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# THE JOURNAL

OF

## SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

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Vol. VI.

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EDITED BY WM. T. HARRIS.

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THE METAPHYSICAL CALCULUS.

In the province of mathematics, thought is engaged in ascertaining and defining quantitative functions, and in transforming these into equivalents. When it has found the numerical equivalent of a given function, its goal is reached. To use the words of another\*: "Speculative [pure] mathematics is the science of the functional laws by which to convert figure and force into number. Its first division *creates* functions by establishing the laws of derivation—Geometry and Mechanics;—the second division computes the functions either in form or value—Algebra or Calculus, and Arithmetic."

There is a certain analogy between mathematics and metaphysics in objects and methods.

In general, the problem in metaphysics is to find the equivalent forms of Mind and Matter,—to find the equivalent of each in terms of the other. And this involves, as in mathematics, preliminary sciences, wherein "functions are created by establishing the laws of derivation." In other words, each province—Mind and Matter—must first be reduced to its elemental functions, its simplest terms found, and its entire empire reduced to corresponding equivalents in those simplest terms. Then comes the necessity of a bridge—the discovery of an equivalence between the terms of Mind and Matter—

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\* Jour. Spec. Phil., vol. v., p. 178.

and over this bridge the investigator carries his science to its completion.

If one is skeptical as to the existence of such a bridge, he has only to reflect a moment to perceive that the two great classes of thinkers really assume its existence in all their investigations. If he reflects still further, he is likely to find that even his own skeptical stand point presupposes such a bridge.

The materialist assumes that all phenomena have their material equivalents, and that Matter and Force is the substantial mode of existence, while Mind is one of its many phases. Hence to him all mental phenomena have equivalent terms of matter and force, and the object of his philosophy is to ascertain and fix these terms and their relations. He asks: what is the physical equivalent of thought and feeling? What movement of the brain, what change of texture or consumption of tissue is concomitant with thought, feeling, or volition? This leads him to inquire into the structure and function of nerves and brain, and the relations of different qualities and quantities of food and drink to the modifications of intellectual products. His psychology seeks the laws of derivation of the complex from the simple, and explains all thought as modified sensation. "Thought is a secretion of the brain just as bile is a secretion of the liver." In this mode of scientific procedure matter is assumed as the substantial and as the most knowable; systematic knowledge will result from ascertaining the physical composition and laws of phenomena in general.

The idealist—using a somewhat inadequate expression as a name for the opposite class of thinkers—assumes that all phenomena have their mental equivalents, that Mind or Thinking Being is the substantial, and that the material world is only one of its processes. Matter is the phenomenon or appearance of Spirit. "The Ego is the actual substance or Being, and at the same time it is subject or free activity. It is that whose being or essence consists in the act of positing itself, i. e. of creating or producing itself. Before I became self-conscious, I did not exist as Ego. The Ego is its own object. In the act of thinking itself, it is the active subject and the product of its act. Its being is Freedom, Exist-

ence for itself; it is absolute subject. The determinations of objects are determinations of the Ego. All true being is knowing. The basis of the universe is not unspiritual—the antithesis of spirit—whose connection with spirit can never be comprehended—but spirit itself. No death, no lifeless matter, but everywhere life, spirit, intelligence, a realm of spirits throughout its entire extent. Again, all actual Knowing is Being; it posits absolute reality and objectivity; or the Ego is substance and the content of all reality.” In this statement of Fichte we have the general outcome of the German philosophic movement since Kant. Kant’s problem was precisely to ascertain the mental equivalent in the act of cognition. The result of his labors, supplemented by those of his successors, is a complete reduction and formulation of the mental factors in the various realms of Knowing. What activity of the mind is involved in thinking the idea of Space, and how its idea differs from that of Time, Motion, Matter, or how these differ from one another and from any other ideas, all this sort of information is given us with the utmost painstaking and minuteness; the results being stated in terms of mental activity: this idea is defined thus and so, i. e. its thinking requires such and so much consciousness of the entire circular movement of thought. The idea of Space, for example, is a consciousness of that part of the activity of thinking wherein the separation or distinction of the Ego from itself is involved. Any arc of the entire circular activity of thinking may be made the object of consciousness, and, according to its extent and completeness, the depth and generality of the idea, which is the object contemplated, varies. Thus the idea of Time is a consciousness of the opposite phase involved in the activity which thinks space. That activity is common to thought and to Being, and that all objectivity, no matter how intuited, perceived, or conceived, involves movement of some sort, and that its thinking is accomplished through an internal constructive movement of thought—this seems to be the basis of the great reactionary system of Trendelenburg which brings the ancient Greek and the modern German systems of Philosophy close together.

Again, if one were to discard both views and attempt to take a skeptical position denying the possibility of a bridge

from mind to matter, it is certain that he would not defend himself successfully. The materialist takes his stand on sensuous perception and posits as substantial, certain metaphysical entities such as matter, force, and the like, naively supposing that they are realities cognized by him through his senses. The idealist takes his stand on self-consciousness, and from the universal and necessary principles found there he constructs his science. The skeptic, if he employ a procedure at all, must assume logical principles borrowed from the materialist or from the idealist. If he stands on the antinomy of the two systems like Kant, he will like Kant furnish a basis for the strict conclusions of a Fichte quoted above. To say there is no bridge from mind to matter is to deny the possibility of knowing that there is such a thing as matter, for the assertion sets out from mind.

The utilitarian will be most astonished when he examines the manifold applications that the German scientific explorers have made with this idealistic method of ascertaining the mental equivalent of cognitions. In fixing with absolute precision the exact content of the various writings of Aristotle, in settling the numerous ethnological questions that arise in connection with philological researches in the higher sciences, social, political, and theological, they have the mastery of a method that gives them the vantage ground: they can solve the antinomies by pure thought; those who cannot, must work out the solutions with expenditure of life itself. Thought alone makes life valuable, and has power to protect and preserve it.

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## IDEALISM AND REALISM IN THEIR RELATION TO THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

From Herman Lotze's "Mikrokosmos."

By MAX. EBERHARDT.

Philosophy is a mother who is served with ingratitude at the hands of her children. At one time she was all in all to them; Mathematics and Astronomy, Physics and Physiology, no less than Ethics and Politics, sprang into existence

from her maternal fold. But soon her daughters had established their own affluent homes, and each one the sooner in proportion to the rapid progress made under her maternal influences, conscious of what she now had wrought by dint of her own labor, they withdrew from the control of Philosophy, who, not being able to follow them into the minutiae of their new departments of life, became troublesome by her monotonous recurrence to impertinent counsels. And thus, after all of her offspring had branched off from the common stock, Philosophy shared the dubious lot of retaining the insoluble part of all problems as her undisputed province. Placed upon this reserve, she has still maintained her vitality, ever pondering over the old hidden enigmas, and ever sought in lonely quietude by those who founded their hopes upon the unity of human knowledge.

The connection of phenomena had been thoroughly investigated by the empirical sciences; they showed how many and how multiform the links are that form the series of actions uniting a cause with its ultimate effect; but what it is which connects two coëxistent links of the series, eluded their grasp; they neither said what the things were in themselves, nor in what that interaction of things consisted by means of which the state of one might produce a change in the state of the other. The religious and moral life of man, as regards itself, has developed the belief in that which is of absolute value, in what should be, as enjoined by an imperative duty, and which, if Reality is to have any meaning whatever, must be the most real of all; but the world of forms and facts, wherein alone it would realize itself, lay before it, a strange domain, being neither a creation of its own, nor even, as it seemed, reconcilable with it. This state of things prompted the agitation of the two questions again and again as to the peculiar nature of Being, whose appearance to us we observe, and as to the relation which this world of existing reality sustains to the world of values that should be. And, ere the first two were answered, arose the third, as to the capacity for truth possessed by our cognition in general; and as to its relation, there, to the existing reality—here, to that which ought to be in it and through it.

Certitude in our thoughts is attainable by reducing them

to the certainty of others previously demonstrated, or to the evidence of immediate or intuitive truths, neither in need of, nor susceptible of, demonstration.

The confidence we have, partly in the laws of Thought which effect that reduction or generalization, partly in the simple and direct cognitions to which these laws lead us, may be saved from prejudices whose power of persuasion is but fortuitous, by repeatedly and closely examining the object of our research; whilst it could no longer be preserved by any sort of demonstration from a doubt which would turn into a possible error, and shake our confidence even in that which we always find to be a necessity of thought. A skepticism, however, that did not show the error of certain prejudices from particular contradictions liable to be pointed out, and the possibility of correcting them, but were only desirous of repeating, without provocation, the idle question, whether all things, in the end, might not be entirely different from the manner in which we of necessity must think them, would, together with Certitude, destroy all the value which we attach to reality. That this, however, shall not be—that the world cannot be an incongruity without meaning—this conviction of a moral faith is the last ground upon which we base our trust in the capacity for truth possessed by our cognition, and in the possibility of any knowledge whatever. But the extent of knowledge is not determined, as yet, by this conviction.

Only of our own being have we any immediate consciousness; in regard to an external world, all our knowledge is based upon representations which are but changeful states of our own selves. What certainty have we, then, that this image of an external world is not a dream evolved by our nature? The cautious man asks this, while the imprudent one asserts it; he forgets that it must, indeed, be so in both cases, whether things be external to us or not; even an actual world outside of us could be represented by us only in images composed of affections of our being. The subjective nature of our presentative faculty does not, therefore, decide upon the existence or non-existence of the world that it believes to be representing to itself. The attempt, however, to conceive the world's image simply as the native product of



the mind was generally early repudiated by the even tenor of science; it was always found essential, to this end, to assume within us just as many impulses foreign to the nature of our mind, and not deducible from it, as the ordinary view imagined us to receive from without. Reserving for future discussion what is of importance in these contemplations, we follow for the present the conviction to which Philosophy has ever returned, that our representative faculty springs from the reciprocation with a world independent of us.

If this be the case, however, could the act of representation be more than the effect of things—could it be their corresponding copy? and could truth, for the recognition of which we possess a capacity, consist in the agreement of Thought with Being? We speak of the image of an object when any combination of other agencies produces the same impression upon our perception which the object itself would have caused; from the similitude of its effects upon us, therefore, do we recognize one thing to be the image of another. Can this very effect, which both produce within us, ever be identical with them in such a degree, that in the observing gaze of a stranger our cognitions would be accepted as an image of the object? Wherever there is reciprocation—and cognition is but the particular instance of such an effect between the objects and the percipient mind—there the nature of the one element never turns into the other, remaining identical with itself and unchanged: but every first element serves only as an encouragement for every second one to realize from among the many states of which its own nature is susceptible, a certain particular one—that one, namely, which, according to a general law of this nature, is an adequate response to the quality and quantity of the stimulus to which it was subjected. Hence, there is a correspondence between the external causes acting upon us, and certain images within us, which *we* produce, a correspondence between a change of those causes and a variation of these, our internal or mental states. But no particular representation is a likeness of the cause whose product it is, and even the relations between these unknown elements which we imagine we recognize, are not, in the first place, the very relations existing between them abstractly; they are the forms in which we perceive.

them. And this state we do not consider a human imperfection; we rather conceive it as inherent in the nature of every knowledge depending upon reciprocation with its object. All beings who are subject to this condition suffer the like consequence: they never behold things, as they are in themselves, when no one sees them, but only as they appear when they are seen.

Limited in this manner to phenomena, knowledge is still not devoid of all relation to the Existent itself. For we must not complain of its delusiveness as though a mere semblance were presented, while the essence which gives birth to this semblance were beyond our ken, absolutely avoiding all comparison with the former, and questionable even in its very existence. We cannot consider the fundamental forms of cognition as mere forms of human perception, into which the objects, in themselves entirely differently constituted, drop, without admitting that, in order to drop into these forms, the objects must, of course, conform to them in the same manner as anything must fit the mesh of the net by which it is to be caught. Or, not using any figure of speech, every phenomenon, in order to appear at all, presupposes an essential being whose internal relations furnish the principles determining the form of its appearance. From an analysis of the forms of our intuition in which perception directly seizes its objects, the conviction may be secured that these forms with which we are so familiar are not applicable to the objects themselves; but still we must seek in the nature of things and their true mutual relations the conditions which permit us to perceive them in those forms. It may thus be doubtful whether space and time, as such, may not consist in the act of representation merely, which comprehends the multifarious; but it cannot be doubtful that then the Existent need not be subject of itself to an order devoid of time and space, which, while acting upon us, is converted into the forms of coördination and sequence. The sensation which presents any object to us, or calls forth any act, is certainly not identical with its cause: but it is equally certain that we consider two objects or acts as identical, alike, or different, if their impressions upon us be identical, alike, or different; and the degrees of their affinity we estimate according as the differ-

ences are greater or less in their impressions. We thus inevitably conceive that which apparently exists and transpires, presented by perception simply in the form of the Phenomenal, as being in perfect correspondence with that which truly exists in the things themselves or transpires between them, and which, for that reason, is by no means devoid of truth and a due conformity to Law. To renounce these premises would not add to our certitude, but would simply produce a fruitless, self-contradictory affliction of thought.

Although Semblance thus points to Being, yet it points to mere formal relations of the Existent and their changes; the essence of things which subsist and move in these relations remains inscrutable. And for the very reason that the nature of things remains unknown, the actions taking place among them cannot be comprehended from their nature; only the semblance, the result of experience can teach us to surmise what in truth is taking place. In this manner philosophical research follows the same course which, as we have seen, the natural sciences have taken; it commences with the separate phenomena, mysterious and contradictory, presented by experience, and guided by the general laws of Thought, it endeavors to arrive at the form of what in truth exists and transpires, which must serve as its efficient cause to explain what is strange and contradictory in the material furnished by our perceptions. There may be many a glorious success even within this limited scope of its problem attending this spirit of Realism, which is content in reducing given data of Semblance to data of Being which we must of necessity assume; not only that it may succeed in elucidating the causal nexus in a certain analogous series of phenomena, but the comparison of the knowledge obtained may also afford a prospective glance at that which, as the true Reality, lies at the foundation of the whole phenomenal world. Yet even this final result will not, in the main, remove the character of a mere matter of fact by virtue of this principle, and thus it will ever give rise to the opposition of that idealistic disposition of the human soul which does not recognize true Being in facts that exist merely because they exist, or must of necessity be assumed because something else exists, but gives countenance to such a fact only as the

form of true Being, which, through the dignity of Thought that it represents, proves its mission, its right, its potency, to place itself at the summit of Reality as the ultimate datum, as the highest formative principle.

With the bold assertion that Thought and Being are identical, Idealism confronts the profession of Realism that the nature of things is unknowable. Although Idealism has sometimes ventured to assert this, it does not necessarily follow that it will ever be possible for human cognition to penetrate by the activity of thought the quiddity of all things and to reproduce them in thoughts: the limits which the finitude of our nature imposes upon this extension of our actual insight into the essence of things are too obvious. But, to a power of cognition free from these limits, things would no longer be impenetrable; they would not be as much beyond all comprehension as, for instance, light is beyond the faculty of hearing, sound beyond the faculty of sight; as actualized thoughts rather would they be recognized by the cognitive faculty of man, the latter recognizing itself in them. Thus, though not exactly taken as an assertion with regard to the relation of our knowledge to its object, but rather as a conviction with reference to the nature of being-in-itself, this proposition imperceptibly imparts a different meaning to Being, or the nature of things, from that given to it by current opinion. For, that content by which one thing is distinguished from another, the natural consciousness believes to have within its immediate reach, partly in sensation, partly in representations which primarily attach to sensations and embrace their elements. The more mysterious does it seem, that this content has the virtue of presenting itself to the mind as something existent, self-subsistent, tangible, in general, as a thing: whoever would discover the hidden source of extension, fulness, hardness, elasticity, or whatever pertains to objectivity, would, as man would naturally suppose, have found the true peculiar nature of the thing,—not that by which one is distinguished from the other, but that in which they all are alike, the nature of their being, the Reality. Can, then, Idealism claim the ability to solve this problem? Certainly to no greater extent than that to which Realism has also professed to solve it: what it is that causes things

to be, and why it is that they are *related* to one another; how it is finally brought about that something follows from these relations; in what manner an event, a state of becoming and acting, are possible: all this remains as impenetrable a mystery to Idealism as it does to its opponent. Admitting, for a moment, everything we may concede, although this theory may not know how all this is brought about, it may still succeed in proving a connection, according to which, supposing this very Being to exist in a manner inconceivable, there must also be, in a manner alike inconceivable, that very state of becoming and acting, and no other; even then, however, Idealism would have fathomed but the *meaning* and the rational connection of particular determinations, which we before comprehended as a totality under the name of Being; wholly unknown would it be still how this inner connection of reality can be. And this it was that the proposition, presented in a bold and striking manner, promised to fulfil when it declared Being identical with Thought; we were led to imagine that the very element through which Being as Being was first distinguished, in a manner precluding all agreement, from Thinking or the state of being thought, might finally represent itself to be an imperceptible difference, and this Being be wholly dissolved in thoughts. Now it appears that Idealism, too, in regard to the two ideas by dint of whose fusion we think the Existent, that of the What and that of its Being, leaves this very Being equally unexplained.

But, however injudicious it was to speak in that proposition of Being, it was just as inexpedient, on the other hand, to mention Thought as that which is to be identical with it; as long, at least, as this name is to distinguish with a fixed meaning a particular act of the mind from others. And this seems to be the meaning; for to sensuous perception Idealism also does not concede that it seizes the truth of things; it abandons both, and reserves to Thought, as a higher and peculiar activity, the privilege of detecting, behind the deceptive wrappings in which the world of perception crowds upon us, the true Being. But this hope is based upon a widely diffused error. That for which language has coined a name, we are generally very prone to consider a product of Thought, although its aid in determining the subject that a name serves

to denote is often very insignificant, and frequently wholly valueless. As far as sensuous impressions are concerned, we are, of course, readily convinced that no art applied in logical operations can supply to the blind or deaf the want of perception with regard to color or sound: that, therefore, blue and sweet are no conceptions thought by us, but impressions we experience, that their names are but signs of speech which remind us of a content, in which thought shares at most but to the extent that it points out its dependent character by virtue of the adjective form it imparts to it. But in the more general conceptions which are everywhere entwined with our perceptions, investing them with form and import in the ideas of Being, of Becoming, of Activity, and of any relation pointing from one element to another, we believe the more positively that we find true products of Thought, and of that alone. And still the import of Being is not capable, by the activity of Thought, of being rendered intelligible to him who does not intuitively know what is meant thereby; only by way of analysis can Thought, in removing all irrelevant conceptions which are not intended, teach us how to trace the meaning of the word that is apprehended only by direct intuition. Nobody will discover a definition with regard to Becoming which does not embrace under another name its most essential characteristics—the conception of a transition from one event to another, or of the act of transpiring in general.

Thought can aid in defining this conception only by elucidating both the points between which that mysterious transition takes place, between those which are namable only, but not capable of being further analyzed in thought. And equally beyond the reach of all logical operations is the concept of Activity. We can easily believe that we may yet reduce it to the more abstract one of the Conditioning, although it then would be questionable whether the reverse would not be more correct: but would it then be possible to determine by a further analysis of thought what the idea of the Conditioning actually signifies? Apparently, perhaps—in reality, certainly not—under this or that name Thought will after all be but capable of merely designating the ideas of an essential connection of different events, without, however, being able to generate it by dint of its own activity.

And here the objection may be urged that I unnecessarily dwell upon that which is self-evident; it may be said that Thought as a relative and synthetic activity would, of course, be compelled to presuppose the elements to be put in relation and synthesis, as having been furnished from some other source. I really aim at nothing else than to render this conviction very apparent for the moment, and to deduce its consequences. For, after some consideration, we are soon convinced that those elements secured by Thought in this manner, as having originated elsewhere, contain nothing else than the sum total of those cognitions of true Being and Eventuation which formerly were predicated of it as its inherent properties. In all cases, Thought is but an introactive agency that places the primitive intuitions of the internal and external perceptions in reciprocal relations, these being predetermined by fundamental ideas and laws the origin of which we cannot trace; logical forms proper, peculiar to itself, it develops only in the attempt at applying this truth which we find within us, to the diverse variety of perceptions, and the consequences drawn from them. Hence, there is nothing less justifiable than the assertion that Thought, as it is, is identical with Being, and capable of absorbing it without any residue; in all instances there rather remain unabsorbed, in its ideal flow, the particular traces which mark the special features of the great Entity we have distinguished by the name of Being. With more truth we should have said: Being perceives itself; we—inasmuch as we are—know, feel, perceive, or experience rightly that which is said to be; being active, we know full well what we mean, though without the power of expressing it, when not only speaking of a periodicity of phenomena but of a state in which the one is conditioned by the other. And, in this sense, all the world has always known what Being or Reality denotes, for every one has inwardly experienced the meaning of these words; having, however, found it difficult or impossible to express, by dint of logical categories, what he has so vividly experienced. Philosophy has been equally unsuccessful in supplying this deficiency; it has invariably given us only names for the experiences of life; and living and moving in names, it sometimes has experienced less vividly that which has presented itself

as the object of its efforts. Consequent upon such considerations it will in the spirit of Idealism be insisted upon, that this point should now at length be dropped; it is admitted, that we do not know how things can exist and act, but their essence does not consist in their actuality, but rather in *what* they are and act. Is, then, this content of things more susceptible of thought than the manner in which we have sought to determine it? Whatever Thought may be, it is an activity of the mind; and if it be not this, it is at all events a variable series of states which the mind experiences. Now, how can a succession of states depict and reproduce anything else than their like again?—can it apprehend the essence which is subject to these states? It will only then be possible when we add another to our former assumptions, and no longer consider what things *are*, but what they *experience*, as their very essence and their true being which Philosophy is in quest of. Thus Idealism, by a course whose particular stages we cannot here point out, would admit that it, at all events, neither knew how things were, nor what they were; but certainly what they *signify*. And this, their true being, is also knowable. What everything is in itself, that very nature of it by which it *is* at all, and is enabled to vindicate itself effectually and to be something different from others, this may forever remain an impenetrable mystery to Thought. But in the forms of their destinies, their changes, their evolution, their activity, and their participation in the grand, connecting scheme of Reality,—in all these respects things are, it is said, apprehensible by Thought, and comparable with one another; the essential import of every one of them, so far as it consists in this, is of itself exhaustible in thought, no matter whether we human beings can find this thought or not. Thus Idealism, like Realism, is confined to a cognition of that which transpires in and between things remaining unknown; but in the import which this fact presents, it imagines that it possesses all essential truth; things do but exist for the purpose of realizing this fact.

A similar conviction has always been entertained and expressed in other forms by Faith, inasmuch as it has held the world to be of divine creation. It thereby denies as emphatically as philosophical Idealism that there is resident in things



any being, or part of their being, which they are invested with by means of themselves. All they are, they are by the will and intent of God; their most peculiar being consists in that which God has meant or intended with them, in their significance as to the unity of the great scheme of Life. To fathom this scheme is not what Faith claims, but its idea of God is full of different rays beaming upon one another, as it were, which cast their illumining lights also upon the world created below. The idea of an immutable and just God harmonizes with the rigorous laws of the phenomenal world; the infinite fulness of His beatific Being conforms to the beauty of the latter—His sanctity with the order of events in the world of morality. To trace back to these creative attributes of God all particular incidents of Reality, was neither attempted, nor was it considered possible; it was sufficient to believe, despite the contradiction of numerous perceptions, in the verity of these attributes in general, and to derive anew in particular instances, from a selection of preferred phenomena, the vivid feeling of their efficiency prevailing throughout the universe.

In two respects philosophical Idealism sought to transcend this belief. It first took exception to the loose manner in which Religion spoke of a personal God, in which it permitted Him to evoke things from naught into reality, and to place Himself in a state of reciprocation with these realized nullities; the metaphysical import of all these proceedings was to be discovered and raised into the light of comprehension.

None of these efforts, upon the purport of which the conclusion of our considerations invites us to enter more fully, have been successful; whilst criticising all ideas which Faith had anthropomorphosed of the relation of God to the world, they have left remaining in forms of speech generally artificially obscured, as a final outcoming, the assertion merely, that a single highest Idea permeates all phenomena of the actual world with its formative and authoritative principles, without explaining how. And for the very reason that Idealism could at most but seize upon the import of the world and not furnish the proof of its reality, everything that pointed to this enigma was eliminated from its consideration. There was no longer any mention of God, for this name sig-

nities naught without the predicates of actual power and efficiency; there could only be mention of the Idea whose content, whether in this or that manner alike incomprehensible, actually constituted the very being and import of the world. But for that very reason the hope was entertained of being able to express fully and systematically the whole tenor of this Idea in thoughts, and by this second effort greatly to surpass Faith, which knew but in general terms the intent of God—this remaining, in its particulars, inscrutable. This promise, likewise, could be realized only by abstracting from the nature of the subject what remained inconceivable to Thought. For, as a matter of course, the living forces which Faith had contemplated as resident in God, presented themselves to Thought in a manner just as inconceivable as the sensuous impressions furnished by perception. For them, too, we invent names; their content we merely experience, and do not seize by means of Thought. What is good or bad remains just as inconceivable as what is blue or sweet; only after an immediate feeling has taught us the presence of merit and demerit in the world, and the difficulty of distinguishing them, Thought may develop from out of that which we thus experience, certain criteria which afterwards assist us in subordinating anything particular in the one or the other of those two general intuitions. Is it possible to find in concepts the peculiar vivifying nerve of Justice? We may talk much of a balance of powers, of a conformity among active and passive states, of weal or woe falling back upon him who has caused them; but what process of Thought explains the interest we exhibit in these phenomena only when they signify that which we call a Retribution? Love and hatred, are they thinkable? can their quiddity be exhausted in concepts? In whatever process of transforming duality into unity, or in whatever mode of separating what might be one, we should be desirous of perceiving their significance: we shall forever announce but an enigma. For the enigma is the pointing out of criteria, from which the full, living content to which they belong does not spontaneously flow, but must be devined, as it does not lie in them. Now, this whole, living content which Faith apprehended in the personal being of God, Philosophy not

only expected to reproduce in Thought; it imagined that it conferred upon Him, who is more than all that may be called Idea, an honorable distinction by raising Him from the obscurity of that which is experienced and felt with all the energies of heart and soul to the dignity of a concept as an object of pure Thought.

Nature and Humanity are alike subject to this treatment, which reduces the true import of all things and events to the formal manner of their appearance, and which looks upon things and events themselves merely as being designed for the realization of these forms. The creatures of nature exist, according to this view, in order to take rank in a system of classification, and to secure to the logical categories of the General, Particular, and Individual, an abundance of phenomena; their living actions and their reciprocation take place in order to celebrate the mysteries of the Differential, the Opposite, of Polarity, and Unity. — to perform a rhythm in whose oscillations Affirmation, Negation, and mutual Limitation, succeed one another. Man, engaged in the contemplation of the Spiritual world, would at one time, under the influence of Realism, view Thought and all spiritual life simply as the highest forms in which those mysterious powers, Affirmation, Negation, Contrariety and its extinction, would become manifest; and at another time, more given to Idealism, he would consider Thought to be the true being and object of all things, looking upon those forms wherein that which merely exists and transpires is presented to him as the faint prelude to the more potent theme of thought. But he went not beyond the attempt at recognizing Thought as the most essential attribute of mind—as the acme of Thought, the thinking of Thought, the pure self-reflection of the logical activity of the mind. Existence and the dignity of the moral world were, of course, not forgotten; but the Imperative in the moral nature of man had also to submit to this procedure by which everything was reduced to formal relations; it seemed as if it ought to be only to the extent it repeated, in the forms of its realization, those esteemed relations which stood for the true nature of Being.

Right here, in pointing out these errors, we drop this subject. Tacitly passing by much that is considered great and

momentous by the disciples of this school, this brief sketch shows a spirit of partiality in merely pointing out what was apt to serve as an introduction to the object we had in view in these disquisitions. Philosophy is at present neither exclusively controlled by the false Idealism we have been last opposing, nor is it possible to avoid the mistake into which it has fallen; but we do not deem it proper as yet to set forth the conviction we desire to hold as our ultimatum. Only, as a preliminary enunciation we may say: The Essential of things does not consist in thoughts, and Thought is not capable of apprehending it; but the whole Mind may nevertheless experience, in other forms of its activity and its affections, the necessary import of all Being and activity, and then Thought serves as a means of placing what was experienced in that connection which its nature requires, and in experiencing it more intensely as the mind succeeds in controlling that connection. Very old errors they are which oppose this insight.

It was long before the vivid imagination of man recognized in Thought the rein which secures to its course steadiness, certainty, and truth; it may take just as long before it will be known that the rein cannot generate the motion it is to control. The shadow of Antiquity, its mischievous over-estimation of the *Logos*, hangs still over us, and does not permit us to perceive either in the Real or the Ideal that by dint of which both are more than all Reason.

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## THE TRINITY AND THE DOUBLE PROCESSION.

By FRANCIS A. HENRY.

If it be admitted that truths concerning what we call the Infinite, the Absolute, and the Divine, supply a key to the comprehension of this mysterious universe in which, we know not how, we find ourselves, supply an explanation of this life which each of us is somehow living without memory of its beginning or foresight of its end, then it follows that the science which treats of these truths has a right to its old name of *scientia scientiarum*, and may fairly be considered the

most important study which can occupy mankind. But nowadays very few will make this admission or accept this consequence. Men's intellects are ruled by a philosophy of relativity and nescience which denies the reality or cognizability of the Infinite and Absolute, and by a physical science which declares all supra-mundane concerns to be "essentially questions of lunar politics," and conceives that it only "shows a proper regard for the economy of time" when it "declines to trouble itself about them at all." These are dark days certainly for Speculative Theology, and embittered too by that memory of happier things which is the crown of sorrows. For time was when she herself sat upon the throne of intellectual despotism, and Physical Science hid its face, and worked in holes and corners, and Free Thought was brought to the scaffold and the stake. But if while Theology wanders unregarded and uncared for now, she is brought to see that her own tyranny over men provoked their rebellion and explains their contempt, adversity will not be without its uses; and when she acknowledges that perfect liberty is due to thought, and perfect charity to error, she may regain, for she will then deserve, her old ascendancy. Meantime whoever writes upon theological subjects must content himself with the fit audience though few, and to such an audience it may not be uninteresting to consider briefly the fundamental question of all Theology, namely, the essential constitution of the Divine existence.

This is expressed in the Christian religion by the doctrine of the Trinity, a doctrine which is taught from Scripture as a mystery, and which is not explained because not understood philosophically nor sought to be so understood. The doctrine as contained in the Catholic formularies is briefly this: The one God is three Persons; the three Persons are co-eternal and in every respect co-equal, so that each Person is in the full sense God, and yet there are not three Gods, but one God; God is one and singular, yet that Singular is not one Person but three Persons. Thus expressed the doctrine is the closest contradiction, for the gist of every statement of it is that there is a unity of One and Three *taken in the same sense*. The unity and the plurality are the same thing, in the same respect, and from the same point of view. It is true

different terms are used for each; the unity is said to be of Substance and the triplicity of Persons, but these terms are only for convenience in speaking now of the unity and now of the plurality. Without such distinct terms ordinary men could hardly frame any conception of the doctrine even as a contradiction, but it should be remembered that they are terms of economy and do not inhere in the object. When God is said to be one in Substance and three in Person, it cannot be meant that He is one in a *different respect* from that in which He is three, as if the unity and the plurality lay side by side and the mind could go from one to the other, because, in the first place, the terms are equivalent in meaning. Personality *is* Substance, and Substance can be nothing else than Personality. Again, the moment the plurality is isolated from the unity, the Persons present themselves as individually independent; Godhead is rather their attribute than their substance, and the result is Tritheism, not the Christian Trinity. Furthermore, if God is One in one respect and Three in another respect, there is no longer any difficulty, it is true, but there is also no new or important truth. All that is deep and distinctive in the doctrine vanishes along with the incomprehensibility; there is no longer any mystery, and the Trinitarian controversy appears inexplicable madness. Sameness *in one respect* is not identity but only similarity, and difference in one respect is only dissimilarity, not essential difference. If this were all it means, the doctrine might be predicated of everything in the universe, for we know that everything is the same as another thing in some respect and different from it in others, but no *thing* in the universe is the same as another in one respect and also different from it in the same respect, and just this is what Christianity means by the Trinity, although it does not profess to understand it. The doctrine is expressed as a contradiction because what is contradictory is here what is essential, and the difficulty cannot be removed for the understanding without maiming or perverting the idea. The unity *is* in and through the plurality, and the plurality, as such, is unity.

Now if it be objected to the doctrine that thus stated it is incomprehensible and inconceivable, the common answer is

that although it cannot be understood it is to be believed; that it is properly not contrary to reason but above and beyond reason, and so matter for faith. The answer is not satisfactory. For, in the first place, it is not possible to believe in an unintelligibility, if by belief is to be understood any mental *activity*. Faith in an unintelligible is purely a negative attitude of mind, for it is necessarily nothing more than suspension of thought; it is simply the non-holding of an opinion to the contrary of the unintelligible proposition; no man *can* go further than this with his faith, let him try as he will. In the second place, the distinction between contrary to and above reason is a sophism as here used. If the doctrine of the Trinity be fairly presented, it is directly contrary to reason as that term is commonly used. The true answer is that its being inconceivable and incomprehensible is no objection to the doctrine of the Trinity, because conceivability and comprehensibility are no criteria of any concrete truth. Take the notion of infinite space: it is equally impossible to conceive of it as limited—for then it is not infinite—and as illimitable, for conception can only represent the bounded. In like manner it is impossible to comprehend logically the commonest facts of experience. For instance, all forms of motion embody a contradiction logically insoluble. A body cannot move where it is not, for it must be there first; and it cannot move where it is, for it is *there* and not elsewhere: therefore it cannot move at all. Thus it is no new or alarming circumstance if a truth cannot be conceived or comprehended, for there is a certain subject-matter which from its very nature is inconceivable and incomprehensible. The fact is, one must know how to suit his instruments to the work to be done, and not conclude a task to be impossible because some instruments are found inadequate. One must know the different powers and the different uses of sensuous representation, logical reasoning, and pure thinking. Logical reasoning is the activity of the abstract, and abstraction-making understanding. It holds fast to certain half principles which state only one phase of the totality of an object—such as the principles of Identity, of Contradiction and the Excluded Middle, which it calls “laws of thought”—by which it judges and determines of everything. Very useful within its proper sphere, it

becomes disorganizing and obstructive when it carries itself outside that sphere. For it finds the actual world, the eternal system of things, existing somehow illogically. This persistent contradiction of logic by actuality would puzzle it into silence if it were not so sure that it is right, and so satisfied with its lucid demonstration of how everything must be that it ignores or denies the fact of its existence otherwise. Driven helplessly round and round the circle of its own categories, Understanding cannot find the return from the abstract to the concrete and actual, but dwells forever in a shadow-world of its own creation. A great deal is said by religious people about the danger of abstract speculation upon revealed truth, but the danger consists entirely in the inquirer's ignorant or unconscious use of abstract categories for universal principles. "Common sense" places implicit faith in such categories and uses them without distrust—hence that what is one should be also three appears to it absurd—and although when it applies these categories to the totality, that is, uses them for universal principles, it falls at once into as many insoluble antinomies, it accepts this mishap with a good grace, and consoles itself with the philosophy of necessity and the limits of human thought, never thinking of investigating the categories in themselves to see how far they are adequate to the measure of all truth. Such investigation would discover that the laws of formal logic, being only forms of the abstract and partial, are not forms of the true but of the untrue. Considered dialectically they refute themselves, and show their dependence upon more concrete and synthetic principles. In the speculative procedure, on the contrary, *form* and *matter* are united, not sundered and held apart as in the logical. Hence the thought is a whole, and corresponds with the actual, or rather *is* the actual, *thought*. Speculative philosophy has nothing to do with abstractions; its cardinal principle is the falsity of any abstraction when taken for a universal, and its idealism is simply the inward or essential truth of things.

And now let us see how the Trinitarian doctrine, which is a stumbling-block to Conception and to the Understanding foolishness, appears to pure reason. Reason calmly accepts the triune God of Christianity as the highest actualization of



its greatest principle of Idealism, and the highest exemplification of what it has found to be the fundamental cosmical fact. That fact is self-conservation through self-diremption, and that principle the essential conjunction of contradictories. For the Trinitarian principle which was brought into religion by Christianity, was to a great extent anticipated by philosophy. To Plato belongs the honor of having first apprehended the secret of the universe to be spirituality, and penetrated the triune nature of its constitution, and Aristotle developed and systematized his master's discovery. If we inquire how it is that the doctrine of Trinity in Unity commends itself so immediately to the speculative reason, this will best appear on consideration of the character and working of that reason as it sifts and tries by the dialectic the categories of thought. Take the category which directly underlies the Trinitarian doctrine, that of Distinction.

All distinction originates in relation, and its first or immediate form is identity and difference, in which these are posited abstractly, or held as true in separation. This is the view of common sense and formal logic. Let us examine it. I. It holds that each thing is an identity, and distinct from all other things. (1) A is A, and not anything but A. It will be seen that "A is A" while it states directly only identity, indirectly states difference as well. If A is only A, it is not B or C, that is, it differs from them. How far does it differ? It cannot differ *universally*; for if A and B are determined existences, they are both alike in possessing being and determination; and if they are pure simples, one must be pure being and the other pure nought; and then they do not differ at all, for neither possesses content; both are the same abstraction. Hence A is like B in at least one respect; they have one predicate in common, the *summum genus*. (2) A is then like B in one respect and unlike it in another respect. Now the respect in which A is *like* B differs from the respect in which it is *unlike* B. Therefore the difference falls wholly in A. For A being both like and unlike B, in so far as it is unlike B it is unlike *itself* as it is like B. A and B have something in common; and so wherein A differs from B, it differs from that in itself which resembles B. Thus the object A appears to be a self-opposed. II. Hence simple

difference rests upon opposition. Is this the ultimate distinction? Let us see. (1) The two sides of opposition are called positive and negative; they are the logical contraries. These are correlatives. The positive is such only through its relation to the negative, and conversely the negative is negative only relatively to the positive. (2) If A is what it is only through B, then B determines A in so far as A is A; and if B is what it is only through A, then A determines B in so far as B is. Now take up this reciprocity in its unity. (3) A determines B, but, since B likewise determines A, it appears that the determination which proceeds from A returns again to A through B. That is, A determines itself through determining B. III. Hence opposition rests upon self-determination. The determination which proceeds from either side returns to that side again, and is what determines that side. It is a circular movement; one half is called positive and the other half negative: if these halves are viewed separately we have opposition, but either positive or negative grasped in its whole compass includes the other. Thus simple difference reduces to antithesis, and antithesis resolves in self-determination. The ultimate distinction is self-distinction, and this also is the only true identity.

The immediate form of self-determination is contradiction. A is A, but (also) A is not A; the non-being of A as A is its true being. But since A itself is not A, it is its own ground, and preserves itself in its contradiction. Still the difference is not annihilated in the identification. Self-relation is self-negation and this is self-diremption. Hence arises a duality; self becomes its own other. But since that Other is only the self *become*, it is at once identical and non-identical, and so self-nugatory and non-abiding. It appears inasmuch as it is Other, and disappears in that it is also Self. Hence the Other is the manifestation of an Essence, or the Phenomenon. It is not Essence in totality, for then it would be permanent; nor is it empty phenomenon, or appearance of nothing; but it is Essence in self-opposition, out of its true being; hence its disappearance, or return from Otherness, *manifests* its nugatoriness as Other, and so its whole being as Essence.

Such being' the form of the universal to pure thought, let us see how it is in actuality, and we shall find that no less in

the latter than in the former abstract identity is null, for Nature is nothing else than the realization of the dialectic we have just pursued. It is at once to be observed in the contemplation of Nature that the sensuous object undergoes change. Through its relation to other things it passes from one state of being to another. Hence the state which it occupies at any one time is no more real than that which it occupies at another, as is shown by its changing from the one to the other. Against its definite being as a This is placed its indefinite being, or capacity of becoming a different; e. g. against the liquidity of water, its vaporous and solid conditions. Hence the being of the thing resides not in its state at a given time—for no state is commensurate with the whole compass of its being—but rather in its relation to the totality of conditions—that is, to the being of all other things—upon which depends its transition from state to state. Its being lies in its immanent relativity, but relativity is negativity; it has its being therefore in its non-being—not in the immediate, positive identity which it is, but in the universal which it is not;—properly therefore it never *is*, but always is *not*. Its true actuality would be the simultaneous realization of its whole circle of potentiality, or its ideal totality, but the sensuous thing never attains this actuality, and therein precisely lies its finitude. As an identity it changes and passes away because it is out of itself, out of its whole being; it is, but even more it is not;—the flower points beyond itself to fruit and seed, and hurries to fade and fall that it may realize its aspirations. The finite thing then, as a non-abiding, is a *phenomenon*; the variable particular appears and *manifests* a Generic which is constant, or infinite. It is this Generic which *is*, and not the particular as such. For if there were nothing but finite particulars, they could not disappear and reappear; once they were gone, existence would come to an end. But the whole movement of finitude manifests its infinitude. Change, which is destruction and death to the unsubstantial particular, is in the Generic only a process of self-identification, or self-affirmation. Change, *as such*, cannot be regarded as the universal (the position of Heraclitus), for it lacks the into-itself-returning movement which is its self-preservation. In the Generic, Change is immanent change,

remaining self-identical, which is Life. The whole movement of Essence through Existence to Existing Essence is to be regarded as the eternal act of the universal, which in this self-relation is essentially free activity. As Essence—the potentiality, which is negative to finite existence—it is Capacity; as Existence it is the same *matter* realized through Energy, or Exertion, the actualizing *form*; as Existing Essence it is the Totality of matter and form, in which only these two have being.

In general, then, as may to some extent appear from the foregoing, the form of trinity is the essential form of the idea as idea. From the limitation of Reason by the categories of Understanding there arises the Antithesis, which however does not persist as duality, but falls together of itself into a Third as its presupposition and its truth. Thus the category Quantity falls asunder into the antitheses Unity and Multiplicity, or Continuity and Discreteness, and these synthesize again in Totality, which is their organic whole and true actuality. So Quality duplicates into Positive and Negative, and unifies in Self-relation; and so Actuality separates into Potentiality or Contingency and Reality or Necessity, and coalesces in Free Activity. Universally, any first and one, looked at long enough, is seen to imply and develop an opposite. Each of these Two passes into the other because each is implicitly in the other; each is both, and as much one as the other. For instance, One cannot be thought without giving rise to the notion Many, because One is simply the not-Many; its determination as One is to be the constant opposite of Many. This is exclusion or repulsion. But in Many which is so repelled, One is all the time posited; the determination of Many is simply to be the manifold of One. Hence, in excluding the Many, the One excludes itself, negates itself; but this can only be to include and reaffirm itself, and so include again the Many. In this interchange, this disappearance and reappearance of each term of the antithesis in the other, the evanescence and unreality of the abstract come out clearly. What we have everywhere is division in the indivisible, separation in the inseparable, difference in the identical, so that identity *alone* is unreality. The fact on which the universe is built is this, that identity and differ-

ence, positive and negative, being and non-being, are one indissoluble knot—are but obverse and reverse of a single truth. Alone, by themselves, they exist not; either alone is but half the truth, and so not a truth but an untruth, and that untruth which is distinctively the delusion of Pantheism. For the One as opposed to the Many is only first or immediate unity, which, in its indifference to itself from want of qualitative distinction, remains a pure negative while “opined” to be the positive. If such abstract Being be enunciated as the Absolute, it necessarily collapses to the pure void, and so from the very eagerness with which the Pantheist insists on a pure positive, and the very energy with which he would banish the negative utterly from existence, it results that his over-rarefied positive melts away like a smoke-wreath into that very negative which it sought to extinguish. Thus the Negative asserts itself as an element equally essential with the Positive in the necessity to be. The true Positive is that which contains the negative as its immanent qualification, as that by which alone it has any positive character, as that by which it is constituted to be a positive. Withdraw such immanent negation, and it, the Positive, will fall into that indeterminateness which is nothing else than the Negative itself.

The negative, I say, is an element *equally* essential with the positive, but here a further step is to be taken. One must not infer that because mediation is necessary, it is therefore the whole or the last. Mediation leads to self-mediation, the Negative leads to negation of negation, as may be put at shortest thus: The Negative is in opposition, it is negative to somewhat; hence the somewhat is also in opposition, or negative to the Negative; hence the Negative was in the first place only the negative of a negative. Positive and negative are only the abstract factors of the actual, and their truth is their Reciprocity. Here a distinction is to be noted.

Reciprocity in its immediacy is only negativity, the neutrum in which the independence of the contraries is cancelled. If this, their mutual limit, is regarded as extrinsic to them, the truth of each determination is posited in the other; each goes into the other as its ground. (This is the position of the “Correlation” theory of Force.) But thus there is in fact no ground, but rather negation of ground. If the true

being of A and of B is not in themselves respectively, but in each other, A's being is grounded in B. But if so, A is an unsubstantial: hence B's being cannot be grounded in A. But by the hypothesis B is not a self-grounded; hence it can have no being; hence A also can have no being. Consequently the relation, the mutual limit, must be their ground and substantiality; it is not a mechanical equilibrium, but a living nerve. That in which the opposites are coïncided is the concrete unity in which only they are realized. It was said above that any first and one implies and develops an opposite; it will now be further seen that such Second, when developed, coalesces with the First to the production of a Third, in which Third the opposition resolves in unity.

There remains this further distinction, namely, between Reciprocity viewed dialectically and viewed from the Idea. The synthetic third which results from the mutual involvement and reciprocal determination of the antithetic two, *results as third* only dialectically; actually, it is the true primitive as well as the true positive. The dialectic reaches it as the last, as the return from the antithesis and negation of its negation, but in itself it is the first; it is the presupposition and higher principle of the antithesis, and that which sends it forth. The dialectic is a process which comes to an end when it reaches the Idea, and goes together into itself; the end turns round to the beginning, the line curves into a circle: the process is lost in the eternity of the Idea, whose perpetual present has no beginning and has no end. The dialectic is the ascent to truth; the idea is already there.

These two important points—the substantiality of Reciprocity and its priority, or eternity—are clearly to be seen in the process of self-consciousness. Ego is first unal simplicity, or simple immediacy; as such it is, as we have seen, pure negativity, i.e. relativity. As a relative it goes apart into a duality of Ego-subject and Ego-object, and then it cancels again this self-duplication inasmuch as the confronting units are recognized as the same identity. Or, more briefly, Ego is first Ego-impliciter; as such it necessarily develops an Ego-expliciter; and this second unifying with the first, they become a third, Ego-universal. The process of consciousness is to negate itself as simple and become dually, and then to negate this

again and reaffirm itself in unity. But this unity is far from being the mere indifference of the other two; it is Personality, that totality of the Ego which only is the Ego, and which is the only Ego. The process takes nothing from the Ego's unity, because it is a process *within* the unity, eternal, ideal in it. The self-differencing of the Self is the Self's identity: the self-moving of the Self through the Self is the Self's repose.

This same spiritual movement which in its unity gives itself its determinate diversity, and in its diversity finds again its reunion with itself, is at the same time the genetic evolution of thought as thought and the immanent soul of the actual All. The Category as category in highest generalization is unification of Universality and Particularity in Singularity, for the function of every category is conjunction of a manifold into a one, or singularization of a particular through a universal. As such the Category is objective as well as subjective; it is the *noumenon*, the true "thing in itself." That which is the pulse of thought, the very being of the conscious Ego, is equally the inward being of unconscious Nature; e. g. this dog, yours or mine, is individualization of a particular, the species Dog, through a universal. Life. The Ego, then, is a true microcosm; Thought, the Category, is the *rerum natura*, is the one and all of actuality. And this is no abstract Idealism, for we see that Thought *is* only in order to be realized; Realization is its final cause, and the unity of both is the true Actual—that which has its final cause within itself. It is easy now to see the working of this objective or absolute Category. The true Identity we have found by the dialectic of the negative to be Self-relation. As Identity it is the Simple, the Universal, the undetermined possibility of all. But in that it *relates* to itself, its Activity determines it; its very nature is creative. Hence arises the Particular, the Other of self-opposition, the realizing, specific form. But the Universal and its Activity are one; hence the specializing proceeds to unity, the Singular. That which *is*, is neither the Universal as such, which would be pure abstraction, nor the Particular, which is its pure negativity, but the living Individual as Whole; absolute Being is an infinite Self. Such a perfect Entelechy, who thinks the universal,

and lives the universal, may well call himself "I AM," "Alpha and Omega," "the First and the Last," "which was, and is, and is to be."\*

Yet it is to be understood that Spirit is exclusive unity only in immediacy. As highest actualization of Thought, it contains within it Thought's essential triadic constitution, but now on Thought's own highest plane, the plane of the Idea, Personality, that is, goes on through self-mediation to tri-personality. Personality in its own determination is a monad, which in its self-completeness is indifferent to multiplicity. Hence it is met by other monads, external to it, equally indifferent. But such manifoldness of the self-completes is their mutual limitation. Relatively each monad is only the other of all the others, and it is only by abstraction that it is a non-other. For since Personality becomes, or is, a monad through inclusion of the "other" as object, it cannot now exclude the "other," when also monad, from immanence as relative. The relation of the monads, that is, is not a *between* but a *through*; they are not separately for themselves, but mutually in one another, and their whole being is in their mutual relation. Thus even personality is not a self-sufficient, and is not the ultimate; as the human being declares whose whole life *as a human being* is in his social and civic relations with his fellows. There is always too strong an accent of subjectivity upon the Self, even while it declares that universality is its native element, out of which it perishes; and so the absolute Self goes on thoroughly to universalize itself, and herein Reciprocity as substantial unity reappears once more. But it is now Reciprocity in its totality, and that is the Idea. As such it undergoes an important modification. As the reciprocity of CONCRETE *totalities* it is the negation of their anti-thetic independence, but not any longer of their being. The

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\* "The true First Principle, which Hegel names Idea, and Aristotle calls *νοῦσις ἢ αὐτὸ ἀπείρητον*, is God as self-conscious Reason. Subject and Object of Himself. Nature is his product as creator, and the world of progressive intelligent beings is his image. This statement is odious to some who style themselves "scientific," for the reason that they are still obliged to be on the alert lest their dogmatism fall back into the mere implicit faith of Religion—an issue to be guarded against with all caution. But the strictest and severest logical procedure followed out to its result, will inevitably lead to this concrete first principle—the recognizing Reason."—W. T. HARRIS.




mutual relation which annuls their independence, is just as much constitutive of their being. *And* since it is now their determination to *be as* independents, their independence is, in the act of its annulling, restored. While in the earlier stages one substantial unity resulted from reciprocal negation of each other by two—as above, not the Generic nor the Particular, but the Individual exists—here, on the contrary, all three are substantial unities. The synthesis is no longer negative unity—a unity which negates its factors—but now a unity purely affirmative—subsisting through the affirmance of its factors. All limitation has vanished out of Relation, and has become transformed into recognition. Hence the reciprocity is no longer dual but triple, and its simultaneous unity is the Idea. The Idea is the unal totality of the syllogism, not as a *process* but as a *simultaneous thought*. And that is the difference between the logical and the speculative syllogisms. In the former, each of the terms passes for an identity independently distinct, and the uniting of the extremes through the middle is an external one which leaves them still in their independence. In the speculative, on the contrary, the extremes are neither independent towards each other nor towards the middle term. The extremes are not *likened* to each other, but *identified* with each other in the middle. The middle is not that which is *common* to the extremes, but that in and through which the extremes are self-identical. Hence each place may be occupied by any one of the terms, for all are the same; and if they are all the same, all are one. But the syllogism in which the Universal, the Particular, and the Singular, are each not successively but simultaneously the middle term, is no longer a mere syllogism, but an immediate grasp of self-mediation. This is that “knowing by wholes” which philosophy speaks of. Seen from the Idea, universality, particularity, singularity, are all identical, are each the same, are each the whole—One, coalescing in a triune, transparent distinction. Here Identity and Distinction, carried up to their highest, melt together, blend together, are transfigured in dazzling mist, are all but lost. One turns giddy in looking, but as the eye grows accustomed, the head steadies. The Singular *is* the Universal—universality is its constitutive

quality or determination; the Universal *is* the Singular—its being is wholly in singularity; and the Particular, held between both, is each, or in each, and both are in it. Hence the identification of each with all and all with each gives each the determination of all, and, instead of one, there are three substantialities. As the unity of the ultimate category is Spirituality, so the unity of the Idea is triune Spirit—One *through* its Threeness. This, the unity of the Idea, is a notion entirely unique, as distinct from the negative unity of Reciprocity as that is from the abstract unity of Identity. And so when Hegel declares that “the Idea is the demonstration of God as He is in His eternal essence before the creation of the world or a single finite creature, the statement cannot but commend itself to the Trinitarians.\*

I have avoided any express reference to the Trinity in this attempt to exhibit the highest principle of thought, because I preferred that the identity of the Christian dogma and the philosophic truth should, if possible, declare itself. It seemed better to trust to the reader’s finding for himself that

\* The categories of actuality in their triadic development and connection may, in a manner, be represented by the following table:



Reason leads him step by step to the comprehension of that which Religion presents to his faith, and so coming to *see* what before he believed without seeing,—rather than by frequent comparison or plausible suggestion to lead him to one of two probable alternatives, either to accept *on such persuasion* the true relation of philosophy to religion—and so only to add another article to his belief—or else to turn away in impatience from what he might deem sophistry and artifice. I trust I am not too sanguine in thinking that the careful and candid reader will by this time see the truth of the statement made at the outset, that the doctrine of the Trinity expresses the great first principle of all Idealism, and exemplifies what it has discovered to be the fundamental cosmical fact. If so, he will observe that what was said concerning the Phenomenon and Essence contains the necessary idea of the revelation of the God-man historically; that the exhibition of Reciprocity, not as an abstract relation, but the most concrete of substantialities, is the universal truth on which rests the personality of the Holy Ghost; and that the self-mediation of Personality to tri-Personality is the inward necessity of the passage from Hebrew Monotheism to the Christian Trinity. It may be seen that Religion contains a theistic development strictly dialectical. The Old Testament is concerned with GOD in His relation to nature and humanity. (“In the beginning, GOD created the heaven and the earth. . . . And GOD said, Let us make man in our image.”) The New Testament contains the self-determining of the Absolute, in which itself is distinguished from itself and posited as an identical Other, which is manifested to men as Man. (“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with GOD, and the Word was GOD. . . . And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us.”) In this antithetic relation as incarnate, the Other is at once identical and non-identical, and hence non-abiding. (“I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world; again, I leave the world, and go to the Father.”) The return from Otherness reveals the synthetic unity which was the presupposition of the antithesis. (“For the Holy Ghost was not yet, because Jesus was not yet glorified.” “If I go not away, the Comforter will not come; but if I depart, I will send him unto you.”) As their identity, the

synthetic third has the same determination with the other two. ("God is a Spirit"—"Now the Lord is that Spirit.") And this threefold sameness is unity. ("There are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and these three are one.") Thus the appearance of the Trinitarian Idea at once in pure thought and in revealed religion witnesses to the equal truth of reason and revelation, since it is their common content by which each illustrates and confirms the other. And this is the point I would urge. My object in this paper is mainly to show how Philosophy and Christianity at once ally themselves in a natural and kindly bond as soon as Philosophy discovers how deep the speculative truth of Christianity is, and Christianity discovers that Philosophy issues in an orthodox theology. I may not have succeeded in this attempt. It may be objected by some that the above treatment is too metaphysical and obscure, and it may be criticised by others as unscientific and not sufficiently profound. And it may be open to both objections, for the common fate of what is meant to suit opposite requirements is to suit neither. But if any one should be led by it to a thorough examination into the essential harmony between Christian Theology and the results of profound and exhaustive thought, this paper will not be altogether worthless. To the philosopher I would say, that the religion which alone among all others recognizes the deepest and abstrusest of philosophic truths, and makes it the foundation of its theology, he must admit to be the most philosophic of all religions, and the only one which attains to a comprehension of the Divine. But, further, such philosophic depth pertains only to the religion in itself. He who knows with what slow, painful, partial, and uncertain progress the Idea has worked itself out in philosophy, cannot dream that it was reached in thought by the twelve Apostles, men destitute of philosophic culture and incapable of philosophic thought. It is clear that the men who promulgated the doctrine of the Trinity—"baptizing all nations in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost"—did not understand the speculative significance of the message they bore; it was for them, as for their hearers, a mystery. Hence the possession by Christianity of this truth, which it cannot understand or ex-

plain, is proof that the Truth has come down to men from heaven. On the other hand, I would say to the Christian: This doctrine of the Trinity we all acknowledge, this we all believe to be the highest truth; what shall we say, then, of a philosophy of the Conditioned to whose limited religious thought this truth is an incomprehensible contradiction, philosophically absurd? As sound Trinitarians, as thinking Christians, how shall we number ourselves among those whose scheme of thought must shut its eyes and *bolt* the central dogma of the Catholic faith—whereby, although nourished and brought up on inconsistencies, it is all but choked? How shall we listen in patience to such men when we find another philosophy to which our great mystery is native and kindly food? a philosophy not of the Unconditioned, but of the Self-conditioning, which these men fancy themselves to have refuted, while their own language shows that they cannot read its alphabet; a philosophy which, having arrived at the Trinitarian principle by its own road, is ready to accept the constitution of the Absolute as revealed in Christianity, and is ready to accept Christianity for the reasonableness of its revelation. Further, it is in this philosophy alone that religious convictions find a rescue from the attacks of the reflective understanding, and that a solution is obtained of the antinomy in which faith and reason are at this day involved. For the essential triadic form governs the development of the cognitive faculty of man. This begins in simple apprehension, proceeds through reflective reasoning, and arrives at pure thinking. This threefold movement of cognition corresponds with the threefold aspect of the object as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; and as the last of these is the unity of the other two, and the whole truth of the object, so speculation is the unity of the other two faculties, and the totality of cognition. The history of human thought in modern times has only been the progress of its necessary movement. The revelation of the Spiritual made in Christianity was first seized by Apprehension as a pure objective, the thesis; then when the activity of Reflection was slowly awakened, negative thinking entered upon the scene, the subjective claimed its place, the Antithesis arose in sharply defined antagonism, and systems of Church and State were

shaken and overthrown. The conflict of Thesis with Antithesis still goes on—for assertion and counter-assertion of opposite half truths can never avail to silence either—but speculative thought has meanwhile advanced to Synthesis, and calls on the world to follow it. The philosophy which began in the last century with Kant has reëstablished all spiritual principles, held implicitly by the early ages, in their whole truth—that is, in explicit unity with the negation of Understanding—and so this philosophy, and it alone, brings us completion and rest.

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The constitution of the God-head as trinity in unity being established or admitted, there arises another consideration respecting it scarcely less important, namely, the relation of the Three Persons to each other according to their syllogistic derivation. The Catholic doctrine as to this derivation is briefly this: The First Person is self-existing, God of Himself; the Second Person is from the First, God of God; the Third Person is from the First and Second together, according to the Latin Church—according to the Greek Church, from the First only. In other words, the First, the Father, neither proceeds nor is begotten; the Second, the Son, does not proceed but is begotten of the Father; the Third, the Holy Ghost, is not begotten but proceeds from the Father—or, from the Father and the Son. This relation corresponds substantially with that of the pure syllogism, which is thus expressed: “The Universal includes *under it* the Particular and the Singular; so likewise the Particular includes *under it* the Singular; on the contrary, the Singular includes *in it* the Particular and the Universal, and the Particular includes *in it* the Universal. The Universal is more *extensive* than the Particular or Singular, but the latter are more *comprehensive* than the former, which for the reason that it is included in the Singular is a determinateness of it. The Universal *inheres in* the Particular and Singular, while the latter are *subsumed under* the former.”\* It will be evident from the above, as well as from the whole tenor of the preceding

\* Jour. Spec. Phil., vol. iii. p. 531.

argument, that the philosophic idea of the Trinity contains of necessity the Procession of the Spirit from both the other Persons, so constituting Him their eternal unity. For the Second Person *is* the First in self-opposition. The One is self-dirempted into Two, and remains not in that duality, but moves on in duality, and as duality, to unity in a Third. The Self once self-duplicated, what further proceeds from the Self must proceed from it *as* duplicated; else what is opposed to to the Self in the duplication is not the Self, but another. The Third proceeding is, then, the unity of the Two because it is their reunion; they were the same One before they were Two. But the First cannot be made the unity of the Second and Third, as it is in the scheme of the single Procession, for *they* were not the same, and though they should meet in another they would not meet in themselves. Hence the single Procession which sunders the mutual relation of the Son and Spirit, pulls down the key-stone of the unity of the Trinity. If the Second and Third Persons have no relation to each other except a common origin, they are in no essential unity; there is an end of the mystery of the Trinity, and we are left with a sort of family relation in which the Spirit has the place of younger son. Now it is always to be borne in mind that the Trinity being the unity of the Idea, any question of origin or derivation of one Person from another concerns not its substantial actuality but merely its formal ideality. What is, what always was, is the One *eternally* gone out into Three, the Three eternally gone into One. As was said above of the process of self-consciousness, the dialectical process takes nothing from the unity because it is an eternal or ideal process. It is easily seen how weak it would be to suppose self-consciousness as taking place in time: as if there were in actuality first an Ego as Subject, then an Ego as Object, and then Personality; for if the Ego-subject were an actuality it would be complete in itself, and any process would be superfluous; but in fact the Ego is *always* in the last state of return to unity out of diversity. It is the same weakness to derive the Trinity from the Unity in time. For it must be remembered that although the Persons are totalities, and as such persist affirmatively in the synthesis, none the less the being of each Person is wholly in the synthetic relation; the

relation is His essential being, and out of the relation He has no being. If God the Father were sufficient to Himself—if God were complete in one Person—any further, God would either necessitate Polytheism, or be a created being. The misapprehension which looks upon any final concrete category as chronologically later in realization than the abstract ones at the beginning, would, if logical, lead to Pantheism, for it sets up an abstract universal instead of a concrete one. This misapprehension was the ground of a heresy which long rent the Church with discord. The error of Arius was making the abstract *prius* of the Father an actual *prius*, and it arose from his inability to think from the Idea, or under the “form of eternity.” The battle was fought, however, rather on the ground of consequences than of principle, and the principle was not quite definitely exploded. Hence, as Dr. Schaff says,\* “the Nicene fathers still taught, like their predecessors, a certain *subordinationism* which seems to conflict with their doctrine of consubstantiality” (of the Son) . . . . “Father, Son, and Spirit, all have the same divine essence, yet not in a coördinate way, but in an order of subordination.” The Father was considered the primal divine subject, to whom alone absoluteness belongs, since He has the essence of Himself and from no other; the Son, on the contrary, has the essence by communication from the Father in a secondary, derivative way; hence a certain inferiority was held of the Son to the Father, which inferiority was still more applicable to the Holy Ghost. Scriptural argument for this theory of subordination was found abundantly, but, as Dr. Schaff remarks,\* “all such passages refer to the historical relation of the Father to the incarnate Logos in his estate of humiliation (the relation of the Essence to the Phenomenon, as such), not to the eternal, metaphysical relation of the Father to the Son.” Where, as in many instances, Christ asserts His inferiority to the Father, such assertion cannot be allowed to contradict other passages in which His co-equality and essential unity with the Father are distinctly stated. For in the former cases He is to be understood as speaking solely from that earthly estate of humiliation in which His

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\* History of the Christian Church, by Philip Schaff, D.D., vol. ii. p. 681.



full divinity was temporarily laid aside. As incarnate He was out of His true being, and whereinsoever He was inferior to the Father He was in the same kind and in the same degree inferior to Himself as He is in that true being of co-equal Godhead. For the doctrine of the Trinity is precisely this, that the divine essence is *not* such that it can be held entire by a single Personality, and be by Him communicated. That essence is immanent reciprocity. Just in that the Father is determined *as* Father, as ἀρχὴ and source, lies His incompleteness as God. The generation of the Son is the demonstration that He is as necessary to the Father as the Father. The Father as necessarily looks forward to the Son and Spirit for his completion as they look backward to Him for their origin. This point is distinctly brought out in the 25th article of the Athanasian Creed: "And in this Trinity none is before or after another; none is greater or less than another; but the whole Three Persons are co-eternal together and co-equal." This "remnant of ante-Nicene subordinationism" still survived however, and so, when the doctrine of the Holy Ghost came afterward to be considered, His necessary Procession from the Son as well as from the Father was not seen into, being obscured from men's view by their monarchian theory. It must be matter of regret that so important a point as the Double Procession should not have been clearly stated by the creed-making Councils, but have been left an open question to become the occasion of a wide and lasting schism. But, at least, the doctrine was by no means denied. The intent of the Constantinopolitan Creed in affirming the Procession from the Father was not to limit such Procession to Him and exclude the idea of Procession from the Son also, for no such idea was in the mind of its framers. Their statement was simply aimed at the Pneumatomachi, and intended to affirm the divinity of the Spirit by giving Him a relation to the Father as immediate as that of the Son. Whether the Procession were single or double was a point left unsettled by the Council because left untouched. Nor are the Greek Fathers at one upon the question. According to Dr. Schaff, some—as Athanasius, Basil, and the

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\* *Ib.* p. 683.

Gregories—give the Procession from the Father without denying it from the Son also; others—as Epiphanius, Marcellus of Ancyra, and Cyril of Alexandria—derive the Spirit from both Father and Son; and others—Theodoret and Theodore of Mopsuestia—“would admit no dependence of the Spirit upon the Son.” It would seem that these last rather misunderstood than denied the double Procession, which is far from subordinating the Third Person to a Second, itself subordinate (what seems the ground of their objection), but is, on the contrary, the negation of the subordination of that Second, and the perfect co-equality of the Three.

The difference with regard to the point between the Greek and Latin churches arose from the fact that while the former stopped with the Nicene statement of the Trinitarian doctrine, the latter carried on its development to the formation of the Athanasian Creed. In this work of development St. Augustine was chiefly eminent, and his services the most considerable. Their main effect was to eliminate the subordination or monarchian view, bringing out more sharply the consubstantiality of the Three Persons and their numerical unity, and in consequence asserting the Procession from the Son. His presentment of the doctrine gradually met with universal acceptance in the West, and at length the insertion of the famous clause *Filioque* in the Nicene Creed by the Council of Toledo, A. D. 589, gave the doctrine of the double Procession a place in the Catholic symbol. The questions relating to the *Filioque* separate into three classes: those concerning the doctrine considered in itself; those concerning the Scriptural authority for the doctrine; and those concerning the historical right of the clause to a place in the creed. The last two points do not belong to the present consideration, but a suggestion or two may be allowed.

As to the second:—while there is no direct or distinct statement of this doctrine in the Scriptures, as there is of scarcely any doctrine of speculative Theology, it may safely be claimed that it has as ample scriptural warrant as any other doctrine of a like character. The very same language and expressions from which the Procession from the Father is inferred are, with one exception, used to denote the relation to the Son. Some have doubted the double Procession on the strength of this

exception—John xv. 26: “the Spirit of truth which proceedeth from the Father”—and the absence of any corresponding passage asserting with the same expressness Procession from the Son. But if this language of our Lord be construed as denying the Procession from Himself as eternal God, there are many other of His utterances, made after He had “emptied Himself” of His divinity and taken upon Him the form of a servant, which must be construed as a still more express denial of as many attributes of deity, and which taken together amount to a denial of His divinity altogether. In short, we are not to expect from the God incarnate, speaking of Himself in His then condition, a characterization of His true or absolute condition as pure Spirit. The evidence for such a doctrine as this is to be gathered out of a wise and comprehensive study of the whole Scripture; no single text is of weight to prove or disprove it; else the personality of the Holy Ghost, for instance, might be shaken by repeated expressions which harmonize much more closely with the notion of an emanation or influence than with that of a person. And if this and other admitted doctrines rest upon Scriptural language not perfectly distinct, and expressions not entirely unquestionable, it can be no prejudice to the double Procession—one among the least likely to be explicitly taught—that it has no firmer ground. It may also be remarked that there seems to be an argument for the Latin doctrine in the very term Procession. If the Procession is as exclusively from the Father as the generation is, it is difficult to see why a different and more general term should be employed to describe what is after all the same thing, production. But the difference in terms becomes intelligible and indispensable when we consider that one states a production which is necessarily by a single agent, and the other production in general, in which two or more producers may concur.

As to the historical question, it is to be borne in mind that the right of the clause *Filioque* to a place in the creed is a point entirely distinct from the truth of the doctrine it expresses. This latter point was never in dispute between the Greek and Latin Churches. The Eastern Church simply claimed that no articles of faith were of authority unless promulgated by a general council, and ratified by the acceptance

of the whole Church. But it was not until three hundred years after the Council of Toledo that any controversy arose between the two communions. And then, when in character, interests, and modes of life, the people of the East and West had drifted apart, when the active and arrogant ambition of the Roman see had roused the jealousy of Constantinople, the question of the Procession was recurred to as a recent doctrinal centre around which more worldly and personal causes of discord might array themselves. As between the Greek Church and the Anglican or American, the feud is an anachronism, and for the separation between us to continue without an effort made by either party to remove the barrier—as it were, only carelessly left up—is surely a reproach to both. We may admit that the Greek position with regard to articles of faith is technically the safest and best, and such admission should lead them to recognize and assent to the Augustinian doctrine of the Western Church as, however irregularly introduced, unquestionably the true, and the crowning and completing truth of the great doctrine of the Trinity.

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## FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE, by A. E. KRÖGER.

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### BOOK II.

FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN REGARD TO THE PRACTICAL FACULTY.

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#### CHAPTER I.

*The Causality of the Ego being checked by a non-Ego is posited as Impulse —the Check of the non-Ego as a Material World, and from the positing of both a Tendency of the Ego to overcome that check is posited.*

In Book First we have considered immediate external perception as a causality of the presupposed absolute life through its immediate being. How far this view will prevail in our Second Book will shortly appear. Nevertheless it is evident that we must commence our investigation with such a causality, and hence we do so now, though in another manner. It is, however, to be remembered, that the word Being is here

taken strictly to signify an absolutely upon-itself-reposing being.

1. Let us then assume that such a causality of life through its immediate being is checked: what will then arise in the checked life? That causality, in so far as it is in the life, can surely not be annihilated itself; only its manifestation can be checked; that causality or determined activity and freedom remains in the life, but in a manner as a causality which has no causality. How do we term this in language? I believe, an *Impulse*. Hence through the checking of the causality there arises in life an impulse: and this is the first place where we have deduced, in its proper connection and from its possibility, an independent being of mere and separate freedom, which in our first book we merely postulated. If we ascribe to life an actual causality, freedom always must immediately and inseparably dissolve in the being produced by it, and can have no separate being of its own at all.

2. An independent being of freedom is, according to our previous results, consciousness. Hence there must arise in life, under the above condition, a consciousness of the impulse by virtue of a limitation. Now, an immediate and self-made consciousness of an actual limitation is called *Feeling*, and the general faculty of such a consciousness is called *Sensuousness*: and since in the present instance consciousness is directed upon the actual condition of life itself, this feeling is a feeling of self, and this sensuousness an *inner* sensuousness.

I add this remark: that which thus limits life can be held to be, firstly, a *force*, and a force stronger than the life, and which, as opposing itself to life, must then be posited outside of it as an independent being; which assumption is the basis of an objective dogmatism, a transcending beyond free life. But it may, perhaps, also be held to be a limitation within that life itself, not however in so far as that life is free, but in a higher being of that life, in relation to which that being of the life whereof we have hitherto spoken would then be only a lower and subordinated being; an assertion, which, if proved, would cancel the above dogmatism and found an immanent idealism.

3. Life has now been elevated above its stage of immediate

causality into the region of consciousness. Hence if there really is an impulse in the life it must have immediate causality in that same region of consciousness. But how will consciousness be able to connect with this feeling of an impulse, and what manner of consciousness will it be when it thus connects? Let us investigate this.

First of all, life contains absolutely through its being freedom a determined faculty; and this faculty has arrived at an independent existence only through the being checked of its immediate causality, since in its unchecked causality it was always evaporating into and flowing together with being. Now since every independent being of freedom results in consciousness, the check produces immediately, together with the consciousness of the impulse, a consciousness of the faculty; with this distinction, that the latter, as not expressing an actual condition but merely a possible activity of life, is called by us, not feeling, as we call the impulse, but contemplation.

Now let us stop at this contemplation of the real faculty to have causality within the sphere of being. It is, as we have seen, a faculty to progress within time through a series of conditions to the intended end. It is this faculty which is to arise on the occasion of an impulse to exercise real causality, and which is to enter contemplation immediately when it thus arises.

The matter stands thus: in this state of affairs, immediately free life is absolutely checked, and cannot progress a single step within the sphere of being. Let us call this limit, which at the same time expresses the intended causality, D. Now this D it cannot immediately attain, being checked. But there may be a point, A, which life is able to produce through immediate causality, and if this point A is produced life may be able to produce another point, B—A being the condition of the realization of B; and again, B being produced, life may be able to realize C, and thus, finally, the originally intended D. If a contemplation or conception of this series arises in life, it must therein behold its own faculty to produce D.

Now this faculty to produce D lay undoubtedly concealed in life and in its absolute being originally; but that it has

now become an actual faculty of life, completely within its free power, and that having thus gotten the faculty within its power, life can at once proceed to realize it, is effected solely by means of the conception life has now attained of it. Only through the conception has life gotten possession of this faculty, for before the conception it had not got it; and we here obtain an insight into the very important proposition, that the conception liberates and can become the ground of an actual faculty. Nay, the very superiority of consciousness over unconscious nature consists in this, that the latter always works blindly whatever it can produce, whereas the former can moderate its work by conceptions and can regulate them according to a rule.

4. As soon as the impulse to have causality exists and continues, there arises in consciousness a desire to form the just described conception of a possible causality to produce a certain end from the contemplation of the faculty in general. The question now is, through what is this forming of such a conception conditioned? I maintain that, besides the already described contemplation of the faculty in general, it is conditioned also by an image of the checking power, or resistance; for if the conception of that possible causality is to arise in the mind—which it does by means of quiet reflection and consideration—the faculty as well as the resistance must be taken hold of by the mind, compared with each other and calculated, until it is found that a certain direction of the faculty will necessarily conquer the resistance. But how does such an image of the resistance arise? Evidently it is not a matter of feeling, for feeling involves only the impulse, which can lead at the utmost to the conception of a limitation; nor of contemplation, for contemplation is directed only upon the faculty. We know this image as the condition of the conception of our possible causality; but this conception is a product of free imagination, which is here—supposing a knowledge of the faculty as well as of the resistance—altogether production, and consciously and considerably productive, since it proceeds in accordance with the rule given it by both premises. Thus it appears that the image of the resistance must also be created by productive imagination, not consciously however—since itself is not intended to be

created, but only that the creation thereof is conditioned by it—but blindly, and absolutely in consequence of the impulse which craves its satisfaction. In short, in producing this image of a resistance, the productive power of imagination must have causality absolutely through its being, i. e. as a productive power of imagination.

5. How, then, will such an image result? Firstly, as that of an absolute resistance, and hence as posited outside of the Ego into the sphere of Being itself, since Being itself is opposed to life or to the Ego. This positing outside is precisely what we have characterized in Book First as objective thinking. Secondly, as the *image* of a resistance in an image; for it is resistance only in an image and its other relations, whereof hereafter, belong to feeling and cannot enter the image from that feeling; hence as resisting that very imaging and annulling its freedom.

For let us consider, that here, where imaging first begins, we have still the whole infinite freedom of imaging or absolute positing. This freedom is limited in its infinity and this limitation is imaged. Hence there are in this image two elements in reciprocal relation and opposition with each other: 1. The infinite faculty of positing, grasped in the unity of the image, and which we have above described as *Extension*—an empty extension, which, as the image of the faculty itself, is everywhere penetrable by, and transparent to, the Ego; 2. The opposition to this infinite faculty of positing, namely, just the same kind of an infinite positing on the part of the resistance, whereby that transparency and penetrability are cancelled. The whole, which arises from these two components, is the image of *matter*.

But again, the image of the resistance is most certainly *posited*. Hence there must be pictured also an opposition to this positing; otherwise that image would not be the image of a resistance. It is posited, through the positing of the Ego generally, as *being*; but now the resistance must, moreover, posit itself with this its being; and this its own being which the resistance posits together with that being, which it derives from the general positing of the Ego, results in a further determined being, or a quality.

Let us make clear this latter fact by a further and pro-



founder consideration of the external sense. The external sense is, according to the above, a limitation of productive imagination through the self-positing of a resistance generally. Thus the collective sense, feeling or the sense of touch, is nothing but the power of imagination to extend, in a state of limitedness. Through this sense we perceive matter as impenetrable. Now we say at present nothing about this sense as furnishing, besides this impenetrability, still other qualities of matter: warmth, coldness, &c. The easiest to be comprehended sense for quality is sight, which is distinguished from feeling as a collective sense, that the latter expresses only the positing in the act, whereas seeing is the image of the positedness, and of a positedness which is transparent to itself as such. "I see an object" signifies: "The positing of it is completed and I am limited to its positedness." But I do not see through the object signified: the inner condition of the object has not been posited through me, hence is also not known to me, but is posited through the object itself. The limit of this my positing and of the itself-positing of the object is then characterized by a further determination of my seeing, which is ascribed to the object; that is, my seeing is no longer a pure seeing, but the seeing of a color, as the further determination of pure seeing.

These three components form an organic whole amongst themselves, as has already been proved in the first book; and hence it is absolutely impossible that an external objective being should be formed without having sensuous qualities and being immaterial. Hence it is also impossible that matter can be without quality, or that a quality can be otherwise than adherent to a material body.

6. With this investigation our whole view is changed and expanded. In our first book we considered what we then called external perception, in its own triplicity as a for-itself-existing and separate affair. But now we have found it to be a mere link of a greater organic whole, consciousness. For the synthetic period, which we have described, consists of the following three chief components: 1. A feeling—namely, of an impulse; 2. A contemplation—namely, of the real faculty to have causality within the sphere of being; and 3. An image of the resistance. And since this latter image is produced

by the free and absolutely productive power of imagination, without consciousness of freedom, we may very properly call the whole labor in this imaging a *thinking*, since this new view brings even that which formerly we called sensuous affection and contemplation into the one general sphere of thinking.

7. Now let us ask: wherein lies the focus of external perception when we consider it as a separate matter; that is to say, in what condition of it doth life manifest itself? Evidently in the creating of the image. Not the contemplation of extension, which occurs in it, is the focus and central point of its condition: this extension is merely imaged and objectively posited, and when thus posited, an opposition is given to it. Again: not sensuousness is that focus and central point; for sensuousness is only the real point of conflict of the opposites, and as such it also is not immediate, but is objectively posited. Finally: the third component of external perception, the positing, is certainly immediate, since it is the act of imaging or the creating of an image; but it is also posited in the same undivided moment as objective, thus becoming the particular sense for quality, as has been illustrated in the above example of seeing. Hence the whole external perception is not a consciousness at all, but simply an object of consciousness, created by the absolute production of the power of imagination for consciousness. Thus it appears that the thinking which occurs in it is a double thinking, being firstly an actual thinking, as the creating of an image, and secondly a thought thinking, as the objectivated sense for quality; and the contemplation which occurs in it is likewise double, being firstly an actual contemplation, in the creation of extension, and secondly a contemplated contemplation, in that the freedom of it finds a resistance in matter.

Thus, then, the external sense is not an actual sense, but merely the image of the only true sense which remains, of the internal sense. All this might, in fact, have been discovered in mere observation from the circumstance that space as well as the external sense generally is posited outside of the real internal essence of the Ego, the external sense being even embodied into a tool of the senses.

8. Thus the matter stands, therefore. That act of the productive power of imagination cannot, however, arise to consciousness, but melts together immediately with its product. Hence external perception appears to be not an object of consciousness, such as we have shown it to be, but as a true consciousness, and moreover as an immediate and unconditioned consciousness; and thus it happens that the external world is made to appear to ordinary consciousness as an immediate object of consciousness. Now, how have we proceeded that we should have arrived at an insight of the opposite as the truth? We have through means of thinking gathered up external perception into a higher connection, and thus have brought the connecting link, which remains hidden to common consciousness, before our artificially created consciousness. Only thus, indeed, could that insight have been arrived at. Hence whosoever does not undertake this thinking together with us, or, though trying to do so, is not penetrated by its evidence because he does not proceed in the right manner, simply does not get that insight; and all his asserting, getting angry, and averring that he cannot do better, helps him nought. We know it right well, and moreover can prove to him, which he cannot do, that he really cannot look at the matter other than in the way he does, simply because he does not fulfil the conditions of the other view. Should some one, however, interpret our proposition as asserting that we merely imagine things—as indeed some pretended philosophers have actually interpreted it—he would thereby simply exhibit his infinite lack of understanding, his absolute incapacity to be taught, and to enter into other ideas than those he already possesses, and to take hold of two thoughts in such a manner as not to have forgotten the first when he gets to the second. We *imagine* in the higher regions of freedom, where we can also leave off imagining. But that imaging, whereof we have spoken, we cannot leave off at all under the presupposition of an impulse which we shall likely find to belong absolutely to the life of consciousness. Such an imaging is absolutely necessary, and for that very reason its result forces itself upon us. And thus, I think, we have deduced also external perception.

9. The clear result is this: that which has been suggested

by the relation of life has here been under consideration, and which may perhaps remain as the only true, namely, a *limitation* of life, is not at all touched in the object of external perception. That object is a mere opposition to the power of imagination, and is not at all anything by itself, as indeed it does not pretend to be; it is simply the product of a relation to another, to the power of imagination. For surely that through which the thing really exists, and hence can alone enter into connection with us, and which therefore must surely constitute its essence, is its force or *power*: but power is nothing material, nor manifests itself to any external sense; it is simply thought. Hence this power, something altogether unsensuous and supersensuous, were the real thing. What, then, can this space-filling matter claim to be, with its qualities, and how can it ever pass for the real thing?

10. Nevertheless the preliminary question arises here, requiring however, also, only a preliminary answer at present: how is such an image of a resistance usually connected in its general form with the conception of the desired causality? Evidently thus: the whole resistance, to which the impulse relates in its totality and which we seek to get at in parts by proceeding through its various conditions, must be together, and in this, its being together, it is posited in space. In it is, at the same time and as one, that which afterwards in time becomes a many-fold and a succession. Hence the problem is to hunt up in space a point—corresponding to the A described in 3—wherein the causality may commence. For instance: in matter, this resisting power to be overcome is the connection of the parts, and this connection is to be broken first in one point, and from that one to the next.

11. The image of the immediate causality of the Ego is a straight line; hence also all such immediate causality appears as occurring in lines—pressure, impact, &c. If an unsurmountable resistance occurs, the causality moves off in another straight line, and the result is a straight-lined angle. Causality in curved lines occurs only mediately and with considerateness, according to a rule: for instance, around a given centre; whereas the straight line breaks out immediately and without any considerateness, being indeed the very outbreak of free construction. Curvedness is the exact

opposite of freedom, or its limitation; for which reason, indeed, universal space is necessarily figured as a globe.

People have inquired after the ground of the three dimensions of space. Now, firstly, all that is needed is to get at the correct conception of dimension, which will show itself as soon as we shall exhibit its ground. Secondly, it is simply needed to know where to look for this ground; namely, not in the region of conceptions, but of contemplations; for here is a mere contemplation, and the problem is a limitation of contemplation. "Show me the ground of the three dimensions" signifies nothing but: "Put me on a stand-point where this contemplation will necessarily occur to me." This stand-point is, for instance, not that of the point; for from me as a centre an infinite number of lines are possible, and if these were called dimensions space would have an infinite number of dimensions. The stand-point of the required contemplation is rather that of the line as the image of freedom, and hence also of time. This line (freedom), having but one dimension, must be limited by the above resistance in all possible ways. But there are three such ways: it is limited in length at both ends, in breadth again at both ends, whereby space changes from the line into a plane, and finally in height and depth, whereby space changes from a plane to a geometrical body. These are the three possible directions in which to reconstruct original space, that is, if we start from and presuppose the line. Hence, in true opposition to the image of the Ego's causality, space has dimensions, and three of them.

12. We have called external perception generally a *thinking*; previously we said that it was a production of an absolute power of imaging. Hence in so far as we hold both propositions seriously, which we do, we consider all thinking as producing through an absolute power of imaging, and *vice versa*. Thinking is, therefore, nothing passive, receptive, or anything like that.—If former philosophers had made the conception of thinking clear in this way, they would have necessarily ere this put Philosophy on the right track.—Above, we described thinking as a going out of an inner and immediate consciousness. But this inner is feeling and contemplation, both as the immediate being of freedom, and is thus immediate consciousness. Now we say thinking goes out of it. In what manner? Certainly not in the way of Be-

ing, which indeed does not occur here at all, but in the manner of consciousness, which does occur here. But since this is a going out of immediate consciousness, it must be an imaging, and moreover an absolute imaging, a pure creating of a new consciousness. To be sure, a creating according to a rule, and by no means blind and lawless, as those assume who understand us to say that we merely imagine things.

This established conception of thinking will be found to confirm itself altogether. Here we particularly think a resistance of the productive power of imagination, or thinking itself in its most universal form; hence we have here the absolutely first thinking. Productive imagination produces itself—of course, in an image—and images a resistance to this thus produced itself. This is, in short, the here-occurring function of thinking, or of the absolute power of imaging; which power is here immanent, transcendent, remaining in and going out of itself.

With another kind of thinking, of which we shall speak hereafter, it will be different. In it the power of imaging will image not itself, but another faculty given to it before in contemplation, and will image an opposition to this faculty, in which latter function alone it is pure thinking.

13. We also in philosophizing, simply as such, must think; that is, produce absolutely through the power of imaging.

What we have just said may be divided into two chief parts. Firstly, we had to note: under such and such a presupposition (of an impulse, &c.), a picture of a resistance must be created. This "must" expresses that another thinking will connect with the first one, as the presupposed thinking, immediately and as inseparable from it; hence this "must" expresses that through the immediate causality of thinking itself the second thinking will grow out of the first one without any action on the part of freedom: and thus the second link must have arisen—if our assertion is correct—in every one of our readers who has thought the first link correctly, and must so have arisen without any act of his own freedom. The desired evidence must have taken hold of him immediately. It is quite otherwise with the second part of what has been said, namely, with the question: what will this image of a resistance result in?

## HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND.

Translated from the German\* of K. ROSENKRANZ, by G. S. HALL.

It was natural that during Hegel's intimate association with Schelling, his expression should become somewhat colored by the latter, in whom we may observe the converse of this influence. When Schelling left Jena in the spring of 1803, Hegel returned more to his own individuality. He resumed also the collegia which he had somewhat neglected during his activity as an author. He lectured especially upon logic and metaphysics, and also upon a philosophical encyclopaedia, *totam philosophiæ scientiam, philosophiam logicæ, naturæ et mentis*. This distinguished him from Schelling, who did not lecture at all upon logic or metaphysics, and had critically treated the various philosophical sciences, only once, in the lectures on the methods of academic study. A systematic totality was what lay at Hegel's heart. He collected himself gradually for its production, and intended to bring it out in two parts, of which the first was to contain a critical justification of his stand-point, and the second the system itself. The first only, at the close of his abode in Jena, was brought to press, and appeared in Bamberg, 1807: "The Phenomenology of Mind, or the Science of the Experience of Consciousness."

This work included, first, the theory of consciousness; second, a critical review of history, to see at what result the history of mankind has arrived in respect to science. It united psychology with the philosophy of history. Hence it has been called a psychology confused by history, or a history distracted by psychology. It is easy to represent it as a monstrosity if narrow criteria are applied, but the inner unity of Hegel's thought was to have consciousness criticise itself by its development, not only in respect to form, but in respect to contents. The title "Science of Consciousness" indicates the content. The mind of mankind itself is summoned to state what form of consciousness it assumes as present, as now final. The chief title "Phenomenology of

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\* A chapter from "Hegel als Deutscher National Philosoph," Leipzig, 1870.

Mind" recalls the phenomenology of Lambert's "Organon." Mind advances in its consciousness from step to step. Each lower stage is shown upon the next higher to have been a relative error, but it is not therefore nothing, but a necessary condition of the higher. This, when it is entered upon, seems to be the highest, but progress reduces this to a mere seeming. It is therefore not entirely false, but only relatively so, in that it was taken as ultimate. In designating the phenomenology as that of *mind*, Hegel indicates the difference which existed between himself and Fichte, Schelling, and previous philosophers in general. In a former treatise upon natural right Hegel had brought the conception of mind into prominence, and had said that it stood higher than nature, while Schelling made nature and mind parallel as coördinate factors of the absolute indifference. The conception of mind had hitherto been treated under the conception of reason, consciousness, thinking, and willing, but not in and for itself, not as an adequate conception of the absolute. Reason and nature are presuppositions which mind makes for itself, but which, as Hegel says, it overreaches. Reason, Nature and Mind are mutually coördinated in their independence as *idea* in general. In respect to compass, reason is ranked above nature and mind: but in respect to content, reason is put with and in nature, and nature with and in mind. Nature is rational, but it is something other than mere reason, for it becomes specific in gases, metals, earths, plants, animals, and constellations. Mind is also in itself rational, but through consciousness it is free from the power of nature, and uses the latter as the organ for realizing its purposes, and thereby spiritualizes it. In its history it annuls nature. It is higher than nature because it is the highest, the absolute in aggregate, which knows itself as truth. Hegel's Phenomenology is the preliminary conclusion of the transformations which had begun with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. This critique was no psychology or logic or metaphysics in the sense of school-wisdom: it was all these, yet was nothing of them all; it was one of those anomalous products which appear at epochal points in the development of mind, and in which the past is concluded and a new future is ushered in. Kant's Critique, although no definite science, was the foundation of



the great modern revolution of philosophy ; Fichte's doctrine of knowledge and Schelling's system of transcendental idealism were its consequences. Hegel's *Phenomenology*, after many intermediate formations, is also a result of the same, an analogue of Kant's *Critique*, and, like it, the source of a new movement.

The *Phenomenology* may be and has been called the proædeutics of Hegel's system ; but the name is appropriate only so far as he sought therein to lay the foundations of his stand-point : it must not indicate, as it usually does, a philosophizing outside of philosophy, which is to make the latter easier, to introduce it by gentle gradations, or as far as possible to economize individual thought. On the contrary, the *Phenomenology* is very difficult, for it is still more profound than Kant's *Critique*, than Fichte's *Science of Knowledge*, or than Schelling's *Transcendental Idealism*. The two latter were the immediate and extended consequents of Kant's *Critique*, and are in so far transition stadia from Kant to Hegel. At the same time the relation of the *Phenomenology* to the *Critique of Pure Reason* is most intimate, as is manifest in the first words of the introduction, which commences thus : "It is a natural notion that in philosophy, before the subject-matter itself—namely, the real knowledge of that which in truth is—be entered upon, it is previously necessary to arrive at an understanding concerning the faculty of knowing, which is regarded as the tool by which man possesses himself of the absolute, or as the medium through which he descries it. This solicitude seems to be justified partly by the fact that there are different kinds of knowledge, and among them one may be better adapted than another to the attainment of this ultimate end, so that a false choice may be made among them ; moreover, partly by the fact that, since knowledge is a faculty of a definite kind and compass, clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth will result unless a more accurate determination of its nature and boundary is accomplished." It is impossible in these words, and in the entire subsequent exposition, not to detect constantly implied allusions to Kant's stand-point in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, although Kant is not named. Hegel decidedly dissents, toward the end of the introduction, from the view that phenomenology is a mere

preface, outside of philosophy. For consciousness which is established in its phenomenal form, that which arises through its own mutations is ever another object. But for our consciousness which detects the becoming of phenomenal consciousness from stage to stage, this movement itself becomes an object of our knowledge. Hence Hegel says: "Through this necessity this way to science is itself already science, and, on account of its content, science of the experience of consciousness."

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason began with transcendental æsthetics, with the receptivity of intuitions of space and time, and ascended through understanding of the analytic logic to the dialectic of reason, to the ideal finality of speculative theology. It ended with the result that the absolute object is incomprehensible to us, since the intelligence of the understanding cannot be adequately applied to the conceptions of reason, but can be brought into relation only to phenomena. Hegel began in the same way with sensuous certainty, which comes to intuition here in space and time. From this, like Kant, he ascended to the absolute, but differed from him in affirming the possibility of absolute knowledge. The final result of the Phenomenology is exactly opposite to that of the Critique. The interval between sensuous certainty as the beginning, and absolute knowledge as the end, has of course an entirely different content from the interval between Kant's transcendental æsthetics and the ideal finality of theology. It should be well observed that Hegel regarded absolute knowledge as the limit of the development of consciousness. Not a negative limit, such as, according to Kant, the understanding opposes from fear of the truth of reason, but the positive limit of the highest satisfaction of consciousness, beyond which a higher is impossible: for only the absolute is true, but only the true is absolute. Hegel makes consciousness advance by its own dialectic from one stand-point to another; sensuous certainty makes it have to do, not only with this single object, here and now, but, as soon as it attempts to say what it feels, tastes, hears, &c., this must resolve itself into generality. The predicate which it utters of the object as its essence, is a generality which, as such, is not sensuous. The sensuousness of the certainty thereby

sublates [annuls] itself; while consciousness is driven onward from the unit (as this being) to generality, another and new stand-point arises. And thus it proceeds from stand-point to stand-point. Formally, the same process is ever repeated for us, but not to the infinite, not progressively to the endless, but with a distinct conclusion in absolute knowledge, in which being and intelligence mutually cover each other. In knowledge of the truth, mind first finds, not the rest of the church-yard, but a rest which is vital and full of content. Science is therefore the absolute power in human life, against which all opposition is vain. What sense has once demonstrated, gradually makes its way as law into the knowledge, and finally into the action, of the people. No polity, no religion avails against it. Copernicus overthrew the mediæval heaven with his solar system. The Pope contradicted him for centuries, until in 1821 he was obliged expressly to recognize the Copernican system. Buckle, in his history of civilization in England, made the assertion that mankind advance in knowledge, but not in morals. This I regard an error, for it is impossible that the knowledge of truth should not tend to make men both freer and better. "Know the truth, and it shall make you free," said Christ.

Since, then, the phenomenology is the science of the experience of consciousness, it nevertheless stands at variance with the conception of science, in that it transposes and adulterates it with historical elements.

Attention must now be drawn to the reproach always urged with so much emphasis, that in the *Phenomenology* Hegel nowhere mentions the name of a philosopher, a people, or an event. He allows each stand-point to characterize itself with relative absoluteness. Nevertheless it is unmistakable that he has in mind distinct historical phenomena. Does he employ them, as it were, by chance, as we select any example to illustrate an abstract proposition by a concrete notion? By no means; but we observe that he fixes upon such a phenomenon as can validate itself in universal history as the classic type of the stand-point which is to be elucidated. He borrows his colors from it because they are the most striking and expressive. From the peculiar collusion of this view in the background, with the conception of the particular stages

of consciousness in the foreground, springs that charm of exposition which the *Phenomenology* has ever exerted upon the temper of those who were cultured enough to enjoy it. Hegel gives no illustrations in a dry, scholastic manner, yet we do not miss that insight which we seek in illustration. Hegel must not be understood as though he would say that the general stand-point which he describes is present only among this people, in this condition, at this epoch of history; his meaning is, that that which occurs in and for itself in the development of consciousness, as a necessary moment of its becoming, has attained in this form of historical phenomenon its purest objectivity. When, for example, in the conception of the ethical mind, the Hellenic world seems to glimmer through, it should not be understood that he abstracted the conception of ethics from the history of the Greeks, and therefore adduces it here: but this conception is in and for itself universal, and is therefore found, as an essential element, among other people, although among the Greeks in its most pregnant beauty and truth. This procedure is therefore by no means wrong, but is in most exquisite taste.

One should first attempt to understand the *Phenomenology* from itself, rather than apply to it the criterion which Hegel has given in the preface, which is swollen to the length of a formal treatise. Prefaces are ordinarily printed before the work itself, but are written only after it is completed. It is quite right that the preface to Hegel's *Phenomenology* should have been regarded as his manifesto against the excesses of romanticism, and the degeneracies of Schelling's natural philosophy; but the consciousness to which Hegel has given utterance could arise only after the completion of the *Phenomenology*. We shall, therefore, speak of it later.

The more obscure and confused the conceptions which are wont to be made of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, the more necessary it becomes briefly to review its outlines, though it is a work so peculiar, that, before conclusions are reached, it must be made familiar in the originality of its earliest form. Hegel distinguished as the most general determinations—(1) consciousness; (2) self-consciousness; (3) reason. Consciousness is knowledge which has for its object that existence which is given it through mediation of the senses: (*a*) as

sensuous certainty; (b) as perception; (c) as understanding. —Sensuous certainty takes the individual thing as truth; but as soon as it undertakes to say what the thing *in se* is, it finds itself compelled to utter a generality concerning it. It supposed itself concerned now and here, and with this which presents itself immediately as an exclusive unit, but in this unit the universal is at the same time contained. To this, consciousness must accordingly direct itself as the truth. It becomes perceptive to discern the properties of the thing in which their generality inheres. Things are what they are through their properties, but at the same time they dissolve themselves through these, for through these they cohere with other things, and in this coherence they undergo change. The force which determines things is, therefore, a new object for consciousness; the latter becomes understanding in that it searches out the laws which preside over the play of forces. These laws, in their immutability, as contrasted with things, constitute a supersensuous world.

Consciousness has thus advanced from sensuous certainty to the certainty of the understanding, that within the sensuous the supersensuous, viz. law, is truth proper. Rather, it is itself the supersensuous; for that which knows laws is not an object of sense, has no properties which can dissolve themselves, but makes itself its own object. It is thus self-consciousness, in which are distinguished, (a) its independence; (b) its freedom. It is independent in so far as it subjects life, with its passions and lusts, to itself; dependent, in so far as, conversely, it subjects its own self to life and its passions and lusts. But how does it learn this distinction? Not by distinguishing itself, within itself, from itself, as ego; nor by distinguishing the likeness of the ego from life and its manifold passions and lusts; but by coming to itself in another ego, and entering upon a life and death conflict with it: for thus alone can it become truly self-certain, both whether it has exalted itself above the attachment to life, and whether the opposing consciousness has done so. Should either self-consciousness renounce the conflict, or fear death, or cherish life more than self, in so doing it unselfs itself, becomes dependent, subject to another self, and degrades itself to the service of a lord. This conflict for recognition, to find self for

others its like, is the origin of the relation of servitude and dominion. This position of Hegel has often been invidiously perverted into the doctrine that slavery is a righteous necessity, which he never intended. It is generally said that slavery originated in the captures of warfare. Hegel goes deeper, and inquires how there arose the subjection of one man to another. He answers, "From the want of self-subsistence in self-consciousness." And, "Whence arises this?" he inquires. "From fear of death, from the subjection of self to life."—Hegel develops the mysterious ethico-psychological process from which the fact of slavery arises. By culture, the slave can gradually make himself worthy to be recognized by his master as independent: he gives him freedom because it is already present in him. The freedom of self-consciousness lies in its self-determination as a thinking will. It appears, according to Hegel, in the forms (*a*) of stoicism; (*b*) of skepticism; (*c*) of unhappy consciousness.

Stoicism retires from all reality into the purity of thinking, into the thought of freedom, to which no access from without can be obtained, and in which it is indifferent whether the subject exists as servant or sovereign: for, though in chains, it can still think. Skepticism, conversely, frees itself from the pressure of reality by construing it as mere appearance, as a turmoil of contradictions. Nevertheless it adapts itself to the dominant order of things, which for it is a falsehood. It subjects itself to a reality which is naught to it, since of every distinction which empiricism can find, its opposite exists. The repose of the stoic, and the unrest of the skeptic, absorbed in the detection of contradictions, coalesce in the unhappy consciousness, which, from the unrest of the phenomenal world as the Present, rises to the rest of the Beyond as its true essence, but from this exaltation sinks back again into itself. The Essence which is in the Beyond is universal, immutable; that which is here, on the other hand, as an individual is exposed to mutation. It attempts by labor to escape the sundering of the Present and the Beyond; but labor augments its independence, its property, its enjoyment. Hence it thanks the Eternal for what is mutable; it renounces the attempt to bring itself into harmony with its activity; but, while it thanks, it acquits itself of its obligation to the Im-

mutable, for thereby it recognizes the latter, and returns to its individuality. To express the same still more earnestly, it makes sacrifice of its possession through the priests of the Immutable, who, in place of the latter, receive his gift. But the priest, who renders thanks in its name, is no more the Immutable than the sacrifice is the individual who offers it through the priest. Hence self-consciousness denies itself the enjoyment of the gifts which the Immutable presents it; it fasts, chastises itself, and finally, in order spiritually to annihilate itself, allows itself to be determined by priests as the council of its conscience. In order to be free from itself, it has renounced its freedom of self-determination, and acts as the slave of priests. It is unhappy, for it is broken down; and does not escape from itself even when it surrenders itself to authority, for it must resolve to do even this. It must will to be unselfed.

But since the Beyond is pure thought, no less so than self-consciousness, it experiences that, at bottom, the Immutable is united in itself with the Mutable; and that the Eternal, which seemed to be a Beyond, is really present in the Here. This consciousness of the unity of the idea and its reality is reason. Rational self-consciousness is, according to Hegel, (1) certainty of the truth of reason; (2) mind; (3) religion; (4) absolute knowledge. The certainty of the truth of reason proceeds directly and instinctively to discover itself. It becomes (*a*) observing reason; (*b*) realization of rational self-consciousness through itself; (*c*) individuality, which is real in and for itself. Observing reason applies itself (*a*) to nature; (*b*) to purity of self-consciousness and its relation to external reality; (*c*) to the immediate reality of self-consciousness. Objects of nature are described, arranged, and investigated, according to their laws. Inorganic as well as organic nature is appropriated by observation as rational. Reason observes—and so does self-consciousness in its purity—how it follows logical laws in thinking, and how it is subject to psychological laws in its development; for individuality, in its reciprocity with the circumstances which casually surround it, evolves nothing which was not involved in its instincts, propensities, and faculties. The great influence which is wont to be ascribed to circumstances is valid

only in so far as the individual admits and incorporates them into his activity. Hence in immediate reality as it appears in physiognomy and in the brain (or, since this cannot be directly perceived, in the skull), observation recognizes the existence of self-consciousness. The mental is one with the material, as brain and spinal marrow. Without brain, observing reason can find no self-consciousness, no thinking, no mind.

The antithesis of observation is the attempt of self-consciousness to realize the conception of reason through itself—not to find, but to produce, the reality of the conception. Hegel distinguishes here (*a*) pleasure and necessity; (*b*) the law of the heart, and the frenzy of self-conceit; (*c*) virtue, and the way of the world. Under the stand-point pleasure and necessity, he included that form of self-consciousness which reason seeks in the satisfaction of the appetites and passions in pleasure; but experiences that enjoyment has a limit, and that pleasure is contravened by necessity arising out of itself. Pleasure would make all a means of enjoyment; but the world, the Universal, is not to be consumed. The consciousness for which pleasure has decayed, seeks happiness in the heart: to make itself and all being happy, becomes its law. But the world, by its nature and its institutions, renders this high undertaking difficult; so that, as soon as it experiences this contradiction, the good heart in its self-conceit revolts to frenzy. Self-consciousness, therefore, concludes to renounce happiness, and to follow the law of the heart. In duty it recognizes law as general necessity, and is ready to sacrifice its individuality to it. Virtue must perform duty for its own sake. All inclination must be excluded. The Good exists only through virtue; if it be not realized, it is a mere thought. Virtue is thus brought into conflict with the way of the world, for the world, as such, is not virtuous. It guards individuality, and contends against vice only so far as it violates public law or becomes crime. Up to this limit individuality, even in its infirmities and vices, is allowed wide scope. Virtue revolts at the wickedness of the world, and spends itself in pompous delineations of its conflicts, its purity, its nobility, its incomparableness, its sacrifices. It thinks it very sad that virtue must so often



succumb. The vicious world, strange to relate, does not collapse, but preserves itself in tolerable order.

Individuality, by its varieties, produces manifoldness and interest. The world cannot dispense with it, nor indeed can virtue; for without it there can be nothing to contend against, nothing to be resigned to. Without the existence of temptation, of vice, the hero of virtue would have no cause for pride. Thus it is individuality which, by the resignation of virtue to it, has shown it itself preëminent. It is in and for itself real. i.e. it no longer seeks out of itself what it possesses within. In its immediacy it is indeed only natural individuality, but as the certainty of reason it appears (*a*) as animal kingdom of mind; (*b*) as law-giving; (*c*) as law-proving reason. As animal kingdom of mind, it produces itself in works in which it gives its peculiarity an objective expression. Such a work is not absolutely universal, for this it can represent only according to what individuality in its particularity is able to do; and therefore the latter modestly asserts that it intended merely a contribution to the Universal, and that it designed what was done to be referred not to itself, but to the subject. But the work also stands in relation to others who apprehend and judge of it. Since these are also individual ties, their judgment is also colored by this peculiarity, although they likewise modestly insist that not themselves, but the subject alone is concerned. Thus deception arises from both sides. The producer makes the subject his own, wishes to display himself in it—to put his own talent, culture, skill, mind to account. Thus not only the subject, but essentially he himself, is concerned in the work. The critic, on the other hand, rightly says that he must judge of the work as good, bad, or indifferent, only because the subject demands it; but, at the same time, the judgment is his, and expresses his penetration, erudition, taste, and mind. It is, therefore, his own individuality which comes into account in his judgment, and he deceives himself and others if he asserts that it remains neutral. When this deceit is recognized on both sides, consciousness ascends to that instance in which both producer and critic have to subject themselves to the conception of reason as law. Reason is the criterion which must be applied both to production and judgment. Reason gives laws, practical,

æsthetic, &c. But these numerous laws, which exist with and through each other, require in turn a demonstration of how far they are rational and at one with each other.

Law-proving reason seeks not, as it were, to annul laws, but to refine them by its critique, to liberate them from their isolation and one-sidedness, and imperfect construction, in order, in them, to become absolutely certain of the truth of reason. This is the result of the development of reason, i.e. of the stand-point of mind. Mind is self-certain of reason as its truth. It is (*a*) immediately the *true mind*, or the *morale*; (*b*) self-estranged mind, or culture; (*c*) mind certain of itself, or morality. To these conceptions Hegel limits the conception of mind, which he distinguishes from that of religion. True mind, as moral, appears, according to Hegel, (*a*) in the ethical world; (*b*) in ethical action; (*c*) in the condition of rights.

The moral world is immediately included in the family and the nation, for here freedom and necessity are indistinguishably one. Natural individuality, its external reality, pleasure and its limits, necessity, the good heart and its vanity, creative activity and criticism, law-giving and law-proving reason, are annulled in ethics. Man and woman as husband and wife, the latter as parents, parents as trainers of children, children as brother and sister, stand in spiritual relationship by virtue of their natural connection. Brother and sister sustain the purest relationship, because here the sexual passion is not concerned as it is between parents, after whose death the brother is the natural supporter and protector of the sister. All families are individual in one people. Only the princely family in its individuality is at the same time the collectivity of the state. The ethical act springs from the ethics of the people, in which the reason of mind is present. The law which animates the ethical appears partly as divine, partly as human: as divine in piety, which is especially cherished by woman, who is ordained by nature as guardian of the hearth; as human in the law of the state, whose prime guardian is the prince. Divine and human law may collide, which for the individual is his fate. He bears the guilt of his fate, but in it becomes conscious of the right which summoned him to the doing of his deed. He acted because, as a member

of the family or state, he could act only so, and not otherwise. Right itself, in turn, acquits him of his guilt and his wrong—as Orestes, Creon, Antigone, rightly did wrong, wrongly did right. The consciousness of right makes man a person, and in the atomic individualization of personality, ethical unity resolves itself into the multiplicity of the indifferent masses, which again can be held together only by a single person as a despotic power. Right is cold and egotistic as long as it seeks only to accomplish itself. When husband goes to law with wife, parents with children, brothers and sisters with each other, the spirit of the ethical has vanished. The individual insists on his right whatever consequences may follow, but just for this reason right is cold and regardless. Mind which is estranged from itself presents itself (*a*) in the world of its estrangement, partly as culture, partly as belief; (*b*) it becomes *éclaircissement* in that it opposes and makes an end of superstition; (*c*) in absolute freedom estrangement has the sense of self-renunciation for something other than we ourselves really are. The right of person inheres therein as far as in this act the entire will is expressed. The importance which the individual attains outside himself in society, depends upon whether he possess power or riches. Power is attained by state service; riches, by augmenting possessions. In the former, he acts nobly when he devotes his efforts and his activity, even to the sacrifice of his own life, to the state; in the latter, when his possessions, even to self-retrenchment, are given up to benefit the poor. Still the state is not without distrust of those in power, who serve it, lest they misuse their power against it. The client, the pauper, is not without inner indignation that benefits must be presented to him. It seems to be chance that a person can elevate himself by means of power, riches, or indeed both—for power may lead to riches and riches to power—since individuality, as such, is originally a stranger no less to power and honor than to riches. It can lose as well as possess both.

Mind, therefore, seeks a possession which is inalienable from its individuality, and which can be affected by no mutations of power or riches. This possession is culture, which the individual gives himself. But culture is estrangement from his immediate naturalness, for it makes of man some-

thing other than he is by race, sex, &c. It raises him above the hazard of power or riches, for it is the self-consciousness of mind in its universality which can be snatched away by no fate. In cultured society the individual is significant, not because he is powerful or rich, but because he is cultured. Each signifies only what he has made of himself by culture. But there are of necessity different departments, grades, peculiarities, in culture; therefore it becomes its essential interest to set up a standard of culture for individuals, for just here is shown *how* one is cultured; for the criteria which one applies characterize the stand-point of his own culture. Judgments also become involved in contradiction; nay, one comes to appear talented by so much the less as he agrees with the judgment of others, or indeed with the judgment of the multitude. Thus arises a universal disintegration of mind, in which the chaos of various cultures and naturally contradictory judgments begets finally a chaotic confusion, above which only faith emerges, which subordinates culture as a vanity of the present. Before God is no respect of persons. Neither might, nor riches, nor culture, entitle one to blessedness: heaven demands from its own, not the evidence that they are talented, but the poor in spirit are blessed if they are pure in heart. But faith which is indifferent to it, agrees with culture in that it estranges the mind from immediate reality, for it transports it to the representation of a Beyond, of which, here, we can have no experience. In this fantastic world it is quite at home with its representations, and discerns that all must be just as it is.

The *éclaircissement* overtakes it nevertheless, because on the one side it clings to the supersensuous, yet on the other cannot deny that it wishes to find the supersensuous in the sensuous. *Eclaircissement* is the unavoidable product of culture which seeks satisfaction only in thought, and pushes forward faith with its double housekeeping in the present and in the Beyond. Faith, as genuine, does not think of making the sensuous the ground of blessedness, but it always contradicts itself by the weight which it lays upon the sensuous; for, in spite of its insight into the transitoriness of what is earthly, and the nothingness of what is external, it believes in sacred places, times, and pictures; it believes in sanctifi-

cation by washing, and by partaking of consecrated food and drink; by acts of sense, pilgrimages, fasts, scourgings, &c. It believes that eternal truth is contained in writings which have been preserved by chance, &c. Especially it represents the Beyond again in a form which is really only a copy of the human, of the Present. Its gods, angels, devils, have human shape. Angels play on harps, sing, &c. Faith revolts against this critique, which lacerates its very heart, just as the talented consciousness of culture revolts against its own distraction because the latter derisively expresses it.

*Eclaircissement* has its truth in the thought of the usefulness of things, for therein it attains the unity of being and of thought. Prosaic as the category of use may be, it still contains the thought of the end and aim for which things are present as means. It twines itself through all things as the bond which unites them to each other. All is useful. In nature, earth is useful to plants, plants to animals, animals to animals. All nature is useful to man, man to man; and even religion is useful, for it constrains man patiently to endure the pains of the Present in view of the future To Be.

The category of usefulness also contains the unity of thought and being of the idea and its reality, which, as deism and materialism, are widely separate; on the one hand, into the abstraction of a supreme essence, and into matter on the other. Its metaphysics knows only things and their properties; and among things, useful or natural, full as many have hurtful relations, for what is useful in one respect harms in the opposite; yet through this twofoldness of all things *éclaircissement* affirms the ever uniform stability of the world.

As the true, the moral mind is merged in the condition of right; so likewise the culture of the self-estranged mind is merged in absolute freedom and terror. The thinking of the *éclaircissement* has disposed of all, and has left to consciousness, at last, only the thinking of thinking, for *éclaircissement* supremely respects the logic of the understanding that twice two is four. If pure thinking would give itself a content, it must determine itself as will; but the will, conformably to the stand-point of thinking, will have to be a pure will, which wills itself in its universality. Yet since in its reality the will is always individual, universality as such can hold only a

negative relation to will when it wills to realize itself. It becomes a fanaticism which would exterminate the existing order of things. In so far as will assumes the form of government, the purpose of which is to care for the general well-being, and to realize the will of all, it becomes an object of suspicion to individuals, because as such they possess the possibility of dissenting from the will of the government which assumes the stand-point of universality. To meet the danger thus arising, nothing remains but to put such to death. But individuals conversely become objects of suspicion to government, because it is government that, in their determinations, they do not seek the pure will of all, but rather some special end. Government is therefore accused of being partisan, and its members in turn are executed. A new government is instituted, which in a short time succeeds no better. The terror of death is the result of absolute freedom, which detects slavery in every ethical relation, in family, rank, office; and fears, persecutes, and slays every individual who does not seem to come out into the colorless abstraction of freedom as absolute.

In the dissolution of the world of culture, the only stability is the mind's certainty of itself, or morality. The individual who ascends the scaffold, not because he has committed a crime, but because he has expressed an opinion other than absolute freedom has declared valid by the stamp of universality, dies with the certainty of having remained true to himself, of having acted correctly, morally. This certainly exalts him above death, and destroys the terror which it is said to inspire. The moral view of the world looks above the Present far beyond into a relationship in which all the contradictions of history shall be conciliated. In reality, to be sure, the highest good, the harmony of virtue with happiness, is not yet present, but is striven for as that which should be. If it had not to contend with vice, virtue would not be virtue. Without instincts, desires, passions, temptation, it would be without the material of conflict—would be an unemployed, inactive virtue. It should prosper externally, for through its exertions to overcome the allurements of vice it acquires a certain claim upon happiness; but experience shows that the virtuous often find the world very unfriendly, while the

vicious find it very comfortable. While, then, virtue, postulates happiness, although it confesses that in reality it by no means corresponds with the conception, its claim is no less unfounded than when the envy with which it looks askance at the prosperity of the vicious claims to be called virtuous. The moral order of the universe, according to Hegel, is a dissimulation [*verstellung*], which its bad conscience, that it is not really virtuous or free from sensuousness, conceals under the complaint of the difficulties which assail the virtuous, and against the course of the world when the bad thrive and the good suffer hardship. And yet conscience can in fact become self-certain, because it is determined not by feeling, but by the conception of duty which is clear and unambiguous. The new difficulty which now arises consists in the fact that duty which would perfect virtue as pure duty for its own sake, resolves self into a plurality of duties, so that although each individual is determined for himself, he may fall into doubt which to perform, or at least which to perform first. But in fulfilling one duty other duties may be violated, though it be only by omitting their performance. Hence, to act with perfect morality, it seems best not to act at all, for in so doing one stains himself in some way with finitude. By the determination of an act, no one can avoid exciting contradiction, or reaping blame. The fear of degrading its high ideal by expression in action, of soiling it by contact with vulgarity, drives back the æsthetic soul into itself to refresh itself in the purity of its inactivity, and with other æsthetic and congenial souls to fall into criticism of those who act and therefore err. The erring, however, who confesses his sin, thereby annihilates it. Should the æsthetic soul close itself against him, it would itself become wicked. It must pardon him who confesses his wickedness; for as he became wicked, so can he become good again. Thus the good must recognize the essence of equal freedom in the wicked, and, if he has confessed, cannot hardheartedly hold itself aloof in privileged exclusiveness. The forgiveness of the wicked is the breaking through of religion, for it is the mind's act of majesty to make what has been done as though it were not done. In the act mind becomes conscious of its sovereignty over nature and history. The wickedness which I repent of, is as though it had not occurred.

I break off from my past, estrange myself from it, cast it from me as a nullity.

In religion, mind as human ascends to unity with the divine, to certainty of absolute truth; for this unity is truth. This sphere, in turn, begins as such from the bottom to build itself up, step by step, to perfection, viz. from the natural religion, through art-religion, to revealed religion. In natural religion, mind beholds the absolute still in natural existence, in the heavenly bodies, in plants, animals, until, as Hegel expresses it, like a master-workman, it encloses the hull of mind, its corpse, in the habitation which it has prepared for it out of stone. Buiding now becomes the *cultus*. With it, mind passes over to art-religion, which venerates the divine in the Beautiful, which it produces in statues of deities humanly beautiful, in the beautifully formed contestants at gymnastic sports, and in epic, lyric and dramatic poetry. In Phenomenology, Hegel has treated art only as religion, because it here simply gains the significance of the absolute, and in no sense serves as an ornament for prosaic ends, or as a means of recreation. But this æsthetic religion, after it has passed through the earnestness and pain of tragedy, dissolves into the frivolity and pleasure of comedy, after it has made all, even the gods of the nether world, its wanton sport. Now it becomes evident what mind is. Trust in the gods has vanished—the oracles are dumb—the altars empty—hymns are words without power—priests are needy, weak mortals like others—the statues of the gods are but cold figures to which Faith no more lends a soul—Consciousness shudders back into itself in this mental waste, and can no longer save itself from the despair of its absolute misfortune by the scorn of comic perversion. God can be found as the true God neither in nature nor in art, but reveals Himself as such only in the real man who knows that he is one with Him in self-consciousness. God has not only human form, is the æsthetic God, but becomes a man who can be felt, seen, heard. The absolute substance appears as an actual subject, which also really dies, i.e. the divine is the essence of the human self-consciousness; all disunion is extinguished in the Atonement.

Religion, therefore, already knows what truth is; but its knowledge is yet imperfect, for it has not yet the form of



pure self-consciousness, of the conception, but of intuition and representation. Indeed, revealed religion cannot yet detach itself from the sense-colored breadth of representation. It goes back into the past, or forward to the future. In the course of the year, on its festal days, it lives through the circle of its representatives in which truth presents itself to it in historical forms. It remains, therefore, to give to the absolute content absolute form. This is the final stand-point of phenomenally absolute knowledge, a beyond which has no passage to another, because in it not only truth but also certainty is posited as absolute. To elevate religious representation into the form of thought, is to *dissolve* it as representation; to dissolve does not mean to destroy its content, but to free it from its contradiction of representing the eternal in forms of adjacency and succession. That which should be absolutely conformable to self-consciousness, must be like itself pure idea, which, as absolute presence, is independent of time and space. Religious consciousness forgets itself momentarily in its representations, but falls back from them into itself again. Absolute knowledge conceives not only its object in and for itself, but it conceives itself also in its knowledge.

The position which Hegel has given to absolute knowledge, i.e. to speculative philosophy, became later the occasion of much opposition, since priests and theologians very naturally found in it an insufferable presumption which degraded religion to a "mere representation." We will here only remark that science cannot dispense with the critique of faith, and faith can assume no privileged immunity from being really thought. The particular science of faith struggles against being dissolved in the general science of nature and of mind; but really it cannot escape this fate, because this is necessarily involved in the relation between representation and thought. The miracles of faith are incomprehensible because they lack a rational nature. They can be represented, but not thought. Thought can find a general content symbolically expressed, an abiding truth; but, with this discovery, thought elevates its truth above its sensuous actuality, and transforms it into allegory. Miracles are to remain for faith an individual fact, which it devoutly gazes upon; for science,

they are to become a universality which is absolutely true.

When we glance back upon the Phenomenology in its totality, we must admit that it is a work which can be ranked in no traditional department, but at the same time we cannot refrain from the opinion that its greatness lies in its strangeness and uniqueness. An ordinary schoolmaster's understanding, which revolves with economical exactitude within the paragraphs of the text-book, never would have hit upon such a monstrosity. The mastership with which Hegel characterizes each particular stand-point of mind may pardon the occasional artifice of its deductions. His appositeness justifies, upon reflection, the apparent strangeness of his expression. When, e. g., Hegel calls culture the self-estranged mind, the word has acquired the partial meaning of confusion of mind, like the French word *aliéner*. All culture sustains a negative relation to our immediateness. We have in schools Greek and Latin, which we do not speak in life, but in which we estrange ourselves from our every-day reality: our companions travel among "strangers" in order to exalt themselves above the narrowness of home-life, &c. Hence the expression "estrangement" is quite right. Each new stand-point which consciousness enters upon is absolute for it so long as it deals with it: as, conversely, the world—in itself ever the same—is new for every new generation. It was with deep design that Hegel included the practical side of mind in the Phenomenology, a deduction of absolute knowledge from dogmatism and skepticism: realism and idealism would not have corresponded to the totality of mind. The forms of consciousness which Phenomenology exhibits in a long series, are constant elements of mind which lie between the extremes of sensuous certainty and absolute knowledge, and which hence always and everywhere reproduce themselves; in their individualization they may likewise modify the form of their appearance. Each is relatively the whole, but it is first in the absolutely free self-consciousness of spirit that it comprehends itself as the idea of truth. No one will deny that sensuous certainty and perception, that the conflict of self-consciousness for recognition, that stoicism and skepticism, that the efforts of the unhappy self-consciousness to solve the

contradiction between heaven and earth,—are stand-points which ceaselessly renew themselves among men. The case is the same with reason, which can never become weary of observing the nature of natural phenomena, in order therein to find itself. It has been supposed, in considering the laws of physiognomy, that Hegel intended, with Lichtenburg, to deride a presumptive science, and that only a transient mania of his time induced him to incorporate this matter; but the interest of mind to rediscover itself in the eternal reality of its form is constant. Our interest will always be excited in observing the physiognomy and cranial development of a Raphael, Schiller, Napoleon, Talleyrand, Socrates, and others, and therein tracing the expression of their minds. The realization of rational self-consciousness in pleasure and necessity, in the good heart and in the frenzy of conceit, or in virtue and the course of the world, astonishes us at first by the originality of its delineation; but it makes, nevertheless, a constant factor in the phenomenal knowledge of mind. Among the Greeks, e. g., it was the Cyrenian school which gave utterance to the experience that pleasure has its limits in necessity, and the Hegesians, who proceeded upon the attempt to constantly fulfil pleasure, concluded upon suicide because they found it impossible. The author of the Koheleth, among the Hebrews, expressed the same experience of the vanity of all things. Individuals ever repeatedly attempt to make pleasure their principle, but in the satisfaction of their desires they ever find the experience unavoidable, that in enjoyment they have subjected themselves to a necessity inseparable from pleasure. It is the same with the good heart and virtue in their one-sidedness and inexperience. When Hegel shows that virtue may be overcome by the course of the world, it may seem that he places no high estimate upon virtue, but only that virtue succumbs in the conflict with the course of the world, which wrongly estimates its own principle, the right of individuality, and regards its own sacrifice as the Absolute. Eating and drinking, sleeping and begetting of children, working and recreation from labor in sport, and the accumulation of property, will ever strike out new courses. The existence of monks and nuns presupposes as its condition the existence of the course of the world, from

which they retreat behind high walls. Individuality then makes its appearance as that which is real in and for itself. This stand-point also makes a constant element of the *becoming* mind, which produces itself as its object in what it creates, in which it deposits its entire peculiarity, but thereby calls out the judgment of other individualities. This "animal kingdom of mind," as Hegel sportively and wittily expresses himself, is likewise a constant element of history; and, to become convinced that this is the case, it is only necessary to read prefaces to books which are published, to find the assurance that their authors are concerned only in their respective subject-matter, to which they offer their modest contribution, or, on the other hand, to read the critiques of books in which the reviewers assert, with praise or blame, that they are concerned only about the subject-matter. Law-giving and law-proving reason are constantly present in the constitutional conflicts of states. It is proposed, for instance, to abolish the death penalty; the law is subjected to criticism, the grounds which sustain the proposition are examined, &c., whether they are in accordance with reason.

In the description of mind it has been said that Hegel at first had before his eyes the Hellenic ethics as Æschylus and Sophocles depicted it, but in the dissolution of the true ethical mind in the legal condition which strengthens the egoism of persons, the Roman empire. Then he makes the process of the estrangement of mind complete itself in Feudalism and Catholicism; but the culture of humanism, on the other hand, reacts in *éclaircissement*, and absolute freedom culminates in the terrorism of the French revolution. In the stand-point of morality he alludes to the dualism of German philosophy in the Fair Saint, especially to Jacobi's ALL-WILL and Waldemar. It may be unhesitatingly granted that from the phases of history he derived his colors for these stand-points, but it does not follow that these are not constant elements in all history. Hegel depicts—in the act of the ethical mind—e. g. blood revenge, with unmistakable reference to Orestes and Œdipus; but blood revenge is a constant element of the ethical in the family, among all peoples who are making the transition from the sphere of their natural condition to that of the state. The Arab who avenges the

death of his father, is in this respect as ethical as Orestes. That Hegel opposes right, as private right, to the ethical, is likewise to be understood generally, although Roman jurisprudence carried out the conception of personal atomism most perfectly. When children as heirs of their patrimony do not quarrel about their respective shares, but seek to terminate the strife by judicial decision, the very spirit of the ethical has vanished. Even Aristophanes, in his comedies, attacked the bad disposition of the citizens, who became entangled in their private interests and their lawsuits about *meum* and *tuum*, and allowed the ancient virtue of Marathon, which guided itself in view of the whole, to fall into decay. Culture in a distinct sense, where the word denotes primitive civilization, is also a constant element among all people, who, by reverence of the power of the state, or by the splendor of riches, have elevated themselves above the significance of the individual, to self-consciousness of mind. When Hegel here, in characterizing the peculiar distraction to which this standpoint leads, borrows a few features from Diderot's dialogue, *Rameau's Nephew*, one must not be so narrow as to believe that he thought only of the intellectual French society of the 18th century. This language, which levels all difference of station; which expresses with spirit all the phenomena of mind, even the most depraved; which discloses with shameless publicity all the contradictions of mind,—attracts interest to itself whenever the individual, by way and manner of speaking, attests that he is a man of culture, and when comparison of tendency of independence and of degree of culture is the chief topic of the general discourse. Lucian among the Greeks, Petronius among the Romans, Heine among the Germans, discover a language similar to that of Diderot among Frenchmen. *Eclaircissement* is no less a constant element of history, for it arises from culture. The Sankhya philosophy of the Indians is an *éclaircissement* of their Mythology. The doctrine of the sophists was an *éclaircissement* among the Greeks, as in modern times the movement of the 17th and 18th centuries. Over against the popular belief of the Greeks, Plato with his critique of their Mythology appeared as an apostle of *éclaircissement*, and, like those in England, France and Germany, would substitute morals in its place.

The stand-point of absolute freedom, i. e. of that freedom which wills the will only as universal, may seem to be so designated by Hegel as though only the first French revolution hovered before him; but in itself this form of consciousness is a constant element of history, where democratic and communistic tendencies pass over into fanaticism. This element was present in the German peasant war, among the English Puritans, and the social reformers of the Paris revolution of February, as well as among the Jacobins, who overthrew the Girondists. Morality is depicted with extraordinary accuracy by Hegel; no one can doubt that here he detects one of the most general stand-points of mind: but the turn which Hegel gives to it—viz. in making religion, or the certainty of the unity of the human and divine mind, to emerge from the wicked man's confession of guilt and from his pardon—may seem peculiar. Otherwise, morality appears as that inclination which religion absorbs in itself, as private right absorbs the æsthetic *morale* (ethical condition). But morality has exalted itself above this stand-point; and now Hegel shows how mind, apprehending itself in conscience, passes over from the isolation of its self-certainty, through pardon of the wicked, to the truth of the community. This is one of his most profound and beautiful developments. That religion is construed as a constant element of mind is of course self-evident, and the question can only arise how far the differences between natural religion, art-religion, and revealed religion, are constant. This question is answered by the fact that every man must in childhood pass through the stages of fetichism and pantheism, which compose the essence of natural religion. Even if people existed no longer in a state of nature, still the contemplation of nature in sun, moon, plants, and animals, would precede the representation of a creative God, even for children who grew up within the pale of a revealed religion. Children often sustain the same relation to animals which men in a state of nature do in animal worship. Hegel treated art-religion in general as the presentation of art, because only as religion does it make the beautiful a pure Absolute. Art lies without as a moment in the stand-points of production and culture. The beautiful is now, to be sure, the absolute in respect to

form, but only the æsthetic stand-point sublimates the truth of the absolute and must subordinate itself to it, as occurs in revealed religion, which makes art a means in its *cultus*. Roman Catholicism, in architecture, sculpture, music, and poesy, has produced as excellent works of art as the Greek art-religion, but religion as such has ever distinguished itself from these works even when superstition has confounded them.

Finally, absolute knowledge exists in all philosophical endeavor as a constant element, for philosophy must strive for such a certainty of truth that even the formal side of knowledge may be complete, that certainty may become true, and truth certain. Philosophy is, therefore, capable of endless development, since neither its breadth nor the depth of knowledge can have a limit. That all moments of the experience of consciousness make up constituent elements of mind, Hegel distinctly affirms in saying that phenomenology has the same content as a system of science. The latter is not power, nor is it riches. The difference lies in the fact that that which phenomenology presents as a stand-point of phenomenal knowledge in the relation between consciousness and its object, so that knowledge during its becoming does not conceive itself until by its mutation it has arrived at a result, although we who observe its process can apprehend it before it becomes clear to itself—that this appears in the system as a pure, organic conception, no longer confused with consciousness.

The sequence of the conceptions is in general the same in both spheres, although with the difference which is conditioned by the nature of consciousness. In the history of consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, mind, religion, and absolute knowledge, follow in order; but in history many modifications occur through freedom, chance, arbitrariness, which are eliminated from the necessity of the system. The stand-point of natural religion, e.g., may be interrupted by the violent intrusion of revealed religion; for what wide extremes may be united in consciousness! Take a New Zealander of to-day, as he may be seen and spoken to in London, who in his youth has participated in cannibal feasts, but is now converted to Methodist Christianity. Thirty or forty years ago he ate human flesh, now at the Lord's table he partakes of the body and

blood of Christ. An important point of the succession is that each higher stand-point elevates each lower into itself, and reduces it to a moment which disappears in itself. That which in an earlier stage had absolute significance for consciousness, loses it in the higher. The most earnest occupations of earlier ages, as Hegel expresses it, sink in an advanced stage to be childish plays. It might be asked whether many of the elements which Hegel adduces have not now entirely vanished. Under art-religion, for example, he speaks of living art-work, and understands thereby the reverence in which the Greeks held beauty, and the strength and suppleness of the human body. The Greeks, indeed, deified beautiful men because they were beautiful. This element exists among us no longer as a religion. We build temples to no man now because he is beautiful, but in the circus we admire the beauty, strength, and gymnastic virtuosity, of the human body, i.e. the living art-work. It is degraded to a mere moment of secularity, but it is not wanting. The successive connection of the forms of consciousness, which advances from sensuous certainty to absolute knowledge, is therefore necessary. If we have attained a certain grade of consciousness we must advance to philosophy: and hence, not only in Greece but in China and India, not only among Christians but among Mohamedans, not only among Europeans but among Americans, we see philosophers arise; for even the practical, gain-seeking, pure utilitarianism of the Yankees has not prevented the appearance among them of a Parker, an Emerson.

Hegel preceded his *Phenomenology* by an extended preface, in which he defined his relation to the dominant views respecting the essence and method of philosophy still more distinctly than in the introduction to his article concerning the difference between the systems of Fichte and Schelling. He strongly contended, moreover, against the degeneracy of Schelling's philosophy, which among many of its adherents had sunk to a mere formalism, and which sought to conceal the want of scientific earnestness partly by fantastic decoration, and partly by the assumption of dictatorial impertinence and prophetic unction. Hegel contended no less against the insipidity of *éclaircissement*, which sought a narrow satis-



faction in the temporal, than against the pseudo-geniality of romanticism, which was designed to supersede the pains and the thoroughness of learning, by simple inspiration. He gave a careful critique of the method of the scientific knowledge, which, with precipitate construction according to superficial antitheses, is not adequate to the task. The truest method, he affirms, is the dialectic, which makes the negative an immanent moment of development, because negation is not only negative, but at the same time positive; for its result is not pure nullity, but rather a higher determination, in which that which was denied is ideally preserved. Nothing is lost to this method, but it enriches itself, in its progress from negation to negation, by an equal number of positions. He expresses this thought in such a manner as to affirm that the philosopher must entirely abstract from himself, and in the movement of conception reserve for himself only the attitude of a spectator. "Substance must be grasped as subject";—with these words, which have become so full of fate for his philosophy, he would indicate that the idea for itself is independent; that, although we think it, it determines itself entirely independent of us, and that its relation to other ideas can really proceed only from it and not from us. When, e.g., we think the idea of identity, it, and not we, is the ground that the next idea is that of difference. It is not we who determine identity to difference, but identity determines itself to difference, for difference has a meaning only as difference of identity. The idea of identity moves, therefore, of itself to its opposite idea, to difference, and leaves to the philosopher only the observation of this process.

It is, in fact, the original sense of the word that substance in itself is subject. Substance here signifies the essential content, subject the form of knowledge. The subject must here be not the knowing philosopher, but the idea itself. Still the philosopher is also the subject which thinks the idea, but his thinking is not bound to the self-determination of the idea, into which the philosopher, with absolute renunciation of his own individual subjectivity, must think himself. Hegel's thought may be thus explained: In common logic, it is said that in judgment we join a predicate to a subject. In this the subject appears as passive, and receives the

predicate through us. According to this logic, it is we who bind the predicate to the subject by the copula. Hegel reverses the matter by saying that it is the subject which determines itself to its predicate; for, if this be not the case, it is in vain that we join a predicate to a subject, because the judgment can be only in so far true as the predicate either inheres in the subject as a casual and relative determination, or is immanent in it as a necessary and absolute *natura sua*. When I judge, "This circle is large," this judgment is true only in so far as greatness inheres in it. But greatness is only a relative determination in the relation of this circle to others. A circle may just as well be relatively small. If I judge, "The circle is a self-enclosed curve," this judgment is a necessary, absolute one, for without this determination the circle would not be a circle. Thus it is the idea of a circle itself that immanently determines itself to its predicate. It is not I who produce this idea, but the idea which produces itself in me. The predicate of the subject circle, by which it is a circle, does not depend upon me. I recognize it, I utter it, I make it my object; but I do not produce it. But the circle, because it is a circle, produces itself in the object.

By the example which I have just chosen, I am reminded that, in the preface of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel would make of mathematics merely a science of the understanding, partly because its content, space in geometry, and unity in arithmetic, is so meagre, and partly because the construction of mathematics turns upon formal identity. A synthetic or an analytic course rather than the dialectic must be referred to mathematics. But when, as Hegel affirms, truth can become certain of itself only in the form of dialectic method; when further, according to him, mathematics forms a necessary member in the system of science; when, finally, it is the conception of space with which the idea as nature first found its existence,—it is hard to see why mathematics should be an exception to all other content. That it never has been, is no reason why it never should be treated dialectically. The conception of the one of quantity, &c., i.e. of arithmetic, Hegel has already presented dialectically in the first part of his *Logic*: "Why should geometry dispense with the dialectic?" Quantity does not even exclude qualitative distinctions, but

is partly a moment of them and partly qualitatively distinguished in itself; for an arithmetical progression, e.g., is not only qualitatively different from a geometrical progression, or the acute angle is not only quantitatively but qualitatively different from an obtuse angle. The one is smaller, the other larger, than a right angle; and just for this reason they are opposites in form. The lack of rational nature [*begriffslosigkeit*], which Hegel charges upon quantity, is only relative. Through the integral and differential calculus, and through descriptive geometry, modern mathematics has in fact already become dialectic.

Hegel believed that an example of the dialectic method was afforded in the *Phenomenology* itself. Without boasting, yet with profound self-feeling, he expressed in the preface the consciousness of having found that method which the future would confirm as the only true one. Though it be acknowledged that he is right, that henceforth without the dialectic method philosophy would no longer be in a condition to satisfy the conceptions of science, and that it no less than others cannot submit to an arbitrary treatment; still it cannot be denied that the method is open to great danger, and that it no less than others may degenerate to arbitrary treatment. The philosopher shall remain out of the question. The idea shall determine itself through itself, shall adopt nothing into itself from without. This is the postulate. It is, indeed, justified; but, in fine, it is the philosopher even here who advances with his thoughts as thinking subject from conclusion to conclusion, and what he holds to be a necessary correlation describes as such. Just this description is the most dangerous moment, for its extent, its tone, its address, remains more dependent upon the philosopher than its form would indicate. Experience has subsequently shown that the descriptive manner of the Hegelian school, especially through imitation of the *Phenomenology*, degenerated into a mere assertory procedure, which was in no respect better than the polarities of Schelling's philosophy, the antitheses and syntheses of Fichte's, or the categories of Kant. The dialectic, which was to have engendered the most active self-movement of science, stiffened into the most arbitrary and lifeless dogmatism, which often became the more contradic-

tory the more it set up pretension to absolute infallibility. If the application of the dialectic method had been guarded from every error, Hegel himself, for instance, would not have set the example of altering the position of ideas in his system. Without the *Logie*, the danger would have become still greater.

For profound penetration into the essence of science, for sharp criticism of the delusions behind which scientism has taken refuge in order to preserve itself in the public mart as authority, for noble dignity of scientific temper, for spirited apprehension of the entire turning-point of the age,—the preface to Hegel's *Phenomenology* can only be compared with that which Kant introduced in the second edition of his *Critique of Reason*. This is its counterpart in literature.

## THE LOGICAL QUESTION IN HEGEL'S SYSTEM.

Translated from the German of TRENDLENBURG, by THOS. DAVIDSON.

[Continued from our last number.—ED.]

In the first place, the *Negation* is the inborn impulse which drives pure thinking along from stage to stage. No sooner is a concept produced than it turns over, from its own inner nature, into its negation, and we have before us the problem of thinking a positive and a negative together. This problem is solved by the creation of a mediatory concept which reconciles the two antitheses. Thus the progress of the *Dialectic* is conditioned by the *Negation*.

The investigation showed that the applied negation cannot be a pure logical negation, the relation of *not-A* to *A*, but that it must be real opposition in order to produce a *Contrary*—an *Opposition*. But since the *Contrary* does not run off into indefinite contradiction or opposition, into mere unlimited negation, but is on the contrary another *Positive*, which, concrete and limited in itself, contains the negation of *Another* [somewhat] only as one relation, it became apparent at once that the real opposition—the negation of the *Dialectic*—was not to be reached in any merely logical way. Not only

was this shown in general terms, but the same demonstration was further applied to the most important concepts of the system (e.g. to repulsion and attraction, to whole and force, to substance and causality, to nature and spirit), and it was proved in the particular cases that the negativity always goes beyond its logical essence, and the opposition does not spring from the pure thought, as is pretended, but from the apprehensive intuition, which arbitrarily condenses the indefinite looseness of the logical negation into a positive form, and, in that form, seizes and holds it.

If, now, the antithesis is supposed to be evolved from the thesis by negation, so likewise thesis and antithesis are carried up by *Identity* to a concept which stands above them, and is designated as their truth. The identity, therefore, appears in the result as the real unity, as the force of concretion. If, however, we probe it to the bottom, we find that it is far short of what it professes to be; that it is nothing but the reflection of a relative, logical likeness—an abstraction which bleaches and blots out. *Becoming*, in Hegel's *Logic*, is the first act of identity, Being and Nothing being comprehended under it. Pure Being, we are told, is empty Being—Nothing; and empty Being is pure Being. The one is what the other is. The two are identical, and, thought as such, they are *Becoming*. In spite of this, this identity of the reflection is only a self-annihilating compromise, without a trace of living unity to transform in a real manner Being into Nothing, and Nothing into Being. It is the completed levelling of two concepts, viz. pure Being and empty Being, while it is anything but a case of mutual intus-susception or interpenetration. In such identity, the antitheses blunt each other, instead of bestirring themselves and becoming one as they should do. What is here summarized in the well-known example of dialectic *Becoming*, reappears, as the *Investigations* prove, in the most essential concepts of the system, e.g. where the Finite unites with itself in the Infinite; where the freedom of the concept is conjured out of the necessity of substance; where the idea is defined as the absolute unity of concept and objectivity. The power of unity over the greatest antitheses rests on the identity of such impotent assimilation. The real interpenetration is forced in. Compared with the boldness of

the idea of reconciling antitheses with each other, the proof which pure thought has to offer for the fact appears rather infirm. Its truth has its origin in something quite different from any such mere logical act.

Thus the hinges of the system break down.

The investigation showed further that *ad infinitum* procession, a mere indirect proof, was frequently misused in order to obtain a positive creation of an opposite. It turned out, likewise, that the Immediate, which cannot appear in the pure thought as sensuous, is nevertheless tacitly introduced into the sensuous apprehension.

After such results, the internal connection—the glory of the system—could not hold out. Notwithstanding, this too was subjected to a special investigation. Then, independently of the necessary consequences of the points already made, it became manifest in many other places that the intrinsic connection which asserts the self-development of science from its own most undisputed ground, viz. the concept, in opposition to knowledge derived from without, is merely appearance, bold assertion. When the determinations of science, in the dialectic and internal contemplation of the concept, had to make a step in advance, instead of doing this unassisted, they betrayed, when examined more closely, the foreign impulse of external experience. What ought to originate from itself is simply borrowed. Anticipations of concepts, and foreign matter, picked up at random, were shown to exist in the most important creations of the Dialectic; the former, for example, in Measure, in the Freedom of the Concept, in the Totality of the Unconditioned, in the Transition of the Idea into Nature, already frequently alluded to; the latter, in the logical treatment of Matter, in the logical categories of Mechanism, Chemistry, Life, &c. We are thus led to consider the relation of the dialectic method to the material of experience. Hegel had almost asserted, in regard to this, that the dialectic process presupposes the facts of experience, but that it exalts them into the true rational form. Who could have refrained from admiring, with an admiration amounting to astonishment, in Hegel himself—from his *Phenomenology* down to his posthumous *Lectures*—the extreme universality of his empirical knowledge! And no one asserted

that Hegel could have meant that the philosopher ought to "suck the world out of his finger-ends." But the question here was not one touching his subjective knowing or his opinions, but one relating to the objective relation of his absolute method; and then it was shown that this method, strictly confined to itself, and advancing by means of borrowed crutches, had, by its very nature, no opening, whether door or window, to let in experience, and because it nevertheless tacitly and stealthily opens a back door to it, it occupies an *uncritical* position to experience, with its indefinite expression regarding presupposition, and is perhaps more uncritical than unspeculative, but careful, Empiricism. It is impossible to find a place for experience, without making holes in the internal connection of the self-productive Concept.

The speculative method undertook to show that the process whereby the concepts were produced was likewise the process which produced the thing. Thus the dialectic and the genesis of the thing seemed necessarily to coincide. On closer examination, however, it became apparent that the dialectic process in most cases inverts the genesis of the thing, or passes over it without concern, and without touching it. In view of this surprising discrepancy, the advantage which had just been gained had to be abandoned, and refuge to be taken in a distinction which had not originally lain in the plan, that the *eternal* birth of the pure concept was not the temporal development of the becoming thing, and that the two did not necessarily coincide. The dialectic then admitted itself to be, in individual cases, a methodical *hysteron-proteron*.

If, in the dialectic method, the syllogism and its figures came to assume such importance that the *dictum* was trumpeted abroad, "God is a syllogism; the state is a syllogism; the planetary system is a syllogism," &c., on closer examination there turned out to be in this doctrine an obscurity and confusion which distinctly showed themselves in the application. Here too, in a word, the dialectic topsy-turvy showed itself in the very *dictum* itself. If we were to construe mental maladies according to the same type—if we were to say, for example, that Pietism unites itself with Mysticism to form Phariseeism, as the Hegelian terminology would express it,

we might also say, with equal right, "Everything irrational is a syllogism." Thus the doctrine has overshot itself.

After such results, neither the leading thought of the dialectic method nor the carrying out of it could be recognized, and the question now came to be, whether openly to abandon the philosophical prejudice of the present, or to refute the charges brought against the system.

So far, neither one thing nor the other was done. The former was difficult: along with the dialectic method, it would have been necessary to abandon Hegel's system as a system; for the two are one, just as the critical system and Kant's system are one. The second looked easier perhaps, and yet it did not take place. Perhaps silence was meant for a refutation.

Erdmann published his well thought-out *Outlines of Logic and Metaphysics* in 1841. In certain turns of phrase and remarks, he seemed to have reference to the *Investigations* just mentioned, nay, even in places to yield points to them. But he did not mention this fact, and left it to be guessed by the initiated. Erdmann changes several things in the matter, and almost everything in the expression, which he to some extent managed so dexterously as to take the point off any objection that had been made. But the *Investigations* had attacked the *thing* itself, and could hardly be brought to silence by a change in the mode of expression. Any one who will take the trouble to compare it with this new presentation may satisfy himself on the point. Besides this, it might easily be shown that the altered expressions, where they mean anything at all, imply a change of view, and an alteration in the thing. It would be desirable to see these differences discussed within the school itself, in order to show their magnitude. Erdmann's *Logic*, although written in the spirit of Hegel, is not altogether Hegel's old logic.

Treating matters in an opposite spirit, appeared in 1841 Werder's *Logic, a Commentary and Supplement to Hegel's Science of Logic*. It belongs to the idea of a commentary, that it shall smooth over difficulties and disentangle intricacies. Up to that time, all philosophical commentaries had been written with this purpose—e.g. commentaries on Aristotle, for thousands of years. *This Commentary to Hegel's*



*Logic* took no notice of the *Investigations*, directed against it, and probably did not consider the doubts expressed as worth discussion. As for the rest, he invented a new logical category, calling the opponents of the system "the Lord's heaviest cross," and those who could not accept the concept of God set up by the pure thinking, and therefore rejected it, "God's sorest suffering, a passion to which the history of the Passion is but a shadow." Still, there were some *innovations* in this *Logic* too, and, although it had appeared as a supplement, it was rather an *annihilation* of the original, as even the adherents of the system seemed to admit. Particularly remarkable was the correction which appeared at the very beginning. The identity of pure Being and Nothing in the production of Becoming had always excited opposition, and difficulties of various kinds had been found in it. Among other things, people had found it impossible to think the identity of Being and Nothing, because, after all, Nothing appeared to be *less* than pure Being—to be a *minus*; people could not conceive how two empty abstractions—pure Being and pure Nothing—could mutually complement each other, so as to form the concept of *Becoming*. These difficulties were settled by an emendation. It was asserted that Hegel had been wrong in holding the difference between pure Being and Nothing to be inexpressible—a mere opinion. The difference was quite considerable. It was discovered that Nothing is *more* than pure Being, a *plus*; that Nothing is the most comprehensive something. "In Nothing, Being, of itself, breaks the silence in itself. Nothing is Being's coming to consciousness, the rise of perception in it, its glance into itself, the salient point of its originality. In Nothing the sacred ambiguity of the emptiness of Being discloses itself. That it is nothing else than *Self-Being, Being-through-itself*; that it, singly and alone, is *full* of itself,—this is its emptiness, this is Nothing. Thus Nothing is Being's knowledge of its fulness, of its repletion from itself, of its free action, of its self-creation; and, stirring itself in itself, in the energy of this Knowing, Being is no longer Being, but Becoming." "When I say Nothing, I know more than when I say Being, because it *is* more; because it is Being revealing itself, bursting its husk—because it is *naked* Being, the spirit

of Being, Being in Being." Finally, when the Commentary declared the dialectic to be the "*Rêverie* of Logic," and treated it as such, pure thinking, as far at least as principle was concerned, became vague thinking. The Hegelian school has thus far allowed this Logic to pass muster, without rejecting or disowning it.

In fact, the great differences which subsist within the school seem all to rest, pretty much in the same way as the schisms in the Church used to do; the Church forgot these, when she had to combat with heretics or heathens outside.

Gabler gave a lengthy review of the *Logical Investigations* in the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, Oct., 1841, No. 65 sq., Art. I. In this, however, he has criticised a result without its premises—the twentieth section, without the nineteen that precede it and form its basis. The dialectical question, in the first place, is not touched upon at all, my understanding of it being merely set aside as an "incomprehensible misunderstanding." As no harm is done by such assertions, we wait to see the proof of them in the second article; otherwise we might turn the tables and repeat the compliment of "incomprehensible misunderstanding." The aim of the criticisms is to show that the *Logical Investigations* know less of God than the dialectic method, which is absolutely and directly the thinking of God. This we willingly acknowledge, if the dialectic method be true; but we had proved that it is false, and therefore really knows nothing. If one, therefore, meant to argue in this way, he could not afford to omit the opposite proof. At all events, until it appears, his assertion has no foundation.

Other critics have taken it for granted that the whole question has been set at rest by this *velo* of Gabler's. For example, we find in a polemical article: "The main objection, derived from Hegel's unexplained assumption of movement, is developed in the *Logical Investigations*, and duly weighed by Gabler in a criticism of that work." The truth is, that in that criticism not a word is said about such objections, and we cannot say that we at all admire the spirit of such tactics. No explanation, such as the above words would imply as having been made, was intended by Gabler, who, at the end of his criticism, openly states that he will deal with the

heavy charges brought against Hegel's philosophy, in a second article.

In support of the dialectic method, which thinks the thought of God, reference is repeatedly made to the Christian Logos (Cf. *inter al.* Gabler's Criticism, p. 570). We take the reference to mean this: Through Him and for Him all is created, and He is before all, and all exists in Him. If, then, He be the head of the body—that is, of the Church—He belongs to us, and we may comprehend Him in pure thought. This conclusion will hardly be permitted to any one who understands the Christian Logos in the sense demanded by the entire context. The same Logos that in the beginning was God—the world-creating Logos—redeems men from the dominion of darkness and sin. It is this function that is the inheritance of the Church; but from this to attempt to authenticate, by a sort of Christian testimony, the act of the pure idea, which produces the world-creating Logos out of itself, is something quite new, and hardly coincides with the notion of the Apostle Paul, who openly says to the Church that “now we know but *in part*,” and “behold but as through a glass darkly.” If from words like these any one were to conclude that the Christian view of the Universe was universal skepticism, he would be as far from the truth as he who should cite the Christian Logos in authentication of the stand-point of the speculative method. Such confusion of thought only tends to warp unbiassed investigation.

Reference has been made by various persons, and on various occasions, to the *Phenomenology*, as properly preceding the *Logic* of Hegel. “The Thinking which in the *Phenomenology* works itself up out of the phenomena, in the *Logic* produces itself freely—plays with itself” (Werder, p. 25). This is, perhaps, implied in Gabler's remark (Art. I., p. 519), that in the *à priori* (process) of dialectic movement, “man's reproductive *reflection* has already *swallowed* the whole of the *à posteriori*” (das menschliche reproductive *Nachdenken* [habe] das ganze Aposteriorische *bereits im Leibe*). The expression can signify nothing but the digestion in the *Phenomenology*.

As to the *Phenomenology*, there seem to be only two positions possible for it. Either it is a link in the system, and

then it is a part of the philosophy of the subjective spirit—and this, indeed, is the position assigned to it by Hegel in the *Encyclopædia*,—or it is a propædeutic, meant to educate the consciousness up to the speculative stand-point, in which case its place is before the system, and it stands in the external relation of an introduction.

Hegel, in the *Encyclopædia*, produced his system as a whole, and it is the most complete outline of a system, whether we consider the whole or the parts, that the history of philosophy is acquainted with. We must accept the relations in which he here places the different branches to one another, as he gives them. Since then, in the *Encyclopædia*, the *Phenomenology* follows long after the *Logic*, the *Nature-Philosophy* and the *Anthropology* coming in between, we perpetrate a bad piece of anticipation if we appeal to the *Phenomenology* for the investigation of the dialectical method laid down in the *Logic*—an anticipation which rends Hegel's system to pieces. In view of the great unity which was Hegel's aim, we have thought it our duty to follow the *Encyclopædia*, which was so often revised by him.

If we assume the second stand-point, and consider the *Phenomenology* as a propædeutic to the absolute method, or to the stand-point of Speculative Logic, then it stands outside of the system, and has, as a preparatory exercise, a subjective importance, but no influence on the objective foundation of the system, which, on the contrary, aims, starting with the *Logic*, to produce itself from itself, and to comprehend itself in itself. The *Phenomenology*, then, is a propædeutic to the *Logic*, as creeping is a propædeutic to walking, arithmetic a propædeutic to the logical syllogism. In this case no less than in the other, the appeal to the *Phenomenology* is an inconsistency, a mere subterfuge, which, however, does not escape the eye of the clear-sighted.

If the appeal to the *Phenomenology* were admissible, this work ought to be always read *before* the *Logic*, which is never done, or, if it ever is, only by way of introduction. If it were so read, there would result a somewhat odd circumstance. In the course of the whole, certain sections would occur *thrice*: e.g. life, first in the *Phenomenology* as a phenomenon, then in the *Logic* as an idea, and lastly in the *Phi-*

*osophy of Nature.* What is the object of this? It is bad enough that life, for example, is treated twice, once in the *Logic* and once in the *Philosophy of Nature*; and it has been shown that the idea of life produced from the pure concept is nothing more or less than intuition—which, indeed, is contemned, but which, in a clarified and enfeebled form, is accepted. If we admit, as was shown, that the *means* employed by the dialectic method are false, it is of no avail to appeal to the dialectic Phenomenology. Altogether, people should not be always quite so ready with the *Phenomenology* in their talk; it is, and ever will be, a *liber laudatus magis quam lectus*.

Thus, likewise, is barred the attempt to defend the dialectic method by the aid of the *Phenomenology*.

But its defenders hold in reserve a brilliant retreat for themselves, by ascribing all objections brought against the absolute dialectic to mere imagination, which, in its very nature, say they, is incapable of reaching the pure concept. Any one who questions the products of the absolute concept, occupies the stand-point of the imagination, and, therefore, has no right to speak. When the pure concept is hedged round in this way, it becomes as unapproachable as the Holy of Holies. All possibility of coming to any understanding ceases, and one might as well try to make something out of the illuminations of a visionary, who treats all opposition precisely in this way, as out of speculative science. Be this as it may, all objections—to speak in the language of the school—are due to an “immanent” criticism of the concept, to its own demands, assertions, and consequences.

Never, in the history of philosophy, did the logical question assume so much importance as at present. Whereas, formerly, the attack had been directed against “the speculative theology” flank, it now approaches closer to the centre, which supports the whole—the *Logic*. The contest regarding the logical question is a contest for the existence of the system. All the consequences which have developed themselves from Hegel, stand or fall with it.

Profound investigation of objective reality and perspicuity of style will not reappear in philosophy until that false and exaggerated admiration of the dialectic unity of method,

which still fetters men's minds, whenever a new work appears, written according to this method, shall have given way; and philosophical science will then again speak an intelligible language, as human beings are wont to do, when it is compelled to give up its unintelligible, divine utterances — *alias* dialectic categories.

The dialectic method is a logical hypothesis. Is it, then, so difficult to come to clearness about its essence — its truth or untruth?

If by scientific procedure we mean one that is essentially necessary and universal, then the question that must arise for decision is simply this: *Is Hegel's dialectic method of pure thinking a scientific procedure?*

In view of the investigations already made, we must answer this question with a round negative. We do not mean by this that the dialectic method does not possess relatively even a certain scientific value. Such, indeed, it possesses, as a preparative, measured by the standard of the Aristotelian dialectic, inasmuch as it forces the concepts more sharply against each other, and defines them more clearly, whereas in the sense of being an absolute method it has no value whatever. Such it is not. It has exercised a powerful scientific influence by stretching the demands of Logic, but in so doing it has *over-stretched* itself. It possesses merely the importance of a relative reflection, but it is not an absolute production.

The proof of this has been adduced, the refutation has yet to be brought forward. Verily, it will not be brought by the differences which have already manifested themselves within the Hegelian Logic, and whereof, we hear, more may yet be expected. After a long period of haughty stability, such moving and bustle are signs of internal insecurity and actual disturbance. But a work so rigidly carved out of one thought as Hegel's *Logic* will go far to verify the saying: *Sint ut sunt, aut non sint*. Mending and bolstering up will be of no avail, as Plato warns us in the *Statesman*: "My good friend, it isn't safe to whittle here; it is much safer to cut right through the middle: one is much surer to come upon ideas."

The undersigned is prepared, with all seriousness, to take up the investigation anew, provided opposite arguments of

any moment are brought against him. But until a refutation is undertaken, let our friends at least leave off singing their old song about mental languidness and convenience, when scientific men do not recognize the dialectic method. A short time ago, something of this kind might have been read in a certain preface. If the investigation is shunned, the arrow may return and strike him who discharged it.

Science cannot live on criticism, which only expels what the living organism cannot assimilate. Where criticism reigns alone with its negativity, we are seized with a dull, heavy sense of discomfort, which necessarily accompanies such a process of decomposition. Decomposition and assimilation ought, on the contrary, as in breathing, to form but one activity. Then criticism, instead of repressing the life of science, increases it by purifying it. But since even Logic cannot satisfy itself with the mere critical result which rejects the dialectic method of pure thinking, the *Logical Investigations* entered, in a positive sense, into the facts of human thought, and tried to show that the science of the idea does not go down, but, on the contrary, becomes all the more certain, when the dialectic method, with its false sanctions, is rejected.

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## BOOK NOTICES.

### WORKS OF DR. H. K. HUGO DELFF:

1. *Ideas of a Philosophical Science of Spirit and Nature.* Husum, 1865.
2. *Cecilia; or, Concerning the Truth of the Supersensuous.* A Dialogue with a Postscript. Husum, 1867.
3. *Fundamental Doctrines of Philosophical Science.* Husum, 1869.
4. *Dante Alighieri and the Divine Comedy.* Leipsig, 1870.
5. *The Idea of the Divine Comedy.* A Study. Leipsig, 1871.

The two works on Dante by Mr. Delff have attracted so much attention in Germany, that it may not be considered out of place in this Journal to bring them also to the notice of the American public, and especially of those whom Longfellow's translation of the Italian poet must have interested more or less in Dante-literature generally. Mr. Delff's works on the Divine Comedy have this distinguishing merit, that the author brings to his task the results of a life-long study of mystical literature, to which Dante's work is generally held to belong. This thorough knowledge of the mystical writings of all times enables the author to illustrate his exposition in the most varied and instructive manner. Most particularly felicitous is his sketch of the political, ecclesiastical, and philosophical revolutions and conditions that preceded Dante, and that form the basis from which Mr. Delff starts his interpretation of Dante's life and works. This sketch evinces, moreover, a rare comprehension of the early *status* of the

Christian Church; and the manner in which the gradual rise of the Roman papacy and the substitution of new Œcumenical Council dogmas for the original *regula fidei* is developed, deserves the highest praise.

Mr. Delff's philosophical and religious views, of course, pervade also the Dante-essays; but are more particularly developed in the three above-named purely philosophical works, which we are sorry that space forbids us to characterize at length. In these days, when it requires great boldness on the part of a philosophical writer to speak otherwise than slightingly of religion, it is certainly interesting to see Mr. Delff taking an enthusiastic stand in defence of religion,—nay more, of Christianity, and still more of catholicism and mysticism.

In the development of these views Mr. Delff is probably more nearly related to Baader than to any other German writer, though he exhibits originality enough of his own. Of our own writers in the same direction, Mr. Aleoff comes nearest to him. The most interesting parts of Mr. Delff's works are his polemics against the current "natural philosophy," but chiefly his religious expositions and unfoldings of psychological phenomena, such as are rarely treated by men of science. In these regions his erudition can fully exhibit itself, and his vivid, graceful style throws a peculiar charm over the subjects treated. Thus the dialogue "Cecilia" may even be called brilliant in its development of the author's most cherished convictions.

A. E. K.

*Il Cavour e Libera Chiesa in Libero Stato.* Per A. Vera, Professore di Filosofia nella Università de Napoli. Napoli: Detken & Roeholl. 1871.

Professor Vera is making his deep insights into the Philosophy of History and Religion tell in the formation of public opinion at this important juncture in the affairs of Italy.

We see by the advertisement on the last page of the above work that this active author has in press a new (enlarged) edition of his French translation of Hegel's *Logie*, and also a translation of Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion*, with Introduction and Commentary.

*Revue des Cours Littéraires de la France et de l'étranger.* Paris. July, 1871.

The two numbers received contain two articles by Professor Vera of Naples: the first on "The great Mosaic at Pompeii," a genial characterization of the celebrated artistic representation of the battle between Alexander and Darius (at Issus?); the second article is the opening lecture of a course on the History of Philosophy, and treats of the epoch of Socrates. At the close he touches on the present state of affairs in Italy, and concludes thus: "The true regeneration of a people springs from a new thought, from a new Idea, from a new breath of the Eternal Spirit—a breath which, as before remarked, revives the past, but revives it transformed and elevated to a high degree of energy, consciousness, and liberty. Now, without wishing to exaggerate and to attribute to Philosophy a monopoly of intelligence, I believe I can affirm that there is no science which can better cause such a thought [i.e. regenerating new thought]. For Philosophy acts on the soul in many ways. In the first place, it extirpates those evil seeds in it—torpor, ignorance, error—which weaken it, corrupt it, and render it insensible to the light of truth. And since it lives in the region of thought and of absolute verities, it possesses more than any other science the faculty of understanding and of manifesting the Idea, and of causing it to penetrate the mind, thereby regenerating the inner man; for the outer man



cannot be regenerated until the inner has been. You see then, gentlemen, how that in fighting the battles of intelligence, and above all fighting them in a free disinterested spirit, we accomplish a work than which none is higher nor more advantageous to ourselves, to our country, and to humanity."

Another article in one of the numbers, under the caption "Contemporary Philosophy in Italy," speaks approvingly of Raphael Mariano's work of that name, and of his "Essay on Hegelian Philosophy"; it then notices Louis Ferri's work on the "History of Philosophy in Italy in the Nineteenth Century." It speaks, finally, of Count Mamiani's "Confessions of a Metaphysician," and of his later work, the "Cartesian Meditations Revised in the Nineteenth Century," of which it says: "Taking as a model that methodic system of doubt extended to all our knowledge, this work rises by rigorous demonstration to philosophic faith in the spirituality and immortality of the soul, in the eternity of ideas, in the existence of a personal God, in the universal and indefinite progress of Creation \* \* \* The twofold consciousness of the activity and passivity of the Ego give to it the perception or direct intuition of its relations with other beings upon which it acts or which act upon it, and it includes thus in one common certitude its own existence, external nature, the ideal world, and the Absolute Being."

*The Wanderer: A Colloquial Poem.* By Wm. Ellery Channing. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1871.

The preface, by Emerson, serves as an honest introduction, which leads one on into seven quiet, still poems, full of the perfume of nature. Often the irregularity of the rhythm jars, and yet through the whole there is a certain serene melody. One is assured, however, that the poet did not write with a purpose to suit the taste of any reader. If sometimes a figure is a little overstrained, one does not feel that it was done for effect, but because the thought so shaped the words; e.g.

"Each hour this laughing boy tenacious caught  
A fist-full of existence, spread it out  
Flat on its back, and dried it in the sun  
Of all his breezy thoughts, to shape its truth"

Or this, where, after speaking of the grinding of the submerged mountain-tops by floating icebergs, he says,

"Till all the furrowed surface deeply carved,  
The saline torment took its hand away,  
And left a course of splinters in dry air  
To mock the balled thinker of an orb  
Where somewhat thinks, superior to himself."

Or this:

"I sometimes caught an echo of the past,  
Lessons of sunk religions, sounding faint."

The poems are colloquial in the sense that they seem as if they were fragments of an utterance in an age before men "forgot the fashion of leisure." There is no unity to be sought or found in them, but a clear, pure current of fine thought and fancy. The picture of the scholar, at the end of the last poem, is one of the finest passages; and leads one's thoughts irresistibly back to the preface, as if it were a portrait.

A. C. B.

*A History of Philosophy from Thales to the Present Time.* By Dr. Friedrich Ueberweg, late Professor of Philosophy in the University of Königsberg. Translated from the Fourth German Edition, by George S. Morris, A.M., Professor of Modern Languages in the University of Michigan. With Additions by Noah Porter, D.D., LL.D., President of Yale College. With a Preface by the Editors of the Philosophical and Theological Library. Vol. I.: History of the Ancient and Mediaeval Philosophy. New York: Chas. Scribner & Company. 1872.

This first volume of the Philosophical Division of the Philosophical and Theological Library, conducted by Drs. Henry B. Smith and Philip Schaff, of the Union Theological Seminary, New York, will be apt to prejudice many in favor of the whole enterprise; and deservedly, for it is an admirable book, admirably translated. It has often been remarked, how much superior American translations of German works are to English ones; and nothing could prove this more clearly than a comparison between the recent translation of Ueberweg's System of Logic, done in England, and the work of the same author now before us. The former is transferred, the latter translated, into English. One has often to render whole passages of the Logic back into German, word for word, in order to understand what they mean; whereas, in the present work, one can only guess at what the German might have been.

Dr. Ueberweg's work has for many years been very popular in Germany, and it deserves to become so among us. Its author was a man of very extensive learning, unweariéd application, and considerable philosophic insight. At the same time, it must be admitted that he was a scholar rather than a philosopher, an organizer rather than an originator. He has stated what other men thought with admirable clearness and conciseness; he has not enriched the treasury of Philosophy by any original thought. This cannot be considered a drawback in a historian of Philosophy, but rather the contrary. Dr. Ueberweg, indeed, had no pet theory to illustrate in his work; he did not try to make history appear the self-development of a series of categories; he was content to state what he found in previous thinkers and to classify on historical principles, which are very different from logical ones. The result is a work objective and reliable.

Following the example of Hegel, Dr. Ueberweg refuses the designation of Philosophy to the dreams of the Oriental sages, and dates the rise of thought from Thales of Miletus. Like Zeller, he divides Greek Philosophy into three periods, which, however, do not coincide with those of the former; and we must admit that we prefer Zeller's division. These are all treated with due consideration, and the affiliation of the different schools is well brought out, showing the natural development of thought. A most important feature of the book is, that it contains a very full, though by no means exhaustive, bibliography of Philosophy in all its parts. The author seems not to have been so well acquainted with French and English works as he was with German. This defect has, to a small extent, been remedied by the translator. The dimensions of the work admit of considerable space being given to every name of importance, and of a clear presentation of the outlines and peculiarities of every system. This is done with uncommon vigor, although in some places the translator has not shown it to the best advantage. For example, it is amusing to find *πάθος* translated by *passion*, and *ἔχειν* by *possession*, in the Aristotelian Categories.

The portion of the present work that refers to the Scholastic Philosophy is of unusual interest, as being almost the only scientific treatise upon that period existing in the English language. The work of F. D. Maurice, notwithstanding its fine, genial tone, is too much the work of a dreamer to be of much objective value, and the large work of Albert Stöckl (*Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*) has not yet been rendered into English. But, apart from its thus standing alone, Ueberweg's treatment of Scholastic Philosophy is of exceeding interest and value. It is so calm and appreciative, so much the work of one who looks at all men and times dispassionately, that we often feel inclined to agree with the author when our unbiassed judgment says we should disagree.

In conclusion, we would say briefly that we heartily recommend this work as the best History of Philosophy existing in our language.

T. D.

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## THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC.

Translated from the German of Dr. K. ROSENKRANZ, by G. S. HALL.

Much as that which Hegel accomplished as pedagogue demands recognition; still, that which had greatest scientific significance, which he wrought out all in quiet during his rectorate, and which grew up to him partly from the ever newly formed *dictata* of which he made use in his lectures, was the elaboration of the Logic, which appeared, like the Phenomenology, at an unfavorable time, in the midst of the great war of nations in Europe.

The Logic should make only the beginning of the system of science, to which the Phenomenology had furnished an introduction in so far as it had had, as its result, from the development of consciousness, the conception of absolute knowledge. This stand-point of self-consciousness, in which the antithesis of subject and object was absolutely cancelled, was to unfold itself in the organic form of free, self-subsistent idea. Inasmuch as, in the depiction of the embryonic plan of the Hegelian system, the historical connection of his Logic with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason has been already given, we will here revert to this no further than is unavoidably necessary in order to characterize the position which Hegel's Logic assumes in science, and from which alone its form and its language can be rightly understood and judged.

The general problem transmitted from Kant to Hegel was to develop the idea of pure reason in the totality of its deter-

minations in such a manner that the understanding, which with Kant remained master of reason and prescribed for it boundaries which it must not transcend, should subordinate itself to reason as its tool. To this end it was necessary to rescue the categories from the uncritical dead form in which they had been adopted by Kant from the old formal logic. The latter had selected its distinctions only empirically. There are, according to it, ideas, judgments, syllogisms, in manifold form, just as there are negroes, Mongolians, &c., in manifold varieties. The determinations were found ready made in tradition, only always differently arranged by logicians, furnished with more or less illustrations, and in general brought into relation to more or less matter entirely foreign to themselves. Hegel now demanded that the idea of reason, as that of the logical idea, should develop itself in a connection in which every determination must be mediated as necessary, but at the same time, likewise, should mediate another. The categories could not, therefore, appear as fixed, unmoved conceptions of the understanding, but they are essentially dialectic, i.e. they pass through themselves over into other and opposite conceptions, quality into quantity, something into other, one into many, essence into appearance, ground into consequence, content into form, substantiality into causality, cause into effect, general into special, &c. It must, therefore, be shown how an idea is changed in and through its development, i.e. how it advances to the idea which is the opposite of itself, which emerges from its sublation [dissolution] as its positive result; for negation does not come from without to the idea, but it produces its negation itself from within outward. All ideas of pure reason make up, therefore, a system in which the lower is richer in extent but poorer in content, while the higher is poorer in extent and richer in content, inasmuch as the latter embraces in itself, as steps of its formation, all that have gone before it; for it is higher only in that it includes in itself all that is presupposed by it, through a determination which has power to transcend it and to sublimate it into itself. The higher step not only preserves the lower in itself, but also changes them, in that it elevates them to itself.

The correctness of this problem in apprehending the deter-

minations of pure reason as dialectic, is to be granted throughout. The science of logic, which treats of the laws of thought, contradicts itself when it presents these laws in a formless shape, as an inorganic mass, as a medley of fixed ideas. Thinking—the final ground of all motion, of all life—cannot be unmoved and lifeless in itself. Of the necessity of this problem, by the solution of which Kant's Critique was emancipated from the enchantment of the understanding, Hegel was entirely conscious, and so said that he must re-form the Logic from the very beginning.

The second special problem bequeathed from Kant to Hegel lay in the solution of the old metaphysics by means of logic. Fichte and Schelling, Kant's immediate successors, had neither a logic nor a metaphysics, but, with them all, the elements of these sciences had become moments of consciousness. Hegel returned to a metaphysics within logic, by developing the categories of Kant, and by making them precede the idea of the universal. He declared the determinations, quality, quantity, relation, modality, to be definitions of Being in itself, as categories of objective logic, in distinction from idea, judgment, syllogism, as the moments of subjective logic. The metaphysics of logic should be made to consist in the fact that the latter is the ideal archetype of all reality. The idea of pure reason is the *prius* of all concrete reality, which is rational only in so far as it is thought in itself, and is, therefore, thinkable for us. The idea as logical, to speak like Kant, is the ideal prototype of nature and of mind. In the idea of reason, e.g., the pure idea of quality exists; in nature, qualities—red, yellow, sweet, sour, hard, soft, rough, smooth, heavy, light, &c.—exist. So also in mind, dull, shrewd, upright, false, strong, weak, &c. The idea of quality in itself is, therefore, that of pure quality, because in that real quality it gains existence, but itself is no definite quality. The same is true of quantity, &c.

Consequently, all those ideas must be excluded from logic which belong to nature or to mind, like the conception of life, which falls to nature; or the knowledge of the true, or the willing of the good, which fall to mind. In this Hegel is still biassed by Kant, who applied the dialectic to the ideas of soul, world, and God. The idea of the absolute idea, purely

as idea, Hegel seems not to have regarded as significant enough, and therefore he determined it further as life, and as knowledge of the true, and as willing of the good. The science of the logical idea must also, in conclusion, sublimate [cancel] itself, i.e. pass over to nature; but it does not follow hence that it must itself develop the idea of life in which nature reaches itself as idea.

With respect to the idea of mind this difficulty exists, viz. that the idea of reason is unthinkable without that of mind, for reason is the totality of the abstract determinations of thinking, but thinking exists, *in actu*, only as the activity of a thinking subject; hence ordinary logic takes it up psychologically from the stand-point of knowledge, and inquires how we come to form ideas, judgments, and syllogisms. But with the determinations of thinking as such, it is found that they are independent in themselves, and are valid not only for thinking, but for all being. They are law not merely for our ideal subjectivity, but no less for all real objectivity. It is by virtue of this that they can appear as the neutral indifference of nature and mind in the autonomy and autarchy of the logical idea; in which, however, it must not be forgotten that the principle of reason, the ground of its existence, is ultimately the absolute mind itself. When Hegel said in the preface to his *Logic*, that it presents the truth as it is unveiled, he sought thus to express that the categories of reason are the absolute form, without which neither nature nor mind can be thought. It would be impossible to think the concrete—star, plant, animal, fantasy, action, family, &c.—without the abstract determination of reason; the latter are contained, therefore, in the concrete as its unity, difference, ground, &c., but in a concrete manner; for nature and mind are not merely the veil of pure reason, as though they were related only externally to it, as though they presented only a masked reason, but, compared with the abstract form of reason, they are as it were higher forms of the idea. Hegelians misunderstand Hegel when they behave as if in all philosophy only logic were ultimately concerned, of which nature and mind properly are only superfluous translations.

Still another expression of Hegel, in the same place, has led to many disputes. He said that the *Logic* could be

regarded as the exposition of God as He was before the creation, of nature, and of the finite mind. This has been received as though he had put the conception of the logical idea in the place of God. All Hegelians who are pantheists, or atheists, or Logo-theists, make the idea of God vanish in that of reason, and regard logic as the fortunate destruction of all theology. It is still not to be left out of account that Hegel himself distinguished, on the one hand, between reason and God, and, on the other, between God and the finite mind. He says, when we abstract from nature and from the finite mind, and therefore from ourselves, only the abstraction of pure thinking remains. God can then be determined only as Logos. He is, then, pure Being, absolute essence, idea in itself. He would say that philosophy concerns itself only with definitions of the absolute, and that hence those of reason are in and for themselves divine. To obviate misunderstanding, he declared later in the Encyclopedia that of the categories only the first and third, but not the second, could have validity as definitions of God; for only the former were affirmative, while the later, intermediate between them, was negative; e.g. quality, quantity, measure, make up the ontological trichotomy. Thus I must think of God as the essence of all qualities as well as the measure of all things, but not as quantity, because as infinite He transcends all quantitative limitations; thus I must think of Him as essence and reality, but not as phenomenon, &c. Hegel exhibits here an imperfect reserve, which was first developed into greater clearness and distinctness in his lectures on the proofs of the existence of God.

The unmistakable enthusiasm with which Hegel was wont to speak of the Logic, has its cause in the absolute interest of science, and of thinking in general, in the categories. Can these be fortuitous? Can there be now this, now that significance arbitrarily given to a category? Certainly not. In common life, to be sure, we carelessly use related categories promiscuously. We speak of something and thing, essence and substance, reality and actuality, ground and cause, &c., as equivalents in meaning; but in science we must undertake a critical sifting. If these most general ideas are not fortuitous but necessary, they must

hang together among themselves, and make up an accordant totality in which every determination results only from a mediation which concerns only it. The uncritical consciousness lays hold of now this, now that category, according to its needs, and operates therewith as well as it can: the scientific consciousness, on the contrary, renders account of the categories, and limits each to its appropriate sphere. We uncritically apply, e.g., the category of *thingness* to every possible object. We apply it rightly in naming, e.g., a lump of sugar, or a thimble; but if any one should name family, or state, or poetry, a thing, we should ourselves take offence in common conversational language. Hegel has, therefore, rightly apprehended the problem of the science of the logical idea, even if his solution of it may be contested in single points. It is impossible that those determinations, from the truth of which all other truth in thought depends, should not be necessary. My caprice must not decree what is to be understood by being, essence, phenomenon, content, form, &c. My caprice cannot decide which idea has to develop itself earlier, which later, in this logical cosmos. Let it be undertaken with a single idea, in order to show the truth of what has been said. Let any one undertake to say what effect is, and he is obliged to go back from it to cause. Can he rest at cause? No: cause leads to the idea of substance, which is active, and from which the change of being which we designate as effect arises. But what is substance? Substance is a reality subsisting through itself, in contrast to a merely accidental existence which definitely is only in and through another definite being. Thus, analytically, we can ever retrogress until we arrive at the general conception of Being, of pure Being without predicates, beyond or beneath which nothing more can be thought. Or, let the contrary method be followed. Let us ask ourselves — What arises from effect? Obviously, a new effect; i.e. the effect becomes itself, in turn, a cause. When an officer in a battle gives to his soldiers the command to *fire*, this word is an effect of his thinking, and considered as sound, of his vocal organs. But this effect becomes the cause of the soldiers' discharging their weapons. This effect becomes cause that, of the hostile soldiers, some are killed or wounded. This effect becomes cause



that they either energetically resist the attack, or flee, &c. There arises, therefore, an infinite progress. At the same time the idea of cause and effect is changed into that of reciprocity; action invariably follows reaction, &c. Thus thinking pursues its onward way synthetically through deduction, until here, too, it arrives at an ultimate, viz. the idea, which in the causal process of substances constitutes the principle of their activity. In the adduced example, one would proceed *in concreto* from soldiers to armies, from armies to nations, from nations to their wars, from wars to history, from history to freedom, which is the idea of mind. The process goes no farther. All the remaining categories lie midway between the idea of the being without predicates and that of the idea, which is the unity of the particular idea and its reality. Included in logic are the determinations of being, of essence, of idea, in all their differences,—still themselves the content, to the universality of which nature and history are related as examples.

Over against the fulness of the concrete idea in nature and history, the cosmos of the logical idea with its abstract categories appears in fact as a world of shadows. It is remarkable that Hegel is so often reproached with offering up the world of blooming life to idea as to a desolate Hades. Can Hegel make the abstract something other than it is? Is not, then, this abstract contained in the concrete as its logical soul, just as the shades in Hades are not absolutely dead, but are departed souls that must drink blood in order to make themselves apprehensible? Hegel himself designated the logical ideas as pure essences, souls; and so, too, they are with him as they are in reality; but what is the logic of so many logicians? Not a Hades, in which souls longing for life drift about, but a church-yard, into which the bones of the corpses of ideas are desolately and promiscuously thrown.

If Hegel sought to present the connection of the categories as in itself self-producing, he must make each one to appear analogously, as a special formation of the logical idea, the same as he did in the Phenomenology with the different stand-points of consciousness. It has been supposed that he changed categories into individualities, and reduced them to

speculative poetical figures that waver past like the shapes in Goethe's masquerade procession. In order to gain a clear conception of Hegel's process, it is only necessary to institute the attempt to make any category develop itself with perfect objectivity, and without mixing in, one's own personality. As soon as it is no longer said, e.g., we pass over now from quality to quantity, or, in another form, after we have disposed of the conception of quality, we come now to that of quantity, &c.; but when quality shall sublata [develop] itself into quantity, it will be found that quite another language will be used. It will be seen how the idea of quality changes with each progressive distinction which is made, until finally through itself it projects the determination opposed to it (that of the indifferent external boundary) on itself, and thereby passes over into the category of quantity. It is true that Hegel has constructed a new language for logic; but this was a necessity, which moreover had the advantage of being truly German, without lapsing into a fantastic purism. How far the effect of this most admirable language extends, must by no means be overlooked. We read everywhere that the *Logic* was composed in a very dark, oracle-like tone, which must frighten the "uninitiated" from its study; but far rather, such remarks themselves are intended to create the prejudice which frightens students from it. I will here extract a few passages at random from the *Logic*, and then let it be asked whether they are written plainly, whether they are German, whether they are in good taste, and how they should be written otherwise. In the doctrine of extensive and intensive *quantum*, e.g. in the elucidation of their difference, he says:

"Degree is thus determinate magnitude, quantum, but not at the same time multitude, or the Plural within itself; it is only a plurality; plurality is the plural aggregated in simple determination, extant-being gone back into being-for-self. Its determinateness must, indeed, be expressed by a number as the most perfect determinate being of quantum; but it is not a sum, but simple, only *one* degree. When we speak of 10, 20 degrees, the quantum which has so many degrees is the tenth, twentieth degree, and not the amount or sum of the same: in that case it would be extensive: but it is only *one*, the tenth, twentieth degree. It contains the determinateness

which lies in the enumeration 10, 20, but does not contain it as plural; but it is the number as sublated [cancelled] enumeration, as simple determinateness."

What is there to be changed in this?—We take the liberty of extracting from the doctrine of the idea of Actuality another passage, in which the difference between might [*Macht*] and power [*Gewalt*] is described:

"Power [external constraint] is the phenomenon of might, or it is might as external. Might is, however, external only in so far as the causal substance, in its action, i.e. in its positing of itself, is at the same time presupposing, i.e. posits itself as sublated. Hence, conversely, an act of power is none the less an act of might. It is only an Other presupposed by itself upon which the powerful cause works; its working thereon is negative relation to itself, or the manifestation of itself. The passive is independent, which is only posited; something broken within itself—a reality which is condition, and, indeed, condition in its truth, viz. a reality which is only a possibility; or, conversely, inherent being, that is, only determinateness of inherent being, only passive. It is, hence, not only possible, but necessary, for him on whom power is exerted, to exert power; whatever has power over another, has it because it is the might thereof, which thereby manifests itself and the other. Passive substance is posited by power only as that which it in truth is, especially because it is the simple Positive or immediate substance only in order to be posited. The prerogative of being a condition is the semblance of immediateness, which real causality strips off of it. Through the penetrating influence of another power, justice is thus done to passive substance. What it loses is the above immediateness, substantiality foreign to it. What it receives as foreign to it, viz. to become determined as a posited being, is its own determination."

How plainly and how strikingly all this is said! Let the experiment be made on one example to see whether Hegel's inflections must necessarily be used. The vital, e.g., is the might which exerts power upon the inorganic world; the inorganic—air, light, water, &c.—is immediately present over against the Vital; the Vital presupposes it as its condition. But in laying hold on it, it ceases to be self-subsisting in respect to the might of life, and is sublated by it. In this sublation, might manifests itself as power, which manifests at the same time itself and that which it determines as passive to it. Thus the sculptor who exerts power upon a block

of marble, in order to make a statue of it; thus the teacher who exerts power upon the intelligence of a child, in order to make therefrom a cultivated understanding, &c. In this metaphysical category morality is, of course, not involved; might may not conduct itself with injustice, as if *potestas* and *jus* were ethically the same, but only causality is involved. Ordinary consciousness receives much only from the side of activity or passivity, without bringing both determinations together in the unity of reciprocity. Men complain, e.g., that the state exerts power in taxation, or in enforcing military duty; but forget that the state is their own substance, without which they can possess no property and would enjoy no personal safety. How far a government may impose too many burdens on the citizens, &c., is another question.

Hegel's style made great progress in the *Logic*. The language of the *Phenomenology*, full of spirit, pervaded with an ironical tone, artistic in bold pictures, often highly pathetic in its descriptions, mystic in its imagery, only recurs when Hegel regards indignantly the want of confidence in the mind to recognize truth, or the frippery of formal logic, or the hypocrisy and bad preëminence of positive sciences. Otherwise he writes entirely to the point, and with pedagogical regard for his readers. Neither does he fail, at important points, to adduce the history of science, and to show how the idea of being-in-itself belongs to the Eleatics; that of becoming, to Heraclitus; that of the One, to Leucippus and Democritus: that of quantity, to Pythagoras; that of measure, of identity, of difference, and of ground, to Leibnitz; that of the Negative, to the Sceptics; that of the thing-in-itself, and of phenomenon, to Kant; that of content and form, of matter and form, to Aristotle; that of substance, to Spinoza; that of the general idea, to Plato; that of the absolute idea, to Plato, Aristotle, and Kant. His *Logic* allowed no true principle of science which had ever made an epoch in its history, to escape it. But that which appears in the history of philosophy in connection with a thousand-fold other relations, enters the *Logic* as a simple idea in its systematic place.

Where it seemed necessary to him, he made remarks and

digressions, of which that upon the idea of the differential calculus, under the category of quantitative infinity, is one of the most weighty, to which, in the second edition of the Logic, only that upon Berzelius' theory of chemical affinity, and Berthollet's critique, can be compared. He would never have resolved upon such a casual, loose form of expression in the Phenomenology; for that needed to be a plastic, definite, beautifully articulated work of art. Now clearness of understanding was his supreme aim; the aesthetic design, to form out of the Logic a scientific work of art, was not lost sight of, but it became subordinate to didactic necessity.

As pedagogue, he had learned also the art of exemplification, and knew how to make good use of it in the Logic. He had acquired the tact of remarking where and how an illustration was necessary to the reader. He speaks, for example, of the formal syllogism, and seeks to show that it can attribute to the same subject contradictory determinations because it can make of the different sides of the subject a *medius terminus*. The conclusion can accordingly be correct in form, yet false in content. This he explains by illustrations:

“When from the *medius terminus* of sensuousness the conclusion is reached that man is neither good nor bad, because neither the one nor the other can be predicated of the sensuous, this is correct; but the concluding clause is *false*, because of man as concrete the *medius terminus* of spirituality is no less valid. From the *medius terminus* of the gravity of the planets, satellites, and comets, toward the sun, it duly follows that these bodies fall into the sun; yet they do not fall into it, because they are in equal degree their own centre of gravity, or, as we say, they are impelled by centrifugal force. Also, from the *medius terminus* of the sociality, community of goods of citizens can be deduced; but from the *medius terminus* of individuality, when it is driven into like abstraction, the dissolution of the state ensues, as has been the case, e.g., with the German empire, because it has adhered to the latter *medius terminus*. There is, in short, nothing which is held to be so insufficient as such a formal conclusion, because it reposes upon chance or upon arbitrariness, which *medius terminus* is to be made use of. When such a deduction has spun off through conclusions ever so finely, and its correctness has been fully granted, still it leads at least to nothing; for the fact ever remains that other *medii termini* arise, from which the exact opposite can with equal propriety

be deduced. Kant's antinomies of reason are nothing else than that, from a conception, now one of its determinations is made fundamental, and now, with equal necessity, the other."

Hegel opposed logical formalism. It is quite erroneous to think that he despised the forms of formal logic; on the contrary, he respected them as products of mind, which, in his estimation, was higher than nature. Hence he expressly took them under his protection, and said:

"If it is thought not unimportant to have discovered more than sixty species of the parrot, and thirty-seven species of the veronica, &c., the discovery of forms of reason must be esteemed still more important. Is not a figure of logical syllogism something infinitely higher than a species of parrot, or veronica?"

Hegel has repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that no true determination of formal logic is lost in speculative logic, but that, rather, the former is dialectically reproduced in the latter. When, e.g., formal logic posits the idea of the general, special, and individual, it describes these determinations, in part psychologically, in part grammatically, until it forgets this, and suddenly treats them as in-and-for-themselves independent. It commences psychologically. It calls upon consciousness to abstract from the Manifold in immediate contemplation; thereby the unity which exists in the Manifold is attained; this identity is the generality which therefore appears as the product of an act of theoretical intelligence. The general is the idea. Now it proceeds to combining conceptions into judgments. This combination is again an act of consciousness; it is not the conceptions which combine themselves, but it is the thinking subject which brings together into a proposition those which are taken as external to one another. Thereby logic becomes grammatical. It names the judgments expressly, logical sentences, *enunciations*, *propositions*. It is the thinker who joins the predicate — or, more properly, any predicate — to the subject, in that he ties it to it with the copula. The copula is, in turn, regarded as a bond which is external and indifferent alike to the subject and to the predicate, although it unites both. In the syllogism, formal logic combines judgments with one

another by deriving from the relation of two judgments with each other, a third as result. Hence they can no longer affirm their subjectivity, for the dependence of the determinations upon each other, and therewith the metaphysical element of logic, come here to light. The so-called rules of inference express nothing but the independence of the idea toward the thinking subject. *Ex propositionibus mere negativis nihil sequitur. Ex propositionibus mere particularibus nihil sequitur.* But why not? In the first case, because the affirmative nature of the idea forbids it; in the second, because the special cannot be subsumed under the special, but only under the general. *Quid valet de omnibus, valet etiam de singulis;* because in the idea, generality is identical with individuality. *A majori ad minus, non a minori ad majus valet consequentia;* of course, because the individual must contain determinations which are not in the special; and the special, distinctions which are not expressly posited in the general. Logic recognizes here, therefore, that ideas determine themselves so that, when their objective relations are not attended to, the conclusion has no validity. It finds itself compelled also to distinguish the essential from the unessential characteristics; qualitative from quantitative; positive from negative; substantiality from causality; possibility from actuality; chance from necessity; i.e. the entire metaphysics breaks suddenly into logic, and is smuggled in, now here, now there, in the form of abrupt definitions. Once arrived at this point, logic falls into the opposite extreme of subjectivity with which it psychologically began. In the figures of the syllogism it began to calculate by means of ideas. Calculating is, in fact, thinking, as Bardili said in his Logic, with which he would cure 1800 as with a *medicina mentis* of Kant's Critique of Reason. "Whoever calculates, thinks." With these words he begins his Logic. The arithmetic of numerical relations in nature and history shows us that they have been reckoned, that they rest upon syllogisms, and therefore betray a subject which has thought them; but in the form of thinking as mere reckoning the vitality of the idea is destroyed, for, in order to be able to reckon, the moments of the idea must be reduced to dead *quantums*. Hence Hegel declares himself decidedly opposed

to that tendency in logic which would transmute thinking into reckoning, like Ploucquet's Calculus, &c., although he knows that reckoning without thinking at all is impossible. On the contrary, he took pains, in the third part of his *Logic*, especially at the beginning, and in the first chapter of the first division, to describe the dialectic nature of the idea. This is unquestionably one of the most difficult problems which he attempted to solve. Many readers have been frightened away from the Hegelian logic because they became giddy in this constant transition of opposite into opposite. They were accustomed to have general and special and individual nicely distinguished side by side, but now Hegel comes and shows them that (1) all three determinations are moments of one idea; (2) that just for that reason each of them contains both the others in itself; (3) that every moment is equal to every other in value, and that nevertheless they are found in subordination; (4) that therefore the conception of general, special, and individual, is distinguished, but that the perfect, true conception can be only the totality, the concrete unity of these distinctions. The general is also the special, for it distinguishes itself from itself, and it is this distinction which we call the special. But the general is also the individual, for without having it for a content the realization of the special into an existence independent in itself would be only a unit, not an individual. This individual is also thus itself again the general. Each moment of the total idea is, as determined, not what the others are, but at the same time as a moment of the whole no less *is* what they are.

Mathematicians do each other the justice, or at least the fairness, of admiring, in the work of others, even the elegance with which a problem is treated. From such a recognition philosophy is yet far removed. It allows the difficulties with which its presentation has to contend to be so little suspected, because it uses language accessible to all. The art with which Hegel has described the idea has been as yet but poorly estimated. We are wont to speak as if the "Hegelian idea" were something quite apart, which he construed in his *Logic*, while it really contains the objective thoughts which have absolutely nothing to do with the casual individuality of the thinker. The Hegelian idea is really the idea of idea, and no speculative idiosyncrasy.



## RELATION OF THE LOGIC TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY.

Phenomenology was to constitute the *first part of the system of science*. In the first edition this title stood first. *Phenomenology of mind* was placed underneath, as designating the content of the first part.

In the preface as well as in the introduction to logic, Hegel mentioned expressly the Phenomenology and its relation to logic, especially that it should present the *arising* of the stand-point of absolute knowledge, in which the antithesis of subject and object has vanished, and from which, therefore, knowing should begin as pure science without antithesis. Within the perfected system, of course, phenomenology could not appear with that fulness with which at first it had absorbed the entire kingdoms of nature and mind into itself; for in the systematic totality this same content appears in a simple organic form, uninvolved in the struggle of consciousness to master its own essence in it. Phenomenology shows us how mind as consciousness, as individuality, as ethics, as right, as morality, as religion, as art, as science, stands related as opposed to nature, so far as it seeks to find the reality of its idea in these forms, until it arrives at absolute knowledge, as the absolute unity of the subject with the object, because the object has here become the absolute itself, in the absolute form itself of the idea. In the system of science phenomenology could, therefore, become only a moment of the sphere of the subjective mind, of ordinary so-called psychology. The stages, consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, were here the essentials.

Just before his death, Hegel began to revise the Phenomenology for a second edition, but he reached scarcely the middle of the preface. In its main features he left it much the same, but crossed out those passages which referred to the intended second part of the system. The suppression of these has been explained as if he had thereby retracted the original relation of the phenomenology as the mediation of the stand-point from which logic proceeds for thinking consciousness. This, however, does not follow; but merely that, since the publication of his system had taken place in another than the intended manner, the said announcement had lost its significance.

Hegel orally designated the *Phenomenology* in Berlin as the work in which he had made his "voyage of discovery." This expression can relate only to the concrete content of nature and history which he wrought over in it, and not to the general idea of consciousness, which also retained the same moments in the system of the philosophy of mind. Hegel conceded, however, by that expression, that he could have brought in a still more extended content into the *Phenomenology* than he did. When, later, he reduced the relation of the knowing subject to speculation (so far as concerns the beginning of speculative thinking), to the transition through skepticism, and to the simple resolution to will to think the truth absolutely, it must not be forgotten that no one would come to this resolve whose consciousness had not previously in some way completed in experience all its other content.

Hegel's division of consciousness remained (1) consciousness, (2) self-consciousness, (3) rational self-consciousness. To this, the following division of the *Logic* would correspond: (1) objective logic, (2) subjective logic, (3) absolute logic. The first would have contained the categories of being in general; the second, the moments of the idea; the third, the canon of the absolute idea. That Hegel confounded this trichotomy with another in the *Logic*—viz. being, essence, idea—is explained by the fact that he distinguished the idea of idea itself again into (1) the subjective, (2) the objective, (3) the idea. Hence one of the greatest difficulties of the *Logic* has arisen. We will here touch only upon the point adduced by criticism, that the same categories occur in the *Phenomenology* and in the *Logic*; so that the *Logic* was properly already contained in the *Phenomenology*.

This is quite right, but it cannot be otherwise. First, the content of *phenomenology*, as well as that of every other science, is formally ruled by logic. It cannot dispense with logical forms, which must therefore become manifest in its articulation. Second, the logical categories must themselves become objects of consciousness in concrete forms. Consciousness must, in the course of its culture, become master of the idea of logical forms. The existence of the logical in the concrete matter of consciousness cannot be excluded from its experience. Sensuous certainty, for example, cannot do otherwise

than make being, as definite being, its object. The senses make their appearance as the mediation of the certainty that something now and here looks red, tastes sweet, or feels smooth, &c.; but sense does not know that this something, as red, is distinguished from another, e.g. a green something. This knowing is an act of consciousness which distinguishes that excitation of the nerves of sight which we designate as red, from another as green. The animal does not attain this objectivization of its sensations, but rests in sensation. Red and green are distinguished even for the eye of the animal, but the animal cannot conclude *this is red*. It does not know that red is a different color from green. It knows nothing of *here* and *now*. It knows nothing of an individual object. It is, indeed, a self-feeling individualization, but knows not itself as subject in opposition to an object. It is consciousness which makes the sensuous an object, and thereby becomes certain of itself, i.e. knows being as distinct, as *this definite being*. Thus apprehension cannot perfect itself without the categories of the essential and the unessential, of the thing and its properties, &c.

THE ESSENTIAL AND THE UNESSENTIAL IN THE HEGELIAN  
METHOD.

The great problem which Hegel proposed in his Logic, centred itself about his conception of the dialectic method, which he regarded as the only true one. It consisted in the Platonic method, made profound by the method of Aristotle's metaphysics, and more accurately determined by the forms of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Subjectively it was to constitute the absolute organ of all genuine knowing, but objectively it was also to contain the immanent rythmus of ontological development which is immanent in reality. What Kant had distinguished on the one side as understanding, judgment, and reason, and on the other as idea, reflection, and syllogism, was to become united in the abstract, reflected, and speculative determinations of the logical idea. Its course was to be not merely analytic from the individual to the general, not merely synthetic from the general to the individual, but regressive and progressive at the same time, because the general unity was to distinguish itself from itself,

and only ultimately to be determined to its genuine concrete idea. In the treatment of the Phenomenology and of the Logic, Hegel himself gave an example of this method. He had made the idea expound itself, and thereby build itself up to a new idea. Idea as such is identical with itself, but through its differentiation it produces new ideas, and in that degree changes itself.

This must be rightly understood. The idea of a point, e.g., is always the same; but in so far as the point moves it begets another, the other of itself, in which it sublates itself as the true. The line again, by moving in different ways, produces the difference of straight and crooked. The point makes itself analytically a line, but synthetically it remains contained in it; the line makes itself analytically a straight or a crooked line, but synthetically it is posited as a line in the one as well as in the other. The soul of this dialectic was thus here, as with Plato and Aristotle, the negative of the idea, the antithesis which it brought forth out of itself. This is the incontrovertible truth of this process. Closely connected with this, however, is the unessential, so easily possible in its presentation, viz. error in regard to that which is posited as the negative. Hegel's thought strove toward the absolute independence of the idea from the philosopher. The part of the latter should be only that of looking on its movement. In the above illustration it is not I who make the point become a line; but it itself, by moving itself, produces itself as a line. I look upon this its self-formation. This highest ideal of all scientific investigation was not insured in its realization against the contingency of the philosopher, for here in the transition from the general to the special the distinction necessary in itself could very easily be varied, and the immanent antithesis be falsified. Even the abstract generality might be transposed with the concrete, the first with the last. Then, despite all claim of infallibility, the method fell into fallacious construction. In Hegel himself examples may be found where he is deluded and vacillating in this respect; e.g. in the Philosophy of Right, under the conception of the state power, he has set up royal sovereignty as the first, therefore abstract, moment; while in the second edition of the Encyclopedia it is the final and concrete moment.

Among the adherents of Hegel, the differences are still greater. Opponents of his philosophy receive these as proof of the falsity of his method, while the ground lies only in its uncritical use. Hegel wished manifestation of the idea, but the school often fell back to the mere construction of the philosophy of Schelling through precipitate and external application of the logical categories. That which can be called the unessential in Hegel's method has been especially evoked by the fact that the idea of antithesis became confounded with that of contradiction. Hegel took up the antinomy from Kant's dialectic with great satisfaction. While Kant placed contradiction only in our knowledge, Hegel said it should belong also to actuality itself. Contradiction, as real, is also possible, and can therefore become actual. It is not merely a phenomenon of our intelligence. Hegel now affirmed that, in the development of the idea, antinomies everywhere present themselves which must be solved into a higher unity. He did not intend to explain the contradiction as that which is true, for that which is true cannot contradict itself, but he discerned the foundation of all life, of all activity, in the fact that in the phenomenal world antithesis grew into contradiction, which latter manifested the unity in whose depth it sank away. The higher a particular being stands, and the more sides it has, so much the more easily can it involve itself in manifold contradictions. Hegel, therefore, took up contradiction as a constitutive moment into his system, and aroused endless contradiction thereby, because by this it was customary to understand the absurdity of something unthinkable, logically impossible. Contradiction is also antithesis; but antithesis as such, brought to the tension of negative actuality *versus* identity, is not contradiction, but in the world of phenomena it may every moment become contradiction. The antithesis of positive and negative electricity is in itself ever and everywhere present, but only in the thunderstorm does it become a contradiction which solves itself in lightning. Egoness, as individualization of mind, is immediately antithetical to its universality, but it becomes bad only when it negates it *in actu* and with consciousness. Physical selfishness is not yet ethical egotism. It cannot be

denied that Hegel's philosophy has not distinguished the contradictory, the contrary, and the repugnant, with sufficient care, and has caused confusion thereby; but still less can it be denied that the zeal which would again exile contradiction from philosophy without surmounting it, has resulted in the most lamentable shallowness.

The idea in-and-for-itself is, to be sure, without contradiction; but in its development, contradiction produces itself in the steps of transition. It must, therefore, always be measured on the higher. Eudemonism is the quite consequent issue of psychology. In itself there is nothing contradictory in being happy, in the satisfaction of one's instincts and appetites, but this principle leads to the contradiction of pleasure with itself, and this contradiction is solved not by psychology but by ethics. Man shall be more than happy—he shall be free.

When, therefore, Hegel is reproached with discerning truth in contradiction, an error is made; the contradiction which begets itself is in the same degree sublated; unity continues, not only negative but affirmative, through the totality of the development. The unity with which an idea begins is abstract identity: from this proceeds its difference; these station themselves over against one another in order to sublimate themselves into a higher unity. Thus backwards this is concrete, but forwards it manifests itself as a contradiction which sinks away in the depth of a higher unity opposed to it, which nevertheless in the beginning of its formation, or immediately, is only an abstract identity. The abstract in-and-for-itself is without contradiction, but the different steps of the phenomenal universe, re-interlinked with one another through contradiction (since it demands solution) into living unity.

That which is true, therefore, in the Hegelian method is the unrest of the negative, which makes its appearance in every sphere save that of the pure absolute. But this unrest is at the same time full of the repose which accrues to every moment of the whole as necessary and for itself positive. The higher step negates that which is presupposed and lower, and includes it in itself (as Hegel was wont to say) as its negative identity, but does not destroy it in its relative inde-

pendence. When, e.g., man as a microcosm comprehends the macrocosm of all nature compendiously in himself, the persistence of nature in itself is not destroyed.

The transition of one idea to another is no gradual metamorphosis as students of nature so readily seek to derive the origin of new forms by successive transformation of those already existing, but the existence of the higher grade is posited through the idea of the idea. The lower grade often reveals types in which the higher already has its analogy. It is the types which may deceive, but they are only the humorous prelude, not yet the thing itself; as the Rosaceæ envelope their kernel with the superfluity of a flesh which is yet no real, feeling flesh—as the ape seems to foreshadow the human form, yet is separated from man by an impassable gulf—as relief extends picture-like over surfaces, but is as yet no painting. Hegel could not call his method merely synthetic, because the higher step is the teleological ground of the lower; in its execution however, which he was not able himself to carry on to its completion—i.e. in the lectures published after his death—he has often, it is true, contented himself with a synthetic derivation. Here then, as with Spinoza, dogmatism entered, and in such a manner that presentation not infrequently sunk into that form which Hegel most abhorred in philosophy—to narration; in the school this increased still more—the trichotomies of the idea were decreed only in an assertorical manner. The discipline of thought, as Hegel had named the method, was quite thrown off to make way for the most motley anarchy.

#### THE ENCYCLOPEDIA.

It was natural that a mind which found itself upon so high a stand-point of scientific unity must approach the wish to live in a sphere adequate to itself. Hegel longed for academic activity. The favor of fortune came to him in various offers. He had already decided upon Heidelberg, when notice was also taken of him from Berlin.

There were especially two men, quite opposed to each other, who were instrumental in his appointment, Paulus and Daub. With the first he had stood in relations of personal friendship since Jena. With the latter he became

acquainted in Heidelberg, and through him was gradually alienated from Paulus, who observed the fact with great displeasure. Paulus was the most decided opponent of Romanticism, and could not pardon Hegel's sympathy for Daub and Creuzer, which he, in common with Voss, construed into a suspicion of crypto-catholicism. Hegel had never expressed himself publicly against Paulus, but Paulus persecuted him, when he was dead, in pamphlets and periodicals, and especially in a work which he entitled "*Geister revue.*" He waged this polemic under the name "*Magis amica veritas.*" Many bitter things which were retailed, ever more sarcastically, ever in wider circulation, owe their origin to their attacks under this pseudonym.

In Heidelberg, Hegel must have felt the necessity of giving to the public a presentation of his philosophy in its totality, for the *Phenomenology of Mind* had been a propaedeutic work, and logic had been only the first part of his system. Both were, moreover, in a dialectic form so strict that they could have been understood only by the narrow circle of philosophers. Hegel's predecessor in Heidelberg had been Fries. With his totally different apprehension of speculation, it was necessary for Hegel to take pains to present in outline to the students the difference of his philosophy from that of Fries, at least in its chief moments. He proposed, therefore, a guide for his lectures which he named "*Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.*"

By the word *Encyclopedia* he wanted, as he himself said, to designate the unity of science, which composes a circle of circles. Beginning from itself, it widens itself to ever new determinations, which at the same time constitute deeper insights of the principle, until an ultimate stage is attained beyond which progress cannot be made, and with which knowing reverts into its beginning. Ever since Bacon, European science has striven toward totality. Since he had given to it only a psychological foundation in reason, memory, and phantasy, the unity remained external. The French *Encyclopedia* of Diderot and D'Alembert followed out, in the organization of sciences, essentially the plan of Bacon, but split up in execution into the atomistic multiplicity of the alphabetical article. In Germany, the division of the



Leibnitz-Wolff philosophy into theoretical and practical sciences had acquired validity and had been adopted by Kant, although he set up a higher division in the *Architectonique* of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: the physiology of pure reason, the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of ethics—or science of the idea of that which should be in general, of that which is, and of that which should be. This trichotomy Hegel elevated to the distinct grasp of the idea, (1) as logic, (2) as nature, (3) as mind. Every system since then, which, in the place of this simple articulation, would place another, has fallen. One very important step of Hegel was the presentation of natural philosophy. It should, consequently, have followed the *Logic* as an independent whole. Now it appears as an integral part of the total cycle of sciences, in an abbreviated form, which scarcely suffices to make clear the inner connection of nature with the idea as logic and as mind.

Still more scanty and difficult of understanding was the composition of the last part of the philosophy of mind. Its division into the idea of the subjective, objective, and absolute mind, was, to be sure, of convincing simplicity; but the presentation of absolute mind as art-religion, revealed religion, and philosophy, must at once awaken doubt. Why was art apprehended at the same time as religion? Why was religion, as revealed, distinguished from the idea of religion in general? Why was the absoluteness of knowledge placed only in philosophy, which, as human activity, is not yet free from ignorance, error, and doubt, i.e. is infected with problematic knowing? Why was it not plainly enunciated whether the absolute mind also exists in-and-for-itself as subject, or whether Hegel under this word had in view only art, religion, and science, within the phenomena of the human mind? In the enigmatical paragraphs, only one very scanty extract from the last chapter of the *Phenomenology* can be detected. We shall see later what weighty consequences are attached to this indistinctness.

As Hegel wished to give a clue for his lectures, he omitted the proper dialectic development, and gave only a list of definitions in which he had much practice in the notes for the philosophical propædeutics at the gymnasium, and had at-

tained great skill in using modes of expression. This form, moreover, has not been without influence upon the school, because it favored its dogmatism and abjured stricter philosophy. It is no exaggeration to affirm that, with the exception of Euclid, no text-book exists of such concentrated precision. Every word in this laconic language is freighted with meaning.

To logic, natural philosophy, and psychology, Hegel appended remarks in which he gave a trenchant criticism of those views which contradicted his own. In this way he skilfully incited to free reflection.

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## FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE, by A. E. KROEGER.

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### BOOK II.

FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN REGARD TO THE PRACTICAL FACULTY.

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#### CHAPTER II.

*The Tendency of the Ego to overcome the Check of the non-Ego is posited as a material Body.*

A.—We have seen how the Ego, limited to a mere impulse and without any immediate causality, through its mere Being contemplated its power to arrive in time at an end through conditional states; calculating that power, at the same time, the resistance that was also contemplated in the image, and thus completing a plan of its causality. It appears immediately that it can fix this manifold of conditions and of time in no other unity-conception than the conception of itself, and that hence it must in this connection necessarily think itself here, moreover, as a real principle—and not merely, as in the previous book, as the principle of a reproduction through the power of imagination—and furthermore absolutely *à priori*, without any real causality having preceded, since the whole synthetical period starts from a complete annihilation of such causality.

Now that which offers the resistance is matter, and the purpose is to separate this matter, get it out of its place, or

remove it. But matter can be moved out of its place in space only through other matter; and thus it appears that the Ego, as a working power in a material world, must itself be matter, hence an immediately given, determined, and in-space-limited body. Moreover, in this body it must be possible that the conception can become immediately the cause of a motion of its matter, in order that by this designedly moved matter the dead external matter may be moved. Such a mobility of matter through the mere conception may very properly be called organization, by means whereof one body becomes an organ to work upon the rest of the material world. The Ego, in its image of a causality upon matter, would thus turn into an organized body.

A causality executed by means of this organization upon the material world, must be accompanied always by the above described external sense in order to judge to what extent the intended plan has been executed, and what still remains to be done. Hence this sense must be thoroughly united and constitute one with that organ, and must therefore be represented in matter in the same way. From this there results a material Ego with an external sense and organ.

Thus, I say, the Ego must appear absolutely *à priori*. We do not learn by experience that we act; we have no perception of it as we have of our passive states. That causality of ours presupposes a free conception created through absolute self-activity. This conception, and our possible causality in accordance with it, are internally contemplated—for thus we have described and accomplished it in the above—as a mere faculty, even in advance of the actual accomplishment of the intended causality; and it is already in this executed and completed prototype of such a causality that the Ego appears necessarily as a material organ.

Through what then, and through what faculty, is the Ego formed into a material body? Evidently through the productive power of imagination, precisely like the image of the resistance itself, and at the same occasion, and in virtue of the same law. The conception of the intended causality, the determined prototype of this causality, was to be sketched. To do this made necessary an image of the check or resistance, in order to calculate the effect of the power on it; so

again an image of the power is necessary in order to calculate the effect of the resistance on it. But the resistance is placed in matter, and hence the power of the Ego must be placed in the same medium of matter in order to make such a calculation possible. From this it follows that just as the image of the resistance, external perception, was not consciousness, but an object of consciousness, so also the image of the Ego as a material body is not consciousness, but an object of consciousness; or, expressing it more strictly: materiality is the absolute *à priori* form of self-consciousness in its causality upon the original check, the form of the Ego's self-contemplation through its external sense, just as time is the Ego's form of self-contemplation through its internal sense. Now the causality of the Ego upon that original check may either be merely prototyped, to which region we have hitherto confined ourselves, or it may be actually executed, and contemplated in the actual realization. But in both cases the form, there of free imaging and here of contemplation, remains the materiality of the Ego.

B.—Now let us assume the Ego to be completely ready with this conception of its desired causality and all the constructions that condition this conception, and let us ask: has the actual causality now real existence or not? I say, it has by no means existence as yet even through the completest conception, but is only now possible. The Ego, which at first was enchained and deprived of all its power to have causality, has now, through the mere conception, completely freed itself in such a manner that it can begin the proposed causality at the conceived point of beginning—as soon as it does begin it—needing only itself for this causality.

But if this perfect possibility is to be changed into actuality, what must occur, what is the real point of transition, the requisite *complementum possibilitatis*? This question is very important, partly because it has hitherto never been thoroughly investigated by philosophers, and partly on account of its vast consequences for our whole system.

This transition to actual causality is doubtless a change of its present condition. Let us, then, make this present condition very clear to ourselves, in order to see wherein it can be

changed. At present, it has its causality in the conception only. True, that causality is thoroughly determined and completed; but this its being is only in thought, and vanishes as soon as the act of thinking vanishes, since with it the thought itself vanishes. The being of this causality is held in this present state only through the continuing freedom of thinking, and falls down as soon as this freedom withdraws its hand. Probably it is this relation that is to be changed in such a manner that the being of that causality becomes independent of the thinking, in which case it would be called actual. But how is such a change to occur? Let us explain the whole matter to ourselves in the following way: There is a double relation to immediate consciousness. Wherever any immediate consciousness occurs, not excepting feeling and contemplation, an absolutely free and undetermined power of imaging is to be posited as the *summum modificabile*. This power is always being limited when a determined consciousness is to occur; but it can be so limited in a twofold way. Firstly, by the immediate activity of the Ego itself, which manifests itself as activity to create a certain product, an image. In this case the *summum modificabile* is immediately directed upon that activity, and it beholds the product only through this activity; hence if that determined activity leaves, the product also leaves consciousness, and its being in consciousness is cancelled. This is the case with all mere thoughts, and hence also with the described image of that possible causality. Secondly, the *summum modificabile* is absolutely and immediately limited, and not by any free activity conditioning this limitation, as is the case in the above described limitation of the absolute productive power of imagination.

Now, since such a limitation is altogether unconditioned, the Being, which enters into our consciousness, is represented also as an unconditioned Being, which no withdrawal of that freedom can possibly cancel, since it is not conditioned by it.

Hence to say that the Ego must realize the conception of its causality in an act, is to say that the Ego must move from the region of a Being, which can be annihilated at any moment by the withdrawal of freedom, or the region of concep-

tion, into the region of the immediately confined power of imagination, wherein everything assumes a fixed, permanent, and on-itself-reposing Being.

Now, into this region it is transposed already by its material body. Hence it must make itself an actually working material body in order to enter the form of actuality; and since in this region everything remains permanent, the products of its freedom thus accomplished will certainly also stay permanent.

The transition of the Ego from the mere thinking of a possible causality to the actual realization of that causality consists, therefore, in this, that the Ego frees itself in its whole personality from the freedom of mere conception, and surrenders itself to its original existence as a principle in the region of the absolutely limited power of imagination. But this transition occurs with absolute freedom.

This is the reason why in thought we can take back every resolve, but cannot think a deed as not done, since the deed irrevocably binds our own contemplation of Being. A deed we can take back only by another actual deed, through which we destroy the product of the first deed and put a new one in its place.

*Remarks.*—1. The transition of the Ego from the mere conception to an actual causality can be described as a confining of its previously (in the region of conception) unchained freedom; but it can also be regarded—when we consider that conceptions are mere pictures, but causality the true actual—as a liberation from emptiness and the acquiring of a higher freedom; and thus we have regarded it above. In either case it is necessary, according to the above established principles, that an immediate consciousness of this transition should occur, which consciousness will appear as a consciousness of self-determination, since it is the transition of the Ego from one form of its power into the opposite form through another higher power of its own, which higher power soars between both.

2. Whatsoever falls into the region of the absolutely limited power of imagination, receives an unconditioned and permanent Being. In this form the Ego appears as a material body, and hence this is its permanent Being. As a Think-

ing essence, for instance, the Ego appears to itself only when thinking, but the Ego may also not think at all. Its bodily existence, however, it always retains, even in deepest sleep or in swoons. Thus, also, the products of the Ego in the material world retain their existence as long as the matter, which they have modified, remains, and may survive their original centuries in the material world.

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## HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART.

Translated from the second volume of HEGEL'S *ÆSTHETICS*, by Miss S. A. LONGWELL.

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### CHIVALRY.—I. *Honor.*

The motive of honor was unknown to ancient classic art. In the *Iliad*, the anger of Achilles furnishes the spirit and moving principle upon which the whole broad production is dependent; but what we, in the modern sense, understand by honor, is not involved here. Achilles finds himself really injured only in this, that his actual share of the booty, which is his reward of honor, his recompense, has been taken from him by Agamemnon. This offence pertains to something real, to a gift, to which a distinction had certainly been attached, an acknowledgment of glory and of bravery, and Achilles becomes angry because Agamemnon insults him, and does not render him, in the presence of the Greeks, the honors that are due him. But this offence does not penetrate to the ultimate point of the personality as such, so that Achilles is appeased by the return of the booty and the addition of more gifts and bounties. Agamemnon finally grants this reparation, although, according to our modern ideas, they have injured each other in the grossest way possible. Through insulting words they have only made themselves angry, while the real offence is cancelled in a way just as real and special. Romantic honor, on the contrary, is of quite another type. In it the offence touches not the real essential value, possession, condition, duty, etc.; but the personality as such, the opinion that the individual has of himself, the value that he attributes to himself. This value, in the

present stage, is just as infinite as the subject is in its own view infinite. In honor man has therefore the readiest affirmative consciousness of his infinite subjectivity, independently of its content. Now that which the individual possesses partakes, through honor, of his personality, which has an absolute value in his own eyes, and ought to have the same in the eyes of others. The measure of honor is not in what the subject really is, but in what it imagines itself to be. The tendency of the imagination is to generalize, so that I can place my entire personality in this particular object which pertains to me. "Honor is only an appearance" people are accustomed to say. Certainly this is the case; but it is better suited to the present stand-point to regard it more seriously. It is not only the appearance, the mere external reflection of the absolute personality. The image of that which in itself is infinite, is itself something infinite. Through this infinity even the manifestation of honor becomes the true existence of the subject in his highest reality: and every particular quality, which honor illuminates and makes its own, is, through this illumination, raised already to an infinite value.

Honor, thus understood, determines a sure foundation in the romantic world, and presupposes that man has emerged just as fully from the merely religious sphere and internal world as he has entered into the living actuality, and that he now brings into this relation only himself in his pure personal independence and absolute availability for existence.

Honor may have the most varied content: for, indeed, all that I am, that I do, that is done to me by others, pertains to my honor. I can, therefore, attribute to honor the merely substantial even, loyalty to princes, devotion to native land, vocation, accomplishment of paternal duties, matrimonial faith, uprightness in business, conscientiousness in scientific investigations, etc. But, in the point of view of honor, all these, in themselves valid and legitimate duties, are not yet sanctioned and recognized as such through themselves, but only as I identify them with my personality and allow it to become an affair of honor. Therefore the man of honor thinks of himself first, in all things; and the question is not whether anything in and of itself is right, but whether it is fitting for him, whether it becomes his honor to engage his faith



that he will be obliged to keep. Thus he may even commit the most reprehensible actions, and yet be a man of honor. He creates arbitrary purposes, presents himself in a certain character and causes himself to be bound, by himself and others, to this, in which no necessity or obligation has place. Then the imagination scatters difficulties and chimerical embarrassments in the way, because it is an affair of honor to maintain the once assumed character. So Diana considers it as opposed to her honor to confess the love which she feels, because she had once been thought to deny an audience to Love.

In general, honor gives value to contingency, since it avails only through the subject, and not through its own inherent reality. We see, therefore, in the romantic representation, on one side, that which is authorized in-and-for-itself as the expressed law of honor, while the individual at the same time unites with the consciousness of right the unlimited self-consciousness of his personality. Honor demands or prohibits something, then compels the whole subjectivity to establish itself in the significance of this demand or prohibition, so that an offence may not be overlooked, pardoned, or made good through any transaction; and no compensation is admissible. But, conversely, honor can become something quite formal and artificial, in so far as it includes nothing except the mere ego, which is for itself infinite, or perhaps accepts an entirely wrong conception as obligatory. In this state honor remains, especially in dramatic representation, a cold and dead subject throughout; while its aims, instead of a real meaning, express but an abstract subjectivity. In the succession of events, only the essential ideas of right offer to the mind a regular connection and necessary development. This lack of deep meaning is clearly manifest when the subtlety of reflection, in itself contingent and trifling, that stands in contact with the subject, shows itself within the compass of honor. The subject is never exhausted, for a minute analysis discovers a crowd of distinctions, particularities which taken in themselves are insignificant, that may yet become important and furnish material for an affair of honor.

The Spaniards have especially built upon this casuistry of reflection concerning points of honor, in their dramatic poets,

and represent their heroes as reasoning upon this subject. So, for example, the fidelity of the wife, investigated in the most insignificant circumstances possible, and even the mere suspicion of others, indeed the mere possibility of such a suspicion even when the husband knows the suspicion to be false, becomes an affair of honor. This leads to collisions as no satisfaction is to be obtained, because we have nothing substantial before us, and therefore, instead of subduing a necessary opposition, can obtain only a limited painful experience.

Also in the French drama there is often mere honor, wholly abstract in itself, which is to avail as the chief interest. But in this regard, the *Marcus* of Herr Friedrich von Schlegel is still more frigid and insipid. The hero murders his noble wife. Why? For the sake of honor; and this honor lies in his desire to marry the king's daughter, for whom he cherishes no affection, in order to become the king's son-in-law. This is a despicable pathos and a base conception, which displays itself as something noble and infinite.

Now since honor dwells not only in myself as a manifestation of my personality, but also in the conception and recognition of others, who must again on their side demand the same recognition of their honor, it is therefore essentially susceptible. For how far, and in reference to what I shall extend the demand, depends entirely upon my choice. The smallest offence can be to me in this respect significant. Man stands within the concrete truth, with many things in manifold relations; and the sphere of that which he will consider his own, and in which he will place his honor, may expand indefinitely; so in the self-dependence of the individual and in his reserved personality, which is also embraced in the principle of honor, there are endless disputes and contentions. Therefore the offence generally depends not upon the sense in which I must feel myself injured; for that which is denied, touches the personality that has created such a sense for itself, and now imagines itself assailed in this ideal infinite point. Consequently, every injury to reputation is regarded as something in itself infinite, and can therefore be made good only in an infinite way. There exist, it is true, many grades of offence and just as many grades of satisfaction.

But what the person usually regards in this sphere as an offence, the measure of this offence, and the reparation, depend wholly upon the subjective free will, which has the right to advance even to the most scrupulous reflections and most irritable sensitiveness. When such a satisfaction is demanded, the offender as well as the person injured must be recognized as a man of honor. For what I wish is the recognition of my honor by my equal. But in order to have honor for and through him, I must esteem him as a man of honor, infinite in his personality, the injury that he did me and my subjective enmity toward him notwithstanding. So the principle of honor has in general this determining foundation, that no one through his own actions can give to another a right over himself: and therefore, whatever he may have done and committed, he is considered, after as before, a being of infinite nature, invariably the same, and will be regarded and treated as such.

Since honor depends, in its controversies and reparations, in this regard, upon the personal independence which knows itself circumscribed by nothing, but manifests itself clearly, we see that again appear which determined in the heroic manifestation of the ideal a sure foundation, namely, this same independence. In honor, we have not only the energy of will and its spontaneity, but personal independence is here bound with the conception of itself, and this conception expresses precisely the only purport of honor: so that it manifests its personality and its whole subjectivity in the external and existing. Honor is consequently its own reflected self-dependence, which has only this reflection for its being, and it is left plainly contingent whether its significance is the customary and necessary, or the accidental and insignificant.

## THE MERCHANT OF VENICE.

By D. J. SNIDER.

The main-spring of the action in "Merchant of Venice" is the contest between Antonio and Shylock. Every means culminates in this end, every incident contributes either to call forth their struggle, or to harmonize it after it has arisen. A glance at the leading events of the play will show that this is the one central point from which the entire action radiates, which organizes and vivifies the whole piece. The incidents relating to Portia, which at the first look seem somewhat remote from the main action, bring forth in fact the profoundest mediation of the drama. Bassanio loves Portia, and applies to his friend Antonio, the wealthy merchant, for the money to carry on his courtship in a suitable style of magnificence. For magnificent it must be, since it requires such a large amount of money, and besides it appears already to have exhausted his own purse. In this fact we see the motive for the account of this elaborate wooing; Shakespeare has brought before us lords and princes, with grand retinues, suing for the hand of the fair Portia; to compete with these, Bassanio has to apply to the merchant for the ducats. But the merchant's ventures are all at sea—he has not the cash on hand—hence he must go to the money-lender. This brings him into contact with the Jew, and the main circumstances of the play are thereafter rapidly developed. Thus Portia was indirectly the cause of Antonio's falling into the hands of the Jew; and hence the poet makes her the instrumentality by which Antonio is released. And even the incidents of the last act, which take place after the culmination of the play, are logically necessary for the harmonization of the lesser contradictions which have been called forth by the grand struggle. Every part must be rounded off with the perfection of art; no shreds are left to draggle from the edges of this well-wove garment; our poet is like the sculptor, who finishes the finger-nail as exquisitely in its way as he does the face, the expression of intelligence.

But the question next arises, What do these two men represent? What principles does each one maintain? For men

without a grand motive lying at the basis of their action, and giving color to their endeavor, can have no interest for us. It is the conflict of these principles, represented and carried into execution by men, that excites our sympathy, our fear, our delight. The first thing which we find much stress laid upon, is that Shylock is a Jew, a circumstance which should excite our careful consideration. The poet evidently intends to portray the Jewish character, or rather the Jewish consciousness. Antonio's religion is not specially dwelt upon; but he is, of course, a Christian, as well as those around him. The Jew thus finds himself in a Christian world, acting and dealing with men of a strange race and strange morality, and with ends in life far different from his own. Hence the possibility of a conflict both of nationalities and of moralities. The collision, therefore, which supplies the nerve of the play may be stated, in a general form, to be between Christianity and Judaism. But mark! it is not between these religions as dogmatic systems of theology, but as realized in the practical life of men. Antonio is a Christian, not that he goes to church and makes long prayers and daily rehearses the creed; he does none of these things as far as we know; but a general spirit of brotherhood and generosity animates all his actions; a liberality which we may fairly call Christian is ingrained into his very nature, and is the well-spring of his conduct in his dealings with his fellow-men. On the contrary, Shylock exhibits Judaism as it must influence the doings of those who act according to its principle. To be sure, the religious element is brought into more prominence in his character than in Antonio's, but only for the purpose of showing the moral consequences of that system of belief. Shylock carries out in his life the faith that is in him with the utmost logical rigor and bitterness. And here we desire to lay stress upon an important fact. Shakespeare has nowhere in any of his dramas made religion *as such* the principal motive. This was, no doubt, intentional on his part, for no man understood the concrete nature of religion—religion as determining the conduct of mankind—better than he. In this form he uses it continually. But to make men die for an abstract principle of Theology, Shakespeare utterly refused, and he was right. For we all say that religion means nothing unless carried out

in life, and just there Shakespeare seizes it, religion in action. But then in this sphere the religious form vanishes; for a man may be of the highest worth and integrity, and still refuse to conform to the required observances; who can tell the difference between such a man and the most worthy church member in their actions towards their fellow-men? Now the drama represents just this; man in action. Hence, if it be universal, it must take not the religious but the ethical basis, for all men recognize *that*. A number of poets of very high rank have tried to embody a religious theme in the drama, as Calderon, Corneille, and Massinger. But the judgment of mankind has not pronounced these efforts the highest products of the dramatic art. In fact the real religious drama is found in the old miracle-plays, and it has always been considered a great advance in dramatic form, when that kind of plays disappeared into the regular drama. This progress is an historical fact; the old Moralities with their abstract virtues, their demons and angels, devils and gods—in general, with their wholly external way of representation developed into motives and ends, into freedom, into Shakespeare. For he puts the demon and the angel inside of man, where they belong. No longer is a human being lured on to a deed which he seemingly cannot help, by some irresistible power outside of his own nature. This, then, is the difficulty with the religious drama: in its machinery—or, if you please, in its mediations—the self-determination of man is obscured and often lost. Hence this form of the drama has disappeared with the advancing consciousness of Freedom, and Shakespeare has taken special pains to discard it in all its forms.

But to return. We said that the collision was between Christianity and Judaism, not as dogmatic systems of Theology but as realized in the practical life of men. They are thus internal, subjective, and determine human conduct. It is the conflict of two hostile moralities, and the struggle is ethical rather than religious. We feel that the consciousness of the two men is entirely different, that their notions of right and wrong are in many respects directly opposite. Shylock cannot help being a Jew in character no more than being a Jew in nationality. He is no vulgar villain; he acts according to his principle, according to his end in life; given his

moral basis, his deeds must follow. He is really not a comic character; on the contrary, he belongs rather to tragedy, for he is the bearer of one of the two grand colliding principles, and it is his principle which has gone down in history, and which must again go to the wall in every conflict with the profounder phases of modern spirit. We see the destiny impending over him; but he yields, as the Jews always have done, and is preserved. The poet has thus made him the type of his race, which avoids the life-and-death collision; for, like him, the Jew has lived among all nations without being swallowed up; he possesses that happy admixture of stubbornness and submission, which has kept him from being destroyed on the one hand and from being absorbed on the other. The cause of this strange preservation lies in the nature of the Jewish faith; it is not for all men, but for the peculiar people of God; hence it is not a religion of propagandism, and thus avoids any struggle with dominant systems. Still, it maintains its individuality, and has a tenacity which can only spring from the profoundest conviction, or rather from a complete limitation of Intelligence beyond which the Hebrew mind cannot pass. Thus we see renewed, though in a different form, the contest which took place 1800 years ago, on the plains of Judea—the contest which forms, perhaps, the most important period in history, and upon the result of which our entire modern civilization has turned. No wonder, then, that this play has been so popular, and has said so much to mankind, when the content of the modern world and the momentous struggle for its existence loom up in the background. We cannot help noting again what permanent and universal themes the poet seizes upon as materials for his all-comprehensive genius: for here it is the collision between two of the grandest world-historical epochs, between the old and new dispensation, which lays the imperishable foundation of the play.

But this statement that the collision is between Judaism and Christianity is still abstract, and hence we next ask, What is the content of these two systems of religion, especially in their influence upon the practical life of mankind? What objects do these two men place before themselves, to be attained by their living? in other words, What is their

end in Life? This gives the central point, the germinal unit from which all action springs. Antonio is a merchant, but it is plain that his end in life is not money, nor can it be any Christian's. Antonio's purse is open to all his friends; he is the centre of a jolly crowd of good fellows, though he himself is inclined to be melancholic; in such a position, we can easily see it is not difficult to get rid of money. A deeper phase of his moral nature is his hatred of usury; he has relieved many a poor victim from the clutches of Shylock, and has denounced the meanness and cruelty of the latter on the Rialto with extremest vehemence. He realizes in the highest sense of the expression that man is above property—that is enough to show his Christianity. Money is to him only a means—a means of enjoyment for himself and friends on the one hand, and for helping his fellow-mortals on the other. Antonio is truly merciful; he is the practical embodiment of the holy declaration, "without charity I am nothing." Christianity always insists upon the neighbor, who has the same rights as yourself: he is a person as well as yourself in the thought of universal Reason, or, as Holy Writ saith, "in the sight of God." Nay, more: its cardinal doctrine is mercy,—which means that man, within certain limits, is to be shielded from the consequences of his deeds. Man is a finite being—God made him so—and in so far as he is finite, he cannot be held responsible for the results of his actions. He is ignorant and hence liable to err; Mercy says that he shall not suffer from his mistakes: but he is also weak and hence liable to transgress; Mercy says that he must receive pardon, if the transgression be repented of. Here the conflict arises: Justice demands rigid accountability; it asserts that man must be responsible for all his acts, while mercy tries to shield even the crouching criminal. These reflections, which may seem a little irrelevant, develop the motive for the most celebrated speech in the play, where Portia divinely discourses of mercy:

"The quality of mercy is not strained;  
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven,  
Upon the place beneath; it is twice bless'd;  
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes,  
'Tis mightiest in the mightiest; it becomes  
The throned monarch better than his crown;  
His sceptre shows the force of temporal power,



The attribute to awe and majesty,  
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings;  
But mercy is above this sceptred sway;  
It is enthroned in the heart of kings,  
It is an attribute of God himself;  
And earthly power doth then show likest God.  
When mercy seasons justice. Therefore, Jew,  
Though justice be thy plea, consider this,—  
That in the course of justice none of us  
Should see salvation: we do pray for mercy;  
And that same prayer doth teach us all to render  
The deeds of mercy.”

The allusion is plainly to the Lord's prayer, the very heart of Christianity. Thus the poet states directly the conflict between the two religions, and gives the content of the Christian faith in a way that he alone can.

Antonio's mishap was, no doubt, his own fault; he had no business to give such a bond, especially since it seems that his credit was good in Venice and he might have got the money by other means. But his case deserves the commiseration of his fellow-mortals, especially since he made a mistake merely, and did not even commit a transgression. Besides, he probably could not think, with his consciousness, that even the Jew would proceed to such extreme measures. He was himself merciful, and he could not comprehend a monster. But Judaism knows no mercy, at least in its universal sense. God has his own peculiar people; the world is for them and the fulness thereof. Furthermore, the manifestation of God's favor is prosperity; of his wrath, adversity. Hence Shylock well states his end in life to be—Thrift. The acquisition of gain is the highest object of existence, every other end is subordinate. Put a man in the world with this notion, “I am the favorite of the Almighty; the rest of mankind is only so much material to make money out of, which I can use as I please,”—and you have the Jew. It is curious to observe how the poet paints Shylock as penetrated with the morality of the Old Testament. He tells the story of Jacob's deceiving Laban as scriptural proof that his end was justifiable:

“This was the way to thrive and he (Jacob) was blest;  
And thrift is blessing, if men steal it not.”

Note that only one exception is made: no stealing, everything else is allowable. The reason is manifest: Theft would

annihilate property, and with the destruction of it his end also must perish, for that end itself is Property. Hence his motto is: Thrift but no Theft. Herein we have the clue to all the deeds and sayings of Shylock. The bigotry, the avarice, the hypocrisy, the hate, even the scoffing speech, all spring from the one source. Of course, the moral nature of man is as it were scooped clean out in such a character. Deception, extortion, even crime, are allowable, and humanity is extinguished in the breast of man.

But there is another contrast between Antonio and Shylock. The scene of this drama is laid in the greatest commercial city of that age, and it represents the business-world. Hence it portrays man in his commercial relations to his fellow-man, and these transactions furnish the basis of a business morality. We hear the buz of the exchange; we observe the leading question of a mercantile community, "What's the news on the Rialto?" we note with astonishment this centre of information and commercial enterprise, for the ventures and the credit of Antonio are all well-known to Shylock through this medium. This is, no doubt, one of the great elements of the popularity of this play, for the great portion of mankind must always be employed in the production and exchange of the fruits of the earth; thus it appeals directly to business men, and is a picture of the business-world. Furthermore, this is a world of free activity, for each one chooses what branch of business best suits his inclination and character. The calling thus becomes an index of the moral disposition of the man. It is well known that some kinds of business, though acknowledged by law and recognized by the community as necessary, are nevertheless held in disrepute by the great majority of mankind. What callings, then, have these two men respectively chosen? Antonio is a merchant; he exchanges the productions of the world, he knits the nations together by mutual traffic—of course, for a consideration. But there is nothing narrow or mean in his nature; his end, as before stated, is not money, and this frees him from any trace of avarice or illiberality. In fact, his melancholy seems to arise in part from a dissatisfaction with his calling—it cannot satisfy the highest wants of man. Shylock, on the contrary, is a usurer; he takes advantage of the sudden wants of

men to extort their earnings. Hence this class of men were regarded as the enemies of society, ready to draw profit out of any misfortune to the individual or the state. No wonder this business fell into the hands of the Jews, who were persecuted by society, and hence hostile or at least indifferent to it. We shall not now dwell upon that equally unreasonable prejudice against all interest on money which seems to be shared also by Shakespeare. The use of money ought to be worth something as well as the use of anything else. Our age has recognized this fact for the most part, though there still remain upon our statute books some traces of the old spirit, as, for example, the limitation of the rate of interest. The consequence, however, is that in our time the banker has taken the place of the usurer, and money has its price like any other commodity. The bank is now the handmaid of all commercial activity, and supports instead of sapping the enterprise of the country. But it is no wonder that formerly the merchant hated the usurer, for the merchant-prince who carries on a world-commerce is exposed to many unforeseen contingencies, the storm, the rock, the pirate, and sometimes *must* borrow. Hence Antonio's hatred of the Jew lies also in their callings.

But we must hurry on to the consummation of this interesting collision. Shylock, being a Jew, can use the Gentiles for his own end; that end being Thrift, he uses them for making money. This is allowed by the law of Moses, which permits the Hebrews to take usury from the stranger but not from the brother. But Antonio stands in his way; he has the right to employ any means of getting rid of the hateful merchant which does not endanger his own safety—for if he should lose his life in the attempt, that would not be thrifty. The means most consistent with his own safety is the formal side of the Law—he is going to murder Antonio legally. Now Law expresses the Right of the Person in reference to Property; its main *dictum* even at the present time is, "Property is sacred"; and the Jurisprudence of Venice was still more rigid in this respect than that of the present day. Hence the Right of Property comes into conflict with the existence of the Individual. This is illustrated by the well-known example of a starving man stealing a loaf of

bread: is he justified in doing so or not? We see the contradiction—the right to a loaf of bread, on the one hand, against a human life on the other. All of us would say in such a case: Property is the lower, and must be subordinate when it conflicts with humanity. Mercy overrides Justice. But the Jew must remain deaf to such considerations, for his highest end is Property; how, then, can he acknowledge a higher? But Shylock's ground of right is still more devoid of a content than the case just mentioned, for he can get back his Property trebled. No; his bond calls for a pound of flesh; that and nothing else will satisfy him. Thus the collision is narrowed down to a mere empty form of law against the existence of an individual. Law is pushed in this way to the extreme limit of self-contradiction, for Law which was made to protect and preserve mankind has now become the direct instrument of their destruction; is not that self-contradictory? But it is the Law, and Law must have its course, says Portia: only mercy can soften its severity and annul its wrong. Hence her appeal for mercy which we have already quoted. But the Jew cannot relent; the character would be utterly illogical and untrue if he did. The letter of the Law, then, is to be followed with the utmost rigidity: this is the Jew's own basis. "But, hold!" says Portia, "the bond mentions no blood." If you want the letter, you can have it to your heart's content. Portia abandons her first defence, that of mercy, and takes the weapons of the Jew and turns them against him. This contradiction rests upon the fact, that a law, a bond, a contract—yea, language itself—cannot describe the Particular, for they are in their nature general. We all know how cumbersome legal formulas are; with what wearisome detail they try to describe a title, a piece of land, or a testamentary act: it results from this circumstance. Hence if an absolute adherence to the letter is insisted upon, neither Shylock's nor any other bond is possible. Many lawyers have made objection to this point taken by Portia; they say that no court in Christendom would have decided that a pound of flesh did not include the blood, though the bond may not have expressly said so. This may be the case, but it does not affect the truth of Shakespeare's representation. His design was to show how formal Law contradicts itself, and to exhibit

the Jew beaten at his own game. From this moment Shylock subsides; he sees the point and is completely non-plussed. The might of the Form of Law was never more powerfully presented. The judge, the people, and justice itself, are all on the side of one innocent man, yet they are unable to rescue him from the clutches of an odious wretch who has the form alone on his side. Still, the poet must find for us some reconciliation with the Law: it would be most ridiculously inadequate if it did not furnish some means for reaching the Jew. This it does, inasmuch as it is made to seize the crime of Shylock just in its truly vulnerable point—criminal intention. This is Portia's next point against him. He has willed the death of a citizen, of which the punishment is confiscation and death. We have seen this motive lying behind all his actions, notwithstanding his howling for Right and Justice. Still we must not suppose that he was a common villain, an Iago, or Richard, or Edmund. The subjective side was little emphasized by the Jewish faith; if men conformed to Law and Religion, it mattered little about motives. Under the old dispensation, the man who committed the most justifiable homicide had to flee the country, and the person who ate pork was damned. Hence when Shylock is arraigned for his subjective intention, we may fairly assume that this principle lies beyond his consciousness. It is the product of the modern world and Christianity. Still Shylock is saved because he is ready to yield to formal Law when that turns against him: hence the Law cannot well destroy him. This characteristic is the direct antithesis of the modern spirit whose tendency is rather to break down formal Law, to sacrifice it to the Individual. Shylock, however, is punished with a truly poetic justice: avarice loses its money, religious and national bigotry sees the Jewish house of Shylock go down forever by the marriage of the daughter with a Christian.

It is not the design of Shakespeare to make the Law contemptible, but to exhibit its limitation. Even the old Romans recognized this limitation—although theirs was essentially the law-giving consciousness—in the well-known maxim: *Summum jus, summa injuria*. But it has been left to modern Jurisprudence to recognize and embody its own finitude within itself; in other words, to establish a system of mercy.

The pardoning power is lodged in the executive by *law*; thus the highest officer of the state, out of his own heart, out of his own infinite subjectivity, reverses the legal decision, and hence is by Law above Law. The Judge has to administer the formal Law even in its injustice, and therefore he often, after giving a condemnatory sentence, turns around and signs a paper recommending executive clemency. But the Jurisprudence of Venice had not yet recognized this distinction. It was a commercial state, its prosperity depended greatly upon the security of Property, hence the inflexibility of its Law; for the Right of Property was deemed of almost paramount importance. Hence its Law cannot save Antonio, though it can condemn Shylock.

But what if the Jew would still insist upon taking his pound of flesh? Then he must have it, and the play becomes a tragedy. Antonio loses his life by the letter of the Law, and Shylock is executed for murder. But the play cannot admit of this solution. For thus the character of the Jew would be wholly untrue, as we have before stated; nor can the poet allow Antonio to perish for a mere mistake. This would be totally averse to his moral code. Hence the difficulty demands mediation and the conclusion must be happy. The piece is, therefore, neither a tragedy nor a comedy, but a middle species of play, which may be called, for want of a better word, a drama, in a special sense. But we shall not take up these distinctions now; we hope to elaborate them in full at some future time.

Shylock ranks as one of the most perfect characterizations in Shakespeare. How complete in every respect! How vividly does he rise up before us! Not merely his physical appearance but his entire spiritual nature stand forth in the plainest lineaments. In fact, we feel as if we know him better than we could possibly have done in real life. The poet has laid open the most hidden recesses of character, has portrayed him in the most diverse relations with a truth and fulness unapproached and unapproachable. We ask ourselves, whence this completeness, this richness, this concreteness of characterization? If we wish to see the infinite difference upon the same subjects, compare Shylock with the best efforts of other dramatists. Take "*L'Avare*," by Molière. Placed

by the side of Shylock, how meagre and unsatisfactory? Can we get at the ground of this extraordinary superiority? First, we should say that Shylock is something more than mere avarice; he has a deeper motive in his nature, and his greed for gain is only one of its manifestations. It is true that his end in life is Thrift, as before stated; but that end is the offspring of his moral and spiritual being, of his religion. Everything goes back to this centre. Shylock is a Jew, one of the "peculiar people"; in all his actions, this deepest principle of his faith and his consciousness wells out; given the motive, he marches logically to its consequences. Thus we have arrived at an absolute spiritual unity in the man. The second reason for the transcendent excellence of this characterization is the breadth which it exhibits. The activities of Shylock embrace quite the totality of Life; we see him in his family, in business, in the state, in social relations, in morality, in religion. We behold him brought into contact with every essential form of society, and he acts in them, brings his principle to the test through them. Nor is he plunged into them from the outside, but is brought into living relation with them. Hence the concreteness, the perfection, the complete individualization of character. But it is different with L'Avare. How limited is the range of the piece in this respect! Harpagon almost descends to the common miser, cut off from the world, in obscurity, dirt and rags, holding fast to his money-bags. His niggardliness in his household, his tyranny in his family, and an example of his extortionate usury, express quite all that we see of him. This is not Shylock, who is exhibited in many more and also far more important relations, who sees the world and grapples with it in all its essential forms; this is what gives content and concreteness to his character. Hence the Harpagon of Molière is empty, almost like an abstract personification of avarice; in fact, it is a meagre caricature compared with the Shylock of Shakespeare. But it gives occasion to many laughable incidents and situations; this was what Molière wanted; he sought for predicaments, and not for characters.

But here this essay must close. The subordinate personages of the play have hardly been mentioned, though worthy of the highest admiration. Especially the character of Portia

is enticing. One question at least must be noticed: Has not Shakespeare sinned against the highest principle of Art—namely, self-determination—in making Portia's choice of a husband depend upon the merest accident? We answer, no; and it is most interesting to observe what care he has taken to insist upon the right of subjective choice, and with what consummate skill he has turned a purely external incident into an emblem of Free-Will. For the selection of the caskets indicates the character and end of the choosers; thus we understand the nature of their motives, and hence their respective deserts. Therefore the result of their choice is not accidental, but inherent in their character. But a full elaboration of this subject cannot now be entered upon.

## EMPIRICAL CERTITUDE.

By JOHN C. THOMPSON.

We conceive and shall attempt to demonstrate that Berkeley's error lies in two mistaken notions; first, that the image or appearance is given in sensation; and secondly, that our minds are so constituted that we are forced to believe in a corresponding reality to the appearance;—both of which are caused by the fundamental fallacy which attributes many separate faculties to the mind, as memory, will, a reasoning power, &c. The conditions of the argument are two propositions, which may be thus expressed:

- (a) Mere consciousness is the fundamental form of all the modes of the thinking activity, and not a special mode of the activity.
- (b) Error can enter the human mind only under cover of an inferred identity.

The second above proposition is intended as a corollary to Descartes' test of certitude, namely, that we have a perfectly clear and distinct idea only of our own existence (*cogito, ergo sum*), and our certainty of any other thing is more or less reliable as it approaches the certainty of our existence.

It will not be questioned that Sensation is the first stage of experience. Sensation, in our sense of the word, is the sim-



plest complex fact, having two factors, of which one, the psychological, when detached from the other, the physical (as in memory), is knowledge; but undetached (as in sensation), it is feeling, or pure consciousness. Mind and matter, it is true, have nothing in common known to us, but it is nevertheless a psychological fact that pure consciousness (meaning the highest measure of consciousness) is only experienced in the act in which they are brought in contact (meaning the immediate cognition of a material motion). The psychological side of the sensation is then an act of consciousness. And the power to be conscious is alone the Ego, an essential activity, which would lose itself in space and remain forever unconscious were it not to encounter some resistance, in the effort to overcome which, it becomes conscious of something not self, and in the same act necessarily conscious of self.

The other factor of the sensation, which may be called the physical side or material moiety, is the mere motion of a nerve of sense. It may be that the nervous system, with all its phenomena of ganglia and sensational centres, acts as described by Bain and Spencer (and generally the school of modern physiologists), and that an image—for instance, a landscape—pictured on the retina, is communicated to consciousness, as they say; but nevertheless we know that, whether or not all its constituent parts are thus presented simultaneously, the image, as an image, is not cognized until the sensations of which it is constituted fall into their proper relations to one another. By the infant's mind, in the beginning of life, no image is cognized at all, but only the several parts of the image. In other words, until with experience Consciousness has mastered the appearance, nothing is presented but a lake of floating lines and colors in bewildering confusion. So the artist knows that the picture on his canvass he has himself constructed with countless minor strokes.

Commencing now with the first stage of experience. Assuming the Mind to be a single faculty, it is unnecessary to consider our physiological conditions further than that the act of consciousness in sensation is a mental act having a corresponding material fact, namely, the other moiety of the sensation. It is, in strictness, an act of consciousness caused by the motion of a nerve of sense; but, in common parlance,

it is the consciousness of the affection, or motion, of the nerve. To know, perceive, or be conscious, are then, in sensation at least, convertible terms. But since the mental moiety of a sensation is an act of consciousness, or one motion of a single power, while the material moiety is a motion of the attenuated nerve tissue, it follows that of a hundred such material motions happening simultaneously in the nervous system, only one becomes the material moiety of a sensation by the Power of Consciousness (Mind) being drawn thereto; while the ninety-and-nine others, unperceived, are mere tremors of nerve tissue. So that however speedily acquaintance with the nerves of sense may be acquired in the first stage of experience, that knowledge is not acquired but once, but by parts: and is, in fact, a general knowledge of the motions of the nerves of sense, composed of a particular acquaintance with the motions of each nerve, or class of nerves. We proceed now to show that the unassisted exercise of the Power of Consciousness not only results in such acquaintance with the nerves of sensation, but retains all of those particular knowledges, thoughts, or ideas.

The Mind being an essential activity, in the condition of a continued act of consciousness would be at rest; and, from that state of rest, its motion would consist in the activity, being arrested. For, to know, perceive, or be conscious, being the one motion of the Mind (an essential activity), it follows that when a thing is known, perceived, or cognized, the Mind no longer knows, perceives, or is conscious of it. To explain this seeming paradox, let us suppose A, the material moiety of the first sensation. The mental moiety of that sensation, whether we call it an idea, a perception, or an act of consciousness, we take to be in fact the act of consciousness of the greatest vivacity. Such sensation would be an affirmation of existence satisfying to the fullest extent the Cartesian axiom, *cogito, ergo sum*. We are, for the sake of argument, supposing our physiological conditions to be such that A, the psychological side of the first sensation, is a more perfect act of consciousness than that experienced in the sexual orgasm, or a draft of cold water in fever, or the inhalation of fresh air by a diver on coming to the surface. Supposing thus A, the first sensation, let us suppose a continuation of it

and we suppose it lost to consciousness. Why so? Because, prior to the idea A, the Mind was a certain entity, to wit, the unconditioned Ego; but, subsequently, it was the Mind conditioned by the idea A. Then the continuation of A awakens no consciousness, because if it could again take in the idea A it would have the same idea duplicated, which is absurdity. The perception of A was the arresting of the unconditioned activity. But when the Power cognizes A and nothing else, A is no longer known, perceived, or cognized, because the Activity has then no other motion but the idea A, and in that one motion is at rest. The form would be an essential activity and its mode the idea A.

When however we suppose the mind having the idea A, to know, perceive, or become conscious of B, the material moiety of the second sensation, we see that it has at once gained indefinitely more than the two ideas A and B. For whereas at the perceiving of A there was in consciousness no other idea, on the contrary at the perceiving of B there was already in consciousness the idea A; and as the perception of B was a change of the Ego from its then condition to the condition of knowing B, necessarily in that change is an active consciousness of both A and B. Because consciousness means the Ego's consciousness of itself, the Ego; and, being an essential activity, that involves the consciousness of its own changes of motion. It cannot change from one condition to another without being conscious that it does so; involving the consciousness of, 1st, the condition from which it changed; 2d, the act of changing; 3d, the condition to which it changed. And all but so many successive thoughts, ideas, or acts of consciousness; for the Activity being a single power, all thought is a succession of phenomena: co-existence of phenomena is impossible.

So far, then, there is certainly no other psychological factor engaged but the single faculty of Consciousness: yet the exercise of that faculty alone in the first two sensations involves an act of comparison, because it is the setting off of two contrasted ideas in the mind. But, in the supposed instance, is the knowing of B as large an act of consciousness as was the knowing of A? No. Because the knowing of A was the act of the unconditioned Power, and therefore the

purest act of consciousness, meaning of the highest vivacity. Whereas the knowing of B was the change of the Mind from its condition of A to that of B, and,

1. *In so far as there are properties in common to A and B there is no change at all.*

Motion consists not in the change effected, but in the act of changing; and here, as to the properties in common, there was no act of changing. Hence, having the idea A, the acquisition of B is the active consciousness only of those properties of B wherein it differs from A; i.e. the individuality of B. In other words, in knowing B, the hither boundary of B is at the forward extremity of the act of consciousness, while its other boundary is somewhere in A, and includes so much of A as is common to A and B. Of course the same is true of the change of the Activity from B to C, from C to D, and so on. Now the condition of the mind prior to the first idea A, and then its condition subsequent to that idea but prior to B, the second idea, are both unnatural conditions, for the reason that, in either instance, as above shown, it is the being at rest of an essential activity, the being unconscious of a sole power of consciousness. But subsequent to the perception B, if never another idea should be acquired, the Ego would forever continue changing from the one idea to the other. Of course it would pass from the one idea to the other upon some property in common to the two. And, of course also, if the two ideas have nothing in common, the Activity would forever remain unconscious (lost) in the channel in which it was left. Such property in common is the nexus, or bridge of identity, connecting the two ideas. To fall into an idea having no point of identity with another, and to fail to be recalled by sensation, would leave the Mind detached from all it knows. So death separates; and so birth starts the soul anew, with or without ideas *à priori*, as Plato or Aristotle may be in the right.

In any sensation, the act of consciousness caused by the motion of the nerve is a consciousness not of the motion of the nerve (material moiety of the sensation) but of itself, the mental moiety. And as the material moiety is a particular motion of the nerve, so the mental moiety is equally an indi-

vidual act of consciousness. They have nothing else in common. But, attenuated as is that common property, in it is involved this fundamental psychological law, viz.:

2. *Although it is true that the act of consciousness in sensation is a purely subjective fact, yet the individuality of each material moiety is correlated by a corresponding individuality of each mental moiety.*

We say, conventionally, that one thought suggests another; but that is in effect to say that every thought, act of consciousness, or idea, has its nexus of identity with some other thought; and the Ego, an essential activity, would forever thus pass from one thought to another; because change, so soon as effected, becomes rest, and motion consists in the act of changing. For example, in sensation we are conscious of the act of touching, but not of continued contact. And,

3. *Except in the stage of sensation, every psychological act supposes two ideas; the second following the first and conditioned by it.*

We can by no conception escape from that law. To do so would be to conceive an unconditioned idea, which is impossible. In sensation each psychological act is conditioned by its physical correlate, the material moiety of the sensation; while in all other stages of experience every thought is conditioned by two other thoughts, namely, its immediate antecedent and its immediate sequent.

The supposed necessity for Memory and Volition, separate mental faculties, is begotten by our experience of material force, erroneously, though almost unavoidably, applied to mental action. For, seeing every material force exhausted in the exercise, and of itself coming to an end, it is too easily suggested that the same is true of the Mind; an essential activity, to which therefore a persistent idea would be a blank. Perhaps it is easier to accept phenomena in sensation, and perception (of images), as being mere acts of consciousness, than to admit that a separate faculty, Memory, is not assured to us in the facts of consciousness. Yet the proposition will stand the test of any analysis. For, in supposing the mental moiety A, unless we suppose that idea to remain after the cessation of its corresponding material moiety, we in fact suppose the psychological side of the sensation to be also

subject to the law of material force. In other words, when A is known, as it would add nothing to that knowledge to continue the presentation of A, so it would be strange if it should take from that knowledge to cease the presentation of it. As to Volition, to elect which of the simultaneously occurring motions the mind shall perceive, that faculty is demonstrably naught; and for the plain reason that the perception must precede the choice.

Before, however, proceeding to the second stage of experience, namely, that of the perception of images, let us pause briefly to consider what general, or universal, ideas are acquired in the stage of sensation. After the first sensation the Mind, in any two thoughts, certainly experiences that idea which of all others is declared by the Platonist to be an intuition — the idea, namely, of Time. For, every thought being a single motion of the Mind, necessarily any two given thoughts, or ideas, must occur at different times. Co-existence of ideas in consciousness being impossible, it follows that the Ego is conscious of itself in its change from the one idea to the other, which is to say is conscious that the one proceeds and the other comes after. This is no more than to say that it changes, and is conscious of changing, from A to B instead of from B to A. Truths are but perceived relations; the idea of time is nothing else. We cannot conceive a Universe without Time, it is true, but only because we cannot conceive our own non-existence; for our existence is no more than a succession of phenomena strung upon the consciousness of a continuing personal individuality. And this universal and necessary idea of Time, which is no more than the self-consciousness, in every act of consciousness, that the act differs from its antecedent and its sequent, is involved in any two conceivable acts of consciousness, or thoughts.\*

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\* "The perception of Space must precede that of Time, for it is only through the former that we can reach the latter." — (*Jour. Spec. Phil.*, vol. i., No. 3. p. 177.) This general error, as we consider it, is a consequence of the general loose idea of sensation, supposing the image, if not also the conception of external reality, to be given in sensation; and which, consequently, refers the first perception of successive motions not to the consciousness of successive phenomena in the first stage (sensation), or the second (perception of images), but to the third, namely, the intelligible movements of bodies in Space.

When, therefore, it is said that experience is incapable of guaranteeing any universal and necessary idea, it is manifest that the assertion holds good only upon the assumption that the perception of images, and the reference of them to external cause, is the first stage of experience. Whereas neither the image nor the notion of externality are found in sensation at all; and those truths of universal and necessary acceptance, called sometimes ideas *à priori*, are such only to the extent that they were in the Mind prior to the conception of an external cause to the image. Having in fact been acquired in sensation, the stage of immediate apprehension, of which the first act (to wit, the idea A, the mental moiety of the first sensation) is not only antecedent to all the categories, *because antecedent to the idea of Relation*, but is, for the same reason, antecedent to all those truths of universal and necessary acceptance; except, perhaps, the idea of pleasure or pain, the originals of good and bad. Those universal and necessary truths, acquired in the first stage of experience, are Time, Individuality (including Identity), and Relation. These may, with absolute certainty, be referred to the stage of naked sensation, because the definition of consciousness (self-consciousness) assures us that they are experienced in any succession of phenomena, however early; and the facts of consciousness assure us, with a certainty equal to the certainty of our own existence, that they are still more clearly and distinctly exercised and confirmed in the second stage of experience, namely, that of the perception of images. Every mental moiety, or psychological side, of a sensation is neither more nor less than that act of pure consciousness, the realization of our own existence. And those necessary truths (their originals) are certainly acquired in that stage of experience, because the Power of Consciousness cannot change from A to B without being conscious of the change. If A and B were not individual acts, their identity would be complete, and consequently as to the second thought there would be no motion of the Ego at all, but the space of the second thought, B, would be to consciousness a blank. In what they differ, and in what they are the same, consists their Relation; the consciousness of which is included in the self-consciousness of the change from the one idea to the other. Every two phe-

nomena therefore, experienced in succession, involve an act of comparison; and,

4. *Every act of comparison involves the general ideas Good or Bad, Time, Individuality, Identity, Relation.*

Relation is the *tertium quid* of Individuality and Identity. If there were no Identity there could be no Relation, because the Individuality of entities would be complete; and so, if there were no Individuality there could be no Relation, because complete Identity would constitute a one-ness.

Coming now to the second stage of experience, that of the apprehension of sensuous images, it is manifest that the image is simply the perception of many simultaneous motions of an organ in their relations to one another. Take for example the visual image. That nerve (the optic) is the smaller base of a truncated cone; upon it are converged the rays of light reflected on the eyeball. Were the rays to fall with equal force, as from a concave surface of snow, there would be no image, because of the identity of the sensations. But where the rays strike with unequal force, an image, or, in other words, natural conjunction of sensations, is the result; because each idea, the mental moiety of a constituent sensation, has its own individuality, as well as its point of identity with its immediate antecedent and sequent. Thus it is that the picture painted by the pencils of light on the retina is the correlate of the image in consciousness, since each mental moiety of a sensation is the correlate of its material moiety. And thus, also,

5. *The image in consciousness is not a representation of the affection of the organ, but, on the contrary, the affection of the organ is a correlate of the image;*

and in the instance of the visual image it is a picture in virtue of that fact. The colors, the harmony, the pleasure, are all affections of the soul, while the correlative affection of the organ is no more than a certain number of simultaneous motions of a nerve of sense: and which form a picture only because, being individually objects of immediate consciousness (material moieties of sensations), they *seem* to be identical with their corresponding mental moieties, which together constitute that harmonious conjunction of ideas we call an



image. The consciousness of the many simultaneous impressions on the retina was at first a particular apprehension of individuals, but with continued experience becomes an apprehension of the many in their relations to one another, i.e. each to its immediate antecedent and sequent: which apprehension is the image in consciousness, as completely an individual thought as the sensation itself, by virtue of the ever self-determining action of the Activity. (See the psychological law expressed in Rule 8.)

It is naught to say that each organ has its specific mode of being affected; for that each one of the five special senses is in fact a special sense of touch, to be admitted needs only to be suggested. The nerves of the special sense of Touch, determining to the surface of the body, which come in contact with solid foreign bodies, are moved only by the consequent compression of the flesh tissue in which they are contained. But when we consider the other four special senses, we see that they differ from the sense of Touch only as "the hand of little employment hath the daintier sense." And that while so placed in the physical system as to be not subject to the influence of contact with solid foreign bodies, they are severally subject to the influence of contact with external matter more attenuated, each answering in its own manner to its peculiar stimulus. The image, therefore, to whichsoever organ it may belong, is an infallible proposition, because it is a natural conjunction of infallible ideas; the ideas of the first category, naked sensations, each one of which is individually a mere assertion of existence; and the image asserts nothing more.

If Logic is the science of affirmation, and if Affirmation is the active exercise of the Mind, then the thoughts, or ideas, in sensation are nothing but affirmations of existence. And if Judgment is that operation of the Mind by which joining different ideas together it affirms or denies something, then,

6. *An image is but another affirmation of existence, in which there is no more possibility of mistake than in the affirmations of mere sensations, ideas of the first category.*

Now, the only thought, or idea, in which something is affirmed immediately, and not involving other ideas, is the affirmation of existence in sensation. Of those immediate

affirmations, the constituent number perceived in their proper relations (considered as sensations), or in their logical sequence (considered as ideas), is the image, another affirmation of existence. That the conjunction of ideas constituting the image cannot be expressed in words is true, but since the result, the judgment, can be designated by an arbitrary term, we violate no rule of logic in calling the image a proposition; and,

7. *It is an infallible proposition, because a proper conjunction of the infallible ideas of the first category; affirming nothing but existence, and carrying with it no inferred identity with something else.*

The facts of consciousness assure us that every idea in the first category (mental moiety of a sensation) is a totality, an individual idea. But the facts of consciousness assure us with equal positiveness that the image is a totality; and that, in fact,

8. *A consciousness of the individuality (self-determination) of phenomena is the fundamental law of thought; without which not only is no certitude possible, but no reason is possible.*

To strike it from the Mind would be the obliteration of every idea, as to smear the artist's paint while still wet upon the canvass would be the effacement of his picture. Or, perhaps, it is a better figure to say that the mind, thus without thought, would compare to the present ever self-determining action of the Activity, as ink spilled on the paper, to the same ink separated into letters, the letters into syllables, the syllables into words, the words into sentences. For, assuming the Activity to be a single faculty of consciousness, what Mill and others have designated as complex ideas, or clusters of ideas, should in figure be represented neither by surface nor by cubic, but by linear measurement.

Now, first, would such attainment of the image by the conjunction of sensations be a logical process? and secondly, is such the constitution of the image?

As to the first. After the immediate affirmation of existence in sensation, any other affirmation is the result of, and presupposes, a concatenation of ideas logically leading to the affirmation. But the image, or idea, in the second category is a concatenation of sensations (the psychological sides or

mental moieties, ideas in the first category) into a single idea; an affirmation itself of existence, and one which not merely presupposes, but in fact includes, the train of ideas on which it depends. It is, therefore, the perfection of a logical process.

Now as to the second aspect of the question: namely, admitting such to be a logical process, is the image the result of that process? That it is so, we have the assurance of consciousness. First: in the fact that while the analogy of the different genera of images is complete, only one genus, the visual, is a perception (*seriatim*, but with the infinite quickness of thought) of the simultaneous affections of the organ; while, on the contrary, the others are constituted in every instance of an appreciable succession of sensations. There are, indeed, but two other genera, namely, the tactile and the auditory. The nasal and gustatory senses present no images, their ideas belonging to the first category, that of naked sensation, always. Secondly: in the fact that while in two of the genera the image can be always thus analyzed into its constituent ideas, in all three—the visual as well as the other two—the intrusion of an idea having no point of identity with its antecedent and sequent (or so slight as to give it undue individuality) destroys the concatenation; the Mind passing at once from the milder consciousness of the second category to the more acute consciousness of the first. Such an idea, intruding or out of place, in the auditory image is a false note in music. An instance, in the visual image, is the sensation caused by an inharmonious stripe or check in a shawl or dress pattern; in the tactile image, is caused by a raised point or line while the hand is feeling a smooth surface.

Coming now to the third stage of experience, we see that necessarily the ideas of that category are constituted ideas, or judgments; the constitution of each being an harmonious conjunction of idea of the two former stages. We say necessarily so, because otherwise the nature of the Activity, as we have followed it from its condition of *tabula rasa* through the first and second stages of experience, is changed in the third. In the first and then in the second stage we have seen the Mind, from the proper nature of the Activity itself, in a mere succession of phenomena to cognize, first, ideas of naked sen-

sation individually; next, the five Universals corresponding to the five special senses, under some one of which each several sensation falls; and lastly, in the same progress of the Activity, to construct the image. Now, if it be so that the images of different genera have nothing further in common, then knowledge transcending that of experience must be postulated to enable the mind to arrive at the idea of an external cause to the image in consciousness. But if, on the contrary, any one of the general ideas, or truths, of universal and necessary acceptation, acquired in the first or second stage of experience, shall form a point of identity between two images of different genera, then the same law of consciousness which in the progress of the Activity constructed the image out of sensations, will likewise construct the ontological idea out of images.

Now, experience soon points out a connecting link of identity common to two images of different genera, and one which is the very largest possible evidence of a common cause, as we come afterwards to express it: the identity, namely, of Time. So soon as that (as an inevitable) point of identity is established in consciousness, the mere conception of two several images in that relation to one another is in itself the idea of a common cause. For any two phenomena successively experienced involve an act of comparison, and here the act of comparison finds no other nexus of the two ideas save simultaneousness of creation. Neither at that stage of experience, nor ever afterwards, have two images of different genera (the tactile and visual for example, or either or both with the auditory) any other possible identity in consciousness than the reference of them to a common cause by reason of simultaneous appearance. It is to be borne in mind that while the several simultaneous images have so little in common, yet have they nothing at all antagonistic, not being conflicting impressions on a common organ. The ideas of Distance and of Space are judgments (in the third stage of experience) constituted of images of Touch (judgments of the second stage); for not only is our body, to the Ego, an object like any other external matter, but the organic senses, such as those of the alimentary canal and of muscular activity, are in fact modes of the sense of Touch. The sensations conse-

quent on stretching forth the arm, for instance, constitute an image of that special sense, the same as do those consequent on grasping an object with the hand. So likewise of the concatenation of sensations consequent on any similar exercise of the person, or parts thereof. That the idea of Distance is a judgment, or proposition, resulting from a sufficient experience of those images, we shall not pause to argue, because, as it seems to us, one who would question it would be equally ready to question his own existence. An infant, in the act of grasping an object, is conscious of two several images, namely, the visual and the tactile. The two have the identity of Time only. An object not within his grasp presents to him the visual image alone; but then add the advantage of distance within reach, and straightway he has the other image, that of touch, again simultaneous with the visual image. The same experience, continued, not only results in the knowledge, as a Universal proposition, that, having the visual or the auditory image, or both, or a sensation of smell, the additional experience of a certain distance brings within the grasp a tactile image also; but likewise results in the knowledge, as a Universal proposition, that the visual and auditory images and the sensations of smell are cognized with more or less distinctness according to the distance of the object. And since the experience of continued distance beyond that at which the tactile image is attained, results in a loss of all the images, necessarily a sufficient experience results in the knowledge that the cause (potentiality of attainment) of the appearances is at a certain distance from us. In that is our idea of Space, which is neither more nor less than the impossibility of divesting the mind of a conception of the potentiality of Distance, in all directions from any given point. Every accident of infancy throws the sensations of smell and images of touch, of sight, and of sound, into concatenations whose results are the ideas of distance, of direction, of space. Experience of the identity of time to the several images causes the presence of one to suggest the other two, or the presence of two to suggest the third. Wherefore it is that the infant soon comes to grasp at any object he may see in obedience to that law of nature which causes the muscular system to obey thought; or turns his eye in the direction of

a voice addressed to him. But, as before observed, although the ideas of distance, space, and direction, are concatenations of images of Touch, yet the ideas of a common cause to the several images of different genera leads directly to the perception of a certain relation in the distinctness of the visual and the auditory image to the distance of the object. So that although the young infant will grasp at the moon and stars, yet with but a little additional experience he begins to measure with his eye, and to grasp only at those things within his reach. Thus a landsman, for the first time in his life on the sea shore, is ready to cast a pebble at an object far beyond his throw; and supposes the ship to be a mile off, which is really five.

Descartes, in his sixth Meditation, referring to the deceptions practised not by Nature but by our inconsiderate judgments, cites the instance that "stars, towers, and all other distant bodies, are of the same figure and size as they appear to our eyes at a distance." These and similar instances (and which Descartes rightly called inconsiderate judgments) have been, since the day of Berkeley, attempted to be accounted for thus—to borrow the words of a modern fashionable writer: "A little knowledge of optics appears to explain the difference, but does not. At fifty yards you say the tower appears round, but it really is square. At fifty yards, we reply, it *appears* round, and at one yard it appears square. It is neither. Both round and square are conceptions of the mind, not attributes of things: they have a subjective, not an objective, existence." Now, so long as the suggestion of external reality is attributed to the mere cognizance of the image, certitude is not demonstrable, because we turn our back to the experience which led to the belief, thus going down the stream in search of its fountain. The suggestion of squareness, in the given instance, is no part of the visual appearance at all. It belongs, on the contrary, to our knowledge of Extension (or place in Space), which is a judgment or idea in the third category, constituted of certain ideas of the second category—namely, images of Touch. But for our knowledge derived from that sense, experience to the end of time of the sense of sight, unassisted, would leave us at last with the tower appearing equally round at the distance of one yard and of fifty. But,

as we have shown, a certain appearance of tactile images having resulted in the idea of Distance, a continued experience in the knowledge of distance assures us that the visual image is cognized with greater or less distinctness according to our distance from the object. At the distance of fifty yards, and while the visual image is not distinct, it has a greater identity with the distinct image of a round tower than a square one. But, as the distance is diminished and the image becomes more distinct, its identity with the distinct image of a round tower becomes less, and with that of a square tower greater. So that when, finally, we are conscious of a distinct image, we are as conscious of the image of a square tower as of our own existence. And whereas the approach satisfies us of the squareness of the object, a return to the distance of fifty yards does not in the least cause a return to the opinion that the tower is round; because of the square image, or appearance, we have as clear and distinct an idea as we have of our own existence, but of the round appearance we have not. Not only is the idea of roundness or of squareness not given by the sense of sight, but no idea of externality at all is given in the visual image, or any other image, unassisted. That idea, as we have shown, is a judgment in the third category, and is, in effect, the logical result of a concatenation of ideas of the previous stages of experience, self-determined by the Activity into a single idea. It is, indeed, no more than the idea that the several simultaneous images are referable to a common cause. Extension is the idea obtained by natural induction (i.e. by the action of the ever self-determining Activity) from a sufficient experience of the images, or judgments, of Touch. A blind man has the idea of extension as well as one who can see; and, therefore,

9. *When we say that we see the object to be square, we can only mean that we are conscious of a visual image such as Experience assures us has its identity (common cause) with a square image of Touch.*

The author, to subserve his purpose, must seek another illustration in some instance in which the object shall, under the same conditions, present at one time a round appearance and at another a square one. That instance, we apprehend, can not be found. The distant tower never appears square; the oar dipped into water never appears straight.

From the experience of images of the sense of Touch, result the ideas of Space and Distance; as also from the same experience the idea of Extension, or place in space. The simultaneous images of the different senses having but one nexus, the identity of time, the logical induction is that their cause is in that place in space at which the image of touch is attainable. For the reason that after we have arrived at the ideas of Space, Distance, and Extension, we know that we are conscious of the image of sight, or visual image, as clearly and distinctly as we are conscious of our own existence, only when we can add to it the image of Touch; or, in other words, verify the inferred identity. But as the tactile image is only attainable by the annihilation of distance, it follows that the greatest distinctness of the visual image is only attainable by the annihilation of distance—equivalent to the attainment of the image of Extension. And when it is said that the tactile image is simultaneous with the greatest consciousness of all the images, we say in effect that the cause of extension is the cause of all the images. The cause of Extension must be where Extension is, or else we should separate cause and effect. But the meaning of Extension is place in Space. Therefore the idea of that place in Space is affirmed by each one of the several images, each confirming the testimony of the others. When, therefore, the visual appearance affirms the object to be square, what it in fact affirms is that at the distance of a yard is the cause of itself, the visual image; and that the same cause has such a place in space (Extension) as will cause a square tactile image. The knowledge that it will do so results from many simultaneous experiences of the like visual images and square tactile images. And when a sufficient experience has resulted in the knowledge that the cause of a certain visual image is also the cause of a certain tactile image, the cognizance of the visual image, in the act of informing us of its own cause, informs us also of the *potential* cause of a corresponding tactile image. In other words, when the object at the distance of one yard appears square, it is that we are conscious of a certain visual image, the cause of which, experience has taught us would prove to be also the cause of a square tactile image, were the distance annihilated and the extension of the object realized by the organs of Touch.



Here then, in the third stage of experience, is the first possibility of an error in the affirmations of Consciousness, and that error comes in

(b) *The only form in which it is possible for error to enter the hum a mind, namely, under cover of an inferred identity.*

The proposition is that the visual image is caused by an external object whose cause is also potentially the cause of a certain image of extension. The error comes of the failure to verify each step of the induction. But as the proposition is the simplest conceivable, being composed of but two particulars, it may always be resolved into its parts, and the induction thereupon either verified or corrected — not only with perfect rigor logically, but with the clearness and distinctness of the consciousness of our own existence. For the particulars of the proposition are images of the second category, ideas in which severally error is impossible because severally they affirm nothing but existence. So long as the image affirms nothing but itself, an act of consciousness, error is impossible: *when, however, the image seems to affirm the potential cause of another than itself*, then it does not affirm with the same confidence as it affirms itself: for the reason that it is then no longer an individual affirmation, but is one of the parts of a proposition in the third category, which proposition it is that affirms the oar dipped into water to be broken, the distant tower to be round.

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## ON THE DIALECTIC METHOD.

(E. V. HARTMANN'S Reply, in the *Philosophische Monatshefte*, to the Criticism of his Essay "On the Dialectic Method," by Prof. MICHELET.)

Translated from the German by LOUIS SOLDAN.

If the anatomical knife pierces the vital nerve of any being, we must not be astonished at the appearance of spasmodic convulsions: their non-appearance, on the contrary, would be an indication of a failure to hit the right point. In this way it can be but flattering for my essay that it called forth a violent effusion of wrath from Professor Michelet as the

representative of Hegelianism, and the above consideration renders more excusable the irritated and personal tone of his criticism, which in some places steps beyond the limits of what is becoming. If I have not hesitated "to print the whole trash," though Mr. Michelet, as he did not omit publicly to state, had previously had the kindness, gratefully acknowledged by me, to communicate to me in writing all his objections to my whole manuscript *ad marginem*; if these objections could not move me to even any changes worth naming, it is plain enough that I felt very little hurt by his thunderbolts, and very little touched by the anticipation of "standing before the eyes of the public at large the reproof which I first sent him in a confidential letter."

Not what Mr. Michelet wrote causes me to break my silence, but what he did not write. I will explain what I mean.

All that Mr. Michelet says can essentially be classified under two headings. Under the first, Hegel's assertions and turns, which in the respective chapters I had critically analyzed and annihilated, are simply repeated as if they were still "alive and kicking" and my critique did not exist. This mode of acting may be very convenient, and perhaps sufficient to produce a bad opinion of my essay with those who do not know it; but the serving up again of the sufficiently known dialectic phrases will not pass for a refutation. Under the second heading, wherever I infer the most immediate consequences from Hegel, the objection is raised that I did not understand Hegel, inasmuch as he never said such a thing; as if I did not know this just as well. But he who asserts, asserts also the consequences, and only the proof of having inferred incorrect consequences can refute them. But such proof Mr. Michelet brings nowhere, reproaching me, on the contrary, with not knowing that Hegel said just the opposite of those inferred consequences. It is all the worse for me that I show, a few lines below, that I know the passage in which the opposite is said, for now I am made responsible for the contradiction which I have exposed in Hegel's thoughts, as though for one which I have committed myself.

I shall gladly pass over in silence the compiling and quoting of fragments torn out from their connection which was intended to exhibit to the reader what absurdities I had writ-

ten. I shall not speak about Mr. Michelet's peculiar habit of denying all erudition in the History of Philosophy to all but those who approve of the intentional misrepresentations in Hegel's History of Philosophy; for science tabled this matter long ago. All this could not have brought me to a word of reply, for whosoever feels interested in the subject may read my little pamphlet, and will there find the best refutation.

But Mr. Michelet, though discussing most of my chapters, even giving their titles, has omitted altogether to mention two chapters which happen to be the most important ones; he has ignored them in a critique extending over sixteen pages, in which he allowed room even to the most insignificant thrusts and reflections. To explain the meaning of this interesting fact, I must give a short outline of the thread of my critique.

1. I point out in Hegel's *Dialectics* the hitherto seldom noticed dualism between an esoteric side which must decline every justification outside of itself, standing purely on reason, and an exoteric side which finds the former stand-point practically untenable, and makes the inconsistent attempt of justifying itself before the understanding. (Against this Mr. Michelet could show nothing but the repetition of some of the most common dialectic phrases.)

2. I show that the exoteric side essentially seeks its justification in the proof that contradiction is contained in all being and in all thinking, with the intention of inciting the understanding by this knowledge to throw itself into the arms of reason. (That this means the setting aside of the principle of contradiction I proved strictly, but Mr. Michelet responded by the strange imputation that I intended to deny the existence of contradiction in thoughts and actions of men in general; while he quotes my words on the next page, “that contradiction is only found where it was made previously”; in which expression I say distinctly enough that “contradiction is found,” but only as the product (and therefore at the same time as the indication) of error; as error is possible only in conscious, discursive thought, and not in the unconscious, intuitive thought, which Hegel terms objective thought. What kinds of antitheses form a contradiction in

their union, and under what conditions they do so, I have investigated at length in my work above quoted.)

3. I enter upon the esoteric side of the dialectics as it follows in its purity from Hegel's principle, and show that the absolute fluidity of the idea, the cancelling of the principle of Identity, and with it the impossibility of all thinking, results from the self-movement of the idea (the property of A to be at the same time B).

4. I prove that it is impossible ever to arrive at a new idea, and consequently at a dialectic progress, by the union of contraries. This chapter, as is explicitly stated there, is the specific critique of all dialectics that attempts to evade nominally the setting aside of the principle of contradiction, and tries to operate merely with the unity of contraries instead of operating like Hegel with the Identity of contradictories. As Mr. Michelet calls this view of Kuno Fischer quite correct (p. 329), the refutation of this chapter ought to have been a great deal more important to him than the refutation of all the rest of my book; next to this, his criticism ought to have been directed against the preceding chapter, which grinds to dust the dialectics in its esoteric side, its innermost kernel. And of all the sections of my book these are the very ones about which Mr. Michelet has not a single syllable; while another adherent of the dialectic method, who of course rejects like Mr. Michelet every word of my book, still designated to me these two chapters as the dazzling points of my essay.

Any supposition that Mr. Michelet overlooked or did not understand the significance of these chapters is precluded by the circumstance that I had written to him about their importance, regretting the absence of his marginal notes in regard to the most important points of my line of argument. As Mr. Michelet has shown now how easy a thing it is for him to make a reply, it cannot be supposed that he was at all at a loss to "say something" also against these chapters; the only explanation that remains for his action is that he intended to kill by silence the principal part of my writings in order to criticise more explicitly minor points, and thereby to make a show of thorough critique, while the readers remained ignorant of the principal part of the contents.

## THE LOGICAL QUESTION IN HEGEL'S SYSTEM.

## SECOND ARTICLE.

*A Demand for a Scientific Settlement of it.*

Translated from the German of TREDELENBURG, by THOS. DAVIDSON.

Investigation has at all times been accorded the right of conducting polemics, and only such polemics have been condemned as were not themselves investigations. If ever truth, or, its human incarnation, deliberate conviction, were to lose its polemical spirit, it would soon exhaust itself in lazy, idle self-enjoyment, and renounce the mission which it has of reproducing itself in others, and of strengthening itself with victorious necessity in elements foreign to it. Certainty, which is the heart of truth, there can be none, where conflict is declined.

We, therefore, do not decline the contest. But every contest has its code of honor, for the maintenance of which a few words of preface will be needed.

In the *Logical Investigations*, Hegel's Dialectic Method was subjected by us, both as a whole and in detail, to a careful scrutiny; afterwards, in an article in the *Neue jenaische allgemeine Literatur-zeitung* (April, 1842, No. 97 sqq.), a *résumé* of the main points was given. In both cases the thing itself, and the thing only, was discussed, and called upon to defend itself.

Whence comes it, then, that the reply which has appeared—viz. Gabler's review in the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* (1841, Oct., No. 65 sqq.; 1842, Nov., No. 81 sqq.; Dec., No. 114 sqq.), afterwards published in book-form with some additions under the title, "*The Hegelian Philosophy: Contributions toward the Formation of a Just Judgment, and Appreciation of it.* Part I. Berlin: Duncker. 1842"—threatens to turn the logical contest, which certainly, if anything, ought to be conducted with coolness, into a personal matter?

The author of the *Logical Investigations* is, without much obscurity of phrase, compared to a blustering thimble-rigger (*The Hegelian Philosophy*, pp. 81 sqq.), or to a hangman's loon

(p. 83), "who would fain give the *coup de grâce* with a philosophical weapon to a philosophy already condemned, branded, and proscribed." Attention is repeatedly called to the circumstance that he does not stand alone, but "in close and formidable league with a whole great and powerful band of opponents, congregated from the most diverse directions." A consequence which he did not draw at all, but which the history of the Hegelian Philosophy drew, is declared to be a "slander" and an "insinuation" against the Elders (p. 109).

Every person understands such language; it has been in fashion since people began trying to make out the Philosophy of Hegel to be persecuted freedom of thought, and its opponents slavish-minded eye-servants; the Philosophy of Hegel to be the sole light of the times, and its opponents to be the persons who would fain blow out this great light, in the interest of a tenebrose government, although there does not and can not exist any such government at present. Such language is disingenuous, destitute of self-respect, and, therefore, unworthy of philosophy. Who would relegate any philosophy from the minds of thinkers, in which alone its dominion is, unless—being impotent and powerless to maintain itself—it so relegates itself? And such language the Hegelian Philosophy ought, less than any other, to adopt. For long years it enjoyed the tide of popularity, while we and others were buffeted by the wind of public opinion. Any sailor who has been through a stormy day is bolder than that. But he knows where he is steering.

Without freedom of thought there is no philosophy; and any one who desires only blind faith and blind obedience ought to have nothing to do with any philosophy; for if one part of a philosophy lent itself to fettering men's minds, the other and better part would set them at liberty. But it is quite a new idea for deceiving the multitude and the time, when one philosophy assures us that it has taken a general lease of freedom. If any one desires to understand one phenomenon, or even one tendency of life, he must not stop with his bodily senses, as if he were in bondage to them, but he must, as if independent of them, rise spiritually above them, in order to master them. And the philosophy which is bold enough to go beyond the individual part, and to seek the

thought of the whole, and the moving powers (*Gründe*) that lie behind it, is to be called, or is capable of being, disingenuous! The greatest philosopher that ever contemplated human and divine things, Aristotle, declared philosophy to be the freest of the sciences—the only free science. Let us survey the two thousand years and more of life that philosophy has passed in our race so richly endowed with mind, and confess that, at the basis of all transformations of systems and of self-consciousness, there lies one common tendency—reason and freedom. Why, then, does one form out of many press itself forward and run about the market, with its whole body pasted over with the catchword “freedom,” writ so large that he that runneth may read, and calling out vociferously, “Freedom! Help, help! or I shall be suppressed!” When thought-masses can no longer support themselves, they go down; and when they are too great, no persecutor can do them any harm; on the contrary, they grow gigantic through persecution. Reason and Freedom!—these have, at all times, been taken for granted as the conditions of all philosophy. But how is Freedom understood at present? The mental concept is made as clear as daylight, while the eternal idea is left to the caprice of the next mutable moment. “What is Freedom but opposition?” is a motto to which the newspapers try to give currency in our time, and we find the banner of Philosophy bearing the device, “Freedom and Opposition.” Nothing could be more prejudicial to science, nothing more destructive of thoroughgoing free inquiry, than to mix up philosophy with the momentary passions of politics. Dragged into the arena of party strife, Science forgets the *cause* which it is its mission to elevate into an everlasting possession, and becomes a mere partisan of present interests: instead of the quiet and perseverance of painstaking study, it degenerates into habitual unrest and impatience amid the questions of the moment. It does not belong to Philosophy to bar itself off from the times; it is rather its mission to view them under the form of the eternal, and, undazzled by the chameleon colors of the present, to seek out and exhibit the enduring idea in them. A philosopher like Fichte knew what nation and courage meant in days of humiliation and peril; and we believe as little as Fichte did in Philosophy's painting

everything in neutral colors, and waiting till the forms of life have grown old ere it treat them, or in its forgetting the eagle which flies toward the sun, and beginning its flight only at the approach of twilight, like Minerva's owl. We have a living faith in the vigorous power of thought. But, for that very reason, we are ready to protest when a philosophy coquets with Freedom, and deals more with the flimsy, captivating word "freedom" than with solid knowledge; or when, as if it enjoyed a monopoly of freedom of thought, like a demagogue in Plato's sense, it tries, with glib talk about Freedom, to ingratiate itself with the mob, or, what tends in the same direction, woos the favor of popular opposition against supposed oppressors.

What, after all, do those accusations of want of freedom, brought against the author of the *Logical Investigations*, mean? It is one thing to impute interested motives, another to refute a work, the fruit of long years of patient thought. Under any circumstances, it would be better to tear the work to pieces before the eyes of the public, if it will not hold together, and to leave the author's private views entirely out of the question. Such, indeed, used to be the practice in the "closed circle" (*geschlossenen Bunde*) of the Hegelian school, whenever it could be applied to works of a hostile character. Now that other methods are appealed to, every unbiassed person will be able to find out the value and grounds of such imputations. The man who utters them cannot believe them himself, if he can cease feeling disconcerted and out of humor, and reflect on the plain facts. Or, does he not reflect that the Undersigned, whom, in tolerably plain terms, he degrades into the logical creature of a higher judgment not his own, was, already at the time when he himself received a call to propagate Hegel, occupying a position—though, indeed, a lonely one—at the same university, teaching as he does now, or that he has used his efforts in undisguised opposition to Hegel as long as he has been reading in his spirit? Perhaps he has never been made aware that the same Society for Scientific Criticism, which has now, in the interest of the dialectic method, backed his insinuations, fourteen years ago, in Hegel's life-time and at Hegel's desire, returned a criticism *presented* by the Undersigned, because it contained objections



to the dialectic method (which is still a matter under discussion), and especially against its application to Aristotle. It hardly requires the adduction of these facts to place the equivocal character of those imputations in their proper light, or, rather, in their own shadow. It is true that their hostile tone is repeatedly laid to the account of *necessary self-defence* (pp. 85, 176, &c.), the whole existence and reputation of the Hegelian Philosophy being at stake. This may be; but the question related to the *matter* itself, and is not answered by attacking the author.

We shall, therefore, unhesitatingly resume the discussion of the *matter* itself, about which alone we have hitherto contended, and shall begin, where we find ourselves most at home, with its history. As we have promised to report upon the present state of the question, we would ask, in the first place, what has been done for or against Hegel's dialectic method since our first article?

In the notices which appeared of the *Logical Investigations*, judgments have been pronounced upon the dialectic method from the most diverse quarters. We shall not appeal to the voices of men, who, like the prematurely deceased Kopp, the eminent student of ancient philosophy, H. Ritter, E. Reinhold, Strümpel, known through his writings on Herbart, accepted the unfavorable criticism. One of these went so far as to say that the question was merely a local one, over which science need not spend so very much time. When we consider all the antecedents of these men, we need not be surprised if certain persons do not hesitate to declare their judgment biassed, however unbiassed it may really be. When, however, men who were originally devoted to the dialectic method, do not refuse their assent to the criticism whose results were communicated in the former essay, we perhaps get some idea of the strength of the cause.

First, the *Deutsche Jahrbücher* (April, 1842, No. 83, sqq.) gives a criticism signed by Wirth. As it overlooks the most essential portions of the work, and treats it as if these were not in it, one can hardly expect that it will meet with much favor. It is there, however, stated expressly that those "who believe in the stability of the Hegelian Logic, or even admit that it is formally and quantitatively perfectible," are in

error. Even the objective frame in which Hegel set his logic is admitted to be by no means the only possible one for the formal to exist in, it being a wholly unhistorical prejudice of our time to think that the choice lies only between the two, &c. So Hegel's Logic was seen suddenly to give way, where a champion had been expected.

*Weisse*, who, in every contest against Hegel, affirms the dialectic method to be the abiding amid the transient, and who has himself employed it in his former writings and even in his metaphysics, while he complains that in the *Logical Investigations* the new form has not been sufficiently tested, nevertheless elsewhere asserts with an unreserved frankness for which we sincerely thank him, that Hegel's dialectic method has in fact been refuted, and proved to be a method impossible in the general, and belying its own concept in the particular. "Among the numerous objections," he continues, "which the author raises both against the dialectic movement of the Logic and the realistic-philosophy portions of the Hegelian system, there will perhaps not be found one which could be refuted from the Hegelian premises and with strict adherence to the Hegelian concept of method. With *words* which, as everybody knows, that school is ready with, wherever thought fails, of course it might be done; although even in the unmasking of this abuse, which is maintained with words — with the dialectic terminology — the author has displayed a merciless acumen, so that it would require no small amount of audacity to meet him again with the same artifices." (J. H. Fichte's *Zeitschrift*, 1842, v. 2, p. 273.) We may, perhaps, not be blamed, if, as an offset against the bitterness of one opponent, we adduce these words coming from another opponent of our opinion, in order to enable our readers to find their bearings.

In the contest against the dialectic method, there appeared an unexpected auxiliary in an able and vigorously written treatise: "*The Psychology of the Hegelian School*. By Dr. F. Exner, Professor of Philosophy in Prague." The author, aware that the Hegelian school have staked their whole fortune upon the dialectic method, as bold gamblers do upon one throw, and that it derives all its knowing from the application of the method, pursues this method through the whole

of psychology, and does not leave it a single nook into which it can skulk to hide itself. It is of great value, in a subject as concrete as psychology is, to have made clear what kind of science, or rather what scientific monstrosities, the boasted dialectic method gives birth to. When certain writers complain that the negative has never received fair treatment (Gabler, p. 171), they may take comfort in this one example, as an offset against all its successful performances. (Exner, p. 55 sqq.) Will the dialectic method ever be able to raise its head again, after it has suffered discomfiture throughout a whole science?

In philosophical literature, however, no clear decision has been reached. It is true that there have appeared no works, written in the strict dialectic method, according to the discipline of the old Hegelian method. But while the vibrations which proceeded from Hegel's Logic are ceasing, an echo of it is still repeated, and, in conjunction with old melodies, produces new tunes. In *Wirth's Dialectic* are united dialectic and combination; in a recently begun History of Philosophy, which, in its excellent mode of presentation, strives evidently to attain freedom of form, dialectic alternates with analogy. Dr. George, in his work entitled *Principle and Method of Philosophy*, has shown, with great acumen, the peculiar defects in the philosophies of Hegel and Schleiermacher, and, finding them standing in opposition to each other, he has improved the one method by the other, and melted them down into a new process. Care will have to be taken that the difficulties connected with the production of concepts—difficulties which occur both in Hegel and Schleiermacher—are not all transferred to the new process. Without disrespect to this new attempt, we must say that we have a certain dread of mongrel systems, as when we see Hegel revised by Schleiermacher, or, in another work that lately appeared, Hegel amended by Kant, or in a third, written in a peculiar spirit, Hegel and Herbart worked up together. But in most of these attempts, if not in all, there comes out, as clearly as any literary fact can, the silent or expressed admission that Hegel's dialectic method, at least in original form, is not all that it ought to be.

Dr. *Marheineke*, in his work: *Introduction to Public Lec-*

tures on the Significance of the Hegelian Philosophy in Christian Theology (1842, p. 30), writes: "The Hegelian philosophy is not a philosophy having a particular and definite principle. We cannot, therefore, say in one word, or in one sentence, what Hegelian philosophy is, or wherein it consists, as the phrase is. *Its principle we must look for in the method*, whose discovery was Hegel's everlasting prerogative, and one which, hitherto, has met with but very slight opposition." It is not unusual for banking-houses, when they wish to remove the impression that they are on the eve of failure, to speak on 'change of the very slight losses which they have experienced. At all events, we would call special attention to the important words of the above statement: "The principle of the Hegelian philosophy we must look for in its method." Hitherto we had been of the same opinion, and, in view of Hegel's lectures and writings, we are unable to take the matter otherwise. We supposed that in particular the older school was willing to make the same admission. But, as in the Hegelian school generally discord is stronger than harmony, it seizes the older disciples in this fundamental thought, although, according to the writings of Marheineke and Gabler, these appeared to hold more closely together. Even Marheineke and Gabler disagree. Gabler teaches us that the dialectic method is not to be made the first thing or the principle. He tells us that we had been placing our batteries wrong, directing them against the dialectic method, and expecting thereby to destroy the Hegelian philosophy. (p. 113 sqq.)

We shall pass over the clever *mutatio controversiæ*, as common logic calls it. In the *Logical Investigations* not a single word was said of destroying the Hegelian philosophy—though we might derive some superior instruction about how to proceed in such an attempt from the reply of our opponent (p. 101 sqq.)—but of testing the dialectic method. What result the refutation of it would have upon the existence of the system, we knew, might be left to take care of itself. All those demands which claim that we ought to have defined philosophy (p. 101 sqq.), or at least stated the difference between human and divine thinking (p. 152 sqq.), are invented merely to give the impression that there is something else

in question than the clearly expressed subject of the dialectic method. We are satisfied if it is proved false, and leave to others the task of some day coming at Hegel's philosophical system with the prescription given on p. 101: "When people try to break down a philosophical system, the question comes to be, what belongs to that system?" There are, perhaps, more points of attack than one. We are satisfied with ours, and merely ask, in the spirit of Marheineke, whether Hegel's system will still be considered alive when the "moving soul," the dialectic method, has gone out of it.

But why, after all, cannot the dialectic method be put in the foreground and made the principle? We hear the reasons (p. 114 sqq.): "Otherwise," we are told first, "we should have the opponents of Hegel upon us, and they make it a special business to represent the dialectic method as a mere invention of subjective thinking, without any internal necessity or unity with objective nature." This argument, taken in connection with appended historical explanations, looks as if we might translate it: We must look for another principle, since this one no longer sustains itself. The second reason is given us in the words (p. 115): "If the method itself were the absolute principle, the definition of the absolute would have to be: The Absolute or God is the dialectic method,—which Hegel would certainly have indignantly rejected." Any one who takes the dialectic method as having the importance which Hegel attributed to it, as that in which pure form produces the content of reason, and any one who has before his eyes such passages as § 237 of the Encyclopaedia, in which we are expressly told that nothing remains to the absolute idea, as form, but the "*method*" of the content, "the determined knowing of the preservation of the moments," will be in great doubt about this supposed indignation of Hegel's, which might have had reference merely to the unwary expression. In both of these proofs, which are so external, lies the whole force and the whole depth of the reasons which are supposed sufficient to give the dialectic method another position than that which it has hitherto occupied, and to defend it and (through it) the system against attack. However, we shall leave this new difference, which is hardly inferior to any one of the old ones, to be set

tled by those who must be more concerned about the last refuge of the school, at least of the old one, and about the last token of union, than an opponent can be supposed to be.

It seems, however, to be a matter of solid earnest that the real significance of the Hegelian system consists in a certain mode of seizing the Absolute, to which Gabler has been at last led. Are we, then, to suppose that the presuppositionless dialectic method has been given up? Yes; and all the trouble spent in investigating it is as thrown away upon a mere phantom of the imagination. For we are told in the preface (p. vii.): "Among the bogles, with which some people try to scare others, is the *bugbear of pure thinking*." If Germany had so short a memory that the proud doctrine of the presuppositionless pure thinking no longer rang in its ears, it would at least have Hegel's Logic and Encyclopedia to inform it what pure thinking means in fact and in name. We read, for example, in the Encyclopedia, § 19: "Logic demands that it should have the power—in opposition to all intuitions, even the abstract sensuous images of geometry—to withdraw itself into pure thought, to grasp it and move in it." (Cf. §§ 14, 17, 78, &c.) We read similar statements not only in innumerable other works which owe their origin to Hegel, of the power and the feats of pure thinking, but even in Gabler's own text-book, "Introduction to Philosophy"—*Lehrbuch der philosophischen Propädeutik*. Erlangen, 1827—e.g., p. 31 sq.: "In the assertion that 'the object is as it is known,' there is truth contained, if the knowing is an actual pure knowing, and such determinations of the object are treated as belong to it through this knowing, which is at the same time pure thinking." From this one may judge whether the "bugbear of pure thought" is merely a new-spun "chimera" which misapprehension has laid on the shoulders of Hegel's philosophy. For long years, and indeed until quite recently, pure thinking was the common watchword of the initiated, whereby Hegel's disciples recognized each other, and passed as the central life-fountain of "speculation"; and now people assert in all seriousness that when one has turned against this and struck it, he has not shot through the heart of the system, but only into the air.

Against this new acceptance we could not possibly have

fought, simply because it was not in existence; and even if it had been in existence, we should have been obliged to decline discussing it, because, in the *Logical Investigations*, we had under consideration the original form of the Hegelian system, and not any of its numerous varieties. When, however, our opponent everywhere brings up this new acceptance (although we meet it here for the first time and only in dim outlines), as if we ought to have known it, the question comes to be whether, after all, this new acceptance is really so very much different from the old original doctrine of pure thinking which we investigated. We are told on page 156: "Pure thinking is nothing more or less than that which, retreating back into itself, from its external distraction and manifoldness, and raising itself in its *pure activity of form*, already determined in and for itself, to the fountain of primal *content of thought*, reproduces and regains thus an ideal thought"; p. 159: "The pure knowledge whose aim is absolute truth will reach that aim in *no other form* save that of the *absolute thing*." "It is the method which remains identical with the *thing* itself." If we take these passages, as we might take others, in their connection, we can see very distinctly wherein Gabler's view differs from the view of those who recognize thinking only in man, and who hold that God is self-conscious only in the thinking human being. For he defines the content of human thinking as one that has been previously thought by God; he designates human thinking as "a *second* thinking which returns to its origin, in the rethinking of that which has been previously thought through all eternity." Whether the deduction of this statement, given on pp. 123 sqq., be sufficient, we will not undertake to say. The bolder view, represented mainly by Strauss, seems to us more consistent, and is more of a piece with the whole spirit of the Hegelian philosophy. We do not desire, however, to pronounce any judgment on this, and are willing to accept Gabler's view for the time and for the present purpose. Is, then, by this long discussion, which is more a flourish of trumpets over the religious conscience of the Hegelian philosophy, than a treatment of the logical question, the internal difficulty of pure thinking removed? Are the demonstrated contradictions of the presuppositionless dialectic solved? The

cause is not at all bettered thereby. It is true that it seems to be so; for throughout the whole of the reply, wherever the *Logical Investigations*, following Hegel, spoke of cognizing, by an important and careful correction, recognizing is substituted, and wherever, following Hegel, they spoke of the production of thinking, reproduction is substituted. Where, then, has Hegel, in all his works, spoken half as much of re-thinking, of re-cognizing, of re-production, as Gabler has done in this one book? However, we need not be deceived by the words. In the reply, they are not understood to mean, that that which is received through the senses is reproduced from the unity of its concept, or that which is cognized through experience in the individual from the necessity of the whole and the universal. The words *recognition* and *reproduction* do not apply to the antithesis existing between the receptive perception and the thinking which manipulates the matter thereof, but only to the fact that the content of the thought has been previously thought by God, and that therefore the creation of the divine spirit is created anew in the human spirit. If this altered mode of expression, giving us recognition and reproduction, related to the condition of all experience, the relation of the *Phenomenology* to the system would at once come in question; but Gabler will not condescend (p. 205) to an explanation upon this fundamental point, which, as our first article showed, stands so much in need of one. Is anything gained, then, by his correction? We investigated human thinking, and asked, whether it has at its command any such creative dialectic as Hegel has asserted and employed. We returned an answer in the negative, because the concepts upon which the dialectic rests broke down, and because the means which it employed were mere delusions. Has our author anything to say in reply? Does he deny the creative dialectic? Far from it. He shows (pp. 158-sqq., 168) that the formal activity of the human and of the divine thinking are the same. But since the form produces the content, as Hegel essentially teaches, the formal activity of the human (the pure) thinking produces the content of the divine thinking, "the absolute thing," and is therefore, as far as the system of thoughts is concerned, as creative as the divine thinking. If this is the truth, and any one who will read Gabler's reply may



convince himself of it (pp. 156, 159 sqq.), the new view, as far as our objections are concerned, is not one whit better than the old one." We shall, therefore, hardly be expected to investigate very closely this new construction of the divine spirit (pp. 144 sqq.) which moves along with the old formulas of self-differentiation and mediation, of in-itself and for-itself. It employs the already discredited dialectic instruments, as if they were unassailed, or as if they had safely escaped from attack—which no one will assert, since our author very wisely declines to enter upon a discussion of them (p. 204). A person who does not wish to go (*gehen*) the long examination of human thinking takes a short leap into the divine thinking, and is more at home there than in his own Ego. Is he, then, prophet or philosopher, theosophist or logician? Perhaps, in both cases, neither; for the first requires enthusiasm, the second strictness. But a person puts on the appearance of metaphysical profundity when he deals more easily with the divine thinking than with the first and most individual phenomenon, which one has to study the whole of physics in order to understand.

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#### CORRESPONDENCE.

Dr. Carl Rosenkranz, of the University of Königsberg, writes us regarding his differences with Dr. Hoffmann. In vol. vii. of the *Philosophische Monatshefte* (Berlin), pp. 267-274, and, again, pp. 313-320, he reviews at length the position of the latter as taken in various periodicals and books, especially in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. In vol. i. *Jour. Sp. Phil.*, p. 180, we published a letter from Dr. Hoffmann on the Philosophy of Baader. In vol. ii., p. 55, Dr. Rosenkranz replies to a remark in the former, and points out briefly and clearly the difference between his position and that of Baader. The chief point concerned Baader's concept of the negative and of its realization in the world. Dr. Rosenkranz unfolds his theory of antithesis and contradiction. Again, in vol. v., p. 87, we published an extract from a letter of Dr. Hoffmann's in connection with a translation of a por-

tion of his pamphlet on Theism and Pantheism. A passage in this letter speaks of Dr. Rosenkranz as making "Hegel assert the personality of God and deny individual immortality to man." Under the date of April 4th, 1871, we received another letter from Dr. Hoffmann, from which we quote the following extracts:

"The January number of your Journal has lately arrived, and I was especially pleased with the article, 'Theism and Pantheism.' I do not consider it correct that Hegel is explained in St. Louis theistically, but it gives me evidence that I stand with the philosophers of your city, in fundamental questions, on the basis of identical or at least nearly related conviction. Now whether Hegel ought to be interpreted this way or not, it is of the greatest importance that the philosophers of St. Louis endeavor to found and to propagate a theistic philosophy, for only a theistic philosophy can stand; and upon the building of a superstructure upon it, depends the future of humanity, its elevation to the higher steps of culture, the civilization of the barbarian and semi-barbarian tribes, a future confederation of all states and nations, and still more than this if we extend our view beyond that which is earthly. My writings concerning Hegel's Philosophy, which I have published in the last few years, are scattered through Dr. Bergmann's *Philosophische Monatshefte*, Leonardi's *Neuer Zeit*, in *Deutschland* of Wilhelm Hoffmann in Berlin, and in the *Allgemeiner Anzeiger für das evang. Deutschland*. You would find in these writings that I have not left unnoticed the Hegelian literature of the year 1870."

(He speaks further of the collection of his miscellaneous writings for publication, and of the published reviews of former works of his that have appeared in Germany, and of the important discussion which he undertook in his *Blitzstrahl gegen Rom*, rendered now more important from the position taken by Dr. Döllinger and from the recent acts of the Imperial Parliament at Berlin. He speaks sadly of the death of his son, a lieutenant in the 9th infantry, killed at the battle of Wörth, Aug. 6th, 1870, "pierced by three French bullets while advancing at the head of his troops." But the heart of a German father beats proudly when he adds: "He fell for a great cause. The results of these grand victories will be

tremendous for the whole of Europe, and without doubt beneficial. The restoration of the German Empire on a national basis makes an onward move in the history of the world. North America and United Germany will certainly approach each other. German literature will exert its influence in every direction, and in Germany science will be cultivated as never before. The union of Germany owes much to the culture of science and art; Germany knows this and will not forget it." He says, in conclusion :) "I have just finished an essay on Hegel's Philosophy in St. Louis, which I shall send to-day to Dr. Bergmann for the *Philosophische Monatshefte*." This article appeared in vol. vii., pages 58 to 63, of the journal named, and was the immediate occasion of the article of Dr. Rosenkranz in the same journal, as well as of the letter above referred to, from which we now quote the following extracts (translated for this journal by Mr. Arthur Amson); it is dated Königsberg, August 14th, 1871:

"You will permit me now to enter more closely upon a matter which concerns us both. In an article, 'Theism and Pantheism,' you have, in speaking of Hegel, adopted an interpretation of his system to which I adhere, and which is also represented on the part of the English by Dr. Stirling ('Secret of Hegel'). Hegel not only does not deny God, freedom, and immortality, but he teaches them as the highest consequences of his speculation. He rejects atheism and pantheism in the clearest words. Freedom is the soul of his ethical view of the world. In regard to immortality, he has nowhere pronounced a *credo* in catechism-form; but the manner in which he expresses himself in his 'Philosophy of Religion,' in treating of the Egyptian religion, can surely leave no doubt on the subject.

"Professor Hoffmann of Würzburg, a man whom for years I have truly honored, has been induced by your essay to insert in one of the numbers of Bergmann's *Philosophische Monatshefte* an essay which bears the title, 'The Hegelian Philosophy in St. Louis, in North America.' In this article he opposes your interpretation of Hegel, from his own standpoint, which is that of Baader's philosophy, and then turns to a special polemic against me. For many years he has written polemical articles against me in various periodicals. I

have made no reply to these attacks, because it is painful to me to quarrel publicly with an old friend. But now I cannot forbear to break my silence, and briefly to tell my honored friends in St. Louis at least, how I believe I stand in relation to the accusations of Hoffmann.

“Hoffmann is frightened at the thought that Hegel could, in fact, be a theist: he apparently considers theism, so far as a scientific knowledge is concerned, as a kind of prerogative of Baader’s system. He thinks it settled, in regard to Hegel, that he was a pantheist. To me he ascribes *semi*-pantheism, since he cannot deny that I have declared expressly for theism.

“Wherein is this tendency to pantheism supposed to consist? He says that I deny the freedom of God in the act of creating, and that I teach a self-realization of God in the world. He infers this from the fact that I assume the revelation of the essence of God in nature and in history. How this revelation could be conceived without the real activity of God is incomprehensible to me. But I have never thought that God is exhausted in nature and in history; that there is no difference between Him as a manifestation of His Being, and Him as a subject.

“You have, as you once informed me, my ‘System of Science.’ In the last section of it, ‘On Philosophy,’ I have expressed myself in regard to the improvements which the so-called proofs for the existence of God would have to undergo. These improvements I treated in detail in the introduction to the second edition of my ‘Encyclopedia of the Theological Sciences (1845), under the heading, ‘Phenomenological Theogony (in opposition to Schelling’s ‘Theogonic Realism’). To this I may still refer.

“But Hoffmann took no notice of this, and yet I should believe, when one accuses an author of semi-pantheism, that an entire system of theology, if he has built up such a one, would surely be considered the best source of information. I have also published an exhaustive criticism of Strauss’ *Glaubenslehre*, and in it also have verified my conception of God, as opposed to the world. But of it, also, my friend Hoffmann takes no notice. On the other hand, he has expressed his entire agreement with a work of mine in Hilgenfeld’s Jour-

nal of Scientific Theology, 'Materialism and German Theology,' wherein I expounded and reviewed the entire literature of materialistic theories, and repeatedly has he called on me, by letter, for a separate reprint. How could he concur with me if I were a semi-pantheist, or if I believed God, immediately as a subject, to be confounded in the processes of nature and history?

"Hoffmann now comes to a point, on which I expressed myself once before in your journal. This is Nature in God, which is said to be misapprehended by me, and to be correctly taught only by Baader. That nature must lie in the essence of God, inasmuch as otherwise he could not create it, is certain. I expressed myself afterwards at length in my treatise on Hegel's 'Nature-Philosophy,' which was sent to you on its appearance. Hoffmann ignores this. I have no idea of that mysterious nature of Baader's, which is said to exist without space and time, without matter, without finity. Previous to its creation, nature is only *potentially* in God. I will not again take up the quarrel on the integrity of nature, on which conception I printed a Latin dissertation in 1834. In the first volume of my *Studien* (1839), there is a longer treatise, 'The Glorification of Nature,' which treats on this subject. Where, then, are the refutations of these works?

"Of freedom I shall not speak, since Hoffmann admits that I acknowledge its reality. But I can only teach the freedom of man by assuming, that he is as free from God as God is from him.

"But I must still say one word in regard to immortality. He affirms that he was unable to see it clearly from my printed expressions. But he says that he heard from a mutual friend of ours, that I believed it. There, however, exists a quite definite document of mine on this point, which is printed at the end of my 'Critical Explanations of the Hegelian System' (1840).

"In this I related with all openness, how I certainly had forsaken the belief in immortality for a long succession of years, but, through science itself, had come to abandon this stand-point, because the difficulties of proving non-immortality continually presented themselves more clearly before my mind. It is curious that Hoffmann should derive his information, whether I believe in immortality, through letters,

since I wrote a 'Psychology,' to the third edition of which I prefixed a statement in which the present stand-point of German psychology is treated in detail, and with special reference to materialism. These, I think, are the sources from which Hoffmann was bound to draw, if he wished to attack me publicly.

"When I had said in your periodical that the concept of death is inseparable from that of life, Hoffmann inferred from this that I had finally clearly denied immortality. I hereupon wrote to him that I should not be able to convince myself of the immortality of cats and dogs and vermin, although I should be found to do this if I considered everything living to be immortal; but that immortality presupposes, as an essential condition, the existence of consciousness. Individuality, such as the animal possesses, is not yet subjectivity. Ideal power, and even subjectivity, do not make up the entire concept of personality.

"Moreover, it seems to me that in science, *science*—i.e. demonstration—is the principal thing. Here we have to deal with objective proofs, while every freedom of individual fantasy is to be accorded to belief. In the problem of immortality, the greatest difficulty will always lie in the fact that we are completely incapable of forming any adequate idea of the nature of a condition after death. It is just the same with the concept of God, which we are forced to think, since we must think the Absolute not only as an absolute substance, but also as an absolute subject. But we are not able to *imagine* the absolute spirit, and for that reason it is common in our times to deny its existence.

"It occurs to me, finally, that I, perhaps, am the German philosopher who has contended most against atheism and materialism, because, in 1866, I published a book on Diderot's Life and Works, in two volumes, the fruit of many years' research; and that Diderot may be considered the most intellectual representative of that stand-point. I sent the book to Hoffmann, and he expressed to me his entire satisfaction therewith; all the more, therefore, does his present polemic surprise me. The name of Hegel does not even occur once in the book, because I thought I must solve my problem entirely within the last century.

"Pardon these lucubrations, which I thought I owed you,

since Hoffmann condemns you as a theist to the same category with myself.

“To the honored members of the Philosophical Society my best respects.”

*Dr. C. L. Michelet and Dr. E. v. Hartmann.*

In the present and last previous number of this Journal we have given a part of the polemic excited by the appearance of Dr. E. v. Hartmann's work on Hegel's Dialectic. His great work on the 'Philosophy of the Unconscious' was reviewed in vol. iv., No. 1. We have received the third edition of that remarkable work, which is very much enlarged—containing now over 800 pages. By reason of its popular style—which seems largely inherited from Schopenhauer, and perhaps ultimately traces to an English or French origin—the work has been very largely circulated and read. It is just now advertised that a translation of it will soon appear in Boston from the house of Roberts Brothers.

Since the publication of the organ of the Philosophical Society of Berlin—*Der Gedanke*—ceased with its 7th volume in 1867, when Dr. Bergmann, one of the editors, started the *Philosophische Monatshefte*, Dr. Michelet, the other editor, commenced an irregular periodical called “*Der Gedanke: Fliegende Blätter in zwanglosen Heften*,” thus nominally continuing *Der Gedanke* into its eighth volume. In this volume he attacked Dr. Hartmann in the critique translated and published in this journal, while Dr. Hartmann and others replied in the *Philosophische Monatshefte*. The third number of *Der Gedanke* is chiefly taken up with an account of the celebration of the centennial anniversary of the birth of Hegel. On this occasion a monument was erected to his memory, surmounted with a very excellent bust of the philosopher. The oration of Dr. Michelet, delivered at the ceremony of uncovering the monument, will be given to our readers in due time. A letter received from Dr. Michelet when the contributions to the monument were in progress, contains the following interesting passage:

“Even if you do not at all represent yourself as an adherent of Hegel, yet I see from the tone of your periodical what large store you set by Hegel, and how much he seems wor-

thy the homage of both hemispheres. I would go into particulars only in relation to the famous question of the Beginning of Philosophy [see Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. i., No. 4]. The author of the article does not agree with Paul Janet's objections against Hegel. That Hegel's reasoning in regard to the Beginning comes to a false conclusion, as M. Janet urges, 'since the beginning of knowledge and the beginning of being are two different things,' is a statement that I should more sharply refute thus: When we make a beginning in philosophy, since it must be something *immediate*, we cannot yet make the distinction between being and cognition. They are, perhaps, both the same, as, indeed, the Irish bishop, Berkeley, has asserted expressly. The answer of Janet's is particularly infelicitous: 'The thinking being knows itself before it knows the being which it thinks.' For self-thinking is, as Fichte has also said, to posit oneself immediately as being. And even Descartes said: '*Cogito, ergo sum.*' The antithesis between cognition and existence is a much later one, and one lying far behind the beginning, at which we only arrive by means of the dialectic. I therefore say: Philosophy, since it is an absolute beginning, begins with the beginning: as the French say, '*Il faut commencer par le commencement.*' Here we do not yet at all know whether we or the thing begins, or whether we as well as the thing begins, because it is only subsequently that, out of this immediate unity, we shall derive the distinction between the thinking subject and the thought object.

"But the conception of the beginning itself contains nothing else than being, pure being. For what, in conception, is about to begin (*id quod inchoatum est*), is not as yet anything determined or definite, and we know as yet nothing determinate of it, but simply know that it is."

The third number, above mentioned as containing the orations delivered at the centennial celebration, contains also a fine photograph of the monument as it now stands.

*Dr. J. H. Stirling, Dr. Vera, and Philosophy in Europe.*

From Dr. Vera we learn that he expects to get out a new edition of his French translation of Hegel's Logic, "greatly enlarged, in fact nearly doubled in size. After the Logic, it



will be the turn of the Philosophy of Religion." The latter work has been announced as "in press" for several years, and has been anxiously looked for. It seems that the war set things back, and that Dr. Vera now intends to postpone the translation of the Philosophy of Religion for a year or two. He is still Professor at the University of Naples.

Dr. Hutchinson Stirling, author of the "Secret of Hegel," is publishing a series of Lectures on the Philosophy of Law in the Journal of Jurisprudence at Edinburgh. They were delivered to the members of the Juridical Society in November and December, 1871. The first of these is a very entertaining "Introduction to Philosophy in general," and the others unfold step by step, in a style such as only Dr. Stirling can write, the ideas of Rights in general, of Property, of Criminal jurisprudence. They furnish an exceedingly valuable contribution to Philosophical literature, and should be largely read in America now that so much thought is directed towards the foundation-ideas of government. Unless otherwise republished in this country, we propose to reprint these lectures in this journal, commencing with the October number. We are glad to learn also that there is a prospect of a publication of Dr. Stirling's critique of Buckle, in the North American Review. His strictures on Professor Huxley's Protoplasm, which have been republished in New Haven by Messrs. Chatfield & Co., are soon to appear in a second edition much enlarged. We hope to publish also a review of Berkeley, from the same pen, eventually.

Writing in the fall of 1871, Dr. Stirling speaks of the death of Dr. Ueberweg, and pronounces him the most earnest and sincere thinker of his time. His work on the History of Philosophy, translated for us by Professor Morris of Michigan University, we have already noticed. We are expecting soon the second volume, and shall again have an opportunity to speak of it. It seems that the place made vacant in the University of Königsberg by the death of Dr. Ueberweg, has just been filled by the appointment of Dr. A. J. Bergmann of Berlin, well known as the editor of the *Philosophische Monatshefte*. That periodical passes under the editorial charge of Dr. E. Bratuscheck, *docent* in the University of Berlin, whose articles in the *Phil. Monatshefte* have attracted much atten-

tion. In our next number we hope to give an account of the contents of the articles that have appeared in the last three volumes of that journal.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DIALECTIC METHOD OF HEGEL AND THE SYNTHETIC METHOD OF KANT AND FICHTE.

By A. E. KROEGER

There are two parties holding opposite judgments regarding the relation of Hegel's dialectic method to the method of Kant and Fichte's system of transcendentalism. It seems that the question should be considered settled by Hegel's own statement in his *History of Philosophy*, where he substantially avers that the method of Fichte's *Science of Knowledge* is the same as his own, just as he there modestly concedes to Schelling the contents of his system; he claiming for himself only the merit of being the first who fused the true absolute system with the true absolute method. But this declaration of Hegel's has not been considered satisfactory; and all recent historians of Philosophy are more or less at loggerheads with each other on this point. To settle the question it will, therefore, be necessary to examine the two methods; that is, to see how Fichte, following Kant, proceeds in his philosophizing, and how Hegel proceeds in his. For this purpose it is not necessary to consider beforehand whether or not philosophy can be true only in so far as its method is true, philosophy being in fact nothing but the absolute method; though it may not be out of place to state historically that both Fichte and Hegel agree upon this point, both answering in the affirmative.

Fichte, then, in all his various representations of the *Science of Knowledge*, and indeed in all his scientific writings, proceeds as follows:

He states, and calls upon his readers to verify it in contemplation, that in every act of thinking there are two ingredients, whereof neither one can be deduced from the other, but both of which claim equal validity; that hence every act

of thinking is a synthetical act embracing two opposites, and that it is the sole province of philosophy to discover and explain how this synthesis is possible; that is, how it happens that we must in every act of our mind hold two opposites, in part related and in part opposed to each other.

The problem of philosophy, therefore, is altogether, as Kant very correctly had stated before, to discover the absolute ground of all synthetical judgments.

Now this absolute final ground Fichte—as before him Kant—states to be this: the Ego, or an absolutely active self-conscious activity, could not be an Ego, could not be self-conscious of itself as such absolute activity, if there did not appear in every act of its self-consciousness also a non-Ego; the reason being this: an absolute activity could never become conscious of itself if it were not checked in its activity, and thus, as it were, thrown back into itself with what would now be a consciousness of both itself and a check. Now, having once named itself as absolute activity by the name Ego, it could certainly not look upon the check of that activity as also Ego, but would rather have to look upon and name it its opposite, non-Ego.

Coming thus to consciousness, it would, therefore, find as its primitive nature and act, as indeed that which constituted its nature and act, a synthesis of non-Ego and Ego; and this primitive and original synthesis could not otherwise than manifest itself in every other one of its acts.

What must be noticed here is the statement, that neither can the Ego be explained from the non-Ego, nor the non-Ego from the Ego; that neither is analytically contained in the other as part of it, but that both are in fact complete and utter opposites; that is, must be so conceived, and cannot be conceived otherwise. Their union, the union of the thesis of a pure Ego and the antithesis of a checking non-Ego, results in the synthesis of a self-conscious Ego; that is, of a rational absolute mind in a material limited body, or, more accurately expressed, in a system of such rational individuals, each one of which, as such a synthetic unity, is that very trinity which theologians by a fallacy of reasoning apply to the conception of the totality of the Egohood and call it the triune God.

Hegel's proceeding differs from the above synthetic in this,

that he does not concede, or at least does not seem to concede, this partly absolute oppositedness of the two elements of the synthesis; and looks only to their relatedness. Thus he does not say, that immediately together with the conception of Being another entirely opposite, though also related, conception of non-Being is joined when we think Becoming; but he says, or seems to say: that the conception of Being involves as one of its parts the conception of non-Being; that the latter conception can, therefore, be analytically gathered from the first; though, if he does so mean, it is not possible to see how Being could change into Becoming, since the element of non-Being would not alter the character of Being at all, and Being, after non-Being had been pointed out as one of its characteristics, would still remain simply Being and nothing else. If Hegel does not so mean, he has chosen a most unfortunate way of expressing himself; but his own averment in his History of Philosophy would, as we have said, seem to suggest that he did not so mean. If he did so mean, however, then there is a difference and a most vital one between Fichte's synthetic and Hegel's dialectic method, a difference which will now be apparent to every one.

It may be mentioned in passing, as perhaps of interest to those who have read Trendelenburg's criticism of Hegel's method in this Journal, that Trendelenburg's objection to the dialectic method—that it surreptitiously takes and applies the contemplation of *local* motion from empirical consciousness—is simply absurd. *Local* motion occurs between two bodies in space, and the conception of local motion can be applied, of course, to nothing else. Trendelenburg's criticism, therefore, implies that he considers the conceptions of Being and non-Being—which are alluded to by Hegel as moving in a dialectic way—as things in space; and one is tempted to ask him, whether he considers them of globular or triangular form, &c. The absurdity is clear. It is not from local motion that the general conception of motion issues: indeed, the very reverse is the case, the activity of thinking, being the primitive source of the conception of movement. And even in common language we thus speak of thoughts as moving, &c. Hegel is thus perfectly justified, and introduces no surreptitiously obtained conception when he speaks of a dialectic

movement as the equivalent for the sequence of certain conceptions in thinking. It is a strange evidence of the general superficiality of "thinkers" that such things should require notice: stranger still that this evident absurdity should have been considered by Trendelenburg a wonderful discovery, overthrowing the gigantic fabric of Hegel's *Logic*! But these continual misapprehensions and disputes make it all the more clear, how necessary for the exactness of a pure science is a system of signs to replace words, and leave it a matter of deep regret that Leibnitz, who had such a system projected, did not carry out his design, he being of all the great minds of science beyond doubt most peculiarly gifted to have given it best shape. The real objection, as already suggested, to the word "movement" in that famous paragraph of the *Logic* is this, that Hegel speaks as if the conceptions of Being and non-Being moved. Now, mere conceptions as they are, they of course cannot, in proper use of language, be said to move; but the thinking of them is, in all language, quite properly called a moving from one to the other. The question, however, whether Hegel meant this or not, does not involve any unauthorized making use of the conception of *local* motion, but simply the point, above discussed, whether Hegel meant his dialectic method to be the same as Fichte's synthetical method or not.

### BOOK NOTICES.

*The Dialogues of Plato*, translated into English, with Analyses and Introductions, by B. Jowett, M.A., Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford. 4 vols. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1871.

This reprint, which costs the student just one half the price of the original English edition, should be in every library, public or private. Moreover, every one should read it; many people own a copy of Plato, but how few read and understand him! Professor Jowett has spared no pains to make a free translation—one that seems vernacular English. It has immense advantages in this respect over any former translation. We commend the work to all interested in Philosophy. Let them read Emerson's essay on Plato in the "Representative Men," then Hegel's lecture on Plato in Vol. IV. of this Journal, and then read Jowett's translation, and study his Introductions.

*Die Rechtsstellung des Weibes innerhalb der Ehe.* Ein Vortrag von Max Eberhardt. Chicago: Meninger & Shick. 1871.

*Friedrich Ueberweg*, von A. Lange. [Eine Gedächtnissrede.] Berlin: Ernst Siegfried, Mittler & Sohn. 1871. [Sent us by Dr. Collyns Simon.]

*The Journal of Psychological Medicine: A Quarterly Review of Diseases of the Nervous System, Medical Jurisprudence, and Anthropology.* Edited by Wm. A. Hammond, M.D. Vol. 5, No. 4. October, 1871. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

This number contains among other articles an elaborate one entitled, "Medico-Legal Notes on the Case of Edward H. Ruloff; with Observations upon, and Measurements of, his Cranium, Brain, &c.; by Geo. Burr, M.D." In another, entitled "A Letter to the Editor on some Recent Contributions to Mental Science, Medical Jurisprudence, and Anthropology; by Geo. E. Day, F.R.S.," is given a very interesting account of Huxley's recent lecture on Bishop Berkeley.

*Das Verhältniss von Schule und Staat.* Hamburg, 1871. [Sent us by Dr. A. G. Todtenhaupt.]

*Ueber die Grundung eines Wissenschaftlichen Volks-Lehrer-Seminars unabhängig von Kirche und Staat.* Ein Gegenvorschlag gegen die beabsichtigte Grundung einer Hamburgischen Akademie, von A. G. Todtenhaupt.

*Schule und Staat.* Aus dem Französischen des Professor Tiberghien in Brüssel; übersetzt, von J. H. Hamburg: Wilhelm Jowien. 1871. [Sent also by Dr. A. G. T.]

*Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Phil. Kritik.* LIX Bandes, erstes und zweites Hefte. Halle: C. E. M. Pfeffer. 1871.

Contents of No. 1: I. Philosophizing—Extract from a Speech by *Prelate G. Mohring*. II. Contributions to the History and Criticism of Philosophy, noticed by Dr. Arthur Richter. III. Logic, or Science of Knowing with respect to the relation between Philosophy and Theology; its Outlines presented by Rudolph Seydel, D.Phil., &c.; reviewed by *Prof. Dr. c. Reichlin-Meldegg*. IV. Logic and Metaphysics, by Prof. Dr. Leonhard Rabus: Part 1st—Theory of Knowledge, History of Logic, System of Logic, together with a Chronological Survey of the Literature of Logic, and an Alphabetical Index to its Contents; reviewed by *Dr. Reichlin-Meldegg*. V. The Complete Logic: A Book for Schools and Students, compiled from the stand-point of Natural Science, and intended for a criticism of previous books on Logic, &c.: by Prof. Dr. J. Hoppe; reviewed by Dr. Reichlin-Meldegg. VI. *Psychologie Naturelle*: A Study upon the Treatment of Aliens and Criminals; by Dr. Prosper Despine; reviewed by F. A. v. Hartsen. VII. Speculative Anthropology looked at from a Christian-Philosophical Stand-point; by Dr. Carl Werner; reviewed by Prof. Dr. Sengler. VIII. The Doctrine of Berkeley: A short final reply to T. Collyns Simon, LL.D.; by *Prof. Ueberweg*. IX. Correction of Certain Statements in Ulrici's Defence; by *Dr. R. Hoppe*. X. Correction of the Foregoing "Corrections"; by *Dr. Ulrici*.

*Beiträge zur Kenntniss des Amerikanischen Schulwesens* [Review of the St. Louis School Report continued through five numbers of the *Gemeinnützige Wochenschrift*, published at Würzburg, Germany], by Prof. L. Grasberger.

*Bulletin of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters*, Nos. 4 & 5 (Feb. and July, 1871); published by the Academy, at Madison, Wis.

Contents: I. List of Officers of the Academy. II. Executive Proceedings of the Fourth Meeting. III. Scientific Communications presented at the Fourth Meeting. IV. Executive Proceedings at the Fifth Meeting. V. Scientific Communications presented at the Fifth Meeting. [Sent us by Dr. J. W. Hoyt, President of the Academy.]

*Jahres Bericht über die Dorotheenstaedtische Real-Schule.* 1870 and 1871.

The Report for 1870 contains, besides the school advertisement, a learned article by Dr. F. Frederichs, principal of the school, on Berkeley's Idealism. This is followed in the Report for 1871 by a discussion of the Phenomenal Idealism of Berkeley and of Kant, a contribution also by Dr. Frederichs. These articles belong to the wide-spread movement occasioned by the translation of Berkeley's chief work by Dr. Ueberweg and the polemical articles of Dr. Collvyns Simon, of which we have spoken in vol. v., p. 283, of this Journal.

*La Filosofia della Scuole Italiane.* Anno ii., vol. iii., disp. 1, 2 & 3; vol. iv., disp. 1 & 2. Firenze: M. Cellini. 1871.

*Contents No. 1*—I. Acts of the Literary and Philosophical Society: (a) The Future of Metaphysical Speculation; (b) Letter on the same topic. II. The Incapacity of the Human Will, and other Hypotheses of the Materialists (T. Collvyns Simon, LL.D.), being a Letter to Dr. Herzen, author of *Physiological Analysis of the Free Human Will*. III. Ethics of Positive Philosophy: Speculations on the Intention, the Moral Good, and the Useful (Prof. G. Barzellotti). IV. Philosophical and Literary Notice on Bergmann's *First Principles of a Theory of Consciousness* (Prof. Luigi Ferri).

*Contents No. 2*—I. Acts of the Literary and Philosophical Society: (a) Act of approval of three MSS.; (b) Influence of Philosophy on the German National Spirit (Dr. Giuseppe Desours, of Tournay). II. Philosophical Conversations (Prof. F. Bonatelli). III. Incapacity of the Human Will, and other Hypotheses of the Materialists (T. Collvyns Simon, LL.D.) IV. Analysis and Criticism of New Works; Literary and Philosophical Notices (Prof. Luigi Ferri).

*Contents No. 3*—I. Acts of the Literary and Philosophical Society: (a) Philosophical themes; (b) Literary themes; (c) The Philosophy of Religion—(1) The Infinite its own Limit, (2) The Conception of Life applied to God. (3) Reconsideration of the Conception of the Infinite, (4) The Real Relation of the Creator to the Created, (5) General Treatment of the Divine Attributes, (6) Conclusion. II. Incapacity of the Human Will, and other Hypotheses of the Materialists (T. Collvyns Simon, LL.D.) III. The Circle of Science (Profs. Bonatelli and Mamiani). IV. Analysis and Critical Notices of New Works; Literary and Philosophical Notices. V. Index to vol. iii.

*Vol. IV., No. 1*—*Contents*: I. Summary of Acts of the Society for the Promotion of Philosophy and Letters. II. Philosophical Conversations. III. Letter of T. Collvyns Simon to Dr. Herzen on the "Limitations of the Human Will, and other Hypotheses of Materialists." IV. Theory of Relation: (a) Reid's Doctrine and its Insufficiency; (b) Theories of contemporaneous English Psychologists; (c) The Facts of Perception newly Examined; (d) Other Distinctions solving the Difficulty and confirming the New Doctrine; (e) Objections Answered; (f) Facts of Reception. V. Ethics of Positive Philosophy (continued): VI. Analysis of New Works. VII. Philosophical and Literary Notices.

*No. 2*—*Contents*: I. Summary of Acts of Philosophical Society. II. Human Cognition. III. Notes on the Article on Relation and Perception. IV. Influence of Philosophy on the German National Spirit. V. Theory of the Objectivity of the Idea, by Count Terenzio Mamiani. VI. Analysis and Criticism of New Works.

WORKS OF C. A. WERTHER, DR. PHIL.

1. *Die Kräfte der Unorganische Natur in ihrer Einheit und Entwicklung.* Dessau, 1852.
2. *Was ist Lebenskraft? Versuch einer Antwort auf diese Frage.* Dessau, 1854.

3. *Lebens-Seelen-und Geisteskraft, oder die Kräfte der Organischen Natur in ihrer Einheit und Entwicklung. Erster Theil: Die Pflanze und das Thier.* Halle, 1860.
4. *Zweiter Theil: Der Mensch als Geistiges Individuum nach seiner Bildung und Entwicklung auf der Grundlage der Natur.* Nordhausen, 1867.

The above-named works constitute a complete sketch of Philosophy in outline. Commencing with the Inorganic, our author—after an introduction in which he justifies his method of investigation and discusses the various stand-points and categories used in a Philosophy of Nature—considers, *first*, the forces which constitute matter or manifest it, such as magnetism, electricity, chemical affinity, &c.; *second*, the forces which *move* matter. The former forces are the static ones that give form and shape to matter; the latter forces relate to motion as well in molecules as in masses.

Ascending from the Inorganic, Dr. Werther grapples with the problem: What is organism or vital force? Sharply discriminating this from the mechanical and physical realms of force, he comes to the wider and deeper idea that subordinates those spheres and exhibits itself as final cause.

The "Absolute force" he defines as self-determination. To this not merely the Inorganic and the Organic realms are necessary, but the realm of Mind. He traces step by step the organic forces through the life of the Plant and through that of the Animal until its elevation to consciousness. The struggle for self-revelation, checked in the lower forms, at length achieves its purpose.

A sketch of Man as a "pneumatic individual"—i.e. as a being of instinct, a mere soul—is followed by a portrayal of his higher life in the activities of thinking and willing. Thought and will are the polar manifestation of the psychical force, or, as he calls it, the "pneumatic" force. "As *thought*, the conscious activity represents the objectivated multiplicity in the unity of the subject; as *will*, it represents the unity of the subject in a determinateness of objectivated multiplicity." Thus they are two antithetic activities, inseparably connected and in continual reciprocal action. There are three stages of progress in the perfection of the soul-power. I. The thinking activity reaches only the phase of forming judgments, of joining predicates to subjects—the descriptive stage—while the corresponding development of the will manifests itself only in moving to realize purposes, i.e. simple ends and aims. It is the interaction of this stage of the will with that of the thinking that elevates it to the next higher, that of the *reflecting thinking* and the *willing in accordance with principles*. II. Here subjectivity begins to assert an equal right with objectivity. Thinking by its activity develops abstractions, and posits them as the truth of the objective. To will to realize a purpose is a free act; no inorganic or merely organic being can do this: only a being possessed of a soul can form purposes. But it is far in advance of that stage to be able to will one's action in conformity to principles. Through the mediation of this form of will with the thinking that reflects, the psychical power rises to the third and highest stage of development: III. The thinking activity of Reason and the activity of the Will for the realization of Ideals, are the highest antithesis of the soul-power. In the activity of Reason the antithesis of subject and object is reconciled, and objectivity comes to be a moment of subjectivity which proves itself the Absolute form. The thinking Reason stands in unity with Faith, and seizes the revelation of the Infinite Unity in the Finite by means of thought-representations, while Faith seizes the same through the living sacrifice of the individual to this Revelation. All thinking and knowing is brought to a unity; and thus *Science* is formed. The Will becomes *ethical* in



adopting as its principle the absolute ideal, and thus also becomes free. This ideal is self-determination. The three-fold combination of individuals gives rise to the manifestation of the Family, the State, the Christian Religion. The process of completely realizing this unfolds successively the course of human history. Arrived at this point, our author pauses and takes a rapid survey of the phases that enter now into this highest unity.

It will be observed that the peculiarity of Dr. Werther's exposition consists in uniting the theoretical and practical sides of Mind and treating their development as the result of reciprocal action. Other branches of the Hegelian school treat first the Theoretical and then the Practical. A certain resemblance to the popular methods in which subjects of natural science are treated, is also observable, and makes a vivid impression on the reader.

*La Morale nella Filosofia Positiva*: studio critico di Giacomo Barzellotti. Professore di Filosofia nel R. Liceo Dante di Firenze. Florence: 1871.

We have already spoken in this journal (vol. v., p. 94) of the great revival of Philosophy in Italy, and of the two centres of its activity, Florence and Naples. Among the most notable philosophical laborers in Florence is Professor Barzellotti, author of the critique above named. In his handling of the subject, one is very strongly reminded of Cousin's method. He investigates the ideas of *experience* and *law* as they have been presented in the Positivist school; then unfolds the two extremes of opinion on the subject of free will, and how the positivists essay a middle ground. Alexander Bain's analysis of the physical and psychological conditions accompanying volition is stated and criticised. John Stuart Mill's theory of volition passes next under review. The concepts of *cause* and *force* are investigated: "psychology becomes in the English school a natural history of the mind."

In Part Second the author investigates the subject of final causes and motives, sketching the history of discussion on this subject, and drawing distinctions between the *intuitive* and *utilistic* schools. Absolute obligation is contrasted with materialistic theories. The inductive system of morality, taught by the positivists and illustrated in the writings of Mr. Lecky, is well defined as regards its outcome. Theories of *happiness*, *utilitarianism*, *methods of investigation*, are discussed. The prevailing method in Germany after Kant is Reduction; in England after Bacon, is Analysis. The method of Reduction does not seek the relation of psychical activity to its organs—of Psychology to Physiology—but *the relation of the various forms of psychical activity to each other and to a common foundation, Feeling*. Association is the fundamental psychological law in the English school.

In Part Third our author takes leave of the English—having discussed sufficiently the old writers, Hobbes, Cudworth, Clarke, Locke, Butler, Hutcheson, Hume, Price, Paley, Brown, and Bentham, as well as the contemporary moralists, Mill, Bain, Spencer, and others. He turns now to the theory of Comte himself and the French positivists. Their system of "social physics" makes impossible any science of Character. The abstract universal of society annuls each individual as effectively as the abstract force of the correlationists destroys the identity of particular forces.

With some important remarks as to the future direction of investigation, the book closes.

*Introduzione alla Filosofia della Storia*: Lezioni di A. Vera, raccolte e pubblicate con l'approvazione dell'autore da Raffaele Mariano. Florence: 1869.

In this work the Philosophy of History is worked up with admirable intro-

ductions calculated to initiate the reader into all the great philosophical questions. It deserves to be translated into English as a primer of Speculative Philosophy.

*Compendium der Logik zum selbstunterricht und zur Benutzung für Vorträge auf Universitäten und Gymnasien.* Von H. Ulrici. (2d ed. improved and enlarged.) Leipzig: T. O. Weigel, 1872.

In the author of this work, Dr. Ulrici, is recognized one of the editors of the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik*, published at Halle. As may be supposed, the author embodies in this book the results of his investigations as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Halle. He claims in this work to have mapped out a reform in Logic in its trunk and limbs, and to have completed, for the first time, a firm foundation for the same. He combats, as untenable, not only Hegel's identification of Logic and Metaphysics, but also the more recent attempts of Trendelenburg and others to fuse logic with the theory of knowledge (or Psychology). He does this on the ground that before a theory of cognition or a system of Metaphysics can be treated, there must be a preceding investigation into the general laws, norms and forms of thought as such, and by this means the question is settled whether and how far we are justified to assume as belonging to us a faculty of cognizing things in respect to their metaphysical conditions.

*The Finite and the Infinite.* By Theophilus Parsons. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1872. (From Soule, Thomas & Winsor, St. Louis.)

*Contents:* What is Matter? The Belief in God; The Natural Intellectual Faculties; The Spiritual Intellectual Faculties; The Natural and Spiritual Affectional Faculties; The Idea of God; God an Infinite Person; Man as Immortal; Freedom; Our Life our own, and yet God's Life; What is the Preparation for another Life? The Providence of God; Revelation; Succession of Revelations; Correspondence; Ancient Churches; The Bible; First and Second Christian Revelations; Swedenborg; Spiritism; Who receive the Latest Revelation; The Word of God cannot pass away; Future Revelations; He comes with Power and with great Glory.

*The To-morrow of Death, or the Future Life according to Science.* By Louis Figuier. Translated from the French by S. R. Crocker. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1872. (From Soule, Thomas & Winsor, St. Louis.)

*Contents*—Chapters I. to XXIII.: Man the result of a triple alliance of Body, Soul, and Life; Death Analyzed; Where the Superhuman Body dwells; Reincarnation of the Wicked and of Infants; The Planets as Inhabited; Mercury, Mars, and Venus; Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune; Order of the Development of Life in the Planets—Vegetables, Animals, and Man; Attributes of the Planetary Man; The Superhuman after Death; The Sun the definitive Home of Souls that have reached the highest stage of the Celestial Hierarchy; The Solar Rays are Emanations of Spiritual Beings who dwell in the Sun; Sun-Worship among various Nations ancient and modern; Relations that Subsist between Ourselves and the Superhumans; The Soul of Animals; The Plant as a Living Being; Proofs of the Plurality of Human Existences and Incarnations; The innate Ideas of Locke [!!! p. 25], M. Figuier is made to say by the translator, "The English philosopher Locke immortalized himself by the discovery that the human understanding has ideas called "innate," that is, ideas that we bring with us into life"; and Dugald Stewart's principle of Causality, are explicable only on the hypothesis of a Plurality of Lives; Answer to Objections; Ethical Results of his Theory.

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IS POSITIVE SCIENCE NOMINALISM OR REALISM?

Do universals possess reality—or are particular things alone real? Are all general ideas to be held as simple names, *flatus vocis*, representations without content and without reality? Does the particular include all that exists, and is the general idea only a fiction formed for convenience of expression?

At first thought, it is a little strange that this old dispute should revive in our day amid the blaze of Positive Science and enlightened Baconian Induction. Has not this whole question been set at rest by the doctrine of “Conceptualism” advanced by our modern eclectic thinkers?

However clear and simple the answers may be to these questions if regarded in the light of the traditional Metaphysics of this country, we apprehend that our new thinkers—those who call themselves Positivists, or who rank under the banner of Herbert Spencer—are very nearly in a quandary. Their declarations at the outset are very unmistakably nominalistic. They regard the particular thing as alone real, and all general names as without corresponding reality. The reader of Spencer’s *First Principles* remembers the precise statement of chapter second, to the effect that conceptions are symbolic when general, and that they are real and true only in ratio of their application to the particular individual. But we are disappointed in these

men when we expect to find them consistent. The entire process of their scientific expositions has this general object in view: *the reduction of all particularity and individuality back to general terms, such as matter and force, or law.* They prove that there is no such thing as permanence of the particular—that it is only an immediate phase of a general process—that its only reality or existence is its vanishing (its beginning and ceasing)—that “the sole truth which transcends experience by underlying it, is the persistence of Force.” Thus, while claiming to be nominalists or conceptualists at the outset, they end in asserting, in the most explicit language, the reality of the universal. They would say that the concepts and names Force and Matter correspond to the most real of realities, while they are the most general and farthest removed from the realm of particularity.

That such realism as this is called pantheistic or materialistic, and is dreaded by spiritual or religious thinkers, makes the question all the more a vital one. That Religion can be defended at all only on the ground of the highest realism, must never be forgotten. Unless the “Real of all realities” is a Spirit—not an abstract Universal such as the correlationists hold, but a *concrete Universal* such as Plato and Aristotle held (the one virtually, the other explicitly)—Religion must necessarily be fetichism, and nothing above that.

But this position assumed by the new realists is so strange when viewed from the premises with which they set out, that it deserves a more definite exposition.

*Scientific Premises.*

Starting from the assumption that all speculation is vain, that there is no such thing as pure thought; or that if there is any pure thought, it is mere idle fancy; and holding that a knowledge of the true is obtained by means of the senses, and that its truth is measured by its exact correspondence to the particular facts as they exist in their separateness or isolation in the world; holding, moreover, that classification and generalization, the discovery of laws, is the legitimate occupation of science, although its results are symbolic or inadequate just in proportion to their generality; holding to these irreconcilable premises, they proceed to expound the doctrines of Positive Science.

*Scientific Results.*

1. Investigation of the so-called facts of the senses leads on all hands to the discovery that each fact is a passing phase of a larger fact. What one takes at first sight for a particular individual, is a phase in the manifestation of the individuality of some phenomenon of greater scope. All the marks, attributes, qualities and modes of "this particular individual" are placed there by the activity of a more general and more widely-inclusive individual process. It would be as absurd to attribute independent individuality to the color of this violet, which we know to depend on properties of the violet, and on earth, air, water and light, to say nothing of the structure of our senses. Its individuality is nothing; it is a *phase* of individuality, and its reality is all borrowed or secondary. What gives it reality lies behind it.

2. Science declares that all these material phenomena are manifestations of Force. The things which are sensuously perceived are only transitory phases in the ceaseless process of the play of forces. These forces are correlated in such a way that their constantly recurring and constantly annulled equilibrium is what is known as *matter*. But force is the only abiding; and it is not the abiding as particular forces,—each particular force loses its individuality and vanishes in another.

3. Thus particular individuality continues to recede before the analytic investigation of science. "The species lives, but the individual dies." Not only "this particular" of the senses dissolves into the particular forces, such as light, heat, electricity, magnetism, attraction, &c.: but each of these particular forces proves to be a mere vanishing phase in a process of force in general. Each of these particular forces exists only while in process of manifestation, and the process of manifestation is only the process of transition from an antecedent form of force to a subsequent one.

4. What we call the *reality* of a force, its perceptibility by our senses, is only its passage into another or its vanishing, its ceasing to be itself, its loss of individuality, its negation and annulment. Its reality and particularity is, then, only the destruction of that same reality and particularity.

5. The reality has, therefore, two sides, (*a*) origination and

(b) evanescence. (a) It originates in that activity of force which acts on a previous state, changing it to "this particular reality." (b) "This particular reality" is, in turn, immediately swallowed up by a like negative action of force. Only force in general abides. It acts continually, and its activity is both positive and negative—originating the particular by the same act that annuls the particular. Force in general causes the marks, properties, qualities, and attributes, of the particular reality, and at the same time it destroys them. The constant result is a phenomenal world, wherein the particular is perpetually beginning and ceasing without interval between the two sides of the process. The very reality itself is the vanishing thereof.

6. Thus Force in general is self-related, in the sense that its activity is always directed to the negating or annulment of the very determinations that it has caused. It destroys just what it originated. But its act of destroying is an act of originating new determinations. Force, therefore, is the source of all reality, and is the resistless might before which reality vanishes. Force is thus something more than reality; it is reality *and* potentiality—it is *Actuality* (the *ἐνέργεια* of Aristotle). Thus we arrive at something more real than reality, taking the latter in the sense of the existing, or transient, particular things. Force as thus seized is a Universal, and is the real in all realities. In fact, it requires the production and annulment of the entire round of phenomenal realities to completely manifest this Universal or Actual, which is called Force by the scientific man.

7. Force in general is not any particular, real force; for such real force is a particularized form—a limitation of force in general. Hence universal force manifests its superior generality by negating every particular force. It is of the utmost importance to see this point. *It is involved in the very being or reality of a particular force that the very limitation or determination which constitutes it is at the same time the activity of the general force engaged precisely in annulling the particular force.* What constitutes it destroys it. Light, for example, shines in its diffusion or transition to its opposite. Every force in specific action is passing from a tension to an equilibrium—i.e. from one specific form to another.

8. Under the process of correlation, wherein real forces lose their individuality, only abstract or general force abides. This may be called IDEAL force when contrasted with particular real forces; it is cognized only by inference, and not by immediate sensuous perception. It is a really-existent universal or generic entity — an Actuality whose manifestation is the correlation of forces. The particular forces are *its* reality, but not their *own*; for their manifestation is their destruction, but both phases give evidence of the reality of the Universal. In the entire round from one force through all the others back to the same force again, we have the successive annulment of all the characteristic distinctions of the several forces, and thus we have left force in general as the pure negative might whose constitution or nature is self-made by its activity in the play of forces. Its universal nature — its ascent out of particularity — refusing to be limited to a special form — appears in the negative side of the process, wherein it perpetually annuls special characteristics. Its positive affirmative side appears in the perpetual production of the special out of the negation of (old forms of) the same.

9. Wherein this Universal force, which is a self-determined, differs from the thinking activity or Mind (*ἐντελέχεια*), is a profitable inquiry. But the sole point we had in view here was simply to show the new doctrine of Realism now arising in place of the dismal nominalism and stifling conceptualism in vogue.

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## THEORIES OF MENTAL GENESIS.

By JOHN WEISS.

The later scientific method derives the conscience from selected experiences of the useful and agreeable. In the finest minds the moral sense is only the clarified residue of the experiences of people in learning to live safely and comfortably with each other. It sums them up, but can add nothing to them. It becomes, like a family resemblance, a permanent trait acquired by inheritance. A fresh experience may compel a fresh adjustment, and the moral sense can be

modified from without by a social exigency, but it has attained to no independent power to force its own adjustment upon experience. It is never conscious of an exigency of its own, which may transcend experience, and dictate to it; such a faculty is as inconceivable as that a fountain should rise higher than its source. Acts of moral heroism are suggestions of an ultimate utility which persuade the individual to sacrifice himself. But what is the origin of such suggestions which contradict the average sense derived from human experience? The scientific method insists upon its derivation of conscience from empirical observation, yet proceeds to explain transcendent morals which reform the race and abolish any wrong that average experience has incorporated in its social system, by endowing certain individuals with the capacity to conceive of a more beneficent system, to anticipate the future, to sacrifice peace, the feeling of approbation, the immediate security of society, life itself, for the sake of a finer idea of Right. These individuals are moved thereto, perhaps, by seeing outrages, or by suffering from them. But what impels a man who suffers from a wrong which is upheld by society, to increase his suffering by protesting against it in behalf of other men? Every feeling of the useful and the agreeable would counsel him to keep his suffering and that of his fellows at a minimum. Experience has gradually founded the system which surrounds him: it can no more furnish him with the seeds of his revolt than the nut of a beech can provide the acorn for an oak. When the empirical method is held strictly to its own logic, this absurdity is perceived, of something resulting from objective experience different from all the objects which constituted that experience. A state of morals at any epoch is only the state of comfort, happiness, usefulness, and mutual approbation of the majority; it is an average attained by the exigencies of the people who are forced to live together. Logically that average is insurmountable; but practically it is constantly surmounted, and society is compelled to assume a higher average by men of a forlorn hope who propose a conception of religion, of worship, of human rights and happiness, which nowhere exists, and which could not therefore be suggested by empirical sensations. They are frequently men



who conceive these things from afar, without the stimulus of personal suffering, quite removed from that into calm regions of meditation. They emerge from the solitudes of thought to proclaim the advent of a fresher and more just society: but the sense of justice, the instinct of order, devastates the things that men hold dearest, and, if the thinkers are obstinate, demands their life as a sacrifice to existing order. One thing is "said by them of olden time"; but these men, the products of no time at all, step out of a purer conception, and are heard, "But *I* say unto you." What an unaccountable phrase if morals are nothing but the silt which time brings down and deposits. There must be somewhere existing an Absolute Righteousness, the inspirer of every more righteous future, as there must exist a Plan of Absolute Intelligence, the continuous cause of every developing epoch of creation. The hero of Right and Absolute Religion is not maddened by suffering into forgetfulness of self, but possessed by a higher Self which his fortunate structure invites into him and to which he responds. Or, shall we suppose that his structure develops an exceptional Self? At any rate, the empirical method does not account for him, because he is essentially different from all the materials and sensations which it has to work with to produce notions of utility and social approbation. We may concede that such results may be derived from such materials; but the burden of showing the genesis of prophets and reformers rests with those who would restrict us to these materials alone.

In Mr. Huxley's book, entitled "More Criticisms on Darwin," I find the following paragraph: "Assuming the position of the absolute moralists, let it be granted that there is a perception of right and wrong innate in every man. This means simply, that when certain ideas are presented to his mind the feeling of approbation arises, and when certain others, the feeling of disapprobation." I should suggest to Mr. Huxley that he would more correctly say, *the feeling of approval*; that is, the mind approves of the right idea which it perceives. The word *approbation* includes a sense of approving one's self; but this may be, and generally is, absent from a simple perception of Right. Mr. Huxley's mistake is clear in his very next sentence, where he says: "To do your

duty is to earn the approbation of your conscience, or moral sense; to fail in your duty is to feel its disapprobation." Of course: but the question is of simple perception of an idea of a right act and of a wrong act; the idea of doing either personally is not involved. So that there can be an absolute perception of an act as right or as wrong, pure and simple, without any mixture of personal satisfaction or pain. The unbiased moral sense can simply recognize right and wrong, as the mind perceives that two and two make four; both recognitions are an organic necessity. If the recognition of a right thing is reflected on, then approval of it arises: a feeling closely bordering upon the mental satisfaction which accompanies the perception of truths and facts of the exact sciences. But the pleasure and pain of self-approbation and disapprobation cannot arise until the Self transfers or fails to transfer its moral perception into private action.

So that there is something in man *besides* the "something which enables him to be conscious of these particular pleasures and pains."

Now the *origin* of this moral Something is a distinct question. It may have descended from obscure traits of anticipatory moral action which reign in the animal world. Transferred into human and social circumstances, they may have filtered through a developing sense of the useful and the salutary, till they were deposited in average habits of behavior. But these traits reach at length in the finest brains a capacity of being self-perceived as immutable morality, distinct from motives of utility, or of pleasure and pain, whether they travelled manward by those routes or not. There is no objection to the theory that they did, until it undertakes to insist that they have not emerged from those routes upon a broad land of a Conscience which transcends all selfish feelings, to sacrifice them to a more arduous Right yet unattained, whose attainment may involve the hero of Conscience in ruin.

The latest scientific method derives the Imagination, as it does the Conscience, from accumulated sensations. But its language here struggles painfully to bring its phrases up to the level of the whole function of Imagination. It is quite inadequate to say that a brain well compacted with images

derived from natural objects, spontaneously creates the associations between them and human moods, passions, and emotions; that a sense of symmetry and beauty, a feeling for landscapes, a power to evolve them out of the crude assemblage of natural features, a gift of constructing all the sensations derived from life and nature into the sublimity of poetry and song, results from the number and variety of these sensations taken into a temperament of sensibility, where they are moulded, fused by personal passion, and express cerebral felicity of structure. These phrases mix up the raw material in which the poet, artist and composer work with other phrases which are assumptions that it also generates their working faculty. That is the very point involved. No doubt the poet has received a multiplicity and variety of sensations. The difference between him and other men is first a capacity to receive them; second, a capacity to transform them into his own personality; third, a capacity to express them, thus transmuted, with a rhythmical flow that involves the whole of Nature and man in its course, and converts Nature into a metaphor of his private vitality. No number of empirical sensations derived from Nature, no experience of mankind, no recollection of its history, can account for this result. A brain of rare structure incorporates a world, but gives it back to us another world; or, rather, the world's secret is fathomed and betrayed: we see it not as it always seemed to us, but lifted into a passionate and symmetrical vitality, which transcends every empirical sensation, and is, in fact, its reason for being: and that is something which mere sensation cannot supply. Held to strict logic, the materialist has no right even to the phrases he employs in speaking of this subject.

H. Taine says that there is a fixed rule "for converting into one another the ideas of a positivist, a pantheist, a spiritualist, a mystic, a poet, a head given to images, and a head given to formulas. We may mark all the steps which lead simple philosophical conception to its extreme or violent state," as in the passage which he quotes from Sartor Resartus, beginning, "generation after generation takes to itself the Form of a Body, and, forth issuing from Cimmerian Night, on Heaven's mission appears." "Take the world as science shows

it," continues Taine. "it is a regular group, or, if you will, a series which has a law; according to science it is nothing more. As from the law we deduce the series, you may say that the law engenders it, and consider this law as a force. If you are an artist, you will seize in the aggregate the force, the series of effects, and the fine regular manner in which the force produces the series." In this connection Taine evidently recalls the novels of Balzac, who develops the character of various human passions as primitive forces, which appear in objective facts of men and women, who are to be observed, without praise or dispraise, as beings who develop organically their whole moral disposition, and whose joy or grief may be inferred according to the judicious rule laid down by Hegel, that every work of art depends for its moral upon the person who is studying it. Elsewhere Taine shows how Thackeray, for instance, violates this rule. "To my mind," continues Taine, "this sympathetic representation is of all the most exact and complete; knowledge is limited as long as it does not arrive at this, and it is complete when it has arrived there. But beyond, there commence the phantoms which the mind creates, and by which it dupes itself. If you have a little imagination, you will make of this force a distinct existence, situated beyond the reach of experience, spiritual, the principle and the substance of concrete things." By the simple intensification of this quality, the metaphysician and the mystic are evolved. But notice here how Taine has smuggled in the phrase, "if you have a little imagination," as if that faculty were something excrementitious, whose products are what alimentation abandons and expels. It occurs to us to inquire, at the lowest, if imagination may not be a mode of force: if so, it must be taken into the account of mental development, where it appears to be something quite as positive as any passion which Balzac describes. It is then a legitimate object whose products cannot be rejected merely because they deposit in the mind a sense of Spirit. They push out a horizon filled with images and correspondences which are different from visible things, and which those things, left to themselves, could not procreate, any more than a garden of flowers could impregnate itself. A viewless wind must stir the celibate stalks—a ranging bee

must make its geometric cell an excuse for these promiscuous marriages. Here is the point where the scientific method, which is complemented by Taine's artistic method, fails to account for all the facts that a universe provides. As soon as the word Spirit appears, or phrases hinting at the Invisible put in their claim, or a capacity that transcends inherited effects is supposed, the empirical method disclaims it all, as Conscience is explained to be the cumulative result of experiences of utility. Yet the scientific method itself is indebted to the faculty of imagination. That is a twofold faculty: it performs two functions.

First, it anticipates subsequent epochs of scientific interpretation by incessant proclamations of the essential unity of all things. Its instinct is for similarities; it floats at so great a height that objects appear blended, but the horizon from that height is so enlarged that a hemisphere of objects is spread out. It selects on one meridian the counterpart of an object upon another, though it may skulk, and imitate the color of its neighborhood, hoping not to be swooped upon and assimilated. Its prey runs in forests and multiplies in all seas. The ocean is a saucer, and its bottom scarce skin deep. And the distances which lie within the galaxy are sanded with the gold dust of its imagery. The firmament is a solid floor on which this sense of unity can walk.

This instinct appears first in poetry, where Nature is rifled of all the features that can correspond to our emotions, or serve as symbols of our thought.

"The forest is my loyal friend;  
Like God it useth me."

And like God we use the forest. Its million leaves dance in the anticipation which our mind has that this "sense sublime of something interfused" will turn out to be the identity of law and object, of the creature and the Creator, of the scenery and the seer. And all the images of the Poet, so far from being the bastards of an irresponsible impulse which ravishes an idiotic universe, are the healthy children of the only realism that dare aspire to his feathered hand. See it tremble in moments of conception! God remembers His rapture. There is not an object which is not a passion—

not a passion which does not overtake itself in objects. What is my thought like? Whatever it be like, that is my thought, or else it could not be like it. How irrational and fantastic seems this conclusion to which the imagination leaps with the faith of a child in his "make believe"! How futile this hysteric passion which mounts to the eyelid and inundates the cheek at the happy rashness of some image that abolishes time and space, and makes the dirty earth a lens! We put our eye to it. Thou Deity, our eyes have met!

There is no sense in this transubstantiation of poetry, except to the senseless communicants, until the epoch of scientific Synthesis arrives, and the imagination is justified in ransacking the universe for symbols. Synthesis is imagination secularized. I mean that every one of the old symbols, the old confidences with Nature, the old obscure sympathies, the artless pretences that objects are personal and vital, and all related through the observer, are now proved to be the mind's expectation that there is but one kind of intellect, but one object, and but one law or mode of divine manifestation. Synthesis builds a hive for imagination to dwell in: the structures planned by the original Geometer are filled with myriad meadows of sweets distilled to sweetness.

This leads me to say that, secondly, the imagination sometimes anticipates, at any existing epoch of information, a subsequent epoch, when all the facts collected up to that date justify the anticipation. They are interpreted by a law, or by a mode of Force which put them forth. They arrive at length in sufficient number, and in relations obvious enough, to vindicate the previous divining of the imagination. Hardly a great man, from Pythagoras downward, can be mentioned who did not have fore-feelings of the genuine scientific direction, in Number and mathematical relation, in the qualities of Motion and their application to planetary phenomena, in the sphericity of the earth and stars, in the law of musical intervals, in the applications of the arc and conic sections, in the position of the earth in the solar system. Before the facts were in, the method was surmised; sometimes the law itself was hinted at, and imperfectly formulated. Now, no unconscious cerebration, or automatic sorting of impressions derived from the number and similarity of facts, can promulgate

or anticipate a law, because that is something essentially distinct from Object. There may be simultaneousness in the appearance of law and object; we may admit that the two are really one, a moment in which identity appears, a focus of correlation. But there is not any feature of this intimacy which can proclaim itself; that is not done for a long time, nor until an independent mental faculty appears of such a divining nature that it is not at any epoch a common human faculty. It is the result of rare structural qualifications, which recur to Creation with the gift that made creation possible, with a power to repeat by a sense of Cause the logic that caused, to create a mental synthesis that sweeps all observation into the unity of a Law, to show that all the sciences are Protean moods of one eternal moment of correlation, to speak at length in human language the plan which without speaking planned. That ineffable creative word becomes flesh in the divinings of imagination. They precede any collection or arrangements of objects, just as infinite Will must have preceded its own going into objects. Or, if Will and Object be continually identical, it is not in consequence of Object. We cannot eradicate or explain away that aboriginal habit of the scientific imagination to ask *Why?* as the child does; and to answer, *Because!* as the child does. "Of such is the kingdom of Heaven." Object cannot ask nor answer, because it cannot originate. But the intellect does not wait till all the facts are in, any more than the divine Mind did in order that the facts might be created.

Luther said, "the principle of marriage runs through all creation, and flowers as well as animals are male and female," before botany was dreamed of, or the principle of vegetable life divined. This was an anticipation as remarkable as that of Swedenborg, who clearly posited the nebular hypothesis before he or any other man had an inch of standing ground to show for it.

Now, if at any epoch the finest brains—those, namely, whose synthetic method is rarefied by imagination—are only deposited by empirical contact with the world, so that their state of intelligence is nothing but juxtaposition of facts, and their structure nothing but a result of microscopic packing of sensations, such brains could not discharge the functions of

which they are conscious. The problem is to build a brain. Let us build it after the fashion of the materialist. The animal kingdom slowly elaborated the cerebral matter, and roughly mapped out the relation of its parts. Nature, cautiously feeling her way from species to species, from simple to complex forms, from a dot of plasma to the complicated lobes which respond to external circumstances and record them, contributes the whole of the process to the progenitors of mankind. What had their brain become by that time? It was an agglutination of sensations. What must have been the result of the first sensible impression which was made upon the earliest rudimental nerve-matter? That question is answered by the discovery that the nerve-matter was a part of the objective world which produced the impression. It did not lose or modify its character by being eliminated from that world; it was still one of its discrete forms, and identical in substance. Then the object which impressed it and the impression were identical. The object was the sensation. There is no infinitesimal rift into which you can thrust your surmise of a difference and pry apart a sameness into duality; that is, into the supposition of an object to impress and an object to be impressed—one to become by means of that impression something different in kind from the object that impresses. Brood upon that primitive relation of plasma to all the rest of elemental matter. You cannot hatch it into a different kind of vitality by merely saying that plasma was a more highly organized matter. You cannot establish a schism in matter by determining grades of organization. Every grade preserves, prolongs, embodies the original identity in which it was contained; just as oxygen by aërating the blood impresses it with the character of oxygen, but does not liberate it from the materiality which they both share. A nerve-sensation is not a leap from Object into Subject.

If it is not, as the materialist alleges, then it makes no difference how many sensations the accumulating brain receives and registers. Their number cannot change their quality. On the long route of developing mankind there is no station where independent mentality may step on board. The train stops for refreshment, wood, and water. But the food and the fuel still correspond to their own motive power and digestive



ability. Stomach and food, brain and object, are convertible expressions. All objective circumstances remain unaltered; nerve-matter accumulates because sensations do. The first word of human speech, the first musical cadence, the first smatter of the natural language of human emotions on the face, the first prattling of social intercourse, the first fumbling for a tool of bone or flint, the first sparkle kindled in the dry pith of the fennel—all these rudiments of society were only the sensations of Sensation, the objectivity of Objects. The brain was but another object set up by the concurrence of objects, a self-registering world in the compass of a skull. Even if the cerebral capacity should cease to expand, while the perceptions continued to accumulate, it never can be filled; for the method of packing them is economical of room. If a drop of water is capable of containing 500,000,000 animalcules endowed with locomotive limbs, there must be room enough in any brain for any number of objective residues. But so long as the world does not swerve from its own objectivity and change its climate, so long does the human brain continue to be its odometer, or automatic tally.

“The *Holothuriæ* living in the South Sea, which feed upon coral sand, spontaneously eject their lungs and intestine through the anus when they are transferred to clear seawater; then they construct new bowels corresponding to the new conditions.” But Object does not transfer the human brain into the element of Subject, so that it can void its assimilative structure, and set up the liver, lungs and lights of Subjectivity.

I think this is a correct presentation of the latest materialism, which derives all mental functions from an automatic system of storage of objective impressions. But its advocates have not yet looked in the glass of their own theory. I have tried to reduce it to the absurdity which lies latent in it. It is this. It has nothing but objects to start from, nothing but them to accumulate, and yet it assumes to arrive at something which is not object; for instance, its own capacity to make any assumption at all, and to deny that the capacity demonstrates independent mentality. It will deduce and presume; something which a skull commensurate with the sky, and crammed with objectivity, could never do. It will refuse

to a human being an independent personality: something which nothing but such a personality could do. It started with speechlessness, and had, of course, nothing but agglutinated dumbness to end with: yet it invents words, and commits to them its affirmations and denials; lends them to the poet, who makes whole landscapes share the breath of their life; turns them over to the prophet, who puts them in his thwarts, casts loose from actual states, and pulls into the possible and the desirable: yields them to the synthetic imagination, and hears its own best guesses before it has proclaimed them, and its own experimental method suggested before objects could muster strong enough to raise a whimper; consigns them to the moral sense, and is refuted by a style of speech which transcends the latest moment of utility and social advantage, pronounces in divine men their own death-warrant, and sighs out selfishness upon a million crosses. Was that bit of plasma, then, nothing but one object more in a world full? or, was it an anvil upon which objective impact flew into a spark? Now a myriad hammers of the many-handed Cosmos crash through our skull, and we see stars—abysses full of them! Is it an optical illusion? They appear to attain orbits—they move in definite and harmonious relations—they create distance, deepen it with perspective: flat objectivity is broken up as a thinkable Universe comes pondering through.

Let me have recourse to an illustration.

A planetary motion is the result of two causes: first, a force that acts in the direction of a tangent; second, a force that attracts. What happens when the mind has observed that there are these two forces? Something which discovers their laws. This may be an inductive process, derived from prolonged and numerous calculations, adjustments, and corrections, based upon as many planetary directions as can be observed. Then suppose we wish to ascertain the motion of a planet which is submitted to the influence of these laws. That is a deduction based upon calculation. There is an astronomical duplication of the planetary facts, a mental rehearsing of orbital motions. The facts recur to their Cause through our intellect. Their mere objectivity is not competent to achieve this result, which is something causative, and

therefore essentially different from themselves, which are caused. They are occasions for addressing, stimulating and developing in us a quality which is not themselves, not their counterpart, but which is identical with the quality which caused them. They stand between, and could as soon have originated cause behind them as our causality beyond them. What is the mental fact which takes place when this mediate Object recurs to Subject? Something besides cerebral registering of the succession of sensations produced by the phenomena. That only succeeds in confirming succession or simultaneousness. We call the mental fact Deduction. But that is only a word, and not an explanation. It does not put us into possession of the actual occurrence when objects are mentally fitted with the laws of their causes. It does not explain the nature of that mental moment. To say that it is the result of cerebral movement and waste, of changes in the grey matter in the brain, does not explain it. That is only a dynamical accessory.

In like manner, what happens when an imaginative person, seeing some features of a landscape, or some combinations of light, sky, sea, color, at morn or sunset, invests the scene with his own personality? In fact, the combination called a landscape exists nowhere; it is a pure ideal construction of his own. The scene without is only a palette or a pot of paint. A poetic symbol, a simile which encloses a trait of nature in the amber of thought or emotion, is a mental process unaccountable on any theory of empirical accumulation of sensations.

But we seldom find a materialist who is willing to accept a statement of his method which shows that it really starts with a term that is incapable of starting. Bald matter is impotent to proceed except into fresh forms of matter; and even that process requires that Force should be assumed. And something has to make that assumption. That assuming faculty cannot be merely a form of matter, for no thing can step outside of itself and become what is not Thing. No number of things can do that, though the sensations produced by them accumulate for centuries. They may be irritants, as a drop of acid on a frog's bare muscle after his head is cut off; but they cannot conceive that they irritate, any

more than the frog can conceive that he is irritated. They cannot formulate their unconscious function of exciting our senses.

What does the materialist say when his empirical method is boned in this way, and sinks on the floor of creation a helpless huddle of Object, every articulation and vertebra of his own mentality withdrawn from it? He disclaims the result, cannot tolerate being defrauded of his own analytic and classifying skill, and declares against materialism in that sense. But it has no other sense. The moment he declares against it, he declares in favor of an intellectual perception of an objective sensation, that is, in favor of something which Object cannot generate. His own idealism rises against its jailer, and breaks out of prison in this declaration.

This ought to startle him into making a more distinct definition of the word Matter than he has yet undertaken. He uses that, and the word Object, in the ordinary sense; but he will not recognize all that it connotes when it is pressed to ultimates. And it is astonishing that he can invent such words as Vitality, Force, Correlation, to account for phases of objects, elemental modes, conditions of existence, without feeling compromised. He is obliged to assume something which is anterior to objects and their phenomena, anterior to the sensations produced by them; he speaks of correlation, but says nothing about something previous which does the correlating. If that something be another objective condition, a more tenuous tenuity, it involves the necessity of something still beyond, since mere condition cannot conditionate itself, and no thing can do itself. So that, sooner or later, the words employed by the empirical observer justify an ultimate ground of Being, an absolute Cause; and that, too, justifies Cause in the observer, for Being goes into Object, and not Object into Being.

Perhaps the materialist will take refuge in the Hegelian phrase, "Matter is Being outside of Itself," in order to endow Matter with a causative capacity, and secure perpetual vitality to its plastic germs. Then he may suppose that objective phenomena, in their gradual achievement of the human brain, lent it their primitive endowment as Being outside of Itself, and made of it another animate object. But what becomes

of Being outside of Itself when this object disappears, is disintegrated, ceases to be a focus of Being? It either must recur to Being in Itself, or must be correlated in some mode of Force. Both suppositions make the human intellect only a phenomenal phase of Absolute Being; it is only caused matter, it is on the footing of every other object, its root imbibes the identity of Object and Being, its self-consciousness is only an increase of animateness, but not a differentiation of it into Person. It invents the phrase, to be sure—claims to have or be a self—and that the unconscious animal, reaching man's estate, comes to the line where consciousness begins; man separates to that extent from the world of Object, because Object has been Being all the time. But if it has been Being all the time, one of two things must be true, either that self-consciousness resided all along the route in organic objects, or at no point of it at all; the reputed consciousness of Self is only a phenomenon of Object.

Perhaps the materialist will thank us for such a reduction of the Hegelian phrase to another form of Matter, because it makes Soul and Person impossible on any terms; and perhaps the idealist, discontented with any style of the doctrine of Evolution, will be driven to the notion that there is outside of us an ocean of germinal soul-monads which become allied with human structures.

There are insuperable objections, lying mainly in the direction of the facts of inheritance, to this attempt at spiritualism. In the meantime, the Doctrine of Evolution cannot be dispensed with. The burden does not rest upon us to indicate the point in time and the method of appearing of independent mentality. But we can show that Object can propagate only Object; nor that without something assumed which Object cannot propagate.

Let us take, however, a word which the materialist is competent to invent and is obliged to use—Vitality. He must assume it in spite of the objectivity of every point of his empirical method. Then, in the interest of Idealism, we suggest, taking a statement used by us in another place, "whether there can be any germinal soul-substance except the mysterious force which we call Vitality wherever we see it in the human state. It went into creation allied with

all the germs which have subsequently taken form. It carried everywhere a latent sensibility for the creative law out of which it came. It swept along with a dim drift of the Personality that first conceived and then put it on the way to self-expression. It mounted thus by the ascending scale of animals, and its improvements in structure were preparations to reach and repeat Personality, to report the original consciousness of the Creator that He was independent of structure. At length it became detached from the walls of the womb of creation, held only for nourishment by the cord of structure till it could have a birth into individualism. Then the interplay of mind and organism began, with an inherited advantage in favor of Vitality. Now Vitality, thus developed and crystallized into personality, tends constantly back towards its origin. The centrifugal movement through all the animals is rectified by the centripetal movement in man. The whole series of effects musters in him to recur to an effecting Cause."

Prof. Hæckel of Jena, in his *Biological Studies*,\* makes the following statement: "Protoplasm, or germinal matter, also called cell-substance or primitive slime, is the single material basis to which, without exception and absolutely, all so-called 'vital phenomena' are radically bound. If the latter are regarded as the result of a peculiar vital force independent of the protoplasm, then necessarily also must the physical and chemical properties of every inorganic natural body be regarded as the result of a peculiar force not bound up with its substance."

Very well, why not? Even the vague motions, like the incoherent simmer of a crowd of people on a great square, which take place in the molecules of the densest substance, are dumb gropings of some Force, arrested for the present in the substance, and not to be detected transgressing its limits. But something is there which shares and testifies to a universal tendency towards evolution into other substances and into organic forms. Physical and chemical forces attest the presence of Vitality, as well as the mental functions which use the structural results of those forces. Something

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\* See Toledo Index, April 29, 1871.

independent of the material basis must have endowed it with its movements and qualities. It certainly could not have originated itself or its forces. Something anterior to the material basis must include and transmit a tendency of Vitality towards mental and moral functions, which are at once independent of the basis and yet closely allied to it.

Let us observe now if any contribution may be made to idealism from another quarter. The empirical method has not busied itself much with the phenomena of musical sensibility, though, to be consistent after including the imagination in its genesis of mind from external sensations, it ought to construct the sense of Harmony and the inventive genius of the composer in the same way, since imagination plays so large a part therein. Some physical facts which at first threaten to support a pure empiric origin for mental functions, turn out upon cross-questioning to belong to the other side of the case, and to contribute toward some more ideal statement.

The German Helmholtz, who has made some profound studies of the laws of Harmony, in his examination of the structure of the human ear, found that the cochlea, or snail-formed cavity, contained a fluid, across which three membranes were thrown—an upper, middle, and under. In the middle compartment he discovered innumerable microscopic disks, lying next each other like the keys of a piano: one end of each of them is attached to the vessels of the auditory nerve, the other end to the outstretched membranes. These disks are the sensitive points which receive the vibrations of musical instruments, and transmit them to the brain in the form of notes and tones. A single string will give off different vibrations from its upper and its middle section. Does the ear solve the sound of a complex vibration made by these waves of different length, or does it receive the sound as a whole? Answering this, Helmholtz says that the physical ear funds the wave-forms into a sum of simple waves, which is the result of their concurrence; since any wave-form you please can be constructed out of a combination of simple waves of different lengths. And as in the instruments, so in the ear, the ground tone wakes the corresponding upper tone.

When vibrations play upon the disks in the ear, it is as if

they played upon banks of keys; and the first physical impressions are produced, sorted, combined, and then transmitted as so much seasoned material to be used in manufacturing music. Then occurs the wonderful moment when Something beyond these microscopic feelers digests the prey they catch into human moods and emotions. What leaps the genius takes, through and across what an unbridged abyss, upon these stepping-stones of disks, to gather the waifs and strays that float upon the manifold sea of Harmony! There is no such startling proof that Nature has at length developed a transcending Person in mankind; perhaps whole races died for it, dissonances and partial chords, or constructed upon vicious intervals, before Harmony could respond to its own laws. At length an essential differentiation seems to have taken place, an abstraction which compels sensations to subserve its subtlest emotions. For at one end of this process is nothing but the disks vibrating in their fluid: at the other end is something rarely and radically different—the gamut of the human heart, the symphony upreared by intellect and feeling, the song exhaling into the mist that sheathes the eye, the lyric whose silvery trumpets summon bravery and nobleness from every drop of blood.

Now, atmospheric vibrations and the structure of the ear enclosing the microscopic disks are the objects which provide empirical sensations. The temperament, culture and inherited susceptibility of the musical composer's brain collect and organize these sensations into the modes of harmony, and reject all dissonance. But when, and by which of the two parties in this transaction, was the earliest step taken toward such a complicated result? There was a time when there was nothing but an atmosphere capable of vibrating, and nothing but an ear capable of receiving the accidental throng of natural noises. There was a time when the first fibre of a plant, the first tense string of some creeping vine, twanged to some chance touch: when the wood of the forest first revealed its resonant capacity, when the dried reeds first sighed and whistled in the wind. This was all the appeal which Nature had to make. Did it originate the sequence of melodies and construct the theory of harmony? What is a dissonance? Is it merely a physical repugnance of the disks for interfering and



contrarious vibrations? Whence, then, the repugnance of the disks? There are tribes of men whose ears have not been furnished with it. There are civilized Indo-Germanic people who cannot tell a chord from a discord. It is not credible that the crude objectivity of natural vibrations gradually selected out of Nature a harmonious ear. Nature has no harmony which could effect such a selection; she has never sorted and combined and weeded out her noises. She is unisonous, monotonous, or full of jar and clash; she has no art to reconcile the voices of the sea, the air, the birds of the forest: each creature has its note and its key, and the air itself is a Babel of cross-purposes. The empirical sensations produced by modern music are drawn from things which vibrate by a law that the things do not possess, and never could have suggested. Harmony has been imposed from within upon their isolated qualities; and an orchestra, so far from being an induction, is an intuition. The Composer listens to its combinations before they are played. His subjectivity has imparted to every instrument its peculiar quality by gradual selection among the woods, reeds and metals of Nature, and by discovery of the isolated shapes which correspond best to atmospheric conditions. His inductive experiments have been presided over by a sense which no induction could have furnished. What, for instance, is the temperament of a piano but a metaphysical compromise between the imperfections of the material and the law of intervals? Harmony, in short, is a refutation which the materialist himself might welcome; but it kills his theory as effectually as the poison poured into the auditory tube, which made a ghost of Hamlet's father.

It is much easier to tolerate the doctrine that a slice of meat, well-assimilated, becomes the poet's happy thought, than to understand how wafts of common air could be transformed into the mighty uplifting of the soul when the orb of music passes over our flat life, and draws emotion into every barren creek, and dashes its tonic against the heart. Physics must allow an essential difference between a vibration and a well-cooked mutton chop; and it is in favor of the stimulating and edifying quality of the chop. Music has been called the image of motion. But when the ear is struck, something else than a wave is propagated. It would be more just to say that Music is imagination set in motion.

The sea-tide writes its diary accurately enough in the sand-ripples. But air did not imprint these footsteps so massive and deep that our own are lost as we try to follow; yet there is no dismay, for in the bosom of each trace lies home's direction,—by which we know that a Beethoven had just passed.

I claim, then, against a strictly logical empirical method, three classes of facts. First, the authentic facts of the moral sense whenever it appears as the transcender of the ripest average utility. Second, the facts of the Imagination as the anticipator of mental methods by pervading everything with personality, by imputing Life to Object, or by occasional direct suggestion. Third, the facts of the harmonic sense as the reconciler of discrete and apparently sundered objects, as the prophet and artist of Number and mathematical ratio, as the unifier of all the contents of the soul into the acclaim which rises when the law of Unity fills the scene.

Upon these facts I chiefly sustain myself against the theory, consistently explained, which derives all possible mental functions from the impacts of Objectivity.

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### ANTI-MATERIALISM.\*

By G. S. HALL.

To a concise though popular restatement of the younger Fichte's, Fontlage's, and Leopold Schmidt's construction of the ego as person, modified as he believes it to have been by Lazarus and Lotze, the author joins a vigorous and original polemic against "materialism in natural science and theology" which he calls an "absurd and therefore impossible form of subjective idealism." This he does in the interest of speculative philosophy, which he would rescue from present discredit and neglect, and to which he would restore an ultimate character as the mediating unity of theology and natural science.

The barren abstractions of the absolute philosophy carried thought into so rare an atmosphere that its utmost effort was

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\* Five Lectures on Philosophical Subjects, by Ludwig Weis. Berlin, 1871.

required to sustain itself; progress was impossible; and its prime function of diverting and impelling action was virtually abdicated. Thought must strike root as well as climb. Antæus-like, it has now reverted to earth. Its own law of gravity has brought it down to the fact and thing of sense. This is, however, its most dangerous extreme; for as thought approximates sensation it acquires an inertia which is hard to be overcome. The objects of sense are phenomenal and unstable to thought. Outer and immediate distinctions are superficial, and must be transcended. "Natural science knows its objects only in some of their external relations."

Causal and inductive reasoning, as too often applied, merely enlarges the boundaries of the fact, without revealing its true nature. The present tendency of physical science is, by resolving the object of sense into properties, laws, or forces, to press on toward the real nature of the thing in itself. In doing the former, it acquires a subjective character, indeed becomes philosophy in the disguise of a new nomenclature, seeks like it the central principle of all being and development.

So, too, in religion thought must neither lose itself in ecstasies of emotion or feeling, nor bind itself to the form or letter of revelation. The latter, whatever its content or origin, is worthless if it be not re-affirmed by reason. This is not making reason supreme; it is theologising in the true sense of the word. Theology, even if it rest upon inspired apprehension, of revelation, is individual, and even tentative. Dogmatism, formalism, and literalism, culminating in the doctrine of infallibility, constitute the religious materialism of the age, which he terms extreme, reactionary, and all-pervading.

The radical question of philosophy at its present stage is, "What is the essence of man?" The author here follows the philological theory of Lazarus and Steinthal. Physically man is higher, though not essentially different from, animals. Darwinism, which is as yet an open question, cannot affect his present or future. The human and animal soul alike are first manifest in what Lotze terms "general feeling"; in which the whole sum and elasticity of disposable vital force are set over against the outer world. This is the

most generic form of external consciousness. Through the senses, which are organs of the soul's intercourse with the external world, this general feeling becomes localized and specific. These separate sensations are "so combined as to correspond with the external pattern," and perception is the result. By means of the mental pictures thus formed, and which begin to exist independently of the outer object, the animal soul remembers, thinks, &c., with great accuracy within the narrow field of instinct. In the impulse to escape from the pressure of the outer world upon the senses, nerves of sensation react on nerves of motion, and an interjectional language is formed, expressing, like sensation, very general relations. The animal soul never distinguishes its perception of the sound from its perception of the object; never hears itself speak. With this distinction self-consciousness, or, as it may be called at this stage, verbal consciousness, begins. "A perception of a perception, or a conception, arises," to which the animal never attains. As sound and perception become associated, these interjections become objective, and the inner perception of the sound also becomes vocal by the more subjective and generic principle of onomatopœia. This process continued under the law of natural (i.e. rational) selection until this *language of language* was finally resolved into the fundamental phonetic types or roots of articulate speech. These may be said to "exist by nature," or, according to Professor Heyse, "As material objects produce their own peculiar sound, so must it also be with the most perfect organization under the working of nature."

The fact of the existence of such an original power in man, which, in forming roots out of the natural cries of sensation, transformed itself into reason, and which alone distinguishes man from animals, must be regarded as ultimate. It was an instinct which ceased to exist when its function was performed. Starting then anew from these roots, of which the few hundred known to philology were doubtless but a small fraction, but which were very generic in signification, (as is indicated by the fact that most of them are known to have been originally predicates,) words have constantly become more specific in meaning and more individual in form. The individual finds a ready-made vocabulary, in which words

are mere counters, with a capricious or fortuitous value, and with little trace of original meaning. A feeling of imperfection and insecurity arises which impels to a new harmonization of the spoken logos with the logos of reason, a process which now goes on in the full light of consciousness. Now is realized of single words what was in a measure true of them even as roots, that they are inadequate expressions of thought. By sentences (logical formula) reason attempts, not a mere enumeration of properties or conceptions, but "such an arrangement of them as is conditioned by their relation to the total content" of consciousness. In this way knowledge is translated from external to internal relations, and becomes self-knowledge. Consciousness reaches its highest and most intimate self-involution in the consciousness of the ego as such. Indeed knowledge is uncertain and hypothetical till it has reached its ultimate form of self-certainty.

Conditioned by the intellectual, though springing at first from physical relations, is the practical nature of man. Action realizes thought. As knowledge is phenomenal and formal, motives are external and mechanical; but as the former become self-certain, the latter resolve themselves into the *pressure of self-feeling*. The ultimately rational and necessary act of man is self-realization. In self-certainty and self-realization consists the essence of man as a *person*. Greek philosophy, with its slave states, never rose to this full conception of the nature of man. The mediæval doctrine of innate ideas allowed no free, personal self-determination; nor was the nature of the mind rightly conceived as a *tabula rasa*, receiving impressions of sense. Kant first conceived the soul as a principle which won ideas by its own activity. The ego of the elder Fichte was merely the ego of self-consciousness. His son laid the true foundation of philosophy and ethics in personality as the common ground of thought and action.

Lazarus' well-known law has shown how every perception must be complemented by an inner apperception: i.e. that since all new knowledge must have points of contact with the old, the reproduction of similar conceptions in consciousness is an indispensable condition of belief. Faith cannot

rest upon the external grounds of authority or testimony, or it would be, as science holds, a lower form of knowledge; yet, like knowledge, it may arise from these, or even from æsthetic grounds. Neither is faith a "higher organ of knowledge, above sense, understanding, or reason." It is subject to the law and conditions of all belief; and pursues the same way as knowledge to self-certainty. "Faith without rational grounds is a psychological impossibility." The separate use of the word received an early sanction in philology, and Greek philosophy taught a higher innate knowledge above consciousness. Kant made faith and knowledge utterly antagonistic. The word *faith*, as indicating such a distinction, should be banished from the field of theory. In a practical sense, however, the distinction remains. Here knowledge denotes acquaintance with means and methods, while faith, in the sense of fidelity, faithfulness, denotes "self-committal to what one is self-certain of." It is confidence in the purpose or end in view. It is the force of personal conviction impelling to the realization of that end, and thus "higher than mere knowledge."

But self-realization is self-enlargement, though neither are selfish, such external motives as love of being observed, or higher, the love of esteem or of glory; in short, all which is detrimental to self, or to other selves, is selfish. Even the enthusiasm which sacrifices self to its cause, is apt to react into pride of voluntary humility. The feeling of satisfaction which is inseparable from every act of self-realization, and which is the last refuge of selfish utilitarianism, is not a motive.

The earliest instinct of self-realization is traced through its phenomenal stages, and is shown to be the most irrepressible act of conscious life, and to culminate in *love*, which "unselfishly realizes itself by seeking the enlargement of others by helping them to like independence."

Division of labor in the fields of science, the degeneration of the doctrine of personal freedom, which demands a fixed and positive basis, into individual and arbitrary license; the development of material life, which causes superstition to settle over the higher fields of thought, perversion and misunderstanding of the leading principles of philosophy, de-

tached from their systematic connection, and especially the false antagonism of philosophy and religion, are enumerated as the prominent causes of the present decadence of philosophic studies. Every department of truth is spun over with the dicta of sects, or parties, or of individual assertion; and so-called positive truths have suspended the force of original conviction on the ultimate question of human being and destiny. True philosophy, on the other hand, which consists "in working over forms of thought," or in elevating conceptions to ideas, is at the same time "the might of personality and the necessary task of each." It begins with the all-construing ego, which itself cannot be construed. The individual passes three phenomenal stages on the way to complete personality: 1. Language, the immediate reflex of the object, the truth of apprehension; 2. Reason, the truth of thought or self-certainty; 3. Action, the realization of certainty. Philosophy contemplates three objects, God, man, nature; origin, perfection, and process of all things. The content and the form of thought must be carefully distinguished; e.g. God is first present in the sense of dependence which arose when man first distinguished himself from objects of nature around him. All representations of God, of which the Jewish and Christian are most perfect, have the same contents, but an inadequate form; while, on the other hand, one may be self-certain of God, with very imperfect conception of him.

Man's essence consists in self-determination and self-certainty reproducing each other. He became self-certain of good and evil by an act in the fall; and, in turn, all moral action is a product of self-certain conviction. Nature (and history) affords field for experiment and investigation where general though not universal results are obtained, as well as a field where deduction can lay off its content in tangible forms of time and space. But only when thought shall "*perfectly* agree with its object" shall we become self-certain of what is in the world.

Space forbids any lengthened consideration of the theological bearings of the work. We have chosen simply to reproduce its contents, not merely because it is the pronouncement of a well-known physicist against the tendencies of natural science, but because mediating between materialism and ide-

alism, the seductive extremes of modern thought, it affords a safe and prospective stand-point from which to observe the course of recent philosophy and science in Germany, and because it adds still another to the favorable and easy points of contact between the German and American mind.

## KANT'S CRITICISM OF PURE REASON:

AN INTERPRETATION AND CRITICISM,

By SIMON S. LAURIE.

PREFATORY REMARKS.—I have called what follows an “interpretation,” because, while the text of Kant is closely and stringently adhered to, I have aimed rather at giving the actual substance of such proposition than at a translation. I am satisfied that it is only when so presented that German philosophy will find in America and England intelligent students. The criticism is close, strict, and concise; and the only apology to be offered for its unattractive and uninteresting character is that it aims at being scientific, and is addressed consequently only to those who are already familiar with metaphysical questions, and accustomed to the severe toil which the study of them demands even from the most competent.

The next part will contain to the end of the *Æsthetic*.

## KANT'S KRITIK OF PURE REASON.

### I.

#### *Of the Distinction between Pure and Empirical Knowledge.*

In respect of *Time* no knowledge antecedes experience. How else than by means of *objects* (*Gegenstände*) could the knowing faculty be stirred into activity?

[At bottom is not this only to say that there can be no knowledge without an object; and in this sense, inasmuch as all cognitions involve objects or matter of cognition, there can be no knowledge without experience. All objects of knowledge, whatsoever their source, are, in so far as known, experience. Therefore the *origin* of all knowledge is experience, but not therefore the *source*.

N. B.—There is a want in this first chapter of a sufficient distinction between experience generally and *sense-experience*.]



Those knowledges which have not their origin in experience—[that is to say, *sense*-experience, or what?]*—*we call *a priori*. Have we truly *a priori* cognitions—cognitions *wholly* independent of experience?

[What kind of experience? I may again ask.]

Those *a priori* cognitions are alone pure which have no mixture of sense: e.g. "Every Change has its Cause" is *a priori*; but *mixed*, because "change" is a notion [Begriff] got from [*Sense*] experience.

## II.

*We are in possession of certain A PRIORI knowledge, and even the common understanding is never WITHOUT SUCH.*

If a proposition is thought along with necessity, it is a judgment *a priori*, therefore one wholly (schlechterdings) so; if deduced from no other, or, if deduced, yet deduced from that which is *itself* necessary. Again, the universality of induction is only provisional, thus: "So far as *we have observed*, All bodies are heavy; therefore, All bodies *are* heavy." This is not true and strict universality. Where true and strict universality belongs to a proposition, it is *ipso facto* *a priori*. Universality and necessity are the two marks by which we know an *a priori* judgment. The one really involves the other.

[That is to say, experience—by which is meant sense-experience—cannot yield *true* universals. Can it not? If I have exhausted the facts, I can safely affirm strict universality. If I have tested *all* stones and found *all* heavy, then the proposition "All stones are heavy" is strictly universal. It is not an induction proper, but a colligation. Though universal, is it necessary? is it *a priori*? Not so. Universality is not, then, a test of the *a priori*; universality does not involve necessity. But necessity involves universality; therefore, the sole criterion, keeping within the Kantian sphere, is *Necessity*. Again, "All men are rational," "All animals die,"—are these universals strict and true? Yes. Do they convey to us the notion of Necessity? Yes: and yet they are *experience*-inductions—observations of sense not yet completed; for we have not yet seen all animals die. There may, then, be necessary propositions which are not *a priori*.]

That such universal, necessary, and therefore *a priori* cognitions exist, it is easy to show. Take mathematical propo-

sitions generally for example; also the proposition, "Every change must have a cause." The necessity bound up with such propositions cannot be explained as a habit of mind engendered by association, as Hume says: for the necessity vanishes under the explanation. Moreover, *a priori* cognitions can be established as indispensable to the possibility of Experience — as that which gives to experience certitude (Gewissheit).

[Is not this to beg the question, there *may* be no "certitude," whatever certitude may mean? Of course, if Certitude of experience is a fact, and if this is possible only in so far as experience rests on *a priori* judgments, then *a priori* judgments exist: and there is no use of arguing further as to the *fact of their existence*. Our business would then be only to collect them. But there may be *no* certitude in experience: if so, what then? Again, if by Certitude of experience be meant the element of the "necessary" which is bound up with experience-judgments, the argument will run thus: "There is a necessary in propositions: Experience cannot give this necessariness: Therefore the necessariness is *a priori*." Now it seems to me, that, given this element of apparent necessity in propositions, it is our business as philosophers to take it up as an *alleged* necessity not yet demonstrated, and to analyze it with a view to ascertain its source and ground by the unveiling of its place and manner of genesis. It is not enough merely to say that, if Hume be right, the element of Necessity gänzlich verloren gehen würde (p. 35).]

There is a necessity not only in judgments but also in Begriffe (notions, concepts); e.g. abstract from a bodily object its qualities of hardness, color, &c., and still there remains the space it occupied which you cannot think away. There is also that whereby you think the object as "Substance," or dependent on Substance, which cannot be thought away.

[On the first point I remark, that when I have thought away all the sense-qualities of a body, I have thought away also *its* figure and extension: in fact it is thought away *entirely*, and the space which remains is not the body, nor the space of the body, but merely space. Space *as such* I cannot think away, but determined space or figure and localization I can, and in the above case do think away. — As to the second point: I cannot think away the "Substance" of a material object so long as the object is before my consciousness in any shape, howe'r mutilated as regards "qualities"; but if *all* its qualities disappear from my consciousness, I affirm that

its "substance" also disappears. At the same time it has to be affirmed that there exists the notion of "Substance," and that it seems not to be given in sense; and further, that it seems to have more to do with the thing before me than anything else has. But to demonstrate its *a priori* character I must find another argument than the necessity with which it clings to my concept of an object. I cannot venture to beg the question as to the *a-priority* of the necessary. I must analyze the notion "substance" and find out whence it springs, and I must also analyze the notion "necessary" and find out what it truly means.]

### III.

*Philosophy needs a Science which shall determine the possibility, the principles, and the range, of all knowledge of A PRIORI.*

Still more important is the fact that certain cognitions go beyond the limits of experience by means of notions, concepts (*Begriffe*), which have no corresponding experience-object. Precisely in these super-sensible cognitions lie the most important questions of "Reason" (*Vernunft*), viz. *God, Freedom, Immortality*. The science which deals with these is called Metaphysic, which (unfortunately) undertakes its task without a prior demonstration of the capabilities of *Vernunft*.

When once we have left behind us the ground of experience we ought to inquire how the understanding (*Verstand*) could attain to all these *a priori* cognitions which we wot of, and what range and validity they have. We are led by the success which attends the *a priori* reasoning of Mathematics to expect equally great results in other and different regions without making sure that we stand on a foundation of certitude (and to think that we have got them). What deceives us in this process is that the chief business of the *Vernunft* is the Analysis of Concepts (*Begriffe*), and we seem to ourselves to be thereby adding to the content of our knowledge new Insights when we are merely explicating and elucidating what is already there. This experience *does* give a true *a priori* cognition—[how? I suppose in so far as it yields "necessary" propositions (identical)]—which has a sure and useful issue; and Reason (*Vernunft*) inadvertently insinuates affirmations (*Behauptungen*) of a totally different kind, by which it adds to the given *Begriffe* alien *a priori* *Begriffe*

without knowing or asking how they find their way here.— [Illustration wanted here.]—Our first business, then, is to investigate this twofold kind of cognition — [that is, the kind whereby we truly obtain new insights, and the kind which is merely analytic].

[The defect in Kant's argument, already indicated at an earlier point, still hangs about the above reasoning. The criterion of the *a priori* is "Necessity" (not Universality, of which we have already disposed); but is it legitimate to conclude, as it were *per saltum*, that what is "necessary" in a judgment or concept has its source outside sense-experience? And this I take to be the strict meaning of *a priori*.

Note, that Kant says that *Vernunft* is the power by which we analyze concepts or notions. Also that he once (in the above chapter) uses *reines Verstand* as an equivalent for *Vernunft*.]

#### IV.

##### *Of the Distinction of Analytic and Synthetic Judgments.*

The two kinds of judgments are the Analytic and Synthetic. By an analytic judgment is meant a judgment in which the predicate is merely an explication of what is already contained in the subject. A synthetic judgment is a judgment in which the predicate is an ampliation of the subject—a clear addition to the content of the concept. "All bodies are extended" is analytic, for in "Body" is already contained Extension, which I by the above judgment merely bring into clearer consciousness. "All bodies are heavy" is synthetic, because "heavy" is not thought in the mere concept "body," and is a clear addition to that concept. The former are *Erläuterungsurtheile* or explicatory judgments, and the latter *Erweiterungsurtheile* or ampliative judgments.

[I remark on this, that the predicate "heavy" is doubtless, for the most part, ascertained *after* the predicate Extension; and consequently is, at a certain stage in the progress of my knowledge, Synthetic: thereafter, however, analytic. True, Extension is contemporaneous with the first presentation of "Body" to my consciousness, and thus it may be regarded as analytic in quite a special manner; but what shall we say of one born blind whose first acquaintance with "body" was "weight"!] ]

Judgments of Experience (*Erfahrungsurtheile*) are wholly Synthetic. It would be absurd to ground an analytic judg-

ment on experience. Experience could not give to it its necessary character which it has by virtue of the Law of contradiction.

[By this is meant that analytic judgments *as such* cannot be grounded on experience: but the attributes which at first go to constitute the subject, and which in an analytic judgment I merely draw out, are in truth themselves primarily based on Experience. An analytic necessity is not at bottom, *therefore*, an *a priori* cognition. Its necessity is explained by the Law of contradiction. Body is given in Sense *qua* extended: therefore "Body" with the predication extension is so given in Sense. This being so, the notion "Body" with all that is implied in it is *a posteriori* unless I can show that there is an attribute implicit in it which is not given in Sense.]

But in synthetic judgments *a priori* we are bereft of this help of experience. When I say, "Whatever happens has a Cause," I, in so far as "whatsoever happens" is concerned, affirm a fact of sense-experience, and at the same time *a priori* to the "happening": but where do I get the universal and necessary Begriff, "Cause," which I import into the Judgment, and which cannot be the object of Experience, because it is necessary, and Experience can give only the contingent? On such Synthetic or Ampliative Grundsätze—[he ought to say Principien]—rests the whole of Speculative knowledge *a priori* in its final aim.

[For this notion, "Cause," I have to account. It is not given in Sense. As Synthetic and yet not given in sense, therefore, it demands explanation and vindication.

Kant, it will be seen, assumes that the notion is *a priori* because it is necessary and universal; but it is evident that it *might be possible* to account for its necessity, or seeming necessity, without involving ourselves in apriority. Here however, let it be noted, we truly come on a "notion" which we may, as a matter of fact, ransack Sense in vain to find, and which *therefore* is strictly *a priori*.]

V.

*In all Theoretical Sciences of Vernunft, synthetic A PRIORI Judgments are contained as Principles.*

MATHEMATICAL JUDGMENTS ARE WHOLLY SYNTHETIC A PRIORI.

First of all, mathematical propositions are necessary, and, *therefore*, *a priori*.

[To this I again demur. If they are *analytic* necessities, they are then not because necessary therefore *a priori*, in the strict signification.]

Next they are Synthetic. That  $7 + 5 = 12$  seems at first sight Analytic; but how can we get anything like the number 12 out of the summation 7 and 5. The notion "Twelve" is not thought through the union of 7 and 5; and I may analyze the notion of such a possible summation ever so long without finding 12 *therein*. To find this, I must go beyond the notion of the Sum and resort to sensible perception, and, starting from 7, add five units in the shape of fingers or points. Thus I see 12 spring out of this process. In the notion of the sum  $7 + 5$ , I have thought, it is true, that 5 is to be added to 7, but in that *thought* the equality of this sum with the number "12" is *not* thought.

[In other words, Kant means to say that the result 12 is not already contained in  $7 + 5$ , and that therefore it is something new, synthetic, ampliative. And it is also, as we already know, "necessary," and, therefore (according to Kant), *a priori*. Here again I must object to the assumed a-priority of the "necessary." An analytic judgment is necessary, and yet the predicate is not *therefore* ascertained a priori—i.e. outside sense experience. A true a priori proposition is always necessary, but a necessary proposition is not always *a priori*.

What, however, we have chiefly to do with here is the synthetic character of the above numerical judgment. It seems to me that it is *not* synthetic. There is nothing in  $7 + 5$  which can yield 12 any more than it could yield 20, except in so far as 7 and 5 are mere verbal signs for 7 units and 5 units respectively; and it is by my sensible perception of the accumulation of these units one on another that I see that they yield a larger quantity of units, which for shortness sake I call 12, just as I have already called so many units 7 and so many units 5. "Twelve" is nothing but  $7 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1$ , which I gather into unity under the designation "Twelve" and the sign 12. Kant admits that by the above process I can see 12 "spring out" of  $7 + 5$ , but affirms that the "notion"  $7 + 5$  cannot contain in it 12. I would ask: Is it denied that when I say  $7 + 5$ , I *ipso facto* affirm 12 even though I have not yet discovered either a name or a sign for the said cumulation or sum? If this is not denied, then 12 *is* contained in the notion  $7 + 5$ .—Again, what does Kant mean by the "*notion*" of  $7 + 5$ ?

This can only mean the notion of 7 units and the notion of 5 units thrown into union.

The weakness of Kant's position is shown by his advising us to take *large* numbers if we would see the truth of this Synthetic character of the Judgment. But if we would see clearly what a thing is in thought, we must, *on the contrary*, rest on its simplest forms. Had K. taken  $7+1$  he would have found it hard to show that the notion 8 was not contained in the notion of this sum, and that the predicate was synthetic. Or what would he say to  $1+1=2$ ?

So with Pure Geometry: A straight line is the shortest between two points" is a synthetic proposition.

[Now the question we have here to ask ourselves is, what do we mean by "straight"? We must look at *things* and not be the slave of words. By "straight" we mean that which does not deviate in its progress from point to point by going round or zigzag; and by "shortest" we mean that which covers least ground. It being so, the proposition becomes this: "That line between two points is the shortest which does not go ever so little round, or zigzag, or out of its way." And this is an identical or analytic proposition, and not synthetic.]

There are, it is true, certain fundamental propositions (Grundsätze) in Geometry which are analytic; but these are not *Principien*, e.g. " $a=a$ ";  $(a+b) > a$ ;" the whole is greater than its part."

[True; but these are in no sense *more* analytic than the so-called synthetic proposition above considered.]

In *Physics* also are to be found certain synthetic judgments a priori as *Principien*: e.g. "In all changes of the material world, the *quantity* of matter remains unchanged." It is clear that this is not only necessary, and therefore a priori, but also synthetic; for in the notion "Matter" I do not think the *permanence* of matter, but only its presence in Space through the filling of the same. I in the above proposition go beyond the notion of "matter" to add something which is not thought *in* it.

[Perhaps I do not quite understand the above proposition; for I cannot detect the grounds on which it is even to be presumed to be synthetic a priori. I do not see its necessity in any proper signification of that word. That it might be shown

to be synthetic *a posteriori* is possible; but that it should be synthetic *a priori* in the signification of being at once necessary and also an ampliation of our knowledge of matter not given in sense, I cannot see.

There are various ways of looking at the proposition: for example, "Change in particular matter cannot lessen or increase the total quantity of matter." Now I might ask, why should change, simply as change, lessen quantity? Is it not the fact that in the word "Change" I think the non-lessening of matter? In any case I certainly do not think the lessening; and the proposition is identical or analytic.—Or put it thus: "It is not possible to lessen or increase the total quantity of matter by changing particular matter." I confess I cannot see the necessary *a priori* synthetic character of this proposition any more than in the proposition, "It is not possible to kill an elephant by means of a pea-shooter"—which, if necessary in any proper sense, is analytically necessary. By the very terms of the proposition matter is only *changed*, not lessened or increased; and to say that "Change" is not annihilation nor creation, is merely negatively to define "Change."—Perhaps, however, the necessary synthetic proposition is an underlying one, viz. "Matter is indestructible." But a proposition put so generally is not necessary, nor a priori, nor synthetic a priori: it is either given primarily in our notion of matter, or it is synthetic a posteriori and a synthesis of experience. In the latter case it is an induction of experience; in the former, it is equivalent to saying, "Matter as presented primarily to Consciousness is composed of particles or atoms ultimately indestructible; therefore, particular matter or body, however it may be affected by Force, is not *qua* (atomic) matter destructible."—This proposition is either (a) an assumption, and therefore invalid; or (b) an inductive conclusion of experience, and therefore neither necessary nor *a priori*; or (c) an analytic judgment.]

In Metaphysic also there needs must be synthetic *a priori* cognitions. Vernunft has not only to explicate by analysis, but also to extend knowledge by *a priori* synthesis, and that in regions where Experience cannot follow, as e.g. in the proposition, "The World must have a first beginning."

[Truly this is Synthetic and not the synthesis of experience; therefore, *a priori*.

Much of Kant's reasoning is invalidated by the unsatisfactory use of *a priori* as an equivalent for necessary and *vice versa*.]



VI.

*The Universal PROBLEM (or Task) of Pure Reason.*

The problem of Pure Reason is contained in the question, "How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?"

Hume held that they were impossible, and accounted for such (apparent) judgments (confining himself however solely to the question of Cause and Effect) as being the product of Experience to which Custom had given the semblance of necessity. Had he seen that mathematical propositions are synthetic *a priori*, he could not have made this blunder; for his position would have made Pure Mathematics impossible. [As already stated, there is, to my thinking, only an analytic necessity in Mathematical judgments.]

The solution of the above problem is bound up with the possibility of the use of Pure Reason in all sciences, and answers the questions :

1. How is Pure Mathematics possible?
2. How is Pure Physics possible?

There is a natural disposition in Reason towards Metaphysic (*metaphysica naturalis*). It *will* ask certain questions. The answers to these hitherto have been involved in unavoidable contradictions.

Still it must be possible to say whether we can know or not, to judge respecting the capability or incapability of Vernunft to answer the questions which it puts, and to what extent we may trust it;—all which yields this Query :

Is Metaphysic as Science possible?"

The Criticism of Reason (Vernunft), consequently, leads to Science as opposed to Dogmatism, which uncritically makes large affirmations, to which equally plausible affirmations on the other side may be opposed, and leads consequently to Skepticism.

Its range of inquiry is not very wide, for it has to deal not with objects, but with Vernunft itself, its capabilities, and its own self-given queries.

All Dogmatic Metaphysics we must regard as non-existent, since it merely analyzes the *a priori* notions which our Vernunft already has; whereas our true aim is to ascertain how

we come by these notions, and to determine their valid application to the objects of knowledge.

## VII.

*Idea and Division of a Particular Science under the name of a KRITIK OF PURE REASON.*

From what has been said, the "Idea" of a special science will have been now attained, which we may designate the "Kritik of Pure Reason." For Reason is the faculty which gives us the *Principien* of *a priori* cognitions, and therefore Pure Reason contains the *Principien* of *a priori* knowing.

[That is to say (I suppose), Vernunft (which also, as we have seen, analyzes notions) yields us the PRINCIPLES which underlie all *a priori* cognitions, and also contains the Principles whereby we know *a priori*. I cannot understand the double use of the word *Principien* above. Perhaps I misunderstand the passage. It may merely mean, *Pure Reason* is the faculty by which we know *a priori*, and it further contains in itself the grounds of our *a priori* knowledge;—which is much as if we said that it holds in its bosom the substance of *a priori* knowledge as *Forms*. This, doubtless, is the meaning.]

An Inbegriff or Compendium of those *Principien* whereby we are enabled to acquire cognitions *a priori* would be an Organon of Pure Reason,—the complete application of which would yield a System or Doctrine. It is not, however, our purpose to do more than furnish a critique with a view to define the sources and limits of Pure Reason. This may be regarded as a Propædætic to a system.

[Should he not say — "to define the limits of the activity of that which I have called Pure Reason, and the sources of the *Principien* which it yields"? I would then understand *Principien* to mean the affirmation of synthetic *a priori* judgments as free from content as possible, i.e. an abstract statement, e.g. "A thing cannot at the same time be itself and another": or a Formula, e.g.  $A = A$ .]

Kant next goes on to define *Transcendental* Knowledge as being the Knowledge which has to do, not with objects, but with our *mode* of cognizing objects in so far as it is *a priori*. A system of such Begriffe would be a system of *Transcendental* Philosophy.

[That is to say, the Rational forms of *a priori* or necessary thought—or, to put it otherwise, the forms of Reason in a *priori* or necessary Knowing—are called “*Transcendental*.”—An illustration is wanted here. The word *Begriffe* is loosely used.]

The forms of cognition of *analytic* necessities are also *Transcendental*; but it is only the *Synthetic a priori* which constitute the subject of the *Kritik*. Did it occupy itself also with the *Analytic*, it would then embrace the whole of human knowledge *a priori*, and thus realize the complete Idea of a *Transcendental Philosophy*.

[It occurs to us here to wonder how Kant will keep clear of the criticism of *Analytical* necessities. He can do so only by bringing within the range of the *Synthetic* much which is in truth *Analytic*, as he has already done in the case of *Mathematical Judgments*.]

This *Kritik* will consist of two great Divisions :

*First*, the Doctrine of the Elements of Pure Reason ;

*Second*, the Doctrine of the Method of Pure Reason.

By way of Preface, it is only further necessary to say that there are two stems of human Knowledge (perhaps springing out of a common root), viz. *Sense* and *Understanding*, through the former of which objects are *given*, and through the latter of which objects are thought.

In so far as the *Sense-faculty* contains *Vorstellungen a priori*, it belongs to the *Transcendental Philosophy*; and, as the conditions under which all objects are given, it must take priority in treatment over that through which objects are thought.

[*Vorstellungen a priori* mean *Necessary Presentation* to *Consciousness* in perception. These, however, come within Kant's scope only if they are *synthetic*. I suspect he already loses sight of his own self-imposed restrictions as to the proper range of the *Kritik*.]

END OF INTRODUCTION.

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## THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CÆSAR BY SHAKESPEARE.

By D. J. SNIDER.

The Drama represents man in action. It exhibits him in the infinite web of his complications, with influences passing out from him and coming back to him, and thereby portrays in the shortest space and in the most striking manner the relative worth of human deeds. Nor does it rest content with the mere external doings of man; on the contrary, it penetrates his innermost nature, and probes the profoundest depths of his spiritual being. For it unfolds motives, ends, convictions; and, in fact, these subjective elements constitute its most important feature. They form the basis of what is called character, and their true logical subordination is exhibited in the denouement of the piece.

The Drama is the most concrete and therefore the highest of all the forms of Poetry. The Epos is the product of national childhood; it contemplates man in an intellectual infancy which demands the continuous supervision of the Gods. It therefore lays stress upon the Objective, the Universal: not, however, as mediated through the spirit of man, but as an existence standing outside of him and determining his actions. Hence the tinge of Fate which prevails in all Epic Poetry, for the contradiction between Freedom and Necessity is not yet developed by this early consciousness. Still self-determination may and in fact ought to peer through these external forms in a naïve, unconscious manner; such is the case with Homer, who often seems to make the Gods his sport. The Epos therefore may be said to be essentially religious, and seeks to unfold if not to justify the ways of Providence to man.

The Lyric Poet, on the contrary, portrays his own emotions, desires, reflections; in fine, the entire content of his own subjectivity. His strain may be one of joy and happiness, but it is most commonly an incessant lamentation about his own injured and unappreciated self, or a stinging censure of the cold, heartless world. He thus falls out with the existing order of things, becomes negative and sceptical, assails and undermines the ancient faith and simple epical feeling.

So old Simonides was accused of impiety. But to mention all the phases of the lyrical form of poetry would be impossible, for it is as varied and boundless as the nature of man, and extends into all periods of civilization. Its general characteristic however is subjective, and it portrays man in reflection.

But in the Drama all this is changed. Man starts up from the repose in which he has been describing and nursing his emotions, and begins to act; that is, he begins to give his subjective nature validity in the objective world. His feelings, passions, hopes, ends, are no longer satisfied with quiet, lyrical description, but must take on the form of reality. Nor again are these ends which he is trying to realize always merely subjective; on the contrary, they represent objective principles of universal validity, as the Right, the Ethical, the State. Hence the Dramatic is the concrete unity of the Epic and Lyric: not a mixture of the two, but an entirely new species. It unites the subjective side of the one with the objective side of the other, by making the objective world inherent in the subject, and thus filling its emptiness and giving it content; and, on the other hand, it gives validity to the subject in the objective world through his own activity. The Drama presents an action like the Epos; but it must abandon the principle of external divine interference, and put in its stead the self-conscious, self-acting individual. Hence no demons, angels, or Gods, are allowed to perform the mediations of the Drama in its highest manifestations; all is human and expressive of human freedom. For there can only be one reason why the Drama is the highest of all the forms of Art: it most adequately represents self-determination—man as a free and hence responsible being. If, therefore, the Epical consciousness is essentially religious and the Lyrical negative and even sceptical, the Dramatic, on the other hand, is Ethical.

But the Ethical is not a single principle, but includes a series of principles which form a regular gradation from the lowest to the highest. Hence it is possible for a lower principle to collide with a higher. It is just this conflict which constitutes the source of all dramatic action. As the science of Ethics, if truly elaborated, would show all these principles,

in their proper relation and subordination, from a theoretical point of view, so the Drama in a practical way, by means of human action, exhibits in victory or defeat, success or failure, the true relation and subordination of these same ethical principles. It calls man before its tribunal, and unfolds to him the consequences of his deeds, not in an abstract form, but in the form of the deed itself.

If we consider the Drama in this light, it is not the trivial, sportive toy which furnishes amusement for an idle hour, but it assumes immense proportions. We shall find that it is only another form of proposing the greatest of problems, a new way that people have of looking at the profoundest questions of human existence. For the Drama is certainly based upon the ethical world, its collisions must rest upon elements inherent in the ethical order of things, and its solutions if true—which is the same as artistic—must be in accordance with this order. Therefore, to judge of the Drama, we have to know something of this ethical world, its contradictions and its harmonies, its principles and the order of their subordination; or, if we do not know these things already, the Drama may be able to give the requisite instruction. And furthermore, since the ethical world is the realization of Reason, we are led through the Drama to ask ourselves the more important question, What is the absolutely Rational?—not as an idle question of speculation, but as the vital fount of action, as the guiding thread of Life ought we to consider such a theme. The Rational in the Drama and the Rational in Thought and Action cannot well be different; indeed the one is only the adumbration of the other. So the Drama in its highest utterances takes up the problem of Life, and solves it in its own peculiar manner. The clash of appetites and passions, the conflict of rights and duties, the alarming hand of Fate reaching over, grasping after all, and, most prominently, the beneficent form of Freedom standing on a heap of broken chains, are there portrayed, the opposing forces reconciled and reduced to one harmonious, well-ordered system. Thus we may learn a practical as well as an æsthetic truth of incalculable value, that the Rational in the Drama is the Rational in Life. By these remarks we hope it may be seen that the Dramatic Art is no mere abstraction apart from or opposed

to the real world—no plaything to amuse those refined and elegant natures who long to fly away from this grovelling sphere to realms ideal, there to bathe in the sunlight of eternal truth; but it clings to earth, and is the most intensely human of all Art. Nor has mankind ever failed to appreciate its significance as furnishing a reflex of the highest endeavors and greatest achievements of the race.

There is one man to whom we all instinctively turn with the certainty of finding a rational basis—Shakespeare. Criticism has worn itself almost threadbare upon him, and we often are sated with the interminable talk about him, the most of which is so unsatisfactory; still we have always to come back to his works as the unfailing source of the highest intellectual and artistic enjoyment. People feel that his is the greatest name in all literature, perhaps in all history. But this is not enough: we must know what is the special form of that greatness. And so the question arises, wherein is Shakespeare the greatest of authors? We cannot say in the perfection of form, for herein others perhaps surpass him; nor in the mastery of language, for this is a knack which may be learned, and moreover means little by itself; nor in the beauty of his images, for they are often confused, incongruous, and far-fetched; not even in characterization, nor in the management of an action, in the strict sense of the term. Great as his excellence in these things, it has been attained sometimes at least by far inferior writers. There can be no doubt in the statement that the unique and all-surpassing greatness of Shakespeare lies in his comprehension of the ethical order of the world. Though this side of his genius has been always most inadequately stated, and commonly has been passed over entirely in the essays of his critics, still men have instinctively felt that his works were the truest literary product of modern times, because they were the most perfect and concrete presentation of realized rationality. Men see in him their highest selves, and hence must take him as their greatest exponent. The contrast in this respect with even the best creations of nearly all other poets is most striking. We read them, we are charmed with the imagery, the thoughts, the rhythmic flow of the verse. But when we come to the end of one of these works we are confused, lost; we

analyze it more closely, and find that the Whole, however beautiful its individual parts, is an ethical chaos. But Shakespeare, in this sphere as elsewhere, is all harmony : no contradictions cloud his poetical horizon, nor does he ever make the denouement a logical annihilation of the whole play.

To throw out some hints towards a comprehension of this highest side of Shakespeare's genius is our present purpose. To this end we have selected "Julius Cæsar," as exhibiting Shakespeare's ethical world in its completest if not in its concretest form. But first it would perhaps be well to enumerate some of the elements of this ethical world. Those most obvious and most commonly recognized are the Individual, Family, and State. These elements have their limits against one another ; hence they fall into conflict, and one must be subordinated to the other. That is, the individual may assert himself against the demands of Family or State, or the Family may come into collision with the State. It is evident that there must be a gradation of rank in these powers ; one must be above another, else strife and confusion can only result. But above all these there is a fourth principle, which has not the taint of finitude which rests upon the others. For even the State, to which every individual must bow and every principle yield, whose absolute supremacy is expressed in the fact that its safety is the highest law, seems notwithstanding to be exposed to the might of the destroying angel. The Past is strown with the wrecks of States ; the empires of the Orient, Greece, Rome, the Middle Ages, have arisen and passed away : and so we must acknowledge a Power above the State which calls it into being and also puts an end to its existence. What this Power is, we need not now discuss : we only wish to recognize and name it : let us call it the Spirit of World-History ; or, more concisely, the World-Spirit ; or, in the language of religion, God in History. Only let us not imagine that it is some far-off Power wholly external to man, whose arm descends and smites him to the earth without his knowing whence it cometh or whither it goeth.

Furthermore, all these Principles can only be vitalized through the Individual. Taken alone, they are mere abstractions and of no force ; but when a man goes forth armed with them, and makes them the basis of his action, they move the



world. It is only in this way they can collide and form the foundation of a drama. An individual thus becomes the bearer of some grand ethical principle, and can come into conflict with another individual who is fulfilling the same destiny in a different sphere. For instance, a person may assert the right of individual conscience—certainly a valid principle—against the majesty of law which is the command of the State; or, like Antigone, may prefer duty toward Family to obedience to civil authority; or, finally, there may be a still higher collision, that between the defenders of the State on the one hand and the supporters of the World-spirit on the other. Such is the collision between nations struggling for independence and their conquerors, the collision of Carthage with Rome, of the Pole with the Russian, of the Hungarian with the Austrian. We feel for the fallen nation, we may even weep over an heroic people defeated and prostrate, still in the end we are compelled to say: It is just; the World-Spirit, whose right it is to judge the nations, has decided against them.

Now it is just this collision which Shakespeare has presented in "Julius Cæsar." For Cæsar is the representative of the World-Spirit; he appears upon the stage of History as the destroyer of his country's liberties, hence the grand conflict of his life was with the State. It is indeed this fact which has caused him to be calumniated by nearly twenty centuries of writers and speakers. But note that Shakespeare does not join in this cry of execration. To him Cæsar's career is not political, but world-historical; not limited to a single state, but having the world as its theatre. To him Cæsar stands at the head of that eternal and infinite movement in whose grasp the nations are playthings. But, on the other hand, let us not forget that this movement was nothing external to Rome; it was the movement of Rome herself; the Roman Constitution was sapped perhaps before the birth of Cæsar. He only carried out the unconscious national will; he saw what Rome needed, and possessed the strength to execute it, and this is his greatness, and in fact the only real political greatness. That one man can overturn the form of government permanently against the will and spirit of a whole people is preposterous. That such was not Shakespeare's view is shown by the termination of the play. The conspira-

tors are overthrown and the supporters of Cæsar are successful. But this will be more fully pointed out hereafter.

The State has also its representatives in this conflict—Cassius and Brutus, more especially the former. They were the bearers of the spirit of the old Roman Constitution, and were strong enough to destroy the individual Cæsar, but by no means the movement which he represented. The thought of Cæsar remained, and Octavius simply steps into his place, conquers, and has peace—shuts the temple of Janus for the first time in generations. That is, Cæsar's revolution is accomplished, and the Roman people acquiesce.

With this explanation, we may now consider some of the incidents of the play. The first scene introduces us to the grand background upon which the whole drama is painted—the Roman people. Shakespeare has most truthfully depicted the populace as fickle and faithless, without any substantial fixity of purpose within itself. Hence we hurry into the next scene to find the element which gives consistency and stability to this mass. Here the two great men of the time appear, like gladiators, each one bent on the destruction of the other. Cæsar has arrived at the summit of his greatness; he is ready to receive the crown and be called king, whose functions indeed he already performs. This fact is to be particularly noted, as it will answer many objections that have been raised against the play. The critics are much troubled because Cæsar does not say or do anything great, and declare that he is inadequately portrayed. But the poet represents him at the consummation of his deeds, and as the founder of a new order of things; greater he could not well be. To be sure, a drama might be written which would exhibit Cæsar at an earlier period of his life, in the bloom of his activity, energy, and military genius. But such a drama could never present the collision which Shakespeare intended, nor in the faintest degree exhibit the ethical ideas which lie at the basis of this "Julius Cæsar." For in the present piece it is absolutely necessary that Cæsar as the representative of the World-Spirit be assailed, and that his assailants perish. Equally devoid of insight is the reproach of another critic, that Cæsar comes upon the stage only to be slain: for the play assumes Cæsar in the plenitude of his power: this is its first presup-

position. The second presupposition is the deep hostility of Cassius to the government of Cæsar. These are the two gladiators who in this second scene leap forth stripped for the fight. Cassius is in ability only inferior to Cæsar, and Cæsar is perfectly aware both of his hatred and of his talents. Cassius is first shown in the play overcoming the scruples of Brutus and alienating him from the party of Cæsar. With what skill does he introduce the subject, with what logical force are all the motives adduced, until Brutus, partly by the most delicate flattery and partly by adroit appeals to his moral nature, is completely won. A further proof of Cassius' ability is that he essayed Brutus first of all, for the name of Brutus was the greatest and most venerable in Rome, going back even to the expulsion of the kings; and Brutus himself was perhaps the most respectable character in Rome, and consequently of the greatest influence among his fellow-citizens. With him, the conspiracy might be a success; without him, it was impossible. In the third scene, we have Cassius working upon an altogether different character. Casca is the desperado of the conspirators, a man possessed of the greatest physical courage, but without an iota of moral courage. He will rush upon an enemy and stab him, but turns deathly pale at a clap of thunder. Whatever is human he is ready to meet, but that which he conceives to be divine or supernatural is a source of the direst terror. This man Cassius must have; no respectable man could have been found who possessed equal audacity. In fact every conspiracy or vigilance committee has just such an instrument, whose function it is to do work which no decent man is willing to perform, but which must be done. When we observe that Casca was the first one that stabbed Cæsar, we know exactly where to place him. Cassius needs this man, and it is curious to note with what consummate tact he proceeds. Knowing the weak side of Casca's character to be his superstition, he brings all his force to bear upon this single point. There is only one result which can follow.

Thus far we are all admiration for the intellect of Cassius, but several things have transpired under his direction at which the rigidly moral man must shrug his shoulders. He has no doubt taken advantage of the weakness of Brutus and

Cæsar, and deceived them both; he has declared that to be truth which he himself could not have believed, especially to Cæsar; he has laid a most unrighteous snare for poor Brutus by writing him anonymous letters which the latter took to be calls from the people; finally, he designs the assassination of a human being, an act which can hardly be justified from any purely moral point of view. Further on in the play we shall find many other deeds of an equally doubtful nature. How, then, is Cassius to be understood? Shall we take the common statement, that it is a case of great intellect without any moral perceptions? But if we look at another side, we behold a character of the noblest stamp, of surpassing brightness. With what energy does he strive to restore the old Roman state—with what industry does he collect every fragment of opposition to the mighty Cæsar—with what readiness does he die for his country! To be sure, he knows the might of place and pelf, but he only uses them as instruments to his great end. There is only one clue to his conduct. His highest end was the State, and everything which came in conflict with this end had to be subordinated. It was a time of strife and revolution, the ancient landmarks of society were swept away, the prescribed limits of order obliterated. No man ever saw more clearly than Cassius the finitude, one-sidedness and inadequacy of the merely moral stand-point in such a period, and consequently he proceeded to disregard it entirely. Suppose he did deceive or assassinate a man, provided he thereby saved the State? In fact, what is war but lying, cheating, robbing, and killing, for one's country? And the man who can do these things most successfully and on the most gigantic scale is the hero, is the great general. To be sure, all this is done to our enemy; but that can be no justification; the moral obligation lies between fellow-men, and not fellow-countrymen. When Cassius no longer has this end in view, he is as moral as any other man—in fact, an exemplary character. His abstinence is especially contrasted with the debauchery of Antony; he is moderate in desires, meagre in shape, a great student and observer of men,—all of which point to a temperate and steady life. His chief characteristic, then, is the subordination of moral to political ends: he is the statesman, his thought

and activity find their limits in the State, his world is his country. His point of view is stated by himself:

In such a time as this it is not meet  
That every nice offence should bear his comment.

His reasoning is: To be sure, Lucius Pella has taken bribes, but that offence can by no means be balanced against his services and abilities, or his influence; therefore let it pass, for we need the united efforts of all against the common enemy. A distinguished American officer once expressed this subordination of moral to political duties in the following toast: "My country—may she ever be right; but, right or wrong, my country." This is, perhaps, only the *feeling* of patriotism; but the insight of Cassius was deeper, for he comprehended *intellectually* that the right of the state is superior to any individual right of conscience, whenever these rights come in collision.

But the cyclus of characters, in order to be complete, must have its moral representative. This is Brutus. The poet has treated this character with such evident delight, has thrown around it such a halo of virtue, that it seems to be the leading one of the play. The honor, sincerity and nobleness of the man, the purity of his motives, his unimpeachable integrity in a corrupt age, the perfect fulfilment of every duty of the citizen, are brought out in their most glowing colors; even his family relations are introduced to crown the moral beauty of his character. All the virtues of private life seem to centre in this man, and we heartily join in the encomium of Antony:

This was the noblest Roman of them all;  
His life was gentle, and the elements  
So mixed in him, that Nature might stand up  
And say to all the world: This was a man.

But alack the day! he was called upon, or thought he was called upon, to act in times of revolution, when all the ancient prescribed landmarks were swept down, and when even the clearest and most logical head could scarcely find its way out of the confusion. Now what does this man, of the keenest sense of honor, of the most truthful nature, proceed to do? First, to desert, and then to assassinate, his dearest friend. His motive, he says, was the general welfare, but immediately

thereafter declares that Cæsar had as yet done nothing hostile to the public good. And so this contradiction runs through all his acts and sayings. It is evident that he had violated this fundamental principle of his nature, his profoundest intellectual conviction. As far as his insight goes, the act is wrong. Cassius can consistently do such a deed, for his stand-point is the State; and in its preservation, everything—men, property, and principles—are to be submerged. But poor Brutus! what is his next step? He tries to justify the deed. Listen to his soliloquy, for nothing can more completely show the inadequacy of the moral point of view, and it is besides a fine specimen of moral reasoning not unknown in our day:

It must be by his death: and for my part  
I know no personal cause to spurn at him,  
But for the general. He would be crowned:—  
How that might change his nature, there's the question.

It would seem that he was not aware of the great change which had actually taken place in the Roman Constitution, and does not know that the formal coronation of Cæsar would produce no alteration in the real condition of things. This fatal lack of all political sagacity in the leader would destroy any party or any cause. To continue:

It is the bright day that brings forth the adder  
And that craves wary walking. Crown him — That,  
And then I grant we put a sting in him  
That at his will he *may* do danger with.

Possibility is here made the basis of action. That all practical wisdom is based on directly the opposite principle needs hardly to be stated. Moreover, all crimes can easily be justified in this way, since a man has only to plead some indefinite possibility.

The abuse of greatness is when it disjoins  
Remorse from power; and, to speak truth of Cæsar,  
I have not known when his affection swayed  
More than his reason.

From this it would appear that Brutus thought that Cæsar was still a good man and unworthy of death. It was only what Cæsar might become, that can furnish any defence for the deed.

But 'tis a common proof  
That lowliness is young ambition's ladder  
Whereto the climber upward turns his face;  
But when he once attains the topmost round  
He then unto the ladder turns his back,  
Looks into the clouds, scorning the base degrees  
By which he did ascend; so *Cæsar* may.  
Then, lest he *may*, prevent.

Possibility is again announced as the basis of action. The logical nature of this category is not very difficult of comprehension. In the Possible the Real and the Unreal are not yet differentiated, therefore it cannot have any determination. But action is something determined, and since the Possible has no such element in itself, the subject alone can make the necessary determination. Everything is possible, and just as well impossible. Who is to determine? Only the individual, and he must also act on this determination. Thus subjectivity asserts its absolute validity, and this is what is meant by the subjective or moral point of view which in this play is represented by Brutus.

And since the quarrel  
Will bear no color for the thing he is,

(what he now is, cannot justify our act—another declaration that *Cæsar* had as yet done nothing which merited death,)

Fashion [stat-] it thus: that what he is, augmented  
Would run to these and these extremities;  
And therefore think him as the serpent's egg,  
Which hatched would as his kind grow mischievous,  
And kill him in the shell.

If you cannot find a real crime, draw on your imagination and you are sure to discover one. It will be noticed that in the foregoing soliloquy no charge is made against any act of *Cæsar's*. And yet the world has generally held that it is not moral perversity which utters these declarations—nay, that it is moral greatness. What, then, is the matter? *Brutus* is not able to subordinate the various spheres of moral duty when they come in conflict. He recognizes them all, to be sure, but not in their true limitations. Hence when they collide with one another, he becomes a mass of confusion, strife, and contradiction. Herein lies his immeasurable inferiority to *Cassius*, who clearly comprehends these limitations and

acts upon them. It is intellectual weakness, the inability to rise out of merely moral considerations in political affairs. The trouble is with Brutus' head, not his heart. He intends to do the right thing, only he does not do it. He acts not so much in opposition to, as outside of, his real intellectual conviction; for mark! he is not at all inwardly convinced by his own specious reasonings. He gets beyond his intellectual sphere, is befogged, and lost. So after all we see that intellect is necessary to the highest moral action. We have had much talk of late concerning the cultivation of the intellect to the neglect of morality. But it seems that Shakespeare has here contrasted these two sides of human nature in the most effective manner, decidedly to the disadvantage of the latter. For Brutus is a man of intense moral susceptibility, yet of small mental calibre; the result is that his mistakes and (what is worse) his transgressions are appalling. Shakespeare has thus illustrated a truth which it will do no hurt to repeat now-a-days, that the content of a moral act can only be given by intelligence, and that the cultivation of intellect is in so far the cultivation of morality in its true sense. Hence our schools are our best, and indeed are fast becoming our only moral teachers. To be sure, submission does not always follow insight; men often know the right, but do it not: still we can hardly ascribe this to their knowing it, nor should we assert that they were better off if they had known it. For in the one case there is a possibility of their becoming good men; but if they have no comprehension of the good, it is impossible.

In ordinary times of civil repose, we should say of Brutus, what a noble citizen! No one could be more ready to fulfil his duties to his family, his fellow-men, and his country. But it must be recollected that these duties were the prescribed usages, customs, and beliefs, of his nation; they were given to him, transmitted from his ancestors. But when prescription no longer points out the way, such a man must fall, for he has no intellectual basis of action. Still the morality of mankind in general is prescriptive, and does not rest upon rational insight: they follow the footsteps of their fathers. Hence it is that most people think that Brutus is the real hero of the play, and that it is wrongly named. But this was



certainly not Shakespeare's design, for it was very easy to construct a drama in which Brutus should appear as triumphant, by having it terminate at the assassination of Cæsar with a grand flourish of daggers, frantic proclamations of liberty, and "sic semper tyrannis." Shakespeare, however, takes special pains not to do any such thing, but to show the triumph of Cæsar's thought in the destruction of the conspirators. Still Brutus remains the favorite character with the multitude, because they do not and cannot rise above his stand-point, and to-day he is often taken as the great prototype of all lovers of liberty.

The effect of intellectual weakness combined with strong moral impulses appears, then, to be the meaning of this character. It is amazing to observe its contradictions and utter want of steadiness of purpose; nor are they at all exaggerated by the poet. This man, who could assassinate his best friend for the public good, cannot, when a military leader, conscientiously levy contributions for his starving soldiers; "For," says he, "I can raise no money by vile means." That is, he would sacrifice that very cause for which he committed the greatest crime known to man, to a moral punctilio. This may be moral heroism, but it is colossal stupidity. Furthermore, in every instance in which Cassius and he differed about the course to be pursued, Brutus was in the wrong. He, out of moral scruples, saved Antony, against the advice of Cassius; this same Antony afterwards destroyed their army and with it their cause. Moreover, the battle of Philippi, the fatal termination of the conflict, was fought in disregard of the judgment of Cassius. And finally he dies with a contradiction upon his lips, for he says that Cato was a coward for committing suicide, and then declares that he will never be taken captive to Rome alive, and shortly afterwards falls upon his own sword. Perhaps, however, he came to the conclusion that his country needed his death, for he said in his celebrated speech, "I have the same dagger (which slew Cæsar) for myself when it shall please my country to need my death." This oft-quoted and favorite sentence seems to be usually regarded as expressing the very quintessence of moral sublimity and heroic self-sacrifice. But one naturally asks who is to be judge whether his country needs his death

—the country or himself? If the country, then he would be a criminal publicly condemned, and there would be no necessity for his dagger, since his country would furnish him both instrument and executioner free of charge. But if he was to be the judge himself, why did he commit such villainous acts that in his own opinion his country needed his death? All this was intentional no doubt on the part of Shakespeare, for it comports too well with the contradictory character of Brutus to admit of any other supposition. One imagines that if the old bard could have foreseen all the frothy vaporings and mock-sentimentality to which this innocent absurdity has given rise, he would still be laughing in his grave. Such is the *true* irony of the great poet, so much insisted on by some critics, which portrays the finitude of individuals, classes, even whole historical periods, so adequately that they themselves take delight in the picture.

This difference in character between Brutus and Cassius must lead to a collision, and accordingly we have the celebrated quarrel in the 4th Act. Here we see the respective stand-points of the two men fully exhibited; Brutus is haughty, insulting, and plumes himself upon his moral integrity, though it seems that he was ready to take and indeed asked for some of the money which Cassius had raised by "vile means"; Cassius, on the contrary, keeps restraining himself, though exasperated in the highest degree, and ultimately leads the way to reconciliation. No personal feelings can dim to his eye the great end which he has in view, nothing must be allowed to put it in jeopardy: hence the quarrel, which would otherwise doubtless have terminated their friendship, if not have ended in a personal encounter, is healed as speedily as possible. There is a mightier collision pending which hushes all lesser strifes.

A further contrast to Brutus is Antony. This loose reveller is true to his friend Caesar and avenges him, but the rigid moralist abandons and slays him. Antony is, moreover, a man of pleasure, and acts from impulse; Brutus pretends to be a philosopher and to be guided by fixed principles. "I am no orator as Brutus is, but a plain, blunt man, that love my friend." Antony's highest end was personal devotion to one whom he loved: he in nowise comprehends the move-

ment of either Cassius or Cæsar. Thus both Antony and Brutus are quite on the same spiritual plane, and hence Antony can justly reproach Brutus for his faithless conduct with a cogency which the latter can by no means answer :

Witness the hole you made in Cæsar's heart  
Crying *long live, hail Cæsar!*

Yet Antony does most ample justice to the motive of Brutus, and seems to place all worthiness of an action in the motive, —a point of view, it needs hardly be said, purely moral and subjective:

This was the noblest Roman of them all;  
All the conspirators, save only he,  
Did what they did in envy of great Cæsar;  
He only in a general honest thought  
And common good to all made one of them.

These lines are often quoted as Shakespeare's actual opinion of Brutus ; but they are spoken by Antony, to whom they appropriately belong, and to nobody else. It is by no means certain that Shakespeare's own views are to be found always in the utterances of his characters. The dramatic poet expresses his convictions in the action, in the collision, and, above all, in the catastrophe. Judging by this standard, we should most decidedly aver that the above lines did not express Shakespeare's personal opinion. Both Antony and Brutus, therefore, have quite the same intellectual standpoint, though differing much in their outward lives ; but the one was true to it, the other was not. Brutus ought to have acted as Antony, to be faithful to his deepest convictions, and to have remained friendly or at least indifferent to Cæsar. Cassius alone can *intellectually* slay Cæsar.

Such appears to be the general purport of this play. Much might be said upon its formal excellence—the poetic beauty, rhetorical finish, and unusual clearness of the language, making it a favorite with many who read nothing else of Shakespeare—the logical arrangement of the parts, the happy consecution of motives ; but all this we shall leave to our reader to follow up at his leisure. Some of Shakespeare's fairest gems of characterization are found in the minor personages of the play, as Portia, the absolute type of wifehood, and Lucius, the faithful slave ; but their basis is plain and needs not

to be specially developed. Moreover, the mediations employed are deserving of the most careful study on account of their truth and profundity, as when for example in the third act the Poet makes popular oratory the means by which the tide is turned against the conspirators, and thus assigns its place as one of the chief political instrumentalities in the ancient and modern world. Also those curious supernatural manifestations, as the cry of the soothsayer, "Beware the ides of March," the appearance of the ghost of Cæsar, the presence of a lion in the streets, the wrathful signs of the heavens, seem to demand some rational explanation as well as the strange anthropological phenomena, as the presentiments of Cæsar and Brutus, and the dreams of Calpurnia and Cinna the Poet. Here is a side which Shakespeare always elaborates in full, but which can be best treated in a separate paper. The object at present is to bring into prominence the ethical world of Shakespeare and its immense significance, for these same collisions are taking place to-day, and indeed their true solution constitutes the comprehension of and mastery over the practical world.

To recapitulate; there are three leading moments in the drama: 1. Cæsar in the consummation of his world-historical career, on the pinnacle of his power and glory; 2. The reaction of the State against him headed by Cassius; 3. The negation of this reaction, the restoration and absolute validity of the Cæsarean movement. Hence we see that Cæsar is the real hero, and that the piece is justly entitled "Julius Cæsar." We also see, I think, that the collision is between the World-Spirit and the Nation, and that in this struggle three typical characters participate, forming a complete cyclus of characterization. Cæsar represents the world-historical stand-point, Cassius the political, Brutus the moral. Cæsar perishes; the ancient national sentiment rises up for a moment and destroys the individual, for, being of flesh and blood, an assassin may rush upon him and stab him to the heart; but his thought is not thus doomed to perish. Next to him comes Cassius, whose great mistake was that he still had faith in his country; a pardonable error, if any, to mortals! He did not, and perhaps could not, rise above the purely political point of view; to him the State was the ulti-

mate ethical principle of the Universe. Hence he did not comprehend the world-historical movement represented by Cæsar, but collided with it and was destroyed. To me a painful, melancholy character; with all his greatness, devotion, and intelligent activity, still finite and short-sighted. The mistake of Brutus is that he had anything to do with the matter at all—that he took part, or at least a leading part, in this revolution. The collision lay wholly beyond his mental horizon; hence he represents nothing objective, is the bearer of no grand ethical principle, like Cæsar and Cassius. He presumed to lead when he was intellectually in total darkness, trusting alone to his own good intentions. We do not blame him because he was ignorant, but because he did not know that he was ignorant. Every rational being must at least comprehend its own limits, must know that it does not know. We may laud the motive but lament the deed; still man, as endowed with Reason and Universality, cannot run away from his act and hide himself behind his intention, but must take the inherent consequences of his deed in their total circumference.

Brutus is no doubt the sphinx of the play, and has given much trouble to critics on account of the contradictions of his character. He seems both moral and immoral—to be actuated by the noblest motives for the public good, yet can give no rational ground for his act. Indeed we are led to believe that his vanity was so swollen by the flattery of Cassius that it hurried him unconsciously beyond the pale of his convictions. Still Brutus was undoubtedly a good citizen, a good husband, and a good man. But any one of these three relations may come into conflict with the others: which, then, is to be followed? If a man has not subordinated these spheres into a system—which can only be done by Intelligence—he cannot tell what course to pursue. Sometimes he may follow one, sometimes another, for in his mind they all possess equal validity. Hence such a person can only be inconsistent, vacillating and contradictory in his actions; and such a person was Brutus—a good, moral man, who recognized all duties, but did not comprehend their limitations, and hence fell beneath their conflict.

## HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART.

Translated from the second volume of HEGEL'S *ÆSTHETICS*, by MISS S. A. LOEWELL.

CHIVALRY.—II. *Love*.

The second sentiment that plays a dominant part in the representations of romantic art is love.

(*a*) If the fundamental character of honor is the personal subjectivity as it manifests itself in its absolute independence, the highest degree of love, on the contrary, is self-forgetfulness, the identification of the subject with an individual of the other sex. It is the yielding of its independent consciousness, its particular individuality, which is for the first time compelled to have its self-knowledge in the consciousness of another. In this respect, love and honor are opposed to each other. But conversely we can regard love as the realization of a principle which already exists in honor, in so far as it is the necessity of honor to see the infinitude of person which he assumes recognized by another. This recognition is first genuine and total, when not only my personality in the abstract, or in a concrete, particular, and therefore limited sense, is honored by others, but when I, entirely, with all that I am and comprehend in myself, as I have been, am, and shall be, pervade the consciousness of another, constitute its real will, thought, tendency, and most intimate possession. Then this other lives only in me, as I live only in him. Each becomes in this complementary unity first for himself, and they place their whole world and soul in this identity. In this respect there is the same intrinsic infinity of the subject which gives to love its importance in romantic art, an importance which is still enhanced through the higher wealth that the idea of love comprehends.

Love does not depend upon reflection and the casuistry of the understanding, as may often be the case with honor, but finds its origin in emotion, and has at the same time, where sex is concerned, the foundation of spiritualized natural relations. However, this difference is essential only because the individual puts into this union his soul, the spiritual and infinite element of his being. This renouncing of self in order

to be identified with another—this devotion, this disinterestedness, in which the subject finds again the plenitude of his being—this self-forgetfulness, so that the lover exists not, cares not for himself, but finds the sources of his being in another,—constitute the infinite character of love. And its chief beauty is that it does not remain mere impulse and feeling; but imagination, under the charm of love, creates its own world, makes all else, that otherwise pertains to interest, surroundings, purposes of the actual life and being, an ornament of this feeling, draws all into this circle, and only in reference to this assigns to anything a value.

Particularly in feminine characters is love most beautiful, since this sacrificing, this disinterestedness, is carried by them to its highest degree. They conform the whole intellectual and moral life to this emotion, find in it alone an anchor to existence, and, if deprived of love by adversity, vanish as a light that is extinguished at the first rough breath.

In this subjective fervor of emotion, love does not appear in classic art, and generally it only makes its appearance as a kind of manifestation of subordinate moment, or only by the side of sensuous enjoyment. In Homer either no great stress is placed upon love, or it appears in its most worthy form in domestic life, as, for example, the conjugal fidelity of Penelope, or, as the tender solicitude of the wife and mother, in Andromache, or otherwise in moral relations. On the contrary, the tie that unites Paris and Helen is acknowledged as immoral—it is the cause of the horrors and necessity of the Trojan war; and the love of Achilles for Briseis has little internality and depth of emotion, for Briseis is a slave, submissive to the hero's will. In the Odes of Sappho, the language of love rises indeed to lyric enthusiasm, yet it is rather the expression of a flame which consumes, than that of a sentiment which penetrates to the depths of the heart and fills the soul. Love appears in another phase in the graceful little songs of Anacreon. It is a more serene, more general pleasure, which knows neither infinite sorrows, nor the absorption of the entire existence in a single sentiment, nor the submission of an oppressed and languishing soul. It partakes freely of immediate pleasure without attaching to the exclusive possession of precisely this person and no other—

a demand which is as foreign to its thought as the monastic resolution entirely to ignore the relation of sex.

The high Tragedy of the Ancients, likewise, does not know the passion of love in its romantic meaning. Especially in Æschylus and Sophocles it claims no real interest. For although Antigone is the destined wife of Hæmon, and he, unable to save his beloved, destroys himself for her sake, yet he manifests before Creon only objective relations, and not the subjective power of his passion, which he does not even experience in the acceptance of an ardent modern lover. Euripides treats love as a more real pathos—in Phædra, for example; yet even here it appears as a criminal aberration, caused by ardor of blood and by a troubled mind, as incited by Venus, who wishes to destroy Hyppolytus because this young prince refuses to sacrifice upon her altars. So we have indeed in the Venus di Medici a plastic representation of love which leaves nothing to be desired, in delicacy and perfection of form, but the expression of the subjective. Such as romantic art demands is entirely lacking. The same is true in Roman poetry. After the destruction of the republic, and in the accompanying laxity of morals, love appears more or less as a sensuous pleasure. In the Middle Ages, on the contrary, although Petrarch, for example, regarded his sonnets as trifles, and based his reputation upon his Latin poems and works, yet he immortalized himself by this ideal love, which under the Italian heaven is united in an ardent imagination with the religious sentiment. The sublime inspiration of Dante also had its source in his love for Beatrice. This love appeared in him as a religious love, while his energy and boldness attained the energy of a religious artistic intuition, through which he dared that which no one before him had ventured, namely, to exalt himself as supreme judge of the world, and to assign men to Hell, to Purgatory, and to Heaven. As a contrast to this exaltation, Boccaccio represents love, in its vivacity of passion, frivolous, without morality; while he brings before our eyes, in his various tales, the customs of his time and country. In the German Minnesingers love appears sentimental, tender without copiousness of imagination, playful, melancholy, and monotonous. With the Spaniards it is imaginative in expression, chivalric, subtle sometimes



in seeking and defending its rights and duties, of which it makes so many points of personal honor; it is also enthusiastic when displayed in its highest brilliancy. Among the modern French it becomes, on the contrary, more gallant, inclined to frivolity, a sentiment created for poetry. Sometimes it is pleasure without passion, sometimes passion without pleasure, a sublimated entirely reflexive sentiment and susceptibility.

(b) The world and real life are full of conflicting interests. On one side stands society with its actual organization, domestic life, civil and political relations, law, justice, customs, etc.; and in opposition to this positive reality rises love, a passion which germinates in noble, ardent souls, which now unites itself with religion, now subordinates it, forgets it even, and, regarding itself alone the essential, indeed the only or highest necessity of life, is able not only to determine to renounce all else and to flee with the beloved into a wilderness, but may besides deliver itself to all excesses, even to the renouncing of human dignity. This opposition cannot fail to occasion numerous collisions, for the other interests of life also make valid their demands and rights, and thereby affect love in its pretensions to supremacy.

(1) The first and most frequent collision which we have to mention, is the conflict between love and honor. Honor has in itself the same infinity as love, and may assume a significance that is an absolute hindrance in the way of love. The duty of honor may demand the sacrifice of love? In a certain class of society, for example, it would be incompatible with honor to love a woman of inferior rank. The difference in rank is the necessary result of the nature of things; and, besides, it is admitted. Now, since secular life is not yet renewed through the complete conception of true freedom, in which position, vocation, etc., of the subject, as such, disappear, so it is always more or less birth which assigns to man his rank and position; and these conditions are still regarded as absolute and eternal by, although not through, honor, in so far as it makes its own position an affair of honor.

(2) But secondly, besides honor, the permanent substantial powers themselves, state interests, patriotism, domestic duties, etc., may also conflict with love and forbid its realiza-

tion. Especially in modern representations, in which the objective relations of life have already attained complete validity, is this a very popular theme. Love then appears as a powerful right of the subjective nature, so opposed to the other rights and duties that the heart itself banishes these duties as subordinate, or acknowledges them, and comes into conflict with itself and the power of its own passion. The Maid of Orleans, for example, rests upon this last collision.

(3) Yet, thirdly, there may exist in general external relations and impediments which oppose themselves to love: the general course of events, the prose of life, misfortunes, passion, prejudice, wilfulness of others, and events of various kinds. Consequently much hatred is often involved, because the perversity, the crudeness, the wild fierceness of foreign passions, are placed in opposition to the tender beauty of love. Particularly in recent Dramas, Tales, and Romances, we often see the same external collisions. They interest chiefly through our sympathy with the sufferings, hopes and disappointments of the unhappy lovers. The conclusion, according as it is happy or unhappy, satisfies or moves us. Sometimes these productions simply entertain us. This kind of conflict however, which depends upon mere contingency, is of a subordinate nature.

(c) Love presents in all these respects, it is true, an elevated character in so far as it remains in general not only an affection of the sexes for each other, but manifests in itself a rich, beautiful, noble nature; and is, in its unity with others, living, active, brave, self-sacrificing. But romantic love has likewise its limits; namely, there is wanting in its comprehension the general and universal. It is only the personal sense of the individual subject that shows itself satisfied, not with permanent interests and the objective value of human existence—with the well-being of the family, of the state, and of native land—with professional duties, freedom, and religion,—but aspires only to find itself reflected in another, and to have its passion shared. This comprehension corresponds neither to its formal ardor, nor truly to the totality which must be in itself a concrete individuality. In the family, in marriage even, in a moral point of view both public and private, the subjective perception exists as such, and the union

with exactly this and no other individual, may not be the principal thing upon which it depends. But in romantic love all turns upon this principle, the mutual love of two individuals. Indeed, only this or that individual exists who finds his subjective particularity in the contingency of caprice. To every one his beloved appears as to the maiden her lover, always incomparable; each finds the other the supreme type of beauty and perfection. But if it is true that each one makes of the beloved a Venus or something more, it happens that there are many who pass as the same, for, as indeed all know, there are in the world many excellent maidens, pretty or good, who all, or at least the majority, find their admirers, lovers, and husbands, to whom they appear beautiful, virtuous, and lovely. Only this exclusive and absolute preference is purely an affair of the heart, an entirely personal choice; and the unlimited pertinacity indispensable in finding in just this one his life and his highest consciousness, proves itself the eternal choice of necessity. There is recognized in this manifestation the higher freedom of the subjectivity and its abstract choice—freedom, not merely, as the Phædra of Euripides, for pathos, but concerning the absolutely individual will from which it proceeds; choice seems, at the same time, a caprice and stubbornness of the particular individual.

Therefore collisions with love retain ever a phase of contingency and authorized wantonness, especially when love conflicts with substantial interests; because it is the subjectivity as such which opposes its demands, in and for themselves invalid, to that which must make the claim to its own reality dependent upon recognition. The personages in the high Tragedies of the Ancients, Agamemnon, Clytemnestra, Orestes, Œdipus, Antigone, Creon, etc., have likewise, it is true, an individual purpose; but the reality, the pathos, that was the motive of their acts is of absolute authority, and precisely on that account in itself also of general interest. The destiny that befalls them as the result of their acts does not affect us because there is an unhappy destiny, but because there is an unhappy being that at the same time loves absolutely; while pathos, which affects not until it has obtained satisfaction, has a necessary significance. If the

guilt of Clytemnēstra is not punished in this particular case, if the wrong which Antigone as sister experienced is not redressed, then there is in itself a wrong. But these sufferings of love, these heart-rending hopes, this being in love, these infinite anxieties which a lover experiences, this eternal felicity and blessedness that he imagines, are not in themselves of general interest, but pertain only to himself.

Every man indeed has a heart for love and the right to find happiness in loving; but there is no injustice done if he exactly in this case, among these and those circumstances, in respect to precisely this maiden, does not attain his aim. For there is no necessity that he interest himself in this capricious maiden, and that we should be interested in an affair so accidental which has neither extension nor universality. This is a phase of coldness that manifests itself in the development of this ardent passion.

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## HEGEL AS PUBLICIST.

Translated from the German of Dr. K. ROSENKRANZ, by G. S. HALL.

When compendiums are printed, their style is usually meagre and skeleton-like; the paragraphs of the Hegelian Encyclopedia, on the contrary, preserve for us a lively, didactic prose, in the intensive fullness of which it is throughout felt that a high geniality has imposed such a limitation upon itself with freedom. Behind these well-weighed words, the rich spirit may be conjectured which is able to broaden each into an entire world of meaning and to defend each in its own peculiar significance.

The Heidelberg professors had made the "Heidelberg Year-book" a critical organ, which, at the time of Hegel's sojourn there, was at the acme of its highest prosperity. At first it represented the stand-point of Romanticism, which at the time of the French dominion had a national patriotic significance. Daub. Creuzer, and Goerres, who had previously been united in the editorship of the "Studien," exercised at first the greatest influence upon it. At the time of Hegel, Paulus had as-

sumed its editorship. He procured Hegel's coöperation. The latter furnished only two criticisms, which however for philosophy as well as for himself were of great significance. One was upon Jacobi, the other upon the Württemberg Constitution.

In the "Critical Journal," which he published with Schelling, he had sharply attacked the stand point of Jacobi. Now, as Jacobi, at the close of his career, began to publish his collective works, he desired to explain himself once more to him, and, aside from all positive differences, to become, out of respect for his endeavors, reconciled with him. This he could not do without affecting Schelling, who in the meantime had come to a most violent rupture with Jacobi. Every recognition of Jacobi on the part of Hegel, although it be qualified, must offend Schelling, however much Hegel might emphasize Schelling's scientific right as opposed to Jacobi. This is a point which for the further relations of both philosophers is so often overlooked. That which is, however, often still more overlooked, was that in this critique Hegel was necessitated to pronounce with reference to atheism.

The reproach of atheism was first raised against Fichte by the government of Saxony — against Schelling by a philosopher, by Jacobi. The latter saw in Schelling's philosophy renewed Spinozism. Against this Hegel had decidedly pronounced in the "Phenomenology of Mind," and had expressly recognized the Christian religion as absolutely true. Later, in his Logic, he had subjected Spinozism to extended criticism and had shown its untenableness. He accorded right, therefore, to Jacobi in finding Spinozism defective, because, in the conception of the Absolute, it suppresses the moment of subjectivity. It follows hence that substance is to be apprehended, not merely as being and essence, but also as subject; i.e. not merely as causal necessity, but also as self-determining and self-conceiving freedom. The introduction to the third part of his Logic, which he entitled Subjective Logic, has no other purpose. Hegel must, therefore, admit to Jacobi that he could find no satisfaction in Spinozism. It is impossible for one to express himself clearer than Hegel has here done upon the point whether God is to be known only as substance, or at the same time as subject. The Absolute is

not as it were only so far subject as it becomes so in plants, animals, and man, but it is subject in and for itself.

When Jacobi, however, affirmed that we could apprehend the Absolute only in faith, only in feeling and not in thought, in self-conscious conception, Hegel denied it in the most decisive way. Jacobi had even advanced to the paradoxical proposition that all demonstrative philosophy must lead to atheism. Hegel, on the other hand, proved the necessity of proof if the question of science was at all involved. The tenderness with which Hegel treated Schelling as well as Jacobi, without in the least sacrificing positive sharpness or his own dignity, makes this critique one of the most exemplary polemics. While he allowed no doubt to remain that he apprehended the Absolute in and for Itself as subject, there was offered to him, on the other hand, an opportunity to express himself in a popular manner upon the conception of the state, which he had done in the short paragraphs of the *Encyclopaedia* only in very general and often dark outlines.

Now came the proceedings of the Diet of Würtemberg upon the new constitution of the state, which, through the confederacy of the Rhine, had grown into a kingdom. The state, even after the war of emancipation, was still a conglomeration of the most diverse particular rights. It needed to be transformed upon the principle of the freedom of person and of property; the equality of all citizens before the law; the uniform distribution of the burdens of taxation; freedom of religion and freedom of the press; the legal participation of the citizens in legislation, and the responsibility of ministers. The kings of Würtemberg recognized this necessity, and laid the plan of a constitution before the aristocracy. It met with determined opposition, because it must of course demand the surrender of many privileges. These were named by the aristocracy "good old German rights," and the royal presumption in proposing to sacrifice them to the common good was rejected with indignation, while the constitution was suspected of being a means of despotism. It was not only the nobility who were hostile, but especially the guild of advocates and notaries, who feared that under a new constitution they would lose much of their influence and of their incomes, because the incessant collisions of multitu-

dinous privileges was the occasion of innumerable suits at law, by conducting which they were able to watch over and plunder the rest of the citizens. After violent contests, in which all the animosity of political passions was let loose, the kingdom finally accomplished its work. The proceedings were printed, and Hegel undertook their criticism. So far as the public was concerned, he here entered a sphere of activity which was entirely new, for the question was now not upon the judgment of a philosophical system by any single author, but upon the political act of two princes of a neighboring state, of the same stock as that from which Hegel was descended, the capital of which was his early home, and the constitution of which, as early as the close of the preceding century, he had made the subject of an unpublished reformitory article. Upon which side should he, as a philosopher, take his stand in his critique? Upon the side of the so-called good old right of the aristocracy? Impossible; for this right was the prerogative of feudalism, the privilege of the guild, the purchased monopoly of the rich. He must, therefore, take his stand with the kings, for they were, in this case, the representatives of rational freedom, of the true idea of the state.

That this took place in a small German state does not affect its importance. The reproach has been made that Hegel glorified the petty Schwabian kingdom with Asiatic flattery. The inhabitants of Württemberg themselves, later, became proud of their constitution, and the contests in their chambers have exercised a politically-shaping influence upon all Germany. The names of Uhland and Pfizer were as popular in Berlin as in Stuttgart. Hegel always had strong political instincts. It was natural that the occurrences in his narrow fatherland should interest him intensely. He was patriotic so far as to recognize the independence of nationality as one of the essential conditions of a healthy state life; but he was not patriotic in the polemic, fanatic sense, the Germanic tendency of which proceeded from Fichte, Fries, and others, who attempted to organize the student corps into an exclusively German party. In his opening address at Heidelberg, Hegel had emphasized the maintenance of our nationality itself as a chief moment, through which the higher advancement of scientific thought might be secured among us. No modern

state can make national purism its principle, because the purity of races is everywhere impaired. Germans have everywhere come in contact with Roman, Celtic and Slavic elements, and the reason of the state must subject itself to the peculiarity of its population. The Jews, scattered among all nations, are careful that this be not forgotten. That which in his youth had so interested Hegel in the French revolution, viz. the creation of a state in accordance with the Idea, now attracted him strongly in the proceedings in his fatherland. In France it was the people who wrested the modern state from the kingdom, while in Würtemberg it was the kingdom which must win the free constitution from the people. In the introduction to his critique he delineated this noteworthy situation in a masterly way, such as was possible only from a profound understanding of history. Hegel's style has nothing of what is wont to be called rhetoric in the ordinary sense, for all phrases, all Ciceronian *ornate et copiose dicere*, was opposed to his strictly matter-of-fact nature. The German language stood at his command in rare compass, to give to his thoughts the most happy and manifold utterance. The dramatic vividness with which he depicted the course of the proceedings of the Diet is incomparable. The loftiness of his style passes over now and then to the bitter *comique*, with which he lashes the hypocrisy of that egoism which perverts the words fatherland, freedom, right, fidelity, and uses them against laws and princes in order to conceal its own private interests. The case which Hegel treated as a concrete one is the same in all history. It is the conflict of the progress of freedom with positive right, which over against the self-consciousness of more cultured reason has become a wrong, and struggles against dissolution because it has hitherto been accredited as a recognized chartered right. On this point Hegel had a perfectly philosophical consciousness, and the incisive words with which he expressed it will ever renewedly awaken the liveliest interest in the historian and the philosopher. Those who know the course of real affairs will not wonder that the passion of the reactionary party which Hegel, with his firm frankness and truly statesmanlike superiority had found so sensitive, turned upon him with rage because he defended the princes in their constitu-



tional endeavors, and abused him as a servile man. Hegel has never uttered a word respecting this suspicion; he was above such insinuations of the crowd. It is, however, unprecedented that now, after several decades, his enemies are not weary of persecuting him, on account of this critique, as an anti-popular servant of kings, without being able to adduce a single actual proof for such bitter disparagement.

Even a historian like Gervinus, in his history of modern times, is not free from this acridity which has become traditional. Dr. Haym's groundless aspersion of Hegel, in his work "Hegel and His Time," as if he would have purchased, by his criticism of the government of Würtemberg, the chancellorship of the University of Tübingen, I have answered in my "Hegel's Apology before Dr. Haym." The proof which I demanded for the foundation of such an insinuation has not yet to my knowledge been furnished.

Since the July revolution, Germans have made great progress in political science. In this they were very backward when Hegel wrote. Hegel lacks the declamatory pathos in which Fichte was so great, as well as the diplomatic dexterity of a Genz; but the philosophic sobriety which permeates his political inspiration imparts to his language, in its apt acuteness, a peculiar nobility. The great philosopher enchants us ever by the exalted naivety of his soul, which knows no other cultus than the truth; and this naivety, replete with a deep infusion of history, makes the philosopher a classic publicist, who judges his age, and knows how, fittingly, to say to it what it has to do.

#### HEGEL, PRUSSIA, AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

The local spirit of the beautiful city of Heidelberg seems to favor the so-called positive sciences rather than philosophy, and Spinoza indulged perhaps a proper instinct when he refused the call of the elector of the Palatinate to a professorship there. And yet Hegel's efficiency during the two years, 1816 and 1817, in which he lectured there, was of comparatively great significance. He prepared, however, in 1818 to go to Berlin, with which he had previously had relations. In this, as in all that is historical, the element of chance can be discerned, but for Prussia as well as for Hegel it was

necessity. Prussia is the philosophic state *par excellence* in Germany, which has allowed no great German philosopher since Leibnitz to remain outside it. The chair which Fichte had occupied had been vacant since 1814. Solger proposed Hegel for the place. In the biography of Fries the correspondence is given which DeWette carried on with him concerning this call. Fries wished especially to come to Berlin. DeWette, his theological disciple, left no means untried to influence the majority of the Senate in his favor. In this electoral contest, and the passionate agitations which attended it, the two parties may be seen which in the University of Berlin opposed one another even more resolutely, and in which was reflected the great antithesis which pervaded the entire age.

At the beginning of the century, Hegel had almost abhorred Prussia on account of its bureaucracy and its court service, and had foreseen the fate of the Prussian army at Jena. But this state had undergone a new birth which showed that it yet bore within itself a great future. This future is at the same time the future of Germany itself, for the Ultramontans and the South-Germans may abuse Prussia as much as they will; still Germany will not again get rid of Prussia, for it is the only German state that can save united Germany and conduct it to a higher national plane.\* The Congress of Vienna would not round off Prussia: it gave to it the Rhine province as an *enclave* between Hussia, Nassau, Rhinic Bavaria, France, Belgium and Holland, and thus imposed upon it the Watch on the Rhine. Eventually, the Rhinic province with Westphalia could be again snatched from Prussia, and be declared an independent kingdom for any prince. Prussia must make vast endeavors so to organize its own military power that it could be ready to commence war with France at any moment. It was thus that it became stronger than its intriguing enemies had intended. Its geographical position brought it into immediate territorial contact with Russia as well as with France, as was the case with no other German state. It bordered on Austria and (with the exception of Württemberg and Baden) nearly all the German middle and

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\* This was written in 1868.—ED.

smaller states. Although the wasp-like contour of the Prussian state was made the occasion of much reproach, yet it was from the very fact of its many-sided border-contacts that it rose to an influence over all Germany, which rendered the foundation of the *Zollverein* possible as the first real unification of the German states. With the Rhine it had also taken into its domain the last of the great streams which flow from south to north into the sea. Cologne, under the Prussian administration, rose to renewed prosperity as a commercial city. Besides the encouragement of material interests, Prussia had undertaken through the Rhine provinces the difficult task of winning the confidence of the other Rhinic provinces, for the intensity of the prejudices with which these were then filled against the Prussian government can scarcely yet be correctly represented.

Hegel entered the Prussian state as a stranger. He felt in Berlin that an intense thought-life pervaded the entire atmosphere. This predominance of North-German reflection impressed him favorably with Berlin, because it responded to his character as a philosopher. He unduly transferred the impression which Berlin made upon him to the entire Prussian state, just as most Frenchmen and Englishmen are wont to do who conceive the one-sided views of Berlin to be the exhaustive expression of the entire Prussian community. Hegel began to interest himself in Prussia as a model state, but as a philosopher he cherished still another ideal which by no means tallied with the actual condition of Prussia.

That, which the great Prussian statesmen and military heroes of that epoch strove for, surpassed, in its tendency, the Hegelian conception of the state, in the greater participation which it allowed to the people in legislation. In a state where the system of defence obliged all citizens without exception to defend the land from invasion, they would admit all to participate in legislation. In a state where municipal communities administered their own affairs, the question of a bureaucratic omnipotence of the ministers as in France could not arise. In a state where rights of seigniorry and tutelage were removed, where the possession of land and industry were left free, where access to all state offices was conditioned

only upon proof of competency,—in such a state mediæval conditions, forms, institutions, could find no longer a footing.

Rejuvenated, well-matured Prussia was built from 1810 to 1815 upon democratic foundations, which were given by the monarch himself. The elevation of the entire system of instruction by Wilhelm von Humboldt and von Altenstein, the establishment of the universities of Berlin, Breslau and Bonn, and the more munificent endowment and equipment of those at Halle and Königsberg, was accomplished in a democratic sense, for Prussia had made attendance at schools compulsory upon all. But after Napoleon had been conquered, and especially after his death, the reaction of the aristocracy and hierarchy against the political establishments of Prussia grew stronger even in Prussia itself. It resulted in that sad policy of restoration which now we are wont to call, from its most prominent representative, the policy of Metternich. This policy invaded Prussia, and began to imprint upon the government a political character of distrust for the people. The immediate result was that the people found no legislative representation, but provincial diets were established in their stead.

The combinations of the student-corps furnished occasion and pretext to the governments to persecute the democratic movement as revolutionary. Fichte, in his discourses in Berlin on the German nation, had declared the then passing generation incapable of achieving a *renaissance* by reason of the general depravity, and he called on the better trained young men to save the nation. These young men had actually followed with enthusiasm the call of the king into the war with France, and, thirsting for freedom and braving death, had shed their blood upon the battle-field. They dreamed of a great united German kingdom with an emperor at its head. In songs of wondrous beauty they sang of the indissoluble fraternity of Germans, and of the future glory of the new kingdom which was to arise from it. And not youths alone grew eloquent over the resurrection of the old Barbarossa, whom the saga makes to slumber with sword in hand, now in Kyffhäuser on the golden Au, now under the mountain near Salzburg: but many men joined this movement, and, old and

young, united in societies for physical culture in gymnastic halls and in Turner expeditions. The danger of this tendency lay in over-exciting patriotic feeling, and in over-stimulating national purism for want of deeper political conceptions. The attack on President von Ibell and the murder of Kotzebue by Sand were outbursts of an enthusiasm which had degenerated to fanaticism. As the student-corps conceived it to be a holy resolve to murder Kotzebue, they might with the same propriety resolve to remove by assassination a prince who was displeasing to them.

Princes trembled upon their unsteady thrones before such a secret tribunal, and the military trials filled not only fortresses with their sacrifices, but occasioned, after the resolutions of Carlsbad, a fanatical tendency to censure all liberalistic movements. Hegel, no doubt, harmonized with the governments in their opposition to these movements and excesses of the students; he certainly never approved of the frequently terrible severity of the Inquisition. What could he do? He sought to save the young by offering to them rational conceptions of right and of the state. Many in maturer years have thanked him for reconciling them with the present by his instruction—by explaining to them, instead of the Utopian ideal of their morbid aspiration, the organism of the state. While he won the love of very many sturdy members of the student-corps, he remained filled with inappeasable indignation against the leaders of the corps and especially toward Fries.

He published in 1821 a text-book on the Philosophy of Right and of the State, in which he more widely developed the brief hints in the paragraphs of his Encyclopedia. As in the latter so here in this presentation he assumed a more dogmatic tone, and in the numerous remarks which were directed against views which deviated from his own, a more polemic tone than that which he had allowed to pervade the dialectic genesis of the Phenomenology and the Logic. The didactic end he had in view might justify this form, for he sought only to establish a foundation for his lectures; but it remains a subject of regret that he treated so important material only in the form of categorical dictation, for the element of proof became therefore too meagre. Within this limit his language,

like the style of inscriptions on monuments, is uniformly significant. Since he presented the dialectic here only in the general construction, he became for the first time intelligible to the public at large, which has an appetite only for the *results* of thought.

It is quite inconceivable how the construction of servility to the Prussian government can be put upon this work, as if in his paragraphs he had copied the Prussian state as it was empirically presented to him. Hegel did not become false in Prussia to that conception of the state which he had defended in Bavaria against the Würtemberg reaction. Prussia was then not a constitutional state; there was no publicity or oral procedure in the maintenance of justice, no freedom of the press, no equality of citizens before the law, no participation of the people in legislation or assent on their part to taxation,—and all this Hegel taught as a philosophic necessity. When in remarks he lashed the caricatures which often distorted the idea in the field of every-day reality, even this was quite in order, and even this contributed to clarify conceptions. In order to bring him under the suspicion of the crowd, these caricatures, painted with satirical colors, have been excerpted and peddled about as his own definitions.

That which distinguished Hegel from preceding philosophers was the conception of constitutional monarchy as the absolute form of the state. He well knew that a state could pass through different constitutional forms, but as a philosopher he considered this the only form which fully corresponded to the idea of freedom. It is a very common opinion that a philosopher can only be a republican in politics, although it is generally added by way of lament that the imperfection, and especially the moral weakness of man, renders the realization of a republic very difficult. Hegel contradicted this current view by the emphasis with which he insisted on monarchy. Many make this a ground of reproach against either the profundity, or, still worse, against the sincerity, of his thought. He was, however, in thorough earnest with his deduction of monarchy, and he had taught it in Jena just as well as in Heidelberg and Berlin. He had a rich political experience, having made himself acquainted with the most diverse constitutions, including those of the republics at Bern

and Frankfort. He had witnessed the rise of the French republic and its transition to despotism, the fall of the Polish and the German elective monarchies as well as the impotence of hereditary monarchies, which cherished only dynastic egotism and which had never been organically united with the people. He did not, however, derive his proof of the necessity of hereditary monarchy from experience or from comparative studies, but from the conception of the sovereignty of the state, which must exist self-consciously in a real person and which must be securely removed from the instability of parties. Such an influx of nature into history would be fortuitous and unphilosophical, if, in the first place, the royal family itself had not been mediated historically, so that its call to the governmental functions was a natural fact; and secondly, if the ruler had not the freedom to renounce the throne if he felt himself uncalled to rule. Montesquieu was the first who, in his *Esprit des Loix*, made the conception of a constitutional government popular and put forward the view of the separate organization of the powers of government. Hegel is the philosopher who taught, not like Kant, the general necessity of the representative system, but who identified the idea of constitutional monarchy with that of the fully developed, rational state. He was very far from deifying the person of the prince in the sense of the abstract legitimist theory, for he often said that in a well-organized state very little depended on the special excellence of the ruler; he was only the essential conclusion of the ascending series, the personal summation of the entire state—the dot on the “i,” which without it would be a mere perpendicular mark. His tendency to relegate the person and the individuality of rulers to relative indifference was exhibited in his polemic with Haller, who sought with his restorational policy to make rulers, by the grace of God, the private possessors of land and people.

If we compare this legal and political philosophy of Hegel with the principles which he had earlier advocated at Jena, we shall find the same fundamental idea, viz. that of realizing a system of ethics in the state, and shall at the same time see how untiringly he had labored, and revised his labor, in the development of this idea. In his original system, the plan

was at the same time the most simple and the most inclusive, because there he omitted the contraposition of legality and morality. He there divided jurisprudence into three parts. In the first, he treated the elementary distinctions of right, viz. freedom, personality, labor, acquisition of property, exchange and commerce, and up to the origin of the family. In the second, he treated the negation of all these positive elements, the violation of Right—trespass and crime—in all its forms, and the entire world of Injustice. In the third, he presented ethics, which in laws and customs constitutes the will directed to the realization of the good, and in courts constitutes the negation of the negation caused by injustice. Later, he construed ethics as the higher unity of legality and morality, so that the system is finally divided thus: (1) right in itself, (2) morality, (3) ethics. Under the latter he subsumed the idea of the family, of civil society, and of the state, and closed with a perspective into universal history. Hegel had great horror of a state founded merely upon right, where only the externality of personal justification made the frigidity of egoistic rectitude a dominant principle. In this respect, also, he bore a certain grudge against Roman jurisprudence. He regarded with great aversion a state in which the moral ideal held the sceptre, and where all should be made to depend upon good intention, upon subjective consciousness, and upon the conflict of virtue with vice. This moral stand-point, which goes to the extreme of calling the vanity of its own conceit “warmheartedness,” and, as satirized in the *Xenia*, “does the behests of duty with horror,” and which finally ends in the complacent pride which, in order not to soil itself, does nothing at all,—this stand-point of abstract internality he treats with almost malicious disparagement. Hegel desired a state which should neither stiffen into the mechanism of a merely external right, nor grow stolid in the virtuous feeling of mere internality. An ideal here ever hovered before him similar to that which Hölderlin has depicted with such aspiration in his *Hyperion*, and from which he has complained that the Germans stood so far removed. He approached here nearer to Fries and to DeWette than he thought, and Michelet has now openly acknowledged this in his *Philosophy of Right* by the development of the idea of unions



and associations. Hegel was so strongly possessed with the idea of the state as the "terrestrial God," as he termed it, that in this enthusiasm he can be compared only with Plato, to whom he expressly appeals in the preface of his text-book, although, as he expressly showed in the extended criticism in his *History of Philosophy*, he rejected the content of this state.

Hegel was convinced that his construction of practical philosophy was the only correct one, and that his method was correspondingly correct. In a remark in the *Psychology*, which Boumann had printed, he expressed himself with the greatest distinctness, because the antithesis of the objective and the subjective in right and morals was absolutely cancelled by the unity of both in ethics. With such divisions of the subject, one must not look to the right hand or to the left, but must submit himself entirely to the necessity of the idea. I confess still that I have ever found ground of offence in the position he assigns to morality. With such transitions—as those from subject to object, or from object to subject—alone, it is not accomplished. The relation of the general to the special and of the abstract to the concrete is also involved.

The most general conception of the entire practical sphere is the conception of good; for the conception of will in general, without reference to its content, falls to the sphere of psychology. The domain of psychology extends as far as the formal freedom which seeks happiness in the satisfaction of the appetites and passions, i.e. as far as Eudæmonism. Ethics, on the other hand, proceeds from the necessity with which good determines the will as with the truth of its contents. That will only which recognizes and which realizes good, or its law, is really free. Hegel did not forget these elementary determinations; but, instead of making them constitute the first part of the *Ethics*, he treated them only in the form of an Introduction.

The general conception of good can be realized only through the power of the individual will to which it prescribes duty as the categorical imperative. This is the sphere of morality, which describes the special essence of action. It is an old dispute in morals whether the conception of duty must precede that of virtue, or the converse. This dispute rests upon the fact that we reflect upon the contents of action according

to our concrete determinations. Each of these may be presented as a duty or as a virtue. Hegel condemned the latitude with which this was wont to be done by rightly declaring that each moment of the moral life could issue either in the form of duty or of virtue. Family piety, e.g., becomes the duty of filial, paternal and fraternal love. It need therefore, according to Hegel, only be added to the conception of piety that it constitutes now the duty and now the virtue of the members of the family; and likewise with all the relations of family and of state. We find, therefore, in Hegel no special doctrine of duty and of virtue, because the ethical organism embraces them as its vital development. This thought of Hegel is quite correct, and by means of it the useless and extensive repetitions of content in the ordinary treatment of morals is dispensed with. The meagreness to which he reduced the *morale* does not result from this. Hegel devotes only three chapters to morals, viz.: (1) design and guilt; (2) intention and well-being; (3) the good and conscience. But the idea of duty contains an entire system of determinations which through the moral organism are entirely independent from its concrete contents, e.g. the difference between categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive duty, or the difference between the duty of love and that of compulsion. The same is true of the conception of virtue, the peculiar field of which lies in the difference of virtues, as physical, intellectual, and practical and physical training, and in the formation of character. There is no doubt that the acquisition of all virtues is our duty; but it does not follow thence that the conception of virtue must precede that of duty, for virtue is dependent upon the conception of duty. I must first know what I ought to do before I venture to act. The realization of duty is virtue. Children, e.g., know nothing at all of virtue. Educators make cleanliness, temperance, punctuality, honesty, modesty, etc., duties for them, and accustom them to practise them. With every virtue, the conception of duty, that it is something which *ought to be*, is posited. The conception of action as something which must precede the virtuous act, can be only perfected in the conception of duty as complementary to a necessary action.

The transition from morality to ethics Hegel makes through

the conception of conscience in so far as it can sublimate itself through its reflexion. According to him, the eternal laws of ethics, which man must obey without equivocation, are the positive negation of all moral skepticism. But this is the difference of right in general from morality; for right is the will which is valid not for me alone, but for all others as Good. In morality, I stand only before my *forum internum*, before conscience; in right, also, before the *forum externum*, before recognition through general consciousness. That right attains also the external form of a law fixed by authority or by letter, detracts nothing from its high significance, any more than does the fact that empirical rights can exist which in their content are unethical, like the *jus primæ noctis* of the French feudal lords. The circumstance that right can be practised without moral disposition detracts still less from its significance; for right itself is not responsible for this. I must proceed consciously in the practice of right, and must regard in so doing the well-being of others. The internality of the moral stand-point for itself, which is therefore so often apprehended as the stepping-stone to religion, appears higher than the mere externality of positive right; but there is manifestly nothing in right in itself which hinders the existence of morality. Hegel always accepts right in itself only as formal; he cannot deny, however, that ethics assumes essentially the form of right. Private, then, as well as public right embraces the same content which exists as the ethical (*Sitte*). The decay of all ethical organisms takes place when morality evacuates them and leaves only the naked, atomic person with the demands of his denuded rights. Hegel makes the transition from right itself to morality through the idea of imputation, which leads to the idea of premeditation and guilt, and, further on, to intention and well-being. These, however, are ideas which right, in the conception of will and of action in general, already presupposes for itself, as appears immediately in the idea of wrong.

The distinction of ethics from right and from morality rests, according to Hegel, upon the fact that right and duty are always posited as unity, as correlatives, in their determinations. This reciprocity is by no means wanting to personal right; for the right of my own personal freedom evokes,

as my right, the duty to respect the right of another; and not to treat him as a slave; the right to acquire property is identical with the duty to respect that of another; the service which is engaged to me by a bargain with another, involves the duty of a return service on my part, etc. A Crusoe upon a lonely island can live very morally, but there exist for him only duties; right exists for him only *potentia*, and can only develop itself *actu* when at least one other person lives with him, because only with this other would a recognition of his willing and acting become possible. He might, indeed, be immoral toward himself; he might be lazy, intemperate, unchaste, etc., but a crime or trespass he could not commit.

The full division of right is left incomplete by Hegel because it revolves only about property. He distinguishes (1) property, (2) fraud, (3) wrong. But fraud is itself a wrong, and the division must rather, according to his own dialectic rule of the negation of the negation, be thus: (1) personal right (personal freedom, property, contract); (2) wrong; (3) punishment. These are the elementary ideas of all right which can be separated from morality only violently by abstraction. Contract, e.g., imposes upon me the duty of fidelity and consciousness in the execution of the stipulation. Fraud is not only an action which affects right, but it is at the same time immoral; for through it I violate the duty of truthfulness. I do not question that in ethics right and morality should be one; but I ascribe right to ethics, which, even in its loftiest formations, cannot dispense with the objective form of right. The constitutions of nations, on the higher planes of state-culture, are not mere *naïve* traditions, but written laws, in which they with consciousness express what conception of ethics and of good they have. The anti-thesis of ethics within itself is the individual right of the single person, and the particular right of the organic community, of family, of civil society, and of state. Particular sublates itself as universal right, which is brought out in the history of the state as the right of mankind in and for itself, and which we are therefore wont to call the right of universal citizenship. In his earlier plan of ethics, Hegel concluded with the conception of colonization, by which a state transcends its own limits, producing other states. The

thought, however, of including the conception of history itself in the system of philosophy was more correct.

Hegel had avoided making use of the traditional terminology in his Philosophy of Right, unquestionably because it was not congruent to his ideas. He, therefore, named private right "abstract right," in order to indicate that in it abstraction was still made from morality, to which he first passed with the conception of imputation. This is, however, an error, for imputation [responsibility] is in general a conception identical with that of freedom. "Concrete" ought to be opposed to "abstract" right. Instead of that, Hegel goes entirely out of the conception of right over into that of morality. In ethics, which contained that which he was obliged to call "concrete right," he did not make use of the word "right" at all in the headings: he speaks only of family, of civil society, of state: only in the latter does he distinguish an internal state-right from an external. It is not to be denied that the Kantian division of public right as state-right, right of nations, and right of the universal citizen, is more simple and more compendious.

But where is church right? This is mentioned by Hegel only in a remark, in which he subordinates the church as a religious society to the ethical supervision of the state. Here he occupies precisely the stand-point of the *éclaircissement*, but in this point *éclaircissement* is right. The faith of a church should be left free from the state, for the sphere of religion is higher than that of politics. But in so far as the church, as such, comes to external manifestation, it should be treated as every other society, for a state-church is as bad as a church-state. It is, in fine, the church which has to do chiefly with the fostering of morality and with the cultivation of conscience.

But all the blame which can be attached to Hegel's construction arises from the profound idea which he had formed of the state, in which he saw the realization of ethics. Hence it was that he subsumed family, society, and state, under the conception of ethics; for with this category he wished to say at the outset that the state was an end to itself, and not a mere means for the security of persons in demanding their eudæmonistic ends or their tem-

poral interests. It is society which exercises its functions in the sphere of cultivated egoism, but in which that which the individual produces immediately for his own use, in the satisfaction of his necessities is converted into a contribution to the well-being of all. The family is the stand-point of the nature-state, of the patriarchal constitution. Society is the stand-point of the culture-state and of the constitution of community. It integrates the family in itself, but produces only the state so far as it rests upon necessity. The state which proceeds from the consciousness of freedom, and with it permeates all its communities, families, and individuals, is the true state. When Hegel is represented as though he had had in mind a centralized or bureaucratic state in which the omniscience or omnipotence of the government destroyed all individual vitality, as Fichte did in his exclusive, commercial state, he is entirely misunderstood. Stahl, who after Hegel distinguished himself greatly in the elaboration of natural right, directed against him a sharp polemic which derived its material from individual propositions wrested from their connection, and from methodic maladroitness. But if we regard the content we find that Stahl fully agrees with Hegel in seeing in the state the system of self-organizing ethics, and in constitutional monarchy the most perfect form of state. The two Greek words *ethos* and *pathos*, which Stahl so much uses, signify only that which Hegel expresses by the German word *Sittlichkeit* (ethics). Ruge in particular has attacked the Hegelian system on the side of democracy. Ruge, an old member of the student-corps, is indebted to the study of Hegel for all the categories with which he has often so happily and successfully figured as a publicist. He cannot forgive Hegel for considering representation of the people in legislation as organized, not atomically according to the mere census, but as socially founded on caste by means of a landed aristocracy, and by elected representatives of municipal corporations. By the orthodox Protestant and by the ultramontane Catholic party Hegel's deification of the state was rejected because he would not have the state a mere mechanism, a centralized or military state, but would rather transfuse it with the self-consciousness of vital freedom. The political dominion of the church was at any rate made en-

tirely superfluous by the Hegelian conception of the state. The state was for Hegel the absolute might in all judicial and ethical relations. He did not make it absolute, however, in a sense that precluded him from knowing and recognizing another higher sphere. This was the sphere of art, religion, and science, for the external culture of which the state should be solicitous, but which internally in its essence must be left free. Here Hegel has expressly admitted that the state itself must have the interest to presuppose in its citizens the existence of a religious disposition, through which it exalts itself above all that is empirical, and above the history of one's own state, into direct relation to the pure absolute. Hegel opposed religious fanaticism most strenuously; and most strenuously has he defended that which ultramontaniam scornfully treats as temporal, viz.: work, property, marriage, moral conviction as basis of action, without need of a confessor; but religion itself he did not reject. He was implacable against all superstition, and as a philosopher he was able to treat it psychologically, while at the same time as a philosopher he must scout it. Hence it was that he gave the political precedence to Protestantism over Catholicism, because the former demands freedom of thought and conscience, and thereby harmonizes with the principle of political self-determination; while Catholicism allows the criticism of scientific investigation only outside the dogmas it has fixed, and by the institution of oral confession it reserves to itself the leading of conscience by its priests.

The state is the peculiar work of freedom of mind, in which it has to deal with its own creations, and becomes revealed as spirit for itself. Right and ethics are therefore in themselves holy through the good which constitutes their content, and do not first become so through the blessings of a church. Sanctification, in a specific sense, belongs to religion in so far as it is the purification of our will which arises from its immediate relation to the Divine will, which is the personal principle of all legality. Religion is internally connected with right and with science, but in their own necessity they are independent of it. The laws of æsthetic formation are now less independent than those of logic. Art proceeds according to the former, science according to the latter. Reli-

gion, so far as it is presentative, or in the forms of worship, must follow æsthetical laws: so far as it is scientific, or in the form of theology, it must follow logical laws; but for itself it follows its own law, as it springs from the relation of man to God, as the peculiar content of religion.

Hegel's doctrine of the state could satisfy none of the parties in the midst of which it appeared. By demanding conformity to law, he stood opposed to feudalism, which is so ready to claim itself a patriarchal constitution; by demanding monarchy, he stood opposed to abstract democracy, which complacently calls itself popular sovereignty; by demanding representation of the people, bureaucracy of state officers, and freedom of the press, sworn courts, the independence of corporations, he opposed the aristocracy; by demanding the subordination of religion, as it appears in the church, to the sovereignty of the state, and the emancipation of science from the authority of the church, he stood opposed to the hierarchy; by demanding ethics as the absolute end of the state, he opposed the industrial state, which seeks to entangle the people in the slavery of factory work by the bait of riches and material comfort; and by the demand of a constitution, he opposed the despotism of *éclaircissement*, which seeks to do all for, and nothing through, the people. We say nothing here of that cosmopolitan socialism which he contrasts with the historical and national character of the state. Hegel's contradiction was not, as it may appear, that of a yet unprejudiced, youthful naivety, but that of a critically elaborated and matured judgment which was fully conscious of its range. Hence, he thoroughly embittered all parties against himself. They turned upon and derided him, now as servile, now as radical. With true manly courage, Hegel held his position against them all, as the appended remarks, which after his death Gans had printed from his lectures on the philosophy of right, show.

A half century has elapsed since its first appearance. The progress of time has actually transcended Hegel in very many points, e.g. in that of the political culture of the masses; but in its chief features the Hegelian state remains still the most rational, and the expression which it attained in Hegel's presentation, the most beautiful. In treating of ordinary,



natural right, his language savors of Roman right, in the manner of the definitions in the Institutes and the Pandects. Fichte cast off this dry method in his system of natural right, but did it in a confused way; while Hegel labored with artistic circumspection, and from the treasury of the German language he coined the purest gold.

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## THE PARMENIDES OF PLATO.

By S. H. EMERY, JR.

[In Quincy and Jacksonville (Illinois) there are two flourishing philosophical clubs that have been prosecuting vigorously the study of Plato. The bravery that attacks Plato, and especially the Parmenides, deserves the highest admiration. Mr. S. H. Emery, Jr., member of the club at Quincy, writes under date of April 21, 1872, as follows; "I have read the first three hypotheses, viz., i. a., i. b., and what *should* be called (it seems to me) i. c., although Jowett includes it in i. b. I make of the first hypothesis: (i. a.) The One considered as indefinite immediate—indeterminable and undetermining is *Nothing*. (i. b.) Of the second: the One considered as self-determining—subject-object—*is* and is the totality; all the categories are embraced in it. (i. c.) Of the third: the becoming of the One is in eternity, and through all its self-determining it remains self-identical." The following essay is an outline of his view of this "great master-work of ancient dialectic." Its author modestly says: "All I claim at all is—to have seen something of the main purpose of the dialogue." —EDITOR.]

Now that we have finished our *first* attempt to discover the true meaning of this most celebrated Platonic Dialogue, it will be an advantage to review the whole matter and see what we have gained.

As to the *form* of the Dialogue, we find it divided into two main divisions—the first a preliminary discussion between Socrates and Parmenides, which leads easily and naturally to the second part, in which Parmenides gives Socrates an example of the true philosophical method. It has occurred to me (although I will confess that my acquaintance with the early Philosophies is not sufficient to enable me to be *sure* that I am right), that Plato intends by this arrangement of the characters to intimate that the Eleatic Philosophy, legitimately extended, goes deeper than the Socratic teachings.

As to the *matter*, we find the Dialogue devoted wholly to the consideration of Ideas in themselves, or, as Socrates calls them, "Ideas in the abstract."

The main hypothesis of the Dialogue is, "If Abstract Ideas are," and is introduced by Socrates at the very outset. The Absolute in itself having been thus presupposed, the problem is to find the connection between *it* and *existing* things.

The first connection tried is "Participation"—"Things partake of the Ideas." This is soon shown to be inadequate. Parmenides then asks Socrates if he has not found these "Abstract Ideas" by abstracting from existing things; and Socrates says, "Yes." Parmenides then shows that this process leads to an "Infinite Progress," from which Socrates endeavors to escape by inquiring if the Ideas may not be *subjective* only; that is, mere generalizations, without any real being for their ground—an entire relinquishing of Ideas as real essence; but Parmenides makes him admit that there cannot be cognitions without a something cognized, and this something is the *Idea*. Socrates then substitutes "Assimilation" for "Participation." Parmenides shows that this also leads to an "Infinite Progress," and then proceeds to explain to Socrates that his method is inadequate; that if Ideas are posited as distinct from (separated and apart from) existing things, and we attempt to find a connection in this external way, we shall never accomplish anything,—but Ideas must be contemplated in their own proper movement, by the true Dialectic method. I believe that this first part of the Dialogue is intended by Plato to present and refute possible erroneous views of the "Platonic Ideas," which would assume them as set off somewhere—isolated from existing things by a chasm which cannot be bridged.

The second part shows us the "Platonic Ideas" in their true aspect. The One and the Many are considered in two series of hypotheses—nine in all. In the first series are developed the consequences which follow from the hypothesis, "If the One is"; and in the second series are developed the consequences which follow from the hypothesis, "If the One is not." This division into nine hypotheses is really only a matter of form, as the whole content is actually developed from the hypothesis, "If One is."

Let us now examine this second part of the Dialogue in detail.

First, "If One is, the One cannot be Many." There follows, then :

"The One is not a whole and will not have parts.

"The One is unlimited.

"The One is formless.

"The One cannot be in any place.

"The One can neither have rest nor motion.

"The One is neither the same nor other in relation to itself or other.

"The One can neither be older nor younger than itself, nor of the same age with itself.

"Therefore the One does not partake of Time, and is not in any time.

"And if not of Time, then not of Being.

"Then the One *is* not and is not One, and is neither named, nor uttered, nor conceived, nor known; nor does anything that is, perceive One." So the One that cannot be Many is disposed of, and the outcome is plain. The Abstract—Indeterminate—Undeterminable—One—is *nothing*—can be neither known nor uttered.

Let us make a fresh start, then, from the hypothesis :

"If One is."

There follows, then :

"One partakes of Being.

"One becomes infinite in number.

"If One is, number is.

"One broken up into parts by existence must be infinite Many.

"One partakes of a figure.

"One is in itself and in Other.

"One is the same with itself and Others.

"One is other than itself and Others.

"One is both like and unlike Others.

"One is both like and unlike itself.

"One touches and does not touch itself and Others.

"One is equal to and greater and less than itself and Others.

"One is equal to and more and less in number than itself and Others.

"One is and becomes older and younger than itself and Others.

"One neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself and Others."

This, then, is the One which *is*—the Self-determining One—which includes all Categories and is Many as well as One. In the first consideration, the One is viewed in its abstract identity and the attempt is made to hold fast to that, but it is useless.

The next hypothesis unites the two first: "If One is both One and Many, and neither One nor Many"—that is, If One considered in its whole truth is both One and Many, and held in indefinite immediateness is neither One nor Many—then the One becomes: The becoming of the One in its various forms (some of which are specified) is not in Time but in Eternity, and in its becoming the One remains self-identical.

"These, then, are the affections of the  $\hat{\text{O}}\text{ne}$ ."

Could there be a more complete statement of the One? The One *is* in eternal becoming, remaining self-identical.

The fourth hypothesis, "If One is, what will happen to the Many?" portrays the true character of the Being: *For-Itself* of the One. The Others are shown to be infinite in their ground, but finite in their particularity; that is, the *For-Itself* Being of the One is infinite variety posited in individual things. The categories which are potential in the One *exist* in the Others, and the Others are a complete image of the One; but it must be always particularly borne in mind that the Others are *not* the One; that back of the *created* is the *Creator*.

The fifth hypothesis shows the result of attempting to separate the Others from the One, and, as might be expected, they prove to be nothing.

The result of the first series of hypotheses is, therefore, that—The One, when truly considered, is all things; when otherwise considered, is nothing; and the others are similarly affected.

The first hypothesis of the second series is, "If One is not." Upon consideration, it appears that this is something quite different from an absolute denial of Being to the One. As we proceed, we find that it is a consideration of the One which *is* from the side of its Being-In-Other. We see, first, that

there is a knowledge of One; then that the One is different from the Others and has determinate quality.

We are considering the One on the side of *variety*, not of *unity*; but we find that, when so considered, the One has Likeness, Unlikeness, Greatness, Smallness, Equality, Inequality, Motion, Rest, &c. We also find that Non-Being is as necessary to the One as Being, neither being complete without the other. We find that the One, when it is moved, is changed, and we recognize the "Finite sphere," Origin, and Decease; but we see also that the change is within the One—that it includes Life and Death—so that it comes into being and perishes, and neither "comes into being nor perishes."

The seventh hypothesis is the same as the sixth, but the "*not*" is accepted as absolute denial of being. The conclusion is soon reached, and from this point of view is inevitable, viz.: The One which is not, has and is nothing at all.

The eighth hypothesis is, "If One is not, what becomes of the Others?" This leads to a consideration of the Others in themselves; that is, it is an attempt similar to that of the (so called) natural philosophers, who investigate phenomena from the phenomenal side, pretending ignorance of the ground on which they depend. We find, however, that before we have proceeded far the One appears, and that all the categories which we found to *exist* in the Others when we considered them truly—that is, from the side of the *Being* of the One—now *appear* to exist in them when considered from the phenomenal side; and we find further, when we come to the ninth hypothesis (which bears the same relation to the eighth that the seventh bears to the sixth), that, no matter how hard we may *try* to leave the One out of our consideration, if we could succeed in our attempt, nothing would be left. It is only the immanent presence of the One in its Not-Being which enables the Others to even *appear*; for, "If One is not, nothing is."

As a summing up of the whole content, we find (to use Hegel's words): "The One, whether it *is* or is *not*, is the *Many* as well as it *itself*, and in relation to *another* as well

as for *itself*—all throughout is *not* as well as *is*; it *appears* and does *not* appear." *Or*: The One is the Totality—All that *is*—Being and Non-Being—One and Many.

NOTE.—I make a distinction between "Being" and "Existence," which I think was suggested to me by the "Secret of Hegel."

## BOOK NOTICES.

*The Sciences of Nature versus the Science of Man: A Plea for the Science of Man.*  
By Noah Porter, LL.D. New York: Dodd & Mead. 1871.

Portions of this essay were delivered as an address before the societies of the Phi Beta Kappa at Harvard and Trinity Colleges, in 1871.

Dr. Porter has done valiant service in the cause of Philosophy in two directions. First, against the Sir William Hamilton school he has contended in favor of the capacity of thought to solve the problems that arise in Consciousness; second, against the modern materialistic and especially the Positivist school he contends for the transcendent interest of Mind over matter, and for its substantiality as compared with the "fleeting shows of sense." In no previous work of his, however, have we seen so successful a vindication of the spiritual over the sensuous as in the little book named above. He begins his essay with a true art-instinct, starting from the summit of modern physical science and inquiring into the pre-suppositions of its structure.

"Science, objectively viewed, is universally conceived as *related knowledge*. Those who limit it most narrowly, assert that it gives us phenomena connected by relations. But facts or phenomena do not connect themselves." "Whence do these relations—these mystic bonds of science—proceed? The interpreting mind does, in some sense, find them already in its hands. Whether they are evolved from its own experience as the progressive acquisitions of association, that cannot be broken, as Mill, Bain and Spencer would teach us; whether, like a mystic veil, they are thrown over the otherwise chaotic phenomena of both matter and spirit by the formative energy of man, as Kant confidently suggests; or whether they are at once the conditions of thought to man because they are conditions of being in nature and God, as the wit and common sense and the research of the profoundest philosophy declare, these relations must, in the study of nature, be confidently applied by man as fast and as far as the chaos which bewilders the infant and overawes the savage, is thought into a cosmos by man's interpreting reason." "Briefly, *an inductive science of nature presupposes a science of induction, and a science of induction presupposes a science of man.*"

"Before Socrates, the physics were as crude as the metaphysics. Both alike were vain guess-work founded on hasty resemblances more rudely interpreted and generalized. From such speculations about matter and

spirit Socrates wisely withdrew his thoughts, that he might first understand himself as nearer and more intelligible to himself than nature. But in learning how to study himself, he also learned the secret of knowing other things. If we may trust the brief expositions of Xenophon and the embellished dialogues of Plato, he learned the rules of cautious observation, wise definition, and comprehensive comparison, and rigidly enforced them as the conditions of all trustworthy knowledge."

The labors of Aristotle, that have stood the test of centuries, the geometry of Euclid, the modern labors of Descartes and Bacon, prove the same result that knowledge of all else is based on self-knowledge. For what can be clearer than that there must be a bridge over from the subject to the object to render knowing at all possible? And this bridge must be the universality of the Ego. For if the Ego has nothing in common with the object—no participation with it, then its activity in the act of knowing will have nothing objective in it, but will be sheer subjective illusion! If knowledge of objects is at all possible, it can be only through "universal and necessary ideas," which are the basis not only of the subjective but likewise of the objective. This identity of subject and object in a universal, is presupposed just as much by the materialist as by the idealist. Those who assume with Büchner that thought is a mode of material motion, do nothing less than assume a universal solvent—material motion—which is general enough to be the same under phenomena as widely different as the bubbling of Professor Huxley's yeast and the thinking activity which speculates upon it—the same in fact in Shakespeare's creative phantasy composing the *Tempest* and in the meteorological disturbance of a real tempest. So far as difference in general presuppositions are concerned—whether one assumes that Mind is a mode of matter or that matter is a mode of mind—both schools assume an identity as the basis. Nor can one resist the conviction that in the subject there is found a deeper and more total identity with the universal essence than on the part of the object as mere object. Seeing that the movement of knowing proceeds from the subject, and goes, through its identity with the universal, to the object, its activity is complete in the perception of the twofold identity—1st, that of the Ego with the universal; 2d, that of the object with the universal: thus each act of knowing is a real syllogism, of which the Universal is the middle term, and subject and object the extremes. When universals themselves are objects, they are related to one another as of different extension and comprehension.

A science of universals is that *First Philosophy* that Aristotle and Bacon speak of. Such a science is a science of Man and at the same time a science of Nature, for it is the universal form and presupposition of all sciences. Such a science, if found by man at all, must be found within himself, for he cannot get out of himself except by its means. It is true that he may be unconscious of the possession of it, as the materialists generally are: they may use general ideas without ever suspecting it, or even while polemicizing against their use. But just as soon as a thinker directs his attention to the form or presuppositions of his scientific system, he will

pass through the experience made by the Greeks in the time of Socrates, just as described by Dr. Porter in this essay.

In his examination of the recent philosophies, he commences with the *Positive Philosophy*, thus summed up by Mill: "We have no knowledge of anything but phenomena (and our knowledge of phenomena is relative and not absolute). We know not the essence nor the real mode of production of any fact, but only its relations to other facts in the way of succession, or of similitude. These relations are constant, that is, always the same in the same circumstances. The constant resemblances which link phenomena together, and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent, are termed their laws. The laws of phenomena are all we know respecting them. Their essential nature, their ultimate causes either efficient or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us." Dr. Porter calls attention to the fact that this philosophy, as thus expounded, is properly if not emphatically metaphysical. And yet Comte claims to have demonstrated that the human mind passes through the stages of Theology and Metaphysics as crude and undeveloped youthful stages of growth, and finally comes to the stage of Positivism as the highest form of development. "That the Positive Philosophy is metaphysical in the proper sense of the term is too obvious to admit of question. Its *problem* is metaphysical. It proposes not only to discover the criteria of the processes which are common to all the special sciences, but it sets these forth as the criteria of every true science." That is to say, it deals with the universal and necessary, and announces the forms of all knowledge. "Like every other metaphysical system, it concerns itself with *relations*. But constant relations are what in all systems exalt observed phenomena to the dignity of Science. Other systems recognize more relations—those of causation or force—mayhap those of design. Comte's metaphysics hold to fewer, those of sequence and similitude. To use a figure of clothing, while other systems honor, by recognition and use, the habiliments which obvious necessity and universal usage have sanctioned, this sect appear among the *sans culottes* of philosophers, on the principle that the fewer clothes we have the nearer we come to naked truth, and the less occasion we have to look after our clothes, or the less we are tempted to think more of the clothes than of the man."

After showing that Comte, while condemning the metaphysical procedure of setting up abstractions as real agencies, yet actually does this everywhere, always appealing to "sequence and similitude" as the most real facts in the world, Dr. Porter takes up the system of *John Stuart Mill*. His theory of mind reduced to "a series of feelings with a background of the possibilities of feeling"; his definition of matter as "a permanent possibility of sensations"; his theory of the process of induction as "the result of repeated experiences of sensations so closely combined as to have become practically inseparable"; his theory of ultimate beliefs as "derived from induction, even those beliefs concerning the sequence and similitude of phenomena upon which the whole process of induction depends, depend on induction—all come from inseparable association";—these four doctrines, or parts of the same doctrine, are exhibited in their vicious circle.



From Mill, with "his admirable candor in confessing difficulties of his own, and with something more than admirable unconsciousness that his confessions amount to a complete surrender of everything for which he would contend," our author turns to the *cerebralists*, to Alexander Bain and his school, who claim that the analysis of the brain and its functions is the only basis for a solid science of the soul. To this he remarks that even if brain convolutions and nerve vibrations explain differences of development in mind, they do not explain nature, and hence do not suffice as a basis for philosophy.

Lastly, he comes to the *Law of Evolution* as set forth by Herbert Spencer. While Mr. Spencer gives full credit to the science of Man, yet as he hides all the difficulties of his system behind abstract entities like *force* and *evolution*, and claims inscrutability for them, he becomes one of the worst sticklers for *a priori* ideas and methods; "worst" because he does not proceed consciously, and hence not *critically*, to work.

"The study of man is not necessarily the study of psychology or speculative philosophy. Man is made manifest in history, philology, literature, art, politics, ethics, and theology. The thoughts of man have recognized and accepted those principles and institutions, those manners and laws, that civilization and culture, which give security and grace to the present life, which awaken the anticipations and confirm the faiths which reach into another. The study of all these is a study of *the humanities*."

W. T. H.

*Radical Problems.* By C. A. Bartol. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1872. For sale by Soule, Thomas & Winsor.

*Contents:* I. Open Questions. II. Individualism. III. Transcendentalism. IV. Radicalism. V. Theism. VI. Naturalism. VII. Materialism. VIII. Spiritualism. IX. Faith. X. Law. XI. Origin. XII. Correlation. XIII. Character. XIV. Genius: Father Taylor. XV. Experience. XVI. Hope. XVII. Ideality.

No one who reads these essays could fail to know from internal evidence that the author was from Boston or its vicinity, and he would be quite safe in assuming that he had lived somewhere on the line of the Eastern Railroad. The illustrations are so often drawn from objects well-known only in Boston and its environs, that one who is not acquainted with that locality must necessarily lose much of the pleasure with which a Bostonian follows the train of thought. It is everywhere taken for granted that all must know about these things. This peculiarity makes one conscious all the time that the essays were written with a particular audience in view. Those acquainted with the attitude taken by the celebrated author will not fail here and there also to detect traces of the personal pain which he has sometimes suffered from the misrepresentation of his views.

In reading the volume through—and one will not be likely to lay it down unfinished—one has a glimpse of a sensitive, eager mind, keenly alive to all the actual problems of the day; of a thought which follows closely the daily events of the world and history, and reads in them all the action of broad and deep motive-powers,—these lying behind, and asserting every day under new aspects their claim for recognition and solution. The author

is no dreamy thinker who seeks to evolve from his own consciousness the Truth of the world. Rather he seizes it on the wing, at once perceives and photographs its many forms, and so gives us material for thought. For example, the Franco-Prussian war, Sheridan's management of the Indians, the portraits of Fiske and Gould on the new Fall-River boats, Darwin's theories, the correlation of forces,—all play continually into and out of his illustrations. Through all the essays the poetic thought shows itself clearly. To it, everywhere, each one individual is only the image of the all. From this universality in the treatment of the subjects, it easily follows that the reader will often find himself in doubt as to the title of the essay which he is reading. It seems that the title might be transferred and no one be the wiser; for through all the essays it is one thought that runs, only one thing that is to be said.

The whole book is a plea for absolute freedom of thought; an earnest expression that growth, active development, is a necessity of life, in whatever form it present itself. In every essay we come continually face to face with an illustration where something is not large enough to contain something else. The rolling-stock on the railroad was not ample enough to accommodate the number of passengers and the amount of freight; the country barn is not large enough for the increasing harvests, and so on indefinitely. If there is one thing which Dr. Bartol must say, and say so that no one who reads or hears can forget it, it is that the old is not large enough to contain the new; or one might more truly put it in the opposite form, and say that the new is not large enough to contain the old. The transient can only for a time display the eternal and abiding; the phenomenal is only the shifting play of the real light of Truth. The content perpetually shivers its form, only to make for itself another and one more adequate.

For such an utterance so forcibly given, so earnestly impressed, so illumined from all sides by perpetually shifting lights of illustration, one cannot fail to be grateful to the eloquent speaker.

The mind of the writer is so quick, and so alive to all the phases, whether humorous or serious, of the thought in hand, that the style is sometimes involved, and the meaning, for the instant, difficult to grasp; and the frequent omission of relative pronouns, and, in some cases, careless punctuation, increases the difficulty; and again, in some passages, one seems to be reading a series of proverbs, as for instance on page 7. From the same cause result figures of speech carelessly used, as when we are told of a "flock of islands beating at our windows." And sometimes the writer's keen sense of the ludicrous lowers for a moment the dignity of the subject. But these faults are, as has been said, only the result of the versatile, appreciative, and poetic mind of the writer, and are soon forgotten, while the impulse to thought given by the perusal of the essays will be invaluable. One is only left to regret that the localization as to time and place of so many of the illustrations may withhold the volume from the permanent place in our libraries which from its thought it has a right to claim.

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DO THE CORRELATIONISTS BELIEVE IN  
SELF-MOVEMENT?

Self-movement, spontaneity, and freedom, are in some sense synonyms. He who cannot think self-movement, cannot think freedom. Materialistic philosophy is distinguished from spiritual philosophy, or idealism, through the fact that the former thinks all phenomena under the categories of cause and effect, or of external determination; while the latter thinks all phenomena as arising in the last analysis through self-determination, or through final causes. Plato and Aristotle agree in this latter view, and with them stand the other great thinkers of the race, such as Leibnitz, Spinoza, and Hegel. That any hypothesis results, when strictly tortured in the logical crucible, in positing *causa sui* as its necessary condition, is the demonstrated outcome of Spinoza's Ethics, as well as Hegel's Logic and the twelfth book of Aristotle's Metaphysics.

The feeblest and most dogmatic thinking (i.e. thinking which has to do with mere opinions) is best satisfied with mechanical causes. It is cultured thought which learns to perceive *Necessity* and *Universality* in its ideas. The highest thinking identifies necessity and freedom through the idea of self-determination.

Since the course of history and the laws of development alike point to a progress from the simple to the complex, from the implicit to the explicit, from the acorn to the oak,—we look with confidence to see a growth in the scientific mind from age to age. In the great intensity with which Natural Science is pursued, there is occasion for great improvement in methods of thinking.

Depth and Exhaustiveness—Comprehension—will be gained. This can be seen already in the foremost ranks.

Those who uphold the theory of Correlation set out with materialistic hypotheses, and nothing is further from their expectations than the support of spiritual, ideal conclusions. They think in fatalistic forms, and do not admit self-determination. Spencer says (*Psychology*, § 220) that psychical changes (thoughts, &c.) conform to law, or else a science of Psychology is impossible; and "if they do conform to law, there cannot be any such thing as free-will." And yet the idea of Correlation, when reduced to its lowest terms, gives us self-movement pure and simple. One force becomes another and the second a third, and so on; the first is an equivalent and may be derived from the last. The action of the first produces the second and the rest, and the rest produce it; thus its energy reverts to itself—no matter how long the series of links may be. Its action is the cause of its action, and hence it becomes *causa sui*. But the thought of this total of action is not a mere force, still less a material somewhat; it is a vital system, a whole, a monad. This thought once grasped, materialism passes over to idealism; fatalism gives way to free personality.

## PEDAGOGICS AS A SYSTEM.

*By Dr. Karl Rosenkranz, Doctor of Theology and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Königsberg.*


Translated by ANNA C. BRACKETT.

[Inquiries from teachers in different sections of the country as to the sources of information on the subject of Teaching as a Science have led me to believe that a translation of Rosenkranz's *Pedagogics* may be widely acceptable and useful. It is very certain that too much of our teaching is simply empirical, and as Germany has, more than any other country, endeavored to found it upon universal truths, it is to that country that we must at present look for a remedy for this empiricism.]

Based as this is upon the profoundest system of German Philosophy, no more suggestive treatise on Education can perhaps be found. In his third part, as will be readily seen, Rosenkranz follows the classification of National ideas given in Hegel's *Philosophy of History*. The word "Pedagogics," though it has unfortunately acquired a somewhat unpleasant meaning in English—thanks to the writers who have made the word "pedagogue" so odious—deserves to be redeemed for future use. I have, therefore, retained it in the translation.

In order that the reader may see the general scope of the work, I append in tabular form the table of contents, giving however, under the first and second parts, only the main divisions. The minor heads can, of course, as they appear in the translation, be easily located.—*Tr.*]

*Analysis.*



INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. The science of Pedagogics cannot be derived from a simple principle with such exactness as Logic and Ethics. It is rather a mixed science which has its presuppositions in many others. In this respect it resembles Medicine, with which it has this also in common, that it must make a distinction between a sound and an unhealthy system of education, and must devise means to prevent or to cure the latter. It may therefore have, like Medicine, the three departments of Physiology, Pathology, and Therapeutics.

§ 2. Since Pedagogics is capable of no such exact definitions of its principle and no such logical deduction as other sciences, the treatises written upon it abound more in shallowness than any other literature. Short-sightedness and arrogance find in it a most congenial atmosphere, and criticism

and declamatory bombast flourish in perfection as nowhere else. The literature of religious tracts might be considered to rival that of Pedagogics in its superficiality and assurance, if it did not for the most part seem itself to belong, through its ascetic nature, to Pedagogics. But teachers as persons should be treated in their weaknesses and failures with the utmost consideration, because they are most of them sincere in contributing their mite for the improvement of education, and all their pedagogic practice inclines them towards administering reproof and giving advice.

§ 3. The charlatanism of educational literature is also fostered by the fact that teaching has become one of the most profitable employments, and the competition in it tends to increase self-glorification.

—When “Boz” in his “*Nicholas Nickleby*” exposed the horrible mysteries of an English boarding-school, many teachers of such schools were, as he assures us, so accurately described that they openly complained he had aimed his caricatures directly at them.—

§ 4. In the system of the sciences, Pedagogics belongs to the Philosophy of Spirit,—and in this, to the department of Practical Philosophy, the problem of which is the comprehension of the necessity of freedom; for education is the conscious working of one will on another so as to produce itself in it according to a determinate aim. The idea of subjective spirit, as well as that of Art, Science, and Religion, forms the essential condition for Pedagogics, but does not contain its principle. If one thinks out a complete statement of Practical Philosophy (Ethics), Pedagogics may be distributed among all its grades. But the point at which Pedagogics itself becomes organic is the idea of the Family, because in the family the difference between the adults and the minors enters directly through the naturalness of spirit, and the right of the children to an education and the duty of parents towards them in this respect is incontestable. All other spheres of education, in order to succeed, must presuppose a true family life. They may extend and complement the business of teaching, but cannot be its original foundation.

—In our systematic exposition of Education, we must not allow ourselves to be led into error by those theories which

do not recognize the family, and which limit the relation of husband and wife to the producing of children. The Platonic Philosophy is the most worthy representative of this class. Later writers who take great pleasure in seeing the world full of children, but who would subtract from the love to a wife all truth and from that to children all care, exhibit in their doctrine of the anarchy of love only a sickly (but yet how prevalent an) imitation of the Platonic state.—

§ 5. Much confusion also arises from the fact that many do not clearly enough draw the distinction between Pedagogics as a science and Pedagogics as an art. As a science it busies itself with developing *a priori* the idea of Education in the universality and necessity of that idea, but as an art it is the concrete individualizing of this abstract idea in any given case. And in any such given case, the peculiarities of the person who is to be educated and all the previously existing circumstances necessitate a modification of the universal aims and ends, which modification cannot be provided for beforehand, but must rather test the ready tact of the educator who knows how to make the existing conditions fulfil his desired end. It is exactly in doing this that the educator may show himself inventive and creative, and that pedagogic talent can distinguish itself. The word "art" is here used in the same way as it is used when we say, the art of war, the art of government, &c.; and rightly, for we are talking about the possibility of the realization of the idea.

—The educator must adapt himself to the pupil, but not to such a degree as to imply that the pupil is incapable of change, and he must also be sure that the pupil shall learn through his experience the independence of the object studied, which remains uninfluenced by his variable personal moods, and the adaptation on the teacher's part must never compromise this independence.—

§ 6. If conditions which are local, temporal, and individual, are fixed as constant rules, and carried beyond their proper limits, are systematized as a valuable formalistic code, unavoidable error arises. The formulæ of teaching are admirable material for the science, but are not the science itself.

§ 7. Pedagogics as a science must (1) unfold the general idea of Education; (2) must exhibit the particular phases into

which the general work of Education divides itself, and (3) must describe the particular standpoint upon which the general idea realizes itself, or should become real in its special processes at any particular time.

§ 8. The treatment of the first part offers no difficulty. It is logically too evident. But it would not do to substitute for it the history of Pedagogics, simply because all the conceptions of it which appear in systematic treatises can be found there.

—Into this error G. Thaulow has fallen in his pamphlet on *Pedagogics as a Philosophical Science.*—

§ 9. The second division unfolds the subject of the physical, intellectual and practical culture of the human race, and constitutes the main part of all books on Pedagogy. Here arises the greatest difficulty as to the limitations, partly because of the undefined nature of the ideas, partly because of the degree of amplification which the details demand. Here is the field of the widest possible differences. If e.g. one studies out the conception of the school with reference to the qualitative specialities which one may consider, it is evident that he can extend his remarks indefinitely; he may speak thus of technological schools of all kinds, to teach mining, navigation, war, art, &c.

§ 10. The third division distinguishes between the different standpoints which are possible in the working out of the conception of Education in its special elements, and which therefore produce different systems of Education wherein the general and the particular are individualized in a special manner. In every system the general tendencies of the idea of education, and the difference between the physical, intellectual and practical culture of man, must be formally recognized, and will appear. The How is decided by the standpoint which reduces that formalism to a special system. Thus it becomes possible to discover the essential contents of the history of Pedagogics from its idea, since this can furnish not an indefinite but a certain number of Pedagogic systems.

—The lower standpoint merges always into the higher, and in so doing first attains its full meaning, e.g.: Education for the sake of the nation is set aside for higher standpoints, e.g. that of Christianity; but we must not suppose that the na-



tional phase of Education was counted as nought from the Christian standpoint. Rather it itself had outgrown the limits which, though suitable enough for its early stage, could no longer contain its true idea. This is sure to be the case in the fact that the national individualities become indestructible by being incorporated into Christianity—a fact that contradicts the abstract seizing of such relations.—

§ 11. The last system must be that of the present, and since this is certainly on one side the result of all the past, while on the other seized in its possibilities it is determined by the Future, the business of Pedagogics cannot pause till it reaches its ideal of the general and special determinations, so that looked at in this way the Science of Pedagogics at its end returns to its beginning. The first and second divisions already contain the idea of the system necessary for the Present.

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FIRST PART.

**The General Idea of Education.**

- § 12. The idea of Pedagogics in general must distinguish,
- (1) The nature of Education in general ;
  - (2) Its form ;
  - (3) Its limits.

I.

*The Nature of Education.*

§ 13. The nature of Education is determined by the nature of mind—that it can develop whatever it really is only by its own activity. Mind is in itself free ; but if it does not actualize this possibility, it is in no true sense free, either for itself or for another. Education is the influencing of man by man, and it has for its end to lead him to actualize himself through his own efforts. The attainment of perfect manhood as the actualization of the Freedom necessary to mind constitutes the nature of Education in general.

—The completely isolated man does not become man. Solitary human beings who have been found in forests, like the wild girl of the forest of Ardennes, sufficiently prove the fact that the truly human qualities in man cannot be developed without reciprocal action with human beings. Caspar Hauser in his subterranean prison is an illustration of what man

would be by himself. The first cry of the child expresses in its appeals to others this helplessness of spirituality on the side of nature.—

§ 14. Man, therefore, is the only fit subject for education. We often speak, it is true, of the education of plants and animals; but even when we do so, we apply, unconsciously perhaps, other expressions, as “raising” and “training,” in order to distinguish these. “Breaking” consists in producing in an animal, either by pain or pleasure of the senses, an activity of which, it is true, he is capable, but which he never would have developed if left to himself. On the other hand, it is the nature of Education only to assist in the producing of that which the subject would strive most earnestly to develop for himself if he had a clear idea of himself. We speak of raising trees and animals, but not of raising men; and it is only a planter who looks to his slaves only for an increase in their number.

—The education of men is quite often enough, unfortunately, only a “breaking,” and here and there still may be found examples where one tries to teach mechanically, not through the understanding power of the creative word, but through the powerless and fruitless appeal to physical pain.—

§ 15. The idea of Education may be more or less comprehensive. We use it in the widest sense when we speak of the Education of the race, for we understand by this expression the connection which the acts and situations of different nations have to each other, as different steps towards self-conscious freedom. In this the world-spirit is the teacher.

§ 16. In a more restricted sense we mean by Education the shaping of the individual life by the forces of nature, the rhythmical movement of national customs, and the might of destiny in which each one finds limits set to his arbitrary will. These often mould him into a man without his knowledge. For he cannot act in opposition to nature, nor offend the ethical sense of the people among whom he dwells, nor despise the leading of destiny without discovering through experience that before the Nemesis of these substantial elements his subjective power can dash itself only to be shattered. If he perversely and persistently rejects all our admonitions, we leave him, as a last resort, to destiny, whose iron rule must

educate him, and reveal to him the God whom he has misunderstood.

—It is, of course, sometimes not only possible, but necessary for one, moved by the highest sense of morality, to act in opposition to the laws of nature, to offend the ethical sense of the people that surround him, and to brave the blows of destiny; but such a one is a sublime reformer or martyr, and we are not now speaking of such, but of the perverse, the frivolous, and the conceited.—

§ 17. In the narrowest sense, which however is the usual one, we mean by Education the influence which one mind exerts on another in order to cultivate the latter in some understood and methodical way, either generally or with reference to some special aim. The educator must, therefore, be relatively finished in his own education, and the pupil must possess unlimited confidence in him. If authority be wanting on the one side, or respect and obedience on the other, this ethical basis of development must fail, and it demands in the very highest degree, talent, knowledge, skill, and prudence.

—Education takes on this form only under the culture which has been developed through the influence of city life. Up to that time we have the naïve period of education, which holds to the general powers of nature, of national customs, and of destiny, and which lasts for a long time among the rural populations. But in the city a greater complication of events, an uncertainty of the results of reflection, a working out of individuality, and a need of the possession of many arts and trades, make their appearance and render it impossible for men longer to be ruled by mere custom. The Telemachus of Fenelon was educated to rule himself by means of reflection; the actual Telemachus in the heroic age lived simply according to custom.—

§ 18. The general problem of Education is the development of the theoretical and practical reason in the individual. If we say that to educate one means to fashion him into morality, we do not make our definition sufficiently comprehensive, because we say nothing of intelligence, and thus confound education and ethics. A man is not merely a human being, but as a reasonable being he is a peculiar individual, and different from all others of the race.

§ 19. Education must lead the pupil by an interconnected series of efforts previously foreseen and arranged by the teacher to a definite end; but the particular form which this shall take must be determined by the peculiar character of the pupil's mind and the situation in which he is found. Hasty and inconsiderate work may accomplish much, but only *systematic* work can advance and fashion him in conformity with his nature, and the former does not belong to education, for this includes in itself the idea of an end, and that of the technical means for its attainment.

§ 20. But as culture comes to mean more and more, there becomes necessary a division of the business of teaching among different persons, with reference to capabilities and knowledge, because as the arts and sciences are continually increasing in number, one can become learned in any one branch only by devoting himself exclusively to it, and hence becoming one-sided. A difficulty hence arises which is also one for the pupil, of preserving, in spite of this unavoidable one-sidedness, the unity and wholeness which are necessary to humanity.

—The naïve dignity of the happy savage, and the agreeable simplicity of country people, appear to very great advantage when contrasted on this side with the often unlimited narrowness of a special trade, and the endless curtailing of the wholeness of man by the pruning processes of city life. Thus the often abused savage has his hut, his family, his cocoa tree, his weapons, his passions; he fishes, hunts, plays, fights, adorns himself, and enjoys the consciousness that he is the centre of a whole, while a modern citizen is often only an abstract expression of culture.—

§ 21. As it becomes necessary to divide the work of teaching, a difference between general and special schools arises also, from the needs of growing culture. The former present in different compass all the sciences and arts which are included in the term "general education," and which were classified by the Greeks under the general name of Encyclopædia. The latter are known as special schools, suited to particular needs or talents.

—As those who live in the country are relatively isolated, it is often necessary, or at least desirable, that one man should

be trained equally on many different sides. The poor tutor is required not only to instruct in all the sciences, he must also speak French and be able to play the piano.—

§ 22. For any single person, the relation of his actual education to its infinite possibilities can only be approximately determined, and it can be considered as only relatively finished on any one side. Education is impossible to him who is born an idiot, since the want of the power of generalizing and of ideality of conscious personality leaves to such an unfortunate only the possibility of a mechanical training.

—Sägert, the teacher of the deaf mutes in Berlin, has made laudable efforts to educate idiots, but the account as given in his publication, "Cure of Idiots by an Intellectual Method, Berlin, 1846," shows that the result obtained was only external; and though we do not desire to be understood as denying or refusing to this class the possession of a mind *in potentia*, it appears in them to be confined to an embryonic state.—

## II.

### *The Form of Education.*

§ 23. The general form of Education is determined by the nature of the mind, that it really is nothing but what it makes itself to be. The mind is (1) immediate (or potential), but (2) it must estrange itself from itself as it were, so that it may place itself over against itself as a special object of attention; (3) this estrangement is finally removed through a further acquaintance with the object—it feels itself at home in that on which it looks, and returns again enriched to the form of immediateness. That which at first appeared to be another than itself is now seen to be itself. Education cannot create; it can only help to develop to reality the previously existent possibility; it can only help to bring forth to light the hidden life.

§ 24. All culture, whatever may be its special purport, must pass through these two stages—of estrangement, and its removal. Culture must hold fast to the distinction between the subject and the object considered immediately, though it has again to absorb this distinction into itself, in order that the union of the two may be more complete and lasting. The subject recognizes then all the more certainly that what at

first appeared to it as a foreign existence, belongs to it as its own property, and that it holds it as its own all the more by means of culture.

—Plato, as is known, calls the feeling with which knowledge must begin, wonder; but this can serve as a beginning only, for wonder itself can only express the tension between the subject and the object at their first encounter—a tension which would be impossible if they were not in themselves identical. Children have a longing for the far-off, the strange, and the wonderful, as if they hoped to find in these an explanation of themselves. They want the object to be a genuine object. That to which they are accustomed, which they see around them every day, seems to have no longer any objective energy for them; but an alarm of fire, banditti life, wild animals, gray old ruins, the robin's songs, and far-off happy islands, &c.—everything high-colored and dazzling—leads them irresistibly on. The necessity of the mind's making itself foreign to itself is that which makes children prefer to hear of the adventurous journeys of Sinbad than news of their own city or the history of their nation, and in youth this same necessity manifests itself in their desire of travelling.—

§ 25. This activity of the mind in allowing itself to be absorbed, and consciously so, in an object with the purpose of making it his own, or of producing it, is *Work*. But when the mind gives itself up to its objects as chance may present them or through arbitrariness, careless as to whether they have any result, such activity is *Play*. Work is laid out for the pupil by his teacher by authority, but in his play he is left to himself.

§ 26. Thus work and play must be sharply distinguished from each other. If one has not respect for work as an important and substantial activity, he not only spoils play for his pupil, for this loses all its charm when deprived of the antithesis of an earnest, set task, but he undermines his respect for real existence. On the other hand, if he does not give him space, time, and opportunity, for play, he prevents the peculiarities of his pupil from developing freely through the exercise of his creative ingenuity. Play sends the pupil back refreshed to his work, since in play he forgets himself

in his own way, while in work he is required to forget himself in a manner prescribed for him by another.

—Play is of great importance in helping one to discover the true individualities of children, because in play they may betray thoughtlessly their inclinations. This antithesis of work and play runs through the entire life. Children anticipate in their play the earnest work of after life; thus the little girl plays with her doll, and the boy pretends he is a soldier and in battle.—

§ 27. Work should never be treated as if it were play, nor play as if it were work. In general, the arts, the sciences, and productions, stand in this relation to each other: the accumulation of stores of knowledge is the recreation of the mind which is engaged in independent creation, and the practice of arts fills the same office to those whose work is to collect knowledge.

§ 28. Education seeks to transform every particular condition so that it shall no longer seem strange to the mind or in anywise foreign to its own nature. This identity of consciousness, and the special character of anything done or endured by it, we call Habit [habitual conduct or behavior]. It conditions formally all progress; for that which is not yet become habit, but which we perform with design and an exercise of our will, is not yet a part of ourselves.

§ 29. As to Habit, we have to say next that it is at first indifferent as to what it relates. But that which is to be considered as indifferent or neutral cannot be defined in the abstract, but only in the concrete, because anything that is indifferent as to whether it shall act on these particular men, or in this special situation, is capable of another or even of the opposite meaning for another man or men for the same men or in other circumstances. Here, then, appeal must be made to the individual conscience in order to be able from the depths of individuality to separate what we can permit to ourselves from that which we must deny ourselves. The aim of Education must be to arouse in the pupil this spiritual and ethical sensitiveness which does not recognize anything as *merely* indifferent, but rather knows how to seize in everything, even in the seemingly small, its universal human significance. But in relation to the highest problems he

must learn that what concerns his own immediate personality is entirely indifferent.

§ 30. Habit lays aside its indifference to an external action through reflection on the advantage or disadvantage of the same. Whatever tends as a harmonious means to the realization of an end is advantageous, but that is disadvantageous which, by contradicting its idea, hinders or destroys it. Advantage and disadvantage being then only *relative* terms, a habit which is advantageous for one man in one case may be disadvantageous for another man, or even for the same man, under different circumstances. Education must, therefore, accustom the youth to judge as to the expediency or in expediency of any action in its relation to the essential vocation of his life, so that he shall avoid that which does not promote its success.

§ 31. But the *absolute* distinction of habit is the moral distinction between the good and the bad. For from this standpoint alone can we finally decide what is allowable and what is forbidden, what is advantageous and what is disadvantageous.

§ 32. As relates to form, habit may be either passive or active. The passive is that which teaches us to bear the vicissitudes of nature as well as of history with such composure that we shall hold our ground against them, being always equal to ourselves, and that we shall not allow our power of acting to be paralyzed through any mutations of fortune. Passive habit is not to be confounded with obtuseness in receiving impressions, a blank abstraction from the affair in hand which at bottom is found to be nothing more than a selfishness which desires to be left undisturbed; it is simply composure of mind in view of changes over which we have no control. While we vividly experience joy and sorrow, pain and pleasure—inwoven as these are with the change of seasons, of the weather, &c.—with the alternation of life and death, of happiness and misery, we ought nevertheless to harden ourselves against them so that at the same time in our consciousness of the supreme worth of the mind we shall build up the inaccessible stronghold of Freedom in ourselves.—Active habit [or behavior] is found realized in a wide range of activity which appears in manifold forms, such as skill,



dexterity, readiness of information, &c. It is a steeling of the internal for action upon the external, as the Passive is a steeling of the internal against the influences of the external.

§ 33. Habit is the general form which instruction takes. For since it reduces a condition or an activity within ourselves to an instinctive use and wont, it is necessary for any thorough instruction. But as, according to its content, it may be either proper or improper, advantageous or disadvantageous, good or bad, and according to its form may be the assimilation of the external by the internal, or the impress of the internal upon the external, Education must procure for the pupil the power of being able to free himself from one habit and to adopt another. Through his freedom he must be able not only to renounce any habit formed, but to form a new one; and he must so govern his system of habits that it shall exhibit a constant progress of development into greater freedom. We must discipline ourselves, as a means toward the ever-changing realization of the Good in us, constantly to form and to break habits.

—We must characterize those habits as bad which relate only to our convenience or our enjoyment. They are often not blamable in themselves, but there lies in them a hidden danger that they may allure us into luxury or effeminacy. But it is a false and mechanical way of looking at the affair if we suppose that a habit which has been formed by a certain number of repetitions can be broken by an equal number of denials. We can never renounce a habit utterly except through a clearness of judgment which decides it to be undesirable, and through firmness of will.—

§ 34. Education comprehends also the reciprocal action of the opposites, authority and obedience, rationality and individuality, work and play, habit and spontaneity. If we imagine that these can be reconciled by rules, it will be in vain that we try to restrain the youth in these relations. But a failure in education in this particular is very possible through the freedom of the pupil, through special circumstances, or through the errors of the educator himself. And for this very reason any theory of Education must take into account in the beginning this negative possibility. It must consider beforehand the dangers which threaten the pupil in all possible

ways even before they surround him, and fortify him against them. Intentionally to expose him to temptation in order to prove his strength, is devilish; and, on the other hand, to guard him against the chance of dangerous temptation, to wrap him in cotton (as the proverb says), is womanish, ridiculous, fruitless, and much more dangerous; for temptation comes not alone from without, but quite as often from within, and secret inclination seeks and creates for itself the opportunity for its gratification, often perhaps an unnatural one. The truly preventive activity consists not in an abstract seclusion from the world, all of whose elements are innate in each individual, but in the activity of knowledge and discipline, modified according to age and culture.

—If one endeavors to deprive the youth of all free and individual intercourse with the world, one only falls into a continual watching of him, and the consciousness that he is watched destroys in him all elasticity of spirit, all confidence, all originality. The police shadow of control obscures all independence and systematically accustoms him to dependence. As the tragi-comic story of Peter Schlemihls shows, one cannot lose his own shadow without falling into the saddest fatalities; but the shadow of a constant companion, as in the pedagogical system of the Jesuits, undermines all naturalness. And if one endeavors too strictly to guard against that which is evil and forbidden, the intelligence of the pupils reacts in deceit against such efforts, till the educators are amazed that such crimes as come often to light can have arisen under such careful control.—

§ 35. If there should appear in the youth any decided moral deformity which is opposed to the ideal of his education, the instructor must at once make inquiry as to the history of its origin, because the negative and the positive are very closely connected in his being, so that what appears to be negligence, rudeness, immorality, foolishness, or oddity, may arise from some real needs of the youth which in their development have only taken a wrong direction.

§ 36. If it should appear on such examination that the negative action was only a product of wilful ignorance, of caprice, or of arbitrariness on the part of the youth, then this calls for a simple prohibition on the part of the educator, no

reason being assigned. His authority must be sufficient to the pupil without any reason. Only when this has happened more than once, and the youth is old enough to understand, should the prohibition, together with the reason therefor, be given.

—This should, however, be brief; the explanation must retain its disciplinary character, and must not become extended into a doctrinal essay, for in such a case the youth easily forgets that it was his own misbehavior which was the occasion of the explanation. The statement of the reason must be honest, and it must present to the youth the point most easy for him to seize. False reasons are morally blamable in themselves, and they tend only to confuse. It is a great mistake to unfold to the youth the broadening consequences which his act may bring. These uncertain possibilities seem to him too powerless to affect him particularly. The severe lecture wearies him, especially if it be stereotyped, as is apt to be the case with fault-finding and talkative instructors. But more unfortunate is it if the painting of the gloomy background to which the consequences of the wrong-doing of the youth may lead, should fill his feelings and imagination prematurely with gloomy fancies, because then the representation has led him one step toward a state of wretchedness which in the future man may become fearful depression and degradation.—

§ 37. If the censure is accompanied with a threat of punishment, then we have the same kind of reproof which in daily life we call “scolding;” but if reproof is given, the pupil must be made to feel that it is in earnest.

§ 38. Only when all other efforts have failed, is punishment, which is the real negation of the error, the transgression, or the vice, justifiable. Punishment inflicts intentionally pain on the pupil, and its object is, by means of this sensation, to bring him to reason, a result which neither our simple prohibition, our explanation, nor our threat of punishment, has been able to reach. But the punishment, as such, must not refer to the subjective totality of the youth, or his disposition in general, but only to the act which, as result, is a manifestation of the disposition. It acts mediately on the disposition, but leaves the inner being untouched directly; and

this is not only demanded by justice, but on account of the sophistry that is inherent in human nature, which desires to assign to a deed many motives, it is even necessary.

§ 39. Punishment as an educational means is nevertheless essentially corrective, since, by leading the youth to a proper estimation of his fault and a positive change in his behavior, it seeks to improve him. At the same time it stands as a sad indication of the insufficiency of the means previously used. On no account should the youth be frightened from the commission of a misdemeanor, or from the repetition of his negative deed through fear of punishment—a system which leads always to terrorism: but, although it may have this effect, it should, before all things, impress upon him the recognition of the fact that the negative is not allowed to act as it will without limitation, but rather that the Good and the True have the absolute power in the world, and that they are never without the means of overcoming anything that contradicts them.

—In the statute-laws, punishment has the opposite office. It must first of all satisfy justice, and only after this is done can it attempt to improve the guilty. If a government should proceed on the same basis as the educator it would mistake its task, because it has to deal with adults, whom it elevates to the honorable position of responsibility for their own acts. The state must not go back to the psychological ethical genesis of a negative deed. It must assign to a secondary rank of importance the biographical moment which contains the deed in process and the circumstances of a mitigating character, and it must consider first of all the deed in itself. It is quite otherwise with the educator; for he deals with human beings who are relatively undeveloped, and who are only growing toward responsibility. So long as they are still under the care of a teacher, the responsibility of their deed belongs in part to him. If we confound the standpoint in which punishment is administered in the state with that in education, we work much evil.—

§ 40. Punishment as a negation of a negation, considered as an educational means, cannot be determined *a priori*, but must always be modified by the peculiarities of the individual offender and by the peculiar circumstances. Its administra-

tion calls for the exercise of the ingenuity and tact of the educator.

§ 41. Generally speaking, we must make a distinction between the sexes, as well as between the different periods of youth; (1) some kind of corporal punishment is most suitable for children, (2) isolation for older boys and girls, and (3) punishment based on the sense of honor for young men and women.

§ 42. (1) Corporal punishment is the production of physical pain. The youth is generally whipped, and this kind of punishment, provided always that it is not too often administered or with undue severity, is the proper way of dealing with wilful defiance, with obstinate carelessness, or with a really perverted will, so long or so often as the higher perception is closed against appeal. The imposing of other physical punishment, e.g. that of depriving the pupil of food, partakes of cruelty. The view which sees in the rod the panacea for all the teacher's embarrassments is censurable, but equally undesirable is the false sentimentality which assumes that the dignity of humanity is affected by a blow given to a child, and confounds self-conscious humanity with child-humanity, to which a blow is the most natural form of reaction, in which all other forms of influence at last end.

—The fully-grown man ought never to be whipped, because this kind of punishment reduces him to the level of the child, and, when it becomes barbarous, to that of a brute animal, and so is absolutely degrading to him. In the English schools the rod is much used. If a pupil of the first class be put back into the second at Eton, he, although before exempt from flogging, becomes liable to it. But however necessary this system of flogging of the English aristocracy may be in the discipline of their schools, flogging in the English army is a shameful thing for the free people of Great Britain.—

§ 43. (2) By Isolation we remove the offender temporarily from the society of his fellows. The boy left alone, cut off from all companionship, and left absolutely to himself, suffers from a sense of helplessness. The time passes heavily, and soon he is very anxious to be allowed to return to the company of parents, brothers and sisters, teachers and fellow-pupils.

—To leave a child entirely to himself without any supervision, even if one shuts him up in a dark room, is as mistaken a practice as to leave a few together without supervision, as is too often done where they are kept after school, when they give the freest rein to their childish wantonness and commit the wildest pranks.—

§ 44. (3) This way of isolating a child does not touch his sense of honor at all, and is soon forgotten because it relates to only one side of his conduct. It is quite different from punishment based on the sense of honor, which, in a formal manner, shuts the youth out from companionship because he has attacked the principle which holds society together, and for this reason can no longer be considered as belonging to it. Honor is the recognition of one individual by others as their equal. Through his error, or it may be his crime, he has simply made himself unequal to them, and in so far has separated himself from them, so that his banishment from their society is only the outward expression of the real isolation which he himself has brought to pass in his inner nature, and which he by means of his negative act only betrayed to the outer world. Since the punishment founded on the sense of honor affects the whole ethical man and makes a lasting impression upon his memory, extreme caution is necessary in its application lest a permanent injury be inflicted upon the character. The idea of his perpetual continuance in disgrace, destroys in a man all aspiration for improvement.

—Within the family this feeling of honor cannot be so actively developed, because every member of it is bound to every other immediately by natural ties, and hence is equal to every other. Within its sacred circle, he who has isolated himself is still beloved, though it may be through tears. However bad may be the deed he has committed, he is never given up, but the deepest sympathy is felt for him because he is still brother, father, &c. But first in the contact of one family with another, and still more in the contact of an individual with any institution which is founded not on natural ties, but is set over against him as a distinct object, this feeling of honor appears. In the school, and in the matter of ranks and classes in a school, this is very important.—

§ 45. It is important to consider well this gradation of punishment (which, starting with sensuous physical pain, passes through the external teleology of temporary isolation up to the idealism of the sense of honor), both in relation to the different ages at which they are appropriate and to the training which they bring with them. Every punishment must be considered merely as a means to some end, and, in so far, as transitory. The pupil must always be deeply conscious that it is very painful to his instructor to be obliged to punish him. This pathos of another's sorrow for the sake of his cure which he perceives in the mien, in the tone of the voice, in the delay with which the punishment is administered, will become a purifying fire for his soul.

## III.

*The Limits of Education.*

§ 46. The form of Education reaches its limits with the idea of punishment, because this is the attempt to subsume the negative reality and to make it conformable to its positive idea. But the limits of Education are found in the idea of its nature, which is to fashion the individual into theoretical and practical rationality. The authority of the Educator at last becomes imperceptible, and it passes over into advice and example, and obedience changes from blind conformity to free gratitude and attachment. Individuality wears off its rough edges, and is transfigured into the universality and necessity of Reason without losing in this process its identity. Work becomes enjoyment, and he finds his play in a change of activity. The youth takes possession of himself, and can be left to himself.

—There are two widely differing views with regard to the limits of Education. One lays great stress on the weakness of the pupil and the power of the teacher. According to this view, Education has for its province the entire formation of the youth. The despotism of this view often manifests itself where large numbers are to be educated together, and with very undesirable results, because it assumes that the individual pupil is only a specimen of the whole, as if the school were a great factory where each piece of goods is to be stamped exactly like all the rest. Individuality is reduced

by the tyranny of such despotism to one uniform level till all originality is destroyed, as in cloisters, barracks, and orphan asylums, where only one individual seems to exist. There is a kind of Pedagogy also which fancies that one can thrust into or out of the individual pupil what one will. This may be called a superstitious belief in the power of Education.—The opposite extreme disbelieves this, and advances the policy which lets alone and does nothing, urging that individuality is unconquerable, and that often the most careful and far-sighted education fails of reaching its aim in so far as it is opposed to the nature of the youth, and that this individuality has made of no avail all efforts toward the obtaining of any end which was opposed to it. This representation of the fruitlessness of all pedagogical efforts engenders an indifference towards it which would leave, as a result, only a sort of vegetation of individuality growing at hap-hazard.—

§ 47. *The limit of Education is (1) a Subjective one, a limit made by the individuality of the youth.* This is a definite limit. Whatever does not exist in this individuality as a possibility cannot be developed from it. Education can only lead and assist; it cannot create. What Nature has denied to a man, Education cannot give him any more than it is able, on the other hand, to annihilate entirely his original gifts, although it is true that his talents may be suppressed, distorted, and measurably destroyed. But the decision of the question in what the real essence of any one's individuality consists can never be made with certainty till he has left behind him his years of development, because it is then only that he first arrives at the consciousness of his entire self; besides, at this critical time, in the first place, much knowledge only superficially acquired will drop off; and again, talents, long slumbering and unsuspected, may first make their appearance. Whatever has been forced upon a child in opposition to his individuality, whatever has been only driven into him and has lacked receptivity on his side, or a rational ground on the side of culture, remains attached to his being only as an external ornament, a foreign outgrowth which enfeebles his own proper character.

—We must distinguish from that affectation which arises through a misunderstanding of the limit of individuality, the



way which many children and young persons have of supposing when they see models finished and complete in grown persons, that they themselves are endowed by Nature with the power to develop into the same. When they see a reality which corresponds to their own possibility, the presentiment of a like or a similar attainment moves them to an imitation of it as a model personality. This may be sometimes carried so far as to be disagreeable or ridiculous, but should not be too strongly censured, because it springs from a positive striving after culture, and needs only proper direction.—

§ 48. (2) *The Objective limit of Education* lies in the means which can be appropriated for it. That the talent for a certain culture shall be present is certainly the first thing; but the cultivation of this talent is the second, and no less necessary. But how much cultivation can be given to it extensively and intensively depends upon the means used, and these again are conditioned by the material resources of the family to which each one belongs. The greater and more valuable the means of culture which are found in a family are, the greater is the immediate advantage which the culture of each one has at the start. With regard to many of the arts and sciences this limit of education is of great significance. But the means alone are of no avail. The finest educational apparatus will produce no fruit where corresponding talent is wanting, while on the other hand talent often accomplishes incredible feats with very limited means, and, if the way is only once open, makes of itself a centre of attraction which draws to itself with magnetic power the necessary means. The moral culture of each one is however, fortunately from its very nature, out of the reach of such dependence. •

—In considering the limit made by individuality we recognize the side of truth in that indifference which considers Education entirely superfluous, and in considering the means of culture we find the truth in the other extreme of pedagogical despotism, which fancies that it can command whatever culture it chooses for any one without regard to his individuality.—

§ 49. (3) *The Absolute limit of Education* is the time when the youth has apprehended the problem which he has to

solve, has learned to know the means at his disposal, and has acquired a certain facility in using them. The end and aim of Education is the emancipation of the youth. It strives to make him self-dependent, and as soon as he has become so it wishes to retire and to be able to leave him to the sole responsibility of his actions. To treat the youth after he has passed this point of time still as a youth, contradicts the very idea of Education, which idea finds its fulfilment in the attainment of majority by the pupil. Since the accomplishment of education cancels the original inequality between the educator and the pupil, nothing is more oppressing, nay, revolting to the latter than to be prevented by a continued dependence from the enjoyment of the freedom which he has earned.

—The opposite extreme of the protracting of Education beyond its proper time is necessarily the undue hastening of the Emancipation.—The question whether one is prepared for freedom has been often opened in politics. When any people have gone so far as to ask this question themselves, it is no longer a question whether that people are prepared for it, for without the consciousness of freedom this question would never have occurred to them.—

§ 50. Although educators must now leave the youth free, the necessity of further culture for him is still imperative. But it will no longer come directly through them. Their pre-arranged, pattern-making work is now supplanted by self-education. Each sketches for himself an ideal to which in his life he seeks to approximate every day.

—In the work of self-culture one friend can help another by advice and example; but he cannot educate, for education presupposes inequality.—The necessities of human nature produce societies in which equals seek to influence each other in a pedagogical way, since they establish by certain steps of culture different classes. They presuppose Education in the ordinary sense. But they wish to bring about Education in a higher sense, and therefore they veil the last form of their ideal in the mystery of secrecy.—To one who lives on contented with himself and without the impulse toward self-culture, unless his unconcern springs from his belonging to a savage state of society, the Germans give the name of Philistine, and he is always repulsive to the student who is intoxicated with an ideal.

## LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW.

By JAMES HUTCHISON STIRLING.

## I.

*An Introduction to Philosophy in General.\**

GENTLEMEN :—My first word must be one of apology. That an individual who is not a lawyer should address a distinguished society of lawyers, and on their own science, has that in it—in direct statement at least—to suggest only audacity and presumption. This I have felt from the first; and I have, all along, experienced a genuine reluctance to accept this place. Nevertheless, you yourselves have so willed it, and I have simply obeyed. I comfort myself with the thought, too, that it is not strictly into law that I am required to go, but rather into philosophy, though only so far as philosophy has legal bearings. I comfort myself, moreover, with this other circumstance—that, viewing the state of your information in this connection, whether private or public, I shall not be expected by you to handle this subject *proprio Marte*, but by the aid of another or others. Indeed, I may say at once that the result of my examination of a goodly pile of books, supplied to me by your own courtesy, was to convince me that not only was Hegel's statement the most valuable in itself, but that all the others of any importance were so saturated with it as to be unintelligible without *its* intelligence. The production of this intelligence, besides, is one of the most important things that at the present moment requires to be effected, at the same time that it is one in which my own slight ability is as likely to be serviceable as in any other, perhaps. The philosophy of law, then, which I shall exhibit to you is that which has been presented in full detail by Hegel in the separate volume expressly published by himself, and named "Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, or Natural Right and Political Science in Ground Plan"—constituting, as I believe, the most valuable product of its author. Of the rest—Trendelenburg, Röder, Hildenbrand, Heron, Austin, and all the

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others—I hope to be able to say a word before concluding. Let me recommend to you *now* only Hildenbrand, a work most accurate, most elegant, yet most easy, though steeped withal in the light of Hegel—a work, too, that shames our English books on the subject into impotent beggary.

My situation, then, gentlemen, before you is a somewhat peculiar one; and when I refer to it now, and all it implies, together with certain other circumstances of time, number, &c., known to some of you, as bearing on the composition of these lectures themselves, I wish to be understood as suggesting a few considerations in appeal to your indulgence, and I have no doubt that, with your well-trained minds, they will very readily be taken—*ad avisandum*.

It is my duty now, then, so far as my ability permits, to make you acquainted with the Philosophy of Right in the compass and character in which it presents itself, in its own place, within the system of Hegel. But that, as these very words suggest, entails some consideration of the system itself in which it is imbedded, and of which it forms a part; for only through a sufficient conception of that, the whole, with which it is in connection, and from which it rises, can we ever hope to arrive at an adequate knowledge of this, the part. Besides, it is an affair of common knowledge as regards Hegel, that, in his expositions, no matter presents itself which is not the product of his peculiar dialectic, at the same time that that dialectic itself takes origin from a single principle. A preliminary word, then, will be necessary on the general system of Hegel, its dialectic, and principle. In short, I fear I shall be necessitated to disclose to you—the “Secret of Hegel.” Now, do not for a moment fear, however, that I am going to inflict on you anything very detailed or very abstruse. Whatever I shall tell you shall be very short, and very plain, and, after all, perhaps, no such tax on your attention. The possibility of this, of course, may—and very excusably, perhaps—be doubted. For example, it is told of one of my best friends that, a gentleman finding him occupied with my work on Hegel, and inquiring what he thought of “the *Secret*,” he answered, “Why, I think the author has *kept* it!” I believe I saw from the papers too, lately, that some gentleman, examined somewhere as to the state of philosophy

at Oxford, and asked particularly as to whether the Hegelianism supposed to be there now prevalent was in any way due to the "Secret of Hegel," had boldly answered—"No; that book only makes the dark darker!" I fain hope there may be mercy for this gentleman; but, in view of the state of conscience he must yet come to, I really am tempted to believe that he will have a great fear in the end of going to—a very bad place!

But, joking apart, the "Secret" of Hegel is once for all open, and there need be no such very great difficulty in its regard—hard though Hegel may be to *read* after revelation of every secret. It appears to me that Mr. Lewes himself has at last found this to be the case. Not that I believe him yet truly to *judge* Hegel; but in the re-written article "Hegel," of the new edition of his "History of Philosophy," just published, he will be found to quote from my work on Hegel at least one passage in which it appears to me the *Secret* is very fairly *named*.

But, be all that as it may, I think I shall have no difficulty in finding, in characterization of the general procedure of Hegel, the short preliminary word we require here.

If it is possible to shut up Kant in a sentence, it is equally possible, in a sentence, to shut up Hegel. But Kant *has* been so shut up, and, as I believe, more than once. Here, from the "Note" on Kant in the second and third editions of the translation of Schwegler, is what I consider one such sentence: "The sensations of the various special senses, received into the universal *à priori* forms of space and time, are reduced into perceptive objects, connected together in a synthesis of experience, by the categories." Those who do not understand such phrases as "universal *à priori* forms," "perceptive objects," "synthesis of experience," "categories," &c., will probably know just as little of Kant *after* this sentence as they did *before* it. Nevertheless, that is no impeachment of the truth of the assertion that this sentence *does* contain all the broad outlines of the *cognitive* theory of Kant; and perhaps a word or two of explanation will demonstrate this—an explanation which I hope you will presently find to be in place. We can all fancy an ego, an I—fancy it as a unit or unity, as the primal unit, the primal unity. Well, to feel,

to know, this unit must be, so to speak, *charged* with something, an *object*. Now this object, whatever it be, has parts; it possesses a certain breadth; it is, as compared with the unit into which it is received, a complex, a manifold; and it is by connecting the various units of this manifold to each other and to itself that the primal unit or unity, the ego or I, can come to possess, or, what is the same thing, to *know* an object. In an act of cognition, the primal unit, the I, then, reduces into its own unity the plurality of some manifold or object given to it. But the I does not effect this its function of unity, its uniting power, only in a single way. The I is strictly judgment, or the *I in act* is strictly judgment; and judgment, as we know from logic, has twelve subordinate forms or functions, which functions are arranged by threes under the more general functions of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. We see now, then, the general constitution of the subjective factor in an act of knowledge, of what concerns the I as I. As regards the other factor in the same act, the object again, it is always a *many* or manifold of special sense in space and time. Now, as for space and time, they are (to Kant) neither notions nor sensations; not the latter (sensations), for they are not due to any special sense, and they have not objects like other special sensations; and not the former (notions), for, viewed in the relation of wholes and parts, they are seen to have the constitution, not of something intellectually or logically understood, but of something sensuously perceived. Time and space, then, Kant reasons, being neither notions nor sensations, *and being at the same time universal and necessary*, must be pronounced general perceptive forms, *à priori*, or native to the mind, and lying in the mind from the first as necessary pre-conditions of special sense. This last—special sense—again, is, in all its forms, a mere affection of the subject exposed to the object. For, in all cases, an unknown object, or, as Kant calls it, a transcendental object, is to be supposed to act on special sense and excite the correspondent subjective affection. Here now, then, we have a view of Kant's whole world; so far, at least, as cognition is concerned. There are the various affections of the various special senses (colors, feels, &c.); these are received into the general perceptive forms of space and time; and, finally, through the

twelve different categorical modes of it, they are reduced into the unity of self-consciousness, or the ego. Should I repeat the sentence, and say now, then, "the sensations of the various special senses, received into the universal *à priori* forms of space and time, are reduced into perceptive objects, connected together in a synthesis of experience, by the categories," I think it will perhaps be less difficult for you to realize what is meant by Kant's *cognitive* theory being shut up in it.

As for Hegel, we must understand him to have started from these constructions of Kant, and only to have modified them. To him Kant's great want was that of *process*, process deductive, process interconnective. Starting with the I, the ego, he (Hegel) would have, like Fichte, the whole foison of the universe derived from its one primal and, so to speak, constitutive act. Accordingly, it is not enough for Hegel to take up, like Kant, abstract logic as it presents itself, and say, there are twelve classes of logical judgment, and these represent twelve functions of unity in self-consciousness, or the ego. Hegel must see the ego develop out of its own self, according to its own law, according to its own rhythm, according to its own principle, according to its own special, original, and primitive nature—develop into the entire system of its own constituent *inner* furniture or contents. And in this we see, too, how Hegel differs from Fichte. Fichte assumes a sort of *external* law of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, according to which he *externally* develops the ego into its own constitutive variety. Hegel will have nothing to do with such *externality* of procedure; he must see the ego unfolding itself into its native variety, according to its own native principle, according to its own inner nature.

Well then, having accomplished this—and you are simply to consider it done—having developed the ego, by its own law, into its own inner contents, Hegel will not, like Kant, only conceive it endowed further with two subjective perceptive forms, two subjective cones of projection, and a variety of special sensational affections, which, received into and externalized by these cones, becomes reduced by the categories, or functional unities of the ego, into the innumerable special objects, and the one system, of experience. No; that is for

him still external, and still arbitrary procedure; it is for him unwarranted procedure, which he must reject; and he conceives instead, after the internal process has reached its full sum, the same law to continue, and externalization of the whole internal sum to be the next result—externalization, that is, into this outward world of things. There is *Nous* to Hegel, thought, which, in obedience to its own law, *involved* into its own *inner* constituent sum; is further, in obedience to the same law, *evolved* into its own *outer* constituent sum, and that is the formed universe as it exists around us. In relation to Kant, then, it is to shut up Hegel in a single sentence to say he conceives the ego to develop into its own categories, and these being complete, externalization to result from the same common law. Still Hegel, unlike Kant, thinks not of the particular ego—yours and mine—in this process, but of the universal ego. So, to him, the ego completed in its own inner, is *Nous*, thought, universal self-consciousness—God, “as He is in His eternal essence before the creation of nature or any finite spirit.” This is fairly the amount of the pretension of Hegel when he so describes his logic as such “exposition” (*Darstellung*) of God. But, this being the case, then God’s universe to Hegel is plainly but the *contre-coup*—the counter-stroke of God’s own inner nature. This universe is only to him in externality what God is in internality, or it is in externality only what *self-consciousness* is in internality.

These, then, are the leading ideas of these two men, Kant and Hegel, so far as *theory*, or *cognition*, is concerned; and if one sees in them great similarity, one sees in them also great difference. In Kant’s world there is no knowledge of any *noumenal* existence. Although he postulates things in themselves—that is, independent outer objects—to set up the affections of sense in us, these affections (only further manipulated from within) alone constitute for him all that can be called things. And though he postulates a *logical* unity for self-consciousness, he *knows* no *existential* unity to correspond to the word *soul*: what we call our affections from within, as well as what we call our affections from without, are only *phenomenally* known. In fact, all that Kant knows are phenomenal affections, phenomenally projected into optical spectra of externality, and then *logically* gathered in into



unities again. Whether as regards the subject or as regards the object, he is quite destitute of any noumenal knowledge. *Without* is but sensation, *within* is but sensation; both are but stretched on two spectral skeletons, time and space, to be construed thence into what is called *experience*. The logical element is the only one in Kant that seems to possess any noumenal character, and that, too, rather in reference to *validity* than to *existence*. There is room in Kant—that is, for attaching to his logical element the character of noumenal or objective *validity*, but scarcely that of noumenal or objective *existence*; for self-consciousness being only logical in his eyes, his whole logical element is left without any substantial basis of support—unless in the mere postulate of an *inner* thing in itself, as there is a postulate of *outer* things in themselves. Now Hegel, though starting from these ideas, and deeply influenced by the importance of the logical element, still arrives in the end at a construction very different. The ego is not phenomenal to him, but noumenal; then the furniture of the ego is not limited to these twelve categories, but develops, and with rigorous necessity in every step, into a vast rich system. The spectral perceptive forms of space and time again do not exist for him in that character: they are the universals of externality, but externality to him is necessary, objective, and actual. These, then, are great improvements on the scheme of Kant, and there results a theory which, supplied with an actually external time and space, and an actually external world, is not repugnant to common sense. It is in his conception of externality and externalization, indeed, that we have one of the happiest characteristics of Hegel. “God said, Let there be light; and there was light”: the summed internality burst into its accurately correspondent externality: the flash of light was the birth of the universe. Directly we understand Hegel’s dialectic, there is no difficulty at all in *conceiving* internalization as internalization *here*, and externalization as externalization *there*, but both together as mutually complementary co-factors, as correspondent pieces of one whole: they are the counterparts of the single tally. And in that case, also, it is not difficult to understand that all further characters of externality will flow from the very idea of externality as external-

ity. There will be consequently a boundless possibility of outness, a boundless side by side of particulars, all material, but boundlessly *different*. It is but in obedience to the general conception, too, that externality itself is not an absolute chaos; that the shadow of the tree of intellect falls on it, controlling it, and that it returns in circles, narrowing and narrowing, up to the thought, the internality from which it started, or from which it fell. In regard to this Hegelian theory of externalization, I recollect one of our most famous citizens to have exclaimed to me, "I cannot take in all that d——d nonsense. Do you mean to say that thought made granite?" But I really do not see this to be so very difficult: it lies in the fact that in externality as externality there must be boundless material *difference*: granite is simply one of the *differences*. Altogether, I must acknowledge myself to find Hegel's plan of externalization the happiest ever yet proposed—a plan necessary even when we say, as we *do* say, and *must* say, God *made* the world; for it answers the question of *how*—precisely that question how God, how thought, made granite, for example.\*

From this account it will be evident, then, that Hegel is an idealist only as Aristotle is an idealist: he, like the Greek,

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\* The moment the idea of externality as externality is seized, the great difficulty will be found at an end. One ought to ask one's self, what *must* the idea of externality—what must *externality* itself be? Or, suppose you have *internality* completed—an ego, a boundless intussusception of thoughts, all in each other, and through or thorough each other, but all in the same geometrical point—what must *its* externalization—and its externalization is accurately externalization as externalization—be? *Its* externalization—it being an *internalization*—must plainly be the opposite of its own-self: whatever internalization *is*, externalization will be *not*; just as darkness and cold *are* precisely what light and heat are *not*. Or, taking it from the other end, we *see* that *externality* is infinite *out and outness*, infinite *difference*, under infinite *external* necessity (or, what is the same thing here, *contingency*); while *internality* again is, and must be, infinite *in and inness*, infinite *identity*, under infinite *internal* necessity (or, what is the same thing here, *reason*). We can see here, too, the origin and meaning of Hegel's constant words, *negation*, and the *negative*. Externality is the negative of internality. But the former is the particular, while the latter is the universal: therefore the particular is always the negative of the universal. This may serve to show how deeply *logic* enters into *existence*. The same connection finds meaning for Hegel's perpetual *abstract*. Abstraction, in general, is to take any character in isolated self-identity; and that is the same thing as wresting any one *moment* apart from its connection with the rest into isolated self-identity—the work of *understanding*, not *reason*.

would simply reduce all things to *notions*, would simply reduce all things to an ultimate generalization; and for what is ordinarily called *idealism*, he has not only no sympathy, but an absolute contempt. Absolute or objective idealism is to him only *the thinking of the universe*; but *subjective idealism* is that spurious idealism which would make externality due to the internality of each *particular* subject, and then, for that simple act, take a big air as if it were philosophy. Hegel rejects such conception and such pretension utterly, and he is never tired of telling us so. In effect, it is a very insufficient reflection this, that because a knower can only know within, therefore there is no independent external universe; but that is really the *bulk* of what is called *subjective idealism*.

There is another side from which the work of Hegel may be regarded. It is that of *explanation in general*, explanation as such. Man may go on as much as he likes in his merely animal capacity, marrying, doing business, journeying here and there, and enjoying his senses in general: he finds always in the end that that is not enough; that he must *think* as well as live and enjoy; above all, that *he must think existence*; that he must inquire why, once for all, *all this is here, why* is it, *whence* is it, *whither* does it go? All that may be summed up in the single phrase: he demands *explanation*. Now, of course, there are a great many explanations now-a-days. Since Bacon, and, above all, Newton, there is what is called science. Explanation is sought for as regards the stars, and there is astronomy. Explanation is sought for as regards the atmosphere, and there is electricity, say. Explanation is sought for as regards the constituents of the earth, their inter-relations, their inter-combinations, &c., and there are the sciences of physics, chemistry, and what not. Well, now, all these sciences are explanatory, science in general is an explanation; but these sciences, or science itself, are an explanation *within conditions* (the stars and planets themselves, the air itself)—within condition of the element itself, so to speak, which constitutes their *nidus*. That element, that *nidus*, is simply taken as we find it, and, after every explanation of science in regard to the special laws of it, the questions in general, why, whence, whither? remain

unanswered. These questions in general constitute philosophy. We shall not stop to consider that these "questions in general" constitute religion. We shall confine ourselves to philosophy. Philosophy, then, receives all the explanations of the sciences, of science in general, and, so instructed and prepared, proceeds to put the final question, the questions in general, why, whence, whither? In a word, philosophy demands an explanation of existence as existence. It is all very well to say here, *that* is impossible; that is a demand that, by the very conditions of the case, never can be granted. This is the situation pretty well of general belief at present: there is now a renunciation of metaphysics, there is now a renunciation of religion. This renunciation can never quash the essential need, however. Man is reason, and reason is irrepressible. Reason knows itself the essence of this universe, the essence of existence, and would see itself as it is, in its own grounds, in its own connections, in its own system. In a word, reason demands explanation as explanation. Now, what is that? What is explanation as explanation? And here it is that Hegel steps in. He considers the general nature of the case, and sees how its conditions *must* be. An explanation, to be an explanation, says Hegel, *must* be *so* and *so*. Now, in this he is not singular: all philosophers who *are* philosophers have seen the same thing. The philosophers *before* Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Proclus, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz *after* him, have all, more or less, consciously been led, in their philosophizings, by the same want. It would be easy to illustrate this in the case of all of them. I shall only, with this view, refer to Diogenes the Apo loubiate. The object of this philosopher, as represented in the first two or three fragments of his writings collected by Mullach (they occur also in Ritter and Preller), is plainly explanation, explanation as a general problem. As necessary presuppositions to that end, he assumes that there must be *a single first* principle; that this principle must be *indisputable*: that it must be *adequate* to the *entire* existent *variety*; and that consequently it must possess intelligence — for intelligence in actual fact *is*. Some of his particular expressions, literally translated, are these: "All things that are must be but alterations of one and the same thing, and

therefore the same thing; for if the things that are now—land and water, and the rest—were different the one from the other, each in its own nature, and were not the same thing variously changed, it would be impossible that they could be mixed together, or bring each other advantage or disadvantage: all things, then, are alterations of one and the same thing—at one time so and another time thus, and they return to the same thing. But this thing must be great, and mighty, and eternal, and immortal, knowing much. For without intelligence it could not be so disposed as to possess *measures* of all things, of winter and summer, and night and day, and rains, and winds, and calms. And, in the same way, whoever considers them will find all other things disposed as beautifully as possible.”

There is involved here, as is evident, a sort of *à priori* reasoning; as about the necessity to explanation of a common principle: how could things combine together or act on each other unless they participated in a common principle? that is pretty well the thought throughout. The further thought, too, is that, in view of the evident measure, proportion, rule, design according to which all things are disposed, this common principle can only be thought as intelligent: if there is rule, reflection, calculation in the effect, there must equally be rule, reflection, calculation in the cause. So it was, then, with Diogenes of Apollonia: *before* explaining, he determined the necessities *of* explaining; and so it was, also, with many of the others; so it was, above all, and in a supreme degree, with Hegel.

Hegel said to himself, or seems to have said to himself, for there is little that is direct in Hegel—he builds his system as a man might build a house, and lets us find out all his thoughts about it for ourselves—I, too, like other philosophers, would like to explain existence; but what does that mean? Evidently, I must find a single principle, a single fact *in* existence, that is adequate to all the phenomena *of* existence, to all the *variety* of existence; and this principle, while adequate to all the variety of existence, while competent to reduce into its own *identity* all the *difference* that is, must bring with it its own reason for its own self, its own necessity, its proof that it is, and it alone is, that which could not

not be. This for explanation—ultimate, radical, and all-embracing explanation—is evidently the necessary presupposition. It will plainly never do to *feign* a principle, to *fancy* a principle: the principle must *be*, an actual denizen, an actual thing present in *that which is*. The Red Indian who exclaims of all that he sees, of thunder and lightning, of the gas when it is lit in a theatre possibly, Manou! Manou! does not explain: he only exclaims; he only excites the imagination of his hearers into the vision of a monster, of a creature of fancy, of a mere Vorstellung, that is only assumed, or said to have such and such power, to be such and such a cause. It does not explain rain to say there is a spout above the clouds, although there are minds which would find themselves quite contented with such a mere hypothetical image. Such mere hypothetical, *vicarious* image of phantasy is not enough for Hegel, then: he must find in that which actually is an all-fertile, an all-competent single principle. And here we see at once the reason of Hegel's dislike to the infidel god, the Gallic god, le dieu français—that *être suprême* of Enlightenment, of the Illumination, that is an empty abstraction, a barren image of phantasy on which all only *is to be* hung. But that is no prejudice to Hegel's prostration before God, before the true God, before that which is the eternal centre and root, and everlasting substance of the world. He really and truly believes in God, but not in god that is only a topical god—a circumscribed, limited, particular something that is fancied up there—an enormous big man in the air that it is not absurd for Lalande the astronomer to try to see with his telescope. He has thought too much for that, he has read too much for that, he knows his catechism too well for that. He knows that God is a Spirit; that we cannot by physical searching find God out, but that we must worship Him in spirit and in truth. To that, at all events, his own words fairly amount.

This apart then, Hegel, believing himself to acknowledge the true God, and averse only to the abstract god of the Aufklärung, would find an explanation of all that is in some *actual constituent* of all that is. And that is thought, reason; that is *self-consciousness*. Self-consciousness he finds to be the one aim of existence: all that is, *is*, he finds *only*

for *self-consciousness*. That is the one purpose of existence. Nature itself is but a gradual and graduated rise up from the dust of the field to the self-consciousness of man. This we can see for ourselves; in the inorganic scale, up and up to the organic, and, in this latter, up and up to man. All is *explained* only when it is converted into thought, only when it is converted into ourselves, only when it is converted into self-consciousness. But if all only *is* for self-consciousness—if all can be converted into self-consciousness—if self-consciousness is the substance and the ultimate of all, then self-consciousness can be regarded as that which *instituted* all, self-consciousness can be regarded as the *præ* of all: all is only there for it, and to be explained into it. In this way it is seen, then, that self-consciousness is the principle of all; in other words, that self-consciousness is the principle of explanation sought. Hegel's work, consequently, is but one of ultimate *generalization*, of ultimate *induction*. Of *actual facts*, he finds self-consciousness the dominant one, the key to, and the *raison d'être* of, all the rest. What follows, then, is that Hegel should apply this key.

Of course, there are many men now-a-days, as I may just stop to remark, who only scorn as futile any such attempt as this of Hegel; and to the sentiments of these men we find from Xenophon that Socrates long ago gave voice and authority. "For *he* did not, like most of the others, debate of the nature of this all, speculating as to how what the Sophists call the world came into being, and by what necessities the various heavenly bodies were produced . . . . and he wondered if it was not evident to these men that it was impossible for man to find out these things." These words occur in the very first chapter of the *Memorabilia*, and there are more beside them to the same effect, with general derision of these high speculative philosophers, who yet, as is further pointed out, with all their claims, have hardly an opinion in common. This the opinion of Socrates is a very decided one, then. Hegel knows it well, too, but he does not let it trouble him. Rather, in direct opposition to Socrates, and to Socrates as praised by Cicero, he boldly exclaims, "Philosophy cannot be worth anything to the lives and homes of men unless it come down from heaven; and it is the one duty left us to

carry it up into heaven." In this, it is certain that, apart from that of Socrates, the highest names can be placed on the side of Hegel. Indeed it is difficult to find a single name on the whole bright file which did not belong to one whose reflection was such as fell within the censure of Socrates. Plato and Aristotle directly followed him; but the favorite speculation of both lay, we may say, *in the heavens*, and this not less in the case of the real Aristotle than in that of the ideal Plato. These names shall suffice, then, for the side of Hegel, and we shall let all the others, modern or ancient, pass. In a word, as I said already, *reason* demands an explanation of existence as existence; and *we must obey reason*.

On the part of Hegel, we shall see now, then, his application of the key of self-consciousness for this purpose. It was by induction, as we saw, that Hegel came to this key. Self-consciousness is in the world of facts, and all these other facts are only for it. *It* is the ultimate and essential drop of the universe, and explanation is only the reduction of all things into it. All things, indeed, stretch hands to it, rise in successive circles ever nearer and nearer to it. Now, what is self-consciousness? Its constitutive movement is the idealization of a particular through a universal into a singular, or, taking it from the other end, it is the realization of a universal through a particular into a singular. Now that may appear a very hard saying, but it is a very simple one in reality: it is only a general naming of the general act of self-consciousness. In every act of self-consciousness that is, there is an object and a subject. The object on its side is a material externality of parts, while the subject on the other side again is an intellectual unity, but a unity that has within it, or behind it, a whole word of thoughts. It is by these thoughts the subject would master the object, reduce it into itself. These thoughts, then, that thus master the object, are the universals under which it is subsumed, and it, as so subsumed, is but the particular to these universals. The outward world, then, consists only of the particulars of the universals that constitute the inward world. I think this will be readily seen to be true. We can only think by generalizing, and generalizing is the reduction of particulars to universals. Evidently, then, in every act of self-consciousness particulars



meet universals in a singular. We were right, consequently, in describing the constitutive movement of self-consciousness to be the idealization of a particular (the object) through a universal (the thought) into a singular (the subject). When we consider, moreover, that self-consciousness is the original substantial principle, the veritable *prius* of all, we shall see also that it is not incorrect to describe the constitutive movement of self-consciousness as the *realization* of a universal through a particular into a singular. Now, that is the Notion—that is the Secret of Hegel. *The vital act of self-consciousness is the notion.* The single word *notio* involves all the three elements, a *knowing* (universal) of *something* (particular) in a *knower* (singular). An act of knowing—idealization quite generally—is the reduction of a particular through a universal into a singular; but *è contra*, *creation*—and that is realization quite generally—is the exemplification of a universal to a singular through a particular. This, then, is the one ground-notion which Hegel, by virtue of its own law, its own rhythm, as triple in its own form, and so triple that its units, though *different* from, are yet related to, and *identical* with, each other—this, I say, is the one ground-notion which Hegel sees develop before him out of its own self into the sum of its own *inner* constituent system of notions. That inner system he then calls *idea*. The notion is the first and the ever-present substance—every one of the derivative notions is but *the* notion—but the completed internal system of these notions, or of *the* notion, is *the idea*. The idea now, then, is the entire and complete universal, and it is only in obedience to the one ever-present law that it sunders into the particular—Nature. Nature again, the particular, returns to the universal in the singular, Mind, which gradually rises from its primal involution in nature up through all its forms to the Absolute Spirit.

Universal, particular, and singular, are the three moments of the notion, and everything *organic*, everything *true* in this world is—however abstract its *element*—a *concrete* of these three moments, which can be seen to take on in the course of the development a thousand names, as thesis, antithesis, synthesis; or a form which is a great favorite in my own explanations, simple apprehension, judgment, and reason. This

*notion* may be illustrated in a variety of ways. What is *organization*, for example—what is an organization to any purpose? Reflect on it as you may, you will find that it is the reduction of a *many* of particulars to the *unity* of a singular through the menstruum of universals—the plan and what it implies. Every concrete is but such organization. The family, for example: there is no perfect family where there is not the *fulfilled* IDEA, where each of the three moments, universal, particular, and singular, has not full justice accorded it. So the state; a state must be *idea*—perfect harmony of universal, particular, and singular, else it is imperfect and not a state. The state is the accomplished *idea* of the self-developing *notion*: here free-will, and in it, if perfect, each of the *moments*, has its due place and its due scope. But is not the universe itself the best illustration? The universe itself is but the realization of the universal through the particular in the singular; and all that is said when we pronounce the single word—self-consciousness.

Hegel's work now, then, can evidently be called simply the ultimate *generalization*. He sees that if we would ultimately explain, we must fairly generalize explanation itself. Explanation is always the reduction of an object into self-consciousness; ultimate explanation, then, must be a reduction of all into self-consciousness. But self-consciousness is a fact, it is something *in rerum natura*, a principle actually existing: Hegel's work, then, is in so many words the final and universal *induction*.

But you will say, perhaps, the self-consciousness that is in nature is *ours*—there is no other self-consciousness *in nature* than ours: are we to suppose that Hegel views *my* self-consciousness, *your* self-consciousness, *his* self-consciousness, as God? In one way, I cannot deny this. Still Hegel's idealism, as I said already, is no *subjective* idealism: he does not conceive nature to be an externalization of the *individual subject's* categories, notions, but of those of the universal subject, of those of the universal self-consciousness. But Hegel, we might object further, would certainly admit that every individual finite subject might die, and yet the universe would subsist. What in that case were God? Would not Hegel seem simply to conceive then a potential God—a God as it were asleep in

nature—and who had yet to be *realized* afresh in other finite self-consciousness? There are professing adherents of Hegel—Ruge and the so-called party of German critics—who seem to entertain some such conception. I, for my part, admit that such may appear to be the case, so far as Hegel's developments apart from time, apart from history, are concerned; but I assert such an appearance no longer to obtain the moment the development has entered the domain of spirit. In the sphere of religion especially, Hegel, as is well known, sums up his development in Christianity as the revealed religion, and in the midst of numerous expressions that are unmistakably theistic. I may quote here what I said in the newspapers (*Courant*, Dec. 21, 1868) on this head three years ago:—"We are bound to accept Hegel's own professions. Again and again, and in the most emphatic manner, he has asserted himself not only to be politically conservative, but religiously orthodox—a Lutheran Christian. If we accept, as we do, his first assertion without difficulty, we have no right to deny his second. Indeed, however pantheistic the construction, so to speak, in space may appear, the tables, as intimated, are wholly turned in the construction in time, and Hegel ends not only by profession, but by philosophy, a theist and a Christian."

I may say also, that this statement met at the time with the complete approbation of the non-Hegelian Professor Ueberweg—non-Hegelian, but before his death, as both correspondence and actual published writings led me to believe, less and less so. Ueberweg, whose premature death—the premature death of perhaps the most indefatigable philosophical student of his time—we are now justly lamenting, wrote me that his belief was quite mine as expressed in the quotation I have read, and that it was impossible to establish a negative against such a religious claim for Hegel. Of course, it is to be allowed that Hegel *philosophizes* Christianity, and that his understanding of much is not such as John Knox would have accepted. Nevertheless, this is to be said, that Hegel would have claimed accord—*substantially*—even with John Knox. We believe the same historical fact and facts, he would have said; only you see them in the *Vorstellung*, while I see them in the *Begriff*. That at all events is really

the true nature of the case; and it is a piece of wisdom that is much needed at present. That single distinction between *Vorstellung* and *Begriff* is fitted to bring about perfect reconciliation between the beliefs of the less educated and those of the more educated, and give the Church peace. I may add, too, that every objection from the religious side that may be taken to the *rôle* assigned by Hegel to self-consciousness will disappear on due consideration of the text: "In His own image God created man."

Returning again for a moment to the principle of self-consciousness itself, let me point out another advantage possessed by it as a principle of explanation. It contains within itself both *difference* and *identity*, and a little reflection will make it plain that there can be no possible explanation of this world without a principle that contains both elements. The origin of *difference in identity* is the point and focus of the whole problem; but we have that at once in self-consciousness. Thought, reason, self-consciousness, is the one single necessity, the primal ἀνάγκη, that that could not *not* be, and alone that that could not *not* be; but thought, reason, self-consciousness, is by nature a duplicity in unity, difference in identity, for to know is to be always two things in one; what knows and what is known are for ever different but for ever identical. And so it is that evolution is possible; for, after all, the work of Hegel is certainly an *evolution*. It must be regarded, however, as only a *potential* one, only one *in idea*, not one that takes place or ever took place *in time*. And this gives it a vast superiority over ordinary evolution doctrines. To suppose that there ever was a natural first germ that *naturally grew* into another—as, for example, that the oyster ever *grew* into a man—is to suppose an absurdity. The evolution *is—there—in idea*—and that is really by power of the idea—but it never took place in *natural* fact. All that ingenuity which would explain the peacock's tail by the loves of the female (whose comparative plainness then remains unaccountable) is but perverse and a waste of time—a waste of time in this, too, that science is quite unable to allow the explanation itself *time enough*. It would be easy to bring forward sufficient ingenuity to explain the spider's web—by a drop of accidental fluid accidentally

emitted by some certain spider one fine day, that gave that accidental advantage which is necessary; but would such ingenuity, such *Vorstellung*, such mere fancy, be scientific explanation? The method of *natural conjecture* in fact, however amusing, leads nowhere.

But let us now, in conclusion, just glance at Hegel's evolution that precedes and results in the notion of law, to which all that I have yet said is only preliminary; and I trust I have your excuse for spending so much time on what *is* only preliminary, my conviction being that any shorter previous explanation would have been futile. Hegel's system, as is now pretty well known, is contained in three great spheres—the Science of Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Spirit. Here we see at once that what we have before us is the Notion. Logic is the universal, Nature is the particular, and Spirit is the Singular. Logic, having developed into full *Idea*, passes into the particular as the particular, into externalization as externalization, in Nature; and Nature, rising and collecting itself, through sphere after sphere, from externality itself in the form of space, up to *natural* internality in the form of organic life, passes into Soul, which is the first form of Spirit. The instrument of the evolution all along, we are to understand, is the *Notion* in its three *Moments*. Omitting any closer consideration of the evolution in Logic and Nature—vast wholes of philosophy though they be—we shall pass to that of Spirit; and here, too, we must be but perfunctory only until we reach our own subject. The three heads under which Spirit is treated are Subjective Spirit, Objective Spirit, and Absolute Spirit—obviously again in agreement with the three moments of the Notion. Under Subjective Spirit we have mind rising *through its own faculties* to its own higher forms—or *the faculties themselves* are represented *but as successive stages* of development in mind itself—and all as ever in obedience to the *notion*. Thus, theoretical spirit, or the spirit that knows, cognition that is, being complete, passes into practical spirit, the spirit that acts, the spirit that has will; and will can only realize itself in the objective world of Law—in the State. And here we have reached at last our own subject. The introduction has been long, but not longer, I believe, than was

absolutely necessary to enable us to understand the movement of Hegel — that dialectic which we shall find as active in what concerns Right, Law, as elsewhere. Now, however, I think we may consider ourselves fully *instruits*; and at our next meeting we shall effect the transition from the theoretical to the practical spirit, and enter on the objective domain of the latter — on the domain of will, and of law as its realization.

## FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE, by A. E. KROEGER.

### BOOK II.

FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN REGARD TO THE PRACTICAL FACULTY.

#### CHAPTER III.

*The Tendency of the Ego to overcome the Check is posited as a Multiplicity of material Bodies, or as a System of Individuals.*

That which I actually — that is, in the region of my self-confined power of imaging — produce through my causality is to confine my own external causality, so that no retraction of my thinking can retract its being. Nay, what is more, even the contemplation of other beings like myself is to be bound by it, as likewise by my own bodily existence.

This is here simply my assertion, and presented simply as a mere pure fact of consciousness. Now this assertion involves the following:

1. There do exist outside of myself beings like myself.
2. These beings are bound to recognize me, by virtue of my bodily existence, as a being like themselves.
3. They are also bound to perceive the products of my activity in the material world.

The latter two propositions I may safely take for granted after having assumed the first one. The whole is here represented simply as a fact of consciousness without any deduction or (what our deductions here are) junction with a higher link, since we have here as yet no higher link wherewith we

could bring this fact into conjunction, being as yet busy in the endeavor to get at such a higher link by ascending from our present point. Hence we have at present to see simply what this fact involves; that is, to connect it with what is already known to us, and to comprehend it from that standpoint.

First of all: how do I get at all at that presupposition? How does the picture and the thought of such beings like me outside of myself arise in me? It is not only wonderful but contradictory to all our previous supposition. The life of freedom and of consciousness has hitherto been represented as one; all our deductions have been made from the oneness, and only by its means have we proved and explained. But now this one life evidently dirempts into many lives, which in their essence are to be like each other; hence this one life is here repeated in many forms, and repeated. How does this repetition occur? Don't let us, by any means, ask as yet from what ground it occurs, for that question can probably be answered only in another place; but, through what fact does this positing of other beings outside of us occur?

A.—In order to prepare our investigation, let us once more answer in all possible clearness the oft-answered question: how do I make myself a real principle? As an imaging principle I already have myself, and contemplate myself as such through the immediate internal contemplation of freedom. But, apart from this internal contemplation, I have another form of immediate consciousness, namely, my immediately through-itself-limited productive power of imaging. I attempt to apply also this second form to the Ego contemplated in the first described manner, and I find that this my productive power of imaging is limited by this Ego also immediately and in a two-fold manner, namely, 1st, by that Ego as a material body; and 2d, by the products of that Ego as a material body in a material world.

Have I now, then, completely externalized the Ego, and placed it, through thinking, out of the region of immediate internal contemplation, in the region of external perception? Yes and no. The bodily presentation of the Ego and its causality in the material world are externalized: but the self-determining of this causality, the conception and plan

that precede it, remain as yet mere objects of internal contemplation, and in so far the Ego has not yet been externalized. But that causality, as the external, is conditioned by that self-determining, or by that conception, as the internal, and without an internal we shall never get an external. Hence this Ego gets completely externalized neither by the mere external contemplation or productive thinking, nor by the mere internal contemplation, but only by an absolutely inseparable synthesis of both.

B.—I try still further whether I cannot get this Ego—even beyond this synthesis and precisely as it occurs in this synthesis, namely, as composed of internal and external self-contemplation—by means of productive thinking from the now completed inner contemplation; that is, whether I cannot get hold of it in that purely original thinking, whereby it would—as an absolute giving out of the internal—get utterly cut off from this given internal contemplation, and would receive for the Ego of this internal contemplation an altogether peculiar on-itself-reposing Being; becoming for this Ego a true non-Ego, just as happened in the case of the first product of free thinking, the merely material object of external perception, only in a much higher degree. I say, for the Ego of this hitherto described internal contemplation, although in-and-for-itself it may well be an Ego, since it has been thought as such.

I try and I find that I not only can but must do so. The productive power of imagination in attempting to realize such a thinking finds itself compelled to realize it, that is, finds itself limited by the existence of such external Egos, and moreover—as results from the original form of the power of imaging—by an infinite number of possible Egos. The Ego must be externalized through thinking, and can be so externalized infinitely. Now, in what particular case this conception must be applied and realized we shall have to specify hereafter.

C.—Let us, firstly, consider the form of this original thinking of the Ego, that is, of externalizing. To be sure, the inner Ego is also thought and received into the form of independent Being; it is not thought, however, through the absolute original thinking, but by means of the inner contemplation.



Now that previously described thinking of the mere material object of external perception appeared—at least in our first investigation—as grounded and conditioned through another, through the necessity to draft a conception of the activity which the impulse desires to achieve. Now we have no condition given for the thinking of an Ego beyond the Ego of immediate internal contemplation; we have posited it as an absolute fact. Hence this thinking is, at least here, an altogether unconditioned determination of pure and absolute thinking, and is therefore thought simply because it is thought, and thinking, itself, involves this particular thinking. We cannot say, I think—produce—other Egos; but rather, universal and absolute thinking thinks—or thinkingly produces—those other Egos, and my own Ego amongst them. Hereafter we shall, perhaps, find a ground even of this thinking; but it is already evident here that that ground cannot be of the same nature as the grounds and conditions heretofore.

D.—Let us now proceed to ascertain the contents of this absolute thought. The Ego is thought absolute—precisely as it was generated above through the absolute synthesis of internal and external contemplation, and as the uniting central point of both. Hence the thought Ego receives *internally* its immediate self-contemplation—its faculty of conception, of self-determination, &c.; and *externally* a materially organized body and a possible causality in the material world, precisely as pertains to the first Ego, from which we started in our internal investigation.

Now, the significant part here is this: the immediately internal contemplation is repeated, for the present at least, twice. But these two internal contemplations are separated by an absolute gulf, and neither of them can look into the other, since each one is not contemplated but thought by the other. What is this gulf?

Evidently it is upon this distinction that I base my assertion, this is *my* Ego; and that I admit of my neighbor's Ego, although it is just like mine: this is not mine but his Ego; words that he, speaking of me, repeats in the same manner. Now, what does this duplication of the Ego into my Ego signify here? Evidently it is the basis of the fundamental

character of the individual as such. What, then, is this character?

Just remember how we arrived at all at an Ego. Knowledge reflected itself, and found and seized itself in the act, which act may thus be well called an altogether immediate (and if we have named this internal an external) contemplation. But it was this contemplation which, gathered into the fixed form of thinking, first gave rise to an Ego, first as a knowing intelligence, and next as a principle; and this indeed was the origin of the first and in all our previous investigations single, Ego; nor would any Ego have arisen without that reflection and self-contemplation of knowledge. Hence it follows that the actual existence of an Ego is grounded upon an absolute fact of immediate self-contemplation, namely, the self-contemplation of knowledge.

At present this Ego is to be multiplied; there are to be many Egos. This immediate self-contemplation must, therefore, occur many times; that is, its fact must be multiplied, since every such fact is the ground of an Ego. Vice versa, to say that many Egos are posited, is to say that the fact of inner contemplation is posited as having occurred many times. That knowledge, which is internally contemplated in this fact, may well remain one and the same; for we have neither said, nor does it result from our deduction, that this knowledge is repeated and posited many times. It is simply the altogether seemingly accidental fact of contemplation, or of the reflection of that knowledge, which is posited many times; and it is only thus that a manifold Ego of internal contemplation has first arisen. Now, with this original fact of inner contemplation as its essential birth-place, there connects another Ego, which develops itself as a power of other internal contemplations, of an impulse, of a faculty, of freely-created conceptions. All that further occurs in internal contemplation is gathered into the unity of the Ego thought in virtue of that fact. Thus the Ego of each individual is that Ego which he has thought in virtue of that absolutely primary and original self-contemplation of knowledge which first gave him existence, and to which he now relates all that may occur in the same internal contemplation. Hence the expression, *my* Ego. The Ego which

involves the *my*, and whereof "my" is the adjective, is the absolutely original Ego which has arisen through the immediate fact of self-contemplation. The second Ego, alluded to here, is the progression of the first original Ego in time; and this progression occurring with freedom, and thus remaining under the control of the first original Ego, the original Ego appropriates it as its own and calls it its Ego. Hence that which we have described is the essential character of the individual as such, and through which the spheres of internal contemplation, as based upon separate facts, separate from and mutually exclude each other.

Result: the individuals as such are absolutely separate in themselves, complete single worlds, without any connection whatever.

E.—Now, if we stopped here, life in the background as the matter of the manifold facts of reflection might well remain one and the same, as we have just now maintained; but it could certainly never arrive at a unity, at least in consciousness, since all consciousness would be altogether individual. Indeed it would even remain inexplicable how we, who confess ourselves to be individuals, could think such a unity, though it were simply problematically, and how we could possibly make ourselves understood about the matter. Hence if consciousness is to remain consciousness of the one life, as we have maintained from the first it must, that unity which was cancelled by individuality must be restored in that same consciousness. This must be restored of course; *firstly*, since the inner contemplation is precisely the medium of cancelling the unity by going beyond this medium, by its opposite, which is thinking; and which, since it is a representation of the original and absolute unity, must be an original thinking; and *secondly*, it must be restored just in so far as it is cancelled: that is, those individuals that have been separated into many lives in inner contemplation, must again be united in thinking as such and as remaining such; in other words, they must all occur in the one same thinking.

F.—Consider well what has been said. That thinking, which has as yet been described only factically in its relative form as the opposite of inner contemplation, and hence as a going beyond that contemplation, obtains here, where

its peculiar and inner essence is made apparent, an altogether different and higher significance. It becomes an immediate self-representation of life, as a one and in its unity. Hence it can be only a single thinking, corresponding, and agreeing with itself.

This thinking is the representation or consciousness of life. Hence this thinking must occur everywhere where life enters the form of consciousness. This form it has entered in the individuals. Hence it must occur in these individuals, and, moreover, in all of them. It is in itself one, and must therefore occur in all in the same manner.

I say, the one life represents itself in this thinking in its unity. But the individual as such is not at all life in its unity, but merely a fragment of it. We cannot, therefore, say at all that the individual as such thinks that thinking; or, if we do say so, we must add that it thinks that thinking not as an individual, but as the one and same life. It is in this thinking no longer a particular separate Ego, but the one and universal Ego. After a while we shall arrive at very remarkable applications of this proposition.

If this thinking does occur in the individual, it will appear of course under the condition of free reflection, and not otherwise, in inner contemplation; not as a product of the Ego, however, but simply as the expression of an absolute fact.

*Remarks.*—The Science of Knowledge has generally been understood as ascribing effects to the individual—for instance, the production of the whole material world, &c.—which cannot at all be ascribed to it. Now, how is the Science of Knowledge, in truth, related to this objection? Thus: those who raised that objection fell into their misunderstanding precisely because they themselves ascribed to the individual far more than appertains to it, and thus committed the very error which they imputed to the Science of Knowledge. Hence, having once misunderstood the first principles of that science, they find that error in it even to a further extent than they themselves are inclined to grant to it. But they are altogether mistaken; it is not the individual, but the one immediate spiritual life, which is the creator of all appearances, and hence also of the appearing individuals. Hence the Science of Knowledge holds so very strictly, that this one life

be thought purely and without any substrate; for the individual serves precisely as such substrate, and hence arise all their errors. Reason—or universal thinking, or knowledge simply—is higher and more than the individual. To be unable to think any other reason than one which an individual possesses as his accident is to be unable to think reason at all. Happy the individual whom reason possesses!

Result: the described absolute thinking represents a community of individuals.

G.—This thinking is expression of life generally, and therefore occurs necessarily wherever life arrives at consciousness. But life arrives at consciousness, as we have said above, in the individuals. It follows, therefore, that *all* actually existing individuals—all points wherein knowledge has arrived at a contemplation of itself—must be necessarily thought from the stand-point of *each* individual. Just as I, individual, think the others, so the others again think me; and as many as I think, so many think me. Thus all think the same community or system of individuals, with this only difference, that each has another starting-point, another sphere of inner contemplation from which he starts. Each one thinks all the others through absolutely original thinking, but he does not think himself so; himself he produces through the described synthesis of both contemplations.

H.—An Ego is necessarily thought as in an organized body. Hence each individual thinks necessarily all the others thus; for Egohoods and organized materiality are absolutely united in original thinking, or in the law of thinking, and hence they are so likewise in actual thinking, or in the following out of that thinking.

Thus the previously first question, as to where the conception of the Ego is applicable in actuality, is here answered as follows: wherever an organized body appears to the external sense, or—as we know better now—to the absolute thinking of a material world. It is not to be understood as if we concluded from the form of the body to the Ego,—neither immediately, for how could such a conclusion from one world to its direct opposite be possible? nor mediately, because I, individual, have such a body, for how can I know that this body is not merely accidental, but belongs essentially and

absolutely to my Ego! But the matter stands thus: both, the thought of the Ego and this bodily representation, are united in the original thinking which expresses life in its unity.

## HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

Translated from the German of Dr. K. ROSENKRANZ, by G. S. HALL

The conception of history must enter into the system of sciences, although it must be granted that history cannot become strictly a science in the same degree as psychology, logic, etc., because chance and arbitrariness influence the empirical development of Spirit.

The constant elements of history are found in the conception of reason, in the laws of nature, in psychology and ethics. By their necessity alone the actual becomes intelligible. So far as human action is controlled by this necessity, nothing new happens under the sun. We find the family, the community, property, labor, rank, professions, trades, government, laws, customs, and war, among all people and in all ages. Everywhere and in every age we observe the growth and decay of states, of reforms, of revolutions. If all these elements as phenomena were infinitely modified, a science of history would only be still more impossible. What then, in this tumult of facts, is the leading principle? If such a principle exist, the facts, as its consequences, must sustain an inner relation to each other. According to Hegel, such a principle does exist. He defines universal history as the progress of mankind in the consciousness of freedom. This is no less grandly and truly thought than it is simply and strikingly uttered.

That which is truly new in history is the deeper apprehension of the conception of freedom, which permeates and transforms all special elements of life with itself. So far, then, something new *does* occur under the sun. Mind, as phenomenal, is infinitely perfectable. In their material aspect the actions of men remain ever the same, but the consciousness with which they act changes. The more difficult question now

arises for philosophy, Where in the system does history find its place? for art, religion, and science, belong to history. It may unhesitatingly be granted that the philosophy of history should be placed at the close of the system. It would be pedantic to deny this. Since consciousness finds its most precise expression in philosophy, the conception of science might very well be combined with that of history, and be exhibited as its highest result. That Hegel brought his history to a close with the conception of the state, is accounted for by the essence of freedom, which, in the state, acquires indubitable objective existence, and gives distinct consciousness of right and duty to the moral worth of human actions, while in art and religion, phantasy and in science, doubt and error have large scope. The law-books of nations are the concrete criterion according to which this consciousness of freedom may be measured. The state embraces the totality of all relations which refer to the idea of good. Here, as in so many other passages, Hegel resembles Kant, who would likewise see the conception of the state made to preside over the development of history. In the introduction Hegel entered into an exhaustive justification of his thoughts, in which he essentially explained and completed that conception of the state which he had proposed in the *Philosophy of Right*. If any one still has scruples as to whether Hegel meant well for freedom, or how he understands the conception of ethics, he is referred to this derivation of the conception of universal history from the conception of the state. It is also an example how, with the purest German idioms, a profound thought may be presented with perfect clearness and intelligibility. The way in which he describes ethics, both here and in the *Philosophy of Right*, can be compared only with the inimitable art with which Jacob Grimm treated similar objects. The purest fountains of German words sprung spontaneously for both. A poetic ether hangs over the creative constructions of this great teacher even when they descend to the plane of the readiest intelligibility.

The constant elements of history he had already investigated in the *Phenomenology* as the science of the experience of consciousness. There, as we have already seen, no ethnographic, no chronologic or historic fact was mentioned; no

person in history was named. Now he treated history from the principle of the state. In so doing he followed Kant, who in 1784, in an original treatise, had apprehended the conception of the historical process from this point, because consciousness of freedom attained to objective distinctness in the state. Kant, however, had only made a plan, and had never entered into the details of its execution as Hegel attempted to do.

The geographic element, where we speak of the history of Asia, Africa, Europe and America, does not suffice for history. Nations transcend natural divisions. Geographic distinctness is a very important factor for the historical process, but it is only an external foundation, not a principle. Water, still more than land formation, is adapted to supply a guiding principle, for it mediates the movement of peoples. Kapp, in his philosophy of the knowledge of the Earth (*Erdkunde*), distinguished the oriental, the antique, and the modern world, respectively, as (1) the potamic, (2) the thallassic, (3) the oceanic. Asia produced great states upon the banks of rivers, Europe upon the Mediterranean Sea, and America, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, is essentially oceanic. The next higher element is the anthropological one of racial differences, so far as the black, yellow, and white race exhibit not only a different outer type, but different psychological endowment. But races mix, so that there exists, however much Herr von Gobineau may sigh about it, less pure blood with every advancing generation. In America already all races mingle.

- (1) The Ethiopian is for itself unhistorical;
- (2) The Mongolian is historically at a stand-still;
- (3) The Caucasian is historically progressive.

An anthropological analogy is connected with the ethnographic element, which is derived from the ages of human life, and which is very often repeated. Herder brought it into acceptance and Hegel adopted it.

- (1) The Orientals represent the stage of childhood;
- (2) The Greeks that of youth;
- (3) The Romans that of manhood;
- (4) The Germans that of old age.

History cannot be comprehended under such an analogy, and



therefore the abstract conception of time has been adduced, and history has been divided into (1) Ancient, (2) Middle, and (3) Modern, or simply into Ancient and Modern. Ancient and modern is, however, a purely relative conception; no principle is expressed thereby. If this is to be done, recourse is had to the break which Christianity made in the world. Thus we come to religion, and it becomes manifest that it cannot be excluded from the development of the state. We speak, therefore, of Heathen, Mohammedan, and Christian States. (1) Paganism—Polytheism—(2) Monotheism, (3) the Christian belief in the Trinity, are qualitative differences in the field of religion. A fantastic element, however, lies in religion which transcends objective reality, while the sphere of the state lies in the indubitable relations of the self-conscious will. So long as these relations are at the same time regarded as religious, or so long as they receive from religion absolute justification in an external manner, the state is not yet perfectly free and sovereign. Hegel demands, therefore, for the perfection of the state "good-will and consent." He will acknowledge right apart from morality. Right should not be an internally foreign, casual determination of man, but he should know himself therein according to his essence. He should regard the state not merely as an institution for the security of his person and possessions, for the advancement of his peculiar interests, but it should be sacred to him as the concrete realization of the idea of good. Hegel, as well as Fichte, Schleiermacher and Steffens, regarded the police state and the industrial state as mere caricatures of the true state. This was not a blasphemous deification of the state, as is so often said; for he recognized the spheres of religion as transcending those of the state. In his outlines of a new constitution for Germany, he said that the state could admit different confessions, and even that by so doing it would be more free. In his Berlin period he was inclined to regard Protestantism as that confession which alone makes the true ethical state possible. But it appears that the state, as such, has to concern itself merely with the reason of its laws and institutions, without reflecting thereby upon any creed. The modern state, as such, has no religion. This he leaves free to dispose of itself. He concedes to every citizen the right to relate himself to God

according to his own peculiar conviction. The state must do all with the reason of human freedom, and nothing with eternal happiness. This he leaves to the belief of the individual. It is the highest right of man to be free in this from every outer constraint, for here he stands in the deepest mystery. If it be said that the state, to correspond to its true conception, must be Protestant, then the question immediately arises whether Lutheran, or Calvinistic, or Anglican, &c. Thus the presumption that a state ought to have a confession is refuted as factious.

Hegel therefore, for the division of universal history, has ignored religion. He distinguished four ages of the world: (1) the Oriental, (2) the Grecian, (3) the Roman, and (4) the German. Of these four, the two middle periods, in antithesis to the Orient, are fundamentally only one, which we usually call the ancient world. A clear idea is not expressed by this designation. Hegel gives this, therefore, in the form of the qualitative judgment, that in the Orient one is free; in the antique world, several; and in the modern world, all: or, in another form,

- (1) Despotism—Orient;
- (2) Republic—Greece and Rome;
- (3) Constitutional monarchy—the German State.

For Hegel, history furnishes the empirical proof of the necessity of the latter form. He admits at the close of his observations that the main difficulty lies in realizing the justification and defence of all, in legislation. He was an opponent of Rousseau. He desired a representation of the people according to rank. How astonished he would be that, within scarcely twenty years after his death, Europe became politically reconstructed, and that every independent man of legal majority and of unblemished reputation, without distinction of station, race, culture, or fortune, was endowed with full active and passive right of franchise. He would have been shocked to behold in porters, watchmen, coachmen, &c., political persons who had an equal voice with merchants, professors, judges, and counsellors of state. With proper reflection, however, he would have been obliged to recognize in free suffrage the legitimate consequence of the constitutional principle. The idea of the state must pervade and civilize every peas-

ant. It endures no longer plebean masses (Pöbel). The elective franchise of voters reconciles the sovereignty of the people with the royal sovereignty, in which the former individualizes itself as concrete personality. Since Herder we have had a great multitude of books which have proposed as their end the philosophic consideration of universal-history. They have been for the most part forgotten, because their authors either could not master the empirical material and reduce it to an abstract formulization, or because, like Krause, they proceeded from abstract principles and neglected the empirical process. Talented historians like J. V. Müller, in his 24 volumes of the Universal History of Mankind, or Dipold in his Sketches of History, approached much nearer the true idea of history than the so-called *a priori* constructions. Hegel's work is the only one of these attempts which has proved enduring, because it presents an adjustment of these extremes which is deserving especial admiration. It will evince itself also as classical for the future, because in the form of simple narration it brings out the significance of the idea as the inner soul of facts; and conversely, because, by the very plain and unavoidable evolution of the idea, it recalls to mind the lucidity of historical phenomena, and especially serves, like an enchanting picture, to bring into the present great individuals like Alexander, Cæsar, and Luther. The great fact however remains, that he rightly apprehended the principle of universal history and the conception of freedom. The individual must not be blamed if he help himself as well as he can, through the life of vicissitude, with hypotheses. One appeals to fate, another to providence; but the necessity of freedom is the absolute might of events. The end of history is not the eudæmonism of sensuousness equipped with every comfort, but freedom, which is fore-knowing in the consciousness of its conformity to law, and by its providence shapes its destiny now tragically, now comically.

Of course, a much stricter carrying out of philosophical history may be conceived than Hegel accomplished, by which the question of the position of the Jews must especially be brought into closer consideration. Hegel ascribed to them different relationships in different fields. In the Philosophy of History he mentioned them only as a moment of the Per-

sian kingdom; in the Philosophy of Religion he placed them immediately before the Greeks. The Jews, however, who constitute the middle term between the national states of the Orient and of classical antiquity, and the humanity-state of the Germano-Christian world, belong to universal history. In political culture, in æsthetic refinement, in scientific insight, they are behind many other nations; but in religious inspiration they surpass all others. The universal criterion for the historical significance of nations can lie only in the degree which the conception of manhood has attained reality. From this stand-point the Jews are not only higher than all the nations of the Orient, but higher than Greeks, Romans, or Germans. As the absolute middle term of history they are a contradiction, and maintain still with their nationality a negative relation to the idea of mankind. They make the postulate of a general Theocracy, to which all nations, by their mediation, shall be subjected; but they condemn and kill those Jews who express the consciousness that the true God cannot be merely a national God, but must be the God of all men, from whatever national stock they spring. The nations of the old world fell into three great groups, each of which came to an end with the indifferentiation of its nationality.

I. The Eastern Asiatic group embraces the passive nations which, in contrast to the rough eudæmonism of those historical nations who lived in a state of nature, as the first nations of culture, brought forth at first only a negative ascetic ideal. Such are (1) the Chinese, (2) the East Indians, (3) the Buddhistic or Indo-Chinese nations. The Chinese are contrasted with Indians. The State-principle of the first is the natural ethics of family piety, which passes into moral discipline. The principle of India is the dignity of caste, which leads to a formal Legal state, which stamps the most striking inhumanity as a positive right, because caste and family are united, and the lower caste has no right which the higher must respect. Buddhism seeks emancipation from the inhumanity of a state resting upon caste, by mendicancy, which it exalts to a religion, and affirms the equality of all men in the sufferings of sickness, of age, and of death, as a principle of abstract brotherhood.

II. The Western Asiatic group embraces the active nations which pursue a heroic ideal, and make the enjoyment of the goods of this world the reward of conflict. These are (1) the Persians, (2) the Egyptians, (3) the Semites. The Persians wage war for conquest and dominion; the Egyptians, to defend their states, canals, palaces, temples, and tombs; the Arabian Semites, for the sake of carnage and plunder; the Chaldean Semites, for the defence of their culture and riches; the Phœnician Semites, for the enlargement and defence of trade. Babylon became the seat of continental trade. Tyre and Sidon advanced from land to the sea, and this perfected the cosmopolitan character of trade. The secular disposition of the Semites is the affirmative counterpart of the monastic renunciation of Buddhistic mendicancy. Egypt's attitude of uniformity contrasts strongly with the fantastic excesses and monstrosities of India—the belligerent pathos of the Persians with the peacefulness of the much-eating and much-writing Chinese.

III. The European group embraces (1) the Grecians, (2) the Romans, (3) the Germans (before their conversion to Christianity). These are the nations of political individuality. Interest in the development of the constitution of the state becomes the life problem of the free man. Among the Greeks, the democracy of the community; among the Romans, the aristocracy of the patricians; among the Germans, the monarchy of the elective army-king, became the foundation of their development. The Germans, in their migrations and wars, effected the dissolution of the nations subjugated by the Romans, but freshened them with their own blood. They made themselves the greatest and most powerful people which thenceforth no other was able to withstand. This universal dominion became possible only by the acceptance of Christianity, because this consecrated their extraordinary and naturally developed power as the organ of the idea of manhood. The Jews are contrasted with all these nations chiefly as theocratic: they integrate all special elements by which the former nations made epochs in history, but give them a peculiar concatenation which cancels the consequences of their one-sided exclusiveness.

Nationality has for the Jew, not *as* but *through* the merely

natural bond of unity, an infinite significance, viz. that the descendant of Abraham had the good fortune to come into immediate relation to the true God, and to His will as revealed in the law. The Gentile, by recognition of the law and by circumcision, can become a member of the theocracy, just as, conversely, the defection of the individual estranges him from his people. In other words, the Jewish nationality does not rest upon physical but upon spiritual grounds, and is therefore stronger than mere nationality. Faith in the God of Abraham, and not parentage, which is only of secondary importance, makes the Jew a Jew. Moses, when very old, did not hesitate to espouse a ngress. His brothers and sisters disapproved, but Jehovah punished them. Jesus expressed the freedom of faith from external hereditary descent, by asking the Pharisees, who were proud of their genealogy, if they did not believe God could raise up seed to Abraham from every stone. As Semites, the Jews did not deny a realistic sense for the goods of this world: they conquered Canaan, a land flowing with milk and honey; but the idea which inspired them, and pervaded their entire life, was that of holiness. A closer analysis of their ethical organization shows that in real humanity they stood higher, before Christianity, than all other nations, although the history of the Jews is crowded with traces of the most depraved and abominable transgression, because in no people has the might of passion been shown in greater intensity against the law of God.

By their faith they were free from the demoniac might of Nature which represses all other nations. This point alone makes it impossible to coördinate them with the other nations of antiquity. They were free from the pressure of history when its weight threatened to crush them, by the belief that their God still held out universal dominion to them. This faith consoles them to the present day, and causes them to regard Christianity as an episode in their history. The Jews, like the Chinese, honor family piety, but they do not make it an exclusive principle. Like the East Indians they divided into tribes, but have not petrified in castes; and the tribe of Levi, to which the discharge of priestly functions is committed, does not therefore enjoy the precedence of a holier or more divine tribe, for all are a priestly nation.

Holiness is the injunction upon every Jew, but he need not like the Buddhist become a monk and a beggar. The Jews are soldiers, and, up to the revolt of Bar-Chochba under Hadrian, have shown an incomparable bravery which was adequate to contend with the most powerful nations. They did not set out, like the Persians, upon a career of conquests, but were content with that of Canaan as the ancient settlement of the descendants of Abraham. The Jew pursues agriculture and pasturage like the Egyptians, and trade like the Babylonians and Phœnicians, without carrying this activity to a ruinous extent. In the constitution, he proceeds, like the Greek, from the conception of the community. The seventy elders constitute a senate — the aristocratic Roman element; the monarchical element can consequently reside only in God, who reveals His will to the people through the prophets. The kingdom was an inconsequence for the Jews, and the prophet Samuel expressly dissuaded them from it. After a short period of prosperity their state was brought to desolation through this very cause. After their return from exile, the centre of their entire organization fell more exclusively to the high-priests. The prophets, as the free representatives of the entire people, exercised the same function which we now call freedom of the press. The chief moment of the original German state, feudalism, was not wanting among the Jews, inasmuch as they held all Canaan as a fief of Jehovah, which every fifty years should be returned to Him. I believe, therefore, that the position of the Jews in universal history is found by contrasting them, as the only true Theocrats, with the nations of antiquity, but at the same time, in this antithesis, to place them higher than they. The Jews, like the Germans, are an absolute migratory people, which persists through all other peoples. The Germans generally lose their nationality among other nations and fuse with them, while the Jews know how to maintain theirs in every act of life. In the sketch which Hegel has given at the conclusion of his *Philosophy of Right*, he mentions the Israelitic people, on their entrance into the Germanic world, as that people among whom the ceaseless pain of the absolute separation of man from God made the transition to absolute atonement of God with men. This I believe to be the correct position of

the Jews. The following division of universal history results: (1) the National state, (2) the Theocratic state, (3) the state of Humanity. He concludes with the Germans because, within the Caucasian race, they are in fact that race to which the initiative of all further movement in universal history falls. From Europe they have spread themselves by navigation into every quarter of the world. They compel innumerable peoples in a state of nature, who have previously stood outside the process of universal history, either to enter into it or to vanish. They compel, also, the old historical nations of the Orient to remove their rigid exclusiveness, and to attempt self-regeneration by a higher principle.

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### THE LOGICAL QUESTION IN HEGEL'S SYSTEM.

Translated from the German of TRENDELENBURG by THOS. DAVIDSON.

(Continued.)

It has been often enough repeated, and Germany knows the formula by heart, that Hegel's great merit is that he defines God as a subject, in contradistinction to Spinozism which defines Him as substance. In the reply this is likewise enlarged upon (p. 116 *et alibi*). It may, perhaps, have been necessary to call attention on every possible occasion to this, inasmuch as a modern Spinozism has developed itself out of Hegel. An appeal is made to the consciences of those opponents who "assault Hegel with murderous intent, and mercilessly mangle him," not to condemn a philosophy in which God is assumed to be *spirit* (p. 131). Hegel's highest absolute principle is made to depend upon the significance of *subject* (p. 116), and the *Logical Investigations* are treated cavalierly because they do not touch this point—this solution, given by Hegel—of the fundamental question of all philosophy. Is this last true? In a philosophy of cognition the mere dogma counts for nothing, while the process by which it is reached and proved counts for everything. The question therefore is, how this applies to Hegel. In him, the said process is based on the important and difficult part of the *Logic* (*Encyclopædia*, § 150 sqq.), in which it is supposed



to be shown how, according to dialectic reason, the necessity which is the attribute of substance passes over into the freedom of the idea. There and nowhere else in Hegel is the *primum movens* which draws the thinking on from substance to subject. In the *Logical Investigations*, therefore (I., p. 50 sqq.\*), this most important of all dialectic transitions, upon which the weight of the whole system rests, was carefully considered, and shown to be without any support, and to give way and vanish as soon as it is touched. While substance may get outside of itself, subject, we are told, is with itself (*apud se*). But it was shown that this being-with-itself of Hegel's rests merely upon a vague, feeble comparison—a play of similar expressions. It was demonstrated that the process by which it was reached would apply as well to blind emanation as to free creation from the idea of purpose, and that, hence, it contains no progress from the doctrine of substance to subject. The logical difficulty was at the same time made apparent; for it was the logical question that was under discussion. How does the reply venture to speak as if no notice had been taken of this determination, which is supposed to condition all the rest? Does it go even so far, seeing that it appeals so often to the elevation of substance to subject, as to remove those inherent obstacles which were shown to exist? It was easier to pass over the objections raised without *one word* of comment. If, however, it is true that, in Hegel, the doctrine which is so warmly recommended in the reply rests, in its deepest metaphysical basis, on this sole point of the *Logic*, then that doctrine must stand or fall with it.

That, in its new shape, it seeks for a new support, is of no consequence; if it is to continue true to Hegel, it cannot get round this original ground; while, if it does not continue true to Hegel, it no longer comes within the limits of our discussion.

In Hegel's *Logic*, the point in question is one of the boldest turns taken by the negativity. If, as is the case, the reply accuses us of not having considered closely enough this fundamental law of all thinking, which is likewise a fundamental law of all being, what we have said above is a sufficient

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\* Third edition, p. 51 sqq.—Tr.

refutation of the charge. Why should the reply at all insist upon investigations, seeing that itself does not condescend to any of those proposed to it? It is, however, the opposite of correct to assert that the Negativity has not been investigated. The Negativity, the perpetual spur of the dialectic movement of thought, so highly extolled again in the reply, rests, in Hegel's view, on negation and identity; and indeed on the latter, inasmuch as it is the negation of negation. Both these logical appliances were fully and fairly put to the test, both in their principle and in their different applications, and rejected as ambiguous and untenable (*Log. Inv.* I., pp. 30-56). Sometimes, in Hegel, the Negativity shoots off on the leaping-pole of the *progressus in infinitum*; but it also broke down under the hands of criticism (*Log. Inv.* I., pp. 55 sq.) Before Gabler asserted that the author of the *Logical Investigations*, having no knowledge of the fact that the negativity was the soul in the forms of dialectic development, or of the manner of its operation, had not specially made it a subject of criticism, he might have read those passages, or else he might have shown what *logical element*, besides those discussed, was contained in the negativity. It was incumbent upon him, not to repeat in vague terms a eulogy on negativity, but simply, in accordance with this fundamental law, to employ the energetic negation of negation on the negation of our criticism, so as not to allow the negativity to stick fast in the negation, but to bring it out in the positivity claimed for it. But there was not even an attempt made in this direction.

"Negativity" is an imposing word; as an abstraction, it keeps the intuition suspended and the mind in wonderment. As Plato in the *Philebus* tells us that the youth triumphed as if they had found a treasure of wisdom, when they made their first acquaintance with the One and the Many, and, in their enthusiasm, applied it to every concept, so precisely it is with the cognate fundamental law of negativity: for, of course, everything is intrinsically negative, in everything there is flux, in everything there is distinction; and what is easier than to place the aim "which repels itself from itself" under negativity? But the result is much less considerable in the case of the negativity than in that of the great treasure-house of "The One and the Many"; for it is such an abstrac-

tion as no longer represents an original and productive Universal, but has upset itself and thus lost all tangibility. If we are honored with some sprinklings of praise, because the principle of motion brought forward in the *Logical Investigations* is similar to negativity, we object to any such kinship. Negativity is like a large mantle, of which many folds can be made, to stow away the most various things. It is, as our investigation has shown, entirely indefinite and ambiguous. Against it the *Logical Investigations* rebelled, and endeavored to free the conceptive faculty from the spell with which this and similar words had bound it. They restored to intuition its freedom, and thereby to thought its definiteness, by proving that movement, which outlines and produces a picture, was the intellectual principle of intuition and *form*. The Proteus of negativity would do well to keep at a respectful distance from it; he would meet his death in it.

In the *Logical Investigations*, and in the brief statement afterwards published, the result of the inquiry into the dialectic method went to show that it was *per se* impossible. Our author feels, in spite of his attempt to make the position of the dialectic method less fatal, that still Hegel's philosophy becomes an impossible system, and therefore enters the strongest protests against this ruling. Is the existence of the case a proof of its intrinsic possibility? That will not pass muster; for, as the reply itself says, the very questions at issue are those of existence and recognition. Or, was the judgment in the *Logical Investigations* merely a feint announced with a flourish of trumpets? Neither can that be asserted. For the judgment was well supported by the proofs brought forward in the course of a long investigation. It was proved, and in the statement of the position of the question again asserted, that all the logical means used by the dialectic method fell to pieces, and, measured by the standard of their own purpose, were sadly insufficient and even impossible. The simple conclusion was, that the dialectic method was intrinsically impossible, because its means were so. From this demonstration, apart from good assurances, which are not spared, but which avail nothing, there is but one means of escape. It would have to be shown that those logi-

cal means (negation, identity, progress *in infinitum*) really perform what they promise, and, just because they perform it, have an energetic actuality over and above their intrinsic possibility. Has this been done? The reply takes the shorter way of preferring not to touch the point at all (p. 204). We are perfectly satisfied with this, since, supported by the old grounds, we may again pronounce the judgment that the dialectic method of pure thought is in itself impossible, and add that it has not been rendered a whit more possible by the reply in question.

Hegel's *Logic* asserted that, as opposed to all intuition, even to the geometric figure, it moved in the element of pure thought, and, without any presupposition, developed from this alone an uninterrupted "immanent" series of metaphysical concepts. We, on the other hand, showed, both in general and in particular, that the presuppositionless logic everywhere presupposes the principle and the general activity of intuition, and thus in secret possesses a picture which in public it contemns; we showed that, instead of developing from itself a closely-knit series, it smuggled in the despised intuitions of experience, diluted and weakened, and gave them out as products of its own soil. What has the reply to say to this thorough-going proof? "The manifest discovery," it says, (p. 193 sqq.) "does not touch the thing itself—the pure concepts—in their distinct form, but merely their origin—the source from which they come into thought"; it does not touch the *what* of the pure immaterial concepts and determinations of thought, but rather *their origin in thought*. In the first instance, this is certainly the whole question. Did the assertion of presuppositionless thinking, and of immanent interconnection, mean anything else than that the concepts did not flow from a foreign source, e.g. from intuition, but from the native one of pure thought? Only the delusiveness of this magnificent promise was to be shown. The reply, if we understand it correctly, admits this proof—and how much is thereby admitted!—but it consoles itself with the distinction that the question of the *whence* does not touch the *what*. Is this possible in the present instance? Hitherto, for example, it was asserted in Hegel's *Logic*, that continuous and discrete, extensive and intensive magnitude, attraction and

repulsion, all occurring in the first part of the *Logic*, not as concrete examples and applications, but as the purest determinations, were to be seized as concepts of the pure thinking without intuition, and therefore without that movement which produces the geometrical figure. If the opposite of this it has been proved, it touches the *what* of the pure concepts so far, that there are no such "pure concepts" in disjunct form. The author of the reply is perhaps aware of this; for he glides rapidly over the dangerous point, and vents his spleen in heavy charges of empiricism and materialism, with which he loads the *Logical Investigations*.

We shall not waste a word on these charges, since the person who can believe that such accusations will cling to the work, cannot have read it, or must have read it merely with the eyes on his face. It is true that it does not deal with any sort of dialectic idealism, which, unconcerned about any connection with the other sciences, and despising any contradiction which the latter, with the support of facts, might raise against Philosophy, dwells on the royal heights of the pure idea, with an empire all to itself, perfectly secure against being confounded with empiricism. If, however, Philosophy is, as Schleiermacher somewhere calls it, the central science, and there is no centre except with reference to the circumference, just as there is no circumference save with reference to the centre, then surely the time has come at last to strive for further progress, and to bring about a living connection between the central and the peripheral sciences. Logic must become a metaphysic of the actual sciences, in the sense that it must comprehend their real principles in order to comprehend the act of thinking within its sphere, and thus to become a true logic. Are we to be accused of empiricism because we deal with experience in this sense? The fact that we are so accused is indeed perfectly intelligible from the standpoint of dialectic idealism, but not from that of impartial criticism, which would have justice enough to remark and to recognize, that we on all occasions and even in the very midst of experience look only for its spiritual origin, i.e. the very thing which has not experience in it.

It was our wish, in writing the previous article, to treat the logical question in Hegel's system by itself, and to keep

apart, as something altogether foreign, our own logical investigations in so far as they investigate positively the essence of cognition. In the reply, the two are commingled, and defence, as is perfectly fair, is supplemented by attack. We must therefore add a few words in regard to the method of criticism, in order to remove from the question at issue the false lights and shadows that are thrown upon it from this quarter.

Firstly, there is one thing characteristic. In a long book written to criticise another, the reader looks in vain for the real content of the latter, as forming the basis of the criticism. He looks in vain for an outline of the *Investigations*, for a sketch of their method, for the sum of their results, for a presentation of the fundamental thought. Only from such a survey could he derive a notion of what the *Logical Investigations* specially attempt, and whether they unite to form a spiritual whole. A person who knows a system only by the headings of the paragraphs, is not likely to find it in them; whereas the person who is able to follow it through the windings of the investigations and to restate it in his own words, will not miss it. When the reader of the reply puts it down, he is as wise respecting the purpose and essence of the *Logical Investigations* as he was before he took them up; or, what is perhaps worse, his head is filled with the most contradictory judgments, since the reply is a perfect conglomerate of appreciation and depreciation, respect and disrespect. At one time, the author of the *Logical Investigations* is a disciple of Aristotle, who, be it remembered, is counted by Hegel among the speculative philosophers; at another time, he is an empiricist and a materialist, utterly destitute of anything speculative: according to one passage, he fights with Hegel for the present world-consciousness; at another, he is related only to Bacon and Locke, although these are long ago buried for German science;—at one time, his philosophy is valuable as a propædeutic which might pass for Hegelian; at another, he has written only for “business men” (p. 177);—at one time, the *Logical Investigations* appear to merit a place among literary productions; at another, they are described as a mere rude compilation, without plan or principle (pp. 178 sqq.), so that the reader cannot help won-

dering why, for the sake of such a book, our author undertook to write another book, and why he found himself compelled by it to put his old system into a new shape;—at one time, the reply attributes to the development of the categories and principles (*principia*) a value which it afterwards lowers by the additional assertion that Hegel *also* has them, only in a somewhat different shape (!);—at one time, he denies to the enumeration (which, a moment before, he called development) every claim to system;—in another place, it honors the organic world-view with which the *Logical Investigations* close with a certain amount of applause; at another, it hints that this world-view is such as might be suitable for children, although, of course, it would be of no use to them, as they do not philosophize (p. 188).

But has Gabler quite perused, or quite overlooked, the *Logical Investigations*, about which he has written a book? We must be allowed to express our doubts. He would hardly, for example, have ventured (pp. 184 sq.), in plain terms, to refer the author of the *Logical Investigations* to Hegel's treatment and derivation of the categories, if he had remembered that the same had been subjected to a careful examination (*Log. Inv.* II., pp. 62 sqq.), in which they were shown to be entirely unequal to developing the possibility of this concept, and proving the necessity of its dominance. He would hardly, had he known the whole, have given all kinds of good counsels, which the *Logical Investigations* had long ago followed of their own accord (e.g. cf. p. 184 *ad fin.*, with *Log. Invest.* II., pp. 62 sqq.) He would hardly have hinted—we cannot understand the passage otherwise (p. 187)—that the *Logical Investigations*, pregnant with materialism, “looked upon thought as a mere accessory, or something merely secondary and superinduced,” if he had considered, what is pointedly shown (II., pp. 62 sqq.), that the world, penetrated as it is with purpose, can be understood only by admitting the priority of thought. He would hardly have charged the *Logical Investigations* with a blind reverence for nature (e.g. p. 179), if he had only remarked their general tendency, which is to prove that the comprehension of nature, in movement and in purpose, is derived entirely from the original Spiritual in nature. He would hardly have ventured to tax

the whole view with vulgar empiricism (pp. 193, 197, &c.), if he had considered that same general tendency, and if he had been aware of the war which the *Logical Investigations* wage with empiricism, and that too in the very midst of the facts, for the sake of this tendency (e.g. I., pp. 206 sqq., 274, sqq., &c.) He would scarcely have had the hardihood to assert (p. 200) that the *Logical Investigations* abandon the à-priority of time and space, while, on the contrary, they everywhere strive to prove that the spiritual à-priority of movement with its products, time and space, alone affords a key to the great scientific, à priori fact of pure mathematics, and use every effort to show that the objectivity of these categories is not thereby excluded, and that the same à-priority is the basis of all empiricism (cf. the whole of Investigations 5 and 6, pp. 124-277). He would hardly have ventured to squeeze a single expression respecting the idea, till he brought out of it the result, that, according to the *Logical Investigations*, it is only as substance (Spinozan?!) that God lies at the basis of the world (p. 189), if he had remembered that the idea is idea only through the creative thought of aim (*Zweck*) (II., pp. 359 sqq.) He would hardly have ventured to counsel the *Logical Investigations* to follow the fundamental principle of the Hegelian system, which is, at the same time, the logical principle of form, through the sphere of philosophy, and prove it insufficient and incapable of explaining anything, if he had reflected that the section on the dialectic method and the criticism of the Hegelian notion of aim have performed said task, and that it is precisely Hegel's logical principle of form that so completely breaks down in the detailed examination of his development of the judgment (II., pp. 190 sqq., and the syllogism (II., pp. 251 sqq.) He would scarcely have said that the *Logical Investigations* were unacquainted with the Hegelian syllogism, and acted as if they had confounded it with the scholastic syllogism, if he had remembered how (II., pp. 251-279) they first turn it round and consider it from all sides, before they declare that Hegel's twisted theory of three times three syllogisms, which are supposed to produce and classify the system of things in their reality, was manufactured and untrue. These facts are incredible, but they are facts. If our author could overlook all these and many other things, where,



with such defects of knowledge and misconceptions in regard to matters of fact, remains the right to criticize?

The author of the reply cannot get rid of himself. For what is peculiar in the writings of others, for the specific in the *tout ensemble* of the doctrine of his opponents, he has no eye, and, therefore, no expression. He evidently feels hostile to an investigation which pursues a path different from his, and which takes pains, in dealing with the elements of thought, till, after quiet progress, it comes at last to a point at which the elements necessarily coalesce in the fact of a whole. Ever and everywhere the absolute comes up in his writing, as if it were the only question, and as if human thinking, which, after all, in the broad sphere of the sciences, thinks the finite in the first instance, did not move at all in the finite. It shows itself likewise in the outward form, so that he never succeeds in bridling and controlling the association of his own ideas long enough to make those of other people his own. For while, as a general rule, people are not given to interrupting each other, he everywhere interlards other people's statements with interjections and remarks of his own. When these parentheses and interjections are taken away, there remains very little counter-argument. But parentheses will hardly pass for discussions, or interjections for solid judgments. After all, there is a great difference between real and manufactured consequences. Real ones lie in that which is based upon a principle, and such of those scientific consequences as do not appear in the *Logical Investigations* will be shown hereafter in the further carrying out of the thought. Manufactured consequences, on the other hand, lie in one-sided half-truths picked up at random, and in words caught and pressed into service (p. 189). We decline to accept any ransom for the captives taken in our work; they will get freed without our help, in the mind of the intelligent reader. The objections raised in the reply are altogether not of a kind to prevent us in any way from continuing our superstructure on the basis of the *Logical Investigations*. At the same time, it is quite natural that our opponents should try to make us occupy an "obsolete stand-point" (*überwunderer Standpunct*), one assigning us to empiricism, a second to Aristotle, a third to Kant, a fourth to Herakleitos. Let us, think they, dress

him up in some old worn-out dress of the world-spirit; and the present, which wants fashion, will not look at him. There is, perhaps, reason in that. How many stand-points, however, Hegel has made obsolete, is shown by the present rebellion of all.

It is the aim of the reply to force the examination of human thought ever toward the Absolute, and to maintain Hegel's Absolute,—although in a new shape, which will perhaps be as little recognized by foes or friends as Gabler is inclined to recognize the dressing up of Hegel's in the gold frame of fancy and the trappings of poetry (p. IV.) But as this new shape, like every other shape which calls itself an emanation from Hegel, rests on the dialectic method, everything, as was shown in the previous article, reduces itself to the question whether the dialectic method of pure thinking is correct. If it is false, there arises from it no knowledge, and no new mode of seizing the Absolute. It is therefore of no use to swing round in one's own circle; the question always comes up again: What has been done to redeem the dialectic method? for it is the basis of the whole.

In the previous article, the main points at issue were clearly set forth; they were,

- 1°. The suppositionless beginning;
- 2°. The immanent interconnection;
- 3°. The significance of the negation;
- 4°. The power of identity;
- 5°. The application of the *progressus in infinitum*;
- 6°. The methodical *hysteron-proteron* of the dialectic development;
- 7°. The delusiveness of the Hegelian syllogism.

Among these, again, the assertion of the absence of presupposition, the negation, and the identity, stand prominent as the real pillars of the whole edifice. In the reply, there is as good as nothing on all these points—at least, there is scarcely one word looking at all like a refutation, or really bringing home a misapprehension. It brings no danger except to the cause which the reply defends, when it refuses to occupy itself with all these things, or, as we say, does not stand up and hold its own. Thus, then, the *Logical Question in Hegel's System* stands at precisely the same point where it stood at

the close of the previous essay; there is not a single iota cleared up. At best, we have been shown, by one example, how it can *not* be cleared up.

We are told in the *Theaitetos* of Plato, in connection with that movement, to which Hegel compared the negativity, concerning the disciples of the profound Herakleitos:—"About these speculations of Herakleitos which, as you say, are as old as Homer, or even older still, the Ephesians themselves, who profess to know them, are downright mad, and you cannot talk with them about them. For, in accordance with their text-books, they are always in motion; but as for dwelling upon an argument or a question, and quietly asking and answering in turn, they are absolutely without the power of doing this; or, rather, they have no particle of rest in them, and they are in a state of negation of rest which no words can express. If you ask any one of them a question, he will produce, as from a quiver, sayings brief and dark, and shoot them at you; and if you inquire the reason of what he has said, you will be hit by some other new-fangled word, and *will make no way with any of them, nor they with one another.*"

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## THE MERCHANT OF VENICE.

By D. J. SNIDER.

[*Conclusion of the Article in the April number.*]

In a late number of the Journal there was a partial analysis of Shakespeare's "Merchant of Venice." We now propose to complete that criticism by extending it to other parts of the same drama. But first it will be well to recapitulate the results arrived at in the former essay. Only the leading collision of the play was there developed, that between Shylock and Antonio. The first characteristic to be observed in respect to these two characters is that the one was a Jew and the other a Christian; hence the historical collision involved in the drama was between the Hebrew and the modern world. But, in the second place, this collision was elevated from a merely natural to a spiritual basis by the ends which these two men proposed; that of Shylock being the acquisition of

gain, in general Thrift; while that of Antonio, though he was a merchant, subordinated money to higher purposes. In the third place, Shylock's end—Property—is absolutely confirmed and protected by Law, which possesses objective validity, and cannot be assailed with impunity. With this mighty principle Antonio falls into conflict by his bond, for bonds and all contracts must be held sacred if property be protected. Hence Law enforces Shylock's end and seizes upon Antonio. But Formal Law manifests its limitation through its own self-contradiction and thus annuls itself,—this is the point made by Portia in her celebrated defence whereby Antonio is saved. But this result cannot be final, for it is purely negative and terminates in the annulment of Law; hence we pass to a higher principle which takes up and harmonizes within itself the negation before mentioned, namely, the principle of Mercy, which in its turn saves the Jew. When Law becomes self-contradictory, annihilates its own end, destroys that which it was made to protect, there must be some way of abating its action, and this is accomplished by a system of mercy. But let it not be forgotten that within its own sphere Law is paramount, and cannot be interfered with from any quarter. The reason why the Jew does not perish, though he has willed and tried to commit murder, is that he was the real object of mercy, since he was arraigned for subjective intention which lay outside of his consciousness. Hence he was in truth not responsible. Nor could the court and Portia reasonably condemn the Jew after they had maintained the cause of mercy with such persistency and power. It would be a flagrant inconsistency to demand that for Antonio which they the next moment refuse to Shylock. Hence the piece is not a tragedy. Moreover, it will be seen at the very outset that this play, if it be true to thought and history, cannot have a tragic termination. Christianity has triumphed in the world, and its representative, who is here Antonio, cannot perish in such a conflict. Nor can the Jew suffer death at the hands of Christians, for their doctrine is forgiveness and mercy. Hence the difficulty must be mediated. But who is to perform the act of mediation? This question brings us to the third leading character of the drama—Portia.

But before we go on let us speak of a possible misunderstanding. By the foregoing remarks, or in the previous essay, it is not meant to assert or to be implied that the Jews of the present day are Shylocks. On the contrary, they have risen out of the narrow limits of nationality and religion as completely as any other people. No one can deny them their full share of the culture, liberality and genius of modern times. Nor is the historical position of this nationality to be underestimated. It has certainly contributed the largest ingredient to our modern civilization, and it alone of all world-historical peoples of antiquity is in existence to-day. Shylock, however, represents the ancient Hebrew, with all his peculiarities, cast into the modern world. He is the product of two influences: first, the original Jewish character; secondly, that character in a strange land, persecuted and outlawed by society. Hence the bitterness which overflows his whole existence, and poisons not merely his social relations, but his own domestic hearth. In America these external restraints are removed, there is hardly a prejudice except what is imported, and no one would think of distinguishing in any public relation the Jews from the common body of citizens.

But to resume. Portia is the third great character of the play, and in importance stands quite on a par with Antonio and Shylock. Her function is mediatorial; in fact, she may be called the grand mediatrix of the entire drama. In her we see the instrumentality by which the main results are brought about. Through her courtship with Bassanio, Antonio comes into the power of the Jew by means of the loan. At her house all the personages of the play assemble and the wooing is done. Moreover, she accomplishes the rescue of Antonio, which is the main mediation of the poem. The great principle of which she is the bearer may be termed the Right of Subjectivity. She asserts the validity of the Internal and the Spiritual against the crushing might of externality. But she does not deny the Right of the Objective in its true limitation. Only when this Objective becomes destructive of its end and self-contradictory, as in the case when the Law was about to murder Antonio, does she place a limit to it and invoke a higher principle. Her struggle is with legality and proscription asserting themselves in spheres where they do

not belong. But in relations when this contradiction no longer appears, she is the most ethical of women. In the Family her subordination is complete, almost devout. In fact, we shall see that all her acts have one end and one impelling motive: devotion to her husband, an absolute unity with his feelings and interests; in other words, subordination to the Family. She vindicates the Right of Subjectivity to herself in order that she may obtain the one whom she really loves, without which principle, it need hardly be said, the true existence of the Family is impossible. So peculiar is this character, so difficult is it to ascertain its unity, and so important is its place in the drama, that we shall be justified in looking somewhat minutely at all the circumstances in which it has been placed by the poet.

First comes the long array of suitors, among whom were to be seen the nobility from every part of Europe—nay, even from Africa. The motive for this elaborate display, as we have before intimated, was to show the necessity of Bassanio's borrowing large sums of money to compete with these nobles, and also to exhibit Portia in all her dignity and splendor. But Portia has quite disregarded the outward glitter of wealth and rank, and has seemingly sought out a follower in the retinue of a lord instead of the lord himself—"a Venetian, a scholar, and a soldier, that came hither in the company of the Marquis of Montferrat." So at the outset we see that she cares naught for the External, but lays stress upon the Internal. The poet has thus given us an inkling of her inclination that we may not be in the dark about her choice. Moreover, we already know of the inclination of Bassanio from the very first scene of the play, and he too is aware of Portia's preference for himself. This point, then, let us carefully bear in mind, that the poet has already let us into the secret, unknown to the outside world, that Portia and Bassanio love one another, and that each one knows of the other's love. The two people, therefore, belong together; they alone can form a rational union, since they possess the absolute prerequisite of the Family, namely, reciprocal love.

Under ordinary circumstances nothing would remain but that the happy pair should go to the nearest church, and, in common parlance, have the knot tied. But to this blissful

consummation there is a great obstacle. Portia's father is dead, and has left a will which seems to bind her choice of a husband to a hopeless accident. Three caskets, made of gold, silver, and lead, respectively, are to be set before his daughter's suitors for selection, and that casket which contains her image carries with it her hand in marriage. Hence we find her lamenting in almost her first words that she cannot choose whom she would, nor refuse whom she disliked. But she recognizes the binding validity of the last request of her parent, and thus we have one of Shakespeare's favorite collisions, which may be stated as the Right of Choice against the will of the parent. Both sides have their validity, and it is just this validity of both sides which makes it a genuine collision. None will deny the right of the parent over the child, and this right was less circumscribed in former times than at present. But though the parent may no longer have any legal right, he has still the right of respect, and no child with a truly ethical feeling such as Portia undoubtedly possessed would withhold obedience. Such is the one side. But the other side is what we have termed the Right of Choice, or, in general terms, the Right of Subjectivity. This demands that the daughter should have absolutely the right of selecting her partner for life. She has to bear the responsibility of her choice, for she must live with him. The husband and wife constitute that unity called the Family: it is a unity of emotion; each party finds true life in the other. This emotion, by which both are melted together into one common existence, is called love. So if we have a true unity, or a true Family, there is the indispensable condition of love. Now it is just this important element that the will of Portia's father flings to the winds by exposing the choice of her to mere accident. It does not demand reciprocal love, which is the only basis of rational marriage. Such is the problem which Portia has to solve, and such is the mental conflict which we find her undergoing. Let us, then, carefully observe how she manages the matter.

All the suitors have taken their departure except two (not including Bassanio), who are more determined or less punctilious than the rest. The causes of this withdrawal are not given, but may be easily imagined; we may suppose they

were men of honor, and would refuse to acquire a wife by lot, to take the hand without the heart. Portia, too, may have shown in an unmistakable manner her dislikes, or, finally, they may have found the last condition too hard, viz. that they must swear never to woo another woman. Whatever the reason may have been, they all vanish after they had served the poet's purpose. But those who remain demand to have the caskets placed before them. The first one who goes through with the process of selection is the Prince of Morocco, who chooses by the outside appearance, and seems to rest his claim upon physical courage. He takes the golden casket, whose glitter typifies the brilliant exterior. Of course, such a choice is directly antagonistic to the character of Portia, and it is logically impossible that he can become her husband. The second one, the Prince of Arragon, chooses only to a certain extent by the outside, since he takes the silver casket, and he rests his claims upon merit. Now merit is a most excellent thing, but we all know that it can never supply the place of love. It is no uncommon occurrence that the more deserving are passed by and the less worthy are chosen, and who will say that it is not justifiable? Both Princes fail. Why? Because they lack the subjective element—love; at least, the love of Portia. For, as before stated, in order to form a true basis of the family relation, love must be reciprocal—each one must feel and find his or her own harmonious existence in the other. Rank, wealth, courage and merit are much in their places, but they can never be substituted for affection. Thus we see that the rejection of these suitors was not a mere fortuitous circumstance, but a logical necessity of the play.

Now comes Bassanio. He has both the requisite elements, loves and is loved; for the poet has carefully told us all this beforehand. We have no doubt of his success from the start. It is curious to trace the ethereal, almost imperceptible influences which the poet brings to bear upon Bassanio to determine his choice. First, his state of mind, all a-glow with affection; no wonder that he disregards the exterior of things, for love is blind. Then Portia in the same condition, and giving expression to it in words; to which we may add, in imagination, her looks. Finally, the music, and the vague



hints of the song, until the feeling of internality is intensified to such a degree as to be irresistible. The very air seems to whisper in the ear of Bassanio, "Take the leaden casket," since it is the negation of all outside show and glitter. In it he finds the picture of Portia, a most fitting symbol of the internal nature of the characters of both Bassanio and Portia, as well as of their relation to one another—the image of the loved one imprinted on the heart. The same principle which causes the rejection of the two Princes must bring about the triumph of Bassanio. The moments of a rational marriage are now complete, Portia and Bassanio have all the elements of a true union. Such is undoubtedly the logic of the play. Thus the choice of caskets, which seemed to represent a horrible Chance about to crush out the rights of human nature, is spiritualized into the highest forms of freedom. Portia wins, and moreover wins through the very instruments which threatened her happiness, converts them to weapons for her own rescue. The choice exhibits the ends and motives of the chooser, and, in so far as these are finite and fall short of the Rational, failure results. In this sphere, namely, the unity which forms the basis of the marriage relation, the Rational is the Right of Subjectivity.

But does Portia really give any hint to Bassanio which of the caskets to choose? It will be recollected that it was forbidden her in her father's will to tell this secret. A suspicious circumstance is the introduction of a song during the choice of Bassanio, which the previous choosers did not have the benefit of. Hence one is inclined to scrutinize closely the meaning of this song. It is somewhat enigmatic, yet its general purport may be stated to be: "Don't choose by the eye, by the glittering outside, for it is the source of all delusion." Hence Portia, after observing with the greatest care all the formalities of her father's will, breaks it just at the point of its conflict with her subjective right. This is done so delicately by her that it is scarcely perceived; still it is none the less real. Thus she stands here as the grand bearer of the Right of Subjectivity in its special form of Love *versus* Obedience to the will of the parent.

We have already several times called attention to the fact that Shakespeare has been very careful to show the mutual

affection of both parties. These were the two that belonged together, and were bound to come together in spite of all obstacles. The two Princes exhibit various phases of conflict with this principle of love, which was finally to triumph. Otherwise the poem would be irrational, which in Art is the Ugly. Here we may note a distinction between Shakespeare and an inferior poet. The latter, instead of hedging Chance on all sides and making it the lowest possible factor, would have given it full scope. For he seeks dramatic effects by surprise. Shakespeare, on the contrary, always prepares, never surprises. He elaborates the motives and ends, and marches to their logical conclusion. We feel that so it is, and cannot be otherwise; the process has all the rigid necessity of Reason. But the novelist or playwright seeks to produce a "sensation" through unexpected turns and incidents. The true Artist, however, aims to have every action, and especially every crisis, properly *motived*—to use a German expression—and to banish accident altogether.

So ends the first part of Portia's career; she has solved the problem of marriage. Now a wholly new field awaits her. Up to this point (towards the end of the third act) the drama has produced three happy pairs of lovers, Portia and Bassanio, Nerissa and Gratiano, Jessica and Lorenzo, who are all brought together in the pleasant halls of Belmont, Portia's country-seat. But those very means which caused this blissful union have in another direction called forth a terrific collision. Suddenly upon this tender scene there lights the demon of ill news; word comes to Bassanio that his dearest friend Antonio, to whom he owes all his present happiness, is in imminent danger of being sacrificed by the Jew. It falls like a thunderbolt in their midst and scatters the company in every direction. Leaving Lorenzo and Jessica behind, they all quit Belmont at once, animated with one purpose—to rescue Antonio. Bassanio goes direct to his friend; Portia hits upon an indirect mode of procedure which need not be here detailed. The main point to be noticed is that Portia succeeds, Bassanio does not. This is specially emphasized by the poet: Bassanio with all his money, or rather her money, fails, while Portia is the chosen mediatrix. With what skill she fulfilled her mission has been shown in the previous

essay. It will be recollected that the collision which she is now called upon to mediate is there stated to be between Formal Law and what may be termed the Right of Mercy. Now it is essentially the same struggle through which Portia has just passed; she had been able to master the difficulty and assert her principle. Having thus gone through the fire herself, and knowing the frequent injustice of formal authority, she now sallies forth in defence of injured innocence. It is true that her father's will was enforced by prescription rather than by law. But it is the same principle fundamentally, and in both cases Portia steps forth as the champion of the Right of Subjectivity. It is confessed that Antonio is wholly innocent; he has not even willed, much less committed, any wrong, yet he is about to be sacrificed on the altar of legality. She comes, therefore, to cut the toils of the law when they have entangled a pure heart. It will thus be seen that she has been educated to meet just this crisis by her own experience.

But, however well fitted for the task she may be, there must be some motive to impel her forth. It has already been stated that, in the external course of the drama, Portia was the primal cause, or rather occasion, of Antonio's falling into the hands of the Jew. Bassanio needs money to carry on his courtship; he applies to his friend Antonio, who resorts to the Jew, and thus becomes his victim. Hence it is not at all out of place that she should become the instrument to make good the evil which she had unwittingly done. But when it is added that this same man was the dearest friend of her husband, and the chief means of her obtaining the one whom she loved, the motive must be for her all-powerful. Portia is a truly ethical character—she is one with her husband in feeling and interest. Her whole struggle hitherto has been in order that she might make a rational marriage, unite with the man of her heart. Anything, therefore, which affects him profoundly, must affect her in an equal degree, as she is an organic member of that unity called Family. Now Bassanio is so deeply attached to Antonio that he would even sacrifice his hard-won wife to effect the rescue of Antonio. It is this sympathy, this oneness of feeling with her husband, which impels her to undertake the difficult enterprise. The pang

which thrills his heart must pierce hers; the impulse which drives him forth cannot leave her behind. That woman expressed unconsciously the deepest principle of her nature who said to her sick husband, "My dear, I have a pain in your breast."

But why should the mediatorial character be sustained by a woman? In this respect, also, we claim the poet is true to human nature. For it is just the subjective side of mind which is prominent in woman and distinguishes her from man, who lays much more stress upon the validity of the objective world. So strong is this tendency in him that he is apt to disregard the other element. Hence we see in the trial-scene that the judge and citizens are all on the side of Antonio, yet they quail before that objective reality called Law. By no means let it be understood that these remarks are directed against Law; on the contrary, it is the greatest conservative power of humanity. But it has its limitations, and these we are insisting upon. Nor will it be denied that woman is the fittest person to plead for mercy, since it tallies so thoroughly with her subjective, emotional nature. So appropriate is all this that we feel that Portia never unsexes herself, nor even manifests any of the unlovely traits of strong-mindedness, though her adventures may well strike terror into any imitators.

Now, what is the secret of this characterization? Shakespeare has made Portia assume the most hazardous disguises and perform the boldest acts, acts from which any woman might well shrink; and yet we feel that she is always womanly—nay, the most womanly of women. The great majority of Shakespeare's prominent female characters have one trait, however varied they may otherwise be: subordination to the Family. It is a devotion to husband, parent, child, lover; they live but for one object—to be absorbed into the existence of another. By themselves, they feel that they are nothing; only in the unity of feeling, interest and existence with another do they have any happiness in life. The complete cancellation of the individual through emotion, not consciously but instinctively, is the grand characteristic which Shakespeare gives to his women; that is, to those whom he wishes to portray as good and dutiful. On the contrary, his

bad women are, for the most part, marked by quite the opposite of this quality. Such are the limits in which Shakespeare's female characters move. Now that just this trait forms the charm of woman few men will deny. Though wit, fancy, learning, may call forth admiration, there must be something quite different to subdue. It is not servitude, but the willing subordination to the higher end, self-sacrifice in its most exalted form. We believe that it is this consideration which makes us ever respect Portia; her motive is pure devotion to her husband, complete oneness with his interests and friendships, added no doubt to gratitude toward that man (Antonio) who has been chiefly instrumental in making her the happiest of mortals. For Antonio is a stranger to her, so far as we know; why should she assume the disguise and run the risk of an ignominious exposure and tarnished reputation? No; she has that complete harmony and unity with her husband, that his joys are her joys, his sorrows her sorrows, and she has the same interest in her husband's friend as the husband himself. Thus she is a truly ethical character, ethical in the sense that she instinctively subordinates herself to the highest end of woman.

Such is the motive which impels Portia forth to the rescue of Antonio. Just here occurs the seeming contradiction in her character. Hitherto she has asserted boldly and strongly her individual rights; she has trampled upon custom and even law when they have stood in the way of her purposes. But the moment she is united with Bassanio, all is changed. She yields up her whole being to another, who is, of course, equally devoted to her; this daring and resolute will is now at peace and submissive; and her expression of subordination is as absolute as language can make it:

— “ though for myself alone  
I would not be ambitious in my wish,  
To wish myself much better; yet for you  
I would be trebled twenty times myself . . . .  
She is not bred so dull but she can learn;  
Happiest of all in that her gentle spirit  
Commits itself to yours to be directed  
As from her lord, her governor, her king,  
Myself and what is mine to you and yours  
Is now converted; but now I was the lord  
Of this fair mansion, master of my servants,  
Queen of myself, and even now, but now  
This house, these servants, and this same myself,  
Are yours, my lord.”

Now what is the solution of these contradictory traits? *Portia insists upon the subjective principle only in order that her union with her husband may be more complete.* She has struggled for the Right of Choice. To what end? Since the oneness of the marriage-tie is based upon emotion, she insists that emotion in this sphere must have absolute validity. Every hindrance must be set aside; the more intense and unobstructed the affection, the more perfect the bond of unity. Thus she has asserted her individuality with the single purpose that her subordination might in the end be more complete, and that her marriage might be truer and more rational.

A great many persons are inclined to rebel at this sudden swallowing up of individuality, and at the first glance it does seem a hard destiny. Yet it will require but little examination of the actual world to discover that all true living is coupled with just such abnegation of self, indeed that life would otherwise be impossible. Goethe in his later writings has often laid much stress upon the Renunciation of the Individual; and the great poets, philosophers, and moralists, in their own different ways, have repeated the same lesson. To live for a universal end is not merely desirable but necessary, and forms the basis of moral action. All organization, society, state, demand the subordination of particular ends, motives, and desires; otherwise institutions of every kind would be quite impossible. The truth is, the individual would perish through his own self-contradiction were he not subsumed. So the family organism requires the same renunciation from man and woman; both must sacrifice their self-will and submit themselves to the higher end. In fact, love is the emotional, and hence unconscious and unwilled cancellation of the individual; it means that a person finds his whole happiness, indeed even his existence, not in himself but in another. It is from these considerations that we perceive Portia's character to be a harmonious Whole, springing from one central thought, and true in the profoundest sense to human nature. Portia thus stands as the type of the rational woman, rational in what she resists and in what she accepts, rational in rebellion and in submission. She is a strong character, yet not strong-minded in the special sense of this term; she

withers not, like a delicate flower, at the first rude blast, but maintains her individual right till to yield becomes duty.

The remaining characters need not be long dwelt upon. Bassanio is made worthy of Portia by his devotion to his friend, and she perceives him to be a true man. He is even ready to sacrifice his new bride on the altar of friendship, through which alone he has gained her. Bassanio is the means by which Antonio has come into difficulty; Bassanio's prosperity has been Antonio's adversity, but he is willing to forego it all for the sake of the friend to whom his good luck is owing. Thus his devotion is complete, every shade of selfishness is stripped off, and we behold the worthy husband of Portia. Gratiano and Nerissa serve chiefly as mirrors for the leading characters to reflect motives, thoughts, and sentiments. They have little distinct individuality, yet are very necessary to show other persons. Nerissa does little but exhibit her mistress, and the same function is performed for Antonio by Solanio and Solarino. One of the under-currents of the play, which however soon mingles with the main stream, is the story of Jessica, the daughter of the Jew. Here again we have the assertion of the right of choice against the will of the parent, the same collision as Portia's. But it is in a wholly different soil and atmosphere, and hence the fruit is different. Portia respects all the formalities of her deceased father's testament; Jessica tramples without scruple upon all the commands and prejudices of a living father, and steals his money besides. Portia's father was said to have been wise and just; we know the character of Shylock, and what his daughter's education must have been. Hence the great difference in the moral character of the two children. The same collision occurs in the clown Gobbo, but in a form so low, so devoid of content, that it becomes ridiculous—in fact, a burlesque. It appears here as duty to a master who starves and abuses against the right of running away. Gobbo succeeds, after a subtle piece of argumentation, in reconciling his conscience with his desire, and then takes to his heels. Thus in Portia, Jessica, and Gobbo, there is seen a gradation of the same collision.

The fourth act terminates the leading collision of the play, that between Shylock and Antonio. The one has been pun-

ished, the other rescued. Why, then, is the fifth act added? It is because the minor complications, which are brought about by the leading collision and form a necessary element of it, are not yet solved. Portia and Bassanio have been violently separated, likewise Gratiano and Nerissa, by the main struggle; when this is at an end, there is no longer cause for separation; but they must quickly rebound to their former union, which is their only rational existence. Hence the return, which is the theme of the fifth act, is a logical moment of the whole drama. If there be mediation, it must be complete in every part. Moreover, Bassanio and Gratiano are as yet ignorant of the share their wives have had in accomplishing the great mediatorial act. To be sure, we, the audience, or the reader, know all about the matter, but it is certainly not our duty to supply the missing elements of a work of art. If such were the case, the greatness of the poem would depend upon the greatness of the hearer or reader; that is, his ability to make it perfect. In short, a drama, or any work of art, must be complete in itself, an Objective Whole, not dependent upon anybody to supply its omissions, and the characters must be intelligible not merely to us but to one another. Hence the fifth act may be called the Return; the characters pass out of the realm of difference and contradiction into the world of harmony. It opens with an idyllic strain which at once ushers us into the nature of the place; we are now in the land of love; Lorenzo and Jessica in responsive song celebrate the heroes and heroines of romantic devotion. Next the sweet strains of music arise, the language of emotion and harmony. So there is diffused over the whole scene the atmosphere of love and concord. Finally, the parties return separately from their struggle into the land of harmony; the rescued Antonio is there as the mark of triumph. The difficulty about the rings is only temporary; their hearts are right, and that is the main thing; for it would ill become Portia, after her crusade against the most weighty formalities, to insist upon the formality of a ring. Even the ships return to smooth over the last trouble; and the concord is perfect when the story of the disguise is told. It is worth noticing that Shakespeare has here localized his themes; the abode of quiet is at a distance from the place of strife; so



Belmont is the land of Harmony and Love, which they leave in the hour of struggle, and to which they come back in the hour of peace. This may be a violation of that critical canon which demands Unity of Place, but it is a rule which Shakespeare very often follows, and which it would not be difficult to justify.

To sum up in a few words our results. The collision is between Antonio and Shylock, and is mediated by Portia. Its logical basis is the contradiction between the Objective as realized in the institutions of Reason and the Subjective, or the individual side of man. The former undertakes to crush the latter, through which alone it had existence, for it is posited by the Subjective; hence it becomes contradictory of itself and is negated. The Subjective, since it is not universal, is in its turn a new self-contradiction, and hence a negation of itself, which results in its subsuming itself under the Objective. So Portia asserts subjectivity only to end in subordinating herself to one of the forms of objective reality—the Family.

The external movement of the drama may be divided into three parts: 1. The Union; 2. The Separation; 3. The Return. Each of these parts is determined and complemented by the others. The Union, by which is meant the bringing together of the three pairs, has produced the collision between Antonio and Shylock, which then returns and dissolves it, for this Union cannot consistently destroy the one who brought it about. Hence the second step, the Separation, results necessarily from the first. But the parties must overcome this diremption, for they are rationally united, and the collision itself must be mediated; hence the obstacles are removed, and there follows the third stage of the movement, namely, the Return. This when completed is the same as the first Union, but with the collision which was involved in it harmonized. Here the play must end; no further action is possible. Or, to take more abstract terms, we may express these three stages as Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis. That this movement is a type of the movement of Reason itself, needs not to be told to the Thinker. Every spiritual process involves the same moments, and a work of Art as the child of imaginative Reason must bear the image of the parent.

## BOOK NOTICES.

*Concord Days.* By A. Bronson Alcott. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1872.

There are two sides or phases to the "Practical." The practical includes what is instrumental, subsidiary—a means to an end. This, so far as man is concerned, has relation first to his bodily wants: food, clothing, and shelter—to their satisfaction and supply; secondly, the ministration toward his spiritual wants which crave culture, or the ascent above individual limitations, and the realization of the generic ideal of humanity or Mind. In other words, the practical endeavor of Man must neutralize his immediate and slavish dependence on Nature (relieve him from the sensuous inportunity of hunger, heat and cold, external intrusion), and it must enable him to realize in himself as particular individual the universal, or the consciousness of his entire species—the human race.

The first phase of the Practical looks to providing the means for the sustenance of the body; the body is, however, an instrument for the soul, or for the purposes of conscious being. Hence this phase looks to the creation of an instrument *for* an instrument—thus a double mediation.

The second phase of the Practical is ministrative directly to the final end, the Consciousness of Man. Subtract consciousness, and the possibility of the practical altogether vanishes. There must be a conscious adaptation in any one or all of its phases. A complete and entire consciousness of it—a comprehension of its entire scope—may be found, however, in few people. This necessary knowledge commonly takes on a partially unconscious form, the form of *conviction*, or religious faith. The individual looking out upon the world of instrumentalities, the infinite complex of mediations, is unable to trace it through to the end, and therefore borrows from the SEER his insight in the form of a Divine Revelation, and by its light believes that he possesses a personality which is absolute end and beyond all subservience to mere outward uses.

The Practical as regards provision for bodily wants has an incidental higher use. It is not simply for the neutralization of the physical pangs and inconvenience—the rendering of the same a nullity—that the bulk of human endeavor goes to the supply of the body. If all this were merely to still the Cerberian dog, the economy of Providence might be doubted. In stilling the clamor of the body, man is obliged to resort to social and political combination. The division of labor in Civil Society, the institution of the Family and the State,—all these are initiated to relieve man from the degrading slavery to bodily sensation. But only "initiated" for these institutions, all serve directly a spiritual end; when Spirit can provide for the body incidentally while providing in the most direct way for the Soul, then it has achieved freedom, for the External no longer sways or swerves.

In these great institutions—Family, Society, and the State—mankind arrives at the necessary conditions of spiritual combination. These it would organize therefore as mere forms, were there no material need to goad it

on—provided, once for all, that mankind had achieved rational insight into the means and demands of culture. But as the consciousness of the Race develops in Time, and is a *historical* existence and not an Absolute one, it follows that the bodily necessities with their pricking pangs are useful as initiatives,—nay, even necessary. Here the divine Providence is manifest: Nature urges herself to complete introversion, and the “breath of Life” is compelled to sustain itself by contest with the clay dwelling in which it finds itself. In satisfying the physical, the spiritual is excited to activity, and gradually gains ascendance and independence. The “mask of life” and the subjection of the Spiritual to material ends is seen to be only *Maya*—a mere delusion of the senses. All this servitude and slavery has been only for self-knowledge, and for the freedom of the self from the self—the realization of the Universal in the Particular. In Jordan’s beautiful version of the “*Sigfridsage*,” the spiritual lineaments of that old Northern-Mythologic presentation of this greatest Fact of Existence are thus portrayed:\*

“Und hinunter in’s Nachtreich der nichtigen Schatten  
 Versank von der Seele Brunhildens der Selbstschein,  
 Die qualvolle Lüge der Larve des Lebens,  
 Der Traum des Tropfens der sich getrennt hat  
 Vom ewigen Urquell: er sei nur was Eignes,  
 Er könne sich mehren ohne zu mindern,  
 Er könne zerstören ohne zu sterben  
 Mordern und martern, ohne Mitpein,  
 Er dürfe verdammend in heillosem Dünkel  
 Zum übrigen Dasein “Du” nur sagen,  
 Ohne dass ächzend die Antwort laute:  
     ch, das Urall, bin In dir wie Aussen;  
 Unheil üben ist eigenes Elend  
 Und wo du folterst da musst du fühlend  
 Die Bosheit büssen; den Alles BIST du.”

The blind Samson grinds in the mill, not for others but for himself; the imprisonment in sensuous being must be broken by pain and stern renunciation. When it is done, down falls that lying torment, the Mask of Life

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\* In Mr. Davidson’s translation:

“And down to the night-realm of shadowy nothings  
 Sank the seeming of self from the soul of Brunhilde,  
 The martyring lie of the mask of living,  
 The dream of the drop that hath withdrawn it  
 From the primal source, as itself were something,  
 Weening to wax, while nothing waneth;  
 To rend asunder and yet not suffer;  
 To doom to perdition, secure of dying;  
 To murder and mangle and not be maimed;  
 With daunting conceit and self-assertion,  
 To say *Thou*, in addressing the rest of Existence,  
 Nor hear the answer, in agony echoed:—  
 ‘I, the prime All, am within as without thee;  
 Who worketh woe, to himself doth work it.  
 Attempt to torture, thou shalt in atonement  
 Ache for thine evil, for thou *art* all things.’”

(*die qualvolle Lüge der Larve des Lebens*), and the soul looks through the interval upon the unveiled Eternal Verities. The Universal, the Absolute, God, is the root of this Ego which I call myself, and when I free myself from the glare of the senses (which cause selfishness in place of self-consciousness) I shall live and have my being in the presence of this great fact.

"Before I was a Me, in God then was I God,  
As soon as I shall die I shall again be God,"

says Angelus Silesius. And Fichte, in a sonnet, says (in Seeley's translation):

"The Eternal One  
Lives in my life and sees in my beholding.  
Nought is but God, and God is nought but Life.  
Clearly the veil of things rises before thee.  
IT IS THYSELF! What though the *Mortal* die?  
And hence there lives but God in thine endeavors,  
If thou wilt look through that which lives beyond this death  
The veil of things shall seem to thee as veil,  
And unveiled thou shalt look upon the Life divine."

But there is a possibility of undervaluing that portion of our life which is called *secular* to distinguish it from the direct, conscious seeking of the Divine. As already stated, the whole realm of the Secular—the Family, Society, and the State—is also directly tributary to the divine life of Man.

It is not a mere instrumentality for the purpose of silencing the beast of the body, but rather is it the propædæutics of human combination and communication wherein spiritual life becomes a reality, a fixed fact. The division of labor and exchange of productions are the apparent ends of industry, but the cunning of Spirit uses them merely as means for the circulation of ideas. The real Practical result is the addition to consciousness of new foreign material—the appropriation of points of view that were alien to it. By solving (spiritually digesting) the contradiction between its own ideas and those of the new people with whom it comes in contact, it rises to more universal and truer ideas. The contrast between this commerce and the material commerce is to be marked. In material commerce the goods are to be consumed and rendered null; in the commerce of ideas, both parties gain, and neither lose anything.

By this discussion we have only sought the stand-point of the Idealist. Whether he be the mystic, the religious man, or the speculative philosopher, he regards the world as a "fleeting show," considered by itself, and the great fact of the Universe to be the Immanence of Spirit, of the Divine Person. In this he is not necessarily "impractical," but is quite likely to be intensely the contrary.

Mr. Alcott, the author of "Concord Days," is widely known as one of the most uncompromising idealists in our time, or in all time. His early acceptance of the doctrine of "The Lapse" nearly as Plotinus taught it, together with his remarkable original statements of it, make him noteworthy in the history of modern thought. A brief discussion will make this apparent.

MR. A. B. ALCOTT'S APERÇU, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES AND RELATIONS TO OTHER SYSTEMS.

## I.

Mr. Alcott's first principle is Person—or the absolute self-reflection—that which knows itself purely.

Hence it is a speculative stand-point. All stand-points are material which posit at the basis a fixed or rigid substance, a realized multiplicity, whether the same be called simply matter, force, law, form, cause, essence, ideas, or archetypes, &c., &c.; while, on the other hand, all stand-points are speculative which posit a self-moving, self-making pure act at the basis, whether they call it God, Person, or Idea, its proper names, or any of the other terms mentioned.

A demonstration that Person or Idea is the Absolute Principle, and that nothing else can be, would run somewhat as follows:

*a.* Being is either dependent or independent: if the latter, it is by itself; and if the former, it exists in another which *is* independent.

*b.* Actual Being is either determined through itself or another: if the latter, it is finite, not self-contained, not a totality; if the former, it is self-contained and infinite.

*c.* Hence all being is self-determined and independent, or else exists in and through a self-determined and independent.

*d.* That which is self-determined or self-made is not subordinate to Time and Space, but generates them in its own process; for if it were subordinate to Time and Space, it would be externally determined, and thus a dependent somewhat.

*e.* This self-determined Being is what we name God, Spirit, or Idea (in the sense of person).

*Remarks.*—In this proof we have taken the reflective method: a very deficient form, because we are forced to jump from one beginning to another. We have an insight into the true stand-points at first, and then construct a bridge to get to them. The genetic or dialectic method, on the other hand, unfolds the progress of discovery as well as its grounds. The method used above is similar to the mathematical method. It jumps across the river to get a plank to make a bridge with. Of course, itself does not need a bridge; it kindly makes one for others.

But the genetic method gives the wings with which the discoverer flew across the chasm. All these strictures on the method employed here will become evident on looking at the beginning, which is gratuitously assumed without explaining why it is done.

In the Geometric demonstration I draw this construction and that, but give no explanation of the why. Thus it is an external procedure when contrasted with the dialectic method.

Thus one may have a speculative stand-point and not a speculative procedure. It may be without any procedure, a mere positing of the various degrees of the finite; or these degrees may have the reflective nexus exemplified. Or, finally, the dialectic may be given, and in this case the whole system is speculative. This prepares us for a view of the second stage in Mr. Alcott's Philosophy—

THE DESCENT (*Absfall*) OR LAPSE OF THE SOUL, AS PRESENTED BY MR. ALCOTT.

II.

a. The first Principle, or God, is a Person—a self-determining, or creative, self-dirempting, or self-dissecting.

b. He creates that which is most like Himself—hence self-determined or creative beings. They differ from the Absolute Person only in degree; they are pure souls.

c. These pure souls may lapse or may not. They have the possibility of lapse, since they are free.

d. Those that lapse create thereby bodies for themselves; and, lapsing still further, generate the lower animals; and, these continuing the lapse, beget the plant-world; and thence results the inorganic world.

e. The limit to the lapse is the atom [i.e. complete self-externality, or space, or chaos].

*This Scheme has the following advantages as a view of the world:*

A. (a) It recognizes Person as the only substantial, and all else as dependent thereon. This is the opposite of the materialistic scheme.

(b) It places next to the Person, as the substance, that which is most like it, as being the most substantial; that which is least personal, is least substantial and most dependent, hence is placed last as depending on the dependent.

B. It represents all creation as through thought.

(a) The total thought of God thinks the total, and thus Himself as His own object, or Pure Spirit.

It is only finite thinking, i.e. an act of thought, which seizes only one moment of the totality, that creates an imperfect being. The finite thought thinks a part or phase as though it were a totality, and thus takes it out of its truth; hence arises untruth. In this sense, the theory of the finite resting on *lapse* is deepest truth.

(b) It implies that thinking creates its thought (the deep fundamental thought of Aristotle); hence seeing creates what it sees. The divine, harmonious, pure, unlapsed soul comprehends or seizes all in the One or Person; while the lapsed soul, in the form of sense and understanding, creates spectres, i.e. gives validity to abstractions, and thus cannot cancel them and arrive at their negative unity in pure thought. This leads us to the consideration of the positive value of this scheme.

III.

This order of stating the genesis is an order of rank or caste.

a. Each lower form has its explanation in the next higher or more concrete. The soul sees its moments scattered and isolated in the lower forms in such a manner that each is deficient and demands to be complemented by another.

b. When we consider the inorganic, we find strange properties—such, for example, as gravity, inertia, or light and heat; we ascend to the organic world and see what all these meant. The lower forms of the organic, such as vegetation, likewise have their explanation in the higher or animal forms,

and the animal has its explanation in man. Thus this system formally justifies itself.

According to Plotinus, "The soul appetizing is the animal. The world of vegetation is the merely reproductive soul. The world-soul is the immediate effective agency of the intellect which is its own object. The longing of the individual, special soul gives it a body; with the body it retains fancy and memory. Below it is the sense-world, and then feeling, desire, and the vegetative life."

In the Fifth Ennead, he has this order:—I. The One; II. The Intellect (dualism). The Primal Essence in its return to itself sees itself, and thus arises knowing or intellect; thus the Primal Essence is dirempted in its unity; as diremption (or intellect) it produces the lower orders.

Proclus considers the One as uncognizable in itself, and to be cognizable only as it is in its process and return. The relation of the unity to the distinctions which it produces is that of the procession from itself. He shows by a dialectic more or less external how all determinations cancel themselves and return to the One.

In these outlines it will be seen that Proclus is the student of Plato, and that Plotinus is Aristotelian in method. And, what is more surprising to preconceived notions concerning Mr. Alcott, he, like Plotinus, is rather an Aristotelian than Platonist.

Plato's highest principle is the Comprehension or genus (*ἰδέσθαι*). This is the universal particular and individual as one process, hence dialectic throughout. Plato is therefore dialectical, always moving from the Many to the One, like Proclus. His dialectic is more or less mixed with reflections, seldom pure; and his great inferiority to Aristotle is in this, that he does not enunciate so clearly the self-thinking thought to be the first Principle.

When the logical idea finds all its presuppositions, so that its moments or phases become equal to the total, we have the IDEA, in which the dialectic vanishes. There is no longer an external negative unity cancelling the moments, for each moment is its own negative unity, and thus a complete totality. Each one is in the image of the whole, and the whole thus attains extant being, so that in the sphere of the idea we have the identity of Being or immediateness and Comprehension or subjectivity. This is seized by Aristotle in its immediate or elementary phase, and hence he has the appearance of proceeding empirically; for he seizes each stage as a totality, and leaves out the dialectic—unlike Plato. The complete Philosopher should show the genesis of the Idea dialectically, but this is Plato's side. Aristotle assumes it. Plato is always demonstrating the dialectical evolution of the Idea, but leaves the work unfinished.

From this we shall be able to point out the missing links in Mr. Alcott's Philosophy. He leaves out the dialectic entirely, and hence we have no historical Comprehension, but each step is treated as a totality or an idea. When this becomes entirely insufficient, he has recourse to concrete dialectical terms, such as appear in Psychology, or even Physiology, as "appetite," "desire," &c. The starting-point, too, or the genesis whose soul is the dialectic, is rigid, and we advance by reflections or else begin anew

with each link, making a discrete degree. Now, to the mind of the oracle all this is present. The totality hovers before it, but in such an immediate form that the permanent variable cannot be seized. Hence it is that the steps are seized isolatedly, while the mediation of the same remains unconsciously in the subject and is not explicitly stated.

Of course, when the dialectic is left out the series may be inverted without any obvious impropriety. Thus in the present instance we are taught that the most perfect created beings were created first instead of last—which is the Mosaic order and that of the ordinary conception. The apparent difficulty would entirely vanish if the creation of the first pure soul were considered dialectically; for then the links would fall between the Absolute Idea and its realization as Pure Spirit as cancelled moments, and hence not as real evil. As all these intermediate links would have their explanation and *raison d'être* in the Final Cause or perfect spirit, the predicate evil or good could not be applied to them, and hence the obstacle which Plotinus sought to remove (the *real* existence of evil as a creation of the Absolute) is shown to have no absolute existence, but only a relative one to finite consciousness (the reflective understanding). This, perhaps we have reason to believe it, is the true view of those who explain creation through the lapse. They cling to that form of stating it in order to emphasize the hierarchy of Spirit and the dependence of destiny upon Choice, or the freedom of the Will.

In the "Concord Days" we have the art-form of a Diary, the extracts running through the months from April to September inclusive. A second volume, we are told, will continue through the remaining months. It presents us the picture of a literary artist looking over and arranging his choice hours of the day, eliminating from the record of life its petty collisions, and, vintner-like, giving us the expressed serenity and wisdom.

Think of intercourse with one whose life is in intimate communion with the wisest and best of the race. Familiar with Plato, Pythagoras, Boehme, More, Glanvil, Coleridge, and the rapt mystics of all time, he moves about in the atmosphere of the *Paradiso*. It is the atmosphere of Aspiration and Prayer, like that of a Gothic cathedral; of serenity and purity, like that of a Greek temple. One reads books of Correspondence and Diaries chiefly for the society into which they admit him. The more elevated the tone of exposition and of the characters portrayed, the subtler the penetration of its cultivating influences. The Dialogues of Plato and the Lives of Plutarch have accomplished a wonderful work in this respect.

We have in the volume before us the poetry of private life—its universal aspects portrayed. The looseness of form permits private reflections, choice bits of quotation, scenery-painting, personal biography, disquisitions on politics and social science, neighborhood gossip, correspondence, poems from favorite authors, essays on the genius of present and past literary men, and mystic glances into the profounder realms of philosophic speculation. This freedom of form justifies much that in an ordinary book would be considered one-sided, as for example what is said of Carlyle and Goethe.



*The Basic Outline of Universology: An Introduction to the newly-discovered Science of the Universe; its Elementary Principles; and the first stages of their development in the Special Sciences. Together with Preliminary Notices of Abwato, the newly-discovered Scientific Universal Language, resulting from the Principles of Universology.* By Stephen Pearl Andrews. New York: Dion Thomas. 1872. Pages cxix and 764. Price, \$5.

*Contents:* Introduction; Notices to the Reader; Vocabulary. Chapter I.—General Statement and Distribution of the Subject; Classification of the whole field of Human Knowledge. Chapter II.—Definitions and Illustrations of *Analogy* and *Correspondence*; General Statement of the Evolution of Thought, hitherto; Principles of Organization and Evolution. Chapter III.—*Analogy* more accurately Defined; Scientific Analogy as the Basis of Universology; the three Fundamental Laws of Universal Science, *Unism*, *Duism*, and *Trinism*, stated, illustrated, and defined. Chapter IV.—*Number*; its Universal Aspects; of the Various Numerical Series, and of the Meanings of Numbers; Introductory Treatment of the Analogues of Form; Parallel Distribution and Tabulation of the total scientific domain and of the several systems and departments of Philosophy; the Great Crisis; Suggestive Programme of Human Destiny. Chapter V.—*Form*; the Science of Pure and Abstract Morphology; and its Relations to Universology, with diagrammatic Illustrations; Points, Lines, Surfaces, and Solids, with their Symbolism or Correspondential Signification. Chapter VI.—Morphology and Universology (continued); their Relations to Human Destiny; the *Grand Reconciliation* of all Intellectual Conceptions, and the Prospective Harmony of the Organic Social Life of Man. Digested Index.

*Creator and Creation; or, The Knowledge in the Reason of God and His Work.* By Laurens P. Hickok, D.D., LL.D. Boston: Lee & Shepard, Publishers. New York: Lee, Shepard & Dillingham. 1872.

Dr. Hickok is widely known in this country and abroad as one of the pioneers of Philosophy in America. He is a veteran in the service, and one may easily ascertain the importance of his labors by visiting our Educational institutions here in the West, and conversing with those teachers and professors who have to deal with Psychology or any other form of Philosophy. He will find that, in proportion to the depth and originality of the views presented for his consideration, a ready acknowledgment of obligation to the writings of Dr. Hickok will be confessed.

Among those whose profound study of Kant enabled them to come before the world with a new version of Philosophy founded on the Critical system, Dr. Hickok stands in the foremost rank. Such as Hamilton, Balmes, Cousin, indeed, have failed in attaining so positive a grasp of the categories of pure thought as our author.

His merit lies primarily in seizing the Kantian criterion of *a priori* ideas—universality and necessity—and in holding this firmly and confidently. In discriminating carefully between ideas and opinions, by means of this criterion the speculative philosopher will find his first task. The moral philosopher, likewise, will find no other foundation for his science.

The increasing influence of Positivism and the various materialistic schools of thought may be considered the occasion of the present book, and

its welcome will be cordial among those who have experienced the vicious circle described in the preface thus:

"An assumed Revelation may be studied and its facts arranged with much learning; but when a profound skepticism meets us, and drives us back of the facts, and asks for the validity of prophecy, and miracles, and inspiration; and even for the being of a God who can foreknow, and work miracles, and inspire human messengers,—we are thrown directly back upon these old assumptions of Nature's connections. No sense-experience puts within the consciousness anything by which Logic alone can enable us to know that which beyond Nature supports and connects Nature; and thus the logical understanding is driven helplessly to swing on the circle, of taking the Bible's God to make and hold together Nature, and then to take Nature's God to make and reveal the facts of the Bible."

Among the admirable things in this book will be found the able treatment of Positivism and the solution of the Darwinian problem. Aristotle, indeed, when he set up the doctrine of Final Cause as the ultimate explanation of all Natural phenomena, knew the last word on Natural Selection as a philosophic theory. "Not sex instinct, but the Absolute Ideal, determines the higher unity of all species," says our author.

In his attempt at a speculative construction of Nature, his chapters on Antagonist force, Diremptive force, and Revolving force; on Life, Sense, and Reason,—are profound and suggestive, resting as they do upon a chapter devoted to Space and Time—a chapter that Kant himself might have written. But we must mention the descriptive sketch of the historical development of Critical Philosophy, which he divides into three stages or epochs:—1st, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; 2d, Fichte's Science of Knowledge; 3d, Hegel's Science of Logic. To the latter he concedes: "That it is the entire compass of all knowledge, so far as the *subjective process* of knowing is concerned. The most searching criticism will find scarcely anything, perhaps utterly nothing, to object to it as a process complete of the science of *Thinking*." When the question is asked, "What is this worth intrinsically, as philosophy of *knowing overt realities*?" we think some other predicate than "worthless" will be given if one remembers that all this is but the genetic unfolding of the Universal and Necessary, which is equally objective and subjective, inasmuch as it furnishes not only the forms of pure thought but the logical conditions of all phenomena. As the *à priori* science of Mathematics gives us the means of cognizing matter and motion, so the *à priori* system of pure thought gives us the ideas through which to interpret human history, science, and institutions; and *also* natural phenomena and the empirical sciences. The recognition of pure thought as embodied and realized in the world of man and matter is Hegel's chief work, and throughout its entire extent empirical results are taken as the raw material. On page 128-9, it is difficult to agree with Dr. Hickok when he seems (contrary to the general purpose of his book) to teach that God's Absolute thought is not solid enough for the real world; i.e. that Creation is not God's thought; or that the Absolute thinking-process is confined to a subjective time and space which cannot be the time and space of human, conscious experience. Not only Hegelians, but the followers of Malbranche and Berkeley—indeed the whole race of Platonists and Aristotelians—must enter protest against that.









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