, viii. 10, x. 6, xv. 4, etc. These are all just such details as we expect to see employed by a story-teller who, without being very well informed, wishes to make his tale sound like a chapter of history.¹ The geographical statements of the book are thus to be used only with great caution; and when, further, the inevitable corruption of proper names transliterated from Hebrew into Greek, in passing through the hands of successive copyists, is considered, it is not surprising that some modern scholars have despaired of making any serious use of the geography of Judith.

¹ That the author's aim in this was purely literary, seems to me in every way probable. It is plain that he was a writer of exceptionally strong imagination, and that he depicted the incidents of this story with the keen interest of a genuine story-teller in his own creation. See, for striking illustration of this, x. 10, xiii. 13, xiv. 6.

But in the frequent descriptions which the writer gives of the region where the principal action of the story takes place, the geographical and topographical details are introduced in such number and with such consistency as to show that he is describing localities with which he was personally familiar. Nor is it difficult to determine, in general, what region he had in mind. Beyond question, the discomfiture of the 'Assyrian' army is represented as having taken place in the hill country of Samaria, on the direct road from Jezreel to Jerusalem.

When the army of Holofernes reached the Great Plain of Jezreel, in its march southward, it halted there for a month (iii. 9 f.) at the entrance to the hill country of the Jews. According to iii. 10, "Holofernes pitched between Geba and Scythopolis." This statement is not without its difficulties. We should perhaps have expected the name Genin, where the road from the Great Plain enters the hills, instead of Geba. The latter name is very well attested, however, having the support of most Greek manuscripts and of all the versions. The only place of this name known to us, in this region, is the village Geba (Gēba'),¹ a few miles north of Samaria, directly in the line of march taken by Holofernes and his army, at the point where the road to Shechem branches. It is situated just above a broad and fertile valley where there is a fine large spring of water. There would seem to be every reason, therefore, for regarding this as the Geba of Judith iii. 10; as is done, for example, by Conder in the *Survey of Western Palestine, Memoirs*, ii. p. 156, and by G. A. Smith, *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, p. 356. There is nothing in the sequel of the story to disagree with this conclusion. According to the narrator, the vast 'Assyrian' army, at the time of this ominous halt, extended all the way from Scythopolis through the Great Plain to Genin, and along the broad caravan track² southward as far as Geba (see the map below, p. 169).

¹ Apparently the גִּבְעָה of the Talmud, Mishna *Kelim* xvii. 5, said to be a village of Samaria (Neubauer, *Géographie du Talmud*, p. 264). That the Gabe mentioned by Eusebius and Jerome (Lagarde, *Onomastica Sacra*, 128, 17; 246, 53) as lying about sixteen miles east of Caesarea is to be identified with this Geba, is quite possible.

² There is nothing of the nature of a mountain pass anywhere between Genin and Geba, but everywhere a wide and easy road, or rather, 'beaten tract' (Conder, *l. c.*, p. 49). The route is a succession of open plains, connected in one or two places by narrower valleys.

It was while the army was in this position that the Jews prepared to oppose a desperate resistance to its further advance (iv. 4-8, v. 1, cf. vii. 1). The city on which everything depended was Bethulia, or rather Betylūa (Βαιτυλωνα, Βατυλωα, etc.; see below, p. 172), which commanded the main road by which the army was advancing into Judea. On this fact the whole story turns. This city could 'hold the pass' through which it was necessary that Holofernes, having once chosen this southward route, should lead his army in order to invade Judea and attack Jerusalem. This is plainly stated in iv. 7: [καὶ ἔγραψεν Ἰωακείμ] λέγων διακατασχέιν τὰς ἀναβάσεις τῆς ὄρεινῆς, ὅτι δι' αὐτῶν ἦν ἡ εἰσόδος εἰς τὴν Ἰουδαίαν· καὶ ἦν εὐχερῶς διακωλύσαι αὐτοὺς προσβαίνοντας, στενῆς τῆς προσβάσεως οὕσης.¹ "And Joachim wrote, charging them to hold the pass² of the hill-country; *for through it was the entrance into Judea*, and it would be easy to stop them as they came up, because the approach was narrow." When the people of Betylūa comply with the request of the high priest and the elders of Jerusalem, and hold the pass (iv. 8), they do so simply by remaining in their own city, prepared to resist the approach of Holofernes. So long as they continue stubborn, and refuse to surrender or to let the enemy pass, so long their purpose is accomplished, and Jerusalem and the sanctuary are safe. This is made as plain as possible in all the latter part of the book; see especially viii. 21 ff., where Judith is indignantly opposing the counsel of the chief men of the city to surrender: "For if we be taken, all Judea will be taken,³ and our sanctuary will be spoiled; and of our blood will he require its profanation. And the slaughter of our brethren, and the captivity of the land, and the desolation of our inheritance, will he turn upon our heads among the nations wheresoever we shall be in bondage. And we shall be an offence and a reproach in the eyes of those who have taken us captive . . . Let us show an example to our brethren, because their lives hang upon us, and upon us rest the sanctuary and the house and the altar." That is, the city which the writer of this story had in mind lay directly in the

¹ That the last clause of vs. 7, 'ἐπ' ἀνδρας τοὺς πάντας δύο (!), is a mere exaggeration, has never been doubted.

² Notice how in the sequel this word ἀναβάσεις (plur.) is used for the pass at the summit of which the city Betylūa stood (vii. 7), which is at the same time 'the pass' of the hill country (vii. 1).

³ Reading, with Cod. 58, Syr., Vet. Lat., ληφθήσεται. The more common readings καθήσεται, κληθήσεται, κληθήσεται, καὶ θήσεται, are evidently due to a copyist's blunder in the Greek (from οὕτως καὶ ληφθήσεται?).

path of Holofernes, at the head of the most important pass in the region, through which he must necessarily lead his army. There is no escape from this conclusion.

This absolutely excludes the two places which have been most frequently thought of as possible sites of the city, Şānūr and Mithiliyeh, both midway between Geba and Genin. Şānūr, though a natural fortress, is perched on a hill west of the road, and "guards no pass whatever" (Robinson, *Biblical Researches*,¹ iii. 152 f.). As for Mithiliyeh, first suggested by Conder in 1876 (see *Survey of Western Palestine, Memoirs*, ii. 156 f.), it is even less entitled to consideration, for it lies nearly two miles east of the caravan track; guarding no pass, and of little or no strategic importance. Evidently, the attitude, hostile or friendly, of this remote village would be a matter of indifference to a great invading army on its way to attack Jerusalem. Its inhabitants, while simply defending themselves at home, certainly could not have held the fate of Judea in their hands; nor could it ever have occurred to the writer of such a story as this to represent them as doing so.

Again, having once accepted the plain statement of the writer that the army during its halt extended from Scythopolis to Geba, there is the obvious objection to each and all of the places in this region which have been suggested as possible sites of Betylūa (see those recorded in G. A. Smith, *l. c.*, p. 356, note 2; Buhl, *Geographie des alten Palästina*, p. 201, note), that they are all north of Geba. From the sequel of the story we should be led to look for the pass occupied by Betylūa at some place on the main road not yet reached by the army. It is plainly not the representation of the writer that a part of the host of Holofernes had already passed it.

And finally, Betylūa is unquestionably represented as a large and important city. This fact is especially perplexing, in view of the total absence of any other mention of it. Outside of this one story the name is entirely unknown. On the other hand, nothing can be more certain than that the author of the book of Judith had an actual city in mind when he wrote. Modern scholars are generally agreed in this conclusion, that whatever may be said of the historical character of the narrative, the description of Betylūa and the surrounding country is not a fiction.

The theory which at once suggests itself, that the name is a pseudonym, has not been very widely accepted; both because the

reason for such a substitution has not appeared, and because it is not easy to see what city would be likely to appear in such disguise—unless it were Jerusalem. Some of the rabbinical writers do in fact identify ‘Betylūa’ with Jerusalem; but even a hasty reading of the story shows that this is quite out of the question.

There was one city, however, in all the land, that could not possibly have been called by its proper name in a Jewish story such as this is, supposing it to have been represented as the home of Judith and the scene of these events. That city was *Shechem*, the Samaritan stronghold. The moment this name is suggested, it is seen that it meets exactly the essential requirements of the story; in fact, that no other city between Jezreel and Jerusalem can compete with it for a moment in this respect. When the advance guard of Holofernes’ army halted in the broad valley below Geba, it was within four hours’ march of the most important pass in all Palestine, namely that between Ebal and Gerizim. Moreover, this was the one pass through which the army would now be compelled to proceed, after it had once turned westward at Bethshan and chosen the route southward through Genin. We see now why the narrator makes Holofernes encamp “between Scythopolis and Geba.” It is a good illustration of the skill which he displays in telling this story. Having advanced so far as this, it was too late for the ‘Assyrians’ to choose another road. As for the city Shechem, which was planted squarely in the middle of the narrow valley at the summit of the pass,¹ its attitude toward the invaders would be a matter of no small importance.

The first approach of some of the enemy to the city is narrated in vi. 10 ff. The servants of Holofernes, with their prisoner, Achior, after leaving the camp, passed first through the plain; their road then ascended through a mountainous region; passing through this, they at length arrived at the springs below ‘Betylūa’ (vs. 11). This describes perfectly the way from the plain below Geba over the mountain to Shechem (see Baedeker, *Palästina*³, p. 225–228), whether the steeper direct path is taken, or the longer road by Samaria, which would be more likely to be chosen for the approach of such an army. The spring below the city might be the present *beit el-mā*, beside the road, fifteen minutes from Shechem (the ‘fine large fountain’ mentioned by Rob-

¹ See Kitchener’s excellent plan in the *Survey of Western Palestine, Memoirs*, ii. 186; and that by Rosen, ZDMG. xiv. 634.

inson, *l. c.*, p. 136); or even the *'ain el-quṣab*, in the valley just below the western gate of the present city of Nābulus. All the valley on this side is abundantly supplied with water.

From this time on, definite hints are frequently given in the narrative as to the location of the city and the nature of the surrounding country. The features of the description are as follows:

1. Below the city and at no great distance, on the side from which the invaders came, was a valley of considerable extent (vii. 3, x. 11, xiv. 2, etc.). Here were the springs (πηγαί) above mentioned (vi. 11; also vii. 3, xii. 7). This valley, into which Holofernes and the advance guard of his army now moved, lay on the west side of the city, as appears from the verse vii. 18, which describes the surrounding of the city by the hostile forces (cf. vss. 13, 20). Troops were sent to the north ("in the direction of Dothan," which would be northward from any point on the road south of Geba), others "toward the south," others "toward the east"; the main body of the army remaining in the plain where they had pitched, i. e., on the west. Finally, this valley—or at least the upper end of it—was in plain view from the walls of the city (vi. 11 f., vii. 6, x. 10; cf. xiv. 2, 11 f.).

2. As for the city itself, the statements regarding its situation are both explicit and consistent. As has already been seen, the first and most important requirement of the narrative for 'Betylūa' is that it should occupy the summit of an important pass. With this requirement the various bits of description inserted here and there by the writer correspond admirably. One who approached the city from the plain where the army was encamped, ascended through a narrowing valley (xiii. 10, cf. x. 10; the translation has *φάραξ* in the former passage). At the head of the valley, a short distance back from the brow of the hill, stood the city (vi. 12¹, x. 10, xiii. 10, xiv. 11). Rising above the city, and overlooking it, were mountains (vii. 13, 18, xv. 3). No one can read these verses describing the immediate neighborhood of 'Betylūa' without feeling sure that the writer had an actually existing city before his mind's eye. Nor does there seem to be any room for doubt, in view of the remarkable correspondence of this description with that of Shechem and its surroundings, that the latter city, and no other, was in his thoughts when he wrote.

¹ In this verse, the first ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν τοῦ ὄρους should be omitted, with Cod. 58, Syr. It is a plain case of text corruption due to homœoteleuton.

3. The account of the manner of the siege and the plan pursued by Holofernes may also serve as evidence. It is true, to be sure, that the plot of the story (which bears everywhere the marks of thought and skill) made it necessary that the men of the city should be reduced to desperate straits by famine or thirst. The writer had small choice, and it might seem to be of little use to follow him into details here. But it is worthy of notice that of all of the cities of Palestine, Shechem was the one most likely to suggest to a narrator this precise manner of reducing a stronghold to submission, by cutting off from it the springs which were the source of its water supply. What is more, investigation of the narrative at this point will be found to bring most striking confirmation of the conclusion already reached. 'Betylūa' is not represented as an especially strong fortress. As a large and strongly-built city, perched in the narrow saddle between high mountains, it had an important advantage of position, and its warriors could defend themselves for some time, provided they remained within their own walls. This fact is stated, and probably exaggerated, in vii. 10; cf. iv. 7. But elsewhere the city does not appear to be thought of as one whose strength rendered it especially difficult of capture. Its people could not easily be overcome, because their god would fight for them (v. 21, xi. 9, 10). It was in order that Holofernes might punish them to his satisfaction without the loss of any of his army (vii. 11 f.) that he is advised by the Edomites and Moabites to cut off the water supply from the city. The modern city of Nābulus is full of running water, and springs are to be found everywhere. Robinson (*Physical Geography of the Holy Land*, p. 247) conjectured that "very many of these" were simply "branches from larger fountains brought down by underground conduits" to various parts of the city. From the interesting discoveries mentioned by Guérin, *Samarie*, i. 401 f., it would seem probable that the abundant water supply of the city is due for the most part, if not wholly, to a system of underground conduits—some of them very ancient—from the important springs a little above the city, in the valley on the south side (see also Rosen, ZDMG. xiv. 636 f.; *SWP.*, *Memoirs*, ii. 167). The uppermost of these springs, the magnificent perennial *rās el-'ain*, is the most celebrated of the fountains about Nābulus. From it proceeds the main canal of the system of ancient conduits above mentioned, built of large blocks of hewn stone.¹ There are strong reasons for believing

¹ For some further description of these aqueducts, see *SWP.*, *Memoirs*, ii. 210.

that the author of the book of Judith had this all-important spring in mind when he described the siege of Shechem. It must be evident that in his representation the spring from which the city was supplied was not the one in the valley, beside which the army encamped (vii. 3). This latter (the *beit el-mā?*) was of course in his camp (ἐν τῇ παρεμβολῇ, xii. 7) from the first. He also took possession of other waters still nearer the city (the *‘ain el-quṣab?*), as narrated in vii. 6: "On the second day Holofernes led out all his horse in the sight of the children of Israel who were in Betylūa, and viewed the ascents to their city, and searched out the fountains of the waters, and seized upon them, and set garrisons of men of war over them; then he himself returned to his camp." But these springs, though important for him and his army, were not of any great value to the city, it would seem. It was just at this point that the Edomites and other old-time neighbors and enemies of Israel came to Holofernes with their advice concerning the fountain that supplied the city, of whose existence he as yet knew nothing. Their counsel was the following (vs. 12 f.): 'Ανάμεινον ἐπὶ τῆς παρεμβολῆς σου, διαφυλάττων πάντα ἄνδρα ἐκ τῆς δυνάμεώς σου, καὶ ἐπικρατησάτωσαν οἱ παῖδες σου τῆς πηγῆς τοῦ ὕδατος ἣ ἐκπορεύεται ἐκ τῆς ῥίξης τοῦ ὄρους, διότι ἐκείθεν ὑδρεύονται πάντες οἱ κατοικοῦντες Βιτυλουα, καὶ ἀνελεῖ αὐτοὺς ἡ δόξα, καὶ ἐκδώσουσι τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν, "Remain in thy camp, and keep safe every man of thy host, and let thy servants get possession of the fountain of water that comes forth from the foot of the mountain, because all the inhabitants of Betylūa have their water thence; and they will perish of thirst, and will surrender their city." This advice was followed forthwith. The Moabites,¹ with five thousand of the 'Assyrians,' went up and made their camp in the valley, or ravine, ἐν τῷ αὐλῶνι, where the springs were situated (i. e., in the above-mentioned valley south of Shechem, at the foot of Mount Gerizim), and cut off the water supply of the city (vs. 17); while the Edomites and Ammonites ("with twelve thousand of the Assyrians"; Syr., Vet. Lat.) went up on the mountains on the other side of the city (vs. 18).

The correspondence of all this part of the narrative with the topography of Shechem is thus seen to be absolutely perfect. It is probable that still other details of the original description are

¹ So we should probably read, with Cod. 19, 108, Syr., Vet. Lat. Cf. vs. 8.

preserved in the Latin Vulgate, and in the late Hebrew version¹ of the story published in Jellinek, *Bet ha-Midrash*, ii. 12-22. The Vulgate, after narrating how Holofernes and his armies encamped before the walls of Bethulia, proceeds (vii. 6): Porro Holofernes, dum circuit per gyrum, reperit quod fons qui influebat, aquaeductum illorum a parte australi extra civitatem dirigeret; et incidi praecepit aquaeductum illorum. So also the Hebrew midrash: **ואל'פורני בלכתו סביב ההר מצא סילוני המים אשר חוץ לעיר ויצו . . . להאביר ולהרום אותם**. That is, in the recension represented by these two versions it was plainly stated that 'Betylūa' was supplied with water by means of an aqueduct from a spring above the city *on the south side*.

These last words, in particular, are very significant. It is plain that such a statement as this about the direction of the spring from the city cannot have been a mere literary addition. It must have formed a part of the description in the original form of the story, though now preserved only in this slovenly and distorted recension. The description of the Shechem water works, as we know them to have existed, is thus made as exact as any one could wish.² Nor do we know of any other city in Palestine to which water was brought by aqueducts from 'a spring' (*fons*, *πηγή*)³ on the south side.


4. If any further evidence were needed to make the demonstration complete, it could be found in the interesting passage vii. 18, in which the surrounding of the city by the hosts of Holofernes is described. The verse reads: "And the children of Esau and the children of Ammon went up, and encamped in the mountains toward Dothan; and they sent some of them toward the south, and toward the east, over against Ekrebel, which is near

¹ Apparently a free adaptation based on the Latin Vulgate.

² Is it not possible that Josephus, in the account which he gives (*Antt.* xiii. 10, 3) of the destruction of Samaria by John Hyrcanus, has introduced a feature properly belonging to the destruction of Shechem previously narrated by him (xiii. 9, 1)? He says that Hyrcanus "brought streams to drown" the city, etc. It is difficult to see how this could have been possible in the case of Samaria, which was situated on the very top of a hill. In the case of Shechem it would have been an easy matter.

³ This feature of the description is hardly given its due weight by those scholars (Scholz, Ball) who would find here a possible allusion to the aqueducts of Jerusalem (see Ball on Judith vii. 7, in Wace's *Apocrypha*).

Chusi, which is by the wady Mochmur." The places named must of course be looked for in the near neighborhood of 'Betylūa'; otherwise the verse is meaningless. The purpose of establishing a blockade of the city had been plainly stated in verses 13b, 16; the manner in which the plan was carried out is now described in vs. 18; and in the following verses, 19, 20, its complete success is narrated.



It is obvious that Ekrebel and Chusi must be the names of places near by the city, commanding the roads leading eastward and southward from it. The former name, Ekrebel,¹ has generally been recognized as the well known village Akrabbi,² the modern 'Aqrabeh, lying about three hours southeast of Shechem, on

¹ Cod. A, Εκρεβηλ; 19, 108, Ακραβηλ; 249, Ακρεβηλ; Vet. Lat., Etrelbel; Syr. 'Aqrabīth (var. 'Aqrabath); Ⲭ, B, and a number of cursives, Εγρεγλ.

² The עקרב, עקרב, of the Talmud, and the Ἀκραβεία of Fl. Jos., *B. J.* iii. 3, 5 (ed. Niese). See also Schürer, *Gesch.*³, ii. 182.

the road that leads down into the valley of the Jordan (Lagarde, *Onomastica*, 87, 28: Acrabbi . . . vicus grandis nunc usque novem milibus a Neapoli contra orientem descendentibus ad Jordanem et Jerichum). It is remarkable that out of the many who have agreed in this identification (among them Fritzsche and Ball, the two who have commented most fully on the book of Judith) no one should have followed this manifest clew back to the only point to which it can lead, namely, to the city of Shechem. The idea that such a skillful narrator as this one could have proposed to blockade the village of Šānūr, or of Mithiliyeh, by sending men to 'Aqrabeh, is preposterous.

'Chusi,' the other place mentioned in the verse, has not been satisfactorily identified. In the accompanying map I have followed G. A. Smith and others in locating it at Qūza, a few miles south of Nābulus, on the direct road to Jerusalem (see Robinson, *Biblical Researches*,¹ iii. 93; *SWP.*, *Memoirs*, ii. 285 f.). The village is situated just above a deep wady, through which in the rainy season a stream carries off the water of the plain of el-Makhna westward (Robinson, *l. c.*).

The 'Wady Mochmur' is quite unknown outside of this verse. It is not unlikely that this form of the name is the result of scribal errors; notice the Syriac reading *Pe'ōr*, with which the Old Lat. (in Sabatier's *Cod. Sangerm.* 15) *Pochor* agrees. Possibly these places should be looked for on the north of Aqrabeh; eastward, rather than southward, from Nābulus.

In view of all the evidence thus presented, it will hardly be an exaggeration to say that the identity of 'Betylūa' with Shechem is fully established. It is also beyond question that Shechem must have been the city described in the story *in its original form*. Those versions of it which lay the scene at Jerusalem are therefore all later adaptations,² sure to arise because of the popularity of the story and the fact that 'Betylūa' was an unknown place.

The question whether the story as originally written contained the true name or the pseudonym is more difficult to answer. If

¹ B, Χους; Vet. Lat., *Chus*; Syr., *Kūsh*; 19, 108, Ουζ; A, and a number of cursives, Χουσαι (Χουσι).

² That the short recension published by Gaster, *Proceedings Soc. Bibl. Archaeol.*, 1894, pp. 156-163, is a later popular version of the story, bearing about the same relation to our Judith that the 'Megillath Antiochus' bears to 1 Macc., any one can see who takes the trouble to read it.

we suppose the author to have been a Samaritan, there would be no reason to doubt that the true name of the city was used throughout by him. If we suppose him to have been a Jew, on the other hand, it is unlikely—though not impossible—that the name 'Shechem' ever appeared in the story. There are several considerations which seem to favor the theory that the author of the book of Judith was a member of the Samaritan community. These are the following : 1. The evidence of his minute acquaintance with the neighborhood of Shechem makes it natural to suppose that he lived in that city. 2. His astonishing ignorance of Jewish history as narrated by the Chronicler. The siege of the city, and its deliverance by Judith, are represented as having taken place soon after the return of the people from the Babylonian captivity (iv. 3, v. 18 f.) ; but the king who sends his armies against them is Nebuchadnezzar ! 3. The O. T. material in the story seems to be taken only from the Pentateuch. Notice the use of the names Phut, Lud, Arphaxad, Tiras, Arioch, and Japheth. 4. The fact that 'Manasseh' was chosen as the name of Judith's husband (viii. 2).

But these considerations are not very weighty even when taken together. Not every Jew of the Maccabean time, or of the last century B.C., was acquainted with all the Hebrew literature ; and as for the Chronicler's history, in particular, it is not easy to see why it should have been much read outside of Jerusalem. As for the topography of Shechem and the surrounding country, a Jew who lived in one of the towns of that neighborhood¹ would have been perfectly familiar with all these details. Moreover, the hypothesis that the first writer of the story was a Samaritan makes it necessary to suppose that the book before us is a Jewish revision, considerably altered from the original. But this latter supposition is a very difficult one, and seems more improbable the more carefully the book is studied. The Jewish element is interwoven in all its fabric, from beginning to end ; not merely added here and there. The book is a homogeneous and consistent composition, written on a large scale and by a writer of no ordinary talents, whose hand appears as plainly in the passages referring to Jerusalem and the Jews as in the remaining portions.

The reason why Shechem was made the scene of these events is undoubtedly this, that the locality first suggested the tale.

¹ Some slight evidence that Dothan was the home of the writer of this tale may perhaps be found in viii. 3 ; cf. vii. 18, iv. 6, iii. 9(?), vii. 3.

Possibly some incidents of the siege and capture of the city by John Hyrcanus, about 120 B.C., may have brought to this Jewish writer the thought of such a romance. However that may be, it is certain that he recognized, with the eye of a born story-teller, the rare possibilities of the place, and made full use of them. From what we know of the feeling of the Jews toward the Samaritans at the time when this book was written, it does not seem at all likely that the author would have employed the name 'Shechem' for the city whose people wrought deliverance for Judah and Jerusalem. There was no reason to disguise *the locality*, be it noted. Every one knew that Shechem had once been a good Jewish city, before the days of the Samaritans. Only *the name*, because of present disagreeable associations with it, could not be used in such a tale as this. So the pseudonym was used, in characteristic Jewish manner.

The question of the original Hebrew form of the name 'Bethulā'¹ is somewhat simplified by these conclusions. On the whole, the favorite derivation from בֵּית אֱלֹהִים, 'house of God,' seems most probable; both because this corresponds fairly well with the Greek, and because we should expect a name of about this nature, under the circumstances.

¹ A and B, generally Βετυλονα or Βαιτουλονα; X generally Βαιτουλονα, once (iv. 6) Βαιτουλια. These are also the readings of the cursives; Βαιτουλια occurring only once (Cod. 108, in vi. 10). Cod. 58 has Βατυλωα (vi. 10, viii. 11, xii. 7, xiii. 10). Vet. Lat., Vulg., *Bethulia*; Syr., *Beth Pallū*.

A Samaritan Manuscript of the Hebrew Pentateuch written in A. H. 35.—By W. SCOTT WATSON, West New York, N. J.

ON June 13th, 1896, there was delivered into my hands in Heidelberg a package sent to me from Jacob, the High Priest of the Samaritans in Nāblus, Syria. It contained an unpretentious-looking volume about $6\frac{3}{4}$ inches high, $5\frac{3}{4}$ inches wide, and 2 inches thick, bound rather rudely in red leather and green cotton; but among its 414 pages was the earliest definitely dated manuscript of the Hebrew text of any portion of the Old Testament known to be in existence.¹ Of its leaves 80 (160 pages) are of parchment and, with the exception of the first six (containing Gen. xli. 49–xl. 27; xlv. 1–xlvi. 19 לעיניך, and xlviii. 21–l. 26), which are of a more recent origin, formed part of a codex written in Damascus in A. H. 35 (began July 11, A. D. 655).² The rest of the book is of paper, and was supplied by Jacob to make a complete Pentateuch.

It is to the oldest portion only that I desire to call attention here. The seventy-four leaves in my possession represent eight gatherings of twenty pages each, and one of perhaps only sixteen, in all of which the sheets were so placed that at every opening both the pages are either flesh-sides or hair-sides. They contain the Hebrew text of Ex. iii. 13 שלחני—vi. 30 יהוה; xl. 7 ונתתה (2°)—Lev. vi. 2 ביהוה; Lev. vi. 27–xiv. 27 הימנית; xiv. 51 והיה—xxiii. 11; xxiii. 36 ובים—xxvii. 22; Num. i. 1–i. 31; ii. 6–vii. 74; ix. 15 ובערב—xvi. 18; and xxxii. 1 ולבני—Deut. x. 9.

¹ I should here acknowledge my indebtedness to the Rev. C. Fallscheer for his invaluable assistance in securing this manuscript.

² The oldest Hebrew biblical manuscripts other than this of which the age is definitely known are the Codex Babylonicus of the Latter Prophets, dated A. D. 916, and a codex of the entire Old Testament, dated A. D. 1009, both now in St. Petersburg. At a meeting of this Society in 1888, Dr. Moore gave an account of a fragment of a Samaritan Pentateuch in the possession of Dr. Grant Bey, of Cairo, (*Proceedings*, Oct. 1888 [= JAOS. xiv.], p. xxxv ff.). From the description I think that it originally belonged to the same volume as my leaves. It was then in Andover, but, as I have been informed by Prof. Moore, has been taken back to Egypt.

The leaves now measure, after the rebinding, about $6\frac{1}{2} \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches, and have on each side a text-space for a single column of writing which varies between $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches and $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches in height and $4\frac{1}{8}$ inches and $3\frac{5}{8}$ inches in width. They are in general well preserved, but some parts have suffered injury, and in some places the old letters have been retraced by the pen of the repairer. There are no catch-words or other indications of sequence. The ruling was made by pressure, with the flesh-side of the parchment next the hand, and consists of a series of horizontal lines with a pair of vertical lines (or, on some pages, only a single line) at each side of the text-space. Where the cryptogram occurs, there is an additional pair of vertical lines to separate the central space from the wider side columns. I have failed to find any guiding punctures, but they may have been so near the edges of the sheets that they were cut off in the rebinding. The number of lines of text on a page ranges from twenty-nine to thirty-five, those left blank between paragraphs being included. The characters, written with a black ink, are of the style usually employed in old Samaritan parchment copies of the Pentateuch, and not of the more current nature used in some other manuscripts of that people. The scribe had a great fondness for writing similar letters in consecutive lines under each other; in some places a mark (such as c: or —c:) was made at the beginning of a line so that the initial letter might stand under the same character occurring as the second letter of the preceding line. There is but one exception to the rule according to which words are not divided between two lines.¹ Superlinear marks, the employment of which became quite extensive in later times, are present in a limited number. There are various punctuation marks, a dot occurring regularly after every word (except frequently the last words of lines), unless some other sign takes its place. Originally there was no current numeration of the sections into which the text is divided; but the repairer has in many instances added in the margin Arabic numerals of the style now in general use in Syria.

Besides what has already been mentioned, we have from the first hand the following matter: 1. Between the fifteenth and

¹ The first three letters of : וימרו Lev. xvi. 1 close a line, and the rest of the word stands at the left extremity of the following line which is otherwise blank.

כתבת · ארהותה · קד"שה · לסהבה · וסמוכה · וארכונה ·
 יוסף · בן · סהבה · וסמוכה · וארכונה · ישמעאל · דמבני ·
 סגינה · בשנת · חמש · ושלשים · שנה · לממלכות · ישמעאל ·
 "I, Jacob, the son of Israel, the son of Joseph, the son of Mar, the priest, in the city of Damascus, wrote the Holy Law for the elder [סהבה is used as the Arabic *sheikh*] and the stay of the congregation and the pillar of the congregation Joseph, the son of the elder and the stay and the pillar, Ishmael, of the children of Saginah, in the year thirty-five of the kingdom of Ishmael. And praise be to God." This cryptogram exists as it was made by the first scribe; the possibility of altering any of its letters without the change being easily detected by simply reading the passages affected by the arrangement is absolutely excluded.

On the lower part of the page on which is the end of Numbers, Amran, the uncle and predecessor of the present incumbent in the Samaritan highpriesthood, wrote an Arabic memorandum recording his presentation of "these leaves, which are a fragment of an old Torah written in A. H. 35," to his "nephew, Jacob the Priest," on the tenth of Dhū-l-Hijja, A. H. 1291. After the addition of some diacritical marks it reads thus: **في ١٠ الحجة سنة ١٢٩١**
قد اوعيت هذه الاوراق الذي هم مشتر توراة قديمة مكتوبة سنة
٣٥ اسماعيلية الي ابن اخينا المحروس يعقوب هكهن
... عمران هكهن هلوي

The person to whom Amran gave the old leaves, and from whom I obtained them, records in a colophon in the Samaritan current script on pp. 412, 413, the completion in A. H. 1295 of his work of repairing "this [which] is the Torah of A. H. 35."

הוא · הכלול · מן · מלאת · חסרן · זאת · התורה · הקרו · בצפר ·
 יום · הששי · כט · מן · חדש · מחרס · והו · העשירי · שנת · ה ·
 צ · ר · ואלף · לממלכת · עם · הגר · על · יד · עבדה · מסכינה ·
 סגי · החטאות · יעקב · בן · אהרן · בן · שלמה · בן · טביה · בן ·
 יצחק · בן · אברהם · בן · יצחק · בן · צדקה · בן · טביה · בן · בן ·
 אברהם · בן · יוסף · בן · טביה · בן · אברהם · הכהן · הלוי · פני ·
 הקהל · בזבנה · הרן · דו · מן · נוף · קהת · הכהן · הלוי · יהוה ·
 יסלח · לו · מה · אתקדם · ממו · מכל · עון · ופשע · וחטאה ·

אמן : אמן : אמן : וכתבתי בזאת התורה מן בראשית .
 אל וליוסף ילידיו ומן ויבא יוסף הביתה : אל ולא יכל .
 יוסף להאתפק : ומן ויקן יוסף אל ויקרא יעקב אל .
 בניו : ומן ואלה שמות ראש ספר השני : אל ויאמר .
 אלהים אל משה אהיה אשר אהיה : ומן ראה נתתיך :
 אל ולקחת את שמן המשחה ומשחת את המשכן ומן .
 נפש כי תחטא ומעלה בו מעל אל זאת תורת .
 החטאת : ומן וספרתם אל אך בחמשה : ומן ואם את .
 שדה מקנתו : אל חתמת ספר השלישי : ומן לבני יוסף .
 אל איש על דגליו : ומן ביום שנים עשר אל וביום .
 הוקם המשחה : ומן הברלו מתוך העדה : אל ומקנה .
 רב היה : ומן בעת ההיא הבריל יהוה את שבט הלוי :
 אל חתמת התורה : וממחה מן אותתיה רב עמרתי .
 אתה ביכלות יהוה : אולי יזכר שמי בטוב : כי זאת .
 התורה מתכתבה מן שנת ה ל ישמעאיליה : ושמתי .
 אתה על שם בני השנים ומה ייתי לי מן הזכרים :
 אשול אלה יפתח מדע שני בני לתלמודה על הקשט :

Thus we see that the scribe who wrote the manuscript says that he performed the work in the thirty-fifth year of the Moslem era, and that two successive religious heads of the Samaritan community gave their unqualified attestation to the genuineness of the document. In *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, xviii. (1864), there were published extracts from a letter addressed to Prof. Fleischer by Dr. Rosen in 1861. Some account is given of manuscripts at Nāblus, and representations of four pages of one dated in A. H. 35 accompany the article. While the illustrations are very inaccurate and exhibit several modernisms not present in the original, being merely free-hand reproductions and not fac-similes, they serve to establish with certainty the identity of the leaves referred to with

¹ The expressions quoted by the repairer are designations (by their first words or otherwise) of the sections of the Pentateuch which began nearest—in either direction—to the points he desired to specify ; they do not, therefore, give the exact limits of the passages supplied by him except when one of the paper portions happens to begin or end with a paragraph. The contents of pages 217 and 218 are not referred to.

those now in my possession. Rosen there says (p. 586), "Ich muss gestehn, dass ich nicht einmal eine Handschrift von diesem Alter in dem Nâbluser Synagogenschatze vermuthet hatte, und doch auch hier an ein Falsum zu denken, wäre völlig grundlos."

I see no reason to doubt the correctness of the statement made in the cryptogram. I am certain that no intentional fraud has been practiced on me—the article in ZDMG. alone furnishes sufficient proof of that. A study of certain phenomena connected with erasure and ruling proves that we have here not a mere facsimile transcript of another codex, but a copy of the Pentateuch for which the cryptogram was specially worked out. The Samaritans are not known ever to have put fictitious dates in manuscripts. There is also much to show that they never dropped the hundreds from dates until some time after the current year according to the Moslem calendar required four figures to express it. Harkavy says, "As Samaritan palæography is not yet in a condition to decide with certainty upon the age of an undated MS., it is only such as contain dated epigraphs [cryptograms] whose age can be without doubt ascertained" (Nutt, *A Sketch of Samaritan History, Dogma and Literature*, p. 155).

It is well established that the era of the Hegira was in common use before the date borne by our manuscript. Arabic historians attribute its official institution to the second successor of Muhammad, in A. H. 17, but I need not quote their words at length. Hughes, in his *Dictionary of Islam* (pp. 174, 175), says, "The Hijrah, or the era of the 'Hegira,' was instituted seventeen years later [than A. D. 622] by the Khalifah 'Umar But although 'Umar instituted the official era, according to at-Ṭabarī, the custom of referring to events as happening before or after the Hijrah originated with Muḥammad himself." Damascus fell before the victorious arms of Islam in A. H. 13, and soon become a chief, if not the most important, city in the Saracen empire. Coins dated in A. H. 17 and other years before A. H. 35, that were struck there, are still extant (Lavoix's *Catalogue des Mon-*

¹ The most recent reference to this manuscript, independent of my connection with it, that I have seen is in *Studien über zwei Blätter aus einer alten Samar. Pentateuch-Handschrift* (Wien, 1896; Abhandlungen aus dem Jahrbuche der Leo-Gesellschaft, 1896) by Prof. Neumann of the University of Vienna. The author uses Rosen's report in his attempt to determine the age of the leaves he is describing.

naies Musulmanes de la Bibliothèque Nationale . . . Khalifès Orientaux). From the historical references to the Samaritans nearest—both preceding and following—the time of the Arab conquest of Syria, we should infer that they were principally employed as bankers, agents, and merchants, i. e., in responsible lines of business that would bring them into close contact with the ruling class.¹ In drawing up commercial and legal papers they would necessarily have to refer to the national era, and thus would become accustomed to its use. It does, indeed, seem exceedingly strange that they ever permitted it to find its way into cryptograms in copies of the Mosiac Law ; but it is nevertheless a fact that it appears in their oldest dated manuscripts now in St. Petersburg, among which are even some fragments of synagogue rolls.² It is most reasonable to suppose that the custom of dating from the Hegira in their religious books arose while the power of the invaders was yet a new force. If that period had passed without the innovation being made, it is not probable that the year of transcription would ever have been given in copies of the Pentateuch as we now find it.

¹ See Juynboll, *Commentarii in Historiam Gentis Samaritanae*, p. 52, and Nutt, *A Sketch*, etc., p. 27.

² Harkavy's *Catalog der hebräischen und samaritanischen Handschriften der kaiserlichen öffentlichen Bibliothek in St. Petersburg* (in Russian).

The myth of Purūravas, Ūrvaçī, and Âyu.—By MAURICE BLOOMFIELD, Professor in Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

IN the present state of Vedic studies it requires some hardihood to speak of the Vedic accounts of these personages as a myth. Nevertheless these accounts contain a mythic kernel; possibly a variety of naturalistic motives have contributed pieces to the mosaic of the finished story. We must consider, too, the possibility that some folk-lore story, universal and not specifically Indic, may have blended itself with mythical conceptions of the Hindus. He who is engrossed with the similarity of the story to that of Eros and Psyche, the beautiful Melusine, Undine, and Lohengrin,¹ need not therefore refuse to catalogue and interpret its specific traits among the Hindus. Nor is the degree of confidence with which some scholars refuse to analyze the story itself, with a view to a possible mythic content, in accord with sound reasoning on such subjects. Great difficulties and many a snare beset the way of the interpreter of a myth that has advanced beyond the elementary stages of personification. But there is a difference between difficulty in interpretation and absence of anything to interpret. Zeus, the typical man about town, and Zeus, the shining sky, are hardly suggestive of one another, but as luck would have it, their identity is established. This, the bed-rock of Indo-European naturalistic mythology, marks nearly, if not quite, the extreme distance between a mythic root and its final manipulation in a story; nothing but the accident of a more perfect literary tradition has secured for this myth its unrivaled transparency. Most times such clear solutions cannot be reached, but we may nevertheless feel certain that there are mythic contents in stories of the most complicated character. The older comparative mythologists were inclined to exaggerate the methods of explanation founded upon this belief by applying them indiscriminately, almost mechanically, to all stories reported in ancient literatures; ordinarily they tended to apply them to the story

¹ Interesting parallels from all sorts of folk-lore sources are arrayed in A. Kuhn's *Die Herabkunft des Feuers und des Göttertranks*¹, p. 88 ff.

throughout, little or nothing being in their view the aftermath of individual fancy. Modern critics err no less when they mistake the brittleness and opacity of certain advanced mythological narratives for the want of mythic origin on the part of these narratives; we may still assume confidently that most ancient stories that are on their faces mythological contain naturalistic kernels; the search after these, undertaken without prejudice either one way or another, is the resolving chord of all mythological inquiry.

Since Yāska's faltering attempts to deal with Urvaçī (Nirukta 5. 13; cf. also 11. 35, and 49), many Western scholars have tried their hand at interpreting the texts and unraveling the myth in question;—Lassen, Max Müller, Weber, Roth, Adalbert Kuhn, Muir, Bergaigne, Siecke, Geldner, Regnaud,¹ in addition to these the translators of the Rig-Veda, Ludwig and Grassmann. There is no doubt in the mind of the present writer that Kuhn and Bergaigne have approached the truth very closely. The myth fairly reeks of fire. In the ritualistic texts, at the churning of the fire, the lower churning-stick is addressed with the words, "Thou art Urvaçī"; the upper churning-stick with, "Thou art Purūravas"; the fire that results is addressed with the words, "Thou art Âyu."² Now it is easy to belittle the significance of these statements: might not this well-known instance of fruitful sexual union, certainly divine in the minds of the ritualists, have been chosen accidentally as the fitting type and symbol of the production of fire? Any other notorious act of copulation productive of issue might have done just as well. This is not so, for the kernel of the myth is not so much Urvaçī or Purūravas, for which another couple might have been substituted, but Âyu whose place could be taken by no other child. Âyu is fire from the very start, as has been known all along. One may accept the presence of a story element, *à la* Undine, in the myth; but it is far more important that the significant element of the myth, as far as its earliest handlings are concerned, is not so much the romance of

¹ A. Kuhn, *l. c.*, p. 85 ff. (where previous treatments are discussed); Bergaigne, *La Religion Védique*, i. 59 ff.; ii. 91 ff.; Siecke, *Die Liebesgeschichte des Himmels*, p. 71 ff.; Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, i. 243 ff.; Ludwig, *Ueber Methode bei Interpretation des Rig-Veda*, p. 35 ff.; Regnaud, *Comment naissent les Mythes* (Paris 1898), p. 153 ff.

² VS. v. 2; TS. i. 3. 7. 1; vi. 3. 5. 3; MS. i. 2. 7; iii. 9. 5; ÇB. iii. 4. 1. 22; KÇ. v. 1. 30; ApÇ. vii. 12. 13; Kāuç. 69. 20; and the passages following upon these.

an amorous couple as the production of fire. And we must not forget how easy it would have been for an extraneous Undine-story to have mixed itself up with almost any truly naturalistic myth that happened to deal with the union of a male and a female element. This may account for the human character of Purūravas, which is so pronounced and perplexing a feature of the story in its finished form from the time of RV. x. 95.

Whether this blending process has taken place or not, we must not let go of the essential feature of the myth as a heavenly *manthana*, or act of propagation on the part of a male and female element. Purūravas 'the loud shouting' may be thunder or lightning; Urvaṣī, the heavenly cloud; in any case Âyu is surely fire. "Go thou, O Agni Aṅgiras with the name of Âyu," says ÇB. iii. 5. 1. 32. Note how artlessly Âyu in MS. i. 6. 12 (p. 106, l. 3) says to the gods, who wonder how he can execute his desire to go to heaven, "There are many like me; they shall carry me." Of course, just as Agni has brothers (other fires) so Âyu has his doubles. The passage is not unimportant because it shows, as is often the case, that a legend even in an advanced and secondary form may keep in view the mythic origin of some of its motives. How many things does Hindu literature tell about the god Agni without ever really forgetting that he is fire. Of cardinal importance for the solution of the myth is the distinction made in the Rig-Veda between *upamā āyú* and *úpara āyú*, 'highest and lower Âyu,' which at once suits heavenly fire (lightning or sun), and terrestrial fire.¹ Lest there be doubt that *āyú* is here the Âyu of our myth, one of the passages, iv. 2. 18, contains the word *urvāṣī* in the same stanza, and iv. 2. 18 has an unquestioned parallel in v. 41. 19, which also mentions Urvaṣī and Âyu, the latter without the adjectives *úpara* or *upamā*. The last-mentioned passage is in the nature of a *nivṛd* or *āpri*-stanza: the favor of certain female divinities is asked for; they are Idā, the rivers, and Urvaṣī, the latter together with Âyu in the hemistich, *urvāṣī vā brhaddivā grṇānābhyūrvānā prabhṛthāsyāyóh*. The stanza does not only mention two of the chief figures of the myth, but the third also is somewhere in the mind of the poet, since Purūravas from the time of ÇB. xi. 5. 1. 1 is the son of Idā. It is hardly possible that the minds of the Rishis were perverted enough to deify euhemeristically the

¹ RV. i. 104. 4; iv. 2. 18 (*úpara*); x. 5. 6. (*upamā*).

dramatis personae of a mere fairy-tale ; but, even so, what sense would there be in saying ‘Urvāṣī of the great heaven that covers up Âyu,’ *urvāṣī . . . brhaddivā . . . abhyūrṇvāṇā . . . āyóḥ*. The fact is that Urvāṣī is the cloud just as her companion Iḍā in the same passage ; the *nadīs* (heavenly) rivers are not far removed from the same conception.¹ And Urvāṣī, the mother of Âyu, is the cloud containing the heavenly fire. Our interpretation of the kindred passage iv. 2. 18, *mártānām cid urvāṣīr akrpran vṛdhé cid aryá úparasyāyóḥ*, contains the special novelty of this brief treatment of the myth. The word *akrpran* has been derived from the root *kṛp* ‘to pity.’ Why not take it from *kṛp*=*klp* in the sense ‘there were formed’? The passage then means : ‘Even for mortal men Urvāṣīs were fashioned for the production of the noble lower Âyu.’ The sense of the passage is : Just as Urvāṣī, the goddess cloud, produces *upamá āyú*, the god Fire on high, so men have at their disposal Urvāṣīs of their own for the production of *úpara āyú*, the terrestrial sacrificial fire. The perplexing plural of *urvāṣī* explains itself neatly in the liturgical sense of ‘churning-sticks.’ This is why the ritual texts can say to the lower churning-stick “Thou art Urvāṣī.” The churning-sticks among mortals are the liturgical reflex of Urvāṣī, the goddess Cloud ; the lower sacrificial fire (*úpara āyú*) contained in the churning-stick is the reflex of the higher heavenly fire (*upamá āyú*) deposited in the womb of the cloud. I am much mistaken if we have not here what I have called the mythic kernel, and am quite ready to admit that folk-notions from other sources contributed much to the poetic development of the legend which has taken so strong a hold on the Hindu fancy.

¹ Cf. the passages in Bergaigne’s *La Religion Védique*, in which RV. v. 41. 19 is touched upon ; see my Index to Bergaigne’s work, *Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études*, Fasciculus 117 (Paris, 1897).

A proposed photographic reproduction of the Tuebingen Manuscript of the Kashmirian Atharva-Veda, the so-called Pāippalāda-Çākhā.—By MAURICE BLOOMFIELD, Professor in Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

IN the entire domain of Indian manuscript tradition there is no single manuscript which claims so much interest as the unique birch-bark manuscript of the Kashmirian Atharva-Veda now in possession of the library of the University of Tuebingen. The credit of its discovery belongs in a peculiar manner to the late Professor von Roth. That eminent scholar, as early as the year 1856, was led by a remark of the traveller Baron von Huegel to the belief that a new version of the AV. might be found in Kashmir. Baron von Huegel in his work *Kashmir und das Reich der Siek*, ii. 364, remarked that the Brahmans of Kashmir belonged to the Atterwan, or as they said 'Atterman,' Veda; and upon the strength of this statement Professor von Roth induced the authorities of the British government in India to institute a search in the inaccessible earthly paradise, in the hope of finding a new version of the Atharvan. His prophetic surmise came true most brilliantly.

In the year 1875, His Highness, the late Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Ranbir Singh, had this manuscript sent to Sir William Muir, the then Lieutenant-Governor, by whom it was in turn dispatched to Professor von Roth.¹ The latter, after publishing a stirring account of its discovery, character, and con-

¹ A short time before his lamented death, Professor Bühler wrote to me as follows (under date of February 22d, 1898): "Wenn Sie, wie ich vermuthete, die Geschichte des MS. drucken lassen, so bitte ich darum, dass Sie erwähnen, dass Sir William Muir sich auf meinen Rath entschloss das MS. an Prof. von Roth zu senden. Ich musste deshalb im Februar 1876 eigens von Indor nach Calcutta reisen, da Sir William nicht wusste was er mit dem zerlumpten Bande machen sollte. Ich zeigte ihm dass derselbe zunächst ein Bad nöthig hatte, welches er in Sir W.'s Badezimmer bekam. Danach sah das MS. wieder recht frisch aus, und Sir W. übergab es mir, damit ich es von den native bookbinders flicken lasse. Die aufgeklebten Papierstreifen stammen aus dieser Reparatur, die beinahe eine Woche dauerte."

tents, in a tract of the University of Tuebingen entitled, *Der Atharva-Veda in Kaschmir* (1875), guarded it until his death ; it has now passed into the possession of the University library of Tuebingen, whose greatest and priceless treasure it forms. The manuscript is written on birch-bark in the Kashmirian, the so-called Sharada, character. It consists of 287 leaves (written on both sides) of about 20 by 25 centimeters. Professor Bloomfield has obtained the consent of the library authorities in Tuebingen, and the Johns Hopkins University is about to make the manuscript universally accessible in a photographic reproduction. The work will be carefully supervised by Professor Bloomfield ; and it is hoped that it will be ready for distribution by the end of the year 1899.

Contributions to Syriac Folk-Medicine.—By RICHARD GOTTHEIL, Professor in Columbia University, New York, N. Y.

THE title of this paper is, perhaps, badly chosen. I should have said "Extracts from a Syriac Materia Medica." But to a people so backward in the physical sciences as are they who copy and use such works as this, the difference between folk-medicine and true medicine is not very apparent. Where the names Hippocrates and Galen are still highly prized, such ignorance can not excite wonder. And the name of Galen was what first caught my eye when I looked over the pages of the Syriac manuscript. That Galen had been translated into Syriac—at least in part—we have known since the publication of Wright's *Catalogue of Syriac MSS. in the British Museum*. In that library there are two palimpsests of the eleventh century,¹ and portions of two manuscripts of the seventh and eighth centuries.² Specimens of these latter two have been published by Sachau³ and by Merx.⁴ Galen is cited by the lexicographers Bar Ali and Bar Bahlūl.⁵ The value of the Syriac translation in connection with the Arabic and Hebrew renderings is well known.⁶ Sufficient material is at hand for an edition of portions of the Arabic Galen. It is a wonder that no one, as yet, has undertaken this work.⁷

¹ Vol. i. p. 159; ii. p. 1020.

² Vol. iii. p. 1187.

³ Sachau, *Inedita Syriaca*, pp. 78–96 (τέχνη ἰατρική, and περὶ ἀνατομικῶν ἐγχειρήσεων).

⁴ ZDMG. xxxix. 237 f. (περὶ κράσεων τε καὶ δυνάμεων τῶν ἀπλῶν φαρμάκων).

⁵ See Bar Bahlūl, ed. Duval, col. 27, 13, etc., etc., and Berthelot, *La Chimie au Moyen Age*, ii. 131. Cf. *Bar Hebraei Chronicon* (edd. Bruns and Kirsch), p. 6 below; *Das Buch von der Erkenntniss der Wahrheit*, ed. C. Kayser, pp. 32, 2; 127, 2; Löw, *Aramäische Pflanzennamen*, p. 18. I know nothing further about the quotation from Galen in my article on Dawidh bar Paulos, PAOS. May, 1891 (=JAOS. xv.) p. cxviii.

⁶ For the Arabic, see Klamroth ZDMG. xl. 639; for the Hebrew, Steinschneider, *Die Hebraeischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters*, § 415; *Monatschr. f. Gesch. u. Wiss. d. Judenthums*, xxxviii. 177, 366.

⁷ Cf. Wetzstein, ZDMG. i. 203, and Lagarde's plaint, *Mittheilungen*, i. 149. (I have not seen Iwan von Müller, *Ueber Galens Werk vom wissenschaftlichen Beweis*, Munich, 1895; cf. O. B. ix. No. 5894).

אָדוּ עֲמִירָא חֲבִיבָא עֲבֵד־לִמְנָא מִן מִנְדָא לְחַלְפָא דְחַסְרָא וְעֲדָרָא
 עֲבֵד־מִנְדָא. מְלַכְעָ עֲבֵד־מִנְדָא דְעֵיבִיתְמָא עֲבֵד־מִנְדָא מִן מִנְדָא עֲבֵד־מִנְדָא
 אֲזַב־מִנְדָא. עֲלִיבִי חֵס מִנְדָא עֲמִירָא מִכְּדָמָא. אִם דְאֵלֵךְ.

From this we see that the manuscript was written by Joseph Azaria, son of John Odū in Tell-Kēfē, a teacher in the Catholic school of that place. He finished his work on the first day of the month Ḥaziran, in the year 1888. We have no information as regards the original compiler or the translator.

The manuscript is not difficult to read, and is full of marginal notes in Arabic. I have translated as best I could. Any changes which I have suggested have been recorded in the notes.¹ Where I was unable to translate, I have left a blank space. I hope, at some future time, to publish the rest of the manuscript.

1. * מִנְדָא וְיִנְדָא דְמִנְדָא *

יִנְדָא יִנְדָא אִינְדָא אִינְדָא אִינְדָא אִינְדָא אִינְדָא אִינְדָא אִינְדָא אִינְדָא אִינְדָא
 מִנְדָא אִינְדָא. מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא
 מִנְדָא מִנְדָא. מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא
 אִינְדָא מִנְדָא. מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא
 מִנְדָא מִנְדָא. מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא מִנְדָא
 מִנְדָא מִנְדָא.

2. * חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא *

חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא

3. * חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא *

חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא חֲסִירָא

¹ The marginal glosses of the MS. are indicated by Gl.

² I have numbered the sections to facilitate reference.

על עתה ועל ברכה לחיים אמן. וכן ועל זלזול חסדו אמן. סלב
 חסדו ספרו איתך כל לבא וזמנא חסדו וזלזול חסדו. ספרו איתך חסדו
 על לבא. וכן חסדו וזמנא. ואיתך עתה חסדו וזמנא
 וזמנא. 10. חסידיה וזלזול חסדו * יחזקאל וזמנא איתך חסדו
 חסדו. איתך חסדו וזמנא חסדו וזמנא חסדו. איתך חסדו וזמנא
 חסדו לזלזול חסדו.

11. * חסדו וזלזול חסדו *

זלזול חסדו וזמנא חסדו וזמנא חסדו. איתך חסדו וזמנא חסדו
 וזמנא חסדו וזמנא חסדו וזמנא חסדו.

12. * חסדו וזלזול חסדו *

זלזול חסדו וזמנא חסדו וזמנא חסדו (fol. 3b) חסדו וזמנא חסדו
 חסדו. איתך חסדו וזמנא חסדו וזמנא חסדו.

13. * חסדו וזלזול חסדו *

חסדו וזלזול חסדו חסדו. חסדו וזמנא חסדו וזמנא חסדו. איתך
 חסדו וזמנא חסדו. איתך חסדו וזמנא חסדו וזמנא חסדו
 חסדו וזמנא חסדו וזמנא חסדו.

14. * חסדו וזלזול חסדו *

זלזול חסדו וזמנא חסדו וזמנא חסדו וזמנא חסדו.

15. * חסדו וזלזול חסדו *

זלזול חסדו וזמנא חסדו וזמנא חסדו וזמנא חסדו וזמנא חסדו.
 איתך חסדו וזמנא חסדו וזמנא חסדו וזמנא חסדו.

[illegible]

41. * לא יתן * אפי' ז' עולה *

ועל מנחתם וזוהי שומר חסד. אי צוילא שפילא חבילא דביתא
 אדנא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא מכלא דביתא דמכלא דאפי' דמ
 מכלא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא דמכלא דאפי' דמכלא דאפי' דמ
 חסד דמכלא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא דמכלא דאפי' חסד
 מכלא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא דמכלא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא
 דאפי' חסד דמכלא דאפי' חסד דמכלא דאפי' חסד.

42. * חכמה * דמכלא דאפי' *

דמכלא דמכלא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא דמכלא דאפי' חסד
 דמכלא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא דמכלא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא
 דמכלא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא דמכלא דאפי' חסד.

(fol. 7b)

43. * חכמה * דמכלא דאפי' *

מכלא דמכלא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא דמכלא דאפי' חסד
 מכלא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא דמכלא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא
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 דמכלא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא דמכלא דאפי' חסד.

44. * חכמה * דמכלא דאפי' *

מכלא דמכלא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא דמכלא דאפי' חסד
 מכלא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא דמכלא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא
 דמכלא דאפי' חסד. אי שפילא דמכלא דאפי' חסד.

[§ 4] For ulcers on the head.

Burn grain, knead it with the yolk¹ of egg, and smear.

[§ 5] For ulcers from which flows yellow fluid.

Take some pieces of old² shoe-leather, used by tailors; burn them and beat them up like stibium. Throw the whole into tar, and smear.

[§ 6] For an ulcer on the head.

Scrape the root of . . .³ Place it in the sun that it become dry. Beat it up and put it in olive-oil; boil, and smear.

[§ 7] For the head; quickly.⁴

Burn stalks of plants; break up until they are like dust. Throw in olive-oil; boil, and smear on the head. Then sprinkle vinegar on the head. *Or*, take soap⁵ made in Rakka (?), and foeniculum;⁶ pulverize and mix with old sheep's oil. Put it out under the stars for three nights, commencing on a Wednesday.⁷ Then spread it on the head.

[§ 8] For ulcers and scabs which appear on the head.

Beat up incense, dustbrand⁸ and . . .⁹ flesh in equal parts. Mix in olive-oil, and spread on the scab.¹⁰ Then slightly warm an egg over the fire and smear it on above the medicament. *Or*, put human blood upon the scab. *Or*, beat up caper leaves and put in vinegar. Beware of this medicament, lest it do an injury. *Or*, beat up peanut root, roll in honey and smear.

Further, for a scab which appears on the head or on other parts of the body. Heat dry rose-thorns, dove's breasts, and sheep's fat over the fire, and smear. *Or*, knead soot from the pot in vinegar, and smear. Another (recipe) for a scab on the head. Beat up chickpeas,¹¹ nuts, and garlic, and put that (on the wound).

¹ Gl. بياض.

² Gl. برجاء.

³ I do not understand these words. Ms. لَصَا دَافَا مَوْجِد. Above لَصَا Arabic نقاية; I suggest خَصَا.

⁴ I suppose that this means, a prescription which can be quickly put up.

⁵ Gl. صابون. The translation of فَمَد is a guess; Gl. حلبى "of Aleppo."

⁶ Read مَفْتَرَا.

⁷ Perhaps this means, "three nights, each of which is a Wednesday."

⁸ See Bar Ali in P.S. col. 2385; Gl. صَر.

⁹ Ms. ١٢٤٠٢? Perhaps ١٢٣٠٢.

¹⁰ Gl. حَزَارَة.

¹¹ Gl. لَبَّ جُون.

[§ 9] For eye troubles.

Mix together fennel water, thirty drams, and hydromel, ten drams. Burn on a slight fire until half remains. Then take it off the fire and keep it in a glass vessel. Bind it on the eyes while the stomach is empty.

[§ 10] For eye-lashes which grow over the eyes.

Smoke the skin of a serpent under the eyes. *Or*, paint [the eyes with] the gall of a stork and the gall of a carp. *Or*, paint [the eyes] with the gall of an eagle; [then] they will not grow over.

[§ 11] For an eye which is awake and will not sleep.

Boil leaves of savory in wine and vinegar, and put on. *Or*, beat up cyminum and mix with the white of an egg. Put this on a piece of paper and put it on the eyes, outside.

[§ 12] For eyes on which there is flesh.

Beat up eggs with their yolk; spread this on a piece of paper, and put it on the eyes, outside. *Or*, knead cucumber in new wine, and paint.

[§ 13] For hairs which grow in the eyes.

Take out the hairs from the eye, and spread over the spot the blood of bugs, or the blood of dog's lice. *Or*, mix the gall of an owl equally with a little . . . ,¹ and apply it to the spot whence thou hast plucked out the hair.

[§ 14] For eyes from which the eyebrows have fallen out.

Beat up dry hare's dung; purify(?)² and sift it, and apply.

[15] To preserve the eyes from [being affected by] snow and cold.

Boil clean wheat straw in water. Purify water³ and cast it upon the eyes many times. *Or*, burn wheat, purify(?) and sift it, and apply. *Or*, beat up garlic and press out the juice.⁴

[§ 16] For eyes in which dust remains.

Break up the husks of sweet pomegranates; lay them in water for one day. Then pass the water through a clean cotton rag, and lave the eyes with it six times. After this [lave them] with the juice of the hyoscyamus.

[§ 17] For the sickness of dry eyes; for eyes which are sick and smart.

¹ Ms. ܡܠܚ. Perhaps ܫܝܢܝܢ, coriander-seed.

² Ms. ܡܠܚܬܐ. I suggest ܡܠܬܐ.

³ Does this refer to the water spoken of immediately before?

⁴ But this would be ܡܠܬܐ. Ms. ܡܠܬܐ. P.S. col. 2032 ܡܠܬܐ?

Knead the excrement of salamander¹ in water and old olive-oil which is of the consistency of honey, and smear. *Or*, apply she-ass's milk while it is still warm. *Or*, apply bitch's milk.

[§ 18] For eyes that smart.

Boil raisins in vinegar and wine; smear the outside of the eyes. *Or*, break up the inside of nuts and cinnamon. Knead this in wine, and apply. *Or*, break up foxes' testicles, boil in water, filter, and apply.

[§ 19] For children's eyes which are sick and do not open.

Beat up black earth and honey, and apply.

[§ 20] For red eyes.

Boil well grains of sweet and of sour pomegranates until they are of the consistency of honey, and smear.

[§ 21] For a wound or festering² of the eyes.

Inject into them dove's blood or female chicken's blood. *Or*, inject into the eyes the heated white of eggs.

[§ 22] For running eyes.

Smear [over them] the juice of acid pomegranates. *Or*, smear every day the blood of white doves. *Or*, smear the juice of black prunes.³ *Or*, beat up asparagus seed and the inside of fried lentils; mix with wine and apply. *Or*, boil well red prunes and mix with a little vinegar; [with this] wash your face. *Or*, roast⁴ anethum foeniculum and pour it over thy head for seven days. *Or*, apply the juice of ammi.⁵ [This remedy] is well-tried and certain.

[§ 23] For⁶ of the eyes.

. . . .⁷ Take leaves of xanthoxylon;⁸ masticate them and put them on the eyes.

[§ 24] For eye-ache.

¹ Bar Bahlûl (ed. Duval) col. 1681.

² Literally 'fluxion.'

³ Read عقطن. Gl. سود; Ms. عقطن. ⁴ Read مخف; Ms. مخف.

⁵ Read نيسا. Gl. نافخية; Ms. نيسا. ⁶ اعدا ?

⁷ Ms. مخف, which makes no sense here, even if it stand for مخف (Löw, p. 133).

⁸ Ms. خنخنا. I suggest خنخنا (فاغرة). See Duval, *Notes de Lexicographie Syriacque et Arabe* (Extrait du Journal Asiatique), Paris, 1893, p. 38.

Apply olive-oil and . . .¹ of oil. *Or*, dip a piece of olive-wood into the yolk of an egg and apply it to the eyes.

[§ 25] For severe diseases of the eye.

Mix grains of . . .,² cucumber, and salt in woman's milk, and put this on the eyes. *Or*, dessicate swallow's flesh and mix with sarcocolla, and apply. The patient must not drink wine. He shall use for them an astringent,³ by means of sponges which they immerse in warm water. Then let blood.

[§ 26] For a swelling and air⁴ in the eyes.

Beat up portulacca; squeeze out its juice; mix in barley-corn, unripe figs, and the white of eggs. Smear this on the outside. *Or*, beat up gall-nuts, terminale chebula, the husks of sweet and sour pomegranates, sumach,⁵ and black prunes. Boil them equally; filter the juice, smear and rub. This is also good for tears.

[§ 27] For yellow of the eyes.

Beat up husks of pomegranates, and mix with olive-oil. With this besmear the portions adjacent to the eyes. *Or*, let the patient drink cow's milk while it is warm. It will remove from him the yellow and livid color.

[§ 28] For poor eye-sight.⁶

Cast narcissus water on the eyes. *Or*, smear the blood of foxes, which is also good for . . .;⁷ or the blood which flows from the liver of the buck. *Or*, smear the blood of . . .⁸ ravens, while it is warm. *Or*, roast a buck's liver; smear on the gall⁹ which comes out of the liver while it is warm, and give [the patient] the liver to eat. *Or*, smear fish's blood. *Or*, cook a buck's liver in a pot, and let them [that are afflicted] receive on their eyes the steam which comes from the water. *Or*, apply human dung. *Or*, mix seeds of garlic and urine¹⁰ of little boys, and smear. *Or*, beat up green gourds, squeeze them, and put in his nostrils. *Or*, mix the juice of fresh cheese with the urine of young boys, and smear. *Or*, roast unripe grapes,¹¹ drain off the water, and apply. *Or*, mix the gall of goats with honey of the comb, and smear.

¹ Ms. ܡܫܠܐ ? ² Ms. ܡܠܐ ? ³ ܡܠܐ ? My translation is a simple guess.

⁴ Ms. ܡܠܐ.

⁵ Read ܡܠܐ. Ms. ܡܠܐ.

⁶ Literally "darkness of the eyes." ⁷ Ms. ܡܠܐ ?

⁸ Ms. ܡܠܐ, as in note 3, p. 200; I hesitate to suggest ܡܠܐ.

⁹ Gl. ܡܠܐ. Cf. Bar Bahlûl, and P.S. col. 3506, s. v. ܡܠܐ.

¹⁰ Read ܡܠܐ. Ms. ܡܠܐ.

¹¹ Ms. ܡܠܐ = ܡܠܐ ?

[§ 29] For blindness of the eyes.

Take a young swallow. Pluck out its eyes; bind some sign upon it. Leave it in its nest for three days. Then its mother will come; and, seeing that it is blind, will go and bring a certain root, and place it upon the bird's eyes, which will then open. If thou art able to get at that root, or that piece of it [which the mother-bird used], take good care of it. Cut off the head of the young swallow; burn it well, smear him that does not see, so that he see [again].

[§ 30] For one whose sight is poor.

Burn frogs' legs,¹ beat them up, knead with bitter almonds, and apply. Or, burn the heads of some young pigeons; beat them up, mix them with honey, and apply. Or, liquefy the fat of fishes, mix with honey, and apply. Or, burn an ass's hoof, dip it in ass's milk, and apply. It will help much. Or, apply the fat of the swan² and mare's milk. Or, apply the gall of a swan. Or, beat up a cucumber, moisten it with the yolk of an egg, and put this on the eyes. Or, put the juice of sweet pomegranates in a glass of licorice.³ Place this in the sun until it becomes as consistent as honey. Mix with this, in equal quantities, menstrual fluid. When asleep apply, and it will give much relief.

[§ 31] For one who can not see at night.

Apply the marrow of a mule's thigh-bone. Or, take out the liver of a mare, roast it on a fire, beat it up. Throw on this the oil of one musk which has been preserved,⁴ and apply.

[§ 32] For eyes upon which either sweet or black water has fallen.

Smear the gall of a vulture and honey. Or, take a green frog, kill it. Take of its blood, and smear where the sickness is greatest.

[§ 33] For whiteness in the eyes.

Smear the gall of a turbot.⁵ Or, smear the eggs of a white⁶ raven. Or, beat up sea-naptha, dust of grape kernels, and egg

¹ Read ابو جنيب. Gl. شوشة.

² Gl. قبح.

³ شوشة? Gl. شوشة.

⁴ Gl. πικράσφαλος of Dioscorides, P.S. 2038. (μονυμία). For the Arabic موميا see Dozy, *Supplément*, ii. 625. For دنا I would read دنا, P.S. col. 930; for دنا read دنا "prepare." The sentence might then be translated, "Throw upon this one *dānik* of musk-oil; prepare it, and apply."

⁵ Gl. شيوخ.

⁶ Gl. ابيض ? حكما.

shells, and apply. *Or*, beat up rue¹ seed, put it in unwashed² wool; throw this into asses' milk, and bind it upon the eyes. *Or*, throw safron into asses' milk, and smear. *Or*, apply the gall of a locust. *Or*, reduce Egyptian date-wine, . . .³ wine, bitter almonds, cat's gall, lizard's⁴ tongue, all in equal parts, to a powder, and eat.

[§ 34] For blood which issues from the nose.

Smear figs with honey and put this between the eyes. *Or*, reduce incense, sulphur, and glass; knead in vinegar and apply on the face and on the temples. *Or*, knead red dust in vinegar, and apply to the face while [the patient] sleeps on his side. Sprinkle, in the meantime, a little very cold water on his body.⁵ This is a good and well-tried [remedy].

[§ 35] For noses which are fetid.

Pound almonds with the juice of vetch,⁶ with which rub and then put on.⁷

[§ 36] For ear-ache.

First, for . . .⁸ which grows in the ears. Burn the root of the reed; beat it up and apply. It will disappear.

[§ 37] For ears which are insensible and deaf.

Mix swine's grease⁹ unsalted, turtle-grease, oil of bitter nuts. Prepare *μονμια*,¹⁰ heat it, and sprinkle over them. *Or*, mix up goat's grease and put it on them.

[§ 38] For ears which sing.

Boil olive-oil and goat's gall, and throw this on them while it is still hot. *Or*, heat oil of bitter almonds and grease of a black chicken, and sprinkle it over them. *Or*, cook gall-nuts in vinegar and old wine, and put it on them. *Or*, heat garlic in olive-oil, and put it on them. *Or*, sprinkle them with swine's-gall. *Or*, let [the patient] eat copiously onions. This will help him.

¹ Gl. *جرمل*. Cf. WZKM. xiii. 10.

² Gl. *بلا غسل*.

³ Ms. *نصب*. Read *نصب*, i. e. *نبيذ* P.S. col. 2267. Ms. *نصب* = *نصب*.

Is this a *nisbah* of *نصب*?

⁴ Ms. *دند*. Read *دند*, P.S. col. 1070, *ورل*. Gl. has a word which may perhaps be *ورل*. *دند* is also possible.

⁵ *دخخه*?

⁶ Gl. *كرسنة*.

⁷ Literally "cause to drip."

⁸ Ms. *علبا*, 'a reed.' Does this refer to a growth in the ear?

⁹ Gl. *شحمه*.

¹⁰ See note 4, p. 202.

[§ 39] For the smell of ears which buzz.

Press sweet pomegranates and rhubarb, and mix in old wine, oil of sesame¹ and woman's milk, and put on. *Or*, mix lye² and myrrh and oil of myrrh, and put it on them.

[§ 40] For the ears of children from which issue blood and pus.

Beat up spice and a little salt; mix in woman's milk, and sprinkle. *Or*, heat vinegar and honey, and put on. *Or*, boil gall-nuts and lettuce in vinegar, and bind this on the ears.

[§ 41] For ears which have worms.

[Mix³] blood, water, and ox-flesh, and put this on them. *Or*, heat sharp garlic in boys' urine, and sprinkle this on them. *Or*, beat up sumach,⁴ goats' milk, pomegranate shells, and gall-nuts; mix this in honey, heat, and sprinkle it on them. *Or*, press out flesh from the loins⁵ of a half-roasted bull with salt, and put on. *Or*, mix the oil of bitter almonds with vinegar and throw on. *Or*, mix oil and vinegar and put this on them. *Or*, throw on them juice of absinth and old oil, while [the patient] is lying down. They will go out.

[§ 42] For the clotting⁶ of blood which comes from the ears.

Throw aloes and prepared cucumber in vinegar, and put on. *Or*, boil rock alum⁷ in vinegar and honey, and put on. *Or*, cook the juice of pomegranates in vinegar, and put on. *Or*, put on the juice of leek⁸ and vinegar. *Or*, boil the juice of the bramble, and gall-nuts. Strain, and throw this on them.

[§ 43] For ears from which pus⁹ flows.

Boil what is called "Egyptian medicine," honey, one pound, rust¹⁰, three parts, and vinegar, three parts. Then throw in vinegar; at the end, take it off the fire, and put in rust. Use it properly with every boil. Smear the ears [with it] by means of pieces of wick. Apply this for old ailments of the ear. *Or*, heat she-asses' milk, woman's milk, and honey, and apply. Wash the ears with hydromel and beet-water; cook lentils in water. While he sleeps, let it remain in his mouth.

¹ Gl. سیرح. ² Gl. شناعة? ³ The verb is wanting; سحوب?

⁴ Read سقمونيا; cf. note 5, p. 201.

⁵ Gl. کلی.

⁶ Ms. حکنما. I have guessed at the meaning.

⁷ Read بطنیا; cf. Berthelot, *La Chimie au Moyen Age*, ii. 10; Duval, *Notes de Lexicographie Syriaque et Arabe*, p. 30.

⁸ Gl. کراد. ⁹ Gl. وسنج. ¹⁰ Gl. زنجار. Cf. Duval, *l. c.* p. 16.

[§ 44] For winds in the throat.

Cook in water leaves of the castor plant, black figs, and lentils. While [the patient] sleeps, let him keep it in his mouth. *Or*, let him gargle with she-ass's milk and goat's milk. *Or*, let him gargle with vinegar and oil of roses. *Or*, beat up strong onions, throw them into wine, and press them well. Let him wash with this the fleshy part¹ of the throat. Then put these onions on the throat. *Or*, beat up the root of birthwart;² spread it on his neck by means of a rod. *Or*, beat up dung³ of a white dog, and spread it on. *Or*, knead them in honey, and let him gargle in his mouth. *Or*, take a crab, dry it, beat it up, mix with cold water, and let him gargle. *Or*, cook cotton seeds, pepper, dates, figs, dried roses, cummin and lentils in water. Keep this in thy mouth, whilst sleeping on thy side. *Or*, let him take in his mouth the juice of sweet pomegranates, while sleeping on his side.

¹ حنظل ?

² Gl. دغلي .

³ Gl. حرة .



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