


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1

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

DICTYS CRETENSIS AND HOMER.

IN his very original article "Dictys of Crete and Homer" (*Journal of Philology*, Vol. xxxi. No. 62, p. 207) Mr T. W. Allen says that "even as it now stands it does not meet with Mr Andrew Lang's approval." I could not but smile at the idea of my venturing to disapprove. But as we have no hint of direct and external evidence for the existence of an Achaean "verse-chronicle," written or orally handed down from an age which, to Homer, was remote antiquity; and as Mr Allen appears to think that there was such a chronicle, poetised by Homer, but known in one form or another to the so-called Dictys of Crete, I think that we must look for evidence to analogous cases. Mr Allen in his interesting paper had no space for a study of analogies in other early national literatures. Analogy is a very frail reed, but, in this case we have no other support in inquiry as to the relations between historical records of historical events,—on one side—and epic or other early narrative poetry, such as ballads, which are also concerned with historical subjects,—on the other. It is mainly, but not solely, the evidence of analogy; of what is actually known concerning the relations of very early mediaeval epics, and much later ballads, to chronicle-history, that causes me to dissent from Mr Allen's theories.

My dissent begins to declare itself very early in the discussion. Homer was perfectly familiar with Court minstrels, and represents them as knowing the whole tale of the Trojan war, and the Returns of the Heroes, beginning at any point which the audience chose. "The whole series was in the bardic memory. In other words a body of verse was extant, deposited in the heads of a professional class, *δημοεργοί*. *Od.* xv. 333...¹" If there were "a body of verse," a verse-chronicle, added to as fresh events occurred, kept up to date, and "deposited in the heads of a professional class," the Court minstrels were not so much poets as rhapsodes or reciters. But Odysseus (*Od.* viii. 487 ff.) applauds Demodocus as an original poet, "taught either by the Muse or Apollo" (in his *art*, I presume), and as well-informed as if he had been an eye-witness of the war, or had, at least, information at first hand. Here is nothing like a hint of a verse-chronicle. The supposed events are contemporary; are known from the reports of men who took part in the adventures.

All this reads, and other passages read, as if, in Homer's own day, the poet were a kind of living but tuneful newspaper: "the newest songs" are the most favoured. But, on the other hand, Homer himself does not sing new songs of contemporary events (which, he says, is the popular thing to do), but of events so remote that they have "won their way to the mythical," just as, in early mediæval France, in the eleventh century, the favourite, indeed the only themes of the *Chansons de Geste* are so remote (800—814) that they also are almost purely mythical, and interwoven with occurrences much later than the reign of Charlemagne, but thrown back into that period. No chronicle, no history, but folk-memory and fancy inspire the French singers. To this I shall return, but Homer does not suggest to me the idea that a contemporary and continued chronicle was in existence: he speaks of inspiration, and of reports of eye-witnesses of the war.

To take another analogy; Homer knows Court minstrels who sing of events of their own date. We, too, have abundance of, not courtly lays, but popular ballads, composed by unknown

¹ *Journal of Philology*, p. 210.

and humble versifiers on historical events of their own time. But these, like the English ballads on the affairs of the Scottish Court,—the murder of Darnley, the minority of James VI,—are almost crazily unhistorical. It seems impossible that events so striking, so important, and so renowned should be so misunderstood and perverted in song. The affair of the French waiting-maid and French apothecary, hanged for child murder in 1563 (Randolph to Cecil, Dec. 31, 1563) becomes the ballad of *The Queen's Marie*, one of the Four Maries, and of Henry Darnley, who was not even in Scotland at the date of the events, and this ballad has some twenty variants, all wildly wrong, only one retains a trace of the apothecary. Yet ballads against the Maries were common in Knox's time, "which we for modesteis sake omit," says the pudibund Knox. The ballads are always more or less or altogether wrong in their facts: they rest on no chronicle. Now historical ballads and early epic lays are things very closely akin.

I can scarcely be wrong in saying that the epic, Greek or Frankish, if not a courtly development of *Volklieder* on historic events, at least retains unmistakable relics of the ballad manner. This is natural, both ballad and epic being primarily intended to be recited or chanted to a circle of listeners.

Thus in both of these early literary *genres* the poets practise the same art of economy of phrasing.

As I have said elsewhere¹, "Motherwell, who wrote without Homer in his mind, seems to state the case of the ballad very clearly. 'There is not an action, not an occurrence of any sort, but has its appropriate phraseology; and to enumerate all these would, in effect, be to give the principal portion of all our ancient ballads. For in all cases where there is an identity of interest, of circumstance, of action, each ballad varies not from the established mode of clothing these in language.... They were the general outlines of every class of human interests².'"

¹ *The World of Homer*, p. 292.

² Motherwell's Introduction, "The Origin and History of Scottish Ballad

Literature," in his *Ancient and Modern Minstrelsy*.

These words of Motherwell apply as closely to the style of the Homeric epic. The convention of both epic and ballad, the economy in invention of expressions, is a relief to the memory of the reciter in both cases, yet in neither interferes with the spirit and *élan* of the narrative. Thus Mr Leaf says of the Eighth Book of the Iliad, "it has undoubtedly great spirit and movement though nearly one-third of the lines are found again in the Iliad and Odyssey—sometimes with a slight difference¹." These being the characteristics of ballad and epic, we may think it probable that both will bear a similar relation to actual recorded history whether contained in chronicles or in documents.

My excuse for disagreeing with Mr Allen is that I have made a study of the relations of early mediaeval epics (the *Chansons de Geste*, the *Volsunga Saga*, *Beowulf*, and so forth), to actual chronicles dealing with the same events; and of the relations of old historical ballads to history. The mediaeval epics, such as the *Chansons de Geste*, owe next to nothing, if anything, to chronicles; and the ballads often merely make a start from an historical fact, or from popular memory of a recent fact, and then plunge into romance.

Now Mr Allen postulates throughout by way of hypothesis, a "chronicle," a "verse-chronicle" which, in one way or another, may be supposed to have reached Dictys of Crete, say in 300 A.D. Dictys thus would be "able to represent the actual course of events²." Homer had the same chronicle, I understand, and treated it with the utmost poetic freedom.

The objections are three; first, I think the existence of any actual "chronicle" of the Trojan affairs very improbable (here Mr Allen differs). Secondly, the early mediaeval epics and the traditional ballads do not go for their facts to such chronicles as we know to have actually existed, but merely to popular memory of the events, which from the first, is purely fantastic and romantic. Thirdly, in the evolution of mediaeval literature the epic, by a long interval, precedes the verse-chronicle: as the *Chansons de Geste* precede the earliest verse-chronicles of

¹ Leaf, *Iliad*, Introduction to Book VIII.

² *J. P.*, p. 228.

France. Barbour's *The Brus*, Wynthoun's *Cronykil*, are much later in evolution than the ancient German epics, *Beowulf*, and the lost or fragmentary epics which lend episodes and digressions to *Beowulf*, as other lays or epics, not a chronicle, lent them to the poet of the *Iliad*.

Unluckily we have only analogy to guide us, and the early mediaeval analogy is distorted by the known fact that chronicles were written in Latin; and certainly to the Latin chronicles (as Gaston Paris demonstrates in *Légendes du Moyen Age*, and as every reader can see), the authors of the *Chansons de Geste* did not go for their facts.

They went to popular tradition, and to *Volklieder* which, we know, existed, and to *Märchen* as in *Berthe aux grands pieds*. Charlemagne collected the traditional Germanic lays of the past; he had no Germanic verse-chronicle to study: or we hear of none, of lays we hear from Tacitus.

But, in Mr Allen's theory, there existed a *vernacular* chronicle of the Trojan affair in Greece.

This we cannot prove or disprove, but I think it most improbable. As for a *written* chronicle we do not know that Minoan characters were used for literary purposes in Crete; or, if they were, that they were employed by Achaean chroniclers in the remote age of the expedition to the Hellespont, an expedition earlier, perhaps, than the Achaean occupation of Crete. Our information is, on this point, more dim than it is about the Germanic peoples of the Late Celtic or La Tène period in Ireland. The Germans, certainly, had runes in the days of Attila, and earlier; the Irish may have had Ogam characters (as the *Tain Bo Cualgne* asserts), in the days of Cuchulain. But nobody says that they used runes or Ogam for contemporary chronicles, and it is perfectly clear that the Cuchulain cycle, the *Volsunga*, and *Beowulf* are not in any way derived from vernacular or from Latin chronicles, though the two latter mention persons named in Latin chronicles, Cochlaicus and Atli, and Alboin is a historic character appearing in epic; though the story of Alboin and Rosamund is a mere variant of the *Märchen* of Candaules and Gyges.

We know then, that by 350 A.D. and earlier, the Germans

could write in runes; we do not know that the invaders of Troyland could write; but the Germans did not employ their runes in keeping chronicles; and their early epics are certainly based on no chronicles, but on popular tradition mixed up with lays and *Märchen*: though they had runes, alphabetic characters.

Homer, and the lays on Thebes, the Argonautic expedition, Aetolia, Corinth and so forth, appear, like the French, Germanic, and Irish epics to be based on the same sort of materials, legend, lays, *Märchen*, with far more of *Märchen* than of historic tradition.

If chronicles existed, the traditions of each Greek state should have been based on them. But you may read through Grote's chapters on these traditions, and you will find that every one of them is a tissue of *Märchen* of world-wide diffusion (localised in Thebes, Corinth, Athens, Megara, in Thessaly, and so forth), just as is the chronicle history of *King Lear*.

This is no conjecture, I can give the *Märchen* which is the base of each State legend.

Now surely this fact in itself demonstrates that the States had no chronicles.

The only approaches, known to me, to such historic chronicles as Mr Allen postulates, are, rather strangely, to be found among non-writing peoples, notably Maoris and the Pueblo Indians. The Maori "chronicle" beginning with a truly Hesiodic cosmogony continues into an account of the migrations, and arrival in New Zealand. The Pueblo Indians, beginning with an amazing mixture of Hesiod and Hegel, also deal with dreamlike migrations. In Melanesia genealogies of very considerable length are extant in memory. The Tohunga colleges of the Maori preserve, or used to preserve, the traditions. We hear of no such colleges in Greece, and the extreme curtness of the Greek genealogies, going back to a god, with the entire absence of more full information in the hands of Herodotus and other historians, indicates that no such genealogies were preserved.

If Dictys could get at any shape or kind of chronicle, much more could Thucydides, yet Homer is his only source, "if any

one chooses to believe Homer¹." His source is the lays of Sennachies (δημοεργοί). Achilles had "stories of men," and Mr Allen concludes that "the stock of heroic poetry consisted (besides theology) of past history, and *vice versa* that the salient and greater feats of past history were extant in verse and remained till later times. No one will object to see such *verse-chronicle* in the various παρεκβάσεις of the *Iliad*, the wars between the Pylians and Eleans, the clearing of the hairy men out of Pelion by the Lapithae, the story of Meleager²."

I would as soon see chronicle in the παρεκβάσεις of *Beowulf*, which are certainly known to be derived from epic lays. I have no doubt that there were in Greece ballads of Border raids and recoveries; one of Nestor's is very like *Jamie Telfer*, but Jamie with his "hot-trod" is a myth, based on two historic events, and, historically false from end to end³. There was no such person as Jamie Telfer! The war in Pelion also left a tradition of Centaurs, it became myth. Meleager wandered into the *Märchen* of the Life Token, the natal brand, the spae-wives. As for Argo, from the beginning to the Flight from Colchis it is a tissue of *Märchen*, known from the Samoyeds to the Samoans⁴.

Eumelus and others pragmatized and historicized this tissue of fairy tales. If they had possessed a chronicle of the events (none of which ever occurred) they would have used the chronicle. They had none. Pindar cites Eumelus for the absurd Corinthian part of the legend of Argo, the patriotic and impossible invention of Eumelus. For Attic history, Lycurgus cites—Euripides, not an Attic chronicle. Had Thucydides known any relics of the chronicle of events which was accessible to Dares how gladly he would have quoted it! "The bards, children of Memory, had in their hands a chronicle...⁵" Not so, they were "children of *Memory*," of popular memory, like the singers of the *Chansons de Geste*, of *Beowulf*, the *Volsunga Saga* man and the makers of the ballad of *The Queen's Marie*.

¹ Thucydides, i. 10.

² *J. P.*, pp. 210, 211.

³ See Jamie Telfer in my *Sir Walter Scott and the Border Minstrelsy*, 1910.

⁴ See *Custom and Myth*, "A Far Travelled Tale," *The World of Homer*, pp. 169—180.

⁵ *J. P.*, p. 211.

On the other hand, I entirely agree with Mr Allen, in holding that the maker of the Iliad and of the Catalogue, knows the heroic geography of Greece. But so does the *Chanson de Roland* know the topography of Roncesvaux and of Spain; so do the ballad-makers know the topography of the Border. I conceive the Iliad to have been made in the pre-Dorian age, but neither in the age nor from a chronicle of the expedition to the Hellespont. The poet knew no more, *historically*, of that event than the poet of the *Chanson de Roland* knew of the history of Charlemagne, or even of the nature of the truth about the rearguard action at Roncesvaux. Here the parallel is very close. In both cases a war of two or three centuries ago is known, topography is known, the rest is myth: Ethiopian auxiliaries (in both epics), visits of gods or of angels.

As another example take Blind Harry's *Wallace* (1490). Harry, in an age of chronicles, Latin and vernacular, writes of events distant by about a hundred and sixty years. He has Barbour's *The Brus* before him, a chronicle often very accurate. He knows his geography as well as Homer does. But he writes "a heroic poem, it is poetry not chronicle." The epic of *Wallace* comes after the verse-chronicle. He represents, after Barbour (1370), a century of change, a new *couche sociale*. He does to *The Brus* what the *Cypria* and the Attic tragedians do to Odysseus. As they make Palamedes first in counsel and in war, and denigrate Odysseus, so Harry makes Wallace knock down Bruce, and actually assigns Bruce's feats of arms and adventures to Wallace! He fills Wallace's career with events which occurred long after Wallace's limbs were fixed on stakes about the country. As the Cyclics introduce non-Homeric rites, manners, and religion, so does Harry introduce manners, arms, ceremonies and political institutions unknown to Wallace's time. Like the Cyclics who bring in non-Homeric ghosts, Harry brings in very fearsome ghosts. "Harry nearly uproots Barbour," says Mr Neilson. The Cyclic, Ionian, Athenian, and Roman inventions actually uprooted Homer throughout the Middle Ages¹.

¹ For Harry see Mr Neilson "On *Studies of the English Association*, pp. Blind Harry's Wallace" in *Essays and* 84—112.

Thus careless is epic of history, to which the verse-chronicle of Barbour keeps, as a rule, very close. Dictys often follows the Cyclics (the parallel to Blind Harry), not Homer, and not a real chronicle of the Trojan war. The Cyclics themselves do not follow a real chronicle. *The Cypria* opens with councils of the gods, and then enters into the *Märchen* of the wooing of Nemesis by Zeus in many bestial disguises. Then *The Cypria* follows Homeric hints; then goes to "Peloponnesus" (a name never used by Homer) and plunges into the *Märchen* of Keen Eye: of Oedipous, of Theseus. Here Dictys omits all this matter. Palamedes, recruiting the heroes, unmasks the cowardly shirking of Odysseus (omitted by Dictys).

Then come more borrowings from the Iliad, and then, as the author of *The Cypria* has to fill nine years before he reaches The Wrath of Achilles, he manages by aid of Homeric hints; introducing non-Homeric knowledge of geography. He returns to hints from Homer, and next brings in the *Märchen* of three fairy girls who magically produce corn, wine, and oil, and are induced by the great Palamedes to come to the Achaean camp. Then these scoundrels Diomedes and Odysseus drown Palamedes and excite the anger of Zeus, who detaches Achilles from the Achaean cause.

Dictys, I think, is a writer with a "tendency," an anti-Homeric, anti-Achaean tendency, also exhibited in *The Cypria*. Thus in his early part, "Agamemnon and Menelaus are alluded to with contempt as the sons of Pleisthenes." Menelaus is in Crete when Paris carries off Helen. That is from *The Cypria*. Palamedes is the hero of *The Cypria*, at least a part of it was called Palamedeia¹. *The Cypria* made Palamedes the bringer of the magical maidens; Dictys historicises this: Palamedes superseded Odysseus in the commissariat!

In my opinion *The Cypria* dates itself as posterior to Homer, and proves its *provenance*, a non-Achaean source, by its introduction and treatment of Palamedes. Here Dictys follows either *The Cypria* or later Attic expansions of the legend of Palamedes, the hero of plays by each of the three great Athenian tragedians. Palamedes is usually made a

¹ Mure II. 281.

Nauplian, therefore, in the eyes of Homer, a subject of Diomedes. He is no Achaean prince; even Dictys cannot assign to him a single ship: the authority of the Catalogue was too powerful. Yet this Palamedes, less important than Nereus even, is always, while he lives, first and foremost with Dictys, as he apparently was with the author of *The Cypria*. As I have shewn (*The World of Homer*, "The Story of Palamedes"), this hero was originally a "culture hero," an inventor of the arts among the sea-coast people of western central Greece. He has no natural place among the Achaean peers and paladins. He is foisted into the Tale of Troy by the anti-Achaean reaction.

He was, says Dictys, in Crete, when the news of the elopement of Helen arrived, and paralysed Menelaus. "But when Palamedes saw that Menelaus was stupefied by rage and indignation, and incapable of counsel, *he* prepares the ships," who but he "consoles the king, makes all necessary arrangements, puts Menelaus aboard ship," and brings him home? "*He*, at that time, was of most avail in counsel, in domestic and military affairs¹."

It is thus that some non-Achaean stock, Ionian or what you will, vindicated its greatness against the silence of Homer, though it had to kill off Palamedes before the Iliad opens. Dictys makes Palamedes the chief of three ambassadors to Troy, to ask for the return of Helen. The other two, in Iliad III, are Menelaus and Odysseus; perhaps *The Cypria* first added Palamedes; if not, Dictys promoted that hero to the arduous duty. Later, Dictys makes the host elect Palamedes as commander-in-chief², though the fact does not appear in Mr Allen's summary. Indeed his summary is too succinct, and does not reveal the fact that for Dictys, probably following *The Cypria*, Palamedes is the foremost hero in council and in war. He it is whom the Delphic oracle chooses to offer a great sacrifice to Apollo Smintheus, "an honour that was grateful to many, on account of the energy and kindness of the hero, but painful to some of the leaders³." In Homer, of course, the Over Lord by divine right does sacrifice for the host. "About

¹ Dictys, i. 4—6.

² Dictys, i. 19.

³ Dictys, ii. 14.

that time Diomede and Ulysses plotted the death of Palamedes: a thing in human nature because cowards and envious men cannot endure to be excelled by their betters." So these cowardly brothers-in-arms, Odysseus and Diomede, kill "the best of men" Palamedes. All this is distinctly anti-Achaean and anti-Homeric invention. "There were some who said that Agamemnon was in the plot, because Palamedes was so adored by the army, and because the more part desired to be ruled by him, and spoke openly of making him the general."

I really cannot believe that in all this anti-Homeric and anti-Achaean matter, Dictys is following an Achaean "chronicle." He is following the version of *The Cypria*, which, in every detail of handling, is non-Homeric, and, in religion, rites, and so forth, appears to represent the ways of a non-Achaean people, whose glories are not celebrated in the Iliad.

Dictys pragmatizes *The Cypria* as he pragmatizes the narrative of Homer. Dictys (much praised for his conduct by mediaeval writers) cuts out the gods, and offers what the mediaeval writers thought plain practical history. Was he not an eye-witness? He also dealt, to their delight, in love-intrigues.

It appears to me, but not to Mr Allen, that Dictys treats the narrative of the Iliad in much the same way as he treats that of *The Cypria*. Is it not more probable that he invented the forged letters of Odysseus to bring Iphigeneia to Aulis¹, than that he found them in *The Cypria*? If he invented them, then, as in his omissions, he treated the matter of *The Cypria* with scant respect.

To me Dictys seems to take many of his facts from the Iliad, or from hints in the Iliad, and then to space them out in what he thinks a probable and plain historical way, through dull expanses of his prose. Thus he makes Menestheus of Athens marshal the Greek forces by tribes. This seems to be borrowed from Nestor's suggestion in the Iliad to return to the system of clan regiments², combined with the one Homeric compliment to an Athenian, on the skill of Menestheus in arraying men. (The passage looks suspiciously Athenian, for

¹ Dictys, i. 20.

² *Iliad*, II. 361—368.

Menestheus does nothing in the Iliad but ask for supports.) The wound of Menelaus by Pandarus is from Iliad IV, but Dictys makes the foul deed occur during the duel, retaining the death of Pandarus at the hands of Diomede. Then Dictys, writing plain history of course, sends the Greeks into winter quarters, and makes Hector fire a ship by a sudden surprise. He is merely pragmatizing Homer. Aias fells Hector with a stone, again from the long battle in the Iliad, Books XI—XVIII. That colossal and crowded campaign in one battle is not in nature, thinks Dictys, so he breaks it up and scatters the incidents over much time in his prosaic style. He breaks the Doloneia into two pieces: first the capture of Dolon: then, after the surprise of the ships the attack of Diomede and Odysseus on Rhesus and the Thracians. For history the events of Iliad X—XVIII are much too crowded; the plain veracious Dares therefore distributes them through several months. Achilles yields to the embassy;—quite right too, think our modern separatists who cannot believe that Achilles would have refused offers of atonement,—for which he had never asked. He asked for one thing, and got it, the slaying of the Achaeans among the ships. This is too poetical and not political enough for Dares, as for the modern critics. They delete the embassy; Dares depoetises it: and makes it more like history.

There is a winter truce;—very historical before Napoleon came! Having got Polyxena and her sacrifice at the tomb of Achilles (a thing not to Homer's taste) from the Cyclic poem, *Iliou Persis* (such sacrifices are truly Ionian), Dictys *more suo*, makes a love story. In the winter leisure Achilles saw and loved Polyxena. This leads to what Ionia (as in the case of Palamedes and Odysseus) loved; a tale of treachery. There is no traitor in the Iliad. Hector asks for the treachery of Achilles, in Dictys this crime is to be the bride-price of Polyxena. The offer is refused: the Iliad is again taken up in fragments; again the long battle (Books XI—XVIII) is pilfered from: Patroclus kills Sarpedon. We must have no crowding of incidents, nothing divine, like the Making of the Arms of Achilles, nothing poetical like the fight of Achilles to

avenge Patroclus, who is killed and mutilated, *not* on the day he killed Sarpedon, by Hector and Euphorbus. In the Iliad Hector had threatened to mutilate Patroclus; in Dictys he executes his threat. Euphorbus wounded Patroclus in the Iliad, Dares keeps that; but, of course, excises the action of Apollo, as given by Homer. There is to be no race thrice round the walls of Ilios, such a thing, under shield, is impossible; and too highly poetical is the death of Hector sword in hand. So Achilles in Dictys ambushes Hector, as, in *Troilus and Cressida*, he mobs the unarmed hero with the Myrmidons, and butchers him. The rest is a mere debasement and modernisation of the last Books of the Iliad, Andromache and of course (love-interest) Polyxena soften the heart of Achilles who restores the body of Hector.

All the story is merely a prig's debasement of the Iliad; his restoration of what he thinks probable and historical, "Achilles's reconciliation," as Mr Allen writes, "is effected upon terms, owing to general political considerations¹." Dares is merely trying to make a historical narrative out of a romance; he breaks up narratives of crowded events, scatters them here and there, makes men act as he thinks they *do* act from love, from political considerations, from climatic conditions, and with un-Homeric treachery. Hector's death "is no climax, and occasions no heroism²."

Of course it does not! Dares is as dull as our scientific historians: he hates heroism (save in Palamedes), he *must* keep on a low level.

All this opinion of mine is, as Mr Allen shews², the current, the obvious opinion. That disadvantage it has! Post-Homeric writers, as Achæan power declined, from the Cyclics downwards through the Attic tragedians, and, of course, the Romans with their belief in their Trojan origin, were anti-Homeric, anti-Achæan. They debased Homer's favourite heroes; put up against them (as Blind Harry put up Wallace against Bruce) their Palamedes; brought the Theseids to Troy, backed Aias, a neighbour of Athens, against the blameless Achæans, and so forth. But they did not break up, pragmatise, alter

¹ *J. P.*, p. 221.

² *J. P.*, p. 222.

and debase Homer to the level of scientific history. "Could a late prose writer have ventured to rewrite the Iliad?"

Dictys, to quote an old writer, "did more, he *did* it." "Would not his paradox have remained a sterile paradox?" Facts prove that it "caught on," was done into Latin, and, till the Renaissance reopened the Iliad, uprooted Homer.

But why does Dictys "respect the events" (except when he pragmatizes them, omits them, and, in love stories, popularises them) of the Cycle, while he rewrites the Iliad? I cannot see that he does respect the Cycle: had we more of the Cyclic poems we should probably find that Dictys treats them as freely as the Iliad. In any case, he minces up the Iliad because it gives, in a night and a day, events so very numerous that Dictys, as a scientific historian, has to scatter them over perhaps a year, politicising them *à son devis*. Apparently he likewise politicises *The Cypria*, making the Commandership and therefore the Over Lordship, elective. Nauplian Palamedes even, for a while, held the Commandership-in-Chief. Of course all this in Homer's age of Divine Right was as impossible as in the *Chanson de Roland* it would have been to elect a new Emperor in place of Charlemagne. Mr Allen speaks of the Cyclic as older than the Homeric tradition¹. But the Cyclic tradition knows "the uncolonised Cyclades and Colophon," Colophon whence Dictys makes Mopsus lead a contingent to the war². Surely this geography is post-Homeric, is not older than Homer, but later. Dictys debased Arctinus as he debased Homer in the treacherous murder of Achilles in temple. Dictys introduced his politics, "prolonged negotiations," and his beloved treachery, into the narratives of the *Little Iliad*, and the *Sack of Ilium*. The Palladium is betrayed, sold, not captured in a daring adventure. (Homer, of course, mentions no Palladium.) It is to this extent that Dictys "respects the Cycle." His rites and religion are non-Homeric: dead heroes receive more sacrifices than the gods: gold and silver, by the talent, not cattle, are the circulating medium.

I need not go into the Odyssey, notoriously a mass of *Märchen*, heroicised by Homer, historicised by Dictys. I have

¹ *J. P.*, p. 225.

² *J. P.*, p. 217.

already given my reasons for disbelieving in any "heroic chronicle." When "Dictys gives the operations of the siege their natural time¹," that is merely because he is a scientific historian, not because he had a heroic chronicle before him. Epic poets, in early times, as we know them, never go to a chronicle for their historic facts, nor do ballad makers², nor did Homer. He knew older romantic lays, full of *Märchen*, from which, in the cases of Meleager, Bellerophon, and Achilles, he excised the wilder fancies.

This, at least, is my view of the case. Analogy gives us the Germans, who could write but wrote no chronicle; they produced absolutely unhistoric epics, resting on folk-memory and *Märchen*. The Icelanders, who could write, produced no chronicle. The Irish, if they had Ogam characters early, produced no chronicle. The French epic poets, who could write, or employed clerks, and who could consult chronicles wrote no vernacular chronicles and based their epics on folk-memory and folk-song. Later the *Chanson de Roland* was done into the Latin prose sham-chronicle of Turpin. I therefore conceive that if the Achaeans, centuries before Homer, could write, they did not write chronicles; their State traditions are *Märchen*: no heroic chronicle is cited by Herodotus; Thucydides knew no heroic authority but Homer.

Thus it really seems in a high degree improbable that there was any heroic chronicle in Greece; and practically certain that Homer and other poets of his time did not (no early epic poets known to me ever do) go to his chronicle for "facts." That many centuries before Dictys, Eumelus and the logographers historicised old Epics, is certain. Dictys followed their example much more methodically and systematically.

Mediaeval chroniclers, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, William of Malmesbury, Lindsay of Pitscottie, borrow from ballads and lays; the reverse process—the authors of lays and ballads borrowing from chronicles,—is to me unknown, or all but unknown, in early literatures. I can only give my reasons for

¹ *J. P.*, p. 226.

as in *Johnny Armstrong*, used ballad material.

² "Otterburne," English and Scots, is an exception, unless the chroniclers,

dissenting from Mr Allen's conclusions. One of these reasons is that Dictys represents the manners and rites of the Homeric age in the post-Homeric non-heroic way: while Homer's picture of heroic manners is historic.

On turning to Mr Allen's paper, *The Homeric Catalogue*, in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* (1910, pp. 319, 320), I observe that he does not postulate writing or archives, the "verse-chronicle of the Achaeans" may have been orally transmitted. Our old difficulty recurs when we turn to analogous cases. In these there is no trace of an oral verse-chronicle or history: we only find legends, lays, *Volklieder*, and *Märchen*. The Catalogue itself is in as good and refined Homeric verse as the rest of the Iliad; not in any other older and less elaborate metre or measure. It is done by some one versed in pre-Dorian political geography. He gives the importance of states by positing a highest unit of one hundred ships and reducing the number in proportion to his estimate of the relative power and importance of the fiefs, so to speak. Thus the Catalogue is not a "document" extracted out of an oral or written verse-chronicle. I cannot believe in "a list taken down at Aulis, of princes, their homes, and their forces¹."

When we look at the estimates of forces in our chronicles,—at Bannockburn or Orleans for example,—and compare them with contemporary public records, we see that even the chronicles are often as far out as the epics in questions of numbers. The Catalogue is a document in its way; but its princes are as mythical as the Ganelon, Naimes, Oliver, Turpin, and Roland of the *Chanson de Roland*; or as the Wallace of Blind Harry; indeed more so than Wallace who was a historic person as Charlemagne was, though by Harry mythicised.

Of course Mr Allen does not conceive of the Catalogue as extracted word for word from the "morning states" of the forces of Aulis. As I understand him the author of the Catalogue turned the "morning states," the list of ships, forces, and commanders into heroic verse, adding references to stories and events. But it is in the survival of contemporary

¹ *J. H. S.*, p. 322, note 37, Vol. xxx., Pt. 2, 1910.

lists that I disbelieve, knowing nothing like it in other epics produced when such lists actually existed in State papers.

In arguing against the theory that there is more of *history* in the Cycle, and in what Dares may be said to have taken from the "chronicle," than in Homer, I think I am justified by the case of Palamedes. Homer certainly presents us with a picture of a polity and a state of society in a stage of unchartered feudalism: princes with an Over Lord by right divine. In such a state of society the pre-eminence of an individual adventurer, as we may say, like Palamedes, an inventor of the arts as he appears in Attic legend, is a plainly impossible intrusion. Achæan society, as Homer represents it, has no room for such a hero, who, as far as we learn, has no "following," does not contribute a single ship to the fleet, yet is once elected commander-in-chief, is selected to do sacrifice for the whole host (which only the Over Lord can do), and is expected to be again elected General-in-Chief by suffrage—just as Agamemnon was elected, says Dictys, by ballot slips written in Punic characters, and after copious bribes given in gold.

Every word of this is entirely out of keeping with the society which Homer knows and describes, a society in which supreme sway is based on divine right, as Agamemnon says, corroborated by Nestor¹. The Nauplian Palamedes was intruded by men probably of non-Achæan stock, and certainly living in a non-Homeric state of society in which *la carrière est ouverte aux talents*, in the modern sense; or elections to office may be bought by talents of gold.

All these modernisms are more probably inventions of Dictys than ideas borrowed from *The Cypria*, but even in *The Cypria* the supremacy of Palamedes, a man without a single ship, is a modernism and an unhistorical intrusion.

So successful were these Cyclic and later intrusions that Palamedes, in *Troilus and Cressida*, fights in what answers to the battle of Iliad XI—XVIII; and, in Malory's *Morte d'Arthur*, is a paynim knight who tilts with Lancelot! The Cyclics, the Athenian tradition, Virgil, and Dictys had uprooted Homer, one of the strangest things in the history of Literature.

¹ *Iliad*, i. 175, 277, 279.

It is a comfort that, as far as I can see, one or other of the competing views must be right. Either there was a chronicle of the rather prosaic progress of a long siege, and Homer took that chronicle, crammed the events into a few days, made all things dramatic, all things romantic; or there was no chronicle (or none used by Homer), and Dictys merely pragmatized Homer and the Cyclic poems. I do not remember that Dictys introduces chariotry, or specifies the metal used for weapons; and his manners and rites are often un-Homeric. But, it may be replied, Dictys, from the chronicle, and the Cyclics, gives sacrifices to dead heroes, because he found them in the chronicle; and Homer, for reasons of his own, invented a state of opinion about the powerless dead, which made sacrifices to heroic ghosts an impossible institution. Why Homer should have taken these liberties and others I cannot guess; and his view of the state of the dead chanced to coincide with that entertained by the author of the Book of Samuel. On Mr Allen's system I suppose that we cannot trust Homer as an historical authority on manners, customary law, rites, polity, costume, and so forth. I suppose at least Homer must be wrong when he differs from Dictys and the Cyclics. If this be true, Homer was wonderfully successful in inventing manners and customary laws which we know certainly have really existed elsewhere; for example among the tribes portrayed in *Beowulf*.

A. LANG.

HOMERICA.

A 5. οἰωνοῖσί τε πᾶσι.

Zenodotus read *δαῖτα*, but this must have been only because he neither bethought him that *οἰωνός* in Homer means "a bird of prey," nor that a poet uses "all" in a different way from a mathematician. Compare Ezekiel xxxix 4 :

"I will give thee unto the ravenous birds of every sort,
And to the beasts of the field to be devoured."

A 20. παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ λύσαι τε φίλην τὰ δ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι.

This seems to me to be the right reading; it avoids any change of mood, and *δὲ* frequently answers *τε*. See E 359 with Leaf's note, H 433 (*οὔτε—δέ*), and at H 465 the right reading is *δύσετό τ' ἥελιος τετέλεστο δὲ ἔργον Ἀχαιῶν*. Lines like this last are pretty common in the *Odyssey* and in them the *τε* is kept by editors. I cannot understand why Van Leeuwen, who reads as above, should call it "locus nondum persanatus."

B 303. χθιζά τε καὶ πρωΐζ' ὄτ' ἐς Αὐλίδα νῆες Ἀχαιῶν ἠγερέθοντο κακὰ Πριάμφ καὶ Τρωσὶ φέρουσαι.

See Leaf's note for the various interpretations of this desperate passage. I agree with him that the only one tolerable is that of Lehrs, "*Vix cum Aulida advecti eramus.*" But is even that really tolerable? *ὄτε* ought to stand at the beginning of its clause; the theory that *ἦν* is to be supplied with *χθιζά* puts *ὄτε* in its proper place, but then *ἦν* cannot be supplied. Homer is much more particular about the order of words than are later poets, and though he sometimes puts *ἐπεὶ* late in a clause he never does so with *ὄτε*.

It is about this *ὄτε* then that the difficulties centre, and I believe it is interpolated. The hiatus is infinitely common at

the weak caesura, and has yet often caused corruption. Omit *ὄτε* and all the trouble vanishes, and the whole sentence is improved enormously.

Γ 23. ὡς τε λέων ἐχάρη μεγάλῳ ἐπὶ σώματι κύρσας.

The scholiasts say that *σώματι* here is equivalent to *ζώῳ*, because the lion will not eat any animal he has not killed himself; but Aristarchus rightly insisted that *σῶμα* in Homer always means a dead body. Homer knew more about lions than a scholiast was likely to do. "The South African lion is often a very foul feeder, and according to my experience prefers eating game that has been killed by man to taking the trouble of catching an animal for itself...No matter how plentiful game may be, lions will almost invariably feast upon any dead animal left by the hunter, from a buffalo to a steinbuck, that they happen to come across." Selous, *A Hunter's Wanderings in Africa*, p. 265. It will be conceded that it is more probable that the Homeric lion agreed with the South African in this than that the scholiasts knew what they were talking about.

It is noticeable that the author of the *Shield of Heracles* misunderstood this passage. For he writes (426):

λέων ὡς σώματι κύρσας
ὄς τε μάλ' ἐνδυκέως ῥινὸν κρατεροῖς ὀνύχεσσι
σχίσσας ὅτι τάχιστα μελίφρονα θυμὸν ἀπήυρα.

Thus he also took *σώματι* to mean a live animal. Poets are apt to misunderstand one another, and we shall presently come to a case where the Homer of the *Odyssey* has shockingly misinterpreted the Homer of the *Iliad*.

Γ 125. τὴν δ' εὖρ' ἐν μεγάρῳ ἢ δὲ μέγαν ἰστὸν ὕφαινε.

Women do not weave in the *μέγαρον*; the phrase *ἐν μεγάροισι* elsewhere in connexion with it proves nothing because *ἐν μεγάροισι* only means "somewhere in the buildings." From 142 we learn that Laodice *ὠρμᾶτ' ἐκ θαλάμοιο*. Evidently then *μεγάροφ* is here a slip in the tradition for *θαλάμοφ*.

Δ 468. πλευρά, τά οἱ κύψαντι παρ' ἀσπίδος ἐξεφαάνθη.

Did not Homer say *παρ' ἀσπίδα*?

E 135. καὶ πρὶν περ θυμῷ μεμαῶς Τρώεσσι μάχεσθαι.

It seems to me that *περ* here does not mean *though*, but only emphasizes the *πρὶν*. Cf. e.g. A 131, ἀγαθὸς περ ἑών, which Aristarchus explained as equivalent to ἀγαθὸς δὴ ὄν, and on which Leaf observes that “*περ* seems here to have merely its original force of *very*.” Hence E 135 may, and indeed must, be taken along with the preceding line.

E 139. τοῦ μὲν τε σθένος ὄρσεν ἔπειτα δέ τ' οὐ προσαμύνει
ἀλλὰ κατὰ σταθμοὺς δύεται, τὰ δ' ἐρῆμα φοβεῖται.

A lion leaping over the wall into the fold is wounded by a shepherd, ἀύλης ὑπεράλμενος. Observe the distinction between the ἀύλη and the σταθμοί; the lion would hardly want to go into the buildings. The subject of δύεται is therefore the shepherd, not the lion; the shepherd flies into the farm-house, as you would expect, and the sheep, being left unprotected (ἐρῆμα ποιμένος), are scattered. Another proof that the subject of δύεται is the shepherd may be found in the words οὐ προσαμύνει ἀλλά, for when a negative and verb are thus followed by ἀλλά and another verb we can hardly suppose the subject of the second verb to be a new one unless a noun is put in to shew this.

E 554. οἷω τῷ γε λέοντε δύω ὄρεος κορυφῆσιν.

“The evil,” says Leaf, “is probably past remedy, τῷ γε representing some adjective which was thrust out because it was unintelligible and forgotten.” I have an idea that it was a noun, namely λιε, the dual of λῖς, that has caused the trouble. Düntzer audaciously proposed οἷω αἰθωνε λέοντε, with an incredible synzesis. If the original was οἷω λι' αἰθωνε δύω, it is possible that this may have given rise to our text, either through Düntzer's reading or in some other way.

It is not so likely that the poet said οἷω λιε δύω and that some adjective agreeing with ὄρεος or κορυφῆσιν has dropped out. For compare II 756,

τῷ περὶ Κεβριόναο λέονθ' ὡς δηριυθήτην
ὧ τ' ὄρεος κορυφῆσι...μάχεσθον.

I strongly suspect that the same thing has happened at O 324:

θῆρε δύω κλονέωσι μελαιίνης νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ.

"Two beasts" is a very un-Homeric expression, unless you will say that it was so dark that Homer could not see what manner of beasts they were. But at O 586 θηρὶ seems natural, "a brute that has done a mischief."

E 734. πέπλον μὲν κατέχευεν ἑανὸν πατρὸς ἐπ' οὔδει.

The violation of Wernicke's law and the contracted form of οὔδει can both be corrected by reading ἐπ' οὔδει πατρὸς ἑανόν. If this was the original the corruption must be very ancient, as the line is repeated at Θ 385, again with the same difficulties.

Z 58.

μηδ' ὄντινα γαστέρι μήτηρ
κοῦρον ἔοντα φέροι, μηδ' ὄς φύγοι.

It is obvious that κοῦρον here means "male child," and this is supported by η 64, where the context shews that ἄκουρον means "without male offspring"; a meaning which seems to me simple enough and involving no real difficulty. So also at K 317 μούνος means an only son, as shown by the addition of the words μετὰ πέντε κασιγνήτησιν.

Θ 189. οἶνόν τ' ἐγκεράσασα πιεῖν ὅτε θυμὸς ἀνώγοι.

This line was objected to by ancient critics, because horses do not drink wine, but if it is ejected Hector has to eat barley. Horses drink some kinds of alcohol fast enough. "In those days, I am told, wine was given to horses" in Italy. H. Laing-Gordon, quoted in Archdall Reid, *Laws of Heredity*, p. 301. In Knapp's *Life of Borrow*, vol. ii, p. 174, is a story of a quart of ale given by Borrow's advice to a fallen horse, who is soon "pulling merrily" again. Matthew Arnold was wiser than the critics when he gave Ruksh "corn in a golden platter soaked with wine." Virgil, *Georg.* iii 509, Columella vi 30, recommended wine as a medicine for sick horses. Whiskey is given in England to sick cows. And readers of *Redgauntlet* may remember the law-case which arose because one old woman's cow had drunk up a pailful of ale belonging to another.

In Philostratus *Vit. Apoll.* v 42 is a fabulous story of a tame lion who drank wine, but what Philostratus says is not evidence.

Λ 113. ὡς δὲ λέων ἐλάφοιο ταχείης νήπια τέκνα
 ῥηϊδίως συνέαξε λαβῶν κρατεροῖσιν ὁδοῦσιν
 ἐλθῶν εἰς εὐνήν.

It is an interesting thing that this simile was entirely misunderstood by the poet of the *Odyssey* (δ 335—339). He takes the εὐνή to be the lair of the lion! The oddity of the *Odyssean* passage has been noted by the commentators on the *Odyssey*, but I think it has not been observed how this extraordinary piece of natural history came about, whereby a deer deposits her young in the lion's den. The *Odyssey* is less familiar with lions than the *Iliad*, and there is no passage in it which need indicate more than poetical tradition about the animal, unless it be ι 292:

ἦσθιε δ' ὡς τε λέων ὀρεσίτροφος, οὐδ' ἀπέλειπεν,
 ἔγκατὰ τε σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα μυελόμεντα.

For "in eating the carcass of a large animal lions always either tear open the belly near the navel and first eat the entrails, liver, etc., or else commence near the anus and eat the meat of the hind-quarters." Selous, *ut supra*. Thus the order ἔγκατα, σάρκας, ὀστέα is right. Cf. Σ 582.

Λ 256. ἀνεμοτρεφὲς ἔγχος.

Cf. Darwin, *Variation of Animals and Plants*, vol. ii p. 296 (first ed.), "Mr H. Spencer has also shown that the ascent of the sap in trees is aided by the rocking movement caused by the wind; and the sap strengthens the trunk 'in proportion to the stress to be borne; since the more severe and the more repeated the strains, the greater must be the exudation from the vessels into the surrounding tissues, and the greater the thickening of this tissue by secondary deposits'."

M 381 f. οὐδέ κέ μιν ῥέα

χειρὶ γε τῇ ἐτέρῃ φέροι ἀνὴρ, οὐδὲ μάλ' ἠβῶν.

This is the reading of A and other MSS., but Aristarchus and the majority of MSS. read χεῖρεσσ' ἀμφοτέρῃς ἔχοι. I wish to shew that Aristarchus was wrong.

Is this a future condition or a past condition? Ajax threw a great stone which a modern man could not *have* raised if he had been there. It is plainly a past condition. Therefore the optative ought to be an aorist. But *φέροι* is used by Homer, though not itself aorist, as if it were one; see no. 51 of this Journal, p. 83. Homer does not use *ἔχει* in that way, so on that ground *φέροι* is superior. Again the verb *φέρειν* is better than the verb *ἔχειν* here; cp. 451, E 303.

If then *φέροι* is right *χείρεσσ' ἀμφοτέρης* is suspicious, because of the short form of the dative plural; hence metrically *χειρί γε τῇ ἑτέρῃ* is to be preferred. And the reason given by Aristarchus for preferring *χείρεσσ' ἀμφοτέρης* is a false reason; two hands, said he, are better than one and consequently it heightens the prowess of Ajax to say with *both* hands; any body might fail to lift it with *one*. This is the sort of criticism which makes one blush sometimes for the great master. So also Pindar thought he was going to improve on Homer; Homer's Posidon takes four strides to get from Samothrace to Aegae, Pindar's Apollo gets to the pyre of Coronis in one. But Homer's Posidon is four times as impressive as Pindar's Apollo for all that.

Finally it is evident that *χειρί γε τῇ ἑτέρῃ* would be more likely to be corrupted to *χείρεσσ' ἀμφοτέρης* than *vice versa*.

M 433. *γυνή χερνήτις ἀληθής*.

"*ἀληθής* seems to be used here in the primitive sense, 'not forgetting'." Leaf. Cf. Aesch. *Septem* 709, *παναληθῆ, κακόμαντιν πατρὸς εὐκταίαν Ἐρινύν*, "the fury that forgets not."

N 485. *εἰ γὰρ ὀμηλική γε γενοίμεθα τῷδ' ἐπὶ θυμῷ!*
αἰψά κεν ἢ φέροιτο μέγα κράτος ἢ φεροίμην.

That is how these lines should be punctuated. A mere comma after *θυμῷ* gives a very feeble sentence; indeed it is downright ridiculous to say: "If we were to become of the same age, I would fight him."

εἰ γὰρ γενοίμεθα is Homeric for *εἰ γὰρ ἐγενόμεθα*. Cp. 825,

εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼν οὕτω γε Διὸς πάϊς αἰγιόχοιο
εἶην ἥματα πάντα, τέκοι δέ με πότνια Ἥρη,

which equals *εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἔτεκεν δέ*. The present optative for the imperfect indicative in such sentences is common enough in Homer. See Bergk on Theognis 667.

O 14. ἦ μάλα δὴ κακότεχνος ἀμήχανε σὸς δόλος Ἥρη.

Read *κακότεχνε*. For the tone of the line compare Σ 357. The nominative in such a position could only be defended by saying that the meaning is: "evil is the art by which, etc." But plainly all that Zeus intends is: "So you've done it at last!"

Π 46. ὧς φάτο λισσόμενος μέγα νήπιος· ἦ γὰρ ἔμελλεν
οἷ αὐτῷ θάνατόν τε κακὸν καὶ κῆρα λιτέσθαι.

These two lines seem to me perfectly natural and genuine. The aorist *λιτέσθαι* with *ἔμελλε* is right, for the meaning is: "So he spake in prayer in the folly of his heart—folly, for he *had*, methinks, prayed for death thereby." As the prayer has been already given in full the aorist is the right tense. And the form *λιτέσθαι* is Homeric. In ξ 406 it is quite impossible to read *Κρονίων' ἀλιτοίμην*, despite Van Leeuwen. Here is the passage:

ξείν', οὐτω γάρ κέν μοι εὐκλείη τ' ἀρετή τε
εἶη ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους ἅμα τ' αὐτίκα καὶ μετέπειτα,
ὅς σ' ἐπεὶ ἐς κλισίην ἄγαγον καὶ ξείνι' ἔδωκα
αὐτίς δὲ κτείναιμι φίλον τ' ἀπὸ θυμὸν ἐλοίμην·
πρόφρων κεν δὴ ἔπειτα Δία Κρονίωνα λιτοίμην.

The whole speech is ironical. "I should be fair-famed indeed, shouldn't I? I could pray to Zeus with a clear conscience, couldn't I, *after that*, ἔπειτα." But if we adopt *ἀλιτοίμην* we cannot construe ἔπειτα at all, except on the hypothesis that, having once begun to sin, Eumaeus after that intends to defy God and man!

The only objection left is the short vowel before *λισσόμενος* and *λιτέσθαι*. But this is found eight times in the *Odyssey*, says Leaf; and in the only other place where the aorist *λιτέσθαι* occurs in Homer we have just seen another short vowel before it. That *λίσσομαι* originally began with some kind of double consonant is plain enough, but it is equally certain that

this had been reduced to one by the time of the *Odyssey*. In the *Iliad* traces of the double consonant remain in the imperfect ἐλλίσσεται (four times if we include the very doubtful M 49), and six times is a short vowel lengthened with the metrical ictus before this verb. But without this metrical ictus a short vowel is only lengthened three times, E 358, Φ 368, X 91, and the important point is that all these three are in the phrase πολλὰ λισσόμενος (-η, -ω) at the beginning of a line. Is not this suspicious? Does it not look as if this was an ancient formula in which the ancient scansion had been kept? Just so we find πόντια Ἡρη dating from a time when the last syllable of πόντια was long. Practically therefore we have only two phrases where a short vowel at the end of a foot precedes λίσσομαι; in the one it is apparently an ancient formula and the old scansion is kept, in the other, ὡς φάτο λισσόμενος, it is not. And in the *Odyssey* nobody disputes that it is not. Upon the whole then it seems to me that there is really no sufficient ground for raising any objection to this couplet.

Π 104. δεινὴν δὲ περὶ κροτάφοισι φαεινὴν
πήληξ βαλλομένη καναχὴν ἔχε.

Authority is divided between δεινὴν and δεινή; Homer, I believe, said δεινόν, which is actually found in one or two MSS. καναχὴν ἔχε = κονάβιζεν; to make an adjective agree with καναχὴν is not in the Homeric style, to say nothing of the distance between the words. For the corruption compare H 346, where δεινὴ τετρηχυῖα must be emended to δεινόν.

Π 203. σχέτλιε Πηλέος υἱέ, χόλω ἄρα σ' ἔτρεφε μήτηρ.
Compare *Macbeth* I v 48:

"Come to my woman's breasts
And take my milk for gall."

Σ 180. σοὶ λώβη, αἶ κέν τι νέκυς ἠσχυμμένος ἔλθη.

It seems to me most improbable that νέκυς should here be accusative plural. The so-called Attic accusative after verbs of going is almost entirely confined in Homer to words meaning a house or city or one's native land or the like (Monro, *Hom.*

Gr. § 140); the only two exceptions, Φ 40 and δ 478, are proper names. And P 160:

εἰ δ' οὗτος προτὶ ἄστν μέγα Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος
ἔλθοι τεθνηώς,

also spoken of the body of Patroclus, seems to me quite decisive. It is clear that ἐλθεῖν is a natural word to use of a slain warrior being brought into camp, but who ever heard of νέκυς ἐλθεῖν being used of the soul going down to Hades?

T 97. "Ἡρη θήλυς εἶουσα δολοφροσύνης ἀπάτησεν.

I think the meaning is that Hera deceived Zeus just *because* she was a female. Deceit is notoriously a characteristic of theirs, ἐπίκλοπον ἦθος and a capacity for lying was all the intellectual dower of Pandora, and it is easy to fill pages in illustration.

Φ 66. ἦτοι ὁ μὲν δόρυ μακρὸν ἀνέσχετο δῖος Ἀχιλλεὺς
οὐτάμεναι μεμαώς· ὁ δ' ὑπέδραμε καὶ λάβε γούνων
[κύψας· ἐγκείη δ' ἄρ' ὑπὲρ νότου ἐνὶ γαίῃ
ἔστη, ἰεμένη χροὸς ἄμεναι ἀνδρομέοιο.
αὐτὰρ ὁ τῇ ἐτέρῃ μὲν ἐλὼν ἐλλίσσεται γούνων],
τῇ δ' ἐτέρῃ ἔχεν ἔγχος ἀκαχμένον οὐδὲ μεθίει.

Achilles desires οὐτάμεναι, not βαλεῖν, and Lycaon runs in under the uplifted spear and grasps the knees of his enemy. The spear therefore was not thrown, and could not stand quivering in the ground. And if it had so stood, what a ridiculous picture; Lycaon with one hand embraces the knees of Achilles, with the other he grasps a spear standing in the ground behind him! Omit the three bracketed lines and all is smooth. (They were added apparently because somebody thought that τῇ δ' ἐτέρῃ required τῇ μὲν ἐτέρῃ to precede it.) Lycaon now does what of course he must have done, catching hold of the spear while still in the hand of Achilles in order to stop his stabbing him with it.

At 115 Lycaon lets go of the spear and drops on his knees with both arms swinging helplessly beside him, ἔζετο χεῖρε πετάσσας. That must be the meaning, for utter terror does not "spread out the hands," and yet πετάσσας is a curious

word for it¹. Achilles might then be expected to run the spear through him, instead of which he draws his sword and kills him with that. This however is no objection to my view of the passage, for compare Δ 529, 530.

Φ 126. *θρόσκων τις κατὰ κῦμα μέλαιναν φρίχ' ὑπαίξει
ἰχθὺς ὅς κε φάγησι Λυκάονος ἀργέτα δημόν.*

For the quantity of *ὑπαίξει* compare Aratus 334. The reading of the Chian edition, *μελαίνῃ φρίχ'*, seems to me right; it avoids the violation of Wernicke's law and would be certain to be corrupted owing to the elision of *φρικί*. "Many a fish leaping out of water all about the waves shall dart up from underneath in the black ripples."

Φ 374. *μή ποτ' ἐπὶ Τρώεσσιν ἀλεξήσειν κακὸν ἦμαρ.*

The compound *ἐπαλέξειν* can mean "help," but it can no more mean "drive off" than *ἐπαμύνειν* could. Homer must have said *ἀπὸ Τρώεσσιν*; this was easily corrupted to *ἐπὶ* because *ἀπὸ* and the dative look so strange together. Moreover *ἐπὶ* may have got in from the line before. The corruption is very old, for the line is repeated in this form at Τ 315, probably the later passage of the two.

Χ 127. *οὐ μὲν πῶς νῦν ἔστιν ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης
τῷ ὀαριζέμεναι, ἅ τε παρθένος ἠίθεός τε,
παρθένος ἠίθεός τ' ὀαρίζετον ἀλλήλοιν.*

The original meaning of *οὐκ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης* seems to me to have been: "Not a fairy, oak-man or gnome, but a man of flesh and blood." Literature condescends not to take note of such beings before Shakespeare, but we may feel pretty sure that the children of Cnossus and Mycenae knew all about them. I do not believe it is any reference to a mythical origin of man, nor does the line in the *Odyssey* (τ 163) really support this theory. When Penelope says: "Tell me who were your parents, for you came not of oak or rock," she does

¹ Perhaps the phrase is incorrectly repeated from Δ 523, etc.

not mean "you are not a primitive savage"; she means "you are an ordinary man, no fairy¹." Compare *Pericles* v i 154 :

"But are you flesh and blood,
Have you a working pulse? and are no fairy?
Motion! Well, speak on. Where were you born?"

The phrase may have been proverbial for centuries before, and then gets used in any context and any sense, as proverbs will. So here it means "idle talk," as Leaf says, although the ἀπὸ by rights ought to have been changed to περὶ as in Hesiod *Theog.* 35.

There is yet another reference to be added to those already collected, Juvenal vi 11, "rupto robore nati compositivo luto," where the meaning really is "primitive men."

The couplet which follows has been objected to in modern times, and indeed one cannot expect every taste to appreciate pearls. But, says "some full-acorned boar, a German one," it is not natural for Hector to be embroidering thus at such a moment. Is it not? Why, he is hesitating on the brink of a fatal resolution, talking against time in the dreadful pause of thought², and, because his creator was a poet and not a χλοῦνης σὺς ἄγριος, he therefore marks this culminating moment by the loveliest ornamentation he can devise. Even so does Shakespeare mark the culminating moment of the third scene of the third act of *Othello* by putting into his hero's mouth the magnificent simile about the Pontic sea; even so have Shakespearian commentators there rivalled Homeric in blindness and ingratitude.

The principle of ornament at the critical point is eternally illustrated in the Homeric poems. To take only two instances, when Odysseus strings the bow, we have an elaborate simile. When Priam enters the tent of Achilles we have another. Here the simile is given to Hector himself. But what is the difference of principle? None that I can see.

What caused the ancient critics, when criticism was

¹ If Penelope had meant "you are not descended from the primitive ancestors of the human race," she would have been talking sad nonsense.

² Indeed he has been really talking nonsense from 111 onwards, as he admits himself.

something resembling a science, to admire these lines so greatly is the combination of chiasmus with epanalepsis. Of this I only recall to mind one equally enchanting instance; it is in the great modern master of all poetical figures, Milton:—

“Brightest Seraph, tell
In which of all these shining Orbes hath Man
His fixed seat, or fixed seat hath none,
But all these shining Orbes his choice to dwell.”

(P. L. iii 667.)

Nay, by the aid of rhyme he has added yet another enchantment, but he has been unable to repeat the effect of the change from *δαριζέμεναι* to *δαρίζετον* which is one of the charms of the Greek.

X 322. τοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τόσον μὲν ἔχε χρῶα χάλκεα τεύχη.
καὶ is unintelligible (Leaf); read *κατ’*.

Ψ 455. λευκὸν σῆμα τέτυκτο περίτροχον ἥυτε μήνη.

Plainly Homer meant a crescent; *περίτροχον* need only mean *curved*. So *κύκλω* is eternally used in prose to mean no more than *round* often does in English; *κύκλω περιμέναι* is only to “make a *détour*.”

Ω 388. ὡς μοι καλὰ τὸν οἶτον ἀπότμου παιδὸς ἔνισπες.

This is one of those wonderful flashes which illuminate all this book; Hermes has said never a word to describe the death of Hector, but Priam is answering his own thoughts. There is nothing in Shakespeare himself so Shakespearian as this.

Ω 400. τῶν μέτα παλλόμενος κλήρω λάχον ἐνθάδ’ ἔπεσθαι.

This line should be regarded with as much respect as the Solenhofen slate which has preserved *Archaeopteryx* for us; it contains a fossil of a vanished world in its use of *μέτα*. For obviously *μετὰ* with genitive must once have meant “from among,” and here it is. “I was chosen from among them.” Zenodotus too seems to be right in reading *μεθ’ ὀμίλου* in the same sense at P 149.

Ω 506. ἀνδρὸς παιδοφόνου ποτὶ στόμα χεῖρ’ ὀρέγεσθαι.

Homer is full of curious middles. If *τείνομαι* can govern

an accusative, why should not *ὀρέγομαι*? Empedocles, frag. 141 (Diels), says:

δειλοί, πάνδειλοι, κυάμων ἄπο χεῖρας ἔχεσθαι.

It looks too as if Aeschylus used *ὀρέγομαι* in the same transitive way, for it is pretty certain that the right reading at *Agam.* 1097 is:

προτείνει δὲ χεῖρ' ἐκ
χερὸς ὀρεγομένα,

and it seems to me that *ὀρεγομένα* as well as *προτείνει* there governs *χεῖρα*.

Whether we say that the construction is *ὀρέγεσθαι χεῖρα ποτὶ στόμα* or that it is *ὀρέγεσθαι στόμα ποτὶ χεῖρα* (or *χεῖρε*) does not seem to matter much, but I prefer the former because it is a more natural action for Priam to raise the hand of Achilles to his lips than to duck his head down to kiss a hand which might be snatched away before he reached it¹.

If the meaning had been "raise my hand (*χεῖρ'*) to touch his chin," the poet would not have said *ποτὶ στόμα* but *γενείου*.

Ω 527. διοιὸ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει
δώρων οἷα δίδωσι κακῶν ἕτερος δὲ ἑάων.

It is hardly the case that there are two possible interpretations of these lines; there is only one, that which Leaf prefers on other than linguistic grounds. If there were two jars of evil and one of good, if *δώρων κακῶν* went together, then *οἷα δίδωσι* would be wrong for two reasons. "Such gifts as he gives" must include good as well as ill, but cannot with *κακῶν* after it; and secondly the return to the genitive *κακῶν* after *οἷα* is impossible. Then too think of the poetical absurdity of representing Zeus as keeping two distinct jars full of the same thing.

Theognis 446, *χρῆ δῶρ' ἀθανάτων οἷα διδοῦσιν ἔχειν*. And it is pretty clear from the previous lines that Theognis only thought of two jars; at least he speaks simply of good and evil

¹ On the other side it may be said that *ὀρέγεσθαι χεῖρα* ought to mean "reach out *my own hand*"; if this is so, we must take *ὀρέγεσθαι στόμα* together. But may not *ὀρέγεσθαι* be middle because Priam raises the hand to himself?

gifts, arguing that "the web of our life is a mingled yarn." He never suggests that the evil are double the good.

I do not know how this passage may have filtered down to Jean de Meung; anyhow he takes the right view, *Roman de la Rose* 7549.

Ω 721. θρήνους ἐξάρχουσ' οἳ τε στονόεσσαν αἰοδὴν
οἳ μὲν ἄρ' ἐθρήνεον ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γυναιῖκες.

On this desperate passage see Leaf, but when he says that there is no clear evidence of any line being lost in Homer believe him not. For he says in another place that a whole long passage has been lost (introduction to Σ). Moreover there is very clear evidence that I 458—461 were lost from our MSS., for they are only preserved in a quotation by Plutarch; if those lines are not genuine, it is a miracle, for no mortal man would have thought of adding them in later and more civilized times, whereas all the Homeridae and every rhapsode who ever strutted in public were interested in keeping them out¹. When we consider the history of the Homeric text we can hardly doubt that hundreds of lines have been lost; if a gap was caused they were replaced by others as a rule; if not, neither ancient nor modern could generally suspect anything. Friedländer was evidently right in assuming a lacuna here between 721 and 722. For οἳ μὲν ἄρ' ἐθρήνεον is just the way Homer goes back to the story after a digression of any kind. And, to get that in, οἳ τε must have introduced some verb on its own account. Agar's οἳ τ' ἐξάρχουσιν αἰοδὴν does this, but at dreadful expense, for it involves an extraordinary corruption of ἐξάρχουσιν into στονόεσσαν, and with little profit, for it is miserably weak after θρήνων ἐξάρχους which he reads in the earlier part of the line. To say "leaders of dirges, who lead lamentation" is Homeric, but to substitute the general word αἰοδὴν for lamentation is not.

Now the evidence of the tradition is very greatly in favour

¹ Cf. Murray, *Rise of the Greek Epic*, 2nd ed., p. 142. But I cannot believe in any sweeping process of "expurgation" having been carried out upon the *Iliad*.

of the reading printed in my lemma. How did that reading arise? Suppose the original was

θρήνοι' ἐξάρχους¹, οἳ τε στονόεσαν αἰοιδὴν

* * * * *

οἳ μὲν ἄρ' ἐθρήνεον.

This would be recited or written *θρήνου ἐξάρχους* and, the second line (or more) being lost, meaning having taken flight, *θρήνου* was easily corrupted to *θρήνους* because of the hiatus and the following *ἐξάρχους*. Then an attempt was made to elicit sense by reading *ἐξάρχουσ'* and so we get the traditional text.

a 22. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Αἰθίοπας μετεκίαθε τηλόθ' ἔοντας,
Αἰθίοπας τοὶ δίχθα δεδαίεται.

Aristarchus and the MSS. read *Αἰθίοπας* in 23, but there was an ancient variant *Αἰθίοπες* which Bentley advocates and which surely must be right. The change from an oblique case to the nominative in epanalepsis is a characteristic Homeric idiom; see Leaf on Z 396. But it was certain to be corrupted in such a passage as this, whereas if *Αἰθίοπας* had been the original where did the variant come from? It is quite probable that the original of H 137, 8 was:

τεύχε' ἔχων ᾧμοισιν Ἀρηϊθόοιο φάνακτος,
δῖος Ἀρηϊθοος τὸν ἐπίκλησιν κορυνήτην....

For the vulgate *δίου Ἀρηϊθόου* involves the rather curious repetition of the genitive in the short form after the long one. Even without epanalepsis there is a tendency to jump into the nominative, as at ε 477.

γ 352. οὗ θην δὴ τοῦδ' ἀνδρὸς Ὀδυσσῆος φίλος υἱός.

This curious expression, *τοῦδ' ἀνδρός*, may perhaps throw some light on the similar *ᾧ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός* and *ᾧ παῖ ἐκείνου τάνδρὸς* in Plato *Rep.* 368 A, *Philebus* 36 D. It is true that in Homer the name *Ὀδυσσῆος* is added, but in reality this addition only makes the phrase all the more curious.

¹ So also van Leeuwen and da Costa, but they leave the passage unintelligible.

In all three places the meaning must be "son (or sons) of a distinguished father"; at least the attempts to explain the Platonic passages in any other way seem to me failures. In Homer *τοῦδ' ἀνδρὸς* does indeed refer to the conversation just preceding, whereas in Plato *ἐκείνου τάνδρὸς* has become cut loose from any context, but I think we can see here the sort of way in which such a phrase might come to be used independently.

δ 546. ἡ γὰρ μιν ζῶν γε κιχήσεται, ἢ κεν Ὀρέστης
κτεῖνεν ὑποφθάμενος, σὺ δέ κεν τάφου ἀντιβολήσαιο.

It seems to me that *κτεῖνεν κεν* means "will have killed." Suppose Homer wanted to express that, how else could he do it? *κεν* gives the idea of futurity, *κτεῖνεν* gives the idea of the act being by that time in the past. If Homer had said *κτείνειε κεν*, it would have meant "will kill" or "would have killed"; I do not think it could mean "will have killed." If he had said *κτενέει* with or without *κεν*, he would not get in the future-perfect notion. There is only one way by which that can be done in Homeric Greek, and that way Homer naturally took.

In Attic it could only be done by means of a past participle and auxiliary verb, or by turning the sentence into a passive form and using the future-perfect tense. But that tense is never found in Homer at all, *κεχολώσεται* for instance being only a reduplicated future with no perfect force whatever.

ε 300. δίδω μὴ δὴ πάντα θεὰ νημερτέα εἶπη.

So the great majority of MSS., rightly. The aorist subjunctive referring to past time after a verb of fearing is found elsewhere in poetry; nay more, in Homer it is not only permissible but necessary, for Homer does not use the indicative after verbs of fearing at all.

Another example of such an aorist subjunctive (without the *verb* of fearing) is γ 315, repeated at ο 12:

μή τοι κατὰ πάντα φάγωσι
κτήματα δασσάμενοι, σὺ δὲ τηϋσίην ὁδὸν ἔλθης,

where *ἔλθης* must mean "lest thou have come" and probably *φάγωσι* also means "they have devoured."

At ν 216 the right reading is *οἴχονται*, but here also is a variant *οἴχονται*.

ο 393. οὐδέ τί σε χρῆ
πρὶν ὄρη καταλέχθαι.

“πρὶν ὄρη sc. ἔη” Monro. The ellipse does not look Homeric. *πρὶν* was originally a comparative and governed a genitive; of this use there is still one instance in early poetry, *πρὶν ὄρας* in Pindar *Pyth.* iv 76. *πρὶν ἡλικίης* is several times found in a formula in inscriptions; see Kaibel *Epig. Graec.* 198, 300, 373. Manetho ii 288, *πρὶν γονίμης ὄρης*. The genitive occurs even in late prose; Porphyry *de Abst.* iv 12, *καὶ γεύσασθαί τινα πρὶν τῆς εὐχῆς ἀθέμιτον*, and the lexicon refers to another instance in Arrian¹. *πρὶν ἡλίου ἀνατολῆς* appears twice in a magical papyrus (Brit. Mus. Pap. CXXI 418, 420). Observe that it is specially with *ὄρης* that this use is found.

ρ 218. ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον.

I believe the old explanation of the second *ὡς* as being equal to *πρὸς* is correct after all. Monro objects that “such a solitary use is evidently most improbable.” But compare Hippocrates (Kühn) vol. i p. 390: *ἡ δὲ σὰρξ αὐξομένη ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος ἀρθροῦται καὶ ἔρχεται ἐν ταύτῃ ἕκαστον ὁμοῖον ὡς τὸ ὁμοῖον, τὸ πυκνὸν ὡς τὸ πυκνόν, τὸ ἄραιον ὡς τὸ ἄραιόν, τὸ ὑγρὸν ὡς τὸ ὑγρόν*. Again on page 392 we find: *ἔπειτα δὲ χρόνῳ φυσώμενα ἐλεύσεται ὃ τε μόλιβδος ὡς τὸν μόλιβδον καὶ ἡ ψάμμος ὡς τὴν ψάμμον καὶ ἡ γῆ ὡς τὴν γῆν*, and *εὐρήσει αὐτῶν τὸ ὁμοῖον ἐς (leg. ὡς) τὸ ὁμοῖον ἐληλυθός*. *οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ γονὴ καὶ σὰρξ διαρθροῦται καὶ ἔρχεται ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ ὁμοῖον ὡς τὸ ὁμοῖον*. In these places there is not a double *ὡς*, and so the theory that the meaning is “*as one, so the other*” will not suit them.

Cf. Galen, vol. ii p. 6, *ὡς τὸ ὁμόφυλον ἕκαστον ἰέναι*. Here LMP read *ὡς, Ο πρὸς*; the presumption is that *πρὸς* is a correction.

We know that the use of *ὡς* with an accusative is primitive, as it is found also in Sanscrit; it seems that the phrase *ὁμοῖος*

¹ For other instances from late prose see Stephanus.

ὥς τὸν ὁμοῖον survived in a proverbial way in Ionic, and this special survival accounts for the "solitary use" in this phrase alone in Homer.

I do not know whether ὥς is found elsewhere in this sense in the Hippocratic corpus; I can only say that I have not met it. If these are the only passages, it is to be noted that Hippocrates practically agrees with Homer in the usage. For though he does use other accusatives after ὥς, yet they are all based upon the first ὁμοῖον ὥς τὸ ὁμοῖον and are extensions of it in the same context. It is remarkable too that the accusatives here are not persons but things.

ARTHUR PLATT.

ON ARISTOTLE DE ANIMALIUM INCESSU.

ii 1. 704^b 13. λαβόντες [τὰ] τοῦτον ἔχοντα τὸν τρόπον ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις.

Z omits τὰ rightly, for the meaning is "finding certain principles to be of this kind in all the works of Nature."

iii 3. 705^a 12. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀλλόμενον καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀπερειδόμενον τὸ (leg. τῶ, S has τῶ) ἄνω καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας ποιεῖται τὴν ἄλσιν.

"For even things which jump do so by taking off *both* from themselves (i.e. the lower part of themselves) with the upper part *and* from the ground under their feet (with the lower part)."

iii 5. 705^a 22. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μένον θλίβεται διὰ τὸ φέρειν, τὸ δ' αἰρόμενον τείνεται (leg. γίνεται with Z) τῶ φέροντι τὸ (omit τὸ again with Z) φορτίον.

"For the lower part, remaining fixed, is pressed down because it carries the upper, while the upper part, being raised, becomes a burden (weighs upon) the lower part which carries it."

At the end of this section read αὐτῶ for αὐτῶ.

iv 7. 705^b 29. ὅτι δ' ἐκ τῶν δεξιῶν ἢ ἀρχῇ τῆς κινήσεώς ἐστι, σημεῖον καὶ τὸ φέρειν τὰ φορτία πάντας ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀριστεροῖς.

This statement is certainly not true without qualification. But compare this from *The Revelations of Inspector Morgan*¹, p. 215: "Bearers of a heavy weight, such as a dead body, walking together, invariably bear heavily upon the left foot, both those who are supporting it on the left and those who are supporting it on the right side."

¹ By Oswald Craufurd, 1906. A volume of detective stories.

On this question Dr Ogle has sent me the following note:—
 ‘Sir B. Wilson (*Left-handedness*, p. 171) watched men engaged in unloading or loading ships and found that 278 carried the load on the left shoulder against 162 on the right.’

iv 12. 706^a 18. ἀπολελυμένα δ' ἔχουσι τὰ ἀριστερὰ τῶν ζῴων μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν μάλιστα τῶν ζῴων· φύσει δὲ βέλτιόν [τε] τὸ δεξιὸν τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ [καὶ] κεχωρισμένον.

Omit τε and καὶ with SUZ. “The left is more independent of the right in man than in any other animal because man most nearly approaches the ideal of Nature; now it is better from Nature’s point of view that the right be separated from the left.”

v 4. 706^b 9. τὰ δὲ δίποδα πρὸς τὸ ἄνω διὰ τὸ ὀρθὰ εἶναι, μάλιστα δ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος· μάλιστα γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ δίπους.

δίπουν Z, but the word must be omitted. Man is most erect of animals because he is most “according to Nature.”

vi 1. 706^b 18. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκη πάντος συνεχοῦς, οὐ τὸ μὲν κινεῖται τὸ δ' ἡρεμεῖ, ὅλου (leg. θατέρου or perhaps ἄλλου, for S gives ἀλλ' οὐ, but θατέρου is really wanted; cf. ix 2)¹ δυναμένου κινεῖσθαι ἐστῶτος θατέρου, ἧ (leg. ἦ, Z has εἰ) ἄμφω κινεῖται ἐναντίας κινήσεις, εἶναι τι κοινὸν καθ' ὃ συνεχῆ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀλλήλοις....

“In every continuous body, one part of which is moved while the other is at rest, the one part being able to be moved while the other stands still, or of which both parts are moved at once in opposite ways, there must be some common point at which these are joined to each other.”

vi 3. 706^b 33. Aristotle is talking of three pairs of opposites, before and behind, right and left, up and down. διὸ τῶν ζῴων ὅσα μέρεσιν ὀργανικοῖς χρώμενα προέρχεται, τῇ μὲν τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ὀπισθεν διαφορᾷ οὐκ ἔχει διωρισμένα ταῦτα (animals which advance by use of organic parts, as legs, have no distinction of before and behind in these, as no animal moves backwards naturally; see section 2), ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς, ἀμφοτέραις μὲν,

¹ This is very unsatisfactory, but I can't do anything better with it.

προτέρα δὲ τῇ κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ ἀριστερὸν διοριζούσῃ, διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν ἐν τοῖς δύοσιν εὐθέως ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὑπάρχειν, τὴν δ' ἐν τοῖς τέτταρσι πρώτοις (leg. πρώτον, for πρώτοις is nonsense; and πρώτον has got into the text in the wrong place in three MSS. either before or after ὑπάρχειν. Animals which walk have both the other pairs of opposites, right and left first because you must get right and left as soon as you have even two legs; but it is only when you have *four* locomotive appendages that the difference of upper and lower comes in, as when wings are added to the feet of a bird. Even with four it is not necessary, for the distinction does not exist in quadrupeds). ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ τε ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ ἀριστερὸν τῇ αὐτῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ κοινῇ συνήρτηται πρὸς αὐτά, λέγω δὲ ταύτην τὴν τῆς κινήσεως κυρίαν (now these two pairs of opposites are all united at the same common point of origin of motion, the heart, for the heart is the centre which controls and originates motion), δεῖ δ' ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ μέλλοντι κατὰ τρόπον (leg. τόπον) ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀφ' ἐκάστου κινήσιν ὠρίσθαι πῶς καὶ τετάχθαι ταῖς ἀποστάσεσι ταῖς πρὸς τὰς ῥηθείσας ἀρχάς, τὰς τε ἀντιστοίχους καὶ τὰς συστοίχους τῶν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τούτοις, τὸ τῶν λεχθεῖσῶν κινήσεων ἀπασῶν αἴτιον (secondly the organ responsible for these motions, i.e. the heart, must stand in a definite relation in respect of distance or interval from the two pairs of opposites, if an animal is to move in space, i.e. you must have a central organ from which the impulses of motion radiate to the points of motion and it must be at a proper distance from each. Thus if a bird has two wings and two legs the heart can be at the right distance from all of them, but if it had four wings and two legs, then the balance would be upset. For suppose the heart was rightly placed to control the motions of upper and lower limbs in respect of the legs and the first pair of wings, then it could *not* be properly placed to control the legs along with the second pair of wings, seeing that this second pair would have to be either higher or lower than the first pair; consequently the second pair would be too high or too low to co-ordinate with the legs), αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἀφ' ἧς ἀρχῆς κοινῆς τῶν ἐν τῷ ζῳῳ ἢ τε τοῦ δεξιοῦ καὶ ἀριστεροῦ κινήσις ἐστίν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ

τοῦ ἄνω καὶ κάτω (thirdly, this is the common principle of these movements, the heart), ταύτην (leg. ταύτη δ') ἔχειν ἐκάστω ἢ (leg. ἢ with Y) παραπλησίως πρὸς ἐκάστην τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥηθείσι μέρεσιν ἀρχῶν (and this heart in each animal must be in this particular relation, or very near it, to each of the motive principles in the limbs), δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἢ μόνοις ἢ μάλιστα τούτοις ὑπάρχει τῶν ζῴων ἢ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, ἢ δύοσιν ἢ τέτταρσι ποιεῖται σημείοις τὴν κατὰ τόπον μεταβολήν. (Apodosis at last, thank Heaven! "Therefore it is clear (!) that locomotion is the prerogative especially of those animals which have not more than four points of motion." By which we shew that vertebrates are superior herein to insects, spiders, crustacea, mollusca, worms, etc. Certainly these lower animals do move, but nature has not perfected their apparatus, either they have too many "points of motion" or else they have none at all, and the possession of not more than four is one of the triumphs of the vertebrata.)

vii 3. 707^b 1. ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ ποιεῖται τὴν πορείαν.

For ἐπὶ Z reads καί; the right reading is κατὰ. For the point is not that the hinder part of e.g. a worm moves *in the same direction* as the front part, of course it does so in *any* animal, but that it moves *in the same way*, by wriggling, and consequently can go on moving after the animal is cut in half.

vii 8. 707^b 24. Omit πάλιν.


viii 3. 708^a 26. δῆλον ὡς τοῖς μὲν βέλτιον τοῖς δ' ὅλως ἀδύνατον πορεύεσθαι.

This has got to mean that an animal can walk better with an even number of feet, and could not walk at all with an odd number. But it is intolerably obscure in expression, and for ὡς τοῖς Z reads ὅτι τοῖς, SUY read ὡς ἔστι τοῖς, and P ὡς εἰ τοῖς. These are all the MSS., and so Bekker's text is not found in any of them. It looks as if the original was ὡς ἀρτίους, which was corrupted into ὡς ἀρτιοῖς and thence changed into the three MSS. versions. For τοῖς δ' ὅλως also we should certainly expect περιπτοῖς δ' ὅλως.

ix 2. 708^b 26. ἀλλὰ μὴν κάμφεώς γε μὴ οὕσης οὐτ' ἂν πορεία οὔτε νεύσις οὔτε πτήσις ἦν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπόποδα ἐπειδὴ

ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ἀντικειμένων σκελῶν ἐν μέρει ἴσταται καὶ τὸ βάρος ἴσχει, ἀναγκαῖον θατέρου προβαίνοντος θατέρου ποιεῖσθαι κάμψιν· ἴσα τε γὰρ πέφυκεν ἔχειν τῷ μήκει τὰ ἀντίστοιχα κῶλα, καὶ ὀρθὸν δεῖ εἶναι τὸ ὑφ' ἑστώδ' τῷ βάρει, οἷον κάθετον πρὸς τὴν γῆν. (Yet Aristotle presently says that it is not the leg which is put forward that is bent but that which remains on the ground and so supports the body. But he assumes that at first one is standing upon one upright leg.) ὅταν δὲ προβαίῃ, γίνεται ἡ ὑποτείνουσα καὶ δυναμένη τὸ μένον μέγεθος καὶ τὴν μεταξύ. (But when one leg is advanced it becomes the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle. Let AB be the leg you stand on

and AC the leg you put forward.



Then AC is the

hypotenuse of the triangle, being, as Aristotle irrelevantly remarks, the square root of the sum of the squares on τὸ μένον μέγεθος AB and τὴν μεταξύ γραμμὴν BC .) ἐπεὶ δ' ἴσα τὰ κῶλα, ἀνάγκη κάμψαι τὸ μένον, ἢ ἐν τῷ γόνατι ἢ ἐν τῇ (leg. ἄλλῃ) κάμψει, οἷον εἴ τι ἀγόνατον εἶη τῶν βαδιζόντων. (But of course one can't make such a right-angled triangle, because the leg AC isn't long enough, being only equal to AB . Consequently to get AC to reach the ground we must bend AB , either at the knee or somewhere else if there were no knee, as in the fabulous elephant.) σημείον δ' ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ τις ἐν γῆ...βαδίξει παρὰ τοῖχον, ἢ γραφομένη ἔσται οὐκ εὐθεία ἀλλὰ σκολιά, διὰ τὸ ἐλάττω μὲν κάμπτοντος γίνεσθαι τὴν γραφομένην, μείζω δ' ἴσταμένου καὶ ἐξαιρόντος. (A proof is that if you walk holding a pencil against a wall—some words have been lost here, see Z “ἐν γῆ corr. loco plurium”—the line traced by it will be zig-zag.)

Here follow some parenthetical remarks, then he goes on in section 6, 709^a 12: ἀλλ' ὀρθὸν οὐδὲν δύναται ἂν πορευθῆναι συνεχῶς καὶ ἀσφαλῶς, κινηθεῖ δ' ἂν οἷον ἐν ταῖς παλαιίστραις οἱ διὰ τῆς κόνεως προΐοντες ἐπὶ τῶν γονάτων. πολὺ γὰρ τὸ ἄνω μέρος, ὥστε δεῖ μακρὸν εἶναι τὸ κῶλον· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κάμψιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔστηκε πρὸς ὀρθήν (“for since the angle ABC is a right angle”), εἰ ἄκαμπτον ἔσται τὸ κινούμενον εἰς τὸ

πρόσθεν ("if the animal which is moving forwards is not to bend"; I add these words from Y; they look genuine, and the fact that they are not strictly logical in this place is perhaps in their favour), ἢ καταπεσεῖται ἐκτὸς τῆς καθέτου γινόμενον, ἢ οὐ προβήσεται ("either the line AC must fall outside the perpendicular or else the animal will not be able to get forward"; I follow Y again against Bekker).

This amounts to saying that if you stand on your right leg and put your left leg forward without bending your right, the left can only come down again where it was before; bend you must, either at the knee or at the hip, but Aristotle seems to me to ignore the hip in this bit of his argument.

εἰ γὰρ ὀρθοῦ ὄντος θατέρου σκέλους θάτερον ἔσται προβεβηκός, μείζον ἔσται, ἴσον ὄν· <οὐ> δυνήσεται γὰρ τοῦτο (leg. ταῦτό) τό τ' ἡρεμοῦν καὶ τὴν ὑποτείνουσιν (leg. ἢ ὑποτείνουσα. "For if AC is to touch the ground while AB remains upright, AC must be greater than AB , which is true in the diagram but impossible in real life because the two legs are equal. If AB is not to bend, we get a right-angled triangle; now AB and AC in such a triangle will not be equal." I insert οὐ from Z).

ἀνάγκη ἄρα κάμπτεσθαι τὸ προῖόν, καὶ κάμψαν ἅμα ἐκτείνειν θάτερον, ἐκκλίνειν τε καὶ διαβεβηκέναι καὶ <μῆ> ἐπὶ τῆς καθέτου μένειν· ἰσοσκελές γὰρ γίνεται τρίγωνον τὰ κῶλα, καὶ ἡ κεφαλὴ γίνεται κατώτερον <ἢ> ὅταν κάθετος ἦ ἐφ' ἧς βέβηκεν ("so then an animal which means to go forward must bend, at the same time putting its other leg forward; it must diverge from the straight line AB and stand straddling and not remain upon the perpendicular; for in walking the legs form not a right-angled but an isosceles triangle; and, which is a proof of this, the head is lower in the act of striding than when it is supported upon a perpendicular leg." See above the experiment with the pencil upon the wall. I insert μῆ and ἦ by conjecture).

ARTHUR PLATT.

NOTES ON AGAMEMNON.

IN the following paper I am well aware that several proposals are of a somewhat reckless nature, but when a text is in such a condition the commentator *ἀνάγκας ἔδν λέπαδνον*. It is more satisfactory to explain a line than to emend it, it is more satisfactory to emend by change of one letter than of many. So no doubt one had rather only have to restore a finger to a statue, but when the Melian Aphrodite confronts you, what is the use of denying that she has lost her arms? Better do nothing at all than attach a finger to the shoulder in such a case. Anyhow none of the suggestions here made are more violent than some of those printed in his text of 1888 by the greatest benefactor to the student of Aeschylus whom we have seen in our generation, Wecklein, to whom I feel so thankful that it is with regret that I differ so often from him. Nor can those who read *προσαιθρίζουσα πόμπιμον φλόγα* at 313 for *πλέον καίουσα τῶν εἰρημένων* afford to cavil about trifles. Of course I use Wecklein's numeration throughout.

33. *τρὶς ἐξ βαλούσης τῆσδέ μοι φρυκτωρίας.*

Read *τῆσδ' ἐμοὶ*, for the whole point consists in the contrast between *ἐμοὶ* here and *δεσποτῶν* in the line before.

69. *οὔθ' ὑποκαίων οὔτ' ἐπιλείβων
οὔτε δακρύων ἀπύρων ἱερῶν
ὄργας ἀτενεῖς παραθέλξει.*

ὑποκλαίων MSS., corr. Casaubon. *οὔθ' ὑπολείβων* MSS., corr. Schütz. Bamberger omits *οὔτε δακρύων* altogether, but no really satisfactory meaning can then be extorted from the words; yet after Mr Farnell's searching examination of this passage it is impossible to retain *δακρύων* anywhere in the context (*Class. Rev.* xi 293).

I am not satisfied with anything I can excogitate on it, but sometimes a groper may suggest by his groping the truth to some one else. Is it then possible that Aeschylus wrote something like

οὐτ' (or οὐδ') ἄρα θύων ἀπύρων ἱερῶν,

or even ἄκρα θύων? Cf. frag. *Niobe*, οὐδ' ἄν τι θύων οὐδ' ἐπισπένδων ἄνοις. Homer sometimes uses ἄρα with οὐτε, as *Il.* i 93. I strongly suspect that θύων ought to come in somewhere; the verb can be used of any sort of offering. But the partitive genitive is odd, to say the least of it, and I don't like ἄκρα ἱερῶν, though if it were in the MSS. we should compare Pindar *Ol.* iii 63, ἀκρόθινα ἔθυε, and feel quite happy about it.

76. *μυελὸς στέρνων ἐντός.*

The combination of *μυελὸς* and *στέρνων* instead of *ὄστων* is curious, but there is a near parallel in the authorized version of Job xxi 24:

His breasts are full of milk,
And his bones are moistened with marrow.

The parallel however, it must be admitted, is not to be found in the Hebrew poet, for Driver tells us that the marginal variant, "milk-pails" for "breasts," must be followed.

104. *κύριός εἰμι θροεῖν ὄδιον κράτος
αἴσιον ἀνδρῶν
ἐκτελέων ἔτι γὰρ
θεόθεν καταπνεΐει
πειθῶ μολπᾶν
ἀλκᾶ σύμφυτος αἰών.*

ἀλκᾶν MSS., corr. Schütz.

So would I write these lines. *κύριός εἰμι*, for the hero of Marathon has a right if any man to sing of war, and here speaks in his own voice as well as in that of the Chorus. *ὄδιον κράτος αἴσιον ἀνδρῶν* = *ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς αἰσίαν ὁδὸν ἐξιόντας*. But *ἐκτελέων* has never been well explained in connexion with what precedes it; stop as above and explain *ἐκτελέων* to mean "finishing the course." For the uncontracted form cf. *P. V.* 558,

Pers. 65. The position of γὰρ in the third place is only too common in Aeschylus. Both τελέω and διατελέω are used intransitively; it seems not impossible that ἐκτελέω should be so used by a poet; compare too the use of ἀνύω, ἐξανύω. If so, the passage means "my life, nursed amid battles (connate with valour), still as it nears the end breathes charm upon my songs by the grace of God." Cp. Dryden:

"Old as I am, for lady's love unfit,
The power of beauty I remember yet;
Which once inflamed my soul, and still inspires my wit."

Cymon and Iphigenia 1—3.

121. βοσκόμενοι λαγίαν
 ἐρικύμονα φέρματι γένναν
 βλαβέντα λιοσθίων δρόμων.

The sense required is manifestly "a pregnant hare and her brood unborn," and it is necessary also to provide somehow for the neuter plural βλαβέντα. If we read ἐρικύμονα φέρμα τε γέννας we can satisfy these demands (ἐρικύμονα, φέρμα τε, γένναν H. L. Ahrens).

I really do not know whether λαγίαν was originally an adjective or not, but at any rate it is common enough in Greek poetry to use adjectives as nouns in speaking of animals, e.g. ἀρνεῖός, πτωκάς, τρήρων and λαγφός itself. Therefore I take λαγίαν here to be used as a noun, if indeed it is not itself a noun. When one turns to Stephanus for light on this subject, it is reassuring to find that λαγίνα seems never to occur again in any kind of Greek except as a noun. Thus Constantine Manasses *Chron.* 6199:

τότε δὴ τότε τρομερὰ λαγίνα καθωρᾶτο
δράκων ὁ πρὶν βλοσυρωπός, ὁ λέων χαμαιλέον.

And Marcus Eugenicus, "Ecphrasis ed. Kayser, p. 161, 6" is reported as saying "τὴν λ. ἐκείνην, ὡς ἡγεῖται λαυθάνειν προσισχημένη τῇ γῆ." Unfortunately I cannot verify this reference, or find out what Kayser's edition may be, but it is said in Stephanus that the passage is a reminiscence of that in *Agamemnon* and clearly λαγίνη is used in it as a noun. It is unlucky that Constantine and Marcus are such late and bad

witnesses, but it does look as if they knew of a noun *λαγίνη* and there is really no evidence for an adjective *λάγιμος* at all, as the passage in Aeschylus is indisputably corrupt.

Then *φέρμα γέννας* is "the offspring she bears within her." There being two nouns and the second being neuter, *βλαβέντα* is naturally neuter plural, though strictly the mother alone could be said to be "stayed in her last course," and see also Monro *Hom. Gr.* § 166 (2).

The reading of Ahrens already quoted appears to me to labour under great difficulties. Even Headlam can find nothing to justify the order of words in it except in Lucian. The phrase *λαγίναν ἐρικύμονα γένναν* sounds to me quite intolerable; *λαγίναν γένναν* is no way to speak of a hare and to stick *ἐρικύμονα* into the middle of it makes it ten times worse. It is as if one should describe a lady as *ἀνθρωπίνην καλήν γένναν*. Besides *φέρμα* seems to want qualifying somehow.

To the passages already given by me in *Class. Rev.* xi 94 add Plutarch *de Soll. Anim.* 971 A: *ἐὰν δ' ἀπογνούς ἐαυτὸν ὁ λαγῶός, ὃ γίγνεται πολλάκις, ὅσον ἔχει πνεύματος εἰς τὸν ἔσχατον ἀναλώσας δρόμον ἐκλίπη.* Here is the *λοισιθίων δρόμων* translated into prose. That the hare is killed "in her last spurt" shews Calchas that the siege of Troy will be a long one, that her young are killed within her shews him that

πάντα δὲ πύργων
κτῆνη ἔτοσθε (Todt, πρόσθε MSS.)¹ τὰ δημοσπληθῆ
μοῖρα λαπάξει πρὸς τὸ βίαιον.

147. δρόσοις ἀέπτοις μαλερῶν ὄντων.

Stanley restored *μαλερῶν λεόντων* from the *Etym. mag.* There however the line is not quoted; it is only stated that Aeschylus called lion-cubs *δρόσους* in this play.

The whole of this long epode, like the two preceding strophes, is entirely composed of dactylic measures with an occasional bit of iambic. Hence Stanley's *μαλερῶν λεόντων* is altogether unaccountable metrically. Read *μαλερῶν τε λεόν-*

¹ It is no longer possible to deny that *κτῆνη* may mean *κτῆματα*, for Hesiod certainly so uses it. *Berlin. Klass. Text.* Heft 5, Pap. 9739, 25 *κτῆνει γὰρ Ἀχαιῶν φέρτατος ἦεν, 49 κτῆνεσσί τε δωτίνας τε.*

των. This also improves the sense; Artemis is kind *not only* to ravening lions *but also* to the young of all manner of wild things, and therefore to the hare as well as to fierce creatures of prey.

The rhythm of the epode has been ruined in other places; *τέρπνα* and *στρουθῶν* long ago fell justly under suspicion; *ἰήιον δὲ καλέω Παιᾶνα* is no kind of verse at all nor can I see what business Apollo had to interfere with his sister; moreover it is clear that the scholiast read *τεύξης* in 156. This 156 also looks unmetrical; read *ἀπλοῖας τεύξης* and it will then be defensible by *τοιάδε Κάλχας ξύν* further down, if you believe in the colometry of the MSS.

175. εἰ τὸ μάταν ἀπὸ φροντίδος ἄχθος
χρῆ βαλεῖν ἐτητύμως.

Qu. ματᾶν?

190. καὶ παρ' ἄκοντας ἦλθε σωφρόνα.

σωφρόνα Housman (*Cl. Rev.* ii 244), *σωφροεῖν* MSS. Cf. Thuc. vi 87 ad fin. ἀμφοτέροι ἀναγκάζονται ὁ μὲν ἄκων σωφροεῖν ὁ δ' ἀπραγμόνως σφῆζεσθαι.

220. πῶς λιπόνανς γένωμαι,
ξυμμαχίας ἀμαρτών;

Cf. *Iliad* xxiv 68, φίλων ἡμάρτανε δῶρων, meaning not "he failed in getting gifts," but "he failed in giving them." So here *ξυμμαχίας ἀμαρτών* means "failing in respect of my allies," that is to say "deserting them" or "not doing my duty towards them." If Agamemnon failed thus, he would thereby become a "deserter," *λιπόνανς*, and so the aorist *ἀμαρτών* is right.

288. ἀλλ' ἢ σ' ἐπιάνεν τις ἄπτερος φάτις.

Dr Verrall takes *ἐπιάνεν* to be aorist of *ἐπιαίνω*, but quotes no example of this compound. Rather read *σέ γ' ἱανέν τις*. This is just the place for *σέ γε*. It is said that *ἱαίνω* is not used in tragedy, but it is at the same time admitted that it was used by Phrynichus the tragedian, and if by Phrynichus why not by Aeschylus¹? If it be said that such a word might

¹ It is also nearly certain that Weil's *lalvoiro* is right at *Supplices* 659.

be expected to occur frequently if it were allowed in tragedy at all, I answer that *θεωρεῖν* is a verb we should also expect to meet often there and yet it only occurs once (*P. V.* 318), *O. C.* 1084 being admittedly corrupt.

Cf. *Soph. Ant.* 790. ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων vulg. σέ γ' ἀνθρώπων Nauck.

300. πεύκη τὸ χρυσοφεγγές ὡς τις ἥλιος
σέλας παραγγείλασα.

It is generally thought that τὸ is the end of a lost verb, but of the conjectures none is convincing, Wecklein's ἤπεικτο being the best. Perhaps ηὔξητο may be right; this if written -ΕΥΚΣΕΤΟ (cf. Conington on *Cho.* 990 = 992) is very near to the letters, and the verb goes well with ὑπερτελής at the opening of the sentence. ηὔξητο παραγγείλασα = παρήγγειλεν ηὔξημένη.

326. νικᾶ δ' ὁ πρῶτος καὶ τελευταῖος δραμών.

Really this is one of the simplest lines in Aeschylus. The beacons "conquer" because they are bearers of the news of conquest, one and all of them, just as the whole chain of torch-bearers "conquer" in the race, one and all of them. The comparison was never meant to go any further.

There is a curious verbal parallel in a passage of Dionysius, thirteenth bishop of Alexandria, quoted by Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* vii 11. περιττὸν γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀνατρέχοντι. But here the idea seems only to be that of running twice as far as one need.

As for the omission of the article with the second of two nouns, adjectives or participles, it is simply the usual thing. At *Ajax* 649, χῶ δεινὸς ὄρκος καὶ περισκελεῖς φρένες, Brunck conjectured χαί, but was refuted by Erfurdt who compared 1240, οὐ γὰρ οἱ πλατεῖς οὐδ' εὐρύνωτοι φῶτες, and *Tr.* 356, οὐ τὰπὶ Λυδοῖς οὐδ' ἐπ' Ὀμφάλη πόνων λατρεύματα. Add *Solon* 4, 15, τὰ γυγνόμενα πρό τ' εἶοντα, *Agam.* 324, *Sept.* 516, *Androm.* 405, *Iph. Aut.* 859. This is of course common in Thucydides, especially when the two phrases are connected by τε and καί, e.g. i 7, αἱ τε ἐν ταῖς νήσοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡπείροις,

iv 9, τῶν τε ἀόπλων καὶ ὀπλισμένων, vii 14, τά τε ὄντα καὶ ἀπαναλισκόμενα, and plenty more, to say nothing of such things as τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων in the very first sentence of the first book. Indeed Marchant on vi 2 apologizes for a repetition of the article. Other prose instances are *Alcibiades* II 150 A, Theophrastus frag. vi, 2, 36, ὁ τε καικίας καὶ λίψ.

362. πολλῶν γὰρ ἐσθλῶν τήνδ' ὄνησιν εἰλόμην.

I never could understand why any difficulty should be made about this line; Clytemnestra simply means "from among many good things have I chosen this blessing," i.e. "I would rather have the satisfaction of killing my husband on his return than anything else you could offer me." Compare what she says at 954. τήνδ' ὄνησιν does not refer to anything in the last two lines, but to the return of the king and the events to follow it, 355—359.

τήν MSS., τήνδ' Hermann, intending, I suppose, to take the words as I do.

379. Διὸς πλαγὰν ἔχουσιν εἰπέειν
πάρεστι τοῦτ' ἐξιχνεύσαι.

Blomfield's demonstration is conclusive enough, as Headlam says, that we should read "Διὸς πλαγὰν ἔχουσιν" εἰπέειν πάρεστι (and of course Hartung's πάρεστιν is right). The difficulty is now how to continue. One thing seems to me pretty certain, that we must not insert any connecting particle; it quite ruins the tone of the passage. The second line should probably run thus:

πάρεστιν τοῦτ' ἂν ἐξιχνεύσαις.

Cf. Stevenson, *New Arabian Nights, The Suicide Club* ad fin. "'God's justice has been done,' replied the Doctor. 'So much I behold.'" Think how you would spoil this by saying "And so much I behold"!

421. πάρεστι σιγᾶς ἄτιμος ἀλοίδορος
ἄδιστος ἀφεμένων ἰδεῖν.

It is impossible to avoid concluding that Hermann was right in restoring σιγᾶς ἀτίμους ἀλοιδόρους, and most critics if not

all are agreed so far. For my own part I find Margoliouth's ἄπιστος ἐμφανῶν ἰδεῖν (ἄπιστος Hermann) equally irresistible. But how can both these restorations be accepted together?

There comes in here another observation due to Wilamowitz, approved by Blass (*Hermes* xxix 633), and which once made must be approved by everyone who has read the choruses of Aeschylus with any attention. The metre of 421 and 437 is not what we should expect. Lines beginning ∪ - ∪ - ∪ - | - ∪ - (or others of similar type) ought to be continued by something more than - ∪ - ∪ -. Hence Wilamowitz proposes *συνορμένοισι* for *συνορμένοις* at 437. But what is lost may be more than one syllable; it may equally well be an iambus.

Putting all these things together I would suggest, as at least restoring a sentence which is not on the face of it unworthy of Aeschylus, that we may read:

πάρεστι σιγάς ἀτίμους ἀλοιδόρους <ἔχων>
ἄπιστος ἐμφανῶν ἰδεῖν.

I supply ἔχων because it is the only word in the Greek language that I can think of which will satisfactorily fill the gap. There is no visible reason for its falling out, but why should there be? When a word fell out it was not always so obliging as to begin with the same syllable as the word next to it, and the desire to account always for gaps in this way has led to innumerable absurdities. If I wanted to be clever in that line I would propose ἀτίμους <ἀλοῦς> ἀλοιδόρους, which I could make shift to construe; but really I often think that cleverness is a worse enemy of poetry than stupidity.

This involves also an addition at the end of 437, but that passage is even more obscure than this. The Scholiast seems to have read *συνορμένων*, and *συνορμένῳ στρατῶ* is an obvious possibility among others.

425. εὐμόρφων δὲ κολοσσῶν
ἔχθεται χάρις ἀνδρί,
ὀμμάτων δ' ἐν ἀχηνίαις
ἔρρει πᾶσ' Ἀφροδίτα.

There is a passage curiously reminiscent of this in Alcidas *Soph.* 27, 28. ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῦτα (τὰ ἀγάλματα) μμήματα

τῶν ἀληθινῶν σωμάτων ἐστί, καὶ τέρψιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς θεωρίας ἔχει χρῆσιν δ' οὐδεμίαν τῶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ παραδίδωσι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὁ γεγραμμένος λόγος... ἀκίνητος ὢν οὐδεμίαν ὠφέλειαν τοῖς κεκτημένοις παραδίδωσιν· ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἀνδριάντων καλῶν ἀληθινὰ σώματα πολὺ χείρους τὰς εὐμορφίας (so Dobree for εὐπορίας, Vahlen substitutes the much inferior εὐπρεπείας and is followed by Blass; εὐμόρφων in Aeschylus is in favour of Dobree) ἔχοντα πολλαπλασίους ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων τὰς ὠφελείας παραδίδωσιν, οὕτω καὶ λόγος ὁ... λεγόμενος ἐμφυχός ἐστι καὶ ζῆ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἔπεται καὶ τοῖς ἀληθέσιν ἀφωμοίωται σώμασιν, ὁ δὲ γεγραμμένος εἰκόνι [λόγου] τὴν φύσιν ὁμοίαν ἔχων ἀπάσης ἐνεργείας ἄμοιρος καθέστηκεν. (I bracket λόγου because it ruins the parallelism of the sentence. λόγος λεγόμενος : σῶμα :: λόγος γεγραμμένος : εἰκῶν).

Even Helen, I suppose, was less beautiful than a statue, but in the absence of the living eye all the love, which used to gain a reflected delight in contemplating the statue, has departed¹.

This passage is memorable for the worst conjecture, perhaps, ever perpetrated. Keck (τίς ποτ' ὠνόμαζεν ὧδε;) suggested *στρωμάτων* for *ὀμμάτων*. Helen took all the bed-clothes with her, it appears. Luckily no one has yet ventured on *σωμάτων*.

For the connexion of the whole passage, observe how beautifully Margoliouth's *ἄπιστος ἐμφανῶν* fits in with the rest. Menelaus stands there in silence; he cannot believe the evidence of his own eyes that Helen has fled; her image still seems to flit before him as mistress of her home²; as he gazes round him he sees beautiful statues which remind him of her, but the more beautiful they are, the more hateful they appear.

Und Marmorbilder stehn und sehn mich an:

Was hat man dir, du armes Kind, gethan?

431. μάταν γὰρ εὐτ' ἂν ἐσθλά τις δοκῶν ὀραῖν.

I cannot help thinking that this line once ended with *καραδοκῆ*. The letters got shuffled as often happened and

¹ "In the absence of Helen's eyes to light up each lifeless representation into Helen herself." PEILE.

² The old notion that the *φάσμα* may be Menelaus himself, which has been recently revived, seems to me quite ridiculous.

were patched up into some semblance of meaning. Cf. Eur. *Or.* 703:

καραδοκοῦντι κτήμα τιμιώτατον.

Then ἐσθλά τις is utterly impossible as Housman has observed, for τις is quite out of place here where nobody is in question except Menelaus, and ἐσθλά is contemptible. What of ἐς χλιδάς? *Supplices* 1014:

καὶ παρθένων χλιδαῖσιν εὐμόρφοις ἔπι
πᾶς τις παρελθὼν ὄμματος θελκτῆριον
τόξεν μ' ἔπεμψεν, ἰμέρου νικώμενος.

ἐς χλιδάς *καραδοκῆ* = "gazes with eagerness upon her charms." θ and χ are often confused, and ἐς θλιδάς might be well altered into ἐσθλά τις.

435. τὰ μὲν κατ' οἴκους ἐφεστίους ἄχη·
τὰ δ' ἔστι καὶ τῶνδ' ὑπερφατώτερα
τοπᾶν ἀφ' Ἑλλανος αἴας συνορμῆνοις.*
πένθος δὲ τηξικάρδιον
δόμοις ἐκάστου πρέπει.

ἐφεστίους Vossius, ἐφ' ἐστίας. τὰ δ' Halm, τὰδ'. ἔστι Verrall, ἐστί. ὑπερφατώτερα Herwerden, ὑπερβατώτερα. τοπᾶν Housman, τὸ πᾶν. ἀφ' Karsten, δ' ἀφ'. Ἑλλανος Bamberger, Ἑλλάδος. πένθος δὲ scripsi, πένθεια. τηξικάρδιος Auratus ex gloss., (τηξικάρδιον scripsi), τλησικάρδιος. δόμοις schol. (?), δόμφ' ὕ Dobree, δόμων MSS. See also above on 421.

This appalling list of corrections seems to me the least required to bring this passage into order. *τομᾶ τὸ πρῶγμα*. In this play we are dealing with a terribly corrupt text; that is generally admitted; in a corrupt text like this we must in accordance with the laws of chance expect to meet with some passages where there is a rain of errors, whilst in other places everything may be pretty smooth for a considerable number of lines together. If you doubt this try the experiment of tossing a penny a hundred times; more often than not you will get one or two heads or tails running and then a change, but here and there* you will get a run of six or seven. The application of this to such a text as that of *Agamemnon* is obvious.

I will begin by discussing the general drift of the whole passage. The Chorus has pictured the state of things in the palace, 435, τὰ κατ' οἴκους ἄχρη. They will proceed in 438—458 to describe the grief of those who have not gone on the expedition but lose their friends and relations upon it. Between these two pictures came something about the troops *συνορμένοις* from Greece. And it is pretty clear that the Chorus might be expected, in summing up the woes caused by Helen, to say something about the troubles of the army. We certainly seem to me to want the three clauses (1) such is the sorrow in the house of Menelaus, (2) the army also suffers, (3) their relations at home are in mourning.

Now the first set of troubles the Chorus might see at home, the second they could only guess. Hence if we take Halm's τὰ δ', accepted by Wecklein who is a good judge of the emendations of others, and combine it with Housman's *τοπᾶν*, we shall get the required sense without changing a single letter so far as these two corrections are concerned. "And other woes yet greater than these is it possible to conjecture among those who went forth together from Hellas." It is true that δ' has to be dropped after *τοπᾶν*, but I had already concluded that it must go before I turned to Wecklein's appendix and found it deleted by both Karsten and Naegelsbach.

The *Troades* is full of reminiscences of *Agamemnon*. There also Euripides makes Cassandra dilate on the troubles of the Greek army away from home, and then (379) turns to the mourning in Greece over the lost, τὰ δ' οἴκοι τοῖσδ' ὄμοι' ἐρίγνετο. A somewhat similar contrast is found again in *Ajax* 1021,

τοιαῦτα μὲν κατ' οἶκόν, ἐν Τροίᾳ δέ μοι
πολλοὶ μὲν ἐχθροὶ παῦρα δ' ὠφελήσιμα.

Next comes that wondrous couplet

πένθεια τλησικάρδιος
δόμων ἐκάστου πρέπει.

It is really heart-breaking to find a scholar of Headlam's calibre retaining the word *πένθεια*, but I cannot say more against it than has been said already by better men than myself. With it goes also his *ἀτλησικάρδιος*, and besides Auratus

is plainly right in restoring *τηξικάρδιος* from the gloss in h. Nobody would ever have glossed *τλησικάρδιος* by *τὴν καρδίαν τήκουσα*.

But if my view of the preceding lines is right, we must here have a connecting particle in place of the fish's tail of *πένθεια*. That the place where my particle is wanted is at present filled with rubbish encourages me to believe my general view of the passage correct. It would at least make sense to read *πένθος δὲ τηξικάρδιον*, though nothing else is to be said for it, but desperate diseases require desperate remedies.

It is possible that the peccant *δ'* in 457 is itself the *δὲ* which is missing in 458.

465. μένει δ' ἀκοῦσαι τί μου
μέριμνα νυκτηρεφές.

In the old alphabet ΝΤΚΤΕΡΕΦΕΣ would stand equally well for *νυκτηρεφής*, and this seems to me far preferable.

544. χαίρω· τεθνᾶναι δ' οὐκ ἀντερῶ θεοῖς.

In the Farnesian MS. and the scholion on 555 *οὐκέτ'* is read, probably being nothing but a conjecture by Triclinius. Every one of the restorations known to me is impossible because their authors have failed to grasp the sense required. The herald did not mean: "I no longer object to death." We are told by the Chorus at 555 what he said quite clearly enough. *ὡς νῦν τὸ σὸν δῆ, καὶ θανεῖν πολλὴ χάρις*. "We were so miserable that we echoed your complaint and often wished we were dead." Manifestly therefore in 544 he said: "I rejoice, and no longer pray for death, (as I have done daily for these ten years)."

Hence *ἀντερῶ* is as inexplicable as *τεθνᾶναι* itself; we must have a word meaning "pray for," not *against*. I believe he said:

χαίρω· θανεῖν δ' οὐκ ἄντομαι θεοῦς ἔτι.

ἄντομαι was corrupted to *ἀντερῶ* on account of *ἔρω*s in the next line, whether accidentally or because its author thought in some confused way that he was leading up to *ἔρω*s by it.

ἄντομαι is used with an infinitive by Aristophanes at *Thesm.* 977. The infinitive after a verb of praying may have

two meanings; generally ἄντομαί σε θανεῖν would mean "I pray you to die," but it also may mean "I pray you for death" as here. Much stranger is τὴν ἐγὼ θαμὰ θεοῖς ἀρῶμαι πημονῆς ἄτερ λαβεῖν at *Trach.* 47.

θανεῖν Franz, adopted by several critics and recently again commended by Petersen, *Rhein. Mus.* 66, p. 20.

561.

τί δ' οὐ

στένοντες οὐ λαχόντες ἡμатов μέρος;

Headlam's objection to Margoliouth's ἀσχάλλοντες (or -ας), that it "would require a second negative," is entirely baseless. If οὐ went with στένοντες it is true that it would have to be repeated with ἀσχάλλοντες, but it does not; it goes with μέρος, τί δ' οὐ μέρος = πᾶν δὲ μέρος. Hence it appears on consideration that what is wrong in our text is, among other things, exactly that second οὐ, and the objection ends by proving a defence.

But admitting ἀσχάλλοντες to be the most probable conjecture, if not absolutely certain, there is still no construction about the sentence. Then too the next line starts off with τὰ δ' αὐτε χέρσῳ, and yet we have not had a word about the sea. Supply therefore after 562 some line like

πόνους θαλάσσης εἶχομεν πολλῶ σάλῳ;

This simple device clears up the construction, supplies a proper antithesis to the "ill-laid berths" just above in the toil by day upon the tossing ship, leads up naturally to τὰ δ' αὐτε χέρσῳ, and gives a reason hitherto lacking for the groaning and lamentation.

616. οὐδ' οἶδα τέρψιν οὐδ' ἐπίψογον φάτιν
ἄλλου πρὸς ἀνδρὸς μᾶλλον ἢ χαλκοῦ βαφάς.

It seems a very absurd thing for Clytemnestra to say that she knows delight from any other man no more than she knows some secret of metallurgy or some impossibility. οἶδα is used first to mean "experience" and then to mean "knowledge" of a scientific kind. What anybody would be likely to say would surely be: "As bronze knoweth not of the dipping, so I—etc." Thus at 334 she says again: "As oil and vinegar will not mix, so the voice of conqueror and conquered is

discordant" (where by the way to refuse Auratus' φίλω for φίλωσ is to refuse sense for nonsense). Hence I think that we should here accept, also from Auratus, χαλκός for χαλκοῦ, truly χρύσεια χαλκείων.

The conjecture becomes almost a certainty when we reflect that the author of *Christus patiens*, as first pointed out by Porson, read χαλκός¹. His authority is quite equal to that of our MSS. of *Agamemnon*. It is true that the Virgin in that line also says τινός πρὸς ἀνδρός, but that is a necessary alteration on the part of the author, for the Virgin obviously could not keep ἄλλου πρὸς ἀνδρός.

Antipho, whether the orator or the sophist is uncertain, is reported to speak of βάψιν χαλκοῦ καὶ σιδήρου (frag. 158 Blass). But Pollux, who reports this, does not say that these words come straight out of Antipho, or that he spoke of βάψις of the two metals in the same context at all; he is only interested in the word βάψις itself. Antipho might have said in one place that there is no βάψις χαλκοῦ and have spoken in another place of the ordinary dipping of iron. In fact nothing can be built upon the citation any way at all; only it helps to dispose of the scholiast's guess that Aeschylus here uses χαλκοῦ for σιδήρου (as Pindar no doubt does at *Pyth.* iii 85).

"Proclus in Hesiod. *Op.* 142, et Eustath. *ad Il.* A. 236, tradunt aes apud veteres calidum in aquam frigidam demersum fuisse, quo durius fieret." Blomfield. Antipho may have said the same thing. Well, suppose the ancients *did* "dip bronze." Then the dipping of bronze could not become a proverb for something that does *not* happen. If pigs *did* sometimes fly, their incapacity for levitation would not have become proverbial. But I believe that Proclus and Eustathius were misled by the poetical use of χαλκός for metal in general, just as the translators of the English bible were misled into translating χαλκεὺς by "copper-smith."

639. πῶς γὰρ λέγεις χεῖμῶνα ναυτικῶ στρατῶ
ἐλθεῖν τελευτηῆσαι τε δαιμόνων κότῳ;

There is not one of my readers who could not have filled up

¹ Brambs reads χαλκοῦ however in *C.P.* without remark, χαλκός is the reading of the Benedictine editors.

the last line with something better than this irrelevant and pointless *τελευτήσαι τε*, and who are we that we should write better verse than Aeschylus? But nobody seems to have ventured on a correction except Badham, and he can hardly have been content with *τε λυσσήσαι τε* himself.

Suppose Aeschylus had written *καταστράψαι τε*, suppose this had been copied as *καταστρέψαι τε*. Then Suidas gives us the gloss: *καταστρέψαντες, τελευτήσαντες. καταστροφή, τέλος*. Of course he meant "dead," but if *τελευτᾶν* was the regular gloss on *καταστρέφειν* in any sense, it might well enough be written here also.

But Aeschylus did not write *καταστράψαι τε* for two reasons. *Ζεὺς μὲν καταστράπτει, χειμῶν δὲ οὐ*. And *ἐλθεῖν* does not go well with another verb and a connecting particle; cf. *Persae* 442:

λέξον τίν' αὐ φῆς τήνδε συμφορὰν στρατῶ
ἐλθεῖν κακῶν ῥέπουσαν ἐς τὰ μᾶσσονα.

We must go further afield. The right verb for *χειμῶν* would be *ἐπαιγίζειν* or *κατασκήπτειν* or the like¹. If Aeschylus wrote *ΚΑΤΑΣΚΕΠΣΑΝΤΑ*, the change to *καταστρέψαντα* is trifling, and the gloss *τελευτήσαντα* got into the text with little enough further depravation, *ὡς γλωττα*.

649. Read *μὲν τοι* as two words. The *μὲν* echoes that in 645 and *τοι* is appropriate.

655. ξυνώμοσαν γὰρ, ὄντες ἔχθιστοι τὸ πρίν,
πῦρ καὶ θάλασσα, καὶ τὰ πίστ' ἔδειξάτην
φθείροντε τὸν δύστηνον Ἀργείων στρατόν
* * * * *
ἐν νυκτὶ δυσκύμαντα δ' ὠρώρει κακά.

That something has been lost after 657 is plain as daylight, though why Keck should desiderate *three* verses is more than I can guess. But just consider whether any decent third-rate poet would start with the reconciliation of fire and water and then go on to say not a word of fire but add the miserably feeble statement that it was a stormy night. I say nothing of

¹ *στρόμβον καταγίζοντα* frag. 195 (Dind.).

the position of δ' in 658, for Aeschylus often keeps back his connecting particles. Is it not certain that something like

ἔξ οὐρανοῦ μὲν ἐρράγησαν ἀστραπαὶ
ἐν νυκτί, δυσκύμαντα δ' ὠρώρει κακά

was the original? Look too at the way in which Euripides reproduces this passage in *Troades* 80—83. Ovid, *Ibis* 341, Utque ferox periit et fulmine et aequore raptor.

Then δὲ falls into its proper place, and ἐν νυκτί, which in the MSS. is pointless, recovers its proper force. The difference between νυκτός and ἐν νυκτί is this; νυκτός means "by night" as a note of time only, ἐν νυκτί means "in the dark." Thus Thucydides, vii 80, says τῆς δὲ νυκτός ἐδόκει... ἀπάγειν τὴν στρατιάν, "in the night they determined, etc." Then καύσαντες πυρὰ πολλὰ ἐχώρουν ἐν τῇ νυκτί, "they began their march in the dark," and again, "panics are apt to attack armies ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐν νυκτί τε καὶ διὰ πολεμίας ἰούσιν." Where he simply contrasts the *time* of night with that of day he says νυκτός, where he lays stress on the *conditions* he says ἐν νυκτί with or without the article. Xenophon *Hellenica* vi iv 26, μάλα δὲ χαλεπῶς πορευόμενοι οἶα δὴ ἐν νυκτί τε καὶ ἐν φόβῳ ἀπίοντες καὶ χαλεπὴν ὁδόν. *Symp.* i 9, ὅταν φέγγος τι ἐν νυκτί φανῇ. [Aristot.] *Problem.* xi 33. Lucian *Toxaris* 20, 21. *Etym. genuin.* γλαυξ...ἐν νυκτί ὄραν δυνάμενον.

The tragedians do not always observe the distinction; at least it does not look as if νυκτί or ἐν νυκτί at *Trach.* 149, *Hippol.* 106, *Alcest.* 357, differed in any way from νυκτός. Nor indeed do they ever use ἐν νυκτί in the prose way at all except in this line of *Agamemnon*, but φῶς ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φέρων is just the same at 527. Compare πῦρ διαπρέπει νυκτί in Pindar, *Ol.* i 2. If the dative is qualified by a poet, as ἐν νυκτί τῇ νῦν, ἐν χειμερίᾳ νυκτί, that of course is another story.

The author of *Axiochus*, full of "mauvais lyrisme" as he is, says νυκτί at 367 C when he means νυκτός.

679.

Μενέλεων γὰρ οὖν

πρώτον τε καὶ μάλιστα προσδόκα μολεῖν.
εἰ δ' οὖν.....

I would combine Bothe's γὰρ ἂν and Badham's προσδοκῶ.

I take the meaning to be: "as for Menelaus, I think that he would have got home" *sc.* if he had been alive. The speaker shrinks from continuing his thought, because it were ill-omened to blurt out, "but as it is, the presumption is that he is dead." Then after this ellipse he goes on with δ' οὖν to suggest that if he is alive after all he will turn up some day.

πρῶτον on this view is masculine; cf. Plat. *Charmides* 157 A δεῖν οὖν ἐκείνο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα θεραπεύειν, where πρῶτον clearly agrees with ἐκείνο¹. The meaning then is that Menelaus ought to have got home first of all the army. Instead of saying *ought to have* done so, the herald substitutes the conditional ἂν μολεῖν, because of the latent thought in his mind, εἰ ἔζη. As he is not back first, the conclusion is that he is dead. καὶ μάλιστα means, "he if anybody." εἰ δ' οὖν is then properly used to go back to the point after the suppressed clause.

The γὰρ after Μενέλεων also requires explanation on this view. "We talk of them as dead, though they may not be so. γένοιτο δ' ὡς ἄριστα, for though I think M. ought to have returned first and therefore fear he is dead, yet if he is alive—."

736. ἐκ θεοῦ δ' ἱερεύς τις Ἄ-
τας δόμοις προσετράφη.

"A sort of priest of Death was—by God to the house." Ask any one you like to fill up the missing word and see whether they will babble about "reared" or "turned" or "rubbed." If Heath's προσεθρέφθη (a word neither known nor here construable) or Verrall's προσετράφθη or J. B. Bury's προσετρίφθη were in the MSS., I might make a shift to deceive myself into thinking that a poet might have written it. But as it is, we are driven to supplying the necessary word as well as we can. A priest is "appointed" or "ordained," and there are at least two good words for this in Greek, not very far from προσετράφη. Against προεγράφη there are three deadly objections, against προσετάχθη there are none that I can see. Cf. *Hebrews* v 10, προσαγορευθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ

¹ See also Headlam's note.

Θεοῦ ἀρχιερεὺς κατὰ τὴν τάξιν Μελχισεδέκ. The corruption might come through προσετάθη easily enough.

740. ἀκασκαῖον ἄγαλμα πλούτου.

Read ἀκασκαῖοι' ἄγαλμα. Aeschylus elsewhere uses this genitive in -οιο and we know now from the papyrus of Bacchylides that its elision was a matter of course. The first critic to introduce it in modern times was I believe Porson at *Hecuba* 465.

807. τῷ δ' ἐναντίῳ κύτει

Ἐλπίς προσήει χεῖρὸς οὐ πληρουμένη.

The meaning must clearly be that the Trojans hoped, but their hope was empty and vain. Such a hope may be poetically described as "empty-handed." Perhaps then we should combine suggestions of Bothe and Schütz, and read χεῖρας οὐ πληρουμένη. Cf. 1219, χεῖρας κρεῶν πλήθοντες.

893. τερπνὸν δὲ τὰναγκαῖον ἐκφυγεῖν ἅπαν.

Cf. Theognis 472 :

πάν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον χρῆμ' ἀνηρὸν ἔφυ.

924. ΚΛ. ἠϋξῶ θεοῖς δείσας ἂν ᾧδ' ἔρξειν τάδε ;

ΑΓ. εἶπερ τις εἰδὼς γ' εὐ τὸδ' ἐξεῖπεν τέλος.

ἔρξειν Headlam, ἔρδειν. ἐξεῖπεν Auratus, ἐξεῖπον.

It is rather violent, but I feel sure that for δείσας we ought to read πεισθείς. Violent it is, but worse corruptions than this are common enough, without rhyme or reason, even in printed books. Everybody knows this, even if they will not act upon the knowledge. To say that Clytemnestra asks whether Agamemnon would have vowed to walk upon purple if he had got into a fright is unsatisfactory on more grounds than one. The language could only imply that he made the vow in a moment of panic in hope of extricating himself from a tight place ; if so, he could not wait to get information or orders from a competent authority, εἰδὼς εὐ¹. And a man in a fright does not make such a vow as this. Nor does Agamemnon's answer

¹ Cf. *Iliad* i 384 :

ἄμμι δὲ μάντις
εὐ εἰδὼς ἀγόρευε θεοπροπίας ἐκάτοιο.

suit the question. Ask him if he would have vowed in a fright, and he will answer by repelling the insinuation of cowardice or by saying he does not know what he might not have done in an unreflecting moment, or something of the sort. But ask him: "Would you have vowed this in obedience to the gods?" and of course he answers: "Yes, if their will had been declared to me by one with full knowledge of it."

Auratus with his wonderful instinct saw that ἐξείπεν must be read, that the king must mean he would have vowed the vow if he had had orders from heaven, and that the conditional ἤξω ἂν is naturally followed by εἰ with an indicative, which the MSS. reading does not allow.

It may be said that there is no obvious reason why Clytemnestra should have suggested orders from the gods any more than panic, but it can be shewn out of her own mouth that this notion is one which comes naturally into her mind. For in the speech with which she ushers the king into the palace she recurs again unnecessarily to a similar idea; she would have vowed much trampling of many garments *if she had been so ordered* in any house of oracle; she does not talk about fearing anything but about obeying the gods.

Except for δείσας I agree entirely with Headlam's notes on these two lines.

930. ὁ δ' ἀφθόνητός γ' οὐκ ἐπίζηλος πέλει.

My instinct clamours aloud for οὐδ' ἐπίζηλος. In 932 καὶ would be sadly missed if it were absent, and δέ γε καὶ there is like δέ γ' οὐδ' here, with a difference.

934. πιθοῦ· κρατεῖς μὲν τοι παρεῖς ἐκὼν ἐμοί.

Compare Publilius Syrus: "Nec vincitur sed vincit qui cedit suis," on which the commentators quote Calpurnius Flaccus *decl.* 21: "Cede fratri, cede vel patri; victor eris, mihi crede, si cesseris."

κρατεῖς Weil, κράτος. μὲν τοι Blomfield, μέντοι. πάρες γ' MSS., παρεῖς γ' Weil, γ' del. Wecklein.

950. ἰσάργυρον is incorrectly expressed, insomuch that Headlam has been driven to take it to mean *only* worth its

weight in silver, cheap. When a tragic poet is loading his language with double meanings he often sacrifices the literal sense, and makes the speaker say something which on the face of it is no sense at all. The opening of this speech, as Verrall notes, is intended to suggest the crimson stain of blood; "there is a sea in the house of Atreus producing crimson to stain all our garments, crimson of great price because it is the blood of man. No fear of *that* ever running dry." Hence the ominous *ισάργυρον*, which however in the ostensible meaning of the speech has no point.

952. οἶκος δ' ὑπάρχει τῶνδε σὺν θεοῖς, ἀναξ,
ἔχειν· πένεσθαι δ' οὐκ ἐπίσταται δόμος.

What does *τῶνδε* mean? Grammatically it might refer to either *εἰμάτων* or *βαφάς*. Clytemnestra means ostensibly the former, but in her heart she is thinking of the latter. That too is why she uses the extraordinary expression *πένεσθαι δ' οὐκ ἐπίσταται δόμος*. It is a shocking piece of style in the ostensible meaning, but the secret meaning is that "the house of Atreus does not know how (despite all endeavours) to be poor in bloodshed."

Aeschylus cannot always be acquitted of clumsiness, but this *οἶκος* and *δόμος* is intolerable. Nor can *οἶκος ὑπάρχει τῶνδε* be defended; nor yet is any conjecture satisfactory; Wecklein's *ἄλβος* would be attractive if *ἄλβος* ever had a genitive depending on it. *οι* and *α* are easily confused; did the poet say *ἄλις*? Cf. 1656, *πημάτων δ' ἄλις γ' ὑπάρχει*. Donaldson thought that *ἄλις* in 1659 was a corruption of *ἄκος*, and from *ἄκος* to *οἶκος* is but a step.

1013. προφθάσασα καρδία
γλώσσαν ἂν τὰδ' ἐξέχει.

I do not wish to see worse nonsense than this, but if anybody does want to see it let him read Paley's note. The Chorus mean to say that their hearts are full of gloom, but they do not know why and therefore they do not prophesy anything definite. If they did not reflect that "one law limits another" by divine providence, their tongues would run away

with them and pour out some definite prognostication of misfortune. Schütz accordingly reads:

προφθάσασα καρδίαν
γλώσσα πάντ' ἂν ἐξέχει.

He gets the tongue and heart into their proper places, but his πάντα is no sense to speak of. Yet it is better than τάδε, for τάδε is no sense at all. The tongue of the Chorus is pouring forth "these things," they are saying what they are saying. The conditional ἂν ἐξέχει shews that they mean that they would be saying something else. What Aeschylus wrote was

προφθάσασα καρδίαν
γλώσσ' ἂν ἐξέχει κακά.

The corruption was started either by loss of κακά, or more likely by the dittography γλωσσαναν; then γλώσσαν being separated out compelled the change of καρδίαν to καρδία and the limping metre was corrected by insertion of the nonsensical τάδ' and ejection of κακά.

1104. ἄλλ' ἄρκυς ἢ ξύνευνος, ἢ ξυναιτία
φόνου· στάσις δ' ἀκόρετος γένει
κατολολυξάτω
θύματος λευσίμου.

The explanations of ξυναιτία φόνου are obviously untenable. Dr Verrall reads ξυναιτία· φόνου στάσις δ', asserting that to stop after φόνου spoils the rhythm, and that στάσις must go with φόνου. On the latter point I agree, but on rhythm I prefer the opinion of Aeschylus, who stops at the same place in the antistrophe; he did not then consider that there was any harm in that. However even Verrall's ingenuity suggests no meaning for ξυναιτία. Read ξυνεστία (or if necessary ξυνέστιος). The hearth is the symbol of the family affections; εὐνή and ἐστία go well together, both being violated by Clytemnestra; compare 704, τραπέζας καὶ ξυνεστίου Διός. Herodian, *Hist.* III x 8, ὡς μήτε εὐνῆς μήτε ἐστίας κοινωνεῖν.

The late position of δὲ though so common in Aeschylus may have often caused corruption, and very likely did here. As ξυνεστία φόνου must have seemed absurd even to the

ancient editors of Aeschylus, it was badly emended, and this accounts for *ξυναιτία*. It always seems to me that Bentley's *ἐμοὶ φόβος γὰρ* is the best correction yet proposed at 14; there some early scribe in like manner punctuated after *ἐμοί*, which in consequence had to be altered to *ἐμήν*.

λευσίμου had better be left alone altogether than altered to such things as *γενσίμου* or *λουσίμου*. I do not jest; both those words have been proposed in print. But to get anything which shall be at once poetically acceptable and palaeographically probable is beyond me; the nearest I can think of is *δυστόνου*.

1110. ἐπὶ δὲ καρδίαν ἔδραμε κροκοβαφῆς
σταγῶν ἄτε καὶ δορία πτώσιμος
ξυνανύτει βίου
δύντος αὐγαῖς.

ἄτε can scarcely be right. How could the Chorus say that there runs back to their hearts the blood *which* etc.? It is not the blood of the dying gladiator, for example, which runs back to your heart if you turn pale, it is your own blood. In fact we have to get out of *ἄτε* the meaning of *ὡς*, and *ὥστε* is I believe what Aeschylus wrote. The copyists were puzzled by *ὥστε* in this sense; thus at 1671 they corrupted it against the metre into *ὥσπερ*. It is also possible that *ἄτε* may have arisen by wrong transliteration of *O* in the old alphabet; *ὄστε* would be then changed to *ἄτε* to correct the gender. In Thuc. vii 24 on the other hand *ἄτε* has been corrupted to *ὥστε* in all MSS. except B.

For the rest of the line Casaubon's *καὶ δορὶ πτωσίμοις* still seems the best reading. The whole sentence is obscure and loosely expressed, but I take it to mean: "The blood runs back to my heart and I turn pale in consequence, even as men turn pale when dying of a spear-wound"; *ora modis pallentia miris* says Virgil of such a warrior. But Aeschylus first confuses the colour of the bloodless cheek with that of the blood itself, and then goes on to say "as *it* comes to an end in dying men along with the last rays of life" when he ought to have said "as the dying man grows pale."

1145. πτεροφόρον δέμας

This means "a body bearing wings or feathers." The sense ought to be "a wing-borne body," as Swinburne rightly translates it in *On the Cliffs*. Accent therefore πτερόφορον, and compare e.g. θεόφορος with θεοφόρος.

Cf. *Iliad* xix 386 :

τῷ δ' εὔτε πτερὰ γίνετ' ἄειρε δὲ ποιμένα λαῶν.

1193. ἡμαρτον ἢ τηρῶ τι τοξότης τις ὄς;

The antithesis to ἀμαρτεῖν is κυρεῖν or τυχεῖν, an archer does not "hunt" but "hits," and if Cassandra had wanted to talk about hunting she would not have said τοξότης but κυνηγέτης. Consequently Canter's θηρῶ is here as absurd as τηρῶ itself or as τήκω or anything else to be had for the sake of keeping three letters instead of two. And κυρῶ (H. L. Ahrens) would in reality be quite as easily corrupted into τηρῶ as θηρῶ would.

To suppose that the whole virtue of a correction is in proportion to the number of letters which it keeps is to forget the object we are aiming at. The virtue of a correction consists in restoring what an author must, or at least might, have written, not what he never could have written at all. Given the first indispensable requirement, sense, it will then be time to begin counting letters.

Compare the corruption of τυρῶ to κηρῶ in Aristotle *Hist. An.* 557^b 6.

1206. ἢ καὶ τέκνων εἰς ἔργον ἠλθέτην ὁμοῦ;

Elmsley's ἠλθέτην for the MSS. ἤλθετον is right, though accidentally, for the grounds on which he proposed it are much too doubtful. But the scansion demands it, since Butler's ὁμοῦ for νόμφ is manifestly right also. νόμφ cannot mean "in course" as Headlam translates it, that is φύσει. And to talk about any law regulating the loves of gods and mortals would be too absurd.

On the dual forms see Monro *Hom. Gr.* § 5.

1228. οὐκ οἶδεν οἷα γλώσσα μισητῆς κυνὸς
 λείξασα καὶ σήνασα, φαιδρωποῦ δίκην
 ἄτης λαθραίου, τεύξεται κακῇ τύχη.

λέξασα MSS., corr. Tyrwhitt. κτείναςα MSS., corr. Wakefield. φαιδρόνους MSS., φαιδρωπός Wakefield, φαιδρωποῦ scripsi.

If we are going to surrender to the MSS., we may as well stick to *κτείναςα*. Did not the tongue of Clytemnestra end by killing Agamemnon? But no, editors will have none of it; what they substitute is a variety entertainment of which I decline to put down here the items. I am no fanatical admirer of Aeschylus, but one must draw the line somewhere. For Wakefield's *σήνασα* there is one thing to be said; it is poetry and it is sense. For *κτείναςα* there is one thing to be said; it is there in the MSS. For the other readings you can say neither the one thing nor the other. And after all what is the difference between ΚΤΕΝΑΣΑ and ΣΕΝΑΣΑ? Not that I assert the corruption to have come in at that stage; it may have arisen at any time. Shelley wrote *printless*, Mrs Shelley published first *mouthless* and then *monthless*¹, and people talk of the impossibility of a scribe with *σήνασα* before him writing *κτείναςα*!

But indeed there is not only one thing but a great deal to be said for *σήνασα*; it will all be found in Headlam's note, and need not be repeated; it is curious to read that note and see how Headlam all the time escapes his own notice defending *σήνασα* through thick and thin.

However I am here mainly concerned with the next word, *φαιδρόνους*. Everybody must have felt how unsatisfying is this epithet as applied to *γλώσσα*, and rhythm along with comparison of many other passages leads us to expect a genitive here before *δίκην*. Consequently Kirchhoff's *φαιδρόνου* is a great improvement. In favour of it also at first sight is *Persae* 97:

φιλόφρων γὰρ παρασαίνει
 βροτὸν εἰς ἄρκυας Ἄτα.

At first sight, but for all that *φαιδρόνου* will hardly do; it

¹ Forman's note in Trelawny's *Letters*, p. 57.

is evident from the passages quoted in the lexica that φιλόφρων is right enough, "welcoming hospitably," but for justification of φαιδρόνους one looks in vain. The word is never seen again, and "bright-minded" is no sense. Then too the lion-cub of 726, as restored by Weil and Auratus, φαιδρωπῶς ποτὶ χεῖρα σαίνοντα, is greatly in favour of Wakefield's φαιδρωπὸς here. Only φαιδρωπὸς is again an absurd epithet for γλῶσσα, and again we want a genitive. Read then φαιδρωποῦ, and so we get a pointed contrast between the external smile and the inward treachery. It is possible that ΦΑΙΔΡΟΠΟ was misread as φαιδρόπου, rivalling in absurdity φαιδρὸν οὖς itself, that this was then wrongly altered to φαιδρόνου and corrupted further by accident to φαιδρόνους.

1289. *ἰούσα κἀγὼ τλήσομαι ἐὸ κατθανεῖν.
ὀμώμοται γὰρ ὄρκος ἐκ θεῶν μέγας.
"Αἶδου πύλας δὲ τάσδ' ἐγὼ προσεννέπω.*

Such is the order of these lines in the MSS. The second of them has long been transplanted to its proper place, the third remains cumbering the ground. Both were added at the foot of a page in some ancestor of our MSS., and it is easy to see where 1291 ought to go. It will find a place quite well after 1275:

*ἀπήγαγ' ἐς τοιάσδε θανασίμους τύχας·
"Αἶδου πύλας δὲ τάσδ' ἐγὼ προσεννέπω,
βωμοῦ πατρώου δ' ἀντ' ἐπίξηνον μένει.*

Ἄπολλο has haled her to this doom of death, brought her to the gates of the palace which may rather be called gates of Hell, and within these gates she foresees the block for the altar.

κἀγὼ Heath, *πράξω* MSS. No one with any feeling for style can doubt the correction. *τάσδ' ἐγὼ* Auratus, *τὰς λέγω* MSS.

1358. *τοῦ δρῶντός ἐστι καὶ τὸ βουλευσαί περὶ.*

This is plainly impossible; we cannot supply τοῦ δράματος after περὶ, nor can περὶ here mean "exceedingly." In meditating a remedy I devised and rejected as again impossible three conjectures; three scholars before me have been more

hasty, for all three conjectures are to be found in Wecklein's appendix. Then I hit upon another, which is at least good Greek and good sense. Read τοῦ δρῶντός ἐστι καὶ τὸ βουλευσαί πρέπον. The use of πρέπον with the auxiliary verb is very common, but the construction of πρέπον with a genitive might throw the scribes out; it is found however in *Ajax* 534, [Plato] *Menæxenus* 239 c, and in Thucyd. iii 59 the true reading is ὡς πρέπον ἰμῶν. Either πέρι is a bad guess by somebody who could not construe the line and thought to mend it by changing πρέπον to the πέρι which so often follows βουλεύω, and hoping it might mean something; or else, which is more likely, some letters were lost at the end of the line, leaving ΠΡΕΙ or the like.

1479. ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ ἔφως αἱματολοιχὸς
τρέφεται καὶ νῆ, πρὶν καταλῆξαι
τὸ παλαιὸν ἄχος, νέος ἰχώρ.

νείρει τρέφεται MSS., corr. Housman. Headlam justly objects to ἰχώρ that it cannot mean *blood*, but there is no need to change it. "The lust for blood is fed by that Evil Spirit, and ever flows fresh corruption before the ancient wound be healed." The idea of a recrudescent wound or sore is familiar to tragedy; the new ἰχώρ is purulent matter discharging again from it.

1547. τίς δ' ἐπιτύμβιον αἶνον ἐπ' ἀνδρὶ θείῳ
σὺν δακρύοις ἰάπτων
ἀλαθείᾳ φρενῶν πονήσει;

ἐπιτύμβιος αἶνος MSS. corr. Vossius. ἀληθείᾳ MSS., corr. Dindorf. The MSS. reading is untenable, for though a mourner might be said *πονεῖν*, his praise certainly could not. Unless indeed you mean that it was badly sung. *ναῦς πονεῖ*, a ship labours in the sea, *αἶνος πονεῖ*, an encomium halts.

With the amended reading we still are in trouble. The grammar is faultless, but after all Aeschylus was a poet and a man of sense; he had not debauched his mind with *ductus litterarum* to the exclusion of all other considerations nor yet with the defence of clerical blundering. No man of sense, no

poet, would ever say: "Who uttering praises over the hero shall labour?" To avoid this commentators take the words to mean "Sorrow with sincerity of heart." But *πονείν* never refers to heart-ache or sorrow; what Liddell and Scott mean by referring to *Iliad* ix 12 for this Heaven only knows.

Read *ὀνήσει*. Praise of the dead may be presumed to be a comfort to him if sincere. The Chorus naturally ask who is to bury or praise him; "wilt thou bury him, who didst murder him? who shall comfort him with praise? thou canst not, for thy praise would be hypocritical."

If anybody likes to accept this and on the strength of it replace *ἐπιτύμβιος αἶνος*, it can no longer be said that the nominative involves any absurdity. But the intransitive *λάπτων* here is most unlikely, despite *Supp.* 556.

Cf. frag. 257 (Dind.) *καὶ τοὺς θανόντας εἰ θέλεις εὐεργετεῖν*.

1583. Ἄτρεὺς γὰρ ἄρχων τῆσδε γῆς, τούτου πατήρ,
πατέρα Θυέστην τὸν ἐμόν, ὡς τορῶς φράσαι,
αὐτοῦ τ' ἄδελφον.

H. Wolf reduced this intolerable stuff into more decent order by omitting all the words after *Θυέστην*. But *πατέρα Θυέστην*, so left naked, could not mean "my father Thyestes."

Read *πατέρα τὸν ἐμόν*. On this *Θυέστην* was added as a gloss, and then the senseless rubbish *ὡς τορῶς φράσαι* and the irrelevant *αὐτοῦ τ' ἄδελφον* (which Elmsley notes to be ungrammatical and emends to *αὐτοῦ δ'*) were added to piece out the metre.

It will be said that *τορῶς* is not like an interpolator's style. On the contrary an interpolator would just like to put such a word in, exactly as we do when we mimic Aeschylus "with moulded lines less lovely than his own." Look for instance at that precious couplet *Ajax* 841, 2 with its Aeschylean *τῶς*, its truly tragic *φιλίστων* and its Ionic *ὄλοϊατο*.

1601. λάκτισμα δείπνου ξυνδίκως τιθεὶς ἀρᾶ.

For the symbolic overthrowal of the table compare Schol. Lycophr. 481, where Zeus after a similar cannibal feast *ὀργισθεὶς ἀνέτρεψε τὴν τράπεζαν*. It seems that the expression had

become proverbial. Lycophron 137 says of Paris *λάξας τράπεζαν* (*Μενελάου*), the kicking here meaning only what Aeschylus calls *τραπέζας ἀτίμωσιν*. Andocides i 130, *Ἰππόνικος ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἀλειπήριον τρέφει, ὃς αὐτοῦ τὴν τράπεζαν ἀνατρέπει*.

1613. *σὺ δ' ἄνδρα τόνδε φῆς ἐκὼν κατακτανεῖν,
μόνος δ' ἔποικτον τόνδε βουλευσαι φόνον.*

Surely this sentence is interrogative. "You confess, do you?"

1625. *γύναι, σὺ τοὺς ἤκοντας ἐκ μάχης μένων
οἰκουρός, εὐνήν ἀνδρὸς αἰσχύνων ἅμα.*

μέων Wieseler, *νέων* MSS. *αἰσχύνων* Keck, *αἰσχύνουσ'* MSS. If these changes are right, as I believe them to be, they involve another, *ἤξοντας* for *ἤκοντας*. For Aegisthus was waiting (*ἔμμενεν*) not for those who had returned but those who should return.

People who prefer logic to poetry will argue that *τοὺς ἤκοντας* = *Ἀγαμέμνονα*, and that Agamemnon really has returned at the date when the Chorus is speaking. Poets do not talk like that. "You lay here in wait for the king's return" demands a future participle.

But at 1224 *μολόντι* is right, because *βουλευεῖν* is not an imperfect but a present.

1653. *δεχομένοις λέγεις θανεῖν σε.*

It is not easy to see how this could mean anything but "You say that you are dead," or else "you bid yourself to die," and even then it would be odd enough; *λέγεις* "*θανεῖν*" is right here, but that leaves *σε* stranded; *λέγεις* "*θανεῖν*" *σε* cannot mean "you use the word *death* about yourself." To read *σὺ* is obvious and at least grammatical; but if it is to be emphatic, "you say it yourself," we should rather expect *αὐτός* than *σύ*; it does not altogether please me, but I see nothing better to be done. Had I been writing the line myself I would have said *δεχομένοις θανεῖν ἔλεξας*.

1657. *στείχετ' αἰδοῖοι γέροντες πρὸς δόμους, πεπρωμένοις
πρὶν παθεῖν εἴξαντες· ἀρκεῖν χρῆν τάδ' ὡς ἐπρά-
ξαμεν.*

Thus restored by Auratus (who only however got so far as ejecting *τούσδε* at the end of 1657), H. L. Ahrens, Madvig and Hermann among them, these lines are unimpeachable. Attempts to meddle with them further have only resulted in injury. The whole couplet is exactly like Thucydides v 93: *ὅτι ὑμῖν μὲν πρὸ τοῦ τὰ δεινότατα παθεῖν ὑπακούσαι ἂν γένοιτο, ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ διαφθείραντες ὑμᾶς κερδαίνομεν ἄν.*

ARTHUR PLATT.

NOTES ON THE *POETAE LATINI MINORES*.

CICERO, *De Consulatu Suo* 47—50.

Tum quis non artis scripta ac monumenta uolutans
uoces tristificas cartis promebat Etruscis?
omnes ciuili generosa stirpe profectam
uoluier ingentem cladem pestemque monebant.

49 e generosa *Baehrens*: generosa ab *vulg.* All editors seem to know what a *clades generosa stirpe profecta* is, and what a *ciuilis generosa stirps* is: but I can form no notion of either. *ciuili* is, I think, a corruption of *diuini*, soothsayers. Given this clue, it is easy to see in *omnes* the tail-end of an original *Lucmones*.

diuini is, in fact, nothing but a gloss upon *Lucmones*. *generosa* is a corruption of *genus Etrusca* (= *gen'etrusca*), and the line should read

Lucmones, genus Etrusca <de> stirpe profectum.

CICERO, *Odyssey* XII. 184 sqq.

8—9. nos graue certamen belli clademque tenemus
omniaque e latis rerum uestigia terris.

In l. 9 the MSS have *regum* for the *rerum* of all editors. Anyone who has the Homeric original before him

ἴδμεν δ' ὄσσα γένηται ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ

will think at once that *frugum*, rather than *rerum*, is the natural correction of *regum*. Moreover, the line of Cicero which editors offer is not Latin (what are *uestigia e latis terris*?), nor does it bear any close resemblance to the words of Homer which it purports to render. I take *regum uestigia* to be a corruption of *frugum uix indiga*, and would write

omneque <quod> celat frugum uix indiga tellus.

Celeuma.(Baehrens *P.L.M.* III. 167.)

13—14. Heia, uiri, nostrum reboans echo sonet heia.

†^eachoresultet portus† nos tamen heia.

Of many attempts to restore l. 14 none has been even plausible. The best is Peiper's *et chorus exultet Portuni: n. t. h*: the worst is Riese's *aequoreos uoluens fluctus ratio audiat heia*. Baehrens writes *aequore flet Corus: uocitemus nos tamen heia*. I fancy that the true reading is a good deal closer to the MS than any of these attempted restorations. Read

echo te pultet, portiscule: nos tamen heia.

The *portisculus*, the hammer of the *κέλευστής*, is appropriate enough to a *κέλευμα*. But the scribe when he came to this rather rare word left a blank space after the first half of it.

Incerti Ponticon Praefatio, 1—6.(Baehrens *P.L.M.* III. p. 172.)

Tethya marmoreo fecundam pandere ponto
 Et salis aequoreas spirantis mole cateruas
 Quaeque sub aestifluis Thetis umida continet antris
 Coeptantem, Venus alma, foue: quae semine caeli
 Parturiente salo, diuini germinis aestu
 Spumea purpurei dum sanguinat unda profundi,
 Nasceris e pelago, placido dea prosata mundo.

In l. 2 for *cateruas* I would suggest *cauernas*: and *spirantis*, which must be a blunder of some kind, may perhaps be a blunder for *wiridantis* (through *aequorea sbiridantis*). In 4 and 5 the three ablatives are very clumsy: and *semina* in 4 would be an easy alteration.

aequoreas cateruas might seem to be supported by *caerulas cateruas* in *Peruigilium Veneris* 10 (= 64). The whole of *Peruig. Ven.* 59—62, 9—26 (= 59—77) bears, though I have not seen it noted, a close resemblance to this passage. I transcribe ll. 59—62, 9—11 (= 59—65):—

Cras erit quom primus aether copulauit nuptias,
 Et pater totum creauit uernis annum nubibus.

In sinum maritus imber fluxit almae coniugis,	
Vnde fetus mixtus omnis aleret magno corpore.	62
Tunc cruore de superno spumeo pontus globo	9
Caerulas inter cateruas inter et bipedes equos	10
Fecit undantem Dionem de †maritis imbribus.	11

In 10 the *bipedes equi* are too grotesque to be even plausible: and one MS has *uipedes*. *uipedes*, written in capitals, is scarce distinguishable from *uirides*: and I would write

caerulas inter cauernas inter et uirides specus.

If this suggestion is at all probable it supports in a notable manner the conjecture *cauernas* in *Ponticon Praefatio* l. 2.

The *Ponticon Praefatio* is ascribed in the MSS to *Solinus*. Wernsdorf sees in it a work of Varro of Atax. The only Latin writer whom I can recall as credited by any ancient authority with the composition of a poem on the Sea is the unnamed friend of Ovid referred to in *Epist. ex Ponto* iv. 16. 21—22:

ueliulique maris uates eui credere possis
carmina caeruleos composuisse deos.

Now one of our MSS has 'Solini siue Garamanti.' The last word may be a blunder for *grammatici*: but it suggested to me the name of Arbronium Silo. Arbronium Silo was a poet contemporary with Ovid who is known to have written on mythological subjects. I would suggest, therefore, that the author of our poem is the person mentioned by Ovid in *Pontica* iv. 16: and if we identify him with Silo, the confusion *Silonis Solini* might explain how this fragment is found in the MSS of Solinus.

CLAUDIUS' *Ad Lunam*.

(Baehrens, *P.L.M.* III. p. 163.)

8—11. Tu sistro renouans brumam, tu cymbala quassas,
Isis Luna choris caelestis Iuno Cibile
alternis tu nomen agis sub mense diebus
et rursum renouas alterni lumina mensis.

Haupt Baehrens and Riese agree in finding the last two lines unintelligible. I find the first line equally unintelligible, and would restore the passage thus:—

Tu sistro resonas, Brimo, tu cymbala quassas;
 Isis Luna Core; uel Vesta es Iuno Cybebe;
septenis tu lumine eges sub mense diebus
 et rursum renouas alternis lumina mensis.

The Moon has *seven* appellations: and in each month its light fails for *seven* days, and is renewed again for *seven* days, turn and turn about (*alternis*). In other words, the seven names of the moon correspond to the number of days in which it alternately, in its last and first, and, again, in its second and third, quarters, waxes and wanes.

De Aue Phoenixe.

(Baehrens III. pp. 253 sqq.)

103—4. †creuerit in mensum subitus tempora certa
 seque oui teretis colligit in speciem.

creuerit perhaps represents *c̄pleuerit* = *compleuerit*. In that case

complerit mensum si fetus tempora certa,
 sese oui teretis colligit in speciem

will at any rate be nearer to the MSS than other conjectures: *sese* (104) is due to Heinsius. I would arrange 100—108 thus: 100, 103—4, 101—102, 107—108, 109—106. Various other transpositions have been attempted.

125—126. principio color est qualis sub sidere caeli
 mitia quae croceo punica grana legunt.

I accept from Baehrens in 125 *praecipuus* and, for *sub*, *sunt*. For *sidere* one MS has *siderę* = *siderae*. This line should then read thus

praecipuus color est quali sunt sidera caeli:

i.e. the principal colour is pale yellow. In 126 *quae croceo* is manifestly corrupt. Riese, the only modern editor who retains it, is obliged, in order to do so, to write *cortice* for *mitia*. *quae croceo* is, I think, a corruption of *prae-cocia* = *praecoqua*: and

mitia is merely a gloss upon *praecoqua*, and has crept into the text with the result that some words have become lost. Read

praecoqua (uel *qualis*) *punica grana tegit*.

(*tegit iam Leyser*). The colour is the pale yellow of the stars, or the pale yellow of early-ripe pomegranates (or the pale yellow (the poet continues) of the full-blown poppy). Nobody who looks at the emendations of this passage by modern editors will think the changes I suggest harsh. It is something to have got rid of the incongruous *sidere Cancri* which they all agree upon in 125.

This is, perhaps not the only place where a corruption of the word *praecoqua* has caused confusion in a Latin text. At Manilius iv. 173—4 the MSS offer:

*nauigat et celeris optando sortibus annos
dulcibus usuris aequo quoque tempora uendit:*

where I would suggest

*euigilat celeris optando sortibus annos:
dulcibus usuris praecocia faenera mandat.*

TIBERIANUS.

(Baehrens *P.L.M.* III. p. 264.)

i. 7. *et nemus fragrabat omne uiolarum spiritu.*

Baehrens suggests (sub) *spiritu* or (de) *spiritu*. Riese postulates *uīolarum*. But Tiberianus is a careful and skilful metrist. We ought perhaps to write *uiolarum suspiritu*.

i. 10. *auro flore praeminebat forma dionis rosa.*

Baehrens' alterations are violent. Riese's *auriflora* for *auro flore* is clever and probably right. With this correction, we might perhaps read *flamma Diones*. The rose is the torch of Venus, just as in the pretty poem *P.L.M.* v. p. 216, no. XIII. Cupid is urged to use it as *his* torch.

i. 12—14. *Fonte crebro murmurabant hinc et inde riuli:
antra muscus et uirentes intus uinxerant
quae fluenta labibunda guttis ibant lucidis.*

In 13 Baehrens writes *intus* (*myrtus*), Riese *intus* (*hederae*). Baehrens' supplement is clearly preferable: *myrtus* might easily

have become lost after *intus*. Both Baehrens and Riese transpose 14 with 13. It seems simpler to keep the MS order and merely to change *quae* in 14 to *qua*.

II. 1—2. aurum quod nigri manes, quod turbida uersant
flumina.

uersant looks like a blunder for *mersant*: cf. ll. 24—26.

II. 6. qua ductus saepe inlecebra micat impius ensis.

Should not *ductus* be *tectus* ('inlaid')?

II. 15—17. Sic etiam ut Troiam popularet Dorica pubes
aurum causa fuit: pretium dignissima merces.
infamem probro palmam conuendit adulter.

Baehrens marks a lacuna after *fuit* in '16. But the text seems sound enough: *pretium* means the 'money-value' of Troy. But I am not sure that in 17 we should not write *pretio* for *probro*.

In l. 27 Baehrens' text offers the strange word '*fuluor*,' = yellow-colour. This was the reading of the only MS which Baehrens had (a MS of the 15th century). Holder edited the poem from a 9th century Paris MS: and Holder's MS gives *fulgor*. The word *fuluor* thus disappears from the Latin language and, it is to be hoped, from the text of Catullus lxiv. 100 (*fuluore expalluit auri* both Baehrens and Postgate).

IV. 1—14. Omnipotens, annosa poli quem suspicit aetas,
quem sub millenis semper uirtutibus unum
nec numero quisquam poterit pensare nec aeuo,
nunc esto affatus, si quo te nomine dignum est,
quo sacer ignoto gaudes, quo maxima tellus
intremuit, sistunt rapidos uaga sidera cursus.
tu solus, tu multus item, tu primus et idem
postremus mediusque simul mundique superstes—
nam sine fine tui labentia tempora finis—
altera ab alterno spectans fera turbine certo
rerum fata rapi uitasque inuoluier aeuo
atque iterum reduces supera in connexa referri,
scilicet ut mundo redeat quod partibus astra
perdiderint refluxumque iterum per corpora fiat.

In 2, *uirtutibus* should, I think, be *contutibus*, 'under a thousand aspects one god.' The reference to the divine *virtues* is inapposite here. In 5 I conjecture *seu sacer*. In 6 R's *intremuit* is, I think, clearly preferable to the *intremit et* of the other MSS. Riese obelises 9, and both he and Baehrens obscure its sense by a faulty punctuation which I have corrected. The line is a parenthesis explaining *mundi superstes* (8). Riese has not perceived that *finis* is 2 sing. pres. indic. from the verb *finio*, 'you make an end of our transient times without any end of yourself.' In 10 V has *alter ab aeterno* which I have changed to *altera ab alterno*. (The other MSS have *altus ab aeterno*.) The human *fata* are borne along by a *turbo* which ebbs and flows (*alterno*). By *altera fata* I understand either of two terms in the contrast of birth and death. If this correction has any value, it gives great authority to V as against the other MSS. Accordingly in 13 I have accepted V's *astra*, and in 15 have written *perdiderint* for *perdiderit*. *partibus* in 14 stands for *partubus*. What the stars lose when they give birth to a human being must return to the sky (*mun-do*) and then again be made to flow through a mortal body (*corpora* PV is clearly right against *tempora* RS, Baehrens, Riese, in 14).

IV. 23—25.

Tu sexu plenus toto, tibi nascitur olim
 †hic deus hic mundus, domus hic hominumque deumque †
 lucens, Augusto stellatus flore iuuentae.

24 is mere nonsense, though Riese prints it, merely altering to *domus haec*. Baehrens writes *hic mundus cunctus, domus una*. This is sense, but it does not explain the corruptions it postulates. *hic deus* perhaps represents *id'eus*, that is *sidereus* without its initial letter. The second *hic* came in as a metrical stopgap when *sidereus* had already passed into *hic deus*. Write, then,

Tu sexu plenus toto, tibi nascitur olim
 sidereus mundus (*genus hinc hominumque deumque*),
 lucens, Augusto stellatus flore iuuentae.

THE SPEECH OF CLAUDIUS ON THE ADLECTION OF GALLIC SENATORS.

COLUMN I.

And indeed, looking to the very first and foremost impression in the minds of the public, which I foresee will meet me at the very outset, I beg of you not to be startled at my proposal, as at the introduction of a new precedent, but much rather to reflect how many new precedents have taken their place in our constitution, and into how many forms and phases from the first origin of our city our republic has been made to fit.

There was a time when kings possessed this city, without however being able to hand it down to successors within their own families. Others took their place from other families and even from other nations. Thus Numa succeeded Romulus, imported from the Sabines, a neighbour it is true, but of a foreign stock. Thus Priscus Tarquinius succeeded Ancus Martius. The former, born at Tarquinii of Demaratus a Corinthian and a high born mother of that city—poor she must have been, to be compelled to marry such a husband—he, I say, being precluded through the taint in his blood from obtaining honours in his own home, migrated to Rome, and obtained the position of king. Between him again and his son or grandson, for on this point our authorities disagree, there intervened Servius Tullius, sprung, if we believe our own historians, from a captive woman named Ocesia. According to Tuscan writers, I may remind you, he was once the loyal and devoted retainer of Caelius Vivenna, whose every fortune he shared, and when by changing fortune was driven to leave Etruria with all that was left of the army of Caelius, he occupied the Caelian Mount, giving it this name from his leader Caelius, and changing his own name from the Tuscan form Mastarna, assumed that by which we know him. At any rate, as I said, he obtained the position of king, with the greatest advantage to the

State. Later on, when the habits of Tarquinius Superbus, and no less of his sons, became hateful to our State, the minds of the people grew weary of the kingship, and the administration of the republic was transferred to the annual magistrates whom we call consuls.

What need now for me to remind you how the dictatorship was contrived by our ancestors, a power greater even than that of the consuls, to be made use of in more dangerous wars or more threatening civil commotion? Or how the tribunes were created to give protection to the plebs? What need to cite the transfer of power from consuls to decemviri, and its restoration once more to the consuls, when that ten-fold kingship was broken up? Why should I recall how the consular power was divided among a larger number, the so-called military tribunes with consular power, who were elected, six or sometimes eight each year? and how at last the privilege was shared with the plebs not only of holding magistracies, but also priesthoods? Indeed, if I should tell the story of our wars from their beginnings under our ancestors to the point we have reached to-day, I fear lest I should be thought arrogant, nay should seem to have sought occasion to boast the glory of our empire's extension beyond the limits of the ocean. I will rather return to the point. Our citizenship.....

COLUMN II.

..... the divine Augustus.....but it was the will of my uncle, Ti. Caesar, that the better and wealthier members, the flower of the colonies and municipia throughout the empire, should have a place within this Senate-house. But you ask me: has not an Italian a better claim than a provincial? That question I shall answer by the selection I make, when I come to justify to you that part of my censorship. Meanwhile in my opinion, not even provincial senators are to be excluded, provided that they are qualified to adorn this house.

Look, I pray you, at that most splendid and powerful colony of Vienna, and remember for how long a time it has furnished senators to this House. From that colony came L. Vestinus, one of the chiefest ornaments of the equestrian order, whom I value among my most intimate friends, and whose services I still monopolise, for my own affairs. But it is my desire to see his children obtain the highest among priestly offices, and proceed as their years advance to

the further stages of their career. An ill-omened name occurs to me (a ruffian bore it), and I pass it over. Besides, I hate that blend of the gymnast and the "rara avis," which imported the consulship into his family, even before his colony had received the full privilege of the Roman citizenship. I might say the same of the man's brother, though he is prevented by a pitiable and undeserved fate from proving himself a useful senator. But now that you have come, Ti. Caesar Germanicus, to the extreme boundaries of Gallia Narbonensis, it is full time that you should disclose to the conscript fathers the purpose of your address.

I say this: these illustrious youths whom I see before me, will no more give you cause for regret, if I make them senators, than my noble friend Persicus has cause to regret, when he recognises among the ancestral images of his family the name of Allobrogicus. But if you admit that these things are so, what more do you demand than that I should point to this one fact, that the regions beyond Gallia Narbonensis already send us senators, since we have and do not regret to have men among our order from Lugudunum? It is with some hesitation, conscript fathers, that I have passed outside the limits of your well known and familiar provinces, but the time has come when I must plead in no uncertain tones the cause of Gallia Comata. And if any among you looks to this, that these people defied the divine Julius in war for ten whole years, let him put against that the unswerving loyalty and obedience of a hundred years, tested and tested again by many a critical moment in our fortunes. It was they who, during his task of subduing Germany, afforded my father Drusus by their tranquillity a steady peace and security in his rear, and that at a time when he had been called away to the war from the work, still strange and new to the Gauls, of imposing the census. How arduous that work still is to-day at the present moment among ourselves, although nothing is required from us beyond a public knowledge of our material resources, I have the best reason to know from only too clear proofs.

From this inscription, taken by itself, we are able to gather the following facts:

The emperor Claudius at an uncertain date delivered a lengthy oration in the Senate, which he considered of sufficient

importance to have engraved on brass tablets. From the first column it appears that he was proposing to introduce an innovation of some kind to which he anticipated considerable opposition. The mere fact of its being an innovation, he argues, is no fatal objection, because the history of Rome from the commencement had been marked by constant innovations. This point is elaborated by a tedious, rambling and often irrelevant résumé of early Roman political history, in which the speaker seems quite as anxious to display his own learning as to make his particular point. The apparently undue importance however devoted to the kingly period to a certain extent prepares us for the precise character of the innovation proposed, because each new king represented an element from outside.

In the second column, which follows a missing passage presumably sketching the gradual extension of the *civitas*, we are left in no doubt as to the nature of the change proposed, nor as to the particular occasion for making it. It is clearly in connexion with his powers as censor that Claudius dealt with the matter in question. (Cum hanc partem censuræ meæ adprobare coepero.) It is equally clear that this question is the admission of certain provincials into the Senate. He works gradually up to his point. The admission of provincials as such is not new, for it was the policy of Tiberius to admit the better and more well-to-do citizens of *coloniae* or *municipia* all over the empire. Among these, it would seem, Roman citizens in a town of Latin right were included, for Vienna had long since supplied senators to the Roman *curia*, although it had only received the full *civitas* between the first and second consulships of Valerius Asiaticus. From the passage immediately following and beginning with the curious exhortation to himself to disclose his own policy, we gather that so far the election of provincial senators had been confined to the well known and familiar provinces, and had in fact not passed the boundaries of Gallia Narbonensis, except in the case of Lugudunum, from which senators had already been taken. At this point Claudius apparently turns to certain "insignes juvenes," who, if admitted, would be "senatores non paenitendi." Finally, and without further delay, we have his design disclosed "de-

stricte jam Comatae Galliae causa agenda est." The few remaining lines are merely to the effect that though the Gauls had given Caesar ten years' work to subdue them, they had now been loyal and peaceful for a hundred years.

Even from these fragments alone therefore there can be no doubt what the general setting of the speech must have been. Claudius was proposing as censor, and therefore necessarily by means of "adlectio," to admit into the Roman Senate persons described as "insignes juvenes" from Gallia Comata, *i.e.* from the provinces commonly known as the Tres Galliae. This was an innovation, except as regarded Lugudunum, though senators had come from the more "familiar" provinces, and the emperor professes to make his proposal with some timidity, in view of the opposition which he foresaw. Now if the political import of this speech is to have further light thrown upon it, it must be of course by means of the three chapters, *Ann.* XI. 23 to 25, in which Tacitus describes the affair under the year 48 A.D. Modern historians however have been too apt to depend wholly on Tacitus in this matter, with the mere remark that there are extant fragments of the real speech, characteristic of Claudius' pedantry, and perhaps giving a clue to the method of Tacitus in inserting speeches¹.

However, there are three points in which we get additional information from Tacitus. (1) The arguments used by the obstructionist party are stated. (2) Some fresh light is thrown upon the "insignes juvenes." (3) What is of more importance, the practical result arrived at is given.

It appears from Tacitus that in 48 A.D. while Claudius was censor, and no doubt in consequence of his having for various reasons removed a number of senators from the roll, the question of filling up the vacancies was in the air. An impending *lectio senatus* would always cause excitement in Rome, but on this occasion the excitement was increased by the fact that certain "primores Galliae, quae appellata est Comata, foedera et civi-

¹ Of course the illuminating note of the late Prof. Pelham, now included in his *Essays in Roman History*, is an exception to this. I agree with his

conclusions, as far as they go, though I think he might have got still more out of the inscription.

tatem Romanam pridem adsecuti," were now putting forward a demand for the "jus adipiscendorum in urbe honorum."

Two questions at once present themselves. What exactly was this demand, and who were the persons who made it? There can only be one answer to the former question. It was a demand for admission into the Roman Senate, involving of course the possibility of an official career. This is clear from the statement of Tacitus that the question agitated was *de supplendo senatu*, and also from the fact that what the Aedui received was "jus senatorum." It is still more clear from the whole second column of the inscription. It was not then a mere demand for permission to seek the quaestorship as a stepping-stone to the Senate, which indeed would have had no connexion with the censorship. It was a demand for direct *adlectio in senatum*, no doubt, as the applicants were *juvenes*, "inter quaestorios." The answer to the second question is perhaps more open to doubt. With the exception of the citizens of Lugudunum, who, as Claudius expressly tells us, already had this privilege, all the natives of Gallia Comata, who possessed the Roman *civitas*, possessed it on individual grounds. There were at this date, 48 A.D., no *municipia* or *coloniae* of Roman right and only two unimportant colonies of Latin right¹ within the Tres Galliae, with the exception of Lugudunum. But there may have been a few Gallic legionaries living in the country after their *missio* (from what we know of

¹ Two colonies are indeed mentioned by Pliny as belonging to Gallia Belgica, Equestris and Raurica. The former, in territory once belonging to the Helvetii, would seem from its title, Julia, to have been founded by Caesar, and was probably a settlement of some of his Gallic cavalry. The latter was certainly founded by Munatius Plancus after Caesar's death. "In Gallia colonias deduxit Lugudunum et Rauricam." Wilm. 1112. Neither can be taken to point to any deliberate policy; both were prior to the organisation of Gaul, and the example was not followed

by Augustus. Both these colonies, whether they had the full Roman or, as is more probable, only Latin rights, must have remained unimportant places, and though the Roman citizens in them would, as belonging to colonies, be qualified for what Tacitus calls the *jus senatorum in urbe*, no colonists of sufficient mark were produced, and the question therefore never arose. If it had, Claudius would have mentioned these colonies as well as Lugudunum, as having furnished senators to Rome.

the recruiting system of this time these must have been very few), and there must have been a good many retired auxiliaries who had gained the *civitas* for themselves and their children after 25 years' service. But certainly these were not the persons here referred to. They could not be called *insignes* or *primores*; they would not be rich, as Tacitus implies that these persons were, "divites illos," cap. 23, 6; and having 20 or 25 years of service behind them, they could not be *juvenes*. In addition however to these numerous but somewhat obscure Roman citizens in Gallia Comata, there can be little doubt that Julius Caesar had conferred the citizenship with some liberality upon wealthy and influential men among the various tribes. The frequency with which the name Julius recurs, e.g. Julius Florus, Julius Sacrovir, Julius Tutor, Julius Classicus, Julius Vindex, etc., is an indication of this, for their citizenship was naturally hereditary. It is of course possible that Augustus may have done the same thing to some extent, but not, I think, very likely. Apart from the establishment of military colonies, he is known to have been far less liberal than Julius in the bestowal of the *civitas* both on individuals and communities¹.

¹ In his *Schweizer Nachstudien*, Hermes, 16 pp. 485 foll., Mommsen put forward a view about the "primores Galliae," which he had apparently given up before his volume on the Provinces was published, and which in any case it is impossible to accept. He suggested that Caesar had probably given the Roman citizenship to the four *civitates foederatae* mentioned by Pliny, the Aedui, Carnuti, Remi and Lingones, and that the *primores Galliae* described as "foedera et civitatem Romanam pridem adsecuti" were the Gauls belonging to these four tribes. The objections to such a view are not only the entire absence of evidence for it, and the improbability that Caesar would have conferred the *civitas* in so wholesale a manner, but also the fact that the status of a *civitas foederata* was in-

compatible with inclusion in the Roman citizen body. How could a state be bound by treaty to the Roman people, when it was a part of that people? How could the Aedui be still called the "brothers of the Roman people," if they were themselves all Roman citizens? Such a view seems on the face of it impossible; besides, it is surely very unnatural to take "primores Galliae" as equivalent to "members of the leading Gallic tribes." Can it mean anything but "leading men in Gaul"?

Very likely Roman citizens, belonging to the federate tribes, would consider that they had a prior claim, and hence the "foedera et civitatem" of Tacitus. Another questionable suggestion made by Mommsen is that some of these Gallic citizens may have gained the *civitas* through belonging

In Gaul he may probably have thought that Caesar had gone too far in this direction, and at any rate, as we shall see, he actually reversed the policy of the dictator in the matter of admitting "semibarbari Galli" to the Senate. As a matter of fact too, the system of organisation adopted by Augustus for Gaul was such as to leave no appropriate place in it for Roman citizens.

I take it therefore that the *primores* of Gallia Comata, "civitatem Romanam pridem adsecuti," were the grandsons or great-grandsons of the nobles who had originally received this mark of distinction from Caesar. It seems to me however somewhat misleading to describe them, as Prof. Pelham did, generically as "the chiefs of Gallia Comata." There is no evidence, and it is not likely, that Caesar bestowed the honour upon the chiefs of the Gallic tribes as a class. He more probably selected a certain number of influential men from the more important tribes. Nor does it seem to me at all certain that the present demand was put forward by the descendants of all even of these. The words of Tacitus are "foedera et civitatem Romanam pridem adsecuti." I interpret this to mean that it was only the leading men in the more privileged

to tribes which had the *jus Latii*. Again, there is no evidence whatever for the suggestion that the Helvetii or any other of the 64 *civitates* possessed Latin rights. As far as I can see, the collective possession of either the Roman or Latin franchise implied municipal organisation. If so, the Helvetii can only have gained Latin rights when their town Aventicum was made a Latin colony. It was probably the case that tribes attributed to a *municipium*, though not themselves urban communities, had the *jus Latii*. But that is just an exception which proves the rule, for "attributio" had come to be, in North Italy at any rate, part and parcel of the municipal system. The statement of Pliny that Vespasian gave the *jus Latii* to the whole of Spain can only,

it seems to me, apply to the town communities, or if any non-urban districts were affected, it must have been by attributing them to neighbouring colonies or *municipia*, just as we know that there were certain "contributi" belonging to the *Colonia Genetiva*. *Lex. Col. Gen. cap. ciii*. In the same way, when the *jus Latii* was given to the Maritime and Cottian Alps, either one or more towns must have been made Roman *municipia*, and the tribes attributed to them, or some towns must have been invested with Latin rights, and the tribes distributed among them. Both the Roman and Latin *civitas* were essentially bound up with municipal right, and that was exactly the reason why the position of these Gallic Roman citizens was an anomalous one.

of the 64 *civitates* who claimed the right of being admitted into the Senate. We know from Pliny that four of the *civitates* were *foederatae*, and that others were *liberae*, but certainly the great majority were neither, and though some of the chiefs among these latter may have been Roman citizens, I imagine that these were not concerned in the present claim¹.

We come now to the question, on which Tacitus throws no light, how it was that these Gallic Roman citizens required a special grant of the right to hold office or to be senators in Rome. Prof. Pelham has once for all disposed of the view, unfortunately borrowed from Nipperdey by Mr Furneaux, that the citizenship conferred on individual Gauls, whether by Julius or Augustus, was the old and obsolete *civitas sine suffragio*. I need only refer here to the incisive exposure of this view in *Essays on Roman History*, p. 153. Only less objectionable however, as it seems to me, is Mommsen's assertion that Augustus "took from burgesses proceeding from the three Gauls the right of candidature for magistracies, and therewith excluded them from the imperial Senate," *Provinces*, vol. i. p. 98. It was surely not a case of taking anything away. The Roman *civitas* was always the Roman *civitas*, and included potentially all the rights of a Roman citizen. But for all that, a certain environment might be necessary, outside which, either by the facts of life or custom or constitutional usage, some of these rights might be inoperative or dormant.

I do not think much stress is to be laid one way or the other on the fact that Caesar actually enrolled in the Senate, according to Suetonius, some of his newly made Gallic citizens. The political significance of the step is very doubtful, and in any case the Roman constitution was at the time virtually in the melting pot. What is certain is that the act was unpopular in Rome, and that Augustus, probably not so much owing to that, as from more constitutional reasons, removed these Gallic

¹ I must just notice here the almost impossible suggestion of Mr W. T. Arnold, that the constitutional position of the Aedui in relation to Rome was very similar to that of Latin

towns, inasmuch as their leading men or magistrates were Roman citizens. There seems no justification whatever for such a view. *Studies of Roman Imperialism*, p. 111.

senators, and while not taking away the *civitas*, where Caesar had conferred it, constructed an environment in the Tres Galliae, which practically reduced Caesar's gift to what Tacitus calls it, "vocabulum civitatis."

That, with the exception of citizens of Lugudunum, no natives of the Tres Galliae had been admitted to the Senate since the time of Caesar is clear both from Tacitus and the inscription. It is equally clear that these *primores* felt themselves at a disadvantage as compared with Roman citizens elsewhere, and especially as compared with those provincials who lived within the limits which Claudius calls "adsuetos familiaresque." I hardly think that we can remain content with the explanation of this disability suggested by Prof. Pelham. "The real obstacle in the path of these noble Gauls was the fact that, though Roman citizens and very probably in some cases Roman knights, they had not the broad senatorial stripe, and that therefore the doors of the senate house were closed to them." But, as Prof. Pelham had himself pointed out, the absence of the *latus clavus* was not peculiar to the citizens in Gallia Comata; it was not even peculiar to provincials generally, since Italians too, unless they were *laticlavii* by descent, equally stood in need of its bestowal by the emperor before they could stand for office. And yet we know from the speech of Claudius in reference to Vienna, and from *Ann.* XII. 23, "senatoribus ejus provinciae," that senators could be drawn from Narbonensis. They could also no doubt be admitted from the Spanish provinces. Claudius does not indeed mention Spain in the extant fragment of his speech, and the case of Balbus put into his mouth by Tacitus was in some respects irregular. But it will hardly be disputed that the phrase "adsuetos familiaresque vobis provinciarum terminos" includes the Spanish provinces as well as Narbonensis. Was it therefore merely a deep-seated Roman prejudice which had hitherto barred the way against these Gallic nobles? That there was such prejudice is no doubt true. Claudius deals with it in the last sentence of the inscription. But again, it is perfectly clear that there was the same prejudice against the admission of all provincials. The popular objections to this particular claim

which Tacitus gives in XI. 23, depend mainly on the argument that Italy has not fallen so low as not to be able to supply her own Senate, and are directed generally against the *coetus alienigenarum* which threatens to swamp it. Claudius himself too, evidently in view of this prejudice against provincials generally, thinks it necessary to say: "sed ne provinciales quidem, si modo ornare curiam poterint, reiciendos puto." Augustus and Tiberius had disregarded this prejudice in the case of Spain and Narbonensis, why should they have given way to it in the case of Gallia Comata, unless it was supported by some constitutional or semi-constitutional disability, such as certainly seems to be implied in the words of Tacitus: "fruentur sane vocabulo civitatis; insignia patrum, decora magistratum ne vulgarent."

I believe myself that there was at least a semi-constitutional disability, and that it was involved in the nature of the Augustan organisation of the Tres Galliae. The central point of that organisation was that it was not based upon the Italian or any non-Italian municipal system. The tribes or cantons which gave their names to the 64 units of organisation were called *civitates*, and of course, like the Frisii, had had to accept "senatum magistratus leges," *Ann.* XI. 19, but they were not municipal centres with territories attached, and their members, though perhaps in a loose sense *cives*, were not *municipes*, and had in the strict sense no municipal domicile or origin. But Roman citizens in the old days, when citizenship was practically confined to Italy, had always belonged to some municipality, and as the *civitas* was extended to the provinces, it was mainly in connexion with the extension of the Italian municipal system. It was in this way, as it seems to me, that the custom or semi-constitutional principle grew up of associating the full exercise of the *civitas*, especially in respect to its highest political rights, with an *origo* or domicile in a municipality of the Italian type. That Latin *municipia* or colonies would come under this head, is obvious and is proved by the case of Vienna, which certainly sent senators to Rome before it had the full *civitas*.

If the view suggested above is correct, it would follow

almost of necessity that the *civitas* granted to individuals was bound to be very much a *vocabulum civitatis*, a hall mark of distinction, giving of course certain rights like that of "appeal to Caesar," but incapable, simply through defective environment, of complete exercise. The peculiarity about the *primores* of Gallia Comata was that whereas the majority of such citizen waifs and strays were not probably men of sufficient wealth or importance to think of a career in Rome, these Gallic chiefs were not only men of ambition, but also of great wealth and influence. They were none the less incongruous elements in these provinces, as Augustus proceeded to organise them, being in fact deposits from a régime in which that organisation had not yet taken shape. How indeed, if strict constitutional forms were insisted on, could an Aeduan, the citizen of a *civitas foederata*, be also a *civis Romanus*? Strictly, the two citizenships were incompatible, just as it was still the case that a Roman by being "receptus in Massilienses" ceased to be a Roman citizen.

That this absence of a municipal *origo* did constitute the essential difference between Gallia Comata and the neighbouring provinces, and did amount to a constitutional disability, is, I think, to be deduced from the second column of the inscription. After referring to the action of Augustus in respect to admission to the Senate in a sentence now lost, he goes on to state the views of Tiberius, which clearly represent the policy adopted in the matter up to his own time. "Patruus Ti. Caesar omnem florem ubique coloniarum et municipiorum, bonorum scilicet virorum et locupletium, in hac curia esse voluit." In other words, membership in a town of Italian right in any part of the empire involved what Tacitus calls the "jus senatorum," in the sense that Roman citizens belonging to them, and having the requisite census, were eligible for adlection into the Senate. The *primores* of Gallia Comata did not fall under this category, but the citizens of Lugudunum, the one town of Italian right within the Tres Galliae, did fall within it, and accordingly Claudius is able to make a point possibly of doubtful fairness, by declaring that the reasonableness of the claim now put forward for Gallia Comata had

already been acknowledged by the fact "ex Luguduno habere nos nostri ordinis viros." The same characteristic, the possession of Italian municipal right, which distinguished Lugudunum from the rest of Gallia Comata, was of course also very widely present in Narbonensis and the Spanish provinces. Vienna, which Claudius takes as his example from the former, was only one among a number of towns of Roman or Latin right. In the three Spanish provinces at this period there were 26 Roman colonies, 24 municipia c. R. and 48 towns of Latin right. It seems to me that it is in the light of these differences that "the inherent defect in the status of the Gauls as Roman citizens" is to be explained.

But of course the ease with which Claudius set aside this defect is an indication that it must have been a matter of policy in his predecessors not to set it aside. In this policy they were probably wrong, and Julius and Claudius right. No doubt these descendants of formerly independent chieftains had far more wealth and influence in their *civitates* than the most prominent citizen in any Roman colony or municipium. That they could also raise and possibly use against the government large bodies of retainers, is shown by the case of Julius Florus in the rising of Sacrovir, *Ann.* III. 40 ff. As a matter of fact, with this one exception, they seem to have been loyal, but their loyalty might have been still more assured, if some of them had been themselves associated with the government, or at least not excluded by a hard and fast line. This at any rate was the policy adopted by Claudius, dictated partly by his well known Gallic sympathies, partly by a liberal view of imperial questions, which deserves to be called statesmanship.

The result of Claudius' speech is of course not to be gathered from the inscription. It seems however clear that he had made up his mind what he would do in the matter of filling vacancies in the Senate. "What my view is," he says in effect, "as to the proportion to be observed between Italian and provincial senators, I shall show by the course I shall adopt—*rebus ostendam.*" What that course was to be, is pretty clearly indicated. He was passing outside the well known and familiar provinces, going beyond the policy of Tiberius, and

intended by his censorial right of *adlectio* to admit some of these nobles in Gallia Comata into the Senate. That this was done is an inference from what Tacitus tells us: "orationem principis secuto patrum consulto, primi Aedui senatorum in urbe jus adepti sunt," Cap. 25. The effect of the *senatus consultum* we do not know. It did not however in any way single out the Aeduan claimants from the rest. Claudius had announced his intention of disregarding for the future any objection, whether constitutional or sentimental, to the adlection of these Gallic citizens, and the Senate obediently and formally assented to whatever constitutional innovation this action of the imperial censor involved. It was one of the cases, and of course there were many, in which the legality of an act, really, as things were, within the competence of the princeps, is confirmed and sanctioned for the future by a senatorial decree.

In accordance therefore with his announced intention, and fortified by the decree of the Senate, Claudius in that part of his censorship, the *lectio senatus*, proceeded to elect a few; probably only one or two, for immediate admission to the Senate. His choice fell upon one or more of the Aeduan candidates for the reasons given by Tacitus. "Datum id foederi antiquo, et quia, soli Gallorum fraternitatis nomen cum populo Romano usurpant." I have no doubt that "datum" refers to Claudius and not to the Senate, and that the translation should be not "the Aedui first obtained, etc." but "Aeduans were the first to obtain the right of being senators in Rome." The word "primi" seems to imply that in later "lectiones" nobles from other tribes were also admitted, but of this we have no evidence, except perhaps the career of Julius Vindex, whose disloyalty by the way suggests no criticism of the policy of Claudius, but only on the blunder which made him a governor so near his own birthplace.

There was of course another obvious way in which Claudius might have removed the constitutional disability, if it was what I have suggested. He might have granted municipal rights to the *oppidum* or *caput gentis* of this or that canton, and these rights, whether Roman or Latin, would have put all Roman citizens within the territory into the same position as

those in Vienna or Lugudunum or Corduba. As a matter of fact, Claudius within the next two years did take this step in the case of the *oppidum Ubiorum*, and is generally believed to have done the same with the *oppidum Treverorum*, giving the status of colonies, probably with Latin rights to both. There is no indication in the histories of Tacitus that either Claudius or Nero went further in this process of assimilating Gallia Comata to the other western provinces, but it was a process which certainly went on at the end of the first and in the second century¹.

As evidence throwing light on the true nature of this incident in the censorship of Claudius, we could, as it seems to me, better spare the chapters of Tacitus than the fragments, imperfect as they are, of the emperor's own speech. It is of course easy enough to ridicule the ponderous style, the learned irrelevance and the grotesque reminder to himself that there were limits to the patience of his audience. But in spite of all this, the speech seems to have been well arranged, and to work gradually up to its point. What the exordium was, and whether he began, as Tacitus makes him, with a reference to the foreign origin of the Claudii, we cannot tell. At any rate by the opening of our fragment he is arguing that an innovation as such is not necessarily a thing to be resisted, since previous Roman history had been marked by constant innovations. This point is developed by a wearisome and uninteresting historical retrospect, at the end of which Claudius manages to get in a wholly irrelevant allusion to the conquest of Britain. Then, if we may infer from the word "civitatem," Claudius must have gone on in the missing part of Column II. to give instances of innovations directly bearing upon the one proposed, viz. the gradual extension of the *civitas* to the Latins, to the rest of Italy and to the provinces. Of this lost section we probably have the substance in Tacitus. Before our second fragment begins, Claudius has already got upon the main question, how

¹ It is perhaps worth noting, whatever it may signify, that the modern Autun derives its name, like the towns in Narbonensis and N. Italy, from the

town name, Augustodunum, and not like the great majority of modern names within the Tres Galliae from the tribe.

to deal with this extended citizen body in filling vacancies in the Senate. After stating the policy of Tiberius in the matter, he illustrates its working in a colony like Vienna, which is evidently taken as a type of similar towns in the *adsuetae familiaresque provinciae*. Finally he comes to the precise object of his speech, the admission of senators from Gallia Comata. No doubt there are points to be criticised. The changes from king to king should have commenced the second section, because they were examples of alien elements introduced from without. Tacitus makes the point admirably in four words: *advenae in nos regnaverunt*. Again, the two instances from Vienna are not happy. One was not a senator at all. The other is brought in only to be obliterated. Still, on the whole the arrangement is clear, logical and to the point.

It is often said that it is not fair to judge of the method of Tacitus in dealing with original speeches from this instance, because the length and verbosity of Claudius made condensation so difficult. To a parliamentary reporter no doubt the difficulty would have been great, but to an historian with the original before him, the speech was one peculiarly easy to condense just for the reason that it is so clearly arranged. That arrangement is absolutely lost in the version of Tacitus. Nor is any other logical arrangement substituted for it. After an allusion at the outset to the lesson suggested by the Sabine ancestry of Claudius, we get rapid references to the adoption of other foreign families, the absorption of Italy, the inclusion of the Transpadani, the planting *per orbem* of military colonies, and the grant of the *civitas* to individuals from Spain and Narbonensis. Then, after the unfortunate example from Greek history, which may or may not come from Claudius himself, we are hurried back to Romulus and the *advenae reges*, and, with Claudian irrelevance, to freedmen-born magistrates. Then objections on the ground of earlier hostile relations with the Gauls are met. The last sentence seems almost an after-thought, going back to the idea that long established institutions were once innovations, and for the third time taking examples from ancient history, the admission to privilege first

of plebeians then of Latins. It is hardly too much to say that from the Tacitean speech, without the help of Caps. 23 and 25, it would be impossible to gather what proposal the emperor was making. The examples from past history almost all refer to the extension of the *civitas* or admission into the citizen body, and though we have the statement "Etruria Lucaniaque et omni Italia in senatum accitos," the Senate or admission to it is elsewhere not mentioned. There can be no doubt Tacitus knew of the real speech and had read it. It gave him the general idea of his own version, and in one or two places he condenses, and condenses admirably, certain parts of it. But it in no way represents the speech of Claudius, and entirely fails to mark the real point of that speech. In my opinion it does give us a clue as to the authenticity of his other speeches. It points to a method almost the reverse of that of Thucydides. The aim of the latter was primarily to give the effect of the speeches actually delivered, secondly, where this was not possible, to compose a speech appropriate to the occasion. The latter was the primary aim of Tacitus, but where an original speech was preserved and accessible, he allowed it in some degree to assist his own invention. If, when the speech was the emperor's, fully preserved, carefully arranged, and dealing with a matter of intense interest to the senatorial order, he chose to insert what was practically a composition of his own, still less in other cases, where the point was more vague, the occasion less emotional, and the speaker less conspicuous, can we reasonably look in Tacitus for genuine résumés of actual speeches.

E. G. HARDY.

NOTES ON THE LEX JUDICIARIA OF G. GRACCHUS,
THE LEX SERVILIA OF CAEPIO AND THE LEX
THORIA.

I.

The Gracchan Lex Judiciaria.

THE epitomator of Livy, Lib. LX, states that among the "perniciosas leges" of G. Gracchus in his first tribunate was one, "qua equestrem ordinem, tunc cum senatu consentientem, conrumperet; ut sexcenti ex equitibus in curiam sublegerentur: et quia illis temporibus trecenti tantum senatores erant, sexcenti equites trecentis senatoribus admiscerentur; id est ut equester ordo bis tantum virium in senatu haberet." That this law was not, as the epitomator apparently supposes, actually passed, is of course certain, and indeed a very good case may be made out for the view that the real judiciary law of Gracchus is the partially extant Lex repetundarum, certainly passed in 122 B.C. and almost as certainly to be identified with the Lex Acilia, spoken of more than once by Cicero. It was however long since conjectured by Freinsheim, and Mr Warde Fowler has recently revived the suggestion, that the original scheme of G. Gracchus may really have been what the epitomator describes and that it was only after failing in this drastic attempt to reform and popularise the Senate, that he fell back, as far as the court for repetundae was concerned, upon the plan adopted in the Lex Acilia, vv. 13 and 16, for excluding senators from the judices. That Livy really made mention of this proposal, we can hardly doubt. Not only is it consistent with the uncompromising and high-handed policy of Gaius, but the epitomator is so clear both as to the number of equites to be admitted, and as to the effect on the balance of power which

the change would produce, that he cannot have mistaken the scheme, though he must have misunderstood Livy in supposing that the law was passed. It is perhaps worth noticing that there is no indication in the epitome of any direct relation between this scheme and the juror question, and possibly the latter would only have been an incident in a wider reform. It has sometimes indeed occurred to me whether Appian's exaggerated description in Cap. 22 of the complete inversion of the constitution, ἀνεστράφθαι τὸ κράτος τῆς πολιτείας, as the effect of the judicial law, may not be due to his having confused what he found in his authorities about the predicted results of the first scheme by its opponents, and the results of the law actually passed.

In any case, an important change in the character of the jurors in the court of repetundae would have been a necessary result of this projected re-constitution of the Senate, and as in spite of the epitomator's phrase, "tunc cum senatu consentientem," this must have been a burning question between the two orders, we may perhaps bring this first proposal of Gaius to some extent into line with that of the younger Livius Drusus, as described by Appian in Cap. 35. There were differences of course. Drusus would only have added 300 equites to the Senate, his object was more directly judiciary, and involved more loss than gain to the equestrian order. It is clear however that the enlargement of the Senate by the admission of at least as many equites, whether for political or judicial purposes, was in the air, and when it was carried into effect, it was by a statesman with a political outlook different from that either of Gracchus or Drusus. Appian is very likely mistaken in asserting that Sulla added 300 equites to the Senate both before and after his Mithridatic campaigns, and Sulla probably realised more clearly than at any rate Gracchus did, that the fresh equestrian senators would soon identify themselves with their new order, but it must nevertheless have been the case that the Senate to which he proceeded to transfer the courts was a body bearing some resemblance to the enlarged Senate which, according to the epitomator, Gracchus had intended to form.

But an actual amalgamation of a section of the equestrian order with the Senate was not the only solution of the judiciary difficulty. The unsatisfactory nature of the *repetundae* court, as long as the accused were tried before jurors exclusively of their own order, must have been obvious long before 123 B.C., and Plutarch's statement, *Tib. Grac.* 16, that a proposal of reform was included among the promises made by Tiberius Gracchus in his second candidature for the tribuneship, seems in no way improbable. But the proposal was essentially different from that described by the epitomator. Plutarch's words are: *τοῖς κρίνουσι τότε, συγκλητικοῖς οὔσι [τριακοσίοις], καταμυγνὺς ἐκ τῶν ἰππέων τὸν ἴσον ἀριθμὸν*. In fact he proposed to associate with the present judices, who were men belonging to the Senate, an equal number of equites. The words seem to me entirely against the view, which I know has its supporters, that 300 equites were to be added to the Senate. They were to be mixed with the present judices, who were senators, i.e. clearly as a second panel, but for no other purpose. In his life of G. Gracchus, *Caps.* 5 and 6, Plutarch evidently supposes that this was the scheme actually passed by Gaius. In his enumeration of the laws in *Cap.* 5 he says: *ὁ δὲ δικαστικός, ᾧ τὸ πλείστον ἀπέκοψε τῆς τῶν συγκλητικῶν δυνάμεως. μόνοι γὰρ ἔκρινον τὰς δίκας, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φοβεροὶ τῷ τε δήμῳ καὶ τοῖς ἰππεύσιν ἦσαν, ὁ δὲ τριακοσίους τῶν ἰππέων προσκατέλεξεν αὐτοῖς οὔσι τριακοσίοις, καὶ τὰς κρίσεις κοινὰς τῶν ἑξακοσίων ἐποίησε*. It seems fairly obvious from these words that the point to be remedied was that senators *μόνοι ἔκρινον*, and that it was done by selecting 300 equites to form a second panel, the result being, not that the Senate was composed of 600 members, but that the courts were in the hands of the joint 600. This seems to me the natural interpretation of the passage, and it is surely made almost certain by the opening words of *Cap.* 6. Plutarch there says: *οὐ μόνον ἐδέξατο τὸν νόμον τοῦτον ὁ δῆμος, ἀλλὰ κάκείνῳ τοὺς κρινούντας ἐκ τῶν ἰππέων ἔδωκε καταλέξαι*. This surely must mean, that Gracchus was to select, not the equites to be added to the Senate, but the equites to form the second panel of jurors, *τοὺς κρινούντας*. It would seem therefore that while the

epitomator and Plutarch are equally wrong in their description of the measure actually passed, the former, to judge by his very explicit statement, is giving a correct version of the original scheme, while the latter merely assumes that Gaius was carrying out the design of Tiberius. His statement that Gracchus was himself to draw up the first album of equestrian jurors must be incorrect, and hangs together with his theory that from this time the tribune possessed *μοναρχική τις ισχύς*. As a matter of fact such an equestrian album would have to be revised every year, and we know from the Lex Acilia that this was done by the praetor assigned to the court of repetundae, while the original list was to be drawn up within 10 days of the passing of the law by the praetor peregrinus of the year.

But though the compromise apparently suggested by Tiberius Gracchus was not adopted by his brother, whose alternative plan, not carried out by himself and only momentarily made law by Livius Drusus, was with whatever motive finally accomplished by Sulla, yet there is some reason to suppose that the earlier proposal was again unsuccessfully put forward in 106 B.C., in the interests of the Senate however not that of the equites, while it certainly became the basis of the durable settlement made by the Lex Aurelia of 70 B.C.

II.

The Lex Servilia of Caepio.

The so-called Servilian law of Caepio, who was consul in 106, presents serious difficulties. That in that year Caepio made a proposal of some kind with regard to the jury courts and in the interest of the Senate, is proved by the phrase applied to him by Valerius Maximus, "patronus senatūs," and by at least two passages of Cicero. In Brutus, 43, 161, he states that L. Crassus in a contio presided over by Mucius Scaevola as tribune, "Serviliam legem suasit." In the De Inventione Rhetorica, 1, 49, 92, he gives as an example of an oratorical *faux pas*, any reference which wounds the audience in some sensitive point, e.g. "si quis apud equites Romanos cupidos judicandi Caepionis legem judicariam laudet." Obviously none

of these passages prove that the law, whatever its contents may have been, was passed. It hardly needs pointing out that a rejected or abortive measure might loosely be called a "lex." Cicero made speeches concerning a *lex agraria* which was never passed. He writes about the proposal of Flavius which was similarly withdrawn: "quod quaeris de lege agraria, sane jam refrixisse videtur." The passage from the *De Inventione* undoubtedly proves that the proposal had left its mark on history, and was remembered long afterwards as the cause of bitter animosities. But that may often be the case with proposals which have not reached the statute book. Cicero's warning might be repeated to-day with Mr Gladstone's Home Rule Bill and an Ulster audience substituted for the *Lex Servilia* and the *equites Romani*. But there are other passages to be considered which in the first place throw some light on the precise object of the law, and in the second place imply that the law was passed. The passages I refer to are the following. Tacitus, *Ann.* XII, 60, says: "Claudius omne jus tradidit, de quo totiens seditione aut armis certatum, cum Sempronius rogationibus equester ordo in possessione judiciorum locaretur, aut rursus Serviliae leges¹ senatui judicia redderent." Cassiodorus under the year 106 records: "per Servilium Caepionem consulem judicia equitibus et senatoribus communicata." Obsequens almost in the same words has: "per Caepionem cos. judicia senatorum et equitum judicia communicata." It appears therefore that the proposal was either to transfer the courts wholly back to the Senate, or to share them between the two orders in accordance with the original proposal of Tiberius Gracchus.

¹ On the whole perhaps it is best to take "Sempronius rogationibus" and "Serviliae leges" as mere rhetorical plurals. Unless we do so in the case of the latter, we should have to adopt the suggestion of Nipperdey that "aut adimerent" has fallen out after "redderent," and this would be to attribute to Tacitus not only some misconception as to the law of Caepio,

but the error of placing the law of Glaucia after it. Mr Furneaux accepts this date, but we cannot do so without ignoring the fact that the *Lex Agraria* of 111 was engraved on the back of the *Lex Acilia*. That circumstance indicates that the latter law was obsolete, and Cicero leaves no doubt that it was replaced by the *Lex Servilia*.

We have then two questions to decide, (1) which of these proposals is the more probable, and (2) whether we can accept the view, that, whichever it was, it was really passed. The answers cannot depend wholly on the ipsissima verba of these authorities. Tacitus is writing 200 years after the event, and besides is only taking a casual retrospective glance into a period which there is no reason to think he had carefully studied. The other two writers were much later, but were probably following the authority of Livy. Their statements however are entitled to no more weight than statements in the epitomes, and we have already seen one conspicuous instance where the epitomator has confused an attempted with a consummated measure. But even when the authorities stand nearer to the events they are recording, some attempt at least must be made to test their statements as probable or improbable, perhaps even as possible or impossible, in the light of the known conditions of the time to which they refer. In the present instance we are unfortunately dealing with an obscure period, as far as the internal politics of Rome are concerned. But without attempting, what is manifestly impossible in a paper like this, a survey of the political situation in 106 B.C., one or two points may be noticed which seem very pertinent to the questions before us. Whatever amount of senatorial reaction there may have been after the death of G. Gracchus, it is admitted that the new judicial arrangement was acquiesced in. By 111 B.C., if not before, any such reaction must have spent its force. In that year the *Lex Agraria*, and almost certainly the *Lex Servilia* of Glaucia, were passed. With regard to the former, I may be allowed to refer to my own arguments in the last number of this journal to show that it was far more Gracchan than reactionary in its spirit. The latter supplanted the *Lex Acilia repetundarum*, but, while making certain changes in procedure, adhered to the principle of equestrian jurors. A still more unequivocal sign of anti-senatorial tendencies in the same year was the tribuneship of G. Memmius, and his agitation, supported both by the equestrian order and the people, against senatorial mismanagement and corruption in Numidia. Two years later in 109 this agitation reached its

climax in the establishment of the extraordinary Mamilian commission, by which the equestrian jurors were able to make considerable havoc in the ranks of the senatorial party. Two years later still, and therefore in the very year before 106, the *novus homo*, G. Marius, was swept into the consulship by an overwhelming wave of popular feeling, which also in spite of senatorial opposition secured him the conduct of the Numidian war. In the next year Servilius Caepio was elected consul, but it is perhaps significant that a still more uncompromising aristocrat than Caepio can have been, Q. Lutatius Catulus, was defeated by Atilius Serranus. Cic. Pro Planc. 12. The latter has come down to us as "stultissimus homo." He may not have been a pronounced democrat, but his election over Catulus is inconsistent with anything like a strong senatorial reaction in this year, which can be set off against the indications of popular enthusiasm just cited. It is in the light of these indications, as it seems to me, that we must consider the passage as quoted above.

If the passage of Tacitus is interpreted to mean that the Lex Servilia reversed the Sempronian law, in the sense that it took away the courts from the equites and gave them back wholly to the Senate, it seems to me that we know enough of the general conditions in Rome at the time to make the statement an incredible one. I would even go so far as to say that no such measure could even have been proposed. No consul, however Catonian, would have ventured to do more than express a pious wish for such a change in the Senate. No contio would have listened to Crassus speaking in support of it. We should have to suppose that Tacitus was speaking without book, and was misled by the tradition of mortal offence given by Caepio to the equites, of which indeed the passage in the *De Inventione* is a proof. But is it certain that the words "senatui judicia redderent" imply the exclusion of the equites? A reference to Lex Acilia, vv. 13 and 16, shows that whatever may have been the positive qualification of the new jurors, which is unfortunately lost in both passages, the specific exclusion of all senators and of all connected with senators was the salient feature of this part of the law. But if the plan

suggested by Tiberius Gracchus were accepted, this exclusion would be reversed, and judicial duties restored to the Senate. I do not see that the words of Tacitus need of necessity imply more than this, and when we turn to the description of the measure by Cassiodorus and Obsequens, presumably derived from Livy, there seems good reason to believe that the proposal made by Caepio was a return to the original design of Tiberius, and therefore a compromise. That such a proposal may have been made is not improbable. It would have given some relief to the senators smarting still under the effects of the Mamilian quaestio, and of the *Lex Servilia repetundarum*. It might conceivably appeal to some of the more moderate populares, men perhaps like Atilius Serranus, as representing the views of Tiberius Gracchus rather than of his more extreme brother.

But though there is no insuperable difficulty in believing that such a law was proposed, can we accept the evidence of Tacitus and the later chroniclers that it was passed? That the equites were uncompromisingly hostile to it, is clear from Cicero. The question was of course more vital for them than for the general public who voted in the comitia, but for several years past there had been a close alliance between the equites and the people under the leadership of Memmius and Mamilius, and perhaps of Glaucia. If there was no reason why the equites should accept such a compromise, neither was there any reason why the comitia should force it upon them. There was clearly a boom of popular and anti-senatorial feeling at the time, and by all the canons of historical probability we are bound to deny that the law can have been actually passed. The difficulty is not removed, but rather a fresh difficulty added, by the suggestion of Dr Greenidge that it was repealed again within a few months. All the reasons, which on this hypothesis caused its repeal, especially with popular leaders like those mentioned above, would have been operative to prevent its being passed at all.

Events had marched far and fast since the days of Tib. Gracchus, and a proposal which would then perhaps have contented the equites, was now after 16 years' monopoly of the courts and especially after the episode of the Mamilian

commission one of which they naturally regarded the revival as reactionary. It is clear that the whole order was highly exasperated, that the crisis was long remembered, and in fact took a place in the judicial controversy between the orders as real or almost as real as if the measure had passed. It was, and remained, a *cause célèbre*, and may have been the one in which Crassus and Memmius are represented by Cicero as pitted against one another. See the suggestion made by Lange, 3, p. 66. I think this circumstance accounts for the mis-statement of Tacitus, who knew of the excitement at the time, but did not remember the exact details, any more than when he declares directly afterwards that Marius and Sulla were fighting on the same subject.

As for the later writers, they may as easily have misrepresented Livy on the matter of the measure having been passed, as the epitomator of book 60 certainly did in the case of the first proposal of G. Gracchus. I conclude this argument by pointing to Cicero's statement, Verr. 1, 13, 38, that the equestrian order acted as jurors "annos prope quinquaginta continuos." I do not say that these words would by themselves decide the question, and certainly the statement that during all those years there had been no single instance of judicial corruption requires considerable qualification, but viewed in connexion with more general considerations, it may fairly be taken to imply that Cicero did not believe the Lex Servilia had taken effect.

III.

The Lex Thoria.

I ventured in the last number of this journal to approach the vexed question as to the authorship of the last two agrarian laws mentioned by Appian in 1, 27, from a somewhat new point of view, and to attempt a reasoned conclusion drawn from the known contents of the last law, and the probable meaning of the second, as inferred from the general situation. I allowed myself to say that the arguments against regarding the Lex Thoria as the third law almost amounted to demonstration. For this I have been criticised, and in view of the fact that

I have failed to convince some very competent authorities, I willingly withdraw the expression. But I wish that my critics in the "Athenaeum" and the "English Historical Review," instead of merely reiterating the somewhat arbitrary assertion that Cicero's words in Brut. 136 cannot possibly bear Mommsen's translation of them, had pointed out where in their opinion my attempted demonstration that no other translation will meet the case, has failed. If it had not been for what Cicero here says of Thorius, that he "agrū publicum vitiosa et inutili lege vectigali levavit," no one would have thought of doubting Appian's statement that Spurius Thorius was the proposer of the second law. The reasoning, which I thought almost amounted to demonstration, was an attempted *reductio ad impossibile* of the only two ways of translating the sentence, if we reject Mommsen's. If it is translated, "he relieved the public land from a faulty and useless law imposing a vectigal," Cicero is made to describe the second of Appian's laws in those terms. If we translate it, as my critic in "The Eng. Hist. Rev." somewhat dictatorially says we must, "he relieved the public land from a vectigal by a faulty and vicious law," he uses those terms of the partly extant Lex Agraria. On the assumption that I established my chief points as to the character and objects of those two laws, and that Cicero knew anything about them, I am justified in saying that both are impossible translations. At any rate, if my argument is not accepted, that is where it ought to be attacked. If it is a choice between attributing to Cicero either a slight solecism in style or a reckless and ignorant disparagement of one or other of two sound laws, I confess I prefer the former.

Nor does Professor Goligher's translation absolve Cicero from a solecism more serious than that involved in Mommsen's. The third law, as Cicero must have known, though possibly Appian did not, only abolished vectigal by turning certain categories of public land into private land. If Cicero had intended to express that, by saying that public land was freed from vectigal, he failed to make himself intelligible. I repeat that the law, as we have it, does not relieve any category of public land from vectigal. Professor Goligher strangely cites

my translation of v. 19 as inconsistent with this statement. On the contrary, the prohibition against exacting "*pecuniam scripturam vectigalve*" is expressly limited to that part of what had been public land in 133 B.C., "which by law or plebiscite or by the effect of this law has become or shall become private property." Professor Goligher triumphantly says: "this agrees precisely with Appian and Cicero." Appian says nothing whatever about land being made private, nor, as I have shown above, does Cicero except by a very unnatural interpretation of his actual words.

My critic in the "*Athenaeum*" thinks that the passage in the *De Oratore*, 2, 70, 284, as compared with v. 26 of the *lex*, greatly strengthens the theory that the *Lex Thoria* was our *Lex Agraria*. The passage in the *De Oratore* merely alludes to a debate in the Senate on the *Lex Thoria* and public lands, and to the fact that Lucullus was pressed "*ab iis qui a pecore ejus depasci agros publicos dicerent.*" Verse 26 of the *Lex Agr.* provides that any person may graze cattle on the public lands up to a prescribed number without any payment to the State or a tax farmer. I do not see that a comparison of the two proves more than what we might be pretty certain of without it, viz. that the *Lex Thoria*, like the *Lex Agraria*, contained a clause dealing with the right of grazing on the public lands. I am not sure indeed that I might not turn the tables on my critic, and argue that by the *Lex Thoria* the right of grazing cattle seems to have been disallowed, since Lucullus had got into trouble for having done it, whereas by the *Lex Agraria* it was allowed up to certain limits. But Cicero's words are too vague for the point to be pressed. But, as far as I can see, the comparison gives no support whatever to the "rival theory."

E. G. HARDY.

ARISTOTELIA V.

De Interpr. 5, 17^a 8: ἔστι δὲ εἰς πρῶτος λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς κατάφασις, εἶτα ἀπόφασις.

One would expect rather *πρῶτως*. Similarly in *Metaph. I* 1, 1052^a 17 οἱ συγκεφαλαιούμενοι τρόποι εἰσὶ τέτταρες τῶν πρῶτων καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ λεγομένων ἐν Sylburg saw that *πρῶτως* should be restored for *πρῶτων*.

Phys. 4. 7, 214^a 10: ἡ δὴλον ὅτι εἰ μὲν δέχοιτο σῶμα ἀπτόν, κενὸν εἶναι.

Read κενὸν <ἀν> εἶη. I may perhaps be permitted to refer to a note of mine on *Poet. 9*, 1451^b 23 for instances of the same error in MSS.

Phys. 6. 1, 231^b 21: εἰ γὰρ τὸ μέγεθος ἐξ ἀδιαίρετων σύγκειται, καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἢ τούτου ἐξ ἴσων κινήσεων ἔσται ἀδιαίρετων.

Read ἡ κίνησις ἢ <ἐπὶ> τούτου. Aristotle is not thinking of the movement of a magnitude, but as the following context shows, of the movement of something *over* a magnitude, i.e. (in this connexion) a line. For this sense of μέγεθος it may be sufficient to refer to *Bon. Ind. 449^a 36*.

Phys. 6. 5, 235^b 24: οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἐχόμενον τῷ B.

Surely ἐχόμενον τὸ B—a correction anticipated, as I learn from Prantl, by Hayduck.

Probl. 16. 8, 914^b 9: τῶν περὶ τὴν κλεψύδραν συμβαινόντων τὸ μὲν ὄλον ἔοικεν αἴτιον καθάπερ Ἀναξαγόρας λέγει· ὁ γὰρ ἀήρ ἐστὶν αἴτιος ἐναπολαμβανόμενος ἐν αὐτῇ τοῦ μὴ εἰσιέναι τὸ ὕδωρ ἐπιληφθέντος τοῦ ἄλλου.

Though the ἄλλου at the end here is a palpable error for αὐλοῦ, it has kept its place in our editions of the Greek text

for centuries, in spite of the fact that Gaza's rendering (*fistula*) might have led the editors to the right reading, even if they could not discover it for themselves. In his valuable contribution to Aristotelian criticism, the Preface to the fourth volume of the Didot Aristotle, Bussemaker says on this passage 'omnino legendum est *αὐλοῦ*'; but for all that ἄλλον appears once more in the actual text of that edition—owing, I suppose, to some superstitious regard for the Bekkerian 'recensio'. Bussemaker has also noted a whole series of most convincing emendations as implied in Gaza's version of the Problems. It seems to me indeed, that other Renaissance versions too have been unduly neglected by modern editors of Aristotelian texts. I myself in a former volume of this Journal proposed to restore ὀδῶ ποιεῖν, for ὀδοποιεῖν, in Rhet. 1. 1, 1354^a 8, and have only recently found that the same correction is presupposed in the version of Riccobonus, *facere certa via et ratione*. Translators, or at any rate those among them who keep a conscience, are obliged to think of the meaning of the texts before them; whereas the editors of texts are often too ready to assume that interpretation is no part of their business.

Probl. 30. 1, 953^b 32: οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ οἱ πλείστοι λάγνοι εἰσίν...καὶ ἔτι πρὶν δύνασθαι προῖεσθαι σπέρμα, γίνεται τις ἡδονὴ ἐπὶ παισὶν οὖσιν (κτέ.).

Read ἔτι παισὶν οὖσιν, bracketing the ἔτι in the preceding line as a marginal correction, which has got into the text in the wrong place.

Probl. 30. 1, 954^a 39: ὅσοις δ' ἂν ἐπανθῇ τὴν ἄγαν θερμότητα πρὸς τὸ μέσον, οὗτοι μελαγχολικοὶ μὲν εἰσι, φρονιμώτεροι δέ.

The passage is obviously corrupt, and is noted as that in Bon. Ind. 265^b 41. With the help, however, of Gaza's version, *at quibus nimius¹ ille calor remissus ad mediocritatem sit*, Bussemaker has been able to recover what may very well have been the original reading, ὅσοις δ' ἂν ἐπανεθῇ ἢ ἄγαν θερμότης. The verb ἐπανιέναι is found with the same sense

¹ *minus* in the reprint in the Berlin Aristotle (vol. 3) is a pretty obvious printer's error.

in a fragment of Sosipater (51 Kock) on the art of the cook :
*καὶ πότε | εὐκαιρον αὐτοῖς ἐστι τῶν ὄψων τὰ μὲν | θερμὰ
 παραθεῖναι, τὰ δ' ἐπανεῖντα [scil. τὸν μάγειρον], τὰ δὲ μέσως, |
 τὰ δ' ὄλως ἀποψύξαντα.*

Metaph. A 1, 980^b 21: *καὶ διὰ ταῦτα φρονιμώτερα καὶ
 μαθητικώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μνημονεύειν ἐστίν.*

This is said of creatures possessed of memory; but it is not true that they are all *φρονιμώτερα καὶ μαθητικώτερα*; the following context explains that the capacity for learning implies a capacity for hearing, which is not always found in creatures possessed of memory. The true reading here, therefore, would seem to be *φρονιμώτερα <τὰ δὲ> καὶ μαθητικώτερα*—of which the E reading, *τὰ μὲν φρόνιμα τὰ δὲ μαθητικώτερα*, may perhaps be thought to retain a trace.

Metaph. A 3, 983^b 11: *καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οὐθὲν οἴονται οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως αἰεὶ σωζομένης, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν Σωκράτην φαμέν οὔτε γίγνεσθαι ἀλλῶς ὅταν γίγνηται καλὸς ἢ μουσικός, οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι ὅταν ἀποβάλλῃ ταύτας τὰς ἕξεις, διὰ τὸ ὑπομένειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον τὸν Σωκράτην αὐτόν. οὕτως οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν. δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τινα φύσιν μίαν ἢ πλείους μιᾶς ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται τᾶλλα σωζομένης ἐκείνης.*

The full stop here after *τὸν Σωκράτην αὐτόν* (l. 6) should be replaced by a comma; the sentence is a clear instance of what Riddell terms the Binary structure with comparisons, when the fact illustrated is stated before the illustration and then restated after it; so that the *ὡσπερ* clause does duty as it were twice over, in relation to what precedes and also in relation to what follows. I need not say that the construction is not uncommon in Aristotle. For *δεῖ* (l. 6) I suggest *αἰεὶ*, in order to bring the *εἶναι* which comes after it into line with the other infinitives after the *οἴονται* at the beginning of the passage.

Metaph. A 7, 988^b 23: *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ὅτι ζητηταί αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἢ οὕτως ἢ τινὰ τρόπον τούτων, δῆλον.*

Read surely *τοιούτον* for *τούτων*.

Metaph. A 9, 991^b 22: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναρίθμων [ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ Α^b], οἷον ἐν τῇ μυριάδι, πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ μονάδες; εἴτε γὰρ ὁμοειδεῖς, πολλὰ συμβήσεται ἄτοπα, εἴτε μὴ ὁμοειδεῖς, μήτε αἱ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλαις μήτε αἱ ἄλλαι πάσαις.

Though Alexander seems to recognize αἱ αὐταί, I think the true reading here would be [αἱ] αὐταί, without the comma after εἴτε μὴ ὁμοειδεῖς.

Metaph. H 3, 1043^a 33: καὶ γραμμῇ πότερον δυὰς ἐν μήκει ἢ ὅτι δυὰς, καὶ ζῶον πότερον ψυχῇ ἐν σώματι ἢ ψυχῇ.

The ὅτι here looks very like an intruder, a repetition of the ὅτι in the previous line (ὅτι σκέπασμα).

Metaph. Θ 10, 1051^b 17: περὶ δὲ δὴ τὰ ἀσύνθετα τί τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀληθές καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος; οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ σύνθετον, ὥστε εἶναι μὲν ὅταν συγκέηται, μὴ εἶναι δὲ ἐὰν διηρημένον ᾖ, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκὸν ξύλον ἢ τὸ ἀσύμμετρον τὴν διάμετρον.

If we may restore <τὸ> ξύλον, λευκὸν will become a predicate, like ἀσύμμετρον.

Metaph. I 2, 1053^b 16: εἰ δὲ μὴτὲν τῶν καθόλου δυνατὸν οὐσίαν εἶναι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ οὐσίας καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἴρηται λόγοις. οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐσίαν ὡς ἔν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ δυνατὸν εἶναι (κοινὸν γάρ) ἀλλ' ἢ κατηγορήμα μόνον, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ τὸ ἔν.

I suspect that a little word, very apt to be omitted even in the best MSS., has dropped out, and that we should restore εἴρηται λόγοις <ὅτι> οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο. Aristotle's point is that what he has already proved to be true of τὸ ὄν is equally true of τὸ ἔν.

Metaph. Λ 7, 1073^a 5: δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἔχει ἐνδέχεται ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλ' ἀμερῆς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν.

It has occurred to me, at any rate as a suspicion, that Aristotle may have written here ἀλλ' <ἀμεγέθης καὶ> ἀμερῆς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν, the pleonasm being very much in his manner. His argument makes no use of the idea of the οὐσία being ἀμερῆς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, but this would come in naturally enough as an addition to a statement that it is ἀμεγέθης.

Metaph. Λ 8, 1074^b 3: τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσῆκται πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ τῶν πολλῶν.

Aristotle is explaining how the purely mythical accretions came to be added on to the primeval philosophy which preceded mythology. I suspect that he wrote *προσῆπται*, not as in the text, *προσῆκται*.

Metaph. N 1, 1088^a 6: διὸ καὶ εὐλόγως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν ἀριθμός· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ μέτρον μέτρα· ἀλλ' ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ ἐν. δεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτό τι ὑπάρχειν πᾶσι τὸ μέτρον, οἷον εἰ ἵππος τὸ μέτρον, ἵππους, καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπος, ἀνθρώπους. εἰ δ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος καὶ θεός, ζῶον ἴσως, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς αὐτῶν ἔσται ζῶα.

Bonitz found a difficulty here, but his suggestion, *οἷον εἰ ἵπποι, τὸ μέτρον ἵππος, καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωποι, ἄνθρωπος*, seems to me too artificial to be in any degree probable. To my mind the fault in the passage is in the *τὸ μέτρον* after *ὑπάρχειν πᾶσι*, which I suspect to be a repetition of the *τὸ μέτρον* in the preceding line. If we ignore it as an emblemata, the sense of the second sentence (*δεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ κτέ.*) will be practically this: There must always be an element of identity (*τὸ αὐτό τι*) in the group of objects counted together—horses, for instance, if the unit of measurement with which one starts be a horse, and men, if it be a man. But if one starts with a man, a horse, and a god, as the units in the group, these dissimilars have to be brought under a common term, say *ζῶον*, and the sum of them, when counted together, will be so many *ζῶα*.

* Rhet. I. 2, 1356^b 24: τὴν δ' αἰτίαν αὐτῶν, καὶ πῶς ἐκατέρω χρηστέον, ἐροῦμεν ὕστερον.

αὐτῶν, which Muretus ignored in his version, may very well be supposed to have got in through a repetition of the *αὐτῶν* in the following line of text.

Rhet. I. 2, 1357^a 22: ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὀλίγα μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξ ὧν οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ εἰσι...τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἐκ τοιούτων ἀνάγκη ἐτέρων συλλογίζεσθαι, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα ἐξ ἀναγκαίων...φανερὸν ὅτι ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ἔσται τὰ δὲ πλείστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.

The statement here, however wanting in strict logical form, is clear enough as regards the sense. Aristotle begins by saying that the premisses with which the rhetorical syllogism starts are but rarely in the class of necessary truths, because the facts under discussion (e.g. actions) are very generally in contingent matter¹; and contingents can only be demonstrated from premisses of the same order; it is evident, therefore, that the premisses of the enthymeme, though sometimes necessary, are in most instances contingent and only probably true. After this he proceeds to distinguish the premisses more precisely by the use of technical terms. The enthymeme starts with either *εἰκότα* or *σημεῖα*—these latter being in some instances *τεκμήρια*, ‘infallible signs’, in other words necessarily true and warranting a logically necessary conclusion. But owing to the nature of the subject-matter enthymemes of the conclusive kind are rarely possible. It will be seen, therefore, that even in this technical statement Aristotle comes round to that with which he began, the distinction between the two kinds of premisses (*τὰ ἐξ ὧν*), and tells us again that the necessary premisses are but few, whereas the contingent ones are not few but many. It seems to me accordingly, that if allowance be made for certain defects of statement, the text is sound as it stands, and that there is no need to alter the *ἐξ ὧν* in l. 2 into *περὶ ὧν* with Vahlen, whom Römer has followed in his edition.

Rhet. 1. 2, 1357^a 34: τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον.

Read <τὸ> ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον. The article is wanted to show that the predicate is coextensive and convertible with the subject.

Rhet. 1. 3, 1358^b 36: ὡς δ' οὐκ ἄδικον τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας καταδουλοῦσθαι καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικούντας πολλάκις οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.

This would seem to have been A^c's original reading, but that now in the text—by the same hand, it is said—is ὡς οὐδ' οὐκ ἄδικον. This may perhaps be taken as an indication of two competing earlier readings, ὡς δ' ἄδικον (which Wolf wished

¹ This reason is given in the parenthesis, represented above by dots.

to restore) and *ὡς δ' οὐ δίκαιον*. Either of these would satisfy the sense, which the ordinary text does not do.

Rhet. 1. 4, 1360^a 13: *καὶ τίνων ἐξαγωγῆς δέονται καὶ τίνων εἰσαγωγῆς, ἵνα πρὸς τούτους καὶ συνθήκαι καὶ συμβολαὶ γίνωνται.*

πρὸς τούτους appears to imply a definite reference to those able to supply the required imports. Read therefore *καὶ τίνων* <*καὶ παρὰ τίνων*> *εἰσαγωγῆς*.

Rhet. 1. 5, 1361^b 28: *ἔστι δὲ [scil. εὐγηρία] καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν καὶ τύχης· μὴ ἄνοσος γὰρ ὧν μηδὲ ἰσχυρὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἀπαθῆς οὐδ' ἄλυπος καὶ πολυχρόνιος, οὗτ' ἄνευ τύχης διαμείνειεν ἄν.*

Muretus saw that the comma should be before, and not after, *καὶ πολυχρόνιος*. The *οὗτ'* before *ἄνευ τύχης*, which has given editors and others so much trouble, seems to me to be an ordinary scribal error for *οὐδ'*.

Rhet. 1. 6, 1363^a 35: *καὶ πρὸς ἃ εὐφύεις καὶ ἔμπειροι [scil. προαιροῦνται]· ῥᾶον γὰρ κατορθώσειν οἴονται.*

Römer in his second edition restores *κατορθῶσαι* from A^c (m. 1), but without observing that, in the interests of grammar, it becomes necessary to write *ῥᾶον γὰρ* <*ἄν*> *κατορθῶσαι οἴονται*. This construction after *οἴεσθαι* and the like is common enough in Aristotle; there is a whole series of instances of it in Rhet. 2. 5.

Rhet. 1. 6, 1363^a 38: *καὶ μάλιστα ἕκαστοι [scil. προαιροῦνται] πρὸς ἃ τοιοῦτοι, οἷον οἱ φιλόνοικοι εἰ νίκη ἔσται.*

Römer has omitted to note the palmary emendation of Vahlen, <*φιλο-*>*τοιοῦτοι*, which has been sufficiently long before the world to be recorded in the Index Aristotelicus.

Rhet. 1. 7, 1363^b 10: *μέγα δὲ καὶ μικρὸν...πρὸς τὸ τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθος, καὶ ὑπερέχον μὲν τὸ μέγα, τὸ δὲ ἐλλείπον μικρὸν.*

Transpose, so as to read *τὸ δὲ μικρὸν ἐλλείπον*. The chiasmic order is as common in Aristotle as in other Greek writers.

Rhet. 1. 7, 1364^a 1: *καὶ τὸ αἰρετώτερον καθ' αὐτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθ' αὐτό.*

One would naturally understand here *μείζον ἀγαθόν* from the preceding context, though the use of the comparative is hardly consistent with that view. Römer accordingly restores *αἰρετόν* in lieu of the traditional *αἰρετώτερον*. It seems to me that in this instance also the difficulty may be got over by a very simple transposition—by reading *καὶ αἰρετώτερον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθ' αὐτό*.

Rhet. 1. 8, 1365^b 22: *μέγιστον δὲ καὶ κυριώτατον ἀπάντων ... τὰς πόλεις ἀπάσας λαβεῖν*.

Perhaps rather <τὸ> *τὰς πόλεις ἀπάσας λαβεῖν*.

Rhet. 1. 9, 1368^a 10: *χρηστέον δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀξητικῶν πολλοῖς... καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ καιρῶν*.

One would expect *καὶ τῷ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ καιρῶν*, the argument (or *τόπος*) from the circumstances of time and occasion.

Rhet. 1. 10, 1369^a 3: *οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλ' ἢ ὅταν οἰηθῆ εἶναι ἀγαθόν*.

Perhaps rather *ὃ ἂν οἰηθῆ εἶναι ἀγαθόν*.

Rhet. 1. 10, 1370^a 27: *ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴδεσθαι ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι τινος πάθους, ἢ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἰσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, καὶ ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ ἂν φαντασία τις οὐ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἅμα μεμνημένοις καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ αἰσθησίς. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἡδέα ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι παρόντα ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνησθαι γεγενημένα ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐλπίζειν μέλλοντα*.

Instead of *καὶ ἐν* before *τῷ μεμνημένῳ* (l. 3) A^c has *ἀεὶ ἐν*, from which *καὶ ἐν* has been recovered by Susemihl, and adopted by Römer. I should much prefer *ἀεὶ* <δ'> *ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ*. Another alteration in Römer's text, *εἰ δὲ τοῦτο* (l. 4), seems to me due to a misconception of the course of the argument—for which Bekker's punctuation is responsible. All that is required is to put a colon instead of a full stop after *ἐλπίζει* (l. 4), and also after *ἐπεὶ περ καὶ αἰσθησίς* (l. 5), so as to make the *ὥστ'* before *ἀνάγκη* mark the conclusion of a long and complex argument, as it so often does in Aristotle. I need hardly say that after *δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ* we have to understand *ἀκολουθοῖεν ἂν* from the preceding context.

Rhet. 1. 11, 1371^a 31: καὶ τὸ μαθάνειν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἡδὺ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μαθεῖν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μαθάνειν <τὸ> εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι.

In 1. 3 μαθεῖν has been bracketed by certain editors for some occult reason; the fact of its being omitted in one of the least important of the later MSS. can hardly be supposed to have been of any weight with them. It seems to me that without μαθεῖν the sense of the text becomes a hopeless puzzle. To say that 'wonder implies a desire to learn' is intelligible enough to any one who remembers the opening of the Metaphysics; but to say ἀπλῶς that 'wonder implies a desire' is much too vague to convey any definite meaning even to the inner circle of Aristotle's original followers.

Rhet. 1. 11, 1371^b 15: ὅθεν καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι εἴρηνται, ὡς ἡλιξ ἡλικά τέρπει, καὶ ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον, καὶ ἔγνω δὲ θῆρ θῆρα.

Though the ὡς before ἡλιξ may admit of defence, I suspect it is an intruder, that has got into the text through the ὡς before αἰεὶ—which is an integral part of the second proverb.

Rhet. 1. 11, 1371^b 21: ἐπεὶ δὲ φίλαιντοι πάντες, καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι πᾶσιν, οἷον ἔργα καὶ λόγους. διὸ καὶ φιλοκόλακες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ φιλερασταὶ καὶ φιλότιμοι καὶ φιλότεκνοι· αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔργα τὰ τέκνα.

Römer brackets καὶ φιλερασταὶ, apparently because it is wanting in A^c; that MS. however is notoriously apt to omit words or small groups of words, and more especially in the case of homoeoteleuta. φιλότιμοι, which does not seem to range very well with the other words in the list, may perhaps be a corruption of φιλόμαιμοι—a word not to be found in the Lexicons.

Rhet. 1. 12, 1372^a 5: αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν [scil. ἀδικούσιν] ὅταν οἴωνται δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα πραχθῆναι καὶ ἐαυτοῖς δυνατὸν, εἴτε ἂν λαθεῖν πράξαντες, ἢ μὴ λαθόντες μὴ δοῦναι δίκην.

Read εἴτ' ἂν λαθεῖν, which will follow in construction after the preceding ὅταν οἴωνται, 'when they think that they can do the deed, and then, having done it, may escape detection,

or if detected, avoid the punishment'. For the asyndeton with *εἶτα* it is sufficient to refer to Rhet. 1. 15, 1375^b 13 and 3. 11, 1413^a 16; and for the construction *οἴωνται ἂν λαθεῖν* to Rhet. 2. 5 (passim). In their desire to remove elisions by supplying the elided vowel copyists were not always careful to supply the right one.

Rhet. 1. 15, 1377^a 19: *καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους ἀρμόττει, ὅτι οὐκ ἴση πρόκλησις αὕτη ἀσεβεῖ πρὸς εὐσεβῆ.*

This saying of Xenophanes is printed in Diels, *Vorsokratiker*² I p. 35, as prose, but I cannot help feeling that the rhythm is too marked and sustained to be regarded as accidental—notwithstanding the obvious metrical difficulty in *αὕτη ἀσεβεῖ*, and the strange apology for it propounded by Mullach and Cope. It seems to me that *ἀσεβεῖ* should be *τάσεβεῖ*, and that the quotation might take this form:—

οὐκ ἴση

πρόκλησις αὕτη τάσεβεῖ πρὸς εὐσεβῆ.

I am quite aware of the objection that may be raised, that there is no record of Xenophanes having ever written iambs.

Rhet. 2. 1, 1377^b 22: *ἀνάγκη μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὄρᾶν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται καὶ πιστός, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ποιὸν τινα καὶ τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευάζειν. πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει πρὸς πίστιν...τὸ ποιὸν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ τὸ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἔχειν πῶς [πῶς διακεῖσθαι A^c] αὐτόν.*

The general sense of this is that the orator who means to succeed wants something more than a conclusive and convincing argument; he must also think of his hearers, and endeavour to make them regard him as trustworthy and well-disposed to themselves. The difficulty I find in the passage is that *ὑπολαμβάνειν* lacks a subject, i.e. *τοὺς ἀκροατάς* or something equivalent. *ἐκείνους* may perhaps have dropped out after *ὑπολαμβάνειν*.

Rhet. 2. 15, 1390^b 28: *ἐξίσταται δὲ τὰ μὲν εὐφῶ γένη εἰς μανικώτερα ἦθη, οἶον οἱ ἀπ' Ἀλκιβιάδου...τὰ δὲ στάσιμα εἰς ἀβελτερίαν καὶ νωθρότητα, οἶον οἱ ἀπὸ Κίμωνος.*

Here Spengel prints [*οἱ*] ἀπὸ Κίμωνος simply because the *οἱ* is wanting in A^c. He cannot have realized how easily OI

would drop out after ΟΙον, and that there is a clear instance of the omission in the same MS. in Poet. 13, 1453^a 11.

Rhet. 2. 16, 1391^a 2: διὸ φαίνεται ὅνια ἅπαντα εἶναι αὐτοῦ. αὐτοῦ stands here for πλούτου, which is the subject under consideration. I suspect that the true reading must be <δι> αὐτοῦ, since an ordinary genitive of price seems out of place in this connexion.

Rhet. 2. 17, 1391^a 20: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως σχεδὸν τὰ πλείστα φανερά ἐστιν ἦθη· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχει ἡ δύναμις τῷ πλούτῳ τὰ δὲ βελτίῳ.

The passage is, I need hardly say, sound enough as it stands, but I think it may be worth while to draw attention to the A^c reading, in order to show the vagaries of which that MS. is capable. Instead of τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχει ἡ δύναμις it offers us τὰς αὐτὰς ἔχει δυνάμεις. δύναμις having once become δυνάμεις through an ordinary scribal error, an officious corrector could not resist the temptation to make τὰ αὐτὰ agree with it—fortunately, however, forgetting to tamper with the τὰ βελτίῳ which follows. There is a very similar corruption in A^c in 3. 7, 1408^b 9, where τὰ μαλακὰ σκληρῶς has been turned into τὰς μαλακὰς σκληρῶς. μαλακὰ having become μαλακὰς through dittography of the initial σ of σκληρῶς, some corrector thought to set matters right by reading τὰς μαλακὰς.

Rhet. 2. 18, 1391^b 28: λοιπὸν ἡμῖν διελθεῖν περὶ τῶν κοινῶν. πᾶσι γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τὰ περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνατοῦ προσ-
χρηθῆσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις...ἔτι δὲ περὶ μεγέθους κοινὸν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν λόγων.

I suspect that what Aristotle himself wrote was in l. 2 τῷ περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ, and in l. 3 ἔτι δὲ <τὸ> περὶ μεγέθους (see above, on 1. 9, 1368^a 10).

Rhet. 2. 23, 1398^b 25: ὥσπερ τὸ εἰς Μιξιδημίδην εἶπεν Ἀντοκλῆς.

Surely ὃ εἰς Μιξιδημίδην, as in 2. 24, 1401^b 15 οἶον ὃ λέγει Πολυκράτης, and in 3. 9, 1410^a 16 καὶ ὃ εἰς Πειθόλαόν τις εἶπε.

Rhet. 2. 25, 1402^b 4: ἐπὶ [ἀπὸ Spengel] δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἔνστασις φέρεται, οἶον εἰ τὸ ἐνθύμημα ἦν ὅτι ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ πάντας τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ μοχθηρὸς κακῶς.

<ὅτι> ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ μοχθηρὸς κακῶς would be more in keeping with the parallels in the context, and also clearer, as the ὅτι will serve to separate the ἔνστασις from the statement it controverts.

Rhet. 3. 1, 1404^a 1: ὅλης οὔσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαίου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιητέον [scil. τοῦ περὶ τὴν λέξιν].

Römer omits to notice Gaisford's correction here, οὐχ <ὡς> ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος.

Rhet. 3. 2, 1404^b 2: σημεῖον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος, εἰ μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον.

In place of εἰ μὴ δηλοῖ Spengel restores the A^c reading ὡς εἰ μὴ δηλοῖ. The old Latin version, however, suggests another reading, ὡς ἂν μὴ δηλοῖ, which appears to me much more probable, if one remembers how natural it was in the period of the κοινή to put εἰ for ἂν after relatives. There are many instances of εἰ for ἂν in even good MSS. of classical writings.

Rhet. 3. 2, 1404^b 12: ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μέτρων πολλὰ τε ποιεῖ τούτο, καὶ ἀρμόττει ἐκεῖ... ἐν δὲ τοῖς ψιλοῖς λόγοις πολλῶ ἐλάττωσιν.

I would suggest here ποιεῖται οὕτω, and at the end, ἐλάττω—on the supposition that the dative in ἐλάττωσιν may have arisen through accommodation to that in λόγοις.

Rhet. 3. 2, 1405^a 35: οὐ πόρρωθεν δεῖ ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν μεταφέρειν τὰ ἀνώνυμα ὀνομασμένως.

Read μεταφέρειν <ἐπὶ> τὰ ἀνώνυμα. Bonitz Ind. 462^a 4 cites several instances of this use of the preposition.

Rhet. 3. 3, 1406^b 11: καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιτείχισμα τῶν νόμων.

The old interpreters translate ἐπιτείχισμα τῶν νόμων by *propugnaculum legum* or something to the same effect; and the same view has been taken by Vahlen, who renders it by 'ein Bollwerk der Gesetze', 'a bulwark of the laws' (Ges. Philologische Schriften I p. 130). But one may well hesitate to accept such an interpretation when one considers the

ordinary meaning of ἐπιτειχίζειν, *munire adversus*, and that of ἐπιτειχισμός in Thucydides. The ultimate difficulty in the expression is in the genitive τῶν νόμων. I venture to think this an error for τῷ νόμῳ—a dative being often used by Aristotle after substantives of this type (Bon. Ind. 166^a 61). A confusion of -ων and ωι in terminations is not uncommon in the textual tradition of Aristotle; there is a striking instance of it in Rhet. 3. 14, 1412^b 21, where instead of ὅσῳ Α^c has ὅσῳ ὅσων, a combination of the true reading and the false.

Rhet. 3. 4, 1406^b 21: ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπη τὸν Ἀχιλλέα “ὡς δὲ λέων ἐπόρουσεν”, εἰκὼν ἐστίν.

Perhaps rather τὸν Ἀχιλλέα <ὅτι> “ὡς δὲ λέων.

Rhet. 3. 5, 1407^a 19: ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς λέξεως τὸ ἐλληνίζειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐν πέντε, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις, ἂν ἀποδιδῶ τις ὡς πεφύκασι πρότεροι καὶ ὕστεροι γίγνεσθαι ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἔνιοι ἀπαιτοῦσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ μὲν καὶ ὁ ἐγὼ μὲν ἀπαιτεῖ τὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν ὁ δέ. δεῖ δὲ ἕως μέμνηται ἀνταποδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις, καὶ μήτε μακρὰν ἀπαρτᾶν μήτε σύνδεσμον πρὸ συνδέσμου ἀποδιδόναι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου· ὀλιγαχοῦ γὰρ ἀρμόττει. “ἐγὼ δ', ἐπεὶ μοι εἶπεν (ἦλθε γὰρ Κλέων δεόμενός τε καὶ ἀξιῶν) ἐπορευόμην παραλαβὼν αὐτούς”. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ πολλοὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἀποδοθησομένου συνδέσμου προεμβέβληνται σύνδεσμοι· ἐὰν δὲ πολλὸν τὸ μεταξὺ γένηται...ἀσαφές.

The general sense and drift of this is quite clear: one rule of style is that, when particles naturally go together in pairs, so that the first leads one to expect the second to follow in due course, there should be no great distance between the two, and as far as possible, no other particles in the intervening part of the statement. Taking μὲν (e.g. ἐγὼ μὲν...) and δέ (e.g. ὁ δέ...) as typical instances of the particles he has in view, Aristotle illustrates his point by an instance of the neglect of his rule—a sentence in which there are too many particles in the interspace between the first particle and that which is naturally expected to respond to it at the beginning of the following sentence. He does not actually append the following sentence with its apodotic particle, but he assumes that we can see for ourselves how it would run (e.g. ὁ δέ...);

the tense in τοῦ ἀποδοθησομένου συνδέσμου in l. 10 is quite enough to show that. If this is a correct view of the drift and intention of the statement, the only difficulty that interferes with it is in the ἐγὼ δ' in l. 8. To me this seems to be a sciolist's correction of an original ἐγὼ μὲν; it will be observed too that the ἐγὼ μὲν in l. 4 suggests ἐγὼ μὲν here, and would even by itself be a sufficient reason for a change of reading. The sentence quoted (ἐγὼ—αὐτούς) must be an instance of a μὲν sentence; the fault under consideration, the multiplicity of intervening particles, is not to be found in the second or δέ sentence, but only in the interspace between it and the μὲν in the μὲν sentence which precedes it.

Rhet. 3. 7, 1408^b 17: φθέγγονται τε γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα [i.e. διπλᾶ and ξένα ὀνόματα] ἐνθουσιάζοντες...διὸ καὶ τῇ ποιήσει ἤρμωσαν· ἔνθεον γὰρ ἡ ποίησις.

It may perhaps be worth noting that the parallel in Poet. 24, 1459^b 32 has the perfect, ἤρμοκεν.

Rhet. 3. 7, 1408^b 32: τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἠρῶος σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικὸς καὶ ἀρμονίας δεόμενος. ὁ δ' ἴαμβος αὐτῆ ἐστιν ἡ λέξις ἢ τῶν πολλῶν.

The reading here of Victorius, καὶ <οὐ> λεκτικὸς, seems to me the most probable as well as the simplest correction of this difficult passage; and it certainly derives some support from the echo of the statement in Demetrius De Eloc. 42, ὁ μὲν ἠρῶος σεμνὸς καὶ οὐ λογικός. The omission of the negative will not disturb any one who has given due attention to the pathology of A°, or of any other important Aristotelian MS. Spengel and others have preferred Tyrwhitt's correction, καὶ λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας δεόμενος—which our English translators render (after Cope) by 'and is deficient in conversational harmony' (Wellson), or 'and remote from the measure of common conversation' (Jebb). Both renderings seem to me to overlook the 'natural and normal meaning of δεόμενος, which (if I am not mistaken) does not mean 'wanting' in the sense of 'deficient in', but 'wanting' in the sense of 'demanding' or 'requiring'; so that the heroic rhythm is said here to 'require'

a certain *ἀρμονία*, as something over and above the actual words of the verse.

Rhet. 3. 9, 1409^b 4: *ἀνύειν*.

I note this only to draw attention to A^c's *ἀνοίγειν*, which, I need not say, points to an older reading, *ἀνύτειν*—this becoming *ἀνοίγειν* through a twofold corruption, a confusion of *υ* and *οι*, which may go back to the Roman period, and a confusion of T and Γ, which one naturally refers to the uncial stage of the textual tradition. It is to be remembered that *ἀνύτειν* is the Attic form, whereas *ἀνύειν* belonged rather to the *κοινή*. This and certain other sporadic facts of the same kind may perhaps justify a suspicion that there was a time when the language of our Aristotelian texts was more like Attic than it now is in our existing vulgate.

Rhet. 3. 10, 1410^b 21: διὸ οὔτε τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εὐδοκιμεῖ...οὔτε ὅσα εἰρημένα ἀγνοούμενά ἐστιν.

Perhaps *ἀγνοούμεν*, since A^c omits the *ἐστιν* after *ἀγνοούμενα*.

Rhet. 3. 10, 1411^b 12: καὶ ὅτι τὸν νοῦν ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἀνήψεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· ἄμφω γὰρ δηλοῖ τι. “οὐ γὰρ διαλυόμεθα τοὺς πολέμους ἀλλ’ ἀναβαλλόμεθα”.

The words τὸν νοῦν—*ψυχῇ* are clearly a quotation, and might very well have been marked as such. Before οὐ γὰρ *διαλυόμεθα* a καὶ ὅτι seems wanted to introduce the second quotation; the homoeoteleuton in *δηλοῖ τι* will explain the loss. A little further on, in l. 19, Gaisford seems to have been quite right in restoring καὶ ὅτι, for ὅτι καὶ.

Rhet. 3. 11, 1412^a 23: καὶ τὰ εἰς ἡνιγμένα διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδέα· μάθησις γάρ, καὶ λέγεται μεταφορά.

Perhaps rather *μεταφορᾶ* (comp. Bon. Ind. 462^a 43).

Rhet. 3. 12, 1414^a 14: ἀλλ’ ὅπου μάλιστα ὑποκρίσεως, ἐνταῦθα ἥκιστα ἀκρίβεια ἐνι· τοῦτο δέ, ὅπου φωνῆς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅπου μεγάλης.

I suspect that *χρεία* or some similar word has dropped out before or after *ὑποκρίσεως*.

Rhet. 3. 14, 1415^a 18: καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ δηλοῦσι περὶ τὸ δρᾶμα.

Surely περὶ <οὔ> τὸ δρᾶμα, just as we have in 3. 19, 1419^b 31 ἵνα μὴ λανθάνῃ περὶ οὗ ἢ κρίσις.

Rhet. 3. 14, 1415^a 25: λέγεται δὲ ταῦτα ἕκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου. περὶ αὐτοῦ μὲν καὶ τοῦ ἀντιδίκου ὅσα περὶ διαβολὴν λύσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι.

One would expect ὅσα περὶ <τοῦ> διαβολὴν λύσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι.

Rhet. 3. 18, 1419^a 8: Σωκράτης, Μελήτου οὐ φάσκοντος αὐτὸν θεοὺς νομίζειν, εἶρηκεν ὡς ἂν δαιμόνιον τι λέγοι, ἤρετο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαίμονες ἦτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἶεν ἢ θεῶν τι.

The text stands thus in A^c, though not in the Bekkerian vulgate; and it duly reappears in the same form in the editions of Spengel and Römer. Spengel's lengthy note on the passage throws no light on the more serious difficulties in the new text, which he cannot have fully realized. Both Madvig and Kayser have made some effort to put things right by means of emendations, which may be seen in Römer's adnotatio. Assuming A^c to preserve here some memory of a really ancient textual tradition, I would suggest—with no little doubt and hesitation, let me say—that the primitive reading may perhaps have been εἰρηκὼς ὡς δὴ δαιμόνιον τι λέγοι.

I. BYWATER.

PLATO TIMAEUS 37 c.

ὡς δὲ κινήθην αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶν ἐνενόησε τῶν αἰδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ, ἠγάσθη τε καὶ εὐφρανθεὶς ἔτι δὴ μᾶλλον ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα ἐπενόησεν ἀπεργάσασθαι. καθάπερ οὖν αὐτὸ τυγχάνει ζῶν αἰδίου κ.τ.λ.

À propos of a proposed emendation of the passage of which I heard from my friend Professor J. A. Smith, I am encouraged by him to publish an interpretation which I suggested many years ago to Professor Lewis Campbell. The sense of 'counterfeit of' or 'copy of,' as opposed to 'statue of,' for ἄγαλμα could be defended by ἀγάλματα ἀρετῆς, Symposium 22 A (Ast's Lex.), and so Proclus seems to have interpreted¹, but it is not suitable here because in the same sentence the original is referred to in the singular—τὸ παράδειγμα—and not as the Gods, but as the ζῶν αἰδίου.

Again 'image made by the Gods' (cf. τὰ Δαιδάλου ἀγάλματα, Meno 97 D, Ast, *ibid.*) would be too awkward beside the description of the maker as ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ. I suggested that ἄγαλμα does not mean 'statue' or 'image' at all, but has its primitive meaning of a 'delight' as = something to delight in, or 'pride' as = something to be proud of. Cf. Lid. and Scott ἄγαλμα 1 and 2, and the examples there.

It had occurred to me also that the motive for Plato's expression might well have been a poetical reminiscence, and one finds the very expression, delight of the gods (or of a god)

¹ Procl. in Tim. 239 D καθ' ἕλον ὑποδεχόμενος τοὺς νοητοὺς θεοὺς· οὐδὲ οὖν ἑαυτὸν ὁ κοσμὸς πληροῦται θεότητος, γὰρ τὰ ἀγάλματα τὰς οὐσίας τὰς ἐξηρημένους τῶν ἕλων ὑποδέχεται τῶν θεῶν. ἑαυτὸν τῶν νοητῶν θεῶν, αὐτοὺς μὲν οὐχ

in two passages of the *Odyssey*. *Odys.* 8. 509 (cit. Dunbar and L. and S.) has the combination of words *ἄγαλμα θεῶν*:

ἢ ἕαν μὲγ' ἄγαλμα θεῶν θελκτῆριον εἶναι

where L. and S. interpret 'a pleasing gift.' It might be objected that *θεῶν* is governed by *θελκτῆριον* alone (though L. and S. make *ἄγαλμα* also govern it): but anyhow the interpretation given to *ἄγαλμα* itself is confirmed by *Odys.* 3. 438:

χρυσὸν ἔδωχ', ὃ δ' ἔπειτα βοὸς κέρασιν περιχέυει
ἀσκήσας, ἵν' ἄγαλμα θεᾷ κεχάροιτο ἰδοῦσα.

ἄγαλμα in the sense of a gift or a possession to delight in or to be proud of, is found in several other passages of the *Odyssey*. See Dunbar's *Concordance*.

From the sense of 'a pride' = something to be proud of (for which cf. *χώρας ἄγαλμα*, Pindar's epithet for his own poem, and *τέκνον δόμων ἄγαλμα* in Æschylus (cit. L. and S.)), is perhaps derived that of 'ornament.'

The interpretation 'pride, or delight, of the eternal Gods' seems very suitable to the passage in the *Timæus*, for the world is represented as something very good and rejoiced over by its creator (cf. *Genesis* i. 31).

That *ἄγαλμα* means image or statue elsewhere in Plato is no matter, considering how appropriate the use familiar in poetry happens to be in this passage.

I learn from Professor J. A. Smith that he himself had begun to think that the meaning of *ἄγαλμα* here was somehow connected directly with that of *ἀγάλλεσθαι*.

J. COOK WILSON.

SOME NOTES ON LUCAN VIII.¹

§ 1. The eighth book of the *Pharsalia* describes Pompey's flight after the lost battle, and his death in Egypt. The main business of this paper is to criticise Lucan—to point out faults in his art, and in his treatment of history. It is therefore right to say here, that, in spite of this criticism of details, there is much which seems to me excellent in this book, and that the episodes, which it contains, are among the best in the poem. Much of the narrative moves with rapidity and force; much of the declamation, especially that with which the book ends, is powerful and effective. The enumeration of Pompey's exploits (ll. 806—815) was picked out by Macaulay, together with one other passage of Lucan, as surpassing in eloquence anything which he knew in the Latin language; and few men have been as familiar with ancient literature as Macaulay was.

The least successful part of the book is the main incident, the actual death-scene of Pompey. There are few more tragic scenes in history than the murder of Pompey, stabbed by treacherous ruffians under the eyes of his devoted friends and helpless wife. But Lucan spoils his great opportunity. In his anxiety to make the very most of it, he falls, or rather, rushes, into his besetting sin: he over-steps the modesty of nature, and what was meant to be sublime becomes ridiculous. The tradition was well established, that Pompey never spoke after the attack began: in the grand Roman fashion, which Caesar too was soon to follow, he drew his *toga* over his face and endured the agony of death in silence. Lucan therefore restricts himself to describing the feelings which passed through Pompey's mind in his last conscious moments. A writer, who undertakes to record the unspoken thoughts of a dying man,

¹ Read before the Cambridge Philological Society, Nov. 9, 1911.

especially when death comes with violence, is obviously on dangerous ground. The great artists of course felt this. When Virgil (*Aen.* 10. 782) says of his dying warrior,

dulcis moriens reminiscitur Argos,

probability is not violated and sentiment is pleased. But where Virgil fears to tread, Lucan rushes in. When an unarmed man, conning over a speech in a boat, is suddenly assaulted by armed ruffians, and after he is actually stabbed, it is contrary to nature that his subsequent reflexions should take the form presented by Lucan—that they should be orderly, sententious, and prolonged. Indeed Lucan seems to feel that here he has gone too far; for, at the end of this preposterous soliloquy, he adds (l. 635),

*talis custodia Magno
mentis erat, ius hoc animi morientis habebat.*

But the thing is simply impossible.

And then there follows immediately the speech of Cornelia. Is it natural that a wife, watching the brutal murder of a dear husband, and powerless to help him or even to get near him, should express her agony, not merely in articulate and continuous words, but in a succession of far-fetched conceits and ingenious epigrams which is only cut short by a swoon? It is not natural; it is not even conceivable.

When Lucan writes like that, the reader repeats the criticism of Horace: *incredulus odi*, 'I don't believe it, and I don't like it.'

§ 2. When the battle of Pharsalia was lost, Pompey took to the sea at the mouth of the Peneus and sailed to Lesbos, where his wife, Cornelia, had been living since the beginning of the war (l. 151).

(Why was Cornelia sent to Lesbos, and to Mytilene? Lucan implies that Lesbos was chosen, merely because it was out of the way and therefore safe. But many other islands of the Aegean would have served this purpose equally well; and Pompey's powerful fleet was not in the Aegean at all but at Corcyra. I suspect that Cornelia was sent there, because Mytilene was the native place of Pompey's most intimate

friend, Theophanes. By Cicero (*Att.* vii 7, 6) Theophanes is spoken of with contempt as *Mytilenaeus*; Tacitus (*Ann.* vi 18) records that the Lesbians paid divine honours to Theophanes after his death; in the eyes of Greeks his intimacy with Pompey was not a little thing. Theophanes was at Pharsalia and accompanied Pompey in his flight to Lesbos. Cornelia may very well have been living in his house.)

The people of Mytilene beg Pompey to spend at least one night within their walls; and they add reasons thus (l. 116):

*nulla tibi subeunda magis sunt moenia uicto:
omnia uictoris possunt sperare fauorem,
haec iam crimen habent. quid quod iacet insula ponto?
Caesar eget ratibus.*

"There is no city which you should enter, in your defeat, rather than ours: for (1) all others can hope for the clemency of the conqueror, but ours is guilty already," guilty by having sheltered Cornelia.

In the words that follow, I wish to place a comma after *ponto*, and the question-mark after *ratibus*. I can show what I take to be the meaning by translating the words into Greek: ἔπειτα (*quid quod*) ἡ μὲν Λέσβος νῆσός ἐστι, ὁ δὲ Καίσαρ οὐκ ἔχει ναῦς. Then *quid quod* will bear its common sense of "moreover, besides," a sense found in Horace and Ovid and common in the poets of the Silver Age. Also the logic of the passage is now right, because the people of Mytilene are giving a second reason why Pompey should prefer their city to others, the second reason being that Lesbos is inaccessible to the conqueror without a fleet. The asyndeton between the two contrasted clauses introduced by *quid quod* is of course perfectly normal.

§ 3. Pompey declines the offer of the Lesbians, puts his wife on board and sails away. Next Lucan describes with some elaboration and even pedantry the sun in process of setting: (ll. 159 foll.)

*iam pelago medios Titan demissus ad ignes
nec quibus abscondit nec si quibus exserit orbem
totus erat.*

“Now half the sun’s ball of fire was sunk in the sea; and part of his orb was hidden both from those from whom he was withdrawing his disk and from those (if such there be) to whom he was revealing it.”

Whether or not there were antipodes, who receive the sun’s light when we lose it, was a debated question in antiquity: we know from Lucretius (i 1065) that the Stoics (and Lucan was a Stoic) defended the belief in the existence of such people. By his *si quibus* Lucan wishes to convey that he is aware that the learned differ on the point, and that he admits the possibility of a view opposed to his own.

Well, what event in the narrative takes place at the point of time so particularly described? None whatever. Nothing takes place; and six lines lower down Pompey is questioning the steersman about the constellations, now visible from the deck, by which the vessel is kept on her course. It is, I think, impossible to attach the description of the setting sun to the previous paragraph; no editor has attempted to do so. I suppose that Lucan had got this piece of description ready-written by him, and inserted it here without noticing that such a particular indication of time requires to be attached to a particular event. It is a piece of careless writing, of which he offers instances enough.

§ 4. At l. 210 Pompey sets Deiotarus ashore at some unnamed point on the coast of Asia Minor. He addresses the king as *fidissime regum*, and sends him off on a mission to the king of Parthia.

From a number of authorities, of whom Cicero is one, we know that Deiotarus, the ruler of Galatia, joined Pompey’s army and was present at Pharsalia. By Plutarch *Pomp.* c. 73 we are told that he accompanied Pompey in his flight across the Aegean. But there is, I believe, no other evidence than Lucan’s for this episode; and I wish to consider its credibility.

First, Deiotarus was a very old man. Five years before, Crassus, on his way to Syria and to Carrhae, found Deiotarus engaged in building a new city and rallied him on starting such an enterprise at so advanced an age. Plutarch *Crass.* 17 ‘ὁ βασιλεὺς, δωδεκάτης ὥρας οἰκοδομεῖν ἄρχει’ γελίσας δ’ ὁ

Γαλάτης, 'ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτός' εἶπεν 'ὁ αὐτόκρατορ, πρὸς λίαν ἐπὶ Πάρθους ἐλαύνεις.'

Secondly, he was, not only very old but very decrepit or, at least, unwieldy. Cicero, in his defence of Deiotarus, spoken in 45 B.C., says that about the time of Pharsalia he required several men to hoist him into the saddle, and that, when this operation was successfully performed, all were astonished that the old man could stick on. Cic. *pro Deiot.* 28 *itaque Deiotarum cum plures in equum sustulissent, quod haerere in eo senex posset, admirari solebamus.*

(In the same speech § 13 Cicero says, that Deiotarus accepted the result of Pharsalia as final and left Pompey then. But this cannot be pressed too far, as it was important for Cicero's object to minimise as far as possible the assistance given to Pompey by Deiotarus.)

Is the story in itself credible, that a man, very old and very decrepit, was landed somewhere near Ephesus, disguised as a slave (Lucan insists upon this detail), to make his way, presumably on foot, to the court of the Parthian king at Ctesiphon? To me it seems incredible. And I believe that Lucan would not have scrupled to invent such an episode, and also that his reasons for doing so can be guessed at.

For many incidents of the poem prove his indifference to historical fact: a familiar instance is found in his account of the battle of Pharsalia, where he makes Cicero the spokesman who conveys to Pompey the senators' demand that a battle shall be fought. Even if Cicero had been present, he would have been the last among Pompey's partisans to undertake such a commission. But it is perfectly well known (we have even Livy's authority for it), that, when the battle was fought, Cicero was in the camp at Dyrrhachium, more than two hundred miles away.

But why should Lucan invent such a story as this mission of Deiotarus? Because to him, as to many Romans, there was something peculiarly striking and picturesque in the relation between Pompey and the eastern kings; and he wishes to show that, even in defeat and disaster, Pompey could still use kings to run his errands, that he could say to a crowned sovereign

“go,” and he went. And Lucan chose Deiotarus, because his readers were familiar with the fact that Deiotarus was the only king who shared the flight of Pompey across the Aegean.

§ 5. Pompey then sails eastward and, having been joined by a number of senators, holds a council of war at Selinus on the west coast of Cilicia. He proposes to seek aid from the Parthian king, in order to meet Caesar again in the field. (Of the mission of Deiotarus not a word is said here or later.) His proposal is rejected by the senators, as undignified and unpatriotic. A long speech to this effect, a regular *suasoria* of the type familiar in the rhetorical schools, is delivered by Lentulus; and Lucan comments thus on the decision (l. 454):

*quantum, spes ultima rerum,
libertatis habes! uicta est sententia Magni.*

The meaning is: the senatorial party was at its last gasp; desperate men are free to speak their minds; and so the policy of Pompey was outvoted. As a closing comment this sounds effective; at a recitation it might earn applause; but it will not bear examination. For, if it means anything, it means that, before the rout of Pharsalia, Pompey's ascendancy in his party was unquestioned, and that his policy was invariably approved by the senators who left Italy with him in the spring of 49. But no fact of the Civil War is better attested than this: that Pompey was unwilling to fight at Pharsalia and was forced to do so by the senators, who were then so far from despair that they felt confident of victory. As to the fact all our authorities are agreed; and none of them describes the situation more fully than Lucan, who compares Pompey to a sea-captain overcome by the violence of the storm and leaving his ship to drift before the wind (vii 125 foll.). Thus the historical facts entirely knock the bottom out of the epigram.

As I have said, in Lucan's narrative the opposition to Pompey's policy is expressed by Lentulus. As consul in 49 he was mainly responsible for the outbreak of civil war. He was a violent partisan; but we may infer from Cicero's letters (*Att.* viii 9, 4) that he was not a disinterested patriot, as we are told that Caesar was trying, during the first weeks of the war,

to win his support by bribes. It is true that Caesar failed; but Cicero attributes this result to the fact that Caesar's emissary, Balbus, could not catch up Lentulus before he left Italy. In Plutarch's narrative (c. 76) this council is described at some length, and Pompey's proposal to seek aid from Parthia is adversely criticised in a similar strain. In both accounts stress is laid upon the hurt to Cornelia's feelings and the danger to Cornelia's honour involved in Pompey's Parthian plan. She had been the wife of Publius Crassus, who fell at Carrhae. But in Plutarch's narrative the speech is attributed not to Lentulus but to Theophanes. Which of our authorities are we to follow?

I suspect that Lucan had two reasons for attributing this speech to the wrong person. First, it seemed proper to him that a patriotic argument should be spoken not by a Greek and a man of letters but by a Roman and a senator. Secondly, it was impossible for him to introduce into his verse the name of Theophanes; even if he had contracted it into Theuphanes, few of the cases would be admissible; and he could hardly introduce his stirring piece of rhetoric by such a line as

*tum Mytilenaeus, quem uersu dicere non est,
incipit.*

§ 6. It appears that a similar liberty is taken with another speech later in the book. When Pompey arrives off the coast of Egypt, Ptolemy, the young king, holds a council, in which the villain's part is played by the eunuch Pothinus. It is Pothinus who persuades the king to murder Pompey. In this case the evidence is very strong, that the treacherous policy was urged, not by Pothinus but by the king's tutor, Theodotus, a native of Chios (or, according to one authority, Samos).

For (1) Plutarch (c. 77) distinctly states this and cites a memorable phrase, with which Theodotus ended his speech: *προσεπέειπε δὲ διαμειδιάσας ὅτι νεκρὸς οὐ δάκνει*, "stone-dead hath no fellow." And (2) the epitome of Livy cxii, while mentioning Pothinus, throws the main responsibility on Theodotus: *Pompeius...auctore Theodoto praeceptore, cuius magna apud regem auctoritas erat, et Pothino, occisus est ab Achilla*. And

(3) Appian (*Civ.* 2. 84), who says that Pothinus and Achilles opened the debate (*βουλήν προθεμένων*), attributes the plan of murdering Pompey to Theodotus and to him only. And (4) Seneca (*De Ira* ii 2, 3) does not mention Pothinus at all: *quis non Theodoto et Achillae et ipsi puero, non puerile auso facinus, infestus est?*

Again I suppose Lucan to have had two motives for tampering with the historical fact. It seemed to him to deepen the horror of Pompey's end, that he owed it to an unsexed monster like Pothinus. But also the name of Theodotus was no more admissible in his verse¹ than the name of Theophanes, or the name of Tuticanus in Ovid's elegiacs, or the name of the town, where water was sold, in Horace's hexameters, or the name of Earinus in Martial's hendecasyllables. It was certainly hard upon Lucan that *two* of the prominent actors in the tragedy bore names which begin with three short syllables and were therefore shibboleth to him or to any other writer of dactylic verse.

§ 7. I shall give one other instance of Lucan's independent attitude to historical facts. The last fifty lines of the book are very fine declamation; and they depend entirely upon one assumption, that the remains of Pompey have never been removed from the shore of Egypt. But the last sentence of Plutarch's Life tells us that the remains *were* removed and given to Cornelia, who buried them at Pompey's Alban villa. τὰ λείψανα τοῦ Πομπηίου Κορνηλία δεξαμένη κομισθέντα περὶ τὸν Ἄλβανὸν ἔθηκεν (Plut. *Pomp.* c. 80).

It seems impossible to suppose that Lucan did not know this. But apparently he chose to ignore the fact so as to get an opportunity for effective declamation. I can quite believe that his contemporaries thought him justified in doing so. But in modern times this would surely be impossible: *nobis non licet esse tam disertis, qui Musas colimus severiores*. What would be said now, if a Frenchman wrote a poem on Napoleon's career and ended by pouring reproaches on France for leaving

¹ Professor Housman has since informed me that Ovid, in the *Ibis*, uses the name *Theodotus* in the contracted

form *Theudotus*. The statement in the text therefore needs qualification.

the bones of her hero to moulder into dust in St Helena? and yet what Lucan does is something not very different from this.

§ 8. At l. 542 foll. Lucan reproaches the gods for allowing Egypt to play any part in a war between Romans. He goes on l. 547 thus:

*hanc certe seruate fidem, civilia bella:
cognatas praestate manus, externaque monstra
pellite!*

As the word *fidem* is typical of Lucan's queer topsy-turvy way of looking at things, and as the passage is insufficiently explained in the current commentaries, I will say a few words about it. Lucan means: 'a war that calls itself a civil war, is bound to *be* a civil war, and behave as such. It must satisfy the reasonable expectations of a person who engages in it. Now the reasonable expectation of such a man is to be killed by a *ciuis* or country-man. Consequently any Roman, who, like Pompey, was killed by foreigners, has been cheated of his rights; and civil war has broken its bargain with him.'

In all texts that I have seen, a comma is placed after *pellite* in l. 549, and a full stop after *nefas* in 550. I believe that anyone who reads the lines with attention will agree that there should be a full stop after *pellite* and a comma after *nefas*. The second clause will then read thus:

*si meruit tam claro nomine Magnus
Caesaris esse nefas, tanti, Ptolemaee, ruinam
nominis haud metuis?*

"If the mighty name of Magnus entitled him to be Caesar's guilt (i.e. to fall by Caesar's hand), do you, O Ptolemy, not dread the downfall of that great name?": i.e. Pompey's greatness gave him the right to fall by a noble hand: Caesar may be a fit instrument to slay such a victim, but the interference of a degenerate Egyptian is revolting. This antithesis is entirely obscured by the current punctuation.

§ 9. After Pompey is murdered, his head is cut off, and the Egyptians proceed to embalm it, that they may be able to show to Caesar a convincing proof of what they have done.

When reading the description in Lucan, I turned to Herodotus to see how he described the process as he saw it; and, when I had read it, there seemed to me grounds for believing that Lucan also consulted Herodotus when he wrote this passage. There is great similarity in the language used; but it is curious to see how Lucan contrives to add a note of violence and horror to the simple words of Herodotus. (He has of course his reasons for doing this; but the operation was no doubt performed, not by the murderers, but by professionals who would do what had to be done with professional coolness). Thus in Lucan (l. 689) *rapto cerebro* ('they tear forth the brain') represents ἐξάγουσι τὸν ἐγκέφαλον (Herod. ii 86); and when Herodotus says that the Egyptians embalm the head by pouring in spices (ἐγχέοντες φάρμακα), Lucan seizes hold of the more sinister sense of φάρμακα and ends his description with *infuso facies solidata ueneno est* (l. 691). *infuso ueneno* is a literal translation of ἐγχέοντες φάρμακα, but it implies something different.

§ 10.

*cum tibi sacrato Macedon seruetur in antro,
et regum cineres exstructo monte quiescant,
cum Ptolemaeorum manes seriemque pudendam
Pyramides claudant indignaque Mausolea,
littora Pompeium feriunt...* (ll. 694 foll.)

It is perhaps worth pointing out, as none of the books I have used does point it out, that *regum* in l. 695 does not refer to the Ptolemies but to the Pharaohs, the native kings of Egypt. Lucan speaks first of the sepulchre of Alexander, whose body, embalmed in honey, was long preserved in the city which he had founded; then of the ancient kings of Egypt, and lastly of the line of Lagus. His point is that all these have honour in their deaths, while Pompey's headless body is tossing in the sea and beating against the rocks.

§ 11.

*nil ista nocebunt
famae busta tuae: templis auroque sepultus
uilior umbra fores: nunc es pro numine summo
hoc tumulo, Fortuna, iacens.* (ll. 858 foll.)

Lucan is apostrophising Pompey thus: "that grave will not mar thy fame. If buried in temples of gold, thy body had been less worshipful; as it is, laid in this tomb (O Fortune) thou art great as a god." The construction is awkward, because in the middle of the apostrophe to Pompey there is inserted an apostrophe to Fortune. The emendation accepted in the Corpus text gets rid of this difficulty but seems to me unsatisfactory on other grounds.

When I think of Lucan viii 793

*placet hoc, Fortuna, sepulcrum
dicere Pompeii?*

and of Juvenal 10, 159

O gloria, vincitur idem,

in view of these two vocatives, I think it possible that Lucan may have thrust in here the vocative *Fortuna* in the sense of 'Fie! for shame! Fortune.'

J. D. DUFF.

ON SOME PASSAGES IN PLATO'S *SOPHIST*.

218 E Ξ. Τί δῆτα προταξαίμεθ' ἂν εὐγνωστον μὲν καὶ μικρόν, λόγον δὲ μηδενὸς ἐλάττονα ἔχον τῶν μειζόνων ;

The Stranger's point is, not, that the small thing has as *large* a definition as any of the great ones, but that the small thing has a definition *just as much* as any of the great ones. Whence it would seem that ἐλάττον should be substituted for ἐλάττονα. Compare μηδὲν ἦττον in 224 A and οὐχ ἦττον in 224 B.

225 A Ξ. Τῆς τοίνυν μαχητικῆς τῷ μὲν σώματι πρὸς σώματα γιγνομένῳ σχεδὸν εἰκὸς καὶ πρέπον ὄνομα λέγειν τι τοιοῦτον τιθεμένους οἷον βιαστικόν.

For σώματι, read σώμασι. The proximity of τῷ is both a reason for preferring the plural and an explanation of the traditional singular.

244 C Ξ. Τό τε δύο ὀνόματα ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι μηδὲν θέμενον πλὴν ἓν, καταγέλαστόν που. Θ. Πῶς δ' οὐ ; Ξ. Καὶ τὸ παράπαν γε ἀποδέχεσθαι τοῦ λέγοντος ὡς ἔστιν ὄνομά τι, λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον.

Apelt comments: "λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον respondet antecedenti illi καταγέλαστόν που, ut non opus sit mutatione. Ceterum ad totius loci sensum nihil interest, utrum ἔχον an ἔχοι scribatur." I venture to think that καταγέλαστόν που is to be carried forward from the former sentence, and that the comma after ὄνομά τι should be expunged. Translate: "And, again, surely it is absurd to accept from any one the statement that there is a name which cannot have a definition."


DIFFICULTIES IN THE TEXT OF ARISTOTLE.

I.

De Motu Animalium 698^a 16—24.

δεῖ γὰρ, ἂν κινήται τι τῶν μορίων ἡρεμεῖν τι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αἱ καμπαὶ τοῖς ζώοις εἰσὶν. ὥσπερ γὰρ κέντρῳ χρώνται ταῖς καμπαῖς, καὶ γίνεται τὸ ὅλον μέρος, ἐν ᾧ ἡ καμπή, καὶ ἐν καὶ δύο, καὶ εὐθύ καὶ κεκαμμένον, μεταβάλλον δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ διὰ τὴν καμπήν. καμπτομένου δὲ καὶ κινουμένου τὸ μὲν κινεῖται σημεῖον τὸ δὲ μένει τῶν ἐν ταῖς καμπαῖς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τῆς διαμέτρου ἡ μὲν A καὶ ἡ Δ μένοι, ἡ δὲ B κινεοῖτο, καὶ γίνοιτο ἡ $A\Gamma$.

The last sentence of this passage causes some difficulty¹ which may be removed by a small emendation, the mistake lying in $A\Gamma$, for which P and S read α καὶ γ . ΔAB is probably the diameter of a circle; A is the centre and represents the καμπή of ^a18, and ΔAB is the εὐθύ of ^a19. The points A and Δ remain fixed, so that ΔA remains fixed. The point B is conceived as moving to Γ , so that the part AB revolves on the centre to the position $A\Gamma$. The result is that instead of the εὐθύ ΔAB there is produced (cf. γίνοιτο) the κεκαμμένον (cf. ^a20) $\Delta A\Gamma$. Probably therefore Δ has fallen out before the A in $A\Gamma$, and we should read $\Delta A\Gamma$. The feminine article may represent γραμμή or



¹ My attention was drawn to this by Mr A. S. L. Farquharson of Univer-

sity College, Oxford, when preparing his translation of the De Motu An.

γωνία : cf. 94^a 28—32. The reading of P and S arose more probably from a clumsy attempt at emendation, because the symbols before ΑΓ represent points, than from any corruption of ΔΑΓ.

II.

Rhetoric 1403^b 21 sqq. and Poetics 1449^a 23 sqq.

In the last instalment¹ of the Aristotelia, with which Mr Bywater from time to time delights the students of Aristotle, there are two emendations on which one may be permitted to offer suggestions. The first is in Rhet. 1408^b 32, τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἠρῶος σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικὸς καὶ ἀρμονίας δεόμενος, ὁ δ' ἰαμβος αὐτῆ ἐστὶν ἢ λέξις ἢ τῶν πολλῶν.

The commonly accepted emendation of this passage, due to Tyrwhitt, is καὶ λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας δεόμενος; grounded upon the similar passage in Poet. 1449^a 27, ἐξάμετρα δὲ ὀλιγάκις καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας.

Mr Bywater convincingly shews the impossibility of this. He points out that it rests on a mistake about the meaning of δεόμενος, which is rendered as 'deficient in' (or 'remote from'), whereas "the natural and normal meaning of δεόμενος is not 'wanting' in the sense of 'deficient in,' but 'wanting' in the sense of 'demanding' or requiring." It is strange that such an oversight should have been made by scholars like Tyrwhitt, Spengel, Cope, and Jebb; but it is still stranger that it should have been endorsed by such an Aristotelian authority as Bonitz, the use of δεόμενος being so familiar to the readers of Aristotle. One may quote e.g. the well-known place in the Politics, 1288^b 39—νῦν δ' οἱ μὲν τὴν ἀκροτάτην (sc. πολιτείαν) καὶ δεομένην πολλῆς χορηγίας ζητοῦσι μόνον. Bonitz in his *Index Aristotelicus*, under ἀρμονία, takes Tyrwhitt's emendation for granted, and, significantly enough as we shall see, quotes the passage along with the passage from the Poetics, by help of which it has been emended, as the only two instances of a 'latior sensus' of ἀρμονία.

¹ *Journal of Philology*, vol. xxxii. p. 107 sqq.

The emendation which Mr Bywater approves in the Rhetoric is Victorius' insertion of οὐ before λεκτικός. With the proper interpretation of δεόμενος the emendation is convincing enough on its own merits; but the passage quoted by Mr Bywater from Demetrius de Eloc. (42) ὁ μὲν ἡρῶς σεμνὸς καὶ οὐ λογικός ought to disarm any scepticism¹.

But now this has important consequences for the passage in the Poetics, 1449^a 23, ...λέξεως δὲ γενομένης αὐτῆ ἢ φύσις τὸ οἰκείου μέτρον εὖρε· μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτικὸν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἰαμβεῖόν ἐστιν· σημείον δὲ τούτου, πλείστα γὰρ ἰαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἑξάμετρα δὲ ὀλιγάκις καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.ε.

It becomes necessary to consider the phrase λεκτικὴ ἀρμονία.

Whatever ἀρμονία may mean—and I shall venture in the sequel to offer an opinion about this—in the passage from the Rhetoric it is a property which rhythm may have, for the heroic rhythm must have it (δεόμενος), and therefore it cannot be identified with rhythm. Yet one of the best chances of making sense of the passage from the Poetics, with the received text, is to understand ἀρμονία as in effect equivalent to rhythm—possibly the 'latior sensus' intended by Bonitz.

But there is a more serious difficulty.

Whatever, again, ἀρμονία may mean here, it is according to the Rhetoric something which belongs to the heroic rhythm (with its hexameter metre) and does not belong to ordinary speech (λέξις), to the rhythm of which, according to both the Rhetoric and the Poetics, the iambus is most akin. For this view of the iambus compare Poet. 1449^a 24 μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτικὸν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἰαμβεῖόν ἐστιν, with Rhet. 1408^b 33—a passage which (N.B.) we are warned not to take too literally by Aristotle's own express statement a little before, viz. that prose should have rhythm and not metre (and so, of course, not literally consist of iammbuses) and not even rhythm literally (ἀκριβῶς) but rather an approximation to it (διὸ ῥυθμὸν δεῖ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον μέτρον δὲ μὴ...ῥυθμὸν δὲ μὴ ἀκριβῶς· τοῦτο δ' ἔσται ἐὰν μέχρι του ἤ).

¹ I find that the edition of the Rhetoric, published by the Clarendon Press in 1820, 'in usum Academicæ juventutis,' reads σεμνὸς καὶ οὐ λεκτικός.

To return to the way in which the difference is put in the Rhetoric:—According to the treatise, ordinary speech (*λέξις*), with its approximately iambic rhythm, is expressly distinguished from what has *ἄρμονία*, and it is because the heroic measure is stately and requires *ἄρμονία* that it is *οὐ λεκτικός*. From the point of view therefore of the Rhetoric, the phrase in the Poetics, *λεκτικὴ ἄρμονία*, is a contradiction in terms.

This suggests that Tyrwhitt's procedure should perhaps be inverted, and instead of emending the Rhetoric from the Poetics we should emend the Poetics from the Rhetoric; and a comparison of the two passages suggests the line which emendation might take.

If the two passages with their full context are read side by side it will be seen that they are an instance of what is common enough in Aristotle. When the course of his thought brings him to a subject which he has treated before, he repeats what he has said in essentials, sometimes almost in the same words, and sometimes, as here, with variation of expression. The main point of both the passages before us, as already seen, is the association of the iambic with conversational prose, and the distinction of the rhythm of this prose from the heroic rhythm and the hexameter.

But beside this an exceptional use of hexameter rhythm in prose is indicated (Rhet. 1408^b 35, Poet. 1449^a 27). In the Rhetoric the ascription of *ἄρμονία* to the heroic rhythm is one of the essentials, and it is not likely that there would be a contradiction on such a point in the version of the same subject in the Poetics (which will be still more obvious when we consider what *ἄρμονία* probably means). And if Aristotle had felt that what he had said in the one treatise—whichever passage came first—about *ἄρμονία* required so much alteration when he came to write the other, we should expect him to make this somehow clear, but there is no hint of any such thing.

If we consider the Poetics passage by itself there is a certain flatness about the words *καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτικῆς ἄρμονίας*. It would be natural to expect this clause to be epexegetic of *ὀλιγάκις*, and to explain the exceptional usage: but as it stands it sounds little better than a tautology, for, of course, if

the iambic rhythm is characteristic of conversational prose, if we introduce the hexameter into it we must be departing (*ἐκβαίνοντες*) from the conversational style. There is then here a certain difficulty—if not a great one—in the Poetics passage even when taken by itself.

But now if we look back to the corresponding part of the Rhetoric we shall see that what we might expect in the Poetics but do not find, is really supplied in the Rhetoric; and that is the reason for the departure (*ἐκβαίνειν*) from the rule of prose by the introduction of the hexameter rhythm (*ἐκστῆσαι* in the Rhetoric corresponds sufficiently to *ἐκβαίνειν* in the Poetics, though the matter is put a little differently). The words in the Rhetoric (1408^b 35) are *δεῖ δὲ σεμνότητα γενέσθαι καὶ ἐκστῆσαι*. A little above Aristotle has said that if actual metre is introduced into prose it diverts the attention (from the normal course of thought)—*καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐξίστησι*. So now he says, in effect, that we ought to carry the attention (*δεῖ ἐκστῆσαι*) from its normal course in prose expression, by the introduction (i.e.) of the hexameter rhythm. (Obviously he means, though he does not expressly say, that this should only be done occasionally, and it is interesting to observe that in the Poetics he says so expressly—*ὀλιγάκις*.) But he further gives the reason for the exception in the words *δεῖ δὲ σεμνότητα γενέσθαι* which precede *καὶ ἐκστῆσαι*. The reason is to get the stately effect which the hexameter brings with it, for sometimes such an effect is needed to carry the reader (*ἐκστῆσαι*) out of the mood of ordinary prose. But according to the Rhetoric the *σεμνότης* of the hexameter is closely associated with its *ἁρμονία*, and requires it. Each of the characteristics implies the other, and the introduction of the hexameter rhythm into prose, in the exceptionally allowed case, would produce both of them. This of itself suggests the kind of emendation wanted in the Poetics passage. As in the Rhetoric the attainment of *σεμνότης* is given as the reason of *ἐκστῆσαι*, so we may suspect that the word *ἁρμονίας* in our present text of the Poetics remains from an original in which *ἁρμονία* was given as the reason of the exceptional *ἐκβαίνειν* from the prose rhythm. What the exact

form of the original was I would not pretend to determine, but I suspect it may have been simply—*ἑξάμετρα δὲ ὀλιγάκις καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τοῦ λεκτικοῦ ἁρμονίας <ἔνεκεν>.* ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.ἔ.

For τοῦ λεκτικοῦ cf. above, 1449^a 24, *μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτικὸν τῶν μέτρων κ.τ.ἔ.*, and what is said lower down at the end of this article. The emendation, if otherwise approved, can be justified palaeographically. The scribe would pass from the first *εν* in *ἔνεκεν* to the second one—a phenomenon too familiar to need comment¹, with the result *ἁρμονίας εν.* ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.ἔ. The meaningless *εν* would be ejected as a mistake and then it would be only natural to emend τοῦ λεκτικοῦ ἁρμονίας into τῆς λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας. These changes are not an independent addition complicating the hypothesis, as they are merely direct logical consequences of the supposed corruption, which itself is simple enough².

The effect of the emendation would be that the Rhetoric and the Poetics would present the same doctrine, and the difference between them would be that whereas Aristotle might well in both passages have said the reason for the exceptional introduction of the hexameter rhythm was its associated characteristics of *σεμνότης* and *ἁρμονία*, in the Rhetoric he mentions one of these and in the Poetics the other. A cognate phenomenon in the relation of the two passages has already been noticed, viz. that whereas Aristotle clearly implies in the Rhetoric that the introduction of the hexameter would be exceptional but does not say so, he does expressly say so in the Poetics.

¹ However, to shew what this kind of 'homœoteleuton' can do I may give an extreme instance (which I have quoted elsewhere) where the effect is produced by a single letter. ἀνι⁵ in one MS. represents ἀΝτὶ τῶΝ ις', where the two Ν's have caused the loss of all the intervening letters.

² Perhaps I need hardly say the assumption of such deliberate alteration enters into a large proportion of accepted emendations, and this is only logical. Nor does what is here suggested appear to transgress reasonable

or usual limits. It is e.g. like the supposed deliberate alteration of ἡ ἀγαν θερμότης into τὴν ἀγαν θερμότητα in Probl. 954^a 39 (quoted by Mr Bywater in his article), except that such alteration of a case seems more serious than the alteration of the gender of an adjective. Instances can easily be multiplied. I give one from another military text: πᾶν τάγμα (found in one MS.) has been corrupted into παντά-*πασι*. The first corruption was probably πανταπμα, and the μα was deliberately altered into -*ασι*.

In the above nothing has been made to turn upon the meaning of *ἁρμονία*, in case there should be a dispute about it: but it is from the use of *ἁρμονία*, one may think, that the argument receives an important confirmation. The emendation makes it possible to dispense with the artificial interpretations of the word which the received text inevitably occasions, and to explain it naturally, in accordance with Aristotelian usage, and particularly with the usage of the word whenever it occurs elsewhere in the two treatises which concern us most—the Poetics and the Rhetoric.

In a considerable number of passages in Aristotle *ἁρμονία* means music; as often in the Politics. In some of these it means specially a mode of music (see the passages collected in Bonitz' *Index*) In a few passages it is found not, be it observed, as a word used generally for any ordered system, but in the special application, said to be Pythagorean, to the 'harmony' of the Universe, of the stars and of the soul—a usage itself, in all probability, derived from music.

In the other passages of the Poetics beside the one before us where *ἁρμονία* occurs it means music and music only. A very clear instance is 1447^a 21—28: cf. especially 26, *αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ῥυθμῷ μιμοῦνται χωρὶς ἁρμονίας αἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν*.

As to the Rhetoric the only other place in which *ἁρμονία* occurs is 1403^b 31 *τρία γὰρ ἐστὶ περὶ ὧν σκοποῦσιν ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μέγεθος ἁρμονία ῥυθμός*. Here *ἁρμονία* is distinguished from *ῥυθμός* and the context proves that it refers to the musical distinctions in the voice; the differences of musical pitch or musical note.

In the passage of the Rhetoric before us, I venture to think, with the right interpretation of *δεόμενος*, the meaning of *ἁρμονία* is quite obvious. It again has a musical reference, and is most naturally interpreted as a musical quality in the spoken words. We may render 'the heroic rhythm is a stately one and not that of ordinary conversation and has to be musical,' or 'and has to be sonorous,' for *ἁρμονία* here may be fairly rendered by sonorousness. Accordingly in the Poetics passage, if emended, we may render, 'We use the hexameter seldom in prose, and then we desert the prose rhythm for a sonorous effect.'

Finally I find the interpretation here given to *ἄρμονία* confirmed by Demetrius *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* 42—a passage already partly quoted by Mr Bywater. The fuller quotation is *ὁ μὲν ἠρῶος σεμνὸς καὶ οὐ λογικὸς ἀλλ' ἠχῶδης*, where *ἠχῶδης* means 'sonorous,' so that Demetrius understood the passage as I have done.

I do not forget that the following passage from Aristoxenus (ch. xviii. 11—16) has been quoted as containing a sort of parallel to *λεκτικὴ ἄρμονία*:—*λέγεται γὰρ δὴ καὶ λογῶδες τι μέλος, τὸ συγκείμενον ἐκ τῶν προσφιδίων τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι· φυσικὸν γὰρ τὸ ἐπιτείνειν καὶ ἀνιέναι ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι*. Now (1) even if one had not the context of the passage to correct such an inference from it, one may reasonably object that a passage in Aristoxenus which anyhow presents no striking parallel in language to the received text of the Poetics, cannot count against the clear and frequent use of *ἄρμονία* in Aristotle himself and especially not against Aristotle's express representation of *λέξις* in the Rhetoric as not having *ἄρμονία*.

But (2) there is a stronger objection, and one which, without presumption, may be held to quite prevent the proposed use of the passage from Aristoxenus. An examination of the context of the quotation shews that it is actually in favour of the view I have maintained: for instead of offering a parallel to the Poetics passage it agrees with the Rhetoric, and stands in the same contradiction to the Poetics. The words which immediately precede the passage quoted are these:—*ὅτι μὲν οὐ διαστηματικὴν ἐν αὐτῷ δεῖ τὴν τῆς φωνῆς κίνησιν εἶναι προείρηται, ὥστε τοῦ γε λογῶδους κεχώρισται ταύτῃ τὸ μουσικὸν μέλος*. From *λογῶδης μέλος*, then, is distinguished *μουσικὸν μέλος*. Now in the remaining context the *μουσικὸν μέλος* is repeatedly identified with *τὸ ἠρμωσμένον μέλος*, and *λογῶδες μέλος*, which is the *μέλος τῆς λέξεως*, is contrasted with it as *ἀνάρμωστον*. Cf. ch. xviii. 17, 22 and 32; ch. xix. 5, 6, 10 and 21. *ἠρμωσμένον* is obviously the word which corresponds to *ἄρμονία* in the Aristotelian passages, and *τὸ ἠρμωσμένον μέλος* is exactly equivalent to the sense of *ἄρμονία* or music in Aristotle, which

is the same as the wider sense of *ἄρμονία* implied in Aristoxenus¹.

The musical quality, therefore, τὸ ἤρμωσμένον or *ἄρμονία*, is, according to this passage of Aristoxenus, as much denied to λέξις as it is in Aristotle's Rhetoric. Indeed the matter is put more fully and technically by Aristoxenus, as may be seen by reading the whole context: Aristotle uses the principle, Aristoxenus formulates it scientifically and gives it scientific grounds.

Aristoxenus uses λέξις here in the same way as Aristotle, and τὸ λογῶδες μέλος is τὸ τῆς λέξεως μέλος: cf. ch. xviii. 30, τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς λέξεως γιγνόμενον μέλος. λεκτικὴ ἄρμονία would be the equivalent of λεκτικὸν ἤρμωσμένον μέλος or τὸ λογῶδες ἤρμωσμένον μέλος or τὸ ἤρμωσμένον μέλος τὸ λογῶδες: but this latter expression would be quite impossible and a contradiction in terms from the point of view of Aristoxenus, just as the former expression (λεκτικὴ ἄρμονία) would be a contradiction in terms from the point of Aristotle's Poetics.

The doctrine then of the passage from the Rhetoric and of the passage from the Poetics would be that, to gain an exceptional effect of stateliness and sonorousness, departure might be made from the normal iambic-like rhythm of prose by the introduction of a hexameter rhythm.

Assuming, as I venture to do, that Victorius' emendation of the Rhetoric passage has been put beyond reasonable doubt by Mr Bywater, the proposed emendation (1) would not only reconcile two passages which would be otherwise in contradiction², and (2) supply a want in the conception of the subject as presented in the Poetics—a want confirmed by the corresponding passage in the Rhetoric, but also (3) would give a

¹ In the extant fragments of Aristoxenus *ἄρμονία* is nearly always used in the narrower technical sense of the enharmonic system as distinguished from the chromatic and diatonic. Cf. e.g. ch. xlv. 23. But the wider sense it bears in Aristotle is presupposed in Aristoxenus in his use of the adjective *ἄρμονικός*: e.g. ἡ ἄρμονικὴ

ἐπιστήμη and τὰ ἄρμονικά.

² Apart from any considerations of contradiction between the Rhetoric and Poetics, Mr Bywater has recognised an intrinsic difficulty in the expression *λεκτικὴ ἄρμονία* taken by itself, as is well known to readers of his monumental edition of the Poetics.

meaning to *ἄρμονία* which suits the subject exactly, and as already remarked one which accords with the usage of the word elsewhere in the two treatises and in the other writings of Aristotle.

With regard to the first of these points—the contradiction, I may return to what was said in advance; that while contradiction here was anyhow unlikely it would seem still more so when the probable meaning of *ἄρμονία* was taken into account. I have frequently had to urge the necessity of recognising the possibility of certain kinds of contradiction in Aristotle and in other writers ancient and modern, but there are limits to this principle, and there are some contradictions which, humanly speaking, are impossible. That prose as such is in a sense unmusical, as both Aristotle and Aristoxenus assert, is so obvious and the expression of it so simple that Aristotle was not the least likely either to change his mind about the fact or fall into verbal contradictions in expression. A man who has realised that prose is unmusical as such, would never talk about ‘the prose music,’ supposing there was not some altogether exceptional need or temptation to use such an expression, and certainly he would not use the phrase ‘prose music’ for mere ‘prose rhythm.’ Now when Aristotle says that prose has not the musical quality, he uses the word for music—*ἄρμονία*—which his writings shew was the general word for music with him, and so the most natural and appropriate word to use, and, the word having this quite definite meaning, it must be submitted that it would be as incredible that he should ever speak of *λεκτικὴ ἄρμονία* as that in the given case a man should speak of ‘the prose music.’ Nor can it be plausibly urged that he was in any way driven to such a verbal contradiction for want of vocabulary. One has only to look at the context of the Poetics passage to see at once the *ἔκβασις* spoken of (*καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες κ.τ.λ.*) is necessarily *ἔκβασις τοῦ λεκτικοῦ ῥυθμοῦ*; which is entirely confirmed by both the thought and the expression of the Rhetoric passage. ‘*Ῥυθμός* is the right word and the obvious word: but *μέτρον* also, as the context again shews, would serve the purpose. The simplest way of all, and one in agreement with Aristotle’s constant and familiar usage, would be to use the neuter of the

adjective in -ικός with the definite article—and write ἐκβαίνοντες τοῦ λεκτικού. There could not then be the slightest difficulty in the matter of expression, and indeed it would be a perversity one can hardly believe possible to exchange the obviously right word ῥυθμοῦ—if a definite noun was wanted—for a word which stood regularly for music.

As regards the second point—the sense of something wanting in the text of the Poetics passage confirmed by a comparison with the Rhetoric—while I should submit that all the evidence seems to converge, in a manner worthy of attention, upon the general conclusion that some emendation of the kind indicated is required, I am well aware there must be a *prima facie* prejudice against an emendation which does not seem immediately suggested by the words of the text. On this account I would lay stress on the fact that the text on careful examination does shew something wanting in the conception. I fully admit that this could not be relied upon as a strong point for the purposes of argument if we had no parallel passage to compare. But this is all changed, and, I may be permitted to hold, the point does become a valuable one when such striking confirmation of the surmise is found in a parallel passage.

III.

Physics 231^b 21.

The other of the passages discussed by Mr Bywater on which I would offer a suggestion is Physics 6. 7, 231^b 21—εἰ γὰρ τὸ μέγεθος ἐξ ἀδιαίρετων σύγκειται, καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἢ τούτου ἐξ ἴσων κινήσεων ἔσται ἀδιαίρετων, οἷον εἰ τὸ ΑΒΓ ἐκ τῶν ΑΒΓ ἐστὶν ἀδιαίρετων κ.τ.ε.

Mr Bywater points out that ἡ κίνησις ἢ τούτου cannot be right, because the magnitude referred to is not represented as itself in motion but as having a movement taking place over [or along] it. He therefore conjectures ἡ κίνησις ἢ <ἐπὶ> τούτου, and doubtless had in view ἐπὶ τῆς ΑΒΓ a little below. But I venture to think there is something to be said in favour of either leaving the text exactly as it stands or of altering at most one letter of it.

There are certain idioms which may be called technical as belonging to the language of science. These we cannot anticipate from the ordinary usage of a given language, but have to learn them empirically from their actual occurrence. I have given before in this Journal (Vol. XXVIII. p. 222) an example of such an idiom which explains a noted difficulty in the text of Plato's *Meno*. The present context of the *Physics* gives another such idiom which we should not have anticipated, and that is the combination of the feminine with the neuter article before a letter of the alphabet used as a symbol, the feminine following the gender of the thing signified and the neuter belonging to the symbol. Thus ἡ τὸ A may mean the angle (*γωνία*) represented by the symbol A (τὸ A), ἡ τὸ AB means the proposition (*πρότασις*) symbolised by AB (see a valuable note on this subject in Waitz, *Organon*, Vol. I, p. 485). So here we find (231^b 28) τὴν τὸ E for the motion (*κίνησις*) symbolised by E.

The context contains also another technical idiom foreign to the ordinary usage both of Greek and of other languages. In ordinary speech the 'proper name' of the space traversed, that is the word which designates it as the particular space which it is, never becomes the accusative after an intransitive verb of motion. Only a designation of dimension can be such an accusative. Thus we say 'it moved a foot,' or 'it moved the length of the table,' but not 'it moved the table.' If the space is represented by a symbol which designates that particular space, the symbol is a kind of proper name, and so in a technical description with a diagram we should not say 'the point *P* moves *ABC*' nor even 'moves the curve *ABC*,' nor 'moves the path *ABC*.' (It is true that if *AB* were a straight line we might possibly find such an expression as '*P* moves *AB*,' understood however to be an exceptional abbreviation—a rough note, and not as proper technical style.)

In the present context however we have both the symbolic designation and a word signifying the spatial magnitude—not its dimension, put in the accusative after the verb of motion: 231^b 27 τὸ μὲν δὴ A ἐκινήθη τὸ Ω τὴν τὸ Δ κινούμενον κίνησιν—'the point Ω moved the line A (i.e. along the line A) in the move-

ment Δ.' Cf. 232^a 5 εἰ δὲ τὴν μὲν ὅλην τὴν ΑΒΓ κινεῖται τι, which means 'if anything moves along the line ΑΒΓ' (not, N. B., 'the distance ΑΒΓ'). In 231^b 28 seqq. we find the spatial magnitude as accusative both with and without the symbolic designation—κεκινήσθω τὸ βραδύτερον τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ ΓΔ μέγεθος ἐν τῷ ΖΗ χρόνῳ· δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ θάπτον ἐν ἐλάττωι τούτου κινήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ μέγεθος: where it is to be observed that τὸ αὐτὸ μέγεθος is not to be translated 'the same distance' or 'the same length': it means the actual spatial magnitude (μέγεθος) designated above by ΓΔ.

It is clear from the context that the technical idiom was fully established, for it occurs repeatedly. Cf., beside the passages already quoted, 232^a 1, 232^a 7, 232^a 14, 232^a 22 (εἰ δ' ὁ χρόνος διαιρετὸς ἐν ᾧ φέρεται τι τὴν Α (sc. γραμμὴν), καὶ ἡ τὸ Α ἔσται διαιρετή).

The formula, then, κινεῖσθαι τὸ Α or κινεῖσθαι τὴν τὸ Α (sc. γραμμὴν) being equivalent to κινεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ Α, or ἐπὶ τῆς Α, we have to ask what would happen when for the infinitive of the verb of motion (e.g. κινεῖσθαι) the corresponding noun (e.g. κίνησις) was substituted. It is by no means certain that the technical idiom would now be dropped in favour of the ordinary one, because the technical idiom was clearly so well established. If it were not dropped there seem to be two alternatives.

(1) Since the form κινεῖσθαι τὸ Α is the equivalent of κινεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τὸ Α, the substantival form corresponding to the first might follow the same rule as the second. This rule is that the construction after the verbal noun is the same as that after the verb. Thus as κινεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ Α gives rise to ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦ Α κίνησις or ἡ κίνησις ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦ Α, so κινεῖσθαι τὸ Α would give rise to ἡ τὸ Α κίνησις or ἡ κίνησις ἡ τὸ Α. And as the μέγεθος can in the idiom with the verb be construed just as the symbol for it—cf. 232^b 30 (quoted above) κινήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ μέγεθος (i.e. τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ ΓΔ μέγεθος)—the correct expression for 'movement over this (spatial magnitude)' would be ἡ τοῦτο κίνησις or ἡ κίνησις ἡ τοῦτο. Hence we should read ἡ κίνησις ἡ τοῦτο for ἡ κίνησις ἡ τούτου in the passage before us, and suppose that the expression unfamiliar to the ordinary reader was altered into ἡ τούτου.

(2) The second alternative is that in *κινεῖσθαι τὸ A* the accusative after the verb (which, it should be observed, is not a true cognate accusative) should follow the idiom of ordinary Greek, and when the verb was replaced by the corresponding noun, the accusative would become the so-called objective genitive, e.g. Πανσανίου μῖσος, φόβος τῶν πολεμίων, ἢ τοῦ πατρὸς φιλία, τῆς πόλεως κτίσις. See Kühner, *Gr. Gr.* § 416 seqq., Madvig's *Syntax der Gr. Sprache*, § 48, Matthiae, § 313. The usage is so extended in Greek that it seems quite possible that this is the analogy which would be followed.

In this case *κινεῖσθαι τοῦτο* (sc. τὸ μέγεθος) would produce ἢ τούτου κίνησις or ἢ κίνησις ἢ τούτου, and the received text would be quite right.

It is true that both alternatives would give an ambiguous formula. ἢ κίνησις ἢ τούτου would mean, according to the context, 'the movement of this' or 'the movement along this.' But this is obviously no objection, for exactly the same thing happens in the ordinary idiom of the objective genitive; e.g. φόβος τῶν πολεμίων, according to the context, means 'fear of the enemy,' or 'fear felt by the enemy.' Cf. also Soph. Oed. C. 631 ἀνδρὸς εὐμένειαν τοιοῦδε. The first alternative would not be ambiguous in the non-symbolic form, e.g. as in ἢ κίνησις ἢ τοῦτο, but it would be so in the symbolic form, for ἢ τὸ A κίνησις could mean either 'the motion designated by the symbol A,' as already explained, or 'the motion along A.' As before this would perhaps not be a valid objection, though in this case the difficulty is greater. This latter form might perhaps at first seem confirmed by the context, for in 232^a 1 it appears to suit the argument if we take τὴν τὸ A τὴν ἀμερῇ to mean 'the indivisible movement along (the indivisible) A,' and similarly in 232^a 7 and 232^b 22. But that the feminine represents γραμμῇ and not κίνησις, so that τὴν τὸ A τὴν ἀμερῇ means 'the line designated by A,' is made fairly certain by 232^a 9 τὴν γὰρ A διελέλυθεν οὐ διεξιόν; cf. 232^b 33, διελέλυθε τὴν ὄλην τὴν ΓΔ, and 232^b 6. Of the two alternatives I incline to the second as perhaps the more natural in itself, and therefore also to the explanation of the text as an objective genitive which needs no emendation.

ἡ κίνησις ἢ τούτου would then mean 'the movement of this spatial magnitude' as = the movement along this spatial magnitude; and in principle this would be analogous to the genitive with words of true dimension, such as e.g. 'a movement of a foot,' 'a retreat of two miles.'

It seems worth while to call attention to another peculiarity of the passage.

ἐξ ἴσων κινήσεων does not mean 'movements equal to these spaces,' which would be absurd, nor 'movements equal to one another,' which would be irrelevant to the argument.

The meaning is determined by a comparison of what is said about the relation of the divisions of the time in which a motion takes place to the divisions of the space over which it takes place—233^a 16, αἱ γὰρ αὐταὶ διαιρέσεις ἔσονται τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους (cf. ib. 11, τὰς αὐτὰς γὰρ καὶ τὰς ἴσας διαιρέσεις). This is a brachylogical expression and means (the velocity being supposed uniform) not that the divisions of the time are literally equal to those of the space traversed, but that the time is divided in the same proportion as the spaces traversed, so that e.g. half the space is traversed in half the time, as the context shews. In the passage before us we have probably a still more brachylogical expression of the same kind, for ἴσων κινήσεων appears to mean movements whose ratio is equal to that of the corresponding spaces moved over. Such brachylogy will not surprise the student of the Organon.

IV.

Aristotle, Nic. Eth. iv. ii. 10, 1122^b 11–18 ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπή εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἂν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος, περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου. κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν (τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν). καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετὴ μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐν μεγέθει.

In this familiar passage there are two notable difficulties. The first of these lies in the words *περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης* (where H^a reads *ταῦτά*). The second concerns the translation of the last words *καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετῆ μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐν μεγέθει*.

To begin with the first difficulty:—Taking the reading of the best MS., *ταῦτα*, it seems impossible to make sense of *περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης*, and if the words of the text are retained it seems necessary to follow the reading of H^a, as giving the only tolerable result. But even so the words seem out of place and there remains a difficulty as to the meaning of *οἶον μέγεθος*. My friend Mr F. H. Hall, of Oriel College, has made the ingenious suggestion that we should transpose the clause *περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης* and place it immediately after *δεῖ* in 1122^b 12, so that we should have *καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης. ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἶον μέγεθος, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον*.

To those who feel no difficulty about *οἶον μέγεθος*, this transposition may well seem a satisfactory solution, and therefore I think that it should be published, although I confess that I do not agree with it myself. It seemed attractive at first, but on reflection considerable difficulties seemed to be involved in it. Even if we were satisfied about the sense that the emendation produces, it is not easy to see how the transposition could have come about. The transposed words do not seem likely to have formed a complete line according to the normal lengths of *στίχοι* at the period within which the transposition could probably have taken place; but even if they did, we have to assume that the line which they represent consisted of an exact grammatical unit. Nor is there any real homoeoteleuton which would account for it. Professor Burnet has pointed out that *ἐν τούτοις*—1122^b 12—refers to *ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ*, and I owe to the acumen of Professor J. A. Smith the remark that this constitutes a certain difficulty for the proposed transposition:—I may add that it causes the same difficulty in the case of Professor Burnet's own translation. In the trans-

position the words *περὶ ταῦτα* ought strictly to refer to *ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ*, that is to the properly liberal acts, whereas they would have to be understood more widely as referring to the field of expenditure in general in which liberality is exercised. However it will be probably agreed that this difficulty is not a very serious one, for *περὶ ταῦτα* might fairly refer to the general field to which *ἃ δεῖ* and *ὡς δεῖ* belong.

The main difficulty, I think, lies in *οἶον μέγεθος*. These words are referred by the Paraphrast to the *μέγεθος* of the *ἔργον*, but the context would rather indicate, as will be seen hereafter, that they belong to the part of the passage concerned with the *μεγαλοπρέπεια* shewn in magnitude of expenditure, while the representation of the other side of *μεγαλοπρέπεια*, which has to do with the magnitude of the *ἔργον*, does not begin until the words *καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης* etc. Apart from this, it would exceed the limits of reasonable interpretation to press the words *οἶον μέγεθος* (following as they do upon *ἐν τούτοις*, which refers to the expenditure) into meaning 'for example magnitude in the object (as opposed to the expenditure on it).' And yet if the words refer to the magnitude of the expense they seem very awkward and entirely unnecessary, while *οἶον* would be inexplicable.

Argyropylos, Giphanius, and Lambinus (see Zell's note on the passage) join *μέγεθος τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος*. This has found little favour with modern interpreters, though reasons will presently be given for thinking that it is right. There would remain however a grave difficulty about *οὔσης*, and in consequence it has been proposed to read (see Zell's note) *τῆς περὶ ταῦτα οὔσης ἐλευθεριότητος*, a twofold transposition which, rather improbable in itself, does not yield a satisfactory sense, leaving, as it does, difficulties both about *οὔσης* and *περὶ ταῦτα*.

We shall find it necessary to consider the whole doctrine of the chapter before us.

Aristotle begins with an account of *μεγαλοπρέπεια* which connects it solely with large expenditure¹. The expenditure is

¹ It is noteworthy that the definition in the Rhetoric is confined to this aspect of *μεγαλοπρέπεια*. *μεγαλοπρέπεια*

δὲ ἀρετὴ ἐν δαπανήμασι μεγέθους ποιητική.

to be in excess of what is liberal, and the *μεγαλοπρεπής* is so far *ἐλευθέριος* (§ 1 1122^a 19–23, § 3 1122^a 28, § 10 1122^b 10). He is distinguished from the *ἐλευθέριος* as only concerned with the greater forms of expenditure—*ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνου*. But more than this, we are told *ἐν τούτοις* (i.e. in the sphere of the greater expense) *ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει*. We might be tempted to suppose that *μεγέθει* referred to the magnitude of the *ἔργον* produced, the expenditure itself, though great, being only what liberality demanded. But it seems clear that the first part of the chapter, i.e. §§ 1–4 1122^a 19—1122^b 3, is concerned solely with the magnitude of the expense, and is accordingly summed up by the words *αἱ δὴ¹ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι*, the transition being made to the magnitude of the *ἔργον* in the words *τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα*, 1122^b 3, which immediately follow.

The meaning therefore of *ἐν τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει* seems to be that the *μεγαλοπρεπής* spends more on the given object than *ἐλευθεριότης* taken by itself would require. Thus, though the *μεγαλοπρεπής* is *ἐλευθέριος*, *μεγαλοπρέπεια*, or at least that aspect of it which Aristotle has before him in the first part of the chapter, is not really a part of *ἐλευθεριότης*². It is rather indeed a kind of magnified *ἐλευθεριότης*. Now this at once suggests that this side of *μεγαλοπρέπεια* might well be called *μέγεθος ἐλευθεριότητος*. Unless I am mistaken there seems to be an impression that *μέγεθος ἐλευθεριότητος* would hardly be good Greek, but it is sufficiently confirmed by passages both in Plato and in Aristotle. Cp. Philebus 45 C *ὄρα δὴ, μὴ με ἡγήθῃ διανοούμενον ἐρωτᾶν σε εἰ πλείω χαίρουσιν οἱ σφόδρα νοσοῦντες τῶν ὑγιαίνοντων, ἀλλ' οἴου μέγεθος με ζητεῖν ἡδονῆς, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ποῦ ποτε γίγνεται ἐκάστοτε*: Plato, Laws 867 D *τρία δ' ἔτη... φευγέτω μεγέθει θυμοῦ πλείω τιμωρηθεῖς χρόνον*: Aristotle,

¹ It has been proposed to read *δέ* here for the *δὴ* of the MSS., and change the full stop after the preceding *ἐστὶν* to a comma. But *δὴ* is exactly the right particle to resume the main point of the preceding context, and the ordinary punctuation, as given in

Bywater's edition, is correct.

² This is confirmed also by *ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπής* (1122^a 29), for this would not be true if the given aspect of *μεγαλοπρέπεια* was a species of *ἐλευθερία*.

Rhetoric, 1367^b 26 ἔστι δ' ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς. These passages shew that the expression μέγεθος ἐλευθεριότητος is a perfectly natural one, and the last of them is both a close parallel and a guarantee of the possibility of the usage in Aristotle. It may be observed that in either of the first two passages the article might have preceded the genitive—μέγεθος τῆς ἡδονῆς and μέγεθος τοῦ θυμοῦ.

Eth. Nic. x. vii. 5, 1177^b 17 may also be quoted as to some extent germane, because of the application of μέγεθος to action—εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν.

The other side of μεγαλοπρέπεια is a certain quality of the object on which the outlay is made; a quality in the product or ἔργον, which, as already said, is first introduced in 1122^b 3. When first mentioned this quality appears as mere largeness of scale of a proper kind (πρέπον)—αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα, 1122^b 2, § 6. This passage implies, it should be noticed, that the large scale of the object involves a large expense (not merely relatively large) and there is a similar implication below § 13, 1122^b 26, 7 διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἶη μεγαλοπρεπῆς κ.τ.ε.—a position somewhat modified in the sequel. But presently another element is added, namely beauty (κάλλος). This is at first implied § 9, 1122^b 8 καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον: later on § 10 it is expressly added μέγα καὶ καλόν (1122^b 16). It is again implied in § 18, 1123^a 14, the passage on the present to a child.

This quality of the ἔργον or product is something which it has in itself quite apart from and independent of the sum expended upon it. (1) That this is so is evident in itself because the quality in question is beauty combined with largeness of scale. (2) It is also implied in the continuation of the passage already partly quoted, § 9, 1122^b 8 καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου. Also in 1122^b 13 καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. This passage shews that the quality of the ἔργον is something which it has irrespective of the expense, and that the ἔργον itself has a μεγαλοπρέπεια,

which is constituted by this quality alone: in short, this quality is *μεγαλοπρέπεια τοῦ ἔργου*. There is the same implication both as regards the difference of the quality from any considerations of cost, and as regards the application of the term *μεγαλοπρέπεια*, in what immediately follows about the difference between the *ἀρετή* of a *κτῆμα* and that of an *ἔργον*—*κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν (τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν)*.

(3) The independence of expense is also expressly asserted in what is said of the *παιδικὸν δῶρον* § 18, 1123^a 13, where the *μέγα* in the *ἔργον* is said to be different from the *μέγα* in the *δαπάνημα*. In this extreme case the *ἔργον* is *μεγαλοπρεπές* but the cost of it is insignificant, shewing how completely independent the quality of *μεγαλοπρέπεια* in the *ἔργον* is of the expenditure upon it. (It would follow that the remarks in § 6 and § 13 upon the magnitude of the expense have to be qualified either by alteration or addition. The inconsistency arises quite naturally as the subject develops. It involves no fundamental alteration of principle and the previous statements might have been easily adjusted to it¹. However this was not done, whatever may be the reason.)

¹ One could conceive, for instance, that Aristotle might have made use of the distinction between the *μεγαλοπρέπεια* of the *ἔργον* and that of the expenditure, and said that though the *ἔργον* might be *μεγαλοπρεπές*, because it was *καλόν* and, in its kind, *μέγα*, the man was not *μεγαλοπρεπής* unless the expenditure was considerable, and his excellence would be rather that of a certain good taste which is ascribed to the *μεγαλοπρεπής* in the earlier part of the chapter, § 5, 1122^a 34, *ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπής ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν*. This would involve no change in the previous statements but only an addition to them. Or he might have modified them by making them refer only to what he might have called the *ἀπλῶς*

μεγαλοπρεπής. Indeed I should venture to suggest that if *ἀπλῶς* is inserted at all into the text in 1123^a 12—*καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα*, we should read for *μεγαλοπρεπέστατον* not *μεγαλοπρεπέστατον (ἀπλῶς)* but *μεγαλοπρεπές (ἀπλῶς)*: and that not merely because the emendation would fairly restore consistency, but because, I have to confess, I cannot see how the mere addition of *ἀπλῶς* can at all remedy the difficulty of the traditional text. That difficulty lies in the fact that *μεγαλοπρεπέστατον* ought to be understood with *ἐνταῦθα δὲ*. But this remains just as necessary after the introduction of *ἀπλῶς*, and then a quite unsuitable sense, one must venture to

The general result, then, is that we have to distinguish between a *μεγαλοπρέπεια* of the *ἔργον* which is called its *ἀρετή* independent of its costliness, and a *μεγαλοπρέπεια* in the scale of the cost, which of course involves a consideration of what is appropriate to the *ἔργον* (*μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ*, § 6, 1122^b 3). . It is in virtue of this latter that the *μεγαλοπρεπής* is called *ἐλευθέριος*.

We have now the material for forming an opinion on the main points in the passage before us.

In 1122^b 12 *ἐν τούτοις...μεγαλοπρεπέστερον*, the last clause *καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἵσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον* relates to the *μεγαλοπρέπεια* of the *ἔργον* alone. What precedes it, with its reference to *ἐλευθεριότης*, evidently refers to the *μεγαλοπρέπεια* of the expenditure. The words *καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἂ δέι καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς* carry us directly back to the words at the beginning of the chapter, § 1, *οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης κ.τ.ε. ἐν τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει*. The last words correspond exactly to *ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς* which evidently mean that in these matters of liberal expenditure it is the greatness which is characteristic of the *μεγαλοπρεπής*, and distinguishes his conduct from mere *ἐλευθεριότης*.

These words have been taken differently, but the meaning

think, is produced. For it will probably be admitted that it cannot be Aristotle's intention to distinguish the most *μεγαλοπρεπές* in one *γένος* from the most *μεγαλοπρεπές* in another, but, clearly, to say that whereas the *μέγα* &c. in each kind, relative to that kind, was *μεγαλοπρεπές*, either (1) that the most *μεγαλοπρεπές* was the *μέγα* in the *μέγα γένος*, or (2) that the *μεγαλοπρεπές* in the truest sense (*ἀπλῶς*) was the *μέγα* &c. in the *μέγα γένος*. It would hardly be replied that the difficulty can be removed by understanding *μεγαλοπρεπές* and not *μεγαλοπρεπέστατον* with *ἐνταῦθα δέ*, for that could be equally well done with the received

text and then the given difficulty would disappear with the result that the introduction of *ἀπλῶς* would become unnecessary.

The choice seems therefore to lie between reading *μεγαλοπρεπές ἀπλῶς*, and the original text with *μεγαλοπρεπές* understood in the second clause. In the first alternative we might suppose when *ἀπλῶς* was lost *μεγαλοπρεπές* was altered into *μεγαλοπρεπέστατον* to make sense. The second alternative does not seem impossible in the style of Aristotle, and therefore perhaps the balance of probability is in favour of the traditional text.

assigned to them¹ is not only what the context, both here and at the beginning of the chapter, seems to necessitate, but is quite confirmed by a similar passage about the *μεγαλόψυχος* in the next chapter IV. iii. 14 1123^b 30 καὶ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη ἀρετῇ μέγα.

As we have seen already the expression *μέγεθος ἐλευθεριότητος* would be remarkably appropriate to characterise the difference between the *μεγαλοπρέπεια* shewn in the scale of the expenditure, and *ἐλευθεριότης*, because the expenditure of the *μεγαλοπρεπῆς* exceeds the limit which would satisfy the standard of *ἐλευθεριότης* alone, and thus the given kind of *μεγαλοπρέπεια* is not a part of *ἐλευθεριότης* but above it, and is rather, as we have said, a kind of magnified *ἐλευθεριότης*. Moreover as *μέγεθος* is really used metaphorically in such an expression as *μέγεθος ἐλευθεριότητος* (for it does not mean the literal magnitude now of the expense but a magnitude in the virtue or principle), just as it is metaphorical in *μέγεθος ἀρετῆς* already quoted, it is very aptly introduced by *οἶον*. It thus becomes fairly certain that we have to join *μέγεθος* with *ἐλευθεριότητος*. The general expression then from which we start would be *οἶον μέγεθος ἐλευθεριότητος*, and it remains to determine what is the precise meaning of the modification of this actually before us.

It must first be observed that with the explanation above given to *οἶον* the participle would naturally be *ὄν* and not *οὔσης*—*οἶον μέγεθος ἐλευθεριότητος ὄν*. Suppose now the text to be *οἶον μέγεθος περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος ὄν*, leaving the defence of the substitution of *ὄν* for *οὔσης* for consideration presently.

The clause *οἶον μέγεθος* etc. would be logically a kind of equivalent of what has preceded; accordingly we may infer that the collocation of words *μέγεθος περὶ ταῦτα* corresponds to the collocation *ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα*. Thus *μέγεθος* would be associated with *περὶ ταῦτα* and the meaning would be ‘a largeness, as it were, in dealing with this kind of expenditure,’

¹ The Paraphrast, Victorius and Lambinus (see Zell’s note) rightly make τὸ μέγα subject and τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς

predicate—‘is distinctive of the *μεγαλοπρεπῆς*.’

i.e. right and proper expenditure. This 'largeness' being a largeness of the liberal disposition or principle which is shewn in right and proper expenditure, or of which such expenditure is the expression, we can explain the article before ἐλευθεριότητος by supposing the full construction to be οἶον μέγεθος περὶ ταῦτα τῆς περὶ ταῦτα ἐλευθεριότητος (= the principle shewn in these, viz. liberality). The second περὶ ταῦτα would naturally be suppressed. This explanation however is not absolutely necessary: we may take the meaning to be simply 'a largeness in dealing with it of the spirit or principle of liberality,' and this might be expressed indifferently by μέγεθος περὶ ταῦτα ἐλευθεριότητος or μέγεθος περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος.

As to the proposed substitution of ὄν for οὔσης (1) it seems possible that ὄν may have been corrupted by a sort of unconscious attraction to the gender of ἐλευθεριότητος, or deliberately altered because the construction was not observed. As already remarked there is evidence of such changes in MSS. But (2) perhaps a more probable account is that according to a known phenomenon in copying, the word ἴσης caught the scribe's eye, and was written before its place. This would yield ὄν ἴσης, the transition from which to οὔσης would be easy, especially after the feminine genitive ἐλευθεριότητος.

If then we read ὄν for οὔσης the meaning of the passage ἀναγκαῖον δὴ κ.τ.ε. would be 'Accordingly it is necessary that the μεγαλοπρεπῆς should also be liberal. For the liberal man will spend what he ought and as he ought [and as the μεγαλοπρεπῆς also spends what he ought and as he ought he is so far liberal]. But in this kind of expenditure [i.e. right expenditure] it is greatness which is characteristic of the μεγαλοπρεπῆς, being, as it were, a largeness in dealing with it of the principle of liberality,' or, if we take the article in the way first suggested, 'a largeness in dealing with it of its principle of liberality.' In any case the meaning is, shortly, that magnificence *in expenditure* is a kind of magnified liberality.

If we care to preserve the verbal correspondence we might render 'But in this kind of expenditure it is magnitude which is characteristic of the magnificent man, being as it were a magnitude in dealing with it of the principle of liberality.'

As already indicated, this interpretation would have a parallel in what is said of the *μεγαλόφυχος* 1123^b 30 *καὶ δόξειεν ἂν μεγαλοφύχου τὸ ἐν ἐκάσῃ ἀρετῇ μέγα*.

The second difficulty in the passage, as has been said, is concerned with the meaning of the words *καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετῇ μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐν μεγέθει*. One may venture to think that the solution depends upon the distinction between the two applications of *μεγαλοπρέπεια*,—the *μεγαλοπρέπεια* of the expenditure and the *μεγαλοπρέπεια* of the *ἔργον*. If we look at the form of the sentence, since it has been preceded by the statement that the *ἀρετῇ* of a *κτῆμα* and the *ἀρετῇ* of an *ἔργον* differ—*οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετῇ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου*, it should be an account of what the *ἀρετῇ* of an *ἔργον* is. Thus *ἔργου ἀρετῇ* must be the nominative case to the verb *ἔστί*, and *ἔστί* must be the so-called copula. The remaining words then must be the predicate or contain the predicate; *μεγαλοπρέπεια* must either be part of the predicate or it must be equated to the subject and in grammatical apposition to it. As regards the latter alternative it must be observed that the sentence does not give a definition of *μεγαλοπρέπεια* in general, but only of that quality of the *ἔργον* which is *μεγαλοπρεπέες* and forms only one side of *μεγαλοπρέπεια* in general. We could not therefore translate: ‘the excellence of an *ἔργον*, that is to say *μεγαλοπρέπεια*, is etc.’: for this would naturally imply that all *μεγαλοπρέπεια* was defined as the *ἔργου ἀρετῇ*. If *μεγαλοπρέπεια* is equated at all to the subject, that is to *ἔργου ἀρετῇ*, it could only be so as meaning the special *μεγαλοπρέπεια* of the *ἔργον* and so would have to be rendered by ‘its *μεγαλοπρέπεια*.’ We should then have to translate ‘and the excellence of an *ἔργον*, that is to say its *μεγαλοπρέπεια*, is etc.’ But one must doubt whether such syntax is possible and whether any parallel could be found for it. It follows, then, from considerations both of the grammar and of the subject matter, that *μεγαλοπρέπεια* properly belongs to the predicate. Thus the whole predicate is *μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐν μεγέθει*, and there should be no commas in the sentence. Now the context shews that *μεγαλοπρέπεια* would rightly be a predicate, for the definition

of the ἀρετή of the ἔργον has just preceded, and the essence of this ἀρετή has been determined to lie in a combination of μέγα and καλόν, which is said to be μεγαλοπρεπές. Thus the difference between the ἀρετή of the κτήμα and the ἀρετή of the ἔργον would be expressed by saying that the first was costliness (cf. πλείστου ἄξιον), and the second the magnificence (μεγαλοπρέπεια) of the ἔργον. The words καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου etc. are clearly in the form of a résumé of the foregoing definition and such a résumé (following directly as it does upon τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπές θαυμαστόν) would naturally and correctly be καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετὴ μεγαλοπρέπεια, and there would be little or no difficulty if the sentence ended at μεγαλοπρέπεια.

On the other hand a difficulty is caused, *prima facie*, by the addition of the words ἐν μεγέθει. It was proposed by Muretus to bracket μεγαλοπρέπεια, but really if anything is to be ejected it should rather be ἐν μεγέθει. If μεγαλοπρέπεια here represented μεγαλοπρέπεια in general, the addition of ἐν μεγέθει would seem superfluous, because μεγαλοπρέπεια, in the most general sense, is as such ἐν μεγέθει, just as μεγαλοψυχία is said to be ἐν μεγέθει, chapter iii. § 5, 1123^b 6. If we omit μεγαλοπρέπεια, the ἀρετή of the ἔργον would be said simply to be ἐν μεγέθει; but this is neither enough nor is it a proper résumé of the preceding, for it omits the important element of καλόν. The fact is that we do want some word to be added in the predicate to ἐν μεγέθει. Again, though μεγαλοπρέπεια by itself covers the ground, and after the preceding μεγαλοπρεπές might well stand alone, yet since a particular aspect of μεγαλοπρέπεια is intended, the expression would be more complete if something were added to differentiate μεγαλοπρέπεια. Thus then ἐν μεγέθει cannot well stand by itself, and μεγαλοπρέπεια is at least better with some addition. Now, whereas the other kind of μεγαλοπρέπεια consists in the costliness of the object or ἔργον, the μεγαλοπρέπεια here meant is the large scale in the object itself, combined with beauty. One may conjecture therefore that μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐν μεγέθει really represents, though not with strict accuracy of expression, the μεγαλοπρέπεια of the object; ἐν μεγέθει referring naturally to the μέγεθος of the object in a context in which ἔργον has immediately

preceded. The form of the expression may be due to the fact that it would be difficult to add the element which seems logically wanting, namely *κάλλει*, after *μεγαλοπρέπεια*. It was quite natural as we have seen that *μεγαλοπρέπεια* should be written after the preceding context, but, when it was once written, a feeling that it needed differentiation might cause the addition of *ἐν μεγέθει* as referring to the greatness in the object, the *κάλλος* being sufficiently covered by the ordinary associations of *μεγαλοπρέπεια* itself¹. We should get much the same effect in English by saying: 'the excellence of an *ἔργον* or product is that it should be on a magnificent scale,' which is a very different thing from saying that it should be 'on a large scale.'

The want of strict logic in a formula is not exactly exceptional in Aristotle and the case for the interpretation offered is strengthened by inaccuracies in the chapter similar to the one here supposed and due to the cause suggested for it, viz. the influence of the familiar and well understood use of the word *μεγαλοπρέπεια*. Thus, § 19, 1123^a 16 we find—*διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῆ γένηι μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν*. Considering that Aristotle is defining *μεγαλοπρέπεια* this is an obvious lapse in logic, but easily accounted for, as everybody knew what *μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν* meant. There is a similar lapse in the passage immediately before us: for we are told it is part of the characteristics of the *μεγαλοπρεπής* that *ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον*, though the meaning of *μεγαλοπρεπές* in this application is not yet explained and is to follow.

Logic would be satisfied, it might be thought, if Aristotle had written *καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετὴ ἐν κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει*. This would be a rather tame repetition of what has just been said (*ἔργον δὲ μέγα καὶ καλόν*). Perhaps that does not matter much, but there remains the very serious objection that the formula

¹ This reminds me of Professor Burnet's scholarly remark in his note on § 1, "Of course in the compound *μεγαλοπρεπής πρέπειν* had its original sense of 'to be conspicuous,' but

Aristotle treats it as if it meant 'to be fitting.'" I would venture to add that while this is true Aristotle is influenced by the natural and ordinary meaning of the word.

would leave out the thing Aristotle most needed to say in a *résumé*, viz. that the ἀρετή of an ἔργον lay exactly in its magnificence, which is the prominent feature of the preceding context where we learn what the μεγαλοπρέπεια of the ἔργον consists in. Muretus in proposing to bracket μεγαλοπρέπεια had overlooked this essential point¹.

We may now endeavour to determine what is the precise meaning of the formula ἐν μεγέθει which occurs in one other place in this chapter, § 1, 1122^a 23. We have here the association of the preposition ἐν with a singular noun, which is a general noun representing a general kind of thing or a quality in general. (Instances of this in Aristotle are collected in Bonitz' index under ἐν, and are associated with examples from which they ought to be distinguished, with the noun in the plural number, under the general heading: "Inde praep. ἐν modalem significationem induit, ut usurpetur, ubi vel simplicem dativum modalem vel praepositionem causalem expectes, ut interdum prope ad adverbii vim accedat.")

In this idiom the noun stands for a department or category, so that, A representing a general noun of the kind aforesaid, ἐν A means 'in the field or department of A.' This again has two species. (1) 'In the department of A' means being one of the members of the class of A and so may be rendered 'in the category of A.' The consequence of this is that ἐν A might be replaced by the adjective or adverb corresponding to A, or by the noun A itself, if A stands not for a quality but for a kind of thing. The following are instances of this first kind. Rhetoric 1367^b 25 τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης ὡς ἐν προαιρέσει ληπτέον—'in the category of προαίρεσις,' that is προαιρετά. Herodotus: ἐν ἡδονῇ μοι ἐστὶ—'in the category of pleasure' and so = ἡδὺ μοι ἐστὶ, where also we might possibly have the substantive instead of the adjective—ἡδονή μοι ἐστὶ. Herodotus: ἐν ὁμοίῳ ποιεῖσθαι—equivalent to the adjective; so also ἐν ἐλαφρῶ ποιεῖσθαι; compare the common phrase ἐν ἴσῳ. Arist. Meteor.

¹ The fact that μεγαλοπρέπεια has a different position in the sentence in some MSS. is no evidence of un-genuineness, as an inspection of ex-

amples of such variation in Bywater's apparatus criticus of the Ethics easily shews.

356^b 19 *ἐν προχείρῳ*. The familiar phrase *οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι* is another instance, = *οἱ ἀξιωθέντες κ.τ.λ.* grammatically. Eur. Phoen. 1276 *οὐκ ἐν αἰσχύνῃ τὰ σά = οὐκ αἰσχροί*. And we even find Eth. Nic. IX. vi. 1167^a 29 *τὰ ἐν μεγέθει*, things in the category of greatness = *τὰ μεγάλα*—an instance relevant to our immediate purpose. Problems 959^b 14 *τὸ ὄξος ἐν φαρμάκῳ*, in the kind or category of *φάρμακα*, that is to say a *φάρμακον*; where the equivalent is the noun itself.

We may designate as adverbial such instances as *εἰκάζειν ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογον*, Rhetoric 1406^b 31, and in the Poetics *ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μίμησιν ἐν ῥυθμῷ* or *ἁρμονίᾳ*. So also the dative is used of the category to which a given *κίνησις* belongs, Physics 227^b 24 sq. *ἀνάγκη...ἐν τινὶ κινεῖσθαι οἶον ἐν τόπῳ ἢ ἐν πάθει*. Metaphysics 1092^b 27 *ἐν ἀριθμῷ*. To this heading also belong *ἐν παρέργῳ*, *ἐν κεφαλαίῳ*, *ἐν τύπῳ*.

(2) But secondly *ἐν* A means 'in the department of A' not in the sense of being in the category of A but as being found in, or as concerned with, things which are of the kind A. A clear instance of this we have in the chapter on *μεγαλοψυχία*, IV. iii. 5, 1123^b 6 *ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἢ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι*, where the expression cannot be equivalent to *μεγάλῃ γὰρ ἢ μεγαλοψυχία* as the following clause *ὥσπερ* etc. shews. From the context we find that *ἐν μεγέθει* here is equivalent to *περὶ μεγάλα*. Compare 1123^a 34 *ἢ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα κ.τ.ξ.* and the following context. We observe therefore that the expression *ἐν μεγέθει* is used with both species of meaning; for as we have seen *τὰ ἐν μεγέθει* in the Ethics in another place is merely equivalent to *τὰ μεγάλα*.

What meaning then has *ἐν μεγέθει* where it occurs in this chapter?

In the case of the first passage (§ 1, 1122^a 23) *ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν*, the only *μέγεθος* which has been spoken of is that of the expense itself and so the first species of usage would suit. The *πρέπουσα δαπάνη* which is *ἐν μεγέθει* can be the *δαπάνη* which is in the category of greatness, that is the great expense—*δαπάνη μεγάλη*. Here however the result is the same if we give *ἐν μεγέθει* the other meaning as equivalent

to *ἐν μεγάλοις*, because the latter expression may mean 'in matters which involve large expenditure' as it does below in § 3, 1122^a 28.

In the passage which has just been discussed *μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐν μεγέθει* could not mean *μεγαλοπρέπεια* which is in the category of greatness, i.e. great *μεγαλοπρέπεια*. It could only have the other meaning, and that meaning is exactly suitable. The *μεγαλοπρέπεια* which is *ἐν μεγέθει* is the *μεγαλοπρέπεια* concerned with what is great in scale in the way of *ἔργα*, or with *ἔργα* which are large in scale.

A note may be added on the word *εὐφιλοτίμητα* which occurs in this chapter. It has been said that this is 'a very strange word' on the ground that it ought to mean [presumably from the form of the compound] 'easy objects of ambition.' This would hardly be right even if the word had to follow the analogy of those compounds with *εὐ* in which the prefix means easily, for then it would mean not 'easy objects of ambition' but 'things easily made objects of ambition.'

But the true account of the compound seems to be that it is a case of another general type in which *εὐ* does not mean 'easily.'

When a word has not in itself a good signification and tends naturally to have a sinister one, or to have sinister associations, the fact that it has to be taken in a good sense or with good associations may be expressed by a compound beginning with *εὐ*.

Thus in Aristotle are found *εὐγήρως* and *εὐγηρία*, and in Hesychius *εὐγηρότατος*. Hesychius gives *εὐγήρως* as one meaning of *εὐαίων*. *εὐαῆς* also may be quoted, as opposed to *δυσαιῆς*, and *εὐδαίμων*. A very near parallel to *εὐφιλοτίμητος* is *εὐαγῆς*, because *ἄγος* has a sinister side like *φιλοτιμία*. A similar parallel is *εὐάρητος ὄνειρος* given by Hesychius. But we have a most complete parallel in Aristotle himself—Rhet. II. xv. 1390^b 21 *ἐντιμότερα καὶ εὐαλαζόνετα*. For *εὐαλαζόνετα*, wrongly interpreted by Riccoboni as 'ad gloriandum idonea,' means 'objects of justifiable boasting,' just as *εὐφιλοτίμητα* means 'objects of justifiable ambition.'

PLATO, TIMAEUS 37 c.

With regard to the interpretation of *ἄγαλμα* in Timaeus 37 c proposed in Vol. XXXII. of this Journal I hear from my friend Mrs Adam that among several suggestions which her late husband, Dr Adam of Emmanuel College, wrote in the margin of his copy of the Timaeus against this passage, occurs the following: " ? glory, some poetic reference." It is not surprising that some one else should have thought of taking *ἄγαλμα* as I have, but the coincidence about the poetic reference is a curious one. There appears to be no indication that Dr Adam preferred this view to others which he suggests.

J. COOK WILSON.

CATULLUS lxiii 31.

In an Article on Catullus by Dr Postgate, *Journal of Classical Philology* VII 1, of which he has kindly sent me an offprint, there is a proposal to read *tonitante* for *comitata* in the following passage from Catullus (lxiii 31—32)

furibunda simul anhelans vaga vadit animam agens
comitata tympano Attis per opaca nemora dux.

Dr Postgate gives excellent reasons against the possibility of such an expression as *comitata tympano*. He puts his case forcibly, and the arguments in support of his emendation should be read in his own article. He mentions also my friend Mr Garrod's suggestion of *comitum alta* (*alta* with *nemora*), and Baehrens' emendation *vadit animum agens | comitum ante tympano*. In the latter *ante* is taken with *vadit*, and Hor. *A. P.* 120—*animum auditoris agunto*—is cited in support of the new text. I trust Dr Postgate will not think me too presuming if I venture on a suggestion which would be nearer the MSS.—that of *tympanistis* for *tympano Attis*. If *tympanistis* were corrupted into *tympanastis*—and I learn from a paper of Mr A. C. Clark's that (*h*)*astis* is corrupted into *istis* in a passage of Cicero—the mistake might have been corrected into *tympano Attis*¹. It appears from Liddell and Scott, as Mr Garrod has pointed out to me, that *τυμπανισταί* was the name of a lost play of Sophocles. The chorus was probably of worshippers of Cybele, such as is represented in Catullus' poem, and he may well have been acquainted with

¹ Professor Robinson Ellis has drawn attention to the frequent expansion of single words into two in the MSS. See Simmons' edition of Ovid, *Metamorph.* XIII and XIV, p. 238.

the fact. Mr Garrod (as some other scholars) is good enough to think my suggestion worth publishing. On the other hand another distinguished Latin scholar tells me that while he prefers my emendation to the rest, he is convinced the text is right and that it can bear the interpretation which the emendation gives. At first I was much inclined to think this view was the sound one. But on reflection it seems difficult to take *tympano* in the collective sense implied, with *comitata* referring to a person. In classical Latin could a man leading a band of spearmen be described as *comitatus hasta*? My friend adds that he has found the view he holds already expressed fully by Friedrich. *Leve tympanum remugit* is quoted by Friedrich from this same poem (l. 29) to support the collective sense of *tympano*. But this is not a true collective. If we say 'the voice of the lark is in the air' (e.g.) we are not thinking of a collection of larks. A noun is only a true collective when it is necessarily in the collective sense that it forms a part of what is stated. In the above example it wouldn't matter if there were only one lark. We have to do rather with a kind of individualised—sometimes personified—abstraction, as is clearly seen for instance in 'the lark is a singing bird'; though this is of a different type, as a particular set of circumstances is not referred to. In any case it is not so much an example of a collective that is wanted as of a collective in such a combination as *comitata tympano*, *comitata* referring to an individual personal subject. The nearest Friedrich can offer is Prop. 2. 13. 19 *nec mea tum longa spatietur imagine pompa*, which is given for the collective. But it should have been observed that the adjective (*longa*) makes all the difference. The construction is the familiar Tacitean idiom, which I venture to think of the same kind as the ablative absolute—the adjective taking the place of the participle—and in this case it is precisely the combination of the adjective with the noun that produces the collective sense.

One may doubt whether 'imagine' could have possibly stood by itself: but even if it could there is the further objection that 'pompa' is itself collective and not an individual personal

subject. An effective parallel therefore has not really been found. What one wants is an answer to the question put already: Whether *comitatus hasta* could mean 'accompanied by a band of spearmen.' It sounds like a mere modernism and unclassical: but one knows there are surprises in these matters. An unexpected example sometimes upsets the most plausible reasoning, and perhaps one will eventually be found which decisively vindicates the text.

J. COOK WILSON.

§ i. *Preliminary.*

So far as I know, the principal helps to the understanding of these difficult chapters are (1) L. Spengel's appendix to his *ueber die unter dem Namen des Aristoteles erhaltenen Ethischen Schriften*, 1841, together with a few supplementary notes in his *Aristotelische Studien* II, 1865, pp. 28—30; (2) A. T. H. Fritzsche's commentary in his edition of the Eudemian treatise, 1851; and (3) the critical notes appended to F. Susemihl's text, 1884. To Spengel we are indebted for many good emendations; to Fritzsche, for many good emendations and for helpful references to other parts of the treatise; to Susemihl, for an exact statement of the traditional evidence and a careful summary of the conjectures of scholars. But all three have their limitations. Spengel deals principally with details: Fritzsche's paraphrases are often loose and superficial, and his interpretations are sometimes impossible and even grotesque: Susemihl is precluded by the scheme of his book both from discussion and from explanation. To Victorius, Casaubon, Sylburg, Bussemaker, Bekker, we owe important, but isolated, conjectures. In a word, of all the scholars whom I have named, Fritzsche alone endeavours to state the argument of the two chapters, and his attempt cannot be accounted successful. Now I venture to think that the main lines of Eudemus' exposition can be ascertained, and that, despite the difficulties of the text, a critic who keeps those main lines steadily in view may do something towards its restoration.

The Greek authorities are P^b and M^b. P^b Vaticanus, in the

Nicomachean ethics connects more closely than L^b M^b O^b with K^b of the Laurentian library, and in the *Eudemian ethics*—where K^b and L^b fail us—takes the first place¹. M^b Marcianus is one of the four MSS upon which Bekker relies for the text of the *Nicomacheans*: see Bonitz, *Aristotelische Studien* II 9, Susemihl *politics* p. xxvi, and my edition of the fifth book p. x. It is inferior to P^b both in age and in value: but, as Bekker has understood, it is an indispensable adjunct. I have depended principally upon Susemihl's statement of the readings of these two MSS in constituting what I venture to call "the Greek tradition."

In © ii, Spengel, Fritzsche, Bussemaker, and Susemihl, have made good use of the so-called *de bona fortuna*. This ancient version of *magna moralia* B viii and *Eudemians* © ii is printed in an undated volume of Aristotelian tracts (Hain 1786), in a Latin Aristotle of 1482 (Hain 1682), and in

¹ In *Eudemians* © i, ii, as in the fifth book of the *Nicomacheans*, the readings of Susemihl's Cantabrigiensis (University Library II. v. 44) are in general agreement with those of P^b, and accordingly I have not thought it worth while to print the results of my collation of the former. In the *Journal of Philology*, 1876, VI 208, and again in my edition of the fifth book of the *Nicomacheans*, 1879, I stated my belief that this Cambridge MS, dated 1279, was copied from P^b, and that accordingly P^b was written before that year. This judgment about the date of P^b has been questioned, on the ground that a MS in which there are so many contractions could not well have been written before 1300. But the Cambridge MS, which abounds in contractions, and is dated 1279, proves that this consideration is not necessarily decisive. I still think that the two MSS are of very nearly the same date, and that, if the Cambridge MS was not copied from

the Vatican MS, the two are directly derived from a common source. When I collated the Vatican MS, my impression was that its contractions were in all respects similar to those of the Cambridge MS, and I suspected that the two were written by the same scribe: but, not having had an opportunity of comparing the hand-writings side by side, I refrained from publishing this opinion. Later, Dr Heylbut, to whom through Susemihl I sent photographs of the Cambridge MS, wrote to him—"Der Vaticanus ist von einer Hand geschrieben, welche mit der des Cantabrig. nicht nur ganz gleichzeitig, sondern möglicherweise *identisch* ist; es sind ganz dieselben Compendien, hier und da löst der Cantabr. etwas mehr auf.... Ich zweifle indess nicht, dass beide aus einer Vorlage, nicht einer aus dem andern, copirt sind." See to the same effect Susemihl in his edition of the *Magna Moralia*, p. vi.

a Latin Aristotle published at Venice in 1496 (Hain 1659): but these books are rare¹, and for this reason, as well as with a view to exactitude, I print so much of the tract as represents the Eudemian chapter. My text of this "Latin tradition" is founded upon collations, made for me by Dr Paul Marc, of five MSS at Munich (162, 306, 18917, 8003, 14147); a transcript, made for me by Mr A. Rogers of the Cambridge University Library, of a MS at Peterhouse, Cambridge (O. 9. 3); and a collation, for which also I have to thank Mr Rogers, of a MS now in the Fitzwilliam Museum. To my kind collaborators I am deeply grateful for their skilful help. I have not thought it necessary to print a detailed collation of these seven MSS, as their variations appear to be accidental and without significance.

For ease of comparison, I have thought it worth while to print in juxtaposition, (1) the Greek tradition, as represented by P^b and M^b, with notes showing their discrepancies; (2) a reconstituted text, to which I have subjoined a statement of its sources—Greek tradition, Latin tradition of Θ ii, conjecture; (3) a translation or paraphrase; and in Θ ii I have added to these (4) the Latin tradition, as I gather it from the seven MSS above mentioned. In my statement of the Greek tradition I have added from Bekker some discrepancies of P^b and M^b which Susemihl seems to have overlooked. (Another such discrepancy occurs at 1247^a 12, where, according to Bekker, P^b has *μὲν* and M^b *τὸ μὲν*.) The Latin tradition is in nearly all essentials consistent, and I have not thought it necessary to record the misspellings and the trifling variations of the MSS. Nor have I noted under (2) conjectures which I do not approve: they will be found in Susemihl's critical notes. In my translation or paraphrase I have tried to show how I understand the argument, both as a whole and in detail:

¹ I am indebted to Professor Bywater for the loan of his copy of the volume of tracts; to Mr Arthur Sidgwick for access to a copy of the Aristotle of 1482 in the library of Corpus Christi College, Oxford; and to the late

Robert Proctor who told me of the book at Corpus, and afforded me facilities in collating the British Museum's copy of the Aristotle of 1496.

and for this purpose I have sometimes found it convenient to express the implications of the original, to break up its sentences, or to deviate somewhat from its order. Where the translation or paraphrase does not sufficiently explain my interpretation or my procedure, I have dealt with the passage in a supplementary commentary.

In my critical notes I have used the following abbreviations, which are, in general, those employed by Susemihl.

Manuscripts :

P^b Vaticanus 1342.

M^b Marcianus Venetus 213.

B^f *de bona fortuna libellus*.

C^v Codex Victorii, on which see Susemihl p. v.

Commentators :

Bek Bekker.

Bu Bussemaker.

Fr Fritzsche.

Iac Jackson.

Sp Spengel.

Sus Susemihl.

Syl Sylburg.

§ ii. Text and Translation.

Greek tradition.

i. ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, εἰ ἔστιν ἐκάστω [φίλω] χρήσασθαι 26
καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ πέφυκε καὶ ἄλλως καὶ τοῦτο ἢ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ κατὰ
συμβεβηκός, οἷον ἢ ὀφθαλμὸς ἰδεῖν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως παριδεῖν
διαστρέψαντα ὥστε δύο τὸ ἐν φανῆναι, αὐται μὲν δὴ
ἄμφω ὅτι μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ὅτι ἦν δ' ὀφθαλμῷ ἄλλη δὲ 30
κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον εἰ ἦν ἀποδόσθαι ἢ φαγεῖν· ὁμοίως
δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμη. καὶ γὰρ ἀληθῶς καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν, οἷον, ὅταν
ἐκὼν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράψῃ, ὡς ἀγνοία δὴ νῦν χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ με-
ταστρέψας τὴν χεῖρα καὶ τῷ ποδί ποτε ὡς χειρὶ καὶ
ταύτῃ ὡς ποδὶ χρώνται ὀρχηστριάδες. εἶδη πᾶσαι αἱ ἄρι- 35
σται ἐπιστήμαι εἶπαν καὶ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ὡς ἀδικία χρῆσθαι.
εἰ δίκης εἰ ἄρα ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης τὰ ἀδिका πράττων ὥσπερ
καὶ τὰ ἀγνοητικὰ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον, φα-
νερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἶεν ἐπιστήμαι αἱ ἀρεταί. οὐδ' εἰ μὴ ἔστιν 124^b
ἀγνοεῖν ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης ἀλλ' ἀμαρτάνειν μόνον καὶ τὰ
αὐτὰ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας ποιεῖν, οὐτι ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης γε ὡς
ἀπὸ ἀδικίας πράξει. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη καὶ

26 ἐκάστω P^b, ἐκάστω φίλω M^b || 27 ὦ P^b, ἄ M^b || 33 δὴ νῦν P^b, δὴ M^b ||
χρήσθαι M^b, χρήσται P^b || 35 ὀρχηστριάδες M^b, ὀρχηστριάδες P^b || εἶδη P^b, ἦδη
M^b || αἱ—36 εἶπαν in lac. om. M^b ||

Here a question may arise. It is possible to use any given thing (i) for its natural purpose, (ii) otherwise than for its natural purpose, and also to use it (1) in its proper character, or again (2) incidentally. For example, using an eye in its proper character as eye, it is possible (a) to see with it, or again, otherwise, (b) to see with it amiss, when we displace it so that the single object appears double,—both of them because it is an eye: but meanwhile there is (c) the possibility of using an eye—in another way—incidentally; for instance, if there is a possibility of selling or eating it. This being so, it is possible to use knowledge in like manner. That is to say, it is possible to make a real use of it and also to do what is wrong: for instance, when a man wilfully misspells, to use knowledge on the particular occasion in counterfeiting ignorance, just as dancing girls sometimes invert the functions of

Reconstituted text.

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις· εἰ ἔστιν ἐκάστῳ χρήσασθαι 26
καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ πέφυκε καὶ ἄλλως, καὶ τοῦτο ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ αὐτὰ κατὰ
συμβεβηκός,—οἷον ἢ ὀφθαλμός, ἰδεῖν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως παριδεῖν
διαστρέψαντα ὥστε δύο τὸ ἐν φανῆναι, αὐτὰ μὲν δὴ
ἄμφω ὅτι μὲν ὀφθαλμός ἐστιν, ἦν δ' ὀφθαλμῶ, ἄλλη δέ, 30
κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον εἰ ἦν ἀποδόσθαι ἢ φαγεῖν—ὁμοίως
δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμη. καὶ γὰρ ἀληθῶς καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν· οἷον, ὅταν
ἐκῶν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράψῃ, ὡς ἀγνοία δὴ νῦν χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ με-
ταστρέψασ<αι> τὴν χεῖρα καὶ <τὸν πόδα> τῷ ποδί ποτε ὡς
χειρὶ καὶ | ταύτῃ ὡς ποδί χρῶνται <αἱ> ὀρχηστρίδες. εἰ δὴ 35
πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐπιστήμαι, εἴη ἂν καὶ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ὡς
ἀδικία χρῆσθαι· ἀδικήσει ἄρα ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης τὰ ἄδικα
πράττων, ὥσπερ | καὶ τὰ ἀγνοητικὰ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης· εἰ δὲ
τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον, φα|νερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἶεν ἐπιστήμαι αἱ ἀρεταί.
οὐδ' εἰ μὴ ἔστιν | ἀγνοεῖν ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης ἀλλ' ἁμαρτάνειν 1246^b
μόνον καὶ τὰ | αὐτὰ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας ποιεῖν, οὐτι ἀπὸ δικαιοσύ-
νης γε ὡς | ἀπὸ ἀδικίας πράξει. ¶ ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ φρόνησις ἐπιστή-

26 φίλω post ἐκάστῳ add. M^b, secl. Sp || 27 ὃ P^b, ἂ M^b || ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ αὐτὰ Iac, ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ δὴ P^b M^b || 28 ἢ Iac, ἢ P^b M^b || 29 αὐτὰ Iac, αὐταί P^b M^b || 30 ἔστιν Iac, ὅτι P^b M^b || ἄλλη Iac, ἄλλη P^b M^b || 32 ἐπιστήμη Sp, ἐπιστήμη P^b M^b || 33 δὴ νῦν P^b, δὴ M^b || χρῆσθαι M^b, χρῆσται P^b || μεταστρέψασ<αι> Iac, μεταστρέψας P^b M^b || 34 <τὸν πόδα> Iac || 35 <αἱ> Sp || ὀρχηστρίδες Sp, ὀρχηστριάδες P^b, ὀρχηστριάδες M^b || εἰ δὴ Sp, εἴδη P^b, ἦδη M^b || αἱ—36 εἴη ἂν in lac. om. M^b || ἀρεταί Sp, ἄρισταί P^b || 36 εἴη ἂν Sp, εἶπαν P^b || 37 ἀδικήσει Sp, εἰ δίκης εἰ P^b M^b ||

the hand and the foot, and use the foot as hand and the hand as foot. If then all the virtues are knowledges, it will be possible to use justice also as injustice: and consequently, from justice a man may do what is unjust and behave unjustly, just as from knowledge he may make the mistakes of ignorance. And, if that is impossible, plainly the virtues will not be knowledges. And even if, <as may be objected,> it is not possible from knowledge to be ignorant, but only to make mistakes and do the same things as are done from ignorance, <it must be remembered that> a man will not act from justice as he would from injustice: <so the objection falls to the ground.> But again prudence, inasmuch as it is knowledge and

Greek tradition.

ἀληθές τι, τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσει κακείνη· ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν 5
 ἀφρόνως ἀπὸ φρονήσεως, καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν ταῦτ᾽ ἄπερ ὁ
 ἄφρων. εἰ δὲ ἀπλή ἢ ἐκάστου χρεία ἢ ἕκαστον, κἂν φρο-
 νίμως ἔπραττον οὕτω πράττοντες. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν ταῖς ἄλλαις
 ἐπιστήμασι ἄλλη κυρία ποιεῖ τὴν τροφήν· αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς
 πασῶν κυρίας τίς; οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη γε ἢ νοῦς. ἀλλὰ 10
 μὴν οὐδ' ἀρετῆ· χρῆται γὰρ αὐτῇ· ἢ γὰρ τοῦ ἀρχοντος
 ἀρετῆ τῇ τοῦ ἀρχομένου χρῆται. τίς οὖν ἔστιν; ἢ ὡσπερ λέ-
 γεται ἀκρασία κακία τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πῶς ἀκό-
 λαστος ὁ ἀκρατῆς ἔχων νοῦν ἀλλ' ἤδη ἂν ἰσχυρὰ ἢ ἢ
 ἐπιθυμία στρέφει καὶ λογιεῖται τὰναντία ἢ..... σφι..... 15
 δηλονότι κἂν ἐν μὲν τούτῳ ἀρετῆ ἐν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἄνοια ἢ
 ἕτεραι μεταποιοῦνται. ὥστ' ἔσται δικαιοσύνη τὸ δικαίως
 χρῆσθαι καὶ κακῶς καὶ φρονήσει ἀφρόνως· ὥστε καὶ τὰ-
 ναντία. ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τῆς μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἀρετῆς
 μοχθηρία ποτὲ ἐγγενομένη μὲν τῷ λόγῳ στρέφει καὶ ποιή- 20
 σει ἀγνοεῖν ἢ δ' ἀρετῆ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἀνοίας ἐνούσης οὐ

10 ἢ νοῦς M^b, om. P^b || 15 ἢ M^b, ἢ P^b || 16 ἐν μὲν P^b, μὲν ἐν M^b ||

a thing which is truthful, will do the same thing that knowledge does: that is to say, it will be possible from prudence to behave imprudently and to make the same mistakes as the imprudent man: and if the uses of a given thing in its proper character are not distinguished <according as the end sought is or is not the natural purpose>, men would be acting prudently if they so acted. Now, where the other knowledges are concerned, another knowledge of a superior grade effects the diversion. But what knowledge diverts the knowledge which is supreme over all? There is no longer any knowledge to do this, or any mind. (Certainly moral virtue does not divert it: for prudence makes use of moral virtue, and the excellence of that which controls makes use of the excellence of that which is controlled.) Who is there then <who is thus affected>? Is there—in the way in which incontinence is said to be vice of the irrational part of the soul, and the incontinent man in a manner intemperate—one who is possessed of mind, and yet, if the desire is strong, it will divert him, and he will draw the opposite

Reconstituted text.

μη καὶ | ἀληθές τι, τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσει κακείνη· ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ 5
 ἂν | ἀφρόνως ἀπὸ φρονήσεως, καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν ταῦτ' ἄπερ ὁ
 ἄφρων. εἰ δὲ ἀπλή ἢ ἐκάστου χρεία ἢ ἕκαστον, κὰν φρο-
 νίμως ἔπραττον οὕτω πράττοντες. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν ταῖς ἄλλαις
 ἐπιστήμαις ἄλλη κυρία ποιεῖ τὴν στροφὴν· αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς
 πασῶν κυρίας τίς; οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη γε ἢ νοῦς. ἀλλὰ 10
 μὴν οὐδ' ἀρετῆ, χρῆται γὰρ αὐτῇ· ἢ γὰρ τοῦ ἄρχοντος
 ἀρετῆ τῇ τοῦ ἀρχομένου χρῆται. τίς οὖν ἔστιν; ἢ, ὥσπερ λέ-
 γεται ἀκρασία κακία τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πὼς ἀκό-
 λαστος ὁ ἀκρατής, ἔχων νοῦν, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἂν ἰσχυρὰ ἢ ἢ
 ἐπιθυμία στρέψει, καὶ λογιεῖται τὰναντία; ἢ ἔστι 15
 δῆλον ὅτι κὰν ἐν μὲν τούτῳ ἀρετῆ ἐν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἄνοια ἢ,
 ἑτέρα μεταποιοῦνται; ὥστ' ἔσται δικαιοσύνη τ' οὐ δικαίως
 χρῆσθαι καὶ κακῶς, καὶ φρονήσει ἀφρόνως· ὥστε καὶ τὰ-
 ναντία. ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἀρετὴν
 μοχθηρία ποτὲ ἐγγενομένη ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ στρέψει καὶ ποιή- 20
 σει ἀγνοεῖν, ἢ δ' ἀρετῆ <ἢ> ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ <ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ>
 ἀνοίας ἐνούσης οὐ | στρέψει ταύτην καὶ ποιήσει φρονίμως

9 στροφὴν C^r, restit. Bek, τροφὴν P^b M^b || 10 ἢ νοῦς M^b, om. P^b || 13
 καὶ πὼς Iac, καὶ πὼς P^b M^b || 15 ἢ ἔστι Iac, ἢ...σφι...M^b, η...σφι...P^b || 16
 δῆλον ὅτι Sp, δηλονότι P^b M^b || ἐν μὲν P^b, μὲν ἐν M^b || 17 ἑτέρα Iac, ἑτεροι
 P^b M^b || τ' οὐ Iac, τὸ P^b M^b || 19 τὴν—ἀρετὴν Sp, τῆς—ἀρετῆς P^b M^b ||
 20 ἐν Sp, μὲν P^b M^b || ἀλόγῳ Sus, λόγῳ P^b M^b || 21 <ἢ> Iac || <ἐν τῷ
 λογιστικῷ> Sus ||

conclusion? Or is it an obvious consequence that, similarly, if there are <simultaneously> virtue in the irrational part and folly in the rational, virtue and folly are transformed in yet another way? Thus it will be possible to use justice unjustly and viciously, and prudence imprudently, and therefore the opposite uses will also be possible. For it is strange if, while vice, when it upon occasion occurs in the irrational part, will divert the excellence in the rational and cause it to be ignorant, virtue in the irrational part, when there is folly in the rational, will not divert it and cause it to form judgments which are prudent and right, and if again prudence in the

Greek tradition.

στρέψει ταύτην καὶ ποιήσει φρονίμω κρίνειν καὶ τὰ δέοντα, καὶ πάλιν ἢ φρόνησις ἢ ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ τὴν ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ κόλασιν ἂν σωφρόνως πράττειν· ὕπερ δοκεῖ ἢ ἐγκράτεια. ὥστ' ἔσται καὶ ἢ ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας φρονίμωσ. ἐπὶ τε ταῦτα 25 ἄτοπα, ἄλλωσ τε καὶ ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας χρῆσθαι φρονίμωσ. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδαμῶσ ὀρώμεν, ὥσπερ τὴν ἱατρικὴν ἢ γραμματικὴν στρέφει ἀκολασία ἀλλ' οὖν ὁ τὴν ἀγνοίαν, ἐὰν ἢ ἐναντία, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐνεῖναι τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅλωσ μᾶλλον εἶναι πρὸσ τὴν κακίαν 30 οὕτωσ ἔχουσαν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀδικὸσ πάντα ὁ δίκαιὸσ δύναται, καὶ ὅλωσ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἢ ἀδυναμία. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἅμα φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀγαθαὶ ἐκείναι αἱ ἄλλω ἐξείσ καὶ ὀρθῶσ τὸ σῶμα κρατητικὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεωσ. ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἔφη, οὐκ ὀρθόν· ἀρετὴ γάρ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ 35 ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ γένωσ ἄλλω γνωσ

28 στρέφει P^b τρέφει M^b ||

rational part will not cause intemperance in the irrational to behave temperately, wherein continence is supposed to consist. Consequently, <if it is possible from prudence to behave imprudently,> it will also be possible from folly to behave prudently. But these consequences, namely, <that a man may behave temperately from intemperance, and prudently from folly,> are strange, and above all it is strange that a man should use a thing prudently from folly. Certainly we do not find it so in any other instances: for example, intemperance diverts medicine or grammar, but it does not follow that intemperance diverts ignorance, if it is contrary to the knowledge, because the superiority does not reside with ignorance, and, generally, it is virtue which is superior to vice, rather than otherwise: for instance, all that the unjust man can do, the just man can do, and, generally, incapacity is covered by capacity. Thus it is plain that prudence and virtue go together, and that the complex conditions above mentioned are states of one in whom prudence and virtue are not combined. Moreover, Socrates' principle, 'nothing is stronger than prudence', is right, but his dictum, 'nothing is stronger than

Reconstituted text.

κρίνειν καὶ τὰ δέοντα, | καὶ πάλιν ἢ φρόνησις ἢ ἐν τῷ λογι-
 στικῷ τὴν ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ | ἀκολασίαν σωφρόνως πράττειν,
 ὅπερ δοκεῖ ἢ ἐγκράτεια. | ὥστ' ἔσται καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνοίας ²⁵
 φρονίμως. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα | ἄτοπα, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνοίας
 χρῆσθαι φρονίμως. | τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδαμῶς
 ὀρώμεν· ὥσπερ τὴν | ἰατρικὴν ἢ γραμματικὴν στρέφει ἀκο-
 λασία, ἀλλ' οὖν οὐ | τὴν ἀγνοίαν, ἐὰν ἢ ἐναντία, διὰ τὸ μὴ
 ἐνεῖναι τὴν ὑπεροχὴν | ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅλως μᾶλλον εἶναι ³⁰
 πρὸς τὴν κακίαν | οὕτως ἔχουσιν· καὶ γὰρ <ἀ> ὁ ἄδικος
 πάντα ὁ δίκαιος δύναται, | καὶ ὅλως ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἢ
 ἀδυναμία. ὥστε δῆλον | ὅτι ἕμα φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀγαθοί, ἐκεῖναι
 δ' ἄλλου ἕξεις. καὶ | ὀρθῶς τὸ Σωκρατικόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυ-
 ρότερον φρονήσεως· | ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐπιστήμης ἔφη, οὐκ ὀρθόν· ³⁵
 ἀρετὴ γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ | ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ γένος ἄλλο γνώσ-
 <εως ἢ φρονήσις>.

22 φρονίμως Sp, φρονίμω P^b M^b || 24 ἀκολασίαν Victorius, κόλασιν ἂν
 P^b M^b || 25 ἢ secl. Sp || ἀνοίας Iac, ἀγνοίας P^b M^b || ἔστι δὲ Sp, ἐπὶ τε P^b M^b,
 ἐπεί τε C^v || 26 ἀνοίας Iac, ἀγνοίας P^b M^b || 28 στρέφει P^b, τρέφει M^b || οὐ Iac,
 ὁ P^b M^b || 31 ἀ add. Iac || 33 ἀγαθοί Iac, ἀγαθαί P^b M^b || 34 δ' Iac, αἱ P^b M^b
 || Σωκρατικόν Bek, σῶμα κρατητικόν P^b M^b || 35 ἐπιστήμης Iac, ἐπιστήμην P^b
 M^b || 36 γνῶσ<εως ἢ φρονήσις> Iac, γνῶσ<εως> Syl, γνῶσ P^b, om. M^b ||

knowledge', is wrong: for prudence is an excellence, and not
 a knowledge, but a different sort of apprehension.

Greek tradition.

ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον ἡ φρόνησις ποιεῖ τὴν εὐπραγίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ φαμὲν καὶ τοὺς εὐτυχεῖς εὐ πράττειν ὡς καὶ τῆς εὐτυχίας εὐ ποιούσης εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῆς ἐπι- 1247^a στήμης, σκεπτέον ἄρ' ἐστὶ φύσει ὁ μὲν εὐτυχῆς ὁ δ' ἀτυ- χῆς ἢ οὐ, καὶ πῶς ἔχει περὶ τούτων. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶ τινες εὐτυχεῖς, ὁρῶμεν· ἄφρονες γὰρ ὄντες κατορθοῦσι πολλὰ ἐν οἷς ἡ τύχη κυρία, εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν οἷς τέχνη ἐστὶ πολλοὶ πολὺ 5 μέντοι καὶ τύχης ἐνυπάρχει, οἷον ἐν στρατηγίᾳ καὶ κυβερνητικῇ. πότερον οὖν ἀπὸ τινος ἕξωσ οὗτοί εἰσιν, ἢ οὕτω αὐτοὶ ποιοῖ τινες εἶναι πρακτικοὶ εἰσι τῶν εὐτυχημάτων; νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως οἴονται ὡς φύσει τινῶν ὄντων· ἢ δὲ φύσις ποιοῦς τινὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς διαφέρουσιν 10 ὥσπερ οἱ μὲν γλαυκοὶ οἱ δὲ μελανόμματοι τῷ τὸ δεῖν

1247^a 5 πολλοὶ P^b, πολὺ M^b ||

Latin tradition.

Quoniam autem non solum prudentia facit eupragiam et uirtutem, sed dicimus eciam benefortunatos bene operari tamquam fortuna bene faciente eupragiam et eadem sciencie, considerandum est utrum est natura hic quidem benefortunatus hic autem infortunatus an non, et quomodo se habet de hiis. quod quidem enim sunt quidam benefortunati, uidemus. insipientes enim existentes dirigunt multa in quibus fortuna domina, si autem et in quibus ars est multo magis et fortuna inerit, puta in militari et gubernatiua. utrum igitur ab aliquo habitu isti sunt, aut non eo quod ipsi quales quidam sunt operatiui sunt eorum quae bone fortune? nunc quidem enim sic putant ut natura quibusdam existentibus: natura autem quales quosdam facit, et confestim a natiuitate differunt quemadmodum hii quidem glauci hii autem nigrorum oculo-

But prudence is not the only thing which, acting in accord with moral virtue, makes welfare: on the contrary, we say that those also fare well who are lucky, thus implying that good luck as well as prudence makes welfare and that it achieves the same results as knowledge. This being so, we must inquire

Reconstituted text.

ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον ἡ φρόνησις ποιεῖ τὴν εὐπραγίαν κατ' ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ φαμέν καὶ τοὺς εὐτυχεῖς εὐ πράττειν, ὡς καὶ τῆς εὐτυχίας [εὐ] ποιούσης εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῇ ἐπι- 1247^a στήμη, σκεπτέον ἄρ' ἐστὶ φύσει ὁ μὲν εὐτυχῆς ὁ δ' ἀτυχῆς ἢ οὐ, καὶ πῶς ἔχει περὶ τούτων. ¶ ὅτι μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶ τινες εὐτυχεῖς, ὁρῶμεν· ἄφρονες γὰρ ὄντες κατορθοῦσι πολλοὶ ἐν οἷς ἡ τύχη κυρία, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐν οἷς τέχνη ἐστὶ πολλῶ μᾶλλον 5 πολὺ | μέντοι καὶ τύχης ἐνυπάρχει, οἷον ἐν στρατηγίᾳ καὶ κυβερνητικῇ. πότερον οὖν ἀπὸ τινος ἕξωσ οὗτοί εἰσιν; ἢ οὐ τῷ αὐτοῖ ποιοῖ τινες εἶναι πρακτικοὶ εἰσι τῶν εὐτυχημάτων,— νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως οἴονται, ὡς φύσει τινῶν ὄντων,—ἢ δὲ φύσις ποιούς τινας ποιεῖ, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς διαφέρουσιν, 10 ὥσπερ οἱ μὲν γλαυκοὶ οἱ δὲ μελανόματοι τῷ τοιοῦτο εἶναι τοι-

37 κατ' Iac, καὶ P^b M^b, et B^f || 38 καὶ post ὡς om. B^f || 1247^a 1 εὐ P^b M^b, bene B^f, secl. Sp || τῇ ἐπιστήμη Sp, τῆς ἐπιστήμης P^b M^b, sciencie B^f || 4 πολλοὶ Iac, πολλὰ P^b M^b, multa B^f || 5 οἱ Bek, εἰ P^b M^b, εἰ B^f || πολλῶ μᾶλλον πολὺ μέντοι Iac, πολλοὶ μέντοι P^b, πολὺ μέντοι M^b, multo magis B^f || 6 τύχης P^b M^b, fortuna B^f || ἐνυπάρχει P^b M^b, inerit B^f || 7 οὐ τῷ Ald, non eo quod B^f, οὕτω P^b M^b || 11 τῷ τοιοῦτο εἶναι τοιονδὶ καὶ Iac, eo quod tale secundum esse tale oportet et, τῷ P^b M^b ||

whether it is or is not by nature that one man is lucky and another unlucky, and how it is with both. ¶ That there are some who are lucky, is matter of observation. For many are imprudent and notwithstanding succeed in matters in which luck is supreme: and there are also some who succeed in matters in which, while art plays a much larger part, a considerable element of luck is present with it; for instance, in generalship and navigation. Is it then by reason of a habit which they have formed for themselves that these are lucky? Or shall we rather say that it is not the possession of a certain character, which makes men capable of achieving good luck,—current opinion takes this latter view, supposing that certain persons are lucky by nature,—and that nature produces persons of certain qualities, so that the lucky and the unlucky are differentiated from their birth, as those who have blue eyes and those who have black eyes are differentiated, because an eye of

Greek tradition.

τοιονδι ἔχειν οὕτω καὶ οἱ εὐτυχεῖς καὶ ἀτυχεῖς. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐ φρονήσει κατορθοῦσι, δῆλον. οὐ γὰρ ἄλογος ἢ φρόνησις ἀλλ' ἔχει λόγον διὰ τί οὕτως πράττει, οἱ δ' οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν διὰ τί κατορθοῦσι· τέχνη γὰρ ἂν ἦν. ἔτι 15 δὲ φανερόν ὄντες ἄφρονες, οὐχ ὅτι περὶ ἄλλα, τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὐθέν ἄτοπον· οἶον Ἰπποκράτης γεωμετρικὸς ὢν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα δοκεῖ βλάξ καὶ ἄφρων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ χρυσίον πλέον ἀπώλεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Βυζαντίῳ πεντηκοστολόγων δι' εὐήθειαν, ὡς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ἐνίοις εὐτυ- 20 χοῦσιν ἄφρονες. περὶ γὰρ ναυκληρίαν οὐχ οἱ δεινότατοι εὐτυχεῖς ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν κύβων πτώσει ὁ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλος δὲ βάλλει καθ' ἣν φύσει ἐστὶν εὐτυχής, ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ φασίν, ὑπὸ θεοῦ καὶ ἔξωθέν τι εἶναι τὸ κατορθοῦν.

13 ἢ M^b, om. P^b || 14 πράττει M^b? (sic Sus), πράττοι P^b || 15 ἔτι P^b, ἔστι M^b || 16 μὲν om. M^b || 17 οὐθέν om. P^b || 24 τι P^b, τε M^b ||

Latin tradition.

rum eo quod tale secundum esse tale oportet et habere, sic et benefortunati et infortunati. quod quidem enim non prudentia dirigunt manifestum. non enim sine ratione prudentia, sed habet rationem propter quid sic operetur: hii autem non habebunt utique dicere propter quid dirigunt: ars enim utique esset. amplius enim manifestum insipientes existentes, non quia circa alia, hoc quidem enim nichil inconueniens, uelut ypcras geometricus existens, sed circa alia negligens et insipiens erat et multum aurum nauigans perdidit ab hiis qui in bisancio quingentorum talentorum propter stulticiam ut dixerunt, sed quod et in quibus fortunate agunt insipientes. circa naucliriam enim non maxime industri benefortunati, sed quemadmodum in taxillorum casu hic quidem nichil alius autem iacit ex eo quod naturam habet benefortunatam aut eo

this or that sort is blue or black accordingly and the particular individual has an eye of this sort or of that. For that it is not by prudence that the lucky succeed, is clear: because prudence is not irrational, but has a reason to account for its particular

Reconstituted text.

οὐδὶ καὶ τονδὶ | τοιονδὶ ἔχειν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ εὐτυχεῖς καὶ ἀτυχεῖς ;
 ὅτι μὲν | γὰρ οὐ φρονήσει κατορθοῦσι, δῆλον. οὐ γὰρ ἄλογος ἢ
 φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἔχει λόγον διὰ τί οὕτως πράττει, οἱ δ' οὐκ ἂν
 ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν διὰ τί κατορθοῦσι· τέχνη γὰρ ἂν ἦν. ὅτι 15
 δέ, φανερόν, ὄντες ἄφρονες· οὐχ ὅτι περὶ ἄλλα, τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ
 οὐθὲν ἄτοπον· οἷον Ἰπποκράτης γεωμετρικὸς ὢν, ἀλλὰ περὶ
 τὰ ἄλλα ἐδόκει βλάξ καὶ ἄφρων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ χρυ-
 σίου πλέων ἀπώλεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Βυζαντίῳ πεντηκοστολό-
 γων δι' εὐήθειαν, ὡς λέγουσιν· ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ἐν οἷς εὐτυ- 20
 χοῦσιν, ἄφρονες. περὶ γὰρ ναυκληρίαν οὐχ οἱ δεινότατοι
 εὐτυχεῖς, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ ἐν κύβων πτώσει ὁ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλος | δὲ
 βάλλει ἐξ καθὰ ἦν φύσει, τῷ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν εὐτυχή ἐστὶν εὐτυ-
 χής. ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι, | ὥσπερ φασίν, ὑπὸ θεοῦ καὶ ἐξῳθεῖ τι

11 τονδὶ Iac, τὸ δεῖν P^b M^b, om. B^f || 12 τοιονδὶ P^b M^b, om. B^f || 13 ἢ
 M^b, om. P^b || 14 πράττει M^b (?) Syl, πράττοι P^b || 15 ὅτι Iac, ἔτι P^b, *amplius*
 B^f, ἔστι M^b || 16 δέ P^b M^b, *enim* B^f || ὄντες ἄφρονες P^b M^b, *insipientes*
existentes B^f || τοῦτο μὲν P^b, *hoc quidem* B^f, τοῦτο M^b || 17 οὐθὲν om. P^b ||
 18 ἐδόκει Syl, δοκεῖ P^b M^b, om. B^f || εἶναι P^b M^b, *erat* B^f || 19 πλέων
 Victorius, *navigans* B^f, πλέων P^b M^b || πεντηκοστολόγων P^b M^b, *quingent-*
orum talentorum B^f || 20 λέγουσιν P^b M^b, *dixerunt* B^f || ἐν οἷς Victorius, *in*
quibus B^f, ἐνίοις P^b M^b || 21 γὰρ ναυκληρίαν P^b M^b, *nauclicriam enim* B^f || 23
 ἐξ Iac, *ex* B^f, om. P^b M^b || καθὰ ἦν φύσει, τῷ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν εὐτυχή ἐστὶν
 εὐτυχής Iac, καθ' ἦν φύσει ἐστὶν εὐτυχής P^b M^b, *eo quod naturam habet bene-*
fortunatam B^f || 24 τι P^b, τε M^b ||

actions, whereas the lucky could not say why they succeed : if they could, this would be art. But that men succeed is plain, although they are imprudent, not merely imprudent in other things, for in that there is nothing strange,—for example, Hippocrates succeeded as a geometer, but he was thought to be stupid and imprudent in other matters, and, they say, chartered a ship, and out of simplicity allowed himself to be cheated of a considerable sum by the tax-collectors at Byzantium—; but imprudent in the very things in which they have luck. Thus in navigation it is not the cleverest who are lucky : rather, as in the fall of the dice, one man throws a blank and another six, according as nature determines, so here a man is lucky because his nature is such. Or is it because he is, as they say,

Greek tradition.

οἶον πλοῖον κακῶς νεναυπηγημένον ἄμεινον πολλάκις δὲ 25
 πλεί, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν.
 ἀλλ' οὗτος εὐτυχῆς τὸν δαίμον' ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν.
 ἀλλ' ἄτοπον θεὸν ἢ δαίμονα φιλεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ
 τὸν βέλτιστον καὶ τὸν φρονιμώτατον. εἰ δὴ ἀνάγκη ἢ
 φύσει ἢ νόῳ ἢ ἐπιτροπία τινὶ κατορθοῦν, τὰ δὲ δύο μὴ 30
 ἐστὶ, φύσει ἂν εἶεν οἱ εὐτυχεῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε φύσις
 αἰτία ἢ τοῦ αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἢ δὲ τύχη
 τοῦναντίον. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παραλόγως ἐπιτυγχάνειν τύχης
 δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ' εἶπερ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχῆς, οὐκ ἂν τοιοῦτον
 εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, οἶον αἰεὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. ἔτι 35
 εἰ τοιοσδὲ ἐπιτυγχάνει ὥσπερ ὅτι ὁ γλαυκὸς οὐκ ὀξὺ ὄρα,

27 ἀλλ'—ἀγαθόν om. pr. P^b "in mg. suppl. ead. man." || 35 εἰ P^b; om.
 M^b || 36 εἰ M^b, ἢ P^b || ὥσπερ ὅτι M^b, ὅτι ὥσπερ P^b || γλαυκὸς M^b, ὁ γλαῦκος
 P^b ||

Latin tradition.

quod ametur ut aiunt a deo et extrinsecum aliquid sit dirigens.
 ut puta naus male regibilis melius frequenter nauigat, sed non
 propter se ipsam, sed quia habet gubernatorem bonum. sed
 sic quod benefortunatum daimonem habet gubernatorem.
 sed inconueniens deum aut daimona diligere talem sed non
 optimum et prudentissimum. si itaque necesse aut natura
 aut intellectu aut cura quadam dirigencia autem non sunt,
 natura utique erunt benefortunati. at uero natura quidem
 causa aut eius quod est semper similiter aut eius quod ut in
 pluribus, fortuna autem contrarium. si quidem igitur quod
 preter rationem adipiscitur fortune uidetur esse, qui autem
 propter fortunam benefortunatus non utique uidebitur talis
 esse causa semper eiusdem aut ut in pluribus. adhuc si quia
 talis oportet accidere, sicut quia glaucus non acute, non fortuna

beloved by God, that is to say, because there is something
 external which makes him succeed, just as an ill-built ship
 makes the better passage, and on many occasions, not by
 reason of itself, but because it has a good pilot? But, if so,
 one who is lucky has the divinity for good pilot, whereas it is

Reconstituted text.

εἶναι τὸ κατορθοῦν, | οἷον πλοῖον κακῶς νεναυπηγημένον ἄμεινον, 25
 πολλάκις δέ, | πλεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔχει κυβερνήτην
 ἀγαθόν; | ἀλλ' οὕτως <ὁ> εὐτυχῆς τὸν δαίμον' ἔχει κυβερνήτην
 ἀγαθόν' | ἀλλ' ἄτοπον θεὸν ἢ δαίμονα φιλεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ
 μὴ | τὸν βέλτιστον καὶ τὸν φρονιμώτατον. εἰ δὴ ἀνάγκη ἢ
 φύσει ἢ νῶ ἢ ἐπιτροπία τινὶ κατορθοῦν, τὰ δὲ δύο μὴ 30
 ἔστι, φύσει ἂν εἶεν οἱ εὐτυχεῖς. ¶ ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε φύσις
 αἰτία ἢ τοῦ αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἢ δὲ τύχη
 τοῦναντίον. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παραλόγως ἐπιτυγχάνειν τύχης
 δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχῆς—ἀλλ', εἶπερ, διὰ τύχην εὐτυχῆς
 —οὐκ ἂν δόξειε τοιοῦτον | εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον οἷον αἰεὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὡς 35
 ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. ἔτι | εἰ ὅτι τοιοσδὶ ἐπιτυγχάνει <ἢ ἀποτυγχάνει>,

25 δὲ om. B^f || 27 οὕτως Fr, sic B^f, οὗτος P^b M^b || <ὁ> add. Sus in
 not. || εὐτυχῆς P^b M^b, quod benefortunatum B^f || 27 ἀγαθόν om. B^f || 30 νῶ
 Iac, νόφ P^b M^b || κατορθοῦν, τὰ P^b M^b, dirigencia B^f || 34 ὁ δὲ διὰ τύχην
 εὐτυχῆς—ἀλλ', εἶπερ, διὰ τύχην εὐτυχῆς—Iac, qui autem propter fortunam
 benefortunatus B^f, ἀλλ' εἶπερ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχῆς P^b M^b || ἂν δόξειε Iac, utique
 videbitur B^f, ἂν P^b M^b || 35 οἷον om. B^f || ἢ Fr, aut B^f, εἰ P^b, om. M^b || 36
 εἰ M^b, si B^f, ἢ P^b || ὅτι τοιοσδὶ Fr, quia talis oportet B^f, τοιοσδὶ P^b M^b ||
 ἐπιτυγχάνει ἢ ἀποτυγχάνει Sus, ἐπιτυγχάνει P^b M^b, accidere B^f || ὥσπερ ὅτι
 M^b, sicut quia B^f, ὅτι ὥσπερ P^b || γλαυκός M^b, ὁ γλαυκος P^b, ὁ secl. Fr ||

strange that a God or a Divinity should favour such an one and not him who is best and him who is most prudent. Hence, if of necessity it is either by nature or by intellect or by a sort of protection that he who is lucky succeeds, and the last two explanations are rejected, those who are lucky will be so by nature. ¶ But again nature is cause of what occurs either always uniformly or generally, whilst luck is the opposite. Now if by assumption irregular achievement is characteristic of luck, while the lucky man is one whose achievement is due to luck—and it is by luck, if by anything, that a man is lucky—it would seem that the cause is not such as to bring about always or generally the same result. Moreover, if a man achieves or fails to achieve because he is of a certain sort, as a man is slow of sight because his eyes are blue, it is not luck which is the cause but nature. Hence such an one is not a man who

Greek tradition.

οὐ τύχη αἰτία ἀλλὰ φύσις· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν εὐτυχῆς ἀλλ' οἶον εὐφυνής. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη λεκτέον, ὅτι οὗς λέγομεν εὐτυχεῖς, οὐ διὰ τύχην εἰσίν. οὐκ ἄρα εἰσὶν εὐτυχεῖς· τύχης γὰρ ὅσων αἰτία τύχη ἀγαθὴ ἀγαθῶν. εἰ δ' οὕτως, 1247^b πότερον ἢ ἔσται τύχη ὅλως, ἢ ἔσται μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι; ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι. ἔσται ἄρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν τισὶν αἰτία ἢ κακῶν. εἰ δ' ὅλως ἐξαιρετέον καὶ οὐδὲν ἀπὸ τύχης φατέον γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἄλλης οὐσης αἰτίας 5 διὰ τὸ μὴ ὀρᾶν τύχην εἶναί φαμεν αἰτίαν, διὸ καὶ ὀριζόμενοι τὴν τύχην τιθέασιν αἰτίαν ἄλογον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ ὡς οὐσης τινὸς φύσεως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἄλλο πρόβλημ' ἂν εἴη· ἐπειδὴ ὀρώμεν τινὰς ἄπαξ εὐτυχῆσαντας, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ πάλιν ἂν διὰ τὸ ἀποκατορθῶσαι καὶ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν; 10

37 ἀλλὰ P^b, ἀλλ' ἢ M^b || 1247^b 7 ἄλογον P^b, ἀνάλογον M^b || 10 καὶ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν M^b, καὶ πάλιν P^b ||

Latin tradition.

causa sed natura: non igitur est benefortunatus, sed uelut bene naturatus. quare hoc utique erit dicendum quia quos dicimus benefortunatos non propter fortunam sunt. non igitur sunt benefortunati: fortunati enim quorumcunque causa fortuna bona bonorum. si autem sic, utrum aut erit fortuna omnino, aut erit quidem sed non amplius? sed necesse et esse et causam esse. erit igitur et bonorum aliquibus causa aut malorum. si autem omnino segregandum et nichil a fortuna dicendum fieri, sed nos alia existente causa propter non uidere fortunam esse aimus causam, propter quod et diffinientes fortunam ponunt causam sine ratione humane racioni tamquam existente quadam natura. hoc quidem igitur aliud problema utique erit. quoniam autem uidemus quosdam semel bene fortunate agentes, propter quid non et iterum sed propter idem dirigere unum et iterum? eiusdem enim eadem causa.

has good luck, but a man who has a good nature. So our conclusion will be that those whom we speak of as lucky are not so by reason of luck. Consequently they are not lucky:

Reconstituted text.

ὥσπερ ὅτι γλαυκός, οὐκ ὀξὺ ὄρᾱ, | οὐ τύχη αἰτία ἀλλὰ φύσις· οὐκ
 ἄρα ἐστὶν εὐτυχῆς ἀλλ' | οἶον εὐφυῆς. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη λεκτέον,
 ὅτι οὗς λέγομεν | εὐτυχεῖς οὐ διὰ τύχην εἰσίν. οὐκ ἄρα εἰσὶν
 εὐτυχεῖς· εὐτυ|χεῖς γὰρ ὅσοις αἰτία τύχη ἀγαθῆ ἀγαθῶν. ¶ εἰ 1247^b
 δ' οὕτως, | πότερον ἢ οὐκ ἔσται τύχη ὄλως, ἢ ἔσται μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐκ
 αἰτία; ἀλλ' | ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι. ἔσται ἄρα καὶ
 ἀγαθῶν τισὶν αἰτία ἢ κακῶν. εἰ δ' ὄλως ἐξαιρετέον καὶ οὐδὲν
 ἀπὸ τύχης φατέον γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἄλλης οὐσης αἰτίας 5
 διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄρᾱν τύχην εἶναί φαμεν αἰτίαν, διὸ καὶ ὀρι-
 ζόμενοι τὴν τύχην τιθέασιν αἰτίαν ἄλογον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λό-
 γισμῷ ὡς οὐσης τινὸς φύσεως, τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἄλλο πρό-
 βλημ' ἂν εἴη. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὀρωμέν τινας ἄπαξ εὐτυχήσαντας, | διὰ τί
 οὐ καὶ πάλιν ἂν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ αὐτό, κατορθώσαιεν καὶ πάλιν καὶ 10

37 ὄρᾱ om. B^f || 39 εὐτυχεῖς Iac, *fortunati* B^f, *τύχης* P^b M^b || 1247^b 1 ὅσοις
 Iac, ὅσων P^b M^b, *quorumcumque* B^f || 2 ἢ οὐκ Iac, οὐκ Sp, ἢ P^b M^b, *aut*
 B^f || οὐκ αἰτία Sp, οὐκέτι P^b M^b, *non amplius* B^f || 7 ἄλογον P^b, *sine ratione*
 B^f, ἀνάλογον M^b || 9 ἐπεὶ δὲ Fr, *quoniam autem* B^f, ἐπειδὴ P^b M^b || 10 ἂν,
 ἀλλὰ Iac, ἂν P^b M^b, *sed* B^f || διὰ τὸ αὐτό κατορθώσαιεν Iac, *propter idem*
dirigere unum B^f, διὰ τὸ ἀποκατορθῶσαι P^b M^b || καὶ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν M^b,
 καὶ πάλιν P^b, *et iterum* B^f ||

for those are lucky to whom good luck is cause of goods.
 ¶ But if this is so, shall we say either that there is no such
 thing as luck, or that there is such a thing, but that it is not a
 cause? no, there must needs be such a thing, and it must
 needs be a cause. Consequently it will also be to particular
 persons a cause of goods or of ills. Whether we are to exclude
 it altogether, and to say that nothing comes about by luck, the
 truth being that there is some other cause, which we do not dis-
 cover, and therefore say that luck is cause,—wherefore some de-
 fine luck as a cause which is incalculable by human reasoning, the
 theory being that there is a natural cause,—<whether, I repeat,
 we are to exclude luck altogether,> will be matter for another
 inquiry. But whereas we see that some persons have good luck
 on a single occasion, why should they not succeed also a second
 time for the same reason, and a third time, and a fourth? For

Greek tradition.

τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' αἴτιον. οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται τύχης οὐ τὸ ἀλλ' ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποβαίῃ ἀπείρων καὶ ἀορίστων, ἔσται μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἐπιστήμη δ' οὐκ ἔσται αὐτοῦ ἢ δι' ἀπειρίαν, ἐπεὶ ἐμάνθανόν τινες εὐτυχεῖς ἢ καὶ πᾶσαι ἂν αἰ ἐπιστήμαι, ὥσπερ ἔφη Σωκράτης, εὐτυχίαι ἦσαν. τί οὖν 15 κωλύει συμβῆναι τινι ἐφεξῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλαίς, οὐχ ὅτι τοῖς δεῖ, ἀλλ' οἷον ἂν εἶεν τὸ κύβους αἰεὶ μακρὰν βάλλειν; τί δὲ δῆ; ἄρ' οὐκ ἔνεισιν ὄρμαι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αἰ μὲν ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ αἰ δὲ ἀπὸ ὀρέξεως ἀλόγου καὶ πρότεραι αὐται; εἰ γὰρ ἔστι φύσει ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέος, καὶ ἡ ὄρε- 20 ξις φύσει γε ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν βαδίζοι ἂν πᾶν. εἰ δὲ τινὲς εἰσιν εὐφρεῖς ὥσπερ οἱ ἄδικοι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι ἄδειν οὕτως

16 συμβῆναι τινι] συμβαίῃ τινί P^b, τινὶ συμβῆναι M^b ||

Latin tradition.

non igitur erit fortune hoc. sed cum idem euenerit ab infinitis et indeterminatis, erit quidem quod bonum aut malum, sciencia autem non erit ipsius aut propter experienciam, quoniam didicissent utique quidam benefortunati, aut et utique omnes sciencie, quemadmodum inquit Socrates, eufortunacio [*v.l.* eufortunatis] essent. quid igitur prohibet accidere alicui deinceps talia multociens, non quia hos oportet sed quale utique erit cubos semper longa iacere? numquid igitur? non sunt impetus in anima, hii quidem a racionacione, hii autem ab appetitu, et primi ipsi sunt natura quidem si propter concupiscenciam delectabilis et appetitus natura quidem ad bonum tendet semper. si itaque quidam sunt bene nati quemadmodum

the same antecedent is cause of the same consequent. So this, <that is to say, the operation of the unknown natural cause,> will not be a matter of luck. On the other hand, when the same result follows from indeterminate, indefinite, antecedents, that result will be to a particular person good or bad, but there will not be the knowledge of it which comes by experience: or else some who are lucky would learn to achieve it, or even, as Socrates said, all the knowledges would be good lucks. What

Reconstituted text.

πάλλιν; | τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ αἴτιον. οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται τύχη τοῦτο.
 ἀλλ' | ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποβαίῃ ἀπ' ἀπείρων καὶ ἀορίστων, ἔσται
 μὲν | τῷ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἐπιστήμη δ' οὐκ ἔσται αὐτοῦ ἢ δι'
 ἐμπειρίαν, ἐπεὶ ἐμάνθανον ἂν τινες εὐτυχεῖς ἢ καὶ πᾶσαι ἂν
 αἱ ἐπιστήμαι, ὥπερ ἔφη Σωκράτης, εὐτυχίαι ἦσαν. τί οὖν ¹⁵
 κωλύει συμβῆναί τινι ἐφεξῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλάκις, οὐχ
 ὅτι τοιοσδί, ἀλλ' οἷον ἂν εἴη τὸ κύβους αἰεὶ μακαρίαν βάλ-
 λειν; ¶ τί δὲ δῆ; ἄρ' οὐκ ἔνεισιν ὄρμαι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ μὲν
 ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ὀρέξεως ἀλόγου; καὶ πρότεραι | αὐταὶ
 εἰσι φύσει γε. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι φύσει ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέος, καὶ ἢ ²⁰
 ὀρεξις φύσει γε ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν βαδίξει ἂν πάντοτε. εἰ δὲ τινές
 εἰσιν εὐφυεῖς—ὥσπερ ἀδίδακτοι φῶδικοὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι ἄδειν

11 τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ Iac, *eiusdem enim eadem* B^f, τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτ'
 P^b M^b || τοῦτο, ἀλλ' Sp, *hoc, sed* B^f, οὐ τὸ ἀλλ' P^b M^b || 12 ἀπ' ἀπείρων Iac,
ab infinitis B^f, ἀπείρων P^b M^b || 13 τῷ Iac, τὸ P^b M^b, *quod* B^f || ἢ δι'
 ἐμπειρίαν Iac, *aut propter experienciam* B^f, ἢ δι' ἀπειρίαν P^b M^b || 14
 πᾶσαι ἂν P^b M^b, *utique omnes* B^f || 15 ἔφη P^b M^b, *inquit* B^f || εὐτυχίαι P^b
 M^b, *eufortunacio vel eufortunatis* B^f || 16 συμβῆναί τινι edd, *accidere alicui*
 B^f, *συμβαίη τινι* P^b, *τινὶ συμβῆναι* M^b || 17 τοιοσδί Iac, *τοῖς δέ* P^b M^b, *hos*
oportet B^f || εἴη Syl, *erit* B^f, *εἶεν* P^b M^b || μακαρίαν Fr, *μακρὰν* P^b M^b, *longa*
 B^f || 19 ἀλόγου om. B^f || καὶ πρότεραι αὐταὶ εἰσι φύσει γε Iac, *et primi ipsi*
sunt natura quidem B^f, καὶ πρότεραι αὐταὶ P^b M^b || 20 γὰρ ἔστι φύσει ἢ om.
 B^f || 21 πάντοτε Iac, *semper* B^f, *πᾶν* P^b M^b || 22 ἀδίδακτοι φῶδικοὶ Iac,
indocti B^f, *φῶδικοὶ* Syl, *οἱ ἄδικοι* P^b M^b || ἄδειν edd, *ἄδειν* P^b M^b, *que*
oportet B^f ||

is there then to prevent such things from happening to a particular person several times in succession, not because he has a certain character, but in the way in which the throw of the dice might always be fortunate? ¶ But again, are there not impulses in the soul which originate, some of them in reasoning, others in irrational appetency? <There are:> and these last are in the order of nature prior to the others; for, if the impulse which is caused by desire of what is pleasurable is by nature, the appetency also will by nature be directed to that which is good in every several instance. If then certain persons have good natures,—just as untaught musical geniuses,

Greek tradition.

οὐ πεφύκασι καὶ ἄνευ λόγου ὀρμῶσιν ἢ φύσις πέφυκε, καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦσι καὶ τούτου καὶ ποτὲ καὶ οὕτως ὡς δεῖ καὶ οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, οὗτοι κατορθοῦσι κἂν τύχῳσιν ἄφρονες ὄντες καὶ ἄλο- 25 γοι, ὥσπερ καὶ εὖ ἔσονται οἱ διδασκαλικοὶ ὄντες. οἱ δὲ γε τοιοῦτοι εὐτυχεῖς ὅσοι ἄνευ λόγου κατορθοῦσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. φύσει ἄρα οἱ εὐτυχεῖς εἶεν ἄν. ἢ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται ἢ εὐτυχία; τὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται ἀπὸ τῆς ὀρμῆς καὶ προελομένων πρᾶξαι, τὰ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ τούναντιον. καὶ ἐν 30 ἐκείνοις κακῶς λογίσασθαι δοκοῦσι κατορθοῦντε καὶ εὐτυχῆσαι φαμεν· καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις, εἰ ἐβούλοντο ἂν ἢ ἔλαττον ἔλαβον τὰγαθόν. ἐκείνους μὲν τοίνυν εὐτυχεῖν διὰ φύσιν ἐνδέχεται, ἢ γὰρ ὀρμῆ καὶ ἢ ὄρεξις οὖσα οὐ δεῖ

24 καὶ ποτὲ P^b, ποτὲ M^b || 26 οἱ (ante διδασκαλικοὶ) P^b, εἰ M^b || 31 κατορθοῦντε M^b, κατορθοῦνται P^b || 34 ἢ ante ὄρεξις M^b, om. P^b ||

Latin tradition.

indocti non scientes que oportet sic bene nati sunt et sine ratione impetum faciunt secundum quod natura apta nata est, et concupiscunt et hoc et tunc et sic ut oportet et quando, isti dirigunt etsi contingat insipientes existentes et sine ratione, quemadmodum et bene erunt non docibiles existentes. tales autem benefortunati quicumque sine ratione dirigunt ut in pluribus. natura igitur benefortunati erunt utique. aut multipliciter dicitur bona fortuna? hec quidem enim operantur ab impetu et preeludentibus operari, hec autem non sed contrarie. et in illis in quibus male ratiocinasse videntur dirigunt et benefortunate egisse aimus: et iterum in hiis si uoluissent utique secundum quod minus sumpsissent bonum. illos quidem igitur bene fortunate agere propter naturam contingit, impetus enim et appetitus existens cuius oportet direxit, ratio-

without professional knowledge of singing, have a natural aptitude for it,—and, apart from reason, are impelled in the natural course, and desire what they ought, when they ought, as they ought, these persons will succeed even if they are

Reconstituted text.

οὕτως | εὖ πεφύκασι—καὶ ἄνευ λόγου ὀρμῶσιν <ἦ> ἢ φύσις
πέφυκε καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦσι καὶ τούτου καὶ τότε καὶ οὕτως ὡς δεῖ καὶ
οὐ δεῖ καὶ | ὅτε, οὗτοι κατορθώσουσι καὶν τύχῳσιν ἄφρονες ὄντες 25
καὶ ἄλογοι, ὥσπερ καὶ εὖ ἄσονται οὐ διδασκαλικοὶ ὄντες· οἱ δέ
γε | τοιοῦτοι εὐτυχεῖς ὅσοι ἄνευ λόγου κατορθοῦσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
πολύ. φύσει ἄρα οἱ εὐτυχεῖς εἶεν ἄν. ¶ ἢ πλεοναχῶς λέ-
γεται ἢ εὐτυχία; τὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται ἀπὸ τῆς ὀρμῆς
καὶ προελομένων πρᾶξαι, τὰ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον. καὶ ἐν 30
ἐκείνοις, <οἱ> ἐν οἷς κακῶς λογίσασθαι δοκοῦσι κατορθοῦσι κατ-
ορθοῦν τε καὶ εὐτυ|χῆσαι φαμεν· καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις, οἱ ἐβού-
λοντο ἄλλο ἢ ἔλαττον <ἦ> ἔλαβον τὰ γαθόν. ἐκείνους μὲν τοῖνυν
εὐτυχεῖν διὰ | φύσιν ἐνδέχεται· ἢ γὰρ ὀρμῆ καὶ ἢ ὄρεξις οὐσα οὐ

23 εὖ Fr, bene B^f, οὐ P^b M^b || <ἦ> ἢ Iac, secundum quod B^f, ἢ P^b
M^b || πέφυκε P^b M^b, apta nata est B^f || 24 καὶ τότε Sp, et tunc B^f, καὶ ποτὲ
P^b, ποτὲ M^b || 25 κατορθώσουσι Fr, dirigent B^f, κατορθοῦσι P^b M^b || 26
ἄσονται Syl, ἔσονται P^b M^b, erunt B^f || οὐ Fr, non B^f, οἱ P^b, εἰ M^b || διδασ-
καλικοὶ P^b M^b, docibiles B^f || 31 <οἱ> Iac || ἐν οἷς Fr, in quibus B^f, om.
P^b M^b || κατορθοῦσι Iac, dirigunt B^f, om. P^b M^b || κατορθοῦν τε C^v, κατορ-
θοῦντε M^b, κατορθοῦνται P^b, om. B^f || 32 οἱ Iac, εἰ P^b M^b, si B^f || ἄλλο Iac,
ἄν P^b M^b, utique B^f || 33 <ἦ> post ἔλαττον Bu || 34 ἢ ante ὄρεξις M^b, om. P^b ||

imprudent and irrational, just as men will sing well without being able to expound musical theory. Now those persons are lucky who apart from reason are in general successful. Hence it will follow that the lucky are so by nature. ¶ Or shall we say that the term good luck is used in more senses than one? For, some actions proceed from impulse and purpose, and, contrariwise, others do not: and in the former case we say that those who succeed where they are thought to have miscalculated, not only succeed, but also had good luck in so doing; and again, in this case, we say that men have good luck, if they wished for a different good, or if they wished for a smaller measure of the good sought than they received. Now it is possible that persons who, in spite of miscalculation, succeed in actions of the former sort, should owe their good luck to nature, for the impulse and the appetency, being directed to the right

Greek tradition.

κατώρθωσεν. ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς ἦν ἡλίθιος. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐν- 35
 ταῦθα ὅταν μὲν λογισμὸς μὴ δοκῶν ὀρθῶς εἶναι τύχη δ'
 αὐτοῦ αἰτία οὖσα, αὐτὴ δ' ὀρθὴ οὖσα ἔξωσεν· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε δι'
 ἐπιθυμίαν ἐλογίσατο πάλιν οὕτω καὶ ἠτύχησεν· ἐν δὲ δὴ
 τοῖς ἑτέροις πῶς ἔσται ἡ εὐτυχία κατ' εὐφύιαν ὀρέξεως καὶ
 ἐπιθυμίας; ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ἐνταῦθα εὐτυχία καὶ τύχη διττὴ 124^b
 κάκεινη ἡ αὐτὴ ἢ πλείους αἱ εὐτυχίαι. ἐπεὶ δ' ὀρώμεν
 παρὰ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς τοὺς ὀρθοὺς
 εὐτυχοῦντάς τινας, δῆλον ὅτι ἕτερον ἂν τι εἴη τὸ αἴτιον τῆς
 εὐτυχίας. ἐκείνη δὲ πότερον ἢ εὐτυχία ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν; ἢ ἐπε- 5
 θύμησεν ὧν ἔδει καὶ ὅτε ἔδει τὸ λογισμὸς ἀνθρώπινος οὐκ
 ἂν τούτου εἴη. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάμπαν ἀλόγιστον τοῦτο, οὔτε φυ-

37 αὐτὴ δ' M^b, αὐτὴ P^b || 124^a 5 ἢ M^b, om. P^b || 6 ἔδει τὸ P^b, ἐδεῖτο M^b ||

Latin tradition.

cinacio autem insipiens, et eos quidem qui hic, quando quidem
 raciocinacio non uisa recta esse fortuna autem ipsius causa
 existens concupiscencia ipsa recta existente saluauit: sed est
 quando propter concupiscenciam raciocinatus est, ueruntamen
 sic et infortunate egit: in aliis itaque quomodo erit bona
 fortuna secundum eusyiam appetitus et concupiscencie? at
 uero si hic bona fortuna et fortuna duplex et ibi eadem aut
 plures bone fortune. quoniam autem uidemus preter omnem
 scienciam et raciocinacionem recte benefortunate agentes quos-
 dam, manifestum quia altera utique aliqua erit causa bone
 fortune. illa autem utrum bona fortuna est aut non est? que
 concupiuit que oportuit et quando oportuit raciocinacio quidem
 humana non utique huius [*v. l.* huiusmodi] erit causa. non

end, brought about success while the reasoning was futile. And in this case, when reasoning seems to be incorrect and nevertheless of itself brings about the result, whilst the desire on its part is rightly directed, it is the desire which, being rightly directed, brings about the right result: but there are times when a man again reasons in this way under the influence of desire and has ill luck. But in instances of the other sort,

Reconstituted text

δεῖ | κατώρθωσεν, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς ἦν ἡλίθιος. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐν- 35
 ταῦθα, ὅταν μὲν λογισμὸς μὴ δοκῶν ὀρθὸς εἶναι τύχῃ δι'
 αὐτοῦ αἰτία οὖσα, τῆς ἐπιθυμίας αὐτῆς ὀρθῆς οὕσης, αὕτη ὀρθὴ
 οὖσα ἔσωσεν· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐλογίσαστο πάλιν οὕτω
 καὶ ἠτύχησεν. ἐν δὲ δὴ | τοῖς ἐτέροις πῶς ἔσται ἡ εὐτυχία κατ'
 εὐφύιαν ὀρέξεως καὶ | ἐπιθυμίας; ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ἐνταῦθα 124^a
 εὐτυχία καὶ τύχῃ διττῇ | κάκει ἡ αὐτῆ, ἡ πλείους αἰ εὐτυχίαι.
 ¶ ἐπεὶ δ' ὀρώμεν | παρὰ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τοὺς
 λογισμοὺς τοὺς ὀρθοὺς | εὐτυχοῦντάς τινας, δῆλον ὅτι ἕτερον
 ἂν τι εἴη τὸ αἴτιον τῆς | εὐτυχίας. ἐκείνη δὲ πότερον 5
 εὐτυχία ἐστίν; ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, εἰ ἐπε|θύμησεν ὧν ἔδει καὶ ὅτε
 ἔδει ᾧ λογισμὸς γ' ἀνθρώπινος οὐκ | ἂν τούτου εἴη αἴτιον·

35 ἦν om. B^f || 36 ὀρθὸς C^v, *recta* B^f, ὀρθῶς P^b M^b || *τύχῃ* Sp, *τύχη* P^b
 M^b, *fortuna* B^f || δι' Iac, δ' P^b M^b, *autem* B^f || 37 αὐτοῦ Iac, αὐτοῦ P^b M^b,
ipsius B^f || τῆς ἐπιθυμίας αὐτῆς ὀρθῆς οὕσης Iac, *concupiscentia ipsa recta*
existente B^f, om. P^b M^b || αὕτη Sp, αὐτῆ P^b, αὐτῆ δ' M^b, om. B^f || ὀρθὴ οὖσα
 P^b M^b, om. B^f || ἔσωσεν Sp, *saluauit* B^f, ἔξωσεν P^b M^b || 38 πάλιν P^b M^b,
ueruntamen B^f || 39 εὐφύιαν P^b M^b, *eusyiam* B^f || 124^a 1 ἡ Sp, ἡ P^b M^b,
si B^f || 2 κάκει Fr, *et ibi* B^f, *κακείνη* P^b M^b || 3 πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τοὺς
 λογισμοὺς τοὺς ὀρθοὺς P^b M^b, *omnem scienciam et ratiocinationem recte*
 B^f || 5 εὐτυχία ἐστίν Iac, *bona fortuna est* B^f, εὐτυχία P^b, ἡ εὐτυχία M^b || εἰ
 Sp, ἡ P^b M^b, *que* B^f || 6 ἔδει ᾧ Iac, ἔδει τὸ P^b, ἔδειτο M^b, *oportuit* B^f || 7 λο-
 γισμὸς γ' Iac, *ratiocinacio quidem* B^f, λογισμὸς P^b M^b || αἴτιον Bu, *causa*
 B^f, om. P^b M^b ||

<where there is no impulse or purpose,> how can good luck depend upon natural rightness of appetency and desire? The truth is that, either good luck and luck are of two kinds in actions of the one sort, and in actions of the other sort are of one kind only, or good luck, <though not luck,> is of more sorts than one. ¶ Now, when we see people having good luck independently of all knowledges and right reasonings, plainly the good luck will have for its cause something other than natural rightness of appetency. But is the good luck which is due to such natural rightness really good luck? shall we not rather say that it is not good luck, if right ends are desired at right times by one who could not be guided to the right behaviour by human reasoning? For that is not altogether irrational whereof the

Greek tradition.

σική ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἀλλὰ διαφθείρεται ὑπό τινος. εὐτυ-
 χεῖν μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ ὅτι ἢ τύχη τῶν παρὰ λόγον αἰτία
 τούτου δὲ παρὰ λόγον, παρὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὸ κα- 10
 θόλου· ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ διὰ
 τοῦτο. ὥσθ' οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος οὐ δείκνυσιν ὅτι φύσει εὐτυ-
 χεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ πάντες οἱ δοκοῦντες εὐτυχεῖν διὰ τύχην
 κατορθοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ φύσιν· οὐδ' ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι τύχη αἰτία
 οὐθενὸς δείκνυσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν πάντων ὧν δοκεῖ. τοῦτο μέντ' 15
 ἂν ἀπορήσειε τις, ἄρ' αὐτοῦ τούτου τύχη αἰτία, τοῦ ἐπιθυμῆ-
 σαι οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ; ἢ οὕτως γε πάντων ἔσται; καὶ γὰρ
 τοῦ νοῆσαι καὶ βουλευσασθαι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐβουλευσατο βου-
 λευσάμενος καὶ τοῦτ' ἐβουλευσατο, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τις,
 οὐδ' ἐνόησε νοήσας πρότερον νοῆσαι, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον. οὐκ 20

14 οὐδέν P^b, οὐδ' M^b ||

Latin tradition.

enim utique omnino sine ratione hoc neque naturalis est con-
 cupiscencia sed corrumpitur ab aliquo. benefortunate quidem
 igitur agere uidetur quia [v. l. quod] fortuna eorum que preter
 rationem causa, hoc autem preter rationem, preter scienciam
 enim et quod uniuersaliter. aliter uidetur non a fortuna sed
 uidetur propter hoc. itaque iste quidem sermo non ostendit
 quod natura benefortunate agatur, sed quod non omnes qui
 uidentur benefortunate agere propter fortunam dirigunt, sed
 propter naturam, neque quod non sit fortuna causa nullius
 ostendit, sed non omium quorum uidetur. hoc quidem utique
 dubitabit aliquis utrum fortuna causa huius istius quod est
 concupiscere quod oportet et quando oportet. aut sic quidem
 omnium erit? etenim eius quod est intelligere et consiliari:
 non enim consiliabatur consilians et antequam consiliaretur,
 sed est principium quoddam: neque intellexit intelligens
 priusquam intelligeret et hoc in infinitum. non igitur eius

desire is natural, though reason is misled by something. Of course
 such an one is thought to have good luck because luck is cause
 of results which are independent of reason, and this result is
 so, because it is independent of knowledge and rule. But, as it

Reconstituted text.

οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάμπαν ἀλόγιστον τοῦτο οὐ γὰρ φυ|σική ἐστὶν ἡ
 ἐπιθυμία, ἀλλὰ διαφθείρεται ὑπό τινος. εὐτυ|χεῖν μὲν οὖν
 δοκεῖ ὅτι ἡ τύχη τῶν παρὰ λόγον αἰτία, | τοῦτο δὲ 10
 παρὰ λόγον, παρὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὸ καθόλου.
 ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ διὰ | τοῦτο.
 ὥσθ' οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος οὐ δείκνυσιν ὅτι φύσει εὐτυ|χεῖν,
 ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ πάντες οἱ δοκοῦντες εὐτυχεῖν διὰ τύχην | κατορ-
 θοῦσιν ἀλλ' <οὐ> διὰ φύσιν· οὐδ' ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι τύχη, οὐδ' ὅτι
 οὐκ ἔστι τύχη αἰτία | οὐθενὸς δείκνυσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν πάντων ὧν 15
 δοκεῖ. ¶ τοῦτο μέντ' | ἂν ἀπορήσειε τις, ἄρ' αὐτοῦ τούτου τύχη
 αἰτία, τοῦ ἐπιθυμῆσαι οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ; ἢ οὕτως γὰρ πάντων
 ἔσται; καὶ γὰρ | τοῦ νοῆσαι καὶ βουλευέσασθαι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ
 ἐβουλευάτο βου|λευσάμενος καὶ πρὶν ἐβουλευάτο τοῦτο ἐβου-
 λεύατο, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀρχή τις. | οὐδ' ἐνόησε νοήσας πρότερον 20

8 οὐ γὰρ Iac, οὔτε P^b M^b, neque B^f || 10 τοῦτο Victorius, hoc B^f, τούτου P^b
 M^b || 12 εὐτυχεῖν P^b M^b, benefortunate agatur B^b || 14 ἀλλ' οὐ Iac, ἀλλὰ P^b
 M^b, sed B^f || οὐδ' ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι τύχη P^b, οὐδ' ὅτι οὐδ' ἐστὶ τύχη M^b, om. B^f ||
 οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τύχη Iac, neque quod non sit fortuna B^f, om. P^b M^b || 19 πρὶν
 ἐβουλευάτο Iac, antequam consiliaretur, om. P^b M^b || τοῦτο ἐβουλευάτο P^b
 M^b, om. B^f || 20 πρότερον P^b M^b, om. B^f ||

seems, it is not the result of luck; and yet for this reason it is thought to be so. Consequently, this argument does not show that good luck is by nature; but that not all those who are thought to have good luck succeed by reason of luck and not by reason of nature. Nor does the argument show that there is no such thing as luck, nor that luck is not cause of anything: what it shows is that luck is not cause of all the things which are attributed to it. ¶ But the question may be raised: Is luck cause of the fact which we are considering, the occurrence of desire for the right thing at the right time? Or, shall we think that, if this is so, luck will be cause of everything? For it will be cause also of the occurrence of thought and deliberation: for deliberation does not begin with a previous deliberation, and that deliberation with yet another; there is a principle: again, thinking does not begin with a thinking previous to it, and so on in an infinite regress. Hence mind is

Greek tradition.

ἄρα τοῦ νοῆσαι συνοῦσα ἀρχή, οὐδὲ τοῦ βουλευσασθαι βουλή. τί οὖν ἄλλο πλὴν τύχη; ὥστ' ἀπὸ τύχης ἅπαντ' ἔσται, εἰ ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ ἧς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη ἕξω, αὕτη δὲ διὰ τί τοιαύτη, τὸ εἶναι τὸ τοῦτο δύνασθαι ποιεῖν; τὸ δὲ ζητούμενον τοῦτ' ἔστι, τίς ἢ τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. δῆλον 25 δὴ ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ὄλω θεὸς καὶ πᾶν ἐκείνω. κινεῖ γάρ πως πάντα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον· λόγου δ' ἀρχὴ οὐ λόγος ἀλλὰ τι κρεῖττον· τί οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης εἴποι πλὴν θεός; ἢ γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῦ νοῦ ὄργανον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ πάλοι ἔλεγον εὐτυχεῖς καλοῦνται οἱ ἂν ὀρμήσωσι κατορθοῦν 30 ἄλογοι ὄντες καὶ βουλευέσθαι οὐ συμφέρει αὐτοῖς. ἔχουσι γὰρ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἢ κρεῖττον τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς βουλεύσεως. οἱ δὲ τὸν λόγον τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔχουσι καὶ ἐνθουσιασμοὶ τοῦτο

27 οὐ M^b, om. P^b || 30 πάλοι P^b, παλαιοὶ M^b || 31 βουλευέσθαι P^b, βούλεσθαι M^b || 32 τοιαύτην ἢ κρεῖττον τοῦ νοῦ καὶ M^b, om. P^b ||

Latin tradition.

quod est intelligere intellectus principium neque consiliandi consilium. quid igitur aliud quam fortuna? itaque a fortuna omnia sunt. aut est aliquod principium cuius non est aliud extra ipsum autem quod [*v. l.* quia] tale secundum esse tale potest facere? quod autem queritur hoc est, quid motus principium in anima. palam quemadmodum in toto deus et omne illud. mouet enim aliquo modo omnia quod in nobis diuinum. responsionis [*v. l.* rationis, racinacionis] autem principium non ratio sed aliquid melius. quid igitur utique erit melius et sciencia et intellectu nisi deus? uirtus enim intellectus organum et propter hoc quod olim dicebatur benefortunati uocantur qui si impetum faciant dirigunt sine ratione existentes: et consiliari non expedit ipsis: habent enim principium tale quod melius intellectu et consilio. qui autem rationem hoc autem non habent neque diuinos instinctus, hoc

not the principle of good thinking, nor counsel of deliberating. What else is there then save only luck? Thus all things will proceed from luck. Or shall we say that there is a principle which has no other principle external to it, and that this principle,

Reconstituted text.

πρὶν νοῆσαι, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον. οὐκ | ἄρα τοῦ νοῆσαι εἶ
 νοὺς ἀρχή, οὐδὲ τοῦ βουλευσασθαι βουλή. | τί οὖν ἄλλο πλὴν
 τύχης; ὥστ' ἀπὸ τύχης ἅπαντα ἔσται. ἦ | ἔστι τις ἀρχή ἧς
 οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη ἔξω, αὐτὴ δὲ διὰ τὸ | τοιαύτη γε εἶναι τοιοῦτο
 δύναται ποιεῖν; τὸ δε ζητούμε|νον τοῦτ' ἔστι, τίς ἡ τῆς κινή- 25
 σεως ἀρχή ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. δῆλον | δὴ· ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ὄλῳ θεὸς καὶ
 πᾶν ἐκεῖ κινεῖ. κινεῖ γάρ | πῶς πάντα <τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν> τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν
 θεῖον· λόγου δ' ἀρχή οὐ λόγος | ἀλλά τι κρεῖττον. τί οὖν ἂν
 εἶη|κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ [εἴποι] | πλὴν θεός; ἡ γὰρ
 ἀρετὴ τοῦ νοῦ ὄργανον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ὃ | πάλαι ἔλεγον, εὐτυχεῖς 30
 καλοῦνται οὐ <ἂ> ἂν ὀρμήσωσι κατορ|θούσιν ἄλογοι ὄντες. καὶ
 βουλευέσθαι οὐ συμφέρει αὐτοῖς· | ἔχουσι γὰρ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην
 ἢ κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς βουλευέσεως· | οὐ δὲ τὸν λόγον τοῦτο

20 πρὶν Iac, *priusquam* B^f, om. P^b M^b || 21 εἶ νοὺς Iac, *intellectus* B^f,
 συνοῦσα P^b M^b || 22 ἔσται P^b M^b, *sunt* B^f || ἦ Sus, *aut* B^f, *ei* P^b M^b || 23 αὐτὴ
 Iac, *αὕτη* P^b M^b, *ipsam* B^f || διὰ τὸ Iac, *διὰ τί* P^b M^b, *quod* B^f || 24 γε
 εἶναι Iac, τὸ εἶναι P^b M^b, *secundum esse* B^f || τοιοῦτο Iac, *tale* B^f, τὸ τοῦτο P^b
 M^b || δύναται Syl, *potest* B^f, δύνασθαι P^b M^b || 26 δὴ P^b M^b, om. B^f || ἐκεῖ
 κινεῖ Iac, ἐκείνῳ P^b M^b, *illud* B^f || 27 <τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν> Iac || οὐ M^b, *non* B^f,
 om. P^b || 28 εἶη add. Iac, *erit* B^f, om. P^b M^b || καὶ νοῦ add. Sp, *et intellectu*
 B^f, om. P^b M^b || εἴποι P^b M^b, om. B^f, secl. Iac || 29 ὃ πάλαι ἔλεγον Iac, *quod*
olim dicebatur B^f, οἱ πάλαι ἔλεγον P^b, οἱ παλαιοὶ ἔλεγον M^b || 30 <ἂ> ἂν
 Iac, ἂν P^b M^b, *si* B^f || κατορθούσιν Fr, *dirigunt* B^f, κατορθοῦν P^b M^b || 31
 βουλευέσθαι P^b, *consiliari* B^f, βούλεσθαι M^b || 32 τοιαύτην ἢ κρείττων τοῦ
 νοῦ καὶ om. P^b || 33 κρείττων Ald, κρεῖττον M^b, *melius* B^f ||

because it is such, can of itself produce the particular result? Here the question is, What is the principle of motion in the soul? The answer is plain: As in the universe, so in the soul, God moves everything: for in a sense the divine element in us is the origin of all our motions: the principle of reason is not reason, but something superior to it. What then can there be superior to it, and to knowledge, and to mind, save God only? <Not moral virtue:> for moral virtue is an instrument of mind. And for this reason, as I remarked a while ago, those are called lucky who, being deficient in reason, succeed in all their efforts. And it is not expedient for them to deliberate; for they have a principle of such a sort that it is superior to mind and deliberation, whilst those who have reason, but not

Greek tradition.

δ' οὐ δύνανται· ἄλογοι γὰρ ὄντες ἀποτυγχάνουσι καὶ τούτων φρονίμων καὶ σοφῶν ταχείαν εἶναι τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ 35 μόνον οὐ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ ἀπολαβεῖν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δι' ἐμπειρίαν οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειάν τε ἐν τῷ σκοπεῖν χρήσθαι τῷ θεῷ δὲ αὐται. τοῦτο καὶ εὐ ὄρᾳ καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ὧν ἀπολύεται ὁ λόγος οὗτος, διὸ οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ καὶ εὐθύνοειροι. ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀπολυομένων τοὺς 40 λόγους ἰσχύειν μᾶλλον, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ μνημονεύουσι 1248^b μᾶλλον ἀπολυθέντες τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις εἶναι τὸ μνη|μονεῦον. φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι δύο εἶδη εὐτυχίας, ἡ μὲν θεία, διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ εὐτυχῆς διὰ θεὸν κατορθοῦν· οὗτος δὲ ἐστίν

36 μόνον M^b, μόνων P^b || 40 ἀπολυομένους P^b, ἀπολυμένων M^b || 1248^b 4 οὗτος M^b, οὗτω P^b ||

Latin tradition.

[hoc: Hain 1786 hoc autem] non possunt: sine ratione enim existentes adipiscuntur et horum prudentium et sapientium uelocem esse diuinationem et solorum non eam que a ratione oportet suscipere: alii quidem propter experientiam, hii autem propter consuetudinem in considerando uti deo autem per se hoc et bene uidet et futurum et presens et quorum perit ratio sic. propter quod melancolici et recte diuinantes. uidetur enim principium amissa ratione ualere magis et quemadmodum ceci memorantur magis amissisque hiis que [v. l. qui] ad uisibilia uirtuosius esse quod memoratur. manifestum itaque quoniam due sunt species bone fortune, hec quidem diuina, propter quod et [v. l. ut] uidentur bene fortunati propter deum dirigere. iste autem est qui secundum impetum directius,

this principle, which is an inspiration, have not the powers of these favoured persons. For, although deficient in reason, they attain even to the rapidity of the divination which is characteristic of men of practical and speculative intelligence; and it may almost be said that they should put a check upon the divination which depends upon reason. The fact is that some by experience, and others by habit, have this power,

Reconstituted text.

δ' οὐκ ἔχουσι καὶ ἐνθουσιασμόν, τοῦτο | δ' οὐ δύνανται. ἄλογοι
 γὰρ ὄντες ἐπιτυγχάνουσι καὶ τοῦ | τῶν φρονίμων καὶ σοφῶν 35
 ταχεῖαν εἶναι τὴν μαντικὴν, καὶ | μόνον οὐ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου
 δεῖ ἀπολαβεῖν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δι' | ἐμπειρίαν οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν
 τὸ ἐν τῷ σκοπεῖν χρῆσθαι | τῷ θεῷ δύνανται τοῦτο καὶ εὐόραν
 καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ | τὸ ὄν, καὶ ὧν ἀπολύεται ὁ λόγος οὕτως·
 διὸ οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ καὶ εὐθυόνειροι. ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀπολυ- 40
 μένου τοῦ | λόγου ἰσχύειν μᾶλλον, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ μνη- 1248^b
 μονεύουσι | μᾶλλον ἀπολυθέντες τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ὁρατοῖς εἶναι, τῷ
 πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις σπουδαιότερον εἶναι | τὸ μνημονεῖον.
 ¶ φανερόν δὲ ὅτι δύο εἶδη εὐτυχίας, ἡ μὲν θεία, | διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ
 ὁ εὐτυχῆς διὰ θεοῦ κατορθοῦν, οὗτος δὲ ἔστιν | ὁ κατὰ τὴν ὀρμὴν 5

34 καὶ ἐνθουσιασμόν Sp, καὶ ἐνθουσιασμοὶ P^b M^b, neque diuinos in-
 stinctus B^f || 34 ἐπιτυγχάνουσι Fr, adipiscuntur B^f, ἀποτυγχάνουσι P^b M^b ||
 τοῦ τῶν Syl, τούτων P^b M^b, horum B^f || 36 μόνον M^b, μόνων P^b, solorum B^f ||
 37 τὸ Iac, τε P^b M^b, om. B^f || 38 δύνανται Iac, δὲ αἱται P^b M^b, autem per se
 B^f || ὁράν Iac, ὁρᾶ P^b M^b, uidet B^f || 39 ἀπολύεται P^b M^b, perit B^f || οὕτως
 Iac, sic B^f, οὗτος P^b M^b || 40 ἀπολυμένου τοῦ λόγου Sp, amissa ratione B^f,
 ἀπολυμένους τοὺς λόγους P^b M^b || 1248^b 2 ἀπολυθέντες τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ὁρατοῖς
 εἶναι, τῷ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις σπουδαιότερον εἶναι τὸ μνημονεῖον Iac, ἀπολυ-
 θέντες τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις εἶναι τὸ μνημονεῖον P^b M^b, amissisque hīs
 que ad uisibilia uirtuosius esse quod memoratur B^f || 3 δὲ Fr, itaque B^f,
 δὲ P^b M^b || 4 δοκεῖ ὁ εὐτυχῆς P^b M^b, uidentur benefortunati B^f ||

when they are thinking about things, of consulting the God and discerning aright both the future and the present: and those also have it whose reason is disengaged in the manner described. This is why men of the melancholic temperament hit the mark in dreams: for seemingly, when reason is disengaged, the principle has greater strength, just as blind men, who are released from attention to visibles, remember better than others, because the faculty of memory is thus more earnestly addressed to what has been said. ¶ Thus it is plain that there are two sorts of good luck. Of these one is divine: whence it is that the lucky man is supposed to owe his success to God's intervention: this is the man who takes the

Greek tradition.

ὁ κατὰ τὴν ὀρμὴν διορθωτικός, ὁ δ' ἕτερος ὁ παρὰ τὴν ὀρ- 5
μὴν· ἄλογοι δ' ἀμφότεροι. καὶ ἡ μὲν συνεχῆς εὐτυχία
μᾶλλον, αὕτη δὲ οὐ συνεχῆς.

Latin tradition.

alius autem qui preter impetum, sine ratione autem ambo. et
hec quidem continua bona fortuna magis, hec autem non con-
tinua.

Reconstituted text.

διορθωτικός· ὁ δὲ ἕτερος ὁ παρὰ τὴν ὀρ|μὴν· ἄλογοι δ' ἀμφό-
τεροι. καὶ ἡ μὲν συνεχῆς εὐτυχία | μᾶλλον, αὕτη δὲ οὐ συνεχῆς.

right course by impulse. The other is the man who takes the
right course independently of impulse. But both are irrational.
Further, the former sort is in a considerable degree a con-
tinuous good luck; the latter is not continuous.

§ iii. *Commentary.*

The former of these two chapters deals with the mutual relations of virtue (*ἠθικὴ ἀρετή*), knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), and wisdom (*φρόνησις*), and is supplementary to *Eudemians* E xiii = *Nicomacheans* Z xiii, 1144^b 16 ff. See especially 1144^b 28—32 *Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι, ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας, ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς.* In the former part of © i, 1246^a 26—1246^b 4, Socrates' theory, that the *ἀρεταί* are *ἐπιστήμαι*, is controverted: in the latter, 1246^b 4—36, the doctrine that *ἀρετή* cannot exist apart from *φρόνησις*, nor *φρόνησις* apart from *ἀρετή*, is affirmed.

In the former of the two paragraphs it is argued that, (1), 1246^a 26—31, there are three ways in which a thing can be used—(a) in its proper character and for its natural purpose, (b) in its proper character but not for its natural purpose, (c) neither for its natural purpose nor in its proper character, (2), 1246^a 31—35, knowledge can be used in the second of these ways,—in other words, can be used in counterfeiting ignorance, whence (3), 1246^a 35—^b 4, justice, if it were knowledge, might be used in the doing of unjust things, and, inasmuch as this is impossible, justice and the other *ἀρεταί* are not *ἐπιστήμαι*.

I proceed to discuss certain details of this paragraph.

1246^a 26—32 *ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις· εἰ ἔστιν ἐκάστῳ χρῆσασθαι καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ πέφυκε καὶ ἄλλως, καὶ τοῦτο ἦ [codd. ἦ] αὐτὸ ἢ αὐ [codd. ἢδὺ] κατὰ συμβεβηκός,—οἷον ἦ [codd. ἦ] ὀφθαλμός, ἰδεῖν ἦ καὶ ἄλλως παριδεῖν διαστρέψαντα ὥστε δύο τὸ ἐν φανῆναι, αὐτὰ [codd. αὐται] μὲν δὴ ἄμφω ὅτι μὲν ὀφθαλμός ἐστιν [codd. ὅτι], ἦν δὲ ὀφθαλμῷ, ἄλλη [codd. ἄλλη] δέ, κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον εἰ ἦν ἀποδόσθαι ἢ φαγεῖν,—ὁμοίως δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμη.* That is to say, first, dividing uses according as the thing is, or is not, used for its natural purpose (*ἐφ' ᾧ πέφυκεν*), and again dividing them according as it is, or is not, used in its proper character (*ἦ αὐτό*), we have three possible uses of a thing:

(a) *ἦ αὐτό* and *ἐφ' ᾧ πέφυκε*; for example, the use of the eye in seeing;

(b) ἡ αὐτό, but not ἐφ' ᾧ πέφυκε; for example, the misuse of the eye when it is dislodged and sees double;

(c) neither ἐφ' ᾧ πέφυκε nor ἡ αὐτό, but κατὰ συμβεβηκός; for example, the use of the eye as an article of commerce or of food.

In order to obtain this sense, I have made several small changes in the traditional text. (1) for ἡ αὐτὸ 27 and ἡ ὀφθαλμός 28, I write ἡ αὐτὸ and ἡ ὀφθαλμός: see 1246^b 7 εἰ δὲ ἀπλῆ ἢ ἐκάστου χρεία ἢ ἕκαστον, which echoes the passage before us; and compare *politics* A ix 1257^a 12 χρῆται τῷ ὑποδήματι ἢ ὑπόδημα, *metaphysics* Δ iv 1015^a 14 ἡ οὐσία τῶν ἐχόντων ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ αὐτά. (2) for ἡδὺ 27, I write ἡ αὐ, on the strength of the palaeographical equivalence of δ̄ and ā: for the phrase, see Plato *apology* 41 A. (3) for αὐται 29 I write αὐτά: see Bast in Schaefer's Gregorius Corinthius, p. 190, "litterae ā interdum hamulus adhaeret, qui facile potest pro ī haberi, inprimis in fine verborum." I have tried to show by my punctuation that I suppose the words αὐτὰ μὲν δὴ ἄμφω to be in apposition to ἰδεῖν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως παριδεῖν. The effect of this supplement is to bring together ἰδεῖν (which is a use ἐφ' ᾧ πέφυκεν) and παριδεῖν (which is a use ἄλλως ἢ ἐφ' ᾧ πέφυκεν), as being, both of them, uses of ὀφθαλμός ἢ ὀφθαλμός or ὅτι ὀφθαλμός ἐστιν, and to oppose them to uses of it which are κατὰ συμβεβηκός only, as when the eye is regarded as an article of commerce or of food. I cannot reconcile myself either to Spengel's insertion of χρεῖαι before ἄμφω, or to Fritzsche's subaudition of that word. (4) for ὅτι after ὀφθαλμός in 30, I write ἐστιν; for palaeographical confusion of the two words, see Bast, p. 810. (5) for ἄλλη 30, I write ἄλλη, supposing ἄλλη δέ, in the sense of οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον, to be parenthetically interposed in the sentence ἦν δὲ ὀφθαλμῷ κατὰ συμβεβηκός [subaudi χρῆσασθαι]. Should we perhaps read ἄλλη δὴ? (6) Spengel is clearly right in substituting ἐπιστήμη for ἐπιστήμη.

1246^a 33—35 ὥσπερ μεταστρέψασ<αι> τὴν χεῖρα καὶ <τὸν πόδα> τῷ ποδί ποτε ὡς χειρὶ καὶ ταύτῃ ὡς ποδί χρῶνται <αἱ> ὀρχηστρίδες [αἱ add. Sp.]. The changes which I have made in this sentence seem to me at once easy and indispensable.

1246^b 1—4. In this sentence the argument of 1246^a 37—^b 1 is amended in view of an implied objection. That argument was as follows: ‘(1) if justice is knowledge, it should be possible *ἀδικεῖν ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης τὰ ἄδικα πράττοντα*; but (2) this is impossible; therefore (3) justice is not knowledge.’ To this it may be objected that he who does from knowledge what the ignorant man does from ignorance is not ignorant: consequently, in (1) what should be possible is, not *ἀδικεῖν*, but *ἄδικα πράττειν* or *ὡς ἀπὸ ἀδικίας πράττειν*, whereas in (2) what is assumed to be impossible is *ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης ἀδικεῖν*, and therefore the conclusion (3) does not follow. This implied objection is disposed of in 1246^b 1—4 by the remark that, whereas the man who knows may do from knowledge what the ignorant man does from ignorance, the just man cannot behave from justice as the unjust man behaves from injustice. In other words, if we distinguish between *ἀδικεῖν* and *ἄδικα πράττειν*, what is assumed in (2) to be impossible is, not merely *ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης ἀδικεῖν*, but *ἄδικα πράττειν*: and, consequently, the disproof of the Socratic theory holds in the amended form—‘(1) if justice is knowledge, it should be possible *ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης ὡς ἀπὸ ἀδικίας πράττειν*: but (2) *ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης ὡς ἀπὸ ἀδικίας πράττειν* is impossible: therefore (3) justice is not knowledge.’

Spengel’s substitutions of *εἴη ἂν* for *εἶπαν* in 1246^a 36 and *ἀδικήσει* for *εἰ δίκης εἰ* in 37 are manifestly right. I see no need in 1246^b 2, *τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας*, to insert *ἅπερ* with Spengel or *ἃ* with Fritzsche; and similarly in ^b 5, *τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσει κάκεινη*, I see no need to write *κάκεινη*. Surely after *τὰ αὐτά, τὸ αὐτό, καί* is a sufficient particle of comparison.

1246^b 4—36. In the latter part of the chapter the relations of *φρόνησις*, to *ἐπιστήμη* on the one part, and to *ἀρετή*, i. q. *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή*, on the other, are carefully investigated; and the doctrine of *Eudemians* E xiii, that *ἀρετή* and *φρόνησις* are interdependent, is emphatically affirmed. We have seen that the moral virtues are not knowledges. But *φρόνησις*, ‘prudence,’ ‘practical wisdom,’ is knowledge, and therefore it may be thought that a man can behave *ἀφρόνως ἀπὸ φρονήσεως*. There is however no superior knowledge which can interfere with *φρόνησις*:

nor can moral virtue interfere with it, for *φρόνησις* directs moral virtue, moral virtue does not direct *φρόνησις*. Shall we then ignore the distinction between incontinence and vice, and say that the incontinent man has reason, and, notwithstanding, can become the slave of desire and disobey reason's dictates? For in this way, we might suppose the *φρόνιμος* to behave like the *ἄφρων*. But the hypothesis that *φρόνησις* in the *λογιστικόν* can co-exist with *κακία* in the *ἄλογον*, implies that *ἀρετή* in the *ἄλογον* can co-exist with *ἄνοια* in the *λογιστικόν*, and these two co-existences imply four conversions: that is to say, we shall be able to conceive (1) that a man has justice and yet behaves unjustly, and (2) that he has *φρόνησις* and yet behaves *ἀφρόνως*; and further, if vice in the *ἄλογον* can overpower *φρόνησις* in the *λογιστικόν*, (3) that virtue in the *ἄλογον* can control *ἄνοια* in the *λογιστικόν*, and (4) that *φρόνησις* in the *λογιστικόν* can control vice in the *ἄλογον*. But these consequences are absurd. In particular, the notion that the fool may use a thing prudently is so. If we test this consequence by applying it to knowledges other than prudence, we see that, while intemperance diverts medicine or grammar, it does not divert an ignorance which is contrary to medicine or to grammar. Hence we must abandon the assumptions upon which the argument begun at 1246^b 12 rests, namely, that *φρόνησις* can co-exist with *κακία*, *ἀρετή* with *ἄνοια*: on the contrary, the doctrine of *Eudemians* Z x = N.E. H x 1152 a 7 ff οὐδ' ἅμα φρόνιμον καὶ ἀκρατῆ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος δέδεικται ὄν, is affirmed: *φρόνησις*, the virtue of the *λόγον* ἔχον, cannot exist apart from *ἀρετή*, the virtue of the *ἄλογον*, nor *ἀρετή* apart from *φρόνησις*. Or, as we read at line 32, men are simultaneously *φρόνιμοι* and *ἀγαθοί*; it is in one who is not *ἅμα φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος* that we find the incomplete moral conditions which we call continence and incontinence. Thus *φρόνησις* must be distinguished from *ἐπιστήμη*, whereas Socrates confounded them in the dictum οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον ἐπιστήμης.

It remains to deal with some details of this passage.

1246^b 7 εἰ δὲ ἀπλή ἢ ἐκάστου χρεία ἢ ἕκαστον, κὰν φρο-
νίμως ἔπραττον οὕτω πράττοντες; 'if the first and the second

of the three uses discriminated above are not distinguished, they would be acting prudently, if they so acted.' But they do not so act: for, as we shall see, it is impossible *πράττειν ἀφρόνως ἀπὸ φρονήσεως*. For the phrase *ἢ ἕκαστον*, see above on 1246^a 27. Bussemaker, Fritzsche, and Susemihl, are wrong in substituting *ἦν* for *ἦ*. The apodosis *κὰν φρονίμως ἔπραττον* has for its protasis *οὕτω πράττοντες*, i. q. *εἰ οὕτως ἔπραττον*: *εἰ δὲ ἀπλή κτλ*, is a preliminary proviso.

1246^b 9 *ποιεῖ τὴν στροφήν*. On the strength of this passage, in B x 1227^a 21 *παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ διαστροφὴν οὐ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν*, and in 30 *βούλεται φύσει μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ διαστροφὴν καὶ τὸ κακόν*, read *διὰ στροφήν* in place of *διαστροφὴν*.

1246^b 11 *ἢ γὰρ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἀρετὴ τῇ τοῦ ἀρχομένου χρήται*. Compare 1248^a 29 *ἢ γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῦ νοῦ ὄργανον*. It may be worth while to note once for all that Eudemus does not scruple to use *ἀρετὴ* indifferently both for excellence whether intellectual or moral, and for moral excellence as opposed to intellectual excellence. Thus in 1246^b 12 the word is used in the more general sense; but in 11 *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἀρετὴ, ἀρετὴ* is *ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ*.

1246^b 12—15 *τίς οὖν ἔστιν; ἢ, ὡσπερ λέγεται ἀκρασία κακία τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πῶς ἀκόλαστος ὁ ἀκρατής, ἔχων νοῦν, ἀλλ' ἤδη, ἂν ἰσχυρὰ ἢ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, στρέψει, καὶ λογιεῖται τάναντία*; In view of *ἔχων νοῦν* 14, (1) I understand *τίς οὖν ἔστιν* to mean *τίς οὖν ἔστιν ὁ τὰ τοιαῦτα παθών*, Who is there who is in this case? and (2) with *ἢ...ἔχων νοῦν*, I supply *ἔστι τις*, Is there one who has intelligence? For lines 12—14, compare *E. E. Z* i 1145^b 14—17, ix 1151^a 5, 6. Eudemus is interested in *ἀκρασία* and *ἐγκράτεια*, but is always careful to distinguish between them and *κακία* and *ἀρετὴ* respectively.

1246^b 15—26. In spite of the traditional indications of lacunae, I suspect that *ἢ...σφι...δηλονότι* represents nothing more than *ἢ ἔστι δηλον ὅτι*. In 16, 21, where for *ἄνοια, ἀνοίας* Spengel writes *ἄγνοια, ἀγνοίας*, the readings of the manuscripts should certainly be retained; because *ἄνοια* and not *ἄγνοια* is the intellectual vice which answers to the intellectual virtue of

φρόνησις. For the same reason, in 25, 26, where the manuscripts give ἀγνοίας, ἀνοίας seems to me an indispensable correction. On the other hand, in 21 ἀγνοεῖν and in 29 ἀγνοίαν are, I think, right: for here we are concerned, not with the intellectual vice of folly, but with a state of ignorance. In 17 for ἔτεραι I write ἐτέρα; and, for δικαιοσύνη τὸ δικαίως, δικαιοσύνη τ' οὐ δικαίως. In 21, I have added ἡ after ἀρετή, and (after Susemihl) ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ after ἀλόγῳ. In 24, 25 I have adopted obvious corrections from Victorius and Spengel. The argument, as I understand it, is as follows. 'If, starting from the hypothesis that the virtue of the λογιστικόν is separable from the virtue of the ἄλογον, we suppose (1) that the λογιστικόν may have its characteristic excellence and yet be misled by a vicious ἄλογον, we must also recognize another στροφή or μεταποίησις, namely, (2) when the ἄλογον has its characteristic virtue and is misled by folly in the λογιστικόν. That is to say, there may be, by (2), δικαιοσύνη, and yet unjust (and therefore vicious) action, and, by (1), φρόνησις, and yet imprudent action. But, if the defect can prevail over the excellence, similarly, one would think, the excellence can prevail over the defect. We cannot suppose (1) that μοχθηρία may pervert φρόνησις, and yet deny (3) that φρόνησις may convert ἀκολασία: and we cannot suppose (2) that ἄνοια may pervert moral virtue, ἀρετή, and yet deny (4) that moral virtue, ἀρετή, may convert ἄνοια, and by (4) it is possible ἀπὸ ἀνοίας χρῆσθαι φρονίμως: surely a paradoxical result.

1246^b 27—32 τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδαμῶς ὀρώμεν· ὡσπερ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἢ γραμματικὴν στρέφει ἀκολασία, ἀλλ' οὖν οὐ [codd. ὁ] τὴν ἀγνοίαν, εἰάν ἢ ἐναντία, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐνεῖναι τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅλως μᾶλλον εἶναι πρὸς τὴν κακίαν οὕτως ἔχουσιν· καὶ γὰρ <ᾰ> ὁ ἄδικος πάντα ὁ δίκαιος δύναται, καὶ ὅλως ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἢ ἀδυναμία. In 28 οὐ for ὁ seems to me inevitable. In 31, several of the editors add ἃ before ὁ δίκαιος δύναται: but the sentiment surprises me, and seems to me inconsistent with the context. So I have added the relative before ὁ ἄδικος. As I understand, the author justifies the statement made in 26, that ἀπὸ ἀνοίας χρῆσθαι φρονίμως is paradoxical, by reference to particular ἐπιστήμαι.

Moral vice may pervert medical science; that is to say, a scoundrel may misuse his medical knowledge: but if there is a contrary ignorance, he cannot use it in furthering his vices. For ignorance has not the superiority which belongs to knowledge. In fact, generally, excellence is superior to defect: for the just man can do what the unjust man does; and, generally, incapacity is covered by or included in capacity, rather than capacity covered by or included in incapacity.

1246^b 32—36. Consequently the hypothesis propounded at 12—15, that intellectual excellence can coexist with moral vice, is withdrawn. Thus we conclude that *φρόνησις* and *ἀρετή* are inseparable; the intellectual excellence of *φρόνησις* cannot exist apart from the moral excellence of *ἀρετή*, nor the moral excellence of *ἀρετή* apart from the intellectual excellence of *φρόνησις*: and that Socrates is wrong in so far as he confounds *φρόνησις* and *ἐπιστήμη*.

The general drift of this concluding paragraph is clear enough: but the all-important sentence *ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἅμα φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀγαθαὶ ἐκείναι αἱ ἄλλου ἕξεις* 1246^b 32, 33 is plainly in a very unsatisfactory state. Now I do not believe that a *ἕξις* could be described as *φρόνιμος*: and this being so, I suspect that the beginning of the sentence should be *ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἅμα φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀγαθοί*; compare *E. E. Z x 1152^a 8 ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος δέδεικται ὄν*. That is to say, I suppose that *ἀγαθοί* has been perverted into *ἀγαθαί* to bring it into grammatical agreement with *ἕξεις*. And, whereas the words *ἅμα φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀγαθοί* indicate the author's theory of intellectual and moral virtue in their perfect realization, *ἐκείναι* would seem to be those incomplete conditions in which the intellectual and the moral elements of man's nature conflict. Read then, instead of *αἱ, δ'*: *ἐκείναι δ' ἄλλου ἕξεις* will then mean, 'and it is in some one other than the *φρόνιμος ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθός* that incomplete conditions are found.' That the word *ἕξεις* may be used of the incomplete conditions of man's moral nature appears from *E. E. Z x 1152^a 35*, where it covers *ἐγκράτεια, ἀκρασία, καρτερία, μαλακία*. I suppose *αἱ* to have taken the place of *δ'* in consequence of the equivalence of $\bar{\delta}$ and \bar{a} , see Bast, p. 703 etc., and of \bar{a} and $\bar{a}i$,

see Bast, p. 705. For οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως, compare *E. E. Z* iii 1146^a 5 αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον.

1246^b 37—1247^a 3. *Summary.* We have seen that well-faring (εὐπραγία, εὖ πράττειν) or well-being (εὐδαιμονία) is the result of prudence (φρόνησις), acting in accordance with virtue (ἀρετή, or, more exactly, ἠθικὴ ἀρετή), virtue being the moral excellence which determines the end, and prudence the intellectual excellence which determines the means. But in ordinary parlance we say that those who are lucky (εὐτυχεῖς) fare well, thus implying that good luck (εὐτυχία) also may bring about well-faring, and, generally, the same results as knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). So we must inquire whether it is, or is not, by nature that one man is lucky and another unlucky: and, generally, we must investigate good luck and bad. In short, popular language suggests that good luck may serve, instead of prudence, to determine the means through which the ends prescribed by virtue are to be attained. Is this so?

For the Eudemian theory of well-being, which I have stated in the foregoing paragraph, see *E. E. E* xiii = *N. E. Z* xiii 1144^a 6 ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἢ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον. The traditional reading καὶ ἀρετήν is clearly wrong; for φρόνησις does not make moral virtue. So Spengel would read καὶ ἀρετή. I prefer κατ' ἀρετήν: for, (1), with καὶ ἀρετή, the sentence suggests that εὐτυχία may take the place at once of φρόνησις and of ἀρετή, whereas the context shows that εὐτυχία is regarded as a possible substitute for φρόνησις only; (2) καὶ ἀρετή, without the article, would be strangely placed; (3) the accusative ἀρετήν, because of its difficulty, seems to represent a genuine tradition. After Spengel, I bracket εὖ in 1247^a 1. Spengel's τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ for τῆς ἐπιστήμης is, I think, a necessary correction: but I do not accept his κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ for καὶ τὰ αὐτά. Apparently he identifies τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ with τῇ φρονήσει: but at 1246^b 35 Eudemus has carefully distinguished between them. Whence it would seem that the words καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ are of wider application than καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῇ φρονήσει would have been, and cover more than the question which concerns us

here, namely, 'Can good luck take the place of prudence in the production of well-faring and well-being?'

1247^a 3—31. *Summary.* That there are persons who are lucky, is obvious: for many fools prosper in matters of luck or chance, and some do so in matters of mingled luck and skill. What is it then which makes them lucky? (1) Are they lucky on the strength of a habit which they have formed (*ἀπό τινος ἕξεως*), do they do the lucky thing because they have, themselves, certain personal characteristics (*τῷ αὐτοῖ ποιοί τινες εἶναι*)? Current opinion says no to this. (2) Does nature make men lucky or unlucky at their birth, as it makes them light-eyed or dark-eyed? Current opinion inclines to this view. (3) Is the success of the lucky man the result of prudence (*φρόνησις*)? No, for the lucky man cannot explain his success. (4) Is good luck due to the favour of God? No, for God would bestow his favour on the man who is morally or intellectually excellent. It would seem then that the lucky are so by nature (*φύσει*).

In 5, *εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν οἷς τέχνη ἐστί*, Bekker reads *οἱ* in place of *εἰ*. Believing this to be right, I have substituted *πολλοί* for *πολλά* in 4, that *οἱ* may have a correlative. In 5, 6 *ἐν οἷς τέχνη ἐστί, πολὺ μέντοι καὶ τύχης ἐννύπαρχει*, which appears to be the reading of M^b, gives a satisfactory sense; but B^f has *in quibus ars est multo magis et fortuna inerit*; and it is not easy to see how *πολλῷ μάλλον*, the equivalent of *multo magis*, could have ousted *πολὺ μέντοι*. Moreover, in place of *πολὺ μέντοι* P^b has *πολλοὶ μέντοι*, where *πολλοί* would seem to represent *πολλῷ = multo*. My conviction is that both *πολλῷ μάλλον* and *πολὺ μέντοι* are genuine; and accordingly I read *ἐν οἷς τέχνη ἐστί πολλῷ μάλλον πολὺ μέντοι καὶ τύχης ἐννύπαρχει*.

In 7—10 *τὸ αὐτοῖ ποιοί τινες εἶναι* is opposed to *τὸ φύσει τινὲς εἶναι*. Similarly, *E. E. A iii 1215^a 12—19, τὸ αὐτὸν ποιόν τινα εἶναι καὶ τὰς κατ' αὐτὸν πράξεις*, and *τὸ αὐτοὺς παρασκευάζειν ποιούς τινὰς καὶ τὰς πράξεις*, are contrasted both with *τὰ διὰ τύχην γιγνόμενα* and with *τὰ διὰ φύσιν*: and a comparison of *E. E. A i 1214^a 15—25*—where Eudemus inquires whether *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* comes *φύσει*, or *διὰ μαθήσεως*, or *διὰ τινος ἀσκήσεως*, or *ἐπιπνοίᾳ δαιμονίου τινός*, or *διὰ τὴν τύχην*—

shows that the *ἕξις τις* of 1247^a 7 is a habit which a man develops for himself δι' ἐθισμού, as opposed to a natural gift which he possesses from his birth. See in particular 1214^a 19, 20. Seemingly Eudemus thinks a formal disproof of this theory unnecessary: and accordingly he ignores it when at 1247^a 29 he sums up his argument. In the parenthetical sentence of line 9 οὕτως = ὅτι οὐ τῶ αὐτοὶ ποιοὶ τινες εἶναι πρακτικοὶ εἰσι τῶν εὐτυχημάτων. After the parenthesis, the question ἢ οὐ τῶ αὐτοὶ κτλ is resumed, and is continued to line 12.

11, 12. Here B^f has *eo quod tale secundum esse tale oportet et habere* = τῶ τοῖον τὸ εἶναι τοῖον δεῖν καὶ ἔχειν, while the Greek tradition gives τῶ τὸ δεῖν τοιονδὶ ἔχειν. Now I find it difficult to believe that τοῖον τὸ εἶναι τοῖον δεῖν καί is an expansion of τὸ δεῖν τοιονδί, or the latter an abridgment of the former. Let us then suppose that in the longer form preserved in B^f the words peculiar to the Greek tradition have dropped out between καὶ and ἔχειν. Let us further write—for τοῖον τό, τοιοῦτο; for τοῖον δεῖν, τοιονδί; and, for τὸ δεῖν, τονδί. We shall now have τῶ τοιοῦτο εἶναι τοιονδί καὶ τονδί τοιονδί ἔχειν: "because an eye of a certain sort (τοιονδί) is light or dark as the case may be (τοιοῦτο), and the particular individual (τονδί) has an eye of the sort specified (τοιονδί)." Compare *περὶ ζῳῶν γενέσεως* 779^b 28 ff τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔχοντα τῶν ὀμμάτων πολὺ τὸ ὑγρὸν μελανόματά ἐστι διὰ τὸ μὴ εὐδίοπτ' εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ [qu. πολὺ], γλαυκὰ δὲ τὰ ὀλίγον. Hence in the passage before us τοιονδί represents τὸ ἔχον ὀλίγον ἢ πολὺ τὸ ὑγρὸν.

15. For ἔτι (or ἔστι) δὲ φανερόν, Spengel writes ἔτι δὲ φανερόν ὅτι. It seems to me simpler to write ὅτι in place of ἔτι, and to carry on in thought *κατορθούσι* from 13. The sentence now comes into line with other sentences or clauses begun with ὅτι at 13, 16, 20.

17. Hippocrates was a notable geometer, but "a child in finance." There was then no element of luck either in his scientific success or in his commercial failure.

22, 23. Again the Greek and Latin traditions are irreconcilable, and again I think that they must be combined. The Greek tradition gives us ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν κύβων πτώσει ὁ μὲν

οὐδὲν ἄλλος δὲ βάλλει καθ' ἣν φύσει ἐστὶν εὐτυχής: the Latin tradition has, in place of βάλλει κτλ, *iacit ex eo quod naturam habet benefortunatam* = βάλλει ἐκ τοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν εὐτυχῆ, or, perhaps, βάλλει ἐξ τῆς τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν εὐτυχῆ. Now after βάλλει we want a description of the throw, and accordingly Fritzsche has inserted πολὺ. Rather, from the Latin *ex*, restore ἔξ, and from *eo* τῶ. We may then write ἀλλ'—ὥσπερ ἐν κύβων πτώσει ὁ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλος δὲ βάλλει ἔξ, καθὰ ἣν φύσει—τῶ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν εὐτυχῆ ἐστὶν εὐτυχής.

25. ἄμεινον πολλάκις δὲ πλεί. For δὲ πλεί Sylburg would read διαπλεί, and Bussemaker would omit δέ. But I think that πολλάκις δὲ may stand for καὶ τοῦτο πολλάκις.

26—28. The five-fold occurrence of the word ἀλλά in these three lines seems to have puzzled the editors. The first ἀλλά appends οὐ δι' αὐτό to the main sentence. The second introduces the positive statement ὅτι ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν which answers to the negative statement οὐ δι' αὐτό. The third, in ἀλλ' οὕτως (M^b οὗτος, P^b om.) <ό> εὐτυχῆς κτλ, brings the illustration into juxtaposition with the theory ὅτι τῶ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ θεοῦ εὐτυχῆς τίς ἐστίν. The fourth raises against the theory thus amplified the objection ὅτι ἄτοπον θεὸν ἢ δαίμονα φιλεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον. The fifth opposes to τὸν τοιοῦτον, τὸν βέλτιστον καὶ τὸν φρονιμώτατον.

1247^a 31—1247^b 1. *Summary.* We have seen reason to believe that the lucky are not so either by prudence or by divine protection: whence we have inferred that good luck comes by nature. But, whereas the operation of nature is, either always or for the most part, regular, the operation of luck or chance (τύχη) is incalculable. Moreover, if a man succeeds or fails because he has certain characteristics, his success or failure is due not to luck or chance but to nature. Whence it would seem that he of whom we were thinking in the preceding paragraph, 1247^a 3—31, is εὐφύης rather than εὐτυχῆς. In short, whereas in the preceding paragraph we were thinking of one who habitually succeeds, we are here reminded that good luck is occasional, unexpected, success. For Aristotle's conception of τύχη, see D. D. Heath's articles, *Journal of Philology* vols. vii and viii.

33. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παραλόγως ἐπιτυγχάνειν τύχης δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχής,—ἀλλ', εἶπερ, διὰ τύχην εὐτυχής—οὐκ ἂν δόξειε τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸ αἷτιον οἶον αἰεὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. I obtain this text by (1) adding from B^f ὁ δὲ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχής and δόξειε, and (2) marking εἶπερ as parenthetical. The Latin tradition *qui autem propter fortunam benefortunatus* = ὁ δὲ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχής gives just what we want to complete the argument: and the Greek tradition ἀλλ', εἶπερ, διὰ τύχην εὐτυχής is quite intelligible when it is read parenthetically as an affirmation of the hypothetical clause ὁ δὲ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχής. On the other hand, if, with the editors, we limit ourselves to the Greek tradition, (a) ἀλλ' εἶπερ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχής cannot bear the meaning of ὁ δὲ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχής, and (b) it is not easy to see how the translator could have got *qui autem* out of ἀλλ' εἶπερ. That the recurrence of the words διὰ τύχην εὐτυχής might bring about the omission, is obvious.

In 34, 35 Spengel adds εἴη after οὐκ ἂν and omits εἶναι, and Fritzsche substitutes εἴη for εἶναι: but, as B^f has *non utique uidebitur*, it is obvious to keep εἶναι and to write οὐκ ἂν δόξειε. For 36, ὅτι γλαυκός, οὐκ ὄξυ ὄρα, see περὶ ζῳῶν γενέσεως 780^a 1 ff.

39. οὐκ ἄρα εἰσὶν εὐτυχεῖς· εὐτυχεῖς γὰρ ὅσοις αἰτία τύχη ἀγαθῇ ἀγαθῶν. These, inasmuch as they are independent of τύχη, are not εὐτυχεῖς: for those are εὐτυχεῖς who derive ἀγαθά from ἀγαθῇ τύχη. Compare ἀλλ', εἶπερ, διὰ τύχην εὐτυχής in 34. In 1247^b 1, for τύχης P^b M^b, I read εὐτυχεῖς from B^f, and for ὅσων I substitute ὅσοις. It seems to me that with τύχης γὰρ ὅσων we should want εὐτυχία in place of τύχη ἀγαθῇ: for the purpose of the sentence is to emphasize the intimate connexion of τύχη and εὐτυχία.

1247^b 1—18. *Summary.* If then, as appears in 1247^a 31—^b 1, the so-called εὐτυχής of 1247^a 7—31 is not so much an εὐτυχής as rather an εὐφύης, are we to think, either that there is no such thing as τύχη, or that, whilst there is such a thing, it is not a cause? To these questions we shall reply that there is such a thing, and that it is a cause—a cause of good or a cause of evil to this or that person. Whether the existence of luck or chance and of causation due to it should be dis-

allowed, luck or chance being no more than the name given to an unknown natural cause, is a different matter: but, if so, when a man has luck on a single occasion, why should he not have luck again and again by the operation of the same cause, whatever that cause may be? On the other hand, when indefinite, indeterminate, antecedents are followed by the same consequent, whether it be to a particular person good or evil, there will be no experiential knowledge of it; for, if there were such a knowledge, people would learn to bring about good luck, or indeed all knowledges would be good lucks. Thus the repetition of casual good luck may be casual, and may have nothing to do with individual character.

2. Spengel points out that a negative is wanted before *ἔσται*, and therefore substitutes *οὐκ* for *ἤ*. I see no reason why, when *οὐκ* is added, *ἤ* should not be retained.

3. *ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι, κτλ.* As I understand, Eudemus declines to go over the ground covered by Aristotle in *physics* B v, and, without formal justification, takes for granted that a result which might have been designed may come about, without having been designed, by the intersection of designed causations. Such results are not matters of scientific investigation, and do not depend upon the character of the subject.

7. *αἰτίαν ἄλογον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ.* Compare *physics* B v, 197^a 9 *ὅθεν καὶ ἡ τύχη τοῦ ἀορίστου εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄδηλος ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς οὐδὲν ἀπὸ τύχης δόξειεν ἂν γίγνεσθαι.*

9—11. *ἐπεὶ δὲ ὀρώμεν τινὰς ἄπαξ εὐτυχῆσαντας, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ πάλιν ἄν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ αὐτό, κατορθώσαιεν καὶ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν; τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ αἴτιον.* In 9 the restoration of *ἐπεὶ* δέ, in place of *ἐπειδή*, is due to Fritzsche. In 10, where the Greek tradition has *ἄν* and the Latin tradition represents *ἀλλά*, I have with Fritzsche retained both. In 10 I obtain *διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ κατορθώσαιεν* from B^f *propter idem dirigere unum* = *διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ κατορθῶσαι ἔν*: and I write with M^b *καὶ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν*, thinking it more likely that this reading would be abbreviated than that the *καὶ πάλιν* of P^b and B^f would be duplicated. Again in 11 B^f gives us the

equivalent of τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ αἴτιον and τοῦτο. From B^f too I get the ἀπ' which I have inserted before ἀπείρων in 12. For ἀπείρων καὶ ἀόριστων, compare *physics* B v, 197^a 8 ἀόριστα μὲν οὖν τὰ αἴτια ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἀφ' ὧν ἂν γένοιτο τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης. In 13, for τό I write τῷ, comparing 1247^b 4; and, for ἡ δι' ἀπειρίαν, where B^f has *aut propter experienciam*, ἡ δι' ἐμπειρίαν.

14, 15. I understand the argument to be as follows: 'there are such things as casual—that is to say, undesigned—occurrences, and they may be to this or that person good or evil; but there can be no knowledge of them. If there were such knowledge, men would learn how to produce good luck, and indeed, knowledge and good luck would be indistinguishable. Fritzsche supplies the necessary reference to *Euthydemus* 279 D ff. For εὐτυχεῖς in 14, Spengel and others would read εὐτυχεῖν: but I think that the text may stand.

16, 17. οὐχ ὅτι τοιοσδί. So I read. The Greek tradition gives οὐχ ὅτι τοῖς δεῖ, and the Latin *non quia hos oportet*. Compare 1247^a 36 ἔτι εἰ ὅτι τοιοσδί ἐπιτυγχάνει κτλ, which passage is here echoed and answered.

1247^b 18—28. *Summary*. But again, psychical impulses have their origin either in reasoning or in irrational appetency: and, in the order of nature, psychical impulses or actions of the latter sort are prior to those of the former. For, if the impulse which originates in desire of the pleasurable is natural, the appetency will in the course of nature seek in each case what is good. Hence εὐφρονεῖς, who apart from reason take the natural course, will succeed, even if they are imprudent and irrational; and those who generally succeed apart from reason are εὐτυχεῖς. Consequently, the εὐτυχεῖς will be so by nature.

Here we return from the consideration of good luck which is occasional to that of good luck which is habitual. So-called good luck which is habitual, may be the result of natural tact or instinct which accompanies the natural desire, but for want of education cannot explain its procedure or communicate it to others, and is therefore irrational.

18—21. In 20 I have added from B^f the words εἰςὶ φύσει γε. In 21 I reconcile the πᾶν of the Greek tradition with the

semper of the Latin by writing πάντοτε. (As πάντοτε does not appear in the Berlin Index, it may be worth while to add a reference, given to me by my friend Mr R. D. Archer Hill, to *N. E.* 1166^a 28.) When πᾶν has been thus disposed of, it is possible to retain the words καὶ ἢ which Spengel, Bussemaker, Fritzsche, and Susemihl bracket, and to regard ἢ ὄρεξις as subject to βαδίζοι and καὶ ἢ ὄρεξις κτλ as apodosis to εἰ γὰρ ἐστι φύσει κτλ. As ἐπιθυμία is an ὄρεξις, ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ὄρεξις would be an impossible phrase. In εἰ γὰρ ἐστι φύσει κτλ, γὰρ introduces, not a justification of the preceding proposition, but an explanation of its relevance to the matter in hand.

21—28. With the substitution in 23 of ἢ ἢ for Bⁱ *secundum quod* and P^bM^b ἢ, the principal sentence contained in these lines is perfectly intelligible. But the parenthetical clauses, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄδικοι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι ἄδειν οὕτως οὐ πεφύκασι, and ὥσπερ καὶ εὖ ἔσονται οἱ διδασκαλικοὶ ὄντες, are manifestly corrupt. In 22 for οἱ ἄδικοι B^b has *indocti* = ἀδίδακτοι; and Sylburg and Spengel read, respectively, ᾠδικοί and ἀδίδακτοι. It seems to me that the sense requires ἀδίδακτοι ᾠδικοί. In 23 Fritzsche rightly gives εὖ for οὐ on the strength of the Latin tradition. I take οὕτως with εὖ πεφύκασι, and understand it to represent ᾠδικῶς: 'have a good natural aptitude for this subject.' In 26, P^b has οἱ διδασκαλικοί, M^b εἰ διδασκαλικοί, Bⁱ *non docibiles*. With Fritzsche and Susemihl I write οὐ διδασκαλικοί. I cannot imagine why Susemihl does not accept Sylburg's ἄσονται in place of ἔσονται.

1247^b 28—1248^a 2. *Summary.* The truth is that the word εὐτυχία is used in more senses than one. We may distinguish three cases: (a) when some one achieves his end in spite of miscalculation of the means; (b) when by reason of miscalculation some one achieves another good, or a greater, than that which he had proposed to himself; (c) when a good comes to some one independently of purpose. Now good luck of the first and the second of these three sorts may be due to nature; for though the reasoning is faulty, the impulse and the appetency are right. Indeed, even if the errors in the reasoning compensate one another, so that the reasoning is effective, it is the right desire which secures the right result. But under (c)

there is no appetency or desire which by its *εὐφύια* can bring about success. Thus, *either*, there are three sorts of good luck and three sorts of luck—two, within the region of deliberate choice, and one without it—*or*, if we put down (a) and (b) to nature, and recognize luck, *τύχη*, under (c) only, there are still the three sorts of good luck, *εὐτυχία*.

30—33. *καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις, <οὐ> ἐν οἷς κακῶς λογίσασθαι δοκοῦσι κατορθοῦσι κατορθοῦν τε καὶ εὐτυχῆσαι φαμεν· καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις, οἱ ἐβούλοντο ἄλλο ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ ἔλαβον τὰγαθόν.* Here I add *οὐ* conjecturally: Fritzsche adds *ἐν οἷς* from B^f: I add *κατορθοῦσι* from B^f, keeping *κατορθοῦν τε* from M^b C^v: I substitute *οὐ* for *εἰ*: for *ἄν* I write *ἄλλο*; see Bast, p. 921: with Bussemaker I add *ἢ* after *ἔλαττον*. I suppose that *ἐν ἐκείνοις* in 30, and *ἐν τούτοις* in 32, represent *ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀρμῆς καὶ προελομένων*. Of course any attempt to deal with this perplexed sentence must needs be provisional.

35—37. *καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐνταῦθά, ὅταν μὲν λογισμὸς μὴ δοκῶν ὀρθὸς εἶναι τύχη δι' αὐτοῦ αἰτία οὖσα, τῆς ἐπιθυμίας αὐτῆς ὀρθῆς οὐσης, αὕτη ὀρθὴ οὖσα ἔσωσεν.* Spengel's *τύχη* from *τυγχάνω* in 36 seems to me certainly right: but I require also *δι' αὐτοῦ* for *δ' αὐτοῦ*, and I introduce *τῆς ἐπιθυμίας αὐτῆς ὀρθῆς οὐσης* from B^f. I think that Spengel is right in giving *αὕτη* for *αὐτή* P^b and *αὐτή* δ' M^b.

In 39 *τοῖς ἐτέροις* represents *τὰ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ τὰναντίον* in 30. Here, as there is no *ὄρεξις*, and therefore no opportunity for *εὐτυχία κατ' εὐφύιαν ὀρέξεως καὶ ἐπιθυμίας*, we find at last true *εὐτυχία*. In 1248^a 1, I write *ἦ* for *ή*, so as to emphasize the contrast between *ἐνταῦθα εὐτυχία καὶ τύχη διττὴ κακῆ* (from B^f) *ἢ αὐτή* and *πλείους αἱ εὐτυχίαι*.

1248^a 2—16. *Summary*. When *εὐτυχία* is independent of all knowledges and right calculations,—that is to say, when the success is one which could not have been the result of intelligent design,—its cause must be something different from that natural rightness of appetency of which we have spoken. But is success which is due to natural rightness of appetency properly called *εὐτυχία*? Shall we not rather say that if any one, apart from reasoning, desires what he ought, when he ought, his success is not *εὐτυχία*, because the object of a natural desire is

not irrational, though the reasoning is defective. In these circumstances success is regarded as good luck, because it is attained independently of reason, and luck is independent of reason. But such success is not the result of luck: and therefore the fact that, in default of reason, instinct may lead us to success, proves, not that good luck comes by nature, but that some persons who are thought to be *εὐτυχεῖς* owe their success to nature and not to luck; and again, not that there is no such thing as luck, nor that luck is not the cause of any thing, but that it is not the cause of all the events which are put down to it.

This paragraph affirms and justifies the doctrine laid down at 1247^b 33—1248^a 2. Successes which come from *εὐφρία ὀρέξεως*, though independent of ordinary reasoning, are not irrational. Hence they must not be ascribed to luck, *τύχη*: and, strictly speaking, they ought not to be regarded as *εὐτυχίαι*. Luck, *τύχη*, has its own place, and our conclusions here do not throw any light upon it.

1248^a 4 *ἕτερον ἂν τι εἴη τὸ αἴτιον τῆς εὐτυχίας*. The *εὐτυχία* which is outside *τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀρμῆς καὶ προελομένων πράξαι* and is due to the undesigned crossing of lines of causation, will have for its cause something other than the *εὐφρία ὀρέξεως καὶ ἐπιθυμίας* which has principally occupied us in the preceding paragraph. In 5, with Spengel, I write *εἰ* in place of *ἦ*. In 6, where P^b has *ἔδει τὸ* and M^b *ἔδειτο*, I have written *ἔδει φ*: and after *λογισμός* I have added *γε* to represent the *quidem* of B^f. In 7 I have substituted *οὗ γε* for the traditional *οὔτε*. In 12 I have preferred *εὐτυχεῖν* P^bM^b to *εὐτυχεῖται* (*bene agatur* B^f). It is conceivable that in 14 *ἀλλὰ διὰ φύσιν* stands for *ἀλλ' <ἐνιοι> διὰ φύσιν*: but I think it more likely that something such as *ἀλλ' ἐνιοι οὐ διὰ τύχην κατορθοῦσιν* has been dropped after *διὰ τύχην κατορθοῦσιν* in 13, 14, than that *ἐνιοι* or *πολλοί* (Susemihl) has been omitted between *ἀλλὰ* and *διὰ φύσιν*. I have however contented myself with writing *ἀλλ' <οὐ> διὰ φύσιν*; a smaller and therefore a less hazardous alteration. In 14, 15 the Greek tradition gives *οὐδ' ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι τύχη αἰτία οὐθενὸς δείκνυσιν*, where *αἰτία οὐθενός* can hardly coexist with *οὐδέν ἐστι*: and the Latin tradition has *neque quod non sit fortuna*. Insert the equivalent of the Latin

tradition between *τύχη* and *αἰτία*, and we have perfect sense: οὐδ' ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι τύχη, οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τύχη αἰτία οὐθενὸς δείκνυσιν. It will be seen that this summary statement exactly answers to 1247^b 2.

1248^a 15—^b3. *Summary.* But at this point the question will arise—Is luck cause of the desire for the right thing at the right time? Or, if this is to be so, would not luck be cause of everything? Now there must be a principle in which deliberation and thought begin. Is this principle luck? or is there some other principle? In other words, what is the beginning of motion in the soul? Plainly, as in the universe God is the principle with which motion originates, so in man it is the divine element which enables some persons to succeed in all their enterprises without the help of reason. In a word, they have a principle which is superior to intellect and deliberation. Indeed, it is better that they should not deliberate: for the principle or divine element is superior to reason, and is more effective when reason is not present to interfere with it.

In 19, where the Greek tradition has *καὶ τοῦτ' ἐβουλεύσατο*, and the Latin *et antequam consiliaretur*, I combine the two, and thus obtain *καὶ πρὶν ἐβουλεύσατο τοῦτο ἐβουλεύσατο*. With less confidence, in 20, where the Greek tradition has *πρότερον* and the Latin *priusquam*, I write *πρότερον πρὶν*. In 21, *τοῦ νοῆσαι συνοῦσα ἀρχή*, where Casaubon substituted *ὁ νοῦς* for *συνοῦσα*, I would read *τοῦ νοῆσαι εὖ νοῦς ἀρχή*. I write the sentence 23, 24, as follows: *αὐτὴ* [codd. *ipsam, αὐτῇ*] *δὲ διὰ τὸ* [codd. *διὰ τί, quod*] *τοιαύτη γε εἶναι* [codd. *τὸ εἶναι, secundum esse*] *τοιούτο* [codd. *tale, τὸ τοῦτο*] *δύναται* [codd. *potest, δύνασθαι*] *ποιεῖν*. In 26 the Greek tradition gives *ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ὀλῷ θεὸς καὶ πάν ἐκείνῳ· κινεῖ γάρ πως πάντα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον*: and for *ἐκείνῳ* B^f has *illud*. It seems to me that *ἐκείνῳ* represents *ἐκεῖ κινεῖ*, and I venture to insert *τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν* between *πάντα* and *τὸ ἡμῖν θεῖον*. In 28 I have added from B^f *εἴη*, and, after Spengel, *καὶ νοῦ*, and I have bracketed *εἴποιοι*, though I confess that I cannot imagine how it came into the text. Does it perhaps represent *εἰπεῖν*?

With ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῦ νοῦ ὄργανον in 29, compare 1246^b 10—12: moral virtue, the virtue of the semi-rational part of ψυχὴ, cannot direct the superior, rational, part. In 30, where P^b has οἱ πάλαι and M^b οἱ πάλαιοι ἔλεγον, and the Latin *quod olim dicebatur*, I read ὁ πάλαι ἔλεγον, regarding the phrase as a reference to 1247^b 26, 27, and to the anterior context elsewhere. The protasis of the parenthetical sentence οὐ δὲ τὸν λόγον κτλ, ends with ἐνθουσιασμόν, 33: τοῦτο δ' οὐ δύναται is the apodosis. The first τοῦτο represents the ἀρχήν of 32 and is interpreted by καὶ ἐνθουσιασμόν, while the second τοῦτο represents κατορθοῦν ἄλογοι ὄντες. Spengel is certainly right in substituting ἐνθουσιασμόν for the ἐνθουσιασμοί of the Greek tradition and the *divinus instinctus* of the Latin. In 34 I adopt ἐπιτυγχάνουσι from Fritzsche and τοῦ τῶν from Sylburg. In 37 I write τό for τε P^b M^b, τοῦ Sp; in 38 δύναται for δὲ αὐται and ὁρᾶν for ὁρᾶ: and in 39, with B^f, οὕτως for οὗτος. Spengel's substitution of the genitive for the accusative in 40 is guaranteed by B^f. In 1248^b 2 I have to make a more hazardous alteration. The Greek tradition has ὥσπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ μνημονεύουσι μᾶλλον ἀπολυθέντες τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις εἶναι τὸ μνημονεῖον, where εἰρημένοις is manifestly absurd: but the Latin tradition has *amissisque hiis que ad visibilia virtuosius esse quod memoratur*, that is to say, ἀπολυθέντων τε τῶν πρὸς τοῖς ὁρατοῖς σπουδαιότερον εἶναι τὸ μνημονεῖον. Now the meaning must be that the blind, being discharged from attention to ὁρατά, are more alive to εἰρημένα. So I read ἀπολυθέντες τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ὁρατοῖς εἶναι, τῷ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις σπουδαιότερον εἶναι τὸ μνημονεῖον. It has however occurred to me to wonder whether the Latin tradition represents τῷ τοῖς ἀπολυθείσι γε πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις σπουδαιότερον εἶναι τὸ μνημονεῖον.

1248^b 2—7. *Summary.* There are then two sorts of εὐτυχία: the one is divine, when the εὐτυχίης takes the right course by reason of a sound instinct: the other, which is more properly called εὐτυχία, is when the successful man has no instinct to guide him. It is the former sort of success which tends to repeat itself. The latter, being casual, is occasional.

§ iv. *The two traditions.*

It remains to say something about the mutual relations of the Greek and Latin traditions. I find not infrequently, (1) that a clause in one of the traditions, while at first sight, in consequence of its general resemblance to the corresponding clause in the other, it appears to be equivalent to it or alternative, has at the same time differences which cannot be accounted for by known palaeographical principles; and (2) that, when the similar but not identical clauses are treated, not as equivalents or alternatives but as complementaries, their conjunction restores or improves the sense. Thus, at 1248^a 14 the Greek tradition is οὐδ' ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι τύχη αἰτία οὐθενὸς δείκνυσιν, while the Latin tradition represents οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τύχη αἰτία οὐθενὸς δείκνυσιν. At first sight it is obvious to regard these very nearly identical clauses as equivalents, and to bring the Greek tradition into accord with the Latin by substituting οὐ for οὐδέν. But it is to be remembered that at 1247^b 1 two questions were proposed—πότερον ἢ {οὐκ} ἔσται τύχη ὄλως, ἢ ἔσται μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰτία: whence it would seem that at 1248^a 14 we should combine the two traditions and write οὐδ' ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι τύχη οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τύχη αἰτία οὐθενὸς δείκνυσιν, where the words οὐδ' ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι τύχη come from the Greek, the words οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τύχη come from the Latin, and the words αἰτία οὐθενὸς δείκνυσιν are common to both. Again, 1247^a 33, where the Greek tradition has εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παραλόγως ἐπιτυγχάνειν τύχης δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ' εἶπερ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχῆς κτλ, and the Latin tradition represents, not ἀλλ' εἶπερ, but ὁ δέ, it is obvious that the Latin tradition, ὁ δέ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχῆς, is the right sequel to the preceding clause εἰ μὲν οὖν κτλ, and that ὁ δέ could not well be corrupted into ἀλλ' εἶπερ. But if, after the Latin tradition ὁ δέ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχῆς, the Greek tradition, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, διὰ τύχην εὐτυχῆς, is added parenthetically, it helps the argument by affirming the proposition which the preceding clause had put forward hypothetically. For other instances, see 1247^a 5, 11, 21, 1247^b 31, 1248^b 1, with my comments.

Now it is easy to see that a scribe or a translator who found in his original \acute{o} δὲ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχής—ἀλλ', εἴπερ, διὰ τύχην εὐτυχής—might very easily drop one or other of the similar but not identical clauses. But it is remarkable that in as many as seven instances the scribe and the translator supply one another's deficiencies. Can we devise a hypothesis to explain how it was that in so many instances what was omitted by the one was preserved by the other? I suppose (1) that a scribe *X*, whether by design or accidentally, placed one of the two similar but not identical clauses in the margin or between the lines; (2) that his successors, *Y*, the scribe, and *Z*, the translator, dropped one or other of the two (seeming) alternatives; (3) that, whereas one of them, regarding what he found in the margin or between the lines as a rejected reading, preserved always what he found in the text, the other, regarding what he found in the margin or between the lines as a valuable correction, steadily gave it the preference.

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30 December 1912.

PALAEOGRAPHICA.

I.

Many years ago I hazarded a correction of the received text of the Nicomachean Ethics in 10. 3, 1173^b 25, where the sense appeared to require not λέγοιτ' ἄν as in K^bL^b, but rather λέγοι τις ἄν; and the L^b readings in two other passages were cited as still presenting some trace of a τ' = τις. In 1138^b 34 that MS. has τίς τ' ἐστὶν for τίς ἐστίν (K^b) and in 1173^b 21 λέγοιτ' ἄν τις for λέγοι τις ἄν (K^b); in both these places the τις seemed to me intrusive, as having been inserted when the meaning of the τ' already in the text was no longer understood. Having learnt from Bast that a little mark, so like that of elision as to be easily confused with it, might stand for the termination -ης, I ventured to assume that, as ης and ις were indistinguishable to a Byzantine ear, the same compendium τ' might very naturally do duty for τις as well as for της. Since then I have come across some further traces of a τ' = τις in the manuscript tradition of other Greek texts. I may say that the editions I have had before me were for Herodotus Hude, for Hippocrates Kuehlewein, for Plato Burnet, and for Dionysius *De comp. verb.* Usener-Radermacher.

The first and most direct piece of evidence is in Dionysius c. 4, p. 16. 1 Us., where Usener reads ἦ τις on the authority of Syrianus and another. But his best MS. F has here (with our common texts) ἦ τ', which seems to imply a τ' = τις in the older MS. from which F was derived. In another passage in Dionysius the manuscript variations point to the same conclusion. Usener, no doubt following F, reads in c. 5, p. 24. 6 Us. παράσχοι τις ἄν, in lieu of which three of his MSS., PMV, are said to read παράσχοιτ' ἄν τις. In other words, the τ' after παράσχοι being misunderstood the τις that was wanting was restored as an addition, instead of being substituted as

a correction for the τ' , in the text of the three MSS. So that in their actual text the $\tau\iota\varsigma$ appears twice over, first as curtailed into τ' , and then in full as $\tau\iota\varsigma$ —the critical situation being thus precisely like that in L^b in E.N. 10. 2, 1173^b 21.

In two other places the proof of the equation $\tau' = \tau\iota\varsigma$ is not quite so simple owing to the fact that certain of the MSS. concerned give us $\tau\epsilon$ instead of a τ' . The reading in Herodotus 4. 36, *οἴη τις ἐστι*, must be assumed from Hude's silence to be certified by R and its family; the text, however, of the other family, viz. ABC, has *ὄση τέ ἐστι*, which may very well be supposed to imply an older reading *ὄση τ' ἐστί*, i.e. with a τ' corresponding to the $\tau\iota\varsigma$ in the other group of MSS. The same substitution of $\tau\epsilon$ for τ' —whether standing for $\tau\epsilon$ or for $\tau\iota\varsigma$ —is to be seen in Plato Laws 705^b 1, *οὐκ ἂν πολύφορος τε εἴη καὶ πάμφορος ἅμα*. Stobaeus quotes the passage with a $\tau\iota\varsigma$ after *πολύφορος* instead of the $\tau\epsilon$ of our MSS. His text of Plato, therefore, may be presumed to have had not $\tau\epsilon$ but τ' ; and rightly or wrongly he took this τ' to mean $\tau\iota\varsigma$.

The last piece of evidence I have to offer is less satisfactory, as I am under the necessity of supposing an error of text in the MSS. which have to be considered. In Hippocrates 1, p. 109. 6 (Kuehl.) the latest editor reads *δύναιτο τις ἂν* with certain of his authorities; but one observes that his best MS. (as also others) omits the $\tau\iota\varsigma$ and reads simply *δύναιτ' ἂν*. I suspect that this *δύναιτ' ἂν* is compressed from an earlier *δύναι<-τό> τ' ἂν*. The reading with this alteration will agree with that in Kuehlewein's other authorities, if we may explain the τ' as standing for $\tau\iota\varsigma$. But apart from this passage in Hippocrates, which is certainly not quite free from difficulties of another kind, I think I have said enough to show that the τ' in Greek MSS. may in some rare instances be regarded not as the elided form of $\tau\epsilon$, but as a survival of an old compendious way of writing $\tau\iota\varsigma$.

II.

The following survey of the graphic accidents which have befallen *ἂν* and *ἀν*- in our chief Platonic MSS., more especially in A, B, and T, is the result of a somewhat desultory study of

the data for the text so far as they are recorded in the Oxford Plato. It is abundantly clear that editors like Schanz and Burnet were fully aware of the facts, and of the critical use to be made of them; but one cannot say that of everyone among the many who have dealt with the language and textual difficulties in the Dialogues. This must be my apology for printing these memoranda on the vicissitudes of *ἄν* and *ἀν-*, as seen in the manuscript tradition of Plato.

(1) **Ἀν* may drop out in the ordinary way, through haplography:

Apol. 27 d 9 *τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων] ἂν om. BT.*

Symp. 196 d 4 *πάντων ἂν ἀνδρείοτατος εἶη] ἂν om. B.*

Rep. 558 e 1 *δικαίως ἂν ἀναγκαῖαι καλοῖντο] ἂν om. AFD.*

Tim. 45 c 5 *ὄπῃπερ ἂν ἀντερείδῃ] ὄπῃπερ ἀντερείδει A.*

Laws 687 c 11 *εὐχοίμεθ' ἂν ἀναγκαίως] ἂν om. A.*

„ 926 c 3 *μήποτ' ἂν ἀναγκάσαι] ἂν om. AO.*

(2) **Ἀν* may drop out before any word beginning with *a-*:

Phaedo 85 b 9 *ἕως ἂν Ἀθηναίων ἐώσιν] ἂν om. B.*

Phil. 47 b 5 *ὄσφ ἂν ἀκολαστότερος...τυγχάνῃ] ἂν om. B.*

Phaedr. 256 a 4 *μὴ ἂν ἀπαρνηθῆναι] ἂν om. B.*

Hippias mai. 295 a 5 *ἀκριβέστερον ἂν αὐτό] ἂν om. TW.*

Alcib. 133 e 5 *τὰ τῶν ἄλλων που ἂν ἀγνοοῖ] ἂν om. B.*

Rep. 353 a 1 *μαχαίρα ἂν ἀμπέλου κλήμα ἀποτέμοις (so F and Stobaeus)] ἂν om. ADM.*

„ 473 b 2 *ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἀγαπῶην] ἂν om. M and Stobaeus.*

„ 586 c 8 *ὅς ἂν αὐτό] ἂν om. A.*

Laws 920 b 5 *ὅσαπερ ἂν αὐτῶν] ἂν om. A and pr. O.*

(3) **Ἀν* sometimes added through dittography:

Symp. 219 e 8 *ὅπότ' ἀναγκασθεῖμεν] ὅπόταν BTOxy.*

Laches 199 c 4 *ἀνδρείαν] ἂν ἀνδρείαν BTW.*

(4) **Ἀν*, misread as *-αν*, annexed to the preceding word:

Rep. 589 b 8 *ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι] ἀλήθειαν λέγοι AM.*

(5) **Ἀν*, misread as *ἀν-*, annexed to the following word:

Theaet. 207 a 5 *ἀγαπῶμεν ἂν ἐρωτηθέντες] ἀερωτηθέντες B.*

Phileb. 13 d 7 *τάχ' ἂν ἰόντες] ἀνιόντες BT.*

„ 43 c 8 *ὁ νυνδὴ ῥηθεὶς βίος ἂν ἦκοι] ἀνήκοι B.*

„ 61 b 2 *τὴν εὕρεσιν ἂν ἔχοι] ἀνέχοι B.*

Euthyd. 263 d 7 πολλοῦ ἂν ἄξιοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἶεν] ἀνάξιοι B.

Gorg. 514 c 4 ἦν ἂν ἰέναι (so F)] ἀνιέναι BTP.

Rep. 496 b 6 ἂν ἔλθοι] ἀνέλθοι AFM.

„ 526 c 12 ἂν εὔροις] ἀνεύροις A.

„ 577 b 1 ἂν ὀφθείη] ἀνοφθείη A.

Laws 880 a 5 ἂν ἐπονειδίστου] ἀνεπονειδίστου AO.

Epinomis 977 a 7 ἂν ὁμολογοῖμεν] ἀνομολογοῖμεν A.

In one passage this kind of error seems to have led to a corruption of the actual letter of the text:

Parm. 163 d 4 οὔτ' ἂν λαμβάνοι οὔτ' ἀπολλύοι] οὔτ' ἀναλαμβάνοι B.

(6) Ἄν- in compounds misread, and converted into ἄν :

Theaet. 157 a 7 ἀνεφάνη] ἂν ἐφάνη T.

Polit. 258 c 3 ἀνευρήσει] ἂν εὐρήση B.

Phileb. 16 c 2 ἀνηυρέθη] ἂν εὐρεθῆ T.

Charm. 153 d 1 ἀνέροιτο] ἂν ἔροιτο B.

Lysis 204 e 10 ἀνηῦρες] ἂν εὔρες B.

Euthyd. 276 d 5 ἀνίει] ἂν ἴει B.

Meno 85 c 10 ἀνερήσεται] ἂν ἐρήσεται BF.

Rep. 580 b 8 ἀνείπω] ἂν εἴπω FD.

„ 606 c 7 ἀνείεις] ἂν εἴης AFM.

Alcib. II. 142 d 3 ἀνευχόμενοι] ἂν εὐχόμενοι B.

(7) Ἄν and ἀν- interchanged with δῆ through their similarity in the uncial script (AN = ΔΗ):

Phaedo 64 b 3 συμφάναι ἄν] ἂν δῆ B²W—a combination of two readings.

„ 70 a 8 νυνδῆ] νῦν ἂν B. So also FD in Rep. 399 c 5.

Theaet. 186 d 9 οὔκουν δῆ] οὔκουν ἂν δῆ T—combining the two readings.

Soph. 237 e 7 τέλος γοῦν ἂν ἀπορίας ὁ λόγος ἔχοι] δῆ W.

Alcib. 129 a 2 πότερον οὖν δῆ ράδιον τυγχάνει] ἂν T.

Lysis 204 a 3 ἡδέως ἄν σοι μεταδιδούμεν] δῆ B.

Meno 78 e 8 ὁ μὲν ἂν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης γίγνηται (so BTW)] ἂν δῆ F.

Hipp. mai. 292 c 8 πῶς δῆ] πῶς ἂν F.

Clit. 408 a 1 ὅστις γὰρ δῆ μὴ ἐπίσταται (so F Stob.)] ἂν D, ἂν δῆ A.

Laws 701 a 3 εἰ γὰρ δὴ...ἐγένετο] ἄν A.

„ 629 b 8 ἀνερώμεθα (so AO)] δὴ ἐρώμεθα A².

(8) Ἄν, written as \bar{a} , may become simply a , if the super-scribed symbol be overlooked or omitted:

Laws 951 a 5 ἄν τινες] ἄ τινες AO. So also in Phaedr. 256 a 7 B has \hat{a} in lieu of ἐάν or ἄν.

(9) Ἄν reduced (through \bar{a}) to a is taken as part of the preceding word:

Laws 891 b 3 οὐδὲν ἄν] οὐδένα A and pr. O (implying οὐδενᾶ).

This seems to have often happened when the ἄν comes after a word which in its unelided form would end in $-a$:

Phaedo 100 e 8 ἄρ' ἄν] ἄρα B (= $ar\bar{a}$). So also A in Rep. 387 e 9.

Soph. 219 b 1 δικαιοτάτ' ἄν] δικαιοτάτα W Stobaeus.

„ 266 a 10 μάλιστ' ἄν] μάλιστα B. So also T in Alcib. 115 e 1.

„ 266 c 1 ἡνίκ' ἄν] ἡνίκα T.

Phaedr. 256 c 1 τάχ' ἄν] τάχα W. So also A in Laws 925 e 5.

Laches 190 b 9 τίν' ἄν (so Ars.)] τίνα BT.

„ 190 c 1 γενοίμεθ' ἄν (so Ars.)] γενοίμεθα BT.

Tim. 56 d 1 μάλιστ' ἄν ἔχοι (so A)] ἄν om. FY. Their reading implies a corruption of text, μάλιστα (= $malist\bar{a}$) being altered into μάλιστ'.

(10) Ἄν reduced (through \bar{a}) to a is sometimes taken as part of the following word:

Crat. 386 e 6 ἄν εἴη] ἀεὶ ἦ T (= $\bar{a}eih$).

Laws 777 c 6 ἄν πάντα (so Stobaeus)] ἄπαντα codd. and Athenaeus.

„ 963 b 6 φαίης ἄν, πάντων] φαίης ἀπάντων A and pr. O.

(11) Ἄν, i.e. \bar{a} , sometimes read or written by error for a :

Apol. 24 e 7 ἄπαντες (so B)] ἄν πάντες T (= $\bar{a}panτες$).

Alcib. 111 d 2 βουλοίμεθα (so B and Proclus)] βουλοίμεθ' ἄν T (= $\betaouloi\bar{m}eth\bar{a}$).

Menexenus 249 e 6 οὐ κατερῶ] οὐκ ἀντερῶ F (= $ouk\bar{a}ter\omega$).

Critias 112 e 7 οἶα (so F)] οἶ' ἄν A (= $oi\bar{a}$).

Most of the above confusions, which would be natural enough in the uncial stage of the text, may be of considerable antiquity; but there are also others, common in our Byzantine MSS., which must have come in later, in the minuscule script.

(12) "Αν (or αν-) and αῡ confused :

Theaet. 157 a 5 πρὶν αν̄...συνέλθῃ] αῡ B.

Soph. 249 c 4 ὄντα ἢ γενόμενον αν̄] αῡ B.

Phil. 22 e 1 οὐτ' αν̄] οὐτ' αῡ T.

„ 53 a 5 πῶς οὖν αν̄ λευκοῦ] αῡ T.

Symp. 176 d 7 αν̄ εἰ βουλευόνται] αῡ B.

„ 184 d 6 αν̄] αῡ B.

Laws 877 b 4 οἵπερ αν̄ τοῦ φόνου ἐδίκασαν] αῡ ALO.

Crat. 391 b 5 ἥτις ποτ' αῡ ἐστιν] αν̄ T.

Theaet. 157 a 7 ἄλλῃ αῡ προσπεσὸν πάσχον ἀνεφάνῃ] αν̄ W.

Soph. 220 b 9 ταύτην αῡ τὴν θήραν] αν̄ B.

„ 223 c 12 καὶ μὴν αῡ φήσομεν] αν̄ φήσωμεν B.

Symp. 207 c 2 αῡ ἔλεγον] αν̄ ἔλεγον BTW.

Alcib. 107 b 4 αῡ] αν̄ B.

Ion 536 b 2 αῡ ἠρτημένοι] ἀνηρτημένοι W.

Rep. 348 a 8 ὅσα αῡ ἀγαθὰ ἔχει] αν̄ A m. 1.

„ 463 c 6 ἀληθέστατα αῡ (so Stobaeus)] αν̄ F (om.

ADM).

Tim. 90 c 2 αῡ] αν̄ F.

(13) "Αν and οὖν confused. This confusion, though not recognized by Bast, seems to be implied in the manuscript variants in the following passages :

Parm. 136 b 7 περὶ ὅτου αν̄ ἀεὶ ὑποθῆ] οὖν T.

„ 136 c 3 ὅ τι αν̄ προαιρῆ] οὖν B.

Phil. 15 d 1 πῶθεν οὖν τις ταύτης ἄρξεται] οὖν αν̄ T—
a combination apparently of two readings.

Symp. 184 d 5 δικαίως αν̄ ὑπηρετεῖν] οὖν B.

It will be observed that I have made a point of ignoring passages in which αν̄ has been altered, inserted, or deleted by modern scholars. The readings assumed as correct have, I believe, in all instances the sanction of a respectable tradition—that of one or other of our MSS., or of ancient quotations.

THE POLICY OF THE RULLAN PROPOSAL IN 63 B.C.

Cicero's speeches "against Rullus" would seem not only to have given its quietus to the Lex agraria brought forward under the name of that man of straw, but to have decided also the verdict of history on the nature, object and statecraft of that still-born scheme. It is not my intention in this paper to make any attempt to controvert this practically unanimous verdict of modern historians. I say "of modern historians," because somewhat strangely the extraordinary and revolutionary project, which was to cost the Roman people its *pax*, its *libertas* and its *otium*, has attracted practically no notice from ancient writers. Cicero, looking at the scheme as a whole and at the indirect, not to say underhand method of its proposal was justified from all points of view in opposing it. Its acceptance by the people, the political situation being what it was, could, it might well be argued, hardly have failed to impair the financial stability of the State, might even have precipitated civil war, and in any case might have stirred up too many animosities both in Italy and in the provinces to give any reasonable chance of success to the ostensibly agrarian portion of the measure.

But it does not follow either that all the arguments employed to secure a verdict on the measure are fair or satisfactory representations of the facts, or that all the sections of this complicated law deserve equal condemnation, or are to be described as *vinolentorum somnia* or *optata furiosorum*.

It has seemed to me on re-reading Cicero's speeches, and comparing them with the deductions drawn from them by the authorities to whom we mainly look for guidance, that it may be worth while to review once more this notorious proposal, to draw fresh attention to some ambiguities and not a few

disingenuous misrepresentations on the part of Cicero, to disentangle, if possible, a little more thoroughly than our historians have taken the trouble to do, the numerous schemes comprised under the law, and to enquire whether after all there are no traces in it of *consilia siccorum* or even of *cogitata sapientium*.

It is however obviously only worth while to make this attempt on the assumption, made equally by Cicero and by later historians, that the bill really emanated from more important personages than Rullus. If it had really been the conception of a tribune without antecedents, and so insignificant that his name never re-emerges in a period offering so many chances to able adventurers, the episode would deserve no place in history, and would require no mention except as having afforded Cicero an occasion for a somewhat easy oratorical triumph. It was indeed, as it seems to me, the fatal mistake made by Caesar at this point that he put this easy victory within Cicero's reach by entrusting his measure to a man of straw, and then, as far as we can see, simply leaving it to take its chance. No doubt he might well have hesitated to have come forward in open opposition to Pompey, but at the same time, if he really desired, as it seems agreed by all that he did, to obtain through this law some position of vantage against that general, and if he laid any stress, as I shall argue that he did, upon the scheme of Italian colonisation, he, as a matter of fact, wrecked both objects, not so much by the extreme character of some of the proposals, as by providing the bill with no adequate or responsible support.

Cicero undoubtedly regarded the law as seriously meant by its authors, and as the outcome of a deliberate and dangerous design to overawe, if not to destroy, the republican government, but he is able to represent it as an impudent challenge to Pompey by Rullus, as a shameless bid for self-aggrandisement and self-enrichment at the expense of the State by Rullus. It is Rullus who will manipulate the election of commissioners by the 17 tribes; who will be the leading spirit among them; who will decide the future fate of Egypt; who will sell the very ground under Pompey's camp; who will use

his powers of land purchase in Italy in the interests of his father-in-law and himself, and who in the end will appropriate goodly portions of the rich *ager Campanus*. This mode of attack was perfectly safe,—we may measure the insignificance of Rullus by the outrageous lengths to which Cicero ventured—and must have been very effective with the people. While even in the Senate he affected to ignore the other commissioners; *tu Rulle,—missos enim facio ceteros*. But more than once Cicero allows himself to drop this thin disguise, and to allude, though in cautious language, to those whom he well knew to be the real authors of the law. “For what security,” he asks the Senate, “do you suppose will be left you in the republic, or in the maintenance of your liberty and dignity, when Rullus and those whom you fear far more than you fear Rullus have got possession of Capua and the cities round Capua?” (I, 7, 22). Again, still more unmistakably; “and the men who aim at all this are wont again and again to complain that every land and sea has been handed over to Gn. Pompeius” (II, 17, 46). We may add such expressions as; “neque ipse (Rullus) neque illi horum consiliorum auctores” (II, 8, 20) and “tibi nos, Rulle, et istis tuis harum omnium rerum machinatoribus totam Italiam inermem tradituros existimasti” (I, 5, 16).

We may take it therefore that Cicero, while openly directing his attack against the impudent and self-seeking designs of Rullus, was well aware that he was really dealing with the formidable and carefully devised scheme of serious politicians. But if we admit this, it surely follows that many if not most of Cicero's most effective arguments are irrelevant to the real scheme, the scheme as conceived by Caesar himself. That Cicero should have taken the opportunity, unguardedly put into his hands by Caesar, and avoided almost all discussion of the bill on its merits, is only natural. He was professedly speaking as the champion of Pompey's interests (see especially II, 18, 49, foll.), and it may even be doubted whether he had detected any policy in the proposal at all except the obvious intention to neutralise or undermine Pompey's commanding position.

When we turn to modern historians, what seems surprising to me is that while scouting the idea that Rullus was more than a man of straw, and avowedly attributing the whole scheme to Caesar, or to Caesar and Crassus, they seem nevertheless content to accept the description of the law as assigned by Cicero to Rullus. Mommsen accepts the view that a purely personal position was aimed at *legis agrariae simulatione*. Mr Strachan-Davidson seems to admit that the main lines on which Caesar was about to work were foreshadowed in the law, but as far as its agrarian character is concerned, he merely suggests that the democratic leaders "would have ample means at their disposal to provide for their more hungry partizans" (Cicero, p. 104). Mr Heitland sees no serious purpose in the law beyond the aim of the moment. "As a practical means of relieving poverty or ridding Rome of a surplus population, the bill was a sham. Caesar of course knew this, but he wanted a cry to serve his real purposes" (Vol. III, p. 87). Mr Ferrero simply assigns to the law the double end of destroying Cicero's popularity and of raising again the great question of Egypt (Vol. I, p. 259).

I confess that I am not entirely satisfied with any of these accounts of the matter. They do not go much beyond Cicero's declaration that from the first chapter to the last he can find nothing in the law except the establishment of a *decemvirale regnum*. They do not take into account, what Cicero, when he made his speeches, had no means of doing, the later programme and policy of Caesar. Was the position of Pompey so all-absorbing that there was no room for social legislation or financial readjustment? Or was Caesar only a serious politician after 59? In that year he passed two genuine agrarian laws. May it not be possible to find their antecedents in his abortive scheme of 63? At any rate, I propose to make an attempt to get at the meaning of those provisions of the law which can be extracted from the three speeches of Cicero, unfortunately our sole evidence. How imperfect our knowledge of the law, as a whole, must be, is shewn by the fact that while Cicero's criticisms relate to not more than about ten of its clauses, the provision about the "Sullan lands" was

Chapter 40, and this certainly came before the chapters dealing with the colonial scheme. It is sometimes said that the law was clumsily drawn up, with clauses vaguely and ambiguously worded, and containing "loose general expressions capable of still wider application." This may have been the case, but I suspect that the vagueness and ambiguity which hangs over the law is due to Cicero's method of presenting it to his audiences. His *praeco* stood beside him with a copy of the law in his hands, but Cicero rarely quotes from it, and when he does, it is usually only the first few words, the purport of the clause, as he wished his hearers to understand it, being merely a paraphrase of his own. We have therefore to trust to a hostile critic, and though we may sometimes suspect, we must take the contents of the law as Cicero gives it. It is however possible in certain cases to check or explain statements made in the speech to the people by corresponding passages in that to the Senate. Sometimes too we can distinguish between Cicero's interpretations of a clause and its actual wording, while in one or two instances this interpretation can be shown to be unwarranted by his own statements elsewhere.

Whatever its real object, the law was entitled a *lex agraria* and its proposer was an otherwise unknown P. Servilius Rullus with whom several of his colleagues were associated. An agrarian law was always taken to imply the settlement by the State of Roman citizens on public or at least on publicly provided land, and Cicero as a *consul popularis* is careful to declare that such laws may be worthy of all praise, like those of the two Gracchi, *clarissimos ingeniosissimos amantissimosque plebei Romanae viros* (II, 5, 10). The proposal of Rullus was that an extensive scheme of colonisation should be carried out by the State in Italy. So far it hardly went beyond the proposals of Livius Drusus in 122 B.C., and his son in 91 B.C., and neither of these had been considered revolutionary, though they had ended in nothing. But at these dates there had been considerable quantities of public land in Italy, which, though perhaps not without some friction, might be resumed for the purpose. In 63 B.C. however with the exception of the *ager Campanus* and

the *ager Stellas*, which had been untouched by previous agrarian laws, there was practically no public land in Italy which had not in one way or another been disposed of. All that was left was to be used for the purposes of the scheme, but the bulk of the land required for it was to be obtained by purchase on a large and systematic scale. To provide for this, and perhaps to make the scheme a permanent and continuous one, an extraordinary fund of money was to be established, partly by the immediate alienation and realisation of certain categories of *ager publicus* in the provinces, partly, as I shall argue, by such a readjustment of the financial system as would keep it supplied for the future, or at least for the next few years, with a regular income. The creation of this fund by the various methods prescribed in the law together with its management and disposal in the necessary purchase of land, and finally in the foundation or enlargement of the contemplated colonies, were to be in the hands of a board of ten commissioners, elected by the 17 tribes, and invested with extraordinary judicial and administrative powers for five years. Cicero declares, whether correctly or not, that no land was to be purchased until all the sales were completed and the money realised (*Ante omnia veneunt, ante pecuniae coguntur. . . quam gleba una ematur*, II, 27, 71), and though quite possibly the *ager Campanus* might have been parcelled out at once, it will be better to take that part of the law first which contained the scheme for raising the required fund. It was mainly through these clauses that the democratic leaders hoped to obtain a position in the provinces which would put them on even terms with Pompey, or, as Cicero preferred to put it, that the *decemviri* would become kings over all the provinces, the free peoples, the client kingdoms and in short over the whole world (II, 6, 15).

(1) What Cicero calls the *primum genus venditionis* is given in his own words, not those of the law. *Ut liceat ea omnia vendere de quibus vendendis senatus consulta facta sunt M. Tullio et Gn. Cornelio coss. postve ea* (II, 14, 35). The provision need not detain us long. The offer for sale from time to time *propter angustias aerarii* of public sites in the city, and

other state assets like the willow plantations at Minturnae, was one of the most unsatisfactory and undignified contrivances of Roman finance and quite possibly, as Cicero declares, the responsible magistrates had sometimes shrunk from acting on these senatorial decrees. But at any rate the promoters of the law were taking no unprecedented course, and in raising an extraordinary fund for a special object it was natural enough to adopt this among other methods, especially as the Senate had already marked out these particular properties for sale. Cicero complains that they are not specified, and suggests that this is either due to a sense of the shameful character of such sales, or points to a sinister intention on the part of Rullus to sell under senatorial sanction whatever he chose. The latter insinuation is perfectly gratuitous, while if the Senate was not ashamed of its decrees, there was no reason for Rullus to be ashamed of his clause.

(2) The next provision is perhaps the crux of the law. However we begin hopefully with some actual words of the clause, and Mr Strachan-Davidson (p. 101) remarks that we could hardly believe the extraordinary nature of the project "if the very words of this clause had not been preserved to us by Cicero." Unfortunately the only words of the clause preserved to us are these: *qui agri quae loca aedificia aliudve quid*. At this point Cicero abandons quotation for paraphrase and sums up the provision thus: *quicquid igitur sit extra Italiam quod publicum populi Romani factum sit L. Sulla Q. Pompeio consulibus* (88 B.C.) *aut postea, id decemviros jubet vendere* (II, 15, 38). Now it is to the designs discovered by him to be lurking under this chapter that Cicero allows himself to apply the expressions already cited, *somnia vinolentorum* etc. What are those designs? In the first place, towns like Ephesus, Smyrna, Miletus and Mytilene with all their territories, and in fact the whole province of Asia, might be brought under the terms of the clause, since having been lost in the second Mithridatic war they had been recovered after 88 B.C. The whole of Asia might therefore be sold. Again, the kingdom of Bithynia had been inherited by the Roman people within the period specified. It too was saleable. More monstrous

still, Alexandria and the whole of Egypt was alleged to have been bequeathed to Rome by the will of king Alexander in 81 B.C., *ergo ex sua lege vendet Alexandream, vendet Aegyptum* (II, 16, 43). But what according to Cicero was even more scandalous than this wide power of selling Roman property was the unlimited judicial authority belonging to the *decemviri*. It was not only for Rullus and his colleagues to decide the legal question whether Egypt was or was not the rightful inheritance of the Roman people, but they might make a tour of the whole empire, adjudicating on the claims of the Roman people to this or that territory, and either appropriating and selling it, or exacting heavy blackmail for their forbearance.

For my part I profess myself unable to accept this interpretation of the clause. No doubt it was vaguely worded, though it is hardly doubtful that the *aliud quid*, where Cicero finds it convenient to stop, received some explanation or limitation in what followed. It is perfectly clear that neither Asia nor Bithynia nor Egypt was mentioned by name. But Bithynia and Egypt, and Cicero might have added Cyprus, would come under the terms of the clause, and he was undoubtedly right in recognising that the open attempt made in 65 B.C. by the democratic leaders to get a standing in Egypt was being replaced by this less direct and more subtle method. That Egypt with its position, its wealth and its resources was to be the real set off against Pompey, is admitted by all, and need not be further insisted upon. After his failure of two years before, Caesar naturally omitted all mention of Egypt, and left his clause vague. Cicero partly sees this, but cannot resist the insinuation that the vagueness was meant to cover all sorts of other possibilities. We cannot be sure that some action would not have been taken in Cyprus and Bithynia, but the suggestion that the whole of Asia would have been brought under the clause on the ground of its release from Mithridates is preposterous, and was of course intended to blind the equestrian order. Macedonia and Achaia might equally have been included. Cicero inadvertently proves his own suggestion to be dishonest. In introducing the next provision he in

both his speeches emphasises the fact that he is passing from a clause which impaired the dignity of the empire, and caused unrest and alarm in all its parts, to one which weakened its resources, attacked the *aerarium* and laid hands on the *vectigalia*. *Cum se sociorum cum exterarum nationum, cum regum sanguine implerint* (the exaggeration is ridiculous, and only in Egypt was a foreign nation or king threatened), *incidant nervos populi Romani, adhibeant manus vectigalibus vestris, inrumpant in aerarium* (II, 17, 47 and I, 1, 2). The suggestion therefore that Asia, the richest of the provinces, was to be handed over to the *decemviri* and "sold" was evidently unfounded and dishonest. With regard to Bithynia, we shall find that the royal domain lands in that province were to be sold under the next clause, but if, as Cicero implies, the whole *regnum Bithyniae* was liable to be sold under this one, the royal domains would have been included. In all probability therefore, in spite of its general terms, the provision was intended to apply to Egypt alone, and Cicero must have known this, but the vague wording gave him an opportunity for alarming suggestions of which he made skilful use.

With regard to the judicial powers of the *decemviri*, by which they were to decide the question as to the will of Alexander, and to terrorise and pillage the whole empire, we can only describe Cicero's argument as audacious sophistry, which was only not libellous because the *decemviri* were not yet in existence. In the first place, the question whether Egypt did or did not belong to the Roman people was diplomatic and not legal, and the Senate, as Cicero himself admits (II, 16, 41), had already taken action on the assumption that the will was genuine. The *decemviri* would simply proceed on the same assumption. In the second place, we can hardly doubt that the judicial powers of the commissioners were specified in the law, though Cicero keeps this out of sight, and in any case his picture of the unscrupulous uses to which it would be put is a reflection of his insinuation that the *decemviri* would be composed of Rullus and his like, whereas he knew perfectly well that however *improbi* politically, they would number men of position and responsibility. To brand

this still unelected body with infamy may have been effective at the moment, but we may surely dismiss it as not worthy of serious consideration.

The question arises, what are we to understand by the statement that the *decemviri* were empowered "to sell" such properties of the Roman people as Egypt, or if we like to add it, Bithynia? That much movable property would be actually sold and realised is probable, but it is ridiculous to talk of selling a province or a kingdom, or any considerable part of either, in the ordinary sense. Besides, it is by the carrying out of the next clause as distinct from the present one that *praesens pecunia certa numerata* is looked for. I have no doubt myself that *vendere* is here used not in the sense of *alienare* (where Cicero uses this word, it is always in connexion with the next clause) but in the sense in which the censors are said sometimes *vendere*, sometimes *locare*, the usufruct of either *vectigalia* or lands. The system, whatever it might be, in force in the older provinces for getting the *vectigalia* from *ager publicus* was not interfered with, but in the case of these new acquisitions, certainly Egypt, and possibly Bithynia and Cyprus, the *decemviri* were to make the necessary arrangements, selling the usufruct of the land, and possibly selling or farming out the *vectigalia* from it, but not actually alienating any immovable property of the Roman people. For the next five years at any rate all that accrued from these arrangements would be at the disposal of the commissioners for purposes of the agrarian scheme. It was of course an audacious interference with the ordinary financial system, and it foreshadowed the anti-senatorial and personal policy of the first triumvirate, but reduced to its true proportions, it was something more than the mere dream of madmen or drunkards.

Mr Heitland says (Vol. III, p. 85), "the extent of the power of sale under this head may be gathered...by observing that the recent annexations of Pompey were included also." This was most certainly not the case. If it had been, we may be sure that Cicero would not have been absolutely silent on the point. Pompey's annexations were indeed affected by the law,

but as we shall see, under two other clauses, not under this. As a matter of fact, Pompey was still engaged in framing the various *leges datae* for the new provinces and their divisions, and until this was completed, they were not technically the property of the Roman people, though the royal domains of Mithridates might be claimed, as appears from the next clause, as part of the public *patrimonium* immediately on his deposition. Cicero's fancy picture of the ground under Pompey's camp being sold by Rullus belongs to the clause with which we have next to deal, while we shall see in a still later clause that the appropriation of the *vectigalia* from the new provinces was to date from the end of 63 B.C. Indeed the whole of that clause would have been redundant, if Pompey's annexations had been included under the present one.

(3) If the terms of the preceding clause were vague and general, the same complaint can certainly not be made against the next (I, 1, 2 to 2, 6; and II, 18, 47 to 21, 56). The present clause, unlike the former, is a direct attack upon the *aerarium*. Its object is to secure *praesens pecunia certa numerata*, in other words, a fund of ready money, available for the immediate purchase of Italian land. It not only permitted but ordered the actual sale and alienation of certain specified portions of *ager publicus*. Nothing that was not so specified was to be touched under this clause. Cicero is very explicit on this point in both speeches. *Imperat ut decemviri vestra vectigalia vendant nominatim* he says in the second speech, and proceeds to give the list exhaustively. Again, in the first speech; *perscribit in sua lege vectigalia quae decemviri vendant, hoc est, proscribit auctionem publicorum bonorum*, and again he gives the list, but not so completely. I call attention to the limited sense in which the phrase *auctio publicorum bonorum* is used, because Mr Heitland (p. 85) makes Cicero speak of "a sale of the Roman people's effects," which is misleading, for it was a sale of quite a small portion of them. It was however in this case to be actual sale of lands and not merely of their usufruct. It makes no difference under this clause whether the sale is said to be of lands or of *vectigalia*, since the latter was involved in the sale of *agri vectigales*

(II, 24, 64). That it was actual sale appears from the phrase *venire nostras res proprias et in perpetuum a nobis abalienari* (II, 21, 55), and the phrase *vectigalia abalienare* wherever it occurs refers to this clause and to this clause only.

What then were these properties of the Roman people that were to be immediately realised? In Italy there was the *silva Scantia*, some woodland probably leased by the censors, but unlike the *ager Campanus*, not suitable for assignation. Besides this, all the remaining *possessiones*, nothing being omitted, were to be sold. This need not detain us, since, as we shall see later, there was practically nothing left under this category. We pass to Sicily. *Nihil est in hac provincia quod aut in oppidis aut in agris majores nostri proprium nobis reliquerint quin id venire jubeat* (II, 18, 48). It was however certainly not the whole of Sicily which was to be sold. In the first speech he puts it in this way; *persequitur in tabulis censoriis totam Siciliam*. I infer from this that it was only that part of Sicilian land *a censoribus locatus* which came under this clause. It is clear that some of the land in Sicily came under another clause, that by which *pergrande vectigal* was to be imposed on public lands, because the *ager Recentoricus* is made an exception to that clause. *Excipit in vectigali imponendo agrum Recentoricum Siciliensem* (I, 4, 10). It would be irrelevant here to enter into the intricate question of land tenure in Sicily. My point is that it was not the whole of Sicily, as Cicero's words to the people would imply, which was to be sold, but only a part and perhaps the smaller part of it. Further afield we find put up for sale the territories of certain communities in Cilicia, captured in war by Servilius Vatia, such as the Attalenses, the Phaselites, the Olympei and others. To these are to be added the royal domain lands in Bithynia, and also those in Macedonia, both of which properties, like the saleable lands in Sicily, *a censoribus locati sunt et certissimum vectigal adferunt*. Belonging to the same category were the domain lands of the Attalids in the Chersonese, and those of king Apion in Cyrene, while all that remained of the Corinthian territory was to be disposed of. In the west there were certain lands near Nova Carthago, acquired by the two Scipios, and

"ancient Carthage." This expression must have meant more than the mere site of the destroyed city, since exception is made of certain land on the coast, originally assigned to the use of Massinissa's children and then occupied by Hiempsal, on the ground that this occupation had been sanctioned by a treaty. How much however of the former territory of Carthage was included, we cannot say. Cicero's insinuation (II, 22, 58) that this exception was *quaestuosa* seems gratuitous, since the same exception was made from the sale of African land in 111 B.C. (Lex Agr. v 81). The last category of land to be sold under this clause, though probably not the most valuable, was what most excited Cicero's indignation. It consisted of the royal domain lands of Mithridates in Paphlagonia, Pontus and Cappadocia. It can hardly have been more than bluff which induced Caesar to insert these lands, or possibly their insertion might be useful in future negotiations with Pompey. Cicero complains that it was irregular to interfere with these lands, while the arrangements for the new provinces were still *sub iudice*, and the *leges datae* not yet issued. I suggest that this objection would have been fatal to bringing these provinces under the preceding clause, but that Mithridates once deposed, his domains passed *ipso facto* to the Roman people. At any rate the picture of Rullus summoning Pompey by letter, and conducting his auction midway between the two camps, is too silly and far-fetched to have imposed even upon a Roman mob.

We must remember that there was at least one precedent for the sale of provincial land, for some of the African and some of the Corinthian land had been sold in 111 B.C. On that occasion too some of the land had been sold by the commissioners on the spot, another arrangement which Cicero complains of, contrasting it with the censor's *locatio* which had always to be in Rome. Local sales were of course the obvious way of guarding against the glutted market which otherwise would have been inevitable. The clause, though far less sweeping than is generally represented, was no doubt a serious interference with the financial authority of the Senate; it was laying hands on the *vectigalia* and it meant the loss to

the treasury of not unimportant revenue. Saturninus in a law not defeated on its merits had apparently contemplated the appropriation of these same lands for the settlement of the Marian veterans, since it can hardly be a mere coincidence that the provinces mentioned in connexion with his scheme were Africa, Sicily, Macedonia and Achaia. Caesar's later schemes of transmarine colonisation too meant the withdrawal from revenue of what would otherwise have been *agri vectigales*. If Italian colonisation was desirable, and later events showed that it might be made a success, then some sacrifice of revenue for the purchase of land was justifiable, and it was a policy deliberately adopted afterwards both by Caesar himself and by Augustus.

(4) The next provision is more vague, though the vagueness is almost certainly due to Cicero and not to the law. Cicero however begins with the actual words of the clause, of which unfortunately he only gives us the first four; *omnes agros extra Italiam* (II, 21, 56). His own paraphrase is best given to the Senate (I, 4, 10); *jubet enim eosdem decemviro omnibus agris publicis pergrande vectigal imponere*. This, like the preceding clause, has no time limitation, *infinito ex tempore*. As the *decemviri* were to have unlimited judicial power, Cicero represents this as enabling them to visit any province, any free community, or any client kingdom, and either to levy this impost on whatever land they chose to declare public, or to exact blackmail for themselves for all land which they exempted. This imputation of an intended *nundinatio juris et fortunarum* against men not yet elected is surely more dishonouring to Cicero himself than to any one else. But what does the clause mean? Mr Heitland says (p. 85): "it was of course clear that all the vast territories potentially affected by the bill could not in practice be actually sold. To meet this difficulty, power was given to lay a rent or tax on whatever was not disposed of by sale." This explanation is wholly inadmissible. If vast territories were potentially saleable, which I have argued was not the case, it could only be under the first clause, and between that and the present one there was no possible connexion, since the former

was subject to the consulship of Sulla and Pompey as time limitation, and the latter is *infinito ex tempore*. It is clear that the lands on which this *vectigal* was to be imposed stood outside the categories included under the first two clauses. We cannot doubt that the law itself was more explicit than Cicero, both as to the lands affected and the nature of the tax. The term *pergrande* can only be Cicero's description of a specified rate or rates. It is impossible to decide whether the *vectigal* was a lump sum to be paid at once, or an annual impost levied presumably for the next five years, or how far in a province like Asia it would have complicated the ordinary censorial *locatio*. It was at any rate an extraordinary tax to meet an extraordinary need. In Sicily the *ager Recentoricus* was exempted from this *vectigal*, and it appears that this land was in the hands of *possessores* holding by custom not contract. On the other hand, the land to be sold in Sicily was, as we have seen, *in tabulis censoriis*. Whether this distinction gives us a clue which might be applied to the other provinces is a suggestion which I am not prepared to press.

(5) The next provision by which the land purchase fund was to be increased is at least clear and specific enough. It is partly retrospective, partly prospective. It requires that *aurum argentum ex praeda ex manubiis ex coronario ad quoscunque pervenit neque relatam est in publicum neque in monumento consumptum* (II, 22, 59) should be accounted for and paid by the generals or their heirs to the *decemviri*. Apart from the difficulties always involved in retrospective enactments, and assuming, what of course Cicero ignores, that the *decemviri* were to be a responsible financial commission, and not the mere gang of Rullus, there seems little that is unreasonable in this. The money certainly belonged to the State, and only the slack senatorial government was responsible for its misappropriation. Cicero implies that the provision was aimed at Faustus Sulla, the heir of the dictator. Perhaps it was, but probably no one felt more uncomfortable than Lucullus, to whose case Cicero is not anxious to call attention. For the future, or at any rate for the next five years, all generals

immediately on leaving their provinces were to account for money falling under these heads to the *decemviri*. To this Pompey for obvious reasons was made an exception. Whether the money was necessary for this particular fund or not, the clause would have put a check on what was probably systematic speculation.

(6) The last provision in this division of the law, though in no way interfering with Pompey's free hand in organising and framing *leges datae* for his new annexations, would undoubtedly have the immediate effect of offending his dignity. The provision was *ut si qua pecunia post nos consules ex novis vectigalibus recipiatur, ea decemviri utantur*. This of course pointed to Pompey's annexations, the *vectigalia* from which *se frui putat oportere* (II, 23, 62). The same thing is expressed a little differently in the first speech; *quasi vero non intelligamus haec eos vectigalia quae Gn. Pompeius adiunxerit vendere cogitare*. We can gather, I think, from these passages the meaning of the clause. In spite of the word *vendere* in the last quotation, it certainly does not mean that the land in these provinces was to be sold or the *vectigalia* alienated. The money is to come *ex novis vectigalibus*, i.e. from their produce not from their sale. The *vendere* in the first speech is clearly equivalent to the *frui* or *uti* in the second, and *frui vectigalibus* and *abalienare vectigalia* are sharply contrasted with one another in II, 13, 33; *vectigalibus non fruendis, sed alienandis*. The *decemviri* were therefore to have the usufruct of the new *vectigalia*, and this usufruct they then were empowered to sell, no doubt to *publicani*, just as the censors sold to *publicani* the *vectigalia* of Asia. Mr Ferrero, I think, speaks of the interests of the equestrian order being jeopardised by the bill. This is not what we should expect from Caesar at such a crisis, and if they lost the royal domains in Bithynia and Macedonia, they would be more than compensated by these new *vectigalia*. As to the policy of risking offence to Pompey, we may believe that Caesar was farsighted enough to see that the time must shortly come when Pompey would require some provision for his soldiers. To meet this contingency was probably part of the agrarian

scheme, and the legal control of these revenues would facilitate negotiations and rearrangements with Pompey when the time came.

Such was the scheme with its six distinct means of raising the extraordinary agrarian fund required. The only provision affecting every province was that empowering the imposition of a *vectigal*. The actual sale of land was to be carried out in nine provinces out of fourteen, but in almost every case the amount of land affected was very small compared with the whole province. Mr Strachan-Davidson writes (p. 100): "Rullus' commissioners were empowered to sell the whole of the property of the Roman people beyond the seas." Mr Heitland declares (p. 85): "the sale was to include...all State property abroad (with one or two trifling exceptions) in particular all the acquisitions made in the first consulship of Sulla or since. The extent of the power of sale under this head may be gauged...by observing that the recent annexations of Pompey were included also." The detailed examination of the clauses given above will, I hope, show that such statements have next to no justification, and are utterly misleading. They indeed go far beyond anything which Cicero himself ventures to say.

Still, making every allowance for Cicero's highly coloured and often unfair interpretations of these provisions, we must admit that even their partial carrying out would have created, if not a *decemvirale regnum*, at least a position for Caesar and his adherents more inconsistent with a republic even than Pompey's own. Cicero declares that the ten kings would be practically the nominees of Rullus. Election was to be by 17 tribes selected by lot, because it was easy to manipulate the lot so as to secure nine tribes ready to vote to order. It is just as likely that Caesar had recourse to this plan as a means of guarding against the flagrant bribery of the aristocrats. It was useless to buy votes when no one knew before the day which tribes would be called upon. Equally unconvincing is the criticism on Rullus for proposing that the extraordinary powers of the *decemviri* should be confirmed by a *lex curiata*. Cicero knew well enough that there were good constitutional

arguments in favour of such a law, and we may be very sure that if Rullus had ignored them, they would have been adroitly used against him.

All the clauses of the law so far considered are preliminary to its more properly agrarian provisions. Modern historians have hardly thought these worthy of examination. Cicero took a more serious view of them, though in passing to their consideration he at first professes to find merely *alios immensos et intolerabiles quaestus* concealed under the popular title of an agrarian law (II, 24, 63). The law provided that out of the immense sums of money in the hands of the *decemviri* they should purchase land in Italy on which a part of the too numerous *plebs urbana* was to be settled in colonies. *Plebem urbanam nimium in republica posse, exhaustendam esse*. One would have imagined that Cicero would not have been sorry to see some of what he elsewhere calls the *misera et jejuna plebecula*, the blood-suckers of the *aerarium*, safely disposed of, especially as he speaks in laudatory terms of the Gracchan scheme. But he can find no precedent for an agrarian law which made use of lands acquired by purchase. *Non esse hanc nobis a majoribus relictam consuetudinem ut emantur agri a privatis quo plebes publice deducatur. Omnibus legibus agris publicis privatos esse deductos* (II, 25, 65). But with the exception of the Campanian land, to the use of which Cicero is even more opposed than to the purchase scheme, there was no *ager publicus* in Italy left. All that had been in the hands of individual possessors had in one way or another become private property after 111 B.C., and that portion which the law of that year had allowed Italian communities to retain on terms of usufruct, and which is last heard of in the tribuneship of Livius Drusus (App. I 35), had certainly been disposed of in the course of Sulla's agrarian arrangements. If therefore colonisation on a large scale was contemplated, it could only be by a system of purchase, and Cicero's objection on the ground that there was no precedent was simply to ignore the altered agrarian conditions of the time. As a matter of fact, the principle of purchase was from this time accepted in all agrarian arrangements which were not, like those of the second

triumvirate, based on robbery and confiscation. It was adopted by Caesar's agrarian law of 59 B.C.; it was again enunciated by the dictator in the settlement of his soldiers after the civil war, and it was the boast of Augustus that all the Italian land on which he settled his veterans was bought and paid for. But it was in the Rullian proposal that this piece of Caesarian policy was first embodied. Cicero however is not only opposed to the principle of purchase, but finds in it all sorts of occasions for jobbery and chicanery on the part of the *decemviri*. But all his arguments depend on the assumption that the *decemviri* will be self-seeking rascals, and will therefore behave as such. In answer to Cicero's enquiry as to what particular lands are going to be bought, Rullus reasonably replied that, as there was to be no purchase *ab invito*, it was impossible to say beforehand what lands would come into the market. Only land capable of cultivation would be bought. "Capable of cultivation" Cicero chooses to interpret as "not yet cultivated," and the *ne ab invito* provision he takes as an indication that Rullus and his friends have their eyes on certain land-owners, who will be far from unwilling to part with undesirable land on terms advantageous to themselves but disadvantageous to the State. Two categories of land, he declares, will come into the market, land which is barren and not worth keeping, and land of which the title is not sound, or its original acquisition not creditable. His most effective appeal to the *optimi cives*, who in his letters are the greedy leeches of the treasury, is that they will be giving up their games, their holidays, their corn doles, the money value of their votes, merely to be planted in some barren or pestilential corner of Italy (II, 27, 71).

Thus the whole scheme is condemned *a priori*. No justification is offered for the outrageous insinuations against the honesty of the commission. They all depend on one fact and one hypothesis, the fact only being relevant, if the hypothesis is accepted. The fact is that Valgus, the father-in-law of Rullus, had acquired considerable land in the Sullan times, and was supposed to be anxious to part with it. The hypothesis is that Rullus would be not only one of the *decemviri*, but the

leading spirit among them. On the strength of this Cicero is not ashamed to declare that the law has been concocted *non a vestrorum commodorum patrono sed a Valgi genero*.

But was it after all necessary to buy the land owned by Valgus or by any of the other *Sullani homines*? It might very well be the contention of the Marian party and of a Marian tribune that a tenable claim could be made by the State to all the so-called *Sullani agri*. The question indeed as to the legal position of the lands which had changed hands in the course of the Sullan proscriptions, and as to the legal title of their new occupants, was the most difficult agrarian problem of the time, and urgently called for some authoritative solution. It must be remembered that all Sulla's agrarian measures depended for their ultimate validity upon the Lex Valeria, which ratified in advance all his acts. It was this which authorised the confiscation of the lands of many Italian towns, as well as the proscription of individual estates. It was this law again which authorised the sale by auction of much of this public land, and the assignation of other portions of it to his old soldiers. The result of these measures was naturally profound and lasting discontent among many sections of the community, and the *Sullani homines*, whether soldier colonists or purchasers, were objects of hatred to all connected with the dispossessed. Nor was this all. The Lex Valeria was as even Cicero declared, and as the whole Marian party would certainly agree, a *lex iniquissima et legis dissimillima*. It had been passed without *promulgatio*, and proposed by an *interrex*, whose constitutional function was not to pass laws but to conduct elections. It might therefore be argued that the titles to all these lands were unsound, that the land was still *ager publicus*, and that in the eyes of the law all these *Sullani homines* were no more than *possessores*, liable to be ejected by a new agrarian law. There were other *Sullani homines* whose title was still more unsound. Much of the land made public had remained unsold and unassigned, and had, no doubt with the connivance of Sulla, been simply appropriated by his satellites. These men therefore were legally mere *possessores* of public land, although they had for the last twenty years regarded

themselves as owners. "Sunt enim multi agri lege Cornelia publicati nec cuiquam adsignati neque venditi qui a paucis hominibus impudentissime possidentur" (III, 3, 12). Now it was extremely desirable that the question as to these *Sullani agri* should receive final settlement. Such a settlement was contained in the law of Rullus. Caesar was statesman enough to perceive the only possible solution. Though irresponsible tribunes might talk of a restoration of the Marian exiles, he recognised that it was outside the range of practical politics, and could only lead to economic confusion throughout Italy, to interfere now after twenty years with these *Sullani homines* either with a view of restoration to the original owners, or of saving the State some expense by using the lands for distribution. And in this general settlement it was obviously wise to include the worse titles along with the better. Accordingly—and for once Cicero gives us a complete sentence of the law—clause XL provided; "qui post Marium et Carbonem consules agri, aedificia, lacus, stagna, loca, possessiones publice data adsignata, vendita, concessa, possessa sunt, ea omnia eo jure sint ut quae optimo jure privata sunt" (III, 2, 7).

This moderate and on the whole equitable provision puts Cicero in some difficulty, but gives him the opportunity of imputing political inconsistency and corrupt motives to the authors of the bill. He does not venture openly to express the opinion that the *Sullani homines* ought to have been dispossessed, and he would certainly have opposed such a suggestion if Rullus had made it¹, but he twits the *Marianus tribunus plebis* with political inconsistency intended solely to benefit his father-in-law, and he allows himself to suggest to the *optimi cives* that the *Sullani agri* would have been a useful perquisite for themselves.

It would hardly perhaps be worth while to examine Cicero's criticisms of this clause, unworthy as they are of a serious

¹ Rullus seems to have represented Cicero as taking up this position; *me gratificantem...Sullanarum adsignationum possessoribus agrariae legi et commodis vestris obsistere*. This is certainly not his attitude in the

second speech, but Rullus may have referred to some utterances of Cicero while he was still ignorant of the contents of the bill, and suspected an attack on the *Sullani homines*.

statesman, were it not that they throw so much light on his methods of political controversy. *Ne ei quidem qui agros publicos possident decedent de possessione, ... Conversa ratio. Antea, cum erat a tribuno plebis mentio legis agrariae facta, continuo qui agros publicos aut qui possessiones invidiosas tenebant extimescebant; haec lex eos homines fortunis locupletat, invidia liberat* (II, 26, 68). Previous agrarian laws had been unfavourable to the interests of possessors, this one is not. Therefore, argues Cicero, with an enthusiasm for earlier agrarian laws which he does not always show, and without any regard to the different conditions of the possessors now protected, this is a bad law, and must be due to corrupt motives, though the only trace of these which he can find is the possible case of the unfortunate Valgus. It is on the strength of this that he says: "you are selling your *vectigalia* won by the blood and sweat of your ancestors, merely to enrich the Sullan possessors" (II, 26, 69). In criticising the wording of the clause, he first suggests that the consulship of Marius and Carbo was taken as the *terminus post quem* in order to disguise the fact that the *Sullani agri* were referred to. But the next year was that of Sulla's dictatorship, and *post Sullae dictaturam* would have cut out the very lands intended by the clause. He then tries to persuade the people,—he would hardly have attempted such buffoonery in the Senate,—that if these lands were to be *optimo jure privata* they would be forthwith freed from any hypothecations or rates or servitudes to which they were liable.

Before taking leave of this clause, it is necessary to mention one other kind of land the title to which was ambiguous, but would seem to have been safeguarded by it. That the lands in question are not mentioned by Cicero in the course of his speeches is from his later utterances on the subject somewhat surprising. In the year 45 B.C. he wrote to Valerius Orca, one of Caesar's land commissioners, begging him not to interfere with the lands of Volaterrae in Etruria. In a letter written to Atticus at the time of the agrarian proposal of Flavius (*ad Att.* I, 19, 4) it appears that Sulla had confiscated the territory both of Volaterrae and Arretium, but had not made use of

them for purposes of distribution. "Volaterranos et Arretinos quorum agrum Sulla publicaverat neque diviserat in sua possessione retinebam." The lands were therefore, as confiscated by Sulla's act, *agri publici*, and, as still being allowed to remain with the towns, they were legally *possessiones*, liable at any time to be claimed by the State. A comparison of the phrases *publicaverat neque diviserat* and *publicati nec cuiquam adsignati neque venditi* shows that the legal position of these two territories was exactly that of the *Sullani agri* whose titles were least secure. But it is perfectly clear that Caesar intended by this law to restore full ownership to the towns and so to put an end to a state of uncertainty and suspense. Their case was beyond all doubt covered by cap. XL of the law, and the people of Volaterrae only differed from the *Sullani homines* in being the possessors of land which they had themselves formerly owned, a point which made a difference in equity but not in law.

In view of these conclusions, from which I can see no escape, what are we to make of Cicero's explicit assertion to Valerius Orca in 45 B.C. that he had defended the lands of Volaterrae against the law of Rullus? "Summo studio populi Romani a me in consulatu meo defensi sunt. Cum enim tribuni plebis legem iniquissimam de eorum agris promulgavissent, facile senatui populoque Romano persuasi, ut eos cives, quibus fortuna pepercisset, salvos esse vellent. Hanc meam actionem C. Caesar primo suo consulatu lege agraria comprobavit" (*ad Fam.* XIII, 4). Is Cicero forgetful or disingenuous? or does he confuse the Rullan with the Flavian proposal? Not only is there no word of reference to these lands by name in the extant speeches, but, as we have seen, they are safeguarded by the clause quoted by him. If Cicero really disapproved of this clause, as he wishes the people to believe, the people of Volaterrae might well pray to be saved from their friends, for it was the *lex iniquissima* which defended them, and Cicero who would have prolonged their ambiguous position. Cicero at the date of this letter was living on the memory of his own good deeds, real or imaginary, and as the details of the Rullan law were long since forgotten, was quite safe in

making this statement to Orca. What is more striking is that he should have had the effrontery to represent Caesar's action in 59 B.C. as based upon his own. What I think we may safely conclude is that in 59 B.C. Caesar carried into effect along with other provisions of his own former scheme this wise acceptance of faits accomplis involved in the confirmation of all ambiguous titles, individual and corporate.

The avowed object of the wholesale purchase of Italian land contemplated in the law was the foundation of colonies. *Scriptum est enim, 'Quae in municipia quasque in colonias decemviri velint, deducant colonos quos velint et eis agros adsignent quibus in locis velint'* (I, 6, 17). Now in all probability Caesar's scheme included colonies of the Gracchan type for the *plebs urbana*, and also colonies of the newer military type for old soldiers. Cicero however, though plainly aware that colonies of the former kind were contemplated (especially in the passage where he urges his hearers not to give up the pleasures of Rome for life in the country) bases all his arguments against the colonial scheme on the supposition that the colonies will be *praesidia* garrisoned by soldiers and men prepared for violence, sedition and bloodshed. He gives a false note at once to the discussion by taking colonies in the bygone sense of *propugnacula imperii*, and asking Rullus what suitable strategical sites he had selected (II, 27, 73). He even suggests that the sites chosen will be those from which pressure might most easily be brought to bear on Rome. The aim of the authors of the law is in his eyes *totam Italiam suis praesidiis obsidere et occupare*; and *vestram libertatem suis praesidiis et coloniis interclusam tenere*. If we add to these expressions a passage in the peroration to the second speech concluding with the words; *ut omnem rempublicam vestris militibus vestris urbibus vestris praesidiis cingeretis*, it will be evident that Cicero saw in the law a scheme for the foundation of military colonies. On what wording of the law he based this belief, we do not know, but I cannot believe that he was mistaken. The two points on which he went astray were, first his assumption that these colonies must be instruments of revolution rather than a necessary and useful provision, under

present conditions of service, for old soldiers; and secondly his incredulity as to colonies for the *plebs urbana*. It is certain that the carrying out of both kinds of colonies was among the serious and salutary measures of Caesar's dictatorship. In spite of some obscurity, there is reason to believe that his agrarian laws of 59 B.C. were intended both for Pompey's soldiers and for poor citizens who were fathers of three children. Why then, when we find both kinds of colony figuring in this law, admittedly Caesar's and admittedly prepared with care and trouble, should we all blindly follow Cicero, a blind leader indeed where political situations are concerned, and believe that this first agrarian scheme of 63 B.C. meant nothing, or if anything, revolution? Even politically, apart from other aims which certainly actuated him later, Caesar had much to hope from carrying these schemes. To have the land and the machinery ready for a considerable number of military colonies would give him immense advantages and something very tangible to offer Pompey in the critical negotiations with that powerful general which were bound before long to take place. While to get rid of some of the too powerful *plebs urbana*, devoted as it was to Pompey, would be equally to his advantage.

If I am right in my view that Caesar was serious in his double scheme of colonisation, I think we may assume that one part of it was more immediate, and the other more remote. Remembering that the land to be purchased could not be available till after money had been raised in the provinces, and that the veterans, whom Caesar probably had in mind, would not be ready till after Pompey's return, we may perhaps connect these facts and assume that the military colonies would have come later, and would have been mainly on the purchased land. We are of course at a great disadvantage in not having the clauses of the law, but only the vague and often misleading diatribes of Cicero, but as usual, we may get something from his own admissions and from a careful reading between the lines. Thus when he complains (II, 27, 74) that the localities to which colonists are to be sent are not specified, nor the kind of colonists, nor the number for each foundation,

he is clearly speaking of the future, not the immediate scheme. How could the localities be specified when the lands were not bought, and the *ne ab invito* proviso made it quite uncertain what would be bought? As to the kind of colonists, if my suggestion about Caesar's motive for making future provision for Pompey's soldiers is correct, he would hardly show his hand by specifying them at present, and I imagine that the *quos velint* was intentionally vague so as to give him a free hand when the time came. The fact too that the number of colonists is not given proves by itself that the colonies were not immediately contemplated, for it was a characteristic of Roman colonies that they were always for a fixed number. On the other hand, there can be no manner of doubt that immediate colonisation was contemplated by the law. In this case the locality is specified, the number of colonists fixed, and even certain details of constitution, such as the number of decurions, augurs and priests determined (II, 28, 76 and 35, 96). What colonists then were ready for immediate settlement, and what land was available for them?

If Cicero was right in attributing to Rullus or Caesar the sentiment, *plebem urbanam nimium in republica posse*, this distrust of the people can only be explained by the present popularity of Pompey, and therefore it was politically desirable *sentinam urbis exhaurire* at once before the victorious general's return. As for land, there was still one region of *ager publicus*, which both the Gracchi and Sulla had left untouched, the *ager Campanus* and the adjoining *campus Stellas*. It was proposed by the law that these lands should now be applied to purposes of colonisation, five thousand colonists to be sent at once to Capua, there to be settled on the rich territory forfeited after the second Punic war, and others apparently to some of the neighbouring Campanian towns. *Et enim ager Campanus hac lege dividetur...et Capuam colonia deducetur* (II, 28, 76); *nunc omnes urbes quae circum Capuam sunt a colonis...occupabuntur* (I, 7, 20).

But though the considerations put forward above would seem to connect the purchased land with future military colonies, and the *ager Campanus* with immediate citizen

colonies, Cicero argues against the latter scheme on a different assumption. He is obsessed by the idea, perhaps suggested by Sulla's *φρούρια κατὰ τῆς Ἰταλίας*, that "all Italy" was to be kept down with garrisons and soldiers of the *decemviri*. In accordance with this idea Capua and the other cities are to be colonised by the satellites and *praesidia* of the *decemviri*, by men who are *ad vim prompti, ad seditionem parati...armati in cives et expediti in caedem*. We are not here concerned with the historical misrepresentation which ascribes the punishment of Capua to the same motives as that of Corinth and Carthage, or with the futile attempt to stir up obsolete animosities by talking about the *Campana arrogantia* and the danger of an *altera Roma*. It is perfectly clear that in Cicero's eyes the real danger was not in the colonisation of Capua or Cumae or Atella, but in the supposed character of the colonists who were to be sent there. I suspect that these ferocious satellites of the *decemviri* existed only in Cicero's imagination. That by the wording of the law itself these lands were intended for the *plebs urbana*, is inadvertently admitted by Cicero when he speaks of the *ager Campanus* as *qui vobis ostenditur, aliis comparatur* (II, 31, 85), while it appears that the colonists were to be taken tribe by tribe, though not in an order which Cicero approved. There is no more solid ground that I can discover for his insinuations as to the desperate character of the Campanian colonists than there was in the equally reckless imputations of corruption and abuse of power in the provinces. Nor is Cicero even honest in his alarm at these new *praesidia* which the distribution of the *ager Campanus* will bring into existence. It appears that after all, the real motive of these not yet elected *decemviri* is the basest personal greed. They want the rich *ager Campanus* themselves, and these desperate colonists are only to be put in to keep their places warm, until in spite of the clause forbidding sale they can contrive to buy up the five thousand plots of ten *jugera*. *Nam agrum quidem Campanum quem vobis ostentant ipsi concupiverunt; deducunt suos quorum nomine ipsi teneant et fruuntur. Coement praeterea, etc.*" (II, 28, 78). I think we may leave Cicero's two theories as to the destina-

tion of the *ager Campanus* to cancel one another. At any rate they cannot both be true, and I can see no reason for believing that either is so. I believe therefore that the colonisation of the *ager Campanus* was intended by Caesar as a real agrarian reform, and primarily for the benefit of the city proletariat, though not without the hope of political advantage to himself. As a matter of fact, the scheme was actually carried out in 59 B.C., and whether the colonists then were civilians or Pompeian veterans, the political danger of Capua developing into an *altera Roma* was proved wholly chimerical.

Whether the distribution of these Campanian lands, leaving, as it did, to the Roman people *gleba nulla de paternis atque avitis possessionibus*, was justifiable from a financial point of view is perhaps more difficult to decide. They comprised some of the most fertile land in Italy, and were in the hands of tenants, described by Cicero as *aratores* and *milites*, who paid a substantial rack-rent to the State. The Gracchi certainly, and Sulla possibly, had spared them from financial considerations. Cicero states the financial objections very strongly, laying great stress on the certain and unvarying revenue derived from this source. It was all very well to point to the *transmarina vectigalia*, but Asia had paid no *vectigalia* in the Mithridatic war; Spain had produced nothing while Sertorius held out, and Sicily in the slave wars had not had enough corn for itself. *At ex hoc vectigali numquam malus nuntius auditus est*. No doubt it was not one of the best features of Roman finance at this period that it depended more and more exclusively on the provinces, and that the *domestica vectigalia* were one by one relinquished till Cicero can say after 59 B.C., *portoriis sublatis, agro Campano diviso, quid vectigal superest domesticum praeter vicesimam?* It must be admitted too that this loss of the Campanian *vectigalia* might be all the more serious at the present moment, because in the same bill there was involved a good deal of temporary interference with some of the provincial revenues. Still we can hardly help suspecting that Cicero overstates his case. Though rented high, the lands were limited in extent and the total receipts must have compared unfavourably, as

far as figures went, with other and more precarious sources of revenue. If Cicero's sonorous phrases, *caput vestrae pecuniae*, *pacis ornamentum*, *subsidium belli*, *fundamentum vectigalium*, *horreum legionum*, *solacium annonae*, were ever true, it was well over a century earlier, when legions were few, income and expenditure small, and when the crowded city was not yet dependent on foreign corn. At the present time they were ridiculous exaggerations. After all, the real question is—and we cannot answer it—whether the results of the scheme were likely to be worth the money sunk in it. Caesar seems to have thought that they were; for, much to Cicero's disgust, the same scheme formed the substance of his second agrarian law in 59 B.C., and was then carried out. In spite of Cicero's prognostications, there is no evidence that it in any way crippled the financial stability of the State.

With regard to the character and object of the law as a whole, after an examination of all that can be gathered concerning it from a comparison of Cicero's statements with one another, with the probabilities of the case and with known facts, and from a consideration of Caesar's immediate political requirements and his subsequent policy, I am drawn to conclusions very different from those contained in the imaginative peroration to the second speech and in other equally exaggerated passages. The *decemviri* were not to be the reckless and irresponsible gang of Rullus. There is no reason to suppose that their judicial powers would have enabled them to declare public or private at will any territories within the empire. They would not be a common danger to all foreign kings, though they might depose the usurper in Egypt, and might come into collision with the king of Cappadocia, in whose country lay some of the domains of Mithridates. They would not have all the free peoples at their mercy, though in imposing a *vectigal* on public lands they might have to readjust the boundaries of free town territories. They were not to "alienate the *vectigalia*" of the Roman people, though they were empowered to sell certain specified *agri vectigales* in a limited number of provinces. They would not have the supreme control of the *aerarium*, though they would no doubt

have the temporary administration of a large and extraordinary fund. In applying this to the purchase of Italian land, there is no indication and little likelihood that they would either use the opportunity to relieve the *Sullani homines* from insecure possessions or would buy undesirable lands at exorbitant prices from their friends or from one another. Lastly, there seems no justification for the suspicion that the *ager Campanus* was either to be the territory of a new and rival capital, held by armed and violent satellites of the *decemviri*, or that it was to find its way into the possession of the leaders themselves.

For all these assertions or insinuations the evidence, if such a term can be used, utterly breaks down. On the other hand, the law, as I understand it, shows unmistakable signs all through of that audacity, disregard of constitutional precedent, contempt of outworn prejudices, of that clear recognition of the end desired, and that unscrupulous but dexterous adaptation of means, which characterised Caesar at all stages of his career. So far from containing the mere dreams of madmen, the measure was a singularly cool and adroit piece of statecraft, providing the popular leaders with not one but several "points d'appui" against the threatened predominance of Pompey, and at the same time containing schemes for the improvement of agrarian conditions in Italy which were in complete harmony with the domestic policy of the popular party.

There can be no doubt that, if the law had been passed, Caesar and Crassus would have been in a very strong position when the time came for Pompey's relations both with the popular party and with the republic to be readjusted. By that time Egypt and its resources would have been practically in their hands, and in all probability a military force have been found necessary in order to complete the annexation. They would also presumably have been in possession already of a very large amount of money. No attempt would of course have been made to interfere with Pompey's settlement of the East, nor is it probable that he, however indignant at the action taken by his political rivals, would have been diverted from

this work. Meanwhile in Italy the initiatory steps would probably have been taken to carry out the agrarian scheme by the colonisation of Capua and perhaps by the sending of colonists to other Campanian towns. Whether this would have created much enthusiasm in Rome is doubtful, but it might to some extent have dissipated the strength of the *plebs urbana*, and that, as long as Pompey was its idol, would be something gained. With regard to the purchase scheme, though no lands would have been actually bought for some time to come, the prospect of a market and favourable prices would probably have appealed, not as Cicero pretended to believe, to the *Sullani homines*, but to some of those land-owners who having got into debt, through excessive speculation supervening on a boom of prosperity, as Mr Ferrero puts it, saw no way of escape except by sale or *novae tabulae*. Of course a conceivable result of the challenge to Pompey involved in this law would have been civil war, as soon as Pompey's hands were free. But Caesar probably knew Pompey well enough to foresee other more likely contingencies, though if a struggle could not be avoided, the money in the hands of the *decemviri* could easily be diverted from agrarian to military ends. But what was far more likely to happen was negotiation, and a coalition. It was to put himself and his followers in a position to conduct these negotiations on at least equal terms that Caesar caused the various provisions of this law to be so adroitly framed. On facing the situation outside his immediate sphere of command, Pompey would have found these provisions more or less in operation. He would almost certainly have seen Egypt on its way to becoming a military base; he would probably have found that the *decemviri* had used their opportunities of securing influence in Macedonia and Achaia. Of course no attempt would have been made to touch the Mithridatic domain lands, but he would have found the men who had decreed their sale, and who had been empowered to dispose of the *vectigalia* from his own annexations, in a very commanding position in Rome and Italy. Short of entering upon a civil war, how was he to deal with the situation so produced? How was he either to accept arrangements so compromising to his

dignity, or to counteract them? At such a point Caesar could with great effect have made use of that clause in the law empowering the *decemviri* to settle on the lands still to be purchased in Italy "any persons they might choose." To get his veterans safely provided for in this way without having himself to face the task of carrying through an agrarian law would be a strong, if not an irresistible inducement to Pompey to acquiesce in the appropriation of his new *vectigalia*, and the more so, as the arrangement would carry with it of necessity the confirmation of his *acta* during the recent years.

Caesar's aim therefore in putting forward this law, involving too many and too distant combinations for Cicero to understand its full meaning, was not wantonly or through mere jealousy to attack Pompey's position, or to rob him of the fruits of his successes, but to compel him by indirect pressure to fall into line once more with the leaders of the popular party. Perhaps some of the powers and actions assigned and allowed to the *decemviri* may seem to have gone beyond this aim, and, as Cicero contended, beyond the necessities of the agrarian scheme, but at any rate they constituted a reserve of force, which it might or might not be necessary to make use of.

The proposal miscarried ignominiously. We can hardly avoid the conclusion that Caesar had calculated to better effect on the results of the law if passed, than on the chances and methods of passing it. Agrarian schemes always needed delicate handling and persuasive authors, and yet this one, unprecedented in several points, involving serious financial innovations and certain to be displeasing to Pompey, he allowed to be put forward by a man of straw, who inspired no confidence and spoke with no authority. It was a course which gave Cicero his greatest oratorical triumph. Whether a somewhat similar mistake later in the year gave him also his greatest political success, is a question which it is not pertinent here to ask or to answer.

As a matter of fact, in spite of the failure of this elaborately contrived scheme, various circumstances, on which Caesar could not possibly have counted beforehand, brought about practically the same situation as that for which the law had been

designed to pave the way. Pompey was induced to join in the famous coalition of 59 B.C., and the main inducement was the prospect opened out to him of providing for his soldiers by means of Caesar's agrarian schemes. To secure this end, he was ready enough, as Caesar had foreseen, to fall in with the plan of using the new *vectigalia* for the purpose. The question has often been raised whether Caesar's agrarian laws of 59 B.C. were intended for Pompey's veterans or for poor citizens generally. Later writers declare that fathers of three children were to be preferred. Cicero, when he says that if there was only room for five thousand on the *ager Campanus*, *reliqua omnis multitudo* would be alienated, implies citizen colonies. On the other hand, when we remember the avowed object of the abortive law of Flavius, and Pompey's anxiety to make good his promises to his soldiers, we cannot doubt that they were at least included. Probably the laws were mere repetitions of the Rullan proposals, with this difference, that then the provision for soldiers was more remote, provision for the *plebs urbana* more immediate, while in 59 B.C. the order was reversed. Whether Caesar's first agrarian law, which decreed the purchase of land in Italy for purposes of colonisation, was carried out is uncertain. It was soon supplemented by the second law for the distribution of the *ager Campanus*, and on this the activity of the commissioners seems to have been mainly concentrated. In 58 B.C. Pompey is said to have stated in a *contio* that agrarian laws had had to be postponed through the emptiness of the treasury (Dio Cass. 38, 5), and Caesar trusting to Pompey's *vectigalia*, which would hardly be available at once, had provided no fund of *praesens pecunia*, as he had intended to do by the Rullan law. The full realisation of Caesar's agrarian schemes, foreshadowed in 63 B.C., and imperfectly carried out in 59 B.C., was reserved for the dictatorship.

E. G. HARDY.

CICERONIANA¹.

Cic. de fin. v 30 atque etiam illud, si qui dicere uelit, perabsurdum sit, ita diligi a sese quemque, ut ea uis diligendi ad aliam rem quampiam referatur, non ad eum *ipsum*, qui sese diligit.

de leg. I 49 ubi enim beneficus, si nemo alterius causa benigne facit? ubi gratus, si non eum *ipsum* cernunt grati, quoi referunt gratiam? ubi illa sancta amicitia, si non ipse amicus per se amatur toto pectore, ut dicitur?

ipsum in both of these passages is the reading of most MSS and of all editions, in both of them it yields exactly the sense required, but in both of them the best MSS, or rather the only good MSS, give something else: in the de finibus B and E have *ipse*, in the de legibus A and B have *ipsi*. Neither makes sense, and one is not even grammatical; but for that very reason, apart from their superior authority, they ask attention, since neither could easily arise from anything so simple as *ipsum*.

The *ipse* of de fin. v 30 is a phenomenon which meets us now and again in the MSS of Plautus, and which Plautus' editors recognise for what it is. most. 346 *eum ipse* codd., Pers. 603 *eum ipse* P, *eum se* A, truci. 890 and 891 *eum ipse* codd., mil. 1069 *eam ipse* codd., Poen. 272 *eam ipse* P. In the interpolated MS F it has once, Poen. 272, been changed to *ipsi* (because the plural *reges* follows as the plural *cernunt* follows in de leg. I 49), and once, Pers. 603, to the *ipsum* of Cicero's inferior MSS. This *ipsum* also reappears in trin. 950 *eum ipsum* codd., truci. 114 *eum ipsum* A, *eum sum* P, 133 *eum*

¹ Read to the Cambridge Philological Society on the 24th Oct. 1912.

ipsum codd., Pacuu. arm. iud. ap. Non. p. 124 *eum ipsum* codd., Caecil. Eph. ap. Cic. de sen. 25 et Non. p. 1 *eum se* codd. Cic., *eum ipsum* codd. Non. In all these places the corrections of critics from Camerarius to Fleckeisen have restored to our texts the forms *eumpse* or *eampse*. This same archaic accusative of *ipse* I wish to restore in these two passages of Cicero, 'non ad *eumpse*, qui sese diligit,' 'si non *eumpse* cernunt grati, quoi referunt gratiam'; for that the pronoun *ipse*, when a relative follows, can stand alone instead of *is ipse* is demonstrated by Madvig de fin. II 93 with many examples, such as de inu. I 82 'ut de *ipso*, qui iudicarit, iudicium fieri uideatur.'

Should it be objected that *eumpse* is nowhere found in Cicero's MSS, the objection, if valid, will exclude *eumpse* not only from Cicero but from Latinity; for it is nowhere found in any MS of any author. Wherever we now read it in our texts of Plautus or the fragmenta scaenica it has been recovered by conjecture, as I recover it here, from MS corruptions. But the MSS of Plautus present similar forms uncorrupted, *eampse*, *eapse* (nom. sing. and abl.), *eopse*, *eaepse*; and so also do the MSS of Cicero, especially the oldest and best of them, the Vatican palimpsest of the de republica. *reapse* for *re ipsa* is preserved at de rep. I 2 and de am. 47, and under the disguise of *reabse* or *re ab se* at de rep. II 66, de leg. III 18, de fin. v 27, de diu. I 81, de off. I 154, ad fam. IX 15 1, in several of which passages the gloss *re ipsa* appears as a variant; while *sepse* for *se ipsam* is found in de rep. III 12 'eam uirtutem, quae est una, si modest, maxime munifica et liberalis, et quae omnis magis quam *sepse* diligit.' This last form has only escaped by the skin of its teeth: a corrector has written *i* overhead, and doubtless in the very next transcription the true reading was obliterated and *se ipse* usurped its place. Both *sepse* and *reapse* have vanished from Seneca's MSS in the very passage where he attests their employment by Cicero: ep. 108 32 'eosdem libros (Ciceronis de republica) cum grammaticus explicuit, primum uerba expressa, *ab se* dici a Cicerone, id est *re ipsa*, in commentarium refert, nec minus *sese*, id est *se ipse*; deinde' etc. That the *ab se* and the *sese* of this sentence are false readings would in any case be evident; but

it is only because we possess Cicero's book, and possess it in an ancient MS, that we are able to convict Seneca's scribes of writing *ab se* where he wrote *reapse*, and *sese* where he wrote *sepe*. It is possible and even probable that they have also corrupted his explanation of the latter word, for in Cic. de rep. III 12 it means not *se ipse* but *se ipsam*.

ad Att. II 19 4 Cosconio mortuo sum in eius locum inuitatus. id erat uocari in locum mortui. nihil me turpius apud homines fuisset, neque uero ad istam ipsam ἀσφάλειαν quicquam alienius. sunt enim illi apud bonos inuidiosi, ego apud improbos meam retinuissem inuidiam, alienam adsumpsissem.

There is no doubt or difficulty about the meaning of this lopsided sentence,—that Cicero in joining the uiginti uiri had something to lose and nothing to gain,—but the symmetry and point which it received from its author are destroyed by the punctuation of his editors. The words should be divided thus: 'sunt enim illi apud bonos inuidiosi, ego apud improbos: meam retinuissem inuidiam, alienam adsumpsissem.'

ad Att. XIV 10 1 meministine <me> clamare illo ipso Capitolino die senatum in Capitolium a praetoribus uocari? di immortales, quae tum opera effici potuerunt laetantibus omnibus bonis, etiam sat bonis, fractis latronibus!

The only possible meaning of 'clamare senatum a praetoribus uocari' is to exclaim that the praetors are convoking the senate. But the praetors were not convoking the senate on the Ides of March, and if they had been it would have been absurd to exclaim that they were: Cicero exclaimed that they ought to do so. This sense, which Messrs Tyrrell and Purser vainly try to impose upon the words by quoting examples of the infinitive with *censeo*, is usually obtained by inserting either *oportere* or *debere* at some place or other in the sentence. But there is a third way of saying the same thing.

...a praetoribus uocan<dum>? di immortales...

No need to remove the preposition: see X 4 6 'amanda potius ab illo quam tam crudeliter negligenda.'

The confusion of *u* with *ii* is easy in many scripts, early and late, from the uncials of Livy, xxv 26 10 *ii*t for *ut*, xlv 28 9 *dieuter* for *diei iter*, to the cod. Mediceus of these epistles, II 11 2 *iisque* for *usque*, IV 7 1 *durati* for *di irati*. But the best instance to show that the termination *-dum* might be lost in the first four letters of *di immortales* as easily as the word *me* in the last three letters of *meministine* is VIII 6 3, where *di immortales* itself appears in M as *dum mortales*. The loss of *dum* left *uocan*. The confusion of *n* with *ri* is just as common as the other: Verg. Aen. v 89 *uanos* P for *uarios*, Lucr. III 1011 *funae* codd. for *furiae*, Pers. VI 68 *inperisius* A B for *inpensius*, Ouid. her. VI 42 *dignion re* E for *dignior ire*, XIII 88 *offeris olimine* P for *offenso limine*, Cic. ad Att. IV 8^a 1 *aperias* M for *Apenas*, x 8 5 *uereris* M for *uerens*.

de imp. Pomp. 20 dico eius aduentu maximas Mithridati copias omnibus rebus ornatas atque instructas fuisse, urbemque Asiae clarissimam nobisque amicissimam Cyzicenorū *obsessam* esse ab ipso rege maxima multitudine et oppugnatam uehementissime; quam L. Lucullus uirtute, adsiduitate, consilio summis obsidionis periculis liberauit.

obsessam cett., *oppressam* Harl. 2682. The Harleianus is on the whole the best MS of this speech, but it is not so much the best as its rediscoverer thinks it; and this is one of the places where Mr Clark has adopted its readings to the detriment of his text. Cyzicus was not *oppressa* in any sense of the word, it was neither surprised nor overthrown: its condition is precisely described by the term *obsessam*, which is again combined with *oppugnatam* at de har. resp. 6 '(Carthaginem) a multis imperatoribus *obsessam, oppugnatam, labefactam, paene captam*.' But this is not the only place where *obsessus* is found with the variant *oppressus* in its company. Verg. georg. III 508 '*obsessas* fauces premit aspera lingua,' *oppressas* Macrobius in his citation Sat. VI 2 8; Hor. epod. 14 14 '*accendit obsessam* Ilion' most MSS, *oppressam* λ, *oppressam* 1; Cic. in Cat. I 6 '*multis meis et firmis praesidiis obsessus*' one family of MSS, *oppressus* the other two. Sometimes *oppressus*

alone is given by the MSS where *obsessus* is required by the sense: Liu. xxvi 12 3 'Capua etsi nihilo segnius *oppressa* per eos dies fuerat, tamen aduentum Flacci sensit,' Petron. 141 'Saguntini *oppressi* ab Hannibale humanas edere carnes.' The explanation of these substitutions and variants is everywhere the same: *oppressus* is a corruption, and *obsessus* a modernisation, of the form *opsessus*. At Hor. epod. 14 14 this spelling is preserved in the scholia of Acron, at Liu. xxvi 12 3 it was restored by Lipsius, and it ought to be restored also in Petron. 141, where Rittershusius conjectured *obsessi*, in Verg. georg. III 508, in Cic. in Cat. I 6, and here in de imp. Pomp. 20. There are several passages of Cicero where it survives uninjured in the cod. Par. 7794 saec. IX,—de har. resp. 49 *opsessus*, pro Sest. 84 *opsessum*, de dom. 13 *opsessor*, pro Balb. 6 *opsessionis*; and at pro Balb. 5 it was detected under another disguise by Madvig, '(Balbum) Carthagine esse *possessum*,' i.e. *opsessum*.

de leg. agr. II 93 quem hominem 'uegrandi macie torridum' Romae contemptum abiectum uidebamus, hunc Capuae Campano fastidio ac regio spiritu cum uideremus, Blossios mihi uidebar illos uidere ac Vibellios.

It is recognised that the words *uegrandi macie torridum* are none of Cicero's own, but an iambic or trochaic fragment from some comedy or tragedy. Even so however they are passing strange. The most lenient translation that I can devise in English is 'parched with puny spareness,' but the Latin, as we shall presently see, is stranger still than this: both *uegrandi macie* and *macie torridum* are phrases requiring a great deal of defence, and yet none is vouchsafed them.

The adjective *uegrandis* means 'stunted,' falling short of full or normal growth. It is therefore properly applied to living things, whether animal or vegetable: Ouid. fast. III 445 sq. '*uegrandia farra* coloni | quae male creuerunt, uescaque parua uocant,' Fest. p. 372 *uegrande frumentum*, Paul. Fest. p. 379 *uegrandem fabam*, Pers. I 97 *uegrandi subere*, Auson. 414 13 (Peip. p. 274) *messibus uegrandibus*, Varr. r. r. II 2 13 (*oues*) *uegrandes atque imbecillae*. Thence it is transferred to other

things by metaphor: Plaut. cist. 378 (Fest. p. 372) 'quin is, si itura es? nimium is *uegrandi gradu*,' 'you take too short steps,' strides which halt before they reach the usual length: the opposite is *praegrandi gradu* in Pacuu. arm. iudic. ap. Fest. p. 355. A second example is very obscure and doubtful: Nonius twice over, p. 183 under *uegrande* and p. 297 under *efferre*, quotes a verse from Lucil. XXVI which in the former place runs 'non idcirco extollitur nec *uitae uegrandi* datur.' In the absence of a context we cannot determine the sense of this phrase: Nonius' own explanation that *uegrandi* means *ualde grandi* is incredible, and casts doubt on his explanation of *extollitur* as *editur* or *prouehitur*. If the words *uitae uegrandi* stood alone, we should naturally interpret them somewhat as Bentley does at Hor. serm. I 2 129, '*uitae humili et miserae*,' a blighted life, never fully and healthily developed. But the reading *uitae* is itself uncertain, for instead of *nec uitae* the MSS of Nonius at p. 297 give *uelite*.

There remains the phrase from which we started, *uegrandi macie*. This should properly mean, if anything, consumption arrested at an early stage. There exists however an extended use of epithets which may be called their factitive use: *exsanguie cuminum* in Hor. epist. I 19 18 is '*cuminum quod exsanguie facit*,' and so far as grammar is concerned the words *uegrandi macie* might signify *macie uegrandem efficienti*. But still they will yield no just sense. *macies*, if we learn its meaning not from glossaries and lexicons but from the practice of Latin authors, is not so much 'leanness' or *ἰσχνότης* as 'wasting' or *ἰσχνασμός*: it is a process of decline and diminution. *uegrandis* on the other hand is not 'small' but 'stunted' or 'undergrown'; it implies arrest of development: a man who loses flesh and dwindles in size does not thereby become *uegrandis*. The adjective and the substantive are therefore incompatible.

And *macie torridum* is little better. *torridus* elsewhere signifies 'parched' with heat or more rarely 'nipped' with cold, and the ablatives which attend it are such as *igni, sole, siccitate, frigore, gelu*. It does not elsewhere, as here it must, mean simply 'shrivelled' or 'withered.'

Now the text of Cicero which I have given above is already an emended text, for *uegrandi* itself is a conjecture of the 15th century and all older MSS have *ut grandi* in its stead. What I propose is to alter two letters more. From the ancient practice of continuous writing, with no interval between word and word, there proceeded false divisions, and these in their turn led to the change of letters. For example in Lucr. I 846 the original *illi supra* has passed (through *illis upra*) into *illis uira*; 919 *uti risu tremulo* into *utiris ut aemulo*, II 294 *fuit unquam* into *fultum quam*, IV 1209 *uim uicit* into *ui mulcit*, VI 641 *mediocri clade* (through *medio cricla de*) into *media grecia de*. But there is no better instance of what I mean than in the adjacent § 92 of this speech of Cicero's, where *Capuae illo creante* has become *Capua et locreanti*, first by wrong division, then by the loss of one *l* and the change of *i* into *t* and of *e* into *i*. I think that *uegrandi macie torridum* arose in like manner from *uegrande macre torridum*, which, rightly divided, is *uegrandem ac retorridum*, 'puny and wizened.' The adjective *retorridus*, 'dried up,' first appears, like *uegrandis*, as a term of agriculture, in Varr. r. r. I 9 5 *prata retorrída muscosa*, and afterwards in Seneca (*arborem breuem retorrídám infelicem, nodosi et retorrídi rami, pars in oliuetis ueteribus arida et retorrída*), Columella (*plantas scabras et retorrídas, semina scabra atque retorrída, retorrídae frondis*), and Pliny (*myrtus retorrída ac squalída, nihil ulcerosum aut retorrídum, id retorrídum et nodosum, gemmas retorrídas hirtasque, neuras spinis retorrída, retorríde nata*); but it is also applied to animals and to human beings, Phaed. IV 2 17 sq. '(mus) *retorrídus*, | qui saepe laqueos et muscipula effugerat,' Sen. ep. 95 16 '*retorrídi digiti articulis obrigescentibus*,' Gell. xv 30 1 '*qui ab alio uitae genere detriti iam ac retorrídi ad litterarum disciplinas serius adeunt*.'

pro Cael. 31 necare eandem uoluit; quaesiuít uenenum, sollicitauít seruos, potionem parauít, *quam* locum constituit, attulít.

This unconstruable *quam* is absent from all MSS except the best, Mr Clark's Σ. Nobody would have wished to insert it,

everybody would have wished to omit it; it must therefore be regarded as the remnant of something which Cicero wrote. If one enquires what sort of word Cicero might be expected to write beside 'locum constituit,' the answer is given by Sall. Iug. 113 2 '*tempore et loco constituto*,' Liu. xxii 22 16 '*loco et tempore constituto*,' Ter. eun. 541 '*locus, tempus constitutum est*': Caelius presumably fixed not only the place but the time. And the exact word which Cicero chose to convey this notion may be discovered by comparing the letters of the MS with the following passages: Mart. xi 73 2 '*constituisque horam constituisque locum*,' Val. Max. iv 7 ext. 1 '*hora a Dionysio constituta*,' v 6 ext. 4 '*citra constitutam horam*,' Hor. serm. i 4 15 '*detur nobis locus, hora*.' QVAM is a mistake for ORAM; and *ora* instead of *hora* is a spelling not only customary in the middle ages but found even in Virgil's best MSS at georg. iii 327, Aen. iv 679, vi 539.

Q for O is of course one of the easiest errors in capital script: v for R is not, but Ribbeck proleg. p. 254 cites Aen. ii 261 *diuus* for *dirus*, iii 473 *diuae* for *dirae*, ix 282 *auguerit* for *arguerit*. I suspect that this same confusion of OR with QV is at the bottom of a variation in the MSS and a difficulty in the text of Iuu. x 197.

plurima sunt iuuenum discrimina, pulchrior ille
hoc atque *ille* alio, multum hic robustior illo:
una senum facies.

'To tell young men apart there are many tokens; one is handsomer than another *and a third than a fourth*; a fifth is sturdier far than a sixth: the old are all alike.' In this sentence the words '*and a third than a fourth*,' *atque ille alio*, are surplusage, and while they add nothing to its substance they impair its form; for the repetition of *ille* and the introduction of *alio* upset the balance between *pulchrior ille hoc* and *hic robustior illo*. Now the *ille* of u. 197 is found indeed in most MSS and also in G. L. K. iv p. 492, but it is absent from the best MS P, from the celebrated cod. Oxoniensis, and from the most noteworthy of the late MSS, Burneianus 192¹.

¹ This MS, I may remark, presents conjectured by Mr Leo; though I do in Iuu. xiv 269 the *assiculis* lately not reckon that among its merits.

I think therefore that *ille* is a metrical interpolation and that after QVE there has been a loss of ORE, an easier loss than that which we see to have taken place in Manil. III 274 'atque ora fugantia,' where *ora* is omitted by M. Then the sense will be 'one is handsomer than another and differently featured (*ore alio*), this is sturdier far than that: the old are all alike.' The ablative of quality is less common in Juvenal and his contemporaries than the genitive, but recurs at XI 96, where, as here, it is co-ordinated with an adjective: 'nudo latere et paruis' is exactly parallel to 'pulchrior atque ore alio.'

A. E. HOUSMAN.

AESCHYLEA.

Pers. 347 (Wecklein). μή σοι δοκούμεν τῆδε λειφθῆναι μάχη; Perhaps it is just possible to squeeze the required sense out of this, but of course Aeschylus wrote, as anybody else would, τῆδε λειφθῆναι μάχης, "to have the worst of the fight so far as numbers go."

Pers. 507.

φλέγων γὰρ ἀνγαῖς λαμπρὸς ἡλίου κύκλος
μέσον πόρον διήκε θερμαίνων φλογί.

διήκε is scarcely intelligible. If it come from *διήκω*, the translation "passed through" is absurd, "passed over" is worse still. Nor do I think a Greek poet could say ἡλίου κύκλος *διήκε κρύσταλλον* to mean ἡλίου ἀκτίνες *διήκον*. If it come from *δίημι* we want an accusative after it, and cannot supply *ἀνγὰς* from the previous line, nor is it a possible substitute for *ἀκτίνας* even if we could. The idea that *δίημι* means "melt" looks plausible at first sight but will not bear investigation. "Trieb auseinander, löste, sprengte," says Jurenka, but can quote no parallel for such an interpretation.

δίηνε will give the meaning we want. Cp. Arist. *Meteor.* IV ix 25, ἔστι γὰρ ἀτμὶς ἢ ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καυστικοῦ εἰς ἀέρα καὶ πνεῦμα ἔκκρισις ἐξ ὑγροῦ διαντικῆ. As heat *διαίνει* liquid here and segregates vapour, so in Aeschylus the heat *διαίνει* the ice and turns it into water.

Sept. 125. ἐβδόμαις πύλαις = seven gates. For this curious numeral cp. Dante, *Inferno* iv 148, la sesta compagnia, "the company of six."

Sept. 747. μεταξὺ δ' ἀλκὰ δι' ὀλίγον
τείνει πύργος ἐρύκειν.

ἐρύκειν Weil for ἐν εὐρει. Cp. Aratus 299, ὀλίγον δὲ διὰ ξύλον "Αἰδ' ἐρύκει. Weil also suggests οἶδμα for ἀλκά, but it seems

to me that we want a genitive after *μεταξύ*, and therefore I should prefer *ἄλμας*. If Aratus was imitating this passage, we might read *Ἄιδα*, but it is not likely that he was.

This construction of *μεταξύ* with only one of the two opposites definitely mentioned is to be heard often enough in English speech, like many other recognized Greek idioms. Mr de Morgan, a great noter of such things, puts it into the mouth of one of his characters in *Somehow Good*. And it is classical English too. Fletcher writes "And puts him out of grace that stood between me" (*Wit at several weapons*, Act iv, Sc. i). Byron :

"Rocks rise and rivers roll between
The spot which passion blest."

(*Occasional Pieces, The Adieu.*)

Sept. 777. *θαρσεῖτε παῖδες μητέρων τεθραμμένοι.* It were waste of time to dilate on the hopelessness of this line as it stands. Aeschylus wrote *METPEΣETEΣTPAMMENAI*. This was easily corrupted into *μητέρες τ' ἔστραμμένοι* or *τεθραμμένοι*; then *μήτερες* was altered to *μητέρων* to get a semblance of sense. Cf. *Supp.* 608, *θαρσεῖτε, παῖδες*, 719, *ὑμεῖς δὲ μὴ τρέσητε*, *Oed. Col.* 1737, *φίλοι, τρέσητε μηδέν*. Aeschylus uses *τρέω* for *fly* as Homer does; cf. *Sept.* 423, *μὴ τρέσας μενεῖ*, will stand his ground without running. So here he meant: "Cheer up, young women; don't turn and run away," as the Chorus had turned to do. *στήτέ μοι, ἀμφίπολοι, πόσε φεύγετε φῶτα ἰδοῦσαι*;

Sept. 1037.

KH. *ἀλλ' ὃν πόλις στυγεῖ σὺ τιμήσεις τάφω;*

AN. *ἤδη τὰ τοῦδ' οὐ διατετίμηται θεοῖς.*

KH. *οὔ, πρίν γε χῶραν τήνδε κινδύνω βαλεῖν.*

Line 1038 is manifestly corrupt. *ἤδη* is meaningless, for *ἤδη οὐ* cannot stand for *οὔπω*. The scholiast indeed read *τοῦδε* or *τούτου*; at any rate he had no negative in his text, but his text is just as hopeless as ours. Nor is *διατετίμηται* a compound susceptible of explanation; Wieseler however has solved that part of the problem with *δίχα τετίμηται*.

Read οὐ δῆτα τῶδε δίχα τετίμηνται θεοῖς, which at least gives an excellent meaning. It would be possible to keep ἢ δῆτα, taking the sentence to be a question, but οὐ δῆτα seems easily preferable in itself, and Mr Bywater suggests to me that the οὐ of our text is a misplaced marginal note intended for a correction of the ἢ of ἢδη. He compares Canter's emendation of Eurip. *El.* 1088.

Then in 1039 read τόνδε for τήνδε, and the whole triplet is smooth. "The city hates him; will you honour him?" "The gods have made no distinction between the two." "No, not before this one of them invaded his country."

P. V. 1000.

EP. κρεῖσσον γάρ, οἶμαι, τῆδε λατρεύειν πέτρα
ἢ πατρὶ φῦναι Ζηνὶ πιστὸν ἄγγελον.

HP. οὕτως ὑβρίζειν τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας χρεῶν.

Some in despair delete 1002 altogether. But interpolators mean something as a rule, and if this line is the work of one what was he driving at? Another theory is that a line is lost before it. But what can have been in it to lead up to this sentiment?

What should we expect Prometheus to say? Would it not, considering what Hermes has said, be something like: "That's the way a lackey should insult"? τοὺς ὑπηρέτας in fact. It would be quite easy after ὑβρίζειν to write ὑβριζέτας accidentally. I know I not seldom catch myself making such slips in writing, and having to correct them. A similar corruption anyhow, whatever the cause of it, is found in [Demosth.] lix 51, ὀργισθεὶς δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις ἅπασιν καὶ ὑβρίσθαι ἠγούμενος, where there is a variant ὑβρισθεὶς for ὀργισθεὶς. In Alciphro iii 25 (Schepers) one MS. reads ὑπομένειν (evidently by a bad conjecture) for τοῦ ὑβρίζοντος. An exact parallel to the corruption I suppose here is this from the translation of Schumann called *Music and Musicians*, vol. ii, p. 441, "Schubert's Schusucht (!) waltz."

Cho. 205.

καὶ μὴν στίβοι γε, δεύτερον τεκμήριον,
ποδῶν ὁμοῖοι τοῖς τ' ἐμοῖσιν ἐμφερεῖς.

It has been actually suggested before now that there may have been some legendary peculiarity about the feet of the Pelopidae, which would account for this remarkable observation of Electra's. The following passage may accordingly amuse some readers; it is from a very curious old Buddhist play called *Nágánanda*, translated by P. Boyd, Trübner & Co., 1872, page 17. "Ah! whose footsteps have we here on the dusty ground, having the sign of the chakra manifest? Assuredly it will be the footstep of this mighty man. For... his eyes resemble a lotus; his chest vies with Hari; and since his feet are marked with the chakra, I conjecture that he who rests here is assuredly one who has attained the dignity of an emperor of the Vidyādhara."

The chakra, I am informed by Professor Neill, is a wheel-shaped mark, which was one of the signs of certain supernatural persons in Buddhist mythology. The speaker in the play discovers the presence of some great one by his foot-mark *before* he sees him, and so far resembles Electra. One might blow a beautifully-coloured bubble over this, but I prefer to agree with Euripides for once.

Eum. 149. *ἰὼ παῖ Διός, ἐπὶ κλοπος πέλη.*

The corresponding line is *ἰὼ ἰὼ πύπαξ· ἐπάθομεν φίλαι*. If we allow that dochmiacs need not answer one another syllabically we can restore the metre by *ἰὼ ἰὼ παῖ Διός*. For my own part I suspect that dochmiacs have often been forced into exacter correspondence than the poets desired.

Frag. 99 (Oxford text), line 22.

λεπτὴ γὰρ ἐλπὶς ἸΗΔΗΕΠΙΞΤΡΗΜΕΝΗΙ.

Wilamowitz proposes *ἦδ' ἐπὶ ξυροῦ τ' ἔβην*, where *ἔβην* is displeasing, and Sidgwick writes *ἀκμῆς* instead. But surely Aeschylus said *ἐπὶ ξυροῦ μὲν οὖν*, which is a way of speaking very common with him and nearer the letters of the papyrus.

ARTHUR PLATT.

NOTES ON ARISTOTLE.

De Anima.

III. xii. 3, 434^a 32. εἰ οὖν πᾶν σῶμα πορευτικὸν μὴ ἔχον αἴσθησιν φθείροιτο ἂν καὶ εἰς τέλος οὐκ ἂν ἔλθοι ὃ ἐστὶ φύσεως ἔργον—πῶς γὰρ θρέψεται; τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μονίμοις ὑπάρχει τοῦτο ὅθεν πεφύκασιν, (virgulam pro periodo scripsi) οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ σῶμα ἔχειν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν κριτικόν, αἴσθησιν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, μὴ μόνιμον ὃν γεννητὸν δέ. (ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγέννητον· διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ἔξει; ἢ γὰρ τῇ ψυχῇ βέλτιον ἢ τῷ σώματι· νῦν δ' οὐδέτερον, ἢ μὲν γὰρ οὐ μᾶλλον νοήσει τὸ δ' οὐθὲν ἔσται μᾶλλον δι' ἐκεῖνο.) οὐθὲν ἄρα ἔχει ψυχὴν σῶμα μὴ μόνιμον ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως.

The text and interpretation of this passage are of notorious difficulty. I think to begin with that Torstrik, Susemihl and others are right in regarding the first clause as containing some error, but that does not here concern me. What it is necessary to say something about is the passage γεννητὸν δέ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγέννητον· διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ἔξει; There are here three separate questions. First, practically all our MSS. give γεννητὸν and ἀγέννητον, a reading known to Themistius also, though he and Simplicius read γεννητὸν and ἀγέννητον; authority is thus divided between the two from ancient times. The word ἀγέννητος is not found elsewhere in Aristotle, for Bonitz must be right in proposing ἀγέννητον at *Metaphys.* 996^b 7. But it is a good word in itself and there is certainly good authority for it here; this however is a weak point in my view of the passage. Secondly, five of our MSS. read διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ἔξει, and this was the reading of Plutarch, a more ancient authority than any of the commentators; nor is there the slightest reason for supposing that Plutarch invented it. Other MSS. and ancient authorities omit οὐχ. Modern commentators, I do not know

why, mostly omit it also and then squeeze some sense out of the rest of the words by a prodigious tour de force. Omission of negatives is so amazingly common both in Greek and English books that it is surely better to suppose that οὐχ was accidentally dropped in some ancient copy than to suppose that Plutarch inserted it and that from him it got, nobody can guess how, into five of our MSS. Thirdly, most important of all, the clause ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγέν(ν)ητον is in all the MSS., it was read by Plutarch and by the ancient commentators before Simplicius, it was known to Simplicius too though not in his own text. But Simplicius rejected it, and since Torstrik the moderns mostly reject it also. Why? Because they take ἀγέν(ν)ητον to refer to the heavenly bodies, the αἰθια, and then the comment of Simplicius is enough to condemn it, φαίνεται μηδαμοῦ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπὶ τῶν οὐρανίων προσιέμενος. It does seem to me that the weight of authority is enormously in favour of keeping the words, and I imagine, perhaps fondly, that I see a way of making sense of them. In order to do so, it is necessary however to read γεννητὸν and ἀγέννητον, and to put upon these words a sense which is undoubtedly somewhat strained, but it must be remembered that something will have to be strained on any view of this passage whatever.

I must first premise several things. In *Gen. An.* II. v. Aristotle asks why the female cannot produce young by herself, why does she want aid from the male? αἴτιον δ' ὅτι διαφέρει τὸ ζῶον τοῦ φυτοῦ αἰσθήσει (741^a 9). τοῦ δ' αἰσθητικοῦ ἢ μὲν πρώτη μεταβολὴ γίνεται ὑπὸ τοῦ γεννῶντος (*De Anima* 417^b 16), i.e. the father, as γεννῶν regularly means. In *Gen. An.* again, 715^b 16, he says: ὅσα δὲ μὴ πορευτικά, καθάπερ τὰ ὀστρακόδερμα τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὰ ζῶντα τῷ προσπεφυκέναι, διὰ τὸ παραπλησίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῖς φυτοῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν ἐκείνοις, οὐδ' ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν. In fact τὰ πορευτικά = τὰ ἔχοντα τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν. And τὰ μὴ πορευτικά = τὰ μόνιμα = τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν = τὰ ἀγέννητά. Moreover in these passages and in others it is implied that τὰ μόνιμα do not possess αἴσθησιν. But on this point Aristotle contradicts himself elsewhere; he ascribes αἴσθησιν to sponges in *Hist. An.* 487^b 9, and at *de Anima*

432^b 19 he says *πολλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν ζώων ἃ αἰσθησιν μὲν ἔχει μόνιμα δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκίνητα διὰ τέλους*. So he is unsettled in his own mind upon this question: have sessile animals sensation or have they not?

Thus his attitude in regard to *πορευτικὰ* and *μόνιμα* is that *πορευτικὰ* have sexes and are *γέννητα*, whereas *μόνιμα* have no sex, being produced by spontaneous generation, *ἀγέννητα*. Again *πορευτικὰ* certainly all have sensation, but about *μόνιμα* this is a more doubtful point.

I will now translate the passage here in question, according to my view of its meaning. "If then there should come into being a body capable of motion but without sensation, it would perish and frustrate the operation of Nature by failing to reach perfection. For how is it to be nourished? For though (*μὲν*) sessile animals get their food from the place where they have grown, it is not possible for an animal which is not sessile but produced by sex-generation (and therefore locomotive) to possess soul and power of discrimination (which it does possess because it is an animal) without sensation (for without this it could not be directed to its food). But yet (adds Aristotle as an afterthought) neither can an animal be in this condition which is not produced by sex-generation (but spontaneously generated and therefore sessile); why should not it also have sensation? The only reason would be that it was better for its soul or its body to have no sensation, but in point of fact it will be no advantage to either the one or the other; the soul will be no better able to use its discriminating power for lack of sensation, nor will the body exist any the more. So then (going back after this parenthesis) no non-sessile animal has soul without sensation."

I suppose the parenthesis to have been added on revision as an afterthought. In the first draft Aristotle was going on the assumption that sessile animals have no sensation, being as he often says just like plants. On overhauling this chapter at a later date, when perhaps he had changed his views about this, he added this note; either he stuck it violently into the middle of his argument himself or his editor did it for him, finding it in the margin or somewhere.

It is to be observed that there is another great inconsistency connected with this argument. Here Aristotle assumes, as in other places, that "sessile animals" is coextensive with "spontaneously generated." But this is flatly contradicted in many passages, as for instance when he says that some insects are spontaneously generated. Again he knew very well that many testacea move, and yet he does not believe them to have sexes. But these contradictions and inconsistencies are in Aristotle anyhow, and do not affect the question of the meaning here.

De Sensu.

ii. 20, 438^b 25. This section should be stopped as follows: διὸ καὶ τῷ περὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον τόπῳ τὸ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως αἰσθητήριόν ἐστιν ἴδιον· δυνάμει γὰρ θερμῇ ἢ τοῦ ψυχροῦ ὕλη ἐστίν· (καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ γένεσις τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου γὰρ συνέστηκεν·) οὗτος γὰρ ὑγρότατος καὶ ψυχρότατος τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι μορίων ἐστίν. The remark about the eye is parenthetical, having nothing to do with the main argument. We can now see the force of γὰρ in the last sentence. "<I say that the organ of smell is located near the brain, because smell is connected with fire and so its organ should be actually cold, potentially hot; therefore it should be near the brain> for etc."

The next section has never been satisfactorily explained, but it seems to me simple enough, if I do not, like Simmias in *Phaedo*, escape my own notice talking nonsense. τὸ δὲ ἀπτικὸν γῆς, τὸ δὲ γευστικὸν εἶδος τι ἀφῆς ἐστίν. The other two senses, taste and touch (seeing, hearing and smelling being already connected with water, air and fire), have to do with earth. Now the sense-organ of smell, being connected with fire, is actually cold, potentially hot, and therefore near the cold brain. So we should expect the organ of touch and taste, being connected with earth, to be actually hot, potentially cold, and therefore near the hot heart. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ τὸ αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν, just what we expect, and of course πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ can mean nothing whatever except "near the heart."

But the organ of sight refuses to fit in with this way of thinking, for it is watery, and therefore cold, and yet is near the brain. That however is a fault in Aristotle's system which he cannot get over, if indeed he really thought the senses to be connected with the four elements in the way here stated, which is doubtful; see 438^b 16.

v. 30, 445^a 19. διὸ καὶ περιπτώματα γίνεται τῆς τροφῆς, ἢ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ ἔξω, ὡσπερ τοῖς φυτοῖς. The last three words are a stupid interpolation. Aristotle repeatedly asserts that plants have no περιπτώματα. And if they had, what would be the sense of saying, as I gather that he is supposed to say, that animals have περιπτώματα internally, plants externally? The word means "residues," residual matter left over from the nutriment. (Not "waste-products," for a great quantity of them is of the highest importance.) These residues are both internal and external, e.g. milk and excreta; thus both internal and external residues are found in *animals*, and both would be found in plants if plants had any at all.

Zeller (*Phil. Gr.* II. ii. 396, note 4) explains the meaning thus: "als περιπτώματα der Pflanzennahrung scheinen hier die Stoffe betrachtet zu werden, welche die Pflanzen nicht aufsaugen, sondern im Boden zurücklassen." This is very ingenious, and it suits the Aristotelian theory that plants get their nutriment out of ground ready prepared for them. But it seems most improbable for all that; περιπτώματα γίνεται τῆς τροφῆς cannot mean anything except that residues are extracted from the food, whereas on Zeller's view the meaning is that the food, extracted from the earth, leaves non-nutritious stuff behind it.

De Memoria.

i. 16, 450^b 28. If you look at a picture simply as so many lines and colours, you perceive it οἶον νόημά τι ἢ φάντασμα, not as a reminder of something else, ἀν δ' ἦ ἄλλου, "but if you look at it as a copy of something else," ὡσπερ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ὡς εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ, "just as in the picture you look at it as a

representation," καὶ [μὴ] ἑωρακῶς τὸν Κορίσκου, ὡς Κορίσκου, "and if you happen to have seen Coriscus, you look on it as a representation of Coriscus." I bracket μὴ because it upsets both sense and grammar. If you have *not* seen Coriscus, you cannot recognize it as his likeness. And ἑωρακῶς surely cannot mean, as Prof. Beare is driven in his excellent translation to say, "having *at the moment* seen."

Who was this Coriscus whom Aristotle is always talking about? If I may take a leaf from Professor Jackson's book I should say that this passage shews that a picture of him hung in Aristotle's lecture-room.

De Somno.

ii. 16, 456^a 11. τοῖς δ' ἀναίμοις καὶ ἐντόμοις καὶ μὴ δεχομένοις πνεῦμα. So the best MSS.; others have καὶ τοῖς ἐντόμοις. Aristotle does not allow that any animal respire except mammalia, birds, reptiles and amphibia; no ἄναιμα do so. Hence τοῖς ἀναίμοις καὶ μὴ δεχομένοις πνεῦμα is a reasonable enough phrase, meaning "bloodless animals as they do not respire" (though he ignores fish here). But "bloodless animals and insects" is as bad as "mammals and rodents" or "elasmobranchs and sharks."

Hence at first sight it seems that ἐντόμοις is a variant on ἀναίμοις, which has got into the text; compare the variant ἄναιμα for ἔντομα at *de Partibus* 682^a 21. But on the other side it may be argued that the connexion here defends ἐντόμοις. For Aristotle has just spoken of the refrigeration brought about by the lung in most sanguinea, and by the intaking of water in fishes and other aquatic animals; he is going on to treat of insects in what immediately follows. But if so, this again proves τοῖς δ' ἀναίμοις καὶ ἐντόμοις to be wrong. For if he has already been thinking of ἄναιμα in what precedes, he could not go on with τοῖς δ' ἀναίμοις here. Yet we cannot read τοῖς δ' ἐντόμοις καὶ μὴ δεχομένοις πνεῦμα, and to omit these last four words also would be very violent.

Rather I think the connexion in his mind to be this: "In sanguinea, whether air-breathers or fish, the seat of

sensation is the heart, and the refrigeration takes place near this, whether by respiration or by taking in water (455^b 31—456^a 10). In non-sanguinea which do not admit air [or water either, but it was not necessary to add this], the cooling is caused by the innate spiritus. This you may see for yourself in the case of insects.”

Upon the whole then I return to the first impression that the words *καὶ ἐντόμοις* should be omitted, whether they came in as a variant reading or were a gloss anticipating what follows. The reason why Aristotle specially mentions insects is because they are the only animals in which he could discern the movement of the innate spiritus, as he thought, though he must have supposed it to exist in other *ἄναιμα* also, such as terrestrial mollusca. But this passage is closely connected with the obscure words which follow, *δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν ὀλοπτέρων, οἷον σφηκῶν καὶ μελισσῶν, καὶ ἐν ταῖς μυῖαις καὶ ὄσα τοιαῦτα*. The buzzing and humming of certain insects shews the presence of this alleged spiritus according to him, and he seems at first sight to divide insects into two classes, diptera (*μυῖαι καὶ ὄσα τοιαῦτα*) and tetraptera (e.g. bees and wasps). But how in the world can *ὀλοπτέρων* mean “tetrapterous”? Even an Aristotelian may be expected to know that bees and wasps have four wings, and it is plain that if *ὀλοπτέρων* really meant “with undivided wings,” as Liddell and Scott assert, this epithet would be applied to diptera if to any insects, not to those in which the wings are doubled.

The puzzle was solved years ago by Dr Ogle, who pointed out that *πετερόν* in Aristotle does not mean *wing* at all, but *feather*. Thus *all* flying insects are *ὀλόπτερα* as contrasted with birds, which are *σχιζόπτερα*, because in insects the “feather” is “without barbs or shaft” (Ogle on *de Partibus* 682^b 18). I see no way of escaping from his argument. And in this passage the words I have quoted mean: “this is plain in the case of *insects*, as bees and wasps and flies, etc.” *ὀλόπτερα* are not distinguished from *μυῖαι*, but *μυῖαι* are one of the examples of *ὀλόπτερα*.

But, it may be said, if so, why *ἐν ταῖς μυῖαις*, why not *μυιῶν*? Well, Aristotle is often very clumsy as a writer, and

here he may have tacked on *καὶ ἐν ταῖς μυΐαις* as an afterthought without considering the mode of expression. The diptera are very different, and make a very different noise, from the bees and wasps. But both are *όλόπτερα*; if any further proof be needed, read the *De Incessu*.

At the end of 17 (456^a 19, 20) *τῶν όλοπτέρων* is an intolerable interpolation. It cannot be taken with *τὰ πτερωτά*, because it is clear that *τὰ πτερωτά τῶν όλοπτέρων* is as great nonsense as *τὰ πορευτικά τῶν τετραπόδων* would be, to say nothing of the order of words. And to take it with *τὸ ὑπόζωμα* is even worse, if possible. It may as well be added that *ὑπόζωμα* does not mean "diaphragm" here, because no insect has anything of the kind; it means "waist," and is correctly explained by Liddell and Scott for a wonder.

De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae.

iii. 4, 465^b 16. *ἔτι καὶ εἰ ἀνάγκη περίττωμα ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ περίττωμα ἐναντίον· ἐξ ἐναντίου γὰρ ἀεὶ ἢ μεταβολή, τὸ δὲ περίττωμα ὑπόλειμμα τοῦ προτέρου.*

Aristotle is arguing that no animal can be imperishable. Things are destroyed by their opposites. Now change implies an opposite, and a *περίττωμα* is a residue of what was opposite. E.g. grass, *τὸ τρέφον*, is the opposite of a sheep, *τὸ τρεφόμενον*. But the blood of the sheep is a *περίττωμα* of *τὸ τρέφον*. If then it is necessary for the sheep to make the *περίττωμα*, as it is, it must make it out of what was opposite to it. Consequently the sheep must eternally be coming into contact with its opposite, and must end by perishing.

εἰ δὲ πᾶν ἐξελαύνει (ἐξελαύνοι?) τὸ ἐνεργεία ἐναντίον, κᾶν ἐνταῦθ' ἄφθαρτον ἂν εἶη; ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος φθείρεται.

But if the sheep could get rid of everything actually opposite to it, it still would not be imperishable, for it will be destroyed in the long run by its environment. It is only by getting the residual matter out of its food that it is able to keep up the conflict with the environment at all; if it get

rid of the necessity of getting περιπτώματα out of its opposite, it would collapse all the sooner.

εἰ μὲν οὖν, ἰκανὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· εἰ δὲ μή, ὑποθέσθαι δεῖ ὅτι ἔνεστι τι ἐνεργείᾳ ἐναντίον καὶ περίπτωμα γίνεται. If the first words of this mean anything (which I doubt if they really can) it must be: "if then this is possible must be judged from what has been said." Then he continues: "but if not (which of course it isn't), we must assume that there must be something actually opposite in the animal (because it must go on taking food, which is actually opposite though potentially not so) and residual substances are formed from it."

A mark of interrogation is necessary after ἄφθαρτον ἂν εἴη, because without it καὶ ἐνταῦθα is meaningless.

iii. 8, 456^b 24. διὸ μάλιστα γίνονται ὕπνοι ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς· ἀθρόον γὰρ πολὺ τότε ὑγρὸν καὶ [τὸ] σωματώδες ἀναφέρεται.

Omit τὸ (Y), for if the meaning were "the liquid and the solid," the word would not be σωματώδες at all but ξηρόν, nor is it true that the solid is carried upward in digestion according to Aristotle. And σωματώδες is regularly used by him as an epithet of liquids. So the meaning here is "for then ascends liquid in great quantities and containing much solid matter in solution." Compare 457^b 20, γίνεται ὁ ὕπνος τοῦ σωματώδους ἀναφερομένου ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ διὰ τῶν φλεβῶν πρὸς τὴν κεφαλὴν.

Ancient authority is divided between τότε ὑγρὸν and τό τε ὑγρὸν; this indicates that some of the ancients at any rate read τὸ σωματώδες. Even if they all did so, and if therefore the reading of Y is due to accident, it still seems to be right. But the variant may quite well be as ancient as the old commentators.

iii. 30, 458^a 26. Omit ὑπὸ before τοῦ σωματώδους.

ibid. 458^a 30. ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν γεγόμενος... ἔνεκα δὲ σωτηρίας. "Coming about by necessity indeed, but still also for a final cause." Compare *de Gen. An.* 778^a 30—778^b 19, and other passages.

De Somniis.

iii. 11, 461^b 18. καὶ λυόμεναι ἐν ὀλίγῳ τῷ λοιπῷ αἵματι τῷ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις κινοῦνται, ἔχουσα ὁμοιότητα ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τοῖς νέφεσιν, ἃ παρεικάζουσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ κενταύροις ταχέως μεταβάλλοντα. The key to understanding this passage is in λυόμεναι, for which see *de Gen. An.* 768^a 31—768^b 16. There resemblances to ancestors are accounted for by the “resolution” of the movements in the σπέρμα; here the shifting shapes of dreams are accounted for by the “resolution” of the movements in the blood. Compare too 461^a 8—10.

De Divinatione per Somnum.

ii. 11, 464^b 2. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ Φιλαϊγίδου ποιήματα καὶ οἱ ἐμμανεῖς ἐχόμενα (read ἐχόμενοι) τοῦ ὁμοίου λέγουσι καὶ διανοοῦνται, οἶον Ἀφροδίτην, καὶ οὕτω συνείρουσι εἰς τὸ πρόσω.

About Philaegides, or as other MSS. have it Philippides, nothing whatever is known, and the ancient commentators do not succeed in concealing their total ignorance of any meaning in this passage. But what sort of verses would οἱ ἐμμανεῖς gabble? Nonsense-verses probably, in which some jingle catches their ear, stuff which hangs together of itself, like “hickory, dickory, dock.”

Well, EMU here read Ἀφροδίτην φροδίτην. Does not that shew the sort of thing Aristotle is thinking of? One must not expect sense in such jeux d'esprit; I remember an interpretation of the name Napoleon which ran thus: Ναπολέων ἀπολέων (!) πόλεων ὀλέων λέων ἐών. So here Ἀφροδίτην φροδίτην ῥοδίτην ὀδίτην. This gives a similar jingle of words which mean nothing but still are words. φροδίτην=προοδίτην like φροίμιον=προοίμιον. I do not mean that Aristotle need have added the last two words.

Such a jingle might do well enough for a lunatic, and such stuff is created by vacant minds; it is a poetic figure run to seed; echolalia.

But one need not accuse Philaegides of drivelling like this. His ποιήματα must have been more serious, but still something

similar. They probably bore the same relation to such nonsense as Heine's "alleine die Kleine, die Feine, die Reine, die Eine" bears to the "eena, deena, dina, do" of the nursery.

It seems to me necessary to read ἐχόμενοι both for other reasons and because it obviates the difficulty raised by Susemihl in *Philologus*, vol. 44, p. 582.

De Juventute.

i. 7, 468^a 9. ἀνάλογον γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ῥίζαι τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ τὸ καλούμενον στόμα τοῖς ζώοις, δι' οὗ τὴν τροφήν τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῆς γῆς λαμβάνει τὰ δὲ δι' αὐτῶν.

Root of plant, mouth of animal are analogous, because by the root the plant gets nourishment out of earth, by the mouth the animal gets it δι' αὐτῶν. It seems to me clear that τὰ μὲν means plants; observe ἐκ τῆς γῆς, out of the earth; this could hardly be said of animals, but Aristotle does use the phrase of plants.

And τὰ δὲ must mean animals, as opposed to plants. Compare *de Incessu* iv. 3, 705^b 6, αἱ γὰρ ῥίζαι εἰσὶ τὸ ἄνω τοῖς φυτοῖς· ἐκείθεν γὰρ ἡ τροφή διαδίδεται τοῖς φυομένοις καὶ λαμβάνει ταύταις αὐτήν, καθάπερ τὰ ζῶα τοῖς στόμασιν. What then is δι' αὐτῶν? "The text is undoubtedly corrupt," said Dr Ogle, but it is perhaps possible to take the words to mean "and animals by means of them, i.e. plants." For in the long run animal life does depend upon plants. But if this is not possible, help may be got from the variant in MZ, διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν, which may easily be a corruption of διὰ τῶν φυτῶν.

As for δι' αὐτῶν, that anyhow is meaningless.

ii. 5, 468^b 1. ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔχει κατὰ γε τοῦτο τὰ τε φυτὰ καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐντόμων γένος. ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ τὴν θρεπτικὴν ψυχὴν ἐνεργεῖα μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσιν εἶναι μίαν, δυνάμει δὲ πλείους.

Insects and plants are alike in that they, or parts of them, can go on living after division. "And it is necessary therefore that the nutritive soul also (as well as the bodily part) should be (like that part) one actually but plural potentially." A little ordinary attention will enable us to get that much of the

translation correct. But we come now to a serious difficulty; what is the meaning of ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσιν? Dr Ogle, who had a most extraordinary objection to making Aristotle talk undiluted nonsense, saw that ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσιν must be wrong. For perhaps someone will tell us what plant or animal does *not* possess a nutritive soul; moreover the whole of this discussion is about a very limited class of animals. He therefore boldly substituted ἐντόμοις for ἔχουσιν. But this is not only an unlikely conjecture; it is not quite satisfactory in itself, because the limited class of animals in question is wider than insects. A better correction on both grounds would be ἐν τοῖς <οὕτως> ἔχουσιν.

ii. 7, 468^b 12. διὸ καὶ μικρὰν αἴσθησιν ἔνια ποιεῖ διαιρούμενα τῶν μορίων ὅτι ἔχει τι ψυχικὸν πάθος. I think that αἴσθησιν ποιεῖ means "give indications"; compare the passages referred to in the lexicon. οἶον καὶ αἱ χελῶναι τῆς καρδίας ἀφηρημένης. Here καὶ goes with αἱ χελῶναι; what else can it go with? Aristotle emphasizes the animal because he is astonished that one so high in the scale, not a mere insect but a reptile, should behave in such a way.

vi. 1, 470^a 19. ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν ζῶον ἔχει ψυχὴν.... The various suggestions to emend ζῶον are I think mistaken. The connexion is this: ἐπεὶ πᾶν ζῶον ἔχει ψυχὴν...τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς...τῶν δὲ ζῴων (470^b 1)... The trouble arises from not appreciating the force of μὲν and δέ, that fruitful source of error. Aristotle begins "since every animal has soul" intending to go on with "they all must cool their natural heat somehow." Then he interpolates the μὲν clause about plants, which runs to great length, and gets back to his original start again at 470^b 1. Such a sentence as ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄνθρωπος σοφός ἐστι, πίθηκος μὲν τῇ χειρὶ οὐ χρῆται ἄνθρωπος δὲ χρῆται, would be strictly parallel and quite correct Greek—though it may not be true.

De Respiratione.

i. 3, 470^b 20. ἐμφυσώμενος οὖν αὐτὸς τῇ κινήσει καταψύχει. The question is why tortoises can live so long under water.

Aristotle answers that their lung has little blood in it and therefore little heat, and so by itself (*αὐτὸς*) cools the heat of the tortoise's heart by its motion. For the business of the lung is to refrigerate and keep in order the fire of the heart; it does this by means of air as a rule; when the tortoise is under water it can get no more air, but the motion of the lung refrigerates just because it is a motion (see Dr Ogle's note *ad loc.* on this amazing theory). Everything so far is plain, but remains *ἐμφυσώμενος*. How can this present participle mean, as Ogle translates, "when once it has been inflated"? It does not; it means "by swelling (and contracting alternately)." That is what the motion is. Aristotle supposes the lung to go on expanding and contracting, precisely as the air-bladder of a fish can do, without taking in any fresh air. But if it remained at rest, *ἐμπεφυσημένος*, it would not cool the animal at all, and so the perfect participle would spoil the sense.

iv. 2, 472^a 3. λέγει δ' ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ θερμὸν ταῦτὸν τὰ πρῶτα σχήματα τῶν σφαιροειδῶν. Read ταῦτὸν ὄντα πρῶτα, "are the same thing, being the first figures." For *συγκρινομένων* directly after this *ἐκκρινομένων* must be right (L and some ancient authorities).

iv. 9, 472^b 4. ἀλεύζοντες δὲ πολλάκις ἀναπνεύουσιν, ὡς ἀναψύξεως χάριν ἀναπνεύοντες, ὅτε τὸ λεγόμενον ποιεῖ πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ. Read ὁ δέ, τὸ λεγόμενον, ποιεῖ πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ, "Democritus, as the proverb says, adds fire to fire." Cf. *Probl.* i. 17, xxii. 12.

vii. 4, 473^b 3. ἔχουσι δὲ πόρους εἰς τὸν ἔξω ἀέρα, τῶν μὲν τοῦ σώματος μορίων ἐλάττους τῶν δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος μείζους. Aristotle describes the vessels in the account of respiration given by Empedocles. "Too small to give passage to the particles of blood," translates Ogle, who therefore read *αἵματος* for *σώματος*, and thereby gets sense; then too the actual words of Empedocles are ὥστε φόνον μὲν κεύθειν. But *μορίων* can hardly be right for the particles of blood; I should expect *ὄγκων*, as at *Meteor.* iv. ix. 3, 385^b 19, ἔχει τοὺς πόρους μείζους τῶν τοῦ ὕδατος ὄγκων. After *αἵματος* had been corrupted to *σώματος*, *σώματος ὄγκων* was then more or less deliberately

changed to *σώματος μορίων* because the two words so often go together.

viii. 5, 474^b 16. Read *ἔτι* for *ὅτι*.

ix. 1, 474^b 26. *τοῖς μὲν μικροῖς πάμπαν καὶ τοῖς ἀναίμοις*. Surely this cannot mean "small and bloodless animals," but two distinct groups, the very small (whether bloodless or not) and the bloodless (whether small or not). Else why the article before *ἀναίμοις*? Besides, the correct translation makes better sense. The circumambient air or water is a sufficient refrigerator for a bloodless animal, however large; Aristotle particularly states this of the cephalopoda and crustacea at 476^b 32, and these would include the largest bloodless animals.

But then *μικροῖς πάμπαν* is incorrectly expressed (as happens often enough in Aristotle, Heaven knows), for there are no sanguinea which are so cooled according to him; all sanguinea have either lungs or gills. What he had in his mind, which caused this, was the fact that smaller animals are generally shorter-lived than longer, and he is going on to speak of the short life of bloodless animals.

If indeed the correct reading at 474^b 31 were *μικρὰ ὄντα μικρᾶς τυγχάνει ῥοπῆς*, that would be a fatal argument against me. But that is an impossible reading, for it could only mean "being small, they *get* a small push," whereas the sense required is manifestly "they only *need* a small push." If we compare *Problems* I. 17, 861^a 31, we see that Aristotle probably wrote *μικρᾶς δέομενα τυγχάνει ῥοπῆς*. (Bekker with the best MSS. writes *μικρᾶς τυγχάνει ῥοπῆς*, omitting *μικρὰ ὄντα*, but that also can hardly be tortured into sense.)

If however we desire the meaning to be "small and bloodless," we must read *τοῖς μὲν μικροῖς πάμπαν καὶ ἀναίμοις*; that too is not a correct expression for it omits the cephalopoda and other invertebrates. But it is not easy to decide in any way.

ix. 2, 475^a 5. *καὶ τᾶλλα δὲ ὅσα βομβεῖ, οἷον σφήκες καὶ μηλολόνηθαι [καὶ τέττιγες]*. I bracket the last words for two reasons. Nobody would use the verb *βομβεῖν* of a cicada. And the cicada is added in 475^a 18 in a manner which shews that it has not been mentioned before.

Theocritus (v. 29) speaks of σφάξ βομβέων τέττιγος ἐναντίον as an instance of contrast in sound; σφήξ βομβεῖ, τέττιξ αἰδεῖ; the former sound is ugly, the latter beautiful.

ix. 8, 475^a 29. ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἀναπνεῖ τὰ ἔντομα τῶν ζῳῶν εἶρηται μὲν καὶ πρότερον φανερόν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μικρῶν ἐστὶ [ζῳῶν] οἷον μυιῶν καὶ μελιττῶν. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὑγροῖς πολλὸν χρόνον ἀνανήχεται, ἂν μὴ λίαν ἢ θερμόν ἢ ψυχρόν, καίτοι τὰ μικρὰν ἔχοντα δύναμιν πυκνότερον ζητεῖ ἀναπνεῖν. ἀλλὰ φθείρεται ταῦτα καὶ λέγεται ἀποπνίγεσθαι πληρουμένης τῆς κοιλίας καὶ φθειρομένου τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὑποζώματι ἕμενος (so Ogle, ὑγροῦ or θερμοῦ MSS.). I bracket ζῳῶν as a manifest interpolation. The argument is this: Another proof that insects do not breathe is that even small insects swim about *under* water for a long time. If they did breathe they could not do this. A *large* animal which breathes and which has not much natural heat, such as a tortoise, may live a long time under water, but a *small* one cannot, because a small animal has little strength and consequently, if it does breathe, must breathe frequently. (One of Aristotle's strange notions is that holding the breath produces strength; apparently he here inverts the proposition.) If then a small insect lives long under water, this proves that it does not breathe. The heat within it is sufficiently counteracted by the innate spiritus which causes a friction and movement of the membrane at the hypozoma, as stated earlier in this chapter. But though this keeps it alive a good time, yet in the end it dies of what is called suffocation (which has just been defined as "exhaustion by lack of refrigeration"), because the abdomen is drenched and in consequence the membrane at the hypozoma is rendered inefficient and can no longer keep up its motion. (For the mere motion of lung in sanguinea or hypozoma in insects refrigerates apart from introduction of air; see Ogle, note 41.)

Thanks to Dr Ogle's beautiful emendation ἕμενος this is now all clear. The vulgate ὑγροῦ is obvious nonsense, for there is no liquid in the hypozoma; θερμοῦ in MZ seems to be a conjecture to get rid of this absurdity, but it only blunders out of one error into another. Nobody who has given himself the trouble to think for ten minutes on Aristotle's theory of

respiration could suppose that an insect under water is killed because the heat in the hypozoma is destroyed. The business of the lung in air-breathers is to *cool* the heat by taking in air; a fish cools it by the water; a fly or bee cools it in the air by the motion of the membrane at the hypozoma. A fly under water is in a cool environment just as it is in the air, but this is not enough by itself, the membrane must still move; and it is "drowned" because the membrane is spoilt. So far from destroying the internal heat, this causes the heat to become excessive and the fly dies in consequence "by lack of refrigeration."

ix. 11, 475^b 10. οὐ μὴν εἰς τέλος γε διαρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, διὰ τὸ ὀλιγόθερμα εἶναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ἰχθύων [οἱ] πολλοὶ ζῶσιν ἐν τῇ γῆ, ἀκινήτιζοντες μέντοι, καὶ εὐρίσκονται ὀρυγτόμενοι.

Crustacea and octopuses (which here evidently stand for *all* the cephalopoda) can live a long time in the air *because they have little heat* and the air suffices to refrigerate them. "Yet the air in the long run is not enough to keep them alive" διὰ τὸ ὀλιγόθερμα εἶναι—what does this mean? It is exactly *because* they are ὀλιγόθερμα that it keeps them alive at all. Dr Ogle, with his healthy dislike of nonsense, and paraphrasing freely, has contrived to keep the words in a way by transposing them to another place at the end of the last sentence. But this is unsatisfactory, for we then have both διὰ τὸ ὀλίγον ἔχειν τὸ θερμὸν and διὰ τὸ ὀλιγόθερμα εἶναι in the same sentence. I think they should be omitted altogether, as a duplicate reading which has got into the wrong place, or else a stupid attempt at explanation.

Of course it is possible to retain them, translating: "Yet in the long run it cannot {keep them alive because of their little heat}." But this practically amounts to making διὰ mean "in spite of," and anyhow is intolerable.

Then ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ἰχθύων means, as Ogle says, "nor need we be surprised at this for, etc." He brackets οἱ since it is obviously too ludicrous to say that "*most* fish live in the mud." This passage is quoted by Sir J. Emerson Tennent in that fascinating work, the *Natural History of Ceylon*, p. 345, where

a great quantity of information is given on the subject. See also *Nature*, vol. 88, pp. 107—110.

xii. 6, 477^a 4. σηπίαι δὲ καὶ πολύποδες διὰ τοῦ κοίλου <αὔλου> τοῦ ὑπὲρ (read ὑπὸ) τῆς καλουμένης κεφαλῆς. Dr Ogle practically reads αὔλου for κοίλου, but it is better to insert it as I have done; cf. *Hist. An.* 524^a 10, πρὸ τοῦ κύτους δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν πλεκτανῶν ἔχουσι κοίλον αὔλον. "Both the decapodous and octapodous cephalopoda (for such is the meaning of σηπίαι καὶ πολύποδες when used generically, just as καρκίνοι καὶ κάραβοι a few lines back means crabs and lobsters in general) discharge the water through τοῦ αὔλου, the funnel (look at any drawing of a cephalopod) which is above the head." But it is *not* above the head, it is below it, and we must read ὑπό. Aristotle's knowledge of these animals excited the admiration of Cuvier and Owen; it is not likely that he made a blunder of this kind, which would be like saying that an elephant's tusks are below his mouth. Besides he says distinctly elsewhere that it is below the head; *de Partibus* 679^a 4, οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ὑπτίοις, 685^a 9, *Gen. An.* 720^b 27. The only difficulty is that in *Hist. An.* as quoted above he says ὑπὲρ τῶν πλεκτανῶν, but that is easily solved. He there is not speaking of all cephalopoda but only of the poulps or octopods, and when one of them sits on the sea-bottom his αὔλος really does stick out above the tentacles, though it still could not be described as above the head. See e.g. *Royal Natural History*, vol. VI., p. 329.

xiv. 6, 477^b 25. Ogle is plainly right in omitting καὶ ψυχροῦ.

Historia Animalium.

IV. i. 26, 525^a 13. ἔστι δὲ γένη πλείω πολυπόδων, ἐν μὲν τὸ μάλιστ' ἐπιπολάζον. This must mean simply "one the common form," for no octopus frequents the surface of the sea. The same word ἐπιπολάζον is used in the same sense of echini at *de Partibus* 680^b 19.

IV. ii. 9, 525^b 34. διαφέρει δ' ὁ κάραβος ὁ ἄρρην τῆς θηλείας· τῆς μὲν γὰρ θηλείας ὁ πρῶτος ποῦς δίκρους ἐστί. See Thompson's most interesting note, from which it appears

that the first foot must be taken to mean "first reckoning from behind." I cannot think that this way of reckoning is at all likely; is it not more probable that *πρώτος* is an instance of the common corruption of *τέταρτος*? For the foot in question is the fourth, if the big claws are not included, and though Aristotle has previously observed that the number is five including the claws he was not bound to include them always.

IV. ii. 24, 527^a 8. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πάντα ἔχουσι καὶ οἱ κάραβοι καὶ αἱ καρίδες καὶ οἱ καρκίνοι· καὶ γὰρ ὀδόντας δύο ἔχουσιν οἱ καρκίνοι. Dittmeyer brackets this sentence; it should rather be transposed to follow πάντ' ἔχει ταῦτα in 526^b 33. For in a general sense *κάραβοι*, *καρίδες*, *καρκίνοι* covers the whole of Aristotle's malacostraca, and (after they have been thus transposed) he goes on to τὰς ἰδίας διαφοράς.

IV. ii. 28, 527^a 26. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ σάρκα ἐρυθράν. There is nothing for ἐν τούτῳ to refer to; read ἐνταῦθα. "Hereabouts" Thompson. "τούτοις legit aut finxit Gaza, pronomem ad pedes referens; τούτῳ...explicari non potest" Dittmeyer. But Gaza's reading does not give the right sense.

IV. vii. 6, 532^a 9. καὶ οἱ μύωπες δὲ καὶ οἱ οἰστροὶ ἰσχυρὸν τοῦτ' ἔχουσι, καὶ τάλλα σχεδὸν τὰ πλείστα. As Aubert and Wimmer say, this must be corrupt. Aristotle speaks of the tongue of stinging insects; for πλείστα read πλείστα τῶν διπτέρων. Cf. *de Partibus* 683^a 14—20.

IV. ix. 4, 535^b 11. ὁ γὰρ ψόφος τρίψις ἐστὶ τοῦ ἔσω πνεύματος. These words are an unintelligent interpolation by someone who remembered that *other* insects, but not those here mentioned, make a noise in the way here described.

VI. ii. 6, 559^b 7. ὅταν δ' ὀχευθῆ, ἄνω πρὸς τὸ ὑπόζωμα λαμβάνει ἢ θήλεια. Read πρὸς τῷ ὑποζώματι, for the meaning can be nothing but "conceives near the hypozoma," as is further shewn by the next sentence. So too Gaza translates it.

VI. iii. 8, 561^b 6. τὸ δ' ὠχρὸν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ὑγρὸν ἐστὶν ἤδη καὶ πλείον ἢ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν. This means that the yolk is by this time liquid and larger than at first (larger because it absorbs the white); cf. *Gen. An.* 753^b 25. But what does τὸ κατὰ φύσιν mean? Aristotle states that the yolk is *regularly* larger at this time; therefore it is κατὰ φύσιν that

it should be so. "Als im Anfange" translate Aubert and Wimmer, and that is the meaning we want. It really looks as if we ought to read *κατ' ἀρχήν*, and this is not more outrageous than many of the corruptions in Aristotle's scientific works. Indeed a much more extraordinary confusion occurs with this same word at *de Partibus* 678^a 26, *θεωρία* PY, *ἀρχή* SU, *ἀρχήν* E.

De Partibus Animalium.

I. iv. 7, 644^b 9. οἷον τὸ τῶν ὀρνίθων γένος πρὸς αὐτὰ πέπουθεν. αὐτὰ yields no meaning, Y has αὐτό, read αὐτό. "Such a resemblance as we find in the class of birds compared with itself," i.e. when we compare the members of the class with one another.

I. v. 12, 645^b 16. τὸ σύνολον σῶμα συνέστηκε πρᾶξεώς τινος ἕνεκα πλήρους. As the parts of an animal exist each for its own activity, so the whole body must exist for a complicated set of activities. *πλήρους* is a strange word for this, and P has preserved the real word, *πολυμερούς*. This was corrupted to *πολυρους* in E and *πλήρους* in SUY.

II. x. 1, 655^b 29. πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ τελείοις δύο τὰ ἀναγκαϊότατα μῦρία ἔστιν, ἧ τε δέχονται τὴν τροφήν καὶ ἧ τὸ περίττωμα ἀφίᾳσιν.

This statement is not true, and Aristotle himself makes an exception to it in *Hist. An.* iv. vi. 531^b 9, speaking of sea-anemones; on the other hand he contradicts himself about the sea-anemone at *Hist. An.* VIII. ii. 590^a 30; such contradictions are not very uncommon in him. Anyhow here he certainly states that *all* animals have both parts. But what is *καὶ τελείοις*? Read <*καὶ τελειουμένοις*> *καὶ τελείοις*. It is while the animal is growing and when it is full grown alike that *τροφή* is necessary, and in both cases this involves also a mechanism for getting rid of the *περίττωμα*.

I do not mean to say that Aristotle includes the embryo in *τελειουμένοις*; he would only mean to refer to the period of growth after the young has been liberated from the mother or the egg. In this connexion an interesting question may be

raised. How did Aristotle suppose that the embryo discharged its external *περίττωμα*? This question is never raised by him himself, I believe; his answer however would certainly have been this. The embryo "lives the life of a plant" (*Gen. An.* 736^b 13, 779^a 1). And plants have no *περίττωμα* whatever (*De Partibus* 650^a 22, 655^b 32, *Hist. An.* 531^b 8). Therefore the embryo also in early stages has no external *περίττωμα*, but uses up the whole of the *τροφή* for its own growth. But he notes carefully that at the end of embryonic development *περιπτώματα* have begun to exist in the intestinal canal, *Hist. An.* 562^a 10.

The last word of our present passage clearly should be *ἀφιάσιν* (SUY), not *ἀφήσουσιν* (EPZ Bekker).

II. xiv. 4, 658^a 29. Omit *πρανές*, which has got in as a note in consequence of section 3.

III. i. 16, 662^b 10. *ὄσα δὲ ποηφάγα καὶ ὄσα παρ' ἔλη ζῆ, καθάπερ τὰ πλωτὰ καὶ στεγανόποδα, τὰ μὲν ἄλλον (ἄλλα ὄν Z) τρόπον χρήσιμον ἔχει τὸ ῥύγχος, τὰ δὲ πλατύρυγχα αὐτῶν ἐστίν.* Aristotle here describes the beaks of two classes of birds, as shewn by the double *ὄσα*. They are put together because the *ποηφάγα* do live *παρ' ἔλη*; cf. 693^a 15; in fact he would have expressed his meaning more correctly if he had said *καὶ ὄσα ἄλλα παρ' ἔλη ζῆ*. Of these two classes one has a broad bill to dig up herbage, i.e. the former of the two, but the arrangement is chiasitic. What then about the other class? How feeble to say merely *ἄλλον τρόπον χρήσιμον!* And why should Z give so strange a variant as *ἄλλα ὄν*?

These other marsh birds are described more fully at 693^a 17, *γίνεται τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ὁ μὲν αὐχὴν καθάπερ ἀλιευτικὸς κάλαμος τὸ δὲ ῥύγχος οἷον ὄρμια καὶ τὸ ἀγκιστρον.* Is not *ἄλλα ὄν* then the remnant of *ἀλιευτικόν*? *ἀλίεων* would be much nearer but I doubt its possibility. (*καλάμου* will not do.)

III. ii. 3, 662^b 35. *τῶν δὲ διχαλῶν τὰ μὲν πολλὰ κέρατα ἔχει πρὸς ἀλκὴν, καὶ τῶν μωνύχων ἔνια, τὰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς βοήθειαν.* "Ὅσοις δὲ μὴ δέδωκεν ἡ φύσις ἄλλην ἀλκὴν πρὸς σωτηρίαν..."

This *ὄσοις* has no apodosis. Consideration of the whole context suggests that we should read *πρὸς βοήθειαν ὄσοις*

μη δέδωκεν. "Most cloven-hoofed animals have horns for offensive purposes (as also the rhinoceros); some only for defence, namely those which have no other means of securing their safety."

III. iv. 28, 667^a 20. μεγάλας δὲ τὰς καρδίας ἔχουσι λαγῶς, ἔλαφος, μῦς, ὕαινα, ὄνος, πάρδαλις, γαλή, καὶ τὰλλα σχεδὸν πάνθ' ὅσα φανερώς δειλὰ ἢ διὰ φόβον κακοῦργα.

It is not credible that the leopard should be included among these animals; its ferocity would be familiar to every reader of Homer, even supposing Aristotle had not much first-hand information about it, and he says of it himself that it is "always savage," *Hist. An.* 488^a 28. There is some sad nonsense about it in the *Physiognomonica*, cap. v., but there too it is one τῶν ἀνδρείων ζῴων. δορκαλις might easily be corrupted to πάρδαλις; this form is only extant in poets, but δορκὰς is evidently unlikely to have been the original. Cf. Herodian *Hist.* I. xv. 3 where ἐλάφους καὶ δορκάδας are contrasted with λέοντας καὶ παρδάλεις ὅσα τε ζῶα γενναῖα. And Nonnus *Dion.* xv 183, 188.

III. xiv. 26, 676^a 4. τοῖς μὲν οὖν θήλεσι γίνεται ὅπου ἂν τύχη τοῦ ἄνω ἐντέρου ἢ νήστις· οἱ δ' ἄρρηνες ἔχουσι πρὸ τοῦ τυφλοῦ καὶ τῆς κάτω κοιλίας.

This ludicrous nonsense was never written by Aristotle, who has just described the intestine with what I am told is great accuracy. Luckily the MSS. variations shew pretty well what has happened. For θήλεσι Z has τελείσις, and the half-way house to θήλεσι is in SU which have θηλείσις. Of what then is τελείσις itself a corruption? The answer is in 675^a 35, διόπερ αἱ κύνες...τοῖς δὲ πλείοσιν. For θήλεσι therefore read πλείοσι and for οἱ δ' ἄρρηνες read αἱ δὲ κύνες. A comparison of the two passages makes this correction inevitable.

Much the same has happened at *Hist. An.* 606^a 18, where the MSS. all have ἄρρηνες and those of Gaza and Albertus apparently had θήλεα, but the right readings are ἄρνες and τὰλλα; see Thompson's note. And at 572^b 20 Aubert and Wimmer rightly restore ἄρρηνια for ἄγρια or ἀγριώτερα.

One would like to suppose that πλείοσι was first corrupted and that ἄρρηνες was a deliberate change to correspond. But

as SUZ all have ἄρρενες it seems that the corruption began with αἰ δὲ κύνες.

IV. x. 16, 686^b 26. αἴτιον δ', ὡςπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχὴ πολλῶ δὴ δυσκίνητός ἐστι καὶ σωματώδης. After πολλῶ δὴ Y inserts καί. The reason previously given is τὸ γὰρ βάρος δυσκίνητον ποιεῖ (686^a 31). Here then we should read πολλῶ δὴ καὶ <βαρεῖ σώματι καταφερομένη> or the like.

IV. xiii. 2, 695^b 5. ταύτην δ' οὐχ ὁμοίαν ἔχουσι πάντες, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν παραπλησίαν, τῶν δὲ πλατέων ἕνια ἀκανθώδη καὶ μακράν.

"The tail is not alike in all fish, but in some it is like—" like what? Read by all means Housman's note on Manilius I. 317. Ogle adds τοῖς πτερυγίοις which gives sense and may be right. But P reads τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παραπλησίαν; this ἄλλα may indeed mean "other fishes" as contrasted with πλατέων ἕνια, or it may be an accidental repetition of ἀλλά, but it is possible too that it is a corruption of ἄμη. "Spade-like" would not be a bad description of the tail of homocercal fishes such as tench or carp.

De Motu Animalium.

ii. 2, 698^b 15. εἰ γὰρ ὑποδώσει ἀεὶ, οἶον τοῖς μυσὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ γῆ ἢ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἄμμῳ πορευομένοις, οὐ πρόεισιν. If the ground is to keep on giving way beneath you, you can't get on. For μυσὶ read ποσὶ with E and omit τοῖς ἐν τῇ γῆ ἢ altogether. SY already omit τοῖς, and I take it that ἐν τῇ γῆ was a variant on ἐν τῇ ἄμμῳ.

iii. 3, 699^a 25. τὰ ζῶα καὶ τὰ κινούμενα δι' αὐτῶν. Omit καὶ with PS, and read αὐτῶν.

iv. 8, 700^a 8. Read αὐτοῖς with P. "In the case of those animals which move themselves."

v. 1, 700^a 26. πότερον δ' ἐν τῷ αὐτὸ κινοῦντι κατὰ τόπον μόνῳ δεῖ τι μένειν, ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλλοιουμένῳ αὐτῷ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐξανομένου; Then the next sentence should be put in a parenthesis, and we go on ὡςπερ δ' ἐν τῷ ὄλω, καὶ ἐν τῷ ζῶῳ κινήσεις πρώτη αὕτη, ὅταν τελεωθῆ, ὥστε καὶ αὐξήσεως, εἴ ποτε

γίνεται, αὐτὸ αὐτῷ αἴτιον καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως; (I add the mark of interrogation, for there is no sense in all this without it.) "As in the universe there is a *πρῶτον κινουῦν* which is itself at rest, is there a similar first movement also in an animal when full-grown? If there is, then the animal itself (as possessing this first principle of movement) must also be the cause of its own growth and change." εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἀνάγκη, (*virgulam pro periodo scripsi*) αἰ δὲ πρῶται αὐξήσεις καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ὑπ' ἄλλου γίνονται καὶ δι' ἑτέρων. (Here we want a full stop, the next clause going on to another matter.) "But if there is no such *πρῶτον κινουῦν* in the animal, it need not make itself grow, but the origin of growth and change is started by something else."

vii. 12, 701^b 28. Bekker's text and punctuation are a nightmare. Stop and read thus: ἔτι δὲ κατὰ θερμότητα ἢ ψύξιν ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον πάθος ὅταν γένηται ἀλλοίωσις περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, καὶ ἐκ ταύτης (ἐν ταύτῃ MSS.) κατὰ μέγεθος ἐν αἰσθητικῷ (ἀναισθήτῳ E, ἐν ἀναισθήτῳ cett.) μορίῳ, πολλὴν ποιεῖ τοῦ σώματος διαφορὰν. "When any change in respect of heat etc. takes place in the region of the heart, and when a corresponding change starting from this (the heart) results in proportion (*κατὰ μέγεθος*, the corresponding change being much greater than the first impulse) in a sensitive part, it makes a great change in the body."

ix. 2, 702^b 17. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει πρὸς <ταύτας> τὰς κινήσεις τοῦτο, καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄνω καὶ κάτω. It is necessary to add *ταύτας*, for the sense is: "And the heart has the same relation not only to *these* movements (of the right and left) but also to the movements of the upper and lower parts." Cf. *de Incessu* iv.

ix. 6, 702^b 36. Omit *κινουμένων*.

The above was in type before Mr Farquharson's learned translation appeared.

De Incessu Animalium.

709^a 19. δυνήσεται γὰρ τοῦτο τό τ' ἡρεμοῦν καὶ τὴν ὑποτείνουσιν. In the last number of this Journal, page 42, I made some sense out of this at the expense of some violent

changes of the text. In particular I had assumed that τὴν ὑποτείνουσιν must mean the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle, as it certainly does in 709^a 1; this necessitated reading ἡ ὑποτείνουσα and taking δύνασθαι in different senses in the two sentences referred to. I certainly did not feel altogether comfortable about this, and am greatly obliged to Sir Thomas Heath for pointing out to me the real meaning of this sentence. I cannot do better than quote his letter on the subject.

"The difficulty of interpretation is caused by the use of ὑποτείνουσα in two senses, the first the technical sense in line 1, the second the non-technical sense in line 20. I think that δυναμένη and δυνήσεται must mean the same thing in the two passages, 'has its square equal to (the squares on—).' The parallel works out thus:

Line 1.

ἡ ὑποτείνουσα = τοῦτο, the leg which is stretched forward,
 δυναμένη = δυνήσεται,
 τὸ μένον μέγεθος = τὸ ἡρεμοῦν,
 τὴν μεταξὺ = τὴν ὑποτείνουσιν.

Line 19.

"For the non-technical sense of ὑποτείνουσα cf. ὑποτέταται in 695^a 2; the sense is the same as that e.g. of 'subtangent' and 'subnormal' in conics.

"The sentence can, I am sure, only mean 'the square on this is equal to the squares on the stationary leg (i.e. perpendicular) and on the subnormal (or intervening horizontal line, stretched out underneath).'

"Therefore I think that no alteration in the text is required in 709^a 19, 20."

It is evident to me that Sir Thomas Heath is right, and I retract my proposals with apologies to all concerned.

But it still remains to fit this sentence on to its predecessor. The whole passage is this: εἰ γὰρ ὀρθοῦ ὄντος θατέρου σκέλους θάτερον ἔσται προβεβηκός, μείζον ἔσται, ἴσον ὄν· δυνήσεται γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ τ' ἡρεμοῦν καὶ τὴν ὑποτείνουσιν. The leg which is put forward is only equal to the other on which the man stands. But if it is to touch the ground, μείζον ἔσται,

because it will have to be the square root of the sum of the other two squares. For if a line is such a root it is evident that it would be greater than either of the other two lines.

This explains also that other sentence 709^a 1, ὅταν δὲ προβαίνη, γίνεται ἡ ὑποτείνουσα καὶ δυναμένη τὸ μένον μέγεθος καὶ τὴν μεταξύ. I said on page 41: "then *AC* is the hypotenuse of the triangle, being, as Aristotle irrelevantly remarks, the square root etc." One should think twice before accusing Aristotle of irrelevance, and indeed I had thought more than twice about it, but could not see the point. I see now that when he says ἡ ὑποτείνουσα καὶ δυναμένη κτλ. he means "the hypotenuse and therefore greater than either *AB* or *BC*," which is important for his argument. But why couldn't he say so plainly? It seems that when he wrote this work he was determined to drive his readers mad; to put simple mathematics in the worst form you can think of was a trick he had learnt from Plato.

Problemata.

I. 15, 861^a 6. ταραχώδης γὰρ καὶ οὐ μία <ἡ> πέψις.

IV. 2, 876^b 7. οὔτε μὴ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καταβληθέντων. Delete μὴ, which got in from the line above.

X. 52, 896^b 12. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὁμοίως ὅτι πᾶν (σὺν codd. al.) ζῶον καλόν. Read ὁμοίως ὅτι οὖν.

ibid. 896^b 19. ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς τὸ εἰς τὴν συνουσίαν ἠδὲ ὅτι ὁ μὲν καλόν, ὅτι ἐπιθυμοῦντες χαίρομεν ὀρῶντες. Read καλοῦμεν for ὅτι ὁ μὲν.

XI. 13, 900^a 30. οἱ γὰρ θερμοὶ τῷ πνεύματι αὐλοῦντες πολὺ βαρύτερον αὐλοῦσιν. Read θερμῶ, and compare *Gen. An.* 788^a 20.

XI. 33, 903^a 23. Omit καθάπερ τῆς ἡμέρας, which got in from 26.

XI. 34, 903^a 35. ὡσπερ καὶ <ὁ> ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄρχεις (sc. πόρος).

XI. 58, 905^a 39. For ἐκπίπτειν read εἰσπίπτειν.

XX. 7, 923^a 35. ἢ ἅπαντα μὲν μέχρι τούτου ἀκμάζει ἕως ἂν κατὰ τὸ σπέρμα ἀκμάζη. Read ἕως ἂν καὶ τὸ σπέρμα ἀκμάσῃ.

- XXVI. 16, 942^a 14. μεγαλοκύνων <ών>.
 XXVI. 48, 945^b 30. For ἐφέρετο read φέρεται.
 XXVI. 53, 946^a 34. For ζοφωδέστατον read ζοφωδέστερον.
 XXVII. 11, 949^a 19. For συγκινεῖ read συμβαίνει. συνκ
 and συνβ are practically identical.
 XXVIII. 1, 949^a 36. τροφή <μὲν> μεμιγμένα.
 XXIX. 6, 950^b 28. αἴσχιον for αἴσχρόν.
 XXX. 1, 954^a 22. ἐπιπόλαιος for ἐπιπολαίως.
 XXXI. 2, 957^b 6. πλείους οὔσαι is a dittography for πλείους
 αἰ.

Finally it must be added that Mr Bywater's criticism has caused me to rewrite the first note (on *De Anima*), with which he entirely disagrees.

ARTHUR PLATT.

ARISTOTLE, *METAPHYSICS*, 1048^a 30 sqq.

In the case of the passage from the Poetics above discussed, I have suggested that the text has been corrupted by a special effect of homœoteleuton. Such an effect, which seems possible enough of itself, would, if it really came about, tend to produce a somewhat unusual kind of disturbance, as in the supposed instance in the Poetics (1449^a 27), which could not be remedied by ordinary methods of emending the words in the text. The probability of the hypothesis advocated will be heightened if passages can be found presenting difficulties which have fairly defied other methods but have a plausible solution by this one.

Such a passage there seems to be in the Metaphysics (1048^a 30 sqq.) to the difficulty of which my attention has recently been directed by Mr Charles Cannan. It is indeed so far unlike the passage in the Poetics that there is a hitch in the construction of the text taken by itself, and not merely in its relation to another passage; but while no treatment on ordinary principles seems to have been offered which is at all successful the hypothesis of a loss by homœoteleuton would yield a result of the kind which seems required.

The passage is as follows:—*ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια τὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα μὴ οὕτως ὥσπερ λέγομεν δυνάμει· λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει οἷον ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ Ἑρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὄλῃ τὴν ἡμίσειαν, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθεὶς ἂν, καὶ ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἐὰν δυνατὸς ἦ θεωρῆσαι· τὸ δ' ἐνεργείᾳ. δῆλον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν καθέκαστα τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ ὃ βουλόμεθα λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντὸς ὄρον ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συννοῶν, ὅτι ὡς τὸ οἰκοδομοῦν πρὸς τὸ οἰκοδομικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς πρὸς τὸ καθεῦδον, καὶ τὸ ὄρῳ πρὸς τὸ μῦνον κ.τ.λ.*

Bonitz puts the sentence *λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει...θεωρῆσαι* in a parenthesis, following, as he says, Alexander; but admitting that this is not a sufficient remedy, he suggests that perhaps

the stop after *ἐνεργεία* and the conjunction *δέ* after *δήλον* should be omitted. But it is evident that the context thus produced would be scarcely tolerable, the idiomatically perfect sentence beginning with *δήλον* would be destroyed and an unnatural turn given to the construction¹.

If we look at the illustration Aristotle gives of the *τὸ δυνάμει*, what the *ἐνέργεια* is in each case is obvious, because it is mentioned in each case to explain the *δύναμις*. In accordance with this I would suggest that Aristotle may have written *τὸ δ' ἐνεργεία δήλον ἐν τούτοις ὅ τι πότε ἔστι* or some equivalent, such as perhaps simply *τὸ δ' ἐνεργεία δήλον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις*, or *ἐν τούτοις*. The scribe having before him e.g. *τὸ δ' ἐνεργεία δήλον ἐν τούτοις· δήλον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα τῆ ἐπαγωγῆ ὃ βουλόμεθα λέγειν*, would pass from the first *δήλον* to the second and thus produce the actual text, through loss of the words between the two instances of *δήλον*.

The repetition of *δήλον* is hardly a difficulty; for Aristotle is quite careless about repeating a word in the same context, if it happens to be the right word each time for what he wants to express.

It seems to me that the only alternative to an emendation of this kind is to suppose *τὸ δ' ἐνεργεία* to be an extreme case of elliptical expression and equivalent to 'the other element mentioned in each case is that which is *ἐνεργεία*' or 'the other element mentioned in each case we say (*λέγομεν*) is *ἐνεργεία*': but I doubt whether this will commend itself as an at all likely solution.

J. COOK WILSON.

¹ I find that some students of the passage have supposed, though not without misgiving, that the remedy might be to put the words *δήλον δ' ἐπὶ...συνορᾶν* in a parenthesis, omit the following *ὅτι* (with one of the MSS.), and remove the full stop after *ἐνεργεία*. But while the sense produced would be a scarcely possible piece of 'logic,' the verbal expression would

have a harshness for which it might be very hard to find a parallel, and would, like the other method, destroy a closely coherent sentence. It would separate *τὸ ἀνάλογον* from what is naturally the epexegetis of it, viz. *ὅτι ὡς τὸ οἰκοδομοῦν πρὸς τὸ οἰκοδομικόν καὶ τὸ ἐργηγορὸς πρὸς τὸ καθεῦδον κ.τ.λ.*— a difficulty which seems decisive.

ARISTOTLE: *E. E.* B viii, 1225^a 14; *H. A.* Δ viii, 533^b 15.

Eudemian Ethics B viii 20. 1225^a 14 εἰ γὰρ ἵνα μὴ λάβῃ ψηλαφῶν ἀποκτείνου, γελοῖος ἂν εἴη εἰ λέγοι ὅτι βία καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ μείζον κακὸν καὶ λυπηρότερον εἶναι ὃ πείσεται μὴ ποιήσας.

Insert ὁ before ψηλαφῶν, and compare Phrynichus in Bekker's *Anecdota* i 73 ψηλαφίνδα: παιδιὰ τις ἐστίν, ἐνός τινος δεδεμένου τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν κύκλῳ ψηλαφῶντος καὶ λέγοντος ἐκάστου τοῦνομα. Plainly ψηλαφίνδα was the game which we know as "Blindman's buff," Shakespeare's "Hoodman blind." Eudemus says: "If a man in order that he might not be caught were to kill the 'blind man' of the game, it would be absurd of him to plead compulsion; because, if he were not to kill him, and were to be caught, the consequences would not be serious."

Historiae Animalium IV viii 533^b 15 ἔτι δ' ἐν ταῖς θήραις τῶν ἰχθύων ὅτι μάλιστα εὐλαβοῦνται ψόφον ποιεῖν ἢ κώπης ἢ δικτύων οἱ περὶ τὴν θήραν ταύτην ὄντες· ἀλλ' ὅταν κατανοήσωσιν ἐν τινι τόπῳ πολλοὺς ἀθρόους ὄντας, ἐκ τοσοῦτου τόπου τεκμαιρόμενοι καθιᾶσι τὰ δίκτυα, ὅπως μῆτε κώπης μῆτε τῆς ῥυμῆς τῆς ἀλιάδος ἀφίκηται πρὸς τὸν τόπον ἐκεῖνον ὁ ψόφος· παραγγέλλουσί τε πᾶσι τοῖς ναύταις ὅτι μάλιστα σιγῇ πλεῖν μέχρι περ ἂν συγκυκλώσωνται.

Plainly ἐκ τοσοῦτου τόπου...καθιᾶσι τὰ δίκτυα ὅπως μῆτε κώπης κ.τ.λ. cannot mean "so werfen sie die Netze in etwa solcher Entfernung aus, dass kein Geräusch...bis zu jener Stelle gelangen kann" (Aubert u. Wimmer). But we have what we want, if, in place of ἐκ τοσοῦτου τόπου, we write ἐκτὸς τοῦ τόπου: "they let down their nets outside the place where the fish are, in order that no noise may reach it." My attention was called to this passage by my friend Professor Arthur Platt.

HENRY JACKSON.

10 February 1913.

‘VERIFY YOUR QUOTATIONS.’

Whether the Will of Aristotle in Diogenes Laertius be genuine or, as some think, a fabrication, it is on either assumption an interesting document, more especially as one of its provisions implies that Aristotle either was, or was supposed to have been, a sincere and dutiful follower in private life of the established religion of his country. In more than one modern work on Aristotle, however, the provision reappears in a form which raises a serious question :

‘During some past danger of Nikanor (we do not know what) Aristotle had made a vow of four marble animal figures, in case the danger were averted, to Zeus the Preserver and Athênê the Preserver. Nikanor is directed to fulfil this vow and to dedicate the figures in Stageira.’

‘Nikanor is charged...to fulfil a vow formerly made by himself of four marble figures of animals to Zeus the Preserver and Athene the Preserver. This last clause throws suspicion on the genuineness of the document, for it looks like a mere imitation of the dying injunction of Socrates : “We owe a cock to Aesculapius ; pay the debt and do not fail.” Other points also suggest doubts.’

‘Wird endlich in der Aufstellung von vier Thierbildern, die Arist. Zeus dem Erretter und Athene der Erretterin für Nikanor gelobt habe...eine Nachahmung des Sokratischen Opfers für Asklepios...gesucht, so scheint mir diese Parallele doch zu weit hergeholt ; in der Sache aber ist dieser Zug ganz unbedenklich.’

It will be observed that the eminent scholars, from whose works the above quotations come, have taken all three of them the same view of the meaning of the clause, and find no difficulty in the religious situation which their several statements seem to presuppose. But the plain man may very

naturally ask, Why *animal* figures? Is one to infer from this the survival of theriomorphic deities in a Greek colony even in the days of Alexander the Great? One would also like to know why there were to be *four* such figures, when only two deities, Zeus and Athene, were concerned. It may perhaps be as well, then, before any attempt to solve the puzzle, to look into Diogenes Laertius (5. 16) and see how the clause stands there in the Greek:

ἀναθεῖναι δὲ καὶ Νικάνορα σωθέντα, ἣν εὐχὴν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ
 ἠύξάμην, ζῶα λίθινα τετραπήχη Διὶ σωτῆρι καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ
 σωτεῖρα ἐν Σταγείροις.

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